The Process of Politics in Europe: The Rise of European Elites and Supranational Institutions 9780755620630, 9781848853263

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Für meine Großeltern Ingeborg und Wilhelm Koops

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5

Educational background of high officials Professional background of high officials Previous international experience of high officials Distribution of university degrees in DG IV and DG VI Last position DG IV officials held before entering the Commission Table 6 Last position DG VI officials held before entering the Commission Table 7 Previous international experience of DG IV and DG VI officials Table 8 Posts of DG VI officials on entry Table 9 Final posts of DG VI officials Table 10 Posts of DG IV officials on entry Table 11 Final posts of DG IV officials

38 39 43 114 116 116 117 122 122 123 123

LIST OF IMAGES

Image 1 At the occasion of the opening of the common steel market: members of the High Authority (Albert Coppé, Jean Monnet and Dirk Spirenburg) with Pierre Uri and Ursula Wenmackers, Esch-sur-Alzette, 30 April 1953. Copyright: European Commission

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Image 2 The Hallstein Commission in 1964. Copyright: European Commission

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACDP Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik AIACE Association Internationale des Anciens des Communautés Européennes ANL Archives Nationales, Luxembourg Arbed Aciéries réunies de Burblach-Eich-Dudelange BAK Bundesarchiv, Koblenz CAP Common Agricultural Policy CDU Christlich Demokratische Union CNPF Conseil national du patronat français Coreper Permanent Representatives Committee DG Directorate-general DGB Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund DKBL Deutsche Kohlenbergbau-Leitung DKV Deutsche Kohlenverkaufsgesellschaft EC European Communities ECE (United Nations) Economic Commission for Europe ECHA European Commission Historical Archives, Brussels ECJ European Court of Justice ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EDC European Defence Community EEC European Economic Community ENA École nationale d’administration EPC European Political Community ETUC European Trade Union Confederation EU European Union Euratom European Atomic Energy Community FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation FJM Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, Lausanne HAEU Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

xiv IISH IRA MAEF NSDAP OEEC OECD

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International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam International Ruhr Authority Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei Organisation for European Economic Cooperation Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development PAAA Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin PV Procès-verbal (minutes) of the High Authority and Commission meetings PvdA Partij van de Arbeid SOE Special Operations Executive UN United Nations UNICE Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe WVESI Wirtschaftsvereinigung der Eisen- und Stahlindustrie

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book would never have been written without support – moral, intellectual, practical and financial. I received funding from the following: Centre for European and International Studies Research, University of Portsmouth; Luxembourg Ministry of Culture, Higher Education and Research; Professor Adolf Schmidtmann Foundation, PhilippsUniversität, Marburg; and Deutsches Historisches Institut in Paris. The last-named also provided me with a stimulating work environment during the final stages of the project. The research benefited from the help and advice of many archivists and librarians. In particular, my thanks are due to Joceline Collonval of the European Commission’s Historical Archives in Brussels, Ruth MeyerBellardini of the European Union’s Historical Archives in Florence and Françoise Nicot of the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe in Lausanne. I am immensely grateful to the former civil servants of the High Authority and the Commission who granted me interviews; the lively and fascinating accounts of their life and times in the European Community institutions were indispensable for this research. My thanks go also to the Association des Anciens des Communautés Européennes in Brussels for their assistance. Particularly in the early stages the project benefited greatly from the advice and support of Professor Eckart Conze of Philipps-Universität Marburg and from the discussions in his research seminar. I was also invited to present the project in the research seminars of Professors Wilfried Loth, Universität Duisburg-Essen, and Gabriele Clemens, Universität Hamburg, from both of which I received valuable feedback. Finally, I am very grateful to Professor Wolfram Kaiser, University of Portsmouth, for his guidance, criticism and encouragement and to Dr Piers Ludlow of the London School of Economics for his support and advice.

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Finally, I thank my parents, Gerhard and Petra Seidel, for their unconditional support, and friends and colleagues for providing distraction and giving feedback on the book: Charlotte Ball, Maria Fritsche, Carine Germond, Brigitte Leucht, Antje Robrecht, Claudia Schraut and, last but certainly not least, Geoffrey Kite. Katja Seidel Paris

INTRODUCTION

‘A new race of man was emerging in the Luxembourg institutions, as if in a laboratory.’1 Jean Monnet, the first president of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), expected the European civil servants in the High Authority to develop a strong European attitude. They were to take on a pioneer role in the European integration process and to take the lead in uniting European countries. The officials who worked in the European administrations in the 1950s and 1960s are generally seen as the idealistic generation of convinced Europeans. These men and (a very few) women, while coming from diverse national and cultural backgrounds, are said to have formed a European elite working together to shape Europe and to define European interests. Although acting mostly in the background, they had a vital influence on the European integration process. This book is the first systematic historical study of this ‘new race of man’. It examines the biographical background of European civil servants, the motives that drove them to enter the European administrations and whether they indeed underwent Europeanisation adopting European values and aims. The rise of European administrative elites is inextricably linked to the emergence of European administrations. They are the second focus of this study. With the founding of the ECSC, for the first time European nation states renounced part of their national sovereignty by transferring responsibilities in key policy areas to this new European organisation. The institutional framework laid down in the ECSC treaty, signed on 18 April 1951 by the governments of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, was based on four pillars: the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the Common Assembly, the Special Council of Ministers and the High Authority.2 The High Authority was to watch over the implementation of the ECSC treaty, generate a European interest among member states and have decision-making powers of its own. Less than six years after endorsing the ECSC treaty, the heads of

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state and government of these six countries (‘the Six’) signed the Treaties of Rome on 25 March 1957, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).3 The EEC’s task was to set up and manage a common market, integrating the entire economies of the member states. The institutional framework of the EEC was modelled after that of the ECSC. Crucially, the European Commission, the EEC equivalent of the High Authority, had executive-type functions, such as the right to initiate Community policies and legislation and to oversee their implementation.4 As a result, without proposals from the Commission there would be no European policies. Given the increasing importance of European-level institutions and their personnel in European Union (EU) policy-making, it is surprising that scholars studying the history of European integration have neglected both the institutional and actor dimensions. Until recently, the overwhelming majority of studies were written in the tradition of diplomatic and political history, assuming that governments had the power to formulate European policies without significant domestic constraints and were pursuing clearly defined ‘national interests’. This explains why this historiography concentrated on member states and their attitudes, politics and policies towards Europe, and occasionally on emerging European policies such as the common agricultural policy (CAP).5 In such narratives little space was accorded to European administrations and officials, and whenever actors were taken into account they were the socalled founding fathers like Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak, Alcide de Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer and Jean Monnet.6 Increasingly, historians acknowledge the importance of non-state actors and European institutions that are part of what could be called the incipient European political system.7 This trend favours a supranational and transnational historiography of the EU.8 Research thus became more focused on European-level actors, the interplay between actors and institutions at the EU and the national levels, and non-state actors.9 For example, Piers Ludlow’s study The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s aims to be a ‘supranational history’ of the EEC, thus acknowledging the multinational and multi-institutional nature of policy-making in the Community.10 For him, the contribution of Community institutions – and not just that of member states – to the development of the EEC and its policies needs to be taken into account if the ‘workings of a supranational system’ are to be fully understood.11 Such a historiography would require a detailed knowledge of the structure and functioning of the European institutions and of their personnel.

INTRODUCTION

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While the High Authority and the Commission were popular research topics for political scientists in the 1960s and 1970s,12 there are few studies by historians. Among these, the recent volume The European Commission, 1958–72, edited by Michel Dumoulin, is an excellent starting point for exploring the history of the Commission; it provides a useful introduction to the Commission and its role in the different policy areas of the EEC.13 The book was commissioned by the European Commission and relies heavily on oral history accounts of former civil servants, which sometimes leads to a somewhat distorted picture of the early Commission and its personnel, which this book will help to adjust and complete. A thorough and source-based history of the High Authority has been written by Dirk Spierenburg and Raymond Poidevin;14 however, their focus lies less on the internal organisation, staff policy and administrative staff of the High Authority. The biographies and ‘images of Europe’ of senior European civil servants have only been investigated by social scientists such as Liesbet Hooghe and Didier Georgakakis.15 Hooghe analyses the biographical and career background of today’s senior Commission officials, exploring their attitudes towards supranationalism and intergovernmentalism or democracy and technocracy. Rather than simply linking officials’ preference formation to utility maximisation, like many rational-choice scholars do, she attributes a vital role to values and identities in shaping preferences.16 In the historiography of European integration an attempt such as Hooghe’s to analyse and account for socialisation processes at the European level is lacking. This gap in the literature has led to a situation in which historical research often relies on memoirs – and memories – of former Commissioners when describing the founding years of these administrations.17 The first president of the Commission, Walter Hallstein, for example, is often depicted as a fervent supranationalist or ‘supranational Icarus’ in search of an independent role for the Commission;18 this study will seek to show, however, that he was much more pragmatic than previously thought. In this book the analysis of eyewitness interviews with former European civil servants is combined with that of archival sources. This will shed light on the emergence and internal functioning of the High Authority and the Commission, and will thus provide new insights into the unique atmosphere of the European administrations in the 1950s and 1960s. As to the European officials, the ‘innovating idealism’ and ‘almost missionary’ role often attributed to this ‘founding generation’19 will be scrutinised in this book, thus resulting in a more complex picture of the first European officials.

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There are obstacles to studying what Antonio Varsori calls a ‘slippery topic’.20 One of the reasons why the administrative staff of the European institutions so far has been neglected lies in the lack of availability of, and access to, source material. As personal files are not subject to the 30-year rule and remain closed, the first difficulty is finding and accessing sources on the European administrative staff.21 This obstacle was overcome by multi-archival research in Community, national, political-party and private archives in seven countries, combined with 39 semi-structured interviews with former civil servants of the High Authority and Commission; interviews conducted by other researchers were also used.22 The lack of personal files make interviews an important source of information on the biographical background of European civil servants. Moreover, archival sources rarely convey the atmosphere of a place, or the interpersonal relations in the High Authority and the Commission. Such insights gained from interviews are thus extremely valuable for reconstructing the history of the two administrations. Also, in the age of the telephone, it is often not possible to trace conversations and decisions in the sources. As Wolfram Kaiser writes, ‘[T]o compensate for the fragmented written documentation, contemporary historians need to make greater use of interviews with key actors in a more systematic way than they did in the past.’23 No doubt, there are shortcomings of using interviews as a source, particularly if they take place much later than the events which form their topic. Interviewees tend to overemphasise their personal contributions, and to idealise their time in the European administration as a halcyon period. Autobiographical writings of actors entail similar problems, also differing as to informational value, reliability and accuracy.24 To a certain extent, however, it is possible to compare the statements in interviews and memoirs with written sources, contemporary studies and interviews that scholars have conducted in the 1960s and 1970s.25 If balanced with archival evidence and contemporary literature interviews can be a useful tool in historical research. In this study the term ‘Europeanisation’ will be used to describe the process of institution-building and the emergence of new rules and norms at the European level, on the one hand, and to analyse the socialisation process of actors in adopting these rules and norms, on the other. Claudio Radaelli defines Europeanisation as ‘processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms’.26 Whilst his explanation is more geared towards change in member states, for example when adapting to EU rules and norms, the definition could be used, first, to describe the process of institution-building with respect to the European administrations in

INTRODUCTION

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Luxembourg and Brussels. And, when replacing ‘institutionalisation’ with internalisation, it could, secondly, be applied to individuals. It is in both these senses that it will be used in this study. To ascertain a Europeanisation of officials, for example, it has to be established if and which internal factors inherent in the officials’ biographies and which external factors, that is, the influences they were subject to in the High Authority and the Commission, facilitated or obstructed Europeanisation. The book is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the High Authority and the second with the Commission. In terms of the administrative history of Europe, the High Authority certainly has to be considered as a model for the Commission. Its institutional legacy is arguably stronger, however, than its influence on the integration process in either political or economic terms. The study thus does consider the High Authority, but grants more space to the analysis of the Commission. The executives of the ECSC, Euratom and the EEC were merged in 1967 when the merger treaty, signed in April 1965, came into force. The EEC Commission imposed its structure and working methods on the unified Commission, the merger being more of a take-over of the other two administrations. The Commission thus had the greater long-term impact on EU history. The early years of an institution are regarded as crucial. Once in place, the administrative structures and working methods but also the core values of the organisation are difficult to modify. The central features of the High Authority and the Commission were established in their early years, but created long-term ‘path dependencies’, defining corridors for the future evolution of the administration.27 Consequently, for the High Authority, the core period explored is the presidency of Monnet (1952– 55). The chapters on the Commission mainly concentrate on the early years of Hallstein’s presidency (1958–67). Chapters 1 and 3 analyse the administrations of the High Authority and the Commission respectively, including the particular difficulties encountered when setting up a supranational administration – in terms of organisation, working methods and staff recruitment. These organisational features constituted the social environment in which European civil servants interacted. The biographies of selected groups of high officials (83 for the High Authority and 109 for the Commission) are at the centre of Chapters 2 and 4; these chapters also study socialisation mechanisms within the administrations which could have facilitated the officials’ adoption of institutional values, norms and aims, which in turn could have resulted in the creation of a European administrative elite with a similar outlook. Chapter 5 explores possibilities of linking the results of the two preceding chapters to the emergence of the EEC’s competition and

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agricultural policies. This structure allows for comparisons between the High Authority, the first European administration, and the Commission, its sister organisation, and their civil servants. Moreover, the book innovatively combines administrative and biographical history to explore the emerging administrative culture(s) of the European administrations.

1 ESTABLISHING A SUPRANATIONAL ADMINISTRATION Challenges and Constraints

The High Authority was to be an institution of a new kind. Neither an international organisation nor a national administration, it was a hybrid between both models: a supranational organisation, or even, as many thought, ‘Europe’s first government’.1 The ECSC, and later also the EEC, were supranational as ‘more (independent) power is given to the new central agency than is customary in the case of conventional international organisations’.2 This concept’s central feature was that decisions taken at Community level were binding for member states. Article 9 of the ECSC treaty described the High Authority as being ‘supranational’. Likewise, in a commentary on the ECSC treaty, dating from October 1951, the French negotiating team declared that supranationality was at the basis of the ECSC, and of the High Authority in particular.3 Some of its institutional features stipulated in the treaty were declared as being the gateway to supranationality. These were, for instance, the number of High Authority members (nine), which did not correspond to the number of member states (six), and the absence of a rule of unanimity for the decisions taken by the college of High Authority members. Moreover, the report expected that a higher degree of supranationality would soon be attained through the esprit d’équipe that would inevitably develop between individuals who collaborated in the High Authority and who were ‘joined together by the same task, [that is] to create in reality this supranational idea, the foundation of the treaty’.4 After taking up office in Luxembourg on 10 August 1952, the High Authority’s main task was to set up and manage a common market for coal and steel, in which none of the industries or governments of member

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states would receive preferential treatment nor be discriminated against. High Authority decisions were binding on the member states (Article 14, ECSC treaty). The institution was authorised to impose fines for noncompliance with its decisions or with the treaty, and it could request and obtain information from enterprises in the member states (Article 47). It had its own resources from levies on coal and steel production, and was entitled to negotiate loans (Article 49). Finally, the High Authority maintained relations with international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), on behalf of the Community (Article 93). These are powers and competencies that go far beyond what one would normally find in an international organisation. In their history of the High Authority, Spierenburg and Poidevin explain that ‘new ways had to be found [for establishing relations with member-state governments] because the High Authority was not an international organization external to the member states. It represented the merging of their sovereignties in its particular field.’5 Jean Monnet, the first president of the High Authority and his colleagues, the High Authority members, consequently also sought ‘new ways’ when building the administration. Living up to the supranational principle was considered necessary, not least because the ECSC was seen by many as a first step towards the construction of a united Europe.6 It had to be a success from the start. The institutional analysis of sociologist M. Rainer Lepsius focuses on ‘central ideas’, or, to put it differently, on the ideological foundation of an institution. These central ideas have an effect on the structure of institutions and they structure behaviour in the institutional context.7 In this chapter, the assumption that supranationality was the central idea of the High Authority, and thus the underlying norm for setting up the organisation, defining its working methods and recruiting its staff, will be tested against the administrative reality in Luxembourg. The chapter investigates these three areas of analysis to explore in what ways the ideal of supranationality inspired the choices that were made during the Monnet presidency (1952–55), and where the High Authority had to make concessions and deviate from the central idea of supranationality. It is likely, for example, that the High Authority’s members came under pressure from member-state governments and non-governmental interest groups when setting up the European administration and recruiting personnel. 1.1 Organisation The High Authority was headed by a college of nine ‘independent individuals’, chosen with regard to their general competencies (Article 9),

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of which eight were nominated by the governments of the member states and one was co-opted, thus emphasising the High Authority’s supranational character. Apart from Monnet, the members appointed were the Frenchman Léon Daum, the Belgians Albert Coppé (vicepresident) and Paul Finet (co-opted member). the Germans Franz Etzel (vice-president) and Heinz Potthoff, the Dutchman Dirk Spierenburg, the Italian Enzo Giacchero and Albert Wehrer from Luxembourg.8 The members’ term of office was six years, with one third of the members to be renewed every two years (Article 10). The ECSC treaty did not contain clear-cut instructions for setting up the administration, nor did it prescribe the status and number of personnel the High Authority members would appoint. It merely decreed in very broad terms that the ‘High Authority shall make all appropriate administrative arrangements for the operation of its departments’ (Article 16). It also stipulated that the tasks of the Community institutions should be carried out with a ‘minimum of administrative machinery’ (Article 5). The treaty assigned the president a strong role in administrative matters (Article 16). With respect to administration, therefore, the members of the High Authority, and the president in particular, were in principle given a considerable measure of autonomy. Even so, between the signing of the treaty and its coming into force in August 1952 the governments of the member states and the industries concerned embarked on preparations for the organisation and staffing of the High Authority. The coal and steel industries held consultations both at national level and in transnational meetings, where they discussed staffing and organisational schemes. At the national level, according to Ulrich Sahm of the West German foreign ministry or Auswärtiges Amt, the powerful lobby organisation of the German iron and steel industry, the Wirtschaftsvereinigung der Eisen- und Stahlindustrie (WVESI), had already decided which individuals to put forward for posts in the High Authority.9 At a transnational level, in May 1952 representatives of the steel industries of the six countries held a meeting in Luxembourg at which they discussed the implications of the Schuman Plan for their industry and different organisational schemes for the new supranational administration.10 According to Charles Barthel these preparations had few consequences and did not result in more transnational cohesion between the coal and steel industries of the Schuman Plan countries,11 though they may have facilitated collaboration between industries, enterprises and interest groups in the medium term. In any event, they were united by their mistrust in this new supranational administration that was to decide the fate of their industries.

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The member-state governments also devised plans to influence the organisation of the High Authority, some of which were discussed in the Interim Committee, in which government representatives met several times between April 1951 and July 1952.12 Monnet’s conception of the High Authority’s organisation clashed with those of member-state representatives, and it is useful to compare them. Monnet was, on the one hand, convinced of the crucial importance of institutions as regulators in the relations between states.13 In countering the potentially peripatetic behaviour of their staff, he considered institutions a stabilising factor, where experience and knowledge were accumulated.14 On the other hand, he was very cautious when it came to establishing rigid and thus possibly irrevocable structures in the High Authority. Similarly, the importance he attributed to institutions did not result in a penchant for large and bureaucratic machineries. One model he favoured, for instance, was the Tennessee Valley Authority, an independent, expert-based administration set up in the USA in 1933.15 Monnet had introduced a similar structure in the French Planning Commission, or ‘Plan’, which he had founded in 1946 to revive and modernise the post-war French economy and which he headed until 1952.16 For Monnet, the Plan was proof that an efficient administrative body did not necessarily have to be large.17 He preferred a small and flexible administration de mission. In his memoirs, Monnet explained how he expected the High Authority to work: ‘A few hundred European civil servants would be enough to set thousands of national experts to work, and to make the powerful machinery of firms and governments serve the aims of the Treaty.’18 The High Authority should not rival national administrations but collaborate closely with them, as well as with industries, interest groups and experts. A small homogeneous team, filled with ‘European spirit’ and capable of adapting to the respective problems and tasks, would suffice.19 They should be supported by a small number of departments to assist them in their work. In contrast, the governments of the member states were eager to see rigid structures introduced into the High Authority from the outset – structures which, ideally, they could influence. A meeting in July 1952 between Monnet and Etzel, a prominent Christian democrat, illustrates this divergence of views. In the name of the German government, Etzel presented several proposals and an organisational scheme for the High Authority, which Monnet rejected. Instead, he argued that introducing a rigid organisational structure right from the start would not be appropriate, given the novelty of the tasks the High Authority had to undertake; on the contrary, its organisation should be gradually adapted to the experience gained.20 Shortly before the establishment of the ECSC, in a meeting of Dutch, German and French participants in August 1952 –

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most of them future members and officials of the High Authority – drafts were presented, by the German delegation, of general organisational rules and working methods, a règlement d’organisation and a règlement intérieur, provided for in the treaty.21 Again, Monnet rejected both drafts. Other member governments, such as the Dutch, also reflected on the administration of the High Authority.22 One of the main concerns of Spierenburg, who drafted a paper on behalf of the Dutch government, was how to avoid the smaller member states being dominated by the larger; the governments of Belgium and Luxembourg had similar concerns. The Luxembourg foreign ministry devised an organisational scheme which limited the powers of the High Authority’s president (who would be French) by introducing a post of secretary-general at the top of the administrative hierarchy.23 We will return to this draft, which showed the Luxembourg government’s mistrust of Monnet, when discussing recruitment patterns in the High Authority. All these drafts and schemes were attempts to influence the organisation, and subsequently the policy-making, of the High Authority. Not surprisingly, Monnet tried to prevent this kind of behaviour; in a similar vein, he opposed the idea of having a permanent German ‘mission’ established in Luxembourg, something the German government had envisaged. He thought the High Authority, as a supranational organisation, should be able to communicate directly with the governments of the member states.24 Initially, at least, he succeeded in defending his ideas.25 The establishment of the High Authority administration It was thus only after the High Authority took up office in August 1952 that its organisation was conceptualised, initially corresponding to Monnet’s aims of maintaining the administrative apparatus small and the hierarchies flat. A first-draft organisational scheme, drafted by a group of senior officials, envisaged the creation of only four to five large divisions, plus a secretariat.26 The proposal was rejected by the High Authority members, not least because this would not provide a national of each member state with the leadership of a division. In an interview, Pierre Uri, a close collaborator of Monnet, bemoaned the rejection, for nationalist reasons, of this first organisational chart, since it meant deviating from the ideal of supranationality. Eventually, ‘more directorates were created than initially planned’.27 The minutes of the High Authority’s meetings do not reveal this dissention on the organisational structure, and it is likely that the members discussed the questions informally, not least because Monnet thought it important to uphold the collegiate unity of the High Authority, at least seen from outside.

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More organisational schemes were circulated in August and September 1952. Finally, a proposal put forward by Uri on 25 September was accepted as forming the basis of the organisation.28 At its 14th meeting, the High Authority formally decided to set up 12 divisions: Economics, Production, Investments, Market, Social Affairs, Transport Service, Statistics Service, Legal Service, Financial Affairs Service, Internal Affairs Service, Interpretation and Translation Service, and a secretariat.29 The High Authority took a fundamental decision in not creating separate coal and steel departments. This was contrary to the opinion of its own coal and steel experts, such as the Belgian François Vinck, who argued that the sectors were too different to be treated in the same division.30 In a speech addressed to the organisational committee of the ECSC Parliamentary Assembly, Monnet explained this decision: ‘Had we separated our administration into coal and steel, inevitably the means and ways the High Authority would have embarked upon would have been different and would have jeopardised our target of creating a common market.’31 The non-separation of coal and steel had effectively been envisaged by Monnet even before the High Authority had taken up office.32 It can be seen as a political move, as blazing a trail for the common market with the possibility of extending it to other sectors of the economy, and was thus in conformity with the supranational ideal. The principle of multiple leadership was another innovative organisational feature of the High Authority. Responsibility for a service was often assigned not to one person but to two or even three. Monnet explained that the traditional practice of one director heading each division would not have been an appropriate solution for the High Authority, where a ‘balanced judgement’ of decisions was particularly important.33 This implies that such multiple leadership was a shield to protect the High Authority against accusations of bias in its decisionmaking. Maintaining a high degree of independence necessitated extraordinary measures. Also, the president explicitly sought to boost team spirit among the officials by attributing the leadership of a division to individuals from different national backgrounds. The ‘Franco-German couples’ were particularly important to Monnet. His ‘special relationship’ with vice-president Etzel34 was thus reflected, at the administrative level, by the pairing of Uri and his deputy Rudolf Regul in the Economics Division, in the Legal Service by Michel Gaudet and Robert Krawielicki and in Transport by Roger Hutter and Werner Klaer. The Market Division was headed by the German Hermann Dehnen, the Belgian Vinck and Tony Rollman from Luxembourg. Multiple leadership did not survive the administrative reform of 1959–60, however, when the 12 divisions were merged into seven directorates-general (DG), each

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headed by a single director-general.35 The reform was essentially a realignment of the High Authority’s administrative structure and hierarchy with that of the EEC Commission in Brussels. It can also be seen as a normalisation: there was no longer any need for multiple leadership to demonstrate the High Authority’s impartiality. The fact that Dehnen had already been responsible for the coal sector and Rollman for the steel sector within the Market Division was sanctioned by the creation of separate DGs for Coal and Steel. The decision not to separate coal and steel was thus reversed once the EEC was set up, because it was now certain that the competencies of the ECSC would not be extended to other sectors of the economy. Moreover, the non-separation had revealed itself to be impractical, just as the experts had predicted. The influence of senior officials on the organisation of the High Authority Senior officials had a considerable influence on the organisational structure of the High Authority. This was due, on the one hand, to a power vacuum in the High Authority. The nine members of the college, of which only three, Monnet, Spierenburg and Wehrer, had participated in the ECSC treaty negotiations, relied heavily on the expertise of a core group of officials, most of whom had either been present at the negotiations or were experts in the coal and steel sectors. On the other hand, Monnet had transferred his working methods from the French Planning Commission to Luxembourg: at the Plan he had worked with a core group of collaborators who were closely involved in the decisionmaking process. At the High Authority, Monnet remained faithful to this practice. Officials such as Uri were closely involved in conceptualising the organisational set-up and later High Authority policies. In particular the members of the comité de démarrage had considerable influence on the organisation. At its first meeting, the High Authority had put together this ‘start-up’ team, composed of Uri, Vinck, Richard Hamburger from the Netherlands, the German Rolf Wagenführ, the Italian Cesare BalladorePallieri and Christian Calmes from Luxembourg.36 Their main task was to establish an overall programme of work for the High Authority, but they were also asked to draft an organisational structure.37 Uri, in particular, authored several memoranda on this topic in August/September 1952. His memorandum on the priority tasks of the High Authority was a key text, containing as it did a draft for the programme of work.38 The Economics Division that also figured in this document was tailored to Uri and to his expertise in economic matters.39 Moreover, it was he who advocated the idea of placing the coal and steel sectors in the wider

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context of the economies of the member states. The Economics Division should thus be seen as a future European ministry of economics. Like Uri, Max Kohnstamm had participated in the treaty negotiations. He became the secretary of the High Authority and was another confidant of Monnet, on whom he tried to use his influence to ensure the smooth running of the administration and to improve working methods. He also played an important role as a go-between, between the different members of the High Authority, and between the members and the administration.40 However, there were limits to the influence of senior officials in the High Authority. Some members disapproved of Uri’s extended role, and his acting as a ‘tenth member’ of the High Authority.41 The initial autonomy of these officials was somewhat restricted and channeled by the working parties which were introduced in late 1953, and which will be discussed below. These working parties, formally incorporated into the general organisational regulations of November 1954, were presided over by High Authority members.42

Image 1. At the occasion of the opening of the common steel market: members of the High Authority (Albert Coppé, Jean Monnet and Dirk Spirenburg) with Pierre Uri and Ursula Wenmackers, Esch-sur-Alzette, 30 April 1953. Copyright: European Commission

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1.2 Working methods ‘Provided with a collegiate structure by the treaty […] and vested with supranational responsibilities and powers, the High Authority had to invent an original working method.’43 This note on organisational problems, dating from November 1952, suggests that, as a consequence of its supranational character, the High Authority had to develop its own, unique ways of working. From the archival records, however, one gets the impression that in the High Authority’s early period its working methods were mainly a response to original difficulties. The members had to maintain the principle of collegiality, and the non-hierarchical structure of the administration had led to a situation where directorates and services existed side by side ‘deprived of a joint leadership apart from the High Authority itself’.44 Finally, not the least of the difficulties was Monnet’s reluctance to introduce stable administrative structures. All these problems had to be incorporated in an ‘original working method’. One of the main characteristics of the start-up period was what could be called Monnet’s personal leadership. This was characterised for instance by his preference for frequent meetings with his colleagues and leading officials, whom he would summon whenever he deemed it necessary – regardless of the time of the day, or whether it was a holiday or a weekend.45 This management style may have been appropriate at the very beginning, when a constant exchange of ideas and a high degree of inventiveness were necessary to set up the organisation and to establish the common coal and steel market, but it could not be a permanent solution. Officials soon felt overworked, in particular those in Monnet’s entourage. Similarly, the meetings of the High Authority were summoned without notice, unorganised and exceedingly long; though there were early attempts to regularise them,46 these were fruitless as the members were still trying in mid-1955 to introduce a jour fixe for their meetings.47 These arbitrary working methods for a long time prevented the institution from becoming a ‘normal’ administration. Nonetheless, Monnet’s personal leadership has become legendary and part of what could be called the founding myth of the High Authority. Monnet’s biographer François Duchêne writes: The atmosphere of permanent emergency he [Monnet] generated (and to which quite a few strongly objected) drove people of different and stubborn traditions to overwork together and, almost without knowing it, to develop a corporate identity and pride.48 Initially, Monnet refused all distribution of tasks among High Authority members as premature and against the principle of collegiality.49

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Moreover, he and his collaborators thought that assigning a division to each member would cause suspicion in the member states: The nomination of the directors is already accompanied by distrust: at least they have collaborators with a different national background in their departments. On the contrary, a member of the High Authority to whom a service is entrusted would be in the limelight.50 Maintaining a high degree of collegiality was thus treated as synonymous with preserving the supranational character of the High Authority. According to Barthel, the coal and steel industries strongly advocated the collegiate principle, thus hoping that Monnet would be counterbalanced by his colleagues.51 Consequently it was necessary to find working methods which would enable the High Authority to address its tasks without abandoning the principle of collegiality. At their 15th meeting, the High Authority members discussed their working methods and a possible distribution of tasks.52 Monnet felt that these questions were closely linked to the role the president would assume within the college. Of primary importance to Maurice Lagrange, Advocate-General at the ECJ, who was advising Monnet on this matter,53 was the question of who would have authority over the administration. While the treaty made the president head of the administration, it also provided for the possibility of delegating presidential powers to other members (Article 16). Finally, any possible distribution of tasks should not prevent the college from maintaining an overview of the High Authority’s policies and from taking decisions in joint deliberations. Monnet, following Lagrange, proposed two alternative ways of realising these principles: first, he could assume the role of a Président-Directeur Général who alone would be responsible for the administration and for supervising the preparation and execution of decisions. The other solution was a Président du Conseil, who would assign to each member, by the delegation of presidential powers, a division or a service. The High Authority would thus resemble a council of ministers.54 The minutes of the High Authority’s meetings do not reveal if any decision was taken in this matter: it is likely that neither solution satisfied Monnet’s colleagues, the first assigning too much power to the president and the second sacrificing the principle of collegiality. The High Authority thus missed an early opportunity to clarify competencies and define working patterns. One year later, in autumn 1953, finding a solution became a pressing need as the lack of co-ordination, between the services on the one hand and the college and the administration on the other, was seriously affecting the High Authority’s work.55 Spierenburg, who thought one year

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of experimenting with the administration was more than enough, presented a draft for a règlement général d’administration and a scheme for five working groups to be created, chaired by High Authority members.56 Monnet was prepared to delegate some of his powers to his colleagues but favoured the creation of a ‘Council of Ministers’ with each member taking over responsibility for a division.57 In a memorandum to his colleagues, Monnet established a balance sheet of the first year’s activity. According to him, members had tried to maintain the college as the High Authority’s decision-making body, even though the services had worked more or less autonomously when preparing decisions. While this had been acceptable in the start-up period, Monnet came to the conclusion that in future the preparation of decisions should not be separated from their execution; and after the opening of the common market for coal and steel in early 1953, the preparation of new decisions should be informed by how the previous ones had been carried out.58 Having said this, Monnet ‘acknowledged that . . . the various services needed some kind of permanent points of contact at the highest level’.59 He then suggested delegating some of his presidential powers to his colleagues, so that he could concentrate on the overall co-ordination of the High Authority, the negotiations with the USA on a loan to the High Authority, and the association of the UK with the ECSC.60 Monnet’s suggestion entailed each of the members taking over responsibility for a certain sector of the High Authority. Etzel’s chef de cabinet, Wolf von der Heide, analysed both Monnet’s and Spierenburg’s proposals and came to the conclusion that adopting the former would weaken the collegiate principle;61 Kohnstamm and Spierenburg also urged Monnet to opt for working parties, again in order to maintain collegiality.62 Most High Authority members shared this view, as they opted – Monnet was outvoted – for setting up six working parties composed of three to four members each, to the presidents of which Monnet would delegate his executive powers.63 However, he remained responsible for the implementation of decisions.64 One reason for Monnet’s defeat in this matter was mentioned by von der Heide: the collegiate principle was a guarantee for member states of the High Authority’s impartiality.65 With a government-like structure, where every member would have taken over responsibility for one policy area, it would sooner or later have been this member who would have taken the decisions in his/her area. The High Authority thus decided against extending its supranational rule, and so risking a hostile reaction from the member states. The six working parties that were created were: Market; Investments, Finance and Production; Labour; External Relations; General Objectives, Long-term Policy and Short-term Economic Situation; and Administrative

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Matters. The working groups’ role was to ‘coordinate the activities of several divisions interested in similar problems . . . to direct the studies carried out by the division; to bring final proposals to the High Authority for decision; and to oversee the execution of those decisions’.66 This system was retained until the High Authority was amalgamated with the Commissions of Euratom and the EEC in 1967. Co-ordinating tasks efficiently and maintaining the collegiate character of the High Authority had been the main motivations for creating working groups. Decisions continued to be taken within the college and each member had the right to make suggestions to any working party, and to be informed about the progress of its work. The introduction of working parties and the delegation of presidential authority were important steps towards a more regularised administration. Similarly, the introduction of general organisational regulations and internal rules for the High Authority’s procedures, mentioned in Articles 16 and 13 of the ECSC treaty respectively, was a long overdue step towards institutionalising rules and practices. It had taken the High Authority two years to decide on the general organisational regulations, working methods and recruitment that were finally introduced on 5 November 1954.67 There can be no doubt that Monnet’s conception of appropriate working methods for a supranational administration shaped the early history of the High Authority. The somewhat chaotic conditions in the beginning, the endless discussions in the frequent but irregular High Authority meetings and Monnet’s notion of personal leadership – in short, the omnipresent figure of Monnet – have become part of the founding myth of the first European administration. However, Monnet was counterbalanced by members such as Spierenburg, or collaborators such as Kohnstamm, who did not believe that an unclear distribution of tasks and disorganisation were essential features of a supranational administration. It was often perceived that only with the advent of Monnet’s successor, René Mayer, did the High Authority turn into a smoothly running bureaucracy;68 but the foundations were laid under the Monnet presidency, with the introduction of working groups and the evolution of the secretariat’s role within the High Authority. The role of the secretariat Even before the High Authority took up office, Monnet had had the Dutchman Kohnstamm in mind for the post of secretary.69 As Monnet wanted to maintain flat hierarchies, the secretariat was – in theory – not to be interposed between the college and the administration. It was therefore not conceived as the powerful secretariat-general that one finds in many international organisations. In reality, however, it came close to becoming

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such a nexus, as it subsequently turned into the co-ordinating body the High Authority would otherwise have lacked;70 and although at first reluctant to assign too many tasks to the secretariat, Monnet sanctioned this development.71 Much of this was due to the initiative of the High Authority’s first secretary, Kohnstamm: his notes and letters to Monnet show the insufficient organisation and overlapping responsibilities of the administrative services, and the need for a co-ordinating body. Under Kohnstamm, the secretariat became the heart of the High Authority. Importantly, Monnet assigned to it responsibility for co-ordinating and facilitating the flow of information within the High Authority. Notes from the divisions that were initially sent to the members directly soon had to be forwarded to them via the secretariat.72 The divisions were also to keep the secretariat informed about their work.73 Subsequently, each division had a secretary and these secretaries met weekly under Kohnstamm’s chairmanship. These meetings allowed him to keep an overview of the work of the different divisions. He was also responsible for putting together the agenda of the High Authority’s meetings and for writing the minutes.74 Effectively, therefore, the secretary was interposed between the members and the directors. After the constitution of the working parties, the information flow was mainly directed via these groups.75 However, the secretariat was still in charge of co-ordinating the working parties, of establishing timetables and compiling reports of their meetings for the members.76 It thus preserved its influential role in collecting and channeling information. In a note to his successor, Mayer, Monnet wrote that he relied on the secretariat to keep him informed on everything that was happening in the High Authority as well as on relations between the High Authority and the other institutions of the ECSC. For him, the secretariat was even a substitute for a cabinet présidentiel.77 Introduction of the cabinet system Ministerial cabinets, that is the personal staff of a minister, have been an important feature of French administrations since the early 19th century, and they are also known in Italy and Belgium;78 the High Authority introduced such a cabinet system. While the sources show no trace of the actual decision and the motives underlying it, it is likely that cabinets were introduced at the suggestion of the French, but also of the Belgian and Italian members of the High Authority, who would have been familiar with the system; and seeing the benefits of having one or more personal collaborators, the other members would not have objected. The cabinets were small, with only one and later two members, the chef de cabinet and his/her deputy. These officials, as personal aides and advisers, were to

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assist the members in their daily tasks, preparing opinions on policy matters and generally keeping them informed of events elsewhere in the High Authority.79 They were entitled to request information from the divisions and services, though they could not take part in the directors’ meetings,80 nor did they have regular meetings among themselves like those introduced later in the EEC Commission.81 Also, again unlike under the Commission, they were not allowed to take part in meetings of the High Authority and/or to replace an absent member in them.82 (Directors, on the contrary, were frequently called in to participate in a High Authority meeting.) Cabinet officials could, however, represent their member in the meetings of the working parties.83 Another important task of cabinet staff was to maintain contact with government bodies and other institutions in their member’s home country.84 Importantly, in the multinational administration of the High Authority, the staff of a cabinet, which would mainly be composed of people having the same nationality as the member, was a source of trust; for example, they advised their member on the possible implications a policy proposal could have in their home country. On the whole, cabinets did not play a very important role in the High Authority, but they were significant in that they constituted a quasi-national element in the supranational administration. Crucially, cabinets developed into a core feature of the European administration, and later became highly influential in the European Commission. 1.3 Recruitment patterns The ECSC only introduced a regularised recruitment procedure or concours in 1957. Before, recruitment was haphazard and personalised, but with important long-term consequences for the institution as many of the staff employed at the outset stayed in the High Authority, or another of the European institutions, for the remainder of their careers. The recruitment mechanisms moreover exemplified characteristics of this first European administration. According to Monnet and his collaborators, the supranational and independent character of the High Authority should not only be reflected in the institutional setting but also in its patterns of recruitment. For them, the ideal was a recruitment procedure in which the nationality of the candidates played no role: Naturally, they [European civil servants] have to be chosen indiscriminately among the countries of the Community, without favouring any one country. It will be sufficient to avoid all national preference and to focus on personal skills so that, spontaneously,

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nationals of the six countries see themselves integrated into the services in balanced proportions.85 But was the High Authority able to live up to this supranational principle when it came to appointing its administrative staff? Initial recruitment of leading officials of the High Authority The treaty negotiations in Paris were considered a good recruitment ground for European officials with the right attitude to working in the High Authority.86 Monnet regarded the participants in the negotiations as a source of ‘European spirit’ with which, from the outset, they could endow the High Authority.87 The national delegations at the Schuman Plan negotiations in Paris were composed of a small number of people, mostly experts from the industries concerned, economists and lawyers. The atmosphere at the negotiations, often described as ‘cordial’, and Monnet’s alleged ability to persuade the delegations not to negotiate against each other but to pursue joint solutions and a common cause, contributed to the ‘corporate feeling developed in the Schuman conference’.88 However, the Luxembourg government, for one, had other reasons for proposing members of its negotiation team for posts in the High Authority. Because these people had become experts in matters concerning the ECSC treaty, had developed a mutual understanding and had worked well with Monnet and his colleagues, only they would be able to control and restrict the power of Monnet as a High Authority president who ‘wants to dominate this organisation-to-be, [and] surround himself with men who obey’.89 The Luxembourg ambassador in Paris could have had a point here, as Monnet did not regard everyone who had taken part in the negotiations as apt for work in Luxembourg. Hinting at Sahm from the Schuman Plan department in the Auswärtiges Amt, Monnet emphasised that ‘national forces’ were not welcome in the High Authority;90 he suspected that Sahm was acting on behalf of ‘probably Westrick’,91 state secretary in the German Ministry of Economics, though sources shed no light on whether there was a grain of truth in these allegations, and Sahm himself does not seem to have aspired to a position in the High Authority.92 In any event, Monnet’s reticence over Sahm shows his suspicion of the German economics ministry under Ludwig Erhard, who was unenthusiastic about Monnet’s sectoral integration model and, more generally, about his economic planning.93 In addition, Monnet must have been aware of Sahm’s activities as head of the Schuman Plan department, in first trying to bring the views of German government and industry into the treaty negotiations, and then in securing a sufficient representation of Germans

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in the High Authority’s administration.94 He may have concluded that Sahm would not be able to live up to the role of an independent European official. Clearly, an important hurdle to entering the European administration was securing Monnet’s consent, given his understanding of qualifications for being considered a ‘European’. Only a handful of national civil servants, economists, trade unionists and coal and steel experts were the first to enter the High Authority in August 1952: Pierre Uri (French Planning Commission), Rolf Wagenführ (economic advisor to the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), Richard A. Hamburger (Ministry of Economics, Netherlands), Hans vom Hoff (DGB), Walter Much (Ministry of Justice, Germany), François Vinck (Ministry of Economics, Belgium), Tony Rollman (Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), Geneva, and Arbed (Aciéries réunies de Burblach-Eich-Dudelange, the Luxembourg-based steel and iron company), Max Kohnstamm (Dutch foreign ministry), Charles Reichling (foreign ministry, Luxembourg), Christian Calmes (foreign ministry, Luxembourg) and Cesare BalladorePallieri (Italian Ministry of Finance). To extend this core group of collaborators, the High Authority members agreed that each member would establish a list of candidates for leading posts.95 Monnet wished to discuss these candidacies with each member individually.96 Accordingly, the minutes of the High Authority meetings do not contain discussions on the appointment of leading officials. This way of proceeding suggests that recruitment was a very sensitive topic: it is plausible that members confided in Monnet where particular interests of their governments lay and where they would be able to make concessions. In November 1952 the High Authority decided on the recruitment of its directors,97 and by the following January the bulk of leading officials had been appointed.98 The newly-appointed directors and deputy-directors were invited to suggest candidates for other posts in their divisions. In theory, these nominations were subject to the approval of the Administrative Affairs Committee,99 and of one member – usually someone of the same nationality as the candidate.100 In reality, however, the directors, who knew best which abilities were needed for a certain task, were free to recruit the candidates of their choice.101 These personalised recruitment patterns in the beginning were inevitable, but at the same time problematic, since they could give rise to favouritism. As Sonia Mazey put it: ‘Internal cleavages – along national, sectoral and ideological lines – which existed within the college of the High Authority were thus quickly reproduced and reinforced at the administrative level.’102

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Contacts and networks Senior officials appointed by the High Authority were often recommended by member-state governments. They were certainly chosen for their expertise, but also because they represented certain social, political and economic worldviews and preferences which (it was thought) should ideally prevail at the European level.103 Importantly, staffing the High Authority appeared to be no less than a matter of determining the future economic and social order of Europe. The question was, for example, whether Europe would be governed by a more dirigiste economic policy and planning, the path France had chosen after World War II, or a more market-oriented policy like that in Germany. One of the earliest documents raising such concerns came from the foreign ministry in Luxembourg mentioned above. In the text, written after the summer break in the Schuman Plan negotiations in August/September 1950, the administrative staff was considered as a source of power for whoever would head the High Authority’s administration. The text goes so far as to point out that the recruitment of certain persons could entail the danger that socialist ideas would be put into practice, which were not in the interest of the citizens of Luxembourg and which could be harmful for the economy and living standards in the Grand-Duchy.104 From the perspective of the governing Christian Democrats there, Monnet and his collaborators stood for (socialist) statism. Having the right people in the right post in the administration was thus considered important, not least in order to guarantee that the appropriate ‘philosophy’ would reign in the European administration and, ultimately, in Europe. While it was the members of the High Authority who presented the lists of potential candidates,105 these lists were likely to have been established in close collaboration with governments and interest groups in the member states. Experts from the coal and steel sector and representatives of trade unions, as well as civil servants, figured prominently in these lists. As the ECSC’s main clients, representatives of the coal and steel industries had been extremely sceptical about this supranational organisation meddling in their affairs.106 German industrialists attempted to infiltrate trustworthy candidates into the High Authority’s administrative services, as they also feared the statism of Monnet and his collaborators from the Plan; and when it became clear that members of the High Authority would not be representatives of industry, they focused on the administrative ranks.107 Members of the High Authority facilitated the entry of personnel from interest groups and businesses into the administration. For instance, Etzel secured for Wilhelm Salewski, Hauptgeschäftsführer or chair of the WVESI, the post of director of the Investment Division.108 The candidacy of the Luxembourg

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steel expert Rollman from the steel consortium Arbed is another case in point. Recruiting him should have accommodated fears in the Luxembourg government – and, no doubt, in the Arbed – that the local steel industry would not be adequately represented in the High Authority’s services.109 René Tezenas du Montcel of the French Groupe de Contrôle Charbon, which was part of the economic committee in the High Commission to Germany, was the candidate of Charbonnages de France, the French state-owned coal-mining company.110 Other candidates with expertise in, and ties to, the coal and steel sector were Max Schensky, a former high official of the German mining administration, Caspar Berding from the Netherlands and Gérard Delarge, a former director of a mine in the Belgian Borinage. It is thus misleading for Barthel to argue that Monnet earned distrust among the industries concerned because he rarely opted for experienced people with a coal and steel background.111 In fact, these people actually dominated the High Authority’s technical divisions. Certainly, Monnet brought with him a group of officials from the Planning Commission and the French civil service such as Uri, JacquesRené Rabier, Gaudet, François Fontaine, Jacques van Helmont, André Lamy and the young Inspecteur des Finances, Jean Guyot, who became director of the Financial Service in the High Authority at the age of 31.112 National administrations were generally an important source of officials; many of those who had taken part in the ECSC treaty negotiations had served in ministries of the member states. The files of the German economics ministry highlight the fact that national administrations identified candidates and then presented them to the High Authority. Future leading officials of German origin, such as Schensky, Regul (German Coal Administration, Deutsche Kohlenbergbau-Leitung (DKBL), Hans Michaelis (German economics ministry) and Dehnen (DKBL) had already been in the ministry’s focus since November 1951 – long before the members of the High Authority were even nominated.113 In fact, the majority of leading German officials employed in the High Authority by January 1953 were suggested by the economics ministry.114 While this seems to contradict the supranational attitude Monnet initially sought to maintain when recruiting personnel, a pre-selection of candidates at the national level was indispensable, as the High Authority’s administration would not have been able to manage and process thousands of applications from the six member states.115 But the bulk of the 1,800 candidacies the economics ministry identified were not taken into consideration by the High Authority: after all, it had autonomy in recruitment matters and civil servants like Hans von der Groeben complained that ‘suggestions from the BMWi [economics ministry] do not have priority’.116

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Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the High Authority had to compromise in recruitment matters. Civil servants in the French foreign ministry pondered how best to include officials from the Direction des Affaires Économiques et Financières, the ministry’s economics and finance directorate, in the High Authority’s administration. These should form a link and a source of information for the French government. In particular, having French officials from the Quai d’Orsay in the entourage of the High Authority’s president, and thus at the centre of decisionmaking, was of interest.117 For the German government there was more to it than merely having a link in the High Authority: it particularly tried to advance individuals who were convinced market economists. For example, when a vacancy in Uri’s Economics Division came up, leading officials from the German economics ministry sought to get someone into the post who was a market economist and could counterbalance the tendencies towards planning and statism that they believed existed within the High Authority.118 Which economic model would ultimately prevail in Europe was a matter of general concern to the German government. The administration of the High Authority was also a battleground for the major tendencies in economic governance of the time. Obviously, the trade unions were also interested in being represented in the services of the High Authority. Whereas Paul Finet was the candidate of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) at the level of High Authority members, the trade unionists Hans vom Hoff and Giuseppe Glisenti were employed at the administrative level. Like Finet, both vom Hoff and Glisenti had taken part in ICFTU meetings.119 In addition, vom Hoff had been the DGB representative in the German delegation at the ECSC treaty negotiations and the DGB had asked Adenauer to secure a post for him in the High Authority.120 Vom Hoff thus became conseiller, or adviser, in the High Authority. However, the sources reveal very little about these discussions as Monnet never openly acknowledged that the High Authority employed people because they had a certain background or useful contacts;121 this would have gone against the principles of independence and supranationality. Also, once in the High Authority, these people had to prove themselves. In the case of vom Hoff, for example, the BMWi deplored the fact that he ‘was not able to assert himself’.122 In general, however, trade unionists had excellent relations with Monnet and also with Mayer, and the European administration was one of the few career opportunities outside the trade unions. According to Patrick Pasture ‘the transnational European trade union elite . . . shared a common culture with the burgeoning European administration’, particularly in those divisions dealing with social concerns.123

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The national balance While Monnet and Uri stated repeatedly that the nationality of the candidates should not play a role in recruitment, the reality was different. Governments and industries of the member states wanted to see their nationals represented in acceptable numbers, being unconvinced that their concerns would be sufficiently addressed in an institution with a supranational label. For example, the German steel industry did not trust an unbiased ‘Europeanness’ to develop soon in the High Authority, and therefore emphasised the need for ‘national’ criteria in recruitment in order to defend their corporate interests – for example the abolition of discriminatory regulations and production controls.124 In spite of the supranational rhetoric, in October 1952 Uri presented a note on the ‘balanced distribution’ of posts which took into account the figures of the production and consumption of coal and steel, the seats in the Parliamentary Assembly of the ECSC and the population of the member states as criteria for filling vacant posts in the High Authority.125 From the outset, a ‘certain equilibrium’ between nationalities was agreed upon by the members,126 but these proportions should remain flexible.127 However, it seems the resolution to maintain this flexibility was soon abandoned, the High Authority admitting difficulties in maintaining a national equilibrium because well-qualified people with the desired national background were often not willing to come to Luxembourg (particularly Italians, who were often not prepared to live permanently north of the Alps).128 However, the national balance meant that it was hardly possible to appoint a betterqualified candidate with a different passport,129 and sometimes less wellqualified candidates were employed in order to fulfil a national quota.130 The departure of senior officials and the search for suitable successors triggered discussions about whether they should be replaced by officials of the same nationality, as this would limit the field of candidates and might discriminate against other, more capable candidates.131 In these discussions the members usually sought to ensure that their own nationality would not be discriminated against – they would come under pressure by their government if they accepted an ‘inadequate’ representation of their nationality in the High Authority’s administrative services.132 According to Uri a candidate put forward by a government could not be rejected, as it was considered taboo to judge the candidate of another member state. As a consequence, he thought that a number of candidates were put forward not with the interests of the Community in mind but, for instance, to get rid of unwanted personnel.133 In a note of November 1953, Monnet stated that the initial phase was characterised by the careful choice of collaborators, ‘taking their competencies into account as well as showing consideration for national

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sensibilities – indispensable in the first phase of a supranational organisation’.134 This ‘first phase of supranationality’ was not followed, as Monnet had hoped, by a second phase in which the nationality of staff would play no role. Under pressure of member-state governments the formula of recruiting personnel on a ‘wide geographical basis’ entered the ECSC staff regulations (Article 28) and subsequently the staff regulations of the EEC and Euratom. Daily allowances, contracts, staff regulations The situation of the first collaborators in Luxembourg was precarious. The ‘Convention on the dispositions of the transitional period’, annexed to the ECSC treaty, provided for recruitment on a contractual basis before the ‘Committee of Four Presidents’135 – comprising the presidents of the Court of Justice, the Parliamentary Assembly, the High Authority and the Council of Ministers – met for the first time (§ 7, Article 3 of the Convention). This controlling body should establish an overall estimated budget, and decide on salary levels, the overall number of staff and their status in the ECSC institutions (Article 78(3) ECSC). At first, the High Authority remunerated its collaborators on the basis of – generous – daily allowances, which they received on top of their normal salary.136 A 29year-old official in the German finance ministry could earn an incredible DM 4,541.40 per month in Luxembourg, in addition to his meagre publicsector salary of DM 518 – a premium of almost 900 per cent.137 On the one hand, it was thus very lucrative to work for the High Authority under the daily-allowance scheme, while on the other many individuals who came to Luxembourg sought security in their jobs rather than financial advantage,138 and recruitment of new staff seems to have been hampered by the lack of job stability. A commitment towards European integration or the temporary benefits of high remuneration was not enough to keep officials working in the High Authority. Very soon, they demanded secure jobs and the opportunity of a career in a European administration. In 1954 Kohnstamm notified Monnet of general dissatisfaction among staff.139 The main causes were a delay in the introduction of staff regulations and the randomness of the remuneration levels set for individual officials, leaving people doing a similar job and having the same qualifications with a different salary. Moreover, officials’ individual situation differed: personnel coming from the Dutch civil service, for instance, were only granted up to six months of unpaid vacation from their employer. After this period, they had to decide whether they wished to return to their old post or stay in the High Authority;140 with no job security or career system in place, it was risky to opt for Luxembourg.

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Monnet and officials such as Balladore thought however that the contractual period – with a three-month notice period – was an opportunity to test the future European civil servants, to keep the most apt and to send away the weakest.141 It was not clear from the outset whether staff in the ECSC institutions would benefit from a statutory regime similar to that of a national civil service.142 Article 16 of the ECSC treaty merely stated that the High Authority ‘shall make all appropriate administrative arrangements for the operation of its departments’. Article 7 of the transition-period dispositions attributed to the Committee of Four Presidents the task of drawing up staff regulations, but did not state which form these should take. Jacques Rueff, judge at the ECJ, explained that the supranationality of the High Authority was one of the reasons for introducing a statute: ‘We thought that a corps of supranational civil servants was, in fact, virtually a corps of national civil servants who had supranationality as their nationality. And that made us decide in favour of a statute.’143 The decision to create a European civil service was thus linked to high-flying ideas of creating a European-minded workforce. In December 1952, the Committee of Four Presidents set up a comité statut in charge of drawing up staff regulations and a provisional statute.144 However, work progressed slowly because Monnet did not prioritise this project. He did not want the statute to become ‘the preamble of the general statute of the European civil service’;145 instead, it should be short and adapted to the particular problems of the ECSC. In addition, discussions at the level of member-state governments hampered work on the statute. A point of discord between the member states was, for instance, the secondment procedure. High officials in the Quai d’Orsay wished to uphold the possibility of sending, or ‘seconding’, French civil servants to the Community administration where they would stay for a limited period of time and then return to the French civil service.146 In this, the French were supported by German officials in the Auswärtiges Amt and the economics ministry,147 but Monnet was opposed to incorporating seconded national civil servants in the services of the High Authority. On his initiative, Article 27 of the draft statute included a paragraph that required national civil servants to quit their posts in the national administration before they could take up a post in one of the ECSC institutions.148 This paragraph was later removed, however, and did not appear in the final version of the statute. After Monnet resigned from his post as president in November 1954, and in June 1955 left Luxembourg, Spierenburg seems to have been the only member left to fight secondment, arguing that it would not be conducive to officials’ independence.149 The other High Authority members claimed, however,

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that officials being guaranteed reintegration in their home administration would make them even more independent.150 Finally, a very important reason for the High Authority members abandoning the principle of incompatibility between national and European civil services was pressure from the German and French governments.151 The ECSC staff regulations were adopted on 28 January 1956, with Article 2(3) providing for the possibility of incorporating officials temporarily in the ECSC services.152 The issues of secondment and national balance were what most underlined the grip of the member-state governments on the High Authority’s staffing policy. Yves Conrad sees in this a gradual sacrifice of supranational principles under Monnet’s successors.153 However, for those who defended supranationality, such as Kohnstamm, the statute was nevertheless of crucial importance for the formation of a high-quality ‘corps of European civil servants’.154 Conclusion: consolidation and bureaucratisation ‘Under no circumstances will we create an administration. We want to maintain our organisation as reduced as possible and avoid any tendency towards bureaucracy.’155 However determined Monnet and his collaborators may have been to keep the High Authority’s administration small and flexible, bureaucratisation seems to have been inevitable, not least because of the increasing complexity of the tasks the High Authority had to undertake. According to sociologist Maurizio Bach, bureaucratisation is a process of the consolidation and persistence of the supranational institutional framework.156 This is a positive view of a process that was often perceived as hampering innovation, flexibility and rationality within the administration. The members and staff did not perceive the High Authority as an organisation that worked in a smooth and rational way.157 In interviews, former High Authority officials frequently underlined the anarchic character of work under the Monnet presidency, where working hours did not exist.158 Nevertheless, the chaotic beginnings and the heavy workload seem to have contributed to forging a ‘team spirit’ among the High Authority’s staff. Anecdotes such as officials catching a couple of hours of sleep in the office, stretched out on the floor under their desks, became part of the founding myth of the European administration, also passed on to, and propagated by, officials who had joined the High Authority long after Monnet’s departure.159 A persistent problem under the Monnet presidency was overlapping responsibilities between the divisions, and the consequent duplication of work, which were a result of the ambiguous demarcation of these responsibilities. Defining the scope of the divisions seems to have caused serious problems, which had still not been solved long after the

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establishment of the working groups.160 It was only when work on the staff regulations reached its final stages in spring 1955 that the High Authority perceived a need to understand the structure of its divisions and the number of their different tasks, as well as the internal hierarchy of each division.161 Before then there had been no detailed organisational scheme of the different services and divisions and their internal hierarchies. The lack of co-ordination between the divisions also seems to have facilitated an unintended increase in staff numbers: a division tended to employ personnel in an area for which it felt responsible but which was also covered by another division.162 The High Authority was thus unable to live up to its aim of retaining a small and flexible administration, also because this would have necessitated a more rigorous approach to organisation and staff management, matters in which Monnet took little interest. At the beginning of January 1953, the High Authority had 280 employees;163 by the end of 1958, the figure had more than tripled, to 938.164 Increasing staff numbers can be an indicator of various phenomena, such as lack of leadership, bureaucratisation and changing administrative roles: ‘[W]ith the opening of the common market, the administrative services became increasingly involved in the daily management and adjustment – i.e. the execution – of Community policies.’165 The High Authority had lost its initial character, close to Monnet’s heart, as a thinktank working with external experts, because the services soon aimed to undertake all the work themselves.166 By trying to keep the administration small and flexible, did Monnet ‘defy organisational logic’, as Mazey suggests?167 It is more likely that, with his experience at the Plan, Monnet really believed that the High Authority could remain a small administration de mission. However, apart from his relaxed attitude towards organisation, there were external factors that played against him, such as member-state governments requesting the creation of supplementary divisions and the observing of the national balance. Still, Mazey’s claim that the ‘High Authority was more intergovernmental than supranational in character’168 overstates the influence of member-state governments. She leaves aside all consideration of socialisation of High Authority members and staff and of individuals in member-state governments, industries and trade unions who participated in the Council of Ministers or the Consultative Committee, and who were certainly affected by the structures, working methods and ideas at the heart of the High Authority.169 In spite of the High Authority not being able completely to live up to the supranational ideal, it is likely that working in a multinational administration with a claim of supranationality

ESTABLISHING A SUPRANATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

33

had an effect on its administrative staff, creating a corporate identity and loyalty within the institution.

2 TOWARDS A EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE? The First European Civil Servants

This chapter examines the biographies and careers of senior civil servants in the High Authority. It focuses in particular on socialisation mechanisms which may have facilitated a shift of loyalties to the European level.1 The first section examines the officials’ biographical background, including their education, experience and careers before joining the High Authority. These are called ‘internal’ factors in the Europeanisation process. The second section explores ‘external’ factors that could have triggered or enhanced the process, such as living and working in Luxembourg. The final section features the biographies of three types of High Authority officials. There were three careers in the High Authority: A, B and C. Civil servants of the A career, ranging from A1 (director) to A7 (administrator), were highly-qualified civil servants. Directors, for example, were at the top of the administrative hierarchy and headed the largest administrative units in the High Authority, serving as advisers to its members and responsible for policy drafts devised in their divisions and submitted to the High Authority. The main focus of this chapter will be on A officials of the Market Division, Economics Division and the secretariat. This choice allows the study of a wide range of officials, in a technical division concerned with the coal and steel market, in a division dealing with more general economic questions, and in the secretariat playing a vital role in the smooth running of the High Authority generally. Staff numbers in the High Authority are difficult to determine. The lack of them in the sources suggests that initially there was little interest in keeping track of such numbers – which is unsurprising given Monnet’s attitude towards administration. Staff numbers, however, are available for a later period. According to the ECSC Monthly Bulletin, in July 1956 the

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High Authority had 662 employees, of which 171 were A Officials, 54 B, 389 C and 48 L (language) staff.2 Of the 171 A officials, 12 worked in the Economics Division, 21 in the Market Division and seven in the secretariat. This chapter examines in total 19 officials from the Economics Division, 25 from the Market Division and 26 from the secretariat (this number including the External Relations Division, the Legal Service and some officials who served in cabinets). These officials joined the High Authority before 1956 and spent at least part of their career in these divisions. In addition, 13 officials, randomly selected across other divisions of the High Authority, serve as a comparison group. Not all officials worked in these divisions at the same time, but moved on to other divisions or left the High Authority. The number of officials studied here is therefore higher than the staff numbers given for the individual divisions in 1956. The study thus comprises 83 officials which is quite a high proportion of the 171 A officials, given that biographical information for the High Authority officials is hard to come by. Many of these first European officials, born in the late 19th and early 20th century, died before it became more common, in the 1990s, to conduct interviews with witnesses to European integration, and they have left few traces in archival sources. Some officials, therefore, are merely known by name and by the position they held within the administration. For others it was possible to obtain biographical details. Due to the fragmented nature of the source material, the picture that emerges of the High Authority personnel is not exhaustive. However, it is a crucial step towards a fuller analysis of the first administrative staff of the European administration in Luxembourg. 2.1 The officials’ biographical background The ideas and ideologies, political convictions and values, and aims and objectives of individuals are the result of their accumulated experience. What (generational) experience did the High Authority’s civil servants share? In order to place the officials in a generational context, determining the age groups they belonged to is vital. The average year of birth of officials in the secretariat was 1918;3 they were born between 1905 and 1929. Typically, A officials in the secretariat were in their early to late thirties when coming to Luxembourg. Compared to the secretariat, officials of the Market Division were significantly older. Their average year of birth was 1906, with three officials born in the 19th century (one in 1897 and two in 1899) and three shortly after the turn of the century (in 1902); the youngest was born in 1922.4 When entering the High Authority officials in the Market Division were on average over a decade older than their colleagues in the secretariat. Finally, with 1915 as its staff’s average year of birth, the Economics Division was more similar to the secretariat.

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The oldest official was born in 1899 and the youngest in 1928.5 While this renders the Market Division the oldest by far, the officials of the comparison group were born on average in 1910, with two born in 1899. This corresponds more to the results for the Market Division and shows that this higher average age was not exceptional in the High Authority. The age distribution indicates that the High Authority’s staff was notably heterogeneous. However, the officials’ dates of birth indicate that they may have shared certain generational experiences.6 The concept of a generation can be a useful analytical tool to determine similarities and differences between groups of individuals and thus to reach more general conclusions on these groups. Jürgen Reulecke coined the term Jahrhundertgeneration (‘century generation’), which he applied to Germans born between circa 1900 and 1912.7 This corresponds to the seemingly unique German experience of defeat in World War I, political and economic crisis in the inter-war years and the rise of National Socialism. It is likely, however, that individuals born in this period shared some experiences across national borders. They grew up during World War I and experienced political and/or economic instability in the 1920s and 1930s which did not only hit Germany but also Italy, France and the Netherlands, for example. Italy saw the rise of fascism in the 1920s and during World War II southern France was governed from 1940 to 1944 by the nationalist collaborationist government of Marshal Philippe Pétain. While taking into account the diversity of the different personal experiences, the concept of century generation can be applied to individuals from the six member states and was not peculiar to the generation of German officials. Born on average in 1918, the staff of the secretariat and the Economics Division was nearer to the so-called ‘45er’ generation, one that was profoundly marked by World War II, and for whom 1945 was an important turning point in their lives.8 This generation dominated the Commission, and is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. What impact did the generational background of the officials have on their ability to adopt European values? The members of the century generation reached the height of their careers in the 1930s and 1940s, and thus the possibility of supporting European integration as a new way of peaceful cooperation between European states opened up to them relatively late in life. Ulrich Herbert attributes to them a high degree of rationality and dispassionateness.9 Arguably, they were less likely to adopt and internalise European values and aims. Considerably younger at the end of World War II, the 45ers were more likely to adapt to the multinational surroundings of the High Authority. Herbert also attributes to the 45ers a particularly positive attitude towards the European integration project.10

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Educational background Exploring the educational background and previous professional experience of officials is vital for comprehending their preferences and decision-making behaviour.11 It is likely that the diversity in age is complemented by diversity in the officials’ educational background, as the tasks in the divisions and services of the High Authority were themselves diverse and required a range of different skills. Indeed, Table 1 suggests that there are such variations in the educational background among the staff of all four groups. Table 1. Educational background of high officials Secretariat Market Division Economics Division Comparison group

No degree 2

Law

Econ

FGE

E/M

Other

NK

4 -

Law/ Econ 5 1

5 1

5 -

14

1 2

6 5

-

3

9

1

4

1

2

8

1

2

2

-

1

3

1

3

Key: Econ – Economics; FGE – French Grande École; E/M – Engineering/ Mining; NK – Not Known

With five lawyers, four economists, five qualified in both law and economics, five graduates from an elite French Grande École and one (Kohnstamm) with a degree in modern history, the secretariat was dominated by generalists. In contrast, the Market Division was clearly a division of specialists. Fourteen officials held a degree in engineering, of which nine had specialised in mining. However, at least two of the three directors of the Market Division, namely Rollman and Dehnen, had not studied at a university but received training on the job. Dehnen had worked in a bank before embarking on a career in different enterprises in the German coal industry, and Rollman had left school at the age of 18 with a certificate from the École Industrielle et Commerciale in Luxembourg. He then worked in steel enterprises in France and Luxembourg.12 As for Vinck, the third director, it is not known whether he had a university degree or whether he had been trained on the job in the Belgian coal industry. The Economics Division was, like the secretariat, a division composed of generalists, with the exception of one engineer. But the educational background of these officials was more complex. Several officials held degrees in more than one subject; this can be explained by the fact that French officials were in a relative majority in this division, and in France it was common to study more than one subject to degree level. In this

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39

respect, the German deputy director Regul fitted well into this group, as he held degrees in history and economics. With philosophy, law, economics and a diploma from the École nationale d’administration (ENA), Uri had accumulated the most degrees. While it would be going too far to compare the Economics Division to the French Planning Commission, it is true that with Uri being responsible for recruitment in his division, a network of French economists entered the High Authority. Uri, Pierre Pujade and Jacques Cros had studied at the Institut de sciences économiques appliquées under the economist François Perroux, who had connections with the Planning Commission, and Robert Marjolin, future vice-president of the EEC Commission.13 Finally, the educational background of officials from the comparison group is more balanced, with generalists and specialists evenly distributed. Judging by their age and educational background, the High Authority’s staff seems to have been divided into two groups: younger generalists of the 45er generation and older coal and steel experts of the century generation. Professional background The officials’ professional background before entering the High Authority can be divided into five categories: national civil service; business; interest groups; universities and research institutions; and international organisations (Table 2). Table 2. Professional background of high officials

Secretariat Market Division Economics Division Comparison group

National Business civil service 12 3 8 11

Interest groups

Uni/ Research

IO

Other

NK

3 2

1 0

1 2

4 2

2 0

2

6

7

-

2

2

0

3

3

6

1

2

Key: Business (in particular coal and steel industry); Interest Groups (employers’ organisations, trade unions etc.); Uni/Research – University/Research; IO – International Organisations; NK – Not Known

The bulk of officials had worked in national administrations in the member states; in the secretariat alone, 12 had come from their national civil service. In the Market and Economics Divisions, eight and seven officials respectively had been civil servants. However, the group of former civil servants was not the strongest in the Market Division. This is not surprising as in this division expert knowledge of coal and steel

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markets was needed, and this was best found in practitioners who had worked in businesses in these sectors; this explains the high number of officials (11) from private enterprises. On the other hand, there were no officials from private enterprises in the Economics Division, and a negligible number in the secretariat and the comparison group. The number of people from interest groups is very low in all three divisions studied here. At first sight, this seems to confirm Monnet’s claim of the High Authority’s impartiality. However, this first impression has to be modified when looking at the comparison group, where former interestgroup employees constitute the largest group of officials. This suggests that there were a sensible number of former interest-group employees in the High Authority as a whole. War Set up only seven years after the end of World War II, it is unlikely that the war did not play a role in the High Authority – if not in its decisions, then at least in the everyday working life of its officials. ‘War experience’ here refers to World War II, although some High Authority officials had also experienced World War I.14 The war experiences of the civil servants were diverse; they included fighting as a soldier for or against Nazi Germany, activities in the Resistance, imprisonment, persecution, torture, occupation, and suffering the loss of friends and relatives. Given this diversity of experience, the question is which mechanisms allowed the officials to overcome possible feelings of resentment and mistrust towards, in particular, their German colleagues. Georges Berthoin, Monnet’s chef de cabinet, recounts that after he arrived in Luxembourg he invited all the chefs de cabinet to dinner and asked them what they were doing in 1943, including Winrich Behr, then an officer on the Wehrmacht’s General Staff. Further, they discussed ways of dealing with the situation – whether it was possible to forgive and forget. The majority of the French and Dutch colleagues said, according to Berthoin, that they could neither forget nor forgive, but that they were determined to look ahead and ‘to construct the future together’.15 If this was the motto for dealing with the past, it did not prevent the German officials meeting with mistrust and even hostility from their colleagues. The Luxembourger Calmes, for example, had been imprisoned in Hinzert concentration camp near Trier.16 In an interview he stated that his first reaction to the Schuman Plan was hostile; the only positive aspect he found in the proposal was that it would lead to peace.17 He also ‘tested’ his German colleagues, confronting them with what he had had to endure during the war. In an interview, Behr recalled such an encounter when he

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41

and his wife were invited to dinner by Calmes, and shown the wroughtiron coat rack he had made in captivity.18 The attitude of a ‘fresh start’, without forgetting the past, was displayed by other officials including Kohnstamm, who had himself been imprisoned several times during the war. He befriended Behr and described his first encounter with him: You walked into my office and said that you were a regular officer. I said that was none of my business and that we were here to talk about the future, not the past. Later, we talked about the past and there comes a time when this is indispensable. But there are times when action has to be forward-looking.19 Calmes and Kohnstamm stood for two ways of dealing with the immediate past, but clearly the ‘fresh start’ did not always run smoothly. In this respect it is also of interest to note how the German government dealt with the role that potential German candidates for the High Authority might have played during World War II. While Hallstein required information on whether the members of the German delegation at the Schuman Plan negotiations, which he headed, had been members of the Nazi party, the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP),20 this was not followed through rigorously when it came to staffing the High Authority. The Federation for the Victims of the Nazi Regime urged the German chancellery and economics ministry carefully to consider candidates’ backgrounds and careers during the period of National Socialism, and to exclude compromised individuals.21 Indeed, a certificate of ‘denazification’ was among the criteria German candidates had to meet. The files of the economics ministry reveal a case where a candidate was considered unsuitable for working in an ‘interstate organisation’ because of his wartime membership of the Waffen-SS. It was however merely out of consideration for the opinion of other member states that this candidate was excluded, and not because of a German government conviction that such individuals should generally be banned from a career in the public sector.22 Surprisingly, the German government seems to have lacked consideration when it came to the German members of the High Authority. While not a member of the NSDAP,23 vicepresident Etzel, born in 1902, had a background in the völkische Bewegung, a nationalist movement of right-wing student corporations in Germany in the inter-war period, and had fought in the Wehrmacht during the war. These corporations were traditionally anti-Semitic, revanchist and antiFrench.24 With regard to Etzel and Fritz Hellwig, an anti-French nationalist before and during World War II, Bernd Bühlbäcker concludes

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that the ‘[German] federal government displayed considerable moral indifference’ when it came to the assignment of posts in the High Authority to politically incriminated individuals.25 The case of Potthoff, however, seems to contradict this judgement: a trade unionist and a candidate from the DGB, Potthoff seems to have been chosen precisely because he had not been a member of the NSDAP. Yet, he was originally only second choice behind the DGB’s first candidate, Heinrich Deist, who had indeed been a NSDAP member. Adenauer allegedly feared that his candidature would be criticised or even rejected by the other member states.26 Consideration for the other member states was however only a pretext for Adenauer to reject Deist’s candidature – the latter’s economic orientation, which tended towards economic planning, could have caused problems for Etzel, who was to defend the values of the social-market economy within the High Authority.27 The German government did not pursue a consistent policy of preventing individuals with a dubious past from entering the High Authority. In a way, however, Etzel’s and Hellwig’s biographies were representative of Germans of the century generation. It was not unusual that after the war both became convinced democrats. In this respect, the choice of Etzel, a co-founder of the CDU, as vice-president of the High Authority was logical, because he was a prominent personality in West Germany and close to Adenauer. His candidature was intended to stress the importance the German government attributed to the ECSC. Combining the former nationalists Etzel and Hellwig with Monnet and other High Authority members, some of whom, such as Piero Malvestiti, had resisted fascism since the 1920s, could have led to conflicts – unless they granted each other the right to renounce old beliefs and the ability to change. Thus at the origins of the fruitful collaboration between Monnet, Etzel and the other members there was certainly also an attitude of ‘do not forget, but look ahead’. Moreover, as Mauve Carbonell has shown in her collective biography of the High Authority members, few had as impressive a Resistance record as Malvestiti, or indeed any Resistance activity.28 International experience International experience can point to an individual’s greater ability to adapt to new work and life-related circumstances. It can render people more open, tolerant and flexible. In the case of European officials it could mean that they would respond in a positive way to the multinational aspects of the High Authority and, ultimately, adopt the goal of European integration. According to Jarle Trondal, officials with international experience ‘may be conducive to supranationalism’ and are more likely to

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adopt ‘supranational role perceptions’.29 Table 3 lists the international experience of High Authority officials. It should be noted that some individuals have accumulated two or more such experiences, which explains why the overall figure for international experience exceeds the number of officials analysed. Table 3. Previous international experience of high officials IO Secretariat Market Division Economics Division Comparison group

IN

2 7

Uni/ studies 9 4

Other

2 4

Work abroad 1 1

4 2

None/ NK 9 8

-

3

1

1

-

15

4

2

3

-

8

Key: IO – International Organisations; Uni/studies – University studies; IN – International Negotiations; NK – Not Known

The high figures in the ‘none/not known’ column stand out, and it is likely that a large proportion of the officials included here did not have any international experience before joining the High Authority – the proportion of officials having such experience would otherwise seem excessively high for the early 1950s. In the secretariat, the most common type of international experience was studying abroad (nine). Only two officials had worked for international organisations, while a further two had participated in international negotiations. The overall picture is that of a very mobile secretariat staff; the high number of university studies in another country, as opposed to other types of experience, such as working abroad, is also probably due to the relatively young age of the secretariat staff, for example in comparison to officials in the Market Division. Secretariat staff had often not lived for enough years to accumulate more international experience before joining the High Authority. The officials of the Market Division had the most diverse international experience. Seven had worked temporarily for international organisations such as the UN or the OEEC; Dehnen, for example, had presided over the latter’s coal committee.30 Vinck had participated in the Schuman Plan negotiations and had been the president of the UN coal committee. The case of Rollman is discussed in detail in the third section of this chapter. All three leading officials had international experience linked to their industrial sectors. With four officials having participated in the Schuman Plan negotiations, the Market Division seems to have absorbed much of the core of the small negotiating team that joined the High Authority.

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Officials in the Economics Division had the least international experience. Three had studied abroad, including Uri, who had also participated in the Schuman Plan negotiations. Officials in this division were rather young, with a large proportion raised in the French elite education system, where studying abroad was not necessarily an advantage for a successful career in France. The general picture that emerges from this analysis is that of considerable mobility among High Authority officials. Part of this mobility goes back to the transnationally organised coal and steel industry in the inter-war period, and initiatives concerning these industries in the postwar period. The Frenchman Tezenas du Montcel had been the directorgeneral of a Polish mining company in the 1930s. After the war he worked for the French administration of the Allied Control Commission in Berlin, in the industrial-production division. The younger staff in the secretariat accounts for a different kind of mobility, more linked to university exchange, something that became more common in post-war Europe. For example, the German Klaus Ewig spent several months abroad on work experience in Great Britain and Switzerland during his studies, and wrote his PhD thesis in France.31 Three assumptions emerge from this picture. First, the high proportion of internationally experienced staff suggests that the High Authority attracted a more than averagely mobile and flexible staff. Second, it is likely that these officials had developed an increased ability to adapt to work in a multinational and multilingual administration, where the main working languages were French and, to a lesser extent, German. Third, because of their openness, they were more likely to adopt European values and aims. Their motives in joining the High Authority may clarify whether this mobility coincided with a particular interest in issues of European integration. Motives for working for ‘Europe’ Was it idealism or pragmatism or something entirely different that enticed officials to leave their home countries, move to Luxembourg and work for the newly-founded ECSC? Idealism and pragmatism seem to be the two extremes, between which there was a range of motives. These do not necessarily have to be mutually exclusive, of course – individuals can have different, coexisting motives. Undoubtedly, with regard to the long-term success story of the European Communities, in interviews and memoirs the number of those who claim they acted out of idealism is greater than those who admit that they were led by pragmatism. In an interview Behr, half ironically, said that there was hardly a retired European civil servant who did not claim to have had this European impetus while working at the High Authority.32

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Certainly, some individuals were drawn to the High Authority because they wanted to contribute to the success of this first supranational administration, and more generally to European integration; very often, such idealistic motives were drawn from experiences in World War II. Some of these individuals worked hard on obtaining a post in Luxembourg, like the Dutchman Gérard Wissels, whose initial application to the High Authority was unsuccessful as he lacked professional experience. He then worked at Rotterdam harbour to gain this experience, reapplied, and in 1954 entered Spierenburg’s cabinet.33 Voicing sentiments typical of German officials at the time, Wolfgang Ernst mentioned the ‘moral shock’ of the Germans after the war, and the doubt he and others had about whether other countries would ever again treat Germany as an equal partner. After he met Monnet, however, ‘[he] became convinced that the Monnet line was a real . . . perspective for a common European future’.34 In the case of Ernst and also Behr,35 idealism was complemented by a political motive, namely contributing to a project that allowed Germany’s return to the international political scene and the negotiation table as an equal partner. Some officials date their interest in European affairs to their engagement in the resistance movement. Berthoin was active in the Union des étudiants patriotiques in Grenoble, where he met Simon Nora, another French official. According to Berthoin they discussed plans for Europe’s future because they thought a situation similar to that after World War I, a new Versailles, had to be avoided.36 It was thus from a historical perspective, with the aim of avoiding a situation similar to that which had led to the downfall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Hitler, that these officials saw the need for a united Europe. Kohnstamm had similar motives when he thought that after the war Germany should not be oppressed but stabilised, and reintegrated into the international community.37 Pragmatic motives included pecuniary and career advantages. As shown earlier, work in the High Authority was indeed lucrative, at least in the beginning. In March 1953 Monnet made it clear that the High Authority aimed to attract and retain highly-qualified staff by paying them competitive salaries, comparable to those in the private sector.38 For some officials, therefore, the prospect of improving their financial situation may well have contributed to their decision to become expatriates. There were allowances to compensate for having to move to another country, such as the 5 per cent ‘residency allowance’ which officials received on top of their salary.39 A motive situated between the extremes of pragmatism and idealism was that of finding a solution for the European coal and steel industries.

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After World War II leading coal and steel experts such as Salewski and Rollman, but also Vinck, Dehnen and Schensky, were pondering the question of how their industries could survive, particularly in the face of US competition, and came to the conclusion that the only possible solution was close cooperation between European countries’ coal and steel industries, or even their integration.40 Writing in the late 1940s, Salewski had been in favour of a revival of the inter-war steel cartel of the 1920s41 – for him the ideal form of transnational industrial cooperation.42 Although he finally supported the Schuman Plan, his candidature for a post in the High Authority was not uncontested: Etzel and Potthoff insisted on Salewski, but Monnet and Uri feared ‘that he is too well networked and has been linked for too long with the German steel cartels’.43 Rollman also had the survival of the European steel industry in mind but, as he had become an internationally accepted steel expert working for international organisations, he was less associated with a particular business or interest group, and his candidature was therefore less contested. 2.2 Living and working in Luxembourg Careers in the High Authority Length of service can facilitate socialisation processes within an organisation: socialisation theory sees a link between duration and intensity of service and the development of an esprit de corps and of a ‘perception of group belongingness’.44 What kind of career did the first European civil servants have, and how long did they stay in the High Authority or European Community institutions? The majority of those officials studied for this chapter entered the High Authority in 1952 or 1953 (15 from the secretariat, 16 from the Market Division, eight from the Economics Division and 12 from the comparison group). A further two entered the secretariat in 1954, three in 1955 and three more after that year.45 Four officials joined the Market Division in 1954, and four later than 1955.46 The Economics Division recruited 13 of the officials studied here between 1952 and 1956, and six after this latter date. Civil servants from the secretariat spent an average of 15.7 years in the service of the High Authority, the EEC or the Euratom Commission. Eight officials stayed less than ten years, three between ten and 20, five between 20 and 30, and two over 30.47 One could assume that those who stayed less than ten years were the least committed to European integration, especially if they did not simply retire but returned to pursue their careers in their home countries. The latter is certainly the case for individuals such as Jean Poincaré and Paul Delouvrier, two of the so-

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called French high-flyers, who were offered leading posts in the French administration. However, among those who served less than ten years were also Monnet’s close collaborators Fontaine and Kohnstamm, who left the High Authority shortly after Monnet and continued to serve him elsewhere. In their case, time does not seem to have been a determinant factor in their Europeanisation – they already held strong idealistic motives for joining the High Authority. Kohnstamm, for example, believed that he could serve the cause of European unity better by working at Monnet’s side than in the High Authority, which was limited to the coal and steel sector.48 The average length of service of Market Division officials, 15.2 years, was similar to that of secretariat officials and of those in the Economics Division (15.8 years). In the latter, length of service ranged from three to 32 years.49 Of the Market Division eleven officials worked ten years or longer in the High Authority, and only three stayed for less than ten years.50 The Italian Carlo Facini, who started his career in the Market Division, worked in the Community administration for a total of 35 years. In summary, an average of more than 15 years of service in all three divisions seems lengthy. However, taking 1952–53 as the base, it implies that on average officials left the High Authority before the merger of the executives in 1967, or shortly thereafter. Older officials retired, and younger officials – like Behr, who took a job in private business in 1960, at the age of 42 – moved on. The officials in the Market Division, in particular, were on average no more than 15 years away from retirement age when they joined the High Authority; it was thus probably the last stage in their careers. Finally, the average length of service in the High Authority is less than that of officials in the Commission’s DirectoratesGeneral for Competition and Agriculture (22 and 24 years), explored in Chapter 4. This is not necessarily an indicator for a lesser degree of loyalty of High Authority staff towards their institution, but can also be explained by the younger average age at which Commission officials joined their institution. The opportunity to pursue a career within an organisation facilitates the development of loyalty links between the organisation and its staff. It is thus important to discover whether European officials had the opportunity to make a career in the High Authority, or in the European administrations more generally. Of the civil servants working in the secretariat two, Kohnstamm and Edmund Wellenstein, reached the position of secretary or secretary-general, which correspond to that of A1 or director. In 1968 Wellenstein became director-general (A1) of DG External Relations in the Commission. Rabier also became a directorgeneral in the Commission and Behr a deputy executive secretary (A2).

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Three officials reached the post of director-general (A1) in the High Authority, two became directors (A2) and two deputy directors (A2), while one became speaker of the High Authority.51 Another two officials became heads of division (A3) in the Commission. One was promoted to conseiller hors classe in the High Authority, usually a position corresponding to A1 but not necessarily influential. A conseiller was an adviser, but often with a reduced amount of responsibility compared to a director-general. Such a post could be created to reward someone, for example if a suitable high position was unavailable, but it could also be used to ‘promote’ someone to free a post for a more talented person. One official reached the post of head of division (A3) in the High Authority and one reached A4. Four officials had been chefs de cabinet (A2);52 one of them, Wissels, reached the post of deputy director-general (A1) in the Commission. A total of seven officials from the secretariat served in cabinets at some point in their career. Of the officials from the Market Division, four reached the post of director-general in the High Authority and three in the Commission – Vinck, who had already been a director-general in the High Authority, was among the latter. Eight officials became directors in the High Authority, and one in the Commission; another became a conseiller in the Commission. Two officials were heads of division in the High Authority and one in the Commission; another ended up as head of the Commission’s information office in Geneva, and one became chief adviser in the External Relations Division.53 Finally, the Economics Division produced four directors-general (all in the Economics Division itself) and one deputy director in the High Authority. Robert Sünnen first became chef de cabinet and then a director in the Commission, and another official also ended up as a director there, while two remained at A4 level in the High Authority, and a further two became heads of division in the Commission.54 What this overview shows is that most of the first European civil servants reached top positions in the hierarchy of the European administration, and some continued on to influential positions in the Commission. Younger officials were particularly drawn to the Commission, long before the merger. Facini, Behr and Pujade went to Brussels in 1958, where they were offered good posts; they were attracted by the scope of the tasks facing the new European administration, and thought that the future lay in the EEC.55 Michaelis was one of the few High Authority officials who went to the Euratom Commission in the late 1950s where he was promoted to director-general. The Bulletin of the ECSC in 1960 shows a rising number of people leaving the High Authority,56 but the bulk of officials went on to Brussels after the merger

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in 1967. Overall, officials from the High Authority’s secretariat and cabinets seem to have fashioned longer careers and ended up in more senior positions in the Commission; this is not surprising given their younger average age on entry. With their more general professional training they were also more versatile than, for example, a highlyspecialised mining engineer. Sünnen, an economist from the Economics Division, said he had no problem adapting to work in DG Regional Policy in the Commission.57 All in all, High Authority officials were able to construct satisfying careers, and this could have helped to trigger Europeanisation. Analysing the working and living conditions in Luxembourg will add more potentially significant dimensions. Living in Luxembourg Accounts of the first months after the High Authority took up office can take on a nostalgic and even mythical note. The officials felt they were part of something new and different. ‘Creation’ and ‘invention’ are notions which they evoke frequently when talking about the early days in Luxembourg.58 When comparing contemporary accounts with memories and eyewitness interviews from a later date, there seems to be an element of truth in these stories. In a letter of October 1952, Kohnstamm described the atmosphere in Luxembourg to a friend:59 what stands out in his account is his impression of the remoteness of Luxembourg, both in a geographical sense and in the sense that people were deprived of their usual contacts. There was little else to do than getting to know each other. In these conditions the dynamics that unfolded and developed within the High Authority between senior officials were probably more intense than if they had been in Paris or Brussels. It is in smaller and more remote places – like Geneva, where Monnet had gained his experience as an international civil servant at the League of Nations, or Luxembourg – that international or supranational civil servants as well as national representatives, through communication and transactions, learned to think in transnational and supranational terms. According to René Girault, European institutions, and international organisations in Europe, became milieux in which national perspectives were overcome,60 and former High Authority officials’ descriptions of the unique atmosphere in Europe’s smallest capital agree with him.61 Yet the fact that Luxembourg was only the provisional seat of the High Authority had negative repercussions for the lives of its personnel. Faced with job insecurity and with problems such as children’s schooling, many officials initially refrained from bringing their families with them to Luxembourg.62 Later, the permanent move of a family to Luxembourg was no less a difficult decision, as it could mean exchanging bustling

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capitals such as Paris and warmer climates such as Italy for a life in the Grand Duchy; transport connections there were poor – there was no airport, an underdeveloped rail network and no motorways. The Frenchman Michel Bonnemaison vividly recalled his move from Paris to Luxembourg, where the shops closed at five o’clock in the afternoon and where there was hostility from the local population, not least because the ‘invasion’ of ECSC staff had caused a rise in property prices.63 The isolation which High Authority officials were thus led to feel contributed to creating close links between them – forced links, as they could hardly escape each others’ company. Groups of officials organised their weekends and spare time together; for example, the families of Gaudet, Kohnstamm, Behr and Wellenstein all became friends.64 Other important meeting places were the European parishes, organised on the initiative of ECSC officials; here the divide was at first less between nationalities than between Protestants and Catholics.65 The High Authority itself also organised activities for its staff. In July 1953 the director of the administration, Balladore-Pallieri, spoke of the officials’ ‘moral isolation’, and suggested the High Authority should encourage initiatives to develop social relations by founding a club.66 This idea was pursued, and the Amicale des fonctionnaires was founded in October 1953, offering a restaurant, evening classes, sports events and excursions.67 One has to contrast this with Brussels, a much larger city where people lived further away from each other and where the transport connections, for example with Paris, were better. Wissels stated that at first the officials who relocated to Brussels tried to ‘do it like in Luxembourg’, that is, meet with colleagues of all nationalities.68 However, soon a sort of Dutch club emerged. Rabier, who had insights into both administrations, thought that in Luxembourg relations between officials from different national backgrounds were closer than in Brussels.69 The choice of the seat of the ECSC certainly turned out to have been a fortunate one when it came to facilitating the cohesion and integration of its multinational staff. Gérard Bossuat cites Gaudet on Luxembourg’s power to integrate and, ultimately, to transform ways of thinking: Luxembourg was a lieu de rencontre, a place of encounters, and place of close contacts. There were people with whom one had been unfamiliar, if I may say so. Germans whom one saw for the first time in a totally different light than one used to see them for several generations; people from countries of the north like the Netherlands. We met and got to know each other and friendships were formed which, thank God, still exist today. Through these friendships we collectively discovered what these different countries

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stood for, what animated them in their activities, in their striving for creation and their vision of the future.70 The officials’ families were part of this transformation process, and one important medium was the European school.71 Schooling proved to be a problem at the beginning: the existing schools were unable to provide lessons in all the children’s mother tongues, and were also seen as provincial. This problem was attended to early on, however, as many leading officials had small children and pressed for a solution. A temporary remedy was to provide transport to the nearest schools in Belgium, France and Germany.72 While this worked well for older children attending secondary school in Arlon, Thionville or Trier, the long commute was strenuous for smaller children. Moreover, Italian, Dutch or Flemish children had no access to schooling in their mother tongue. To remedy the situation, officials of the ECSC institutions in Luxembourg founded the Association des intérêts éducatifs et familiaux des fonctionnaires non-luxembourgeois de la C.E.C.A.,73 chaired by the Belgian Registrar at the Court of Justice, Albert van Houtte, to advance the cause of a European school. The High Authority allocated resources for the school to the association, and rented a house in the avenue Pasteur in Luxembourg.74 The first to open in May 1953 was the infant school, which was to prepare the children for the ‘atmosphere of the future European school’,75 and on 1 October of the same year the primary school opened its doors for the first time. This proved to be a success: by early 1954 the school had 141 pupils.76 A year later, in October 1954, a secondary school followed, also financed by the High Authority.77 While this was a rapid development, it took another three years until the school gained statutory status and, more importantly, until its diploma was recognised in European countries.78 The European baccalaureate was finally established in July 1957.79 While a single school for children of all nationalities was a necessary development in view of there being too few children sharing one mother tongue to justify separate schools, ideological reasons for a school educating the children of six countries together were also advanced. The children would adopt a ‘European attitude’ by receiving a ‘European education’ from the start.80 In the first year of primary school they were already learning a foreign language, German or French, in which they were taught subjects such as history and geography,81 and older children could take up an optional second foreign language. As the school also prepared children for secondary education in their home countries, they had supplementary lessons in ‘national and local history and geography’. Like the European officials, their children should remain rooted in their own

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language and culture, while learning to understand, interact with and work with other cultures and languages. The European school was a central institution for High Authority and other ECSC civil servants; it contributed to forging friendships and acquaintances as parents met others through their children. Role models and working methods Role models can trigger processes of imitation and social learning. When writing about role models in the High Authority, it is appropriate to discuss Monnet first. In many eye-witness accounts, he is described as a quasi-mythical figure, and often as personifying the High Authority during its founding years. It was particularly the experience of the team spirit brought to the treaty negotiations, and facilitated by Monnet, that united the High Authority’s core staff. In January 1953 Much, who entered the Legal Service in late 1952, wrote to Hallstein: ‘To keep this spirit [of the treaty negotiations] alive in the rough climate of reality is my daily task.’82 The appeal of working with Monnet was not immediately evident, however. According to George Ball, an American civil servant who had worked with him, it was a combination of his unusual working methods and his charisma: He was oblivious to the need for allocating time to other requirements, such as sleeping or even eating . . . That he seemed always able to find men willing to submit to his stimulating but exasperating methods of work testified to his extraordinary charisma . . .83 In an interview Gaudet recalled Monnet’s ability to bring people together and to focus their attention and abilities on the problem in question.84 According to Duchêne and Kohnstamm, Monnet was able to make people feel important and he let them know that they were making a significant contribution.85 Clearly, Monnet’s working methods focused on team work and participation. During his presidency, senior officials frequently took part in meetings of the High Authority. According to Wellenstein: ‘All officials who had something to do with the problem at hand practically had access to the meeting-room of the High Authority. It was always a very crowded place.’86 At the beginning, there was ‘creative chaos. All opinions were allowed. Everybody in the rather large circle around Monnet could suggest things, and they were even taken up.’87 Gaudet claimed that Monnet succeeded in convincing the entire staff of the High Authority that, in fact, their work was not about coal and steel but European unity.88

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Participation certainly contributed to creating links of loyalty between officials and members of the High Authority, and moreover between them and the institution itself, its aims and its values. However, the situation seems to have changed under Monnet’s successors; the participation of senior officials in meetings of the High Authority was less frequent, and was transferred from the High Authority to the working groups.89 Still, not all civil servants felt a loss of influence. Antoon Herpels recalls the openness of discussion in the working groups, where even lower-ranking officials were heard and felt they were part of the decision-making process. This was ‘fantastic also for the pride of the official’.90 As for Monnet himself, it is difficult to grasp his real influence on civil servants. He was undoubtedly able to engage and motivate his close collaborators: people like Dehnen remained in contact with him long after Monnet had left the High Authority. He certainly won over some of the coal and steel experts to his views on European integration. Retrospectively, however, other officials were sceptical of his abilities and impact. The chaos of the High Authority’s early years tends to dominate their memories. For them, Monnet’s successor Mayer was the ‘saviour’ who turned the High Authority into a well-functioning organisation.91 Wellenstein recalled this about Mayer: He had a great sense of orderly administration, orderly procedures, orderly meetings, with an agenda . . . which with Monnet was never, never, never the case . . . He [Mayer] gave the High Authority a very strong political face, but in a totally different way.’92 Factors working against Europeanisation Some factors that could hamper the Europeanisation of High Authority officials, such as the balance of nationalities, have already been discussed in the previous chapter. Although Coppé claims that the national balance in the High Authority was observed in a much less strict manner than in the Commission,93 it could still lead to blocked careers and cause frustration among officials. By the mid-1950s a phenomenon called ‘parachuting’ began to appear as a problem in the High Authority. This entailed filling leading posts in the administration with individuals who were external to the European administration, and thus obstructed the career progress of High Authority civil servants.94 Conflicts of loyalty could be experienced by officials, particularly if they were seconded to the High Authority from their national administration. For the High Authority, secondment was an important source of qualified employees; for the member states, their nationals promised them some influence on the European administration. While relations between

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national administrations and such officials in the High Authority remained particularly close, the sources do not confirm that these staff members were less independent or committed. Their situation as seconded national civil servants could also make them vulnerable, and could serve as a pretext for accusations of partiality; in one case an official was accused of experiencing a loyalty conflict as his recommendations had gone against the perceived interests of another member state. Nora, a seconded official and an Inspecteur des Finances in France, took over the Economics Division in 1960, but by December 1962 had already resigned to return to the French civil service. After handing in his notice, Nora participated in an important study on the coal-sales companies in the Ruhr which recommended that the constitution of two new such companies should not be authorised; and when the High Authority discussed the recommendations at its weekly meeting, a German member, Hellwig, accused Nora of acting on behalf of the French government against German interests.95 The High Authority was divided over the matter, with the two French members actually on Hellwig’s side; however, the smaller member states outvoted them, and the High Authority decided in favour of notifying the Ruhrbergwerke that their request could not be granted in the present form. It seems probable that the French members decided to take sides with their German colleagues to distance themselves from Nora, and to prevent any future retaliation by German members should a similar situation arise concerning a sales agency in France. Some officials’ previous experience had resulted in the formation of allegiances which militated against them developing strong loyalties to the High Authority. For example, Frenchman Marcel Jaurant-Singer was deeply marked by his experience of fighting with British and Canadian troops to liberate France during World War II. He had belonged to the Special Operations Executive (SOE), set up by Winston Churchill in 1940, which consisted of volunteer agents who were trained in Britain and parachuted into France. For Jaurant-Singer, contributing to the liberation of his country together with British and Canadian troops was a formative experience that was more important than his experience at the High Authority. He has since been engaged in Franco-Canadian efforts to preserve the history and memory of his fellow combatants in the SOE. Moreover, before entering the High Authority he had already worked for international organisations and he did not find the High Authority any different.96 Nora recounts how fighting in the Maquis, a group within the French Resistance movement, had had an impact on him and his friends, teaching them ‘a certain number of values . . . patriotism, solidarity, fraternity’.97 They became part of a technocracy eager to reconstruct and modernise France from within the highest levels of the administration.98

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In the case of Berthoin, these resistance values could be transferred to the European context, but other officials’ loyalties remained primarily with the French administration. 2.3 Biographies of High Authority officials The three civil servants portrayed in this section represent different types of officials that were typical of the High Authority. However, they are exceptional in that they were able to exert more influence within the institution than the average among their colleagues. They were also exceptional in having left sufficient source material to allow an analysis of their roles. Pierre Uri represents the generalist strand among the officials. Not a coal or steel expert, Uri was concerned after the war with the reconstruction of France, and subsequently of Europe. Other generalist officials were, for example, the economists Regul and Wagenführ, the lawyers Gaudet and Krawielicki, and Behr. All of them were convinced of the necessity of European integration, and thought that the process should be ‘horizontal’ rather than ‘sectoral’. The generalist is followed by the expert official, represented by Tony Rollman. Like the generalists, the experts came to be convinced of the need for European integration. However, they were first and foremost concerned with finding a solution for the European coal and steel industry. Other experts were Salewski, Schensky, Dehnen and Vinck. Max Kohnstamm, finally, stands for the strand of realistic idealists, for whom European integration was more important than their day-to-day work in the High Authority, and became a life-long occupation. Such officials were less common than the other two types; they included Rabier, Wissels, who became Secretary General of the Union of European Federalists, Berthoin, Fontaine, Wellenstein and Bernard Zamaron. For all three types World War II had been a catalyst, and was what induced them to see integration as a solution for post-war European societies. These officials were partly similar to some others that could later be found in the Commission, and are discussed in Chapter 4. With Rollman, the steel expert, and Uri and Kohnstamm, Monnet’s close collaborators, the individuals presented here also represent the particular conditions of sectoral integration in the ECSC. Pierre Uri: philosopher, economist and ‘planificateur à la française’ Born in Paris in 1911, Uri studied at the ENA, obtained the Agrégation (a French state diploma enabling its holder to teach in both schools and universities) in philosophy, and embarked on an academic career teaching at Reims university. Uri, a Jew, lost his teaching post following the Loi du 3

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octobre 1940 portant statut des Juifs, effectively an anti-Jewish law, passed by the Vichy government. He used this forced break to study political economy, economics and law at the Centre de perfectionnement aux affaires de la chambre de commerce in Paris, an evening school for professionals. Although keeping a low profile in Paris, he had to flee to Lyon to avoid imprisonment.99 After the war Uri turned definitively to economics and entered the Institut de sciences économiques appliquées, under French economist Perroux. Like Uri, Perroux was close to the Socialists and both favoured a Keynesian policy to overcome France’s post-war economic problems. Uri entered the French Planning Commission in March 1947 and was soon admitted into the inner circle around Monnet. Part of Uri’s self-understanding and self-confidence was certainly due to his feelings of having contributed at the Planning Commission to the modernisation of France.100 Uri then contributed to the drafting of the Schuman Plan, which he partly revised. For him, the appeal of the Plan lay not only in its solution to the German question, but also in its capacity to resolve France’s economic problems.101 Together with Monnet and Etienne Hirsch, Uri played an important part in the interstate negotiations leading to the ECSC treaty in 1951. By then, Uri was taken with the idea of European integration, not least because he had found a task where he could successfully employ his problem-solving abilities. In 1952 he wrote an article about Europe’s future in which he predicted a spill-over process from integration in the coal and steel sector to other sectors of the economy.102 These were the ideas Uri took with him to the High Authority. Uri’s role in the High Authority cannot be underestimated. He first chaired the start-up group (groupe de démarrage) and then took over the directorship of the Economics Division.103 As in the Planning Commission, Monnet relied on Uri’s capacities to devise complex solutions to political and technical problems. While the other members of the High Authority respected Uri’s abilities, relying on him alone could not be a permanent solution in a multinational administration. In 1953, Kohnstamm reported to Monnet an ‘outburst’ among High Authority members against Uri’s dominance in the institution.104 It was due not least to deficient organisation in the early days that Uri could play such a prominent role; and this was claimed back by the High Authority members when the working groups were introduced at the end of 1953. Not surprisingly, Uri defended the High Authority’s technocratic element; according to him, only the expert knowledge concentrated in the supranational High Authority and Commission, and not representatives of members states, could address the common interest.105 It is likely that his

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disregard for diplomatic or political solutions was also a reason why he never became a member of the High Authority or the Commission, posts to which he aspired. Uri’s idea of Europe was essentially an economic one. In his speeches and articles he rarely mentioned the European Political Community (EPC) or the European Defense Community (EDC), which were important to Monnet and Kohnstamm. In 1955 Uri contributed to the so-called relance européenne, or ‘relaunch’ of the European integration process, first by drafting a paper on economic integration in April 1955. For him economic integration was essential to ensuring the survival of the European economy vis-à-vis those of the USA and the Soviet Union. Europe had to become an economic ‘third force’.106 Uri claims to have presented the idea of horizontal integration to the German state secretary in the Auswärtiges Amt, Friedrich Ophüls, in a meeting with him and Monnet, who then transmitted Uri’s memorandum to Spaak.107 According to Uri, however, the passages on horizontal economic integration were not taken up, as both Monnet and Spaak preferred further sectoral integration. Instead, it was the project of Dutch foreign minister Johan Willem Beyen in 1952 that constituted one of the bases of the Benelux memorandum of 18 May 1955. Most likely the passages on integration in the transport, energy and atomic-energy sectors, which Uri had included at Monnet’s request, were taken up in the Benelux memorandum, but not the passages on horizontal integration which had been so important to Uri.108 However, by codrafting the so-called Spaak Report in April 1956, and by participating in the Val Duchesse negotiations leading to the EEC treaty, Uri after all did contribute to the founding of the Common Market. He then served the Commission in an expert group, drafting a report on the economic situation in the member states. Not having obtained a post as a member of the High Authority or the Commission, Uri was stuck in his post as director of the Economics Division and left Luxembourg in 1959.109 Not least because he was considered the prototype of the French planning mentality, the German government opposed a greater role for Uri in any of the supranational administrations, and he also lacked the necessary backing in the French government.110 In 1961 Uri took over the post of director-general of the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs in Paris, where he wrote extensively on European integration and the relations between the USA and Europe.111 Moreover, he was charged with several missions, studies and reports in Europe, South America and in his native France.

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Between Japan and Luxembourg: the steel expert Tony Rollman A keen amateur film-maker, Rollman captured much of his life on film; the audio-visual material was put together in a documentary by the Luxembourg film-maker Delphine Kieffer in 2004.112 In this respect Rollman is exceptional among the experts of the so-called century generation, who remain among the least well-known of European civil servants. Having spent much of his life travelling to the most remote corners of the world – including a stay of nearly a decade in Japan – the title of Kieffer’s film, A European Adventure, seems somewhat too narrow. Born 30 March 1899 in Reisdorf, Luxembourg, Rollman started working for the Arbed at the age of 22. Until 1944 he travelled the world in the service of the Arbed sales organisation Columeta. After the war he worked for the Luxembourg government, became economic councillor in the Luxembourg legation to Brussels, and participated in the Marshall Plan negotiations in Paris in 1947. In 1948 he became the chairman of the steel division of the ECE in Geneva and presided over work on a report entitled European Steel Trends in the Setting of the World Market, published in November 1949.113 The study concluded that if no measures were taken, the European steel industry would generate eight million tons of excess steel by 1953. For Rollman, this was an alarming prospect, and he saw an urgent need to co-ordinate the European steel market. The report was discussed in the European press, the West German weekly Die Zeit concluding, for example, that ‘in Tony Rollman and Gunnar Myrdal European unity has powerful and courageous advocates’.114 In early 1950 Myrdal, head of the ECE, invited Rollman to present his ideas to the Socialist federalist and former French economics minister André Philip, who at that time was a member of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.115 It is uncertain what was discussed at this meeting, but Rollman’s thinking was probably to some extent informed by the cooperation of steel makers in the International Steel Cartel of 1926.116 However, as far as can be established, Rollman did not envisage a revival of the steel cartel of the inter-war period but seems to have endorsed the competitive principle that would govern the ECSC. Ideas of cooperation in the iron and steel sector were being developed in all six founding countries at that time, with the Benelux countries being more advanced because of their experience with the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union (1921) and the Benelux customs union (1944).117 Monnet, who knew Philip, invited Rollman to Paris to discuss his thoughts.118 Suggestions such as Rollman’s were taken up and incorporated by the drafters of the Schuman Plan.119 Nearly 40 years after the event Rollman wrote a short note about this period of his life. In

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retrospect it is difficult to separate Rollman’s ideas from those of Monnet, whose memoirs Rollman had certainly read, when he wrote in 1986: Because I was a steel expert, I had the idea of starting with steel and its raw materials, coal and ore. And from this emerged very valuable political considerations. Coal and steel are needed by any war industry. If one withdrew these two materials from the rule of nation states and put them under control of a European authority, nation states would be deprived of the possibility of starting a new war in Europe.120 Rollman, having participated in the Schuman Plan negotiations in 1950–51 as a member of the Luxembourg delegation,121 was thus an obvious choice for the High Authority.122 He was already 53 years old when in 1952 he became a director in the Market Division, with responsibility for integrating the steel markets of the member countries. Convinced of the necessity of his work, Rollman deplored the lack of collaboration from trade unions and member-state governments, which were reluctant to endorse the market principle in the steel sector. As for the companies, Rollman claimed that they had, against the rules of the treaty, favoured concentration in the steel industry and informal close cooperation, effectively reconstituting the old cartels. When Rollman retired from the High Authority, at the age of 65, he concluded, somewhat wearily: ‘In 1964, I had been at the ECSC for 12 years already; 12 years during which I tried to bring to bear the supranational conceptions that were at the basis of the High Authority.’123 Taking the problems of the European steel industry in the late 1940s as a starting point, Rollman seems to have endorsed the High Authority’s supranational principle. However, he and some of his expert colleagues did not meet Kohnstamm’s high expectations of their faith in Europe. In August 1953, he wrote to Monnet: The difficulty with Rollman, to take an example . . . is that at the end of the day he does not believe in the possibility of a revolution in the European economy . . . He is afraid of these enticing prophecies which he considers disconnected from reality. The truth is that the only means of reaching our aim, that is, a united Europe, is to give people new hope and to tell them: ‘the sky’s the limit’. One tends to forget the plain biblical truth that a prophecy is an act of faith and not of mathematics. It is this faith that many people here are lacking. And it is precisely this faith that we need to have in Europe. It is

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Max Kohnstamm: Dutch, European and world citizen Kohnstamm was the European conscience of the High Authority. Born in Amsterdam in 1914, he came from a family of academics. He studied modern history in Amsterdam and spent the academic year 1938–39 at the American University in Washington DC.125 Kohnstamm was impressed by the hands-on approach of the Americans, for him a stark contrast to a Europe petrified by the coming war.126 Appalled by the appeasement policy of the French and British governments, Kohnstamm and his family had no illusions about the nature of the National Socialist regime in Germany. Although he was half-Jewish, Kohnstamm returned to the Netherlands, and during the war was active in the Dutch Resistance, being imprisoned several times between 1942 and 1944. After the war he served Queen Wilhelmina as a private secretary before taking over the German department in the Dutch foreign ministry. Kohnstamm was one of the first Dutchmen to travel to Germany after the war, participating in a meeting between Dutch and German Protestants in 1947.127 Finding a solution to the German question and avoiding a new Versailles were important to Kohnstamm for two reasons. First, the economy of the Netherlands was dependent on that of its larger neighbour, and secondly, a politically and economically stable Germany was important to Kohnstamm on a personal level after his experiences in the 1930s and during captivity. In Kohnstamm’s eyes, therefore, the Schuman Plan provided an ideal solution: equality but, at the same time integration, and thus control of Germany.128 Kohnstamm volunteered to participate in the negotiations leading to the ECSC treaty, where he met Monnet. They got on very well, not least because they had both spent time in the USA and, according to Kohnstamm, for both of them European integration was only a step towards a new world order. Monnet’s ideas promised a transformation of international relations – the creation of supranational institutions would lead to legal certainty, as member states gave up part of their sovereignty. This was vital for Kohnstamm, who had experienced despotic rule under the German occupation.129 Kohnstamm’s role as secretary of the High Authority between 1952 and 1956 has already been discussed in the previous chapter and will thus not be reiterated here. What stands out is that in his everyday work he tried never to lose sight of the overall aim of furthering European integration. Not least because of his high expectations and hopes, he was soon disappointed by the administrative reality of coal, steel and scrap in Luxembourg.130 When the EDC failed in August 1954, Kohnstamm

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thought that Monnet should leave the High Authority to gain room for manoeuvre in launching new initiatives; he was ready to accompany him.131 In 1956 Kohnstamm entered Monnet’s Action Committee for the United States of Europe, as its vice-president. Like Monnet, Kohnstamm became convinced of the necessity of securing Europe’s energy supply through cooperation in the atomic-energy sector.132 In 1956–57 he therefore also served as secretary-general to the ‘Committee of the Three Wise Men’: Louis Armand, Franz Etzel and Francesco Giordani. The Committee was in charge of preparing a report on the possibility of integrating the atomic-energy sector and of cooperating with the US government on the question.133 The report constituted a preparatory document for Euratom. After this interval, Kohnstamm returned to serving Monnet’s Action Committee on a full-time basis. While he believed a spill-over from economic integration to political union would occur in Europe,134 during the 1960s he realised that no progress was being made towards political integration. Kohnstamm feared that French president Charles de Gaulle’s hostility towards British accession to the EEC would establish Europe as a ‘third force’ between the USA and the Soviet Union. For him, however, a united Europe, including Britain and with close relations to the USA, was the precondition for a peaceful organisation of the West, and, in the distant future, of the whole world.135 The Action Committee was eventually dissolved in 1975 and Kohnstamm then became the first president of the European University Institute in Florence. Kohnstamm tried to minimise his own contribution to European integration – he described his reaction to being awarded the Franklin Roosevelt Freedom from Fear medal in the following terms: My first thought was: why me? My next thought put my mind somewhat at ease. The medal must have been awarded to me in order to honour the two statesmen who taught me the force of hope: President Roosevelt and Jean Monnet.136 Conclusion In terms of its staff, the High Authority was a divided administration. One group was composed of members of the century generation, mainly coal and steel veterans like Salewski, Rollman, Dehnen and Schensky. The other included generalists and realistic idealists such as Kohnstamm, Gaudet and Behr, who were more open, more multinational and more multilingual than their counterparts; arguably, they adopted European values more easily. Schensky’s farewell note of March 1967 is telling. He had not experienced his work in the High Authority as a new chapter in

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his career, writing in the note that his time there had been a satisfying end to his 46-year career in mining.137 Although he had spent the last 15 years of this in a European administration, there was not a word about European integration. Others were more receptive to the notion: while Salewski and Rollman believed that transnational cooperation was primarily necessary to secure a future for their industry in Europe, they were open to its Europeanising effects. A note from Kohnstamm to Monnet of October 1953 suggests that a Europeanised staff had developed in the High Authority, and had adopted supranational values: In my opinion it is remarkable to see how the supranational spirit has developed in the High Authority during the first year of our work. Guyot told me the other day how he was delighted with the objectivity with which people such as Salewski and Regul worked on questions concerning investments. Uri made a similar remark concerning Dehnen and Regul.138 In his neofunctionalist study Ernst B. Haas wrote that supranationality also depended on the ‘behaviour of men and groups of men’.139 It appears that the lack of supranationality in the administrative structure and working methods, as shown in the previous chapter, was at least partly counterbalanced by the attitudes and corporate identity that developed among the staff. After the merger, many of the High Authority officials who went to Brussels thought that in Luxembourg the administration had been more ‘European’, more informal and based on personal relationships between colleagues. All in all, it was considered less hierarchical than ‘Hallstein’s machinery’ in Brussels.140

3 PRUDENCE AND PRAGMATISM The Institutional Establishment of the Commission

In the 1960s and early 1970s research on bureaucracies was booming. In numerous studies academics analysed what they called the ‘bureaucratic phenomenon’, or even ‘the bureaucratisation of the world’.1 In the near future, these researchers predicted, the Western world would be governed by bureaucracies. This corresponded to a strong belief in technical progress and in the manageability of technical, economic and political problems, which characterised this period. Bureaucracy was seen as a modern method of policy-making. The establishment of the Commission has to be considered in the light of its time and of the ideological context: it was a child of this period and thus part of a trend – an institution with a future, or so it seemed. Neofunctionalist scholars attributed an important role to institutions for furthering integration, and the Commission’s successes in the early 1960s seemed to prove the theory right. Not yet the government of Europe, the Commission defined itself through expertise, one of the main sources of bureaucratic power, and attempted to gain reputation and recognition by acting as a competent actor and interlocutor.2 Hence, when gathering for the first time on 16 January 1958, the nine members of the Commission were optimistic: they were going to construct Europe.3 By the 1970s, however, the Commission’s reputation was suffering. This can be put down to several intra-Community factors such as the crises of the mid- to late 1960s and internal administrative problems;4 but it was also because bureaucratisation became increasingly unpopular. The European bureaucracy, accused of lacking democratic legitimacy, was subjected to harsh criticism, especially in the European press.5 Nevertheless, the hyping of bureaucracy in the 1960s left its imprint on the Commission: early decisions on its organisation and working methods, taken in this ambience of optimism and in a belief in its problem-solving

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capacity, left an important legacy for its administrative services and, what is more, for its personnel. It is this period that the present chapter examines. Anthropologists Marc Abélès and Irène Bellier define the Commission as a continuous creation and as a ‘cultural compromise’, in which different identities and affiliations were combined ‘in the name of a common project’.6 The administrative structure the Commission adopted was necessarily an answer to the Community’s national and cultural pluralism. Some political leaders such as French president de Gaulle feared, however, that the Commission could become a ‘technocratic and deracinated Areopagus’.7 As regards the administration, this chapter attempts to show that the Commission did not intend to create a bureaucracy that was aloof and disconnected from the member states’ interests and needs. Instead, the Commission – and especially its first president, Walter Hallstein – showed a high degree of consideration towards these interests when designing the administration and recruiting personnel. The first section of this chapter analyses the setting-up of the Commission as an institution, while the second examines the working methods it established. The focus of the third section is on problems connected to staffing the Commission’s administrative services – from the outset, the Commission was aware of the shortcomings inherent in its creation. The fourth section will go on to examine the Commission’s efforts to reform the administration and improve its efficiency. 3.1 The institutional set-up of the Commission In search of autonomy: decisions in early 1958 The Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC was the legal basis for the setting-up and functioning of the Commission. Like the ECSC treaty, however, the EEC treaty contained few precise provisions on the shape of the institution.8 The Commission, the treaty merely decreed, should be headed by a college of nine Commissioners, designated by the governments of the member states ‘on the grounds of their general competence and whose independence is beyond doubt’ (Article 157, EEC Treaty). The Commissioners, appointed at a conference of foreign ministers of the Six on 6–7 January 1958 in Paris, were Walter Hallstein (president, Germany), Piero Malvestiti (vice-president, Italy), Sicco Mansholt (vice-president, Netherlands), Robert Marjolin (vice-president, France), Robert Lemaignen (France), Giuseppe Petrilli (Italy), Michel Rasquin (Luxembourg, who was replaced, after his death in April 1958, by his fellow-countryman Lambert Schaus), Jean Rey (Belgium) and Hans von der Groeben (Germany). Their term of office was four years,

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renewable (Article 158). Few treaty articles referred to the administration and its personnel. Article 212 contained the provision that staff regulations should be established, but until they entered into force the institutions should recruit their staff on a contractual basis (Article 246(3)). In principle, the members of the Hallstein Commission were free to adopt for their institution whatever administrative structure they saw fit, and they defended this freedom. For example, they took no notice of the memorandum on organisational methods which they were sent by the Interim Committee of government representatives, which met between April 1957 and January 1958.9 Although the college of Commissioners acted quickly and took major decisions on the administration between January and March 1958, during the first months the Commission had no organisation to speak of. At first, the Commissioners were assisted by personal collaborators whom they brought to Brussels. To address the initial and most urgent tasks set by the treaty, the college established ad hoc working groups; one of which, for instance, comprised Marjolin, von der Groeben and Mansholt and was in charge of administrative questions.10 Comparing this to the setting-up period of the High Authority, one has to note the limited influence of senior officials in the Commission. The sources provide no evidence that non-Commission members played a major role in defining the administration and working methods before Émile Noël was appointed executive secretary in late March 1958. Possible reasons for this are that Hallstein’s working methods differed from those of Monnet: he was less a team worker, and thus did not need the constant input from close collaborators that Monnet valued, and he had clear ideas of how he wanted the Commission’s administration to look. Hallstein preferred to discuss basic decisions on organisation with his colleagues in the Commission, the members of which were thus instrumental in defining the administration. In their choices and decisions on the Commission’s administration, they were influenced by the experience they had gained in their previous occupations – whether in their home country’s government or civil service or in international organisations. Marjolin, for example, frequently evoked the case of the OEEC, where he had been secretary general.11 The Commission thus discussed, ruled out, adopted or adapted examples of the national, European and international administrations with which they were familiar, and these served as a pool of possible models and ideas for the new European bureaucracy. Moreover, the college decided that when naming the different administrative units it would use terms which already existed in the member states rather than inventing new ones.12 Aligning the Commission’s administration with public administrations in the member states should help to facilitate interaction

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between Commission officials and civil servants from national administrations. One has to count the High Authority among these national and international models. Before outlining the features the Commission took into account, the differences between the two administrations should be pointed out. The Commissions of the EEC and Euratom were founded under different political circumstances. Following the failure of the EDC in 1954, in the mid-1950s member-state governments were less inclined to attribute powers and funds to a supranational organisation. It is also likely that the member states had learnt a lesson from the experience of the High Authority, and chosen to keep the new supranational institutions under closer control. For example, unlike the ECSC treaty, that of the EEC made no provision for a Committee of Four Presidents able to decide autonomously on administrative and staff-related questions. While the High Authority was given its own resources and far-reaching budgetary autonomy, the Commission had not been granted such a degree of independence and financial security; on the contrary, each year it had to negotiate with the Council of Ministers over the number of posts it could create and the salaries of the staff it could employ. This financial dependence in budgetary, and therefore staffing, matters considerably limited the Commission’s autonomy in administrative matters. Executive secretary Noël deplored this dependence on the goodwill of the finance ministers of the Six.13 It was a disappointment for the Commission when, in the merger treaty of 8 April 1965, the member states did not confer the High Authority’s budgetary autonomy on the Single Commission. In terms of administrative structure, the High Authority certainly served as one model for the Commission, and it also assisted the new Brussels administration in the initial period, for example by providing it with staff and funds. The Luxembourg experience helped the Commission to take quicker decisions of a more practical nature, such as on salary and contracts for personnel and on insurance matters.14 On 25 January 1958 the Council decided that the Commission would provisionally adopt the regulations of the High Authority in terms of salary and pensions for senior officials.15 Overall, however, the High Authority was seen in the late 1950s as an institution in decline, and was thus disqualified as an archetypal European administration. President Mayer and vice-president Etzel had just left the High Authority; when Finet took over the presidency in January 1958 the institution experienced a period of crisis,16 and anxiously watched its new rivals, the Euratom and EEC Commissions in Brussels. The Commission, on the contrary, resembled the young and dynamic institution the High Authority had been in 1952–53. It was eager to manifest its independence and was convinced of the importance of the

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EEC, which had a much wider scope than the High Authority, and the Hallstein Commission was keen to establish its own institutional identity as soon as possible. For Hallstein, having a clear-cut, hierarchical organisational structure was paramount. Here again, he differed from Monnet, the Commission opting for an organisational structure with nine directorates-general (DGs), corresponding roughly to the policy areas stipulated in the EEC treaty and, importantly, to the number of Commissioners. The DGs were: External Relations (I), Economic and Financial Affairs (II), Internal Market (III), Competition (IV), Social Affairs (V), Agriculture (VI), Transport (VII), Overseas Countries and Territories (VIII) and Administration (IX).17 The Commission also set up an executive secretariat and three joint services, namely the Joint Press and Information Service, the Statistical Office and the Legal Service, which it administered together with the High Authority and the Euratom Commission. Within the DGs a hierarchy was created by subdividing them into directorates and divisions. According to a note of 1962, the DGs were considered as the ‘ministerial core’, or proto-ministries, that would one day become the ministries of a European government, an assumption which is characteristic both of the Commission’s ambition and of its then optimism.18 Each DG was to be presided over by a group of three to four Commissioners, one of whom would act as group president.19 The EEC treaty, contrary to the ECSC treaty, did not make the president head of the administration; possibly, this was to prevent the Commission president from becoming as strong a figure as Monnet had been at the High Authority. However, as the Commission could decide on the internal structure and distribution of work among the Commissioners, Hallstein subsequently claimed, and obtained, administrative powers similar to those of his counterpart in the High Authority. At the Commission’s second meeting, he took over responsibility for the institution’s personnel policy, a task he shared with two other members of the college.20 This marked the beginning of Hallstein’s strong position and influence on recruitment and the administration. He subsequently took over responsibility for DG IX, by becoming the chair of the ‘Administration’ working group, composed of himself and the three vicepresidents. The Commission thus created its own ‘Committee of Four Presidents’. Hallstein understood his presidential role as taking an overall view of Commission policy-making and avoiding becoming absorbed in a single policy area. This also demonstrates the importance he attached to administrative – and especially staff-related – questions: a smoothly running administration with well-qualified staff was important for the standing of the Commission in the Community.

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The shape of the administration did not solely follow functional considerations but was also guided by concerns for a balanced and just distribution of posts among nationals of the six member states. In some cases, this even led to the creation of supplementary administrative units. Vice-president Malvestiti, for instance, stated that in order to ensure the adequate representation of Germans in his DG he would have to set up an additional directorate.21 The institutional setting-up did not progress smoothly, not least because the Commissioners disagreed on how large the bureaucracy should be. During 1958 the Commission recruited more than 1,000 people, and Marjolin warned his colleagues that ‘our system will be attacked’, adding, ‘our fundamental interest is to have a minimum staff constituted of capable people’.22 His ideas on the Commission’s administration resembled more Monnet’s concept of a small and flexible organisation, while Hallstein was in favour of creating ‘a large administration’.23 Conflicts within the college and with the Council were bound to arise. While having to take these fundamental decisions on the internal organisation, the Commission also needed to find its place in relation to the other Community institutions. The role and tasks of the individual institutions were of course defined by the treaty (Articles 137–188) but organising the day-to-day business and, crucially, establishing the symbolic standing of the individual institutions could not be provided for by the legal framework. First and foremost, the Commission aimed at establishing its place as an important, and autonomous, player in the Community system. For symbolic and political reasons, for example, the Commission members refused to attend the meetings of the representatives of member states at the EEC in Brussels – the future Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Member States (Coreper). They sent leading Commission officials to the meetings, however, whose rank corresponded to that of the permanent representatives, while Commissioners made sure they had direct access to ministers in the member states. The symbolic level was also targeted when each year, in a formal ceremony, Hallstein received the ambassadors of third countries accredited to the EEC.24 Relations with the European Parliament were less charged than with Coreper and the Council, even if the Commission was responsible to the Parliament, which could censure it, thus forcing it to resign (Article 144) – which has never occurred so far. The Commission saw the Parliament as its natural ally, and wanted rather to see its competences extended. Another potential ally of the Commission was the ECJ, a court of appeal against breaches of the treaty or of community legislation. In the process of policy-making the Commission could forge alliances with these Community institutions and,

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for example, ‘gain democratic legitimacy through alliances with the Assembly, political legitimacy through alliances with the Member States via the Council, and legal legitimacy by referring matters to the Court of Justice’.25 The question of where the seat of the Commission was to be was an unsolved problem which in the early days affected its work. The member states failed on various occasions to come to a definite agreement on a seat for the Commission, or for the Community institutions in general. This meant that at first the Commission was obliged to hold meetings in Luxembourg, Strasbourg and other places throughout the Community, and this made it more difficult to get the administration to run smoothly. The unsolved question of the seat also entailed insecurity for the Commission’s staff, as it was difficult to make permanent arrangements for moving to Brussels – it was at least theoretically possible that they would have to pack up and move again in the near future. Brussels was finally declared the de facto seat in June 1958, and the provisional seat eight months later. In spite of the initial difficulties (or perhaps even because of them), the first Commission led by Hallstein is said to have developed a strong team spirit. The president sought to organise the meetings of the Commissioners in an informal and intimate atmosphere, and tried to limit the number of participants to a minimum. According to Lemaignen, these meetings in small and cramped offices in the absence of an audience to impress created a feeling of trust and intimacy.26 President Hallstein’s ideas on Europe and the Commission’s role in it As the case of Monnet has shown, the president of a European administration is more than an equal among equals. While any president’s leadership qualities are important for the success of organisations such as the High Authority or the Commission, it is the first president of a newlyfounded organisation who has a strong impact on shaping its administration, culture and working methods. It is therefore important to discuss Hallstein’s ideas on European integration and the role he attributed to the Commission in this process. Hallstein was a German law professor, a former state secretary in the Auswärtiges Amt and member of the CDU.27 Heading the German delegation at the negotiations on the ECSC treaty, and being closely involved in those on the Rome Treaties, meant that he had extensive experience in matters of European integration. As a federalist, he was influenced by people like Monnet, the two men meeting for the first time at the 1950–51 Schuman Plan negotiations in Paris; Hallstein was deeply impressed by the Frenchman. Both preferred close economic and political integration to loose market integration, as for instance in the free-trade

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area propagated by, among others, the German economics minister, Erhard.28 For both Monnet and Hallstein, effective supranational institutions and clear rules of the game were the precondition for successful and durable integration. A transformation of European consciousness could only be achieved with the help of institutions, Hallstein believed.29 Despite the failure of the EDC in 1954, he was still convinced – not least as a consequence of World War II and the Cold War – of the inevitability of political integration in Europe,30 and therefore saw his role as Commission president as a political one. According to Jonathan White, the works of neofunctionalist academics influenced Hallstein and his collaborators;31 and the successes of the Commission in the 1960s in turn influenced these scholars. Neofunctionalism is said to be a ‘“translation” into academic terminology of the EC Commission’s original strategy’.32 In the mid-1990s Cris Shore argued that neofunctionalism had remained at the basis of the Commission’s self-image, i.e. that ‘it would emerge as the future government of this new supranational state’.33 Accordingly, integration for Hallstein was a process, a continuous creation, and economic integration was not only a step towards a political union but was already a political act in itself.34 In his book Europe in the Making – the German edition is entitled Der unvollendete Bundesstaat (the unfinished federal state) – he takes up the notions of the Sachlogik, or material logic, of integration, of engrenage (interlocking) and ‘spill-over’ (a term coined by Haas35) to describe this process. While he believed in the spill-over effect as a means of achieving further integration, his writings show that he was a federalist. For Hallstein, the Community was intended to become a federation, with a constitutional structure that was ‘clearly federal in intent and design’.36 His model for the European federation was the United States.37 He qualified the administrative services of the three executives of the ECSC, Euratom and the EEC as ‘the modest embryo of what will one day be a truly European administration’.38 This explains some of the choices Hallstein made for the Commission, in which he saw Europe’s future government. His goal was to create an independent and well-structured administration, of a sufficient size, which could match those of the member states. Its administrative staff should be on a par with civil servants of the member states and representatives of industry and interest groups. Hallstein described the Commission as the executive of the Community, representing the common interest of member states to the outside world.39 The nine Commissioners – the college – had to be united in this task, and to form a unified and independent body. He underlined this, for example, in his farewell speech to the European Parliament in June 1967.40 While aiming to extend the influence of the Commission, however, Hallstein

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retained a realistic view of the powers given by the treaty to the member states, on the one hand, and to the Commission on the other. According to him, upholding the balance between the national and ‘what could be called the European element’ was important: The Communities have not been designed to make states disappear but rather as a kind of union between them. . . . It goes without saying that the Commission has to encourage this rapprochement [of the member states’ economic policies] through proposals and initiatives and for this work it would need the support of national authorities.41 In the course of the 1960s, Hallstein substituted the term ‘supranational’ with the concept of ‘Community’:42 because the use of the word ‘supranational’ appears to some to imply that we are bent upon destroying national identities. The ‘Community’ concept, by contrast, implies – and rightly – that states renounce merely a part of their sovereignty, or rather that they put parts of their national sovereignty into a common pool which is controlled by ‘Community’ institutions whose decisions are in fact their own.43 Even though avoiding the term ‘supranational’, Hallstein aimed to defend the Commission’s prerogatives in the Council. Whenever member-state governments attempted to take a decision in which Hallstein thought the Commission should be involved, he made this known. Reminding governments to abide by the articles of the treaty was often the only weapon the Commission had to preserve its rights.44 True to his profession, Hallstein defended a legalistic perspective of a European Community founded on the law. For him, the Community as a Rechtsgemeinschaft, or community of law, was a guarantee of a peaceful and prosperous Europe. Although defending the Commission’s rights as granted by the treaty, Hallstein was also a pragmatic leader. Compared to Rey, Mansholt and sometimes Marjolin, he often took a moderate position in the Commission’s meetings. In 1962, for instance, Rey wanted the Commission to play a much more active political role in the Community. He asked his colleagues: ‘Shouldn’t the Commission be ready to fight and, from time to time, to put the virtues of courage before those of caution? Shouldn’t it make its existence as an authority [vis-à-vis the member states] be felt more, and, as a consequence, shouldn’t it render itself more

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respected, and even feared?’45 As the Commission’s president, Hallstein was more cautious. His views, at least with respect to questions on the Commission’s administration and staffing, were characterised by pragmatism. Unlike Monnet, Hallstein was, for instance, a great advocate of maintaining a national balance and of recruiting staff from national administrations. His colleague Marjolin, on the contrary, was in favour of choosing and promoting staff by taking their individual qualifications and merit more into account, and paying less attention to their nationality.46 In this respect, therefore, the judgement of Andrew Moravcsik – that Hallstein and Mansholt lost their sense of reality and were, in contrast to people like Marjolin, politically ‘unconnected and unconcerned with democratic politics’47 – clearly does not apply to Hallstein. Not least, the president was keen to win over public opinion and, faithful to the longstanding demand of the Christian Democrats and the federalists, sought to strengthen the European Parliament.48 The future of the Commission and of European integration was, however, a different matter. In Hallstein’s opinion, the Commission should be empowered to ‘take all measures necessary for the implementation of the treaty on its own authority, without having to rely on special and specific approval by the Council of Ministers’.49 His caution in administrative questions did not prevent him from seeking a greater role for the Commission in the future development of the Community. First, though, a smoothly running administration had to be created, which was close to, aligned with and accepted by the administrations of the member states. 3.2 The establishment of practices and working methods Between collegiality and autonomy: the Commission as a college The principle of collegiality was, and still is, a distinctive feature of the European administration. The members of the Commission, like the High Authority members, chose to act as a college and take their decisions after deliberating in common. They meant to act in unity and speak with one voice to the outside world. One Commissioner could, in principle, represent the entire college in all policy areas. However, the variety and the complexity of the tasks conferred on the Commission imposed a compromise solution. The Commissioners were thus confronted with the question of how to organise and distribute the work between them and, at the same time, to respect the principle of collegiality. The Commission considered either introducing the Ressort-Prinzip, with each Commissioner taking over responsibility for one department, or a working-group system, similar to that introduced by the High Authority; the members opted for a

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modified version of the latter. The nine working groups established consisted of three to four members each, and each working-group president was responsible for one DG and, unlike in the High Authority, for a policy area across several departments. Decisions were prepared in the working groups, but the final decisions on Commission policies were taken by the college in weekly meetings.50 The Commission thus opted for a combination of a departmental and collegial structure. However, in 1960 Hallstein’s chef de cabinet, Berndt von Staden, had already pointed out that the working-group system had effectively ceased to function properly.51 According to von Staden, this was due to the fact that the groups had no real purpose as they could not take decisions even on matters of minor importance. There are more reasons why the group system did not work properly. As each group president had a particular responsibility for one DG, he ‘received virtually a delegation of the Commission to execute the day-to-day tasks in his sector’.52 The group presidents were reluctant to share this responsibility with their colleagues, and soon they were de facto in charge of the policy of their respective DGs.53 The group presidents were thus comparable to ministers in national governments. By contrast, in the High Authority the working groups were cross-departmental, the members of the High Authority could therefore not lay claim to the leadership of a particular department, and they were thus more inclined to share leadership. In the Commission, a similar system would not have been feasible – given the wide scope of the Commission’s tasks, it would have been impossible for the Commissioners to keep up to date in every policy area of the Commission. Moreover, the allocation of portfolios, or group presidencies, to the Commissioners had been a struggle in which satisfying the interests of national governments had played an important role. In these highly sensitive areas the Commissioners were unenthusiastic about sharing their spheres of influence. For example, von der Groeben was a member of the agriculture working group and his opinion on the aims of the common agricultural policy (CAP) differed considerably from Mansholt’s ideas.54 Von der Groeben sought to bring into the Commission a German adviser for agricultural policy, Professor Hermann Priebe of Frankfurt University, founder and director of the Institute for Rural Development Research; Priebe became consultant to DG VI in June 1958. The German Commissioner had – in vain – promoted Priebe’s appointment as the second deputy director-general in DG VI, alongside Mansholt’s trusted collaborator Berend Heringa and under directorgeneral Louis Rabot, to counterbalance the Franco-Dutch influence on the CAP.55 Later, Priebe became one of the CAP’s most fervent critics.56

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The Commission took the principle of collegiality very seriously, and it remains the underlying organisational principle of today’s European Commission. When the administrative units were dispersed across different buildings in Brussels, it was considered important that the Commission members kept their offices under one roof, while also having an office in the building of their respective DGs. In a Commission meeting, Mansholt explained that the unity of the Commission should be expressed in the spatial proximity of the Commissioners.57 This closeness facilitated informal and spontaneous communication between the members, and certainly contributed to the good working atmosphere attributed to the Hallstein Commission. Finally, as in the High Authority, collegiality served as a shield against accusations of partiality. According to Noël, the Commission always took national interests into consideration without abandoning its independence and its impartiality.58 This was possible not least because the principle of collegiality inspired trust in the Commission. Deciding on appropriate working methods (1958–60) The Commissioners adopted the High Authority’s custom of using Wednesday as the jour fixe for their weekly meetings. Von der Groeben described the Commission’s deliberations in his memoirs: according to him, Hallstein did not hesitate to bring decisions to the vote. While the literature emphasises Hallstein’s aim of maintaining a harmonious

Image 2. The Hallstein Commission in 1964. Copyright: European Commission

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relationship with his colleagues by avoiding voting,59 von der Groeben’s view is confirmed by Noël’s handwritten minutes of the Commission’s meetings, which show that the Commission did indeed resort to voting. A simple majority was sufficient, according to the Commission’s rules of procedure.60 While certainly seeking to reach consent among the members, Hallstein also thought it important that decisions were taken quickly; he feared that shelving decisions and postponing matters would give the impression that the Commission was not up to its tasks.61 The Commission introduced its formal rules of procedure, provided for in Article 162(2) of the EEC treaty, only at the end of 1962.62 One reason for this delay could be that a certain amount of experience was needed to reveal best practice and the appropriateness of working methods. A first revision of the latter took place in July 1960 when the Commission held an extraordinary meeting to discuss the administration. Before the meeting, Commissioners Lemaignen and Petrilli distributed notes with their observations. These give an insight into working methods but also reveal the perceived faults of the new European administration. First, both Lemaignen and Petrilli were content with the practice of involving the group of the chefs de cabinet more thoroughly in the work of the college, for instance by asking them to examine and discuss documents and problems before a Commission meeting. This method had until then only been used in exceptional cases. According to Petrilli, the main reason for the trust the Commissioners placed in their chefs de cabinet was that these shared, unlike the directors-general, the political beliefs of the respective Commissioner.63 The two Commissioners were thus in favour of strengthening and enlarging the cabinets. Secondly, given the increasing workload of the Commission, Lemaignen demanded a better and more efficient distribution of work. He found the Commission’s meetings too detailed and time-consuming and deplored the fact that the members had too little time to concentrate on the overall picture – the political side of their work. For instance, Lemaignen would have liked to dedicate more time to cultivating his contacts with political leaders in Paris and with representatives of French industry. The Commissioners should, he suggested, only meet once every two weeks and resort to written procedures – that is, a proposal would not be discussed in the Commission’s meeting but rather circulated in the cabinets, and if there was no objection, automatically adopted. Moreover, Lemaignen admitted that for the most part he did not know what was going on in the other DGs. Often the Commissioners were not confronted with a proposal emanating from a DG until their weekly meeting, and then had to take major decisions. Hence the principle of collegiality did not in practice seem to work very well. Lastly, Lemaignen

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regretted that the Commission had embarked on a process of bureaucratisation: having to produce a receipt for every external telephone-call would ‘at the same time harm our means of action and our dignity’ and would add weight to criticisms of the Commission.64 On 18 July 1960 the Commission met to discuss these issues. First and foremost the nine Commissioners committed themselves to the principle of collegiality, the president in particular stressing its importance. Not surprisingly, Hallstein, a workaholic, did not think that the Commission was ‘overburdened with work’ and was thus not prepared to reduce the number of Commission meetings.65 However, for minor decisions, the Commissioners decided that written procedure should be applied in a more systematic manner, sometimes combined with preparatory work by the chefs de cabinet. This resulted in a strengthening not only of the role but also of the size of the cabinets, as each Commission member was entitled to employ additional cabinet staff.66 As it was intended as a general exchange of views, Rey took the meeting as an opportunity to criticise Hallstein’s leadership. In essence, he stated that the president was overworked, because he had taken on too many tasks: for example, he aimed to study most of the documents the Commissioners received from the administration himself, assumed responsibility for the external relations of the Commission, and headed the administration; and the latter would suffer from this situation. Rey suggested that one Commissioner should assist Hallstein in managing the administration. This also led to a severe critique of the director-general for administration, Maurits van Karnebeek, whom Rey described as a charming man who was not ‘up to his administrative task’.67 Vicepresident Mansholt backed Rey; he considered the administration was the Commission’s ‘weak spot’.68 Mansholt mentioned ‘Parkinson’s law’, the semi-serious proposition that bureaucrats tend to create work for each other and that, especially in public administrations, ‘work expands to fill the time available for its completion’.69 The political head of the Commission’s administration, the college, was thus not entirely in control of its own creation, which had taken on a life of its own. Hallstein acknowledged his colleagues’ criticism of DG IX, and declared himself ready to delegate some of his own tasks. At the same time he emphasised that he wished to retain responsibility for the Commission’s policy on personnel, which he regarded as crucial. The meeting consolidated basic working methods, and showed that the principle of collegiality needed to be applied in a more flexible manner. The cabinets, as the trusted personal advisory bodies of the Commissioners, were strengthened. The college clearly regarded the inefficiency of DG IX as one of the administration’s main problems, but

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the notorious weakness of this DG was partly compensated for by the executive secretariat. The role of the executive secretariat under Émile Noël While agreeing on the necessity of creating a secretariat in the Commission, the Commissioners decided that the future secretary should not bear the title of secretary-general,70 which would have implied a position hierarchically superior to the heads of the other administrative units. The secretariat as conceived by the Commission should only be responsible for ‘technical aspects’ of the Commission’s activities and would not be in charge, for instance, of the preparation of the Commission’s decisions. Moreover, ‘secretary-general’ was the title the heads of many international organisations bore – a connotation the Commissioners sought to avoid. On 26 March 1958 the Commission appointed the Frenchman Noël, who had been recommended by Marjolin.71 Noël was not prepared to settle for the simple title of secretary, however, as in France this title would appear rather insignificant. Instead, he asked to be made secrétaire exécutif, or executive secretary, a title used in the French civil service.72 Noël led the Commission’s executive secretariat (which was after all renamed ‘secretariat-general’ in 1967) until his retirement in 1987. The shape of the executive secretariat was, according to Noël, inspired by the French administration, in particular by the French government’s secretariat general and by the British cabinet office, with which the French government was in close contact in 1956–57 when Noël worked with Guy Mollet, at that time Président du Conseil, or prime minister.73 It was composed of four divisions: greffe (registry), internal relations, relations with other Community institutions, and a division responsible for putting together the Commission’s general report. The secretariat’s responsibilities comprised preparing for and organising the Commission’s meetings, taking the minutes, and communicating the college’s decisions to the services. Moreover, it oversaw the execution of decisions and assisted the services in keeping the Commission informed of their work.74 In June 1958 the Commission assigned deputy executive secretary Behr the task of representing the Commission in the Coreper, on the grounds that the secretariat was in charge of (administrative) relations with the Council. In Coreper meetings Behr was accompanied by the director-general or another senior official of the interested DG(s).75 As mentioned above, the Commissioners themselves did not participate in the Coreper, and the executive secretariat was one of the intermediaries they were able to use to remain close to, and informed about, the member states’ points of view. The secretariat drafted a note after each meeting, summarising the

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discussion, which was then distributed before the next Commission meeting.76 The Commission could thus react immediately and give new instructions to the executive secretary and his deputy. As Noël and Behr took part in the Commission’s meetings, they were equally well informed about the Commission’s views, and could act accordingly in the Coreper, or advise the officials of the DGs concerned. Given the increasing importance of the Coreper in the EEC,77 this is where the Commission’s executive secretariat differed most from the High Authority’s secretariat. Beyond the formal tasks assigned to the executive secretariat, Noël soon accumulated more responsibilities. As seen in the High Authority, administrations develop informal structures that fill a gap, such as a lack of institutionalised channels of communication.78 Even though the Commission initially sought to prevent the secretariat from turning into a powerful administrative unit, it underwent a similar development to that of the High Authority’s secretariat. An indispensable co-ordinating unit, it soon took over important tasks in communication and the distribution of information. For instance, on Noël’s initiative the secretariat distributed regular notes with information on the Commission’s and the other EEC institutions’ activities to the directors-general, directors and heads of division; this met with the Commissioners’ approval.79 From mid-1958 onwards, Noël held meetings each Friday morning with the assistants of the directors-general.80 They discussed administrative questions but also the outcome of the Commission’s gatherings, and what was generally happening within it. These meetings were a means of keeping the directors-general, and thus the Commission’s services, informed. One former assistant called the group of assistants a ‘phalanx’, and a coordinating element in the Commission.81 One official from the executive secretariat, a close collaborator of Noël, went so far as to call the assistants the Hausmeier (major-domo) of the Commission and Noël’s source of power.82 These meetings were also important on a psychological level: they facilitated contact between officials across DGs and left them feeling informed about what was going on in the Commission. Likewise, of course, Noël learned what was happening in the different DGs. Later on, and at first only infrequently, Noël also held weekly meetings with the directors-general83 and the chefs de cabinet.84 In fact, it was only under the presidency of Rey, after the merger of 1967, that the weekly meetings of the chefs de cabinet were institutionalised.85 Noël was not only an indispensable source and recipient of information, but also had a major role in designing the Commission’s administrative structure. The secretariat ‘played a crucial role in institutionalising the Commission: establishing and regularising its procedures . . . shaping an independent administration . . .’86 This was also

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made possible by the close relationship between Hallstein and Noël, which allowed the secretariat to develop into this important co-ordinating unit. Moreover, Noël’s experience and his intimacy with the French political scene made him a valuable collaborator.87 He advised the members of the Commission, and Hallstein in particular, who observed retrospectively: Originally, this secretariat was meant to be little more than a technical body to assist the Commission as and when required; but under its outstanding French Secretary-General, Émile Noël, it soon acquired a more important role and, though hardly ever noticed by the general public, became an essential part of the Commission’s machinery.88 The secretariat was a central instrument for Hallstein to realise his aim of building an administration to match those of the member states. Moreover, Noël was important for the creation of the Commission’s institutional identity. Through collecting and distributing information, ‘the Secretariat established, and at the same time became keeper of, the Commission’s institutional memory’.89 What is more, the executive secretary assumed an important role in the Commission’s external representation: it was he who received groups of visitors (for example students, or members of a parliament) and who explained to them how the Community worked.90 Noël thus acted as an informal ambassador. By receiving visitors, giving talks and writing articles about the Community and the role of the Commission, he promoted European integration. For instance, his piece, ‘How do the European Communities work?’91 was widely read. Finally, Noël played a crucial role in the Commission’s staffing policy. He kept an eye on the distribution of posts between nationals of the member states, and discussed suitable candidates with the directors-general and the cabinets.92 The role of the cabinets Introduced by the High Authority, the cabinets became one of the most important and perhaps also one of the most contested characteristics of the European administration. In the first Commission meeting, the members agreed on appointing a small number of personal staff to assist them.93 At the beginning, these cabinets were composed of a chef de cabinet and a deputy, while Hallstein was granted a third A official.94 They were attributed the grades A2 (chef de cabinet) and A3 (deputy chef de cabinet),95 corresponding to director and head of division in the hierarchy of the administration, and thus inferior in rank to director-general.

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While at first it appeared that Hallstein had imposed his view that the cabinets should have little importance in the Commission,96 they rapidly gained influence. The reasons for this development are diverse. As in the case of the executive secretariat, another informal structure developed in the administration to fill a gap and to respond to a certain need. The principle of collegiality left the Commissioners with the obligation to keep themselves informed on other policy areas. With the growing workload of the Commission, they were forced to delegate tasks and to attribute more responsibility and power to their personal collaborators, on whom they relied for advice and assistance. The cabinet staff vetted information, such as incoming proposals from other DGs; they made sure that these did not contain aspects which could be problematic or would not be acceptable to their Commissioner’s home government. The cabinet staff largely ended up deciding which pieces of information would reach the Commissioner, and it is not surprising that most shared their Commissioner’s nationality. Petrilli’s note for the Commission’s conclave meeting of July 1960, which was ironically drafted by his chef de cabinet, showed that the Italian Commissioner trusted his personal collaborators more than the directorgeneral heading his DG; the former shared his political beliefs and national background and the latter did not.97 In his memoirs, von der Groeben also underlined cabinet members’ important role as trusted advisers in a multinational administration,98 a role enhanced by the fact that they could represent their member in the Commission’s meetings. Although with no right to vote, they were allowed to speak and to articulate their member’s opinion. In the early 1960s the chefs de cabinet met only infrequently before the Wednesday sessions of the Commission, to discuss a specific problem. However, when the Commission’s workload increased, and as alternative co-ordinating bodies were lacking, these meetings became more important. The Commissioners introduced two categories of decisions, A and B; A-category decisions would only appear on the Commission’s agenda for the weekly meeting if one of the Commissioners wished to discuss the topic further. Otherwise the chefs de cabinet would take the decision.99 By circa 1965–66 the cabinets were starting to prepare the decisions of the college. In a 1967 report, Wellenstein, secretary-general of the High Authority, Giulio Guazzugli-Marini, secretary-general of the Euratom Commission, and Noël all qualified the weekly meetings of the chefs de cabinet as the Commission’s most important and efficient forum for preparation and problem-solving .100 The cabinets also played a vital role in the Commission’s staff policy: they monitored the national balance of staff and put forward candidates, especially for A4 and A3 posts. The presidential cabinet was particularly

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influential in this area.101 The chefs de cabinet discussed the ‘nationality of a vacancy’ with Noël.102 Cabinet members then looked for suitable candidates in the Commission first, and then in the member states. According to Alfred Mozer, Mansholt’s chef de cabinet, the cabinets had a Vorschlagsrecht, the right to nominate suitable candidates for leading posts in the Commission.103 The influence of the cabinets and the increasing exclusiveness of the relationship between the Commissioners and their cabinets, to the detriment of the directors-general, triggered problems and jealousies, as some cabinets attempted to control access to their Commissioner. Moreover, former cabinet members were likely to be promoted to a higher position in the administration once their service in the cabinet ended, for instance when their Commissioner left, and the cabinet career-path became an important and contested issue.104 The burgeoning power of cabinets was also a result of the weakness of the Commission’s administration, which became increasingly fragmented – policy proposals were often prepared and discussed in one DG without consulting other DGs, and a cabinet meeting was often the first occasion for a proposal to be discussed across different DGs. The role of high officials An employee of the Commission followed one of four different careerpaths, from A to D. The A career required a university degree and comprised eight grades: director-general (A1), director (A2), head of division (mainly A3, but initially also A4 and A5), principal administrator (A4/5), administrator (A6/7) and, later, assistant administrator (A8). Young graduates with no or very little professional experience were employed as A6/7, later as A8. After the staff regulations came into force in 1962, A8 to A3 officials were in principle recruited through a competitive entry examination, the concours. For A1 and A2 posts, which were qualified as ‘political posts’, this recruitment procedure did not apply. ‘Political post’ meant that a candidate external to the European administration could be appointed (‘parachuted in’) and that A1 and A2 officials could be dismissed from the Commission’s service with only a short period of notice.105 In practice, A3 posts were also often considered political posts, although not labelled as such in the statute. Directors-general were the most senior category of officials in the Commission. They headed a DG and worked closely with the member responsible for its policy area. In order to ensure impartiality, the Commission decided that the directors-general should have a different nationality from this Commission member.106 Sometimes they also had different political convictions, as in the case of von der Groeben, a

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Christian Democrat, and Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, the directorgeneral of DG IV, a Socialist. In some cases, this affected the relationship between a Commissioner and the director-general. For instance, Commissioner Petrilli suggested that the directors-general should not be involved in political decisions of the Commission because they normally did not share the political beliefs of the respective Commissioner.107 Generally speaking, the relations between Commissioners and their directors-general seem to have become more distant over the years.108 Yet Hallstein called the directors-general the ‘elite’ of the administration because the scope of their competencies was comparable to that of an entire ministry in the member states.109 Directors-general had an important role in the formulation of their Commissioners’ preferences, and they represented the latter’s authority in dealings with the administrative services.110 In 1960, Lemaignen deplored the fact that there were hardly any links or cooperation between the directors-general themselves: they did not form a united ‘corps’, he considered, while this kind of solidarity had become ‘almost instinctive within our Commission and between our cabinets’.111 This suggests that by the early 1960s the directors-general were already acting like ‘dukes’ defending their duchies within the administration – which in 1966 von der Groeben deplored.112 As the directors-general usually remained in the administration for a longer period of time than the Commissioners, Lemaignen thought that the ‘corps’ of the directors-general should become the conscience of the Commission and its ‘keeper of experiences and tradition’;113 yet it seems they mainly conserved the experiences and traditions of their own DGs. Hierarchically positioned between the director-general and the heads of division, and presiding over several divisions, the tasks of the directors were otherwise rather ill-defined. For instance, the German Commissioners do not seem to have expected them to conceptualise policies. Von der Groeben deplored the fact that the directors played too important a role in devising policy proposals. For him the head of division alone should be ‘l’homme de conception’,114 the one to formulate policies, as it was the case in the German administration. There was clearly a misunderstanding arising from variations between the administrative cultures of the member states. Karl Heinz Narjes explains this difference: ‘[T]he division head from France or Italy approached his new, expanded duties and his greater freedom guardedly and in disbelief at first, while the German division head felt treated like a child.’115 The Commission considered the division as the core unit of the administration, and consequently attributed an important role to the heads of division, later embodied in the Commission’s rules of procedure.116

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The assistants to the directors-general were an additional category of civil servant: they were appointed A4 or A3 so they would not compete with the directors and become ‘assistant directors-general’. However, they were considered as potential future heads of division, or even directors.117 In charge of the secretariat, the administration and the organisation of work in a DG, an assistant was directly responsible to the directorgeneral.118 The assistants supported them in their daily tasks and maintained relations with the Commissioners’ cabinets and the other services of the Commission. They also advised the directors-general on questions of staffing. However, the detailed nature of the tasks and responsibilities the assistants were given depended on the director-general. For example, Helmut von Verschuer in DG VI was more concerned with questions related to the CAP than Charles van Aken in DG IV with questions related to competition policy as van Aken focused more on the administration of DG IV.119 Through their weekly meetings, chaired by Noël, the assistants had important co-ordinating functions in the Commission, and were a source of information for their directorsgeneral.120 Competent senior staff – directors-general, directors and heads of division – were vital for the overall performance of the Commission, for the performance of DGs and for the motivation of other employees in administrative units. Playing an important role in the administration and being treated with respect and esteem have an effect on individuals and facilitates the development of loyalties towards an organisation. The drafters of the EEC treaty had the independence and the standing of leading civil servants in mind when drafting the treaty’s annex, the ‘Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities’, which decreed that the Commission members, and a group of officials to be defined by the Commission, would benefit from laissez-passers as valid travel documents within the EEC.121 Likewise, a group of officials would be declared immune from legal proceedings ‘in respect of acts performed by them in their official capacity’.122 These measures would guarantee Commissioners and senior officials the necessary independence when executing their functions. Apart from sharing European status and diplomatic immunity with the Commissioners, senior civil servants were entitled to represent the Commission at external events,123 and were also occasionally present at the weekly meetings of the Commission. However, it seems that they did not participate as freely and frequently in discussions as did their counterparts in the early days of the High Authority. As a general rule, the executive secretary, his deputy, and the greffe, or registrar, were the only officials present in the Commission’s meetings on a regular basis. Directors-general, directors, and also heads of division and sometimes

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even lower-ranking officials, were invited to participate in a meeting if their area of expertise was under discussion, and if a member required their assistance.124 However, this presence of non-members in the sessions did not remain uncontested: in September 1959 Hallstein deplored the fact that, compared to cabinet meetings of ministers in national governments, too many officials took part in the Commission’s meetings.125 While in the conclave of July 1960 the Commission confirmed on principle the presence of officials at the weekly meetings, after an incident where information from a meeting was leaked the Commissioners tried to restrict the presence of officials in their meetings.126 Instead, the members were allowed to bring a member of their cabinet to assist them, and this incident thus strengthened the role of the cabinets as the Commissioners’ trusted collaborators, to the detriment of other senior officials. There was some variation in the quality and abilities of the first senior officials appointed. With the staff regulations about to come into force in late 1960 and early 1961, the Commission attempted to evaluate its personnel, and to dismiss incapable staff before they became protected by the new rules. Marjolin feared that with the continued presence of mediocre staff the Commission’s services would end up inferior to national administrations. It would also signal to the more talented and hard-working staff that there were no sanctions for weak performance.127 The Commission therefore set up a commission d’intégration to assess the fitness of A officials, up to the grade of head of division, for integration into the European civil service.128 The college itself decided on the fate of the directors-general, directors and some heads of division. In a meeting in February 1962, each Commissioner presented problematic cases in his directorate-general. Matters were less straightforward than they appeared to be, as the college also had to consider the possible implications of a decision to dismiss an official: consequences for the national balance and social considerations were weighted against potential harm to the Commission’s performance and reputation. For instance, Schaus pointed out that if he sent directors home, there was no guarantee that their successors would be more capable: the Commission could not always choose the most capable people because of ‘political pressures’ from the member states.129 Cases of non-integration under the statute were thus the exception, though some officials were offered a lower grade (déclassement). In cases of social hardship, the Commission suggested solutions such as a research contract.130 Financially, this must have been a considerable loss to the Commission, but it allowed the officials concerned to save face. Solidarity

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with personnel who had spent four years in the administration and fear of political consequences guided the Commission’s decisions. The minutes of this Commission meeting in February 1962 indicate that inept members of staff were distributed unequally across DGs. For instance, Rey, responsible for DG I, complained about two of his directors, Robert Faniel and Riccardo Luzzato.131 Likewise, Schaus was not satisfied with any of his three directors in DG Transport, while there were few complaints about DG IV and DG VI staff. Vice-president Mansholt thought that this was due to the careful choice of collaborators by his director-general, Rabot. The one case discussed for DG VI concerned the Belgian director for Agricultural Structures, Roger Grooten, whom Mansholt thought was not the ideal man for the post; Mansholt considered that in the specialist area in question there was an expert community, within and outside the Commission, of which Grooten was not part and which he was not capable of joining.132 The fact that Grooten was not part of this network was considered harmful to the Commission’s structural policy in agriculture.133 This episode speaks to the importance of the contacts and networks of leading Commission officials for the Commission’s success in a given policy area, contacts which they had either made before entering the Commission or subsequently acquired. The college decided that Grooten should remain in his post until DG VI was restructured, and a more suitable position could be found for him. However, two years later Grooten was still in post as director of the Directorate for Agricultural Structures.134 Confronted with member states’ demands, the Commission had to compromise: a determination to act expressed in a Commission meeting was thus not always followed by action. Under these circumstances, the Commission’s administration performed surprisingly well. The examples of DG IV and DG VI show that it was possible to choose well-qualified staff even when under external pressure. In an interview, the director-general of DG IV, VerLoren van Themaat, prided himself that he had successfully appointed qualified personnel, while at the same time abiding by the rules of national balance just like any other DG in the Commission.135 This is confirmed by a contemporary statement of president Hallstein: ‘There are few cases in DG IV, not because of generosity but because of careful recruitment.’136 3.3 Recruitment patterns and personnel policy The beginnings of the Commission’s staff and recruitment policy Recruitment is of vital importance to any organisation; its effectiveness depends significantly on the skills of its personnel. The Commission started appointing staff in early 1958. The staff regulations introducing a

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standardised selection procedure for European civil servants only came into force in 1962. Hence, between the Commission being set up and the statute entering into force lay four years of more or less unregulated recruitment. As Gaudet, the head of the Commission’s Legal Service, emphasised in March 1959, the absence of staff regulations gave the Commission great freedom in recruitment matters, this being limited only by budgetary restrictions.137 The first appointments were meant to be for a limited period of time; many of the first Commission officials remained initially in the service of their home administration. However, the Commissioners were aware that these appointments could create a certain prerogative for a more permanent post,138 and careful selection of these collaborators was thus necessary. The Commissioners’ expectation proved to be accurate: the first Commission officials for the most part were granted the status of permanent officials.139 Moreover, they often stayed in the Commission for the remainder of their professional careers, many of them reaching leading positions in the administration. According to David Coombes, only a small proportion of A posts between 1962 and 1967 were filled through a concours, a competitive entry examination, with people from outside the Community. The other posts were filled through internal promotion, an internal concours or transfers from other Community institutions.140 Analysing the initial recruitment patterns of the Commission’s top-level staff is thus paramount when considering the long-term service of some of these officials and the influence they therefore had on the administration and, what is more, on Commission policies. The Commission’s initial staff consisted of the personal collaborators the Commissioners had brought with them to Brussels. Also, the High Authority provided the Commission with staff, either on a permanent or temporary basis. As this core group had to be extended, the Commission defined three sources from which to recruit: national governments, international organisations and independent candidates.141 For Monnet, the negotiations leading to the ECSC treaty had been a source of both ‘European spirit’ and European officials. Hallstein had also played an important role in the Val Duchesse negotiations. The sources do not explicitly name the treaty negotiations as an important source of staff for the Commission, but this might be because Hallstein’s role in the negotiations and in the preparatory, setting-up phase of the Commission cannot be compared to Monnet’s fundamental role in founding the ECSC. However, it might by then have simply been understood, again because of the High Authority’s experience, that experts participating in the negotiations made excellent staff for the European administration. Leading Commission staff had indeed participated in the Val Duchesse

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negotiations – Franco Bobba, Jean-François Deniau, Ernst Albrecht and Theodor Hijzen, to name but a few. In order to fill the organisational chart with appropriate personnel, the Commission proceeded in a top-down mode. At the Commission’s 12th session, on 9–10 April 1958, the directors-general were officially nominated.142 They then assisted the Commissioners in recruiting leading staff for their respective DGs.143 Unfortunately, the exact circumstances of the Commission’s first appointments, especially those of directors-general and directors, are far from transparent. Due to the informality of the selection process, and the political importance attached to these posts, the sources do not reveal much information about the procedure. While Hallstein, as president, was of course ‘personally responsible for selecting’ the directors-general and directors, as Dumoulin writes,144 the evidence suggests that he shared this responsibility with the other Commission members. Moreover, the decision about which candidate from which member state was to head a DG or a directorate was certainly guided by the particular interests of the member states. The French government, for example, thought it paramount that a Frenchman was appointed at the head of DG Agriculture.145 Mansholt and Marjolin therefore proposed Rabot, an experienced French and international civil servant whom Mansholt already knew. When selecting and recruiting its first staff, the Commission benefited from, and was dependent on, the assistance of member-state governments. I found no evidence for Wilfried Loth’s claim that memberstate administrations generally made recruitment difficult for the Commission,146 although this might have been the case for individual ministries, such as the German agricultural ministry. The Commission did not have the administrative capability to deal with the 15,000–18,000 applications it received,147 and in March 1958 it asked for, and obtained, the personal files of candidates pre-selected by national administrations.148 Sooner rather than later, however, the Commission wanted to divest itself of member-state involvement in recruitment and to centralise the procedure in its DG IX.149 This proved difficult, as DG IX was often not invited to assist in recruitment by DGs taking action autonomously. Staff matters were of high political importance and, as Coombes has argued, this resulted in ‘less real power [being] delegated from Commission staff here [to DG IX] than anywhere else’.150 The nine Commissioners, for example, discussed and decided personally on the recruitment of all A officials in their weekly meetings.151 It is thus unlikely that, as Dumoulin writes, the cabinets were in charge of all appointments except the directors-general and directors.152 The Commissioners remained in control of this important matter, especially in the early stages.

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Noël described the first year of the Commission as a great ‘recruitment rush’.153 This can be put down to the initiative of president Hallstein, who wanted to create a fait accompli with respect to the member states.154 In November 1958, Hallstein urged his colleagues to tap the full potential of the current budget, which provided for 1,231 staff.155 By the end of 1958, the Commission had already appointed most of the directors, heads of division and other leading officials, 399 A officials in total.156 By February 1959 the total number of officials in post had reached 1,108.157 For 1959 Hallstein recommended prudence, however;158 the Commission recognised the danger of paralysing the administration by recruiting too many people in too hasty a manner. Recruitment continued in the following months and years, but there were now restrictions set by the Council, and the Commission had to reduce its demands.159 The time of abundant and generous recruitment was over. In early 1959 the Council established an Expert Committee for Budgetary Questions, which made recommendations to the Commission. While willing to take these recommendations as a basis for discussion, the Commission rejected the committee’s suggestion of introducing an average cost per official and to limit the overall number of officials to 1,300 in 1959.160 Reaching agreement on the Commission’s budget and staff numbers became an annual challenge and a source of conflict, not least because budget debates always had political implications. The Commission saw itself as a victim of the member states, whose motives were more often than not guided by domestic political and financial considerations.161 In Hallstein’s perception, the denial of additional posts by the governments of the member states was a measure directed against the dynamism of the Commission. He considered that refusing the Commission the necessary staff constituted a violation of the treaty.162 The Commission was thus in a constant dilemma, caught between striving for autonomy and budgetary dependence – while for the Council the budget was an important means of controlling the Commission. Selecting European civil servants According to Coombes, ‘the main qualification for inclusion [in the Commission’s administration] was to be “pro-European”’.163 But was being ‘pro-European’ really a key prerequisite for future European civil servants? There is no evidence in the sources to suggest that a European commitment was among the decisive factors for recruiting candidates.164 Expertise and language skills were the only criteria the Commissioners agreed upon.165 The staff regulations were even more vague, merely stating that the applicants had to be citizens of a member state and to have the necessary language skills.166 This lack of concrete criteria left open the

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possibility for basing recruitment decisions on informal rules, personal preferences and, importantly, a political consensus. For Hallstein, for example, service in a national administration was a good preparation for a job in the Commission.167 But how could people be attracted in the event that the European idea was in itself not reason enough to come to Brussels? In the late 1950s there was no shortage of employment in the six member states, and: ‘Why leave your home to go to a distant, cold, dark, damp, rainy country where they can’t cook spaghetti?’168 The Commissioners were aware of this problem and concerns that the Commission would not attract a sufficient number of high-calibre staff guided their discussions over levels of salary and income tax. A high net income should ensure ‘the recruitment of quality personnel in all the member states’.169 It should neither be inferior to the ECSC nor to European intergovernmental organisations and the Permanent Representations of the member states, as these were the institutions with which the Commission thought it had to compete. By 1964 the initial difference between salary levels in the member states and the higher levels in the Commission seems to have dwindled.170 According to Mansholt’s chef de cabinet, the Commission had severe problems attracting high-calibre staff because salaries in the member states had increased by around 30 per cent since 1958, compared to eight per cent in the EEC, ECSC and Euratom,171 not least because of the favourable economic situation in most western European countries in the 1960s. Because of the Commission’s concern to recruit and retain highly qualified staff, the distribution of grades and salary levels, or so-called ‘echelons’, among the newly appointed European civil servants was a delicate matter. In the member states’ civil services, the classification of officials was handled in different ways, and as a result the Commissioners had divergent views which had to be accommodated in a common solution.172 Marjolin argued that the previous career of candidates should be decisive, rather than their age or seniority. Having an ancienneté professionnelle instead of an ancienneté d’âge would be an advantage for the French civil servants in the Commission, who were on average younger than their colleagues. Hallstein, on the other hand, coming from the German civil service where age and seniority were decisive criteria for promotion, maintained that the Commission should not be too generous when classifying its (young) civil servants, because it was closely interrelated with national administrations where seniority played a role.173 The Commission finally decided that age should be one of the criteria for classifying candidates, and adopted a pay scale in which seniority was the determining factor, but which left open the possibility of handling cases of A1 and A2 officials in a more flexible manner, thus accommodating

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youthful French high-flyers.174 A promotion to the next point on the pay scale, or echelon, would automatically take place every two years,175 a practice which corresponded, for example, to that of the German civil service. Not only in its structure but also in its staff policy the Commission sought to be as similar as possible to a national administration: this, it was thought, would facilitate interaction and win the Commission crucial recognition from the member states. Networks, member states, political parties and interest groups Member-state governments, political parties and party networks, industries and trade unions all sought influence on the Commission’s administration by putting forward candidates for the Commission’s services. In addition to a balanced distribution of posts between nationalities, there was a ‘political balance’ for high-level posts which the Commission observed from the outset.176 First and foremost, the nine seats of the Commission were distributed among the important political parties governing the member states: Socialists, Christian Democrats and Liberals. For Belgian candidates there was even a balance between candidates from Flanders and Wallonia, in terms of both regional origin and language. However, matters were more complex than this. There was an overall national and political balance between the members of the High Authority and the Euratom and EEC Commissions. Moreover, interest groups such as trade unions and industry also had to be satisfied and Petrilli, in charge of DG Social Affairs and Lemaignen, a former businessman and vice-president of the French employers federation, were meant to be contact people for these groups in the Commission.177 This complexity was reflected at the level of high officials. From the second half of 1957 onwards the recruitment of leading staff for the Commission had been discussed in the member states.178 European Christian Democrats met several times during 1957 simply for this purpose, as Kaiser demonstrates,179 but no decisions on staffing the new European administration could be taken as the treaty had accorded the Commission autonomy to decide on appointments. Notwithstanding this legally granted independence, the interests of the governments of the member states were discussed in the Commission’s meetings, and the Commissioners kept in close contact with their respective governments while these decisions were being taken. For instance, for the first meeting of the Working Group Administration on 25 January 1958, Marjolin drafted an organisational scheme for the Commission. The following day, Hallstein and von der Groeben returned to Bonn to discuss the scheme with top-level officials of different German ministries. They discussed the upcoming meeting of the Commission, German interests, what were

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perceived as those of the other member states, and possible candidates for leading posts in the Commission.180 The French Commissioners, Marjolin and Lemaignen, meanwhile had similar discussions at the Quai d’Orsay.181 Most probably, staff questions were discussed in a similar manner in the other member states. Back in Brussels, the Commission members had to take these interests into consideration. In this respect, the nomination of Grooten as director in DG VI is a case in point: the Commission was under pressure from the Belgian government, with Rey underlining ‘the extreme political importance of the nomination of Mr Grooten for the Belgian side’.182 In member-state governments and ministries there was also an opposite reaction. Some of the German ministries did not wish to lose their best civil servants to ‘Europe’. The ministry of agriculture seemed downright hostile towards the EEC, and one official, who chose Brussels over Bonn, felt treated like a Volksverräter, a traitor to his people.183 Rudolf Hüttebräuker, state secretary in the agricultural ministry between 1962 and 1968, recalled that his ministry preferred sending less capable civil servants to Brussels in order to get rid of them.184 Compared to this situation, the French ministries seem to have been more aware of the potential importance of the Commission, and thus proposed good candidates. When the future director-general for DG VIII, Helmut Allardt, examined the French candidates for his DG recommended by the Commissioner in charge, Lemaignen, he reported to Hallstein that the French candidates ‘made on average an excellent impression and will – because of their qualifications and technical know-how – very likely dominate, something I anticipate not without concern’.185 These examples suggest that member states differed in how seriously they took the importance of staffing the Commission.186 However, to claim that France proposed good candidates throughout while Germany only wanted to get rid of its lame ducks would be a step too far. For the German economics ministry, Bernhard Löffler insists on the openness of at least the departments concerned with European questions and on the enthusiasm of the civil servants working in them. These officials spent a significant part of their working life abroad, whether attending meetings and negotiations in Luxembourg, Strasbourg and Brussels or by spending a couple of years on secondment to one of the European administrations.187 This suggests that there was not only a frequent exchange between ministries in Paris and the Commission but also between the Commission and some of the ministries in Bonn. Political parties were equally interested in being represented in the new Commission. For example, the Nouvelles Équipes Internationales (NEI), the European network of Christian Democratic parties, attached great

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importance to the new European administrations.188 It is difficult if not impossible to assess the outcome of the efforts to influence recruitment by political parties, transnational party-networks and interest groups. However, the following example shows that the Commission at least tried to comply with their demands. In May 1958, Lucien de Groote, a collaborator of NEI President August de Schryver, met Narjes, then Hallstein’s deputy chef de cabinet (and a Christian Democrat), to discuss the organisation’s representation in the Commission’s administrative services.189 Although Narjes did not promise de Groote any appointments in the Commission, shortly after this encounter de Schryver, in a letter to Hallstein, expressed his gratitude for the appointment of a candidate supported by the NEI.190 Hallstein and others in the German government involved in the European integration process, like Heinrich von Brentano, the minister for foreign affairs between 1955 and 1961, were key members of the NEI. The example of the NEI also shows that these parties were at times more concerned about promoting Christian Democrats for key posts in the Commission than about advancing candidates of their respective nationalities. One of the reasons for this was that the number of higher-level appointments in the administration assigned to each member state was limited, and the NEI therefore tried to support candidates who shared their political and ideological beliefs. From 1957 onwards, the NEI had organised meetings to prepare for the founding of the EEC, expecting that the administrative establishments of Euratom and the EEC would grow to 10,000 officials within five years, more than Hallstein could have dreamed of. When it came to the distribution of these posts, the NEI thus asked for quotas, in respect not only of the nationality of the candidates but also of their ideological, political and social tendencies.191 The Socialist parties had no wish, meanwhile, to leave the battlefield to the Christian Democrats. First, European Socialists promoted the candidature of Mansholt as Commission president. Then in May 1957 Jaap van der Lee of the Dutch Socialist Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) met Noël, at the time Mollet’s chef de cabinet. Mollet should try to convince ‘the Germans’ to support Mansholt, van der Lee demanded;192 Monnet’s Action Committee was also involved in these negotiations. Mansholt and van der Lee met Monnet and Kohnstamm in October 1957.193 However, Mansholt, ‘a farmer and a socialist’, was not acceptable to Chancellor Adenauer, himself a Christian Democrat.194 In May 1958, Mansholt’s departing chef de cabinet, van der Lee, recommended that Mansholt should employ a Catholic as his successor in the cabinet, because in the future he might be dependent on the support of the Dutch Katholieke Volkspartij, the main coalition partner of the PvdA until December 1958.195 Against

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van der Lee’s advice, Mansholt chose the Socialist Mozer. However, as deputy chef de cabinet he appointed Willem van Slobbe, a Christian Democrat who had also been proposed by van der Lee.196 Whether a Christian Democrat as Mansholt’s chef de cabinet would have raised Mansholt’s chances of becoming Commission president is doubtful. However, this episode illustrates the potential importance for the Brussels administration of a particular political constellation in the Commissioners’ home countries. As for the trade unions, judging from documents of the European Trade Union Confederation, the influence of trade unions on the common market, for instance in the EEC treaty negotiations, seems to have been less important than in the ECSC.197 At the level of the college of Commissioners the trade unions were not represented by a member. However, Pasture believes that the only occasions where trade unions collaborated successfully in the international context ‘were primarily aimed at ensuring trade union representation in the European institutions or the nomination of trade unionists in the European administration’.198 Indeed, there are examples of Commission officials with a trade-union background reaching top-level posts in the Commission: Willy Schlieder, an official in DG IV and later director-general for Competition, had been the personal collaborator of Alfred Rosenberg, leader of the DGB.199 Some two years later, in 1964, accommodating political-party interests within the Commission’s recruitment and promotion mechanisms seems to have become routine and institutionalised. It was mainly via the Commissioner’s cabinets, but also through high officials, that the respective parties sought backing.200 According to Manfred Lahnstein, former chef de cabinet of Commissioner Wilhelm Haferkamp in the 1970s, the German staff policy in the Commission increasingly concentrated on furthering the careers of promising young professionals who had received a scholarship from the party foundations the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.201 In a nutshell, the Commission’s administration to an extent reflected the power balances between political parties and interest groups in the member states. By going some way towards meeting the requests of parties and interest groups, the Commission tried to recreate a miniature image of member states’ societies at the European level, not least with the intention of obtaining greater legitimacy for the European administration. National balance While Monnet liked to emphasise that nationality did not play a role in the distribution of posts in the High Authority, Hallstein had a more pragmatic attitude:

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According to the president, the Commission followed a ‘rough-and-ready rule of thumb in filling posts in its Civil Service’.203 This became fixed in the staff regulations: recruitment should be based on a wide geographical spread among the member states.204 Although there was never an official quota, this rather vague formula was more than a ‘rule of thumb’; it was applied thoroughly to the overall number of staff appointed in all categories and to all DGs. The national balance was observed with particular strictness with respect to the A1, A2 and A3 posts. There are good reasons why the Commission thought it necessary to respect a national balance. First, a serious disequilibrium within the administration, to the detriment of one or more member states, might have led to distrust of the Commission and its policies. Secondly, and linked to this, for the Commission the national balance was a means of maintaining its independence, a shield against allegations of partiality. Thirdly, it enabled the Commission to reject clientelist demands for giving jobs to unsuitable candidates, by stating, for example, that a certain post had to go to a person of a different nationality. And finally, a member state should in particular be represented in the Commission’s services in policy fields where it made a major financial contribution to the budget. Accordingly, the French Commissioner Henri Rochereau, Lemaignen’s successor and responsible for DG VIII, stated that he would only accept a German as the German director-general Heinrich Hendus’ successor: ‘since Germany was the greatest net contributor it had to occupy a position of responsibility in the development fund’.205 The great disadvantage of this system was the need for constant surveillance of the national balance, which tied up substantial administrative resources:206 there was a professionalised system for carrying out this supervision, involving DG IX, the executive secretariat and the cabinets. In addition, at their weekly meetings the nine Commissioners spent large amounts of time calculating and discussing the just distribution of posts in the Commission. As the Commissioners were assigned a particular responsibility for the candidates and officials of their respective countries of origin, each Commissioner defended the alleged interests of his own state.207 Generally, no candidate for a higher-level post was to be appointed without consulting a Commissioner of the candidate’s

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own nationality.208 The Commission even resolved to create supplementary posts in order to satisfy a country’s demands, or to respect the national equilibrium. In DG VI, for instance, an additional A1 post was created, which went to the Italian Mario Bandini.209 This was a costly solution, and one which caused the administration to expand rapidly. Despite the fact that no post was to be ‘reserved’ for candidates of a certain country,210 in practice the DGs became fiefdoms of the member states, and sometimes even of a ministry within a specific country. For instance, the post of director-general for DG VIII had always been filled with people from the German foreign ministry, but in 1964 state secretary Rolf Lahr said that his ministry would ‘cede’ the post to the economics ministry.211 Rey severely criticised this system, deploring the fact that the Commission had established ‘une Europe des Patries’ for its top-level officials.212 Also, Rey was a strong advocate of internal recruitment, filling a vacancy for a leading post in the Commission with an internal candidate, thus allowing the growth of ‘home-made’ European officials.213 The Commission, however, paid only lip-service to the practice of recruiting staff first and foremost within its own administration, and especially for A1 and A2 vacancies external candidates were often preferred. What is more, it proved practically impossible to change the locked–in initial arrangement, with the nine directors-general and other leading posts distributed among nationals of the Six. Even if unable to put forward a suitable candidate, the government of a member state was often not prepared (even temporarily) to renounce a post. It was often assisted in this attitude by the Commissioner of the country who took up the case in the Commission meetings. For instance, the quest for a successor to the Italian director-general in DG VII, Giuseppe Renzetti, proved to be a nightmare that lasted several months. Given the difficulty in finding a suitable successor with an Italian passport, the Commission first considered the possibility of exchanging directorsgeneral in order to be able to appoint a director-general of a different nationality for DG VII and at the same time to respect the national balance.214 After this solution proved to be too complicated, the college discussed the candidate suggested by the Italian government, Tergia, from its ministry of transport. However, with the Commission having compromised on so many candidates before, this time it wanted to make a point and to accept only someone of ‘adequate rank and character. Our prestige is at stake.’215 And Tergia was, according to Hallstein, not up to the difficult tasks facing DG VII. Finally, the Commission persuaded Renzetti, who was due to return to the Italian administration, to stay in the Commission for another year.216 After this, the DG remained in Italian hands for years to come.

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The case of the Renzetti succession shows that the Commission was torn between keeping its independence, appointing the best candidate and satisfying the requests of a member state. Italians and Luxembourgers were generally not well represented in the senior posts in the Commission, and the case above illustrates that it was difficult to find highly qualified candidates in Italy willing to come to Brussels or to stay there permanently. Between 1961 and 1967 44 per cent of A officials who resigned from the Commission were Italian.217 Dumoulin adds another reason for their under-representation: the lack of assertiveness of the Italian and Luxembourg Commissioners, who ‘often recommended “worthy” compatriots, whereas the French and the Dutch put forward experienced people’.218 The haggling over posts also had the effect of disadvantaging suitable internal candidates already working in the Commission’s service. Maintaining the national balance was undeniably a factor causing immobility and inflexibility within the administration. Having the right passport and the right contacts sometimes proved more useful than skills, especially when it came to reaching a position above the grade of A4. One official explained that, for those without (political) backing, reaching A4 was already an achievement.219 No doubt, the national balance led to frustration among the civil servants. Von der Groeben detected a ‘justified malaise among the competent officials’, and called for more internal recruitment to leading posts.220 In retrospect, though, the Commission’s civil servants tend to defend the underlying system of national balance. In one interview an official argued that every culture and every tradition should be represented in the European administration, as its personnel stood for the diversity of Europe.221 Others maintained that in a multinational administration it would have been impossible to proceed any differently.222 In any event, the national balance became an integral part of the European administrative culture. A member of Hallstein’s cabinet tried to explain the typical ‘European’ ways of the Commission’s administration to the newly appointed deputy executive secretary, Helmut Sigrist: All this [turning down suitable internal candidates in order to appoint Sigrist, an external candidate] should not alarm you but rather demonstrate that staff management in a European Community follows entirely different rules than in the Auswärtiges Amt.223

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Staff regulations and the creation of a European civil service The Staff Regulations for Officials of the European Communities came into force on 1 January 1962. They resulted, as in the High Authority, in the formal creation of a European civil service. The statute created the framework for providing the Commission with an independent and stable workforce, providing job security and a career. It is not possible to discuss the establishment of the staff regulations here in any detail,224 but it is important to outline some of the underlying ideas and discussions accompanying their working-out. Work on common staff regulations for Euratom and the EEC, and initially also the ECSC, began in late 1958 with the establishment of a working group composed of representatives of the Council, the EEC Commission and the Euratom Commission.225 The main contentious issues for the group’s discussion were taxes and salary levels and, on recruitment, whether the European civil service should be closed or whether there should be rotation between the Community’s and national civil services. The latter included the question of whether seconded officials should continue working in the Communities’ service. Member states’ legislations concerning the secondment of officials to international or European organisations differed considerably,226 with the French version the most advantageous for the officials as it facilitated their reintegration into the home administration. On their return from secondment French civil servants received their full salary until a post corresponding to their former rank became available.227 The Dutch law, meanwhile, was the least advantageous: Dutch civil servants who entered the services of an international organisation could take six months of extraordinary leave.228 After this they had to choose between the national and the international administration. Their French counterparts, by contrast, could indefinitely maintain links with the national while continuing to serve the international administration.229 Not surprisingly, in the working group on the statute opinions diverged. The French and German governments were advocates of a ‘continuous osmosis’, in both directions, between the national and the European administration. They were backed by the Luxembourg government, which feared that its administration could otherwise be drained of the best people. ‘In contrast,’ wrote the French permanent representative, ‘my Italian, Dutch and Belgian colleagues have pointed out that they were very firm partisans of a statute which would guarantee the gradual establishment of a corps of European civil servants completely independent of their respective governments’.230 The Euratom Commission supported the latter approach, while the EEC Commission was more in favour of the French and German position, although initially

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it was divided on the matter. Hallstein’s approach was a notably pragmatic one: he thought that imposing an obligation to quit the national civil service permanently would considerably limit the choice of candidates willing to come to Brussels. Rey, however, doubted the independence of seconded officials, and considered they should opt either for Europe or for their home administration.231 Hallstein dismissed these objections as ‘understandable in theory’ but ‘unrealistic’,232 and eventually his colleagues concurred. The final agreement, permitting secondment, was negotiated by the Luxembourg permanent representative Albert Borschette,233 but the rules and conditions for secondment continued to diverge in the different member states. In 1963, Hallstein’s cabinet deplored the disadvantageous conditions for a seconded official from Germany: these would deter people from coming to Brussels and obstruct the ‘German personnel policy: the constant circulation of qualified officials between the Federal Republic and the European Communities (and international organisations) as well as between these Communities (and organisations) and the Federal Republic’.234 The German government, despite being in favour of an exchange of personnel, did nothing to facilitate it; for example by continuing to promote seconded officials at home while they served the European administration. Even Commissioner von der Groeben, a former civil servant in the economics ministry, was refused a promotion in absentia.235 After the statute came into force, the Commission voiced the criticism that it did not allow for a ‘dynamic’ personnel policy and was not suitable for a young and fast-growing administration.236 The normal concours procedure was complicated and consisted of initially advertising a post internally in the Commission. If no suitable candidate was found, then officials from the other Community administrations were invited to apply. If this failed to produce a suitable candidate, the vacancy was made public in the Official Journal. Mozer complained, for example, that the recruitment procedure was very slow and that the Commission tended to fall back on recruiting people under the label of ‘experts’,237 thus being able to circumvent the lengthy concours procedure and instantly to fill a vacancy. This implies that the advertisement of a vacancy was often something of a farce, when the post had already been filled by an ‘expert’ candidate. Roughly at the same time as the staff regulations came into force, the first staff representation was formed, the Fédération de la fonction publique européenne, or FFPE. During the early years of the Commission, however, there was relatively little activity on the part of European officials in the trade union, as job satisfaction and salary levels were perceived as satisfactory and the excitement of the European project dominated. The first protests and strikes were organised in the mid-1960s but were

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directed against the Council, which had the budgetary authority to grant salary adjustments.238 3.4 Inflexibility, inefficiency and dissatisfaction: reforming the administration Since the Hallstein Commission, reforming the administration and its working methods have been objectives for almost all subsequent Commissions. Public management expert Les Metcalfe’s statement that ‘there is an established reform agenda going back to the Spierenburg report in 1979’239 does not go back far enough, thus failing to take into account all the long history of attempts at rationalisation (the most farreaching reform to date being implemented by vice-president Neil Kinnock following the 1999 resignation of the Santer Commission). This section will look at three reform attempts between 1958 and 1972, and what they reveal about the persistent long-term problems in the administration and about the changes and developments in the Commission’s organisational structure. The Bosboom en Hegener report of 1959 Since March 1958, the Commission was aware of the fact that its organisational scheme ran the risk of duplicating tasks in the different DGs.240 Moreover, partly due to the careful application of the national balance, the administration lacked flexibility from early on. As a result, during 1958–59 the Commission discussed measures for improving the efficiency of its organisation, while continuing to develop it. One of the main concerns was the malfunctioning of DG IX, which is one of the reasons why, in early 1959, the Commission charged the Amsterdambased management-consultancy group Raadgevend Efficiency Bureau Bosboom en Hegener NV with undertaking a preliminary analysis of the efficiency of the organisational structure and working methods. It was an opportune moment for assessing what had been achieved so far: in early 1959 the establishment of the Commission’s complex administrative machinery was already fairly advanced, but at this stage adjustments could still be made quite easily, or so the college believed. On the one hand, the decision to call in external advisers speaks to the Commission’s openness and the importance it attached to the administrative services and their smooth running. On the other hand, it suggests that not even one year after its establishment the decisions taken in organisational questions had left the Commission with serious efficiency problems which, once engrained in this already quite large administration, would be difficult to remedy later on.

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The Rapport d’étude préliminaire sur l’efficacité de l’organisation du travail à la Commission de la Communauté Economique Européenne à Bruxelles, or Bosboom en Hegener report, comprised two parts:241 the first, submitted in May 1959, provided an analysis of DG IX, while the second, completed in August of the same year, was concerned with the general organisation of the Commission. The analysts first identified two internal obstacles to efficiency for which there was no remedy: multinationality and the national balance.242 The consultants did not consider the diversity of language and culture as an asset because, in their view, the officials tended to consider the working methods of their home country as the ideal – instead of looking for the working procedures best suited to the new context of the Commission, they preferred to retain the methods with which they were familiar.243 In 1959 the Commission was thus far from a unified administration, with well developed and accepted ‘European’ working methods. As to the second factor, the consultants thought the national balance should be applied in a less dogmatic manner, as this would allow for better matches between an employee’s qualifications and the requirements of the post.244 Overall, however, they were impressed with the quality of the Commission’s staff, and this demonstrates that the initial recruitment had provided the Commission with mainly adept and motivated staff: The enthusiastic manner in which the large majority of officials conceive of their task and their average high level of expertise justify the prediction that it is possible to continue developing this administration in a harmonious and successful manner.245 The Commission’s main tasks would be to keep the growing organisation under control and to adapt it constantly to different and changing tasks. Here again, the consultants were optimistic, given the Commission’s success in recruiting well-qualified staff.246 This also implied a danger, namely that officials could be tempted, through over-confidence, to take on tasks which did not fall within their competence – typically officials brought great enthusiasm to their task, worked more than required, but tended to extend their area of responsibility. As the administration was as yet rather small the consultants did not consider this a problem for the time being, but did see it as likely to cause increasing difficulties in the future.247 As to the question of how the Commission could improve its organisational scheme, the report suggested several possibilities derived from classical organisation theory, for example, to organise the administration according to the objectives of the treaty, or to group all

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activities concerning one subject – a country, for example – in one administrative unit.248 The Commission had opted for the first possibility, which was logical enough but, the consultants considered, entailed difficulties. Whereas in some policy sectors the treaty set a strict working schedule for the Commission, it granted more freedom of manoeuvre in others, and a structure exclusively based on objectives was therefore inappropriate, given the need for flexibility in the Commission’s administration to accommodate new tasks.249 Moreover, an organisation based on objectives would have required substantial co-ordination efforts. However, as radical restructuring would have considerable consequences for the administration, and might also not necessarily result in a logically structured organisation, the analysts did not make recommendations for a different organisational structure.250 In other words, they had no solution to the Commission’s efficiency problems, beyond suggesting that shortterm tasks should be addressed by temporary committees; this would avoid creating new and permanent administrative units. (These units would later be called ‘task forces’, the first dealing with the British application for EEC membership in 1961–63.) For the consultants, the Commission’s ever-increasing staff budget was an indication of weak leadership, and they recommended establishing a strong centralised unit that could implement a programme of work to transform the general objectives of the treaty, to control that process and to manage its outcome.251 By thus delegating some of its power and refocusing the college’s tasks, the Commission would become an effective authority-exerting body. The results of the Bosboom en Hegener report were taken into account by the comité de rationalisation. The comité de rationalisation and the Ortoli report (1960–61) In February 1960, Hallstein established a committee composed of three directors-general: Franco Bobba, François-Xavier Ortoli and Pieter VerLoren van Themaat. The main task of this comité de rationalisation was to make suggestions for rationalising the administration and, in particular, reducing the DGs’ demands for more staff.252 The Commissioners were aware that tasks in the Commission were not evenly distributed, some officials being overworked and others underemployed. Marjolin stated that he had experienced a similar situation at the OEEC, where as a result they had simply dismissed one third of the staff after the first three years because the focus of tasks, or the tasks themselves, had changed. The Commission was not inclined to take such radical measures. Moreover, Hallstein was critical of the fact that, while everybody was in favour of rationalisation, nobody was prepared to make the sacrifices in their own

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DG.253 This would have meant giving up staff – and staff numbers were associated with power. In December 1960, the Commission charged the rationalisation committee with producing a report on the functioning of the Commission’s services.254 This study, submitted in May 1961, was based on a questionnaire distributed to all A and B officials, but excluding A1 and A2, of which about 700 were returned.255 Compared to the Bosboom en Hegener Report, which was largely based on interviews at director level, this approach offered a different perspective on the Commission’s organisation. Also, this was an internal report, established by officials employed by the Commission and who thus knew the organisation from the inside. The authors concluded that the external reputation of the Commission was excellent. From the inside, however, this perception had to be at least modified. While great successes had been achieved in some policy areas, in others what the authors called an ‘international routine’ had become established where some officials, having no clear idea of their exact task, wrote studies and reports that often served no immediate purpose.256 The committee made three principal suggestions for improving the situation: first, dismissing superfluous or under-qualified staff; secondly, reorganising the administration; and thirdly, reorienting its activities. The first measure mainly concerned so-called ‘mediocre staff’ who, as shown above, were often retained in the Commission for reasons of ‘humanitarianism, political considerations or lack of courage on the part of their superiors’.257 The second suggestion involved a reorganisation of the administrative units, which had become necessary after three years because duplication of work was occurring.258 As to the third recommendation, the report pointed out that the Commission lacked a programme prioritising certain activities or policy areas, instead treating all aspects of the EEC treaty as equally important.259 The report described the Commission’s administration as a very heterogeneous body, with some units performing extremely well and others less so. As to personnel policy, the report predicted that in the future there would be a ‘blockage of careers’. As the Commission had recruited the bulk of its staff over a short time span, with few staff being over the age of 50, hardly any vacancies could be expected in the leading posts for the foreseeable future.260 In June 1961 the Commission discussed the recommendations of the rationalisation committee, and their possible consequences. The college then set up a working programme and procedures to allow for the assessment, evaluation and if necessary dismissal of insufficiently qualified officials and other employees, as the introduction of staff regulations was by now imminent.261

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The Bosboom en Hegener report and the Ortoli study were the last attempts at reform which the Commission undertook in the 1960s. Few of the Bosboom suggestions were implemented, whereas some in the Ortoli report were taken up. There were, however, no radical changes in the organisational structure. The reasons for this lack of determination to implement reforms could be that change would have affected the power relationships within the Commission. The individual interests of Commissioners were at stake, and directors-general were also not prepared to abandon competencies and influence. Furthermore, the 1960s were a busy and active period for the Commission. As long as the DGs that were regarded as successful in terms of output – the Ortoli report singled out DG Agriculture and the CAP in this respect – continued to work smoothly, the Commissioners turned a blind eye to the weaknesses which had been identified. It was only after the merger of the executives in 1967, and with the first enlargement looming, that the Commission under president Franco Maria Malfatti (1970–72) again called for an analysis of the organisation. The Poullet report of 1972 In March 1972 the Malfatti Commission commissioned a report on the internal functioning of the post-merger Commission from Edouard Poullet, Professor of Public Administration at the Université Catholique de Louvain. The outcome of this analysis, the so-called Poullet report, was published in November 1972.262 The report dealt with an administration which had already been established for some 14 years, and the lack of flexibility in the administrative structure for adapting to new tasks, already pointed out in the Bosboom and Ortoli reports, was now more apparent. In particular, the Poullet report took into account the Commission’s dual responsibility for the elaboration and the co-ordination of policies, on the one hand, and on the other for their implementation and administration.263 The study thus sought a ‘strategy of organisation’, the aim being to improve the match between the organisation and its tasks, and accordingly to suggest reforms. Poullet’s team derived its information essentially from discussions with the Commission’s Co-ordination Committee,264 set up for this purpose, and from interviews with senior officials. The first chapter of the report analysed the internal functioning of the Commission’s services. Again, the Commission was complimented on its staff: ‘One cannot help but underline, on this occasion, the great motivation of the leading European civil servants . . .’265 But at the same time its administration was described as extremely hierarchical, centralised and also fast-growing: within ten years, the number of officials had tripled, from fewer than 2,000 in 1962 to almost 6,000 in 1972.266 This rapid

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growth had had an effect on the structure of the organisation, as well as on social relations and career management. The merger of the executives had led to a further destabilisation of the organisation, according to Poullet. Taking into account the history and the external environment of the organisation, the study was the first, of the reports discussed here, to acknowledge that external factors influenced the administration, with the Commission’s structure seen primarily as an answer to its position and tasks within the Community.267 One set of external factors was the diversity, extent and complexity of the Commission’s tasks; this made it more difficult to find a suitable organisational structure, a problem that had already been pointed out by the Bosboom analysts. However, the difficulty in accommodating two tasks – of innovation on the one hand and administration on the other – seems to have become particularly pressing, as the former required more supple and flexible structures than the latter.268 The challenges of multinationality were a second factor, though compared to the Bosboom report there was a change in tone – by 1972 the Commission was already an established and experienced organisation which had perfected multinational working methods: It seems that the results are particularly good [in the Commission]. The interpersonal relations develop, it seems, in a spirit of confidence and cooperation. No doubt the institutional loyalty of the employees and their feeling of being part of a common enterprise play an important role in this situation.269 However, like the Bosboom report, Poullet pointed to the negative aspects of multinationality, such as the national balance and the college structure. The latter had an impact on the internal functioning of the services, and had resulted in an over-centralisation of the organisation.270 Furthermore, the report warned against ‘reserving’ posts in the administration, in particular at the higher levels, for particular nationalities, which had a negative impact on the atmosphere in the organisation.271 By 1972 the Commission’s administration was subdivided into around 150 administrative units, including some very small.272 This increase was partly a consequence of the limited availability of leading positions in the Commission, already pointed out as a growing problem by the Ortoli report – additional divisions of course meant that more leadership positions were available. Moreover, Poullet criticised the compartmentalisation of the administration: there was very little cross-DG collaboration when a proposal was in preparation. Instead, one DG would employ what the report called ‘the tactic of the fait accompli’.273 As a

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consequence, collaboration was only usual among the top-level officials, the Commissioners and their cabinets, which had led to a centralisation of the administration. This problem, already detected in 1959, had therefore been aggravated. Also, compartmentalisation was increased by the fact that some DGs were more important than others, had access to more resources and power and were thus not dependent on cross-DG collaboration. As a remedy, the report suggested vesting a central authority – the secretariat-general – with the task of overseeing the administration and of encouraging cooperation.274 This would further enhance the important coordinating function which the secretariat had acquired since the establishment of the Commission. Moreover, the Poullet report shows how much the meetings of the chefs de cabinet had gained in importance compared to the early 1960s. Their weekly meetings were now an integral part of the Commission’s working methods, and to an extent compensated for the lack of co-ordination between the DGs.275 The next part of the Poullet report dealt with how the administration’s fragmentation influenced the performance of the Commission. Policies were mostly conceived in a single DG, and were thus formed in its own style – they were not part of an overall political programme or strategy – which made it more difficult for the Commission to present coherent proposals and to set priorities.276 This fragmentation therefore had an important effect on policy outcomes, as it more or less excluded profound discussion of general policy directions. At its weekly meetings, the college mainly decided on proposals from the different administrative units. The Commissioners, together with their DG, were thus each able to exert a major influence on policy orientations within their own area of responsibility. The third part of the report was concerned with the need to reconsider and enforce the role of the Commission as Europe’s policy initiator. In general, Poullet considered, the Commission’s administration seemed more designed for administrative tasks than for developing policies;277 this would need a detailed working programme, a recommendation the Ortoli report had already made. Poullet suggested using methods derived from economic planning. The Commission had already decided to adopt PPBS (‘Planning-Programming-Budgeting System’), a management system based on ‘management by objectives’.278 The report suggested enhancing coordination and flexibility by reinforcing the secretariat-general, initiating inter-DG working groups, task forces and study groups. Taking a longterm perspective, it also suggested a regrouping of small administrative units into larger and better-structured entities. Poullet’s view was that the administrative structure of the Commission (sub-divided into DG, directorate and division) invited compartmentalisation. Better

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management would be the answer in the long run. In summary, the Poullet report shows that by the 1970s many problems of the early 1960s persisted or had been aggravated, such as the lack of co-ordination and the fragmentation of the administration. At the same time, the Commission officials appear to have maintained their strong sense of loyalty to the institution, and to be as well-motivated in the early 1970s as they had been in the late 1950s. Conclusion With respect to the administration, the decisions taken in the late 1950s and early 1960s by the Hallstein Commission were characterised by prudence and pragmatism, accommodating the interests of member-state governments and sometimes of political parties and interest groups. Hallstein’s pragmatic attitude dominated over calls, from Commission members such as Rey, for more independence from member states. As Hallstein intended, the Commission quickly developed into a large bureaucracy; into this hierarchies were introduced, which resulted in a high degree of rigidity and compartmentalisation, and a reluctance to reform or change. The executive secretariat and the cabinets took over important co-ordinating tasks, thus compensating for flaws in the organisation. In a similar fashion to the High Authority, the main characteristics of the Commission as a supranational administration were the principles of national balance and collegiality – two factors which limited manoeuvring room in organisational matters for Hallstein and for his successors in the Commission presidency. According to Ludlow, the years of the Hallstein Commission can be qualified as a success, even a striking one: an administration was set up from scratch, and the CAP and the customs union were successfully implemented. ‘[F]or much of its first decade of operation, the Brussels institution gained a reputation for administrative activism and efficiency rather than bureaucratic inertia.’279 Yet, it is doubtful whether this verdict is true of all parts of the Commission: some DGs were more successful than others, and the Commission’s administration was overly heterogeneous. This chapter has shown that from very early on the administration was fragmented, with the different DGs acting autonomously and defending their spheres of influence. Within the DGs there was sufficient space for the development of DG-specific identities and cultures. Before studying the examples of the DGs for Competition and Agriculture in Chapter 5, the next chapter will deal with the European high officials who made possible the success of the Hallstein Commission, who were affected by these administrative structures and who in turn influenced them.

4 BIOGRAPHICAL STUDIES High Officials of the Commission

Eurocrats, technocrats and apatrides – these are some of the terms attributed to Commission officials. In July 1961, the Economist described this new species, the ‘Eurocrat’ or ‘multilingual tough-minded European’, as characterised by youth, European spirit and enthusiasm.1 In their 1969 study on European elites, Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden qualify the Eurocrats simply as the ‘EC elite’.2 The European civil service differed from its national counterparts, they consider, in comprising officials with a higher average education and a lower average age. The study also ascribed to the Eurocrats ‘an impressive esprit de corps’ and a ‘deep sense of identification with the Community’.3 During the 1960s, the term ‘Eurocrat’ thus had a positive connotation, describing a European civil servant imbued with the values of the European Community. The term ‘technocrat’ could have an equally positive connotation: for the federalist Henri Brugmans, technocracy was a modern – and better – form of bureaucracy.4 He thought the technocrat superior to the bureaucrat, as the latter, a product of nationalism, stood for the old divided Europe whereas the former represented innovation and team spirit. For Brugmans, Monnet was the model technocrat.5 Finally, the pejorative term apatride was also used to describe European civil servants; it was used by de Gaulle to express his contempt for the Commission and its personnel. But all three expressions have something in common: they imply a shift of solidarity from the national to the European level, and account for supranational socialisation processes. The biographies of the Eurocrats are the focus of this chapter. The first section explores the biographical background of Commission civil servants, establishing similarities and differences in their lives and careers, such as their generational experiences and their motivation in working for ‘Europe’. These may be called ‘internal’ factors affecting the process of

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Europeanisation, while the officials’ experience as expatriates living and working in Brussels, analysed in section two, constitute the ‘external’ factors. The third section will discuss examples of biographies illustrating the different sociological types among the officials, and section four examples of the different identities present in the Commission, and civil servants’ images of Europe. The group of officials studied consists of 109 A officials, including cabinet staff, from the DGs IV (Competition, 57 officials) and VI (Agriculture, 52). All these individuals entered the Commission between 1958 and 1963. In addition, some officials from the executive secretariat have also been included in the study. The data is derived from memoirs, interviews and archival sources. The focus on the staff of two DGs permits a comparison of their backgrounds; moreover, DGs IV and VI were, and still are, among the most important in the Commission. An analysis of the administrative staff of these two DGs may contribute to a better understanding of how the European competition and agricultural policies were developed – and by whom. 4.1 Internal factors in Europeanisation: biographical background The wartime generation The average year of birth of DG IV officials is 1924, while that of DG VI officials is 1922.6 These averages conceal a range, and thus a possible agedifference, of some 30 years (1905–35). However, a break-down of the birth-dates shows that the majority of officials were born in the 1920s. In DG IV, the oldest was born in 1910, three from 1911 to 1919, 17 from 1920 to 1929, and five in 1930 or later. In DG VI, two were born from 1900 to 1909, ten from 1910 to 1919, 17 from 1920 to 1929 and six in 1930 or later. Recurring themes in memoirs and interviews can point to the existence of similar or typical experiences of a social group.7 What then were the experiences and the ‘baggage’ the officials brought with them into the Commission? As the birth-dates show, the first Commission officials belonged to the war generation. However, in terms of formative years and events, there are clearly differences between those born in 1905 and those born after 1930. Mozer, for instance, born in 1905 in Munich, lived through World War I, the crisis years and the downfall of the Weimar Republic,8 while those born between 1910 and 1928 often actively participated in World War II; for those born later, the war provided strong and formative memories of their childhood and youth. Without doubt, the experience of the war had an impact on all of them. As the data sample comprises only one woman, war experience here has to be understood as

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the experience of (mostly young) men in World War II. For the officials from DG IV and DG VI this encompassed military service as well as various other experiences such as persecution, captivity, expulsion, forced labour, occupation and torture. Members of the Commission also went through the ‘school of war’9 – former Resistance fighter Rasquin suffered the consequences of Gestapo torture and died in 1958 at the age of 59, while of the Commissioners responsible for DG IV and DG VI, von der Groeben served in the Wehrmacht and Mansholt was active in the Dutch Resistance.10 Moreover, being born in 1907 and 1908 respectively, both men had childhood memories of World War I and had experienced the crisis years of the late 1920s and 1930s. As in the High Authority, National Socialism and the potential involvement and guilt of German officials must have been topics in the Commission. During the 1930s and 1940s, some future Commission civil servants were members of the National Socialist party, supporting and spreading Nazi ideology. For example, the lawyer Arno SchulzeBrachmann wrote a legal essay in 1940 full of anti-democratic comments about the ‘German party state’, referring to the Weimar Republic.11 Other examples include the future directors-general Helmut Allardt and Günther Seeliger, whose doctoral theses dealt respectively with the German Volksgemeinschaft, or ethnic community, and the defence of NS economic policy. Both include passages expressing contempt for the market economy and for individualism.12 Another, Friedrich Arnsmeyer, became a member of the National Socialist party at the age of 17.13 Moreover, German officials born up to the year 1928 most certainly participated in the war, either as soldiers in the Wehrmacht or as Flakhelfer – young men, often teenagers, deployed as helpers in anti-aircraft defence, or in the Reichsarbeitsdienst, the Reich Labour Service.14 The younger ones belonged to the so-called ‘Flakhelfer generation’ that survived the war relatively unscathed and in political terms remained relatively uncompromised. These ‘Flak-democrats’, as they are also called, are said to have played an important role in the rebuilding of Germany after 1945.15 Older officials had sometimes held high ranks in the Wehrmacht: Hans-Broder Krohn, for instance, later deputy director-general in DG VI, had been an officer on the General Staff, as had deputy executive secretary Behr.16 At least one case is more problematic: Siegfried Korth, head of division in DG VI, was an SS-Obersturmführer based at the eastern front during the war. His SS-career can be traced in files held by the German federal archives, though there is no evidence of war crimes,17 as is also the case with both Krohn and Behr, according to the German institutions responsible for holding such information.18 It is unlikely that individuals would have been considered for a post in the Commission if it

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had been known that they had committed war crimes. The sources do not reveal whether the Commission had an official policy regarding former German soldiers or members of the National Socialist party, and the college appears to have decided each case individually. A former member of the SS could apparently enter the Commission’s administration if he was able to submit a clearance certificate. Dumoulin writes that the Commission took few risks, performing strict security checks on its staff, not only with regard to any Nazi past but also, given the Cold War context, to exclude Soviet spies from entering the Commission.19 Given that one ‘spy’, an official who worked in the executive secretariat, was allegedly uncovered in the late 1960s, these fears were not entirely unfounded.20 On the other side were those civil servants who had fought against Germany, or suffered from German occupation or atrocities. The Belgian Raymond Craps had participated in the liberation of his country from occupation by the German army.21 Mozer survived the occupation of the Netherlands hidden in a mental health hospital. In interviews two Belgian officials recalled their experiences of the occupation in their home town, Brussels.22 The family of Maurice Barthélémy, the son of a Lotharingian farmer, was expelled by German troops while VerLoren van Themaat’s academic mentor, Benjamin Telders, died in Bergen-Belsen concentration camp in April 1945. Mixing these officials who had directly or indirectly suffered the cruelties of the Nazi regime with a former member of the Waffen-SS or former members of the NSDAP was potentially an explosive combination. What role did war experience play in the everyday working life of the Commission? What mechanisms allowed trust to form between former enemies? It is remarkable that in interviews some non-German officials recalled and even recounted the war experiences of their German colleagues, especially their experiences – and suffering – on the eastern front.23 In interviews the Belgian Frans de Koster spoke about German Commission officials who had allegedly ‘hidden’ in the Wehrmacht in order not to be compromised by the Nazi regime. He recalled Behr’s past more than 40 years after the latter had left the Commission, and named others, like Swidbert Schnippenkötter, Narjes and Krohn, who had also allegedly tried to keep a low profile by volunteering for the Wehrmacht.24 Thus even non-German officials such as de Koster adopted the image of the ‘clean’ and ‘uncompromised’ soldier of the Wehrmacht, which was constructed and nurtured in West German society in the 1950s and 1960s to foster integration and social peace.25 Having served in the Wehrmacht was seen as normal and even positive.

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Moreover, many officials cite the war as their main incentive to ‘make Europe’. For some, European integration brought about the end of a thousand years of ‘civil war’, and was a guarantee of lasting peace between European countries.26 This was an important motive for officials from diverse national and cultural backgrounds to make an effort to collaborate. It is justifiable to speak of World War II as a shared generational experience and a major source of social identification. Former officials themselves used the term ‘generation’ when describing the first group of European officials. For instance, Rudolphe Dumont du Voitel wrote on the occasion of his retirement in 1987: We belong to a generation that went through a lot. As young people we experienced the war, we were shocked by this excessive nationalism. We realised that Europe will not be able to survive without reconciliation between the European people and countries and I believe that this experience has influenced us decisively.27 A.D. Moses characterises Germans born between 1918 and 1930 as ‘45ers’ because 1945 marked the most important turning-point in their lives.28 There are good reasons for applying this term to the first Commission officials. For many civil servants 1945 had indeed marked a turning point in their personal history, in the history of their country and in that of Europe. The origins of the legendary ‘team spirit’ of the Eurocrats lie at least partly in the shared generational experience and similar socialisation during World War II, which resulted in shared norms and values and the conviction that building Europe was a means of avoiding future armed conflict in Europe. It gave their work meaning beyond the daily routine. The fact that people had fought on different sides did not lead to division. On the contrary, this seems to have fostered understanding, especially in the case of German officials who had been ‘simple’ soldiers. The idea of the ‘clean’ Wehrmacht seems to have been widely accepted in the Commission, and certainly facilitated the integration of the German officials among their colleagues. This potential for reinterpreting history, and for accepting a discourse which was dominant in Germany at the time, was a necessary precondition for the integrative success of the Community. Otherwise the administration could have fallen apart or at least split into two camps – the Germans and the rest. Education and professional background The civil servants in DG IV and DG VI for whom educational information is available obtained their degrees from 48 different universities across Western Europe and the USA. Universities in Paris are

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the most often cited, with 11 graduates, and the next in line are Bonn with four, Tübingen and Göttingen with three each and Leuven, Brussels, Munich, Stuttgart, Rome, Leiden, Utrecht and Bordeaux with two each. Compared to France, the other member states did not, and still do not, have such a centralised university system, which helps to explain the diversity of places of study in these countries. However, most of the universities named above had a good reputation. The distribution of types of university degrees in DG IV and DG VI varies between the two DGs. This can easily be explained by the different requirements of expertise in these policy areas. Table 4. Distribution of university degrees in DG IV and DG VI DG

Law

DG IV

10

Economics / Political Economy 9

DG VI

7

1

Agriculture

Other

5

Grande École (France) 1

1

3

5

15

1 (College of Europe29) 3

Law/ Economics

Among the DG IV officials, degrees in law or economics, or a combination of both, dominated.30 One civil servant who held a degree in agriculture also had a degree in economics and a postgraduate degree from the College of Europe in Bruges, founded in 1949–50. With six law graduates, plus another holding a combined degree in law and economics, the number of law graduates was particularly high among the Germans in DG IV. In the group of DG VI officials, the number of generalists, with a degree in law or economics or one from a French Grande École, slightly exceeds the number of specialists with a degree in agriculture (16 versus 15).31 Moreover, in two political scientists DG VI (ranged in the ‘other’ category) could count another two generalists, not to mention Mozer, a journalist and autodidact. Yet DG VI was mainly concerned with highly technical matters, and even with their preponderance in the group studied here the generalists sometimes felt inferior because of their lack of a technical background.32 The types of degrees correspond to what one would expect to find in a national civil service. The high percentage of law degrees reflects the dominance of law graduates in the German civil service, which was often seen as the equivalent to a degree from a French Grande École or an English Oxbridge degree, with its graduates making a similar claim of belonging to a generalist elite, educated to take over leading functions in state and society.33 Among the French officials in DG VI, four had graduated from the ENA or from one of the other Grandes Écoles, a degree from which was in France, and still is, an entry ticket to the highest

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ranks of the national civil service. Obviously, in the Commission there could be no dominant type of official, such as the lawyer in the German administration. Commissioners and those responsible for recruitment fell back on the qualifications they were familiar with, thus tending to reproduce patterns from their home countries. In the case of DG IV, with its mixture of lawyers and economists, von der Groeben most probably brought his experience of the German economics ministry to Brussels. In the ministry in Bonn he had experienced collaboration between lawyers and economists as uncomplicated and enriching for both sides,34 as had the Dutch director-general VerLoren van Themaat who, like von der Groeben, had worked as a lawyer in an economics ministry. The distribution of university degrees suggests that the Commission officials were part of the patterns of elite formation in their countries of origin. While pioneers of European integration such as Brugmans emphasised the fresh start made in the Brussels administration, compared to national administrations which were, according to him, ‘creations of the nineteenth century’,35 a fresh start could not possibly have been achieved in the Commission. This becomes even more evident when looking at the age and the professional background the officials had when starting to work for the Commission. The average age of officials when entering the Commission’s services was quite low. For DG IV it was 34.7 and for DG VI 36.9 years. This confirms the impression many observers had of the Commission in the 1960s – of a young administration36 (though an average age of 35 naturally includes the 25-year-old graduate as well as the veteran on the verge of retirement). The figures show that most officials did not start their careers in the Commission straight from university, which might perhaps have allowed for a ‘fresh start’. The Commission’s civil servants were more experienced on the one hand, but on the other possibly less flexible in adapting to the new multinational surroundings and working patterns. What is more, if they had say eight to ten years of previous professional experience, they might already have undergone strong socialisation in their previous appointment; and in terms of such socialisation it is revealing to look at the employment of officials immediately before they entered the Commission. The knowledge and previous experience of the officials were an important asset for the Commission, one on which it relied and which it utilised. This could involve intimate knowledge of a national administration, an interest group or an international expert network. The distribution of the types of previous occupations in Tables 5 and 6 shows that the national civil services were clearly the main previous employer.

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Table 5. Last position DG IV officials held before entering the Commission37 Country of origin NL F B G I Lux Total

NCS 2 2 4 4 2 1 17

Cartel office 1 1 3

Interest groups 1 1 1 1 1

IO

5

3

5

Business

Uni/ Research

1

1 3 1

1

5

Other

1

1

2

1

Key: NCS – National civil service; IO – International Organisations; Uni/ Research – University/Research; NL – Netherlands; F – France; B – Belgium; G – Germany; I – Italy; Lux – Luxembourg

Table 6. Last position DG VI officials held before entering the Commission38 Country of origin NL F B G I Lux Total

National civil service 3 6 2 8 2 21

Interest groups, political parties 2 2

IO

1 2 1

1 5

Business

4

Uni/ Research

Other

1 1 2 1 4

3 1 4

1

Key: IO – International Organisations; Uni/Research – University/Research

An impressive 21 officials in DG VI had worked in the national civil service before coming to Brussels (Table 6). The number is equally high for DG IV if one includes the five officials who had worked for national cartel offices, which were often government agencies, to the 17 from the national civil service (Table 5). In DG IV, interest groups and university or research come next, with five recruits each. International organisations follow with three, while only one came from private business. This is remarkable given the fact that private companies were the main ‘clients’ of DG IV, though perhaps fear of being accused of partiality may have prevented DG IV from employing more people from private business. Also, the lack in this new European civil service of attractive salary-scales and, initially, of job security compared to what private business could offer may have generally hampered recruitment among this group, which was underrepresented in the Commission as a whole. In DG VI, interest groups also come second, with five recruits, followed by international organisations, private business and university or research with four each.

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A German research institute for agriculture provided the Commission with at least three officials, two of them future heads of division. Finally, in neither DG did international organisations seem to have been the preferred recruitment ground, which raises the obvious question of whether the new European officials possessed international experience of another kind. European and international experience, and political background If the European civil servants were already internationally socialised before entering the Commission, this would indicate an increased ability to adapt to new situations, to succeed in a multinational administration and to deal with individuals of different national, cultural and linguistic backgrounds. International experience can include university studies in a foreign country, service in international organisations, participation in negotiations at an international level, military service and employment in a foreign country. Table 7. Previous international experience of DG IV and DG VI officials DG IV DG VI

International organisation 5 3

University studies 6 6

International negotiations 3 7

Work abroad/other 2 7

None/not known 41 29

At least 23 of the DG VI officials had some kind of international experience (Table 7). Three had worked in international organisations, six studied abroad, seven participated in international negotiations (for instance in the framework of the OEEC) and seven had other experience, such as a job abroad. In DG IV the number of officials with international experience was considerably lower; of the sample group, a minimum of 16 had such experience: five had worked in international or European organisations such as the Council secretariat of the ECSC in Luxembourg, the High Authority or the OEEC, six studied abroad, mainly in the USA, and three participated in international negotiations, on the OEEC or the Benelux customs-union; one Belgian had spent his military service in Germany after the war and another Belgian worked there. Deprived of the possibility of studying in their home country – where there was at that time no institution of higher education – officials from Luxembourg who had sought to undertake university studies had necessarily to do so abroad. After the war they were mainly attracted by French universities or Grandes Écoles. They were fluent in French and German, both official languages of Luxembourg, their own language being a variant of the latter.

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Given that in the 1950s it was far from common to study or work abroad, this proportion both in DG IV and DG VI seems rather high. In fact, it might have been higher, as in the case of many officials it could not be established whether they had previous international experience or not. Unfortunately, there are no comparable studies on national administrations showing the percentage of civil servants with international experience which could have shown whether the degree of such experience on the part of Commission officials was exceptional or not. In any case, prior international experience certainly facilitated understanding among colleagues of different national and cultural backgrounds. Sometimes these experiences had resulted in the formation of transnational networks, for instance in the negotiations on the Green Pool in the early 1950s, which certainly provided for a kind of pre-socialisation and was a preferred recruitment ground for DG VI.39 A surprisingly small number of officials had been active in groups and networks furthering European integration, such as the (student) European Movement. In DG VI there were only Georges Rencki, Mozer, van der Lee and François Muller, and in the DG IV sample there is no comparable case. Barthélémy, another DG VI official, had been active in a FrancoGerman student movement,40 and he is not the only one to emphasise that his interest in ‘Europe’ was triggered by the aim of Franco-German reconciliation. In his study on French elites in the European Communities, Bossuat also emphasises this aspect: ‘For some, the emergence of a European Community culture was directly linked to the experience of the Franco-German conflict.’41 European integration was a means for many – in particular French and German – civil servants to overcome Franco-German antagonism. All in all, the divide between DG VI and DG IV is interesting, and difficult to explain. It is possible that Mansholt, a federalist, attracted more individuals with a well-developed interest and activism in European groups than von der Groeben, who while clearly pro-European was not as ideologically committed. If federalist commitment was not very pronounced among officials, what about their political beliefs? It would be naïve to believe that European civil servants, especially in the higher ranks, were politically neutral. However, as the topic was not openly discussed in the Commission, it is difficult to determine the political background of senior Commission officials. As shown in the previous chapter, the Commission’s way of dealing with the diversity of opinions, political convictions and social groups in Europe was to include as many of them as possible in the administration. One example is the director-general in DG IV, VerLoren van Themaat, who, being close to the Dutch Socialist Party,42 was most probably recruited to counterbalance von der Groeben,

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a Christian Democrat.43 However, people might not want to admit that they obtained their posts because of their political affiliation, since this would imply that their skills were less important. Moreover, the Commission wished to preserve an image of neutrality among their senior officials. For instance, on the occasion of the appointment of Bernhard B. M. Smulders as director-general in DG IX, Rey criticised the Commission’s press communiqué announcing Smulders’ appointment for containing information on the appointee’s previous political posts: ‘The Commission specifies that no mention of a possible political affiliation should figure on any document or communication of an official nature issued by the Commission’s services.’44 Political ties were particularly important in countries such as Belgium and Italy, where sometimes even in the lower ranks of the national civil service party-membership was a necessary precondition for recruitment.45 These principles seem to have been transferred to the Commission. For instance, the Belgian de Koster was a Socialist who, in 1957, entered the cabinet of the Flemish (Socialist) Minister of Foreign Trade, Hendrik Fayat. When in May 1958 the Socialist-Liberal coalition was replaced with a Christian Democratic government, he had to give up his post. As a compensation, however, he found himself on Rey’s list for a post in the Commission.46 Motives The officials’ motives for entering the Commission were diverse, combining different elements of personal and career considerations. Finding out about motives is problematic, particularly when officials try to recall them in retrospect, with a gap of up to 45 years between now and the events. Pecuniary or personal motives such as problems in the previous workplace are most likely omitted in such recollections. Nevertheless, this section attempts to outline possible incentives that may have encouraged the officials to work for the Commission. Motives (and motivation) of staff are important as they impact on the Commission’s overall performance. According to Robert Peterson, a mixture of career and ideational motives were most beneficial for the Commission as these officials would perform best in the job.47 The main ideational reasons to work for Europe given in interviews and autobiographical writings are the experience of World War II and the aim of overcoming the Franco-German divide. However, there were other significant motives for working in the Commission, and curiosity and a sense of adventure were certainly among them. In interviews, a number of former civil servants claimed that they had been interested in working in an international context in general, and for European integration in

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particular.48 Another recurring theme in interviews is that as young people they did not care what the salary would be or whether the job was secure, as long as it was interesting.49 The answers in interviews which Peterson conducted in 1964–65 with A-officials of the Commission are strikingly similar to what officials chose to tell much later in life, namely that they were excited about their tasks in the Commission, which they considered pioneering work.50 This consistency makes interviews conducted with Commission officials in a later stage of their life more credible. For some officials the salary was certainly an incentive, or a bonus for working in the Commission, even if this is something they do not readily admit.51 Interestingly, career prospects were hardly ever mentioned in interviews as a strong motive for moving to Brussels. The reason might be that at the beginning it was not certain whether having a career would be possible, as the success and thus continuance of the institution was not guaranteed from the outset. For the officials studied here, who entered the Commission in the setting-up period, it was often a step into the unknown, with important consequences for their private and professional lives. Then again, once the Commission was established, making a career there may have been widely considered as understood. This section has shown the officials’ awareness of belonging to one generation and of sharing a life-shaping experience – World War II. Moreover, the future Commission officials had similar university degrees and comparable previous professional experience, with national civil services dominating. They were experienced individuals, but at the same time young and flexible enough to adapt. Previous international experience had certainly led to a certain openness and curiosity which could have helped them overcome conflicts resulting from their different cultural backgrounds. These are biographical factors, or internal preconditions, which made the officials predisposed towards engaging in a new task and, possibly, eventually adopting new values. Much depended on what they would find in the Commission. 4.2 Space and time: external factors in Europeanisation Trondal, a scholar of public administration, emphasises the power of institutions to transform actors’ identities and allegiances.52 The Commission officials could thus have formed a ‘socio-psychological community’, based on ‘sentiment, affect, shared values – the kind of solidarity characteristic of Church, family or nation’.53 If integration were to succeed, Hallstein thought it necessary to create such a community, based on new identities, and to redirect loyalties towards the Community.54 Which factors could have triggered or intensified such a process among European civil servants?

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Careers in the Commission The first factor is time. Long-term exposure to institutional dynamics increases the likelihood of being affected by them. Moreover, long careers of European civil servants could indicate a high degree of loyalty towards the Commission and of job satisfaction. Indeed, long careers in the Commission seem to have been the norm for the officials studied. The majority entered the Commission in 1958: 28 in DG IV (Competition) and 20 in DG VI (Agriculture). In 1959, a further 11 entered DG IV and eight DG VI.55 Officials who commenced their service in DG IV remained in the Commission, on average, for 25 years – with a range of four to 38 years. The average length of service is comparably long for officials who started their careers in DG VI: 22 years, ranging from eight and 34 years.56 The relatively young age at which the first European civil servants joined the Commission made this long service possible. The high level of stability suggests, moreover, that the officials identified with the Commission, or at least thought that their career prospects were good enough to stay (though in some cases, of course, a lack of alternatives and the comparably high income may also have been motives to remain). It was only between 1984 and 1996 that a large proportion of this ‘pioneer’ generation finally retired from the Commission.57 These officials therefore blocked upper grades in the administration well into the 1980s and early 1990s. The long service of the first Commission civil servants is striking, and the stability of personnel also accounts for the continuity in the Commission’s common agricultural and competition policies. The civil servants in DG VI were particularly committed to staying in their DG: only five left it for another DG.58 The specialisation of many of DG VI’s officials is certainly a factor in this stability, but they also seem to have identified strongly with the DG and its policy, the CAP. Of the officials who left, three moved to DG VIII (Development Aid), one moved to DG XVI (Regional Policy, created in 1967), and one, Pierre Malve, left to serve in the cabinets of Commissioner Deniau and Commission president Ortoli in the 1970s. DG VIII, of course, also had to deal with problems concerning agriculture. Hence it was probably the first port of call for DG VI officials who considered a move. Moreover, like civil servants in DG VI, DG VIII officials strongly identified with their policy area.59 It is more difficult to assess the stability of DG IV officials as this DG was reorganised in 1967, when the Directorates for Tax Harmonisation and Approximation of Laws were assigned to DG XIV (Internal Market and Approximation of Legislation). Of 22 DG IV officials, 12 moved to another DG. At least four moved to DG XIV. At the end of their careers three ended up in DG XV (Financial Institutions and Taxation), one

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moved to DG III (Industrial Affairs) and two to DG VIII. Franz Froschmaier left DG IV to work for the Commission’s information office in Washington and Manfred Caspari became deputy director-general for External Relations before returning to DG IV as director-general. DG IV’s first director-general, VerLoren van Themaat, encouraged his officials to move to other DGs to build a network of allies throughout the Commission,60 and to spread the competitive principle to other parts of the organisation. The long-term exposure of officials to institutional structures would certainly not have been sufficient to create strong loyalties if the career opportunities had not been satisfactory. Studying the career patterns of the first European civil servants shows that opportunities were quite good for those who started their careers in the late 1950s or early 1960s. As to the starting positions, in DG VI there were two officials in the cabinet as well as five A7/6, twelve A5/4, five A3, five A2 and one A1 (Table 8). By the end of their careers, apart from three A4, all of them had reached the rank of head of division (eight A3, plus one head of division with grade A4) or above (Table 9). The figures for DG IV are very similar: by the end of their careers, one official had reached A4, 13 A3, eight A2 and six A1, while two had reached the rank of conseiller principal (Tables 10 and 11). Table 8. Posts of DG VI officials on entry61 NL F B G I Lux Total

Cabinet 2

A1

A2 1

A3

1

2 1 1 2

2

1

1 1 1 5

5

A4 1 2 1 1

A5 1 2 1 2 1

A6

2 1

1

7

3

2

5

A7 1

Key: NL – Netherlands; F – France; B – Belgium; G – Germany; I – Italy; Lux – Luxembourg

Table 9. Final posts of DG VI officials62 Cabinet NL F B G I Lux Total

1

1

Conseiller principal 1

1

A1

A2

A3

A4

1 1 1 2 1

1 4 1 1 2 1 10

1 3 1 2 1

2 1

8

3

6

A5

A6

A7

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Table 10. Posts of DG IV officials on entry63 Cabinet NL F B G I Lux Total

A1 1

2 2

1

A2

A3

A5 1

4 1 2

A4 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 3

7

4

5

A6 1 1

2 2

A7

2 1

1 1 1

5

3

Table 11. Final posts of DG IV officials64 Cabinet NL F B G I Lux Total

Conseiller principal

A1

A2

1 1 1 4

3 1 3 1

6

8

1 2

A3 3 3 3 4 13

A4

A5

A6

A7

1

1

Although in interviews many officials emphasised the extent of the job satisfaction they experienced when working in the Commission, careers in the European administration were and are subject to particular practices which differ from those in national administrations. As pointed out in the previous chapter, not every official had the opportunity of reaching a post of head of division or above. Multiple factors influenced career decisions in the Commission. Many A4 officials were aware of the fact that, because of their nationality and because of the political importance of the posts above A4, they could not become head of division. Peterson quotes an A4 official who said that he would stay in the Commission despite his blocked career, because of job satisfaction and ‘believe it or not, a commitment to working for a united Europe’.65 It is often emphasised that service in a cabinet was a career booster.66 However, in DG VI (apart from van der Lee, who moved to another DG in mid-1958), Mansholt’s cabinet staff remained stable – there was no ‘jumping ship’ to other senior positions in the Commission’s administration. The situation is different for DG IV. No less than three future directors-general for Competition – Albrecht, Schlieder and Caspari – served in the cabinet of von der Groeben and in that of Haferkamp, who succeeded him as German Commissioner. In addition, Froschmaier became director-general for Information, Communication and Culture, after serving in the cabinets of both these two Commissioners. Service in a cabinet usually improved the position of an official by one or two steps in the hierarchy. However, furthering a career with help from a cabinet was

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not popular. According to Peterson, ‘when administrators refer to their own contacts with cabinets, they are often apologetic or deny that these contacts involved attempts to obtain promotion. In general there is a norm of non-recourse to the cabinets.’67 It was also possible to get from A7 to the top of the hierarchy without having served in a cabinet, as the example of Eduard Brackeniers shows – his final post was as directorgeneral for Translation. As so many officials chose to spend the rest of their careers in the Commission, post-Commission occupations are not the norm. However, many officials retired rather early, around the age of 60; such early retirement was often voluntary, as the workload with which leading officials had to cope throughout their careers sometimes led to exhaustion. Also, the Commission’s recruitment practice and the stability of the first intake of staff had led to an uneven distribution of age and a blockage of careers. Early retirement was therefore desirable to create vacancies for officials from new member states, following enlargement, and for promotion candidates. For such reasons staff regulations were altered to facilitate retirement at 60.68 As to post-Commission careers, some officials chose to withdraw gradually from Community affairs, becoming special advisers to the Commission69 or to a Commissioner;70 their knowledge and experience could thus continue to be drawn upon. Others entered politics. Van der Lee became mayor of Dordrecht and Eindhoven and held a seat in the Dutch Raad van State, (the Council of State), between 1979 and 1988. Albrecht was Minister President of the German Land Lower Saxony from 1976 to 1990, while Froschmaier became Minister of Economics and Finance in the Land SchleswigHolstein. Some moved into academia: three officials taught at the College of Europe in Bruges or the Université Libre de Bruxelles, while Noël became president of the European University Institute in Florence and VerLoren van Themaat a professor of International Law at Utrecht University. Another official, Aurelio Pappalardo, set up a law firm in Brussels. Generally speaking, however, a transfer to private business was less frequent. Living and working in Brussels Bruxelles, l’Européenne is the title of a book edited by the Belgian historian Dumoulin.71 It is very likely that Brussels and its specific urban and social environment had an impact on the officials. As well-paid expatriates, they were sometimes detached from the reality in their home countries, and also from the Belgian population of Brussels. Albrecht recalled that leaving Brussels was not an easy step for his family, as they also left behind the community of officials of six different countries. He described

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his return to Lower Saxony and to politics as a Rückkehr ins Volk, or return to the people,72 as opposed to the privileged and somewhat aloof existence of a European civil servant. The officials underwent supranational socialisation when working at the Commission, and while socialising with people from different national and cultural backgrounds, for example in clubs, churches and schools. A particular European culture developed in Brussels, and the officials were part of it. As shown above, most people attracted by a career in Brussels were fairly young and flexible. They were either married but with a young family, or single, which made relocation easier. When coming to Brussels in the late 1950s, many officials and their spouses perceived the Belgian capital as a provincial town, particularly when they came from cities such as Paris or Berlin. For the male officials’ wives in particular – most of whom, as was customary in the 1950s and 1960s, had no occupation outside the house – life in Brussels was a harsh contrast to what they were used to and they felt isolated, not least because of the language barrier.73 In the early years, the provinciality of Brussels was overcome by an active social life. One cocktail reception followed the other.74 Those who were single and came to Brussels in their early and mid-twenties came to savour this new-found freedom.75 This probably reflects more the experience of officials not in a leading position in the administration at the beginning, as those at the top of the hierarchy usually emphasised that they did not have much of a social life while working for the Commission.76 Nevertheless, at the beginning, the Commission was, like the High Authority, a small organisation where people got to know each other well. Muller remembered that he and others had a ‘great thirst for and an immense pleasure in getting to know’ people with different backgrounds.77 Some Commissioners invited senior officials to their homes,78 and on occasion a close relationship developed between them. Sports teams and other groups, clubs and charitable associations were founded which ‘proved to be a real melting pot in which the European identity of the Communities’ staff was forged’.79 However, this rosy picture of intercultural understanding has to be put into perspective – some officials recount that people of different nationalities rarely mixed in their private lives.80 One official qualified his life in Brussels as ‘predominantly marital’,81 and such a withdrawal into the family could also be observed among High Authority officials. Yet one of the avenues for socialising with other civil servants, including those of different nationalities, were the children. The European schools had and still have a great symbolic value for the social integration and Europeanisation of European civil servants and their families. Aimed at providing a European education for the next generation, they brought children and families of different national and

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cultural background together. In order to cater for the educational needs of the officials’ children, in mid-1958 the European institutions in Brussels decided to create a European school, which opened its doors in September 1958.82 Marcel Decombis, co-founder of the European school in Luxembourg, was convinced of the effect these schools had in Europeanisation – a European spirit would essentially develop through education.83 While generally praising the benefits of the European school, not all parents sent their children there. It was an all-day school and some, especially German parents, were not used to this concept and thought it was hard on their children.84 Some preferred national schools in Brussels, such as the German school or the Lycée français, so as to facilitate the reintegration of their children in the school and university system of their country of origin.85 Another option was to send the children to a Belgian school, a decision which showed these officials’ willingness to integrate in Belgian society. For the Dutch officials in particular, the Flemish-speaking schools were an attractive alternative. As in Luxembourg, the relationship between the natives of Brussels and the ‘Eurocrats’ was not without strain. The new inhabitants of the Belgian capital were met with indifference and sometimes even hostility. Their high salaries and perceived advantages, such as tax-free shopping and cheap petrol, caused envy among the locals, according to officials interviewed. Many mentioned that they had problems integrating in the Brussels society, or did not make an effort. A contemporary newspaper article confirms that the officials mainly lived ‘on the margins’ of society in Brussels.86 The prejudices seem to have been reciprocal – Belgian society was seen as conservative and closed. One official explained, moreover, that in ‘the European milieu with all these different nationalities, with activities that were open towards European and global problems, there was already such a diversity between us that there was little need to find contacts among the locals’.87 For others, however, the motto was to ‘go native’. One official organised Commission teams that participated in public events such as marathons. This was considered good publicity for the Eurocrats and an opportunity to get to know the local population.88 Another means of integrating in Belgian society were the parish churches. For many French officials and Commissioners, Paris remained the place in which to spend weekends and holidays,89 which may explain why they did not make more effort to integrate in Belgian society. The evening train between Brussels and Paris, the ‘Transeuropean Express’, has become legendary. It provided not only a speedy means of transport between the French and the European capital, but it was also important as an informal place to meet, where matters could be discussed in private

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amongst officials, Commissioners, representatives of interest groups and business, and journalists.90 While the fact that the Commission was a multinational and multilingual administration caused many difficulties, it was at the same time an opportunity to build trust and solidarity. In interviews, officials account for the fact that they assisted each other in coping with working in a foreign language by translating and explaining for each other.91 From today’s perspective, however, these are part of the myth of the Commission’s pioneer generation, and all statements about how smoothly everything worked have to be handled with a measure of scepticism. Another factor in this respect are the long working hours: most officials, when interviewed, stated that they voluntarily renounced spare time and regular working hours because they were so engaged with, and so enthusiastic about, their work.92 Though this may well be the case, these long working hours were also a source of concern, as they had repercussions on the officials’ health and family life. In 1962, the Commission’s medical examiner diagnosed a large number of cases where overwork had led to psychological strain, and in some cases to a breakdown.93 Many Commission officials were simply overworked, and this made it difficult for them to settle and integrate in Brussels, notwithstanding the satisfaction they found in their job. Socialisation mechanisms in the Commission In addition to the time factor, job satisfaction and the particular environment that came with living and working in Brussels, there were other socialisation factors which this section explores: expert culture; shared generational experiences, already alluded to in the previous section; role models; and working methods. In the Commission, what could be called an ‘expert culture’ developed. This led to an identification of officials with the institution, combined with a strong identification with Commission policies. In 1965 Albrecht judged the Commission’s expertise to be one of the main assets through which it could gain credibility and recognition as a Community actor.94 Moreover, the expert culture enabled the officials to overcome prejudices, and certainly helped to bridge cultural and linguistic divides which could have led to misunderstandings and conflicts. It seems that difficulties were mainly overcome through collaboration and through the sense of working for a cause adopted as common and worth pursuing. In a 1967 article, Helmut von Verschuer attempts to explain the dynamics, difficulties and challenges of multinational cooperation.95 He is one of the few who seem to have reflected on these problems while still active officials in the Commission. The views expressed in his article differ somewhat from the

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ideal of multinational solidarity and cooperation that comes across in some of the interviews with long-retired officials. Verschuer concluded that the strongest link between people of a different kind would develop through a common mission. As a DG VI official, the CAP was for him the ideal example of a task behind which people of different national and cultural backgrounds could rally.96 Decades later, DG VI officials such as Barthélémy spoke of the strong will to collaborate with each other and to achieve goals together: ‘Because there really was this will, this will to succeed, to achieve results . . . There was this strong sense of being able to construct something together, of having to accomplish a common creation.’97 Other officials also emphasised this enthusiasm for shaping a policy or, rather, creating European policies.98 Beyond the expert culture, the fact that the first European civil servants belonged to a generation with shared experiences, such as World War II, has to be considered as a strong factor in socialisation. Shortly before his retirement in 1988, French official Gérard Imbert looked back at what brought the Commission officials together, apart from the expert culture: It needs to be said that we were all of a similar age in 1958/59 and that we had lived through nationalist experiences . . . because we were children of the war. It was thus immensely hopeful for us to find ourselves together [in the Commission]. The European spirit emerged thanks to the high degree of trust and the relations that have developed among us and which have greatly facilitated finding solutions for certain problems within the Commission’s administration.99 According to Imbert, this esprit de corps of the early generation has gradually disappeared with every enlargement of the Community.100 Officials would cling to these early memories, this ‘unique moment in time’,101 in the less ‘golden’ 1970s and 1980s. According to Albrecht, he and his colleagues in the Commission in the late 1950s and early 1960s believed that they were writing history, and for him this explains why nobody complained about the long working hours.102 The feeling of being able to change the course of history – even if it was in small steps, and even if it took years for a policy to be finally adopted and implemented – is important. Although not everybody was as conscious as Albrecht of their ‘contribution to history’, many felt that they were participating in something new and important. Moreover, as shown above, the officials were conscious of the past and the war experiences they shared with their colleagues.

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The time factor, good career prospects, living and working in Brussels, commitment to an expert culture and shared generational experience were necessarily complemented by another socialisation factor: there had to be someone to animate and motivate the officials. European role models, therefore, count as a sixth factor of socialisation. While officials refer to Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer, Philip and Brugmans as what could be called ‘archetypal’ role models,103 there were also, and perhaps more importantly, role models within the Commission. The close collaboration between Commissioners and the civil servants of their DG, especially during the first years, facilitated the formation of loyalties. For instance, Mansholt was perceived as being approachable, enthusiastic and assertive, and this seems to have made a deep impression on his DG VI officials.104 Moreover, leading figures such as the directors-general of DG VI and IV, Rabot and VerLoren van Themaat, also served as role models.105 Noël, the éminence grise of the Commission, as he is sometimes referred to, apparently became a legend while still working in the Commission. As he recalled in an interview, Lahnstein, who entered the administration in the mid-1960s, already then thought of Noël as the Ur-Europäer, or prototype European.106 The reasons why a person was considered a role model are diverse; they could include a European conviction, but also outstanding expert knowledge and hard work, as was the case for Heringa, deputy director-general in DG VI.107 The presence of role models motivated officials, triggered social learning and facilitated socialisation. The working methods introduced by the Commissioners in DG VI and DG IV seem to have encouraged discussion and inspired creative policy solutions, which count as another socialisation factor. Mansholt’s so-called ‘round table’, for instance, has become legendary (it is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5).108 The CAP was largely developed within this intimate circle of DG VI collaborators. Such an environment gave even lowerranking officials the feeling that they were participating in creating and shaping the CAP. Taking part in decision-making, or at least being under the impression that one was doing so, was important for creating solidarity with the policy and the institution. Von der Groeben established similar working methods in his DG IV, also creating an atmosphere of openmindedness and free discussion.109 Senior officials mention the great freedom of manoeuvre they had, especially at the beginning, where even A5 or A6 officials could take on a great deal of responsibility.110 In Coombes’ study, Commission civil servants rated highly being able to use their initiative in the decision-making process, and some gave the prospect of this as a reason for having joined the Commission in the first place. ‘The chief motivation of these officials was far more a desire to participate in a new and interesting undertaking, and to be given the opportunity to

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take some initiative in the policy-making process.’111 This sense of camaraderie and common purpose contributed to forming the esprit de corps of the early European civil servants. Long service and job satisfaction, particular living and working conditions in Brussels, expert culture, a shared generational experience, the presence of role models and participatory working methods contributed to a strong identification with the Commission and with European integration, and were socialisation factors that have facilitated Europeanisation. What negative factors, however, could have obstructed Europeanisation? The uncertain career prospects in the Commission’s administration, mentioned already, have to be counted among the obstacles. Often posts above A4 were ‘reserved’ for members of a certain nationality. Also, advancing one’s career required great flexibility and the willingness to move to another division or DG, which for highly specialised officials could be difficult. The reluctance of the other Community institutions, such as the Council, to commit to European integration and to support Community policy-solutions were certainly factors liable to cause frustration. It was uncertain if a proposal, often developed through much hard work and lengthy negotiations, would finally be adopted and implemented; and when it was, it could take years and sometimes decades to get a proposal through the Council – patience was clearly a necessary attribute for a European official. Another factor which may have obstructed Europeanisation was the change of climate in the 1970s and early 1980s, to which officials referred in interviews. An article in Le Monde of 1979 criticised the loss of role models, the lack of independence of the Commission and the lack of Community spirit. ‘[N]umerous officials deplore the present weakness of the Commission and they regret the loss of the energy and the independence of Commissioners such as the Dutchman Sicco Mansholt, the father of the common agricultural policy.’112 In 1984, Imbert gave a talk about the difficulties of bringing about the free movement of services: after the Commission had already put forward in 1976 what in his eyes was a good proposal for a flexible directive, eight years later the negotiations had come to a standstill. For Imbert, the main reason for the failure of the negotiations was that: [T]he attitude at the level of the experts [in national administrations] has changed . . . Because at the moment, I regret having to say this, . . . instead of coming with an open mind, they tend to consider their own legislation as a kind of bible, and they try to impose their bible on the other member states.113

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Also, working methods where even an A7 official would get to see, and be heard by, a Commissioner could not be sustained forever. At the beginning, the size of the administration was limited and personal relationships among the civil servants could develop more easily. As the administration grew, however, the feeling of belonging to a kind of ‘family’ diminished. A strong pre-socialisation in another institution could make Europeanisation difficult, if not impossible. Temporary Commission officials in particular could resist the Community socialisation mechanisms. Coombes identifies a specific type of official who did not integrate in the ‘common culture’, the French ‘ENA graduate’ type. According to Coombes, such people existed in the civil services of all the member countries; while they had great technical skills and competence, they ‘lacked the sense of adventure and shared undertaking, which so many officials enjoyed even in senior positions’.114 The next section presents six types of officials, the ‘ENA-type’ among them. 4.3 Biographies of Commission officials This section proposes a classification of officials into sociological types, a concept used in qualitative biographical sociology and which refers to the variants, or types, occurring in a certain sphere of activity or society. Contrasting these types with each other allows the construction of a typology.115 It is not easy, however, to classify people with different talents, complex thoughts, ideas and behavioural patterns. Yet, the previous sections have revealed some key similarities between officials – in their backgrounds, personal and professional experiences and motives for working in the Commission. Establishing sociological categories for Commission officials could help to throw further light on the nature and outlook of the Commission’s staff. The categories are derived from the findings presented in the previous two sections: events in officials’ biographies, and the lessons they have drawn from them; early career patterns and previous socialisation; motives for working in the Commission; ambitions for their careers; and, last but not least, their stance on European integration and the Commission’s role in this. Not every Commission civil servant, of course fits neatly into one of the categories outlined below; most combine elements of two or more categories. However, this section will primarily discuss examples of those who come close to the typical Commission official. Six categories emerge from the analysis of the officials’ biographies; these can be arranged into opposing pairs. The first pair consists of the ‘expert’ and the ‘political’ official, who though distinctive, are in some respects also complementary – both have the aim of furthering European

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integration. They differ, however, with respect to the means they employ to realise this goal. The first focuses on defending the rights of the institution as defined in treaties and Community legislation, and could be counted among those advocating the neo-functionalist ‘spill-over’ theory. The political official campaigns to extend the power of the institution, and takes part – openly or covertly – in the political struggle between memberstate governments and the Commission. While political-party membership is not necessarily a criterion for political officials, they have often spent a period in a Commissioner’s cabinet and held a political post during their careers. Examples of political officials are Albrecht, Froschmaier, Klaus Meyer, Lahnstein, Narjes and Henri Etienne. Among the experts are VerLoren van Themaat, Ivo Schwartz, Heringa and Barthélémy. The second pair is made up of what might be termed a ‘novice’ and a ‘veteran’. The first has gone straight from university into the Commisssion, where all his socialisation – at least with respect to his professional career – has taken place. Brackeniers, Muller, Pappalardo and Kurt Ritter are examples of this type of official. The veterans are represented by someone like Krohn, an officer during World War II and a civil servant in the German agricultural ministry, who entered the Commission at the age of 45, or Mozer. Veterans are characterised by their strong motive for working for the Commission, a consequence of their personal experience in World War II. Finally, the third pairing might be called ‘realistic idealist’ and ‘pragmatist’. Those in the first group are fully committed to European integration, sharing with the federalists the goal of a united European state. In addition, they have developed particularly strong loyalties to the Commission. For the pragmatists, on the other hand, working in the Commission is no more than an interlude in their career. While generally pro-European, they have not developed strong ties with the European administration. There are French examples in both groups: Noël and Rencki rank among the idealists, while in particular French so-called high flyers such as Deniau, Ortoli and Alain Prate fall into the pragmatist category. In the following, one exemplary biography for each of the categories will be presented: the political official (Albrecht), the expert (VerLoren van Themaat), the novice (Brackeniers), the veteran (Krohn), the realistic idealist (Noël) and the pragmatist (Deniau). Ernst Albrecht represents the political official with a mission. For him, a federal state was the ultimate goal for Europe, a state in which the regions were to play an important role under a European umbrella but one in which the nation states would continue to exist. Accordingly, he organised his memoirs into three sections: Europe, Lower Saxony and Germany.116 While Germany comes last in this list, it takes up the most

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space in the autobiography; he argues that German federalism should be a model for the organisation of Europe. Albrecht was very attached to his region, Lower Saxony, which he strove to turn into an ‘autonomous, selfconfident component in the multi-level structure of a united Europe’.117 Born in Heidelberg in 1930, Albrecht grew up in Bremen, a ‘Free’ city in northern Germany. As a teenager during the war, Albrecht was trained as a medical assistant, and deployed to give first aid after bombing raids; this experience, he said, had a profound effect on him as he was directly confronted by, and had to cope with, the horrors of war. It caused Albrecht to adopt a ‘never again’ attitude.118 After the war, he became interested in philosophy and theology – his way of coping with the disorientation resulting from the lost war and the Nazi regime.119 He studied theology, philosophy and political economy at the universities of Tübingen, Cornell, Basel and Bonn. In Basel he was taught by the philosopher Karl Jaspers and the Swiss theologian Karl Barth, one of the founders of the Bekennende Kirche, or Confessing Church, a Protestant confessional resistance movement.120 During his stay in the USA (1949–50), Albrecht recalled, he was frequently asked to explain the situation in Europe rather than just in Germany. He thus came to see himself as a kind of ambassador for both Europe and his country. Albrecht qualified this experience as a turning point, at which he decided that he wanted to work for European unity and for the West German Federal Republic which had just been founded.121 In order to be able to join the civil service and work for what he saw as the common good, Albrecht abandoned philosophy to study political economy. This change of direction also appears to be a result of his reflection that the economic crisis of the Weimar Republic had caused its downfall, and that a similar outcome had to be avoided for the young Federal Republic.122 Albrecht considered the Schuman declaration of May 1950 as an important event that confirmed his desire to work for European integration.123 In 1954, Albrecht was appointed to the ECSC Council secretariat in Luxembourg. Two years later, he became the secretary in the negotiations between Adenauer and Mollet over the restitution of the Saar to Germany. This is where Albrecht met Adenauer, whom he admired and whose policy of anchoring the Federal Republic of Germany in the West he supported. For Albrecht, the well-being of Germany was inextricably linked to a strong and prosperous Western Europe.124 At the Val Duchesse negotiations Albrecht became the secretary of the Internal Market Committee; von der Groeben, who presided over this committee, then recruited him as his chef de cabinet in the Commission, and when von der Groeben took over DG Regional Policy in 1967, Albrecht succeeded VerLoren van Themaat as director-general of

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DG IV. However, having reached the top of the administrative hierarchy at the age of only 37, Albrecht left the Commission in 1970. He sought to enter politics in his native Lower Saxony, and was elected to the regional parliament for the Christian Democrats, and in 1976 was elected Minister President. As von der Groeben’s confidant, Albrecht also played an important role in the Commission generally. He was engaged in defining and enhancing the political role of the Commission in the Community, and was among Hallstein’s close advisers. Importantly, he was one of the authors of the proposals which Hallstein presented to the European Parliament in March 1965, and which triggered the ‘empty chair’ crisis,125 in which France temporarily withdrew its permanent representative from Brussels and did not participate in decision-making in the Council, thus paralysing the Community. In this episode Albrecht’s role as a political official was most pronounced. For him, the Commission was an impartial institution working for the common welfare, and presenting balanced solutions that were in the interests of all member states. Even during the empty chair crisis Albrecht remained optimistic, and expected the role of the Commission to expand to other policy areas in a kind of spill-over movement. In January 1966 he wrote: In the long run, new targets will come up for which we do not yet have . . . the responsibility, for example improvement in living conditions [of European citizens]. To the extent to which the expressly-formulated aim of the EEC treaty (common market) is realised, it will lose importance vis-à-vis these complementary aims. Then the problem of overall political direction will have to be addressed in Brussels.126 The fact that Albrecht envisaged aims that went beyond those fixed in the EEC treaty distinguishes him from the expert official described below. Today, Albrecht is worried about Europe’s future which, according to him, is still not a united, democratic and social Europe, capable of defending human rights and peace in the world.127 He fears that a change of attitude of the younger generation, who take peace and freedom for granted, could jeopardise the integration process that he and his colleagues, under the impact of their wartime experience, had worked for. Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, born on 16 March 1916 in Rotterdam, was a Dutch lawyer specialising in cartel law. As an expert, he played a crucial role in defining and fleshing out the EEC’s competition policy, an area where the Commission ended up with considerable autonomy and power vis-à-vis business enterprises and member states. It

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was thus less through direct political intervention that VerLoren van Themaat sought to further integration than through expertise and Community law. Graduating from school in 1934, and thus in the middle of an economic crisis, VerLoren van Themaat decided to study law, a subject which he thought would guarantee employment.128 After graduating from Leiden University in 1939, he studied (with Professor Telders) for a doctorate in international tax law.129 During the German occupation of the Netherlands, Telders acted against the occupiers by informing the Dutch administration about its right to resist orders under the terms of the 1907 Hague Convention. In December 1940, Telders was imprisoned and died in the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp; VerLoren van Themaat saw him as his role model, in both moral courage and legal expertise.130 In 1946 he obtained his doctorate and entered the ministry for economic affairs where he became responsible for cartel policy and price control.131 VerLoren van Themaat was instrumental in designing important economic legislation for the Netherlands, and served as an adviser to the Dutch delegation during the negotiations leading to the ECSC and EEC treaties.132 In 1957 he became head of the working group on cartels in the negotiations for a European Free Trade Area, which eventually failed at the end of 1958.133 VerLoren van Themaat entered the Commission in April 1958 as director-general of DG IV. As a lawyer, he saw the EEC treaty as the basis of Community law, and its principles had to be defended. He therefore had little understanding of how political considerations or necessities could influence decision-making, as an article in the German weekly Der Spiegel, in December 1959, demonstrates. When the French government introduced tax concessions in favour of certain products, such as machinery, to compensate for the ten per cent tariff reduction in the common market, it violated Article 92 of the EEC treaty (on state aids), the application of which was the responsibility of DG IV. VerLoren van Themaat wrote to the French government protesting at its protectionist measure, and asking for it to be rescinded. The letter was kept secret within the Commission as Hallstein wanted to avoid showing France up as breaching the treaty, but it was leaked to the press. When the French government failed to act, VerLoren van Themaat considered proposing legal action in the Court of Justice. However, von der Groeben, Hallstein and the German government all sought to avoid this. VerLoren van Themaat, according to Der Spiegel, then wrote to von der Groeben that the German government seems ‘anxious to limit the Commission’s means of intervention if these would seemingly entail curtailing member states’ national sovereignty’.134

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VerLoren van Themaat left the Commission in 1967 to become a professor of Dutch, European and International Social and Economic Law at Utrecht University. Between 1981 and 1985 he was Advocate General at the ECJ, a post created following the accession of Greece to the EC. According to VerLoren van Themaat, the Council of Ministers had discussed whether the appointment of a fifth Advocate General, who should be from a small member state, would disrupt the balance between small and large member states at the Court – a concern for which VerLoren van Themaat lacked sympathy: ‘As if for a Court the national background and the political orientation [of a Court member] would play a role.’135 During his career, VerLoren van Themaat had served in two European institutions, and taught European law. Moreover, he was part of a transnational network of lawyers and European law experts which developed as a consequence of European integration. For instance, he was instrumental in setting up the London-Leiden meetings, a forum for discussing and developing the law of the Communities and from which the Common Market Law Review emerged.136 From 1970 onwards, VerLoren van Themaat co-edited a commentary on European Community law.137 In 1974 he became a member of the Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen. In an article in 1995, he reflected on the future of the European Union after Maastricht. As to the role of the Commission, he thought that it should remain as small as possible to guarantee its independence and enable it to develop objective and high-quality policy solutions, controlled by the European Parliament and the Court.138 Schwartz, VerLoren van Themaat’s collaborator in DG IV, can also be counted among the experts. For Schwartz, the Commission as a nonelected body had to gain legitimacy and reputation through expertise.139 Schwartz and VerLoren van Themaat, the law experts, aimed at contributing to this. They were what could be called institutionalists, rather than neofunctionalists, praising the independent ‘expert Commission’ and a Community based on law. The Belgian Eduard Brackeniers entered the Commission as a young graduate at the lowest level (A7), ending his career as director-general (A1). A novice in the world of employment, he thrived in the Commission’s career system, always keeping his eyes open for opportunities and often being ‘in the right place at the right time’.140 His loyalty belonged to the Commission as a whole, not to one DG. Brackeniers thought of himself as a generalist, a type of official who knew how to change and develop. Born in December 1931 in Antwerp, Brackeniers received a bilingual education. After attending the Flemish Jesuit College of Notre Dame in

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Antwerp, he studied at the Francophone University of Namur for two years. He then graduated from the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Flanders with a (Flemish-medium) doctorate in law to add to his (Frenchmedium) degree in economics. Before entering the Commission Brackeniers worked briefly at the Institut catholique des hautes études commerciales in Brussels. His recruitment to the Commission was informal, typical of early recruitment practice in the Commission, and typical of a small country such as Belgium. When Baron Jean-Charles Snoy et d’Oppuers from the economics ministry, the former head of the Belgian delegation at the Val Duchesse negotiations, was looking for young graduates for the Commission, he asked for suitable candidates from the universities of Leuven and Brussels. Brackeniers’ professor at Leuven suggested him; in an interview Brackeniers emphasised that he was already interested in Europe and had discussed questions of European integration with his professor. Entering the Commission in early 1959, Brackeniers started by working for DG IV. However, he did not become particularly passionate about competition policy, being less interested in theory and in the meticulous interpretation of case law and treaty articles than in organising and communicating. Unlike many of his colleagues, therefore, he was not very attached to DG IV. He admired VerLoren van Themaat and von der Groeben, but also mentioned later that the former encouraged people to leave DG IV in order to have allies in other DGs – a practice Brackeniers continued. As career opportunities in DG IV were not good for Belgians, he concluded that to advance in his career he needed to move on and apply for posts in other DGs. In 1973, he became assistant to Fernand Braun, director-general in DG III. Under president Jacques Delors (1985–94), Brackeniers was promoted to director for Human Resources, and finally became the first director-general for Informatics and then for Translation. While he did reach the top of the Commission’s administrative hierarchy, he was never in charge of one of the politically important DGs, such as Internal Market, Agriculture or Competition. For a career entirely within the Commission, without service in a cabinet, it seems that this was as far as one could go. When Brackeniers retired in 1996 he had spent more than 37 years in the Commission. Working in an international context was a new experience for Brackeniers when he first entered the Commission. To him, at first, the Germans seemed the most ‘foreign’ among the foreigners in the Commission. With Belgium occupied twice by German troops and his family suffering bombing raids and food shortages during the war years, he had reservations about his German colleagues. According to him, however, they discussed these problems in the Commission, sharing their

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personal experiences, and this led to mutual understanding. For Brackeniers ‘building Europe’ to maintain peace was therefore an important motive to work for the Commission. Another novice, KlausOtto Nass, admitted that he had not been interested in European integration when entering the Commission, as a young graduate with only one year of professional experience in the German economics ministry. However, Nass underlined the great socialisation pressure – in a positive sense – in the Commission. According to him, one would get ‘infected’ with this contagious European spirit at the Commission.141 Hans-Broder Krohn was born in 1915 in Bredstedt, Northern Frisia, Germany.142 Unlike the novice Brackeniers, Krohn entered the Commission following a career as soldier and civil servant. A veteran such as Krohn brings in a wider range of personal experiences, and it was mainly these experiences which incited him to make a radical career change and to work for European integration. Krohn graduated from school in 1934, after which there is for a time a gap in his personal history. An orphan, Krohn was raised by his grandparents, and it is likely that he worked for his grandfather for a while (the latter was a veterinary surgeon and a merchant). Krohn joined the Wehrmacht in 1939, and rose to the position of staff officer.143 After the war, until 1946, Krohn was held by the British army as a prisoner of war, and then, as a consequence of his role as a former staff officer, he was not allowed to enrol immediately at any German university. As he intended to study agriculture, Krohn worked as a farm labourer for four years, between 1946 and 1950. At the age of 35 he began studying at the University of Göttingen, graduating in 1954. He then became assistant to Professor Arthur Hanau, one of the founders of the landwirtschaftliche Marktlehre (agricultural market theory), according to which agriculture was a sector of the economy like any other, and should not receive subsidies or special treatment. Krohn accompanied Hanau to the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in Rome, and became interested in world agricultural affairs, publishing a comparative analysis of international agricultural markets in 1957.144 In 1956–57 he entered the German ministry of agriculture to become head of section at the OEEC, where he was responsible for agricultural analyses and statistics. In 1957, Krohn became the personal aide of agricultural minister Heinrich Lübke, and accompanied him to the Stresa conference in June 1958. When Lübke, who supported the integration of the Six, became President of the Federal Republic in 1959, Krohn entered the Commission. He explained that he chose to make this move because of his personal experience in World War II,145 and because European integration had been a taboo subject in the agricultural ministry

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– he had not been very popular among his colleagues there, being openminded about European integration and, faithful to the theories of his academic teacher Hanau, opposed agricultural protectionism. Krohn vividly recalls that when leaving the ministry in Bonn, state secretary Theodor Sonnemann called him a Volksverräter, a traitor to his country. However, there was another factor that could have helped Krohn to decide on leaving the ministry and the German civil service. He had not been a typical German Beamter, and had not followed the normal civilservant career path. Lübke wanted Krohn to become a civil servant and, given his professional experience, to enter the ministry at a senior level. However, this would have been an exception in the German civil service at that time, and the staff council of the federal government only offered Krohn a position as Oberregierungsrat, merely one rank above the entry level for graduates, and thus very low for a person of Krohn’s age and experience.146 He rejected the offer, but continued working in the ministry as Lübke’s personal aide; it is doubtful whether he would have had a future in the ministry after Lübke left. This episode can also explain Krohn’s negative judgement of the closeness and small-mindedness of the German civil service, and his unconditional praise for the Commission’s administration and – as he perceived it – its flexibility.147 Krohn entered the Commission as head of division in DG VI. He had a successful career, being promoted to director for Economy and Agrarian Law in 1963 and deputy director-general subsequently. He belonged to the inner circle of DG VI, and frequently participated in Mansholt’s table ronde. However, when it became evident that the Commission was unable to push through its ideas on the member states and farmers’ lobbies, and that the EEC would therefore end up with a protectionist agricultural policy, Krohn left DG VI. ‘The CAP was only for the farmers and this is the development I opposed,’ he said in retrospect.148 In spite of the weaknesses of the CAP, Krohn admired Mansholt and the fact that he had established the CAP on the basis of a set of vague treaty articles. In a 1970 text Krohn identified the CAP as the motor of the integration process in the 1960s.149 He criticised the increasing technicality of the policy, however, which in his view prevented political progress.150 The lessons he had drawn from his personal experience in World War II and in the German agricultural ministry had raised high expectations in him as to how the Commission should work to create a united Europe, starting with a common agricultural policy. Disappointed, he left DG VI and became director-general for Development Aid in 1970, where he negotiated the Lomé treaty of 1975. The example of Krohn shows that perceptions can guide action.151 He felt mistreated in the German agricultural ministry, and found a new home

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in the Commission. For him, this experience resulted in the fervent adoption of supranationalism. Allegedly, Krohn was one of the authors of the Hallstein proposals of March 1965.152 He strongly identified with the Commission (to which he referred retrospectively as ‘we’). After working for Hanau and Lübke, both of whom he admired, Krohn had found a new role model in Mansholt. In an interview, he emphasised the positive experience of collaborating with people from six different countries who, according to him, all shared the same thought: ‘We want to make Europe’. In his opinion only people who became independent of ‘their’ government deserved admiration.153 Krohn compared himself to Hallstein, whom he thought had suffered a similar fate: ‘The people in Bonn wanted to get rid of him and sent him to Brussels.’154 Krohn retired from the Commission in 1978, and taught at the College of Europe in Bruges until 1992. A prominent example of a realistic idealist is Émile Noël, perhaps the Commission’s best known, and in many ways its ‘model’ official.155 For nearly three decades Noël was the conscience and memory of the Commission. Extremely hard-working, he was committed to the European cause and to the Commission which to him embodied it. Noël was born on 17 November 1922 in Istanbul (then called Constantinople), and grew up in southern France. A graduate of the French elite education system, he held a degree from the École nationale supérieure in mathematics and physics.156 During World War II Noël was active in the French Resistance,157 and two causes emanated from this experience, which he pursued after the war: Europe and youth. Noël became secretary-general of the youth movement Camerades de la Liberté, which developed out of the Resistance.158 Invited by Georges Rebattet, a former Resistance leader and deputy secretary-general of the European Movement, Noël became involved in the latter in early 1949. Like Rencki, another realistic idealist, it was thus out of the Resistance that Noël became interested and involved in European integration. He started working for the Council of Europe at the end of 1949, and became secretary of its General Affairs Committee.159 Greatly in favour of European political integration, however, he was disappointed by the limits of the Council of Europe.160 During this period he came into contact with European federalists like Alexandre Marc and Brugmans who, according to the historian Cathérine Previti Allaire, had a profound effect on him,161 as had the integration initiatives of the early 1950s. He was closely involved at this time in the development of the EPC. From 1952 to 1954 Noël was seconded to the ad hoc Assembly of the ECSC, which was in charge of developing the EPC. Temporarily unable to attend the meetings, Noël wrote to the Belgian federalist Fernand Dehousse: ‘Brand [a colleague] keeps me informed about the war machines you set up against

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the national fortresses. I hope to be back in time to witness them collapsing.’162 A socialist himself, Noël met the French socialist politician Mollet in the International Secretariat of the European Movement in 1949. In 1954, when Mollet was President of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, he recruited Noël as his chef de cabinet. Noël was also a technical adviser to the secretariat of the Common Assembly of the ECSC in 1955, and became the First Secretary in the Council of Europe in 1956. In early 1956 Mollet, by then Prime Minister, called him back to Paris and made him first his chef de cabinet and then deputy director of his private office. In this capacity, Noël supervised and co-ordinated the French delegation to the Common Market and Euratom negotiations in the Val Duchesse. Noël’s early years of European commitment were in at least two ways a preparation for his later role in the Commission. First, he was able to build a network of important individuals involved in European integration. Secondly, his tasks were similar to those he would later assume in the Commission, namely co-ordinating and advising – in short, pulling the strings in the background. For example, during the Val Duchesse negotiations he acted as intermediary between the French delegation, the French government and the Avenue Foch headquarters of Monnet’s Action Committee.163 Noël knew Monnet well, and was in close contact with the Action Committee throughout his career. In the months before he was appointed executive secretary, Noël’s diary entries show that he met with Monnet several times, most likely discussing the possibility of him entering the Commission. Later, in the early 1960s, Kohnstamm visited Noël regularly in Brussels.164 Even though it was Marjolin who proposed him as executive secretary, Noël was already a well-known figure in Europe and had close contacts with Monnet and other key personalities. Noël combined experience in European integration and administration with intimate knowledge of the French administrative and political scene. As executive secretary he could utilise this knowledge and his network of contacts at national and European levels, to the benefit of the Commission and to expand his influence within it. Noël developed a deep sense of solidarity with the Commission: he thought the institution ‘irreplaceable and its role vital’, as it ‘best serves both the Community and its Member States. The Commission must be a living force; it must assert itself politically . . .’165 He expected this kind of loyalty in other Commission officials – according to him, a pronounced Europeanism was necessary to be able to accept the negative aspects of working in the Commission, such as the national balance. As a compensation, he promised them a large measure of satisfaction in their work.166

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A federalist, Noël qualified the 1960s as a ‘pre-federal phase’, where features such as the national balance and the principle of collegiality were necessary to create trust on the part of the member states.167 Noël saw the EEC as a future global player and he expected further and deeper integration to develop as a kind of ‘mathematical certainty’,168 similar to Hallstein’s Sachlogik. This was in 1962, at the height of Commission optimism. In May 1963, after the first setback of de Gaulle’s veto on British accession, Noël gave a talk about the prospects of the EEC. While he considered that the Community was recovering from a crisis of confidence, he remained optimistic that integration would continue through the creation of irrevocable acts, such as the customs union. The inevitable political impact of these would strengthen the Community institutions. Furthermore, Noël anticipated the introduction of majority voting in 1966, which would bring about further progress for the integration of Europe.169 Even in the aftermath of the empty chair crisis, when majority voting was informally shelved, his speeches reflect his faith in the institutions. He was certain that a solution to the crisis could only be found within the existing institutional framework.170 For Noël, like for Kohnstamm and Albrecht, European integration was a means to avoid repeating the same mistakes as in the inter-war period, that is humiliation of the vanquished and economic protectionism, which in his view had led to the economic and political crises of the 1920s and 1930s. The integration of Germany in a European structure had already been discussed in the Resistance, and Noël had participated in these discussions.171 For him, Europe’s future lay in a European federal state. In 1975 he presided over a group called ‘European Union’, set up by the federalist Commissioner Altiero Spinelli. The group’s report suggested establishing a European government, endowing the European Parliament with full legislative powers, and extending the powers of the Community to foreign affairs and security.172 While in the early 1980s Noël was pessimistic regarding the future of the Community,173 he regained his optimism after the Single European Act was signed in 1986. He immediately demanded that people should set their aims higher, and extend integration to defence and security policy.174 In 1990, Noël looked back on his career and concluded: I have indeed been fortunate in being able to combine my work with my personal commitment in the service of such an enterprise. I can assure you that, wherever I may be my commitment to the institution and to those who direct and represent it is as strong today as on the day I joined.175

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Noël retired in 1987 after 29 years of service to become President of the European University Institute in Florence. An ENA graduate, Jean-François Deniau advanced fast in the French civil service after entering the Inspection des Finances in 1950. A member of the French administrative elite, he stands for the pragmatist in the Commission. Pragmatists are not characterised here by their lack of interest in European integration but by the fact that they did not commit their career fully to service in the European institutions. Deniau held multiple loyalties. Born in Paris in 1928, he was raised and socialised in the French university and administrative systems. In the late 1940s Deniau served in the French army in Indochina, and in 1963 became the French ambassador to Mauritania. He thus acquired a broad outlook beyond the borders of Europe, with the French colonial empire crumbling but still in existence. However, Deniau was interested in European affairs as well: in the French administration he was one of the few who volunteered to participate in the Val Duchesse negotiations.176 In 1958, at the request of Marjolin, he entered the Commission as director in DG External Relations at the age of 29. In 1961 he was promoted to A1 and in charge of the first accession negotiations with the United Kingdom. As a Gaullist, however, he was personally opposed to British accession to the EEC. After de Gaulle’s veto in 1963, which Deniau personally supported, he accepted the post in Mauritania. Unlike Noël, Deniau did not choose to stay in the Commission permanently. In 1963 he returned to the French civil service because, as he later explained, he knew how Brussels worked. ‘I have spent enough time there,’ he declared.177 In 1967, on his return from Mauritania, he did not know whether French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou would give him a post as a minister in the French government or whether he would become a Commissioner in Brussels. Deniau did not seem to have had any preference, either. He was made Commissioner in 1967 and stayed in Brussels for another six years. However, he stood for the Gaullists in the French elections in 1968, as he could not understand why one should have to choose between Europe and the nation: ‘It shocked him [Rey] when I presented myself at the elections in France in May 1968. [For Rey] one had to choose between the national and the European sphere.’178 In 1973, Deniau returned to Paris to take up a high position in the French administration, and during the 1970s and 1980s served as minister in several French governments. Moreover, as a successful author, he was elected to membership of the Académie Française in 1992. Deniau played an important role during the negotiations leading to the EEC treaty as well as in the early Hallstein Commission. He was doubtless loyal to the Commission while an official and then a Commissioner in

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Brussels; for him, however, the tasks he was confronted with were first of all an intellectual challenge. Many of his colleagues in the Commission have praised the competence of Deniau and his colleagues from the French administration.179 However, according to Axel Herbst, for instance, they were ‘lone warriors’ and did not like teamwork.180 Von Staden, later Hallstein’s chef de cabinet, worked under Deniau in DG External Relations. Ten years his senior, von Staden wrote in his memoirs that he learned to admire Deniau, who had introduced him to the method of thought of this ‘exceptional type of human being’, a graduate of a French Grande École. ‘I marvelled at this director who resembled an exotic being from another planet,’ wrote von Staden.181 Interestingly, in a long interview Deniau gave Bossuat in 2004, there is no allusion to what European integration meant to him and what his vision was for a united Europe. Neither in his book, L’Europe interdite, published in 1977, nor in the interview does he profess any kind of sentimentality about his time in the Commission. For other officials, the experience of working with people from different backgrounds – some of them former enemies in World War II – to create common policies from scratch, count among the main reasons for their fascination with their work in the Commission. For Deniau, the Commission seems to have been a space which one can conquer and where one can do interesting work. In L’Europe interdite he defended the quality and the work of the Commission, not least because he had contributed to them. In his book, Deniau is more explicit about his views on Europe’s future than in the later interview. His view is pragmatic in that it does not prescribe one ideal state of Europe for the future, and in that Deniau refuses to define the geographical boundaries of Europe: ‘Everybody is European who considers himself or herself to be European.’182 This has to be seen in relation to Deniau’s Gaullist outlook on Europe’s role in the world. Europe should be united and strengthened in economic, social and military terms, and most of all it should be strengthened to the point where it could to stand up to the USA. The Europeanness of the citizens of the European countries had to be nurtured, but nurtured against the USA.183 Europe should be established as the ‘other’, offering a third way between the two superpowers. In the late 1970s, Deniau falls back on solutions of the 1950s and early 1960s. Pragmatists like Deniau were useful for the Commission, as they were often exceptionally ambitious and talented officials. Ortoli, who at the age of 33 became director-general of DG Internal Market, is comparable to Deniau. He left the Commission in 1962 to serve in Pompidou’s government in France. Between 1966 and 1972 he held several portfolios in the French government before returning to Brussels in 1973 as Commission president. Pragmatists do not necessarily have to be French

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ENA graduates, however. Commission officials who came from the German Auswärtiges Amt (ministry of foreign affairs), such as von Staden, Schnippenkötter, Herbst and Sigrist can also be counted among them. For them, the Commission was a step in their careers, often leading to posts as ambassadors. On the one hand, pragmatists were important in that they brought fresh ideas into the administration; on the other, they were often parachuted into top-level posts in the administration, and thus obstructed career opportunities for the Commission’s ‘home-grown’ officials. Moreover, they were not willing to commit themselves to staying in the Commission, remaining loyal to the institution where they had previously worked. Thus they were prone to introduce different and often conflicting identities into the Commission. 4.4 Identities, images and roles of Commission officials Identities are multiple and never static. Commission officials had European, national, regional but also institutional identities of different natures and to varying degrees. It is hence impossible to speak of the officials’ European identity as monolithic and without variation. This section presents examples of different kinds of identities within the Commission. Hallstein aimed at rapidly creating an independent administration with a distinct (institutional) identity. However, as shown in Chapter 3, he was not in favour of creating a hermetically-sealed European civil service. What is more, with his preference for officials from the Auswärtiges Amt, he did not hesitate to bring civil servants with a strong institutional identity of their own into the Commission. Hallstein, himself a product of the Auswärtiges Amt, thought that these officials were best suited to work in a European administration. This is reflected in the recruitment pattern of leading German officials. Hallstein’s cabinet staff, Schnippenkoetter, von Staden, Narjes, Meyer and both the first German directors-general in the Commission, Allardt and Seeliger, all came from the Auswärtiges Amt. as did Herbst, nominated as deputy executive secretary and the successor to Behr.184 Herbst’s successor, Sigrist, again was a diplomat from the Auswärtiges Amt, and was already acquainted with the members of the ‘small group of the Auswärtiges Amt’ in the Commission before coming to Brussels.185 Another stronghold of these people was DG VIII where the director-general, Hendus, once again from the Auswärtiges Amt, sought to replace departing German officials with diplomats from the same source.186 Civil servants coming from the German diplomatic service may have been well qualified to work in the European civil service, but at the same time they had a strong Auswärtiges Amt identity, and many of them only stayed in the Commission for a short period of time. The Auswärtiges Amt sent people to Brussels, and

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when it saw fit recalled them to Bonn, as in the case of Hendus,187 Schnippenkötter and von Staden, while Allardt returned after falling out with his Commissioner, Lemaignen. The Commission thus resembled a post among others in a diplomatic career. Advising a young diplomat, an official from Hallstein’s cabinet said: ‘In the foreign service you will find a home [Heimat] which despite all the optimism has, I feel, still somehow more of a solid basis and constitutes more of a family than our European institutions.’188 Under these circumstances, socialisation and the development of loyalties through, for example, long-term exposure to the Commission’s administration were difficult to achieve. The situation was similar, if not more pronounced, in the French administration. A memorandum from the French foreign ministry shows that it made abundant use of secondment, with the explicit objective of serving the interests of the French government from within the European administration. French personnel policy towards international administrations should ‘place officials in the different international secretariats who are able to act in favour of French interests, but who at the same time comply with the requirements of the international civil service’.189 Even more than the Auswärtiges Amt, the Grandes Écoles and the French civil service ‘Grands Corps’, such as the Inspection des Finances, have to count as a source of identity and of a certain vision of the world. Michel Mangenot has described the ENA concours as a rite of passage signifying ‘the entrance into technocracy’ and the ENA as the reproduction mechanism of a social elite and of a certain façon d’être.190 Indeed, Coombes calls the type of official not affected by the Commission’s culture the ‘French ENA official’. This strong socialisation mechanism certainly made it difficult for the Commission to supersede this identity and to Europeanise officials from either the French administration or the Auswärtiges Amt. Hence, strong identities of national administrations were present in the Commission which could interfere with a Europeanisation of these officials. At the same time, while the Commission was in favour of having a core of loyal permanent civil servants, it also wanted to keep the option open of providing its services with new ideas from experienced external staff. This was a dilemma: Lemaignen believed that officials who chose to spend their entire career in the Commission would serve the European cause loyally, while those others who expected to return to their home administration were less independent in their thoughts and daily work.191 For people like von Staden or Deniau there was always an open back door leading back to (higher) positions at the national level. All in all, they were too implicated in the networks and reward systems of their home administration to cut all ties, and career chances seemed better there than

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in Brussels. However, there is no evidence to suggest that these temporary officials served the Commission less well. Moreover, they certainly contributed to disseminating knowledge about the EEC, and perhaps even enthusiasm for European integration, in their home administration. Von Staden, for instance, is reported to have ‘missed’ the Commission when back in the Auswärtiges Amt.192 It is likely, however, that officials who were recruited through a concours, or who entered the Commission as novices, developed more of a European or institutional identity because they owed the Commission their career and much of their professional identity. The European official as negotiator and go-between As it was one of their tasks to forge compromises, European officials who were able to switch between their different identities were regarded as particularly useful for the Commission. This becomes evident in the following example. In his function as a member of the ‘merger working group’ of the Commission, the Luxembourger Etienne met with Jean Dondelinger, then a Luxembourg diplomat, ‘as a compatriot and friend but also as a civil servant interested in the smooth running of the Communities’.193 Etienne and Dondelinger discussed the question of compensation for Luxembourg when the High Authority left the Grand Duchy on the merger of the executives, stating that ‘on this occasion the compatriot was not in conflict with the Commission civil servant’.194 Etienne was able to interpret and translate the ‘emotional’ state of his compatriots for Noël,195 and the executive secretary used this information to respond to a request from Hallstein, namely to make proposals for possible compensation for Luxembourg, which was about to lose the High Authority.196 The Commission utilised the national background of its collaborators in order to obtain insider information and subsequently form an opinion about the political and psychological situation in a member state. The official as negotiator and go-between was therefore important for the success of Commission policies. This is how the Commission’s administration could best utilise its bureaucratic power. The officials’ expertise but also their special knowledge of their home country or of a particular interest group were crucial in this respect. The officials naturally brought in their own viewpoints – shaped by their socialisation in the different member states – when elaborating European solutions in the Commission, and this was what was expected of them. As one official put it, there was no ‘European’ type of official emerging in Brussels:

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Instead, a healthy rootedness in one’s own nationality has proven to be an advantage for a constructive collaboration of individuals with different nationalities. This rootedness bears the invaluable advantage that one has at one’s disposal national experiences, detailed knowledge of national and even regional conditions and access to national networks . . .197 One could derive from this statement the impression that the Commission, as it represented all the member states adequately and competently, was highly competent in finding European solutions and creating European policies – the European civil servants, and the national balance, legitimised the Commission to act in the name of the member states. To capture this Commission strategy, Lawrence Scheinman utilised the term ‘bureaucratic interpenetration’.198 This interpenetration was based on institutionalised contacts but also on private networks and friendships between the Commission and national administrations. Gaining information and keeping partners in national administrations informed reduced the risks of policy failure and deadlocks. The Commission needed to develop into an expert administration in order to gain credibility and to develop and secure its role in the institutional interplay of the EEC. An example of how the ‘expert Commission’ could function can be found in DG VI, where officials, as the apparently disinterested party, formulated package deals to facilitate a successful outcome of Council meetings on the CAP. European officials were go-betweens, mediators and diplomats. They were masters of what could be called the Community’s ‘compromise culture’: ‘Everything one does is a compromise,’ one official said. ‘If you cannot live with this, you become unhappy.’199 European attitudes of high officials In 1965, according to Lerner and Gorden’s study based on interviews with Commission officials, 93 per cent of Eurocrats were in favour of a Monnet-inspired ‘United States of Europe’, whereas only 5 per cent supported de Gaulle’s Europe des Patries solution. More than two out of three officials opted for a federation as a political model for Europe.200 However, there was a gap between the officials’ daily routine work, which was often very technical, and more far-reaching political aims, such as a federation. One official, who worked under the federalist Commissioner Spinelli, stated that while he appreciated Spinelli’s enthusiasm for the federal cause, he thought that it was going too far when Spinelli asked him to insert into his technical papers and proposals paragraphs with political messages that Spinelli’s cabinet had prepared.201 Thirty years on, anthropologists Abélès and Bellier observed a similarly pragmatic attitude

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among Commission officials, constantly searching for the ‘lowest common denominator’ while at the same time advocating a strong political message: constructing a peaceful Europe in a fast-changing world.202 It was thus through realistic policy solutions and compromises that Europe could progress, rather than by inserting political messages in a proposal. At a more individual level, there are, however, attitudes and character traits that seem to reflect certain values of European civil servants. These can be identified in interviews but also in articles in the employees’ newspaper of the Commission, the Courrier du Personnel, or in Les Anciens, the bulletin of the association of the former officials of the EC, the Association Internationale des Anciens des Communautés Européennes (AIACE). Recurring themes are, for example, honesty and ingenuity, the latter being particularly valued in overcoming the cumbersomeness and delays in the Commission’s administration.203 The officials’ battle against bureaucracy, finding pragmatic and practical solutions to the policy problems and difficulties of administrative life in the Commission, was considered an important matter, and the ability to come up with compromise solutions, for instance in the Council, was highly valued.204 Like many others, looking back on 40 years of European integration, former Commission official Paul Collowald believed that the period between 1949 and 1989 stood for 40 years of peace and democracy in Europe.205 For him, Luxembourg was the ville mythique of Europe, where the ‘European adventure’ had begun.206 The officials often used terms such as ‘adventure’ and ‘pioneer’, and also more aggressive terms reminiscent of war (‘fight’, ‘struggle’) to describe the process and politics of European integration. For Collowald, building Europe was a battle that mainly had to be fought against politicians in national governments. Peace, economic growth and stability in Europe and in the world through European integration were also important topics.207 Esprit européen for one official was ‘to develop this European Union and to make this part of the world a better place’.208 In brief, the analysis of interviews, memoirs and publications suggests that Commission officials formed a ‘sociopsychological community’, based on shared values and ideals.209 However, this community was shaken by change brought about by events such as the enlargements. British accession, in particular, made an impact on the officials and some looked back with nostalgia to the days of the Europe of the Six.210 Moreover, in interviews a number of officials referred to the difference between ‘now’ and ‘then’. While according to them younger people at the Commission tended to see the Commission merely as a step in their career ‘in the past, one entered the Commission as one would join a religious order’.211 Also, while acknowledging that the new member

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states had the right to join the EU, many thought that the EU of today had no longer anything to do with the Europe of the Six – it was now a matter of cooperation rather than integration.212 However, they were torn between the historical debt towards the Central and Eastern European countries and a more cohesive smaller community: Many people . . . tend to find that enlargement has gone too far and too fast . . . At the end of the day . . . these are European peoples that have suffered because we let them down [during the Cold War], because of our egotism and our weakness. [W]e have a duty to welcome and include them.213 Conclusion The Commission was bound by the treaty to submit policy proposals to the Council, composed of representatives of the member states, and the Commission civil servants preparing these proposals therefore had to be aware of the preferences of the different governments – otherwise the proposals would have had little chance of being adopted. Officials therefore could not stay detached from interests promoted by national governments. Apart from being able to work out European solutions, they were expected to act as ambassadors or translators of their home countries’ needs and problems. Working in the opposite direction, they negotiated with representatives of their home countries in order to explain European policies to them. The Commission used the national identity, special knowledge, and cultural, linguistic and previous professional background of their officials deliberately; there was no wish to employ apatrides, or deracinated officials. However, this did not necessarily lead to conflicting loyalties between ‘Europe’ and the ‘nation’ because the first European civil servants developed a strong esprit de corps. The origins of this team spirit lie in seven main factors: first, the shared generational experience and similar socialisation during World War II that had resulted in shared norms and values, together with a conviction that ‘building Europe’ was a means of avoiding future armed conflicts in the region; secondly, long-term exposure to institutional structures, combined with, thirdly, career opportunities and a high degree of job satisfaction; fourthly, the emergence of an expert culture focused on the shared task of ‘building Europe’ through Community policies; fifthly, the particular living and working conditions in Brussels; sixthly, the presence of European role models like Hallstein, von der Groeben and Mansholt, who inspired motivation and enthusiasm; and lastly, the participatory working methods these Commissioners introduced.

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According to Coombes, despite setbacks in the integration process a ‘common culture’ developed in the Commission. But ‘our research suggests that this common culture [was] not an evangelical kind of organisation commitment . . .’214 As this chapter has shown, however, there was indeed an organisational commitment, originating in a pioneer spirit and the motivation of working for a common cause and creating European policies together. The crises of 1963, 1965–66 and the first enlargement were key events for the officials, however, and they had a negative impact on their motivation. The steady growth of the administration resulted in a less flexible and more hierarchical administration. In 1970 Coombes detected among European civil servants a loss of institutional identity and a certain malaise resulting from these factors.215 The findings presented here, however, suggest that the institutional identity built up during the first ‘euphoric’ years of the Commission survived in the long term, and that many civil servants continued to believe in the goal of further integration. It is at least arguable that the Commission developed an overall administrative identity. The loyalties of officials often belonged to their Commissioner or the director-general in their DG. The specialisation and compartmentalisation within the Commission’s administration, which was pointed out in the previous chapter, make it likely that, due to overspecialisation, the officials mainly identified with the political ‘sub-goals’ of the organisation, namely those of the particular DG for which they worked.

5 INSTITUTIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURES AND THEIR ROLE IN EU POLICY-MAKING The Directorates-General for Competition and Agriculture

In the introduction of their book with the programmatic title Rediscovering Institutions, James March and Johan Olsen claim that: ‘Social, political, and economic institutions have become larger, considerably more complex and resourceful, and prima facie more important to collective life.’1 This is particularly true for the institutions of the EU, which have taken over competencies from nation states. While these institutions were established to serve a certain purpose, scholars of historical institutionalism argue that such bodies cannot always be controlled, but end up quasi-autonomous and pursue their own agendas.2 Also, once in place, institutional structures and, importantly, the policies they devise and administer become more difficult to modify as the political, economic and social costs of change and reform increase.3 According to political scientist Paul Pierson, events occurring early in a sequence can be disproportionately important for determining the direction of a ‘path’, and the longer a particular path remains unchanged the greater the likelihood of a solution being ‘locked in’ – a phenomenon known as ‘path dependency’.4 The founding years of an organisation are therefore vital as they determine the path an organisation, and the policies developed and managed by it, will take. The Commission’s administration was fragmented, a development triggered by its initial decisions on organisation and working methods. By December 1960 Marjolin was already complaining that the administration was a ‘federal system – each DG rests upon its Commissioner. There is no “civil service”, but several civil services having too much autonomy.’5

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Contemporary studies also noticed this phenomenon: Coombes, for instance, considered the Commission a ‘porous organisation . . . in which different styles of administration and different normative approaches compete for domination’.6 Each DG could be considered an organisation in itself, developing a different administrative culture, including a ‘mission’, values and working methods that were closely related to the policy area of the DG in question. While organisational structures are frameworks within which policies are devised, they are also places of social interaction and socialisation. Institutional structures exert pressure on the formation of individuals’ interests and thus on their behaviour, for example by which types of behaviour are rewarded.7 This chapter makes the case that the administrative cultures developed in DG IV and DG VI during the founding years, and the subsequent socialisation of officials into these cultures, helped to bring about policies in the relevant areas, and then to keep them on track. It proposes a threestep analysis which could help explain how a particular path in competition and agricultural policies was chosen and followed, and why it was difficult to modify this path at a later date. The first step consists in determining the historical context – institutions do not materialise out of nowhere, and policies are not created from scratch. The shape of both depends on particular political, legal and social contexts that are the results of long-term developments. The chapter establishes, first, the importance of context, previous experiences and events for the shape of institutions and policies. This includes the previous experiences and ideas of Commissioners and leading officials, on the one hand, and institutional models and policies dating from before the setting-up of the Commission, on the other. These ‘pre-cultures’ were transferred into the Commission, and their influence was brought to bear on early policy decisions. Sociological institutionalism argues that ideas, norms and rules are ‘forged within a social environment’8 such as institutions. Ideas and norms were transferred into the DGs, where they amalgamated with others to shape a new and unique ‘social environment’, an emerging administrative culture, which contributed decisively to creating and reinforcing policy paths. Identifying core elements of DG IV’s and DG VI’s administrative cultures is thus the second step. Closely linked to this is the third step, the socialisation of actors into these cultures. The adaptation of Commission bureaucrats to administrative cultures helped secure the continuity of a policy. Actors outside the Commission were also affected by socialisation processes, for example through network-building. The Commission utilised both internal socialisation and networks as a means of securing the longevity and continuity of a particular policy path.

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5.1 The legacy of context and previous experiences Hans von der Groeben and the legacy of ordo-liberalism Nowadays the existence of a DG for Competition in the Commission is taken for granted, but the following incident shows how a small episode determined future developments in European competition policy. In a first draft of the Commission’s organisational scheme, dating from January 1958, Marjolin gave the responsibility for the EEC treaty’s competition rules to a large department for political economy and finance, which he intended to take over. Competition policy would very likely have evolved differently had Marjolin been responsible for this area. French competition policy was entirely different from what had developed in post-war Germany in this domain. David Gerber clarifies that in France, contrary to German practice: [C]ompetition law long operated in the shadows of dirigiste economic controls . . . Since the inception of the European Community, France and French officials have often tended to resist a more vigorous role for competition law in the process of European integration.9 Hallstein and von der Groeben presented Marjolin’s scheme to leading government officials of the economics and foreign affairs ministries in Bonn.10 At the meeting, the participants demanded that competition should become an independent administrative unit, reflecting the importance the German government attached to competition policy. This meeting in Bonn laid the ground for DG IV to become the ‘German’ DG in the Commission.11 Competition became a DG in its own right, led by von der Groeben, a former senior civil servant in Erhard’s economics ministry. Social market economy, a term coined by Erhard’s state secretary Alfred Müller-Armack, and the ordo-liberalism of the so-called Freiburg School had framed this ministry’s policy-making12 and became equally important for policy-making in DG IV. Closely linked to neo-liberalism, the ordo-liberal Freiburg School was developed in Germany in the early 1930s by an interdisciplinary group of academics at the University of Freiburg. Its main protagonists were the lawyers Franz Böhm and Hans Großmann-Doerth and the economist Walter Eucken. Having witnessed the downfall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of National Socialism, these scholars were convinced that the main cause of this had been the failure of the legal system to prevent the rise and subsequent abuse of private economic power.13 After World War II they aimed to create a new society with competition at the heart of their

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economic and political programme. A competitive economic system was to the benefit of all in society, they argued; it provided the key to the two complementary goals of economic prosperity and political stability. Von der Groeben had collaborated with Müller-Armack and others of the Freiburg School at the economics ministry. He shared their outlook on competition, not economic planning, as central to the smooth functioning of an economy or a European common market.14 Moreover, from the late 1940s to 1957 a German competition law was under intensive discussion in the Federal Republic. This also has to be seen in the context of Allied, particularly US, deconcentration and decartelisation policies in post-war Germany.15 Other European countries, on the contrary, lacked experience with competition legislation. Until 1958 only the parliaments of France and Germany had adopted national competition laws, and the Dutch parliament did not enact a law on cartels until July 1958.16 Crucially, these Western European countries lacked (independent) institutions which could have put such legislation into practice. The German Bundeskartellamt, for example, was not founded until 1958. At the European level, the ECSC treaty contained anti-trust rules in articles 65 and 66.17 Contrary to other policy areas covered by the treaty, competition policy was thus a fairly recent field, of which member-state administrations had little experience. The treaty defined only some basic principles which were to be fleshed out later on. It was thus up to the Commission, and in particular DG IV, to define a competition policy and to make proposals to the Council. DG IV was given responsibility for four sectors: restrictive practices and monopoly policy; state aids; approximation of laws; and taxation (Articles 85–99). Starting from there, von der Groeben and his collaborators developed a holistic concept of competition, corresponding to the ordo-liberal notion of Wirtschaftsverfassung, or economic constitution, that is, an ‘economic order based on competition’.18 They conceptualised a common competition policy with the aim of creating a European competition regime, or Wettbewerbsordnung.19 Competition policy was considered as being at the basis of a legally-protected common market governed by a regime of fair competition.20 During von der Groeben’s time in office (1958–67) important groundwork was accomplished.21 Within the field of competition policy the Commission first focused on restrictive practices, or cartels. Article 88 of the EEC treaty provided for authorities in the member states to take over responsibility for the application of Articles 85 and 86, concerned with restrictive practices and monopolies, until the EEC had passed its own regulations. The Commission tried to enforce this by seeking the cooperation of the member states,22 but this turned out to be difficult as

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only France, Germany and the Netherlands had appropriate legislation. A regulation providing a European solution on cartel policy hence became a pressing need. The Commission’s proposal, submitted to the Council on 31 October 1960, envisaged a notification system and the general prohibition of restrictive practices and agreements, with the possibility of applying for an exemption, provided for in Article 85(3). In this draft, only the Commission was authorised to grant permission for such an exemption. In spite of strong protests against this draft by industrialists in Germany, France and Belgium, and by member-state governments such as that of France, these three crucial elements of the initial draft – prohibition of restrictive practices, obligatory notification of agreements to the Commission, and the Commission’s exclusive authority for the granting of exemptions – survived into the final version of what was to become Regulation 17. There are three main reasons why, in spite of the opposition, the Commission’s view prevailed and why it obtained a unanimous Council decision on a regulation that determined the path of European competition policy for the next four decades. First, while the French government was against the Commission’s proposal, it was unable to come up with a convincing counter-proposal: it favoured a system of legal exemption instead of the notification regime proposed by the Commission.23 In the domestic context, the French administration had traditionally been tolerant towards cartels. The French employers’ organisation, the Conseil national du patronat français (CNPF), was also in favour of a lenient competition policy and of economic integration through industrial agreements; instead of prohibiting cartels, in its view competition rules should encourage this kind of collaboration between enterprises.24 In merely criticising the Commission’s proposal and failing to develop a clear-cut position of its own, the French government missed the chance of influencing the basic principles of the EEC’s future competition policy. According to Laurent Warlouzet, an additional reason for the French government’s inaction was the aim of a group of leading French civil servants to modernise the French economy:25 a far-reaching competition law at the European level could accelerate such a modernisation process – and the French government would not even have to add its weight to the agenda, as the proposed regulation was backed by a strong coalition, including the Germans. As for the French business representatives, instead of lobbying the Commission, and DG IV in particular, they relied on – in this case – passive French government officials to push through their views.26 Secondly, the Commission was successful in building a coalition in favour of its ordo-liberal approach. In publicising its proposal widely, and

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submitting it to the scrutiny of not only the Council but also of the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, it became more difficult for the Council to reject the proposal outright. The crucial role of the European Parliament’s internal market committee, with Arved Deringer as its rapporteur, also needs to be stressed: Deringer shared von der Groeben’s ordo-liberal outlook, and his report supported, and improved, the Commission’s proposal.27 The expert knowledge and entrepreneurship of individuals such as von der Groeben and Deringer helped to persuade member-state governments and other actors of the benefits of the proposal. The coalition of the Commission and the European Parliament included trade unions and, crucially, the German and Dutch governments. Eventually, the governments of Italy, Luxembourg and finally also Belgium rallied to the Commission’s standpoint. Thirdly, Regulation 17 was not a priority for the French government.28 Having secured major gains in the Council negotiations on the CAP in December 1961 and January 1962, it was in turn prepared to vote for the regulation, which some French officials had found useful in the first place. The CAP and Regulation 17 were tied together in a package, and the Council adopted the latter measure on 5 February 1962. Possessing the right of initiative in the Community, the Commission was able to shape the draft in conformity with the ordo-liberal preferences of von der Groeben and leading DG IV officials, and with the backing of the European Parliament’s internal market committee. In March 1962 Regulation 17 came into force, attributing substantial powers to the Commission in cartel policy.29 The Commission was authorised to grant permission for, or prohibit, any agreement formed after March 1962, though an ECJ ruling could of course modify or nullify the Commission’s decision. Regulation 17 clearly had an impact on the institutionalisation of DG IV as the Commission’s bulwark of economic liberalism, and it determined the shape of the common competition policy. It was not replaced until 2003 (by Regulation 1/2003).30 Sicco Mansholt’s experience in post-war European agriculture The circumstances leading to the CAP, and the CAP itself, are among the most complex chapters in the history of European integration.31 Focusing on Mansholt’s role in post-war European agricultural policy contributes a small but vital piece to the jigsaw puzzle of the CAP’s historical context. A member of the Dutch Social Democratic party PvdA, Mansholt became Minister of Agriculture, Fishery and Food Distribution in June 1945 – a portfolio he held continuously in various coalition governments until he entered the Commission in January 1958.32 One important aim of his

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policies in the Netherlands was to turn agriculture into an effective and productive sector of the economy.33 Meanwhile, in the neighbouring countries, agricultural pressure groups were demanding subsidies for agricultural production, and protection against more competitive foreign producers,34 which would have acted to the detriment of Dutch agricultural exports. In his effort to liberalise agricultural trade, Mansholt was backed by the Dutch farmers’ organisations, of which the Stichting voor de Landbouw, renamed Landbouwschap in 1954, was the umbrella organisation. In the Netherlands, a country with a strong corporatist tradition, the Stichting had an important advisory role.35 There were regular meetings between it and senior officials in the agricultural ministry, and monthly meetings with the minister himself. As the Dutch minister holding the agriculture portfolio, Mansholt became heavily involved in international agricultural affairs. The importance he attached to these international questions became manifest when he created a department within his ministry concerned with external agricultural relations; it was headed by van der Lee, who later followed him to the Commission. Inspired by the launch of the Schuman Plan in May 1950, Mansholt drafted a paragraph on agriculture which was incorporated in the Stikker Plan in September 1950; in this document Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker envisaged the abolition of tariffs on industrial goods among the OEEC countries.36 The core of Mansholt’s proposal was the integration of the entire agricultural sector into a customs union, and the immediate introduction of European price levels for agricultural products. Attempts to reach a European agreement on agriculture remained fruitless. For example, the so-called Green Pool negotiations between the OEEC member states in the early to mid-1950s failed.37 Despite their breakdown, these negotiations were useful for two main reasons. First, they led to an exchange of views among policy-makers and civil servants on the subject of agricultural integration, and secondly they resulted in the formation of an international network of agricultural experts. In these negotiations Mansholt sharpened his preferences on European agricultural integration. He favoured setting up a supranational organisation, something the agricultural ministers of most of the other participating countries, however, were not prepared to accept.38 He also thought it necessary to restrict the Green Pool to the six Schuman Plan countries. Generally, he favoured a smaller supranational organisation over a larger intergovernmental one – which would have provided Dutch agriculture with a larger market, possibly including Britain, next to Germany the most important market for Dutch produce. Mansholt’s party, the PvdA, was generally in favour of including Britain in the integration process, but the

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British government undermined any attempt to introduce supranationality in the Green Pool.39 Yet, for Mansholt, supranationalism was a guarantee that necessary decisions could not be vetoed by member-state governments under domestic pressure, particularly by farmers’ unions. Mansholt’s experience of the failure of the Green Pool negotiations enforced this belief in the necessity of supranational institutions. Moreover, his underlying interest in supranational policy-making can be seen as a calculation that only a supranational organisation could put an end to the protectionist national agricultural policies so harmful to Dutch agriculture. Another insight Mansholt gained from the failure of the Green Pool negotiations was that agriculture could not be treated in isolation from the rest of the economy.40 He was an experienced politician and negotiator, and realised that in order to advance agricultural negotiations there needed to be some bargaining margin, preferably by combining agriculture with other policy areas. In early 1955, Mansholt’s hopes of realising a common agricultural policy rose when it became clear that agriculture would be incorporated in the Benelux proposal: this combined the Beyen Plan, put forward in 1952 by Dutch Foreign Minister Jan Willem Beyen, for a customs union, and the ideas of Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, with his preference for continuing sectoral integration. Agriculture was to be part of the common market envisaged in this proposal. When the EEC treaty was ratified in 1957, some kind of progress in agriculture was therefore guaranteed. Agricultural policy was locked into a particular institutional framework, and linked to progress with the customs union. Representing the lowest common denominator between member-state governments, and reflecting their divergent views on the aims of the CAP, Articles 38–47 of the EEC treaty on agriculture were left vague, merely setting out some general objectives.41 From 1958 to 1973 Mansholt was responsible for agricultural policy in the Commission. In July 1958, the Commission convened a conference in Stresa to discuss the basic objectives of the future CAP with the governments of the member states and with interest groups such as farmers’ and consumer organisations. The Stresa resolutions, although again left vague, were at the basis of the proposals DG VI came up with 18 months later. These provided for the free exchange of agricultural goods within the six member states, the gradual development of the CAP during the transition period, and the adoption of common price levels for many types of product. The first decisions in agriculture had to be taken by the end of 1961, as a precondition for transition to the second stage of the customs union on 1 January 1962. The first of many agricultural ‘marathons’ started on 15 December 1961 and ended – the clocks had been stopped on 31

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December to allow the negotiations to continue – during the night of 14 January 1962. The main outcome of the negotiations was a system of market organisations, and a price policy to guarantee farmers’ incomes. A system of intervention buying would ensure that farmers were able to sell their produce. This result was enshrined in the so-called Agricultural Code, setting out: ‘the principle of a unified internal market with common prices permitting free circulation of goods; the principle of community preference ensured by external protection; and the principle of financial solidarity through the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (FEOGA)’.42 The Agricultural Code was the cornerstone of the CAP, until the EU agricultural ministers, on the initiative of the Commission and of agricultural Commissioner Ray MacSharry, agreed on a reform of the CAP in 1992.43 The successful conclusion of the first and subsequent marathons was also due to Mansholt and his collaborators acting as ‘honest brokers’. Mansholt himself thought that this was where he and his collaborators could have an important impact and facilitate a successful conclusion of the negotiations.44 Because he had been instrumental in post-war agricultural negotiations, Mansholt understood better than most other policy-makers what kinds of proposals were acceptable for the different member states. Likewise, DG VI officials had expert knowledge, and had often participated in these post-war agricultural negotiations themselves. Moreover, Mansholt and his staff prepared the ground for the Commission’s proposals in intensive consultations with government officials and agricultural interest groups, such as the COPA, the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations, but also UNICE, the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe.45 During the first years of the Community, decisions in the Council had to be unanimous. So-called ‘package deals’ became crucial in this period, as in order to obtain a decision in a certain sector, each country had to gain something so that different decisions for different sectors were tied together in a package.46 Mansholt became a master in the art of forging such deals, not least because he had served as a minister in various coalition governments in the Netherlands and was used to this kind of bargaining.47 He thus induced the Council either to accept the Commission’s package or to depart empty-handed. In her book Ann-Christina Knudsen analyses the policy process which led to the foundations of the CAP. She shows that in this crucial period Mansholt and his staff adroitly guided the negotiation process. The Commission’s June 1960 proposal, for instance, which contained the pillars of the future CAP, was known as ‘the bible’, ‘because of the remarkable resemblance between many of the mechanisms described in it

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and the final policy’.48 Another striking example of the Commission’s bargaining tactics and entrepreneurship was the common cereals price, which the Council agreed on in December 1964, after years of tedious negotiations. The member states adopted exactly the price for soft wheat which the Commission had proposed in November 1963, namely 425 DM per tonne.49 While this was seen as an enormous break-through for the Community, which had allowed the CAP to become its first common policy, the decision also sanctioned a relatively high price-level for agricultural products in the EEC, leading eventually to overproduction and budget pressures. Nonetheless, for the argument in this chapter it is important to note that Mansholt and his staff played a crucial role in shaping the policy process of the CAP, while the member states at times lacked ideas and initiative. Contrary to Moravcsik’s opinion that the ‘negotiations managed by governments were efficient’,50 large member states such as Germany and even France lacked leadership and this ‘provided ample opportunity for supranational entrepreneurship’51 on the part of the Commission. 5.2 The emergence of administrative cultures DG IV’s administrative culture DG IV’s administrative culture was based on expertise. This has to be seen in connection with von der Groeben’s ideas about modern and efficient administrations. A classical nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury administration – fragmented and hierarchically organised – could not satisfy the needs of the contemporary world, where the economy occupied an increasingly important role; a modern administration required new working methods and clear aims.52 Hence von der Groeben was keen to involve academics and other experts in policy-making. Competition law being a rather recent area of economic policy in Europe, he thought that consulting with external experts and seeking their advice was all the more important. Consequently, he recruited Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, a former student of Böhm’s and a professor at the University of Saarbrücken. Mestmäcker had familiarised himself during his studies in Frankfurt with 1920s cartel law and with US anti-trust and deconcentration law.53 At first, he advised von der Groeben informally, but this consultancy was institutionalised when he became a special adviser to DG IV in 1962.54 Other advisers to von der Groeben were the German economist Hans Möller, the agriculture expert Priebe and Jacques Houssiaux, a young economist at Nancy University.55 These experts mostly met with von der Groeben and his cabinet, and partly also with DG IV officials.

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In Germany, experts and academics traditionally served as advisers to political bodies. Von der Groeben even sought – in vain – to convince the college to institutionalise a board of economic advisers to the Commission, consisting of external academics and experts and modelled on the Wissenschaftlicher Beirat, or academic advisory board, of the German economics ministry.56 The advisory board, which had its origins in the Allied administration of the British and American occupation zones, was founded in January 1948.57 It was initially dominated by the Freiburg School with Böhm as one of the founders and Mestmäcker becoming a member in 1960.58 With his insistence on close and institutionalised contacts with experts and the academic community, von der Groeben was the exception in the Commission of the 1960s.59 DG IV, like any newlyfounded institution, had to acquire a good reputation, and in the long term this was facilitated by collaborating with leading experts in the field. Crucially, seeking scientific advice added authority to the Commission’s and DG IV’s proposals, and ultimately strengthened their policy preferences. Ordo-liberal experts in DG IV thus contributed to consolidating the chosen policy path. Another aspect of DG IV’s administrative culture was its working methods. Von der Groeben promoted teamwork and was particularly in favour of involving younger officials in the policy-making process and assigning them their own areas of responsibility, thus fighting not only (what he called) ‘horizontal but also vertical isolation’.60 The Commissioner organised regular meetings with DG IV officials and members of his cabinet, where current topics and problems of competition policy were discussed openly.61 These meetings resembled the table ronde organised by Mansholt in DG VI. To von der Groeben, teamwork was particularly important in a multinational administration, because different economic and political developments in the member states and the resulting repercussions for EEC-level policy-making would require constant collaboration between Commission officials of several nationalities.62 Director-general VerLoren van Themaat had similar working methods: he held regular meetings at DG IV level and weekly meetings with the directors, and he also created ad hoc working groups.63 Lastly, DG IV’s autonomy became part of its administrative culture. Compared to other DGs in the Commission, DG IV stands out because of the direct influence it could exert on the economy of the common market. Early policy decisions such as Regulation 17 were at the basis of this autonomy. Crucially, the Commission’s independence in this sector, with the help of ECJ rulings, was subsequently extended.64

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DG VI’s administrative culture DG VI’s administrative culture was significantly shaped by Mansholt and the working methods he introduced in his area of responsibility. These methods were partly those he had experimented with in the Dutch ministry of agriculture. Two examples of these practices were intense dialogue with interest groups, and the table ronde. Cultivating close contacts with farmers’ organisations and other interest groups was considered vital by Mansholt, who had followed the same approach in the Netherlands. This had an impact on the internal organisation of DG VI: the division concerned with non-governmental organisations, headed by Rencki, reported directly to the cabinet and the director-general without a director being interposed. The table ronde was an institutionalised discussion and consultation forum. One French official called it the ‘Dutch system’.65 It was composed of permanent members – the cabinet, the director-general, Rabot, and his assistant, Verschuer, and Heringa and Rencki66 – as well as directors and officials, even lower-ranking ones, invited to participate, to give a presentation or to share their opinion on a given problem. A presentation would be followed by a lively discussion, with Mansholt, however, reserving for himself the right to take the final decision. This round table has become legendary;67 it epitomises the high degree of officials’ participation in the DG VI decision-making process, and seems to have encouraged dialogue and creativity. The working methods and the atmosphere in DG VI gave even lower-ranking officials the feeling that they were participating in shaping and creating the CAP. In June 1962, in a note to Hallstein’s cabinet, von Verschuer underlined the importance of the round table for the CAP: ‘It was because of the round table that DG Agriculture could develop and push through a far-sighted agricultural policy.’68 DG VI’s administrative culture was also shaped by the early successes of the CAP. Because agriculture was an important domain for most member states, the Commission identified the CAP as a field where it could excel by demonstrating its expertise, and the policy became a priority for it; according to Hallstein, its ‘life depended on the CAP’.69 Ludlow, meanwhile, emphasises the political motives of the Commission: ‘A major common policy . . . would require a degree of political and bureaucratic activism, and a common budget high enough to emphasise that the Commission was a political player and not just an international civil service.’70 The institutional backing for the CAP in the Commission was reflected, for instance, in DG VI’s ever-increasing staff numbers.71 When asked whether he was content with the way the CAP had developed, however, one official acknowledged that not all aspects of the

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outcome were desirable. However, the important point for him was that the CAP had been ‘the first common policy put in place by the institutions’ (the Council and the Commission).72 The actual shape of the CAP was thus less important, even though the policy soon generated major, and very costly, problems. These ranged from overproduction to the distortion of competition on world markets by EEC countries exporting their heavily-subsidised surpluses. Nevertheless, throughout the 1960s and 1970s DG VI was seen as a successful unit, or even as the Commission’s ‘glamour DG’,73 and the importance and success of the CAP had a strong impact on DG VI officials. 5.3 Socialisation processes in DG IV and DG VI Socialisation of DG IV officials There were two groups of officials in DG IV. The first consisted mainly of German officials, who were already pre-socialised, into either the ordoliberal concept of competition or US anti-trust law, or both. Among these officials – alongside Albrecht – were Schwartz and Hermann Schumacher. Schwartz, an official and later cabinet member in DG IV, had graduated with a degree in law from the University of Freiburg, where one of his teachers was Eucken. He had also studied anti-trust law at Harvard law school, and was an assistant to Heinrich Kronstein, a German emigrant professor and cartel expert at the Institute for Foreign and International Trade Law at Georgetown University in Washington. In March 1961, Schwartz drafted an overall concept of European competition policy for von der Groeben, which served as a basis for DG IV’s activities.74 Schumacher was the son of the economist Hermann Schumacher, who had been Eucken’s mentor;75 he became the director of the Directorate for Cartels and Monopolies. Not far from the ideas of these three Germans were those of directorgeneral VerLoren van Themaat, who had long-standing experience of competition policy at the Dutch economics ministry. This group of officials participated in the development of DG IV’s competition policy and served, alongside von der Groeben, as role models for the second group of officials. This group was constituted in the main by younger and/or non-German officials, like the Italian Pappalardo, who had to familiarise themselves with the dominant concept of competition in DG IV, and in particular with the Freiburg School and its protagonists, such as Eucken and Böhm. Their writings were part of this dominant concept, but were not, for example, part of the university curriculum in Italy.76 Soon, however, these officials reached a high level of expertise in this area.

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Leadership by role models is important for facilitating socialisation processes. In interviews conducted by Hans Michelmann in the mid1970s, officials emphasised ‘the importance of leadership in the early EEC phases for the subsequent patterns of policy development in the various DGs’.77 In DG IV, von der Groeben and VerLoren van Themaat had an excellent reputation as the founders of European competition policy.78 Because they were regarded as successful leaders, they served as role models. Their success triggered processes of imitation and social learning. Moreover, frequent and direct contact with these European role models was crucial for motivating DG IV officials. At least during the first and crucial years, when competition policy was being shaped, officials were received and heard by the Commissioner on a regular basis. The feeling of being able to contribute to the decision-making process was important in creating a sense of solidarity with the aims and values of DG IV. According to the available first-hand evidence, this facilitated the formation of an esprit de corps among the civil servants, especially during the founding period, when the Commission was still a rather small administration. DG IV’s autonomy and a sense of ‘being different’ became engrained in the self-perception of DG IV officials. Pappalardo believed, for example, that competition was different from other services in the Commission: ‘DG Competition is an exception in this “mega-mechanism” still today. The competition regulations are to a large extent applicable without consent of the Council.’79 DG IV ‘celebrates its autonomy from the Council’, as Michelmann put it.80 The officials took pride in what they perceived as their effective and important policy sector. Similarly, the idea of being the ‘judges’ of the Commission was propagated by some officials:81 after all, DG IV had judicial functions and its rulings affected enterprises and even governments. Their judge-like tasks had an influence on the officials and their relations with the outside world: they nurtured their image as ‘the incorruptibles’ of the Commission,82 or as its watchdog. With respect to the 1980s, a study by political scientist Michelle Cini backs these findings: the officials shared a certain vision of the world, separating good from bad and seeing themselves as missionaries, spreading the values of competition.83 The French director in DG IV, Armand Saclé, described competition as a Geisteshaltung, or mind-set;84 this coming from a leading French official in DG IV who had no background in ordo-liberalism is an indicator of the successful adoption of DG IV’s competition ideology by its officials. Network formation was a form of socialisation through which actors outside the Commission were familiarised with the Commission’s leading competition concept. This was a slow process, however, since particularly

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at first the directorate concerned with cartel policy focused mainly on academic exchange, something which Scheinman confirms: ‘Some Community pundits have dubbed the cartel sector “l’Université”, especially in view of its tendency to draw heavily on independent experts in the academic community.’85 The situation seems to have changed during the 1970s, however, when DG IV officials appear to have become more accessible and consulted more broadly with (external) professionals concerned with competition policy.86 The reason for this could be that by then a community of competition experts had been formed, containing national civil servants, lawyers and academics who collaborated closely with DG IV, not least because competition policy was beginning to have a tangible impact. From 1958 onwards DG IV organised so-called ‘cartel conferences’ with representatives of national administrations, and Regulation 17 provided for a committee to consider questions of cartels and monopolies. It is likely that these forums facilitated the incremental formation of a transnational competition network. The participants were socialised into this competition community and developed ‘shared causal beliefs and policy aims’87 that eventually resulted in their backing the Commission’s competition policy. It is thus plausible that the socialisation of DG IV officials into a certain concept of competition was followed by the constitution of an expert network transcending the Commission. Moreover, socialisation appears to be a long-term process, reinforced over time. The powers DG IV obtained through Regulation 17 certainly intensified the impact of certain socialisation factors. For instance, the autonomy factor certainly gained in importance after the regulation came into force as the measure constituted the basis of DG IV’s independence. Hence a policy and its effects impact on institutionalisation and fuel socialisation processes. Lee McGowan and Stephen Wilks underline the importance of the time factor for DG IV’s gaining of legitimacy and confidence, arguing that the 1970s were characterised by low morale whereas in the 1980s DG IV ‘emerged onto centre stage’. By then, it had established a competition network ‘by cultivating close relations with the non-core actors’ and had become ‘one of the most active and respected of all the DGs’.88 The low morale of DG IV staff is not confirmed in Michelmann’s 1978 study. Yet, the incremental development of competition policy during this decade could have had an impact on the morale of some DG IV staff. Socialisation of DG VI officials Negotiations and initiatives in the agricultural sector in post-war Europe had led to the creation of an internationally socialised and networked

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group of agricultural experts, and when setting up his DG Mansholt was able to fall back on this network. The appointment of the director-general, the Frenchman Rabot, is one example. On the one hand, Rabot’s appointment was a politically-motivated decision: the French government, having a strong interest in the CAP, insisted on providing the directorgeneral for Agriculture.89 On the other hand, Rabot had been director of the International Relations Directorate in the French agricultural ministry and participated in the Green Pool negotiations. In 1955 he became secretary-general for Food and Agriculture in the OEEC.90 Rabot was thus a well-known figure in the post-war international agricultural negotiations, and Mansholt knew him well.91 He had an important role in recruiting personnel for DG VI. In a Commission meeting, Mansholt emphasised that his director-general had succeeded in putting together a team of collaborators well-suited to the tasks at hand.92 It is very likely that Rabot relied on pre-existing contacts and networks. For instance, the Frenchman Guy Amiet had been deputy secretary-general at the Green Pool negotiations from 1952 to 1955. Amiet had also worked for the OEEC, like his future colleagues in DG VI, the Italian Adolfo Pizzuti, the Belgian François Stroobants and the German Krohn.93 Likewise, Rabot’s assistant, the German von Verschuer, had participated in the Green Pool negotiations, where he got to know Rabot.94 Von Verschuer had also taken part in the Val Duchesse negotiations in 1956, where he met van der Lee; and by January 1958 Mansholt and van der Lee were already considering him for a post in DG VI.95 From the Dutch ministry of agriculture Mansholt brought van der Lee as his first chef de cabinet and Heringa, DG VI’s future deputy director-general. These highly-skilled agricultural experts shared the view that Europe needed a common agricultural policy, and they had confidence in their own problem-solving capacity. The knowledge and previous experience of DG VI officials were an important asset for the Commission, one on which it relied and which it utilised. While officials were partly presocialised in negotiations and organisations dealing with agriculture before entering the Commission, their positive identification with DG VI and its aims was further advanced through leadership and participatory working methods. First, for the officials the direct contact with European role models was important: the personality of Mansholt seems to have made a deep impression on them. His success in building the CAP and his professional and physical strength – he was reported never to get tired during Council negotiations – gave him prestige. In Mansholt, Mozer admired the ‘endless patience of an otherwise impatient character who is obsessed with his mission’.96 Therefore, his collaborators would not only see in him the ‘rooted farmer’ but also a great politician.97 The image

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Mansholt had among his collaborators was thus one of a down-to-earth farmer who became a successful politician because he resolutely fought for two interrelated causes: the CAP and European integration. This went down well with his staff, many of whom had a farming background and had studied agriculture. One official explained the skills and the assertiveness of Mansholt by comparing the successful CAP with the transport sector, where the Community had made less progress: ‘Had Mansholt been responsible for transport, then we would have had a Common Transport Policy.’98 Likewise, Heringa was highly esteemed for his expertise and assiduous manner. He was responsible for devising the complex market organisations; one official called him ‘the engine of the common agricultural policy’ and claimed that his example encouraged them to work ‘Saturdays and Sundays’.99 Interestingly, Heringa was not a strong Europeanist, according to van der Lee, and it was on account of his knowledge that he served as a role model. Director-general Rabot and his assistant von Verschuer also belonged to this circle of leading officials who inspired enthusiasm and loyalty.100 In the mid-1970s Michelmann detected nostalgia among officials for the Mansholt era – they feared that DG VI might lose its status as the ‘glamour DG’ of the Commission.101 However, even in the mid- to late 1970s, leadership was given very high marks in DG VI: the ‘leading positions have gone to capable men, thus leadership is excellent,’102 wrote Michelmann. The tradition of good leadership introduced in DG VI in the 1960s thus seems to have persisted. The CAP was the ‘success story’ of the Commission. In contrast to other policy areas which the Commission dealt with, the CAP had an immediate impact on individuals and the economy in the member states. Whereas initially other DGs were mainly concerned with background studies, DG VI produced most of the Community’s legislation and administered large agricultural funds. In interviews, leading staff of DG VI emphasised the importance of the CAP for the Community and for the functioning of the common market.103 One official explained that the legal texts they wrote had a large impact on Europe.104 Working in a small expert group and convinced that they were making such an impact was always likely to create solidarity with the institution. In his study of the Kennedy Round, Coombes concludes that DG VI officials were more organised and had a stronger predetermined departmental standpoint to defend than others.105 One could argue that they were even more inclined to defend this departmental standpoint as they had contributed to developing the position within DG VI. ‘In the case of Agriculture administrative style happened to favour support of the “departmental philosophy”’, Coombes found.106 Crucially, in the Commission the CAP was considered as leading the way to increased powers for the

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Commission in other policy areas.107 The Commission and the officials in DG VI were convinced that the CAP was the key to European integration. In the following decades the CAP came under increasing criticism, however. In her study on CAP reform Isabelle Garzon argues that the inability to reform the policy was due to a policy-making process in which unanimity voting was the rule and agricultural policy networks ‘developed into a closed policy circle excluding other considerations and interests’.108 Given their involvement in day-to-day management of the CAP in numerous committees, it is likely that DG VI officials became part of these policy-networks, came to share the interests of national civil servants and agricultural interest groups, and thus contributed to maintaining the status quo of the CAP. After the first attempt at changing the direction of the CAP, with the so-called Mansholt Plan of 1968, had failed, DG VI developed into a conservative organisation, according to Eve Fouilleux.109 DG IV and DG VI – two divergent cases Traditional diplomatic history accounts of how ‘national interests’ shaped policy outcome in the EEC do not sufficiently explain why, for example Regulation 17 was adopted, or why the CAP developed in a certain way and not in another. Often there simply were no well-defined national interests, as in the case of France and Regulation 17, and as Knudsen and Ludlow convincingly demonstrate in that of the German government during the founding period of the CAP.110 This chapter has demonstrated that an analysis of the role and impact of institutions and institutional cultures can contribute to a better understanding of the functioning of the early EEC and of how Community policies came into being. Moreover, the early decisions examined in this chapter often had a disproportionately strong impact in that they implemented a particular path which was difficult to revise later on; and one of the factors which helped to reinforce such a path was the emergence of administrative cultures. These were often based on pre-cultures and early decisions, as demonstrated in the case of DG IV and Regulation 17, and/or on presocialised and cohesive groups of officials, as in DG VI. New officials were socialised into these administrative cultures, internalising the values and aims that were an integral part of these cultures. Socialisation processes also affected individuals and institutions outside the Commission, for example through network formation. According to Antje Wiener the EU creates ‘interactive spaces for elites who then take an active role in diffusing norms, ideas and values through interactions back in their respective domestic contexts’.111 This shows that the role of supranational institutions in diffusing and stabilising norms and practices

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is important, and operates outside the realm of the supranational administration itself. In their policy areas both DG IV and DG VI contributed in important ways to creating path dependencies. Clearly, the situation each of the two DGs faced in its own area of policy differed fundamentally one from another. The first difference concerns the role of pressure groups, which in competition policy were not as clearly defined nor as well organised as in the agricultural sector. Business lobbies at the national and European levels, such as the CNPF and UNICE, respectively, hesitated to embrace the Commission’s proposals for Regulation 17, which they considered too rigid. However, they did not develop a common strategy to push their view forward, nor did they come up with a coherent alternative proposal. Also, it is likely that the implications of a European competition policy as conceived by DG IV were not understood nor entirely foreseen (or foreseeable) by some business lobbies and member-state governments. The Commission was thus able to shape the common competition policy with the help of a coalition in favour of its approach. Farmers’ organisations, on the contrary, had collaborated transnationally since before World War II.112 Here the Commission and governments of the member states were confronted with well-organised agricultural pressure groups, with focused interests.113 Moreover, farmers were considered an important electorate, in particular for the Christian Democrats who still governed most member states in the 1960s. An agricultural policy in favour of these groups was seen as part of the postwar consensus;114 to a large extent DG VI and the Commission supported and became an integral part of this consensus. With the CAP, national protectionism and the management of the costly agricultural subsidies were transferred to the supranational level.115 DG VI helped to shape this important Community policy, and ended up administering it. The second difference with the agricultural policy area was the degree of pre-socialisation by the officials concerned, and their consciousness of the issues at stake in their sector. Before entering the Commission, many of the DG VI officials had participated in post-war negotiations or had worked for international organisations dealing with agriculture. This experience, combined with Mansholt’s collaborative approach in DG VI and with the early successes of the CAP, reinforced their view of a need for a European agricultural policy devised and administered by the Commission. Officials in DG IV had generally less previous experience in their subject area, and in many cases they were entirely convinced into accepting competition as the basis of the common market after they were appointed to the Commission. The outcome was similar in both DGs. DG IV and DG VI therefore have in common the fact that, within the

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Commission, their personnel – while sharing a particular generational experience – was confronted with role models, good leadership and participatory working methods. Commission staff developed a high degree of expertise that allowed them to feel as competent actors in their work, able to influence the policy-making process. This facilitated their adopting the institutions’ norms, aims and values. It also guaranteed the continuity of the agricultural and competition policies even after Mansholt and von der Groeben had left the Commission. The early decisions in competition and agricultural policy had a longterm impact in both policy areas. Regulation 17 was in force for over 40 years, and the many attempts to reform the CAP were only carried out in a half-hearted manner because of the high political and social costs a more fundamental reform would have entailed. The first years of an organisation and the first set of personnel are thus crucial in getting a policy on track. In the case of DG IV ordo-liberal views on competition were introduced and prevailed, not least because of personnel continuity. VerLoren van Themaat’s successors in the post of director-general were Albrecht, Caspari and Schlieder; all three were German and had been close collaborators of von der Groeben. Compared with DG VI, DG IV’s story is that of a more gradual development. As networks of competition experts were nearly non-existent in post-war Europe, the powerful instruments the Commission obtained through Regulation 17 could only be used effectively after a period of network-building and socialisation of external actors. The building of a body of competition case-law through judgments of the ECJ was also conducive to DG IV becoming much more active in the 1980s.116 When it came to putting its preferences into practice, the Commission often had to rely, to get its proposals approved, on coalitions formed of member-state governments, interest groups and expert networks. In the incipient multi-level political system of the EEC the success of a Commission proposal depended on such coalitions for backing a particular policy. At the same time, the Commission and its staff played a pro-active part in forging coalitions in favour of its proposals.

CONCLUSIONS

European bureaucracies – an integral part of Europe’s supranational history As this book has demonstrated, the setting-up of the organisation, the introduction of working methods and recruitment mechanisms in the High Authority and the Commission produced elements of a distinct European administrative culture. Put under close scrutiny, many of these elements were linked to the aim of gaining legitimacy for the new supranational institutions. Thus, the central idea of supranationality was often traded for legitimacy. The principle of collegiality has become a core feature of the European administrative culture; decision-making in the college, where nationals of all member states were represented, increases the legitimacy of decisions. Collegiality is still today the basis of decisionmaking in the European Commission. Although both the High Authority and the Commission were entitled to recruit personnel independently, concessions had to be made when it came to the nationality of staff and the special interests of a member state in a policy area. Both administrations distributed posts according to an informal national balance. As each member state was represented in the administration according to a certain quota, the national balance was seen as enhancing the legitimacy of the European administration, and became another of its core features. The European administrations were not created from scratch. Instead, they were built on the experience of individuals from a variety of traditions characterising national administrations and international organisations. The founding presidents of the High Authority and the Commission, Monnet and Hallstein, had a strong impact on the internal organisation of their administrations. When shaping them, they took into account pre-existing models – whether the Tennessee Valley Authority, the French Planning Commission or the Auswärtiges Amt. Designing the administrations along the lines of well-known models increased their

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legitimacy; this was particularly the case for the Commission, which incorporated elements of the French and the German administrations. Both the High Authority and the Commission were confronted with efforts of national governments, political parties and interest groups to transpose certain political and economic concepts or policies onto the European level. The recruitment strategy of both the High Authority and the Commission was geared towards incorporating these groups into the administration. The aim was to reproduce a miniature image of member states’ societies at the European level. This, again, served the aim of increasing the legitimacy of the European bureaucracies. The administrations became more autonomous in their staff policies once they adopted staff regulations. This was an important step towards an independent supranational civil service, introducing a career system and the guarantee of life-long employment, similar to the national civil service. Moreover, the statute facilitated the formation of a group identity and of identification with the institutions. While practices such as parachuting, secondment or the national balance persisted, conflicting loyalties of officials seem to have been only a minor problem in the European administrations. Indeed, a requirement for officials to become effectively stateless would have undermined the European administrations’ legitimacy, as this was largely based, at least originally, on the rootedness of their officials in their member state’s national traditions; and this provided the European administrations with insight from such national perspectives. The legitimacy of the High Authority and the Commission vis-à-vis their staff but also the outside world was enhanced by a founding myth that was to justify the European administrations’ claim to embody the European cause. Their early years were not only crucial in terms of setting up administrative structures and establishing working methods, but also in generating such a founding myth. Monnet and, to a lesser extent, Hallstein as the founding presidents were crucial in this respect, as they cultivated and at the same time became part of the founding myths of the High Authority and the Commission. Such a myth is important for an institution’s history and for the values and legitimacy emanating from it, and in the case of the High Authority and the Commission it facilitated the officials’ adoption of these values. In the Commission in particular, the first period was extremely successful and characterised by a euphoric atmosphere. During this period of creation and creativity, important capital was accumulated for motivating the administrative staff. This legitimised the institution and its actions and resulted in the establishment of a durable relationship of trust between officials and the Commission.

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In summary, many features of the European administrations were a response to member states’ concerns that they could become an unaccountable ‘technocratic Areopagus’1. It was a major aim of the European bureaucracies to be accepted as serious and competent interlocutors. This was also achieved by recruiting able staff. Towards a prosopography of the European Union Most of the Commission’s officials belonged to the 45er generation, and thus had shared a crucial experience: World War II. Profoundly marked by it, many of them had idealistic motives for entering an organisation where a strong esprit de corps could flourish. A united Europe, after the experience of extreme European disunity, was a positive aim with which they all could identify. Moreover, the educational and professional background of both DG IV and DG VI officials was relatively homogeneous. This is an important finding with regard to the internal cohesion of the different DGs and, ultimately, their policies. The High Authority’s officials, on the contrary, were more heterogeneous and split into two groups: technical experts, mainly of the century generation and the younger 45er generalists. This shows that the choice of personnel was adapted to the respective ‘mission’ of the European administration. The High Authority needed experienced technical experts to draw up and administer the common coal and steel policies, who did not necessarily have to be convinced protagonists of Europeanism. The Commission, concerned with economic integration, attracted mostly younger individuals, often from national administrations and often with previous international experience. While these did not necessarily need to be convinced Europeans either, their younger average age and the dominant war experience made them more receptive to socialisation pressures within the Commission. Studying the biographical background of the High Authority technical experts turned out to be difficult. The lack of source material inevitably circumscribed the conclusions concerning this group. It would be going too far, for instance, to claim that these officials generally had less European spirit than their colleagues of the 45er generation. The existing source material suggests, however, that a number of them were primarily interested in working towards solutions for the European coal and steel industries, and were less concerned with European political unification. The crucial importance of institutions, institutional cultures and actors for understanding EC policies European policies could only be as good as the European administrations’ staff and organisation. The three-step model developed in Chapter 5

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demonstrates how particular paths in competition and agricultural policies were implemented and which factors contributed to keeping these paths in place over a long period of time. Important groundwork in these policy areas was laid in the crucial early years of the Community. To explain how these early decisions came about and why they took on a certain shape, the chapter showed that it is important to look beyond intergovernmental bargaining in the Council of Ministers. Exploring the role of and the interplay between historical context, institutions, institutional cultures and actor socialisation contributes to a better understanding of the process of politics in Europe. The Commission in the 1970s The 1970s are generally seen as a period of inertia and crisis for the Community, and for the Commission in particular.2 For example, in proposing a reform of the Commission’s services, the Spierenburg Report of 1979 stated that over the preceding decade the Commission’s ‘influence, effectiveness and reputation [had] declined’.3 Scholars of public administration such as Anthony Downs argue that administrations experience life cycles – ups and downs.4 After a successful decade of institution-building, and of initiating and shaping policies, it is likely that the Commission did indeed experience a downward move during the 1970s and early 1980s. This was certainly caused by both internal and external factors restricting the Commission’s room for manoeuvre. Arguably, the so-called Luxembourg Compromise of January 1966 following the empty-chair crisis ‘bore the seeds of a weaker Commission’5 and resulted in curbing the optimism that had reigned in the Hallstein Commission up to the mid-1960s. In addition, when Hallstein left in 1967, his successor, Jean Rey, was immediately confronted with a major challenge: the merger of the executives. The merger treaty came into force on 1 July 1967: joining together the High Authority, the EEC and the Euratom Commissions not only brought about organisational and logistical problems, but also resulted in a clash of three administrative cultures. The difference between the three traditions in the – now much larger – Single Commission was still apparent to Christopher Audland when he became deputy secretary-general in 1973.6 Although meticulously prepared by Noël since 1963, restructuring the merged administration and reallocating roles took time. In a speech to the European Parliament in May 1968, Rey characterised the merger as ‘extremely difficult’ and an ‘unfortunate period’.7 Just as things had more or less returned to an even tempo, the Commission was confronted with the next challenge: the first enlargement of 1973.8 Officials from three new member states, Britain, Denmark and

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Ireland, had to be integrated into the services. Importantly, the ‘anglosaxon’ administrative tradition and the Whitehall model posed a threat to the Commission’s administrative culture. In 1971 Christopher Soames, the British Ambassador to France, expected that given the good reputation of the British civil service, the UK’s entry would help to ‘ensure administrative efficiency’ in the Community.9 Indeed, nationals of the new member states advocated a reform of the administration which would lead to more efficiency and better staff management. A direct result of this pressure was the commissioning of the Spierenburg Report, which made suggestions for improving the Commission’s organisation and career management. Changes in the post-enlargement administration seem to have been more gradual than radical, however. For example, French continued for a long time as the main working language in the Commission. The impact of the first and subsequent enlargements on the Commission and its administrative culture(s) remains to be studied. The general change in the European political and economic climate during the 1970s has to count as an external factor affecting the Commission’s performance. After completion of the customs union, and with the CAP fully functioning by the late 1960s, the Commission and the Community had to identify new goals. The summit of The Hague in December 1969 was in this respect an important event, as the heads of state and government of the Six decided on the widening, deepening and completion of the Community. The subsequent rise of European summitry and the establishment of the European Council showed, however, that further integration would not, at least not in the near future, go hand in hand with an increase in the Commission’s power. The new area of European Political Cooperation, for example, established in the aftermath of the summit of The Hague and of the 1970 Davignon Report, was primarily intergovernmental. The Commission was increasingly confined to administering rather than initiating policies. The merger, the enlargement and the generally less integration-friendly climate had an effect on the morale of Commission officials in the 1970s. Respondents in interviews go as far as considering the merger as a first ‘shock’ and enlargement as a second,10 with the latter watering down11 the integration process. Others, on the contrary, experienced the first enlargement as ‘enriching’.12 More generally, the 1970s were perceived as a ‘period of administration’ and stagnation for which they blamed the practice of unanimous decision-taking in the Council, which slowed down progress in Community policy-making,13 and shortcomings in the Commission itself, such as the lack of policy initiative and the increased bureaucratisation and inefficiency of the administration.14

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Whether crisis and ‘eurosclerosis’, or progress, dominated the integration process in the 1970s and early 1980s is currently a subject of discussion in historical research. A recent volume on the period 1969–84 is sub-titled ‘Towards a Europe of the Second Generation’, thus shunning the term ‘crisis’.15 As archival material becomes available, it is the historians’ task to investigate how a ‘second-generation Commission’, its services and staff coped with and performed under the challenges of the 1970s. Moreover, new areas of activity were identified, for example regional, industrial, energy and environmental policies, and economic and monetary union. The Commission became again more of a policy entrepreneur, for example, when Commission president Roy Jenkins (1977–81) successfully launched an initiative to revive the idea of economic and monetary union and, as a first step, to create a European Monetary System during 1977–79. It may well be that the 1970s will be judged more successful for the Commission than they now appear to have been. The structures and practices introduced in the Commission in the late 1950s and early 1960s seem to have been remarkably resilient. They were only seriously challenged by vice-president Neil Kinnock’s Task Force for Administrative Reform16 – the most radical and successful reform to date. The process was triggered in October 1999 and resulted in a number of important changes, among them the introduction of new staff rules in 2004, after the old statute had been in place for over 40 years.17 However, with its aim of infusing its employees with the Commission’s institutional interests, unifying their preferences and strengthening their ‘ethos of impartiality’,18 it seems that this reform was also an attempt of returning to the values of the early Hallstein Commission.

NOTES

1 2 3

4 5 6

7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14

Introduction

Monnet 1978: 376. On the history of the High Authority, see Spierenburg and Poidevin 1994. On the so-called relance européenne, see Serra 1989. On the treaty negotiations, see Küsters 1982. A comprehensive account of the treaty negotiations based on archival sources is still lacking. A highly-specialised organisation with a mixed balance-sheet, Euratom was soon over-shadowed by the EEC, and will play no role in this study. On the emergence of Euratom, see Weilemann 1983; for a short balance-sheet cf. Nugent 2001: 33–5. For a detailed account of the Commission’s roles see Coombes 1970: 78–86. Varsori 2006a: 9; Seidel forthcoming. For Schuman, see Poidevin 1986; for De Gasperi, see Kohler 1979; Conze, Corni and Pombeni 2004; Craveri 2006; for Spaak, see Dumoulin 1999; for Adenauer, see Küsters 1983; Schwarz 1986; 1991; and for Monnet, see Fontaine 1988; Duchêne 1994; Roussel 1996; Monnet 1978. Rasmussen 2009. One of the first to use the term ‘supranational history’ is Johnny Laursen 2002. For an overview of recent publication trends, see Kaiser 2006b; Kaiser and Varsori forthcoming. See Dumoulin 2007a on the European Commission; Ludlow 2005a and 2009 on the Coreper; Varsori 2006b on the Economic and Social Committee; Poidevin and Spierenburg 1994 on the High Authority; Kaiser 2006a and 2007 on Christian Democrats’ networks; Kaiser, Leucht and Rasmussen 2009 for supranational and transnational European integration history. Ludlow 2006a. Ibid., 212. Coombes 1970; Haas 1958/1968; 1964; Lindberg 1963; 1965; Scheinman 1971. Dumoulin 2007a. Spierenburg and Poidevin 1994.

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15 Hooghe 2001; 1999a; 1999b; 1999c; Georgakakis 2008; Georgakakis and de Lassalle 2007. 16 Hooghe 2001: 205. 17 For example, Knudsen 2009 and Ludlow 2006b. 18 The term is used by Ludlow 2006b to describe the failure of Hallstein’s institutional ‘vision’ of the Commission to extend its power and influence in the EEC. 19 Spence 1997: 91. 20 Varsori 2006a: 11. 21 Article 4 §1(b) excludes personal data from the right of the public to access Community documents. Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, Official Journal of the European Communities, L 145/43, 31 May 2001. 22 A large number of interviews are available on the website of the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence and at the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe in Lausanne. I am grateful to Sibylle Hambloch and Jürgen Elvert for making available to me the interviews they conducted with former civil servants and Commissioners. 23 Kaiser 2005: 30. 24 Memoirs were rarely written by high officials but rather by former members of the High Authority and the Commission, for example Potthoff 1973; Lemaignen 1964; Marjolin 1986; von der Groeben 1995. Exceptions are Uri 1991; Allardt 1979; Van Helmont 1986; von Staden 2001. 25 For example Peterson 1971; 1974–75; Michelmann 1978a; 1978b. 26 Radaelli 2000: 4; 2003: 30. 27 For the Commission this is confirmed by Nugent 2001: 19. 1 2

3

4 5 6

Chapter 1

Duchêne 1994: 235. Ernst B. Haas, paraphrased in Hooghe and Marks 2001: 161, fn 4. On the originality of the High Authority and the EEC Commission as supranational organisations compared to secretariats of international organisations, cf. Sidjanski 1964. European Commission, Historical Archives, Brussels [henceforth ECHA], Archives of the High Authority [henceforth CEAB] 2 34, République Française, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Rapport de la Délégation Française sur le Traité instituant la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier et la Convention relative aux dispositions transitoires, signés à Paris le 18 Avril 1951, Paris, October 1951. Ibid., 21. All foreign-language citations from the literature and other sources are translated into English by the author. Spierenburg and Poidevin 1994: 47. Archives Nationales, Paris [henceforth ANP], Archives of the Planning Commission (81 AJ), 160, E. Hirsch, note, Réflexions sur l’organisation de la Haute Autorité, undated.

NOTES 7 8 9

10

11 12

13 14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21

22 23

181

Lepsius 1995: 394–5. For a collective biography of the members of the High Authority, see Carbonell 2008. Cf. for example ECHA, Archives of the Commissions of the EEC and of Euratom [henceforth BAC] 233/1980 33, Sekretariat für Fragen des Schuman Plans, Dr Sahm, Aufzeichnung für die Sitzung am Montag den 11. Februar, betr. Vorbereitende Maßnahmen für den Schumanplan, undated [February 1952], 10–15, here 11. Founded in 1874 as the Verein Deutscher Eisen- und Stahl-Industrieller, the association was renamed Wirtschaftsvereinigung der Eisen- und Stahlindustrie in 1946. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin [henceforth PAAA], Personal Papers of Walter Hallstein, Vol. 14, Max C. Müller to Hallstein, 9 May 1952. For different organisational schemes, particularly in the steel industry, see also Barthel 1996; for the German coal and steel industry and trade unions, cf. Bühlbäcker 2007; Bührer 1986. Barthel 1996. The Interim Committee took no decisions on the organisation and staffing of the High Authority, not least because Germany withdrew the items on the internal organisation and personnel of the new administration from the agenda of the first meeting on 17 May 1951; see Gillingham 1991: 294. Monnet 1978: 304–5. Ibid., 384. On the TVA, cf. ibid., 276; Ekbladh 2002. Monnet 1978: 232–63. The French Planning Commission was responsible for setting up and implementing the Plan de modernisation et d’équipement de l’Union française, the French national programme for modernisation and reconstruction. This is often referred to as the ‘Monnet Plan’ or ‘French Plan’. See Mioche 1987; Mioche and Cazès 1990. Mioche 1987: 75–6. Monnet 1978: 373. BAC 233/1980 33, Erwägungen über die Organisation der Hohen Behörde, no author, undated [1952]. Ibid., Aide-Memoire über die Besprechung mit Herrn Etzel, Zeitplan über die Inkraftsetzung des Schuman Plans, 16 July 1952. CEAB 3 37, Duits Voorstel [remainder illegible], 4 August 1952, 8–17. The participants at this meeting were: Jean Monnet, Léon Daum, Pierre Uri, Jacques van Helmont, Etienne Hirsch, Heinz Potthoff, Ulrich Sahm, Franz Etzel, Max Kohnstamm and Richard A. Hamburger. Conrad 1989: 52 mentions proposals put forward by the Belgian government and the Belgian coal industry. Archives Nationales, Luxembourg [henceforth ANL], Affaires Etrangères 11384, Plan Schuman – Négociations, Rapports d’ensemble sur l’évolution des négociations 1950, document STRICTEMENT SECRET, undated [ca. August/September 1950]. For similar fears on the part of the Belgian government, see Conrad 1989: 41.

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24 BAC 233/1980 33, Aufzeichnung über die Besprechung bei Herrn Monnet in Paris am 4. August 1952, 2. 25 Monnet also seems to have succeeded in excluding organisational and staffrelated questions from the agenda of the meetings of the Interim Committee. See PAAA, Abtlg. 2, Sekretariat für Fragen des Schuman-Plans, Bd. 186, Bl. 1–3, Sahm to Hallstein, Aufzeichnung. Betr.: Gespräch mit dem Mitglied der Belgischen Schuman-plandelegation Herrn Vinkh [sic], 18 February 1952. 26 Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, Lausanne [henceforth FJM], Personal Papers of Jean Monnet, AMH 3/1/7, Note sur l’organisation de la Haute Autorité, annotations manuscrites de J.M., corrections manuscrites de P. Uri, undated. 27 Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence [henceforth HAEU], DEP PU 204, Entretien Pierre Uri – Eric Westphal, Paris, 14 February 1966, 4. 28 FJM, AMH 3/3/14, P. Uri, Note sur l’organisation initiale du travail et des services, 25 September 1952. 29 CEAB 2 713, PV (Procès-verbal) of the High Authority, 1 October 1952, (pt. 3), 68–70, here 68–9. 30 FJM, AMH 3/3/29, Note pour Monsieur le Président, 19 September 1952. 31 FJM, AMH 3/3/23, Exposé de M. Jean Monnet, Président de la Haute Autorité, devant la commission d’organisation [de l’Assemblée commune] de la Communauté européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier, 18 November 1952. 32 PAAA, Abtlg. 2, Sekretariat für Fragen des Schuman-Plans, Bd. 186, Bl. 73–7, [Monnet], Aufzeichnung über die Organisation der Hohen Behörde, 16 July 1952. 33 FJM, AMH 3/3/23, Exposé de M. Jean Monnet. 34 Monnet 1978: 386. 35 CEAB 2 588, Communiqué, 24 November 1959, 1–3. For the reform, cf. Spierenburg and Poidevin 1994: 479–86. 36 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 1st session, 11 August 1952, 3. 37 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 8th session, 4 September 1952, 35. 38 CEAB 9 26, P. Uri, Memorandum über die Gliederung der zuerst anfallenden Aufgaben der Hohen Behörde, 23 August 1952. 39 See FJM, Pierre Uri, interview with Roberto Ducci and Maria Grazia Melchionni, Paris, 21 September 1984. 40 Cf. also Spirenburg 1994: 74. 41 Cf. for example CEAB 2 715, PV of the High Authority, 82nd session, 15 April 1953; Spierenburg 1994: 69, 72; Gérard Wissels, interview with the author, Overijse, 22 April 2004. 42 CEAB 1 908, PV of the High Authority, 224th session, 5 November 1954, Annex II, Règlement Général d’Organisation de la Haute Autorité du 5 novembre 1954, article 9. 43 CEAB 1 821, J.P. [J. Poincaré], Organisation du travail de la Haute Autorité, 27 March 1954. 44 FJM, AMH 6/6/1, Projet de directive du Président de la Haute Autorité, undated [January 1953]. 45 HAEU, INT 609, Jacques-René Rabier, interview with Gérard Bossuat, location unknown, June 1998; Duchêne 1994: 240.

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46 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 14th session, 1 October 1952, pt. 1, 68–70, here 68. 47 CEAB 2 268, PV of the High Authority, 268th session, 6 June 1955. 48 Duchêne 1994: 239. 49 BAC 233/1980 33, Erwägungen über die Organisation der Hohen Behörde, undated [1952]. 50 FJM, AMH 3/3/31, P. Uri, Note pour le Président sur la répartition des départments entre les Membres de la HA (confidentiel), 4 October 1952. 51 Barthel 1996: 243. 52 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 15th session, 2 October 1952. 53 FJM, AMH 3/3/18, M. Lagrange, Note sur le fonctionnement des services de la Haute Autorité, 6 October 1952. 54 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 15th session, 2 October 1952. 55 FJM, AMH 6/4/38, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur Monnet (III), 21 November 1953. 56 CEAB 2 586, D. Spierenburg, Note pour les membres de la Haute Autorité, 21 November 1953, 8–12, including the documents Projet de Règlement Général d’Administration and Propositions for working groups. 57 One of the first drafts of an overview of the working parties to be established dates back to early September 1953; FJM, AMH 6/7/6, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur Monnet, 7 September 1953. 58 CEAB 2 1239, J. Monnet, Memorandum du Président pour les Membres de la Haute Autorité, 24 November 1953. 59 Morgan 1992: 9. 60 CEAB 2 1239, J. Monnet, Memorandum, 24 November 1953. 61 CEAB 2 586, W. von der Heide, Vermerk, 28 November 1953, 47–9. 62 FJM, AMH 6/7/7, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur Monnet, 17 November 1953; see also the documents in FJM, AMH 6/4/38; Bühlbäcker 2005: 35–6. 63 CEAB 2 586, Protokoll der 134. Sitzung der Hohen Behörde, 26 November 1953, 57–59, with the final decision being taken on 1 December: CEAB 2 718, PV of the High Authority, 137th session, 1 December 1953. 64 Ibid., pt. 1. 65 CEAB 2 586, W. von der Heide, Vermerk, 28 November 1953, 47–9, here 48. 66 Mazey 1992: 41. 67 CEAB 2 223, PV of the High Authority, 224th session, 5 November 1954, Annexes I and II. 68 Cf. HAEU, INT 659, Edmund Wellenstein, interview with R.P.B.H. Dingemans and J. Schram, The Hague, 10 July 1998. 69 BAC 233/1980 33, Aufzeichnung über die Besprechung bei Herr Monnet in Paris am 4. August 1952. 70 FJM, AMH 6/6/5, W. Ernst, Mémoire demandé par M. Kohnstamm à l’intention de M. Etzel, 30 June 1953; Spierenburg and Poidevin 1994: 74. 71 FJM, AMH, 6/4/15, letter, M. Kohnstamm to J. Monnet, 7 August 1953, 2. 72 CEAB 1 821, J. Monnet, Note à MM. les Directeurs, 1 October 1953, 4. 73 Ibid., J. Monnet, Note pour Messieurs les Membres et Messieurs les Directeurs, 16 September 1953, 3.

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74 FJM, AMH 6/6/1, Projet de directive du Président de la Haute Autorité, undated [Jan. 1953]. 75 CEAB 7 405, Note E. Wellenstein to Directors of the Market Division, 12 October 1956. 76 Spierenburg 1994: 74. 77 CEAB 2 91, [J. Monnet], Projet de note du President Monnet pour son successeur, undated [1955], 7. 78 Ritchie 1992: 96–7. 79 Wissels, interview with the author. 80 CEAB 2 1239, M. Kohnstamm, Note à MM. les Membres de la Haute Autorité, 21 October 1953. 81 The contribution of Jean Degimbe, in CECA 1952–2002. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2002, 94. 82 CEAB 2 574, PV of the High Authority, 574th session, 6–7 April 1960. 83 CEAB 2 577, PV of the High Authority, 577th session, 5 May 1960; Wissels, interview with the author. 84 Cf. Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (henceforth BAK), B 102, No 8628, Etzel to Rust, 25 November 1954. 85 FJM, AMH 3/1/7, Note sur l’organisation de la Haute Autorité. 86 Cf. ANP, 81 AJ 160, E. Hirsch, Réflexions sur l’organisation de la Haute Autorité, undated. 87 FJM, AMH 3/1/1, Aide-mémoire sur la conversation avec M. Etzel, correction manuscrites de J.M., 16 July 1952. 88 Duchêne 1994: 220. 89 ANL, Affaires Etrangères No. 11393, Le Ministre de Luxembourg en France to Bech, 20 June 1952. 90 BAC 233/1980 33, Aufzeichnung über die Besprechung bei Herr Monnet, pt. 9. 91 CEAB 3 37, Letter R. Hamburger to D. Spierenburg, 5 August 1952. 92 Sahm 1994: 140. 93 Monnet described Erhard as a ‘dogmatic “liberal” economist, who kept a close watch on our work’: Monnet 1978: 329. 94 BAC 233/1980 33 (1952), Auswärtiges Amt, Konferenzsekretariat Tgb. Nr. 1189/52, 18 July 1952; Sahm 1994. 95 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 11th session, 18 September 1952, 59. 96 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 15th session, 2 October 1952, 3–9, here 3. Cf. also ibid., 18th session, 14 October 1952, 94–5. 97 Ibid., 23rd session, 4 November 1952, 118–21, here 120–1; CEAB 1 1414, Situation générale des services du personnel de la Haute Autorité, 29 November 1952. 98 CEAB 1 1415, Administration Haute Autorité, 27 January 1953. 99 Cf. Conrad 1989: 64–5, on the role of the Administrative Affairs Committee. 100 CEAB 1 908, PV of the High Authority, 224th session, 5 November 1954, Annex II, Règlement Général d’Organisation de la Haute Autorité du 5 novembre 1954, article 6. 101 Spierenburg 1994: 76. 102 Mazey 1992: 39. 103 Cf. Bühlbäcker 2007: 14.

NOTES

185

104 ANL, Affaires Etrangères, No. 11384, Concerne la question des pouvoirs du Président et la création des services administratifs, STRICTEMENT SECRET, undated [ca. August/September 1950]. 105 See FJM, AMH 4/3/186, AMH 4/3/187, AMH 4/3/188, AMH 4/3/190, AMH 4/3/191, AMH 4/3/192, AMH 4/3/193; for Etzel’s list, see CEAB 12 55, ‘List of Vice-President Etzel’, undated, 136–41. 106 Barthel 1996. 107 Bührer 1999: 217. 108 BAC 233/1980 33, Aufzeichnung über die Besprechung bei Herr Monnet. 109 ANL, Affaires Etrangères, No. 11384, Report, Wehrer to Bech, 2 August 1950. 110 FJM, AMH 4/3/339, Candidatures présentées par Charbonnages de France, 29 September 1952. 111 Barthel 1996: 243. 112 Monnet 1978: 385. 113 BAK, B 102, No. 8614, Kellermann an Dr. Krautwig, Betr.: Organisation der Schumanplan-Behörde, 27 November 1951. 114 BAK, B 102, No. 8614, Deutsches Personal bei der Hohen Behörde, 19 January 1953. 115 CEAB 3 389, C. Balladore-Pallieri, Vorlage für den Verwaltungsausschuss, undated [presumably 1953], 38. The personnel division of the High Authority was inundated with some 4,300 applications. 116 BAK, B 102, H. von der Groeben to state secretary L. Westrick, 25 May 1953. 117 Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, [henceforth MAEF], DE-CE Coopération économique 1945–1966, Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier, Vol. 527, note of the Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières, 29 July 1952. 118 BAK, B 102, No. 8614, Vermerk für Herrn Min. Dgt. Solveen von Dr. Spandau, 6 January 1955. 119 Cf. International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam [henceforth IISH], ETUC 261, Confédération Internationale des Syndicats Libres, Commission pour le Plan Schuman, Rapport sur la séance du 3 juillet 1952 à Berlin. 120 BAK, B 102, No. 8615, Letter DGB to Adenauer, 27 September 1952. 121 FJM, AMH 4/3/124, Letter J. Monnet to A. Cools, undated [ca. late 1952/early 1953]. 122 BAK, B 102, No. 8614, H. von der Groeben to state secretary Dr Westrick, 28 May 1953. 123 Pasture 2005: 123. 124 Bührer 1999: 208–10. 125 FJM, AMH 4/5/2, P. Uri, Note sur la ‘repartition équitable’ pour les postes dans les services, 15 October 1952. 126 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 23rd session, 4 November 1952, 118–21. 127 CEAB 2 713, Note à MM. les Membres de la Haute Autorité concernant un entretien informel qui a eu lieu le vendredi, 5 décembre [1952], 165–7, here 166. 128 CEAB 2 1419, E. Wellenstein, Note pour Monsieur Dinjeart, 30 October 1958, 19.

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129 CEAB 2 1419, E. Wellenstein, Note pour Monsieur le Directeur du Personnel et de l’Administration et Monsieur le Chef du Service Budget et Contrôle, 8 October 1958, 18. 130 CEAB 2 1419, E. Wellenstein, Note pour Monsieur Dinjeart, 19. 131 CEAB 2 726, PV of the High Authority, 268th session, 6 June 1955, pt. 4. 132 CEAB 2 352, PV of the High Authority, Sonderprotokoll des geheimen Teils der 352. Sitzung der Hohen Behörde vom 19. Dezember 1956, um 19 Uhr in Luxemburg. 133 HAEU, DEP PU 204, Entretien Pierre Uri – Eric Westphal, 25. 134 CEAB 2 1239, J. Monnet, Memorandum du Président pour les Membres de la Haute Autorité, 24 November 1953. 135 Cf. Conrad 1992: 61–3, for the tasks and the work of the Four Presidents Committee. 136 FJM, AMH 3/3/7, note, Technischer Aufbau, no author, undated. 137 BAK, B 102, No. 8214, Hartmann [Finance Ministry] to the Minister of Economics, 8 October 1952, citing the example of Heinrich Gerns. 138 FJM, AMH 3/4/2, R. Hamburger, Chronologie de l’exécution des mesures d’organisation, 10 October 1952. 139 FJM, AMH 6/4/47, Letter M. Kohnstamm to J.M., 16 July 1954. 140 FJM, AMH 3/4/4, R. Hamburger, Note à MM. les Membres de la Commission pour les Questions administratives, 20 October 1952. 141 CEAB 2 89, C. Balladore-Pallieri, Plan de travail dans le secteur administratif, 13 July 1953. The three-month notice period is mentioned in CEAB 3 515, Arbeitsgruppe für Verwaltungsfragen, Protokoll über die Sitzungen vom 30. Juni, 7, 13. und 14. Juli 1954, 15 July 1954, 22–36, here 25. 142 The preparatory work on the staff regulations of the ECSC, their provisions and implications can only be treated here in a cursory manner. For more details see Sassi 2000. 143 CEAB 12 73, Compte rendu de la réunion ‘Statut du personnel’, 28 October 1953, 43. 144 CEAB 2 1146, An die Herren Mitglieder der Hohen Behörde, Aufzeichnung über die Sitzung des Ausschusses der vier Präsidenten vom 19. Dezember 1952, Vertraulich, 22 December 1952, 4–6. 145 FJM, AMH 4/1/31, J.M., Mémorandum du Président de la Haute Autorité sur le statut des fonctionnaires, 25 October 1954. 146 Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris [henceforth MAEF], DECE Coopération économique 1945–1966, Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier, Vol. 527, Note pour Monsieur le Ministre de l’Industrie et du Commerce de Relations avec la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier, 18 March 1955. 147 PAAA, B 18, Bd. 151, Dr Müller-Roschach, Kurzprotokoll der Ressortbesprechung über das Personalstatut der EGKS, 9 December 1955. 148 Cf. Conrad 1992: 69. 149 CEAB 2 294, PV of the High Authority, 294th session, 30 November 1955, Points secrets. 150 Ibid.

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151 PAAA, B 18, Vol. 7, Dr Müller-Roschach, Aufzeichnung, 12 January 1956, 3. The Benelux countries were in favour of European officials leaving their national civil service. Cf. ibid., Dr Motz to the Ministers of the Interior, Finance and Economics, 19 January 1956. 152 CEAB 2 297, PV of the High Authority, 297th session, 21 December 1955; CEAB 12 153, Statut du Personnel de la Communauté, undated [July 1956]. 153 Conrad 1992: 70. 154 FJM, AMH 6/4/31, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur Monnet, 22 October 1953. 155 FJM, AMH 3/3/23, Exposé de M. Jean Monnet. 156 Bach 1995: 370. 157 CEAB 7 8, C. Balladore-Pallieri, An die Herren Direktoren, 15 March 1953. 158 See for example Marcel Jaurant-Singer, interview with the author, Paris, 22 January 2005; Max Kohnstamm, interview with the author, Fenffe, 26 April 2004. 159 Cf. Antoon Herpels, interview with the author, Tervuren, 13 April 2004; Kees Zijlstra, interview with the author, Sneek, 26 February 2005. 160 CEAB 3 516, Arbeitsgruppe für Verwaltungsfragen, Protokoll über die 9. Sitzung vom 25. September 1954, 29 September 1954, 10–11. 161 CEAB 12 99, P. Finet, Note pour Messieurs les Directeurs, 29 March 1955, 56–7; Spierenburg 1994: 72. 162 CEAB 3 516, Arbeitsgruppe für Verwaltungsfragen, Protokoll, 10. 163 CECA, Haute Autorité, Exposé sur la Situation de la Communauté, 10 Janvier 1953, 18. However, another staff list contains only 100 employees, CEAB 3 389, Situation du Personnel et des Services à la date du 27 janvier 1953, 6–10. 164 CEAB 2 472, Sonderprotokoll der 472. Sitzung der Hohen Behörde vom 17. November 1958, 13 December 1958, 141. 165 Mazey 1992: 43. 166 CEAB 2 319, PV of the High Authority, 319th session, 17 May 1956. 167 Mazey 1992: 45. 168 Ibid., 46. 169 Carbonell (2008) shows this for the members of the High Authority. See also Dichgans 1980. 1 2 3 4 5 6

Chapter 2

Cf. Haas 1968: 13–15; Deutsch et al 1957: 6. Monthly Bulletin, cited in CEAB 12 89, Note à l’attention du Président, 18 July 1956, 1–2. 18 out of 26 officials; the dates of birth of five officials are not known, and three were not taken into consideration as they entered the High Authority in the late 1950s or early 1960s, and thus were not in the first intake of staff. This number includes 14 officials out of 25; the dates of birth of seven are not known, and four entered the Authority after 1956 and were not taken into consideration. 12 out of 19 officials were included; the dates of birth of six are not known. Mannheim 1978.

188 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

14 15 16 17 18 19

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

THE PROCESS OF POLITICS IN EUROPE Reulecke 2003. Moses 1999. Herbert 2003: 98. Ibid., 105. Trondal 2007: 1116. Documentary film, Tony Rollman, une aventure européenne, directed by Delphine Kiefer, Luxembourg, 2004. Information from HAEU, INT-ECH 716, Jacques-René Rabier, interview with Yves Conrad et Julie Cailleau, Brussels, 8 January 2004. François Perroux (1903–87) was the founder of the Institut de sciences économiques appliqués, and inter alia was a Professor at the Collège de France. There seems to have been only one official in the Market Division, Otto Hotzel, who had fought in both World Wars. HAEU, INT-ECH 702, Georges Berthoin, interview with Gérard Bossuat and Anaïs Legendre, Paris, 31 January 2004. Calmes wrote a book about his ordeal, Geôles sanglantes (with a preface by Pierre Frieden). Luxembourg: Edition Letzeburger Bicherfrenn, 1948. HAEU, Int 34, Christian Calmes, interview with Jean-Marie Palayret, 12 October 1991. HAEU, Int 489, Winrich Behr, interview with François Duchêne, DüsseldorfHubbelrath, 29 April 1987. Pierre Calame, The Building of Europe: Some Lessons for the Future, 2 May 1996 (report of a discussion between Max Kohnstamm, Winrich Behr, Georges Berthoin, Émile Noël, Michael Palliser and Jean Ripert). At http://www.alliance21.org/en/themes/global/docs/PIC_euro-en.rtf, 5, accessed 16 September 2009. PAAA, Abteilung 2, Sekretariat, Vol. 90, Bl. 27, Sahm to Hallstein, 31 October 1950. BAK, B 102, No. 8614, Abschrift. Bund der Verfolgten des Naziregimes (BVN) an das Bundeskanzleramt und das Bundeswirtschaftsministerium, 21 July 1952. BAK, B 102, No. 8615, Vermerk Buff, Abtlg. Z 2 k an III D 1, 28 July 1959. At roughly the same time, however, the Commission employed former SSObersturmführer Siegfried Korth. A negative result of a search by the BA Berlin-Lichterfelde confirms that Etzel had not been a member of the NSDAP. Letter to the author, 5 May 2008. On Etzel, see Bühlbäcker 2007: 149–88. Ibid., 355. 234. Kabinettssitzung, 11 July 1952, TOP A (Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online). At http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/1020/k /k1952k/kap1_2/kap2_54/para3_15.html, accessed 16 September 2009. Bühlbäcker 2007: 287. Carbonell 2008. Trondal 2007: 1116–7. CEAB 12 55, F. Etzel to J. Monnet, 25 September 1952, 136–41, here 139. Klaus Ewig. interview with the author, Strasbourg, 21 March 2005.

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32 Winrich Behr, interview with the author, Düsseldorf-Hubbelrath, 14 June 2005. 33 Wissels, interview with the author. 34 HAEU, Int 29, discussion with Wolfgang Ernst (from the series 06 – Les origines de l’administration communautaire, round-table discussion organised by the IUE, 9 July 1991). 35 Behr, interview with the author. 36 HAEU, INT-ECH 702, Berthoin. 37 Mak 2005: 680. 38 CEAB 14 2, Commission des quatre Présidents, Procès-Verbal de la deuxième séance tenue à Luxembourg, jeudi 26 mars 1953, 7. 39 CEAB 1 1347, Personalordnung der Gemeinschaft, undated [1956], 103–35, here 105–10. 40 For Salewski, see Bührer 1986; for Rollman, see biography below. 41 For the international steel cartel, see Barthel 2006. 42 Bührer 1986: 93. 43 CEAB 3 37, Letter R. Hamburger to D. Spierenburg, 5 August 1952, pt. 4. 44 Trondal 2007: 1118. 45 The entry dates of three officials are not known. 46 The entry dates of four officials are not known. 47 For eight officials the length of service is not known. 48 Kohnstamm, interview with the author. 49 This is the average length of service of 11 people; that of another eight is not known. 50 For ten officials the length of service is not known. 51 After the reorganisation of 1961 this would correspond to an A2 post. Cf. Spierenburg and Poidevin 1994: 482. 52 While in the Commission the deputy chefs de cabinet were assimilated to the A3 grade, in the High Authority they were on a lower pay-scale. For example Spierenburg’s deputy chef de cabinet, Wissels, was an A5 in 1956. See CEAB 12 813, Bulletin mensuel de la Communauté à l’usage du personnel des institutions, February 1957, 16. 53 The final career positions of ten officials in the Market Division are not known. 54 The final career positions of three officials in the Economics Division are not known. 55 Behr, interview with the author. 56 CEAB 12 814, Bulletin mensuel CECA, October–December 1960. 57 Robert Sünnen, interview with the author, Brussels, 9 December 2003. 58 Cf. for example HAEU, INT-ECH704, Michel Bonnemaison, interview with Yves Conrad and Ghjiseppu Lavezzi, Brussels, 12 February 2004. 59 HAEU, DEP MK 1, Letter Kohnstamm to Dr W. A. Visser ‘t Hooft, Secretary-General of the World Council of Churches, Geneva, 24 October 1952. 60 Girault 1995: 88.

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61 Cf. for example Rabier 1993; Behr and Kohnstamm, interviews with the author. 62 CEAB 2 1146, Gesamtbericht des Ausschusses der vier Präsidenten über die Sitzung in Luxemburg am 26. März 1953, 54–62, here 59. 63 HAEU, INT-ECH 704, Bonnemaison, interview with Conrad and Lavezzi. 64 Behr, interview with the author. 65 Conrad 1989: 111. According to Madame Kuhn-Régnier this changed later, and a German Protestant, a French Catholic and an English Anglican parish were founded; see Ferdinand Kuhn-Régnier, interview with the author, Luxembourg, 16 March 2005. 66 CEAB 2 89, Cesare Balladore-Pallieri, Plan de travail dans le secteur administratif, 13 July 1953. 67 Kuhn-Régnier and Herpels, interviews with the author; cf. also Conrad 1989: 110–11. 68 Wissels, interview with the author. 69 HAEU, INT-ECH 716, Jacques-René Rabier, interview with Yves Conrad, Brussels, 8 January 2004. 70 Cited in Bossuat 2006: 77. 71 Cf. Conrad 1989: 120–30 for a more detailed account of the founding of the European school. 72 CEAB 3 20, Umfrage, 10 November 1952. 73 CEAB 1 1501, École Européenne à Luxembourg: Ouverture, undated. 74 ECHA, Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier, Haute Autorité, 3e Rapport Général, Dépenses administratives de la Communauté durant le deuxième exercice financier (1 juillet 1953–30 juin 1954), 39; 65. 75 CEAB 3 386, Cesare Balladore-Pallieri, Note pour la Commission Administrative, undated [1953], 137 ; ibid., Note aux fonctionnaires chefs de famille, 6 April 1953, 138. 76 CEAB 12 63, Commission des quatre Présidents, Procès-Verbal de la sixième séance, 19 March 1954, 96. 77 CEAB 12 63, Commission des quatre Présidents, Procès-Verbal de la septième séance, 11 October 1954, 124–5. 78 CEAB 1 1501, Statut de l’École Européenne, October 1956. 79 Spierenburg 1994: 77–8; ibid., 77, fn 152. 80 CEAB 3 387, A. van Houtte (chairman of the board for studying school problems), Entwurf für eine Schule der Gemeinschaft, undated [1953], 152–62, here 152. 81 Ibid., 154. 82 PAAA, Private Papers Walter Hallstein, I. Privatdienstliche Korrespondenz 1950–1955, Vol. 14, Much to Hallstein, 7 January 1953. 83 Ball 1982: 73. 84 HAEU, Int 500, Michel Gaudet, interview with François Duchêne, Paris, 12 April 1988. 85 Ibid.; Kohnstamm, interview with the author. 86 HAEU, Int 532, Edmund Wellenstein, interview with François Duchêne, The Hague, 16 May 1989; cf. also Gaudet, interview with Duchêne.

NOTES 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114

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Wellenstein, interview with Duchêne. Gaudet, interview with Duchêne. ECHA, CEAB 2 577, PV of the High Authority, 577th session, 5 May 1960. Herpels, interview with the author. Jaurant-Singer, interview with the author. Wellenstein, interview with Duchêne. HAEU, Int 28 Albert Coppé (from the series 06 – Les origines de l’administration communautaire). See also CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, Note à MM. les Membres de la Haute Autorité concernant un entretien informel, 165–7, here 166. CEAB 3 554, P. Finet, Note pour MM. les Membres de la Haute Autorité, 18 January 1955, 1. CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 717th session, 16 January 1963. Letter Marcel Jaurant-Singer to the author, 19 December 2004; Jaurant-Singer, interview with the author. Simon Nora, interview with the author, Paris, 13 January 2005. Nora, cited in Hugounenq and Ventelou 2002: 38–9. These ENA technocrats are seen as the elite of the French elite, cf. Fickers 2007: 195–6. Cf. his autobiography, Uri 1991, esp. 34–43. See also Seidel 2005 for biographies of Uri, Kohnstam and Behr. Uri 1991: 60. HAEU, DEP PU 244, P. Uri, ‘L’Europe se ressaisit’. Réalités, July 1950. Ibid., ‘La prospérité par l’Union’. Réalités May 1952. Two weeks after the High Authority had begun work, the group had already submitted its Memorandum über die zuerst anfallenden Aufgaben der Hohen Behörde, mainly drafted by Uri. CEAB 9 26, 23 August 1952. FJM, AMH 6/4/14, M. Kohnstamm to J. Monnet, 1 August 1953. Cf. for example HAEU, DEP PU 197, Conférence de M. Pierre URI à la Società Italiana per la Organizzazione Internazionale, Rome, 28 March 1957. HAEU, DEP PU 53, P. Uri, Premières réflexions sur le document intitulé ‘Considérations sur le problème de la Coopération ou de l’Intégration, 5 April 1955. HAEU, DEP PU 53, [P. Uri], Projet de Déclaration, 13 April 1955 ; see also Monnet 1978: 403–4; Gerbet 1989. It is difficult to measure the contribution of individuals to the events preceding the Messina conference. See the round-table discussion in Serra 1989: 175–6. HAEU, DEP PU 189, P. Uri to Ben. T. Moore, 29 July 1959. Uri 1991: 140–1, 150; HAEU, DEP PU 189, letter, F. Walter to P. Uri, 31 July 1959. The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs was founded in 1961, the brainchild of NATO parliamentarians. For example, Uri 1963; HAEU, DEP PU 249, P. Uri, ‘For a community of the free world’. Réalités, December 1961. Documentary film, ‘Tony Rollman’. United Nations, Steel Division, Economic Commission for Europe, 1949. Edgar Gerwin, ‘Der Stahlrahmen für Europa’. Die Zeit, 5 January 1960, 6. Between 1947 and 1957 the Swede Myrdal was the executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva.

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115 Dichgans 1980: 34. 116 The International Steel Cartel is often seen as a precursor of the ECSC; cf. Gillingham 1986. 117 Stefan Krebs, review of Rasch, Manfred and Düwell, Kurt (eds.) (2007) Anfänge und Auswirkungen der Montanunion auf Europa: Die Stahlindustrie in Politik und Wirtschaft. Essen: Klartext. In H-Soz-u-Kult, 19 February 2008. At http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2008-1-138, accessed 16 September 2009. 118 Dichgans 1980: 33. 119 For a detailed discussion of the emergence of the Schuman Plan and other post-war initiatives targeted at European integration, see Leucht 2008a: ch. 3. 120 Tony Rollman, in Rieben et al, 1986: 78. 121 ANL, Affaires Etrangères, no. 11345, Conversations sur le Plan Schuman. Liste des délégations & répartition au sein des groupes, undated. 122 FJM, AMH 4/3/193, Candidatures présentées par Monsieur Wehrer, 1 October 1952. 123 Documentary film, ‘Tony Rollman’. 124 FJM, AMH 6/4/14, Kohnstamm to Monnet, 1 August 1953. 125 For this period see Kohnstamm 2003, the edited collection of his correspondence with his father. For his biography, see also Mak 2005: 676– 85. 126 Kohnstamm, interview with the author. 127 The meeting is described in Müller-Armack 1971: 39–40. 128 Kohnstamm, interview with the author. 129 Mak 2005: 682. 130 HAEU, DEP MK 1, M. Kohnstamm to J. van Helmont, 23 February 1954. 131 HAEU, DEP MK 2, M. Kohnstamm to Tommy, 9 February 1955. 132 HAEU, DEP MK 4, M. Kohnstamm, Notiz für Herrn Etzel für ein Gespräch über EURATOM und den Gemeinsamen Markt, 2 September 1956. For Kohnstamm’s engagement with Euratom, cf. also Duchêne 1994: 299–315. 133 CEAB 2 735, Sonderprotokoll des geheimen Teils der 352. Sitzung der Hohen Behörde vom 19. Dezember 1956, um 19 Uhr in Luxemburg. See also the documents in HAEU, DEP MK 5 2/1957-3/1957 Travaux du Comité des Trois sages; DEP MK 6 4/1957-5/1957, Rapport du Comité des Trois sages. 134 CEAB 2 640, M. Kohnstamm, L’expérience CECA, undated [1956], 5. 135 Cf. for example HAEU, DEP MK 32, Monnet 7187, entry for 19 January 1959. 136 Max Kohnstamm, acceptance speech, 19 April 2004 (copy in the author’s possession). 137 CEAB 7 1570, M. Schensky to D. Del Bo, 2 March 1967, 112. 138 FJM, AMH 6/4/31, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur Monnet, 22 October 1953. 139 Haas 1968: 59. 140 Herpels, Zamaron, Wissels, Ewig, Kuhn-Régnier and Sünnen, interviews with the author.

NOTES

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Chapter 3

193

The former is the title of a book by Michel Crozier (1964), the latter of a book by Henry Jacoby (1973). See also Downs 1967: 1; 255–66; Putnam 1973; Brugmans 1967: 337. This aspect is also mentioned by Ludlow 2006b: 42. See for instance the passage in Mansholt’s biography, Merriënboer 2006: 243– 4. For the crises of the Community in the 1960s see Ludlow 2006a. See for example the article ‘Half Kafka and Half Chaplin’, Time Magazine, 9 December 1974, 10; Scheuer and Weinstock (1977) address the problems of bureaucracy and democratic deficit. Abélès and Bellier 1996: 432. At a press conference on 9 September 1965 in Brussels; Touchard 1978: 218– 9. The Comité intérimaire, a preparatory committee set up by the six governments to operate between the signature of the treaty and the establishment of the EEC, did not take any decisions on the shape of the institutions or their future personnel. On the Comité intérimaire see Dumoulin 2006. Dumoulin 2007c: 42. BAC 209.1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 1st session, 16 January 1958, pt. 12; and IISH, Archief van Sicco L. Mansholt, No 104, Jaap van der Lee, Eerste vergadering Europese Commissie Resumé der beslissingen, 18 January 1958. Cf. for example HAEU, DEP EN 722, 21.9.–9.11.60 (117e à 123e réunion de la Commission), 11 October 1960. BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 22nd session, 23–24 June 1958, pt. 14. HAEU, DEP EN 815, E. Noël, La fusion des Communautés Européennes. Talk given at the Centre Européen Universitaire, Nancy, in the academic year 1965/66, 8. See for example BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 4th session, 7– 10 February 1958, pt. 10. ECHA, Rapport de la Commission de contrôle relatifs aux comptes de l’exercice 1958, undated, 57. This is the title of the chapter on the Finet presidency in Spierenburg and Poidevin 1994. See BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 10th session, 20 March 1958, pt. 2. BAK, N 1266/1253, Dem Herrn Präsidenten, no author [Hallstein’s cabinet], 21 November 1962. BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 6th session, 24–26 February 1958. BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 2nd session, 24–25 and 27 January 1958, pts. 9–10.

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21 Document inserted in HAEU, DEP EN 701, 12.4.–25.5.60 (101e à 105e réunion de la Commission), 13 and 14 May 1958. 22 HAEU, DEP EN 705, 1.10.–19.11.1958 (31e à 38e réunion de la Commission), 2 October 1958. 23 Ibid. See also the memoirs of Hallstein’s chef de cabinet: Berndt von Staden 2001: 179–80. 24 Most of the photographs available from this period in the archives of the Commission’s Audiovisual Service website show this ceremony. See also Loth and Bitsch 2007: 60. 25 Ibid., 55. 26 Lemaignen 1964: 32. 27 On Hallstein see the volume Loth et al. 1995. 28 Schönwald 1999: 273–4. 29 For Hallstein’s concept of institutions see Schönwald 2001: 159. 30 Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik, Sankt Augustin, [henceforth ACDP], personal papers of Hans von der Groeben, I-659, 070/2, Der Staatssekretär des Auswärtigen Amtes [presumably Hallstein], Erwiderung auf die Gedanken des Herrn Bundeswirtschaftsministers zu dem Problem der Kooperation oder der Integration, 30 March 1955. 31 White 2003. 32 Wessels 1998: 244. 33 Shore 1995: 220. 34 See Hallstein 1972: 46; 28. On Hallstein and European Union see also Rye 2005. 35 Haas 1968: 283. 36 Hallstein 1972: 34. 37 Schönwald 2001: 164. 38 ACDP, I-659, 002/3, Communication de M. le Président, Projet. Fusion des Exécutifs, 12 February 1964, 2. 39 Hallstein 1972: 58. 40 Ibid., 59. 41 Hallstein 1958: 6–7. 42 See Schönwald 2001: 156. 43 Hallstein 1972: 39. 44 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 139th session, 2ème partie, 15 March 1961. 45 ACDP, I-659, 058/1, J. Rey, Note pour Messieurs les présidents et membres de la Commission. Délibérations de la Commission au seuil de son second quatriennat, 13 January 1962. See also Conrad 2006: 86 on Rey urging the Commission to play the role of ‘prophets’ and not simply of ‘clergy’. 46 Cf. HAEU, DEP EN 720, 22.6.–27.7.1960 (108e à 114e réunion de la Commission), 18 July 1960. 47 Moravscik 1998: 232. 48 At the Schuman Plan negotiations, Hallstein had already asked for direct elections of the General Assembly of the ECSC; Schönwald 2001: 154; 162. 49 Hallstein 1972: 62–3.

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50 The Commission mentioned the group presidents for the first time in its sixth session: BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 6th session, 24–26 February 1958, pt. 10. 51 BAK, N 1266/1071, B. von Staden to President Hallstein, 30 May 1960. 52 HAEU, DEP EN 800, E. Noël, Le fonctionnement de la Commission et ses rapports avec les autres institutions européennes. Visite d’information d’un groupe de banquiers français à la Communauté Européenne, 14 November 1958, 2. 53 Noël 1992: 151. 54 Von der Groeben 1982: 106–8. 55 BAK, N 1266/1253, Note Cabinet [Narjes?] to President Hallstein, 14 June 1962. 56 See his book Priebe 1985, the title of which ‘Subventionierte Unvernunft’ can be translated as ‘subsidised irresponsibility’. 57 HAEU, DEP EN 701, 12.4.–3.6.1958 (14e à 19e réunion de la Commission), 7 May 1958. 58 HAEU, DEP EN 815, E. Noël, Le Comité des Représentants Permanents. Exposé fait à l’Institut d’études européennes de l’Université libre de Bruxelles, 19–21 April 1966, 12. 59 See for example Conrad 2000: 169 and Knudsen 2009: 112. 60 Von der Groeben 1995: 378. 61 Ibid. 62 ACDP, I-659, 058/1, Geschäftsordnung der Kommission (KOM (62) 378), 17 December 1962; published as ‘Règlement intérieur de la Commission des Communautés européennes’. Journal Officiel des Communautés Européennes, No. 17, 31 January 1963, 181–5. 63 BAC 209.80, R. Arena, Nota per il Prof. Petrilli per la riunione della Commissione del 18.7.1960, 16 July 1960 (document inserted in PV of the EEC Commission, 112 session, 18 July 1960). 64 BAC 209.80, R. Lemaignen, Note pour le conclave du 18 Juillet 1960, 13 July 1960. 65 For the above see: HAEU, DEP EN 720, 22.6.–27.7.1960 (108e à 114e réunion de la Commission), 18 July 1960. 66 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 112th session, 2ème partie, 18 July 1960. 67 HAEU, DEP EN 720, 22.6.–27.7.1960 (108e à 114e réunion de la Commission), 18 July 1960. 68 Ibid. 69 C. Northcote Parkinson, ‘Parkinson’s Law’. The Economist, November 1955. 70 BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 1st session, 16 January 1958. On the origins of the executive secretariat see also Dumoulin 2007d: 222. 71 BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 11th session, 24–27 March 1958; Marjolin 1989: 298. For a short biographical article on Noël’s career until 1958 see Previti Allaire 2004. 72 BAK, N 1266/1071, Note Narjes to President Hallstein, 2 April 1958. 73 ‘Entretien de M. Noël avec le Courrier du Personnel’. Courrier du Personnel, numéro spécial “Au revoir M. Noël”, No 488, September 1987, 13–30, here 16.

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74 HAEU, DEP EN 349, Direction Générale de l’Administration, Projet de règlement provisoire d’organisation des services présenté par la Direction Générale de l’Administration, 24 June 1958. 75 BAC 209.80/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 19th session, 3–4 June 1958, pt. 2. See also HAEU, INT-ECH 677, Axel Herbst, interview with Wilfried Loth and Veronika Heyde, Bonn, 25 May 2004; and HAEU, INT-ECH 683, Helmut Sigrist, interview with Veronika Heyde, Bonn, 7 January 2004. 76 HAEU, DEP EN 815, Émile Noël, Le Comité des Représentants Permanents. Exposé fait à l’Institut d’études européennes de l’Université libre de Bruxelles, 19–21 April 1966, 35. 77 See Ludlow 2005a; 2009. 78 Downs 1968: 63. 79 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 35th session, 29–30 October 1958, pt. 5. 80 See for example HAEU, DEP EN 2122 (Agenda 1958); according to Noël’s diary entries, the first session was on 26 September 1958. 81 Helmut von Verschuer, interview with the author, Nentershausen, 16 February 2004. Nowadays the assistants still hold their meeting on Friday mornings although their role has changed slightly from an administrative to a more political role. See Anonymous, ‘Coordinating the coordinators’. Courrier du personnel, No. 70, 23–29 October 1997, 4–5. 82 Henri Etienne, interview with the author, Brussels, 7 March 2005. 83 Assistant to the director-general of DG IV, interview with the author, Brussels, 14 April 2004. 84 See for example HAEU, DEP EN 2124, Agenda 1960, entry of 25 April. 85 HAEU, Int 30, Émile Noël (Serie 06 – ‘Les origines de l’administration communautaire’, Table ronde organisée par l’IUE, 6 July 1991). 86 Kassim 2004: 48. 87 Von der Groeben 1995: 379. See also Chapter 4 for a short biography of Noël. 88 Hallstein 1972: 61. 89 Kassim 2004: 52–3. 90 See for example the documents in HAEU, DEP EN 2667, 1960–1976. 91 Noël 1963 and idem. 1973. 92 Kassim 2004: 54. See also Eduard Brackeniers, interview with the author, Brussels, 10 March 2005 and Manfred Lahnstein, interview with the author, Hamburg, 19 December 2005. 93 BAC 209.1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 1st session, 16 January 1958, pt. 12. 94 BAC 209.08, PV of the EEC Commission, 40th session, 6 December 1958, pt. 13. 95 See for example HAEU, DEP EN 705 1.10.–19.11.1958 (31e à 38e réunion de la Commission), 15 October 1958. 96 IISH, Archief van Sicco L. Mansholt, No 97, J.J. van der Lee, Memorandum voor Dr Mansholt, 23 April 1958. On Hallstein’s desire to keep the personal

NOTES

97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118

197

collaborators of the Commissioners to a minimum see also the passage in Lemaignen 1964: 49–50. BAC 209.80, R. Arena, Nota per il Prof. Petrilli per la riunione della Commissione del 18.7.1960. Von der Groeben 1995: 303. HAEU, DEP EN 720, 22.6.–27.7.1960 (108e à 114e réunion de la Commission), 18 July 1960. HAEU, DEP EN 21, Rapport du Secrétaire général de la Haute Autorité et des Secrétaires exécutifs des Commissions de la CEE et d’Euratom sur l’organisation des services de la Commission des Communautés Européennes, Bruxelles, 1 July 1967, 12. Coombes 1970: 153. Franz Froschmaier, interview with the author, Brussels, 15 April 2004 and Lahnstein, interview with the author. IISH, Archief van Alfred Mozer, No 5, Letter A. Mozer to Klaus Pöhle, 14 October 1964. Ritchie 1992: 105. On the evolution of the Commission’s cabinets see Donnelly and Ritchie 1994: 40–8. Article 29(2) of the statute. Statut der Beamten der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft. Official Journal of the European Communities, No 1389/62, 14 June 1962. BAC 209/1980 No 1, PV of the EEC Commission, 6th session, 24–26 February 1958, pt. 4. BAC 209.80, R. Arena, Nota per il Prof. Petrilli per la riunione della Commissione del 18.7.1960. BAC 25/1980, No 1608, Proposition en vue du renforcement des liaisons entre la Commission et les Directeurs généraux (Projet de note du Président de la Commission), 20 November 1968, 114–19. HAEU, DEP EN 702, 3.6.–15.7.1958 (20e à 24e réunion de la Commission), 24 June 1958. HAEU, DEP EN 720, 22.6.–27.7.1960 (108e à 114e réunion de la Commission), 18 July 1960. Ibid. ACDP, I-659, 051/1, H. von der Groeben, Vermerk Frühjahr 1966, undated [spring 1966], 38. See also Peterson 1971: 128. BAC 209.80, R. Lemaignen, Note pour le conclave du 18 Juillet 1960, 13 July 1960 (document inserted in PV of the EEC Commission, 112th session, 18 July 1960). HAEU, DEP EN 720, 22.6.–27.7.60 (108e à 114e réunion de la Commission), 18 July 1960. Underlined in the original text. Narjes 1998: 113. ACDP, I-659, 058/1, Geschäftsordnung der Kommission (KOM (62) 378), 17 December 1962, Article 20. BAK, N 1266/1264, Note to President Hallstein, no author [Hallstein’s cabinet], 13 November 1962. BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 14th session, 21–24 April 1958, pt. 7.

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119 CEAB 2 1672, CEE, Euratom: statut, déscription des tâches pour la cat. A (1959), undated. 120 BAK, N 1266/1264, Note Smulders to President Hallstein, 12 November 1962. 121 EEC treaty, Protocol on the privileges and immunities, Chapter 2, Article 6. 122 Ibid., Chapter 5, Article 11. 123 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 67th session, 8 July 1959, pt. 5. 124 See for example BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 15th session, 28–29 April 1958. 125 HAEU, DEP EN 711, 22.7.–22.9.1959 (69e à 74e réunion de la Commission), 7 September 1959. 126 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 140th session, 2ème partie, 22–23 March 1961. 127 HAEU, DEP EN 724, 14.12.1960–1.2.1961 (128e à 133e réunion de la Commission), 21 December 1960. 128 HAEU, DEP EN 322, Réunion de la Commission, 23 February 1962. 129 HAEU, DEP EN 323, Réunion de la Commission, 28 February 1962. 130 Ibid. 131 HAEU, DEP EN 322, Réunion de la Commission, 23 February 1962. 132 Ibid. 133 HAEU, DEP EN 323, Réunion de la Commission, 28 February 1962. 134 BAK, N 1266/1254, K. Meyer to President Hallstein, 9 April 1964. 135 Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, interview with the author, Bilthoven, 29 April 2004. 136 HAEU, DEP EN 322, Réunion de la Commission, 23 February 1962. 137 HAEU, DEP EN 708, 25.2.59–11.6.59 (51e à 58e réunion de la Commission), 18 March 1959. 138 Ibid. 139 BAK, N 1266/1267, Personalangelegenheiten 1961–63. Note W. Hallstein to the members of the Commission, 2 May 1961. 140 Coombes 1970: 142–3. 141 BAC 209.1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 1st session, 16 January 1958, pt. 12. 142 BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 12th session, 9–10 April 1958, pt. 8. 143 Von der Groeben 1995: 302. 144 Dumoulin 2007d: 226. 145 HAEU, Int 30, Émile Noël. 146 Loth and Bitsch 2007: 58. 147 HAEU, DEP EN 352, Rapport d’étude préliminaire sur l’efficacité de l’organisation du travail à la Commission de la Communauté Economique Européenne à Bruxelles, Raadgevend Efficiency Bureau Bosboom en Hegener NV, Amsterdam, 29 May 1959, 28. 148 The government of the Federal Republic submitted several lists in February and March 1958. See BAK, N 1266/1092. BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 7th session, 5–6 March 1958, pt. 6.

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149 BAC 209.80/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 24th session, 9–11 July 1958, pt. 4. 150 Coombes 1970: 152. 151 BAC 209.08, PV of the EEC Commission, 18th session, 20–22 May 1958. 152 Dumoulin 2007d: 226. 153 HAEU, Int. 30, Émile Noël. 154 Ibid. 155 HAEU, DEP EN 705, 1.10.–19.11.1958 (31e à 38e réunion de la Commission), 12 November 1958. 156 HAEU, DEP EN 707, 7.1.–25.2.1959 (45e à 51e réunion de la Commission), 21 January 1959. 157 EWG-Kommission 1959: 17. For an overview of the development of staff numbers see Dumoulin 2007d: 220. 158 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 36th session, 5 November 1958. 159 See for example HAEU, DEP EN 710, 17.6.–22.7.1959 (64e à 69e réunion de la Commission), 17 June 1959. 160 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 46th session, 2ème partie, 21 January 1959, pt. 8. 161 HAEU, DEP EN 722 21.9.–9.11.60 (117e à 123e réunion de la Commission), 11 October 1960 and BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 77th session, 2ème partie, 12 October 1959. 162 HAEU, DEP EN 722 21.9.–9.11.60 (117e à 123e réunion de la Commission), 14 October 1960. 163 Coombes 1970: 142. 164 For one of the rare discussions on staff skills see for example BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 7th session, 5–6 March 1958, Compte-rendu confidentiel. 165 HAEU, DEP EN 704 9.9.–1.10.1958 (29e à 30e réunion de la Commission), 11 September 1958. 166 Personalstatut 1962, Art. 28. 167 BAK, N 1266/1113, Letter President Hallstein to the state secretary in the German ministry of justice, Walter Strauß, 10 June 1958. 168 An Italian official cited in Dumoulin 2007b: 244. 169 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 41th session, 2ème partie, 10 December 1958, pt. 9. 170 According to a table comparing salaries in the German civil service with those of the Commission. BAK, N 1266/1268, Aufstellung vom 15.5.1964. 171 IISH, Archief van Alfred Mozer, No 5, Letter A. Mozer to K. Pöhle, 14 October 1964. 172 See for example the discussion whether age should be a criterion for classification, HAEU, DEP EN 702, 3.6.–15.7.1958 (20e à 24e réunion de la Commission), 24 June 1958. 173 HAEU, DEP EN 717, 2.3.–12.4.1960 (95e à 101e réunion de la Commission), 9 March 1960. 174 HAEU, DEP EN 705, 1.10.–19.11.1958 (31e à 38e réunion de la Commission), 2 October 1958.

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175 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 26th session, 22, 24 July in Paris, 26 July 1958 in Brussels, Annex I, pt. 4–5. 176 IISH, Archief van Sicco L. Mansholt, J. van der Lee to S. Mansholt, 15 January 1958. 177 Cf. Condorelli-Braun 1972: 81, 90. However, no member of the Hallstein Commission was a trade unionist. The German Wilhelm Haferkamp was the first trade unionist to enter the Commission in 1967. See ibid., 89–90. 178 See for example BAK, N 1266/1462, Dok. I. Welche Aufgaben ergeben sich nach Inkrafttreten der Verträge über den Gemeinsamen Markt und Euratom? undated [1957]. 179 Kaiser 2007. 180 BAK, N 1266/1092, Aufzeichnung über Organisations- und Personalfragen von EWG am 26. Januar 1958, 27 January 1958. See also ibid. protocol of a meeting between Hallstein, Müller-Armack, Ophüls, Carstens, Estner, von der Groeben and others in Bonn, 27 January 1958. 181 Lemaignen 1964: 51. François Muller referred to a working group in the Quai d’Orsay which preselected French candidates and submitted a list to the Commission. Muller, interview with the author, Strasbourg, 19 March 2005. 182 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 42th session, 2ème partie, third session, 17 December 1958. 183 ACDP, I-659, 122/2, Vermerk über eine Besprechung [of Hans von der Groeben] mit Herrn Hans Broder Krohn, ehemals Direktor der Landwirtschaftsabteilung der EWG, dann Generaldirektor für Entwicklungsfragen (pensioniert etwa 1977) in Brüssel am 15. Januar 1981. See also Hans-Broder Krohn, interview with the author, Göttingen, 3 February 2004. 184 See BAK, Kleine Erwerbungen 927-3, Hüttebräuker, Deutsche Agrarpolitik in den Jahren 1962-1968: Heft 1: Streiflichter auf besondere Ereignisse: Heft 2: Anlagen dazu. This is confirmed by Krohn, interview with the author. 185 BAK, N 1266/1216, H. Allardt to President Hallstein, 29 April 1958. 186 Officials in interviews often referred to the young French ‘geniuses’ in Brussels such as François-Xavier Ortoli, Jean-François Deniau, Émile Noël, Michel Gaudet and Louis Rabot. See for example Manfred Caspari, interview with Sibylle Hambloch, Bad Honnef, 16 October 2002. 187 Löffler 2002: 208–9; 571. 188 Gehler and Kaiser 2001: 777; for the NEI see also the introductory chapter in Gehler and Kaiser 2004 and Kaiser 2007. 189 BAK, N 1266/1281, note K. Narjes to President Hallstein, 2 May 1958. 190 BAK, N 1266/1290, letter A.E. de Schryver to President Hallstein, 6 June 1958. 191 KADOC, Archief A.E. de Schryver, 7.4.1.4., Vorbereitungstreffen der NEI zur EWG-Gründung, Brüssel, 29 July 1957. Printed in: Gehler and Kaiser 2004, Dokument 159, 501–2. 192 IISH, Archief van Sicco L. Mansholt, No 62, Letter J. van der Lee an J.A.W. Burger [Dutch Minister of State], 20 May 1957. 193 Ibid., J. van der Lee to J.A.W. Burger, 11 October 1957.

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194 This is cited on several occasions, for example Mansholt 1974: 85; HAEU, Int 654, Jaap van der Lee. 195 IISH, Archief van Sicco L. Mansholt, No 97, J. van der Lee to S. Mansholt, secret, 9 May 1958. 196 Ibid. 197 IISH, ETUC, No. 86, Les conséquences pour les syndicats des nouveaux Traités sur la Communauté Economique Européenne et Euratom. Rapporteur H. Strater, membre du Comité d’I.G. Metall, RFA, 18 July 1957. See also Pasture 2000: 88. 198 Ibid., 96. 199 HAEU, DEP EN 722 21.9.-9.11.1960 (117e à 123e réunion de la Commission), 20 October 1960. 200 IISH, Archief van Alfred Mozer, No 5, Letter W. Reuter to H. SchmittVockenhausen, 22 April 1964. 201 Lahnstein, interview with the author. 202 Hallstein 1972: 61. 203 Ibid. 204 Verordnung Nr. 31 (EWG), Nr. 11 (EAG) über das Statut der Beamten und über die Beschäftigungsbedingungen für die sonstigen Bediensteten der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft (1385/62), Art. 27. 205 BAK, N 1266/1293, K. Narjes to W. Hallstein, Bericht über die Kommissionssitzung, 23 February 1967. Rochereau’s predecessor, Lemaignen, was of the same opinion. See Lemaignen 1964: 57. 206 Olivi 2000: 231. 207 See for example HAEU, DEP EN 706, 19.11.–27.12.1958 (39e à 44e réunion de la Commission), 17 December 1958. 208 BAC 209.08, PV of the EEC Commission, 20th session, 11–12 June 1958, pt. 13. 209 HAEU, DEP EN 706, 19.11.–27.12.1958 (39e à 44e réunion de la Commission), 17 December 1958. 210 Verordnung Nr. 31 (EWG), Nr. 11 (EAG), Art. 27. 211 BAK, N 1266/1280, Note K. Narjes to W. Hallstein, 18 January 1964. 212 BAK, N 1266/1293, Note K. Narjes to W. Hallstein, 23 February 1967. 213 HAEU, DEP EN 716, 17.2.–2.3.1960 (93e à 95e réunion de la Commission), 24 February 1960. 214 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 112th session, 2ème partie, 9–10 November 1960. 215 HAEU, DEP EN 722, 21.9.–9.11.1960 (117e à 123e réunion de la Commission), 9 November 1960. 216 Ibid., 8 December 1960. See also HAEU, DEP EN 724, 14.12.1960–1.2.1961 (128e à 133e réunion de la Commission), 21 December 1960. 217 Schmitt von Sydow 1980: 123. 218 Dumoulin 2007b: 250. 219 Assistant to the director-general of DG IV, interview with the author. 220 BAK, N 1266/1293, Note K. Narjes to W. Hallstein, 23 February 1967.

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221 See for example Giampiero Schiratti, interview with the author, Brussels, 22 April 2004. 222 See for example Georges Rencki, interview with the author, Tervuren, 5 April 2004. 223 BAK, N 1266/1214, letter [Narjes?] to H. Sigrist, 21 January 1964. 224 On the staff regulations of the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom see for example Sassi 2000 and Dumoulin 2007b: 251–3. 225 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 48th session, Annex, Réponse à la question No 29 du 29 décembre 1958 adressée à la Commission par M. Bertrand, membre de l’Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne (adoptée par la Commission le 4 décembre 1958), 7 February 1959. 226 BAC 118/1986, No. 1076, Groupe de travail ‘statut’, Note présenté par la délégation allemande, 12 June 1959, 9–12. 227 Ibid., Groupe de travail ‘statut’, Note introductive de la délégation française, 20 February 1959, 18–21. 228 On all the above, see ibid., Annex, La situation des fonctionnaires détachés des administrations nationales ou internationales, undated, 23–7. 229 BAC 118/1986, No. 1076, H. Buurman, Memorandum pour M. le Président [Euratom] et de M. le Commissaire-Européen Sassen, 23 March 1961, 53–5. 230 MAEF, EU Europe 1956–1960, Généralités, Vol 191, letter Permanent Representative of France at the European Communities to French Foreign Minister, 13 February 1959. 231 HAEU, DEP EN 712, 22.9.–24.10.1959 (75e à 78e réunion de la Commission), 30 September 1959. 232 HAEU, DEP EN 719, 31.5.–14/15.6.1960 (105e à 107e réunion de la Commission), 15 June 1960. 233 Articles 37–9. ‘Statut der Beamten der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft’. Official Journal of the European Communities, No 1385/62, 14 June 1962. On Borschette’s role see Dumoulin 2007b: 252. 234 BAK, N 1266/1268, Aufzeichnung über den Vorschlag des Bundesministerium des Innern vom 16.1.1963, 18 March 1963. 235 See the article ‘Karriere hat Ruh’, Der Spiegel, No. 39, 26 September 1963, 29– 30. 236 BAK, N 1266/1266, Ka [Kalkbrenner] to President Hallstein, 17 July 1963. 237 IISH, Archief van Alfred Mozer, No 5, Letter A. Mozer to K. Pöhle, 14 October 1964. 238 Dumoulin 2007b: 254. 239 Metcalfe 2001: 419. 240 BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 11th session, 24–27 March 1958, pt. 6. 241 HAEU, DEP EN 352, Rapport d’étude préliminaire sur l’efficacité de l’organisation du travail à la Commission de la Communauté Economique Européenne à Bruxelles, Raadgevend Efficiency Bureau Bosboom en Hegener NV, Amsterdam, 29 May 1959; and DEP EN 353, Rapport d’étude préliminaire sur l’efficacité de l’organisation du travail à la Commission de la Communauté Economique Européenne à

NOTES

242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278

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Bruxelles. Deuxième partie: l’organisation générale, Raadgevend Efficiency Bureau Bosboom en Hegener NV, Amsterdam, 6 August 1959. HAEU, DEP EN 352, Bosboom Report, Part 1, 5. Ibid., 5. Ibid. HAEU, DEP EN 353, Bosboom Report, Part 2, 4. Ibid., 7. Ibid., 7–8. Ibid., 24. Ibid., 26. Ibid., 30. Ibid., 34. HAEU, DEP EN716 17.2.–2.3.1960 (93e à 95e réunion de la Commission), 24 February 1960. HAEU, DEP EN 722, 21.9.–9.11.1960 (117e à 123e réunion de la Commission), 11 October 1960. BAC 51/1986, No 495, Note à l’attention de Monsieur von Goeler, 25 May 1961. Ibid. Rapport sur l’organisation des services de la Commission, présenté par M. Ortoli (après premier examen par le Comité de rationalisation), 1. Ibid., first part, 3. Ibid., 4. Ibid., 6. Ibid., 12. Ibid., 21. BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 150th session, 2ème partie, 14 June 1961. BAC 158/1990, No 19, Université de Louvain, A.U.R.A. (Association Universitaire de Recherche en Administration), Rapport à la Commission sur le fonctionnement interne de ses services, Novembre 1972. Ibid., 1. The committee was presided over by Noël, and was composed of leading officials such as von Verschuer and Wellenstein. BAC 158/1990, No 19, Rapport à la Commission. Ibid., 8. Ibid., 6. Ibid., 9–10. Ibid., 10. Ibid. Ibid., 11. Ibid., 14. Ibid., 17. Ibid., 22. Ibid., 25–6. Ibid., 33. Ibid., 61. Ibid., 55.

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279 Ludlow 2006b: 41. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

12 13 14

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Chapter 4

‘The Eurocrats’. The Economist, 29 July 1961, 449. Lerner and Gorden 1969: 262. Ibid., 263–4. Brugmans 1967: 338. See also Lerner and Gorden 1969: 283. Brugmans 1967: 339. These figures have been established from the average years of birth of 26 (DG IV) and 35 officials (DG VI). See Kruse and Schmitt 1999: 161. On Mozer see also Wielenga 1997a. Etienne, interview with the author. See von der Groeben’s memoirs (1995), and Mansholt’s biography, Merriënboer 2006. Arno Schulze-Brachmann, ‘Die Durchführung der Kriegspreisvorschriften in den Reichsgauen der Ostmark, im Reichsgau Sudetenland u. in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten’. In Metzner, M. and Müller, H. (eds.) (1941) Die Preisbildung im Kriege. Preissenkung und Gewinnabführung. Berlin, Leipzig and Vienna: Otto Elsner Verlagsgesellschaft, 126–9, here 126. Löffler 2002: 185–6. He entered the NSDAP in 1943. Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde [henceforth BA Berlin], NSDAP-Gaukartei, Arnsmeyer, Friedrich. In Nazi Germany, students born between 1926 and 1928 were recruited as Flakhelfer once they turned 16 or at an even younger age. From 1943 onwards the Notabitur, or emergency school leaving-certificate, was the normal way to leave the Gymnasium (grammar school). See the cases of Günther Fitterer (born 1928), Ivo Schwartz and Helmut von Verschuer (both born 1926). See for example Bude 1987. There is no evidence that Krohn or Behr were members of the NSDAP. See BA Berlin, Letter to the author, 16 November 2007. The SS file of Siegfried Korth, BA Berlin, NSDAP-Zentralkartei. Information from BA Berlin. Dumoulin 2007d: 228. ‘Überläufer X’. Der Spiegel, No 19, 5 May 1969, 76. See also HAEU, INT-ECH 729, Beniamino Olivi, interview with Michel Dumoulin and Myriam Rancon, Brussels, 26 January and 9 February 2004. Raymond Craps, interview with the author, Brussels, 16 April 2004. See Brackeniers, interview with the author and Jean Dubois, interview with the author, Brussels, 20 April 2004. Ibid. Frans de Koster, interview with the author, Brussels, 6 April 2004. De Koster repeated this in an interview in November 2004, HEAU, INT-ECH 692, Frans de Koster, interview with Gérard Bossuat and Myriam Rancon, Brussels, 14 November 2004.

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25 This image of the ‘clean’ Wehrmacht has recently been overthrown by historical research. See for example Browning 1992; Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung 1996; Müller and Volkmann 1999. 26 Ernst Albrecht, interview with the author, Beinhorn, 27 April 2005 and Dubois, interview with the author. 27 ‘Dumont du Voitel, ein engagierter Europäer’. Les Anciens, Bulletin No 6, May 1987, 7–12, here 11. 28 Cf. Moses 1999. 29 This official also had a first degree in agriculture. 30 This information was available for 26 of the 57 DG IV officials studied in this chapter. 31 This information was available for 34 of the 52 DG VI officials studied in this chapter. It is difficult to compare university courses across countries. For example, the Grandes Écoles teach a broad mix of subjects, and a law degree in France and Belgium is often combined with economics while in Germany the two subjects are hardly ever combined. 32 See for example Georges Rencki, interview with the author. See also Coombes 1970: 211. 33 Löffler 2002: 137. See also Page and Wright 1997: 8. 34 Löffler 2002: 140. 35 Brugmans 1967: 336. 36 See for example the Economist, June 1961; see also Merriënboer 2006: 249. 37 This information was available for 37 of the 57 DG IV officials. 38 This information was available for 39 of the 52 DG VI officials. 39 See Chapter 5. 40 Maurice Barthélémy, interview with the author, Brussels, 13 April 2004. 41 Bossuat 2006: 57. 42 VerLoren van Themaat, interview with the author. See also Albrecht, interview with the author, who states that VerLoren van Themaat was a socialist. 43 However, von der Groeben was not a member of the CDU party while a Commissioner. See for example von der Groeben 2002: 47–8. 44 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 146th session, 2ème partie, 17 May 1961. 45 Page and Wright 1997: 8. 46 De Koster, interview with the author. 47 Peterson 1974–75: 31–3. 48 See for example Froschmaier, Muller and Rencki, interview with the author. 49 See Aurelio Pappalardo, interview with the author, Brussels, 8 March 2005, and Muller, Brackeniers, Schiratti, Froschmaier, Etienne and Schwartz, interviews with the author. 50 Peterson 1974–75: 27. 51 Olivier de Vos is one of the few to admit that it was also financial reasons that made the post in Brussels attractive. Olivier de Vos, interview with the author, Breda, 25 February 2005. 52 Trondal 2004: 75.

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53 Shore 1995: 219. 54 See White 2003: 121. 55 In 1960 six in DG IV, respectively eight in DG VI; 1961 eight in DG IV respectively six in DG VI; four in 1962 in DG VI and none in DG IV; three in DG VI in 1963; and one in each DG after 1963. DG VI was the fastest growing DG in the Commission, and thus the number of A officials in DG VI increased more rapidly than in DG IV during 1960–63. 56 These numbers are based on information on 22 officials in DG IV and 26 officials in DG VI. 57 17 out of 26 in DG VI and 17 out of 22 in DG IV. 58 Of 26 officials analysed, five left DG VI. 59 See Dimier 2004. 60 Brackeniers, interview with the author. 61 Entry positions in DG VI for 30 officials out of 52. 62 Final position in DG VI for 29 out of 52 officials. 63 Entry position in DG IV for 30 out of 57 officials. 64 Final position in DG IV for 30 out of 57 officials. 65 Peterson 1971: 134. 66 Cf. Donnelly and Ritchie 1994. 67 Peterson 1971: 132–3. 68 Proposals for reform of the Commission of the European Communities and its services. Report made at the request of the Commission by an Independent Review Body under the chairmanship of Mr Dirk Spierenburg, Brussels, 24 September 1979 (the so-called Spierenburg Report), 39–40. 69 Schwartz, Ritter, von Verschuer, Rencki and Nicolas Bel. 70 For example Dubois to Karel van Miert. 71 Dumoulin 2001. 72 Albrecht 1999: 44. 73 See for example the conversations with Mrs Imbert and Mrs Gleichmann, widows of deceased DG IV officials. 74 For example the diaries of Jean Schwed, an official in the Executive Secretariat, of 1960 and conversation Mrs Schwed with the author, Brussels, 11 March 2005. 75 Official of DG V, interview with the author, Brussels, 8 December 2003. 76 See Albrecht, Froschmaier, de Koster and Etienne, interviews with the author. 77 Muller, interview with the author. 78 IISH, Archief van Sicco L. Mansholt, No 97, Letter van der Lee to Mansholt, 8 November 1958. 79 Dumoulin 2007b: 262–4. 80 HAEU, INT-ECH 681, Klaus-Otto Nass, interview with Wilfried Loth and Veronika Heyde, Paris, 2 April 2004 and ibid., INT-ECH 680, Klaus Meyer, interview with Wilfried Loth and Veronika Heyde, Bonn, 16 December 2003. 81 Ritter, interview with the author. 82 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 25th session, 15–16 July 1958, pt. 7.

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83 Marcel Decombis, ‘Il y a trente-cinq ans naissait l’École européenne’. Les Anciens, Bulletin No. 8, May 1988, 7–8, here 7. 84 See for example HAEU, INT ECH-682, Ivo Schwartz, interview with Veronika Heyde and Myriam Rancon, Brussel, 16 January 2004. 85 See for instance Muller, interview with the author. 86 BAK, N 1266/1268, ‘Les fonctionnaires européens et nous’. La Dernière Heure, 17/18 January 1965. 87 Muller, interview with the author. 88 Etienne, interview with the author. 89 See for example HEAU, INT-ECH717, Georges Rencki, interview with Ghjiseppu Lavezzi, Tervuren, 13 January 2004, and ibid., INT-ECH767, JeanFrançois Deniau, interview with Gérard Bossuat and Anaïs Legendre, Paris, 3 and 10 November 2004. 90 Lemaignen 1964: 43–4. 91 De Vos and Muller, interviews with the author. 92 See for example Schiratti and Froschmaier, interview with the author. 93 BAK, N 1266/1268, Hitzelberger to von Staden, 29 September 1962. 94 ACDP, I-659, 062/2, Vermerk über eine Besprechung der Herren von der Groeben, Mestmäcker, Albrecht, Caspari, Schwartz, Nass und Albert am 17. Dezember 1965 über innerhalb der EWG-Kommission gegebene Möglichkeiten, längerfristige Konzeptionen zu entwickeln und in allen Sachgebieten durchzusetzen, 21 December 1965. 95 Verschuer 1967. 96 Ibid., 5. 97 Barthélémy, interview with the author. 98 See Schiratti, Krohn, Froschmaier, Barthélémy, Schwartz and Dubois, interviews with the author. 99 ‘Institutions financières’, interview with Gérard Imbert. Courrier du Personnel, undated [ca. 1988], kindly provided by Mrs Imbert. 100 Ibid. 101 Schiratti, interview with the author. 102 Ernst Albrecht, interview with Sibylle Hambloch and Gerold Ambrosius, Beinhorn, 22 March 2002. 103 The latter two were named by Rencki; see HAEU, INT-ECH717. 104 On Mansholt, see for instance Thiemeyer 2005. See also Craps, von Verschuer, Rencki and Barthélémy, interviews with the author. 105 For example Craps, Krohn and Barthélémy, interview with the author. 106 Lahnstein, interview with the author. 107 See for example Barthélémy, interview with the author. 108 The ‘table ronde’ was composed of Mansholt, his cabinet, Heringa, Rabot and his assistant von Verschuer as permanent members plus the directors and other officials concerned with the matter under discussion. 109 See for example Pappalardo and Brackeniers, interviews with the author. 110 Froschmaier, interview with the author. 111 Coombes 1970: 215. 112 Francesca Barbarelli, ‘Qui sont les ‘Eurocrates’ de la Commission? De vrais fonctionnaires nationaux’. Le Monde, 6 February 1979, 19.

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113 Gérard Imbert, contribution to: Diritto e pratica nell’assicurazione, a cura del Centro Studi Assicurativi, Avv. Emilio Pasanisi. Numero Speciale dedicato al Convegno dell’A.I.D.A. Sezioni Friuli-Venezia, Guilia e Lombarda sul tema Attività Assicurativa, Trattato di Roma e libertà di prestazione. 19–20 ottobre 1984, Trieste. Milan: Estratto, 293–305, here 297. 114 Coombes 1970: 213–4. 115 Fuchs-Heinritz 1999: 9. 116 Albrecht 1999. 117 Ibid., 48. 118 HAEU, INT-ECH 671, Ernst Albrecht, interview with Jan van der Harst and Veronika Heyde, Burgdorf/Beinhorn, 4 March 2004. 119 HAEU, Int 640, Ernst Albrecht, interview with Wolf D. Gruner, Hanover, 7 August 1998. 120 For the Bekennende Kirche cf. Henley 2007; Hey 2005. For Karl Barth, see Bautz 1990. 121 Albrecht 1999: 9. Cf. also Albrecht, interview with the author. 122 Albrecht 1999: 11. 123 HAEU, Int 640, Albrecht. 124 Albrecht 1999: 26. 125 This is confirmed by Albrecht and numerous eye-witnesses. On the empty chair crisis see for example several contributions in Loth 2001. 126 ACDP, I-659, 062/2, Dringende methodische und sachliche Probleme deutscher und europäischer Politik, Entwurf des Protokolls eines Gesprächs bei Herrn von der Groeben unter Teilnahme der Herren Priebe, Möller, Mestmäcker, Albrecht, Caspari, Schwartz, Nass, 13 January 1966. 127 Albrecht 1999: 31. 128 See VerLoren van Themaat, interview with Sibylle Hambloch and Gerold Ambrosius. 129 Kapteyn, P.J.G. (2007) Obituary Pieter VerLoren van Themaat. In http://www.knaw.nl/publicaties/pdf/20051115-16.pdf, accessed 16 September 2009. 130 VerLoren van Themaat 1995: 1558. 131 VerLoren van Themaat, P. (1966) ‘Economische Aspecten van de Kartel- en Concentratiepolitiek in de E.E.G’. In Voordrachten van het Studiecentrum voor bank- en financiewezen, No. 116, 15 June 1966, 3–31, here 5. 132 VerLoren van Themaat, interview with the author. 133 Ibid. 134 ‘Gemeinsamer Markt. Pinays Zehnter’. Der Spiegel, No. 50, 9 December 1959, 40–1. 135 VerLoren van Themaat, interview with the author. 136 Ibid. 137 Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat 1995. 138 VerLoren van Themaat 1995: 1554. 139 Schwartz, interview with the author. 140 The information in the following paragraph is derived from Brackeniers, interview with the author.

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141 HAEU, INT-ECH 681, Nass. 142 For the following see Krohn, interview with the author. 143 Information provided by the Deutsche Dienststelle für die Benachrichtigung der nächsten Angehörigen von Gefallenen der ehemaligen deutschen Wehrmacht. 144 Krohn, H.B. (1957) ‘Futtergetreidewirtschaft der Welt 1900–1954’. Berichte über Landwirtschaft, N.S., Special Issue No. 165. Hamburg and Berlin: Paul Parey. 145 Krohn, interview with the author. 146 Breuer, U. (1970) ‘Die Bürokraten murren. Widerstand gegen die Personalpolitik der Minister’. Die Zeit, No. 12, 20 March. At http://www.zeit.de/1970/12/Die-Buerokraten-murren, accessed 16 September 2009. 147 See Krohn, interview with the author. 148 Ibid. 149 ACDP, I-659, 030/2, Hans-Broder Krohn, ‘Bilanz 1970’, 5 June 1970, 1. 150 Ibid., 3. 151 Niedhart 2000. 152 Etienne, interview with the author. 153 Krohn, interview with the author. 154 Ibid. 155 As the only Commission high official, Noël had a chapter dedicated to him in the recently-published history of the European Commission (Bossuat 2007), entitled ‘Émile Noël, a loyal servant of the Community of Europe’. 156 HAEU, DEP EN 1254, Curriculum Vitae of Émile Noël, 17 June 1945. For biographical information on Noël see also Previti Allaire 2004 and Bossuat 2007. 157 HAEU, DEP EN 1254, Curriculum Vitae of Émile Noël, 17 June 1945. 158 See HAEU, DEP EN 1182, Camerades de la Liberté et Train-exposition de la jeunesse, Spring 1947. 159 Kassim 2004: 52. 160 Previti Allaire 2004: 83. 161 Ibid., 81. 162 Noël cited in ibid., 86. 163 Ibid., 89; see also HAEU, DEP EN 349, Documentation Presse, Index Quotidien de la Presse, Les hommes, les fonctions, les affaires, 29 March 1958. 164 HAEU, DEP EN 2124 diary January to June 1960; EN 2125 diary June to December 1960; EN 2126 diary 1961; EN 2128 diary January to June 1962. 165 Noël 1990a: 55. 166 Émile Noël, ‘La fonction publique européenne’, allocution prononcée le 25 octobre 1981 à l’occasion de la remise de la médaille Robert Schuman par Gaston Thorn, président de la Commission. In Hommage à Émile Noël. Luxembourg, Office des publications officielles des Communautés européennes, 1988, 153–7. 167 HAEU, DEP EN 815, Émile Noël, La fusion des Communautés Européennes, talk given at the Centre Européen Universitaire, Nancy, undated, academic year 1965/66, 7.

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168 Ibid., 24. 169 HAEU, DEP EN 804, Émile Noël, Discours devant la Commission parlementaire de l’association de la Grece à la Communauté, 6 June 1963, 4. 170 See HAEU, DEP EN 816, Émile Noël, Quelques aspects institutionnels de la crise des communautés. Le fonctionnement des Institutions pendant la crise, 15 September 1966. 171 HAEU, Int 66, Émile Noël à l’OURS (Paris), 19 June 1989. Round-TableDiscussion of the Fondation Guy Mollet on: ‘Les socialistes et la construction européenne 1946–1956’. 172 Previti Allaire 2004: 91. 173 Noël 1990b. 174 Noël 1990c: 158. 175 Noël 1990: 58. 176 HAEU, INT-ECH 767, Jean-François Deniau, interview with Gérard Bossuat and Anaïs Legendre, Paris 3 and 10 November 2004. 177 Ibid. 178 Ibid. 179 Cf. Albrecht and Schwartz, interview with the author and HAEU, INT-ECH 765, Fernand Braun, interview with Michel Dumoulin and Julie Cailleau, Brussels, 8 December 2003. 180 HAEU, INT-ECH 677, Herbst. 181 Von Staden 2002: 178–9. 182 Deniau 1977: 46. 183 Ibid., 246, 270. 184 HAEU, DEP EN, 716 17.2.–2.3.1960 (93e à 95e réunion de la Commission), 24 February 1960. 185 BAK, N 1266/1214, Letter cabinet Hallstein to Helmut Sigrist, 21 January 1964. 186 BAK, N 1266/1287, Letter of H. Hendus to the cabinets of President Hallstein and Commissioner von der Groeben, 19 September 1961. 187 BAK, N 1266/1280, Narjes to President Hallstein, 18 January 1964. 188 BAK, N 1266/1214, [Narjes] an Stülpnagel [Commission Sprechergruppe], 10 November 1960. 189 MAEF, DE-CE, Coopération économique 1945-1966, Communauté économique européenne – CEE – Euratom, Vol. 644, Note pour la Direction générale du personnel de la Direction générale des Affaires Économiques et financière. Service de coopération économique, 31 January 1958. 190 Mangenot 1999: 93–4. See also Bourdieu 1996. 191 Lemaignen 1964: 72. 192 BAK, N 1266/1214, Narjes to Stülpnagel, 8 June 1964. 193 HAEU, DEP EN 313, H. Etienne, Note à l’attention de M. Noël, strictement personnelle, 8 February 1965. 194 Ibid. 195 HAEU, DEP EN 306, note H. Etienne to E. Noël, 27 January 1965. 196 Ibid., E. Noël, Note pour Monsieur le Président Hallstein, strictement personnelle, 11 February 1965.

NOTES 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215

211

Von Verschuer 1967: 5. Scheinman 1971: 204–5. Official from DG V, interview with the author. Lerner and Gorden 1969: 264. Costantino Friz, interview with the author, Brussels, 10 March 2005. Abélès and Bellier 1996: 442. See for example ‘In Memoriam. Hommage à Jean-Claude Morel’. Courrier du Personnel, No. 229, 1–7 February 2002, 6. Obituary Gérard Imbert. Courrier du Personnel, No. 326, 4–10 June 2004, 7. Paul Collowald, ‘Souvenirs (particuliers) et avenir (commun)’. Les Anciens, Bulletin de l’association internationale des Anciens des Communautés européennes, No. 10, May 1989, 9–11, here 11. Speech Edmund Wellenstein. Les Anciens, No. 9, October 1988, 4–5, here 4. This is emphasised by Georges Brondel. Courrier du personnel, No. 318, 19–25 March 2004, 5–6. See also Brondel 2003 and Brackeniers, interview with the author. Official from DG V, interview with the author. Shore 1995: 219. ‘Interview d’Albert Coppé 3.12.1984’. Les Anciens, No. 2, May 1985, 4–7, here 6. See also Krohn, interview with the author. An official from DG I, interview with the author, Brussels, 10 December 2003. Pappalardo and Friz, interviews with the author. Muller, interview with the author. Coombes 1970: 260–1. Ibid., 263.

Chapter 5 1 2 3 4 5

March and Olsen 1989: 1. See Rasmussen 2009: 38–40. Cf. for example Pierson 2004. Ibid., 18. HAEU, DEP EN 724, 14.12.1960–1.2.1961 (128e à 133e réunion de la Commission), 21 December 1960. Emphasis as in the original (which used underlining). See also Hallstein’s comment in HAEU, DEP EN 711, 22.7.– 22.9.1959 (69e à 74e réunion de la Commission), 29 July 1959. 6 Coombes 1970: 291. 7 Wiener 2006: 38. 8 Ibid., 43. 9 Gerber 1998: 180. 10 BAK, N 1266/1092, Aufzeichnung betr. Besprechung über Organisations- und Personalfragen von EWG am 26. Januar 1958, 27 January 1958. Three days later, on 29 January, Hallstein also participated in a Federal Government cabinet meeting. However, the short cabinet minutes do not reveal if the matter was discussed in the meeting. 11. Kabinettssitzung am Mittwoch, den 29. Januar 1958. Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online, at

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11 12 13 14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

THE PROCESS OF POLITICS IN EUROPE http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0000/k/k1958k/kap1_2/kap2_ 4/index.html, accessed 16 September 2009. Cini 1996b: 466. Löffler 2002, see esp. ch. B.3. On Müller-Armack and Erhard, see also Nicholls 1994. For an overview, see Gerber 1998: 232–60. More detailed is Kolowski 2000. Von der Groeben 1995: 244–5; 258–9. Cf. Murach-Brand 2004 for the evolution of German competition law in this context. The German Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkung (GWB), 27 July 1957; in France the Ordonnance No. 45-1483, 30 June 1945 and the law of 1953; and the Dutch cartel law, 16 July 1958. The Italian Codice Civile only included two vague articles on competition. On the development of these articles during the treaty negotiations and the influence of transatlantic networks on this process see Leucht 2008a and 2008b. On merger control in the ECSC see Witschke 2009. Gerber 1998: 241. Von der Groeben 1961: 10. Cf. also idem. 1995: 343–4. Idem. 1961: 10. On the beginnings of European competition policy see also Hamboch 2009. BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 25th session, 15–16 July 1958, pt. 23. Hambloch 2002: 891. For a detailed account of the position of the French government and that of the CNPF see Warlouzet 2007: 564–617. Ibid., 930. Idem. 2006: 191. Seidel 2009b. Warlouzet 2006: 191. Cini and McGowan 1998: 13. Council Regulation (EEC) No 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of 6 February 1962. Official Journal of the EEC, No 13, 21 February 1962, 204/62, replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. Official Journal of the European Communities, 4 January 2003, L1/1. There is ample literature on the subject. Cf. for example Noël 1988, 1995; Thiemeyer 1999; Griffiths 1990a; Griffiths and Girvin 1995a; Hendriks 1999; Ludlow 2005b; Knudsen 2009; Patel 2009a, 2009c; Seidel 2009a. For biographical information on Mansholt see Merriënboer 2006. Mommens 1990: 50. Griffiths 1990b: 94. Mommens 1995: 116. Griffiths 1990b: 96–7. On the Green Pool see Thiemeyer 1999 and Noël 1988. Griffiths 1995: 25.

NOTES 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63

64

65 66

213

Thiemeyer 1999: 266. Griffiths and Girvin 1995b: xxxiv. See for example Hendriks 1999: 141–2. Ibid., 143, 147–8. Kay 1998; Garzon 2007. Mansholt 1974: 111. For such consultations see e.g. Knudsen 2009: 230–2. Ludlow 2005b: 358. Merriënboer 2006: 262. Knudsen 2009: 137. Similar comments were made by the French agricultural minister Edgar Pisani and the Dutch government relating to the decisions of January 1962. Ibid., 201 Knudsen 2009: 225–7. Moravcsik 1998: 160. Knudsen 2009: 167. ACDP, I-659, 058/1, H. von der Groeben, Vermerk für die Herren Mitglieder der Kommission, Betr: Arbeitsmethoden der Kommission, 29 June 1962. Erich Mestmäcker, interview with Sibylle Hambloch, Hamburg, 4 October 2002. Schwartz 2006: 461. Houssiaux (1960) is one of the few French scholars to have published on competition policy. ACDP, I-659, 058/1, H. von der Groeben, Vermerk für die Herren Mitglieder der Kommission. Cf. Nicholls 1995: 180–2. Löffler 2002: 72. Löffler calls Böhm and Eucken ‘political professors’. While in 1958 Robert Marjolin appointed the Belgian economist Robert Triffin as adviser, he does not even mention him in his autobiography, Marjolin 1986. ACDP, I-659, 058/1, H. von der Groeben, Vermerk für die Herren Mitglieder der Kommission. Schwartz 2006: 473–4; Pappalardo, interview with the author. ACDP, I-659, 058/1, H. von der Groeben, Vermerk für die Herren Mitglieder der Kommission. ACDP, I-659, 002/1, Vermerk VerLoren van Themaat an von der Groeben, Zusammenfassender Bericht des Gedankenaustausches zwischen dem Generaldirektor und den Direktoren hinsichtlich der Bildung einer beratenden internen Arbeitsgruppe zur Unterstützung des Generaldirektors bei seinen Koordinierungsaufgaben, 4 November 1964. For example two landmark decisions were Commission vs Grundig & Consten, Cases 58/64 and 56 [1966] European Court Reports (ECR) 299 and Case 6/72, Europemballage Corporation vs Commission [1973] ECR 215 (Continental Can). Barthélémy, interview with the author. Information provided by Helmut von Verschuer in a letter to the author, 4 November 2005.

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67 See for example Muller and Schiratti, interviews with the author. 68 BAK, N 1266/1253, Note B. von Staden to President Hallstein, 7 June 1962. 69 ‘Notre vie en dépend’ [Our life depends on the CAP]. HAEU, Dep EN 720, Réunion de la Commission, 18 July 1960. 70 Ludlow 2005b: 356. 71 See for example the discussion in BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 153th session, 2ème partie, 10/12 July 1961. 72 Barthélémy, interview with the author. 73 Michelmann 1978b: 162. 74 This was published under von der Groeben’s name in the EC Bulletin; see von der Groeben 1961. 75 At http://www-wiwi.uni-muenster.de/~09/ecochron/personen/pm_eucken 1.pdf, accessed on 16 September 2009. 76 Pappalardo, interview with the author. 77 Michelmann 1978b: 170. 78 Cf. the interviews of the author with DG IV officials; Michelmann 1978b; Cini 1994. 79 Pappalardo, interview with the author. 80 Michelmann 1978b: 78. 81 Ritter, interview with the author. 82 See for example ibid. 83 Cini 1996b: 465. 84 ACDP, I-659, 001/1, Aufgaben der Wettbewerbspolitik in der EWG, Niederschrift über die Besprechung bei Herrn von der Groeben am 12.6.64. 85 Scheinman 1971: 212–3. 86 Michelmann 1978b: 63. 87 Kaiser 2005: 22. 88 McGowan and Wilks 1995: 164. 89 HAEU, Int 30, Noël. 90 See Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, No 19800140, Cabinet du Ministre ou du Secrétaire d’Etat. File: Conférence européenne sur l’Organisation des Marchés Agricoles. Pool Vert. 1953-1954. Document OECE, Comité Ministériel de l’agriculture et de l’alimentation, Nomination of Rabot as Director for Agriculture and Alimentation, 3 March 1955. 91 HAEU, Int 654, Jaap van der Lee, interview with J.C.F.J. van Merriënboer and J.H. Molegraaf, The Hague, 14 July 1998. 92 HAEU, DEP EN 322, Réunion de la Commission, 23 February 1962. See also Chapter 3. 93 BAK, N 1266/1254, CVs Guy Amiet, Adolfo Pizzuti, François Stroobants. 94 See von Verschuer, interview with the author. 95 IISH, Archief van Sicco L. Mansholt, J. van der Lee to S. Mansholt, 15 January 1958. 96 IISH, Archief van Alfred Mozer, No 48, A. Mozer, Bauernkrieg und zweite Etappe. Das ministerielle 16-Tage-Rennen in Brüssel, December 1963. 97 Ibid. 98 Krohn, interview with the author.

NOTES

215

99 Barthélémy, interview with the author; see also for example Günter Fitterer, interview with the author, Brussels, 14 April 2004; Muller and Rencki, interviews with the author. 100 Cf. for example Craps, interview with the author. 101 Michelmann 1978b: 162. 102 Ibid., 139. 103 Michelmann 1978b: 60; see also Barthélémy, interview with the author. 104 Barthélémy, interview with the author. 105 Coombes 1970: 212. 106 Ibid. 107 IISH, Archief van Alfred Mozer, No 48, Alfred Mozer, Bauernkrieg und zweite Etappe. 108 Garzon 2006: 27–8. 109 Fouilleux 2003: 254–6. ‘Memorandum on the Reform of Agriculture in the European Economic Community and Annexes’. Submitted by the Commission to the Council on 21 December 1968. COM (68) 1000 final, Parts A and B, 18 December 1968. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement No 1/69. 110 Ludlow 2006a; Knudsen 2009. 111 Wiener 2006: 39. 112 Cf. Thiemeyer 1999: 4. 113 For the German farmers lobby, Deutscher Bauernverband, see Patel 2009b. 114 Griffiths and Girvin 1995: xxxvi. 115 Thiemeyer 1999: 262–3. 116 McGowan and Wilks 1995: 150. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Conclusions

General de Gaulle on 9 September 1965, cited in Touchard 1978: 218–9. Cf. for example Von der Groeben 1995: 370. Proposals for Reform of the Commission of the European Communities and its Services. Report made at the request of the Commission by an Independent Review Body under the chairmanship of Mr Dirk Spierenburg, 4. Downs 1967: 20. Bitsch 2007: 125. HAEU, INT-564, Christopher Audland, interview with Ruggero Ranieri and Charles Turner, Milnthorpe, 11 July 1998. Outlook on the development of the economic union. Address by M. Jean Rey, President of the Commission of the European Communities to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 15 May 1968, 5. Cf. Dumoulin 2007d: 236–9. Soames quoted in Willis 1982: 85. Brackeniers, interview with the author. Fitterer, interview with the author. Dubois, interview with the author. See Brackeniers and Schiratti, interviews with the author and HAEU, INTECH 681, Nass.

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14 Scheuer and Weinstock 1977; Commer and Weinstock 1975. 15 Knipping and Schönwald 2004. 16 Neil Kinnock was appointed Commissioner responsible for Transport under Commission President Jacques Santer (1995–99). Under Commission President Romano Prodi (1999–2004) he became Vice-President for Administration Reform. 17 Mr. Neil Kinnock, Vice-President of the European Commission, Press Statement, Brussels, 29 September 1999: http://europa.eu/rapid/press ReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/99/118&format=HTML&aged=1 & language=EN&guiLanguage=en, accessed 24 August 2009. 18 Hooghe 2001: 200.

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INDEX

Abélès, Marc 66, 148 Adenauer, Konrad 2, 27, 42, 94, 129, 133 Aken, Charles van 85 Albrecht, Ernst 89, 123–124, 127–128, 132–134, 142, 165, 172 Allardt, Helmut 93, 111, 145– 146 Amiet, Guy 168 Armand, Louis 61 Arnsmeyer, Friedrich 111 Audland, Christopher 176

Beyen, Johan Willem 57, 160 Bobba, Franco 89, 103 Böhm, Franz 155, 162–163, 165 Bonnemaison, Michel 50 Borschette, Albert 99 Bossuat, Gérard 50, 118, 144 Brackeniers, Eduard 124, 132, 136–138 Braun, Fernand 137 Brentano, Heinrich von 94 Brugmans, Henri 109, 115, 129, 140 Bühlbäcker, Bernd 41

Bach, Maurizio 31 Ball, George 52 Balladore-Pallieri, Cesare 15, 24, 30, 50 Bandini, Mario 97 Barth, Karl 133 Barthel, Charles 11, 18, 26 Barthélémy, Maurice 112, 118, 128, 132 Behr, Winrich 40–41, 44–45, 47–48, 50, 55, 61, 79–80, 111–112, 145 Bellier, Irène 66, 148 Berding, Caspar 26 Berthoin, Georges 40, 45, 55

Calmes, Christian 15, 24, 40–41 Carbonell, Mauve 42 Caspari, Manfred 122–123, 172 Churchill, Winston 54 Cini, Michelle 166 Collowald, Paul 149 Conrad, Yves 31 Coombes, David 88–90, 129, 131, 146, 151, 154, 169 Coppé, Albert 11, 53 Craps, Raymond 112 Cros, Jacques 39 Daum, Léon 11 Decombis, Marcel 126

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Dehnen, Hermann 14–15, 26, 38, 43, 46, 53, 55, 61–62 Dehousse, Fernand 140 Deist, Heinrich 42 Delarge, Gérard 26 Delouvrier, Paul 46 Deniau, Jean-François 89, 121, 132, 143–146 Deringer, Arved 158 Dondelinger, Jean 147 Downs, Anthony 176 Duchêne, François 17, 52 Dumont du Voitel, Rudolphe 113 Dumoulin, Michel 3, 89, 98, 112, 124 Erhard, Ludwig 23, 72, 155 Ernst, Wolfgang 45 Etienne, Henri 132, 147 Etzel, Franz 11–12, 14, 25, 41– 42, 46, 61, 68 Eucken, Walter 155, 165 Ewig, Klaus 44 Facini, Carlo 47–48 Faniel, Robert 87 Fayat, Hendrik 119 Finet, Paul 11, 27, 68 Fontaine, François 26, 47, 55 Fouilleux, Eve 170 Froschmaier, Franz 122–124, 132 Garzon, Isabelle 170 Gasperi, Alcide de 2 Gaudet, Michel 14, 26, 50, 52, 55, 61, 88 Gaulle, Charles de 61, 66, 109, 142–143 Georgakakis, Didier 3 Gerber, David 155

Giacchero, Enzo 11 Giordani, Francesco 61 Girault, René 49 Glisenti, Giuseppe 27 Gorden, Morton 109, 148 Groeben, Hans von der 26, 66, 75–77, 82–84, 92, 98–99, 111, 115, 118, 123, 129, 133–135, 137, 150, 155–158, 162–163, 165–166, 172 Groote, Lucien de 94 Grooten, Roger 87, 93 Großmann-Doerth, Hans 155 Guazzugli-Marini, Giulio 82 Guyot, Jean 26, 62 Helmont, Jacques van 26 Haas, Ernst B. 62, 72 Haferkamp, Wilhelm 95, 123 Hallstein, Walter 3, 5, 41, 52, 62, 66–67, 69, 70, 71–78, 81–82, 84, 86–88, 90–97, 99, 103, 108, 120, 134–135, 140, 142, 144–147, 150, 155, 164, 173–174, 176 Hamburger, Richard A. 15, 24 Hanau, Arthur 138–139, 140 Heide, Wolf von der 19 Hellwig, Fritz 41–42, 54 Hendus, Heinrich 96, 145–146 Herbert, Ulrich 37 Herbst, Axel 144–145 Heringa, Berend 75, 129, 132, 164, 168–169 Herpels, Antoon 53 Hijzen, Theodor 89 Hirsch, Etienne 56 Hitler, Adolf 45 Hoff, Hans vom 24, 27 Hooghe, Liesbet 3 Houssiaux, Jacques 162 Houtte, Albert van 51

INDEX Hüttebräuker, Rudolf 93 Hutter, Roger 14 Imbert, Gérard 128, 130 Jaspers, Karl 133 Jaurant-Singer, Marcel 54 Jenkins, Roy 178 Kaiser, Wolfram 4, 92 Karnebeek, Maurits van 78 Kieffer, Delphine 58 Kinnock, Neil 101, 178 Klaer, Werner 14 Knudsen, Ann-Christina L. 161, 170 Kohnstamm, Max 16, 19–21, 24, 29–30, 38, 41, 45, 47, 49, 50, 52, 55–57, 59–62, 94, 141–142 Korth, Siegfried 111 Koster, Frans de 112 Krawielicki, Robert 14, 55 Krohn, Hans-Broder 111–112, 132, 138–140, 168 Kronstein, Heinrich 165 Lagrange, Maurice 18 Lahnstein, Manfred 95, 129, 132 Lahr, Rolf 97 Lamy, André 26 Lee, Jaap van der 94–95, 118, 123–124, 159, 168–169 Lemaignen, Robert 66, 71, 77, 84, 92–93, 96, 146 Lepsius, M. Rainer 10 Lerner, Daniel 109, 148 Löffler, Bernhard 93 Loth, Wilfried 89 Lübke, Heinrich 138–140 Ludlow, N. Piers 2, 108, 164, 170

243 Luzzato, Riccardo 87 MacSharry, Ray 161 Malfatti, Franco Maria 105 Malvé, Pierre 121 Malvestiti, Piero 42, 66, 70 Mangenot, Michel 146 Mansholt, Sicco L. 66–67, 73– 76, 78, 87, 89, 94–95, 111, 118, 123, 129–130, 139, 140, 150, 158–164, 168–169, 171–172 Marc, Alexandre 140 March, James 153 Marjolin, Robert 39, 66–67, 70, 73–74, 79, 86, 89, 91–93, 103, 141, 143, 153, 155 Mayer, René 20–21, 27, 53, 68 Mazey, Sonia 24, 32 McGowan, Lee 167 Mestmäcker, Ernst-Joachim 162–163 Metcalfe, Les 101 Meyer, Klaus 132, 145 Michaelis, Hans 26, 48 Michelmann, Hans 166–167, 169 Möller, Hans 162 Mollet, Guy 79, 94, 133, 141 Monnet, Jean 1, 2, 5, 10–32, 35, 40, 42, 45–47, 49, 52–53, 55–62, 67, 69–72, 74, 88, 94–95, 109, 129, 141, 173– 174 Moravcsik, Andrew 74, 162 Moses, A. Dirk 113 Mozer, Alfred 83, 95, 99, 110, 112, 114, 118, 132, 168 Much, Walter 24, 52 Muller, François 118, 125, 132 Müller-Armack, Alfred 155–156 Myrdal, Gunnar 58

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Narjes, Karl Heinz 84, 94, 112, 132, 145 Nass, Klaus-Otto 138 Noël, Émile 67–68, 76–77, 79– 83, 85, 90, 94, 124, 129, 132, 140–143, 147, 176 Nora, Simon 45, 54 Olsen, Johan P. 153 Ophüls, Friedrich 57 Ortoli, François-Xavier 103, 121, 132, 144 Pappalardo, Aurelio 124, 132, 165–166 Pasture, Patrick 27, 95 Perroux, François 39, 56 Pétain, Philippe 37 Peterson, Robert 119–120, 123– 124 Petrilli, Giuseppe 66, 77, 82, 84, 92 Philip, André 58, 129 Pierson, Paul 153 Pizzuti, Adolfo 168 Poidevin, Raymond 3, 10 Poincaré, Jean 46 Pompidou, Georges 143–144 Potthoff, Heinz 11, 42, 46 Poullet, Edouard 105–108 Prate, Alain 132 Previti Allaire, Cathérine 140 Priebe, Hermann 75, 162 Pujade, Pierre 39, 48 Rabier, Jacques-René 26, 47, 50, 55 Rabot, Louis 75, 87, 89, 129, 164, 168–169 Radaelli, Claudio 4 Rasquin, Michel 66, 111 Rebattet, Georges 140

Regul, Rudolf 14, 26, 39, 55, 62 Reichling, Charles 24 Rencki, Georges 118, 132, 140, 164 Renzetti, Giuseppe 97–98 Reulecke, Jürgen 37 Rey, Jean 66, 73, 78, 80, 87, 93, 97, 99, 108, 119, 143, 176 Ritter, Kurt Lennart 132 Rochereau, Henri 96 Rollman, Tony 14–15, 24, 26, 38, 43, 46, 55, 58–62 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 61 Rosenberg, Alfred 95 Rueff, Jacques 30 Saclé, Armand 166 Sahm, Ulrich 11, 23–24, Salewski, Wilhelm 25, 46, 55, 61, 62 Schaus, Lambert 66, 86–87 Scheinman, Lawrence 148, 167 Schensky, Max 26, 46, 55, 61–62 Schlieder, Willy 95, 123, 172 Schnippenkötter, Swidbert 112, 145–146 Schryver, August de 94 Schulze-Brachmann, Arno 111 Schumacher, Hermann 165 Schumacher, Hermann Sen. 165 Schuman, Robert 2, 129 Schwartz, Ivo 132, 136, 165 Seeliger, Günther 111, 145 Shore, Cris 72 Sigrist, Helmut 98, 145 Slobbe, Willem van 95 Smulders, Bernhard B. M. 119 Snoy et d’Oppuers, Jean-Charles 137 Soames, Christopher 177 Sonnemann, Theodor 139 Spaak, Paul-Henri 2, 57, 160

INDEX Spierenburg, Dirk 3, 10–11, 13, 15, 18–20, 30, 45, 101, 176– 177 Spinelli, Altiero 142, 148 Staden, Berndt von 75, 144, 145–147 Stikker, Dirk 159 Stroobants, François 168 Sünnen, Robert 48–49 Telders, Benjamin 112, 135 Tergia 97 Tezenas du Montcel, René 26, 44 Trondal, Jarle 42, 120 Uri, Pierre 13–16, 24, 26–28, 39, 44, 46, 55–57 Varsori, Antonio 4 VerLoren van Themaat, Pieter 84, 87, 103, 112, 115, 118,

245 122, 124, 129, 132–137, 163, 165–166, 172 Verschuer, Helmut Freiherr von 85, 127–128, 164, 168–169 Vinck, François 14–15, 24, 38, 43, 46, 48, 55 Wagenführ, Rolf 15, 24, 55 Warlouzet, Laurent 157 Wehrer, Albert 11, 15 Wellenstein, Edmund 47, 50, 52–53, 55, 82 Westrick, Ludger 23 White, Jonathan 72 Wiener, Antje 170 Wilhelmina, Queen of the Netherlands 60 Wilks, Stephen 167 Wissels, Gérard 45, 48, 50, 55 Zamaron, Bernard 55