A Better Metro Manila?: Towards Responsible Local Governance, Decentralization and Equitable Development [1 ed.] 9789811978036, 9789811978043

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A Better Metro Manila? Towards Responsible Local Governance, Decentralization and Equitable Development

Edited by Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem Maria Ela L. Atienza

A Better Metro Manila? “This book edited by Teresa Encarnacion Tadem and Maria Ela Atienza is very timely. It sheds light to one of the burning issues of our time, a better Metro Manila within the context of local governance, decentralization and equitable development. Indeed, the search for appropriate politico-administrative institutions for Metro Manila — then known as the Greater Manila Area (GMA) — continues to this day even after half a century of existence. Metro Manila’s experience is an excellent study of how institutions continue to evolve given the challenges of metropolitanization and rapid urbanization. These range from rapid population growth, pollution, flood control, traffic, housing, urban decay, solid waste management, etc. The imperatives of robust inter-local cooperation among the component local governments, and clear lines of authority and responsibility — vertical and horizontal — are indispensable if metropolitan institutions are to be responsive. Similar concerns have been addressed by metropolitan institutions in Jakarta, Bangkok, Seoul and Tokyo. A continuing concern over the decades is the debate whether Metro Manila should evolve into a local government similar to its counterparts in the region. This book is a must reading for public administration and governance scholars and practitioners who want to understand the Philippine experience on metropolitan governance not only in the Philippines but in Asia as well.” —Alex B. Brillantes, Jr., Ph.D., Professor Emeritus and former Dean, National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines Diliman “As Tadem and Atienza convincingly assert, the framework of decentralized local governance in the Philippines is at a crossroads. Urban governance presents particularly daunting challenges, and nowhere more so than in the megalopolis of Metro Manila. When the Local Government Code was passed in 1991, the Philippines’ urban population totalled roughly 30 million persons; today it is some 53 million. Since the Metro Manila Development Authority was created in 1995, the population over which it watches has grown by roughly 50% (to some 14 million persons). Across the chapters of this landmark volume, the authors present innovative and timely reform proposals across a range of policy realms: health, education, housing, water service and water supply, flood mitigation and disaster risk management, solid waste management, urban farming and land use planning, and revenue generation. This volume thus offers a critical first step toward “a

better Metro Manila” as it provides policy guidance toward the goal of more responsible local governance and more equitable development outcomes. There are, literally, at least fourteen million reasons why the conclusions of the book should be closely heeded.” —Paul D. Hutchcroft, Professor of Political Science and Social Change, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, The Australian National University

Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem · Maria Ela L. Atienza Editors

A Better Metro Manila? Towards Responsible Local Governance, Decentralization and Equitable Development

Editors Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem Department of Political Science University of the Philippines Diliman Quezon City, Philippines

Maria Ela L. Atienza Department of Political Science University of the Philippines Diliman Quezon City, Philippines

ISBN 978-981-19-7803-6 ISBN 978-981-19-7804-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Alex Linch shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface

This book emanates from the research project of the University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP CIDS), the Department of the Interior and Local Government-National Capital Region (DILG-NCR), and the Office of the Quezon City Mayor, the output of which was a report entitled “Federalism and the National Capital Region: Specific Governance Concerns,” which ran from 2018 to 2019. Based on the 2018 DILG-NCR research project document, the study was in support of the DILG through the Local Government Academy’s (LGA) task in leading the development and implementation of information and education campaigns and technical studies during the time when the Duterte administration was promoting a shift to a federal form of government. The project was part of the National Capital Region (NCR) Peace and Order Council (PROC), which was then chaired by former Quezon City Mayor Herbert M. Bautista. Thus, we would like to thank DILG-NCR for funding the project and DILG-NCR Regional Director Maria Lourdes L. Agustin and Helen A. Verzosa, Division Chief, Local Government Capability Development Division. Special thanks also to Raymond Gerard E. de Asis, DILG-NCR Research Coordinator. Raymond shepherded this project on behalf of the DILG-NCR since its inception and until he went on study leave in 2019. We wish to also thank Maria Jasmin D. Diaz, DILG-NCR Assistant Research Coordinator, who ably took over as research project coordinator from Raymond. We are especially grateful that DILG-NCR allowed us to v

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PREFACE

develop and transform the components of our final report further into academic pieces for publication into an edited book. Our deepest appreciation also to Former Quezon City Mayor Herbert M. Bautista, the over-all proponent of this research project which was his “brainchild.” Former Mayor Bautista actively participated in the project’s conceptualization and provided valuable inputs to the various topics covered by this research project through a series of meetings with and presentations by the research project leaders. We are also deeply grateful to the former mayor in encouraging us to come out with academic publications based on our research report. It is with deep gratitude that Palgrave MacMillan has agreed to publish this book. We are particularly grateful to Vishal Daryanomel, Palgrave MacMillan’s Senior Commissioning Editor, who oversaw the review process and provided us with additional comments and suggestions, and to Uma Vinesh for her professional assistance in the book’s production. Thank you also to the three anonymous reviewers of the original draft book manuscript for their valuable inputs in improving the manuscript. We started the project with many more governance topics and writers from different disciplines involved. However, due to multiple commitments, the list of topics and writers who committed to the project until the submission to DILG-NCR became shorter. We are, thus, particularly very grateful to the chapter contributors of this book for agreeing to transform their respective UP CIDS-DILG-NCR reports into book chapters and their patience in being with us in every step for this book project even as we were in the midst of a global pandemic and varying types of lockdowns which have affected our working and living conditions. We thank them for their patience in revising their chapters several times to address all substantive and technical comments. Our special thanks also to our very hardworking research assistant Jesam Jimenez, from the UP CIDS Program on Social and Political Change (PSPC), who was with us in this project since the beginning until the book production. UP CIDS PSPC hosted the research and book projects for UP CIDS. Finally, our deep gratitude goes to the following past and present UP CIDS Staff who provided this research and book projects with the needed administrative, finance, publications, and library support: Joyce Dimayuga, Rose Punay, Dominador de la Cruz, Ellen Cometa, Ace Molo, Clarisse Culla, Klara Bilbao, Mikhail Aggabao, Joseph Cruzado, Virna

PREFACE

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Guano, Zylyka Gendraule, Winston Ayon-Ayon, Patrick Cariño, Sueyen Austero, Terence Estrella, Janus Nolasco, Mika Ramirez, and Nathaniel Candelaria. Quezon City, Philippines September 2022

Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem Maria Ela L. Atienza

Contents

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5

Introduction: The Search for Alternative Models for Responsible Local Governance Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem and Maria Ela L. Atienza The Evolving Empowerment of Local Governments and Promotion of Local Governance in the Philippines: An Overview Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem and Maria Ela L. Atienza Where the Gaps Are: Reexamining the Framework of Multilevel Governance to Improve the Delivery of Key Public Services in Metro Manila Kevin Mark R. Gomez, Joey R. Loristo, and Fatima Joy O. Pamittan Where the Gaps Are: Assessing Alternative Models of Governance to Improve the Delivery of Key Public Services in Metro Manila Kevin Mark R. Gomez and Fatima Joy O. Pamittan Decentralisation Experiences in the Philippines: Social Services Sectors and the Local Government Code of 1991 Jan Robert R. Go

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CONTENTS

The State of Health, Health Service Delivery, and Equity of Access in Metro Manila: Challenges and Possible Ways Forward Maria Ela L. Atienza Basic Education and Federalism: Implications and Options for the National Capital Region Elvin Ivan Y. Uy and Dina Joana S. Ocampo Ensuring the Affordability of Socialized Housing: Toward Livable and Sustainable Homes for the Filipino Poor Chester Antonino C. Arcilla

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Reclaiming Public Services: Giving Back Ownership and Control of Water Services to the Public Sector Eduardo C. Tadem and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem

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Alternative Water Sources for Metro Manila for Water Security and Resilience Guillermo Q. Tabios III

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Urban Dimensions of Floodings and Holistic Flood Risk Management: Case of Pasig-Marikina River Basin in Metro Manila Guillermo Q. Tabios III Urban Environmental Governance and Sustainable Development: Empowering National and Local Governments for Solid Waste Management in the Philippines Maria Lourdes Genato Rebullida and Jalton Garces Taguibao Urban Farming and Land Use Governance in Metro Manila Kristian Karlo Saguin and Mark Angelo Cagampan IRA and Local Fiscal Governance in the Philippines Rogelio Alicor L. Panao

347

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407 443

CONTENTS

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Risk Transfer Mechanism: Charting a Strategy on Local Insurance Dennis G. de la Torre and Erwin A. Alampay Reforms and Ways Forward for Responsible Governance, Decentralization, and Equitable Development Maria Ela L. Atienza and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem

Index

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465

489

519

List of Contributors

Erwin A. Alampay National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines Chester Antonino C. Arcilla Department of Social Sciences, University of the Philippines Manila, Manila, Philippines Maria Ela L. Atienza Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines Mark Angelo Cagampan Independent Scholar, Quezon City, Philippines Dennis G. de la Torre Resilience Institute, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, Philippines Jan Robert R. Go Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines Kevin Mark R. Gomez Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Pasay, Philippines Joey R. Loristo Center for Policy and Executive Development, National College of Public Administration and Governance (NCPAG), University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines xiii

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Dina Joana S. Ocampo College of Education, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines Fatima Joy O. Pamittan College of Engineering, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines Rogelio Alicor L. Panao Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines Maria Lourdes Genato Rebullida Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines Kristian Karlo Saguin Department of Geography, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines Guillermo Q. Tabios III Institute of Civil Engineering, College of Engineering, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines Eduardo C. Tadem Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines Jalton Garces Taguibao Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines Elvin Ivan Y. Uy Philippine Business for Social Progress, Mandaluyong City, Philippines

List of Figures

Chapter 3 Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Metro Manila’s urban sprawl (Source Maps rendered based on data collated from Reyes 1998, Shatkin 2006, Magturo 2012, Bueza 2019b, Choguill 2001, Mercado 1998, Regmi 2017, Lustre 2015) Metropolitan governance framework (Source Mercado and Manasan 2002)

95 110

Chapter 4 Fig. 1 Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Fig. 4

Fig. 5 Fig. 6

The Districts of Metro Manila (Source Map rendered by authors) Percent distribution of Gross Regional Domestic Product (as of 2016) (Source Original diagram by authors based on data from Philippine Statistics Authority [2017]. “Gross Regional Domestic Product.”) Framework of Relationships Among Public and Private Institutions in the NCR (Source Original figure rendered by the authors.) Crime incidents in Metro Manila (Source Maps rendered based on collated data from the Philippine National PoliceNCR [ncrpo.pnp.gov.ph]) Health facilities in Metro Manila Literacy Rate in Metro Manila

128

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133

135 136 139

xv

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 7 Fig. 8

Fig. 9 Fig. 10 Fig. 11 Fig. 12

TVIs in Metro Manila (Source Maps rendered based on collated data from Open Data Philippines [data.gov.ph]) Susceptibility of LGUs to groundshaking, liquefaction, and landslide (Source Maps rendered based on data collected from PHIVOLCS) Ranking of LGUs on peace and order (Source Authors’ own figure) Ranking of LGUs in the provision of health services (Source Authors’ own) Ranking of LGUs in the provision of basic education (Source Authors’ own) Ranking of LGUs on disaster susceptibility (Source Authors’ own)

142

143 144 145 145 146

Chapter 5 Fig. 1 Fig. 2

Structure of local governments in the Philippines 2019 (Source Atienza, Go, and Esmeralda 2019) IRA dependence of municipalities (average), 2009–2016 (Data Source Bureau of Local Government Finance; graph by the author)

161

171

Chapter 7 Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Fig. 13 Fig. 14 Fig. 15

Basic and functional literacy rates Total enrollment (in Millions) Net Enrollment Rates (NER) Completion rates and NAT scores DepEd annual budget Spending per public school student Total enrollment in NCR (in Millions) Share of public education in NCR Enrollment (in %) Net Enrollment Rates in NCR Completion rates and NAT scores in NCR Governance and basic education cycles in select countries Basic education as exclusive power of the federal government School-based management framework Basic education as a shared power of federal and regional governments SEF per capita by DepEd SDO in NCR

224 224 225 225 226 226 228 228 229 229 230 236 237 238 247

LIST OF FIGURES

xvii

Chapter 8 Fig. 1 Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Summary of the NHA socialized housing functions (Source Author’s creation) Socialized housing price ceiling, mean incomes, and affordable housing of the poorest 30% Filipino families, 2000–2015 (Source Author’s computations using data from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)’s Family Income and Expenditure Survey for years 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2015) Uniform annual amortizations as a percent of mean annual incomes of the poorest 30%, 2000 to 2015 (Source Author’s computations using data from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)’s family income and expenditure survey for years 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2015)

264

268

268

Chapter 10 Fig. 1 Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Fig. 4

Fig. 5

Fig. 6 Fig. 7

Potential alternative water sources for Metro Manila (Source Authors’s creation) Angat River system with Umiray transbasin tunnel and proposed Sumag and Biliway watershed flow augmentation (Source Tabios and David [2014]) Location of existing groundwater permits issued by the National Water Resources Boards (NWRB) as of 2012 (Source Author’s creation based on NWRB data) Groundwater heads in 2055 for base case (existing NWRB groundwater permits) and case with increased extraction rates (1.5 times base case extraction rates) from 3d groundwater model simulations. Initial heads in 2016 are also plotted. (Source Author’s creation based on groundwater simulation studies by the author) Laguna Lake and surrounding watersheds delineated into 668 sub-basins for watershed modeling and simulation for water balance studies (Source Tabios [2018]) Kaliwa-Kanan-Agos River Basin in the eastern slope of Sierra Madre (Source Tabios 2020) Alternative water resources system configurations of Kaliwa-Kanan-Agos River system in the proposed New Centennial Water Project in 2012 subjected to project sequencing and staging with optimization-simulation studies (Source Tabios [2020])

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333 337

338

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 8

Fig. 9

Fig. 10

Fig. 11

Resulting project sequencing and staging of the alternative water resources system configurations of Kaliwa-Kanan-Agos River Basin to meet the projected water demands (in MLD) of Metro Manila (Source Tabios [2020]) Pampanga River Guagua-Pasac River Basins: Drainage Area of 10,710 km2 composed of 11 major basins. For modeling studies, the river basin is delineated into 960 sub-basins. (Source Author’s creation) Long-term, average daily flow (in m3 /sec) of Lower Pampanga River Basin from watershed hydrology model simulation of the entire Pampanga River with 40 years of daily rainfall data (1972–2012) (Source Author’s creation based on hydrologic study by the author) Long-term, 80 percent-of time, dependable daily flows (in m3 /sec) of Lower Pampanga River Basin from watershed hydrology model simulation of the entire Pampanga River with 40 years of daily rainfall data (1972–2012) (Source Author’s creation based on hydrology study by the author)

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Chapter 11 Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3

Fig. 4

Fig. 5 Fig. 6 Fig. 7

Pasig-Marikina River Basin of Metro Manila, Philippines (Source Tabios, 2020) Major Flood-Prone Areas in Metro Manila (Source Tabios, 2010 from a JICA report) TS Ketsana hourly rainfall fields from 8AM to 2PM on September 26, 2009 by multiquadric spatial interpolation (Source Tabios, 2020) Flooding extent, pictures and flood computations during TS Ketsana on September 26, 2009; Flood Inundation Levels around Marikina River during TS Ketsana (Source Tabios, 2020) Laguna Lake Level at Angono station during TS Ketsana (Source Tabios, 2020) Laguna Lake Levels at Angono stations during TS Gener (Source Author’s creation) Residential area and commercial establishments inside the floodplains or meander loops of Marikina River (Source GoogleMap)

349 350

351

352 353 354

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 8

Fig. 9 Fig. 10

Fig. 11

Fig. 12

Fig. 13

Fig. 14

Fig. 15

Fig. 16

Another development in a meander loop with Rosario weir structure for diverting Marikina River flows into Laguna Lake through Manggahan Floodway (Source GoogleMap) Manggahan Floodway looking upstream toward Marikina River (Source Department of Public Works and Highways) Local drainage channels with constricted outlet into the major waterway and a river that disappeared, thus obliterating drainage outlet from this area (Sources 10a, Laguna Lake Development Authority; 10b, Prof. Siringan, University of the Philippines—Marine Science Institute) Residential subdivision within Laguna Lake and settlements inside the floodplains of Napindan River connected to Laguna Lake (Source Laguna Lake Development Authority) Forest denudation and quarrying in the upper Marikina River basin responsible for increased soil erosion and sediment load to rivers (Source Laguna Lake Development Authority) Constriction along Pasig River around Makati City of Metro Manila due to river sedimentation from soil erosion and sediment load from upland watersheds (Source Prof. Siringan, University of the Philippines—Marine Science Institute) Changes in Laguna Lake bathymetry during the period 1939 to 1968 as well as the period 1968 to 1998. Average depth (from MLLW) in 1939 is 2.52m, and in 1998 is 2.24m. (Source Prof. Siringan, University of the Philippines—Marine Science Institute) Conceptual alignment of proposed Marikina stormwater tunnel to Agos River and/or all the way to Pacific Ocean (Source Author’s creation) Time series plot of Laguna Lake water level from 2008–2011 showing Typhoon Ondoy and 2012 Habagat events (Source JICA , 2018)

xix

355 356

357

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Chapter 12 Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3

Policy, Governance, and Sustainable Development: Empowering Government for Solid Waste Management Devolution -- Hierarchy of Solid Waste Management Responsibilities Metropolitan Manila Development Authority Structure

376 385 386

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LIST OF FIGURES

Chapter 13 Fig. 1 Fig. 2

Demonstration farm and nursery in Marikina (Photo by Mark Angelo Cagampan) Urban farming using plastic container bottles in Caloocan (Photo by Mark Angelo Cagampan)

413 414

Chapter 14 Fig. 1 Fig. 2

IRA and public welfare spending in cities IRA and public welfare spending in provinces

460 460

Chapter 15 Fig. 1 Fig. 2

Conceptual framework on DRFI (Source Authors’ creation) QC premium vs. risk transfer allocation, 2016–2018

468 477

List of Tables

Chapter 3 Table 1 Table 2

Exclusive powers of federal and regional governments under the Bayanihan Constitution Metro-wide services/functions across eight metropolitan arrangements

102 108

Chapter 4 Table 1 Table 2

Elementary and Secondary Schools in Metro Manila State and Local Universities and Colleges in Metro Manila

140 141

Chapter 5 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5

Composition of the local health boards for municipalities and cities Dependence on internal revenue allotment for cities in the National Capital Region, 2009–2016 Total expenditures on health for cities and municipalities, 2009–2016 (in million pesos) Composition of the local school boards for municipalities and cities Total collection of Special Education Fund, cities and municipalities, 2009–2016 (in million pesos)

166 169 170 175 178

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 6

Table 7

Total expenditures on education for cities and municipalities, sourced from SEF, excluding capital outlay, 2009–2016 (in million pesos) Total expenditures on education under capital outlay for cities and municipalities, sourced from SEF, 2009–2016 (in million pesos)

178

179

Chapter 7 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6

Median Years of Completed Education by Wealth Quintile and by Sex Net Attendance Ratios (NAR) by wealth quintile and by sex Comparison of Basic Education Governance in Ten Countries Family income, labor force data, and median years of completed education (female and male) by region NCR Revenues and Expenditures (in PhP Millions) Revenues and expenditures by LGU in NCR (in PhP millions)

227 227 232 240 241 242

Chapter 8 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3

Table 4 Table 5 Table 6

Table 7

Socialized housing price ceilings adjustments Income deciles with average family incomes, expenditures, savings, and affordable housing loans in 2015 National Capital Region income deciles with average family incomes, expenditures, savings, and affordable housing loans in 2015 Actual graduated amortization schedule for a PhP 450,000 loan at 4.5@ interest Actual graduated amortization schedule of a PhP 240,000 loan at 4.5% interest National Capital Region income classes with average family incomes, expenditures, and savings given actual housing expenses/amortizations in 2015 Daily food and transportation expenses of an above-minimum wage work relocated in a off-city relocation in Rodriquez, Rizal

267 269

271 272 272

273

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LIST OF TABLES

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Chapter 10 Table 1

Table 2 Table 3

Table 4

Reliability analysis of Angat Reservoir in terms of daily releases to Ipo Dam for MWSS domestic water supply at 46 and 50 CMS MWSS demand for cases: (1) without Biliway and Sumag; (2) with Biliway and Sumag with tunnel capacity of 10 CMS; and (3) with Biliway and Sumag with tunnel capacity of 15 CMS Long-term daily means of 110 sub-basin inflows (in m3 /sec and MLD) that flows into Laguna Lake Results of reservoir optimization-simulation and reliability analysis with Kaliwa Low Dam only (The optimum target release is 15 CMS which implies that an aggressive reservoir release rule [high target release] will result in less flow reliability but too passive release rule will result in lower firm water yield but have higher reliability especially at 85 percent-of-time.) Results of reservoir optimization-simulation and reliability analysis with Laiban Dam (upstream) and Kaliwa Low Dam (downstream) in series (The optimum target release is 20/20 which means 20 CMS for Laiban Dam and 20 CMS for Kaliwa Low Dam. The releases at Laiban Dam goes to Kaliwa Low Dam so only the water supply reliability of Kaliwa Low Dam is meaningful to deliveries to Metro Manila.)

329 335

339

340

Chapter 11 Table 1

Table 2

Flood control design level of protection in terms of return period and other pertinent information of major Department of Public Works and Highway (DPWH) flood control projects in the Philippines (Source DPWH website) Traditional Science and Sustainability in the Context of Flood Management (The first 4 columns were adapted from Yoshikawa, 2011)

361

367

Chapter 13 Table 1 Table 2

Metro Manila local government units and current urban agriculture offices, ordinances, and projects Selected national policies, plans, and programs related to urban farming

416 426

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LIST OF TABLES

Chapter 14 Table Table Table Table

1 2 3 4

Descriptive summary of variables for cities Descriptive summary of variables for provinces IRA and local income generation IRA and public welfare spending

453 455 458 459

Chapter 15 Table 1 Table 2 Table Table Table Table Table

3 4 5 6 7

Table 8 Table 9

World Bank-GFDRR Disaster Risk Management Framework Disaster risk financing and insurance policy alternatives and benefits Lead agencies for disaster prevention and mitigation Key risk transfer-related strategies, PDP Philippine DRFI strategy, local level Quezon City LDRRMF and risk transfer expenditure Quezon City estimated premium vs. risk transfer expenditure, 2016–2018 Quezon City LDRRMF budget items on risk transfer, 2016–2018 Humanitarian assistance actions related to DRFI, Quezon City LDRRMP

470 471 474 475 476 476 478 478 480

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Search for Alternative Models for Responsible Local Governance Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem and Maria Ela L. Atienza

1

Introduction

When Rodrigo Roa Duterte ran for the Philippine presidency in 2016, his battle cry was the “war on drugs,” i.e., to eliminate drug pushers and users in the country using what he did in Davao City, where he was mayor for 16 years, as the template. By doing this, he projected himself as the embodiment of how a city mayor from Mindanao is able to do good in his own constituency, giving him the political capital to run for the highest position in the country. His second battle cry, which also drew the attention of his supporters, was the underdevelopment of Mindanao, a situation they accused “imperial Manila” of propagating, that is, the resources of the south are being siphoned off to the capital city and region

T. S. E. Tadem (B) · M. E. L. Atienza Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] M. E. L. Atienza e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 T. S. E. Tadem and M. E. L. Atienza (eds.), A Better Metro Manila?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3_1

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T. S. E. TADEM AND M. E. L. ATIENZA

as a form of “internal colonialism.” There was thus a need to give development priority to Mindanao and consequently also to the Visayas. This earned the support of the Visayans and the Mindanaoans who through the years have felt isolated and/or even abandoned by the national capital. Both campaign slogans echoed the importance of local governance. That is, the drug war can be controlled at the local level so as not to escalate to the national level. Meanwhile, the marginalization of Mindanao highlights how local governance should be given impetus through institutional changes at the national level, i.e., greater devolution and autonomy which will require amendments of existing laws like the 1991 Local Government Code and/or the organic act creating the political region of Muslim Mindanao or federalism which will require constitutional change. Federalism was also used by Duterte and his supporters during the 2016 presidential campaign to address the problem of minority Muslims in the south. According to Duterte and his allies, there was a need to further localize political power at the grassroots and federalism was the institutional set-up which will address the pressing problems of Muslim Mindanao, particularly the need to find peace in the area. The Duterte Administration (2016–2022) also presented federalism as the panacea to addressing issues of poverty and underdevelopment elsewhere. This gave the incentive to the formation of both government and non-government initiatives to look into the different facets and features of federalism for the country. As a result, task forces were constituted by the government and political parties among others to look into the transition of the Philippines to a federal form of government. It was under this effort that the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), through the Local Government Academy (LGA), took on the task of “leading the development and implementation of information and education campaign and technical studies for the transition to a federal form of government” (UP CIDS-DILG-NCR Terms of Reference 2018). Studies have thus emerged with regard to this. A Consultative Committee to Review the 1987 Constitution was also formed through Executive Order No. 10 in 2016 but whose members were only appointed by the President in 2018. The Consultative Committee (2019) came out with “Power to the People: Bayanihan Federalism, Power to the Regions (A Draft Constitution for a Strong, Indissoluble Republic).” Focus was also placed on Article X (Local Government) of the 1987 Constitution, which the President of the Constitutional Commission

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INTRODUCTION: THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE …

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of 1986 which drafted the 1987 Constitution, Cecilia Muñoz Palma, described as one which “devolves the powers of imperial Manila to the provinces and cities in the hinterland in a clear reversal of the colonial policy of over centralization” (Mendoza and Ocampo 2017, 33). Furthermore, in one of the earliest Supreme Court decisions on Article X, the Supreme Court “echoed a political sentiment to add flourish to legal interpretation” (Mendoza and Ocampo 2017, 33). It wrote that while the 1987 Constitution does not usher in a regime of federalism,” it does “break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments… to liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila” (Mendoza and Ocampo 2017, 33). All these efforts have brought calls to study the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 or Republic Act 7160 (referred to hereafter as the 1991 LGC), which devolves significant powers and responsibilities to local governments and which some have viewed as revolutionary, “not because it gives powers and responsibilities to the local government units, but because it does so swiftly” (Tapales 1993, 22; see also Republic Act No. 7160, Local Government Code of 1991). Arguments have also arisen to point out that there is no need for the Philippines to shift to a federal form of government, but what is needed is to do the following: (1) examine the provisions of the 1991 LGC to see whether these have been implemented or not; if not, what are the reasons for these; and (2) if indeed there are shortcomings to the 1991 LGC, to look for a recourse to amend these. Both advocates of federalism and those for reexamining the 1991 LGC, however, agree that there is interest in the general public to address whatever obstacles there are at the moment which hinder the empowerment of local governments. Devolution of power from the central government to local government units (LGUs), as pointed out, continues to be the major pathway to further the country’s democratization process and development efforts. However, the shift to a full federal form that was promised by President Duterte was abandoned midpoint during his administration. Even the President’s economic managers argued against the cost of the shift to a federal form of government. The Consultative Committee’s draft Bayanihan Constitution was rejected by the President’s own allies in Congress with the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passing their own watered-down version of the draft Constitution, i.e., House leaders removed the progressive provisions in the draft Bayanihan Constitution

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like term limits, ban on political dynasties, and party system reform, and the Senate not even prioritizing discussions about a federal Constitution before the May 2019 mid-term elections. Even the President, in his July 2019 State of the Nation Address (SONA), no longer discussed federalism and later clarified that federalism may not happen during his term. Instead, an inter-agency task force he created and led by the DILG began focusing on proposing “surgical amendments” to the 1987 Constitution after his 2019 SONA (Atienza 2019, 2020, 133–134).

2 The Continuous Search in Addressing the Shortcomings of Decentralization in the Philippines Despite Duterte’s abandonment of his federalism promise, however, the call for a federal form of government has opened up a Pandora’s box in reexamining the state of the country’s decentralization process. More specifically, to what extent has it indeed empowered LGUs to take charge of decision-making at the local level with regard to what they view are their development needs and the political structures needed to pursue this? This book, A Better Metro Manila? Towards Responsible Local Governance, Decentralization and Equitable Development, thus aims to contribute to the discussions and debates which emerged from this. Historically, the Philippines experienced a highly formalized centralized governance structure under a unitary state during the Spanish (1521– 1898) and American (1989–1945) colonial periods. This includes the Commonwealth Period (935–1945) as the country transitioned into “independence.” With the granting of the independence by the Americans to the Philippines in 1945, the country witnessed several attempts to decentralize power but only to be halted by the advent of the martial law period (1972–1986). The 1986 People Power which ousted the Marcos dictatorship revived the trend toward decentralization culminating with the enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code (1991 LGC) which couched decentralization as the embodiment of people empowerment1 (Tapales 1993; de Guzman et al., 1998; Batario 2001).

1 A more detailed discussion of this is found in Tadem and Atienza, Chapter 2.

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Continuing challenges to the Local Government Code of 1991.2 Upon the implementation of the 1991 LGC, it would be only a matter of time when studies emerged in highlighting the continuing challenges which decentralization was confronting under the 1991 LGC. Studies revealed that although it has been said that the 1991 LGC has brought forth greater democratization and development from below, such efforts have also been greatly hindered by the continuing centralization of finances, human resources, and technical capacity which are not passed on to LGUs. LGUs continue to complain of inadequate financing which has undermined local autonomy. Furthermore, national development planning and budgeting continue to favor national agencies and the central government still determines the development priorities to be pursued by LGUs (Panganiban 1998; Legaspi 1996; Legaspi and Cabo 1996; Mehta and Buendia 2004; Atienza 2006). Aside from examining these obstacles to economic decentralization, studies also assessed the continuing problem of patronage politics at the local level where local politicians continue to perpetuate a problem of patronage producing a “culture of dependency.” At the national level, studies also pointed out that it also does not help that Congress continually provides appropriations for local programs and “pork barrel.” These also revealed that although the 1991 LGC viewed the important role of civil society with LGUs in counteracting political patronage, unfortunately there is still much to be desired on this matter. This is because the relationship between these two parties are marked by animosities and mistrust. Although there seems to be inroads with regard to this, NGO representatives taking part in the decision-making processes in the LGUs seem to be more of the exception rather than rule. Moreover, research findings have shown that the representatives of NGOs and POs in local special bodies, e.g., local health boards, are sometimes determined by local officials themselves or those who are close to the local officials (Tapales et al. 1996; Legaspi 1996; Budd 2005; Batario 2001; Atienza 2006; Hutchcroft 2010). Moreover, research on decentralization since People Power also focused on a reality that decision-making powers and financial resources were concentrated in Metro Manila, i.e., the National Capital Region

2 Further details of the shortcomings of the 1991 LGC will be expounded on in Tadem and Atienza, Chapter 2.

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(NCR). An adverse effect of this was the failure of the government to adequately deliver basic services to the people in the peripheries. Federalism as a panacea to the shortcomings of the 1991 LGC. It is within this context that the proposal for a federal form of government to contribute to a more enhanced and effective decentralization emerged from some sectors, including the Duterte administration. Consequently, studies have examined as a probable solution to addressing basic issues of local government, e.g., inefficient and ineffective social services and the persistence of inequalities in development which exist between the national and local governments and within LGUs despite devolution. Moreover, some studies assessed whether federalism is indeed the cure for the lack of genuine autonomy of LGUs which is stymied by the inadequate fiscal transfers from the central government. Studies have also zeroed in on the federalism advocated by President Duterte. Aside from highlighting regional inequalities, he sees a federalism which will recognize socio-cultural, ethnic and identity differences with special attention on the Muslim areas in the south but also including other regions outside Metro Manila. Thus, a major difference of the proposed federal structure of the Duterte administration is to move from the devolution structure of the 1991 LGC under the 1987 Constitution, which still recognizes the existence of two special autonomous regions, i.e., the Bangsamoro and the Cordilleras, to a full transformation of the entire country into a full federal arrangement (Araral et al. 2017; Pimentel 2017; Tigno 2017; Brillantes 2017; Manasan 2017; Miral 2017a; Hutchcroft 2017; Atienza 2019, 2020). Elsewhere in the country, the major concern continues to be political decentralization whereby the LGUs or regions will play a bigger role in national decision-making particularly in accelerating economic development. There is the view that federalism should also address the problem of patronage politics and the dominance of the elites in both politics and the economy; together with breaking up the overconcentration of political power in the hands of a few is also the persistent monopoly of fiscal resources in the center (Araral et al. 2017; Pimentel 2017; Tigno 2017; Brillantes 2017; Manasan 2017; Miral 2017a; Olivar and the FEF Study Group on Constitutional Reforms 2017; Oxales 2017; Hutchcroft 2017; Atienza 2019, 2020). However, what many of the proponents of federalism as well as those who advocated greater devolution and more powers to the special autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao created by law in 1989 (which eventually led to a new autonomous law passed

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by Congress in 2018 and approved in 2019 through a plebiscite that created a new, geographically larger Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao [Atienza 2020, 133]) missed were more legal and institutional reforms. Furthermore, there should be focus also on more agency-related reforms as well as efforts to address inequality of access to public services and development even within the so-called highly urbanized areas, including Metro Manila. Although the Duterte Administration succeeded in having Congress pass the Bangsamoro Basic Law in 2018 to further strengthen the autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao, there emerged the lack of public support and awareness for federalism. As mentioned earlier, the President abandoned the federalism project in 2019. It nevertheless opened up opportunities to (re)examine the current shortcomings and limitations of the 1991 LGC and how to address this given the current governance structure. Moreover, debates about federalism became an opportunity to examine what governance measures currently exist in a multilevel form of governance which can be further enhanced, e.g., metropolitan arrangements as well as new ones which can be learned from experiences of countries with forms of federalism.

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Background of the Book

Based on the above context, A Better Metro Manila? Towards Responsible Local Governance, Decentralization and Equitable Development thus aims to contribute to efforts to examine the strengths and limitations of the 1991 LGC and the 1987 Constitution’s Article X in light of the Duterte administration’s initial push for federalism and continuing quest for more responsible local governments. The book’s chapters emanate from the outputs of the research project of the University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP CIDS), the Department of the Interior and Local Government-National Capital Region (DILG-NCR), and the Office of the Quezon City Mayor, to study the advantages and disadvantages of federalism in the context of NCR or Metro Manila. The research project was part of a set of research projects which fed into the DILG-NCR study on the “The Administrative Region of the Republic of the Philippines: A Study on the Implications of Federalism in the National Capital Region and Considerations for Forming the Federal Administrative Region” (DILG-NCR). This research

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endeavor, in particular, was “initiated to come up with solid policy recommendations for the writers of the Federal Constitution and to provide inputs for creating a federal state out of the National Capital Region” (UP CIDS-DILG-NCR Terms of Reference 2018). Furthermore, the outputs of the study are intended to “be used by Constitutional framers, legislators and policymakers in establishing a state in the NCR…” (UP CIDS-DILG-NCR Terms of Reference 2018). This study was, thus, made in light of the Duterte Administration’s initial advocacy for federalism because it looks on the implications of the progress or lack of progress in the decentralization and devolution in the country in general, and the reforms and future directions that policymakers and stakeholders may take vis-à-vis the development problems the country faces. These include the lack of resources, coordinated planning, peace and order, as well as the risks of the unknown in the shift to federalism. The focus on NCR is also of utmost importance because the Philippines is generally Metro Manila-centric and it is viewed as the microcosm of the bigger geopolitics that is the Philippines. The repercussions of what happens in Metro Manila also affects the other regions in the country. While the current national administration had already abandoned its federalism plans when the project was wrapping up, it is important to continue evaluating the current status of decentralization and considering possible reforms (whether through constitutional change, constitutional amendments, ordinary legislation, or other actions) to improve governance, delivery of services, and democratization particularly in the context of Metro Manila. After all, governance reforms should not be the monopoly of a specific administration or presidency. At the same time, it is important to look at the challenges highly urbanized settings face in the pursuit of responsible governance, effective decentralization, and equitable development. Data gathering for the chapters were completed prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

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Governance as the Framework of Analysis

The project team was guided by the objectives set forth by DILG-NCR (de Asis 2018). The major concern was the nature of the governance structure for the NCR which would make its LGUs more effective in the performance of their tasks and responsibilities. In relation to this, federalism was the proposed governance structure at the time the project

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began. Thus, the team was made to examine the possible regional personality of the NCR should it become a federal state. In so doing, the project had the following general objectives: (1) to examine the strong and weak points of governance in the NCR and, hence, to identify areas to reform; (2) to identify the functions of the national and regional/state governments and identify which functions can be devolved to the NCR or to its respective LGUs; and, (3) to consolidate existing literature on decentralization and address gaps. Given the above objectives and questions, this book project adopted “responsible governance” as its overarching framework. Governance generally refers to “the various ways through which social life is coordinated” (Heywood 2019, 74). Government is seen “as one of the institutions, involved in governance” and “it is possible to have governance without government” (Rhodes 1996 as cited in Heywood 2019, 74). Heywood (2019, 74) further adds that “The wider use of the term reflects a blurring of the state/society distinction, resulting from changes such as the development of new forms of public management and the growth of public–private partnerships.” Thus, this book volume specifically refers to responsible governance where “responsible” is defined as the issue of accountability and the legal or moral obligation to carry out the duty and “where one is answerable for one’s behavior.” Moreover, responsible means “having to account for one’s actions to an authority or a superior” (Cowie 1989, 1077). With the broad and comprehensive scope of what governance means, this book volume adopts the transdisciplinary approach as highlighted by Tabios (Chapter 11). This approach puts importance into looking at governance in a holistic manner which cuts across disciplines, e.g., from the natural sciences to the social sciences. Thus, although governance is generally in the purview of the disciplines of political science in general and of public administration in particular, a more comprehensive understanding of the term, particularly as it applies to decentralization and equitable development, is enriched by the other disciplines. For this volume, these include among others the following: economics, geography, engineering, urban planning, education, and area studies. Two approaches to governance. This transdisciplinary approach cuts across the two frameworks to the structural models of governance as laid out by Gomez et al. (Chapter 3) on “(Re)Configuring Metro Manila.” These are the multilevel governance framework and the metropolitan arrangements framework.

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The multilevel governance framework is defined as “a complex policy process in which political authority is distributed at different levels of territorial aggregation” (Heywood 2019, 393). Multilevel governance has both a “vertical conception” and a “horizontal conception.” The former “takes account of the interdependence of actors in the policy process at subnational, national and transnational levels, creating a fluid process of negotiation” (Heywood 2019, 393). The latter characterizes the more complex nature of multilevel governance as it derives from “‘horizontal’ developments such as the growth of relationships between states and nonstate actors, and the emergence of new forms of public–private forms of public partnership” (Heywood 2019, 393). Thus, this volume extensively examines the concept of multilevel governance and its models for Metro Manila and how these impact social services delivery. Another key aspect of multilevel governance addressed in the chapters is the continuing enormous impact of the national government despite efforts to decentralize powers under the 1991 LGC. One finds this in the book’s discussions on health, education, and water privatization, as national agencies continue to dominate social service delivery (see Tapales 1993; Tapales et al. 1998; Batario 2001). This is also seen in urban development concerns such as solid waste management, flood mitigation, urban farming and land use where the national government plays an important role. Moreover, in terms of funding for these social services, the IRA shares from the national government are inadequate for most of the LGUs to do this on their own. Because of this, the less endowed LGUs that cannot collect enough local revenues continue to rely on the national government for funding for social services delivery and urban development projects. This financial quandary will not automatically end with the increase in national tax allotment of LGUs due to a recent Supreme Court decision which begins implementation in 2022 unless other reforms are made (discussed by Atienza in Chapter 6). (For further discussions on the IRA, see also Panganiban 1998; Legaspi and Cabo 1996; Manasan 2017; Brillantes 2017; Capuno 2017; Mendoza and Ocampo 2017; Miral 2017a, b.) A major concern, therefore, is what multilevel governance model can do to facilitate a broad-ranging collaboration among the various levels of governance. This refers not only to government agencies and national and local officials but also other stakeholders, e.g., communities, the private sector and civil society organizations (CSOs) (see Brillantes 1994; Tapales 1996; Atienza 2006).

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As for the metropolitanization framework, this allows for a subnationallevel government (as opposed to central government) provision of services characterized by economies of scale and externalities. Furthermore, Mercado and Manasan (2002, 37) observed that the 1991 LGC very much embodies the concept of metropolitan arrangement whereby under Chapter 3, Section 33 “Local government units may through appropriate ordinances, group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts.” There are, however, also advantages and disadvantages to the metropolitanization approach as strengthened by the 1991 LGC. The former notes that this will give greater and broader powers and functions to the LGUs but the latter points out that this may also lead to re-centralization, i.e., a threat to the autonomy of LGUs (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 37). In general, however, Manasan and Mercado stress that this can be viewed not as re-centralization but rather as a refinement of the decentralization thrust. For Rebullida and Taguibao (Chapter 12) on solid waste management, the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) epitomizes the metropolitanization arrangement as it plays an important role in this aspect. Strengthening the institutional framework for responsible local governance. To render these frameworks more effect in facilitating responsible governance, the book’s chapters emphasized the need to also strengthen the institutional framework of local governance particularly in the areas of social services delivery and urban development. Gomez and Pamittan (Chapter 4), Go (Chapter 5) who covers both health and education, Atienza (Chapter 6) on health, and Uy and Ocampo (Chapter 7) on education note that LGUs’ social service delivery is epitomized in the establishment of multi-sectoral special bodies to encourage local-level participation. For Tadem and Tadem (Chapter 9) on water privatization, it is the strengthening of the LGUs with the support of the communities and CSOs that can provide an alternative to the current dismal state of water privatization. Benefits have mainly accrued to the private concessionaires at the expense of the public in general and the urban poor in particular. Panganiban (1998) cautioned on privatization in general with regard to delivering the needed public service goods at the expense of the consumers, e.g., higher rates for water and electricity. The strengthening of institutions through decentralization also looks into how institutions can be more effective in terms of realizing economic

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growth as well as addressing issues which arise from rapid urban development, thus, the need to strengthen the institutional capacity of LGUs to address the urban dimensions of flooding (Tabios, Chapter 11) as well as a more effective solid waste management which is also environmentalfriendly (Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). Empowering LGUs through the decentralization of power also means the LGUs are to provide the institutional framework to make the most use of the growing scarce urban land available to communities who might want to farm (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13). Another important component of effective decentralization is financing for local governments to adequately perform the tasks of social service delivery and urban development concerns. Generally, there is a need to examine the advantages and disadvantages of fiscal decentralization as noted by Panao (Chapter 14). A proposal, in particular, to help mitigate local government resources in times of disasters is the strategy on local insurance risk as examined by dela Torre and Alampay (Chapter 15). As pointed out by Kuhonta (2011, 10), “state capacity and intervention is pertinent in the strengthening of institutions to transform society.” Responsible governance and equitable development. The strengthening of institutions through decentralization, however, is not an end in itself. An important end goal of responsible governance is to bring forth equitable development. This becomes most pertinent because in Philippine society, as elsewhere, there has been rapid growth but it is an exclusive one. This resulted in the widening gap between the rich and the poor. Wide socio-economic inequalities are further enhanced in Metro Manila and other urban centers because of rapid urbanization and migration. The reality of the socio-economic inequalities which exists in Philippine society today is further mirrored in the 2017 Forbes Richest Filipinos survey. It demonstrated that: the top 50 richest Filipinos in 2016, have a total wealth of USD304.8 billion. This is approximately 25% of the country’s GDP. The top 10 richest Filipinos already constitute 17% of the GDP of $53 billion. This is in stark contrast to 24% of the Filipino people who are rated below the poverty line according to a 2017 Social Weather Station survey. Moreover, according to this SWS survey 50% of the Filipino people rated themselves poor. (Canivel 2018, A5)

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Moreover, “more than a year into the COVID-19 pandemic that caused that economic hardships around the world, the Philippines’ 50 richest people grew their combined wealth by 30 percent to USD79 billion (equivalent to about PhP4 trillion at the current exchange rate)” (Dumlao-Abadilla 2021). While the billionaires in the Philippines continue to grow in their wealth, the majority are left to wallow with socio-economic inequalities which characterize society’s mundane needs such as lack of access to basic social services. The majority depend on government for equitable development but as Gomez, Loristo, and Pamittan (Chapter 3) show, decentralization has not led to a uniform development in the Philippines leading to inter- and intra-LGUs’ disparities in basic public services. Equitable development also means benefitting the marginalized sectors of society like the urban poor and women. As for the IRA, Panao (Chapter 14) notes that there is the issue of interregional inequality when it comes to central government fund transfers to LGUs. As Gomez, Loristo, and Pamittan (Chapter 3), Gomez and Pamittan (Chapter 4), Atienza (Chapter 6), Uy and Ocampo (Chapter 7), and Arcilla (Chapter 8) mention, the 1991 LGC provides mechanisms to address these but there is still the glaring issue of lack of access and equity in public services in Metro Manila, like other places in the country. In the case of NCR’s urban development, as elaborated by Saguin and Cagampan (Chapter 13), there is a need to address the issue of land use planning and the manner of allocation of land resources as equitably as possible among competing stakeholders. At the very core of the obstacle to equitable decentralization is the nature of development which the Philippines has embarked on and mirrored in the experience of the evolution of Metro Manila; this development model has reverberated throughout the country. This was a dependent development which was spawned by an export-driven economy benefitting mainly U.S. economic interests and an elite few (Caoili 1999; see Tadem and Atienza, Chapter 2). To address the problem of urban development and population growth, various supra-administrative bodies were formed since the post-World War II period (see Tadem and Ateinza, Chapter 2) to address Metro Manila’s problems which these brought about. These problems included pervasive poverty, inadequate housing and transportation, deteriorating health and sanitation conditions, among others. What also emerged was the very wide gap among other LGUs and Metro Manila with regard to their inherent revenue-generation capacities. During martial law and the final

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years of the Marcos dictatorship (1972–1986), for instance, Metro Manila was given by the national administration further priority concern with regard to social services delivery and as a showcase for the country’s drive for modernization. It viewed this as consistent with its export-oriented national development strategy (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 264). Under the Corazon Aquino Administration (1986–1992), on the other hand, Metro Manila expanded beyond its previous legal boundaries and there was a need to explore metropolitan governance structures to address its current and lingering problems. This need for appropriate alternative structures and models remain today. But the implementation of national and local governance structures to facilitate decentralization at the local levels may fall to naught if the same type of economic development is pursued, i.e., one which is externally dependent as epitomized by the movement of influential members of the business community together with like-minded politicians to further open up the economy but neglects the local economy and does not result in equitable development. This move toward further liberalization, as part of a neo-liberal framework, was intensified during the martial law period. This development framework is also coupled with the principles of market-economy and privatization. The principal neo-liberal goal is to “roll back the frontiers of the state” in the belief that unregulated market capitalism will deliver efficiency, growth, and widespread prosperity (Heywood 2019, 36, 152). Neo-liberalism assumes a level playing field and is generally concerned with growth and not equity. Given the dominance of political dynasties in the country and the wide gap between the rich and the poor, this kind of development model could very well be a hindrance to decentralization efforts and responsible local governance. Failure to address this will also further perpetuate the unequal allocation of resources in favor of Metro Manila, where the elites congregate, and will continue to see the impoverishment of the country’s peripheries, particularly those in Mindanao. Of course, there are various solutions being tested and offered to bring about equitable regional development and sustainable peace in Mindanao—which we will not discuss exhaustively here as we are focusing on Metro Manila governance. Suffice to say at this point that for as long as unequal development is not resolved, the development process will be stymied especially in the provinces whose population will continue to troop to Metro Manila in search for greener pastures. The violent conflicts and war in Muslim Mindanao has also seen the exodus of thousands of Muslim refugees to NCR. This has made it

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quite a challenge for Metro Manila. Despite being the richest region in the country, the major problems of urbanization, e.g., unemployment, inadequate public infrastructure and services and housing, and environmental degradation among others, persist. Even within Metro Manila, there continues to exist the inequality of rich LGUs, like Makati and Quezon City, vis-à-vis poor LGUs, like Navotas and Malabon. Economically, a solution to the inequality is by increasing the IRA from the current 40% of national internal revenue taxes. However, the formula for IRA distribution in the 1991 LGC also requires amendments as currently, it favors LGUs with higher population and larger geographical size, i.e., richer LGUs. There should be an equalization formula that supports poorer LGUs and encourages them to perform. Local government officials have expressed that “the funds would not be enough for any equally dramatic improvements in local government service.” This is despite the fact that LGUs will be receiving more than P200 billion in additional funds starting 2022 as a result of the Supreme Court ruling (Salaverria 2021). As Quirino Governor Dakila Cua, president of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines expressed, this amount “would have to be divided among 81 provinces, 146 cities, 1,488 municipalities and 42,000 barangays.” In other words, LGUs would still need the help of the national government for the effective delivery of services of its devolved functions (Salaverria 2021). Aside from the IRA, joint LGU and private sector ventures are also viewed as a strategy to spur development at the local level. Caution is, however, also placed with regard to the kind of development which is to be pursued. Privatization, for example, has been pushed by the national government to be an efficient solution to addressing underdevelopment. But this too has political repercussions, e.g., removal of socialized pricing structures (Panganiban 1998). The specter of the repercussions of a dependent development seems eminent as found in some of the proposals for federalism to further open up sectors in the economy for foreign investors. There is the assumption that foreign investors bring in more employment for locals but not necessarily as foreign investments can be capital-intensive or may bring in foreign labor as in the case of recent Chinese investors. It is in this context that equitable development is a primary consideration in the search for alternative models of governance for a more people-centric development. Non-negotiable, therefore, in this endeavor is the institutionalization of political participation of all stakeholders. In

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examining social services delivery and socio-economic inequalities, importance is also placed on national laws which are supposed to complement the provisions of the 1991 LGC to address these. Particular frameworks highlighted in the chapters that link responsible governance and decentralization to equitable development are the following: (1) a human security framework in Atienza’s Chapter 6 on health; (2) a human rights framework in Arcilla’s Chapter 8 on housing; and (3) a critique of the neo-liberal framework and water privatization in Tadem and Tadem’s Chapter 9. The human security framework which is applied to the issue of decentralization and health services by Atienza borrows from the UNDP classification of human security which mainly includes economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. Citing Mani (2005), Atienza notes that human security’s major concerns are the vulnerable, particularly those susceptible to poverty, disease, conflict, and disempowerment (Mani 2005). In particular, she points out that health is a security issue in highly urban Metro Manila with poor, marginalized, and informal settlers unable to access health services. With regard to decentralization, the human security framework plays a crucial role as it combines top-down protection and bottom-up empowerment approaches. The former refers to the issue of responsible governance while the latter looks at empowerment as a means toward equitable development. Atienza argues that there is a need to establish mechanisms at different levels of government, adding that these institutional reforms have to be coupled with an enabling environment to empower the crucial actors and stakeholders in health planning, service delivery, and monitoring. Arcilla (Chapter 8) utilizes a human rights approach to housing as a social service and the right of every individual to own a house. In Philippine society, the problem of affordable housing particularly for the poorest of 30% families is enormous. Arcilla critiques the dominant approach to socialized housing through the private production of off-city resettlements because it violates the human right of Filipinos to own a house. This has “created livelihood displacement, increased transportation and living costs, and social service inaccessibility” for the poor (Chapter 8). The human rights framework advocates for socialized housing units which are affordable and are located in accessible city resettlement, with access to livelihood, water and electricity, and other basic needs.

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The private production of homes and the issue of unaffordable socialized housing brings the issue of private investors delivering social services. The neo-liberal development paradigm which espouses this carries the philosophy that private is better than public. Tadem and Tadem (Chapter 9) on reclaiming public services and water privatization dispute this assertion. It cites studies which show how privatization of a social service like water in over 1,600 cities in 45 countries, including in Metro Manila, has failed. Evidence reveals that with privatization, the costs of water have gone up accompanied by the inefficiency in the delivery of water services and lay-offs among other adverse effects. The ones who have suffered the most in Metro Manila are the urban poor. They either cannot afford the water prices or the private concessionaires have failed to install the water pipes in the slums which they deem as “unprofitable.” Chapter 9 thus offers alternative approaches by which water services could be delivered by the public sector, i.e., through the joint effort of the local government and the community and if possible, the national government. A theme this carries as in the human security framework is the need to empower the marginalized sectors of society and in the case of Metro Manila, these are mainly the urban poor. What has emerged from this research process is the consensus on the bias to reclaim the public service value of decentralization to the people that local governments should serve, and the implied advocacy of empowering local governments because they are closer to the people. These values permeate all the studies in this volume in light of also realistically recognizing the challenges posed by the design and inequities in power, resources, and other factors, between the national and local governments. Thus, the stress on responsible local governance by strengthening the decentralization process to attain an important goal which is equitable development. Decentralization, equity, and popular participation. In addition to strengthening institutions, the issue of equity in social services delivery and urban development needs addressing. This is highlighted in the volume’s chapters on social services delivery in health, education, housing, and water. Again, focus is also placed on the importance of the state, which for Kuhonta (2011, 10) plays a crucial role in producing a redistributive agenda in these areas as they require massive state coordination and planning. The success of such restructuring is to ensure “that the economy continues to grow and that those whom the redistributive program disfavors are not so thoroughly marginalized” (ibid.).

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The institutionalization of powers in LGUs under the 1991 LGC also highlights the importance of the empowerment of the citizenry at the local level in terms of equity which is not brought about by mere economic growth. This is complemented by other landmark laws toward this end. Thus, the chapters on health, education, socialized housing, water services delivery, solid waste management, and urban farming and land use stress key 1991 LGC provisions which encourage people’s participation, i.e., the concerned communities, CSOs and the private sector with their respective LGUs. This produces an environment of democratic decision-making and in the process, allows the harnessing not only of local but also of national government resources for social services and development for all. A crucial end goal is sustainable and equitable development. The effective implementation of popular participation at the local level in the 1991 LGC would also be greatly facilitated by political reforms, e.g., the anti-political dynasty bill. Political dynasties have concentrated political and economic power at the national and local levels among a few. The problem is that majority of the members of Congress hail from political dynasties and have thus refused to act on any reform efforts. These same actors have also stymied attempts to reform and institutionalize the electoral and party systems as a counterfoil to political dynasties. Regarding development, a recent proposal to addressing LGUs’ inequality is by increasing the base of the IRA (now national tax allotment due to the Supreme Court ruling) from the national income. This hopefully will spur both local-level development and proposals for LGUprivate sector joint ventures. Of course, LGUs’ capacity to raise their own revenues and implement appropriate and sustainable development plans should also be strengthened. But as earlier mentioned, LGUs claim that this funding increase is still inadequate to fully pay for all the social services supposed to be devolved at the local level (Salaverria 2021). We must also question the kind of development to be pursued. Privatization, for example, has been pushed by the national government as an efficient solution to addressing underdevelopment. But this too has political repercussions, such as the rise of the cost of basic utilities (Panganiban 1998; see also Tadem and Tadem’s Chapter 9 for additional literature). A Better Metro Manila: Responsible Local Governance, Decentralization and Equitable Development addresses all these concerns by first providing an overview of the continuing pertinence of the search for alternative models for empowering local governance. Tadem and Atienza

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(Chapter 2) zero in on the experience with regard to strengthening LGUs in the Philippines, with a focus on Metro Manila. Although the book chapters are country- and region-specific, these may very well reverberate in other countries, specifically with highly urbanized areas, in the world currently confronting the challenges of the needs of megacities. Case studies are grouped into three clusters which constitute this volume, namely, Cluster One on Social Services Delivery; Cluster Two on Urban Development; and Cluster Three on Financing Local Governance. Cluster One contains chapters on the following topics: (1) re(onfiguring) Metro Manila through models for development, i.e., federalism and metropolitan arrangements to facilitate better social service delivery; (2) mapping the state of services in the Philippines; (3) a study of social services and the 1991 LGC; (4) the state of health services delivery; (5) socialized housing; (6) public education; (7) reclaiming public services in the water sector; and (8) alternative water sources for Metro Manila. Cluster Two contains chapters on: urban flooding and holistic flood risk management; urban solid waste management; and urban farming and urban land use dilemma in Metro Manila. Cluster Three includes two chapters, one on fiscal decentralization and another concerning a strategy for local insurance risk transfer mechanism. The book’s conclusion focuses on reforms, constraints, challenges, and ways forward for policy research in Metro Manila. It highlights the challenges currently confronted by Metro Manila on efforts to strengthen responsible local governance, effective and efficient decentralization, equitable development, and even the inevitability of the evolution of the current metropolitan governance arrangement into a full metropolitan government.

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Significance of the Study

Despite past studies on implementation of the 1991 LGC, particularly on the state of social services delivery, i.e., health, education, and solid waste management (see Tapales 1996; Tapales et al. 1996, 1998; Brillantes 1994; Legaspi 1996; Sayos et al. 2002; Batario 2001; Pineda 2002; Atienza 2006; Brillantes and Flores 2012), the studies in this book come amidst the debate on whether there is a need to do the following: (1) efficiently and effectively implement the provisions of the 1991 LGC; (2) amend the 1991 LGC; or (3) shift to a federal system of governance.

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Furthermore, this book revisits the overarching themes of decentralization and local governance, which continue to face challenges even after the enactment of the 1991 LGC. The issues are further highlighted in the context of the most urban, highly developed, but heavily populated region in the country, i.e., NCR. Given that the 1991 LGC marked its 30th year of existence in 2021, this book offers policy recommendations based on previous as well as present studies. As such, this book volume seeks to update previous studies which have already been done on the 1991 LGC, many of which are overly legalistic, formally institutionalist, and technical. This current work recognizes the significance of the law but goes further by closely examining how it affects social services and urban development. A number of decentralization studies in the Philippines have also focused on political and administrative aspects pointing out shortcomings of fiscal decentralization (see de Guzman and Reforma 1988; Legaspi 1996; Batario 2001). This volume, thus, seeks to provide an expanded and more recent indicative picture of Philippine devolution and its impact on society still undergoing rapid urban expansion. Consider urban farming and land use, an understudied topic with regard to the impact of the 1991 LGC. Urban farming, the topic of Saguin and Cagampan’s Chapter 13, is now viewed as a new coping strategy for the people in terms of food supply, security, and recreation. Urban farming has become a crucial measure as a survival strategy for Filipino families in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and all the lockdown measures which have stymied the flow of food, e.g., vegetables, to the cities. Local risk insurance is another overlooked topic. Yet, it constitutes an essential part of building disaster resilience and facilitating recovery for people and their communities. Local risk insurance, written by Dela Torre and Alampay (Chapter 15), then becomes more crucial in light of the COVID-19 pandemic as it seeks to help address the shortage of government funds needed in dealing with the damages caused by humans and natural hazards. In the case of COVID-19, the government has been distributing and borrowing money for its social amelioration programs to help those who have lost their jobs and the temporary shutdown or total collapse of business establishments. A third underappreciated and less studied topic is the impact of the 1991 LGC on water services. This is particularly so in the context of decentralization and water privatization. Water privatization, a national

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policy, has fallen short of its promises to the detriment of Metro Manila residents, especially the urban poor. There have been calls to reclaim public services like water back to government, particularly, by LGUs that know the needs of their communities best. Tadem and Tadem (Chapter 9), therefore, highlight the alternatives for water privatization which bring together the local governments in partnership with citizens’ movements. Another issue of importance, which is touched on by Tabios (Chapter 10), is the need to look for alternative sources of water for NCR. This issue is not touched on by the 1991 LGC, but has to be confronted by LGUs. The growing need for metropolitanization which has also been encouraged by the 1991 LGC, whereby LGUs can combine resources for a more effective and efficient delivery of social services, is a model looked upon by which to address this problem. The topic also brings to light how these LGUs will harness the support of the national government toward this endeavor, leading to the reexamination of the debate of re-centralization vis-à-vis devolution of power to LGUs. All in all, this book seeks to contribute to the now currently shelved debate, but possibly will reemerge in the near future or medium-term again, on the proposed shift to a federal form of government and attempts to foresee the implications of intergovernmental fiscal relations. Furthermore, the state of decentralization as assessed by the chapters and their policy recommendations can help policymakers by serving as a guide on how a federal system or other hybrid alternative arrangements may unfold in practice. Finally, this book usefully provides multidisciplinary perspectives on responsible local governance. Although a number of research projects have been undertaken and published on assessing the implementation of the 1991 LGC, these publications have generally been from the perspectives of the following disciplines: (1) political science, (2) public administration; and (3) economics. This book continues to draw from the specialists in these disciplines, but their studies are complemented by authors whose expertise are in the areas of geography, education, engineering, and area studies, among others. The value of the insights provided for in the book, however, goes beyond these disciplines as it can also be used by scholars in the fields of sociology and urban planning among others. By multidisciplinarity here, we mean that the whole book draws on the knowledge from different disciplines on Metro Manila governance and responsible local governance; however, we hope that the findings will contribute in the future to further interdisciplinarity by

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linking various disciplines in their analyses and syntheses of findings and recommendations on the subject.

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Mercado, Ruben G., and Rosario G. Manasan. 2002. “Chapter 2: Metropolitan Arrangements in the Philippines: Passing Fancy or the Future Megatrend?” In Managing Urbanization: Under a Decentralized Governance Framework, Vol. 1, edited by Rosario G. Manasan, 33–73. Demographic Research and Development Foundation, Inc. (DRDF) and Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS). Quezon City: Demographic Research and Development c/o Population Institute, University of the Philippines. Miral, Romulo E. M., Jr. 2017a. “Federalism: Prospects for the Philippines.” Discussion Paper Series No. 2017-29, Philippine Institute for Development Studies, September, 1–106. ———. 2017b. “The Fiscal Imperatives of Federalism to Ensure Equalization and Sustainable Development.” In The Quest for a Federal Republic: The PDP Laban Model of Philippine Federalism 1.0, edited by Jonathan E. Malaya, 140–165. Pasay City, Metro Manila: Total PR solutions Phils. Inc., Media Touchstone Ventures, Inc. Olivar, Gary B., and the FEF Study Group on Constitutional Reforms. 2017. “Removing the Restrictive Economic Provisions of the 1987 Constitution.” In The Quest for a Federal Republic: The PDP Laban Model of Philippine Federalism 1.0, edited by Jonathan E. Malaya, 186–201. Pasay City, Metro Manila: Total PR solutions Phils. Inc., Media Touchstone Ventures, Inc. Oxales, Alberto. 2017. “IX: Incremental Federalism: Steps to a Successful Shift to a Federal System.” In The Quest for a Federal Republic: The PDP Laban Model of Philippine Federalism 1.0, edited by Jonathan E. Malaya, 166–178. Pasay City, Metro Manila: Total PR solutions Phils. Inc., Media Touchstone Ventures, Inc. Padilla, Perfecto. 1998. “Local Government Reorganization for Greater Administrative Efficiency.” In Local Government in the Philippines: A Book of Readings Volume I: Local Government and Administration, edited by Prosperpina Domingo Tapales, Jocelyn C. Cuaresma, and Wilhelmina L. Cabo, 165– 185. Quezon City: Center for Local and Regional Governance and National College of Public Administration. Panganiban, Elena M. 1998. “Local Governance and the New Community: Economic Development as a Function.” In Local Government in the Philippines: A Book of Readings Volume I: Local Government and Administration, edited by Prosperpina Domingo Tapales, Jocelyn C. Cuaresma, and Wilhelmina L. Cabo, 247–283. Quezon City: Center for Local and Regional Governance and National College of Public Administration. PDP Laban Federalism Institute. 2017. “Proposed Amendments to the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: The Constitution of the Federal Republic of the Philippines.” PIDS (Philippine Institute for Development Studies). 2017. APPC 2017: Critical Perspectives on Federalism for Regional Development. Proceedings of the Third

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Annual Public Policy Conference, September 19. Marco Polo Ortigas, Pasig City. Pimentel III. Aquilino “Koko” 2017. “Foreword: The Cornerstone of the Agenda of Change.” In The Quest for a Federal Republic: The PDP Laban Model of Philippine Federalism 1.0, edited by Jonathan E. Malay, 19–34. Pasay City, Metro Manila: Total PR solutions Phils. Inc., Media Touchstone Ventures, Inc. Pineda, Virginia S. “Health Management: Strategies from Selected Cities.” 2002. In Managing Urbanization: Under a Decentralized Governance Framework, Vol. 1, edited by Rosario G. Manasan, 105–126. Demographic Research and Development Foundation, Inc. (DRDF) and Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS). Quezon City: Demographic Research and Development c/o Population Institute, University of the Philippines. Republic Act No. 7160. Local Government Code of 1991. Manila: National Printing Office, 1991. Salaverria, Leah B. 2021. “P200-Billion IRA Not Enough, Local Governments Claim.” Inquirer.Net, September 26. Sayos, Anicia C., Ross Q. Quisao, and Rosario G. Manasan. 2002. “Chapter 5: Local Efforts in Housing Provision.” In Managing Urbanization: Under a Decentralized Governance Framework, Vol. 1, edited by Rosario G. Manasan, 127–151. Demographic Research and Development Foundation, Inc. (DRDF) and Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS). Quezon City: Demographic Research and Development c/o Population Institute, University of the Philippines. Tapales, Prosperpina D. 1993. Devolution and Empowerment: The Local Government Code of 1991 and Local Autonomy in the Philippines. State of the Nation Report. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press and Center for Integrative and Development Studies. Tapales, Prosperpina D., Perfecto L. Padilla, Ma. Ernita T. Joaquin, and Eden V. Santiago. 1996. Modern Management in Philippine Local Government. Quezon City: Local Government Center, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines and Public Administration Promotion Centre, German Foundation for International Development. Tapales, Prosperpina D., Perfecto L. Padilla, and Ma. Ernita T. Joaquin. 1998. “Managing Change in Local Government: Issues and Concerns in Organizational Development.” In Local Government in the Philippines: A Book of Readings Volume I: Local Government and Administration, edited by Prosperpina Domingo Tapales, Jocelyn C. Cuaresma, and Wilhelmina L. Cabo, 187–202. Quezon City: Center for Local and Regional Governance and National College of Public Administration. Tayao, Edmund. 2017. “II. Federalism and the Challenge of Politics and Administration in the Philippines.” In The Quest for a Federal Republic: The PDP

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CHAPTER 2

The Evolving Empowerment of Local Governments and Promotion of Local Governance in the Philippines: An Overview Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem and Maria Ela L. Atienza

1

Introduction

Decentralization in the Philippines has been evolving, and this has been undertaken under a unitary form of government. Efforts toward this end began in 1946 with the grant of independence to the Philippines by the American colonial rulers. Previously, the trend was toward centralization of powers in the national government during the Spanish and American colonial periods in 1565 to 1898 and 1898 to 1946, respectively. Decentralization was generally regarded as furthering the democratization process in the Philippines and, consequently, enhancing development at

T. S. E. Tadem (B) · M. E. L. Atienza Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] M. E. L. Atienza e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 T. S. E. Tadem and M. E. L. Atienza (eds.), A Better Metro Manila?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3_2

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the grassroots level. However, this has not been smooth. This is because although such efforts have been institutionalized through various legal promulgations, it has generally been lacking in the effectiveness of the implementation. Despite this, however, the resolve to further decentralize power to local governments continues to persist, and understandably so. Decentralization, particularly political decentralization or devolution, is an important means of empowering not only local officials but their respective local communities as well as in taking part in policy-making over matters that affect their lives. It also provides a venue which can encourage popular participation in the efficient delivery of social services and development efforts on the ground. Moreover, with the increasing complexity of society, the national government cannot tackle all the issues and concerns which confront a rapidly developing polity. This chapter, therefore, gives an overview of the evolving empowerment of local government units (LGUs) and promotion of local governance in the Philippines. The first part provides the historical context from the Spanish colonial period, through the martial law and end of Marcos periods (1972–1986), and culminating in the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 (1991 LGC). The second part expounds on the pertinent sections of the 1991 LGC which are concerns of the book’s chapters. These are mainly on social services delivery, urban development, and financial resources to enable the success of decentralization. The third part examines the challenges which have confronted the implementation of the 1991 LGC. These challenges have given impetus for the initial call for a federal system of government under the Duterte Administration (2016–2022), the proposed structure of which is discussed in the chapter’s fourth part. Finally, the fifth part focuses on the evolution of empowering local governance in Metro Manila, this book’s case study. This chapter sets the context by which the rest of the chapters takes off from, that is, examining the problems which have besieged Metro Manila in the quest to decentralize power at the local level bringing forth the advantages and limitations of the decentralization efforts in the country. Related to this is the need to determine whether it is necessary to further strengthen and tweak the existing framework for decentralization, or to discard this completely and adopt another model of central-local structure, e.g., federalism. Either way, the intention is how to make more effective local governance, using the National Capital Region (NCR), i.e., Metro Manila, as a case study of further institutionalizing the empowerment process at the local level.

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A theme which cuts across the sections and takes off from Chapter 1 is decentralization as a strategy to bring about a mode of responsible governance that will allow the more efficient and effective delivery of basic services as well as equitable development that will uplift the welfare of the marginalized sectors of society. The challenge now is determining the structural form of governance which will shape these decentralization efforts. This will have to take into consideration political, economic, and socio-cultural forces which in the past until the present have hampered such efforts. There is optimism, however, that lessons have also been learned by which these could be overcome.

2 A Historical Overview of the Decentralization Experience in the Philippines De Guzman et al. (1988, 207) note that there are essentially two major concepts of local government. One is its traditional and legal concept which views it “as a political subdivision of the national government, excluding the field offices of line agencies geographically located within the jurisdiction units”. The second concept of local governments “refers to the geographic area where all government units, including the field officers of line agencies of the national government, are considered as part of the local government”. Taking these two concepts into consideration, the Philippine local government system is said to be “modeled after the French, through the colonial influence of Spain (Tapales et al. 1996, 3) where there exist the hierarchical relationships between the national and local government” (Humes IV 1991 as cited in Tapales et al. 1996, 4). Prior to Spanish colonization, village governments were already existing in the Philippines, whereby “family and clans, the barangays , had their own form of governance” (Tapales et al. 1996, 4; see De Guzman et al. 1988; Ocampo and Panganiban 1998). The datu (chief) was “acting as executive and judge and, with his council of elders served as legislature” (Tapales et al. 1996, 4). Under Spanish colonial rule (1565 to 1898), the Spaniards established the encomiendas , parcels of land which were given as farms to Spaniards who helped in the colonization of the islands. Later on, they established provincias (provinces), cabildos (cities), and pueblos (municipalities) which served as local government units in a descending order

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of power. The people were alienated from the foreign national government but also from their own local rulers. (Tapales et al. 1996, 5; see De Guzman et al. 1988)

This is understandable as the raison d’etre of the system of government under colonial role was to subjugate the local people. This government structure of subjugation was carried on during the American colonial period (1898–1946) as the United States (U.S.) carried on the system of local government which the Spaniards started. The same hierarchical pattern of local government which Spanish colonization established was essentially kept with the President exercising general supervision over the provinces and cities, and if he chose and the law allowed, over the lower levels of local government. The provinces served as coordinative mechanism for the conduct of national services over its territory, and had some supervision over municipalities, which in turn has supervision over the barrios. The cities were independent of the provinces, and supervised the barrios (and in some instances, districts or zones) within their territory. (Tapales et al. 1996, 6; De Guzman et al. 1988; Ocampo and Panganiban 1998)

Such a hierarchical system was carried on during the Commonwealth period (1935–1945) which was meant to prepare the country for independence from the U.S. The country adopted the 1935 Constitution which was designed to have a strong Presidency and a strong central government. This was attributed to the strong leadership of President Manuel L. Quezon. President Quezon believed that “under the unitary system, the national chief executive does and should control all local offices” (De Guzman et al. 1988, 108–109). The Philippines thus has functioned under a unitary system of government which vests “sovereign power in a single, national institution” and since “constitutional supremacy is vested with the center”, “any system of peripheral or local government exists at the pleasure of the centre” (Heywood 2019, 400). In a unitary system, therefore, there “is no intervening level between the national government and the LGUs. The President’s power of general supervision is delegated to the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)” (Tapales et al. 1996, 7). This is in contrast with federal systems which “are based on a compromise between unity and regional diversity, between the need for an

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effective central power and the need for checks or constraints on that power” (Heywood 2019, 395). Furthermore, both central government (the federal level) and regional government (the state level) possess a range of powers on which the other cannot encroach. These include, at least, a measure of legislative and executive authority, and the capacity to raise revenue; thus, enjoying a degree of fiscal independence. (Heywood 2019, 397–398)

The period from 1946, when the Philippines was granted its independence by the U.S., to 1972, when martial law was declared, saw the trend toward decentralization. “Congress passed a number of laws giving more autonomy to local governments through a grant of additional powers or through lessening of national control of local affairs” (De Guzman et al. 1998, 109). A significant number of legislative enactments on local governments were passed during this period. Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, provided greater autonomy “to local governments, including more discretion in the allocation of resources as well as in reorganizing provincial governments” (Araral et al. 2017, xvi; Batario 2001, 12; also see De Guzman et al. 1998, 109). City and municipal governments were thus given greater fiscal, planning, and regulatory powers and the Act to a certain degree also broadened their taxing powers (Araral et al. 2017, 3). Moreover, the Act gave local units a freer hand in local zoning and planning (Tapales 1993, 9). Furthermore, it also gave the local governments broader powers like the authority to impose license taxes or fees in the exercise of professions. It likewise diminished national control over provincial planning and budgeting (Batario 2001, 12). This was followed in 1960 when Republic Act No. 2370 (later amended by RA 3590), known as the Barrio Charter Act, was enacted and recognized the barrio (or barangay) as a legal entity and empowered its inhabitants to elect its officials (Batario 2001, 12; Araral et al. 2017, 3; De Guzman et al. 1988, 109). This Act granted autonomy to the barrios by considering them quasi-municipal corporations endowed with the powers of particular government functions. It also contains details on the powers and governing structures of barrios (Araral et al. 2017, xvii). Thus, it is recognized as “a legal entity and empowered its inhabitants to elect its officials…” (De Guzman et al. 1998, 109).

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In 1967, another effort to decentralize government powers occurred with Republic Act No. 5185, also known as the Decentralization Act of 1967, which introduced the following changes: 1. The provinces and the cities were authorized to supplement national programs in rural and agricultural extension services; 2. National approval over a number of local actions was removed; 3. The share of provinces in internal revenue collection was increased and distributed on the basis of population and land area; and 4. The appointment of some officials, including the provincial assessor and agriculturist who were appointed by the President, was devolved and transferred to the Governor (De Guzman et al. 1998, 109; also see Batario 2001, 12; Araral et al. 2017, 3). Centralizing power during the martial law period (1972–1986). The declaration of martial law by President Ferdinand Marcos on 21 September 1972 brought greater centralization of power to the national government. This characterized “changes in local government-national government relations” (Tapales et al. 1996, 6; see De Guzman et al. 1988; Ocampo and Panganiban 1998) and was further reinforced by the 1973 Constitution which provided a whole article on local government. Presidential Decree No. 1, which implemented the Integrated Reorganization Plan created a Department of Local Government and Community Development to which was delegated the President’s power of general supervision over local governments. (Tapales 1993, 9)

The 1973 Constitution, which was ratified during the martial law period, however, recognized the important role of local governments. “Local autonomy is guaranteed by the Constitution and local governments are given the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes” (De Guzman et al. 1998, 113). The 1973 Constitution also encouraged local governments to pool their resources in development efforts by providing that LGUs may group themselves, or consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them (Art. IV, Sec. 2). It was in the 1973 Constitution whereby a separate article on local government was provided for, in contrast with the 1935 Constitution

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that has no separate article on it. Among its provisions was the drafting of a Local Government Code which would serve as the law concerning local government. It took ten years for the Code to pass. It was enacted by Batas Pambansa 337 in 1983, and is now referred to as the first Code (Tapales et al. 1996, 6). “With the 1973 Constitution as frame of reference, the first Local Government Code provided for criteria for the creation of all local units. The criteria used were basically population and income” (Tapales 1993, 10). When martial law was officially lifted on 17 January 1981 and the New Republic was inaugurated on 30 June 1981, a significant development was the “conversion of the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development into a Ministry of Local Government (MLG)” and “the approval of the Local Government Code” (De Guzman et al. 1988, 115). Executive Order No. 777, dated 28 February 1982, mandated the MLG to “develop the capability of local government units… to assist the President in exercising his power of general supervision over local governments… and to assist in the administration of the Katarungang Pambarangay” (EO No. 777, Sec. 4 in De Guzman et al. 1998, 115). As for the Local Government Code, this contained “a number of significant provisions, including the principle of liberal interpretation of local government powers” (De Guzman et al. 1998, 116). Despite these seemingly decentralization of powers, the imposition of martial law “was to drastically erode the trend toward more autonomy…there were specific manifestations of increasing central control over local affairs and decreasing powers, functions and responsibilities of local governments” (De Guzman et al. 1988, 117). Decentralization and the beginnings of the Local Government Code of 1991. Based on the Philippine experience, therefore, the historical trend until 1986 was generally toward centralization. There was a period toward decentralization, however, during the period of Philippine independence in 1946 until 1972. In general, the choice between whether to centralize or decentralize took place under a unitary system. Under such a system, there are different forms of decentralization which “can be distinguished primarily in terms of the extent of authority transferred, and the amount of autonomy the decentralized organizations achieved in carrying out their tasks” (Atienza 2006, 416). These include first, deconcentration, which is purely an administrative matter, denoting a relocation of central government employees from the capital (Hague and Harrop 2013, 264). Thus, “the redistribution of administrative responsibilities

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only with the central government” (Atienza 2006, 416). The case of deconcentration is that “it spreads the work around; reduces costs by allowing activities to move to cheaper areas; and frees central departments to focus on policy-making, rather than execution” (Hague and Harrop 2013, 264). Deconcentration of powers was seen during the martial law period in these instances: The creation of regional governments; (2) the creation of regional offices of different ministries; (3) the creation of regional development councils; and (4) the adoption of the integrated area development approach. However, these decentralization measures were directed more towards delegation of authority to the field offices of line agencies, which are mere extension of the central government, rather than towards a strengthening of local government units. (De Guzman et al. 1998, 114–115)

The second, and politically more significant, way of dispersing power is through delegation. This term means that policy execution is delegated to subnational bodies, such as local authorities… (Hague and Harrop 2013, 265). In this situation, decision-making “and management authority for specific functions, is delegated to organizations that are not under the direct control of the central government ministries” (Atienza 2006, 416). The third and most radical form of decentralization is devolution. This occurs when the center grants decision-making autonomy (including some legislative powers) to lower levels (Hague and Harrop 2013, 265). “Devolution of responsibilities means transfer of appropriate personnel, programs, projects, records, and equipment of the concerned national agencies to local government units” (Batario 2001, 19). Devolution thus seeks to strengthen autonomous levels or units of government as the central government “relinquishes certain functions or creates new units of government that are outside its control” (Atienza 2006, 416– 417). Atienza (2006, 416–417) also points out that devolution may also involve “the transfer of functions of government to nongovernment institutions” whereby some “planning and administrative responsibility or public functions are transferred from government to voluntary, private, or nongovernment institutions” (Ibid.). Decentralization/devolution in the Philippines. The country’s history of centralization, however, has not stymied the relentless effort to push for decentralization. Efforts toward this are best seen in the context

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of the global decentralization of the expansion of the state’s economic and social responsibilities leading to the decentralization of state power during much of the twentieth century (Heywood 2019, p. 392). But unlike its other counterparts, whereby impetus for decentralization was further seen in the 1960s and 1970s in an attempt to redefine identity on the basis of culture and identity (Heywood 2019, 392), in the Philippines, the major reason for decentralization was to make bureaucratic processes more efficient and effective. As noted by Brillantes (1994, 47), the importance of decentralizing and/or devolving powers to LGUs is brought about by several realities. One is that with most decision-making powers and financial resources concentrated in “imperial Manila”, development of the countryside has been neglected. This has resulted in the general inability and failure of government to deliver basic services to the people, not only in the center but also in the periphery (Brillantes 1994, 47). Secondly, by devolving powers and authority to LGUs, this will increase their capacity to respond to the needs of the people (Brillantes 1994, 47). What was observable for Tapales et al. (1996, 189) was that even before the drafting of the 1991 LGC, in the 1973 Constitution local governments in the country were already providing services with their own complement of personnel, administrative machinery and local funds in the basic areas of health, agriculture, social welfare, and environment and natural resources. The local programs nearly always attempted to supplement national government provisions, and oftentimes field agents of the four national departments (Tapales et al. 1996, 18). Among the agencies, the Departments of Health, Agriculture, Social Welfare, and Environment and Natural Resources were called upon to lend logistical support (Tapales et al. 1996, 19). The impetus for decentralization is also due to urbanization which has led to increases in the demand for basic services. As observed, the concentration of population and “the intensification of economic activities in urbanized areas increased the demand for public infrastructure, goods and services, and new ways of delivering them” (Brillantes and Flores 2012, 294). Importance, therefore, is placed on LGUs’ autonomy “in the mobilization, allocation and utilization of resources” (Pineda 2002, 105). Addressing urbanization needs in the cities and municipalities have also called for a more visible active participation of LGUs. As noted, at the national level, “the impact of local economies can also be felt. While macroeconomic policies of the national government determine the urban economy, the performance of the local economy also affects

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the macro economy” (Panganiban 1998, 255). Furthermore, the success of local governments is normally measured in economic terms. One is through employment, that is, the number of jobs created and cost for jobs. Another is through the adoption of local economic programs and its fiscal considerations (Panganiban 1998, 254).

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Empowering Governance Through the Local Government Code of 1991

Decentralization can thus be viewed as a means to bring forth development that seeks to improve the welfare of society. As noted by Miral (2017a, 6), a major constraint to Philippine development is the concentration of resources and the power to deploy them in the hands of the national government. This has engendered inefficiency in the delivery of government services and has exacerbated regional inequalities by sustaining patronage, corruption and the growth of political dynasties. Reducing this concentration of resources is an essential initial step in addressing the long-standing problems of poverty and uneven economic growth. (Miral 2017a, 6)

Decentralization, thus, is viewed “as a strategy towards democratizing the political system and accelerating the attainment of sustainable development” (de Guzman and Reform 1998, 22). Moreover, it seeks that the “equitable distribution of power, resources, and services will be rationally deployed to habitually neglected groups and communities, in contrast to the existing practice which concentrates these to the center” (de Guzman and Reform, 1998, 23). Efforts toward this end are also founded in democratic processes, i.e., the need to make political choices and one which enables rather than provides for the people (Panganiban 1998, 249). Underlying all of these is the need for “a democratic decentralized system and an indirect role of government” (Panganiban 1998, 249). As noted by von Einsiedel (2002, 28), the four basic objectives of decentralization are democracy, empowerment, efficiency, and development. Aside from urbanization, “democracy appears to be an important factor that triggers decentralization” (Brillantes and Flores 2012, 295). This was seen in the Philippines in the advent of the 1986 People Power with the ouster of Marcos. The Corazon Aquino Administration (1986–1992) adopted

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the “Policy Agenda for a People Oriented Development” which “states that the role and structure of government will be guided by the key organizational principles of, among others, decentralization” (De Guzman et al. 1988, 237). This saw the need “to institutionalize the grassroots by devolving power from the center to local governments” (Hutchcroft 2010, 442). The Policy Agenda laid down the following decentralization measures for adoption by the government (De Guzman et al. 1988, 237): 1. The strengthening of the regional and local levels through the devolution of more powers and functions to the lower units; 2. the strengthening of regional organization units as the focal points for promoting and coordinating regional and local development; 3. the reinforcement of local autonomy through the actual transfer of the power of national programs implemented at the local level; 4. the strengthening of the capabilities of the regional development councils which shall be given sufficient authority to coordinate the formulation and implementation of plans at the regional level; 5. the continuous upgrading of planning capabilities through the recruitment of qualified technical staff and the training of existing personnel to increase technical competence; and 6. the active involvement of the people through community organizations and non-governmental organizations in the planning and implementation process. These measures are embodied in Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (1991 LGC) which was viewed as “a decentralization effort that came forth from the mandate of the 1987 Constitution” (Hutchcroft 2010, 442). For Brillantes (1994, 41), the enactment of the 1991 LGC “was a culmination of the long and arduous struggle for autonomy among the local government units in the country” to counteract the highly centralized politico-administrative system, whereby most decisions were made in “imperial Manila”, where financial resources were also concentrated (Brillantes 1994, 41). Results of this were “waste, inefficiency, red tape, and even corruption resulting in the general unresponsiveness of the system that thrived on maintaining the dependency of local structures upon the central government” (Brillantes 1994, 41). Thus, a positive effect of the 1991 LGC was to produce

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a policy and legal framework which “enabled the local governments to respond to the demands of rapidly changing environment, and in fact, provide opportunities for innovations in the local level” (Brillantes 2017, 46). Moreover, the chief motivation behind decentralization is to make the government more responsive to local and regional development. It brings government closer to the people, making it more accountable with sufficient autonomy that would enable them to steer local development better than the central government. (Araral et al. 2017, 2)

Batario (2001, 15), further adds that the 1991 LGC was expected to shift the onus for countryside development from bureaucrats and congressmen to mayors and governors. With local autonomy and greater self-sufficiency, local leaders could spend time in their communities. The influence of the congressmen would decline, no longer would there be a great need for local officials to approach their legislators for pork barrel, projects, endorsements, clearances, assistance in dealing with line agencies and other favors. It could mark the decline of the traditional patronage system.

At the same time, the 1991 LGC was viewed to have brought about strong leadership at the local level which had positive effects on decentralization. Examples of these were city mayors Jesse Robredo of Naga and Bayani Fernando of Marikina (Brillantes 2017, 46). The 1991 LGC is also viewed as “the enabling law that transferred power, authority, and responsibility over certain government functions from the national (central) to local government units” (Araral et al. 2017, 1). The Code also provided for “a lot of changes in terms of national-local relations and intergovernmental relations although it retained the basic structures of local government” (Tapales et al. 1996, 7). The 1991 LGC defines local government as a “political subdivision of a nation or a state constituted by law, which has substantial control over local affairs including the power to impose taxes, the governing body of which is elected or appointed” (Batario 2001, 7). As for the barangay, this constitutes the smallest political unit in the country’s system of governance (Batario 2001, 7). Panganiban (1995, 124) notes that there are “two parallel independent streams of devolution” which “provide new

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opportunities for making local self-government a reality, both in partnership with national government and other institutions; and within local government itself”. “The first stream includes the transfer of services and functions from national government agencies to local governments” while the second stream “refers to enhancement of local government power and authority” (Panganiban 1995, 124). Taking these into consideration, the 1991 LGC contains five features (Atienza 2006, 427; Brillantes 1994, 43; Miral 2017a, 31–32; Panganiban 1995, 124–129): 1. The Code devolves or transfers the responsibility for the delivery of various aspects of basic services to local governments. The most significant devolved services include health, agriculture, environment and natural resources, social services, and public works funded by local funds. 2. The Code transfers regulatory and licensing powers to local governments. These include reclassification of agricultural lands, enforcement of environmental laws, inspection of food products and quarantine, among others. 3. It increases the financial resources available to LGUs by broadening their taxing powers and providing them with a specific share from the national wealth exploited in their area (e.g., mining, fishery, and forestry). The Code also increases the elbow room for LGUs to generate revenues from fees and charges. 4. It lays down the policy framework for the direct involvement of civil society, most especially nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and people’s organizations (POs), in the process of local governance—in other words, some degree of de-bureaucratization. 5. The Code authorizes local government to finance capital investments. As Atienza (2006, 429) notes, the Code encourages LGUs to be more entrepreneurial by providing them with opportunities to enter into joint ventures with the private sector, engage in build-operate-transfer (BOT) arrangements, float bonds, obtain loans from local private institutions and the like. All of these are within the context of encouraging LGUs to be more “business-like” and competitive in their operations.

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Tigno (2017, 11) further adds that the 1991 LGC gives local governments the authority to decide on matters pertaining to public works, health services, social welfare and development, tourism development, telecommunications, environmental protection and management, and agricultural extension, among many others, within their jurisdiction. Likewise, they are also given their own regulatory powers to reclassify geographical areas within their jurisdictions, grant business licenses and permits accept foreign grants, grant tax exemptions, encourage cooperative undertakings with civil society or with the private business sector, among others.

As for education, which by law should receive the biggest budgetary allocation, this remains a national government function. “The only education-related function devolved to local governments is school building maintenance. Education policies, including curricula and qualifications and selections of teachers, are prescribed by the Department of Education. Teachers and other education workers, regardless of locality, are employees of the Department” (Miral 2017a, 31). In terms of its other governance features, the LGC empowers people’s organizations and civil society, making local governments more transparent and accountable through special or sectoral representation in local bodies, mandatory consultations with communities affected by local as well as national policies and programs, recall against erring local government officials, and the power of the people to directly propose, enact, repeal, or amend any local ordinance through the power of local initiative. (Tigno 2017, 11)

In terms of electoral participation, the 1991 LGC allows a wide latitude of participation by the electorate in the selection of local leadership, as it was in the past (Panganiban 1995, 130). Thus, for Brillantes (1994, 42), “the decentralization of government is one fundamental strategy to encourage active people’s participation in the development process (within the context of empowerment) toward the general objective of making government more responsive to the people”. By doing this, Brillantes (1994, 42) argues that “the provision of basic services to the people would not only be adequate but responsive and relevant as well”. The 1991 LGC and the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). “To enable local governments to carry out their functions, the Code vested

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them with additional taxing powers and higher shares in the internal tax revenues of the national government” (Miral 2017a, 32). Furthermore, “it increased the IRA from 11 percent to 40 percent” (Miral 2017a, 32, Batario 2001, 19). The IRA is the annual share of local governments out of the proceeds from the national internal revenue taxes based on the gross collection for the third fiscal year (Panganiban 1995, 125–126). Each level of local government, e.g., province, city, municipality, and barangay, gets a separate allotment, which is stated in the 1991 LGC through a sharing formula. A part of the allotment must be allocated to local development projects (Araral et al. 2017, xvii). Hutchcroft (2010, 445) considers this as the most important provision of the Code as this 40% includes all the internal revenues to be given to all LGUs. “For most LGUs, this is their main source of funds, which they use to finance the delivery of public services” (Brillantes and Flores 2012, 304). By 2019, the Supreme Court would further increase the base of the national tax allotment shares of LGUs from the national government through the Mandanas-Garcia ruling, i.e. aside from the IRA, LGUs will now have a share in all national taxes. In addition to the IRA, the Code entitled local governments to a share in the gross collection of the national government from taxes and proceeds derived by any government agency or government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) in connection with the utilization and development of natural resources in their territorial jurisdictions. Capuno (2017, 99) thus points out that the 1991 LGC is viewed as “the law that underlies the country’s fiscal decentralization”. The important features of the 1991 LGC on governance discussed above are rooted in the general sections which define the overall nature of the LGC of 1991. These are contained in Book I of the General Provisions of the Code, of which are the following (see also Tapales 1993; Tapales et al. 1996; Legaspi and Cabo 1996; Sayos et al. 2002; Legaspi 1996; Batario 2001) (see Annex I). Delivery of social services. The 1991 LGC’s sections mentioned in Annex I which deal with enhancing social service delivery at the local level, highlights “the need of the government to effectively and efficiently deliver basic services and facilities to the people” (Go 2001, 211). This was a recognition by the national government “that LGUs are in a better position to identify and respond more efficiently to the most basic needs of their constituencies” (Go 2001, 211). As noted by Araral et al. (2017, xvi), the 1991 LGC gave the LGUs “the capacity to devise their own

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method of providing basic public services to their constituents, which are listed in the law itself and authorizing more discretionary powers in various areas of governance”. Go also noted that most of the service delivery functions are assigned to the cities and municipalities. This is because the city and the municipality serve primarily as generally purpose governments and are therefore responsible for the coordination and delivery of basic, regular, and direct services. (Go 2001, 215)

These basic services include the following areas: agriculture, health, social services, public works, tourism, school building program, and environment and natural resources (Batario 2001, 20; Tapales 1993, 11) as well as low-cost housing (Sayos et al. 2002, 127). What is also emphasized in these sections is the institutionalization of the role of NGOs in the delivery of basic services. As Tapales noted (1993, 21), the 1991 LGC recognizes the active role NGOs have had in the past, especially during the Marcos years when they supplemented the efforts of the government in the delivery of such basic services such as health, education, and welfare. Moreover, Tapales (1993, 21) highlights the sectoral representation in the local legislative councils and local special bodies concerned with social service delivery which the 1991 LGC accords to women and special groups as well as NGOs and POs. Urban development. As regards the 1991 LGC and urban development, Tapales et al. (1998, 187) pointed out that the “case of a pro-active Philippine local government involvement in economic development has taken root as decentralization paved the way for greater local authority to create intervention schemes in land use and management, infrastructure, finance and services”. With regard to the 1991 LGC’s sections on urban development, importance is placed on the establishment of Local Development Councils (LDCs) which play a key role in this aspect. As noted by Legaspi (1996, 42–3), the functions of the LDC are the following: “1) Formulate the medium-term and annual public investment program; 2) Appraise and prioritize socio-economic development programs and projects; 3) Formulate local investment, incentives to promote the inflow and direction of private investment capital; and 4). Coordinate, monitor, and evaluate the implementation of development programs and projects”. Legaspi (1996, 28) further elaborates that this provision

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allows the LGUs to consolidate and integrate their resources and efforts in constructing an infrastructure facility for economic development purposes. This would make up for the inadequate resources of each LGU which constrain their efforts in generating more economic activities in the local areas.

The above are important factors of development in a community as this “can be largely controlled and influenced by local government by virtue of its broadly controlled and defined policy-making administrative, and regulatory powers over a large spectrum of activities” (Panganiban 1998, 260). These include the use of its land “available to local government in pursuit of its economic development” (Panganiban 1998, 262) and infrastructure “which has always been one of the top priorities of local government” (Panganiban 1998, 266). With regard to the latter, infrastructure investments of some local governments “are now wisely allocated by including not only essential services which cater solely to household or residential needs, but also growth-oriented and productive programmes” (Panganiban 1998, 267). All of these would need a “sound fiscal system that stems from rational design, allocation and mobilization of resources…” (Panganiban 1998, 273). Like in social services delivery, emphasis is also placed on inter-local cooperation by LGUs to advance urban development in their communities. LGUs, in general, are deemed “responsible for many of the public goods and services that are viewed as essential inputs to economic development” (Panganiban 1998, 274). “Based on the arguments of economic efficiency, local government should perform these functions since they are better adapted to local needs and their benefits accrue to local inhabitants” (Panganiban 1998, 274). This is of utmost importance in addressing urban growth happening in cities where half of the population live (Mehta and Buendia 2004, 9). Moreover, although public expenditures in urban areas have been increasing, this is spent more on public infrastructure and irrigation projects and less on social infrastructures and services (Mehta and Buendia 2004, 9). Sections in the 1991 LGC mentioned above highlight “the importance of the linking up of LGUs with NGOs or the private sector in the planning and prosecution of economic projects as seen in the various partnership schemes with the NGOs and the private sector” (Legaspi 1996, 28). Another dimension of the Code which puts emphasis on the

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importance of community organizations is their participation in livelihood or enterprise projects (Legaspi 1996, 28). Of importance is also to involve the urban poor in this endeavor as they are very much involved in the informal economy and contribute substantially to the national gross domestic product (Mehta and Buendia 2004, 10). Local participation and local governance in the 1991 LGC, for Gonzalez et al. (2001, 133), therefore “are not mutually exclusive and can go hand-in-hand in promoting urban decentralization… under a decentralized framework”. In this kind of situation, LGUs are given full opportunities for social mobilization and participation and control (Gonzalez et al. 2001, 133). Tapales et al. (1996, 25) and Legaspi (1996) also have taken note that LGUs may partner with POs, NGOs, and the private sector to facilitate rural industrialization. Such partnerships have indeed taken place “with increased citizen engagement in local development processes”. This was also largely facilitated by making civil society institutions, NGOs and POs as formal members of local special bodies (Brillantes 2017, 47).

4 Continuing Challenges to the Local Government Code of 1991 It is for all these above-mentioned reasons that the LGC of 1991 has been cited as increasing the country’s democratization and development from below. It brings forth an expanded meaning of democratization in relation to “developing alternative mechanisms for the delivery of basic services traditionally undertaken by its bureaucratic organizations” (de Guzman and Reform 1998, 23). There are, however, still formidable challenges in the implementation of the 1991 LGC such as the deterioration of the quality of public services. This is blamed on two factors. One is the “unfunded mandates of local governments brought about by inadequate financial transfers from the center” and the other is “a lack of manpower and technical capacity of local governments because of the centre’s failure to transfer expertise and personnel” (Brillantes and Flores 2012, 308).

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Inadequate financing of decentralization. An Asian Development Bank (ADB) study1 revealed that “there continues to be inadequate finance to cover the costs of devolution” (Brillantes 2017, 49). Panganiban (1995, 126) also observed that the “allocation formula has an urban bias and therefore tends to favor cities because of their large population”. Such a situation is aggravated with the centralization of government resources which brings forth a “common resource pool of problems that contribute to weak government accountability and operational efficiency, corruption and patronage politics” (Miral 2017b, 140). What is needed as observed is to give more taxing powers to “local governments that would make them more fiscally autonomous and accountable for their actions” instead of “just increasing their share of central government transfers” (Miral 2017b, 265). Such a situation has rendered a weak local revenue autonomy and a high level of IRA dependency. As further observed, “local revenue autonomy has deteriorated with the implementation of the 1991 LGC in case of both cities and municipalities” (Manasan 2017, 49). In general, therefore, development efforts are stymied by inadequate financial resources. As noted, there are good projects but these remain on paper because the local unit is unable to finance them. This is despite “the increased shares of the LGUs from the national government collection of nationally imposed taxes or the internal revenue allotments (IRA)” (Legaspi and Cabo 1996, 164). As observed, the 1991 LGC failed to commensurately decentralize control over public finances and/or revenue raising powers to the subnational levels. Planning and administration were decentralized to the regions, but budgeting decisions have remained largely with the central offices of national government agencies. (Miral 2017a, 42)

The limited amount of resources under local government control has thus undermined local autonomy. This situation is aggravated by the fact that when the national government directly provides services already devolved to local governments according to the former’s own priorities, then

1 ADB commissioned an In-Depth Study of Decentralization for the Department of Interior and Local Government (Brillantes 2017, 45).

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provides assistance or transfers to local governments based on its own discretion, it is effectively exercising control over local governments. The adage that there can be no genuine local autonomy without fiscal autonomy cannot be truer than in this case. (Miral 2017a, 42)

Lack of competent human resources at the local level. Atienza (2006, 433) links the lack of competent human resources with the bureaucratic shortcomings which hinder LGUs from benefitting more from the IRA which is transferred to them by the national government. Atienza (2006, 433) points out the following instances: (1) local officials are not able to spend the LGUs’ resources efficiently, adversely affecting basic services like health and social services; and (2) because local government employees are devolved from national agencies, they do not have the experience in working in a local environment which contributes to bureaucratic inertia. In relation to this, LGU officials and employees may also lack the capability to undertake new functions and services. The nature of the IRA is also characterized by the unequal distribution of financial resources whereby “municipalities are having more financial difficulties compared to provinces and cities”. In these areas, chances are “nontraditional and well-intentioned local officials may not be able to do a lot at once because some areas are simply too small or too poor to have surplus resources to invest” (Atienza 2006, 433). This situation is not also helped by the fact that permanent national staff who have been turned over by the national government to local governments had a higher salary scale than their local counterparts. This created a politically volatile situation in the local governments. There were also instances when national employees were unwilling to transfer (Panganiban 1995, 126). Local governments also did not welcome these national employees who saw them as inept, incompetent, and inappropriate for the positions some of which the former viewed as redundant (Panganiban 1995, 126). Aggravating this situation was “the lack and variety of local government capacities” which has rendered devolution “difficult for the traditional organizational structure to function efficiently and effectively” (Panganiban 1995, 126). Thus, the existing technical and financial capacities of LGUs cannot cope with the requirements of local economic development. Many LGUs lack competent

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and qualified personnel to undertake the various tasks of economic promotion. They do not also have enough financial resources to conduct promotional and marketing activities to attract inward investments. (Legaspi 1996, 73; Legaspi and Cabo 1996, 165)

As Legaspi (1996, 73) notes, it “is in this context that the national government has to play an active role. It has to strengthen the capabilitybuilding efforts to mobilize LGUs for economic promotion. Aside from this, it has to provide the needed support mechanisms to enable the LGUs to perform their role well”. National constraints on fiscal decentralization. Unfortunately, it has been observed that in general, “national budgeting continues to be inefficient by still favoring national agencies despite the devolution of substantial responsibilities, personnel, and facilities to LGUs” (Atienza 2006, 433). The central government agencies, for example, continue to receive and control larger financial allocation from the national budget (von Einsiedel 2002, 26). Furthermore, the central government believes that it must have the responsibility for income redistribution programs and must control a large share of taxes and public expenditures (von Einsiedel 2002, 28; Miral 2017b). LGUs are also “expected to provide budgetary support, in the form of either additional personnel benefits or outlays for maintenance of other operating expenditures to many central government agencies operating at the local level like the police, fire protection bureaus, local courts…” (Manasan 2017, 43). Thus, a continuing complaint of local executives are the “so-called ‘unfunded mandates’ wherein plans drafted by national agencies are supposed to be implemented by local government units without the corresponding budget” (Batario 2001, 22). There is also the reality that the President exercises general supervision over LGUs through the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG). Local government officials are also held accountable through the many bodies created by the national government (Tapales et al. 1996, 12). This has brought instances which has made the IRA “as a fund transfer from the national government… as vulnerable to national constraints and changing priorities”. This was seen during the Ramos Administration (1992–1998) when the LGUs’ IRA was cut by five percent due to the Asian financial crisis (Atienza 2006, 433). In the case of the Estrada Administration (1998–2001), it withheld five percent of the IRA and when it was finally released in December 1998, “the money

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was used as a carrot to rally local governments around Congress and the administration” (Batario 2001, 22). In terms of the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs from the national government, although the 1991 LGC gives the former “vastly improved powers and responsibilities”, Batario (2001, 22) noted that the latter continues to retain supervisory power of the LGUs. This is most seen when the national government’s “plans or programs influence decision-making at the local level” (Batario 2001, 22). Aggravating this situation is that “the national government institutions still continue to dominate in the allocation of resources” (Atienza 2006, 433). A reason for this is that a decentralized system is less likely than a centralized system to address inequalities among regions. That is, in a decentralized system, the local jurisdiction would collect all taxes and undertake all expenditures on behalf of its residents. By contrast, a centralized system would redistribute income from richer areas to poorer ones, even under regressive tax and expenditure systems. (von Einsiedel 2002, 29)

This brings forth the reality that the central government has not completely shed off its policy-making powers. Through comprehensive planning at the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), the central government still determines the program for the entire government. Because of this, such a situation often forces local governments to realign their budgets, not to mention their development priorities, according to the wishes of the national government. A reason for this is the view that “a decentralized system makes macroeconomic policies more difficult to implement” (von Einsiedel 2002, 29). Such a conflict could be minimized if national planning is complemented by planning at the local level through the LDCs. Brillantes (2017, 43) argues that it is pertinent “to clarify the specific powers, functions, authorities of various levels of government”. Moreover, this should be complemented by capacity building “not only of local government officials, but of national officials as well” (Brillantes 2017, 44). Aggravating this situation is the lack of coordination between the central and local governments in their pursuit of regional development. This has resulted in “duplication and misallocation of scarce resources” (Brillantes and Flores 2012, 310). As further noted by Manasan (2017, 43), national government-local government relations are currently “weighed down by the over lapping, and at times,

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unclear assignment of functions across various levels of government (i.e., among the national governments and the different levels of LGUs), which tends to result in the waste of resources”. Nevertheless, these unfunded mandates can therefore be considered as threats to autonomy because they impinge on fiscal autonomy, thus hamstringing genuine development efforts at the local level (Batario 2001, 22). Brillantes (2017, 43) also pointed out that there is a need to complement fiscal decentralization and revenue generation with local governments becoming entrepreneurial and creative in generating financial resources. The reality, therefore, is that LGUs still have to conform to their shifting role from a delivery mechanism of basic services to that of an “entrepreneur”, which is tasked “to generate more economic activities in the local communities in order to develop the local economy” (Legaspi and Cabo 1996, 167). Linking the national and the local through the regional development councils. In addressing the need to link national and local development plans and to generate local investments, the Regional Development Council (RDC) plays a crucial role. This is because the RDC has as an important bearing on the integration of economic plans among provinces, independent component cities, and highly urbanized cities in the region. The approved plan represents a comprehensive package of economic projects or investment programs to be implemented in the whole region. In other words, this regional structure performs a significant role in providing the linkages among levels of LGUs in the whole region (Legaspi 1996, 55). Beyond its role as integrating mechanism for development plans, it exercises a more detailed job of coordination, monitoring and evaluation of socio-economic development plans and investment programs and undertakes the appraisal and prioritization of nationally-funded programs and projects; promotes and monitors the inflow and allocation of private investment capital in the region, consistent with development objectives, strategies, and policies adopted; reviews and approves the annual and multi-year regional infrastructure programs and other sectoral programs, which require appropriation of national government funds; reviews and recommends to the national government the allocation of agency regional budgetary ceiling among the provinces and cities in the region; and coordinates the implementation of programs and projects in the region which involve several agencies and LGUs in their implementation. (Legaspi 1996, 55)

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A limitation of the RDC is that statutorily, there is no regional budget preparation under its auspices for the implementation of the regional development plan and investment program. The mandate of the RDC is limited to reviewing and endorsing the budget proposals of the regional offices of national government agencies for the approval of the agency central offices… The substance of regional budgets is thus determined independently of RDCs, and regional budgets are expended by national government agencies.. … the reality is that they do not have control or power over regional budgets. (Miral 2017a, 23)

Furthermore, although “RDCs are mandated to set the direction for and coordinate all economic and social development efforts in the region” (Miral 2017a, 23), the “central office of national government agencies retains the stronger, or the only influence in the prioritization, allocation, and fund releases relevant to regional projects”. Therefore, the budgeting system, although “regionalized” in essence, is actually “agency-based rather than area-based” (Miral 2017a, 23). RDCs can only provide inputs and do not have control or power over regional budgets, raising doubts on the usefulness of the regional development and investment programming exercise that they are tasked to coordinate. ... Projects for implementation in the regions reflect the preferences and priorities of these central offices, rather than those of the localities in the region. (Miral 2017a, 23)

Decentralization and patronage politics. Batario (2001, 15), noted that the 1991 LGC was viewed to “help change the culture of dependency as it will enable governors and mayors to have authority over the delivery of basic services”. Furthermore, as pointed out by Atienza (2006, 433), the positive side of this is that it gives “greater authority and resources to a range of local politicians” who can pursue genuine agenda of democratic reform, usually in alliance with civil society organizations”. But as Atienza observed, it will be a problem if these politicians “seek merely to entrench their control of local authoritarian enclaves” (Atienza 2006, 433). Hutchcroft (2010, 443) agrees with the latter view that the 1991 LGC is viewed as “a mere slicing of the patronage pie in favor of governors, city mayors, town mayors and barangay captains”. This can be attributed to the increase of the IRA to the LGUs which

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has “strengthened the position of local politicians vis-à-vis congresspersons” (Hutchcroft 2010, 443). As noted by Budd (2000, 21), in some provinces, decentralization merely meant a new circle of political and economic elites plundering the local government for their “particularistic interests” and doling out contracts to their friends and relatives (Budd 2000, 21; see also Atienza 2006, 432; Araral et al. 2017, 47; Batario 2001, 8). With regard to civil society participation in local governance, politicians have also been known to set up their own NGOs (Brillantes 2017, 47). Aggravating this situation is despite 30 years of the 1991 LGC, what has emerged is weak governance and the dominance of traditional politics as epitomized by “guns, goons and gold” (Banaag et al. 2017, 93). Adding to the issue of decentralization and patronage politics is that LGUs, just as other agencies, are subject to oversight by the national legislature. Congress provides appropriations for programs and “pork barrel” for local projects (Tapales et al. 1996, 12). A problem which has emerged is the decision on how to use funds for public services from the national budget given to the LGUs; they are made by “national government officials and politicians who are clearly less informed of local priorities. Moreover, common pool resource properties of the national government budget have been conveniently capitalized on to buy political support of local officials and certain groups and individuals in society” (Miral 2017a, 36). Aggravating this situation is the lack of political commitment or will to implement economic development projects on the part of the local political leadership (Legaspi 1996, 45). Civil society relations with LGUs. Hopes have been placed on the role of civil society organizations (CSOs), through stipulations in the 1991 LGC, to be a bulwark against patronage politics at the local level. Atienza (2006, 432), however, observed that while the Philippines has a vibrant civil society and media nationally, their local presence is uneven. In many parts of the country, for instance, the number of NGOs is still insufficient to fill available places on local special bodies or even to meet the more traditional demand for NGO partners for “pork barrel” programs originating from Congress.

This may also be because some animosities and mistrust continue to exist between the LGUs and NGOs (Legaspi 1996, 43). As further

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elaborated by Tapales et al. (1996, 26), although “mistrust has been gradually overcome as cases of successful LGU-NGO ventures—in community organizing, resource mobilization and project management and implementation—proliferated”, there is limited data as to how the NGO representatives actually function inside LGU systems. It was further noted that provisions for representation of civil society organizations had not always been implemented, that local development councils and other bodies were often ineffective, and that local youth councils were frequently dominated by the children of the political elite. (May 2007, 174; see Turner 1999 as cited in Tigno 2017, 11)

5 Proposed Federalism Structure to Address Limitations to the Local Government Code of 19912 As seen therefore, thirty years since the enactment of the 1991 LGC, a gamut of problems continue to hound decentralization efforts of LGUs. Three overarching themes of this situation are the continued need to address the inefficient and ineffective delivery of social services, the persistence of inequalities in development between the national government and the LGUs as well as among LGUs and the lack of human resources and technical capacity of local governments to carry on the tasks of service delivery and urban development. These are among the issues and concerns, along with the need to address regional inequalities and to recognize socio-cultural, ethnic and identity differences, particularly in the Muslim areas in the South, that made the move for a federal form of government garner some national support led by no less than Philippine President Duterte, who made federalism one of his campaign promises in 2016. In fact, the President through an executive order in 2016 created the Consultative Committee to Review the 1987 Constitution, though he 2 This section is based on Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem’s Executive Summary for the research project of the University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP CIDS), the Department of Interior and Local Government-National Capital Region (DILG-NCR), and the Office of the Quezon City Mayor on “The Administrative Region of the Republic of the Philippines: A Study on the Implications of Federalism in the National Capital Region and Considerations for Forming the Federal Administrative Region”.

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only appointed members in 2018. The Consultative Committee came out with “Power to the People, Bayanihan Federalism, Power to the Regions: Draft Constitution for a Strong, Indissoluble Republic” (2019). This document contained a number of proposals which specifically address the issues of social service delivery and urban development which are the focus of this book. The pertinent articles and their corresponding sections of the so-called draft Bayanihan Constitution are in Annex II. The draft Bayanihan Constitution also reflects the relevant articles and sections of the Local Government Code of 1991 in the former’s Article II which contains the Declaration of Principles and State Policies. This emphasizes the importance of alleviating poverty in the country by providing adequate social services and employment with emphasis on the promotion of “social justice in all phases of national development” (Consultative Committee 2019, 6). These principles are further spelled out in Article III: Bill of Rights, B. Social and Economic Rights which highlights the importance of every person’s right to adequate food, complete and quality education, and decent housing and livelihood employment opportunities (Consultative Committee 2019, 13). Also, under Article III is the issue of promoting a “healthy environment and a balanced ecology…” (Consultative Committee 2019, 13), which is also a vital concern of the LGC of 1991. These concerns are further elaborated in the following articles: (1) Articles XII on the distribution of powers of the government whereby Section 1 enumerates the exclusive power of the Federal Government and Section 2 elaborates on the exclusive power of the Federated Region; and (2) Article XVI on social justice which makes special reference to urban land reform and housing and the role and rights of POs. The issue of taxation, which is the key source of financial empowerment of local governments, is spelled out in Article VII, Section 28. This is also tackled under the draft Bayanihan Constitution’s Article XIII: Fiscal Powers and Financial Administration. What is understandably absent from the 1991 LGC is reference to two federated regions, i.e., the Bangsamoro and Cordilleras as stated in Article XI, as their creation in the current Philippine unitary system is covered by legislative organic acts in accordance with the 1987 Constitution. As observed “in designing the federal system for the Philippines, special attention should be given to the special and unique identity and character of the indigenous peoples’ and our cultural minorities” (Brillantes 2017, 52). As noted by Bacani (2017, 83), federalism may help

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to address the Bangsamoro issue if it brings forth an asymmetric structure of governance and if federalism is used as a tool “to implement and not subvert peace agreements” that have been forged between the Bangsamoro and the Philippine government. With regard to the overarching framework of national economy and patrimony, this is covered by Article XV of the proposed Bayanihan Federalism Constitution (Consultative Committee 2019) which makes references to areas of concerns also articulated in the 1991 LGC of which are the following: (1) equitable distribution of income; (2) development of natural resources; (3) use of land water and resources; (4) local ownership of educational systems; (5) the viability of cooperatives “as instruments for social justice and economic development” (p. 83); (6) the relationship of national development agencies with the federated regions and the private sector in the area of development; and (7) the establishment of a central monetary authority to provide for national policy direction. These concerns which have been raised by the draft Bayanihan Constitution have been complemented by other proposals for federalism which include one from President Duterte’s political party, the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban) through its PDP Laban Federalism Institute. The Institute has come out with its proposal for a federal form of government entitled Proposed Amendments to the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: The Constitution of the Federal Republic of the Philippines.3 The document seeks to highlight what it perceives are the disadvantages of the current unitary system which prevents the further decentralization of power to the local levels (Malaya 2017b, 217). For the PDP Laban Model of Philippine Federalism (PLMPF) 1.0, if a unitary system of government is to remain, the concentration of political and economic power will remain in the “center”, i.e., Metro Manila and the nearby areas, i.e., Central Luzon and the CALABARZON (Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon) (Malaya 2017b, 217). For the PDP-Laban, the objectives of federalism are the following: 1. Involving the regions in national decision-making;

3 For further discussion on the PDP Laban Model of Philippine Federalism vis-à-vis the Bayanihan Constitution for Federalism, see Chapter 3 (Gomez et al.).

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2. Accelerating the economic development of regions; 3. Achieving “Peace in Mindanao”; and 4. Allowing the preservation of the culture and language of the various ethno-linguistic groups of the country (PDP Laban Federal Institute 2017). In terms of addressing the issues of political dynasties,4 the federalism agenda should address the “main problem of patronage politics and put in place a more effective mechanism that could at the minimum manage the distortion of society caused by the dominance of the elites in both politics and economy” (Tayao 2017, 69). Proponents of federalism, therefore, sees it as a means by which to break up the over-concentration of political power. Casiple (2017, 134) notes, for example, that federalism can address the great political power that is vested in the president under a unitary system of government. This, he argues, has “undermined the constitutional intent to develop participative democracy and decentralize power to the national peripheries”. To also further enhance participative democracy, Brillantes (2017, 50) argues that under a federal system, it is pertinent to clearly define the roles and responsibilities between and among the different layers of government” (Brillantes 2017, 50). Together with this is taking into account the “critical role of capacity building for federalism” (Brillantes 2017, 51). Unfortunately for federalism supporters, the federalism promise of the President and his administration stopped during the midpoint of Duterte’s term. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the President’s own allies in Congress did not support the draft Bayanihan Constitution. There are many possible reasons why charter change and the federalism plan was abandoned. These include the President’s own economic managers arguing against the shift due to the economic costs; lack of support even among allies in both Houses of Congress that are supposedly dominated by a “super majority” or coalition of parties behind the President; the possible loss of momentum of full federalism due to the passage of the

4 “Political dynasties are “members of the same family that have occupied the same

post in the past or have spread to different elected positions. The pervasiveness of these dynasties could vary from province to province, depending on how people from the same family are currently occupying elected posts at present or how many of them have ‘passed on’ their posts by letting another member run for office after a family member’s term expires” (Banaag et al. 2017, 94).

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Bangsamoro Organic Law in 2018 that created a stronger autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the holding of a plebiscite that approved the new law which paved the way for a transition government in the region; and the lack of public support and awareness of federalism despite the huge budget allotted for the federalism campaign (Atienza 2020, 133). With the President’s public statements that federalism will not happen during his administration, those still pushing for changes in centrallocal relations within the national administration shifted their strategy. The inter-agency task force the President created and headed by the DILG shifted on what they consider as “surgical amendments” to the 1987 Constitution. By the end of 2019, they presented to Congress the following suggested amendments to the 1987 Constitution, particularly in Article X (Local Governments), as well as in the LGC of 1991 (Atienza, 2019, 2020, 133–134; “Task Force CORE” 2019), among others: 1. Expansion of the base of the IRA or the share of LGUs from the national government following the 2018 and 2019 decisions of the Supreme Court (Mandanas-Garcia ruling) to include shares not just from internal revenue collections but other national collections; 2. Reformulating the distribution of the IRA to various levels of LGUs, balancing local needs with LGU performance based on national standards; 3. Strengthening regional development councils by transforming them into regional development authorities with more powers and funding; and 4. Other political reforms related to more successful devolution, like strengthening political parties, prohibiting the usual practice of political turncoats who shift from one party to another so easily, making the Constitution’s anti-dynasty provision self-executing, creating a democracy fund for campaign finance reform, and extending the term of local government officials from three to five years, with only one consecutive reelection. However, while the House of Representatives started deliberating on these amendments in early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic and various degrees of quarantine or lockdown were imposed in the whole country, prompting the DILG, Congress, and various government agencies at

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different levels to prioritize responding to the pandemic and putting on hold discussions of these proposed amendments. Nevertheless, the array of reforms considered by the Duterte administration can still be evaluated in terms of usefulness to improving decentralization, local governance, and Metro Manila governance specifically. To reiterate what we mentioned in Chapter 1, reforms can still be discussed for the future and should not be the monopoly of a single administration.

6

Issues and Concerns for Responsible Local Governance in Metro Manila

Taking into consideration the provisions set forth by the 1991 LGC in empowering LGUs as well as the challenges the Code confronts which the proposed system of federalism seeks to address, the challenge of empowering responsible local governance in Metro Manila or NCR is of utmost importance. This is given that Metro Manila has the “distinction of being the economic, social, cultural, educational and political center of the nation” (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 44). Those pushing for a federal form of government argue that a unitary form has brought about a lopsided kind of economic progress and development whereby Metro Manila, Central Luzon, and Southern Tagalog produce 62% of the country’s GDP. It was also noted that the provinces closest to NCR have the lowest poverty incidence, also pointing to Metro Manila’s poverty incidence rate which is a low 3.9% (Pimentel 2017, 20). Thus, efforts such as these will definitely be looked at as a template by which other LGUs in other regions will seek to emulate. 6.1

Background on the Evolution of Metro Manila5

Caoili (1985, 1) argues that although “metropolitan reorganization is traditionally viewed in terms of solving the technical and administrative problem of service delivery, i.e., economy and efficiency in the provision of housing…”, understanding the problems of urbanization has to be understood in the context of the broader problems of national 5 For further details of the administrative historical evolution of Metro Manila to a National Capital Region, see Chapter 3 (Gomez et al.). Please also see Caoili (1999) which provides an extensive political and social analysis of the origins of Metro Manila.

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development and politics. Historically, Caoili (1999, 63) points out that “Manila’s urban growth and dominance was shaped by the convergence of geographic, economic, social and political factors in the Philippines colonial history”. Under colonial rule, Manila’s growth was viewed at “the expense of the hinterland and its own internal development was constrained by the fact that it also served as a means for pumping our surplus abroad” (Caoili 1999, 65). (See Chapter 3, Gomez et al. for the colonial historical evolution of Manila.) This brought forth a dependent development aggravated by the “concentration of political and economic power and the pervasiveness of clientelist, particularistic politics” (Caoili 1999, 154). A result of this was the perpetuation of “rural underdevelopment and the further concentration of wealth and economic activities in Manila and it surrounding area” (Caoili 1999, 154). Furthermore, there was “the continuing emphasis of agricultural production for export, and rural underdevelopment” (Caoili 1985, 4). The result of this was “a widening gap in income distribution and living standards between elite and the masses, between rural and urban areas, and among geographic regions” (Caoili 1985, 4). Rapid population growth and “the perception of better job opportunities in the urban areas, particularly in Manila, coupled with rural unrest and underdevelopment, resulted in the acceleration of rural to urban migration in the postwar years” (Caoili 1985, 4). It was under this context that Metro Manila or NCR emerged as a metropolis. This was unlike the experience of the other LGUs (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 44). Such a structure of governance was viewed to be needed to address issues and concerns brought about by rapid growth and urbanization needing reforms in government administration. As Caoili (1999, 2) points out, the concept of urbanization “commonly refers to the growth of population concentrations, i.e., the development of towns and cities”. Metro Manila is located in the southwestern portion of Luzon, directly below Central Luzon. It is bounded by the province of Bulacan in the north, the Sierra Madre mountains and Laguna de Bay in the east, Manila Bay in the west, and the provinces of Cavite and Laguna in the south (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 256). It is currently composed of 16 cities (the city of Manila, Quezon City, Caloocan, Las Piñas, Makati, Malabon, Mandaluyong, Marikina, Muntinlupa, Navotas, Parañaque,

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Pasay, Pasig, San Juan, Taguig, and Valenzuela) as well as the municipality of Pateros (https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-d& q=Metro+Manila+Cities). Its land area is 619.6 square kilometers with a population of 24,100,000 (https://www.google.com/search?client=fir efox-b-d&q=Metro+Manila+land+area). Mercado and Manasan (2002, 261) note the following important historical junctures in the history of Metro Manila: In the immediate post-war period, urban development radiated from the city of Manila, which has been the administrative, economic, educational and social center since the colonial period, and situated northwards to Caloocan City and southwards to Pasay City. In the late 1950s and 1960s, the development of government housing projects in Quezon City emerged as well as the private sector development of Makati as financial, commercial and residential center.

The 1960s saw the intensification of industrial and residential development of Navotas, Malabon, and Valenzuela, followed by Marikina, Pasig, Parañaque, Las Pinas, and Muntinlupa in the 1960s and 1970s (League 1993 as cited in Mercado and Manasan 2002, 261). It was in 1975 whereby the distinction between inner and outer core of Metro Manila was “obliterated as infrastructure and economic links have virtually made all these local units a unified core and have spatially merged them into a metropolitan area that was then loosely referred to as Greater Manila Area” (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 261). 6.2

Supra-Administrative Bodies to Address Metro Manila’s Issues and Problems

During the post-war period, Manila’s population “was 10 times that of the country’s second largest city, Davao” (Caoili 1999, 65). The geographic arrangement, i.e., Metro Manila Area (MMA) from 1946 to 1972, failed to deal with the MMA’s problems. At the national level, this was blamed on party politics which “pervaded the functioning of the city and municipal governments” (Caoili 1985, 7). These party politics were characterized as “particularistic, focused on pragmatic and short term political bargaining between the President and Congress and this determined policy-making” (Caoili 1985, 7). Such a situation under laid

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“mayor-council conflicts which tended to cripple local administration, thus adversely affecting the delivery of services” (Caoili 1985, 7). This was the political context in which the MMA encountered “growing pains” particularly in the 1950s and 1960s because of rapid and uncontrolled population growth. This resulted from a high rate of natural increase and significant internal migration which, although contributing to the economic growth of Manila, also brought countless problems in the process (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 262). Congress failed to address these since 1946 as it was more preoccupied with bills which will gain the support of their rural elite constituencies, e.g., local autonomy, and neglected the need for a national economic development plan and policies on urban land reform and urban policy, among others (Caoili 1999, 154). This led to the pervasiveness of poverty and housing shortage exemplified by the proliferation of slums and squatter settlements, inadequate public transportation system, traffic, deteriorating health and sanitation condition due to lack of potable water and unsanitary disposal of waste, lack of drainage and sewage system, pollution (air, water, and noise), and worsening peace and order situation (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 262). These seemed to be the price of urbanization as Metro Manila was already 100% urban since 1970. Its share of urban population is estimated at nearly half of the total urban population of the country (Gonzalez et al. 2001, 1). Martial Law and the Metro Manila Commission. With the declaration of martial law in September 1972 and the abolition of Congress, Presidential Decree No. 824 promulgated in 1975 saw the integration of the then four cities and thirteen municipalities that make up Greater Manila.6 Before their integration, the four cities were semi-autonomous political and administrative units of government, “while the thirteen

6 Presidential Decree 824: CREATING THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA COMMISSION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 2. Territorial Jurisdiction. The Commission shall have jurisdiction over the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, and Caloocan and the municipalities of Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las Pinas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Patero, Paranaque, Marikina, Muntinlupa, and Taguig in the province of Rizal; and the municipality of Valenzuela, in the province of Bulacan, all of which together shall henceforth be known as Metropolitan Manila (https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1975/11/07/presidential-dec ree-no-824-s-1975/).

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municipalities were geographical component towns of the provinces they were located” (Padilla 1998, 169). This was “conceived and implemented with the objective of promoting more effective coordination, higher efficiency, and greater equitability in the performance of governmental functions and provision of services within the metropolitan area” (Padilla 1998, 168). This was to cope with “the rapid increase in population size and density and continuous flow of in-migration… The efficient and effective approach to these metropolitan-wide problems would be cities and municipalities working together, closely coordinating with reach other…” (Padilla 1998, 168). “Each local unit was responsible for providing services to its constituency within its territorial jurisdiction, which include the administration and financing of its services” (Padilla 1998, 169). A problem which emerged was “the very wide gap among the local units, which might be attributed to their inherent revenue-generation capacities and could hardly be remedied by existing national-local intergovernmental fiscal relations” (Padilla 1998, 169). This “had an obvious implication on the extent and quality of services that each of the communities in the Metro Region was capable of rendering” (Padilla 1998, 169). Another problem which ensued brought about by the semi-independent relationship of the local government units in the metro area was the uncoordinated delivery of metro-wide services and disintegrated approach to problems that traverse municipal boundaries. Local government agencies undertook their projects without inter-consulting with each other. (Padilla 1998, 169–170)

Ad hoc bodies or local government arrangements were, therefore, established to address specific problems or needs. “The first centered on the need to improve public services in the areas geographically embracing the center of government” (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 263–264). The second stemmed from the need to develop a region that will serve as the showcase of the country’s modernization thrusts. Given these considerations, Memorandum Order No. 314 (dated November 10, 1972) was issued creating the Inter-Agency Committee on Metro Manila (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 264). The Inter-Agency Committee was tasked to study the system of municipal/city government in Metropolitan Manila and to recommend whatever measures of coordination and integration are deemed appropriate.

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Furthermore, it was mandated to study the functions and responsibilities of the national government in the metropolitan area, and to recommend whatever changes in structure and interrelation with municipal governments are deemed appropriate (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 264). The committee proposed the creation of a Metropolitan Manila Authority under the Office of the President through a promulgation of a Presidential Decree. Eventually, Presidential Decree 824 creating the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) was issued in 1975 and delineated the territorial jurisdiction of the MMC to include the 17 LGUs enumerated earlier (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 264). The MMC was to assume the “functions of the city and municipal governments and discharging certain services originally under the direct supervision of the local units” (Padilla 1998, 169). At about the same time, the needs of Metro Manila became a priority concern of the national leadership and there were two major issues (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 263). The first was that the MMC was tasked to take primary responsibility in the delivery of garbage collection and disposal, transport and traffic services. It was also mandated to coordinate and monitor government and private activities pertaining to the delivery of essential services like water supply and sanitation, flood control, health, social welfare, housing, and park development. More important, the Commission was ordained to develop a comprehensive social, economic, and physical plan for the region. (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 264)

The second consideration was “the need to develop a region that will serve as the showcase for the country’s drive for modernization consistent with its export-oriented national development strategy” (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 264). For Caoili (1999, 156), however, these metropolitan reforms through the MMC further reinforced “Manila’s historic role as the centre for capital accumulation and surplus extraction by the dominant elite in the continuing dependent development of the Philippines”. A persistent intervening variable to these institutional reforms was the political dynamics which impinged on the formulation and implementation of a national urban policy to be complemented by socio-economic growth. The obstacles continue to be partisan politics and the bargaining approach to policy-making and implementation which

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earlier on characterized the relation between Congress and the President as well as between the national and local governments (Caoili 1999, 123).7 At the macro level, economic planning “was systematized and centralized under the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)” which was chaired by the President (Caoili 1985, 9). “Steps were taken to immediately tackle Metropolitan Manila’s deteriorating urban conditions” and “to inforce Manila’s historic role as the center for capital accumulation and surplus extraction by the dominant elites…” (Caoili 1985, 9). In relation to this, the MMC may “thus be seen as furthering the concentration of central government power to carry out a national development plan which relies heavily on foreign capital” (Caoili 1985, 9). At a more specific level of analysis, the MMC represents a technical answer to the problem of urban government, following the traditional metropolitan reorganization approach which emphasizes economy and efficiency. It attempts to balance the need for metropolitan authority to provide area-wide services, the need for effective local government to take care of local services, and the need for grassroots institutions for citizens’ participation. (Caoili 1985, 9)

The Corazon Aquino Administration and the Metro Manila Authority. By 1988, the development of Metro Manila has gone beyond its present legal boundaries as compared to 20 years ago. In recognition of this, the Philippine National Development Plan for the Twenty-first Century or Plan 21 (NEDA 1998 as cited in Mercado and Manasan 2002, 261) made explicit its recognition of Metro Manila’s spatial development by referring to a Metropolitan Manila Growth Network that includes the industrial areas of

7 An example of this, as Caoili (1999, 151) narrated, was President Marcos had

to contend with the political strength of Isidro Rodriguez, the governor of Rizal province, by building grass roots and local officials’ support for the concept of metropolitan reorganization. Rodriguez’ opposition to MMA reform was due to the fact that he stood to lose control over the most populous and prosperous towns in his province and, hence, would have a much weakened political based.

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the neighboring regions, namely, the Southern Tagalog Region (CaviteLaguna-Batangas-Rizal, Quezon) or CALABARZON and the ManilaRizal-Laguna-Quezon or MARILAQUE areas and the Central Luzon Region (areas linking Manila with Subic and Clark Special Zones). (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 262)

Under the Corazon Aquino Administration (1986–1992), Executive Order 392 was issued in 1990, replacing the MMC with the Metro Manila Authority (MMA). The MMA, like the MMC, also proved inutile. As observed by Caoili (1999, 129): Voluntary ad hoc arrangements among MMA local governments, intended to solve common problems and coordinate delivery services, proved unworkable because of uneven financial resources among local units, fragmentation of authority and traditional jurisdictional conflicts. There was absence of coordination between local governments, national departments/agencies and the private sector providing services in MMA.

It was not surprising, therefore, that four years after its creation, the MMA was replaced in March 1995, when Congress enacted a law, RA 7924, creating the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), replacing MMA. RA 7924 affirmed “the compositional definition of Metro Manila constituting it into a ‘special development and administrative region subject to direct supervision of the President of the Philippines’” (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 275). The MMDA was given more powers than the MMA (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 265). “Except for Metro Manila, all metropolitan arrangements are largely locally led” (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 265). In general terms, “the MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring, coordinative, regulatory, and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila without diminution of the autonomy of LGUs concerning purely local matters” (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 275). The question, therefore, now is whether this metropolitan governance structure in place is adequate to address the current problems of Metro Manila which have existed more than two decades ago. These include, among others, population densities, quality of life, sanitation, distribution of incomes and tax base, services, and housing (Caoili 1999, 74–94). As pointed out by Caoili (1999, 21), urban problems require not just technical solutions but also necessitate internally-generated economic growth and the political will to enforce basic

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changes in the distribution of power between political centers, in relations between center and periphery, between urban and rural areas.

Lessons from the past and the continuing search for a governance structure for Metro Manila. Understanding the evolution of the governance structures of Metro Manila is thus important in comprehending the federalism discourse and other proposed arrangements. As pointed out by Manasan (2017, 35), this is generally framed along two strands. One is what is referred to as “imperial Manila” whereby there is the unequal allocation of resources in favor of Metro Manila, while the other strand is the search for sustainable peace in Mindanao while protecting regional diversity. Addressing these issues confronting Metro Manila brings to attention again the need to address the problems facing social service delivery and the area’s urban development. Much is still to be desired with regard to the LGUs’ generation of their own revenues asides from the IRA which is allotted to them by the national government. This is specially so for some LGUs in Metro Manila which are not financially at par with the wealthier ones, e.g., Makati and Quezon City. A proposal toward this end under a federal form of government, for example, is “enhancing LGUs’ revenue autonomy by assigning them more taxes whose rates and bases they can control”. This will hopefully give the LGUs the incentives “to allocate and deliver services in an effective and efficient manner” as well as enhance the greater accountability of subnational governments (Manasan 2017, 53). A more basic issue though is the general clamor of LGU officials for a bigger share of the LGUs in national taxes to enable them “to deliver the basic services that they are responsible for” (Manasan 2017, 53). A proposal, for example, is to increase the IRA share from the current 40% of national internal revenue taxes to as much as 50% of all national taxes (Manasan 2017, 60). There is also the need for the IRA distribution formula to “sufficiently equalize the net fiscal capacity of LGUs in the sense of providing more resources to LGUs with lower revenue capacity relative to their needs and less to LGUs with greater revenue capacity to their needs” (Manasan 2017, 59). In relation to this is the critical role of a strong middle-level government which is viewed as important for the success of decentralization and fiscal federalism. As noted by Miral (2017a, 1), the establishment of a regional government, “its powers and functions and its relations to the national government and local governments, is the most crucial element

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in the shift from a unitary to a federal form of government”. This is needed to “facilitate better coordination, both vertical and horizontal, between and among the different levels of government” (Miral 2017a, 73). As for ways of addressing the budgetary constraints of devolution as provided by the 1991 LGC, LGUs can enter into joint ventures with the private sector which the Code also envisions. A caution, however, brought forth with regard to this aspect are cost saving measures and market-oriented mechanisms. Although “these are simple to implement in the private sector, this cannot be adopted in toto by local authorities…” Some adjustments and revisions have to be made in their total approach to service delivery. The need for more capital infusion to fuel development nationally as well as locally, has also led to proposals in the PDP Laban Philippine Federalism 1.0 through the findings and recommendations of the Foundation for Economic Freedom (FEF) on Constitutional Reforms to advocate for the removal of restrictive economic provisions in the 1987 Constitution. In particular, it has sought to “liberalize only the economic provisions to help the domestic economy become more conducive to foreign investments” (Olivar 2017, 187). This brings to mind Caoili’s (1985, 1999) concern with regard to the nature of development, fueled by foreign capital, which has brought forth a dependent development whereby the country’s economic benefits went to Manila in general and to the country’s elites in particular. This has left out the peripheral areas of the country and the majority of the population. The question which arises is whether a federalist structure would be able to address this uneven economic development which has spawned socio-economic inequality and underdevelopment. Moreover, proposing federalism to address Metro Manila’s political concerns should not only be “redefining the vertical relationship between the different levels of government and instituting the basic principle of ‘subsidiarity’” but “the approach should be more comprehensive to include political, electoral, and political party system” (Tayao 2017, 69). These include the prohibition of political dynasties and the strengthening of political parties as public institutions (Oxales 2017, 176–177). Other reforms which some proponents of federalism are also seeking are the following: (1) shift to semi-presidential form of government; (2) shift to proportional representation; (3) strengthening of constitutional bodies in the region; and (4)

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judicial reforms (Araral et al. 2017, 179–180). In relation to fiscal federalism, Manasan (2017, 35) asks whether a federal form of government, which aims to bring the government closer to the people, can bring forth increased economic efficiency and societal welfare. Moreover, will this also “dampen rent-seeking tendencies by local politicians by promoting interjurisdictional competition” (Manasan 2017, 35)? In attaining all of these, as earlier on noted by Caoili (1985, 19), in examining the problems of an incipient Metro Manila Area (MMA), “there is a need for a strong political will, and for sincere committed leadership…”. As observed by Panganiban (1998, 137), there was also the natural reaction and opposition against the 1991 LGC “to relinquishing power by any means, however peaceful or beneficial it may be, especially when it concerns old political bailiwicks that have almost become an institution in the Philippine setting”. Furthermore, as posited by Hutchcroft (2017, 12–13), will federalism stop “the widespread patronage practices that undermine the quality of Philippine democracy” and/or “undermine the oligarchy and enhance long term development prospects in ways that will be beneficial to the population as a whole?” Any thoughts on federalism, as pointed by Tayao (2017, 24), therefore, “should fundamentally address the main problem of patronage politics and put in place a more effective mechanism that could at the minimum manage the distortion in society caused by the dominance”.

7

Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of the decentralization process in the Philippines, which as a unitary state, political and economic powers were generally centralized in the national government. This was seen during the Spanish and American colonial periods and was continued during the Commonwealth period as the country transitioned into independence. There were efforts toward decentralization from the period of independence in 1945 to 1972 in a number of Republic Acts enacted to give further autonomy to local governments. This was, however, cut short with the declaration of martial law which saw the further centralization of power under authoritarian rule. The 1986 People Power gave impetus once again to decentralize powers to the LGUs. This was viewed as a way of pushing not only the democratization process by empowering people in the local communities but also facilitating a bottom-up development

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approach. The embodiment of this effort was the enactment of the 1991 LGC. Decentralization was viewed to address the problems of Philippine society which have perpetuated poverty, socio-economic inequalities, and underdevelopment. Foremost of this was the inefficient and inequitable delivery of social services. This was also linked to the problems of an unsustainable and unequal urban development. This was fueled by the increasing urban population due to internal migration from the provinces to the cities, i.e., mainly to Metro Manila, due to lack of employment in the former. Such a situation was also blamed on a bigger national picture of a country which has been ruled by political dynasties which have bred patronage politics and corruption. This has made it difficult to come out with a coherent national policy dealing with decentralization as political families were very protective of their own respective bailiwicks and their powers within that. Moreover, decentralization efforts were viewed as means to perpetuate further one’s political and economic power. The 1991 LGC sought to address all of these through further devolution of powers to LGUs. By doing this, it was hoped that this will have a positive impact on social services delivery and addressing urban problems as it was viewed as cutting down bureaucratic red tape in policy-making. Furthermore, the 1991 LGC gave more financial autonomy to LGUs because of the increase in IRA to 40% of their revenues and giving them more taxing powers. This fiscal decentralization is seen to give impetus in bringing forth a more efficient and effective service delivery but also the push for development at the local level. In line with the visions of popular empowerment, the 1991 LGC also encouraged popular participation in local development councils and local special bodies through membership of the private sector as well as civil society organizations and for local governments to pursue entrepreneurial activities. The thirty years (30) of the 1991 LGC, however, have shown that there are a number of obstacles to hurdle with regard to its effective implementation. Foremost of this is the nature of Philippine politics, whereby elites, i.e., political dynasties, continue to rule. This has rendered popular participation in LGUs inutile in many areas, thus hampering development efforts from the ground. Furthermore, despite the increase in the IRA, the reality continues to exist that LGUs still need the national government for funds for development efforts as their IRA is not enough to do this. There is also the history of the arbitrary reduction of the IRA of LGUs at the whim of the president. Thus, the fiscal autonomy of LGUs

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is severely compromised. With regard to the further need to generate resources, complementary models for decentralization have emerged such as strengthening RDCs mandated by the Code and/or metropolitanization for integrating development plans involving two or more cities or the whole Metro Manila. It is within this concern on the hindrances to political and economic power to LGUs that the call for a federal system of government emerged. Metro Manila’s experience with the devolution of powers and responsibilities mirrors the national experience in general whereby much more is to be desired with regard to social services delivery and urban development. It also does not help much that there are large inequalities even among and within Metro Manila LGUs. This is most unfortunate as NCR is deemed to be the template to be emulated by the other urban areas in the country. The Philippines, therefore, currently finds itself at the crossroads of looking for a more viable model for decentralizing power to LGUs. This involves the following: (1) the nature of the governance models to take into consideration; (2) the ways and means to strengthen the institutions for responsible governance; and (3) pursuing decentralization which brings forth an equitable development and further institutionalizes popular participation. In all of these, priorities are the human rights and human security of the urban poor and other marginalized sectors of society. Focus is placed on social services delivery, particularly in the areas of health, education, housing and provision of basic utilities, e.g., water, as well as on resolving pressing urban development like flooding, solid waste management, urban agriculture and land use. Crucial in all of this is the need of LGUs to have adequate funds to address all these concerns whether through the IRA or the national tax allotment, LGU revenues and enterprises, and even local risk insurance in times of disasters. Addressing all of these will hopefully minimize the adverse effects of patronage politics and corruption which have hampered decentralization efforts at the local levels. These are best complemented by ongoing efforts to initiate political change, e.g., ending the dominance of political dynasties in the country, the very bane of all democratization efforts. This volume, therefore, seeks to contribute to this effort in providing policy recommendations, whether under a unitary or federal system of government, for a more responsible governance particularly for Metro Manila. At the heart of this is decentralizing power to the people for them to decide and to pursue what for them would be a more just, humane and equitable society.

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Annex I Governance Provisions in the 1991 Local Government Code Title 1: Basic Principles Chapter 1: The Code: Policy Applications SECTION 1 Title. - This Act shall be known and cited as the “Local Government Code of 1991”. SECTION 2 Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local government units. (b) It is also the policy of the State to ensure the accountability of local government units through the institution of effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum. (c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people’s organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. (continued)

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(continued) Title 1: Basic Principles SECTION 3

Operative Principles of Decentralization. - The formulation and implementation of policies and measures on local autonomy shall be guided by the following operative principles: (a) There shall be an effective allocation among the different local government units of their respective powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources; (b) There shall be established in every local government unit an accountable, efficient, and dynamic organizational structure and operating mechanism that will meet the priority needs and service requirements of its communities; (d) The vesting of duty, responsibility, and accountability in local government units shall be accompanied with provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge their powers and effectively carry out their functions: hence, they shall have the power to create and broaden their own sources of revenue and the right to a just share in national taxes and an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas; (f) Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources commonly beneficial to them; (k) The realization of local autonomy shall be facilitated through improved coordination of national government policies and programs an extension of adequate technical and material assistance to less developed and deserving local government units; (l) The participation of the private sector in local governance, particularly in the delivery of basic services, shall be encouraged to ensure the viability of local autonomy as an alternative strategy for sustainable development SECTION 5 Rules of Interpretation. - In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply: (a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned; (c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community; Chapter 2: General Powers and Attributes of Local Government Units (continued)

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(continued) Title 1: Basic Principles SECTION 16

General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. SECTION 17 Basic Services and Facilities. (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein. SECTION 18 Local government units shall have the power and authority to establish an organization that shall be responsible for the efficient and effective implementation of their development plans, programs, objectives, and priorities; to levy taxes, fees and charges which shall accrue exclusively for their use and disposition and shall be retained by them… to apply their resources and assets for productive, developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or furtherance of their government or proprietary powers and functions and thereby ensure their development into self-reliant communities and active participants in the attainment of national goals. Chapter 3: Intergovernmental Relations Article III: Inter-Local Government Relations SECTION 33 Cooperative Undertakings Among Local Government Units. - Local government units may, through appropriate ordinances, group themselves, consolidate, or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them. In support of such undertakings, the local government units involved may, upon approval by the sanggunian concerned after a public hearing conducted for the purpose, contribute funds, real estate, equipment, and other kinds of property and appoint or assign personnel under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the participating local units through Memoranda of Agreement. (continued)

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(continued) Title 1: Basic Principles Chapter 4: Relations with People’s and Non-Governmental Organizations SECTION 33 SECTION 34 Role of People’s and Non-governmental Organizations. - Local government units shall promote the establishment and operation of people’s and non-governmental organizations to become active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy. SECTION 35 Linkages with People’s and Non-governmental Organizations. - Local government units may enter into joint ventures and such other cooperative arrangements with people’s and non-governmental organizations to engage in the delivery of certain basic services, capability-building and livelihood projects, and to develop local enterprises designed to improve productivity and income, diversify agriculture, spur rural industrialization, promote ecological balance, and enhance the economic and social well-being of the people. SECTION 36 Assistance to People’s and Non-governmental Organizations. - A local government unit may, through its local chief executive and with the concurrence of the sanggunian concerned, provide assistance, financial or otherwise, to such people’s and non-governmental organizations for economic, socially-oriented, environmental, or cultural projects to be implemented within its territorial jurisdiction. Title III: Human Resources and Development SECTION 76 Organizational Structure and Staffing Pattern. - Every local government unit shall design and implement its own organizational structure and staffing pattern taking into consideration its service requirements and financial capability, subject to the minimum standards and guidelines prescribed by the Civil Service Commission. Title IV: Local Development Councils SECTION 106 Local Development Councils. - (a) Each local government unit shall have a comprehensive multi-sectoral development plan to be initiated by its development council and approved by its sanggunian. For this purpose, the development council at the provincial, city, municipal, or barangay level, shall assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction. Title VI: Credit Financing SECTION 295 Scope. - This Title shall govern the power of local government units to create indebtedness and to enter into credit and other financial transactions (continued)

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(continued) Title 1: Basic Principles SECTION 297

Loans, Credits, and Other Forms of Indebtedness of Local Government Units. (a) A local government unit may contract loans, credits and other forms of indebtedness with any government or domestic private banks and other lending institutions to finance the construction, installation, improvement, expansion, operation, or maintenance of public facilities, infrastructure, housing projects, the acquisition or real property, and the implementation of other capital improvement projects. SECTION 302 Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and Management of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector. (a) Local government units may enter into contracts with any duly prequalified individual contractor, for the financing, construction, operation, and maintenance of any financially viable infrastructure facilities, under the build-operate-transfer agreement, subject to the applicable provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6957) authorizing the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of infrastructure projects by the private sector and the rules and regulations issued thereunder and such terms and conditions provided in this Section. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 270 - PRESCRIBING THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 ARTICLE 66 Joint Ventures and Cooperative Programs or Undertakings. — LGUs may enter into joint ventures and such other cooperative arrangements with people’s organizations, NGOs or the private sector, to engage in the delivery of certain basic services; capability-building and livelihood projects; develop local enterprises designed to improve productivity and income; diversify agriculture; spur rural industrialization; promote ecological balance; and enhance the economic and social well-being of the people.

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Annex II Relevant Provisions in the Draft Bayanihan Constitution Article II: Declaration of Principles and State Policies SECTION 11

The Federal Republic shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living befitting human dignity and an improved quality of life for all. SECTION 12 The Federal Republic shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. SECTION 27 The Federal Republic shall promote autonomy of local government units in line with the principle of subsidiarity and in accord with federalism. SECTION 17 The Federal Republic shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. SECTION 18 The Federal Republic shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. SECTION 19 The Federal Republic shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human dignity, security, liberation, and development. Article III: Bill of Rights A. Social and Economic Rights SECTION 26 Every person has the right to: (a) Adequate food; (b) Complete, quality education; (c) Adequate and decent housing; and (d) Livelihood and employment opportunities. SECTION 27 The Federal Republic shall adopt measures to guarantee the progressive realization of these rights. B. Environmental and Ecological Rights SECTION 28 Every person in every generation has the right to: (a) A healthful environment and balanced ecology, clean air, clean water, clean soil, and clean surroundings All doubts shall be resolved in favor of the right of the people to a healthful and balanced ecology. Article VII: Legislative Department SECTION 28 (a) Taxation shall be uniform, equitable, and progressive. Article XI: Federated Regions, the Bangsamoro, and the Federation Region of the Cordilleras Article XII: Distribution of Powers of the Government (continued)

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(continued) Article II: Declaration of Principles and State Policies SECTION 1

The Federal Government shall have exclusive power over: (f) National socio-economic planning; (g) Monetary policy and federal fiscal policy, banking, currency; (m) Basic education; (n) science and technology SECTION 2 Within their regional territory, the Federated Region shall have exclusive power over: (a) Socio-economic development planning; (b) Creation of sources of revenue; (c) Financial administration and management; (e) Infrastructure, public utilities and public works; (g) Land use and housing; (i) Local government units; (k) Municipal waters; (l) Indigenous peoples’ rights and welfare; (m) Culture and language development Article XIII: Fiscal Powers and Financial Administration Article XV: National Economy and Patrimony SECTION 1 (a) The Philippine Economic System seeks an equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth through sound and efficient use of human and natural resources. It is directed at a sustainable increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the State for the benefit of all sectors of society, especially the underprivileged. SECTION 4 (a) The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be a shared power of the Federal and Regional Governments. Within their respective competencies, they may determine the manner and extent of their exploration, development, and utilization. They may directly undertake such activities, or they may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or entities at least sixty percent (60%) of whose voting capital is owned by Filipino citizens. Such agreements may be for a period of exceeding twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years. SECTION 8 Congress shall enact a comprehensive federal land use policy that shall provide the minimum standards for the Federated Regions in the rational, holistic, and just approach for the allocation, utilization, development and management of the country’s land and water resources. It shall include the regulation of activities that bear impact on said resources. Regional Assemblies may legislate other standards in the pursuit of its activities, provided that they are not below the minimum standards set forth in the policy. (continued)

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(continued) Article II: Declaration of Principles and State Policies SECTION 15

(a) Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. (c) No educational institution shall be established exclusively for aliens and no groups of aliens shall comprise more than one-third (1/3) of the enrollment in any school. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to schools established for foreign diplomat personnel and foreign temporary residents. SECTION 19 The Congress shall promote and protect the viability and growth of cooperatives as instruments for social justice and economic development. SECTION 25 An independent economic and planning agency headed by the President shall, after consultations with the appropriate public agencies, the private sector, and the Federated Regions, recommend to Congress and implement continuing integrated and coordinated programs and policies for national development. The National Economic Development Authority, operating under existing laws, shall function as the independent planning agency of the Federal Government, unless otherwise provided by federal law. SECTION 26 (a) An independent central monetary authority shall provide policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It shall have supervision over the operations of banks and exercise such regulatory powers as may be provided by law over the operations of finance companies and other institutions performing similar functions. Article XVI: Social Justice SECTION 1 The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and its increments. SECTION 2 The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. Urban Land Reform and Housing SECTION 9 The Federal Republic shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the public sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program, it shall respect the rights of small property owners except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. (continued)

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(continued) Article II: Declaration of Principles and State Policies SECTION 10

Urban or rural pool dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate consultation with them and the communities where they are to be relocated. Role and Rights of People’s Organizations SECTION 15 (a) The Federal Republic shall respect the role of independent people’s organizations to enable the people to exercise their right to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means. (b) The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The Federal Republic shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms. (c) People’s organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure. Article XVII: Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports EDUCATION General Provisions SECTION 9 The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting indigenous peoples, the majority of the members of which shall come from such communities.

Bibliography Araral, Eduardo, Jr., Paul D. Hutchcroft, Gilberto M. Llanto, Jonathan E. Malaya, Ronald U. Mendoza, and Julio C. Teehankee. 2017. Debate on Federal Philippines: A Citizen’s Handbook. Quezon City: Ateneo University Pres. Atienza, Maria Ela L. 2019. “From ‘Big Bang’ to Incremental Changes to the 1987 Philippine Constitution.” Voices from the Field, ConstitutionNet, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Accountability, October 21. https://constitutionnet.org/news/big-bang-incrementalchanges-1987-philippine-constitution. ———. 2006. “Local Governments and Devolution in the Philippines.” In Philippine Politics and Governance: An Introduction, edited by Noel M. Morada and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem, 415–439. Quezon City: Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines Diliman.

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Laban Model of Philippine Federalism 1.0, edited by Jonathan E. Malaya, 54–83. Pasay City, Metro Manila: Total PR solutions Phils. Inc., Media Touchstone Ventures, Inc. Tigno, Jorge V. 2017. “Beg Your Pardon? The Philippines Is Already Federalized in All But Name.” Public Policy XVI and XVII: 1–14. von Einsiedel, Nathaniel. 2002. “Overcoming the Obstacles to Decentralization in Asia.” Philippine Journal of Public Administration XLVI (1–4) (January– October). https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1975/11/07/presidential-decree-no-824-s1975/.

CHAPTER 3

Where the Gaps Are: Reexamining the Framework of Multilevel Governance to Improve the Delivery of Key Public Services in Metro Manila Kevin Mark R. Gomez, Joey R. Loristo, and Fatima Joy O. Pamittan

This paper was originally written when the corresponding author, Kevin Mark R. Gomez, was still a faculty at the Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines. K. M. R. Gomez (B) Department of Foreign Affairs, Pasay City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] J. R. Loristo Center for Policy and Executive Development, National College of Public Administration and Governance (NCPAG), University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 T. S. E. Tadem and M. E. L. Atienza (eds.), A Better Metro Manila?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3_3

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1

Introduction

Metro Manila’s superior economic development relative to the other regions of the Philippines has been consistently cited by federalism advocates as a rationale for federalization. Paralleled perhaps only to a certain extent by Cebu and Davao, Metro Manila’s distinctiveness rests on its status as the national capital, “an important component of the national brand [whose] performance… is significant for the center [and whose] international competitiveness… calls for reinforcement through public policy” (Hague and Harrop 2010). Yet, Metro Manila is not legally or asymmetrically more powerful than any other region in the country (such distinction is currently enjoyed only by the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao). Nor is its local governance congruous or synonymous with the national government, despite perceptions to the contrary (Porio 2009). And yet Metro Manila, home to the national government and the central offices of national agencies, certainly has a unique status among the country’s regions. Thus, it is worth examining whether the arguments of federalists—namely, that a shift to federalism would allow the country’s other regions to reap the gains supposedly monopolized by the National Capital Region (NCR)—bear any merit. After all, despite the popular “notion of an imperial Manila that lords over the rest of the country,” there remains an “overriding concern” that these ideas have “largely been unsubstantiated in fact” (Tigno 2017). In general, the core motivations for the ongoing initiatives to enact federalism rest on legitimate and multifaceted issues of governance, power-sharing, and planning, as well as the multitude of pressing social realities shaping people’s daily experiences (Bueza 2019a, b). This is why the discourse on federalism is renewed time and time again. However, in contemporary proposals, blanket reforms tend to be directed toward applying NCR’s sought-after affluence to the entirety of the archipelago.

F. J. O. Pamittan College of Engineering, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected]

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Federalism-as-a-solution, then, is largely premised on devolving and evenly spreading power across all the country’s regions, rather than reflecting upon current realities and on-the-ground characteristics (i.e., levels of development, political maturity, and readiness to graduate from the current setup toward a more sophisticated form of governance). Particularly for NCR, a one-size-fits-all approach may prove inadequate, as “the governance of large urban areas has emerged as an issue complicating territorial governance within countries” (Hague and Harrop 2010). While there have been sustained calls pushing for asymmetric federalism as a middle-ground between the best of federalist and local governance reforms, in general, relatively little has been said about the prospects of “gradated” ways. This more nuanced framing deepens and expands the latitude of prospects and answers to the “federal question.” This chapter interrogates the motivations and imperatives that has kept federalism a viable and attractive option to many Filipinos, through the lens of the campaign’s emphasis on the disparity between Metro Manila and other regions. Several questions are immediately apparent. First, what lessons can be learned from NCR’s own evolution as the country’s urban center? What experiences can NCR draw from its international counterparts in charting the way forward? The next step is to explore options for changing the status quo. What alternative governance model can better address Metro Manila’s current development challenges, given its present context and pressing realities? How could such alternatives enable NCR to adapt to the demands and pressures of the twenty-first-century governance? There is an oft-repeated maxim in this debate: “If federalism is the answer, what is the question?” This chapter argues that in fact, federalism is not the only answer, and the “question”—concerning the systemic problems underlying the country’s pervasive problems with inequality and uneven development across regions—is more complex than it seems. Thus, studying NCR as a template and examining several possible options for progress may lead to a more profound understanding of the conversation surrounding the latest push for federalism in the Philippines. This chapter, therefore, takes off and gives a more detailed narration of the evolution of Metro Manila as earlier on discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 and from there, elaborates on how the current multilevel governance structure is applied in Metro Manila. Based on these discussions, proposed alternative governance frameworks for Metro Manila, i.e., metropolitanization and federalism which were elucidated in Chapter 1, are further

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examined. It argues that Metro Manila, as the National Capital Region, is distinct from the other local government units (LGUs) and thus its proposed multilevel governance structure should vary from the rest to achieve its utmost potential.

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The Evolution of Metro Manila as the National Capital Region

Metro Manila, officially known as the NCR, is composed of 16 highly urbanized cities and a lone municipality that collectively stands as the country’s political and economic epicenter (Shatkin 2006). Its regional gross domestic product (GDP) alone constitutes 36.6% of the country’s total GDP (PSA 2016), pointing to its central role in the country’s economy. With the exception of Pateros, all LGUs in NCR are classified as highly urbanized cities, which means each has at least P50 million in annual income and a population of at least 200,000 (1991 Local Government Code). “Metropolitan Manila” was first constituted in 1975 by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 824 that designated the 17 LGUs currently part of NCR. The region’s constituent units remained unchanged since. By the nature of NCR’s rapid growth and urbanization, subsequent regionalization and metropolitanization entailed a governing entity for the region. At the metro-wide level, NCR has been governed by three different bodies with varying powers and functions that adapted to the political, social, and economic conditions of the day. These are the Metropolitan Manila Commission (1975–1986), Metro Manila Authority (1986–1995), and Metro Manila Development Authority (1995–present). NCR’s administrative structure is strongly shaped by its urban politics with its political-economic forces, which are apparent in the shifting spaces and symbols of power in, and of, the national capital (Porio 2009). Likewise, the country’s ever-changing national politics and economy across time have molded Metro Manila into various frames with different forms of governing structures.

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Metro Manila’s Urban Sprawl and Region-Formation1

The narrative of present-day Metro Manila is the result of hundreds of years of progressive changes in its spaces and landscapes shaped by the prevailing political and socio-economic conditions of different time periods: from the settlements of early communities, centuries of colonial conquests and Western-style urban planning, modern influences of the post-war period, to contemporary trends alongside the times’ accompanying administrative system.

Sidebar 1: Development of Metro Manila’s administrative systems

Pre-1521. Manila developed as a city, as its communities were initially organized. 1521–1700s. Spanish colonial conquest in the Philippines began. Intramuros was established as the colonial capital. Physical, political, social, and economic changes spilled over neighboring territories. 1800s. Enacted town and urban planning of the city became manifested. Age of industrialization accelerated Manila’s urbanization and development. 1898–1900s. Americans took over the country as its colony. Urban planning and landscape were modified to accommodate the complicated effect of rapid urbanization. 1935–1944. Quezon City was carved from the Province of Rizal with the aim of making it the country’s new capital city. Post-1945. After the Japanese occupation (1942–1945), areal reclassification and boom in number of population and informal settlements were apparent. 1975. “Metropolitan Manila” was first constituted, reflecting the NCR’s current configuration through PD 824, which also created the Metropolitan Manila Commission. It was tasked to coordinate metro-wide services and provide an avenue for policy-making. 1990. Presidency of Aquino (1986–1992), Metro Manila Authority replaced the MMC, which was perceived to be a political instrument than a region-wide authority. 1 This section expounds further on the evolution of Metro Manila as previously discussed in Chapter 2.

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1991. Republic Act 7160 or the 1991 Local Government Code was enacted. This empowered local government units with an array of comprehensive powers and functions, and enshrined the principles of local autonomy, and decentralization. 1995. Creation of Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) established Metro Manila as a special development and administrative region.

Pre-colonial settlements, pre-1521. Prior to Spanish colonization, Maynilad was a flourishing agricultural and indigenous settlement endowed with advantageous geographical characteristics—lowland, sitting in the alluvial plains of the Pasig River, and in between two large bodies of water, Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay. Because of its strategic location and intrinsic features, it became a growing center for agriculture, trade and commerce, and service industry (Doeppers 1972). Amidst this progress, Rajah Sulayman, paramount ruler of the Rajahnate of Maynilad, planned and began consolidating the communities along Pasig River to form a supra-barangay confederation (Reyes 1998). Maynilad’s governance was thus underpinned by the relative simplicity of a traditional system of government that concentrated nearly exclusive power to the chieftain. Spanish colonial conquest, 1521–1898. With the advent of Spanish colonization, Sulayman’s plan was shelved as the Spaniards laid down their own ideas for the newly annexed territory’s spatial development. The site of Intramuros was to serve as the colony’s capital, as urban development crawled out from the walled city. Manila’s urbanization and eventual changes in architectural landscapes were patterned from the concept of a “planned city,” which had a highly fragmented settlement system. Under Spain’s command, Manila became highly urbanized and its development was sustained by its economic importance, eventually becoming a primate city, the first in Southeast Asia. It became the country’s growth center as physical, political, social, and economic expansion continued. Later, urbanization spilled over to peripheral territories as the affluent built their estates there. By 1650s, these areas had also been urbanized, such that suburbanization continued to spread toward more neighboring territories. When the country industrialized in the early 1800s, the city’s urbanization continued—the Spanish residential pattern

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became more decentralized, Manila Port and Pasig River were used to aid the mercantilist and capitalist systems, and interior roads, bridges, and railroad were constructed to connect Manila to Central Luzon. In retrospect, the Spanish takeover of Maynilad was disruptive of the city’s organic development. The change in leadership and political system heavily influenced the succeeding changes in the city’s economy and social landscape from its indigenous ways. This explains the current-day incoordination in the social, economic, political conditions, and growth of the urban communities (Reyes 1998). American colonization, 1898–1946. After the United States took over the archipelago in the 1900s, the City of Manila that included Intramuros and twelve other rapidly urbanizing towns was established. Although the Americans recognized the need to emphasize local autonomy, at the time, the need for centralization for more efficient governance prevailed. By then, urbanization had engulfed other territories near the City of Manila, whose development along with its suburbs, was being modeled after David Burnham’s “Modern Town Planning” (Shatkin 2006). Burnham’s model was supposed to incorporate recreational areas (parks) into city layouts, improve infrastructures especially those for sanitary and drainage purposes, and increase Manila’s accessibility through road improvements and railway systems. During the Americans’ time, complicated development of the city center began. Metro Manila had become polycentric because of the distinctiveness of each central business districts’ (CBD) booming industries or services that prompted the need for multiple nodes of growth. Presidency of Manuel Quezon. In 1939, Quezon carved a territory from the Province of Rizal, named it Quezon City and declared it an independent city (Magturo 2012; Bueza 2019b). Quezon sought to replace the City of Manila as the country’s capital, as overcrowding and proximity to the bay (that made it vulnerable to bombardments during World War II) beset the latter. However, it was only in 1949 that President Elpidio Quirino, through Republic Act No. 333, inaugurated it as the new capital—a status it held until 1976. The establishment of Quezon City, coupled with the ongoing war and the nation’s struggle for independence, derailed the development of the Burnham plan for the “Metropolitan Manila,” (Reyes 1998) except for systems of broader avenues and parks (Shatkin 2006). Japanese occupation, post-1945 era. From the time of Japanese occupation to the post-war period, the City of Manila and its suburbs

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was marked with overpopulation and informal settlements (Reyes 1998). This was caused by both natural increases in population, and the abnormal and positive net influx of migrants to Manila who were either lured by the prospects of greener pastures, or were displaced by aerial bombings during and after the Japanese occupation. This trend of population growth and continued expansion of Manila’s economic activity resulted in areal reclassification. Built-up areas expanded outward and eventually encroached surrounding, formerly non-urban areas. As the urban areas were pushed outside from the core, the industrial and agricultural/production areas followed suit—toward the peripheries, continuously creating urbanized and suburbanized areas (Ortega 2012). In June 1949, Republic Act 409 divided the Central City of Manila into 14 districts, and shortly after, seven suburbs were officially added as part of the ‘Province of Manila’: Caloocan which had recently become a city; Pasay City which originally broke away from Manila to become Rizal City; the earlier established Quezon City; and the municipalities of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Makati, and Navotas that were all apportioned from Rizal Province. Official census from 1960 to 1967 also listed Parañaque and Malabon as suburbs of Manila. By the 1970s, the National Census and Statistics Office in a special report coined the term “Manila Metropolitan Area,” which encompassed the eight official cities of the Province of Manila and 19 more cities and municipalities: Bacoor, Cavite City, Kawit, Noveleta, and Rosario (from Cavite); Biñan and San Pedro (from Laguna); Meycauayan and Valenzuela (from Bulacan); and Las Piñas, Malabon, Marikina, Muntinlupa, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Taytay, Parañaque, and Cainta (from Rizal). The grouping was created from a set criteria that included contiguity to Manila and its suburbs, evidence of strong economic and social integration, and classification as urban area, among others (Reyes 1998). Despite a legitimate matrix of criteria as basis, however, the grouping was disbanded shortly after the addition of 19 other territories was perceived as premature (Reyes 1998) (Fig. 1). Term of Ferdinand Marcos, 1965–1986. In 1975, Marcos’ Presidential Decree No. 824, upon deliberation, officially organized “Metropolitan Manila” to include only 17 cities and municipalities: Las Piñas, Malabon, Marikina, Muntinlupa, Parañaque, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, and Valenzuela were added to the eight constituent units of the Province of Manila (Reyes 1998). PD 824 also established the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) to organize the highly urbanized LGUs,

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Fig. 1 Metro Manila’s urban sprawl (Source Maps rendered based on data collated from Reyes 1998, Shatkin 2006, Magturo 2012, Bueza 2019b, Choguill 2001, Mercado 1998, Regmi 2017, Lustre 2015)

coordinate metro-wide services, provide an avenue for policy-making aimed for the metro’s betterment, and address urbanization-related problems (Padilla 1988). The same law transformed Metropolitan Manila into a public corporation that possesses quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial, and fiscal/taxation powers, in which MMC was to coordinate the overall urban development efforts of the region’s constituent units (Choguill 2001). Presidency of Corazon Aquino, 1986–1992. Instead of managing the metro and/or the needs of urbanization, the MMC was seen as an instrument to pursue political interests (Padilla 1988), as the LGUs were stripped of some of their political autonomy. Aquino sought to manage the metro with a new appropriate institution (Choguill 2001). Executive Order No. 392 replaced the MMC with the Metro Manila

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Authority (MMA), a move which restored much of the LGUs’ executive and revenue powers. Later, local governments would receive a general boost in their stature with the passage of Republic Act 7160 or the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC), which empowered LGUs with an array of comprehensive powers and functions. The worsening dilemmas that naturally come with urbanization called for the need to establish a stronger metropolitan body (Mercado 1998). In 1995, the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) superseded MMA through Republic Act No. 7924, which established Metro Manila as a special development and administrative region under the direct supervision of the President. The MMDA is mandated to “perform planning, monitoring, and coordinative functions, and in the process, exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila without diminution of the autonomy of the LGUs concerning purely local matters [as accorded by the LGC]” (Choguill 2001; Regmi 2017). The MMDA is governed by the Metro Manila Council, which also acts as its policy-making body, composed of the mayors of the 17 LGUs, heads of national government agencies, representatives from the vice mayors and councilors’ leagues, and local district representatives. This further strengthens the link between the national government (whose main interests primarily lie with Metro Manila’s status as the national capital region) and local governments (which must exercise its powers and functions over their respective jurisdictions through the 1991 LGC). The 1990s saw the urban sprawl reaching neighboring municipalities and cities that had developed either its own centers or CBDs, and had their land uses altered. Present-day Metro Manila. With the exception of Pateros, all of NCR’s LGUs had become highly urbanized cities, with the neighboring provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan, Cavite, Rizal, Laguna, and Batangas (Lustre 2015) as its suburbs. In the late 1990s and 2000s, more recent changes in Metro Manila’s spatial structure were unleashed by economic liberalization from external (foreign, international) economic forces, which altered its conservative policy framework (Reyes 1998). The wave of neoliberal reforms of deregulation, privatization, and economic liberalization changed much of the city’s economic and spatial landscape, leading to population increases, rapid urbanization and expansion to peripheral territories (Ortega 2012).

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The city’s growth in the twenty-first century is heavily influenced by its position in the global economy. Demographic shifts had a symbiotic relationship to these developments, especially as informal settlements and the residential areas of the middle classes grew (Ragragio 2013; Shatkin 2004; Nakamura 2009). Both these factors further help to drive the forces of urbanization and suburbanization. As of 2016, Metro Manila has a population of 12.8 million or 12.4% of the country’s total population (PSA 2016). With a land area of 63,600 hectares or approximately 0.21% of the country’s total area (Ragragio 2013), NCR’s population density is computed at approximately 21,000/km2 . This figure is remarkably high in comparison to other megacities such as Tokyo, at 6000/km2 (Tokyo Metropolitan Government n.d.), or Jakarta, at 5000/km2 (worldpopulationreview.com). Metro Manila’s population is predicted to grow at 1.58% annually (PSA 2019). Evidently, while NCR’s present-day spatial arrangement retains influences from its colonial heritage and key past events, emerging modes of governance have evolved along with the pressing needs of the metropolitan area to keep with the pressures of modern-day urbanization. As Hague and Harrop (2010) emphasize, “[g]overnance always incorporates a spatial dimension.”

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Sidebar 2: Applying Models of Urban Spatial Structures to Metro Manila

Apart from looking at the historical context, the development and spatial arrangement of present-day Metrop Manila may be explained by the adoption of various spatial structure models. For instance, Von Thunen’s Location Theory has a regional approach and is focused on agricultural development. This can be seen during the early stages of Manila’s urban development during the pre-colonial period when markets flourished along the Pasig River. Another example would be Burgess’s Concentric Zone Model, which has an urban approach that correlates with the establishment of central business districts (CBDs) at the core of the city, with an outward development from the center, or Hoyt’s Core Zone Model, which focuses on sectors and invariant spatial clustering around CBDs. A related theory is Harris and Ullman’s Multiple Nuclei Model, which describes an expansion characterized by more than one city center and irregular clustering. Metro Manila’s growth shows a similar trajectory, as it spread out from core zones with economic and residential functions. The rapid urbanization and economic expansion of the main core resulted in the development of complementary sub-cores over time. Meanwhile, the Typical Southeast Asian (Primate) City model is usually located along coastal areas, with the city founded on the site of indigenous settlements and laid out in a gridiron pattern with segregated residential areas. Manila, as an urban settlement, is located along the coastal margin, and its inevitable growth and expansion are directed inward. Its core is located along the coast and the zones are concentrated and are developing only on one side (toward the mainland). Finally, Christaller’s Central Place Theory uses a multiple core/CBD approach, but with one central city. There are also apparent, distinct and integral variations within each CBD. Continuous development and rapid urbanization resulted in having more than two multiple cores (with only one sub-core) with their own functional zones surrounding each other. Metro Manila now looks like multiple communities with their own core, within a larger community with a main core.

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Multilevel Governance in the NCR2

The framework of MultiLevel Governance (MLG) comprehensively captures the current governance structure of Metro Manila, as it explains how an array of multi-tiered governing entities coherently operates as a single administrative system by coordinating with each other.3 A main theme in MLG discourse is the identification of overlaps and gaps in governance—issues that are typically addressed by administrative models designed to remove or minimize redundancy of jurisdictions, and/or assign new ones to areas overlooked in the system. Coordination in this sense occurs both at the different levels of governing units (vertical) and among different sectors within each tier (horizontal). MLG aims to explain the relations and division/distribution of jurisdiction among and across the tiers. Simply put, Vertical MLG is characterized by the nesting of different levels of governance, while Horizontal MLG by the partnership within each governing units (Hague and Harrop 2010). The 17 current LGUs in Metro Manila serve as the primary governance structures that operate the region on a daily basis. Under the auspices of the 1991 LGC, NCR’s cities and municipality individually enjoy substantive powers and functions within its respective jurisdictions and run the political unit like any other local government. These include powers to generate local revenue, grant business licenses and permits, and provision of services such as health, social welfare, and local infrastructure, among others. Likewise, its barangays (as the most basic unit of local governance in the Philippines) also exercise full powers, functions, and accountabilities under the supervision of their respective cities or municipality. In this case, the relationship between city/municipal LGUs to their barangays in the areas of service delivery and local supervision can be framed through vertical MLG, while cooperation within same tiers (city-city, citymunicipality, barangay-barangay) is underpinned by horizontal MLG. In 2019, NCR had 1710 barangays (DILG 2019). The region’s economic landscape is being shaped both by its politicoadministrative changes and its role in the international market, which pushed the metropolitan area into economic liberalization (Reyes 1998). 2 This section expounds on Chapter 1’s discussion on the multilevel governance framework as it applies to Metro Manila. 3 For a more thorough discussion, see related chapter in this book, “Where the Gaps Are: Assessing alternative models of governance to improve the delivery of key public services in Metro Manila.”

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For instance, following the wave of privatization in the ‘90s, at present the metro’s electricity and water service providers are largely owned or operated by private concessionaires. The national government’s looming presence in the capital region is also seen in the latter’s transportation sector, wherein the metro’s in-city train systems are managed and operated by government-owned, privately run corporations (Light Rail Transit Authority and Metro Rail Transit Corporation) primarily responsible for the construction, operation, and maintenance of light and metro rail transit systems, respectively. While LGUs (both at the city/municipality and barangay levels) perform their functions and powers under a regime of decentralization, the MMDA executes its mandated roles pertaining to metro-wide services. Moreover, metro-wide provision for electricity, water, and light rail transportation is functionally fragmented and delivered to the public by organizations outside the usual local governments and higher-tier bodies, such as national government agencies, private concessionaires, or hybrid types. As such, the current governance structure of NCR is a pastiche of 17 LGUs and all its barangays, a second-tier authority through the MMDA, and a host of functionally fragmented services delivered by either the national government or the private sector. In theory, all these institutions must work in a concerted manner to deliver services before Metro Manila’s general public. In pursuit of region-wide development agenda and narrowing disparities among its constituent LGUs, NCR’s cities and municipality could thus either become enablers of “regional interests,” or inhibiters thereof, especially when they prioritize parochial concerns (Manasan and Mercado 1999).

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Alternatives for Metro Manila: Two Models of Governance4

The last time the country nearly shifted to a federal form of government was during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Convention that drafted the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. Later, several “highprofile efforts” at amending the constitution fell short (Coronel-Ferrer 4 This section scrutinizes further the issues and concerns with regard to the proposals for federalism, i.e., the Bayanihan Federalism Constitution and the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan’s (PDP-LABAN) model of Philippine federalism as discussed in Chapter 2. It contextualizes this within the discourse on multilevel governance.

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2016). In subsequent decades, the prospect of a Federal Republic of the Philippines would intermittently surface, triggered by changing presidential agendas and political priorities, but never came to be implemented. President Rodrigo Duterte’s push seems no different. This time, however, Coronel-Ferrer notes Duterte’s “unusually compelling” drive, as it prioritizes federalism over any other agenda (like removing protectionist measures on the economy or changing the presidential to a parliamentary form of government) rather than being relegated as a secondary concern (2016). Consequently, this spurred a wide range of discussions on the prospects of Philippine federalism, and animated various proposals, two of which are strongly associated with the president—the PDP-Laban model of federalism and the Bayanihan Constitution drafted by the Consultative Committee to Review the 1987 Constitution. While the PDP-Laban model was advocated among the members of Duterte’s political party, no formal draft explaining the proposed model was ever released, and committees formed by Duterte to review proposed amendments to the 1987 Constitution focused instead on proposals based on the Bayanihan Constitution. However, constituting a federal solution whether wholly or partially is only one of several possible alternatives to the status quo. This chapter discusses two possible governance models: 1. A federal NCR (based on the Bayanihan Constitution, prepared by the Consultative Committee to review the 1987 Constitution) 2. Metropolitan arrangements (a model developed by Ruben Mercado and Rosario Manasan, of the Philippine Institute of Development Studies) 3.1

Federal NCR

This section looks at two of the most relevant articles of the Bayanihan Constitution. The first is Article XI: Federated Regions, the Bangsamoro, and the Federated Region of the Cordilleras, which defines the constitution of the federated regions and its asymmetric treatment of the Bangsamoro and the Cordilleras. The second is Article XII: Distribution of Powers of the Government, which itemizes the scope of powers and jurisdictions that each tier would exercise.

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Like the 1987 Constitution, the Bayanihan Constitution implicitly prescribes a single uniform format for the federated regions, with the exception of the two autonomous regions—a regional legislature, executive, and judiciary. Nine sections of Article XI elaborate on the specific features afforded to the Bangsamoro and Cordilleras. Meanwhile, the draft grants exclusive federal and regional powers (Table 1). Table 1 Exclusive powers of federal and regional governments under the Bayanihan Constitution Federal government

Regional government

(a) Defense, security of land, sea, and air territory; (b) Foreign affairs; (c) International trade; (d) Customs and tariffs; (e) Citizenship, immigration and naturalization; (f) National socio-economic planning; (g) Monetary policy and federal fiscal policy, banking, currency; (h) Competition and competition regulation bodies; (i) Inter-regional infrastructure and public utilities, including telecommunications and broadband networks; (j) Postal service; (k) Time regulation, standards of weights and measures; (l) Promotion and protection of human rights; (m) Basic education; (n) Science and technology; (o) Regulation and licensing of professions; (p) Social security benefits; (q) Federal crimes and justice system; (r) Law and order; (s) Civil, family, property, and commercial laws, except as may be otherwise provided for in the Constitution; (t) Prosecution of graft and corruption cases; (u) Intellectual property; and (v) Elections

(a) Socio-economic development planning; (b) Creation of sources of revenue; (c) Financial administration and management; (d) Tourism, investment, and trade development; (e) Infrastructure, public utilities and public works; (f) Economic zones; (g) Land use and housing; (h) Justice system; (i) Local government units; (j) Business permits and licenses; (k) Municipal waters; (l) Indigenous peoples’ rights and welfare; (m) Culture and language development; (n) Sports development; and (o) Parks and recreation

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The profound implications of federalism cannot be understated, especially on the issue of government structure and power-sharing between the central and regional governments. The framework of MLG remains relevant in explaining these relationships. The Bayanihan Constitution emphasizes not only the existence of tiers of governance—federal and regional—but also how the delineated functions and powers should complement the entire governance system, rather than being repetitive or outright redundant. However, there are also potential overlaps in powers despite the supposed exclusive jurisdictions to be exercised by federal and regional governments (Atienza 2018). At present, the draft remained a proposal from the president’s consultative committee, not taken seriously by national legislators, so there has been very little discussion on how federal and regional governments will operationalize these potential powers in reality. A striking feature of the proposed Bayanihan Constitution is the absence of a separate article on local governments (Article X in the 1987 Constitution). In fact, the term “local government/s” appears only eight times throughout the proposed draft, oftentimes as executors of assigned functions (i.e., freedom parks, penal facilities, disaster risk), or as units covered by accountability mechanisms (i.e., federal ombudsman). Aside from being mentioned as among the exclusive power of a federated region, whose regional executive “exercise general supervision over its component local governments,” there is hardly any mention on the nature, role, powers, and functions of LGUs compared to those wellarticulated in Article X of the 1987 Constitution. A plausible interpretation is that regional governance structures—its definition, delineation, and relation with regional and subregional tiers—are left to the exclusive domain of the regional government. While these possibly allow the creation of context-specific regional structures, this is largely premised on the wholesale shift of the country’s political system to federalism. Anything short of federalism will therefore derail any efforts at crafting a gradated response for NCR. Also, the multitude of powers, functions, and responsibilities is idealized to inevitably empower the current administrative and autonomous region(s) into full-fledged state governments with greater control in its internal affairs, as far as the draft Constitution will allow. The Bayanihan Constitution “acknowledges the asymmetrical character of the Bangsamoro and the Federated Region of the Cordilleras,” (Article XI,

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Sec D, Draft Bayanihan Constitution) in which the principle of asymmetric federalism is clearly seen. By continuing to recognize these two regions’ “ethnicity, culture, religion, customs, traditions, language, and distinct identities of their people” (Article XI, Sec D, Draft Bayanihan Constitution), the draft proposal builds upon the autonomy provisions presently accorded by the 1987 Constitution to these regions. Ultimately, these translate to the extent of power given to the aforementioned regions that no other region—not even NCR—is afforded. In fact, the terms “Metropolitan Manila,” “Manila,” and “metropolitan” appear only twice in the Bayanihan Constitution: in the context of the apportionment of seats for legislative district representatives of the federal House of Representatives, and as a separate jurisdiction for the federal ombudsman commission. The 1987 provision on “special metropolitan subdivision” was completely deleted, leaving no constitutionally assured space for pursuing special arrangements that account extraordinary characteristics of the region. The Federated Region of Metro Manila, once created under this design, would have to define its subregional governance structures. In this sense, Metro Manila’s distinction as the national capital region, as in the past, remains unrecognized in the absence of particular designations or substantively special powers or status. Despite adopting a fundamentally federal structure, the drafters of the Bayanihan Constitution have notably not bestowed special status to NCR, in sharp contrast to how other federal states have treated their respective capitals such as Washington, District of Columbia (United States), Canberra Australia Capital Region (Australia), or Moscow (one of Russia’s three federal cities). A possible explanation to this is an underlying assumption that all the regions—except for the Bangsamoro and Cordilleras—must follow a single pattern of governance, despite local nuances in growth and development trajectories. NCR will have to be lumped with the rest and would have to be tied by rigid constitutional frameworks. As a result, Metro Manila’s urban growth is inhibited while the rest of the country need not experience the opportunity cost of a one-size-fits-all approach, with the notable exception of the Bangsamoro and the Cordillera regions. Without prejudice to the two autonomous regions, the principle of asymmetric federalism must go beyond ethnicity, culture, and identity. In the same manner that “sub-provincial” LGUs are classified into municipalities, component cities, and independent chartered cities, while a separate class for highly urbanized cities exists, the gradations between

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regions must be recognized so that more appropriate governance mechanisms could be tailor-fitted to local contexts. There is no better candidate in the country for piloting such experiments than NCR, which enjoys the national government’s robust support and presence, and whose constituent LGUs are among the most equipped and experienced to carry out wide-scale reforms. As policy-makers and experts learned from the blanket policy implementation of the 1991 LGC and its succeeding consequences—intended or otherwise—plunging the country into changes in the political system at a nation-wide scale opens up risks and vulnerabilities. This time however, armed with solid, decades-old experience at local governance, decentralization, and development, changes of such magnitude could be taken with more precaution and prudence to usher the optimal outcome of a federalist project. Moreover, various cases of success and best practices from abroad have emerged, and are worth studying. Another key component of a federal shift would be the incorporation of lessons from other territories, whose experiences demonstrate the vital importance of taking unique needs and circumstances into consideration in all models of governance.

Sidebar 3: Lessons from other countries: Unitary vs. federal systems

Most political systems in the world adopt a unitary form of government where sovereignty lies exclusively with the central government, including the power to abolish lower levels of bureaucracy. Depending on the political culture, the status of lower level governments varies such as extensions of central power tasked to merely implement policies upon the national government’s directions. This arrangement is most common in countries formerly governed by monarchs and those not faced with ethnic division (Hague and Harrop 2010). For instance, the cases of the Bangkok Metropolitan Region in Thailand, the Greater Tokyo Area in Japan, and the New Taipei City in Taiwan show how to move beyond national capitals, while the Greater London Area in the United Kingdom and the Ilê de France in France illustrate the workings of decentralization in developed countries. An interesting case for consideration is also that of

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Spain, which demonstrates a unitary structure, but where areas such as Catalonia, Basque, and Galicia are afforded asymmetrically federal status by nature. Federalism, on the other hand, is a form of multilevel governance where different levels of government, typically between a national or federal government and its subnational units, share legal sovereignty and power (Hague and Harrop 2010). Functions such as defense, foreign affairs, and immigration usually reside at the federal level, while the rest are distributed across the many tiers of government. Large and culturally diverse countries usually have federal systems to bring governance closer to their peoples, induce competition among subnational units, and open policy experimentation. However, it also risks the challenges of division among subnational units, security dilemma in protecting territories, and slow decision-making (Hague and Harrop 2010). The notion of symmetry and asymmetry in federalism refers to the extent by which power and functions are shared by subnational units with the national government relative to each other, a question of its participation in the pattern of social, cultural, economic, and political characteristics of the federal system it belongs. A model is symmetrical when each separate political unit, in effect, is a miniature reflection of the important aspects of the federal system (Tarlton 1965). Each state maintains the same relationship to the central authority on the minimum. On the other hand, an asymmetrical federal system is where political units vary in terms of interest, character and make up. Subnational units as such possess varying degrees of autonomy and power (Tarlton 1965). The idea of ‘keeping it together’ within an asymmetric federal structure can be seen in the case of Russia’s federal subjects and the Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, while a study of the influence of nation, identity, and culture on granting autonomy to specific regions can be seen in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in India.

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Metropolitan Arrangement5

At the turn of the millennium, the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS), the research arm of the National Economic and Development Authority, focused on the phenomenon of metropolitan formation in the country and explored its various policy implications. In 1998, Ruben Mercado and Rosario Manasan of PIDS launched a discourse on the concept of a metropolitan arrangement, defined as “a conglomeration of a highly urbanized city and the local government units contiguous to it, engaging in cooperative urban development ventures” (2002). It was a recognition of the need for governmental policies to fit the natural evolution of metropolitan arrangements in the Philippines, intended to propose ways forward within a more purposive framework, as economic, political, and cultural trends driven by globalization surged in the 1990s. Initially, Mercado and Manasan considered using the term “metropolis”—defined as “a large urban settlement with at least one million population … [with a] geographical area usually extend[ing] across several local government boundaries” (Angotti, 1993 as cited in Mercado and Manasan 2002). Eventually, they settled on “metropolitan arrangement” to account for the diversity of metropolitan areas in the country, including Metro BLIST (Baguio, La Trinidad, Itogon, Sablan, and Tuba), CAMADA (Calasiao, Mangaldan, Dagupan), Metro Naga, Metro Iloilo, Metro Cagayan de Oro, in addition to the metropolises of Metro Manila, Metro Cebu, and Metro Davao. The extent and breadth of coordinated functions and services vary widely among the eight metropolitan arrangements discussed comprehensively by Mercado and Manasan. A study of the intersections among these arrangements is indicative of at least two things: first, that the respective local contexts of these urban areas affect the array of services and functions that prompt the creation of the metropolitan arrangement; and second, that there are observable commonalities in these same areas of concerns despite the nuances of each metropolitan area (Table 2). Mercado and Manasan (2002) recognize Metro Manila’s unique spatial and geopolitical attributes relative to the seven other metropolitan arrangements, and articulated the following observations:

5 This section expounds on the discussion on metropolitan arrangements in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.

*

*

Metro Manila * Metro BLIST (Baguio, La Trinidad, Itogon, Sablan, Tuba)

*

* *

*

*

*

*

* * *

* *

*

*

* *

*

* *

*

* *

*

Zoning and land use planning and shelter services

Other services pursued by the metropolitan arrangement (related ones have the same color)

Urban Renewal

Telecommunication

Flood control and sewerage management

Maintenance of peace and order

Development Planning

* *

Water Supply

Networking of economic support infrastructure

Tourism

Urban protection Public and pollution safety control

* * *

* * *

Health and sanitation

* *

Transport and traffic management (/engineering)

* *

Solid waste management and disposal

Metro-wide services/functions across eight metropolitan arrangements

Metro Manila Metro BLIST (Baguio, La Trinidad, Itogon, Sablan, Tuba) Metro Naga Metro Cebu Metro Iloilo Metro CDO Metro Davao CAMADA (Calasiao, Mangaldan, Dagupan)

Table 2

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*

*

*

Metro Cebu Metro Iloilo

Metro CDO Metro Davao

CAMADA (Calasiao, Mangaldan, Dagupan)

*

* *

Urban protection Public and pollution safety control

*

*

Networking of economic support infrastructure

*

*

Maintenance of peace and order

Source Authors’ own table developed from raw data from Mercado and Manasan (2002)

*

Metro Naga

Health and sanitation

*

*

Telecommunication

Environmental sanitation, disaster management, trade and investment promotion Livelihood program *Long term: Industrial estate development, power generation, mass transport, sustainable natural resource development, human resource and technology development Education, housing/resettlement

Equipment pool program, elderly service, emergency rescue, enterprise development, manpower development and employment

Other services pursued by the metropolitan arrangement (related ones have the same color) 3 WHERE THE GAPS ARE: REEXAMINING THE FRAMEWORK …

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• Metro Manila is the only metropolitan arrangement that stems from a deliberate national policy and is sustained as such throughout its metamorphosis (from PD 824 that gave Metropolitan Manila a public corporate character and created the MMC, to the institutionalization of the MMDA in 1995 through RA 7924); • Its development has been part and parcel of the priorities of national leadership since 1975; • It’s the only metropolitan arrangement in the country that emerged before the trend became a global phenomenon in the ‘90s; • It has a special role as the country’s link to other premier cities in the world and distinguishes itself as the economic, social, cultural, educational, and political center of the nation by bearing the title “National Capital Region.” The Metropolitan Governance Framework featured in Mercado and Manasan (2002) identifies three crucial elements in metropolitan planning and development. At the apex is a “common vision for the region,” which may be an elaborately framed goal or a simple recognition of the benefits that the members of the constituted metropolis may derive from the arrangement or cooperation (Fig. 2). Common Vision for the Region

Metropolitan Planning and Development Unified Economic and Political Base

Appropriate Metropolitan Structure

Fig. 2 Metropolitan governance framework (Source Mercado and Manasan 2002)

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Meanwhile, at its foundation are several core concepts. A “unified political mechanism” tackles the challenge of disjointed political jurisdictions in metropolitan planning and management, since this situation often thwarts unified planning especially when these political jurisdictions retain and exercise substantial functions and powers under existing laws. “Unified economic institutions” address the difficulty of harmonizing or rationalizing the various sectoral and specialized agencies providing urban development services in metropolises, which often develop independently of elected government and may resist participation in metropolitan-wide planning if not handled carefully and systematically. Finally, an “appropriate metropolitan structure” means that each metropolis will have to craft its own workable structure, given the multiplicity and variety of political and socio-economic challenges it is faced with and in the spirit of decentralized governance. Public criticism of metro-wide services in Metro Manila are often directed against the MMDA, possibly due to reasons such as frequent exposure to media (mostly on reports about traffic congestion and road policies affecting the riding public) or its seeming proximity to the daily experiences of NCR residents through road signs and reminders, the deployment of traffic constables in key thoroughfares, or clean-up drives in side streets or diversion routes. There is also the lack of understanding on the nature of MMDA and the weight of expectation from a government agency that bears “development authority” affixed after the capital region’s name. In reality, however, the current functions and powers of MMDA form only a portion of the metro-wide nexus of services. The existence of Metropolitan Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System as the chief regulatory body for the region’s water supply, and the Light Rail Transit Authority and Metro Rail Transit Corporation for mass transport, are both striking examples of services functionally fragmented from all the other activities provided by MMDA and those mandated to LGUs by the 1991 Local Government Code. The presence of all these organizations is a clear consequence of Metro Manila’s distinctiveness as the national capital region, whose management is as much a concern of national leadership as of the LGUs within it. With a patchwork of different providers and varying systems of service delivery (and consequently accountability), the currently broad metropolitan framework of Metro Manila perfectly fits the framework of MLG. From the outset, there is nothing inherently wrong with such a

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setup, provided that proper delineation and coordination among service providers and tiers of authority are achieved, whether by vertical or horizontal MLG. Metropolitan arrangements in the Philippines are generally not dismissed for lack of technical merit or benefits (Mercado and Manasan 2002), but oftentimes hindered by political decisions instead. The perplexing case of solid waste disposal is used as a case-in-point, wherein the decision of finding the perfect host LGU for a physical dumping site would result to the latter’s withdrawal or resentment of the metropolitan arrangement (Mercado and Manasan 2002). In contrast, Metro Manila is relatively shielded from these concerns, owing largely to the national government’s dominating presence and role for and on its behalf. In this vein, the notion of LGUs’ ownership of a metropolitan arrangement as a key element to success must come into play in Metro Manila. If the initiative to enter into a metropolitan arrangement comes from constituent LGUs themselves, then they would be more willing to sustain its operability through financial contributions, in full recognition of the benefits they would reap and the accompanying opportunity cost from participating in such a scheme. With a national government constantly at its back to support the metropolitan arrangement, the interests and perspective of NCR’s constituent LGUs rather vary, especially considering the history of “forced” carving of 13 municipalities (12 from Rizal and one from Bulacan) to be included under the jurisdiction of the MMC, in addition to the initial LGUs of Manila, Quezon City, Caloocan, and Pasay (Mercado and Manasan 2002). Thus, the interlinked processes of information dissemination, buyin, and ownership must factor not only technical soundness but also political support both from local governments and the constituents themselves. The national government must also strike the proper balance in articulating its special interests for the region, and ensure that the present decentralization regime is strengthened than reduced, especially considering NCR’s historical development as a region. Inducing local participation then becomes an essential core for a metropolitan arrangement’s success—strongly preferred, rather than being driven from the top that prevents animosity from local key players, and resentment due to “centralist tendencies” of the national government. Recognizing Metro Manila’s current “metropolitan spread” then necessitates an integrated and holistic reconstruction of the various models of metropolitan arrangements present into a single coherent

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framework, one that could show how the various parts dovetail or complement other nodes in the system within the overall setup underlied by decentralization, urbanization, regionalization, and privatization. Having this contemporary iteration of NCR’s hybrid metropolitan arrangement (s) could reframe the entire discussion on Metro Manila’s urban sprawl and the consequent policy actions that stretch beyond targeting the MMDA alone. When the needs of metropolitan Manila became a priority concern of the national leadership in 1975, the seeds of the eventual NCR were hinged on “how to improve public services in the areas geographically embracing the center of government” and the “need to develop a region to serve as the showcase for the country’s drive for modernization consistent with its export-oriented national development strategy” (Mercado and Manasan 2002). The politics surrounding that initiative notwithstanding, the more than four decades that have since passed offer rich insights on how to further optimize the metropolitan arrangement in the national capital region. “[E]xisting problems of inefficient and uncoordinated services as well as future challenges posed in these areas in the face of rapid urbanization” were further push factors in the ‘70s (Mercado and Manasan 2002). Well into the twenty-first century, the historical, political, economic, and technical dimensions of NCR’s metamorphosis should be holistically accounted alongside a sound, participative, planned, and truly regional outlook to craft a context-specific and tailor-fitted metropolitan arrangement. As rapid urbanization remains a development phenomenon for cities and regions that local and national governments will continue to confront in the future, the performance of Metro Manila’s metropolitan arrangement must be revisited and assessed, particularly how such a setup delivered on its purported purposes and promises. There is little merit in belaboring NCR’s spatial integrity and contiguity even with its “forced” evolution from Marcos’ time than having the metropolitan arrangement work for the challenges of today. Otherwise, LGUs, the national government, and other stakeholders’ low appreciation and miscalculation of the pressures of twenty-first-century governance will undoubtedly remain, leaving the general public lying at the losing end.

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4 Conclusion: A Case for reconfiguring Metro Manila It is high time for Philippine policy-makers to finally recognize Metro Manila’s distinctiveness—the region, as the national capital, is in a class of its own, and must be accorded with the special powers, functions, and governance structures that would enable it to stand alongside other modern capital regions in a globalized world. Moreover, as the country’s most progressive region, it is the perfect candidate for pilot-testing prospective systems before nation-wide cascading. It needs to be emphasized, however, that applying lessons from NCR to the rest of the country must take into account the different conditions on the ground in other regions relative to the situation in Metro Manila. This chapter discussed two alternative governance proposals that have the potential of translating NCR’s particularities into concrete structures and programs, albeit through different means that each carry their own perspectives and values. All the appraised proposals arise from shared premises—the rejection of a one-size-fits-all approach to development in contemporary national and local governance, the complexity of the metropolitan species spawned by the confluence of geographical, historical, political, economic, and geospatial considerations, and the need to reform the NCR’s current governance architecture into one capable of confronting the pressures of urbanization, regionalization, and twentyfirst-century governance. Indeed, the “question” that drives the agenda for change—the demand for poverty reduction, welfare, and general development—must be comprehensively revisited, before an “answer” can be reached regarding federalism or any other alternative model of governance. Such task requires a long-term commitment from the 17 LGUs, the MMDA, the Metropolitan Manila Council, and the national government leadership and its agencies, especially the Department of the Interior and Local Government and the National Economic Development Authority. Various stakeholders must strongly consider NCR’s metamorphosis and how it fared in the overall regime of local governance in the country from its nascent beginnings to the era of decentralization. Furthermore, Philippine policy-makers should also realize that while the legacy of decentralization is here to stay, it must be contextualized with a more regional framework that aims to serve complementing goals of constituent units, rather than just maintaining an order that privileges

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parochial interests and fragmented functions. For the national government, the approach must also thread the principles of cooperation and participation instead of employing brute centralist methods. Whether the option is to create a new governing entity, or to reform an existing one, a candid partnership between the national government and the 17 LGUs is central for the success of any proposed political arrangement. As gradated ways forward take precedence, the prospects of smaller clusters cannot be precluded as well. In choosing between a federal NCR and a metropolitan arrangement, the government must build upon Metro Manila’s rich experience of urbanization, regionalization, and decentralization. This should reflect how the characteristics, functions, structures, and other elements of a new or reformed governance entity would materialize. In the end, if Metro Manila is to take the next step, national and local leaders must do so in full cognizance of its status as the national capital region— far from being merely a conglomeration of local governments acting on their own parochial interests, it is a distinct subnational and political unit whose progress is the vital groundwork for the development of the entire country, federal or otherwise.

Annex I: Breakdown of Metro Manila’s metro-wide authorities across time

Areas of responsibilities

Governing body

and others

Common, essential, municipal and public services to be integrated

MMC

Transportation Flood control and drainage Water supply and sewerage Social services Health services Environmental services Housing Park development Public safety Management and control of operations during calamities and emergencies

Land use, planning and zoning, urban development and renewal Sanitation and waste management Traffic management

MMA

(continued)

Shelter services

Health and sanitation

Development planning, urban renewal, zoning and land use planning Solid waste disposal and management Transport and traffic management Flood control and sewerage management

MMDA

116 K. M. R. GOMEZ ET AL.

MMC

General administrative, executive, and policy-making functions which includes coordination, integration and unified management of local government services of all the local units under the metropolitan

Governing body

Scope of powers

(continued)

Perform planning, monitoring, coordinating and implementing functions where appropriate, and in the process, exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila area, and in conformity with the national government policies without diminution of the autonomy of the local government concerning purely local matters

Attend to metropolitan-wide and/or common problems that transcend local boundaries, without interfering with the local government units which shall continue to be primarily responsible for the administration of their respective political jurisdictions

(continued)

MMDA

MMA

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Has jurisdiction over the delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination or consolidation for operations in the Metropolitan Manila and formulation of relevant policies

Public corporation vested with powers and attributes to act as a central government to establish and administer programs and provide services common to the area

Characteristics

Source Presidential Decree 824, Executive Order 392, Republic Act 7924

MMA

MMC

Governing body

(continued)

Special development and administrative region that deals with the planning, supervising, regulating, monitoring, coordinating, or implementation of basic services affecting or involving Metro Manila (metro-wide)

MMDA

118 K. M. R. GOMEZ ET AL.

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CHAPTER 4

Where the Gaps Are: Assessing Alternative Models of Governance to Improve the Delivery of Key Public Services in Metro Manila Kevin Mark R. Gomez and Fatima Joy O. Pamittan

1

Introduction

In 1991, the state codified the idea of the Philippines as territory uniquely suited to decentralized governance, primarily because of its defining geographic trait—its archipelagic nature. With the enactment of the Local

This paper emanates from a policy report entitled, “Where the gaps are: Assessing alternative models of governance to improve the delivery of key public services in Metro Manila” by Aimee Dresa R. Bautista, Kevin Mark R. Gomez, and Fatima Joy O. Pamittan. This research was made when the corresponding author, Kevin Mark R. Gomez, was still a faculty at the Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 T. S. E. Tadem and M. E. L. Atienza (eds.), A Better Metro Manila?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3_4

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Government Code, the key powers and functions of governance were devolved to local government units. Among the goals of decentralization was to improve the delivery of social services, in terms of both accessibility and efficiency (Shah and Thompson 2004; Ghuman and Singh 2013). However, in practice, decentralization has not necessarily led to uniform development in the Philippines. Although social services have become more accessible across all regions, the quality of these services has unevenly deteriorated (Ghuman and Singh 2013). It is partly due to those circumstances that, in recent years, there was an increase in the popularity of calls for federalism as the best way to achieve effective decentralization. The Duterte administration has repeatedly asserted that there is a gap in service delivery between the National Capital Region (NCR) and the other regions in the Philippines, and that such a disparity can only be resolved by adopting federalism. In this context, this chapter will answer several key questions. First, during the first half of President Rodrigo Duterte’s term, from 2016 to 2019, what was the state of key public services in Metro Manila? Second, how do individual local government units in Metro Manila perform relative to their peers in other regions? Finally, under current conditions, what governance model can best address the gaps in public service delivery in Metro Manila? Such research is vital to identifying the gaps in the delivery of these public services among local government units (LGUs) and pinpointing how Metro Manila’s current governance structure exacerbates or alleviates these concerns. As the national capital, an assessment of Metro Manila’s methods for service delivery may serve as a “template” for the country’s other regions to follow (Shatkin 2006).

K. M. R. Gomez (B) Department of Foreign Affairs, Pasay City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] F. J. O. Pamittan College of Engineering, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected]

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Metro Manila Through the Lens of Multi-Level Governance Overview of the National Capital Region (NCR)

NCR, also called Metro Manila, holds a distinctive position both administratively and geospatially. Its governing bodies face myriad challenges which are not present in other regions, especially terms of coordinating responses in accordance with the expansion of the metropolis and the consideration of its impact on urban viability. In the face of geographic realities and severe strains to the biophysical features of Metro Manila, as well as the complex socio-political, economic, and demographic dynamics it has spawned, any potential solution requires understanding the inextricable connections between governance, geography, urbanization, and regionalization. Metro Manila evolved into its current form through centuries of colonial rule. Today, like other national capitals, it is distinguished from other regions by virtue of its importance to the central government (Hague and Harrop 2010). The region serves as the country’s political and economic epicenter, contributing a huge share of the country’s economic production and cultural resources (Shatkin 2006) (See further discussion on this in Chapters 2 and 3) (Fig. 1). Although it comprises a mere 0.2% of the country’s total land area, NCR houses 12.4% of the country’s population. It also accounts for 38.1% of the National Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a contribution notably larger than that of any other region. Metro Manila’s local economy is heavily reliant on the service sector. This adds to NCR’s distinctiveness relative to other regions, for the sectors which are most common in the rest of the country—agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing—comprise only 0.2 percent of its local economy (Fig. 2). A region’s local economy can serve as a collective indicator of the capacities of its constituent LGUs. On average, NCR still depends on national government transfers for about 30–40% of its revenue. From 2011 to 2016, it generated between 58 and 67% of its own revenue. Among the 17 LGUs, Makati performed the best between 2011 and 2016, having locally generated an average of 89% of its total revenue. Makati is followed by Pasig with 83.17%, Mandaluyong with 82.67%, Pasay with 78.67%, and Quezon City with 76.67%. In contrast, Manila

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Fig. 1 The Districts of Metro Manila (Source Map rendered by authors)

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DAVAO REGION 4.52%

SOCCSKSARGEN 2.77%

CARAGA 1.23%

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ARMM 0.72%

NORTHERN MINDANAO 4.11% ZAMBOANGA PENINSULA 2.05% EASTERN VISAYAS 2.26% CENTRAL VISAYAS 4.21%

NCR 39.11%

WESTERN VISAYAS 4.21% BICOL 2.16% MIMAROPA 1.54%

ILOCOS 3.18%

CALABARZON 15.20%

CENTRAL LUZON 9.24%

CAR 1.75%

CAGAYAN VALLEY 1.75%

Fig. 2 Percent distribution of Gross Regional Domestic Product (as of 2016) (Source Original diagram by authors based on data from Philippine Statistics Authority [2017]. “Gross Regional Domestic Product.”)

only has 61.67%, and on the lowest end of the scale, Navotas sourced only 41% of its revenue locally. In terms of financial independence, the most capable LGUs appear to be distributed between the second and fourth districts. Evidently, within Metro Manila, there is great variance in the level of dependence the LGUs have on national government transfers. Locallysourced revenue can be a useful barometer for evaluating an LGU’s financial capacity to deliver public services, as it shows a local government’s proclivity to raise its own resources for its own disposal. Still, despite a dependency rate of around 30–40%, Metro Manila shows marked affluence compared to other Philippine regions. Apart from

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contributing the largest share of income to the national GDP, it also has a poverty incidence of 2.7%, which is far below the national average of 16.5%. 2.2

Applying the Socio-Political and Geospatial Dimensions of Multi-Level Governance in NCR

In 1993, Gary Marks introduced the concept of “multi-level governance” (MLG) as a new theory which could be used to analyze how governance transcends national boundaries. Marks defined MLG as “a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers—supranational, national, regional and local” (392). This section elaborates further multi-level governance which was discussed in Chapter 1. The term “governance” over “government” shows the theory’s emphasis on the relationships between institutions (Hague and Harrop 2010). It recognizes the dispersion of authority across levels of government and across different spheres, including both public and private sectors. Accounting for boundary-crossing activity (Daniell and Kay 2017), the MLG theory was used to analyze the decision-making dynamics within the European Union (EU) which exercises supranational authority (Piattoni 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2003). While the theory of MLG is more often applied in European integration discourse and dynamics within the EU, it also became relevant in examining and evaluating governance across different tiers within the state. The MLG framework is a useful tool in explaining the local governance setup in the Philippines, especially for Metro Manila, where tiers of authority and crisscrossing delineation of functions and services between public and private providers culminate in the region’s unique institutional setup. Hooghe and Marks (2003) further identified two types of MLG which are not based on the extent of power-sharing in a territory. Type I MLG is conceptualized in terms of sharing authority among a few different levels of government. This is analogous to the vertical approach to multi-level governance, as seen in the case of federalism. This type is concerned with only one relevant jurisdiction at any particular territorial scale and sets a more stable line of jurisdiction, authority, and responsibility. Type I MLG is based on general-purpose, non-intersecting jurisdictions, and limited to a number of levels (international, national, regional, meso, and local).

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Type II MLG, on the other hand, is based on task-specific, intersecting jurisdictions, and numerous jurisdictional levels. It is generally nested in Type I governance, but seeks to solve specific policy problems and distribute capacities among several overlapping governments with the same need for collective decision-making, making it more flexible. Type II MLG is analogous to the horizontal approach to governance that emphasizes the sideways relationship within each tier of government. Ferguson (2009) notes that horizontal governance “replaces hierarchical leadership with collaboration, coordination, shared responsibility for decisions and outcomes, and a willingness to work through consensus.” Among the common characteristics of horizontal governance that Ferguson cited are: non-hierarchical structures where authority and responsibility are shared, preference for partnership over competition, and a focus on “coordinated government.” The advantage of MLG lies in the greater flexibility accorded to the government as an institution. However, this often comes at the cost of increased complexity in government transactions, which would require coordinating multiple jurisdictions (Hooghe and Marks 2003). Coordination refers to “the need to ensure that the various organization—public and private—charged with delivering public policy work together and do not produce either redundancy or gaps in services” (Peters 1998). A minimal level of coordination is one where organizations are, at most, aware of the activities of other organizations and avoids to duplicate or interfere. Since the policies of a jurisdiction may have a negative or positive spill-over to others, it is necessary that these jurisdictions coordinate to avoid negative outcomes. There are also several negative, unintended consequences which arise from problems with coordination. These include inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and internal conflict within organizations (Peters 1998); turf protection (Bardach 1996); power distribution (Bryson and Einsweiler 1991); competition for resources (Peters 1998); and multiplicity of accountabilities (Fitzpatrick 2000, as cited in Ferguson 2009). In the early years of Metro Manila’s establishment, disparities in basic services among its local governments were apparent because the development of the system and the delivery of these services (including coverage and quality) were dependent on each LGU’s financial capacity (Reyes 1988). This became unfavorable for less affluent (and usually smaller)

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LGUs. More so, Metro Manila as a whole was suffering from the problems naturally brought by urbanization—overpopulation, pollution, and congestion, among others. In trying to address these issues, the LGUs of Metro Manila undertook projects without consultation with each other (Reyes 1998). However, issues of services delivery and urbanization problems are matters which surpass local jurisdictions (Padilla 1988). Some structures and systems should be planned with consideration to other territories, or in a more efficient scale (Mercado and Manasan 2002)—for instance, in metro-wide settings. Various attempts have been made over the past decades to deal with these issues. In 1975, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) became the first metro-wide body created as a means to address gaps in service provision within Metro Manila. As the country’s political and socioeconomic conditions changed post-1986, the MMC was eventually replaced by the Metro Manila Authority (MMA); however, the demands of urbanization and inefficiency of the metro’s governance system persisted. In 1995, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) was created to replace the MMA. Today, as per R.A. 7924, the MMDA continues to “perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units.” Applying the MLG framework in contemporary Metro Manila shows the following relationships among public and private organizations in delivering services to NCR’s constituents (Fig. 3): The 17 Metro Manila LGUs are the primary governance structures that operate within the region’s constituent units on a daily basis. These cities and municipality, like any other local government, individually enjoy substantive powers within their respective jurisdictions, and are in charge of their political unit, as mandated by the 1991 LGC. Likewise, respective barangays, as the most basic unit of local government in the Philippines, also exercise full powers, functions, and accountabilities directly supervised by their respective cities/municipality. It can be observed that MLG I, or the vertical model of governance, is demonstrated by the city/municipality-barangay relationship. Meanwhile, cooperation within same tiers (city-city, city-municipality, municipalitymunicipality, and barangay-barangay) are underpinned by MLG II or horizontal relations.

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NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DILG

MMDA

NCR

CHED

DOH

NCR

DOHoperated hospitals

DOTr

LRT / MRT

NAV

MAL

CAL

MKT

PSY

MNL

TAG

PSG

MRK

QC

VAL

PRQ

A

R

A

N

L

O

C

A

L

G

A

Y

C

O

N

Maynilad / Manila Water

PTR LUCs

B

Meralco

MWSS

SJ

MND

LPN

MUN

ERC

B

A

R

A

N

G

A

Y

S

T

I

T

U

E

N

T

SUCs

Local hospit als

NCR

hosp itals

Non-NCR resident-constituents at-large

Fig. 3 Framework of Relationships Among Public and Private Institutions in the NCR (Source Original figure rendered by the authors.)

Presently, the MMDA is mandated to coordinate all the decisions and actions of the 17 LGUs for the following metro-wide services: traffic management, solid waste disposal and management, flood control and sewerage management, health and sanitation, and urban protection and pollution control. It also acts as the region’s second-tier body. As a coordinative body, however, the MMDA lacks quasi-legislative or quasijudicial powers (Gamboa 2018), and effectively works above but also under Metro Manila’s LGUs. The mix of vertical and horizontal MLG can also be seen in other dynamics. Following the wave of privatization in the ‘1990s, electricity and water services were provided by private concessionaires. The national government’s looming presence in the capital region is evident in the latter’s transportation sector, wherein the metro’s in-city train systems are managed and operated by the Light Rail Transit Authority and the Metro Rail Transit Corporation, which are government-owned, privatelyrun corporations primarily responsible for the construction, operation, and maintenance of light rail transit systems (lrta.gov.ph) and metro rail transit systems, respectively (mrt3.com). Further, the Department of Health, a national agency, remains a dominant figure in the supervision and operation of several specialty and specialized hospitals despite

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the decentralization of health services in 1991. Meanwhile, state universities and colleges, owned and operated by the central government, while having a national catchment are also mostly located in the region. As such, a 1998 assessment still holds true, even two decades later: Metro Manila is struggling to find the right formula for the most efficient and equitable form of local governance (Mercado 1998) that would effectively and efficiently deliver basic services to the NCR’s constituents.

3

The State of Public Service Delivery in Metro Manila

To analyze the selected public services in Metro Manila, data from each LGU will be compared against several parameters. The first one is peace and order, a goal which Duterte himself has repeatedly emphasized in his campaigns and programs, particularly the fight against drugs and other criminal activity, the “zero” in the administration’s 0 + 10 point socioeconomic agenda. The second and third parameters are health and education, which are included in the seventh point of the agenda, linked to the goal of “invest[ing] in human capital development…and match skills and training to meet the demand of business and private sector,” according to the the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA, 2018). The fourth parameter considered in this section is disaster risk reduction and management, as the Philippines was ranked the third most disaster-prone country in the world (World Risk Index 2018). Recent calamities have also exposed the vulnerability of local communities and the need for LGUs, as first responders, to upgrade their capacity to handle a broad range of disasters. 3.1

Peace and Order

Peace and order was of utmost priority of the Duterte administration, serving as the “bedrock” of its socioeconomic agenda, in order to ensure “the foundation for inclusive growth, a high trust and resilient society, and a globally competitive knowledge economy” (NEDA 2018, 152). Hence, public order is designated as a means of facilitating the execution of other strategies in the 2017–2022 Philippine Development Plan. In this section, the number of index crimes and the number of police stations in each LGU were used as an indicator of the state of peace and order in Metro Manila. From 2016 to 2018, Quezon City, Manila, and

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Caloocan recorded the highest number of index crimes in NCR. These cities also have the highest number of police stations in Metro Manila, which is indicative of these LGUs’ effort to address criminality in their areas (Fig. 4). When computing the ratio of index crimes to land area, however, crime is shown to be most prevalent in the Western part of Metro Manila—an area which includes the cities of Navotas, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, and Pasay. Notably, both by quantity and crime to land area ratio, a high level of crime incidence is observed in the City of Manila in particular. Meanwhile, Las Piñas and Pateros remained low in their level of crime incidence, even after their sizes were taken into consideration. This may have implications for the question of how to address the situation in Manila as the country’s capital, in terms of reinforcement and more

Fig. 4 Crime incidents in Metro Manila (Source Maps rendered based on collated data from the Philippine National Police- NCR [ncrpo.pnp.gov.ph])

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strategic initiatives to combat criminality notwithstanding factors such as political and technical support. At present, coordination among NCR LGUs on issues of peacekeeping, order, and public safety campaign is done by the National Capital Region Police Office of the Philippine National Police. 3.2

Health

Health services in the NCR are provided by 604 public health facilities and 261 private health facilities distributed throughout the region. Nominally, government facilities vastly outnumber private ones; however, further disaggregated data reveals that the majority of these government facilities are rural health units, which only provide basic health services (Fig. 5).

Fig. 5 Health facilities in Metro Manila

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The ratio of health facilities to land area is used to compare the presence of health service providers across NCR in a standardized manner. For instance, Quezon City has the highest number of both government and private health facilities in the region and appears on the surface to be the regional center for health services. But when the ratio of facilities to land area is factored in, Quezon City drops in the rankings. It joins other cities with a less developed capability to deliver health services, placing among the lowest five LGUs in Metro Manila along with Malabon, Pateros, Paranaque, and Muntinlupa. Without prejudice to service quality, these five cities have the fewest number of health facilities when land area is taken into consideration. On the other hand, Navotas, Manila, San Juan, Mandaluyong, and Makati have the highest number of health facilities in the same criteria. Despite these figures, Quezon City remains an important focal point in the health services provided not only for the constituents of the NCR, but of the country as a whole. Several highly specialized hospitals, with no counterpart anywhere else in the Philippines, are located in Quezon City: the National Kidney Transplant Institute, the Lung Center of the Philippines, the Philippine Heart Center, the Philippine Children’s Medical Center, the Philippine Orthopedic Center, the National Children’s Hospital, and the Quirino Memorial Medical Center. 3.3

Education

The state of education in the NCR is measured in this chapter through three criteria—literacy rate, distribution of basic education schools (elementary and secondary level), and distribution of higher education and skills institutions (through state universities and colleges and technical-vocational institutions with the Technical Education and Skills Development Agency or TESDA-registered programs) in the region. Literacy rate accounts for the percentage of the population that are able to read and write, regardless of any level of educational attainment. According to the Functional Literacy, Education and Mass Media Survey conducted by the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) in 2013, a little more than three-fourths of the population in NCR are literate. The literacy rate is highest in Marikina, San Juan, and Makati, and lowest in Muntinlupa, Navotas, and Taguig. As for the number of basic educational institutions in Metro Manila, there are more private elementary and secondary schools than public

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ones. The disparity is greatest in Quezon City, where there are almost four times more private schools than public schools. This significant difference may have implications on the delivery of basic education in Quezon City and in NCR in terms of accessibility and affordability. Moreover, secondary schools are significantly fewer than elementary schools. This may have repercussions on accessibility and quality of teaching at the secondary level, given fewer educational facilities to absorb elementary graduates who graduate and proceed to secondary schools (Fig. 6 and Table 1). Based on the number of elementary and secondary schools, Quezon City appears to be the most capable LGU, while Pateros is the most challenged. Once land area is considered, however, Quezon City is supplanted in the rankings by Caloocan, Manila, San Juan, Marikina, Mandaluyong, Makati, and Taguig, all of which appear to more capable of providing basic education to their constituents. A total of 23 public higher educational institutions (HEIs, or state and local universities and colleges) can be found in NCR. Many of these HEIs are located in the City of Manila. The national university and the country’s premier state tertiary institution, the University of the Philippines, has two campuses in the region, one in Quezon City and the other in Manila. SUCs are particularly important as the primary provider of accessible quality education in the Philippines, especially in light of the recent Free Tuition Act. In 2017–2018, the average faculty-student ratio of SUCs in NCR was at 1:24 (the national average was at 1:23), marginally higher than the average among private higher educational institutions (HEIs) at 1:19 (the national average was also at 1:19) (Commission on Higher Education 2018) (Table 2). There are eight SUCs and 15 local universities and colleges (LUCs) in NCR. Las Piñas, San Juan, and Pateros have neither an SUC nor LUC. This might be explained by their proximity to neighboring areas which have such institutions—San Juan City, for instance, is surrounded by Manila, Quezon City, and Mandaluyong. Being able to fund an LUC, however, can be seen as an indicator of an LGU’s financial capability and strategic priorities. Another criterion to evaluate the state of skills education in NCR is the distribution of Technical-Vocational Institutions (TVIs) with TESDAregistered programs. More than a third of these institutions (1,222 out of 3,058 TVIs) are concentrated in Manila and the adjacent cities of San

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Fig. 6 Literacy Rate in Metro Manila

139

Source DepEd NCR

74 28 46 34 10 24

93 22 71 54 11 43

175 72 103 121 32 89

108

174 296

63 28 35 31 12 19

94

36 18 18 21 11 10

54

71 17 54 43 14 29

114

86 20 66 55 8 47

141

26 15 11 10 6 4

36

112 21 91 74 10 64

186

49 19 30 29 9 20

78

115 28 87 57 12 45

481 97 384 282 46 236

172 763

25 8 17 17 1 16

138 22 116 76 12 64

42 214

113 39 74 63 19 44

176

11 7 7 7 2 5

18

Caloocan Las ManilaMakatiMalabon Mandaluyong MarikinaMuntinlupaNavotasParañaquePasayPasigQuezon San TaguigValenzuelaPateros Piñas City Juan

Elementary and Secondary Schools in Metro Manila

Basic 286 Education Schools in NCR Elementary178 Public 57 Private 121 Secondary 108 Public 32 Private 76

Table 1

140 K. M. R. GOMEZ AND F. J. O. PAMITTAN

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Table 2

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141

State and Local Universities and Colleges in Metro Manila SUCs1

LUCs

Caloocan City (1)

–

Las Piñas City (0) City of Manila (5)

Makati City (1) Malabon City (1)

– Eulogio “Amang” Rodriguez Institute of Science and Technology Philippine Normal University Polytechnic University of the Philippines Technological University of the Philippines University of the Philippines5 (Manila) – –

University of Caloocan City – Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila

Mandaluyong City (1) Marikina City (2)

Rizal Technological University Marikina Polytechnic College

Muntinlupa City (1)

–

Navotas City (1)

–

Parañaque City (2)

–

Pasay City (2)

San Juan City (0) Taguig City (1) Valenzuela City (1)

Philippine State College of Aeronautics University of the Philippines5 (Diliman) – – –

Pateros (0) NCR Total

– 8

Quezon City (2)

Source Commission on Higher Education

University of Makati City of Malabon University – Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Marikina Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Muntinlupa Navotas Polytechnic College Parañaque City College Parañaque City College of Science and Technology City University of Pasay Quezon City Polytechnic University – Taguig City University Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Valenzuela Valenzuela City Polytechnic College – 15

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Fig. 7 TVIs in Metro Manila (Source Maps rendered based on collated data from Open Data Philippines [data.gov.ph])

Juan, Mandaluyong, Makati, and Pasay, even when adjusted for city size. Geographically, it appears that TVIs are concentrated in the western part of NCR, while the fewest number are in the northern cities of Navotas, Malabon, and Valenzuela (Fig. 7). 3.4

Disaster Risk Reduction Management (DRRM)

The need for stronger coordination among LGUs, more than any other public service, is most pronounced in disaster risk reduction and management because natural calamities are never constrained by local governments’ territorial boundaries. NCR is particularly vulnerable to 1 Excluding satellite campus.

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143

Fig. 8 Susceptibility of LGUs to groundshaking, liquefaction, and landslide (Source Maps rendered based on data collected from PHIVOLCS)

“The Big One”—an earthquake with a magnitude of at least 7.2 in the Richter scale—due to the West Valley Fault (DOST-PHIVOLCS 2016). At the same time, NCR is also infamous for massive flooding caused by inclement weather conditions. The westernmost and easternmost parts of Metro Manila are the most vulnerable, with the highest susceptibility to ground shaking and liquefaction, according to data from the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology. Territories located along the West Valley Fault—Manila, Pasay, Marikina, Pasig, Pateros, and Taguig, Mandaluyong, Makati, Paranaque, Muntinlupa, and Las Piñas—are also high-risk (Fig. 8). The limited data2 seemingly shows that among the most vulnerable LGUs, Makati, Pasig, and Marikina are the only cities highly equipped to respond to disasters. More complete data for Manila, Navotas, Taguig, Pateros, and Quezon City would further add nuances to assessing the preparedness of NCR LGUs vis-à-vis their respective susceptibility to the disasters and hazards enumerated above.

2 As the time of writing, researchers were unable to access data on DRRM facilities in these LGUs online.

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3.5

Summary of the Findings

In this summary, all the featured services are tallied in a single balance sheet to comprehensively compare and contrast the performance of NCR’s 17 LGUs relative to each other. The ratio computed from the chosen indicators (incidence of index crimes-police stations, total health facilities, number of schools both elementary and secondary, and number of technical-vocational institutions) against the LGUs’ land area was used to match LGUs’ capacities with their needs. For the disaster risk management assessment, LGUs were ranked based on susceptibility to disaster (ground shaking, liquefaction, landslide, storm surge, and flooding), and evaluated based on their available evacuation centers and facilities (Fig. 9). Pateros, Las Piñas, and Taguig are the LGUs with the lowest proportion of index crimes to police stations. This may also imply that the adjacent areas of Pateros and Taguig may be the parts of the region that have the highest number of police stations relative to its land area (Fig. 10). On the indicator of number of health facilities relative to land area, San Juan, Mandaluyong, and the City of Manila tops NCR LGUs in terms of presence of health services within their territories. Understandably, given its size, Quezon City would appear to have insufficient health facilities in spite of the country’s many special and specialty hospitals in the city, making it an important node in the delivery of health services in the Philippines. Geographically, the most capable LGUs with a strong presence of health service providers are located in the central-western portions of the metro and are not evenly spread out across the region (Fig. 11).

Pasig

Muntinlupa Pasay

Manila

Marikina

Quezon City

Navotas

Malabon

Mandaluyong

Makati

San Juan

Caloocan

Parañaque

Taguig

Las Piñas

Pateros

Peace and Order

Fig. 9 Ranking of LGUs on peace and order (Source Authors’ own figure)

4

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Pateros

Parañaque

Muntinlupa

Malabon

Taguig

Quezon City

Caloocan

Pasay

Las Piñas

Pasig

Marikina Valenzuela

Makati

Navotas

Mandaluyong

Manila

San Juan

HEALTH

Fig. 10 Ranking of LGUs in the provision of health services (Source Authors’ own)

Pateros

Malabon

Muntinlupa

Pasig

Valenzuela

Navotas

Parañaque

Las Piñas

Quezon City

Caloocan

Taguig

Marikina

Makati

Pasay

Mandaluyong

San Juan

Manila

BASIC EDUCATION

Fig. 11 Ranking of LGUs in the provision of basic education (Source Authors’ own)

For basic education, the City of Manila, San Juan, and Mandaluyong are the most-equipped cities in the region, having the highest proportion of elementary and secondary schools relative to their land areas (Fig. 12). While Pateros, Manila, and Marikina are the three most susceptible cities to disaster, none of these LGUs seem to have adequate facilities and evacuation centers. Meanwhile, Makati, Malabon, and Pasig have the highest number of facilities and evacuation centers. This could imply that, as Pasig is adjacent to Pateros and Marikina, the DRRM of the two latter cities could be improved even further by strengthening their coordination

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K. M. R. GOMEZ AND F. J. O. PAMITTAN

Pateros

Manila

Marikina Pasay

Makati

Navotas

Parañaque

Taguig

Malabon Las Piñas

Pasig

Valenzuela

Quezon City

San Juan

Muntinlupa

Caloocan

Mandaluyong

DISASTER RISK REDUCTION AND MANAGEMENT

Fig. 12 Ranking of LGUs on disaster susceptibility (Source Authors’ own)

with the city that has a stronger DRRM capacity. The same could be said for the City of Manila, which could coordinate with Makati. In this section, measured against a common yardstick and using current data and metrics, Metro Manila LGUs are presented in terms of how they fare relative to their peers on key functional areas, within the context and priorities of the national government. While this is by no means a complete picture, overall, a notable concentration of LGUs in the second district—Mandaluyong, Marikina, Pasig, and Quezon City—seems to perform better relative to the rest of the region. This assessment reveals manifold opportunities and challenges. While it shows a general picture of NCR, the method also highlights interLGU disparities in common public services. Such findings should lead, not to resentment and insecurity among LGUs, but to a greater push for improvement by studying and applying the best practices of successful cities, while utilizing the MLG model for greater coordination with other government units both vertically and horizontally. Looking at the performance of an LGU vis-à-vis other LGUs could highlight their relative strengths, areas for improvement, and potential to become prospective hubs for certain public services and specialized functions, while contributing to the formation of a template for how other regions could operate in the context of decentralization.

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Conclusion: Surfacing the Gaps to Identify NCR’s “Blueprint”

It should be noted that decentralization, despite being touted as the key to greater efficiency in governance, has long been found to have a mixed effect on service delivery in the Philippines (Ghuman and Singh 2013). Health and education have become accessible as seen, for example, in the increased life expectancy and reduced mortality rate, increased health spending, and decreased cost in the construction of schools, compared to data from before the 1990s. However, the improvement in service accessibility was counterbalanced by the decline in quality (Capuno 2008, as cited in Ghuman and Singh 2013). The data provided in this chapter confirms these findings, and further illustrates the importance of conducting further research on the state of service delivery in the Philippines—not only to evaluate the effectiveness of policies, but to also provide a basis for future policies. As Agranoff (1990) noted in his research on metropolitan intergovernmental human services bodies, there is a need for “attempt[s] to understand local complexity as a basis for making other decisions.” The current state of public service delivery in Metro Manila has improved in terms of accessibility, especially in the health and education sector. However, the quality of these services has deteriorated. As for the performance of LGUs, data showed that disparity remains even among the LGUs of Metro Manila, even though NCR is often perceived as a monolithic entity that gets more resources from the national government compared to other regions. Not only are there differences in their capacities to independently generate their own revenues than others, there are also significant disparities in the efficiency and effectiveness of several public services delivered across the metro. To elaborate further on these concerns, LGUs must improve the accuracy of their own collated data on the delivery of public services, which may require cooperative data-sharing and extensive collaboration with other units. There are intriguing prospects that can be derived from the data. For instance, mapping the distribution of certain public services in Metro Manila emphasized the importance of considering geospatial realities in assessing delivery. This, in turn, may also become the basis of policies concerning inter-/intra-LGU coordination. There are also other approaches which may be useful in improving the delivery of public services in a decentralized system, such as federalism and metropolitan

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arrangements each with their own advantages and disadvantages, and each of which shows potential pathways to improve delivery of key public services in Metro Manila (See Chapter 3 for these.). However, the feasibility of any approach rests not just on its technical merits and soundness, but largely on the willingness and seriousness of all stakeholders to commit to a shared course of action. Regardless which configuration best suits NCR as a region, coordination among its LGUs remains crucial. If not done properly, any form of organizational coordination would inevitably induce adverse effects, such as inefficiency, ineffectiveness, competition for resources, and internal conflict within the organizations (Peters 1998). But if such coordination is properly executed, indeed, it could not only address the gaps identified in sectors like health and education; it could also be a new paradigm for the enactment of decentralized modes of public service delivery.

ANNEX I: Demographic Characteristics of Metro Manila LGUs District

LGU

Land Areaa (ha)

Populationb (in thousands)

Number Poverty Poverty of Cluster3 ,d Incidence c barangays among Families (%)

Capital District (1st District) Eastern Manila District (2nd District)

Manila

2,498

1,780

897

5

3.5 (~62,300)

929 2,152 4,846 17,171

386 451 755 2,936

27 16 30 142

5 5 5 5

1.9 (~88,350)

595 5,580 3,264 894 4,702

122 1,584 366 249 620

21 188 21 18 33

5 5 5 5 5

Mandaluyong Marikina Pasig Quezon City San Juan Northern Caloocan Manila Malabon District Navotas (3rd Valenzuela District)

3.3 (~93,027)

(continued) 3 Cluster 1 indicates the bottom or poorest cluster.

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(continued) District

LGU

Land Areaa (ha)

Populationb (in thousands)

Poverty Number of Cluster,d barangaysc

Poverty Incidence among Families (%)

Southern Manila District (4th District)

Las Piñas Makati Muntinlupa Parañaque Pasay Taguig Pateros

3,269 1,831 3,975 4,657 1,397 4,521 1,040 63,321 (0.2% of total PH land area) 30,000,000

589 583 505 666 417 805 64 12,880 (12.4% of total PH population) 104.900

20 33 9 16 201 28 10 1,710

2.8 (~101,612)

NCR

Philippines

5 5 5 5 5 5 5

2.7 (~347,760)

16.5%

Source a Department of Environment and Natural Resources; b Philippine Statistics Authority 2017; c Philippine Statistics Authority; d Philippine Statistics Authority.

ANNEX II: Number of Index Crimes and Police Stations in Metro Manila LGU

Caloocan City Las Piñas City City of Manila Makati City Malabon City Mandaluyong City Marikina City Muntinlupa City Navotas City

Index Crimes4

Police Stations

2016

2017

2018

2014

1,766 284 4,162 881 666 1,200 737 567 461

1,276 249 3,786 839 418 855 565 582 434

1,004 272 2,682 833 387 666 393 526 285

67 22 79 33 17 28 17 10 12 (continued)

4 Note The PNP defines crimes as those that involve crimes against persons (i.e., murder, homicide, physical injury, and rape) and crimes against property (i.e., robbery, theft, carnapping/carjacking, and cattle rustling).

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(continued) LGU

Parañaque City Pasay City Pasig City Quezon City San Juan City Taguig City Valenzuela City Pateros NCR (TOTAL)

Index Crimes

Police Stations

2016

2017

2018

2014

613 748 943 6,657 290 639 950 117 21,681

412 658 904 5,948 202 588 743 66 18,524

335 660 825 4,448 119 514 630 54 14,633

24 12 9 169 8 42 No data 10

Source Philippine National Police (PNP)- National Capital Region Office (http://ncrpo. pnp.gov.ph/crime-data-statistics/) ; DILG LGU Profile CMS, (http://lgu201.dilg.gov. ph/index.php)

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Philippine Statistics Authority. “Clustering of Provinces based on 2015 First Semester Poverty Incidence among Families, by Province: First Semesters of 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015.” Downloaded document. https://psa.gov.ph/ sites/default/files/Table%2014.xls. Ragragio, Junio M. 2013. “The Urban Slums Reports: The Case of Metro Manila, Philippines.” Understanding Slums: Case Studies for the Global Report on Human Settlements. https://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Glo bal_Report/pdfs/Manila.pdf. Regmi, Ram K. 2017a. “Urbanization and Related Environmental Issues of Metro Manila.” Journal ofAdvanced College of Engineering and Management 3. Regmi, Ram K. 2017b. “Urbanization and Related Environmental Issues of Metro Manila.” Journal of Advanced College of Engineering and Management 3. Republic Act No. 7160, or the Local Government Code of 1991. Accessed March 2019 from http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/ 1991/10oct/19911010-RA-7160-CCA.pdf. Republic Act No. 7924, An Act Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, Defining its Powers and Function, Providing Funds Therefore and Other Purposes, Otherwise Known as the MMDA Act of 1995. Accessed April 10, 2019 from http://marina.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ ra7924.pdf. Reyes, Marqueza C. L. 1998. “Spatial Structure of Metro Manila: Genesis, Growth and Development.” Philippine Planning Journal 29 (2). https:// doi.org/10.3126/jacem.v3i0.18906. Shah, Anwar, and Theresa Thompson. 2004. Implementing Decentralized Local Governance: A Treacherous Road with Potholes, Detours and Road Closures. World Bank. Shatkin, Gavin. 2004. “Planning to Forget: Informal Settlements as ‘Forgotten Places’ in Globalizing Metro Manila.” Urban Studies 41 (12): 2469–2484. Shatkin, Gavin. 2006. “Colonial Capital, Modernist Capital, Global Capital: The Changing Political Symbolism of Urban Space in Metro Manila, the Philippines.” Pacific Affairs 78 (4): 577–600. Accessed March 2019 from https:// www.jstor.org/stable/40022969. U.S. Geological Survey. “Soil Type and Shaking Hazard in the San Francisco Bay Area.” Last accessed April 9, 2019. https://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/ urban/sfbay/soiltype/. U.S. Geological Survey. “What is liquefaction?” Last accessed April 9, 2019. https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/what-liquefaction. Von Thünen, Johann Heinrich. 2009. The Isolated State in Relation to Agriculture and Political Economy. Edited by Ulrich van Suntum. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230274112.

CHAPTER 5

Decentralisation Experiences in the Philippines: Social Services Sectors and the Local Government Code of 1991 Jan Robert R. Go

1

Introduction

In 1991, the Local Government Code (LGC) or Republic Act No. 7160 was enacted. This Code serves as the framework of governance at the local level in the Philippines. It prescribed how local governments will be organised, who are the officials to be elected, what powers local governments have, and many more. Effectively, what the LGC of 1991 did was decentralise governance and administration and devolve specific service sectors to the sub-national levels. However, the generic formulation and prescriptions of the Code fail to consider a reality—socially, economically, and politically—confronting most of the local governments in the country, that is: local government capacity and capability are not equal.

J. R. R. Go (B) Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 T. S. E. Tadem and M. E. L. Atienza (eds.), A Better Metro Manila?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3_5

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More so, experiences of local governments are not the same. In urban centres like Metro Manila, Cebu, and Davao, local governments, which are mostly cities, are more or less able to cope with the challenges, namely, duties, and responsibilities, under a decentralised government system. Granted that these localities are not without problems, but looking at the cases of poorer municipalities, especially those in geographically isolated and disadvantaged areas, it will be apparent that the situation is not the same. The Code mandates a regular review of its provision every five years to cater to the localities’ ever-changing and dynamic needs. Unfortunately, such congressional review has not been realised up until today. In this light, the following question is posed: After more than a quarter of a century since the passage of the LGC of 1991, how are local governments today? Through the lens of governance (see Chapter 1), this chapter intends to shed some light on this question by looking at decentralisation and devolution experiences in the Philippines. Acknowledging how variegated these experiences are, this chapter focuses not only on the experiences of cities within Metro Manila, but also local government units outside the national capital. Looking at different local governments’ varying experiences with different contexts provides a perspective on how decentralisation has been implemented and effected in the country. Two service sectors will be given closer attention in the discussion. These are health and education. Health service sector has been fully devolved to the local level, while education follows a decentralised structure in accordance with the LGC of 1991 and the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001. Likewise, both health and education sectors at the local level are supervised by special bodies created by the LGC of 1991. These are the local health board and local school board. As mentioned above, the health function has been devolved from the national to all levels of local government with varying assigned responsibilities for provincial, city, municipal, and even the barangay level. Since 1991, however, several attempts and campaigns were made to recentralise the delivery of health services, one of which was as early as 1995, or four years after the passage of the law. Until today, many local government units have yet to realise the promise of a devolved health sector fully. While not fully devolved like health, the administration of the education sector has been decentralised. It has its own system of “sub-national” levels, i.e. regional, division, and district, and are headed by Department

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of Education (DepEd)-appointed officials. There are distinct set of problems for the education sector, which may also raise some question related to devolution: Given the current setup, is it ideal to further devolve the sector, just like in health, or the current system is acceptable? More explanations are provided in the specific sections below. The chapter is organised as follows. It begins with an overview of decentralisation in the Philippines. This section enumerates the arguments for and against decentralisation and devolution of services to the local level. The second and third section deals with the two service sectors of health and education. Each section looks at the related provisions of the Code and the experiences in implementing these provisions at the city and municipal levels. Based from these experiences, the next section enumerates the challenges under a devolved or decentralised setup. These challenges serve as the take-off points for the general and specific policy recommendations in the fifth section. The chapter ends with concluding remarks, particularly in the light of the proposed shift to a federal form of government under the Duterte administration. Chapter 5, therefore, takes off from Chapter 4 which provides a general overview of mapping out social services, including health and education, within the context of seeking multilevel governance alternative frameworks with emphasis on federalism and metropolitan arrangements. If Chapter 4 (Gomez et al.) examines geo-spatial considerations of social services deliveries, e.g. how many hospitals or schools are there in a specific location, Chapter 5 focuses more on the dynamics of the delivery of health and education services. It does this by examining their impact at the various local levels, i.e. the barangays, municipalities, and cities. Other factors of consideration will be the impact of politicians and local participation and financing through the internal revenue allotment (IRA) and in education, the Special Education Fund (SEF), in assessing social services delivery.

2 Decentralisation in the Philippines: An Overview Since the 1980s, decentralisation has been and continues to be a global trend. Without completely setting aside the central government, local levels of government are enabled under a decentralised system. They can perform tasks, assume roles, and provide services previously held by the national government.

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Prior to the enactment of the Code, there were already mechanisms for a decentralised system as early as the pre-Hispanic Philippines (Brillantes 1998). These mechanisms are primarily administrative, rather than political and substantive devolution of power. Given the country’s archipelagic geography, it was necessary to have a deconcentrated, or in some instances, delegated power distribution. In 1959, years after the independence from the formal American colonial rule, the first local autonomy act was enacted, which gave greater fiscal, planning, and regulatory powers to the local governments. This act was reinforced by the Decentralisation Act of 1967. In 1983, under Marcos Sr., a new constitution was ratified, which recognised the role of local governments in national development and encouraged the units’ full development as self-reliant communities. A version of a local government code has been enacted by the Batasang Pambansa (National Congress) to this effect. However, given the nature of the administration, which was overly centralised and authoritarian, the promise of decentralisation was left on paper and not fully realised. In the 1987 Constitution, Article X (Local Governments) lays down a decentralised Philippines’ foundations with a central government. The Constitution specifically provides for an enactment of a code for local governments’ organisation in the country. At present, decentralisation in the Philippines operates based on the Local Government Code of 1991. For Brillantes (1998), the Code did not only devolve service delivery functions and regulatory powers, but also enlarge the space for citizen participation, broaden the financial resources, and lay the foundation for entrepreneurial-oriented local governments. Figure 1 shows the structure of local governments in the Philippines under the Code. With more than 30 years of decentralisation experience, there are moves from various sectors, particularly the executive and legislative branches, to further the decentralisation and devolution scheme and adopt a full federal system. With this in mind, it is best to look at the arguments for and against decentralisation and place the federalism argument side by side. 2.1

Arguments for Decentralisation

Since decentralisation is the “systematic and rational dispersal of power” from the national to the lower levels of government, what justifies this “dispersal of power”? Brillantes (1998) puts forward two primary

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Fig. 1 Structure of local governments in the Philippines 2019 (Source Atienza, Go, and Esmeralda 2019)

arguments for decentralising government. First, decentralisation hastens decision-making through what he calls “decongestion of government” and eventual reduction of bureaucratic red-tape. Second, decentralisation increases spaces and avenues for citizen participation. If the intent is to further democratisation (see Atienza 2006; Brillantes 2003), then decentralisation can be considered one of the necessary components of such process. Aside from the two identified by Brillantes (1998), another two can be added: (1) decentralisation increases accountability and transparency, and (2) decentralisation has practical benefits. Hasten decision-making. By devolving powers and functions to local governments, decentralisation hastens decision-making. Under a highly centralised setup, most, if not all, decisions are made at the national level through the central offices of the executive department. This can be avoided and reduced through deconcentration, a form of decentralisation where functions are transferred to lower administrative units such as regional, provincial, or district offices (see Atienza 2004, 2006).

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Both the health and education departments have this kind of system. For health, they have the Centres for Health Development (CHD), which replaced the regional offices, and provincial, city, and municipal health offices. Every municipality has a rural health unit. Since the function is fully devolved, each level is capable of making decisions for its own level. For education, they have regional, divisions (provincial level), and district offices. Larger municipalities are divided into several districts, while cities have their own divisions separate from the province. While only decentralised, these education offices can also make decisions, albeit in relatively less critical matters. Accountability and transparency. Since decisions can be made at the lower levels of government under a decentralised system, it promotes accountability of officers and transparency in transactions. In the Philippines, where elections for local officials are held every three years, knowing how officials act and perform their functions and duties is of prime importance. A decentralised system enables the public to scrutinise their officials, exact accountability for wrong decisions, and mishandled situations. The system is also argued to promote transparency. Since the enactment of the Code, there were several programmes of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) to ensure functional and performing local governments and more transparent ones. Earlier forms of these programmes include Galing Pook Awards, while more recent interventions are the Seal of Good Housekeeping and Seal of Good Local Governance. Greater participation. Decentralisation opens spaces for greater citizen participation. By bringing the decision-making power closer to the people, it also promotes democratisation. Since powers and functions are devolved to local governments, local officials are expected to consult with their constituencies in making policies. The LGC of 1991 has several mechanisms to engage the public. These include (1) formation of multi-sectoral special bodies; (2) inclusion of youth, women, and other marginalised sectors in the local council; and (3) strengthening of the recall system for elected officials. However, these mechanisms are yet to be fully realised since an enabling law or ordinance may be necessary for full implementation. Areas of health and education have special bodies, local health board and local school board, respectively, which supervise the implementation

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of local and national policies related to their areas’ concerns. These will be explained further in the succeeding sections. Practical considerations. Aside from substantive considerations such as participation and accountability, there are also practical considerations for adopting a decentralised government framework. Since local officials are more familiar with the situation at their level, it is more appropriate and practical to make decisions at the same level. This can also prevent what is called the bureaucratic “ping-pong” where constituents are passed from national to local, then local to national in the course of transacting with the government. This is especially true in the processing of different permits. 2.2

Arguments Against Decentralisation

Two arguments are challenging the idea of decentralising government. First, decentralisation, while it allows each locality to decide on its own, may result to duplication of efforts. Second, while decentralisation gives the local officials the upper hand in crafting community-sensitive policies or innovations, there are questions of capacity and capability on local governments to carry out these policies or innovations. Duplication of efforts . Under a decentralised setup, each locality can initiate its own health and education programmes, which fit the needs of the citizens. While this is seen as a positive aspect of decentralisation, it has an unintended consequence—duplication of efforts. Duplication of efforts is not necessarily detrimental. In fact, it could heighten awareness and participation from the public. However, in terms of resources, it could pose a challenge. For the most part, municipalities and some provinces in the Philippines are highly dependent on their internal revenue allotment (IRA). This means that the internally generated income of each locality has little contribution to the actual expenses for service delivery, among others. For example, if each municipality will engage in the same programme and spend the same amount of resources to start and maintain that programme, it could lead to waste of resources. What can be done instead is to pool resources together, in order to have more significant impact. Lack of capacity and capability. Another argument against decentralisation is the lack of capacity and capability of local governments to carry out the devolved or decentralised function to them. Regulatory powers, fiscal autonomy, and expansion of other powers may be handled, but devolving

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more functions like management of the local health and education systems may require more expertise that local officials do not necessarily have. What may happen, instead, is that local officials may (1) be forced to study the different aspects of these service delivery systems, (2) rely heavily on health and education officials on decision-making, or (3) ignore the concerns of these sectors altogether.

3

Devolving Health

In general, the delivery of basic services and provision of basic facilities to local constituents are the responsibility of local government units. Section 17(a) of the Local Government Code states: Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.

This provision gives local governments a blanket obligation to assume the functions previously held by the national government. Although each service sector would vary in terms of how much functions are given to local government units, each unit is encouraged to aim for self-reliance and is given authority to pursue this end. Of the basic services devolved to local governments, health service is the most extensive, problematic, and controversial (see Langran 2011). Health devolution is extensive since many of the functions, mainly primary and secondary health service delivery, have been devolved to local government units. To understand the extent of health devolution, the following are the tasks devolved to local government units, at the barangay, municipal, city, and provincial levels. • For the barangay, health and social welfare services which include maintenance of barangay health centre and day-care centre • For municipalities, health services which include the implementation of programmes and projects on primary health care, maternal and

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childcare, and communicable and non-communicable disease control services, access to secondary and tertiary health services; purchase of medicines, medical supplies, and equipment needed to carry out the services herein enumerated • For cities, all the services and facilities of the municipality and province, which include hospitals and other tertiary health services • For provinces, health services which include hospitals and other tertiary health services Local government units were given the task to respond to immediate health needs of the locality. Each level is given a distinct set of health-related tasks, which prior to enacting the Code were not their responsibility. One thing noticeable from the above set of tasks is the difference between those of municipalities and cities. In cities, the functions of both a municipality and province are combined. This means cities have more responsibilities compared to a province and a municipality. Why is this so? Whether component or highly urbanised, cities have their own and stable sources of income, which are greater than a municipality. Component cities are also given considerable autonomy from their provinces, while highly urbanised cities are fully independent from their provinces. In Metro Manila, all cities are highly urbanised cities and are expected to deliver health services from primary to tertiary level. Both municipalities and cities are also expected to assist their barangays in maintaining their health centres. This situation creates problems not only for the local government, but also for the health sector. In the section on justifications for devolution of services, one of the arguments against devolution is the lack of expertise among local governments to implement new tasks. There are also efforts from non-government organisations and health advocacy groups to assist local governments in implementing the above tasks. This resulted to some best practices in health, but there are as well as undesirable ones. These will be further explained in the section on experiences of cities and municipalities below. In the Philippines, among the issues raised by health practitioners and professionals is that health as an issue area and service delivery sector has been trapped in the conundrum of local politics and has been placed in the hand of local politicians. While there is a designated health officer per

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Table 1

Composition of the local health boards for municipalities and cities

Roles

Municipalities

Cities

Chair Vice-chair Members (from government)

Municipal Mayor Municipal Health Officer • Chair of the Committee on Health of the Sangguniang Bayan, and • Representative of the Department of Health in the municipality

Members (from non-government groups)

• Representative from the private sector or non-government organisations involved in health services

City Mayor City Health Officer • Chair of the Committee on Health of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, and • Representative of the Department of Health in the city • Representative from the private sector or non-government organisations involved in health services

Source Author’s creation based on the Local Government Code of 1991

municipality,1 city, and province, their presence is not enough to gear the local health policy out of politics. This makes devolving health a controversial area as well. Local politicians have used health as an avenue for the dispensation of political patronage, either to gain new following or punishment for disloyal supporters or non-followers. 3.1

Local Health Board

To assist the local chief executive and the local council in implementing its health-related tasks and in the formulation of health-related programmes and policies at the local level, the Code has provided for the constitution of a local health board (LHB) in every municipality, city, and province. The table below enumerates the membership of LHBs for municipalities and cities (Table 1). In some instances, as illustrated in the experiences below, the membership of the local health board has been expanded to include other individuals, sectors, and local officials, who may be involved in the delivery of health functions in the locality. Such expansion both had

1 However, not all municipalities have their own permanent health officer.

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positive and negative effects in the overall health situation of the local government. The Code specified the functions of the local health board. These are: (1) To propose to the sanggunian concerned, in accordance with standards and criteria set by the Department of Health, annual budgetary allocations for the operation and maintenance of health facilities and services within the municipality, city, or province, as the case may be; (2) To serve as an advisory committee to the sanggunian concerned on health matters such as, but not limited to, the necessity for, and application of local appropriations for public health purposes; and (3) Consistent with the technical and administrative standards of the Department of Health, create committees which shall advise local health agencies on matters such as, but not limited to, personnel selection and promotion, bids and awards, grievance and complaints, personnel discipline, budget review, operations review, and similar functions.

Based on these functions, the local health board is expected to provide administrative and substantive assistance to the local government as they perform their mandate in delivering health services to the public. Interestingly, however, while the local health board is expected to carry the specialisation necessary in health-related policy- and decision-making, it is only considered an advisory committee to the local council. This means that its recommendations may or may not be entertained by the local council, especially if there is rivalry between the local chief executive and the local council. Aside from this, the local health board is also tasked to prepare the budgetary allocation for health services and facilities, subject to the local council’s approval. This also places health at the centre of political contests and interests. In addition to this, health does not have a stable source of funding. Funding for health services is sourced from the local government’s social development fund, which constitutes around 20% of the total budget allocation of the municipality or city. From this 20%, the health sector competes with other social development projects, such as infrastructure and financial assistance, which are more tangible and visible outputs compared to intangible and indirect health services. As most municipalities in the country are mostly dependent on their internal revenue allotment (IRA), which is close to 99% for lower income-class municipalities, the allocation for health maybe reduced to as low as two to three per cent of the budget and dependent on the extent of prioritisation

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the local chief executive, in particular, and local government, in general, on health service delivery. The national and international targets set by the Department of Health and World Health Organization, respectively, are at least five per cent of the fiscal year’s total budget. 3.2

City Experience

Cities have an extensive set of functions when it comes to health service delivery. The Code specified that cities will assume both the health-related responsibilities of a province and a municipality. This means a city takes charge of all programmes and projects on health and its implementation, establishment, provision, and maintenance of primary to tertiary healthcare facilities and services, and operation of a hospital. The case of Metro Manila is an exemption compared to the cases of other cities, whether component or highly urbanised, elsewhere in the country. As funding for health services are sourced from the city’s general fund, a city would more or less need to rely on its own generated revenue. The table below shows how dependent Metro Manila cities are on their internal revenue allotment. As the data shows, Makati is the most independent, while Navotas is the most dependent. Nevertheless, there is generally a significant amount of independence, which means cities can provide services on their own and can source their funding for such services locally (Table 2). Metro Manila cities have consistently allocated funds for health in their annual appropriations. Most if not all cities have their own local hospital, medical assistance programme, and actively implemented the national programmes on health and provided the necessary funding. Some cities even provide free medical services for indigents and senior citizens. Notwithstanding this impressive record of Metro Manila cities, there are still areas for improvement (see Porio 2012, for some discussion on issues within Metro Manila cities; see also Chapter 6). Due to congestion particularly in highly populated cities like Caloocan City, Quezon City, and the City of Manila, the maintenance of public health facilities is a challenge. Since barangays are very small in terms of land area, but large in terms of population, not all barangays have their own barangay health centres.2 Barangay health centres are not explicitly 2 For example, then Quezon City mayor Herbert Bautista, during a comment on the presentation of an earlier version of this paper, noted that the city does not have a 1:1

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Table 2 Dependence on internal revenue allotment for cities in the National Capital Region, 2009–2016 City/NCR Caloocan City Las Piñas City Makati City Malabon City Mandaluyong City Manila City Marikina City Muntinlupa City Navotas City Parañaque City Pasay City Pasig City Quezon City San Juan City Taguig City Valenzuela City

2009 (%)

2010 (%)

2011 (%)

2012 (%)

2013 (%)

2014 (%)

2015 (%)

2016 (%)

48 48 9 65 23

49 48 10 64 23

48 47 9 59 22

47 43 8 58 18

48 42 7 56 17

49 43 7 58 18

50 43 7 50 12

49 46 8 58 12

30 37 24

30 39 27

31 42 26

28 38 24

24 36 23

21 36 22

22 38 21

24 38 21

65 30 23 17 29 27 33 43

66 30 24 18 29 29 0 45

61 31 21 15 27 28 0 42

60 27 18 14 17 25 30 36

61 24 16 13 23 24 22 37

59 24 18 13 21 22 20 36

57 28 18 13 23 22 20 34

54 26 20 13 23 24 19 34

Source Author’s creation based on data from Bureau of Local Government Finance

mandatory, but these centres must be established since they provide the primary health care services. In any case, this may also reflect the healthseeking behaviour of those in the cities, where citizens either go directly to the local hospitals or seek private health care services. Human resource availability is also a challenge. With Metro Manila cities as centres of economic development, it is not hard to find the experts and specialists in the medical field. They would like to work in government hospitals and medical facilities, despite the relatively low salary. However, given their population size, even with an already high human resource count, there is still insufficient number of health personnel, such as midwives, nurses, and doctors to cater to each citizen. Hospital beds also need to be increased and make available certain facilities in all district-level hospitals, especially in large cities. Nevertheless, barangay-health center ratio. In some areas, there is one health center for a number of adjacent barangays.

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Table 3 Total expenditures on health for cities and municipalities, 2009–2016 (in million pesos) Level City Mun

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

9,284.31 9,229.38 10,635.60 12,144.62 13,907.63 13,223.71 13,221.13 14,900.57 7,323.91 8,118.06 8,802.98 9,002.11 9,406.00 10,020.42 10,602.22 11,479.42

Source Author’s creation based on data from Bureau of Local Government Finance

there are attempts on the part of each city to respond to these needs with the assistance of their functional local health boards. Elsewhere in the country, the cities have appropriated funds for health. Based on the Bureau of Local Government Finance data, cities have annually increased their health expenditures from 2009 to 2016. This could mean two things. First, cities, given their extensive functions, are forced to spend for health. Health as an essential basic service provided by local governments is also a political capital. Thus, spending for health may give politicians a positive impression from their citizens. Second, the increase in appropriations may also increase the prices of resources for health, such as facilities, medicines, and even salaries for human resources (Table 3). 3.3

Municipality Experience

Municipalities have been generally dependent of their internal revenue allotment. Figure 2 shows the average IRA dependence of municipalities in the Philippines. While on the average, municipalities have been 81 to 86% dependent, the extreme cases record 100% dependence on IRA. Entirely dependent municipalities are usually found in the autonomous regions and the poorest provinces of the country. This means that they have no locally sourced income and have no alternative funding sources for services, such as health.3 In municipalities, competition between health and other services are more apparent.

3 In some municipalities, financial and capacity-building support are provided by nongovernmental organisations, civil society groups, and medical foundations to improve services. However, the municipal governments need to exhibit improvements in health outcomes in order to continue receiving support. For more insights on this, see Go 2016b.

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IRA Dependence 87% 86% 85% 84% 83% 82% 81% 80% 79% 78%

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

IRA Dependence

Fig. 2 IRA dependence of municipalities (average), 2009–2016 (Data Source Bureau of Local Government Finance; graph by the author)

However, similar to cities, municipalities in general have an increasing trend of health expenditures. However, again, this does not translate to prioritisation of health. Some local chief executives acknowledge their limitations in terms of health service delivery. Such limitations are on actual capacity of the local government to deliver all health services and on the availability of funds for health expenditures. To address this, some local government units have made innovations (for empirical discussions on innovations, see Capuno 2011) such as charging minimal user fees (Amatong 2005) or forming interlocal health zones (Legaspi and Santiago 1998). Municipalities, particularly those in the fourth to sixth income-classes, have difficulty recruiting municipal health officers. Since these municipalities are mostly geographically isolated, applications from doctors, nurses, and midwives are few. Instead, municipalities rely on the national government to send them doctors through the Department of Health’s programme doctors to the barrio. These doctors usually serve for two to three years. On few occasions, some doctors assigned stay. In most cases,

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doctors leave the municipalities for practice in hospitals, whether public or private. This puts the health agenda of a municipality, if any, in a limbo. The role of local chief executives is vital in the delivery of health services in the municipality. In the study of Atienza (2004), Irosin, Sorsogon’s health service delivery has improved under an active local chief executive, who is a medical doctor by profession. This is also true for some fifth-class municipalities in Go’s (2016b) study, where local chief executives who received training from a medical foundation were found to be more aware and conscious of the health issues in their locality. This resulted to an improvement in health service delivery and increase in health investments in the municipality. In the similar studies of Atienza (2004) and Go (2016b), local citizen participation is also important. In Baliuag, Bulacan, the nursing students at a state university assisted the local government, which help the municipality achieve its health goals. Ownership of the health issues was the angle used by local chief executives in fifth-class municipalities. By involving the public in the health service delivery in the municipality, they see themselves as partners and owners of the issues. The public also became more aware and, in the end, started to demand from the local government service which they know they are supposed to receive. However, given the real-world constraints faced by municipalities, most of their services and programmes remain dependent on the Department of Health, and to a certain extent to assistance from the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO). A barangay health centre is shared among several barangays. Midwives are working on a rotation basis. There is only one nurse and one doctor per municipality. Medicines are limited. Rural health units, if not makeshift structures, serve as alternatives to hospitals. Owner-type jeepneys are used as ambulance. Although these observations are not the same for every municipality, they give a picture of the health service situation in municipalities in the Philippines. What makes the above situation better or worse is the political interests of local officials. Some local chief executives try to manipulate the provision of services by only giving those who supported them in the elections. Non-supporters or supporters of another politician will have a hard time accessing the services or assistance the municipality provides. Powerful local chief executives also limit the participation of health stakeholders in decision-making by either not organising the local health boards or not making the board as active as the Code demands.

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However, politicians with foresight see health service delivery as a political currency (see Arguelles 2018). In the case of Santol, La Union, the municipal mayor took advantage of health and used it as a platform to further her political career (Go 2016b). Aware that her municipality failed to establish barangay health centres, she created a caravan, which brought the rural health unit to every barangay. Eventually, her efforts were recognised through a presidential award of excellence. In sum, the municipalities’ experiences are as diverse as they can be. Despite budgetary limitations, there are positive outcomes, with a proactive local chief executive and a participative citizenry. However, the local chief executives can also cause the success or failure of health service delivery in the municipality (see Capuno and Panganiban 2012).

4

Decentralising Education

Decentralising education in East Asia has been a trend in the region and seen as a powerful reform mechanism to address the problems in the sector (King and Guerra 2005). Unlike the health sector, which has been extensively and almost completely devolved to the local government units, the Philippines’ education sector is not a devolved service-sector under the Local Government Code of 1991. The bulk of the work remains with the national agency, the Department of Education, except for those delegated to subnational divisions of the department as provided in the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001. However, some tasks have been decentralised to the local government units following the provisions of Section 17 (which was already quoted above). To illustrate how limited the functions of the local government for the education sector, the only task devolved to both municipalities and cities is the construction of school buildings and other facilities for public elementary and secondary schools. Other than this, there are fewer substantive powers, such as the power to rename schools in their locality. To complement the provisions of the Code, the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001 specified the principle of shared governance, that is, “a principle which recognises that every unit in the education bureaucracy has a particular role, task and responsibility inherent in the office and for which it is principally accountable for outcomes”. The role of local governments, therefore, has been partly expanded, albeit limited. While not explicitly stating decentralisation, the law states that:

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The communication channels of field offices shall be strengthened to facilitate flow of information and expand linkages with other government agencies, local government units and nongovernmental organisations for effective governance. (Emphasis mine)

In this case, there is not much to expect from local governments in the area of education service delivery. As long as they can fulfil their mandate of constructing school buildings and facilities in their locality, they satisfy the minimal function they have when it comes to the education sector. However, as experiences will show below, some local governments have been proactive in providing above the minimum services to the students in their municipality of city. 4.1

Local School Board

Although the education sector has not been devolved, the Code has provided for the constitution of a local school board (LSBs), which, similar to its health counterpart, is expected to provide advice on education matters. The table below enumerates the membership of LSBs for municipalities and cities (Table 4). Similar to LHBs, in some cases, local school board membership has been expanded to include other stakeholders in education service delivery (Go 2016a). To be more inclusive, some municipalities and cities have involved more private and non-government sector in the board work. However, there were also cases where the board is either not adequately organised or non-functional. The organisation and functionality of the school boards are critical. While the functions of the local government are technically limited, the school boards are empowered by the Code, and in effect expands the work of local governments in education service delivery. Below are the functions specified for local school boards: (a) Determine, in accordance with the criteria set by the Department of [Education, Culture, and Sports], the annual supplementary budgetary needs for the operation and maintenance of public schools within the province, city, or municipality, as the case may be, and the supplementary local cost of meeting such as needs, which shall be reflected in the form of an annual school board budget corresponding to its share of the

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Table 4

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Composition of the local school boards for municipalities and cities

Roles

Municipalities

Chair Co-chair

Municipal Mayor District supervisor of schools

Members (from government)

Members (from non-government groups)

Cities

City Mayor City superintendent of schools • Chair of the Education • Chair of the Education Committee of the Committee of the Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, • Municipal Treasurer, • Representative of the • City Treasurer, “Pederasyon ng mga • Representative of the Sangguniang Kabataan” in “Pederasyon ng mga the Sangguniang Bayan Sangguniang Kabataan” in the Sangguniang Panlungsod • Duly elected president of • Duly elected president the municipal federation of the city federation of of parents-teachers parents-teachers associations, associations, • Duly elected representative • Duly elected of the teachers’ representative of the organisations in the teachers’ organisations municipality, and in the city, and • Duly elected representative • Duly elected of the non-academic representative of the personnel of public non-academic personnel schools in the municipality of public schools in the city

Source Author’s creation based on the Local Government Code of 1991

proceeds of the special levy on real property constituting the Special Education Fund and such other sources of revenue as this Code and other laws or ordinances may provide; (b) Authorise the provincial, city, or municipal treasurer, as the case may be, to disburse funds from the Special Education Fund pursuant to the budget prepared and in accordance with existing rules and regulations; (c) Serve as an advisory committee to the sanggunian concerned on educational matters such as, but not limited to, the necessity for and the uses of local appropriations for educational purposes; and (d) Recommend changes in the names of public schools within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit for enactment by the sanggunian concerned. The Department of [Education, Culture, and Sports] shall consult the local school board on the appointment of division

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superintendents, district supervisors, school principals, and other school officials.

As LSBs are supposedly the authority in matters related to education, they have the mandate to advise the local government, the local chief executive, and the local council, primarily on matters of finance and appropriation. LSBs are also consulted by the Department of Education in the appointment of education officials in the locality, such as school principals, district supervisors, and division superintendents. This makes the LSB a powerful local special body. However, unlike the LHBs where they propose the annual appropriations for health subject to approval of the local council, the appropriations made by the LSBs no longer require the same approval. This is because the education sector has been given a special fund source, which is not the case for health. The education sector does not compete with other social development programmes of the local government because it has what is called the special education fund. The Special Education Fund (SEF) is one of the two special funds mentioned in the Local Government Code. While it is not exactly new, SEF as a source of funding is unique in two ways. First, it is sourced from an additional levy on the real property tax collected by each local government unit. Section 235 of the Code provides for this additional levy. Additional Levy on Real Property for the Special Education Fund. – A province or city, or a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area, may levy and collect an annual tax of one percent (1%) on the assessed value of real property which shall be in addition to the basic real property tax.

Section 272 of the Code more explicitly explains the purpose of the SEF and how local governments can use the said fund. Application of Proceeds of the Additional One Percent SEF Tax. – The proceeds from the additional one percent (1%) tax on real property accruing to the Special Education Fund (SEF) shall be automatically released to the local school boards: Provided, That, in case of provinces, the proceeds shall be divided equally between the provincial and municipal school boards: Provided, however, That the proceeds shall be allocated for the operation and maintenance of public schools, construction and

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repair of school buildings, facilities and equipment, educational research, purchase of books and periodicals, and sports development as determined and approved by the Local School Board.

Section 100(c) enumerates the priority areas for the use of SEF. The section basically echoes the provision quoted above. (1) Construction, repair, and maintenance of school buildings and other facilities of public elementary and secondary schools; (2) Establishment and maintenance of extension classes where necessary; and (3) Sports activities at the division, district, municipal, and barangay levels.

Noticeable in the list of priority areas and allocation limitations are educational research, purchase of books and periodicals, maintenance of extension classes, and sports activities and development. These are outside the decentralised function of school building construction to local governments. These provisions expand the power of local governments in terms of education service delivery. The LSB functions and the utilisation of SEF, without explicitly stating devolution, partly devolves certain functions to the local government. It is not full devolution because the main powers remain with the national agency, but at the same time, local governments also can exercise the same functions. This makes education service delivery as shared power between the national and local levels of government. 4.2

City Experience

The experiences on education are very limited compared to health, which is a fully devolved service sector. Cities and municipalities share the same functions in education service delivery. This is the construction of school buildings and classrooms in their locality. However, this function is not their primary responsibility. Local governments are only supplementary to the Department of Education. The SEF and its allocation only augment the ones already allocated in the national General Appropriations Act for public elementary and secondary schools. Table 5 shows the total collection of SEFs for cities and municipalities from 2009 to 2016. Since SEF is attached to real property tax, the value of real property in the area determines how big or small is the SEF collection. In cities,

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Table 5 Total collection of Special Education Fund, cities and municipalities, 2009–2016 (in million pesos) Level

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

City 11,023.04 12,094.07 12,821.35 13,846.23 15,051.06 16,307.93 17,189.81 17,554.04 Mun 3,465.11 3,271.59 3,935.44 3,942.64 3,607.31 4,216.33 4,332.71 4,487.59 Source Author’s creation based on data from Bureau of Local Government Finance

Table 6 Total expenditures on education for cities and municipalities, sourced from SEF, excluding capital outlay, 2009–2016 (in million pesos) Level

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

City 6,840.24 6,899.00 6,965.65 8,400.98 9,065.57 8,171.89 7,359.97 7,338.61 Mun 1,871.56 2,045.61 2,266.18 2,555.69 2,290.89 2,223.15 2,397.41 2,253.50 Source Author’s creation based on data from Bureau of Local Government Finance

properties are usually valued higher. Thus, it is understandable that while there are fewer cities, their collection is almost three or four times those in the municipalities. Urban areas are densely populated which also means more school children needs classrooms and other education facilities. From 2009 to 2013, cities have an increasing trend of spending for education.4 It began to decrease starting 2014. This is notwithstanding the increase in the annual collection of SEFs. In Metro Manila, cities do not only spend to maintain classes, but they also spend for school supplies, uniforms, and even shoes. At one point, it has become an informal competition among these cities on which of them can provide better “education packages” for their public-school students (Table 6). Perhaps one of the challenges for Metro Manila cities is the construction of classrooms as student population continues to grow. Given the space limitations in Metro Manila, cities would opt a vertical, rather than horizontal expansion of school campuses and facilities. School buildings have to be upward and therefore may be costly for the city government.

4 Outside the basic education level, cities have also put up their own locally funded and maintained universities, such as the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Valenzuela (PLV; City of Valenzuela University) in 2002 Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Marikina (PLM; City of Marikina University) in 2003 and Taguig City University in 2004.

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Table 7 Total expenditures on education under capital outlay for cities and municipalities, sourced from SEF, 2009–2016 (in million pesos) Level

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

City 2,921.02 1,306.44 2,049.07 2,181.82 3,081.16 3,779.16 3,400.69 5,077.87 Mun 531.35 607.81 622.76 550.97 496.55 558.00 770.77 983.88 Source Author’s creation based on data from Bureau of Local Government Finance

Even with expansion, public schools still employ a two-shift school day to accommodate the huge student population in Metro Manila. Elsewhere in the Philippines, cities are not as extensive in the provision of school supplies, nor do they face the issue of space. Table 7 shows the expenditures on education under capital outlay. These are the expenses of cities and municipalities to implement their primary function under the decentralised education system, that is, construction of classrooms and school buildings. Another area for discussion is on the local school boards. Metro Manila cities do not necessarily have difficulty with their LSBs. They are functional and active, and some have expanded their membership to include more stakeholders such as civil society groups forwarding education. Outside Metro Manila, there were also positive experiences about the LSBs. For example, in Naga City, the local school boards were not only organised and expanded, but they were also very functional (see Barcillano 2005; Kawanaka 2002; Prilles 2006). Education, like health, is also seen as a political currency (for example, see Go 2016b).5 As mentioned above, the provision of “extras” to students can have a multiplier effect. Since education expenses are shouldered by parents, reducing the cost of sending students to school through free supplies and uniforms will make a family’s financial burden lighter. This could be interpreted as an effective mechanism and eventually may be translated to votes.

5 In the study of Go (2016b), the municipal mayor was able to take advantage of the resources available to him as chair of the LSB and received positive feedback from the public.

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4.3

Municipality Experience

Experiences of municipalities are not exactly different from the cities. Since they assume the same roles, municipalities are also looking at more innovative ways to use their SEFs and help school children achieve the quality education they deserve. However, unlike the cities, municipalities have smaller SEFs. This is because most municipalities are agricultural or non-commercial. Thus, the valuation of the real property is lower. In addition, the schedule of real property tax in municipalities are rarely updated. In some municipalities, their real property tax rates have not been updated for more than four decades. This affects the amount the municipality can collect for their SEF. In Table 5, compared to cities, the slow increase in the SEF collection for municipalities is noticeable. Two reasons can be attributed here. First, the reason mentioned above of outdated schedule of taxes resulted to lower SEF collection. Second, and worth noting, some municipalities are not as strict in collecting their real property taxes. This could explain municipalities’ relatively low expenditures for education and capital outlay (see Tables 6 and 7). While student population in municipalities are not as big, there are still shortages in classrooms and other school facilities. The Department of Education prescribed classroom-student ratio of 1:30 has not been met. In most municipalities, the average class size is 40 to 50 students. Some schools opt to have three shifts of classes—morning, afternoon, and evening shifts—to accommodate them. Unfortunately, the SEF of municipalities are usually not enough to build more classrooms. Even if they have the space, which cities in Metro Manila do not have, the municipalities do not have the financial capacity to expand. On the average, lower income-class municipalities have two to three million pesos only for SEF. Higher income-class municipalities have 10 to 15 million on the average. A classroom roughly costs around half a million pesos. This includes the materials, treatment of the soil and ground integrity checks, and labour. From 2009 to 2016, the expenditures for capital outlay are relatively low. The highest was in 2016, when municipalities spent almost one billion for construction. Local school boards are also mostly absent. While there are cases where membership of local school boards is expanded, there are cases where education matters are only discussed between the local chief executive and the education officials. Allocation of SEF and other education-related expenditures are also decided in this manner. While effective in some

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cases, this kind of setup defeats the very intent and objective of decentralising education and mandating the creation of a local school board in every municipality.

5

Challenges in a Decentralised Setup6

Decentralisation envisioned in the Local Government Code has changed the politics and governance at the local level (see Brillantes 2003; Legaspi 2001). Following cities and municipalities’ experiences in performing their health and education-related tasks, there are five areas where decentralisation, as a framework and perhaps as a solution to an overly centralised government, faces challenges. These are on how local politicians arrange their priorities in their locality, on how funding is allocated and to what extent funds can be used, on how faithful local governments are in fulfilling their mandate to form special bodies for health and education, on how political families have dominated local politics and its positive and negative effects on service delivery, and on a more substantive aspect, on how capability and capacity of local governments remain a big question. 5.1

Prioritisation and Political Will

With all the functions devolved and decentralised to the local government, some of which have never had the experience of exercising, local officials need to prioritise which area will receive more attention and effort. Between health and education, the health sector needs to compete with other service sectors and programmes of the local government. However, there is no guarantee that education is automatically prioritised. The cases of cities and municipalities showed that prioritisation can help the development and improvement of service delivery in health and education (Cuenca 2018). When local chief executives are more aware of the health and education situation in their locality, they are more proactive in finding solutions, forming policies, and creating programmes. Cities are generally along this line since they are tasked with more functions.

6 Most of the data used in this section were derived from the interviews and focus group discussions in the earlier studies of the author on the decentralisation of education (Go 2016a) and health (Go 2016b) in the Philippines.

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However, municipalities are those which are challenged the most, particularly those in the lower income-class brackets. However, this should not mean higher income-class municipalities and cities are already doing well. As experiences illustrate, higher income does not translate to better services (Abrigo and Ortiz 2018). In fact, awareness of local officials does not always translate to effective and efficient implementation of programmes. In some instances, even if local chief executives claim they prioritise health and education and even if the appropriations for these sectors receive a large sum of money, the implementation may not be very well done. This is also a reflection of political will on the part of the local officials. Sometimes all functions are relegated to the municipal or city health officer or the division superintendent or district supervisor.7 They are more familiar with the issues in their respective sectors. 5.2

Funding and Coverage

Related to the issue of prioritisation and political will is the issue of funding and coverage of funding. When local governments prioritise a service sector or a social development programme, that would mean they are allotting more funds. It has been repeatedly mentioned that health needs to compete with other service sectors (Cuenca 2018; Liwanag and Wyss 2019), because it has no independent funding source. This is why local chief executives need to put health as one of their top agenda. Cities, which have a greater amount of task in health service delivery, are pressured to put more funding on health. With larger income, both from their internal revenue allotment and other internally sourced funds, they may be able to provide the necessary funding to provide primary, secondary, and tertiary health services and operate their local hospitals as in the cases of cities in Metro Manila (for reference, see Liwanag and Wyss 2019). However, even highly urbanised cities have difficulty in ensuring sufficient funding for health services. For example, not all barangays have their health centres and health personnel ratio remains far from the ideal. With this situation in cities, the funding question is even bigger for municipalities. In areas where the priority is farm-to-market roads,

7 This is the case in five of the eight municipal mayors the author interviewed in between 2014 and 2015. For a discussion on the decentralised education sector, see Saguin and Ramesh (2020).

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bridges, waiting sheds, and other infrastructure programmes, the socalled tangible or hard projects, health is at the bottom of the list (Cuenca 2018). To meet the demands of the public for better health service delivery, what municipalities usually do is to partner with nongovernment organisations or enter into loans with banks. The coverage of what the local governments can provide is also limited. A devolved health service resulted to high dependency on the Department of Health for most programmes and services (Liwanag and Wyss 2019). Local governments, particularly those with limited funding for health, cannot independently formulate and implement health programmes, even if they are supposed to do it. For example, some municipalities can put up the physical structures for barangay health centres. However, they do not have sufficient funds for human resources, like midwives, nurses, doctors, and medical resources, like medicines, beds, and other essential equipment. In the area of education, this is not necessarily a huge problem. However, there are still issues regarding funding, particularly on which can and cannot be funded using the special education fund. Since resource for education is fixed, where to get funds is also not an issue for local governments. Aside from coverage, the other issue is the collection of the SEF itself. The Code is explicit on which aspects of education service delivery can the SEF be used. However, local governments have stretched the utilisation of the fund to include paying utilities such as electricity and water bills, transportation allowances of local education officials, and other forms of allowances (Manasan, Celestino, and Cuenca 2011; Go 2016a). The SEF does not cover these. On the one hand, the allocation from the national government is not enough. On the other hand, local governments, even facing limitations in funding, have to resort to using the SEF to pay for bills not covered by the Department of Education allocation. Another issue is the collection of the fund. Since SEF is tied to real property tax, the local government’s failure to completely and efficiently collect this tax results to lower SEF for a fiscal year. Given that the bulk of education expenses is on school building and classroom construction (Saguin and Ramesh 2020), which requires a huge sum of money, not all municipalities and cities can fully accomplish this task, albeit only supplementary to the national government’s own efforts. Interestingly, some LGUs are still reported to underspend their education budget, which

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is attributed to problematic allocation and poor budgeting (World Bank 2016). The outdated schedule of taxes is also an issue in the area of local funding for education. Many local governments have not updated their real property taxes schedule, making most properties in their localities under assessed. A report from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) highlights this problematic valuation of real property assets (de Vera 2020). This clearly affects the SEF collection since the fund is tied to the real property tax. If the schedule of taxes remains outdated, the fund will continue to decrease its value and may not be sufficient to fund the education projects and programmes of the local government. One reason for this is the hesitation of the local councils and chief executives to increase taxes. Doing so will clearly affect their political careers and could jeopardise their political plans in the next coming elections. 5.3

Organisation of the Special Bodies

The local special bodies created under the Code are expected to help the local government perform the devolved and decentralised functions on health and education, respectively. There are two key challenges or issues related to the organisation of the special bodies. The first is the actual presence of these bodies, that is, if they are organised and functional, and can carry out the functions assigned to them. The second is the expansion of the membership of the special bodies and the replication of the health board at the barangay level. While it is mandatory that local governments organised their local health and school boards, not all have active and functional ones (Cuenca 2018; World Bank 2016). This is especially true for municipalities, with strong local chief executives. As proxy for a function local health or school board, the local chief executive takes over the decision-making. Likewise, the local chief executive may only meet with the health officer or education official, as the case may be, instead of calling for a meeting of the entire board. This very informal setup may work for some local governments and effectively deliver health and education services. However, it defeats the idea of decentralisation, which is shared governance between the local government and the stakeholders (see Holmes 2016). On a positive note, there are also cases where more stakeholders have been involved in the decision-making of local health and school boards. Acknowledging the limited membership prescribed by the Code,

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some local governments have opted to expand the membership of their local boards to include more government officials and non-government representations.8 This proactive move of the local governments has produced both good and not so good outcomes. On the good side, more perspectives and ideas have been entertained in discussions about health programmes and education projects of local governments, as evidenced by minutes of their board meetings. It has also strengthened the community involvement as it has further the sense of ownership on the part of the stakeholders. Some municipalities have also replicated the health board down to barangay levels, though organisation remains a challenge at their level (see Atienza 2004; Go 2016b; Saloma et al. 2013). However, some appointed members in the expanded special bodies were not aware of their participation and role in the boards. For example, local police chiefs have been appointed to health boards. However, when asked about their role, the police chiefs are either surprised to know they are part of the board or uncertain about their role in health service delivery. With this kind of “expansion”, the idea of active participation in governance is diluted. 5.4

Political Families, Politicians, and Elections

Local politics in the Philippines is dominated by families (Encarnacion Tadem and Tadem 2016). This is a reality that continues to challenge the ideals of decentralisation and devolution. Because political families control the ins and outs, not only in politics, but also the daily life of the people in their locality, the impact of their dominance is something that cannot be discounted. Usually, there are two big surnames in a municipality that compete. Loyalty is rewarded through services and assistance, financial or otherwise, from the political family in power. This creates a proxy system that diminishes the quality of services for health and education and other service sectors in the locality. Instead of improving the service for the benefit of the larger public, some politicians may use the opportunity of “providing services” as a means of dispensation of spoils for their supporters-clients. The funding for construction of hospital or school buildings are instead

8 For example, some municipalities have included a holistic approach to health and included the school principals and parish priests in their health board.

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allocated to medical and educational assistance. The returns of monetary dole-outs, politically speaking, are direct and more accountable than a generic form of service. The key is to create a connection with the politician and the citizens. Social services are used as political tools. During elections, politicians use health and education as their platform, given the multiplier effect these service sectors have. When a politician helps by giving cash or assistance from the local government to an ailing member of a family or a student in need of scholarship, this translates to political support from the nuclear family and the extended family. The politicians can take advantage of the virtue “utang na loob” (debt of gratitude) in order to propel their political interests.9 This effectively hijacks the service delivery sectors and puts the general public at the mercy of their politicians. 5.5

Capacity and Capability

Of the challenges identified, the challenge related to capacity and capability is the most important. It has been widely discussed among experts, scholars, and practitioners in health and education (Atienza 2004; Cuenca 2018; Go 2016a; Liwanag and Wyss 2019; Saguin and Ramesh 2020; World Bank 2016). Local government officials have no training or background to manage health or education. While these two fall under social services, they require specialised knowledge because the sectors are critical and technical. This does not mean that a local chief executive should be a medical doctor or a public-school teacher to be effective and be considered capable. However, a proper appreciation of the gravity of the issues and concerns in the service sectors is necessary in order to fully and effectively carry out the functions provided to them. As mentioned above in the section on arguments against decentralisation of services, the lack of capacity and capability on the part of local governments and local officials can jeopardise services delivery. This is a challenge for cities since they manage a large health system from primary to tertiary level. They also are in charge of an educational division, which is equivalent to a provincial division. It is equally a challenge for municipalities because the functions decentralised and devolved still require the assistance from their province and even the national government. 9 This has been mentioned by municipal mayors during a series of interviews conducted by the author.

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As some municipal mayors would admit, they are forced to decide based on their limited knowledge and sometimes make mistakes, even with the advice from the health and education officials in their municipalities.10 This places a significant burden on the health and education officials, especially in geographically isolated and disadvantaged areas.

6

Future of Decentralisation

Concerned agencies both at the national and local levels and the Philippine Congress need to address the above enumerated concerns to strengthen the decentralised mechanism of governance and improve the delivery of social services to the public. Responding to these challenges may be done by enhancing existing governance structures, retooling human resources, amending relevant provisions of law, and changing the overall mindset of public officials. Close coordination between the local governments and the national agencies, namely, Department of Health (DOH), Department of Education (DepEd), and Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) is key in implementing programmes and projects downloaded from the national level. In particular, these agencies must assist and monitor the performance of municipalities, particularly those in the lower income-class brackets. One mechanism is to monitor local health and school boards regularly and ensure they are organised and functional. To give a broader appreciation of the problems surrounding social services, local chief executives and other local officials, especially those newly elected and appointed, may need to undergo special orientation and training on health and education issues. A re-evaluation of priorities among local government units outside Metro Manila is also necessary, with emphasis on the inclusion of health and education as key issue areas of governance. At the same time, they must ensure an organised and functional local health and school boards in their locality. To have a synergistic approach to governments, local governments should be more open to stakeholders, especially nongovernment organisations for assistance and support in carrying out health and education related functions. 10 The municipal mayors were very candid about this. Especially in poorer municipalities where mayors are not necessarily medical or education professionals, they admit heavily relying on the advice of their health and education officials.

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The cities in the National Capital Region (NCR) are expected to promote the best practices in the cities and assist replicating these in other cities and municipalities. To this end, they are anticipated to assist other cities outside the national capital and municipalities to improve health and education service delivery. At the same time, while theirs may already be considered “best” in terms of current implementation, there is also a need to review existing health and education programmes to improve health and education service delivery further and identify the weak points and areas for improvement in the cities. Finally, for Congress, it is but imperative that after more than three decades of experience with the Local Government Code of 1991 that the law be amended to reflect the present demands of local governments. First, the membership of the Local Health and School Boards have to be expanded to involve more stakeholders in the health and education sectors, respectively. Second, the core and supplementary functions of cities and municipalities in health and education service delivery need to be specified to reflect the current state of affairs. Third, a special fund for health, similar to the special education fund, may be created to avoid competing for funding with other social development programmes of the local governments. Lastly, the coverage of special education fund utilisation may be broadened to reflect the current spending patterns of local governments. Aside from these proposed amendments, the Congress has to conduct a periodic review of the Local Government Code, as originally intended by the law, to reflect the changes in local political and governance dynamics.

7

Conclusion

From the discussions above of the experiences and challenges and the recommendations to various national agencies and local government units, one question remains to be answered: After more than a quarter of a century since the passage of the LGC of 1991, how are local governments today? If solely looking at the health and education experiences of cities and municipalities, there is a long way to go. Although many could have been accomplished within almost 30 years of implementation, there were clear challenges both within and outside the local governments. The extent of local government prioritisation can dictate the trajectory of the service delivery sector. Suppose officials refuse to recognise the need to give more

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importance on health and education through their actual policies. In that case, promises during elections remain empty and the people are merely hoping for nothing. Political will becomes necessary, but involving the stakeholders are equally important, too. Local governments are the closest to the public. They are the first line of defenders and providers for the people. However, inevitable as it may seem, from the governance point of view, political interests should be of last priority and service provision be the first. In the cases presented, when local officials are proactive, the services are effective. This could bolster both the political careers of the officials, on the one hand, and ensure quality governance, on the other. Finally, under a decentralised setup, local governments will continue to hurdle with capacity and capability questions. Capacitating localities are a great challenge. More recently, non-government organisations have taken an active role in assisting local governments to financial aids, training and seminars, and other forms of cooperation in order to improve the lives of the Filipino people.

Bibliography Abrigo, Michael Ralph M. and Danica Aisa P. Ortiz. 2018. Devolution of health services, fiscal decentralization, and antenatal care in the Philippines. PIDS Discussion Paper Series, No. 2018–42. Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS). Amatong, Juanita D., ed. 2005. Local Government Fiscal and Financial Management Best Practices. Manila: Department of Finance. Arguelles, Cleve V. 2018. “Health as an electoral currency in the Philippines: Insights from political ethnography.” Philippine Journal of Health Research and Development 22 (1): 44–54. Atienza, Maria Ela L. 2004. “The politics of health devolution in the Philippines: Experiences of municipalities in a devolved set-up.” Philippine Political Science Journal 25 (48): 25–54. ———. 2006. “Local Governments and Devolution in the Philippines.” In Philippine Politics and Governance: An Introduction, edited by Noel M. Morada and Teresa Encarnacion Tadem, 418–427. Quezon City: UP Department of Political Science in collaboration with the Commission on Higher Education.

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Atienza, Maria Ela L., Jan Robert R. Go, and Herby Jireh Esmeralda. 2019, May 9. “Structure of Local Government Units in the Philippines.” Infographics. UP sa Halalan. https://halalan.up.edu.ph/structure-of-local-gov ernment-units-in-the-philippines/. Barcillano, Malu C. 2005. “Reinventing the Naga City School Board: Improving Education Outcomes.” Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. http:// pcij.org/blog/wp-docs/Barcillano_Reinventing_Naga_School_Board.pdf. Brillantes, Alex Jr. B. 1998. “Five-Year Assessment of the Implementation of Devolution in the Local Government Code.” In Local Government in the Philippines: A Book of Readings, edited by Proserpina Domingo Tapales, Jocelyn C. Cuaresma, and Wilhelmina L. Cabo, 521–535. Quezon City: NCPAG. ———. 2003. “Decentralized Democratic Government under the Local Government Code: A Government Perspective.” In Introduction to Public Administration: A Reader, edited by Victoria A. Bautista, Ma. Concepcion P. Alfiler, Danilo R. Reyes and Proserpina D. Tapales, 324–343. Quezon City: NCPAG. Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF). 2009–2016. Statement of Income and Expenditures. Capuno, Joseph J., and Marian Panganiban. 2012. The Ties that Do Not Bind: Party Affiliations and the Delivery of Devolved Health Services in the Philippines. Philippine Political Science Journal 33 (1): 63–80. Capuno, Joseph J. 2011. Incumbents and Innovations Under Decentralisation: An Empirical Exploration of Selected Local Governments in the Philippines. Asian Journal of Political Science 19 (1): 48–73. Cuenca, Janet S. 2018. Health Devolution in the Philippines: Lessons and Insights. PIDS Discussion Paper Series, No. 2018–36. Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS). de Vera, Ben O. 2020, October 22. “ADB: PH Revenues to Grow 90% if Real Property Valuation More Efficient.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. https://bus iness.inquirer.net/310157/adb-ph-revenues-to-grow-90-if-real-property-val uation-more-efficient. Tadem, Encarnacion, S. Teresa, and Eduardo C. Tadem. 2016. “Political dynasties in the Philippines: Persistent patterns, perennial problems.” South East Asia Research 24 (3): 328–340. Go, Jan Robert R. 2016a. “Political Leadership and Education Politics: The Mayor and Education Services in Nasugbu, Batangas”. Philippine Political Science Journal 37 (2): 111–134.https://doi.org/10.1080/01154451.2016. 1193987. ———. 2016b, September 23–24. “Health Services and Reelection in Philippine Municipalities.” Conference Paper. 2016b Korean Association for Policy Studies Autumn International Conference, Olympic Parktel, Seoul, South Korea.

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Holmes, Ronald D. 2016. “Local Governments, Civil Society, Democratization, and Development.” In Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy, 2nd ed., edited by Felipe B. Miranda and Temario C. Rivera, 107–141. Quezon City: Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines and the United Nations Development Programme. Kawanaka, Takeshi. 2002. Power in a Philippine City. Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization. King, Elizabeth M., and Susana Cordeiro Guerra. 2005. “Education Reforms in East Asia: Policy, Process and Impact.” In East Asia Decentralizes: Making Local Government Work, World Bank, 179–207. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Langran, Irene V. 2011. “Decentralisation, Democratisation, and Health: The Philippine Experiment.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 46 (4): 361– 374. Legaspi, Perla E. 2001. The Changing Role of the Local Governments Under a Decentralised State: Some Cases in Philippine Local Governance. Quezon City: NCPAG. Legaspi, Perla E., and Eden Valmonte Santiago. 1998. “Devolution of the Hospital Care System in Negros Oriental.” In Local Government in the Philippines, vol. 3, ed. Proserpina Tapales, Jocelyn Cuaresma, and Wilhelmina Cabo, 101–146. Quezon City: Center for Local and Regional Governance and UP National College of Public Administration. Liwanag, Harvy Joy and Kaspar Wyss. 2019. “Optimising Decentralisation for the Health Sector by Exploring the Synergy of Decision Space, Capacity and Accountability: Insights from the Philippines.” Health Research Policy System 17 (4). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12961-018-0402-1. Manasan, Rosario G., Janet S. Cuenca and Alicia B. Celestino. 2011. Mobilizing LGU Support for Basic Education: Focus on the Special Education Fund. Brighton: Philippine Institute for Development Studies. Porio, Emma. 2012. “Decentralisation, Power and Networked Governance Practices in Metro Manila.” Space and Polity 16 (1): 7–27. https://doi.org/10. 1080/13562576.2012.698128. Prilles, Wilfredo Jr. 2006. “Reinventing the Local School Board in Naga City.” In Kaban Galing: Mainstreaming Replication of Exemplary Local Government Practices, 163–181. Pasig City: Galing Pook Foundation. Republic Act No. 7160, or the Local Government Code of 1991. Republic Act No. 9155, or the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001. Saguin, Kidjie Ian, and M. Ramesh. 2020. “Bringing Governance Back into Education Reforms.” International Review of Public Policy 2 (2): 159–177.

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Saloma, Czarina, Maria Elissa Jayme. Lao, and Leslie Advincula-Lopez. 2013. “How to Make Local Government Institutions Work: Some Lessons on Social Change.” Philippine Political Science Journal 34 (1): 83–96. World Bank. 2016. Assessing the Role Played by Local Government in Supporting Basic Education in the Philippines. Philippine Education Note No. 7. World Bank Group and Australian Aid.

CHAPTER 6

The State of Health, Health Service Delivery, and Equity of Access in Metro Manila: Challenges and Possible Ways Forward Maria Ela L. Atienza

1

Introduction

The health sector is the largest service that has been devolved to local governments in the Philippines as a result of the 1991 Local Government Code (1991 LGC) or Republic Act (RA) No. 7160. However, available literature suggests that devolution has not resulted automatically to improved health service delivery and greater access to health services

A shorter version of this chapter was published as a policy brief: Atienza, Maria Ela L. 2020. “Health and Access in Metro Manila: Challenges and Possible Ways Forward.” UP CIDS Policy Brief 2020–11. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies. M. E. L. Atienza (B) Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 T. S. E. Tadem and M. E. L. Atienza (eds.), A Better Metro Manila?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3_6

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across local government units (LGUs). Decentralization has not always resulted in greater efficiency, equity, and effectiveness in the health sector. There is uneven progress in this area across Philippine LGUs. Statistics suggest that human resources, budget, and facilities for health are spread unevenly across the country, with Metro Manila or the National Capital Region (NCR) and other urban centers enjoying more of these (See Chapter 5). However, another important question is whether health services are accessible for all. It appears from various literature that the poor are not getting access according to their needs. It must also be noted that probably because many advanced health facilities are present in Metro Manila, most of the literature, particularly case studies, on health services, devolution, and local governance focus more on rural areas where services are mostly very basic and limited. As Carpio (2018) noted, “(I)nequalities in urban areas” when it comes to health services “are not yet well studied in the Philippines.” However, as this chapter attempts to show, the high population in Metro Manila as well as social, political, economic, and other factors also contribute to inequality in access to health services. Urbanization and migration also create additional stress on the health situation in Metro Manila LGUs. Thus, it is important to look at the health situation in Metro Manila to assess the current set up and discuss possibilities of improving the institutional arrangements and introducing other reforms, especially in the context of the Duterte national administration’s initial attempts to shift to a federal form of government at the beginning of its term to its later but failed emphasis on introducing incremental amendments to the 1987 Constitution and the 1991 LGC. This study is also important in the context of the pandemic where Metro Manila LGUs had to contend with the growing cases of COVID-19 along with the economic, social, and political implications of lockdowns and other measures that affected all sectors, but most especially the urban poor and vulnerable sectors in Metro Manila. What this chapter intends to do is to look into the status of health and utilization of health services in the country, particularly in Metro Manila or NCR, looking into regional and LGU levels with national comparisons. First, the chapter briefly looks into the existing devolved structure of health services in the country as well as in Metro Manila. Second, it assesses (1) the health status in Metro Manila in general and within its LGUs, looking into various health indicators, as well as (2) the utilization of health services in NCR and its LGUs, including access and equity issues. Third, it looks into various policy options for health

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services in Metro Manila and in the Philippines, in the context of the current devolved framework, the initial proposal of the Duterte administration to shift to a federal form of government, or any other alternative proposed arrangement, such as special metropolitan or regional arrangements, applicable in particular to the Metro Manila area. Lessons from other countries and actual arrangements are also discussed in this section. Finally, the chapter concludes with an overall assessment of the health status and utilization of health services in Metro Manila, emphasizing positive areas as well as problem areas that need to be addressed. The chapter utilizes the human security approach and relies on available qualitative and quantitative data and assessments of health status and services in Metro Manila and the country, including LGU budgets, Department of Health (DOH) data, poverty data, and the national health and demographic data. Studies conducted by academics, research groups, private foundations, and other groups are also included. Much of the data gathering and original writing of this chapter were done before the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, this chapter goes more in-depth in the dynamics of health service delivery and access in Metro Manila than the discussions in Chapters 4 (Gomez et al.) and 5 (Go). It provides another dimension in looking at multilevel governance as it applies the human security approach.

2 Human Security, the Human Security Approach, and Health Security One of the most important global concepts to come out in the 1990s is human security, which shifts the definition of security from the traditional military-oriented and state-centric focus to a more people-centric one. Despite disagreements about its definition and actual utility (Goucha and Aravena 2001; Cabilo and Baviera 2010), what is clear is its emphasis on the welfare of people. In the literature, human security appears to have three dimensions, namely freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity. Human security means protecting these fundamental freedoms. According to the Commission on Human Security (CHS), the concept of human security addresses the protection of people (meaning both individuals and communities) from “critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations … using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations” (CHS 2003, 4). Promoting human security means creating various systems “that together give people

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the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity” (CHS 2003, 4). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), meanwhile, defines human security as “safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression; and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily lives, whether in homes and communities” (UNDP 1994, 3). UNDP has further classified human security into seven dimensions, namely economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. Given the general multidimensional concept of human security, the human security approach, meanwhile, targets the vulnerable and directly addresses factors that increase vulnerability to poverty, disease, conflict, and disempowerment (Mani 2005). It covers both top-down (protection) and bottom-up (empowerment) approaches. It also requires mechanisms to be established at different levels of government, and a focus on governance to protect communities from threats. Furthermore, the achievement of human security requires going beyond development goals by undertaking efforts to address the full range of critical and pervasive threats facing people (CHS 2003). Mechanisms appear to be pointing to the need for multilevel governance, which refers to a “complex policy process in which political authority is distributed at different levels of territorial aggregation” both horizontally and vertically across subnational, national, and supranational levels of government as well as across private–public dimensions (Heywood 2019, 393). The UNDP definition of human security includes the dimension of health security. As Andersen-Rodgers and Crawford (2018, 179) say, “good health is necessary for the achievement of human security.” Furthermore, it is related to other aspects of human security like food security, gender equality, environmental stability, poverty, and protection of human rights (Andersen-Rodgers and Crawford 2018, 189). The CHS (2003, iv) stresses the need to provide basic health care at affordable costs. What is health security? Based on the UNDP’s general definition of human security in 1994, health security is concerned with “the protection of individuals from sudden or chronic health threats and efforts to empower individuals to lead healthy lives”; good health is particularly important to the empowerment or freedom from want dimension of human security (Andersen-Rodgers and Crawford 2018, 180). Of course, not all health concerns become security concerns. They become chronic health concerns “when they arise from systemic inequality or deprivation created by societal norms surrounding individuals’ health needs, the

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weakness or inefficiency of health care institutions, or from the structural instability imposed by active armed conflict or state collapse”; an individual health issue becomes a human security issue due to the scale of the problem and the nature of contributing factors, especially if it arises from the failure of the state to protect the population or some segments of it, e.g., marginalized or impoverished groups’ lack of access to medical care, from harm (Andersen-Rodgers and Crawford 2018, 180–181). Thus, this study of the state of health, health services, and equity to health services in NCR will be guided by the human security approach, with emphasis on health security. While the duty bearers of health security, using the multilevel governance perspective, involve not just state actors but also the private sector, civil society groups, and even external actors, the focus of this chapter is mostly the public health care system at the level of the local governments comprising Metro Manila.

3 Existing Devolved Structure of Health Services 3.1

The Devolved Structure Under the 1991 Local Government Code1

The public health system before devolution under the 1991 LGC had both central and local dimensions. At the central level, the DOH managed “a national service delivery structure operating from basic health and hospital facilities located at the barangay level and up to the municipal, provincial, regional and national levels” (Atienza 2004, 30). There was, however, a notable exception; chartered cities possessed direct authority over their health delivery systems, subject only to DOH supervision and regulation. In 1982, the Provincial Health Officer was also allocated expanded authority over budgetary actions, personnel actions, and operational decision-making. While this earlier effort fell short of the fully devolved structure currently in place, the change in 1982 nonetheless built a substantial formal local capacity, particularly at the local level, to manage health facilities and services at the provincial level (Atienza

1 A large part of this section is based on the author’s previous work: Maria Ela L. Atienza (2004), “The Politics of Health Devolution in the Philippines: Experiences of Municipalities in a Devolved Set-up,” Philippine Political Science Journal 25 (48): 25–54.

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2004, 30). In the late 1980s, the DOH with some support from foreign aid agencies, launched efforts to upgrade the performance of key public health programs with attempts “to target the benefits of these programs to areas of highest risk and lowest socioeconomic attainment” (Atienza 2004, 32). With devolution, the 1991 LGC has brought about significant changes in the structure of the public health system. A previous research of this author showed that the decentralization of health services in the Philippines is described by observers as the most radical in the developing world in terms of the scope of health personnel, finances, facilities, and responsibilities devolved to LGUs (Atienza 2004, 32; World Bank 1994, 49). All DOH facilities at the local level, which included 490 out of 534 public hospitals and 12,580 rural health units (RHUs), municipal health centers, and barangay health stations (BHSs) were transferred from the DOH to LGU administration (Perez et al. 1995). About 75% of the DOH’s field staff (45,945) has been devolved to the barangay, municipal, city, and provincial governments (Brillantes 1998, 55). With the 1991 LGC, public health services and hospital operations at these levels are no longer subject to central financial or managerial control. Among the five services devolved to the LGUs by the 1991 LGC, the DOH accounted for the largest absolute amount of devolved expenditure (as of 1993), well above the Department of Agriculture (World Bank 1994, 42–43). Health services also accounted for 66 percent of the total cost of devolved national government functions (Perez et al. 1995). A large part of the devolved health services is borne by provinces and municipalities, with the latter having no prior experience with health decentralization. Provincial governments are responsible for medical, hospital, and support services. Municipal governments are mainly responsible for the administration of primary health care and other national programs’ field services through the municipal health offices and corresponding RHUs and BHSs. They are also responsible for ensuring constituents’ access to secondary and tertiary care through vertical referrals. City governments are responsible for city health offices, city hospitals in highly urbanized cities (except NCR or Metro Manila), and corresponding RHUs and BHSs. In a sense, the involvement of cities in the devolution process is minimal due to the low level of DOH assets and staff devolved to them in 1991. As mentioned earlier, large cities, or the highly urbanized ones, are chartered and have administered and financed

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their own health systems for many years before 1991. Barangay governments are responsible for the maintenance of RHU and BHS facilities. As for the regional health offices, renamed Centers for Health Development, they continue to be an integral part of the DOH structure; they are now focusing on monitoring health policy implementation and LGU performance. Meanwhile, the DOH retained a number of key functions best carried out at the central level.2 3.2

Problems and Issues of the Public Health Care System

As a result of health devolution, LGUs gained significant powers and responsibilities in the area of health service delivery. However, various issues and problems immediately came out, among them (1) financial constraints like the inadequacy of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) share of LGUs and its skewed distribution formula, where cities still benefit while the share of provinces and municipalities is not commensurate with the health responsibilities devolved to them; (2) health personnel issues like low pay and lack of incentives for promotion after being devolved and possible conflicts with local elites; and (3) LGUs’ possible lack of local prioritization for health or lack of local competence on health, etc. Some of the problems can be traced to the fact that during the deliberations on the then proposed LGC, political and other vested interests of legislators such as preoccupation with reelection and rivalry with local politicians resulted in hasty deliberations on the merits of devolving health services (Atienza 2004, 34). Thirty years since the enactment of the 1991 LGC and the devolution of health services, despite some trailblazing local governments with successful health programs, the DOH itself reorganizing to deal with the challenges of devolution, and some national laws passed to address issues related to access to health services and health personnel rights, there are still problems attached to health devolution. Cuenca’s (2018) attempt to

2 The DOH-retained functions are training and technical assistance for medical professionals; all foreign-funded programs; all national experimental and pilot programs; health service and disease control programs associated with international agreements; management of technical and financial assistance to local governments; regulation, licensing and accreditation of health professionals; regulation and monitoring of health facilities and food service establishments; regulation of drugs; and administration of regional hospitals, medical centers and specialized health facilities.

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document and review health devolution in the Philippines identified three general issues and challenges. These are: 1. Financing for Health. Since 1992, the root of the problem is the mismatch between the IRA and the cost of devolved functions. Many provinces and smaller municipalities have insufficient funds to pay the salaries of health personnel devolved to them according to national benchmarks, leading to vacancies in hospitals and RHUs. Funding is also inadequate for the operation of health facilities, including hospitals. Because the IRA is not conditional, funding is further affected by priorities of LGUs which are normally biased for infrastructures. Thus, inequities in health status became even more glaring between richer and poorer LGUs. 2. Health Personnel . Aside from problems during the early years of transition, health devolution led to “geographical displacement, job loss, income and benefit changes, and increased politicization of health” (Cuenca 2018, 10). Even the Magna Carta of Public Health Workers further highlighted the problem of inadequacy of local budgets. 3. Organization/Structural Change. Not all Local Health Boards (LHBs) are functioning. Nongovernment organizations (NGOs) are not always represented in the LHBs. From the pre-devolution district health system, devolution fragmented “the chain of health care delivery system” with different levels of health care devolved to different levels of LGUs (Cuenca 2018, 13). Devolution also broke down the referral system and fragmented public health service delivery and financing. 3.3

Adjustments in the Public Health Care System and New Laws

Despite experiencing the most difficult transition among the agencies that were substantially devolved, the DOH has been working hard in making the necessary adjustments to make health devolution work. It restructured itself to adjust to its role under devolution. A major reform commitment is the Health Sector Reform Agenda. Noting also some of the problems arising during the first few years of the 1991 LGC, the DOH has been creating programs to assist LGUs to fulfill their health responsibilities and at the same time achieve national health goals even

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in a devolved set up. One of the innovations introduced is the revitalization of the district health system or inter-local health zones (ILHZs) to address fragmentation since devolution. The DOH is actually at the forefront of national agencies which are encouraging more participatory mechanisms in service delivery (RFA 1999, 4–6). Perhaps, this inclination can be traced to the fact that even before devolution, the public health sector has already adopted the concept of participatory primary health care and inter-sectoral collaboration. Thus, it is easier for the agency, compared with others, to adjust to the concept of devolution despite initial objections from DOH central personnel about the speed and extent of the transition. Devolution has just increased the venues for more participatory service delivery. More recently, the DOH developed the Philippine Health Agenda 2016– 2022, which uses the “all of government” approach, i.e., mobilizing “government agencies to address the health implications within each agency’s scope of responsibility and function”, guarantees a set of health services for all, encompasses different types of diseases (communicable and non-communicable diseases as well as diseases brought about by rapid urbanization and industrialization), and redefines service delivery networks through the primary care network composed of the BHSs, RHUs, outpatient clinics, and Level 1 and 2 hospitals (Alicias-Garen et al. 2019, 9–10). Immediately after the 1992 elections, the new Congress was faced with clamor from health workers nation-wide to recentralize health services. A Magna Carta for Health Workers was passed in 1992 but it failed to placate the demands of health workers. The result was a compromise bill from both Houses which sought to postpone health devolution to LGUs and to allow certain LGUs to go ahead with devolution if they are certified to be fulfilling a number of requirements (Atienza 2007). The major argument for recentralization is that health programs, health personnel, and the general health of the people are compromised in a devolved set up because of problems in local prioritization, resources, and capabilities (Atienza 2004, 35; Atienza 2007). However, then President Fidel V. Ramos vetoed the bill in 1995 immediately after the mid-term elections. He was supported by a vigorous DOH with a determined leadership under then DOH Secretary Juan Flavier who committed to devolution, the various leagues of local governments, alliances of NGOs, and big aid agencies (Atienza 2004, 35; Atienza 2007). Thus, the presidential veto further institutionalized the devolution of health services.

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Over time, a number of exemplary LGUs emerged showing innovative means of tackling health issues. However, for most of the LGUs, health service delivery and access to them remain a problem as shown above. But two new developments in legislation and jurisprudence may also have long lasting impacts on the delivery of health services and people’s access to these. One recent favorable Supreme Court decision for local government financing is the interpretation or correction of the 1991 LGC’s provision that LGUs get 40% share of national taxes. Since 1991, this was interpreted to mean that LGUs will receive a share of revenues collected by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), leading to problems about insufficiency of the funds, i.e., IRA and internal sources of income, and unfair formula disadvantaging provinces and municipalities who bear the brunt of the devolved services. However, in a July 2018 decision (GR No. 199802 and G.R. No. 208488)—more popularly known as the MandanasGarcia ruling after the petitioners (Mandanas and Garcia)—and affirmed this April 2019, the Supreme Court now defines “the just share” of LGUs not just based on national internal revenue taxes but “national taxes” as stated in the 1987 Constitution. This decision begins implementation in 2022. It still remains to be seen what will be the impact of the Universal Health Care Law of 2019 which grants all Filipinos basic health coverage in order to lower out-of-pocket expenses, particularly the poor. The new law puts a lot of responsibilities on the national government for financing as well as provinces and cities for province-wide and city-wide health systems instead of municipalities managing their own health centers. This law tries to solve the fragmentation of the public health system and increase people’s access to health services. However, the success of this program will depend on funding, availability of skilled personnel, readiness or receptivity of LGUs, etc. In fact, the DOH secretary had already lowered expectations in 2020 by saying that the law cannot be implemented fully for the year because the DOH was not allocated sufficient funds and only those LGUs that were ready and willing would be the pilot sites in 2020. For 2021, the pandemic and other government priorities also led to insufficient budget for the full implementation of this law. In support of the Mandanas-Garcia ruling, the Office of the President issued in June 2021 Executive Order (EO) No. 138 which calls for full devolution and implementation of the 1991 Local Government Code by 2022. However, with a limited health budget approved by the two

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Houses of Congress, guidelines still being drawn up by different agencies, the May 2022 elections, and without calls for complementary reforms in the 1991 LGC to change the revenue sharing formula as well as other legal reforms, the original issues related to problems of implementation of devolved services and access of people to these services (including health services), are still issues in 2022 and beyond.

4 Health Status, Access, and Equity in Metro Manila 4.1

Metro Manila in Brief

Metro Manila, or NCR, is composed of 16 cities and one municipality grouped into four districts. The 16 cities are: Caloocan, Malabon, Navotas, Valenzuela, Quezon City, Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, Makati, Manila, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas, and Muntinlupa and the lone municipality is Pateros. All are classified as highly urbanized. Each LGU is governed by a Mayor. NCR is considered as the political, economic, and social center of the country. It is a highly urban region and “the smallest and most densely populated region in the country” (UNOCHA 2017). The region contributes about 36% to the country’s GDP (World Bank Group 2017). In 2015, the total population of NCR is 12,877,253; the region’s population is equivalent to 12.8 percent of the entire country’s population (PSA 2016). Quezon City had the biggest population with 2.94 million in 2015 followed by Manila with 1.78 million and Caloocan City with 1.58 million (PSA 2016). The most populated barangays are mostly in Quezon City. Residents are normally considered young. Despite its economic growth, Metro Manila in 2012 had an estimated 1.3 million or 11% of its population living in informal settlements (World Bank Group 2017). They face multiple forms of exclusion, like lack of access to basic infrastructures, services, and economic opportunities. They are also the most vulnerable to environmental hazards. Among the urban poor in the country, 9% are in Metro Manila; this may be relatively low compared with national statistics but “disparities in living conditions are most evident in urban areas” than in rural areas (World Bank Group 2017, 3–4). Many of Metro Manila’s urban poor have been informal settlers for decades.

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4.2

Health Facilities, Personnel, and Status in Metro Manila

Health facilities and personnel in Metro Manila are significantly and comparatively higher than in other regions. In 2013, NCR or Metro Manila, together with neighboring Regions III and IVA, has the most endowed hospitals in terms of machines and equipment (Dayrit et al. 2018, 223). In terms of health facilities, Metro Manila boasts of several hospitals with state-of-the-art facilities. These are the Makati Medical Center, St. Luke’s Hospital, and the Asian Hospital. However, most private hospitals like these are very expensive. Public hospitals, where the poor normally go to, suffer from a number of deficiencies. In Metro Manila, DOH data show that there is a 1:800 ratio of hospital beds to people in government hospitals in 2017 (de la Cruz 2017); this is a clear shortage. Support facilities are also in need of upgrade. In a pre-pandemic report of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund Joint Monitoring Program, they noted that three in 10 health facilities in the Philippines, including Metro Manila, lack clean toilets (Cabico 2019). Then WHO Representative in the Philippines, Guindo Weiler, stressed that the 2019 water shortage in Metro Manila underscored the need to focus on long-term solutions to the issue of water, sanitation, and hygiene in health care facilities (Ibid.). His remarks were based on the fact that the water shortage affected the operations of major Metro Manila hospitals, particularly public ones. The advent of the COVID-19 pandemic since 2020 also highlighted the long-standing problem of lack of both basic supplies like masks, alcohol, and oxygen as well as specialized supplies like ventilators and personal protective equipment for health personnel. Another important problem in Metro Manila is the insufficient number of health professionals, especially in public hospitals, particularly relative to a large urban population. While the lack of health personnel is higher in other regions as the tendency of health workers is to flock to the capital region (especially doctors and nurses), the numbers are still insufficient compared with the high population and large percentage of urban poor who flock to public hospitals. In terms of medical doctors alone, Metro Manila lacks 594 doctors if based on the accepted standard of 1.1 doctors per 1,000 population (David et al. 2019); the deficit is definitely lower compared to other regions but it still remains a deficit. Even in terms of community or primary health care in the barangays , there are only 3.3

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midwives per 10,000 population in Metro Manila in 2017, much lower than 9.9 in the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), 6.9 in Cagayan Valley (Region II), 5.6 in Ilocos (Region I), and nine (9) other regions in the country (Dayrit et al. 2018, 144). The health personnel are overworked in the process. A nurse who worked in the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), which is “the endreferral hospital in the country” and located in the city of Manila, disclosed that nurses would usually serve 10 to 20 patients per day, as opposed to the ideal four to five patients per day per nurse (Medenilla and Ordinario 2019). Patients have to be admitted despite lack of nurses and other personnel, but the quality of the services suffers due to the constraints of the health system and health workers also suffer from burnout and diseases as a result. Health workers, especially nurses, in Metro Manila are also not immune to the general trend among Filipino health workers who are attracted to the possible higher pay and perceived better working conditions abroad. We have observed more closely how this shortage of health workers all over the country, particularly in Metro Manila, affected responses to the rising cases of COVID-19 and exposed also the vulnerabilities of Philippine health workers during periods of emergency. Since COVID-19 and the resulting government policies to encourage volunteers and hiring of more personnel in designated COVID-19 hospitals, especially in Metro Manila, health workers groups have been calling for “time-outs” as well as better support for health workers and timely release of salaries and honoraria amidst the pandemic with the rising COVID-19 cases, hospitals reaching maximum capacity, and large number of deaths among health workers infected with COVID-19 since 2020. In 2021, the failure of the national government to provide salaries and allowances for both regular and volunteer health personnel in COVID-19 facilities in a timely manner has resulted in plenty of resignations. The limitations of the public health system lead to its inability to control diseases that are prone to spread in congested urban areas. In 2019, Metro Manila health officials and the DOH faced the problems of trying to control the spread of dengue, leptospirosis, and measles. Starting 2020, Metro Manila LGUs and their hospitals are faced with the daunting task of monitoring and addressing the spread of COVID-19, which the WHO declared as a global health emergency. Metro Manila as a whole, and individual LGUs like Quezon City, have the highest number

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of COVID-19 positive people in the country since 2020, mainly due to the region’s high population. Because public health facilities in Metro Manila are a combination of both local and national facilities, especially hospitals, the less-than-quality state of health facilities in NCR can be attributed to both the limitations and inefficiencies of both the LGUs and the DOH. On the part of the Metro Manila LGUs, each LGU has a different appreciation of health and not all of them prioritize health compared with other items in their budget. It is also difficult to attract health personnel to work in public hospitals and facilities given the low salaries and difficult conditions. At the same time, the national government has been perennially giving the health sector less than the proposed budget annually, including in 2020 when the Universal Health Care Law was pilot-tested for the first time. The DOH itself also has inefficiencies. One pre-pandemic proof was the Commission on Audit (COA) report that the DOH, in 2018, has over PhP 18 billion worth of drugs and medicines in its warehouses that remain undistributed to public hospitals around the country (CNN Philippines Staff 2019a). Since 2020, with COVID-19 cases increasing, the DOH has faced allegations of corruption and other irregularities in issues related to procurement of supplies and health insurance. The 2021 hearings in both the Senate and House of Representatives exposed problems and irregularities in the DOH’s emergency procurement of COVID-19-related medical supplies. The May 2019 elections saw new and younger politicians emerging as mayors in a number of cities in Metro Manila. Many of them have vowed to improve the health facilities of their respective LGUs and prioritize health services by increasing the health budget. We have seen some of them as well as some re-elected Metro Manila mayors try to deliver on these promises and develop innovative programs as they think of more pro-active measures to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic and other related concerns. Hopefully, this will be sustained and translated into actual improvements not only in facilities and number of health personnel but more health services to constituents, especially under-privileged ones, and there will be continuity of innovative health programs even after the May 2022 national elections. There are also issues related to health indicators in Metro Manila. In the area of nutrition, there are a number of challenges. The National Nutrition Council (2015) identified them as follows:

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1. Double Burden of Malnutrition. Using data from the Food and Nutrition Institute of the Department of Science and Technology, among children less than five years old, one out of 10 are underweight (15.1%), which is lower than the national rate of 21.5%. One in every four children 0–5 years old (24.9%) are stunted; this is lower than the national prevalence of 33.4%. Six out of 100 (6.4%) of children 0–5 years old are wasted or thin; this is lower than the national rate of 7.1% but is already considered a public health problem. However, six of 100 under-five children (6.0%) are overweight for their height; this is higher than the national prevalence of 3.9%. Children in less urban areas and from the poorest quantile are more at-risk to underweight and stunting while those in more urban areas and from the richest quantile are more at-risk to overnutrition. 2. Micronutrient Deficiencies . In 2013, the prevalence of anemia among children 6 months to less than 5 years old was 10% and among 6–12 years old and adolescents 13–19 years old were 6.9% and 6%, both lower than the national prevalence. In 2013, teenage pregnant mothers were more anemic than older mothers while pregnant women from the rich quintile and those residing in urban communities are more at-risk to anemia. The prevalence of Vitamin A Deficiency among 5 months to less than 5 years old at 27.3% is considered a “severe” public health problem in NCR. There is also insufficient iodine intake among all age groups, which is considered “severe”. 3. Maternal Malnutrition. In NCR, 4.6% of women age 15–19 had a live birth and 5.6% of teenagers have started childbearing; according to health and nutrition workers, they usually do not attend prenatal care because they keep their pregnancy secret. Teenage fertility (15–19 years old) almost tripled in the past decade, making NCR third across the regions in teenage fertility; around 13.9% have begun childbearing while 3.8% were pregnant with their first child. Maternal mortality rate (MMR) in 2016 was 45 per 100,000 livebirths. 4.3

Access and Equity in Public Health Services in Metro Manila

According to Carpio (2018), health outcomes of “Filipinos living in urban slums are worse than those living in non-slums, and sometimes worse than those living in rural areas”. Specifically, for informal settlers

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in Metro Manila, there are a number of issues and challenges they face, including difficulties in accessing clean water, medical services, and other health services (World Bank Group 2017). Among basic services, access to clean water is a serious problem for informal settlers; this is mainly because they cannot pay the connection fee or provide the necessary requirements, e.g., proof of land title. Lack of access to proper sanitation contributes to water pollution that causes health problems and improper solid waste management adds to health issues and flooding. In addition, overcrowding in informal settlers’ communities leads to overcrowded health facilities and competition. Unless the informal settlers are organized and/or they have kinship ties with local officals, especially in the barangay governments, they are excluded from government decision-making processes that affect them (World Bank Group 2017, 89), including the provision of health services. In a series of statistical studies as well as focus group discussions (FGDs) conducted in several barangays in Quezon City and Manila (the two most populous cities in Metro Manila), Madcasim (2018) had the following findings relevant to the status of health and people’s access to health services and complementary with some available observations made on the topic: 1. LGUs have their own priorities when it comes to their budget. For instance, in 2015, Quezon City allocated 30% of its budget to health, nutrition, and population control which was second only to housing and community development which got 34% allocation; meanwhile, Manila only allocated 20% to the same type of services and activities, prioritizing education, culture, and sports/manpower development which was given 42%. 2. The size of their income also enables some LGUs to spend more on services like health compared with those with relatively lower income. In the case of Quezon City, it has been the top-earning city in the Philippines and with bigger percentage allocation for health and other related services, this means more money for health services. Many basic health services like medicines can be availed for free. This was also the case in the city of Manila. 3. Residents agree that public services like health are collective goods that should be inclusive and accessible regardless of income class, religion, etc.

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4. Discrimination occurs in the delivery of services and access to health facilities. There is a feeling among Muslim residents in the city of Manila that they are discriminated against in many government hospitals not only because of their religion but also because they are poor (at least during the time when Joseph Estrada was Mayor until 2019). 5. Local government officials can exploit these health services for credit-claiming, patronage, and corruption. 6. Barangay health centers are sometimes very far, lacking in supplies, and overcrowded. 7. Partnerships with the private sector and civil society organizations (CSOs) in the delivery of health services are crucial. There appears to be more partnerships in Quezon City than in Manila based on the FGDs (which were conducted in 2018). Based on the above state of health, delivery of health services, and their accessibility in Metro Manila, health has become a human security concern due to the weakness and inefficiency of the health care institutions. Certain sections of the population, particularly the vulnerable populations and the urban poor who depend on the public health care system, are deprived of much needed health care. The state has not invested on strengthening of the entire public health system, leading to the poor and vulnerable sectors deprived of much needed health services.

5 Ways Forward: Federalism and Other Options for the Philippines and Metro Manila 5.1

Federalism and Metropolitanization

Immediately after the 2016 elections, the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte has pushed for a shift to a federal form of government. However, despite efforts of some of his allies in both the executive and legislative branches of government, the administration has failed to achieve this goal in its first three years in office. The strategy of the administration afterwards, through the Inter-Agency Task Force headed by the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), was to focus on “surgical amendments” to the 1987 Constitution, particularly including as a provision the recent Supreme Court decision (MandanasGarcia ruling) that all LGUs are entitled to a 40 percent share not just

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of the collections of the Bureau of International Revenue but also other income collected by the national government, as well as transforming the Regional Development Councils (RDCs) into Regional Development Authorities with their own budget and the power to implement their respective regional development plans (Atienza 2019). In the initial federalism plan, Metro Manila or NCR was designated by the draft Bayanihan Constitution of the Consultative Committee created by the President as a special metropolitan region. Unfortunately, the draft federal constitution did not get the support of both Houses of Congress in 2018. The president, in 2019, has also appeared resigned as to the prospects of shifting to a federal form within his term (until 2022). Nevertheless, what are the implications of federalism for health service delivery in the Philippines, particularly for Metro Manila, given the current state of health services and people’s access to them under a devolved system? Federalism provides both opportunities and issues for health service delivery in the Philippines (Atienza 2017), for instance, using the cases of Canada and the United States, Bhatia and Haussmann (2014) noted that “(f)ederal systems are prone to dividing health benefits inconsistently across subnational jurisdiction … we find significant subnational variations in access to health services and insurance coverage.” There are also different models of health administration and delivery across federal countries (Australia, Canada, Germany, Malaysia, and Mexico) that also vary in income levels and system of government; based on these cases, things that must be considered are: deciding on the appropriate level of government to manage service delivery, system of financing, resolving inter-regional inequities, health insurance, intergovernmental relations, etc. (Estrada and Benipayo 2017). While supporters argue that federalism will provide opportunities for more experimentation on the part of the component states or regional governments, like in the Swiss case cantons often originate new and diverse ideas through their role of experimentation, however, meaningful social change itself, through non-discriminatory health policies supporting various sectors like women, was only possible if it came from the ground up (United Nations 2003). This means that there should be sufficient community organizing and participation to initiate experimentation, more progressive legislation and practices, and innovations. Australia, the only country to have enacted two national women’s health policies and established a strong network of community centers, can credit this achievement not only to the federal structure but to a combination of factors, namely: strong grassroots movement,

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women in trade unions and political parties, feminist advisers in the bureaucracy, women’s policy machinery in all bureaucracies, responsive governments and programmatic political parties, federalism, and social liberalism (Jamieson 2012). There are definitely a number of opportunities for improving and championing health services with federalism in the Philippines. They are as follows (Atienza 2017): 1. Scaling up of exemplary and innovative health programs at the regional/state level which may avoid the current fragmentation in health services; 2. New regional venues and multiple access points for participation and advocacies at the regional level (new state bodies, possible sectoral representation in various structures and special bodies including health, new electoral systems that can lead to more programmatic and disciplined political parties and greater electoral competition, etc.); 3. More broad-ranging partnerships and collaboration possible at the regional level for health (more civil society organizations [CSOs], private sector, academic organizations, etc.); and 4. Economies of scale argument for more resources at the regional government level and higher health budget. However, a number of issues, some of them already evident in the current devolved health situation in the Philippines, must be addressed and/or promoted to champion health in a federal set up. These are (ibid.): 1. Accountability, good governance, and participation at multiple levels of government; 2. Vibrancy of CSOs, especially those advocating health, across regional governments and LGUs and other levels; 3. Representation of health NGOs at all levels and making institutions work for health advocacies; 4. Awareness and appreciation of general health and sectoral health issues not only among state/regional and local authorities but also communities and citizens; 5. Adequate resources and expenditures for general and specific health programs at the national, regional, and local levels; 6. Availability of sufficient technical knowledge and personnel resources at the regional and local levels;

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7. Quality standards for service delivery across states monitored by the federal government agencies and other watchdogs; and 8. Multilevel coordination between central, state, and local levels to avoid fragmentation and deadlock. Thus, based on the experience of other countries under a federal set up, federalism in itself will not lead to improvement in health service delivery and people’s access and representation (Atienza 2017). Health service delivery in a federal set up can even lead to disparities in quality and efficiency across states and regions. However, stakeholders can take advantage of the new environment and institutional openings to advocate and design better health services and systems. Should a shift to a federal set up still be pursued in the future, the following are recommended (Atienza 2017): 1. There is already a pool of exemplary local health innovations, even from municipal cases, but more needs to be done. These can be replicated and scaled up. These best practices are not only in Metro Manila; some are even in poorer LGUs in the country. Perhaps, it is time also for Metro Manila LGUs to learn from best practices from other LGUs that can be adjusted in an urban setting. 2. The disparity or inequality in health services across geographic and political units, even in Metro Manila, must be addressed through better intergovernmental coordination mechanisms and federal legislation that punish inefficiencies and abuses. Government responsibilities, including provision of health services, should be clearly defined across all levels of government and other stakeholders. 3. The quality of service delivery, political inclusion, and political participation at all levels is crucial in institutional design and advocacies. 4. Local success and quality of services and democracy depend also on the quality of civil society, citizens, and leadership as well as available technical capacities and adequacy of resources of each regional/state and local government. 5. Complementary changes or reforms are also needed in the laws governing electoral systems, political parties, anti-poverty programs,

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accountability and good governance, monitoring role of federal governments, etc. 6. Health-based organizations/associations must take an active part in debates on possible constitutional amendments or revisions that can affect health services. In particular, supporters of devolution, autonomy, and inclusive health services should make sure that responsibilities across all levels of government and other stakeholders are clearly spelled-out. For instance, the draft Bayanihan Constitution lacked an article on local governments and did not clearly specify which levels are responsible for certain services, including health services. While the proposed shift to a federal set up may have lost its momentum now with the end of the Duterte administration, the focus has shifted to “surgical amendments” to the 1987 Constitution. COVID19 also has changed some government priorities. However, it is still possible to discuss the possibilities as well as the issues of creating a metropolitan Metro Manila government. A regionally elected body may be able to address some of the common issues faced by Metro Manila LGUs, including in the area of health service delivery. However, many of the same issues related with a full federal shift and implications on health service delivery must be discussed. At the same time, the readiness and openness of different stakeholders, including mayors and other local officials, to this possible reform must also be taken into consideration. The election of new mayors in some cities in NCR may have opened more doors for the possibility of having a metropolitan government (CNN Philippines Staff 2019b; Tuquero 2019), supported by the recent emergence of more pro-active inter-LGU responses to COVID-19 in Metro Manila and more efforts on the part of NCR mayors to address issues stemming from the pandemic as one geographical area through the Metro Manila Council and the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA); but a lot of discussions will have to be done in this issue of greater regionalization, particularly in terms of discussing issues of coordination, shared responsibilities and funding as well as which levels of government will have powers and responsibilities over certain services and functions, including health services. Of course, if there is a demand for the creation of a regional metropolitan body for Metro Manila even without the full shift to a federal form for the entire country, this will require amendments in Article X of the 1987 Constitution which currently mandates the

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creation of only two autonomous regional governments, one in Muslim Mindanao and one in the Cordilleras. 5.2

Amendments in the 1991 Local Government Code

The 1991 LGC is ripe for a number of amendments that can complement or even be prioritized instead of a complete shift to a federal form that will work for improved and equitable health services and genuine participation for health, including in Metro Manila. These include revising the IRA, now national tax allocation, formula to reflect not just equity but also the scale of devolved responsibilities as well as the Supreme Court’s Mandanas-Garcia ruling increasing the base of LGU shares from national income, making equalization transfers that not only cater to the needs of LGUs but also performance, making mandatory the inclusion of sectoral representatives in the local legislative councils, having mandatory budget for devolved services like health, among others. It is noteworthy that the Inter-Agency Task Force led by the DILG, since 2019, had been pushing for amendments in the 1991 LGC and the 1987 Constitution like making the IRA’s distribution formula based on need as well as good performance and empowering the RDCs to become true planning and implementing authorities with their own budget and powers. However, other amendments must also be pushed. While “surgical” amendments to the 1987 Constitution and the 1991 LGC have been shelved due to the need to prioritize the pandemic response, it is unfortunate that EO 138, which is supposed to make LGUs assume all the devolved functions in 2022, does not include promotion of these amendments. 5.3

Community Participation

Using the encompassing framework of human security of this chapter as well as highlighting one of the major principles of the decentralization process brought about by the passage of the 1991 LGC which is people empowerment, issues such as improving the delivery of health services as well as making sure that citizens regardless of socioeconomic position can access these services cannot be addressed solely through top-down or protection-focused reforms. There also have to be bottom-up or empowerment reforms. Institutional reforms and informed and committed local officials may be needed but they cannot succeed without the help and

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partnership with other stakeholders, particularly communities and citizens, organizations, as well as the private sector. As shown also by other countries with federal systems as well as successful cases of health service delivery under a devolved set up in the Philippines, institutional reforms must be complemented by other factors. Thus, community empowerment and participation in local decisionmaking (local health boards, other local special bodies, local assemblies/councils, as well as other processes) through organizing and proper health information dissemination are needed. This will also require partnership of LGUs with CSOs, state colleges and universities particularly those with health programs, the private sector, and other local, national and international agencies. Community or primary healthcare systems must be strengthened to focus on promotive and preventive approaches in health; this way, hospitals will not be overwhelmed by sick people. The human security approach also calls on LGUs and the whole of Metro Manila, together with various stakeholders, to focus not just on making access to health services equitable and sustainable. They should also have a more comprehensive long-term approach that addresses the major sources of vulnerability, such as poverty, hunger, lack of sustainable livelihood, poor sanitation and water supply, and lack of correct information which all affect the health of constituents.

6

Conclusions and Recommendations

Metro Manila LGUs, despite having more facilities, budget, and health personnel compared with other regions in the country, still have problems addressing the health concerns of its large number of citizens. Looking at access to health services as a human security issue, a number of other conclusions can be drawn from the chapter and the current challenge of COVID-19. First, health is a security issue in highly urban Metro Manila with poor, marginalized, and informal settlers unable to access health services equally in various LGUs. Second, health issues in Metro Manila do not only have freedom from want dimension; the dimensions of freedom from fear (from pandemics and other illnesses) and freedom to live in dignity must also be recognized as health, particularly when threatened by lack of access as well as threats of epidemics and pandemics, can lead to threats of insecurity and fears. At the same time, regardless of status in society, all citizens deserve to live in dignity, including exercising the right to access quality health services. Finally, protection and

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empowerment approaches are both needed to enable vulnerable sectors to access health services. While institutional reforms may be warranted, it is also important to focus on making sure that there is an enabling environment and the actors are informed, empowered, and active to be able to contribute to the improvements in health service delivery and general health profile of Metro Manila. For future research, it would be advisable to include interviews and FGDs with local government officials, health workers, and health-focused civil society groups in Metro Manila to get their own views beyond already documented research and other data about health status and access to health services in their LGUs and Metro Manila as a whole, especially with the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic which has threatened rich and poor alike and exposed further the poor state of the public health system in the country, even in Metro Manila.

Bibliography 9th Rapid Field Appraisal (RFA): Synopsis of Findings. 1999, December. Makati: Governance and Local Democracy (GOLD) Project. Alicias-Garen, Maria Dolores, Ramon Pedro P. Paterno, Maria Nikka U. Garriga, and Aubrey Joyce Razon. 2019. Valorizing Research and Evidence for Social Inclusion in the Philippines: A Situational Analysis of Selected Programs Addressing the Shortage of Primary Care Workforce within the Primary Health Care Approach. UP CIDS Discussion Paper 2019–07. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP CIDS). Andersen-Rodgers, David, and Kerry Crawford. 2018. Human Security: Theory and Action. London: Rowman & Littlefield. Atienza, Maria Ela L. 2004. “The Politics of Health Devolution in the Philippines: Experiences of Municipalities in a Devolved Set- up.” Philippine Political Science Journal 25 (48): 25–54. https://doi.org/10.1080/011 54451.2004.9754256. ———. 2007, April 2–3. “Political Opportunities and Health Devolution in the Philippines: Analyzing the Failed Attempts to Recentralize Health Services in the 1990s.” Federico Alcuaz Professorial Chair (University of the Philippines) Unpublished Paper, Presented at the Philippine Political Science Association’s 2007 National Conference, Hotel Intercontinental, Makati City, Philippines. ———. 2017, June 16. “Federalism and Possible Implications on the Philippine Health Situation.” Lecture delivered for the J.V. Sotejo Lecture Series in Nursing and Related Disciplines, Organized by the University of the Philippines (UP) College of Nursing Alumni Association, Inc., UP Manila.

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———. 2019, October 21. “From ‘Big Bang’ to Incremental Changes to the 1987 Philippine Constitution.” Voices from the Field, ConstitutionNet: Supporting Constitution Builders Globally (A website of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Accountability [IDEA]). http://constitutionnet.org/news/big-bang-incremental-cha nges-1987-philippine-constitution. Bhatia, Vandna, and Melissa Haussman. 2014. “Internal Variations in Healthcare Federalism in Canada and the United States.” Fédéralisme Régionalisme 14. http://popups.ulg.ac.be/1374-3864/index.php?id=1363. Brillantes, Alex Jr. B. 1998, January–April. “Decentralized Democratic Government Under the Local Government Code: A Government Perspective.” Philippine Journal of Public Administration 42 (1 & 2): 38–57. Cabico, Gaea Katreena. 2019, April 4. “3 in 10 Health Facilities in the Country ‘Lack Access’ to Clean Toilets — UN report.” Philippine Star. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2019/04/04/1907283/310-health-facilities-country-lack-access-clean-toilets-un-report Cabilo, Zuraida Mae D. and Mara Yasmin S.P. Baviera, 2010. “Defining and debating human security: a review of literature,” pp. 23–87. Developing a Human Security Index: An Exploratory Study in Selected Conflict Areas. Edited by Atienza, Maria Ela L., Clarinda L. Berja, Zuraida Mae D. Cabilo, Mara Yasmin S.P. Baviera, and Dina Marie B. Delias. Quezon City: University of the Philippines’ Third World Studies Center, in partnership with the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process and the United Nations Development Programme-Philippines. Carpio, Louella Patricia D. 2018. “Are Health Services Reaching Filipinos Living in Slums?” Health Research Brief 4 (2). https://www.doh.gov.ph/node/ 14003. CNN Philippines Staff. 2019a, July 25. “COA: P18-B Worth of Undistributed Medicine Stocked in DOH Warehouses.” CNN Philippines. http://cnnphi lippines.com/news/2019a/7/25/COA-DOH-medicine-warehouse.html? fbclid=lwAR0VAJu-jlDN7i2rRHvdOFzsNya6-dGCORxeaAFo6qAzwuo7BD nWqSFgkj0. ———. 2019b, October 15. “Vico Sotto Backs Proposal for a Metro Manila Governor.” CNN Philippines. https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2019b/ 10/15/Vico-Sotto-Metro-Manila-governor.html?fbclid=IwAR2wSjkGych36 FUL74uDnb-sJJTXFZwdnu-ZjnoT0A-ITcqvqFrv8HLLwo4. Commission on Human Security (CHS). 2003. Human Security Now: Commission on Human Security Report. New York: United Nations. Cuenca, Janet S. 2018. “Health Devolution in the Philippines: Lessons and Insights.” PIDS Discussion Paper Series No. 2018–36 (December). Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS).

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David, Clarissa C., Geoffrey Ducanes, Jose Luis Vargas Bacigalupo, Shaira Melissa Tengco, and Karol Mark Yee. 2019. “Eliminating the Deficit in Medical Doctors: Strategies and Costs.” UP CIDS Discussion Paper 2019–02. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies. Dayrit, Manuel M., Liexel P. Lagrada, Oscar F. Picazo, Melahi C. Pons, and Mario C. Villaverde. 2018. “The Philippines Health System Review.” Health Systems in Transition 8 (2). De la Cruz, Jovee Marie. 2017, August 15. “DOH Admits Lack of Beds in Metro Manila Hospitals.” Business Mirror. https://businessmirror.com.ph/ 2017/08/15/doh-admits-lack-of-beds-in-metro-manila-hospitals/. Estrada Miguel Antonio G. and Donato Benipayo. 2017. “Health and Federalism: Prospects for the Philippines.” House of Representatives, CPBRD Discussion Paper No. 3. Goucha, Moufida and Francisco Rojas Aravena. 2001. “New Perspectives on Human Security in Latin American and the Caribbean”, pp. 7–10. Human Security, Conflict Prevention and Peace in Latin America and the Caribbean. Edited by Goucha and Aravena. Paris and Santiago, CA: UNESCO and FLACSO-Chile. Heywood, Andrew. 2019. Politics, 5th ed. London: Red Globe Press. Jamieson, Gwendolyn Gray. 2012. Reaching for Health: The Australian Women’s Health Movement and Public Policy. Canberra: Australian National University Press. Madcasim, Amer. 2018. “The Limitations of Re-Election Incentives in Local Public Service Provision: The Case of Local Chief Executives in the Philippines.” Master’s thesis, MA Political Science (Honors) Program, Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City. Mani, Devyani. 2005. Strengthening Decentralized Governance for Human Security. Regional Development Dialogue 26 (2): 19–36. Medenilla, Samuel P. and Cai U. Ordinario. 2019, July 11. “Universal Health Care Law: No Grand Cure to What’s Ailing PHL Health Sector.” Business Mirror. https://businessmirror.com.ph/2019/07/11/universal-healthcare-law-no-grand-cure-to-whats-ailing-phl-health-sector/. National Nutrition Council. 2015, May 17. “NCR Profile.” National Nutrition Council. www.nnc.gov.ph/index.php/regional-offices/national-capitalregion/57-region-ncr-profile/244-ncr-profile.html. Perez, Juan Ill A., et al. 1995. “Decentralization and Health Systems Change: Managing Transition Dilemmas in the Early Years of Devolution in the Philippines.” Unpublished country report. World Health Organization, Decentralization and Health Systems Change Project.

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Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA). 2016, May 31. “Population of the National Capital Region (Based on the 2015 Census of Population).” Philippine Statistics Authority Website. https://psa.gov.ph/content/population-national-cap ital-region-based-2015-census-population-0. Tuquero, Loreben. 2019, September 21. “Belmonte, Moreno Asked: Does Metro Manila Need an Elected Governor?” Rappler. https://www.rappler. com/move-ph/social-good-summit/240696-belmonte-moreno-asked-doesmetro-manila-need-elected-governor. United Nations. 2003, January 17. “Federalism in Switzerland No Hindrance to Social Change, Women’s Anti-Discrimination Committee Told.” United Nations Website. https://www.un.org/press/en/2003/wom1376.doc.htm. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 1994. Human Development Report 1994. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). 2017, February 27. Philippines: National Capital Region (NCR) Profile. https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/philippines/ infographic/philippines-regional-profiles-ncr-jan2017. World Bank. 1994, May 23. Philippines-Devolution and Health Services: Managing Risks and Opportunities. Report No. 12343-PH, Country Department I, Population and Human Resources Operation Division, East Asia and Pacific Regional Office. World Bank. World Bank Group. 2017, May. “Promoting Inclusive Growth by Creating Opportunities for the Urban Poor.” Philippine Urbanization Review Policy http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/904471495808486 Notes. 974/pdf/115310-PN-P156898-PUBLIC-Policy-Notes-Inclusive-GrowthFINAL.pdf

CHAPTER 7

Basic Education and Federalism: Implications and Options for the National Capital Region Elvin Ivan Y. Uy and Dina Joana S. Ocampo

1 The Push for Federalism and the Proposed Charter On 9 July 2018 and after more than four months of work and deliberations,1 the Consultative Committee to Review the 1987 Constitution (ConCom) formally turned over its proposed Bayanihan Federalism charter to President Rodrigo R. Duterte.2 This draft constitution details 1 Mike Navallo, “ConCom approves proposed charter, backs shift to federalism,” ABS-

CBN News. 2 Presidential Communications Operations Office, “President Duterte receives proposed federal constitution of Consultative Committee,” PCOO.

E. I. Y. Uy Philippine Business for Social Progress, Mandaluyong City, Philippines D. J. S. Ocampo (B) College of Education, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 T. S. E. Tadem and M. E. L. Atienza (eds.), A Better Metro Manila?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3_7

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what a federal Philippines may look like as it mandates the creation of a federal government and 18 federated regions; outlines the modifications to the executive, legislature, and judiciary; and specifies the distribution of powers between the federal and regional governments, among other significant changes from the unitary system of the 1987 Constitution.3 In Article XII (“Distribution of Powers of the Government”) of the draft charter, basic education is defined as an exclusive power 4 of the federal government while culture and language development are exclusive to the federated regions. This assignment of powers upends the prevailing notion that the delivery of “quasi-public goods” and “merit goods” is normally shared between federal and regional governments with the former setting national standards to meet equity objectives and considerations.5 Furthermore, it splits socio-cultural concerns as though these were easily disengaged and could be administered in silos. As with Chapters 4 (Gomez et al.) and 5 (Go), this chapter also looks into the implication of the governance structure of the country’s current state of decentralization and the proposed federalism structure (Bayanihan Constitution) on education in the Philippines. Unlike Chapters 4 and 5, however, it delves more deeply into this by looking at basic education governance models in several federalized countries. Moreover, Chapter 7 goes more in-depth in examining how NCR may function and relate to its federal counterpart in the areas of curriculum and supervision, teacher standards and hiring guidelines, planning, data management, and resource provisions. Of important consideration is how shifting to federalism compares to strengthening the present setup in addressing inequities.

2

Governance of Basic Education Since the 1987 Constitution

Depending on how the distribution of powers between federal and regional governments for basic education will be implemented in the proposed federal constitution, the new setup may simply continue the 3 Consultative Committee to Review the 1987 Constitution, Bayanihan Federalism:

Draft Constitution for a Strong, indissoluble Republic. 4 “Powers which are given to the exclusion of other political authorities are exclusive powers.” (Art. XII Sec. 3, Bayanihan Federalism Constitution). 5 Rosario Manasan, “Designing the Fiscal Features of a Federal Form of Government: Autonomy, Accountability, and Equity Considerations,” Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) Discussion Paper Series No. 2017-56, p. 6.

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persistently and largely centralized governance of basic education. Basic education—compared with other social services such as health—was not as devolved even after the adoption of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160 (“Local Government Code of 1991”) and has had some, but limited, decentralization with the implementation of RA 9155 (“Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001”).6 RA 9155, which created the Department of Education (DepEd) from what used to be the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), espouses the principles of shared governance for the national, regional, division, school district, and school levels.7 With RA 9155 providing the policy cover, an earnest attempt to decentralize the DepEd was carried out through the School-Based Management (SBM) reform beginning in 2001.8 More than a decade hence, SBM has generally become associated with better school performance as measured by student scores on the National Achievement Test (NAT)9 that is administered by the DepEd Central Office rather than context-driven initiatives which leverage local and regional autonomy and resources for educational reforms on the ground.

3 Basic Education: Status and Performance in Numbers The basic education sector has largely been improving for the last decade. Basic and functional literacy rates are now at 96.5 and 90.3%, respectively (see Fig. 1) while total enrollment is estimated to be at 27.3 million learners from Kindergarten, Elementary, Junior and Senior High Schools, and Alternative Learning System (see Fig. 2). The National Capital Region (NCR) has basic and functional literacy rates of 99.5 and 95.3%, respectively, the highest among all 17 administrative regions. 6 Joseph Capuno, “A case study of decentralization of health and education services in the Philippines,” Human Development Network (HDN) Discussion Paper Series No. 3 (2008/2009), p. 10. 7 Sec. 5 and Sec. 7 of RA 9155. 8 Ma. Cynthia Bautista, Allan Bernardo, Dina Ocampo, “When Reforms Don’t Trans-

form: Reflections on institution reforms in the Department of Education,” HDN Discussion Paper Series No. 2 (2008/2009), p. 9. 9 World Bank and AusAID, School Based Management in the Philippines: An Empirical Investigation [Basic Education Public Expenditure Review: Phase II], p. iii.

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Fig. 1 Basic and functional literacy rates10 2013 14.5 14.5 14.4 14.1

2014

2016

2015

2017

13.6

TOTAL = ~27.3M 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.6

8.0

2.3 2.2 2.1 1.8 2.2

2.8 1.4

Kindergarten

Elementary

Junior High School

Senior High School

0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7

Alternative Learning System

Fig. 2 Total enrollment (in Millions)11

Likewise, net enrollment rates (Fig. 3), completion rates, and National Achievement Test scores (Fig. 4) have generally been trending in the right direction albeit gradually.

10 Functional Literacy, Education and Mass Media Survey (FLEMMS) in 2003, 2008, and 2015. 11 From DepEd Presentation to the Senate (2016) and DepEd 2018 Budget Presentation to Congress.

7

BASIC EDUCATION AND FEDERALISM: IMPLICATIONS …

Kindergarten

95

94

77

74 65

Junior High School

Elementary

97

96

93

90

79

76

65

225

65

65

68

63

57

55

2010

2012

2011

2013

2014

2015

Fig. 3 Net Enrollment Rates (NER)12 Completion Rate, %

NAT Overall Score, %

90

80

80

70

70

60

60 50

50

40

40

30

30 20

20

10

10

0

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Elementary

0

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Secondary

Fig. 4 Completion rates and NAT scores13

DepEd has also seen a sizeable and sustained increase in its annual national budget, both in nominal terms (see Figs. 5) and in per capita spending for learners in the public schools (see Fig. 6). While these improvements are noteworthy and encouraging, persistent disparities in education based on income and sex pervade (see Table 1). The lowest wealth quintiles of the female and male populations have only 12 From DepEd Presentation to the Senate (2016). 13 Ibid.

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E. I. Y. UY AND D. J. S. OCAMPO

DepEd Budget,

16.9%

% of National Budget

568.4B

15.3% 580.6B

14.4%

Growth Rate

433.5B

14.1%

% to GDP

367.1B

13.6%

12.6% 11.4%

309.B

14.6%

13.2%

293.4B

238.8B

30.8%

207.3B

175.0B

22.9% 18.7% 18.5%

18.1% 15.2% 5.5%

2.1%

1.9%

2.1%

2.2%

2.5%

2.4%

2.6%

2.9%

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

3.6%*

3.3%*

2017

2018

1 *Based on GDP forecast

Fig. 5 DepEd annual budget14

18,251

Per Capita Spending, 17,794

Growth Rate 14,631

13,991 11,533 10,102

9,019

8,816

22%

21% 15%

14% 3%

4% -2%

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Fig. 6 Spending per public school student15

5.6 and 4.5 median years of completed education, respectively. These figures are about seven years lower than the richest quintile and nearly four years fewer than the overall population. The female population also

14 From DepEd Presentation to the Senate (2016), DepEd 2018 Budget Presentation to Congress, and DBM. 15 From DepEd K to 12 Midterm Report to Congress Presentation and DepEd Presentation to the Senate (2016).

7

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BASIC EDUCATION AND FEDERALISM: IMPLICATIONS …

Table 1 Median Years of Completed Education by Wealth Quintile and by Sex16

Wealth Quintile

Philippines Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest

Median Years Completed (Female)

Median Years Completed (Male)

9.1 5.6 7.0 9.3 10.3 12.2

8.1 4.5 6.7 8.6 10.2 11.5

completes an additional year of education compared to males, with a median of 9.1 years versus 8.1 years. The same is true for Net Attendance Ratios—only three in five of the poorest fifth of the population are able to attend secondary school compared to the nearly nine in every 10 for the richest quintile (see Table 2). Girls have higher NAR for both elementary and secondary education, with a significant difference of 8.1 percentage points for the latter. Focusing on NCR, the region has a total basic education enrollment of 2.87 million learners not counting those from ALS (see Fig. 7), with more than seven in every 10 students going to a public school (see Fig. 8). Net Enrollment Ratio (NER) for kindergarten and elementary in the region has experienced some decline in the last two school years while Table 2 Wealth Quintile Philippines Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest

Net Attendance Ratios (NAR) by wealth quintile and by sex17 Primary School

Secondary School

Female (%)

Male (%)

Total (%)

Female (%)

Male (%)

Total (%)

93.5 92.4 93.7 94.2 94.0 93.6%

92.8 91.3 92.3 93.8 94.3 93.3

93.1 91.8 93.0 94.0 94.2 93.4

82.5 69.0 81.4 85.0 87.1 92.0

74.4 52.9 71.7 79.3 83.9 88.1

78.2 60.3 76.3 82.0 85.4 89.9

16 From National Demographic and Health Survey 2017. 17 Ibid.

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E. I. Y. UY AND D. J. S. OCAMPO

TOTAL = 2.87M

Fig. 7 Total enrollment in NCR (in Millions)18

TOTAL = 71.9%

Fig. 8 Share of public education in NCR Enrollment (in %)19

NER for junior and senior high schools have been increasing steadily (see Fig. 9). NCR completion rates for both elementary and secondary education have also been improving although elementary NAT scores have gone down the last two years while high school NAT scores remain flat (see Fig. 10).

18 Data from DepEd Planning Service. 19 Ibid.

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BASIC EDUCATION AND FEDERALISM: IMPLICATIONS …

229

Fig. 9 Net Enrollment Rates in NCR20 Completion Rate, %

NAT Overall Score, %

100

70

90

60

80 70

50

60

40

50 40

30

30

20

20 10

10 0

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Elementary

0

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Secondary

Fig. 10 Completion rates and NAT scores in NCR21

Taking all these into account, DepEd continues to face chronic challenges in basic education access, quality, and governance, particularly with the full implementation of the K to 12 Basic Education Program,22 planned and ongoing expansion of the Alternative Learning System

20 Data from DepEd Planning Service. 21 Ibid. 22 Edilberto de Jesus, Anne Candelaria, et al., “K-12 Program: Sustaining Education under the Duterte Presidency,” Ateneo School of Government (ASOG) Working Paper 17-005, pp. 25–34.

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(ALS),23 and management of its considerable budget.24 There have been various studies on the impact of the different facets of basic education governance to the sector’s performance and ability to fulfill its mandate, but not one answers the pertinent question of whether federalism can significantly improve the state of basic education in the country particularly for underserved communities and learners.

4

Basic Education Governance in Several Countries

In the ongoing discussions about potential shifts to federalism and how it may affect basic education, it is helpful to consider and understand the experiences of other countries that have either a unitary or federal form of government. Figure 11 shows the governance systems and basic education cycles of four unitary countries, including the Philippines, and six federal countries. Each country has three parts to its basic education cycle: preelementary, elementary, and secondary education. All countries except for

Fig. 11 Governance and basic education cycles in select countries25

23 Sofia Tomacruz, “Expert says DepEd’s ALS ‘not fully effective’,” Rappler. 24 Neni Sta. Romana Cruz, “The burden of a large DepEd budget,” Philippine Daily

Inquirer. 25 From “K-12 Program: Sustaining Education under the Duterte Presidency”.

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BASIC EDUCATION AND FEDERALISM: IMPLICATIONS …

231

Germany have two stages for secondary education. Table 3 compares the governance of basic education in these 10 countries based on structure, responsibilities of federal and regional governments, and financing. There are meaningful and significant variations in basic education governance even among countries that share similar forms of government. But while there is no one prevailing model for the governance of basic education in federal systems, the notion that basic education should be a shared power between the federal and regional government is nearly universal. The discussion then shifts from whether power should be shared to how power may be shared between these two levels, with the balance of power as the main point of debate and design. It is likewise crucial to determine how the regional government and city or municipal governments will share the powers and responsibilities for basic education, and whether such an arrangement will be uniform throughout the country or will be left to the dictates of each federated region. Case Study: Nepal’s Shift to Federalism Nepal formally adopted federalism in 2015,26 a result of the decades-long democracy movement in the country that culminated in the abolition of its 240-year-old monarchy.27 With nearly a decade between the decision to change its system of government to the eventual choice to push through with federalism, Nepal provides an interesting case study for how a country can prepare its basic education system for such changes. In 2014, the UNESCO Office in Kathmandu and its roster of external experts provided the following considerations28 for how to make the transition as seamless and successful as possible: 1. How existing administrative structures and personnel will be distributed in the new setup is paramount; 2. Equitable distribution of central and state resources for education must be a priority;

26 Iain Payne and Binayak Basnyat, “Nepal’s Federalism is in Jeopardy,” The Diplomat. 27 “Nepal votes to abolish monarchy,” BBC News. 28 UNESCO Office in Kathmandu, A Resource Material on Education and Federalism in Nepal, pp. VII–IX.

The responsibilities of administrators at the school and local level, in general, are matters concerning the internal operations of the school. In Guatemala, Indonesia, and the Philippines, school boards have a say in the budget allocation for the maintenance and operation of the schools within their jurisdictions Educational assessment is done at the national level

Responsibilities

29 Ibid.

While there exists a central government agency for the administration of education, certain administrative powers and responsibilities are devolved locally to either school or city level Generally, as in the case of the Philippines, Guatemala, and Indonesia, the local education boards are comprised of community members and local officials

Unitary

While both federal and state governments have roles in the administering of public education, in most cases, such as in Australia, Germany, Brazil and the USA, the state or municipal government has the primary responsibility of providing education to its constituents Certain responsibilities and powers are also devolved down to the local level. In Australia and the US, local school boards or councils are comprised of school administrators, parents, students, and members of the community Malaysia, however, has a very centralized structure in education governance. The Minister of Education appoints the members of the Board of Governors for each state The responsibility of providing education rests primarily on the state governments in a federal setting. The federal government only plays a minimal role in the governance of education. For instance, in India, Germany, Australia, Brazil, and the USA, the federal government merely prescribes the educational standards that states should be able to deliver In most cases, the curriculum is set by each state. However, the trends in policy concerning the curriculum in Germany and Australia show that there seems to be a necessity for a national curriculum framework to maintain quality education Local school boards are mostly concerned with the internal operations of school. In contrast to the local school boards in a unitary setting, the school boards in the federal country cases have more responsibilities such as the hiring of school staff. Additionally, they also have the responsibility of setting the direction of schools Educational assessment is done at the national level

Federal

Comparison of Basic Education Governance in Ten Countries29

Structure

Table 3

232 E. I. Y. UY AND D. J. S. OCAMPO

Financing

The financing of schools rests primarily on the central government. In the case of the Philippines, however, local school boards are, by law, allowed to levy 1% from the local Property Tax. This is called the Special Education Fund

Unitary Schools are primarily financed by the state government from their tax revenues However, the federal government also reserves a small percentage from its tax revenue for education. In the case of the USA, federal funding comes in the form of aid for disadvantaged states

Federal

7 BASIC EDUCATION AND FEDERALISM: IMPLICATIONS …

233

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E. I. Y. UY AND D. J. S. OCAMPO

3. Changes to education governance in an environment of multilingual, multicultural, and multiethnic learners will require considerable amount of planning especially at the regional level (which is assumed to have the balance of power in a shared power setup for basic education); 4. The national or federal government should focus on setting national standards while the regional governments have latitude to hire and develop teachers and staff, for example; 5. To ensure the success of free and compulsory basic education, the regional governments must account for local contexts, challenges, and opportunities while going beyond the mandates and support of the national government; and 6. Capacity building of all concerned personnel may very well determine the success or failure of this shift, and capacity building is much more than just the provision of training.

5

Basic Education in the Bayanihan Federalism Constitution

Apart from specifying that basic education will be an exclusive power of the federal government while culture and language development will be an exclusive power of the federated regions, the ConCom-proposed charter also features the following significant proposed changes30 to the 1987 Constitution: 1. “Complete, quality education” as a “demandable”31 social and economic right in the Bill of Rights; 2. Inclusion of kindergarten and tertiary levels for free public education (Note: only elementary and secondary levels are deemed free in the 1987 Constitution); 3. Inclusion of kindergarten and secondary education for compulsory education (Note: only elementary education is deemed compulsory in the 1987 Constitution);

30 Art. III Sec. 26(c) and Art. XVII Sec. 2, 3, 4. 31 “The rights under this article are demandable against the State and non-state actors,

and their enforcement shall be consistent with international standards.” (Art. III Sec. 1).

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235

4. Federal constitution, Philippine history, and culture as required inclusions in the curriculum; 5. Accreditation as a vehicle to “continually improve education institutions;” and 6. Incentives for autonomous education institutions. The inclusion of the entire basic education cycle as part of both free and compulsory education is unsurprising given similar stipulations in RA 10157 (“Kindergarten Education Act”) and RA 10533 (“Enhanced Basic Education Act of 2013”) which institutionalized the K to 12 Program. With education as a demandable social and economic right however, the government will be under even greater pressure to ensure that every school-age Filipino is able to access and complete quality education at all levels. According to retired Supreme Court (SC) Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, declaring these social and economic rights to be demandable against the State, in effect, “makes them enforceable in the courts.”32 Mendoza further adds that “Social and Economic Rights are different from the Civil and Political Rights because they require the positive furnishing of resources which courts obviously cannot do” and that the “attempt to enforce these rights by court action is likely to cause frustration because of expectations that the rights are demandable against the State and even non-state actors.”

6

Federalism and Basic Education: Two Scenarios

Given the specific provisions of the draft Bayanihan Federalism constitution, there are two scenarios that may potentially define basic education governance under a federal system. The first scenario involves the federal government having exclusive power on basic education while the second scenario contemplates basic education being a shared power between the federal government and federated regions. The succeeding sections discuss and unpack the design considerations and implications for each scenario.

32 Vicente V. Mendoza, “The Supreme Court under the Proposed Constitution,” UP Law Colloquium on 2018 Constitution.

236

6.1

E. I. Y. UY AND D. J. S. OCAMPO

Scenario 1: Federal Government Has Exclusive Power on Basic Education

This scenario would largely mean the continuation of the status quo as all key responsibilities and resources will remain with the national or federal government (see Fig. 12). Basic education governance will continue to adhere to the prescriptions in RA 9155 and RA 7160, particularly the latter’s section on the local school board (LSB). With the current basic education structure potentially being carried over to the federal system, it is crucial that the government continues to strengthen and improve SBM (see Fig. 13). This will ensure that even with a substantially centralized system, schools and its personnel— with the active engagement of their stakeholders and local partners—can continue to be empowered to address their own gaps and challenges in terms of learning outcomes, leadership and governance, resource management, and accountability and continuous improvement. One specific area that the government may strongly explore is increasing the pace of financial decentralization of public schools coupled with a focus on the leadership and management capabilities of its school heads and other non-teaching personnel. School level funds still account

LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD (LSB) 1. 2. 3. 4.

Prepare annual supplementary budget Authorize the disbursement of SEF Serve as advisory committee to the sanggunian on educational matters Recommend changes to the names of public schools

Source: RA 7160

Setting of policies, standards, guidelines and programs for CENTRAL OFFICE national adoption Adopting/adapting the national policies and programs to REGIONAL OFFICES address the context and needs of the region, ensuring that (17) standards are being followed Supervises the implementation of the set policies and DIVISION OFFICES programs in the schools and learning centers; provides technical support to the schools and learning centers (221)

Source: RA 9155

SCHOOLS (60,000+)

Frontline services of the department accountable for education and learner outcomes

Fig. 12 Basic education as exclusive power of the federal government33

33 From RA 9155 and RA 7160.

7

BASIC EDUCATION AND FEDERALISM: IMPLICATIONS …

VISION, MISSION, GOALS LEADERSHIP and GOVERNANCE

237

CURRICULUM and LEARNING (K TO 12)

FUNCTIONALLYLITERATE CITIZEN

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT Source: DepEd Order 83, s. 2012

CENTRAL, REGION, DIVISION

ACCOUNTABILITY and CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT

Fig. 13 School-based management framework34

for a meager proportion of overall basic education spending.35 It is equally vital for policymakers to consider how the LSB can become more effective, particularly for the majority of municipalities that do not have a sizeable local revenue base compared to cities and other higher-income municipalities. 6.2

Scenario 2: Basic Education is a Shared Power of Federal and Regional Governments

Basic education as a shared power is the usual arrangement for countries with a federal system. What is more important to determine is the balance of power between federal and regional governments, and the distribution of resources and responsibilities between regional and local governments—an often missing yet essential component of any discussion on federalism.

34 From DepEd Order 83, s. 2012. 35 World Bank and AusAID, School Based Management in the Philippines, p. 23.

238

E. I. Y. UY AND D. J. S. OCAMPO

There are several ways to distribute power and one possibility is shown in Fig. 14. In this model, the federal government is mandated to set national standards (e.g., curriculum, learning environment, personnel qualifications, and competencies), handle national and system assessments, provide resources for strategic areas (i.e., both geographic and thematic or sectoral), and give assistance or incentives to the regions, as necessary. The federated regions, on the other hand, will be responsible for budgeting and provision of physical and learning resources, localization and indigenization of the curriculum and programs, program management, hiring and staffing, human resource development, creation of new public schools or learning centers, and the regulation and development of private institutions. Both federal and regional governments may however share the responsibility over the articulation of a national basic education agenda, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), research and development (R&D), and data and knowledge management. Policymakers can determine the most optimal configuration for the country and the basic education sector, taking into consideration regional and local variations in economic profile and development plus the overall capacity of implementing units and those who will be affected by the

FEDERATED REGIONS • Budget and provision of physical and learning resources • Localization and indigenization • Program management • Hiring and staffing • Human resource development • Creation of public schools • Regulation of private schools

SHARED • National basic education agenda • Monitoring and Evaluation • Research and Development • Data and knowledge management

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT • Standards • National assessment • Resource provision for strategic areas • Assistance to regions

Fig. 14 Basic education as a shared power of federal and regional governments

7

BASIC EDUCATION AND FEDERALISM: IMPLICATIONS …

239

transition. In fact, this kind and level of fiscal and administrative federalism requires a strong civil service and a deep bench of competent senior leadership and management-level personnel.36

7

Implications for the National Capital Region

NCR continues to be the most economically developed and resourcerich region in the country. Average family income in NCR is significantly higher than every other region while its labor force profile compares favorably with most regions, even with a 2018 unemployment rate that is higher than all but one region (see Table 4). NCR also has the highest median years of completed education at 10.7 and 10.6 years for females and males, respectively, versus the national medians of 9.1 and 8.1 years. Likewise, the region has consistently had the highest basic and functional literacy rates among all regions (see Fig. 1). As the most economically developed region in the country, the NCR accounts for 36.4 percent of total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2017. The region also had the highest per capita Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) at PhP 244,453, which is nearly thrice the national average of PhP 82,592 for the same year.37 Therefore, local government units (LGUs) in NCR enjoy the most resources with total revenues of PhP95.0 billion against total expenditures of PhP 56.7 billion in 2016 (see Table 5). Of that amount, PhP 16.9 billion was spent in education under two headings: Special Education Fund or SEF38 (PhP 9.4 billion) and Education, Culture and Sports/Manpower Development (PhP 7.5 billion). The latter is not exclusive to basic education. From 2013 to 2016, nearly a third of expenditures were education-related. Manila City spent the highest total amount in education in 2016 (see Table 6). The city also had the highest SEF that year while Quezon City

36 Joseph Capuno, “A case study of the decentralization of health and education in the Philippines,” p. 6. 37 Philippine Statistics Authority, “Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) records the fastest economic growth in 2017,” PSA. 38 Sec. 235 of RA 7160 states that, “A province or city, or a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area, may levy and collect an annual tax of one percent (1%) on the assessed value of real property which shall be in addition to the basic real property tax. The proceeds thereof shall exclusively accrue to the Special Education Fund (SEF)”.

71,319 9,087 1,270 3,520 2,402 7,889 10,096 2,093 4,113 5,459 5,296 3,155 2,617 3,314 3,505 3,150 1,885 2,390

₱267,000 ₱425,000 ₱282,000 ₱238,000 ₱237,000 ₱299,000 ₱312,000 ₱222,000 ₱187,000 ₱226,000 ₱239,000 ₱197,000 ₱190,000 ₱221,000 ₱247,000 ₱188,000 ₱198,000 ₱139,000

PHL NCR CAR I II III IV-A IV-B V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII Caraga ARMM

60.9 60.3 61.9 61.7 63.9 59.9 62.7 62.0 60.9 61.2 61.3 61.2 56.3 66.3 60.3 61.7 64.4 46.6

Labor force participation (%)

41 From national demographic and health survey 2017.

39 From family income expenditure survey 2015. 40 From labor force survey 2018 (end of year).

Working age population (‘000)

Average family income 5.3 6.6 4.1 6.8 3.0 5.8 6.6 4.7 4.9 5.3 5.3 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.3 3.9 4.0 3.7

Un-employed (%) 16.4 7.2 15.2 22.1 19.5 11.4 13.4 20.6 29.6 18.6 17.8 21.4 18.9 20.8 15.4 17.0 25.4 8.4

Under-employed (%) 9.1 10.7 10.2 9.6 8.2 9.2 10.1 7.8 7.8 8.1 8.0 7.7 6.9 8.6 7.7 7.3 8.1 5.4

Median years completed (Female)

8.1 10.6 9.1 9.0 7.3 8.5 9.1 6.8 6.9 6.9 6.8 6.6 6.4 7.0 8.2 6.6 6.7 4.2

Median years completed (Male)

Family income,39 labor force data,40 and median years of completed education (female and male) by region41

Region

Table 4

240 E. I. Y. UY AND D. J. S. OCAMPO

7

Table 5

BASIC EDUCATION AND FEDERALISM: IMPLICATIONS …

241

NCR Revenues and Expenditures (in PhP Millions)42

Total revenues Total expenditures Total LGU expenditures on education Total special education fund Education, culture and sports/Manpower development Share of education in total expenditures (%)

2013

2014

2015

2016

69,949 49,038 15,499 8,136 7,363

78,941 49,686 16,440 8,836 7,604

89,621 50,259 16,161 9,273 6,888

95,026 56,740 16,911 9,429 7,482

31.6

33.1

32.2

29.8

had the highest amount spent on education, culture, and sports. Valenzuela City, on the other hand, had the highest share of education in total expenditures at 41.4%. Overall, 10 out of the 17 LGUs had at least a quarter of their expenditures devoted to education with four LGUs spending at least a third on education. However, there were six LGUs that spent less than a fifth on education-related expenditures. In terms of SEF, NCR as a region spent PhP 3,496 per public school student in 2016 and at least PhP 3,000 each year from 2013 to 2015 (see Fig. 15). However, the SEF per capita varied considerably by DepEd Schools Division Office (SDO). Makati City SDO had, by far, the highest SEF per capita at PhP 15,696 in 2016, followed by Pasay City SDO at PhP 8,470 and Mandaluyong City SDO at PhP 6,278. Muntinlupa City SDO had the median value of PhP 3,926 while Las Piñas City SDO had the lowest amount with only PhP 747, which is significantly lower than the schools division’s annual SEF per capita in 2013 to 2015. Every other SDO had at least PhP1,000 per public school student in 2016 except for Caloocan City SDO. Figure 15 implies that the LGUs in NCR are very varied in their capacities or choices in terms of education spending. Notwithstanding these considerable advantages, NCR continues to face longstanding and persistent challenges in basic education access, quality, and governance—from school congestion to uneven distribution of resources, from difficulties in providing for conducive learning environments to challenges in meeting desired learning outcomes (e.g., see Fig. 10 for NAT scores). In fact, NAT scores do not seem to be influenced by SEF per capita spending. It will therefore be important to use SEF expenditures toward the direct improvement of student learning (see Appendix A).

242

E. I. Y. UY AND D. J. S. OCAMPO

Table 6

Caloocan

Las Piñas

Makati

Malabon

Revenues and expenditures by LGU in NCR (in PhP millions)43

Total expenditures Total LGU expenditures on education Total special education fund Education, culture, and sports/Manpower development Share of education in total expenditures (%) Total expenditures Total LGU expenditures on education Total special education fund Education, culture, and sports/Manpower development Share of education in total expenditures (%) Total expenditures Total LGU expenditures on education Total special education fund Education, culture, and sports/Manpower development Share of education in total expenditures (%) Total expenditures Total LGU expenditures on education Total special education fund Education, culture, and sports/Manpower development

2013

2014

2015

2016

2,645 639

2,212 705

2,318 583

2,885 552

291

295

326

325

349

409

257

227

24.2

31.9

25.1

19.1

1,621 464

1,570 389

1,566 416

1,744 285

212

217

263

102

252

173

153

184

28.6

24.8

26.6

16.4

7,570 3,027

7,694 3,001

7,635 2,916

7,445 2,596

1,474

1,596

1,720

1,703

1,553

1,405

1,196

893

40.0

39.0

38.2

34.9

630 176

597 135

989 264

945 237

95

78

83

103

81

57

181

134

(continued) 42 Data from Department of Finance Bureau of Local Government Finance

(DOF BLGF); %share of education from authors’ own computations. 43 Ibid.

7

Table 6

BASIC EDUCATION AND FEDERALISM: IMPLICATIONS …

243

(continued)

Mandaluyong

Manila

Marikina

Muntinlupa

Share of education in total expenditures (%) Total expenditures Total LGU expenditures on education Total special education fund Education, culture, and sports/Manpower development Share of education in total expenditures (%) Total expenditures Total LGU expenditures on education Total special education fund Education, culture, and sports/Manpower development Share of education in total expenditures (%) Total expenditures Total LGU expenditures on education Total special education fund Education, culture, and sports/Manpower development Share of education in total expenditures (%) Total expenditures Total LGU expenditures on education Total special education fund

2013

2014

2015

2016

27.9

22.6

26.7

25.1

2,831 670

2,685 673

2,801 688

2,960 833

325

357

400

470

345

316

287

363

23.7

25.1

24.6

28.1

6,141 2,296

6,626 2,926

6,992 3,273

7,523 2,935

1,355

1,741

1,952

1,782

941

1,185

1,321

1,153

37.4

44.2

46.8

39.0

1,490 370

1,635 360

1,509 355

1,607 395

141

140

152

165

229

220

204

230

24.8

22.0

23.5

24.6

1,944 547

2,163 513

2,509 666

2,990 784

322

308

359

419

(continued)

244

E. I. Y. UY AND D. J. S. OCAMPO

Table 6

Navotas

Parañaque

Pasay

Pasig

(continued)

Education, culture, and sports/Manpower development Share of education in total expenditures (%) Total expenditures Total LGU expenditures on education Total special education fund Education, culture, and sports/Manpower development Share of education in total expenditures (%) Total expenditures Total LGU expenditures on education Total special education fund Education, culture, and sports/Manpower development Share of education in total expenditures (%) Total expenditures Total LGU expenditures on education Total special education fund Education, culture, and sports/Manpower development Share of education in total expenditures (%) Total expenditures Total LGU expenditures on education

2013

2014

2015

2016

224

205

307

364

28.1

23.7

26.6

26.2

420 65

417 95

428 105

420 65

33

57

72

33

33

37

33

33

15.6

22.7

24.4

15.6

2,949 1,148

2,415 842

2,030 368

2,914 506

662

551

183

309

486

290

185

197

38.9

34.8

18.1

17.4

2,900 1,027

2,831 846

2,583 814

3,224 991

597

563

565

634

430

283

249

357

35.4

29.9

31.5

30.7

3,602 973

4,476 1,426

3,198 1,422

3,652 1,487

(continued)

7

Table 6

Taguig

Pateros

245

(continued)

Quezon City

San Juan

BASIC EDUCATION AND FEDERALISM: IMPLICATIONS …

Total special education fund Education, culture, and sports/Manpower development Share of education in total expenditures (%) Total expenditures Total LGU expenditures on education Total special education fund Education, culture, and sports/Manpower development Share of education in total expenditures (%) Total expenditures Total LGU expenditures on education Total special education fund Education, culture, and sports/Manpower development Share of education in total expenditures (%) Total expenditures Total LGU expenditures on education Total special education fund Education, culture, and sports/Manpower development Share of education in total expenditures (%) Total expenditures

2013

2014

2015

2016

624

688

760

732

349

738

662

755

27.0

31.9

44.5

40.7

8,603 2,382

8,539 2,711

9,016 2,530

9,783 2,621

1,309

1,282

1,471

1,409

1,074

1,429

1,058

1,213

27.7

31.7

28.1

26.8

957 231

1,035 243

1,151 237

1,250 225

102

116

107

120

128

126

130

105

24.1

23.5

20.6

18.0

2,948 978

2,664 830

2,863 505

4,227 1,114

304

483

296

368

674

347

209

746

33.2

31.1

17.7

26.4

164

130

131

163

(continued)

246

E. I. Y. UY AND D. J. S. OCAMPO

Table 6

Valenzuela

(continued)

Total LGU expenditures on education Total special education fund Education, culture and sports/Manpower development Share of education in total expenditures (%) Total expenditures Total LGU expenditures on education Total special education fund Education, culture, and sports/Manpower development Share of education in total expenditures (%)

8

2013

2014

2015

2016

17

14

16

20

9

11

10

11

9

3

7

10

10.5

10.5

12.5

12.6

1,620 488

1,996 734

2,540 1,002

2,900 1,200

281

353

552

698

207

382

451

502

30.1

36.8

39.5

41.4

Recommendations

While the specific approach and strategies may vary depending on the determination of basic education as an exclusive or shared power—and the degree to and the manner by which the power will be shared in the latter’s case—there are several common considerations that must inform the discussions, design, and implementation of this reform. These considerations include: 1. The establishment of regional governments—its powers and functions, relation to the federal and local governments—is the single most crucial element in any shift from a unitary to a federal system. This is one area that is generally lacking in the current discussions about federalism. While there has been significant and justifiable attention to the creation of a federal government and the federated regions, the role of the LGUs has had scant mention, if at all. Former Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a 1986 Constitutional Convention delegate,

7

BASIC EDUCATION AND FEDERALISM: IMPLICATIONS …

247

Fig. 15 SEF per capita by DepEd SDO in NCR44

goes much further and warns of an impending “massacre of the LGUs”45 in his extensive critique of the proposed federalism constitution. True and meaningful decentralization can only be possible with empowered, sufficiently resourced and well-managed LGUs. Otherwise, the shift to federalism will merely transfer the pronounced asymmetry of

44 Authors’ own computations from enrollment and SEF data of DepEd Planning Service and DOF BLGF, respectively. 45 Hilarion Davide, Jr., Charter Change and Federalism: Cruel Punishment for a GodLoving People, pp. 11–13.

248

E. I. Y. UY AND D. J. S. OCAMPO

power, influence, and resources from the center (or national government) to the regional capitals.46 2. While costs and benefits of basic education are best internalized at the local level, equity considerations require uniform standards across jurisdictions. The economic underpinnings47 that justify education decentralization—lower degree of technical complexity, more interpersonal and less interjurisdictional nature of education externalities, lower level of information asymmetry—are in fact stronger than those of some significant functions that have been substantially devolved such as health. The need for better equity in social services and the drive for inclusive development do necessitate the continued role of the national or federal government to set quality standards and, when necessary, to enforce these standards. Additionally, the national government should serve as oversight to ensure equity and social justice interventions/inclusions in education. 3. A “big bang” approach to decentralization rarely works. Transition mechanisms for the shift to federalism are currently rather under articulated. While there are political-economic justifications to fast-tracking, the discussions about possible amendments to the 1987 Constitution, considerable time, effort, and resources must be devoted to the planning of any change to basic education governance of this potential scale. The Philippine experience in the devolution of health provides a stark reminder of what could go wrong when the country decides to do too much too soon with too little preparation.48 Numerous LGUs and local chief executives continue to struggle with the complexity and challenges of leading, running, and financing the public health system. Policymakers should learn from these lessons and be cognizant of the time

46 Ronald Mendoza and Jude Ocampo, “Caught Between Imperial Manila and the Provincial Dynasties: Towards a New Fiscal Federalism,” ASOG Working Paper 17-004, pp. 7–9. 47 Joseph Capuno, “A case study of the decentralization of health and education in the Philippines,” p. 28. 48 Ibid.

7

BASIC EDUCATION AND FEDERALISM: IMPLICATIONS …

249

needed for systems to embrace and effect massive changes to programs that have been in place for generations. 4. Radical shifts in governance require a strong civil service and continuous human resource development. As is the case in Nepal and in countries that rely on local governments to lead and deliver basic education services, civil servants must be properly capacitated to take on additional responsibilities and functions. The government must also continue to invest in its human resource and organizational development assets—people, policies, and systems, and programs. Any shift of this magnitude will take years if not decades for full fruition and the bureaucracy, more so than the political class and leaders, will be shepherding this process through. 5. The new system must help improve equity and not lead to greater inequality and marginalization. The country’s continued growth in the past years has benefited a significant number of households but development continues to be uneven. Basic education is rightfully heralded as a tool to foster a more level playing field. However, this is only true if the education system itself does not perpetuate, contribute to, or worse, exacerbate the kind of marginalization and inequities that are commonplace in various communities and contexts. Particular attention should be given to how any new or improved system can benefit groups that have been historically underserved such as persons with disabilities, special needs learners, cultural or ethnic minorities, and lower-income families. Dissecting the details in the SEF expenditures of local governments will show who these funds benefit and how.

Appendix A49 NAT scores vs SEF per capita of DepEd NCR

49 Authors’ own computations from NAT scores, enrollment and SEF data of DepEd Planning Service and DOF BLGF.

250

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NAT scores vs SEF per capita of DepEd NCR SDOs Caloocan City

Las Piñas City

7

BASIC EDUCATION AND FEDERALISM: IMPLICATIONS …

Makati CIty

Malabon City

251

252

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Mandaluyong City

Manila City

Marikina City

7

BASIC EDUCATION AND FEDERALISM: IMPLICATIONS …

Muntinlupa City

Navotas City

Paranaque City

253

254

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Pasay City

Pasig City

Quezon City

7

BASIC EDUCATION AND FEDERALISM: IMPLICATIONS …

San Juan City

Taguig City and Pateros

Valenzuela City

255

256

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Bibliography AusAID (Australian Agency for International Development) and World Bank. 2013. “School Based Management in the Philippines: An Empirical Investigation.” Basic Education Public Expenditure Review Phase II . Washington, DC: The World Bank. Bautista, Ma. Cynthia Rose B., Allan B.I. Bernardo, and Dina Ocampo. 2009. “When Reforms Don’t Transform: Reflections on Institutional Reforms in the Department of Education.” HDN Discussion Paper Series No. 2 (2008/2009). Quezon City: Philippine Human Development Network. Capuno, Joseph J. 2009. “A Case Study of the Decentralization of Health and Education Services in the Philippines.” HDN Discussion Paper Series No. 3 (2008/2009). Quezon City: Philippine Human Development Network. Consultative Committee to Review the 1987 Constitution. 2018. Bayanihan Federalism—Power to the People, Power to the Regions: Draft Constitution for a Strong, Indissoluble Republic. Unpublished document. Davide, Hilario G., Jr. 2018, September 7. “Charter Change and Federalism: Cruel Punishment for a God-Loving People.” Speech delivered at the Forum on the 1987 Constitution and Proposed Changes, De La Salle Santiago Zobel School. https://www.delasalle.ph/news/2018/09/11/2018-9-11-cha rter-change-and-federalism-cruel-punishment-for-a-god-loving-people. de Jesus, Edilberto, Anne K. Candelaria, Ronald U. Mendoza, Mary Caleda, Jeanelia Anne Yap, and Lorenzo Abaquin. 2017a. “K-12: Sustaining Education Under the Duterte Presidency.” ASOG Working Paper 17–005. Quezon City: Ateneo School of Government. DepEd (Department of Education). 2012, November 29. “Implementing Guidelines on the Revised School-Based Management (SBM) Framework, Assessment Process and Tool (APAT).” DepEd Order No. 83, Series of 2012. Pasig City: Department of Education. ———. 2015, March 11. “K to 12 Basic Education Program Midterm Report.” Presentation, House of Representatives Committee Hearing, Quezon City. ———. 2016, August 22. “Updates on the K to 12 Basic Education Program.” Presentation, Senate Committee Hearing, Pasay City. ———. 2017, August 22. “After the Honeymoon: Proposed Budget for 2018.” Presentation, House of Representatives Committee Hearing, Quezon City. Manasan, Rosario G. 2017, December. “Designing the Fiscal Features of a Federal Form of Government: Autonomy, Accountability, and Equity Considerations.” PIDS Discussion Paper Series No. 2017–56. Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies. Mendoza, Ronald U., and Jude B. Ocampo. 2017. Caught Between Imperial Manila and the Provincial Dynasties: Towards a New Fiscal Federalism. Public Policy 16 (17): 28–51.

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Mendoza, Vicente V. 2018, August 1. “The Supreme Court under the Proposed Constitution.” Presentation, UP Law Center Institute of Government and Law Reform Colloquium on the 2018 Draft Federal Constitution, Quezon City. PSA (Philippine Statistics Authority). 2005. Functional Literacy, Education and Mass Media Survey (FLEMMS) 2003. Quezon City: Philippine Statistics Authority. ———. 2010. Functional Literacy, Education and Mass Media Survey (FLEMMS) 2008. Quezon City: Philippine Statistics Authority. ———. 2015. Functional Literacy, Education and Mass Media Survey (FLEMMS) 2013. Quezon City: Philippine Statistics Authority. ———. 2018. Philippines National Demographic and Health Survey 2017 . Quezon City: Philippine Statistics Authority. Sta. Romana Cruz, Neni. 2018, June 9. “The Burden of a Large DepEd Budget.” The Learning Curve, Philippine Daily Inquirer. https://opinion. inquirer.net/113797/burden-large-deped-budget. Tomacruz, Sofia. 2018, July 29. “Expert Says DepEd’s ALS ‘Not Fully Effective’.” Rappler. https://www.rappler.com/nation/208383-world-bankexpert-deped-alternative-learning-system-not-fully-effective. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Office in Kathmandu. 2014. A Resource Material on Education and Federalism in Nepal. Kathmandu: UNESCO Office in Kathmandu.

CHAPTER 8

Ensuring the Affordability of Socialized Housing: Toward Livable and Sustainable Homes for the Filipino Poor Chester Antonino C. Arcilla

1

Introduction

The lack of affordability is a persistent problem in Philippine socialized housing programs. As early as the 1970s, the large-scale resettlement in Tondo, Manila, was plagued by affordability issues. In 2005, the Home Guarantee Corporation (HGC) acknowledged that socialized housing loan packages are not affordable to poor Filipinos. Affordability is a critical component of the right to adequate housing. It is determined by the cost of shelter, household incomes, and access to basic needs that are affected by where the housing is located. Without access to affordable housing, the poor are forced to live in slums and unsafe spaces.

C. A. C. Arcilla (B) Department of Social Sciences, University of the Philippines Manila, Manila, Philippines e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 T. S. E. Tadem and M. E. L. Atienza (eds.), A Better Metro Manila?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3_8

259

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This chapter tackles the issues of affordability of socialized housing within a human rights framework. It particularly highlights the problem of affordable housing for the poorest 30% of Filipino families. It also marks the challenges and limits of the dominant approach to socialized housing in light of the implementation of two codes that govern socialized housing for more than 25 years, the newly constituted Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development (DHSUD), and efforts to shift to a federal form of government. The current dominant approach to socialized housing—private production of off-city resettlement—barely addresses the affordability issues as this focuses on lowering housing prices and fails to account for livelihood displacement, increased transportation and living costs, and social service inaccessibility. Even as some cities find creative ways to provide in-city housing to preserve beneficiary livelihood and social service access, the high cost of land puts these out of the reach of the poorest of the poor. The substantial gap between the prices that private shelter producers find economically feasible and the actual capacities of the poor to pay for housing highlights that the housing crisis is a problem of low incomes. For the poorest of the poor whose incomes barely allow access to basic needs, an income-based housing subsidy, combined with urban land reform to regulate land prices and a transport-oriented and inclusive urban planning, is critical to ensure affordable in-city socialized housing. The challenge to the DHSUD and Metro Manila federal government is to re-center affordable and adequate socialized housing into city planning and development. After discussing the concept of affordability within a human rights framework, the chapter marks the Philippine housing crises arising from the lack of affordability of the socialized housing program. It then analyzes the off-city completed housing resettlement approach of the National Housing Authority (NHA) and highlights the potential of in-city housing using the case of the Quezon City’s BISTEKVILLE program. It concludes with critical policy recommendations for affordable socialized housing and inclusive governance. This chapter, therefore, covers a social service which has not figured prominently in discussions about the implementation of the 1991 Local Government Code (1991 LGC) as compared to health and education services. It is, however, a very crucial basic need which has to be addressed in the search for alternative models of governance.

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2 When is Housing Affordable? Housing Affordability Within a Human Rights Framework The United Nations Human Settlements Program defines housing as affordable when “adequate in quality and location and does not cost so much that it prohibits its occupants meeting other basic living costs or threatens their enjoyment of basic human rights” (UN-HABITAT 2011a, 10). Affordability of housing is instrumental in ensuring adequate access to other basic needs and services. It helps create stable home environments that contribute to improved education, health, and economic security and build better communities. In marketized socialized housing programs, affordability depends on both costs of production and occupancy, which are, in turn, affected by location. The high cost of land remains the greatest impediment for inexpensive socialized housing provision. At the demand side, access to secure and sustainable livelihood and essential social services, including efficient public transport, defines occupancy costs and capacity to pay. Income levels are higher in-city, where better livelihood opportunities are available. In these areas, however, land costs are often prohibitive for housing the Filipino poor. While there is no agreed definition of affordability globally, a house is often considered affordable in reference to cost and household income levels (UN-HABITAT 2011a). A crude indicator of affordability is that housing price must not exceed thrice the gross household income (UNHABITAT 2016). In Canada, Europe, and the United States, housing is mostly considered affordable when 30% or less of gross family income is spent on mortgages or rent and direct occupancy expenses (including taxes and insurance) (Kneebone and Wilkins 2016). These indicators do not consider the effect of relocation on the cost of living. In cases where the housing is far from public transport, commuting expenses may substantially increase, compromising access to other basic needs. Nevertheless, these housing may be considered affordable as a percentage of gross income. To address this gap, scholars drawing mostly from US and European data, proposed the incorporation of transportation costs to determine affordability (Hamidi, Ewing and Renne, 2016). Another indicator considers utility prices. The 50-percent rule takes account of water and electricity access and considers a family to be “severely cost burdened” if more than 50% of its gross income is paid to housing and utilities (Kneebone and Wilkins 2016).

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UN-HABITAT (2011a) includes livelihood and non-housing expenditures in calculating the financial capacity of families to service housing payments. Rather than gross incomes, the use of minimum residual incomes provides a better understanding of whether non-housing basic needs are met after housing payment (Stone 2006). Within this framework, socialized housing units can be unaffordable despite low prices. In off-city resettlements, livelihood, water, electricity, and transportation can be inaccessible, therefore decreasing residual incomes for food, health, education, and other basic needs (UN-HABITAT 2011b). The affordability of resettlement thus calls for evaluation not based on prerelocation household incomes, but on post-resettlement economic conditions, where increased living costs and livelihood dislocation may manifest over long periods.

3 The Philippine Housing Crisis and the (Un)affordability of Socialized Housing 3.1

Legal and Institutional Infrastructure for Affordable Socialized Housing

Two national laws generally outline the objectives of affordable housing— the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA)1 and the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC).2 The UDHA explicitly aims to “uplift the conditions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas and resettlement areas by making available to them decent housing at affordable cost, basic services, and employment.” It details the sources of funding and the functions of housing agencies toward the production of socialized housing. The LGC, on the other hand, tasks local governments to be self-reliant in the efficient and effective provision of essential services, including low cost and mass housing. It also mandates the Office of the Mayor to ensure “humane and just” evictions, demolitions, and relocation contained in the UDHA. The recently passed law creating the Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development (DHSUD) also highlights the need

1 Republic Act No. 7279, enacted March 24, 1992. 2 Republic Act No. 7160 (as amended by Republic Act No. 8553), enacted October

10, 1991.

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to provide affordable housing.3 It expanded the notion to housing to include not just the physical shelter but also the process where communities and cities are formed and sustained, and highlighted the importance of “location relative to access to livelihood.” The DHSUD is mandated to “develop and adopt a national strategy to immediately address the provision of adequate and affordable housing to all Filipinos.” The regulatory, adjudicatory, and policymaking functions of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) are consolidated under the DHSUD. According to the Batas Pambansa 220 (BP 220), the cost of production and affordability levels of socialized housing must be based on 30% of the gross family incomes of low-income earners that the HUDCC considers as the poorest 30% Filipino families.4 Enacted in 1982, the BP 220 remains the governing law for the technical standards, including affordability, of socialized and economic housing. The UDHA identifies poor individuals or families5 living in urban or urbanizable areas who do not own housing facilities as the primary beneficiaries of socialized housing programs. Thus, the National Housing Authority (NHA) is tasked to provide socialized housing for the poorest 30% of Filipinos in the urban areas.6 This focus on the urban poor overlooks the spatial concentration of the poor in farmer and fisherfolk sectors and the high disparity between the income levels of rural and urban residents. The dominant approach to socialized housing is privatized and supply side focused, as reflected in the mandates of the government’s key shelter agencies.7 The NHA regulates and provides incentives to the private 3 On February 14, 2019, President Rodrigo Duterte signed the law creating the DSHUD. It was met with hopes and fears among the urban poor and their advocates. Some organizations welcomed the integration of housing to urban land use regulation and its recognition of the people’s planning process. Others, however, are cautious of the powers to enter in public-private partnership agreements in the context of elite-led gentrification that has resulted in the displacement of many urban poor families to off-city resettlement sites (Ortega 2016). 4 For instance, see HUDCC Memorandum Circular No 1, Series of 2018. 5 Defined by the National Economic and Development Authority. 6 This is according to Executive Order 90, Series of 1986. In the last few years, the NHA has ventured into socialized housing provision for calamity survivors in rural areas, and low-ranked police and military personnel. 7 The HGC and the National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation facilitate fund mobilization for contractors through risk-cover provisions and securitization. The Home

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sector for socialized shelter production. It is also primarily responsible for selecting resettlement sites and beneficiaries. By increasing the supply of low-priced units via private-sector production and providing subsidized housing loans, the hope is that informal settler families will be able to purchase formal and affordable housing. (See Fig. 1).

Fig. 1 Summary of the NHA socialized housing functions (Source Author’s creation)

Development and Mutual Fund provides housing loans for its members and the formal sector. The Socialized Housing and Finance Corporation offers financial assistance to organized communities located on private lands.

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3.1.1 The “Dual” Housing Crisis8 There is a “dual” housing crisis in the Philippines—empty socialized housing in light of the huge unmet housing needs particularly of lowincome Filipino families—that reflect the lack of affordability of socialized housing. The dominant socialized housing approach has not adequately addressed the huge housing need. In the 1990s, 16.5 million Filipinos were slum dwellers. By 2014, 17 million were still living in slums (United Nations n.d.). In terms of physical shelter, the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) estimates that in 2016, 800,000 households are living in unacceptable housing, including families living rent free without owner consent, and in dilapidated, makeshift or condemned marginal housing, and the homeless (NEDA 2017). To address the severe shortage, the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte planned to deliver housing assistance to almost 1.56 million households by 2022 (NEDA 2017), as a part of the massive “Build, build, build” infrastructure program to propel economic growth and attract investments. The NHA would be producing 835,203 shelters for Informal Settler Families (ISFs) (333,078 units), low-salaried armed forces and police personnel (42,000 units), and calamity victims (378,612 units). Through such massive housing production, the proportion of Filipino urban slum dwellers was to be drastically reduced from 38.3% in 2014 to 22% in 2022. However, socialized housing has not received sufficient state funds and the Philippines has the lowest funding allocation among Southeast Asian countries (NEDA 2017). In 2019, the HUDCC noted that the housing budget was recorded at an “all-time low” (Galvez 2019). The NHA implements a completed housing approach. With the high land price in urban areas, the resettlement sites are mostly in the periurban areas. There is a limited number of in-city resettlements often offered at the socialized housing price ceiling. Socialized house and lot units are sold to target beneficiaries through a subsidized loan to be repaid following a graduated 30-year amortization schedule. Units in offcity resettlement are currently priced at PhP 290,000. Comprising the more substantial part of the loan, the component for land acquisition and preparation, and site development is subject to a monthly compounded 8 I explicate the political economy of the low occupation of socialized housing in another paper, from which some excerpts in this section are lifted (Arcilla 2018).

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interest. The component for the housing unit has a flat-rate subsidy with no interest. Land preparation and site development cover construction of streets, sidewalks, subdivision drainage and electricity systems, and open spaces. Despite the “low” monthly amortization, the program is faced with severe affordability issues. The NHA resettlement program has a vast number of unoccupied units, and low collection and retention rates. Target beneficiaries refuse to occupy off-city resettlement, primarily citing the lack of livelihood and social services. As of 2017, 127,225 socialized housing (46%) of the total 274,994 built units are unoccupied. Likewise, NHA amortization collection rates in 2016 are at only 8%. In 2018, the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) documented that many relocatees in 26 resettlement sites around Metro Manila have moved out after a few years. The Commission on Audit remarked that NHA has failed in its mandate of providing affordable socialized shelter. Perhaps the first sizeable in-city resettlement program is a timely reminder of the need to address affordability issues and rethink the dominant socialized housing framework. In the 1970s, the World Bank supported with US$ 263 million the in-city resettlement of Tondo ISFs (Berner 1998) with a full-cost recovery framework (Karaos 1993). While the resettlement was near site, many of the relocated urban poor households eventually resold their units to middle-class families as they found the amortization difficult to pay. 3.1.2

The Economics of (Un)affordability Within Privatized Shelter Production To ensure profitability and facilitate private sector participation in shelter production, the HUDCC regularly adjusts the socialized housing price ceiling for inflation, often at the behest of private contractors. In 2000, the ceiling was set at PHP 180,000. By 2018, the ceiling is PHP 480,000 for the smallest loftable unit (See Table 1). Despite the recent adjustments, contractors find the said price ceilings “unrealistic” given the increases in raw land and labor costs, and urged HUDCC to increase it to PhP 533,333 for the smallest unit (Gonzales 2019). Without these price adjustments, the private sector participation in socialized housing will be limited. The rising price ceilings relative to mean incomes of the poorest 30% of Filipino families signal an increasing lack of affordability. As Fig. 2 illustrates, the socialized housing price ceiling was beyond three times the

8

Table 1 Socialized housing price ceilings adjustments

ENSURING THE AFFORDABILITY OF SOCIALIZED …

Year

Socialized housing price/loan ceiling9

2000 2002 2005 2008 2013 2018

180,000 225,000 300,000 400,000 450,000 480,000 530,000 580,000

(18 (18 (18 (18 (18 (22 (24 (28

267

sq. m) sq. m) sq. m) sq. m) sq. m) sq m + 50% loft or 24 sq m) sq m + 50% loft or 28 sq m) sq m + 50% loft or 32 sq m)

average household incomes of the target beneficiaries from 2000 to 2015. With the increasing price ceilings, a substantial portion of the poor’s family income must be allocated to shelter payments to access socialized housing loans. Matching the ceiling price10 to mean annual incomes of the poorest three deciles from the year 2000 to 2015 shows that the required housing payments are mostly unaffordable, beyond 30% for the poorest 20% in many years. See Fig. 3 below.11 The poorest 10% are particularly severely cost burdened if they access socialized housing from 2003 to 2006. The significant gap between the required household income share to access socialized housing amortization payment and actual housing expenditures evidence the limited capacity of low-income families to 9 Sources: HUDCC Memorandum Circular 1, Series of 2000; HUDCC Memorandum Circular 2, Series of 2002; HUDCC Memorandum Circular 3, Series of 2005; HUDCC Memorandum Circular 1, Series of 2008; HUDCC Memorandum Circular 1, Series of 2013; HUDCC Memorandum Circular 1, Series of 2018. 10 Transformed into equal annual amortization payments using actual interest rates and following the monthly compounded interest calculations used by the NHA on low-rise buildings in 2014. The interest rates were adjusted from 6.0% to 4.5% in 2013, and lowered to 3% in June 2018. Actual amortizations may vary a little as house construction portions of the lower-value loan are not subjected to the monthly compounded interests. 11 Using 2008 socialized housing price ceiling of PhP 400,000, the SHDA (2013) estimates that at least an annual income of PhP 78,000 is required for a household to afford amortization using the 30% household income allocation on shelter expenditure. Based on these computations, up to about 40 percent of the poorest Filipinos in 2006 do not have this annual income. In 2009, the bottom 30 percent poorest Filipinos registered an average annual income of only PhP 62,000, 20 percent short of the needed minimum annual income. In the same years, the savings rate of the bottom 30 percent was negative to zero raising questions as to their capacity to meet amortization payments.

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500000 450000 400000 350000

First Decile Mean Income

300000

Second Decile Mean Income

250000

Third Decile Mean Income

200000 Affordable housing for First Decile Mean Income Affordable housing for Second Decile Mean Income Affordable housing for Third Decile Mean Income

150000 100000 50000 0 2000

2003

2006

2009

2012

2015

Fig. 2 Socialized housing price ceiling, mean incomes, and affordable housing of the poorest 30% Filipino families, 2000–2015 (Source Author’s computations using data from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)’s Family Income and Expenditure Survey for years 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2015) 80.00%

35000

70.00%

30000

60.00%

25000

50.00% 20000 40.00% 15000 30.00% 10000

20.00%

5000

10.00% 0.00%

0 2000

2003

2006

2009

2012

2015

Year Uniform annual payments compounded monthly @6.0% (4.5%) Percent of First Decile Mean Income Percent of Second Decile Mean Income Percent of Third Decile Mean Income

Fig. 3 Uniform annual amortizations as a percent of mean annual incomes of the poorest 30%, 2000 to 2015 (Source Author’s computations using data from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)’s family income and expenditure survey for years 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2015)

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afford socialized housing. In 2015, Filipinos, including the wealthiest families, spent only 7 to around 11% of total household income on shelter. The poorest 30% only spent 7.0–7.6% of their household income on housing. See Table 2. These computations do not consider higher utility payments, increased transportation costs, and reduced incomes in off-city resettlements. Table 2 Income deciles with average family incomes, expenditures, savings, and affordable housing loans in 2015 Per Capita Income Decile

Average Family Income Monthly

Average Family Expenditures Monthly

Average Family Savings Monthly

Average Share of Rent/rental rent/rental value of value of house and house and lot Monthly lot to total income

Affordable loan (30 years @ 4.5% monthly)12

First decile Second decile Third decile Fourth decile Fifth decile Sixth decile Seventh decile Eighth decile Ninth decile Tenth decile

7,168.33

7,428.92

(260.58)

501.82

7.00%

99,039.78

9,516.08

9,186.00

330.08

698.27

7.34%

137,811.38

11,081.92

10,162.67

919.25

850.09

7.67%

167,774.75

13,034.58

11,663.17

1,371.42

1,082.99

8.31%

213,740.16

15,186.00

13,390.33

1,795.67

1,363.82

8.98%

269,165.10

18,150.42

15,719.83

2,430.58

1,708.63

9.41%

337,217.20

21,547.00

18,074.17

3,472.83

2,117.61

9.83%

417,933.96

26,666.33

21,672.58

4,993.75

2,687.82

10.08%

530,471.27

34,593.00

27,181.50

7,411.50

3,639.69

10.52%

718,333.44

65,526.17

44,534.75

20,991.42

7,177.65

10.95%

1,416,589.32

Source Author’s computations using data from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)’s family income and expenditure survey for 2015

12 Affordable loan is computed using the monthly compounded interest method used by NHA based on average monthly household rent/rental value payments. Computations noting that the PhP 240,000 loan with a PhP 35,000 subsidy for off-city resettlements where only the lot component is interest bearing did not change affordability levels. When the assumption of a 24-month savings as equity is added similar to the HGC

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If affordability is to be based on actual housing expenditures, then privatized shelter production has not made socialized housing affordable for the poorest 30% of the population. A Home Guaranty Corporation (2005, 2–4) study concluded in 2003 that “only those belonging to the seventh decile up can afford” the lowest-priced socialized housing13 using the actual monthly payment on rent or the rental value as “the probable budget for housing amortization.“ By 2015, the poorest 70% of Filipino families cannot afford socialized housing at the ceiling price of PhP 450,000. In the same year, the poorest 40% families find unaffordable the lowest-priced units located in off-city resettlement sites, which are at PhP 240,000. See Table 2. Even for many poor families living in the National Capital Region (NCR) who have higher incomes and housing expenses, socialized housing prices are prohibitive. In-city socialized housing is often sold at the price ceiling to cover high land costs. In 2015, the equivalent uniform monthly payment for an in-city housing loan at the ceiling price was PhP 2,280.08.14 Based on their actual monthly payment on rent or the rental value, many urban poor households in Metro Manila find these unaffordable. The poorest 10% families have negative savings and cannot afford this payment. Many families belonging to the second poorest decile can barely afford this monthly amortization. These households with monthly incomes of around PhP 18,500 per month allocate on the average only a little above PhP 2,400. See Table 3. To allow beneficiaries to adjust to the new economic environment, particularly those relocated to off-city resettlements, monthly amortizations are lowered in the first few years and are increased over the 30-year loan period. However, faithful payment following the graduated schedule is contingent on the assumption of rapidly increasing incomes that do not

(2005) study, off-city resettlement remains affordable to the fourth decile and up, while the in-city socialized housing valued at the price-ceiling is affordable to the 6th decile up. In an earlier study, Monsod (2016) computed that the PhP 450,000 loan for High Density Housing in-city is not affordable to the poorest 50%, while the NHA resettlement valued at PhP 205,000 is unaffordable to the poorest 20%. 13 The lowest-priced housing loan of PhP 150,000 is from the Home Development and Mutual Fund (HDMF). 14 Using the monthly compounded interest computation and a uniform mortgage schedule.

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Table 3 National Capital Region income deciles with average family incomes, expenditures, savings, and affordable housing loans in 2015 74 Per Capita Income Decile

Average Family Income Monthly

Average Family Expenditures Monthly

Average Family Savings Monthly

Average Share of Rent/rental rent/rental value of value of house and house and lot Monthly lot to total income

Affordable loan (30 years @ 4.5% monthly)15

First decile Second decile Third decile Fourth decile Fifth decile Sixth decile Seventh decile Eighth decile Ninth decile Tenth decile

14,490

14,858

(368)

1,976.49

13.64%

390,082.36

18,566

17,705

861

2,407.07

12.97%

475,062.13

21,658

20,079

1,579

2,731.92

12.61%

539,174.90

23,426

20,874

2,552

2,998.60

12.80%

591,807.17

27,514

23,683

3,831

3,413.07

12.40%

673,607.45

30,194

25,510

4,685

3,934.89

13.03%

776,594.45

34,300

28,716

5,584

4,926.92

14.36%

972,382.64

40,554

33,145

7,409

5,544.41

13.67%

1,094,251.18

50,160

39,673

10,487

7,370.43

14.69%

1,454,636.61

93,195

66,459

26,736

17,665.92

18.96%

3,486,566.45

Source Author’s computations using data from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) ‘s family income and expenditure survey for 2015

reflect the realities of low-income families. On the sixth year, the amortization amount for a PhP 450,000 loan increases by 75%, as seen in Table 4. For a PhP 240,000 loan for off-city resettlement, the fifth year amortization increases by a whopping 195%. Refer to Table 5. Even in NCR, many urban poor families still cannot afford these graduated monthly payments for in-city housing sold at the price ceiling. Focusing on the urban poor who spend a larger share of their incomes on housing, those having PhP 3,333.00 or less per month cannot afford the PhP 800 monthly amortization. When NHA amortization replaces 15 Affordable loan is computed using same methodology of Table 2.

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C. A. C. ARCILLA

Table 4 Actual graduated amortization schedule for a PhP 450,000 loan at 4.5@ interest

Year

Monthly Amortization

1–5 6–10 11–15 16–20 21–25 26–30

800 1400 2200 3200 4400 5000

Percent increase

75.0% 57.1% 45.5% 37.5% 13.6%

Source Author’s computations using 2015 NHA amortization data

Table 5 Actual graduated amortization schedule of a PhP 240,000 loan at 4.5% interest

Year

Monthly Amortization

1–4 5–8 9–10 11–14 15–18 10–20 21–22 23–24 25–30

200 590 890 990 1090 1250 1295 1310 1330

Percent increase

195.0% 50.8% 11.2% 10.1% 14.7% 3.6% 1.2% 1.5%

Source Author’s computations using 2015 NHA amortization data

actual rent/rental value, these poorest of the poor families have negative savings. On the sixth year, families with monthly earnings of PhP 8,333.00 or less incur negative savings with the adjusted payments of PhP 1,400.00 if their net incomes are stagnant.16 This helps explain why many urban poor beneficiaries sell their in-city housing after several years. See Table 6. The difference between the actual housing payments of the poor against the prices that private shelter producers find economically feasible suggests that the socialized housing crisis is a problem of low incomes (Cariño and Corpuz, 2009). Focusing efforts on privately producing lowcost socialized housing, despite subsidized loans, long amortization terms, 16 Poverty monthly threshold for a family of five in NCR in 2015 was pegged at PhP 10,420. Available income class data does not precisely correspond to poverty threshold cut-off. The actual rental/rental value of house and lot was replaced with the NHA amortizations and the corresponding changes in savings computed.

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Table 6 National Capital Region income classes with average family incomes, expenditures, and savings given actual housing expenses/amortizations in 2015 National Capital Region

Income Class (Annual Incomes in PhP) Under 40,000

Number of Families (in 1000) Percent of HH population Average monthly incomes Average monthly expenditure House Rent/Rental value (% of income) Average house rent/ rental value of house and lot (monthly) Average annual savings (monthly) Monthly savings if amortizations are at PhP 800

40,000–59,999 60,000–99,999 100,000–249,999

1.794

13.453

66.365

0.06%

0.45%

2.20%

1,016.70

33.68%

250,000 and over 1,920.35

63.61%

3,168.95

4,222.75

7,101.71

15,209.91

47,337.29

3,604.09

4,424.16

7,412.00

14,505.68

37,733.78

25.1

25.8

20.9

16.8

18.5

904.63

1,141.43

1,549.11

2,436.95

6,980.75

−435.14

−201.41

−310.29

704.22

9,603.52

−330.51

140.02

438.82

2341.17

15,784.27

(continued)

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Table 6

(continued)

National Capital Region

Income Class (Annual Incomes in PhP) Under 40,000

Monthly savings if amortizations are at PhP 1400

−930.51

40,000–59,999 60,000–99,999 100,000–249,999 −459.98

−161.18

1741.17

250,000 and over 15,184.27

Source Author’s computations using data from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)’s Family Income and Expenditure Survey for 2015

and graduated schedules, has not been adequate to address the housing needs of the poorest Filipinos. 3.2

How Much is Affordable Housing?

“Ano ba ang abot kaya para sa gobyerno? Ano ang abot-kaya ng maralita? Hindi dapat isakripisyo ang pang-araw-araw na gastusin ng maralita para lang makabayad ng bahay, [What is affordable for the government? What is affordable for the poor? The everyday needs of the poor should not be sacrificed to pay for housing],” said urban poor leader Bea Arellano. The economic analyses have focused on gross pre-relocation incomes and have not fully explored a human rights consideration of affordability, where amortization payments must not compromise access to essential needs. Economic dislocation and increased living costs are not taken into account. This implicitly prioritizes shelter amortization over accessing other basic needs. The fulfillment of the right to adequate housing requires that basic needs are first met, and any amount left can be allocated to housing amortization. The 16.5% poor Filipino families in

8

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2015 cannot be expected to fully pay for amortization if they are to meet their basic needs.17 To clarify the notion of affordability, many urban poor groups call for a consultation with the sector to determine affordability. Some groups are forwarding that the relocated families should pay only the principal without interest and penalties. Others, including the Ugnayang Lakas ng mga Apektadong Pamilya (ULAP), are advocating a locationspecific amortization schedule based on the capacity to pay of relocatees and considering living costs. Large formations including the Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap are demanding socialized payments on- or near-site socialized public housing to preserve access to livelihood and social services, and minimize dislocations. Affordability for the poor is contingent on the capacity to pay and access to livelihoods and social services.

4 Affordability of In-City Socialized Housing for the Urban Poor: The Quezon City’s Socialized Housing Program To increase affordability and minimize economic and social displacement of targeted ISFs, socialized housing is built on-site or near-site in-city. The experience of the Quezon City (QC) government is instructive as it is home to the most number of ISFs and has received awards for its Housing Program. QC is highly urbanized and blessed with a vast land area. As of December 2016, the city has 193,403 ISFs and estimates that by 2022, 50,078 new households will require housing. To help address this housing need, the QC local government initiated the BISTEKVILLE Housing Program in 2012. It is an in-city socialized and economic housing program with community facilities, combining row houses with low-rise buildings. The local government facilitates direct utility connections. The socialized unit price ranges from PhP 390,000 (first to be built) to 450,000 and offers flexible loan periods. As of March 17 The national monthly poverty threshold for a family of five was set at PhP 9,064 in

2015. In 2018, the NEDA Secretary admitted that incomes equal to the poverty threshold cannot afford a decent living and instead offered ‘a top of mind’ figure of PhP 42,000 in 2018 as decent living monthly income for a family of five (Cordero 2018). At this rate, only the wealthiest 10% of Filipino families have a decent life and thus can afford housing within a HR framework.

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2018, 4 projects are completed, 18 sites are ongoing, and another 15 are proposed, providing 6,507 socialized units, 460 economic units, and 353 home lots. A socialized housing tax (SHT) was passed as the primary fund source of the BISTEKVILLE program. Following the UDHA provisions, real estate taxes for properties with an assessed value of more than PhP 100,000 were imposed a 0.5% incremental increase for five years. The promise of appreciating land values with the removal of “blighted” informal settler communities enabled some acceptance of the higher taxes among affected QC property owners. Beneficiaries are selected among the QC low-income residents depending on their capacity for loan repayment. According to the Housing, Community Development and Resettlement Department of QC, the minimum monthly regular income to be initially entertained for the program in 2017 is around PhP 9,000–10,000, evidenced by employment contract (for overseas workers), income tax return, or an affidavit of income. The loan grantee evaluates the capacity to pay given the number of family members and household income and expenses. The loan is sourced from the Socialized Housing and Finance Corporation, the Housing Development and Mutual Fund (PAG-IBIG), or in-house. The program is particularly successful in providing formal housing to lowermiddle-class residents with sufficient incomes and regular employment. Public school teachers, government employees, security guards, and small business owners are many of its beneficiaries. It has, however, a limited impact on providing housing for the poor. The number of BISTEKVILLE socialized housing units is not enough to provide for the needs of QC’s ISFs with the high prices of in-city land. More importantly, the minimum regular income and its corresponding documentary requirements make the program inaccessible to many urban poor, given their informal, irregular, and insecure livelihoods. For instance, in its BISTEKVILLE 2 located in Barangay Kaligayahan, Novaliches that opened in 2013, the lowest uniform monthly amortization for a PhP 400,000 loan is PhP 2,645.00 for a 30-year period. Based on actual housing expenditures in 2015, the poorest 20% families in NCR cannot, and even those in the third decile can barely afford this monthly payment. Refer again to Table 3. Earlier economic evaluations revealed that current subsidy channels—lower than market rates’ interest mortgages—are regressive as the urban poor are deemed ineligible for

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loan given their meager and irregular incomes (Ballesteros 2005, Angeles 1985). Thus, QC is compelled to rely on the NHA’s off-city resettlement for housing many of its poorest residents. When the program was initiated in 2012 to March 2018, a total of 15,985 ISF were still relocated to off-city resettlements. In some instances, slum residents and people’s organizations resist the clearing of their communities to make way for BISTEKVILLE projects as they know that many low-income families will be relocated off-city. To increase the acceptability of off-city NHA resettlement units, former QC Mayor Herbert Bautista called for better coordination among sending and receiving local governments to help ensure social service provision in off-city relocation. QC subsidized social service provision and electricity connection of some QC relocatees in Rodriguez, Rizal. QC Mayor Joy Belmonte is now pushing for the prioritization of in-city resettlements. QC’s vast land area enables the provision of in-city land for the upper tier of the socialized housing market and sufficient fund generation from increased real estate revenues through the SHT. Other LGUs have initiated innovative housing practices, yet are similarly beset with issues of affordability and economic sustainability. Naga’s socialized housing program, the “Kaantabay sa Kauswagan [Partners in Development],” also had some success in providing for socialized housing for the poor (Sayos 1998) and was cited by UN-HABITAT as one of the world’s 40 best practices. Working in partnership with urban poor organizations since the mid-1990s, the program combined state and private funding sources to provide low-priced home lots and relied on community organizing and incremental self-built strategies of the poor for shelter development. It even implemented a work-for-amortization scheme. Despite these innovations, it faces non-repayment and resale of units among many beneficiaries arising from insecure and inadequate livelihoods (Valenzuela 2012, Jones and Lang, 2007). The case of the BISTEKVILLE demonstrates that LGUs, through innovative policies and given available resources and land market values, can address the upper tier of the socialized and lower-tier of the economic housing market. Despite its vast land area, QC’s resources are inadequate to address the affordability of socialized housing. Its limited impact on those who need the most help in housing points to serious challenges faced by LGUs in addressing the affordability and economic sustainability of socialized housing programs without the support of the national

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government and if the approach remains supply side focused and privately provided with the lack of adequate livelihoods of the Filipino poor and the high land prices.

5

Affordability of Off-City Resettlement: Economic Displacement, Lack of Social Services, and Increased Transport Costs

Off-city relocation impoverishes many poor families. Setting aside the social costs of family and community segregation endured by relocatees, relocation directly affects net household incomes in at least two ways: livelihood displacement and increased living costs. Off-city resettlements are located in low-value land where economic and employment opportunities are scarce and public transportation limited. Commuting to and from work substantially increases travel costs. This eats up income that can be devoted to food, clothing, education, health, and shelter needs. Relocatees also endure the lack of social services as the sudden influx of poor residents burdens the capacity of receiving local governments, which are often low-income class municipalities. A relocatee explained his economic difficulties in an off-city resettlement in Rodriguez, Rizal. He worked as a concrete pump operator in Makati. His family was forcibly resettled from his home in QC in 2014. He has two little children. His 2018 daily personal food and travel expenses are detailed in Table 5. Even for one who has a regular aboveminimum wage work, albeit non-permanent, life in the relocation is barely sustainable. Very little remains of his above-the-minimum daily wage. PhP 271 is all that is left daily for the family’s basic expenses and shelter amortization, way below the daily poverty threshold for a family of four. As commuting takes four to five hours per day, he spends only four to five hours (often eating and sleeping) with his family. While his situation is reflective of families who continue to access in-city employment after relocation in off-city resettlement, many do not have above-minimum wages and regular work (Table 7). In a 2018 survey conducted by the NAPC that covers 51,352 households in 26 off-city resettlement sites around Metro Mania, 37% of

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Table 7 Daily food and transportation expenses of an above-minimum wage work relocated in a off-city relocation in Rodriquez, Rizal Breakdown of personal daily food and transportation expenses (from relocation to the construction site) while at work Estimated costs Transport (two-way) Transport (one-way) Jeep, Unit to Jeepney Terminal Jeep, Jeepney Terminal to Commonwealth Avenue Bus, Commonwealth to Makati Jeep, Makati to the construction site Personal food consumption (at the worksite) Breakfast AM Snack Lunch PM Snack PERSONAL FOOD AND TRANSPORTATION (FOR WORK) TOTAL DAILY WAGE (above the minimum) REMAINING per day

Total 178

10 21 48 10 230 75 40 75 40 408 679 271

Source Author’s tabulation based on key informant interview

families reported having incomes below the poverty line.18 Poverty in off-city resettlement sites is mainly due to lack of access to regular employment. The NAPC study recorded that more than half (58%) of working-age adults in the resettlements are unemployed.19 Of those who are employed, 44% are non-permanent workers. These poverty and unemployment levels are way above the recorded 2018 official rates in the National Capital Region, Region III, and Region IV-A, where the resettlement sites are located.20 The report also highlighted the high

18 This is based on declared family income and the Philippine Statistical Authority 2015 provincial poverty threshold. 19 These are respondents who answered ‘none’ to the NAPC survey question on primary occupation. 20 Estimated official poverty rates in the first semester of 2018 ranged from 4.8% to 8.1% in District I and 3 in the National Capital Region, and the provinces of Bulacan, Rizal and Cavite. Official unemployment registered from 5.2% to 7.2%, in the National Capital Region, Region III, and Region IV-A. The differences in the NAPC and PSA

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transportation costs that decrease net incomes of families. These findings support an earlier World Bank study that revealed families relocated in off-city resettlements have average monthly incomes lower by almost 30% compared to in-city relocatees, causing an increase in food insecurity, reduced spending on basic needs, and disruptions in children’s education (Ballesteros and Llanto 2015). Due to impoverishment, many relocatees abandon off-city resettlement sites. According to the NAPC report, only 67% of the beneficiaries have remained on the site. A third have rented out, sold, pawned, or lent their units only after a few years. Where socialized housing is located off-city, low-priced units may remain unaffordable given reduced incomes and higher living costs.

6 Enhancing Affordability of Socialized Housing Programs Socialized housing remains unaffordable to the poorest 30% Filipino families. The evidence suggests that to increase affordability, housing programs must include interventions that take into account the demand side, which include livelihood assistance and income-based subsidies. As urban poor communities and their advocates have asserted, affordable in-city housing remains the best option for the Filipino urban poor. It minimizes economic displacement and preserves access to social services of the beneficiaries. In-city housing is more welfare enhancing (Ballesteros and Llanto 2015), and cost effective than off-city resettlements when social service provision is considered (Ballesteros and Egana 2013). However, this remains largely inaccessible to the Filipino poor due to high land costs. Some critical policy recommendations21 toward ensuring socialized housing affordability are highlighted in this section. 1.Develop housing affordability indicators that incorporate the effects of relocation on post-relocation net household incomes.

methodologies allow only a rudimentary comparison but nonetheless point to higher levels of poverty and unemployment in off-city resettlements. 21 The National Housing Summit on Housing and Urban Development (World Bank 2016) produced broad recommendations on affordable housing.

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The human rights-based notion of affordability requires the use of alternative indicators that consider living costs and social services access in resettlement sites, and use post-relocation net incomes. UN-HABITAT’s minimum residual income contexted within particular sites is useful. Current affordability indicators assume a minimum share of gross household incomes or use actual housing expenses—both at the pre-relocation levels. Rates of unemployment, poverty, loan repayment, unit occupancy, and beneficiary retention in resettlement sites can supplement these affordability indicators. The use of these alternative indicators will allow better evaluation of the affordability and welfare effects on beneficiaries of housing programs. 2. Provide well-targeted income-based subsidies for the poor and institute income-restoration mechanisms. Income-based subsidies will help the poor access decent shelter without compromising access to basic needs. In addition to being regressive (Llanto and Orbita, 2001), existing subsidy mechanisms glosses over income differences (Ballesteros 2005). Urban poor communities host varied economies, and families endure different levels of poverty. The Philippine Development Plan of the current administration recognized the need to shift from flat-rate and preferential interest rates subsidies toward income-based subsidies. In the short term, NHA regulations, including evictions of relocatees, padlocking of resettlement units after 3-month consecutive non-payment, monthly-compounded interest rates and financial penalties on arrears, may be suspended subject to consultation with the urban poor sector. As relocation displaces livelihoods and increases transportation and living costs, the subsidies must be based on post-relocation incomes, while efforts are made to restore these to pre-relocation levels. There are no livelihood restoration efforts in the current socialized housing practices. In cases where much-needed development projects unavoidably displace in-city poor communities, the subsidies must aim to restore postrelocation incomes to pre-relocation levels using funds from the stream of project benefits (Cernea 2007). 3. Recognize affordable and decent in-city housing as a significant component of a comprehensive poverty-reduction program.

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The provision of income-based subsidies must be part of a long-term and comprehensive program for poverty reduction and human capital development. Affordable and decent in-city housing provides the poor critical access to education and health services that increase workers’ productivity and incomes. In the short term, off-city resettlement must be minimized, and lack of social services, including cheap and efficient public transport, be addressed. Where off-city resettlement cannot be avoided, the NHA and the sending and receiving local governments must ensure social service provision before relocation. 4. Institutionalize participatory governance for the urban poor at the national, local, and institutional levels. Providing a space where affected families can raise their concerns and participate in decision-making can make socialized housing programs more sustainable and affordable (Ballesteros and Acheta 2018). Adequate consultation is codified in the UDHA. Community consultation and organizing is necessarily a slow and challenging process, which often entails extended periods relative to development of project timelines. It requires economic and institutional support. Thus, housing agencies must devote the necessary time and suitable human and economic resources for consultations and in helping in the people’s planning process. Urban poor groups have developed a concept of people’s planning where residents collectively plan and implement their socialized housing project. Despite serious difficulties in finding low-priced urban land given the lack of state subsidy, the urban poor has proven that they are capable of collective planning and developing more sustainable and inclusive housing programs. Unit design and construction, and site selection must also take cognizance of beneficiaries’ diverse needs and capacities. Current socialized housing practices produce units of similar sizes and design following minimum requirements specified in the National Building Code to maximize spatial use and decrease costs. Standardized units do not account for the heterogeneous incomes and needs of target beneficiaries. A family of six, for instance, cannot adequately live in a 22-square meter socialized housing unit. Mixed and inclusive housing designs can be explored to incorporate differential subsidies and address diverse urban poor

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housing needs. Single workers, elderly populations living alone, physically challenged individuals, non-traditional partnerships, and start-up and extended families have different shelter requirements. 5. Institutionalize alternative tenure modalities within an equitable and inclusive urban land reform. High land prices limit affordability. Without innovative strategies that lower in-city land costs, the practice of locating socialized housing in off-city sites (and producing empty housing) will continue, and the provision of income-based subsidies cannot be sustainable. In the short term, land inventories of idle public lands for socialized housing need to be completed, as specified in the UDHA, and made available to the poor communities and their advocates. Alternative tenure systems must be better explored as these do work (Karaos, Nicolas, and Rabacal 2011). Usufruct agreements lower housing costs as beneficiaries only shoulder unit construction and site development. Public rental must also be institutionalized. These approaches are limited by how much land is accessible to poor communities. In the long run, an equitable urban land reform program must be implemented where the government regains its control of land following Presidential Decree 1517,22 UDHA and Republic Act 10,023.23 Land is a finite resource whose market value can only appreciate. Land owned by the state must be preserved for public projects, including socialized housing. 6. Develop a clear and integrated framework on employment generation based on equitable urban and regional agricultural development. The socialized housing crisis is a crisis of low incomes. UDHA mandates the “direct urban growth and expansion toward a dispersed urban net and more balanced urban–rural interdependence.” Employment opportunities must be generated to increase incomes of the urban poor and enable them to purchase formal housing. Concomitantly, the 22 Proclaiming Urban Land Reform in the Philippines and Providing for the Implementing Machinery Thereof. 23 An Act Authorizing the Issues of Free Patents to Residential Land.

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influx of poor rural peoples in the cities searching for better employment opportunities and social services must be mitigated by increasing agricultural productivity and incomes. A National Land Use Act, where in-city housing is key to inclusive urban development and sustainable employment, must be legislated. A component of this national act is a better linkage of efficient and affordable public transport with socialized housing programs. With sufficient incomes and secure livelihoods, workers can travel faster and cheaper to affordable and adequate resettlement sites. In the current relocation efforts, transportation costs from the place of origin to resettlement can be pegged at a maximum percentage of the minimum wage to minimize dislocation costs and compel efficient public transport development before relocation.

7 Conclusion: Re-Centering Affordable Socialized Housing in the City---Challenges for Federalism and Urban Governance in Larger Metro Manila Affordable socialized housing remains elusive for the Filipino poor. By focusing on supply side interventions—decreasing production costs, facilitating private sector participation, and increasing access to cheap credit—and neglecting livelihood, living costs adjustments and social services access, the current socialized housing program is constrained in addressing affordability within a human rights framework. This concluding section explicates the challenges and potential of increasing local governments’ role in socialized housing provision. Save for a few economic analyses of the devolution of housing functions, there is little that is written on federalism and socialized housing provision in the Philippines. Since the Commonwealth period, the lack of affordable housing has been recognized and housing programs were implemented at the national level (Angeles 1985). After the passage of the LGC and UDHA in 1992, Ballesteros (2005) observed strong interest of LGUs in housing development as reflected in increasing fund allocation. LGUs are better located to identify beneficiaries and provide accessible in-city land for socialized housing. These initiatives can be codified in local shelter and land-use plans (Ballesteros 2009), and funding be made available following an investment program. To strengthen and make more

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efficient LGU participation, Ballesteros (2005) advocated for land market and financial reforms, including: the passage of explicit policies of public land use for socialized housing; the institutionalization of differential subsidies for socialized housing beneficiaries; and reduction of regressive interest subsidies for high and middle-income markets. Within the current institutional set-up, planning and program implementation for urban development is essentially distinct from socialized housing. In crafting city plans, many cities aim to attract investments for employment generation and real estate and corporate income tax increases, spatially reflected by the rise of central business districts. Consequently, this approach constructs on-site slum upgrading or incity housing as inefficient and unaffordable public projects (Ortega 2016). High market value land is better allocated to “more productive” commerce and high-end real estate. Many LGUs prefer off-city resettlement of ISFs and view slums as burdens rather than development opportunities (Steinberg 2010). On the other hand, NHA is mainly responsible for regulating site location and socialized housing production. To remain within the price ceilings, contractors locate socialized housing in remote sites to decrease land costs. Thus, the resettlement location is determined by the market price of land (Arcilla 2018). Some cities find creative ways to provide for in-city socialized housing, often with the prodding and participation of urban poor communities and advocates. These initiatives, however, are limited by the high price of in-city land. Indeed, “housing is often seen simply as a shelter phenomenon and unrelated to urban development” (Cariño and Corpuz 2009, 25). This dominant planning framework and the separation of urban development and socialized housing planning constrain the promotion of the right to adequate housing. It results in the displacement of the ISFs. Ensuring affordable housing for the poor requires a fundamental shift of the planning paradigm—from investment attraction to a human rightsbased approach. The latter approach “not simply…create a favorable setting for the development process by realizing people’s rights but also to empower those people to take part in the decision-making processes, and to fully contribute to and participate in development” (UNDP 2011, 16). Rights-based planning requires states as duty bearers to institute policies and remove barriers to protect and promote human rights. Using a rights-based lens, the challenge to the new DHSUD and a possible Metro Manila region in a federal form of government is

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to re-center the right to adequate housing in urban, regional, and national planning and development. In a federal system, reforms toward making housing affordable must be a critical component of its undertakings for social justice, poverty reduction, and inclusive governance. It requires recognizing the transbounded nature of adequate housing and its complex link with livelihood and human development. It thus entails comprehensive planning and integration with national programs on urban land reform, transport infrastructure, poverty reduction, agricultural development, and employment generation. It similarly demands a better explication of the role and fiscal responsibilities of and coordination among key shelter agencies and regional and local governments. Additionally, a rights-based planning approach must promote urban poor empowerment. Urban poor capacities for democratic participation in urban and shelter planning must be strengthened and their adequate representation in the development councils and local housing boards must be ensured (Ballesteros and Ancheta, 2018). In these spaces, the discussion of housing must not be separated from anti-poverty and welfare-enhancing programs. Institutionalizing grassroots participation better safeguards program continuity and promotes LGU accountability. It also moves community efforts away from patronage relations with local elite politicians (Sayos, Quisao, and Manasan 1998). In the capital, where the housing problem is acute, the formation of a Metro Manila administrative region within a federalized system may provide opportunities for the better provision of in-city affordable housing. Idle public land in the metropolis can be reserved for socialized housing and be made accessible to the urban poor through alternative tenurial mechanisms, income-based subsidies and an urban land reform program. Affordable housing is critical to empowering the urban poor and should be central to inclusive and sustainable urban development.

Bibliography Angeles, Edna. 1985. Public Policy and the Philippine Housing Market. Philippine Institute for Development Studies Monograph Series No. 7. Arcilla, Chester. 2018. Producing Empty Socialized Housing: Privatizing Gains, Socializing Costs, and Dispossessing the Filipino Poor. Social Transformation: Journal of the Global South 6 (1): 77–105.

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Ballesteros, Marife and Gilbert Llanto. 2015. “Social Inclusion and Housing: Evidence from the Philippines. Philippine Institute for Development Studies.” http://www.adb-asianthinktanks.org/sites/all/libraries/2015-res earchpapers/PHI_PIDS_Marife%20Ballesteros_Social%20Inclusion%20and% 20Housing.pdf. Ballesteros, Marife and Jasmine Egana. 2013. “Efficiency and Effectiveness Review of the National Housing Authority Resettlement Program.” Philippine Institute for Development Studies: Discussion Paper 28. Ballesteros, Marife, and Jenica Ancheta. 2018. Participatory Governance in the Public Provision of Housing: The Case of Local Housing Boards in the Philippines. Ballesteros, Marife. 2005. Rethinking Institutional Reforms in the Philippine Housing Sector. Philippine Institute for Development Studies Perspective Paper Series No. 11. Ballesteros, Marife. 2009. Housing for the Poor: Revisiting UDHA and CISFA. Philippine Institute for Development Studies Policy Notes 2009-04. Berner, Erhard. 1998. Globalization, Fragmentation and Local Struggles: Squatter Organizations in Metro Manila. Philippine Sociological Review 46 (3–4): 121–142. Cariño, Benjamin and Arturo Corpuz. 2009. Towards a Strategic Urban Development and Housing Policy for the Philippines. Philippine Institute for Development Studies Discussion Paper Series No. 2009-01. Cernea, Micheal. 2007. Benefit-Sharing Mechanisms in Population Resettlement. Economic and Political Weekly 42 (12): 1033–1046. Cordero, Ted. 2018, June 27. Pernia Says a Family of 5 Needs P42,000 a Month to Live Decently. GMA News Online. https://www.gmanetwork. com/news/money/economy/656068/pernia-says-a-family-of-5-needs-Ton dop42-000-a-month-to-live-decently/story/. Galvez, Daphne. 2020, August 05. HUDCC Rues Declining, All-Time Low Housing Sector Budget. INQUIRER.net. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/115 0196/hudcc-rues-declining-all-time-low-housing-sector-budget Gonzales, Iris. 2019, January 5. Home Builders Urge Higher Ceiling on Socialized Housing. The Philippine Star. https://www.philstar.com/bus iness/2019/01/05/1882331/home-builders-urge-higher-ceiling-socializedhousing#V0Fup9lch00UzdsP.99. Hamidi, Shima, Reid Ewing, and John Renne. 2016. How Affordable is HUD Affordable Housing? Housing Policy Debate 26 (3): 437–455. Home Guarantee Corporation. 2005. The Implications of the Family Income and Expenditure Survey on Housing Demand and Affordability. Jones, Allision and Lang Lang. 2007. Sustaining the Kaantabay sa Kauswagan Program in Naga City: Strengths, Challenges and Recommendations. School

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of Community and Regional Planning, University of British Columbia Report submitted to the Office of the Naga City Mayor. Karaos, Anna Marie, Gerald Nicolas, and Gladys Ann Rabacal. 2011. Innovative Urban Tenure in the Philippines: Challenges, Approaches and Institutionalization. Nairobi: UN-HABITAT. Karaos, Anna. 1993. Manila’s Urban Poor Movement: A Struggle for Place and Identity. Philippine Sociological Review 41 (1/4): 71–91. Kneebone, Ron, and Margarita Wilkins. 2016. The Very Poor and the Affordability of Housing. University of Calgary: The School of Public Policy Research Papers. Llanto, Gilbert and Aniceto Orbeta, Jr. 2001. The State of Philippine Housing Programs: A Critical Look at How Philippine Housing Subsidies Work. Makati: Philippine Institute for Development Studies. National Anti-Poverty Commission. 2018. Welfare and Amenities in Resettlement Areas: A Valuation of Results from the Data Generation in 26 Resettlement Sites. National Economic and Development Agency. 2011. Philippine Development Plan 2011–2016. ———. 2017. Philippine Development Plan 2017–2022. Ortega, Arnission. 2016. Manila’s Metropolitan Landscape of Gentrification: Global Urban Development, Accumulation by Dispossession & Neoliberal Warfare Against Informality. Geoforum 70: 35–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.geoforum.2016.02.002. Sayos, Anicia. 1998. “Kaantabay sa Kauswagan” (Partners in Development) Mass Housing Strategy: The case of Naga City. Philippine Institute for Development Studies Discussion Paper Series No. 98–24. Sayos, Anicia, Ross Quisao and Rosario Manasan. 1998. Local Efforts in Housing Provision. Philippine Institute for Development Studies Discussion Paper Series No. 98–44. Steinberg, Florian. 2010. Technical Assistance Completion Report. Preparing the Metro Manila Urban Services for the Poor Project (MMUSP). Asian Development Bank. Stone, Micheal. 2006. What is Housing Affordability? The Case of the Residual Income Approach. Housing Policy Debate 117 (1). UN-HABITAT. 2011a. Affordable Land and Housing in Asia. https://www.unh abitat.org/. UN-HABITAT. 2011b. Losing Your Home, Assessing the Impacts of Eviction. https://hrbaportal.org/wp-content/files/Losing-your-Home-Assessing-theimpact-of-eviction-UN-Habitat-OHCHR.pdf. UN-HABITAT. 2016. Only 13% of World Cities have affordable housingAccording to new research. https://unhabitat.org/only-13-of-worlds-citieshave-affordable-housing-according -to-new-research/

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United Nations. 2015. Millennium Development Goals Indicators. http://mdgs. un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx. United National Development Program. 2011. Guide for Local Planning from a Human Rights-Based Approach. http://www.co.undp.org/dam/argentina/ Publications. Valenzuela, Annabelle. 2012. The Evolution of the Kaantabay sa Kauswagan Program of Naga City, Philippines: The Influence of Policy and Politics (Pre-1989 to 2010). Asia Research Center Working Paper No. 173. World Bank. 2016. Closing the Gap in Affordable Housing in the Philippines: Policy Paper for the National Summit on Housing and Urban Development. Manila.

CHAPTER 9

Reclaiming Public Services: Giving Back Ownership and Control of Water Services to the Public Sector Eduardo C. Tadem and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem

1

Introduction

In 1995, the Philippines privatized the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), its only public-owned water service for Metro Manila. The only precedent to this is the 1992 privatization of Aguas Argentina in Buenos Aires. The Philippine case was considered as the first large-scale water supply privatization in Asia. Under a concession agreement, two private sector companies, Manila Water and Maynilad,

E. C. Tadem (B) Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] T. S. E. Tadem Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 T. S. E. Tadem and M. E. L. Atienza (eds.), A Better Metro Manila?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3_9

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and their foreign partners won the bid to be the new water provider in place of the MWSS. The policy aimed at the privatization (or commercialization) of water services is set against the context of about 2.4 billion people in the world who have no access to safe drinking water (IBON Facts and Figs. 2003a, 5). Limitations of the urban and water supply and sanitation sector can be traced to: (1) inadequate coverage; (2) unreliable services; (3) inefficient management of water utilities; (4) unsustainable service provisioning, especially in small towns; and (5) low institutional and technical capacity by local government units (LGUs) to run the water utilities as viable enterprises. Twenty years later, however, the goals of water privatization continue to fall short of what it has promised, to the detriment of the consumers, particularly, the urban poor. Such an experience has been duplicated all over the world and because of this, the search for alternatives to water privatization has emerged. Against the above background, this chapter will examine the Philippine experience in privatization of public services focusing on the water sector. The first part presents the framework of analysis highlighting issues on decentralization, privatization, inequality, political dynasties, and human rights. The second part discusses the background and rationale for water privatization and the shortcomings of water privatization in the Philippines. The third part focuses on alternatives to water privatization and its variants which have emerged in the Philippines as well as in other countries. It also highlights a growing trend toward remunicipalization of water services in many cities and towns in the world as a major alternative to privatization.

2

Framework for Analysis

In understanding the issue of decentralization and privatization in general, this chapter contextualizes this within a multilevel governance framework whereby decentralization is viewed as “a complex policy process in which political authority is distributed at different levels of territorial aggregation” (Heywood 2019, 393). In the Philippine context, one of the objectives is to end the Metro Manila-centered patronage tradition and shift power to local officials outside the metropolis. It is also a means to empower people from below via their participation in determining development particularly in the delivery of social services and development efforts from the ground (Brillantes 1994; Tapales et al. 1996; Tapales

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et al. 1998; de Guzman et al. 1998; Pineda 2002; Brillantes and Flores 2012). Multilevel governance has both “vertical” and “horizontal” aspects. In the former, political actors are seen as “interdependent” in the policy process at subnational, national, and transnational levels, “creating a fluid process of negotiation” (Heywood 2019, 393). “The horizontal aspect, on the other hand, derives from developments such as the growth of relationships between states and non-state actors, and the emergence of new forms of public–private forms of partnership” (Heywood 2019, 393). Relationally, this study of water privatization and its challenges examines the concept of multilevel governance for Metro Manila with respect to social services delivery. Despite the policy of decentralization, there remain official strategies which are determined from the central authority and are dictated by the overall policy of privatization like water provisioning and its impact on Metro Manila’s LGUs. The standard rationalization for the privatization of public utilities is that basic services like water and electricity are not covered by the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. Under the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022), the call for a federal form of government is complicated by the long-term dominance of political dynasties at all levels of government. This defeats a major objective of decentralization, i.e., institutionalizing popular participation in decision-making. In theory, decentralization opens windows through which democratic spaces can be developed and enlarged to confront centralized elite power. This chapter shows how this endeavor can be further explored with regard to alternatives to water privatization at the local level. To a certain extent, the 1991 LGC has opened the doors through which this could be done. It gave the local governments the authority to decide on pertinent matters such as public works, health services, and social welfare and development. It also sought to encourage the formation of people’s organizations and non-government organizations and their participation in local government processes, local development councils and local special bodies as a counter foil to entrenched political dynasties at the grassroots level (Brillantes 1994; Tapales et al. 1996; Tapales et al. 1998; de Guzman et al. 1998; Batario 2001; Pineda 2002; Atienza 2006; Brillantes and Flores 2012; Banaag et al. 2017).

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This brings us to the core question on implementing decentralization in a society characterized by high levels of social inequality. Privatization is part of a neoliberal development policy of significantly reducing state intervention in society and “levelling the field.” In an unequal society, where the field is far from “level,” however, the initiative and the accruing benefits would be quickly seized by those with ample political and economic resources. As noted in Chapter 1 (Tadem and Atienza), the state and neoliberals appear to be compatible as the latter view government as only one of the institutions involved in governance. This leads to the blurring of the “state/society distinction” paving the way for private–public partnerships (Heywood 2019, 74). In an unequal society, however, the “private” in the partnership is represented generally by big corporations and conglomerates. In the water privatization experience, this is exemplified by the conglomerate-owned Manila Water Corporation (MWCI) and the DMCI-Metro Pacific corporate group which partners with foreign conglomerates like the French Suez and the UK’s United Utilities. Neoliberalism is basically concerned with growth and not equity. An important end goal of responsible governance, however, is to bring about equitable development and universal access to essential public services. This is a pertinent goal in Philippine society where privatization in the midst of socio-economic inequalities is further enhanced leading to lack of access to a public service such as water. In this situation, the interests of marginalized sectors are neglected. As cautioned by Panganiban (1998), privatization in delivering needed public service goods has been at the expense of the consumers in terms of higher rates for water and electricity. The roots of neoliberal development in the Philippines can be traced to the country’s colonial experience (Caoili 1999; See also Chapter 1). This development was spurred by external factors focusing on Manila which created dependency relations within and with developed economies. In the Philippines, the resources of the provinces were usurped by the Manila center—creating unequal growth and unequal development and impoverishing the periphery. For Caoili (1999), this constituted a major obstacle to decentralization. Additionally, the framework for responsible and equitable governance goes hand-in-hand with the concept of human rights, i.e., the right of people to access basic needs like housing, water, and electricity in order to live a decent life (See Chapter 8 by Arcilla). The human right to water has been asserted by the United Nations General Assembly in

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a resolution adopted on July 28, 2010 (UN 2010) and by the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (UN CESCR 2002). Also important is human security which includes economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security (See Chapter 6, Atienza). In order to attain all these, there is a need to establish mechanisms at different levels of government coupled with an enabling environment to empower the crucial actors and stakeholders in planning, service delivery, and monitoring. There is, therefore, a need to explore how to mobilize the grassroots communities toward linking up with like-minded local officials to assert public control of essential services and contain the privatization push. Such efforts would require national action to link grassroots communities with other social movements and civil society organizations. As noted in this volume, governance should be “responsible governance which takes into account the legal and moral obligation of governing bodies to be answerable to one’s behavior”. Moreover, responsible means “having to account for one’s actions to an authority or a superior” (Cowie 1989, 1077). Only a community empowered from below can make those in power accountable.

3 Background on Water Privatization in the Philippines1 The rationale for privatization in general and water privatization in particular are financial in nature and the presumed efficiency of the private sector. Governments often allude to the lack of resources on its part to address the various deficiencies of the water system (Obanil 2018). International financial institutions (IFIs) such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank have also argued that the private sector can 1 For a detailed discussion on the background and issues of water privatization in the Philippines, see Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 2020. “A Panacea Gone Awry: Water Privatization in the Philippines.” Asia Politics & Policy 12 (4) (October), 632–646. Please also see Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. 2004. “Engaging the State and International Financial Institutions: The NGO Campaign Against Water Privatization in the Philippines.” Asian Studies 40 (2), 39–63; and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem and Eduardo C. Tadem. 2019. “Reclaiming public services: Giving back ownership and control of the water sector to local government.” University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies Program on Alternative Development, UP CIDS Policy Brief 2019-08.

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bring in the needed capital (local and foreign) required for the improvement and expansion of water services. This could relieve the national government’s fiscal responsibilities which had been subsidizing operations of the MWSS (Corral 2003, 12). Aggravating the lack of government funds, the MWSS was saddled with a large debt burden that was among the biggest for government-owned and controlled corporations. This amounted to around PhP405 million, PhP228 million of which was with the ADB and PhP177 million with the World Bank (Obanil 2018). Aside from the financial reason to privatize the water sector, it was also argued that the private sector would be more efficient in water service delivery given that several communities were not being served by the MWSS while, overall, water quality was also questionable (Obanil 2018). Furthermore, as the private sector was viewed as being “de-politicized,” this was deemed as lessening the possibility of corruption in its services (Corral 2003, 12). To address this problem, the National Water Crisis Act of 1995 (Republic Act 8041) was signed by then President Ramos in June 1995, the main provision of which was the mandate to facilitate the privatization of the water sector in Metro Manila (Tadem 2004). A public bidding took place after the Act was promulgated, a process overseen by the World Bank with its subsidiary, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) as consultant. The IFC drew up the contract stipulations for the privatization of the water sector (Obanil 2018). The Lopez-owned Maynilad Water Services, Inc. (MWSI) won the West zone concession with French partner Suez (now Ondeo). The Ayala-controlled Manila Water Corporation (MWCI), on the other hand, won the east zone, with UK’s United Utilities, US-based Bechtel, and Mitsubishi Corporation of Japan as foreign partners. Ondeo, Bechtel, and United Utilities form part of an elite corps of water multinationals that now control roughly 5% of water utilities worldwide. Maynilad and Manila Water submitted winning bids of PhP4.96/cu.m. and PhP2.32/cu.m., respectively (the pre-privatization rate of MWSS was PhP8.78/cu m). An MWSS Regulatory Office (RO) was created as a provision of the concession agreement between the Philippine government and Maynilad/Manila Water (Corral 2003).2 2 The “West Zone” under Maynilad comprises most of the city of Manila, some parts of Quezon City and Makati, Caloocan, Pasay, Parañaque, Las Pinas, Muntinlupa, Valenzuela, Navotas and Malabon, all in Metro Manila; the cities of Cavite, Bacoor and Imus, and

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Both the Lopezes and the Ayalas are big players in the Philippine economy. Eugenio Lopez Sr., founder of the Lopez group of companies, comes from the elite sugar land-owning family of Negros Occidental. As noted by Rivera (1994, 39) the Lopez family is part of the 11 (eleven) family groups. which constitute the dominant bloc of the Negros provincial elites who have made it to the core of the nation’s national economic elites. This same bloc of landed families has produced disproportionately large number of national political leaders.

As for the Ayala family, Rivera (1994, 32) notes that this is one of the “23 landed-capitalist families who dominate the manufacturing sector … and 16 or 70 percent of their wealth is directly linked to the sugarbased sector either as planters, millers, or both as direct descendants of wealthy sugar-landed families.” The Ayala and Zobel families are among “the landed-capitalist families that have established major joint ventures with foreign investors” (Rivera 1994, 94). Through the years, the Lopez and Ayala families have spearheaded their respective business conglomerates and as noted by Fabella (2018, 88), only these conglomerates are able to spearhead privatization efforts in the country in partnership with multinational corporations. With regard to water privatization, in particular, Fabella (2018, 88) points out that water privatization would need companies with “deep pockets” to finance the capital needed for water infrastructure. Upon privatization, the water consumers were promised not only lower water rates but other benefits including: (1) 100% water coverage within 10 years; (2) No real increase in water rates within the first 10 years; (3) US$7.5 billion in new investments over 25 years; (4) Uninterrupted, 24 h-a-day water service that meet Department of Health standards provided within three years to all connected customers; (5) Address the needs of the unconnected populace, roughly 30 million who have to buy water at more than ten times the regular price; (6) Institute a wastewater program with 80% coverage within 25 years; and (7) Relieve government the towns of Kawit, Noveleta and Rosario, in Cavite province. The “East Zone” under Manila Water includes most of Makati, Mandaluyong, Pasig, Pateros, San Juan, Taguig, Marikina, most parts of Quezon City, San Andres and Sta. Ana in Manila, as well as the Rizal cities and towns of Angono, Antipolo, Baras, Binangonan, Cainta, Cardona, Jalajala, Morong, Pililia, Rodriguez, San Mateo, Tanay, Taytay, and Teresa.

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of US$7.5 billion worth of needed new infrastructure investments (Corral 2003).3 3.1

The Role of IFIs, TNCs, and the State

The push for water privatization in the Philippines has generally come from the World Bank and the ADB which have been aggressively proposing the privatization of MWSS operations. In 1995, the World Bank and the ADB accounted for US$250 million of the total US$307 million (or about 80%) long-term loans of MWSS (IBON Facts and Figs. 2003a, 5). The World Bank’s private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), on the other hand, puts importance in assisting the governments’ privatization efforts in water and sanitation. In particular, it explores opportunities to provide direct financing and technical assistance (TA) to private projects in the sector. MWSS in 1997, for example, benefitted with fees-based advisory services from the IFC (Corral 2003). The major tenets of these IFIs in facilitating water privatization in the country are the following: (1) IFIs and private sector participation (PSP), (2) support from transnational corporations, and (3) state support in water privatization (Perez-Corral 2001, 1). As with the ADB, for the World Bank, private sector participation (PSP) in the water sector is to provide much needed additional investments, management expertise, and client-oriented services through which service delivery and coverage would improve. To facilitate PSP, the Bank provided technical assistance to the national government to develop a water sector PSP framework and a set of operational guidelines for accessing national government guarantees. Both of these activities were concluded in 1999. The World Bank-IFC combine provided feesbased advisory services on the privatization strategy in 1996–1997 at a cost of US$6.2 million. The IFC technical consultancy was provided together with SOGREA, a subsidiary of Suez which would later be a partner for one of the contracts for MWSS privatization. The IFC prepared an 18-month privatization plan, designed an operating and investment agreement, and supervised the bidding procedures in early 1997 (Perez-Corral 2001, 1).

3 With the 15-year extensions granted in October 2009 (for Manila Water) and in April 2010 (for Maynilad), both concessions are now to expire by 2037 instead of in 2022.

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The privatization picture will not be complete without considering the role of transnational corporations (TNCs) to provide PSP.4 TNCs made their presence felt at a time when governments were backing away from their regulatory responsibilities over public services in particular and the economy in general. This paved the way for giant TNCs to go into the water, food, and energy businesses among others (Barlow 2001a, b, 69). The role of the Philippine government was, of course, crucial in the privatization of the water sector. The state created the policy environment for privatization. Since 1994, as noted, the government, with donor support, instituted a series of measures to develop a coherent policy and financing framework aimed at (a) rationalizing the Philippine water sector, (b) promoting private sector participation, and (c) improving water and sanitation service delivery to low income communities in urban areas and, more recently, in secondary towns and cities (Corral 2003). These national sector policy changes have led to significant organizational changes within the water supply and sanitation sectors.5 3.2

The Shortcomings of Water Privatization in the Philippines

Even before the advent of water privatization in the Philippines, criticisms toward it have already emerged. These centered on the following issues: (1) The absence of transparency and accountability in privatization efforts which seems to be the track record of water privatization around the world (Barlow 2001a, b, 70); (2) Corruption (Jenkins 2017, 2); (3) Inefficiency (Anna Lappe as quoted by Vidal 2017); (4) Benefits accrue mainly to MNCs (Logan 2003); (5) Loss of control by the states and diminished role of government (Peters 2003); (6) Socio-economic inequalities and class bias (Serrano 2001, 10); (7) Unemployment (Barlow 2001a, 70); (8) “Regulatory capture” by private companies (Flynn and Boudoris 2005, 73); (9) Human rights violation; and (10) Social inequalities and political dynasties. For Fabella (2018, 88), however, he considers the Philippine experience in water privatization a global success. This is probably in relation to 4 In this chapter, multinational corporation (MNC) and transnational corporation (TNC) will be used interchangeably. 5 The water resource sector includes irrigation (which accounts for over 80%) of the total water demand in the country, drainage, flood control, water supply, hydropower, fishery, and navigation (Corral 2003).

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the previous experience with the country’s former water service provider, the state-owned and operated agency, the MWSS, where water service quality was very poor and was subsidized by the state which caused a huge fiscal drain (Fabella 2018, 88). Nevertheless, arguments against water privatization in the Philippines seem to be validated based on the experience of the MWSS privatization. The 2005 failure of Maynilad Water Services Inc. epitomizes the shortcomings of water privatization. “Maynilad was put under rehabilitation in 2005 after huge financial losses under the management of Benpres Holdings Inc. and its partner, the Suez Group of France” (GMA News Online 2007). In 2007, Maynilad was taken over by a new set of private companies. “Its new parent organizations are Metro Pacific Investments Corporation, DMCI Homes and subsidiaries Philippine Hydroincorporated and Amayi Water Solutions Inc. The new owners had to wipe out $240 million that Maynilad owed to creditors and to MWSS to get Maynilad out of rehabilitation” (ibid.). Furthermore, an 18% net income reduction by Manila Water in 2020 led to its takeover in June 2021 by Trident Water, a subsidiary of Enrique Razon’s Prime Strategic Holdings (Burgos 2021).6 A 2000 survey conducted by the MWSS Regulatory Office (RO) and the World Bank called the Public Assessment of Water Services (PAWS) Project revealed that 67% of the 10,000-household respondents think that water services did not improve or had even become worse since privatization (IBON Facts and Figs. 2003a, 6). This perception may be due to the following realities of water privatization which continue to persist two decades later in 2018. The main issues of contention are the following: The rising price of water and excessive profit taking. When the government approved a Foreign Currency Differential Adjustment in the water rate in October 2001, thereby amending the terms of the original concession agreement, water prices immediately went up. Two years later, in October 2003, basic water rates for Manila Water and Maynilad were PhP19.5/cu.m. and PhP24.32/cu.m., respectively, or eight—and five times higher than their 1997 winning bids (Corral 2003). During the succeeding years of the privatization of the water utility, the increases in 6 The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that the Razon-Ayala deal was politically influenced by threats from President Rodrigo Duterte to “jail and sue officials of the two water companies for allegedly benefiting from the contracts that were supposedly disadvantageous to both the government and the public” (Canivel 2021).

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water rates were around 500% for Maynilad and 700% for Manila Water (Obanil 2018). For 2018, Maynilad was granted a PhP5.73 per cubic meter rate increase spread over five years while Manila Water was granted a PhP6.26 per m3 rate hike also spread over five years. This took effect in October. In relation to this, there were also the “hidden increases” in the water bills charged by the two major water suppliers which was approved by the MWSS (Mallari Jr. 2018. A13). Absence of consultation and public participation. “The increase in the water rates and its ‘hidden costs’ was also not fully disclosed to consumers during public consultations whereby any increase in basic charges will also result in an increase in environmental and sewerage charges” (Mallari 2018, A13). If ever there were consultations, these were only focused on rate rebasing. According to Mallari Jr. (2018, A13), “This is an injustice to consumers who have the right to know where their money is going and why.” The increase in non-revenue water (NRW). Despite the projection by the World Bank and the ADB of a more efficient system through privatization, the reality is that Maynilad and Manila Water were not able to reduce so-called NRW to targets set in 1997. “Non-revenue water (NRW) refers to water losses due to leaks and pilferages” (Tadem 2020). In case of Maynilad, NRW even increased from an average 56% in 1997 to 66% in 2001 in its concession area. This means for every three cubic meters of water that Maynilad produces, it only earns from one (Fajardo 2003, 2). By 2018, Manila Water was able to decrease NRW but this is still around 11%. In the case of Maynilad, their NRW is worse at 30%. These companies, however, were able to partially reduce NRW only after 20 years of privatization even though the commitment was to accomplish this within the first 10 years of their respective concession agreements (Mallari 2018, A13). The persistence of corruption and irregular practices. The Philippine experience debunks the view that privatization is the panacea to corrupt practices supposedly endemic in the bureaucracy. The Maynilad management itself admits that “a greater volume of their NRW is lost to theft as corrupt employees take bribes to install illegal connections that include not only small households but even big corporations as

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well” (IBON Facts and Figs. 2003b). Anomalous private sector practices deemed as plunder under the law have also emerged. A 2002 audit by the MWSS RO, for example, disallowed some PhP8 billion (US$160 million) of Maynilad’s expenditures as regulators ruled these as “inefficiently and imprudently incurred” (Corral 2003, 15). These expenditures included “very expensive procurement contracts” and “sweetheart deals” with affiliate companies of the Lopezes and Ondeo (its French foreign partner), very high advertising costs, huge compensation packages and the purchase of brand-new luxury cars for its executives led by no less than the Maynilad President (Corral 2003, 15). Underspending by the private sector. Maynilad had promised “to spend P6.8 billion for infrastructure upgrades from 1997 to 2001,” but “spent only less than 50 percent of the said amount” (IBON Facts and Figs. 2003a, 7). Maynilad explained the underspending as necessary as funds “intended for infrastructure upgrades gadgets were diverted to paying the MWSS loans, which ballooned due to massive currency devaluation in 1997.” This claim was immediately falsified by records which showed that Maynilad concession fee payments during the said period “amounted to P10.9 billion, only P600 million higher than what was assumed in its business plan” (IBON Facts and Figs. 2003b). Limited and poor water services and sanitation coverage. Claims of improved coverage by MWSS and the two private water companies are mainly based on exaggerated figures which redefine what constitutes a “water connection” and their calculation of how many persons make up an average family household. Moreover, in a 2000 MWSS survey of residents of 100 communities in Metro Manila, 55% thought there had been no change in the water service while 12% claimed the service was worse. Only 33% noticed an improvement (IBON Facts and Figs. 2003b, 9). Urban poor communities in Metro Manila are the ones most adversely affected by poor and limited water service coverage. While the two private firms claim coverage for the urban poor, the greater challenge providing access to cheap and good quality water is sustainability of levels of service given the following: (a) higher financial investments involved in connecting urban poor settlements; (b) the high cost of connection fees; and (c) the lack of security of tenure of informal settlements.

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Absence of an efficient regulatory process. Public apprehensions about privatization are often addressed by the establishment of a strong public regulatory process. There are, however, inherent weaknesses in the MWSS regulation of the private water firms. The MWSS Regulatory Office (RO) is merely an appendage of the MWSS Board and was created by the Concession Agreement; its decisions are only recommendatory, with the public MWSS Board having the final say (Esguerra 2002, 4). While there are some cases where MWSS officials and the private water concessionaires were in conflict over certain contract provisions as well as the overall management of the water service, such situations arose only due to the presence of more conscientious and responsible officials in decision-making bodies. Once, these more dedicated officials leave the MWSS, it would be back to the patronage relations between the regulatory body and the private firms (Obanil 2018). Human rights violation. The various issues raised against the Philippine water privatization program basically constitute a violation of human rights. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution of July 28, 2010, “explicitly recognized the human right to water and sanitation and acknowledged that clean drinking water and sanitation are essential to the realization of all human rights” and called “upon states and international organizations to provide financial resources, help capacity-building and technology transfer to help countries, particularly developing countries, to provide safe, clean, accessible, and affordable drinking water and sanitation for all” (UN DESA 2017). Inequalities and political dynasties. The twin issues of wealth inequalities and political dynasties impact on the issues of decentralization as they constitute obstacles to meaningful and participative devolution of political power. The Philippines has one of the highest levels of inequality in the world with a Gini index of 86.9% as of 2020 with only 0.1% of the adult population with wealth of over one million US dollars and 83.1% with less than US$10,000 (Credit Suisse 2021). As far as political dynasties go, Tadem and Tadem (2016) reported that in the Philippine Congress, from 70 to 85% of members belong to long-standing political dynasties who also had a significant presence in all of the country’s 80 provinces.

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4 Alternatives to Water Privatization and the Experiences in Other Countries7 The Philippines has much to learn from the experiences of other countries in addressing the shortcomings of water privatization, particularly, the efforts of local governments in many parts of the globe reclaiming public services such as water (See Tadem 2019). A 2017 global study of the impact of the privatization of public services by Kishimoto et al. (2017) shows that the reasons for the privatization of services, e.g., water services were similar to those given in the Philippines. These included: (1) The issue of financing; (2) To lessen corruption; (3) Efficiency and profit maximization; (4) To improve service quality; (5) Prevent ever-increasing prices; and (6) Continuing instability of the economy. Alternatives to water privatization have emerged in many areas of the world surfacing the viability and sustainability of public delivery of water services as a form of public service. A 2005 study documents successful cases of people-centered participatory public models of water management and services in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and the US as well as “works in progress” in Africa (Balanya et al. 2005). Dargantes et al. (2012) did a survey with regard to the nature of public versus private sector service delivery in Southeast Asia, South Asia, East Asia, and Central Asia whereby 646 listed public water utilities were noted as servicing a total of 10.14 million people. Kishimoto, Petitjean and Steinfort (2017) extensively report initiatives that have been undertaken at the town level to reverse the privatization process and reclaim public services that covered 1,600 cities in 45 countries. Combining the three studies, along with others, the following alternatives to privatization and commercialization of water services arise: (1) reforms in water privatization, (2) public/non-profit partnerships or co-privatization, (3) public-public partnerships, (4) single non-profit agencies, and (5) deprivatization or remunicipalization.

7 Please see Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem and Eduardo C. Tadem. “Reclaiming public services: Giving back ownership and control of the water sector to local government.” UP CIDS Policy Brief 2018–08. University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP CIDS) Program on Alternative Development.

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It is important to note that these alternatives to water privatization are not spearheaded by business conglomerates. These are basically the initiatives of local communities with their respective local governments rather than with the national government. They also differ from the typical local business conglomerate partnerships with multinational corporations as in the experience with the water privatization ventures in the Philippines. 4.1

Reforms in Water Privatization Efforts

One alternative is for water services to be regulated more intently by the local governments in their respective municipalities. The guiding principle here is that water should not be viewed as a commodity to be controlled by the private sector where decisions about water will be made solely for profit. In this respect, the regulatory role of the government is emphasized across its various levels. Some non-governmental organization (NGOs) believe that because “governments have failed badly in protecting their water heritage, it is only through democratically controlled institutions that this situation can be rectified” (Barlow 2001a, b, 5). “These NGOs believe that this will prevent water from becoming established as a commodity to be controlled by the private sector and decisions about water will be made solely on a for-profit basis” (ibid.). To attain this, emphasis is given on the important role of government. That is, each level of government must protect its water trust: municipalities should stop raiding the water system of rural communities. Watershed cooperation will protect large river and lake systems. National and international legislation will bring the rule to transnational corporations and end abusive corporate practices. Governments will tax private sector adequately to pay for infrastructure repair. All levels of government will work together to set targets for global aquatic wilderness preserves. (ibid.)

In single public sector agencies (SiP) in Asia, improvements in the delivery and quality of water have been undertaken. Dargantes et al. (2012, 229–230) point to the following examples: (1) The Water Supplies Department of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government; (2) Hydraulic Department of Greater Mumbai; (3) Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority; (3) Maharastra Jeevan Pradhikaran (MJP), India;

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(4) Village Panvahayt of Hivre Bazar, India; and (5) Village council of Ligao City, Albay, Philippines. 4.2

Public/Non-Profit Partnerships (PuNPP) or Co-Privatization

A second alternative to water privatization is the public/non-profit partnerships (PuNPP) or co-privatization. Dargantes et al. (2012, 227) define PuNPPs as “arrangements wherein one or more public sector agency works with one or more civil society or community-based organization (CBO) to deliver water services.” The partnership between local communities and the water utility for the joint management of water resources is “based on equity, resource management, reduction of water consumption, improvement of reliability, and reduction in operating and maintenance costs” (Dargantes et al., 2012, 227). An LGU and its local citizenry can buy into private water companies to enable it to participate in ownership. Thus, the community stakeholders are not only consumers but are also owners. As co-owners, the local citizenry will have access to vital information regarding water services and water management. In the Philippines, NGOs have suggested co-privatization as an alternative to water privatization. It is perceived that this mechanism will enable consumers to buy into privatized agencies like Maynilad and Manila Water and participate in ownership. Thus “instead of simply paying more for a water rate increase without getting anything in return, consumers would develop their stake in Maynilad and eventually benefit from it not only as consumers but also as owners” (Diokno-Pascual et al. 2001, 18; Perez-Corral 2001, 34–35). Co-privatization is also viewed to be beneficial for companies such as Maynilad which have experienced difficulties without placing undue burden on the consumers. The company would obtain the cash it needs for capital expenditures and operations without necessarily raising tariffs. Any increase in tariffs would be processed through the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) mechanism already provided in the 1997 Concession Agreement (Diokno-Pascual et al. 2001, 18; Perez-Corral 2001, 34–35). The struggling company’s capital position would also be beefed up enough to improve its creditworthiness. This would enable it to procure medium- to long-term loans. The third reason is that since capital is cheaper than credit, the co-privatized company could even save on interest in the long run (Diokno-Pascual et al. 2001, 18). NGOs

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believe that co-privatization would strengthen corporate accountability to consumers as the latter would no longer be just consumers, but also partowners and will have greater access to vital information on management as well as greater say on how the company is run (Diokno-Pascual et al. 2001, 18–19). As for the macroeconomic benefits of a large-scale application of coprivatization, NGOs have pointed out the following (Diokno-Pascual et al. 2001, 19): Development of capital markets with the introduction of new debt instruments and the emergence of a mass base of investors; 2) Creation of a base of forced savings as millions of consumers regularly and reliably plunk equity on the basis of their consumption; 3) Instituting management and investors accountability (failure to perform efficiently and effectively results in the dilution of their position and control); and 4) Real possibility of a diminished fiscal burden with greater consumer accountability.

NGOs have also come out with alternatives for specific issues like the automatic currency exchange rate adjustment (Auto-CERA) mechanism. This has allowed Maynilad to increase tariff rates which is perceived to be done in collusion with the MWSS RO Chief Regulator. This proposal has been circulated among members of the MWSS Board, MWSS Corporate Secretary and Administration Offices, Department of Finance, the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), and the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC). Examples cited of PuNPP by Dargantes et al. (2012, 227–229) are (1) the Tamil Nadu Water Sector Programme (TNR WSP) in India; (2) Tamil Nadu convergence experiment for irrigation water; (3) Dhaka Water and Sewerage Authority of Bangladesh; (3) Bacolod City Water district partnership with Residents Association of Tinagong Paraiso in the Philippines; (4) Salcedo, Eastern Samar partnership between universities, NGOs, and municipal governments; (5) Watershed protection initiative of local WSPs, NGOs, and LGUs within the Sibalom Natural Park in Antique, Philippines; (6) NGOs, Hang Dong farmers and Hmong Hill Tribes collaboration along Ping River, Thailand for a system of water allocation; and (7) West Bengal, India partnership between community members, university faculty, and an international NGO.

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4.3

Public-Public Partnerships (PuP)

A third alternative is the public-public partnership. This involves collaboration among public sector agencies in preventing privatization of water utilities. Among others, they involve opposing privatization of financially viable water districts, collectively developing performance benchmarks, implementing tertiary level treatment of wastewater and reducing demand for piped water, use of excess water, and access to other water sources such as natural springs (Dargantes et al. (2012, 230–231). Examples of PuP are (1) the collaboration between the Alliance of Government Workers in the Water Sector (AGWWAS), the Visayas State University, and the NGO Public Services International Research Unit, and several water districts; (2) PuP between the National Capital Territory of Delhi and the local government of New Delhi; (3) PuP between the Visayas State University and village officials of Baybay, Leyte; and (4) PuP between Baybay Water District and the village councils of Patag and Gabas in the Philippines. One prominent PuP Asian example is in the state of Penang, Malaysia (Santiago 2005, 55–61). The Perbadanan Bekalan Air Pulau Pinang (PBA) water utility firm is owned and controlled by the Penang state which holds 75% equity with the rest distributed among PBA workers and staff, water consumers, and the general public. Penang has one of the lowest water rates in Malaysia and in the world, the highest net income among water providers in the country, has attained 99% billing and collection efficiency, provides 99% universal access to drinking water, and has low NRW. There have been no substantial tariff increases, and “profits” are “reinvested and new infrastructure investments are self-financed” (Santiago 2005, 55–61). In addition, PBA also “offers an interest-free loan of RMB1,000 to poor communities for purposes of connection” (ibid.). 4.4

Single Non-Profit Agencies (SiNPs)

A fourth alternative is the single non-profit agencies (SiNPs). Some NGOs, acting as SiNPs, “were found to have the capacity to develop noncommercialized water systems” (Dargantes et al. 2012, 231). The cases documented involved establishing water (including rain) harvesting structures and check dams using an integrated water resources management

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approach, water system improvement, and securing dependable water supply from third-party bulk providers, among others. Examples of SiNPs were the Sehgal Foundation in Gurgao, Heryana, India, the Yenepoya Medical and Dental College in Karnataka, India, the Self-Employed Women’s Association in Gujarat, India, and the Bagong Silang Water Services Cooperative in Caloocan City, Philippines (Dargantes et al. 2012, 231). Balanya et al. (2005, 9–10) focused on successful innovative approaches that are people-centered and participatory, including cooperatives and the surfacing of an ethos of public delivery among water service workers: In Porto Alegre and Recife (Brazil)... the public water supply is being improved through increased citizen and user participation as well as other democratic forms. In other cities such as Penang, Malaysia, a rediscovered public service ethos has led to significant improvements in the performance of the utility. Water workers play a key role, to the extent that workers’ cooperatives are running the water supplies in cities in Argentina and Bangladesh. In Olavanna (Kerala, India) and Savelugo (Ghana), local communities have taken control to improve water delivery, mobilizing their own capacities and local resources.

4.5

Deprivatization and/or Remunicipalization

Lastly, the fifth alternative is deprivatization and/or remunicipalization, or returning public services back to government. This involves public ownership, public management, and democratic control. Public service results into management being made transparent and accountable. Government is also in a better position than the private concessionaires to ensure that urban poor communities, often neglected by private water companies as unprofitable consumers, will be benefited. Philippine NGOs, for example, have suggested giving back the ownership and total control of the water service utility to the Metro Manila governments. They point out the following advantages to these (Fajardo 2003, 8; Perez-Corral 2001, 3): (1) Lower cost of capital as the loans obtained by government generally have longer terms and lower interest rates; the government has also other sources of capital such as what the government can draw, consumer capital or the socialized one, outstanding loans and the independent water resources; (2) Clear and direct accountability whereby government is directly responsible for water services; (3)

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National security concern is addressed by government itself; (4) Government has a duty to serve all sectors of society and this includes providing services to depressed areas which may not be enticing to private concessionaires; (5) The cost of delivery and access to water can be socialized; and (6) Democratic ownership and management whereby consumers/the public who are the ones who pay for the cost of delivery and access would be able to participate in management. The challenges to deprivatization in general.8 Among these alternatives, the deprivatization road is not an easy path to traverse. The major challenge emanates from central government policies of a neoliberal nature resulting in many of the obstacles that stand in the way of deprivatization. These include: (1) difficulty in modifying or terminating contracts; (2) non-disclosure of information by private firms; (3) the economic power and influence of private companies; (4) central government as an obstacle; (5) large funding requirements; (6) lack of political will; (7) the debt problem; (8) reverting to privatization; and (9) the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism. First, Public–Private Partnerships (PPP) have basically been the privatization strategy in many countries and modifying or terminating contracts is a difficult process. A reason for this is that once the contract is signed “private providers can lock in contractual conditions, and any change that would impact them comes at a price for public authorities” (Petitjean and Kishimoto 2017, 170). Moreover, once they have gotten de facto control over services, private operators are able to force contractual changes on local authorities (Petitjean and Kishimoto 2017, 171). Second, experience shows that “private companies are rarely willing to share all of the information and knowledge that would allow public authorities to control and monitor private contracts, and even less so to remunicipalise the service” (Petitjean and Kishimoto 2017, 171). Because of this, the NGO European Network on Debt and Development or Eurodad has been calling for strong international guidelines for transparency and accountability (Romero and Vervynckt 2017, 114). Third, there “is a strong imbalance in legal resources and experience between the multinationals active in the PPP market on the one hand, 8 This section and the next succeeding sections on deprivatization and remunicipalization are mainly taken from Kishimoto et al. (2017), Kishimoto and Petitjean (2017). Reclaiming Public Services: How cities and citizens are turning back privatization. TNI: Amsterdam & Paris.

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and local authorities or national governments in the global South on the other hand” (Petitjean and Kishimoto 2017, 171). When it comes to terminating contracts, or even not renewing them when they expire, local and national authorities are often faced with an uphill and costly battle (Petitjean and Kishimoto 2017, 171). Fourth, particularly in the case of a strong and highly centralized governance structure, the central government can sometimes be an obstacle to deprivatization efforts especially by municipalities (Petitjean and Kishimoto 2017). Fifth, like any public service a water utility system entails large investments and huge capital costs. Cash-strapped governments battling an economic slowdown and lack of credit access are often hard put to raise the necessary funds for deprivatization (Petitjean and Kishimoto 2017). Sixth, although there has been “expressed discontent for privatization and a desire for change were at the heart of most of these cases, very few achieved this expressed desire for a full departure from private sector participation” (Petitjean and Kishimoto 2017, 164). Many governments, for example, ended up having to retain unpopular economic strategies to finance social programming, or rolled out programs that satisfy only a fraction of the initial demands (Petitjean and Kishimoto 2017, 164). Seventh, in some cases in Europe, “debts incurred due to privatization have had a negative impact on extending the quality of services.” It has, for example, become increasingly more difficult for countries “to break the private sector mold and go fully public because of the consequences they face from the earlier implementation of neoliberal instruments” (Petitjean and Kishimoto 2017, 164). Eight, there is the possibility of remunicipalization efforts reverting back to privatization. This apparently was the case in Mozambique where FIPAG, the public water entity which took over the country’s water services from two multinationals in 2011, “has been considering outsourcing water services to a private operator once again”, including one of the two multinational corporations that previously held the water concession (Buscher 2017). In fact, of Mozambique’s 130 towns and cities, twenty have already entered into agreements with domestic firms for water privatization (Buscher 2017). Ninth, one legal step that foreign corporations take is to sue host governments, invoking investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms in international trade and investment agreements, “a powerful

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and privileged system of protections for foreign investors that undermines national law and institutions”9 (Sundaram 2017). Governments undertaking deprivatization risk being sued for millions, even billions of dollars, by foreign investors who invoke the ISDS mechanism embedded in international investment treaties (Steinfort 2017, 50). Remunicipalization as the major response and challenge to privatization. In other countries, deprivatization is also referred to as remunicipalization and/or renationalization. The 2017 study by Kishimoto and Petijean documented a total of 835 successful remunicipalization cases in 45 countries of which 267 were in the water sector in 37 countries benefiting more than 100 million people. Remunicipalization is viewed as the more radical alternative to privatization (Petitjean and Kishimoto 2017, 172). It refers to. the return of public services from private to public delivery. More precisely, remunicipalization is the passage of public services from privatization in any of its various forms – including private ownership of assets, outsourcing of services and public-private partnerships (PPPs) – to public ownership, public management and democratic control. (Kishimoto et al. 2017, 11)

A major challenge confronted by remunicipalization efforts is that although at the local level remunicipalization is desired, the local politicians and officials have to also deal with the concrete challenges posed at the national levels. In Europe, for example, these include the issues of austerity, budget cuts and privatization at the national and European levels (Petitjean and Kishimoto 2017, 163–164). With regard to water remunicipalization, this was a rare phenomenon 15 years ago but this has accelerated dramatically and the trend keeps gaining strength (Kishimoto et al. 2017, 1). As in other remunicipalizing efforts, the public ethos which guides the process is anchored on popular participation “to ensure that the reclaiming of public water management in municipalities results into truly democratic deepening, through mechanisms of transparency, accountability, education and training” (Petitjean 9 “ISDS allows foreign corporations to sue host governments for supposedly causing

them losses due to policy or regulatory changes that reduce the expected profitability of their investments. Very significantly, ISDS provisions have been and can be invoked, even when rules are non-discriminatory, or profits come from causing public harm. ISDS will thus strengthen perverse incentives for foreign investors at the expense of local businesses and the public interest” (Sundaram 2017).

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and Kishimoto 2017, 157). Water remunicipalization has also brought about the greater cost-effectiveness of public services (Petitjean and Kishimoto 2017, 169). As of 2017, as pointed out above, “there had been at least 235 cases of water remunicipalization in 37 countries, affecting more than 100 million people” (Kishimoto et al. 2017, 1). Key players in the remunicipalization efforts. The outcomes of deprivatization and remunicipalization initiatives depend largely on the actions of three key players—citizens’ movements, municipal governments, and central governments. In Germany, Austria, and Spain, citizens’ movements played a prominent role in the remunicipalization process. German and Austrian workers’ groups and unions were active in the defense of the public sector. They actively joined in the European Citizens Initiative “Right2Water” that campaigned “to guarantee water and sanitation for all EU citizens, to stop the privatization of water services and to achieve universal access to water and sanitation. This initiative collected 2 million signatures throughout Europe” (Terciz 2017, 82). Municipal governments played an important role in the remunicipalization process in Catalonia. “A turning point in the water management” in Catalonia and Spain as a whole took place in March 2016 when “a judgment of the Court of Justice of Catalonia cancelled the public– private partnership contract for water supply to 23 municipalities in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona.” In April 2016, the village of Collbató, fed up with water losses of more than 60%, “became the 12th municipality to recover water service management in Catalonia” (Planas 2017, 148). Another watershed event took place in November 2016 when seven mayors from some of Spain’s largest cities met with public service operators and civil society organizations, with the objective of strengthening and coordinating the movement for publicly-managed water services across Spain (Planas 2017, 148). In December 2016, after 75 years of concession, a serious blow was struck against privatized water when “the contract of private company Mina Pública de Terrassa (35.5 per cent owned by Agbar) with the city of Terrassa (215,000 inhabitants) was put to an end”. (Planas 2017, 148)

Central governments could play a positive and supportive role in the deprivatization movement. Unfortunately, in some cases, as in the

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Catalonia experience, they sometimes pose obstacles to remunicipalization, making it difficult for cities to take back control of public services (Planas 2017, 149). In March 2017, the Spain’s Ministry of Finance, through the State Attorney’s Office, filed a court motion blocking “the transfer of workers from the private company to a new public company, invoking budgetary adjustment regulation” (Planas 2017, 149). This followed a budget proposal by the central government that “prevented the transfer of workers previously in the private sector to any new public body.” This would have had the effect “of turning unions and workers against remunicipalization” not to mention the “loss of expertise and created a lack of skilled workers to provide the services” (ibid.). The central government’s action, however, did not prevent the City Council of Terrassa in Barcelona, in April 2017 from initiating “the process of developing a new model for managing public water supply in the city” (Planas 2017, 151). Terrasa has become “the spearhead of the recovery of public water in Catalonia, just as remunicipalization of water is the spearhead of that of other basic services” (Planas 2017, 151–152). In effect, this constraint to deprivatization is reflected in central government policies informed by a neoliberal paradigm which mandates a reduced government role in social and economic development and privileges the corporate sector’s role in determining the country’s development path. Challenges to water remunicipalization. As in deprivatization cases in general, remunicipalization movements face threats and challenges, some of which are particular to that specific modality. Faced with the threat of deprivatization, particularly through remunicipalization of water services, the involved private corporations have initiated moves to create obstacles and counter the growing trend. Firstly, private water companies such as the TNCs Suez and Veolia aimed to counter-act the remunicipalization trend by “seeking new business models,” e.g., looking for new markets and customers, particularly in the energy and industrial sectors, to compensate for their market losses in public water services” (Petitjean 2017, 32). Perhaps realizing the futility of fighting remunicipalization, corporations resort to “selling… technological solutions, including water treatment and decontamination, and data-based management technologies, which they use themselves as water providers” (Petitjean 2017, 32) to public water operators. This could, however, lead to technological dependence in the future, a new form of control akin to “quasi privatization” of water services.

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Beleaguered private water companies also “claim that the current trend of consolidation of water services on a larger scale (merging of communal water services into larger intercommunal services) will benefit them in the long run” (Petitjean 2017, 32). While no evidence has been offered by the companies and none exist, the claim can be seen as a note of reassurance to their worried shareholders (Petitjean 2017, 32). Secondly, private water companies often refuse to disclose information required by the local governments and the public in general “in order to hinder or discourage remunicipalization” (Petitjean and Kishimoto 2017, 171). This was the case in the intransigence and unwillingness to disclose needed water service data and other information by the Agbar Corporation in cities of Terrassa and Barcelona (Petitjean and Kishimoto 2017, 171). Thirdly, private firms also resort to legal proceedings when faced by the prospect of remunicipalization. The record shows “a long history of judicial battles… between public authorities and private providers in relation to the termination or non-renewal of privatization contracts” in general (Petitjean and Kishimoto 2017, 171). To make the deprivatization costly for governments, private companies “are able to appeal (or threaten to appeal) to local and national courts to seek hefty compensation” (Petitjean and Kishimoto 2017, 171). Argentina holds the record of the most number of cases arising from ISDS suits filed by foreign firms against the government.10 A severe economic crisis in 2001–2002 forced the Argentina government “to freeze the water tariffs to keep them affordable and, in some cases, to deprivatise the water sector” (Petitjean and Kishimoto 2017). Despite the risk of facing legal challenges, strong local governments have been going ahead with contract terminations with the highest percentage to be found in the water sector at 35%. The benefits of exercising political will have been immense. When publicly owned Eau de Paris took over water services in the French capital city, it was able to cut costs by e40 million, “the sum of money that was being extracted each year by the parent companies of the private operators” (Petitjean and Kishimoto 2017, 169). And, fourthly, there is always a danger that large-scale water services, even when deprivatized, could marginalize citizens’ participation and lead

10 See earlier discussion of the ISDS mechanism.

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to “loss of democratic accountability” (Petitjean 2017, 32). A large and insensitive bureaucracy could come into being that will not be bothered by the frequently complicated and time-consuming mechanisms of public consultations, debates, and drawn-out decision-making processes. This would, in effect, violate the principle that decentralization, to be meaningful and participative, is necessarily built on a multilevel governance framework involving both state and non-state actors particularly civil society organizations.

5

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the pitfalls of the water privatization experience in the Philippines and the alternatives which LGUs, particularly, those in the National Capital Region (NCR), could explore in light of the moves toward federalism and/or further empowering LGUs. The problems brought forth by water privatization emphasizes the issues confronting rapid urbanization as epitomized in Metro Manila. As privatization is generally done at the national level, local governments as well as concerned citizens are generally left out of the policy-making process with regard to a crucial social service, i.e., water, for their communities. Thus, it is of importance that LGUs and ordinary residents are part of efforts to address the issues of transparency and accountability at the local level. Multilevel and responsible governance is a key principle to abide by. More important, this is one way by which socio-economic inequalities and class bias of water privatization can be addressed. These include the lack of control by and the diminished role of government and unemployment at the local level. As with the experience of water privatization in the Philippines and elsewhere, of importance, too is the need for LGUs to link with the national government to prevent the “regulatory capture” by private companies of the concerned government agencies. Furthermore, NCR’s urban poor and informal settlements face not only the lack but also frequent water outages. This is a problem which also confronts the middle- and upper-classes residing in gated housing subdivisions. The brisk growth of real estate development creating new subdivisions and condominium buildings and the increase in large shopping malls have also taken a toll on water allocation and distribution. LGUs should be able to address problems that arise from this development. Corruption at the local level arising from privatization might also be better confronted compared to corruption at the national level where

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local communities and their respective LGUs are generally marginalized. Access to water and sanitation is, after all, a human right that is essential to the realization of all other human rights (UN 2010). This chapter acknowledges the need for small incremental reforms in the water sector in particular and in the provision of essential services in general. At the same time, however, there is a need to also recognize that the biggest hurdle is overturning the development paradigm of neoliberalism and its attendant strategies of privatization, deregulation, and liberalization. So long as governments continue to subscribe to this mantra, decentralization, devolution, and participative governance will remain hollow and meaningless catchphrases for the greater majority of peoples who will continue to suffer from unequal access to essential public services. There is much to learn from the experiences of other countries which sought to reclaim water as a public service and to put an end to water privatization. Alternatives have been considered and even implemented which highlight the crucial role of other players other than private water concessionaires. Reforms in water privatization efforts focus on water services as regulated by local governments in their respective municipalities. As for the alternative on public/non-profit partnerships (PuNPP) or co-privatization, importance is placed on the key role which civil society and/or communities play in the delivery of water services. This is done through an arrangement between the public sector agency and one or more civil society or community-based organizations (CBO). Public sector agencies are also viewed as another key player in another alternative—public-public partnerships (PuP) involving collaboration among public sector agencies in preventing privatization of water utilities. The alternative of single non-profit agencies (SiNPs), on the other hand, highlights the role of NGOs in developing non-commercialized water systems. The last alternative is deprivatization and/or remunicipalization, or returning public services back to government. This involves public ownership, public management and democratic control whereby the government plays a key role, instead of the private concessionaires, to provide for water services specially to the urban poor. As pointed out, this alternative is confronted with several challenges and obstacles. Contracts with private concessionaries, as seen in the Philippine experience, are difficult to terminate. This is aggravated by the non-disclosure

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of information by private firms as well as the given economic resources and political influence of private companies. Private companies have also resorted to the ISDS mechanism in blocking any public takeover of water services. Another reality is that central government unwilling to exercise strong political will can also be a major obstacle in reclaiming water as a public service. Despite all these obstacles, enduring challenges to water privatization as well as the search for alternatives to this will continue for as long as it persists to fall short of its promises. It is in this light that an empowered local government and its citizenry with the help of the national government will continue to be in the forefront.

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Romero, Maria Jose and Mathieu Vervynckt. 2017. “Chapter 7: Unpacking the Dangerous Illusions of PPS.” In Reclaiming Public Services: How Cities and Citizens are Turning Back Privatization, edited by Satoko Kishimoto, Olivier Petitjean and Lavinia Steinfort. Amsterdam and Paris: Transnational Institute (TNI), Multinationals Observatory, Austrian Federal Chamber of Labour (AK), European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU), and others, 105–118 www.tni.org/reclaiming-public-services. Santiago, Charles. 2005. “Public-public partnership: An alternative strategy in water management in Malaysia.” In Reclaiming Public Water: Achievements, struggles, and visions from around the world, edited by Balanya, Belen, Brid Brennan, Olivier Koedeman, Satoko Kishimoto, and Philipp. Tadem, Teresa S. Encarnacion. 2004. “Engaging the State and International Financial Institutions: The NGO Campaign Against Water Privatization in the Philippines”. Asian Studies 40 (2): 39–63. Tadem, Teresa S. Encarnacion. 2020. “A Panacea Gone Awry: A Review of Water Privatization Policy in the Philippines.” Asia Politics & Policy 12 (4), (October): 632–646. https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12559. Tadem, Teresa S. Encarnacion and Eduardo C. Tadem. 2016. “Political dynasties in the Philippines: Persistent patterns, perennial problems.” Southeast Asia Research 24 (3). Tadem, Teresa S. Encarnacion and Eduardo C. Tadem. 2019. “Reclaiming Public Services: Giving Back Ownership and Control of the Water Sector to Local Government.” University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies Program on Alternative Development, UP CIDS Policy Brief 2019–08. Tapales, Prosperpina Domingo, Perfecto L. Padilla and Ma. Ernita T. Joaquin. 1998. “Managing Change in Local Government: Issues and Concerns in Organizational Development”. In Local Government in the Philippines: A Book of Readings Volume I: Local Government and Administration, edited by Tapales, Prosperpina, Perfecto Domingo, Jocelyn C. Cuaresma and Wilhelmina L. Cabo, 187–202. Q.C.: Center for Local and Regional Governance and National College of Public Administration. Tapales, Prosperpina D., Perfecto L. Padilla, Ma. Ernita T. Joaquin and Eden V. Santiago. 1996. Modern Management in Philippine Local Government. Q.C. Local Government Center, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines and Public Administration Promotion Centre, German Foundation for International Development. Terhorst. 2005. Transnational Institute and Corporate Europe Observatory: Amsterdam. Terciz, Laurentius. 2017. “Chapter 5: Remunicipalization in Germany and Austria: What Does it Mean for Employees?” in Kishimoto, Satoko, Olivier Petitjean and Lavinia Steinfort. 2017. Reclaiming Public Services: How

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cities and citizens are turning back privatization. Amsterdam and Paris: Transnational Institute (TNI). June. https://www.tni.org/reclaiming-publicservices Serrano, Isagani. 2001. Senior Vice-President of the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM). “Globalization and Poverty Eradication in Asia and Pacific.” Paper presented at the Asia and Pacific Forum on Poverty, 5–9 February 2001, Asian Development Bank. Steinfort, Lavinia. 2017. “Chapter 3: The 835 Reasons Not to Sign Trade and Investment Agreements.” In Reclaiming Public Services: How Cities and Citizens are Turning Back Privatization, edited by Satoko Kishimoto, Olivier Petitjean and Lavinia Steinfort, 68–80. Amsterdam and Paris: Transnational Institute (TNI), Multinationals Observatory, Austrian Federal Chamber of Labour (AK), and others. www.tni.org/reclaiming-public-services. Sundaram, Jomo Kwame. 2017. “Dispute settlement becomes speculative financial asset.” Inter Press Service, April 19. http://www.ipsnews.net/ 2017/04/dispute-settlement-becomes-speculative-financial-asset/ (Accessed 9 September 2018). United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). 2017. “Reflection on development policy in the 1970s and 1980s.” UN DESA Policy Breif No. 53. July. https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/ wpcontent/uploads/sites/45/publication/WESS2017-PB53.pdf United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN ESCR). 2002. “General Comment No. 15.” November. United Nations General Assembly. 2010. “Resolution A/RES/64/292.” July. Vidal, John. 2017. “Water Privatization: A Worldwide Failure?” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jan/30/water-pri vatization-worldwide-failure-lagos-world-bank.

CHAPTER 10

Alternative Water Sources for Metro Manila for Water Security and Resilience Guillermo Q. Tabios III

1

Introduction

The Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) has projected that water demand for Metro Manila will be increasing from 6950 MLD (million liters per day) in 2025, 8300 MLD in 2035, and over 10,000 MLD in 2045. Currently, the water demand is 5200 MLD in which 4200 MLD is sourced from Angat Reservoir through Ipo and Novaliches Reservoir, 200 MLD from Laguna Lake, and about 800 MLD from groundwater. The Angat Reservoir as water source is already topped off at 4000 MLD and its storage capacity is slowly decreasing due to sediment deposition. Laguna Lake may be tapped beyond its water permit grant of 300 MLD to perhaps as much as 1850 MLD but this has to undergo some serious public consultations and negotiations with other stakeholders of the freshwater supply in the lake. Groundwater as

G. Q. Tabios III (B) Institute of Civil Engineering, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 T. S. E. Tadem and M. E. L. Atienza (eds.), A Better Metro Manila?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3_10

325

326

G. Q. TABIOS III

a source has become unreliable due to water quality issues and pollution problems so that its usage has reduced to 800 MLD now from about 1500 to 2000 MLD being extracted in the 1980s as indicated by the groundwater permits during that period. This chapter discusses the urgent need to seriously plan and seek investments to sequence and stage alternative water sources for Metro Manila to be able to meet the increasing water demands which will almost double 25 years from now. There are available water sources but the hesitancy or complacency and impediments for not developing them soon for purposes of water security, redundancy, or resilience is like an accident waiting to happen since 75–80% of Metro Manila’s water use comes solely from the Angat Reservoir. It must be recognized that the Angat Reservoir has risks of failures such as dam-break due to massive earthquake, breakage of transmission lines (tunnels and canals) between Ipo Dam to Novaliches Portal to La Mesa Treatment Plants or into Novaliches Reservoir then Balara Treatment Plants, or even water contamination along the Bicti-Novaliches open channel, conveyance system or as it transits the Novaliches Reservoir by natural means, or even worst, by terrorist attack. Although this endeavor has generally been top-down, i.e., national planning is needed, for this to be successful, the government has to work closely with concerned local government units (LGUs), within and outside Metro Manila, where these water river sources and reservoirs are found for alternative sources for the National Capital Region.

2

Alternative Water Sources for Metro Manila

In the next sections, several alternative water sources for Metro Manila are briefly described. Figure 1 shows the location of these potential river basin sources. 2.1

Angat Reservoir with Sumag and Biliway River Inflows

In 2002, the Umiray River transbasin tunnel was constructed to augment the inflow of Angat Reservoir which added as much 777 MLD for conveyance to Metro Manila and another 230 MLD that goes to Bulacan Province. A proposed flow augmentation which is currently being considered is to source from Biliway River and Sumag River; both rivers are tributaries that feed the Umiray River (downstream of the current Umiray River diversion structure to the tunnel) as shown in Fig. 2 below. As

10

ALTERNATIVE WATER SOURCES FOR METRO MANILA …

327

Fig. 1 Potential alternative water sources for Metro Manila (Source Authors’s creation)

shown in Table 1, with Sumag and Biliway flow augmentation, there is a significant increase in the flow amount of 10 to 15 CMS, during the months of January and February at 90 percent-of-time reliability although there is not so much increase during the months of March to May which is only a gain of 1 to 2 CMS at 80 percent-of-time reliability. Note that 2 CMS is 170 MLD which was the deficit in the water supply that resulted

328

G. Q. TABIOS III

in a major water disruption in the East Zone Concession area of Metro Manila last March–April 2019. The Umiray, Sumag, and Biliway watersheds are located on the eastern slopes of Sierra Madre with Type II climate, that is, with evenly distributed rainfall throughout the year. This is in contrast to Type I climate with pronounced dry season (November to April) and wet season for the rest of the year where Angat Reservoir is located. Thus, the water yield from watersheds on the eastern slopes Sierra Madre is so much greater than on its Western slopes.

Fig. 2 Angat River system with Umiray transbasin tunnel and proposed Sumag and Biliway watershed flow augmentation (Source Tabios and David [2014])

10

ALTERNATIVE WATER SOURCES FOR METRO MANILA …

329

Table 1 Reliability analysis of Angat Reservoir in terms of daily releases to Ipo Dam for MWSS domestic water supply at 46 and 50 CMS MWSS demand for cases: (1) without Biliway and Sumag; (2) with Biliway and Sumag with tunnel capacity of 10 CMS; and (3) with Biliway and Sumag with tunnel capacity of 15 CMS Month

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

July

Aug

Percent of Time

90 80 50 90 80 50 90 80 50 90 80 50 90 80 50 90 80 50 90 80 50 90 80 50

Angat Reservoir Releases (CMS) to Ipo Dam With 46 CMS MWSS Demand

With 50 CMS MWSS Demand

Without Biliway and Sumag

With Biliway and Sumag (10 max)

With Biliway and Sumag (15 max)

Without Biliway and Sumag

With Biliway and Sumag (10 max)

With Biliway and Sumag (15 max)

29.95 46.00 46.00 10.52 30.68 46.00 2.58 6.06 46.00 2.60 4.32 46.00 5.31 14.77 46.00 45.13 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00

45.98 46.00 46.00 25.21 41.98 46.00 3.53 23.32 46.00 2.94 5.83 46.00 6.12 19.28 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00

46.00 46.00 46.00 23.28 43.35 46.00 3.45 26.79 46.00 2.97 6.10 46.00 6.14 19.87 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00

25.07 47.19 50.00 5.55 25.23 50.00 2.43 4.32 50.00 2.60 4.09 50.00 5.26 13.21 50.00 37.92 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00

35.98 50.00 50.00 16.37 34.29 50.00 2.68 6.33 50.00 2.87 4.57 50.00 5.98 15.31 50.00 48.61 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00

39.35 50.00 50.00 18.70 35.87 50.00 2.70 6.44 50.00 2.87 4.70 50.00 5.98 15.97 50.00 47.97 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00

(continued)

330

G. Q. TABIOS III

Table 1 Month

Sep

(continued) Percent of Time

90 80 50 90 80 50 90 80 50 90 80 50

Oct

Nov

Dec

Angat Reservoir Releases (CMS) to Ipo Dam With 46 CMS MWSS Demand

With 50 CMS MWSS Demand

Without Biliway and Sumag

With Biliway and Sumag (10 max)

With Biliway and Sumag (15 max)

Without Biliway and Sumag

With Biliway and Sumag (10 max)

With Biliway and Sumag (15 max)

46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00

46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00

46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00

50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00

50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00

50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00

(Source Author’s creation based on reservoir operation studies by the author)

2.2

Groundwater Pumping from Metro Manila’s Aquifer

Shown in Fig. 3 are the location of existing groundwater permits in Metro Manila and vicinity issued by National Water Resources Board (NWRB) as of 2012. The total amount granted by NWRB is about 1340 MLD (about 15 CMS) but only around 780 MLD (9 CMS) are around Metro Manila. Based on the results of the 2004 study commissioned by NWRB to evaluate the status of groundwater resources in Metro Manila, NWRB has implemented a moratorium on issuing new groundwater permits in Metro Manila to allow its aquifer to recover the piezometric levels that has lowered 20 to 50 m from its original levels due to excessive groundwater pumping or extraction. Upon, comparing the observed piezometric levels in 2004 and 2012, it was found that there are areas in Quezon City, San Juan and Makati that had regained their levels by 20 to 30 m. With this finding, the

10

ALTERNATIVE WATER SOURCES FOR METRO MANILA …

331

Fig. 3 Location of existing groundwater permits issued by the National Water Resources Boards (NWRB) as of 2012 (Source Author’s creation based on NWRB data)

question is if it is possible to lift the moratorium on groundwater permitting in some selective areas in Metro Manila as source of domestic water supply. To answer, this a groundwater simulation was conducted in 2014

332

G. Q. TABIOS III

Fig. 4 Groundwater heads in 2055 for base case (existing NWRB groundwater permits) and case with increased extraction rates (1.5 times base case extraction rates) from 3d groundwater model simulations. Initial heads in 2016 are also plotted. (Source Author’s creation based on groundwater simulation studies by the author)

as shown in Fig. 4 under two scenarios: (i) base case where the groundwater extraction rates are equal to the existing extraction rates granted in the groundwater permits; and (ii) case with extraction rates are 1.5 times the existing groundwater extraction rates. In this study, daily simulation over 40 years period was conducted and the bottom-line result is that there is no significant change in head in 2012 to 2055; thus, it can be concluded that an addition of almost 650 MLD can be safely extracted from the original 780 MLD or so which sums to almost 1400 MLD. 2.3

Laguna Lake Water Withdrawal

Freshwater inflow to Laguna Lake to balance the mixing of saline water from Manila Bay through Pasig River and Napindan Channels may have led to a policy that perhaps, only a maximum of 600 MLD can be extracted from Laguna Lake to maintain its ecological and economic objectives. However, in the early 1980s, the Manggahan was built which temporary stores the diverted floodwaters from Marikina River instead of cascading straight to Pasig River during typhoons and habagat (extreme southwest monsoons) events. With the yearly occurrence of these storm events, Laguna Lake has been receiving significant, artificial volumes of inflows which is no longer the natural flow dynamics of the lake. In this case, is it possible to tap this artificially, additional water into

10

ALTERNATIVE WATER SOURCES FOR METRO MANILA …

333

Fig. 5 Laguna Lake and surrounding watersheds delineated into 668 sub-basins for watershed modeling and simulation for water balance studies (Source Tabios [2018])

334

G. Q. TABIOS III

the lake as domestic water source? For this purpose, a water balance of the lake hydrology considering the seasonal diversion of floodwaters from Marikina River through the Manggahan Floodway was conducted. Laguna Lake and its surrounding watershed system occupies an area of 2,950 km2 and the lake within this system occupies 874 km2 as shown in Fig. 5 which is delineated into 593 sub-basins for purposes of hydrologic modeling for the water balance studies. Table 2 shows the results of water balance computations based on 40 years (1972–2012) of daily rainfall-to-runoff simulated data. In essence, the long-term, average lake outflows is estimated to be 158.5 m3/sec (13,700 MLD) which is the sum of Napindan River outflow of 140 m3 /sec (12,100 MLD), irrigation withdrawals of NIA of 16.2 m3 /sec (1,400 MLD) and the domestic water supply withdrawal of MWSI of 2.3 m3 /sec (200 MLD). To maintain the annual volume stored in the lake, the annual inflow should be equal to the annual outflow in Laguna Lake, so that in this case, the flow to be diverted to Marikina River through the Manggahan Floodway should only be about 13.4 m3 /sec (that is 38% of the total Marikina River flow of 35.4 m3 /sec) which is to let the remaining 22 m3 /sec flowing directly to Pasig River. However, since the 80% dependable flow of Marikina River is about 5.5 CMS and only 10% of that amount is required for environmental or instream maintenance flow, then the net of 21.45 m3 /sec (or about 1850 MLD) may be diverted to Laguna Lake to be diluted with cleaner lake water before extracted for domestic water supply. This could have been simply computed by taking the difference of the long-term, average lake inflows from the surrounding watersheds of 180.5 m3 /sec (including all Marikina River flows) minus the outflows of 158.5 m3 /sec and minus the instream flow requirement of 0.55 m3 /sec to arrive at the surplus of 21.45 m3 /sec. If this is the case, essentially the 21.45 m3 /sec of even half of that is an artificially added inflow to Laguna Lake could actually have been the entire seasonally diverted floodwaters from Marikina River through the Manggahan Floodway during the flood season that may be better off utilized for domestic water supply. 2.4

New Centennial Water Project in 2012

In 1972, Laiban Dam in the Kaliwa River basin was identified as an alternative water source of Metro Manila. In the early 1980s, Laiban Dam project started and stopped in 1986 due to change in administration when in fact about 20% of civil works were already completed.

10

ALTERNATIVE WATER SOURCES FOR METRO MANILA …

335

Table 2 Long-term daily means of 110 sub-basin inflows (in m3 /sec and MLD) that flows into Laguna Lake Sub-basin no

Sub-Basin/Watershed name

Number of lake inflow points

SB-01 SB-02

Marikina River Basin Manggahan FloodwayTaytay Basin Cainta-Napindan Taguig River Basin Muntinlupa Basin San Pedro-Biñan River Basins Sta.Rosa-Cabuyao River Basins San Cristobal River Basin San Juan River Basin Los Banos-Mt Makiling Basin Calauan Basin Pila River Basin Sta. Cruz River Basin Pagsanjan River Basin Caliraya Reservoir Basin Siniloan/Romero River Basin Sta. Maria River Basin Jalajala Peninsula Pililla River Basin Tanay River Basin Morong-Baras River Basin Angono-BinangonanTalim Basin

1 5

35.42 5.29

3

2.89

250

1.60

8 3

2.97 5.96

257 515

1.65 3.30

5

12.39

1,070

6.86

1

9.52

822

5.27

2 12

12.97 3.72

1,121 321

7.19 2.06

2 5 1 2 9

9.29 6.18 9.94 21.45 10.59

803 534 859 1,854 915

5.15 3.42 5.51 11.89 5.86

2

2.26

195

1.25

6 16 2 1 3

8.76 4.55 2.64 4.10 2.12

757 393 228 354 183

4.86 2.52 1.46 2.27 1.17

21

7.49

647

4.15

SB-03

SB-04 SB-05 SB-06

SB-07 SB-08 SB-09

SB-10 SB-11 SB-12 SB-13 SB-14 SB-15

SB-16 SB-17 SB-18 SB-19 SB-20 SB-21

110

Sub-basin lake inflow (m3 /sec)

180.50

Sub-Basin Lake Inflow (MLD) 3,061 457

15,595

(Source Author’s creation based on water balance studies by the author)

Percent contribution

19.63 2.93

100.00

336

G. Q. TABIOS III

Attempts to revive the project were made during the terms of Presidents. Ramos, Estrada, and Macapagal but there were various obstacles especially funding and resettlement issues then. In 2012, President Aquino revived the project since Metro Manila’s water supply has become critical due to increasing water demand. Also, aside from future water security, this project is for redundancy since Metro Manila cannot simply rely on Angat Reservoir as sole source of 85% of Metro Manila’s water use. Lately, there is the move to fast track the construction of Kaliwa Low Dam which is located downstream of Laiban Dam site of the same Kaliwa River and in the future, possibly revive Laiban Dam as well as build Kanan Dam and Agos Dam which are part of this Kaliwa-Kanan-Agos River system as shown in Fig. 6. To increase the reliability of water supply from the Kaliwa-Kanan-Agos River basin, there is the need for water infrastructures and accordingly, 9 alternative water resource project configurations were formulated as shown in Fig. 7. Then, optimization-simulation studies for reservoir sizing, reservoir operations policies and reliability analysis for water supply and hydropower generation were conducted. For each project configuration, the best optimization-simulation case was selected based on the maximum firm water supply and hydropower generation. It may be noted that for a given project configuration, too aggressive water demand or delivery lowers the long-term water firm yield. On the other hand, too conservative (little) water demand decreases the firm water yield although at higher reliability but results in unnecessary reservoir spills. Tables 3 and 4 show the results of reservoir operations studies for the case of only constructing the Kaliwa Low Dam and for the case with Laiban Dam (upstream) and Kaliwa Low Dam (downstream) in series, respectively. Thus, in actual reservoir operations, target water demands or deliveries must be properly set depending on prevailing weather and climate conditions to satisfy the long-term, reliable water supply and hydropower generation objectives. The resulting project sequencing and staging is shown in Fig. 8 at 85% reliability, so that Kaliwa Low Dam will provide 924 MLD at the target year of 2015 and similarly, the Laiban Dam will provide an additional 600 MLD at the target year of 2020. Kanan Diversion will provide 1280 MLD at the target year of 2023 while Kanan Dam development will also provide an additional 1995 MLD by 2035. Agos Dam will have a target year of 2045 to provide an additional 1680 MLD. The total additional

10

ALTERNATIVE WATER SOURCES FOR METRO MANILA …

337

Fig. 6 Kaliwa-Kanan-Agos River Basin in the eastern slope of Sierra Madre (Source Tabios 2020)

water that the entire, completed water system can supply in year 2050 at 85% reliability is about 6480 MLD.

338

G. Q. TABIOS III

Fig. 7 Alternative water resources system configurations of Kaliwa-Kanan-Agos River system in the proposed New Centennial Water Project in 2012 subjected to project sequencing and staging with optimization-simulation studies (Source Tabios [2020])

2.5

Pampanga River Basin Transbasin Water Transfer

Looking north of Metro Manila, a large-scale transbasin water transfer can be coming from Pampanga River. As shown in Fig. 8, the Pampanga River/Pasac-Guagua River basin is a total area of 10,710 km2 . Note that the Pasac-Guagua River Basin is a naturally separate basin from Pampanga River Basin but both interact with each other through the human-made Bebe-Masantol Cutoff Channel which was built for flood control purpose to move water from Pampanga River to Pasac River. However, when Mt. Pinatubo erupted in1991, the lahar flow through Pasig-Potrero River has been depositing and thus shallowing the Pasac-Guagua River basin

10

ALTERNATIVE WATER SOURCES FOR METRO MANILA …

Table 3 Results of reservoir optimization-simulation and reliability analysis with Kaliwa Low Dam only (The optimum target release is 15 CMS which implies that an aggressive reservoir release rule [high target release] will result in less flow reliability but too passive release rule will result in lower firm water yield but have higher reliability especially at 85 percent-of-time.)

Target release (CMS)

10 15 20

339

Water supply reliability (in MLD) 50%

80%

85%

1930 1612 1728

864 1294 833

864 924 585

(Source Tabios [2020])

resulting in reversal of flow at the Bebe-Masantol channel from Pasac River to Pampanga River. In effect, there is some flow augmentation in the Pampanga River at the outflow of Bebe-Masantol channel located just slightly upstream of river outlet to Pampanga Bay. To determine the water availability in the Pampanga River and PasacGuagua River basins, a continuous, watershed simulation model (Tabios, 2020) was used to generate daily streamflows based on 40 years of daily rainfall data (1972–2012) at the 960 sub-basins in these two river basins (see sub-basin delineation in Fig. 8). After discounting or removing all the surface water uses based on the amounts in water permit grants, reliability analysis (i.e., by flow duration analysis) on water availability was performed as shown in Figs. 9 and 10 in particular, showing the long-term, average daily flows and the long-term, 80 percent-of-time dependable daily flows in the Lower Pampanga River Basin, respectively. At the Pampanga River before exiting to Pampanga Bay, the 80 percentof-time dependable flow is 133 m3 /sec or about 11,500 MLD which is the water available equal to or greater than that amount, 290 days a year, on the average. So, this could be the amount that can be extracted and conveyed to Metro Manila with conveyance facility similar in length as the tunnel/aqueduct lines from Angat Reservoir to La Mesa Dam/treatment

340

G. Q. TABIOS III

Table 4 Results of reservoir optimization-simulation and reliability analysis with Laiban Dam (upstream) and Kaliwa Low Dam (downstream) in series (The optimum target release is 20/20 which means 20 CMS for Laiban Dam and 20 CMS for Kaliwa Low Dam. The releases at Laiban Dam goes to Kaliwa Low Dam so only the water supply reliability of Kaliwa Low Dam is meaningful to deliveries to Metro Manila.) Laiban Dam 93 m Cases

Target release (CMS)

1 2 3 4 5

20/15 20/20 20/25 25/15 25/20

Water supply reliability (MLD) 50%

80%

85%

1555 1602 1668 1642 1637

549 898 899 534 561

403 694 657 408 395

Kaliwa Low Dam 53 m Cases

Target release (CMS)

1 2 3 4 5

20/15 20/20 20/25 25/15 25/20

Water supply reliability (MLD) 50%

80%

85%

2152 1926 2263 2335 2119

1296 1655 1724 1296 1441

260 1527 1385 1251 1141

(Source Tabios [2020])

plant in Metro Manila (see, Fig. 1 to approximate distance). To avoid salinity treatment problems, the extraction point should be at some reasonable distance upstream of Pampanga Bay. In this case, the 80 percent-of-time dependable flow amount to be extracted can be slightly lower to say, 10,000 MLD which is still significantly large flow amount.

3

Conclusions and Recommendations

There is no denying that Metro Manila’s water demand will keep on increasing which is projected from the current 5200 MLD (million liters per day), to 6950 MLD in 2025, marching to 8300 MLD in 2035, and over 10,000 MLD in 2045. At present, about 4200 MLD is sourced from

10

ALTERNATIVE WATER SOURCES FOR METRO MANILA …

341

Project Sequencing with 85% Reliability 14000

12000

10000 FLOW RATE, MLD

Agos Dam 2045 Kanan Dam 2035

8000 Kanan Diversion 2023

6000 Laiban Dam 2020 Kaliwa Low Dam 2015

4000

2000

0 2060

2055

2050

2045

2040

2035

2030

2025

2020

2015

2010

2005

2000

YEAR DEMAND (MLD)

SUPPLY (MLD)

Fig. 8 Resulting project sequencing and staging of the alternative water resources system configurations of Kaliwa-Kanan-Agos River Basin to meet the projected water demands (in MLD) of Metro Manila (Source Tabios [2020])

Angat Reservoir through Ipo and Novaliches Reservoir, 200 MLD from Laguna Lake and about 800 MLD from groundwater. The Angat Reservoir as water source is already topped off at 4000 MLD and its storage capacity is slowly decreasing due to sediment deposition. Laguna Lake may be tapped beyond its water permit grant of 300 MLD to perhaps as much as 1850 MLD but this has to undergo some serious public consultations and negotiations with other stakeholders of the freshwater supply

342

G. Q. TABIOS III

120 o 30' 16 o 00'

121 o 15' 16 o 00'

Pantabangan Reservoir

LEGEND Drainage Area (10,710 km 2 ) Watershed Boundary Major Sub-Basin Divides Principal Rivers

Talavera River

Tributary Rivers Control Points [Long-Lat]

Upper Pampanga River

Central Pampanga River

Coronel River

Rio Chico Dela Pampanga River Penaranda River

Guagua River Basin Group

Lower Pampanga River

Angat Reservoir Ipo-Bustos Basin

120 o 30' 14 o 45'

NORTH

121 o 15' 14 o 45'

MANILA BAY

Pampanga River Basin, Major Sub-Basins Watershed delineation and river network and River Network

Fig. 9 Pampanga River Guagua-Pasac River Basins: Drainage Area of 10,710 km2 composed of 11 major basins. For modeling studies, the river basin is delineated into 960 sub-basins. (Source Author’s creation)

10

ALTERNATIVE WATER SOURCES FOR METRO MANILA …

120 o 45' 15 o 20'

343

121 o 10' 15 o 20'

o ba ba Ca

Inflow from Penaranada River

. Cr

M

b ali

ay

nga R. Pampa

San

S an

Mig

R.

. el R

Migu

Ba lac

ag

R. uel

R.

ga an

in

Maasin R.

R.

mp

s aa

Pa

Salapanga n R.

M

R.

Conlong R.

Maasin

R.

R.

NORTH

Pa

mp

an ga

Lower Pampanga River Basin

LEGEND Drainage Area (1640.0 km 2 ) Watershed Boundary

R.

Sub-Basin Divides

Pa mp an ga

Rivers/Tributaries Average Daily Flow Control Points [Long-Lat]

120 o 45' 14 o 45'

Outflow to Manila Bay

121 o 10' 14 o 45'

Fig. 10 Long-term, average daily flow (in m3 /sec) of Lower Pampanga River Basin from watershed hydrology model simulation of the entire Pampanga River with 40 years of daily rainfall data (1972–2012) (Source Author’s creation based on hydrologic study by the author)

in the lake. Groundwater as a source has become unreliable due to water quality issues and pollution problems so that its usage has been reduced to 800 MLD now from about 1500 to 2000 MLD being extracted in the 1980s as indicated by the groundwater permits during that period. Banking on Angat Reservoir to supply 75–80% of Metro Manila’s water supply is too risky considering reservoir sedimentation, dam-break from earthquake, failure of transmission and even terrorist attack. Admittedly, this is too much of an alarmist or doomsday scenario, but this is the idea of building resilient water systems. Thus, Metro Manila has to seriously

344

G. Q. TABIOS III

120 o 45' 15 o 20'

121 o 10' 15 o 20'

o ba ba Ca

Inflow from Penaranada River

. Cr

ba al i M

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R.

Pampa nga R.

San

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Ba

Sa n

Mig

R. uel

lac

ag

R.

an ga

n si

Maasin

n R.

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R.

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Pa

Salapanga

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R.

Conlong R.

Maasin

R.

NORTH

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R.

Lower Pampanga River Basin

LEGEND Drainage Area (1640.0 km 2 ) Watershed Boundary

R.

Sub-Basin Divides

mp an

ga

Rivers/Tributaries Dependable Flow (80%)

Pa

Control Points [Long-Lat]

120 o 45' 14 o 45'

121 o 10' 14 o 45'

Outflow to Manila Bay

Fig. 11 Long-term, 80 percent-of time, dependable daily flows (in m3 /sec) of Lower Pampanga River Basin from watershed hydrology model simulation of the entire Pampanga River with 40 years of daily rainfall data (1972–2012) (Source Author’s creation based on hydrology study by the author)

consider developing new water sources not only for water security but also for redundancy. As seen here, there are several alternative sources of water for Metro Manila. Generally, surface water sources identified will be primarily for large-scale, bulk water supply developments. Groundwater sources (which can be deployed faster) can be bulk water in the short-term but mainly for water supply augmentation during critical, dry periods (may last for several months). On the other hand, the conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater of watersheds in the vicinity and slightly beyond Metro Manila can be a large-scale operational strategy to meet

10

ALTERNATIVE WATER SOURCES FOR METRO MANILA …

345

the future, increasing water demand of Metro Manila. Note that most studies conducted in the past investigated surface water and groundwater resources, separately—not conjunctively. With increasing water demand, changing land use that affects water sources, changing climate and even socio-economic and political changes, adaptive planning and continuous updating of water resources plans and operations studies should be conducted. Specific studies include project sequencing and staging of water projects to best time with available resources and investments, operational studies to capture seasonal variabilities (within-the-year hydrologic cycles) as well as long-term climate variabilities (El Nino, sunspot cycles). Note that even within-the-year seasonal variabilities considering the spatially, geographic and climatic variabilities of the country, for instance, in national irrigation systems, schedule of irrigation cropping seasons is almost the same for the entire country when different parts of the country have different types of climate and timing of wet and dry seasons.

Bibliography Tabios, G. Q. III and C.C. David. 2014. Appraisal of Methodology in Estimating Irrigable Areas and Processes of Evaluating Feasibility of NIA Irrigation Projects, Policy Notes, No. 2014–13, Philippine Institute of Development Studies, Makati, August. Tabios, G. Q. III. 2018. Multiple and Integrated Water Resource Utilization. In Water Policy in the Philippines Global Issues in Water Policy, edited by A. Rola, J. Pulhin, and R. Alcala Hall (Vol. 8, pp. 163–184). Springer: Cham. Tabios, G. Q. III. 2020. Water Resources Systems of the Philippines: Modeling Studies. Springer Nature, Cham, Switzerland.

CHAPTER 11

Urban Dimensions of Floodings and Holistic Flood Risk Management: Case of Pasig-Marikina River Basin in Metro Manila Guillermo Q. Tabios III

1

Introduction

Metro Manila has several highly urbanized river basins and the PasigMarikina River basin, in particular, is the major one that runs through a large portion of Metro Manila (see Fig. 1). The Marikina River Basin with a drainage area of 529 sq. km is located northeast of Metro Manila and joins the Pasig River. The Pasig River Basin is a highly urbanized river basin and drains directly to Manila Bay. Nearby is the Laguna de Bay (Laguna Lake) Basin which is an extensive and urbanizing lake region southeast of Metro Manila. Laguna Lake is connected to Pasig-Marikina

G. Q. Tabios III (B) Institute of Civil Engineering, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 T. S. E. Tadem and M. E. L. Atienza (eds.), A Better Metro Manila?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3_11

347

348

G. Q. TABIOS III

River through the Napindan River and Manggahan Floodway (built in 1985) to serve as temporary storage of floodwaters from these two rivers. Metro Manila experiences severe flooding hazards due to meteorological events such as typhoons from the Pacific Ocean that occur between August to November or the southwest monsoons from the Indian Ocean around June to September. During the recent typhoons brought by Tropical Storm (TS) Ketsana in September 2009 (see Figs. 3 and 4) and TS Gener together with southwest monsoon rains during the period of August 2011, Metro Manila was severely flooded that time and again (see Fig. 2) necessitated reassessment of its flood management schemes and especially its major flood control infrastructures. In Laguna Lake, several towns were flooded for over three or four months after these storm events since it has a severely restricted channel outlet to evacuate floodwaters diverted from Marikina River (see Figs. 5 and 6). Although the rainfall brought by meteorological events were so severe that the local drainage systems of Metro Manila could not handle it, other factors could have worsened the flooding situation such as hydrological or river management factors and also human factors associated with urbanization. These other factors include: reduction of river capacities because of sedimentation of soils eroded from forest denudation; dumping of solid waste in the river and encroachment of river banks especially by illegal settlements; poor land use planning or implementation of it that allow legal or illegal settlements in flood prone areas; and obliteration of pervious areas due to urbanization thus virtually no opportunity for rainwater infiltration into the ground. Other factors include insufficient design level of protection of flood infrastructure, lack of maintenance of drainage system for de-clogging drains or desilting river channels, and fragmented and lack of coordination among flood agencies. In view of the flooding situation and scenario in an urban setting of the Pasig-Marikina River Basin in Metro Manila, this chapter discusses the need for holistic flood risk management for urban areas such as Metro Manila and in particular the Pasig-Marikina River Basin. Holistic flood risk management in an urban setting like Metro Manila must be in the framework of integrated flood management, sustainability science, and transdisciplinary approach. It notes, how the cooperation of the concerned local government units (LGUs) is needed in collaboration with the national government to make this successful. Some materials of this chapter were taken from Tabios (2010, 2020).

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URBAN DIMENSIONS OF FLOODINGS AND HOLISTIC …

349

Fig. 1 Pasig-Marikina River Basin of Metro Manila, Philippines (Source Tabios, 2020)

350

G. Q. TABIOS III

Fig. 2 Major Flood-Prone Areas in Metro Manila (Source Tabios, 2010 from a JICA report)

2

Major Factors Contributing to Floodings

There are three major factors contributing to floodings, namely: meteorological factors, hydrological factors, and human factors. In the Philippines, the meteorological factors are tropical cyclones or typhoons, the southwest monsoons which bring prolong, intense rainfall, intertropical convergence zone (ITCZ) and the thunderstorms associated to flash floods. The hydrological factors to mention a few include antecedent soil moisture conditions, absorptive capacity or infiltration rate of soil, overland flow characteristics, presence or absence of overbank flow, and channel cross-sectional shape and roughness. The human factors include land use activities, occupation of flood plains, decrease conveyance capacity in river

11

URBAN DIMENSIONS OF FLOODINGS AND HOLISTIC …

351

Fig. 3 TS Ketsana hourly rainfall fields from 8AM to 2PM on September 26, 2009 by multiquadric spatial interpolation (Source Tabios, 2020)

channels due to build-up of river debris, household garbage or encroachment by human settlements, forest denudation that promote soil erosion resulting in swallowing of rivers due to deposition of eroded sediments, mining or quarrying activities that can alter watercourses and river topography, and on a global scale, greenhouse gas emissions that affect climate change Nothing can be done to modify the meteorological factors. The hydrological factors are mostly a product of nature but they can be modified to some extent by engineering measures and/or with naturebased solutions. The human factors, in particular, are mostly created by socio-economic and even political developments and perhaps even, intentionally. In urban areas like Metro Manila, the human factors may be considered as dominant factor contributing to flooding as discussed next.

352

G. Q. TABIOS III

Fig. 4 Flooding extent, pictures and flood computations during TS Ketsana on September 26, 2009; Flood Inundation Levels around Marikina River during TS Ketsana (Source Tabios, 2020)

3

Floodings Attributed to Human Activities and Urbanization

The following showcase how human factors and urbanization are major contributing factors to floodings in Metro Manila: 1. Residential and commercial developments in flood prone areas. 1. Reduction of channel conveyance capacities. 2. Local drainage problem. 3. Improper land use zoning. 4. Increase sediment yield in upper portion of Marikina River basin.

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URBAN DIMENSIONS OF FLOODINGS AND HOLISTIC …

353

5. Reduction of Pasig River conveyance capacity and swallowing of Laguna Lake. Figure 7 illustrates the case of residential and commercial developments in the middle portion of the Marikina River which are essentially in the inner meander loops or flood prone areas of the river. During TS Ketsana of September 2009, the residential area (Provident Village) as shown in Fig. 4 was flooded up to the second story of these houses. In the downstream portion of this village is a shopping mall (SM City Marikina) which was originally a floodplain that would have detained certain volume of floodwaters but it is now occupied by the mall infrastructure. Another development in a meander loop of Marikina River is Circulo Verde. As shown in Fig. 8, downstream of this area is the Rosario Weir which is an 8-gated structure that can be partially or fully opened to divert high flows from Marikina River through the Manggahan Floodway into Laguna de Bay (or Laguna Lake) for temporary storage. During TS Ketsana, the gate operators were not able to fully open all the gates right away; thus, it may have contributed to some extent to the flooding upstream of this area due to backwater flow. There is likewise the tendency for sediments to deposit around the river loop right across the EFCOS

Fig. 5 Laguna Lake Level at Angono station during TS Ketsana (Source Tabios, 2020)

354

G. Q. TABIOS III

Fig. 6 Laguna Lake Levels at Angono stations during TS Gener (Source Author’s creation)

Fig. 7 Residential area and commercial establishments inside the floodplains or meander loops of Marikina River (Source GoogleMap)

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URBAN DIMENSIONS OF FLOODINGS AND HOLISTIC …

355

office (see Fig. 8). Again, during TS Ketsana, significant amount of sediments were deposited in this area thus creating a flow constriction and backwater flow. Figure 9 shows the Manggahan Floodway with very much reduced channel conveyance capacity due to human settlements inside the floodway. This is a blatant failure of both the national and local governments to allow and tolerate settlements inside the floodway. This was originally designed with a width of 260m to pass 2,900m3 /sec flow at a design water level of 14m, so the floodway berm is at 15m (i.e., with 1m

Manalo Bridge

Circulo Verde

Fig. 8 Another development in a meander loop with Rosario weir structure for diverting Marikina River flows into Laguna Lake through Manggahan Floodway (Source GoogleMap)

356

G. Q. TABIOS III

freeboard). During TS Ketsana, over 3,000m3 /sec went through Manggahan Floodway with observed water levels of 17m thus about 2m depth of floodwaters spilled over the floodway berm. In addition, regarding channel constriction, the channel has also been swallowing especially at the floodway entrance and exit due to sediment deposition from the Marikina River.

Fig. 9 Manggahan Floodway looking upstream toward Marikina River (Source Department of Public Works and Highways)

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URBAN DIMENSIONS OF FLOODINGS AND HOLISTIC …

357

Fig. 10 Local drainage channels with constricted outlet into the major waterway and a river that disappeared, thus obliterating drainage outlet from this area (Sources 10a, Laguna Lake Development Authority; 10b, Prof. Siringan, University of the Philippines—Marine Science Institute)

Figures 10(a) and 10(b) show local drainage channels with constricted outlet into the major waterway and a river that disappeared; thus, there is no drainage outlet from this area, respectively. These are cases of improper implementation of local drainage standards as well as poor river maintenance or management plans. Another blatant case of flawed land use planning or complacency of government authorities is to allow the establishment of residential subdivision within Laguna Lake as shown in Fig. 11(a) as well as the relocation site of illegal settlements from another area inside the floodplains and mouth of Napindan River toward Laguna Lake in Fig. 11(b). Figures 10(a), 11(a), and 11(b)were pictures taken a few days after TS Ketsana of September 2009. Figure 12 shows forest denudation and quarrying in the upper Marikina River basin responsible for increased soil erosion and sediment load to rivers. This resulted, for instance, in the formation of a sand bar and thus constriction of Pasig River around Makati City of Metro Manila as shown in Fig. 13. The sediment load from the upper Marikina River basin has also reached Laguna Lake. Figures 14(a) and 14(b) show the changes in the lake bathymetry from 1939 to 1968 as well as 1968 to 1998, respectively. It is observed that the average depth of the Laguna Lake (from MLLW) is 2.52m in 1939m and 2.24m in 1998. Significant changes in lake bathymetry occurred during the period 1968–1998 compared to the period 1939–1968 resulting in shallowing of the lake

358

G. Q. TABIOS III

Fig. 11 Residential subdivision within Laguna Lake and settlements inside the floodplains of Napindan River connected to Laguna Lake (Source Laguna Lake Development Authority)

Fig. 12 Forest denudation and quarrying in the upper Marikina River basin responsible for increased soil erosion and sediment load to rivers (Source Laguna Lake Development Authority)

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URBAN DIMENSIONS OF FLOODINGS AND HOLISTIC …

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Fig. 13 Constriction along Pasig River around Makati City of Metro Manila due to river sedimentation from soil erosion and sediment load from upland watersheds (Source Prof. Siringan, University of the Philippines—Marine Science Institute)

which is attributed to the sediment-laden flood flow diversions from Marikina River through Manggahan Floodway (constructed in 1985) into Laguna Lake. The reduced capacity to store floodwater in Laguna Lake had also increased floodings along the lakeshore towns.

4

Flood Control Design Level of Protection

On another issue related to flooding, the Department of Public Works and Highways’ major flood control projects in the Philippines only provide design levels of protection ranging from 1/10-year to 1/30-year return period with the exception of the Ormoc Project of 1/50-year as shown in Table 1. The flood design of Pasig-Marikina River including the Manggahan Floodway is only for 1/30-year return period flood. During TS Ketsana in September 2009, the computed peak flow of 5,300m3 /sec in Marikina River was associated to a return period flood way beyond

360

G. Q. TABIOS III

Fig. 14 Changes in Laguna Lake bathymetry during the period 1939 to 1968 as well as the period 1968 to 1998. Average depth (from MLLW) in 1939 is 2.52m, and in 1998 is 2.24m. (Source Prof. Siringan, University of the Philippines—Marine Science Institute)

1/100-year (i.e., the 1/100-year flood is about 3,400m3 /sec). Thus, 1/30-year flood can happen again and again in the Pasig-Marikina River basin. Thus, it is definitely worthwhile for the national and local governments to rethink if the 30-year return period design flood for the Pasig-Marikina River Basin is the only level of protection that they can provide the people.

5

Metro Manila Flood Control Masterplan

A Metro Manila flood control masterplan funded by World Bank (2012) covered several structural and non-structural measures including the following: (1) Development of safety society resilient to floods by managing land use in the flood risk areas together with artificial flood control structures; (2) Utilization of the benefit of floods as water resources by storing the flood water properly; (3) Improvement and strengthening of flood warning and information system; (4) Establishment of flood risk management system for consistent management for river systems including river channel and river area; and (5) Improvement of institutional system for conducting integrated flood risk management. For the structural mitigation measures in particular, this included projects such as: (1) Pasig-Marikina River improvement with the construction of

11

URBAN DIMENSIONS OF FLOODINGS AND HOLISTIC …

361

Table 1 Flood control design level of protection in terms of return period and other pertinent information of major Department of Public Works and Highway (DPWH) flood control projects in the Philippines (Source DPWH website) Name of River or Area

Return Period

Design Discharge m3 /sec

Catchment area km2

Laoag Agno Pampanga Delta flood way KAMANAVA

1/25 1/10 1/20

11,200 6,410 3,800 – 4,300 450

1,332.1 5,910

2,900

529 (at Sto. Niño Bridge)

1/30: river 1/10: drainage 1/30

Pasig-Marikina Manggahan Flood way Agusan Ormoc

1/30

2,400

1/25 1/50

8,010 610

Specific Discharge: q (m3 /sec)/km2 8.41 1.08

18.5

10,621 25.2

5.5

0.754 24.21

Marikina Large Dam and upgrading the flood safety level up to 100-year return period of floods by conducting some additional works of new river wall along the Lower Marikina River and dredging in the Pasig River downstream reach between junction with the San Juan River and the river mouth; (2) improvement of Meycauayan River, Malabon-Tullahan River, and South Parañaque–Las Piñas River; and (3) Laguna Lakeshore protection by land raising and diking. Two flood mitigation schemes that this author is advocating but were not covered in the World Bank study are as follows: (1) Marikina River Stormwater Tunnel to Agos River or Pacific Ocean; and (2) Maximizing the flood storage function of Laguna de Bay by managing lake levels through large-scale pumping. 5.1

Marikina River Stormwater Tunnel

This recommendation is to divert about 40 to 50% of Marikina River floodwaters (during flood months) to the Pacific Ocean through a flood tunnel that will traverse the Sierra Madre to Agos River or directly to the Pacific Ocean. This way, flooding in Marikina City and vicinity can significantly be reduced. Essentially, this flood solution is to transfer the

362

G. Q. TABIOS III

flood problem to the Pacific Ocean instead of bringing it to Marikina City, Libis, Cainta, and the towns around Laguna Lake. As a background, the Marikina River Basin (at Marikina Bridge, Sto. Niño in Sumulong Highway) has a drainage area of about 525 sq. km. The peak flow during TS Ketsana on September 26, 2009, at that location was estimated at about 5,300m3 /sec. The Marikina-Pasig River and its flood control infrastructure is designed to accommodate about 3,500m3 /sec in which about 600–700m3 /sec can be passed through Pasig River and the rest of about 2,800–2,900m3 /sec can be temporarily diverted to Laguna Lake through the Manggahan Floodway. During TS Ketsana, it is estimated that about 1,600m3 /sec went through Pasig River and the remaining 3,700m3 /sec went to Laguna Lake. Pasig River was overflowing during that period, thus preventing local inland floodwaters to drain into Manila Bay but Laguna Lake in particular was overflowing and it took 110 days (about 3.5 months) for the stored floodwaters to recede (from 13.84 to 12.0m) and flow into Manila Bay. This proposed Marikina River stormwater tunnel is to divert floodwaters into the Agos River (i.e., Kaliwa and Kanan Rivers are upstream tributaries). Agos River is a watershed on the eastern slopes of Sierra Madre which is annex to Marikina River Basin but on the Western slopes of Sierra Madre as shown in Fig. 15 below. The proposed point of diversion is at the upstream part of Marikina River Basin around the junction of Montalban-Linatin-Tayabasan Rivers which has an associated drainage area of about 145 sq. km or 27% of the total drainage area of Marikina River Basin. It is estimated that during TS Ketsana, as much as 1,600m3 /sec peak flow occurred in this subbasin so that if this is diverted to Agos River or the Pacific Ocean, the peak flow at Marikina River (Sto. Niño station) can be reduced to about 3,700m3 /sec. The stormwater tunnel will be 12m in diameter and about 25km long with an intake structure that includes a 25m high dam, and an outlet structure with plunge pool and adequate protection works. The whole project is estimated to cost around PhP30B (2015 prices). 5.2

Maximizing Flood Control Function of Laguna De Bay

As part of the flood control scheme in the Pasig-Marikina River system, floodwaters from Marikina River basin are diverted to Laguna de Bay or Laguna Lake through the Manggahan Floodway when the water surface elevation at Marikina River (Santo Niño Bridge) is 14.5m or higher for

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Fig. 15 Conceptual alignment of proposed Marikina stormwater tunnel to Agos River and/or all the way to Pacific Ocean (Source Author’s creation)

temporary storage in the Lake. During the rainy season, one can maximize the flood storage allocation of Laguna Lake by draining the lake to some environmentally acceptable elevations say at 11.0m to be able to contain significant amounts of floodwaters diverted from Marikina River. After the storm event and especially during the flood season, the lake can then be emptied to back to the environmentally acceptable elevations in preparation for the next possible, incoming storms. Likewise, if the lake levels reach elevations that cause flooding in low-lying areas or towns around Laguna Lake, the lake levels should be drained as fast as possible to avoid prolonged flooding in these low-lying areas or towns. In other words, the objective is to manage Laguna Lake levels similar to San Roque Reservoir or Angat Reservoir with operating rules to effectively utilize their flood control function. Managing the reservoir levels of San Roque or Angat Reservoirs is through releasing water through their gated outlets for water supply and hydropower releases or through their spillways. However, in the case of Laguna Lake, the only major outlet is the Napindan River which has a very limited or restrictive conveyance capacity to allow proper and timely management of the lake levels.

364

G. Q. TABIOS III

Thus, in order to maximize the flood storage function of Laguna Lake, a scheme should be developed to efficiently evacuate or drain the lake water to desirable levels to increase its flood allocation storage when needed and also, to be able to maintain appropriate lake levels in order to prevent flooding in the low-lying towns around Laguna Lake. Two schemes to facilitate draining the lake are to increase the conveyance capacity of Napindan River by dredging and possibly widening and the alternative (or additionally), the revival of the Paranaque Spillway which was supposed to be built together with the construction of Manggahan Floodway. However, the new Paranaque Spillway scheme is no longer an open channel but an underground tunnel (12m diameter and 6 to 8km long constructed about 70m below the ground) with intake structure at either Sucat or Lower Bicutan (30m in diameter penetrating at 77 to 83m) and an outlet structure with pumping (30m in diameter penetrating at 75 to 81m) into Manila Bay. It is estimated to cost about 51B (billion) to 65B pesos. In the case of Napindan River channel improvement, the gain is an average of 545m3 /sec flow from about 348m3 /sec which translates to reducing the lake level of Laguna Lake from 14.0m high to 12.0m to take only 100 days instead of 120 days. Note that while the average gain in flow discharge is almost 1.5 times, the gain in time is less because the flow through Pasig River can be limited to an average of about 450m3 /sec due to diurnal tidal fluctuation of Manila Bay (about 550m3 /sec during low tide to about 400m3 /sec during low tide). The new Paranaque Spillway tunnel has a flow capacity of 200m3 /sec and the intake elevation is at 12.0m. Shown in Fig. 16 from JICA report is the result with the new Paranaque Spillway (and without) during Typhoon Ondoy of September 2009 and Habagat of August 2012 where the peak lake level is reduced by 0.55m and 0.30m, respectively, and the gain of reducing lake levels to 12m of from 110 to 46 days and 108 to 63 days, respectively. In both cases with the new Paranaque Spillway and/or the Napindan River channel improvement, surely, there is a gain in less flooded days but it is still 1.5 to 2 months being flooded in contrast to not being flooded to be begin with if there was no significant inflow from Marikina River Basin through Manggahan Floodway.

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Fig. 16 Time series plot of Laguna Lake water level from 2008–2011 showing Typhoon Ondoy and 2012 Habagat events (Source JICA , 2018)

6 Holistic Flood Risk Management for Urban Areas For an urban area like Metro Manila, a comprehensive flood management solution may be based on the Integrated Flood Management (IFM) advocated by the World Meteorological Organization-Global Water Partnership (WMO-GWP, 2009). Under IFM, the elements relevant to urban flood management is to manage the water cycle as a whole such that IFM recognizes the need to manage all floods (street, river, coastal, pondage, design standard floods), that flood management plans should include drought management, and that urban flood plans must manage both stormwater quantity and quality. Another element is to integrate land and water management so that land use planning and water management should be in one synthesized plan to enable the sharing of information between land use planning and water management authorities and that flood management should understand and account for linkages between upstream and downstream. The third element of IFM related to urban areas is to manage risk and uncertainty since flood risks are related to hydrological uncertainties which are subordinate to social, economic, and political uncertainties (e.g., unpredictable changes may come from population growth and economic activity) and that flood risk management consists of a cycle of preparedness, mitigation, adaptation, response, and recovery. The overall aim of IFM is to improve the functioning of the river basin as a whole, recognizing that floods have beneficial impacts and can never be fully controlled, thus, IFM seeks to maximize the net benefits from the use of floodplains and to minimize loss of life and property.

366

G. Q. TABIOS III

The above elements of IFM provide a very useful framework for dealing with urban flood risk management policies and strategies for an urban area like Metro Manila in general or Pasig-Marikina River Basin in particular. Specific recommendations to deal with the flood control issues and concerns of Metro Manila in the context of IFM are given in the recommendation below.

7 Flood Risk Management with Sustainability Science Holistic flood risk management is actually very complex. For this reason, holistic management requires new approach which can no longer be based on traditional science but rather on the framework of sustainability science (Komiyama and Takeuchi, 2011). Table 2 shows the aims and features sustainability science given in the first 4 columns of this table which was adapted from Yoshikawa (2011) and flood management in the context of sustainability science given in the remaining 2 columns. To highlight some items in Table 2, under the first element, the aim of sustainability science is “to understand everything and manage the relations among the various components of the system” thus, transdisciplinary in nature in contrast to traditional science which created separate disciplines. In relation to flood management, traditional science aims to “understand flood and mitigate flood to protect life and property” in contrast to the use of sustainability science which aims to “understand flood and its relations to flora, fauna and people for its adverse impacts and/or benefits and recognizing the geomorphologichydrologic-ecologic interactions.” In terms of mode of change, flood management in the context of traditional science utilizes “design flood and return period assuming stationary conditions” but sustainability science views that “flood changes with climate, weather, social, political and economic changes both at microscopic and macroscopic levels” with the view that the earth is unstable and slowly changing although it can attain at certain periods, what is referred to as dynamic equilibrium. Under truth verification, traditional science had fairly relied on “experiments in the laboratory” thus a historicist and “certain or almost sure” perspective as opposed to sustainability science where the nature is an “evolution in reality” and is therefore “uncertain, evolutionary and require piecewise engineering.” In the context of flood management,

Experiments in laboratory

Knowledge for understanding

Prosperity of human beings

Truth verification

Result of research

Expected outcome

Sustainability of the earth

Knowledge for action

Evolution in reality

Slow change

Unchangeable (deduced from existence)

Mode of change

Sustainability science (SS) To understand everything and manage the relations

Traditional science (TS)

Aim of study To understand everything and manage individuals

Elements

Understand flood and mitigate flood to protect life and property

Flood management with TS

Design flood and return period assuming stationary conditions Certain (historicist) Observation vs Uncertain (2d/3d lenses) (evolutionary, and estimation piecewise based on engineering) historical data Analysis (dream Flood frequency research) vs Synthesis analysis and (nightmare research) flood design at point or river stretch Prosperity vs Minimize loss of Sustainability life and property

Stable vs Unstable

Separate Disciplines vs Transdisciplinary

Difference TS vs SS

Optimize impacts and benefits of flood to enhance and sustain ecosystem functions and support flora, fauna and especially human life

Integrated flood management that covers physical, socio-economic, and environmental dimensions including land and drought management

Include computer simulations (4d lens) to account uncertainties due to socio-economic or climate and ecosystem changes

Understand flood and its relations to flora, fauna, and people for its adverse impacts and/or benefits and recognizing geomorphologic—hydrologic-ecologic interactions Flood changes with climate, weather, social, political and economic changes at micro/macro levels

Flood management with SS

Table 2 Traditional Science and Sustainability in the Context of Flood Management (The first 4 columns were adapted from Yoshikawa, 2011)

11 URBAN DIMENSIONS OF FLOODINGS AND HOLISTIC …

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368

G. Q. TABIOS III

traditional science employs observations referred to as two-dimensional (2d) lenses or tools in line/time or three-dimensional (3d) lenses in 2d space/time and that estimates are based on historical data, in contrast to sustainability science which employs four-dimensional (4d) lenses through computer simulations and scenario building to account for uncertainties due to socio-economic or climate and ecosystem conditions and future changes. The result of research in traditional science is “knowledge for understanding”, which entails analysis and can be simply a fancy, referred to as dream research versus sustainability science which is “knowledge for action” requiring synthesis and entails nightmare research. In the context of flood management, traditional science would employ “flood frequency analysis and flood design at a point or river stretch” while sustainability science would employ “integrated flood management which covers physical, socio-economic and environment dimensions including land management and drought mitigation.” Finally, with regard to expected outcomes, traditional science is for “prosperity of human beings” while sustainability science is for “sustainability of the earth.” In the context of flood management, this translates to “minimizing loss of life and property” in traditional science as opposed to “optimal management of impacts and benefits of floods to enhance and sustain ecosystem functions and support flora, fauna and especially human life.”

8

Conclusions and Recommendations

As seen above, the challenges of flood risk management in urban areas like Metro Manila is that urbanization is inevitable due to population growth and economic progress; thus, there will be urban sprawl, expansion of paved areas, reduction of absorptive capacity of soils to infiltrate water including wanton or unplanned occupation of floodplains—all of which result in increased risk of urban flooding. This can even be exacerbated by increase in rainfall intensity and duration due to climate change notwithstanding that with or without climate change, extreme rainfalls that result in floods will still be a normal recurrence due to weather anomalies and natural climate variability. In view of the recent severe floodings in Metro Manila and especially after TS Ketsana in September 2009 and TS Gener with southwest monsoons in August 2012, here are certain suggestions and recommendations to address these flood issues and concerns:

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1. Flood studies are needed that consider future land use changes especially due to urbanization, extreme weather events and fluctuations due to climate change, and river sedimentation. 2. Proper land use planning and floodplain zoning must be seriously implemented to avoid residential or commercial developments in flood prone areas and also construction of infrastructures in river floodplains. 3. Reassess and reengineer the flood control infrastructure to provide a higher level of protection to people since flood control projects in Metro Manila are based on 30-year return period flood while the Marikina River peak flow during TS Ketsana was way beyond the 100-year return period flood. 4. Seriously and properly implement local flood drainage design standards especially subdivisions in which some of them do not have an outlet to the main drainage systems. 5. Improve flood control plans with optimal combination of flood walls or dikes, small flood detention ponds, pumping stations, and sediment detention structures (especially in Upper Marikina River). 6. Operationalize real-time rainfall prediction and flood forecasting system to provide early warning system and proper flood evacuation procedures. Two specific structural and operational flood mitigation schemes are also presented which are the proposed Marikina River stormwater tunnel to divert floodwaters into the Pacific Ocean instead letting the floodwaters flow into Metro Manila and combating them and the second one is to optimize the flood control function of Laguna Lake to induce and accelerate flood storage depletion through large-scale pumping with optimal operational rules. These two flood mitigation schemes are worthwhile pursuing but require serious investigation. Finally, with regard to urban floods, it is advocated here that holistic flood risk management is needed which require integrated land and water management with the overall aim to improve the functioning of the river basin as a whole, recognizing that floods have beneficial impacts and can never be fully controlled; thus, it seeks to maximize the net benefits from the use of floodplains and to minimize loss of life and property. On the one hand, since holistic flood risk management is very complex, holistic management requires a new approach which can no longer be based on traditional science but rather on the framework of sustainability science.

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In the context of flood risk management, sustainability science views the flood problem as a complex and complexities of the global system (natural processes, climate, weather), social system (societal, political, economic), and human systems (cultural, behavioral, lifestyles); it requires a transdisciplinary approach that embraces both natural and social sciences such as scientific and technological tools to address the global system, the socio-political-economic studies to address the social system, and the psychological and cultural studies to address the human system.

Bibliography JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency). 2018. Data Collection Survey on Paranaque Spillway in Metro Manila in the Republic of Philippines. Final Report submitted to the Department of Public Works and Highways, Manila, May. Komiyama, H., and K. Takeuchi. 2011. Sustainability Science: Building a New Academic Discipline, I n Sustainability Science: A Multidisplinary Approach, Edited by H. In Komiyama, ed. K. Takeuchi, H. Shiroyama, and T. Mino, 2–19. Tokyo: United National University Press. Tabios, G. Q. III, 2010. Urban Dimensions of Flood Management: Case of Pasig-Marikina River Basin of Metro Manila, Philippines, Journal of Hydrologic Environment, IHES, Vol. 6(1), December. Tabios, G. Q. III. 2020. Water Resources Systems of the Philippines: Modeling Studies. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature. WMO-GWP. 2009. Integrated Flood Management for Sustainable Development Associated Program on Flood Management of World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and Global Water Partnership (GWP), Geneva. World Bank Study. 2012. Master Plan for Flood Management in Metro Manila and Surrounding Areas (Final Draft Master Plan Report), Conducted by CTI Engineering International Co., Ltd. in association with Woodfields Consultants, Inc., March. Yoshikawa, H. 2011. Science and technology for society, In Sustainability Science: A Multidisplinary Approach, Edited by H. In Komiyama, ed. K. Takeuchi, H. Shiroyama, and T. Mino, 256–271. Tokyo: United Nationa University Press.

CHAPTER 12

Urban Environmental Governance and Sustainable Development: Empowering National and Local Governments for Solid Waste Management in the Philippines Maria Lourdes Genato Rebullida and Jalton Garces Taguibao

1

Introduction

Cities are essential in hosting urbanization processes where urban spaces for communities are created for social, economic, and political activities to thrive. The impact of population growth and human-centered activities on the sustainability of resources in cities have become the subject of global endeavors. In the 1987 document, “Our Common Future”,

M. L. G. Rebullida (B) · J. G. Taguibao (B) Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] J. G. Taguibao e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 T. S. E. Tadem and M. E. L. Atienza (eds.), A Better Metro Manila?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3_12

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the United Nations (UN) introduced the concept of “sustainable development ”, which the global community adopted in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 21 at the close of the 1992 Earth Summit (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 1992a, b). Subsequently, the UN facilitated its members’ commitment to the UN Millennium Development Goals 2000–2015 (MDGs), followed by the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2015–2030 (UN 2015). With the interlinking of development-andenvironment, SDG Goal 11 Target 11.6 specifically addresses the adverse impact on the environment by the improper handling of urban solid wastes. This is complemented by SDG 12 that targets reduction in waste generation and recovery of waste resources in the processes of consumption and production. SDG 17 cuts across all the SDGs to emphasize the strategic importance of inclusive partnerships between and among local, national, regional, and global levels of institutions. In the Philippines, SDG implementation is embedded in the national development framework “Ambisyon Natin 2040” (Vision Mission) and the Philippine Development Plan 2017–2022 (NEDA 2016). These directions were pursued by the Duterte leadership at the national level, though likely to change due to the 2022 electoral outcomes. In principle, this has been formally institutionalized in law, though implementation strategies are expected to change across political administrations. Hence, legal mandates remain for the national and local government levels to comply, specifically the 1987 Philippine Constitution and the 1991 Local Government Code that established decentralization by devolution aimed at national and local development. Local government units exercise political and administrative autonomy under devolution in certain areas of public services vis-à-vis the national government. One of the devolved functions is solid waste management. In January 2001, the passage of Republic Act 9003 or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000 (RA 9003 ESWM Act) reinforced the national and local government responsibilities for solid waste management. With devolution as the preferred form of decentralization in the Philippines, the question is about how this has enabled urban environmental governance for solid waste management. Deficiencies have caused environmental degradation, trash slide and trash flood, particularly in Metro Manila (Rebullida and Taguibao 2020; Marajas 2018; MMDA 2019). Intermittent attempts to launch federalism in the country (Pimentel 2016; Consultative Committee Bayanihan Constitution 2018) signal the

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need to investigate the current unitary and devolved system of government, whether it is better-off when changed to a federal system, or if retained can perform better. Decentralization spawns relational issues between national and subnational levels, whether by way of devolution or federalism, which vary across countries, such as in Asia (Brilliantes 2004; Nagai, Funatsu and Kagoya 2019). Responsibilities, powers, and resources are crucial aspects of vertical and horizontal relationships in devolution and in federalism, where there is a national/central government, a mid-level (state or region) and local levels (Phillimore 2013; Eckersley 2016). Capacity issues confront each level of government in performing its functions; and intergovernmental relations become important in enhancing capacities and outcomes (UN Habitat 2020, 207–232). Empowering local governments has become a way to improve performance across countries for specific types of functions, such as for health, environment, business, industry, among others (Eckersley 2016). Arguably, empowerment should be spoken of by the national government vis-à-vis local governments and other actors-stakeholders. In a governance framework, national and sub-national government units may interact, indicating the challenges for respective capacities for their transactions; also between or among government, the private sector, civil society, and citizens for the purposes of service delivery, law and policy formulation and implementation, and other problem-solving situations (Grindle 2010; Bryson et al. 2019; Kooiman et al. 2008; Tsujinaka, Ahmed and Kobashi 2013). Related to this, multilevel governance refers to the interdependence of sub-national, national, and transnational levels of government, as well as engagement with non-state actors at these levels, suggesting vertical and horizontal relationships (Eckersley 2017; Danielle and Kay 2017). In such contexts, engaging in responsible governance refers to the norms, values, rules, and practices for accountability in “administrative decisions” and “discretionary actions” (van Tulder and van Mil 2020, 177). In the case of environmental degradation in the Philippines, empowerment appears to be imperative on both national and local government levels, applied on solid waste management that has remained a critical urban problem since the 1980s in Metropolitan Manila and emerging in new metropolitan sites (Rebullida 2000; JICA 1999; ADB 2004; Senate 2017). Urban environmental governance offers a perspective with

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which to examine multilevel governance in the intergovernmental relations among national agencies, between national and local governments, among local government units, and their engagement with the private sector or business and civil society. These become the stakeholders in sustaining land, air, and water quality in cities as urban areas. How aspects of the politico-administrative system in a devolved setup can uphold urban environmental governance need to be examined to spur change, reform, and improvements relevant to achieving sustainable development in countries. This chapter examines the current institutional framework, policy framework, and implementation performance on solid waste management in the Philippines as an aspect of urban environmental governance and sustainable development. With focus on Metro Manila as the National Capital Region (NCR), inquiry is directed at solid waste management as a critical political, administrative, and policy issue. Specifically, what are the mandates and design of national and local government interactions for solid waste management? What policies were formulated to enhance institutional capacity and empower both national and local governments? Why and how did policy change occur? What performance results indicate government capacity at the national level and empowerment at the local level for solid waste management to protect the urban environment and achieve sustainable development? Metro Manila/NCR provides an appropriate locale for study, considering this is the center of national government, education, business, industry, trade and commerce, and urban life for an increasing population. It hosts the local government of 17 cities and one municipality with devolved functions by the Local Government Code (1991) for local development and specifically, solid waste management. A regionwide administrative agency, the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), carries out functions for solid waste management. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) undertakes law enforcement and chairs the National Solid Waste Management Commission (NSWMC) instituted by Republic Act 9003 or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act, approved in 2001 (RA 9003). Since the 1980s, the national government and Metro Manila local government units (LGUs) have battled the problems of increasing volume of solid wastes and improper disposal systems that cause environmental degradation and aggravate flooding and disaster-related risks during rainy seasons and typhoons. This situation

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makes it imperative to examine the politico-administrative systems crucial to making cities livable and sustainable. This chapter considers the urban contexts as vital to policy development, policy change, governance, and institution building over time. From a historical institutional perspective, formal rules, practices, actors, norms, and related outcomes are emphasized, which are “observable in institutions, whose designs are created and reformed to achieve better results ” (Olsen 2009, 5–6). Policies creating institutions and problemsolving emanate from the confluence of the problem stream—the socioeconomic, political contexts with the political stream of decision-making; and policy change occur when the political, problem and policy streams converge (Kingdon 1984, 2011; Howlett et al. 2014). In the broader context of responsible governance, this chapter examines mechanisms for policy development and institution building while underscoring the outcomes of the dutiful exercise of national and local government mandates framed by decentralization and local empowerment. As such, this chapter puts forward the view that for urban environmental governance and sustainable development, policies may empower national and local governments and even private and civil society sectors to resolve environmental problems, such as solid waste management in cities as urban areas, with innovative waste resource recovery and waste reduction strategies, and institutional collaboration (UN Sustainable Development Goals 2016–2030). Multilevel and responsible governance through decentralization and accountability mechanisms empower local governments and stakeholders to address local needs and accomplish meaningful and relevant outcomes. See Fig. 1. Data had been sourced from documents, national agency official reports, literature search and secondary data, and analyzed qualitatively by extracting descriptors and patterns. Quantitative data sets were also obtained from documents, official reports, and secondary data and analyzed for measurable evidence. This chapter intends to contribute to the empirical literature by providing data and exposing issues, challenges, and policy deficits that require strategic interventions, particularly in the area of solid waste management in the Philippines. Conceptually, this chapter aims to qualify “responsible governance”, “decentralization”, and “empowerment”, using solid waste management in the Philippines as an illustrative case, with the use of inter-disciplinary lenses from political science, public policy, public administration, and environmental studies.

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Global Context Sustainable Development

Governance Government, Civil Society, Business, Citizens

1987 Philippine Constitution

Policy & Institutional Design

Local Government Code - Devolution

Ecological Solid Waste Management Act

Problem Stream

Political Stream

Solid Waste Management

National and Local Government Initiatives

Policy Stream Outcomes

Source: Authors’ creation adapted from Kingdon, 1984.

Fig. 1 Policy, Governance, and Sustainable Government for Solid Waste Management

Development:

Empowering

The first part of this chapter discusses the global paradigm shift, situating solid waste management as a critical element of urban environmental governance and sustainable development. The second part elucidates the urban context for the problem stream—critical solid waste management issues, the framing of the problem, and problem-solving responses over time. For the third and fourth parts, the chapter presents and analyzes the policy and institutional design for solid waste management in the current devolved setup; and the implementation issues and examples of best practices in Metro Manila’s urban environmental governance. The last part analyzes the capacity and empowerment of national and local governments related to the policy changes and implementation performance for solid waste management.

2 Global Paradigm Shift: Solid Waste Management in Urban Environmental Governance and Sustainable Development Contexts “Garbage” or “trash” commonly refers to “solid waste” in everyday language. As a technical term and concept, solid waste requires a definition that can facilitate understanding and corresponding action. The

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2017 Basel Convention (pp. 8–9) defined solid wastes as “substances or objects which are disposed” or “intended to be disposed” or “disposed by the provisions of national laws ”. Generally, solid wastes come under the term municipal wastes because of the collection and disposal services assigned to the municipal level (or city level) of local government, for municipality, or by the city. The World Bank (Hoornweg and Bhada-Tata 2012, 6, 33) lists the types of wastes in global context, namely residential, industrial, commercial, institutional, municipal construction and demolition wastes; also, organic wastes such as food, yard, wood, paper, plastic, glass, metal, other residues, and commercial products. In terms of composition, 44% of waste are composed of food and green wastes, while 17% are made up of paper and cardboard, and 12% plastic (Kaza et al. 2018). What constitutes solid waste is the critical question to resolve as this most likely affects will be managed, and what will be included and excluded. The paradigm shift refers to the changes in perspective about how natural resources are used in production and disposed upon consumption. Since the UN Brundtland Commission’s “Our Common Future” (UNCED 1987) and UN Earth Summit’s Rio Declaration (UNCED 1992) and Agenda 21 (UNCED 1992) and several other international agreements reinforced the “sustainable development” framework, extending this to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 1992), the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005– 2015, and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR 2015). It is thus argued that global development has resulted in environmental degradation due to greenhouse gas emissions from various economic and human activities that exacerbate the production of solid waste, thereby causing climate change and disasters (UNEP 2010; Ferronato and Torreta, 2019). Latest data from the World Bank further show that, globally, 2.01 billion tons of waste is produced annually with at least 33% of such is not managed in environmentally safe systems (Kaza et al. 2018). Regionally, East Asia and the Pacific region generates most of the world’s waste at 23%. Over the last decade in the Asian region, garbage and waste generation increased rapidly and is expected to reach a maximum of 1.8 million tons per day by 2025 (Curea 2017; Kaza et al. 2018). The global discourse has placed solid waste management as a core issue for sustainable development, in the environment-development nexus, and related to climate change and disaster management. Studies show

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evidence of the complex factors of development leading to rapid urbanization, urban development, and formation of cities where production and consumption have increased, resulting in environmental degradation. The generation and disposal of solid wastes are critical processes, as these produce greenhouse gas, impairing environmental quality and contribute to flooding and disasters (Hoornweg and Bhada-Tata 2012; Agenda 21 1992). Improper disposal, such as open dumping, unregulated landfills, and burning (McAllister 2015, 5; Cogut 2016, Kaza et al. 2018), have led to health problems in communities due to the pollution of land, air, and water that are pathways of disease carrying vectors; and to adverse effects on marine and aquatic life due to plastics in the waste stream (Al Salem et al. 2009; Sigler 2014). The global paradigm on sustainable development evolved in the last four decades to the current Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2015–2030 espousing the crucial role of solid waste management in SGD Goal 11-waste reduction in cities and Goal 12-responsible consumption using waste minimization approaches (Rodic and Wilson 2017). The framework of governance is considered as a way for the government to engage multi-stakeholders in decision-making and implementation to achieve sustainable development (McAllister 2015). The interplay of different stakeholders in environmental problem-solving is referred to as environmental governance (Lemos and Agrawal 2006). Urban environmental governance situates the cities as locus for sustainable development, which calls for problem-solving of the adverse effects brought upon the environment by increasing population and economic activities, and consequently increasing consumption and waste generation. The UN has encouraged the interaction of government and its institutions, business and civil society, and citizens to bring global commitments for implementation of sustainable development at national and local levels (UN Guidance Note 2020). Governing and managing solid waste is a multifaceted endeavor that considers diversity in shareholders and operations. A sustainable solid waste management system requires a rational selection of highly functional organizational structures within the administrative and political milieu of a government (Wee et al. 2017; Massoud et al. 2019). Furthermore, empowerment and decentralization mechanisms as aspects of democratization provide participatory conditions which allow local authorities and stakeholders to partake in governance-driven courses of action. This is a pronounced consensus in the scholarly literature on Solid

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Waste Management (SWM) pertaining to administrative and governance systems that are necessary in managing society’s production of wastes to protect the environment, global ecological systems, and ultimately, human life. 2.1

Urbanization, Increasing Solid Wastes, and Metro Manila’s Crises in Solid Waste Management

Solid waste management (SWM) in the Philippines became a devolved function of the national government to local government by the mandates of the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC). The solid waste management crisis intensified from the 1980s to the 1990s, even with the devolved powers and responsibilities granted to local government units. The legislation of Republic Act (RA) 9003 or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000 (ESWM Act) aimed to confront the problems with solid wastes, mainly in the major urban center—Metro Manila constituting the National Capital Region. This section looks into the empirical research literature and study reports that describe and analyze the solid waste management conditions in the Philippines prior to and shortly after devolution mandated by the Local Government Code in 1991, and in 2000 upon enactment of RA 9003. The review aims to provide a historical perspective on solid waste management as a policy and public management issue, tracing the problem stream of the solid waste management crises and the policy responses of the government. This also helps to identify the issues and gaps in empowering local government and enhancing national-local governments relations in solid waste management. The persistent crisis in solid waste management has been generally attributed to (1) the increasing population and urbanization resulting in increased waste generation, mainly in Metro Manila—the country’s metropolis, but also emergent in the newly urbanizing areas in regions of the country; and (2) the inadequate capacities in solid waste management, specifically in the sub-systems of collection, transport, treatment, and final disposal of solid wastes under the charge of respective tiers of local government units. Metro Manila’s urbanization has been characterized as rapid, given the increasing trend of its population related to the influx of rural folks in search of work and better opportunities and development policies that propelled industrialization, business and economy since the 1950s

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(Balisacan 1994; Porio 2009). Balisacan (1994, 3) explains that by the 1980s Metro Manila’s population grew by 2.7% and by the 1990s 12% influx from provincial migrants as industrialization progressed. Metro Manila has been regarded as urban given the definition of an urban area since 1970 until revised in 2003 for implementation beginning the 2005 (NSCB Resolution No. 9s 2003). Porio (2009, 9–10) observes that the 1970 definition pertained to the city or municipality, regardless of the characteristics of component barangays, while the 2003 definition specified the urban criteria even for barangays. The original version stipulated that a city or municipality is urban if “population density is at least 1,000 per square kilometer, with 500 persons per square kilometer, a network of streets in parallel or right-angle orientation; at least six establishments— commercial, manufacturing, recreational and/or personal services; also with at least three elements (a) a town hall or church or chapel; (b) public plaza, park or cemetery, market or trading area, and public building such as schools, hospitals, health center and library” (Census of Population and Housing 1990; Rebullida 2000, 10; Balisacan 1994, 6; Porio 2009, 9–10). The 2003 revised definition characterizes an urban barangay by its population of at least 5,000 or more, with “at least one establishment with a minimum of 100 employees, also five or more establishments with a minimum of 10 employees, and five or more facilities within the two-kilometer radius from the barangay hall ” (NSCB Resolution No. 9s 2003). Mercado and Manasan (1998, 3) acknowledged Metro Manila to be a megacity when it reached a population of eight million in 1990, surpassing the characteristics of a city at 100,000 to 1 million people, and a metropolis in terms of population, urban facilities and networks. Initially, Metro Manila covered only four cities—Manila, the oldest and primate city since the Spanish colonial period, and Pasay City, Caloocan City, and Quezon City in the post war years (1950s). This expanded to include nearby municipalities by Presidential Decree No. 824 (November 7, 1975), which eventually became cities in the 1990s—namely, Las Pinas, Makati, Malabon, Mandaluyong, Marikina, Muntinlupa, Navotas, Paranaque, Pasig, San Juan, Taguig, and Valenzuela, while Pateros currently remains the lone municipality (DILG 2020). By congressional enactment, a municipality may become a city if it achieves an “average annual income of at least Php100 million in the last two consecutives, based on 2000 constant prices and either a population of at least 150,000 inhabitants or a contiguous territory of 100 square kilometers “(Republic Act No. 9009 amending Republic Act No. 7160 Local Government

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Code; Senate Economic Planning Office 2017). Studies indicate that economic activities in Metro Manila pulled people from nearby areas seeking work and income, which contributed to creating enclaves of poor informal settlements that are not linked to the government or the private sector’s service delivery systems, such as water, electricity, health, education, livelihood, sanitation, including garbage collection (Balisacan 1994, 9–10). The “garbage” crisis began to rear its ugly head in the 1980s by the (1) increasing volume of solid wastes and (2) inappropriate disposal in open dumpsites, canals, esteros, and streets in Metro Manila, causing environmental degradation and harm to communities (Rebullida 2000; ADB 2004). Analysis of the solid waste management crises attributed the causal factors to the increasing urbanization, industrialization, and population growth in Metro Manila (JICA 1999; ADB 2004). As a prime hub for business, industry, education, culture, and arts, Metro Manila had a daytime population estimated at 9 million, including the people from nearby regions that came to-and-from daily to work, conduct business, study and other purposes; while an estimated 8 million population remained at nighttime (Padilla 1993, 6; Rebullida 2000). By 2016, data showed that waste generation in Metro Manila or NCR, with population estimated to have increased to 12 million, had risen to 9,212.92 tons daily (Senate Economic Planning Office 2017, 1; Atienza 2020, 125). Informal settlers formed their communities in the river basins located in Metro Manila, estimated in 1990 to be about 1.6 million (Rebullida 2000, 19). The urban poor took up residence near garbage disposal sites where they engage in scavenging and waste picking for livelihood (Rebullida 2000, 25; ADB 2004, 14–18; Gonzales 2003). With a population in 1989 of 7,993,350 in the 17 cities and municipalities of Metro Manila, the estimated solid waste generation rate was 4,025 tons/day (Rebullida 2000, 21). The United Nations Center for Human Settlements (UNCHS 1993) noted that the City of Manila alone generated 30% of Metro Manila’s daily waste generation and Quezon City at 19.20%, which were higher in volume than the other areas (Rebullida 2000, 20). The JICA 1997 study shows increased waste generation of 5,350 tons/day, of which household generated wastes comprised 74% of 4,000 tons. Since 2000, several studies have tracked the increasing waste generation in Metro Manila as population increased. Daily waste generation was estimated to be 5,000 tons in 2002, constituting 50% of 10,000

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tons of solid wastes generated countrywide (Sumalde 2004, 1, citing Bennagen, Nepomuceno and Covar 2002). The study report in 2004 by the Asian Development Bank (ADB 2004, 11–14) calculated Metro Manila’s daily solid waste generation at 6,700 tons, of which 1,500 tons daily are “illegally dumped on private land, in rivers, creeks, and Manila Bay, or openly burned” ( ADB 2004, 11), while 720 tons per day are recycled or composted, and the rest to dumpsites. By 2015, waste generation increased to 9,000 tons daily in Metro Manila and to 40,000 tons daily nationwide (Atienza 2020, 125). Open dumping was found to produce the highest methane emissions, followed by controlled disposal sites and sanitary landfills (Premakumara et al. 2018). The “garbage” crisis flared and caught public attention: (1) in the 1980s, when the open dumpsite named “Smokey Mountain” exemplified environmental degradation and risks to land, air, and water by leachate and gas emissions at disposal sites, and the health risks to the communities, particularly the scavengers or waste pickers residing nearby; (2) in 10 July 2000, when the trash mound at the Payatas open dumpsite crashed and buried some 330 persons and houses among scavenger or waste picking families living nearby (JICA 1999; Rebullida 2000, 5; ADB 2004, 46–48, 64–78; Gaillard and Cadag 2009; Jafari et al. 2013). Since 2018, trash floods have accompanied typhoons in Metro Manila (Marajas 2018; MMDA 2019). With the passage of the Local Government Code (1991), government targeted the closure of 12 open dumpsites, including the controversial Payatas in Quezon City and Smokey Mountain in Tondo, with assistance from international development organizations, such as for two landfills in San Mateo and Carmona (JICA 1999, 1–1 to 1–6; Rebullida 2000, 24–26; ADB 2004, 22–25). The dumpsites’ closure resulted in waste stockpiling and search for new disposal sites amidst public protests (ADB 2004; Gonzales 2003). Poverty and health issues in dumpsite settlements among urban poor scavengers or waste pickers exacerbated the crises (ADB 2004, 46–48, 64–65; Gonzales 2003). The 1991 Local Government Code identified roles and mandates of local government units in resolving the solid waste management crises. Still the Payatas trash slide occurred on 10 July 2000 and shortly after, the legislature enacted Republic Act 9003, signed by the executive on 26 January 2001. These laws basically marked new milestones for governance and shared responsibilities of national and local governments for solid waste management.

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Policy Responses and Institutional Design, Local Autonomy, and Ecological Approach

A groundbreaking principle in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the state acknowledged its responsibility in protecting and advancing the people’s right to a “balanced and healthful ecology” (Art 2s.16). Indicative of the governance approach, private sector enterprises are encouraged to participate actively (Art. 2s. 20). For the first time, the constitution affirmed the engagement of civil society, non-government organizations, community based or sectoral organizations (Art. 2s. 23) and independent people’s organizations (Art.13s.15). A constitutional landmark, people’s rights and their organizations’ participation are recognized at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making, with adequate control mechanisms to be established (Art. 13s.15–16). Most importantly, local governments have autonomy (Art. 2s. 25; Art.10), including fiscal and financial powers. Earliest policy attempt at the solid waste management crisis began with the creation of the inter-agency Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management in 1987 (Memorandum Circular No. 39) with functions to: identify an effective collection and disposal system or technology; designate the appropriate implementing agency; plan sustainable alternative livelihood for scavengers; and review proposals and projects for waste management. Subsequent amendments sought the Commission’s reconstitution to ensure implementation of the National Solid Waste Management Framework (Memorandum Circular No. 39 1994). This still proved to be inadequate because local governments needed to be involved and empowered, and the end-of-process approach proved to be inadequate and unsustainable. The Local Government Code of 1991 transformed the politicoadministrative setup by devolution to empower local governments to pursue local development, while enhancing national government capacity by lessening its load. At the threshold of implementation in 1992, changes occurred in solid waste management (ADB 2004, 22–26): in 1991–1992, the closure of Smokey Mountain in Manila and World Bank financed San Mateo and Carmona sanitary landfills; and in 1997–1999, ban on incinerators (Clean Air Act 1999) and Metro-wide solid waste management plan by JICA. Devolution designated the barangay, as the ground level unit of local government, to undertake solid waste collection; the municipality, as next

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higher level, for solid waste disposal and services for general hygiene and sanitation; the province, at top tier, for national policy implementation directed by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources; while the city performs the functions of both municipality and province (Chap. 2s. 17). With local autonomy, the President still exercises supervisory powers, while national agencies render technical assistance and policy functions (Chap. 3 Art. 1s. 25c; Chap. 3 Art. 2s.26). Local government units are empowered to do their own local development plans, taxation, and income generation (Chap. 2s.18). Echoing the constitution, private business and civil society sectors (Chap. 3 Art. 1, 3; Chap. 4s. 34–36) are encouraged to participate. Still, devolution did not resolve the solid waste management crises and even complicated by the Clean Air Act in 1999 (Republic Act No. 8749) as it banned incineration, halting plans for its use in solid waste management. New crises loomed as ten disposal sites had only 2 years remaining lifespan. The landmark law, RA 9003, introduced the innovative ecological approach. Briefly, the ecological approach involves resource conservation and resource recovery from solid wastes by recycling as a system of waste reduction and minimization, in accord with ecological and sustainable development perspectives (Chap. 1 Art. 1s 2). Ecological solid waste management is described as “the systemic administration of activities which provide for segregation at source, segregated transportation, storage, transfer, processing, treatment and disposal of solid waste and other waste management activities which do not harm the environment (Art. 2 Sec. 3[l]). This punctuated the disposal site end-of-process approach over the years and policy change introduced an ecological and sustainable approach. The primacy of national and local government relations is emphasized in the innovative provisions of RA 9003. The newly created National Solid Waste Management Commission (NSWMC, the Commission), with 14-member national agencies and 3 private sector representatives, prepares the national SWM framework. The Commission monitors and coordinates the implementation of local plans and policies; and assists LGUs in market networking for recyclable materials. The newly created National Ecology Center, under the Commission, undertakes training, education, information, recycling market networking. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources chairs the Commission with its Environmental Management Bureau as Secretariat. Local government units are tasked to submit the Local Solid Waste Management Plan for

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the Commission’s review and approval; create the prescribed Local Solid Waste Management Board for policymaking; and undertake devolved functions, respectively at provincial, city/municipal, and barangay levels (Fig. 2). Policy innovation in the Philippine Constitution, Local Government Code, and the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000 also included civil society and private sector participation. Prior to and after legislation, civil society advocacy and practices promoted the alternative system of waste reduction, recycling, and reuse in various communities, mainly in Metro Manila, by non-government organizations, such as the Recycling Movement of the Philippines, Sagip Pasig Movement, and Mother Earth Foundation, and private business-managed junk shops and waste exchange programs (Atienza 2020, 87; Kojima and Rebullida 2008; Rebullida 2000 72–89; Rebullida 2002, 2007). In Metro Manila, a law created the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) (1994 Republic Act 7924). This supersedes the Metro Manila Authority (Executive Order No. 392s 1990; Metro Manila Commission, 1975 Presidential Decree 824). Executive Order No. 146 (1999) created the Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee to improve collection and disposal of solid waste, among

Department of Environment and Natural Resources Undertake national policies on environmental protection

National Solid Waste Management Commission (DENR-EMB as Secretariat; Prepares the NSWM framework; coordinates implementation of local plans and policies)

National Ecology Center (Conducts training, information, recycling, market networking)

Provincial Implement national policies on environmental protection

City Municipality (Manage solid waste collection and disposal; environment, hygiene, and sanitation services)

(Manage solid waste disposal system; environment, hygiene and sanitation services; undertake national policies on environmental protection

Village (“Barangay”) Solid waste collection

Based on: Republic Act 9003 “Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000” and Republic Act 7160 “Local Government Code of 1991”

Fig. 2 Devolution -- Hierarchy of Solid Waste Management Responsibilities

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other region-wide services. As vital functions, MMDA formulates and implements metro-wide policies, standards, programs, and projects for proper sanitary waste disposal, sanitary landfill, and recycling the Metro Manila Council, as governing board and policymaking body, consists of LGU mayors, president of the vice-mayors league and councilors league, administrative officials, and representatives of national agencies, private sector, and civil society (Fig. 3). This setup implies issues of coordination, overlapping, or complementary functions, that are either conducive to or at least inadequate to meet performance expectations. In devolution, the issue is that LGUs carry politico-administrative powers within jurisdictions, respectively, which MMDA as a metro-wide administrative-development entity cannot override; and mayors being members of the Metro Manila Council may opt to join and comply or not in decision-making and implementation (Mercado 1998; Manasan and Mercado 1998; Mercado and Manasan 1999). Recently, the NSWMC stepped in to empower the MMDA with the review and evaluation of the 10-year SWM plans of LGUs in Metro Manila (NSWMC Resolution No. 143 2015). The NSWMC also empowered MMDA by deputizing its officials and personnel as solid waste management officers to enforce the provisions of RA 9003 and the Implementing Rules and Regulations (NSWMC Resolution No. 839, 2016).

National Government

Metro Manila 16 Cities and 1 Municipality

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority Metro Manila Council -Governing and Policy Making body composed of LGUs in Metro Manila

Villages (“Barangays”) Based on Republic Act 7924 “An Act Creating the Metro Manila Development Authority”, 1994

Fig. 3 Metropolitan Manila Development Authority Structure

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Intermittent proposals for a shift to federalism highlight the advantages of a national central government, a mid-level regional government, and tiers of local government units (Consultative Committee 2018). This prompted prospects for MMDA to be transformed to a mid-tier regional government, instead of a regional administrative government agency for Metro Manila or NCR (Rebullida and Taguibao 2020). In either a devolved or federal set-up, the issues to be resolved in solid waste management remain the same (Rebullida and Taguibao 2020). In the proposed Bayanihan federalism (Consultative Committee 2018), the local government system remains the same, where the mandates and responsibilities under the Local Government Code and the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act are maintained in the devolved setup. The proposed Bayanihan federalism setup creates an additional mid-tier of a regional government with sub-national state powers over the local governments, where NCR is positioned as one of sixteen federated regions. While there is no direct provision for solid waste management, it may be inferred that this is subsumed in provisions regarding regional legislatures that enact state policies to “protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology…(Art. II Sec.19); the right to a healthful environment and balanced ecology”, for clean water, soil, and surroundings; and address “damages to environment and ecology, and threats to environment and ecological balance” (Art. III Sec. 28) (Rebullida and Taguibao, 257). Though policy and institutional gaps are not necessarily discernible in the laws’ provisions, these are identifiable relative to actual implementation processes and results. Mainly, the laws empower national and local government institutions for solid waste management. However, deficiencies persist, evident in recent trash floods in Metro Manila, when solid wastes floated along flooded streets and inundated Manila Bay (Marajas 2018; MMDA 2019). 2.3

Resolving the Solid Waste Crises: Implementation Issues in Metro Manila

Although RA 9003 presents a major breakthrough for steering the country’s waste management policies and regulations toward an ecological and more climate-friendly approach, empirical studies underscore the continued impact of solid wastes on environmental degradation in the Philippines, calling attention particularly to Metro Manila (Galarpe 2017,

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379; Regmi 107, 80). LGU performance is traced to: (1) rapid urbanization, (2) continued open dumping, unregulated landfills, burning; (3) failure of local governments to organize and manage functional local Solid Waste Management Boards and submit local Solid Waste Management Plans; (4) increasing volume of wastes and prevalence of plastic wastes, and organic wastes; (5) inadequate local government resources vis-à-vis costs of integrated solid waste management system; and (6) lack of public awareness on proper waste management practices, among others. In Metro Manila, these problem-causing factors prevail, even with decentralization, the ecological approach, and the metro-wide agency. However, some cases of best practices undertaken by some Metro Manila LGUs demonstrate the use of local empowerment to improve solid waste management. These are presented in this section to highlight the implementation situation after the executive approval of Republic Act 9003 in 2001.

3

Problem-Causing Factors in Metro Manila’s Implementation of SWM

Weak Waste Reduction Strategies in Local Government Units. LGU compliance with waste segregation at source ranged from 43 to 100% based on validations conducted by National Solid Waste Management Commission (NSWMC) Secretariat (Premakumara et al. 2018; DENR 2015). Civil society organizations also raised issues and problems in policy implementation, specifically in undertaking waste reduction and waste avoidance by recycling, composting, and other methods even prior to collection, segregation, and disposal in the appropriate facilities. Garbage and waste continue to end up in streets, sewages, canals and other waterways, attributed to the absence of implementing ordinances in some LGUs, the lack of participation in promoting solid waste management, and the general public’s limited awareness of sorting and segregation, and waste disposal. In short, the law remains poorly implemented twenty years after its enactment particularly in aspects such as waste segregation, materials recovery facilities (MRF), and sanitary landfills (Gatchalian 2020). In 2018, out of the total 178 LGUs in the area, there are still 39.89% that did not comply with the 10-year solid waste management plan, 27.53% that did not comply with regulations for segregation at source, 23.03% that did not comply with regulations on segregated collection,

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44.38% that do not have a functional materials recovery facility, and 10.11% that did not approve disposal facilities (Tantuco 2018). Only 30% of barangays actually segregate their collected waste properly, implying “the mismanagement” of solid waste produced by as many as 77 million Filipinos throughout the course of their day-to-day lives. RA 9003 also provides that every barangay or cluster of barangays should have their own MRF, where LGUs are supposed to receive, segregate, process and even store waste. Unfortunately, as of 2014, only 31% of barangays had access to MRFs, meaning, only three out of 10 Filipino families live in barangays with proper waste segregation facilities (Onenews 2019).

Ineffective and Inefficient Waste Collection and Disposal Systems. In addition to ineffective waste collection, segregation, and disposal practices, the lack of more efficient methods and practices in disposal further exacerbates emergent problems such as pollution, toxicity, and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that endanger public health and the environment. The ineffectiveness of collection and disposal practices are mainly due to (1) inadequate service coverage, (2) operational inefficiencies of services, (3) limited utilization of recycling activities, (4) inadequate management of non-industrial hazardous waste, and (5) inadequate landfill disposal. Therefore, focus should be given toward improving waste collection, terminating waste burning, and promoting maximum resource recovery (composting and recycling) including by encouraging waste separation and restricting open dumping and control disposal practices (Premakumara et al. 2018). Low Prioritization in Developing Alternative and Innovative Disposal Methods. Low political priority, inadequacy in allocated resources, knowledge, and technical gaps regarding alternative solutions beyond the operation and management of landfills, controlled and open dumpsites demonstrate deficits in SWM policy planning. To improve the current situation, alternative institutional and financial models for disposal activities must be developed and applied. “Integrated solid waste management must address reprocessing and resource recovery, not just end-of-pipe disposal of residuals” (Asian Development Bank 2017, viii). Prioritizing SWM through an integrated approach enables local governments to target more effective waste collection and disposal activities while considering cost minimization through more responsive planning.

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Scarcity of Space for Waste Processing and Disposal. Rapidly increasing population and urbanization has a direct relationship with solid waste generation. Furthermore, the lack of sanitary landfills remains the most troubling problem concerning solid waste in the Philippines. “Unless the capacity of waste that ends up in sanitary landfills is reduced and the number of solid waste management treatment facilities is increased, the remaining 60% of municipal solid waste will end up in our drainage system, streets, forests, mountains, lakes, rivers, beaches, seas and oceans” (Onenews 2019). The challenge confronts the LGUs to comply with the appropriate specifications for disposal facilities. Yet, the inefficiencies in managing solid waste among LGUs in the Philippines persist. Despite this, local government units have ventured in engineering sanitary landfills albeit dealing with the scarcity in space for waste processing and disposal. While there have been improvements in solid waste management technology, the limits for waste processing and disposal reach its limitations. The overlapping concern on the high waste generation and the limited disposal facilities further highlight the simple principles of reduce, reuse and recycle. Engineered sanitary landfills, regardless how state of the art they are, have limited lifespan and service capacities until they are saturated (Domingo and Manejar 2021, 37).

Addressing the perennial problem of “space for waste” requires regulatory policies, budgetary resources, as well as technical expertise and know-how in design, construction, operation, and monitoring (Sapuay 2016; Premakumara et al. 2018). Unless the capacity of waste that ends up in sanitary landfills is reduced and the number of solid waste management treatment facilities are increased, the remaining 60% of municipal solid waste will end up in our drainage system, streets, forests, mountains, lakes, rivers, beaches, seas, and oceans. This will contaminate our water and our air. It will also make large stretches of land unusable for any other purpose after being used as a sanitary landfill, or worse as an illegal dumpsite (Romero 2020).

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LGU Implementation and Monitoring Issues

The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000 (RA 9003) prescribes key areas of implementation in order to accomplish the objectives of the SWM policy. Thus, the implementation of RA 9003 at the LGU level, e.g., city or municipality, shall be monitored and evaluated based on the following: 1. Establishment of a Solid Waste Management Board at the Provincial, City, and Village (Barangay) level 2. Preparation and Submission of a 10-year SWM Plan 3. Establishment of Mandatory Solid Waste Diversion 4. Establishment of Material Recovery Facilities in each barangay to increase resource recovery and composting 5. Closure of Open Dumpsites and establishment of Sanitary Landfills The Senate Economic Planning Office (SEPO 2017) reports that, as early as 2010, 17 active city and municipal boards have been established in NCR. Together with these are 1,509 solid waste management committees created at the barangay level. Yet, despite such, the enforcement and compliance with the law remains a daunting task as a majority of the LGUs have yet to comply with RA 9003, especially with respect to the submission of SWM plans, establishment of materials recovery facilities, and the closure of all open and controlled dumpsites (Mawis 2019). Nationwide, a number of municipalities have increased their efforts to convert and rehabilitate dumpsites. Open dumpsites still proliferate despite agreements of communal sharing of sanitary landfills of adjacent municipalities and cities. The National Solid Waste Management Commission notes that out of the 734 open existing dumpsites, 264 of these are already being converted as controlled dumpsites and 142 areas are being developed. Local government units have also raised their efforts to identify potential sanitary landfills (Sapuay 2016, 2018). LGUs in Metro Manila continue to operate landfills in very critical areas such as in Payatas, Quezon City which is near the La Mesa dam—a primary water source for Metro Manila. Data gathered from the Environmental Management Bureau (2019; Mawis 2019) reveal that, as of July 2019, 6.9% of the total number of LGUs have not yet submitted their SWM Plans. 39.9% have been approved while 53.2% are still for evaluation, pending approval. For NCR, all 17 LGUs’ SWM plans have

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already been approved (NSWMC Resolution). Data from the Ecological Solid Waste Management Section at the EMB-NCR show the average daily waste in Metro Manila and forecast an increase from 3,348,000 tons in 2018 to 3,462,687 tons in 2020. NCR accounts for about 16% of the waste generated nationwide (NSWMC Annual report 2018). 4.1

Quezon City

Progress has been observed in the efforts of Quezon City, the largest and most populated city in NCR. A notable local initiative, the LGU’s village waste-for-goods exchange program has promoted recycling and reuse. Residents exchange recyclables for items such as rice, medicine, soap, and shampoo (Atienza 2020). Recycled materials have also been converted to paving tiles and biodegradables into compost. The city’s Environmental Protection and Waste Department (EPWMD) cited Quezon City’s track record as the first city in Metro Manila to have its SWM plan approved by the NSWMC. The city has also been recognized for its successful implementation of a package clean-up system on garbage collection. Quezon City has deputized its personnel and the city police officers to serve as environment police and inspectors. In terms of solid waste disposal, Quezon City is proud of transforming the Payatas Tragedy to Payatas Triumph, thereby shedding off the stigma when the trash slide claimed more than 200 lives 14 years ago (Ramos 2020). In 2004, the dumpsite was converted into a controlled disposal facility in accordance with the standards of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CCAC 2020). In cooperation with PANGEA Green Energy, a private business organization, Payatas became the first Clean Development Mechanism Project. In 2010, the Payatas Controlled Disposal Facility was finally closed and transitioned into a private sanitary landfill. MRFs at the village level have been constructed to manage biodegradable and recyclable wastes. Since 2012, 33 barangays and local communities have operationalized their MRFs and have also constructed composting facilities. More than 89 villages have tapped waste collectors to collect food wastes and junk traders were enjoined to collect recyclables from households (EMB 2020; CCAC 2020).

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Marikina City

Marikina City is well-known for having maintained its cleanliness because of its strict implementation of solid waste management policies and also because of its effective programs. One of its remarkable programs is the Food Waste Truck Program, which implements the collection of kitchen wastes from restaurants and food stalls. These wastes are then transformed into fertilizer to be used in the city’s urban garden. There is also an EcoSavers Program to raise awareness among the children and youth on the importance of proper waste management by allowing them to participate in the recyclable trading activity (Palafox 2017). The participation of stakeholders was effectively enjoined by the Marikina City LGU. Marikina City residents are aware of where their garbage bags should be and when they can have these collected. There is a schedule for each barangay for waste collection. The SWM program of Marikina City improved the streets within the city, ridding it of unwanted odor and illegal garbage dump sites by sending out mini dump trucks at given intervals to collect the garbage of residents and commercial establishments. The collection of garbage is fast, efficient and follows a regular schedule (Cahayag 2018). A simple calendar system has also been instituted to develop garbage disposal norms. In villages, biodegradable wastes are collected every Monday and Thursday. Wednesdays are for nonbiodegradable trash. Also, each bag should have a marking before they place it out. A green rope to seal the bags are used for biodegradable wastes while yellow is for the non-biodegradable ones (Cahayag 2018). By allowing the stakeholders to be involved in such projects and programs, they do not only become more aware of the need to maintain the cleanliness of their surroundings and protect the environment, but they also learn to incorporate the proper practices of solid waste management in their daily lives (Palafox 2017). Marikina has earned local and international awards including the Gawad Pangulo sa Kapaligiran Award, the Konrad Adenauer Medal of Excellence for Best Managed City in the Philippines, the Galing Pook Continuing Excellence Award, the Galing Pook Hall of Fame Award, and the Galing Pook Award for Innovation and Excellence of the DILG and Ford Foundation. For decades, Marikina has garnered some 200 awards and citations from local and international bodies, from being the “Cleanest and Greenest City” and “Most Competitive Metro City” in the

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Philippines to being one of the “Healthiest and Most Livable Cities” in the Asia–Pacific (ADB 2009). 4.3

Pasig City

The city has increased its efforts in enhancing the collection of SWMrelated data through consultation processes with key stakeholders. Aligned with the city’s climate change action, workshops and discussions hosted by the city government broadened the local movements who are involved in SWM. The city has committed to a 10-year SWM plan to reduce waste generation by 20% by 2025. Local ordinances on the proper segregation of waste, waste collection schedules, and proper waste disposal has become effective through the cooperation of city residents with local government agencies. Pasig City has also started youth programs that have SWM impact such as the Greanheart Savers Program that incentivizes recycling and reuse by encouraging students to bring non-biodegradable waste to school (ICLEI 2019). With respect to resource recovery, Pasig City, through its private and government partners, constructed a facility for Refuse Derived Fuel (RDF) in 2015. The facility disposes residual waste through a sanitary landfill. The RDF facility has an input rated capacity of 600 tons of waste a day and can produce a maximum of 150 tons per day of RDF, depending on the quantity and quality of waste received (Sapuay 2016). Also, partnering with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), barangays in Pasig City received new eco-bikes and a mobile MRF to sustain the solid waste management program on the ground. Moreover, as a city that calls itself the “Green City” and the “recycling industry capital of the Philippines”, Pasig City passed an ordinance banning the use of plastic and Styrofoam in commercial establishments.

5

Intergovernmental Relations and Governance

National government through the DENR-EMB and the NSWMC enhanced the MMDA’s capacity and power relative to the LGUs by designating MMDA to review and approve LGU solid waste management plans, and implement RA 9003 in Metro Manila (NSWMC Resolution No. 143 2015; No. 839, 2016). Periodically, the national agencies provide policy guidance, such as the National Solid Waste Management Framework/Strategy (2012–2016); and technical guidelines such as for

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solid waste disposal, criteria for solid waste disposal facilities, practical guidebooks for community based ecological solid waste management, waste characterization, among others (DENR Administrative Orders no. 49, 50s1998; NSWMC 2010, Resolution No. 1380, 2020). The dynamics of relationships occur in the processes of national monitoring of local government compliance. In practice, Metro Manila or NCR LGUs complied with approved SWM 10-year plans. In three cases–Quezon City, Marikina City, and Pasig City, social and community benefits derive from solid waste management when prioritized by the LGUs. These three LGUs demonstrated capacities for joint and collaborative SWM interventions with business and non-government stakeholders for scaling up successful practices.

6

Analysis and Conclusion

The empowerment of local government units and enhancement of national government capacity in the Philippines for sustainable and equitable development are embedded in three landmark laws: the 1991 Local Government Code (RA 7160), the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000 (RA 9003), and the 1994 Metro Manila Development Authority (RA 7924), in accord with the 1987 Philippine Constitution. This study identified legal provisions stipulating the politicoadministrative mandates and institutional design of national and local governments for solid waste management, particularly the hierarchy and designation of powers and responsibilities; and the regional administrative tier for metro-wide services and development in Metro Manila as the National Capital Region. The above-mentioned laws representing the policy stream are the responses to resolve the persistent solid waste management problem, constituting the problem stream since the 1980s in Metro Manila and in other urbanizing regions of the country. Also, the laws signify the Philippine response to the global impetus for sustainable development since the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit up to the current Sustainable Development Goals 2016–2030. The global paradigm of sustainable development refers to the protection and conservation of the environment and natural resources for future generations. Solid waste management is an aspect of urban environmental governance, for which government, the private sector and civil society organizations are major stakeholders.

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Decentralization by devolution granted politico-administrative autonomy to local government units, with specified powers and responsibilities for solid waste management at provincial, city/municipal, and barangay levels, and enabling the participation of civil society and private business organizations. Local autonomy did not prove to be sufficient to resolve the solid waste management problem until the law for an ecological approach added functions for solid waste reduction and recycling at each government level. In addition, legislation creating the MMDA intended to facilitate service delivery and development across Metro Manila or NCR with local government officials as the policy decision makers. Data indicate the innovations and institutional strides in Metro Manila as LGUs complied with laws and policies, specifically in: (1) establishing SWM boards, (2) preparing 10-year SWM plans, (3) establishing MRFs, and (4) the closure of open dumpsites. Specific LGUs like Quezon City, Marikina City, and Pasig City undertake partnerships with non-profit organizations, civil society, and the private sector, and encourage broader community involvement and participation in solid waste management programs. These LGUs have trailblazed recycling systems, waste-toenergy initiatives, and the “Rs” in solid waste management, such as “rethink, reduce, reuse, repurpose, recycle”, among others. Despite observable accomplishments, difficulties continue since implementation of RA 9003, particularly: (1) conflicts arising from provisions of the national laws (for instance the powers of LGUs vis-à-vis MMDA); (2) weak waste reduction strategies, (3) ineffective waste collection and disposal systems, (4) low prioritization in developing innovations in disposal methods, and (5) the scarcity of space for disposal facilities—the materials recovery facilities (MRFs) and sanitary landfills. While local political will remains relevant in pursuing SWM objectives of any city or municipality, the national government agencies’ support is necessary to empower local government units. The preferred scenario is for LGUs to act in response to local contexts and for national agencies to provide a right mix of policy instruments and actions to assist LGUs. In practice, the DENR-EMB-NSWMC released policy issuance to enable LGUs. The presence of the MMDA in Metro Manila or NCR adds another layer of interaction. The national government helped ease the tensions over jurisdiction and powers between MMDA and LGUs by

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authorizing MMDA to implement RA 9003 within Metro Manila, considering that compared to a province, MMDA does not have political power over its cities and barangays. Intermittent calls for federalism have drawn attention to the weaknesses of the country’s devolved set-up. Arguably, however, the problems to be confronted are the same, whether in a devolved and a federal politico-administrative system. In devolution, the scope and coverage of the interactions between the national agencies, MMDA, and LGUs must be strengthened. Apart from MMDA’s mandate for solid waste disposal sites and systems, its ability to coordinate metro-wide ecological solid waste management must be intensified, particularly for economies of scale in waste reduction and recycling. The shortfalls of the unitary devolved setup are manageable through the national agencies’ directives to MMDA and the LGUs, and intergovernmental collaborative ventures for effective solid waste management. A sub-national regional government has executive, legislative, and administrative powers over local governments. The retention of the MMDA must be reconsidered in federalism. Despite their weaknesses in intergovernmental collaboration, financing sustainability, and technology innovations for recycling, reuse, and materials recovery, the LGUs in Metro Manila contribute to equitable development by the extent of its compliance with the laws to mitigate urban environmental degradation related to improper solid waste management adversely affecting all income groups. Particularly affected are the urban poor who make a living as scavengers or waste pickers, and even reside in waste disposal sites. The Quezon City case offers an example for the upliftment of urban poor scavengers or waste pickers and MMDA efforts at the difficult tasks of setting up acceptable solid waste disposal sites. While scholarly and practice-based research literature examine solid waste management in various dimensions, this study argues that the problem stream, constituting the Metro Manila solid waste management situation since the 1980s, led to the policy stream consisting of the landmark laws relevant to solid waste management. Decentralization and empowerment expressed in the institutional design of the laws and policies frame solid waste management as a duty of the state and its levels of government, even by private and civil society sectors. In practice, the legal provisions have been hardly complied with by the LGUs and operational results showed gains and pitfalls through the years. Recent efforts by the national government and well-performing LGUs indicate the feasibility of the laws’ implementation under devolution. Consistent with the theme of

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responsible and duty-bound governance at the national and local levels, this study of Metro Manila or the National Capital Region, demonstrates the opportunities for strengthening institutions for decentralized delivery of public services, such as solid waste management for the environment and sustainable development.

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Fleming, Sean. 2019. “People can swap plastic waste for rice in this Philippines community.“ https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/in-this-phi lippines-community-people-can-swap-plastic-waste-for-rice/ Gaillard, JC and Cadag, Jake Rom. 2009. “From Marginality to Further Marginalization: Experiences from the Victims of the July 2000 Payatas Trashslide in the Philippines.”Journal of Disaster Risk Studies vol. 2(3) December. Galarpe, Van Ryan Kristopher. 2017. “Review on the Impacts of Waste Disposal Sites in the Philippines.” Science International (Lahore) 29(1), 379–385. Gatchalian, Winston. 2020. “Solving the Philippine Garbage Crisis Privilege Speech.” Senate of the Philippines. September 1, 2020. http://legacy.senate. gov.ph/press_release/2020/0901_gatchalian1.asp Greenpeace Southeast Asia and The Institute for Local Self-Reliance. 2000. Wasting and Recycling in Metropolitan Manila, Philippines. www.greenpeace. org/sea/ph/Global/seasia/report/2001/8/wasting-recycling-in-Metro.pdf Gonzales, Eugenio. 2003. From Wastes to The Scavengers of Payatas. International Conference on Natural Assets. January 2018, Tagaytay. Grindle, Merilee. 2010. Good Governance: The Inflation of an Idea. CID Working paper No.202 Octoe Center for International Development, Harvard University. https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/cid/files/pub lications/faculty-working-papers/202.pdf Hoornweg, Daniel and Perinaz Bhada-Tata. 2012. WHAT A WASTE A Global Review of Solid Waste Management. World Bank Urban Development Series March No. 15. https://openknowledge.worldbank.orghandle1098617388/ 68135.pdf House of Representatives. 2018. “Resolution of Both Houses Proposing The Revision of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines”. Committee Report No. 881 Seventeenth Congress Resolution of Both Houses No. 15. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/files/2018/Resolution-ofBoth-Houses-Proposing-the-Revision-of-the-1987-Constitution. Howlett, Michael, Allan McConnell, and Anthony Perl. 2014. “Streams and stages: Reconciling Kingdon and policy process theory.” European Journal of Political Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12064. ICLEI. 2019. “Pasig City, Philippines launches platform for inclusive climate action.” https://www.iclei.org/en/media/pasig-city-philippines-launches-pla tform-for-inclusive-climate-action Jafari, Navid, Timothy Stark and Merry Scott. 2013. “The July 10 2000 Payatas Landfill Slope Failure.” International Journal of Geoengineering Case histories. https://casestories-geoengineer.org-Vol2, Issue 3, p. 208–228. https://doi. org/10.4417/IJGCH-02-03-03

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Japan International Cooperation Agency. 1999. The Study on Solid Waste Management for Metro Manila in the Republic of the Philippines. Final Report. Openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/11495595. Kaza, Silpa; Yao, Lisa C.; Bhada-Tata, Perinaz; Van Woerden, Frank. 2018. What a Waste 2.0: A Global Snapshot of Solid Waste Management to 2050. Urban Development;. Washington, DC: World Bank. © World Bank. https://openkn owledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30317 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.” Kingdon, J.W. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. MA: Little Brown. Kingdon, J.W. 2011. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. IL: Pearson. Kooiman, Jan, Maarten Bavinck, Ratan Chuenpagdee, Robin Mahon, Roger Pullin. 2008. “Interactive Governance and Governability: An Introduction.” The Journal of Transdisciplinary Environmental Studies vol. 7(1). Kojima, Michikazu and Ma. Lourdes G. Rebullida. 2008. “Stakeholder’ Relationships in Recycling Systems: Experiences in the Philippines and Japan.” Promoting 3Rs in Developing Countries: Lessons from the Japanese Experience, Michikazu Kojima (Ed). Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization. Lemos, Maria Carmen, and Arun Agrawal. 2006. Environmental Governance. Annual Review of Environment and Resources 31: 297–325. https://doi.org/ 10.1146/annurev.energy.31.042605.135621. Manasan, Rosario and Mercado Ruben. 1998. Metropolitan Arrangements in the Philippines: Passing Fancy or the Future Megatrend. Discussion Paper Series No. 98–31. Makati City: Philippine Institute of Development Studies. Manasan, Rosario and Mercado Ruben. 1999. Governance and Urban Development: Case Study of Metro Manila. Discussion Paper Series No. 99–03. Makati City: Philippine Institute of Development Studies. Malinauskaite, J et al. 2017. “Municipal Solid Waste Management and Wasteto-Energy in the Context of a Circular Economy and Energy Recycling in Europe.” www.researchgate.net/publication/321263793_Municipal_Solid_ Waste-Management_and_Waste-to-energy_in_the_Context_of_a_Circular_ Economy_and_Energy_Recycling_in_Europe/download Marajas, Katherine. 2018. “The Battle Against Manila’s Garbage,” Manila Bulletin, 22 April 2018. https://news.mb.com.ph/2018/04/22/the-battleagainst. Massoud, May; Michel Mokbel, Suheir Alawieh and Nasser Yassin, “Towards Improved Governance for Sustainable Solid Waste Management in Lebanon: Centralised vs Decentralised Approaches” in Waste Management & Research, 2019 Vol 37(7), 686–697. Mawis, Sara Mae. 2019. Solid Waste Mismanagement in the Philippines. https:// business.inquirer.net/270819/solid-waste-mismanagement-in-the-philippines

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Mercado, Ruben. 1998. Megalopolitan Manila: Striving Towards a Humane and World Class Megacity. Discussion Paper Series no. 1998–30. Makati City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies. McAllister,Jessica. 2015. Factors Influencing Solid Waste Management in the Developing World. Utah State University Digital Commons@USU https:// digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports/528. Memorandum Circular 39. 1987. Creating a Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management. Office of the President. Official gazette. www.officialg azette.gov.ph Mercado, Ruben and Manasan, Rosario. 1998. Metropolitan Arrangements in the Philippines: Passing Fancy or the Future Megatrend? Discussion Paper Series No. 98–31. Makati:Philippine Institute of Development Studies. Dirp3.pds.go.ph/ris/dps/pidsdps9831. Nagai, Fumio, Tsuruyo Funatsu and Karuhiro Kagoya (Eds). 2019. New Waves of Decentralization in Southeast Asia-Local Governance Survey Data. Institute of Developing Economies JETRO. National Economic Development Authority. 2016. Ambisyon Natin 2040 A Long-Term Vision for the Philippines. 20.40.neda.gov.ph/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/A-Long-Term-Vision-for-the-Philippines.pdf National Economic Development Authority. 2017. Philippine Development Plan 2017–2022. neda.gov.p/wp-content/uploads/2017/AbridgedPDP-2017–2022_Final.pdf National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB). 2003. NSCB Resolution No. 9 Series of 2003 Adoption of the Operational Definition of Urban Areas in the Philippines. National Solid Waste Management Commission (NSWMC). 2015. Resolution No. 143 Engaging the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority in the Review and Evaluation of 10 Year SWM Plans of LGUs in Metro Manila. National Solid Waste Management Commission (NSWMC). 2016. Resolution No. 839 Deputizing the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) as an Implementing Agency, as well as its Officials and Personnel as Solid Waste Management Officers, to Enforce the Provisions of RA 9003 and Its Implementing Rules and Regulations, and for other Purposes. Onenews. 2019. Accessed January 23, 2021. https://www.onenews.ph/phl-fac ing-garbage-crisis-16-6-million-metric-tons-of-waste-this-year-can-fill-99-phi lippine-arenas Padilla, Lysander. 1993. “Circular Mobility in the National Capital Region.” Institutional Development Report, Population Institute, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines. Palafox, Felino. 2017. “Ecological Waste Management.” https://www.manila times.net/2017/12/07/opinion/analysis/ecological-waste-management/ 367117

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CHAPTER 13

Urban Farming and Land Use Governance in Metro Manila Kristian Karlo Saguin and Mark Angelo Cagampan

1

Introduction

Metro Manila’s unprecedented growth has brought a host of challenges and complex land use dilemmas that urban governance seeks to address. Land use planning, or the manner of allocation of land resources as equitably as possible among competing groups, has long been an important mechanism for resolving such dilemmas and securing urban development. In the Philippines, while many urban land use decisions have been devolved to the local government units as mandated by the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), the sustainability potentials of several aspects of the planning process remain unrealized. With

K. K. Saguin (B) Department of Geography, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] M. A. Cagampan Independent Scholar, Quezon City, Philippines

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 T. S. E. Tadem and M. E. L. Atienza (eds.), A Better Metro Manila?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3_13

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increasing recognition of the need to balance the economic growth, environmental integrity, and social equity components of urban development, decision-making regarding land use requires moving away from dominant approaches of the past. Further engagement with participatory and inclusive planning and recognition of the importance of understanding social relations on the ground help to address land use dilemmas in a way that is more sustainable, inclusive, and sensitive to the needs of urban residents. This chapter takes the case of urban agriculture or urban farming to illustrate some of these intersecting issues of governance, urban growth, land use, sustainability and equity in the context of Metro Manila. It argues for the need to incorporate urban farming into the urban development agenda in a sustainable and equitable manner that would promote its benefits rather than contribute to further urban exclusion. Working toward sustainable cities has long emerged as a framework for urban development in the Philippines, recently guided by the Sustainable Development Goal of making cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable. The threefold goal of sustainable development, however, has been unevenly brought into urban land use planning, with the economic growth and environmental integrity components often overriding matters of social equity (Saguin et al. 2017). On paper, institutional support for strengthened equity in land use and urban development has been incorporated in various policies and urban agenda in the Philippines such as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279) and the National Urban Development and Housing Framework (NUDHF) 2017–2022, which emphasized the concerns, participation, and involvement in decision-making of the marginalized and underprivileged (HLURB 2013, 2017). As part of a broader democratization movement that accompanied decentralization in the early 1990s, inclusive and responsible governance with a focus on social equity has become a way for the marginalized to articulate their basic urban needs (Hutchison 2007). However, in practice, these strategies and principles of inclusive, participatory, and democratized urban land use planning have led to uneven and inconsistent results, where meaningful participation of the marginalized continue to be limited. The preparation of the Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP), for instance, is time-consuming and requires technical knowledge that constrains grassroots involvement of the urban poor to tokenist participation in select stages of the planning process (Gera 2016; Saguin et al. 2017). The question of who gets to participate and represent

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the civil society’s interests in land use and other development planning processes—often those with established connections or aligned ideologies with the government—is also rooted in local patron-client relations between political elites and constituents (Porio 2017). Furthermore, the power of the private sector to influence or dictate development goals and strategies tend to be reinforced in certain planning principles, such as the highest and best use of land. Many concerns of the urban poor and the marginalized rooted in land use are not addressed even with codified inclusive governance mechanisms. The challenge remains to bring focus on urban spaces as sites of social justice where the least advantaged groups benefit from preferential treatment in the actual practice of planning and decision-making, especially when confronted with complex urban land dilemmas pertaining to basic needs such as food and shelter. The concept of the right to the city moves toward this aim, providing residents with the right to make decisions that contribute to the production of space and to use urban space in a manner that satisfies the needs of its inhabitants (Purcell 2002; Shillington 2013). As a guide to adjudicating land use dilemmas, the right to the city presents a way of bringing back discussions of sustainability to what people need in their daily lives. It also presents a way to realize the promises of multilevel governance on the ground, while contributing toward more equitable forms of urban development. This chapter builds on the frameworks discussed above to illustrate how the case of urban farming and its associated land use and governance dilemmas present opportunities for incorporating social equity and the needs of the marginalized more centrally into urban land use decisions. Urban agriculture is often a significant entry point to jumpstart food system planning (Cabannes and Marocchino 2018; Prove et al. 2019), which is currently lacking in urban land use planning in the Philippines. As a marginal and interstitial activity that has recently received more attention from the government owing to its sustainability and development implications, urban farming provides a good case study for linking inclusive and responsible governance with equitable development amid the context of decentralization in Metro Manila. Urban farming initiatives are place-specific and locally situated, but the question of their governance imbricates a wide variety of issues that go beyond the site and the activity. They therefore serve as venues to empirically examine issues of scale in multilevel governance and metropolitanization arrangements in the urban context.

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Discussion for this chapter is informed by interviews with government officials and urban farmers from 17 Metro Manila local government units (LGUs) from 2016 to 20181 and a review of relevant legislation and policies related to urban farming. Because of the abundance (i.e., hundreds of projects) and diversity of urban agriculture forms and scales throughout Metro Manila, the chapter presents an overview and synthesis with examples drawn from various LGUs rather than focus on sustained analysis of individual empirical case studies. The subsequent discussion emphasizes the socio-environmental, institutional, and policy context of urban farming in Metro Manila, particularly in terms of how they relate to urban land use issues and their governance. The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it introduces urban farming as understood in the literature and other contexts, before examining its place amid urbanization in Metro Manila, characterizing its types, location, participants, and governance. Then, it discusses various challenges in initiating and maintaining urban agriculture within issues of urban land use and environment, social relations of access, and scales of governance. Finally, it poses several considerations to incorporate urban farming in the urban development agenda and land use governance.

2

Urban Farming in Metro Manila 2.1

Urban Farming in Context

Urban agriculture or urban farming refers to the growing of food through the cultivation of plants and animal husbandry in cities, as well as their processing and distribution (Tornaghi 2014; WinklerPrins 2017). It includes a variety of activities (gardening, foraging) within different locations (vacant lots, rooftops, yards, greenhouses, parks) under various management regimes (residential, commercial, collective, institutional, non-profit) (McClintock 2014). Urban farming has long existed in cities, often in marginal or interstitial urban spaces. It has historically provided a means for many urban residents to survive in food shortage conditions and moments of crisis in cities, such as during economic recessions, pandemics, and other urban disruptions. More

1 Data gathering on which certain sections of the chapter were based was supported by a Ph.D. Incentive Award under the Office of the Chancellor, University of the Philippines, Diliman.

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recently, governments have recognized urban farming’s importance in the city and have attempted to include it in various aspects of food systems planning and urban policy (Cabannes and Marocchino 2018; Prove et al. 2019). Several multi-functional benefits of urban farming have been identified (McClintock and Simpson 2018). First, urban farming provides low barriers to entry and relatively easy access for many urban dwellers, thereby improving food security, nutrition, and livelihoods (Galt et al. 2014; Sonnino 2009). Because poorer households spend a considerable proportion of their incomes on food, urban farming presents a way of supplementing incomes while also addressing their nutritional needs (Crush et al. 2011; De Zeeuw et al. 2011; Zezza and Tasciotti 2010). It similarly plays an important gendered role in household livelihood strategies, especially given that many women are engaged in urban farming (Hovorka et al. 2009). Second, urban farming is viewed as contributing to healthier urban dwellers because it increases diversity of diets, provides for nutritional needs, encourages physical activity and improves overall well-being for those who practice it (De Zeeuw et al. 2011). At the level of the community, it is also promoted as a way of building communities and strengthening relations of trust and support (Carolan and Hale 2016; Sonnino 2009; Saguin 2020). Third, urban agriculture as green infrastructure contributes to urban ecological goals of sustainability in cities. It improves urban resilience in the context of increased vulnerability, disasters, and climate change (Colding and Barthel 2013; De Zeeuw et al. 2011; Sonnino 2009). Urban farming through the growing of plants increases areas for green space while also aiding in the reduction of urban wastes and wastewater through composting and reuse (De Zeeuw et al. 2011; Hara et al. 2011; Sonnino 2009). It provides vital ecosystem services in the city, including carbon sequestration, flood mitigation, temperature regulation, and biodiversity promotion (Cameron et al. 2012; Lwasa et al. 2014; Lin et al. 2015). Despite its multiple benefits, urban farming in various parts of the world face a variety of challenges rooted in conflicting demands for urban land and questions of access. Access to land and other necessary inputs remains an important factor in the success and sustainability of urban farming initiatives. Several systematic studies in Africa and elsewhere have shown that because of access limitations, only a few households have

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been able to engage in urban farming, thereby diminishing its nutritional impacts, with wealthier households deriving more benefits than poorer ones (Badami and Ramankutty 2015; Crush et al. 2011; Zezza and Tasciotti 2010). Improving access to land, inputs, and resources by the poorest is necessary to realize the nutritional and income benefits of urban farming. Beyond this, access to participate in decision-making and governance promotes procedural forms of justice and contribute to realizing components of the right to the city and urban citizenship (Barron 2017; Crossan et al. 2016; Prove et al. 2019; Shillington 2013; Travaline and Hunold 2010). However, there is a need to also recognize that urban farming participation may provide avenues for exclusion and conflict among particular stakeholders (Ghose and Pettygrove 2014; Neo and Chua 2017). Addressing questions of access would require understanding the diversity of urban agriculture and its context within broader urban development, social and environmental change and governance (Tornaghi 2014; Prove et al. 2016). 2.2

Who Farms, How, and Where?

The expansion of the built environment in Metro Manila has led to the conversion of remaining vacant, open or farming spaces to other types of land uses, especially in its outer fringes. The 1990s showed intense urban land change both through expansion of the built-up areas and infilling of open spaces, reflecting decreasing available land for urban development in Metro Manila (Estoque and Murayama 2015). The cities of Caloocan, Valenzuela, Las Pinas, Taguig, and Muntinlupa, in particular, have lost the remaining agricultural lands that existed as late as the early 2000s. Loss of these lands to residential and commercial land uses has magnified competition among different land uses and has implications for the future of existing urban farming activities and plans for expanding such spaces. Urban farming practices have been driven by the expansion of the built environment of Metro Manila and by the decentralization of several functions to the local government, such as decision-making regarding environmental and agricultural practices. All 17 LGUs host some form of urban agriculture project that vary in scope, scale, and degree of participation. Many state-sponsored farming projects are located in government lands, including schools, parks, offices, open spaces, and demonstration farms. Demo farms include showcase farms, usually managed by the city

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government, where techniques and technologies of farming are displayed for residents and visitors (see Fig. 1). They seek to demonstrate the possibilities of farming within constrained land but they also serve as sites of technical skills sharing. These are often located in city or barangay halls both for greater visibility and easy access and also because of land availability. Many demo farms are self-sustaining ventures, as they are able to earn income from their operations through their own labor. School gardens have also become very common in Metro Manila as part of the National Greening Program as well as the government’s nutrition and feeding programs. Other institutional farms include gardens in parks and other government-owned spaces. Urban farming also occurs in private lands in subdivisions and residential lots. Homeowner associations promote their own community gardens, and households practice various forms of gardening in communal, vacant, rooftop, or backyard lots. Pockets of agricultural lands that have been surrounded by built-up developments still remain, such as vegetable gardens along the shores of Laguna Lake in Muntinlupa and Taguig, rice farms in Valenzuela, and melon farms in Taguig.

Fig. 1 Demonstration farm and nursery in Marikina (Photo by Mark Angelo Cagampan)

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Given the diversity of urban farming activities in Metro Manila, gardening technique types also differ. They range from space-constrained techniques like vertical farming, container or receptacle farming, hydroponics, floating, and rooftop, window and wall gardening (Fig. 2). More extensive farming techniques involve using plots of land through horizontal gardening in backyards or larger farming spaces. Harvested crops from these farms are mostly consumed by the farmers or are sold in markets or in nearby communities, which could potentially meet a significant portion of household vegetable demand in the area (Hara et al. 2013).

Fig. 2 Urban farming using plastic container bottles in Caloocan (Photo by Mark Angelo Cagampan)

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There are a diverse variety of people who farm, varying across class, gender, and age. Mostly, however, those who engage in urban farming tend to be women and senior citizens, owing to constraints in time and interest from other groups. The urban poor has also been actively targeted by urban farming activities but participation has been uneven owing to a variety of factors. Especially in the fringe cities of Metro Manila, many residents derive additional income from growing and selling vegetable crops, such as pechay, camote tops, and kangkong in nearby markets or in neighborhoods. In Taguig, where the largest remaining pocket of agricultural land remains, around 80 farmers still derive significant income from cultivating melons during periods when Laguna Lake water levels are low enough to allow farming. Urban farming and gardening projects are organized in a variety of ways, ranging from formal and registered associations, such as cooperatives and homeowners and senior citizen associations, to less structured community-based and individual household initiatives. How decisions are made at the level of the farm or garden in terms of planting crops, dividing labor, and sharing harvests then also varies significantly across projects (Saguin 2020). 2.3

Governing Urban Farming in Metro Manila

All local government units currently have an existing urban agriculture, farming or gardening project in one form or another. These projects differ in areas covered, beneficiaries targeted, year instituted, and so on, but share certain common characteristics. Government-initiated projects are also distinct from emergent, non-government-related urban farming initiatives that are managed by private individuals or groups, often informally and occasionally with government support and linkages. Within LGUs, City Agriculture or Environmental Management Offices often spearhead or manage urban farming activities, in coordination with several departments that cover various urban issues such as nutrition, the urban poor, schools, solid waste management and greening (Table 1). The role of specific officials, such as mayors, vice mayors, and councilors are significant, ranging from budgetary approval and support to actual projects initiated by their offices. Notable examples of the latter are in Quezon City (Joy of Urban Farming and Halamanan sa Bakuran from the Offices of the Mayor and the Vice Mayor) and Paranaque (Food Always in the Home from the Office of the Mayor).

Malabon

Makati

Las Pinas

Caloocan

LGU

Table 1

Ordinances and relevant provisions

City Agriculture Office • Establishing techno-demo farm for vegetable production • Conducting seed dispersal and capacity building • Buhay sa Gulay (Life in Vegetables) prohect in Barangay 167 City Agriculture Office • Providing farming inputs and seminars on urban gardens • Establishing nursery and composting facilities • Providing urban farming materials Department of Environmental Services • Conducting seminars on urban gardening for 4Ps beneficiaries • Establishing urban gardens/nurseries in several barangays City Environment and Natural Resources Office • Identifying idle government lots suitable for urban agriculture • Providing agriculture inputs such as fertilizers and seedlings to schools • Establishing urban farming sites using vertical and floating methods

Primary office in-charge and selected projects/initiatives/activities

Metro Manila local government units and current urban agriculture offices, ordinances, and projects

416 K. K. SAGUIN AND M. A. CAGAMPAN

City Ordinance No. 794, s. 2020: An Ordinance Institutionalizing Urban Agriculture in the City of Mandaluyong: Available open spaces in subdivisions and public areas are to be converted into urban gardens, with these lands entitled to idle land tax exemption (Sec. 4-8). A City Urban Agriculture Council will be created to manage urban farming activities (Sec 10-13) and barangays are encouraged to initiate their own programs with budget allocation in their Annual Investment Plans (Sec. 22)

Mandaluyong

Manila

Ordinances and relevant provisions

LGU

(continued)

Not indicated • Establishing the urban farming project Buhay sa Gulay in Tondo • Distributing vegetable seeds and seedlings to jumpstart the urban agriculture project in Tondo under DA’s Plant, Plant, Plant Program

City Environmental Management Division • Establishing urban garden in schools to complement their feeding program for students • Providing agriculture inputs such as soil, fertilizer, and seedlings to city residents • Transforming ornamentals in community parks in barangays to urban gardens for food production

Primary office in-charge and selected projects/initiatives/activities

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City Ordinance No. 15, s. 2016: Ordinance Institutionalizing, Promoting, and Developing Urban Gardening in Marikina City and Providing Funds Therefor: Converting available open spaces in private and government lands into urban gardens in coordination with homeowner associations and enjoining community participation through submission of tree saplings for those availing government services and benefits

Marikina

Muntinlupa

Ordinances and relevant provisions

(continued)

LGU

Table 1

City Environmental Management Office • Establishing pilot demonstration gardens in the vacant lots in La Consolacion Village and Concepcion Subdivision • Conducting information, education, and communication activities and campaign in settlement areas complemented with the Lakbay Aral of community associations members in pilot demonstration areas • Providing agriculture inputs including plant seedlings and maintaining plant nursery and storage facilities Department of Agriculture - Extension Office • Promoting vertical farming systems and container gardens to complement waste segregation measures. Vegetable seeds are distributed while technical assistance in setting up the farm is provided • Utilizing around 8,000 square meters of vacant lot in Elsie Gatches Village for urban agriculture activities of 4Ps beneficiaries • Signing of Memorandum of Agreement for urban agriculture of DA with the city LGU under the PPP Program

Primary office in-charge and selected projects/initiatives/activities

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Paranaque

Navotas

LGU

Ordinances and relevant provisions

(continued)

City Agriculture Office • Distributing vegetable seeds, supporting the establishment of urban gardens/greenhouse and providing lectures on urban farming techniques in schools and barangays • Distributing boats and fishnets to fisherfolk through DA-BFAR and conduct of seminars on value adding activities for fishery products • Opening the tallest urban vertical farm (tower greenhouses) in Metro Manila in Barangay Tanza City Agricultural, Fisheries, and Aquatic Service • Food Always in the Home (FAITH) Gardens, the city government’s food security program that aims to establish gardens in 16 barangays • Conducting livelihood training programs focused on urban gardening, and fish, meat, and vegetable processing for the city’s indigent residents • Distributing agriculture inputs such as soil and seeds, and fishing equipment

Primary office in-charge and selected projects/initiatives/activities

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City Ordinance No. 5631, s. 2014: Recognizing and Institutionalizing Family-based Ecological Diversion and Recycling Of Waste (FEDROW): FEDROW aims to equip low-income families with home-based skills training to become entrepreneurs through the conversion of garbage produced at home

Pasay

Pateros

Pasig

Ordinances and relevant provisions

(continued)

LGU

Table 1

City Environment and Natural Resources Cooperative Development Offices • FEDROW activities include promoting urban farming through demonstration farms in public and private areas managed by barangay officials, community associations and households, and producing vermi-compost for organic fertilizer and homemade organic pesticides City Environment and Natural Resources Office • Conducting training programs/activities for various community sectors on urban gardening, including DIY techniques • Providing agriculture inputs such as soil, fertilizer, seeds • Establishing gardens in schools and enjoining them to practice waste segregation and composting in all barangays Municipal Environment and Natural Resources Office • Inspecting vacant lots/spaces as possible urban farming sites • Promoting vertical gardening as primary method of urban farming particularly in schools as the municipality has very limited land area

Primary office in-charge and selected projects/initiatives/activities

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(continued)

City Ordinance No. SP-2972, s. 2020: An Office of the Mayor/Office of the Vice Mayor Ordinance Amending Section 11, Article VI of • The Joy of Urban Farming activities since 2010 Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93, As Amended, include establishing urban farms for vegetable Otherwise Known as the Quezon City Revenue Code production in different public and private open spaces of 1993, Promoting Urban Agriculture by Granting in the city; providing learning sessions, seminars,C Exception from Idle Land Tax: Land owners will be and orientation, as well as farm inputs and gardening exempt from idle land tax if they improve and promote tools for various sectors; and maintaining a farm use of their idle land through urban agriculture demonstration site with greenhouses in the Quezon Memorial Circle and Quezon City Hall grounds • Forging partnerships with selected barangays and the DA under the PPP Program to Greenhouse Village or a communal garden • Buhay sa Gulay (Life in Vegetables) project and Luntiang Paraiso urban vegetable farm in Barangay Bagong Silangan

Quezon City

Primary office in-charge and selected projects/initiatives/activities

Ordinances and relevant provisions

LGU

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Taguig

San Juan

LGU

Table 1

Ordinances and relevant provisions

(continued)

City Environment and Natural Resources Office • Establishing urban gardening sites for ornamental plants and vegetables in various barangays with participation of 4Ps beneficiaries • Recognizing “Envirokids” for the best schools in urban gardening • Establishing plant nursery within the Pinaglabanan Memorial Shrine • Redeveloping the banks of Ermitanyo River as linear park with plots for ornamental plants and vegetables • Signing of Memorandum of Agreement for urban agriculture of DA with the city LGU under the PPP Program City Agriculture Office • Transforming the city into an agri-aqua business corridor through the Multi-Agency Agricultural Government Assistance Program (Maagap) Para sa Kinabukasan sa Taguig in coordination with DA • Providing technical assistance by conducting lectures, seminars, and training on urban farming/gardening and distributing inputs • Establishing urban farm demonstration sites in schools

Primary office in-charge and selected projects/initiatives/activities

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Ordinances and relevant provisions

Source Interviews and secondary data sources, 2016–2021

Valenzuela

LGU City Agriculture Office • Establishing an integrated community food production program in Disiplina Village, an in-city relocation site • Conducting seedling dispersal and seminars on urban agriculture in barangays, with 4Ps beneficiaries mostly attending

Primary office in-charge and selected projects/initiatives/activities

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In a few local governments where they are employed, professional city agriculturists serve as an important node for disseminating knowledge of urban farming practices to city residents through their technical expertise. Inter-city educational visits also provide knowledge and best practices transfer across various urban farming projects. Barangay officials play a crucial role in managing projects at the barangay level, with some directly involved in the daily maintenance of gardens by providing labor and financial support. Farming or gardening projects are organized in diverse ways, ranging from top-down forms in government projects where officials lead to associations whose leaders are elected or chosen by members. As mentioned earlier, decentralization brought about by the Local Government Code devolved many functions and offices to city and municipal governments, such as environmental management and land use planning. This devolution has enabled the emergence of local government urban farming projects that we see today. However, national government agencies still provide active support and coordination with local governments. Three of the most significant offices are the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST), all of which provide farm inputs (e.g., soil, fertilizer, seeds or seedlings) and seminars or technical assistance to local governments. Outside of government-initiated urban farming projects, other gardening activities take place with varying linkages with local governments. While certain gardening projects receive some support from the government—for example, community-initiated projects recognized as part of a broader city-wide farming project in Quezon City—others remain hidden or beyond the purview of the government, particularly those activities in interstitial or temporary spaces. The private and civil society sectors, such as corporations through their corporate social responsibility arm and non-government organizations, are also involved by providing funding and training for farming activities. In terms of organizations beyond the government that is most actively involved in urban gardening, homeowner associations are perhaps the most significant. In gated subdivisions, in particular, they are able to conduct their projects independent of government intervention. No existing national legislation or policy framework covers urban agriculture in the Philippines. However, various versions of the Integrated Urban Agriculture Act, a bill that sets the framework for urban farming in the Philippines, are pending in Congress. Despite this, other existing

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laws and policies guide urban farming in Metro Manila (see Table 2). These include the Local Government Code discussed earlier; the National Greening Program and its expansion (EO 26 and EO 193), which mandates local government units to establish nurseries that often serve as source for seedlings for garden projects; and related environmental legislation such as the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Urban agriculture is also central to programs such as the Department of Education’s Gulayan sa Paaralan Program and the Department of Social Welfare and Development’s Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps). The COVID-19 pandemic has also brought attention to the importance of ensuring food security, which the Plant, Plant, Plant program of the DA aims to address. Despite all local governments hosting some form of state-initiated urban gardening project, only Marikina, Mandaluyong, and Quezon City have institutionalized urban agriculture through an ordinance (Table 1). Marikina passed the first Metro Manila ordinance in 2016, which promotes urban farming through community participation, bringing together the two connected activities of gardening and greening, and has become a template for other ordinances passed or in development. All three cities with urban farming ordinances also promote the use of idle lands by providing tax exemptions. Pasay has similarly passed an ordinance on family-based solid waste management that intersects with some components of urban farming. The remaining local governments are at various stages of developing ordinances. The lack of institutionalization of urban agriculture presents challenges to government-initiated gardening activities, as will be discussed in the following section. Land, however, remains the most significant constraint to attempts to adopt and expand urban farming in Metro Manila.

3 3.1

Key Challenges to Urban Farming in Metro Manila

Urban Land Use and the Urban Environment

Urban farming in Metro Manila encounters a host of challenges tied to urban land use and development. Due to the sustained conversion of vacant or agricultural lands to other land uses in the last three decades, space for urban agriculture has been dramatically reduced. This restricts

This law devolved the control and responsibility of delivering basic services, including those related to agriculture, from the national government to LGUs to improve resource allocation efficiency and enhance service provision at the local level. Urban farming is under the provisions of the LGC ordering the devolution of agricultural services (Section 17) and the optional creation of an office for the agricultural services (Section 482). Considering that the establishment of such an office is not mandatory, few Metro Manila LGUs have their own agriculture offices This law provides a comprehensive solid waste management program that grants the LGUs the primary responsibility in management of solid wastes and implementation of local plans on feasible reuse, recycling, and composting programs (Sections 17 and 32). In several Metro Manila LGUs particularly at the barangay level, recycling and composting initiatives integrate and/or complement urban agriculture efforts, and sustain community and household gardens, and demo farms

Republic Act (RA) No. 7160: Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991

RA 9003: Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000

Description and relevant provisions

Selected national policies, plans, and programs related to urban farming

Title

Table 2

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(continued)

This DENR national banner program (extended until 2028) aims to contribute to reducing poverty among upland and lowland poor households, including those residing in urban areas, promote food security, and enhance climate mitigation and adaptation by planting 1.5 billion trees in 1.5 million hectares of lands in public domain. Urban and suburban areas under the greening plan of the LGUs are covered by the NGP/E-NGP, including projects such as nursery establishment and seedling production, technical support and extension services and provision of certified seeds of agronomic crops The plan aims to lay down the foundation for inclusive growth, a high-trust and resilient society, and a globally competitive knowledge economy. Under the Pagbabago (inequality-reducing transformation) pillar, Chapter 8 aims to ensure food security through sustainable and resilient food production and availability. The priority strategies to achieve this outcome include the intensified promotion of urban agriculture and household gardening, and the establishment of community gardens as sources of nutritious food and livelihood

Executive Order No. 26, s. 2011 and No. 193, s. 2015: National Greening Program (NGP)/Enhanced NGP (E-NGP)

Updated Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2017–2022

Description and relevant provisions

Title

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Spearheaded by the DA, this is a national program that seeks to increase productivity and ensure food availability and accessibility amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Urban agriculture, which aims to empower city dwellers to grow their own food to attain household food security and provide extra income, campaigns for the establishment of community gardens in open spaces at the barangay level. The DA, through the Agricultural Training Institute (ATI), Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI), and other units, provides agriculture inputs, gardening modules, and technical assistance through training/webinar activities to ensure the maintenance and sustenance of the community gardens This program’s objective is to promote food security and mitigate hunger among children in public elementary and secondary schools nationwide through self-help food production activities among the learners. Established by the Department of Education’s Bureau of Learner Support Services-School Health Division through the issuance of DepEd Memorandum No. 293, s. 2007, this program serves as the source of nutrient-rich food that sustains School-Based Feeding Programs. This program covers the establishment of vegetable gardens and other related activities. The harvested produce is primarily used for feeding and food nutritional information are taught to students

Ahon Lahat, Pagkain Sapat Kontra sa COVID-19 (ALPAS COVID-19) or the Plant, Plant, Plant (PPP) Program

Gulayan sa Paaralan Program (GPP)

Description and relevant provisions

(continued)

Title

Table 2

428 K. K. SAGUIN AND M. A. CAGAMPAN

Description and relevant provisions Institutionalized through RA 11310, this is the national poverty reduction strategy and human capital investment program that provides conditional cash transfer to poor households to improve their health, nutrition, and education dimensions. Household-beneficiaries are required to comply with a set of conditions, including attendance in family development sessions (FDS) that also includes urban gardening as a module. Gulayan sa Barangay sites are also implemented in areas with 4Ps beneficiaries

Title

Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps)

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expansion of current farming and introduction of future projects, particularly those of the more extensive farming practices. Land availability has been identified by respondents as the most important and immediate challenge to urban farming in Metro Manila. In Metro Manila’s outer fringes, former agricultural lands where rice farms and fruit trees used to be have been converted to housing, such as in Caloocan, where 100 ha of former rice fields have given way to residential land uses, and in Valenzuela, where vast tracts of agricultural lands dedicated to rice farming have been reduced to a mere 19 ha In Taguig, a city that promotes a hybrid “Probinsyudad” identity, expansion of residential land uses have come at the expense of rice farming. Beyond demand for land, the planning philosophy of allocating “best use” of land for built developments and of the exclusion and invisibility of agricultural land uses in urban contexts also contribute to the continued loss of open spaces for urban farming. The lack of available lands poses a challenge for local governments to find space for urban farming. Many make the most use out of existing open spaces, including publicly owned parks and vacant lots. A few local governments also borrow lands from national agencies for urban farming, but these tend to be on a temporary basis as they are expected to be returned when new plans for these spaces emerge. Another strategy that local governments, such as Malabon and Navotas, employ in securing lands is striking an agreement or memorandum of understanding with private landowners. This is often brokered by an official, with an understanding that the owner can take back the land if needed. Both strategies create opportunities for urban farming in a space-constrained environment, but prevent further expansion or long-term planning given the uncertainty of land tenure. Other arrangements with private actors include using vacant lots in subdivisions for urban farming. Homeowner associations in cities like Las Pinas, Marikina, Muntinlupa, Quezon City, and Valenzuela have approved versions of these arrangements. There is however, some hesitation from these associations of letting outsiders, most notably informal settlers, enter the subdivision to farm on these vacant lots. In a few cases, there have been direct conflicts between subdivision residents and informal settlements in the use of vacant lands for farming, such as in Quezon City. It is more common, however, to find informal arrangements between the two groups, wherein subdivision management, individual landowners, or

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security guards allow nearby settlers access to these lands until they are needed. Because of the scarcity of land, government urban farming projects have promoted specific types of urban farming that require limited space to address this problem. Newer farming techniques like vertical farming, rooftop, wall, window and container gardening, and other space-saving practices use a lot less land than horizontal or extensive gardening, and are therefore preferred in project design. They also involve a different set of challenges, requiring more inputs per unit area. The dominance of the imaginary of farming in small spaces, however, has led to the exclusion or invisibility of other types of urban agriculture, notably traditional farming practices that require more land. Such spaces then are more vulnerable to pressures of land conversion and are seen as eventually giving way to other land uses. Discourses around urban agriculture often revolve about the possibilities of growing food despite the constraints of the urban built environment. This is often accompanied by the idea that urban farming is that which exists at the interstices of other, more profitable uses of land, and should complement, rather than compete with built-up spaces. Availability of farm inputs has not been a particular source of challenge in Metro Manila, especially for government-initiated urban farming projects. Seeds, water, soil, and compost are often provided for by local government units or national agencies. Water is sourced from deep wells or drawn from the municipal network. Compost is available in several LGUs that have composting facilities integrated with their waste management projects. Integrating urban agriculture and waste management at a larger scale is an important but still an unrealized potential for many LGUs. Suitability of land for farming is however an issue given that soils in many parts of Metro Manila are not ideal for farming. This problem, however, is usually addressed by importing garden soils from elsewhere. Environmental conditions surrounding urban farming are important considerations as well. At least two local governments have explicitly warned farmers not to extract water from polluted waterways due to the possible contamination of crops by heavy metals and coliform. The built environment also constrains availability of sunlight, which limits plant growth. Respondents also attribute air pollution as a secondary challenge of farming in the city. Pests like insects and worms cause crop damage,

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although these are often minor and can be resolved using homemade organic pesticides. 3.2

Social Relations of Access to Urban Farming

Issues of access and the social relations that surround urban farming practices illustrate that physical challenges posed by land and the environment are not the only drivers of urban agriculture. Access to inputs is not often a problem, particularly for government-supported projects. However, access to technical know-how in farming can serve as a barrier for entry in urban agriculture. Building knowledge and skills in farming is crucial in projects, given that many urban residents have limited experience with crops or gardening. Those who have prior experience tend to be migrants from rural areas who brought with them experiential knowledge of farming. However, rural farming tends to be different in many respects from urban farming, requiring constant experimentation and adjustments to the urban context. Free training and seminars are held several times in a year all over Metro Manila to encourage residents to take up urban farming. While often well-attended, these are not reliable indicators of eventual uptake or sustainability of farming activities. Many individuals and communities in several local governments for example take up a farming project, only to be abandoned later due to a variety of reasons. Respondents attribute an interest or background in farming, ample time and patience, and strong community spirit to sustain many gardening projects. Projects where participants had hands-on involvement in initiating and maintaining the gardens and where they felt they had a stake in its success tended to be more successful and sustainable in the long run. Farming projects also do not operate in a vacuum, and the nature of existing social relations among individuals and communities play a role in their eventual trajectories. For urban farmers not part of government garden projects, issues of limited or lost access to existing open or vacant lands remain key concerns. Especially in the fringes of Metro Manila where extensive or leftover forms of farming have existed for decades, the changing urban context and governance transformed the ability of residents to gain access to land for farming. What used to be communal or household lands used for farming have been taken away for other uses. In one barangay in Quezon City for example, the vacant lot used by informal settlers and recent migrants for vegetable gardening from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s was cleared

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to make way for a more formal barangay farm. In the same barangay, informal settlers who used vacant lots in nearby subdivisions lost access when a fence was constructed to keep them out. These had significant effects on residents who depended on access to these lands for food or income. Farmers who have long practiced rice or melon farming along the shores of Laguna Lake in southeastern Metro Manila have also experienced increasing threats of land conversion owing to residential, reclamation and infrastructural pressures. Land values have multiplied by 200 times since the 1960s due to increased demand for land, which has been aided by speculation regarding road infrastructure and expressway projects to be built near the area. In Muntinlupa, the informal settlers who farm vegetables along the shore have also expressed concern about the livelihood impacts of these infrastructure projects. While the urban poor are often the target beneficiaries of urban agriculture projects, the lack of land in densely built informal settlements often poses a problem and dampens interest among many. It is vital therefore to identify spaces elsewhere for such activities. However, the insecurity of tenure of many residents who are at risk of displacement, particularly if they are located along waterways, would limit sustainability of such initiatives. Land tenure and access therefore remains a crucial concern especially for farmers who are not part of government-initiated or recognized urban agriculture projects. The lack of emphasis or recognition of their type of urban agriculture has meant that their claim and access to lands or spaces for farming are more tenuous. 3.3

Scales of Urban Farming Governance

Several challenges in governing urban farming in Metro Manila exist, relating to vertical and horizontal multilevel governance issues and the constraints of implementing metropolitan governance. As there are no legislation or integrated frameworks that guide urban agriculture, there tends to be multiple and overlapping projects and offices responsible for urban farming at the local level. While coordination is often necessary to manage a multidimensional project like urban agriculture, differences among local government units (e.g., some have agricultural offices while others environmental management offices, often with different thrusts) make integrating these projects difficult. Because local government units have their own individual urban agriculture projects with different goals

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and strategies, scaling up urban farming to a metropolitan scale remains a challenge. Spaces that extend beyond one LGU may be managed differently by adjoining cities. The case of the foreshore lands of Laguna Lake is instructive, as the cities of Taguig and Muntinlupa, despite sharing the same shoreline, have different approaches to farming in these spaces. In the absence of an institutionalized framework or an ordinance for most local government units, urban agriculture projects tend to be led on a project basis that may or may not be sustained by succeeding administrations with a different agenda or goal (see Table 2). It is therefore highly dependent on the personal thrust of local officials from the barangay to the city level. In Muntinlupa, for example, early attempts to introduce urban agriculture projects in the 1990s were thwarted by a change in administration. On the contrary as in one Quezon City barangay, political dynasties create a continuity in certain farming projects, especially if these are a core project of officials. Urban agriculture is often not included in most local planning documents, such as CLUP and local development plans. This reflects the secondary importance given at the planning stage to urban agriculture and the general invisibility of farming in the city. In practice, many farming projects are initiated without requiring land use guidelines or are incorporated in existing classifications and greening initiatives. There is also a lot of potential in including urban farming in attempts to integrate food into urban planning (Cabannes and Marocchino 2018). Because many farming activities are informal or are not seen by the state, planning for such spaces becomes tricky. Government-initiated projects tend to be planned from a topdown approach, where officials design projects for adoption by their constituents, even when codified as for example in Marikina’s city ordinance. While this works in several cases, many farming projects that are sustained and perceived to be successful in the 17 LGUs tend to be those initiated by communities or households that received adequate support from the government. This highlights the importance of involving urban farmers in actual decision-making about land use dilemmas. While farmers and gardeners are active in making daily decisions about the farming process, their ability to participate in urban governance often ends at the boundaries of their farms when their roles are constrained as merely recipients or beneficiaries of government projects. The broader issues of land and land use have been predetermined for them by higher-level authorities through land use and development plans, city policies, or personal

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brokering. Promoting the equity and justice component of urban sustainability requires extending such spaces of participation in decision-making to citizens involved in urban farming. Urban farming governance is therefore a fundamental issue of scaling (Prove et al. 2019). In current practice, urban farming projects are formulated, designed, and administered at the level of city governments by officials and experts, with objectives and values that may not necessarily align or match with those of the residents and urban farmers at the local level. Urban farmers encounter different and particular sets of relations at the scale of the farm, and their local concerns should be acknowledged and recognized through appropriate mechanisms of political participation. Urban agriculture in the city exists in diverse types of forms, goals, values and participants, and diversity should be recognized in governance while avoiding one-size-fits-all solutions formulated at one scale (Piso et al. 2019). Similarly, decision-making and conduct of projects at the level of individual LGUs create a patchwork of disjointed urban farming initiatives that do not cohere framing- and policy-wise at the metropolitan level. Urban land use and environmental processes often transcend local government boundaries and broader issues of urban sustainability need to be addressed at a holistic metropolitan scale.

4 Governing Urban Farming for Urban Development: Outlining Opportunities Amid Decentralization Given its benefits and challenges, there are a number of considerations to incorporate urban farming into the urban sustainability agenda amid existing and proposed structures of Metro Manila governance. There is a need to emphasize its place in land use and development plans. Given persistent discursive associations of farming as a rural activity, promoting urban farming as a vital element of the urban landscape is necessary. This requires a different approach to urban farming by seeing it as a permanent fixture, rather than a temporary use of land that is expected to give way to other, more productive land uses, an imaginary that undermines future sustainability and discourages urban residents from farming. Along with parks, green spaces, and other green infrastructure, valuing urban farming spaces need to transcend the focus on the built-up areas as an indicator of urban development. Furthermore, many types of urban farms could easily

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be integrated into and are not necessarily incompatible with other land uses, such as green spaces and housing, given that they often have parallel goals. National and local governments have the opportunity to recognize the diverse types of urban farming in the city beyond vertical farming as the default model. While demo farms and training seminars extol the benefits of farming in constrained space, other types of farming should not be rendered invisible or excluded from support or recognition. Practices in remnant agricultural lands in the fringes and in household and communal lots continue to provide similar benefits and sustain livelihoods. The existence of multiple types of urban farming practices suggests that different strategies may be developed for each of these practices, which in turn requires a mapping and identification of their extent and scope. Consequently, idle and vacant lands in Metro Manila may be identified, surveyed, and determined for possible use in urban farming activities. This can also be incorporated within a similar survey of vacant lands for socialized housing. Urban farming can be practiced in interstitial spaces and even on lands considered as risky for structures. Because of this adaptability and versatility of urban farming, the potential lands for farming spaces could be significantly greater than currently imagined. There is also a need to enhance access by the urban poor to these vacant lands, especially given the lack of space in densely packed informal settlements. Arrangements brokered by the local governments may be made to ensure access to vacant lands, particularly with private landowners and homeowner associations for particular periods of time. Providing greater incentives will also encourage subdivisions with unused lots to dedicate to urban farming, whether practiced by homeowners or outsiders. This recommendation has already been institutionalized in LGUs with urban agriculture ordinances, such as Marikina, Mandaluyong, and Quezon City, all of which provide tax exemptions to encourage conversion of idle lands to productive uses. As in San Juan, existing parks could also be utilized to host urban farming activities, while ornamental plants could be replaced by fruit-bearing trees or other crops. Urban agriculture requires a stronger institutional underpinning beyond piecemeal and often disjointed projects by local governments. This fits within efforts to create a metropolitanized approach to urban governance and to strengthen the institutional framework of local governance concerning service delivery and urban development. Intra-LGU coordination and planning is necessary to ensure spatial continuity

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and encourage mutual learning of good practices and innovative urban farming schemes among different cities. Similarly, agreements with rural LGUs could also be made to supply inputs for urban farming or even land where farmers could grow food that will be brought back to the city. This however should not replace the need to dedicate space in Metro Manila for urban agriculture. A national policy on urban farming, still in the works, is vital to integrate the diverse components of urban farming and harmonize the overlapping and unclear responsibilities and mandates of various offices. Inter-agency coordination, with the DA as the lead implementing agency, for example, has been identified in the most recent House Bill on urban agriculture. Opportunities also exist in integrating urban farming and urban land use concerns in the proposed National Land Use and Management Act. Incorporating urban agriculture with parallel or related goals, such as in green infrastructure, disaster risk reduction, and climate change adaptation could strengthen its place in urban LGU planning. Similarly, urban farming may be included within a broader approach to planning food systems, recognizing the multiple scales and spatial interrelations involved in food provisioning (Prove et al. 2019). The links between decentralization, metropolitan governance structures, and land use need require a more serious consideration. The case of Metro Manila is unique in many aspects, wherein a highly urbanized region is composed of 17 local government units. This individualized planning in the absence of an overarching urban regional framework or governing body tends to lead to the fragmentation of plans and decisions about metropolitan-scale concerns that extend beyond a city’s border, such as land use and urban farming. Similarly, while land use, environmental and local development planning functions have been decentralized to local governments, they could extend further and provide more resources to the barangay level, the scale at which many of the urban farming projects are actually being implemented. This may help to facilitate the integration of the concerns of the marginalized with the planning process. The LGUs could also ensure continuous allocation of sufficient financial and human resources for urban farming projects as priority development interventions. This should contribute to achieving the objectives set in local development plans and sustaining the gains from these initiatives in the long term. Furthermore, the creation of a formal body such as a food council, which is composed of local stakeholders (Cabannes and Marrochino 2018) at a regional or city level might help bring urban farming and other related issues more centrally.

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Taking advantage of the strengths of horizontal multilevel governance frameworks, participatory and bottom-up approaches to designing and planning urban farming initiatives should complement top-down government projects. These can take the form of cooperatives, neighborhood associations, and people’s organizations given the right and leeway to plan the use of land for farming in their vicinity. However, these should be seen as a bundled and multi-scalar process that is tied to other decisions with respect to land use (Prove et al. 2019). Integrating urban farming in land use planning would necessarily involve participation from multiple interests in the planning process at various stages and levels. It also requires building capacity of associations and communities to undertake the different components of such a task, while cognizant of potential forms of cooperation and conflicts that may arise in the process of decision-making. While knowledge of urban farming techniques is relatively easy to share, capacity to construct and execute such a plan or to engage in the planning process remains limited. Activities such as participatory mapping are not only useful planning tools for identifying spaces for farming for instance, they also help communities to understand the spatial and interrelated nature of urban problems, which is an important entry point in involving people in the planning and governance process (Saguin et al. 2017). At the level of local governments, opportunities exist for barangays to dedicate a piece of their land, including rooftops and walls, for urban farming. This proposal however should be sensitive to local differences and to the work and social relations that go into the maintenance of gardens. In practice, many of the demo farms and barangay farms are manned by officials, many of whom work in the gardens out of a strong interest and stake in the success of the project. Enjoining further participation from residents of the barangay needs to take into account these practical considerations of day-to-day management. Incorporating urban farming into the urban development agenda requires a more holistic and systematic planning that includes other related urban issues such as food security, poverty, health, waste, and climate change. This is due to the multidimensional and multi-functional character of urban farming and to its interaction with other urban land use issues that are both social and environmental in nature. Compost production, for instance, plays a crucial role in providing inputs to urban agriculture, while simultaneously helping to reduce organic wastes in the city. While urban farming may reduce incidence of hunger in the city, it

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cannot replace adequate food systems planning at a metropolitan scale because urban inhabitants will still depend on food produced elsewhere. Finally, urban farming needs to be explicitly situated within broader discussions of sustainability, food sovereignty, right to the city and urban land tenure. These issues extend beyond technical matters and must be addressed in their proper political venues. Urban land tenure, in particular, is at the heart of the land dilemma in urban farming. If access or right to urban space is not guaranteed for all, especially for the urban poor and marginalized, urban farming will remain a marginal activity that may benefit the better-off urban residents instead.

5

Conclusion

Responsible urban governance toward sustainable and inclusive cities need to respond to shifting urban demands and configurations. Guided by the multilevel governance and metropolitanization frameworks, this chapter presented the case of urban farming in Metro Manila to illustrate the challenges of urban land use dilemmas while exploring potentials for improving its governance amid the context of decentralization. The multidimensional and multi-scalar nature of urban agriculture—as with urban processes in general—requires understanding and contextualizing how it operates on the ground as both a technical and social activity rooted in land use. The potential benefits of urban farming are manifold but without meaningful participation from grassroots actors or their access to land and other inputs, these will continue to remain unrealized. Evaluating existing governance mechanisms and strengthening institutional structures, therefore, must consider that urban farming is not an isolated activity that is primarily technical but is embedded in broader urban political questions of equity and right to the city.

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Cabannes, Yves, and Cecilia Marocchino, eds. 2018. Integrating Food into Urban Planning. London: UCL Press. Cameron, Ross W. F., Tijana Blanuša, Jane E. Taylor, Andrew Salisbury, Andrew J. Halstead, Béatrice Henricot, and Ken Thompson. 2012 “The Domestic Garden–Its Contribution to Urban Green Infrastructure.” Urban Forestry & Urban Greening 11 (2): 129–137. Carolan, Michael, and James Hale. 2016. ““Growing” Communities with Urban Agriculture: Generating Value Above and Below Ground.” Community Development 47 (4): 530–545. Colding, Johan, and Stephan Barthel. 2013. “The Potential of ‘Urban Green Commons’ in the Resilience Building of Cities.” Ecological Economics 86: 156–166. Crossan, John, Andrew Cumbers, Robert McMaster, and Deirdre Shaw. 2016. “Contesting Neoliberal Urbanism in Glasgow’s Community Gardens: The Practice of DIY Citizenship.” Antipode 48 (4): 937–955. Crush, Jonathan, Alice Hovorka, and Daniel Tevera. 2011. “Food Security in Southern African Cities: The Place of Urban Agriculture.” Progress in Development Studies 11 (4): 285–305. De Zeeuw, Henk, René Van Veenhuizen, and Marielle Dubbeling. 2011. “The Role of Urban Agriculture in Building Resilient Cities in Developing Countries.” The Journal of Agricultural Science 149 (S1): 153–163. Estoque, Ronald C., and Yuji Murayama. 2015. “Intensity and Spatial Pattern of Urban Land Changes in the Megacities of Southeast Asia.” Land Use Policy 48: 213–222. Galt, Ryan E., Leslie C. Gray, and Patrick Hurley. 2014. “Subversive and Interstitial Food Spaces: transforming Selves, Societies, and Society–Environment Relations Through Urban Agriculture and Foraging.” Local Environment 19 (2): 133–146. Gera, Weena. 2016. “Public Participation in Environmental Governance in the Philippines: The Challenge of Consolidation in Engaging the State.” Land Use Policy 52: 501–510. Ghose, Rina, and Margaret Pettygrove. 2014. “Urban Community Gardens as Spaces of Citizenship.” Antipode 46 (4): 1092–1112. Hara, Yuji, Takashi Furutani, Akinobu Murakami, Armando M. Palijon, and Makoto Yokohari. 2011. “Current Organic Waste Recycling and the Potential for Local Recycling Through Urban Agriculture in Metro Manila.” Waste Management & Research 29 (11): 1213–1221. Hara, Yuji, Akinobu Murakami, Kazuaki Tsuchiya, Armando M. Palijon, and Makoto Yokohari. 2013. “A Quantitative Assessment of Vegetable Farming on Vacant Lots in an Urban Fringe Area in Metro Manila: Can It Sustain Long-Term Local Vegetable Demand?” Applied Geography 41: 195–206.

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Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. 2013. CLUP Guidebook: A Guide to Comprehensive Land Use Plan Preparation. Quezon City: HLURB. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. 2017. National Urban Development and Housing Framework 2017–2022: Abridged Version. Quezon City: HLURB. Hovorka, Alice, Henk de Zeeuw, and Mary Njenga. 2009. Women Feeding Cities: Mainstreaming Gender in Urban Agriculture and Food Security. Rugby: Practical Action Publishing. Hutchison, Jane. 2007. “The ‘Disallowed’ Political Participation of Manila’s Urban Poor.” Democratization 14 (5): 853–872. Lin, Brenda B., Stacy M. Philpott, and Shalene Jha. 2015. “The Future of Urban Agriculture and Biodiversity-Ecosystem Services: Challenges and Next Steps.” Basic and Applied Ecology 16 (3): 189–201. Lwasa, Shuaib, Frank Mugagga, Bolanle Wahab, David Simon, John Connors, and Corrie Griffith. 2014. “Urban and Peri-Urban Agriculture and Forestry: Transcending Poverty Alleviation to Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation.” Urban Climate 7: 92–106. McClintock, Nathan. 2014. “Radical, Reformist, and Garden-Variety Neoliberal: Coming to Terms with Urban Agriculture’s Contradictions.” Local Environment 19 (2): 147–171. McClintock, Nathan, and Michael Simpson. 2018. “Stacking Functions: Identifying Motivational Frames Guiding Urban Agriculture Organizations and Businesses in the United States and Canada.” Agriculture and Human Values 35 (1): 19–39. Neo, Harvey, and Cheng Ying Chua. 2017. “Beyond Inclusion and Exclusion: Community Gardens as Spaces of Responsibility.” Annals of the American Association of Geographers 107 (3): 666–681. Piso, Zachary, Lissy Goralnik, Julie C. Libarkin, and Maria Claudia Lopez. 2019. “Types of Urban Agricultural Stakeholders and Their Understandings of Governance.” Ecology and Society 24 (2). Porio, Emma. 2017. “Citizen Participation and Decentralization in the Philippines.” In Citizenship and Democratization in Southeast Asia, edited by Ward Berenschot, Henk Schulte Nordholt and Laurens Bakker, 31–50. Leiden and Boston: Brill. Prové, Charlotte, Joost Dessein, and Michiel De Krom. 2016. “Taking Context into Account in Urban Agriculture Governance: Case Studies of Warsaw (Poland) and Ghent (Belgium).” Land Use Policy 56: 16–26. Prové, Charlotte, Michiel PMM de Krom, and Joost Dessein. 2019. “Politics of Scale in Urban Agriculture Governance: A Transatlantic Comparison of Food Policy Councils.” Journal of Rural Studies 68: 171–181. Purcell, Mark. 2002. “Excavating Lefebvre: The Right to the City and Its Urban Politics of the Inhabitant.” GeoJournal 58 (2–3): 99–108.

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Saguin, Kristian. 2020. “Cultivating Beneficiary Citizenship in Urban Community Gardens in Metro Manila”. Urban Studies 57 (16): 3315–3330. Saguin, Kristian Karlo, Christopher John Chanco, Aildrene Israel Tan, and Arnisson Andre C. Ortega. 2017. “Reclaiming Social Equity in Land Use Planning for Sustainable Cities.” Public Policy 18: 99–126. Shillington, Laura J. 2013. “Right to Food, Right to the City: Household Urban Agriculture, and Socionatural Metabolism in Managua, Nicaragua.” Geoforum 44: 103–111. Sonnino, Roberta. 2009. “Feeding the City: Towards a New Research and Planning Agenda.” International Planning Studies 14 (4): 425–435. Tornaghi, Chiara. 2014. “Critical Geography of Urban Agriculture.” Progress in Human Geography 38 (4): 551–567. Travaline, Katharine, and Christian Hunold. 2010. “Urban Agriculture and Ecological Citizenship in Philadelphia.” Local Environment 15 (6): 581–590. WinklerPrins, Antoinette M. G. A., ed. 2017. Global Urban Agriculture. Oxfordshire: CABI. Zezza, Alberto, and Luca Tasciotti. 2010. “Urban Agriculture, Poverty, and Food Security: Empirical Evidence from a Sample of Developing Countries.” Food Policy 35 (4): 265–273.

CHAPTER 14

IRA and Local Fiscal Governance in the Philippines Rogelio Alicor L. Panao

1

Introduction

Despite claims that intergovernmental transfers facilitate fiscal stability at the local level, evidence from the public finance literature suggests that outcomes vary depending on the nature of expenditure and on the context of existing political institutions. Moreover, extant studies typically focus on the relationship between local revenue generation and intergovernmental transfers and rarely on the development side of the equation. In the Philippines, no less than the 1987 Constitution guarantees a just share in the national income for all local government units. Referred to as the internal revenue allotment (IRA) in the 1991 Local Government Code, this share is released automatically and may not be withheld by national government except on very rare and very extreme cases of public deficit. The unconditional nature of the subsidy, according

R. A. L. Panao (B) Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 T. S. E. Tadem and M. E. L. Atienza (eds.), A Better Metro Manila?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3_14

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to experts and observers, make local governments extremely dependent on the national government, practically defeating local autonomy as a constitutional policy and a legislative intent (Manasan 2008; Panao 2021; Uchimura and Suzuki 2012). Beyond the revenue implications, how does the unconditional nature of intergovernmental transfers affect local fiscal governance? Does local governments’ reliance on automatic central government subsidy inform the spending behavior of local governments? Drawing on local budgeting and election-related data in 144 cities and 81 provinces in the Philippines from 1992 to 2016, this chapter argues that the unconditional nature of the IRA creates at least two undesirable features that have come to characterize fiscal governance in the Philippines. First, the internal revenue allotments that are received automatically disincentivize local governments from generating their own sources of revenue. This conjecture is well-known and has long been brought to spotlight in previous work, albeit based on qualitative accounts. The chapter complements extant literature by providing empirical evidence based on the experience of Philippine provinces and cities. Second, subsidiary governments which are more reliant on central government subsidy also tend to spend less on social and economic services, creating a vicious cycle of dependency and underdevelopment. Although there exists a fair amount of evidence suggesting that, indeed, central government subsidy induces local fiscal dependence, little attention is given to how such dependence can have development implications through local spending behavior. Evidence from our panel estimates suggests that locally generated income tends to be smaller for cities and provinces that are more reliant on the IRA as an income source. This effect is more pronounced in provinces. Beyond fiscal efforts, however, we also found that local governments’ overreliance on transfers can negatively impact welfare spending. Up to a certain level, the IRA improves expenditures for public welfare in provinces. Beyond this threshold, IRA decreases welfare spending, suggesting that the relationship is not linear, and casting doubt on fiscal transfers as a vector of local development. The chapter proceeds by first charting works that look into intergovernmental transfers and the experience of developing economies which relied on transfers to address fiscal imbalance at the local level. This is followed by a discussion of how fiscal decentralization is implemented in the Philippines with the 1991 Local Government Code as institutional milieu. We then expound on fiscal decentralization in the Philippines and

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situate it within the responsible governance framework discussed in Chapters 1 and 3 of this book. Even though fiscal decentralization is widely regarded as an important component of sound local governance, it is susceptible to free-riding and collective action problems (Wunsch 2013). However, existing mechanisms in the Philippines seem to construe equitable development as largely a function of central government fiat. This not only concentrates economic and political power in Metro Manila but also aggravates existing structural and economic inequalities. We then discuss our data, the analytical approach, and the statistical evidence supporting our conjectures for this chapter. The chapter concludes with a few recommendations on how local fiscal mechanisms may be optimized to achieve local autonomy within the ambit of existing constitutional and legislative frameworks.

2

Transfers and Decentralization

We construe intergovernmental transfers or grants as any resource that passes from one level of government to another. This definition encompasses shares from the national tax collections that local governments, such as municipalities or provinces, receive from the national government. By fiscal decentralization, on the other hand, we mean a system of governance where decision-making or policies covering expenditure and revenue is placed upon local governments. In many countries, the central government exercises enormous prerogative over taxes but usually guarantees a portion of the collection for the local or subsidiary units. Many developed economies are known for policies relying on intergovernmental transfers to finance a substantial portion of local government expenditures (Boadway and Shah 2009). Since the capacity of local governments vary depending on levels and regime types, intergovernmental grants are used to allow for a stable and equitable provision of public services in countries with multilevel structures. Intergovernmental transfers are popular as a source of subnational finance to ensure fairness and equity in the pursuit of national or regional development objectives (Shah 2006). In developing countries, for instance, transfers are known to bridge the fiscal gap between resource-challenged local governments and their more affluent counterparts (Uchimura and Suzuki 2012). Be that as it may, transfers are not panacea. Although scholars have come to realize the ubiquity of transfers in decentralized governmental

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systems, there is also recognition of the inevitability of fiscal imbalances once vertical and horizontal responsibilities are assigned to different government levels (Jack 2005; Spahn 2007). In the experience of many Latin American countries, the devolution of responsibilities to subnational governments discourages fiscal effort, further pulling down fiscal balance in municipalities with low fiscal capacity (Aragon and Gayoso 2005; Martinez-Vazquez and Sepulveda 2012). Local development policies hinged on central government transfers, on the other hand, have been criticized for aggravating interregional inequality and inducing subsidiary governments to reply heavily on central government subsidy (Liu and Zhao 2011; Prud’homme 1995). Empirical findings based on specific country cases are also generally mixed on the efficacy of transfers as a fiscal device. In Tanzania, Masaki (2016) finds that fiscal transfers can complement local revenue generation and suggests that, at the very least, an increase in fiscal transfers can facilitate local resource mobilization. In Ethiopia, empirical findings suggest that intergovernmental transfers spur employment and expenditure at the local level (Dejene Mamo 2020). Yushkov’s (2015) examination of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in Russia found a positive effect on economic growth but warns as well that excessive expenditure decentralization without revenue decentralization can stun economic growth. By contrast, China’s experience with its fiscal transfer system shows no tangible link between central-to-local transfers and local fiscal effort (Zhang and Wu 2009). Wu et al. (2019), for their part, find that fiscal decentralization unnecessarily induces urban agglomeration due to competition for resources among local governments. In Turkey, Gbafi and Sarucs (2004) show that revenue-generating efforts increase correspondingly with higher fiscal grants but also suggest that this is due to efforts by local managers to match intergovernmental allocation. In Brazil, Mattos et al. (2011) find that while transfers facilitate welfare spending in municipalities, they also decrease tax collection.

3 Intergovernmental Transfers in the Local Government Code The conventional notion of fiscal autonomy in the Philippines relates to the power of local governments to generate their own revenue sources on top of what they receive from the national government as share in national

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taxes (Mandanas v. Executive Secretary).1 Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the just share in national taxes is operationalized by what is referred to as the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). The 1987 Constitution mandates the automatic release of the IRA. With the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC), the Philippines became one of vanguards of decentralization in Southeast Asia. However, it was not the Philippines’ first foray into decentralization. Throughout its history, the Philippines was said to have vacillated between centralization and decentralization (De Guzman et al. 1988). The trend was toward centralization from the colonial period until the end of Second World War. Afterward, it shifted toward decentralization from 1946 until the declaration of martial law in 1972. The 1973 Constitution also guaranteed local autonomy and gave local governments power to collect taxes and raise their own income. There are even similarities between the 1991 LGC and the draft of the 1983 Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337). Like its predecessor, the 1991 LGC failed to address a number of ambiguities. For instance, the provisions covering local governments’ functional assignment, sources of local revenue, intergovernmental transfer mechanisms, and debt regulatory framework, leave much to be desired. The DILG (Department of the Interior and Local Government 2015) found, for instance, that local tax generation is low for all government units and that somehow this is due to their heavy reliance on the IRA. DILG also cites a number of institutional constraints within the existing decentralization framework of the Local Government Code. Among these is the limited taxing powers the law provides to subsidiary units. Local governments, for instance, cannot impose income taxes as this prerogative is exclusive to the national government under the revenue code. On top of the already limited fiscal powers, local government units generally find it difficult to make full use of the resource-generating prerogatives available under the law. Mandanas v. Executive Secretary clarified the tax base from which IRA is to be computed. Under Art. 284 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the base of local governments’ just share is the national internal revenue collection. However, the 2019 resolution on Mandanas v. Executive Secretary reiterated that the base is national taxes, not just internal

1 G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018.

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revenue collection, consistent with Section 6 Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Under the ruling, the LGUs’ just share shall be derived from the whole of national internal revenue taxes listed in Section 21 of the NIRC, as amended, including VAT, excise taxes, and documentary stamp taxes collected by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The base also includes customs duties and tariffs collected by the BOC. In order for the national government to comply with the decision, however, it first needs to address the problem of fiscal sustainability. The ruling poses a number of financial challenges for the national government since it will need to, among others, raise gross domestic product (GDP) by at least 0.9% for 2022 (Manasan 2020). Phase one of the tax reform program under the Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion Act (RA 10963) has only managed to increase GDP from tax revenue by 0.5% between 2018 and 2019. The prospects cannot be brighter with the COVID-19 pandemic pulling down the country’s economic performance to its worst since 1947.2 The decision’s emphasis on local governments’ just share also obfuscates the fact that the real issue is the failure of institutions to breathe life into fiscal autonomy as a legislative intent. Although local governments’ taxing powers are not as expansive as that of the national government, the list of taxes under Book II of the Local Government Code of 1991 has never been exclusive. Ferrer v. Bautista (G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015) maintains that sans explicit grant or prohibition under a statute, taxing power is assumed to exist subject to statutory limitations that Congress may impose.3 And yet most LGUs are still heavily dependent on IRA which over the years have become their main source of income.4

2 Cliff Venzon, “Philippines GDP shrinks 9.5% in 2020, worst since 1947”, 28 January 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Philippines-GDP-shrinks-9.5-in-2020worst-since-1947. 3 Ferrer v. Bautista upheld the constitutionality of Quezon City’s local tax on socialized housing. 4 Aika Rey, “2021 for LGUs: Cash-strapped in the middle of a pandemic,” Rappler, 21 December 2020, https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/cash-strapped-lgusduring-pandemic-budget-covid-19-series-yearend-2020.

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Intergovernmental Transfers in the Bayanihan Framework

On July 17, 2018, a committee tasked to study the prospect of a federal system for the Philippines released their proposed formula for giving power back to the people and to the regions. The proponents refer to the framework as “Bayanihan Federalism” and envisions a federal republic with regional components of the legislative, executive, and legislative branches. The proposed framework gives the regions in the federal republic wider latitude over the creation of revenue sources and social development planning, among others. Interestingly, the taxes that federated regions can collect under the proposed framework appears to be substantially similar to what local governments can impose under the current decentralization setup. In the same vein, the framework is vague regarding how fiscal prerogatives are to be exercised and shared between and among local government units to avoid duplicitous taxation. This vagueness suggests that the issues besetting the current decentralization setup will likely resurface in the proposed federalism framework. Duplication of fiscal powers and imbalance in the provision of services, it seems, will likely persist despite the supposed reforms. The proposed charter’s vision of fiscal independence is also worth further scrutiny. Under the draft charter, the federated regions are entitled to not less than half of all national taxes, to be equally shared among them. Similar to the IRA, the allocation is also automatic. However, given that this proposed share is even higher than the 40% currently guaranteed under the Local Government Code, fiscal decentralization under this framework is clearly one where the central government shoulders the bulk of the burden of local government financing. Another feature that needs to be scrutinized is the provision creating a Federal Intergovernmental Commission. Under the draft, not only is the commission tasked to manage the equalization fund—which runs to about three percent of government’s annual budget—but endowed with power to decide how much and to which region to allocate aid in pursuit of “financial viability and economic sustainability”.

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5

Transfers as a Governance Problem

The underlying theoretical contention in this chapter is that fiscal decentralization is a governance issue. The determination and exercise of taxing and spending powers at the local level are intricately intertwined with local government responsiveness and accountability. In the Philippines, both decentralization and the proposal to federalize are motivated by the desire to achieve equitable development for local government units (see, i.e., Chapter 1) in the pretext of responsible governance. Despite the overreliance on the internal revenue allotment (IRA), however, many local governments in the Philippines still find it hard to finance the delivery of even the most basic social services (Chapter 3). Ideally, decentralization should enable local governments in the richest jurisdictions to raise adequate revenue to provide services and finance the needs of their citizens. Despite taxation being the lifeblood of government, however, taxes can only be levied upon those who stand to benefit from the services provided by local governments. Thus, governments at all levels need to have a clear understanding which services fall within their public responsibility, as well as of the expenditures for which they are politically responsible. If intergovernmental grants are based on performance or yardstick competition, the cost of providing public goods falls largely on the shoulder of local governments. Because citizens are averse to higher taxes, politicians are constrained to find means to impose taxes without turning off voters. Fiscal decentralization, in this case, especially when there is devolution or delegation of taxation and spending prerogatives to local government units, promotes democratic governance, representation, and accountability. In the presence of unconditional transfers, on the other hand, political responsibility is distorted. Governments which are interested on winning their constituencies’ support would naturally engage in behavior that gives a semblance of public responsiveness instead of imposing taxes (Timmons 2005). If a grant is unconditional and automatic, local governments will appear responsive either by increasing public welfare spending or reducing its tax collection. But citizens are information misers and have limited information on the nature of the funds used to purchase public goods. Hence, when transfers are unconditional, there is no incentive to engage in revenue-generating efforts because local governments can simply use the transfers received from the national government to buy electoral

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goods. Later, we shall test empirically whether the inclination to raise local income decreases as the amount of unconditional transfers increases. Unconditional grants can also shape how local governments allocate funds for public welfare. Any additional IRA translates to funds that can be used to buy more public goods. However, the automatic nature of transfers does not necessarily make citizens better-off. Voters discouraged by tax collections who decide to move to another jurisdiction are unable to enjoy the benefits of better public services purchased by unconditional grants because public services are specific to a local government. Thus, in a system where a huge chunk of public goods can be purchased by transfers, politicians wield substantial bargaining power over voters. However, if public goods are paid for through local sources (e.g., local fiscal efforts), local governments not only are constrained to spend only on goods that the citizens prefer, overall spending is also more prudent. Bargaining power is reverted to voters because citizens dissatisfied with the services provided by a local government can relocate to better localities bringing with them their taxable income. We, thus, expect public welfare expenditure to increase as the inclination for local revenue generation increases.

6

Data and Method

We draw our analysis on yearly panels of election and fiscal data for all 144 cities and 81 provinces in the Philippines from 1992 to 2016. The election component of the dataset consists of vote shares of candidates during mayoral and gubernatorial elections. From this, we computed the number of effective candidates as a measure of the magnitude of electoral competition during the race when the incumbent local chief executive won (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). Data was sourced from the Commission on Elections. The fiscal component, on the other hand, consists of local-level allocation, revenue, and expenditure aggregated annually for all cities and provinces during the span of the period covered. We are particularly interested in the total income generated by a city or province, the amount of IRA it received for a given year, the amount of locally sourced revenue it was able to generate, and the amount it spent on public welfare expenditures. Data was sourced from the Bureau of Local Government Finance. Tables 1 and 2 give a descriptive summary of the pertinent variables for cities and provinces respectively. On average, the internal revenue

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allotment (IRA) makes up about 63% of total income. The maximum share of IRA for cities is 98%. Palayan City, a class 3 component city in Nueva Ecija, sourced more than 98% of its total income from IRA in 1994 and 1995. Provinces, on the other hand, receive on average about 81% of their total income from IRA. There are also provinces which practically relied on IRA for income (e.g. Tawi-Tawi). Provinces in the former Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (now Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) such as Maguindanao, Sulu, Lanao Del Sur, and Basilan derive more than 90% of their income from IRA. It is also interesting to note that the IRA comprises more than quadruple of what the average city earns through local channels. This suggests that there is substantial dependence on the IRA as a funding source even for cities. The IRA for provinces is, on average, about 47 times of the amount they earn from local channels. If fiscal autonomy implies being able to generate local sources of revenue, then local governments in the Philippines obviously still have a long way to go. Interestingly, on average, provinces appear to spend more on public welfare compared to cities. Whereas the average city allocates 20% of its total expenditure on public welfare, the average province spends 27%. Public welfare expenditure encompasses allocations for health and population control, education, culture and sports, labor and employment, manpower development, housing and community development, as well as social services and welfare programs. While these expenditures are development-oriented, they are also particularistic and may be electorally targeted. For both cities and provinces, it appears that two is the effective number of candidates.

7

Results

We estimate separate panel random effects models for cities and provinces to test our hypotheses. Although a panel specification containing fixed effects might be of interest, the random effects model is preferred because the parameters for both models contain time-invariant variables such as the LGUs’ geographic distance from Metro Manila—the seat of the national government. We first test whether local income is crowded out by the amount of unconditional transfers using the log of locally sourced revenue as dependent variable. The operational measure for the main independent variable is the share of IRA in the total income.

Between Within Distance from Metro Manila Overall Between Within Year before an election Overall Between Within LGU income class Overall

Effective number of candidates

Incumbent’s votes

IRA over local income

IRA over total income

Overall Between Within Overall Between Within Overall Between Within Overall Between Within Overall Between Within Overall

2.4

0.34

5.76

1.97

53,460.94

4.14

0.63

825 M

353 M

Mean

Descriptive summary of variables for cities

Total income

IRA

Variable

Table 1

0.388 0.592 1.57 1.599 0 0.474 0.053 0.473 0.891

330 M 235 M 206 M 1440 M 1090 M 790 M 0.221 0.215 0.066 6.61 5.416 3.994 68,970.04 55,692.37 31,307.36 0.7

Std. Dev

1 0.421 0 0 5.764 0 0.304 −0.16 1

0 126 M −1040 M 0 146 M −5640 M 0 0.075 0.243 0 0.083 −24.107 2291 7894.696 −355,744 1

Min

3.237 5.755 7.427 7.427 5.764 1 0.5 1.036 3

3600 M 1710 M 2360 M 18,800 M 7810 M 11,800 M 0.986 0.944 1.02 177.715 32.903 148.957 610,789 423,430 464,251.1 6.113

Max

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

IRA AND LOCAL FISCAL GOVERNANCE IN THE PHILIPPINES

(continued)

n = 144 bar = 17.5903 N = 2500 n = 144 bar = 17.3611 N = 2533 n = 144 bar = 17.5903 N = 2485

N = 2533 n = 144 bar = 17.5903 N = 2533 n = 144 bar = 17.5903 N = 2529 n = 144 bar = 17.5625 N = 2529 n = 144 bar = 17.5625 N = 2533 n = 144 bar = 17.5903 N = 2533

Obs

14

453

(continued)

Between Within

Between Within Overall Between Within Overall Between Within Overall 0.201

636 M

172 M

Mean

0.08 0.064

0.846 0 400 M 312 M 196 M 985 M 805 M 417 M 0.102

Std. Dev

Sources Commission on Elections (2020), Bureau of Local Government Finance (2020)

Public welfare over total expenditures

Total expenditures

Public welfare expenditures

Variable

Table 1

0.074 −0.039

1 2.399 0 16.9 M −1730 M 0 129 M −3270 M 0

Min

0.483 0.658

3 2.399 4220 M 2410 M 2560 M 9020 M 5330 M 4430 M 0.686

Max

T

T

T

T

n = 144 bar = 17.5625

n = 143 bar = 17.3776 N = 2533 n = 144 bar = 17.5903 N = 2533 n = 144 bar = 17.5903 N = 2529

Obs

454 R. A. L. PANAO

Year before an election

Distance from Metro Manila

Effective number of candidates

Incumbent’s votes

IRA over local income

IRA over total income

6.264

Between Within Overall Between Within Overall Between Within

2.094

0.307

169,236.200

47.103

0.819

706 M

549 M

Overall Between Within Overall Between Within Overall Between Within Overall Between Within Overall Between Within Overall

Mean

0.983 0 0.462 0.035 0.461

0.376 0.614 0.975

481 M 253 M 408 M 663 M 377 M 545 M 0.133 0.099 0.089 686.681 288.533 628.955 156,562 140,046.2 69,997.77 0.716

Std. Dev

Descriptive summary of variables for provinces

Total income

IRA

Variable

Table 2

3.126 6.264 0 0 −0.013

1.303 0.438 3.126

0 150 M −518 M 0 161 M −839 M 0 0.485 0.077 0 1.110 −2470.55 2923 3933.625 −157,285.4 1

Min

7.680 6.264 1 0.320 1.035

3.283 4.414 7.680

3110 M 1190 M 2620 M 4610 M 1710 M 3610 M 1 0.980 1.157 21,576.92 2589.819 19,034.21 894,593 622,726.6 549,009.8 5.312

Max

T

T

T

T

T

T

IRA AND LOCAL FISCAL GOVERNANCE IN THE PHILIPPINES

(continued)

n = 81 bar = 25.0988 N = 2033 n = 81 bar = 25.0988

n = 80 T = 23.3375 N = 2033

N = 2033 n = 81 bar = 25.0988 N = 2033 n = 81 bar = 25.0988 N = 2028 n = 81 bar = 25.037 N = 2025 n = 81 bar = 25 N = 1867 n = 80 T = 23.3375 N = 1867

Obs

14

455

Between Within

0.273

549 M

154 M

0.086 0.095

1.108 1.130 0.000 174 M 121 M 125 M 461 M 295 M 356 M 0.128

Std. Dev

Sources Commission on Elections (2020), Bureau of Local Government Finance (2020)

Public welfare over total expenditures

Total expenditures

Public welfare expenditures

1.812

LGU income class

Overall Between Within Overall Between Within Overall Between Within Overall

Mean

(continued)

Variable

Table 2

0.058 −0.076

1 1 1.812 0 28 M −457 M’ 0.000 127 M −760 M’ 0

Min

0.460 0.615

5 5 1.812 1710 M 632 M 1240 M 3460 M 1470 M 2540 M 0.610

Max

T

T

T

T

n = 81 bar = 25.037

N = 2022 n = 80 bar = 25.275 N = 2033 n = 81 bar = 25.099 N = 2033 n = 81 bar = 25.099 N = 2028

Obs

456 R. A. L. PANAO

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457

The impact of electoral dynamics on local revenue generation is not discounted. Local incumbents might be inclined to improve revenue collection during the period before an election to signal performance, thus, we control for the effect of the year prior to an election. Meanwhile, incumbents who fought competitive elections might have difficulty establishing coalitional support and face challenges in instituting better local revenue-generating programs. We use the effective number of candidates to gauge the effect of competitive elections. We also control for the effect of geographic distance, which we assume to decrease fiscal effort the farther away an LGU is from the Metropolitan capital. The models also account for the effect of local governments’ intrinsic capacity by using income class as operational measure. Models 1 and 2 of Table 3 summarize the relationship between IRA share and revenue-raising capacity, for cities and provinces respectively. Although we believe the relationship between IRA share and the inclination to raise local revenue is negative, we do not discount the possibility that the relationship may actually reverse at some point. In both models, IRA as a share of total income is specified as a curvilinear function to determine the tipping point. It appears that no such curvilinear function exists for cities. For cities, IRA depresses local income generation as hypothesized. Model 1 suggests that if IRA share increases by 10% of total income, local income generation decreases by 52%. For provinces, Model 2 shows that the quadratic term of IRA share is significant. However, 97% of the observations have values greater than or equal to the tipping point, implying that a linear fit is not substantially different. The estimates suggest that just a 5% increase in IRA share crowds out local revenue generation by 55%. In both provinces and cities, electoral competition seems to have a negative effect on local revenue generation. Local revenue generation, however, appears to increase during the year preceding an election. The estimates also suggest that local revenue generation is more difficult for LGUs that are geographically distant from the metropolitan capital (Metro Manila). In the same vein, lower-class LGUs have more difficulty raising local income, suggesting that the manner by which subsidiary units are able to take advantage of fiscal decentralization also depends on intrinsic capacities. Table 4 summarizes the relationship between IRA share and public welfare spending for cities (Model 1) and provinces (Model 2). As in the previous models, IRA share is hypothesized to have a negative relationship with public welfare spending although it is possible that such relationship

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Table 3 IRA and local income generation

IRA share in total income IRA share in total income squared Effective number of candidates Year before an election Log of distance from Metro Manila Income class Constant N

(1) Log of total local income (cities)

(2) Log of total local income (provinces)

−5.209***

12.59***

(0.564) 0.583

(1.241) −11.76***

(0.452) −0.151***

(0.845) −0.334***

(0.0184) 0.176***

(0.0297) 0.224***

(0.0232) −0.0659*

(0.0392) −0.270***

(0.0293) −0.355*** (0.0528) 23.17*** (0.200) 2481

(0.0617) −0.394*** (0.0540) 18.41*** (0.594) 1851

Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

is curvilinear. The estimates for cities (Model 1) show that the quadratic term of IRA share is significant but the distribution of the data suggests that a linear fit is more appropriate (see Fig. 1). The linear component of IRA share in Model 1 suggests that a 5% increase in IRA as a portion of a city’s total income decreases public welfare spending by 30%. For provinces, however, the relationship is not straightforward. The quadratic term of IRA share in Model 2 is significant and implies that public welfare spending increases with greater IRA share but up to a point. Thereafter, any further increase in the IRA discourages public welfare spending. The estimates suggest that IRA can facilitate public welfare expenditure for provinces if it does not go beyond 72% of total income (see Fig. 2). About

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459

20% of the observations for provinces fall below or equal to this cut-off, thus, a quadratic fit is still justified. As with local income generation, electoral competition also shows a negative relationship with public welfare spending. Mayors and governors who fought highly contested elections are less likely to engage in welfare spending in their localities. Electoral proximity is also a significant determinant of welfare spending, especially in the provinces, where expenditures on social programs increases by 22% during the year before an election. Welfare spending also varies with geographic proximity but its negative impact, as with local income capacity, is more pronounced in provinces.

Table 4

IRA and public welfare spending (1) Log of public welfare expenditure (cities)

IRA share in total income IRA share in total income squared Effective number of candidates Year before an election Log of distance from Metro Manila Income class Constant N Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

(2) Log of public welfare expenditure (provinces)

−5.971*** (0.646) 3.043***

4.865*** (1.411) −3.367***

(0.518) −0.112***

(0.960) −0.395***

(0.0211) 0.149*** (0.0267) −0.100**

(0.0342) 0.271*** (0.0453) −0.367***

(0.0324) −0.398*** (0.0581) 22.15*** (0.223) 2480

(0.0527) −0.306*** (0.0460) 20.15*** (0.609) 1851

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Fig. 1 IRA and public welfare spending in cities

Fig. 2 IRA and public welfare spending in provinces

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8

461

Conclusion

Drawing on fiscal and electoral data for 144 cities and 81 provinces in the Philippines from 1992 to 2016, this chapter examined the negative impact of intergovernmental transfers on both fiscal autonomy and welfare spending. Our findings suggest that as the IRA increases, local governments are also inclined to decrease their efforts to generate local sources of revenue. This seems to be the case for both cities and provinces although the effect is more pronounced in provinces. This is not new and has been echoed in prior anecdotal accounts. The findings merely complement prior studies by providing empirical validation. Where the study contributes is in extending the theoretical introspection to public welfare spending. Our findings suggest that, overreliance on intergovernmental transfers not only discourages local governments from raising their own sources of revenue but also lowers welfare spending in some cases. However, the relationship between the IRA and welfare spending must be nuanced. While the negative relationship between transfers and expenditures is straightforward for cities, the IRA appears to improve public welfare spending for provinces but only up to a point. Thereafter, the IRA discourages social welfare expenditures, as in cities. Our findings also indicate that taxing effort and welfare spending are tied to the electoral context of local chief executives. We can only surmise that the particularistic nature of these fiscal outcomes makes them susceptible to political manipulation and useful as strategic vote-buying resources. Though a detailed examination is beyond the scope of this chapter, we believe the aforementioned electoral variables merit further empirical introspection. While there had been attempts to address these issues at the policy level, past efforts have largely been preoccupied with expanding LGU responsibility (Matsuda 2011). The Duterte administration, for a time, also embarked on initiatives to adopt a federal form of government in the pretext of empowering local governments. However, the proposed framework failed to address lingering problems and institutional flaws. We believe that any attempt toward local fiscal reform should at least begin with amending the 1991 Local Government Code, or crafting complementary legislative proposals that clarify taxing and expenditure responsibilities for local governments and lessen the ambiguity between delegated and devolved functions. Amendments may also consider providing greater

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leeway to local development councils so they may be able to participate meaningfully in planning, implementing, and monitoring their own development trajectories (Atienza et al. 2020). We believe that these options do not require constitutional redesign and are possible even within the context of existing institutions.

References Aragon, F. M., and V. J. Gayoso. 2005. “Intergovernmental Transfers and Fiscal Effort in Peruvian Local Governments.” SSRN Electronic Journal. https:// doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.773666. Atienza, M. E. L., A. A. Arugay, F. J. A. Dee, J. Encinas-Franco, J. R. R. Go, R. A. L. Panao, and A. J. D. Jimenez. 2020. Constitutional Performance Assessment of the 1987 Philippine Constitution: Summary of Findings. International IDEA and University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies. https://doi.org/10.31752/idea.2020.2 Boadway, R., and A. Shah. 2009. Fiscal Federalism: Principles and Practice of Multiorder Governance, 1st ed. New York: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511626883. De Guzman, R., M. Reforma, and E. Panganiban. 1988. Local Government. In Government and Politics of the Philippines, 207–240. Singapore: Oxford University Press. Dejene Mamo, B. 2020. The Impact of Intergovernmental Transfers on Fiscal Behaviour of Local Governments in Ethiopia. Institute of Development Studies (IDS). https://doi.org/10.19088/ICTD.2020.001 Department of Interior and Local Government. 2015. Review of the Fiscal Provisions of the 1991 Local Government Code. Quezon City: DILG. Gbafi, S., and N. T. Sarucs. 2004. “Intergovernmental Transfers and the Flypaper Effect in Turkey.” Turkish Studies 5 (2): 79–92. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 1468384042000228602. Jack, W. 2005. “Comparing the Distortionary Effects of Alternative Intergovernmental Transfers.” Public Finance Review, 33(4), 488–505. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/1091142105275168. Laakso, M., and R. Taagepera. 1979. “‘Effective’ Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe.” Comparative Political Studies 12 (1): 3– 27. https://doi.org/10.1177/001041407901200101. Liu, Y., and J. Zhao. 2011. “Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers and Local Tax Efforts: Evidence from Provinces in China.” Journal of Economic Policy Reform 14 (4): 295–300. https://doi.org/10.1080/17487870.2011. 591175.

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Manasan, R. G. 2008. “Local Public Finance in the Philippines—Balancing Autonomy and Accountability.” In Decentralization Policies in Asian Development, edited by S. Ichimura and R. Bahl, 333–387. Singapore: World Scientific Press. https://doi.org/10.1142/9789812818645_0014. Manasan, R. G. 2020. “Fiscal Sustainability, Equity, and Allocative Efficiency in the Light of the 2019 Supreme Court Ruling on the LGUs’ Share in National Taxes.” Discussion Paper Series No. 2020-18. Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies. Martinez-Vazquez, J., and C. Sepulveda. 2012. Intergovernmental Transfers: A Policy Reform Perspective. In Decentralization and Reform in Latin America, edited by G. Brosio and J. Jiménez, 260–289. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/978 1781006269.00015 Masaki, T., and UNU-WIDER. 2016. The Impact of Intergovernmental Transfers on Local Revenue Generation in Africa: Evidence from Tanzania, 113th ed., Vol. 2016. UNU-WIDER. https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/ 2016/157-4. Matsuda, Y. 2011. Ripe for a Big Bang? Assessing the Political Feasibility of Legislative Reforms in the Philippines’ Local Government Code. The World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-5792. Mattos, E., F. Rocha, and P. Arvate. 2011. “Flypaper Effect Revisited: Evidence for Tax Collection Efficiency in Brazilian Municipalities.” Estudos Econômicos (São Paulo) 41 (2): 239–267. https://doi.org/10.1590/S0101-416120110 00200002. Morgan, P. J., and L. Q. Trinh 2016. Frameworks for Central-Local Government Relations and Fiscal Sustainability. Asian Development Bank Institute. Panao, R. A. L. 2021. “Beyond Flypaper: Unconditional Transfers and Local Revenue Generation in the Philippines, 1992–2016.” International Journal of Public Administration 44 (15): 1341–1354. https://doi.org/10.1080/019 00692.2020.1759628. Prud’homme, R. 1995. “The Dangers of Decentralization.” The World Bank Research Observer 10 (2): 201–220. https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/10. 2.201. Shah, A. 2006. A Practitioner’s Guide to Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers. The World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-4039. Spahn, P. B. 2007. “Intergovernmental Transfers: The Funding Rule and Mechanisms.” In Fiscal Equalization, edited by J. Martinez-Vazquez and B. Searle, 163–204. New York: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-38748988-9_8. Timmons, J. F. 2005. “The Fiscal Contract: States, Taxes, and Public Services.” World Politics 57 (4): 530–567. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2006.0015.

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Uchimura, H., and Y. Suzuki 2012. “Fiscal Decentralization in the Philippines After the 1991 Code: Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationships and the Roles of Fiscal Transfers.” In Fiscal Decentralization and Development, edited by H. Uchimura, 39–72. London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/ 9780230389618_3. Wu, A. M., L. Ye, and H. Li. 2019. “The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on Urban Agglomeration: Evidence from China.” Journal of Urban Affairs 41 (2): 170–188. https://doi.org/10.1080/07352166.2018.1484254. Wunsch, J. S. 2013. “Analyzing Self-Organized Local Governance Initiatives: Are There Insights for Decentralization Reforms?: Self-Organized Local Governance Initiatives.” Public Administration and Development 33 (3): 221–235. https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.1652. Yushkov, A. 2015. “Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Economic Growth: Theory, Empirics, and the Russian Experience.” Russian Journal of Economics 1 (4): 404–418. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ruje.2016.02.004. Zhang, H., and H. Wu. 2009. “Impact of Fiscal Transfer on Fiscal Effort of Chinese Provincial Governments.” Frontiers of Economics in China 4 (3): 406–424. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11459-009-0022-3.

CHAPTER 15

Risk Transfer Mechanism: Charting a Strategy on Local Insurance Dennis G. de la Torre and Erwin A. Alampay

1

Introduction

The Climate Change Act of 2009, or RA 9729, as amended and the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, or RA 10121, contain specific provisions on risk transfer. Section 9(g) of RA 9729 mandates the Climate Change Commission (CCC) to “create an enabling environment for the design of relevant and appropriate risk sharing and risk transfer instruments”. On the other hand, Section 6(f) of RA 10121 mandates the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) to “develop risk transfer mechanisms that shall guarantee social and economic protection and increase resiliency in

D. G. de la Torre (B) Resilience Institute, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] E. A. Alampay National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 T. S. E. Tadem and M. E. L. Atienza (eds.), A Better Metro Manila?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3_15

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the face of disaster.” More than a decade has passed since both laws were enacted, yet policy developments on the creation of an enabling environment on risk transfer have remained at the national level only.1 While policy goals and objectives on risk transfer have been articulated in Philippine laws and translated into national plans, policy implementation at the local level remains a challenge. Understanding risk transfer. In the aftermath of a disaster, the burden of financing recovery is usually shouldered by the government. The main source of disaster risk financing is public funds. Risk retention ensues when public funds are used by government for disaster risk financing. It is a “process in which a party holds on to the financial responsibility for loss in the event of a shock” (World Bank 2010).2 RA 10121, on the other hand, defines risk transfer as “the process of formally or informally shifting the financial consequences of particular risks from one party to another whereby a household, community, enterprise or state authority will obtain resources from the other party after a disaster occurs, in exchange for ongoing or compensatory social or financial benefits provided to that other party.”3 As such, the burden of financing is shifted or transferred to the private sector or the markets. Another way of looking at it from the perspective of source of funding is that risk retention is from internal and public sources, while risk transfer is from external, non-public, or private sources. Risk transfer as a financing strategy is seen by the World Bank (World Bank 2014) as a means by which the private sector becomes an essential partner because it can contribute capital, technical expertise, and innovative financial solutions to provide fiscal protection against the impacts of disasters. This strategy is part of an overall program known as Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance (DRFI). The World Bank emphasizes that the role of DRFI is to “minimize the cost and optimize the timing of meeting post-disaster funding needs” in a manner that ensures that governments, homeowners, small and medium-sized enterprises, agricultural producers, and the most vulnerable populations can meet post-disaster funding needs as they arrive.” This allows financing to be

1 RA 9729 was enacted on 23 October 2009 while RA 10121 was signed into law in 27 May 2010. “RA” stands for “Republic Act”. 2 Definitions from this World Bank document may be found in its Glossary. 3 See Section 3(kk) of RA 10121.

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made available immediately during the critical time that they are needed for disaster recovery. A World Bank impact analysis provides empirical evidence on the use of DRFI as a tool for development, as shown by the following findings: (1) households that receive financial support during lean season are able to increase consumption, to reduce malnutrition, and to keep children in school; (2) insurance payouts from disaster risk finance program increase farmers’ income by 38% and their consumption by 27%; (3) a disaster risk finance strategy could reduce the average cost of financing by 25%; and, (4) reallocating budget expenditure on reconstruction was three times more expensive than insurance (World Bank 2016). Preference for the poor and vulnerable sectors. The financial impact of disasters impedes poverty reduction because calamities destroy not only the limited assets of poor households but also their means of livelihood, resulting in negative coping strategies such as cutting down on food or children dropping out of school (World Bank 2017). In recognizing the differential impacts of climate change and disasters across sectors, RA 9729 in its Declaration of Policy emphasizes that preference shall be given to the poor and vulnerable. The law mandates the State “to incorporate a gender-sensitive, pro-children and pro-poor perspective in all climate change and renewable energy efforts, plans and programs.”4 Within the context of discussions on local government reforms, policy development on intergovernmental fund transfers is relevant. In simple words, this refers to fund transfers coming from national government in favor of local government units (LGUs). A US study on disaster financing in relation to intergovernmental fiscal management (Miao 2018) suggests that greater fiscal decentralization may result into better disaster recovery because local governments are more familiar with local risks. This is supported by a UNDP paper on local climate financing (UNDP 2013) which posits that fiscal decentralization is a key component in creating an enabling environment on climate finance. It argues for local governments being given adequate funding to fulfill their functions on disaster resilience effectively. Similarly, one of the underlying reasons for the previous call to shift to the federal system in the Philippines is the lack of access to financial resources by local governments because government funds are mostly controlled by national government. Here, it can

4 See Section 2 of RA 9729, as amended.

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be argued that the policy push for fiscal decentralization with respect to disaster financing is already an imperative in terms of the policy agenda. While the push must extend to policy implementation, policy development should continue on local disaster financing regardless of what the prospects are for the expected political and administrative changes under a federal shift or associated local government reforms. Given this context, Fig. 1 is provided for in this chapter. To achieve the societal outcome of having resilient local communities, financial resilience through risk transfer should be the goal. Hence, a Local DRFI Strategy must be formulated by tilting the balance toward risk transfer by increasing the reliance on external sources of financing, such as local insurance, so that its vulnerable communities may avail of ready funding for disaster recovery. This chapter investigates the challenges to implementing risk transfer in local governments by looking at the experience of Quezon City in mainstreaming risk transfer as a strategy in its Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (LDRRMP). The chapter shall first discuss what risk transfer is, including its essential features in relation to risk layering, sectoral coverage, and basic insurance categories and products appropriate for disaster recovery. It will then discuss policy developments at the national level, before focusing on the experience of Quezon City. It then proceeds with an analysis and suggested solutions thereto including a section on general policy recommendations to mainstream risk transfer in local planning.

Societal outcome: Resilient local communities

Goal: Financial resilience thru local insurance/risk transfer

Local Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance Strategy Risk Retention

Risk Transfer

Internal

External

Fig. 1 Conceptual framework on DRFI (Source Authors’ creation)

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Together with Chapter 14 (Panao), therefore, Chapter 15 looks at another financing for local governance, not through the internal revenue allotment (IRA) as discussed in Chapter 15, but through a new scheme of local risk insurance in times of disaster. Note that in the preceding chapter of this book (Chapter 14), the author emphasizes the need for developing economies to reconsider their reliance on fiscal transfers as conduit of fiscal governance, and strike a balance between equalizing vertical imbalance and minimizing fiscal dependency. Risk transfer mechanisms through local insurance are potential means to minimizing fiscal dependency, noting that Panao points out the danger of local governments becoming over-dependent on national government subsidies. Using the Quezon City (QC) experience, this chapter emphasizes RTMs as an external financing option provided by the private sector, and this topic also shows the importance of multilevel governance with regard to risk transfer management as it highlights the important relationship of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) and the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (LDRMMC) with regards to the matter. Furthermore, it also shows the need for the local government units (LGUs) to take note of the policy issuances of other national agencies like the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the Commission on Audit (COA) for the effective implementation of the local risk insurance scheme.

2

Background on Risk Transfer

The concept of risk layering is important to understand the essential features of risk transfer mechanisms (RTMs) in relation to disaster risk financing and insurance. Risk layering is defined as the “process of separating risk into tiers in order to finance and manage risk efficiently” wherein individuals or households retain small but recurrent losses through risk mitigation and self-insurance; more severe and less frequent losses can be transferred to cooperative/mutual insurance schemes, commercial insurers, and reinsurers, and, for major disasters, governments assume responsibility by providing post-disaster aid or otherwise acting as reinsurers of last resort (Word Bank 2010). The process of risk layering identifies the disaster risks by tier or category and matches each tier with the appropriate disaster financing solution. The methods for providing financing solutions through risk transfer are known as risk

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transfer mechanisms (RTMs), the most common example of which is insurance. At the national level, risk layering is presumed to have been done first as a consequence of a national climate and disaster risk assessment, to inform the formulation of a national DRFI program. This is emphasized in the World Bank-Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) Disaster Risk Management Framework (refer to Table 1) where it says that a comprehensive risk assessment should be done as the first pillar, named as risk identification. Risk layering and identification of the appropriate RTMs are presumably included in pillars 3 and 4, named as preparedness and financial protection respectively. Pillar 5 focuses on timeliness or quicker and more resilient recovery (World Bank 2014). The policy alternatives of a national DRFI program are shown on Table 2, where we can also interpret the policy alternatives as the main categories of RTMs. Beneficiaries may refer to the elements or sectors exposed to climate and disaster impacts. Following the process of risk layering, they refer to the stakeholders or sectors in need of RTMs. Table 2 considers the DRFI program at the national level. A sovereign disaster risk financing will be applicable only if this directly benefits local communities, while agricultural insurance will be inapplicable as we discuss the Quezon City experience, since it is a highly urbanized city with an insignificant agriculture sector. Table 1

World Bank-GFDRR Disaster Risk Management Framework

Pillar

Actions

1. Risk identification

Improved identification and understanding of disaster risks through building capacity for assessments and analysis Avoided creation of new risks and reduced risks in society through greater disaster risk consideration in policy and investment Improved capacity to manage crises through developing forecasting and disaster management capacities Increased financial resilience of governments, private sector, and households through financial protection strategies Quicker, more resilient recovery through support for reconstruction planning

2. Risk reduction

3. Preparedness 4. Financial protection

5. Resilient recovery

This table is culled from Fig. 5, “Financial Protection Against Natural Disasters” (World Bank 2014, 22)

• Increases financial response and reconstruction capacity through improvements to: resource mobilization, allocation, and execution; insurance of public assets; social safety net financing • Smooth public expenditure across years by reducing the volatility of the cost of disasters, and hence protects the stability of public finances • Clarifies contingent liability arising through disaster exposure of public assets, the private sector and state-owned enterprises, and the poor • Provides incentives for investment in risk reduction • Provides access to compensation for physical property damage and indirect losses arising from damage • Increases awareness and understanding of financial vulnerability to natural disasters • Helps distribute risk and burden of recovery between public and private sectors • Can incentivize investment in risk reduction

Sovereign disaster risk financing

Property catastrophe risk insurance

Benefits

Disaster risk financing and insurance policy alternatives and benefits

Policy alternatives

Table 2

(continued)

Homeowners and SMEs (small-medium enterprises)

Governments

Beneficiary

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DE

This table is culled from Table 2, “Financial Protection Against Natural Disasters” (World Bank 2014, 25)

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Disaster-linked social protection

• Provides access to compensation for Farmers production losses and damage to productive assets • Helps distribute risk and burden of recovery between public and private sectors • Increases awareness and understanding of financial vulnerability to agricultural risks • Can incentivize investment un-risk reduction • Allows for the adoption of higher yielding but riskier farming methods • Increases access to financial services and markets for low-income households [insurance, banking, savings] • Mitigates shocks by providing compensation The Poorest for livelihood or asset losses through flexible social safety nets • Increases awareness and understanding of vulnerability to natural disasters • Can incentivize investment un-risk reduction • Safeguards vulnerable people from falling into poverty

Agricultural insurance

Beneficiary

Benefits

(continued)

Policy alternatives

Table 2

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Based on Table 2, a country’s DRFI program should target climate and disaster-vulnerable sectors, namely the poorest, homeowners, and SMEs, congruent with the policy imperatives articulated in the Climate Change Act of 2009. Again, it is important that RTMs must be immediately made available during the critical period that they are needed, which is right after or as close as possible to the occurrence of the disaster, targeting the most vulnerable sectors. The rationale for the policy push for risk transfer is outlined by the fact that a highly vulnerable country like the Philippines is also highly uninsured. A global assessment conducted by Munich Re from 2013 to 2018 shows that the Philippines is classified as having a “very low insurance penetration” (Munich Re, n.d.). It should be posited that as a policy goal, the case should be the reverse: the Philippines, as a highly vulnerable country, should have high-insurance penetration.

3

Policy Developments on Risk Transfer

Major policy developments on risk transfer have occurred in the Philippines, albeit limited at the national level. The policy goals and objectives have been well defined in our national policy agenda based on our national policy instruments, as will be discussed below. The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan classifies DRFI under the thematic area known as Disaster Prevention and Mitigation. As shown on Table 3 (see item 5), the Department of Finance as the lead agency is tasked to provide communities with DRFI (National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council 2011). DOF’s national DRFI strategy shall be explained in the subsequent section. Meanwhile, the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) crafted by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) has identified risk transfer-related strategies under two (2) of its chapters, namely Chapter 11 (Reducing Vulnerabilities of Individuals and Households), and Chapter 20 (Ensuring Ecological Integrity, Clean and Healthy Environment), as shown in Table 4 (National Economic Development Authority 2016). Pursuant to its mandate outlined in the NDRRMP, the Department of Finance (DOF) developed the Philippine DRFI Strategy. The provisions relevant to the local level are shown on Table 5.

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Lead agencies for disaster prevention and mitigation

Thematic area 1: Disaster prevention and mitigation Overall responsible agency: Department of Science and Technology (DOST) Outcome

Lead agency(ies)

1. DRRM and CCA mainstreamed and integrated in national, sectoral, regional and local development policies, plans and budget 2. DRRM and CCA-sensitive environmental management 3. Increased resiliency of infrastructure systems 4. Enhanced and effective community-based scientific DRRM and CCA assessment, mapping, analysis and monitoring 5. Communities access to effective and applicable disaster risk financing and Insurance 6. End-to-end monitoring (monitoring and response), forecasting and early warning systems are established and/or improved

Office of Civil Defense (OCD)

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) OCD

Department of Finance (DOF)

Department of Science and Technology (DOST)

Source National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan 2011–2028 (NDRRMC 2011, 3) Note The NDRRMP has been recently updated after the conduct of this policy study

As can be seen from the policy objectives outlined in the above national policy documents, RTMs must be accessible to the poor and vulnerable as social protection instruments at the individual and household levels, in addition to property insurance for government assets. The traditional or most common RTM remains to be local property insurance.

4

The Quezon City Experience

Quezon City (QC) is one of the premiere cities of the Philippines, with an audited revenue of Php 20.2 billion and assets valued at Php 68.3 billion in 2017, based on a Commission on Audit report (Commission on Audit 2018). For the said year, Quezon City became the 2nd top earner among LGUs in the Philippines, eclipsed only by Makati City (Rosario 2018). Quezon City’s Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund’s

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Key risk transfer-related strategies, PDP

Chapter

Key Strategies

Chapter 11: Reducing vulnerabilities of individuals and households

• Innovative insurance products will be explored and developed outside the existing micro-health and pre-need services (Chapter 15 on Ensuring Sound Macroeconomic Policy) • Develop facilities for adaptation including risk transfer mechanisms (RTM) • Maximize access to CC and DRRM financing and risk transfer mechanisms: Information on available international and national CC and DRRM financing facilities will be widely disseminated; technical assistance to stakeholders, particularly LGUs will be provided to comply with the requirements of such facilities • On risk transfer mechanism, CC considerations will be incorporated in the design of financing packages and insurance products • Promote business continuity planning: businesses, especially micro, small and medium enterprises and cooperatives, will be encouraged to prepare business continuity plans for dealing with disaster risks

Chapter 20: Ensuring ecological integrity, clean and healthy environment

Source Philippine Development Plan 2017–2022 (NEDA 2016). Pls See https://www.neda.gov.ph/ wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Abridged-PDP-2017-2022_Updated-as-of-01052018.pdf

(LDRRMF)5 average budget from fiscal year 2016 to 20186 was PhP 854 million. Section 21 of RA 10121 provides that 70% of the LDRRMF may be allocated for pre-disaster activities while the remaining 30%, constituting the Quick Response Fund (QRF), is allocated for post-disaster or relief and recovery programs. The QC LDRRMF budget shows that

5 Section 21 of RA 10121 provides that at least 5% of local revenues be earmarked as LDRRMF. 6 The Quezon City Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office (LDRRMO) started to fully operate in 2016. Data on risk transfer became available starting on the said year only.

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Philippine DRFI strategy, local level

Philippine DRFI strategy Development objectives

Strategic priorities

Key initiatives

• Maintain sound fiscal health • Develop sustainable financing mechanisms • Reduce the impact on the poorest and most vulnerable; shield the near-poor Local level: Provide local governments with funds for post-disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts Individual level: Empower poor and vulnerable households and owners of small and medium-sized enterprises to quickly restore their livelihoods after a disaster Local level: developing a catastrophe risk insurance facility for local governments; pooling local government’s calamity funds; improving insurance of public assets Individual level: broadening private property catastrophe risk insurance and micro-insurance coverage; linking disaster risk financing and social protection

Source Philippines DRFI Strategy (DOF, n.d.) See https://mefin.org/files/DOF%20Disaster%20Risk% 20Financing%20Initiative.%20TWG%20P&R%2020%20May%202019.pdf

the allocation for risk transfer started at PhP 500,000 in 2016, and was increased by 200% or doubled the following year, and was further increased by 1,400% by 2018 to PhP 7 million. While the rate of increase on risk transfer expenditure is by leaps and bounds, the allocation for risk transfer however was very small in comparison, only ranging from 0.09 to 1.03% compared to the pre-disaster funds or 70% of the LDRRMF, as seen on Table 6. On the other hand, the property insurance expenditure of Quezon City from 2016 to 2018 shows that the total value of the properties Table 6

Quezon City LDRRMF and risk transfer expenditure

Year

Total LDRRMF

70% LDRRMF

Risk transfer expenditure

2016 2017 2018

766,038,834.77 830,794,187.24 964,970,307.00

536,227,184.34 581,555,931.07 675,479,214.90

500,000 1,000,000 7,000,000

Percentage of 70% 0.09 0.17 1.03

Source Data for Tables 6–8 and Fig. 2 were sourced from the Quezon City Project Procurement Plan of the Local DRRM Fund, from 2016 to 2018

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Fig. 2 QC premium vs. risk transfer allocation, 2016–2018

477

2016 Premium v. RT 13%

87%

Estimated Premium

Risk Transfer Expenditure

2017 Premium v. RT 23%

77%

1

2

2018 Premium v. RT 17%

83%

1

2

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(school facilities, buildings, and other assets) insured (known as Total Sum Insured or TSI) grew from PhP 3.85 to 4.28 billion. The corresponding expenditure for property insurance or estimated premium decreased from PhP 3.45 to 1.45 million over the same period. Table 7 shows the estimated premium versus risk transfer allocation.7 Table 7 2018

Quezon City estimated premium vs. risk transfer expenditure, 2016–

Year

Total sum insured

Estimated premium

2016 2017 2018

3,851,709,718.72 4,284,124,798.88 4,284,124,798.88

3,451,131.90 3,351,899.24 1,447,285.81

Table 8

Risk transfer allocation 500,000 1,000,000 7,000,000

Quezon City LDRRMF budget items on risk transfer, 2016–2018

Year

budget item

Purpose

Amount in PhP

2016

Insurance Premium and Vaccination

500,000

2017

Insurance expenses

2018

Insurance premium and vaccination Insurance premium Risk transfer livelihood trainings and sustainability

Provision of insurance for volunteer emergency responders Provision of insurance for volunteer emergency responders —Not stated—

1,000,000

1,000,000

—Not stated—8 1,000,000 Provision of emergency services 5,000,000 and public assistance during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, ensure public safety, and meet basic subsistence needs of the community

7 Data on local property insurance were obtained from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). 8 Presumably, the purpose for these 2018 budget items are the same as the previous years, i.e. to provide insurance for volunteers.

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Hence, while the estimated premium is on a downward trend, the allocation for risk expenditure9 shows an upward trend, reflecting the policy push on the part of Quezon City to strengthen or broaden the application of RTMs in its local DRR efforts, as shown by the following charts. By 2018, risk transfer allocation accounted for 83% compared to the expenditure on premiums for local property insurance, as shown in Fig. 2. A deeper perusal of the risk transfer expenditure from 2016 to 2018 of the Quezon City Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (LDRRMP) shows that in 2016, it itemized “insurance premium and vaccination” for the purpose of providing “insurance for volunteer emergency responders” amounting to PhP 500,000. By 2017, it was itemized as “insurance expenses” for the same purpose. By 2018 however, there were now three (3), the newest and most substantial addition being the item on “Risk Transfer Livelihood Trainings and Sustainability” for the purpose of providing “emergency services and public assistance during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, ensure public safety and meet basic subsistence needs of the community.” These are shown on Table 8. Based on an interview with a key informant from the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office (LDRRMO), it was found that planning for local property insurance is not part of the functions of the LDRRMO in Quezon City and was undertaken by another department. This suggests that there is “no strategic approach yet on how to mainstream risk transfer in the LDRRMP” since there are “no concrete guidelines or a mother framework.” Furthermore, there are also no clear Commission on Audit (COA) guidelines on risk transfer expenditure. Local officials are conscious of their liability for the violation of audit guidelines or the failure to provide justification of expenditure. They are wary of being disallowed, including the consequence of having to return the money, and also because they open themselves to personal accountability. Providing social protection through local insurance to the poor may be disallowed because they are private individuals. COA rules are also very strict because these prohibit the payment of hazard premium for Quezon City’s own DRR personnel while allowing for Accredited Community Disaster Volunteers (ACDVs), hence failing to 9 Data on risk transfer expenditure trend were also obtained from the Quezon City Project Procurement Plan of the Local DRRM Fund, from 2016 to 2018.

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provide protection for them through insurance. Last, the increased allotment for additional insurance in 2018 for livelihood is a direct result of an innovative technical assistance by a non-governmental organization. In order to understand the above observations, let us review the current Quezon City LDRRM Plan. Under the section on Recovery and Rehabilitation, the said plan identifies policy actions listed on Table 9 as part of “Humanitarian Assistance” (Quezon City and Earthquakes and Megacities Initiative 2013). In terms of policy decision-making, financial mechanisms have been identified for residential and government assets and financial assistance for response and recovery for affected families, which have been identified as possible interventions or policy options. Deeper examination of the Plan shows the data gap on vulnerable sectors and assets as exposed elements, for the purpose of determining what specific local insurance products can be used with respect to which vulnerable sectors and assets can be targeted for risk transfer. Also, while the plan contains numerous risks, vulnerability, and susceptibility maps, socioeconomic information is not disaggregated at the barangay level (Quezon City and Earthquakes and Megacities Initiative 2013). The detailed hazard, vulnerability, and risk assessments transformed into maps (e.g., Flood Susceptibility Map) were used to generate information such as the ranking of Quezon City’s flood-prone barangays based on affected population. Such information generated the flood risk index that may assist Quezon City in determining the disaster risk hotspots Table 9 Humanitarian assistance actions related to DRFI, Quezon City LDRRMP Action

Purpose

Repair and reconstruction of residential houses and government assets

This includes institutional arrangements and setting up financial mechanisms for immediate and long-term mitigation Extension of financial assistance to families affected. It includes measures for the restoration of normal government operations

Financial Assistance relating to Emergency response and Recovery

Source “Building a Disaster Resilient Quezon City Project, Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan 2014 to 2020” (Quezon City and Earthquakes and Megacities Initiative 2013). See https:// emi-megacities.org/?emi-project=building-a-disaster-resilient-quezon-city-project

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or priority areas. While the said information may show the ranking of Quezon City’s most vulnerable barangays,10 it has no data on vulnerability at the household or individual level or exposed assets for risk transfer investment planning. In general, geographical or mapping data constitute the bulk of the disaster risk information. These information are useful to aid in the identification of which vulnerable areas should be prioritized. However, disaggregation of exposure database at the barangay level are not found on the said QC LDRRM Plan, and is therefore a data gap for the purpose of risk transfer investment planning. Disaggregation of exposure database especially those pertaining to disaster-vulnerable populations is of course important in local planning, noting that risk transfer beneficiaries are targeted at the barangay level. This is further explained in the next section.

5 Gap Analysis on Risk Transfer at the Local Level The foregoing findings and discussions raise some issues and barriers with regard to risk transfer at the local level and are discussed below. 5.1

Data Is Not Optimally Used in Risk Transfer Planning

Based on the above review of Quezon City’s LDRRM Plan, most of the data available are typically geographical or mapping information as a result of the conduct of the hazard, vulnerability, and risk assessment. While the volume of geographical data on disaster risk is huge, the policy decision-making it informs are those pertaining to selection of locations or determination of which barangays to prioritize. For example, data on affected population per barangay may aid decision-making on where to locate evacuation centers, where to concentrate DRR trainings, or where to construct flood control measures. Such risk information may also help in deciding which government assets should be insured, as far as prioritization by location is concerned. It will be recalled that based on the policy guidance provided by World Bank frameworks and our own national plans, financial protection should be provided to vulnerable homeowners,

10 The barangay or village is the most basic and smallest political and governance structure in the Philippines.

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SMEs, and the poorest in the form of RTMs such as household property insurance and social protection measures, and local assets that are needed for delivery of public services. The QC LDRRMP identified financial assistance on response and recovery for affected families, but data is not disaggregated at the household level. Based on the experience of Quezon City, there is no strategic or policy decision framework on risk options planning, hence there is no guiding process on what data and information are needed in the determination of risk transfer options, including the selection of social protection measures for targeting climate-vulnerable populations. Local public assets also need to be identified as subject for risk transfer, noting that asset valuation is essential for determining the cost of local insurance in terms of payment of premiums. 5.2

Absence of Loss and Damage Framework on Exposed Elements

As part of the Paris Agreement of 2015, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) advocates the use of an emerging framework known as the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (UNFCCC 2017). This Mechanism on Loss and Damage proposes the use of comprehensive risk management approaches that includes the following components: risk assessment, risk reduction, financial risk transfer, and risk retention. As discussed in the previous section, the experience of Quezon City shows that data on socioeconomic vulnerability of target sectors are lacking. Hence, even if Quezon City is willing to allocate funds for risk transfer, it is hindered by this problem. Quezon City’s experience validates the findings of UNFCCC when it conducted an intercountry survey on loss and damage. Among these findings are the following (UNFCCC, n.d.): 1. Insufficient forecasting and data coverage (e.g., weather services do not have comprehensive coverage because weather stations are too widely distributed geographically, leading to weather and climate data being of low resolution, and so unable to produce accurate information for some sub-district levels, and unable to provide localized area forecast and quantitative forecast) 2. Insufficient financial and human resources (e.g., insufficient budget and investment in climate service provision; understaffed in climate service institutions; insufficient staff with required knowledge and skills for example in Geographical Information System

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[GIS] to undertake geospatial monitoring and mapping for sea level rise, storm surges, and other climate-related extreme events) 3. Insufficient institutional frameworks (e.g., no structured framework or appropriate institutional arrangement to integrate climate data into policymaking, poor communication channels, low awareness, and knowledge about available technologies to adopt climate change) 4. No systematic or incomplete data management (e.g., data collection and assessment of economic losses are done on case by case and not systemic manner) Integrating these comprehensive risk management approaches as part of the local planning process particularly on risk transfer options planning obviously may help Quezon City, starting with establishing baseline information on socioeconomic vulnerability of target beneficiaries. Loss and damage suffered by these target beneficiaries are crucial information in determining risk transfer options. 5.3

LDRRMF Investment Planning for Risk Transfer Is Not Synergized with Traditional Local Property Insurance Expenditure

As shown in the previous section, local property insurance comprises a significant portion of risk transfer expenditure because this is mandated by law. This is therefore considered a traditional administrative task that is not integrated with the local DRR planning process. Note that Republic Act (RA) 656 known as the “Property Insurance Law” requires firstclass local government units to insure their properties.11 The said law was enacted in 1951, or long before RA 10121. As discussed above, a comprehensive approach is needed to effectively reduce risks against disasters. A comprehensive risk assessment must therefore identify all potential risks, the loss and damage exposed elements/vulnerable sectors stand to suffer, and the entire range of risk transfer options needed to address all the identified risks. It will be recalled that the identification of this entire range of risk transfer solutions is known as risk layering. The risk transfer options planning as part of investment planning of the LDRRMF should

11 See Section 5 of RA 656.

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therefore be synergized not only with local property insurance expenditure planning, but must also include risk layering for all risks a local government may suffer. 5.4

Absence of Clear Implementation Guidelines for Risk Transfer at the Subnational or Local Level

Looking at the three (3) issues discussed previously, they pertain to the lack of a framework and methodology on how to mainstream risk options planning as part of local DRR planning. As emphasized in the previous sections, the national policy agenda on risk transfer as social protection measures have been formulated already. However, there is a large gap on policy implementation because concerned national agencies have yet to formulate clear implementation guidelines that will aid local governments on risk transfer options planning. A perusal of the following policy issuances will reveal that the mainstreaming of risk transfer as part of local DRR planning is not provided for: 1. COA Circular No. 2012-002 dated September 12, 2012, “Accounting and Reporting Guidelines for the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (LDRRMF) of Local Government Units (LGUs), National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (NDRRMF) given to LGUs and Receipts from Other Sources”12 ; 2. NDRRMC Joint Memorandum Circular No. 2013-1 dated March 25, 2013, “Allocation and Utilization of the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (LDRRMF)”; 3. DILG Memorandum Circular No. 2014-135 dated October 21, 2014, “Guidelines on the Formulation of Local Climate Change Action Plan (LCCAP)”; and, 4. DILG Memorandum Circular No. 2015-77 dated July 21, 2015, “Guidelines on Mainstreaming Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction in Local Development Planning”.13 12 Section 3.3 of COA Circular No. 2012-002 allows payment of insurance premiums on property and Accredited Community Disaster Volunteers. 13 Section 6.3 of MC 2015-77 at best mentions that “other sources of funding should be explored”, and not just the LDRRMF and PSF.

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These policy issuances are the possible entry points in the crafting of implementing guidelines on risk transfer for local governments. At the very least, these need to be reviewed for possible amendments.

6

Policy Recommendations on Risk Transfer

Gaps and issues on the lack of a mainstreaming framework and methodology need to be addressed to guide local governments like Quezon City as they mainstream risk transfer options planning as a means of addressing disaster impacts. The following policy recommendations therefore arise as a result of the gap analysis and identification of issues and barriers: 1. Concerned national agencies such as the DILG, COA, CCC, NDRRMC, and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) must jointly address this major policy implementation gap by formulating clear implementation guidelines on the utilization of the LDRRMF for risk transfer mechanisms. 2. The LDRRMF investment planning process must include a risk transfer options planning, and must also be synergized with the local property insurance expenditure planning by designating the LDRRMO as the lead planning department. 3. The hazard, vulnerability, and risk assessment process, together with a loss and damage framework that allows the targeting of vulnerable sectors at the local level, must completely inform risk transfer options planning by including a risk layering approach. These policy areas must be addressed to guide local governments as they identify financing solutions that apply the risk transfer approach. Being a relatively new policy area, local governments have to play it by ear, with no policy or even a recognized good practice, to guide them. Further research on the formulation of a framework and methodology on risk transfer options planning in relation to the local DRR planning process will surely help guide local governments as they strive to become more resilient.

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7

Conclusion

Quezon City is a highly urbanized premiere Philippine city with one of the highest local revenues. It has a large amount of financial resources that it can allocate for disaster financing and insurance, including risk transfer. Relative to other local governments, it has less need of intergovernmental fund transfer or subsidy from national government to address disaster risk financing. The policy gaps on risk transfer for them thus revolve around ensuring that an enabling policy environment is created to push local implementation. The DILG can lead and coordinate with other concerned agencies because it is also the Vice Chair for Preparedness as provided by RA 10121. Fiscal decentralization must be pursued, whether within the context of the shift to federalism or the push for greater funding for local disaster financing. Greater funds made available for local governments means more actions can be implemented to make communities more resilient to disaster impacts. Given the climate projections that disaster impacts will become more frequent and severe, vulnerable populations especially the poorest, will need all the social protection measures national and local governments can provide.

Bibliography Commission on Audit. 2018. “2017 Annual Financial Report: Local Government.” September 25. Retrieved February 27, 2019, from https://www.coa. gov.ph/phocadownload/userupload/Annual-Financial-Report/lgu/2017/ 2017_AFR_Local_Govt_Volume_I.pdf. Miao, Q. 2018. “Fiscal Implications of Managing Natural Disaster for National and Subnational Governments.” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Natural Hazard Science, April. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199389407. 013.194. Munich Re. n.d. “Countries by P&C Insurance Penetration 2013–2018.” Retrieved February 27, 2019, from https://natcatservice.munichre.com/? filter=eyJ5ZWFyRnJvbSI6MjAxMywieWVhclRvIjoyMDE4fQ%3D%3D& type=3. National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council. 2011. “National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan 2011–2028.” Retrieved November 5, 2018, from http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/ 41/NDRRM_Plan_2011-2028.pdf.

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National Economic Development Authority. 2016. “Philippine Development Plan, 2017–2022.” Retrieved November 10, 2018, from https://www.neda. gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Abridged-PDP-2017-2022_Upda ted-as-of-01052018.pdf. Quezon City and Earthquakes and Megacities Initiative. 2013. “Building a Disaster Resilient Quezon City Project, Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan 2014 to 2020.” Quezon City: Quezon City. http://libros.quezon citypubliclibrary.org:8080/jspui/handle/123456789/7237. Rosario, B. 2018. “Makati, Quezon and Manila Top Earners Among LGUs.” Manila Bulletin, November 6. UNDP. 2013. “Financing Local Responses to Climate Change.” Retrieved February 10, 2019, from http://www.asia-pacific.undp.org/content/dam/ rbap/docs/Research%20&%20Publications/democratic_governance/RBAPDG-2013-Financing-Local-Response-Climate-Change.pdf. UNFCCC. 2017. “Compendium on Comprehensive Risk Management Approaches.” March. Retrieved March 5, 2019, from https://unfccc.int/ sites/default/files/compendium_march_2017.pdf. ———. n.d. “Action Area 5 Questionnaire: Summary of Information Received from 28 Non-Annex I Parties.” Retrieved March 5, 2019, from https://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/groups_committees/loss_and_dam age_executive_committee/application/pdf/aa5_summary_parties.pdf. World Bank. 2010. “World Bank Documents and Reports.” Retrieved October 20, 2018, from Government Support to Agricultural Insurance: Challenges and Options for Developing Countries: http://documents.worldbank.org/ curated/en/698091468163160913/pdf/538810PUB0Gove101Official0U se0Only1.pdf. ———. 2014. “Financial Protection Against Natural Disasters: An Operational Framework for Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance.” Retrieved January 20, 2019, from https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/gfdrr/files/publication/Financ ial%20Protection%20Against%20Natural%20Disasters.pdf. ———. 2016. “Disaster Risk Finance as a Tool for Development: A Summary of Findings from the Disaster Risk Finance Impact Analytics Project.” Retrieved March 3, 2019, from https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/publication/ DisasterRisk.pdf. ———. 2017. “Philippine Disaster Risk Finance Country Note.” Retrieved February 10, 2019, from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/723 691502871473411/pdf/118685-REPLACEMENT-PUBLIC.pdf.

CHAPTER 16

Reforms and Ways Forward for Responsible Governance, Decentralization, and Equitable Development Maria Ela L. Atienza and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem

This book entitled A Better Metro Manila? Towards Responsible Governance, Decentralization and Equitable Development has highlighted the various successes as well as limitations of the decentralization experience of Metro Manila or the National Capital Region (NCR). These were examined in the following aspects: (1) social services delivery, i.e., health, education, housing, and water services; (2) urban development, i.e., flood mitigation, solid waste management, and urban farming; and (3) financing local governance, i.e., internal revenue allotment (IRA) and risk transfer mechanism. This concluding chapter, thus, brings forth the issues

M. E. L. Atienza (B) · T. S. E. Tadem Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] T. S. E. Tadem e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 T. S. E. Tadem and M. E. L. Atienza (eds.), A Better Metro Manila?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3_16

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and concerns which confront the decentralization efforts in the Philippines, particularly through the Local Government Code of 1991 (1991 LGC). More importantly, it maps out the general as well as specific themes for reforms and ways forward which each chapter has proposed for the decentralization process to push further the democratization process in the country for responsible local governance and equitable development.

1

Challenges to the Decentralization Efforts

In the area of the delivery of social services, a dominant and persistent challenge is the inefficient and ineffective delivery. There are a number of reasons. One is the inequitable human resources, budget, and facilities. In the health sector, for example, urban areas are enjoying more access to health facilities and personnel as compared to other regions in the country. But within Metro Manila, the poorer local government units (LGUs), e.g., Malabon and Navotas, have lesser access to health services delivery as compared to their richer counterparts, e.g., Quezon City, Makati and Manila. Within each LGU, poorer constituents have less access to quality services. A second aspect is the lack of funding for social services delivery. This holds true, for example, not only in health services but also with regard to socialized housing and solid waste management. These two factors are largely blamed on the following: (1) the inadequate amount of funds generated from the IRA; (2) the need to have adequate institutionalization of the decentralization processes in Metro Manila; and (3) the lack of prioritization of social services by some LGUs. Inadequate funds generated by the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). With regard to funding, since 1992 the root of the problem is the mismatch between the IRA and the cost of devolved functions (Atienza, Chapter 6). This is evident for example in the health status between the richer and poorer LGUs. Because of this, there is dependence on national government financing not only for social services but also urban development. This has brought about the following adverse consequences (Go, Chapter 5; Gomez and Pamittan, Chapter 4; and Panao, Chapter 14): (1) The inability of local governments to independently formulate and implement health programs and this may very well apply to other social services delivery; (2) Local revenue generation becoming less attractive and bringing forth fiscal dependency among LGUs; (3) Lesser spending by dependent LGUs on social and economic services, bringing forth

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continuing dependency on the central government and underdevelopment; and (4) Reliance on the political leadership for more funds for social services delivery. This, however, assumes that the local chief executive will determine what is his or her priority, e.g., health or education. There are also situations where LGUs may tap funds aside from the IRA which is allotted for social services delivery. In the case of education, this is the Special Education Fund (SEF) as stipulated by the 1991 LGC which can be tapped for the operation and maintenance of public schools. The issue, however, is that the SEF collection is not consistent (Go, Chapter 5). Moreover, as pointed out by Uy and Ocampo (Chapter 7), there is also the unevenness of the SEF with cities having a bigger SEF than the municipalities. For as long as there are inadequate funds for social services delivery, the studies have shown there will always be a danger of job displacement or lack of needed human resources in this area. Moreover, these will not be able to meet the needs of continuing urbanization and migration to Metro Manila. All of these have contributed to the poor quality of social services. Lack of institutional capacity for social services delivery. As for the institutional lack of capacity and capability in social services delivery, blame on this is also placed on local officials lacking expertise (Go, Chapter 5). Local government officials, for example, generally have no training or background to manage health or education. While these two fall under social services, they require specialized knowledge because the sectors are critical and technical (Atienza, Chapter 6). The lack of knowledge can also constrain grassroots involvement of the urban poor such as in the preparation of the Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP), which is time-consuming and requires technical knowledge (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13). The unevenness in capability and capacity is also manifested among LGUs, whereby they are not equal across Metro Manila socially, economically, and politically (Go, Chapter 5). There is also a more basic concern which is the unavailability of human resources, e.g., insufficient number of health personnel with poorer LGUs finding it difficult to recruit personnel (Go, Chapter 5; Atienza, Chapter 6). Another institutional problem is the inefficient local governance structures for social services delivery. For example, local health boards, local school boards, and Solid Waste Management Boards are not adequately organized or non-functional (Atienza, Chapter 6; Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). In the health and education sectors, it would help if the membership of the local health boards and local school boards

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will be expanded to involve more stakeholders in the health and education sectors, respectively (Go, Chapter 5). Lack of institutional support for social services delivery by LGUs is also blamed on non-prioritization of these services. This is also found nationally, whereby government agencies are found lacking in assisting social services delivery at the local level. It also does not help much that the national government has not allotted sufficient funds for social services delivery, e.g., not giving an adequate budget for the Universal Health Care Law which was supposed to benefit LGUs (Atienza, Chapter 6). A third institutional problem is the fragmented nature of social services delivery given either by the national government, the local government, or the private sector (Gomez et al., Chapter 3). This aggravates further the situation where one has an NCR governance structure consisting of 17 LGUs and all of its barangays and a second-tier authority such as the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA). What emerges here are also the institutional unevenness and disparities in the efficiency and effectiveness of the delivery of social services which has led to its deterioration (Gomez and Pamittan, Chapter 4). In the area of urban development, the institutional unevenness in the implementation of urban land use planning has brought about economic growth and environmental integrity components undermining matters of social equity (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 12). A reason for this shortcoming may be due to the absence of legislation or integrated framework with regard to social services delivery and urban development. In the case of urban agriculture, for example, there tends to be multiple and overlapping projects and offices responsible for urban farming at the local level (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13). An integrated approach is also needed in solid waste management to enable local governments to be more effective and cost-saving (Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). Institutionalizing popular participation is a fourth problem found in the current decentralization experience of Metro Manila. As noted, the 1991 LGC institutionalized several mechanisms for people’s participation in local governance. These include the formation of local multisectoral bodies which also include civil society representatives, the inclusion of sectoral representatives in the local legislative councils, allowing the process of citizens’ initiative in local legislation, as well as strengthening the recall system for elected officials. All of these, however, have not yet been fully utilized (Go, Chapter 5; Arcilla, Chapter 8). Needless to say, the ones at the losing end of this shortcoming are the

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urban poor and other marginalized sectors who are unable to participate in governance mechanisms affecting them. For example, urban farming projects are designed in a way which are not aligned with the needs of the residents and urban farmers at the local level (Saguin and Cagampagn, Chapter 13). Aggravating the issue is the power of the private sector to influence or dictate development goals and strategies (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13). As for solid waste management, the lack of participation has led to the absence of popular involvement in promoting solid waste management, and the general public’s limited awareness of sorting and segregation, as well as waste disposal (Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). An adverse impact of the failure to incorporate popular participation in the decentralization process has given the LGUs the monopoly to prioritize which social services are important or not, for example, choosing whether to spend more for health or education. A consequence which may emerge is the politicization of social services delivery and urban development. In the former, local government officials can exploit services for credit-claiming, patronage, and corruption. Furthermore, local politicians also do not like to implement policies on social services delivery which might adversely affect their political careers (Atienza, Chapter 6; Go, Chapter 5). Those who get to participate and represent civil society interests in land use and other development planning processes are generally those with established connections or aligned ideologies with the local government (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13). As noted, in the absence of an institutionalized framework or an ordinance for most LGUs, urban agriculture projects tend to be led on a project basis that may or may not be sustained by succeeding administrations with a different agenda or goal (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13). Other concerns adversely impacting on social services delivery and urban development. There are other concerns which adversely impact on social services delivery and urban development. One is with regard to health concerns where there is the reality of unhealthy kids who may either be underweight or obese and groups of constituents who lack access to health services due to discrimination, e.g., Muslim migrants. Social services are also dependent on each other’s availability, i.e., for health services, water service is needed for sanitation and hygiene facilities. There is also the reality of the adverse impact of COVID-19 on regular social services delivery. In the case of health, the pandemic has brought to general public attention what are the pre-existing problems

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that intensified due to COVID-19, i.e., the lack of both basic supplies like masks and alcohol as well as specialized supplies like oxygen, ventilators, and personal protective equipments (Atienza, Chapter 6). As for urban development, there is the persistent adverse impact of the increasing population and urbanization. These have brought about, for example, an ever-present crisis in solid waste management (Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). Population increase and rapid urbanization have also brought about unhindered land conversion which has dramatically reduced the space for urban farming. Such an adverse situation for urban farming is also aggravated by the suitability of land in Metro Manila for farming. It is also not helped much by unfavorable environmental conditions. For example, air pollution has created a secondary challenge in farming in the city (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13).

2 Toward Responsible Governance and Challenges Confronting Decentralization Although there have been incremental steps taken in confronting the challenges of the decentralization process in Metro Manila which include a bigger IRA share, increase in participation in local governance brought about by devolution, and the implementation as well as legislation strengthening national agencies affecting social services delivery at the local level, the realization is that there is the urgent need to bring forth further solutions to these challenges. It is imperative, therefore, that after more than three decades, the succeeding reviews of the 1991 LGC, particularly by Congress and the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), should produce tangible outputs in the form of actual amendments to reflect the present demands of local governments (Go, Chapter 3). Specific reviews can also be followed through, for example in the health and education sectors, to look at the weak points and areas of improvements with regard to the aspect of social services delivery in the cities and one municipality in Metro Manila (Go, Chapter 3). In reviewing the 1991 LGC for possible amendments, it is pertinent to reexamine the various frameworks of multilevel governance. As noted in Gomez et al. (Chapter 3), these include metropolitan arrangements and federalism. In choosing the best multilevel governance (MLG) solution to problems of decentralization in the country based on the experience of Metro Manila, the following guidelines have been proposed (Gomez

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and Pamittan, Chapter 4): first, look into the best practices of successful cities utilizing the MLG model; and second, examine the performance of an LGUs’ vis-à-vis other LGUs which could highlight their relative strengths, areas for improvement, and potential to become prospective hubs for certain public services and specialized functions. This could also contribute to the formation of a template for how other regions could operate in the context of decentralization and improve the accuracy and coordination of LGUs with each other with regard to their own collated data on delivery of public services. This may also require the LGUs’ organizational coordination. By doing this, possible gaps identified in the social services delivery sector, e.g., health and education, may be addressed. It would also be beneficial to look at metropolitan arrangements elsewhere, especially in Asia where China, Japan, and South Korea have metropolitan governments, and their suitability for NCR. As noted by Tabios (Chapter 11), the challenges to multilevel governance is best undertaken using a transdisciplinary approach to decentralization whereby traditional science is not seen as a standalone discipline which can bright forth solutions to the problem of social services delivery or urban development. Solutions to flooding is best combined with the use of sustainability science which relates the problem to its natural environment, e.g., flora and fauna, and to people. Thus, the transdisciplinary approach includes both natural and social sciences in addressing the needs of the global and human systems (Tabios, Chapter 11). As noted by this volume, the focus is on Metro Manila since there is a need for Philippine policymakers to recognize the distinctiveness of Metro Manila as a region and national capital. Reality shows that Metro Manila, also known as NCR, is a class of its own and thus must be accorded with special powers, functions, and governance structures that would enable it to stand alongside other modern capital regions in the world (Gomez et al., Chap. 3; Gomez and Pamittan, Chapter 4; Go, Chapter 3:). Not only does NCR continue to be the most economically developed and resource-rich region in the country but it has also consistently had the highest basic and functional literacy rates among all regions (Uy and Ocampo, Chapter 7). Metro Manila in return can also promote “the best practices in the cities and assist replicating them in other cities and municipalities” (Go, Chapter 3). Also of importance is that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to development in contemporary governance as this is shaped by the complexity of the metropolitan arrangements created by the confluence of geographical, historical, political, economic, and

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geospatial considerations (Gomez et al., Chapter 3; Gomez and Pamittan, Chapter 4). Because of this, the multilevel governance for Metro Manila must build on its rich experience of urbanization, regionalization, and decentralization. Of significance too is that this should reflect how the characteristics, functions, structures, and other elements of a new or reformed governance entity would materialize (Gomez et al., Chapter 3). 2.1

Strengthening the Institutional Framework for Responsible Governance

In the case of Metro Manila, therefore, the case studies in this book generally agree that there is a need to strengthen the institutional framework for decentralization to make it more effective and efficient. This is also largely doable in the current setup of devolution as stipulated in the 1991 LGC although the studies also noted room for improvement which can be attained through amendments. Proposals have also been laid forward on how to tap further metropolitan arrangements and even the possibility that the country will shift to a federal form of government. A caution is, however, thrown in that a “big bang” approach to decentralization rarely works. That is, it will take time, effort and resources in planning. Moreover, there should be accountability, good governance, and participation at multiple levels of government (Uy and Ocampo, Chapter 7). For social services delivery, there should be development of indicators to further its effectiveness and efficiency. In the case of socialized housing, for example, there are indicators for affordability which will incorporate the effects of relocation and post-relocation on net household incomes (Arcilla, Chapter 8). A number of proposals have also been put forward with regard to improving urban development at the local level. With regard to urban farming (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13), for example, local governments should continue encouraging every barangay to dedicate a piece of land, including rooftops and walls, for urban farming. LGUs can also strike an agreement or memorandum of understanding with private landowners to engage in urban farming or to make use of the latter’s vacant lots in subdivisions for this endeavor. Best practices among LGUs with regard to social services delivery and urban development could also be popularized. As for solid waste management, the cities with best practices are Quezon City, Marikina, and Pasig with the latter two stressing the importance of popular participation (Rebullida and

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Taguibao, Chapter 12). It was also noted that there must also be that tight link between the local and national governments with regard to a more comprehensive plan for social services delivery and urban development. It would help, for example in the health and education sectors, that “the core and supplementary functions of cities and municipalities” in these sectors be specified (Go, Chapter 5). Given these various proposals to improve social services delivery and urban development, there are various aspects which can be tapped to attain these institutionally. These include the following: (1) national laws which strengthen local governance; (2) international laws which strengthen local governance; (3) enhancing the working relationship between the national and local governments; (4) rethinking the national policy of privatization which adversely impact on local governance; (5) institutionalizing initiatives from above which enhances the decentralization process; (6) utilizing the role of the national government in this endeavor; (7) pursuing metropolitan arrangements to improve local governance; and (8) federalism or quasi-forms of federalism as an option to improve local governance. National laws which strengthen local governance. There are national laws which may help to strengthen local governance. One only has to look at the 1987 Constitution which enshrines the principles of the devolution of power and people empowerment. In terms of solid waste management, for example, the charter acknowledges the state’s responsibility in protecting and advancing the people’s right to a “balanced and healthful ecology” (Art. 2s.16) (Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). The 1987 Constitution also recognizes that local government autonomy can only be fulfilled if local governments are given fiscal and financial powers, among others (Art. 2s.25; Art.10). There is still much to be desired with regard to this matter (Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). There are also national laws which have been implemented to realize the mandates of the 1991 LGC. In the area of solid waste management, for example, the Congress passed Republic Act No. 9003, or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act, on 20 December 2000. This, unfortunately, still has to be effectively implemented. Executive orders (EOs) which enhance local governance have also been issued. In the case of urban farming, EO 26 and EO 193 established the National Greening Program and its expansion respectively. These mandate “local government units to establish nurseries that often serve as source for seedlings for garden projects…” (Sagiun and Cagampan, Chapter 13).

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As for solid waste management support at the local level, EO 146 (1999) “created the Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee to improve collection and disposal of solid waste, among other region-wide services” (Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). The issue now is to hold LGUs to comply with these national laws and EOs. RA 9003, for example, prescribes key areas of implementation in order to accomplish the objectives of the solid waste management policy. It also established specific conditions by which this would be implemented, monitored, and evaluated at the various LGU levels. But majority of the LGUs still have to comply with this (Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). Another challenge is also when national laws conflict with the powers of the LGUs as in the case of LGUs and the MMDA with regard to the implementation of RA 9003. MMDA, in general, “does not have political powers over its cities and barangays ” (Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). Another example is the Clean Air Act of 1999, or RA No. 8749, which conflicts with RA 9003. This is because the former has banned incineration, halting plans for its use in solid waste management. A result has been the increasing volume of wastes and prevalence of plastic and organic wastes (Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). More recently, this June 2021, the Office of the President issued EO No. 138 which signals the full devolution of basic services and facilities from the national government to the LGUs, as mandated by the 1991 LGC and other national laws, starting 2022. This includes the increased share of LGUs in all national taxes and revenues following the Supreme Court’s Mandanas-Garcia ruling in 2018 and 2019. The EO is supposed to ensure that the transition will be carried out systematically and smoothly. A Committee on Devolution was created to oversee and monitor the implementation of the EO. There is supposedly particular focus on assisting lower income LGUs in capacity building to carry out their functions and services. It also proposed to Congress a Growth Equity Fund to cover funding requirements for poor, disadvantaged, and lagging behind LGUs. However, there is no mention of proposing amendments to the 1991 LGC which could help in fulfilling the EO’s goals, including greater coordination among LGUs and metropolitan areas like Metro Manila. A Growth Equity Fund has already been created by Congress. But even in 2022, experts and some government officials are proposing extending the timeline for the devolution of some functions to LGUs, citing the need to strengthen the latter’s capacity.

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International laws which strengthen local governance. There are also international laws which strengthen local governance as these are incorporated into national laws and transmitted to LGUs for localization. In the case of solid waste management, for example, there are UN documents which have strengthened the need to address sustainable development through effective solid waste management. An example of this is the UN Millennium Development Goals 2000–2015 (MDGs), followed by the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2015–2030 (UN 2015). With the inter-linking of development and environment, SDG Goal 11 Target 11.6 specifically addresses the adverse impact on the environment by the improper handling of urban solid wastes (Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). At the national level, the SDGs’ implementation is embedded in the national development framework, “Ambisyon Natin 2040” (Vision Mission), and the Philippine Development Plan 2017–2022 (NEDA 2016) (Rebullia and Taguibao, Chapter 12). Working relationship between the national and local governments. For both social services delivery and urban development, there is a need for the national and local governments to work together in coming out with a national agenda which encompasses other linked issues. For example, in the area of urban farming (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13), this is best pursued within an urban development agenda which requires a more systematic planning that “includes other related urban issues such as food security, poverty, health, waste, climate change… and the right urban land tenure”. In relation to this, the national and local governments should recognize that there is a need to emphasize urban farming’s place in land use and development plans and to recognize the diverse types of urban farming in the cities beyond vertical farming as the default model (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13). As noted, there are pending bills in Congress which seek to provide an overall development plan such as the proposed Integrated Urban Agriculture Act. These bills seek to set the framework for urban farming in the Philippines but they are still pending in Congress (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13). Local governments and privatization. There is a need to reconsider and rethink development plans conceptualized and implemented at the national level which adversely impact the local level. An example of this is the national policy of privatization, particularly of basic utilities such as water and energy. This volume tackles the problem which the former has brought to local governance (See Tadem and Tadem, Chapter 9). As

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noted in Gomez et al. (Chapter 3), the 1991 LGC has “to grapple with neo-liberal forms of deregulation, privatization, and economic liberalization” which have brought forth the development strategy of privatization. The national government has seen this as a prerequisite for positioning the country in general and Metro Manila in particular in the global economy, a trend which already emerged during the American colonial period (Caoili 1999; Manasan 2017). With privatization, the country’s economic landscape is being shaped by its role in the international market in the bigger context of international economic liberalization. Consequently, politico-administrative changes have emerged to complement this. A result is that LGUs and even the national government are relegated to the background as the wave of privatization in the 1990s witnessed private concessionaires at the forefront as social service providers such as in the electricity and water sectors (Reyes 1998 as cited in Gomez et al., Chapter 3). The push for institutionalization from the national government. A reality too is that national government policies and actions can also help to institutionalize further decentralization processes. In the case of the proposed amendments to the 1987 Constitution, for example, the Inter-Agency Task Force headed by DILG during the Duterte administration pursued amendments in the Code and the Constitution like making the financial transfers’ distribution formula based on need as well as good performance and empowering Regional Development Councils (RDCs) to become actual planning and implementing authorities (Atienza, Chapter 6). Hopefully, after COVID-19 and the 2022 elections, these proposed amendments to the 1991 Code can be pushed again. However, based on the aborted federalism agenda of the Duterte administration, it is advisable for the national government to genuinely consult with different stakeholders in the decentralization process; otherwise, there will not be enough support for reforms at both national and local levels. In the health sector, which may very well apply also to other social services sectors, it would be advisable for future research aimed at policy reforms to include views of concerned stakeholders; this includes the local government officials, health workers, and health-focused civil society groups as well as to conduct FGDs in Metro Manila to get people’s own views about health status and access to health services in their LGUs and Metro Manila, especially with COVID-19 which has threatened rich and poor alike (Atienza, Chapter 6). These inputs should

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be the basis of crafting national policies supporting the decentralization process. COVID-19 has also pushed LGUs, especially Metro Manila LGUs, to coordinate actions more closely to deal with the pandemic since 2020, giving fresh support for strengthening regional, metropolitan, and inter-LGU arrangements. The role of national government agencies. National agencies also have a role to perform in enhancing further a more effective and efficient institutional strengthening in LGUs through national policies. The Department of Health (DOH), for example, has been making the necessary adjustments to make health devolution work. A major reform commitment is the Health Sector Reform Agenda which introduced “the revitalization of the district health system or inter-local health zones (ILHZs) to address fragmentation since devolution” (Atienza, Chapter 6). In the case of urban farming, urban agriculture is central to the Department of Education’s Gulayan sa Paaralan Program and the Department of Social Welfare and Development’s Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps), the conditional cash transfer program which has recently also become a law. The Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) provide farm inputs and seminars or technical assistance to local governments (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13). The pandemic has also brought to the public’s attention the importance of ensuring food security, which the Plant, Plant, Plant program of the DA aims to address (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13). These agencies can be mobilized to pressure local governments to host forms of state-initiated urban gardening projects which are still to be implemented by majority of the Metro Manila LGUs (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13). In the health and education sectors, at the forefront of assisting LGUs are the DOH and Department of Education (DepEd), especially in terms of strengthening local capacities and capabilities and implementing programs and projects from the national level (Go, Chapter 3). Metropolitan arrangements among LGUs. Enhancing metropolitan arrangements can also further strengthen the institutionalization of the decentralization processes. For this to be effective, however, the following actions should be pursued (Gomez et al. Chapter 3). First, the concerned LGUs which would like to enter into metropolitan arrangements should be aware of and agree on the possible financial contribution this will

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entail and the opportunity costs of such participation. Second, both technical and political support is needed from the local governments and the constituents themselves with regard to this endeavor. Finally, the pursued metropolitan arrangement should take into consideration the interest and the role of the national government. In urban farming, for example, because “urban agriculture requires a stronger institutional underpinning beyond piecemeal and often disjointed projects by local government”,… “intra-LGU coordination and planning is necessary to ensure spatial continuity and encourage mutual learning among different cities” (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13). This joint action becomes more pertinent given that “the links between decentralization, governance structures and land use need to be considered” especially in Metro Manila (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13). With regard to possible metropolitan arrangements in the fiscal area, a proposal is that for the use of the IRA, LGUs could pool their resources together in order to have a more significant impact. This is instead of them engaging in the same program individually and spending the same amount of resources to start and maintain that program (Panao, Chapter 14). Another urban development challenge which calls for metropolitan arrangements in Metro Manila is flood mitigation. As noted by Tabios (Chapter 10), “Metro Manila has several highly urbanized river basins and the Pasig-Marikina River basin in particular is the major one that runs through a large portion of Metro Manila” (Tabios, Chapter 10). The proposal therefore is to discuss a holistic flood risk management which takes into consideration sustainability science and the transdisciplinary approach. This will consider the three major factors contributing to flooding, namely, meteorological factors, hydrological factors, and human factors, i.e., socio-economic and even political development (Tabios, Chapter 10). Of consideration here is the implementation of the LGUs of Integrated Flood Management advocated by the World Meteorological Organization-Global Water Partnership. Tabios (Chapter 10) also gives the following recommendations for LGUs to consider in their metropolitan arrangements, namely conducting flood studies on future land use changes, proper land use planning, and flood plan zoning; reassessing and reengineering the flood control infrastructure, seriously and properly implementing local flood drainage design standards; improving flood control plans; operationalizing real-time rainfall prediction; and pursuing a holistic flood risk management.

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There are also metropolitan arrangements which need the national government. This is the case of the search for alternative sources of water which require large-scale, bulk water supply and therefore, a large-scale operational strategy is necessary to meet the increasing water demand in Metro Manila. There is a need to bring in the national government and the concerned LGUs to work closely together. For this metropolitan arrangement to be considered a success, several factors should be taken into consideration by all the parties involved (Tabios, Chapter 10). First, Metro Manila should develop new water sources. Second, due to the changing environment, LGUs should pursue adaptive planning and continuous updating of water resources. Finally, Metro Manila must embark on studies on project sequencing and staging of water projects. Metropolitan arrangements can also be problematic as seen in the experience of solid waste management. Nationwide, although “a number of municipalities have increased their efforts to convert and rehabilitate dumpsites, open dumpsites still proliferate despite agreements of communal sharing of sanitary landfills of adjacent municipalities and cities” (Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). What makes metropolitan arrangements also difficult is when it involves multidimensional projects like urban agriculture. Although coordination exists, of consideration are the differences which may still ensue and hamper the integration of these projects. For example, some LGUs may have agricultural offices while others have environmental offices, often with different thrusts (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13). For urban agriculture, for example, LGUs may have “their own own individual urban agriculture projects with different goals and strategies; scaling up urban farming to a metropolitan scale remains a challenge. Spaces that extend beyond one LGU may be managed differently by adjoining cities” (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13). It is best, therefore, to examine the advantages and disadvantages of metropolitan arrangements given the nature of the social services delivery or urban development needed. There are also situations whereby the national government has enforced metropolitan arrangements with regard to delivery of certain social services. This is seen in the case, for example, of the MMDA which “formulates and implements metro-wide policies, standards, programs and projects for proper sanitary waste disposal, sanitary landfill, and recycling” (Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). What is important is to examine whether such metropolitan arrangements, imposed from above, enhance further the decentralization process.

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Crisis can also bring forth the need for metropolitan arrangements. The pandemic, for example, has brought the need for NCR mayors to address the metro-wide problems it has brought about as one geographical area (Atienza, Chapter 6). Taking note, therefore, of the benefits as well as challenges which can result from metropolitan arrangements, “it is still possible to discuss the possibilities as well as the issues of creating a metropolitan Metro Manila regional government”. A “regionally elected body may be able to address some of the common issues faced by Metro Manila LGUs, including in the area of health service delivery” (Atienza, Chapter 6). The creation of a regional metropolitan body for Metro Manila even without the full shift to a federal form for the entire country, however, will require amendments in Article X of the 1987 Constitution which currently mandates the creation of only two autonomous regional governments, one in Muslim Mindanao and one in the Cordilleras (Atienza, Chapter 6). This may also create the need to also amend certain sections in the 1991 LGC, which is already ripe for a number of amendments given three decades of implementation, periodic Congressional reviews, and existing proposals for amendments. Strengthening institutions of local governance through a federal form of government. Aside from metropolitan arrangements, the option of strengthening of institutions of local governance through a federal form of government has been evaluated and/or proposed by some of the book’s chapters. A caveat here is that in doing so, NCR, because of its distinctiveness from the rest of the other regions in the country, should not be tied by rigid constitutional frameworks (Gomez et al. Chapter 3). In relation to this, the gradations between regions must be recognized so that more appropriate governance mechanisms could be tailor-fitted to local contexts. LGUs, for example, are classified into municipalities, component cities, and independent chartered cities, while there is a separate class for highly urbanized cities (Gomez et al. Chapter 3). The best candidate by which a federal or semi-federal arrangement could be tried is the NCR given the support it gets from the national government and “whose constituent LGUs are among the most equipped and experienced to carry out wide-scale reforms” (Gomez et al., Chapter 3). Metro Manila could also learn from the lessons of other territories “whose experiences demonstrate the vital importance of taking unique needs and circumstances into consideration in all models of governance” (Gomez et al. Chapter 3). In the health sector, for example, there

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is already “a pool of exemplary local health innovations, even from municipal cases, but more needs to be done”. Metro Manila LGUs can also learn “from best practices from other LGUs in the country that can be adjusted in an urban setting” (Atienza, Chapter 6). More experiences in regional and inter-LGU cooperation in combatting COVID-19 and its effects can contribute to this learning process. A federal or semi-federal form of governance structure for Metro Manila would require structural and/or institutional changes at various levels of government. In the health sector, for example, this would require a number of things, namely (1) the scaling up of exemplary and innovative health programs at the regional/state level; (2) the creation of new regional venues and multiple access points for participation and advocacies at the regional level; and, (3) consideration of the economies of scale argument for more resources at the regional government level and higher health budget (Atienza, Chapter 6). Of importance too is that the disparity or inequality in health services across geographic and political units, even in Metro Manila, must be addressed through better intergovernmental coordination mechanisms and federal or national legislation that punish inefficiencies and abuses (Atienza, Chap. 6). In attaining all of these, complementary changes or reforms are also needed in the laws governing electoral systems, political parties, anti-poverty programs, accountability and good governance, etc. (Atienza, Chapter 6). A holistic approach combined with institutional and structural approach, therefore, is needed in bringing forth a more effective social service delivery not only for the health sector but the other sectors as well. With regard to shifting to a federal form of government, a concern is raised with the current devolved setup of the country, particularly with the scope and coverage of the interactions between the national agencies, MMDA, and LGUs which must be strengthened (Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). In the case of solid waste management, the shortfalls of the unitary devolved setup are “manageable through the national agencies’ directives to MMDA and the LGUs, and inter-governmental collaborative ventures for effective solid waste management” (Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). Under a federal form of government, the MMDA’s mandate “for solid waste disposal sites and systems” and “its ability to coordinate metro-wide ecological solid waste management must be intensified, particularly for economies of scale in waste reduction and recycling”. Prioritizing solid waste management through an integrated

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approach enables local governments to target more effective waste collection and disposal activities while considering cost minimization through more responsive planning (Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). Related to this are a number of institutional reforms also proposed if ever the country shifts to a federal form (Ocampo and Uy, Chapter 7; Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). One is that there should be sufficient technical knowledge and personnel resources at the regional and local levels which would also require a strong civil service and continuous human resource development. This should also be complemented with the allotment of more financial and other resources. There is also a need for the monitoring of quality standards for service delivery across states by the federal government agencies and other watchdogs. This would also require coordination between central, state, and local levels to avoid fragmentation and deadlock. And lastly, there should be development of alternative institutional and financial models. In addressing all of these concerns, one has to thresh out the power of the federal government as well as its established regional or state governments. For the latter, one should define its powers and functions and relation to the federal and local governments. This is the single most crucial element in any shift from a unitary to a federal system (Uy and Ocampo, Chapter 7). With regard to basic education governance, it was observed that in the specific provisions of the draft Bayanihan Federalism Constitution, the federal government has exclusive power in basic education, which continues the status quo as all key responsibilities and resources will remain with the national or federal government (Uy and Ocampo, Chapter 7). However, basic education should be a shared power between the federal government and federated regions (Uy and Ocampo, Chapter 7). Related to this are the shared powers between the regional governments and city or municipal governments with regard to social services. The question in institutional design is whether such an arrangement will be uniform throughout the country or will it be left to the dictates of each federated region (Uy and Ocampo, Chapter 7). A lot of discussions have, therefore, emerged with regard to the issue of regionalization. This is particularly in terms of discussing issues of coordination and shared responsibilities as well as which levels of government will have powers and responsibilities over certain services and functions, including health services (Atienza, Chapter 6). Unfortunately, the draft Bayanihan constitution is silent on how responsibility over health services is to be shared or distributed among the different levels of government.

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The application of how the relationship of the different layers of government in a federal form of government, i.e., national or federal government, intermediate levels of government (state or regional governments), and tiers of LGUs will also most likely affect Metro Manila-wide agencies like the MMDA. The federal setup offers a stronger midtier politico-administrative authority. As for the subnational regional or state government, this will have executive, legislative, and administrative powers over local governments. In this context, for solid waste management and other services, the MMDA must be reconsidered in any federal setup. In the proposed federal setup, there are prospects that the MMDA will be “transformed to a mid-tier regional government, instead of a regional administrative government agency for Metro Manila or NCR”. Whether in a devolved or federal setup, the solid waste management issues to be resolved will remain the same (Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). As for the fiscal problems under the proposed Bayanihan Constitution, there remains a question to what extent these proposals will remedy the problems under the present scheme. It was noted that the taxes that federated regions can collect under the proposed charter, for instance, are essentially no different from those already available to local governments under the LGC. Moreover, despite the explicit listing of what regions can tax, the draft is silent to what extent these revenue powers are available to the provinces, cities, and municipalities. Furthermore, “the lack of a clear delineation of what subsidiary units can and cannot do implies that problems raised against the current decentralization scheme under the Local Government Code, such as duplication and under-provision of services, will likely persist in the proposed federalist system”. The problem which this ambiguity implies, therefore, is that “as with the status quo, politicians can still easily divert to the central government accountability for their own underservice or underperformance” (Panao, Chapter 14). It is also important to look at the proposed federal setup’s Federal Intergovernmental Commission. As noted, the Commission “has wide leeway in determining which regions are entitled to aid and by how much, to ensure ‘financial viability and economic sustainability’”. What it implies, therefore, is that the design of the equalization, like the pork barrel, “can be used as a political tool”. The reality, therefore, is that fiscal decentralization in the proposed framework “is one where the central government still shoulders the bulk of local government expenditures”

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(Panao, Chapter 14). What emerges, therefore, is that the Duterte administration was advocating (at least until 2019) a shift to a federal system through charter change but fiscal decentralization under its proposed design seemingly fails to address persisting problems and criticisms in the current decentralization scheme (Panao, Chapter 14). 2.2

Decentralization, Equity, and Popular Participation

With regard to decentralization, equity, and popular participation, as stated in Chapter 1, a primary objective before an alternative governance framework is proposed is an agenda for change, i.e., poverty reduction, welfare, and general development (Gomez et al., Chapter 3; Gomez and Pamittan, Chapter 4). The most vulnerable sector in Metro Manila still remains to be the poor, marginalized and informal settlers of which the inaccessibility of social services and equitable development have generally deprived them of their dignity. There is thus a need to empower them in the areas of health, education, socialized housing, water services, and other services. This is guided, as mentioned in Chapter 1, by the human security framework which includes economic, food, health, the environment, among other dimensions with emphasis on both topdown protection and bottom-up empowerment approaches (See Atienza, Chapter 6) and the human rights approach (See Arcilla, Chapter 8) which focuses on the right of every individual to social services such as affordable housing. Taking this into consideration, any proposed new system must help to improve equity and not lead to greater inequality and marginalization (Ocampo and Uy, Chapter 7). For socialized housing, this means that there should be affordable housing which is not addressed by the current dominant approach to socialized housing that stresses on private production of off-city resettlement. Such an approach fails to account for livelihood displacement, increased transportation and living costs, and social service inaccessibility (Arcilla, Chapter 8). The target of these social services should generally be the marginalized sectors of society. In the case of socialized housing, the proposal is “to provide well-targeted income-based subsidies for the poor and institute income-restoration mechanisms” as well as “recognize affordable and decent in-city housing as a significant component of a comprehensive poverty-reduction program” (Arcilla, Chapter 8). In the case of urban farming (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13), “there is a

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need to enhance access by the urban poor to these vacant lands, especially given the lack of space in densely-packed informal settlements”. Improving access to land is not the only challenge but the poor should also have access to inputs and resources to realize the nutritional and income benefits of urban farming. For both social services delivery and urban development, the national and local governments should develop together a clear and integrated framework for their goals and objectives as well as their operationalization to attain equitable development. In the case of urban farming, for example, this framework involves the issue of employment generation which is based on equity. This calls for developing a clear and integrated framework on employment generation based on equitable urban and regional agricultural development (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13). Best practices addressing the needs of the poor could also be highlighted. In the case of solid waste management, for example, Quezon City is referred to as a model in the upliftment of urban poor scavengers-waste pickers (Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). National laws which promote equity and popular participation. There are national laws which could also be tapped to strengthen popular participation under a decentralized form of government. This, for example, can be found in the 1987 Constitution which specifically calls for popular participation and affirms the engagement of civil society, among others. Moreover, it recognizes their participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-making, with adequate control mechanisms to be established. As for urban farming, institutional support for strengthened equity in land use and urban development has been incorporated in various policies and urban agenda in the Philippines which emphasized the concerns, participation, and involvement in decision-making of the marginalized and underprivileged (HLURB 2013; HLURB 2017 in Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13). In the area of socialized housing, the Urban Development and Housing Act created the then Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development (DHSUD) to facilitate the provision of affordable housing (Arcilla, Chapter 8). The IRA and equity. With regard to the financing capabilities of the LGUs because richer LGUs have bigger IRA shares compared to poor LGUs, the proposal is to widen the tax-raising power of local governments, and to come up with a transfer scheme that takes into account the disparities in the revenue raising capacity and potential of LGUs. As

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noted by Panao (Chapter 14), this option is possible within the context of existing institutions without resorting to constitutional redesign. An example is amending the 1991 LGC “to introduce a transfer scheme that takes into account the disparities in the revenue raising capacity and potential of local government units” (Panao, Chapter 14). As noted further by Atienza (Chapter 6), there is a longstanding proposal to revise the current IRA distribution formula (which should now be called national tax allotment) to LGUs not only to reflect the scale of devolved responsibilities but also just equity and performance. What has to be addressed is the current local fiscal setup which is characterized by vertical fiscal gaps due to, among others, inappropriate assignment of expenditure responsibilities to local units, heavily centralized taxing scheme, and a system that leaves little room for local governments to exercise revenue creation (Atienza et al. 2020; Morgan and Trinh 2016, in Panao, Chapter 14). A suggestion is that in lieu of the IRA, it may be necessary to come up with a fiscal equalization program that weighs each LGU’s capacity to raise revenues from local tax bases to a national standard level, and compensates only the expenditures and costs that are due to inherent disabilities, e.g., an LGU is geographically isolated or is located in a disaster or conflict area) (Panao, Chapter 14). Alternative sources of revenues can also be harnessed by the LGUs as stipulated in the 1991 LGC, such as Secs. 129 and 186 (Panao, Chapter 14). In the health sector, a suggestion is the creation of a special fund for health, similar to the special education fund (SEF). After all, health is the biggest service devolved under the 1991 LGC. This is to avoid competing for funding with other social development programs of the local governments. Furthermore, “the coverage of special education fund utilisation should be broadened to reflect the current spending patterns of local governments” (Go, Chapter 5). Another strategy to generate income for LGUs particularly for those that are lesser endowed is the Local Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance (DRFI) Strategy. This strategy is formulated “by tilting the balance toward risk transfer by increasing the reliance on external sources of financing, such as local insurance, so that its vulnerable communities may avail of ready funding for disaster recovery” (dela Torre and Alampay, Chapter 15). This scheme also seeks to address one of the underlying reasons for the previous call to shift to a federal system which is “the

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lack of access to financial resources by local governments because government funds are mostly controlled by national government” (dela Torre and Alampay, Chapter 15). For this financing strategy to work, what is needed is sufficient forecasting and data coverage, e.g., weather services and sufficient financial and human resources as well as sufficient institutional frameworks to integrate climate data into policymaking as well as systematic or complete data. There should also be clear implementation guidelines for risk transfer at the subnational or local level. There could also be other policy recommendations (de la Torre and Alampay, Chapter 15). One is that concerned national agencies such as the DILG and the Commission on Audit (COA) must jointly address this major policy implementation gap by formulating clear implementation guidelines on the utilization of the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (LDRRMF) for risk transfer mechanisms. Related to this is that the LDRRMF investment planning process must include a risk transfer options planning and that the hazard, vulnerability and risk assessment process must completely inform risk transfer options planning by including a risk layering approach. And lastly, further research on the formulation of a framework and methodology on risk transfer options planning in relation to the LDRRM planning process will surely help to guide local governments as they strive to become more resilient. Privatization, local governance, and development. As regards development strategies to generate income at the national level which will trickle to the local levels, privatization was deemed to play an important role. Aside from bailing out the national government from the debts it had incurred with regard to basic social services like electricity and water, the solution was best to leave this to private concessionaires, i.e., a conglomerate of local and foreign investors who could raise enormous funds for this endeavor. But as pointed out by Panganiban (1998, 136), “while privatization appears to be an efficient solution, it has political repercussions in terms of the escalation of prices, removal of socialized pricing structure which provides subsidy for the poor”. The privatization experience of the Philippines, particularly in the water sector, has proven this observation to be true, thus the move to reclaim public services by local governments and their respective communities (Tadem and Tadem, Chapter 9). In the case of the water sector, the guiding principle is that water should not be viewed as a commodity controlled by the private sector solely for profit. Emphasis is also placed on the regulatory role

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of the government at various levels. This addresses the concerns raised by the human security and human rights frameworks where water is a dimension of human security and a basic human right of individuals to a basic utility. A way to implement this, therefore, is through a publicpublic partnership (PuP) involving the collaboration among public sector agencies in preventing privatization of water utilities (Tadem and Tadem, Chapter 9). Strengthening popular participation. As stated in the theme of this book, responsible governance and decentralization should not merely address effectiveness and efficiency, but also equity. As embodied in the 1991 LGC, this is only made possible when there is popular participation. There has to be a synergistic approach to LGUs where they are more open to stakeholders, especially nongovernmental organizations and people’s organizations, for assistance and support in carrying out social services delivery like health and education-related functions (Go, Chapter 5). In terms of institutional factors for urban development, the pursuit of socialized housing would be successful only if there is the institutionalized participatory governance structure for the urban poor at the national and local levels. This is because urban poor groups “have developed a concept of people’s planning where residents collectively plan and implement their socialized housing project”. This also calls for the institutionalization of alternative tenure modalities within an equitable and inclusive urban land reform (Arcilla, Chapter 8). In the case of urban farming (Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13), “participatory and bottom-up approaches to designing and planning urban farming initiatives should complement top-down government projects”. A prerequisite with regard to this endeavor is the existence of vibrant civil society organizations (CSOs) whether under a unitary or federal form of government which will exist across regional governments and LGUs at all levels (Uy and Ocampo, Chapter 7). This goes together with the awareness and appreciation of social services not only at the state/regional level and local authorities but also across communities and citizens (Uy and Ocampo, Chapter 7). The 1991 LGC has indeed provided for institutional structures for such popular participation at the local level. In the health sector, for example, there are local health boards; in some LGUs, they have set up other more specialized local health bodies and CSOs actively lobby local legislative councils for appropriate health ordinances. All these, if properly used by all stakeholders, help in organizing proper health planning, service delivery, and information dissemination which are

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needed. But these are not enough. Popular participation is better facilitated with partnership of LGUs with not only CSOs but also state colleges and universities, particularly those with health programs as well as with the private sector and other agencies. In all of these, what is needed is an enabling environment whereby the actors are “informed, empowered, and active to be able to contribute to the improvements in health service delivery” (Atienza, Chapter 6). This is of course best served when there is a mandatory budget for devolved services (Atienza, Chapter 6). Such a situation can also be warranted when it comes to other social services such as education and socialized housing. In the case of delivery of water, a strategy to counteract the adverse effect of water privatization through popular participation is through what is referred to as single non-profit agencies (SiNPs). SiNPs put emphasis on the role of NGOs in developing non-commercialized water systems. In general, in the attempt to reclaim water as a public service from the private sector is through the decentralization efforts of local governments in collaboration with an active citizens’ movement and the support of the national government (Tadem and Tadem, Chapter 9). Metropolitan arrangements and federalism in attaining equity and popular participation. Metropolitan arrangements may also bring forth equitable social services delivery and urban development as well as strengthen popular participation if local participation could become an essential core for this endeavor’s success (Gomez et al. Chapter 3). Under a federal form of government, on the other hand, popular participation could be enhanced through “more broad-ranging partnerships and collaboration possible at the regional level for health (more civil society organizations [CSOs], private sector, academic organizations, etc.)” (Atienza, Chapter 6). In a situation like this, the stakeholders, in the health sector for example, can take advantage of the new environment and institutional openings to advocate and design better health services and systems (Atienza, Chapter 6). What is important to keep in mind in all of these is that the local success and quality of services and democracy “depend also on the quality of civil society, citizens, and leadership as well as available technical capacities and resources of each regional/state and local government”. Health organizations and associations must, therefore, “take an active part in debates on possible constitutional amendments or revisions” and other legislative processes “that can affect health services” (Atienza, Chapter 6). What is important is that, “supporters of devolution, autonomy, and inclusive health services should make sure that

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responsibilities across all levels of government and other stakeholders are clearly spelled-out” (Atienza, Chapter 6). These proposals for the health sector may very well apply also to other aspects of social services delivery.

3

Conclusion

This book has provided a general overview of the continuing challenges to the decentralization process in the Philippines, with particular emphasis on Metro Manila, and possible reforms toward this end. Perennial issues continue to haunt the attempt to effectively devolve powers at the local levels. One is the ineffective and inefficient social services delivery which is generally blamed on inequitable resources, budget and facilities, and the general lack of funding. This is further aggravated by the inadequate capability and quality of human resources which lead adversely to the politicization of social services delivery at the local level. Related to this is the lack of funding which is also blamed on the inadequate funds provided for by the share of the LGUs from the IRA. This is made worse by the inequalities with the IRA of the richer LGUs vis-àvis the poorer ones. Another problem is the lack of institutional capacity for social services which is hampered further by the fragmented nature of social services delivery either by the national government and/or the private sector at the local level. Thirdly, there is a need to institutionalize further popular participation. Although there are structures at the local level which provide for these, these have not been fully functioning in some LGUs. An adverse impact of the failure to institutionalize popular participation in the decentralization process is that the local governments and local leaders have the monopoly to prioritize which social services are important and to chart unilaterally the direction of urban development to be pursued at a cost to the marginalized sectors of society. Given all of these challenges, the book’s chapters deemed it imperative to review the 1991 LGC to see where it could be further strengthened as well as rethink models of multilevel governance which will be more in tune with NCR’s needs as well as political and socio-economic dynamics of the times. Models of governance put forward in this book are mainly metropolitan arrangements and federalism. In choosing which model(s) are best to address issues and problems of decentralization, the suggestions are to look at what have been the best practices of cities, provinces, and municipalities and to examine the performance of these LGUs vis-à-vis other LGUs. It is important to also pinpoint their relative

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strengths and areas of improvements. Such an endeavor is best done with a transdisciplinary approach which combines both traditional science and sustainable science for a more holistic perspective of development. This study focuses on Metro Manila which is viewed as a distinct entity from the rest of the country’s regions given that it is the NCR and is the most economically developed and resource-rich region. Therefore, it can promote the best practices in the cities which can be emulated as appropriate by their counterparts in the country. But the studies in the book also recognize that Metro Manila can also learn from the decentralization experiences of the other LGUs in the country and elsewhere. A realization too is that there is “no-one-size-fits-all” model and solutions to local governance may vary given the differing political, socio-economic, and cultural experiences of LGUs. Strengthening the institutional framework for responsible governance. The case studies in this book generally agree that there is a need to strengthen the institutional framework for decentralization which has generally been laid out by the 1991 LGC to make this more effective and efficient. The studies do not also preclude that there is certainly room for improvement which can be attained through amending the 1991 LGC after 30 years of implementation. There are a number of proposals to strengthen the institutional framework for responsible governance. For social services delivery, there should be development of indicators to further its effectiveness and efficiency. As for urban development, there are proposals to strengthen and tighten the links between LGUs and the national government as well as the LGUs and the private sector. Both these proposals could be further strengthened if national laws can be utilized to strengthen local governance and hold LGUs accountable in complying with these. These include laws which govern solid waste management, socialized housing, urban farming, and health, among others. LGUs and other stakeholders should also call out national laws which may conflict with the powers of the LGUs. There should also be a rethinking of the privatization policy of government, which has had a negative impact on social services in LGUs like water. Another major proposal is the commitment to international laws localized through national legislation. This must be implemented for more effective local governance, e.g., the UN SDGs. This would also involve enhancing the working relationship between the national and local governments. Moreover, it is pertinent to come out with a national agenda which will involve LGUs and encompass and/or tie issues and

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common concerns together. In relation to this, it is best to institutionalize initiatives from above which enhance the decentralization process. It is also important to explore metropolitan arrangements among LGUs that would benefit all participating parties. These can be found in many social services and other areas covered by the book’s chapters. Such arrangements may also necessitate the inclusion of the national government in the governance framework. An example of this is in the issue of flooding in Metro Manila in which the proposed solution involves at least more than two LGUs. The search for alternative sources of water also requires the national government’s support as the search for bulk water entails a lot of funds. The current pandemic has also made it pertinent for metropolitan arrangements among LGUs as the problems this has brought about are metro-wide and are not confined to just one geographical area. Caution must, however, be placed with regard to metropolitan arrangements which are difficult to attain as these may be too multidimensional and differences may arise which will hamper the integration of joint projects. Taking all of these into consideration, one proposal is to explore the possibility of a metropolitan Metro Manila regional government that can address some of the common issues faced by Metro Manila LGUs. Fortifying institutions of local governance through a federal form of government. A number of the book’s chapters also explored the possibility and implications of a federal form of government in bringing forth a more efficient and effective social service delivery and equitable and sustainable urban development. In general, Metro Manila as the NCR should not be tied to rigid constitutional frameworks; stakeholders must recognize appropriate governance mechanisms which are tailor-fitted to local contexts. NCR is also viewed as the best candidate for a federal or quasi-federal arrangement with the national government because of the support it gets from the national government, its economic and administrative resources, and its constituent LGUs are among the most equipped and experienced to carry out wide-scale reforms. Metro Manila, however, also has much to learn from other successful models of local governance, particularly those that have been more successful in equitable social services delivery, sustainable development, and people’s participation. If Metro Manila would be developed to pursue some form of semi-federal arrangement or should the whole country be transformed into a federal form with Metro Manila as one of the regions in the future, this would necessitate structural and/or institutional changes at the various levels

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of government. An examination of the role of current agencies, like the MMDA, is needed given their impact on LGUs. Their scope and coverage of interaction should be strengthened vis-à-vis each other. Just like under a unitary system with devolved powers as stipulated in the 1991 LGC, several institutional reforms would also be needed in a federal setup. One, there should be sufficient technical knowledge and personnel resources at the regional and local levels. This should be complemented with the monitoring of quality standards for service delivery across components by the federal government agencies and other watchdogs. Another is that there should also be better coordination between central, state, and local levels to avoid fragmentation and deadlock. Related to this is the development of alternative institutional and financial models, especially in a number of services like solid waste management. As for fiscal problems under the proposed Bayanihan Constitution, there remains a question to what extent these proposals will remedy the problems under the present devolved scheme, including fiscal and taxing issues. In addressing all of these concerns, one has to thresh out the powers and responsibilities of the federal government as well as its established regional governments. Addressing equity and popular participation through decentralization. The book’s chapters also note that any proposed governance framework, even without a full federal shift, for it to be effective, should bring forth a decentralization process that aims toward equity and increasing popular participation. As noted in the chapters on health, socialized housing and urban farming, the human security as well as human rights of the poor, marginalized and informal settlers of Metro Manila must be upheld, thus, the need to empower them through efficient social services delivery and equitable urban development. Together with strengthening the institutional base of the decentralization process, all these proposals are viewed as starting points to provide the impetus needed in a country to promote responsible governance toward equitable development and people empowerment.

Bibliography Caoili, Manuel A. 1999. The Origins of Metropolitan Manila: A Political and Social Analysis. Diliman, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press. Manasan, Rosario G. 2017. “Designing the Fiscal Features of a Federal System of Government: Autonomy, Accountability, and Equity Considerations.” In

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APPC 2017: Critical Perspectives on Federalism for Regional Development, edited by PIDS (Philippine Institute for Development Studies), 35–76. Proceedings of the Third Annual Public Policy Conference. September 19. Marco Polo Ortigas, Pasig City. National Economic Development Authority (NEDA). 2016. Ambisyon Natin 2040: A Long-Term Vision for the Philippines. Panganiban, Elena M. 1998. “Local Governance and the New Community: Economic Development as a Function”. In Local Government in the Philippines: A Book of Readings Volume I: Local Government and Administration, edited by Proserpina Domingo Tapales, Jocelyn C. Cuaresma and Wilhelmina L. Cabo, 247–283. Q.C.: Center for Local and Regional Governance and National College of Public Administration. United Nations. 2015. Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals 2015-2030. A/RES/70/1. https://sdgs.un.org/2030ag enda.

Index

0–9 1935 Constitution, 32, 34 1973 Constitution, 34, 35, 37, 447 1983 Local Government Code, 447 1986 People Power, 38, 69 1987 Constitution, 3, 4, 6, 39, 55, 58, 68, 194, 202, 209, 213, 214, 497, 500 1987 Constitution’s Article X, 7 1991 Local Governance Code, 2, 3, 6–13, 15, 16, 18–21, 30, 35, 37–47, 50, 52–56, 58, 59, 68–70, 125, 193, 194, 197–200, 202, 203, 214, 372, 374, 443, 490–492, 494, 496–498, 500, 504, 507 2016 elections, 209 A academic organizations, 513 access, 13, 193, 194, 197, 198, 202, 203, 207–210, 214, 410–413, 431–433, 436, 439, 493, 509 accessibility, 209

accountability, 9, 47, 103, 111, 161–163, 211, 236, 286, 299, 307, 309, 310, 312, 316, 479, 496, 507 active people’s participation, 42 adaptive planning, 503 adequate housing, 259, 274, 285, 286 adequate resources, 211 administration, 58 administrative powers, 507 affordability, 138, 259–263, 265, 266, 270, 274, 275, 277, 280, 281, 283, 284 affordable housing, 16, 508, 509 agency-related reforms, 7 Agenda 21, 372 agriculture, 37, 41, 44 air pollution, 494 allocation formula, 47 alternative models of governance, 15, 260 alternative sources of water, 21 alternatives to water privatization, 292, 293, 304, 305

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 T. S. E. Tadem and M. E. L. Atienza (eds.), A Better Metro Manila?, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3

519

520

INDEX

alternative water sources, 19, 326, 327, 334 Ambisyon Natin 2040, 499 amendments, 15, 213, 214, 494, 498 American colonial period, 32 Angat Reservoir, 325, 326, 328, 329, 336, 339, 341, 343, 363 anti-political dynasty bill, 18 Article X (Local Governments), 58 Article X of the 1987 Constitution, 2, 213, 504 Asia, 495 Asian Development Bank (ADB), 184, 295, 296, 298, 301, 382 asymmetric structure of governance, 56 Australia, 210 autonomous region, 7, 58 autonomy, 2, 6, 11, 33, 35, 37, 39, 40, 51, 66, 69, 95, 96, 104, 106, 117, 132, 165, 213, 223, 396, 513 Ayala family, 297

B Baliuag, Bulacan, 172 Bangsamoro, 6, 55, 56, 101–104 Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, 7 Bangsamoro Basic Law, 7 Bangsamoro Organic Law in 2018, 58 barangay, 92, 99, 100, 132, 158, 164, 168, 172, 173, 177, 183–185, 480, 481 barangay captains, 52 barangay governments, 199, 208 Barangay health centers, 209 barangay health stations (BHSs), 198, 199 barangays, 15, 31, 33, 40, 43, 99, 100, 132, 148, 149, 159, 165, 168, 169, 172, 182, 198, 203,

204, 208, 383, 480, 481, 492, 496, 498 Barrio Charter Act, 33 barrios, 32, 33 Basel Convention, 377 basic education, 102, 137, 138, 145, 222, 223, 227, 229–232, 235–239, 241, 246, 248, 249 basic education governance, 506 basic public services, 13 basic services, 37, 41, 44, 46, 498 delivery of, 31 provision of, 42 basic social services, 13, 511 basic utilities, 71, 499 Bayanihan, 387 Bayanihan Constitution, 101–104, 222, 507, 517 Bayanihan Federalism, 221, 234, 235 Bayanihan Federalism Constitution, 56 Bechtel, 296 “big bang” approach, 496 BISTEKVILLE, 260, 275–277 bottom-up development approach, 70 bottom-up empowerment, 16 bottom-up empowerment approach, 196, 508 bottom-up reforms, 214 budget, 208, 490 budgetary constraints, 68 budgeting, 47 build-operate-transfer (BOT), 41 bureaucratic processes, 37 bureaucratic red tape, 70 Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF), 170 C CALABARZON, 56, 66 Caloocan, 94, 112, 135, 138, 140, 148, 149, 168, 169, 203, 296

INDEX

Canada, 210 capability, 491 capacity, 491 capacity building, 50, 57, 498 capacity, lack of, 163, 186 capital regions, 495 Cebu, 88, 107, 158 Cecilia Muñoz Palma, 3 Census of Population, 380 Centers for Health Development, 199 central government, 3, 6, 11, 33, 39, 40, 49, 50, 105, 118, 127, 134, 159, 160, 232, 233, 310, 311, 313, 314, 318, 507 central government fund transfers, 13 central government power, 65 centralization, 29, 34–36, 47, 69 centralized system, 50 central-local relations, 58 Central Luzon, 56, 59 Centres for Health Development (CHD), 162 charter change, 57, 508 chartered cities, 197 China, 495 cities, 3, 15, 32, 34, 37, 43, 45, 47, 48, 90, 94, 96, 99, 100, 104, 110, 113, 132, 135, 137, 138, 142, 143, 145, 146, 158, 159, 162, 165, 166, 168–171, 173–175, 177–183, 186, 188, 198, 202, 206, 213, 237, 260, 263, 284, 285, 292, 299, 304, 309, 311, 313–315, 380, 411, 474, 491, 494, 495, 497–499, 503, 507, 514 citizen engagement, 46 citizen participation, 160–162 citizen participation, local, 172 citizens, 211, 212, 214, 215, 512, 513 citizens’ initiative, 492

521

citizens’ movements, 21, 313 citizens’ participation, 65 city governments, 198 city mayors, 52 civil society, 41, 42, 53, 170, 179, 212, 295, 306, 313, 316, 317, 383, 396, 492, 493, 500, 509, 513 civil society groups, 216 civil society organizations (CSOs), 10, 11, 18, 52–54, 70, 209, 211, 215, 512, 513 vibrancy of, 211 civil society participation, 53 Clean Air Act 1999, 383, 498 clean water, 208 climate change, 437, 438 climate data, 511 collaboration, 211, 513 colonial period, 61 colonial rule, 60 Commission on Audit (COA), 206, 511 Commission on Elections, 451 Commission on Human Security (CHS), 195, 196 commitment, 515 Committee on Devolution, 498 Commonwealth period, 32, 69 community, 10–12, 17, 196, 204, 211, 215, 511, 512 community development, 208 community empowerment, 215 community gardens, 413, 428 community organizations, 39, 46 community organizing, 210 community participation, 214 component cities, 504 component states, 210 Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP), 491

522

INDEX

comprehensive long-term approach, 215 comprehensive poverty-reduction program, 508 concerned communities, 18 conflict, 196 Congress, 3, 7, 18, 33, 53, 57, 58, 61, 62, 65, 494, 497–499 conservation, 96, 336, 384 constituents, 493, 502 Constitution, 1987, 100–104, 160, 222, 234, 248 constitutional amendments, 8, 213 constitutional change, 2, 8 Constitutional Commission of 1986, 3 constitutional frameworks, 516 constitutional redesign, 510 Consultative Committee, 3 Consultative Committee to Review the 1987 Constitution, 2, 54 coordination, 50, 63, 66, 68, 213, 506, 517 co-privatization, 304, 306, 307, 317 Corazon Aquino, 66, 95 Corazon Aquino Administration (1986–1992), 14, 38, 65, 66 Cordilleras, 6, 55, 504 corruption, 38, 39, 47, 70, 71, 209, 493 corruption and irregular practices, 301 countryside development, 40 COVID-19 pandemic, 8, 13, 20, 58, 194, 195, 204–206, 213, 216, 493, 500, 501, 505 credit-claiming, 493 crime incidents, 135 curvilinear relationship, 457

D data coverage, 511 datu, 31

Davao, 88, 158 deadlock, 212, 506, 517 de-bureaucratization, 41 decentralization, 6, 8, 9, 11–14, 16, 17, 20, 29–31, 33, 35–40, 42, 44, 53, 54, 56, 59, 67, 69–71, 100, 105, 112–115, 126, 134, 146, 147, 194, 222, 223, 236, 239, 247, 248, 292–294, 303, 316, 317, 372, 397, 489, 490, 492, 494–497, 500–502, 507, 508, 512–514 Decentralization Act of 1967, 34 decentralization, arguments against, 159, 160, 163, 186 decentralization, arguments for, 159–161 decentralization experiences, 515 decentralization, history, 36 decentralization of health services, 198 decentralization, Philippines, 159, 160 decentralization process, 17, 69, 214, 490, 493, 494, 500, 503, 514, 516, 517 decentralized framework, 46 decentralized system, 50 decision-making, local level, 184 deconcentration, 35, 36 delegation, 36 delegation of authority, 36 delivery of services, 8, 209 democracy, 38, 69, 212, 513 democratic decision-making, 18 democratic processes, 38 democratic reform, 52 democratization, 8, 29, 46, 69, 71, 490 democratization process, 3 Department of Agriculture (DA), 501 Department of Budget and Management (DBM), 485

INDEX

Department of Education (DepEd), 159, 173, 176, 177, 180, 183, 187, 223, 225, 229, 501 Gulayan sa Paaralan Program, 501 Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), 374, 501 Department of Finance (DOF), 307, 473 Department of Health (DOH), 133, 166–168, 171, 172, 183, 187, 195, 197–202, 204–206, 297, 501 Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development (DHSUD), 260, 262, 263, 285 Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), 99, 162, 187, 214, 485, 486 Department of Local Government and Community Development, 34 Department of Science and Technology (DOST), 501 Department of Social Welfare and Development Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps), 501 Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), 2, 4, 32, 49, 58, 209, 494, 511 Department of the Interior and Local Government-National Capital Region (DILG-NCR), 7, 8 dependent development, 15, 60, 64, 68 deprivatization, 304, 309–315, 317 development, 3, 7, 15, 18, 38, 46, 54, 493, 495, 499 development planning processes, 493 development plans, 499 development process, 14

523

devolution, 2, 3, 6, 8, 21, 30, 36, 39, 40, 47–49, 58, 68, 70, 71, 159, 160, 164, 165, 177, 185, 193, 194, 197–201, 213, 248, 284, 303, 317, 373, 494, 496, 498, 501, 513 devolution of power, 497 devolved framework, 195 devolved functions, 200, 490 devolved health services, 198 devolved responsibilities, 510 devolved services, 513 devolved set up, 201, 215, 507 devolved structure, 197 devolved system, 210 dignity, 508 disaster recovery, 510 disaster resilience, 20 disaster risk financing and insurance (DRFI), 466, 467, 469–471, 473, 480, 510 Disaster Risk Reduction Management (DRRM), 142, 145, 146, 475 disasters, 12 discrimination, 209, 493 disease, 196 disempowerment, 196 disparity, 212 distribution formula, 67 district health system, 201, 501 DMCI Homes, 300 doctors to the barrios (DTTB), 171 draft Bayanihan Constitution, 3, 55–57, 210, 213, 506 draft federal constitution, 210 dumpsites, 112, 389 duplication of efforts, 163 Duterte administration, 2, 6–8, 30, 59, 195, 500 Duterte national administration, 194

524

INDEX

Duterte, Rodrigo, 1–3, 6, 54, 56, 57, 101, 126, 134, 159, 209, 221, 265, 293

E ecological solid waste management, 505 Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), 372, 497, 498 ecology, 332, 387 economic development, 6, 14, 44, 45 economic efficiency, 45, 69 economic growth, 12, 38, 492 economic planning, 65 economies of scale, 11 Eco-Savers Program, 393 education, 10, 11, 17, 18, 42, 71, 134, 137, 138, 147, 148, 158, 159, 162–164, 173, 174, 176–189, 222, 223, 225–228, 230–235, 239, 241, 242, 248, 260–262, 278, 280, 282, 312, 489, 491, 493–495, 497, 501, 508, 513 education, cities, 178, 188 education, decentralisation, 173 education, East Asia, 173 education, expenditures, 178–180, 239, 241 education, municipalities, 177, 180 education, political capital/currency, 170, 173, 179 education, prioritisation, 181 education, sector, 147, 158, 159, 173, 174, 176, 182, 188, 223, 238 effective decentralization, 8, 12, 19 effective local government, 65 effectiveness, 194, 492, 496, 512, 515 effective number of candidates, 452, 453, 455, 457–459 effective solid waste management, 505

efficiency, 14, 38, 194, 492, 496, 512, 515 efficient decentralization, 19 efficient delivery, 30 elected officials, 492 electoral and party systems, 18 electoral proximity, 459 electricity, 16, 500, 511 elementary school, 138 elites, 6, 14, 57, 70 employment, 55 employment generation, 509 empowerment, 16, 38, 42, 196, 286, 373, 397 empowerment of the citizenry, 18 empowerment process, 30 empowerment reforms, 214 encomiendas , 31 energy, 499 enterprise projects, 46 environment, 499 environmental degradation, 15 environmental hazards, 203 environmental integrity, 492 environment and natural resources, 37, 41, 44 EO 26, 497 EO 146, 498 EO 193, 497 epidemics, 215 equalization, 507 equalization formula, 15 equalization transfers, 214 equitable, 215 equitable and sustainable urban development, 516 equitable development, 8, 9, 12–19, 31, 71, 294, 490, 508, 509, 517 equitable health services, 214 equitable regional development, 14 equitable social services delivery, 513, 516

INDEX

equitable urban development, 517 equity, 13, 14, 17, 18, 194, 207, 408, 435, 439, 508–510, 512, 517 Estrada Administration, 49 exclusion, 203 Executive Order (EO) No. 138, 202, 214, 498 Executive orders (EOs), 497, 498 executive powers, 507 exemplary local health innovations, 212 expenditure decentralization, 446 export-oriented national development strategy, 14, 64 externalities, 11 F facilities, 490, 498 federal arrangement, 504, 516 federal Constitution, 4 federal form of government, 2, 3, 6, 21, 54, 59, 67–69, 194, 195, 209, 210, 214, 496, 504, 505, 507, 513, 516 federal government, 55, 506, 507, 517 federal government agencies, 212, 506, 517 federalism, 2, 3, 6–8, 15, 19, 30, 54–59, 67–69, 88, 89, 101, 103, 104, 106, 114, 126, 130, 147, 159, 160, 209, 210, 212, 222, 230, 237, 239, 246–248, 284, 316, 387, 397, 486, 494, 497, 500, 514 quasi-forms of, 497 federalism agenda, 57 federalism plan, 210 federalist structure, 68 federalist system, 507 federal legislation, 212 federal set up, 211–213, 507, 517

525

federal shift, 213 federal state, 9 federal structure, 6, 210 federal system, 21, 32, 55, 57, 106, 160, 215, 231, 235–237, 467, 506, 508, 510 federal system of government, 19, 30, 71 federated region, 55, 506, 507 Ferdinand Marcos, 94 Ferrer v. Bautista, 448 financial autonomy, 70 financial constraints, 199 financial empowerment, 55 financial resources, 30 financing, 200 financing capabilities, 509 financing for health, 200 financing local governance, 489 fiscal autonomy, 48, 50, 51, 70, 163 fiscal decentralization, 12, 19, 20, 43, 51, 70, 444, 467, 468, 486, 507, 508 fiscal dependency, 490 fiscal equalization program, 510 fiscal federalism, 67, 69 fiscal gaps, 445 fiscal governance, 444 fiscal imbalances, 446 fiscal problems, 517 fiscal stability, 443 fiscal sustainability, 448 flood control, 116, 133, 338, 348, 359–363, 366, 369, 481 flood control infrastructure, 502 flood control plans, 502 flooding(s), 12, 71, 143, 144, 208, 348, 350–353, 359, 361, 363, 364, 368, 495, 502 flood mitigation, 10, 489, 502 flood plan zoning, 502 flood-prone areas, 350

526

INDEX

flood studies, 502 food security, 501 food supply, 20 food systems, 409, 411, 437, 439 Food Waste Truck Program, 393 forecasting, 511 foreign capital, 65 Foreign Currency Differential Adjustment, 300 foreign investments, 68 fragmentation, 201, 212, 501, 506, 517 fragmentation of authority, 66 frameworks, 9 freedom from fear, 195, 215 freedom from want, 195, 196, 215 freedom to live in dignity, 195, 215 full devolution, 202 full federal arrangement, 6 funding, 202, 213, 514 lack of, 490

G Galing Pook, 393 Galing Pook Awards, 162 garbage, 376, 381 garbage collection, 64, 381 garbage disposal, 381 Gawad Pangulo sa Kapaligiran, 393 GDP, 59 General Appropriations Act, 177 general development, 508 generation and disposal of solid wastes, 378 genuine participation for health, 214 Germany, 210 good governance, 211, 496 governance, 8–10, 31, 43, 59, 60, 88, 89, 92, 93, 97, 99–101, 103–106, 110, 111, 113–115, 125–127, 130–132, 134, 147,

157–159, 173, 174, 181, 184, 185, 187–189, 196, 222, 223, 229–232, 234–236, 241, 248, 260, 286, 292–295, 311, 316, 317, 481 governance framework, 508, 516, 517 governance mechanisms, 493, 516 governance models, 71 Governance of Basic Education Act, 158, 173, 223 governance reforms, 8 governance structure, 8, 67, 492, 502 government, 9 government administration, 60 government agencies, 10 governors, 52 grassroots involvement, 491 Greanheart Savers Program, 394 Greater Manila Area, 61 Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee, 498 greenhouse gas (GHG), 351, 389 Groundwater Pumping from Metro Manila’s Aquifer, 330 growth, 14 Growth Equity Fund, 498 H health, 10, 11, 13, 16–19, 37, 41, 44, 48, 71, 99, 133, 134, 136, 137, 144, 147, 148, 158, 159, 162–174, 176, 177, 179, 181–188, 208, 209, 215, 223, 239, 248, 260–262, 278, 282, 293, 295, 476, 489, 491, 493–495, 497, 501, 508, 515, 517 health administration and delivery, 210 health-based organizations/associations, 213

INDEX

health budget, 206 health centers, barangay, 169 health centers, city, 168 health centers, municipality, 172 health, cities, 168, 182 health concerns, 493 health decentralization, 198 health delivery systems, 197 health devolution, 158, 199–201 health, expenditures, 170, 171 health facilities, 136, 137, 144, 167, 168, 204, 209, 490 health, municipalities, 162, 164 health officers, municipal, 165, 166, 171, 182 health organizations and associations, 513 health personnel, 199, 200, 204–206, 490, 491 health, political capital/currency, 170 health, prioritisation, 171 health professionals, 204 health, sector, 158, 165, 167, 173, 181, 490, 510, 513 Health Sector Reform Agenda, 200, 501 health security, 196, 197 health service delivery, 193, 199, 202, 210, 212, 213, 215, 216 health services, 16, 194, 195, 206, 208–211, 213, 215, 490, 493, 506 access to, 215 delivery of, 202, 209, 214 devolution of, 199, 201 devolved structure of, 194 provision of, 212 health services delivery, 19, 490 health status, 195 health workers, 201, 205, 500 highly urbanized areas, 7 highly urbanized cities, 51, 504

527

highly urbanized river basins, 502 highly urbanized settings, 8 historical perspective, 379 holistic approach, 505 holistic flood risk management, 19, 348, 365, 366, 369, 502 House of Representatives, 3, 58, 206 Houses of Congress, 203, 210 housing, 15–17, 55, 62, 71, 208, 489 human factor, 348, 350–352 human resource development, 506 human resources, 48, 54, 491, 514 human rights, 16, 71, 517 human rights approach, 16, 508 human rights framework, 16 human security, 16, 71, 195–197, 209, 214, 215, 512, 517 human security approach, 195–197, 215 human security framework, 16, 17, 508 hybrid alternative arrangements, 21 hydrological factors, 350, 351 hygiene, 493

I identity, 37 imperial Manila, 1, 3, 37, 39, 67 implementation issues, 376 impoverished groups, 197 impoverishment, 14 improper solid waste management, 208 inadequate fiscal transfers, 6 inadequate housing, 13 in-city housing, 508 inclusive cities, 439 inclusive health services, 213, 513 inclusive urban planning, 260 income-based housing subsidies, 260 income-based subsidies, 508

528

INDEX

independent chartered cities, 504 independent component cities, 51 indicators, 496 industrialization, 91, 379 ineffective social service, 6 inefficiency, 17, 39 inefficient social service, 6 inequality, 6, 50, 54, 194, 212, 508 inequality of access, 7 inequitable human resources, 490 informal settlements, 94, 97, 203, 302, 316, 381, 436 informal settlers, 203, 207, 215, 508, 517 informal settlers’ communities, 208 infrastructure, 45 innovations, 40, 210 institutional capacity, 12, 491, 514 institutional design, 212, 506 institutional framework, 11, 12, 496, 515 institutionalization, 490 institutionalized framework, 493 institutionalized participatory governance structure, 512 institutional reforms, 16, 64, 214, 216, 506, 517 institutional strengthening, 501 institutional unevenness, 492 institution building, 375 institutions, 9, 11, 12 insufficient, 202 integrated approach, 492, 506 integrated area development approach, 36 integrated flood management (IFM), 348, 365–368, 502 integrated framework, 509 Integrated Reorganization Plan, 34 integrating development plans, 71 integration, 63

inter-/intra-LGU coordination, 146, 147 Inter-Agency Committee, 63 Inter-Agency Committee on Metro Manila, 63 inter-agency task force, 4, 58, 209, 214 inter-governmental collaborative ventures, 505 intergovernmental coordination mechanisms, 212, 505 intergovernmental fiscal relations, 21 intergovernmental fiscal transfers, 467 intergovernmental relations, 40 intergovernmental transfers, 443, 467, 486 interjurisdictional competition, 69 inter-LGU cooperation, 505 inter-local cooperation, 45 inter-local health zones (ILHZs), 201, 501 Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), 10, 13, 15, 18, 43, 47–49, 52, 58, 67, 70, 71, 159, 163, 167–171, 182, 199, 200, 202, 443, 447, 489–491, 494, 502, 509, 510, 514 internal sources of income, 202 international agency, 215 international economic liberalization, 500 International Finance Corporation (IFC), 296, 298 international financial institutions (IFIs), 295, 298 international laws, 497, 499, 515 inter-sectoral collaboration, 201 intra-LGU coordination and planning, 502 investment program, 52 Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDs), 310–312, 315, 318

INDEX

IRA dependency, 47 IRA distribution formula, 214, 510 IRA shares, 10 Irosin, Sorsogon, 172

J Japan, 495 joint ventures, 68 jurisprudence, 202 just, humane and equitable society, 71

K Kaliwa-Kanan-Agos River Basin Source, 334, 336, 338, 362

L Laguna de Bay (Laguna Lake) Basin, 92, 325, 332–335, 341, 347, 348, 353, 357–359, 361, 362 Laguna Lake Water Withdrawal, 332 land, 45 land conversion, 494 landfills, 378, 382, 388, 389 land use, 10, 18, 20, 71, 407–410, 412, 424, 425, 430, 431, 434–439, 493, 499, 502, 509 land use planning, 13, 502 LDRRM planning process, 511 leadership, 69, 212, 513 legal and institutional reforms, 7 legal obligation, 9 legislation, 8, 202 legislative powers, 507 LGU-NGO ventures, 54 LGU officials, 67 LGU performance, 58 liberalization, 14 literacy rate, 137, 223, 224, 239 livelihood, 16, 46 livelihood displacement, 16, 508

529

living costs, 16 local administration, 62 local agency, 215 local and regional development, 40 local assemblies/councils, 215 local autonomy, 34, 39, 47, 48, 62, 93, 160, 444 Local Autonomy Act of 1959, 33 local capacities, 501 local chief executive, 491 local communities, 30 local decision-making, 215 local development, 40, 444 Local Development Councils (LDCs), 44, 50, 54, 70, 200, 215, 497 Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (LDRRMF), 511 local economic development, 48 local economy, 51 local executives, 49 local funds, 41 local governance, 2, 11, 18, 20, 21, 30, 41, 46, 53, 59, 194, 490, 492, 494, 495, 497, 499, 504, 515, 516 local governance structures, 491 Local Government Academy (LGA), 2 local government autonomy, 497 Local Government Code (LGC), 90, 96, 99, 105, 111, 126, 132, 157, 158, 160, 162, 164, 173, 176, 181, 188, 260, 262, 284, 293 local government financing, 202 local government officials, 15, 49, 491, 493, 500 local government resources, 12 local government(s), 3, 6, 17, 21, 30–34, 37–43, 48, 50, 51, 54, 55, 66, 67, 70, 193, 197, 213, 436, 490, 492–494, 496, 497,

530

INDEX

499, 501, 502, 506, 507, 509–511, 513–515 empowerment of, 3 financing for, 12 leagues of, 201 local government service, 15 local governments, structure, 160, 161 local government units (LGUs), 3, 11, 30, 32, 34–37, 39, 41, 43, 45–54, 58–60, 63, 64, 66–71, 90, 94–96, 99, 100, 102–105, 107, 111–115, 117, 126, 127, 129, 131–138, 142–150, 158, 164, 165, 171, 173–176, 183, 187, 188, 194, 195, 198–203, 205, 206, 208, 209, 211, 212, 214–216, 239, 241, 246–248, 277, 284, 285, 292, 293, 306, 307, 316, 317, 326, 348, 374, 410, 415, 431, 434–437, 467, 474, 475, 483, 490–493, 495, 496, 498–505, 507, 509, 510, 512, 514–516 Local Health Board (LHB), 200, 215, 491, 512 Local Health Board (LHB), composition, 166 Local Health Board (LHB), functions, 174 local insurance, 468, 479, 510 local insurance risk, 12 local insurance risk transfer mechanism, 19 localization, 499 local leadership, 42 local legislation, 492 local legislative councils, 44, 214, 492, 512 locally sourced income, 170 local multisectoral bodies, 492 local officials, 30, 214, 491

local participation, 46, 513 local politicians, 53, 493 local revenue autonomy, 47 local revenue generation, 99, 490 local revenues, 10 local risk insurance, 20, 71 Local School Board (LSB), composition, 175 Local School Board (LSB), creation, 181 Local School Board (LSB), functions, 177 local school boards, 491 Local Solid Waste Management Plan, 384 local special bodies, 44, 46, 53, 70, 176, 184, 215, 293 local success, 212 local youth councils, 54 “lockdown” measures, 20 Lopez group of companies, 297 low-cost housing, 44

M Magna Carta for Health Workers, 201 Magna Carta of Public Health Workers, 200 Makati, 15, 94, 127, 135, 137, 138, 142, 143, 145, 146, 149, 168, 278, 296, 297, 330, 490 Malabon, 15, 490 Malaysia, 210 malnutrition, 207 Mandanas-Garcia ruling, 58, 202, 214, 498 Mandanas ruling, 43, 209 Mandanas v. Executive Secretary, 447 mandatory budget, 214 Manila, 203, 205, 208, 209, 490 Manila, City of, 61, 93, 135, 138, 141, 144–146, 149, 168, 296

INDEX

Manila Water Corporation (MWC), 294, 296 Marcos dictatorship, 14 Marcos, Ferdinand, 34, 44 marginalization, 508 marginalized group, 197 marginalized sectors, 13, 17, 31, 493, 508, 514 marginalized sectors of society, 71 Marikina, 496 Marikina City, 141, 149, 169, 361, 362, 393 Marikina River Stormwater Tunnel, 361, 362, 369 market-economy, 14 martial law, 13, 33–35, 62, 69 martial law period, 14, 34, 36 maternal malnutrition, 207 May 2019 elections, 206 May 2019 mid-term elections, 4 May 2022 national elections, 206 Maynilad Water Services, Inc. (MWSI), 296, 300, 334 mayor, city, 166, 175 mayor-council conflicts, 62 mayor, municipal, 166, 173, 175, 187 mayors, 52, 206 megacities, 19 meteorological factors, 350, 351 Metro Manila, 6–8, 10, 12–15, 17, 19, 21, 59–62, 64–68, 70, 71, 88–91, 93, 95–97, 99, 100, 104, 107, 108, 110–115, 117, 118, 125–127, 129–137, 140–143, 146–148, 158, 165, 168, 169, 178–180, 182, 187, 194, 195, 197, 203–206, 208–210, 212–216, 260, 266, 270, 285, 286, 291–293, 296, 302, 309, 316, 325–328, 330, 331, 334, 336, 338–341, 343–345, 347, 348, 350–352, 360, 365, 366,

531

368, 369, 374, 380, 452, 489–492, 494–496, 498, 500–505, 507, 508, 514–517 Metro Manila Area (MMA), 61, 62, 69 Metro Manila Authority (MMA), 65, 66 Metro Manila Commission (MMC), 64–66 Metro Manila Council, 213 Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), 11, 66, 90, 96, 100, 110, 111, 113, 114, 116–118, 132, 133, 213, 374, 492, 498, 503, 505, 507 Metro Manila governance, 14 Metro Pacific Investments Corporation, 300 metropolis, 60 metropolitan area, 61, 64 metropolitan arrangements, 7, 11, 19, 101, 107, 108, 110, 112, 113, 115, 148, 159, 494–497, 501–504, 514, 516 metropolitan arrangements framework, 9 metropolitan authority, 65 metropolitan governance arrangement, 19 metropolitan governance structure, 14, 66 metropolitan government, 19, 213, 495 metropolitanization, 21, 71, 89, 90, 209 metropolitanization approach, 11 metropolitanization arrangement, 11 metropolitanization framework, 11 Metropolitan Manila, 63, 65 Metropolitan Manila Authority, 64 Metropolitan Manila Growth Network, 65

532

INDEX

metropolitan Metro Manila government, 213 metropolitan reforms, 64 metropolitan region, 210 metropolitan reorganization, 59 metropolitan species, 495 Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), 111, 291, 292, 296, 298, 300–303, 325, 329 metro-wide services, 63 Mexico, 210 micronutrient deficiencies, 207 middle-level government, 67 mid-tier politico-administrative authority, 507 mid-tier regional government, 507 migration, 12, 62, 194, 491 Mindanao, 1, 2, 14, 67 Ministry of Local Government, 35 Mitsubishi Corporation, 296 modernization, 14 monopoly, 493 moral obligation, 9 multidisciplinarity, 21 multidisciplinary perspectives, 21 multilevel coordination, 212 multilevel form of governance, 7 multilevel governance framework, 9, 10 multi-level governance (MLG), 10, 99, 103, 111, 112, 130–133, 146, 196, 197, 373, 494–496 frameworks of, 494 models of, 514 multilevel governance model, 10 multinational corporations (MNCs), 297, 299, 305, 311 multi-sectoral special bodies, 11 municipal, 198 municipal governments, 170, 198, 231, 232, 307, 313

municipal health centers, 198 municipalities, 15, 32, 37, 43, 47, 48, 198, 200, 202, 491, 494, 495, 497, 503, 504, 507, 514 Muslim areas in the south, 6 Muslim migrants, 493 Muslim Mindanao, 6, 7, 14, 58, 504 Muslim residents, 209 MWSS Regulatory Office (RO), 296, 300, 302, 303

N national administration, 8, 14, 58 national agency, 10, 201, 215, 494, 501, 505, 511 national agenda, 499, 515 national and local governance structures, 14 national and local officials, 10 national and regional/state governments, 9 national budgeting, 49 national capital, 2, 495 National Capital Region (NCR), 7–9, 13, 14, 20, 21, 30, 59, 60, 71, 88–90, 96, 97, 99–101, 103–105, 110–115, 126, 127, 132–138, 140, 142–144, 146–149, 169, 188, 194, 197, 203, 204, 207, 210, 213, 222, 223, 227, 229, 239, 241, 270, 271, 273, 274, 276, 279, 316, 326, 374, 379, 489, 492, 495, 504, 514–516 national decision-making, 6 national development, 55, 60 national development framework, 499 national development plan, 65 National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), 50, 65 national economy, 56

INDEX

national government, 6, 10, 15, 17, 18, 21, 29, 30, 32, 34, 38, 41, 47–50, 67, 69, 202, 205, 210, 490, 492, 497–500, 502–504, 506, 507, 509, 511, 514–516 national income, 18, 214 national internal revenue taxes, 15, 43, 67, 202, 448 national laws, 16, 497–499, 515 national legislation, 515 national-local intergovernmental fiscal relations, 63 national-local relations, 40 National Solid Waste Management Commission (NSWMC), 374 national taxes, 202 national urban policy, 64 natural hazards, 20 nature of development, 68 Navotas, 15, 94, 129, 135, 137, 142, 143, 148, 168, 490 NCR mayors, 213 neo-liberal development paradigm, 17 neo-liberal framework, 14, 16 neo-liberalism, 14 NGO European Network on Debt and Development (Eurodad), 310 NGO representatives, 54 non-commercialized water systems, 513 non-discriminatory health policies, 210 non-government organisations (NGOs), 39, 41, 44–46, 53, 165, 166, 183, 187, 189, 200, 201, 211, 305–309, 317, 383, 512 non-revenue water (NRW), 301, 308 nutrition, 206, 208 O Office of the President, 64, 202, 498

533

oligarchy, 69 open dumpsites, 503 operational efficiency, 47 opportunity costs, 502 ordinances, 11 organic wastes, 377 organizational coordination, 495 organizations, 215 Our Common Future, 371, 377 overcrowding, 208

P Pampanga River, 338, 339, 343, 344 pandemic, 59, 194, 213, 215, 493, 504, 516 PANGEA Green Energy, 392 participation, 106, 111, 112, 115, 159, 163, 172, 185, 210, 211, 215, 266, 284–286, 292, 293, 299, 309, 312, 315, 396, 408, 412, 415, 418, 422, 425, 435, 438, 439, 493, 494, 496 participative democracy, 57 participatory, 408, 438 participatory mechanisms, 201 participatory primary health care, 201 Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban), 56 partisan politics, 64 partnership(s), 21, 209, 211, 215, 513 party politics, 61 Pasig, 496 Pasig City, 150, 169 Pasig-Marikina River Basin, 347–349, 360, 366 Pasig River Basin, 347 patrimony, 56 patronage, 38, 69, 209, 493 patronage politics, 6, 47, 53, 57, 69–71

534

INDEX

Payatas, 382, 392 PDP-Laban, 56 PDP Laban Federalism Institute, 56 PDP Laban Model of Philippine Federalism (PLMPF) 1.0, 56, 68 people-centric development, 15 people empowerment, 214, 497, 517 people’s access, 202, 212 people’s organizations (POs), 41, 42, 44, 46, 55, 512 people’s participation, 18, 492, 516 performance, 214, 510 personnel, 204 personnel resources, 211, 506, 517 Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), 172 Philippine Constitution, 100, 372 Philippine decentralization framework, 160 Philippine development, 38 Philippine Development Plan (PDP), 101, 134, 281, 372, 473, 499 Philippine devolution, 20 Philippine government, 296, 299 Philippine Health Agenda 2016, 201 Philippine Hydroincorporated, 300 Philippine local government system, 31 Philippines, 3, 88, 89, 99, 101, 107, 112, 114, 125, 126, 129, 130, 132, 134, 137, 138, 144, 147, 149, 157, 158, 160–163, 165, 170, 172, 173, 179, 181, 185, 222, 223, 227, 230, 232, 233, 235, 248, 259, 260, 265, 283, 284, 291, 292, 294, 295, 297–301, 303–309, 316, 317, 349, 350, 359, 361, 467, 473, 474, 486, 499 planning, 407–409, 411, 424, 430, 434, 436–439

policy, 95, 96, 102, 105–107, 110, 111, 113, 114, 117, 118, 125, 131, 147, 159, 162, 163, 166, 167, 181, 189, 223, 232, 249, 260, 280, 285, 292–294, 299, 310, 312, 314, 316, 332, 336, 366, 374, 466, 468, 470, 473, 474, 479–482, 484–486 Policy Agenda for a People Oriented Development, 39 policy development, 375, 466–468, 473 policy innovation, 277, 385 policymakers, 21 policy recommendations, 21 policy responses, 379 policy stream, 375, 395, 397 political decentralization, 6, 30 political dynasties, 14, 18, 38, 57, 68, 70, 71 political families, 181, 185 political inclusion, 212 political leadership, 491 political participation, 15, 212 political parties, 68 political reforms, 18 political science, 9 political will, 66, 69, 182, 189, 310, 315, 318 politicization, 514 politico-administrative, 99, 395 politics, 60 pollution, 132, 133, 326, 343, 378 poor, 194, 202, 204, 209, 508, 509, 511, 517 popular empowerment, 70 popular involvement, 493 popular participation, 18, 30, 70, 71, 492, 493, 496, 508, 509, 512–514, 517 population, 203, 494 population control, 208

INDEX

population growth, 13, 62 pork barrel, 53, 507 post-war period, 61 poverty, 13, 38, 55, 62, 70, 114, 130, 196, 278, 279, 281, 282, 286, 382, 467, 472 poverty incidence, 59 poverty reduction, 508 Power to the People: Bayanihan Federalism, Power to the Regions (A Draft Constitution for a Strong, Indissoluble Republic, 2019), 2, 55 President, 32, 34, 54, 57, 61, 65, 70, 210 Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management, 383 President Ramos, 296 primary care network, 201 primary health care, 198, 204 primary healthcare systems, 215 Prime Strategic Holdings, 300 private concessionaires, 11, 17 private production, 16 private sector, 10, 18, 41, 45, 46, 66, 68, 70, 100, 130, 134, 166, 209, 211, 215, 264, 266, 284, 291, 295, 296, 298, 302, 304, 305, 311, 314, 383, 466, 470–472, 492, 493, 513–515 privatization, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 96, 100, 113, 133, 291–301, 303–306, 308, 310–313, 315–318, 497, 499, 500, 511 privatization policy, 515 progressive legislation and practices, 210 promotive and preventive approaches, 215 proper sanitation, 208 prosperity, 14

535

protection and empowerment approaches, 216 protection-focused reform, 214 provinces, 3, 14, 15, 32, 34, 43, 48, 51, 53, 59, 198, 200, 202, 507, 514 provincial governments, 198 provincial level, 197 public administration, 9 public health care system, 197, 199, 200 public health facilities, 206 public health sector, 201 public health service delivery, 200 public health services, 207 public health system, 197, 198, 205, 209, 216 fragmentation of the, 202 public hospitals, 204 public infrastructure, 15 public management, 9 public/non-profit partnership (PuNPP), 304, 306, 307, 317 public partnership, public-private forms of, 10 public policy, 88, 131 public-private partnership (PPP), 263, 310, 312, 313 public-private partnerships, 9 public-public partnership (PuP), 304, 308, 317, 512 public sector, 17 public sector agencies, 512 public service goods, 11 public services, 7, 13, 17, 19, 21, 63, 495, 511 delivery of, 43, 495 public service value, 17 Public welfare expenditure, 452 public welfare spending, 450, 457–461 public works, 44

536

INDEX

Q quadratic term, 458 quality, 212 quality of services, 212 quality standards, 506 quasi-federal arrangement, 516 Quezon City (QC), 15, 93, 94, 112, 127, 134, 137, 138, 141, 143, 144, 146, 148, 150, 168, 169, 203, 205, 208, 209, 239, 260, 275–278, 330, 392, 468, 470, 474, 476, 478–483, 485, 486, 490, 496, 509 Quezon, Manuel L., 32

R RA 9003, 498 Ramos Administration, 49 RA No. 8749, 498 rapid growth, 12, 60 rapid population growth, 60 rapid urban development, 12 rapid urban expansion, 20 rapid urbanization, 12, 96, 113, 316, 388, 494 Razon, Enrique, 300 real property tax, 176, 177, 180, 183, 184 recall system, 492 re-centralization, 11, 21, 201 recreation, 20 recycled, 382, 392 recycling, 384 redistributive agenda, 17 red tape, 39 referral system, 200 reforms, 490 Refuse Derived Fuel (RDF), 394 region, 58, 64, 203, 495 regional administrative government agency, 507

regional and local development, 39 regional cooperation, 505 regional development, 50 Regional Development Authorities, 58, 210 Regional Development Council (RDC), 36, 39, 51, 52, 58, 71, 210, 214, 500 regional development plan, 52, 210 regional government(s), 33, 36, 67, 210, 211, 505, 506, 512, 517 regional health offices, 199 regional inequalities, 6, 38, 54 regionalization, 213, 496, 506 regionally elected body, 213 regional metropolitan body, 213 regional offices, 36 regional organization units, 39 regions, 6, 8, 56, 57, 495, 504, 507, 515 remunicipalization, 292, 304, 309, 311–315, 317 rent-seeking tendencies, 69 representation, 212 Republic Act 7160, 3 Republic Act No. 2264, 33 Republic Act No. 2370 (later amended by RA 3590), 33 Republic Act No. 5185, 34 Republic Act No. 7160, 39, 193 Republic Act No. 9003, 497 resilience, 411 resource recovery, 384 resources, 513 responsible governance, 8, 9, 11, 12, 16, 31, 71, 512, 515, 517 responsible local governance, 14, 17, 19, 59, 294, 316 restrictive economic provisions, 68 restructuring, 17 rethink, reduce, reuse, repurpose, recycle, 396

INDEX

revenue capacity, 67 revenue creation, 510 revenue generation, 51 revenue-generation capacities, 13, 63 revenue powers, 507 revenue raising capacity, 509 revenues, 67 reviews, 494 revisions, 213 right to access quality health services, 215 right to the city, 409, 412, 439 Rio Declaration, 372 risk layering, 468–470, 483–485, 511 risk retention, 466 risk transfer, 465, 466, 468, 469, 473, 475, 476, 478–486, 510, 511 risk transfer mechanism (RTM), 465, 469, 470, 473–475, 479, 482, 485, 489, 511 risk transfer options planning, 511 rural health units (RHUs), 136, 162, 172, 173, 198–200 rural underdevelopment, 60 S sanitary landfills, 390 sanitation, 13, 109, 133, 292, 298, 299, 303, 313, 317, 381, 384, 493 scale argument economies of, 211 school building program, 44 school buildings, 173, 174, 177–179, 183, 185 sectoral representation, 42, 44 sectoral representatives, 214, 492 security, 20, 195, 215 semi-federal arrangement, 504 Senate, 206 Senate Economic Planning Office (SEPO), 391

537

service delivery, 54, 59, 68, 70, 201, 212 quality standards for, 212 service delivery networks, 201 services, 15 shared power, 506 shared responsibilities, 213, 506 single non-profit agencies (SiNPs), 304, 308, 309, 317, 513 single public sector agencies (SiP), 305 slums, 62, 259, 265, 285 social development fund, 167 social development programs, 510 social equity, 408, 409, 492 socialized housing, 17–19, 259–263, 265–267, 269, 270, 272, 275–277, 280–286, 490, 496, 508, 509, 512, 513, 515, 517 socialized housing units, 16 social justice, 55 social service inaccessibility, 16, 508 social services, 10, 17–21, 30, 41, 44, 48, 55, 490, 491, 493, 500, 506, 508, 512, 514, 515 coverage, 260 delivery of, 490, 492 funding, 188 inefficient and inequitable delivery of, 70 social services delivery, 10–12, 14, 16, 17, 19, 30, 43, 45, 55, 67, 70, 71, 159, 293, 489–497, 499, 503, 505, 509, 514–517 fragmented nature of, 492, 514 politicization of, 493 social welfare, 37 societal welfare, 69 socio-cultural, ethnic and identity differences, 6 socio-economic growth, 64

538

INDEX

socio-economic inequality, 12, 13, 16, 68, 70 SOGREA, 298 solid waste, 498 solid waste disposal, 112, 116, 133, 384 solid waste generation rate, 381 solid waste management, 10–12, 18, 19, 71, 108, 372, 379, 489, 490, 492–494, 496–499, 503, 505, 507, 509, 515, 517 Solid Waste Management Boards, 491 Southern Tagalog, 59 Southern Tagalog Region, 66 South Korea, 495 Spanish and American colonial periods, 29, 69 Spanish colonial rule, 31 Spanish colonization, 31, 32 special autonomous region, 6 Special Education Fund (SEF), 159, 175–178, 180, 183, 184, 188, 233, 239, 241, 249, 250, 491, 510 stakeholders, 513 state, 17 state coordination, 17 state of decentralization, 21 State of the Nation Address (SONA), 4 state power, 37 states and non-state actors, 10 state universities and colleges (SUCs), 134, 137, 138, 141 strong central government, 32 strong civil service, 506 strong leadership, 40 structural models of governance, 9 subnational bodies, 36 subnational governments, 67 subnational-level government, 11 subnational variations, 210

subsidiarity, 68 subsidiary governments, 444, 446 subsidiary units, 507 supplies, 494 supra-administrative Bodies, 61 Supreme Court, 3, 43, 58, 202, 214, 498 Supreme Court decision, 10, 209 Supreme Court ruling, 15 surgical amendments, 4, 58, 209, 213, 214 sustainability, 411, 439 sustainability science (SS), 348, 366–370, 495, 502 sustainable, 215 sustainable cities, 408, 439 sustainable development, 18, 38, 109, 286, 372, 374, 476, 499, 516 sustainable peace, 14 sustainable science, 515 Swiss case, 210 SWM framework, 384 synergistic approach, 512 systemic inequality, 196

T taxation, 55 taxing powers, 47, 70 tax-raising power, 509 Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN), 448 technical capacity(ies), 46, 54, 212, 513 Technical Education and Skills Development Agency (TESDA), 137, 138 technical knowledge, 211, 506, 517 technical-vocational institutions (TVIs), 137, 138, 142, 144 top-down protection, 16, 508 top-down (protection) approach, 196

INDEX

top-down reform, 214 tourism, 44 town mayors, 52 traditional jurisdictional conflicts, 66 traditional metropolitan reorganization approach, 65 traditional politics, 53 traditional science (TS), 366–369, 515 transdisciplinary approach, 9, 495, 502, 515 transfers, 127, 129, 247, 303, 314, 338, 361, 467 transnational corporations (TNCs), 298, 299, 305, 314 transparency, 161, 162, 299, 310, 312, 316 transportation, 13, 16 Transport-oriented urban planning, 260 Trident Water, 300 Tropical Storm (TS) Ketsana, 348

U unconditional transfers, 450–452 underdevelopment, 15, 18, 68, 70, 491 unemployment, 15 unequal allocation, 14 unequal development, 14 unequal urban development, 70 uneven economic development, 68 uneven financial resources, 66 unfunded mandates, 49, 51 Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, 15 unitary, 68 unitary devolved setup, 505 unitary form, 29, 59 unitary state, 69 unitary system, 32, 35, 55–57, 71, 222, 517

539

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 16, 196 United States (U.S.), 32, 33, 210 United Utilities, 294, 296 Universal Health Care Law, 202, 206, 492 University of the Philippines, 138, 141 University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP CIDS), 7 UN Millennium Development Goals 2000–2015 (MDGs), 372, 499 unregulated market capitalism, 14 unsustainable development, 70 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2015–2030, 372, 499 urban agenda, 509 urban agriculture, 71, 408–412, 415–418, 421–425, 439, 492, 501, 503 urban agriculture projects, 493 urban areas, 89, 94, 107, 178, 194, 205, 262, 263, 265, 299, 348, 351, 365, 366, 368 urban centers, 12 urban decentralization, 46 urban development, 10–13, 17, 30, 44, 45, 54, 55, 61, 67, 71, 408, 410, 412, 435, 438, 489, 490, 492–497, 499, 502, 503, 509, 512–515 urban development agenda, 499 Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA), 262, 263, 276, 282–284, 509 urban environmental governance, 372–376, 378, 395 urban farmers, 493 urban farming, 10, 18–20, 408–417, 419, 420, 422, 424–426, 430–439, 489, 492–494, 496,

540

INDEX

497, 499, 501–503, 508, 509, 512, 515, 517 urban flooding, 19 urban government, 65 urbanization, 15, 37, 38, 59, 60, 62, 194, 491, 494, 496 urbanized cities, 198 urban land, 12 urban land reform, 55, 62, 260, 283, 286, 512 urban land use dilemma, 19 urban Metro Manila, 16, 215 urban policy, 62 urban poor, 11, 13, 17, 21, 46, 71, 194, 203, 204, 209, 491, 493, 509, 512 urban population, 70, 204 urban region, 203 urban setting, 212 urban slums, 207 urban solid waste management, 19 urban sustainability, 435 urban use planning, 492

V vertical fiscal gaps, 510 vertical imbalance, 469 vulnerable sectors, 194, 209, 216

W waste generation, 377, 381 waste reduction, 348, 378, 385 Waste Reduction Strategies, 388 wastes, 163, 348, 377, 411, 438 waste-to-energy, 396 watchdogs, 212, 506, 517 water, 16, 17, 71, 499, 500, 503, 511, 513, 515, 516 water pollution, 208 water privatization, 10, 11, 16, 17, 20, 21, 513 water sector, 19, 511 water service(s), 17, 20, 489, 493, 508 water services delivery, 18 water shortage, 204 water sources, 503 weak governance, 53 welfare, 508 women, 13 World Health Organization (WHO), 204, 205 World Meteorological Organization-Global Water Partnership, 502 Y yardstick competition, 146