Decentralization in Uganda: Explaining Successes and Failures in Local Governance 9781935049999

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DECENTRALIZATION IN UGANDA

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DECENTRALIZATION IN UGANDA Explaining Successes and Failures in Local Governance

Gina M. S. Lambright

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Published in the United States of America in 2011 by FirstForumPress A division of Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.firstforumpress.com and in the United Kingdom by FirstForumPress A division of Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2011 by FirstForumPress. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A Cataloging-in-Publication record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: 978-1-935049-32-6 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. This book was produced from digital files prepared by the author using the FirstForumComposer. Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5 4 3 2 1

To Chip, Eloisa, and Archer

Contents

List of Tables and Figures List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Acknowledgments

ix xi xiii

1

Exploring Decentralization in Uganda

2

Local Government in Uganda

19

3

Patterns of Local Governance

37

4

Explaining Successes and Failures

63

5

Ministries, Mentoring, and Monitoring

107

6

Political Support, Patronage, and Performance

139

7

The Impact of Electoral Competition

195

8

The Role of Political and Civic Participation

225

9

Uganda in Comparative Perspective

259

Appendix A: Local Government Development Program Assessment Criteria Appendix B: Summary Statistics Appendix C: Models Without Generalized Trust Appendix D: Additional Estimates of District Council Performance Appendix E: Sample Characteristics by District Bibliography Index

vii

1

279 283 285 287 289 291 303

Tables and Figures

Tables

1.1: Economic Development, Institutional Experience, and Ethnic Diversity in Bushenyi, Lira, and Mpigi

11

3.1: Comparison of LGDP Assessment Scores in 1999 and 2002

40

3.2: Changes in LGDP Assessment Scores from 1999 to 2002

42

3.3: Effectiveness of Three District Councils

44

3.4: Summary of Budget Statistics for Three District Councils

49

3.5: Most Serious Problems Identified by Local Residents

51

3.6: Responsiveness of District Councils in Bushenyi, Lira, and Mpigi

53

4.1: Estimates of District Council Performance, 1999/2000

82

4.2: Estimates of District Council Performance, 1999, Additional Measures

83

4.3: Estimates of District Council Performance, 2002

84

5.1: District Council Performance and Contact with Central Government Ministries

111

6.1: Support for the NRM Government by Region

142

6.2: Estimates of Central Government Financial Support to Districts

155

6.3: Central Government Support by Region

156

6.4: Central Government Support to Bushenyi, Lira, and Mpigi

157

7.1: Political Competition in District Chairperson Elections

199

ix

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Decentralization in Uganda

7.2: Analysis of Local Election Results

204

7.3: Political Competition in Bushenyi, Lira, and Mpigi

212

8.1: Participation, Social Capital, and Civil Society

229

8.2: Attendance at Local Council Meetings

231

8.3: Reasons for Attending Local Council Meetings

232

8.4: Citizen Evaluations of District Council Performance in Delivery of Services in Four Sectors

239

8.5: Citizen Interest in Five Political Institutions

243

8.6: Linkages between Civic Organizations and District Councils in Bushenyi, Lira, and Mpigi

246

9.1: Estimates of Local Government Performance, Kenya 2003

263

9.2: Democracy and Decentralization in Five African Countries

272

Figures

1.1: Location of Bushenyi, Lira, and Mpigi Districts (2008)

10

2.1: Structure of Local Council System

27

4.1: 2001 Vote by 1999 Cabinet Representation

94

4.2: 2001 Vote by 2000 GOU Projects

94

4.3: 2006 Vote by 2001 Cabinet Representation

95

4.4: 1996 Vote by 1999 Cabinet Representation

95

4.5: 2001 Vote by 2001 Cabinet Representation

97

4.6: 2006 Vote by 2006 Cabinet Representation

97

6.1: Support for the NRM in Bushenyi, Lira, and Mpigi

142

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CAO CBO CFO CG CSO DDHS DDP DPP DTB EFT FDC FDS FY GOU HDI IDMC IDP IFMS IGG KACC KCC KY LA LASDAP LATF LC LG Act LGBFP LGDP LGFAR LGFC

chief administrative officer community-based organization chief finance officer central government civil society organization district director of health services District Development Program Directorate of Public Prosecutions district tender board electronic funds transfer Forum for Democratic Change fiscal decentralization strategy fiscal year Government of Uganda human development index Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre internally displaced person Integrated Financial Management System Inspectorate General of Government Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission Kampala City Council Kabaka-Yekka local authority Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan Local Authorities Transfer Fund local council Local Government Act of 1997 local government budget framework paper Local Government Development Program local government financial and accounting regulations Local Government Finance Commission

xi

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Decentralization in Uganda

LGPAC LoGICS LRA MoAG MoE MoF MoH MoH2O MoIA MoLG MoWks MP NARC NGO NRA NRM NUSAF OAG PAC PAF PEAP PMC PRDP RC RDC UDN ULGA UPC UPDF UPE URA USE

Local Government Public Accounts Committee Local Government Information and Communication System Lord’s Resistance Army Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Education Ministry of Finance Ministry of Health Ministry of Water Ministry of Internal Affairs Ministry of Local Government Ministry of Works member of parliament National Rainbow Coalition nongovernmental organization National Resistance Army National Resistance Movement Northern Uganda Social Action Fund Office of the Auditor General Public Accounts Committee Poverty Alleviation Fund Poverty Eradication Action Plan poverty monitoring committees Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan resistance council resident district commissioner Uganda Debt Network Uganda Local Government Association Uganda People’s Congress Uganda’s People Defense Forces Universal Primary Education Uganda Revenue Authority Universal Secondary Education

Acknowledgments

I am deeply and forever indebted to so many people who helped me during the course of writing this book. The research materials upon which the book is based were collected over the course of twelve years of fieldwork in Uganda. Countless Ugandans generously gave of their time and knowledge to answer my questions and for that I am forever grateful. I am especially grateful to all of the political and administrative officials in the capital and in Bushenyi, Lira, and Mpigi districts. Many of these officials patiently answered my questions on multiple occasions over the course of the last ten years and asked ever so politely when my questions and this book would be finished. Thank you for your generosity and patience. Equally important are all of the survey and interview respondents and focus group participants in these districts who gave of their time to share with me their thoughts on local government in Uganda. Many Ugandans opened their homes to me during my fieldwork, including the sisters at Bwanda Convent in Masaka. I am indebted to them for their warm hospitality. I also benefited tremendously from the hard work and insights of my research assistants in Uganda, especially Adelline Tumikye, Innocent Tuhaire, and Rosette Kyohangirwe, and the wonderful survey team (Jonathan Ngobi, Florence Abesigye, Eunice Kyomugisha, Allen Tushabe, Aliziki Semakula, Margaret Akidi, Florence Abesigye, Grace Akello, William Onyango, and Irene). I am indebted to Ruth Nalumaga for all of her generosity and help, for keeping me current on news from Uganda long after I returned to the U.S., and for her friendship in general. I owe special thanks to my wonderful friend Norah Nambatya, who not only spent hours walking to rural villages in central Uganda with me to conduct focus groups and interview LC officials, but who did so joyfully and still always makes me laugh. I would like to thank Craig Kaufman for research assistance in Washington. I also would like to thank several organizations that provided valuable funding that made this research possible, including the Social Science Research Council, the Fulbright Hays Doctoral Dissertation Program, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of

xiii

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Decentralization in Uganda

Political Science and Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. Countless people provided valuable comments, criticism, and encouragement along the way. I especially benefited from the wonderful advice of all of my professors at Michigan State University, where this project began, especially Michael Bratton, Nicolas van de Walle, Brian Silver, and Mark Jones, who advised and supported me along the way and taught me how to conduct careful political science research. I particularly want to thank Mike Bratton for his assistance and advice over the years and especially for sharing his rich knowledge of African politics. And I owe a very special thanks to my wonderful advisor and mentor, Nic van de Walle, who is always extremely generous with his time, advice, and encouragement. This book, especially Chapter 4, is much improved by the help of my colleagues in the Department of Political Science and the Elliott School at George Washington University who read and commented on various parts of the book and provided extremely helpful advice throughout the process of completing the manuscript. These include Robert Adcock, Alasdair Bowie, Chris Deering, Henry Hale, Llewelyn Hughes, Jai Kwan Jung, Steven Kelts, Eric Lawrence, Forrest Maltzman, Cynthia McClintock, Kimberly Morgan, Chad Rector, Elizabeth Saunders, Holger Schmidt, John Sides, Lee Sigelman, and Manny Teitelbaum. I am especially grateful to Michelle Kuenzi, Wendy Martinek, and Sara Pashak, who provided advice at critical moments in the writing process as well as being all around great friends. The manuscript is much improved by the comments of three anonymous reviewers. I also want to give special thanks to Lynne Rienner and Claire Vlcek for their assistance in the publication process and their confidence in the work. This book would not have been possible without the enduring love, support, and help of my wonderful family and friends. I benefited from the kindness and encouragement of great friends, including Abigail, Sara, and Kristen. Thank you to Lana, Linda, and Nancy who provided priceless hours of babysitting to enable me to work on the book. My husband, Chip, never wavered in his faith that I would finish the book and that it would be wonderful, nor in his enthusiasm for the project even when I was not so sure. Thank you for believing in me. Also, to my children, Eloisa and Archer, who generously gave me smiles, hugs, kisses, and laughter that helped me keep my perspective on the project and gave me the energy to finish. Thank you. This book is dedicated to you.

1 Exploring Decentralization in Uganda

On April 6, 2001, the officials in the district council in Kasese district in western Uganda unanimously agreed to suspend the chief administrative officer (CAO) over allegations of financial mismanagement and misappropriation of funds.1 District officials alleged that the CAO misappropriated over 11 million Ush (approximately $6,077 at that time). In a similar situation in March 2002, district officials in Soroti district in eastern Uganda interdicted the chief finance officer (CFO) and the district development program officer.2 They accused the two officials of stealing 17,585,000 Ush (approximately $10,069 at the time) intended to fund projects under the District Development Program—a program funded by the Netherlands. Unfortunately these cases are far from unique. Local government officials in Uganda are routinely accused of corruption, misappropriation of funds, mismanagement, abuse of office, and nepotism. In fact, in 2000, Uganda’s Inspectorate General of Government (IGG), the agency responsible for investigating and eliminating corruption in the government, received more complaints about corruption in local governments than any other government department or ministry.3 Uganda’s local governments ranked even higher than the police in the number of corruption allegations! Despite the prevalence of complaints about local government corruption, Ugandans and residents in other African countries appear to be generally trusting and satisfied with the performance of local governments, although the situation may be changing as reports of corruption continue to dominate local press. In 2000, slightly more than 78 percent of respondents to the Afrobarometer national survey in Uganda reported that they trust the district council. Similarly, almost 70 percent of the respondents expressed satisfaction with the performance of their representative to the district council. Survey data from eleven other sub-Saharan African countries are quite similar. In fact, in only three of the countries surveyed did less than half of the population report that they were satisfied with the performance of their local government.4

1

2

Decentralization in Uganda

Respondents in South Africa, Zambia, and, not surprisingly, Zimbabwe were much more critical of the performance of their local leaders. Many countries throughout the world have begun to implement comprehensive decentralization programs that are intended to promote democracy and development at the grassroots by empowering local governments.5 According to Oxhorn (2004, 3), “Nearly every country in the world, regardless of its political system, geographical location, history, level of economic development and cultural traditions, is now experimenting with new forms of regional and local governance.” Some scholars and practitioners even promote decentralization as a necessary step in the democratization process.6 The performance of local governments in Africa has also grown increasingly more important in recent years as decentralization has recently risen to the top of many governments’ political agendas throughout Africa. Ndegwa (2002) notes that decentralization has gained prominence in African states in the 1990s and attributes this trend to the public sector reforms that comprised an integral part of structural adjustment programs and also to the recent moves toward political liberalization and greater democratization on the continent. African countries, such as Mali, Mozambique, South Africa, Uganda, and Ghana, among others, adopted some form of decentralization and increased, often dramatically, the responsibilities of local political institutions. The question remains, however, whether local governments in Africa that have historically been poorly funded and politically marginalized under authoritarian rule can actually perform this new role. This book sheds light on this important question by identifying the factors that contribute to good performance among local governments in Uganda. The current emphasis on decentralization by African governments and donors appears to be a hopeful response to the problems and failures of the centralized political systems adopted by African countries shortly after independence. Most observers of African politics recognize that centralized decisionmaking failed to deliver the promises of economic development and democracy to countries that pursued such methods. Instead the result of extreme centralization of political decisionmaking has most often been the marginalization and further impoverishment of African populations. Many observers also believe that centralized decisionmaking sustained and facilitated patronage and corruption, which are commonly viewed as impediments to economic development in Africa. Proponents of decentralization are quite optimistic about what such policies can achieve.7 The stated goals of recently adopted decentralization programs reflect the idea that decentralization cultivates

Exploring Decentralization in Uganda

3

both grass roots democracy and development by shifting political power and financial authority to local levels (Smith 1979; Rondinelli 1981; UNDP 1993). For example, at a recent meeting in Uganda of the Commonwealth Local Government Forum, President Museveni encouraged all Commonwealth countries to adopt decentralization.8 Uganda’s president equated decentralization to “good governance” and reportedly argued, “Central government is remote and bad, it is power far away . . . You need to have power where you are to defend your interests and get services.”9 The fulfillment of these stated goals ultimately depends on the performance of newly empowered local governments. It is not clear whether local governments are equipped to handle these new responsibilities and whether the record of local government performance will be better than that of central governments in Africa. My principal aim in this book is to identify the factors associated with better local government performance in Africa. Under what circumstances, do local governments perform well? I present an interesting answer to this question, one that builds on existing literature in African politics and the growing literature on decentralization in developing countries. The evidence I present in the subsequent chapters sheds considerable light on when and why some local governments perform better than others in Africa. Outline of Argument: The Big Squeeze

Decentralization theorists expect that society will hold leaders accountable. The two examples that started the chapter raise questions about whether and to what extent local leaders are responsive and accountable to local constituents. For example, did district politicians in Soroti and Kasese feel pressure from the community to punish corrupt administrators? How is society involved in decisions and activities of local governments in Africa generally? The research I present in this book indicates that the impact of society on the performance of local leaders and local political institutions is conditional. The ability of local communities to influence the decisions and actions of local leaders and to hold these leaders accountable depends to a considerable degree on the nature of the political relationship between the local government and the central government. “Central-local relations” refers to the formal administrative and informal political linkages between the central government and local governments. Central-local relations matter and, in Africa, where governance has historically been quite centralized, the weight of the

4

Decentralization in Uganda

center persists and determines the success of decentralization and the extent to which local governments respond to local needs. This book demonstrates that central-local relations, especially the informal political linkages between the center and local governments, influence what local governments do and how they perform directly and indirectly. When local government leaders’ attention and accountability are directed primarily to outsiders, whether representatives of the central government or important party officials, the influence of local communities is eroded. As a result, the performance of local governments suffers and African communities do not receive the services they desperately need. Many advocates and scholars of decentralization expect that societies will hold leaders accountable through political participation and civic engagement, thereby promoting better institutional performance. The influence of the central state on local leaders garners little attention within this literature. In the following chapters, I develop a theory that acknowledges and documents the simultaneous and interactive role of society and the central government on the behavior and performance of local leaders. Throughout the book, I highlight the conditions under which each set of actors influences local political outcomes. I do not take society’s influence as a given, but rather investigate the conditions under which local populations are able to shape the performance of their local governments. I find that the informal political linkages between the center and a local area influence how local leaders respond to local populations. The attention in this book given to the role of the center and the potential influence of tight central-local relations highlight the importance of the political context in which decentralization is adopted and some of the very real roadblocks to successful decentralization in Africa. In exploring how central-local relations affect the performance of local governments, this study presents an institutional analysis of local government performance, examining the role of both formal and informal institutions in shaping the choices and behavior of local officials. My analysis considers both formal institutions, such as the mechanisms of central government monitoring and oversight, as well as informal institutions, such as patronage networks, that shape centrallocal relations. My analysis demonstrates that informal political linkages—the central explanatory variable in this study—are powerful to explain differences in performance across local governments. While formal administrative linkages have some effect on the performance of local governments, their effect is considerably weaker and mediated by politics. This study departs from much of the current literature on African politics by investigating the influence of informal institutions,

Exploring Decentralization in Uganda

5

such as patronage networks, and detailing both the positive and negative ways in which informality shapes local government performance, rather than simply taking for granted that the presence of informal institutions leads to undesired or less efficient outcomes. I examine two dimensions of informal political linkages: top-down linkages and bottom-up linkages. Top-down political linkages describe central government support to local governments, which is most often defined by political patronage. Bottom-up political linkages describe popular and elite support within a community for the central government. As expected, my analysis highlights the various ways in which top-down political linkages, particularly patronage, undermine the performance of local institutions. Yet, my analysis also reveals that informality is not entirely harmful to local institutions. For example, bottom-up political linkages are associated with better institutional performance. Moreover, central oversight over local governments also appears to be more effective when officials are flexible in their enforcement of the guidelines. And when formal mechanisms for participation do not work as planned, informal linkages to local officials provide an important alternative. Defining Decentralization

The popularity of decentralization is problematic given the complexity of the concept. Decentralization is often imbued with various, often quite contradictory, meanings and interpretations. For example, a distinction can be made between horizontal and vertical decentralization. Horizontal decentralization distributes power among political institutions within the same level of government, while vertical decentralization distributes power to political institutions between two or more levels of government (UNDP 1993; Regan 1995). Many scholars further distinguish between different types of vertical decentralization. For example, deconcentration or administrative decentralization merely shifts representatives of central government ministries to branch offices at the local level (Manor 1998; Regan 1995; Rondinelli 1981). With deconcentration there are limited changes in the distribution of power. Local administrators can make few decisions without consulting the central government ministries. In such circumstances, the central government maintains full discretionary power over the decisions of local administrators. Fiscal decentralization concerns the transfer of limited influence over budgetary and financial decisions to lower levels (Manor 1998). On the other hand, devolution shifts full decisionmaking and financial authority to local levels and, thus, is often referred to as democratic or political decentralization.10

6

Decentralization in Uganda

Because devolution limits the extent to which local governments must consult with the central government in making decisions, it constitutes “the strongest form of decentralization” (UNDP 1993, 67). Yet, as Oxhorn (2004) notes, decentralization outcomes are often uncertain and ambiguous, despite what the policy stipulates on paper. Recognizing the “fundamental ambiguity” of decentralization outcomes, Oxhorn suggests a definition of decentralization that acknowledges the dynamic relations between levels of government and the fact that “levels of autonomy can vary by issue area” (2004, 5). My interest in the various ways in which central-local relations shape and condition local government performance similarly suggests that levels of autonomy are dynamic across time and across subnational governments within a single country. Formal institutions may award subnational governments a certain level of autonomy, while informal institutions, such as patronage, or informal political relations may in reality offer local leaders a wholly different level of autonomy. Thus, in my analysis, I rely upon the minimal definition of decentralization promoted by Oxhorn in which decentralization is defined simply as “the transfer of power to different subnational levels of government by the central government” (2004, 7). The Context: Decentralization and Institutional Performance in Uganda

Uganda provides an excellent case in which to explore these issues, given its adoption of a comprehensive decentralization policy in the 1990s. A recent study of the extent of decentralization among thirty African countries characterizes Uganda’s policy of decentralization as among the most advanced on the continent (Ndegwa 2002). In fact, Uganda earned among the highest scores on the indices of political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization (Ndegwa 2002).11 District councils in Uganda are now responsible for decisionmaking and policy implementation in several important policy areas, including: education policy through secondary school; health policy, especially concerning hospitals in the district; water policy; road policy, excluding major roads for travel between districts; and agricultural extension (Uganda 1997a). Local councils (LCs) have also been given the responsibility to monitor and supervise the activities of civil society organizations (CSOs) in their areas (Uganda 1997a).12 Moreover, district councils have substantial financial authority, including the power to “levy, charge and collect fees and taxes, including rates, rents, royalties, stamp duties, personal graduated tax, and registration and licensing fees” (Uganda 1997a, 35).13 Thus, it is possi-

Exploring Decentralization in Uganda

7

ble to compare the performance of Uganda’s district councils and identify those factors that are associated with good performance. Like so many other countries in Africa and other parts of the developing world, Uganda’s political system is hybrid. Democratic features, such as elections, coexist with authoritarian tendencies. Understanding how decentralization operates and the challenges local governments face in Uganda can shed light on the likely success of decentralization reforms in other hybrid and democratizing regimes. To examine these issues, I conducted subnational analysis within a single country—Uganda. Subnational comparison is particularly useful because it holds constant features of the political and social context while recognizing and explaining important variation across local governments within a single country. My research design employs mixed methods and combines quantitative analysis of over forty-five Ugandan districts with in-depth case study analysis. This includes analysis across the forty-five district councils that existed at the time I conducted my initial fieldwork, as well as subsequent analysis that includes many of the new district councils that were created before 2003.14 I collected the data used in this study during two years of extensive fieldwork (1998–1999 and 2000–2001) and subsequent fieldwork in 2005, 2006, and 2008. The research strategy enabled me to track the experiences of these districts across time, which deepens our understanding of the dynamics of decentralization and how performance changes across time. The aggregate analysis across the forty-five Ugandan districts is based on an original dataset I created. In compiling the dataset, I collected data to create many original indicators, such as the number of presidential visits to the districts, the number of letters exchanged between the local governments and various ministries in the Ugandan central government, and the number of registered NGOs operating in each district. I combined these original indicators with data drawn from numerous other sources, including census data, election results, and various Ugandan government reports. In addition to the aggregate analysis across all Ugandan districts, I present case study analysis based on in-depth field research in three representative districts: Bushenyi in western Uganda; Mpigi in central Uganda; and Lira in northern Uganda (see Figure 1.1).15 I purposely chose the districts using a least similar approach in order to reflect variation on several important characteristics, including region, distance from the capital city, the date the district was decentralized, level of economic development, and rural/urban status. The three districts represent three of Uganda’s four regions and exhibit high degrees of

8

Decentralization in Uganda

variation on the principal variables of interest. Most importantly, these districts reflect variation on the key explanatory variable in this study, informal political linkages. The political relationship between the central government and each district varies quite significantly. For example, the three districts exhibit different levels of popular and elite support (i.e., bottom-up political linkages) for the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government and also vary in terms of the nature and levels of political and financial support provided by the center to each council (i.e., top-down political linkages).16 As a result of the variation in the informal political linkages between the Movement government and the three districts, these case studies help to clarify how informal political linkages shape the performance of Uganda’s local governments generally. Bushenyi district in western Uganda represents a predominantly rural district that lies 350 kilometers from Kampala. The population of Bushenyi, like that of the other districts in western Uganda, tends to strongly support President Museveni and the Movement. Historically Bushenyi comprised five counties: Buhweju, Bunyaruguru, Igara, Ruhinda, and Sheema. Of the three districts included in this study, Bushenyi district was the smallest—only 4,026 square kilometers. Nevertheless, Bushenyi district still exhibited diversity. For example, the two northernmost counties of Bunyaruguru and Buhweju were among the poorest and the most isolated parts of the district. As has occurred to most districts in Uganda, the boundaries of all three districts have changed during the period of investigation. No doubt Bushenyi’s size and political influence explain why the district avoided division until recently. In May 2010, Uganda’s parliament approved the division of Bushenyi into five districts. Once the new districts go into effect in July 2010, Bushenyi district will comprise only Igara County. The other counties of the former Bushenyi district will be divided across four new districts. Unlike Bushenyi and other districts in the western region, Lira district provides a good example of the sentiment toward the central government among the districts of the north. Historically, the districts in northern Uganda have opposed the Museveni regime, and Lira is no exception. Following the announcement of the contentious results of the 1980 presidential election, in which Yoweri Museveni and numerous others felt that President Milton Obote and his Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) had stolen the election, Museveni organized and led the National Resistance Army (NRA) against the Obote regime. Obote was a Northerner from the former Lango district, which included Lira district and neighboring district, Apac. Museveni’s guerrilla war resulted in the

Exploring Decentralization in Uganda

9

ousting of Obote in a coup organized by generals in the Ugandan army from another northern part of the country. Less than a year later Museveni’s guerrilla army took Kampala. President Museveni and his NRM government have held power since. Museveni has been reinstated three times, in the presidential elections of 1996, 2001, and, most recently, 2006. The sentiment among many Ugandans from the north is anger and frustration focused on Museveni, as the individual who stripped the north of political power and control, and the NRM government he heads. Logan et al. describe Northerners as “outsiders” who feel “deeply disaffected with the political and economic system” (2003, ii). The political alienation of the north is key to understanding the performance of local governments in that region. Lira, like Bushenyi, is predominantly rural and lies approximately 360 kilometers north of Kampala. With over 7,000 square kilometers, Lira has historically been one of the geographically largest districts in Uganda. But in 2005, Lira was divided and Kyoga County formed the new district of Amolatar. The district was subsequently further divided and Dokolo County became the new Dokolo district. Today Lira district comprises three counties (Erute, Otuke, and Moroto) and Lira Municipality (see Figure 1.1). Insecurity from activities of the rebels of Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) or the cattle-raiding Karamojong from neighboring districts plagues much of Lira district. The historic insecurity and what Lira residents see as the inability or lack of desire by the central government to ensure their safety further erode support for the NRM government in Lira. In addition to insecurity, local governments in northern Uganda face an additional challenge of low levels of economic development. Districts in northern Uganda are considerably less developed than their counterparts in other parts of the country, especially those in the western and central regions. For example, the Human Development Index (HDI) score for Lira district is only .44 compared to .51 in Bushenyi and .52 in Mpigi district (UNDP 2005). Much of the disparities across regions in Uganda can and have been traced to the inequitable strategies of development instituted by the British colonial government, but perpetuated under postcolonial governments. The lack of concern for economic development or the provision of public services by most of the regimes in Uganda’s postcolonial history combined with decades of fighting has meant that regional imbalances that emerged at independence were institutionalized and today are difficult to erase.

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Decentralization in Uganda

Figure 1.1: Location of Bushenyi, Lira, and Mpigi Districts (2008)

Credit: Kenneth Somodevilla

Political insecurity at the hands of the LRA or Karamojong cattle rustlers and the low level of economic development certainly challenge Lira’s district council. Yet, as I argue below, neither factor fully accounts for Lira district council’s poor performance. Thus, Lira provides an interesting counterpoint to the high levels of stability, security, and development in Bushenyi, and also its close political allegiance to not only the Museveni government, but to most of Uganda’s regimes since independence. While Lira and other northern districts have tended to be marginalized politically since Obote was forced from power, Bushenyi has a history of close political alignment with whatever government happens to be in power. To paraphrase much of what interview respondents said to describe Bushenyi’s unique

Exploring Decentralization in Uganda

11

political position in Uganda’s history, the district seems to have played the role of true politician extraordinarily well, linking closely to those in power regardless of the ethnic group, religion, or region from which the leader was drawn. Table 1.1: Economic Development, Institutional Experience, and Ethnic Diversity in Bushenyi, Lira, and Mpigi Bushenyi

Lira

Mpigi

HDI score (1996)

.415

.350

.497

HDI score (2000)

.456

.405

.530

HDI score (2004)

.510

.443

.520

Percent of population in poverty (2003)

31.1

33.2

27.5

Age of district (years) (2008)

34

29

34

Years since decentralization (2008)

15

16

16

Ethnic fragmentation

.3045

.1572

.3426

Linguistic fragmentation (2000)

.2075

.0996

.2068

Linguistic fragmentation (2002)

.353

.0461

.2319

Economic Development

Institutional Experience

Ethnic Diversity

Source: Data collected or compiled by author from various sources. HDI and poverty data from UNDP (1998, 2002, 2005). Ethnic and linguistic fragmentation data calculated from Afrobarometer data (2000 and 2002). Age of districts calculated by author.

In some ways, Mpigi district falls neatly between these two districts—in the level of political support for the current government and its linkages to previous regimes. Yet, in other ways, Mpigi is certainly unique. Like Lira, Mpigi is also an older district and, historically, one of the country’s largest, comprising over 6,000 square kilometers. Until its

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Decentralization in Uganda

division in 2000, the district contained both urban and rural area extremes. In 2000, Mpigi district was divided into two separate districts: Mpigi and Wakiso. The predominantly rural counties of Gomba, Butambala, and Mawokota remained in Mpigi district. The urban counties of Kyadondo and Busiro, which includes Entebbe Municipality, formed the new Wakiso district. Like Bushenyi, Mpigi will be divided further in 2010. As I carefully document in Chapter 3, by most measures Bushenyi district council performs better than Mpigi or Lira. I selected these cases in order to focus on the explanatory power of political variables and rule out structural factors to account for the observed differences in the performance of the district councils. (In Chapters 7 and 8, I examine the explanatory power of societal factors, such as levels of political participation and civil society activism and demonstrate that these factors are insufficient to account for Bushenyi’s better performing district council.) While the three districts do vary in level of development, economic variables cannot fully explain why Bushenyi’s district council outperforms Mpigi and Lira. Lira district in northern Uganda is certainly less developed than Mpigi or Bushenyi (see Table 1.1), a gap likely to widen in the future given the effects of the conflict in northern Uganda on the district’s economy. The low level of development in Lira certainly creates challenges for the district council. Yet, as I document in Chapter 3, there are numerous shortcomings in the capabilities and performance of Mpigi’s district council and, by most measures, Mpigi is the more developed district among the three. In fact, Mpigi consistently earns higher HDI scores and reports a lower percent of the population in poverty than Lira or Bushenyi (see Table 1.1). Moreover, while the conflict in Lira affects council activities and performance, the conflict cannot explain the observed differences in council performance. In fact, much of the evidence of Lira’s poor performance predates the LRA’s push into Lira in 2002. While Lira suffered LRA attacks before 2002,17 at that time the conflict was concentrated primarily in the Acholi districts of Gulu and Kitgum. One member of parliament (MP) from Lira explained that “2003 was the worst with the LRA [in Lira]. Before that there was a bit of activity in Otuke [county] and Oromo [subcounty], Apac [district] and Acholi.”18 In 2002, the Ugandan government launched “Operation Ironfist,” a military campaign to push the LRA out of their camps in southern Sudan. In response to the increased pressure from the Ugandan military within Sudan, the LRA pushed back into northern Uganda and even moved further south into districts that had been spared much of the fighting previously, such as the Lango districts of Lira and Apac and the

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Teso districts of Soroti, Katakwi, and Kaberamaido, prompting massive displacement of local populations in those districts.19 The security situation in Lira continued to deteriorate and in early 2004, LRA rebels attacked several internally displaced person (IDP) camps in the district, including an attack on the Bar Lonyo camp that killed over three hundred people. By early 2006, approximately one-half to two-thirds of Lira’s population was displaced.20 However, by March 2008, the security situation in Lira and Apac had improved and all of the IDP camps in Lango subregion had closed.21 Thus, there is little reason to believe that Lira’s experience with the LRA fully explains the district council’s poor performance. Similarly, Mpigi district has not been a victim of the LRA conflict or any other recent violent conflict, and yet the performance of the district council also falls well below that of Bushenyi. Moreover, among the seven districts whose performance on a recent assessment falls more than one standard deviation below the median, only one of these districts, Adjumani, has been affected by the ongoing LRA conflict.22 These three districts also vary little in terms of their policy and institutional experience. All three districts were created about the same time (see Table 1.1). Each has nearly two decades of experience with decentralization. In fact, Lira and Mpigi were among the first thirteen districts brought into the decentralization program in 1993. Decentralization was introduced to Bushenyi, which currently hosts the better performing council, the following year. Thus, institutional experiences does not account for the differences in performance across the three councils. The experiences of these three case study districts also provide little evidence that longer term political institutional legacies determine performance of district councils today. For example, Mpigi district, which by far had the most centralized political history as part of Buganda Kingdom, is not the star of this small group. While Lira district does perform worse than others and is based in a region with traditional political systems that were quite decentralized, there are reasons to question whether Lira’s precolonial institutions actually hinder the district council’s performance today. Some scholars, such as Ottemoeller (1998), argue that the legacies of the precolonial decentralized political system in Langi may have quite positive effects on politics today. Ottemoeller finds, in particular, greater feelings of political efficacy among the Lango in Lira than populations in districts in central and western Uganda. The traditional political system in Bushenyi, formerly part of Ankole Kingdom, falls in between the highly centralized Buganda and the more decentralized political organizations

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Decentralization in Uganda

in Lango. Ankole Kingdom was certainly not as politically centralized as Buganda and constituted a “looser” form of political organization found among kingdoms (Karugire 1980), and yet Bushenyi still outperforms Mpigi district. The multivariate analyses I present in Chapter 4 also offer little evidence that differences in ethnic diversity explain variation in local government performance in Uganda. These three case study districts confirm this general finding. Lira, which performs worse than the other districts, is the least fragmented along ethnic or linguistic lines of the three districts. In fact, Lira district is among the least fragmented districts in Uganda.23 Similarly, Bushenyi district, the better performer, is as diverse or, by some measures, even more diverse than Mpigi district (see Table 1.1). While structural factors fall short, I demonstrate in the following chapters that informal political linkages account for Bushenyi’s better performance. The overwhelming support for the NRM among voters and elites in Bushenyi offers local officials a degree of leverage in dealing with the center and weakens the effects of patronage. Similarly, the high levels of support for the NRM within the district enhance existing administrative linkages, making them more useful to Bushenyi district council. Mpigi and Lira, as subsequent chapters document, are not so lucky. Organization of the Book

In the chapters that follow, I lay out my theoretical argument and provide empirical evidence of the ways that central-local relations shape council performance. In Chapter 2, I review the history of local government in Uganda and describe the current system of local government. I also carefully describe the current political context and highlight those features of Uganda’s political system that influence local government performance. In Chapter 3, I document the performance—particularly the effectiveness and responsiveness—of Uganda’s district councils following decentralization. The chapter includes an analysis of performance across fifty-six district councils as well as an in-depth account of the performance in each of the three case study districts. I present empirical evidence that shows the significant variation in performance across the district councils in the country. In Chapter 4, I present an overview of the book’s theoretical framework. I develop the central arguments of the book, highlighting the influence of both state and society on the performance of local governments. I also present results of multivariate analyses used to test

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my central thesis of the book across fifty-six district councils in Uganda. I posit that informal political linkages have two dimensions: top-down political linkages, comprised of central government financial and political support that flows to local areas; and bottom-up political linkages, comprised of political support provided by an area to the ruling party. I demonstrate in the analyses in Chapter 4 that the two dimensions of informal political linkages have countervailing effects on local government performance. Bottom-up political linkages contribute to better performing local governments, while top-down political linkages undermine local government performance. In the final section of that chapter, I explore how the two dimensions combine to effect local government performance. I present three exemplars (central dominance, cooperative relations, and local autonomy) that detail the impact of different combinations of top-down and bottom-up political linkages on local government performance. From these three exemplars, I derive observable implications for what we would expect to see with respect to local government performance under each of the three different combinations of top-down and bottom-up linkages. The remaining chapters focus on evidence gathered in the three case studies—Lira, Bushenyi, and Mpigi—and demonstrate how clear differences in the political relationship between each district and the central government help to explain the differences in performance across these three councils. In Chapter 5, I evaluate the influence on local government performance of the formal institutions that define centrallocal relations in Uganda. In particular, I analyze the mechanisms for monitoring and oversight of local governments by ministry officials and evaluate the ability and willingness of central government officials and ministries to mentor district councils toward better performance. In Chapter 6, I return to an examination of the informal side of centrallocal relations and turn to my key variable of interest, informal political linkages. I describe the nature of top-down and bottom-up political linkages between each of the three case study districts and the NRM government and discuss how the three exemplars introduced in Chapter 4 map onto the case studies. The chapter focuses, in particular, on the effects of top-down political linkages and carefully examines how local governments fit within patronage networks and then asks how patronage from the center affects local government effectiveness and responsiveness. The existing literature usually assumes that decentralization increases citizen participation and the accountability of local leaders to the public. In Chapters 7 and 8, I evaluate whether decentralization succeeds in this goal. In these chapters, I examine the influence of

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Decentralization in Uganda

individual citizens on their local governments following decentralization. Chapter 7 explores the importance of local elections and the relationship between levels of electoral competition and the performance of local governments. In Chapter 8, I examine how participation outside elections relates to council performance. Finally, Chapter 9 generalizes the theoretical framework beyond the case of Uganda to other African countries. In this chapter, I reveal how decentralization reforms fit more broadly into existing political patterns in Africa and evaluate the impacts of decentralization reforms in relation to broader democratization reforms adopted throughout Africa in the 1990s. 1

“Kasese District Interdicts CAO,” New Vision, May 9, 2001. “Soroti CAO Interdicts Officials,” New Vision, March 21, 2002. 3 Uganda (2001a, 17). 4 The Afrobarometer merged dataset includes data from the following countries: Botswana; Ghana; Lesotho; Malawi; Mali; Namibia; Nigeria; South Africa; Tanzania; Uganda; Zambia; and Zimbabwe. Data available online at www.afrobarometer.org. 5 See, for example, Gélineau and Remmer (2006) on Latin America; Oxhorn, Tulchin, and Selee (2004) for a cross-national perspective. 6 See, for example, Hadenius (2001). 7 Semboja and Therkildsen (1994) makes this point clearly in their comment to Maro (1990). 8 See “Embrace Decentralization, Says Museveni,” The Monitor, May 2, 2006. 9 Quoted in “Embrace Decentralization, Says Museveni,” The Monitor, May 2, 2006. 10 See Hyden (1983); Regan (1995); UNDP (1993). 11 Uganda’s reforms to empower local governments meets the limited definition of decentralization advanced by Oxhorn (2004) as well as many of the features of devolution as defined by Rondinelli (1981). 12 Many terms are used to describe civil society organizations, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), or private-voluntary organizations. These terms tend to refer to organizations that vary by size, location, and perhaps degree and source of funding more so than function. I use the more general term, civil society organizations (CSOs), aware that the use of this term combines groups that vary in size and function. 13 As discussed in Chapter 2 in this volume, the graduated tax was abolished in 2005. 14 Eleven new districts were created by an act of Parliament in November 2000. Between 2000 and 2008, the Ugandan government created twenty-four more districts, for a total of eighty (Uganda Districts Information Handbook, 2008). In 2009, seven new districts were created (“Government Names Fourteen New Districts,” New Vision, May 19, 2009). And on July 1, 2010, twenty-five 2

Exploring Decentralization in Uganda

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new districts were created, increasing the total number of districts to 112 (“Equip New Districts to Execute their Duties,” New Vision, July 4, 2010). 15 Within each of these districts, I interviewed both elected and nonelected local officials, conducted focus group discussions, carried out archival research, and conducted a survey of 612 local residents, using a combination of stratified and cluster sampling techniques (204 respondents in each of the three districts). 16 I use the terms Movement and National Resistance Movement (NRM) interchangeably to refer to the ruling political organization. The Movement formally changed its name to the NRM-O as it transitioned from a movement into a political party in preparation for the 2006 elections, although many within Uganda continue to use the term Movement. Another important distinction, when Movement is capitalized, it refers to the political organization. When movement is not capitalized it refers to the NRM’s no-party political system. 17 For example, on October 10, 1996, the LRA abducted 139 girls from the prestigious St. Mary’s College in Aboke, Lira district. 18 Otuke County is the northernmost county in Lira district, bordering Kitgum district. Oromo subcounty is in Moroto County and comprises most of the southern border of Otuke County. Acholi refers to the districts that occupy the former Acholi district, which existed at independence, and is inhabited primarily by members of the Acholi ethnic group. 19 Azam S. Ahmed, “Peace for Northern Uganda likely in the near future,” United Press International (UPI), June 17, 2005. 20 The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Action put the number of displaced persons in Lira closer to 350,000 as of February 2006, which represents close to half of the district population. A district leader, on the other hand, estimated that during the height of the insecurity in the district close to two-thirds of the population was living in protected camps. 21 “Uganda: Focus shifts to securing durable solutions for IDPs: A profile of the internal displacement situation,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, November 3, 2008. Available online at www.internal-displacement.org, see previous profile updates on the Uganda country page. 22 The districts with Local Government Development Project (LGDP) assessment scores for 1999 that fall more than one standard deviation below the median include: Adjumani, Kalangala, Kapchorwa, Kasese, Moroto, Rukungiri, and Sembabule. See Chapter Two in this volume for a full description of this measure. Data compiled by author. 23 For example, Lira’s score on the index of ethnic fragmentation based on the 1991 census (.1572) is more than one standard deviation below the average score for all districts (mean =.3999; SD =.2143). Data compiled by author from LGDP assessments.

2 Local Government in Uganda

Much of Uganda’s postcolonial history is marked by civil war, authoritarian rule, and economic decay. The institutional decay under the regimes of Idi Amin (1971–1979) and Milton Obote (Obote I, 1962–1971; Obote II, 1980–1985) meant that political institutions no longer provided basic services; rather, these institutions engaged in the extraction of resources from powerless populations (Brett 1994). Moreover, the dictatorial tendencies of Uganda’s postindependence regimes successfully excluded and marginalized the majority of the population. Previous regimes used the coercive instruments of the state to oppress and terrorize their opponents, in particular, and the public generally. Uganda’s recent history, however, is best described as a period of reconstruction. While many recent observers and critics of Ugandan politics may note similarities between President Yoweri Museveni (1986–present) and his predecessors, his NRM government has demonstrated a firm commitment to the goal of social, political, and economic reconstruction. Under Museveni, Uganda witnessed dramatic economic growth and poverty reduction. The percentage of Ugandans in poverty dropped from 56 percent in 1992 to 38 percent in 2003.1 Despite persistent opposition to multiparty politics since taking power in 1986, President Museveni switched his position in 2005 and became a leading advocate for reforms to allow parties to compete in the 2006 elections. In the referendum held on July 28, 2005, voters in Uganda overwhelmingly supported the transition to multiparty elections.2 As a result, national and local elections held in early 2006 were conducted under a newly instituted multiparty system. Decentralization and the rebuilding of local political institutions have played an extremely important part of the NRM’s strategy to reconstruct the Ugandan state. This chapter provides a brief history of local government in Uganda. A review of the history of local political institutions in Uganda reveals the historical roots of many political issues relevant today, such as the nature of central-local relations in Uganda. The following two sections

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Decentralization in Uganda

examine the nature of local political institutions during the precolonial, colonial, and postindependence periods. The final section discusses the continuities and changes to local political institutions under the current NRM government, paying particular attention to the policy of decentralization. Local Government in Precolonial and Colonial Uganda

Before the British arrived, a diverse range of traditional political systems existed in precolonial Uganda, including societies characterized as “states” and “stateless societies” (Evans-Pritchard 1940).3 Many decentralized societies existed in precolonial northern and eastern Uganda among the Nilotic and Nilo-Hamitic peoples (Burke 1964), such as the Langi people who live in Lira and Apac districts today. In the early sixteenth century, groups throughout the northern part of present-day Uganda began to establish simple political systems organized around the clan (Karugire 1980). While there was certainly variation in the methods of social and political organization among these communities, they also exhibited a great deal of continuity. Karugire explains that, “each clan managed its own affairs, settled disputes between its members and recognised no other authority beyond this unit” (1980, 8). These societies pursued “the belief and practice that all important decisions affecting the community could only be arrived at, not by a single person, but by the consensus of the elders representing the different clans constituting the particular community” (11). In such societies, the tradition of a single, all-powerful chief did not exist. The centralized kingdoms found primarily in southern and western Uganda contrast sharply to the smaller decentralized societies in northern and eastern Uganda. Buganda and Bunyoro were the two largest kingdoms in Uganda before colonialism with populations that “may have numbered millions at the height of their power” (Kabwegyere 1995, 19). The kingdoms were governed by a sophisticated hierarchy of chiefs and subchiefs. For example, Karugire describes Buganda as having “the most efficient bureaucracy in precolonial Uganda” (1980, 11). British interest and activity in Uganda began in the 1860s. By the 1880s traders with the East African Company and missionaries were operating in the area of what is today Uganda, although most of the activity at this time was concentrated in Buganda Kingdom.4 Uganda was formally declared a British Protectorate in 1894 and a treaty was signed with the king (Kabaka) of Buganda Kingdom, Kabaka Mwanga. In 1900, the British signed another important agreement with Buganda

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Kingdom, which recognized the political institutions of the kingdom and the role and leadership of the Kabaka in governing Buganda. The 1900 Agreement formally made Buganda “a state within a state,” thereby assuring the preeminence of Buganda relative to other regions (Uzoigwe 1982a). Governance through the institution of African chiefs was established permanently and formally in the 1919 Native Authority Ordinance, which formalized the establishment of the Buganda model of government throughout the protectorate. The British were highly impressed with Buganda’s centralized political system consisting of various layers of hierarchy. Where such a system did not exist, “an administrative system patterned on that which the British had first observed and learned to admire in Buganda was super-imposed over the traditional polities” (Burke 1964, 13). The process involved “a combination of Baganda mercenaries and administrative agents, localized military forces, and agreements with petty chiefs and clan leaders” (Burke 1964, 13–14).5 For example, Baganda agents were sent to serve as chiefs and administrators in these areas and, thus, the colonial state was viewed by many as merely an extension of Buganda (Uzoigwe 1982a).6 What came to be commonly viewed as the “traditional” political systems often bore little resemblance in many areas to what had existed before the British arrived in Uganda.7 This process, which Kabwegyere calls the “artificial tribalization of Ugandan societies” (1995), ultimately reshaped many of the existing political institutions in Uganda. After World War II, there was a shift in British colonial policy and recognition that it was the responsibility of the colonial administration to prepare colonies for self-government. This changed the practice of local government in Uganda. For example, the African Local Government Ordinance of 1949 “aimed to ‘develop local councils and their functions to enable African themselves to take a greater part in the administration of their own local services and local affairs generally that affects their community’” (British colonial government 1949; quoted in OcayaLakidi 1982, 302). The authority granted to the local population was quite limited, however. The ordinance provided for chiefs who continued to be appointed by and responsible to the colonial administration rather than the people they governed. Moreover, while the ordinance granted limited powers to the newly created district councils, such as the authority to pass relevant bylaws, any bylaws had to be approved by the Provincial Commissioner (Ocaya-Lakidi 1982). The District Administration Ordinance of 1955 introduced greater autonomy to local governments in Uganda and consequently gave

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Decentralization in Uganda

district councils more control over the administration of the district and local chiefs (Burke 1964; Ocaya-Lakidi 1982). The ordinance transferred responsibility for select services to the local governments and also introduced the graduated tax to enable local governments to finance the provision of these new services (Ocaya-Lakidi 1982).8 The ordinance also created a District Appointments Board with the power to appoint and dismiss civil servants working in the district. While the ordinance increased the power of local governments, many important activities, such as the selection of members of the District Appointments Board, remained in the hands of the colonial administration and other activities carried out by district councils were subject to approval by the governor or other colonial administrators (Ocaya-Lakidi 1982). As discussed below, this has been an ongoing trend in Ugandan politics. The center empowers local governments, while simultaneously employing various formal and informal mechanisms through which to check or curtail the exercise of that power. By the early 1950s, the British undertook negotiations with Uganda’s key interest groups to design political institutions that would be in place at independence. Buganda was reluctant to accept a subordinate position for the Kabaka, or the kingdom for that matter, in an independent Uganda. During the negotiations over Uganda’s independence, Buganda pushed for a constitution that would sustain the monarchy and the political autonomy to which the kingdom had grown accustomed under colonial rule (Mudoola 1993). Laying the groundwork for an electoral alliance between itself and the KabakaYekka (KY) party, the UPC convinced Britain to accede to Buganda’s demands for federal status under an independent constitution (Mudoola 1993, 25). The Munster Report, which provided the framework for Uganda’s 1962 constitution, gave Buganda direct control over the affairs of the kingdom and denied the parliament of Uganda any jurisdiction over Buganda. Any proposed legislation that concerned the kingdom, even marginally, required the approval of the Buganda Lukiko (Uzoigwe 1983, 255).9 Like previous agreements between Buganda and Britain, Uganda’s other kingdoms (Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole, and Busoga) received far fewer concessions and only a semifederal status. These kingdoms were denied concurrent powers with the parliament of Uganda and given only minimal control over affairs within their respective kingdoms (Uzoigwe 1982b).10 Uganda’s government at independence in 1962 was formed by a parliamentary alliance between the KY and UPC parties. The Kabaka held the office of president and four Baganda held various ministerial

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posts (Mutibwa 1982). The UPC/KY alliance satisfied the needs of both parties. The alliance provided Milton Obote, the leader of UPC, with sufficient seats in parliament to capture the position of prime minister, while furthering Buganda’s efforts to protect the kingdom’s position. Local Government in Postindependence Uganda

The weakness of the central government and the consequent power of local governments at independence, most especially in the kingdom areas, created “centrifugal tendencies” (Uganda 1987). Not unlike many newly independent African countries, a pattern emerged in which local authorities struggled for greater autonomy and the central government sought ways to secure and maintain its hold on power relative to local authorities and other potential challengers at the national level. Efforts by the center to exert its power have often taken nondemocratic forms. Shortly after the UPC gained control of the new government, the government passed the Local Administration (Amendments) Bill, 1962. Several features of 1962 legislation limited the power of local governments. This began the process of increasing the power of the center and weakening the power of local governments. For example, the law increased the power of the minister responsible for local government considerably, giving the minister the right to attend and participate in any district council meeting without notice or a formal invitation (Ocaya-Lakidi 1982). The minister was also given the power to appoint the chairman and vice-chairman of the council in the event of a deadlock during the election for the positions (Ocaya-Lakidi 1982). Subsequent legislation increased the ways the center could check the power of local governments, most especially in Buganda and other kingdoms. Through various pieces of legislation passed between 1962 and 1966, the central government sought to make local administrations a mere “administrative appendage of the central government” (OcayaLakidi 1982, 310). The process culminated in the complete centralization of power in the center with the adoption of the 1967 constitution, which followed the constitutional crisis in 1966.11 The 1967 constitution eliminated all forms of federalism and abolished the traditional monarchies and all other forms of traditional rule. By 1967, Obote had succeeded in his efforts to make local governments simply extensions of the central government.12 When Idi Amin took power in 1971, local governments fared even worse. With military rule, district councils ceased to exist. As had been the case under British colonialism, centrally appointed chiefs served as local administrators. During this time, however, chiefs became more

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Decentralization in Uganda

powerful with fewer, if any, checks on their behavior and use of power. Under Amin, “the tendency was still to blend absolute powers of a chief with a militarist style of administration, a mixture of which gave birth to grave excesses” (Uganda 1987, 15). During the second Obote regime (1980–1985), chiefs were even recruited from among UPC “party sycophants” and functioned “more as security agents than they did as administrative officers” (Uganda 1987, 15). Local Government Under the NRM

The NRM promoted a form of decentralization as early as 1981 during their guerrilla war against the Obote II regime (1981–1986). The NRM included decentralization as one of the principal objectives in its Ten Point Programme along with other complementary objectives, such as an expressed commitment to improve governance through citizen participation and democratization. The resistance council (RC) system, originally established during the war in areas under the control of Museveni’s NRA, provides the institutional foundation for Uganda’s current system of local government and the decentralization policy. The RCs began as primarily administrative institutions and were originally organized “to enlist sympathetic civilians in the acquisition of food, recruits and intelligence for the NRA’s war effort” (Kasfir 1998, 55). The NRM shifted the membership and the focus of the RCs toward broad-based citizen participation at the village level and introduced the election of RC leaders to make the councils more democratic. Once elective, the RCs were given responsibility for maintaining security and law and order in their area and providing a few critical services to local residents (Apter 1995). These institutions functioned as self-help organizations and relied primarily on voluntary contributions from the community in order to accomplish these tasks (Brett 1994). Nevertheless, in many parts of Uganda during the war, they constituted the only functioning government. After seizing power in January 1986, the NRM formalized the RC structure through the National Resistance Council and Committees Statute of 1987 and RCs were instituted across the country. The statute also formally transformed the RCs into Uganda’s new local government institutions and sought to empower local communities, secure local participation in decisionmaking and development, and improve service delivery (Lubanga 1996, 51). Support for the RCs increased as a direct result of the government’s tendency to use the RCs for the distribution of important goods, such as sugar, salt, soap, and paraffin, especially in

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parts of the country where RCs had not existed during the war (Tidemand 1994). The 1987 Resistance Council Statute represented the NRM’s first attempt to implement decentralization. Despite these intentions, the statute failed to empower the new local governments and instead actually reinforced the power of central field administrators. While the RC statute established RCs across the country with locally elected political leaders and gave the councils “extensive political powers to oversee civil servants and guide the local development process,” the statute denied the councils any real authority over personnel and staffing decisions as well as any control over finances (Lubanga 1996, 50). Moreover, district administrators, directly appointed by the president, served as “the political heads of districts” rather than the elected representatives of the people within the RCs (Lubanga 1996, 52). The statute also denied the RCs any revenue-generating authority. Thus, the 1987 statute was contradictory, claiming to promote devolution, while in reality empowering central government representatives and resulting in further centralization. Despite extensive revisions, which shaped the way Uganda’s decentralization policy looks today, contradictions within the current legislation and features of the political context still enable the central government to undermine the powers of local governments today, as I document in subsequent chapters. The failures of decentralization under the 1987 statute prompted the Ugandan government to rethink its decentralization policy. In 1987, a Commission of Inquiry into the Local Government System proposed various corrective measures to address the inconsistencies of the previous statute and to accomplish the stated objective of the decentralization program: the transfer of real power to the local level (Regan 1995). The Local Government Statute of 1993 resulted from this inquiry. This statute created the institutional and legal framework for a more genuine and complete transfer of power, responsibility, and resources to the local governments and served as a reassurance of the importance of local government until the adoption of the new constitution in 1995 (Regan 1995; Apter 1995). Since 1993, Uganda has made considerable progress in the devolution of power and authority down to local governments. In 1995, the resistance council system evolved into the present structure of local government and they officially became local councils (LCs). Uganda’s 1995 Constitution and the Local Government Act of 1997 (LG Act) both deepened the policy of decentralization and substantially strengthened the councils and ensured a more permanent, legal basis for their authority. This act confirms that the local governments now hold

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Decentralization in Uganda

legislative and executive powers and serve as the primary planning and budgeting authority in their jurisdiction. The LC system is a five-tiered hierarchical system of local councils from the village (LC1) to the district level (LC5) (see Figure 2.1). The five levels include: district council (LC5); county council (LC4); subcounty council (LC3); parish council (LC2); and village council (LC1). The pyramidal LC structure is designed to aggregate, systematize, and present citizen priorities to district councils in order to ensure that citizen demands are effectively addressed. All persons eighteen years and older residing in a village are automatically members of the village council. The inclusiveness of the village councils is designed to enable the community to meet monthly to discuss concerns of an individual and communal nature. Direct participation at the village level seeks to guarantee every citizen an opportunity to participate in political decisionmaking. On the other hand, LCs in the higher levels of the local government system are formed by a number of elected representatives, including directly elected councilors and a district chairperson who heads the local government and leads the executive in the implementation of council decisions.13 Only the district, subcounty, and urban councils are local governments and, therefore, benefit from the enhanced powers and authority given to local governments under decentralization. Local councils at all other levels are considered administrative units and are only minimally affected by the decentralization policy. I use the term local government to refer to the subcounty and district councils and their urban equivalents.14 Tensions in the decentralization policy bear on LC performance. While simultaneously expressing a commitment to and even enacting policies to deepen decentralization, the NRM government has maintained and also recently adopted contradictory measures that weaken the authority and the autonomy of the LCs. For example, the existence and role of the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) is an important way in which the center monitors, but also seeks to influence district council activities. The RDC is the central government’s representative in the district and is appointed by President Museveni. The RDC is responsible for reporting to the central government any problems or concerns about the performance of LCs in the district. There have been numerous instances of political struggles between the RDC and the LCs, and political interference in council affairs by RDCs across the country is common.

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Figure 2.1: Structure of Local Council System

Central government

District local government (LC5)

County council (LC4)

Subcounty local government (LC3)

Parish council (LC2)

Village council (LC1)

Another example includes the tight structural linkages between the NRM and the LC system. These linkages are partially historical, based on the origin of the LCs and their role in the NRA’s war against Obote. The linkages are also partially designed by the NRM through the Movement Act, the electoral support provided to favored NRM

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Decentralization in Uganda

candidates in local elections, and even through the RDCs stationed in each district. Until the reintroduction of a multiparty system in 2005, Uganda had a “movement” political system. Supporters described the movement as an example of “no-party democracy” and an inclusive political organization that encourages broad-based political participation. Critics, on the other hand, complained about the restrictions on political competition under the movement system. By law, political parties were allowed to exist, but their activities were restricted and candidates for office had to run on their individual merit rather than party affiliation. For example, Article 269 of the constitution banned parties from: a) opening and operating branch offices; b) holding delegates’ conferences; c) holding public rallies; d) sponsoring or offering a platform to or in any way campaigning for or against a candidate in any public election; [and] e) carrying on any activities that may interfere with the movement political system. (Uganda 1995, 166–67). Uganda’s decentralization program and the LC system have played an important role in President Museveni’s stated desire to foster participatory democracy through the movement. In conjunction with the ban on political parties, the movement system provided Ugandans an opportunity to participate, as all Ugandans are technically members of the NRM. According to the Movement Act, the LCs and LC officials are part of the structure of the movement political system. Articles 16 through 19 of the Movement Act of 1997 create movement committees at various levels of the LC system (Uganda 1997c). The act stipulates that LC chairpersons and councilors at these different levels are automatically members of the Movement committee at that level. The political reforms adopted in 2005 did not provide for the disbanding of the Movement or repealing the Movement Act of 1997. Thus, the tight linkages between the government, including the LCs, and the NRM remain intact. Not surprising, NRM supporters have tended to dominate leadership positions within the local councils. In 2005, opposition politicians headed three districts.15 After the 2006 LC elections, only 15 of 69 districts were headed by members of opposition parties and political independents. Trends in fiscal decentralization further reflect the contradictory impulses of the decentralization reforms generally. In 2002, nearly 50 percent of the government’s budget flowed to local governments.16 Yet

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this figure dropped to just over 20 percent in the 2008/09 financial year, suggesting a recentralization of funds.17 Uganda recently adopted several programs to enhance the fiscal discretion of the district and subcounty councils. The Local Government Development Program (LGDP), instituted in 1999, began a process of decentralizing a portion of capital development funds to Uganda’s local governments to enable them to control and plan for development expenditures.18 The adoption of the Fiscal Decentralization Strategy (FDS) in 2004 introduced greater flexibility into the budget process. The FDS gives local governments “flexibility over the allocation of recurrent sector conditional grants between and within sectors.”19 The program enables LCs to reallocate up to 10 percent of a grant to another sector. The program also offers councils the ability to increase the level of flexibility based on their performance in the previous year.20 Yet recent reforms, such as the Constitutional Amendments Acts and the Local Government Amendment of 2006, have served to recentralize power in the central government. For example, the graduated tax, which constituted one of the only guaranteed sources of income for most district councils, was abolished in 2004.21 Not surprisingly, the elimination of the tax resulted in serious shortfalls in revenue for most district councils. One interviewee lamented the decision to repeal the graduated tax: “The worst action was suspending the local revenue, the g-tax. A disaster. Some organs aren’t functioning. There is no money for meetings. The councilors’ allowances aren’t there. The LC3s are not sitting.” The LC5 Chairman of Masaka District, Vincent Ssempijja, put it this way, “Lower local government councils (LC3s) are no longer effective largely because they do not have any sources of revenue.”22 Following the abolition of the graduated tax, the central government offered districts some additional revenue as compensation. While the additional revenue was badly needed and appreciated by district councils, the program generated much criticism. Many district officials complain that the compensation falls far short of the revenue they previously collected.23 Moreover, district officials are keenly aware that the elimination of their primary source of local revenue and additional funds from the center translates into reduced district autonomy and increased council dependence on the central government. The dependence on transfers is certainly greater today following the elimination of the graduated tax.24 For example, in the late 1990s, local governments, on average, depended on central government transfers for around three-quarters of their annual budget. At that time the percentage of district council budgets made up by central government transfers

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ranged from a low of 48 percent in Moroto to a high of 93 percent in Soroti.25 Today, the typical local government depends on CG transfers for over 90 percent of its annual budget.26 Most of this is in the form of conditional grants, which come with strict requirements on planning, spending and accounting for the funds. In 1998/99, conditional grants comprised over three-quarters of all transfers to Ugandan districts. By 2001, the share of transfers comprised by conditional grants had risen to nearly 85 percent.27 Uganda’s 2007 budget introduced the Local Service Tax and the Local Hotel Tax to replace the graduated tax.28 The new taxes came into effect in July 2008, however receipts from the new taxes fall far below district councils’ needs and expectations. Many critics also complain that the new taxes will benefit urban councils without providing any relief for rural councils.29 Their concern appears justified. Recent evidence suggests that even urban councils raise far less revenue from the new tax than expected. For example, Kampala Central Division council anticipated 1.5 billion Ush, but reportedly raised less than 300 million Ush.30 Recent reforms also reduced local control over local administrators and procurement for local projects. Importantly, the central government amended Article 188 of the constitution, which originally stipulated that the CAO—the head of the district civil service—in each district would be appointed locally by the district service commission. Following the amendment, CAOs are now appointed by the central Public Service Commission and therefore answerable to the center rather than to district officials. Similarly, the reforms abolished the district tender board appointed by the district council and previously responsible for procurement and created “contract committees” answerable to the CAO not the elected council.31 As a result, today Uganda’s central government has greater control over expenditure by the district councils than has been the case since before the LG Act was adopted in 1997. Similarly, the salaries of local government officials, including district chairpersons, are now paid by the central government rather than from local tax revenue. Following the reform, the central government is obligated to pay 6.5 million Ush per district per month, which is approximately 78 billion Ush ($47 million) annually.32 For many LC5 chairpersons, the 2 million Ush salary constitutes a huge pay raise. For example, for the chairman of Kalangala district council, who previously earned just 60,000 Ush per month,33 the new salary is equivalent to a raise of over 3,000 percent! The central government also plans to take control of Kampala City Council (KCC), citing widespread corruption and abuse of office within

Local Government in Uganda

31

the council as justification. Following the adoption of the constitutional reforms in 2005, KCC “ceased to be a district and assumed a special status.”34 While awaiting parliament to adopt a new law describing how KCC is to be administered, Museveni issued a directive ordering the council to stop all development activities, including “awarding and managing contracts for management of markets and car parks, hiring and firing staff, staff promotions, new procurements and disposal of assets.”35 The 2009/10 budget request from the Ministry of Local Government included 5 billion Ush to finance the takeover.36 Local governments operate within a larger political, social, and economic context. Features of the broader political context also weaken the autonomy of Uganda’s district councils, contradicting the government’s aggressive decentralization policy. In 2002, Diamond characterized Uganda’s regime as a “hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime,” indicating that electoral and other “democratic” institutions exist, but they are “largely facades” because there is little real competition or opportunity for the opposition to “seriously criticize or challenge the regime” (2002, 26). The restrictions on political competition under Uganda’s movement system likely contributed to Diamond’s labeling of the regime. Despite formally liberalizing the political environment to allow greater political competition, “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way 2002) persists in Uganda. In addition to being the first multiparty elections in twenty-six years, the 2006 elections were also significant because they were the first held following a constitutional reform that eliminated presidential term limits and allowed Museveni to run for a third term in office. Observers of the 2006 election in Uganda were highly critical of the environment in which these historic multiparty elections were held and complain that these elections were not freely and fairly conducted and that the playing field between the ruling party and opposition parties remains far from level.37 The European Union observers’ report from the 2006 multiparty elections stated that these elections “demonstrated improvement over previous elections but fell below full conformity with international standards.”38 In a report assessing the campaign period in the runup to the February 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections, Human Rights Watch points out that the enabling legislation for the multiparty elections was not formally instituted until November 21, 2005, leaving only three months for opposition parties to organize and campaign (2006, 7). As noted already, the political reforms adopted did not disband the Movement or repeal the controversial Movement Act of 1997, meaning that the party and state remained linked through the

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Decentralization in Uganda

February elections. Not surprisingly, the NRM benefits from these linkages in terms of preferential access to state resources. For example, the Movement Act stipulates that funds for the Movement shall include “monies as may be from time to time appropriated by parliament” (Uganda 1997b, 21). Perhaps not surprisingly, in its 2008 report, Freedom House states that “Uganda is not an electoral democracy.” Beyond politics, other features of Ugandan society shape local governments. Most important among these are the AIDS crisis and the ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda. Since 2000, the HIV prevalence rate in Uganda is 6 percent, although reports indicate that the rate of infection is once again on the rise in the country (UNGASS 2008). As others have noted, the AIDS crisis has devastating consequences for the capacity of African states generally.39 The capacity and performance of local governments in Uganda and elsewhere in Africa are similarly affected by the AIDS crisis. For example, local governments experience increased absenteeism due to personal illness or to care for others, increased turnover, and an increased workload, in particular greater responsibility for providing care for AIDS orphans. Uganda’s policy of decentralization is also part of a much larger reform program to liberalize the economy and reduce the size of the state. Donors are influential in government policymaking and implementation. In 2007, donors funded 42 percent of Uganda’s budget.40 There are limits, however, to donor influence. For example, the Ugandan government continues to create new districts despite persistent donor opposition to this policy.41 Despite the effects of the political, social, and economic environment, Chapter 3 documents the performance of the district councils and shows councils vary, often quite dramatically, from one another. In the rest of the book, I explain this variation, highlighting how central-local relations directly affect the councils and indirectly influence the councils by weakening the influence of local communities. 1

See Uganda country brief at www.worldbank.org. Uganda’s Electoral Commission reports that 92 percent of voters voted for the “yes side” in the 2005 referendum, thereby supporting the transition to multiparty elections. There is some dispute about actual turnout in the July 2005 referendum. The Monitor reported that observer and Electoral Commission estimates of turnout vary considerably (see “EC says 42% voted, Observers say 18%,” The Monitor, July 30, 2005). The final results posted on the Electoral Commission website report a wholly different figure—47.3% of registered voters (see http://ec.or.ug/referendum/finalresults.pdf). 3 See also Bates (1983). 2

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33

4 Buganda Kingdom is located in central Uganda. The constitution lists the following districts as comprising it: Kalangala, Kiboga, Luwero, Masaka, Mpigi, Mubende, Mukono, Rakai (Uganda 1995, 173). Several of these districts have been subsequently divided, so the number of districts in the kingdom has risen as well. 5 Buganda refers to the kingdom located in central Uganda, while Muganda and Baganda are the singular and plural terms, respectively, for members of Buganda kingdom. 6 Uzoigwe describes the situation as one of “Buganda imperialist expansion” (1982a, 9). At times this process entailed increasing the size of Buganda Kingdom to the detriment of its neighbors, such as when the British gave Buganda several counties that had been part of Bunyoro Kingdom. The lost counties issue refers to four counties from Bunyoro that were given to Buganda from the British. The British took the counties from Bunyoro after its defeat. Throughout the colonial period and after independence Bunyoro lobbied for the return of their lands. The lost counties issue was politically contentious because both Buganda and Bunyoro felt that the lands were rightfully theirs. 7 Scholars note that the British and other colonial powers reformulated or even invented “traditional institutions” in different parts of Africa (e.g., Mamdani 1996; Hobsbwam and Ranger 1983).

8 District councils “were authorized to carry out as many as twenty substantial services and functions covering the primary fields of agriculture, veterinary, law and order, forestry, famine relief, medical, education, buildings, water supplies, and local industries” (Burke 1964, 40). 9 Lukiko refers to the parliament of Buganda. 10 Doornbos notes that Busoga lobbied for “inclusion among these lesser kingdoms” (1978, 13). He notes that “In the end this was granted with the status of ‘Territory’ and its Kyabazinga on a par with the hereditary rulers of the kingdoms” (1978, 13). 11 By August 1964, the UPC/KY alliance had broken down and Buganda’s influence in the central government was all but gone. Relations between Buganda and the Obote government deteriorated rapidly, but the Battle of the Palace marked the complete breakdown of relations between Buganda and Obote’s government. The Battle of the Palace erupted in 1966 shortly after Obote unlawfully dissolved the 1962 constitution and assumed supreme power. Buganda immediately protested Obote’s behavior and demanded a reinstatement of the 1962 constitution. On May 20, 1966, the Lukiko passed a motion requiring the central government’s immediate withdrawal from Buganda by May 30 (Southall 1975). Obote’s response was to send troops led by Idi Amin to storm the Kabaka’s palace at Mengo. The Kabaka and several of his ministers narrowly escaped and fled into exile. Buganda ceased to exist and was parceled into four administrative districts, each of which was under a state of emergency and the direct control of the central government (Mudoola 1993). 12 The 1987 Commission of Inquiry into the Local Government System concludes that with the 1967 constitution, “Not only did the Centre establish effective control over Local Authorities, it did this in the context of an increasingly dictatorial system that put an end to all local-level democratic institutions that could give form to local initiatives”(Uganda 1987, 9).

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13 The LC at the district level consists of a district chairperson, one councilor to represent each subcounty, one female councilor to represent each designated constituency (usually a subcounty, but often a constituency may include several subcounties), one male and female councilor to represent youth, and one male and female councilor to represent persons with disabilities. The chairperson and the councilors, except the youth councilors, are directly elected by universal adult suffrage through secret ballot. The LC at the subcounty level consists of a subcounty chairperson, one male and female councilor to represent each parish, one male and female councilor to represent youth, and one male and female councilor to represent persons with disabilities. The chairperson and the councilors, except the youth councilors, are directly elected by universal adult suffrage through secret ballot. Councils at the county level consist of all of the county’s members of the subcounty council executive committees. The chairpersons are elected by the councils. Councils at the parish level consist of all of the parish’s members of the village council executive committees. The chairpersons are elected by the councils. 14 The following urban councils are considered local governments: city councils, city division councils, municipal councils, municipal division councils, and town councils. Parish, ward, and village councils in urban areas are considered administrative units. 15 Interview with representative of Uganda Local Government Association (ULGA) in June 2005. Throughout the book, to maintain the confidentiality of the interview respondents, I do not identify them by name. 16 Kadiresan, Kundhavi, “It is Possible to Improve Local Govt. Service Delivery,” New Vision, May 18, 2009. 17 Ibid. 18 The World Bank funded the LGDP program until the program ended in 2007. With donor support, the Ugandan government continues to provide discretionary development grants to the local governments today. 19 See, General Guide to Local Government Budget Process, Local Government Finance Commission. Available online at www.lgfc.go.ug/docs/general.pdf. 20 Districts participating in the Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan (PRDP) in northern Uganda can reallocate up to 50 percent of their recurrent grants (personal communication with MoLG official, June 2008). 21 One source estimated that 80 billion Ush was collected annually through graduated tax. 22 “Another Turbulent Year for Local Governments,” New Vision, December 31, 2008. 23 See, for example, Bagala, “Local Govts to Retain Power,” The Monitor, October 4, 2006. See also, “Another Turbulent Year for Local Governments,” New Vision, December 13, 2008. 24 The elimination of the graduated tax is discussed further in Chapter 5. 25 Calculated by author and based on district council budgets from various years (1997–2000).

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26 “Can Demand for New Districts Stand,” New Vision, May 13, 2009. See also Kundhavi Kadiresan, “It is Possible to Improve Local Govt. Service Delivery,” New Vision, May 18, 2009. 27 Richard Ssewakiryanga, “Revenue Realities: Citizen Engagement and Local Government Fiscal Process in Uganda,” available online at www2.ids.ac.uk/logolink/resources/downloads/Recite_Confpapers/Ugandafinal. pdf. 28 “Uganda: Proposed Local Service Tax: A New Animal,” The Monitor, September 18, 2007. 29 “Can Demands for New Districts Stand,” New Vision, May 13, 2009. See also, “Local Governments Experiencing Decreasing Returns,” East African Business Week, December 6, 2008. 30 “Can Demands for New Districts Stand,” New Vision, May 13, 2009. 31 “Contract Committees to Replace Tender Boards,” The Monitor, April 25, 2005. 32 See “Government to spend Sh9bn on New LC Salary Scale,” The Monitor, July 13, 2005; and Wilber Muhwezi, “Gov’t Cannot Afford to Pay Councillors, says Otafiire,” The Monitor, September 22, 2006. Exchange rate at that time $1 = 1,651 Ush (www.fxconverter.org). 33 “SH2M for LC5S?” New Vision, February 9, 2004. 34 Katerega, “Mixed Reactions to Museveni’s Directive,” New Vision, October 17, 2007. 35 Ibid. 36 “Sh 5 Billion Needed for Kampala Take Over,” New Vision, April 28, 2009. 37 See, for example, Human Rights Watch (2006) and “Elections not Free and Fair,” The Monitor February 28, 2006. 38 Alfred Wasike, “Elections Were Fair, EU Observers’ Report Says,” New Vision, July 18, 2006.

39

See, for example, De Waal (2003). Sylvia Juuko, “Budget Addresses Major Issues-Donors,” New Vision, June 15, 2007. 41 See, for example, “New Districts a Creation of the People,” New Vision, June 30, 2009. 40

3 Patterns of Local Governance

With the adoption of decentralization reforms, the stakes are raised and the consequences of poor performance by local leaders and local political institutions become life and death as the actions of these institutions determine access to critical resources, such as water, agricultural extension, and health care, among others. How do local governments perform in Uganda today? What, if any, activities do local governments perform well? And where do they fall short? In this chapter, I examine the performance of Uganda’s district councils to answer these questions. The performance of political institutions may be captured in a number of ways. Building on the work of other scholars studying institutional performance, my definition of government performance focuses on two key dimensions: responsiveness and effectiveness (Putnam 1993; Crook and Manor 1995, 1998; Stoner-Weiss 1997; Widner and Mundt 1998). Responsiveness refers to the extent to which government output responds to the expressed needs and preferences of the population. Do local government leaders spend scarce resources on things their constituents desire or need? The second dimension of local government performance, government effectiveness, refers to the extent to which policy outputs correspond to previously set policy goals (Crook and Manor 1995, 1998). Can local governments plan and then execute these plans in an effort to solve local problems? In the next section, I discuss the patterns of performance across all of Uganda’s district councils using a variety of measures to capture the responsiveness and effectiveness of these councils.1 In the final section, I describe the performance and challenges facing three local governments in particular: Bushenyi, Lira, and Mpigi district councils.

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Institutional Performance Across Uganda’s District Councils Corruption

One way to assess both responsiveness and effectiveness is to gauge levels of corruption within local political institutions. Corruption is a clear indicator of ineffective and unresponsive government. Corruption contributes to and results from a lack of accountability and transparency within governments. Corruption is certainly a serious problem in Africa, including Uganda. For example, Uganda appears close to the bottom of Transparency International’s list of country rankings, indicating a general perception by country analysts and business owners surveyed that there is a high degree of corruption.2 Quite telling is the fact that, in August 2005, donors suspended Uganda’s funding under the Global Fund to fight Tuberculosis, AIDS, and Malaria to investigate corruption and mismanagement of previously donated funds. Several high ranking government officials have been embroiled in the scandal, including former Minister of Health Jim Muhwezi.3 Local governments in Uganda are not immune to the problem of corruption. The auditor general’s annual report for 2007 reveals that local governments mismanaged approximately 40 billion Ush (around $23 million) during the previous financial year.4 Forty billion Ush constitutes just about 5 percent of the total resources now under local government control. Nevertheless, by one estimate it could finance construction of “114 fully furnished secondary schools complete with science laboratories” or one thousand health units.5 The central government (CG) also suspended funding to Kampala city council (KCC) in 2006 while an investigation into corruption of over 9 billion Ush was completed.6 Government officials cited such corruption one of the principal reasons for the central government’s takeover of the city administration.7 According to the Inspectorate General of Government (IGG), few Ugandan districts were immune to charges of corruption in 2000/01.8 Only three districts—Nebbi, Kotido, and Sembabule—faced no corruption charges during the six month period for which data were available. The rest of Uganda’s districts were charged with at least one instance of corruption. In fact, six districts had more than ten complaints reported to the IGG. Residents in Kasese district lodged a startling eighteen complaints with the IGG over alleged corruption in the district. The process of awarding tenders for the procurement of goods and services has been closely linked to corruption in Uganda’s district

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councils. According to one source, “District tender boards have been singled out as one of the avenues through which corruption thrives in districts.”9 While problems with the tender process may, at times, be the result of nonpolitical factors, such as a lack of resources, most of the problems with the district tender boards are explicitly political. In 1999, Uganda’s districts were almost evenly divided in their ability and perhaps willingness to follow the established procedures for awarding local government contracts for the delivery of goods and services.10 Half of the districts made no attempt to meet the criteria established for how the tender board should operate. On the other hand, tender boards in nineteen districts operated in consistent and transparent ways.11 As a safeguard against corruption, the LG Act also provides for an internal audit department within each local government and stipulates that councils complete quarterly audits.12 The district councils vary in carrying out this important task. Yet according to the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) reports from 2001, only half of the councils completed the requisite audits during that financial year. These trends offer some justification for the government’s decision to dissolve the tender boards and replace them with contract committees.13 While some scholars of African politics see corruption as a way in which resources are distributed broadly (Chabal and Daloz 1999), most agree that the real beneficiaries of corruption are few (van de Walle 2001; Clapham 1982). The variation in corruption’s pervasiveness across councils has important implications for building responsive and effective government. Local Government Assessment

As part of the LGDP, the MoLG conducted regular assessments of Uganda’s district councils in 1999 and 2002.14 The assessments evaluated district councils’ capacity for development planning, internal audit and financial management, and engineering.15 Ministry officials evaluated and scored each district council according to its performance on nineteen different indicators. The various indicators capture either district responsiveness or effectiveness, and some indicators capture both. Ministry officials then combined the scores for each district on the nineteen indicators to create an aggregate score.16 Higher values correspond to better performance.17 Because many of the indicators focus on features of the bureaucratic process and whether local governments have the requisite administrative structures in place, the scores likely tell us more about the effectiveness of the councils than their responsiveness to local populations (see Table 3.1).

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Given the general problems with corruption in the councils, one might expect generally low assessment scores. This is not the case, however. Both assessments demonstrate that districts exhibit quite different abilities. Some districts performed well, while other performed much worse. For example, the scores for the 1999 assessment range from a low of 48 in Kalangala, the small island district in Lake Victoria, to a high of 91 in Masaka in central Uganda. The average score is 72, which is considerably below the maximum of 97 points. The scores on the 2002 assessment are somewhat lower, suggesting a decline in overall performance. They range from a low of 32 in Bugiri in eastern Uganda to 84 points in Mbarara in the west, while the average score is only 66. Fifteen districts qualified as “good performers” in 1999 and 2002, receiving over 80 percent of the possible points. The majority of the districts were “moderate performers,” earning between 60 and 80 percent of the possible points. Only six districts qualified as “poor performers” and received less than 60 percent of the points possible during either assessment.18 The assessments also reveal that the performance of the district councils is not static across time. Fourteen districts improved their scores between 1999 and 2002, while scores in most districts declined. Of the fourteen districts with improved scores, nine improved enough to change their ranking (see Table 3.2). In fact, Moroto’s score increased from 51 percent in 1999 to 86 percent in 2002. Of the twenty-four districts in which scores fell, scores in twelve of them dropped dramatically enough to alter the districts’ rankings. Apac district, for example, slipped from among the “good performers” in 1999 into the group of “poor performers” in 2002. Only Adjumani district in northern Uganda qualified as a “poor performer” in both 1999 and 2002. Public Satisfaction with LC5

Many scholars rely on public assessments of their government in order to measure institutional performance.19 Afrobarometer surveys conducted in Uganda in 2000 and 2002 include a question about public satisfaction with the LC5 representative, the individuals elected to represent their subcounty on the district council.20 Ugandans express varying levels of satisfaction with their LC5 representatives. For example, in 2000, the percentage of survey respondents who reported feeling satisfied with the LC5 representative’s performance ranges from a low of 27 percent to high of 97 percent. On average, Ugandans appeared more satisfied with the performance of the LC5 when surveyed again in 2002. Values range from a low of 55 percent to a high of 100 percent.

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Table 3.2: Changes in LGDP Assessment Scores from 1999 to 2002 Assessment Scores* (2002) Good

Moderate

Poor

Good

Assessment Scores* (1999) Moderate

Poor

STAYED SAME

IMPROVED

IMPROVED DRAMATICALLY

6 districts Arua; Bushenyi; Kabale; Masindi; Mbale; Mubende

5 districts Busia; Kisoro; Luwero; Mbarara; Soroti

1 district Moroto

DECLINED

STAYED SAME

IMPROVED

7 districts Bundibugyo; Jinja; Kabarole; Kotido; Masaka; Mpigi; Ntungamo

10 districts Iganga; Kamuli; Kapchorwa; Katakwi; Kiboga; Kitgum; Lira; Moyo; Nakasongola; Nebbi

3 districts Kalangala; Rukungiri; Sembabule

DECLINED DRAMATICALLY

DECLINED

STAYED SAME

2 districts Apac; Tororo

3 districts Bugiri; Gulu; Pallisa

1 district Adjumani

*Good performance—over 80 percent of points possible; moderate performance—between 60 and 80 percent of points possible; and poor performance—less than 60 percent of points possible. Source: Data compiled by author from LGDP district assessments for 1999 and 2002.

In this section, I described the performance of Uganda’s district councils and demonstrated that the councils’ performance varies considerably from one district to the next. The discussion suggests that some councils successfully respond to the needs of their constituents, while others instead neglect community problems and engage in corruption. The measures of performance available for all of the district councils only roughly capture the responsiveness and effectiveness of these councils. Therefore, in the next section, I explore the performance of three specific districts councils. The description of their performance offers much greater detail about the factors that weaken institutional responsiveness and effectiveness and sheds light on many of the challenges facing local governments in Uganda and likely throughout Africa.

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Institutional Performance in Three Districts

By most measures, Bushenyi district in western Uganda stands out as a better performer. One MP from the district, however, described Bushenyi as a “one-eyed man among blind men,” indicating that the district faces the same constraints and limitations as other districts, but still manages to perform relatively better. Regardless of the measure of performance, Bushenyi district council appears more responsive and effective than the others. A review of the aggregate measures of performance discussed in the previous section offers preliminary evidence of Bushenyi’s better performance. Bushenyi district council scored 92 percent in both of the recent LGDP assessments. In contrast, Lira district scored 75 percent in 1999 and only 66 percent in 2002. While Mpigi district council performed quite well in 1999, like Lira, it experienced a decline in performance in 2002, earning only 78 percent. As described below, however, the assessment scores provide an incomplete picture of overall district performance. Mpigi’s score for 2002 does not fully capture the problems the district council exhibited at the time. Effectiveness: Policy Process

Quorum Bushenyi district council is more effective than the councils in Mpigi or Lira (see Table 3.3). Putnam argues, “An institution’s effectiveness depends, first of all, on how well it manages its essential internal affairs” (1993, 65). The district council in Bushenyi holds meetings more regularly and is more likely to have a quorum present. Council meetings in Lira and Mpigi, on the other hand, are more infrequent and often start late as the councilors already present must wait for others to arrive before the meeting can begin. For example, Bushenyi district council held six council meetings in 2000. Lira and Mpigi, on the other hand, each held only four council meetings. The minutes of council meetings in these two districts also revealed a problem of attendance, noting that particular councilors were “absent without an apology” or simply failed to attend. In the district council meetings in Bushenyi in 2000, there was only one councilor “absent with an apology” and only one councilor “absent without an apology.” On the other hand, in the council meetings in Mpigi there were numerous absences without apology and in some instances the district chairman even missed the meeting. At a meeting held on March 2, 2000, eleven councilors were absent without apology.

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Table 3.3: Effectiveness of Three District Councils Bushenyi

Lira

Mpigi

6 meetings

4 meetings

4 meetings

Quorum: Attendance at meetings (2000)

Good attendance; few unexcused absences

Moderate attendance; some unexcused absences

Poor attendance; numerous unexcused absences

Budget promptness

Budget drafted and approved by deadline

Budget incomplete by deadline

Budget drafted and approved by deadline

Statistical services and facilities

Key positions filled

Staffing problems

Staffing problems

Cabinet stability: Average years in council or executive committee

Councilors (9.75 years) Executive Committee (8.5 years)

Councilors (7.2 years) Executive Committee (2.3 years)

Councilors (6.6 years) Executive Committee (1.2 years)

Quorum: Number of meetings (2000)

Source: Fieldwork conducted by author (2000-01).

Attendance at council meetings in Lira district falls between that of Bushenyi and Mpigi. For the five meetings held in fiscal year (FY) 1999/00, there were usually at least two or three councilors absent, some with and some without an apology. More damaging to Lira’s effectiveness than absences is the lack of preparation of councilors and others who are required to address the council. For example, the LG Act stipulates that district chairpersons report to the council on the state of affairs in the district at least once a year.21 In April 2001, the minutes from a council meeting in Lira report that the district chairman, Obua Otoa, was unable to “make a report last year [2000] for a number of reasons and due to circumstances beyond control.”22 Chairman Otoa then presented a report on the state of the district spanning two years. For several consecutive Lira district council meetings in 2000 and 2001, none of the sectoral committees was prepared to present reports about district activities in their sectors. Committee representatives explained that the reports were incomplete. This may be due to a lack of committee meetings or a lack of skills necessary to complete the reports, or may even provide evidence of a lack of commitment on the part of the political leadership. Conducting meetings was also certainly a problem for Lira district council. The district speaker complained during the April meeting about the poor time management of the councilors and

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cited this as the primary reason that the budget conference did not start on time. One donor explained, “The district council, I’ve attended a meeting. It should start at 9AM, but it started at 10:15, and it was not useful, and only about half of the people were there.” Lira is not alone in the problem of time management. Several council meetings during FY 1999/00 in Mpigi were delayed for several hours until a quorum was realized. There is some discussion of the same problem in the minutes from a few of the Bushenyi council meetings. For example, the minutes to one meeting note that “The Speaker called the meeting to order at 11:20 am. He requested Honourable Councillors to always come in time.”23 But time management is not as habitual a problem in Bushenyi as in Lira and Mpigi. In fact, the minutes to the council meeting in December 2000 begin this way, “The Speaker welcomed Honourable Councillors and Heads of Departments to the last Council meeting in the year 2000 and thanks them for coming on time.”24 Budget Promptness Preparation of the budget and submission to the council by the legal deadline—the end of the FY (June 30)—provides another way to assess district effectiveness. In Mpigi and Bushenyi, budgets were drafted by district administrators and executive committee members and then submitted to the council for approval before the June 30 deadline. Lira district, on the other hand, missed this deadline three years in a row. In fact, the district did not pass the 2001/02 budget until August 28, 2001. At the district budget conference on June 29 and 30, 2001, councilors passed a vote on account for 25 percent of the estimated annual expenditure because budget preparations were still underway. The minutes report: The speaker called the house to order. . . . He noticed with concern the disorganization in the budget process making by the heads of departments and sections. Up to the morning of the council [meeting], photocopying of the budget document were [sic] still going on. . . . This clearly shows a lack of commitment to work. [The Speaker] appealed to the CAO and CFO to take note.25 The delays and disorganization evident in Lira’s budgetmaking process also characterize other council activities. For example, one interview respondent explained that the Netherlands, as part of the district development program (DDP), offered scholarships to Lira district residents, but the council “was so slow in selecting” the students

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that it could not take full advantage of the program. He explained the delay this way, “Ineptitude. Those people lack foresight and vision. These people don’t see personal benefit, so why should they bother.” Statistical Services and Facilities Facilities and statistical and information services are vitally important to a local government’s ability to carry out basic tasks whether making policy or implementing approved plans. These three districts vary in the quality and availability of key infrastructure, equipment, and even staff. The quality of staffing, infrastructure, and equipment in Bushenyi district certainly contributes to the council’s effectiveness. For example, the facilities in Mpigi in 2000/01, aside from the brand new building for the health department, were in fairly poor condition. Some of the secretaries on the executive committee had their own offices, but none of these offices were used on any sort of regular basis during the time I conducted my initial fieldwork. Several executive secretaries scrambled to find an open office when it was time for our appointment. Usually there was not enough furniture or even office supplies (paper or pens) in case they wanted to take notes. Chairman Zimbe had an office that appeared to be used more regularly, but the district had made purchasing furniture for his office a priority. The administrative staff in Mpigi appeared to be working much of the time, however. Their offices were certainly used more regularly than the offices of the political leaders. I only observed one computer in the entire Mpigi district headquarters, although others might have existed in the individual departments. Workers in the agricultural department, however, complained that the lack of resources negatively affected the performance of the department. One worker explained, “If there was one computer, one person could do the work that we two do in two weeks.” The facilities in Lira were better maintained than the office facilities in Mpigi. There was plenty of office space and the executive committee secretaries had their own offices. Each of the secretaries I interviewed seemed settled in. Papers, books, and other materials were apparent, suggesting that people actually conducted work in the offices. The district administrative staff was also visible and appeared to be working at all times. Bushenyi district was constructing a new district administration building, Bushenyi House, when I conducted my initial fieldwork. The completion of the administration building in 2003 provides additional evidence of the district council’s effectiveness. The council constructed the new headquarters using locally raised tax revenue or funds raised through fundraising efforts. A great deal of the office block was

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completed prior to my fieldwork in the district and, being new, the offices were quite nice. Like Lira, the offices of the administrators and politicians appeared to be used frequently and showed evidence of use, such as the presence of papers, books, and reports. Similarly, Bushenyi and Lira had computers for a variety of staff. For example, I observed that the administrative assistants to the chairmen in both districts had a computer for their own use, which was quite different from the situation in Mpigi. Councils in Mpigi and Lira also faced serious problems in staffing and several key positions in these administrations were not filled at the time I conducted my research. For example, during 2000, Lira district had vacancies in three key positions: the chief administrative officer (CAO), the chief finance officer (CFO), and the district engineer—who is responsible for overseeing the implementation of any project with any type of construction. All three positions were vacant because the officeholders were under investigation for corruption. Mpigi district also had a problem with vacancies in important administrative positions. Many capable administrators were burdened with the responsibilities of fulfilling duties of multiple positions at the same time. For example, one assistant CAO also served as the district’s NGO coordinator, while the head of Mpigi district’s planning unit also served as the secretary of the district tender board and the secretary of the district technical planning committee. While Bushenyi district faced challenges related to staffing, minutes from district council meetings indicate that councilors were well aware that vacancies in the district administration could negatively affect service delivery and sought ways to solve the problem. Councilors noted the need to recruit new staff, especially primary school teachers, to ensure high quality service delivery. Moreover, the district encouraged staff to seek further education and training.26 Bushenyi district also implemented a variety of programs to recognize good work by district employees with the intention of improving the work environment and, as a consequence, increasing the morale of workers. For example, one district official explained during an interview in 2001 that the district performed highest in the secondary school leaving exams and “We are having a day to celebrate the work of the teachers.” Despite differences in the staff capabilities and facilities, these three districts shared some of the same constraints. All three districts faced serious challenges with staff transport. Workers in the agriculture department in all three districts expressed serious concern over the limited transport available and complained that a lack of transport was one of the major constraints on fulfilling district work plans in their

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sector. A veterinary officer in Lira district explained: “We have a problem of transport. . . . At the district here, there is no specific transport for this section. There are two vehicles for the whole of this department with nine sections.” Agricultural workers in Mpigi and Bushenyi offered similar complaints. For example, veterinary workers in Bushenyi explained that the departmental vehicle had “been down for four months.” Effectiveness: Cabinet Stability

Politicians and administrators in Bushenyi also have more experience than their counterparts in either Lira or Mpigi. For example, executive committee members in Bushenyi in 2001 spent on average ten years on the council and nine years on the executive committee (see Table 3.3). On the other hand, most executive committee members in Mpigi and Lira at the time were serving their first term on the LC5. For example, executive committee members in Mpigi spent only seven years on the council and only two years on the executive committee. The political experience of leaders in Lira is lower still. As a result of a recent cabinet reshuffle, executive committee members in Lira had been on the council an average of seven years and on the executive only one. While Chairman Zimbe in Mpigi had not reshuffled his cabinet since his election in June 1998, the division of the district in February 2000 brought many new, inexperienced councilors onto the executive committee. This has been a problem across the country as qualified and experienced staff and local politicians have been divided across multiple districts with each subsequent division. On the other hand, Lira District Chairman Otoa reshuffled his executive committee twice, both times political differences between him and some of the members of the committee prompted the reshuffle. The district chairman in Bushenyi in 2001, Yowasi Makaaru, was active in politics since 1963 and a member of the LCs since 1989. Before retiring from politics in 2002, Makaaru served three four-year terms as Bushenyi’s district chairman. The chairmen in Mpigi and Lira both served only one term (1998–2002). Lira’s district chairman, James Obua Otoa, lost his reelection bid in the 2002 elections and Levi Zimbe in Mpigi decided not to run, a decision influenced by the NRM leadership, as I discuss in Chapter 7. James Obua Otoa had previous political experience, serving as an ambassador under a previous government. Levi Zimbe, on the other hand, had never held an elected government position before successfully ousting Mpigi’s chairman in June 1998.

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Generally councilors in Bushenyi are well educated. One MP explained, “In our councils there are a number of graduates among the councilors. Many councilors could be MPs. They’ve studied and are active. In my area, many of the councilors are educated. One even is a qualified accountant. Our council should be slightly better.” In a study carried out by ULGA, nearly 24 percent of councilors in Bushenyi hold a degree.27 Only KCC ranked higher among the twenty districts included in the study. On the other hand, only 7 percent of councilors in Mpigi and Lira have a degree. While this certainly contributes to Bushenyi’s better performance, this pattern also reflects public interest in and views about the legitimacy of the councils. Today chairmen in all three districts are in their second terms in office, having won in 2002 and again in 2006. Each chairman served on the council prior to their successful election as district chair, suggesting somewhat greater stability in these councils recently. Administrators in Bushenyi also have considerably more experience in public service and more experience at their current posts than the administrators in Mpigi or Lira. In 2001, the average length of time in public service for administrators in Lira and Mpigi was sixteen and thirteen years, respectively, while the average tenure in the current post in Lira and Mpigi was six and eight years, respectively. On the other hand, administrators in Bushenyi have been in the public service quite a long time (fifteen years on average), but have also been posted in Bushenyi for quite some time (twelve years on average). Responsiveness: Spending Priorities

Political responsiveness is a challenge in all three districts (confirming the portrayal of Bushenyi as a one-eyed man among blind men) and throughout Uganda. Dependence on CG transfers in the form of conditional grants makes it difficult, to say the least, for LCs to match spending to citizens’ priorities. For example, in each case study district, education was the largest budget expenditure (see Table 3.4), garnering over two-thirds of the budget in Bushenyi and Mpigi and nearly 50 percent in Lira. Education was not identified by residents as the most pressing problem in any of the districts, however (see Table 3.5). This discrepancy reflects the central government’s emphasis on education, in particular the Universal Primary Education (UPE) program, rather than local priorities or needs. In none of the three districts was the sector in which residents most often cited problems a priority area in budget expenditure (see Tables 3.4 and 3.5). For example, residents in Bushenyi complained most often of the

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poor roads in the district. The council, however, spent less than 6 percent of its budget on technical services and only 2.6 percent on roads specifically. Table 3.5: Most Serious Problems Identified by Local Residents* Bushenyi N=200 1. Roads Poor roads: 26% Lack of roads: 2.0%

Mpigi N=202 1. Agriculture Crop diseases: 18.8% Lack of markets: 12.9%

2. Agriculture Crop diseases: 10.5% Lack of markets: 8.5%

2. Health care Lack of health care: 13.4% Lack of drugs: 5.4% 3. General poverty Lack of capital: 14.4%

3. Health care Lack of drugs: 11.5% Lack of health care: 3.0% 4. Education Too few teachers: 7.5% Lack of schools: 4.5% 5. Corruption Corruption: 10.5%

4. Education Lack of schools: 8.4% Too few teachers: 3.5% 5. Corruption Corruption: 9.4%

Lira N=203 1. Health care Lack of health care: 15.8% Lack of drugs: 13.3% 2. Agriculture Lack of markets: 12.8% Crop diseases: 1.5% 3. Water Lack of water: 11.8% Poor water: 2.5% 4. Corruption Corruption: 12.3%

5. Education Lack of schools: 5.9% Too few teachers: 5.4%

* Percentage of respondents in each district giving each response.

Source: Survey conducted by the author (2000-2001).

Local leaders in all three districts (although not always to the same degree) place emphasis on expenditures that meet political or even personal needs. An examination of spending patterns in these three districts reveals that the spending priorities of Bushenyi’s district council are more focused on meeting the needs of the local people. Yet there is greater emphasis on “sovereignty expenditures” in Lira and Mpigi rather than spending to meet the needs of local residents.28 For example, expenditures for the budget item “gender and community welfare” provide programs for women and orphans, two groups that are among the most impoverished in Ugandan society. In all three districts, expenditures for this important budget item are shockingly low—far less than 3 percent of budget allocations in 2000/01. Yet Bushenyi district council commits more of its resources to

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gender and community welfare spending than either Mpigi or Lira. In fact, Lira’s budget allocation is virtually nothing (see Table 3.6). The Local Government Financial and Accounting Regulations (LGFAR) stipulated that no more than 15 percent of local revenue in a given year can be used to pay for allowances and salaries of LC officials. All three districts violated the 15 percent limit in the 1999/00 FY. Bushenyi, however, just missed this limit and spent only 16 percent of its local revenue on these expenditures (see Table 3.6). Lira spent slightly more, around 22 percent of local revenue, while amazingly Mpigi spent over 40 percent of local revenue on salaries and allowances of political leaders. The estimate for Lira is probably too low given the problems with the draft budget I used to calculate these estimates, and given that the council reportedly spent over 80 percent of its local revenue on emoluments for councilors during the 1998/99 FY.29 Locally elected leaders across Uganda have often pushed for increases in their allowances and complain if allowances are not paid promptly. The shift to CG payment of these salaries eased this pressure somewhat, although complaints persist about the payment and level of sitting allowances to compensate councilors for attending meetings. During interviews, local politicians in Lira and Mpigi were much more likely to complain about their salaries than were politicians in Bushenyi. Not surprisingly, councilors in Mpigi increased their allowances by 30 percent in July 2000.30 This increase came at a time when LCs across the country were struggling to collect graduated taxes following a campaign promise by President Museveni to lower the minimum paid to 3,000 Ush. One district worker described it this way, “Most councilors see the council as a source of income and are not in it for community service, but to earn a living. . . . the district’s expenditure on the council is too high. This depletes the funds that would be used to run development programs.” Monthly salaries for the LC5 chairperson, the vice-chairperson, and the secretaries of the executive committee in Mpigi district were 780,000 Ush, 517,000 Ush and 435,000 Ush, respectively in 1999. Using an exchange rate of 1,580 Ush to $1, these figures are $494, $327, and $275, respectively.31 In comparison, annual local revenue expenditure per person by the district council is only 20,730 Ush ($13). In 2001, Bushenyi district also increased salaries for executive committee members to 960,000 Ush from 660,000 Ush and increased the chairman’s salary to 2 million Ush from 1.2 million.32 Yet increased local revenue collection by the district council meant that these increases were less likely to bite into resources for service.

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In addition to prioritizing the payment of their salaries and allowances, local politicians in many districts use scarce resources to finance activities unlikely to contribute to local development. For example, a great deal of the discussion during the council meetings in Mpigi shortly after the June 1998 LC elections focused on the need to purchase furniture and a computer for the chairman’s office and a car for the office of the district speaker. Such equipment might be deemed necessary for the district executive to function, but exemplifies a focus on sovereignty expenditures to address the political and personal needs of the leaders rather than the immediate needs of residents. During the period in which I conducted fieldwork in Mpigi, I never observed the speaker in her office or working in the district. According to comments made by other interview respondents, she was a professor at Makerere University in Kampala and infrequently returns to Mpigi. This is despite the fact that the position of the speaker is considered a full-time position with a comparable salary. Events in Mpigi and Lira also suggest that corruption is a more serious problem in these districts than it is in Bushenyi. During six months in the FY 2000/01, sixteen corruption charges were leveled against officials in Mpigi. In contrast, Lira district council received nine such charges, while Bushenyi’s council received only seven. Numerous officials interviewed in Mpigi also complained of the tendency of local politicians to shift funds away from planned activities and redirect these funds toward other purposes without the consent of the council or the population. In fact, Mpigi’s district chairman was threatened with a vote of censure as a result of the misallocation of funds to finance a trip to the United States and United Kingdom and the diversion of funds to finance the construction of the road to the district headquarters. In November 2001, subcounty chairpersons in Mpigi and the new district of Wakiso resolved to lobby the Minister of State for Primary Education Hon. Bitamazire, also an MP from Mpigi district representing women, complaining that the process of awarding tenders for the construction of schools in Mpigi and Wakiso was corrupt and resulted in substandard work.33 In 2003, Mpigi district was identified by President Museveni as one of the eight most corrupt districts in the country.34 And most recently, Mpigi district officials were accused by a parliamentary oversight committee of squandering 12.2 billion Ush during FY 2000/01.35 During one of my visits to Mpigi, the district hosted an event to honor a retiring bishop from the Church of Uganda. Chairman Zimbe recognized the occasion by offering a gift of a cow to the bishop on

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behalf of the council. One district official described the decisionmaking process this way: For example, the cow for the bishop. It was not approved by the council, but it was done. The chairman will tell us, “We bought him a cow.” He’s done it on behalf of the council, but the council did not sit and decide. While certainly less significant due to the amount of money involved, the gift of the cow exemplifies the nature of political decisionmaking in Mpigi and the willingness of the chairman to make decisions about how scarce resources should be used without consulting the council or adhering to plans administrators prepared previously. In 1998, district councilors in Mpigi complained that they had not approved the 10 million Ush ($7,675) that was used to finance a trip made by the chairman and the secretary for finance, Joseph Nsereko, to the United States and United Kingdom.36 One councilor complained: Corruption has been the main problem. We asked the IGG to come. Like the American trip, the chairman and another went to the US for a conference without consulting the council. They claimed they consulted the finance committee, but the finance committee only passed 9 million Ush, but they took 23 million. We weren’t given feedback. They talked about bringing back 100 computers for Kabasanda, but they still haven’t come. The minutes from the September 1998 council meeting report that several councilors “emphasised the need to follow the budget in order to develop Mpigi.”37 In their own defense, Chairman Zimbe “explained that the money for the trip was used so as to make fruitful contacts outside the country,” while the secretary for finance justified the expenditure because they had been introduced to many investors in the United States and United Kingdom.38 Lira’s district chairman, Obua Otoa, also made several trips abroad. In 2000, he traveled to Namibia to attend a summit on African cities and led a delegation to Russia.39 Unlike Mpigi, no controversy erupted in Lira related to district expenditure to finance these trips. This may be a result of the extent to which the executive in Lira was able to use funds at its discretion with few questions from legislators or possibly because

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outside sponsors financed the trip, rather than the district council. While few respondents offered direct complaints of diverted funds, there were numerous references in interviews, newspaper articles, and minutes of district council meetings to the high levels of corruption in the district. Several scandals were under investigation during the period of study. For example, Lira district lost important financial grants from the central government that were intended to fund primary education because the district was unable to account for how previous grants had been used.40 Like Mpigi, Lira district council has also been embroiled in a scandal related to the process of awarding tenders for important district contracts, such as constructing schools throughout the district. During interviews, several officials reported that potential contractors had to pay a bribe in order to win a contract. A second corruption scandal rocked Lira district and resulted in the arrest of three top administrative officials—the CAO, CFO, and district engineer—by the IGG. The three officials were charged with embezzlement of over 9 million Ush that was to be used to service and maintain the district’s bulldozer.41 The CAO was cleared of charges and returned to work for the district, only to be interdicted again and forced to leave over further allegations of abuse of office, financial impropriety, incompetence, and general mismanagement.42 Bushenyi is certainly not immune to such problems, but there seem to be fewer instances of corruption and such instances seem to be more individualized rather than routinized or systemic. As one MP put it, “although it’s there, it is less magnified than in other districts.” Moreover, administrators in Bushenyi were not critical of local politicians and were, in fact, quite complimentary, which was not the case in Mpigi or Lira. Questions may be raised about the exact impact on the alleviation of poverty of some of the council’s expenditures, such as a plan to provide car loans to councilors, but the decisionmaking process is more transparent and involves elected councilors, not just the chairman or even the executive committee acting alone. For example, in 2000, a group of councilors calling themselves the United Councilors’ Group accused Chairman Makaaru of a variety of illegal activities, including awarding himself tenders to construct schools in the district, spending over 10 million Ush on a single service of his vehicle, and using district funds obtained illegally to purchase properties in Kampala.43 In an extraordinary council meeting called by the chairman to present his case, Makaaru argued strongly against every accusation. The council unanimously adopted a resolution denouncing all of the accusations.

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Not surprisingly, auditing and other efforts to increase accountability are an extremely low priority in all three districts. This is unfortunate given the problems with corruption and the diversion of funds in Mpigi and Lira. All three districts spend very little of their revenue on the internal audit section of the finance and planning department. In 1999, Bushenyi and Mpigi allocated only .3 percent of their total expenditure for internal audit. Lira spent even less—barely 1/100th of 1 percent was allocated for that purpose. Throughout Uganda, local revenue comprises only a small percentage of total district revenue.44 Beyond reflecting national priorities under the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP),45 local governments face few constraints on how they use revenue raised locally.46 Using local revenue for service delivery provides local governments with greater discretionary power and an enhanced ability to allocate resources according to the needs and desires of the people they represent. All three case study districts depend on the central government for survival. One politician in Mpigi explained that “When somebody else is feeding you, you do not have the power to say what you will take. All our money is from the center. About 90 percent comes from the center.” It is fairly easy to include estimates for local revenue collection in annual budgets. This involves simply inserting a number into a spreadsheet. Meeting these budget goals is a wholly different story. Local revenue collection varies substantially across the three case study districts, with Bushenyi district collecting more than either Mpigi or Lira. During FY 1999/00, Bushenyi collected over 90 percent of its local revenue estimates. In contrast, Mpigi district council collected just 72 percent of local revenue estimates, while Lira collected only 49 percent of budgeted local revenue. Looking at subsequent financial years and considering the end of the graduated tax in 2004, Bushenyi still performs quite well. For example, for the 2003/04 FY Bushenyi district council collected 74 percent of its local revenue estimates. In comparison, Lira district council only collected 32 percent of its local revenue estimates for the 2001/02 financial year and a meager 7 percent for 2003/04.47 In 2007, the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) emptied Lira’s bank accounts to recover a 466 million Ush debt that the district had accumulated since 1997 for unpaid value-added tax.48 The money the URA captured was intended to fund the LGDP program and provide agricultural services. Certainly insecurity hinders local tax collection efforts in Lira. But insecurity only partially accounts for the district’s problems in revenue collection. The debt accumulated to the URA began in 1997 before

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insecurity intensified in the district. On the other hand, Bushenyi’s ability to generate local revenue may reflect the district council’s capacity for tax collection or, even more, could demonstrate the council’s capacity for realistic budgeting, but most likely reflects both. Bushenyi district performs better than average when one compares these three districts with the rest of Uganda’s district councils. On average, Uganda’s districts collected 65 percent of the local revenue estimated in their budgets.49 The percentage of budgeted local revenue actually collected by district councils ranges from a low of 2.2 percent in Adjumani to a high of 104 percent in Kisoro. Only eight districts collect less than 50 percent of their local revenue budget estimates and Lira falls into this group. The other thirty-three districts prove able to collect more than half of their local revenue estimates. Only seven districts collect over 80 percent of their budgeted local revenue and Bushenyi district is included among these districts. Bushenyi’s district council’s commitment to trying to increase local revenue collection is evident in two programs that were instituted by the district. The district adopted an incentive program that provided a 1 percent bonus to reward subcounties for their collection efforts. Similarly, the district instituted a deadline for payment of graduated tax and a surcharge for late payment, both designed to discourage taxpayers from delaying in paying their graduated tax.50 Responsiveness: Citizen Perceptions

Respondents in Bushenyi district evaluated the performance of their local councils and local politicians higher than did respondents in Lira and Mpigi.51 For example, almost 66 percent of survey respondents in Bushenyi evaluated the performance of the district council as “good” or “very good” compared to only 49 percent in Mpigi and 42 percent in Lira.52 Respondents in Bushenyi were similarly positive in their evaluations of their district chairperson: 62 percent felt that the chairperson’s performance was “good” or “very good,” while less than half of the respondents in both Mpigi and Lira offered a positive assessment of the performance of their chairperson. Respondents in Bushenyi also consistently evaluated the performance of their district council higher across a variety of different activities for which district council are now responsible under the country’s decentralization program. I created an index of service quality based on responses to ten questions asking respondents to evaluate district council performance across a range of activities, including inspecting schools, constructing classrooms, mobilizing people for

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immunization, maintaining district roads, and providing agricultural training to local farmers. Values range from a low of 5 to a high score of 46. The average score on this index for Bushenyi district is 29, which is significantly higher than average scores for Mpigi and Lira.53 Results from the Round 2 Afrobarometer survey conducted in Uganda in 2002 confirm the results for my survey conducted in 20002001. Nearly 71 percent of respondents in Bushenyi reported that they trust the district council “a lot” or “a great deal” compared to only 53 percent in Lira and a meager 37 percent in Mpigi. Similarly, less than 3 percent of respondents in Bushenyi reported that they do not trust the district council at all. In comparison, almost 6 percent of respondents in Lira and over 11 percent of respondents in Mpigi expressed complete distrust in the council. The preceding discussion indicates that Bushenyi’s district council is more effective and more responsive than its counterparts in Lira and Mpigi. But what explains Bushenyi’s better performance? In the following chapters, I assess the explanatory power of various factors theorized to account for such differences in local government performance. I demonstrate that central-local relations are critical in order to understand Bushenyi district council’s better performance. 1 My measure of performance focuses on outputs rather than outcomes because outcomes, such as poverty reduction, may be influenced by a host of factors outside the control of the local government, including prices for locally produced commodities or levels of rainfall. I acknowledge that voters, however, often hold elected officials responsible for outcomes and explore economic voting in Ugandan districts in Chapter 7. 2 Uganda earned a score of 2.5 on TI’s 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index in which a score of 0 indicates high levels of corruption. www.transparency.org/ policy_and_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005 3 See, for example, “Muhwezi faces prosecution in Global Fund,” New Vision, June 1, 2006. 4 “Districts Mismanage Sh40b,” New Vision, May 27, 2008. 5 Ibid. 6 “How Deep Has Graft Eaten into KCC?” The Monitor, September 17, 2006. Nine billion Ush is equivalent to approximately $482,315 at an exchange rate of 1,866 Ush to the $1. 7 “Central Government Takes over Kampala in September,” The Monitor, May 24, 2007. 8 The IGG in Uganda performs a watchdog function and is responsible for fighting corruption and abuse of office by elected and nonelected officials in all levels of government, including local governments. The IGG conducts investigations based on its own information and also conducts investigations to follow up on public complaints. Data on the total number of public complaints against LC officials in each district were available for two quarters during the financial year 2000–2001 from the IGG headquarters in Kampala.

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Unfortunately, the frequency of complaints against local councils and administrators reported to the various regional offices was not available. The headquarters does not have this information and logistically it was not possible to travel to each office to collect this data. 9 “How Decentralisation Took Corruption to Districts,” The Monitor, January 31, 2004. 10 To capture the degree of transparency in the tender process, I use data from the 1999 LGDP assessments on whether district officials announce three months in advance of the date for tender board meetings and when requests for proposals are due. The publication of important deadlines for submission of requests for tender and tender board meetings to discuss upcoming contracts is an important indicator of the transparency of the tender process and, because of the significance of tendering to district activities, an important indicator of the transparency of district operations generally. The measure of the tender process is not significantly related to level of economic development in districts. 11 Data are available for forty-one districts. One district was considered to have made “some attempt” to meet the established criteria (Uganda 1999). 12 See Sections 90 and 91, LG Act (Uganda 1997a). 13 See “Tender Boards to be Scrapped,” New Vision, November 9, 2005. 14 The LGDP assessment criteria are used to determine which districts qualify to participate in the LGDP program and, consequently, receive the additional funds for development. The assessment criteria are based on a determination of the skills and resources a district must possess in order to successfully plan for and utilize any development funds they might receive under LGDP. The criteria are also based on the LG Act of 1997 and the rules and regulations established by that act for the appropriate operation of local governments in Uganda following decentralization (Uganda 1997a, 1998). The LGDP assessments were carried out by a National Assessment Team and members of the team divided into four regional groups. Each regional team was responsible for conducting assessments of all of the districts within a particular region. Thus, the same team members evaluated all of the districts in one region. All of the team members attended an orientation “to ensure standardisation of the assessment process” (Uganda 1999, 2). According to the initial assessment report, the team members met daily to review the data collected and complete the various parts of the assessment report together. The initial report explains that “Since information regarding the same indicators was collected from different sources there was a need to reconcile the findings before filling the reporting formats” (Uganda 1999, 2). Thus, the team worked together to determine a district’s score on particular items. It is reasonable to assume that the 2002 assessments were conducted in a similar manner. 15 A list of the items included in the assessment is available from the author. 16 Performance scores from the 1999 assessment were available for all but one of Uganda’s forty-five administrative districts—no report was available for Mukono district. For 2002, scores were available for fifty of the fifty-six districts that existed at the time. The 2002 assessment did not include reports for Hoima, Kampala, Kasese, Kibale, Kumi, and Rakai. I would like to acknowledge the tremendous assistance provided to me by Martin Onyach-Olaa

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and the entire staff at the Policy Management Unit of the Local Government Development Program. 17 The maximum score possible for the 1999 assessment is 97, while the scoring changed slightly in 2002 with a maximum of only 90 points. In order to compare and evaluate any changes in districts’ scores on these two measures across time, I converted each score into a percentage. I calculated the percentage of possible points earned by a district for both years and used these percentages rather than the raw scores in the multivariate analysis presented in Chapter 3. In instances where a final score was not available, I replicated the LGDP team’s scoring process as precisely as possible and calculated final scores for these districts. This was the case for the following five districts in 1999: Hoima, Kasese, Kibale, Lira and Masindi. Because the aggregate scores were provided by MoLG’s LGDP assessment teams, it is not possible to test how well the components of the index cohere together. 18 In 1999, these six districts include: Adjumani, Kalangala, Kasese, Moroto, Rukungiri, and Sembabule. In 2002, the following districts qualified as poor performers: Bugiri, Pallisa, Tororo, Gulu, Adjumani, and Apac. 19 See, for example, Widner and Mundt (1998). Also, there is some evidence that citizen perceptions about government performance offer valid measures of institutional performance. For example, Bratton et al. (2005, 230) note that Africans’ assessments about state institutions “appear to rely on factual information.” As an example, they point out that Ugandans’ trust in the Electoral Commission dropped by 50 percentage points after the 2001 elections that were characterized by a high level of violence and accusations of fraud. 20 I use Afrobarometer survey data from the 2000 and 2002 surveys in Uganda to capture satisfaction with the LC5. I used survey responses to the question, “How satisfied are you with the performance of your LC5 representative,” to create a district-level variable based on the percentage within each district responding that they are “very” or “somewhat” satisfied with the performance of their LC5 representative. 21 See Section 14 (5) of the LG Act, Uganda (1997a). 22 Minutes of Lira District Council Meeting, April 21, 2001. 23 Minutes of Bushenyi District Council Meeting, August 29, 2000. 24 Minutes of Bushenyi District Council Meeting, December 21, 2000. 25 Minutes of Lira District Council Meeting, June 29 and 30, 2001. 26 See Minutes from Bushenyi District Council Meeting, June 26, 2000. 27 Raw data provided by ULGA. Analysis by author. 28 Van de Walle defines sovereignty expenditures as “expenditure linked to the exercise of state sovereignty . . . expenditures for international diplomacy, government offices and other activities that benefit a small stratum of the population” (2001, 101–102). 29 Ochieng, Henry and Robert Mukasa, “MPs Nearly Veto District Budgets,” The Monitor, June 24, 1999. 30 See New Vision, July 2, 2000, 5. Article title was unavailable. 31 Exchange rate on January 1, 2000: $1 = 1,580 Ush (www.fxconverter.com). 32 “Salary Raise Causes Discontent,” New Vision, July 14, 2001. 33 “Wakiso Petitions Minister,” New Vision, November 8, 2001; see also New Vision, January 25, 1999, article title unavailable.

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34 Yunusu Abbey, “8 Districts Accused of Graft Identified,” New Vision, May 7, 2003. 35 “Mpigi fails to account for two billion,” The Monitor, October 18, 2006. 36 See New Vision, September 29, 1998, 5. Article title was unavailable. Exchange rate at the time: $1 = 1,303.5 Ush (www.fxconverter.com) 37 Minutes of Mpigi District Council Meeting, September 28, 1998. 38 Minutes of Mpigi District Council Meeting, September 28, 1998. See also New Vision, September 29, 1998, 5. Article title was unavailable. 39 Minutes of Lira District Council Meeting, June 30 and 31, 2000. 40 “UPE Detractors to be Punished,” New Vision, December 3, 2001. 41 See New Vision, September 8, 2000, 3. Article title was unavailable. 42 “Lira CAO on Forced Leave,” New Vision, January 11, 2003. 43 Minutes of Bushenyi District Council Meeting, October 4, 2000. 44 Total district revenue includes locally raised funds, donor funding, and transfers from the CG. Data on local revenue collection for the three case study districts are based on the 1999/00 budget estimates for these districts. Data on local revenue collection for the other forty districts in Uganda are drawn from budgets for each of these districts on file at the Local Government Finance Commission (LGFC) offices in Kampala. I would like to thank Nagadya and Adam for allowing me to sit in their offices and copy budget figures from the forty-three budgets they had on file. The dates for the other forty districts are inconsistent and vary depending on what year happened to be on file with the LGFC. I would also note that these figures are based on a single budget year. It is possible that these estimates reflect unique circumstances, such as a poor agricultural yield, which could affect the local revenue collected in a district. An average over several years would be preferred, although data for several years were unavailable. 45 The PEAP lays out the Ugandan government’s national objectives and strategies for poverty reduction (Uganda 2007). 46 As noted already, the LG Act limited district councils from spending more than 15 percent of local revenue to pay salaries and allowances of elected officials. This is less relevant now that salaries are paid from the center. 47 Comparable data for Mpigi district for subsequent financial years were not readily available to the author at the time of writing, however recent news reports accentuate the budget problems facing the district. 48 “URA Empties Lira Accounts,” New Vision, February 18, 2007. 49 Calculated by author and based on district council budgets from various years (1997–2000). 50 Minutes of Bushenyi District Council Meeting, February 10, 2000, 5. 51 See Appendix E for information on the sample drawn from each district. The survey questions are available upon request. 52 Significant at the .01 level based on the Chi-square value; Phi = .307 and Cramer’s V = .217, p