European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism. Vol. 2: The 2014 European Election and New Anti-European Forces in Southern, Northern and Eastern Europe 9783515114554

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European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism II The 2014 European Election and New Anti-European Forces in Southern, Northern and Eastern Europe Edited by Patrick Moreau and Birte Wassenberg

SGEI – SHEI – EHIE

EI SGEI HEI SHEI HIE EHIE Geschichte

Franz Steiner Verlag

European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism II Edited by Patrick Moreau and Birte Wassenberg

Studien zur Geschichte der Europäischen Integration (SGEI) Études sur l’Histoire de l’Intégration Européenne (EHIE) Studies on the History of European Integration (SHEI) Band / Volume 28 Herausgegeben von / Edited by / Dirigé par Jürgen Elvert In Verbindung mit / In cooperation with / En coopération avec Charles Barthel / Jan-Willem Brouwer / Eric Bussière / Antonio Costa Pinto / Desmond Dinan / Michel Dumoulin / Michael Gehler / Brian Girvin / Wolf D. Gruner / Wolfram Kaiser / Laura Kolbe / Johnny Laursen / Wilfried Loth / Piers Ludlow / Maria Grazia Melchionni / Enrique Moradiellos Garcia / Sylvain Schirmann / Antonio Varsori / Tatiana Zonova

European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism II The 2014 European Election and New Anti-European Forces in Southern, Northern and Eastern Europe

Edited by Patrick Moreau and Birte Wassenberg

Franz Steiner Verlag

Umschlagabbildung: © Aurélie Kraft Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek: Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über abrufbar. Dieses Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig und strafbar. © Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2016 Druck: Bosch Druck, Ergolding Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. Printed in Germany. ISBN 978-3-515-11455-4 (Print) ISBN 978-3-515-11456-1 (E-Book)

Table of Contents / Table des matières / Inhaltsverzeichnis PATRICK MOREAU Acknowledgements / Remerciements / Danksagung ......................................

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BIRTE WASSENBERG Introduction / Introduction / Einleitung ............................................................

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PART 1: EUROSCEPTICISM AND ANTI-EUROPEANISM IN THE SOUTHERN EU MEMBER STATES / EUROCEPTICISME ET ANTIEUROPÉISME DANS LES ÉTATS MEMBRES DE L’UE AU SUD / EUROSKEPTIZISMUS UND ANTI-EUROPÄISMUS IN DEN SÜDLICHEN EU-MITGLIEDSTAATEN ANTONIO ELORZA Podemos: The Road to Power ...............................................................................

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IANNIS KONSTANTINIDIS Anti-Europeanism on the Rise: The Case of Greece ...........................................

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ANDREAS STERGIOU Euroscepticism in Cyprus ......................................................................................

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ALICE CUNHA

The 2014 European Parliament Elections in Portugal and the Lost Cause of Anti-Europeansim ...................................................................................................

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PART 2: THE 1995 EU-ACCESSION STATES: BETWEEN TRADITIONAL NORDIC EUROSCEPTICISM AND NEW ANTI-EUROPEANISM / LES ÉTATS DE L’ÉLARGISSEMENT DE L’UE EN 1995 : ENTRE EUROSCEPTICISME TRADITIONNEL NORDIQUE ET NOUVEL ANTIEUROPÉISME / DIE EU-ERWEITERUNGSSTAATEN 1995: ZWISCHEN TRADITIONNELLEM NORDISCHEN EUROSKEPTIZISMUS UND NEUEM ANTI-EUROPÄISMUS SVANTE ERSSON The 2014 European Election in Sweden and Euroscepticism ...........................

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DAVID ARTER The Case of the Eurosceptic Tail Wagging the Dog? The 2014 European Parliament Election in Finland ..............................................................................

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PATRICK MOREAU The FPÖ: A Winner Party? The 2014 Elections to the European Parliament Compared with the 2013 Legislative Elections ...................................................

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TABLE DES MATIERES – INHALTSVERZEICHNIS – TABLE

OF CONTENTS

PART 3: ANTI-EUROPEAN FORCES IN CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE AND IN THE BALTIC STATES / LES FORCES ANTI-EUROPÉENNES EN EUROPE CENTRAL-ORIENTALE ET DANS LES ETATS BALTES / ANTI-EUROPÄISCHE KRÄFTE MITTEL-OST-EUROPA UND IN DEN BALTIKSTAATEN PETR KANIOK Eurosceptics we Remain? Czech Republic, Euroscepticism and the 2014 EP Election .....................................................................................................................

147

PETER SPÁČ Anti-Europeanism and Euroscepticism in Slovakia ...........................................

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PÉTER CSINGÁR Der parteipolitische Euroskeptizismus der Gegenwart und der letzten Jahre in Ungern ..................................................................................................................

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TOOMAS ALATALU Estonia: Party-Based EU Loyalty, Our-Guy-In-EP-Based Euroscepticism and the Russian’s Attitude still Unclear ..............................................................

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JURIS ROZENVALDS Russian-speakers in Latvia: Between Brussels, Riga and Moscow ..................

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ANNEXES / ANHÄNGE / APPENDICES LES AUTEURS / DIE AUTOREN / AUTHORS ...........................................................

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CONCERNANT LA SÉRIE « ÉTUDES SUR L’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE »

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ZUR REIHE „STUDIEN DER GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION“ ....

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ABOUT THE SERIES “STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION” ...

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS PATRICK MOREAU The economic crises of 2008 – 2009, the tensions concerning the Euro, the Greek question and the refugee problem have fueled a strong “Eurosceptic” movement. This vague term hides complex political and social realities as well as an extreme variety of political discourse and practice. At the 2009 European elections and at the national elections between 2009 and 2014, the rise of Eurosceptic forces could be observed in virtually all political systems of the member states of the European Union. Besides the traditional classification as “hard” or “soft” anti-European groupings, within the political, numerous actors can be found who are ideologically both on the left and on the right, extremist or not. Sometimes, for example in Italy, they cannot be assigned to a category at all. This variety was a challenge for the analysis. Does the discourse of Eurosceptic parties of the conservative camp, for example, from Poland or Great Britain, differ from that of national-populist formations from the Nordic countries, France or Austria? Is the anti-European agitation of the Greek or Cypriot extreme right hardliners similar to that of regionalist parties like the Northern League or Vlaams Belang? Can we equate the anti-Europeanism of the Greek and Czech Communists and the alter-Europeanism of post-Communist parties with the positions of “parties of disruption” like the Five Star Movement in Italy or Podemos in Spain? Besides the analysis of the organizations and parties as well as the chronology of their progress and defeats, we had to evaluate the discourses and the voters. What reasons prompt anti-European voters: rejection of immigration, xenophobia, fear of the future, of the loss of the achievements of the past, or acculturation, nationalism, falling back to regionalism and “Heimat”, and the rejection of capitalism and globalization? Or is it the collective disappointment about the incapacity of the European elites to promote their values and communicate with the majority of voters? We tried to respond to all these questions. The immensity of the project required the participation of scientist from the whole of Europe who had already addressed this issue in their research before. Three partners helped us realize several phases of our research project and have supported us this time, too. We greatly appreciate this. The first to be mentioned are the University of Strasbourg and the Centre de la Recherche Scientifique. The have co-financed the excellence project IDEX “The European Integration and the New anti-Europeanism” of the UMR Dynamiques européennes. The support of the scientific and administrative directions of the University and the CNRS was a key factor of success of our work. And finally, we want to express our deep gratitude to the Airbus Group. With a significant financial contribution, it has funded our research and will continue to do so. It is too early to take stock of our activities because they shall continue until the end of 2017. Still, first results are already available.Three international confer-

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ences were held, two books were already published, another volume is currently in production, and a fourth one is being prepared1. There, the University of Strasbourg, the CNRS and the Airbus Group support our efforts to understand the present crisis of the European integration. We hope that this way, we shall be able to contribute to the re-foundation and re-vitalization of this great collective project.

REMERCIEMENTS Les crises économiques de 2008-2009, les tensions autour de l´Euro, la question grecque comme celle des réfugiés sont venus nourrir un puissant courant « eurosceptique ». Derrière ce terme vague se cachent des réalités politiques et sociales complexes et une extrême variété de discours et de pratiques politiques. A l´occasion de l´élection européenne de 2009, mais aussi dans la quasi-totalité des systèmes politiques des pays membres de la Communauté européenne, on a pu observer à l´occasion des élections nationales de la période 2009 – 2014, la montée en puissance des forces eurosceptiques. Par-delà la classification traditionnelle entre les formations anti-européaniste « dures » et « molles », on découvre dans les systèmes politiques de nombreux acteurs idéologiquement situés tant à gauche qu´à droite, extrémistes ou non, mais aussi parfois « hors normes » comme dans le cas italien. Cette variété était un défi pour l´analyse. Les partis eurosceptiques du champ conservateur en Pologne ou en Grande Bretagne par exemple tiennent t´ils un autre discours que celui des formations nationales-populistes des pays nordiques, de France ou d´Autriche ? L´agitation anti-européenne de l´extrêmedroite dure du type grec ou chypriote ressemble-t-elle à celle des partis régionalistes comme la Ligue du Nord ou le Vlaams Belang ? L´hostilité à l´Europe des communistes grecs ou tchèques, l´alter-européisme des partis post-communistes est-elle à mettre sur le même plan que les positions des partis de rupture comme le mouvement Cinq Étoiles en Italie ou Podemos en Espagne ? Au-delà de l´analyse des organisations et des partis, de la chronologie de leurs montées en puissance ou de leurs échecs, il nous est apparu nécessaire de nous pencher sur les discours et les électeurs. Quelles sont les motivations de ces votes anti-européens : rejet de l´immigration, xénophobie, peur de l´avenir, de la perte des acquis du passé ou l´acculturation, nationalisme, replis sur le régionalisme et l´Heimat, hostilité au capitalisme et la globalisation ? Ou peut-être une déception collective devant l´incapacité des élites européennes à faire connaitre leurs valeurs et à communiquer avec le gros des électeurs ? Autant d´interrogations auxquelles nous avons souhaité répondre. 1

Les publications effectuées, Bereits erschienen, Already available : Stéphane COURTOIS, Patrick MOREAU, Communisme 2014, En Europe. L´éternel retour des communistes 1989 – 2014, Paris, Éd. Vendémiaire, 2014 ; Ibid, Communisme 2015, La guerre des mémoires, Paris, Éd. Vendémiaire, 2015. En cours d´édition, in Vorbereitung, in production : Martial LIBERA, Sylvain SCHIRMANN et Birte WASSENBERG, Abstentionnisme, euroscepticisme et anti-européisme dans les élections européennes de 1979 nos jours, Steiner Verlag, 2016 ; Patrick MOREAU, Birte WASSENBERG, Perceptions of « external » states on European Integration. Between Europeanism, Euro-scepticism and alterEuropeanism, Steiner Verlag, 2016.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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L´immensité du projet impliquait une mobilisation de scientifiques venus de l´ensemble de l´Europe et ayant dans le cadre de leurs recherches abordé cette question. Trois partenaires nous ont aidé à réaliser plusieurs étapes de la recherche et soutiendront la poursuite de cette dernière, ce dont nous les remercions vivement. Tout d´abord, l´Université de Strasbourg et le Centre de la Recherche Scientifique qui ont cofinancé le projet d´excellence IDEX « L’intégration européenne et le nouvel anti-européisme » de l’UMR Dynamiques européennes. L´appuis des directions scientifiques et des administrations de l´Université et du CNRS a été une des clés de nos avancées. Enfin, toute notre reconnaissance va au Groupe Airbus, qui a lui aussi largement contribué financièrement à notre recherche et soutient à l´avenir notre travail. Il est encore trop tôt pour faire le bilan de nos activités qui se poursuivront jusqu´en fin 2017. Mais on peut cependant évoquer les premiers acquis. Trois colloques internationaux ont été tenus, deux livres ont déjà été publiés, un ouvrage est en cours d´édition et un quatrième en préparation2. Là encore, l´université de Strasbourg, le CNRS et le Groupe Airbus nous accompagnent dans notre travail qui vise à comprendre la crise que connait l´intégration européenne, ceci afin – et nous l´espérons – de pouvoir contribuer à la refondation – et à la revitalisation de ce grand projet collectif.

DANKSAGUNG Die Wirtschaftskrisen von 2008 und 2009, die Spannungen um den Euro, die griechische Frage und das Flüchtlingsproblem haben eine starke „euroskeptische“ Bewegung erwachsen lassen. Hinter diesem unscharfen Begriff verbergen sich komplexe politische und soziale Realitäten und eine extreme Vielfalt von politischen Diskursen und Handlungsweisen. Bei den Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament von 2009, aber auch bei den nationalen Wahlen zwischen 2009 und 2014 war in praktisch allen politischen Systemen der Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen Union das Erstarken euroskeptischer Kräfte zu beobachten. Neben der traditionellen Unterscheidung zwischen „harten“ und „weichen“ antieuropäischen Gruppierungen finden sich in den politischen Systemen zahlreiche Akteure, die ideologisch sowohl links als auch rechts stehen, extremistisch sind oder auch nicht und manchmal, z.B. in Italien, auch keiner Kategorie zugeordnet werden können. Diese Vielfalt war eine Herausforderung für die Analyse. Ist der Diskurs der euroskeptischen Parteien des konservativen Spektrums, etwa aus Polen oder 2

Les publications effectuées, Bereits erschienen, Already available : Stéphane COURTOIS, Patrick MOREAU, Communisme 2014, En Europe. L´éternel retour des communistes 1989 – 2014, Paris, Éd. Vendémiaire, 2014 ; Ibid, Communisme 2015, La guerre des mémoires, Paris, Éd. Vendémiaire, 2015. En cours d´édition, in Vorbereitung, in production : Martial LIBERA, Sylvain SCHIRMANN et Birte WASSENBERG, Abstentionnisme, euroscepticisme et anti-européisme dans les élections européennes de 1979 nos jours, Steiner Verlag, 2016 ; Patrick MOREAU, Birte WASSENBERG, Perceptions of « external » states on European Integration. Between Europeanism, Euro-scepticism and alterEuropeanism, Steiner Verlag, 2016.

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Großbritannien, ein anderer als derjenige der nationalpopulistischen Gruppierungen aus den nordischen Ländern, Frankreich oder Österreich? Ähnelt die antieuropäische Agitation der griechischen oder zypriotischen harten Rechtsextremen derjenigen der regionalistischen Parteien wie Lega Nord oder Vlaams Belang? Können die Europafeindlichkeit der griechischen oder tschechischen Kommunisten und der Altereuropäanismus der postkommunistischen Parteien gleichgesetzt werden mit den Positionen von „Umbruchparteien“ wie der FünfSterne-Bewegung in Italien oder Podemos in Spanien? Neben der Analyse der Organisationen und Parteien sowie der Chronologie ihres Erstarkens und ihrer Niederlagen, war es unerlässlich, uns mit den Diskursen und den Wählern zu befassen. Welches sind die Motive der europafeindlichen Wähler: Ablehnung der Zuwanderung, Xenophobie, Angst vor der Zukunft, vor dem Verlust der Errungenschaften der Vergangenheit, oder Akkulturation, Nationalismus, Rückzug auf den Regionalismus und die Heimat, die Ablehnung des Kapitalismus und der Globalisierung? Oder handelt es sich um die kollektive Enttäuschung über die Unfähigkeit der europäischen Eliten, ihre Werte zu vermitteln und mit der Mehrzahl der Wähler zu kommunizieren? Wir haben versucht, all diese Fragen zu beantworten. Der immense Umfang des Projekts erforderte die Beteiligung von Wissenschaftlern aus ganz Europa, die sich in ihren Forschungen bereits mit dieser Fragestellung befassten. Drei Partner unterstützten uns bei der Umsetzung mehrerer Abschnitte unseres Forschungsprojektes und taten dies auch dieses Mal. Dafür danken wir Ihnen herzlich. An erster Stelle sind die Universität Straßburg und das Centre de la Recherche Scientifique zu nennen. Sie haben das Exzellenzprojekt IDEX „Die europäische Integration und der neue Antieuropäanismus“ des UMR Dynamiques européennes kofinanziert. Die Unterstützung der wissenschaftlichen und administrativen Leitung der Universität und des CNRS waren einer der Schlüssel zum Erfolg unserer Arbeit. Und schließlich sind wir der Airbus Gruppe zu tiefstem Dank verpflichtet. Sie hat mit ihrer großzügigen finanziellen Unterstützung unsere Forschung gefördert und wird auch künftig unsere Arbeit unterstützen. Es ist zu früh für eine Bilanz, da unser Projekt bis Ende 2017 fortgesetzt wird. Dennoch können wir bereits erste Ergebnisse vorweisen. Drei internationale Konferenzen fanden statt, zwei Bücher sind bereits erschienen, ein weiterer Band ist derzeit im Druck, ein vierter in Vorbereitung3. Auch hierbei unterstützen die Universität Straßburg, der CNRS und die Airbus Gruppe unsere Arbeit. Wir wollen die derzeitige Krise der europäischen Integration verstehen, um so hoffentlich einen Beitrag zur Erneuerung und Wiederbelebung dieses großen Gemeinschaftsprojektes leisten zu können.

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Les publications effectuées, Bereits erschienen, Already available : Stéphane COURTOIS, Patrick MOREAU, Communisme 2014, En Europe. L´éternel retour des communistes 1989 – 2014, Paris, Éd. Vendémiaire, 2014 ; Ibid, Communisme 2015, La guerre des mémoires, Paris, Éd. Vendémiaire, 2015. En cours d´édition, in Vorbereitung, in production : Martial LIBERA, Sylvain SCHIRMANN et Birte WASSENBERG, Abstentionnisme, euroscepticisme et anti-européisme dans les élections européennes de 1979 nos jours, Steiner Verlag, 2016 ; Patrick MOREAU, Birte WASSENBERG, Perceptions of „external“ states on European Integration. Between Europeanism, Euro-scepticism and alterEuropeanism, Steiner Verlag, 2016.

INTRODUCTION BIRTE WASSENBERG Since the 2004 enlargement towards the East, the European Union (EU) has been afflicted by severe internal and external consecutive crises. The rejection of the draft of the EU constitution by the negative referenda of the Dutch and French population abruptly stopped the euphoria that had accompanied the process of European integration. 1 The rescue bid of the so-called “simplified” Lisbon Treaty had barely re-launched the European zest in 2008 when the international economic and financial crisis de-stabilized the Euro-zone within the EU to such an extent that Greece was threatened with exclusion from the monetary union. And while the EU member states were still haggling with each other over reform packages to solve this crisis, the next one was already beginning to emerge: For years, the refugee problem had been visible at the maritime borders of Italy, Spain and Greece as well as at the Schengen border of the Channel Tunnel between Calais and Dover. In summer 2015, it escalated when Hungary blocked its external border, and the Dublin agreement was suspended. In addition, since the failed attempt at an economic agreement with Ukraine and the resulting conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2014, the EU has been fighting for the reputation of its tediously established European Neighborhood Policy. It does not come as a surprise that in this context, the breeding grounds of anti-European movements have been growing exponentially. In fact, in almost every EU member state, Eurosceptic parties clearly increased their share of the vote at the 2014 European elections.2 However, for a more detailed general or country-specific analysis, three issues ought to be considered beforehand. First, the examination of this phenomenon should not over-emphasize the current situation. Previous research of political scientists and recent findings of contemporary historians have indicated that Euroscepticism and anti-Europeanism have been widely known phenomena.3 In the 1980s, political scientists initially identified Euroscepticism as a British phenomenon entering the British political arena with Margaret Thatcher’s rejection of the European Community (EC).4 They identified two types of opposition against Europe: the rejection of the principle underlying European integration itself (hard Euroscepticism) and opposition against its realization by the EC and later by the European Union (soft

1

2 3 4

Muriel RAMBOUR, “Les oppositions à l’Europe sont-elles structurées politiquement ?” in: Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN, Birte WASSENBERG, (ed.), Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (vol. 1) : les concepts, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2010, p. 93-109. Europaparl.europa.eu (20.11.2015). Cf. Maria GAINAR, Martial LIBERA, (éd.), Contre l’Europe ? Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (vol. 2) : Acteurs institutionnels, milieux politiques et société civile, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2013. Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCERBIAK, (ed.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Oxford, 2007.

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Euroscepticism).5 Historically, Euroscepticism can be traced back much further: Opposition to Europe is as old as the idea of European integration itself.6 Contemporary historians point out that Euro-pessimism existed during the early crises of the process of European unification, for example, due to de Gaulle’s policy of the empty chair in 1965, or during the period of Euro-sclerosis in the 1970s. Numerous European projects existed even in the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s. But they failed due to the generally anti-integrationist attitude of this period.7 Secondly, it is important for the analysis of Eurosceptic and anti-European movements within the European Parliament, to study this political phenomenon within its global socio-political and societal context. Since the early 1990s at the latest, opposition against Europe has become a pan-European problem concerning large parts of the population in Europe.8 Since the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the very narrow French majority for this further step towards European integration, Euroscepticism has been on a steady rise and has in fact become a visible problem for the EU as a whole. The negative reactions at various referenda on the following European Treaty of Nice, the European Constitutional Treaty or the Lisbon Treaty demonstrate the end of the socalled “permissive consensus” on European integration, i.e., the end of the passive acceptance of this process by the European citizens.9 Reasons persistently named for the loss of this “permissive consensus” are “the lack of political legitimacy” of the European institutions10, the remoteness of the Brussels Bureaucracy, and the failure to explain the elitist construction of the European institutions to the citizens11. Thus, a part of the growing success of anti-European political parties may also result from the rise of public Euroscepticism. Thirdly, when identifying anti-European and Eurosceptic movements, we have to take into consideration, that since the 1990s, within the political spectrum, the “classic” marginal parties from the left or right wing extreme camp (neo-communist, post-communist, national-populist, and right-wing extremist groups) are no longer predominant. Instead, new anti-European parties have entered the scene (for example the Five-Star-Movement in Italy) while so-called mainstream parties (like the German Social Democrats, British Conservatives, or

5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Petr KOPECKY, Cas MUDDE, “The two sides of Euroscepticism: party positions on European integration in East Central Europe”, European Union Politics, B. 3, Nr. 3, 2002, p. 297-326. Justine LACROIX, Ramona COMAN, (éd.), Les résistances à l’Europe. Cultures nationales, idéologies et stratégies d’acteurs, Bruxelles, 2007. Marie-Thérèse BITSCH, “Préface”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (Volume 1) : les concepts, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2010. Fréderic CLAVERT, “Introduction”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 25. Léon LINDBERG, Stuart SCHEINGOLD, Europe’s would-be polity: patterns of change in the European Community, Prentice Hall, 1970. Simon LANG, “Kein Integrationsfortschritt ohne Kritik. Die Funktion Europakritischer Positionen für die Weiterentwicklung der europäischen Integration”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 61-93. Eugen PFISTER, “Die Identität Europas und Europabilder in Wochenschauen nach 1945” in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 233249.

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French neo-Gaullists) also champion anti-European or Eurosceptic positions.12 For this reason, Euroscepticism and anti-Europeanism prove to be a particularly complex phenomenon which is neither homogeneous in its political expression nor evenly distributed, uniform or equally strong in all European countries. Above all, this approach requires a very sophisticated analysis proceeding by country as well as using an interdisciplinary approach. The two volumes on the 2014 European Elections: the Rise of Euroscepticism and Anti-Europeanism focus on the analysis of the electoral success of the anti-European parties in the EU member states. In the first volume, anti-Europeanism and Euroscepticism are analyzed as political phenomena and objects of interdisciplinary research. The focus is on the “traditionally” Eurosceptic Great Britain and on the sometimes very recent anti-European movements within the EC founding states (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands). In the second volume, three further groups of EU member states are studied: the Mediterranean states that – with the exception of Cyprus – acceded the EU in the 1980s (Spain, Portugal, Greece), followed by the Scandinavian states (Sweden and Finland) and Austria who had joined the EU in 1995, and finally, the states of the 2004 enlargement, i.e., the Central and Eastern European and the Baltic countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, and Latvia). The first section of the second volume of our series European Elections: the Rise of Euroscepticism and Anti-Europeanism is dedicated to the Southern EU member states. With the exception of Cyprus, they have been members since the 1980s. At the European elections, Eurosceptic parties were particularly successful in Spain and Greece. Their triumph is considered a consequence of the severe economic and financial crisis and the resulting attitude of the EU towards these states. Thus, Antonio Elorza considers Pablo Iglesias and his radical left-wing party Podemos’ May 2014 election to the European Parliament the first step of a political rise the party intends to use in order to gain domestic political power. Thus, anti-Europeanism is considered the means to the end of reaching national political goals. According to Iannis Konstantinidis, the dramatic rise of the anti-European vote in Greece is a clear sign of the Greeks’ disappointedly turning away from the EU. This “new” hard opposition against Europe is not only proven by the electoral success of anti-European parties at the 2014 Europeans, but even more so by the 2015 referendum when the Greeks rejected the agreement proposed by the European partners thus endangering Greece’s remaining an EU member. According to Andreas Stergiou’s analysis of Euroscepticism in Cyprus, the picture of the resistance against Europe is not quite so clear. The author explains that besides the two anti-European parties (the Cypriot communist party AKEL and the right-wing extremist party ELAM), there are many heterogeneous, nonpartisan Eurosceptic perceptions which can be assigned neither to the classic “hard” nor to “soft” Euroscepticism. In terms of the rising anti-Europeanism at the Europeans, Portugal can justly be called the exception among the Southern European states. Alice Cunha explains that in spite of the deep economic crisis and ensuing problems like debt 12

Maximilian MÜLLER-HÄRLIN, “Die Gegner Europas : Argumentationsmuster im politischen Diskurs”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 141-155

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and unemployment, there was no rise of hard Euroscepticism in Portugal. The 2014 electoral results of right-wing and left-wing extremist anti-European parties are comparable with those of the previous European election (2009). The Scandinavian members and Austria had joined the EU in 1995. Analyzing them in the second section of this volume, we have to differentiate between “traditional” Nordic Euroscepticism and the new anti-European movements. Svante Ersson explains how initially Eurosceptic Sweden had adopted an increasingly positive attitude towards the EU. Anti-Europeanism enjoyed something of a renaissance due to the electoral success of the populist Sweden Democrats (SD) at the 2014 Europeans. However, this party does not primarily fight the EU but especially immigration. It champions anti-European views particularly with regard to this issue. In Finland, too, no party strives for the country’s withdrawal from the EU, David Arter confirms. Mostly due to the Finish single transferable vote, Eurosceptic candidates were able to win a quarter of the votes at the 2014 European elections. In Austria, the situation is completely different, as Patrick Moreau explains in his essay. Ideologically, the FPÖ is a hard anti-European party. Its success at the 2014 Europeans is above all the result of the disappearance of all other right-wing extremist groups. This enabled the FPÖ to attract a far wider range of the Austrian electorate. Thus, opposition against Europe has become a mainstream position. This tendency has been aggravated by the economic crisis, the rise of unemployment, and immigration. The third section of this volume concentrates on the Eastern and Central European as well as the Baltic States, all of them EU members since 2004. They experience very different forms of Euroscepticism. Petr Kaniok, for example, explains that Czech Eurosceptic movements are still very weak. At the 2014 European elections, anti-European party positions had little importance. Peter Spáč’s analysis of the Slovak situation, however, shows major changes: At the end of the 1990s, all parties responded positively to European integration due to the prospect of EU-membership. In recent years, Euroscepticism has grown. Due to the disenchantment with Europe, four anti-European parties ranging from the liberal to the right-wing extremist spectrum competed successfully at the 2014 Europeans. Still, the established political parties have maintained their positive stance on the EU and are integrated into the European party structures. In Hungary, anti-Europeanism is much more pronounced. Péter Csingár demonstrates the profound changes of the Hungarian party system since the accession to the European Union in 2004. Facing the EU, national pride has grown to the extent that Euroscepticism is prevailing in almost every party. At the 2014 European election, predominantly Eurosceptic positions were advocated, even though their form and intensity differed. In the Baltic States, Euroscepticism has different origins. Toomas Alatalu explains that in Estonia, the rejection of the EU mirrors the distrust of the Estonian political elite rather than true antiEuropeanism. This also explains the electoral success of some independent Eurosceptic politicians who entered the European Parliament as protest candidates. In contrast, Juris Rozenvalds emphasizes that the younger Latvian population – including the Russian speakers – is generally pro-European. Euroscepticism is more likely fueled by the Russian language media controlled by Russia. In this

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case, the roots of Euroscepticism are rather domestic and connected with the treatment of the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia.

INTRODUCTION BIRTE WASSENBERG – PATRICK MOREAU Depuis 2004, date de son expansion à l´Est, l´Union Européenne (UE) a été ébranlée par une série successive de graves crises internes et externes. L´euphorie du processus d´intégration avait décliné à la suite du rejet de projet de constitution européenne en 2005 par les référendums des électeurs français et néerlandais. 13 L´élan européen avait à peine repris sa dynamique grâce à la tentative de sauvetage du traité de Lisbonne « simplifié » de 2008 que la crise économique et financière internationale déstabilisait largement la zone Euro au sein de l´UE et faisait que la Grèce se trouvait menacé d´exclusion de cette dernière. Alors que les Etats-membres de l´UE étaient en train de négocier entre eux le paquet de réformes devant mettre fin à cette crise, une nouvelle crise se profilait insidieusement. La question des réfugiés, qui, à l´été 2015, à la suite de la fermeture de ses frontières par la Hongrie et l´abrogation de l´accord de Dublin, se posait avec acuité, était depuis des années perceptible aux frontières maritimes de l´Italie, de la Grèce et de l´Espagne, ainsi qu´à la frontière Schengen de l´Eurotunnel entre Calais et Douvres. Il n´est pas surprenant que dans un tel contexte un terreau favorable à des mouvements anti-européens soit apparu et ait grandi en importance de manière exponentielle. De fait, les résultats des élections européennes de 2014 montrent une croissance en pourcentage des électorats des partis eurosceptiques dans la plupart des pays membres de l´UE.14 En préalable à une analyse globale plus détaillée ainsi qu´à des présentations nationales spécifiques, il nous faut prendre en compte trois dimensions. Tout d´abord, ce phénomène ne doit pas être analysé sous un angle trop marqué par l´actualité. Les recherches en sciences politiques ainsi que les nouveaux acquis des historiens contemporains montrent que l´euroscepticisme et l´anti-européanisme sont des phénomènes largement connus15. Ils identifient clairement l´euroscepticisme tout d´abord comme un phénomène britannique, qui fit son entrée dans l´arène politique britannique avec l´attitude de refus de Margaret Thatcher vis-à-vis de la Communauté Européenne (CE)16. A cette occasion, on put différencier entre deux types d´opposition à l´Europe. D´une part, une oppo13

14 15 16

Muriel RAMBOUR, « Les oppositions à l’Europe sont-elles structurées politiquement? » in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (Volume 1) : les concepts, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2010, p. 93-109. Europaparl.europa.eu (20.11.2015). Cf. Maria GAINAR, Martial LIBERA, (éd.), Contre l’Europe ? Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (vol. 2) : Acteurs institutionnels, milieux politiques et société civile, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2013. Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCERBIAK, (ed.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Oxford, 2007.

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sition contre le principe d´unification européenne en soi (hard Euroscepticism) ; d´autre part, une opposition contre la manière dont elle était réalisée, d´abord par la CE, puis par l´UE (soft Euroscepticism)17. D´un point de vue historique, on peut découvrir l´existence d´un euroscepticisme beaucoup plus ancien. Les résistances contre l´Europe sont aussi vieilles que l´idée d´Europe elle-même18. Les historiens contemporains montrent que des attitudes europessimistes ont existé à l´occasion des crises précoces du processus d´unification européenne, par exemple en 1965 avec la politique de De gaulle de la chaise vide ou dans la phase d´euro-sclérose dans les années 70. Ceci vaut aussi dans l´entre-deux-guerres des années 20 et 30, une période dans laquelle il existait beaucoup de projets européens, mais qui allaient échouer dans l´atmosphère générale d´hostilité à l´intégration de cette période19. Deuxièmement, il est important pour l´analyse des partis eurosceptiques ou anti-européens au parlement européen de replacer ces phénomènes politiques dans un contexte sociétal et socio-politique global. L´opposition à l´Europe est, depuis le début des années 90, un problème global en Europe, qui concerne de vastes franges des populations. Avec le refus des Danois d´adopter le traité de Maastricht en 1992 et la courte majorité de la des électeurs français en faveur de cette nouvelle étape de l´Union européenne, l´euroscepticisme progressait constamment et est devenu, ce faisant, un problème visible pour la totalité de l´UE.20 Le comportement de rejet à l´occasion des différents référendums qui ont suivi – traité de Nice, de la constitution européenne, traité de Lisbonne – illustre la disparition du « consensus permissif » de l´unification européenne, c´est à dire la fin d´une tolérance passive de ce processus par les citoyens européens.21 Les raisons qui en sont la cause ont été analysées de manière concordante : on évoque le « manque de légitimité politique » des institutions européennes22, la bureaucratie bruxelloise loin des citoyens23 ainsi que l´incapacité de rendre compréhensible aux citoyens la construction élitaire des institutions européennes. Le succès croissant des partis politiques anti-européens trouve donc partiellement ses racines dans la montée globale de l´euroscepticisme. Troisièmement, il faut lors de l´identification des mouvements antieuropéens et eurosceptiques faire attention au fait qu´il ne s´agit plus principalement, depuis le début des années 90, de partis de la marge appartenant à l´extrême-gauche ou à l´extrême-droite (formations néo-communistes, postcom17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Petr KOPECKY, Cas MUDDE, « The two sides of Euroscepticism: party positions on European integration in East Central Europe », European Union Politics, B. 3, Nr. 3, 2002, p. 297-326. Justine LACROIX, Ramona COMAN, (éd.), Les résistances à l’Europe. Cultures nationales, idéologies et stratégies d’acteurs, Bruxelles, 2007. Marie-Thérèse BITSCH, « Préface »”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (Volume 1) : les concepts, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2010. Fréderic CLAVERT, « Introduction », in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 25. Léon LINDBERG, Stuart SCHEINGOLD, Europe’s would-be polity: patterns of change in the European Community, Prentice Hall, 1970. Simon LANG, « Kein Integrationsfortschritt ohne Kritik. Die Funktion Europakritischer Positionen für die Weiterentwicklung der europäischen Integration »”, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 61-93. Eugen PFISTER, « Die Identität Europas und Europabilder in Wochenschauen nach 1945 » in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 233249.

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munistes, national-populistes ou extrémistes de droite), mais aussi de nouveaux partis anti-européens (par exemple, le Mouvement Cinq étoiles en Italie) auxquels s´ajoutent des partis du mainstream (par exemple les sociaux-démocrates allemands , les conservateurs britanniques ou les néo-gaullistes français) qui défendent des positions anti-européennes ou eurosceptiques24. Ce faisant, l´euroscepticisme et l´anti-européanisme se révèlent comme des phénomènes particulièrement complexes, qui ne sont homogènes ni dans leurs formes d´expressions politiques, ni identiques, ni également forts dans tous les pays européens. Une telle approche implique une analyse très différenciée, qui passe par des mises en perspectives par pays, mais aussi interdisciplinaires. Dans nos deux livres „2014 European Elections: the Rise of Euroscepticism and Anti-Europeanism“, nous nous penchons sur les succès électoraux des partis hostiles à l´Europe dans les pays membres de l´EU. Dans le premier livre, nous portons notre attention sur l´anti-européanisme et l´euroscepticisme comme phénomène politique et objet de recherches interdisciplinaire. Dans cet ouvrage, nous présentons tout d´abord l´euroscepticisme « traditionnel » de la Grande-Bretagne et les nouveaux mouvements anti-européens actifs dans les pays fondateurs de la CE (France, Allemagne, Italie, Hollande). Dans le second volume, nous présentons trois autres groupes de pays membres : les pays de la méditerranée, qui, à l´exception de Chypre ont adhéré dans les années 80 (Espagne, Portugal, Grèce), puis les pays scandinaves adhérents depuis 1995 (Suède et Finlande) et enfin les Etats adhérents en 2004, c´est à dire les pays d´Europe centrale et de l´Est et les pays Baltes (Tchéquie, Slovaquie, Hongrie, Estonie et Lettonie). Le deuxième volume de notre série European Elections: the Rise of Euroscepticism and Anti-Europeanism analyse dans sa première partie les pays du sud de l´Europe, qui, à l´exception de Chypre appartiennent à CE depuis les années 80. En Espagne et en Grèce surtout, le succès des partis eurosceptiques est interprété comme une conséquence de la grave crise économique et monétaire et de l´attitude de l´UE vis-à-vis de ces pays. Antonio Elorza voit dans l´entrée de Pablo Iglesias et de son parti radical de gauche Podemos comme le premier signal d´une expansion à venir de ce courant, ce parti visant en Espagne à devenir un facteur de pouvoir. La montée en puissance en Grèce d´un comportement électoral hostile à l´Europe est vue par Iannis Konstantinidis comme le signe évident d´un désamour des grecs vis-à-vis de l´UE qui les a déçus. Cette « nouvelle » opposition dure à l´Europe s´est vue confirmée non seulement par le succès des partis antieuropéens à l´élection de 2014, mais aussi à l´occasion du référendum de 2015, les grecs rejetant les accords proposés par les partenaires européens et mettant, ce faisant, en péril le maintien de la Grèce dans l´UE. L´analyse de l´euroscepticisme à Chypre faite par Andreas Stergiou ne donne pas une image très claire de résistance à l´Europe. L´auteur argumente qu´à côté des deux partis anti-européens (le parti communiste chypriote AKEL et le parti d´extrême-droite ELAM), il existe de nombreuses sensibilités hétérogè-

24

Maximilian MÜLLER-HÄRLIN, « Die Gegner Europas : Argumentationsmuster im politischen Diskurs », in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 141-155.

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nes, non liées à un parti, mais qui ne peuvent être classifiées d´euroscepticisme « dur » ou « mou ». Le Portugal reste, dans le cadre général d´une montée de l´hostilité à l´Europe, une exception évidente. Alice Cunha constate que malgré la grave crise économique et les problèmes liés comme l´endettement et le chômage, aucun euroscepticisme dur n´est apparu et que les résultats électoraux des partis extrémistes de droite et de gauche sont restés semblables à ceux des élections européennes antérieures (2009). A l´occasion de l´analyse des pays scandinaves ayant adhéré à l´EU en 1995 et de l´Autriche dans ce second volume, il faut distinguer entre le scepticisme européen nordique « traditionnel » et les nouveaux mouvements anti-européens. Svante Erson montre que la Suède, à priori eurosceptique, a eu à partir de 1995 une attitude de plus en plus favorable à l´EU. L´hostilité à l´Europe a connu toutefois une sorte de renaissance à l´occasion des élections européennes de 2014 avec le succès du parti national-populiste Schwedendemokraten (SD). Ce parti n´a pas comme priorité la lutte contre l´EU, mais s´engage surtout sur les questions d´immigration, à partir desquelles il développe une argumentation antieuropénne. David Arter nous confirme dans son analyse qu´aucun parti en Finlande ne veut quitter l´EU. Néanmoins, le système électoral finlandais a permis aux candidats eurocritiques de recueillir un quart des voix à l´occasion des élections européennes de 2014. En Autriche, la situation est tout autre comme le montre Patrick Moreau dans son article. Le FPÖ est un parti anti-européen dur, dont le succès aux Européennes de 2014 trouve son origine dans la disparition des formations d´extrême-droite concurrentes, le FPÖ attirant ainsi une large frange de la population autrichienne. L´opposition à l´Europe est ainsi devenu un mainstream, une tendance encore renforcée par la crise économique, la montée du chômage et l´immigration. La troisième partie de notre livre porte sur les pays de l´Europe centrale et de l´Est, ainsi que sur les pays baltes. Ces pays membres de l´EU depuis 2004 connaissent des formes très différentes d´euroscepticisme. Alors que Petr Kaniok montre que les mouvements eurosceptiques thèques sont faibles et n´ont pas réussi à l´occasion des élections européennes de 2014 à gagner du terrain, Peter Spáč’s souligne l´évolution de la situation en Slovaquie. Alors qu´à la fin des années 90, la perspective d´une adhésion à l´EU et à l´intégration européenne se voyait saluer par tous les partis, l´euroscepticisme a cru ces dernières années. Déçues par l´Europe, quatre formations hostiles à l´UE allant des libéraux à l´extrême-droite ont remporté des succès aux Européennes de 2014, même si les partis politiques établis continuent à être favorables à l´EU et sont actifs dans les partis européens. En Hongrie, l´anti-européanisme est encore plus affirmé. Péter Csingár montre les dramatiques changements intervenus dans le paysage partisan hongrois depuis l´adhésion du pays à l´UE en 2004. La conscience du fait national en opposition à l´UE s´est renforcé à un tel point que l´euroscepticisme domine dans presque tous les partis. A l´occasion des européennes de 2014, on observe la diffusion globale de positions largement eurosceptiques, toutefois sous des formes et des intensités différentes. Dans les Etats baltes, le succès de l´euroscepticisme a d´autres raisons. Toomas Alatalu constate qu´en Estonie le rejet de l´UE est plus un reflet de la méfiance régnante à l´encontre des élites politiques estoniennes

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qu´une réelle hostilité à l´Europe. Ceci explique pourquoi quelques politiciens eurosceptiques indépendants et protestataires ont été candidat et pu être élus aux Européennes. Juris Rozenvalds montre dans son article que la jeunesse lettone – y compris celle de langue russe – sympathise en général avec l´Europe. L´euroscepticisme s´exprime par contre dans le paysage médiatique de langue russe contrôlé par la Russie. L´euroscepticisme a donc ici plutôt des racines politiques internes, qui sont en rapport avec le traitement par la Lettonie de sa minorité russe.

EINFÜHRUNG BIRTE WASSENBERG – PATRICK MOREAU Seit der Ostererweiterung 2004 wird die Europäische Union (EU) immer wieder von schweren internen und externen Krisen geschüttelt. Bereits 2005 wurde die Euphorie des europäischen Integrationsprozesses wurde schon durch die Ablehnung des EU-Verfassungsentwurfes durch die negativen Referenda der niederländischen und französischen Bevölkerung 2005 jäh gestoppt25. Kaum war der Europa-Elan war durch den Rettungsversuch des sogenannten „vereinfachten“ Lissabonner Vertrages 2008 wieder lanciert, als die internationale Wirtschaftsund Finanzkrise die Eurozone innerhalb der EU weitgehend destabilisierte und zwar so weit, dass Griechenland der Ausschluss aus der Währungsunion drohte. Während die EU-Mitgliedstaaten noch miteinander um die Reformpakete zur Behebung dieser Krise feilschten, bahnte sich schleichend schon die nächste Krise an: die Flüchtlingsproblematik, die im Sommer 2015 nach Abriegelung der ungarischen Außengrenze und dem Aufheben des Dublin-Abkommens eskalierte. Sie hatte sich an den maritimen Grenzen Italiens, Spaniens und Griechenlands sowie an der Schengen-Grenze des Eurotunnels zwischen Calais und Dover schon seit Jahren abgezeichnet. Dazu kämpft die EU seit dem gescheiterten Versuch eines Wirtschaftsabkommens mit der Ukraine und dem dadurch ausgelösten UkraineRussland Konflikt 2014 um das Ansehen ihrer gerade erst mühsam aufgebauten Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik. Es ist nicht verwunderlich, dass in einem solchen Kontext der Nährboden für anti-europäische Bewegungen exponentiell wächst. In der Tat zeigen die Ergebnisse der europäischen Wahlen 2014 einen klaren prozentualen Wählerzuwachs für europaskeptische Parteien in fast allen Mitgliedstaaten der EU26. Für eine nähere allgemeine sowie länderspezifische Untersuchung dieser Ergebnisse sollten jedoch drei Punkte im Voraus berücksichtigt werden. Erstens sollte dieses Phänomen nicht aus einer zu stark aktualitätsbezogenen Perspektive beleuchtet werden. Die bisherige Forschung der Politikwissenschaften und neuere Erkenntnisse von Zeithistorikern weisen darauf hin, dass es sich 25

26

Muriel RAMBOUR, „Les oppositions à l’Europe sont-elles structurées politiquement?“in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (Volume 1) : les concepts, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2010, p. 93-109. Europaparl.europa.eu (20.11.2015).

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beim Euroskeptizismus und Anti-Europäismus um ein schon weitreichend bekanntes Phänomen handelt27. Dabei identifizierten die Politikwissenschaftler den Euroskeptizismus in den 1980er Jahren zunächst klar als eine britische Erscheinung, die mit der ablehnenden Haltung Margaret Thatchers zur Europäischen Gemeinschaft (EG) ihren Einzug in die britische Politikarena fand28. Dabei wurde zwischen zwei Typen der Opposition gegen Europa unterschieden: der Opposition gegen das Prinzip der europäischen Einigung an sich (hard Euroscepticism) und die Opposition gegen die Art und Weise, wie diese von der EG und danach von der EU umgesetzt wird (soft Euroscepticism)29. Aus historischer Sicht kann der Euroskeptizismus noch viel weiter zurückverfolgt werden: Widerstände (résistences) gegen Europa seien demnach so alt wie die europäische Idee selbst30. Zeitgenössische Historiker zeigen demnach auf, dass es europessimistische Haltungen schon in früheren Krisen des europäischen Einigungsprozesses gegeben hat, z.B. 1965 bei de Gaulles Politik des leeren Stuhls oder in der Phase der Eurosklerose in den 1970er Jahren. Sogar schon in der Zwischenkriegszeit der 1920er, 1930er Jahre, in denen viele europäische Projekte existierten, scheiterten diese an der generellen integrationsfeindlichen Stimmung dieser Periode31. Zweitens ist es für die Analyse der euroskeptischen und anti-europäischen Bewegungen im Europäischen Parlament wichtig, dieses politische Phänomen in einen globalen sozialpolitischen und gesellschaftlichen Kontext zu stellen. Opposition gegen Europa ist nämlich spätestens seit Anfang der 1990er Jahre ein gesamteuropäisches Problem, das weite Teile der Bevölkerung in Europa betrifft. Seit der Ablehnung des Maastrichter Vertrages 1992 durch die Dänen und der knappen Mehrheit der französischen Bevölkerung für diesen weiteren Schritt der europäischen Einigung hat der Euroskeptizismus stetig zugenommen und ist zu einem sichtbaren Problem für die EU insgesamt geworden32. Das Ablehnungsverhalten bei den verschiedenen Referenda zu den darauffolgenden europäischen Verträgen von Nizza, der europäischen Verfassung bis hin zum Lissaboner Vertrag illustriert hierbei das Schwinden des sogenannten „permissiven Konsenses“ zur europäischen Einigung, also das Ende einer passiven Duldung dieses Prozesses durch die europäischen Bürger33. Als Gründe für den Verlust dieses „permissiven Konsenses“ werden übereinstimmend immer wieder sowohl die

27 28 29 30 31

32 33

Cf. Maria GAINAR, Martial LIBERA, (éd.), Contre l’Europe ? Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (vol. 2) : Acteurs institutionnels, milieux politiques et société civile, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2013. Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCERBIAK, (ed.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Oxford, 2007. Petr KOPECKY, Cas MUDDE, „The two sides of Euroscepticism: party positions on European integration in East Central Europe“, European Union Politics, B. 3, Nr. 3, 2002, p. 297-326. Justine LACROIX, Ramona COMAN, (éd.), Les résistances à l’Europe. Cultures nationales, idéologies et stratégies d’acteurs, Bruxelles, 2007. Marie-Thérèse BITSCH, „Préface“, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 19.Cf. Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (Volume 1) : les concepts, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2010. Fréderic CLAVERT, „Introduction“, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 25. Léon LINDBERG, Stuart SCHEINGOLD, Europe’s would-be polity: patterns of change in the European Community, Prentice Hall, 1970.

INTRODUCTION

21

„fehlende politische Legitimität“ der europäischen Institutionen34, die bürgerferne Brüsseler Bürokratie35 und das Versäumnis, das elitäre Konstrukt der europäischen Institutionen für den Bürger verständlich zu machen, genannt. Steigender Erfolg anti-europäischer politscher Parteien kann daher auch partiell auf den insgesamt ansteigenden öffentlichen Euroskeptizismus zurückgeführt werden. Drittens sollte bei der Identifizierung der anti-europäischen und euroskeptischen Bewegungen darauf geachtet werden, dass es sich im politischen Spektrum seit den 1990er Jahren nicht mehr nur hauptsächlich um die „klassischen“ marginalen Parteien aus dem extremen linken oder rechten Lager (neo-kommunistische, postkommunistische, national-populistische und rechtextremistische Formatierungen) handelt, sondern dass zum einen neue anti-europäische Parteien auftreten (z.B. die Fünf-Sterne-Bewegung in Italien) und zum anderen auch die sogenannten mainstream-Parteien (also z.B. auch deutsche Sozialdemokraten, britische Konservative oder französische Neo-Gaullisten) anti-europäische oder euroskeptische Positionen verfechten36. Diesbezüglich erweist sich nun der Euroskeptizismus und Anti-Europäismus als ein besonders komplexes Phänomen, das weder homogen in seinen politischen Äußerungsformen, noch einheitlich oder gleich stark in allen europäischen Ländern vertreten ist. Ein solcher Ansatz fordert vor allem eine sehr differenzierte Analyse, die sowohl länderbezogen wie auch in interdisziplinärer Perspektive vorgehen sollte. In unseren beiden Bänden zu den „2014 European Elections: the Rise of Euroscepticism and Anti-Europeanism“ wird vor allem der Wahlerfolg europafeindlicher Parteien in den Mitgliedstaaten der EU analysiert. Dabei wird zunächst im ersten Band generell der Anti-Europäismus und Euroskeptizismus als politisches Phänomen und interdisziplinäres Forschungsobjekt untersucht, wobei vor allem ein Blick auf das „traditionell“ euroskeptische Großbritannien und auf die teilweise neu aufkommenden anti-europäischen Bewegungen in den Gründungsstaaten der EG geworfen wird (Frankreich, Deutschland, Italien, Niederlande). Im zweiten Band werden dann aufeinanderfolgend drei weitere Gruppen von Mitgliedstaaten der EU analysiert: die Mittelmeerländer, die bis auf Zypern in den 1980er Jahren der EU beigetreten sind (Spanien, Portugal, Griechenland), danach die 1995 in die EU aufgenommenen skandinavischen Länder (Schweden und Finnland) sowie Österreich, und schließlich die Staaten der 2004 EU-Erweiterung, d.h. die mittel-und osteuropäischen sowie die baltischen Länder (Tschechien, Slowakei, Ungarn, Estland und Lettland). Der zweite Band unserer Reihe 2014 European Elections: the Rise of Euroscepticism and Anti-Europeanism widmet sich im ersten Teil zunächst den Südländern der EU, die bis auf Zypern schon seit den 1980er Jahren der EG angehören. Vor allem in Spanien und Griechenland wird der Erfolg euroskeptischer Parteien bei den Europawahlen als Folge der schweren Wirtschafts- und Währungskrise und 34 35 36

Simon LANG, „Kein Integrationsfortschritt ohne Kritik. Die Funktion Europakritischer Positionen für die Weiterentwicklung der europäischen Integration“, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 61-93. Eugen PFISTER, „Die Identität Europas und Europabilder in Wochenschauen nach 1945“ in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 233249. Maximilian MÜLLER-HÄRLIN, „Die Gegner Europas : Argumentationsmuster im politischen Diskurs“, in Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (éd.), Contre l’Europe ?, op. cit., p. 141-155.

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der daraus resultierenden Haltung der EU zu diesen Staaten interpretiert. So sieht Antonio Elorza den Einzug von Pablo Iglesias und seiner linksradikalen Partei Podemos ins Europaparlament im Mai 2014 als ersten Schritt einer Aufstiegsbewegung, die diese Partei für den internen Machtgewinn in Spanien nutzen will. Europafeindlichkeit wird also hier als Mittel zum Zweck für nationale politische Ziele eingesetzt. Der dramatische Anstieg des europafeindlichen Wahlverhaltens in Griechenland wird hingegen von Iannis Konstantinidis als klares Zeichen der enttäuschten Abwendung der Griechen von der EU gewertet. Diese „neue“ harte Opposition gegen Europa wird nicht nur durch den Wahlerfolg anti-europäischer Parteien bei den Europawahlen 2014 belegt, sondern mehr noch durch das Referendum 2015, bei dem die Griechen die von den europäischen Partnern vorgeschlagene Vereinbarung ablehnten und so den Verbleib Griechenlands in der EU gefährdeten. Die Analyse des Europaskeptizismus in Zypern von Andreas Stergiou ergibt ein nicht ganz so eindeutiges Bild vom Widerstand gegen Europa. Dabei argumentiert der Autor, dass es neben den beiden antieuropäischen Parteien (der zypriotischen kommunistischen Partei AKEL und der rechtsextremen Partei ELAM) viele heterogene, nicht parteigebundene europaskeptische Wahrnehmungen gibt, die weder dem klassischen „harten“ noch dem „weichen“ Euroskeptizismus zugeordnet werden können. In Bezug auf steigende Europafeindlichkeit bei den Europawahlen kann Portugal klar als Ausnahme unter den Südstaaten bezeichnet werden. Alice Cunha stellt fest, dass in Portugal trotz der schweren Wirtschaftskrise und der damit verbundenen Probleme der Verschuldung und Arbeitslosigkeit kein harter Euroskeptizismus aufgekommen ist. Die Wahlergebnisse der rechts- und linksextremen anti-europäischen Parteien des Jahres 2014 sind mit denen der vorherigen Europawahl (2009) vergleichbar. Bei der Analyse der 1995 beigetretenen skandinavischen EU-Staaten und Österreichs im zweiten Teil dieses Bandes muss zwischen „traditionellem“ nordischem Europaskeptizismus und neuen anti-europäischen Bewegungen unterschieden werden. Svante Ersson erläutert, dass das zunächst euroskeptische Schweden seit 1995 eine immer positivere Haltung gegenüber der EU entwickelt hat. Die Europafeindlichkeit hat erst mit dem Wahlerfolg der national-populistischen Schwedendemokraten (SD) bei den Europawahlen 2014 eine Art Renaissance erfahren. Die Partei kämpft jedoch nicht in erster Linie gegen die EU, sondern vor allem gegen die Zuwanderung, und sie verficht europafeindliche Positionen hauptsächlich in Bezug auf dieses Thema. Auch in Finnland, so bestätigt David Arter, strebt keine der Parteien den Austritt Finnlands aus der EU an. Europakritische Kandidaten konnten bei den Europawahlen 2014 hauptsächlich durch das finnische Präferenzwahlsystem insgesamt dennoch ein Viertel der Stimmen erringen. In Österreich ist die Situation eine völlig andere, wie Patrick Moreau in seinem Artikel belegt. Die FPÖ ist eine ideologisch harte europafeindliche Partei, deren Wahlerfolg bei den Europawahlen 2014 vor allem darauf zurückzuführen ist, dass alle anderen rechtsextremen Gruppierungen verschwunden sind. So konnte die FPÖ ein weitaus breiteres Spektrum der österreichischen Bevölkerung anziehen. Opposition gegen Europa wird damit zur Mainstream-Position, eine Entwicklung, die durch die wirtschaft-

INTRODUCTION

23

liche Krise, den Anstieg der Arbeitslosigkeit und der Zuwanderung noch verschärft wird. Der dritte Teil dieses Bandes widmet sich den ost-und mitteleuropäischen Ländern sowie den baltischen Staaten. Diese seit 2004 in die EU integrierten Mitgliedstaaten erfahren eine sehr unterschiedliche Ausprägung von Euroskeptizismus. Während z.B. Petr Kaniok darlegt, dass tschechische euroskeptische Bewegungen immer noch sehr schwach sind und bei den Europawahlen 2014 antieuropäischen Positionen von Parteien kaum Bedeutung zukam, hat sich, laut der Analyse von Peter Spáč die Situation in der Slowakei stark verändert: Während noch Ende der 1990er Jahre die Aussicht auf EU-Mitgliedschaft durch alle Parteien hinweg positive Haltungen zur europäischen Integration auslöste, wuchs der Euroskeptizismus in den letzten Jahren an. Aufgrund der Enttäuschung über Europa konnten vier europafeindliche Gruppierungen vom liberalen bis zum rechtsextremen Spektrum bei den Europawahlen 2014 Erfolge erzielen, wenn auch die etablierten politischen Parteien weiterhin der EU positiv gegenüber stehen und in die europäischen Parteistrukturen eingebunden sind. In Ungarn ist der Anti-Europäismus noch viel stärker ausgeprägt. Péter Csingár zeigt die gravierende Veränderung der ungarischen Parteienlandschaft seit dem Beitritt zur EU 2004 auf. Demnach hat sich das nationale Selbstbewusstsein gegenüber der EU so weit zugespitzt, dass der Euroskeptizismus bei fast allen Parteien vorherrschend ist. Bei den Europawahlen 2014 wurden weitgehend euroskeptische Positionen verfochten, wenn auch in unterschiedlicher Form und Intensität. In den baltischen Staaten hat der Erfolg des Euroskeptizismus bei den Europawahlen andere Ursachen. Toomas Alatalu stellt fest, dass in Estland die Ablehnung der EU eher das Misstrauen gegenüber der estnischen politischen Elite als eine echte Europafeindlichkeit wiederspiegelt. Dies erklärt auch den Erfolg einiger unabhängiger euroskeptischer Politiker bei der Europawahl, die als Protestkandidaten in das EU-Parlament einzogen. Im Gegensatz dazu betont Juris Rozenvalds, dass die lettische jüngere Bevölkerung – einschließlich der russischsprachigen – generell europafreundlich sei und der Euroskeptizismus eher von der von Russland kontrollierten russischsprachigen Medienlandschaft geschürt würde. Euroskeptizismus hat hier also eher innenpolitische Wurzeln, die mit der Behandlung der russischen Minderheit in Lettland zusammenhängen.

Part 1

EUROSCEPTICISM AND ANTI-EUROPEANISM IN THE SOUTHERN EU MEMBER STATES EUROCEPTICISME ET ANTI-EUROPÉISME DANS LES ÉTATS MEMBRES DE L’UE AU SUD

EUROSKEPTIZISMUS UND ANTI-EUROPÄISMUS IN DEN SÜDLICHEN EU-MITGLIEDSTAATEN

PODEMOS: THE ROAD TO POWER ANTONIO ELORZA “Chávez alive is invincible, Chávez dead is immortal”1. “Whenever we don’t know what to do, let’s ask ourselves what the President Chávez would do”2. The Podemos [We Can] outbreak within the Spanish political arena is a very recent phenomenon: A quick campaign in early 2014, structured around the successful political gatherings of a young Political Science interim professor, leads to the surprising result of five MEPs. Since then, Podemos’ expectations have only and considerably grown, to the point that in early August, the official Centre for Sociological Research (CIS) published that its campaign is acknowledged as excellent by 30.9% of the interviewed people. At the same time, according to the vote forecast (15.3%) they are close to the main opposition party, Social Democratic PSOE but, together with the former communist IU coalition, the eventual annexation would reach 23.5%, quite a significant advance over the EU election result. Regarding the “immediate vote intention”, Podemos’ 11.9% is very close to the 12.8% of the conservative ruling party, Partido Popular (PP); and exceeds the PSOE’s 10.6%3. And the tide keeps rising: Podemos has monopolized public attention. “Tomorrow belongs to us,” its leader, Pablo Iglesias, said in the European Parliament, unconsciously emulating the young Nazi statement in Bob Fosse’s classic film, Cabaret. The amazing irresistible rise of Pablo Iglesias and Podemos could be explained by its correct approach and its electoral campaign when responding, as Beppe Grillo’s 5 Stars Movement did in Italy, to a deep social upset with the political system, in the midst of a crisis. The spontaneous outburst of 15th May 2011 (15-M), the Indignants´ movement [indignados], gave a clear picture of that; and failed because –rewording Marx’s quotation – it was but a mass mobilization without political perspectives4. Podemos has come to give an answer to such a social demand. Podemos’ appearance, however, was anything but spontaneous. It was born in the midst of a radicalized environment, in the old University of Madrid, the Complutense (UCM), from a group of leftist professors and young graduates, proceeding from communist activism, who will later be a group close to Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. Podemos’ ideologue, Juan Carlos Monedero was Chávez closest adviser, and in the Venezuelan political struggle, some ideas came out, like the proposal of a “Socialism of the 21st Century”, populist, shaping a distinct repertoire of ideas, anti-oligarchic, anti-European, anti-imperialist and in favour of creating a constituent power as an alternative to the existing constitutional order based on representative democracy. It is also plausible that 1 2 3 4

Pablo Iglesias, Podemos leader and elected MEP. Juan Carlos Monedero, Podemos’ number 3. Metroscopia, “Barómetro de clima político”, El País, 9 August 2014. VV.AA., Nosotros los indignados, prologue by Stéphane Hassel, Barcelone, Destino, 2011.

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an indirect financial support might have come from Venezuela, to help the initial core set up an active minority, already alive in January this year, when the EU elections were already on the agenda. Television was the launching pad; the radicalized university groups were the source and nursery; and the Internet, their effective instrument for ideological dissemination and propaganda.

1. Videocracy and Populism Silvio Berlusconi’s political career began at a small local TV set in Milan. It did not even have regular studio equipment to record his sordid game shows. The nowadays ex-cavaliere would had stayed a filthily rich speculator without this forging of his own image thanks to his control of private televisions. Since then, the successful building of a political image has depended more and more on television, as Chávez proved to master during his government in Venezuela, through his effective rants as well as through his coercive control of it5. Also during the recent European elections, television played a key role: To beat Beppe Grillo, a communicator like Renzi had to emerge. It was not illogical that, mutatis mutandis, this phenomenon would find one remake in Spain, following the path of the Five Stars Movement. The main actor was a young professor at the Political Science Faculty of the UCM, Pablo Iglesias: five MEPs and one and a quarter million votes. In a very short time, always using videocracy as a tool, he has managed to forge the image of a renewed left-wing leader6. He achieved to do it, as Berlusconi did, initially from a small local TV station, with unknown financing. Starting from there, he profited from a wide network, and it was a good training. His ideological coordinates would be shaping up: When in Spain, a radical political speech orientated to justify a social struggle against the existing democracy, in the name of a populist political alternative with an authoritarian background, and with a communication and control policy inspired more and more by Beppe Grillo; when abroad, anti-imperialism and propaganda of the advantages of the restricted democracy models of Chávez environment. The success of the propaganda experienced a substantial growth when a few months before the elections, the image of Pablo Iglesias becomes the star of TV political talk shows widely broadcasted by influent TV private channels (eg “La Sexta”). His concern is to show himself, sentence by sentence, in his role of an uncompromising left-wing leader, confronting PSOE and PP – political parties that are “the caste” to be destroyed: strict copy of Grillo’s anathema against “the two castes” (politicians and journalists) – as well as facing the right-wing, whose representatives he despised with word and gestures: Hence his best moments were the scuffles with the director of the conservative newspaper La Razón. Iglesias skilfully handled false evidence – whether about the euro or the guillotine whose implementation is regarded as “the founding episode of democracy” – or sarcasm to discredit his opponents. He used marketing techniques to attract follow5 6

Paul GINSBORG, Silvio Berlusconi: Television, Power and Patrimony, Verso Books, London, Verso Books, 2006. Erik GANDINI, Videocracy, documentary film, Sweden, 2009.

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ers among people dissatisfied with the system. So, initially, Podemos was openly presented as the heir of the 2011 indignados. When he later realized that such a statement might raise rejections, he moved towards the central topics of the movement. The key was to develop a simple language able to disguise the antisystem background with proposals attached to the aspirations and frustrations of the recipients, i.e., future voters. To achieve this high performance, he took lessons from professional communicators7. Pablo Iglesias’ success, reached in a four months campaign, is based on the massive use of his image on TV and on the Internet (Youtube, Twitter and Facebook). Íñigo Errejón, Iglesias’ close friend, was in charge of the campaign. He was already an electoral expert in Venezuela and a Chávez enthusiast. Errejón regarded him as the leader of a progressive socialist-orientated movement facing the oligarchic minorities. “We are (almost) all chavistas” is the conclusion of an article written by Errejón. The lack of economic resources – according to their declaration, only one hundred thousand euros were used for the campaign – was compensated by the massive use of social networks. “Podemos has 252,270 Facebook followers whilst PP has 44,000 followers and PSOE 61,000”, Errejón explains in the newspaper El Mundo. The same holds true for Twitter where Pablo Iglesias has over 245,000 followers, 11 times more than the PP and PSOE candidates. Through the omnipresence of his image, the leading role of Pablo Iglesias was reinforced. His photograph was even placed on the ballot, instead of the Podemos’ official name. All it took was to change the class struggle background to a different dualism: democracy – assuming that their democracy is different from standard democracy – against oligarchy. That’s how “turning the social dissatisfaction into an election trend” was achieved, Errejón sums up8. 1.1. The Time for People Podemos followers have reasons to feel satisfied. During Franco’s regimen, the satirical magazine La Codorniz [The Quail] was presented as “the boldest magazine for the smarter audience”. According to a recent “pre-draft” document for the Constituent Assembly of the Pablo Iglesias group, Spain is presently experiencing “the most democratic, open and pluralistic organizational structure our country has ever seen”9. It is declared to be the result of “a discussion among every men and every women”. Even the permanent participation of the intelligentsia will be ensured: intellectuals shall cooperate in so-called Talent and Think Tanks. All in all, Spain shall witness the “birth of the most democratic, open to citizens, and transparent political organization of our history”. The maximum participatory level of the “citizens” was to be ensured. But in order to to prevent them from getting headaches, first of all, the top leader of the movement and future “portavoz” (spokesman), now Secretary General, had carefully elaborated two “pre-drafts” setting the goals of the new organization and planning the suitable organizational form to achieve them. The following dis7 8 9

“Casado y Escario profesoras de Pablo Iglesias”, El Confidencial.com, 24 July 2014. Interview with Iñigo Errejón, El Mundo, May 2014. “Podemos: pre-borrador de ponencia política: ‘La crisis del regimen de 1978 y las posibilidades del cambio político en España’” (document).

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course would a closed one only accepting ancillary modifications. This is imperative for an open-fronted political movement trying to present itself as a mirror of the collective will, but which, in fact, has always had a strictly hierarchical structure. Since its inception, Podemos has been subjected to a personal pretending-tobe-charismatic leadership. The formula is that everyone shall feel involved as a participant, but that the leader may act without any eventual limitation. The political “pre-draft” evinces the reasons why this kind of organization is essential10. With Podemos, the “time for people” has come. Ortega could have called this the leadership of the masses: Everything may be debated, proposed, decided. But the end of such an organization is already fixed in advance, imperative, with no other goal or content but its own realization. The doctrinal basis is overwhelmingly simple: It consists of taking advantage of a structure of political opportunity, here called “window of opportunity”, and conquer the State within the shortest possible time, before a non-desirable economic recovery occurs (which might favour PP) or a revival of the main political opponent, the Socialist Party (PSOE), which fosters the integration of the majority within the nowadays outdated and oppressive constitutional regime of 1978. Within a frame of “political and moral decay of its elites,” whilst “the conservative party accumulated an unedited power (sic, never edited before)”, the 15-M discredits the electoral democracy, without providing solutions. Hence Podemos comes to “articulate those dissatisfactions and identities” and, entering through the window of opportunity, seize power. But what is the political purpose? Post-electoral pragmatism does not appear to recommend taking, at least by now, the path towards the paradise of the “socialism of the 21st Century”11. Juan Carlos Monedero had theorized its advantages, taking Chávez’ regime as a reference. But now it is neither the time nor the place to proclaim the Bolivarian leader “immortal” (Pablo Iglesias), “the Liberator of Latin America” (Juan Carlos Monedero) or that “we are (almost) all Chávez” (Errejón)12. Marketing dominates everything. We enter emptiness: Taking power becomes the goal itself. “In Spain, a political majority for change in a popular sense” has to be built, Iglesias says. Paraphrasing Marx again, we would be facing redemption without ideas. This is not entirely true. Podemos’ leading group follows the outlines of the theoretical elaboration of the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Souza Santos, a professor at Coimbra13. Santos is a committed Chávez supporter. He offers, on the one hand, unbearable slogans like “socialism is never ending democracy”, a slogan that might be based on “socialism is love”, perhaps for personal advocated reasons by Monedero. The essence of Santos’ thought is, however, the delegitimization of the actually existing democracy, “defeated by capitalism,” “neoliberal”, requiring “reinvention” by a brand-new anti-capitalist democracy, designed to serve the people as Chávez exemplifies, deepening “in every aspect of 10 11 12 13

“Pre-borrador del documento organizativo de Podemos” (document). Juan Carlos MONEDERO, “Venezuela y la reinvención de la política: el desafío del socialismo en nuevos escenarios”, OSAL (Buenos Aires), 33, May 2013. By the same author Curso urgente de política para gente decente, Barcelone, Seix Barral, 2013. Iñigo ERREJÓN, “Chávez somos (casi) todos”, El Correo del Orinoco (Venezuela), reprinted by Rebelión, 11/09/2013; Pablo IGLESIAS, “Chávez es inmoral”, YouTube, 2013. Boaventura DE SOUSA SANTOS, Reinventar la democracia, reinventar el Estado, Madrid, Sequitur, 2011; Para descolonizar Occidente, más allá del pensamiento abismal, Buenos Aires, CLDCS, 2010.

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life.” This is Podemos’ scheme for the electoral campaign. In this never ending democracy, of course, the 43 people who died as a result of Maduro’s repression do not count. Podemos believes there is no sense in discussing the policies to be executed once the power shall have been reached, and the supposedly necessary destruction task performed. It is particularly important to take into account one essential precondition in order to impose the “plebeian-democratic alternative” on the “oligarchy”: “Time is not on our side”, “the mere passing of time erodes us”. There is no space for insurrectional alternatives in Europe, the crisis can be stabilized, and the PSOE might catch its breath. So, if Podemos acts now and quickly, its mission could be fulfilled from the Government, and “an exceptional speech for an exceptional situation” imposed. Concerns about Podemos’ undemocratic nature are justified. Political competition is regarded from a purely military point of view, varnished by the social movements’ theory. Not surprisingly, the two main leaders of Podemos, Juan Carlos Monedero and Pablo Iglesias, had their political baptism in the Communism Youth Union radicalized in the 1980s as a response to the frustration caused by the collapse of Eurocommunism. Iglesias became an activist of the antiglobalization movement, where he defended the use of violence (articles in Kaos once upon a time on the Internet). After counselling Llamazares in Izquierda Unida, Monedero’s ideological and personal ties with Hugo Chávez led him to advocate the “reinvention” formulas for the democracy experienced in Latin America. Pablo Iglesias’ campaign reflected the aggressive stance against the opponents tested in Latin America, following the Chavez pattern: Like Beppe Grillo, he pointed out all the other political parties, particularly of those two parties, as “the caste”. There is nothing to say about the conservative party PP. The target is PSOE, “the architect of the subaltern classes’ integration to the 1978 State”. Its crisis is the real “window” for Podemos to reach its purposes. The old fashioned “social-fascism” discourse reappears: Social democracy is depicted as a political tool of the formerly “bourgeois” and presently “oligarchic” reaction. The PCE’s Eurocommunist phase does not escape their attention either, since the Workers’ Commissions (CCOO) traced the counterrevolutionary outlines later followed by PSOE; censorship, even though somewhat less harsh, also reaches the current IU14. The document speaks of alliances, but clearly taking for granted the strict subordination of any eventual ally, according to the formulas of domination once practiced by the Third International in the “class against class” days. We shall see how a truly innovative formula concerning techniques and tools fails to break the traditional mould. 1.2. From “The Wave” to… The protest movements spreading across Southern Europe due to the economic crisis share common features show notable differences. The common denominator is the rejection of the economic policy and the corruption practiced by the ruling parties during the last decades which results in the discredit of representative democracy. The movements respond to a deeply felt social demand; hence the 14

“Campaña para las elecciones europeas de 25/05/2014” (document).

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brilliant election results. But this is where the differences start: Alexis Tsipras’ Syriza is the product of a reorganization of the left-wing. Former comedian Beppe Grillo’s 5 Stars Movement in Italy and interim professor Pablo Iglesias’ Podemos in Spain, though, arise from innovative processes: A well-skilled communicating leader assumes the available role of the representative of social rejection, thus confronting the traditional parties, even on the left-wing. With 5 Stars, it stems from Grillo’s successful blog; with Podemos, from the videocracy channel. Thanks to their intensive use of social networks, both movements support a public agora democracy. Podemos originates from Contrapoder [Alternative Power], a leftist students’ association at the UCM Faculty of Political Science. For decades, it has been the nest and nursery for opposition attitudes, sometimes close to the Castro regime, but also to left-wing Basque nationalism. Like in Dennis Gansel’s film The Wave, since 2008, the totalitarian bias organization has responded to the content of a militant teaching, led by professor Monedero, Chávez’ advisor from 2004 to 201315. He will be the theoretician of the “socialism of the 21st Century”, as well as the herald of a Chávez personality cult. Among others, the younger Pablo Iglesias and Iñigo Errejón, belong to his followers. The Center of Political and Social Studies developed under his influence. Its name was taken from the Center previously founded by Santos in Coimbra. It brought together university students, “loud speakers” of the Chávez regime, whilst Monedero was later made head of the Miranda International Center, the Chavez think-tank in Caracas16. Similarly enthusiastic of the Bolivarian Revolution, we find another professor, Jorge Verstrynge, author of Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam, inspired by the figure of terrorist Carlos. Chávez distributed in 30.000 copies of the book to the officers of his Army17. He supported Podemos, but obviously its leaders did not like him too much. The route to hegemony at the Faculty of Political Sciences combines the violent suppression of conferences of democratic politicians, i.e., the conquest of the communication space, in 2008 and 2010 at the expense of Rosa Díez, leader of a centrist party (UPyD, Union, Progress and Democracy), and Josep Piqué (PP), plus the repeated invitation of Latin American leaders (Evo Morales, Correa). Pablo Iglesias justified “insults” – the aggression against the democratic invaders – as a revolutionary moral obligation. Just one year earlier, in the same way they had attended the demonstrations supporting the release from prison of De Juana Chaos, a well-known ETA terrorist. According to Iglesias, De Juana Chaos had been emulating Antigone18. The video showing the boycott of Rosa Díez was posted on YouTube by Contrapoder. It needs no comments19. The collaboration of academic authorities since 2010 – a do ut des game offering support 15 16 17 18 19

Antonio ELORZA, “La ola”, El País, 16 June 2014. Centro Internacional Miranda (CIM), 2005. Jorge VERSTRYNGE, La guerra periférica y el Islam revolucionario. Orígenes, normas y ética de la guerra asimétrica, Special Edition by the “Ejército de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela”, May 2005. Pablo IGLESIAS, “Democracia, ¿dónde? Terrorista ¿quién?: el gesto de Antígona”, Rebelión, 25 December 2008. [Contrapoder], “Rosa Díez visita la Facultad de Políticas de la UCM”, YouTube, 21/10/2010. “Contrapoder” violently tried to boycott the Centrist deputy, known for her opposition to ETA, on February 2008 (YouTube). It was on this occasion that Iglesias wrote “El gesto de Antígona”.

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in exchange of corporative votes, especially of the Dean of the Faculty – assured their hegemony. The outward projection began with the help of a political TV programme – La Tuerka – in a local TV (“Tele K”). Iglesias test-bed received economic aid from Venezuela (“la tuerka”, the nut, you must throw nuts against democracy)20. Fort Apache was to follow on HispanTV, a TV net of Iranian propaganda that president Ahmadinejad had established in Madrid. The message is revolutionary – e.g. Robespierre, with the guillotine as a symbol of real democracy – and based on anti-imperialism, on the exemplary populist State of Chavez, and, concerning Spain, on the idea that the 1978 Constitution was an agreement between the conservative elites at the people’s expense, an old leitmotif of Monedero21. The goal is the people’s empowerment against the oligarchy. This is achieved from top to bottom, thanks to a strong leadership (Chávez in Venezuela; Pablo Iglesias in Europe). Latin America serves as a model for Europe. While public trust in political parties and institutions is declining steeply, the political opportunity comes for the active minority to jump ahead with the EU elections. “Contrapoder” turns into Podemos. As a result, the Venezuelan connection will be carefully hidden, up to the moment when the newspapers report on the illegal reception of funds via the former collaborator of Chavez, Juan Carlos Monedero22.

2. …to 25-M In the months preceding the elections on May 25th, 2014, videocracy comes to the fore, using the effective image of Pablo Iglesias, ubiquitous on TV political talk shows. In these TV talk shows, reactionary participants, for example the director of La Razón, are used as sparring partners in order to reinforce his image as uncompromising, willing to fight against social unfairness and the perversion of “the Caste” – like Beppe Grillo –, the two major parties lumped together indistinctly. The wish to erode is mainly targeted against PSOE for having legitimized the outdated “regime” of 1978. Although the latter point does not appear in the campaign foreground, it is definitely more important to be identified as the herald of the fight against the prevailing inequality. According to the expert Íñigo Errejón, they had to “turn the social dissatisfaction into an election trend”. So everything, including the controversial points in the ideological background, is in the election program, but softened. The major Chavist proposal of opening a democratic constituent process against the constitutional regime is just a statement without further development. Withdrawal from the NATO, the denunciation of the Treaty of Lisbon, the rejection of the Bologna Process, the cancellation of the “illegitimate” debt, and 20

21 22

Established in November 2010, La Tuerka goes on at the service of Pablo Iglesias even now. Hispan TV was inaugurated by President Ahmadinejad one year later. Its authorization may be considered a gift of the Socialist Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Moratinos, before losing the elections in November 2011. Juan Carlos MONEDERO, La Transición contada a nuestros padres, Madrid, La Catarata, 2013. “Pablo Iglesias no despeja las contradicciones sobre Venezuela y los medios”, El País, 17 November 2014. “Monedero cobró 425.000 euros por asesorar a Venezuela y sus socios”, El País, 21 January 2015.

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EU development policies are the hallmarks of this project. Social promises are prevailing. Some correspond to the current situation, others are adopted from Grillo or filtered from Chávez’ recipes: corruption, “decent employment”, general basic income, limitation of the communication lobbies, progressive taxation. Populism, to sum up, takes shape accumulating unattainable demands like the nationalization of the economy, and even the proposal to re-introduce recapitalized “Cajas de Ahorro”, the catastrophic public savings banks. In short: public is always good; private, evil. The regular geographical and social implantation, surprising for a brandnew group, proves the adjustment between the electoral offer and an important part of society really outraged with the system. In the field of self-positioning, Podemos is situated on the left-wing with 3.7, but its electorate is less radical than that of IU (3.4). PSOE and UPyD are centrist (5.2 and 5.6), and PP, right-wing, 8.6. José Ramón Montero summarizes, using Metroscopia data, Podemos is “closer to settled people than to marginalized ones”. The voters come from classes with a medium education (secondary and higher education), mostly over 35 years old. The electorate is neither rich nor unemployed nor elderly nor teenage. 34% of them are former PSOE voters. This social sector is very similar to the 5 Stars Movement in Italy, where 70% of the activists are between 30 and 49 years old (average: 42 years old), 67% are white-collar workers in the service sector, freelance professions, educated people and very few retirees and students23. Podemos’ geographical distribution of the vote confirms its broad implementation. In 25 of the 51 Spanish provinces, it received between 7 and 10% of the votes (7.83% average), the highest results are in Asturias (13.42%) or Madrid (11.20%), traditionally left-wing areas. They make their gains at the expense of the PSOE which is surpassed by IU and Podemos together in many places. Their share of the vote is also above 10% in provinces with a strong service sector; Las Palmas (13.33%) and the Balearic Islands (10.16%). It rarely falls below 5%. Further expansion can be expected, particularly as long as the PSOE is in free fall. “The caste” voters do not reach 50% of the electorate (in 2011, they attracted 80%). Hence, Podemos’ strategy is to proceed quickly with the State conquest. 2.1. Cybercratic Centralism The term is taken from the article “The Voice of the People or Cybercratic Centralism”, written by the Italian sociologist Rosanna de Rosa24. Its origin lies in the dual process of the 5 Stars Movement’s appearance in Italy, from the successful critical blog of comedian Beppe Grillo which attracted 200,000 visitors per day in 2010. In this blog, all the evils of a discredited regime are denounced. Subsequently, gatherings (meet-ups) take place concerned with immediate issues. They will lead to the urge to participate in elections, on the local level at first. With circles growing in an oil stain strategy, and an increasing electoral presence, the Movement is officially constituted in 2009. Thanks to the Internet, the participation of its members is effective and builds a sense of community whenever they share proposals and actions. The Proxy vote, electronic and without physical par23 24

José Ramón MONTERO, “Podemos como laboratorio político”, El País, 13 June 2014. Rosanna DE ROSA, “Voice of the People or Cybercratic Centralism. The Italian case of Beppe Grillo and Movimento Cinque Stelle”, News and Politics, 26 May 2013.

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ticipation, approaches “liquid democracy”. But on the national level, the same rule of the internet produces different results. Grillo is the owner of the brand. The ideological guidance is his exclusively. It is projected by computer on the organization and on the chosen ones (revocable). Robert Casaleggio, Grillo’s alter ego is in control. Grillini can do little against his guidelines and initiatives. If they demur, they are expelled. The organizational model designed by Pablo Iglesias and his team follows the same criteria of dual organization, local circles and political decisions at the apex, the typical Grillo “cybercratic centralism”. It is “a technological organization of distrust” (De Rosa), complemented by a pinch of communist experience. Apparently, it is isonomy, the perfect political participation of all its citizens. Podemos is a micro-society that embodies the real “People” – “la gente” – under conditions of equality. But participation doesn’t mean to actually take part in the decision-making process. On the one hand, looking at the history of the polis as a precedent, there is lack of isegoria, the ability to give and take information under conditions of equality. This is no problem for the leader: he defines the political outline, broadcasts it on the Internet and finds it reflected in what could be called an Agora democracy, which videocracy provides for the whole society. It is a perfect circuit. But from below, its function is limited, especially concerning key issues on the horizontal level. Bank rules the game. And the principle of universality only embellishes the storefront. It's the old Soviet hallmark of a “mass democracy”, but computerized. Consequently, it is useless to participate, when you are not allowed to effectively oppose the power. The organizational proposal works well at the local level. We can find the principle of substitution principle again, which Trotsky enunciated to criticize the military configuration defined by Lenin in “What is to be done?”. The location of sovereignty is in the basement; its effective implementation, at the top of the organization. Furthermore, there is a permanent monopoly of information in and for the headquarters. In Podemos, Beppe Grillo’s blog cannot be found, but everywhere, you receive the guidelines from the supreme leader, Pablo Iglesias. The lower ranks are permanently subordinated, once the Secretary General (Pablo Iglesias) was elected without feasible opposition, to a three year renewable direction only to be revoked by the vote of 30% of all of its affiliates. (During the constituent process in September-October, the conditions for revocation and for proposals of the Circles have been softened.) The Assembly elects a Council of the Citizens, similar in function to the PCE Central Committee with regards to the Executive, and a Coordinating Council, which is chosen by the Council of Citizens. The members of the Coordinating Council are “proposed by the “Portavoz” [now Secretary General] from among its members” (now the Coordinating Council has disappeared as an autonomous level and become the assistant of the Secretary General)25. It is a closed flow of circulation of power from the apex. Representation is abolished. Every citizen is a participant. And only one decides. 2.2. “The Future Belongs to Me” The “Constituent Assembly” of Podemos was a long process taking place from mid-September to mid-November, its high point being the mass meeting of Ma25

Antonio ELORZA, “Podemos en el jardín de los engaños”, El País, 11 October 2014.

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drid, on October18-19. There, the main proposals were announced, but not voted on. Only during the following week, the three documents on political strategy, organization and ethics were be submitted to the vote of the whole militancy. There was no room for any doubt about the results: “Of Course We Can” (“Claro que podemos”), the platform of Pablo Iglesias and his close collaborators, was to receive overwhelming support26. After that, it was time for the plebiscite on the Secretary General. Everything was prepared for that result. On a well-defined agenda, the adjacent proposals were left to the choice of the militants. So they had the opportunity to show the strength of mass democracy, voting on five resolutions in favour of public instruction, public health service, urgent fight against corruption, “the right for everyone to have his home and the end of financial impunity” and debt restructuring. The last one was a clever move, because up to this moment, Podemos’ position was the rejection of debt, and it was becoming the target of outside attacks. The press painted a different picture and considered this decision a step towards moderation. At any rate, participation was low: less than 30% of the “persons” voted for any of the one hundred resolutions. The debt proposal received 6.7% of preferences. The main obstacle for Iglesias’ apotheosis was the proposal of the organizational structure. It was plainly evident that the Leader aimed for absolute power, and that the cybercratic democracy disappeared behind his uncontested rule for a three year mandate, making his autocratic position even stronger than that of the classical Secretary General of a Communist Party. The Coordinating Committee is similar to the Executive Committee or Politburo. But in Podemos, it will be handpicked by the Secretary General. There is no space for pluralism. Preventing the possibility of an alternative vote favouring a collective, or at least a plural leadership, Iglesias made clear that he was not willing to accept such a decision. L’État c’est moi. Two of Podemos’ MEPs tried to defend the pluralist conception during the mass meeting, or to find a compromise at least. Again, Iglesias’ answer was unequivocal: “Heaven is not conquered by consensus, but by storm”. Democracy does not even exist as a possibility. Obviously, the ruling group of Podemos was not happy with this moment of public opposition. In fact, it is nowhere to be found on the Podemos website. Instead, you are offered to enjoy Iglesias’ speech at the European Parliament once again. Iglesias takes his own leadership very seriously, and therefore he made an advertisement to the pluralist group “Together We Can”: “Who loses must step aside”, after stressing that “storming heaven” cannot be done through “consensus” (i.e., democracy)27. Their spokesman answered that they would not step aside, but that the possibilities of victory were non-existent, not only with seven days at the disposal of the ruling group for putting pressure on the militants, but because the three main proposals – strategy, organization, ethic – were to be voted on together. The pluralist trend only offered an alternative for organisation but agreed with the other two. Storming the heaven, but what for? The political proposal insists on the general line already present in the pre-draft document. Its starting point is the irreversible crisis of the “regime of 1978”, that is the Constitutional regime. It is said to be in the hands of oligarchic elites whose policies run contrary to public inter26 27

Antonio ELORZA, “Podemos: asaltar, ¿para qué?”, El País, 24 October 2014. “Pablo Iglesias apela a la mayoría…”, El País, 18 October 2014.

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est. They provoked a general movement of “indignation” that was the birthplace of Podemos and forms its psycho-social basis even now. The main political purpose of the new party must be profit from the visible insecurity of the conservative elites, of the “caste” and their “media and financial networks”, and win the parliamentary elections of November 2015, conquering the government of the country. To wait is to lose. An economic recovery could destroy all these expectations, and the same can be said of a socialist revival. Again, the Socialist Party is the adversary, because its political meaning consist in the “integration of the subordinate classes in the regime of 1978”. Gramsci’s terminology hides the traditional hate of social-democracy. Once arrived at the point of explaining the real purposes of Podemos, prudence and deliberated ambiguity prevail, just as like during the electoral campaign of May 2014. After the “plebeian irruption”, the offer is not very clear: “democratic and popular opening, possibly in a constituent direction”. Juan Carlos Monedero, the main ideologue of Podemos, sheds some light in an article published in El País just before the mass meeting: After the victory in the general elections, there shall be a “the process of overthrowing the exhausted past and the beginning of a reconstruction of our democracy”28. Silently Chavez reappears. Criticism of the mass meeting has been very reluctant in the independent press. This is the unexpected result of a leitmotif of Podemos’ discourse: Podemos claims that the motive behind anybody’s disagreement with them must be that this person or newspaper belongs to the extreme right. Pablo Iglesias is a follower of the authoritarian pattern of aversion against the free press. In the course of the recent mass meeting, he interrupted the speech, asking ironically for “a tiny applause” for the newspapers that informed about dissent in Podemos. During his recent visit to his friends in Latin America, he recommended State control of the media. Once again, we feel the presence of Chávez. The “Constituent Assembly” is not a new form of mass democracy, but the building of a hierarchical party structure, where the Leninist sense of political action and discipline is latent below the surface of direct democracy and opening to “the people”. As an evidence of this, we have the plebiscitary confirmation of the founding leadership, the absence of any discussion of political strategy, and the imposition of Iglesias’ rules of autocratic organisation, without any possibility left for dissenters. Cybercratic centralism is an updated formula of “democratic centralism”, thanks to the possibilities offered by the technological revolution in course, and by efficient techniques of marketing. Anyhow, popular support of Podemos is growing day by day, and so is the cult of personality, directed towards Pablo Iglesias. His appearance on a TV program or that of any of his close collaborators, or of news about Podemos in the press, have an immediate effect on the audience, or on the number of people consulting the digital editions of newspapers. They are right about emphasising the role of the crisis of the economic and political representation for Podemos’ successful enterprise. The marketing is perfect, and so far, so is the recent masking of a hidden agenda. However, its authoritarian content can be easily discovered reading and listening to their multiple declarations and articles. Of course, they are more pronounced when there are no immediate polls on the horizon. 28

Juan Carlos MONEDERO, “Claro que Podemos”, El País, 17 October 2014.

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Conclusion The recent wave of corruption has given birth to a general attitude of rejection of the main actors of the parliamentary regime in Spain, especially directed against the Popular Party now in power. In its ranks, one scandal is uncovered after another; but neither the Socialist Party nor the United Left are completely free of charge. Under these circumstances, Podemos successfully presents itself as the champion of public morality and the first fighter against corruption (and against the international financial system that is protecting the guilty). On November 1st, El Pais published an article on this subject – “Podemos against fiscal paradises” – and all the records of approval were broken by the huge number of readers. On the following day, El País announced that Podemos had become the first party in Spain, according to one survey, with 27.7% of the vote, followed by the Socialist Party with 26,2%29. The Popular Party drops from 30.2% to 20.7% in one month, and new cases of corruption of its ruling elite are to be expected. Storming heaven is not necessary any more. The inhabitants of heaven are propelling themselves to hell at full speed

PODEMOS: EN ROUTE VERS LE POUVOIR La très forte montée en puissance de Pablo Iglesias et de son parti Podemos depuis sa fondation en janvier 2014 peut être expliquée par un marketing politique efficace. Comme le « mouvement 5 étoiles » en Italie, Podemos a réagi à un profond mécontetement social d´avec le système politique de l´espagne, qui se trouve dans une crise économique. Les manifestations de masse du 15 mai 20111 (15-M), le mouvement des « indignés » [indignados] le montrait clairement, mais aussi la raison de leurs échecs, parce qu´ils mobilisaient les masses sans perspectives politiques. Podemos se créait pour répondre à ces questions politiques. Son succès aux élections européennes de 2014 fut la première étape d´une spirale montante, dont l´aboutissement pourrait être la nomination d´Iglesias comme futur chef de gouvernement au lendemain des élections de décembre 2015 en Espagne. L´émergence de Podemos est loin d´être spontanée. Ce parti fut fondé par un groupe de professeurs et d´étudiants dans un milieu radicalisé de la vieille université de Madrid. Ils s´agissaient d´activistes communistes en contact étroit avec le président vénézuélien Hugo Chavez. Les gouvernements de gauche d´Amérique latine sont vus comme des alternatives politiques à la démocratie représentative en général et à l´ordre constitutionnel espagnol en particulier. La recette de Podemos est une participation de masse à travers la toile avec un contrôle stricte exercé par un chef charismatique. Cette domination autocratique fut exercée sans égard par Iglesias pendant la période de construction du part. Il s´agissait d´un update de la théorie de Lénine du parti révolutionnaire et peut être qualifié de « centralisme cybercratique », un concept forgé par De Rosa pour le « mouvement 5 étoiles ».

29

El País, 2 November 2014.

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PODEMOS: AUF DEM WEG ZUR MACHT Der kometenhafte politische Aufstieg von Pablo Iglesias und seiner Partei Podemos seit ihrer Gründung im Januar 2014 kann mit einem effizienten politischen Marketing erklärt werden. Wie Beppe Grillos 5 Sterne Bewegung in Italien hat auch sie auf eine tiefgreifende soziale Unzufriedenheit mit dem politischen System reagiert, das in einer ökonomischen Krise steckt. Der spontane Massenprotest vom 15. Mai 2011 (15-M), die Bewegung der „Empörten“ [indignados] zeigte dies klar und deutlich – und scheiterte, weil sie die Massen ohne politische Perspektive mobilisierte. Podemos kam, um diese gesellschaftlichen Fragen zu beantworten. Ihr Erfolg bei den Europawahlen im Mai 2014 war der erste Schritt einer Aufwärtsentwicklung, in deren Verlauf sich Iglesias bald als künftiger Regierungschef Spaniens nach den Wahlen im Dezember 2015 präsentieren konnte. Das Auftauchen von Podemos ist jedoch alles andere als spontan. Podemos wurde von einer Gruppe linker Professoren und Studenten in einer radikalisierten Umgebung an der alten Universität von Madrid gegründet. Sie waren kommunistische Aktivisten, deren Anführer in engem Kontakt mit dem venezolanischen Präsidenten Hugo Chávez stand. Lateinamerikanische linke Regierungen galten als politische Alternative zur repräsentativen Demokratie im Allgemeinen und zur Spanischen Verfassungsordnung im Besonderen. Das politische Rezept von Podemos ist die Massenbeteiligung durch das Netz bei strikter Kontrolle durch einen charismatischen Führer. Diese autokratische Herrschaft setzte Iglesias während der Aufbauphase rücksichtslos durch. Sie war das Update von Lenins Theorie der revolutionären Partei und kann als „cyberkratischer Zentralismus“ betrachtet werden. Diesen Begriff prägte De Rosa für die 5 Sterne Bewegung.

ANTI-EUROPEANISM ON THE RISE: THE CASE OF GREECE IANNIS KONSTANTINIDIS There is no other country in which the phenomenon of opposition to the European project has been more evident than in Greece in the last couple of years. Although Greece was considered one of the most Europhile members of the EU, for many years, and certainly since the late 1980s when the Socialists seriously began to come to terms with the country's position within the European family, Greece has experienced a rapid and dramatic change in the level of opposition to the EU. This rise culminated in July 2015, when more than 61% of the electorate voted against the agreement plan proposed by its European partners in a referendum that clearly put Greece's participation in the EU on the edge. During the week between the day the referendum was announced and the day it took place, the streets of Athens were literally flooded with thousands of people either supporting the country’s EU membership or protesting against the EU’s austerity measures. Regardless of the outcome of the referendum, it became evident that the process of European integration itself, as well as Greece’s role in it, has increasingly become an issue of political contestation in Greek society. This piece of work, based on secondary and primary empirical data, sheds some light on both the demand and the supply side of anti-Europeanism in Greece. It seeks to identify the ways in which Greeks have turned into one of the most anti-EU nations within the European Union, as well as the extent to which political parties in Greece have embraced negative feelings against Europe. The first part of the chapter will present the main parties’ views on EUrelated issues. It will conclude by asking whether the anti-EU or Eurosceptic positioning of some parties affects the opinions of other parties causing a spiral of increasing Euroscepticism in Greece. The second part will focus on the ways in which Greeks are turning against the EU and on an anatomy of who is standing more critically against the EU with an eye on testing the validity of social-cultural explanations against crisis-based explanations.

1. The Emergence of anti-Europeanism in Greece Greece was closely linked with the European Economic Community since July 9, 1961, when an agreement was signed establishing an association between the European Economic Community and Greece. This agreement established the closest relations of any country with the Community. It was designed to pave the way to Greece’s full membership. After the fall of the military Junta in 1974, the Greek State undertook serious efforts towards a full membership. The Greek candidacy, although accepted in principle by the member-states, was in fact re-

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ceived cautiously. Finally, in 1981, after twenty years and hard negotiations, Greece became the tenth member of the European Economic Community1. Greece’s accession to the European Economic Community coincided with the Greek Socialist Party (PASOK)’s victory at the general parliamentary elections of 1981. Among others, PASOK’s populist electoral platform included promises that could not be realized within the European Community, for example the socialist transformation of Greek society and the socialization of the means of production. PASOK was also against the membership of the European Community, calling for an economic strategy based on the nationalization of monopolies, the development of the home market through protectionist policies and the exploitation of natural resources by the state. Indeed, the Greek Socialists, more consistently than in any other aspect of their politics, insisted that the US, the NATO, and the “West” were the causes of the “Greek tragedy” and made the struggle against these forces their top political priority2. PASOK’s stance towards the European Community (EEC) turned out to be a very effective strategy of plundering left parties’ supporters. It demanded a “special relationship” with the EC (like Norway or Yugoslavia), adopting the position that the acceptance of the policy of accession was equivalent to a policy of national desertion, transferring responsibility for the future of the country to foreign decision-making centers. Reinforcing its left-wing nationalism, the party declared its willingness, once in power, to ask the Greek people to express, in a free referendum following a full public debate, their own decision on the accession to the EEC. However, like many other broken pre-electoral promises, the proposed referendum was never held3. Not surprisingly, the early anti-EEC rhetoric of some political parties disappeared by the mid-1980s when the economic benefits of the EEC membership became apparent. In this context, the European Community initially and later the European Union were highly appreciated following the inception of the Integrated Mediterranean Programs and of the “Cohesion” funds that considerably benefited Greece while at the same time allowing the parties to maintain their clienteles. After that, different kind of “battles” were fought in Brussels. For the next decades, in this manner, PASOK decisively shaped most of the political culture prevailing in Greek society to date. In 2010, the annus horribilis for the Greek economy, the Greek socialist government (PASOK) admitted that the country was unable to service its mounting public debt and resorted to the rescue mechanism set up by the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Greece was offered a first bailout package that was supplemented two years later by a new one – but linked to a harsh austerity program. This situation had side effects, too. Greece’s bankruptcy revealed the structural deficiencies of its state and private economy. Thus, the political-economic establishment that had man1 2 3

Foreign Greek Ministry, Diplomatic and Historic Archive (eds.), Greece’s participation in the European Integration process, Vol. II From the Association Agreement to the Accession into the European Economic Community (in Greek), Athens, Papazisis, 2006. Michalis SPΟURDALAKIS, The rise of the Greek Socialist Party, London, New York, Routledge, 1988, p. 233. Andreas Moschonas, “Political parties and European Integration: The Greek Experience”, Paper presented to the Fourth Biennial International Conference of the European Community Studies Association-ECSA Charleston, South Carolina, USA, 1995.

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aged the destiny of the country as well as the EU subsidies and funds in the last decades lost all credibility, overshadowing the institution of the European Union per se. Many people began to openly question core features of the process of integration like the gradual sharing of competences or even the country’s Eurozone membership and called for the retention of national sovereignty or independence. Moreover, the fact that this austerity program should be implemented by the parties (the conservative New Democracy Party and the social-democrat PASOK) that had managed Greece’s domestic affairs in such a catastrophic way – while receiving very generous public funding in order to cover the operational costs – further damaged the EU’s credibility. The implementation of the adjustment programme did not distinguish between the well off and the weaker segments of the Greek population. On the contrary, it imposed horizontal measures and cuts in salaries, pensions and the minimum wage4. The primacy of collective bargaining between the various interest groups, embedded in the Greek Constitution, was also lifted5. Consequently, the decline of the mainstream “government parties”, which had usually gathered more than 80% of the vote, enhanced the prominence of political parties that were either formerly negligible, like SYRIZA, or completely on the margins of the political landscape, as was the case with the neo-Nazi movement Golden Dawn. In the twin national elections of 2012, Greece’s old party system collapsed as voters abandoned the mainstream parties and turned to both the left and the right of the political spectrum. Because of its uncompromising anti-austerity stance, SYRIZA became the major opposition party, while the Golden Dawn party garnered about 7% of the vote6. Furthermore, a general feeling of externally imposed injustice began to take root within the Greek society undermining both the legitimacy of the adjustment programme and parliamentary democracy as a system. Large numbers of Greeks chose atypical channels of political participation. Verbal and physical attacks on individual PASOK and New Democracy members of Parliament were not infrequent. The distribution of voters’ positions vis-à-vis the European institutions shifted dramatically. According to a 2013 survey7, of all OECD member states, Greece has the highest rate of people (83%) who believe the government to be largely or entirely run by a few big entities acting in their own interest. The political parties are perceived by the public as the most corrupt institutions in the country. Of 95 countries, Greeks’ perceptions of their political parties are the second worst in the world, along with Mexico and Nepal. Only Nigeria’s parties fared worse in the public eye. The radical left alliance SYRIZA and the right-wing populist splinter party ANEL, which split off Nea Dimokratia (ND) in early 2012, have been campaigning since the day the majority of ND MPs voted in favor of the second agreement 4 5 6 7

Theofanis EXADAKTYLOS and Nikos ZACHARIADIS, Hellenic Observatory papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, no 65, December 2012. Valia ARANITOU, Social Dialogue and employer associations. From the social partners’ cooperation to the market hegemony, Athens, Savvalas, 2012 (In Greek), p. 171-176. Andreas STERGIOU, “The 2012 Parliamentary elections in Greece”. Original title: “Des élections à l'anarchie ?”, Outre-terre: Revue européenne de géopolitique, vol. 32, L’euro sans l’Europe ?, II, 2012, p. 357-361. Transparency International, The 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, p. 15-17.

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for a series of amendments in the agreements Greece has signed with European partners, without ever explicitly admitting it. The have made implicit references to the EU institutions’ malfunctions or to some sort of abstract European interests taking advantage of the country’s bad economic situation. This type of discourse rather dominated the public sphere since May 2011, when the Greek indignados (the so-called aganaktismenoi) had first entered the central squares of Athens and other big cities, and further increased once the new government came into power. Greek society’s increasing aversion against the European Union found its expression in many ways. The first one was a pathological anti-Germanism fueled by the Greeks’ bitter memories of the Nazi-occupation during the Second World War. Led by a number of parliamentarians from both SYRIZA and the right-wing populist Independent Greeks, public opinion became gradually interested in claiming compensation for the Nazi murders of innocent victims. A recent survey reveals that the German government’s rejection of such claims might have motivated the Greek public to demonstrate in the streets more than any other issue, including cuts in public spending, international peace or even the EU’s decision to stop funding the Greek state8. Anti-German sentiments were reflected in the widespread view that it was Germany’s – or even Chancellor Merkel’s – authoritative behavior that accounted for the EU’s harsh stance on the bailout agreement. In early 2014, one in five voters thought Merkel’s authoritative behavior was the main reason for the public opinion’s having taking a turn for the worse on the EU issue9. The second has been the Greek society’s dissatisfaction with the lack of a coherent EU response as well as with many EU countries for their insufficient solidarity with the country’s handling the tremendous migratory wave into Europe. Greece is a “front state in the defense of Europe” for those concerned about migration. Greece has been the gateway for record numbers of non-registered immigrants and asylum seekers to Europe. Therefore, for a long time, Athens has called for more solidarity and a coherent EU response to the numbers of refugees and irregular immigrants from the Middle East, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. The Dublin II regulation of 2003 obliged the country of first entry to the EU to stop illegal immigrants from travelling to other EU countries. This regulation was most frequently applied in Greece. Even before the onset of the financial crisis, migration had topped the public agenda as one of the most important problems of the country. Although the role of the EU in handling the problem is quite complicated, gradually, coalition and opposition parties alike emphasized the importance of an EU intervention in order to reallocate migrants from their points of entry to Europe, i.e., basically Greece and Italy, to other EU member states. Survey findings suggest that public views on the issue have been evenly distributed among the anti-immigrant/pro-immigrant spectrum with the majority, however, closer to blame the EU for the very bad living conditions of immigrants on the one hand, or, on the other hand, the accumulation of an extremely large number of people with no shelter on the Greek territory. 8 9

Survey carried out by the Observatory of Radicalism at the University of Macedonia, June 2015. Survey carried out by the Public Opinion Research Institute of the University of Macedonia, April 2014.

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However, concerning the international profile of the country, a more serious reverberation emanated from the belief that Greece’s foreign policy ought to be re-configured in order to forge new alliances with new international actors like the BRICS. From the first moment, many Greeks had opposed the rescue package for Greece linked to harsh austerity measures imposed by the European Union, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In 2010, they requested the Greek government to consider a loan from Russia instead. But when Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou visited Moscow, Vladimir Putin advised him to go to the IMF for funding, and Greece had no other choice but to accept the EU and IMF bailout-policy10. Pro-Russian views are popular in large parts of the Greek society. In May 2014, for instance, almost six out of ten Greeks rejected the EU initiative to impose economic sanctions on Russia because of to the Russian invasion of the Ukraine11. There is a widespread perception in Greece that it shares a common religious belief and political and cultural historical roots with Russia as well as common economic and political interests. Many Greek foreign policy analysts, among them the foreign minister of the SYRIZA-led government, Nikos Kotzias,12 have argued that closer ties with Russia ought to be part of a multidimensional Greek foreign policy. Especially SYRIZA’s current coalition partner and previous passionate bail-out policy opponent, the right-wing populist party of the Independent Greeks, has been comfortable with Putin’s ideology of traditionalist nationalism, social conservatism and religious affiliation which runs contrary to SYRIZA’s deeply rooted atheism.

2. The Supply Side: The Party Discourse on the EU Issue In this political and social constellation, there are several parties that could be uncovered as hard or soft Eurosceptic. First of all, there are the traditional hard Eurosceptics: From the very first moment of the country’s accession to the EEC, the Greek Communist Party (KKE) on has fought a merciless and unrelenting war against European integration conforming to its Marxist-Leninist ideology. The extra-parliamentary left splinter parties consider the EU an advance forum of imperialism and neo-liberalism. The right-wing extremist party Golden Dawn oppose the European Union as a menace for Greek national sovereignty. These parties completely reject the EU project. They most certainly belong to the hard Eurosceptic parties. The two new governmental partners, the Radical Left Coalition Party (SYRIZA) and the Independent Greeks, rank among parties raising severe doubts against the EU project. Since its foundation in 1992, SYRIZA has taken an inconsistent and peculiar stance towards European integration. Initially, it had been a typical pro-European party. In 2000, though, the party initiated a change of its political orientation and strategy. It adopted more radical positions in some is10 11 12

Andreas STERGIOU, “EU-Russia Antagonism in the Eastern Mediterranean”, Russian International Affairs Council, 19 Οctober 2015. EUVox Voting Advice Application Data available at: http://www.euvox2014.eu/?page _id=363 (3 March 2015). Nikos KOTZIAS, Greece’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century (in Greek), Athens, Kastaniotis, 2010.

IANNIS KONSTANTINIDIS

46

sues and formed an electoral coalition with several parties and organizations from the extra-parliamentary left. In the wake of the crisis, the party showed an ever-growing critical attitude towards the EU and Greece’s participation in the EU project, gradually turning into a soft Eurosceptic party. SYRIZA’s soft Eurosceptic attitude strives for the reform of the EU led fiscal and economic policies. Its criticism is based on the argument that if Greece were to implement the – according to the leftist analysis – failed austerity policy of technocrats and bankers pursued by the previous Greek governments, there would be no need for free elections in Greece or, in fact, in any European country locked into austerity programs. This, in turn, means that austerity imposed from the outside cannot be reversed by the democratic political process inside the country. This, in turn, runs counter to the European value system13. Its smaller governmental ally, the Independent Greeks (ANEL), adopted most of SYRIZA’s party discourse, and especially the conspiracy theories of bankers and foreign interests, most likely Jews, being actively involved in the collapse of the Greek economy. The party was actually founded as a splinter party when the conservative New Democracy accepted the EU plans for the Greek bailout and, by that, the functioning of the EU. ANEL’s objections to this point reveal the party’s critical position against the EU. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the positions of Greek parties on issues related to both the general principles and the workings of the EU. The analysis was carried out by a number of experts involved in designing the voting advice application EUVox in April 2014. It reveals that both the hardliners, i.e., the Communist KKE and the extreme right-wing Golden Dawn, and the soft Eurosceptics, namely, the radical left SYRIZA and the right-wing populist ANEL, share similar views concerning the core principles of the EU integration project. For instance, all four of them stand against the EU’s common foreign policy arguing that it might limit the capacity of Greece to act independently. In addition, when the Golden Dawn wishes to restrict the right of EU citizens to work in Greece, it also opposes the free movement of persons (see Table 1). Table 1: Euroscepticism within Party Discourse – the Principles of the EU The right of EU citizens to work in Greece should be restricted

ND

There should be a common EU foreign policy even if this limits the capacity of Greece to act independently

The EU should redistribute resources from richer to poorer EU regions

Rather disagree

Neither/Nor

Rather agree

SYRIZA

Completely disagree

Rather disagree

Completely agree

PASOK (ELIA)

Completely disagree

Completely agree

Rather agree

ANEL

Rather disagree

Rather disagree

Completely disagree

GD

Rather agree

Completely disagree

Neither/Nor

KKE

Completely disagree

Completely disagree

Neither/Nor

13

Vassilis FOUSKAS, “Letter from Athens”, The Political Quarterly, 86, July–September 2015, p. 353-358.

ANTI-EUROPEANISM ON THE RISE: THE CASE OF GREECE

47

The right of EU citizens to work in Greece should be restricted

There should be a common EU foreign policy even if this limits the capacity of Greece to act independently

DHMAR

Rather disagree

Completely agree

Rather agree

POTAMI

Completely disagree

Completely agree

Completely agree

The EU should redistribute resources from richer to poorer EU regions

Source: EUVox Voting Advice Application (2014) – Anti-EU views are highlighted

Table 2: Euroscepticism within Party Discourse – the Workings of the EU Greece should never adopt Euro

To address financial crises, the EU should be able to borrow money just like states can

A single member state should be able to block a treaty change, even if all the other members states agree to it

Completely disagree

Rather agree

Rather agree

SYRIZA

Rather disagree

Completely agree

Rather agree

PASOK (ELIA)

Completely disagree

Rather agree

Not clear

ANEL

Completely agree

ND

Rather disagree

Not clear

GD

Neither/Nor

Rather disagree

Rather agree

KKE

Neither/Nor

Completely disagree

Completely agree

DHMAR

Completely disagree

Completely agree

Rather disagree

POTAMI

Completely disagree

Completely agree

Rather disagree

Source: EUVox Voting Advice Application (2014) – Anti-EU views are highlighted

Party positions on issues regarding the workings of the EU further confirm that currently, questioning crucial mechanisms of the EU structure has become the norm for a number of Greek parties. Although none has clearly stated that Greece ought to leave the Eurozone, not even on the eve of the July 2015 referendum, the communist KKE and the extreme-right Golden Dawn oppose further economic integration since they do not agree with the recent decision of the EU that it should be able to borrow money just like states to address financial crises. Both hard Eurosceptic parties clearly oppose political integration as well, as revealed by their willingness to accept the controversial statement that “a single member state should be able to block a treaty change, even if all the other member states agree to it”. Interestingly enough, SYRIZA and ANEL also agree on the latter. It is surprising, however, that even the conservative New Democracy expresses such a reluctant view on this issue. New Democracy, always considered the most pro-European party in Greece, seems to distance itself somewhat from the heart of the political integration project. Quite possibly, it is an attempt to stay in tune with the increasingly more Eurosceptic feelings of the Greek public opinion. This is clear evidence that even pro-European parties attempt to respond to the increasing supply of Euroscepticism in Greece (see Table 2).

IANNIS KONSTANTINIDIS

48

Further evidence of the Greek parties’ reluctance to fully express their support of the EU project is provided by their positions on the issue of Russia’s invasion of neighboring Ukraine. Apart from the conservative New Democracy, the socialist PASOK and the small social-liberal Potami, all other parties, including the soft Eurosceptic parties as well as DHMAR (a rather moderate left party that split from SYRIZA) clearly disagreed with the EU initiative to impose economic sanctions on Russia. These party positions are clearly mirroring public sentiment favoring a foreign policy that respects traditional and long-lasting religious and cultural bonds between Greece and Russia.

3. The Demand-Side: How do Voters Feel about the EU? Increasing supply of anti-European stances corresponded with increasing demand for such views. Concerning their position towards the European Union, the Greeks’ judgement had been more positive than that of the average European. In 2009, 70% of Greeks argued that the country’s participation in EU was a good thing. The same held true for 69% of Europeans. Five years later, only 43% of all Greeks still shared the same view; this time, their number clearly below the 2014 European average (51%). In many member-states, support of the EU has notably dropped between 2009 and 2014. Greece is among the countries with the steepest decline in support of the EU as well as trust in European institutions, several EU policies and economic integration as such. Graphs 1 to 4 reveal that just before the May 2014 European Elections, one out of four Greeks had negative feelings towards the EU, and more than half did not trust EU institutions. Moreover, the majority of Greeks did not support the EU Common Foreign Policy. They were also opposed to the recent EU initiative that national budgets should be approved by the EU first. In other words, the majority of the Greek electorate seems to have lost faith in a wide range of different aspects related to the EU project altogether14. Table: Feelings towards the EU by Party, Source: Public Opinion Research Unit, Univ. of Macedonia negative

neither

positive

ND

17

9

74

SYRIZA

35

11

54

ELIA

14

7

79

ANEL

52

22

26

GD

58

2

40

DHMAR

15

0

85

KKE

64

33

3

POTAMI

17

4

79

14

For an extensive tracking of disaffection and Euro-rejectionism in Greek public opinion, see Susannah VERNEY, “Waking the 'sleeping giant' or expressing domestic dissent? Mainstreaming Euro-scepticism in crisis-stricken Greece”, International Political Science Review, 36 (3), p. 279-295.

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49

Table: Trust in EU Institutions, Source: Public Opinion Research Unit, University of Macedonia yes

neither

no

ND

72

9

19

SYRIZA

16

10

74

ELIA

59

14

27

ANEL

14

0

86

GD

19

0

81

DHMAR

31

7

62

KKE

23

7

70

POTAMI

43

25

32

Table: Support for Common Foreign Policy by party, Source: Public Opinion Research Unit, Univ. of Macedonia agree

neither

disagree

ND

50

4

46

SYRIZA

25

6

69

ELIA

47

6

47

ANEL

8

0

92

GD

28

0

72

DHMAR

33

17

50

KKE

20

3

77

POTAMI

53

2

45

Table: ‘National budgets to be approved by EU’ by Party, Source: Public Opinion Research Unit, University of Macedonia agree

neither

disagree

ND

75

6

19

SYRIZA

33

3

64

ELIA

56

19

25

ANEL

33

0

67

GD

54

0

46

DHMAR

67

0

33

KKE

24

2

74

POTAMI

61

5

34

50

IANNIS KONSTANTINIDIS

Demographic factors surely account for variation among different population strata concerning their view of the EU. Negative feelings are shared by 35% of all those over 55 years old and by more than 45% of those who have not finished high school. However, the crucial difference exists in the proportions of the ND, PASOK (Elia) and Potami voters who support the EU institutions and policies, and the proportions of the KKE, GD, and to some extent ANEL and even SYRIZA voters who rather oppose the EU. This finding points towards a political explanation of the increasing hostility towards, or at least controversy about, the EU issue in Greece. It is the party discourse that might have generated or reinforced existing negative sentiments towards the EU in the aftermath of the country’s first bailout agreement. After having described the supply-side of antiEuropeanism, let us briefly present the electorate’s perceptions of which parties are the most pro- and the most anti-EU. After all, if voters consider a party antiEU, their sympathy for it will guide their feelings towards the EU even if the party discourse does not confirm such perceptions. Graph 5 indicates that the conservative New Democracy, the social-democratic PASOK and the socialliberal Potami are regarded as pro-European by the electorate, while the Golden Dawn and the communist KKE are not. Views on SYRIZA are often divided: 10% consider it the most pro-EU and 26% the most anti-EU party. One year after the survey was conducted, these perceptions are very precisely replicating the July 2015 division at the referendum: New Democracy, PASOK and Potami openly campaigned in favor of the YES vote, while Golden Dawn, SYRIZA and ANEL supported the NO side. The KKE opted for a blank vote that was not uniformly adopted by its voters, though. Graph 1: Public perceptions of pro-European and anti-European parties – Source: Public Opinion Research Unit, University of Macedonia

4. The Electoral Dimension of Greek anti-Europeanism Whereas until 2014, Greece would have belonged to the group of countries in which the elections to the European Parliament are of secondary importance, with a low turnout and no impact on the political party competition, the May 2014 electoral contest was significant in that it was yet another showdown in domestic politics. Furthermore, it was an opportunity to assess the public sentiment towards the EU. As most Greeks are not able to distinguish between the

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51

various EU bodies, the EU Parliament is generally perceived as an extension of the EU15. For the very first time in Modern Greek history, a left party gathered the majority of votes. Previously, the most significant performance of the left had been in 1958, when the so-called EDA left coalition gained 24.4% of the votes. Although since 1974, the left had prevailed in terms of political culture and ideological thinking, Greek left parties did not manage to capitalize on their resonance in elections. On May 25, 2014, SYRIZA topped the national poll, while the extreme right-wing Golden Dawn’s strength increased remarkably. The coalition partners, i.e., the center-right New Democracy and the social-democratic PASOK, suffered a combined loss of 11% compared with the results of the June 2012 elections. But with the two-party coalition’s combined 30%, SYRIZA’s lead was not the endorsement the party had been looking for to overturn the government. Instead, the collapse of the mainstream parties benefited the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn which was catapulted onto third place behind SYRIZA and New Democracy in the country’s political constellation. Although stridently anti-EU and anti-bailout, Golden Dawn is also the most vicious extreme-right party in Europe with a third of its leadership in prison on charges of running a criminal organization and a number of its MPs accused of racial violence, possession of illegal weapons and extortion. Nevertheless, the party had managed to cultivate an anti-system and anti-immigrant profile, capitalize on these sentiments and usurp the massive realignment of the Greek electorate away from mainstream parties. As analysts of the phenomenon have already noted, the ethnocentric, racist conception of politics does not stop at excluding non-Greeks from the state but also incorporates a call for the radical transformation of society16. The 2014 European Parliament electoral results clearly revealed this fact. The influence of Golden Dawn began to spill over from the impoverished suburbs of the inner cities, and especially Athens17, to the most rural and non-urban regions of Greece, and even to the most cosmopolitan districts like Kolonaki, in the center of Athens. Here is a list of all the parties elected at the May 2014 Europeans, the percentage they gained, and the seat allocation at the Parliament18: – Coalition of Radical Left (SYRIZA) – 26.57% of the vote and 6 MEPs – New Democracy – 22.72% of the vote and 5 MEPs – Golden Dawn – 9.39% of the vote and 3 MEPs – PASOK (Elia) – 8.02% of the vote and 2 MEPs – Potami – 6.60% of the vote and 2 MEPs – Communist Party – 6.11% of the vote and 2 MEPs – Independent Greeks – 3.49% of the vote and 1 MEP For the very first time, only nine out of twenty-one MEPs (those elected on the party tickets of New Democracy, PASOK and Potami) openly support pro15 16 17 18

The elections were held in line with a new electoral amendment for the EU parliament elections for the very first time permitting the vote of individual candidates. Antonis ELLINAS, “The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece”, South European Society and Politics, 18 (4), p. 543-565. Elias DINAS, Vassiliki GEORGIADOU, Iannis KONSTANTINIDIS and Lamprini RORI (2013), “From Dusk to Dawn: Local Party Organisation and Party Success of Right-Wing Extremism”, Party Politics, 2013, DOI: 10.1177/1354068813511381. (3 March 2015). Source: Greece’ s Interior Ministry.

52

IANNIS KONSTANTINIDIS

European views, while five of them (on the lists of KKE and Golden Dan) are clearly opposing the EU and seven more (elected with today’s government coalition partners, SYRIZA and ANEL) do not hesitate to express their disappointment, or even their anger, with the way the European project is unfolded nowadays. The truth is that in the Greek case, the May 2014 election was more of a prelude to the general elections rather than an opportunity for the parties to compete on their stances on the EU issue. It should not be underestimated though, that parties which have clearly held Eurosceptic or even anti-European stances easily got elected.

Conclusion The years that followed the 2010 first bailout agreement between Greece and its European partners saw a dramatic shift towards Eurosceptic, if not anti-European positions of a country which used to top the list of all member countries with the highest number of voters favoring their country's participation in the EU. With negative sentiments on all kinds of issues (from the common foreign policy to the approval of national budgets by EU), one might wonder about the reason for such a shift despite the fact that European funds have repeatedly, although not steadily, supported the Greek economy. With negative feelings being more prominent among the most vulnerable strata of the population, older cohorts and non-graduates, it is reasonable to believe that the austerity measures and the perceived mismanagement of the Greek financial crisis that account for the anti-EU positions. The EU leadership’s (and most implicitly Germany's) involvement in the Greek crisis has clearly affected public sentiments towards EU, even if the Greek government is equally blamed for the mismanagement by the electorate. But the role of the increasing supply of the Eurosceptic party discourse for the public shift from pro- to anti-EU positions has not been discussed adequately. With the exception of the Communists (KKE), all other parties in Greece have consistently, albeit vaguely, favored the country’s position within the EU for decades. But negative references to the EU have gradually entered the party discourse after the country’s activation of the bailout mechanism. Anti-Europeanism has been seen as a political opportunity: splinter parties like the Independent Greeks (ANEL) and other parties that split off the socialist PASOK and failed to put their mark on election day, as well older parties, like the Golden Dawn, seized the opportunity and further boosted anti-European sentiments by their rhetoric in order to increase their share of the vote. Most importantly, their electoral success at the 2012 General Elections has affected the openly pro-European stances of the formerly big parties (New Democracy and PASOK) as well as SYRIZA, the party always divided on the EU issue. Fighting against the previously mentioned new contestants and trying to distinguish themselves from each other, even the mainstream parties have been occasionally keeping their distance from Brussels. This was most evident in the case of SYRIZA which actually capitalized on Euroscepticism to win power in January 2015. Consequently, larger parties' electoral concerns account for their positive reactions to fringe parties'

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53

anti-European discourse ending up boosting the demand for such positions among the electorate. Greece is facing a vicious cycle of anti-Europeanism.

ANTI-EUROPÉISME EN CROISSANCE: LE CAS DE LA GRÈCE Cette analyse porte à la fois sur l´offre et la demande d´hostilité à l´Europe en Grèce. Elle montre que les grecs sont devenus un des peuples les plus hostiles à l´union européenne et l´intensité avec laquelle les partis politiques ont fait leurs des positions anti-européennes. Ces cinq dernières années, l´intensité de la résistance á l´Europe s´est modifiée de manière rapide et dramatique. Cette poussé a atteint son maximum en juillet 2015, lorsque 61% des électeurs rejetaient à l´occasion d´un référendum un accord proposé par les partenaires européens de la Grèce et mettaient en danger ainsi le maintien de la Grèce dans l´UE. La validité d´explications socio-culturelles ou basées sur la crise sont examinées et le texte présente une anatomie des électeurs et partis, critiques de l´Europe.

WACHSENDER ANTI-EUROPÄISMUS: DER FALL GRIECHENLAND Diese Untersuchung beleuchtet sowohl die Nachfrage – als auch die Angebotsseite der Europafeindlichkeit in Griechenland. Sie stellt fest, wie die Griechen zu einem der europafeindlichsten Völker in der Europäischen Union geworden sind und untersucht, wie stark sich politische Parteien in Griechenland negative Einstellungen gegenüber Europa zu Eigen gemacht haben. In den letzten fünf Jahren hat sich das Ausmaß des Widerstandes gegen die EU schnell und dramatisch geändert. Dieser Anstieg erreichte seinen Höhepunkt im Juli 2015, als mehr als 61% der Wähler in einem Referendum die von den europäischen Partnern vorgeschlagene Vereinbarung ablehnten und so den Verbleib Griechenlands in der EU gefährdeten. Die Gültigkeit soziokultureller gegenüber krisenbasierter Erklärungen wird geprüft. Der Text präsentiert eine Anatomie der Wähler und Parteien, die der EU kritisch gegenüberstehen.

EUROSCEPTICISM IN CYPRUS ANDREAS STERGIU Cyprus’s journey to the European Union officially began in 1972, when the Republic Cyprus1 signed the Association Agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC). Strategic rather than economic considerations apparently underlay the European Community’s decision to sign the agreement with Cyprus2. From a European point of view, the Community had little to gain economically from Cyprus at that time, but at the same time, it was important to attain political stability in the region. The strategic importance of Cyprus as a bridge to the Middle East overrode any economic argument3. In July 1990, Cyprus submitted the application for full membership. The hitherto trading relations were upgraded and set in a new framework, thus making the EU-accession course of Cyprus a fundamental political choice. In April 2003, the European Parliament consented to Cyprus’ accession to the European Union. In May 2004, the Mediterranean island joined the EU. Although the whole island is officially part of the EU, EU legislation is suspended in the Northern part, where the Government of Cyprus does not exercise control. Cyprus’ efforts were linked to the expectation that the EU-membership would make the Cyprus a European one. They hoped for a breakthrough in the long-lasting division of the island. Four years later, in 2008, Cyprus adopted the euro. In 2012, it became the fifth country of the seventeennation Eurozone to seek bailout assistance from the EU and the IMF. In the Cypriot overwhelmingly pro-European political system, so far, two parties have been demonstrating the strongest Eurosceptic features: the Cypriot Communist Party-AKEL and the radical right party (National Popular Front) ELAM, Greece’s Golden Dawn’s sister party. The Cypriot Communist Party, AKEL (the Progressive Party of Working People) was founded in 1941. Until today, it has been one of the most successful Marxist-Leninist parties of the Western world. Furthermore, within the EU, it was the first one to enter government as the main political force (from 2008 until 2013). The far right Party ELAM stands at other end of the Cypriot political spectrum. It also belongs to the anti-European camp. The radical nationalist movement ELAM was founded in Cyprus, not accidentally, in 2008, when the communist leader of AKEL, Dimitris Christofias, was elected the new President of the Republic of Cyprus. Many ELAM members were initially members of the Greek neo-Nazi movement Golden Dawn. Both AKEL and ELAM, however, cannot be described using the main categories of the dominant typologies of anti-European

1 2 3

The paper refers to the part of Cyprus officially known as the Republic of Cyprus, not to the northern part of the island occupied by Turkey since 1974. Cf. Charalambos TSARDANIDIS, The Politics of the EEC-Cyprus Association Agreement: 1972-1982, Nicosia, Cyprus Research Center, 1988. George CHRISTOU, The European Union and Enlargement. The Case of Cyprus, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 63.

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ANDREAS STERGIU

parties. They have presented very heterogeneous features of criticism of Europe and European integration.4 Indeed, following the dichotomy between “hard” and “soft” Euroscepticism suggested by Szczerbiak and Taggart5, AKEL and ELAM have been incorporating elements of both. In the respective theoretical framework, “hard” Euroscepticism is defined as a principled opposition to the EU and to the process of European integration. It characterizes parties that insist on their countries’ withdrawing from the EU. “Soft” Euroscepticism, on the other hand, refers to the expressed concern over one or several EU policy areas, to a qualified opposition to the EU, or to the emphasis of “national interest’’ contradicting the EU trajectory. Other scholars6 have put forward other typologies, distinguishing between Euroscepticism and Europhobia. According to them, Eurosceptics are the more moderate political forces expressing vocal criticism against the EU and its policies and calling for reform. Europhobes reject the EU membership and demand withdrawal from the EU, the Euro, and/or the Schengen area. Eurosceptics have followed various fields of criticism related to national sovereignty – like the transfer of power from the member states to the EU – or to economy by denouncing Brussels as “a place of uncontrolled free market liberalisation”. Criticism of the EU as a stronghold of neo-liberalism gained importance during the sovereign debt crisis and after the creation of the Troika. The latter symbolised an ‘‘IMF type’’ relation between Brussels and the countries under program, based on the conditionality principle. This Eurosceptic dimension seems to apply to the case of Cyprus and can explain the recent radical transformation in political parties’ criticisms of European integration or EU decisions. The March 2013 bail-in agreement was indeed a significant catalyst for the rise of Euroscepticism in Cyprus. It caused concerns related primarily to the socio-economic status of the island and affected Cypriots’ view of EUinstitutions. This runs counter to the initial enthusiasm that had prevailed in the island since the nineties, when the Cyprus government decided to submit its application to become a member the European Union. The attitude the EU adopted towards Cyprus’ existential economic and financial crisis is the main reason for the widespread Euroscepticism, which has plagued the island since 2012. Since the Cypriot economy is closely linked to the Greek one, the debt crisis in Greece had was the cause of serious difficulties already in 2011. It became evident that Cyprus would be unable to pay the debt on bonds worth around 1.2 billion dollars in early 2012 without external financial assistance. However, in August 2011, the European Commission announced that it would not grant credits to Cyprus, even though financial support of Greece had been approved previously. Cypriot banks – the fundamental pillar of the island’s economy – were severely hit by the debt crisis of the Greek state. Huge sums of rescue money were required to shore them up. Rating agencies dramatically downgraded the Cyp4

5 6

Petr KOPECKY and Cas MUDDE, “Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe”, European Union Politics, 3, 2002, p. 297–326; Aleks SZCZERBIAK and Paul TAGGART, (eds.), “Opposing Europe?”, The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, 2, Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008. Aleks SZCZERBIAK and Paul TAGGART, op.cit., p. 1-2 and p. 240-242. Yves BERTONCINI and Nicole KOENIG, Euroscepticism OR Europhobia: Voice vs. Exit?, Notre Europe, Policy Paper, Jaques Delor Institute, 121, 27 November 2014, p. 1, 5, 7-8.

EUROSCEPTICISM IN CYPRUS

57

riot credit rating to junk status. This move effectively excluded Cyprus from international markets. It was a wide spread belief that the island had no other choice than to seek help from Russia, which granted Cyprus a loan of 2.5 billion dollars at the favourable interest rate of 4.5% in December 20117. For long time, Cypriot-Russian economic ties have been very close. Even in 1982, the Soviets had signed the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income and Property with the Cypriot Government. This is the reason why, in the early 1990s, Cyprus was one of the few capitalist countries in which an institutional framework already existed for Russian capital outflow and inflow. Cyprus rapidly became one of the favourite destinations for Russian capital. Under the AKEL-administration (2008-2013) Russian-Cypriot economic relations were even more reinforced, since Cypriot President Christofias and other professional party cadres had studied in Moscow or in other former socialist countries. However, the Russian assistance was not enough to shore up Cyprus. In the spring of 2012, the haircut in Greek government debt brought about heavy losses of Cypriot banks. The government in Nicosia was forced to raise fresh money in order to recapitalize the island’s banking sector. Still excluded from the bond markets, Nicosia turned again to its partners in the European currency union for financial aid. Cyprus considered itself treated unfairly. The EU decision to restructure Greece's debt had forced Cypriot banks into writing off around 80% of the value of their Greek bond holdings. According to the Cypriots, the writedown of Greece’s debt should have been distributed among the Eurozone members based on the size of their economies of which Cyprus makes up just 0.2%. Nevertheless, the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund, together known as the troika, were only willing to grant that assistance in the context of a bailout program. The conditions demanded by other EU-countries were stricter than those of the loan Cyprus had so far taken from Moscow. For this reason, the communist government in Nicosia, with its strong ties to Russia since the Cold War, decided to Moscow for a further 5 billion euro loan ask at the same time. The Cypriot government expected Russia to grant a loan without conditions. Moscow, however, refused to advance more money to Cyprus. Therefore, the Cypriot government returned to its European partners in search of financial assistance. The EU faced a dilemma: It had to fund the bailout completely, which meant raising the 17 billion dollars needed to bail out the country, or force a haircut on Cyprus’s depositors. The EU opted for the second choice, which precipitated an unprecedented tax on bank deposits in Cypriot banks. The overwhelming majority of Cypriot citizens suffered a big financial loss. All insured deposits of 100.000 euro or less were exempted from the levy. However, the second largest bank of Cyprus, Laiki Bank, was shut down and all uninsured deposits above 100.000 euro were levied there. Furthermore, in the Bank of Cyprus, about 60 per cent of the uninsured deposits above 100.000 euro, many held by wealthy Russians and Russian multinational corporations, were also levied up. Apparently, Cypriot leaders were so concerned with keeping their wealthy offshore Russian custom7

See Andreas STERGIOU, “Russian policy in the eastern Mediterranean and the implications for EU external action”, European Union’s Institute for Security Studies (ISS)-online-publicationsopinions, July 2012.

ANDREAS STERGIU

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ers happy that they pushed their own citizens to pay even more than some of the lenders were demanding. In fact, in spring 2013, the bailout became a bail-in agreement8 with the Euro-group, the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF. The agreement entailed a 10 billion euro funding package in exchange for significant reforms in the banking and public sectors. The EU decisions, however, provoked fear, and uncertainty among Cypriot political forces and citizens. They endangered the country’s status as a tax haven, severely hit the island’s thriving service sector, rapidly decreased the country’s gross domestic product, and increased unemployment, for the first time spreading highly negative images of Europe9.

1. The Peculiar Forms of Criticism of Europe in Cyprus Unlike in other EU member states, there are no so-called “single-issue Eurosceptic parties” in Cyprus. In general, in the past two decades, political parties in Cyprus widely agreed on the desirability of the European project. Euroscepticism was mostly expressed as a form of protest against various policies of the EU and because of feelings of disappointment and disillusionment10. Even AKEL’s anti-EU ideological position, like its political rhetoric, had become very lax and volatile in the course of time. Every time circumstances forced the party to adopt a clear stand on a crucial issue, it became obvious that its communism was but a rhetorical box. Ideology was always set “in perspective”. The party leadership employed dialectical acrobatics to prove that circumstances were too difficult and unripe to unleash confrontation, requiring a bourgeois, realpolitik sense of struggle instead that would be a benefitting factor of the labour movement in the future. Marxist-Leninist rhetoric appeared to have been used for purely populist reasons and mainly to appease the old-fashioned ideological reflexes of AKEL’s stalwarts, many of whom had studied in socialist countries.11 Until the mid-1990s, even after the end of the Cold War, AKEL maintained a hard Eurosceptic/Europhobic position, mainly based on ideological grounds, i.e., anti-Western and anti-capitalist ones. In line with most of the orthodox Communist parties during the Cold War, the party rigorously interpreted the world as split between the capitalist/imperialist forces on the one side and the peace 8 9

10 11

Actually it was an early test of what has since become the official European Union policy of “bailing-in banks’’. The policy is intended to force creditors and depositors to pay for a bank’s mistakes and to spare taxpayers from paying for their rescue. What the European leaders had obviously engineered in order to end an economic model fuelled by a flood of cash and “dirty money” from Russia turned out to backfire. As the bail-in provided that the levied money should be exchanged with equities in the share capital of the bank, the EU strategy pulled Russia even deeper into Europe’s financial system by making its plutocrats majority shareholders, at least on paper, of the Bank of Cyprus, the country’s oldest, biggest and most important financial institution. Ellada IOANNOU, Populism and the European elections in Cyprus, Policy Paper published by the Institute of European Democrats, Spring 2014, p. 7. Andreas STERGIOU, “Le Parti progressiste des travailleurs chypriotes – AKEL dans l’après Guerre froide”, in Patrick MOREAU, éd., Post-Communisme 1990-2012, Paris, Éditions Vendémiaire, 2014, p. 208–209.

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forces (i.e. the Pro-Soviet forces) on the other. In compliance with Communist Bloc policy in the region12, it considered the European Union “a vehicle of capitalism and imperialism”, arguing for a Common European Home not consistent with the European Community. Therefore, the Communists had opposed a trade agreement and an association agreement with the European Community the Government of Cyprus had decided to strike with Brussels13. However, the real motives behind this attitude were concerns about the ramifications the association agreement could have on Cyprus’ foreign policy. On 4/25 June 1994, the European Union summit on Corfu decided that Cyprus and Malta were to be included in the next European Union enlargement, it was obvious that before Cyprus’ accession, the Cypriot public opinion was well-disposed towards the EU. The party did not hesitate to give up its antiEuropean stance. In disunion with the ordinary Communist Parties’ stance on the European Union, AKEL decided to adopt a peculiar and ambivalent attitude towards the EU project. In 1995, AKEL published a brochure explaining its new “reformist” course towards the EU. While still believing that “…the Europe of the peoples, given the present situation, is still an advanced organisation of Capitalist Integration and remains a distant dream…”, the party admitted that “…the European Union is by now an existing reality, more economic and less political, and accession to the European Union could also promote a solution to the Cyprus Problem…”. Under these conditions, AKEL would coordinate its efforts with those of the other Communist, Left and Progressive Parties for a different Europe, the Europe of the peoples14. Since then, AKEL’s position has shifted from hard to soft Euroscepticism. All the next party congresses reaffirmed this ambivalent course to the EU: AKEL’s participation is supposed to be interpreted as a fight against the institutionalisation of neo-liberalism, ’’which undermines the social role of the state, strengthens the ground for attacks on labour rights and public wealth and boosts the profitability and enhances the role of the multinational companies and powerful states’’15. The unsolved national question in the framework of the Cyprus conflict seems to have exercised enormous pressure on the majority of the party members to downgrade their ideological objections towards the EU perspective. However, the decision reflected more a strategic concern of the leadership about a policy issue that could threaten party survival and coalition potential, and less an ideological shift. The new EU accession course did not prove electorally damaging to AKEL16. 12 13

14 15 16

Cf. Heinz TIMMERMANN, Südeuropas Kommunisten und die Europäische Gemeinschaft. Eine vergleichende Analyse, Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, Köln, 1981. Political Resolution of the 13th AKEL Congress (April 1974), Neos Dimokratis Party journal, 41, 1974, p. 39; Political Resolution of the 14th AKEL Congress (May 1978), Neos Dimokratis Party journal, 92, 1987, p. 53–54; Political Resolution of the 16th AKEL Congress (April 1974), Neos Dimokratis Party journal, 92, 1987, p. 53–54; AKEL ed., Our concept to socialism, Nicosia, 1990. Central Committee of the AKEL, ed., Suggestion for the Re-examination of AKEL's Position on the Issue of Cyprus' Accession in the EU (in Greek), 1995). See the current official position of the party in the official site of the AKEL: http://www.akel. org.cy. Yiannos KATSOURIDES, “Travelling against the Tide: The Cypriot Communist Left in the Post1990s Era”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 13, 2012, p. 196-199.

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After the 2004 European elections, the first Europeans in Cyprus, AKEL joined the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left maintaining an observer status and sticking to its soft Euroscepticism. Cyprus seems to be a very good example for what Robert Ladrech defined as Europeanisation, ‘‘a set of processes through which the EU political, social and economic dynamics become part of the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies’’17. Indeed, as the Cypriot presidential system requires cooperative behaviour and coalitions among the acting parties, the assertion seems accurate that this type of Europeanisation is affected by the timing of membership or the progress made by a country in its integration process. It depends on the Europeanisation of the political and economic system. Although AKEL voted down the Constitutional Lisbon Treaty in the European Parliament18, as well as the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement19, the President of Cyprus and former party leader, Dimitris Christofias, accepted the strengthening of EU-NATO relations as well as an array of other important European Council decisions at the European Council in December 2008. The March 2013 bail-in agreement, however, had serious consequences on the perception of the European Union by the Cypriot society. Within the Cypriot society, the bank levy and the damaging of the Cyprus off shore and banking financial system resulted in the strong loss of credibility and appeal of the European Union. Especially the media spread their anti-European resentment. In this framework, the Cypriot Communist Party returned to a hard Eurosceptic-Europhobic agenda and proposed Cyprus’ leaving of the Eurozone. In May 2013, the party published a study ’’About AKEL’s course outside the Eurozone’’20. In this study, AKEL proposed the exit from the Eurozone within the framework of an orderly procedure for the introduction of a new currency. This was considered the only alternative way to establish a new economic model in the primary and secondary economic sector and to respond to an important problem, namely the lack of liquidity in the financial sector. Nevertheless, the party admitted this move to require political and social consensus. On the other side of the political scene, from the first moment, the far right radical party ELAM adopted a strong populist and anti-systemic rhetoric. In May 2011, the party participated in the national general parliamentary elections for the first time, polling 1.08 per cent of the vote. Military discipline is a typical feature of ELAM’s organisation and everyday activity. In public appearances, 17

18

19 20

Robert LADRECH, Europeanisation and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis, Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation, 2 (2001), 3. See also a good example of the discussion about Europeanisation in G. MARKS, L. HOOGHE, M. NELSON and E. EDWARDS, “Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West: Different Structure, Same Causality”, Comparative Political Studies, 39, 2006, p. 155-175. The official explanation (AKEL C.C. Press Office, 16th September 2014, Nicosia) for AKEL’s decision to vote against the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement is as follows: The Agreement is based on the logic of the development of relations based on the geopolitical competition with Russia. It constitutes a negative development in the process of decreasing the crisis in the region. Still, we may safely assume that the party’s traditional close ties with Moscow since the Cold War played an important part as well. The decision was made by the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of AKEL on 23 June 2008, which unanimously decided to vote against a treaty whose “…content is not in the interest of the peoples of Europe and especially the workers…”. AKEL’s Study about AKEL’s course outside of the Eurozone (in Greek): Source: Party’s newspaper Charavgi (3 May 2013), www.haravgi.com.cy.(15 march 2015).

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ELAM members march in strictly aligned triads, wearing similar outfits, usually in a military style. The party itself declares a membership of approximately 2.000. This number is likely to be inflated, though. Geographically, most ELAM members are located in Nicosia21. ELAM and the Greek neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party share the same ideological paroles (far from being a consistent ideology) and cooperate closely. ELAM overtly supports Golden Dawn’s initiatives and generally copies its confusing body of political thoughts, adjusting it to the Cypriot social and political context. On its website, ELAM often posts press releases and other documents issued by Golden Dawn. They usually form the basis of its own policies. Compared to Western European radical right Europhobic rhetorics, ELAM’s anti-European attitude may be regarded a “soft” one, nevertheless.

2. The 2014 European Parliament Elections campaign The last surveys before the European Parliament Elections22 indicated widespread anger, dissatisfaction and distrust of the European Union and the Eurozone, especially directed against the European Central Bank. The majority of the respondents expressed the opinion that Cyprus’ accession to the EU had a negative impact on both the Cyprus economy and the resolution of the Cyprus conflict. The most recent Eurobarometer surveys23 also confirmed the Cypriots’ lack of trust in European institutions. The surveys revealed that the majority still supported the single currency. In many other categories, however, the answers were profoundly pessimistic. For example, the respondents thought that the EUmembership had a negative impact on jobs and increased the risk of ending up in poverty. At the same time, they were convinced that the European identity and citizenship had not brought about the desired benefits. Moreover, most of the interviewed persons considered the EU responsible for austerity in Europe, and the majority disagreed with the opinion that the Union contributed to a higher quality of life. The media also became more and more critical of the EU, though political orientation and party affiliation of the various media had a significant influence on their positions. Newspapers attached to a political party (Haravgi, Alitheia and, to a lesser extent, Machi) tended to take similar positions as their respective parties. Others adopted a cautious pro-European stance, criticizing EU actions and decisions favouring Turkey24. 21 22 23 24

Yiannos KATSOURIDES, “Determinants of Extreme Right Reappearance in Cyprus: The National Popular Front (ELAM), Golden Dawn's Sister Party”, South European Society and Politics, 18, 2013, p. 583. As Published in 24h blog: http://www.24h.com.cy/worldnews/item/54300-euroekloges-2014 -apogoiteumenoi-kai-apaisiodoxoi-oi-kyprioi-polites.html (2 March 2015) and Cyprus Mail 15 May 2014, “Abstentions in euro elections could exceed 50 per cent”. Eurobarometer (European Commission) Standard EB 81 Fieldwork: 31 May-9 June 2014, Eurobarometer (European Parliament), Fieldwork: 7-23/06/2013, Eurobarometer (European Commission) Standard 81, Spring 2014, Public Opinion in the European Union. Yiannos KATSOURIDES, “Negative Images of Europe in an Era of Crisis: The Media and Public Opinion in Cyprus”, Journal of Contemporary European Studies (published online 18 December 2014), p. 11-12.

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During the electoral campaign, public discussions centred on the so-called national issue, i.e. the division of the island and the renewed reunification talks with the Turkish Cypriot side, and the effects of the financial crisis. This crisis had badly hit the island’s thriving services sector. Furthermore, the government of Cyprus had signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the EU and IMF the ramifications of which were also felt and discussed. Not surprisingly, in 2014, AKEL dedicated its entire pre-electoral campaign to the repeated condemnation of the so-called institutionalised cooperation of the EU and the IMF. Furthermore, the party fought against the politics resulting from the agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the EU and the IMF (Memorandum) to be implemented by the right wing government. According to AKEL, these EU-policies were imposed upon the peoples and are “increasingly subordinating a number of member states, primarily in the periphery’’. Furthermore, communists blamed the EU institutional bodies for the shock therapy imposed on the Cypriot economy and the Cypriot people. According to party rhetoric, Merkel, Schäuble, and their close allies in the European Union had pre-determined their decision. They enforced their implementation thus unscrupulously destroying the economic model of Cyprus25. The campaign was determined by political and ideological positions AKEL had adopted in its Programmatic Congress on 15-16th February 2014. These positions express strong criticism of the neo-liberal model of economic management promoted by the European Union. According to the Cypriot Communists, policies like the Lisbon Treaty, the institutionalisation of the Single Economic Governance, the Banking Union and the rule for surplus budgets of states are means to institutionalise neo-liberalism, to undermine social intervention by the state and to continue reducing the political and parliamentary sovereignty of member states. AKEL’s goal, on the contrary, was described the effort to take a sharp turn from “government’s adherence to the European insistence on deep budget cuts in return for the financial assistance necessary to keep Cyprus’ economy afloat’’ 26. Furthermore, during the whole campaign, AKEL vehemently defended its persistent anti-NATO rhetoric. The party had maintained this position over the years from in the period in which it had shared the executive power of Cyprus as a supporting political force as well as during the years of the AKEL administration from 2008–2013. AKEL did not only oppose Cyprus’ membership of NATO but also against the so-called Partnership for Peace, a program designed to promote co-operation between NATO and third countries. While membership of NATO is not a requirement for EU membership, most EU members are part of the alliance, and Cyprus and Malta are the only two 2004 accession states that are not members of the organisation. It is noteworthy that even the EU members officially maintaining a policy of neutrality in their external relations had opted to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Cyprus is the only country that decided to act in a different way despite increasing reaction of all parties across the political

25 26

“EU decisions destroyed Cyprus economy”, Statement of Georgos Loucaides, AKEL C.C. Press Office Spokesperson, AKEL C.C. Press Office, 7 May 2014, Nicosia. Theses of AKEL’s Central Committee to the programmatic congress of AKEL 15-16th (Nicosia, February 2014), p. 6, 8-9.

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spectrum. Because of AKEL’s resolute objection, Cyprus has doggedly followed a “non-compliance policy”27. AKEL’s list of candidates at the European elections comprised known political personalities of Cyprus like Stavros Evagorou, Vera Polykarpou, Haris Polykarpou, Panayiotis Stavrianidis, Neoklis Sylikiotis and Takis Hadjigeorgiou. The last two candidates were Members of the European Parliament. ELAM, the far right party, based its electoral campaign on its ideological identity consisting of xenophobic, populist and anti-systemic rhetoric28. These paroles were ’’legitimised’’ by the vastly increasing number of refugees and asylum seekers and of foreign citizens in general taking up their residence in Cyprus in recent years. According to the 2011 population census, 21.4% of the total population were foreign citizens. Of these, 62.6% were EU citizens and 37.3% were Eastern Europeans and Asians. ELAM requested drastic administrative measures to expel of at least contain immigrants and political refugees, including hermetically closing the borders to illegal immigrants. Elam considers immigrants and asylum seekers, especially Muslims, a real threat to the sociodemographic, religious and cultural identity of the Greek Cypriots29. As a matter of principle, ELAM does not oppose the EU or Cyprus’ membership, arguing, “as Greeks, we belong to the other European people”. However, ELAM is opposed to deeper European integration and to surrendering more elements of national sovereignty to the EU bodies. Instead, it seems to prefer an intergovernmental EU consisting of sovereign nation states. On the other hand, ELAM would not oppose Cyprus’ exit from the Eurozone, if the Euro endangered the country’s best interests. ELAM’s anti-European criticism has been concentrating on the troika austerity measures and the EU policy concerning the Cyprus problem as well as the consistent violation of human rights in Cyprus by Turkey30. ELAM’s EP candidates31 did not include charismatic political figures, which far right parties in Europe often do.

3. The 2014 Electoral Results At the May 2014 European Parliament elections, in spite of their negative feelings towards the EU and growing discontent with the political system, Cypriots did not support radical anti-European parties like in most European countries. Instead, they manifested their discontent mostly through remarkably high levels of abstention from the electoral process. According to the Ministry of the Interior, more than half of the electorate (56%) opted for abstention from the electoral process. The turnout reached just 43.97%. Out of 606.916 registered voters, only 266.891 cast their votes. The par27 28 29 30 31

James KER-LINDSAY, “Membership and Foreign Policy”, in James KER-LINDSAY, Hubert FAUSTMANN and Fiona MULLEN, (eds.), An Island in Europe. The EU and the Transformation of Cyprus, London et al., Peter Lang, 2011, p. 113–114. It often accuses politicians and the other political parties of being corrupt, labeling them as faithful and obedient servants of EU and IMF making up the so-called Troika. Party’s political Ideology (in Greek), http://www.elamcy.com/ (2 March 2015). Ibid. Marios Vasiliou, Geadis Geadi, Despoina Kasapi, Panayiotis Kleovoulou, Charalambos Mesaritis, Michalakis Michael.

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ticipation of Turkish Cypriots was the key innovation of this electoral ballot. In total, there were five Turkish Cypriots running as candidates. Two were on a joint ticket with Greek Cypriots, two were the sole representatives of a Turkish Cypriot party and another candidate competed as an independent. Therefore, the results of the Europeans in Cyprus did not entail an earthquake of the magnitude observed elsewhere. The high abstention rate provided a crucial lifeline to the political system of Cyprus, as it protected all political formations from heavy losses. Despite its decision to implement the bail-in in 2013, the governing right party, DISY, enjoyed a comfortable win. It received 37.75% of the vote, the highest score in its history. AKEL was the runner-up, gaining 27% of the vote. This result shows the marked loss of AKEL’s political influence: Compared to 2009, it suffered a loss of 8%. This seems to confirm the impression that the party has been undergoing an electoral mini-crisis in the wake of its defeat at the 2013 presidential elections. However, the face-saving value of abstention is mirrored clearly when the electoral results are translated into absolute terms (number of votes gained at 2009 elections). DISY lost 14% of the popular vote, its main political rival AKEL 35.5%. ELAM received 2.69% of the popular vote. Although not a high percentage per se, ELAM was the only party whose number of votes increased by a factor of more than ten. Another reason for the high abstention was the very small number of seats allocated to Cyprus (6). The Cypriot electorate had the impression that they could not influence decision-making in Brussel anyway because of the small size of Cyprus and the inability of political actors to relate EU decisions and policy making to the everyday life of Cypriots. For the first time, “Europe” played a small part in any type of election campaign in Cyprus32. The elections also verified an underlying trend of Cypriot politics: the continuing detachment of politics from society. This is rather astonishing, taking into account that party-political interests penetrate all spheres of public and private life. For example, there are left and right wing trade unions, soccer clubs, cooperatives, professional associations, etc.33. As in many countries, political apathy and the fact that growing numbers of EU citizens harboured negative feelings about the central institutions of their national democratic system favoured extreme-right advances in Cyprus, too34. Prior to EU accession, the Cypriot society was characterised by high politicisation and party loyalty. They were probably related to the unresolved national problem of Cyprus and to compulsory voting. Since the EU accession in 2004, compulsory voting has been practically abolished, leading to increasing party dealignment and political apathy. Abstention rates reached a record 41 per cent at the 2009 Europeans and 21.3 per cent at the 2011 parliamentary elections. This 32 33 34

See Yiannos KATSOURIDES, The May 2014 European Elections in Cyprus: De-alignment in Process?, Policy paper published by the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 17 June 2014. See Andreas STERGIOU, “Zypern. Verbände und Politik”, in Werner REUTTER, (ed.), Verbände und Interessensgruppen in den Ländern der Europäischen Union, Stuttgart, UTB, 2012, p. 809–835. Also in Cyprus surveys conducted in recent years showed that especially young people have little interest in politics, which they view as having little relevance for their live, see Youth in Cyprus. Aspirations, Lifestyle and Empowerment, Cyprus Human Development Report 2009, published by University of Nicocia, p. 87-90.

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was an extremely unusual phenomenon in Cyprus politics. Public distrust in the political system as well as in the political, social and representative institutions grew rapidly. In general, however, politics and party de-alignment remained lower than in many other European countries. In spite of the fact that there were new faces among the elected Members of the European Parliament, the distribution of the seats remained unchanged compared to the 2009 Europeans. The governing right-wing party DISY (Democratic Rally), which is a member of the European People’s Party, won two seats. AKEL added two MEP’s to the European United Left, the centre-right party DIKO (Democratic Party) and centre-left EDEK (Movement of Social Democrats), both of which paradoxically are aligned to the Socialists and Democrats Group, gained one MEP each. This illustrates the significant role of party affiliation in Cypriot’s electoral behaviour. It also demonstrates the persistence of a peculiar form of partypatronage. It manifests itself in various forms. It may be the impersonal party patronage: The party as an organisation dispenses favours to its supporters and expects their votes in return. Party patronage can also be of an institutional nature: Parties firmly control corporative organisations which exert significant influence in the Cypriot society. For instance, the leftwing trade union PEO is attached to AKEL, whereas the right wing trade union SEKE is more or less affiliated to the Democratic Rally-DISY. Based on this type of party patronage Greek Cypriot parties have developed quite efficient mechanisms to control the electoral behaviour of their clientele. Their task is further facilitated by the small size of the electorate35.

Conclusion Eurosceptic perceptions and ideas are a recent phenomenon in Cyprus, triggered by the EU-policies towards Cyprus’ bank and financial system practices and the consequent Troika-austerity program. The Cypriot Communist Party AKEL is the only exception of a soft Eurosceptic attitude to the European integration. For a long time, the Cypriot people nourished strong pro-European feelings. They harbored security concerns and hoped for the support of big European countries in their efforts to find a solution to the long-lasting Cyprus conflict. The 2013 bail-in agreement, however, seems to have erased the previous EU consensus among the political and social actors of the island. It provoked a general distrust of the Cypriot society towards the European Institutions as well as a radicalization of the rhetoric of the parties who had adopted a soft anti-European attitude in the past. This applies to the Communist Party AKEL. Since 1994, it had abandoned its Eurosceptic stance and accepted the EU-project while strongly criticizing the neo-liberal character of the EU. Since 2014, AKEL has supported a possible resignation from the Eurozone as a panacea for all its political and social problems. The far right party ELAM also intensified its Eurosceptic rhetoric in the wake of the recent financial crisis. 35

Hubert FAUSTMANN, “Aspects of Political Culture in Cyprus”, in James KER-LINDSAY and Hubert FAUSTMANN, (eds.), The Government and Politics of Cyprus, Oxford, Bern et al., Peter Lang, 2008, p. 26-27.

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Thus, the dichotomy between two types of Euroscepticism: “hard” Euroscepticism and “soft” Euroscepticism suggested by some scholars does not seem to apply fully in the case of Cyprus. The respective parties have presented very heterogeneous features of soft and hard criticism of Europe and European integration. However, despite their sometimes aggressive rhetoric, none of them constitutes a real danger for the stability of the Cypriot political system as well as to country’s pro-European orientation. Above all, the main reason for this is the unsolved “national question”. Many Cypriots expect to solve or at least to alleviate its ramifications, primarily the security aspect, within the political and institutional framework of the EU. The second reason could be attributed to the concessional nature of Cypriot political culture favored by the presidential political system. Indeed, in the course of time, consultation and cooperation between the executive and political parties have become an integral part of day-to-day politics: The close cooperation between the leaders of the parliamentary parties in Cyprus’ parliament (House of Representatives) results in the unanimous adoption of most laws.

L’EUROSCEPTICISME À CHYPRE Cet article traite du phénomène de l´euroscepticisme à Chypre. Il aborde les débats politiques sur l´intégration européenne de deux partis (le parti communiste de Chypre l´AKEL et le parti d´extrême-droite ELAM). Il se penche aussi sur des perceptions et des représentations eurosceptiques, non liées à un parti spécifique, qui sont apparus il y a peu de temps en conséquence de la politique de Bail-out, Bail-in de l´Union européenne vis-à-vis de Chypre. L´auteur argumente que la dichotomie classique, telle qu´elle est définie par un groupe de scientifique et qui différencie entre un euroscepticisme dur et une critique « molle » de l´Europe, n´est pas applicable à Chypre. Les partis analysés recourent en effet à des éléments très hétérogènes du type critique molle de l´Europe et à des positions d´hostilité à l´UE.

EUROSKEPTIZISMUS IN ZYPERN Das Papier behandelt das Phänomen des Euroskeptizismus in Zypern. Es untersucht die politische Debatte der europäischen Integration von zwei Parteien (der zypriotischen kommunistischen Partei AKEL und der rechtsextremen Partei ELAM). Es befasst sich ferner mit nicht parteigebundenen euroskeptischen Wahrnehmungen und Vorstellungen, die sich als Folge der Bail-out – bail-in Politik der Europäischen Union gegenüber Zypern in der jüngsten Zeit entwickelt haben. Der Verfasser argumentiert, dass die klassische Dichotomie zwischen zwei Erscheinungsformen des Euroskeptizismus, der „harten“ Europafeindlichkeit und der „weichen“ Europakritik, die eine Reihe von Wissenschaftlern definieren, in Zypern nicht angewendet werden kann. Die untersuchten Parteien weisen sehr heterogene Elemente weicher Europakritik und harter EU-Feindlichkeit auf.

THE 2014 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS IN PORTUGAL AND THE LOST CAUSE OF ANTI-EUROPEANISM ALICE CUNHA In 1820, representative governments began being established in Portugal. The first democratic elections, however, were held more than a century and a half later, on April 25, 1975. The country’s political system is semi-presidential: The elected President of the Republic co-exists with the Prime Minister. The latter is accountable to parliament. President, Prime Minister and parliament constitute the three main political institutions. At the national level, Portugal elects the President and the national parliament (Assembleia da República). Members of parliament are elected for a four-year term by proportional representation. The electoral result serves as an indicator for the President who to invite to form a government. After consulting with all political parties represented in parliament, he usually invites the leader of the party which won the majority of seats in parliament. After the third European Economic Community (EEC)’s enlargement of January 1, 1986, the Portuguese started to participate in European Parliament (EP) elections every five years. The first 24 Portuguese Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were appointed by the Assembleia da República and subsequently elected after 1987. Nowadays, Portugal elects 21 MEPs according to the d’Hondt system of proportional representation within a single national district and with closed party lists. The freedom of association guaranteed by the Portuguese Constitution permits the formation of political parties free to run for office individually or form an electoral alliance. Until the end of the 20th century, four major parties dominated the political spectrum: the center-left socialist party – Partido Socialista (PS), the center-right social democratic party – Partido Social-Democrata (PSD), the communist party – Partido Comunista Português (PCP), and the right wing Centro Democrático Social/Partido Popular (CDS/PP). But the Portuguese party system has progressively grown into a two-party system format1, with two ruling parties alternating in power (PS and PSD). Nevertheless, smaller and micro parties have persisted in Portuguese politics, the most visible of which is the radical leftlibertarian Bloco de Esquerda (BE), created in 1999, from a group of some radical left parties and movements. Before accession to the EEC in 1986, the political arena of the Portuguese parties was generally a domestic one. Afterwards, they started to interact more dynamically with European parties. Still, they kept their proper ideological identity and applied it to their assessment of European integration. Another charac1

André FREIRE, “European Integration and Party Attachments: The Portuguese Case as an Example of the New Southern European Democracies”, in: António COSTA PINTO, Nuno Severiano TEIXEIRA, (ed.), The Europeanization of Portuguese Democracy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2012, p. 196.

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teristic feature is the stability of the Portuguese political system both in terms of the number of parties and their political stances. In fact, the Portuguese party system may be characterized as being of “limited contestation”2, with smaller parties being moderately Eurosceptic and big parties holding pro integration views. This chapter aims to explain the results of the 2014 EP elections in Portugal, focusing on Eurosceptic and mostly anti-European parties’ positions.

1. Portuguese Political Parties and European Integration – a Historical Overview Research on national political parties and European integration is extensive and covers many aspects. An increasingly significant number of studies has been devoted to the role of political parties within the European Union (EU). They are unanimous on the divisive nature of European integration which may even be considered a “destabilizing factor for national parties”3. On the other hand, the impact of European integration on the party systems of the EU member states has been somewhat neglected. In most member states’ elections including the EP elections, this topic has not become a campaign issue. Hence, the traditional approach to this subject holds that the process of European political representation has failed mainly because political parties do not compete in European affairs4. As for Portugal, Marina Costa Lobo analyzed party positions towards Europe from 1976 to 2005 and concluded that during this period, the communists were the most consistently Eurosceptic, while the socialists and social democrats passionately supported the European integration with the CDS-PP being somewhat less enthusiastic5. In 1976, Prime-minister Mário Soares first announced his government’s intention to apply for accession to the EEC. The PCP was the only party represented in parliament to truly oppose this aim. From then until shortly after the accession, the party was clearly anti-European. During that period, the PCP advocated a foreign policy based on the diversification of external relations. But the party did not oppose agreements between Portugal and the EEC as long as they excluded any form of political and economic integration6. European integration was then considered the right wing parties’ alternative to independent economic development7, as an option bound to devastate the economy and destroy the socialist gains of the revolution. Therefore, the PCP was the only party voting 2 3 4 5 6 7

Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCZERBIAK, “Three patterns of party competition over Europe”, paper presented at the Euroskepticism: Causes and Consequences conference, 2005, Amsterdam. Mikko MATTILA, Tapio RAUNIO, “Cautious Voters – Supportive Parties: Opinion Congruence between Voters and Parties on the EU Dimension”, European Union Politics, 7, 2006, p. 431. Peter MAIR, Jacques THOMASSEN, “Political representation and government in the European Union”, Journal of European Public Policy, 17, 2010, p. 20-35. Marina COSTA LOBO, “Da consolidação democrática à qualidade da democracia: a União Europeia e os partidos políticos portugueses”, IPRI Working Paper, 20, 2006. PCP, Programa Eleitoral do PCP, Separata do Avante, no 304, Lisboa, PCP, 1979, p. 6. Álvaro CUNHAL, Não ao Mercado Comum – Efeitos Globais da Adesão à CEE e Alternativa, Lisboa, Avante, 1980, p.75.

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against accession. In the 1990s, after some international (for example, the fall of the Berlin Wall) and domestic changes (namely the implementation of an open market economy), the party gave up its anti-European rhetoric and became Eurosceptic. Meanwhile, the party has come to accept Portugal’s integration in the EU. But it remains firmly opposed to any further deepening. In 1999, a new radical far-left party, BE, appeared in the political arena. Since its principles are widely consistent with Euroscepticism, especially from an economic point of view, it became a direct challenger to PCP on several issues, including European ones. From the start, the party adopted a critical stance on the EU and its policies which its electorate (especially secularized young people with higher levels of education living in large cities like Lisbon and Oporto) supported. For a certain period of time, coinciding with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, CDS-PP also had a short phase of anti-European attitudes after the formal loss of political sovereignty as a result of deeper integration8. It was even expelled from the European People’s Party in 1993. That anti-European/Maastricht campaign lasted only until the party leader changed in 1997. It came to a full stop when the CDS-PP became the PSD’s junior partner in Government in 2002. This is consistent with the research findings, namely regarding the strong connection between the traditional left-right cleavage and attitudes taken towards the European integration9. In the 1980s, far-right and fascist parties re-surfaced in many European countries entailing a “silent counter-revolution”10. In Portugal, however, – a casestudy that has few similarities with its European counterparts – far-right associations only arose in the 1990s and early 21st century. This delay is partly to be explained by the EEC membership and the abundance of Community funds which were to strengthen the electoral outreach of the two mainstream parties (PS and PSD) and also to consolidate the party system itself11. On the other hand, the experience of the Estado Novo authoritarian regime from 1933 to 1974 is also likely to have added some resistance to such ideologies. Likewise, the political context in which the first democratic Constitution was approved in 1976 played a role in prohibiting the establishment of political organizations of a fascist nature. This has also been observed in other countries that have experienced totalitarian rule. The Portuguese Constitution (article 46 no. 4) and the Political Parties Law (article 8) forbid armed political parties or military, militarized or paramilitary racist parties or parties with a fascist ideology12. In fact, and as seen above, in Portugal, “the far-right space in the democratic arena was strongly influenced by the characteristics of the previous political regime, by the very nature of the tran-

8 9 10 11 12

CDS-PP, Programa Eleitoral e de Governo do Partido Popular, Lisboa, CDS-PP, 1995, p. 24. Liesbet HOOGHE, Gary MARKS and Carole J. WILSON, “Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?”, Comparative Political Studies, 35, 2002, p. 965-989. Piero IGNAZI, “The silent counter-revolution: hypotheses on the emergence of extreme rightwing parties in Europe”, European Journal of Political Research, 22, 1992, p. 3-33. André FREIRE, “Pós-materialismo e comportamentos políticos: o caso português em perspectiva comparada”, in: Jorge VALA et al., (eds), Valores Sociais: Mudanças e Contrastes em Portugal e na Europa, Lisboa, Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2003, p. 295-361. Portugal, Constituição da República Portuguesa; Portugal, Lei dos Partidos Políticos, Law no. 2/2003, of 22 August.

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sition period and by the subsequent political environment after the Carnation Revolution”13. As demonstrated, everything converges to a legal framework extremely adverse on the establishment and functioning of far-right parties. Still, in the late 1970s, some far-right associations – such as National Alliance (Aliança Nacional), National Front (Frente Nacional), National Action Movement (Movimento de Acção Nacional) and New Order (Ordem Nova) – were established. Their main objective was to overthrow the existing political and constitutional system and to establish a state-based nationalism. Meanwhile, in 2000, the National Renewal Party (Partido Nacional Renovador) emerged from the Democratic Renewal Party (Partido Renovador Democrático) and participated in the 2001 municipal elections in only two municipalities for the first time. It received only 877 votes, largely due to its quasi anonymity. Since 2005, following the party’s 2nd National Convention, it assumed “the role of a polarizing agent of far-right activism in Portugal”14. Even so, in the right wing political spectrum, the weight of the collective memory and the scars of the revolutionary period continue to exert a very strong constraint to the emergence of new far-right political forces.

2. The 2014 European Parliament election – Campaigning for or against the EU? Between 1991 and 2009, European integration had a reference average of 2.3% in the political programs of the PS and 2.5% in the PSD ones15 (in both cases the issue was the fifth least addressed). Previous data were even more disconcerting, given that between 1960 and 1974 references to Europe in election manifestos were nil, while from 1975 onwards, the percentage range varied between 1.9% (1980-84) and 4.4% (1991-94)16. In Portugal, voting is not compulsory. Although the Portuguese turnout in the EP elections is not the lowest in Europe, it has declined in the course of time. The 2014 abstention rate of 66.09% was the highest ever. More than half of the voters chose not to elect any MEP. This results partially from the lack of real knowledge on the role of the EP and the low interest in this institution. But the most important reason is the broad scepticism of voters about politics in general and particularly concerning the importance of elections. However, this is by no means a distinctive Portuguese feature. In most EU member states, participation rates have been continually decreasing. Despite the economic and financial crisis, in the 2014 EP election campaign, in general, party positions on the European integration did not change. The governing parties still support European integration and insist that it benefits the

13 14 15 16

José MOURÃO DA COSTA, “O Partido Nacional Renovador: a nova extrema-direita na democracia português”, Análise Social, XLVI, 2011, p. 766. Ibid., p. 785. Nuno GUEDES, “Convergência ideológica? Uma análise comparada dos programas eleitorais do PS e do PSD (1991-2009)”, Sociologia, problemas e práticas, 68, 2012, p. 116. Paul PENNINGS, “An Empirical Analysis of the Europeanization of National Party Manifestos, 1960-2003”, European Union Politics, 7, 2006, p. 262.

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country while the opposition parties remain Eurosceptic and critical of several EU policies. Furthermore, there was no strong politicization on this issue. Unlike in other European countries, in Portugal, European affairs did not change the main characteristics associated with the EP elections in a significant way. This is above all due to the de-politicization of the European cleavage and the neutralization of the potential to challenge this issue. In fact, the economic and financial crisis which has emerged since 2008 has produced only minor changes in the positioning of parties on European issues. On the one hand, the distance between the ruling parties (PS, PSD and CDS-PP) and the remaining parties appears to grow. This is above all due to the tension between the need to fulfil the European commitments, namely the Memorandum of Understanding signed with EU, ECB and IMF, and the representation of the preferences of their voters. On the other hand, BE has become more critical, has adopted more extreme positions thus bringing its positions more in line with those of the PCP. The 2014 EP elections were the most disputed ever in Portugal. 18 parties were running, four of them in coalitions (PSD and CDS-PP with Aliança Portugal; and PCP with the Green Party – Os Verdes). The biggest novelty was that two outsiders of party politics – the actor Nicholas Breyner and the well-known lawyer António Marinho Pinto –strove for a seat in the EP, too. Also, there were two new far-left radical parties – Livre (Free Party) founded only a couple of months before the Europeans; its leader is Rui Tavares, former MEP, elected in 2009 on the BE party list; and Movimento Alternativa Socialista (Socialist Alternative Movement), created in July 2013 and also a BE spin-off. The 2014 electoral campaign began with the debate about the prospect of the “post-troika” period. The central issue was the question whether the country should opt for a “clean exit” from bailout or renegotiate a precautionary programme. On 4th May, Passos Coelho’s executive announced that it would not ask the EU for an additional financial assistance programme. With this step, the Prime Minister and the PSD passed the clear message that the economy was improving as a result of the severe measures applied over the last three years. The PS, in the role of opposition party, as usual in this kind of elections, hoped for the opportunity to punish the government. It organized the Um Novo Rumo para Portugal (A New Direction for Portugal) convention where it delivered a document intended to serve as a future government programme. According to the existing literature, these elections could also be considered a preview or rehearsal for the forthcoming 2015 legislative elections. The campaign itself focused mainly on the allocation of guilt about the austerity policies implemented after the external intervention: The PS accused the PSD/CDS-PP government of having increased austerity with extremely negative consequences for the economy, whereas both PSD and CDS-PP argued that they had resumed responsibility for a country on the verge of bankruptcy from the previous socialist government. Both parties clung to this scheme instead of truly debating any real important European issue, proving that in fact “PSD was embarrassed regarding the government’s austerity policies outcomes and the in-

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creasing distance of the PS on the elections’ surveys eventually made disappear any desire to discuss real European issues”17. Voters’ attitudes on the EU issue differ considerably: In some countries like Germany and the Netherlands, voters are not interested in European affairs. Therefore, political parties do not compete on the subject. In other countries like Denmark or the United Kingdom, European affairs matter and the voters’ preferences on the subject have influenced national elections18. As Van der Eijk and Franklin point out, although most voters are ready to use EU preferences, political parties for the most part are inclined to downplay the EU issue by subsuming it into the left/right issue19. Thus, there is a “giant” of public Euroscepticism waiting to be exploited by political entrepreneurs. Portugal clearly belongs to the first set of countries and political parties do not compete on the subject yet. In fact, the only parties really discussing European issues were the radical left parties PCP and BE. The PCP maintained its traditional scepticism about European integration and regarded the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (the so-called Fiscal Pact) as an instrument of foreign interference in Portuguese national sovereignty. Throughout the campaign, it maintained a nationalist and patriotic discourse, blaming the government for all the attacks on the collective rights achieved after 1974, especially in the social sphere. As for BE, it was always critical of the economic and social dimensions of the EU. It demanded several institutional reforms, mostly concerning the decision-making process, as well as a referendum on the budget treaty. One key issue on which parties disagreed was the Euro: The mainstream parties argued in favour of the need of solidarity between member states and the need to change the political, economic and social governance of the EU in order to make it fairer; the communists were in favour of the country’s exit from the Eurozone if austerity policies continued to be the EU guideline. The BE, in line with the communists, considered that the membership of the Euro zone should not be maintained at all cost including the end of the welfare state. But there was another question that clearly divided left from right wing parties, namely debt renegotiation: Whereas the right wing parties PSD and CDS-PP were in favour of paying the debt as scheduled, the left wing parties – PS, PCP and BE – insisted on the need to renegotiate both the debt and the maturity date of payment. Concerning EU topics, the smaller parties centered their campaign around the need to refocus European integration by developing fundamental rights and defeating austerity and capitalism (Livre); to hold a referendum on the Euro (Movimento Alternativa Socialista). More radical demands were voiced: to leave the 17 18

19

Marco LISI, “A despolitização da Europa: as eleições europeias de 2014”, in: Maria Fernanda ROLLO, José Maria BRANDÃO DE BRITO, Alice CUNHA, (coord.), As Eleições para o Parlamento Europeu em Portugal, Coimbra, Almedina, 2014, p.192. Catherine E. DE VRIES, “EU Issue Voting: Asset or Liability?: How European Integration Affects Parties' Electoral Fortunes”, European Union Politics, 11, 2010, p. 89-117; Catherine E. DE VRIES, “Sleeping Giant: Fact or Fairytale?: How European Integration Affects National Elections”, European Union Politics, 8, 2007, p. 363-385. Cees VAN DER EIJK, Mark N. FRANKLIN, “Potential for Contestation on European Matters at National Elections in Europe”, in: Gary MARKS, Marco R. STEENBERGEN, (eds), European Integration and Political Conflict, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 48.

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Euro zone (PCTP/MRPP and Partido Nova Democracia); to create new alternative forms of political, economic and social organization (Partido pelos Animais e pela Natureza); greater participation of citizens in the political life and in the decisions of the major issues of the country and of society (Movimento Partido da Terra – MPT); and, ultimately, withdrawal from the EU (Partido Nacional Renovador – PNR).

3. Euroscepticism and Anti-Europeanism in the EP Elections’ Results The 2014 European elections took place in a time of great tension, at the height of the Euro zone crisis. Therefore, the election of more than one hundred MEPs of nationalist, far-right and populist parties caused no surprise, even though it concerned EU political leaders. In Portugal, however, there is no party similar in strength, visibility and electoral results as Front National, Partij voor de Vrijheid, UKIP, Alternative für Deutschland, MoVimento 5 Stelle. In fact, there is only one party (PNR) which builds its identity on anti-immigrant feelings. The party argues with the defense of Portuguese jobs, traditions and borders. Its language is securitarian and authoritarian, and its leaders often enhance Estado Novo’s virtues20. Its slogan – “Without sovereignty there is no independence” – is associated with the message that the party does not accept to follow Europe in everything. Regarding Europe and the EU, the party’s orientations state that: “The Europe that we need is far from Brussels and Strasbourg. We support cooperation instead of integration, we advocate a Europe focused on its own identity which respects the specific identities of each nation; therefore we do not advocate an EU of political nature, but a union based on mutual benefits, based on reciprocal advantages that can be achieved through various agreements between states. Among other things, we do not accept that intervention powers of national states are gradually transferred into the hands of anonymous bureaucrats in the service of other foreign interests”21. The party is against the single currency and all forms of integration leading to the unification of markets; but it emphasizes the need to strengthen trade relations with the peoples of Europe as long as they do not collide with the principle of national sovereignty22. PNR remains an active party, even though its position in Portuguese society is a purely marginal one. Despite a slight upward trend in its territorial implementation and in the number of votes, it has had, in fact, meager electoral results, both in national and EP elections. A recent police investigation on far-right activities in the country also had a negative impact on the party’s ability to mobilize. 20 21 22

Riccardo MARCHI, “Il Partido Nacional Renovador: La nuova estrema destra portoghese”, Trasgression – Revista Quadrimestral di Cultura Politica, 50, 2010, p. 57-80. PNR http://www.pnr.pt/ideario/valores-e-fundamentos/ (23 February 2015). Author’s translation. José MOURÃO DA COSTA, “O Partido Nacional Renovador: a nova extrema-direita na democracia português”, op.cit., p. 776-777.

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Claudia Toriz Ramos, in her analysis of the national identity, concludes that parties in favor of European integration have tried to demonstrate the compatibility of belonging to the EU and national identity, while those which are against it argue that the former is not compatible with the latter. She also points out that specifically in the Portuguese Parliament, there are no “strictly nationalist discourses, based on an absolute exclusivity of the Portuguese political identity; but there are also no strictly European positions, of total identification between the Portuguese and the European identity”23. If we look at the results of the 2014 EP election in Portugal (cf. Table 1), we can draw some interesting conclusions, but none of them is connected with a substantial increase of Eurosceptic and/or anti-EU voting. The marginal victory of the main opposition party, PS, was an interesting aspect of the results. Taking into account the expectations of the socialists, the 34% result had a bitter taste, since the conditions of the competition were ideal for an excellent performance of the opposition parties: high levels of dissatisfaction with the government, of the unpopularity of the prime minister as well as of unemployment, besides a difficult economic recovery. Table 1: 2014 EP Election’s Results in Portugal Party

% Votes

Mandates

PS

34.01

8

PSD/CDS-PP

29.95

7

PCP-PEV

13.71

3

MPT

7.72

2

B.E.

4.93

1

Other parties http://www.rtp.pt/noticias/elei coes/europeias/?ano=2014 &candidato=L

9.68

0

66.33

–

Abstention Source: European Parliament.

The right wing governing coalition lost votes and three MEPs – as expected. Another party defeat that has been emphasized is that of the BE with only 4.9% of the vote, and just one elected MEP, and also the poor performance of Livre (2.35%). Among the true winners of these elections, the Eurosceptic PCP and the short-term populist MPT stand out: The PCP did not only increase its share of the vote but also the number of its MEPs (from two to three); for the first time, the MPT obtained 7.72% of the vote and was successful with two MEPs. The MPT benefitted from its anti-establishment discourse which included the renewal of the political elite, a stop of Brussels’ technocracy, the disproportionate bureaucracy of the EU, even though the populist nature of its top candidate’s discourse was severely criticized. Both parties benefited from the loss of votes of the two main mainstream and moderate parties. 23

Cláudia RAMOS, “Discurso parlamentar português e construção da identidade política no contexto da integração europeia”, Antropológicas, 9, 2005, p. 76-77; p. 92.

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Still, after the consensual democracy model from 1976 to 1987, when there was a great party fragmentation with minority governments and unstable coalitions, Portugal’s political system has come increasingly closer to a majoritarian democracy with the vote concentrated on two major parties which form stable majoritarian governments and win most seats at the EP, as seen in Table 1. The Euro-zone crisis and its aftermath is often referred to as the reason of the electoral rise of the anti-European parties. But this explanation fails to be sufficient, even though the crisis gave a boost to the combination of Eurosceptic feelings and nationalist discourses. Taking the particular case of Portugal, austeritybattered since 2011, populist right parties are almost non-existent, with the exception mentioned above, whereas in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom they are thriving. Table 2. Far-Right and Far-Left Results at Legislative and EP Elections (in %) Election/Party

BE

PCP

CDS-PP

PNR

EP 2004

4.91

9.09

33.27*

0.25

AR 2005

6.35

7.54

7.24

0.16

EP 2009

10.72

10.64

8.36

0.37

AR 2009

9.81

7.86

10.43

0.20

AR 2011

5.17

7.90

11.71

0.31

EP 2014

4.6

12.7

27.7*

0.50

* In coalition with PSD.

If we compare the far-right and far-left results at legislative and EP elections in the last decade, some interesting conclusions stand out. In general, “the very small parties (both from the left and the right) always performed better in European than in legislative elections24. CDS, BE and PCP have never individually reached more than four MEPs; and PNR has never elected one. It has, however, slightly increased its number of votes (15.036 at the 2014 EP elections), but failed to capture protest votes. Finally, it seems paradoxical that a party continues to run at the EP elections which does not support the EU, nor believe in its institutions, and even advocates the country’s withdrawal from the EU.

Conclusion As demonstrated throughout the chapter, in Portugal, unlike in other member states, there is no significant political party that is completely against European integration. Surprisingly, the economic crisis and how the European institutions managed the response to the key European problems, like the debt burden, unemployment or immigration, as well as the government’s responses did not have a significant impact on the voting in Portugal. The electoral results were very simi-

24

André FREIRE, “European Integration and Party Attachments: The Portuguese Case as an Example of the New Southern European Democracies”, op.cit.,p. 202.

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lar to those of 2009 concerning the distribution of the vote for the main right and left wing political parties. The troika programme had just ended when the electoral campaign took off. This might have influenced programmatic orientations and the political debate on key issues of competition of some parties. But the elections mainly served as a poll to evaluate the government’s performance concerning austerity policies since 2011. As expected, the government was punished by the number of votes and elected MEPs, but the main opposition party failed to capitalize on it. There was almost no sign of anti-European parties in the competition. There is no anti-European political current in the country: neither do the most representative political parties reject Europe, nor the Portuguese in general. There is, of course, more or less veiled criticism and even frontal opposition to certain policy options, common policies and the functioning of the institutions, but in the end, there is no opposition to Europe. Most Portuguese consider the EU membership as positive and benefitting to the country. This offers only a fragile political basis for more Eurosceptic and especially for anti-European political parties. The political segregation of the Portuguese far-right in general and PNR’s electoral failure in particular are essentially dictated by factors of institutional and historical order. These factors differentiate the Portuguese case from other European democracies and make the eruption of a national-populist force in the country unlikely.

LES ÉLECTIONS DU PARLEMENT EUROPÉEN AU PORTUGAL ET LA CAUSE PERDUE DE L’ANTI-EUROPÉISME Ce chapitre analyse les résultats de l´élection européenne de 2014 au Portugal. L´accent est mis sur les positions des partis critiques ou essentiellement antieuropéen. Nos analyses montrent qu´au Portugal, et ceci contrairement à la situation dans d´autres pays européens, aucun parti important de refuse totalement l´intégration européenne. De manière surprenante, ni la crise économique et les réactions des institutions européennes aux problèmes centraux de l´Europe comme l´endettement, le chômage et l´immigration, ni les mesures du gouvernement portugais n´ont eu d´influences importantes sur les comportements électoraux au Portugal. Si l´on prend le nombre des voix comme base de comparaison, on voit que les principaux partis de gauche et de droite ont des résultats électoraux comparables à ceux de 2009.

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DIE EUROPAPARLAMENTSWAHLEN IN PORTUGAL UND DIE VERLORENE SACHE DES ANTI-EUROPÄISMUS Diese Kapitel analysiert die Ergebnisse der Europawahl von 2014 in Portugal. Dabei liegt der Schwerpunkt auf den Positionen der europakritischen und überwiegend anti-europäischen Parteien. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass in Portugal, anders als in anderen Mitgliedsländern, keine wichtige Partei die europäische Integration völlig ablehnt. Überraschenderweise hatten weder die Wirtschaftskrise und die Reaktionen der Europäischen Institutionen auf die zentralen europäischen Probleme wie Verschuldung, Arbeitslosigkeit und Zuwanderung noch die Maßnahmen der portugiesischen Regierung erhebliche Auswirkungen auf das Wahlverhalten in Portugal. Bezogen auf die Stimmenanteile der wichtigen rechten und linken Parteien waren die Wahlergebnisse denjenigen von 2009 sehr vergleichbar.

Part 2

THE 1995 EU-ACCESSION STATES: BETWEEN TRADITIONAL NORDIC EUROSCEPTICISM AND NEW ANTI-EUROPEANISM LES ÉTATS DE L’ÉLARGISSEMENT DE L’UE EN 1995 : ENTRE EUROSCEPTICISME TRADITIONNEL NORDIQUE ET NOUVEL ANTI-EUROPÉISME

DIE EU-ERWEITERUNGSSTAATEN 1995: ZWISCHEN TRADITIONNELLEM NORDISCHEN EUROSKEPTIZISMUS UND NEUEM ANTI-EUROPÄISMUS

THE 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTION IN SWEDEN AND EUROSCEPTICISM SVANTE ERSSON This chapter, which is basically descriptive, deals with the recent 2014 European election in Sweden. It will focus on the occurrence of Euroscepticism1. The question to be addressed is: Will Sweden now face a wave of anti-Europeanism which seems to be on the rise in Europe? Firstly, I will take a look at the European issue in Sweden from a historical perspective; and I will also address the set-up of the Swedish party system with regard to some major political cleavages including the European issue. Next, I will briefly discuss the election campaign for the 2014 election. The third section presents an analysis of the outcome of the elections to the European Parliament and to the National Parliament – the Riksdag – which both took place in 2014. Fourthly, I will review the critique of the European project raised by the Eurosceptic parties as presented in their election manifestos. The final section will enquire into the future of Euroscepticism in Sweden.

1. Sweden and the EU: Some Essentials 1. a) Historical patterns The five Nordic countries have followed different patterns with respect to European policies and foreign and security policies. Denmark, Iceland and Norway entered NATO in 1949. Finland and Sweden, on the other hand, still adhere to a policy of neutrality in armed conflicts and to non-alignment with regard to foreign and security policy. Likewise, as of today, only Finland is a member of the European Union and of the Euro zone. Norway has twice (1972 and 1994) rejected membership of the EU, while this issue, so far, has not been raised in Iceland at a referendum. Yet, since 1994, both Norway and Iceland have been a part of the European Economic Area (EEA). Finland and Sweden entered the EU in 1995, but Denmark (in 2000) and Sweden (in 2003) both said no to the euro. Details on Nordic referenda on the European issue are presented in Table 1.

1

Many thanks to Nicholas Aylott and Niklas Bolin for very useful comments. Responsibility for the text is, however, mine alone. The analysis extends to the end of February 2015.

SVANTE ERSSON

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Table 1. Nordic referenda on relations with the European Union, 1972-20032 Country Denmark

Year

Question

Turnout %

Yes %

1972

Accession to the EC

90,1

63,4

2000

Euro

87,6

46,8

Finland

1994

Accession to the EU

74,0

57,0

Norway

1972

Accession to the EC

79,2

46,5

1994

Accession to the EU

89,0

48,5

Sweden

1994

Accession to the EU

83,3

52,8

2003

Euro

82,6

42,0

1. b) Opinions on the EU One can state that the Nordic countries were reluctant Europeans to begin with3. For Finland and Sweden, a membership of the EU only became an option after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In Sweden, opinions on EU membership have varied over time since the early 1990s. Throughout the decade, only for a short period around the time of the referendum in November 1994, there was a majority for membership. Since the entry into the EU, opinion has slowly grown more positive, and since the end of the 2000s, there has been a plurality in favour of membership (cf. diagram 1). This shift in opinion is also noticeable when comparing Sweden with the EU as a whole: From being distinctively more Eurosceptic in the 1990s, Sweden today comes close to the European average in terms of agreeing that the EU is a good thing (1996-2011). A similar pattern is displayed when looking at the Eurobarometer item on “The Image of The European Union” (2003 to 2014) (cf. diagram 2).

2 3

Based on: EU-Oplysningen, Hvilke folkeafstemminger om EU har det været i EU-landene?, http://www.eu.dk/; Statistics Norway, Folkeavstemningene om EU og EF, http://www. ssb.no/a/kortnavn/euvalg/eu_norge.html. (19 February 2015). See Toivo MILJAN, The Reluctant Europeans: The Attitudes of the Nordic Countries towards European Integration, London, Hurst, 1977; Tapio RAUNIO”, Acta Politica, 42, 2007, p. 191–210; Nicholas AYLOTT, “Softer But Strong: Euroscepticism and Party Politics in Sweden”, in: Aleks SZCZERBIAK, Paul TAGGART, (eds.), Opposing Europe? The comparative party politics of Euroscepticism. Vol. 1, Case studies and country surveys, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 181-200; Cyntia KITE, “East-West Conflict and Europeanization: International Effects on Democratic Politics in the Nordic States”, in: Kaare STRØM, Torbjörn BERGMAN, (eds.), Madisonian Turn: Political Parties and Parliamentary Democracy in Nordic Europe, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2011, p. 329-355.

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Diagram 1: Opinions on Swedish membership of the EU 1991-20134

Diagram 2. Percent who agree that membership to the EU is a good thing: Sweden and EU 1996 – 2011, and percent who have a positive image of the European Union 2003 – 20145

Concerning the Euro, opinions are quite different (Diagram 3). Initially, there was a plurality in favour of the Euro. But as the referendum of September 2003 approached, there was a shift resulting in a majority against the Euro. Since then, and in particular with the impact of the financial crisis from 2008 and onwards, there has been a distinct majority against introducing the Euro in Sweden.

4 5

See Sören HOLMBERG, Opinionsfallet för EU bromsar upp, Stockholm, SIEPS, 2014, http:// www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/2014_5epa.pdf, 4. (19 February 2015). Based on: Eurobarometer interactive search system, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ cf/index.cfm?lang=en. (19 February 2015).

SVANTE ERSSON

84 Diagram 3: Opinions on Swedish membership in the EMU 2003-20136

After twenty years of Sweden’s membership of the EU, starting from low figures, nowadays a plurality is in favour of remaining within the EU and judging the EU positively. On the other hand, the prospect of joining the Euro-zone remains farfetched for the foreseeable future. 1. c) The Swedish Party System and Political Cleavages To this day, one of the major political cleavages in Sweden follows a left-right dimension7. There are other dimensions, too, that may be identified, like energy vs. environment, libertarian vs. authoritarian, or multiculturalism vs. nationalism, and Euro-positive vs. Eurosceptic, or winners vs. losers of globalization8. The left-right dimension is portrayed in Table 2. Based on expert judgments and on voters’ self-location, it is obvious that the Left party (V) and Feminists (FI) go to the left, Social Democrats (S) and Greens (MP) may be classified as centreleft, with Sweden Democrats (SD) in the centre and the other parties as centreright or right. It may be a bit surprising to place the populist SD in the centre, but when it comes to socio-economic issues, the party belongs neither to the left nor

6 7 8

Based on: Sören HOLMBERG, Opinionsfallet för EU bromsar upp, op.cit., p. 5. Henrik OSCARSSON, Sören HOLMBERG, Nya svenska väljare, Stockholm, Norstedts Juridik, 2013, p. 238. Hanspeter KRIESI, “Restructuration of Partisan Politics and the Emergence of a New Cleavage Based on Values”, West European Politics, 33, 2010, p. 673–685.

THE 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTION IN SWEDEN AND EUROSCEPTICISM

85

to the right, even though its voters are more split on these issues than those of other parties9. Table 2. Left-right placement of parties in Sweden10 Postcommunist

Feminist

Social Dem

Green

Populist Agrarian

V

FI

S

MP

SD

Left

Left

Centreleft

Centreleft

Centre

Liberal

Christian

Conservative

C

FP

KD

M

Centreright

Centreright

Centreright

Right

There is an extensive discussion in the literature on the concept of Euroscepticism11. Based upon the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, it is possible to identify political parties on a scale measuring anti- or pro-European orientations over time as a first step12. The next step is to distinguish among the parties with an anti-European orientation those that may be classified as hard or as soft Eurosceptics, thereby following the Sussex conception of Euroscepticism. The pattern for the 2010s is detailed in Table 3. Presently, two parties may be classified as anti-European parties, namely SD and the Left party, and they may also be classified as hard Eurosceptics. One criterion for distinguishing hard from soft Eurosceptics may be the demand for withdrawal from the EU. Today, the Feminists 9

10

11

12

See Anders BACKLUND, Placing radical right parties in political space: Four methods applied to the case of the Sweden Democrats, Stockholm, School of Social Sciences, Södertörn University, 2013, PESO Research Report, No 1. There is a large discussion about how to classify the Sweden Democrats; to simplify I suggest that it may be classified broadly as a populist party although many would call it a far-right party because of its standing on socio-cultural issues. See among many studies, Ann-Cathrine JUNGAR, Anders Ravic JUPSKÅS, “Populist Radical Right Parties in the Nordic Region: A New and Distinct Party Family?”, Scandinavian Political Studies, 37, 2014, p. 215-238; Anna-Lena LODENIUS, “Right-Wing Extremism in Sweden”, in: Ralf MELZER, Sebastian SERAFIN, (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Europe: Country Analyses, Counter-Strategies and Labor-Market Oriented Exit Strategies: Country Analyses Sweden, Berlin, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2014, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/dialog/10957.pdf (19 February 2015); Anders SANNERSTEDT, “Sveigedemokraternas sympatisörer” in: Annika BERGSTRÖM, Henrik OSCARSSON, (eds.), Mittfåra & marginal, Göteborg, Göterborgs universitet, SOMinstitutet, 2014, p. 445-458. Based on expert judgments from Kenneth BENOIT, Michael LAVER, Party policy in modern democracies, London, Routledge, 2006; “voter’s self-location” in: Henrik OSCARSSON, Sören HOLMBERG, Nya svenska väljare, op.cit., p. 225; “voter’s self-location in European Social Survey”, online-analysis, http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/ (19 February 2015). These measures overlap to a large extent, but the location of the parties on the scale is made by the author. See Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCZERBIAK, “Introduction: Opposing Europe? The Politics of Euroscepticism in Europe” in: Aleks SZCZERBIAK, Paul TAGGART, (eds.), Opposing Europe? The comparative party politics of Euroscepticism. Vol. 1, Case studies and country surveys, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 1-15; Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCZERBIAK, “Coming in from the Cold? Euroscepticism, Government Participation and Party Positions in Europe”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 51, 2013, p. 17-37; Cas MUDDE, “The comparative study of party-based Euroscepticism: the Sussex versus the North Carolina School”, East European Politics, 28, 2012, p. 193-202; Lisbet HOOGHE, Gary MARKS, “Sources of Euroscepticism”, Acta Politica, 42, 2007, p. 119-127. Ryan BAKKER et al., “Measuring party positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999-2010”, Party Politics, 21, 2015, p. 143-152.

SVANTE ERSSON

86

and the Greens are soft Eurosceptical parties. Until the mid-2000s, the Centre party could be classified as soft Eurosceptic. The Greens were a hard Eurosceptic party until around 2008. Since then, the Greens may be classified a soft Eurosceptic party13. In the 2010s, the non-socialist parties (Christian Democrats (KD), Centre party (C), Moderates (M) and Liberals (FP)) have a pro-European orientation, and among them, the Liberals are the party with the strongest pro-European orientation. Table 3. Anti-European and Eurosceptical placement of parties in Sweden in the 2010s14 Populist

Postcommunist

Social Dem

Feminist

Green

Christian

Agrarian

Conservative

Liberal

SD

V

S

FI

MP

KD

C

M

FP

anti

anti

neutral

neutral

neutral

pro

pro

pro

pro

hard

hard

soft

soft

Note: European orientations are classified as anti, neutral and pro; Eurosceptical orientations are classified as hard and soft.

The attitude towards the EU is not a major political cleavage in Sweden. Its salience may have declined since the 1990s. But it still is one of the cleavages besides the left-right dimension as expressed on issues like the size of the public vs. private sectors and the amount of social spending.

2. The Election Campaign 2. a) Campaign In Sweden, the 2014 EP election in May was followed by a Riksdag election on September 14, and this election day also included regional and local elections. Since both elections were held the same year, we can make some comparisons between the two campaigns. One obvious point of reference is the expenses of the campaigns. Since there are no official data available, we have to rely on media reports. Comparing the EP-election of 2009 with the parliamentary elections of 2006 and 2010, data suggest that somewhere between 1/3 and ¼ was spent on the EP-elections15. A similar comparison for 2014 indicates that the proportion may have gone down to 1/5, with the Sweden Democrats having the highest

13

14 15

See Raunio; AYLOTT, 2008; Nicolas AYLOTT, Malena Rosén SUNDSTRÖM, “The European Parliament Election in Sweden June 2009”, European Parliament Election Briefing, no 37, 2009; Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCZERBIAK, “Coming in from the Cold? Euroscepticism, Government Participation and Party Positions in Europe”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 51, 2013, p. 17-37. European orientations based on Ryan BAKKER et al., “Measuring party positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999-201”, Party Politics, 21, 2015, p. 143-152; hard or soft according to authors classification. Cecilia FLYGT HÖGBERG, “Riksdagsvalet prioriteras högre än Europavalet”, Riksdag och Departement, no 14, 2009, p. 4.

THE 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTION IN SWEDEN AND EUROSCEPTICISM

87

spending ratio and the Liberals the lowest16. The lower ratio for EP-elections is not only a consequence of their being second order elections. In 2014, 20 candidates were to be elected for the single Swedish constituency, whereas at the national election, no less than 312 elections took place (1 parliamentary, 21 regional, and 290 local elections). Nevertheless, in terms of campaign spending, the national elections are more prioritised than the EP-election. Without the slightest doubt, the Riksdag election campaign is clearly more visible than the EP election campaign. The EP campaign is less intense, it is shorter in duration, and media coverage like televised debates (less than five for the Europeans and more than 10 for the Riksdag election) or opinion polls (during the election month some 10 for the Europeans and some 20 for the Riksdag election) is less frequent. The parties employ similar campaign designs for the both types of elections. The use of social media was stressed while at the same time, both Social Democrats and Moderates attempted to increase the numbers of their house calls in order to meet the voters in person. However, it is difficult to tell whether the differences in campaign effects result from the two kinds of elections or whether they are due to changes over time17. Traditional campaign techniques still seem to matter most. However, the importance of social media is increasing18. But in a comparative perspective, it is obvious that Swedish voters were well informed about the EP election campaign – 89% in Sweden while the EU average was 65%19. 2. b) Election Manifestos In most cases, the national party election manifestos for the Europeans were posted by the end of April or in early May 2014. This also signalled the beginning of the election campaign. As indicated by Table 4, the main messages of the electoral manifestos summarise quite well where the parties stand on the European issue.

16 17

18

19

Svenska DAGBLADET, “Så här mycket kostar partiernas valkampanjer”, 2014-06-22, http:// www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/sa-har-mycket-kostar-partiernas-valkampanjer_3674988.svd. (19 February 2015). See Maria SOLEVID, “Svenska väljares kampanjexponering”, 20 March 2014, http://politolo gerna.wordpress.com/2014/03/20/svenska-valjares-kampanjexponering/ (19 February 2015); Magnus HAGEVI, “Ett år efter valet: valrörelseaktivitet bland väljarna”, 19 September 2011, http://blogg.lnu.se/survey/blog/tag/dorrknackning/ (19 February 2015). See Jens TENSCHER, Juri MYKKÄNEN, Tom MORING, “Modes of Professional Campaigning: A Four-Country Comparison in the European Parliamentary Elections, 2009”, The International Journal of Press/Politics, 17, 2012, p. 145–168; Maurice VERGEER, Liesbeth HERMANS, “Web campaigning in the 2009 European Parliament elections: A cross-national comparative analysis”, New Media & Society, 15, 2013, p. 128–148; Martin KARLSSON, Joachim ÅSTRÖM, “The political blog space: A new arena for political representation?”, New Media & Society published online 29 July 2014; Anders Olof LARSSON, “Online, all the time? A quantitative assessment of the permanent campaign on Facebook”, New Media & Society published online 17 June 2014. European Parliament, “Post-election survey 2014: European Elections 2014”, October 2014, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/00191b53ff/Eurobarometer.html?tab =2014_2. (19 February 2015)

SVANTE ERSSON

88 Table 4. Headings of the Election Manifestos20 Pro

Liberals (FP)

Neutral

Against

Yes to Europe

Moderates (M)

We believe in Europe

Centre party (C)

A slimmer but sharper Europe

Christian Democrats (KD)

Our Agenda in Brussels

Greens (MP)

Change Europe – vote Green

Social Democrats (S)

Fair conditions and more jobs

Feminists (FI)

Feminist Policy for EU

Pirate party (PP)

A more Democratic EU

Left party (V)

Send no more yes men to the EU

Sweden Democrats (SD)

Less EU, more of Sweden

There were two dedicated EU-positive parties, namely, the Liberals and the Moderates, and two clearly EU-critical parties, i.e., the Left party and the Sweden Democrats. In between them, the parties presented agendas for changes of EUpolicies with respect to the Labour Market (Social Democrats), climate change (Greens), less policy details (Centre party) or more subsidiarity (Christian Democrats). The issues discussed during the campaign focused on environment, democracy in the EU, immigration, and mobility in the labour market. To some extent, these topics overlap with the issues deemed most important by the voters as reported in the VALU Exit Poll presented in Table 5 below. One noticeable deviation, however, is the peace issue which voters regard the most important one, although it was not widely discussed during the campaign. It is also noteworthy that the issues receiving an increased attention from the voters over time are refugees/immigrants (the SD issue) and gender equality (the FI issue).

20

Based on a reading of the electoral manifestos available from the web-sites of the parties: (19 February 2015) C: http://www.centerpartiet.se/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Valplattform-EP-valet.pdf FI: http://feministisktinitiativ.se/eu-valsplattformen/ FP: http://www.folkpartiet.se/ImageVault/Images/id_22007/scope_0/ImageVaultHandler. aspx KD: https://www.kristdemokraterna.se/Global/Rapporter_Och_Dokument/V%c3%a5r_ agenda_i_Bryssel_Kristdemokraternas_valmanifest_inf%c3%b6r_EU-parlamentsvalet_ 2014.pdf M: http://www.moderat.se/nyhetsartikel/valmanifest-vi-tror-pa-europa MP: http://www.mp.se/sites/default/files/eu_valmanifest_2014_a5_w.pdf PP: http://euval2014.piratpartiet.se/files/2014/02/Piratpartiet_valmanifest_EU_2014.pdf S: http://www.socialdemokraterna.se/upload/val/Val2014/EP-val2014/dokument/Valma nifest-EU-2014.pdf SD: http://sverigedemokraterna.se/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/eu-manifestet2014.pdf V: http://www.vansterpartiet.se/assets/Kongressuttalande-EU.pdf

THE 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTION IN SWEDEN AND EUROSCEPTICISM

89

Table 5. Important Issues According to Voters as reported in the VALU exit polls 1995 – 201421 Important issues

1995

1999

2004

2009

2014

Peace in Europe

66

66

61

55

59

Environment

56

45

47

53

53

Democracy in Europe

59

53

55

50

51

Social Welfare

–

48

50

44

48

Gender Equality

–

37

42

42

47

Employment

53

50

46

47

46

Food Quality

–

–

–

–

46

Economy

54

47

46

47

43

Energy and Nuclear Power

–

–

–

38

39

Fighting Crime

–

–

–

42

38

National Sovereignty

48

43

47

38

38

Refugees/Immigrants

–

19

26

26

38

Drug Policy

46

–

47

32

29

Labour Market Migration

–

–

–

–

29

Euro

33

29

36

32

28 27

Foreign Policy of EU

–

–

–

31

Defence Issues

34

31

30

26

25

Business

–

27

29

22

24

Agriculture

23

21

25

22

21

Animal

–

–

–

–

20

Thus, the election campaign was strongly oriented towards the national parties. The presence of a European-wide campaign was, however, difficult to note for the general voter. This applies to the Spitzenkandidaten in particular. 2. c) Opinion Polls The first opinion polls aimed at the 2014 EP election were published in July 2013. But they only became frequent in May 2014. Initially, among the parties represented at the European Parliament, the Centre party, Christian Democrats, and Pirate party run the risk of not being re-elected. Among the parties with no MEP’s, there were question marks for SD and the Feminists. The closer the election, the better the forecasts. By the end of the campaign, it became clear that the Centre party, Christian Democrats and SD would be elected into the new parliament while the Pirate party would stay outside. The only question mark remaining until the Election Day was the fortunes for the Feminists – FI. Details of the opinion polls are presented in Table 6 below.

21

VALU exit poll European Election 2014: http://www.svt.se/nyheter/val2014/article20750 79.svt/binary/ ValuResultat_ EUval_PK_resultat_v01.pdf.(19 February 2015).

SVANTE ERSSON

90 Table 6. Opinion Polls on the European Elections 201422 Pollster

Date presented

V

S

MP

C

FP

KD

M

SD

PP

FI

JL

Other 0,4

Novus

24 May 2014

7,1

25,1

15,5

5,0

11,1

6,1

15,0

6,3

2,8

5,4

0,2

Ipsos

22 May 2014

8,4

24,9

13,8

6,0

10,4

6,3

16,5

6,9

1,8

4,5

0,1

Sifo

22 May 2014

6,6

28,3

12,5

5,3

8,8

4,9

18,1

8,6

2,2

4,3

0,1

Novus

16 May 2014

10,2

26,9

14,9

3,2

8,4

6,4

16,3

6,6

3,9

2,5

0,2

0,5

YouGov 14 May 2014

8,0

28,0

11,0

3,0

8,0

4,0

19,0

10,0

3,0

4,0

Demoskop

6,7

29,8

12,6

5,4

9,2

6,0

17,8

6,3

1,4

4,3

0,3

0,2

0,5

12 May 2014

Ipsos

12 May 2014

7,1

30,7

12,7

4,0

8,6

2,9

22,8

5,7

1,3

2,8

SKOP

5 May 2014

5,9

32,6

12,8

4,1

9,2

4,7

20,0

5,2

3,1

1,6

Sifo

4 May 2014

5,8

31,2

16,1

3,6

8,1

3,7

21,7

4,1

2,2

3,2

SKOP

17 April 2014 8,0

29,0

15,0

6,0

7,0

3,0

23,0

5,0

2,0

Sifo

14 February 2014

8,8

32,3

11,2

3,7

9,7

3,9

21,6

6,4

1,5

Novus

11 February 2014

10,8

27,3

15,7

4,5

10,9

2,3

20,9

4,8

1,3

7,0

26,0

15,0

3,0

4,0

4,0

28,0

7,0

TNS Sifo 8 July 2013

1,0

0,9 0,8

0,3

0,0 2,0

0,2

0,5

0,6 6,0

The European election is indeed a second order election, although at the fifth election in 2014, it may be less so than at the first election in 1995. The election campaign had focussed on the European agenda, and it also had effects on the electoral outcomes for parties like SD and the Feminists.

3. Election Results 3. a) EP-election 2014 Recent European elections in Sweden paved the way for new parties to enter the electoral arena. It started in 2004, when the new Eurosceptic June List (JL) won seats, and was followed in 2009 with the entry of the Pirate Party to the European Parliament. In 2014, the Sweden Democrats won two seats, the party had already been able to enter the Riksdag in 2010. The entry of the Feminists into the European Parliament was somewhat less expected.23 The Feminist Initiative was founded in 2005, but they had failed to enter the Riksdag both in 2006 and in 2010. It was only during the election campaign that a window of possibility was opened, and the polls were probably decisive for the Feminists’ securing one seat in the Parliament. As expected, the Pirate party did not return. Some of the major parties like the Moderates lost votes whereas the Social Democrats remained on a 22 23

Based on report in Wikipedia, Europaparlamentsvalet i Sverige 2014, http://sv.wikipedia. org/wiki/Europaparlamentsvalet_i_Sverige_2014; figures checked with the Pollsters. (19 February 2015). See also Nina LILJEQVIST, “Sweden: An escape from mainstream parties”, in: Lorenzo DE SIO et al., (eds.), The European Parliament Elections of 2014, Roma, CISE, 2014, p. 263-267 and Nicholas AYLOTT, “Sweden”, in: Andrei KULIKOV, (ed.), 2014 European Parliament elections: Views from across Europe, Bulletin on European and CIS Studies, Moscow, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, August 2014, p. 37-39.

THE 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTION IN SWEDEN AND EUROSCEPTICISM

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low electoral level. The only winners of the election were, in addition to the Feminists, the Sweden Democrats and the Greens. Employing the classification of parties as hard or soft Eurosceptic – as in Table 3 above – makes it possible to follow the ups and downs of Euroscepticism at the party level. Of course it depends on how the parties are classified. Many smaller parties may be classified as hard Eurosceptics whereas the Pirate Party is classified as a soft party. Over time, the soft parties are on the rise while the hard ones are weaker in 2014 than in 2004 when they had reached their peak. Taken all Eurosceptic parties together, the variation over time is smaller, and there is no particular trend visible. In 2014, the Eurosceptic parties are stronger than they were in 1995, but not as strong as they were in 2004. Details of the European Elections in Sweden for the period 1995 – 2014 are presented in Table 7. Table 7. European Parliament Elections in Sweden 1995 – 2014: Votes in Percent24 Party

Abbr.

EP_1995

EP_1999

EP_2004

EP_2009

EP_2014

Social Democrats

S

28,06

25,99

24,56

24,41

24,19

Moderates

M

23,17

20,75

18,25

18,83

13,65

7,16 (S)

5,99 (S)

6,26 (S)

Centre party

C

Left party

V

12,92 (H) 15,82 (H) 12,79 (H)

5,47

6,49

5,66 (H)

6,30 (H)

Liberals

FP

4,82

13,85

9,86

13,58

9,91

Christian Democrats

KD

3,92

7,64

5,68

4,68

5,93

Greens

MP

17,22 (H)

9,49 (H)

5,96 (H)

11,02 (S)

15,41 (S)

New Democracy

ND

0,11

Sweden Democrats

SD

0,01 (H)

0,34 (H)

1,13 (H)

3,27 (H)

9,67 (H)

Feminists

FI

2,22 (S)

5,49 (S)

Pirate party

PP

7,13 (S)

2,23 (S)

June List

JL

14,47 (H)

3,55 (H)

Animal Party Workers Initiative

0,09 (H)

National Democrats

0,29 (H)

Against EU

0,62 (H)

Justice party

0,56 (H)

Sarajevo List

1,00

Critics of EU

0,69 (H)

Sweden out of EU

0,14 (H)

Peoples Democrats

0,02 (H)

Other parties Total

24

0,31 (H) 0,24 (H)

0,04 (H)

0,08 (H)

0,22

0,14

0,06

0,05

0,18

100,00

100,00

100,00

100,00

100,00

Based on data from The Election Authority, http://www.val.se/. (19 February 2015).

SVANTE ERSSON

92 Party

EP_1995

EP_1999

EP_2004

EP_2009

EP_2014

Soft (S)

Abbr.

7,16

5,99

6,26

20,37

23,12

Hard (H)

31,55

25,64

35,33

12,60

16,28

Hard + Soft

38,71

31,63

41,59

32,97

39,40

Note: Author’s classification of parties as soft (S) or hard (H) Eurosceptics

In 2014, nine parties succeeded in having MEPs elected. Compared with the previous election (2009), one more party won a seat. After some negotiations, the two new parties, the Feminists and SD, joined the S&D group and the EFDD25 group respectively. Details of the adherence of Swedish MEPs to European Parliament Party Groups are shown in Table 8 below. Table 8. MEPs from Sweden and EP Party Groups26 EPG group (as of 2014)

1995

1999

2004

2009

2014

7

6

5

5+1

5

Party

S&D

Social Democrats (S)

S&D

Feminist Inititative (FI)

1

EPP

Moderates (M)

5

4

4

3

EPP

Christian Democrats (KD)

2

1

1

1

ALDE

Liberals (FP)

3

2

3

2

ALDE

Centre party (C)

2 (S)

1 (S)

1 (S)

1

1

GREENS-EFA

Greens (MP)

4 (H)

2 (H)

1 (H)

2 (S)

4 (S)

GREENS-EFA

Pirate party (PP)

GUE-NGL

Left party (V)

EFDD

Sweden Democrats (SD)

ID

June List (JL)

5 1

1+1 (S) 3 (H)

3 (H)

2 (H)

1 (H)

1 (H) 2 (H)

3 (H)

Soft (S)

1

1

1

3+1

5

Hard (H)

7

5

6

1

3

Soft + Hard (S+H)

8

6

7

4+1

8

Total Seats

22

22

19

18+2

20

Notes: S&D = Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats; EPP = European People’s Party; ALDE = Alliance of Liberals for Europe; GREENS-EFA = The Greens – European Free Alliance; GUE-NGL = European United Left – Nordic Green Left; EFDD = Europe for Freedom and Direct Democracy; ID = Independents and Democrats. Authors classification of parties as soft (S) or hard (H) Eurosceptics

In terms of the presence of Eurosceptics at the European Parliament, only the Left party and SD may be said to adhere to Eurosceptic Parliamentary Groups. The 25 26

EFDD collapsed in mid-October 2014 but resurrected very soon. Based on Wolfgang NORDSIECK, Parties and elections in Europe, http://www.parties-andelections.eu/eu.html. (19 February 2015).

THE 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTION IN SWEDEN AND EUROSCEPTICISM

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number of MEPs classified as hard Eurosceptics are less numerous in 2014 than they were back in 2004 and earlier. 3. b) Riksdag election 2014 Less than four months later, on September 14, the national parliament, the Riksdag, was elected. The election resulted in the replacement of the Reinfeldt cabinet by a Social Democrat and Green cabinet with Löfven as the new Prime Minister. Comparing the EP-election with the Riksdag election, it is noteworthy that the Feminist Initiative was not able to enter the national parliament; in fact, FI received fewer votes at the Riksdag election than at the Europeans. This was also the case for the Greens and the Liberals. They, too, had received more votes at the EP-election. All other parties increased their votes at the Riksdag election. The Sweden Democrats advanced the most, they doubled their vote from 2010. Indeed, one may say that the SD was the only winner of the 2014 Riksdag election27. Employing the classification of parties as soft and hard Eurosceptics shows that soft and hard Eurosceptics won their strongest support at the Riksdag election in 2014. But it was weaker than at the 2014 EP election – with the exception of the hard Eurosceptics. The increased support of SD makes the difference. Accordingly, to a large extent, the prospect for Eurosceptics in Sweden will depend on the SD’s future. Figures the Riksdag elections between 1994 and 2014 are presented in Table 9 below. Table 9. Riksdag Elections in Sweden 1994 – 2014: Votes in Percent28 Party

Abbr.

Rd_1994

Rd_1998

Rd_2002

Rd_2006

Social Democrats

S

45,25

36,40

39,85

34,99

30,66

31,01

Moderates

M

22,38

22,91

15,26

26,23

30,06

23,33

Centre party

C

7,65 (S)

5,13 (S)

6,19 (S)

7,88

6,56

6,11

Left party

V

6,17 (H)

12,00 (H)

8,39 (H)

5,85 (H)

5,60 (H)

5,72 (H)

Liberals

Fp

7,19

4,72

13,39

7,54

7,06

5,42

Christian Democrats

KD

4,07

11,75

9,15

6,59

5,60

4,57

Greens

MP

5,02 (H)

4,50 (H)

4,65 (H)

5,24 (H)

7,34 (S)

6,89 (S)

New Democracy

ND

1,24

0,16

0,04

0,00

0,00

0,00

Sweden Democrats

SD

0,23 (H)

0,37 (H)

1,44 (H)

2,93 (H)

5,70 (H)

12,86 (H)

Feminists

FI

0,68 (S)

0,40 (S)

3,12 (S)

Pirate party

PP

0,63 (S)

0,65 (S)

0,43 (S)

June List

JL

0,47 (H)

Animal Party

27

28

Rd_2010

Rd_2014

0,07

See Niklas BOLIN, Nicholas AYLOTT, “One winner and seven losers: The Swedish parliamentary election of September 2014”, EPERN, https://epern.wordpress.com/2014/09/29/onewinner-and-seven-losers-the-swedish-parliamentary-election-of-september-2014/ (19 February 2015); Nicholas AYLOTT, Niklas BOLIN, “Polarising Pluralism: The Swedish Parliamentary Election of September 2014”, West European Politics published online 23 January 2015. Based on data from http://www.val.se/. (19 February 2015).

SVANTE ERSSON

94 Party

Abbr.

Rd_1994

Rd_1998

Rd_2002

Rd_2006

Rd_2010

0,17 (H)

0,06 (H)

0,02 (H)

0,03 (H)

0,02 (H)

0,03 (H)

Rd_2014

Workers Initiative National Democrats Against EU

0,06 (H)

Justice party

0,06 (H)

0,01 (H)

Sarajevo List Critics of EU Sweden out of EU Peoples Democrats Other parties Total Soft (S)

0,74

2,02

1,44

0,89

0,33

0,46

100,00

100,00

100,00

100,00

100,00

100,00

7,65

5,13

6,19

1,31

8,39

10,44

Hard (H)

11,48

16,93

14,67

14,57

11,35

18,59

Hard + Soft

19,14

22,06

20,87

15,88

19,74

29,03

Note: Author’s classification of parties as soft (S) or hard (H) Eurosceptics

After the election, a new minority government of Social Democrats and Greens under Stefan Lövfen as Prime Minister was formed in early October. When the new government presented its budget proposals in December, it was rejected in the Riksdag since SD supported the previous Alliance government parties’ proposal. Faced with this situation, Prime Minister Löfven threatened with a new election to take place in late March 2015. In the wake of this announcement, representatives of the new and the old government negotiated and reached the “December Agreement” designed to ensure that minority governments would be able to get their own budget through the Riksdag. The agreement also resulted in the withdrawal of the proposed new election29. Two parties refrained from this agreement, namely the SD and the Left party. In particular, SD was critical of the Agreement since they had expected to improve their result again at a snap election. 3. c) Comparisons between the two elections Let us briefly compare the two elections with respect to turnout and characteristics of the party systems such as volatility and fragmentation. The European Election is second order to the Riksdag election. This is evident from the turnout for the period between 1994 and 2014 – see Table 10 below. Initially, the turnout dropped. But in the early 2000s, the trend changed for both types of elections. Therefore, the gap between the elections has decreased. Comparing the turnout at the European elections in Sweden with the EU average, it has changed from a deficit to a surplus since 2009.

29

See Ann-Cathrine JUNGAR, Torbjörn BERGMAN, Johan HELLSTRÖM, “Och sen då – efter decemberöverenskommelsen 2014?”, 2015-01-22, https://maktochpolitik.wordpress.com/ (19 February 2015).

THE 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTION IN SWEDEN AND EUROSCEPTICISM

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Table 10. Turnout at elections in Sweden and EU 1994 – 201430 Year

rd_se

1994

86,8 41,6

gap: se – eu

45,2

–15,1

38,8

49,5

42,6

–10,7

37,9

45,5

42,2

–7,6

45,5

43,0

36,5

2,5

51,1

42,5

34,7

8,6

80,1

2004 2006

gap: rd – ep

81,4

1999 2002

ep_eu 56,7

1995 1998

ep_se

82,0

2009 2010

84,6

2014

85,8

Notes: rd_se = parliamentary elections in Sweden; ep_se = European elections in Sweden; ep_eu = European elections in the EU

Voting is less predictable today than fifty years ago. Looking at the data for Sweden we may, however, note a slight decrease in voter volatility at Riksdag elections whereas these figures are relatively stable for the European elections. It is striking that volatility, as measured by the Pedersen index31, is higher at the European elections than at the Riksdag elections, and if looking at volatility between the two types of elections, the figures are even higher. Evidently, voters consider the European election to be different from the Riksdag election, thus enabling them to switch to parties not tested at Riksdag elections. Table 11. Volatility in Votes across Different Elections 1994 – 2014 Election pairs

European

Election pairs

Riksdag

Election pairs

EuropeanRiksdag

ep_95-99

15,98

rd_94-98

15,52

ep95-rd94

22,14

ep_99-04

16,52

rd_94-02

14,58

ep99-rd98

18,80

ep_04-09

20,95

rd_02-06

16,53

ep04-rd02

24,03

ep_09-14

17,34

24,89

Mean

rd_06-10

8,73

ep04-rd06

rd_10-14

10,55

ep09-rd10

22,22

ep14-rd14

19,98

17,70

13,18

22,01

Note: Based on figures reported in Tables 7 and 9

A higher volatility at the European elections is also associated with higher figures for party system fragmentation. On the average, the numbers of effective parties at the European elections are more than six and less than five at the Riksdag elec-

30 31

Based on: Sweden: http://www.val.se/ ; EU: http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/turn out.html. (19 February 2015). Mogens PEDERSEN, “The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility”, European Journal of Political Research, 7, 1979, p. 1-26.

SVANTE ERSSON

96

tions. It is also noteworthy that over this time period, the fragmentation scores have increased from election to election. Table 12. Fragmentation of Party Systems at European and Riksdag Elections 1994-2004 Election

European

Election

Riksdag

EP_1995

5,32

Rd_1994

3,65

EP_1999

5,77

Rd_1998

4,54

EP_2004

6,60

Rd_2002

4,51

EP_2009

7,05

Rd_2006

4,66

EP_2014

7,39

Mean

6,43

Rd_2010

4,79

Rd_2014

5,41 4,59

Note: Based on figures reported in Tables 7 and 9

3. d) Voters Here, we focus on the Eurosceptic parties and the new parties entering the European Parliament. Some traditional social background items and data on trust in politicians as well as an attempt to map the geographic variation for some of these parties will be presented. – Social background: We know that social background, such as class, still have an impact on voting in the Nordic countries32. We also know that gender, age and employment differentiate voters in their party choice. Thus, Greens and Feminists are strong among female and young voters; the Pirate Party, in particular in 2009, was strong in the electorate of young male voters. The Left Party is present in the working class, among employees of local governments, and those on sick leave, but in particular, relatively speaking, among voters grown up outside of Europe. To some extent, this also applies for the Sweden Democrats: they are present in the working class and those on sick leave, but strong among the male electorate; looking at other background variables like age, sector employment or place of growing up, they do fit with voters in general. – Trust: Various kinds of distrust tend to be associated with support for populist parties, i.e., anti-immigration or Eurosceptic parties33. It is a fact that social trust has been high in the Nordic countries. But there are signs of a downward trend, at least in Sweden34. Data from the VALU polls suggest that voters supporting parties like SD, Pirate Party, June List and the Left Party tend to 32 33

34

Åsa BENGTSSON et al., The Nordic Voter: Myths of Exceptionalism, Colchester, ECPR Press, 2014. Laureen M. MCLAREN, “The Cultural Divide in Europe Migration, Multiculturalism, and Political Trust”, World Politics, 64, 2012, p. 199-241; Maria OSKARSON, Marie DEMKER, “Another kind of class voting: The working-class sympathy for Sweden Democrats”, in: Jens RYDGREN, (ed.), Class Politics and the Radical Right, Abingdon, Routledge, 2013, p. 173-189. Maria OSKARSON, Bo ROTHSTEIN, “Den sociala tilliten – håller vi på att tappa de unga?”, in: Lennart WEIBULL, Henrik OSCARSSON, Annika BERGSTRÖM, (eds.), I framtidens skugga: Fyrtiotvå kapitel om politik, medier och samhälle, SOM-undersökningen 2011, Göteborg, Göteborgs universitet, SOM-institutet, 2012, p. 539-544.

THE 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTION IN SWEDEN AND EUROSCEPTICISM

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show lower trust in politicians than voters of mainstream parties (see Table 13). And this is particularly evident for the interpersonal trust of SD voters. The data are presented in the European Social Surveys (not reported here). Table 13. Trust in Politicians and Party Choice According to VALU Exit Polls 2009-201435 Poll

V

S

MP

C

FP

PP

SD

FI

valu_ep14

54

66

66

77

71

KD M 70

82

35

27

58

JL

valu_ep09

44

62

62

81

74

69

79

27

23

57

valu_rd14

59

66

69

78

79

79

81

26

valu_rd10

58

65

67

83

79

81

83

27

Mean differences

–12

–1

0

14

10

9

16 –32 –40 –10 –28

34

OTHER

TOTAL

24

64

24

62

61

18

67

46

19

70

–45

Note: Respondents showing very large or relatively large trust in Swedish politicians

–

Geography: Let us also briefly comment on the geographical distribution of some of the parties participating at the European election and the Riksdag election in 201436. The pattern displayed for the different elections is basically identical. SD has its strongholds in the southern part of Sweden (Skåne and Blekinge), but also in the central part of Sweden in municipalities like Lindesberg and Ljusnarsberg. The Feminist Initiative is SD’s counterpart: where the Feminists are strong, the SD is weak. The Feminists strongholds are the bigger university cities like Malmö, Göteborg, Stockholm, Uppsala and Umeå. It is also noteworthy that the Feminists’ geographical support varies more than that of the SD. To sum up: The European election had three winners (SD, Greens and Feminists) and three losers (Moderates, Pirate Party and Liberals). Among the winners, there was one distinctly anti-EU party, namely SD, whereas two of the pro-EU parties were among the losers, i.e., Moderates and Liberals. The success of SD continued with the Riksdag election, when the party doubled its electoral support once again. The other winners at the EP-election, Greens and Feminists, were less successful at the Riksdag election. Both parties received less votes at the Riksdag election. The Feminists did not win a seat, and the high expectations of the Greens were shattered even though the party was to form a government coa-

35

36

See VALU Exit Polls for European and Riksdag elections 2009 – 2014 (19 February 2015): Rd 2014: http://www.svt.se/svts/article2323667.svt/binary/SVT_ValuResultat_riksdagsval_20 14_PK_0914.pdf ; EP 2014: http://www.svt.se/nyheter/val2014/article2075079.svt/binary/ValuResultat_EUval_PK_re sultat_v01.pdf ; Rd 2010: http://www.svt.se/content/1/c8/02/15/63/14/ValuResultat2010 _100921.pdf (dead link) ; EP 2009: http://www.svt.se/svts/article2051843.svt/binary/SVT%20Presskonferens%202009 -06-10.pdf. For detailed maps, see: Rickard ÖHRVALL, Maps of SD, https://twitter.com/richard ohrvall/status/486811138647408640 (19 February 2015) ; Rickard ÖHRVALL, Map of FI, http://blog.svd.se/trehundratolv/2014/07/16/feministiskt-initiativ-eu-val-och-riksdagsval/ (19 February 2015).

98

SVANTE ERSSON

lition with the Social Democrats in October. Evidently, SD was supported by Eurosceptic voters, but also by voters with low trust in politics which is the result of their critical stance on the anti-immigration issue.

4. Euroscepticism among the Euro-Critical Parties Presumably, Euroscepticism was one of the driving forces behind the SD’s success at the European election. According to the election manifestos of the two hard Eurosceptic parties, the SD and the Left Party, what does Euroscepticism entail in 2014? The general opinion on the EU is more positive today than in former days. But there are still numerous Eurosceptic voters who make at least some parties go on the campaign trail. Striving for participation in government – seeking office at the 2010 and 2014 Riksdag elections without being successful – may have forced the Left Party to downplay its critical stance on the EU; this is not needed for SD. Overall, SD takes a critical stance on the trend towards federal development within the EU and demands the maintaining of an intergovernmental union. They strive for the renegotiation of the Lisbon Treaty and want to subject the result to a national referendum. Whether this will lead to the withdrawal from the EU or not is not considered. They further propose a lower membership fee in order to redeploy more money to social welfare in Sweden. There is also the call for intensifying the fight against corruption within the EU. Restrictions on migration, and in particular on “organised begging” from EU-migrants is claimed. The Swedish labour market model needs to be protected from decisions made by the EU. The SD claims their demands make them the sole trustworthy EU-critical party at the 2014 election. Furthermore, in the later manifesto for the Riksdag election, SD mentioned the possibility of a withdrawal from the EU. The Left Party, too, identifies itself as an EU-critical party. They reject the building of afederal European Union. They criticize the EU austerity policy and the policies of deregulation and demand the introduction of a social protocol. They strive for an open EU with a generous asylum policy and consider the election an opportunity to force back right wing anti-immigrant parties. The longterm goal of the Left Party has been Sweden’s withdrawal from the EU. The critique of the EU of SD and the Left Party overlaps in some fields, but the main difference refers to the issue of migration: while SD stands for restrictions, the Left Party pleads for openness. This issue has not been prominent on the agenda of Eurosceptics before. Other issues raised by the Eurosceptic parties may be traced back to the referendum on the accession to the EU in 1994 or the referendum on the euro in 2003.

Conclusion: Prospects for Euroscepticism Are there prospects for a growing Euroscepticism in Sweden? Here, we may face a paradox. On the one hand, the general opinion on the EU has changed over time from being critical of EU to a more positive view. However, this does not in-

THE 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTION IN SWEDEN AND EUROSCEPTICISM

99

clude the approval of joining the euro. On the other hand, something like a return of party based Euroscepticism could be noticed at the recent elections. It was more visible at the Riksdag elections than at the Europeans. No doubt, the opinion on the EU has shifted from a negative to a more positive on. The rising turnout at European elections confirms this change. In addition, the EU-issue is not a major cleavage at elections any longer. This may simply be a consequence of the fact that Sweden has been an EU member for twenty years now. But it is also true that Sweden has not suffered from severe austerity policies due to the financial crisis. Sweden, and Scandinavia, have emerged from the economic crisis relatively well37. In Sweden, the future opinion on Europe will depend on different factors. On the domestic scene, the prospects of the new minority Löfven cabinet (Social Democrats + Greens) will be important. The December Agreement has secured this minority government the possibility to remain in government until the next expected election in 2018. If they will succeed in this endeavour, there will be a continuous period of political stability. If they fail, Sweden will enter a period of cabinet instability. This would probably have consequences for the fortunes of a populist party like SD, and indirectly an impact on opinions on the EU, too. On the foreign scene, the economic problems the Euro zone now faces will have consequences all over Europe as well as for national political systems, and even more so if it would result in a Europanic 2.0. Obviously, that the forthcoming referendum on the EU in the United Kingdom may spur on hard Eurosceptics in other parts of Europe as well as in Sweden. To a large extent, the return of party based Euroscepticism seems to be associated with the rise of the populist SD which today may be classified as hard Eurosceptic. It is Sweden’s largest EU-critical party. If focussing on SD, it is important, though, to remember that the party is not primarily a Eurosceptic party but rather a populist party with a strong anti-immigration profile. But what are the prospects for party based Euroscepticism if we focus on the fate of the Sweden Democrats? There are at least some scenarios that could be suggested as of early 201538. Over the last Riksdag elections the SD has roughly doubled its electorate. Will the party be able to increase its support to around 25 % at the next election (expected) in 2018? This will probably depend on the reactions of the established parties, but also with internal developments of the SD. So far, the established parties reject SD, and SD seems to remain an outsider of the party system. However, other established parties may enter the migration policy area and thereby disarm the immigration issue for SD to some extent. But the SD might also benefit from a widening of the debate on the migration issue. Internally, the party built a more 37 38

See Lars CALMFORS, “How well is the Nordic model doing? Recent performance and future challenges”, in: Tarmo VALKONEN, Vesa VIHRIÄLÄ, (eds.), The Nordic model – challenged but capable of reform, København, Nordisk Ministerråd, 2014, p. 5-65. See Nicholas AYLOTT, “The Sweden Democrats: Ostracised and energised?”, Policy-network, 22 January 2015, http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4823&title=The-SwedenDemocrats-Ostracised-and-energised (19 February 2015); Ulf BJERELD, “Sverigedemokraterna och yrkandet om misstroendeförklaring”, 20 January 2015, http://ulfbjereld.blogspot.se/ 2015/01/sverigedemokraterna-och-yrkandet-om.html (19 February 2015); Christopher KAM, “Side-lining the Swedish Democrats”, 15 January 2015, http://blogs.ubc.ca/ unparliamentary/2015/01/15/side-lining-the-swedish-democrats/. (19 February 2015).

SVANTE ERSSON

100

effective organisation. This was probably important for the increased voter support at the 2014 elections39. At the same time, the party leadership has faced problems due to party leader Jimmy Åkesson’s sick-leave since October 2014. In November 2015, at its annual conference, the party may decide on the issue of party leadership. There are also signs of strain within the party leadership concerning the position of the general secretary of the party; and there still are tensions between the mother party SD and its youth organisation SDU which stands for a more nationalist orientation. It is of course impossible to predict SD’s fortunes in a forthcoming election in 2018. For now, we know that SD has slightly increased its support in the opinion polls since the Riksdag election, but it is well known that these polls have difficulties accurately estimating the support for SD. Table 14 lists the polls for SD from October 2014 to February 2015, based on a “poll of polls” and polls from Sentio which is a Norwegian pollster generally registering the highest support for SD. Table 14. Opinion Polls for SD October 2014 – February 201540 Month

Poll of polls

Sentio

October 2014

13,4

16,7

November 2014

13,1

16,4

December 2014

14,4

17,5

January 2015

14,3

15,8

February 2015

15.1

16.6

The basic trend we observe in Sweden is an acceptance of the EU membership accompanied by more positive opinions on the EU. Yet this trend may be reversed. One indicator could be the fate of SD. One scenario envisions the continuous progress of SD as the “only” true opposition party. Another scenario expects no major changes since the 2014 election when other established parties could have taken over some of the policies proposed by SD. Still another scenario, probably the least likely, suggests a set-back for SD due to internal problems. Such a set-back hurt its closest predecessor, the New Democracy, so much that it imploded due to internal conflicts after the 1994 election. To conclude with a cautious forecast for Sweden, we may expect that the hard Eurosceptic party base will keep growing, but this growth will be the consequence of the prospects of SD whose main agenda is anti-immigration and not the European issue, while the general opinion on Europe will basically remain the same.

39 40

Ann-Cathrine JUNGAR, “Organisation nyckel till SD:s framgång”, Svenska Dagbladet, 14 September 2014, http://www.svd.se/opinion/brannpunkt/organisation-nyckel-till-sdsframgang_3916896.svd.(19 February 2015). Based on: Novus, Samtliga svenska väljarbarometrar, http://novus.se/valjaropinionen/ samtliga-svenska-valjarbarometrar/ (19 February 2015).

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LES ÉLECTIONS EUROPÉENNES DE 2014 EN SUÈDE ET L’EUROSCEPTICISME A l´origine, la Suède était européen du bout des lèvres. Lorsque la Suède devint membre de l´Union européenne de 1995, l´opinion publique était négative. Au fils des années, et au terme de vingt ans d´adhésion, le sentiment collectif vis-àvis du projet européen était devenu moins critique et plus positif. Des partis qui à l´origine, étaient des opposants durs au « projet Europe », mutèrent en partis critiques « mous », par exemple le Parti vert (MP). A l´occasion des élections européennes de 2014, l´hostilité dure à l’Europe a connu une renaissance consécutive à la montée en puissance des Démocrates suédois (SD). Aux élections parlementaires de septembre 2014, le SD a connu un nouveau succès. La réapparition de cette hostilité à l´Europe dans un cadre partisan semble étroitement lié à la montée en puissance du SD populiste, que l´on peut aujourd´hui qualifier d´opposant dur à l´Europe. Il faut toutefois rappeler que ce parti n´était pas au premier abord anti-européen, mais avait un profil de parti anti-immigration. On peut s´attendre à ce que l´hostilité partisane dure à l´Europe se renforce à l´avenir. Toutefois, ce trend dépend des choix du SD, dont l´agenda central reste la lutte contre l´immigration et pas le thème de l´Europe. Le sentiment collectif sur l´Europe ne devrait pas, selon toute probabilité, profondément changer.

DIE EUROPAWAHLEN 2014 IN SCHWEDEN UND DER EUROSKEPTIZISMUS Zunächst war Schweden ein widerwilliger Europäer. Als das Land 1995 Mitglied der Europäischen Union wurde, war die öffentliche Meinung über den Beitritt negativ. Im Laufe der Jahre, wohl als Folge der zwanzigjährigen Mitgliedschaft, ist die Haltung gegenüber dem Projekt Europa weniger kritisch und positiver geworden. Zunächst waren die Parteien harte Europagegner, aber sie wandelten sich zu weichen Europakritikern, wie z.B. die Grüne Partei (MP). Bei den Europawahlen von 2014 erlebte die harte Europafeindlichkeit eine Art Renaissance aufgrund des Erstarkens der Schwedendemokraten (SD). Bei den Parlamentswahlen im September 2014 konnten sie ihren Erfolg wiederholen. Die Wiederkehr dieser parteibasierten Europafeindlichkeit scheint mit dem Aufstieg der populistischen SD in Zusammenhang zu stehen, die man heute als harte Europagegner klassifizieren kann. Sie ist die größte EU-feindliche Partei. Es muss jedoch daran erinnert werden, dass die Partei nicht in erster Linie eine europafeindliche Partei ist, sondern dass sie ein sehr starkes Profil als zuwanderungsfeindliche Partei hat. Es steht zu erwarten, dass die harte europafeindliche Parteibasis sich verstärken wird. Aber diese Verstärkung wird die Konsequenz der Perspektiven der SD sein, deren zentrale Agenda der Kampf gegen Immigration und nicht das Thema Europa ist. Die allgemeine Meinung über Europa wird sich vermutlich nicht ändern.

THE CASE OF THE EUROSCEPTIC TAIL WAGGING THE DOG? THE 2014 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTION IN FINLAND DAVID ARTER At the October 1994 EU membership referendum, Finland registered the highest pro-accession vote of the three Nordic applicants, Finland, Norway and Sweden. For many (especially younger) voters it was essentially a question of identity, that is anchoring Finland to a bloc of West European states to which, on the basis of its liberal democracy and market economy, it had belonged through the Cold War years1. For the decision-making elite, European Union (EU) membership was first and foremost a question of security – belonging to a Western “security community” after the collapse of the Soviet Union had facilitated the termination of the “special defensive relationship” with the “bear next door”. Unlike Norway and Sweden, there was not a single party in Finland in 1994 that opposed EU membership. During the referendum debate, there was no discussion of the federalism implicit in the Treaty of European Union. Rather, Euroscepticism was largely, though not exclusively, a rural and peripheral phenomenon, strongest among the farmers. Indeed, whilst almost 57 per cent of Finns voted for membership, there was a majority against joining the EU in the six most northerly constituencies where the (formerly Agrarian) Centre Party has had its greatest strength. The basic argument in this essay is that whilst support for EU membership on the 20th anniversary of Finland’s accession had increased fractionally on the 1994 level and the body of EU-critics declined somewhat, in the order of onethird of Finns may be said to have cast a Eurosceptic vote at the May 2014 European Parliament election. Could the Eurosceptic tail be wagging the dog?

1. Finland as a model EU member-state Whether the indicators used are based on the image of the EU, trust in the EU or popular support for the EU/euro, Finland today appears an overwhelmingly pro-European nation. Over the two decades that Finland has been an EU member-state, popular perceptions of the EU, that is the EU’s image in Finland, have been consistently more positive than negative – particularly since the 2008 economic crisis – although on the basis of the autumn 2014 Eurobarometer figures, somewhat fewer Finns had a positive image of the EU than in the EU-28 as a whole (table 1). Rather, those with a neutral view of the EU were notably greater in number in Finland than the EU-28 average (table 2).

1

David ARTER, “The EU referendum in Finland on 16 October 1994: A Vote for the West, not for Maastricht”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 33 (3), 1995, p. 361-387.

DAVID ARTER

104 Table 1 Perceptions of the EU in Finland, autumn 1996-autumn 2014

Question: “Does the EU conjure up for you a positive, neutral or negative image?” YEAR

POSITIVE

NEUTRAL

CAN’T SAY

NEGATIVE

1996

36

27

1

35

1997

38

32

2

29

1998

43

30

1

25

1999

44

27

3

26

2000

39

25

1

35

2001

37

30

2

31

2002

38

28

1

32

2003

43

30

2

25

2004

42

34

2

23

2005

33

33

2

31

2006

35

30

1

34

2007

36

27

1

352

2009

40

33

1

28

2011

37

32

1

30

2012

55

25

1

20

2013

46

27

2

25

2014

42

31

2

243

2014

39

37

2

224

Table 25 Perceptions of the EU in Finland and the EU-28 (2014) %

POSITIVE

NEGATIVE

NEUTRAL

EU-28

39

37

22

FINLAND (EB)

35

48

17

FINLAND (EVA)

42

31

24

Over summer 2014, according to the National Values Survey (T-Median 2014 kansan arvot tutkimus), 40 per cent of Finns expressed trust in the EU (and among the 15-24 age-cohort 52 per cent did so). True, the 40 per cent figure was lower than for trust in the national parliament, the Eduskunta (47 per cent) and Government (45 per cent) and less than half that for the education system (90 per cent) and police (89 per cent). It was, however, above the EU-28 average of 37 per cent in au2 3 4 5

Source: EB = Standard Eurobarometer 82, Public Opinion in the European Union First Results. EVA = Finnish Business and Policy Forum. The data for autumn 1996-autumn 2007 are contained in Ilkka HAAVISTO, Pertti KILJUNEN, Kenen joukoissa seisot?, Yliopistopaino, 2008. The figures for winter 2009-winter 2014 are taken from Ilkka HAAVISTO, Neljäs Suomi, EVA asenne raportti. The percentages for autumn 2014 are found in Standard Eurobarometer 82, Public Opinion in the European Union, First Results

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tumn 2014. Figures for trust are, of course, difficult to interpret. Tellingly, Harteveld, der Meer and De Vries ask how citizens trust the EU – not how much – and they note that trust may derive from citizens’ evaluation of the performance (actual or perceived) of the EU, their emotional attachment to the EU or simply reflect an extension of their trust in national political institutions6. They conclude that “to an important degree, citizens’ trust in the EU can be predicted by their trust in national institutions, regardless of their rational evaluation or emotional affiliation”7. Indicators based on image and trust in short must be treated with care. Popular support, whilst not foolproof, is less open to ambiguity. Unlike Denmark and Sweden, where referenda in 2000 and 2003 respectively rejected membership of the economic and monetary union (EMU), Finns were not consulted over the adoption of the euro. None the less, Finnish support for EMU at 75 per cent in the autumn 2014 Eurobarometer was eight percentage points above the average for the Euro area and almost twenty percentage points above the figure for the EU-28 (table 3). 83 per cent of Finns, moreover, disagreed with the statement that Finland should leave the EU. Indeed, on the 20th anniversary of the October 1994 EU accession referendum, it was estimated that if another were to be held on Finland’s EU membership, the result would be 58-42 per cent in favour – effectively the same as the 57-43 per cent majority twenty years earlier8. Put another way, anti-European sentiment, however defined, is a minority – but not insignificant – sentiment in Finland. Table 3 Support for the Euro – a single currency – in Finland and the EU (2014) % EU-28 EURO AREA NON-EURO AREA DENMARK SWEDEN FINLAND

FOR 56 67 35 34 23 75

AGAINST 36 26 55 61 73 20

DON’T KNOW 8 7 10 5 4 59

Thus, in 2014, between 17 and 24 per cent of Finns had a negative image of the EU; 19-20 per cent of respondents in the National Values Survey would have taken Finland out of the euro and 17 per cent favoured Finland leaving the EU altogether. There were clearly generational differences: among the 15-24 agecohort in 2014 the figures for leaving the euro and leaving the EU were significantly lower at 11 per cent and 9 per cent respectively. Unlike the UK there is no single legislative party in Finland which currently favours leaving the EU. However, in March 2014, two months before the European Parliament election, the extra-parliamentary party Muutos 2011 (“Change 2011”) used the new citizens’ ini6 7 8 9

Elco HARTEVALD, Tom VAN DER MEER, Catherine E. DE VRIES, “In Europe we trust? Exploring three logics of trust in the European Union”, European Union Politics, 14, 4, 2013, p. 542-565. Ibid., p. 561. Ilkka HAAVISTO, Neljäs Suomi, EVA asenne raportti, 2014, p. 96. The data are based on question 19.1 in the Standard Eurobarometer 82: Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. “A European economic and monetary union with one single currency the euro”.

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tiative (kansalaisaloite) provision to seek to stage a referendum on leaving the EU (it did not manage the minimum of 50,000 signatures within the specified sixmonth period). Nevertheless, had a referendum been staged, 71 per cent of True Finn supporters indicated that they would have voted to come out. Moreover, in a survey in September 2014, respondents were asked to identify the characteristics of a good MP from a list of nineteen statements, one of which read: “A good MP is favourably disposed to the EU and the Brussels decision-makers” (table 4). A princely three per cent of True Finn supporters agreed with this statement! Table 4 The Characteristics of a Good MP (September 2014)10 PARTY

AGREED (%)

CONSERVATIVES

50

GREENS

48

SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

38

CENTRE

16

LEFT ALLIANCE

11

TRUE FINNS

311

2. Euroscepticism and the True Finns A well-worn slogan of the True Finns’ leader, Timo Soini, over the years has been: “Wherever the EU is, there you’ve got problems” (missä EU, siellä ongelma). Soini voted against Finnish membership of the European Union in the 1994 referendum and has profiled the True Finns since their creation in 1995 as a eurosceptic party. When I asked him why, unlike Veikko Vennamo the leader of the predecessor Finnish Rural Party, he had voted “no”, Soini admitted there was no overwhelming single reason12. Indeed, for the first decade of its existence the minute True Finn Party was an APE – an anti-political-establishment party – and its Euroscepticism was part of a diffuse protest against the cloying consensualism of the governing elite. As Soini was given to saying: “In Finland you can hold any opinion you like, except a different one”! Put another way, the True Finns’ Euroscepticism – initially at least – could be seen as a visceral reaction to the “what-Jacques Delors-said-to-me” name-dropping of the overwhelming pro-EU political class. It was, however, a sizeable brick in the party-building process. From its origins as an APE, the True Finn Party today is a strongly officeseeking party, running two months before the April 2015 general election at 15.3 per cent in the opinion polls (table 5). It remains essentially a personal par-

10 11

12

Source: “Kansalaiset: Vaalien painopiste sisäpolitiikasta”, Kunnallisalan kehittämissäätiö, 2014. The survey carried out in September 2014 asked respondents aged between 18 and 75 years (n = 1003) to identify the characteristics of a good MP. They could select as many/few characteristics as they liked from a list of 19. The figures in the table are responses to the statement: “A good MP is favourably disposed to the EU and the Brussels decision-makers”. David ARTER, “Analysing Successor Parties: The Case of the True Finns”, West European Politics, 35, 4, 2012, p. 803-825.

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ty13, the party-building process driven and directed by the founder-entrepreneur, Soini, the party chair for the last eighteen years14. Throughout its existence Soini has sought to profile the True Finns as a Eurosceptic party. He characterized the 2011 general election as “a referendum on the euro” and, against the backdrop of the crisis in the Eurozone, the True Finns’ unequivocal opposition to bail-outs for ailing EMU economies meant that high issue saliency combined with clear issue position ownership to create a potentially large True Finn vote and Soini personified that potential. The scale and exclusivity of the True Finns’ general election “victory” in April 2011 was unprecedented. The party advanced by 15 percentage points on the general election four years earlier, claiming 19.1 per cent of the active electorate. No “winning party” in Finnish history has gained on that scale and the gains were exclusive – the True Finns were the only winning party. However, whilst the True Finns were an office-seeking party, its single-issue [Eurosceptic] stance, and the prospective loss of issue ownership, ultimately precluded the compromise necessary for participation in government (although the True Finns were offered six ministerial posts). Table 5 Support for the True Finns March 2007 – February 2015 (%) MARCH 2007

GENERAL ELECTION

4.1

APRIL 2011

GENERAL ELECTION

19.1

MAY 2011

OPINION POLL

22.415

JANUARY 2012

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

9.416

OCTOBER 2012

LOCAL ELECTIONS

12.3

APRIL 2013

OPINION POLL

18.4

MAY 2014

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

FEBRUARY 2015

OPINION POLL

12.9 15.317

In a memorable metaphor, the party leader has described the True Finns as a “bazaar party“18, adding that “there’s a little bit of everything and it’s open day and night”. It has certainly been an arena for multifarious party tendencies. There is a left-reformist tendency focusing on social policy, inter alia children and young families, care for the elderly, health provision, pensions and basic security. It has championed the Nordic welfare model. There is a centrist small businessdriven tendency urging the value of enterprise, innovation and promoting the interests of SMEs. There is an ultra-conservative tendency emphasizing traditional Christian values and societal institutions and opposed to left-libertarianism in all its forms. Finally, there is a radical right ethno-centrist tendency opposed to multi-culturalism and a liberal immigration policy. The massive personal vote for the homophobic, anti-immigrant hardliner and celebrity boxer/wrestler, Tony “the Viking” Halme, who stood as an Inde13 14 15 16 17 18

Paul LUCARDIE, “Prophets, Purifiers and Prolocutors: Towards a Theory on the Emergence of New Parties”, Party Politics, 6, 2, 2000, p.175-185. Timo SOINI, Maisterisjätkä, Helsinki, Tammi, 2008, p. 89. The True Finns were then the largest party. The True Finn chair Timo Soini was his party’s presidential candidate. Iltalehden gallup: Keskustan nousu pysähtynyt’ Helsingin Sanomat, 8 February 2015. Timo SOINI, (2014) Peruspomo, Helsinki, WSOY, 2014, p. 170.

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pendent on the True Finn list in the Helsinki constituency at the 2003 general election, significantly raised the party’s profile and led xenophobic elements to view the True Finns as a potential mouthpiece for their racist views. The website Hommaforum, inspired by the controversial, anti-Islam figure, Jussi Halla-aho, created an online racist community which sought to infiltrate the True Finns and only Soini’s intervention kept Halla-aho off the party’s Euro-list in 2009. Before the 2011 general election, Halla-aho, now a candidate, urged voters to concentrate their support on eleven other True Finn candidates dispersed across eight of the fourteen mainland constituencies that were known to be critical of [what were seen as] the lax immigration rules. The ethno-centrists also produced a separate 45-paragraph election manifesto in which Finland was urged to reject the folly of a multi-cultural society modelled along Swedish lines. Crucially, the common denominator running across these tendencies, and to an extent holding them together, has been the party’s Euroscepticism. To note that throughout its twenty-year existence the True Finns have been a Eurosceptic party may not in fact tell us all that much about the party and, at very least, it begs the need for a clarification of the concept of Euroscepticism. Clearly, Euroscepticism is dynamic and context-specific – it will change over time. As Vasilopolou has observed, “Euroscepticism changes and adapts itself according to the EU Zeitgeist and the national context of each country”19. When viewed from a party leadership perspective, Euroscepticism will have variable tactical value. Sitter has commented that Euroscepticism may be an effective vote-seeking strategy for opposition parties challenging the government of the day, although he adds that “their Euroscepticism may well ‘moderate’ as access to office beckons”20. In any event, there are clearly degrees of party-based Euroscepticism within and between legislative parties and Euroscepticism will take a variety of forms. Skinner for example has identified six different types of Euroscepticism in the non-EU member-states of Norway, Iceland and Sweden21. In the Finnish context Jokela and Korhonen distinguish between Eurosceptics who oppose European integration in principle and “EU critics” who may support European integration but are critical of the way the EU works and/or the kind of policies it produces22. Also in the Finnish context, Raunio, when analyzing the 2009 European Parliament election, distinguishes between Euroscepticism and a defence of the national interest23. Viewed from a demand-side perspective, the literature has differentiated “instrumental skepticism” (the public applying a broad cost-benefit calculus to the “European project”) and “political

19 20 21 22 23

Sofia VASILOPOULOU, “Continuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism: Plus ca change?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 51, 1, p. 154. Nick SITTER, “The Politics of Opposition and European Integration in Scandinavia: Is EuroScepticism a Government-Opposition Dynamic?”, West European Politics, 24, 2, 2001, p. 22-39. Marianne S. SKINNER, “Different Varieties of Euroscepticism? Conceptializing and Explaining Euroscepticism in Western European Non-Member States”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 51, 1, 2013, p. 122-139. Juha JOKELA and Kaisa KORHONEN, “A Eurosceptic Big Bang”, FIIA Briefing, paper 106, 23 May 2012, Helsinki, Ulkopolittinen Instituutti, 2012. Tapio RAUNIO, “Debating Europe in Finland: Euroscepticism or Legitimate Concerns about National Influence ?”, in Robert HARMSEN and Joachim SCHILD (eds), Debating Europe: The 2009 European Parliament Election and Beyond, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2011, p. 165-180.

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Euroscepticism”24. Clearly too, grassroots Euroscepticism may be issue-specific – no Greek bailouts or whatever – or diffuse. Commenting on the 2014 European Parliament elections, Meyer and Ritzen have observed that “Euroscepticism seems to have become more the reflection of a ‘mood’ spurred by the fear of losing cultural identity”25. However, whilst Eurosceptic attitudes may well exist among the citizenry, they need mobilization, articulation and thus legitimization at the party level. Equally, it is the case that a vote for a Eurosceptic party is not necessarily a Eurosceptic vote but rather may represent among other things a general alienation from mainstream politics. In what follows I employ Taggart and Szczerbiak’s simple and well-established distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism26. “Hard Euroscepticism” refers to principled opposition to the EU, namely a rejection of the entire project and a commitment to withdrawal. “Soft Euroscepticism” is characterized by qualified and contingent opposition to European integration which may include opposition to specific policies or national interest opposition.

3. The Background to the 2014 European Parliament election campaign The European Parliament election in Finland on May 25 2014, which was conducted under open-list PR voting arrangements in a single national constituency, was held less than twelve months before a scheduled general election [in April 2015]. It was a tail-end poll and for the political parties their performance at this so-called ‘second order’ election assumed greater significance than the mid-term European Parliament election in 2009. True, the primary purpose was to fill Finland’s allocation of 13 MEP seats but there was also the opportunity to oil the wheels of the party machine and generate a head of steam in the run-up to the main “first order” event the following year. The proximity of a general election created extra candidate incentives too. Put another way, the ratio of MEPcandidates to MEP seats available was almost 20:1 and clearly most candidates had no chance of election, did not expect or even want to be elected; rather, they had diverse motives for standing. For many sitting MPs, notably the marginal incumbents who were elected in last place on the party slate at the 2011 general election, the aim was not to become an MEP but to use the Euro-campaign to consolidate support and their personal vote with a view to remaining an MP in April 2015. Correspondingly, for strong challenger candidates – former MPs, upand-coming local politicians and “young hopefuls” – the aim was not to become an MEP either but to work through the European campaign to become an MP – in some cases an MP again. In short, from both a party management and individual candidate perspective, the imminence of a general election vested the out24 25 26

Marcel LUBBERS and Peer SCHEEPERS, “Political versus Instrumental Euroscepticism”, European Union Politics, 6, 2, 2005, p. 223-242. Arian MEYER and Jo RITZEN, “Euroscepticism after the European parliamentary elections” www.policy-network.net (2 June 2014). Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCZERBIAK, “Theorising Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement and Causality”, EPERN Working Paper 12, 2003, Guildford: European Parties, Elections and Referendums Network.

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come of the 2014 European Parliament election with increased significance. Indeed, the widespread assumption that second order elections are less important is clearly challenged when, as in the Finnish case, the former are separated from a general election by only eleven months27. For the 2014 European Parliament election there were 251 candidates in total with an average age of 45 years. Among the extra-parliamentary parties there were candidates for the Independence Party, “The Cause of the Poor” (Köyhien asialla), “Change 2011” (Muutos 2011), the Pirate Party, the “Blue and White Front” (Sinivalkoinen Rintama) and the Finnish Communist Party. There was also the “Kristina Ilmarinen Electors’ Association” (valitsijamiesyhdistys) which had gained the necessary 2,300 signatures. The Helsinki-based Ilmarinen described herself as “a citizen and taxpayer disillusioned with the political parties”. The lion’s share of the MEP-candidates, however – 160 or 64 per cent – was run by the eight parliamentary parties. In contrast to the 2004 and 2009 European Parliament elections, celebrity candidates (julkkiksia) – top swimmers, rally drivers, former beauty queens and assorted media “personalities” – were conspicuous by their absence in 2014. Instead, voters could choose from three government ministers, two former ministers, a host of present and past members of parliament, current and ex-MEPs, senior party figures including the chair of the Christian Democrats and even Finland’s EU Commissioner. As the Conservatives’ party secretary observed: “All the political parties are taking the election very seriously and this is reflected in the number of experienced professionals running as candidates”. The European Parliament campaign took place against the backdrop of two party leadership contests. Following the decision of the Conservative prime minister and party chair, Jyrki Katainen, to step down from both posts, there was a three-way contest to succeed him, one of the candidates, Alexander Stubb, the minister for foreign trade, also running for the European Parliament. Two weeks before Euro-polling, at the regular Social Democratic Party conference, the party chair and finance minister, Jutta Urpilainen, was narrowly defeated by Antti Rinne, a challenger with strong trade-union links. It is a fair surmise that to a degree these events distracted public attention away from the European Parliament campaign. This was despite the efforts of the media to generate interest in the election. Indeed, the 2014 European Parliament election in Finland was par excellence a transparent, post-modern affair, the state television broadcasting company YLE posting 4-minute video clips of each of the 251 candidates in which they responded to a common battery of questions. In the event, the outgoing prime minister expressed a personal preference for Finnish membership of NATO whilst the dark scenario of a surge of support for populist radical right/anti-immigrant parties across the EU fueled international interest in the fortunes of the True Finns. But the campaign was generally low key and strong divisions between the parties were not in evidence. None of the parliamentary parties sought to take Finland out of the Eurozone although the post-communist Left Alliance stated that the common currency should be abandoned in an orderly fashion if a lasting solution to the eurocrisis could not be found. The True Finns and Christian Democrats were the most 27

Richard CORBETT, “European Elections and Second Order Elections: Is Received Wisdom Changing?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 52, 6, 2014, p. 1194-1198.

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unequivocal in their opposition to incipient federalism and their concern to increase the power of the member-states. The True Finns opposed East European enlargement and Turkish membership in particular. Ironically, the Left Alliance, one of the more “Eurosceptic” parties, advocated the harmonization of taxation systems and a minimum/maximum wage across the EU. Most of the parliamentary parties averred to the urgent need to create jobs. The extra-parliamentary parties, with the exception of the Pirate Party, were “hard Eurosceptics”, committed to taking Finland out of the euro and out of the EU. The Independence Party wanted to do both whilst “Change 2011” demanded a referendum on Finland’s EU membership. However, in the mainstream debate the focus was more on improving and democratizing the EU rather than leaving it.

4. The Result The main polling day, Sunday May 25th was tropical – around 30 degrees centigrade across the country – and many Finns had things other than an election uppermost in their mind. Despite the quality of the candidate on offer turnout rose only marginally from 40.3 per cent to 40.9 per cent. There is evidence [admittedly mixed] that when so-called “second order” elections are held mid-term voters will tend to punish the government of the day. This was, as noted, a “tail-end poll” and any “punishment” was certainly not meted out evenly (table 6). The leading governing party, the Conservatives, emerged, as in all previous European Parliament elections in Finland, as comfortably the largest party in terms of its proportion of the popular vote, but it failed to achieve the fourth MEP seat it craved. The second largest coalition party, the Social Democrats, held on to its two MEP seats but its vote plunged to an all-time nadir of barely twelve per cent. Among the minor coalition parties, the Greens lost a seat to the Left Alliance, which had withdrawn from government two months earlier; the Swedish People’s Party held on to its single MEP whilst the Christian Democrats lost their solitary MEP although their top candidate polled the fifth highest individual vote of any candidate. Of the two leading opposition parties, the True Finns gained a seat but with a vote well down on the 2011 “big bang” whilst the Centre, which ran an EU commissioner and veteran Eurosceptic on the same list, held on to its three seats with just under one-fifth of the popular vote. Out of the eleven MEPs seeking re-election, only four were successful; two more of Finland’s new allocation had formerly served as an MEP whilst five sitting MPs were elected, two of them cabinet ministers. Table 6 The Result of the European Parliament Election in Finland on May 25, 201428 PARTY

% VOTE

MEPs

CHANGE

CONSERVATIVES

22.6 (23.2)

3

0

CENTRE

19.7 (19.0)

3

0

TRUE FINNS

12.9 (9.8)

2

+1

28

The figures in parenthesis are the parties’ performance at the 2009 European Parliament election.

DAVID ARTER

112 PARTY

% VOTE

MEPs

CHANGE

SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

12.3 (17.5

2

0

GREENS

9.3 (12.4)

1

–1

LEFT ALLIANCE

9.3 (5.9)

1

+1

SWEDISH PEOPLE’S

6.8 (6.1)

1

0

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS

5.2 (4.2)

0

–1

OTHERS

1.9 (1.9)

0

0

Over recent general elections, there has been a growing tendency for voters to select a candidate before a party and in European Parliament elections in particular ‘candidate voting’ has been paramount. Unlike Denmark and Sweden, Finnish parties do not nominate a ‘lead candidate’ and voters determine the rank order of successful candidates. However, in elections conducted in a single national constituency, candidates with national name-recognition are most likely to attract a sizeable individual vote. The personable, extroverted Alexander Stubb attracted over 148,000 votes for the Conservatives – more than twice the amount of the EU commissioner Olli Rehn, the top name on the Centre list – and almost 38 per cent of the total list vote. The ‘top candidate dependency’ in the True Finns was of a similar magnitude and saw the hardline, anti-immigrant Jussi Halla-aho gain over 36 per cent of the total list vote. However, the relatively greatest top candidate dependency was evident on the Christian Democrat list where the MEP Sari Essayah gained 68 per cent of the total list vote but still failed to retain her seat (table 7). In 2009 she was beholden to an electoral alliance with the True Finns. Table 7 The Individual Candidate Vote for Elected MEPs at the 2014 European Parliament Election in Finland Alexander Stubb

Conservatives

Jussi Halla-aho

True Finns

148, 101 80, 529

Olli Rehn

Centre

70, 333

Paavo Väyrynen

Centre

69, 224

Anneli Jäätteenmäki

Centre

59, 447

Merja Kyllönen

Left Alliance

58, 419

Sirpa Pietikäinen

Conservatives

49, 784

Liisa Jaakonsaari

Social Democrats

43, 869

Henna Virkkunen

Conservatives

43, 701

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri

Social Democrats

40, 571

Sampo Terho

True Finns

33, 736

Heidi Hautala

Greens

31, 585

Nils Torvalds

Swedish People’s

29, 241

When turnout is expected to be low, intra-party candidate competition can contribute to vote mobilization, as in the case of the co-partisan rivalry between Rehn, the EU commissioner, and Väyrynen, the veteran Eurosceptic on the Centre list (both elected). A “fresh face” can appeal: Li Andersson, the chair of the

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Young Persons’ Organisation in the Left Alliance, ran a high-profile campaign, appearing among other things on the Finnish equivalent of “Have I got News for You?” and attracted a poll of nearly 48 000 voters, many of them “floating voters”. This was not enough for election but she made it clear she would trade off this electoral capital and run for parliament in April 2015. The low turnout appeared to work against the Social Democrats and True Finns who were unable to mobilise their core working class support base. The True Finn leader calculated that a turnout of 45 per cent would be a pre-condition for his party winning three MEP seats. The Social Democrats, divided in the wake of the campaign to elect a new leader, lacked a ‘magnet candidate’ able to counter the erosive effects of social structural change and the job displacement caused by industrial plant closures. Under new leadership the SDP was the fourth largest party on the basis of the popular vote, more than ten percentage points behind the Conservatives. Its performance was described in the media as “catastrophic”. In the northern town of Kajaani the SDP vote fell by 16.1 per cent compared with 2009 and in its traditional industrial strongholds such as Forssa, Imatra and Jyväskylä by over ten per cent. In contrast to the “low turnout effect” for the True Finns and Social Democrats, the “Finland Swede” population – Finland is officially a bilingual country and Swedish a national language – displayed a “pack animal” propensity, turning out in force to retain the Swedish People’s Party’s single MEP seat. The turnout on the Swedish-speaking Åland islands was the highest in the country at 57.4 per cent. We noted earlier that national name-recognition represents in practice a sine qua non for election to the European Parliament. Equally, for general elections a strong “home turf vote” will usually provide the necessary pathway to parliament. Put another way, most Finnish MPs gain most of their vote from the local area and the 2014 European Parliament election reflected these strong local and regional voting patterns. Elsi Katainen, who came fifth on the Centre Euro-list, gained comfortably the largest poll in the Pohjois-Savo district with over 10,000 votes but in neighbouring Keski-Suomi (Central Finland) she managed only 700. On his home turf of Luoto in the Vaasa district, the Christian Democrat parliamentarian, Peter Östman, gained 45 per cent of the vote. In Kauhajoki in the same district the Centre’s support fell by 23.4 per cent because the “local man” Lasse Hautala was not a candidate. A low turnout does not in itself of course denote a crisis of party-based representative democracy. Equally, Finnish general election turnout has been significantly lower than in the other Nordic countries and the 2014 European Parliament election did nothing to reverse this trend. Turnout in Finland was eight percentage points lower than in Sweden and almost sixteen percentage points behind Denmark (table 8). However, whilst the anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats won two European Parliament seats and broke out of their bastion in Skåne to attract support from across much of the country and the Feminist Initiative gained an MEP with the campaign slogan “Out with Racists and In with Feminists”, Finland’s electorate was readily contained within the existing legislative party system. None of the extra-parliamentary parties gained a seat in the European Parliament.

DAVID ARTER

114 Table 8 Turnout at the 2014 European Parliament elections in the Nordic countries (%) DENMARK

56.4

SWEDEN

48.9

FINLAND

40.9

Conclusion Too much should not be read into a single European Parliament election, especially one in which a candidate-centred, open-list PR electoral system is used. Candidates as much as parties take centre-stage and candidates with national name-recognition will attract a substantial personal vote. Moreover, as noted earlier, voters will tend to reflect their views of the national government of the day and/or confidence in national political institutions as much as the EU. None the less, the evidence of the 2014 European Parliament election in Finland appeared to confirm the continuing decline of social democracy. In line with the travails of social democracy elsewhere in Western Europe, the SDP has not been the largest party in Finland this century. It has a diminishing core support base, an ageing membership and, not least, a history of governmental association with the Conservatives dating back over a quarter of a century. The “decomposition” of social democracy is routinely attributed to social structural change but in the Finnish case the party’s long-term co-operation with the Conservatives, which is unprecedented on the Scandinavian mainland, has, among other things, dissuaded a younger generation searching for a radical policy option. For many media pundits the electoral gale which had produced unprecedented gains for the True Finns at the 2011 general election had blown itself out and the party was in decline. Yet, on a low turnout, without their leader running as a candidate (Soini gained the highest individual poll at the 2009 European Parliament election), lacking a ‘bailout crisis’ on which to feed and moderating its populist rhetoric with a view to participating in government after the 2015 general election, the True Finns none the less emerged ahead of the Social Democrats in the popular vote. Whilst the ‘big bang’ (iso jytky) of 2011 is unlikely to be repeated, the 2014 European Parliament election suggested the True Finns had become an institutionalized party system actor that will experience the typical “ups and downs” of the older legislative parties29. Summing up, the five “hard Eurosceptic” extra-parliamentary parties that ran MEP-candidates in May 2014 accumulated a miserly 1.2 per cent of the total vote, the three opposition-based “soft Eurosceptic” parties – the True Finns, Christian Democrats and Left Alliance – attracted 27.4 per cent of the active electorate and there were notable Eurosceptic candidates in other parties, not least Paavo Väyrynen whose personal vote of 69, 224 was just over one-fifth of all Centre votes. All in all, it seems fair to conclude that in the order of one-third of Finnish voters backed a Eurosceptic party and/or candidate in May 2014 although, 29

David ARTER, Elina KESTILÄ-KEKKONEN, “Measuring the Extent of Party Institutionalisation: The Case of a Populist Entrepreneur Party”, West European Politics, 37, 5, 2014, p. 932-956.

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as noted, this does not necessarily mean they were Eurosceptic voters. The poll conducted in connection with the twentieth anniversary of the October 1994 accession referendum showed one-quarter of Finns favoured EU membership without reservation and a half with some reservations. That leaves a Eurosceptic body of about one-quarter of the Finnish electorate. That the influence of the Eurosceptic minority is disproportionate to its size might suggest the tail is wagging the dog. Indeed, whilst the True Finn critique of EU bailouts, and their cost to the Finnish taxpayer, appeared to have become both less strident and less salient as the 2015 general election approached – and with it the possibility of cabinet office – the apparently cavalier approach of the new Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras (ironically a man in the populist Soini mould) towards honouring previous loan arrangements, has given the True Finns fresh ammunition and fired up the party’s Euroscepticism. In February 2015 the True Finns tabled an interpellation on the ‘Greek situation’ and the essentially pro-EU Stubb-led governing coalition was obliged to hold to a firm, non-concessionary line on the Greek debt. As long as Greece continues to challenge the fundamental premises of the eurozone, the Eurosceptics in Finland will continue to “punch above their weight”.

LE CAS DE LA QUEUE EUROSCEPTIQUE REMUANT LE CHIEN? L’ÉLECTION AU PARLEMENT EUROPÉEN DE 2014 EN FINLANDE A l´occasion des élections européennes de 2014, aucun des partis représentés au parlement ne voulait une sortie de la Finlande de l´Union européenne. Dans les discussions politiques, l´attention se portait tout particulièrement sur les questions de l´amélioration et de la démocratisation de l´UE, et beaucoup moins sur l´éventualité de la quitter. Les trois partis « euro-critiques » allaient néanmoins réunir un quart des voix. De plus, le système électoral préférentiel avec des listes ouvertes permettait le succès de candidats eurosceptiques issus d´autres partis. De ce fait, la coalition gouvernementale se vit (au moins jusqu´à l´été 2015) contraint de ne faire aucune concession en ce qui concernait un autre fond de sauvetage de la Grèce.

DER FALL DES EUROSKEPTISCHEN SCHWANZES DER DEN HUND WEDELT? DIE EUROPAPARLAMENTSWAHLEN 2014 IN FINNLAND Bei den Europawahlen 2014 strebte keine der Parteien im Parlament den Austritt Finnlands aus der Europäischen Union an. In den politischen Diskussionen richtete sich das Hauptinteresse besonders auf die Verbesserung und Demokratisierung der EU und weniger darauf, sie zu verlassen. Allerdings erhielten die drei europakritischen Parteien über ein Viertel der Stimmen. Ferner ermöglichte das Präferenzwahlsystem mit offenen Listen den Erfolg europakritischer Kandidaten

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DAVID ARTER

anderer Parteien. So hat tatsächlich der Schwanz mit dem Hund gewedelt, und die Regierungskoalition sah sich (zumindest bis im Sommer 2015) gezwungen, keine Zugeständnisse für ein weiteres Rettungsprogramm für Griechenland zu machen.

THE FPÖ: A WINNER PARTY? THE 2014 ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT COMPARED WITH THE 2013 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS PATRICK MOREAU The result of the 2014 European election in Austria is dominated by strong continuities from the 2013 general elections. Both witness a clear progress for the FPÖ which is ideologically an anti-European, anti-immigration, nationalist and security-oriented party critical of the liberal globalization of the economic and banking sectors. In 2014, the party eliminates all right-wing extremist currents and is therefore able to attract voters of different types: anti-system, protest-oriented, losers of modernization (workers, proletarians and socially marginalized groups), modernization winners motivated by the fear of losing the benefits and attainments of the past because of the foreigners, but also many young people who are insecure about the future.

1. The Position of the Extreme Right within the Austrian Political System Since the end of the 1980s, the Freedom Party of Austria Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) has played a central role within the Austrian political system1. Table: The Electoral Results of the FPÖ from 1949 – 2013 (in %) 1949

11,7

1971

5,5

1995

21,9

1953

10,9

1975

5,4

1999

26,9

1956

6,5

1979

6,1

2002

10,0

1959

7,7

1983

5,0

2006

11,0

1962

7,0

1986

9,7

2008

17,5

1966

5,4

1990

16,6

2013

21,4

1970

5,5

1994

22,5

From 2000 to 2005, the FPÖ chaired by Jörg Haider shared power in a coalition government with the conservatives of the Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP). In 2005, Haider left the FPÖ and founded the Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ) whose president he was until his death in October 2008. In December 2009, the BZÖ of Carinthia split off and finally rejoined the FPÖ in 2013. 1

Cf. Patrick MOREAU, De Jörg Haider à Heinz-Christian Strache. L´extrême droite autrichienne à l´assaut du pouvoir, Paris, Cerf politique, 2012; Kurt Richard LUTHER, “Die Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) und das Bündnis Zukunft Österreichs (BZÖ)”, in: Herbert DACHS et al. (eds.), Politik in Österreich. Das Handbuch, Wien, Manz, 2006, p. 364-388.

PATRICK MOREAU

118

The billionaire Frank Stronach founded the Team Stronach in 2012. Ideologically, it cannot be considered a right wing extremist party. Rather, it is a conservative and anti-European populist party.2 Still, its apparatus consists of many cadres and deputies who resigned from the BZÖ. The regional party bodies have attracted numerous former FPÖ and BZÖ members. Since 2005, Christian Strache, born in Vienna on June 12, 1969, has headed the FPÖ. He may not have Haider’s political culture but he undoubtedly is a charismatic leader and a remarkable communicator who knows how to address young people, workers, and the lower classes. At the 2013 legislative elections, these three parties totaled 36.4% of the vote. Table: Results of the 2008 and 2013 National Council Elections (simplified, in %) 2013

2008

Changes

Seats 2013

Seats 2008

+/–

ÖVP

24,0

26,0

–2,0

47

51

–4

FPÖ

20,5

17,5

+3,0

40

34

+6

BZÖ

3,5

10,7

–7,2

0

21

–21

GRÜNE

12,4

10,4

+2,0

24

20

Team Stronach

5,7

n.t.

n.t.

11

n.t.

n.t.

9

n.t.

NEOS 5,0 n.t. Turnout 2008: 78.8%; turnout 2013: 74.9%

+4

The Team Stronach did not run at the 2014 Europeans. Internal conflicts had weakened the BZÖ and its vote collapsed. At the elections of the European Parliament on May 25, 2014, the ÖVP reached 27 percent (–3.0 %), the SPÖ (Social Democratic Party of Austria) 24.1 % (+0.4%) and the FPÖ 19.7 (+7.0%). The Green Party arrived at 14.5% (+4. 6%) while the first-time competitor NEOS (NEOS – the New Austria) won 8.1% of the vote. The BZÖ arrived at 0.5% (–4.1%), EU-Austritt, Direkte Demokratie, Neutralität (EUSTOP) won 2.8%, ANDERS3 2.1%, and REKOS (reform conservatives) 1.2%. Hans Peter Martin’s List had received 17.7% of the vote in 2009 but stood down in 2014. In 2014, 18 seats were to be allocated. The ÖVP received 5 (–1), the SPÖ 5, the FPÖ 4 (+2), the Greens 3 (+1), and the NEOS 1. The other lists remained below the 4-percent-threshold.

2

3

Frank Stronach, born in September 1932, is a self-made man (1.2 billions). The owner of the Magna Group lived in Canada for many years. Officially, he has retired from business, but he clearly continues to pull the purse strings. He was famous for his close ties with both the liberal and progressive conservative parties in Canada. In the 1988 Canadian federal election, he ran for the Liberal party but was defeated. The creation of the Team Stronach is certainly not the political gadget of an old man but the culmination of his reflections on the nation state and Europe faced with globalization. The Team Stronach’s main weakness was Stronach himself. He is an exceedingly poor communicator and dialectician. “Different” is a political alliance of KPÖ, Pirates, Change and independent candidates.

THE FPÖ: A WINNER PARTY?

119

Table: Results of the EU-Elections in Austria, 1996 – 2014 (in %)4 1996

1999

2004

ÖVP

29,7

30,7

32,7

30,0

27,0

SPÖ

29,2

31,7

33,3

23,7

24,1

FPÖ

27,5

23,4

6,3

12,7

19,7

Grüne

6,8

9,3

12,9

9,9

14,5

BZÖ

2009

4,6

2014

0,5

NEOS

8,1

REKOS

1,2

ANDERS

2,1

EUSTOP Turnout 67,7 49,4 Turnout 2009: 46 %, turnout 2014: 45.4 %.

2,8 42,4

46,0

45,4

The gains of the FPÖ in 2014 (+7%) were evident. However, this success, is less impressive in a long-term perspective. In 1996, Haider’s FPÖ had won 27.5% of the vote. Compared to the 2013 results, the FPÖ had lost votes in the 2014 elections with their very weak turnout.

2. The Economic and Social Framework Economically, Austria is doing rather well. Unemployment rates are low. However, there was a slight deterioration from 2012 to 2014. In 2011, the number of unemployed persons had decreased to 193.800. In 2012, it rose to 208.900. In 2013, there was a marked increase to 231 300 unemployed, thus surpassing the 2009 figures. In 2014, the unemployment figures increased by another 13.600 jobless to 244.900, reaching a new record level. On the 2014 average, men were more often affected by unemployment than women. Over the whole period, however, the situation of men and women took a similar course5. Compared to the other EU states, Austria was on an equal footing with Germany. Nevertheless, the general data hid significant discrepancies between the provinces (lands). For example, in the land of Vienna, the hidden unemployment rate of non-Austrians was significant. In spite of the rather favorable overall situation, the regular rise of unemployment played into the hands of the FPÖ. In 4 5

Source: Bundesministerium für Inneres. Looking at the development of unemployment rates since 1995, when Austria acceded to the EU, several phases can be discerned. From 1995 to 1996, there was a considerable rise from 139.300 to 155.400 unemployed persons. The next two years showed some small growth. Between 1999 and 2001, the job market recovered. The unemployment rate of the year 2000 was the lowest since 1995: 133.800 jobseekers. From 2001 to 2003, there was an annual increase of 19.100 respectively 13.400. The 2003 average was 169.600 unemployed. From 2003 to 2004, there was a rise of 43.900 unemployed, and another 10.000 lost their jobs from 2004 to 2005. The number of unemployed persons reached its peak in 2005 with 223.500 jobseekers. Then, the job market recovered. In 2006, the number of unemployed persons decreased to 211.700, in 2007 to 200.300, and in 2008 to 172.000. In 2008, the job market remained largely stable. Due to the bad economic situation, unemployment rose to 222.900 job seekers from 2008 to 2009.

PATRICK MOREAU

120

its electoral campaigns, it demanded national preference and the stop of immigration. Table: Unemployment in Austria and in the EU States (in %)6 States

Belgium

Average 20002005

Average 20052010

2000

2005

2009

2012

2013

2014

7,7

7,9

6,9

8,5

7,9

7,6

8,4

8,5 5,0

Germany

9,3

8,6

7,9

11,2

7,6

5,4

5,2

Estonia

11,2

9,0

14,6

8,0

13,5

10,0

8,6

7,4

Finland

9,0

7,7

9,8

8,4

8,2

7,7

8,2

8,7

France

8,5

8,6

8,6

8,9

9,1

9,8

10,3

10,3

Greece

10,4

9,6

11,2

10,0

9,6

24,5

27,5

26,5 11,3

Ireland

4,4

7,7

4,2

4,4

12,0

14,7

13,1

Italy

8,6

7,2

10,0

7,7

7,7

10,7

12,1

12,7

Latvia

12,3

11,3

14,3

10,0

17,5

15,0

11,9

10,8

Lithuania

13,2

9,3

16,4

8,3

13,8

13,4

11,8

10,7

Luxemburg

3,4

4,7

2,2

4,6

5,1

5,1

5,9

5,9

Malta

7,3

6,7

6,7

6,9

6,9

6,3

6,4

5,9

Netherlands

4,5

4,7

3,7

5,9

4,4

5,8

7,3

7,4

Austria

4,5

5,0

3,6

5,6

5,3

4,9

5,4

5,6

Portugal

6,7

9,7

5,1

8,8

10,7

15,8

16,4

14,1

Slovakia

18,3

12,9

18,9

16,4

12,1

14,0

14,2

13,2

Slovenia

6,5

5,8

6,7

6,5

5,9

8,9

10,1

9,7

Spain

11,0

12,5

11,9

9,2

17,9

24,8

26,1

24,5

Cyprus

4,4

4,9

4,8

5,3

5,4

11,9

15,9

16,1

Euro Zone (19)

8,9

8,7

8,8

9,1

9,6

11,4

12,0

11,6

Bulgaria

15,0

8,1

16,4

10,1

6,8

12,3

13,0

11,4

Denmark

4,9

4,9

4,3

4,8

6,0

7,5

7,0

6,6

Great Britain

5,0

6,1

5,4

4,8

7,6

7,9

7,6

6,1

Croatia

14,7

10,7

15,8

13,0

9,2

16,0

17,3

17,3

Poland

18,5

11,1

16,1

17,9

8,1

10,1

10,3

9,0

Romania

7,7

6,6

7,6

7,1

6,5

6,8

7,1

6,8

Sweden

6,5

7,3

5,6

7,7

8,3

8,0

8,0

7,9

Czech Republic

8,0

6,5

8,8

7,9

6,7

7,0

7,0

6,1

Hungary

6,1

8,5

6,3

7,2

10,0

11,0

10,2

7,7

EU (15)

7,9

8,2

7,9

8,2

9,1

10,6

11,1

10,5

EU (28)

9,0

8,3

8,9

9,0

9,0

10,5

10,9

10,2

Iceland

2,8

4,3

2,3

2,6

7,2

6,0

5,4

5,0

The inflation rate was low: 3.2% in 2008, 0.5% in 2009, 1.9% in 2010, 3.3% in 2011, 2.4% in 2012, and 2.0% in 2013. Generally, prices remained stable. Still, some consumer prices (rent, cigarettes, health) were under imminent pressure. 6

Source: EU Commission.

THE FPÖ: A WINNER PARTY?

121

Immigration is considerable in Austria, but in 2014, it is controlled. In 2013, the most important immigrant groups were Turks (113.000) and Africans (25.000), with a grey area of illegal immigration, particularly in Vienna7. The concentration of immigrants in the big cities, above all in Vienna, and the development of ghettos sustained the FPÖ’s xenophobic campaign. Table: Immigration in Austria (in %)8 Nationality

2002

2006

2008

2010

2012

2013

2014

Total Population

8.063.640

8.254.298

8.307.989

8.351.643

8.408.121

8.451.860

8.507.860

Austrian

7.333.379

7.457.632

7.478.310

7.468.064

7.456.692

7.447.592

7.441.672

730.261

796.666

829.679

883.579

951.429

1.004.268

1.066.114

9.1

9.7

10.0

10.6

11.3

11.9

12.5

Non-Austrian Foreigners in %

These data indicate that there is no simple correlation between the strong presence of the extreme right within the Austrian political system and the rather positive overall economic situation. Other factors contribute to the political strength of the FPÖ.

3. The 2013 Legislative Elections By their very nature, legislative elections differ from the Europeans. They are considered much more important as the voter turnout proves (2013: 74.9%; 2014: 45.4%)9. Werner Faymann’s SPÖ (27.1 %) succeeded in defending its top position. However, compared to 2008, it lost 2.2 %. The ÖVP led by Michael Spindelegger (23.8%) lost 2.2%, too. The FPÖ finished third increasing its share of the vote by 3.0 points. It ended with 21.4% compared to 17.54% in 2008. The Greens became fourth and received 11.5% (+1.1%). Team Stronach is Number 5 (5.8%) and Matthias Strolz’s Neos won 4.8%. Josef Bucher’s BZÖ is no longer represented in parliament (3.6%, a loss of 7.1% compared with the 2008 elections)10. The strength of the FPÖ forced ÖVP and SPÖ to resume their grand coalition in spite of its high unpopularity. 7 8 9

10

See http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/menschen_und_gesellschaft/bevoelkerung /bevoelkerungs struktur/bevoelkerung_nach_staatsangehoerigkeit_geburtsland/031396. html (2 March 2015). Source: http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/menschen_und_gesellschaft/bevoelke rung/index.html (2 March 2015). Cf. Andreas KHOL, Günther OFNER, Stefan KARNER, Dietmar Halper, Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik, Wien, Böhlau, 2015; Sylvia KRITZINGER, Wolfgang C. MÜLLER, Klaus SCHÖNBACH (eds.), Die Nationalratswahl 2013. Wie Parteien, Medien und Wählerschaft zusammenwirken, Wien, Köln, Weimar, Böhlau Verlag, 2014. Distribution of seats: 183 seats; government majority: 92 seats. Social Democratic Party of Austria: 53 seats, loss: – 4 seats; Austrian People’s Party: 46 seats, loss: – 5 seats; Austrian Freedom Party: 42 seats, gain: + 4 seats; The Greens – The Green Alternative: 22 seats, gain: + 2 seats; Team Frank Stronach: 11 seats, gain: + 6 seats; NEOS The New Austria and Liberal Forum: 9 seats, gain: + 9 seats.

PATRICK MOREAU

122

The FPÖ was able to re-mobilize 69% of its 2008 electorate. It lost 79.000 votes to the abstentionist camp. 41.000 went to SPÖ and Team Stronach each, 36.000 to the ÖVP, 28.000 to the Greens, 19.000 to the NEOS and 18.000 to the BZÖ. The FPÖ gained the highest number of votes from the 2008 BZÖ electorate: 173.000. In addition, it received 52.000 votes from the SPÖ and from 2008 abstentionists. 42.000 came from various parties, 40.000 votes from the ÖVP. For the first time, the Team Stronach ran nation-wide. It received its biggest share of votes from the BZÖ (68.000 votes). 48.000 supporters came from the SPÖ, 42.000 from the ÖVP, 41.000 from the FPÖ, and 29.000 from the 2008 abstentionist camp. The BZÖ was only able re-convince about one in ten of its 2008 voters (12%). The party suffered its biggest loss to the FPÖ (173.000 votes). 77.000 BZÖ 2008 voters stayed at home, 68.000 voted for the Team Stronach, 57.000 turned to the SPÖ, 39.000 to the Greens, 23.000 to the FPÖ, and 21.000 to the Neos. The 2013 electoral campaign was dominated by the question of the possible continuation of the grand coalition between ÖVP and SPÖ. At a poll, a large number of the respondents expressed their wish for “a wind of change in politics” and structural reforms, thus indicating a general tendency towards a protest vote. Table: Desirable Projects (in %)11 Question: Which consequences of the national elections do you consider desirable? Projects

%

to tackle reforms swiftly in Austria

62

to teach the federal government a lesson

35

the election result must provide a clear signal against the right

29

the SPÖ must remain in government

27

at least one new party ought to join government

26

the Greens must join the next government

25

the ÖVP must remain in government

18

the Neos shall enter the federal and national council

18

the Greens shall gain strength and become the most acclaimed party at this election

17

Werner Fayman remains federal chancellor

15

the BZÖ shall enter the federal and national council again

15

a red-green Government

15

the ÖVP must join the opposition ranks

14

the FPÖ shall join the federal government

12

the KPÖ (Communist Party of Austria) shall enter the federal and national council

12

the ÖVP shall become strong enough to provide the federal chancellor

11

the FPÖ shall gain strength and become the most acclaimed party at this

11

11

Source: Market, poll: 1.000 respondents, 16-19 September 2013.

THE FPÖ: A WINNER PARTY?

123

Projects election

%

the SPÖ must join the opposition ranks

9

Team Stronach enters parliament

9

a black-blue government will be formed

9

the Pirates shall enter the federal and national council

6

the BZÖ joins the federal government

5

Team Stronach joins the federal government

4

as little change as possible in Austria

4

Team Stronach becomes the most acclaimed party at this election

2

the BZÖ gains strength and becomes the most acclaimed party at this election

1

Before the 2013 national elections, public opinion was neither extremely content nor critical. When asked how Austria had developed since the 2008 national elections, 46% of the respondents answered that nothing had changed. 30% were convinced their country had changed for the worse, 21% thought things had changed for the better (3%: do not know). Table: Electoral Behavior in Relation to the Evaluation of Austria (in %)12 Question: Since 2008, Austria has developed: SPÖ

ÖVP

For the better

43

For the worse

15

No change

25

Team Stronach

Other

3

3

1

6

11

3

6

4

2

FPÖ

BZÖ

GRÜ

Neos

29

9

3

9

16

35

5

9

26

20

3

14

FPÖ voters were the most critical of the government’s and the EU’s capability to respond to the economic problems and the rise of unemployment.

12

Source: SORA exit poll, 2013 national elections, on behalf of ORF

PATRICK MOREAU

124 Table: Electoral Behavior in Relation to the Evaluation of the Response to the Economic and Labor Market Crises (in %)13 Question: Austria has responded – The EU has responded SPÖ

ÖVP

FPÖ

BZÖ

GRÜ

Neos

Team

Other

Austria: well

30

26

17

2

14

5

4

2

Austria: poorly

20

19

37

5

6

2

8

2

EU: well

26

32

8

2

18

8

3

3

EU: poorly

25

17

33

4

7

3

8

2

All the established political parties got a bad press. In 2013 just like in previous years, the voters were convinced of the inability of the political elites to “listen to the people”. Table: Parties only want to catch the vote of the electorate. They are not interested in their problems (in %)14 Agree

fully

rather

a little

not at all

Do not know/ no answer

Total

32

32

23

12

1

Voters

30

32

24

13

1

Abstentionists

37

33

19

11

1

SPÖ voters

25

26

32

15

2

ÖVP voters

23

34

24

18

–

FPÖ voters

45

30

13

11

1

Green voters

16

44

32

8

–

This situation led to the partial disability of politics to respond to the real needs of the population. Table: In central questions, politics usually fail (in %)15 Agree

fully

rather

a little

not at all

Do not know/ no answer

Total

27

32

27

12

2

Voters

24

33

29

13

2

Abstentionists

34

30

24

9

3

SPÖ voters

15

33

33

14

5

ÖVP voters

17

28

37

16

2

FPÖ voters

36

43

16

6

–

Green voters

17

30

38

13

2

13 14 15

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

THE FPÖ: A WINNER PARTY?

125

Still, the deficiencies of politics did not foster a real authoritarian temptation, not even among FPÖ voters. Table: Democracy may cause problems. But it is the best form of government (in %)16 Agree

fully

rather

a little

not at all

Do not know/ no answer

Total

81

10

6

2

1

Voters

81

11

5

2

1

Abstentionists

83

8

7

3

–

SPÖ voter

80

11

5

2

2

ÖVP voter

85

9

5

1

–

FPÖ voter

72

15

7

4

1

Green voter

90

6

2

1

1

During the 2013 election campaign, Austrians considered education/schools, jobs, taxes, immigration/integration, the economy, and retirement pensions the most important issues. More than 36% of the respondents said to have discussed those topics “intensely” during the campaign. Table: Topics discussed during the election campaign (in %)17 intensely

rather

little

not at all

Do not know/ no answer 6

Education/Schools

43

26

15

10

Jobs

39

30

16

10

5

Taxes

38

28

17

11

6

Economy

37

30

17

9

6

Immigration/Integration

37

28

20

9

5

Retirement Pensions

37

26

20

12

6 7

Fight against Corruption

33

27

19

13

Cost of Living

32

26

23

12

6

Health

24

28

28

13

7

Protection of Nature

23

28

30

14

5

Security

22

25

27

20

6

Housing and Rent

21

28

26

18

8

Traffic

16

20

32

22

10

The priorities of FPÖ voters were somewhat different from those of the other electorates. Besides immigration, their preferred topics were retirement pensions, unemployment, and taxes.

16 17

Ibid. Ibid.

PATRICK MOREAU

126

Table: Topics discussed during the election campaign by the FPÖ electorate (in %)18 intensely

rather

little

not at all

Do not know/ no answer

Education/Schools

39

25

13

18

5

Jobs

45

27

14

7

7

Taxes

43

25

15

10

7

Economy

42

25

17

11

6

Immigration/Integration

53

23

12

7

5

Retirement pensions

46

22

14

11

7

Fight against corruption

39

26

14

11

10

Cost of living

42

25

18

6

8

health

22

27

27

15

9

Protection of nature

11

22

38

23

5

Security

36

25

17

17

5

Housing and rent

29

26

22

15

8

Traffic

13

13

34

30

30

The decision on voting FPÖ was clearly determined by the binomial immigration/integration and security. The cost of living, retirement pensions and the fight against corruption lagged far behind. Table: Attribution of competence/expertise to their party by FPÖ voters (in %)19 Education/schools

30

Jobs

44

Taxes

45

Economy

27

Immigration/integration

70

Retirement pensions

42

Fight against corruption

42

Cost of living

49

Health

30

Protection of nature

19

Security

66

Housing and rent

41

traffic

22

For 64% of the FPÖ voters, the decisive factor for their choice was the best top candidate and the “best program”. 53% named the control of social evils and administrative irregularities.

18 19

Ibid. Ibid.

THE FPÖ: A WINNER PARTY?

127

Table: Electoral motives of FPÖ voters (in %)20 Best top candidate

64

Best program for Austria

64

Highest credibility concerning the control of social evils and administrative regulations

53

Fresh and new ideas for Austrian politics

38

Done the best job so far

32

FPÖ supporters are generally more critical of and dissatisfied with Austria’s development, its crisis policy, the EU, and with parties and politics in general than the electorates of other parties. The 2013 Program of the FPÖ Politik der ‘Nächstenliebe’ (A Policy of Compassion) was a very short one. Moreover, it was repeated word by word at the 2014 European campaign21. The program is clearly interventionist, but liberally minded. Its primary concern is the protection of Austria and its markets, the defense of Austrian jobs, the stop of immigration, the withdrawal from the EU in its present form and/or the reduction of the Austrian contribution to the financing of Europe, the leaving of the Euro, the limiting of the power of banks and transnational financial structures, and the support of small and medium sized companies. All this is accompanied by a policy of support of families. The FPÖ strives for a tax reform and the stop of public debt. It wants the rich to pay (how much?) and defend retirement pensions. The program does not mention the farmers and remains vague on structural and administrative reforms. Security, the stop of immigration, the defense of the “Heimat” and the German and Austrian culture form the core of the program. This is a classic populist program, somewhat critical of capitalism and globalization, xenophobic and advocating national preference. It is not clearly totalitarian, though. In 2013, there are no more “people’s parties” because no party performs equally well in all population groups. A gender gap and marked differences of the electoral behavior of men and women are visible. Table: Electoral Behavior by Gender, Age, Gender and Age (in %)22 SPÖ

ÖVP

FPÖ

BZÖ

GRÜ

Neos

Team

Other

Men

22

19

28

4

10

5

8

4

Women

29

29

16

3

13

5

4

–

16 – 29 years

20

21

22

2

21

6

5

5

30 – 59 years

25

22

24

3

11

6

7

2

60 + years

33

30

18

5

5

3

5

1

Men 16 – 29 years

16

17

30

2

16

4

7

8

men 30 – 59 years

21

19

29

5

10

6

9

2

Men 60 + years

35

23

24

5

4

3

5

1

20 21 22

Ibid. See the 2014 program on http://www.fpoe.eu/dokumente/programm/ (19 March 2015). Source: SORA exit poll, 2013 national elections, on behalf of ORF.

PATRICK MOREAU

128 SPÖ

ÖVP

FPÖ

BZÖ

GRÜ

Neos

Team

Other

Women 16 – 29 years

24

27

9

3

27

8

1

–

Women 30 – 59 years

30

26

18

2

13

6

5

0

women 60 + years

32

36

14

6

6

2

4

1

The different party preference of men and women is particularly noticeable: Women clearly preferred ÖVP, SPÖ and Greens with above average frequency while men preferred the FPÖ. The FPÖ shows the biggest electoral gender gap: It received 28% of the male vote but only 16% of the female vote. In reverse, 29% of the women voted ÖVP but only 19% of the men. Besides the strong gender gap, the exit polls show above average results of the FPÖ among workers: The party received 34% of the workers’ vote. With 25% of the employees’ vote, the FPÖ clearly outperformed the ÖVP and was practically on eye level with the SPÖ. Table: Electoral Behavior by Professional Group (in %)23 %

SPÖ

ÖVP

FPÖ

BZÖ

GRÜ

Neos

Team

Other

worker

24

18

33

5

5

3

10

3

employee

26

19

25

4

15

6

4

2

self-employed

5

35

18

3

12

13

13

2

retired

34

31

17

4

6

2

5

1

The FPÖ had a problem among voters with higher levels of education. Table: Electoral Behavior by Level of Education (in %)24 %

SPÖ

ÖVP

FPÖ

BZÖ

GRÜ

Neos

Team

Other

Compulsory school

34

23

15

4

8

5

9

2

Apprenticeship

28

20

35

3

5

3

4

2

Technical College

24

34

21

0

14

2

4

1

A levels

19

21

19

4

19

10

7

2

University

9

29

4

7

30

12

5

4

The 2013 election showed the strength of the FPÖ, which had gained a “proletarian” profile. Its electorate consisted of young people, people who completed vocational training, skilled and unskilled workers, with low incomes and a relatively low level of education. Based on this profile, the FPÖ was able to compete with the SPÖ for its traditional electorate. It was also able to neutralize the reemergence of anti-capitalist or communist left groups or parties.

23 24

Ibid. Ibid.

THE FPÖ: A WINNER PARTY?

129

4. The 2014 European Election The 2014 Europeans took place in an atmosphere favorable for the FPÖ. On December 16.2013, SPÖ and ÖVP had established the grand coalition with great difficulties. The voters despised it. They desired a new policy. The FPÖ was able to decry the “proporz” and the deadlock of the political system. The difficulties of the common European policy invigorated the electoral campaign of the FPÖ rallied around its chairman Strache. At the same time, its competitors (BZÖ and Team Stronach) practically disappeared from the political arena25. The FPÖ was able to re-mobilize only 64% of its 2009 electorate. 58.000 former FPÖ voters stayed at home. 15.000 votes were won over by ÖVP, Greens, NEOS, and minor parties respectively. The FPÖ lost further 14.000 votes to the SPÖ. Compared to all the other parties, the FPÖ received the biggest share of the former Martin’s List swing, namely, 130.000 votes. The BZÖ was only able to convince 2 out of 100 of its 2009 voters again. 33.000 former BZÖ voters switched to the FPÖ, 29.000 to the abstentionist camp. The electoral swing analysis sums up REKON, “Europa Anders” and “EU-Stop” as “minor parties”. Their electorate mostly consists of former abstentionist (49.000) and 2009 Martin’s List voters (39.000). Table: Electoral Swing Analysis 2014 (read by line)26 ÖVP 2014

SPÖ 2014

FPÖ 2014

Grüne 2014

BZÖ 2014

NEOS 2014

Minor parties 2014

Abstentionists 2014

Sum total 2009

ÖVP 2009

70%

3%

3%

5%

0%

6%

2%

12%

100%

SPÖ 2009

3%

73%

4%

5%

0%

2%

3%

10%

100%

MARTIN 2009

11%

11%

26%

11%

0%

9%

8%

25%

100%

FPÖ 2009

4%

4%

64%

4%

0%

4%

4%

16%

100%

Grüne 2009

3%

3%

1%

70%

0%

12%

4%

7%

100%

BZÖ 2009

10%

8%

25%

11%

2%

12%

9%

22%

100%

Minor parties 2009

6%

6%

8%

21%

0%

26%

24%

9%

100%

Abstentionists 2009

2%

2%

3%

2%

0%

1%

1%

89%

100%

Example: 70% of the ÖVP electorate of the 2009 Europeans elected ÖVP in 2014, 3% switched to the SPÖ, etc.

25 26

See Michael KAEDING, Niko SWITEK (eds.), Die Europawahl 2014. Spitzenkandidaten, Protestparteien, Nichtwähler, Heidelberg, Springer VS, 2015. Source: SORA/ISA exit poll.

PATRICK MOREAU

130 Table: Analysis of the Electoral Switch (read by column)27 ÖVP 2014

SPÖ 2014

FPÖ 2014

Grüne 2014

BZÖ 2014

NEOS 2014

Minor parties 2014

Abstentionists 2014

ÖVP 2009

78%

3%

5%

9%

11%

21%

10%

3%

SPÖ 2009

2%

73%

5%

8%

10%

6%

10%

2%

MARTIN 2009

7%

8%

23%

12%

6%

21%

23%

4%

FPÖ 2009

2%

2%

42%

3%

4%

6%

9%

2%

Grüne 2009

1%

1%

1%

46%

1%

15%

7%

1%

BZÖ 2009

2%

2%

6%

3%

23%

7%

7%

1%

Minor parties 2009

0%

0%

1%

2%

1%

5%

6%

0%

Abstentionists 2009

8%

10%

18%

15%

43%

18%

29%

89%

Example: 78% of the 2014 ÖVP electorate had voted ÖVP in 2009, 2% are 2009 SPÖvoters, etc.

Like in 2013, the different party preference of men and women is notably pronounced at this election: The male choice of ÖVP and FPÖ was above average. SPÖ and Greens were clearly the female preference. Among the age group under 30 years old, the Greens were the strongest party and reached 26%. They were followed by FPÖ and SPÖ. The NEOS’ electorate also tends to be younger. Table: Voting Behavior According to Sex, Age, Age and Sex (in %)28 ÖVP

SPÖ

FPÖ

Grüne

NEOS

Other

Man

30

21

24

11

7

8

Women

26

28

17

17

8

4

Under 30 years old

15

19

23

26

15

2

30 to 59 years old

29

21

21

14

7

8

60 years and older

35

34

17

6

2

5

Men under 30 years

18

14

33

17

13

5

Men 30 to 59 years

30

19

22

12

7

11

Men 60 years and older

36

29

21

7

3

4

Women under 30 years

14

22

16

32

16

0

Women 30 to 59 years

29

23

20

16

8

4

Women 60 years and older

34

40

13

6

1

6

Among the above 60 year olds, ÖVP and SPÖ clearly exceeded their total results. While men of this age group preferred the ÖVP, women favored the SPÖ. The FPÖ was the most successful party among workers receiving about 46% of their vote. The ÖVP was most successful among employees with 26%; among retired voters, ÖVP and SPÖ were equal.

27 28

Ibid. Ibid.

THE FPÖ: A WINNER PARTY?

131

Table: Electoral Behavior According to Occupation (in %)29 Workers

Employees

Self-Employed

Retired Persons

ÖVP

17

26

35

35

SPÖ

24

20

8

34

FPÖ

46

19

16

17

GRÜNE

5

19

17

6

NEOS

3

10

11

2

Others

4

6

14

5

At the 2014 Europeans, formal education was once again a criterion clearly determining electoral behavior: The ÖVP had its highest share of support among voters with intermediate school or university degrees. Voters with a compulsory school education more often preferred the SPÖ. This electoral group also showed a significant preference of the FPÖ. Table: Electoral Behavior According to Formal Education (in %)30 Compulsory School

Skilled worker

Middle level technical education

Matura holders

University graduate

ÖVP

17

29

37

30

33

SPÖ

35

28

20

15

8

FPÖ

32

25

13

9

7

GRÜNE

8

9

15

22

31

NEOS

5

5

7

13

10

Other

3

3

6

10

10

We need to inquire whether the relative success of the FPÖ corresponds with the growing strength of anti-Europeanism. A series of empirical studies of the Austrian Society for European Politics shows that the balance of power has hardly changed in the long run31. Looking back in November 2014, 57% of the Austrians consider the decision to enter the EU the right one, 36% think it was a mistake. 67 of the Austrians favor Austria’s remaining an EU member. 25% want the withdrawal from the EU. On the long-term average, the number of proponents of the membership averaged 71% and the opponents 23%. Based on opposite pairs, 85% consider the EU economically important (economically unimportant: 15%), 69% consider it peacemaking (promoting conflict: 31%). At the top of the negative statements, there is the assumption of 93% of the EU being complicated (uncomplicated: 7%). 59% of the respondents call the EU distant (41% think it is close). Almost 40% call the EU anti-democratic, not in solidarity, and anti-social. 29 30 31

Ibid. Ibid. See http://www.oegfe.at/cms/index.php?id=63&tx_ttnews[pointer]=1&tx_ttnews[backPid] =113&tx_ttnews [tt_news]=802&cHash=6c0a634f5d#sthash.WtMOXvdX.dpuf (2 March 2015).

PATRICK MOREAU

132 Table: Perception of the EU (in %)32

Question: Tell me, using the following opposite pairs, which of the two terms do you think describes the EU best. “For me, the EU is rather …” Economically important

85

Secure

47

Economically unimportant

15

Insecure

53

Peacemaking

69

Liberty and freedom

44

Promoting conflict

31

Force and constraint

56

Democratic

63

Strong

43

Undemocratic

37

Weak

57

In solidarity

60

Close

41

Not in solidarity

40

distant

59

Social

60

Simple

7

Anti-social

40

Complicated

93

49% of the respondents state that the EU-membership has entailed more advantages than disadvantages for Austria. 37% voice their skepticism, while 13% consider advantages and disadvantages maintaining a balance. Table: Balance Sheet 1 (in %)33 Question: Do you think the EU-membership has entailed more advantages or more disadvantages for Austrians? February/March 2014

November 2014

Positive

49

44

Negative

37

35

Clearly more advantages

14

16

Some more advantages

30

33

Neither advantages nor disadvantages

16

13

Some more disadvantages

20

20

Clearly more disadvantages

15

17

Do not know/No answer

5

2

According to the Austrians, especially big companies profited from membership (86% “more advantages, 5% “more disadvantages”). Pupils, university students and apprentices, too, are considered to have rather benefitted (52% “more advantages, 16% “more disadvantages”). However, for another social group, this is less valid: 56% state that farmers have experienced rather more disadvantages (30% insist on “more advantages”). 58% of the respondents also discerned more disadvantages for small and medium-sized companies (27%: “more advantages”)

32 33

Source: Austrian Society for European Politics. Ibid.

THE FPÖ: A WINNER PARTY?

133

Table: Balance Sheet 2 (in %)34 Question: What do you think? Has Austria’s EU-membership had a more beneficial or a more detrimental effect on the following groups? Rather beneficial

Neither – nor

Rather detrimental

Do not know/ no answer

Big companies

86

4

5

5

Pupils, university students, apprentices

52

18

16

15

Employees

40

16

38

7

Farmers

30

9

56

4

Small and medium-sized companies

27

9

58

6

Retired Persons

17

36

34

12

In retrospect, 61% of the respondents consider the introduction of the common currency to be positive. 35% regard it as negative. 51% appreciate the end of passport and border controls, 43% reject it. Table: Balance Sheet 3 (in %)35 Question: Since Austria acceded to the EU 20 years ago, there have been significant developments on the European level. What do you think about them? According to you, for Austria they were … Very positive

Rather positive

Rather negative

Very negative

Do not know/no answer

Introduction of the Euro as the common currency

20

41

24

11

4

End of passport and border controls

23

28

28

14

7

Enlargement of the EU

7

24

46

15

8

The EU enlargement is judged quite critically: 61% consider it negative, 31% positive. Narrowing down the question to Austria’s neighboring countries that joined the EU in 2004, 53% consent to the admission of these countries36. More than half of the respondents do not fear the „loss of the Austrian identity” (53%: “hardly/not at all”). 40% dissent (“to a large extent/to some extent”).

34 35 36

Ibid. Ibid. See http://www.oegfe.at/cms/index.php?id=63&tx_ttnews[pointer]=2&tx_ttnews[backPid] =113&tx_ttnews [tt_news]=718&cHash=cb7ba15662 (3 March 2015).

PATRICK MOREAU

134 Table: Balance Sheet (in %)37

Question: Before the Austrian EU-accession 20 years ago, critics and opponents of the EU-membership raised concerns about the consequences of the accession. Have those concerns come true or not? To a large extent

To some extent

Hardly

Not at all

Do not know/no answer

Jeopardizing of small farms

49

29

9

8

5

Sell-out of Austrian companies

21

43

18

8

10

Approval of genetically modified foods

25

39

16

11

8

Jeopardizing of jobs

23

39

22

12

4

Austria has no business to be within the EU

22

34

24

17

4

Buy-out of land

11

28

32

16

13

Loss of the Austrian identity

13

27

25

28

6

Concerns about the jeopardizing of small farms have persisted the most. 78% state that this has indeed been the case “to a large extent/to some extent”. Only 17 % think this is “hardly/not at all” true. Table: Deepening European Cooperation (in %)38 Question: Presently, the question is often discussed whether the European integration (i.e., cooperation within the EU) should rather be deepened or reduced. Which opinion reflects your attitude most closely? November/December 2012

November 2014

Deepen cooperation

49

42

Just right

27

26

Reduce cooperation

20

23

Do not know/no answer

4

9

42% of the respondents favor cooperation within the EU to be deepened. 26% think the level of cooperation is just right. 23% prefer less cooperation on the EU level. Considering emotions about the EU, in 2014, about 30% of the respondents approach the EU with confidence, and just as many express concern and resentment. The rest of the respondents are indifferent. In general, voters are more confident, while abstainers are more often resentful or indifferent.

37 38

Source: Austrian Society for European Politics. Ibid.

THE FPÖ: A WINNER PARTY?

135

The confidence of the electorates of ÖVP, Greens and NEOS is particularly high. FPÖ voters, on the other hand, are definitely more resentful towards the EU. Table: Which of the following emotions best corresponds with the EU: Confidence, concern, resentment, or indifference? (in %)39 Sum total

Voters

Confidence

28

35

Abstainers 18

Concern

28

28

27

Resentment

31

28

35

Indifference

13

8

19

Table: Relationship between Electoral Behavior and Emotions Concerning the EU (in %)40 Party

ÖVP

SPÖ

FPÖ

Grüne

NEOS

Other

Confidence

36

22

4

21

12

4

Concern

27

34

16

14

6

3

Resentment

21

15

46

8

2

9

For voters considering the EU membership generally a good idea, ÖVP or the Greens are the first choice. Table: Electoral Behavior of selected Groups: EU Membership is … (in %)41 Question: „Do you consider Austria’s membership of the European Union a good thing, a bad thing, or none of the two?” … a good thing

… a bad thing

ÖVP

37

10

SPÖ

25

13

FPÖ

4

60

GRÜNE

20

5

NEOS

10

3

Table: Electoral Behavior of Supporters and Opponents of the EU (in %)42 ÖVP

SPÖ

FPÖ

Grüne

NEOS

Other

EU proponents

37

25

4

20

10

4

EU opponents

10

13

60

5

3

9

Voters whose judgment of the EU membership is negative (about a quarter of the respondents) by far prefer the FPÖ that collects 60% of this electorate. 39 40 41 42

Source: SORA/ISA exit poll on behalf of ORF. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

PATRICK MOREAU

136

The data clearly show that all forms and motives of anti-Europeanism foster the electorate of the FPÖ. We have to investigate the role of the Euro in the structuring of the Austrian anti-Europeanism43. The majority of Austrians considers the Euro important for the future of European integration. At the same time, confidence in the common currency is ambivalent. In 2011 and 1012, trust in the Euro had caved in and a majority had little or no confidence in the Euro. In 2014, opinions stabilized on a low level. Table: Confidence in the Euro (in %)44 no confidence

Very little confidence

little confidence

high confidence

very high confidence 20

March 2010

3

5

21

50

May 2010

4

8

26

53

8

September 2010

5

5

30

45

13

June 2011

8

10

35

38

9

December 2011

10

15

33

34

6

May 2012

6

13

38

33

9

Sept./Oct. 2012

11

13

36

31

7

April 2013

5

12

31

40

13

November 2013

4

10

34

46

5

February/March 2014

8

11

30

42

7

In 2014, 49% of the respondents state their “very high” (7%) or “high” (42%) confidence in the Euro. Exactly 49% express an opposite opinion: 30% have little confidence, 11% very little confidence, and 8% no confidence in the common currency. Table: Confidence in the Euro (in %)45 Very high/high

little/very little/ no confidence

March 2010

70

29

May 2010

61

38

September 2010

58

40

June 2011

47

47

December 2011

40

58

May 2012

42

57

43 44 45

See http://www.oegfe.at/cms/index.php?id=63&tx_ttnews[pointer]=3&tx_ttnews[backPid] =113&tx_ttnews [tt_news]=704&cHash=081bfb11a3 (3 March 2015). Source: Austrian Society for European Politics. Ibid.

THE FPÖ: A WINNER PARTY?

137 little/very little/ no confidence

Very high/high Sept./Oct. 2012

38

60

April 2013

51

48

November 2013

51

48

February/March 2014

49

48

Since its introduction, the Euro has been blamed for rising prices in everyday life. It was the scapegoat of the complex EU crisis policies and lost confidence due to the economic and financial crisis. At the same time, people estimate its practical advantages like the end of currency exchange. They consider the Euro an important asset of Europe’s position in global competition. Table: In your opinion, how important is the Euro as the common currency for the … (in %)46 Very important

Rather important

Rather unimportant

Not important

Do not know/no answer

position of the EU in the global economy

40

37

12

5

6

further development of the EU

30

35

15

8

13

development of a common European identity

28

31

17

13

12

Asking Austrians which aspects of the EU membership they spontaneously consider positive, 53% name the “common currency/the end of currency exchange”. On the negative side, 17% immediately list “rising prizes due to the Euro”. In spite of this ambivalence, the majority considers the Euro an important element of European integration. For the “position of the EU in global economy”, 77% consider the Euro „very important” (40%), or “rather important” (37%). But 17 percent do “rather not” agree and 5% “not at all”. 65% consider the Euro “very” (30%) of “rather important” (35%) for the “further development of the EU”. 23% of the respondents oppose this view – 15% of them answering “rather not” important and 8% “not (important) at all”. 59% of the respondents think the Euro is “very” (28%) or “quite” (31%) important for the “development of a common European identity”. 30 % consider the Euro “rather not” (17%) or “not at all” (13%) important to this end. About 3 out of 4 Austrians consider the future of the Euro as secure.

46

Ibid.

PATRICK MOREAU

138

Table: Will the Euro remain the common currency in the long term? (in %)47 Definitely/ quite likely

rather not/ definitely not

do not know/ no answer 4

December 2011

68

29

Sept./Oct. 2012

66

30

3

April 2013

66

29

4

November 2013

71

26

4

These polls show that there are fears concerning the future of the Euro. Combined with the various forms of criticism of Europa, a fringe of the electorate will search for a party that rejects European integration as it is as well as the Euro. Both topics belong to the FPÖ favorites. In all electorates, the European issue plays a central role for the decision for a party. The representation of Austrian interests in Brussels and the best top candidate were important motives of ÖVP adherents. Those two motives were important for SPÖ adherents, too, even though they were named somewhat less often. Table: Electoral Motives (in %)48 Question: „Which party …” ÖVP

SPÖ

FPÖ

GRÜNE

NEOS

has the best top candidate

83

73

68

64

59

represents Austrian interests in the European Union best of all

85

75

71

71

62

conveys best the hope of a better Europe

69

68

61

76

77

ensures a credible renewal of politics

58

52

65

70

82

has the highest credibility to control deficiencies of the Euro62 56 75 78 68 pean Union Figures in percent of the respective declared electorate Example: 83% of the ÖVP electorate at the 2014 Europeans declared the ÖVP to have the best top candidate.

Of five suggested motives, FPÖ voters most often chose the answer that their party was the most credible one to control deficiencies of the European Union. Adherents of the Greens also named this motive most often, followed by the conviction that their party conveys best the hope of a better Europe. During the election campaign, the Austrians especially discussed the topics immigration and integration in Europe and the fight against unemployment. The preservation of social benefits, security and criminality, and the quality of food – in view of the debate on the free trade agreement with the USA – were also frequent topics of the discussion. 47 48

Ibid. Source: SORA/ISA exit poll on behalf of ORF.

THE FPÖ: A WINNER PARTY?

139

Apart from this trend, there were some differences between the parties: For the ÖVP electorate, the reduction of state debt was a central topic, for SPÖ voters it was the preservation of social benefits. For both electorates alike, the fight against unemployment was an important issue. Table: Frequently Debated Topics of the Election Campaign 2014 (in %)49 Question: “Did you discuss the following topics rather frequently or rather infrequently during the election campaign?” Total

ÖVP

SPÖ

FPÖ

GRÜNE

NEOS

Immigration and integration in Europe

80

78

74

92

79

83

Fight against unemployment

75

77

86

85

75

79

Security and criminality

73

76

82

89

57

72

Preservation of social benefits

73

68

85

80

72

66

Quality of food

73

77

74

71

86

79

Peace in Europe

67

73

71

58

80

68

Environmental protection

66

66

72

59

87

72

Reduction of state debt

66

83

67

68

65

71

Economic growth

58

75

58

51

64

73

Regulation of the financial 54 63 50 50 68 55 markets “rather frequently”, in percent of the party electorate. Example: 73% of the ÖVP electorate at the 2014 Europeans declared to have discussed the topic “Security and Criminality” rather frequently during the election campaign.

FPÖ voters most often discussed immigration and integration as well as security and criminality. There are clear differences considering the expertise the particular electorate attributes to its parties: The ÖVP is considered to have the best concepts for economic growth, the SPÖ for the preservation of social benefits, and the FPÖ for immigration and integration. Table: Expertise of the Parties (in %)50 Question: „Which party running at these Europeans do you consider to have the best concepts concerning…?” ÖVP

SPÖ

FPÖ

GRÜNE

NEOS

Security and criminality

54

49

77

39

34

Immigration and integration in Europe

47

40

78

63

38

Environmental protection

17

13

8

96

14

Food quality

37

27

15

89

10

Economic growth

82

38

26

30

46

49 50

Ibid. Ibid.

PATRICK MOREAU

140 ÖVP

SPÖ

FPÖ

GRÜNE

NEOS

Peace in Europe

52

60

25

66

30

Reduction of public debt

63

38

41

25

43

Regulation of the financial markets

56

35

38

46

35

Fight against unemployment

52

76

50

29

34

Preservation of social benefits 35 86 41 40 20 Example: 54% of its electorate at the 2014 Europeans was convinced that the ÖVP had the best concept in the field of “Security and criminality”.

Statements on the EU show profound differences between the electorates. Table: In crucial issues, the EU usually fails (in %)51 Fully agree

Quite agree

Hardly agree

Do not agree

Do not know/ no answer

ÖVP-Voters

15

36

30

14

6

SPÖ-Voters

20

40

29

5

6

FPÖ-Voters

56

35

4

3

2

Grüne-Voters

15

43

24

14

5

NEOS-Voters

19

35

30

9

6

Asked about their general attitude to the EU, one third of the respondents “fully” agree with the statement that the EU usually fails in crucial political issues. Table: The elections must be primarily used to send a signal against the Austrian domestic policy (in %)52 Fully agree

Quite agree

Hardly agree

Do not agree

Do not know/ no answer

ÖVP-Voters

13

17

28

41

1

SPÖ-Voters

16

23

30

28

3

FPÖ-Voters

44

18

15

18

5

Grüne-Voters

17

18

26

38

2

NEOS-Voters

30

17

17

30

6

Almost 20% considered the election a sign against Austrian domestic policy. The 44% support of the FPÖ electorate of this statement was clearly above average.

51 52

Ibid. Ibid.

THE FPÖ: A WINNER PARTY?

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Table: The EU’s main concerns are the interests of major companies while social questions fall by the wayside (in %)53 Fully agree

Quite agree

Hardly agree

Do not agree

Do not know/ no answer

Total

44

28

18

6

4

Voters

41

31

19

7

2

Abstentionists

48

24

16

5

6

ÖVP-Voters

22

33

30

14

2

SPÖ-Voters

45

32

17

4

2

FPÖ-Voters

69

23

5

2

1

Grüne-Voters

34

39

20

5

3

NEOS-Voters

28

40

21

11

–

More than 40% believe that the interests of major companies are the main concerns on the European level while social questions fall by the wayside. Table: The disadvantages of the open borders in Europe outweigh the advantages (in %)54 Fully agree

Quite agree

Hardly agree

Do not agree

Do not know/ no answer

Total

26

22

22

27

3

Voters

26

27

19

26

2

Abstainers

26

14

26

29

5

ÖVP-Voters

29

35

20

14

2

SPÖ-Voters

22

31

24

17

6

FPÖ-Voters

5

8

21

66

1

Grüne-Voters

50

35

7

8

0

NEOS-Voters

40

31

17

12

0

One quarter of the voters consider the disadvantages of open borders in Europe to outweigh the advantages. Significantly more often, abstainers insist in the failure of the EU in crucial issues and the dominance of economic interests; they also feel somewhat more poorly informed.

53 54

Ibid. Ibid.

PATRICK MOREAU

142

Table: Do you fully/rather/little/not at all agree with the following statement? (in %)55 Question : Answers “fully agree” Sum total

Voters

Abstainers

In crucial political issues, the EU usually fails.

33

27

42

I feel well informed on the EU

23

27

16

The EU’s main concerns are the interests of major companies while social questions fall by the wayside.

44

41

48

Concerning the open borders in Europe, the disadvantages outweigh the advantages.

26

26

26

The elections must be primarily used to send a signal against the Austrian domestic policy.

20

23

16

Still, only 15% of them favor Austria´s withdrawal from the EU (“fully agree”). Table: Austria ought to withdraw from the European Union (in %)56

ÖVP-Voters

Fully agree

Quite agree

Hardly agree

Do not agree

Do not know/ no answer

2

4

19

74

2

SPÖ-Voters

5

9

29

53

3

FPÖ-Voters

28

34

19

15

4

Grüne-Voters

1

2

27

70

–

NEOS-Voters

4

4

23

70

–

Conclusion The 2014 Europeans show that continuities are dominant. Ideologically, the FPÖ remains an anti-European, anti-immigration, nationalist, security-oriented party critical of the liberal globalization of the economic and banking sectors. Presently, the party has eliminated all right-wing extremist currents. It is able to attract voters of different types: anti-system, protest-oriented, losers of modernization (workers, proletarians and socially marginalized groups), modernization winners motivated by the fear of losing the benefits and attainments of the past because of the foreigners, but also many young people who are insecure about the future. With the grand coalition, the deadlock of the political system continues. It enables the FPÖ to hone its profile as the leading party representing opposition and change. The crisis of the Euro and the Greek question and the influx of refugees in 2015 are crucial factors benefitting the FPÖ. The future of this party is by no means clearly defined. It certainly is a heavyweight in the Austrian political system today as demonstrated by the first 2015 regional elections. In Styria, the FPÖ received 26.8% of the vote (+16.1%) and in Burgenland 15% (+6.1%). In 2015, 55 56

Ibid. Ibid.

THE FPÖ: A WINNER PARTY?

143

for the first time, the FPÖ forged an alliance with the SPÖ to form a government coalition. Strache is convinced this model offers promising prospects for the future.

LE FPÖ: UN PARTI GAGNANT? LES ÉLECTIONS AU PARLEMENT EUROPÉEN DE 2014 COMPARÉES AUX ÉLECTIONS LÉGISLATIVES DE 2013 L´élection européenne de 2014 en Autriche montre l´existence de fortes continuités avec les élections générales de 2013. Idéologiquement, le FPÖ est un parti anti-européen, anti-immigration, nationalistes, sécuritaire, critique de la globalisation libérale des secteurs économiques et bancaires. En 2014, le FPÖ a éliminé tous ses concurrents de la droite radicale. Il est en situation d´attirer des lecteurs de type très différents : antisystèmes, protestataires, perdants de la modernisation (ouvriers, prolétaires et groupes sociaux marginalisés), gagnants de la modernisation motivés par la crainte de la perte des intérêts acquis dans le passé par la montée de l´immigration, mais aussi de nombreux jeunes ayant peur de l´avenir. Ces dimensions permettent au FPÖ d´être le parti dominant représentant l´opposition et un possible changement. La crise économique de 2008, celle de l´Euro, la montée du chômage et de l´immigration profitent à un FPÖ dirigé par un leader charismatique à l´écoute des craintes et peurs collectives.

DIE FPÖ: EINE GEWINNERPARTEI ? DIE EUROPAPARLAMENTSWAHLEN 2014 UND DIE LEGISLATIVWAHLEN 2013 IM VERGLEICH Die Europawahl von 2014 steht ganz in der Kontinuität der Nationalratswahlen von 2013. Ideologisch ist die FPÖ eine europafeindliche, immigrationsfeindliche, nationalistische und sicherheitsfixierte Partei, die der liberalen Globalisierung der Wirtschaft und des Bankensektors kritisch gegenüber steht. 2014 hat die Partei alle rechtsextremen Strömungen ausgemerzt. Es gelingt ihr, unterschiedliche Wählertypen anzuziehen: Systemgegner und Protestwähler, Modernisierungsverlierer (Arbeiter, Proletarier und soziale Randgruppen) und Modernisierungsgewinner, die fürchten, die Leistungen und Errungenschaften der Vergangenheit wegen der Ausländer zu verlieren, aber auch viele junge Menschen, die sich Sorgen um ihre Zukunft machen. Mit der großen Koalition besteht die Blockade des politischen Systems fort. Dies ermöglicht der FPÖ, ihr Profil als die führende Oppositionspartei und Garant für Veränderungen zu schärfen. Die Krisen von 2008 und des Euro, der Anstieg der Arbeitslosigkeit und die Zuwanderung sind Faktoren, von denen die Partei profitiert. Dazu verfügt sie über einen charismatischen Führer, der sehr genau auf die Ängste der Bevölkerung hört.

Part 3

ANTI-EUROPEAN FORCES IN CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE AND IN THE BALTIC STATES LES FORCES ANTI-EUROPÉENNES EN EUROPE CENTRAL-ORIENTALE ET DANS LES ETATS BALTES ANTI-EUROPÄISCHE KRÄFTE MITTEL-OST-EUROPA UND IN DEN BALTIKSTAATEN

EUROSCEPTICS WE REMAIN? CZECH REPUBLIC, EUROSCEPTICISM AND THE 2014 EP ELECTION1 PETR KANIOK Since its accession to the European Union (EU), the Czech Republic has been seen as a Eurosceptic country. Above all, the prevalence of this perception was caused by the Czech political representation. Since joining the EU in 2004, the majority of governments was led by the soft Eurosceptical Civic Democratic Party (ODS); and for almost the whole membership period, Prague castle, the seat of the Czech president, was occupied by Václav Klaus, prominent Eurosceptic politician not only in the Czech context. Furthermore, these main ingredients were flavoured for example by the disconcerting Czech EU Council Presidency in 2009 which is memorized particularly for the voting down of the Presidency government in March 2009 and the controversial Entropa installation in the Justus Lipsius building2. Not surprisingly, Czech voters are counted among the most Eurosceptical citizens of the EU. In the Czech party system, both soft and hard Eurosceptical political parties have existed persistently. Taking all the above mentioned points into account, the Czech Republic can be considered a country where Eurosceptics should have been able to transform such excellent conditions (even strengthened by the overall European context) into electoral success. This chapter evaluates the performance of Czech Eurosceptics in the 2014 EP election. Its structure is as follows: The first part focuses on the conceptualization of Euroscepticism used in the subsequent analysis. After that, the context and historical development of Czech Euroscepticism are briefly explained. The third part of this paper deals with the election campaign and the results of the 2014 EP election. The final section comments on the implications of this election for Czech Euroscepticism. The main findings of the chapter can be identified as the continued weakening of Czech Euroscepticism and its persistently high level of fragmentation.

1. Conceptualization of Euroscepticism Euroscepticism is by no means an uncontested issue of political science, just the contrary. Even though having been a topic for mainstream scholars for the last 20 years only, a huge amount of various definitions, conceptualization and typologies have emerged. In this regard, research on party manifestation of Euroscepticism can be considered very productive. The main theoretical battle took place in 1 2

This chapter has been written as a part of the research project 'Europe 2020: A Horizon of Change of Relevant Actors of the Czech Republic´s Political System' (Czech Science Foundation project GA 13-24657S). The New York Times, “Art Hoax Unites Europe in Displeasure”, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2009/01/15/world/europe/15mosaic.html?_r=0, 2009 (5 March 2015)

148

PETR KANIOK

the beginning of the 21st century3. However, in the context of public Euroscepticism, several conceptualizations and definitions have emerged, too4. This paper has only a very limited possibility to review and comment on existing typologies and conceptualization of both party based and public Euroscepticism. Generally speaking, both approaches (either explicitly or implicitly) differentiate between diffuse5 kinds of Euroscepticism and its specific forms. Thus, the former is often connected with scepticism towards the country´s EU membership, criticism of the general principles of the European integration or – particularly in the context of research on public Euroscepticism – with identity issues. As such, in the context of party based Euroscepticism, this form of Euroscepticism was predominantly understood as “hard Euroscepticism”. Szczerbiak and Taggart define hard Euroscepticism as “principled opposition to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU, in other words, based on the ceding or transfer of powers to [a] supranational institution such as the EU”6. On the contrary, specific Euroscepticism usually deals with criticism or scepticism towards the current performance of the EU political system or with disagreement on a particular EU policy. In this form, it does not lead towards the general rejection of the principles of the European integration. In the context of party based research, this form or Euroscepticism is labelled “soft Euroscepticism” meaning “not a principled objection to the European integration project of transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but there is opposition to the EU's current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of competencies that the EU is planning to make”7. As this paper deals with party based Euroscepticism, it adopts the twofold typology of Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart as its departing point. However, in the contextual part of the emergence and relevance of Czech Euroscepticism, forms of specific and diffuse Euroscepticism at the level of public manifestation will also be mentioned. In this part, diffuse Euroscepticism is operationalized as a disagreement with the EU membership and the future self-identification as an exclusively Czech citizen. Specific public Euroscepticism is then operationalized in two indicators as well – the first of them evaluates the country´s benefit from 3

4

5

6

7

For an overview of the debate see Amandine CRESPY, Nicolas VERSCHUEREN, “From Euroscepticism to Resistance to European Integration: An Interdisciplinary Perspective” Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol. 10, no. 3, 2009, p.377-393; Petr KANIOK, “Eurosceptics – enemies or a necessary part of European integration?”, Romanian Journal of Political Science, vol. 12, no. 2, 2012, p. 29-52. See Catharina SØRENSEN, “Love me, love me not… A typology of public euroscepticism”, SEI Working Papers, no. 101, 2008; Cécile LECONTE, Understanding Euroscepticism, Houndmills, PalgraveMacmillan, 2010; Marianne SKINNER SUNDSLISAETER, “Norwegian Euroscepticism: Values, Identity or Interest”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 50, no. 3, 2012, p. 422-440. The diffuse form of support or criticism refers to the support or criticism of general principles of e. g. the political regime. On the other hand, the specific form of criticism relates to criticism of the current performance of the political regime, e. g. its institutions and policies. Thus, the later form depends on the political situation, see David EASTON, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York, Wiley, 1965; Russell J. DALTON, Democratic challenges, democratic choices: the erosion of Political support in advanced industrial democracies, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 2004. Aleks SZCERBIAK, Paul TAGGART, “Introduction: Researching Euroscepticism in European Party Systems: A Comparative and Theoretical Research Agenda”, in: Aleks SZCERBIAK, Paul TAGGART, (eds.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism. Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 1-27. Ibid.

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149

its EU membership and the second one captures the distrust in the European Commission.

2. Context of Czech Euroscepticism The Czech Republic became an EU member state on May 1, 2004, as a part of the so called Eastern enlargement wave. Even if at the moment of accession the country was led by a pro-European left centrist government (Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and Union of Freedom), the majority of the Czech “membership” governments were at least sympathetic to Euroscepticism. Within the EU, particularly the second government of Miroslav Topolánek (January 2007 – March 2009) and the government of Petr Nečas (July 2010 – June 2013) were perceived as Eurosceptical and troublemaker cabinets. And last but not least, from March 2003 to March 2013, the Czech Republic had quite an active and loud Eurosceptic head of state. Although the Czech constitution does not empower the office of the Czech President with any specific authority in foreign relations, Václav Klaus was visibly present in Czech European policy, especially during his second term. Concerning the public opinion, both specific and diffuse Euroscepticism has always been present among Czech citizens. Table no. 1 presents two indicators for each type of Euroscepticism: the diffuse version is operationalized by Eurobarometer questions on EU membership and future self-identification, and specific Euroscepticism is captured by questions dealing with the profit from EU membership and trust in the European Commission of the same survey. Unfortunately, the data presented are incomplete as Eurobarometer has changed questions several times, and some of them – perhaps the most accurate for the simple measurement of public Euroscepticism – were been dropped. Table 1: Overview of indicators of public Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic8 Diffuse Euroscepticism

8

Specific Euroscepticism

Agreement with EU membership

Future selfidentification (%)

Profit from EU membership

Trust in the European Commission

Oppose (%)

Exclusively national (%)

Do not (%)

Do not (%)

10/2004

10

57

41

28

06/2005

11

–

33

33

10/2005

11

37

33

29

04/2006

9

–

30

27

09/2006

10

–

27

27

05/2007

12

–

32

29

10/2007

15

–

29

26

04/2008

11

–

25

27

10/2008

12

–

29

28

Sources: Author´s own calculation based on Eurostat 62-75.

PETR KANIOK

150 Diffuse Euroscepticism

Specific Euroscepticism

Agreement with EU membership

Future selfidentification (%)

Profit from EU membership

Trust in the European Commission

Oppose (%)

Exclusively national (%)

Do not (%)

Do not (%)

06/2009

13

–

29

38

11/2009

13

–

32

28

06/2010

16

59

35

36

11/2010

–

–

40

36

05/2011

19

–

39

40

05/2012

–

–

46

11/2012

–

–

45

05/2013

–

45

–

46

11/2013

–

48

–

46

06/2014

–

48

–

53

Average

12,47

49

32,43

35,7

SD

2,79

8,07

4,86

8,68

cv

0,22

0,16

0,15

0,24

If we take into account all indicators and their values and compare them with the same values in the whole EU, it is obvious that the Czech public belongs to the most Eurosceptical within the EU. Looking at the most recent data (if available), this Euroscepticism is increasing – both in terms of its specific and diffuse manifestation. Concerning the party level, Euroscepticism – either in soft or in hard versions – has always been echoed not only by a high number of minor political parties but also by relevant Czech political forces. Table 2 offers an overview of Eurosceptical parties´ gains in the 2004 and 2009 EP elections. Table 2: Share of domains in Czech Eurosceptical manifestos for EP election 2004 (%)9 ODS % Seats EP Group

KSČM

Nez/Dem

2004

2009

2004

2009

2004

30,04

31,45

20,26

14,18

8.18

9

9

6

4

2

EPP-ED

ECR

GUE-NGL

GUE-NGL

NI

Traditionally, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) have been labelled Eurosceptic parties. While the former is predominantly classified as a hard Eurosceptical party, the latter is being labelled soft Eurosceptic. Operating in two opposing corners of the party scene – the KSČM represents the traditional far left while the ODS can be classified as a liberal-conservative party – both parties have been appealing to differ9

Source: Czech Statistical Office www.volby.cz (15 March 2015).

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151

ent groups of voters using different Eurosceptical arguments. Concerning the competition on the EP electoral level, in 2004, the Czech Eurosceptical party scene was completed by the small movement Independent Democrats (NezDem), a single issue movement making only one breakthrough, perhaps due to the fact that its list was led by Vladimir Železny, the influential former director of the biggest Czech TV channel TV NOVA. However, as Tables 2 and 3 show, it makes no sense to speak about one Czech party based Euroscepticism. Both tables are based on 2004 and 2009 Euro-manifestos, working with datasets coded by the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES)10. Table 3 deals with preferred policy domains and their comparison at the 2004 and 2009 elections. Table 3: Share of domains in Czech Eurosceptical manifestos for the EP election 2004 and 2009 (%)11 ODS

Nez/ Dem

KSČM

2004

2009

2004

2009

2004

External Relations

15

9

22

18

17

Freedom and Democracy

11

2

10

4

13

Political System in General

20

24

11

6

57

Political System of the EU

4

1

3

1

0

Economy

26

45

20

32

4

Welfare and Quality of Life

4

11

20

22

0

Fabric of Society

9

2

6

5

0

Social Groups

11

5

8

11

9

As Table 3 reveals, there was no typical Eurosceptical issue in both EP elections – all Eurosceptical parties stressed different topics. Differences between parties thus indicate that parties preferred specific domains which comply with their primary ideologies. On the other hand, especially in 2009, rather than by a Eurosceptical stance, both relevant parties were affected by the general political situation framed by the economic crisis in the EU and the expectation of early national parliamentary elections in autumn 2009 which would explain the substantial increase of the focus on the economy, for example. Table 4 produces the same fragmented picture which summarizes preferred levels of governance. Again, there are substantial differences within the parties – the shifts between 2004 and 2009 can be explained by the general atmosphere in the Czech Republic. After voting down the coalition government led by ODS in March 2009, all parties started to prepare for early elections, initially scheduled just a couple of months after the EP election. This may be the reason why the na-

10

11

The Euro-manifestos project coded Euro-manifestos into 8 domains (External Relations, Freedom and Democracy, Political System, Political System of the EU, Economy, Welfare and Quality of Life, Fabric of Society, Social Groups) and 3 levels of governance (National, European, Global/Other). Source: author´s own calculation. N (2004) 200 quasi-sentences, N (2009) 741 quasi-sentences.

PETR KANIOK

152

tional level of governance is prevailing as a dominant frame in the 2009 manifestos. Table 4: Share of levels of governance in Czech Eurosceptical manifestos for the 2004 and 2009 EP elections (%)12 ODS

Nez/ Dem

KSČM

2004

2009

2004

2009

2004

National

15

47

2

19

43

European

78

42

93

40

57

Other/Global/n.a.

7

11

5

41

0

Concerning the electoral successes of the Czech Eurosceptical parties, both KSČM and ODS can be undoubtedly counted among the most relevant Czech political parties in the 2004 – 2014 period. This is not to say that the support of both parties was especially due to their Eurosceptical stance as the EU was not their main concern. But their overall popularity ensured that Euroscepticism was constantly present in the Czech political debate. Both KSČM and ODS gains in parliamentary and EP elections in the period of 2004-2014 are summarized in Table 5. Table 5: KSČM and ODS Gains in Parliamentary and EP Elections from 2004-2014 (% of votes)13 EU

Parliamentary

EU

Parliamentary

Parliamentary 2013

2004

2006

2009

2010

ODS

30,0

35,4

31,4

20,2

7,7

KSČM

20,3

12,8

14,2

11,3

14,9

Last but not least, one can hardly omit the overall context of Czech politics. Many things changed in the 2009 – 2014 period, especially in terms of the structure of party competition and its relevant actors. During the five years elapsed since the 2009 EP elections, the Czech party landscape transformed almost completely – something that had not been expected since the Czech Republic had been considered a quite stable party system whose core poles had already been established in the 1990s14. However, voting down Topolánek’s EU Presidency government in March 2009 started a process in the course of which several new parties emerged and have persisted, others emerged as comets and disappeared in the same way, and some former key actors became rather marginal players. Almost all relevant parties changed their leaders (some of them not only once), and the arrival of new parties and political movements introduced new strong figures. Between May 2009 and May 2014, there were four different governments in 12 13 14

Source: author´s own calculation. N (2004) 200 quasi sentences, N (2009) 741 quasi sentences. Source: Czech Statistical Office www.volby.cz (2 March 2015). Lubomír KOPEČEK, Vlastimil HAVLÍK, “Krize vládnutí v České republice. Analýza působení volebního a stranického systému a návrhy možných řešení”, Politologický časopis, vol. 15, no. 3, 2008, p. 188.

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office, two of them caretakers or semi-caretakers. This obvious instability led to three nationwide elections during this period, two of them parliamentary and one presidential. The last parliamentary election of 2013 pointed out three interesting trends which had been already indicated in 2010 or earlier. Firstly, the 2013 election confirmed the presence and increasing support of populism in Czech politics. In the 2010 election, this phenomenon had been emphasized by the Public Affairs party (VV) which had based its campaign on wiping out political dinosaurs and on a strong anti-corruption ethos. Ironically, VV very soon adopted the same practices it had criticized. In 2012, it split due to internal tensions15. In 2013, the total number of voters dissatisfied with the established major actors – like the Social Democrats (ČSSD) and ODS – substantially increased. New parties with a populist or slightly populist rhetoric (ANO 201116 and The Dawn) got almost one third of the parliamentary seats. Secondly, both ČSSD and ODS, two key players in Czech party system since 1996 (in the case of ODS since 1992), continued their withdrawal from leading positions. While in all elections between 1996 and 2006, these two parties together had secured the majority of seats, in the 2010 election their decline started and continued in 2013. While ČSSD can still be considered a major force in the Czech party system, ODS has become only one of its ordinary members. Thirdly, ODS cannot be labelled a major right wing party anymore. For long time, the dominant position of ODS on this side of the party scene was considered granted forever, but the emergence of Tradition-Responsibility-Prosperity 09 (TOP 09)17 in 2009 started to complicate things. This development was illustrated in the 2010 election and confirmed in 2013 when TOP 09 took a leading role. Thus, the question relevant in 2014 was not to identify the strongest right wing party but to estimate whether ODS could survive as a relevant actor at all.

15 16

17

Vlastimil HAVLÍK, Vít HLOUŠEK, “Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde: The Story of the Populist Public Affairs Party in the Czech Republic”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol. 15, no. 4, 2014, p. 552-570. ANO 2011 (Action by Discontented Citizens 2011) started its history in autumn 2011 when it was founded by one of the leading Czech businessmen operating in the chemical and food industries, Andrej Babiš. The organisational structures of the movement were, however, only minimally developed during 2012 and the first half of 2013 because Mr Babiš, the head of the movement since the very beginning, concentrated his efforts on organising his weekly newspaper 5+2, and later, on investing in and buying leading quality media. This led to his occasionally-used nickname of “the Czech Berlusconi”. The activities of the movement increased prior to the 2013 early parliamentary elections. Mr Babiš succeeded in engaging some popular political as well as non-political figures to back his movement. ANO 2011 pumped lots of money into the campaign and this, together with a perfect political marketing strategy and a brief “protest” manifesto focusing on corruption, catapulted this newcomer without any previous significant political impact to the position of the second largest parliamentary club. Tradition-Responsibility-Prosperity 09 (TOP 09) was the first result of the disintegration of the Czech party system after 2009. The party was founded by several prominent former Christian Democrats (e. g. Miroslav Kalousek), but succeed in gaining popular and influential politicians and persons from other “camps”, too – the most typical example of this is current and so far the only party leader Karel Schwarzenberg, before the TOP 09 foundation associated with The Greens. An important strategic factor seems to be TOP 09’s close cooperation with a political movement called “The Mayors and Independents” that organizes successful local and regional politicians. After existing for more than 5 years, TOP 09 aspires to be leading party on the right wing of the Czech party system, where it tries to adopt moderately conservative and strongly pro-European stances.

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To sum up the context, prior to the 2014 EP election, the Czech Republic was an ideal type of country for the successful performance of Euroscepticism. Firstly, the public was quite Eurosceptical, secondly, relevant Eurosceptical parties were present (as well as new Eurosceptical parties), and thirdly, the general dissatisfaction with political life was quite high.

3. Election Campaign and Election Results There were altogether 39 lists registered for the EP election. However, from the beginning of the campaign, the strong majority of them did not stand a real chance to pass the 5 % threshold. Among these “political dwarfs”, there were traditional outsiders like the Czech Monarchists or the Right Block of former dissident Petr Cibulka, but also a colourful mix of extremist and small Eurosceptic parties as No to Brussels – National Democracy or the Party of Common Sense – Against the Euro. Taking into account only those Czech Eurosceptical parties which could dream about EP representation, the list contains only three or four names. The first of them was ODS, for a long time the second pillar of the modern Czech party system – from 1996 to 2010, every election was a competition particularly between ODS and ČSSD with no other party able to go for the first place. After the fall of Nečas’ government in 2013, ODS substantially declined and lost its leading position on the right side of the party system (and in the party system as a whole). This was not only due to the scandals of the last ODS led cabinet. The image and reputation of the party had for a long time been affected by corruption scandals of its local politicians, weak leadership and internal quarrels. Klíma argues that ODS degenerated into a new type of political party he identifies as “clientelistic party”18. In terms of ideology, ODS is usually described as a moderate conservative19 or conservative-liberal subject20. Before the 2009 EP election, ODS was a member of the European People´s Party – European Democrats (EPP-ED) political group. In 2009, it joined the new group European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) which emphasizes a soft Eurosceptical stance towards the European integration. In relation to European integration, ODS has been traditionally labelled a Eurosceptic or soft Eurosceptic party21. This evaluation was particularly caused by the opinions of former party chairman and former Czech Prime Minister Václav Klaus. Even after Mr. Klaus’ resignation as party leader in 2002 and his subsequent election as the second Czech president in 2003, Václav Klaus was still 18 19 20 21

Michal KLÍMA, “Koncept klientelistické strany. Případová studie – Česká republika”, Politologický časopis/Czech Journal of Political Science, vol. 20, no. 3, 2013, p. 215-235. Ladislav CABADA, Vít HLOUŠEK, Petr JUREK, Party Systems in East Central Europe, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2014, p. 93. Vlastimil HAVLÍK, “A breaking-up of a pro-European consensus: Attitudes of Czech political parties towards the European integration (1998–2010)”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 44, no. 2, 2011, p. 134. Tim HAUGHTON, “For Business, For Pleasure or For Necessity: The Czech Republic’s Choices for Europe”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 61, no. 8, 2009, p. 1371-1392; Sean HANLEY, The New Right in the New Europe: Czech Transformation and Right-Wing Politics, 1989-2006, Abingdon, New York, Routledge, 2008.

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influential within ODS and served as an ideal for many party politicians and members. Klaus’ Euroscepticism has been confirmed several times22, but he was not the only source of the ODS’ Euroscepticism. The majority of ODS MEPs (including their leader Jan Zahradil) and many ODS Senators had a Eurosceptic profile. Concerning concrete arguments, its Euroscepticism was always inspired by the British tradition – ODS emphasized economic arguments, criticized the further transfer of competences from nation states towards the EU etc. On the other hand, the party never contested the general principles of the European integration and never seriously considered the withdrawal of the Czech Republic from the EU. The Communist party represented the second traditional Eurosceptic party force in the Czech Republic. Its role and existence constitutes quite a unique feature of the Czech system: Neither did the Communists change their name nor did they ever fully cut themselves off from the legacy of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia. Thus, for a long time, it has been partly living on collecting protest votes and on nostalgia for the former communist regime. As such, KSČM has never joined an executive coalition since the foundation of the Czech Republic23. However, in the last years, it has participated in several regional cabinets, cooperating particularly with the ČSSD. Concerning the party´s EU profile, the Czech Communists have traditionally been criticizing the European integration from various perspectives, taking into account both political and economic shortcomings of the EU. On the other hand, the KSČM’s Euroscepticism has never been based upon any specific and original argument – for example, prior to the 2004 enlargement, the rejection of the EU membership was caused by the overall party approach towards liberal democracy and market economy rather than by a serious evaluation of the pros and cons of membership. Many party members, politicians, and supporters still harbour feelings of nostalgia for the system existing before the Velvet Revolution. As the European integration is not a part of those “dreams”, the KSČM’s Euroscepticism –based upon rather irrational and emotional arguments – follows as a rational choice of the party leaders. Within the EP, the Czech Communists were always part of the GUE-NGL party group. Besides these two traditional actors, two new Eurosceptical parties emerged prior to the election. They had the potential to win seats in the European Parliament. The first was the Dawn of Direct Democracy of Tomio Okamura (Dawn), a party founded in the beginning of 2013 by the Senator and aspiring Czech presidential candidate Tomio Okamura24. The movement was registered as late as June 2013, yet was still able to recruit supporters, leaders, and candidates for the early election in October – and competed successfully. From the very beginning, the main message of the Dawn – under whose umbrella, incidentally, some politicians of the Public Affairs Party found a new political home – was clear: Mr Okamura supported a fundamental change from representative to direct democ22

23 24

Petr KANIOK, Vít HLOUŠEK, “Shaping of Czech Debate on the Euro: Position of Václav Klaus in 1999–2002 Period”, Romanian Journal of European Affairs, vol. 14, no. 2, 2014, p. 42-62; Petr KANIOK, Vít HLOUŠEK, “Strategic or Identity-Based Euroscepticism? The Euro Discourse of Vaclav Klaus”, Romanian Journal of Political Science, vol. 14, no. 1, 2014), p. 35-60. Ladislav CABADA, Vít HLOUŠEK, Petr JUREK, Party Systems in East Central Europe, op.cit., p. 93. Petr KANIOK, Vít HLOUŠEK, “Europe and the Czech Presidential Election of January 2013”, EPERN Election Briefing, no. 72, 2013, Brighton, EPERN, Sussex European Institute, 2013.

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racy (including the popular recall of politicians at all levels of decision making) as a panacea for everything wrong with Czech politics. Below this surface, however, many extremist undertones could be heard, for example Mr Okamura´s support for the creation of “the Roma state”. All accusations of racism were fended off with a single argument: As a man of Czech-Japanese origin, Mr Okamura simply could not be a racist. Observing the positioning of Mr Okamura and his movement, one may well conclude that he was to fill the niche of the “missing” relevant party on the Czech far-right. Concerning the EU, the Dawn’s critique of the EU was actually a consequence of its general profiling quite like in the case of the KSČM. Inter alia, the Dawn has criticized the EU for the uncontrolled increase of immigration and requested a referendum in case of the further extension of EU competencies. The last Eurosceptic party that prior the EP election could have been assumed of being represented in the EP was the Party of Free Citizens (SSO). The SSO tried to address right wing Eurosceptical voters. It had originally been founded as a mainly Eurosceptical party in early 2009 by various former members of the ODS as a consequence of its then softening stance towards the Lisbon Treaty. Especially in recent years, the SSO presents itself as a liberal subject emphasizing that it is not a single issue Eurosceptical party. Therefore, the SSO often claims that its stance towards the EU is just a consequence of its general attitude on regulation and centralization. However, in the political debate, the SSO is particularly (and almost exclusively) known in the context of the European integration. The party strongly believes the EU ought to be replaced by another organization – preferably of purely intergovernmental character – and openly requests the Czech Republic to leave the EU25. Generally speaking, the 2014 EP election campaign was probably the least visible and interesting campaign in modern nation-wide elections held in the Czech Republic. This does not mean that both parties and media ignored the election. But the intensity expressed in the number of billboards, ads, meetings, TV debates, etc. was extremely weak26. Also, the quality of issues debated was very poor – one can simply sum up that statements bearing only general valence and empty slogans prevailed. Probably only people really interested in politics and in European integration and, of course, the politicians themselves, did really care. Czech Eurosceptics – particularly both traditional parties represented in Parliament – did nothing to change this picture. The ODS tried to recover after a catastrophic result at the 2013 parliamentary election. But following its manifesto, it rather competed with the SSO than with the parties in government or with its main rival TOP 09. The main issues of the ODS campaign and manifesto were the rejection of the Czech Republic entering the European Monetary Union and the criticism of the European Parliament and its dual seat. During the campaign, the party organised a petition against the euro and managed to collect more than 40 000 signatures. Ironically – and significant for the current form of the ODS –,

25 26

Petr KANIOK, “Strana svobodných občanů – čeští monotematičtí euroskeptici?”, Středoevropské politické studie, vol. 16, no. 1, 2014, p. 75-92. According Public Opinion Research Centre (CVVM) post-electoral survey more than 50% of respondents did not register the electoral campaign prior to the 2014 EP election.

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the EP can neither influence the Czech Republic’s joining of the Eurozone nor change the number of its official seats. The KSČM only pretended to run a campaign. The party did not invest much effort and money but relied on its usually much disciplined voters, i.e., it acted just like at the 2004 and 2009 EP elections. The KSČM produced a very short manifesto containing no important or substantial message. The Dawn based its campaign on very populist rhetoric and on offering simple solutions. Thus, it demanded the strengthening of Czech national sovereignty and supported a restrictive immigrant policy and the simplification of EU bureaucracy. At the same time, the party requested a referendum before the introduction of the euro and a reform of the European structural funds. The Dawn “borrowed” the well-known anti-immigration sheep poster from the Swiss People’s Party which got some media attention (even abroad). The SSO run quite a visible campaign. Its central message was the criticism of – in SSO words – “Euro-nonsenses” including not only the euro but also, for example, the regulation of light bulbs or toilet flush. The SSO’s main topic, however, was the euro. The SSO rejected its future adoption and requested to negotiate an opt-out for this duty. Table 6: Share of Domains in Czech Eurosceptical Manifestos for the 2014 EP election (%)27 ODS

KSČM

SSO

External Relations

8

19

26

Freedom and Democracy

0

15

7

Political system in general

24

3

1

Political system of the EU

12

2

27

Economy

33

29

33

Welfare and Quality of Life

7

18

5

Fabric of Society

9

7

1

Social Groups

6

5

0

Besides studying the party manifestos and their headlines, it is also interesting to evaluate them on the basis of standardized coding. Kaniok and Havlík did this on the basis of the Euro-manifestos project´s codebook for those Czech parties that were successful at the 2014 election28. Following the policy domains, Eurosceptical parties considered issues connected with economy the most important ones. However, once again it is impossible to speak about one Czech Euroscepticism, even when comparing ODS and SSO. Although competing for similar voters, both parties stressed different domains to a different extent. Compared with the pre-election polls, the results (displayed in Table 7) brought some surprising results. Firstly, polls had expected ANO 2011 to win by a larger margin than it did. Secondly, the support of TOP 09 had been estimated 27 28

Source: Kaniok, Havlík 2014. N 759 quasi-sentences. Vlastimil HAVLÍK, Petr KANIOK, “Europe” in the Czech Political Parties’ EP Manifestos 20042014: Are the Parties on the Way of Continuity and Complexity? Presentation prepared for 23rd World Congress of Political Science, Montreal, 2014.

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substantially lower than the party’s results. Thirdly, according to the polls, ČSSD as well as ANO 2011 should have received more than 20 % of the vote. Polls also underestimated the support of SSO and of the Christian Democrats. Table 7: Results of the 2014 EP Election29 Votes (%)

MEPs (+/–)

EP party group

Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO 2011)

16.13

4 (+4)

ALDE

Tradition-Responsibility-Prosperity 09 (TOP 09)

15.95

4 (+4)

EPP

Social Democrats (ČSSD)

14.17

4 (–3)

S&D

Communists (KSČM)

10.98

3 (–1)

GUE-NGL

Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL)

9.95

3 (+1)

EPP

Civic Democrats (ODS)

7.67

2 (–7)

ECR

Party of Free Citizens (SSO)

5.24

1 (+1)

EFDD

Others

19.91

–

–

Party

The election ended with a narrow victory for ANO 2011. This may lead to a twofold interpretation. Taking into account that the party was new, winning the election and acquiring four seats in the EP can be sold as big success. However, since the party had counted on triumphing with at least 7 MEPs, it was a bitter victory at the same time. TOP 09, which ended as the runner-up, can be considered the real winner of the election. The party was expected to be third at the best, acquired 4 seats in the EP, too, and was beaten by ANO 2011 only by a narrow margin. On the other hand, three MEPs elected for TOP 09 were non-partisan candidates, and one represented the movement The Mayors and Independents. This casts some doubts upon TOP 09’s personnel policy and points out an obvious shortage of its own cadres. ČSSD and its leaders probably shared the feelings of ANO 2011. Having taken into consideration the traditionally low discipline of social democratic voters and internal quarrels after the parliamentary election, 14.17 % of the vote (and four seats) can be interpreted as a success for the ČSSD. However, the same result can be very convincingly interpreted as sign of the continuous weakening of the ČSSD support. For the imagined Eurosceptic camp – note that there is none – the results must have been disappointing. The KSČM ended fourth and lost one seat – which can hardly be called a success. Only 7.7% of the voters elected the ODS. This meant that the support of the party decreased by more than 20 percentage points compared to the 2009 EP election, and the loss of 7 seats. On the other hand, after the 2013 parliamentary election, no one (including rational party politicians) had expected a substantially better outcome. Thus, the only Eurosceptical winner was the SSO with 5.24 % of the vote and one seat for Petr Mach, its party leader. The Dawn got only 3.1% of the vote and remained below the threshold. Other minor Eurosceptical parties obtained only marginal support. 29

Source: Czech Statistical Office www.volby.cz (15 March 2015).

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The first post-electoral survey conducted by CVVM in June 2014 also revealed that Eurosceptic and, generally speaking, EU related issues had not seriously affected the voters´ decision30. Only 0.4% of the respondents claimed that they participated in the election due to their low level of trust in the EU. The sum of all EU related answers reached 7.5%. When questioning why a voter had supported a particular party, only 1.1% of voters mentioned resistance towards the EU as their reason – which was the only EU related argument mentioned at all. Only 9.1% of the respondents stated that EU related issues were more salient for them than domestic ones, while 36.1% preferred domestic topics over the European ones. To sum up, these figures build a clear picture of the low saliency of EU issues for Czech citizens, at least for those who attended 2014 EP election. On the other hand, among non-voters31, more than 10% of respondents explained their non – participation in the election by their low level of trust in the EU – which was the second most frequent reason after the conviction that EP elections are not important. This could mean that there is a group of possible Eurosceptic voters or supporters among non-voters but whom the Eurosceptic political parties did not manage to mobilize. Turning back to the poor quality of the electoral campaign, this seems to be a logical conclusion.

Conclusion: Consequences of the Election for Czech Euroscepticism So far, there were three EP elections in the history of the Czech EU membership. All of them ended with the representation of Eurosceptical parties; all elections were held in quite a Eurosceptical public atmosphere since the Czech public can be considered – both in terms of specific and diffusive Euroscepticism – a Eurosceptical country. However, Euroscepticism does not seem to be a significant and important phenomenon affecting current Czech politics and the current Czech EU policy. And there is hardly any reasonable reason why its importance should change. There are several explanations and arguments for such a conclusion. First, in terms of MEPs and votes, the 2014 EP election was a catastrophe for the Czech Eurosceptical parties. Their loss of 7 MEPs completely transformed the composition of the Czech delegation in the European Parliament. Even if there is no one Czech Eurosceptical party camp (and never was), such a result and the continuous weakening of Euroscepticism (comparing all three EP elections) mean that parties betting on Eurosceptic cards can´t permanently hit the target. Reasons for that may vary across parties – the ODS is obviously paying for its mistakes in recent years concerning its domestic performance, while the KSČM is unable to attract the new generation of voters. Even if the SSO got one MEP, without being established at the national, regional, and local level this does not mean much – note NezDem’s fate: It disappeared from the party scene very quickly. Recent local elections held in October 2014 confirmed that the SSO’s electoral success at the Europeans is far from being relevant in Czech politics – the SSO got a mere 71 of more than 62 000 councillors. This is a very poor result, even if in the Czech Republic, local elections are traditionally won by lists of independent candidates 30 31

CVVM, Naše společnost 2014 – červen, http://nesstar.soc.cas.cz/webview/ (3 March 2015). In this particular survey it means respondents who did not participate in the 2014 EP election.

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and local political projects. Question marks can also be put behind the Dawn. The party associates Euroscepticism with populist, racist, and xenophobic arguments but did not manage to turn them into a representation at the EU level – that may mean that the party’s success in the 2013 national election could have happened by chance. In the local elections, the Dawn’s results were even worse than those of the SSO: It got a mere 63 councillors. Moreover, in early February 2015, a revolt started within the party when the majority of its MPs– contrary to the will of party leader Okamura – announced that they would like to establish a new party inspired by the French Front National32. To sum up, in 2014, the Czech party Euroscepticism seems to be very fragmented – like in 2004 or 2009. The latest EP election did not add any new tendencies and rather weakened it. This is probably the most important difference in comparison with the previous elections. Currently, the Czech Republic has a proEuropean government and a majority of pro-European MEPs. However, this does not mean that Czech voters are satisfied with the current EU. Just the contrary, the permanently high level of both diffusive and specific support and the low (and still decreasing) turnout at the 2014 EP election could be also interpreted as the voters´ turn to apathy and lack of interest in the EU. The obvious question is whether this state of affairs can be interpreted as a positive or a negative one. One can quite reasonably argue that for the EU and the process of the European integration, even a high level of, for example, soft Euroscepticism is better than a high level of apathy because Euroscepticism requires at least a certain amount of interest in the EU project. Apathy, on the contrary, leads to a dead end.

ON RESTE EUROSCEPTIQUE? LA RÉPUBLIQUE TCHÈQUE, L’EUROSCEPTICISME ET LES ÉLECTIONS AU PARLEMENT EUROPÉEN DE 2014 Ce chapitre décrit et analyse les partis eurosceptiques existant en Tchéquie en se concentrant pour l´essentiel sur leurs résultats à l´occasion des élections européennes de 2014. La première partie de l´article se penche sur le concept d´euroscepticisme, qui est utilisé dans cette analyse. Dans la seconde partie, nous présentons le contexte et le développement historique de l´euroscepticisme tchèque. La troisième partie aborde la campagne électorale et les résultats de l´élection européenne de 2014. En conclusion, nous examinons les implications de l´élection pour l´euroscepticisme tchèque. Les principaux résultats de l´analyse sont : a) un affaiblissement durable de l´euroscepticisme tchèque et b) sa forte fragmentation. Pour cette raison, le phénomène de l´euroscepticisme n´est pas suffisamment significatif et important pour influencer la stratégie politique ac-

32

Idnes, “Převrat proti Okamurovi. Poslanci založí stranu inspirovanou Le Penem”, (http://zpravy.idnes.cz/prevrat-proti-okamurovi-poslanci-zalozi-stranu-inspirovanou-le-pe nem-1my-/domaci.aspx?c=A150210_115324_domaci_kop#utm_source=sph.idnes&utm_ medium=richtext&utm_content=top6) (3 March 2015).

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tuelle tchèque vis-à-vis de l´Union européenne. Et il n´y a pas de raisons rationnelles que les choses changent.

BLEIBEN WIR EUROSKEPTIKER? DIE TSCHECHISCHE REPUBLIK, DER EUROSKEPTIZISMUS UND DIE EUROPAPARLAMENTSWAHLEN 2014. Dieses Kapitel beschreibt und bewertet die existierenden tschechischen euroskeptischen Parteien mit einem besonderen Schwerpunkt auf ihr Abschneiden bei den Europawahlen von 2014. Der erste Teil des Artikels konzentriert sich auf das Konzept des Euroskeptizismus, das in dieser Analyse zur Anwendung kommt. Anschließend werden der Kontext und die historische Entwicklung des tschechischen Euroskeptizismus kurz erläutert. Der dritte Teil des Kapitels befasst sich mit der Wahlkampagne und den Ergebnissen der Europawahl von 2014. Im Schlussteil werden schließlich die Implikationen der Wahl für den tschechischen Euroskeptizismus erörtert. Die Hauptergebnisse der Untersuchung sind a) die andauernde Schwächung des tschechischen Euroskeptizismus und b) der weiterhin hohe Grad seiner Fragmentierung. Deshalb scheint das Phänomen des Euroskeptizismus nicht bedeutsam und wichtig genug, um die aktuelle tschechische Politik und die aktuelle tschechische politische Strategie gegenüber der EU zu beeinflussen. Und es gibt kaum einen vernünftigen Grund warum seine Bedeutung zunehmen sollte.

ANTI-EUROPEANISM AND EUROSCEPTICISM IN SLOVAKIA PETER SPÁČ Euroscepticism as a phenomenon is visible in many member states of the European Union (EU). However, the parties labeled Anti-European or Eurosceptic differ from each other. This group includes a heterogeneous variety from extreme left formations such as the Worker’s party in Belgium to far right parties like the Greek Golden Dawn. What they have in common is their negative stance against the EU, though their goals and ambitions range from moderate to harsh, from calling for a reform of the Union to its complete dissolution. Euroscepticism had its roots in Western European countries. This is quite naturally due to the simple fact that these countries became EU members earlier than the Central and Eastern European ones. On the other hand, even the postcommunist countries and parties did not totally miss this topic. They had some reservations about the Union and found their position in these party systems. This chapter provides an analysis of the case of Slovakia.

1. History 1.1.

History and National Specifics

The example of Slovakia is of particular interest. After 1989, the country openly declared its goal to join the EU and NATO. However, in the course of the following years, the level of democracy in Slovakia started to decline. The character of the governments led by Vladimír Mečiar, head of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), was highly problematic. This held especially true for the government ruling between 1994 and 1998: It was a coalition government with the dominant HZDS and its two small coalition partners, the nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS) and the radical left Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS). The democratic deficit was more than obvious. The government gathered the dominating power in the country, minimized the influence of the parliamentary opposition and the president, misused the public media, and even broke the Constitution repeatedly1. These procedures severely damaged Slovakia`s image abroad and entailed certain consequences: In 1997, three out of four Visegrad countries were invited to join the NATO, but Slovakia was ignored. The EU acted in a similar way: It did not include Slovakia in the first wave of countries invited start negotiations about their accession. Slovakia’s poor democratic performance in the 1990s was followed by a huge polarization that divided the politics. The 1998 parliamentary election was 1

Grigorij MESEŽNIKOV, “Vnútropolitický vývoj a system politických strán”, in Martin BÚTORA and Michal IVANTYŠYN, (eds.), Slovensko 1997. Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti a trendoch na rok 1998, Bratislava, IVO, 1998, p. 19-98.

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crucial: It was about to decide not only the composition of the new government, but also the character of the political regime in general. Foreign policy, especially the integration process into EU and NATO became one of the most prominent issues of that conflict. While the government was perceived as an unacceptable partner for other countries, the main representatives of the opposition presented themselves as guarantors of the successful entry of Slovakia in both EU and NATO. Thus, the victory of the opposition in 1998 had one specific consequence. The aim to join the EU was one of the most strongly emphasized ideas of the new ruling representatives. It received a unanimously positive label. As a consequence, during the following years, nearly every relevant political party from left to right preferred a fairly optimistic stance towards the European Union. Even the HZDS officially proclaimed the Slovakia’s accession to the EU one of its goals, despite its former policy which markedly contrasted this aim. The common understanding of the whole political spectrum was clearly visible before the accession referendum in 2003: It was an indispensable necessity to join the EU. The official state campaign opted for the entry and was strongly approved by all relevant parties2. Compared to several other Central and Eastern European countries, the campaign completely lacked any polarization. The only exception was the Communist Party (KSS). Its influence on the public opinion was a very limited one, however. The party was marginal throughout the 1990s. It managed just cross the threshold and got into parliament in 2002. Its stance towards the EU was rather a mixed one, from the general approval of the entry of Slovakia to occasional comments with a more reserved stance3. But it played a rather irrelevant role. In 2006, the party dropped out of parliament again and has remained marginal to this day. To sum up this part, the political conflict of the second half of the 1990s strongly limited the chances of Eurosceptic ideas in Slovakia for nearly a whole decade. If some parties presented any signs of such appeals, they were rather about very specific issues and elaborated in a more systematic way. This fact may be illustratively presented looking at the results of the Comparative Manifesto Project (Table 1) for Slovak parliamentary parties. Until the year 2010, negative comments on EU were scarce among Slovak parties. Most of them had an entirely positive attitude towards the Union. Table 1. Positive and negative stances about European Union in the parties’ manifestos4

2 3 4

1998

2002

2006

2010

HZDS

15/0

28/0

20/0

3/0

2012 –

SDK

25/0

–

–

–

–

SDL

27/0

21/0

–

–

–

SMK

26/0

26/0

65/0

–

–

Jaromír SEDLÁR, “Slovenská republika”, in Petr FIALA and Markéta PITROVÁ, (eds.), Evropská referenda, Brno, CDK, 2005, p. 177-96. Grigorij MESEŽNIKOV, “Vnútropolitický vývoj a system politických strán”, in : Miroslav KOLLÁR, Grigorij MESEŽNIKOV, (eds.), Slovensko 2003. Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti, Bratislava, IVO, 2003, p. 19-112. Source: Comparative Manifesto Project, https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/ (15 March 2015).

ANTI-EUROPEANISM AND EUROSCEPTICISM IN SLOVAKIA

165

1998

2002

2006

2010

2012

SOP

13/0

–

–

–

–

SNS

11/1

–

16/5

18/11

4/22

SDKU

–

24/0

35/0

11/0

12/2

KDH

–

32/0

7/0

69/0

40/3

SMER

–

8/0

11/0

73/1

51/1

ANO

–

36/0

–

–

–

KSS

–

5/0

–

–

–

SaS

–

–

–

1/18

5/41

Most

–

–

–

29/1

6/0

OLaNO

–

–

–

–

4/15

Note: Only parliamentary parties included.

In the last years, the situation has changed somewhat. The debates about the financial support necessary to avoid the bankruptcy of Greece and about the creation of the EFSF had the potential for creating Eurosceptic attitudes in Slovakia. Many parties perceived the idea of helping Greece with some reservation. But only the libertarian Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) combined this issue with criticism of the whole EU and its structures. The full impact of this step became visible in 2011. Slovakia was the last country to ratify the EFSF. But in October 2011, the national parliament voted down approval for enhancing the rescue fund. The crisis had arisen in the centerright government led by Iveta Radičová. Unlike its coalition partners, the SaS rejected the whole idea of a permanent EFSF and publicly declared its MPs would not support it. Even though the Prime Minister linked this vote with a vote of confidence, the SaS group stuck to its position. As a result, the EFSF was not ratified – and the government broke up. A few days later, the remaining center-right parties found an agreement with the social democrats of SMER and ratified the EFSF5. Besides the SaS, currently, three more parties show signs of Euroscepticism in Slovakia. First, the nationalist SNS which had repeatedly been able to share government power, but dropped out of parliament in 2012. All SNS MPs refused to support the EFSF project in 2011. Secondly, the extreme right People`s Party Our Slovakia (LSNS) was established in 2010. Although without parliamentary representation, it shows potential for growth6. Thirdly, and the last to mention is the populist Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OLaNO). This party has a very specific structure: It has only four members and rather serves as a platform for independent candidates of various ideological stances. Although this party entered national parliament only in 2012, its four leaders had been elected MPs in 2010 already when they had been placed as independents on the 5 6

Miroslav KERN, “Val na druhýkrát prešiel“, SME, 14 October 2011. In 2013 the leader of LSNS was elected regional governor in one of the eight Slovak regions. He beat the SMER candidate. At that time, SMER formed both the government and the majority in parliament. See Petr VODA, Peter SPÁČ, “Just a Roma Issue? The Theory and the Support for the (Slovak) Extreme Right,” http://cenaa.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2014/ 09/Zmena-Voda-Spac-PP-full.pdf (15 March 2015).

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list of SaS. At the EFSF vote in 2011, three of these four MPs refused to support the project. At the time of the 2014 European election, only SaS and OLaNO held parliamentary seats while SNS and LSNS had non-parliamentary status. 1.2. Electoral history So far, three Europeans were held in Slovakia, namely, in 2004, 2009, and in 2014. The country uses a system of proportional representation which is very similar to the one used at national elections. Slovakia is not divided into several districts, but all seats are allocated in one single nationwide constituency. The threshold is set to five per cent thus banning the smallest parties from gaining mandates. Party lists are flexible. Voters may not only elect the party of their choice, but they may also cast up to two preferential votes. If candidates get enough preferences, they move to the top of their list and gain seats7. As Table 2 shows, a common feature of EP elections in Slovakia is the low turnout, which is substantially below the European average. So far, the country`s turnout was always less than twenty per cent. This portion is too low even for a second order election. Looking at this figure, Slovakia may be labeled the negative record holder. In 2004, 2009 and 2014, its turnout was the lowest of all member states8. This situation may possibly be attributed to a learning process: Slovak voters are not used to this type of election. However, this interpretation fails in at least two points. First, the European elections were a new mechanism in other Central and Eastern European member states, too. But their turnout was always higher than in Slovakia. Secondly, if the low turnout in Slovakia could be considered only temporary and diminishing one due to the voters’ getting used to the EP election, one would expect participation to increase not only in 2009 but also in 2014, which was not the case. Table 2. Turnout at EP elections in Slovakia9 Eligible voters Votes Turnout in %

2004

2009

2014

4,210,463

4,345,773

4,414,433

701,595

826,782

560,603

16.96

19,64

13.5

The true explanation of Slovakia`s low turnout lies more in the timing of its national electoral cycle. Since 1999, the country`s president has been elected directly, and the elections are of high importance despite the rather moderate position of the head of state. The crucial aspect is the timing. The Slovak president is elected for five years, and the terms thus correspond with the terms of the European parliament. The presidential elections are held in March or April. They only shortly precede the EP elections. The voters may feel some exhaustion, and some 7 8 9

To move to the top of the party list, candidates need to gain an amount of preferences which at least equals ten per cent of their party`s votes. Peter SPÁČ, “Slovakia: Record holder in the lowest turnout”, in: Lorenzo DEL SIO, Vincenzo EMANUELE, Nicola MAGGINI, (eds.), The European Parliament Elections of 2014, Rome, CISE, 2014, p. 243-49. Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, http://www.statistics.sk. (15 March 2015).

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of them may not be willing to go to polls twice within a couple of months. What is more, there is a sharp contrast between the campaigns for both elections. The contest for the president is a highly important competition accompanied by a long and expensive campaign. On the contrary, the campaign for the Europeans is rather downsized and starts only shortly before the actual election date. Therefore, EP elections in Slovakia remain in the shadow of the presidential competition. In the eye of the voter, this may reduce their importance even further. At the first EP election in Slovakia, the most successful parties drew level. As Table 3 shows, four parties scored between 16 and 17 per cent of the vote, thus winning three seats each. The only other remaining party able to secure mandates was the SMK, a party representing the Hungarian minority. It reached more than 13 per cent of the vote. No other formation passed the threshold. In 2009, the situation changed substantially. With nearly one third of the votes, the social democratic SMER-SD won an overwhelming victory. The parties of the center-right opposition followed behind, with SDKU-DS the most successful of them. Each of them received two seats. The remaining mandates were divided equally between LS-HZDS and the nationalist SNS, both coalition partners of the SMER-SD government led by Robert Fico at the time. Contrary to the 2004 election, Slovakia received only 13 seats at the European Parliament due to the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU. Table 3. Results of EP elections in Slovakia in 2004 and 200910 Party SDKU-DS LS-HZDS SMER-SD KDH SMK SNS SaS Other lists Total

Votes 2004

Votes 2004 (%)

Seats 2004

119,954 119,582 118,535 113,655 92,927 14,15

17,09 17,04 16,89 16,19 13,24 2,01

3 3 3 3 2 0

122,792

17,45 14

Votes 2009

Votes 2009 (%)

140 426 74 241 264 722 89 905 93 750 45 960 39 016 78 762

16,98 8,97 32,01 10,87 11,33 5,55 4,71 9,49

Seats 2009 2 1 5 2 2 1 0 13

In both elections, the highest number of seats was attributed to the European People`s Party (EPP) since it had been joined by the the main center-right parties during the previous election period. Another important share of the mandates went to the Socialists & Democrats (S&D) solely due to the electoral success of the party SMER-SD. The gains of other factions were minor at best. To sum up, in 2004 and 2009, most of the Slovak voters preferred parties with a pro-European profile. This decision was in accordance with the above mentioned development of the country`s party system. The circumstances and results of the 2014 Europeans and the role of Slovak Eurosceptic parties in this election shall be discussed in the following parts of this chapter. 10

Ibid.

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2. Campaign 2.1. Persons In Slovakia, the elections to the European Parliament are clearly perceived as second order elections. This is evident from the composition of the candidate lists. Compared with lists compiled for national elections, the candidates for the European Parliament are usually chosen from middle ranks of their parties. They belong to the party elites only occasionally. Typically, candidates are selected from the party members or the parliamentary groups. In addition, lateral entrants who are not party members are also a frequent alternative. It is important to note that party leaders in Slovakia abstain from this electoral arena. In both 2004 and 2009, no party leader competed in the EP election. This is a result of the fact that customarily, party leaders in Slovakia always head the list of candidates at national elections. They participate only rarely in other types of elections11. Another visible trend is the high rate of reselection of candidates who were successful at the previous EP election. Out of 14 Slovak MEPs elected in 2004, only two did not run again five years later. A similar picture emerged in 2014: Nine out of 13 Slovak MEPs were reselected and included in the electoral lists. Without any exception, former MEPs are placed at the top of their lists which in turn contributes to their reelection (Table 4). Table 4. Reselection of MEPs in Slovakia12 Party SDKU-DS LS-HZDS SMER-SD KDH SMK SNS Sum

MEPs in 2004

Reselected in 2009

MEPs in 2009

Reselected in 2014

3 3 3 3 2 0

3 3 2 3 1 0

2 1 5 2 2 1

1 0 5 2 0 1

12 (out of 14)

9 (out of 13)

Regarding the composition of lists at the 2014 EP election, the parties using Eurosceptic appeals only partly followed the trend of rather selecting candidates of middle ranks. Both the liberal SaS and the nationalist SNS included their party leaders on their lists. Thus, Richard Sulik, the SaS leader and a strong critic of the EU bailout mechanisms became a candidate of his party. However, he was placed third on the list. The top rank was occupied by the economist and chief of a liberal think tank Jan Oravec who headed the party list in 2009, too. The nationalist SNS also added its leader Anton Danko to the list. But his party made him the top candidate. 11 12

Among these scarce examples Jan Slota (former leader of SNS) and Robert Fico (leader of SMER) competed in presidential elections. The leader of SDKU Pavol Freso won the office of regional governor in regional election. Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, http://www.statistics.sk. (10 March 2015).

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The decision of the extreme right LSNS was rather surprising: It did not nominate its leader Marian Kotleba on its list even though he was its most popular representative by far. Since the all the other members of the party are rather unknown to the public, Kotleba’s presence on the party list of whatever election may well play a significant role due to his ability to mobilize voters. However, in 2013, the LSNS leader had competed in regional elections. He had won the office of regional governor beating the incumbent Vladimir Manka of the governing party SMER-SD. During his campaign, Kotleba had strongly criticized his rival for occupying two posts simultaneously – that of the regional governor and of an MEP13. Thus, his victory forced him to refrain from competing in the EP election. However, one may safely assume that if Kotleba had not succeed in the 2013 regional election, he would most likely have headed his party`s list at the 2014 Europeans. The last party with Eurosceptic appeals, OLaNO, chose a different approach. Due to its rather anti-party structure and virtually nonexistent membership, it composed the list from people of various cultural, educational or research institutions and organizations. However, the list was headed by the party`s vicechairman and MP Jozef Viskupic. The fourth position was occupied by Branislav Skripek, another MP. In accordance with OLaNO`s profile, the final list was composed of candidates of different ideological background. 2.2. Programs Although the EP elections belong to the less important polls in Slovakia and always end with an extremely low turnout, the relevant political parties repeatedly create specific euro-manifestos. Typically, the programmatic documents of the mainstream parties are shorter than those drawn up for national election. Their visions and goals are often quite abstract. Furthermore, several Slovak parties coordinate their euro-manifestos with the European political parties and movements into which they are integrated14. Regarding the four parties analyzed in this chapter, they presented quite different positions. The strongest stance against the EU was adopted by the extreme right LSNS. In its proclamations before the EP election, the LSNS declared that EU membership was strictly harmful for Slovakia. According to the party, the country almost completely lost its independence, sovereignty, foreign policy and its own currency. It claims Slovakia to be fully obedient to EU. With the threat of penalties, it is forced to adopt all regulations from Brussels. The LSNS insists that the EU also represents a threat to the traditional character of Slovakia by pushing the rights of homosexuals and providing support for various minorities. But even though it strongly objects the current profile of the EU, it requests neither its disbandment nor the withdrawal of Slovakia from the Union. Its central demands are the return of Slovakia to its own currency and the protection of its economy and its producers. Secondly, the EU is to introduce a strict immigration policy 13 14

LSNS`s party magazine Our Slovakia, http://www.naseslovensko.net/naseslovensko.htm. (10 March 2015). Jozef BÁTORA, “Vzniká európsky system politickej reprezentácie? Koordinácia strán SDKÚDS a Smer-SD s nadnárodnými straníckymi federáciami vo voľbách do Európskeho parlamentu”, in: Grigorij MESEžNIKOV, Oľga GYÁRFÁŠOVÁ, Miroslav KOLLÁR, (eds.), Slovensko volí. Európske a prezidentské voľby 2009, Bratislava, IVO, 2009, p. 41-54.

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and force immigrants to adopt the values of the majority. Finally, EU ought not to provide financial support to various minorities who according to LSNS abuse the welfare system at the taxpayers’ expense15. The nationalist SNS shared several points with LSNS. Its overall stance towards the EU was more moderate, however. The party has not created a specific manifesto for the EP election. Instead, it referred to its 2013 memorandum which contains the party’s basic principles concerning its relation with the European Union. According to this memorandum, the SNS supports the Slovak EU membership and also accepts the common currency. Nonetheless, the memorandum is largely critical and calls for reforms of the EU in many areas. SNS requests all EU rules and documents to be followed and their breach to be punished. More specifically, the party rejects any help for those who do not obey the rules or fake their own statistics. Even though naming no names, this is a clear reference to Greece. According to the party, the EU should not help banks and financial institutions either. SNS further demands a substantial reform of the EU bureaucracy and the separation of the EU elites from lobbyists. Like the extreme right LSNS, it calls for a strict immigration policy, protests against the idea of multiculturalism and demands immigrants to live in accordance with the values of the majority. According to the document, the SNS declared that the non-implementation of these requests shall lead to the reconsideration of its stance towards the EU, but without any specification16. The liberal SaS prepared a detailed and thorough euro-manifesto. The only relevant Slovak party elaborating the EU topic in a more systematic way, it concentrated primarily on economic issues. SaS openly appreciates Slovakia’s EU membership, and although it considers the country’s adoption of the common currency premature, it accepts the status quo. It is critical of the centralization of the EU, the high amount of regulations and decisions concerning the economic policy. According to the party, this led to a noticeable loss of competitiveness of the EU around the world. SaS strictly rejects any bailout of “irresponsible” member states as well as any attempts at tax harmonization. It calls for a reform of the EU budget, the abolition of agricultural subsidies, and the reduction of wages and social benefits of EU officials. The central topic of the manifesto is the demand for the EU to return to its roots as a decentralized structure mainly based on four basic freedoms, namely, the free movement of goods, services, people and capital17. The populist party OLaNO adopted its euro-manifesto for the EP election in 2014. Its content is quite a mix of rather ideological perspectives. Thus, it fully reflects the profile of this party. The document also clearly shows that OLaNO’s main arena is the field of domestic politics. There, the party wants to act as the voice of ordinary citizens against the corrupted elites. The euro-manifesto presents a similar attitude: The EU is labeled as a complicated structure of elites who do not have to answer to the citizens. On the other hand, there is a number of points where the EU is considered a tool to improve the quality of national (i.e. 15 16 17

LSNS`s party magazine Our Slovakia, http://www.naseslovensko.net/naseslovensko.htm. (10 March 2015). SNS Memorandum, http://www.sns.sk/engine/assets/uploads/2013/06/A4_POPRADSK %C3%89-MEMORANDUM.pdf. (10 March 2015). SaS Euromanifesto, http://www.strana-sas.sk/file/3912/program-sas-pre-volby-do-europ skeho-parlamentu.pdf. (10 March 2015).

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Slovak) politics, for example the demand to establish a European Public Prosecutor’s Office to investigate corruption connected with EU funds. Apart from this, the party presented a variety of goals in its manifesto. They include the reinforcing of the rights of EU citizens by strengthening their opportunities to file a petition or by adopting the direct election of the head of the European Commission. The party also insisted on less regulation and more liberal economic EU policy. Concerning the preservation of traditional values, the European Union should not have the final word18. To sum up this section, four Slovak parties which use Eurosceptic appeals presented different visions of the EU and the role of Slovakia within its structures. In 2014, the objectives delineated in their EP election manifestos ranged from liberal to extreme right positions. Even though these parties share some aspects of their negative stance against the Union, they differ in a huge way in respect to their ideologies and programmatic goals. 2.3. Methods The EP election campaign in Slovakia is set by law 331/2003 in the following way: The official campaign starts 21 days before the election day and lasts until 48 hours before the polling stations open. Like at national elections, to expenses of the presentation of the political parties are not limited19. The campaign is thus set as a period of nearly three weeks when the parties may present their programs and their candidates. Customarily, in Slovakia, parties do not fully respect such time constraints. They start campaigning before the official beginning. To avoid breaking the law, the parties do not formally campaign, but rather present their candidates without explicitly referring to the elections. However, this is usually not true in the case of EP election. As mentioned before, the Europeans take place shortly after the election of the Slovak head of the state. The presidential elections get much attention both of the political parties and of the public. This results in a long lasting and costly campaign of presidential candidates diminishing the attractiveness of the following EP election. The year 2014 was no exemption to this rule. The campaign for presidential election had started around spring 2013, i.e., nearly one year before the actual election date. What is more, the presidential rally witnessed several strong and popular candidates, including Prime Minister Fico. This fact severely polarized the Slovak society. Taken these circumstances together, the presidential election in 2014 massively overshadowed the EP election. Therefore, the European campaign seemed short, hardly interesting and rather calm. Looking at the parties which use Eurosceptic appeals, their stance towards the EU was quite clear from the main topics. The extreme right LSNS used the theme “For the Reform of the EU! Against the Dictate of Brussels!”, thus showing its strongly critical attitude. The nationalist SNS used the more elegant “To be Partners, not Slaves” stressing the need for the equal position of member states. The SaS liberals mobilized the public with the slogan “All for Brussels, We for You” intending to persuade the voters that SaS was the only party representing 18 19

OLaNO Euromanifesto (not available online). Law no. 331/2003 about European election, http://www.minv.sk/?volby-ep&subor=33130 (10 March 2015).

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the interests of voters while the other parties serve the needs of the EU and its structures. Finally, the party OLaNO used several topics but stressed `More Power to the Citizens of Europe` pointing at their aim to empower people to gain more control over EU representatives. Compared to the campaign before the presidential election in 2014, before the EP election, the electoral mobilization was predominantly calm and slim in respect to expenses. The parties communicated with their supporters through several channels including the media, social media, and also direct campaigning. All in all, the campaign truly fit into the time limits set by the law, objectively limiting the potential to raise the low turnout witnessed in both 2004 and 2009.

3. Results 3.1. Gains and Losses In Slovakia, the 2014 EP election was held on May 24. The first thing to note is the turnout (Table 5). In 2004 as well as in 2009, Slovakia had the lowest turnout of the member states, and the same happened in 2014. Only 13 per cent of the Slovak voters participated in the election, setting another negative record20. Compared with the previous EP elections in 2004 and 2009, the 2014 turnout decreased by nearly four and seven percentage points respectively. The main reason of this may be attributed to the presidential election held shortly before the Europeans. The presidential race usurped most of the attention of the media and public. The rally for seats in the European Parliament could not compete. It seems that the timing of these two consecutive elections diminishes the role of the EP election even more than the theory of second order elections would generally indicate. The election resulted in the clear victory of the social democratic SMER-SD, even though its margin was not as wide as in 2009. The winning party collected nearly one fourth of the votes and four out of thirteen seats. The remaining mandates were divided between seven competitors, including even non-parliamentary parties. Only one of these parties, the Christian democratic KDH, won with more than ten per cent of the vote. The KDH gained two seats, just like the more liberal SDKU-DS. All the others took one mandate. In a more general view going beyond the Slovak perspective, the most successful European group was the EPP which gained six seats. Thus, in Slovakia, the EPP remained unbeaten. It had received the biggest number of mandates in 2004, and in 2009 it had equaled with the Social Democrats (S&D). In 2014, S&D ranked second with four seats, all of them collected by the winning SMER-SD. The remaining mandates went to the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), though not directly after the elections but due to later developments.

20

Peter SPÁČ, “Slovakia: Record holder in the lowest turnout”, op.cit., p. 245; Nicola MAGGINI, “The evolution of turnout in European elections from 1979 to 2009”, in: Lorenzo DEL SIO, Vincenzo EMANUELE, Nicola MAGGINI, (eds.), The European Parliament Elections of 2014, Rome, CISE, 2014, p. 31-37.

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Table 5. Results of the 2014 EP election in Slovakia21 EP Group

Votes

Votes (%)

Seats

SMER-SD

S&D

135 089

24,1

4

– 7,9

–1

KDH SDKU-DS

EPP EPP None  ECR

74 108 43 467

13,2 7,8

2 2

+ 2,3 – 9,2

+0 +0

41 829

7,5

1

+ 7,5

+1

ECR

38 316

6,8

1

+ 6,8

+1

ALDE  ECR

37 376

6,7

1

+ 2,0

+1

36 629 32 708 20 244 9 749 91 088 560 603

6,5 5,8 3,6 1,7 16,2 100

1 1 0 0 0 13

– 4,8 + 5,8 – 1,9 + 1,7

–1 +1

Party

OLaNO NOVA, KDS,OKS SaS SMK Most SNS LSNS Other lists Total

EPP EPP EFD None

Turnout (%)

13

Votes (vs. 2009)

Seats (vs. 2009)

– 6,6

Only two of the parties analyzed in this chapter were able to retain seats. Both the liberal SaS and the populist OLaNO scored around seven per cent of the vote and received one mandate each, the former for its leader Richard Sulik the latter for its MP Richard Skripek. On the other hand, the nationalist SNS and the extreme right LSNS did not pass the five per cent threshold and remain without a parliamentary seat in the EP. For the SNS, this was a decline compared with election in 2009 when it had gained one mandate. Like OLaNO, LSNS had competed in the EP election for the first time. Its share of the vote was slightly higher than the one at the 2012national election, thus indicating a growing potential for this formation in the future. 3.2. Sociography and shift of votes This part of the text shall concentrate on the individual voters. However, concerning the 2014 EP election in Slovakia, there is an objective lack of appropriate data. The election was not followed by any exit poll to investigate the electorate of the various political parties. The original idea to compensate for this by using the results of the 2014 European Election Studies (EES) also failed. The EES survey in Slovakia was done on a sample of 1,095 respondents. Only 322 of them declared they had participated in the Europeans. Concerning the party choice, only ten respondents claimed they had cast a vote for SaS, nine for OLaNO, and seven for SNS. LSNS was not even specified as an individual option and was added to

21

Source: Statistical Office of Slovakia, http://www.statistics.sk. (10 March 2010).

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the “other” category. Taking this into account, we must admit that the results of ESS do not permit a serious analysis22. The results of European Social Survey (ESS) will be used as a partial and imperfect backup plan. However, it will only show the socio-demographics of the parties’ electorates, while the shift of voters for the EP election will remain unknown. Although the technique of ecological inference could be used here, the extremely small numbers of votes cast for the respective parties would make its results rather unreliable. Even the ESS data does not fully support our ambitions. Here, too, the problems with the number of respondents partly remain. To minimize these problems, the data for the most recent (sixth) round of ESS (2012) will be used only for OLaNO, while the calculations for SaS will be done on the basis of round five (2010) and for SNS from round four (2008). The party LSNS must stay out of this analysis since its supporters were added to the category “other” parties. There is no possibility to separate them in the ESS data matrix. Thus the focus will be placed primarily on SNS, SaS and OLaNO. The analysis of the electorate will be done by using binomial logistic regression with the dependent variable mapping whether the respondent voted for the respective party or not. The group of independent variables consists of basic socio-demographic features i.e. age, sex, education, income, religion. The models also include the position on the left-right scale and opinions towards homosexuals, immigrants and the European Parliament. Table 6. Electorate of the analyzed parties in Slovakia23 SNS

SaS

OLaNO

Exp(B)

S.E.

Exp(B)

S.E.

Exp(B)

S.E.

2,116* 1,837 1,242

,428 ,381 ,374

3,255** 2,825** 1,310

,433 ,415 ,444

1,794 1,193 1,157

,455 ,399 ,393

1,571 ,483**

,347 ,269

,418** ,763

,295 ,280

,911 1,029

,342 ,288

1,448 1,480 1,017

,534 ,515 ,606

,748 ,940 ,886

,639 ,594 ,637

1,785 6,579* 8,622*

1,093 1,034 1,058

1,496 ,722

,310 ,425

12,65*** 16,193**

,739 ,752

1,355 1,651

,371 ,381

Age 30 and less 31 – 45 46 – 59 60 and more (ref.) Religion Woman Education Elementary (ref.) Lower secondary Upper secondary University Left-right position Left (ref.) Center Right 22 23

European Election Studies 2014, http://eeshomepage.net/voter-study-2014/ (10 March 2015). Source of data: European Social Survey, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ (10 March 2015).

ANTI-EUROPEANISM AND EUROSCEPTICISM IN SLOVAKIA SNS

Trust in the EP Low (ref.) Middle High Homosexuals Negative (ref.) Neutral Positive Immigrants Negative (ref.) Neutral Positive Constant Nagelkerke R Square

175 SaS

OLaNO

Exp(B)

S.E.

Exp(B) *

S.E.

Exp(B)

S.E.

,646 ,515*

,315 ,360

,772 ,539

,317 ,378

,659 ,741

,319 ,422

,873 1,348

,369 ,319

1,826 3,082**

,465 ,416

1,280 ,798

,352 ,360

1,105 1,031 ,049

,326 ,480 ,710

2,148 2,813* ,004

,466 ,550 1,081

1,637 1,189 ,007

,338 ,514 1,115

,750

,268

,089

Table 6 shows the results of the analysis. The outcomes indicate several differences among the political parties in question. In the case of the SNS, few features were found to be statistically significant. Among younger people, the probability of voting for this party was higher. As generally observable with far right-wing parties, the SNS was more often supported by men. Not surprisingly, its support was lower among voters whose attitude towards the European Parliament was rather positive. The results for SaS provide much more significant features. Younger people and people who do not belong to any religion are clearly more likely to cast their vote for this party. There is also a clear prevalence of persons who place themselves in the center or on the right of the ideological left-right axis. From the beginning of its existence, SaS has presented itself as a post-materialist party supporting the rights of minorities. Its electorate shares theses values. Voters with a positive stance towards homosexuals and immigrants were more likely to vote for this party. With respect to OLaNO, the findings of the analysis were scarce. The only significant values were connected with the left-right position. According to these results, the party may expect a bigger share of votes from people leaning to the right, though not to the same extent as the SaS. The fact that none of the remaining factors could be considered significant is consistent with the nature of the party, namely, to serve as a platform for independent candidates of various ideological backgrounds. It seems that the party’s diverse personal offer leads to the mobilization of various societal groups without a substantial concentration only on particular segments. Considering the electorate of the extreme right LSNS which could not be added to the analysis, we are only able to refer to results based on aggregated data. In their study, Spáč and Voda found that the party scores better in areas

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with a higher share of Roma population, and also in the less developed regions of the country24. However, the lack of individual data prevents us from making any statements on this level. To sum up, the results of our analysis showed that Slovak parties that use Eurosceptic appeals differ concerning the profile of their electorate. The findings about the voters are generally in accordance with the parties’ profiles. However, it has to be taken into account that the data used for the calculations were not connected to the 2014 EP election. They monitored the parties’ voters several years ago. On the other hand, these parties have not gone through major modifications of their character. This fact ought to support the reliability of our outcomes.

4. Criticism of Europe The stances towards the EU vary greatly among the analyzed Slovak political parties. In sum, none of these parties strove for the complete disbandment of the European Union nor for Slovakia to withdraw from the EU. Concerning the common currency, the liberal SaS criticized the decision of Slovakia to adopt the Euro as premature. However, it accepts the status quo and does request a change. Among the four Slovak parties, only the extreme right LSNS stresses the necessity for Slovakia to return to its previous currency and leave the Eurozone. As Table 7 shows, the Slovak parties using some form of Euroscepticism stay behind their counterparts in several other European countries who pursue far more extensive goals. Table 7. Position of the analyzed Slovak parties towards the EU25 SaS

OLaNO

SNS

LSNS

Slovakia to give up EUR

No

No

No

Yes

Slovakia to withdraw from the EU

No

No

No

No

disbandment of the EU

No

No

No

No

On the other hand, the universal absence of calls for the disbandment of the EU or Slovakia’s withdrawal from its structures does not mean that these parties harbor positive feelings about the current EU. Their stance may be labeled reserved at best. All of them agree that the concept of European integration has gone too far and that change is necessary. Their priorities vary, however. According to SaS, the EU should return to its roots as a predominantly economic structure according to the four basic freedoms on which it was built. This aim is considered a road to reduce the amount of bureaucracy. It corresponds with the liberal or libertarian vision of the party. The EU is considered a solid ba-

24 25

Peter SPÁČ, Petr VODA, “Slovak Extreme Right and its Support based on Local Roma Incidence”, paper presented at ECPR General Conference in Glasgow 2014, http://ecpr.eu/ Filestore/PaperProposal/18868690-676e-48c3-9dda-700b77f4e3c1.pdf. (10 March 2015). Source: Party documents and manifestos.

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sis enabling European countries to enhance their economies. But it is endangered by the overdose of regulations coming from Brussels. Two far right parties, the SNS and LSNS, also disapprove of the current status quo and reject any further centralization of the EU. Although they do not demand the disbandment of the Union, they both label it as a potential threat to the Christian values of both Europe and Slovakia. In the light of the development in Western Europe, they both demand a stricter immigration policy in order to prevent the rise of multiculturalism. Finally, the party OLaNO points to the EU as a structure allowing the elites to make decisions without the appropriate control by the citizens or by their elected representatives. It demands reforms to close this gap and strengthen the position of ordinary people vis-à-vis the political actors. To conclude, the agenda of Slovak parties that use some form of Eurosceptic appeals is rather moderate. In respect to SaS and OLaNO, these parties may be labeled as soft-liners: They criticize the existing status quo but do not question the EU itself and its existence. Although they call for moderate to thorough reforms of the EU, their goals are in full accordance with democratic values including the rule of law, pluralism or the protection of minorities. In the case of the SNS, this is only partially valid because the party requests a strict immigration policy that could also have an impact on people already living in the EU. If any one of the four parties analyzed in this chapter were to be labeled a potential hardliner, it would be the extreme right LSNS. Its stance towards the EU is strictly negative, though until now it has not officially called for Slovakia to withdraw from its structures. However, it has to be noted that LSNS represents a new and still marginal player in Slovakia, primarily concentrating on domestic politics with the priority given to ethnic minorities. Therefore, we may possibly expect that with the rising influence of the party, its stance towards the EU will develop and become more radical to the extent typical for several other extreme right parties in Europe. The crisis in the Ukraine may accelerate this development. While most Slovak mainstream parties – including the ones analyzed in this chapter – adopted a rather neutral position or blamed Russia, the LSNS took a different line. In January 2014, the leader of LSNS, Marian Kotleba, sent a letter to Viktor Yanukovych. In this letter, he expressed his sympathy with Yanukovych and accused both EU and NATO of being aggressors aiming to overpower Ukraine and thus weaken Russia. He labeled the Ukrainian demonstrators “terrorists” and warned that accepting their requirements would further imperil the future of Slavic nations in Europe. At the end of the letter, he also mentioned the “Serbian national hero Slobodan Milosevic”26. This letter manifests the great differences of the analyzed parties’ international cooperation. After entering the European Parliament, SNS, OLaNO and SaS were able to join one of the groups operating in this arena. Not surprisingly, they chose to cooperate with parties with a more reserved stance towards the EU, the EFD and ECR respectively. In the case of SaS, this pathway was not a direct one. After the 2014 EP election, the only MEP and party leader Richard Sulik at first joined the ranks of the liberal ALDE group. However, his critical view of the 26

Kotleba`s letter to Viktor Yanukovych, http://www.naseslovensko.net/dokumenty/list _ukrajina.pdf. (10 March 2015);

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EU induced him to leave ALDE and join the more conservative ECR. Despite all of this, it is noteworthy that SNS, OLaNO and SaS are able to cooperate with parties from various member states in the EP arena. In the case of LSNS, this option remains an open one since the party has not gained any EP seats yet. However, this extreme right party frequently stresses its Slavic nature, and the above mentioned letter only confirmed this attitude. It may well be expected that the party is open to cooperation not just with other extreme right parties from EU states, but also with similarly oriented parties outside the Union, typically from Eastern Europe and the Balkans. However, as long as LSNS remains without an EP seat, this assumption remains a hypothetical one.

Conclusion The political development of Slovakia since 1989 has substantially influenced the possibilities for Eurosceptic parties. The conflict resulting in the victory of the opposition at the 1998national election added a strong symbolic meaning to the country’s efforts to accede to the EU. As a consequence, for the following decade, nearly all relevant political parties shared a rather positive stance towards the EU. The most recent years have witnessed some increase of Euroscepticism in Slovakia. However, the influence of the respective parties has remained fairly limited. The chapter identified four parties in current Slovak politics that use certain Anti-EU appeals. Their ideological positions differ strongly since this group includes the liberal or even libertarian SaS, the populist OLaNO, the nationalist SNS and extreme right LSNS. This diversity is reflected in the way these parties operate with criticism of the EU. SaS points to the EU as bureaucratic machinery weakening free trade in Europe. It demands a thorough reform with the objective of a simple liberal concept. OLaNO presents itself as the representative of ordinary citizens against the elites. It proposes changes meant to reduce the gap between the people and the Brussels elite. The two far right parties, SNS and LSNS, concentrate heavily on immigration policies and insist on stricter rules to prevent the flow of people with different cultures into the EU. These parties also differ concerning the degree of their use of Eurosceptic appeals. Among them, only SaS elaborated a rather systematic approach. Since the eruption of the world financial crisis and the issue of Greece, it has paid careful attention to the situation within the EU. This does not apply to the remaining three parties. They concentrate heavily on national politics. The stance towards the EU is of secondary importance for them. Thus, even though the LSNS applies the harshest position against the EU, its primary agenda by far is the Roma minority in Slovakia. This topic serves as a mobilizing tool for the party’s voters. The 2014 EP election has shown that the environment for the Eurosceptic parties in Slovakia may become more positive, even though their results may not be labeled a success. Only two out of the four were able to gain a seat, while the far right formations stayed well below the threshold. As in 2004 and 2009, the parties belonging to the two biggest EP groups, i.e., EPP and S&D, dominated the election and received the majority of Slovak seats. Thus, it may be concluded that although there are some signals indicating a rising potential for Euroscepticism

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in Slovakia, the parties with a more positive attitude towards the EU without any doubt still hold the upper hand.

ANTI-EUROPÉISME ET EUROSCEPTICISME EN SLOVAQUIE Ce chapitre analyse les positions des partis eurosceptiques en Slovaquie. En ce domaine, le pays a connu une évolution intéressante. A l´occasion des élections décisives de 1998, l´adhésion à l´UE a joué un rôle moral symbolique. Ce faisant, toute perspective de développement d´un euroscepticisme s´en trouvait efficacement limité pour presque une décennie. Ces dernières années, la situation a changé. Dans le pays, plusieurs partis sont apparus avec des positions essentiellement ou totalement hostiles à l´Europe. Ce texte identifie quatre de ces groupes avec des positions politiques allant de l´extrême-droite aux libertaires. Même s´ils n´appartiennent pas aux partis les plus forts du système politique de la Slovaquie, leur soutien dans l´opinion publique n´est pas marginal. Les élections européennes de 2014 montre que l´environnement politique pour les partis eurosceptiques pourrait devenir plus ouvert et plus favorable. D´un autre côté ces partis sont encore loin d´être une réelle menace pour les partis politiques établis, qui sont favorables à l´UE et actifs dans les structures partisanes européennes.

ANTI-EUROPÄISMUS UND EUROSKEPTIZISMUS IN DER SLOWAKEI Dieses Kapitel analysiert die Position der euroskeptischen Parteien in der Slowakei. Auf diesem Gebiet hat das Land eine interessante Entwicklung durchlaufen. Bei der entscheidenden Parlamentswahl von 1998 war der EU-Mitgliedschaft die Rolle eines moralischen Symbols zugefallen. Damit war jede Aussicht auf die Entwicklung von Euroskeptizismus in der Slowakei für fast eine ganze Dekade wirksam begrenzt. In den letzten Jahren hat sich die Situation verändert. Im Land sind mehrere Parteien mit einer überwiegend oder völlig negativen Haltung gegenüber der EU entstanden. Dieser Text identifiziert vier solcher Gruppierungen, deren ideologische Positionen von libertär bis rechtsextrem reichen. Wenngleich sie nicht zu den stärksten Parteien im slowakischen Parteiensystem gehören, ist ihre öffentliche Unterstützung auch nicht marginal. Die Europawahlen von 2014 zeigten, dass das politische Umfeld für euroskeptische Parteien in der Slowakei freundlicher und aufgeschlossener werden könnte. Andererseits sind diese Parteien weit davon entfernt, eine ernsthafte Bedrohung für die etablierten politischen Parteien darzustellen, welche der EU positiv gegenüber stehen und in die europäischen Parteistrukturen eingebunden sind.

DER PARTEIPOLITISCHE EUROSKEPTIZISMUS DER GEGENWART UND DER LETZTEN JAHRE IN UNGARN PETER CSINGAR Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich anlässlich der Europawahlen 2014 mit den Europäischen Union (EU)-skeptischen politischen Parteien in Ungarn, allen voran mit der Bewegung für ein besseres Ungarn (Jobbik). Der Fokus liegt zwar auf der Gegenwart, es ist jedoch äußerst sinnvoll, einen mehr als kurzen Blick auf die Entwicklung der letzten Jahre seit den ersten Europawahlen in Ungarn zu werfen. Denn in der Zeit von 2004 bis 2014 vollzog sich eine wesentliche Entwicklung in der ungarischen Parteienlandschaft. Formal markieren sowohl das Jahr 2004 als auch 2014 wichtige politische Ereignisse. Zum einen ist Ungarn zum 01.05.2004 Mitglied der EU geworden und hielt zum ersten Mal in seiner Geschichte Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament ab. Der Beitritt zur Europäischen Union – wie auch zur NATO – war nahezu konsensueller politischer Wille seit der Systemtransformation, von den bedeutenden politischen Kräften war einzig die MIÉP (Ungarische Lebens- und Wahrheitspartei1) des mittlerweile verstorbenen István Csurka von Anfang an skeptisch bis ablehnend gegenüber einer Mitgliedschaft. Da aber diese Partei schon 2002 den Wiedereinzug in das Parlament nicht schaffte und davor auch nur knapp die 5%-Sperrklausel überspringen konnte, kann sie nicht als Träger einer wirklichen Meinungsmacht in Sachen EU-Gegnerschaft zu dieser Zeit betrachtet werden. Die Heilserwartungen gegenüber einer Mitgliedschaft waren in der Bevölkerung relativ tief verankert, in der am 12.04.2003 abgehaltenen Volksabstimmung zum Beitritt stimmten 83.8% bei einer Wahlbeteiligung von 45,6% der Wahlberechtigten für den Beitritt2. Die Bevölkerung erwartete einen Anstieg und Angleichung des Wohlstandsniveaus an die westlichen Nachbarstaaten, diese Erwartungen wurden vom politischen und medialen Establishment unterstützt bzw. gezielt geschürt. In den ersten Wahlen zum Europaparlament am 13.06.2004 nahmen noch 38.5% der Wahlberechtigten teil. Vergleichsweise sei hier erwähnt, dass die Wahlbeteiligung beispielsweise in Deutschland bei 43%, in Frankreich bei

1

2

Siehe zur Partei auf Deutsch, Andreas BOCK, „Ungarn: Die ‘Wahrheits- und Lebenspartei’ zwischen Ethnozentrismus und Rassismus“, Osteuropa, 52, 2002, 3, p. 280-292; Melani BARLAI, Florian HARTLEB, “Länderportrait: Ungarn”, in: Uwe BACKES, Eckhard JESSE (eds.), Jahrbuch für Extremismus und Demokratie, vol. 20, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2009, p. 218-221. Alle amtlichen Wahlergebnisse seit 1990 (Parlamentswahlen, Kommunalwahlen, EP-Wahlen, Volksabstimmungen) sind auf der Website (www.valasztas.hu) des Nationalwahlamtes [Nemzeti Választási Iroda] frei zugänglich – in englischer Sprache ab dem Referendum 1997. Alle Daten zu den Wahlergebnissen wurden von dort entnommen – zu der Volksabstimmung: http://valasztas.hu/nepszav03/outroot/hu/10_0.html (9. Februar 2015).

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42.76%, in Spanien bei 45.1% und in Polen bei 20.87% lag3. Die Wahlberechtigten votierten zu dieser Zeit ganz überwiegend für politische Parteien, die das europäische Projekt bejahten. Die national-konservative FIDESZ bekam 47.70% der Stimmen (12 Mandate), die ebenfalls konservative MDF 5.33% (1 Mandat), während auf die Sozialisten, MSZP, 34.30% (9 Mandate) und die Liberalen, SZDSZ, 7.74% (2 Mandate) entfielen. Die oben erwähnte EU-skeptische MIÈP erhielt lediglich 2.35% der Stimmen und konnte damit aufgrund der 5% Sperrklausel keinen Abgeordneten in das Europaparlament entsenden. Der Beginn der EU-Mitgliedschaft am 1. Mai 2004 stellt sich aber aus einer zehn Jahre später eingenommen Perspektive gewissermaßen auch als der Anfang einer Entfremdung dar, denn in den drei Wahlen 2014 (Parlamentswahlen, Wahlen zum EU-Parlament, Gemeinderatswahlen) kann in Ungarn augenscheinlich keine Rede mehr von einem Konsens sein, welcher die Mitgliedschaft in der EU oder die EU an und für sich zumindest relativ vorbehaltlos bejahen würde. Auf der einen Seite nimmt mittlerweile eine maßgebliche Partei EU-skeptische Positionen ein, die offen auch die Möglichkeit eines Austritts beinhalten, auf der anderen Seite haben sich die Erwartungen gegenüber der Europäischen Union in der Bevölkerung nicht erfüllt, im Gegenteil, sie sind sogar in Ablehnung umgeschlagen: Die EU und Brüssel werden mittlerweile zum Teil als eine fremde Kolonialmacht betrachtet, welche das politische und gesellschaftliche Geschehen in Ungarn zu bestimmen trachtet. Mit dem Wandel in der Beurteilung der Europäischen Union seitens maßgeblicher gesellschaftlicher und politischer Kräfte geht das Erstarken des Rechtsradikalismus in Ungarn einher. Dieser ist zur wesentlichen politischen Kraft aufgestiegen, die Bewegung für ein besseres Ungarn (Jobbik)4 wurde in den Parlamentswahlen 2014 die drittstärkste politische Kraft hinter dem Parteibündnis FIDESZ-KDNP und MSZP. Bei den knapp zwei Monate später abgehaltenen

3

4

Die Daten der Wahlbeteiligung in anderen Ländern stammen von der Website des Europaparlaments: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/default.htm. http://valasztas.hu/nepszav03/out root/hu/10_0.html (9. Februar 2015). Der Durchschnitt lag zwar bei 45.47%, diese Zahl ist aber insoweit verzerrt, als in Belgien eine Wahlpflicht besteht, mithin regelmäßig Ergebnisse um die 90% zustande kommen. Über Einordnung und Charakterisierung der Jobbik als extremistisch, rechtradikal, rechtspopulistisch wird hier aus Platzgründen und aufgrund der Schwerpunktsetzung auf Euroskeptizismus verzichtet. Siehe zu den verschiedenen Aspekten dieser Auseinandersetzung: András BÍRÓ NAGY, Dániel RÓNA, „Tudatos radikalizmus. A Jobbik útja a parlamentbe, 20032010“, in: András LÁNCZI (ed.), Nemzet és radikalizmus. Egy új pártcsalád felemelkedése, Budapest, Századvég, 2011, p. 242-283. József BAYER, „Rechtspopulismus und Rechtsextremismus in der ungarischen Politik“, Studies in political science Working Papers, 3, 2013: 1, p. 37-53; Karácsony GERGELY, Dániel RÓNA, „A Jobbik titka. A szelsőjobb magyarországi megerősödésének lehetséges okairól“, Politikatudományi Szemle, 19, 2010:1, p. 31-63; Jamie BARTLETT et al., Populism in Europe: Hungary, London, Demos, 2012, p. 23-29; Melani BARLAI, Florian HARTLEB, „Extremismus in Ungarn“, in: Eckhard JESSE, Tom THIEME (eds.), Extremismus in den EU-Staaten, Wiesbaden, VS, 2011, p. 414-428; Gábor FILIPPOV, „A név kötelez. A szélsőjobb kutatásának terminológiai problémái“, Politikatudományi Szemle, 20, 2010: 3, p. 133-153; Erin K. JENNE, Cas MUDDE, „Hungary´s illiberal turn. Can Outsiders help?“, Journal of Democracy, 23, 2012, p. 147155; Péter CSINGÁR, „Konsolidierung oder Radikalisierung? Die Geschichte der Jobbik als neue politische Kraft“, Donau Institut Working Paper, 28, 2014, p. 1-23.

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Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament überholte sie sogar die Sozialisten, in den letzten Umfragen5 rangierte sie ebenfalls als zweitstärkste politische Kraft. An den Wahlen zum Europaparlament in 2009 nahmen noch etwa 36.31% der Wahlberechtigten teil, also 2% weniger als fünf Jahre zuvor. Dieses Jahr war aber der Durchbruch für die Bewegung für ein besseres Ungarn (Jobbik), welche aus dem Stand heraus 14.77% (3 Mandate) der Stimmen errang, ohne zuvor auch nur im ungarischen Parlament vertreten gewesen zu sein. Damit landete sie zwar weit hinter der FIDESZ, 56.36% (14 Mandate), aber nur knapp hinter der sozialistischen Partei MSZP, 17,37% (4 Mandate), hingegen schon vor der ehemals größten an der Systemtransformation beteiligten, nun auf 5.31% (1 Mandat) zusammengeschrumpften konservativen MDF. An den Wahlen zum Europaparlament am 25.05.2014 nahmen lediglich 28.97 % teil, die Wahlbeteiligung ist also um ca. 10% im Vergleich zu 2004 gesunken und erreichte damit den tiefsten Stand seit dem Beitritt zur Europäischen Union6. In Deutschland lag die Teilnahme währenddessen bei 48%, in Frankreich bei 42.43%, in Spanien bei 43.81% und in Polen bei 23.84%7. Eine viel bedeutendere Veränderung ist jedoch die Verteilung der Wählerstimmen auf die Parteien. Auf das national-konservative Parteienbündnis FIDESZ-KDNP entfielen 51.48% (12 Mandate), auf die rechtsradikale Jobbik 14.67% (3 Mandate) der Stimmen, während die Sozialisten MSZP 10.90% (2 Mandate), die sozialliberale DK (Demokratische Koalition) des ehemaligen Ministerpräsidenten Ferenc Gyurcsány 9.75% (2 Mandate), das ebenfalls sozialliberale Együtt – PM (Gemeinsam – Dialog für Ungarn) Parteibündnis 7.25% (1 Mandat) und die bürgerlich-grüne LMP (Politik kann anders sein) 5.04% (1 Mandat) der Stimmen erhielten8. Zehn Jahre nach dem EU-Beitritt hat sich in Ungarn die Parteienlandschaft dahingehend verändert, dass mittlerweile die zweitstärkste politische Kraft, die Jobbik, eine konsequent und radikal EU-skeptische programmatische Linie vertritt, die bei Erfüllung gewisser Bedingungen (s.u.) bis zum EU-Austritt reicht. Während die Parteien, die noch weniger Stimmen als die Jobbik erhielten, ausnahmslos für die weitere europäische Integration sind, ergibt sich bei der Regierungspartei FIDESZ ein zwiespältiges Bild. Zwar bekennt sich der gegenwärtige Ministerpräsident und Parteivorsitzende Orbán wiederholt zur Europäischen Union, andererseits erreicht seine Kritik mitunter eine Intensität, dass beispielsweise Taggart und Szcerbiak9 FIDESZ als eine weiche euroskeptische Partei einordnen, während der ungarische Forscher Dúró diese als eine europafreundliche qualifiziert10. Ohne Zweifel ist jedoch Jobbik und nicht FIDESZ der politische Träger der stärksten euroskeptischen Programmatik in Ungarn. Diese war in Grundzügen 5 6 7 8 9 10

Siehe beispielsweise die letzten Datenerhebungen in der Zeit 1-7.02.2015 von dem renommierten Markt- und Meinungsforschungsinstitut Ipsos, Tovább gyengült a Fidesz, csúcson a Jobbik, http://ipsos.hu/hu/news/tovabb-gyengult-fidesz-csucson-jobbik (2. Februar 2015). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/de/country-results-hu-2014.html (15. Februar 2015). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/de/turnout.html (15. Februar 2015). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/de/country-results-hu-2014.html (15. Februar 2015). Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCERBIAK, „Introduction: Opposing Europe? The Politics of Euroscepticism in Europe“, in: Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCERBIAK, (eds.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politic of Euroscepticism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 12. Dúró JÓZSEF, „Euroszkepticizmus ma“, Politikatudományi Szemle, 19, 2010:4, p. 56.

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schon 2004 vorhanden, kam jedoch bei den Wahlen zum Europaparlament 2009 zur vollen Entfaltung. Mit dem Wahlprogramm und Wahlslogan „Ungarn gehört den Ungarn“11 gelang der Partei, die zuvor nicht einmal im ungarischen Parlament vertreten war, der Durchbruch. Fünf Jahre später, also 2014, konnte sie zwar ihr Ergebnis nicht verbessern, sondern ihre Wähler allenfalls halten. Als politischen Stillstand kann man diese Zeit für die Jobbik dennoch nicht bezeichnen, denn einerseits ist sie mit demselben Ergebnis vor den Sozialisten gelandet und entwickelte sich somit zur zweitstärksten politische Kraft. Darüber hinaus ist es auch maßgeblich auf die enorme programmatische Wirkung der Jobbik zurückzuführen, dass sich auch bei der konservativen Regierungspartei FIDESZ die euroskeptische Linie bemerkenswert verstärkte. Zwar werden bei den Europaparlamentswahlen traditionellerweise innenpolitisch relevante Sachverhalte thematisiert, der Wahlslogan der FIDESZ bei den Europawahlen 2014, Üzenjünk Brüsszelnek: Tiszteletet a magyaroknak! (Botschaft an Brüssel: Respekt gegenüber den Ungarn!), setzte dennoch unüberhörbar auf eine euroskeptische Stimmung und war an Intensität mit dem der Jobbik, Nemzetek Europáját! Egy nagy szuperhatalom helyett nemzetek közötti együttműködést! (Ein Europa der Nationen! Statt einer Supermacht Zusammenarbeit unter den Nationen!), vergleichbar. Um die Wurzeln, Entwicklung und Wirkung des Euroskeptizismus in Ungarn auf der parteipolitischen Ebene zu verstehen, ist es deswegen notwendig, sich mit der Bewegung für ein besseres Ungarn (Jobbik) eingehender zu beschäftigen. Diese wird parallel zu der Wahlkampagne zu den Europaparlamentswahlen 2014 und zum Teil 2009 dargestellt. Sodann wird die europarelevante Programmatik der Partei vertieft und klassifiziert und anschließend eine Schlussfolgerung gezogen.

1. Die Europarlamentswahlen 2014 im Lichte der Parlamentswahlen Die Besonderheit der Europawahl am 25.05.2014 lag zunächst darin, dass sie das erste Mal seit Ungarns Beitritt zur Europäischen Union nicht nur im selben Jahr, sondern zeitlich auch sehr nah zu den Parlamentswahlen am 06.04.2014 lag. Der Umstand, dass zwischen den Wahlen nicht einmal zwei Monate lagen, zwang die Parteien im Grunde zu einer zeitlich lang gestreckten Wahlkampagne, die für eine eigenständige Thematisierung der Europawahlen teilweise sogar förderlich war. Er zwang die Parteien darüber hinaus bei der Verwendung ihrer Ressourcen zu neuen taktischen Überlegungen, denn aufgrund der vorrangigen Bedeutung der Parlamentswahlen und des engen zeitlichen Zusammenhanges kam die Europawahl jedenfalls nicht mehr als eine Protestwahl gegen die aktuelle Regierung in Betracht, in die man entsprechend investieren sollte, um die eigene politische Kraft aufzuzeigen. Dementsprechend ist es sinnvoll, diese letzten Europawahlen im Lichte der Parlamentswahlen zu untersuchen. 11

Magyarország a magyaroké! A Jobbik programja a magyar érdek védelmében, a Nemzetek Európája megteremtéséért (Ungarn gehört den Ungarn! Das Programm der Jobbik zum Schutz des ungarischen Interesses und für die Erschaffung von einem Europa der Nationen): Das Wahlprogramm der Jobbik zu den EP-Wahlen 2009 ist auf 56 Seiten zusammengefasst und abrufbar als PDF-Datei von der Website der Partei: http://jobbik.hu/rovatok/egyeb/letoltheto_ a_jobbik_ep-valasztasi_programja (10. Februar 2015).

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Es ist hinreichend bekannt, dass sich in Ungarn bereits bei den Parlamentswahlen 2010 die politischen Verhältnisse grundlegend verändert haben12. Das FIDESZ-KDNP Parteibündnis errang 52,73% der Stimmen und kam damit infolge des dem deutschen Wahlverfahren im Grundsatz ähnlichen ungarischen personalisierten Verhältniswahlrechts zu einer Zweidrittelmehrheit (68% der Parlamentssitze), während die MSZP auf 19,30% zurückfiel. Die an der Transformation 1989/1990 entscheidend beteiligten SZDSZ und MDF meisterten die 5% Hürde nicht und verschwanden rasch in der Bedeutungslosigkeit. Neu ins Parlament gewählt wurden zwei Protestparteien unterschiedlicher Provenienz: die „Alternativen“ LMP (Politik kann anders sein)13 mit 7,48 % und die sich selbst als nationalradikal bezeichnende JOBBIK mit 16,67% der Stimmen. Zwei Jahrzehnte nach der Systemtransformation markierte solch eine Neuordnung der Parteienlandschaft eine Zäsur14. Für die neue Ära im Parteigeschehen stehen neben der qualifizierten Mehrheit der Koalition insbesondere die zwei neuen, ins Parlament gewählten Parteien. Für die parteipolitischen Machtverhältnisse 2014 war die Frage entscheidend, ob die 2010 erfolgten Veränderungen sich stabilisieren würden oder es nochmal zu einer grundlegenden Veränderung kommen könnte. Das war insbesondere deshalb interessant, weil in der Regierungszeit 2010 – 2014 die regierende FIDESZ-KDNP Koalition mit Viktor Orbán an der Spitze eine verfassungsrechtliche, wirtschaftspolitische und gesellschaftliche Veränderung in Ungarn lostrat, die im Rahmen einer funktionierenden demokratischen Staatlichkeit ihresgleichen sucht. Mit der Interpretation der Zweidrittelmehrheit als „Revolution an den Wahlurnen“ schickte sich die Regierung an, im Eiltempo und unter erheblicher Dauerkritik seitens der Institutionen der Europäischen Union und der inländischen Opposition eine völlig neue Verfassung mit bedeutenden Änderungen zu der bisherigen zu erlassen, eine komplett neue Mediengesetzgebung zu erschaffen, das gesamte Schulsystem zu verstaatlichen und zu zentralisieren15 und wirtschaftliche Teilnehmer – dies betraf vor allem ausländische Investoren – mit einer Sondersteuer zu belegen. Außerordentlich bedeutend waren auch die Veränderung des Wahlsystems von dem zwei Runden-System zu einer einzigen Runde bei Verstärkung des Prinzips der Mehrheitswahl, die sogenannte „doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft“ für die Auslandsungarn in den Nachbarstaaten, die für mehr als hunderttausend ethnische Auslandsungarn in kurzer Zeit die Staatsbürgerschaft und infolgedessen das Wahlrecht16 bedeutete. Die Zahl der Parla12 13

14

15 16

Siehe die Wahlergebnisse auf der Website der Nemzeti Választási Iroda: http://valasztas.hu/ hu/parval2010/ 354/354_0_ index.html (10. Februar 2015). Lehet más a politika: Eine kurze Darstellung der Partei findet sich bei Zoltán KISZELLY, „Laboratorium der Politik. Ungarns Parteien und ihre Wählen“, Osteuropa, 61, 2011:12, p. 169-170. Hervorgehoben werden dort vor allem die ökologisch-liberale Ausrichtung der Partei und ihr Eintreten für Frauenrechte. Attila JUHÁSZ, „A Jobbik politikájának szerepe a pártrendszer változásában – különös tekintettel a cigánybűnözés-kampányra“, in: Péter SÁNDOR, László VASS, (eds.), Magyarország Politikai Évkönyve 2009-ről. Kormányzat, Közpolitika, Közélet, Budapest, DKMKA, 2010, p. 61 stellt diese Zäsur schon für das Jahr 2009 fest. Die EP-Wahlen hätten schon deutlich die Neuordnung und den Rechtsruck der Parteilandschaft gezeigt (FIDESZ errang dreimal so viele Stimmen wie die regierende MSZP; Jobbik lag dicht hinter MSZP). Zuvor fielen die Verwaltung und Finanzierung der Schulen in die Zuständigkeit der Gemeinden. Über 95% wählten dann auch 2014 das FIDESZ-KDNP Parteibündnis – Website des Nationalwahlamtes: http://valasztas.hu//hu/ogyv2014/861/861_0_index.html (12. Februar 2015).

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mentssitze wurden nahezu halbiert von 386 auf 200. Hergeleitet wurde diese vor allem auf die Idee der nationalen Interessen und Souveränität aufbauende Politik als Gegenentwurf zu einem weltweit und insbesondere in Ungarn für gescheitert erklärten sozialliberalen Gesellschaftsentwurf. Die Regierungskoalition hat ihre Wahlkampagne im Grunde genommen auf die Person von Orbán zugeschnitten – der den Umfragen zufolge der beliebteste Kandidat unter allen Ministerpräsidentschaftskandidaten war17 – und auf die sogenannte Nebenkostenabsenkung (rezsicsökkentés)18. Letzteres war eine staatlich Maßnahme – ein Eingriff in die Energiepreisbildung –, die darin bestand, die Nebenkosten für alle Haushalte per Gesetz um ca. 10% zu reduzieren. Die Maßnahme brachte nicht nur eine unmittelbar sichtbare Kostenreduzierung für die Haushalte, sondern passte organisch zur Idee der Vorrangigkeit der nationalen Interessen, indem verbreitet wurde, dass die Höhe der Absenkung ein „Extraprofit“ der multinationalen Versorgungsunternehmen seien und man notfalls diese Maßnahme auch gegenüber Brüssel verteidigen werde. Zur „plebejischen Absicherung“ dieser Maßnahme haben die Regierungsparteien vorsorglich ca. 2.2 Millionen Unterstützerunterschriften gesammelt19. Die Regierungskoalition war sich ihres Sieges so sicher, dass sie es nicht für notwendig erachtet hatte, dass Orbán an einem klassischen TV-Duell teilnahm mit der Begründung, es gäbe keine wahre Herausforderer, und die Opposition sei zu schwach20. Die maßgeblichen Wahlslogans auf Plakaten waren „Ungarns Leistung ist besser geworden“, „Nur die FIDESZ“, „In der Einheit liegt die Kraft“ und „Ungarns Ministerpräsident“ mit dem Bild von Orbán21. Die Botschaft des „Weiter so“ war so stark, dass die FIDESZ sogar auf ein offizielles, schriftliches Wahlprogramm verzichtete. Die Parlamentswahlen 2014 zeigten, dass die gesellschaftliche Unterstützung für die Regierungskoalition infolge der angesprochenen Veränderungen nicht erheblich abnahm. Im neuen Wahlsystem gewann das FIDESZ-KDNP Parteibündnis mit 44.87% – es hat auch die allermeisten Wahlkreise direkt gewonnen – erneut die Zwei-Drittel-Mehrheit der Parlamentssitze22. Die Kampagne der Jobbik verfolgte eine Deradikalisierungs- und Normalisierungsstrategie, während sie noch ihre bahnbrechenden Erfolge in den Europaparlamentswahlen 2009 und Parlamentswahlen 2010 ihrer radikalen Strategie verdankt hatten. Sie thematisierte und dominierte die Öffentlichkeit mit den bis dato als „verschwiegen“ apostrophierten und „unter den Teppich gekehrten“ Themen wie der „Zigeunerkriminalität“ und der „Politikerkriminalität“. Die

17 18 19 20 21 22

Siehe zum Beispiel die Datenerhebungen von Median: http://www.median.hu/object.d30af 761-8a4d-46b6-a13c-e030e1ce7ab4.ivy (17. Februar 2015). Dávid KISS, Márton GRÓCZ, “Egység és stabilitás. A Fidesz-KDNP országgyűlési választási kampánya”, in Orsolya SZOMSZÉD, (ed.), Választás 2014. Kampány, közvélemény, új szabályok, Budapest, Nézőpont Intézet, 2014, p. 9-10. Ibid., p. 9. Ibid., p. 8. Ibid., p. 9. Eine gewisse Abnahme der Unterstützung ist jedoch ohne Zweifel zu verzeichnen. Während 2010 noch ca. 2.7 Millionen Wähler für die FIDESZ-KDNP stimmten, waren es diesmal lediglich 2.2. Millionen – das entspricht einem Verlust von ca. einem Fünftel der Wählerschaft. Siehe dazu die Wahldaten aus 2010 und 2014 auf der Website vom Nationalwahlamt: http://valasztas.hu/hu/parval2010/354/354_0_index.html (15. Februar 2015); http://valasz tas.hu//hu/ogyv2014/861/861_0_index.html (15. Februar 2015).

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2009 verbotene und mit Jobbik aufs Engste verbundene Ungarische Garde23 war durch ihre Aufmärsche in Dörfern mit einem hohen Bevölkerungsanteil von Roma auch ein besonders wirksamer Träger dieser Radikalität. In der Legislaturperiode 2010-2014 nahm jedoch die nach außen getragene Radikalität der Partei schrittweise ab, denn die auf Protest aufgebaute Wachstumsmöglichkeit der Partei durch Eliten- und Zigeunerfeindlichkeit sprachen zwar in Ungarn eine mehr als marginale Wählerschicht an, die Jahre nach den Wahlerfolgen 2009/2010 zeigten jedoch, dass die Wachstumspotenziale durch diese Strategie bereits weitgehend ausgereizt waren – die Partei konnte keine Wähler dazu gewinnen. Um für eine breitere Wählerschicht attraktiver zu werden hat sich die Partei ab Herbst 2013 für einen Deradikalisierungskurs in ihrer Sprache und Kommunikation entschieden und programmatisch den Schwerpunkt ihrer Politik merklich in Richtung der Lösung wirtschaftlicher Probleme verschoben (Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen)24. Die Bemühungen der Partei hatten den Zweck, sich glaubhaft regierungsfähig und regierungsbereit zu zeigen. Laut Parteichef Vona wolle man eine Wende hin zur Volkspartei vollziehen, indem man die Außendarstellung der Partei für eine größere Mehrheit annehmbarer macht, die programmatische Radikalität indes beibehält25. Das offizielle Parteiprogramm zu den Parlamentswahlen Kimondjuk. Megoldjuk (Wir sprechen es aus. Wir lösen es) widmete sich überwiegend – auf ca. 40 von 85 Seiten – wirtschaftlichen Sachverhalten und setzte auf staatliche Intervention und Lenkung gestützte Wirtschaftspolitik. In der Wahlkampagne bemühte sich die Jobbik im Sinne ihrer Deradikalisierungsstrategie um eine teilweise apolitische, sog. „Niedlichkeits-Kampagne“ in der der Parteichef Gábor Vona beispielsweise lächelnd kleine Katzen und Hunde streichelte26. Die Video-Wahlkampagne mit dem Titel „Die Zukunft kann man nicht aufhalten“27 ist ausschließlich mit positiven Nachrichten, mit lächelnden und lebensfreudigen Menschen besetzt, die ihre Erwartungen gegenüber der Zukunft ausdrücken. Darüber hinaus drangen auch die anfänglichen Kernthemen wie „Zigeunerkriminalität“ hier und da durch. Vor allem aber die öffentliche Selbstdarstellung der Partei, sich gegenüber den politischen Eliten als die einzige „reine Kraft“ auszuzeichnen, die seit der Systemtransformation nicht an der Regierung war, blieb 23 24

25

26 27

Zu den Gründen des Verbots mit Verweisen auf die Verbotsurteile, siehe Péter CSINGÁR, „Konsolidierung oder Radikalisierung? Die Geschichte der Jobbik als neue politische Kraft“, opc.cit., p. 8-12. „Hét Vezér Terve“ (Plan der sieben Fürsten). Die Partei wollte zunächst beispielsweise als konkrete Maßnahmen den Bergbau reaktivieren und ca. 5 Wasserkraftwerke bauen. Man erhofft sich davon ca. 100 000 neue Arbeitsplätze. Das kündigte Parteichef Vona bereits in einer Fernsehsendung über die Pläne der Partei am 28.02.2013 an: Parlament TV, “Vona Gábor a Parlament TV B+C műsorában”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GV1uBFCtXmk (21 Februar 2015). Ein ausführliches Interview über die neue Strategie der Jobbik mit Parteichef Vona findet sich auf dem größten Nachrichtenportal Ungarns, Origo, Tanítani fogják a Jobbik stílusváltását – Interjú Vona Gáborral (Der Stilwechsel von Jobbik wird einmal Unterrichtsstoff – Interview mit Gábor Vona http://www.origo.hu/valasztas2014/20140403-valasztas-2014-interju-vona-gaborral-a-jobbik-elnokevel.html (17 Februar 2015). Orsolya SZOMSZÉD, „Az üvegplafonon túl? A Jobbik országgyűlési választási kampánya“, in: Orsolya SZOMSZÉD, (ed.), Választás 2014. Kampány, közvélemény, új szabályok, Budapest, Nézőpont Intézet, 2014, p. 28-29. „A jövőt nem lehet megállítani – Jobbik“, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NsGMV uzvJiI (2. Februar 2015).

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weiterhin gut sichtbar. Diese Linie wurde sehr medienwirksam vom Parteichef Vona verstärkt, indem er landesweit regelmäßig im Rahmen einer „Verkleidungsaktion“ einen Tag z.B. als Kellner oder im Museum arbeitete.28 Damit wollte man die Volksnähe der Partei in Abgrenzung zu den anderen demonstrieren. Bei den Parlamentswahlen landete die Jobbik schließlich mit 20.22% auf dem dritten Platz. Die linken und liberalen Parteien waren zwar zersplittert, aber durch ein temporäres, nur für die Wahlen gegründetes Bündnis aus mehreren Parteien – MSZP-EGYÜTT-DK-PM-MLP – erreichten sie ein Ergebnis von 25.57%. Die Jobbik konnte sowohl im Vergleich zu den Europaparlamentswahlen 2009 (14,67%) als auch im Vergleich zu den letzten Parlamentswahlen 2010 (16.67%) ihren Wähleranteil steigern und kam das erste Mal auf über eine Million Wähler (FIDESZ-KDNP wurde von ca. 2.2 Millionen Wahlberechtigten gewählt). Das neue Wahlrecht ermöglichte es dem FIDESZ-KDNP Parteibündnis, wieder eine Regierung zu stellen, die auf eine Zwei-Drittel-Mehrheit – die Mehrheit hing genau an einem Parlamentssitz – im Parlament zurückgreifen konnte. Für die Bewegung für ein besseres Ungarn (Jobbik) ging es realistischerweise bei der nächsten, auf die Parlamentswahlen folgende Europawahl am 25. Mai 2014 innenpolitisch darum zu zeigen, ob sie sich hinter dem regierenden Parteibündnis als zweite politische Kraft etablieren können würde. Da bei den Parlamentswahlen zuvor die stärkste oppositionelle linke Partei, die sozialistische MSZP, in einem Parteibündnis antrat, das sich jedoch zu den Europawahlen 2014 wieder auflöste, war die Frage umso dringender, ob in Ungarn tatsächlich der Fall eintreten könnte, dass hinter einer rechtskonservativen Regierung die größte Oppositionskraft zum ersten Mal nach der Systemtransformation von rechts und nicht von links kommen würde. Wie schon erwähnt, war der Wahlkampf zur Europawahl 2014 gewissermaßen die Fortsetzung der Parlamentswahlen. Da die Wahlen zeitlich so eng aufeinander folgten, ergab sich thematisch die Besonderheit, dass die Europawahl als Protestwahl gegen die Regierung – wie es bis dato mitten in der Legislaturperiode üblich war – nicht in Frage kam. Es tat sich vielmehr ein Raum auf, indem genuin europarelevante Fragen thematisiert werden konnten. Während die Regierungsparteien die Wahlen – wie schon die Parlamentswahlen – ohne ausgearbeitetes Parteiprogramm, sondern mit einer der Europäischen Union gegenüber kritisch eingestellten Kampagne unter dem Motto „Botschaft an Brüssel: Respekt gegenüber den Ungarn!“ angingen, legte die Jobbik ein relativ detailliertes Programm vor, dessen Elemente auch in die Kampagne einflossen. Das Programm mit dem Namen „Europa der Nationen. Das Programm der Jobbik für die ungarische Selbstbestimmung und für den gesellschaftlichen Aufstieg“29 fasste in elf Kapiteln auf 48 Seiten die Vorstellungen der Partei über Europa und die EU zusammen. Wie schon der Titel des Programms erahnen lässt, geht es um das grundlegende Verhältnis der nationalen Selbstbestimmung zu den Kompetenzen der Europäischen Union. Spitzenkandidat war dieses Mal, wie auch bei den letzten 28 29

Orsolya SZOMSZÉD, „Az üvegplafonon túl? A Jobbik országgyűlési választási kampánya“, op.cit., p. 29. Jobbik, Nemzetek Europája. A Jobbik programja a magyar önrendelkezésért és a társadalmi felemelkedésért, http://jobbik.hu/sites/default/files/cikkcsatolmany/ep_program_a5_jav.pdf (15. Januar 2015). Das gesamte Programm ist in Form einer PDF-Datei auf der Website erreichbar.

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Wahlen, die parteiexterne Krisztina Morvai. Der größeren Öffentlichkeit wurde die Juristin und Strafrechts-Dozentin der Eötvös Lóránd Universität Budapest (ELTE)30 bei den Unruhen im Herbst 2006 unter der Gyurcsány-Regierung bekannt. Morvai geißelte lautstark die massiven polizeilichen Übergriffe auf die nach der sogenannten „Lügenrede von Öszöd“ des damaligen Ministerpräsidenten Gyurcsány ausgebrochenen, zum Teil gewaltsamen Demonstrationen. Die Annäherung zwischen Jobbik und der Juristin erfolgte schon zu dieser Zeit, denn viele Jobbik-Sympathisanten waren nicht nur mit den heftigen Demonstrationen gegen die Regierung einverstanden, sondern nahmen auch aktiv an diesen teil. Obwohl Morvai kein Parteiamt übernahm und nicht einmal in die Partei eintrat, stimmten ihr politisches Credo und ihre Themenwahl („Zigeunerkriminalität“, „Politikerkriminalität“, Euroskeptizismus) mit denjenigen der Jobbik überein. Ihr Name war bis zu den Europawahlen 2009 mit der Jobbik so eng zusammengewachsen, dass es nicht überraschte, dass die Partei sie als Spitzenkandidatin für diese Wahl nominiert hatte – zumal sie zuvor jahrelang als Juristin (Frauenrechtlerin) für die UN und Mitte der 1990-er Jahre für die damalige Europäische Kommission für Menschenrechte gearbeitet hatte, also auch eine gewisse Erfahrung und Kompetenz in internationalen Organisationen nachweisen konnte. In ihrem Programm vertrat die Jobbik im Allgemeinen eine ihre ursprüngliche Programmatik fortsetzende EU-kritische Linie, die Spitzenkandidatin Morvai identifizierte in ihrer Einleitung die EU „zurzeit“ als eine Wertordnung „des Großkapitals, der multinationalen Unternehmen und der Banken“31, welche „immer größere Stücke aus der Selbstbestimmung der Nationen und Mitgliedstaaten herausschneiden will und sich in die Richtung der Vereinigten Staaten von Europa bewegt“32. Über den allgemeineren Gegensatz der Selbstbestimmung-Fremdbestimmung hinaus hat die Partei vor allem das Eigentum am Ackerboden thematisiert. Sie hält dieses für die „Existenzbedingung des physischen und ethnischen Erhalts des Ungarntums“33 und sieht diese durch das europäische Recht gefährdet, denn nach diesem kann das Eigentum am Ackerboden nicht an Nationalität oder Staatsbürgerschaft gekoppelt werden. Da das europäische Recht dem mitgliedschaftlichen Recht gegenüber Vorrang genießt, könnte „Ungarn seine historische Verfassung in Bezug auf den Ackerboden nicht durchsetzen“34, diese politische Unterwerfung und koloniale Auslieferung müsse beseitigt werden35. Gelänge das nicht, könnte der Ackerboden nur um den Preis des Austritts aus der EU in ungarischer Hand gehalten werden36. Als konkretes – EU-kritisches – Thema wurde in der Kampagne auch die Erstellung einer wirtschaftlichen Kosten-Nutzen Rechnung gefordert, da die Partei Zweifel daran hegt, ob in einer wirtschaftlichen Gesamtbetrachtung die Vorteile des Beitritts für Ungarn die Nachteile überwiegen37. Abschließend wird festgehalten, dass man 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37

Eine Biographie in englischer Sprache ist erreichbar auf der Website des Europäischen Parlaments: http://www.europarl. europa.eu/meps/en/96661/KRISZTINA_MORVAI_cv.html (10. Januar 2015). „Europa der Nationen. Das Programm der Jobbik für die ungarische Selbstbestimmung und für den gesellschaftlichen Aufstieg“, p. 4. (Übersetzung des Verfassers). Ibid. Ibid., p. 31. Ibid., p. 32. Ibid. Ibid., p. 34. Ibid., p. 37.

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im Falle einer weiteren Integration und „Imperiumsbildung“38 der Europäischen Union – der Vertrag von Lissabon wird wegen mangelnder demokratischer Legitimation vehement abgelehnt39 – und falls der ungarische Ackerboden gegenüber Brüssel nicht verteidigt werden könne, im Rahmen einer Volksabstimmung die Frage stellen müsse, ob Ungarn nicht aus der Union austreten wolle40. Wie eingangs dargestellt, bekam die Jobbik 14.67% der Wählerstimmen bei einem historischen Tiefstand der Wahlbeteiligung von 28.97%. Sie landete damit vor der linken MSZP und untermauerte knapp zwei Monate nach den Parlamentswahlen den Umstand, dass sie innenpolitisch zur zweitstärksten Kraft aufgestiegen ist. Wer aber wählt die Jobbik? Bei den Wahlen 2009 und 2010 hatte Jobbik die stärkste Unterstützung im Nordosten von Ungarn, und zwar genau dort, wo die Sozialisten (MSZP) zuvor geradezu übermächtig waren41. Im Wahljahr 2014 konnte diese Basis gehalten und darüber hinaus neue Wähler im Westen des Landes gewonnen werden.42 Schon bei den Datenerhebungen rund um die Wahlen 2009 und 2010 stach hervor, dass die Unterstützung der Jobbik unter den unter 35-Jährigen überproportional hoch war – nach FIDESZ die zweitbeliebteste Partei43 – und unter den Studierenden vermutlich schon damals am meisten verbreitet. Dem entsprachen auch das Selbstbild und ein Teil der Wahlkampagne der Partei, die suggerierten, dass man unter den Jugendlichen bereits die beliebteste Partei sei44. Nach den neuesten Datenerhebungen liegt die Partei inzwischen unter den unter 30-Jährigen, den Arbeitslosen und den ausgebildeten Arbeitern vor der FIDESZ45. Bei der älteren Generation, insbesondere bei den Rentnern liegt die Partei hingegen deutlich sowohl hinter der FIDESZ als auch der MSZP46. Überrepräsentiert sind zudem Menschen mit Abitur, Kleinstadtbewohner und Männer47, unterrepräsentiert sind Personen ohne jeglichen Schulabschluss48. Interessant ist auch, dass die Einkommens- und Wohlstandsverhältnisse der Jobbik-Wähler im Vergleich zu

38 39 40 41

42 43

44 45 46 47 48

Ibid., p. 47. Ibid., p. 6-18. Ibid., p. 47. Zsolt ENYEDI, Zoltán FÁBIÁN, Róbert TARDOS, „Pártok és szavazók. 2002-2014“, in: Kolosi TAMÁS, István György TÓTH, (eds.), Társadalmi Riport 2014, Budepest, Tárki, 2014, p. 541; Zoltán KISZELLY, „Laboratorium der Politik. Ungarns Parteien und ihre Wählen“, op.cit., p.173. Anderen Datenerhebungen zufolge hat die Jobbik 2010 51% ihrer Wähler von der FIDESZ-KDNP 2006, 19% von dem ehemaligen MIÈP-Jobbik Bündnis und ca. 33% von der MSZP rekrutiert, siehe dazu András TÓTH, István GRAJCZJÁR, „Válság, radikalizálódás és az újjászületés ígérete: a Jobbik útja a parlamentbe“, in: Zsolt ENYEDI, Andrea SZABÓ, Róbert TARDOS, (eds.), Új képlet. Választások Magyarországon, 2010, Budapest, DKMKA, 2011, p. 72. Zsolt ENYEDI, Zoltán FÁBIÁN, Róbert TARDOS, „Pártok és szavazók. 2002-2014“, op.cit., p. 541. Zoltán KISZELLY, „Laboratorium der Politik. Ungarns Parteien und ihre Wählen“, op.cit., p. 173; Eine tiefgehende Analyse über die Gründe findet sich bei Dániel RÓNA, Anett SŐRÉS, „A kuruc.info nemzedék. Miért népszerű a Jobbik a fiatalok között?“, in: Andrea SZABÓ (ed.), Racionálisan lázadó hallgatók 2012. Apátia – Radikalizmus – Posztmaterializmus a magyar egyetetmisták és főiskolások körében I, Szeged, Belvedere, 2012, p. 144. Orsolya SZOMSZÉD, „Az üvegplafonon túl? A Jobbik országgyűlési választási kampánya“, op.cit., p.27. http://ipsos.hu/hu/news/tovabb-gyengult-fidesz-csucson-jobbik (2. Februar 2015). Ibid. Tamás RUDAS, „Jobbik törzsszavazóiról“, in: Kolosi TAMÁS, István György TÓTH, (eds.), Társadalmi riport 2010, Budapest, DKMKA, 2010, Vgl. insgesamt die Tabellen 8-16. Zsolt ENYEDI, Zoltán FÁBIÁN, Róbert TARDOS, „Pártok és szavazók. 2002-2014“, op.cit., p. 541.

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anderen Parteien leicht überdurchschnittlich sind49. Frühere Vermutungen, wonach die Wählerschaft der Jobbik eine Mischung aus sogenannten Verlierern (der Systemtransformation)50, bildungsfernen Schichten und Protestwählern sei, haben sich nicht bestätigt.

2. Der parteipolitische Euroskeptizismus der Jobbik In einem neulich erschienen Aufsatz behauptet Várnagy, dass mit dem Einzug der Jobbik ins Parlament der harte Euroskeptizismus in Ungarn verstärkt wurde51. Über die Klassifizierung und Bedeutung von parteipolitischem Euroskeptizismus gibt es in der Forschungsliteratur verschiedene Ansätze. Nach einer Herangehensweise werden die politischen Parteien in harte und weiche Euroskeptiker aufgeteilt52. Die harten unterscheiden sich dadurch von den weichen Euroskeptikern, dass sie die EU und diese als gemeinsames Projekt aus prinzipiellen Überlegungen verwerfen. In der Konsequenz befürworten diese Parteien den Austritt aus der Europäischen Union oder lehnen zumindest eine weitere Vertiefung der europäischen Integration ab. Demgegenüber kritisieren die weichen euroskeptischen Parteien lediglich einzelne Politiken der EU. Nach einer anderen Ansicht53 wird der Euroskeptizismus zunächst als ein Verhältnis zu den wesentlichen Ideen der Integration der Europäischen Union aufgefasst, dieses kann dann als „europhil“ oder „europhob“ betrachtet werden. Der zweiten Unterteilung wird die Beurteilung der Partei zur zukünftigen Entwicklung der EU zugrunde gelegt, diese kann „EU-optimistisch“ oder „EUpessimistisch“ ausfallen54. Aus der Zusammenschau dieser Einteilung ergibt sich dann eine Typologie von vier verschiedenen Möglichkeiten55: Diejenigen, die gleichzeitig europhil und EU-optimistisch sind, werden als Euroenthusiasts, die europhoben EU-Optimisten als Europragmatics, die europhilen EU-Pessimisten als Eurosceptics und schließlich die europhoben EU-Pessimisten als Eurorejects bezeichnet. Mit welcher Typologie kann die Jobbik am besten erfasst werden? Wenn man die Entwicklung der Partei von ihrer Gründung bis zur Gegenwart beobachtet, ist auf der programmatischen Ebene und an der Darstellung nach außen eine Deradikalisierung zu beobachten. Im Gründungsdokument der Partei aus dem Jahr 200356 wird eine Mitgliedschaft in der EU noch kompromisslos abgelehnt. Es 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

Tamás RUDAS, „Jobbik törzsszavazóiról“, op.cit., p.517. Diese Datenerhebungen beziehen sich auf 2010, wurden aber durch die Datenerhebungen in 2014 im Wesentlichen bestätigt: Zsolt ENYEDI, Zoltán FÁBIÁN, Róbert TARDOS, „Pártok és szavazók. 2002-2014“, op.cit., p. 537, 546. András TÓTH, István GRAJCZJÁR, „Válság, radikalizálódás és az újjászületés ígérete: a Jobbik útja a parlamentbe“, op;cit., p. 68. Réka VÁRNAGY, „Hungary“, in: Nicó CONTI (ed.), Party Attitudes Towards the EU in the Member States, London, New York, Routledge, 2014, p. 174. Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCERBIAK, „Introduction: Opposing Europe? The Politics of Euroscepticism in Europe“, op.cit., p. 7-8. Petr KOPECKÝ, Cas MUDDE, „The two sides of Euroscepticism. Party Positions in European Integration in East Central Europe“, European Union Politics, 3, 2002:3, p.300. Ibid., p. 302. Ibid., p. 303. Jobbik, Alapító Nyilatkozat (Jobbik, Gründungsmanifest), http://jobbik.hu/jobbikrol/alapitonyilatkozat (9. Januar 2015). (Übersetzung des Verfassers)

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heißt dort: „Eine Unionsmitgliedschaft, die mit einer fatalen Verstümmelung unserer nationalen Unabhängigkeit einhergeht, ist für uns nicht akzeptabel!“57. Ein Jahr darauf boykottiert die Partei ihre Teilnahme an den Wahlen zum Europaparlament. Ihr Programm zu den Parlamentswahlen 2006 malt ein düsteres, einer Kolonialmacht ähnliches Bild der EU58. befürwortet aber eine wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit. Der Austritt kommt hier als eine gewünschte, jedoch schon an eine Volksabstimmung gekoppelte Option in Betracht: Wenn „die wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen, sowie die sich vermutlich verändernden regionalen und internationalen Umstände es zulassen, möchten wir mittels Volksabstimmung den Austritt des Landes aus der EU erreichen“59. Im Programm von 2009 „Ungarn gehört den Ungarn“ setzt sich die Partei unter dem Punkt: „Es gibt eine Alternative“60, ausführlich mit der Europäischen Union als Integrationsprojekt in einem ähnlich scharfen ablehnenden Grundton wie oben auseinander. So heißt es etwa, dass die EU „ein bürokratisches, antidemokratisches, von Korruption durchdrungenes, neoliberale Prinzipien durchsetzendes und über den Staaten stehendes Gebilde ist.“61 In Einzelheiten stechen aber programmatische Veränderungen ins Auge, die wohl auch dem Umstand geschuldet sind, dass die Partei im Begriff war, an den Europäischen Parlamentswahlen teilzunehmen und dementsprechend nicht mit einem Programm der „Totalverweigerung“ antreten konnte. So wird unter anderem eine Agenda dessen skizziert, was in der EU zu tun sei62; Als wichtigster Punkt wird die lautstarke Vertretung der Minderheitenrechte der Ungarn in den Nachbarstaaten auf europäischer Ebene unter Herausarbeitung einer gesamtungarischen Nationalstrategie aufgeführt63. Eine Deradikalisierung tritt auch in Bezug auf die Frage des Austritts ein. Hier setzt sich insoweit ein pragmatischer Gesichtspunkt durch, als nun die „Rückeroberung der nationalen Souveränität primär durch die Veränderung der gegenwärtigen Regelungen der Union zu erreichen ist, und wenn dies nicht funktioniert, dann als letztmögliche Lösung sogar mittels Austritt“64. 57 58

59 60 61 62 63 64

Ibid. Jobbik, Független állam, élhető ország, büszke nemzet. A Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom rövid programja (Unabhängiger Staat, lebenswertes Land, stolze Nation. Das kurze Programm der Bewegung für ein besseres Ungarn), http://nezopontintezet.hu/files/2012/03/F%C3% BCggetlen-%C3%A1llam-%C3%A9lhet%C5%91-orsz%C3%A1g-b%C3%BCszke-nemzet-2006. pdf (9. Januar 2015). „Im Zuge des Beitritts am 01.05.2004 ist Ungarn unter Aufgabe seiner nationalen Selbstbestimmung und unter der Annahme von ungünstigen Bedingungen Teil jener Europäischen Union geworden, deren Machthaber das Wohlstandsniveau der Neuankömmlinge nicht angleichen wollen, sondern ihre Einflussgebiete ausdehnend, die abgewerteten natürlichen und humanen Ressourcen dieser Region für die globale Wirtschaft gebrauchen wollen. Wir lehnen die von den Parteien zur Annahme empfohlene Unionsverfassung ab, weil diese Ungarn als selbstständigen Staat abschafft! Zur wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit sagen wir ja, zur politischen Union, dem zentralisierten und bürokratischen Staatenbund, sagen wir nein.“ (S. 2, eigene Übersetzung) http://nezopontintezet.hu/files/2012/03/F%C3%BCggetlen-%C3%A1llam-%C3%A9lhet% C5%91-orsz%C3%A1g-b%C3%BCszke-nemzet-2006.pdf. (2. Februar 2015) (Übersetzung des Verfassers). http://jobbik.hu/rovatok/egyeb/letoltheto_a_jobbik_ep-valasztasi_programja, p. 18 (2. Februar 2015), Übersetzung des Verfassers). Ibid. Ibid., p. 22. Ibid. Ibid., p. 24.

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Im längsten Programm65 der Jobbik – zu den Parlamentswahlen 2010 „Radikale Veränderung“ – etabliert sich schließlich eine pragmatische Linie, die Brüssel-Agenda wird hier weiter durchdekliniert, z.B. die Programme zur Transparenz und Korruptionskontrolle der Projekt-Finanzierung und EU-Beihilfen, zum Schutz des ungarischen Bodens und der Minderheiten, sowie zur Wiedervereinigung der ungarischen Nation im Rahmen der Union66. Vom Austritt aus der Union ist in einer abgeschwächten Form die Rede, dann nämlich, wenn sich die EU weiterhin in Richtung „Imperiumsbildung“ entwickelt: Dann „muss sich unser Vaterland überlegen, […] ob es aus dieser Gemeinschaft austritt“67. Anstatt eines vollkommen düsteren Bildes der Union wird hier ein eigenes Konzept skizziert, das „Europa der Nationen“, dessen zentrale Forderung in der Schwächung des Gemeinschaftsrechts und der Rückdelegierung von Gesetzgebungskompetenzen an die Mitgliedstaaten besteht. Das nächste ausführliche Programm „Wir sprechen es aus. Wir lösen es.“ zu den Parlamentswahlen 2014 wiederholt im Wesentlichen den europarelevanten Teil des vorherigen Programms. Das Programm trägt den Namen des Konzeptes von 2010, „Europa der Nation“ und hat an konkreten Programmelementen wenig Neues zu bieten, vielmehr werden die bisher genannten Punkte lediglich teils wiederholt, teils marginal weiterentwickelt. Interessanterweise wird explizit auf Orbáns EU-Politik Bezug genommen und dieser vorgehalten, sie würde lediglich nur starke nationale Interessenvertretung kommunizieren, tatsächlich erfülle sie hingegen bedingungslos die Forderungen aus Brüssel68. Ziemlich vertieft wird im Programm – knapp die Hälfte – die parteiperspektivische Analyse der Union unter Darlegung ihrer gesamten historischen Entwicklung von der Gründung bis zur Gegenwart. Der Tenor dieser Bewertung ist, dass sich die Union von einer ursprünglich sinnvollen wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit souveräner Staaten zu den „Vereinigten Staaten von Europa“ entwickelt hätte, welche als „Imperium“ das Konzept der Nationalstaaten aufhöben. Einer der größten Angriffspunkte wird im Vertrag von Lissabon gesehen, der ohne Volksabstimmung den weiteren Verlust von nationalen Souveränitätsrechten zur Folge gehabt hätte. Der Austritt ist auch in diesem Programm eine reale Option und zwar genau aus denselben Gründen – weitere Vertiefung in Richtung der Bildung eines Imperiums – wie zuvor und wird auch hier an eine zwingende Volksabstimmung gekoppelt69. Primär soll aber die Durchsetzung der eigenen, nationalen Interessen forciert werden, zu der „Ungarn innerhalb der EU diejenigen Verbündeten finden soll, die ähnlich wie wir denken. Durch gemeinsames Auftreten können wir […] das Europa der Nationen verwirklichen, welches auf der Vielfalt und Gleichheit der Nationen aufbaut […]“70.

65

66 67 68 69 70

Jobbik, Radikale Veränderung. Das Wahlprogramm (Parlamentswahlen) der Jobbik für die nationale Selbstbestimmung und gesellschaftliche Gerechtigkeit, http://jobbik.hu/sites/default/files/jobbik-program2010gy.pdf (19. Januar 2015). Das Programm erstreckt sich auf 88 Seiten. Eine teilweise Übersetzung und Kommentierung findet sich in Péter CSINGÁR, „Radikale Veränderung“, Donau-Institut Working Papers, no. 37, 2013, p. 1-24. Ibid., p. 75-76. Ibid. „Europa der Nationen. Das Programm der Jobbik für die ungarische Selbstbestimmung und für den gesellschaftlichen Aufstieg“, op.cit., p. 45. Ibid., p. 47. Ibid.

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Wenn man nun die europarelevante Veränderung des Parteiprogramms der Jobbik vom Anfang bis zur Gegenwart in den Blick nimmt, lässt sich ohne Zweifel eine gewisse Deradikalisierung und Pragmatisierung erkennen. Trotz dieser Entwicklung bleibt aber die geistig-ideologische Haltung der Partei gegenüber der Grundidee der Europäischen Union im Wesentlichen ablehnend, weil sie darin die drohende Auflösung des Nationalstaates sieht. Deswegen wird auch der Vertrag von Lissabon vehement abgelehnt und die Option zum Austritt ausdrücklich im Programm beibehalten. Das vertritt die Partei als einzige unter den Parteien im Parlament. Selbst für die FIDESZ des sich immer wieder kritisch äußernden Orbán war der Austritt aus der Union nie eine Option, das Wahlprogramm vom 2009 ist ausgesprochen EU- und integrationsfreundlich71. Aufgrund der Ablehnung der Grundidee einer weiteren Integration und der substanziellen Kritik der bereits erfolgten Integration wird man die Jobbik nach der ersteren Herangehensweise als eine harte euroskeptische Partei bezeichnen müssen. Genau aus denselben Gründen ist es geboten die Partei im Rahmen der zweiten Ansicht als Eurorejects zu kategorisieren. Hinzuzufügen bleibt aber, dass sich diese Position nach der Phase der Totalverweigerung mit einer nicht unbedeutenden pragmatischen-kompromissbereiten Linie deutlich abgeschwächt hat.

Schlussfolgerung Nach neuesten Datenerhebungen verliert das Regierungsbündnis FIDESZ-KDNP dramatisch an Unterstützung. Davon profitieren jedoch nicht am meisten die linken und liberalen Oppositionsparteien, sondern die Jobbik. Das Regierungsbündnis hat seit seiner Wiederwahl im Frühjahr 2014 mehr als eine Million Wähler verloren, während die Jobbik derart zugelegt hat – ca. 1.3 Millionen –, dass der Unterschied zum Parteibündnis FIDESZ-KDNP bei ca. 400.000 Wählerstimmen liegen dürfte.72 Datenerhebungen erfassen zwar nur eine Momentaufnahme, und angesichts des Umstandes, dass politische Parteien in Regierungsverantwortung regelmäßig einer größeren Amortisation ausgesetzt sind, ist noch größere Vorsicht bei der Bewertung solcher Ergebnisse geboten. Die Tendenz geht jedoch dahin, dass FIDESZ-KDNP trotz des zweiten Zwei-Drittel-Sieges beständig an Unterstützer verliert, während Jobbik seit den Wahlen 2009 permanent zugelegt hat. Sollten sich diese Tendenzen fortsetzen und in einer kommenden Wahl politisch niederschlagen, ist wohl mit einer radikaleren, souveränitätsbasierten Europapolitik zu rechnen. Ein alsbaldiger Austritt ist hingegen eher nicht realistisch, denn dieser ist in den letzten Parteiprogrammen an eine Volksabstimmung gebunden. In Ungarn ist für diese nach der neuen Verfassung eine praktisch kaum überwindbare Hürde geschaffen worden – nach Art. 8 müssten mehr als die Hälfte der Wahlbürger teilnehmen –, was ein erhebliches politisches Risiko bedeutet. Zudem dürfte ein Austritt in dem Land unmittelbar eine wirtschaftli71

72

Das Programm erstreckt sich auf 283 Seiten und trägt den Namen „Igen, Magyarország többre képes!“ (=„Ja, Ungarn kann mehr!“), es setzt sich besonders detailliert mit den einzelnen Politiken der Europäischen Union aus: Fidesz, Igen, Magyarország többre képes!, http://static-old.fidesz.hu/download/yar/program2009_magyar.pdf (20 Januar 2015). http://ipsos.hu/hu/news/tovabb-gyengult-fidesz-csucson-jobbik. (15. Februar 2015).

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che Krise zu Folge haben, denn ein wesentlicher Teil aller Infrastrukturinvestitionen werden in erheblichem Umfang über EU-Beihilfen finanziert. Abschließend bleibt festzuhalten, dass über die oben vorgenommenen und gebräuchlichen begrifflichen Kategorisierungen hinaus die Frage entscheidend ist, ob diese Deradikalisierungstendenzen rein der politischen Logik der Machtakkumulation geschuldet sind und sich zur gegebenen Zeit in Luft auflösen, oder ob sich dahinter eine tatsächlich vollzogene Konsolidierung verbirgt. Es gibt in beide Richtungen starke Anzeichen, etwa die programmatische Mäßigung auf der einen Seite. Auf der anderen Seite stehen aber beispielsweise die Verbrennung der EU-Flagge, deren Rauswurf aus dem Parlament oder Verbindungen zu der einflussreichen und in jeder Hinsicht als extremistisch zu bezeichnenden Webseite, „kuruc.info“73. Diese entscheidende, aber empirisch bedingte Unsicherheit kann letztlich mit den Mitteln der theoretischen Begriffsbildung nicht erfasst werden.

PAST AND PRESENT PARTY-POLITICS-EUROSCEPTICISM IN HUNGARY This paper deals with the party-based Euro-skepticism of the last few years in Hungary, especially with regard to the party Jobbik. At first, the last European elections shall be described. This demonstrates the development – or rather: the considerable change of the party landscape (2004 – 2014) after the accession to the European Union. Jobbik‘s political objectives and its electoral success at the 2009 and 2014 Europeans shall be examined rather extensively due to their immense impact: By and by, many elements of Jobbik’s Euro-Skeptic positions (i.e., the increasing gravity of the value of national self-determination towards the European Union) were adopted by the conservative government coalition still in power today. Finally, some research approaches are introduced concerning the categorization of the parties according to party-based Euro-skepticism. As for Jobbik, we shall assess to what extent the party fits the existing categories.

L’EUROSCEPTICISME DES PARTIS POLITIQUES EN HONGRIE AUJOURD’HUI ET DANS LE PASSÉ L´article analyse l´euroscepticisme des dernières années en Hongrie, en particulier dans le cas du parti Jobbyk. Nous commençons par une présentation des dernières élections au Parlement européen. Ce qui permet de présenter l´évolution et les changements profonds qui ont affectés le paysage politique en73

Diese Website ist das Flaggschiff der rechtsextremen Gegenöffentlichkeit, sie ist das meistgelesene und wohl radikalste Internetportal im rechten Spektrum mit einer weitaus größeren Leserschaft als konservative Medien. Siehe dazu die Datenerhebung: http://ite.hu/ legnezettebb-hazai-weboldalak-rangsora/ (6. Januar 2015). Demnach steht kuruc.info auf dem 34. Platz der meistbesuchten Websites.

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tre 2004 et 2014, ceci après l´adhésion de la Hongrie à L´UE. Le programme de Jobbyk et le succès électoral de ce parti aux élections européennes de 2009 et 2014 sont analysés en détail, parce que nombre de dimensions eurosceptiques (par exemple l´exarcerbation de la valeur de l´autodétermination nationale vis-à-vis de l´Union européenne) de Jobbyk se virent progressivement reprises par la coalition gouvernementale conservatrice, toujours au pouvoir aujourd´hui. En conclusion, nous nous penchons sur les recherches classifiant les partis dans le cadre de l´euroscepticisme politique et examinons le cas de Jobbyk pour savoir si ce parti se laisse placer dans une des catégories existantes.

ESTONIA: PARTY-BASED EU LOYALTY, OUR-GUY-IN-EP-BASED EUROSCEPTICISM AND THE RUSSIAN’S ATTITUDE STILL UNCLEAR TOOMAS ALATALU Euroscepticism in Estonia, i.e. scepticism of the European Union (EU), began to take shape after the submission of the official application for EU membership (November 24, 1995). Despite the ideas of self-reliance and neutrality voiced in 1987-1995, the practical aspects of independence revealed the exigency to join democratic and forward-looking international associations. The difficulties arising in the course of the withdrawal of the Russian army made this very clear. For a member of the former Soviet Union, this meant a partial renunciation of its hard-won independence. However, the proximity of Russia and the lack of natural resources excluded other options. Furthermore, the withdrawal of the Russian forces (in August 1994, Paldiski naval base in September 1995) coincided with Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to the EU which eliminated the neutral zone of the Cold War era in the Baltic region. The decision in favour of the accession to the EU and NATO was supported by all parliamentary parties. However, unlike in Latvia and Lithuania, there were no joint declarations of political parties or statements of the Parliament at the time. The coalition which had applied for Estonia’s accession of the EU was called “the formers” by those in power in 1992-1995 because of their former membership of the Communist Party. However, the decisions of this coalition led by Prime Ministers Tiit Vähi and Mart Siimann repeatedly set an example for other candidate states, for instance, by creating the post of the Minister of European Affairs in April 1995. It was later eliminated so that the Prime Minister himself was able to head the negotiations with the EU since April 1997. The Association agreement was ratified unanimously (+86) on August 1, 1995. The minister on European affairs issued a report and was asked only four questions. The same approach – a total trust in ministers who defended the bills, and a minimal discussion of topics – was quite typical of the following years1.

1

On the base of this “self-limited” tactics, Estonian researcher Vello Pettai elaborated – to explain the origins of Euroscepticism – the phenomenon of “tutelary transition” to describe the elite’s conduct to use “a temporary window of opportunity to definitively break free from the Russian sphere of influence” and to go ahead without discussing problems with the population and against the popular opinion. – Vello PETTAI, “Unfounded worries? Euroscepticism prior to the referendum”, in: Vello PETTAI, Piret EHIN, (eds.), Deciding on Europe: The European Union referendum in Estonia. Tartu University Press, 2005, p. 43-44. Unfortunately, this tutelage reminds of pre-war dictator (1934-40) K. Päts’ belief that “Estonian people are sick and must be guided” which ended with surrender and occupation. In fact, breaking free from Russia at the first window of opportunity in order to assure the ethnic survival was a common goal and the basis of all activities of the elite as well as the majority of people in the 1990s.

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Estonia was the first Baltic state to be invited to accession talks in July 1997. In January 1997, a standing committee for the European Affairs (since 2004 the European Union Affairs) was established in Riigikogu. It included representatives of all factions, i.e. parties. The committee’s own and explanatory work outside the Riigikogu was based on the “The Basic Principles of Informing the Estonian Public on the European Union Accession” (adopted May 25, 1997) compiled by the Council of Senior Civil Servants. The aptitude of the Estonian state apparatus and bureaucracy (including the dissemination of information, keeping deadlines, the quality of translations, etc.) clearly outdid those of our southern neighbours and thus influenced the decision favouring Estonia2. On January 19, 2000, the Riigikogu discussed the Estonian preparations for the EU accession as an “issue of national importance”. Reports were made by Prime Minister Mart Laar, the head of the Committee of the European Affairs Tunne Kelam, and five ministers. This formed the basis for the regular and direct inclusion of both coalition and opposition in the process of integrating into the European Union. Studies on the European-mindedness of the political parties of the candidate states began in the mid-1990s. They used the results of the surveys conducted among the parties and citizens of the current member states as their models. Soon, it became clear that there was only one party in Estonia whose election programme included opposition to the EU membership, namely the Estonian Future Party (split from the Estonian National Independence Party led by Jaanus Raidal in 1993) – and it was immediately named the Eurosceptic party3. Collecting only 13.907 votes (2.57%) in the 1995 general elections, they did not enter Parliament. In 1999, they continued as the Estonian Independence Party. Calling the EU, among other things, a neo-colonial power, they collected 2.705 votes (0.5%) in the 2003 general elections, 1.273 (0.2%) in 2007, 2.570 (0.4%) in 20114 and 1.047 (0.2%) in 2015. In 2014, they participated in the European elections for the first time and gathered 4.158 votes (1.3%). This openly Anti-EU party is visible in the media mainly because of its spokesmen (Vello Leito, party leader since 2005, Hardo Aasmäe, mayor of Tallinn from 1990 – 92, Juku-Kalle Raid, MP of the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (PRU) faction from 2011-2014, Sven Kivisildnik, a writer) who, however, lack influence in society. The second party publicly opposing EU membership was the Estonian Social Democratic Labour Party, i.e., the remnants of the former Estonian Communist Party disintegrated in 1990-1993. Due to the current Election Act and the support of the joint list of Russian and Estonian candidates from both the East and the West, the party managed to win two seats in Riigikogu (1999-2003). Its cooperation with the United People’s Party had secured its electoral success due to the Russian votes. When this collaboration ended in 2002, the party declined into marginality. After participating in the founding of the European Left Party in 2 3

4

Toomas ALATALU, “Estonia – a little tired regional frontrunner”, in: Janusz ADAMOWSKI, Konstanty Adam WOJTASZCZYK, (eds.), Negotiations of the European Union candidate countries, Warsaw, The Institute of the Political Science of Warsaw University, 2002, p. 114-115. Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCZERBIAK, “Contemporary Euroscepticism in the party systems of the European Union candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe”, European Journal of Political Research, no. 43, 2004, p. 12; Evald MIKKEL, Andres KASEKAMP, “Parties, European Integration and Euroscepticism”, in: Vello PETTAI and Piret EHIN, (eds.), Deciding on Europe: The EU referendum in Estonia, Tartu University Press, 2005, p. 101. National Electoral Committee, Elections in Estonia 1992-2011, Tallinn, 2012, p. 34-73, 106-116.

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May 2004, they assumed the name Estonian Left Party. They collected 1.057 votes (0.5%) at the 2004 European elections. Since 2008, their base has been the town of Maardu near Tallinn. Mardu’s mayor (1996-2013) Georgi Bystrov used to be a member of the United People’s Party, but at the 2004 Europeans, he ran as an independent candidate and reached a total of 6.183 votes. Under his leadership, the remnants of the United People’s Party joined the Estonian Left Party in 2008. Despite the assistance of the European Left Party representative Josef Ben Besset (Israel)5, the Estonian United Left Party collected only 3.519 (0.9%) votes at the 2009 EP elections. Bystrov was in intense contact with the mayor of Moscow (19922010) Yuri Luzhkov. In 2010, he was elected representative of the Baltic States on the Board of the Russian Compatriots Association. In 2010, the ULP’s XVIth conference was attended by representatives of Spravedlivaya Rossiya (Sergei Mironov’s) party. In 2011 “Maardu`s ULP” members ran for Parliament on the list of the People’s Union of Estonia. At the 2013 local government elections, there were only two Estonians on the ULP list of candidates (collecting 36 votes), whereas the party’s Russian members won the elections with the “Maardu Election Coalition” (collecting 3.668 votes or 55%, including G. Bystrov with 1.038 votes). In 2012, the young school teacher Valev Kald was elected chairman of ULP (and in 2013, Deputy Mayor of Maardu). He was the party’s only candidate at the 2014 Europeans, collecting 226 votes (0.1%). In his speech at the ULP’s XVIIIth Congress (18 October 2014), Kald announced that the EP election “Manifesto” (with a print run of 220.000) was financed by the European Left Party. Representatives of German, Finnish and Czech left parties were present at its launch presentation in Tallinn6. The hard Euroscepticism was softened by the acknowledgement of the EU and NATO membership. The critique of capitalism was appended by the demand to replace the present elite with a new one with left leanings. Obviously in order to stress the party’s Estonian origin, the word “Russia” disappeared from the official documents. For instance, in foreign policy, they want Estonia to act as an intermediary between the EU and the Customs Union. The situation in Ukraine is interpreted as the irreconcilable antagonism between the local oligarchs and the Left forces. According to the congress records, there were 1.990 party members. In the general elections on 1 March 2015, for the first time, 25 ULP candidates (Estonians and Russians equally) ran in every constituency, collecting 764 votes (0.1%). But even as a phantom or mirage party, it is considered important and supported from the other side of the Eastern border of Estonia. The third Estonian party representing hard Euroscepticism is the Estonian Conservative People’s Party (ECPP). It was founded in 2012 on the basis of the former governing coalition member (1995-1999, 2003-2007), i.e., the People’s Union of Estonia, and of the National Movement established in 2006. Arnold Rüütel, the leader of the People’s Union, was the President of Estonia from 2001-2006. Presently, he acts as the honorary chairman of the ECPP. His influence on the positive outcome of the Estonian referendum on the EU accession (September 13, 2003) was so remarkable that the Latvian president Vaire Vike-Freiberga asked

5 6

Oleg SAMORODNI, Poluverniki. Vene poliitika iseärasused Eestis, Tammerraamat, 2014, p. 207-8. Otchetnyi doklad predsedatelta partyi. 18 oktyabrja 2014 – vasakpartei.ee/erakonna-xviiikongress/otchetnyi doklad-predsedatelya-partyi.

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him to campaign among the Russian-speaking citizens in Eastern Latvia, too7. Rüütel was the uniting and pro-EU person in the People’s Union, while at home and in Europe, many influential party members delivered statements that could be categorised as Euroscepticism driven by (Russian) national interest8. Due to the illegal dealings and guilty verdict of the head of the party, Minister of Environment Villu Reiljan, the reputation of the People’s Union declined rapidly (64 463 votes and 13% at the 2003 general elections; 39.202 votes and 7.1% in 2007, 8866 votes and 2.2% at the 2009 Europeans). In 2011, they failed to be re-elected to Parliament (12.184 and 2.1%). Selected head of the ECPP in 2013, Mart Helme (Estonian Ambassador to Moscow in 1995-1999) and his son Martin Helme (collecting 1475 votes at the 2004 Europeans as an independent candidate, and 9840 votes or 2.5% in 2009) have repeatedly made statements on the limitation of immigration and attacked the European Union for its federalisation. At the 2014 EP elections, the party collected 13.427 votes (including 9507 of Martin Helme) or 4%, thus becoming the largest extra-parliamentary political party. In the general elections on 1 March 2015, ECPP managed to mobilize the whole conservative electorate and won 8.7% of the vote and 7 seats in Riigikogu. It was mainly due to the parliamentary parties’ unexpected and hurried passing of the poorly worded Civil Partnership Act allowing same-sex registered partnerships (introduced on 17 April 2014, passed on 9 October 2014). This act was openly supported by foreign embassies and governments but opposed by the public. It caused the most extensive protests of recent years. Following the elections, ECPP’s youngest MP was under fire for a 3-year old blog entry praising Hitler’s actions in promoting German economy. The parties starting coalition negotiations quickly excluded any form of cooperation with ECPP leaving the latter with better chances to continue its rhetorical thrusts.

1. The Estonian policy-making in the EU – towards a closed political landscape The 2011 elections witnessed the results of the long and sometimes aggressive process of streamlining the Estonian political landscape (the high threshold of 1,000 members for establishing a new party, prohibition of election alliances, media barrage etc.): Only four parties made it to the Parliament with their total number of votes out of reach for others: They collected 89.5% of the vote. All of them have been included in the governance for years: the Reform Party participated in government in 1995-1996, 1999-2002, 2003-2005, led the governing coalition in 2002-2003, and again since 2005. Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (PRU) led the coalition as follows: in 1992-1994, 1999-2002 (Pro Patria) and 2003-2005 (Res Publica), they were members of the coalition in 1994-1995 and from 20117 8

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, “Current Latvia”, 4 September, Foreign Policy Events, no. 522, 2-8 September 2003. Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCZERBIAK, “Contemporary Euroscepticism in the party systems of the European Union candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe”, op.cit., p. 5; Evald MIKKEL, Andres KASEKAMP, “Emerging Party-based Euroscepticism in Estonia”, in: Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCZERBIAK, (eds.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism Case Studies and Country Surveys, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 308-309.

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2014. The Social Democrats led the coalition in 1994-1995 and were in the government in 1992-1994, 1999-2002, 2007-2009 and once again since 2014. The Centre Party led the coalition in 1990-1992 and participated in government in 1995, 2002-2003, and 2005-2007. There has been no doubt about the European-mindedness of the first three parties. Obviously, this does not exclude the possibility of some well-known members being highly critical of the EU in certain issues. Justifiably, this fact drew attention to the soft Euroscepticism of the Reform Party9. The situation changed completely in 2004: As the result of a secret agreement with the lead party in government, Res Publica, the Reform Party leader Siim Kallas became a European Commissioner in 2004, and the vice-president of the European Commission (2004-2014). Since 2005, the Reform Party has permanently been the leader of the coalition leadership. Quite understandably, its leaders have become the most ardent executives of EU policies in Estonia. Due to Kallas’ high position and Estonia’s irrefutable success story as a highly innovative country, more people related to the mainstream parties have found work-places in European central institutions. This in turn has an immediate effect on their behaviour at home: The party leaders have become increasingly elitist, and the party statutes have come to exclude, for instance, democratic features like internal elections prior to ranking the candidates for Parliament. Thus, it is reasonable to state that the three parties presented may now be considered symbols not only of Euroenthusiasm, but even of party-based Euro-loyalty. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility of opposing certain EU values as the discussion and passing of the Civil Partnership Act convincingly illustrated. Its most outspoken critic was PRU whose representative had been among the draft initiators, however, once in opposition, immediately became its opponent until the law was passed in Riigikogu. Unconditionally accepting EU values and campaigning for the Civil Partnership Act, the Social Democrats took the recognition of EU values to a completely new level by recruiting the black journalist Abdul Turay in their list of EP candidates. He collected 865 votes (ranking him No. 9 out of 12 candidates). Abdul Turay had also performed well in the October 2013 local elections collecting 516 votes (second place among the Social Democrats) and winning a seat in the Tallinn City Council. The attitude of the Centre Party has always been a problem in Estonian politics. We are convinced that it has been judged in a simplistic manner without considering the peculiarities of the Russian-speaking voters and the status of Estonia as a border state. The latter has been absent from many analyses of partybased Euroscepticism10. The voter turnout in the eight Eastern European candidate states at the 2003 EU referendum should have given a hint as to why the turnout was the highest in the border states of Latvia (72.5%), Estonia (64%) and Lithuania (63.3%), and the support of the EU was somewhat lower and also similar in Estonia (66.8%) and Latvia (67%). The enthusiasm about the EU was less pronounced in Estonia and Latvia. This is due to their recurring experience of EU 9 10

Evald MIKKEL, Andres KASEKAMP, “Emerging Party-based Euroscepticism in Estonia”, op.cit., p. 307. Ibid., See also Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCZERBIAK, “Contemporary Euroscepticism in the party systems of the European Union candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe”, op.cit.

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legal stipulations. Brussels seemed to be convinced they had a better knowledge and understanding of the Russian-speaking communities in Estonia and Latvia that received their instructions from Moscow. One well-known example of these requirements is the law on stateless children which the Estonian parliament was forced to replace with a foreign-made version. It was passed on 8 December 1998, in spite of the certitude that it would not work as desired. Instead of the promised 6000 immediate applications for citizenship – according to the OSCE mission and Max van der Stoel, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, or 10.000 as mentioned in EC report on Estonia’s progress –, only 116 applications were received in 1999, and no more than 1.063 between 1999 and 200111. The border state context had been relatively insignificant in the first two EP elections in Estonia. Therefore, the result of the 2014 European Parliament elections came as a surprise: A completely new EU-critical (or even Anti-EU) attitude supplemented the long list of attitudes towards the EU in Estonia. The same phenomenon had already been encountered in Latvia in a similar situation. We should also highlight a third and more serious problem related to the political peculiarities of Estonia which defies party-based analysis. This trend may be characterized as ignorance of the representative democracy, more specifically of political parties. Concerning the Euroscepticism of Estonia and Estonians, its role and weight require examination and description. We shall attempt to explain the nature of each of the three problems and their influence on the level of Euroscepticism in society.

2. The Estonian Centre Party and the initial truth about the EU Estonia’s “simplified” party landscape only appeared to be simple: two rightwing or centre-right parties and two centre-left parties. But in fact, it was a group of three parties cooperating with each other, and one party excluded from collaboration. The latter, namely, the Centre Party is the direct successor of the Popular Front which lead the independence movement in 1988-1991. The Popular Front played an important role in the re-emergence of the Social Democrats, too, by the way. Secondly, after the local Russian did not win any seats in the Riigikogu (2003) and continued their decline, the Centre Party became the only party with a considerable number of Russian members and Russian-speaking representatives in Parliament. Thirdly, ever since Estonia became a member of the EU and NATO, i.e. 2005, the Centre Party has ruled Tallinn which is the national financial and business centre and an international tourist destination. One third of Estonia’s population is living in the capital. In addition, for the second consecutive term of office (since 2009), the Centre Party has held the absolute majority in the City Council. With 79 seats, it is almost as large as Riigikogu (101 seats). Thus, although not state government, the Eurosceptic Centre Party is strongly present in the capital, and its role in the Estonian-Russian and EU-Russian relations is not to be underestimated. Fourthly, since 2004, the Centre Party has had a cooperation agreement with Yedinaya Rossiya. Before, the current ruling party in Russia had 11

Toomas ALATALU, “Estonia – a little tired regional frontrunner”, op.cit., p. 112-113.

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signed cooperation agreements only with ruling parties in Europe and elsewhere. Why United Russia opted for an opposition party after Estonia joined the EU and NATO, was a much pondered serious issue. But soon, the Centre Party managed to join government again (2005-2007). Following the 2007 general elections, a new coalition was formed without the Centre Party. During the notorious Bronze Soldier disorders, though, Moscow clearly signalled that they would prefer the country to be led by “the pragmatic representatives in the Parliament and in the local government (i.e. in Tallinn – T.A.)”12. Since then, the controversies between the Centre Party and the other Estonian parties have deepened while the Russian participation in development projects in Tallinn has increased, most notably in the construction of the new Russian Orthodox cathedral in Tallinn (accompanied by allegations about the Centre Party’s being financed by Russia, known as the “Eastern money scandal”). Playing the “Russian card” in Estonian politics was preceded by a significant change of the relationship between the citizens and politics. The voter turnout was declining rapidly in the nation known for its “singing revolution”, popular front, Estonian citizens’ committees, and other mass demonstrations. While 458.247 voters or 67.8% had participated in the 1992 elections, and 540.699 or 68.9% in 1995, there were only 484.239 electors or 57.4% in 1999, and 494.888 or 58.2% in 2003. There was slight increase in 2007 to 550.213 or 61.9%, 575.133 or 63.9% in 2011, and 577.910 or 64.2% in 2015. But the turnout was still considerably less than 20 years before13. There was another event that set the seal on the reliability of Estonian politics and people’s behaviour: The Centre Party had secured victory in the 1999 and 2003 general elections with 113.378 votes or 23.4% and 125.709 votes or 25.4% respectively. However, the party chairman was never asked to form the government. In December 1998, the three right-wing and centre-left parties had already emphasized their being a coalition and their intention to form a government. The disregard of the election winner was the last straw for the dissatisfaction created by the undemocratic Election Act (the forced renovation of which was initiated later), privatisation, financial scandals, etc. On 7 February 2001, the public learned that Prime Minister Mart Laar and his closest aides had used the opposition leader Edgar Savisaar’s picture for target shooting in 1999.One of the participants was Eerik-Niiles Kross, the security advisor to President Meri. All this caused a rapid decline of trust in Parliament, government, President, politicians, parties, as well as the media. It has been haunting Estonian politics to this day. In May 1999, 50% of the respondents trusted in Parliament, 53% in government, 47% in the prime minister. In April 2001, the respective indicators were 30%, 28%, and 22%. While in May 1999, 51% of the readers trusted in the print media, in June 2001 it was a mere 41%. The number of people distrusting it had risen to 48%14. On April 23, 2001, 26 social scientists made an alarming appeal in the daily 12 13 14

Toomas ALATALU, “Bronze Soldier – Chronology. When and how he became notorious”, in: The Bronze Soldier Removal, (Eurouniversity series, International Relations, no 10 (109)), Tallinn, 2008, p. 28-29. Elections in Estonia 1992-2011, op.cit., p. 6-7. Raivo VETIK, koostaja, Kaks Eestit: artiklite, ettekannete ja analüüside kogumi, Tallinna, Pedagoogikaülikool, 2002; Toomas ALATALU, “Miks rahvas ajakirjandust ei usalda?”, Kesknädal (weekly, Tallinn), 26 September 2001.

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“Postimees”. They acknowledged the emergence of “two Estonias” or a deep divide in the society and initiated the necessary dialogue. On September 21, 2001, the electoral college elected Arnold Rüütel president, the representative of the “Other Estonia”. This election prompted the leader of the Reform Party Siim Kallas to announce that “the first Estonia” preferred to move abroad now (“Postimees”, 19 October 2001). However, Kallas did translate his declaration into action. Instead, in January 2002, he formed a coalition with the Centre Party. The public clearly realized that after having been accused of the disappearance of 100 million kroons and of the secret recording of conversations of political rivals respectively, Kallas and Savisaar needed the short-term coalition to improve their CVs prior to Estonia’s accession to the EU. It is well known that Estonia was the least of optimistic of the former EastEuropean countries about joining the EU15. In the light of the circumstances described above, this lack of optimism was mostly the result of the distrust of our own local politicians who continued to remain in power. Then again, Estonians have learned to be careful expressing their opinions. They clearly differenciate between answering public polls and coming to an important national decision, for instance, the referendum on the accession to the EU. As we know, the voter turnout and support of the EU proved to be higher than in most East-European countries. As indicated above, the outcome of the referendum largely depended on President Arnold Rüütel’s clear support of the accession. He was elected President in September 2001 by the representatives of local governments who had been convened to the electoral college after a standoff in Parliament. This was sometimes interpreted as historical justice because in 1992, in spite of the public support in the first round of the elections, Rüütel was defeated by Lennart Meri in the second round in Parliament. Throughout his term of office, confidence in him was higher than in Lennart Meri. In January 2002, the participation of the Centre Party in government further restored the sense of justice. However, following the new victory in March 2003, they were once again left out. This rejection formed the basis for the Centre Party’s opposition to the EU accession at the referendum. However, the situation was more complex. Despite being forced into opposition at home, Centre Party leader Edgar Savisaar had overcome international isolation:16 Since 2001, there had been regular communication with the foreign embassies in Tallinn. The party fought for its place in the international arena. Since 1999, it had attempted to become a member of the Liberal International. But it was (only) accepted by the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe in 2003. Facing the new situation, Edgar Savisaar, a master of mass manifestations, decided to play an impressive political game inspired by his participation in a conference on the same topic organised by the Finnish Centre 15

16

See: Vello PETTAI and Piret EHIN, “Introduction: the Estonian EU referendum in context”, in: Vello PETTAI and Piret EHIN, (eds.), Deciding on Europe: The European Union referendum in Estonia, Tartu University Press, 2005, p. 19; Evald MIKKEL, Andres KASEKAMP, “Emerging Partybased Euroscepticism in Estonia”, op.cit., p. 295. A letter sent to the foreign ambassadors to Estonia by the Centre Party’s Secretary for Foreign Relations (from 1999-2003, the author of this article held this position) on February 12, 2001, played a significant role. Its topic was the media cover-up of the shooting on the picture of the opposition leader initiating a scandal which eventually brought the “second Estonia” to power.

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Party in 1994. He intended to exploit, among others, the activities of several (including state-supported) “No to European Union” movements and groups, that claim to have been established in 199617. One of the best known is the Research Centre Free Europe at the Academy Nord (2001-2004) led by the eminent politicians and professors Ivar Raig and Igor Gräzin and funded by the British conservatives. By that time, an EU supporters’ wing (ministers of government led by Siim Kallas) and an EU opponents’ wing had formed within the party. On the orders of the Board (i.e. Savisaar), a third group was established. It included members merely campaigning for participating in the referendum with the right to vote according to their conscience. The congress was held in two adjoining conference halls on 9 August 2003. The Centre Party was the only Estonian party to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of joining the EU prior to and during the congress. In his presentation, Savisaar reminded the listeners of the views on the development of the EU expressed in the previous congress in January 2002; whether the EU is a “federation under a strong central power or a union of independent and self-governing states”. He stressed the importance of the conditions of accession. Nobody had voiced any concern during the pre-referendum period although Eastern European farmers were clearly at a disadvantage compared to their colleagues in the old member states (lower subsidies etc.). The Centre Party, too, had remained silent during the final stage of the accession talks even though the Minister of Agriculture was a party member. In his speech, Savisaar weighed the arguments of both supporters and opponents. He invited the congress to support the “draft of conscience” adding that at least “in case of a difference of opinions there is one common conviction – it is important to participate in the referendum”. Savisaar may have miscalculated the outcome. The proponents of the “no” vote had heated up the audience, and their suggestion was supported by 341 delegates. But since there were 235 supporters of the EU accession and 227 supporters “with conscience”18, the anti-accession delegates formed the minority at the congress. However, there was no other vote. Therefore, the other parties and the media immediately proclaimed the Centre Party to be against the EU. Furthermore, as most of the leading EU supporters left the party, the given verdict on the Centre Party’s leanings perpetuated itself. But from 2005-2007, the party was back in government and implemented EU policies. The Centre Party members demonstrated their current attitudes at the 2004 European election: Siiri Oviir, the former Minister of Social Affairs (2002-2003), was an outspoken supporter of the accession. He collected 16 633 votes and won a clear victory even though he was only third on the party list. Edgar Savisaar’s wife Vilja Savisaar (9.920 votes) and former TV journalist Enn Eesmaa (3.331 votes) headed the list. Both of them were opponents of the accession. Heimar Lenk MP, the main proponent of the “no”-wing collected 309 votes, i.e., slightly less than his catch at the party congress after his speech. In view of these circumstances, it seems reasonable to consider the Centre Party’s approach EU-critical. In a nutshell: All the leading Estonian parties are

17 18

Katri VALLASTE, “Euroopa Liiduga liitumise vastased liikumised Eestis”, Riigikogu toimetised, 9, 2004, Tallinn, p. 124. Edgar SAVISAAR, “Keskerakond ja Euroopa Liit”, Kesknädal (weekly, Tallinn), 13 August 2003.

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European-minded with the Centre Party characterized by persistant Eurocriticism.

3. Person versus parties The first European elections in Estonia showed a new trend which has not been discussed in psephological analyses: the votes cast for a specific person or personality. The deliberate protest-spirited preference of a personality regardless of his/her political attitude over the political parties or the power has become one of the characteristic features (not only) of the European elections in Estonia. The first European elections surprised with Toomas Hendrik Ilves’ success. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs was born and raised abroad. From a total of 232.230 voters, the top candidate of the Social Democrats collected 76.120 of 85.429 votes for the Social Democrats thus securing three mandates. The runners up Marianne Mikko received 5.263 votes, and Ivari Padar, chairman of the Social Democrats, 1.012. Andres Tarand had received 841 votes and took Padar’s seat. Ilves’ success was in stark contrast to the Social Democrats’ poor results at the local elections. Furthermore, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ilves had been the object of severe criticism19 from 1996-1998, and particularly during the final stage of the accession talks between 1999 and 2002. He was also criticized for his membership of the Social Democratic Party being a man with right-wing leanings. These and further controversies were ignored at the European election. They have been almost forgotten since Ilves was elected President of Estonia in 2006. After the EP elections in 2004, it was hard to believe that one candidate’s remarkable success may in fact be his personal victory and not the party’s common success. But this fact was confirmed at the second and third EP elections in 2009 and 2014 respectively. In the 2014 elections, there were already two major independent candidates “untouched by any party and power”. They had recognized the existence of an electorate prepared to consciously and openly oppose the present power and its institutions (parties) both in Estonia and Europe. And there is neither gain nor considerable damage – it is but a matter of one or two out of the six Estonians seats at the European Parliament. The persistence of such people in politics favours the persistence of scepticism about the structures and leadership of their own society as well as of the EU. It is not impossible for the recipient of the protest vote to use his mandate against his own state as well as the official EU policy. This happened in 2014: The Estonian MEP Yana Toom disregarded ALDE’s decision concerning the Ukraine and instead took the view of Russia. Obviously, the behaviour of independent protest members or those with a loose connection to a party may be unpredictable and inconsistent. The success of the “clearly distinguished personality” at the 2004 Europeans remained an Estonian phenomenon. Toomas Hendrik Ilves, the top candidate of the opposition party, was preferred over those of the ruling parties. Res Publica, 19

In the election of the representative of Riigikogu in the Convention on the Future of Europe on February 2, 2002, T.H. Ilves was defeated (34:41) by the representative of the People’s Union, fierce EU-critic Janno Reiljan, however, S.Kallas and E.Savisaar agreed to appoint the leader of the pro-EU wing of the Centre Party Peeter Kreitzberg to the position.

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the Prime Minister’s party, failed completely. 15.457 votes left them sixth of all the parties. Similarly, the People’s Union did not win a seat. Res Publica’s coalition partner won 18.687 votes20. His competence distinguished Ilves from other parties’ top candidates. Considering the discussion of the results in 2009 and 2014 below, his support included a strong protest against the ruling parties as well as the preference of an expert to non-experts. He was also supported as the face – or maybe even the symbol – of the EU. Ilves’ personality contrasted sharply with the remaining five MEPs. They were typical representatives of average Estonian party standards and had merely happened to collect more votes than those not elected. In the 2009 and 2014 EP elections, voters no longer opposed only the local Estonian leaders but also the EU central institutions. They consciously supported a candidate who was in conflict with the local leaders and went to the EP as a potential troublemaker as he was not a member of any of the parties cooperating with the European Commission. At the 2014 European elections, the voters’ attitude in Estonia was largely influenced by the cartel politics of the EP which had been led by only the two largest parliamentary groups – the European People’s Party and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats – since 2004. More than half of the MEPs belong to one of these factions. On three occasions, they agreed on sharing power during the legislative period – in 2014 even prior to the elections: During the first half, one faction would hold the leading positions and during the second half, the other one. Estonia’s leading party, the Reform Party, is a member of the third/ fourth largest EP group, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. The Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (PRU) and the Social Democrats sent a clear message in their 2014 campaigns, namely: Vote for us because in Europe, everything is decided by the two great factions. The local cartel parties publicly affirmed the “scheming of the big powers” in Europe. They provided the representatives of the smaller parties and single candidates further grounds for acting on their own in the EP – but also for Eurosceptic propaganda.

4. The phenomenon named Indrek Tarand The protagonist and hero standing for the “notoriety of Estonia up there” is Indrek Tarand. Born in 1964, he is a historian and the son of the long-term leader of the Social Democrats, former Prime Minister (1994-1995) Andres Tarand. In 1988, he was one of the restorers of the Estonian Students’ Society, a powerful body in pre-war and contemporary Estonian policy-making. Tarand was adviser to Prime Minister Mart Laar in 1993-1994, and secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the right hand and protégée of Minister Ilves in 1994-2002. A controversial person, Tarand caused several scandals. One of them resulted in his dismissal from office. He then worked on TV and radio. From 2005-2009, he held the post of the Director of the Estonian War Museum. His first attempt enter politics failed. Running for mayor of Tallinn at the 2002 local elections, he collected only 1073 votes. 20

Its list was led by professor Janno Reiljan. See the previous footnote.

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His entering big politics was favoured by the amendments to the EP Election Act of 16 November 2006. This act made the parties’ candidate lists closed and the total number of votes given to each candidate classified information, in other words, only the number of votes given to the whole list was made public. The amendments were pushed by the Centre Party and People’s Union whose leaders had placed their wife and brother respectively at the top of their candidate list in 2004. The Centre Party reused the same tactics in 2009 (1. Edgar Savisaar 2. Siiri Oviir 3. Vilja Savisaar). The People’s Union was stopped by the legal action against its leader. The grudge against the leading parties since the emergence of “two Estonias” and the new decision taken by the party leaders ignoring the public opinion permitted Indrek Tarand to use the simple slogan “Vote for a person and not for a party”. And indeed, he was elected. He collected almost as many votes (102.509 votes, 25.81%) as the election winner, the Centre Party (103.506). Party-opponents collected 30.5% of the vote: Besides Tarand, Martin Helme received 9.832, Russian journalist and Bronze Night activist Dmitri Klenski 7.137, and to three less known candidates 1.140. Tarand could not secure a mandate for anyone else. At the early stage of counting the votes, the Centre Party seemed to be on the verge of winning three mandates. However, finally 8 votes saved a seat for the Social Democrat leader Ivari Padar. Five years earlier he had given his seat to Andres Tarand. The Social Democrats collected a total of 34.506 votes or 8.7%. Thus, Indrek Tarand replicated Ilves’ election results. Evidently, people preferred both of them to the remaining parties and their candidates. However, while there was never a doubt about Ilves’ readiness for smooth cooperation with the European leaders, Tarand was supported precisely for the hope of receiving somewhat different and more peculiar “news”. Tarand joined the Greens/European Free Alliance without achieving anything noteworthy in Brussels. However, he did manage to shock his supporters by becoming the surprise Centre Party candidate running for President against Ilves on 29 August 2011. Due to the adoption of the Euro on 1rst January 2011, the Estonian success story was at its zenith. The unanimous re-election of Ilves in Parliament seemed possible since the Reform Party was the first to support him, soon followed by the SD and PRU. The opposing candidate from the Centre Party’s own member list would not have secured all the votes of the faction (as it coincided with the socalled Eastern money scandal). Thus, Tarand’s offer was in keeping with Savisaar’s own plan to find a candidate who would retain the unity of the faction. The short political game – Ilves beat Tarand in the first round already by 73:25 – had no losers. However, Tarand helped boosting the Centre Party’s image by showing that there is cooperativeness, and Savisaar contributed to Tarand’s image of a man standing out from the power elite. Since flirting with the Centre Party has always been risky in Estonia, 2014 EP election was even more interesting. The question was whether a large group of local voters was still willing to ignore the European party system and instead support a candidate opposing the power. A new phrase had already been coined: “to do Tarand”, that is, to outdo the power. Considering the advertising costs, media and business circles once again supported Tarand, and the process continued. He won the mandate with 43.369 votes (13.2%). He received less votes than the three of the four parliamentary parties (Reform Party: 79.849 votes, 24.3%;

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Centre Party: 73.419 votes, 22.4%; PRU: 45.764, 13.9%; SD 44.550, 8.7%), but clearly more than the EU-critical ECPP (13.247 votes, 4%) and the remaining candidates. In 2009, the three EU-minded parties had collected 36.2% of the vote. In 2014, their share rose to 51.8%. When adding the results of the EU-critical Centre Party, the share is 62.3% and 74.2% respectively. To Tarand’s vote we have to add the 10.073 votes (3.1%) collected by TV host Tanel Talve who mimicked Tarand’s pattern, and the votes of Silver Meikar (6.018, 1.8%) and Kristiina Ojuland (3.024, 0.9%), They were both expelled from the Reform Party for different reasons. The total share of votes of candidates opposing the general rule adds up to 19%. In 2009, Tarand alone had collected 25%. This group needs to be analysed as well as their readiness rally around some new leader. We also have to investigate Tarand’s electorate on the basis of two EP elections considering that the voter turnout is slightly more than one third of the eligible voters (43.9% in 2009, 36.5% in 2014). Those are primarily citizens who consider voting their civic duty. In other words, they are active citizens. In 2009, to everybody’s great surprise, Tarand won a clear victory in 14 counties, including Harju county considered the haven of the wealthy (11.503 votes compared to the Reform Party’s 7.473). He was defeated by the Centre Party, although being the runner-up in Tallinn (20.550 and 42.846 votes respectively) and in East-Viru county (2.371 and 18.593 votes) and ending fourth in the city of Tartu (6.397). The general impression gained here – counties vs. cities – was soon used to call him a populist. The populist electorate is often depicted as an uneducated mass with no knowledge of politics. However, this is certainly not true for the majority of Tarand’s supporters.

5. E-voting and Tarand Considered one of the main advantages of Estonian innovation, the e-voting system was first introduced at the local government elections in 2005. At the general elections in 2007, 30.275 e-votes were cast. The 2009 EP elections were marked by a low voter turnout. But 58.614 e-votes (14.7%) were cast. The result could already be considered a breakthrough directly and indirectly influenced by Indrek Tarand, too. The proportion of e-votes proves this: Tarand collected 18.905 evotes, the Reform Party 11.759, the PRU 10.113, the Centrists 6.388, and the Social Democrats 6.087. In other words, as a beneficiary of the election innovation, Tarand clearly outdid all parties and collected almost a third of all e-votes. How did he do this? Tarand should be considered the first real candidate of the Internet age in Estonia. He uploaded an “Agreement with the Voter” on his website appealing to a “spiritually independent” citizen. He promised not to implement “classic nomenclature politics”. He claims his “running for the EP will make the politicians pay more attention to the civic position. However, collecting an outstanding number of votes would be even more beneficial – taking one mandate from the parties leaning towards extreme egoism would have a good educational

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influence on enhancing the quality of future politics”21. This statement appears a classical populist one. It is both interesting and important to specify that the first notable analysis of populism in Estonia does not include Tarand or the 2009 EP elections22. The Royalist party represented in the parliament from 1992-1995 included two former functionaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party23, but the Foreign Ministry’s fact-sheets presented the faction as a supporter of Mart Laar’s government “free of Communists”. Having used clearly populist slogans in 2002-2003, Res Publica immediately became a governing party, etc. The inconvenient history of the Estonian populists has not been discussed in the first Estonian handbook on populism24. The discussion of Tarand as a populist has been reduced to equalling him to other well-known TV personae never involved in any scandals. There are two explanations to the extremely smooth and gentle approach: Tarand is one of the people carefully protected by former fellow-students at the top of the media, and his supporters and, most of all, the evoters are not the typical supporters of populists. E-voting as an option necessitates the possession of a computer and computing skills. In spite of the reported use of computers by larger or smaller groups either in hospitals, nursing homes, etc., the majority of e-voters belong to the more successful, educated, informed, wealthier and more experienced younger electorate. According to the data including the results of the 2009 EP elections, 44% of the e-voters belonged to the highest income category, 34% of them are salaried workers in the public, 31% in the private sector, 12% are entrepreneurs, farmers, self-employed, 10% retired persons, 78.8% of them had cast their ballots at home, 18.1% at their workplace/educational institution25. Ivo Rull has called the voters of Tarand and other TV-personae smart voters. It is easy to agree to this description of the new category of protest voters26. The electoral committee has also published an overview of the gender and age of the voters e-voting in all seven elections (2005-2014). Women tend to be more active: 51% of the e-voters in 2009, 52% in 2014 (53% in 2015) are female. In terms of age, the proportion of younger voters has clearly decreased while the share of middle-aged and more educated and experienced elderly people has increased. The number of Russians among e-voters was not significant27. The share of E-voters using advance voting (3-10 days before) had increased from 7.2% in 2005 to 45.4% in 2009, to 59.2% in 2014 (and to 59.6% in 2015).

21 22 23 24 25

26 27

Aastaraamat Kes? Kus? Mis? 2010, Enno Tammer, Tammerraamat ja Postimees, 2009, p. 51-52. Populism in the Baltic States. A research report, Tallinn University, Institute of Political Science and Governance, Open Estonia Foundation, November 2012. Toomas ALATALU, “Le parti est mort, ses anciens membres prosperent.Le communisme en Estonie”, in : Stéphane COURTOIS, Patrick MOREAU, (eds.), Communisme 2014. En Europe L’éternel retour des communistes 1989-2014, Paris, Vendemiaire, 2014, p. 371. Ivo RULL, Populismist: eneseabiõpik valijatele, käsiraamat poliitikutele, Tallinn, Rull&Rumm, 2014. Report for the Estonian National Electoral Committee, Internet Voting in Estonia. A Comparative Analysis of Five Elections since 2005. October 2011, European University, Institute Robert Schuman, Centre for Advance Studies, www.vvk.ee/public/dok/Internet_Voting_Report_ 20052011_Final.pdf (2 March 2015). Ivo RULL, Populismist: eneseabiõpik valijatele, käsiraamat poliitikutele, op.cit., p. 11. Vabariigi valimiskomisjon, Elektroonilise hääletamise statistika, 2015, www.vvk.ee/valijale/ehaaletamine/e-statistika (2 March 2015).

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Age Structure of Estonia’s E-voters 2005-201528 Age group

Local Elect. 2005

Parl. Elect. 2007

EuroP. Elect. 2009

Local Elect. 2009

Parl. Elect. 2011

Local Elect. 2013

EuroP Elect. 2014

Parl. Elect. 2015

55+

15%

16%

20%

18%

21%

22%

28%

25%

45-54

18%

17%

19%

19%

19%

18%

20%

19%

35-44

24%

23%

24%

24%

24%

24%

24%

24%

25-34

33%

33%

28%

28%

27%

26%

23%

25%

18-24

10%

11%

9%

11%

9%

9%

6%

7%

The parties were better prepared for the EP elections in 2014, clearly also learning from Tarand. As mentioned above, he secured a mandate but collected only half of the votes of the previous ballot. He was no clear winner in any of the constituencies, but ran second in eight counties, third in four counties (including the wealthy Harju county), fourth in three counties and in the city of Tartu. In other words, he was always ahead of at least one parliamentary party. His total number of votes in 15 counties varied between 1.056 and 5.896, and 552 supporters on the small island of Hiiumaa, so he had sufficient support everywhere. The only place where he had to admit defeat to all four large parties was the capital Tallinn. If in 2009, Tarand had taken the victory in two of the eight city districts (Nõmme and Pirita reflecting primarily Estonian constituencies) and was runnerup after the Centre Party in the other districts. In 2014, he ended fourth only in Nõmme, leaving the Centre Party fifth. The 103.151 e-votes (31.3% of the vote) were distributed nation-wide as follows: the Reform Party 33.385 (32% of e-votes), PRU 19.327 (19%), Tarand 16.003 (16%), Social Democrats 15.552 (15%), and the Centre Party 6.071 (6%) votes. Of the 38.695 e-votes in Tallinn, 11.232 were collected by the Reform Party, 7.920 by PRU, 5.848 by Social Democrats, 5.351 by Tarand and 2.891 by the Centre Party. Of 8.751 e-votes in Tartu, Tarand collected 1.267. The other “independent of all” candidate, Tanel Tulve, collected 620 and 155 e-votes in Tallinn and Tartu respectively. When added to Tarand’s e-votes, this makes 5.971 and 1.322 votes respectively. About one seventh of the urban e-voters are supporters of the independent candidates. In the wealthiest Estonian county – Harju county surrounding Tallinn – the picture is highly intriguing: The Reform Party took the victory with 5.869 e-votes, leaving PRU second with 3.123 votes, Tarand third with 2.527 votes, the Social Democrats fourth with 2.037 votes, the Centre Party fifth with 493 votes and Talve sixth with 437 votes, in other words, in the area of suburbs, small towns and industrial and agricultural companies, Tarand managed to outweigh the Social Democrats and a TV host competed with the Centre Party in appealing to computer users. Concerning the mentality of Estonians (“individualistic, deal-focused, lowcontext in communications and the most reserved of the Baltic nations”29), it is worth turning to the votes collected by the black candidate Abdul Turay mentioned above. He, too, relied on e-votes that were mainly protest votes against the 28 29

Ibid. Richard R. GESTELAND, Cross-cultural Business Behavior: A Guide for Global Management, 5e éd., Copenhagen, Business School Press 2/1, 2012, p. 305.

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leading Social Democrats running in the same constituency. Former party leader and current MEP Ivari Padar collected a mere 117 votes compared to Turay’s 516 in the Tallinn City Centre election district. 314 of these were e-votes, almost the same number of e-votes given to the well-known writers Maimu Berg (386 and 148) and Karl-Martin Sinijärv (311 and 166). Six months later, Abdul Turay’s success continued at the Europeans: Of his 865 votes, 356 came from Tallinn (201 evotes), 103 from Tartu (51). In the mainly Russian-speaking districts he collected 10 votes from Narva, 5 from Kohtla-Järve, 2 from Maardu, and 0 from Sillamäe. The number of e-votes partly explains the results of the Centre Party, too. The small number of the party’s e-votes is directly related to its opposition to the electronic voting it contested from the very beginning, in the local courts at first, and later in Europe, and by organising various conferences. Of course, there are numerous computer-literate party members. But the small proportion of e-votes also confirms the strict party discipline: If we are against it, we will not use it. A new situation emerged prior to the previous EP elections: On 18 January 2014, Savisaar announced that the Centre Party would be the first to send a local Russian-speaking candidate to the EP (thinking of two mandates). The top of the candidate list reveals the applicant: 1. Edgar Savisaar, 2. Jüri Ratas, 3. Mikhail Stalnukhin, a popular politician from Narva and a long-term leader of the local city council. The last or twelfth place in the list was taken by another Russian politician, Yana Toom (until 2006 Jana Litvinova). She had gained recognition as a journalist, Tallinn Deputy Mayor (2010-2011), member of the Tallinn City Council and of Riigikogu (since 2011). At the time, she was in the middle of a court case against the Security Police having accused her in their yearbook of turning the Russianspeaking schools against the government policy. At the height of the election campaign – on April 12 – the Circuit Court cleared Toom. The Security Police was forced to remove the given sentences from their yearbook. The Security Police appealed the decision to the Supreme Court on May 12. The Security Police is considered a hostile institution by local Russians. Its defeat by the persistent defender of the Russian-speaking population and the subsequent appeal naturally also influenced the course of the election campaign in the Centre Party. The whole propaganda apparatus, including Tallinn TV, the party weekly in two languages (but with different content and emphasis), as well as street campaigns, were used to defend Toom. While in previous election campaigns Savisaar had been attacked and needed protection, this time, Yana Toom played the role of the victim. She managed to collect even more votes than Savisaar and, to everyone’s surprise, took the Centre Party’s only mandate. Her victory was based on the Tallinn electorate where she collected 15.442 votes against Savisaar’s 9.624 and Stalnukhin’s 5.187. Toom left Savisaar and Stalnukhin also behind in East-Viru county and in the city of Narva with the respective votes of 5.108, 4.371, 1.608 and 2.032, 1.860 and 498. Toom collected a quarter of e-votes collected by the Centre Party (6.071), 1.517. In East-Viru county, the vice-chairman of the Social Democrats, Yevgeny Ossinovsky (already the Minister of Education and Research) was deliberately placed compete with Stalnukhin. He collected 25 e-votes in Kohtla-Järve (total vote: 99) and 104 e-votes in Narva (631). The post-electoral survey published on November 3, 2014, once again confirmed the differences between the Estonian and average EU voters across all

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segments. While in Europe, men were more active voters at the 2014 Europeans (45%:41%), in Estonia, women cast their ballot more often (37%:36%). While in Estonia, allegedly 16% of 18-24-year-olds and 49% of over-55 voters participated in the election, the respective figures in Europe were 28% and 51%. The three most active voter groups included self-employed entrepreneurs 53% (in Europe 52%), top or middle managers 47% (53%) and pensioners 47% (50%). Only 20% unemployed persons (37%), 21% students (37%) and 22% workers (35%) participated in the election. The Estonians’ preference “I have always voted for them” was higher than the average in Europe with 47% and 45%. Estonians considered voting their “civic responsibility” more often than the average European with 60% and 41% respectively. But only 11% considered it necessary to support the “political party that one feels close to” compared to 22% in Europe. In terms of being “in favour of the EU”, the Estonians reflected the average European level with 13% and 14%. Only 1% of Estonians agreed that voting allowed them to “express their disapproval of the EU politics”, whereas the average European indicator was 7%. The following results show the curious European-mindedness of Estonians, too: 8% of them stated that they are “very interested in European affairs” (6% in Europe), out of which they were primarily interested in the economic growth 33% (40%), the future of pensions 32% (22%), unemployment 28% (45%), the role of the EU on the international scene 24% (20%) and European values and identity 20% (17%). 75% of the respondents feel they “are a citizen of the EU” (average in Europe 63%) and 61% (43%) trusted the institutions of the EU. 66% (51%) considered the EU membership a good thing, 6% (16%) a bad one, 24% (29%) neither good nor bad. The primary reason for abstention was that the “vote has no consequence” with 18% (14%) and “the lack of trust in politics” with 17% (23%)30.

Conclusion: After the EP elections – new democracy and new, pro-Russian Euroscepticism In March 2014, the government coalition broke and the PRU was forced into opposition. In September 2014, the Estonian Free Party (Vabaerakond) was established. It attracted numerous former PRU members who were dissatisfied with the PRU leaders’ “political games”. The Free Party criticized the established party system and addressed those disappointed in politics. In fact, protests against the increasing arrogance and corruption of politicians had begun soon after the closed party landscape had taken shape. But none of the scandals related to those in power had led to any consequences. Supported by President T.H. Ilves, the leading parties were able to control the protest for a long time (20112014). At first, they started discussions and asked for suggestions in social media. The so-called People’s Assembly followed in April 2013. The leading parties selected reform proposals which clearly revealed that a new party was needed to implement a state reform. The media strongly supported the Free Party’s formation. Thus, the doors to parliament were also flung open for the Estonian Con30

European Election 2014 – Post-election survey. Results for Estonia, http://www.europarl.europa. eu/aboutparliament/et/00191653ff/Eurobarometer.html?tab=2014_2 (2 March 2015).

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servative People’s Party ECPP. For years, it had enjoyed the support of the Centre Party which had permitted ECPP leaders to appear on Tallinn TV. In the general elections on 1 March 2015, all established parties lost seats: The Reform Party collected 158.971 votes or 27.7% and 30 seats (– 3 seats), SDE 87.190 votes or 15.2% and 15 (-4) seats, PRU 78.697 votes or 13.7% and 14 (-9) seats. The Centre Party increased its votes to 142.460 or 24.8% and 27 (+1) seats. The main outcome of the elections was the breaking up of the closed political landscape. Two new parties captured seats in parliament: The Free Party collected 49.883 votes or 8.7% and 8 seats, and ECPP received 46.772 votes or 8.1% and 7 seats. The success of the Free Party was secured by popular TV hosts and actors whose statements included a fair amount of populism. But there could be no doubt about their party’s pro-Europeanism. ECPP had to join the ranks of the opposition and maintained its Euro-sceptic attitude. The number of e-voters broke still another record with 177.416 digital votes. 66.539 or 37.5%, were collected by the Reform Party, PRU 30.550 or 17.2%, SDE 29.964 or 16.9%, the Free Party 21.222 or 12%, the Centre Party 13.604 or 7.7%, and ECPP 12.276 or 6.9%. There were no radical changes in the structure of evoters. But the Reform Party only dominated the general elections. At local elections, their electoral results were rather comparable to those of other parties. This discrepancy triggered new speculations about the reliability of e-voting. Their main initiator is once again Edgar Savisaar, the leader of the Centre Party. He set a personal and national record by collecting 25.057 votes with only 1.835 e-votes. Unlike previously, Savisaar acknowledged e-voting while the party’s general attitude to e-voting remained negative. It is worth studying the foreign policy section of the Centre Party’s election programme. Quite like the ULP programme, it avoids mentioning “Russia” but also the “USA”. However, the Centre Party prioritised the development of relations with “BRICS and the Persian Gulf countries” and intensified cooperation with the Nordic states. They want Estonia to take the role of a mediator, for instance in the solution of the “Ukrainian crisis”. During the various party leaders’ debates, the others were constantly demanding Savisaar to condemn the Russian aggression of Ukraine and to stop cooperation with Yedinaya Rossiya – but to no avail. Concrete declarations and steps taken by the politicians are more important than programmes. Before the Bronze Night, a group of Estonian researchers had already studied the developments within the Russian community. They described the emergence of a so-called “reactive identity”31: The Russian speakers distance themselves from Estonia and mentally identify with Russia, especially concerning human rights and foreign policy issues. The political conduct of local Russians was strongly influenced by Estonians. In spite of the continuous propaganda, the organised and uncontrolled violence of the Bronze Night in 2007 must be considered an exception. In December 9, 1995 and 16 March 1996, mass manifestations of local Russians (up to 10.000 participants) against the Estonian authorities had demanded the registration of the Russian Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, the Bronze Night had an impact on the conduct of the people in a deteriorating international climate. International rela31

Raivo VETIK, Gerli NIMMERFELT, Marti TARU, “Reactive Identity versus EU Integration”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 44, no. 5, 2006, p. 1079-1102.

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tions declined after Russia's aggression in the Crimea and East-Ukraine and the subsequent insistence on the defence of the compatriots' rights. The local Russians’ support of Russian foreign policy and the opposition to that of their own country, i.e. Estonia, the European Union and NATO became increasingly evident. For decades, Estonians have managed to influence the Russians' political conduct. The Estonian public sphere, including parliament, is dominated by discussion and the right of expressing opposing opinions. In the Centre Party, the preference of the “Russian rather than the EU foreign policy” has been evident both in Riigikogu and the Tallinn City Council. Since 2013, the connection with the situation in Ukraine is obvious. The political debate has been a public discussion devoid of any form of aggressive confrontation. The Centre Party’s convictions have merely been acknowledged as different from the others. However, on the so-called mob level, there has been one serious incident: At the Slavonic cultural festival in Sillamäe on 24 May, the Ukrainian groups were publicly humiliated. However, the Estonian public was not informed about the incident, since Estonian media avoid publication of such topics. But after the election of Yana Toom as MEP, the situation changed. On 17 July 2014, she revealed the specific Russians view to the Estonian public when she rejected the position of the EP Liberal faction on the Ukrainian peace plan. Together with Tatyana Zhdanok from Latvia, she voted against it and supported the Russian standpoint. Toom insisted she was respecting the attitude of her voters. The ensuing disapproval was also shared within the Centre Party. It was calmed down by Edgar Savisaar. On 2 August 2014, he reaffirmed that MEPs may vote according to their conscience. Toom’s subsequent deviations from the faction lines have been ignored by the Estonian media, however. Still, Yana Toom and the majority of her supporters must be considered Europhobes: They live in Estonia and thus in the EU, but they embrace the views and behaviour of Eurosceptics. Because of the opposition to the EU foreign policy and the support of the neighbouring state’s foreign policy, this may be called hard Euroscepticism combined with the support of the foreign policy of a foreign country – or possibly foreign-oriented Anti-EUscepticism. Only a fraction of MEP Toom’s later statements expressing the same views were reflected in the Estonian media. This also applies to decisions of the Centre Party faction in parliament. Their refusal to support the new defence concept (of 11 February 2015), for instance, was mentioned without any further comments. The new foreign policy priorities of the election programme were not commented upon by the opponents and were discussed only by a few Estonian Centre Party members. At the 1rst March 2015, Riigikogu elections, MEP Toom ran, as expected, in the East-Viru county bordering the Russian frontier. Her campaign concentrated on the harsh criticism of the Estonian leaders (incl. a reminder of the Bronze Night) and the EU sanctions policy and was broadcasted on Russian TV channels. She collected 11.574 votes, i.e., one third of East-Viru county’s total vote (34.863). The top SDE candidate, the Minister of Education Jevgeni Ossinovski, collected 2.874 votes. In 2011, Toom had won her seat in parliament in the first constituency of Tallinn. The top candidate there was her successor as a deputy mayor and as a promoter of the Russian language education. Mihhail Kõlvart also collected a record number of votes: 10.996. In other words, in the framework

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of the general reinforcement of the Central Party’s position, the number of voters backing politicians who openly support the Kremlin’s aggressive politics, also has increased. But in Estonia, the future of this trend is unclear. Savisaar controls every activity of Toom, Kõlvart, Stalnukhin etc. as members of the Centre Party. It is difficult to predict the future of this party after the 65-years old (born in 1950) Savisaar will leave the political arena. It is generally expected that his already old crown princes will adopt a clear pro-Estonian position. Given this situation, it would be irrational for pro-Russian activists to leave the party. Consequently, they would have to re-think their foreign-based Euroscepticism. Presently, voting for Toom or Kõlvart as a singular expression of protest (against Estonian politics, the EU etc.) without demonstrations, pickets, collecting of signatures (a popular form of protest in the 1990s), etc., is comparable with the vote of Indrek Tarand. In both cases, there was no danger of the increase in strength of Euroscepticism. The loss of a couple out of the six Estonian seats is not considered a great misfortune for the leading EU-loyal parties. Furthermore, it is compensated for by sending dozens of people to the structural units of the European Commission. Such a vote seems to be an intellectual game for Estonians, especially for smart e-protesters (and once every five years!). In the case of the local Russians, it is too early to draw conclusions. The upholding of the given form of Euroscepticism is limited to the Russian-language information space. The Estonian government decided to launch a new Russian TV channel in 2015. Clearly, the decision of the Russian-speaking population –to side with the truth of Europe or the Kremlin – will still depend on the future changes in Russian politics.

L’ESTONIE: LA LOYAUTÉ À L’UE BASÉE SUR LE PARTI POLITIQUE, UN EUROSCEPTICISME BASÉ SUR « NOTRE TYPE DANS LE PARLEMENT EUROPÉEN » ET UNE ATTITUDE RUSSE PAS ENCORE CLAIRE A l´occasion des référendums des pays de l´Europe de l´est sur l´adhésion à l´union européenne, l´assentiment européen était le plus faible en Estonie. Cependant, de manière intéressante, il s´agissait moins d´un sentiment antieuropéen dans le pays que d´une méfiance vis-à-vis des élites politiques estoniennes. A l´occasion des élections européennes, les estoniens allaient exprimer clairement leur méfiance vis-à-vis des quatre grands partis (trois d´entre eux formant une coalition gouvernementale au plan national, le quatrième contrôlant la capitale Tallin). Ils votèrent pour des candidats indépendants, parmi eux des eurosceptiques. En 2004, l´opposant politique Toomas Hendrik Ilves (depuis 2006 président de l´Estonie) obtenait un tiers des voix. En 2009 et 2014, Indrek Tarand – un indépendant critique de l´UE – obtenait un siège au parlement européen avec 25 et 19 % du total des suffrages. Le soutien de Tarand par les votants en ligne – 31 % des votants – fut remarquable. Les votants en ligne d´Estonie sont pour la plupart d´âge moyen ou âgés : en clair, ils sont expérimentés, avec un bon niveau de formation, indépendants ou employés et disposant d´un revenu suffisant. De plus,

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ils sont actifs politiquement, et prêts à soutenir non seulement les partis qui se sont comportés loyalement envers les institutions de l´UE, mais aussi des candidats protestataires. En conséquence, en 2014, une politicienne ouvertement prorusse a obtenu un siège au Parlement européen et un parti eurosceptique fut élu au Parlement estonien en 2015.

ESTLAND: PARTEIPOLITISCH BASIERTE EU-LOYALITÄT, „UNSER MANN IM EUROPÄISCHEN PARLAMENT“ BASIERTER EUROSKEPTIZISMUS UND EINE NOCH UNKLARE RUSSISCHE HALTUNG Bei den Referenden in den osteuropäischen Ländern über die Mitgliedschaft in der Europäischen Union war die Zustimmung zur EU in Estland am niedrigsten. Aber merkwürdigerweise war sie weniger ein Zeichen für den Euroskeptizismus des Landes als vielmehr für das Misstrauen gegenüber der estnischen politischen Elite. Auch in den Europawahlen brachten die Esten ihre kritische Haltung gegenüber den vier größten Parteien (drei von ihnen bilden eine Regierungskoalition auf der nationalen Ebene, die vierte kontrolliert die Hauptstadt Tallinn) klar zum Ausdruck. Sie stimmten für unabhängige Kandidaten, darunter auch Euroskeptiker. 2004 erhielt der Oppositionspolitiker Toomas Hendrik Ilves (seit 2006 Präsident Estlands) ein Drittel der Stimmen. 2009 und 2014 gewann der unabhängige EU-kritische Indrek Tarand einen Sitz im Europaparlament mit 25% und 19% der Gesamtstimmen. Bemerkenswert ist die Unterstützung Tarands durch e-Wähler, die 2014 31% der gesamten Wählerschaft stellten. Estnische EWähler sind meist mittleren Alters oder älter, d.h., sie sind erfahren, mit guter Bildung, selbständig oder angestellt und verfügen über ein ausreichendes Einkommen. Darüber hinaus sind sie politisch aktiv und bereit, nicht nur die Parteien zu unterstützen, die sich immer loyaler zu den EU-Institutionen verhalten, sondern auch Protestkandidaten. Im der Folge gewann 2014 eine offen prorussische Politikerin einen Sitz im Europaparlament, und eine euroskeptische Partei wurde 2015 ins estnische Parlament gewählt.

RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS IN LATVIA: BETWEEN BRUSSELS, RIGA AND MOSCOW JURIS ROZENVALDS The aim of this paper is to examine the attitudes of Latvian Russian-speakers towards European integration as a part of their identity. Diversity of social contexts and choices inevitably results in the multiplicity of a group’s identities based on the affiliation to a certain society and/or state. Different identities tend to overlap and shape complex and multi-layered combinations interacting with each other. This paper is based on the assumption that pro- and anti-European identities of Latvian Russian-speakers can only be properly analyzed in the context of their attitude towards Russia on the one hand, and their interaction with the Latvian ethnolinguistic community and the state of Latvia on the other. In addition, we will demonstrate that combinations of changing identities may change substantially over time. The internal and external causes of such transformations shall be investigated.

1. Russian-Speakers in Latvia: A Historical Background In the course of history, an ethnically and culturally varied society has formed in Latvia. Representatives of about 150 ethnicities live here. With regard to ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity, Latvia is the most diverse country in the Baltic Sea region. Only in terms of religious fractionalization, Latvia lags behind Germany1. On the other hand, according to the 2011 census, the vast majority of Latvia’s population (93.2%) belongs to the four largest ethnic groups: Latvians (62.1%), Russians (26.9%), Belarusians (3.3%), and Ukrainians (2.2%)2. Since the representatives of the latter three nationalities as well as a substantial part of the other minorities generally speak Russian in their everyday life, the most significant dividing line in Latvian society runs between those who speak mostly Latvian at home (56.3% according to the 2011 census) and Russian speakers (33.8%). 79.7% of the non-Latvians speak Russian at home3. 1

2

3

Alberto ALESINA et.al., “Fractionalization”, Journal of Economic Growth, 8, 2002, p. 155-194, http://www.researchgate.net/publicliterature.PublicLiterature.search.html?type=keyword& search-keyword= Alberto+Alesina+Fractionalization&search-abstract=&search-journal= &search=Search (21 March 2015) LR Central Statistical Bureau, Census Results 2011. Permanent Residents of Latvia by Ethnicity, Gender and Age Group on March 1, 2011, http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/lv/tautassk_ 11/tautassk_11__tsk2011/ ?tablelist=true&rxid =3159b564-85b8-4f9e-abe1-e354de68303b (27 March 2015). LR Central Statistical Bureau, Census Results 2011. Distribution of Permanent Residents in statistical Regions, Republic Level Cities and Districts by Language Used at Home on 1 March 2011, http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/lv/tautassk_11/tautassk_11__tsk2011/?tablelist=true&rxid=3 159b564-85b8-4f9e-abe1-e354de68303b, (March 27, 2015).

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Russians appeared in Latvia in important numbers since the second half of the 17th century, when religiously repressed Old Believers from Russia settled in Latgale, in the Eastern part of the country. Since the second half of the 19th century, Russians have constituted a siginificant minority in every big Latvian city, especially in Riga. However, the most far-reaching changes in Latvia’s ethnic structure occurred during and after the Second World War. Between 1939 and 1945, Latvia almost completely lost two historical minorities, namely, the Germans and the Jews. The repressions of the 1940s, the flight and emigration of refugees to Western countries as well as post-war deportations dramatically reduced the number of Latvians in Latvia. The postwar demographic growth rate (plus 230,000 in 1959 compared to 1935) was almost exclusively due to labour migration from other, mainly Slavic, republics of the Soviet Union (see Table 1). The settling of a workforce in the Baltic States turned out to be one of the primary objectives of the Soviet imperialist policy. Therefore, the share of Eastern Slavic settlers among the total population of Latvia grew rapidly: from 12.1 % in 1935 to 30.9 % in 1959, 36.1% in 1970, and 42% in 19894. Although the dominant ideological discourse in the Soviet Union was internationalist and based on the idea of the “friendship of peoples” in reality, in the former USSR, Russians enjoyed substantial privileges concerning language usage, education, and access to leading positions in the state apparatus. In Soviet times, there was a profound difference between Russian-speaking communities and the native population in the Baltic Republics in terms of sources of information and value orientation. To a large extent, this was the result of the poor language skills of the republics’ non-native population. In 1989, only 20 % of the Russians in Latvia had a fluent command of the Latvian language5. Table 1: Migration to and from Latvia, 1951 – 2000 (in 1,000)6 Years

4 5 6

Arrived

Departed

Net migration

1951-1955

212.0

161.8

50.2

1956-1960

165.2

145.8

19.4

1961-1965

180,6

119,0

61,6

1966-1970

146.8

101.8

45.0

1971-1975

202.0

141.0

61.0

1976-1980

187.2

149.6

37.6

1981-1985

171.3

131.7

39.6

1986-1990

149.8

122.9

26.9

1991-1995

30.8

168.2

–137.3

1996-2000

12.2

47.0

–34.8

LR Central Statistical Bureau, Latvian residents by ethnicity, http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/lv/ Sociala/Sociala__ikgad__iedz__iedzskaits/IS0070.px/?rxid=3159b564-85b8-4f9e-abe1-e354de 68303b, (March 27, 2015) Svetlana DJAČKOVA, Latvian Language Proficiency and the Integration of Society, Riga, Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS, 2003, p. 15. Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/lv/Sociala/Sociala __ikgad__iedz__migr/?tablelist=true&rxid=cdcb978c-22b0-416a-aacc-aa650d3e2ce0 (2 March 2015).

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From the Soviet time, Latvia has inherited a Russian-speaking community which, in comparison with the Russian-speaking communities in Estonia and Lithuania, has stood out for the relatively greatest confidence in its power and influence in society. If the self-assessment of a group is placed on a scale of 0 to 1, where 0 is the complete lack of influence, and 1 is a completely dominating influence, the Russian-speakers of Latvia assessment their influence at 0.51. This is higher than the Russian-speakers’ self-assessment in Lithuania (0.49) and Estonia (0.45)7. The Soviet legacy in Latvia’s demographic situation and the mutual relationship of ethnic communities create a contradictory image. On the one hand, compared with the other Baltic republics, Latvia suffered the most: In the last years of Soviet power, Latvians constituted only slightly more than half of the total population of Latvia. They were a minority in all the largest cities. On the other hand, several objective factors facilitate the stabilisation and normalization of interethnic relations. To start with, in comparison with Estonia, where the ethnolinguistic structure of the population is similar to that of Latvia, the non-Latvians are spread across the territory of the country more evenly. Objectively, this simplifies the possibilities of communication between the different ethno-linguistic groups. There are no profound differences between the communities in Latvia regarding their social and economic standing8. Traditionally, the number of mixed marriages has been relatively high in Latvia; and it has not decreased significantly after the restoration of independence. These marriages constitute important ties not only between individuals but also between broader social groups. Considering social integration, it is important to take into account that, traditionally, the bilingual segment of society’s culture in Latvia is significantly greater than that in the neighbouring Lithuania and Estonia. According to M. Ehala, in Lithuania and Estonia, it currently includes about 18 %, while in Latvia, it comprises more than 40 % of the population9.

2. Latvian Russian-Speakers in the Course of the “Singing revolution” In the second half of the 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev came into power in the Kremlin, and the liberalization of the Soviet regime started. In the course of the 1988 opposition mass movement, the Popular Front of Latvia was established alongside Rahvarinne in Estonia and Sajūdis in Lithuania. The first generation of leaders of the Popular Front of Latvia emphasized the priority of the Latvian nation as one of the basic tenets. On the other hand, they were well aware of the post-war demographic changes. At the beginning of the “Singing Revolution”, they stressed the solidarity of all inhabitants of Latvia on the road to increasing selfgovernance within a renewed Soviet Union, and – since the beginning of summer 7 8 9

Мартин ЭХАЛА, Анастасия ЗАБРОДСКАЯ, “Этнолингвистическая витальность этнических групп стран Балтии”, Диаспоры, 1, 2011, p. 30. Mihails HAZANS, “Ethnic Minorities in the Latvian Labour Market, 1997 – 2009: Outcomes, Integration Drivers and Barriers”, in: Nils MUIŽNIEKS, (ed.), How Integrated is Latvian Society? An Audit of Successes, Failures, and Challenges, Riga, University of Latvia Press, 2010, p. 141. Martin EHALA, “Ethnic and national identity in the Baltic states”, Presentation at the seminar on preparation of the collective monograph, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia (Riga), November 23, 2012.

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1989 – to the recovery of national independence. They were quite successful in addressing the Russian-speaking population. In the course of the “Singing Revolution”, it became clear that the Russian-speaking part of the Latvian society was far from being politically united. Russian speakers were not en masse hostile to the hopes of ethnic Latvians. Sociological surveys confirmed that in 1990, 39% of all minority respondents, despite anxieties about the emphasis on the priority of the Latvian nation, supported Latvia’s independence10. Only 20 – 30% of the Russian speakers supported the efforts of the conservative forces to return to the status quo of the Soviet era. Generally, approximately one third of the members of minorities adopted a neutral stance. The referendum on the independence of Latvia provided evidence. It took place on March 3, 1991, as a countermeasure to the referendum on saving the Soviet Union organized by the USSR central authorities later that month. In the Latvian poll, all permanent residents from the age of 18 were invited to participate and answer the question “Are you for a democratic and independent Republic of Latvia?” The share of eligible voters who favoured independence (64.51%) was significantly (around 12 %) higher than the share of Latvians in the total population (52.05% according to the 1989 census). This result indicates that a significant segment of the minority population – at least one fourth – supported Latvia’s independence. Considering this indicator, Latvia outdid Lithuania and Estonia. In Lithuania, the share of the electorate voting for independence corresponded with the number of ethnic Lithuanians among the total population. In Estonia, the share of votes for independence was only a few percentage points higher than the share of Estonians among the population (see Table 2). Table 2: Votes for the Independence of the Baltic Republics (February – March, 1991)11 Voter turnout (%)

1

Voted for independence (%)

Specific weight of titular nations (1989 census, %)

Difference between 3 and 4

5

Out of participants

Out of total population

2

3

4

Estonia

82.9

77.8

64.5

61.5

+ 3.0

Latvia

87.6

73.7

64.5

52.0

+12.5

Lithuania

84.7

90.2

76.5

79.6

–3.1

3. Modes of Identity: “Hope for Return”, “Cultural Trauma”, “Normality” and “Minority” In order to properly interpret the collective behavior of the main ethnolinguistic groups in Latvia since the beginning of the “Singing Revolution”, some concep10 11

Brigita ZEPA, “Sabiedriskā doma pārējas periodā Latvijā: latviešu un cittautiešu uzskatu dinamika (1989-1992)”, Latvijas Zinātņu akadēmijas vēstis, A daļa, 10, p. 543. Source: Dieter NOHLEN, Philip STÖVER, Elections in Europe: A data handbook, Nomos Publishers, Berlin, 2010.

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tual distinctions have to be introduced. They are related to different aspects of identity. First of all, the structures of collective identity developed in Latvia as well as in the other Baltic states based on the collective experience of the Soviet time. Examining this identity, two main phenomena must be mentioned: the „cultural trauma” and the „hope for return”. In this context, „hope for return” describes the widespread intention of the Baltic Nations to return to Europe. In 1997, the Estonian researcher M. Lauristin stated about the Baltic peoples that “their wish to be accepted again by the West and to be recognized as an integral part of the Western cultural realm is a more substantial driving force in their development than mere economic or political motivation could ever be”12. The desire to return to Europe was an important driving force of the mobilization of society, especially of its Latvian speaking part. The readiness to make certain sacrifices in order to achieve this goal, and at the same time, in the openness of society for pressure from the Western democracies, were clearly prooved this attitude. The notion of a „cultural trauma” qualifies the collective shock caused by changes which are sudden and rapid, radical, deep, touching the core, and perceived as imposed, exogenous, coming from the outside13. It is very helpful for conceptualizing the collective experience of Latvians after the decades of Soviet occupation, on the one hand, as well as the collective experience of Latvian Russian-speakers who lost the privileges they had enjoyed during the Soviet era in the course of the dramatic changes since the early 1990s. The next conceptual distinction useful for the purposes of this paper is the one between “normality” and “minority”. With respect to ethnolinguistic groups, “normality” means belonging to the dominant culture, to the group (which does not necessarily constitute the majority of the population) with the most political, economic, and symbolic power. Other ethnic and cultural groups claiming recognition of their language, cultural as well as political and economic needs and rights may be considered “minorities” (or “abnormalities”). The “normality – minority” distinction is closely connected with the structure of identity. With a “normal” identity, ethnic consciousness and questions of the survival of language, education in the native tongue, sometimes religion, etc., usually play a less important role than social or economic questions and the identification with the state. Ethnic Latvians had had centuries of experience as a minority (with a short historical period of independent statehood between the World Wars). It was deepened by the traumatic experience of the Soviet time. On the one hand, this caused the extremely high level of mass participation during the years of the “singing revolution”. On the other hand, it interfered with adjusting to the new situation where Latvians acquired a leading role in the political and economic life of the renewed state. Furthermore, in the sense of the relative ethnic potential of title ethnic groups (which is calculated by comparing the title nation’s selfassessment with the Russian-speaking minority’s ethnic potential in its assessment), Latvians attribute only a small predominance over the Russian12 13

Marju LAURISTIN, “Contexts of Transition”, in: Marju LAURISTIN, Peeter VIHALEMM, Karl E. ROSENGREN, Lennart WEIBULL, (eds.), Return to the Western World. Cultural and Political Perspectives of the Estonian Post-Communist Transition, Tartu, Tartu University Press, 1997, p. 29. Piotr SZTOMPKA, “Cultural Trauma: The Other Face of Social Change”, European Journal of Social Theory, 3, 2000, p. 452.

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speakers of Latvia to themselves (0.10). In this respect they lag significantly behind Estonians (0.23) and Lithuanians (0.20)14. As researchers of the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences conclude more than a decade after the renewal of Latvia’s independence, “Latvians in their country … feel as an endangered majority”15. Due to the relatively low self-assessment, the aforementioned ‘minority complex’ expressed itself in an exclusionary political culture. Among the Latvian part of society and political elite, the attitude was widespread that the post-war immigrants were not entitled to make decisions in strategic matters of Latvian development. In the early 1990s, 49 % of the Latvians believed only pre-war citizens and their descendants should be allowed to participate in the elections of the restored country. For comparison, 44 % of Estonians and only 12 % of Lithuanians gave the same answer. This clearly indicates a link between the level of ‘cultural trauma’ (which in this case is inversely proportional to the proportion of the title nation in the total number of population in the final years of the Soviet era) and the support of an exclusionary political culture16. Such convictions turned out to be viable. In 2013, for instance, 60.3 % of the Latvian respondents agreed with the statement that the identity and culture of national minorities should be supported and strengthened in Latvia. At the same time, only 37.5 % of the Latvian respondents agreed with the statement that a more active participation of other ethnic minorities in the state administration would promote Latvia’s development17. The identity of Russian-speaking inhabitants of Latvia during the last years of Soviet power may be characterized as an example of a “normal” identity. This is partly due to the historically traditional the prevalence of self-identification with the state (“Empire”) and the Orthodox Christianity over ethnic components of identity, but also to the afore-mentioned privileges of Russian-speakers. Last but not least, they perceived the Soviet Union as a single country where Russians formed the majority. Therefore, the the nature of the questions dominating the self-conception of Russian-speakers in the late eighties and early nineties was not an ethnic, but a social and economic one. The role of the Russian language in society and education seemed self-evident and created what could be called “normality inertia”. In the early 1990s, the attitudes of most Russian-speakers were on a different “level” compared with the Latvians’ demands for the preservation of the Latvian language and culture as well as the independence of Latvia – or, at least, were not directly contradictory to them. This may explain, at least partly, the position and attitude of the majority of Russian-speakers during the “Singing Revolution”. On the other hand, the policies of the re-established state of Latvia quickly changed the “inertia of normality” to traumatic consciousness. As a result, both large ethnolinguistic groups of Latvia show insecurity, collective ethnic fear and a sense of threat to their ethnolinguistic identity. The identity of Latvian Russian-speakers changed from “normality” to “minority” faster than Latvians

14 15 16 17

Мартин ЭХАЛА, Анастасия ЗАБРОДСКАЯ, op.cit., p. 30. Brigita ZEPA et al., Etnopolitiskā spriedze Latvijā: konflikta risinājuma meklējumi, Riga, Baltijas sociālo zinātņu institūts, 2005, p. 6. Richard ROSE, William MALEY, “Nationalities in the Baltic States: A Survey Study”, Studies in Public Policy, no. 222, 1994, Glasgow, Scotland. Survey of Latvian residents, “lnequality, Integration, and Sustainable Development”, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia. TNS Latvia, May-June 2013, n= 1001.

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were able to overcome their “minority complex”, and this may endanger the stability of society.

4. Skidding integration For a sustainable development, issues of integration and consolidation are particularly important in diverse societies like the Latvian. Unfortunately, the attempts at integration devised during the “Singing Revolution” were not developed any further. On the contrary, much of what had been attained was lost in the first years after the restoration of independence. Ethno-nationalism became the basis for ethnopolitics. Contrary to pre-referendum promises and the programme of the Popular Front then in force, in October 1991, the Latvian parliament adopted a decision to restore citizenship only to those inhabitants of Latvia who had held it before 17 June 1940, and their descendants. Even though citizenship was renewed regardless of ethnicity, this decision constituted the basis of the division of Latvia’s inhabitants into “us” and “them”. The latter were almost solely post-war non-Latvian settlers. This step had a destructive impact: It provided the basis of the conviction still widespread among Russian-speakers, namely, that they had clearly been deceived. During the first years of restored independence, Latvia did not have a unified integration policy. Among the Latvian society and political elite, the conviction was widespread that the relations between Latvians and Russian-speakers were to be resolved by the emigration of non-Latvians to the homelands of their ancestors, i.e., primarily to Russia. Such hopes were fostered by the fact that more than 137.000 people (mostly Russia’s military personnel and their families) left Latvia between 1991 and 1995 (see Table 1). These hopes have not been fulfilled, however. Still, neither among the political elite groups nor within society at large, a consensus has been formed on the methods and desired results of integration. As the experience of the last twenty-five years has shown, integration only became an important issue on the political agenda due to external pressure. In the years of the “Singing Revolution”, it was the pressure of conservative forces in Moscow and their satellites in Latvia, and in the late nineties, the crisis in relations with Russia and Latvia’s desire to join the European Union (EU). In this situation, the Western partners strongly demanded the Latvian political elite to take measures to consolidate society, threatening to leave Latvia without political support from the West otherwise. Integration became the “unloved child” of the Latvian ruling political elite. Therefore, it is not surprising that integration and consolidation measures were not implemented continuously: „Flows” were followed by „ebbs”. Integration policies were inconsistent: Successes in some fields were usually followed by drawbacks in others. Last but not least, the pronounced paternalism of Latvian integration policy needs to be mentioned. The tendency to resolve minority related issues without the participation of minorities, in turn, resulted from the aforementioned exclusionary political culture. With regard to the Latvian Russian speakers, one of the main reasons for failures of state led integration was the attempt to carry out what could be called “nonrecognition” policy, namely, to act as if they had never existed.

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This approach proved ineffective in the face of the growing consolidation of the political representatives of Russian speakers and the constantly growing electoral success of pro-Russian parties (see Table 3). Over the last decade, the Latvian-speaking political and intellectual elite responded by increasingly emphasizing the priority of Latvian ethnic values as the main precondition for the consolidation of society. This is proven, for example, by initiatives to strengthen the priority of the Latvian language and ethnic culture in the Constitution, and — paradoxical as it may seem — the guidelines of social integration adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers in 2011, which were strongly marked by paternalism and ethnocentricity. All this has served to promote public polarisation and the radicalisation of attitudes. The difference of opinions existing in society was clearly demonstrated by the referendum of 18 February 2012, about a proposal to establish Russian as a second official language. 24.88 % of the referendum participants voted in favour of this proposal. Their number approximately corresponds to the proportion of Russian-speaking citizens of Latvia of the total number of citizens18. Due to the extreme sensitivity of Latvians regarding language issues, the negative outcome of the referendum was known in advance. In the light of this situation, the real cause of the referendum needs to be questioned. It seems plausible that that most of the 273.347 Latvian citizens who voted “yes”, actually did not vote for the recognition of the Russian language but rather for the recognition of the Russian-speaking community of Latvia as a legitimate opponent whose interests ought to be taken into account in order to reach a rational compromise. Table 3: Support for Russian Parties in Latvian National Elections19 1993

1995

1998

2002

2006

2010

2011

2014

10

12,4

14,1

20,1

22,5

27,5

29,1

24,6

Evidently, there is a conflict of ethnopolitical attitudes in Latvia. However, it is restricted to two important aspects: “Firstly, the ethnopolitical issues are not on the daily agenda of the respondents; secondly, if steering clear of the ethnopolitical problems, the opinions of Latvians and non-Latvians about today’s public profile are not significantly different. Social and economic problems are identical for Latvians and Russians alike”20. The situation is complicated by the divide separating Latvia’s the political elite: elite groups oriented towards ethnolinguistic groups exploit the existing discord in order to achieve their political aims. Contrary to the predominant attitude of the political elite, survey data show that overall, in both the Latvian and the Russian-speaking communities, the dominating perception of the other community is positive: 69.3 % of the respondents answering questions in Latvian believe that they can trust the local Russians; 67.6 % believe that the local Russians treat the Latvians well; 62.9 % agree with the suggestion that the local Russians wish to co-operate with Latvians. In the Russian-speaking community of Latvia, opinions are similar: 74.4 % of the re18 19 20

Referendum on the Draft Law, “Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia”, Central Election Commission of Latvia, http://www.cvk.lv/pub/public/30287.html, (27 March 2015). Source: Central Election Commission of Latvia. http://www.cvk.lv (2 March 2015). Brigita ZEPA et al., Etnopolitiskā spriedze Latvijā, op.cit., p. 42.

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spondents answering questions in Russian believe that they can trust Latvians; 63.8 % say that Latvians treat Russians well; 64.9 % believe that Latvians wish to co-operate with Russians. Only 22 % of those answering in Latvian and 17 % of those responding in Russian consider the representatives of the Latvian community aggressive21. The attitudes between the two largest ethnolinguistic groups of Latvian society – Latvians and Russian-speakers – are potentially favourable towards communication and co-operation. In 2013, respondents were asked to choose among three scenarios of ethnocultural development of Latvia: the idea of a Latvian Latvia that would involve the limiting of other languages and cultures; an integrative model entailing the prioritizing of Latvian language and culture while at the same time providing support of the development of other languages and cultures, and, finally, the melting pot model where the relationship between languages and cultures would be a matter of free competition. A substantial majority (71.5 %) of the respondents favored the integrative model. Only 8.8% supported the idea of a Latvian Latvia, and 19.7% favoured the free competition of languages and cultures. Furthermore, the compromise model was supported by a majority of both Latvians and Russians (78.0% and 62.4%, respectively)22.

5. West or East? After the restoration of independence, integration into European and Transatlantic structures became one of the cornestones of Latvian politics. In the beginning of 1995, the Saeima, the Latvian Parliament, adopted foreign policy guidelines whose main objectives were Latvia’s integration into the EU and NATO. In June 1995, the Association Agreement between Latvia and the EU was signed, and in October Latvia submitted its application for accession to the European Union. In 1999, two years later than neighbouring Estonia, Latvia was invited to accession negotiations which started in February 2000. Topping Latvia's political and economic agenda, EU accession has become one of the driving forces behind the country's adjustment and reform efforts. On the other hand, it has to be pointed out that in the late nineties, EU accession was an elite project carried out in a topdown manner and only partly supported by the general public. Together with Estonia, Latvia had the lowest public support of EU accession among the candidate states of the 2004 enlargement. The vision of Europe in people’s minds slowly but surely transformed from an abstract and idealistic hope towards a more concrete – though sometimes contradictional – understanding of the reality of the European Union and the obligations connected with membership. “On the Road to Civil Society”, a survey conducted by the Baltic Social Science lnstitute, shows that between 1995 and 1997, the number of those identetifying with Europe decreased from 30% among citizens and non-citizens alike to 13% percent among citizens of Latvia and to 10% among non-citizens23. In 2000, these numbers decreased even further; to 11% and 21 22 23

Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, SKDS, Survey of Latvian residents for the “Audit of Democracy 2005–2014”, April 2014, n=1000. Survey of Latvian residents, “lnequality, Integration, and Sustainabie Development”, op.cit. Pētījumu un rīcības programma, “Ceļā uz pilsonisku sabiedrību”. Atskaite. 1. un 2. posma rezultāti, Rīga, Baltijas Datu Nams, 2001, p. 60.

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7% respectively24. One of the main sources of the euroscepticisrn among Latvians was their defensive nationalism, i.e., their fear that Latvian ethnic identity could be endangered within the European Union, and that for them, the European Union would be nothing but a new edition of the Soviet Union. As focus group discussions organized by the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences from June to September 2003 showed, Latvians expressed concern about the intervention of EU institutions in language usage questions. They feared that the role of the Latvian language within the Russian community would decrease. The sense of belonging to Europe was more frequently expressed by elderly Latvians, wealthy citizens and non-citizens alike, as well as respondents of the younger generation irrespective of ethnicity, language and citizenship status25. For many, especially middle-aged, non-citizens, the sense of belonging to Europe was affected by their negative attitude towards the state of Latvia due to their legal status. At the same time, 43% of the citizens and even more non-citizens (44%) considered the accession to the European Union one of the pressing problems of Latvia in the end of nineties, although by no means as important as the increase of the living standard, the fight against corruption, and the rule of law stressed by 96% – 99% of the respondents. We also need to mention that in 1997, only 22% of the almost entirely Russianspeaking non-citizens regarded the accession to NATO a pressing problem. Contrary to this, in the same year, 35% of the non-citizens supported idea that Latvia should join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with Russia. Taking into account that this idea was supported by 26% of Russian-speaking citizens (23 % had no answer) and rejected by 88% of the Latvian-speaking citizens of Latvia (with only 6% not able to formulate clear opinion), one may draw least to two conclusions: Firstly, in the end of the nineties, the attitudes towards a political project led by Russia clearly divided the Latvian society in two parts, i.e., Latvian speakers and Russian speakers. Russia was an important center of gravity for Russian speakers in Latvia, even though the number non-Latvians who answered that Latvia would never join Russia constantly grew in the nineties (35% in 1991, 53% in 1994, 56% in 1997)26. Secondly, Russian-speakers in Latvia had clearly different attitudes towards the European Union on the one hand, and NATO, on the other. While the European Union was mostly considered in social economic and humanitarian terms, NATO was overburdened with ideological and geopolitical contexts inherited from Soviet times. The correctness of the aforementioned statement may be proved on the basis of the voting results of the referendum on the EU membership held in Latvia on September 20, 2003. Despite widespread euroscepticism, Latvia achieved the highest turnout (71.49%) of all Eastern European countries holding referendums in 2003 and achieved 66.97 % “Yes” votes27. The suprisingly positive vote of Latvians may be explained as the success of the highest Latvian officials (e.g. President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga) who stressed geopolitical and security considerations 24 25 26 27

Projekts “Ceļā uz pilsonisku sabiedrību – 2000”. Rīga, Baltijas Sociālo Zinātņu institūts, 2001, p. 43. Latvijas iedzīvotāju motivācija un ekspektācijas attiecībā pret Latvijas iestāšanos Eiropas Savienībā Baltijas Sociālo Zinātņu institūts, Rīga. 2004, p. 23, http://www.bszi.lv/dowm loads/news/ES_kvalit.pdf, (21 March 2015). Pētījumu un rīcības programma, “Ceļā uz pilsonisku sabiedrību”, p. 60-66. Central Election Commission of Latvia, http://www.cvk.lv/pub/public/28032.html, (22 March 2015).

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when addressing the general public shortly before the referendum. On the other hand, the negative vote of the Russian-speaking citizens of Latvia was widely discussed in Latvian media and society. Compared to 57% positive votes among Latvians, only a meagre 20 % of Russian-speaking citizens favoured the membership of the European Union, 44% voted against (compared with 18% of the Latvians). 36% of the Russian speakers did not participate in the referendum (compared with 24% of the Latvians)28. The fact that as far back as 2002, Russian speakers in Latvia expressed a more positive attitude towards EU membership than Latvians (see Graph. 1) contradicts with attempts to explain the negative vote of Latvia’s Russian-speaking citizens on the basis of their attachment to Russia and their nostalgia for the Soviet past. A plausible explanation of this fact must take into account the dissatisfaction of Latvia’s Russophones with the official policies of Latvian authorities, especially in connection with the education law provisions adopted in 1998. It had initially ordered the language of instruction to be used in public secondary schools to be only Latvian from 2004. The dissatisfaction culminated with mass protest actions in 2003-2004. In this connection, there were certain hopes among Latvia’s Russophones that EU institutions would apply pressure to Latvia as a candidate state to soften cultural and citizenship policies in general, and school reform requirements, in particular. These hopes failed, and the reaction was the negative vote at the referendum. Survey data show that in 2014, a majority of Russians in Latvia (37.2%) still were more confident about the Commonwealth of Independent States than about EU and NATO. In comparison with 2004, this support increased. On the other hand, during the last ten years which Latvia spent in the European Union and NATO, trust in both organizations increased among the representatives of Latvia’s biggest ethnolinguistic groups. Even more impressing is the growing confidence in NATO.

28

Inese ŠŪPULE, “The referendum on Latvia’s Accession to the European Union: Analysis and Conclusions”, Ethnicity Studies, 2004, p. 60.

JURIS ROZENVALDS

230 Graph 1: Support for EU accession in Latvia29

In 2004, 51.8% of ethnic Latvians and only 17.6% of Latvian Russians had expressed their trust in NATO. In 2014, these numbers increased to 66% among ethnic Latvians and 30.6 % among Latvian Russians30. The aforementioned data permit the following conlusions: Firstly, the process of differentiation between western and eastern oriented Russians has continued within the Russian-speaking community, positions have become more clearly articulated; the number of undecided respondents has decreased. Secondly, the younger generation of Latvian Russian-speakers is much more open towards Europe than the older one. For example, 33.3 % of the 18-24 years age group and 30.3 % of 25-34 years age group of Russian-speakers admit to a sense of belonging to Europe, compared with 17.5% of the 55-64 years age-group and 18.5 % of respondents older than 65 years. Thirdly, the rate of growth of confidence in the EU (+9.4 pp) and NATO (+13.0 pp) exceedes those of CIS (+ 7.3 pp), which is particularly obvious in the case of NATO where the level of trust already doubled in the last decade. Table 4: Do you trust in…31 (Russians in Latvia)

European Union

2004 (%)

2014 (%)

2014-2004 (pp)

26.4

35.8

+ 9.4

NATO

17.6

30.6

+13.0

CIS

29.9

37.2

+7.3

29 30 31

Source: Inese Šūpule, “The referendum on Latvia’s Accession to the European Union: Analysis and Conclusions”, Ethnicity Studies 2004, 62. Survey of representatives of Latvian minorities. SKDS, May-June, 2014, n=801 Source: Faculty of Social Sciences, UL, BISS, Survey of Latvian residents for the “Audit of Democracy”, September-October, 2004, n=1002; Faculty of Social Sciences, UL, SKDS, Survey of Latvian residents for the “Audit of Democracy 2005–2014”, April, 2014, n=1000.

RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS IN LATVIA: BETWEEN BRUSSELS, RIGA AND MOSCOW

231

An analysis of the factors influencing the identities of Latvia’s Russophones will not be complete without taking into account some specific features of the Latvian media system, namely, the existence of two information spaces – Latvian and Russian – with differing orientations and information sources. As it was pointed out in the assessement “How democratic is Latvia” published in 2005, one of the most serious problems of Latvian democracy is the “opposition of two information spaces, lack of dialogue between them, which does not facilitate democratic discussion in the public sphere and the development of an integrated civic society”32. The same problem is indicated a decade later in the recently published assessement “How Democratic is Latvia? Audit of Democracy 2005-2014”33. Experts point out that a substantial part of the Russian-speaking audience considers Latvian public television a part of state propaganda and prefers Russianspeaking channels or even broadcasts from Russia as the prevailing source of information about events in Latvia and abroad. This creates a fundamental difference between the Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking part of the population (see Table 5). The survey data show that 77.8 % of Latvian speakers and only 8.7 % of Russian speakers prefer Latvia’s TV channels, whereas Russia’s TV channels are preferred by 84.1 % of Russian-speakers and only 15.2 % of Latvianspeakers. Taking all this into account, it is not suprising that in April 2014, the majority of non-Latvians who speak Russian at home (43.1 %) indicated that it is possible to justify Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine, 21.2% of the respondents had no clear position on this issue, whereas 35.7% of the Russian-speakers objected34. On the other hand, the pro-Kremlin propaganda machine is not as omnipotent in Latvia as it is in Russia. There, despite economic difficulties and the international isolation of Russia, more than 85% respondents trust President Vladimir Putin as indicated in the beginning of 201535. The opinion of Latvian Russian-speakers clearly shows a different tendency. However, surveys conducted in August 2014 and February 2015 indicate that the percentage of Russian-speaking respondents who consider it possible to justify Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine decreased to 28.6% in August 201436, and to 28.9 % in February 201537. At the same time, Latvian Russophones don’t support sanctions against Russia imposed by the USA and the European Union. 76.7% of Russianspeaking respondents rejected sanctions in August 201438 and 7.6% in February 2015.39 In the geopolitical conflict between Brussels and Moscow, Latvian Russians, citizens and non-citizens alike, are trying to take a neutral stance (see Table 6). Clear support for Russia was expressed by only 13.4% of respondents speaking Russian at home although it is much more than the 1.1 % of the Latvian-

32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

Sergejs KRUKS, Ilze ŠULMANE, “The Media In a Democratic Society”, in: Juris ROZENVALDS, (ed.), How Democratic is Latvia. Audit of Democracy, Riga, LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, 2005, p. 147. Ojars SKUDRA, Ilze ŠULMANE, Vita DREIJERE, “The Media in a Democratic Society”, in Juris ROZENVALDS, (ed.), How Democratic is Latvia. Audit of Democracy 2005-2014, Riga, LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, 2015, p. 205. SKDS data, March, 2014, n=1000. Yuri Levada Analytical Center, http://www.levada.ru/eng/ (23.03.2015). SKDS data, August, 2014, n=1002. SKDS data, February, 2015, n=1001. SKDS data, August, 2014, n=1002. SKDS data, February, 2015, n=1001.

JURIS ROZENVALDS

232

speaking respondents who voiced the same position. Almost two thirds of the Russian-speaking respondents think that Latvia should be neutral. Table 5: Which TV channels do you watch?40 Mostly or only Latvia’s TV channels

Latvia’s TV channels more frequent than Russia’s TV channels

Russia’s TV channels more frequent than Latvia’s TV channels

Mostly or only Russia’s TV channels

Don’t watch neither Latvia’s nor Russia’s TV channels

Speaking Latvian at home

39.4 %

38.4 %

12.0 %

3.2 %

4.7 %

Speaking Russian at home

0.9 %

7.8 %

51.5 %

32.6 %

4.1 %

Table 6. How should Latvia act with respect to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine? (February 2015, %)41 Support Ukraine

Support Russia

Should be neutral

Don’t know/ no answer

All respondents

31.2

5.9

50.1

12.8

Speaking Latvian at home

43.4

1.1

41.8

13.7

Speaking Russian at home

12.4

13.4

62.7

11.6

Citizens of Latvia

34,1

5.2

48.3

12.4

Non-citizens of Latvia

13.8

10.1

61.1

15.1

Conclusion On the basis of data and arguments provided in this paper, the conclusion may be drawn that Latvian Russians en masse are neither anti-European, nor are they primordially anti-Latvian. To a great extent, their attitudes towards European integration are determined by their status in and relations with the state of Latvia. At the moment, they find themselves at crossroads; the direction of their further moves will depend on the choice made by Latvian political elite: Shall the priority of the Latvian language and culture as the sole foundation of the unity of the society prevail, or will a cohesive society be achieved through the emphasis of civic values and the representation of the Russian-speaking minority in the making of decisions important to the whole of Latvian society? 40 41

Source: Faculty of Social Sciences, UL, SKDS, Survey of Latvian residents for the “Audit of Democracy 2005–2014”, April, 2014, n=1000 . Source: SKDS data, February 2015, n=1001.

RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS IN LATVIA: BETWEEN BRUSSELS, RIGA AND MOSCOW

233

LES RUSSOPHONES EN LETTONIE: ENTRE BRUXELLES, RIGA ET MOSCOU La population russophone de Lettonie n´est ni antieuropéenne, ni primordialement antilettone. En général, la jeune génération est plus ouverte que les anciennes. Les attitudes vis à vis des structures européennes et transatlantiques comme des processus d´intégration sont commandées par deux dimensions: Les deux communautés ethnolinguistiques utilisent des sources d´information différentes. En Lettonie, il existe deux secteurs d´informations parallèles, le russophone étant dominé par les médias de Russie sous contrôle étatique. Le deuxième facteur est l´attitude et la politique d´intégration de l´Etat letton vis à vis de ses habitants russophones, ceci avec tous les succès et les défauts de cette dernière. La question qui se pose est la suivante: Le prima de la langue et de la culture lettone restera t´il le seul fondement de la société ou pourrons nous parvenir à une cohésion sociale grâce à l´affirmation des valeurs civiques, grâce à la représentation et au concours de la minorité russe associée aux décisions concernant l´ensemble de la société lettone?

DIE RUSSISCHSPRACHIGE BEVÖLKERUNG IN LETTLAND: ZWISCHEN BRÜSSEL, RIGA UND MOSKAU Die russischsprechende Bevölkerung in Lettland ist weder antieuropäisch noch primordial antilettisch. Generell steht die jüngere Generation Europa offener gegnüber als die ältere. Die Einstellungen gegnüber europäischen und transatlantischen Strukturen und Integrationsprozessen werden von zwei Faktoren bestimmt: Erstens nutzen die beiden großen ethnolinguistischen Gemeinschaften unterschiedliche Informationsquellen. In Lettland existieren zwei separate Informationsräume nebeneinander, deren russischsprachiger von den staatlich kontrollierten Massenmedien Russlands dominiert wird. Der zweite Faktor ist die nationale Integrationspolitik mit ihren Erfolgen und Versäumnissen sowie die allgemeine Einstellung und Haltung des lettischen Staates gegenüber seinen russischsprechenden Bewohnern. Wird auch künftig der Vorrang der lettischen Sprache und Kultur als einziges Fundament der Gesellschaft gelten oder erreichen wir den gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt durch die Betonung staatsbürgerlicher Werte und der Vertretung und Mitwirkung der russischsprachigen Minderheit bei Entscheidungen, die für die ganze lettische Gesellschaft von Bedeutung sind?

LES AUTEURS – DIE AUTOREN – THE AUTORS DAVID ARTER David Arter is Professor Emeritus and currently Director of Research in the School of Management, University of Tampere, Finland.

ALICE CUNHA Alice Cunha holds a PhD in Contemporary History and is Research Fellow at the Instituto de História Contemporânea, Portugal.

ANTONIO ELORZA Antonio Elorza is Professor Emeritus of Political Sciences at the Department of Politics of the Universidad Complutense of Madrid, Spain.

SVANTE ERSSON Svante Ersson is Senior Lecturer Emiritus of Political Sciences at the Umeå University, Sweden.

IANNIS KONSTANTINIDIS Iannis Konstantindis is Assistant Professor in Politics at the Department of International and European Studies of the University of Macedonia, Greece. He is the founder of the Greek Elections, Public Opinion and Parties Standing Group of the Hellenic Political Association.

PATRICK MOREAU Patrick Moreau is a Senior Researcher in Political Sciences at the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) in France and member of the team of researchers UMR 7367, Dynamiques européennes of the University of Strasbourg.

PETR KANIOK Petr Kaniok is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and European Studies at the Faculty of Social Science, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic.

236

ANNEXE

ANDREAS STERGIOU Andreas Stergiou is Assistant Professor of History and Political Sciences at the Department of Economics of the University of Thessaly, Volos, Greece.

PETER SPÁČ Peter Spáč is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Sciences of the Masaryk University, Slovakia.

PÉTER CSINGÁR Péter Csingár is a Lawyer preparing a PhD on Jobbik in Hungary and Research Associate at the Universities of Heidelberg and Regensburg, Germany.

TOOMAS ALATALU Toomas Alatalu is Lecturer in Political Sciences at the Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia

JURIS ROZENVALDS Juris Rozenvalds is Professor of Philosophy, Political sciences and Social Sciences and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Latvia.

BIRTE WASSENBERG Birte Wassenberg is Professor of Contemporary History at the Insitut d’études Politiques (IEP) of the University of Strasbourg (France) and member of the team of researchers UMR 7367, Dynamiques européennes.

CONCERNANT LA SÉRIE „ETUDES SUR L’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE“ L’importance des recherches historiques ne cesse d’augmenter au sein de l’éventail qu’offrent les recherches scientifiques sur le processus d’intégration européenne, et ce à mesure que le recul par rapport au début du processus d’intégration européenne se fait de plus en plus grand. Même si le délai d’attente habituel de trente ans pour la consultation des archives constitue encore un obstacle pour les recherches sur l’histoire récente de l’intégration, les périodes accessibles à la recherche se révèlent de plus en plus étendues. A l’heure actuelle, les archives datant de la fondation de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier jusqu’au premier élargissement peuvent être consultées ; d’ici dix ans, une étude documentée des conditions générales de l’élargissement méditerranéen et de la conception de l’Acte unique européen sera possible. La contribution des recherches historiques dans le cadre de la recherche sur l’histoire toute proche de l’intégration est dès à présent remarquable. La diversité de méthodes utilisées permet en effet de régler des problèmes engendrés par le délai de blocage des archives. Toutefois, le débat historique s’y rapportant s’inscrit encore généralement dans le contexte de l’Etat-nation et représente, de ce point de vue, un anachronisme par rapport à l’histoire européenne. C’est dans ce contexte que des chercheuses et chercheurs de toute l’Europe et au-delà ont décidé de lancer une série d’ouvrages qui mettent en lumière l’histoire de l’intégration européenne non seulement dans une perspective européenne, mais qui se veut également accessible à un large public européen. Cette série d’ouvrages, intitulée Etudes sur l’Histoire de l’Intégration Européenne (EHIE), a été créée en collaboration avec la maison d’édition Franz Steiner. Le caractère trilingue de cette série – allemand, anglais et français – constitue une particularité exceptionnelle. Chaque contribution est accompagnée de résumés plurilingues, détaillés et éloquents sur le contenu s’y rapportant. Les Etudes sur l’Histoire de l’Intégration Européenne offrent pour la première fois aux lectrices et lecteurs intéressés un accès réellement européen aux avancées historiques les plus récentes dans le domaine de l’histoire de l’intégration européenne.

ZUR REIHE „STUDIEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION“ Mit zunehmendem Abstand zum Beginn des europäischen Integrationsprozesses nimmt die Bedeutung der Geschichtswissenschaften im Spektrum der wissenschaftlichen Erforschung des Europäischen Integrationsprozesses zu. Auch wenn die übliche dreißigjährige Sperrfrist für Archivmaterial weiterhin ein Hindernis für die Erforschung der jüngeren Integrationsgeschichte darstellt, werden die Zeiträume, die für die Wissenschaft zugänglich sind, kontinuierlich größer. Heute können die Archive zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl bis hin zur ersten Erweiterung eingesehen werden; in einem Jahrzehnt wird ein aktengestütztes Studium der Rahmenbedingungen der Mittelmeererweiterung und der Entstehung der Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte möglich sein. Darüber hinaus ist der Beitrag der Geschichtswissenschaften auch heute schon Rahmen der Erforschung der jüngsten Integrationsgeschichte nicht mehr zu übersehen. Ihre Methodenvielfalt hilft dabei, die durch Sperrfristen der Archive entstandenen Probleme auszugleichen. Allerdings findet der einschlägige geschichtswissenschaftliche Diskurs in der Regel immer noch im nationalstaatlichen Kontext statt und stellt damit, so gesehen, gerade in Bezug auf die europäische Geschichte einen Anachronismus dar. Vor diesem Hintergrund haben sich Forscherinnen und Forscher aus ganz Europa und darüber hinaus dazu entschlossen, eine Schriftenreihe ins Leben zu rufen, die die Geschichte der Europäischen Integration nicht nur aus einer europäischen Perspektive beleuchtet, sondern auch einem europäischen Publikum vorlegen möchte. Gemeinsam mit dem Verlag Franz Steiner wurde deshalb die Schriftenreihe Studien zur Geschichte der Europäischen Integration (SGEI) gegründet. Ein herausragendes Merkmal dieser Reihe ist ihre Dreisprachigkeit – Deutsch, Englisch und Französisch. Zu jedem Beitrag gibt es mehrsprachige ausführliche und aussagekräftige Zusammenfassungen des jeweiligen Inhalts. Damit bieten die Studien zur Geschichte der Europäischen Integration interessierten Leserinnen und Lesern erstmals einen wirklich europäischen Zugang zu neuesten geschichtswissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen auf dem Gebiet der Geschichte der Europäischen Integration.

ABOUT THE SERIES “STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION” With increasing distance to the process of European integration, there is a growing significance of the historical sciences within the range of the scientific research on the European integration process. Even if the usual blocking period for archive sources is still an obstacle for researching the more recent history of integration, the periods which are accessible for the sciences are continuously becoming more extended. Today, the archives on the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community are accessible as far as to the first extension; in one decade it will be possible to gain access to the appropriate files for studying the history of the prerequisites of the Mediterranean extension and the development of the Single European Act. Furthermore, already today the contribution of historic sciences in the context of researching the most recent history of integration cannot be overlooked. Their variety of methods helps with balancing problems resulting from the blocking periods for archives. However, usually the relevant historic discourse still happens in the context of national states and is thus, if we like to see things this way, rather an anachronism in respect of European history. Against this background, researchers from all over Europe and beyond have decided to found a series of publications which intends not only to shed light on the history of European integration from a European point of view but also to present this to a European audience. For this reason, together with the Franz Steiner Publishing House the series of publications Studies on the History of European Integration (SHEI) was founded. One outstanding feature of this series will be its trilingualism – German, English and French. For every contribution there will be extensive and telling summaries of the respective contents in several languages. Thus, by Studies on the History of European Integration interested readers will for the first time be offered a really European approach at most resent historic insights in the field of the history of European integration.

studien zur geschichte der europäischen integration studies on the history of european integration études sur l ’ histoire de l ’ integration européenne

Herausgegeben von / Edited by / Dirigé par Jürgen Elvert.

Franz Steiner Verlag

ISSN 1868–6214

18. Sven Leif Ragnar de Roode Seeing Europe through the Nation The Role of National Self-Images in the Perception of European Integration in the English, German, and Dutch Press in the 1950s and 1990s 2012. 272 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10202-5 19. Alexander Reinfeldt Unter Ausschluss der Öffentlichkeit? Akteure und Strategien supranationaler Informationspolitik in der Gründungsphase der europäischen Integration, 1952–1972 2014. 332 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10203-2 20. Jürgen Nielsen-Sikora Das Ende der Barbarei Essay über Europa 2012. 148 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10261-2 21. Maria Gainar / Martial Libera (Hg.) Contre l’Europe? Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et altereuropéisme dans la construction européenne, de 1945 à nos jours. Vol. 2: Acteurs institutionnels, milieux politiques et société civile 2013. 363 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10365-7 22. Joachim Beck / Birte Wassenberg (Hg.) Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit leben und erforschen. Bd. 5: Integration und (trans-)regionale Identitäten Beiträge aus dem Kolloquium „Grenzen überbrücken: auf dem Weg zur territorialen Kohäsion in Europa“, 18. und 19. Oktober 2010, Straßburg 2013. 353 S. mit 23 Abb. und 7 Ktn, kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10595-8 23. Kristin Reichel Dimensionen der (Un-)Gleichheit Geschlechtsspezifische Ungleichheiten in den sozial- und beschäftigungspolitischen

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25.

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Debatten der EWG in den 1960er Jahren 2014. 273 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10776-1 Kristian Steinnes The British Labour Party, Transnational Influences and European Community Membership, 1960–1973 2014. 217 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10775-4 Yves Clairmont Vom europäischen Verbindungsbüro zur transnationalen Gewerkschaftsorganisation Organisation, Strategien und Machtpotentiale des Europäischen Metallgewerkschaftsbundes bis 1990 2014. 505 S. mit 18 Tab und 2 Farbabb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10852-2 Joachim Beck / Birte Wassenberg (Hg.) Vivre et penser la coopération transfrontalière. Vol. 6: Vers une cohésion territoriale? Contributions du cycle de recherche sur la coopération transfrontalière de l'Université de Strasbourg et l'Euro-Institut 2014. 377 S. mit 38 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10964-2 Patrick Moreau / Birte Wassenberg (Hg.) European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism I The 2014 European Election and the Rise of Euroscepticism in Western Europe 2016. 212 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-11253-6 Patrick Moreau / Birte Wassenberg (Hg.) European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism II The 2014 European Election and New AntiEuropean Forces in Southern, Northern and Eastern Europe 2016. 239 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-11455-4

The economic crises since 2008, the ten­ sions concerning the Euro, the Greek ques­ tion and the refugee problem have fuelled a strong “Eurosceptic” movement. At the 2014 European elections, the rise of Euro­ sceptic forces could be observed in virtually all Member States of the EU. This publica­ tion regroups the contributions to a Con­ ference organized 2014 in Strasburg by the CNRS-University of Strasbourg research unit “UMR Dynamiques européennes”, in the framework of the IDEX excellence pro­ ject “The European Integration and the New Anti-Europeanism”.

In this second of two volumes, three groups of EU Member States are analysed: Mediter­ ranean (Cyprus, Spain, Portugal, Greece), Scandinavian States (Sweden, Finland) and Austria; finally, Eastern European and Baltic States (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia). Does the dis­ course of Eurosceptic parties in Eastern Eu­ rope differ from national-populists in the Nordic States or Austria? Is anti-European­ ism of the Greek or Cypriot extreme right similar to that of “parties of disruption” in Italy (Five Star Movement) or Spain (Pode­ mos)? Can we equate anti-Europeanism of Czech Communists and alter-Europeanists in the Baltic States?

SGEI SG SHEI SH EHIE E www.steiner-verlag.de

Franz Steiner Verlag

ISBN 978-3-515-11455-4