Education and Empowered Citizenship in Mali 9781421417813

Citation preview

Education and Empowered Citizenship

in

Mali

Education and Empowered Citizenship in

Mali

JAIMIE BLECK

Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore

This book has been brought to publication with the generous assistance of the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts, College of Arts and Letters, University of Notre

©

Dame.

2015 Johns Hopkins University Press All rights reserved. Published 2015

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

2468

9

7

1

3

5

Johns Hopkins University Press 2715

North Charles

Street

Baltimore, Maryland 21218-4363

www.press.jhu.edu

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bleck, Jaimie, 1980-

Education and empowered

citizenship in

pages

Mali

/

Jaimie Bleck.

cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN

(electronic) (electronic)

— ISBN 978-1-4214-1782-0 (paperback) — ISBN 1-4214-1782-0

978-1-4214-1781-3 (paperback)

1.

— ISBN 1-4214-1781-2

Democracy and education—Mali. Mali.

3.

Citizenship—Mali.

LC95.M42B54 379.6623—dc23

A catalog

record for this book

is

2.

I.

Education and state—

Title.

2015

2014049711

available

from the British Library.

Special discounts are available for bulk purchases of this book.

For more information, please contact Special Sales at 410-516-6936 or [email protected].

Johns Hopkins University Press uses environmentally friendly book materials, including recycled text paper that

is

composed of at

least

waste, whenever possible.

30 percent post-consumer

In September 2006, activists

were

political rally in

Oumar Diakite and more

killed in

than 25 other youth

a bus accident while returning from a

Gao. I dedicate citizen

this

book

to

for the world.

Oumar—truly a model

The

how

feasibility it

of democracy in Africa will depend crucially on

relates to the social experience of Africans

and how

far

it

serves their social needs.

—Claude Ake, The

Feasibility

of Democracy

in Africa

CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations

ix

xi

Preface

Acknowledgments

1

2 Research

3

Politiki ni

xiit

Introduction

1

Design and Methodological Approach

Fanga Mali

la/ Power

and

Politics in

Mali

4 Mali’s Evolving Educational Landscape 5

Can Education Empower

6 Schooling

and

Parents’

7 Educational Expansion

Citizens?

Engagement with

173

Bibliography

Index

183

201

44

71

100

the State

and Democratization

Notes

24

in Africa

130 150

ABBREVIATIONS

ADEMA

Alliance for

AQIM

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

ATT BA BC

Amadou Toumani

F

HC] IBK

K KV

M

Democracy in Mali Touré

Bamako

Banconi,

Bamako Coura, Bamako Faladie, Bamako High Council of Islam Ibrahim Boubacar Keita Kayes Rive Gauche Kayes Rive Droite

Mopti

MNLA NGO

National

S

Sikasso

SR

Sikasso

SV T

Sevare

Timbuktu

U

university student interview

USAID

US Agency

Movement

for the Liberation of Azawad

nongovernmental organization

II

for International

Development

PREFACE

I

selected education as the lens through

rican politics

which

contemporary Afwhile working on the USAID-funded African Education Initito explore

From 2004 to 2006, I worked as a program assistant for a project charged with distributing more than 20,000 primary school scholarships in 15 countries in central and southern Africa. My employer, Winrock Internaative (AEI).

worked with 20 African NGOs to identify bright, vulnerable girls and provide them with uniquely tailored scholarship packages. The scholarships

tional,

to

consisted of whatever

it

took to keep a

school

girl in school:

uniform, or sometimes a kerosene lamp so she could study

The ilies.

best part of my job

These young

infectious.

to

a fearlessness

make

the

a

at night.

visiting scholarship recipients

women exuded

They were hungry

an education, and orphans,

was

fees, pencils,

and

their

fam-

and determination that was

most of

their scholarship, to get

Many

to forge a future for themselves.

of the

many of their lives had been touched by HIV/AIDS, and

girls all

were

of them

came from the poorest households in their communities. They were all smart and driven. I couldn't help but daydream about how few of these girls might a

someday change the

future of African governments.

During the three years political systems in flux.

countries

and

elections in

Gabon,

first

worked on the

project,

I

A decade after third-wave

institutions

dom, while other ing their

I

were evolving

Omar Bongo

countries, like

still

was exposed

transitions to democracy,

at different rates: despite

and

regular

ruled the country as his personal

Mozambique and Namibia, were

turnovers in executive power. However,

the context of poverty

to a range of

local governments’

at

fief-

experienc-

the village level—in

bureaucracy—the distinction

between elected democracies and closed regimes was

far less

pronounced.

Conversations about social service provision, aggressive tax authorities,

and unaccountable government

institutions forced

me

to reflect

on how de-

xii

mocracy and governance emerging

by

Preface

actually translate

on

the quotidian

level.

How

are

and actualized

opportunities for political participation perceived

most of these hybrid regimes, there was a sense that instiwere shifting in the direction of democracy, and citizens were ne-

citizens? In

tutions

gotiating their

own

former educators,

opportunities for political involvement. Village chiefs,

and homemakers prompted

taxi drivers,

and hard about what “democracy” means to African and

me

citizens.

to think long

These conversa-

with the scholarship program underscored the role of welfare provision in the democratization process.

tions

In lic

all

my experience

of these countries,

1

was dumbfounded by the

school scholarship to change the trajectory of a

ability

of a small pub-

girl's life.

Parents cared

deeply about educational opportunities as a key to both social mobility and

empowered citizenship. To many parents and grandparents, the African state seemed far out of reach—an alien institution reserved for the privileged, educated

elite.

Their hopes and dreams for their daughters and granddaughters

culminated in their

and

profit

cratic

from

ability to get

an education and, subsequently, navigate

The

state institutions.

girls,

many proudly speaking a bureau-

language that was unintelligible to their families, radiated a hope that

through education anything was This book and the research

possible.

it is

based on were spurred directly by

experiences talking with young students, their parents, school

government administrators.

empowered

I

highlight

how

government

efforts

and donor

and

education might contribute to

citizenship in democratizing regimes in Africa,

the impact of

officials,

my

initiatives, like

access to citizenship in nascent African democracies.

and

I

examine

AEI, to expand

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I

am

indebted to a large group of individuals

edge and support to make Malians

who

this

book

who

have shared their knowl-

possible. First,

I

thank the hundreds of

took the time to share their wisdom, concerns, and reflections

with me. Second, nothing would have been possible without

Amadou

team:

Youba Ould for

my

research

Guindo, Seydou Niambele, Djenebou Sogodogo, Elcaid

Khalifa,

and our

stylish driver, Solo Togola.

your unique contributions: Guindo,

for

your

thank each of you

I

intellectual curiosity

willingness to challenge me; Seydou, for your dedication, precision,

and

and

at-

tention to detail; Djenebou, for your fearlessness, inspiration, and poise; and

Youba, for your sense of humor,

flexibility,

and commitment

to the team.

Many others made the project possible, including the So family in Kayes, the Ministry of Education, the Territorial Administration, the National Election

Commission,

Amadou

Samake,

Mody

Boubacar Guindo,

Moumouni

Sou|

mano, and all of the educators who spoke with me. I also thank my broader network of support in Mali, including my Malian parents, Haoua Cisse and

Moussa

Sissoko;

sisters-in-law;

my

in-laws, Sala

and Salimata

Sidibe;

my

brothers-

and

Cheblen “Jah” Samake; the Kalabancoura Sports Club; Bintou

Traoré; Lala Walet;

and

my mentor

and friend Bara Kassambara.

I

also

want

thank the other expats whose love of Bamako inflamed my own and kept me sane in the 115° heat: Brandon County, Paul Davis, Marie Venner, Jes-

to

sica Chervin,

Owen and Hilary Swearengen,

Spencer Orey, David Wong, and

Devon Golaszewski. I

also

acknowledge a diverse group of mentors and friends on the other

side of the Atlantic,

who

lent their expertise

thank Will Reno and Lee Seymour cool.

I

am

forever grateful to

couragement and guidance.

I

for teaching

my former benefited

and support

to the project.

I

me that political scientists are

boss Martha Saldinger for her en-

from an extremely supportive faculty

xiv

at

Acknowledgments

Cornell, including David Patel, Peter Enns,

Tom Pepinsky,

Richard Bensel,

and Peter Katzenstein. The non-Africanist members of my dissertation committee, Ken Roberts and Valerie Bunce, improved this book significantly by forcing

me to think comparatively. Devra Moehler has been a true role model

me; her consistent guidance throughout all stages of this project was indispensable. Finally, I thank my outstanding mentor, Nicolas van de Walle, for

who believed in me and my research from the very start. With humor, humility,

and wisdom, he has guided At Cornell

imagine.

I

give particular thanks to Julie Ajinkya, Phil Ayoub,

I

Janice Gallagher,

Desmond Jagamond, Don ielle

into a political scientist.

had the most supportive grad school cohort one could ever

Simon Cotton,

Brake,

my transformation

Simon

Benjamin

Onur Ulas

Gilhooley,

Ince,

Leonard, Igor Logvinenko, Michael Miller, Dan-

Resnick, Deondra Rose, Tariq Thachil, Pablo Yanguas, and Chris Ze-

peda.

thank the American

I

APSA Africa

participants at the litical

Political Science Association

Economy Research

(APSA) and the

Conference, the Contemporary African Po-

Seminar, and the African Studies Association con-

ferences as well as the faculty at the Kellogg Institute at Notre nell’s Institute for

Dame and Cor-

African Development for valuable feedback.

must

I

single

out Kristin Michelitch, Keith Weghorst, Kevin Fridy, El Hassen Ould Ahmed,

Dan

Smith,

Emeka

Okerere, AbdoulKarim Saidou, Staffan Lindberg, Leon-

ardo Villalén, Peter VonDoepp, Jessica Gottlieb,

Dembele, and David Stasavage thank

my

colleagues at Notre

for their constructive

Dame

thank

Jessica Peck,

comments.

Finally,

I

on the manuscript: Nara Mainwaring, and Sean McGraw. |

for feedback

Pavao, Guillermo Trejo, Sarah Daly, Scott also

Adam Auerbach, Abdoulaye

Liana Cramer, and Jae

Won Kim

for their excellent

research assistance.

This book was

made

possible with the generous support of a

lowship, the Institute for Social Sciences,

Peace and Conflict Studies

at

and the Judith Reppy

Boren

Fel-

Institute for

Cornell University, as well as the Institute for

Scholarship in the Liberal Arts, the Helen Kellogg Institute for International

and the College of Arts and Letters at the University of Notre Dame. Chapter 3 draws on materials from a 2013 article co-authored with Boubacar Studies,

Mody

Guindo, “Education for

What? Lessons from tions of Chapter

5

Mali,’

All,

Education for

Development

Whom,

in Practice 23(8):1004-1017.

were previously published in 2013

and Islamic Schooling Communities

Education for

as

Por-

“Do Francophone

Participate Differently: Disaggregat-

ing Parents Political Behaviour in Mali,’ Journal of Modern African Studies 51(3):377-408.

Acknowledgments

xv

my rock star brother, Zander, and our parents, Tom and Doreen, thanks for encouraging me to do what I thought was interesting, for tolerating and appreciating my adventures, for supporting me unconditionally, and for always pushing me to be better. Last, to my che, Idrissa: thank you for challengTo

ing

me to bea

stronger, smarter,

and more empathetic person every day.

excited to be your apprendike as our journey continues.

lam

Education and Empowered Citizenship

in

Mali

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The

transitions to

democracy that enveloped sub-Saharan Africa

in the 1990s

have been accompanied by dramatic increases in school enrollment. Since

newly elected governments have expanded access

then,

to

primary educa-

tion at historically unprecedented rates. Elections afforded African citizens a

new political

space in which to voice their

own

policy priorities.

can constituencies seized these democratic opportunities to

Many Afri-

demand

greater

access to education for their children. Elected leaders responded with the

elimination of school fees and the construction of new schools (Harding and Stasavage 2014; Stasavage 2005). School expansion, particularly at the pri-

mary level,

is

arguably the most powerful domestic policy change in the ma-

jority of African countries since the transitions to

democracy began. African gross primary school enrollment increased by 48% between 2000 and 2008; pre-primary, secondary, and tertiary enrollment increased by more

same period (UNESCO Institute of Statistics 2011). Fueled by the Millennium Development Goals and the Education for All campaign, donor aid to education in Africa doubled between 2000 and 2004, rising than

60%

in the

from US¢1.8

billion to

US$3.4

billion (Education for All 2007:2). In order to

reach enrollment targets, governments allocated scarce resources to public education.

Most African

countries averaged

ing every year during the

first

Institute of Statistics 2011).

6% increases in education

decade of the twenty-first century

Governments

spend-

(UNESCO

liberalized education sectors

and

partnered with private schools, including Islamic schools, as an additional strategy to increase the

number

of students counted toward gross enrollment

(Rose 2006; Rose and Akyeampong 2005; Villalon,

Many governments lief to

Idrissa,

and Bodian

slashed primary school fees; they capitalized

2012).

on debt

re-

further fund basic education.

While the quality of schooling during

this

expansion has been critiqued

Education and Empowered Citizenship

2

and debated, the implications of these policy changes

in

Mali

for

democratic citizen-

ship are striking.

An unprecedented number of African children

to attend school.

They

pledge allegiance to a the

in classrooms with peers

common

Equally important,

state.

from the

sit

state for the first time.

now able

from other ethnic groups,

and learn the bureaucratic language of

flag,

many

are

parents are receiving a tangible service

Most African countries and

international do-

nors did not articulate educational expansion as a strategy to improve democratic citizenship,

but rather as a

way

improve

to

human

development.

How-

on education and democratization suggests policy could generate positive results for democracy and citizenship.

ever, the rich theoretical literature

that this

Despite these sweeping societal changes, scholars have not yet explored their implication for citizenship in Africa. This lytical

book aims

to

fill

that ana-

void by bridging the comparative literature on schooling and citizen-

ship with the literature

on the

political

economy of development and

social

welfare provision. Existing scholarship suggests that education can play an

important role in generating knowledge and participation but

it

also fosters parents’

engagement by exposing them

welfare service through a policy feedback tion have

on

effect.

among

students,

to a state-sponsored

What impact does educa-

knowledge of and engagement with politics in the does the receipt of schooling for a child affect parents’

students’

multiparty era?

How

participation in politics?

The

liberalization of the education sector presents

additional questions about the effects of different types of schooling: public, private, secular,

and

religious.

Do

all

types of school generate the

same

levels

of political knowledge and engagement? In this ical

book I examine

knowledge, and

there

is

the relationship between schooling provision, polit-

political participation in Mali.

The educational expansion

emblematic of the wider continental trend, but the increases in enroll-

ment in Mali were among the highest in Africa. Twenty years after the first demMalian primary school gross enrollment rate had jumped from 26% to over 82%. Additionally, Mali is a Muslim-majority ocratic transition in 1991, the

country,

and education providers

are diverse.

As

a strategy to increase en-

rollment, the Malian

government opened up

its

providers, including

NGO-run community

schools, Christian schools, sec-

ular

education sector to for-profit

Francophone schools, and madrassas'—modern, Arabic-language,

reli-

gious education providers. During the 2006-2007 school year, approximately

38% of Malian primary students attended non-public schools. The increase in enrollment and the variety of citizens’ educational experiences—secular, Islamic, public, and private—provide fertile ground to test the effects of ed-

Introduction

3

ucation on citizenship in nascent African democracies with liberalized education sectors. In this

book

I

ask two sets of questions to explore the impact of the ed-

ucational expansion.

The

ucation on students.

How

first series

of questions concerns the effect of ed-

does attending school shape citizens’ capacity and

willingness to engage in politics?

Given the diversity of educational providers

sub-Saharan Africa, a related question asks

in

if different

schooling trajec-

knowledge and engagement. Do experiences shape students political knowledge and engagement

tories generate similar types of

way? Second, is

examine schooling provisions

I

all

in the

representative of the broader welfare capacity of the state.

Traditionally, education has ize citizens

allegiance.

power and gain relevance in reorient citizens’ identities and

As African

idate

citizens’ lives, state

to

actions

leaders

away from

and toward bureaucratic and elected

is

it is

also

the impact

does exposure to

affect parents’ political

been an important tool

and build nation-state

What

How

of a childs education on parents’ political engagement?

communities

same

on parents. Education

effect

important not only as an instructional experience for the pupil;

different types of schooling

schooling

behavior?

for regimes to socialstates seek to consol-

schooling offers a

way

traditional or religious

authorities. In the

wake of the

founding elections that marked the transitions to democracy, the experience of schooling has

become doubly important because

it

can provide individual

citizens with the skills to evaluate political information

the

state. Political

citizens to

in

emerging democracies,

engage with skills

states. It is

enable

institutions.

citizens are often confronted

underfinanced, and poorly performing

ments of

to

science literature typically assumes that these

engage with both elected and bureaucratic

However,

and

by weak,

possible that in environ-

fragile or imperfect institutions, educated,

empowered

citizens

of regimes than their uneducated peers are. One might observe that in environments of extreme institutional underperformance,

might be more

critical

rather than fostering engagement, education could

from

electoral politics.

There

is

promote a withdrawal

an additional threat that education might

disrupt productive, traditional channels of political mobilization. Western

education might awaken in pupils an individualist flict

on

with the communitarian organization of the larger

their

tional or

own

which could consociety.” With sights

spirit,

personal mobility, students might be less invested in associa-

group membership and therefore be

traditional channels of mobilization for

less willing to participate in

group grievances. Education could

fragment traditional venues of interest aggregation.

Education and Empowered Citizenship

4

also

It is

and religious—and ask if all types of schooling

Education

related to

Mali

important to examine diverse schooling providers—public,

vate, secular,

equally.

in

is

not a monolithic force.

content, the political authority

its

Its ability

pri-

affect citizenship

to shape citizens

behind the provision, and

distribution across society. Citizens obtain varying levels of education,

could generate distinct citizenship outcomes.

A

is its

which

primary education and a

university education are different in terms of the skills that they provide to students, the comparative advantage they generate vis-a-vis other citizens,

and

time spent socializing in and out of classrooms.

also the

educated Malian student

is

A

university-

ostensibly fluent in French, has spent time in the

where the University of Bamako is located, and has interacted with peers from all over the country. A citizen who completed sixth grade in capital city

a rural public school in Sikasso has probably not achieved the in the bureaucratic language

same fluency

nor had the opportunity to interact with such a

diverse group of Malian citizens. Similarly,

we might not

expect an education in public, Francophone, sec-

ular schools to generate the

same

political

behavior as Arabic-language in-

struction in Islamic schools. Education providers in the

use different tain religious

same country can languages of instruction and can vary on whether they concontent, which might affect the skills students acquire and the

communities to which they are connected. Non-state providers, by bolstering

weak

state capacity,

might contribute

and

to

an overall increase in

human

capital,

engagement with the state. Conversely, citizens’ involvement with non-state providers might have political ramifications that

empower

citizens,

incite

them away from engagement with the state (Cammett and MacLean 2011, 2014). The tenuous circumstances of Islamic schooling communities—

pull

which have often been suppressed, co-opted, or marginalized by colonial and post-independence governments in raise specific questions

havior

when compared

about the

many Muslim-majority

effects

African states—

of Islamic schooling on student be-

to the effects of secular schooling

on

citizens

who

associate with other educational tracks.

The second ents.

set

of questions examines the impact of schooling on par-

An older political science literature chronicles colonial and postcolonial

regimes’ chronic underperformance as service providers, their legitimacy in the eyes of

most

citizens (see

Ake

which undercuts

1996, 2000;

Ekeh

1972;

Mamdani 1996). However, given the state's efforts to provide a larger community of citizens with opportunities for schooling, the policy feedback literature suggests that the expansion of access to education could foster citizens’ engage-

Introduction

ment with

the

state.

5

Increases in state welfare provision could also generate

legitimacy and relevance for governments.

The

liberalization of the education sector

and a widespread

poor quality of public education complicate the expectation

belief in the

that state provi-

sion will automatically stimulate political participation. If public education

evaluated as inferior to private education, citizens tive

may make harsh compara-

judgments, and this could cultivate negative assessments of the

ditionally, different providers are religious,

and non-state

connected to the diverse

proved

state.

Ad-

loci of traditional,

authorities. Historically, states are not the only actors

and

to use education for state-building. Religious, rebel,

also

is

their ability to harness legitimacy

service provision. Non-state schooling

and

political actors

allegiance

might draw

have

through social

citizens into political en-

gagement mediated by non-state forms of authority rather than by elected or bureaucratic authorities.

Malis turbulent

political trajectory

standing the relationships

among

has increased the urgency of under-

education, citizenship, and political au-

thority. In 2012, junior officers staged a

coup détat in response to the

state’s

mismanagement of a burgeoning rebellion in the north of the country. It removed Malis democratically elected president, Amadou Toumani Touré, only one tion

month

prior to

what would have been

and third executive turnover. Shortly

tainty in

Bamako allowed

Mali’s fifth presidential elec-

thereafter, the political uncer-

rebel groups to seize the three northern regions

of the country. After a year and a half of political uncertainty and the state's near-collapse, the country held a presidential election to usher Mali back into

an era of “democracy.”

The

data presented in this

second term—in the

summer

book were after

collected during President Touré’s

he was

first

reelected in

2007—and

the course of 2009, approximately three years before the rebellion

over

and the

coup détat removed him from office. The research provides insight into how Malians were experiencing democracy during the years prior to the coup. I

draw on

body of evidence, including an original “immersive” survey of 1,000 Malian citizens in the Bamako, Kayes, Sikasso, Timbuktu, and Mopti regions; interviews with more than 50 education professionals; and an exit a diverse

poll of 450 people during the municipal elections in It

remains to be seen

how the

tremors of political

Bamako. crisis will affect

Malian

democracy moving forward. While the arguments of this book are based on research conducted prior to the coup, the themes and trends inform Mali’s current situation.

How

can the current government close the democratic

Education and Empowered Citizenship

6

deficit that existed in

Mali prior to the coup?

in

Mali

How can government actors fos-

and channel participation toward the state? Do some Muslim actors continue to feel marginalized from democratic participation? What role can education play in building citizenship? In this book I offer evidence

ter allegiance

of the relationship between citizens and the state as seen by Malians.

I

also

demonstrate the ways that education provision, one primary channel of state policy making, might slowly improve citizenship and consolidate democratic

governance over time.

More than 20

Why Citizenship

Matters for Democracy

years after the third

wave of democracy swept over the

conti-

nent, the vast majority of sub-Saharan African states hold regular elections,

but democratic progress has been inconsistent. The quality of democracy and

governance in most countries is still hotly debated. While some countries have witnessed an expansion of civil freedoms and watched sitting presidents step

down, others have

power

grabs.

slid

back into cycles of violence and

extrajudicial

case of Mali highlights, 20 years of electoral experience

As the

does not ensure that democratic institutions consolidate and become more responsive to citizen demands. In this

book

I

zens relationship

focus away from this political turbulence to look at to the state.’

I

citi-

problematize two aspects of citizenship that

plague contemporary procedural democracies.

First,

I

emphasize the impor-

tance of empowered democratic agents as a necessary condition for democracy.

Following Amartya Sen (1999),

who

as citizens

toward tinct

define

Second,

I

and the avenues

agents

for expression in democratic in-

discuss the challenge of orienting citizens engagement

the state rather than

toward competing forms of authority. These

concepts—empowerment and engagement with

linked.

Empowered engagement can be

dis-

the state—need not be

directed toward traditional leaders,

religious authorities, or regional brokers. In is

empowered democratic

are knowledgeable about the political system, the range of

potential political choices, stitutions.*

I

weak

states

where democracy

not consolidated, non-state authorities are often more responsive and ac-

countable than the state

is.

However, from the perspective of state-building

or democratic accountability, citizen engagement

is critical

for institutional

growth and democratic consolidation. Since

I

seek to

move

past minimalist definitions of democracy

uate “participatory” or “egalitarian” democracies

(Coppedge

et

and al.

to eval-

2010),

I

Introduction

7

must investigate whether ordinary citizens participate in politics and the range and scope of citizens’ participation

in

government channels. The strength of

engagement with state institutions is a central determinant of the accountable and responsive governance that characterizes consolidated de-

citizens’

mocracies (Bunce and Wolchik 2007; Ippolito-O’Donnell 2006; O'Donnell 2010). In the words of Albert Hirschman (1970), this expression of citizen “voice”

is

necessary in order to keep states from “falling into cycles of slack.”®

This participation can take a multitude of forms, varying from political participation—such as voting, contact with representatives, or running for office

oneself—to involvement in contentious boycotts.

The question of citizens’

politics,

such as protests,

relationship with the state

is

strikes,

and

important not

only to understanding more equitable and inclusive representation, but also to

understanding the very nature of democratic governance and institutions. Many African democracies and semi-democracies lack dialogue between

citizens ical

and democratic

institutions. In his

seminal study of African polit-

economies, van de Walle (2001) concludes that weak governments are

allowed to underperform precisely because of the lack of pressure from

and

cit-

on these institutions. In the absence of a strong state, citizens develop mechanisms of self-reliance, including kinship and familial networks, religious communities, affiliation with patrons, and other types of izens

civil

associations. life

As Claude Ake (2000:47)

describes

it,

associational (non-state)

can be understood as “booming from the vanishing legitimacy of the

state,

and the withdrawal of identity and

hostility.’

to

society

loyalty, fear

and suspicion and even

Rather than imagining a de facto loyalty to the

state,

an allegiance

and engagement with the African state needs to be constructed. While state illegitimacy threatens any constellation of governance, the

consequences are particularly dire for fledgling democracies. In his depiction of minority communities in the United States, Sen (1999:155) warns that non-participation or non-engagement with the state can lead to a lack of representation:

Democracy has

to

be seen

as creating a set of opportunities,

and the use of these

opportunities calls for the analysis of a different kind, dealing with the practice

of democratic and political rights. In this respect, the low percentage of voting in

American and

elections, especially

alienation,

by African Americans, and other signs of apathy

cannot be ignored. Democracy does not serve

remedy of ailments

as quinine

as

an automatic

works to remedy malaria. The opportunity

opens up has to be positively grabbed

in order to achieve the desired effect.

it

Education and Empowered Citizenship

8

in

Mali

Passive exit threatens the representativeness of democracy for those nities that disengage. If passive exit

happens ona

of citizens withdraw from politics,

it

democratic

large scale,

commu-

and the majority

threatens the very nature of the nascent

institution.

Obstacles to Democratic Agency African states continue to populate 27 of the 30 lowest rankings on the United Nations’

Human Development

reaucratic capacity of the state

beg

citizens

for

many

countries, the limited bu-

and the tremendous

an exploration of how

nities for political expression. els

Index.’ In

Since

daily challenges facing

human development

affects

opportu-

many African democracies have low lev-

of development that might constrain citizens’ rights and capabilities, the

autonomy and freedom of political tion

action cannot be assumed.

The

distinc-

between meaningful, informed participation and mobilized or coerced

participation

becomes

critical.

Even though informed participation might

not be sufficient to reform stubborn or nonresponsive institutions, essary condition for change to take place.

Throughout democratic

education has been a systematic tool for states to increase ties to evaluate

and engage with

uninterested or unable to

need

for political

endow

it is

institutions.

a nec-

history,

citizens’ capabili-

While nascent regimes may be

citizens with the skills or information they

engagement, the educational expansion, pushed by donors

and parents alike, might make these transformations more likely. As outlined by Dahl in the first pages of Polyarchy (1971:2), democratic stitutions will only

be responsive

to citizens’ needs

and

in-

desires if citizens “for-

mulate their preferences” and “signify their preferences to their fellow citizens

and the government by individual and collective action.” However, acts do not automatically translate into the expression of political verse incentives for political engagement in procedural

the meaning of participation in Africa.

many

voice. Per-

democracy complicate

democratic countries in sub-Saharan

While the magnitude of these imperfections

in African elections

debated,

most researchers acknowledge the widespread

centives

on

election day.

all political

The ubiquitous presence of

is

role of short-term inpolitical brokers,

who

distribute cash or gifts in exchange for a vote, problematizes the conceptualization of all political behavior as constructive for democratic institutions.

Campaign swag

in Africa surpasses pens, stickers,

and buttons; many vot-

ers expect T-shirts or, in rural areas, salt or sugar as a prerequisite for party visits to villages.

In

some

instances, these types of gift are merely part of ap-

Introduction

propriate protocol.

A

candidate cannot

9

come

to a village to plead his case

without offering some gesture of his benevolence, but accepting a

gift

does

not constrain a citizens ability to vote based on alternative programmatic

(Lindberg 2013). The distribution becomes symbolic of a candidate’s

criteria

generosity

and

his awareness of rural-dwellers’ plight (Jourde 2005).

other instances,

ever, in

tied to a candidate's

gifts

and favors

performance

at

How-

for voting are directly or indirectly

the ballot box.

Whether vote monitoring,

coercion, or convincing the population that they are being monitored, short-

term incentives disconnect the

and Vicente

from the policy outcome

(Collier

2012).

In this environment,

some

might not actually have the political

political act

citizens

who

are observed to

we

autonomous

capabilities or rights necessary for

engagement (O'Donnell 2004:27). Before turning

of participation,

be participating

therefore

must understand

citizens’

to the question

transformation into

democratic agents. Even though their behavior might look identical, those citizens with

knowledge of the

political terrain

preferences are qualitatively different

who

from those

have their

citizens

own

political

who vote because of

Democratic agents must have a level of awareness that “motivates their desire to acquire and process information” (Mattes and a political broker's request.

Shenga 2007:20).

who

We

can distinguish between democratic agents and those

express “allegiant” participation (Shingles 1981)—due to unreflective trust

of authority, in an attempt to “show loyalty to citizens

who

are co-opted or coerced into particular

In addition, ized

more powerful actors” —or

many

forms of participation.

democratic societies are hierarchical and character-

by vertical networks of civil society where

politicians are

dependent on

patrons or brokers to reach voting blocs (Beck 2008; Koter 2013; Villalén 1995). If citizens cast their vote as instructed

by

member, or a party without know-

a patron, family

electoral entrepreneur, or if they claim allegiance to

ing the competing candidates or the consequences of their vote, then one

cannot claim that these citizens are imprinting their state

through the exercise of

political voice. In

own

many

preferences on the

instances, mediators

or brokers can be constructive conduits that link citizens to institutions and welfare programs or offer heuristics in an environment of scarce information

(Baldwin 2013; Krishna 2002; Lerner 1958). While this type of assistance aids citizens in expressing their political voice in the short term,

because

it

stitutions. state,

it is

problematic

obstructs the personal link between citizens and democratic in-

When

brokers mediate the relationships between citizens and the

they keep citizens an arms length from institutions. Rather than gain-

Education and Empowered Citizenship

10

in

ing familiarity with the electoral process during their it,

who

those citizens

Mali

experience with

own

on mediators might remain alienated and

rely

afraid

of state institutions. Further, those mediators, including political parties and other brokers, might capitalize on state welfare provision to entrench their

own

political

power (Fox

Another concern

is

1994).

that

one cannot be sure that

kind of interest ag-

this

gregation captures citizens true preferences. Unlike horizontal institutions,

brokerage relationships are by nature hierarchical and sometimes fused by traditional or family bonds, flexively

which can be unquestioned and embraced

(Hydén 2006). While any

members

interest

group claiming to speak

re-

for all

risks marginalizing or suppressing individual voices, those organ-

izations claiming to represent the “authentic voice’ consistently hide or mis-

represent the preferences of

some

for the continuity of the

group narrative

(Benhabib 2002; Young 2012). Empirically,

and which

it is

very

difficult to

are passively mobilized.

ocratic agents

determine which citizens are empowered

One key and measurable

their political knowledge.

is

attribute of dem-

creates the foundation

Knowledge

Knowledge need not entail memorization of party manior the electoral codebook. In systems where the informal rules weigh as

for all participation. festos

heavily as

what

is

inscribed in legal texts, the memorization of idiosyncratic

constitutional regulations

may be irrelevant.

knowledge could include the political system.

rules of the

ability to

In these contexts, the significant

use proxies to

make

guesses about the

At a minimum, democratic agents should

game and

the basic actors involved:

who

know

running,

is

the basic

who

is

in

power, and what the limitations are to power within the electoral system.

By measuring

citizens’

knowledge one can

of political empowerment. But knowledge

powerment, which might Pollock (1983),

competence izens as

I

arrive at a

is

proxy

for their level

insufficient for political

em-

also require increased internal efficacy. Following

define internal efficacy as citizens assessment of their

as political actors.

While counting

empowered democratic agents

politically

knowledgeable

risks overstating their level

own cit-

of political

empowerment, one can use the assessment of knowledge to get at the initial variation between citizens who are mobilized into political action and those

who

interact with politics in a measured,

In this tions

book I use four measures

measure

citizens’ ability to

to assess citizens’ knowledge.

name

different actors

is

and

Three ques-

parties (the mayor,

and the majority party in the National a rules-of-the-game question: do citizens

the president of the National Assembly,

Assembly). The fourth measure

knowledgeable way.

Introduction

know

11

the executive term limits? This question

Mali in 2009 because the

sitting president

was

particularly relevant in

was completing

his

second and

term in power and because President Mamadou Tandja, in neighboring Niger, had just attempted to alter term limits. final

and Underperforming Regimes

Efficacy, Participation,

Afrobarometer data show that 62% of Africans

feel that their

voices are not

heard between election cycles (Logan 2010:25). The problem of short-term

compounded by widespread belief that the respond to citizens. The perception is that as soon as

incentives to

is

government with

little

do

little

the votes are cast,

recede back into their comfortable government offices

officials

concern for their constituencies’ needs.

low external

state will

When

this perception of

efficacy is widespread, citizens are less sure that their participa-

tion will count.

I

use Pollock's (1983:403) definition of low external efficacy as

a system of governance that individuals perceive as unresponsive to popular

demands. These environments may Citizens

may become

foster feelings of helplessness or apathy.

disillusioned or uninterested in trying to link political

behavior to policy outcomes. Decades of poor state performance could make many citizens question the utility of the state (Bratton 1989). Citizens could

withdraw

to the protection of local barons, religious authorities, or

family networks without making further institutional channels

gagement toward the Literature

buoy

on US

is

demands on the state. This exit from

emblematic of the problem of orienting

citizens’ en-

state.

politics suggests that

specific types of participation

high levels of internal efficacy can

even in environments of extreme skep-

ticism about institutional responsiveness (see Craig 1980; Craig

These increases in internal

giotto 1982; Fraser 1970).

formly stimulate contexts are

political participation,

and Mag-

efficacy will not uni-

however. Confident citizens in these

engage in high-initiative or contentious behavior High-initiative participation—synonymous with what Nie and

more

(Pollock 1983).

extended

likely to

colleagues (1996) refer to as “difficult” participation—includes acts such as

campaigning, running for require greater

skill

at

and contacting

a

government

official,

which

regardless of the incentives offered. Contentious behavior

includes protests, boycotts,

aimed

office,

influencing

and other non-institutional forms of participation

government

policy.’ In contrast,

high levels of internal

efficacy are not typically associated with “easy political behavior,’

ing or identifying with a party.

such as vot-

Education and Empowered Citizenship

12

In environments

varying

levels

where

actors

less efficient

with

of internal efficacy can generate distinct and nonlinear patterns

might eschew mass forms of or plagued by

at

some

political acts will

which

participation,

actors

more

be correlated. are

viewed

as

intimate exchanges

might be willing

to leave their

the polls, but they are intimidated to approach state authority

As mentioned above, imperfect

directly.

all

corrupt processes, for

state officials. Conversely,

thumbprint

Mali

citizens are skeptical about state responsiveness,

of political participation. In other words, not

Some

in

centivize certain types of participation

institutional conditions

among empowered

and contentious behavior, over more

high-initiative

ways of engaging, such

tend to in-

citizens,

including

institutional,

formal

as voting or joining a party.

Possibilities for

Empowered Engagement with

the State

There are many channels through which citizens could gain information to prepare for informed engagement. Rather than predicting which channel will be the most exclusively

effective in

on

transforming subjects into informed

the role of education.

How

does education

democratic citizenship and engagement? In doing cation

is

a panacea for political

so, I

empowerment, nor do

other forms of outreach and empowerment. Basing

I

seek to

affect

focus

empowered

do not claim

I

I

that edu-

question the utility of

my work on an extensive

and an emerging literature in comparunderstand the relationship between education and

literature in the field of ative politics,

US

citizens,

politics

informed, participatory citizenship.

do not claim

I

that education

is

the only pathway to informed citizenship.

Membership in an organization or association could help direct citizens toward political information that is relevant to their interest group. Political parties, for instance, are conduits of information about the electoral process as well as information, albeit biased,

about the

study of Tanzania in the 1960s, Géran

Hydén (2006)

villagers ers

were extremely well informed about the

field

of competitors. In his

finds that

many remote

political processes

and play-

because of tremendous party outreach. Party outreach and competition

also generate information

tions

more

about electoral processes or democratic

institu-

generally.

Citizens could also gather information through other associational channels.

For instance, in Mozambique Mattes and Shenga (2007) find that those

citizens

who most frequently

seek out religious leaders to help them solve im-

portant problems are more likely to support democracy, to

demand democ-

Introduction

racy,

and

tries like

be

to

critical

13

of political performance. Labor organizations in coun-

Zambia have played

a

tremendous role

also in protesting political parties’ positions. In

have been active in championing anti-gay Additionally, the expansion of

Uganda, evangelical churches

legislation

(see, for

(Grossman

2015).

mass media—including radio and

made information about

sion liberalization—has

widely available

in backing political parties, but

electoral processes

example, Moehler and Singh 2011).

Many

televi-

more

Malians

on community or private radio and participate in lively debates on local call-in shows (Tower 2008). Studies have shown that exposure to mass media rely

is

positively correlated with political

(e.g.,

Mattes and Shenga

which has grown dramatically in the twenty-first century, enables connected users to crowd-source information. As demonstrated by the Arab Spring of 2011, but also through African2007). Internet

and

knowledge

cell

born innovations, such

phone

as the

availability,

Ushahidi platform,

this

technology has a dra-

matic potential to shape political participation and electoral accountability

(Makinen and Wangu Kuira 2008).

As

early modernization theorists argued, migration to

also expected to

Deutsch

1961;

expose citizens to more

political

Deutsch and Foltz 1966). In the

urban zones

is

information (Lipset 1959;

capital city, citizens are closer

government, and it is cheaper for candidates and parties to contact them. Furthermore, in urban zones citizens are more likely to join

to the central

multiple associations and networks. Greater population density ensures that citizens are in contact with people of varying perspectives

nodes of information. actions

and

Similarly, travel

linguistic repertoire

different

can often serve to expand the range of

situations that citizens are

can expand their

and with

exposed

and

to.

Through

travel, citizens

their comparative vantage point to

analyze the politics of different regions, villages, and towns.’ Participation in the political process itself can also generate informed

cit-

izenship. Lindberg (2006) argues that elections are conduits of information,

and participation in them sensitizes citizens to the goals of the democratic system. Moehler (2008) notes that citizens who participated in Uganda's constitutional

to

reform became more discerning democratic consumers and tended

be more

As

critical

of the performance of local government.

these examples demonstrate, there are

through which

citizens could gain

many

transformative pathways

knowledge, which in turn prepares them

informed participation. However, given the theorized importance of education in cross-national studies of participation and the fact that education for

policy offers the state a tool to systematically

empower

citizens, in the rest

Education and Empowered Citizenship

14

of the book

I

focus exclusively

on

in

Mali

the relationship between education

and

citizenship in African democracies.

Education Fostering Knowledge and Participation in Nascent Democracies: Limits and Possibilities

An extensive literature on US

politics explains that education is

key

to creat-

ing loyal, democratic citizens. Twentieth-century theorists of democracy un-

derstand school to be a ing

them how to

critical tool for socializing future citizens

participate in democracy. In

Verba (1963:317-318) provide a long citizens are better

list

The Civic Culture,

and teach-

Almond and

of practical reasons that educated

democratic consumers. Educated citizens consume and

disseminate political education to and from a broader range of sources, they

more aware of

are

politics,

they have greater internal and external efficacy,

members of organizations, and they

they are more likely to be

fident in their social environment. Education

is

are

more con-

thought to play a constitutive

role in transforming “subjects into critical citizens”

through the process of

democratic enlightenment (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Norris 1999). almost undisputed that education fosters political participation in the

It is

Western context. Scholars of US democracy show that higher

levels of

edu-

cation are consistently associated with higher levels of political participation

even

when the researchers

1972;

Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

control for other socioeconomic factors (Converse

However, educational expansion in recent African democracies challenges

some of the assumptions

that these scholars

tween education and engaged cess to education has

typically

is

the relationship be-

citizenship. First, the current

brought with

and the content of what

make about

it

expansion of ac-

questions about state school quality

being taught. Since the 1990s, regimes have been

more concerned with building

schools and eliminating barriers to

enrollment than with reforming curriculum or pedagogy. cratic

tent

demo-

regimes would transmit civic content inside the classroom. This con-

might include an

Smith

Ideally,

explicit civics

curriculum (Campbell 2006; Finkel and

2011) or the transmission of liberal democratic values

(Dahl 1967), or

might work indirectly through history and geography courses that expose students to the structure and importance of government (Weber 1976). How-

it

ever, if African

a

regimes do not invest in this type of content or are plagued by

weak execution of this curriculum, one cannot be

be socialized appropriately.

certain that citizens will

Introduction

Second, as mentioned

underperforming

15

earlier, citizens often

institutions.

operate in an environment of

One cannot be sure

that higher education will

automatically spur appreciation of or participation in the regime. Although

educated citizens might be more supportive of the theoretical idea of democracy,

it is

not evident that they would provide “specific support” to poorly

functioning institutions.”°

It

would be naive

would reward underperforming port. Previous analyses of

direct relationship

to

assume

institutions with loyalty or unqualified sup-

Afrobarometer data do not demonstrate a

between education and

(Kramon

ruling regime,

and

2010),

likely to

Nerman

2014).

neighborhoods

The

succumb

to

of the government (McCauley

Political entrepreneurs

get those in highly educated

likely to

be coerced into support for the

less likely to offer criticism

and Gyimah-Boadi 2009). sadam, and

more

more

clear,

Other ev-

political participation.”

idence suggests that uneducated citizens might be vote buying

that educated citizens

may be

less likely to tar-

for mobilization (Isaksson, Kot-

relationship

between education and voting

by vote buying, mobilized turnout, or short-term

in systems characterized

incentives for participation could actually be negatively correlated.”

However, certain mechanisms that link education and citizenship in the

US

context hold, and are even magnified, in nascent democracies in sub-

Saharan Africa. Education can impart general

skills,

distinct

from any

specific

curriculum, such as bolstering citizens’ verbal cognitive capacity, increasing

more information from

citizens ability to harness

the outside world,

and low-

ering the informational costs associated with political action (Dalton 2007;

and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Neuman,

Nie, Junn, skills

Just,

aid citizens in obtaining objective information

and expressing preferences. Access citizens to fact-check to threats

political entrepreneurs.

vulnerable

Given the lower

more important than they do

in

political context.

evidence that education

edge. Mattes

less

information and the higher political uncertainty in the Af-

an information-saturated is

These

from multiple sources

with multiple sources and makes them

rican context, these skills could prove even

There

1992).

to diverse sources of information enables

and incentives offered by

levels of political

is

associated with greater political knowl-

and Mughogho (2009) draw on cross-national Afrobarometer

data to demonstrate that better educated citizens ble

and Crigler

media and

are

more informed.

make

greater use of availa-

In her study of slum-dwellers in Senegal,

Resnick (2010:64) finds that attending school

is

positively

and

correlated to a respondent's ability to describe the oppositions plan, Assises Nationales.

significantly

development

Robert Mattes and Carlos Shenga (2007) argue that

Education and Empowered Citizenship

16

better educated citizens as well as those are

more In

in

Mali

who use news media more

likely to offer political opinions in

frequently

Mozambique.

countries in Africa, education has an accelerated effect on ver-

many

bal cognitive proficiency because citizens: the

government speaks

pendence most African

states

it

eliminates an obstacle that plagues

a language that

most

not their own. At inde-

is

adopted the language of their former coloniz-

(Albaugh 2007; Laitin 1992). Even today, successful politicians generally have to demonstrate dexterity in the former colonial language (Bleck and ers

van de Walle

2011;

Ekeh

1975).

For instance, in the Sahel, where

associated with a French-speaking, secular

French-language to

skills

elite (Villal6n

politics is

2010), those with

have a comparative advantage because of their

ability

understand and interpret the workings of politics and government. For the

general public, literacy in the colonial language enables citizens to listen to the nightly news broadcast or televised debates and communicate with

mem-

bers of different linguistic groups (Laitin 1998).

Education demystifies the citizens the skills to

demonstrates

language

at

how

new

arena of power.

from the United

children of recent immigrants that learn the state

school are able to mediate interactions and engagements between

and the

2008; Weisskirch and Alva 2002). This

much

this

skills to entire families; literature

their parents, siblings, neighbors,

into

of bureaucratic authority and gives

understand and participate in

Schooling provides these States

new forms

state (see

phenomenon

Bloemraad and Trost

stretches

beyond Africa

of the postcolonial world in countries where a large percentage of

the population

is

not fluent in the language of the bureaucracy. For example,

Krishna's (2002) study of educated brokers in Indian villages highlights their

investment in learning bureaucratic procedures and understanding govern-

ment

as a

way to

secure an income from less educated peers.

The comparative

mean

value of a degree

rate of schooling is

is

also higher in contexts

where the

comparably low. Attending a university or

sec-

ondary school distinguishes learners from the majority of the population in countries like Mali, where the mean school attendance is only two years. Nie and colleagues (1996) argue

that education inserts citizens into politically rel-

evant centralized networks, which enables them to participate in more “diffcult” political activities,

participating in

such as contacting representatives, campaigning, and

community

organization.

were educated in the same primary schools,

Networks of African illustrate

elites,

who

the role of education in

building connections across a distinct political class (Sabatier 1978:266). Ed-

ucation endows citizens with connections and resources to invest in politics

Introduction

as well as the credentials to citizens’

own

17

be “heard.” These

sense of internal efficacy

(i.e.,

skills

and connections bolster

citizens’ belief in their

own com-

petence as political actors).

While education and participation do not appear

to constitute a linear

evidence that education can spur

some forms of partic-

relationship, there

is

ipation, particularly in the difficult or contentious channels.

Dalton (2008)

argues that as educated citizens transition to “engaged” citizenship from partisan, “duty-based citizenship,’ they are direct, contentious ficacy,

which

more

likely to take part in these

forms of participation. Education increases internal

ef-

in turn fosters high-initiative or contentious participation in

environments of low external

efficacy (Craig 1980; Fraser 1970; Shingles 1981).

These theories challenge expectations that education

will

uniformly increase

political participation.

Consistent with the theorized relationship between education and different types of participation, analyses of cross-national

show that education has no significant positive effect

Afrobarometer data

on voting, but it has a large and between electoral cycles, such as

discernible effect

on

participation

community meeting, contacting an official, or joining an associ(Isaksson 2013; MacLean 2011; Mattes and Mughogho 2009). The same

attending a ation

data demonstrate that educated citizens also are thorities, are

can provide

more

more

critical

likely to offer opinions, are able to define

political preferences (Mattes

democracy, and

and Mughogho 2009). These

ings suggest that education generates informed,

empowered

than nonreflective, allegiant participation. There

is

gests even informal education can shape

of political au-

find-

citizens rather

some evidence

that sug-

empowered engagement. Michelle

Kuenzi (2006:5) demonstrates that in rural Senegal experience with informal education—literacy and numeracy classes—has a strong positive impact on

and community participation by increasing citizens skills, and community solidarity.

political participation

self-esteem, civic

The Impact of Education on

Political

Engagement

through Broader Welfare Effects Education plays a pivotal role in creating loyalty and credibility for the government, which bonds citizens to formal channels of political expression.

While governing regimes

do not compete with nascent democracies are charged with a

in established democracies

alternative hierarchical authorities,

simultaneous task of state-building. In Europe, education provision played

Education and Empowered Citizenship

18

Mali

in

a vital role in the early years of state-building by establishing legitimacy, en-

couraging citizen support, and fostering civic virtue and nationalism (Ander1983; Gellner 1983;

son

Hobsbawm

Hobsbawm

1990; Laitin 1977, 1998;

and Nationalism

writes in Nations

Weber

1976). Eric

Since 1780: “Naturally states

would use the increasingly powerful machinery for communicating with their inhabitants, above

all

the primary schools, to spread the image and heritage

of ‘nation and to inculcate attachment to flag,

it

and

to attach

all

to country

and

often ‘inventing traditions’ or even nations for this purpose” (1990:92).

Many countries water,

in Africa are

and sanitation

still

services;

working

is

pave roads; provide

and build schools and health

rural populations or slum-dwellers in allegiance building

to

electricity,

centers that reach

urban zones. In this context, the goal of

particularly important since the provision of

primary

school education, along with other verifiable outputs, such as health services

and

infrastructure, represent a

in rural areas

way

governments

(Harding and Stasavage 2014).

evidence of their governments,

government's

for

capabilities. In

it is

more

to

connect with voters

If citizens are

without tangible

them

to recognize the

difficult for

weak or low infrastructure

states in

sub-Saharan

Africa, public education spreads a sense of national unity for learners, but

education provision also gives the government credibility and an increased ability to

monitor populations.

Politicians

can use education, as well

as other

types of social services, to flaunt their authority. In the

US

context, studies have

the ability to shape political

shown

programs have behavior through a policy feedback mechanism. that social service

For instance, Campbell (2003) has demonstrated

how the

government's provision of Social Security has shaped an active constituency of “tiber-citizens” out of the nation’s once marginalized senior citizens. Mettler (2005) shows that the

ble

GI

Bill similarly

created

more

politically active citizens

who

felt

and empowered. Fox (1994) chronicles Mexican president Carlos

capa-

Salinas’s

use of decentralized service provision to reestablish the nation’s credibility

and

government instead of local party and Mexico highlights how conditional

to build direct support for the central

bosses.

More

recent

work

in Brazil

cash transfer programs have raised voter turnout and support of the incum-

bent (De La

O

2013;

Zucco

2011).

While these studies focus on the

role of

welfare in increasing support for a specific regime or candidate, an emerging literature suggests that radical

zens identity

changes in welfare policy could impact

as well as their perception

mett and MacLean

of the legitimacy of the

state

citi-

(Cam-

2011, 2014).

Given scant government services in

many

rural areas in sub-Saharan Af-

Introduction

19

the provision of welfare services, such as schooling,

rica,

A

visible to citizens.

be very brand-new public school in a village might be rurallikely to

is

dwellers’ first real introduction to positive citizenship rights provided state. rica,

In the only study to look at policy feedback effects in sub-Saharan Af-

Lauren MacLean

d'Ivoire are

by the

who

more

(2011) demonstrates that citizens in

have contact with either public schools or public health

likely

than citizens

political leaders, attend

voices heard,

Ghana and Céte

and

who

did not have this contact to vote, contact

community meetings,

protest.

Those

clinics

citizens

join with others to

who had no

make

their

experience with public

schools or clinics used non-state channels of representation

more

frequently

These findings suggest that politicians could build credibility for and also induce citizens who receive services to engage with them.

(ibid.:25).

the state

This includes not only children benefit

from

who

attend schools, but also the parents

who

their children’s education.

The Question of Non-State Educational Providers The

liberalization of the education

market

raises additional questions about

the distinct effects of different types of schooling political

engagement.

state providers

atively

weak

than what

pedagogy

is

We do

Non-state education providers include different content

from

and some schools use

skills for learners.

often tied to different types of political authority, state.

Non-state schools are also

which might compete with

In a worst-case scenario, non-state schools could divide citizens,

foster parochial attitudes,

undermine

state legitimacy,

not the only—sources of citizen contact with the ical

a language of

that of the bureaucracy; in other words, non-state

schools might develop different

the

knowledge and

participation, especially in the context of rel-

offered in public schools,

different

political

not yet understand the role and impact of non-

on democratic

states.

on

knowledge and

state,

and remove one of—if thus decreasing polit-

participation.

Non-state provision through either a secular or religious provider could

away from the public sphere by making the performance of the relevant to their lives. Scholars have documented an emerging class

pull people state less

stratification

by school type

as the

middle

classes are increasingly leaving

public schools in Africa because of a perceived decline in public school quality

(Boyle 1999;

MacLean

2011). In his

study of Kenya, Congo, and Cameroon,

Patrick Boyle (1999) highlights the exodus of wealthy citizens private schools in

what he

calls

from public

the era of sauve qui peut, or every

man

to

for

Education and Empowered Citizenship

20

been a

himself. There has in

significant

in

Mali

growth of low-cost,

for-profit providers

urban and semi-urban areas in Africa (Rose and Akyeampong 2005). The

demand

for low-cost private schools suggests a shift of middle-class parents

away from public

schools.

A

study of school fee abolition in Africa reveals

that the poorest households are the

of school

fees,

most likely to benefit from the elimination

which implies that wealthier actors

their children elsewhere

are obtaining education for

(Harding and Stasavage 2014). The

exit

from public

education makes government institutions less relevant for middle-class

citi-

zens, thus perhaps decreasing their incentive to provide political feedback to

the government. Historically, non-state entities

have used service provision to build sup-

During the colonial period, Christian missionaries in Africa built schools as entry points to communities where they wanted to build churches

port.

(Abernethy 1968). The Muslim Brotherhood and

Hamas have used

service provision as a foundation for their successful political

(Wickham

2002). Political parties in India

social

movements

and Lebanon have used

social ser-

vice provision to recruit voters outside of their traditional base of support

|

(Cammett and Issar 2010; Thachil 2011). Rebel groups have also used service provision and indoctrination through education to build legitimacy for their movements tor,

(Keister 2011; Weinstein 2007).

African governments

that can be reaped

may be

By liberalizing

the education sec-

not only forfeiting the allegiance building

from public goods provision, but passing them on

to other

entities.

The

threat that a non-state provider poses to state legitimacy

is

partially

a function of the sponsoring institution's past relationship with the ruling

regime. In the Sahel, madrassas and Quranic schools are tied to a specific history of contestation with the secular

state.

In contrast, in

much

of Africa,

the Catholic Church received subsidies and support from colonial authorities

and post-independence regimes. Islamic schools faced

from the

state, in

either isolation

the case of the British administration, or elimination and

The French government with predominantly Muslim

resistance, in the case of French colonial authorities.

struggled to establish rule in

many

territories

populations and sought to co-opt or eliminate Quranic education. French officials

feared “Islamic fanaticism”

and saw it

as a significant challenge to their

They closed many schools and led campaigns against some of the French-held colonial territory, the campaign

mission civilisatrice.

Muslim leaders.

In

against Islam, as well as the colonialists’ aggressive forced-labor recruitment practices,

reduced the number of students in Quranic schools." This tension

Introduction

between the secular sitions since

many

state

21

and Islamic schooling plagued independence

tran-

postcolonial states continued to exclude Islamic schools

from government aid or accreditation. Given the tumultuous relationship between the government and Islamic education, fear and distrust might linger despite recent pacts and partnerships (Gandolfi 2003).

It

therefore

is

particularly important to investigate the role

of Islamic education in shaping political knowledge and political participa-

by attending and supporting a madrassa, students and their parents could become integrated into an alternative community that values concentration on their personal moral improvement and relationship tion.

It is

possible that

with God. These communities might encourage civic engagement exclusively

through actions mediated by their mosque or religious leaders, as well as distrust and opposition to the state and its formal channels of participation. Finally,

the content offered at non-state schools could differ from the state

education that

is

associated with citizen-making. There

Muslim

debate about the role of madrassas and state authority in

(Hefner and

Zaman

an active policy

is

societies

2007). Non-state providers, particularly ideologically

charged Islamic schools, could pose a challenge to liberal democracy. It is unclear if madrassas and Quranic schools will instill the liberal-democratic

deems

ethos and support for the ruling regime that Dahl (1967)

crucial for

democratic citizenship. Furthermore, apart from ideology, Quranic schools

and madrassas use Arabic and indigenous languages pedagogy and therefore provide a

different skill set

as their languages of

than what

is

offered

by

Francophone schools. Students who attend these schools do not have access to the

same

linguistic currency,

which

is

needed

to interact

with the

state

bureaucracy.

Book

Structure of the In this introduction, ter for

I

have discussed the reasons that education should mat-

democratic citizenship and

different effects

on

the importance of

political

likely that different schools

knowledge and participation.

empowered and engaged

which education may contribute pation. In chapter

why it is

2, I

citizens

to greater political

I

have

have emphasized

and suggested ways in knowledge and partici-

explore the methodological approach

I

used

to capture

Malian perspectives on the relationship between education, citizenship, and democracy.

I

describe the subnational research design and methods of data

collection, including the strategy of

an immersive survey.

Education and Empowered Citizenship

22

In chapter

3, I

examine the

cism toward formal,

empowered In chapter tion to

4, I

Mali

political culture in Mali, revealing

electoral politics.

I

mass

skepti-

suggest ways in which educated and

might overcome these low

citizenship

in

levels of external efficacy.

describe the dramatic expansion of schooling after the transi-

democracy

in the early 1990s

in the context of liberalization.

I

and the

diversity of education providers

demand

detail the

side for education

and

discuss parents’ motivations for selecting different schooling options in Mali. I

ical

assess the

impact of

different types of schooling

knowledge and participation

in chapter

5. I

on respondents’

polit-

find that education in any

school type empowers citizens to learn more about

politics.

Even

citizens

with a Quranic education or only literacy training were, on average, better than their peers with no education. Citizens’ politknowledge increases with each subsequent level of education, but there

informed about ical is

no

politics

significant difference across those in different types of primary schools.

Further, citizens with to vote

primary education from any school type are more

and campaign than

are those with

who

all. I

did not find

Francophone private schools. However, the

tionship between education that students

at

engagement of students who attended Islamic

differences in the political schools, public schools, or

no schooling

likely

and participation

is

not

linear.

rela-

Evidence suggests

obtain higher education often gain French fluency, which

increases their level of internal efficacy but does not automatically translate

from other

into greater electoral participation. Consistent with the literature

environments where

mands

(i.e.,

citizens are skeptical of state responsiveness to their de-

low external

efficacy),

secondary and university education are

only associated with significant increases in

forms of participation:

and expressing willingness to (Craig 1980; Craig and Maggiotto 1982; Fraser 1970). Those with

campaigning, contacting a government

run for office

difficult

ofhcial,

secondary or university education are no more

likely to vote or

than are their peers with no education. Education builds the the

state,

but citizens ultimately decide

In chapter 6

I

how to

best allocate these

and madrassas.

I

other factors constant, parents

schools are significantly

those parents citizens

who do

who do

their children to

engage

skills.

reveal that public education, as a

welfare service, can foster connections between parents all

skills to

turn to parents’ experiences with two different education

providers: public schools

ing

campaign

more

who

and the

state.

Hold-

enroll their children in public

and have a voter ID card than children in public schools and those

likely to vote

not enroll their

not have school-age children. Conversely, parents

madrassas claim that they vote

less

often

who send

when compared

to

Introduction

a reference category of parents

who do

citizens without school-age children.

in participation

Nor are to

among

parents

23

not enroll their children in school and

There are not comparable differences

who send

their children to

there significant differences between parents

madrassas and those

who send their

Quranic schools.

who send their children

children to public schools in terms of

non-electoral channels of participation. In chapter 7

I

discuss the implications of the findings of this

future of democracy in Mali I

recommend

and

book

for the

for the study of political behavior in Africa.

that greater attention

be afforded

to the

impact of educational

experiences on the expansion of citizens capabilities and to the role of education,

and

and other welfare state authority.

services, in establishing a

connection between citizens

CHAPTER TWO

Research Design and

Methodological Approach

Political science

is

increasingly

demanding

greater transparency in schol-

ars research design and data collection processes

(see, for

example, Elman,

Kapiszewski, and Vinuela 2010; Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read 2015). Here, I

discuss

my

theoretical motivations

pragmatic considerations.

I

I

describe the context in

exit polls,

Since

and interviews

many

an honest assessment of

my case selection,

my

employed

and the sampling

in

strate-

which our research team conducted the survey,

to give readers a sense of the research environment.

political science theories, as well as research methodologies, are

adapted from work in American ticularly

offer

outline the various methodologies

data collection, the motivation for gies.

and

politics, this

important in understanding

how

contextual information

(and

if)

these theories

is

par-

and tech-

niques can travel to dramatically different research environments, such as Mali. In this chapter,

I

some

also highlight

research innovations of the study—

particularly the recording of behavioral observations cations to

and

qualitative justifi-

complement the standard survey responses. The research team was

trained to code responses but also to include information about the participants’ justifications, their candor,

any

common

phrasing,

and ethnographic

details that could further enrich

our interpretation of their responses. The

team’s familiarity with the project

and our commitment

to the research goals

enabled us to capture rich qualitative data while conducting a survey of more than 1,000 citizens.

Case Selection In order to understand the grassroots underpinnings of citizens’ knowledge

of and engagement with the

state,

it is

essential to ask citizens themselves.

Research Design and Methodological Approach

The

goal of my study was to see

political

knowledge and

country

I

had been

how education affected I

participation.

chose to run

25

students’

my

study in

procedural progress;

it

alternations of power,

had held four presidential and boasted the second

pared to other countries that had

democracy was

star

due

to

elections, experienced

freest press in Africa.

made third-wave

its

two

Com-

transitions in Africa, Mali

one of the highest-ranking democracies. However, Mali’s

as

full

of complexities and contradictions.

freest presses in Africa, yet also

reaucratic language of the I

Mali—a

visiting since 2002. Before the 2012 coup, Mali, a poor,

Muslim-majority country, had been an unlikely democratic

had been lauded

and parents’

one of the highest

It

boasted one of the

illiteracy rates in the

bu-

state.’

adopted a subnational research design instead of using a cross-national

research design, for three reasons as outlined

generate

many observations

ential accuracy;

ferences.

A

factors that

to explore regional

subnational design enabled

me

citizenship behavior: systems of governance, the levels

institutional

between schooling and

Malian educational system,

62% (http://www.unesco.org/new/en/dakar/ed

is

ucation/literacy), while

mere 33%

a

many

dif-

of education compared to the rest of society. The

continental adult literacy rate it is

and geographic

to control for

typically mediate the relationship

and the value of different

(2001): the ability to

but control for context; better coding and infer-

and the opportunity

would

by Snyder

in Mali, so schooling in Mali

to have a different comparative value than

it

is

likely

does in other African countries.

In addition, Malis recent educational expansion

education sector provided adequate variation to

and the test the

liberalization of the

impact of different

types of schooling experiences—public, private, secular, and religious—on citizen

knowledge and participation; there

of citizens with no schooling

The focus on Mali

at

also

was a large reference category

all.

also allowed

me

to cultivate

and

capitalize

on

my spe-

knowledge and Bambara language proficiency—thus increasing the accuracy of my coding and interpretation of causal inferences (Adcock cialized area

and Collier 2001). Language and country knowledge are useful in dissecting and translating citizens understanding of democratic concepts borrowed

from the Western context

(Schaffer 2000).

I

conducted

my

dissertation re-

search after already having spent almost a year living with Malian host families

between college and graduate school. This time

in

Mali allowed

me

to

develop the language competency needed to conduct an analysis of regular citizens’

opinions and behavior in a country where most meaningful con-

versations

happen

in local languages.

My

residency in Mali also provided

Education and Empowered Citizenship

26

in

Mali

with a political primer on the country’s vast web of historical social and

me

political relations,

me to contextualize responses and interpret

which enabled

double meanings. Mali’s multiethnic political heritage

and decentralized

political tradition

are so strong that they affect day-to-day logistics. In order to successfully

make

purchases, travel, and follow appropriate protocol, one must

embed

oneself in social categories from Mali’s rich history by adopting a Malian last

name ety.

lian

or,

in

Bambara, jamu, which enables a foreigner to integrate into

For instance,

name,

my business

Madame

Sidibe

card and

Yama

my assumed

position as his kin

does anyone ask

my

“real

is

name.’

across ethnic groups in Mali

my research permits include my Ma-

Coulibaly.

relation to Biton Coulibaly, a ruthless

soci-

While

Bambara

when

enables

by referencing the

clearly

ruler of

taken seriously

My jamu

I

me

have no genetic

Ségou in the 1600s, I

am

in Mali. Rarely

to connect to others

historical interactions of

our

ancestors through Mali’s system of sanankuya, or joking cousins.’

embarked on “immersive survey research.” Rather than sourcing enumerators and logisticians from a local firm, I trained and managed a team of I

five

enumerator-coders, including myself.

My language

participate in the actual survey process since nearly

coded

enabled

Bambara.

me

to

of the surveys were

was present and personally coded responses seven school districts in Bamako, Kayes, and Sikasso. By

in

veys in

80%

skills

I

for 190 sur-

listening to

and observing nearly 200 survey respondents, I was able to better assess the quality of the questions and the responses and to make observations about Malian households, transport systems, and power relations. To assess Malians perspectives on politics, the government, and education, our research

team walked through

cities

and

talked to respondents as they

chopped wood, pounded

villages in Mali.

washed

We

sat in

compounds and

clothes, played cards,

nursed babies,

millet, cooked, collected well water,

with broken appliances. After

11

and tinkered

months, we had amassed a survey of 1,000

citizens in 10 school districts.

By comparing I

was

residents in school districts thousands of kilometers apart,

able to investigate important spatial variation in political

phenomena

while again controlling for the institutional and educational environment.

Mali

is

one of the

largest

and most diverse countries

in Africa.

Covering more

than 478,767 square miles, it contains dense forest regions, a vast savanna, and uninhabitable desert. My original strategy was to select two districts

from each of a geographically diverse Timbuktu, and Mopti.

Due

five regions:

Bamako, Kayes,

Sikasso,

to insecurity in the north of Mali, however,

we

Research Design and Methodological Approach

were only able fore,

to

conduct surveys in one school

we included

three districts in

Bamako

to

27

district in

Timbuktu. Therefor the political

compensate

tension in Timbuktu.

Methodology Immersive Survey Research In this

book I leverage

qualitative

and quantitative data to

plications of hypothesized relationships

edge,

and

political participation.

I

test

between schooling,

observable im-

political

knowl-

draw primarily from an immersive survey

of 1,000 citizens in 10 school districts in

five

regions in Mali.

I

define an

immersive survey as a researcher-led survey in which the researcher works

team of enumerators and

alongside a small

sits

in

on interviews (and may

code responses) over the course of the study. This enables the researcher to assess the quality of the data

led survey this

in

term

which

team

in

is

through every stage of the process.

no way

to distinguish this

A researcher-

a methodological innovation,’ but

I

introduce

approach from the stereotype of survey research

a principal investigator's role consists of a

week-long training with

enumerators and outsourcing to local firms.

Over the course of the year of research, my discussions, debates, and negotiations with Malian stakeholders forced me to reexamine and critically engage with the stereotypes and assumptions that I brought to the study from my literature review and my own experience in the US educational system. I

conducted the survey with the help of four research dou, Youba, and Djenebou.

my team members interpret findings

Malian education

As

I

needed

also furnished intimate, personal

sector.

Guindo, Sey-

recent graduates of the University of Bamako,

provided the language support

and

assistants:

to translate

and

knowledge of the

The primary members of the team

participated in

month-long training in which we covered relevant political science theories and research methodology. During the same period, my team members a

provided

me

with intensive Bambara tutoring, which helped

debates about translation. After

much

me

to join in

discussion over phrasing, cultural ap-

and measurement, the survey instrument was French, Bambara, and Songhrai.*

translated into

my team members

collected with-

propriateness,

I

out

have high confidence in the data that

me

because

that they

I

have an intimate knowledge of their capacity, and

were committed to the research

and working together over the course of 11

I

know

The experience of living months built solidarity, trust, and project.

28

Education and Empowered Citizenship

intellectual interest in the project

among our

five

in

Mali

team members.

able to obtain the survey data despite stifling 115° heat in

mechanical problems with our concrete

bedrooms

car,

Each team member was

Bamako, extensive

wooden pinasses during bridge Maghreb (AQIM) travel warning

in

and an Al Qaeda in the Islamic prevented me from accompanying my team

outages, that

were

bouts of malaria, snakes that invaded our

commutes

in Sikasso,

We

integral to the

to the

north of the country.”

development of

book, and the

this

research would not have been possible without their involvement.

The majority of

surveys were conducted by a team of

and one who posed the questions—so

that the coder

two—one coder

was able

to capture the

participant’s qualitative justifications for closed-ended responses.® In this

way, the surveys often became more like interviews: coders could simultaneously capture any qualitative data inserted by respondents despite using a

standard survey costly,

it

script.

While the use of two enumerators

way

in helping

me

to evaluate the

where the

The

measurement

also served a practical role

validity of the questions. In in-

had contradictory

qualitative justifications repeatedly

tionships to the closed-ended coding, that variable

and excluded from

my

and

inclusion of qualitative data aided

mechanisms, but

interpretation of causal

stances

more

to capture qualitative descriptions of the logic

context of political decision making.

my

ultimately

yields greater coding accuracy, a better ability to assess the honesty

of responses, and a

in

is

was rated

as

rela-

poor quality

analysis. In other instances, citizens’ similar use of

language to rephrase the question alerted us to the ways that the question was being understood. The vast majority of surveys were conducted without interpretation—enabling respondents to express themselves freely in their

own

language.

Additional Data Before conducting the survey,

I

took an

initial trip to

Bamako

in the

summer

of 2007 to obtain information about the educational and political landscape. I

obtained subnational data from the Ministry of Education, the Territorial

Administration, the National Archives of Mali, and the National Assembly. I

also

spoke with educators and school directors

trajectory of education

me

and

politics in Mali.

to better understand the current

and

who

narrated the historical

These descriptive data allowed

historic educational opportunities

in Mali, the country’s rapidly evolving experience with democracy,

ations

and trends across the

variables of interest.

and

vari-

Research Design

In 2009,

29

returned to Mali to conduct the survey and to collect other

I

forms of complementary ucators,

and Methodological Approach

government

more than 50 interviews with edand members of civil society; a survey of 200

data, including

officials,

university students; elected

education

officials’

profiles;

and an

exit poll

of

450 voters during the municipal elections in Bamako. These data provided a further test of the implications of the

erated through the survey

mechanisms driving

work by providing

correlations gen-

insight into observed voting

behavior and descriptions of educational differences between citizens and elected leaders,

which

also allowed us to

compare respondents

an

“elite”

children,

which

to

group of university students.

Measures and Variables

The survey generated education allowed

me

to analyze the

profiles for parents

and their

impact of length of education and type of school-

ing on respondents’ political knowledge, trust, and participation.

on African citizenship and education

existing data

rometer survey, but

this

educational profiles.

It

survey

limited in

is

by school

ability to

cation brings greater precision to the

type.

best

found in the Afrobacapture complete

includes each respondents level of education, but

to disaggregate educational profiles

cation history

its

are

The

fails

My study's focus on edu-

measurement of each respondent's edu-

by including school type

as well as the length of their schooling

experience.

The

research

team placed additional emphasis on

responses about education in survey,

we found

that the

all

French and Bambara words

about their education history, citizens

prompt

that

Our team learned

probed into

that

it

for school, école

Western education.

who had

participated in informal literacy trainings to school.

comprehensive

school types. For instance, in pretesting the

kalanso, carried an association with formal

went

eliciting

When

and

asked

attended Islamic schools or

would often claim

was necessary

to

that they never

make

a

secondary

specific types of informal or Islamic education in

order for respondents to reveal that they did in fact go to a school. Without

would have been underreported.’ added another dimension to the Afrobarometer data

the second prompt, Islamic schooling

My research

and where parents sent their children to school. These data help understand how parents relationship with the state as a welfare provider

by coding us to

project

if

might impact

their relationship with the

to other citizens.

The survey included

government and

their relationships

a series of questions about parents’

Education and Empowered Citizenship

30

in

Mali

enrollment strategies and justifications for school choice. The expansion of education in Africa represents the largest government social well-being of

icy change,

it is

social service

everyday

citizens. In

we

critical that

effort to increase the

the wake of this

monumental

pol-

better understand the effects of provision

on

consumers.

Sampling

My survey uses

area probability sampling

stratified,

(Fowler 2009:29).

I

from 10 school

districts

selected school districts using Ministry of Education na-

on education provision by type of school. I chose districts based on three factors: to maximize variation on the key independent variable (schooling type); to facilitate logistics; and to achieve regional variation. In

tional data

order to maximize variation on

my

independent

variable, type of school,

I

had disproportionately high levels of enrollment in each type—public, private, madrassa, and community—to increase the probability that respondents would have attended or sent their children to a selected school districts that

diverse set of schools.® In each school district,

we used randomized

cluster sampling. First,

we

obtained neighborhood maps from the municipal authorities or Malis Geographic Institute.” Once we received the map of a school district, we drew equal quadrants directly onto the map. In the case of rural areas,

with knowledgeable informants

(e.g.,

we worked

teachers, doctors) to create a

list

of “ac-

cessible villages” in the school district. Accessibility to rural zones

marily determined by the proximity to our starting

were accessible or

donkey

cart).

there

was

alternative transportation (boat,

moto

taxi,

After determining the universe of accessible zones or villages

within the school a

if

was pripoint and whether roads

district,

we

selected four to five quadrants (or villages

from

by using an online randomizer (http://www.randomizer.org). In urban areas, two teams started in the middle of the quadrant and then

list)

proceeded in opposite

directions,

surveying every

fifth

household. Indi-

vidual respondents in households were selected randomly

who were

hold members

among house-

present and at least 18 years of age by using play-

ing cards. Surveys were conducted on weekdays and weekends at varying

times in order to ensure that

when

possible,

ceeded

teams began

we reached at

all

population types.” In

the dugutigi’s (chief's)

home and

villages,

then pro-

in opposite directions, stopping at intervals of five or three houses,

depending on

village size. In certain instances, especially in the rural school

Research Design and Methodological Approach

districts in

into their

Sikasso and Sévaré,

compounds

to

dinates for approximately

some

chiefs insisted

31

on

calling respondents

GPS

be interviewed.” Interviewers recorded

40%

of all respondents’

homes

coor-

as well as neighbor-

ing schools to ensure that the research teams were operating in the correct zones.

Because

sought variation on schooling type and excluded areas with low

I

school enrollment, the sample reflects an urban bias. Additionally, due to budget

and time

constraints,

I

focused primarily on urban and peri-urban zones be-

cause travel to the rural zones

two of the ten school

is

districts

costly, difficult,

were completely

and time-consuming. Only rural,

and thus

my

project

has a bias toward a population with a greater choice of educational options.

Respondents’ educational levels from the survey are slightly higher than national averages,

the

which

also reflects the

combined primary, secondary, and

was 36.7% while 53% of

my survey

schooling in I

all

urban bias of the sample. In 2006

tertiary gross enrollment rate in

Mali

respondents had primary, secondary, or tertiary

sample (Thunnissen 2009).

did include two rural school

Sikasso and Sévaré to try to

districts in

capture the specific challenges facing rural communities. However, this

book

should be read as largely a reflection of how citizens in urban and peri-urban zones in the capital

city

and

in regional capitals of Mali interact with the

contemporary educational and political situation. While this focus on periurban and urban zones may be limiting, the results do offer comparative

away from each

other.

work of Etienne Gérard

(1992,

insight into school districts thousands of kilometers

Future research should build on the formative 1993, 1997b) in order to

understand the dynamics between schooling and

participation in the

isolated parts of the country.

Table pares

2.1

them

summarizes the characteristics of each school to national averages.

capture with each tional average are cally,

more

I

highlight the variation that

district's inclusion. Significant

shown

most

in bold. Because

attended public schools,

it

district

was important

and com-

hoped to departures from the naI

learners, especially histori-

to identify districts with high

non-state enrollment in order to generate enough variation in school type to different educational trajectories.

compare because

44%

percent of children there attend private schools (compared to

the national average of only 10%),

sample of private schools Similarly,

For instance, Faladie was selected

and thus

to enable a better

it

helped us to achieve an over-

comparison across school

Banconi was selected because of the high

types.

rate of students attend-

ing madrassas (20% as compared to the national average of 12%) to ensure

ews_ oY >

CON enanne HA

Beal aR

NW

NAD coo OD

ore)

nKR

oO

KR

WN

nee”

os SS

c 3

cw

5

Bsé/SppD—~ m4

Dpepap

lad

~

43

3 ww

-™

nNnnwton — No

\o

=

wHOUOMN oH =

o ao lotions Sev a He mS O

mn

NNOOR

YO

ue 3 oy ee

pe

oY

wee

8

rn See Sy pAOME be a neon

mo

aot

S No

oo

ae

— be i

ES

TEES SN

poe co ag aes

oe

Bate

ee

ees

Seat oy,

LAS

Se Ue EE

.

}

woe

Me

Saree CC BEE Pee

AN |,ae

WSS ee

ae

a

:

Fs

:

oseMeweett

:

oan

fo

BES

|:

28

Ta

Oe:

oy

eee

CC ee a

:

¥

oh OES

MeNy

*

~—Cn

US

ee

Fagg

ore

eS

|

Ss

LEER

“agi Goudenny

:

=

eS

FS

Bey

:

:

es

Awa)

=

ECS ee | ~=—hE—_—_ems—se

Pye

aoe

oe

ce

a fwell}

oe .

UE

|a | | | spl rr | ..

260KKorneters

190 ,

©

epi

ns

|. — a ee FL J=r fe — ae

Rag

eae

UBS AP

Sagi

we

gah

Aguérakteny

Fete

|

Leg

fle

oe

co

capital

'

Dos

sat

iy

=

: :

Be.

Pe

z

CEES

ec

at

L

pete

oe

ge

a re

. ve a a o c a .... = oS os A of ee ae 2 ye "fs 4. 1 oe Ce Se es FC . — ae eZ = oe ens a Sie eS oN eSve he 8 oo SL _ (UR ce — a ge UE

Be

eo

Lt

:

===+§| llCC =—=—s—Oe

eye

nt

be

ihe

nee

*

ee LEE BEY nas RS PE, en PARE? aly Pee en omy Sbes

Deny

fl

.

Me

CE

ae

:

Sola of

BS

o

ilies

Raat

4

EE

a a eee

me

Be

2 PERSE ~ aey 2 . S Se ob Ae ee seo ae ee Pg : se Fd 4 s =—E—rs—SsSSm DRS Ea ASD? ees L SSATO cE ag CE , i. A if | ee ‘ ee E . SE ao ao c4 ee a... ae We aS . :4( : id cs Bove" ee gye ee ne aes ae oF PGES, a ee a _ Lo Es a oe . < 2h Soe ee ok Pe ee 7 mig. Uae ee io te SSNS shade co ™ SEs ane gegen TT ee ~oS cage oe ee |} aRe GPR i =| Oe ye See Pees 7 Spee! mT 3 Stee agp LpSoe | TNS 3 a — A eae ee ag Me NS? TPO Pe MePe Ss oe MO _ eked ee ae eee fe eee NIG Veg SS oe AL ee peg @. o IGE: 2oo eee f Ryn ae age ae, KAYES? SEN = ON Sean SURE Sa ore fi, ys ASAE Sane Se

Ne

of

al

atk

™~

as

ea

eee

"S

f:

:

oyKa Kayps

se

ct

oC

aR

ju

ly

Ao

Sabel

UE Re

yO

Es MS

BigeNem

oe oy

any

i?

&

Bab

oy

wat

xt

Bs

Le

ey,

oy

SHES

en .

=:

:

/

ae

eS

:

:

mg

Bou

sro

“

eg we ie ‘i

“eh

8OIE nee,

aay

:

Bs,

oe

Shei

.

ae

ie oe

:

%fsmbaue

Swu oy gets geet?

Noy3

;

a6

sopeoensighes

Pout

wet eet ce

oy

coe

fen

XY

xe

a

oo

SENSy

Wa

een

‘sy

Py

ea

(nee

iyi

a?

None

re

eK

~qienng.!

pret

gf

we

fer"

ce

I

Va

——

jMourdiah .

bn

SE Oe

Rie

fe

ciel?

Ee

o

bone

emmmamced

heres

S

Sage

po

Ber

\

ee,

Log#

EESSEE

:

SARS

ae Nampatd

eo

:

CN

eee

+

Eo

.

ae

eES:

ee

ee

Pens Sedat SESa be oS S| Ne PUES

mo

:

fod

‘

Lab LEE

obborcecn

or ee

So

IR

wo

I 2 fe eoyf ke a

By

woe.

a

8.

me

?

4

NNN

ce

fhe

EE

pou

Se

OR

POON RLS

mo ita:

el

we

“

EID

-_—

ca

GOERS

pe

oe

oT Leer

Be SIR InPRES dN Seon eee PS Seniens 7 2 Esou bee y Pe eee a ON 4 Memey ag Pee SER oe SRE {og Perey vw lA Se ea en Fe POE ese Ae cred Us Jfoe canna 2 Re BSA 7 eR po Pe SetS ANg Oe | OY SN CC® . oO pS ple Ko ee Pe fos SUNG s < . Fe oo ee _. ey oa mk oe 8 -—. oo oe . 7 co x S Cee =] yes pp NS rr cs .. Pata Oo ee eee Aee eT NO A Ss Sj oe oe abr KASoS a ~ Roe oo . eo eg Pet Ghee &ey ae ee ed : | or ee fk rere Re ONveDees fee PN = ia oo US e Ss fo fheey Se 3 CONS CC ae ee” — EAs oe — ENSSe Oe Bi epee ~ NOG | Fo ee us OE a ns Ry meh rh ONSe ae Se Be Pe Bsn ry es Sy LU ee Oe CRC oe 0Kebala oo SEY ee eB SESS sO ee | HR eR, ResFE yee Hee eens fern PORES Re PE SS ees ape es eS BEN as — SeesPe ee oy te EOSBoyyo NIG : pe De Sree EN Dh SAUTE 2 PUES Cs. SED eS cot Oe po Ge oe co, eoSRa Se SEE ES COT es Sey Po EE 2 Le hone Sn ie NGOAG en >te ee Se eewun ON SR | PRs 8; : OneSe Se ooSee ER Se \euana yboe SCE Be BD — NEE Rae _ cs Gsa i See aPHA. eee HL Fe DUee oO Wo SS ong UO FOREN SE, Ue if RN ATS. oFRe aes RE / LsSe fsSeae Seee Fee Reon ff| Fes eee pee teat oe aeBe ee jokey oe cfs roe ee oe fe ~ oe SJ RG eR Tete en Ma cea Fe (ik pe MNEs Pe ee Fe oa Sn eu Po Ee eee SESS oe Sees Ue oo tee oe SES ayRE CSey ee ON See pes — ee yt RE SE peas ew ee imal stpe ga! eee Se = ey -SRS TWN eA oe eeeBREN eeLe 8 SN es ON Soe Lies See Sa eee eon EE Ou: es Ld er 2See 2ee oN See NE Se . a : hen oo Se = Ne Ss ARIES ee See RRohEES 5 EES foe EE nn See = Ze a Ra ee.Lh BAS eres

.

Ae

ry po SE e SENEGAL

gor

Mid

3

MOD

7 i, =

4

ee

wo

SON

Bas ata mmf

i

4

of

>

2

ee

oe

Foe

:

‘NG

oe

Ee Ae cee Ey4 Me

ES

ba

ee ‘'

Oe

nes

pie

a

3

at

a

EE

Pe

oan

On

Boer SET

ae

Sees

:

ee

ee

oe

{|

s

ose

ot

pe

:

:

ae

:

ae

i

errs

me ok ar. LE

oo

:

let

3

outialinms

’

ng

Se

ee GS

ee see pny SSR pea fuss oo Ye WNouna lira sy sae

oy

-

eee

eee Rees mee Mian ha ee ee ee SE) POS

ss

ba

bene

*

SOU

*

duahig oy

|

ge

od

oe

Je

Cree

y

Be iy 4 o37

7 Ff vee eet Roo rs

eA

ear

SM

eet

sy

.

:

Ne

aN

Saye

we

Po

Ne

bes ee

Aa

psty

eeMoe

Tot FE

Cy

it

4

doutkoraS:

-

-

a See PRS

es

seo

GENTfol

S&S

4:

oO

4

2a

:

:

Woe

i oy

a ee — 5Pe eo ho. ue | La —4 ae LNs a col 5 a “nF & . Se Ce ke — ~—cS Oe a / oO

EZ

oN

ie

.

Seon

ewe

Cabs

Sigua

eR

as

eee

9

Ce

win SIKASBO

pembenteeesT

,

CB

Foy

oes

BE

3

fo

CU

Se aoe

ee ee

oat

Eg

con

{i

eS

fF

Rees

eg

GN se Po SESE

akan

oe

Cl ‘

*

eno

Penk

rer

san

ance

om

oe

pet

ONE i

ee pe ee

ae

Pees

EN

a0

Verne

%

eae

fF

ae aes 80

Nae?

ee ranean

Pee

BEEP eeng Tubman Re

EES,

Da

SRE

PS

Monratvia

ee

med

ern

Saaways

SEBERE

ee;

iuehinere

ee

ada:

Pees

os

eeSevers

es POs

oe

CR

Sees

A

EODG SES

MAR

|

See CE

es

ae

ee eee SERS Benes eaeNave.

K

;

Fig

At state

the despi

buktu

Th

r

4

« de

e

1 e of myV studyyin

ti

espite

Ss

~

HEPAT

.

she

Niger—a

iontng

:

to the rest of

|

stree

COVE V red

with

mv

xu d

ne are

and,

is

in I

wen .

h

|

eri

dint

e

7

reminiscen ‘.

he

+

dirt

ot

m

road

assable for '

and metii u

ge. Like the other regi egions n oth

]

|

1

|

asndy ‘dl

‘alo n d

L1mM-

Dou ouentz :

)

“s

u

.

|

tanae

Nn

i

‘bu

Mop

M Th'

roa

aved pav

ny

fora

citys C ure y uniique architect es

by

ali

day’

|

Moto vcles Th e e

visi 18

M

deiVv vw’ drive

n -etot he city

VET.

779

y ei

hat

}

AS

BE

Timbuk mbuktu w Mett s still gover vern .

:

k y reminds scape q ul auch!

wooden .

eo ‘ot

RE

|

oe

-Mapcruzin .cOm

|

half

nh

he

si

d

S ource:

an not bein s connect

enon »

seot

ali

ot.

se

‘otan Eis is ee SEY Basin Right nae.

RO

Soe

RRS

Bare OA4

:

Oe 2S

Lagug

Got rau SE a

BS

Pee Po: ere Bae

oR

3

ENS

Sg

es

cr SRC SACSae

Nas fo

ee

ee ag Ea BE. pea

pe

ee

le a eae eae

SES

Gr

Jeu

FT:

SES

se

tec

SSeahy

Renee

spree

Nee

S|

ae

es

(Se

Xe

es

een

ee

Soe

yf

yd

PSU

be

renee

pen

=

s

Suny

ussoule x SS Vans ma ESS See SERENE oo an

ao

i)

CREE

NE

poy SEY eeBre

Re

Rk

CNG oe

ee

(rsd

ee Fach

i

og

Bt

CER

Cee

| 4 ued

ts

LRN

SOS

RE

:

ey

Be

re

We

ee

ae

deena

Re. Ses

Se

Re

pees

Wane

Pe

Se

pera

So

eae

Won:

y ts Shou ROE

OER

Re

-

"AT ee ad.

ELE

me

Re ea

:

ee

sted Bed Bee

,

Ge

es

mee

eas

SNC Ss

Ce

soe

pe

eee

ets,

PERE

ae ce

me

er

KS

ATLANTES OSEAB Nosy) TIC

pee

RL

-_

oe

poeaneny:

eS

B

ee

ge

wee

eer

ee

ees

sa

FIR Senne

TS

Pe

RS

en

se,

ee

ero

Fe

Sn

eS

BEY

atts

pp

Rae

Ferkesoetouy

ee ey

an

praeren)

Lous Mattngou

NS

2c

SUS

ot

i

| ta Roane

Se.

Bol Scotian

‘s

SS

ey oo

en

geen

DS

Sa

s

PON POL

oO stocninocnnsooeb

ae

ee,

ee :

Ace

rR

Geek Soe Sones, ge

:

gue’

oe

eee Leek SOE

po

an

ENN

Beckenus See

©oe 8| > Ae — oe SeeLf a a eat a a SES a Nartar

Epc rane SE

Sets aes pa Na Ronee BP

aes

pes

:

PERBhat

1

ey

Pew dP sed u

ned the

h

nort nN

Research Design and Methodological Approach

43

of Mali, Kidal and Gao, Timbuktu looks distinct from the rest of Mali—as

Bambara tu’s

gives

prominent market language. Timbuk-

diverse population includes Tuareg, Songhrai, Arabs, Bella,

Respondents those

who

to

our survey included those

live in

almost

all

would

all

my

research assistants,

getting

up

early to

do

my

who grew up

go to public school, and then

lessons at

after

Peuls.

permanent houses and

living in

public school learners also attend Quranic schools.

remember

and

makeshift huts nestled in openings along the city

According to one of

“I

as the

way to Songhrai

streets.

in Timbuktu,

He

explained,

Quranic school, then we

public school,

Quranic school.” Our surveys in Timbuktu confirmed

we would return to

this pattern of public

school parents simultaneously enrolling their children in Quranic schools for

supplementary religious instruction.

The recent occupation of the north is linked to a longer history of instability over the last 20 years. The uprisings of the 1990s, aimed in part at improving access to social services for the north of the country, and the subsequent violence destroyed

many

schools and disrupted education provision in the

region. Despite peace accords signed in the 1990s, insecurity

Timbuktu and the

rest of

began

to plague

northern Mali again with the introduction of rebel

and intra-community fighting between 2006 and 2009. Tension between the central government and the north remained as the northerners felt marginalized:

they had fewer job opportunities and

less access to state resources,

including education. The 2012-2013 conflict displaced

people from northern Mali, and the region.

Many

many

ened ethnic tension. Beginning to face the

including teachers, fled

former residents of the Timbuktu region remain abroad,

fearful that if they return they will

back

civil servants,

be targeted in an atmosphere of height-

in late 2013,

some

residents started to trickle

tremendous challenges of rebuilding

ever, insecurity in

more than 400,000

much

their

home

city.

How-

of the region continues, and the future of education

provision in Timbuktu remains to be seen.

CHAPTER THREE

Politiki ni

Power and

Fanga Mali la/ Mali

Politics in

Understanding the relationship between education, knowledge, and political participation requires an exploration of Malians opinions and attitudes toward the government. Citizens perceptions of democratic institutions shape their subsequent engagement with these institutions. In the introductory chapter I theorized that active,

informed citizenship was

critical for

democratic consolidation and

discussed the ways that education could generate knowledge and participation. I

also

underscored the importance of challenging assumptions of institutional

responsiveness and regime legitimacy education, knowledge,

when

and participation

exploring the relationship between

in nascent African democracies. Partic-

ipation often takes place in a context where citizens are not completely convinced

of the competency or the

utility

of the

state.

In these environments other actors—

including religious and traditional authorities—often play a more prominent role in providing solutions to citizens’

demands. Citizens must be convinced

to en-

gage with the state rather than seeking other audiences or solutions. In this chapter

I

demonstrate these dynamics by probing Malian

political

culture almost 20 years after the democratic transition (three years before the

2012 coup). Understanding citizens’ perceptions of the electoral context helps us to better anticipate the relationship between education and democracy. discuss the pervasive view of politics as

bad

(politiki

I

man ni), which persisted

even in the context of increasing education expansion and routine elections.

I

then identify seven factors that contribute to a widespread skepticism about the responsiveness of elected officials

Malis weak judiciary; partisan

and bureaucratic

institutions in Mali:

politics that challenge traditional deliberative

democratic procedures; co-opted participation; the linguistic barriers in lian bureaucracy; the

weakness of

dominance of an educated

elite

minority in

politics;

political parties; the strength of non-electoral authorities;

the lack of Islamic actors in the electoral sphere.

I

Mathe

and

then introduce descriptive

Power and Politics

on Malians’

statistics

from

exit polls

political

in

Mali

45

knowledge and participation

as well as data

conducted during the municipal election in 2009

to describe

Malians’ views of democracy in the pre-coup era.

Politiki

When 2007,

Popular Skepticism about Malian Democracy

man pi:

embarked on my preliminary research in Mali in the summer of directly in the wake of the presidential election, I was eager to delve into I

popular political opinions.

I

would ask

friends, neighbors, family

and shopkeepers what they thought about the current mocracy. To politics.

my surprise,

I

was confronted by

some of the people

Malians, even

with a standard phrase: politiki

man pi,

state of

members,

Malian de-

citizens’ reluctance to discuss

admired most, would respond

I

“politics are

bad.”

I

had anticipated

criticism of specific leaders, parties, or institutions, but the blanket response after nearly

whatI

20 years of multiparty elections startled me.

initially

perceived as Malians’ disinterest in

I

was frustrated by

my topic.

was convinced, however, that the intersection of education, an expanding and diversified sector, and politics was a fruitful research area, and I continI

ued with

me to

Eventually, the repetition of politiki

my interviews.

reflect

on what multiparty democracy

actually

meant

to

man

pi forced

most

citizens.

Their skepticism contrasted with Mali’s heralded position as a democratic star relative to other African countries.”

The pervasive pessimism

under Mali’s democratic facade, especially given

its

stirring

recent democratic break-

down, merits deeper consideration.

The majority of Malians view electoral democracy and its related institutions as a foreign system, which does little to provide for their own needs. The mistrust breeds

a characterization of politics as dishonest or impure.

The following quotes demonstrate other ways politiki

that citizens tried to explain

man pi:

Everything that

is

related to politics in Mali

is

dishonest.

It’s

to

fill

pockets and

get out.

—Mamadou, I

have no trust in politiki mogo

20, high school graduate, Sikasso (S11)

[political candidates].

—Salimatou, attended some secondary school, mother of three children, Banconi (BA7) nothing more than pure lies. —Aminata, Bella, 50s, Quranic education, Mopti (M4o)

I

don’t like politics;

I

don't discuss politics at

it’s

—Ami,

25,

bad thing. Politiki man pi. left her village to seek work in Bamako; her child lives with an aunt and attends school in the village (F81) all.

To discuss

politics

is

a

Education and Empowered Citizenship

46

909%

in

Mali

pr

.

oh eo = | 7 . | — tno |. — | oe ena | |. — | | — | a|

Y >

4

BD

Oo

BD

VU

‘e

© > FP

CO

oO

~

o

Cc Oo

> ne)

>

Oo

wy RD

Dd

Lu Ss

wos £n ~ a i c

= a

OH

c Oo WU

oO

NH ee

WV

=> D ££

— —w

es

P|

: |

c

‘

p

i

3 ~_

%

%~%

e

oO

3

Oo

|

|

oO

&

| |

¥/

ass

;

|

%

C

©

.

.

|

-

2 te

S

i i

o

OY, : i

wo

=@

&O

9,

— S

“4

QO.

:

:

.

S

| :

% ON

i p

} al

2 |

|

_

2 -

|

“Gy

oO

&

“7)

>

o

5 -

Ly

Me

Y

Y

_,

come

CO

a

Ra ne

T-

%

°»

aot

|| |

|

|

.

_ ——————

|

%

©

—Cri‘“(iétOCOCOCOCOCO

Ss

F

FF

EF

F

OV

co

™

\O

a)

OO F vt

eee EF

mY)

N

KF

_

BF

©

%eA

=

Y0

“

%,

Gy Ze,

“Oy

Y EF

~ :

eel

EEE

=

»/

&Y

|

ee

© N 5

Wy,

“Y,

|

_

N c ©

O.

©

i

Z

Sy

Q

a,

So

o

7,

““o,

&

Educational Expansion and Democratization

159

voter received a bribe or voted for a boss; receiving short-term incentives for

voting and the act of voting as an expression of citizenship are not mutually exclusive.

who

book, those

for the process.

Given the is

this

are engaging in democratic politics express a civic appreciation for their

and

act

But despite the widespread mistrust discussed in

irregularities

and the group mobilization

tempting to deride voting as

weak parties and widespread

artificial

for voting in Mali,

it

or inauthentic in the atmosphere of

However,

clientelism.

my findings

suggest that

who engaged in the act of voting, regardless of how they ended the ballot box or what they knew about politics, felt as if they were ful-

those citizens

up

at

filling their civic

duty to the country.’ This

is

consistent with evidence that

participation in the democratic process, as well as the experience of electoral alternation,

can breed a greater trust in democracy (Cho and Logan 2013)

and that democratic participation Getting people out to the polls

is

fuels greater external efficacy (Finkel 1985).

an important step

in

improving democratic

governance in Mali. Citizen voice

is

making them more accountable (Norris has revealed citizens

who

I

from the democratic

institu-

suspect that this cynicism plagues

other African democracies, especially it

1999, 2012). This case study of Mali

feel largely isolated

tions that claim to represent them.

powerful. While

democratic institutions and for

critical for legitimizing

among

the less educated

might take decades before we see change

at

many

and the

less

the national

some evidence of progress at the municipal level. As data from this book and from Afrobarometer demonstrate, the majority of Malians can level, there is

name

their mayor. This familiarity

outputs ona localized, tangible scale

and the

make

it

visibility

of the mayor's policy

easier for constituencies to

judge

them. Conversations with hundreds of Malians during the research for

book

revealed that citizens are willing to issue judgments of their mayor's

performance, even though they tend to be hesitant to president. rate

this

The high turnover

rate of

among voters in municipal

municipal

criticize

officials

deputies or the

and the high turnout

elections relative to other election cycles sug-

gest that healthy competition exists at the decentralized level

and that

citizens

are already holding officials accountable for their performance. If

educational expansion generates a pool of more and

feel eligible

and willing

to

run

for

more

citizens

municipal posts, as well as a larger

who elec-

competent and capable of assessing the growing pool of canthen education’s effect might be evident sooner at the local level.

torate that feels didates,

In contrast to the dramatic, national-level events in capital cities that led to

Education and

160

Empowered

Citizenship in Mali

democratic transitions in the 1990s, the future of democratic consolidation

may be in these

quiet, decentralized processes in rural zones.

Islam and Politics in Mali

The

Islamist incursion into the north has raised questions about the future

of political Islam in Mali? In this

book

I

have suggested that

citizens

who

attend Islamic schools or send their children to these schools have a similar relationship to the state as other

words, there

is

no immediate

members of the Malian

population; in other

threat of a hard-line counterculture emerg-

ing through Islamic schooling within Malian society. Students Islamic schools are

no

less

knowledgeable about secular

who

politics

attend

than their

peers with primary or informal education in state schools nor are they less likely to participate in politics. For the most part, the political behavior of parents

who send

who send

their children to Islamic schools resembles that of parents

their children to state schools.

electoral politics:

madrassa parents vote

While these communities might tics,

The primary sphere of difference

less often

than other Malian

effectively mobilize

is

citizens.

through contentious

poli-

their lack of electoral representation suggests potential marginalization

by

the formal democratic system.

Partnership with Islamic education providers was a groundbreaking departure from the suspicions and hostility that have plagued collaboration

between the government and Islamic schools since colonial times. The current system—which acknowledges madrassas as accredited institutions of state

education, mandates that they teach French, and offers Arabic-language

testing options—attempts to incorporate those into the citizenship project. For the

first

who

prefer Islamic education

time, constituencies that support

Islamic education have gained access to higher education

and government

employment.

The current

collaboration between the state

and Islamic schooling

in the

democratic context sends signals to Islamic actors that their preferences are recognized ues,

it

and legitimated by the

may move Muslims from

state. If

the current system contin-

the contentious sphere into

participation. State support for Islamic education

Arabic-language university entrance

more formal

and the newly

exam could change

instituted

the future political

terrain of Mali. Until now, Western-educated elites have held a

monopoly

over national-level politics because higher education was synonymous with

Educational Expansion and Democratization

Francophone education.

It

remains to be seen

if

161

highly qualified candidates

with Islamic schooling backgrounds emerge. The data do not allow me to determine whether parents self-select into madrassas and specific forms of political action due to their religious attitudes or

if

the experience of enrolling a child in a madrassa decreases the

likelihood of electoral participation. In either case, this issue

it is

because there are differences in the ways Islamic schooling con-

sumers and secular consumers participate in electoral tive

important to explore

politics.

The

descrip-

evidence confirms a popular view in Mali that the most pious Malians

choose Islamic schooling and simultaneously abstain from broadly,

my

politics.

More

findings are a reminder about the central question of political

representation, particularly

marginalized by the

state.

among communities

In

many

that have

been

historically

countries where the government has not

consolidated control as the exclusive authority, the existence of communities

do not engage with the state—or do so ina distinct or limited capacity— raises concerns about representative and inclusive democratic participation. that

In Mali, these questions have

become

particularly salient since

some groups

have turned to violence to express their policy preferences.

Women

and

Politics

My findings suggest that the expansion of education on the continent through privatization

the

and liberalization has increased

citizens’ capabilities as

it

has increased

number of children who are attending school and the number of learners who

are continuing to secondary

and university education. Many of these changes

are positive externalities of efforts to reach

development goals rather than a

culated government strategy to improve the quality of citizens capacity.

The

increase in

girls’

and

cal-

democracy by building

rural-dwellers’ enrollment

and part-

nership with Islamic schools, though driven in part by citizen demand, was also largely engineered to reach

happened

development

accidentally. Unlike the

targets.

The democratic

immediate post-independence

cratic

expansion has not been accompanied by national

izens

and shape

their democratic behavior.

of fledgling democracies might prefer

overwhelm nascent

institutions

demo-

Given the young age and the scarce

or participatory democracy is unsurprising. After

to

era,

efforts to inculcate cit-

resources of African democracies, inattention to building

orists

gains have

all,

more

representative

many politicians and the-

less citizen participation

(Almond and Verba

1963).

so as not

Education and Empowered Citizenship

162

in

Mali

In countries like Mali, where primary school enrollment

still

excludes

20%

of eligible children and where the vast majority of adults cannot read the bureaucratic language, the question of education and ticularly salient.

Education

erment nor do formal

empowerment

not the only way for citizens to achieve

is

politics offer the

most important and

for the expression of political preferences.

It is

clear that

cies of the

Malian

and informal schooling—is a

The that

it

receive

many citizens

and that

However, education—through both formal

tool that the state can offer to systematically

citizens.

educational expansion since the 1990s

enabled

venue

never been to school can articulate the intrica-

political scene.

improve the agency of its

par-

empow-

relevant

“education” through travel or apprenticeship or informal learning

many rural Malians who have

is

many more

is

My study,

attend school.

girls to

shown

of the secondary literature on Africa, has

particularly interesting in

that

as well as

women

much

knowl-

are less

edgeable and less likely to participate in formal politics (Isaksson 2010; Isaksson,

Kotsadam, and

All African states

Nerman

2014; Kuenzi

and Lambright 2005; Logan

2010).

independence, but the

ability

adopted universal suffrage

at

to vote did not translate into equal political opportunities.

acknowledge that women exercise

domains (Hirschmann democratic system

is

political

1991; Tripp 2001),

in

power

It is

important to

other—often informal—

but their participation in the formal

of utmost important to a democracy’s level of inclusion.

Since the increases in access and enrollment have targeted

might interpret the story of greater educational access the foundations for

girls’ political

empowerment.

politics. If a larger

their ability to participate

subset of girls

and

to

is

women,

who manage

to attain the highest levels of education are able to

ama

Sidibé,

elites.

took

Mali’s

first

office in the

be able

to

mayoral posts in Mali. However,

female prime minister, Cissé

women

compete with

Mariam Kaid-

spring of 2011, setting an example for future

generations of educated Malian greater

to

be represented in democracy. Currently,

fewer than 10% of

other educated

shown how

educated, this bodes well for

women hold

all

I

being about laying

My study has

education instructs and empowers citizens, including

engage in

as

women,

girls.

In the future, hopefully

we

number of highly educated women—endowed with an

comparative advantage—competing in national

politics.

Africa

will see a

educational

now

boasts

Banda of Ma-

three

women presidents,

lawi,

and Catherine Samba-Panza of the Central African Republic (serving

Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, Joyce

as acting president), offering

hope

for girls that educational credentials can

translate into elite political opportunities for African

women.

Educational Expansion and Democratization

Despite the pushes for greater

girls’

enrollment, there are

many barriers children who are not

make up 60% of the than 40% of students enrolled

to education that remain. Girls in school; they constitute less

163

school (Pearce, Fourmy, and Kovach 2009). As of 2005, only

who were enrolled in school in sub-Saharan Africa were mary school

(Citing Girls’ Education in Africa 2005).

in secondary

46%

of girls

able to complete pri-

Given the importance

of secondary and tertiary education for

empowerment as a complete citizen, it is imperative that programs continue to focus on girls’ retention and completion in order for them to gain the skills and self-confidence necessary for full

democratic participation. Focus should also be placed on what happens

inside

Malian classrooms. VonDoepps (2002) work in Malawi has demon-

strated that local

relations

power

creep in and obstruct

womens

and outdated gender norms can often

opportunities for participation. If schools are

plagued by these limitations on women’s expression and development, they cannot be expected to contribute to women’s

political efficacy.

Education, Knowledge, and Participation in Environments of Political Skepticism In African contexts

where much of the

happens outside of

political action

formal venues and where traditional, religious, or other types of unelected authorities play a large role in governance (Englebert 2000; citizens

Logan

2013),

have fewer incentives to invest in learning about the bureaucratic

political system.

There

accessible. If schooling

is

a

tremendous need

makes the

state

to

more

make

visible

the state relevant

and

and more familiar

to

students and their parents, educational expansion plays an important role in

making

the state

more

useful for citizens. State-building literatures have

long stressed the role of education in familiarizing citizens with the orienting still

them toward

relevant in

many

turn to an elected

state

and

the state as an important source of authority. This countries in Africa,

official

or

civil

where

citizens are least likely to

servant to express a need or idea, and

prefer to lobby traditional authorities,

economic

is

much

players, or religious officials.

The Primacy of Political Knowledge Education also

offers

an important venue to improve

citizens’ abilities to

gain knowledge about politics and to improve their sense of internal political

efficacy—or self-confidence in their

ability as

democratic

citizens.

The

pres-

Education and Empowered Citizenship

164

Mali

in

ence of short-term incentives and political brokers in most African elections

makes

it

difficult to distinguish

better political representation

between those

and those who

less constructive reasons. Political acts that

sions of political voice or could have

no

citizens

who

are voting for

are mobilized to the polls for

look equivalent could be expres-

any kind of policy or

direct link to

institutional feedback loop.

Behavioral research in nascent democracies can, gate the political competencies of respondents

a

at

who

minimum,

disaggre-

report participating in

easy activities in order to better understand what this participation might indicate.

ment,

Even it is

if

we cannot determine

a person’s exact motivations for involve-

important to distinguish informed from uninformed participation.

In other words, participation should not be isolated

from knowledge. Given

especially in rural zones

rampant group mobilization,

chically stratified groups, this kind of disaggregation

formed

is

and among

essential

hierar-

because

in-

political actors are a necessary, albeit insufficient, condition for pro-

ductive political engagement. For example, a household survey could assess

an actor’ degree of

political

competence in addition

about expected participation.

know the

party of that candidate?

What policy

candidate? to

Do

to standard questions

know for whom they voted? Do they Do they know anything about the party or

they

or expressive feature of the candidate mattered most

them? Then researchers could analyze determinants of projected behavior

among subgroups of the most and least informed citizens. The conceptual distinction between informed and uninformed participation stretches far

beyond Africa and nascent democracies.

of voters in the United States used a political competence

knowledgeable from the uninformed

found that ignorant preferences

and

citizens voted in

that

citizens.

citizen

A

study

Fowler and Margolis (2014)

ways that were inconsistent with

when they were provided with

ers shifted their partisan afhliation. If

the

test to sort

their

information, these vot-

uninformed participation means

that

people mobilize along lines other than their political preferences, this poses a

major threat

to representative

democracy. In contexts where there are high

percentages of uninformed voters, high participation rates

proxy

for the quality of

become

ticipation.

tingent

As

upon

poor

democracy.

In the majority of the political science literature, education

multaneously build

a

skills,

inculcate values,

my study has

demonstrated,

political context

and all

socialize citizens

is

said to

si-

toward par-

of these relationships are con-

and opportunity.’ Instead of rapidly building

from the micro mechanisms of participation and knowledge

to

an assessment

Educational Expansion and Democratization

165

of democracy, analysts need to problematize their assumptions along the way. I

have made

explicit the differing motivations for political participation

emphasized some of the

we would expect

to

factors, like vote

be negatively linked

for participation are diverse,

and

buying and mass mobilization, that

to education.

when political

action

is

While the motivations

coded

ipating or not, these contextual factors are collapsed,

and

as citizens particall

behavior looks

the same.

There

evidence that suggests that

is

some of the most

alized citizens vote at higher rates (Isaksson 2013; Kuenzi

margin-

historically

and Lambright 2005),

which underscores the need to contextualize the motivation, mobilization, and political

information behind political behavior.

An

analysis of

Afrobarometer

data reveals that people with secondary or post-secondary education are actually six or seven percentage points less likely to vote (Isaksson 2013).

studies have

found higher

rates of partisan attachment (Ishiyama

Other

and Fox

2006; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005) and voting (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005;

MacLean

2011)

among

those in rural areas. At the same time, empirical

us that educated voters have distinct patterns of political participation

tells

and respond

icy criteria,

mon

differently.

and

They

are

most

place

type, political scientists

citizens to obtain representation

more weight on pol-

the relationship between education

might

first

analyze

and accountability

at

how

education helps

the local level regard-

of the overarching governance scheme. Education should be thought of

as stimulating citizens capabilities.

the narrow political sphere

These

capabilities are relevant far

and can move

means

how

citizens acquire

to participate in “processes of popular education

tion that can

enhance the

groups, enabling

can apply these

them

skills

beyond

into broader venues of localized

engagement. Cornwall and Coelho (2007:8) describe the

change their

2013:727).

we make assumptions about

and regime

likely to

are less vulnerable to short-term clientelist pressures (Kra-

Weghorst and Lindberg

2010;

Before

information

to

when presented with new information,

vote choice

less

work

and mobiliza-

and confidence of marginalized and excluded

and engage in participatory arenas.’ Citizens substantive and meaningful participation in venues

to enter

skills for

as diverse as hospital facility boards, national deliberative processes, policy

and forums offered through community groups, NGOs, and social movements (ibid.). While these marginal increases in skill might prove incouncils,

sufficient initially for citizens to

make demands on

the national government

or to influence institutional quality, they are necessary for that type of change to

happen

in the future.

Education and

166

Empowered

Citizenship in Mali

Orienting citizens toward underperforming electoral institutions prove to

be more challenging, but

may

ultimately very important for insti-

it is

tutional strengthening. Participation in the political system can foster skills

and encourage support for democracy (Lindberg 2006). If educated citizens and their families are more active participants in politics, and if African democracies spend more than non-democracies on primary education due to

mass demands (Stasavage 2005), we can imagine a generative cycle in which a greater number of citizens are educated and thus are more supportive of as the

democracy

governing system.

Language Fluency and Democratic Governance

My findings emphasize the importance

of fluency in the former colonial lan-

guage and suggest that basic education might not be enough to help citizens realize their full citizenship in Mali. Although Malis literacy rates are among the lowest in Africa, the dichotomy between indigenous languages, used in

popular culture and everyday interactions, and the colonial language that required for citizens interaction with the government persists. tions operate exclusively in French, so in order to

file

is

Many institu-

a complaint, get a land

you need the assistance of someone who speaks French or someone who knows how to

title,

register

your child

at school,

or get a prescription

filled,

navigate the system informally. Malians are quite adept in locating

who knows malities.

someone

the system or finding a language broker to assist with these for-

However, these intermediaries create distance between

citizens

and

the governing system.

warned of the danger of the colonial lanof personal subjugation and asa threat to indigenous

Post-colonial theorists have long

guage as a lingering force

languages and culture (Achebe 1965; Fanon 1965; Gandolfi 2003; Thiongo 1985).

The

analyses

I

have presented in this book suggest that the continued

use of the colonial language has practical implications for democratization in countries

where

literacy rates

remain

low.

Most

states

do not have formal

education requirements for political participation, although some countries,

such as Nigeria and Gambia, require a certain

level

of educational attainment

or language competency in order to run for office (Bleck and Patel 2015). In the Malian context, the political constraints of language are largely

imposed

understanding of linguistic power. The power of French as a necessary condition for full political participation is both a product of the Malian population's collective imagination and understanding of politics

through a

societal

Educational Expansion and Democratization

and a

167

direct effect of French-language colonial institutions. Further, language

fluency is not equally distributed across populations.

and those with fewer resources

Women,

rural residents,

are comparatively disadvantaged

by the dom-

inance of the former colonial language in the political realm. In this context, information

becomes

Knowledge from read-

hierarchical.

ing a source directly or hearing an international news broadcast in French

could be judged as more valuable or more authoritative than information gleaned from local language media. This hierarchy of information the harsh reality facing most

illiterate

reflects

Malians: they are excluded from writ-

ten or spoken information in French unless they can contract the help of

an interpreter or information broker material.

Language fluency

subject to the

whims and

limits

who

can translate the primary source

news sources and makes any information

reliability

of information brokers: local radio DJs,

educated people in the

chiefs, or relatively

villages.

A

citizen

who

speaks a

Bamana or Songhai, might have access to greater information than someone who speaks Bozo or Tamasheg, but in order to meta-trading language,

like

achieve complete, autonomous citizenship, people must deal in the currency

of the former colonial language (Laitin 1992). Brock- Utne argues that European languages used by the elites are

state

and

political

only spoken by 5% of the African population. This has an impact

on not only the

quality of education but citizens’ potential as participants in

How can we expect citizens

engage with a political largely out of their linguistic reach? While Mali has one of the

democracy

(2003).

system that

is

to fully

highest illiteracy rates on the continent, as figure

7.2

70% of

adults are literate in the state language in

Only in

a few places does literacy hover near

governance

is

demonstrates,

many

90%. This

also applicable to other countries

less

than

African countries.

linguistic

dilemma of

where the government

poli-

cies and programs are enacted in a language other than that of mass, popular

discourse.”

Emerging research suggests

that the language of governance

is

Drawing on World Values data, and robust relationship between the

likely to affect citizens trust in institutions.

Liu and Baird (2012) find a significant

languages used in courts and popular confidence in the justice system.

The power of the gests that

governments should put a premium on

tion for students in that

colonial language to delimit complete citizenship sug-

French

all

official

language instruc-

schools, including madrassas,

and consider the ways

might help them

to gain political auton-

literacy classes for adults

omy. However, since education

is

those in remote rural areas, and

unlikely to reach the poorest of the poor,

many

adults, a

complementary—and more

| SS ;

SR

NE ACEC SUCRE

— ;

CER anna

romneareeaainanar

SE CERNE ESAT SACI

SG

EON

SOO SEENON

SE | |a :

UNE ECG EEN SSE REE SAENGER SS

|

© °

YY,

i

SAIS ataccansanecanseasa

SCAR

saat

OcuReenRa

cone

rR

ERC

RENIN

rare

%

&Y

e

ROSCOE CESS SEU RAO :

RN

oO

ee: |

a

ASR

%

co

| 7 oT | EN :

: :

|...

&

;

Aa EE :

;

PA ;

i

SO

>

‘

RRR

%

;

e

CESS CCN

€%

S

&5 ©

SEA

AS

S

oO, QO

‘

SERRE SN CERCA

SERGE OOS

°

“

“

‘co

TAI RHR

ARES RARBREEN

oO

CURCOC FERNS SS

AAR

AN

SRN

oRE si RESALES

©7

AR

wv

vO

a &

%¢

>

NNN SCANSNS

a

,

3

EAS

OO i(‘i‘iC;Ctw*w;w™C—O—O—O—OCO—COC

oO

bas

LEEK Or KKce LN

SE

oN

Seisonontas RSCRRSS

EAN

Pot

|

Bp ok

ERRNO ERECT

&

cements ERE

;

NRE ‘

RARE

'

|

ir

oO BASEN

SATE CEC ENN

uwWwC

a

SARS :

RRA WERCER RRR

SERN

SEAR

Few

©

SAGAN

SRN

SR AR

ERE RSE

|

|

SS

;

“py

:

RR

a Sa SSRI RE RRA

' ccc ere aaa |

|

|

|

:

S

ROO SoA

4

i

;

epemnrnrncnrean

(RSE

Se 5

%

er GY

S

Y

eo

%

.

el 4

& %,

rr Sas SRR RN SAN SE

& o

£

|

$

4

j

‘

:

i i

|

SA

s

‘

‘

:

i

9

A“OD “0

:

|

SERA

:

: i i :

|

i

‘

|

© —

OV

€

NS

oO

Ww)

naa

RS

+

:

SORA OS

~

N

—

™— eS

vY

ty

:

:

su

NM

m=

9 Sp