Works by Locke, The Principles of Human Knowledge by Berkeley, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding by Hume [1 ed.] 0852291639

Citation preview

GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD ^g ^^^^?^v^^^^«^^^^^^^^^

12.

LUCRETIUS EPICTETUS MARCUS AURELIUS

13.

VIRGIL

14.

PLUTARCH

15.

TACITUS

16.

PTOLEMY

Introductory Volumes: 1.

2.

3.

The Great Conversation

The Great The Great

Ideas

I

Ideas II M M »» MM M MM »

4.

5.

»

Cf. Bk. IV. ch.

iv.

§§ 13-17.

JOHN LOCKE

276

BOOK

sence so far from being settled and perfectly known, that very material doubts may still arise about it. And I imagine none of the definitions of the word man which we yet have, nor descriptions of that sort of animal, are so perfect and

some few

exact as to satisfy a considerate inquisitive person; much less to obtain a general consent, and

these the shape

which men would everywhere stick and determining of life and death, baptism or no baptism, in productions that might happen. 28. But not so arbitrary as mixed modes. But though these nominal essences of substances are made by the mind, they are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of mixed modes. To the making of any nominal essence, it is necessary, First, that the ideas whereof it consists have such a union as to make but one idea, how compounded soever.

III

sensible obvious qualities; and often, not always, leave out others as material and as firmly united as those that they take. Of sensible substances there are two sorts: one of organized if

which are propagated by seed; and in is that which to us is the leading quality, and most characteristical part, that debodies,

And therefore in vegetables

to be that

termines the species.

by, in the decision of cases,

and animals, an extended solid substance of such a certain figure usually serves the turn. For however some men seem to prize their definition of

Secondly, that the particular ideas so united be exactly the same, neither

more nor

two abstract complex ideas

less.

For

if

numthey make

differ either in

ber or sorts of their component parts, two different, and not one and the same essence. In the

first

of these, the mind, in

making its com-

plex ideas of substances, only follows nature; and

puts none together which are not supposed to have a union in nature. Nobody joins the voice of a sheep with the shape of a horse; nor the col-

our of lead with the weight and fixedness of gold, to be the complex ideas of any real substances; unless he has a mind to fill his head with chimeras, and his discourse with unintelligible words. Men observing certain qualities always joined and existing together, therein copied nature and of ideas ;

made their complex ones of substances. For, though men may make what complex ideas they please, and give what names to them they

so united

be understood when they steak of things really existing, they must in some degree conform their ideas to the things they would speak of; or else men's language will be like that of Babel; and every man's words, being intelligible only to himself, would no longer serve to conversation and the ordinary affairs of life, if the ideas they stand for be not some way answering the common appearances and agreement of substances as they really exist. 29. Our nominal essences of substances usually conwill; yet, if they will

sist

of a few obvious qualities observed in things. Sec-

Though the mind of man, in making its complex ideas of substances, never puts any together that do not really, or are not supposed to, co-exist; and so it truly borrows that union from nature: yet the number it combines depends upon the various care, industry, or fancy of him that makes it. Men generally content themselves with

ondly,

animal rationale, yet should there a creature be found that had language and reason, but par-

taked not of the usual shape of a man, I believe would hardly pass for a man, how much soever it were animal rationale. And if Balaam's ass it

had all his life discoursed as rationally as he did once with his master, I doubt yet whether any one would have thought him worthy the name man, or allowed him to be of the same species with himself. As in vegetables and animals it is the shape, so in most other bodies, not propagated by seed, it is the colour we must fix on, and are most led by. Thus where we find the colour of gold, we are apt to imagine all the other qualities comprehended in our complex idea to be there also: and we commonly take these two obvious qualities, viz. shape and colour, for so presumptive ideas of several species, that in a good picture, we readily say, this is a lion, and that a rose; this is a gold, and that a silver goblet, only by the different figures and colours represented to the eye by the pencil. 30. Yet, imperfect as they thus are, they servefor com-

mon

But though this serves well enough and confused conceptions, and inaccuways of talking and thinking; yet men are far

converse.

for gross

rate

enough from having agreed on the precise number of simple ideas or qualities belonging to any sort of things, signified by its

requires

name.

much

Nor

is it

time, pains,

a wonder; since

and

it

skill, strict in-

and long examination to find out what, and how many, those simple ideas are, which are constantly and inseparably united in nature, and are always to be found together in the same subject. Most men, wanting either time, inclination, or industry enough for this, even to some tolerable degree, content themselves with some few obvious and outward appearances of things, thereby readily to distinguish and sort them for the common affairs of life: and so, without further examination, give them names, or take up the names already in use. Which, though in common conversation they pass well enough for the signs of some few obvious qualities co-existing, are yet far enough from comprehending, in a settled sigquiry,

nification, a precise less all

number of simple ideas, much

He that much stir about genus and

those which are united in nature.

shall consider, after so species,

ences,

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CONCERNING

CHAP. VI

and such a deal of talk of specific

how few words we have

tions of,

may

differ-

yet settled defini-

with reason imagine, that those

forms which there hath been so much noise made about are only chimeras, which give us no light into the specific natures of things. And he that shall consider how far the names of substances are from having significations wherein use

them do

all

who

agree, will have reason to conclude

though the nominal essences of substances supposed to be copied from nature, yet they are all, or most of them, very imperfect. Since the composition of those complex ideas are, in several men, very different: and therefore that these boundaries of species are as men, and not as Nature, makes them, if at least there are in nature any such prefixed bounds. It is true that many particular substances are so made by Nature, that they have agreement and likeness one that,

are

all

with another, and so afford a foundation of being ranked into sorts. But the sorting of things by us, or the making of determinate species, being in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms, I cannot see how it can be properly said, that Nature sets the boundaries of the species of things or, if it be so, our boundaries of species are not exactly conformable to those in nature. For we, having need of general names for present use, stay not for a perfect discovery of all those qualities which would best show us their most material differences and agreements; but we ourselves divide them, by certain obvious appearances, into species, that we may the easier under general names communicate our thoughts about them. For, having no other knowledge of any substance but of the simple ideas that are united in it; and observing several particular things to agree with others in several of those simple ideas; we make that collection our specific :

and give it a general name; that in recording our thoughts, and in our discourse with othidea,

we may in one short word designate all the individuals that agree in that complex idea, with-

ers,

277

men made

very differently; by some more, and others less accurately. In some, this complex idea contains a greater, and in others a smaller number of qualities; and so is apparently such as the mind makes it. The yellow shining colour makes gold to children; others add weight, different

and fusibility; and others yet othwhich they find joined with that yellow colour, as constantiy as its weight and fusibility. For in all these and the like qualities, one has as good a right to be put into the complex idea of that substance wherein they are all joined as another. And therefore different men, leaving out or putting in several simple ideas which others do not, according to their various examination, skill, or observation of that subject, have different essences of gold, which must therefore be of their own and not of nature's making. malleableness, er qualities,

32.

The more general our

ideas of substances are, the

more incomplete and partial they are. If the

depends on the mind of man, variously collecting them, it is much more evident that they do so in the more comprehensive classes, which, by the masters of logic, are called genera. These are complex ideas designedly imperfect: and it is visible at

first sight,

that several of those qualities

that are to be found in the things themselves are

purposely

mind,

to

left

out of generical ideas. For, as the

make general ideas comprehending sev-

eral particulars, leaves out those of time and place,

and such other, that make them incommunicable to more than one individual; so to make other yet more general ideas, that may comprehend it

leaves out those qualities that

distinguish them,

and puts into its new collection

different sorts,

only such ideas as are

common

The same convenience

that

do who would discourse of any new sort of things

taining only malleableness

31

.

Essences of species under the same name very dif-

ferent in different minds.

But however these species

of substances pass well

enough

in

ordinary con-

versation, it is plain that this complex idea, where in they observe several individuals to agree,

is

-

by

is

a genus constituted;

the essence whereof being that abstract idea, concertain degrees of weight

for.

express

coming from Guinea and Peru under one name, sets them also upon making of one name that may comprehend both gold and silver, and some other bodies of different sorts. This is done by leaving out those qualities, which are peculiar to each sort, and retaining a complex idea made up of those that are common to them all. To which the name metal being annexed, there

name

to several sorts.

made men

several parcels of yellow matter

out enumerating the simple ideas that make it up; and so not waste our time and breath in tedious descriptions: which we see they are fain to they have not yet a

number of

simple ideas that make the nominal essence of the lowest species, or first sorting, of individuals,

and fusibility, with and fixedness, wherein

some bodies of several kinds agree, leaves out the colour and other qualities peculiar to gold and silver, and the other sorts comprehended under the

name

metal.

Whereby

it is

plain that

follow not exactly the patterns set

men

them by na-

;

JOHN LOCKE

27 8 ture,

when they make

stances; since there

is

their general ideas of sub-

no body

to

be found which

species:

BOOK and

this

III

men do without any considera-

tion of real essences, or substantial forms;

which

has barely malleableness and fusibility in it, without other qualities as inseparable as those. But men, in making their general ideas, seeking more the convenience of language, and quick dispatch

come not within the reach of our knowledge when we think of those things, nor within the signification of our words when we discourse with others. 34. Instance in Cassowaries. Were I to talk with

by short and comprehensive and precise nature of things

any one of a sort of birds I

signs,

than the true

lately

saw in St. James's

as they exist, have,

Park, about three or four feet high, with a cover-

in the framing their abstract ideas, chiefly pursued that end; which was to be furnished with store of general and variously comprehensive names. So that in this whole business of genera and species, the genus, or more comprehensive,

ing of something between feathers and hair, of a dark brown colour, without wings, but in the place thereof two or three little branches coming down like sprigs of Spanish broom, long great legs, with feet only of three claws, and without a tail; I must make this description of it, and so may make others understand me. But when I am

but a partial conception of what is in the speand the species but a partial idea of what is to be found in each individual. If therefore any one will think that a man, and a horse, and an animal, and a plant, &c, are distinguished by real essences made by nature, he must think nature to be very liberal of these real essences, making one for body, another for an animal, and another for a horse; and all these essences liberally bestowed upon Bucephalus. But if we would rightly consider what is done in all these genera and species, or sorts, we should find that there is no new thing made; but only more or less comprehensive signs, whereby we may be enabled to express in a few syllables great numbers of particular things, as they agree in more or less general conceptions, which we have framed to that purpose. In all which we may observe, that the more general term is always the name of a less complex idea; and that each genus is but a partial conception of the species comprehended under it. So that if these abstract general ideas be thought to be complete, it can only be in respect of a certain established relation between them is

cies;

and certain names which are made use of to signify them; and not in respect of anything ex-, isting, as made by nature. 33. This all accommodated to the end of speech. This adjusted to the true end of speech, which is to be the easiest and shortest way of communicat-

is

told that the

name

of

it is

cassuaris, I

by that word, which is now become a specific name, I know no more of the real essence or constitution of that sort of animals

than

I

did before

and knew probably as much of the nature of that species of birds before I learned the name, as many Englishmen do of swans or herons, which are specific names, very well known, of sorts of birds

common

35.

Men

in England.

determine the sorts of substances, which

From what has been said, evident that men make sorts of things. For, it being different essences alone that make different species, it is plain that they who make those may

be sorted variously.

it is

abstract ideas which are the nominal essences do thereby make the species, or sort. Should there be a body found, having all the other qualities of gold except malleableness, it would no doubt be made a question whether it were gold i.e. whether it were of that species. This could be determined only by that abstract idea to which every one annexed the name gold: so that it would be true gold to him, and belong to that species, who included not malleableness in

or not,

his

nominal essence,

and on the other

by the sound gold; would not be true gold,

signified

side

it

him who included

or of that species, to

complex idea of extension and solidity, needed but use the word body to denote all such. He that to these would join others, signified by the words life, sense, and spontaneous motion, needed but use the word animal to signify all which partaked of those ideas, and he that had made a complex idea of a body, with life, sense, and motion, with the faculty of reasoning, and a certain shape joined to it, need-

ableness in his specific idea.

ed but use the short monosyllable man, to express all particulars that correspond to that complex idea. This is the proper business of genus and

then

plex idea mentioned in that description; though

ing our notions. For thus he that would discourse of things, as they agreed in the

may

use that word to stand in discourse for all my com-

And who,

I

malle-

pray,

is

makes these diverse species, even under one and the same name, but men that make two it

that

different abstract ideas, consisting not exactly

same collection of qualities? Nor is it a mere supposition to imagine that a body may

of the

wherein the other obvious qualities of gold be without malleableness; since it is certain that gold itself will be sometimes so eager, (as artists call it), that it will as little endure the hammer as glass itself. What we have said of the

exist

may

putting

in,

or leaving out of malleableness, in

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CONCERNING

CHAP. VI

the complex idea the name gold is by any one annexed to, may be said of its peculiar weight, fixedness, and several other the like qualities: for whatever is left out, or put in, it is still the complex idea to which that name is annexed that makes the species: and as any particular

parcel of matter answers that idea, so the of the sort belongs truly to species.

And

thus anything

it;

is

and

name

of that

it is

true gold, perfect

which determination of the species, it is plain, depends on the understanding of man, making this or that complex idea. metal. All

36. Nature makes the similitudes of substances. This,

the case: Nature makes many which do agree one with another in many sensible qualities, and probably too in their internal frame and constitution: but it is then, in short,

is

particular things,

have no other idea of the different essence of an elephant and a spaniel, than we have of the different essence of a shock and a hound; all the

whereby we know and disthem one from another, consisting only

essential difference,

tinguish

in the different collection of simple ideas,

which we have given those

How

39.

making

the

in order to general

eral

names are

in this,

think, consists the

I

and

whole

species.

37. The manner of sorting particular beings the work offallible men, though nature makes things alike. I do not deny but nature, in the constant production of particular beings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alike and of kin one to another: but I think it nevertheless true, that the boundaries of the species, whereby men sort them, are made by men;

much

is

gen-

not to the being, yet

and makwhat has been said above concerning ice and water, in a very familiar example. A silent and a striking watch are but one species to those who have ing

pass for such, will appear, besides

it

but one

name for them: but he that has the name

said perhaps, that the

and

naming.

at least to the completing of a species,

they observe often several individuals to agree, range them into sorts, in order to their naming,

business of genus

if

to

and genera

names; and how

watch for one,

drill:

of species

necessary,

to

different names.

genera and species are related

How much

not this real essence that distinguishes them into species; it is men who, taking occasion from the qualities they find united in them, and wherein

for the convenience of comprehensive signs; under which individuals, according to their conformity to this or that abstract idea, come to be ranked as under ensigns: so that this is of the blue, that the red regiment; this is a man, that a

279

and clock for the other, and discomplex ideas to which those names be-

tinct

long, to him they are different species. It will be

inward contrivance and which

constitution is different between these two,

the

watchmaker has a

clear idea

of.

And yet it is when he

plain they are but one species to him,

name for them. For what is suffiinward contrivance to make a new species? There are some watches that are made with four wheels, others with five; is this a specific difference to the workman? Some have strings and physies, and others none; some have the balance loose, and others regulated by a spiral spring, and others by hogs' bristles. Are any or all of these enough to make a specific difference to the workman, that knows each of has but one

cient in the

these

and

several other different contrivances in

the internal constitutions of watches? It

cer-

is

tain each of these hath a real difference

from

since the essences of the species, distinguished

the rest; but whether

essential,

a specific

by different names, are, as has been proved, of man's making, and seldom adequate to the in-

difference or no, relates only to the

complex

ternal nature of the things they are taken from.

So that we

may truly say,

ing of things 38.

Each

is

the

such a manner of sort-

workmanship of men.

abstract idea, with a

One

name

to it,

makes a

doubt not but will seem very strange in this doctrine, which is, that from what has been said it will follow, that each abstract idea, with a name to it, makes a distinct species. But who can help it, if truth will have it so? For so it must remain till somebody can show us the species of things limited and distinguished by something else; and let us see that general terms signify not our abstract ideas, but something different from them. I would fain know why a shock and a hound are not as distinct species as a spaniel and an elephant. We nominal

essence.

thing

I

idea to which the

it

be an

name watch

is

given: as long

which that name and that name does not as a generical name comprehend different species under it, as they all agree in the idea

stands

for,

they are not essentially nor specifically different.

But

if

any one

will

differences that he

of watches,

give

names

and

make minuter divisions, from knows

frame complex ideas

in the internal

to such precise

that shall prevail; they will then be

them who have those ideas with them, and can by those differences distinguish watches into these several sorts; and then watch will be a generical name. But yet they would be no distinct species to men igno-

new

species, to

names

to

rant of clock-work, and the inward contrivances of watches,

who had no

ward shape and

other idea but the out-

bulk, with the

marking of the

JOHN LOCKE

2 8o

hours by the hand. For to them all those other names would be but synonymous terms for the same idea, and signify no more, nor no other thing but a watch. Just thus I think it is in natural things. Nobody will doubt that the wheels or springs

(if I

may

so say) within, are different

no more than that there is a difference in the frame between a drill and a changeling. But whether one or both in a rational

man and a

changeling;

these differences be essential or specifical,

known

is

to us

40. Species of

artificial things less

casion to

when

confused than

absent. Besides, the greatest part of

it is

tion, as substances

and

43. Difficult

to

lead another by words into the thoughts

we give them. must beg pardon of my reader for having dwelt so long upon this subject, and perhaps with some obscurity. But I desire it may be considered, how difficult it is to lead another by words into of things stripped of those abstract ideas I

the thoughts of things, stripped of those specif-

suggest to the

Because an

actors;

union.

and uncertainty than

in natural.

which are the

wherein the simple ideas that make up the complex ideas designed by the name have a lasting

ical differences

From what

in

their birth, are not capable of a lasting dura-

has been before said, we may see the reason why, in the species of artificial things, there is generally less confusion natural.

III

seldom happens that men have ocmention often this or that particular it

mixed modes, being actions which perish

only

by their agreement or disagreement with the complex idea that the name man stands for: for by that alone can it be determined whether one, or both, or neither of those be a man. to be

BOOK

relations,

name not, I

I

we

give them: which things,

thereby rank them into

mind

if I

do name them, some sort or other, and

say nothing; and

if I

the usual abstract idea of

it is supposed to stand no other idea, nor to import any other essence, than what is certainly to be known, and easy enough to be apprehended. For the idea or

and so cross my purpose. For, to talk of a man, and to lay by, at the same time, the ordinary signification of the name man, which is our complex idea usually annexed to it; and bid the reader consider man, as he is in himself, and as he is really distinguished from

essence of the several sorts of artificial things,

others in his internal constitution, or real es-

artificial

thing being a production of man, which

the artificer designed, the idea

of,

the

name

and therefore well knows of

for

consisting for the

most part

in nothing but the

determinate figure of sensible parts, and sometimes motion depending thereon, which the artificer fashions in matter, such as he finds for his turn; ties to

it is

not beyond the reach of our facul-

and so settle of the names whereby the spe-

attain a certain idea thereof;

the signification

with doubt, obscurity, and equivocation than we

cies of artificial things are distinguished, less

can

whose differences and upon contrivances beyond

in things natural,

operations depend

the reach of our discoveries. 41. Artificial things of distinct species. I

excused here

must be

think artificial things are of distinct species as well as natural: since I find they are as plainly and orderly ranked into sorts, by if I

names anthem, as distinct one from another as those of natural substances. For why should we not think a watch and pistol as distinct species one from another, as a horse and a dog; they being expressed in our minds by distinct ideas,

different abstract ideas, with general

nexed

and

to

to others

by distinct appellations?

42. Substances alone, of all our several sorts of

This is further to be observed concerning substances, that they alone of all our several sorts of ideas have particular or ideas, have proper names.

proper names, whereby one only particular thing is signified. Because in simple ideas, modes, and

that species;

by something he knows not what, and yet thus one must do who would speak of the supposed real essences and species of things, as thought to be made by nasence, that

is,

looks like trifling:

ture, if

it

that there

be but only to make it understood, no such thing signified by the gen-

is

names which substances are called by. But it is difficult by known familiar names to do this, give me leave to endeavour by an example to make the different consideration the mind has of specific names and ideas a little more clear; and to show how the complex ideas of modes are referred sometimes to archetypes in the minds of other intelligent beings, or, which is the same, to the signification annexed by others to their received names; and sometimes to no archetypes at all. Give me leave also to show how the mind always refers its ideas of suberal

because

stances, either to the substances themselves, or

to the signification of their

archetypes;

and

also to

make

names, as

to the

plain the nature

apprehended and of the essences belonging to those species: which is perhaps of more moment to discover the extent and certainty of our knowledge than we at first imagine. of species or sorting of things, as

and made use of by

us;

44. Instances of mixed modes named kinneah and niouph. Let us suppose Adam, in the state of a grown man, with a good understanding, but in

CONCERNING

CHAP. VI

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

a strange country, with all things new and unknown about him; and no other faculties to attain the knowledge of them but what one of this age has now. He observes Lamech more melancholy than usual, and imagines it to be from a suspicion he has of his wife Adah, (whom he most ardently loved) that she had too much kindness for another man. Adam discourses these his thoughts to Eve, and desires her to take care

Adah commit

not folly: and in these disEve he makes use of these two new words kinneah and niouph. In time, Adam's mistake appears, for he finds Lamech's trouble proceeded from having killed a man: but yet the two names kinneah and niouph, (the one standing for suspicion in a husband of his wife's disloyalty to him; and the other for the act of committhat

courses with

ting disloyalty), lost not their distinct significations. It is plain then, that here were two distinct complex ideas of mixed modes, with names to them, two distinct species of actions essentially different; I ask wherein consisted the essences of these two distinct species of actions? And it is plain it consisted in a precise combination of simple ideas, different in one from the other. I ask, whether the complex idea in Adam's mind, which he called kinneah, were adequate or not? And it is plain it was; for it being a combination of simple ideas, which he, without any regard to any archetype, without respect to anything

as a pattern, voluntarily put together, abstracted,

and gave the name kinneah to, to express in short to others, by that one sound, all the simple ideas contained and united in that complex one; it must necessarily follow that it was an adequate idea. His own choice having made that combination, it had all in it he intended it should, and so could not but be perfect, could not but be adequate; it being referred to no other archetype which it was supposed to represent. 45. These words, kinneah and niouph, by degrees grew into common use, and then the case was somewhat altered. Adam's children had the same faculties, and thereby the same power that he had, to make what complex ideas of mixed modes they pleased in their own minds; to abstract them, and make what sounds they pleased the signs of them: but the use of names being to

make our ideas within us known to others, that cannot be done, but when the same sign stands for the

same idea

in

two who would communi-

cate their thoughts and discourse together. Those, therefore, of

Adam's

children, that found these

two words, kinneah and

niouph, in familiar use,

could not take them for insignificant sounds, but must needs conclude they stood for some-

281

thing; for certain ideas, abstract ideas, they being general names; which abstract ideas were the essences of the species distinguished by those

would use

words and agreed on, they were obliged to conform the ideas in their minds, signified by these names, to the ideas that they stood for in other men's minds, as to their patterns and archetypes; and then indeed their ideas of these complex modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt (especially those that consisted of combinations names. as

If,

names

therefore, they

these

of species already established

of many simple ideas) not to be exactly conformable to the ideas in other men's minds, using the same names; though for this there be usually a remedy at hand, which is to ask the meaning of any word we understand not of him that uses it: it being as impossible to know certainly

what the words jealousy and adultery

(which I think answer n*op and *])to) stand for in another man's mind, with whom I would discourse about them; as it was impossible, in the beginning of language, to know what kinneah and niouph stood for in another man's mind, without explication; they being voluntary signs in every one. 46. Instances of a species of substance named Zahab. Let us now also consider, after the same manner, the names of substances in their first application. One of Adam's children, roving in the mountains, lights on a glittering substance which pleases his eye. Home he carries it to Adam, who, upon consideration of it, finds it to be hard, to have a bright yellow colour, and an exceeding great weight. These perhaps, at first, are all the qualities he takes notice of in it; and abstracting this complex idea, consisting of a substance having that peculiar bright yellowness, and a weight very great in proportion to its bulk, he gives the name zahab, to denominate

and mark

all

substances that have these sensible

qualities in them. It case,

Adam

is

evident now, that, in this

acts quite differently

from what he

did before, in forming those ideas of mixed modes

which he gave the names kinneah and niouph. For there he put ideas together only by his own imagination, not taken from the existence of anything; and to them he gave names to denomto

inate

all

things that should

happen

to agree to

those his abstract ideas, without considering

whether any such thing did exist or not; the standard there was of his own making. But in the forming his idea of this new substance, he takes the quite contrary course; here he has a standard made by nature; and therefore, being to represent that to himself, by the idea he has

"

.

JOHN LOCKE

282 even when

of it,

it is

absent, he puts in no simple

idea into his complex one, but what he has the perception of from the thing itself. He takes care that his idea be conformable to this archetype,

and intends

name

the

should stand for an idea

so conformable. 47. This piece of matter, thus denominated zahab by Adam, being quite different from any he had seen before, nobody, I think, will deny to be a distinct species, and to have its peculiar

essence:

and that the name zahab is the mark of and a name belonging to all things

the species,

partaking in that essence. But here it is plain the essence Adam made the name zahab stand for was nothing but a body hard, shining, yellow,

and very heavy. But the inquisitive mind of man, not content with the knowledge of these, as I may say, superficial qualities, puts Adam upon further examination of this matter. fore knocks,

and beats

was discoverable

it

with

flints,

He

he finds

in the inside:

there-

to see it

it

ductility to

essense is supposed.

To

avoid

this therefore,

50.

Which supposition

sider,

when we

either

it

inition,

means e.,

i.

of no use. For, let us con-

that fixedness

"all gold

for;

and

also,

by the same

reason that any of the others were, to be put into the complex idea signified by the name zahab? If not, what reason will there be shown more for the one than the other? If these must, then the other properties, which shall discover in this matter,

reason to

make

all

any further trials ought by the same

a part of the ingredients of the

complex idea which the name zahab stands for, and so be the essence of the species marked by that name. Which properties, because they are endless,

it is

fashion,

by

plain that the idea

this archetype, will

made

after this

be always inade-

quate.

The abstract ideas of substances always imperand therefore various. But this is not all. It

48. fect,

would also follow that the names of substances would not only have, as in truth they have, but would also be supposed to have different significations, as used by different men, which would very much cumber the use of language. For if every distinct quality that were discovered in any matter by any one were supposed to make a necessary part of the complex idea signified by the common name given to it, it must follow, that men must suppose the same word to signify different things in different men: since they cannot doubt but different men may have discovered several qualities, in substances of the same denomination, which others know nothing of.

fixed,

so this affirmation,

nification of the

Or

term gold.

else

it

means,

that fixedness, not being a part of the definition of the gold,

is

a property of that substance

in the place of a substance,

discover fusibil-

trials

Are not they

is

a part of the def-

fixed," contains nothing but the sig-

zahab stands for? Further fixedness.

is

part of the nominal essence the

yield

is

is

affirm that "all gold

in

and

they

what the real essence is, and this is that which men do when they speak of species of things, as supposing them made by nature, and distinguished by real essences.

made part of the essence of the species that name ity

ill

fix their nominal species, a real

have supposed a real essence belonging to every species, from which these properties all flow, and would have their name of the species stand for that. But they, not having any idea of that real essence in substances, and their words signifying nothing but the ideas they have, that which is done by this attempt is only to put the name or sound in the place and stead of the thing having that real essence, without knowing

word gold stands

bend without breaking. Is not now be added to his former idea, and

will

49.

to

what

to blows, but not easily separate into pieces: he finds

BOOK

Therefore

itself:

which case it is plain that the word gold stands

sence of a species of things

having the real

made by

es-

nature. In

which way of substitution

it has so confused and uncertain a signification, that, though this prop"gold is fixed" be in that sense an osition affirmation of something real; yet it is a truth will always fail us in its particular application, and so is of no real use or certainty. For let it be ever so true, that all gold, i.e. all that has the

—

—

real essence of gold,

is

fixed,

what serves

this for,

we know not, in this sense, what is or is not gold? For if we know not the real essence of gold, it is impossible we should know what parcel of whilst

matter has that essence, and so whether

it

be

true gold or no. l

To conclude what liberty Adam

5 1 Conclusion.

had

at

first

to

:

make any complex

ideas of mixed

modes by no other pattern but by his own thoughts, the same have all men ever since had. And the

same

necessity of conforming his ideas of sub-

without him, as to archetypes Adam was under, if he would not wilfully impose upon himself, the stances to things

made by

same are

nature, that

all

men ever since under too. The same Adam had of affixing any new

liberty also that

name

to

any

idea, the

same has any one

(especially the beginners of languages,

imagine any such) but only with ;

where men

if

still,

we can

this difference,

have already established a language amongst them, the that, in places

l

Cl

ch. x. § 17.

in society

.

CHAP.

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CONCERNING

VII

and

significations of words are very warily

men

ingly to be altered. Because

spar-

being fur-

nished already with names for their ideas, and

common use having appropriated known names an affected misapplication of

to certain ideas,

them cannot but be very

He

ridiculous.

that

hath new notions will perhaps venture sometimes on the coining of new terms to express them: but men think it a boldness, and it is uncertain whether common use will ever make them pass for current. But in communication with others, it is necessary that we conform the ideas we make the vulgar words of any language stand for to their known proper significations, (which I have explained at large already), or

make known

else to

apply them

that

new

Chap. VII. Of

we

Particles

Besides words which are

names of

ideas in

many others that made use of to signify the connexion that the mind gives to ideas, or to propositions, one with another. The mind, in communicating its thoughts the mind, there are a great

are

to others, does not only

need signs of the ideas

it

has then before it, but others also, to show or intimate some particular action of its own, at that time, relating to those ideas. This it does several ways; as

Is,

and

Is not, are the

general

marks, of the mind, affirming or denying. But

which words no truth or falsehood, the mind

besides affirmation or negation, without

there

is

in

does, in declaring

its

and therefore it which are not truly by themselves the names of any ideas are of such constant and indispensable use in language, and do much contribute to men's well expressing instead of informing his hearer: that those words

is,

themselves. 3. They show what relation the mind gives to its own thoughts. This part of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected as some others over-

diligently cultivated. It

sentiments to others, con-

4.

They

are all

a coherent

discourse. 2.

In right use of particles consists the art of well-

speaking.

The words whereby

connexion

it

it

signifies

what

gives to the several affirmations

and negations, that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration, are generally called particles:

and

it is

more and beauty of not enough that

in the right use of these that

particularly consists the clearness

style. To think well, it is man has ideas clear and distinct in his thoughts,

a good a

nor that he observes the agreement or disagreement of some of them; but he must think in train, and observe the dependence of his thoughts and reasonings upon one another. And to express well such methodical and rational thoughts, he must have words to show what connexion, restriction, distinction, opposition,

&c, he course.

emphasis

gives to each respective part of his dis-

To

mistake in any of these,

is

to puzzle

marks of some action

or intimation

enough, for the explaining of these words, to render them, as is usual in dictionaries, by words of another tongue which of the mind. Neither

is it

come nearest to their signification: for what is meant by them is commonly as hard to be understood in one as another language. They are marks of some action or intimation of the mind; and therefore to understand them rightly,

all

the several views, postures, stands, turns, limita-

and exceptions, and several other thoughts which we have either none or

tions,

make

to write,

who would show the right use of particles, and what significancy and force they have, must take a little more pains, enter into his own thoughts, and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in discoursing.

of the mind, for

to

men

yet he

sentences one to another, with their several re-

and dependencies,

easy for

after another, of cases

nect not only the parts of propositions, but whole lations

is

and genders, moods and tenses, gerunds and supines: in these and the like there has been great diligence used; and particles themselves, in some languages, have been, with great show of exactness, ranked into their several orders. But though prepositions and conjunctions, &c, are names well known in grammar, and the particles contained under them one

carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions;

Particles connect parts, or whole sentences togeth-

1

er.

signification

to.

283

very deficient names, are diligently to be studied. Of these there is a great variety, much exceeding the number of particles that most languages have to express them by: and therefore it is not to be wondered that most of these particles have divers and sometimes almost opposite significations. In the Hebrew tongue there is a particle consisting of but one single letter, of which there are reckoned up, as I remember, seventy,

I

am sure

above

fifty,

several significa-

tions. 5. Instance in

more

"but" "But"

a particle, none and he that says conjunction, and that it anis

familiar in our language:

it is a discretive swers to sed Latin, or mais in French, thinks he has sufficiently explained it. But yet it seems to

me

to intimate several relations the

mind

to the several propositions or parts of them it

joins

by this monosyllable. "But to say no more": here

First,

it

gives

which

intimates

JOHN LOCKE

284

a stop of the mind in the course it was going, before it came quite to the end of it. Secondly, "I saw but two plants"; here it shows that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed, with a negation of all other.

Thirdly,

"You

pray; but

it is

not that

God

would bring you to the true religion." Fourthly, "But that he would confirm you in your own." The first of these buts intimates a

mind of something otherwise should be: the latter shows that the mind makes a direct opposition between that and what goes before it. Fifthly, "All animals have sense, but a dog is an animal": here it signifies little more but that the latter proposition is joined to the former, as

al,

BOOK

or white, yet every one at

:

or whiteness: and this is as evident as any of the most allowed maxims. All our affirmations then are only in concrete, animality, or rationality,

is

which

is the affirming, not one abstract idea to be another, but one abstract idea to be joined to

another; which abstract ideas, in substances, maybe of any sort; in all the rest are little else but of

and in substances the most frequent are "a man is white," signifies that the

relations;

than

of powers: v.g.

the minor of a syllogism. 6.

To these, I doubt not, might be added a great many other significations of this particle, if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude, and consider it in all the places it is to be found: which if one should do, I doubt whether in all those manners it is made use of, it would deserve the title of discretive, which grammarians give to it. But I intend not here a

has also in it nothing but a power to produce the idea of whiteness in one whose eyes can discover ordinary objects: or, "a

man is rational,

explication of this sort of signs.

stances

I

have given in

this

one

may

and force

The

in-

give occa-

sion to reflect

on

and lead us

into the contemplation of several

their use

minds

' '

in language,

2.

They show

tinction of

man i.e.

same thing that

hath also in

it the esa power of reasoning.

the difference of our ideas.

names shows us

our ideas: for

is

signifies that the

sence of rationality,

touched here.

full

man

thing that has the essence of a

the essence of whiteness, which

hath the essence of a

This matter of the use of particles but lightly

hearing per-

ceives the falsehood of these propositions humanity

supposition in the it

first

III

if

we

observe them,

that our simple ideas have

This

dis-

also the difference of

we

shall find

all abstract as well as con-

names: the one whereof is (to speak the language of grammarians) a substantive, the other an adjective; as whiteness, white; sweetness, sweet. 2 The like also holds in our ideas of modes

crete

and relations; as justice, just; equality, equal: only with this difference, that some of the concrete

names of relations amongst men

chiefly are

substantives; as, paternitas, pater; whereof it

were

which it has found a way to intimate to others by these particles, some whereof constantly, and others in certain constructions, have the sense of a whole

animalitas, humanitas, corporietas,

sentence contained in them.

yet they hold no proportion with that infinite

actions of our

Chap. VIII. Of 1.

why.

Abstract and Concrete

Terms

substances, we have very few or no abstract names at

all.

For though the Schools have introduced

and some

others;

number of names of substances, to which they nevwere ridiculous enough

er

to

attempt the coin-

ing of abstract ones and those few that the Schools

The ordinary words

and put into the mouths of their scholars, could never yet get admittance into common use, or obtain the license of public approbation. Which seems to me at least to intimate the confession of all mankind, that they have no ideas of the real essences of substances, since they have not names for such ideas: which no doubt they would have had, had not their consciousness to themselves of their ignorance of them kept them

of language, and our would have given us light the nature of our ideas, if they had been but

use of them,

The mind, as has been shown, has a power to abstract its ideas, and so considered with attention.

they become essences, general essences, whereby the sorts of things are distinguished.

Now each ab-

any two the one can never be the other, the mind will, by its intuitive knowledge, perceive their difference, and therefore in propositions no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed one of another. This we see in the common use of language, which permits not any two abstract words, or names of abstract ideas, to be affirmed one of another. For how near stract idea being distinct, so that of

1

may seem to be, and how certain soever it is that man is an animal, or ration-

of kin soever they J

easy to render a reason. But as to our ideas of

Abstract terms not predictable one of another, and

common into

in discoursing,

Cf. Bk. IV. ch.

ii.

§

1.

:

forged,

so idle an attempt. And therefore, though they had ideas enough to distinguish gold from a stone, and metal from wood; yet they but timorously ventured on such terms, as aurietas and saxietas, metallietas and lignietas, or the like names,

from

which should pretend

to signify the real essences

knew they had was only the doctrine of

of those substances whereof they

no

ideas.

And

indeed

it

2Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxxi. § 12.

.

CONCERNING

CHAP. IX

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

and the confidence of mistaken pretenders to a knowledge that they had not, which first coined and then introduced animalitas and humanitas, and the like; which yet went very little further than their own Schools, and could never get to be current amongst understanding men. Indeed, humanitas was a word in familiar use amongst the Romans; but in a far different sense, and stood not for the abstract essence of any substance; but was the abstracted name of a mode, and its concrete humanus, not homo. substantial forms,

Chap. IX. Of Words

1

our thoughts.

the Imperfection of

are used for recording

Words

and communicating

From what has been said in the foreeasy to perceive what imperand how the very

going chapters,

it is

fection there

in language,

is

nature of words makes it almost unavoidable for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their significations. To examine the perfection or imperfection of words, it is necessary first to consider their use

and end:

more or they are more or less

for as they are

less fitted to attain that, so

We have,

285

general propositions certain and undoubted truths, which the mind may rest upon and be satisfied with in its search after true knowledge. These two uses are very distinct; and a great deal less exactness will serve in the one than in the other, as

The

4.

we

shall see in

what

follows.

imperfection of words is the doubtfulness or

ambiguity of their signification, which is caused by the The chief end of language

sort of ideas they standfor.

in

communication being to be understood, words

serve not well for that end, neither in civil nor

when any word does not same idea which it stands

philosophical discourse, excite in the hearer the

mind of the speaker. Now, since sounds have no natural connexion with our ideas, but have all their signification from the arbitrary imposition of men, the doubtfulness and uncertainty of their signification, which is the imperfection for in the

we here

ideas they stand for than in

its cause more in the any incapacity there

one sound more than

in another to signify

is

in

any

are speaking

of,

has

idea: for in that regard they are all equally

perfect.

That then which makes doubtfulness and unsome more than

former part of this discourse often, upon occasion, mentioned a double

certainty in the signification of

use of words.

other words,

perfect.

First,

One

in the

for the recording of

our

own

thoughts.

Secondly,

other for the communicating

2. Any words will serve for recording. As to the first of these, for the recording our own thoughts for the help

own memories, whereby, as it were, we talk any words will serve the turn. For since sounds are voluntary and indifferent signs of any ideas, a man may use what words he pleases of our

to ourselves,

own ideas

to himself:

and there

will

be no imperfection in them,if he constantly use the same sign for the same idea: for then he cannot fail of having his meaning understood, wherein consists the right use and perfection of language. 3.

Communication by words

sophical purposes. Secondly,

either for civil or philo-

As

to communication by

words, that too has a double use. I.

II.

the difference of ideas they stand

Natural causes of their imperfection, especially in mixed modes, and for our ideas of substances. Words having naturally no significa5.

The

of our thoughts to others. 1

to signify his

is

for.

with others, in any language. But this is the hardest to be done where, First, The ideas they stand for are very complex, and made up of a great number of ideas put together. Secondly, Where the ideas they stand for have no certain connexion in nature; and so no settled standard anywhere in nature existing, to rectify

and adjust them Thirdly,

by.

When the signification of the word is which standard

is

not

easy to be known. Fourthly,

Philosophical.

by their civil use, I mean such a communication of thoughts and ideas by words, as may serve for the upholding common conversation and commerce, about the ordinary affairs and conveniences of civil life, in the societies of men, one amongst another. First,

Secondly r By the philosophical use of words, I a use of them as may serve to convey

mean such

!Cf. ch. x. § 23.

tion, the idea which each stands for must be learned and retained, by those who would exchange thoughts, and hold intelligible discourse

referred to a standard,

Civil.

the precise notions of things,

those that stand for

and

to express in

and the

Where

the signification of the

word

real essence of the thing are not exactly

the same.

These are

difficulties that

attend the significa-

intelligible. Those which are not intelligible at all, such as names standing for any simple ideas which another has not organs or faculties to attain; as the names of colours to a blind man, or sounds to a deaf man,

tion of several

words that are

need not here be mentioned. In

all

these cases

we shall find an imperfection

JOHN LOCKE

286 in words;

which

I

shall

more

at large explain, in

our several sorts we examine them, we shall find

BOOK

whereby men may adjust them. What the word

their particular application to

murder, or sacrilege,

of ideas: for

known from

if

that the names of

Mixed Modes

are most liable to

doubtfulness and imperfection, for the two first of these reasons;

two

and the names

of Substances chiefly for the

latter.

The names of mixed modes

6.

doubtful. First, be-

cause the ideas they stand for are so complex. First,

The names

of mixed modes are,

liable to great uncertainty

many

of them,

and obscurity

in their

signification.

Because of that great composition these com-

I.

made up of. To make words end of communication, it is necessary, as has been said, that they excite in the hearer exactly the same idea they stand for in the mind of the speaker. Without this, men fill one another's heads with noise and sounds; but convey not thereby their thoughts, and lay not before one another their ideas, which is the end of discourse and language. But when a word stands for a very complex idea that is compounded and decompounded, it is not easy for men to form and retain that idea so exactly, as plex ideas are often

serviceable to the

to

make

same

the

name

in

common

use stand for the

any the least variation. Hence it comes to pass that men's names of very compound ideas, such as for the most part are moral words, have seldom in two different men the same precise signification; since one man's complex idea seldom agrees with another's, and often differs from his own from that which he had yesterday, or will have to-morrow. precise idea, without

—

III

&c,

signifies

can never be

many

things themselves: there be

of the parts of those

complex ideas which are

not visible in the action itself; the intention of the mind, or the relation of holy things, which make a part of murder or sacrilege, have no necessary connexion with the outward and visi-

him

commits either: and the gun with which the murder is committed, and is all the action that perhaps is visible, has no natural connexion with those other ideas that make up the complex one named murder. They have their union and combination only from the understanding which unites them under one name: but, uniting them without any rule or pattern, it cannot be but ble action of

that

pulling the trigger of the

that the signification of the

name

that stands for

such voluntary collections should be often various in the minds of different men, who have scarce any standing rule to regulate themselves and their notions by, in such arbitrary ideas. 8.

Common

use, or propriety not

a

sufficient

remedy.

common use, that is, the rule of propriety may be supposed here to afford some aid, It is true,

and it some measure it use regulates the meaning of

to settle the signification of language;

cannot be denied but that does.

Common

in

words pretty well for common conversation; but nobody having an authority to establish the precise signification of words, nor determine to what ideas any one shall annex them, common use is

Because the names of mixed modes for the most part want standards in nature, whereby men

not sufficient to adjust them to Philosophical Discourses; there being scarce any name of any very complex idea (to say nothing of others) which, in common use, has not a great latitude, and which, keeping within the bounds of pro-

may rectify and adjust their significations;

priety,

7.

Secondly, because they have no standards in na-

ture.

fore they are very various

there-

and doubtful. They

are assemblages of ideas put together at the pleasure of the mind, pursuing its own ends of

and suited to its own notions; wheredesigns not to copy anything really exist-

discourse,

by

it

but to denominate and rank things as they to agree with those archetypes or forms it has made. He that first brought the word sham, or wheedle, or banter, in use, put together as he thought fit those ideas he made it stand for; and as it is with any new names of modes that are now brought into any language, so it was with the old ones when they were first made use of. ing,

come

Names, therefore, that stand ideas which the mind makes

for collections of

at pleasure

must

needs be of doubtful signification, when such collections are nowhere to be found constantly united in nature, nor any patterns to be shown

may not

be

made

the sign of far different

and measure of propriety itself being nowhere established, it is often matter of dispute, whether this or that way of using a word be propriety of speech or no. From all which it is evident, that the names of such kind of very complex ideas are naturally liable to this imperfection, to be of doubtful and uncertain signification; and even in men that have a mind to understand one another, do not always stand for the same idea in speaker and hearer. Though the names glory and gratitude be the same in every man's mouth through a whole country, yet the complex collective idea which every one thinks on or intends by that name, is apparently very different in men using the same language. 9. The way of learning these names contributes ideas. Besides, the rule

also to their doubtfulness.

the names of mixed

The way

also

wherein

modes are ordinarily learned,

.

CONCERNING

CHAP. IX does not a

little

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

contribute to the doubtfulness

1

o.

287

Hence unavoidable obscurity

in ancient authors.

of their signification. For if we will observe how children learn languages, we shall find that, to make them understand what the names of sim-

What

ple ideas or substances stand for, people ordin-

needless to take notice. Since the

numerous

arily show them the thing whereof they would have them have the idea; and then repeat to

umes

their thoughts

them

name

the

that stands for

milk, sugar, cat, dog.

But

as for

it;

as white, sweet,

mixed modes,

es-

upon mote

obscurity this has unavoidably brought the writings of ages,

and

of learned

men who have

different countries,

men, employing

lived in reit

will

be

vol-

more than enough, to show study, sagacity, and reasoning find out the true meaning of But, there being no writings we

that way, are proofs

what

attention,

are required to

pecially the

ancient authors.

the sounds are usually learned

have any great concernment to be very solicitous about the meaning of, but those that con-

most material of them, moral words, first; and then, to know what complex ideas they stand for, they are either beholden to the explication of others, or (which happens for the most part) are left to their own observation and industry; which belaid out in the search of the true and meaning of names, these moral words are in most men's mouths little more than bare sounds; or when they have any, it is for the most part but a very loose and undetermined, and, consequently, obscure and confused significa-

ing

little

precise

tion.

And even

more

those themselves

who have with

attention settled their notions,

do yet

hardly avoid the inconvenience to have them stand for complex ideas different from those which other, even intelligent and studious men,

make them

the signs

of.

Where

shall

tain either truths we are required to believe, or laws we are to obey, and draw inconveniences on us when we mistake or transgress, we may be less anxious about the sense of other authors; who, writing but their own opinions, we are under no greater necessity to know them, than they to know ours. Our good or evil depending not on their decrees, we may safely be ignorant of their notions: and therefore in the reading of them, if they do not use their words with a due

and perspicuity, we may lay them and without any injury done them, re-

clearness aside,

solve thus with ourselves, Si non vis intelligi, debes negligi.

one find

any, either controversial debate, or familiar dis-

1 1

Names

oj substancss of doubtful signification,

course, concerning honour, faith, grace, religion,

because the ideas they stand for relate to the reality of

church, &c, wherein it is not easy to observe the different notions men have of them? Which is nothing but this, that they are not agreed in the signification of those words, nor have in

the signification of the names of mixed modes be uncertain, because there be no real standards existing in nature to which those ideas are referred, and by which they may be adjusted, the names of substances are of a doubtful signifi-

their

minds the same complex ideas which they

make them stand for, and

so all the contests that

follow thereupon are only about the

a sound.

And hence we see

meaning

of

that, in the interpre-

whether divine or human, there no end; comments beget comments, and ex-

tation of laws, is

plications

and of

make new matter

for explications;

limiting, distinguishing, varying the sig-

moral words there is no end. These ideas of men's making are, by men still having the same power, multiplied in infinitum. Many a man who was pretty well satisfied of the

nification of these

meaning of a

text of Scripture, or clause in the

code, at

reading, has, by consulting

first

com-

things. If

cation, for a contrary reason, viz. because the

ideas they stand for are supposed conformable to the reality of things,

and are referred

to as

made by Nature. In our ideas of substances we have not the liberty, as in mixed modes, to frame what combinations we think standards

to be the characteristical notes to rank and denominate things by. In these we must follow Nature, suit our complex ideas to real existences, and regulate the signification of their names by the things themselves, if we will have our names to be signs of them, and stand for them. Here, it is true, we have patterns to folfit,

make

mentators, quite lost the sense of it, and by these elucidations given rise or increase to his doubts,

low; but patterns that will

and drawn obscurity upon the

must be of

this that I

ing, if the ideas they stand for be referred to standards without us, that either cannot be known at all, or can be known but imperfectly

show how

place. I say not think commentaries needless; but to uncertain the names of mixed modes

naturally are, even in the mouths of those who had both the intention and the faculty of speaking as clearly as language was capable to express their thoughts.

the significa-

names very uncertain: for names a very unsteady and various mean-

tion of their

and uncertainly. 12. Names of substances that cannot be

known.

referred, to real essences

The names

of substances

.

JOHN LOCKE

288 1

BOOK who

therefore cannot choose but have

have, as has been shown, a double reference in

handling;

their ordinary use.

different ideas of the

Sometimes they are made to stand for, and so their signification is supposed to agree to, the real constitution of things, from which all their properties flow, and in which they all centre. But this real constitution, or (as it is apt to be

fore

First,

called) essence, being utterly

any sound that

is

unknown

put to stand for

to us, 2

must be

it

very uncertain in its application; and it will be impossible to know what things are or ought to be called a horse, or antimony, when those words are put for real essences that of at

all.

names

And

we have no

ideas

therefore in this supposition, the

of substances being referred to standards

that cannot be

known,

their significations

can

never be adjusted and established by those standards.

To

13.

co-existing qualities, which are

known but

The

simple ideas that are found to co-exist in substances being that which their names immediately signify, these, as united in the several sorts of things, are the proper standards to which their names are referred, and by imperfectly.

Secondly,

which their significations may be best rectified. But neither will these archetypes so well serve to this purpose as to leave these names without very various and uncertain significations. Because these simple ideas that co-exist, and are united in the same subject, being very numerous, and having all an equal right to go into the complex specific idea which the specific name is to stand for, men, though they propose to themselves the very same subject to consider, yet frame very different ideas about it; and so the name they use for it unavoidably comes to have, in several men, very different significations.

The simple

qualities

make

III

same substance, and

the signification of

its

there-

common name

very various and uncertain. For the complex ideas of substances, being made up of such simple ones as are supposed to co-exist in nature, every one has a right to put into his complex idea those qualities he has found to be united together. For, though in the substance of gold one satisfies himself with colour and weight, yet another thinks solubility in aqua regia as necessary to be joined with that colour in his idea of gold, as any one does its fusibility; solubility in aqua regia being a quality as constantly joined with its colour and weight as fusibility or any other; others put into it ductility or fixedness, &c, as they have been taught by tradition or experience. Who of all these has established the right signification of the word, gold? Or who shall be the judge to determine? Each has his standard in nature, which he appeals to, and with reason thinks he has the same right to put into his complex idea signified by the word gold, those qualities, which, upon trial, he has found united; as another who has not so well examined has to leave them out; or a third, who has made other trials, has to put in others. For the union in nature of these qualities being the true ground of their union in one complex idea, who can say one of them has more reason to be put in or left out than another? From hence it will unavoidably follow, that the complex ideas of substances in men using the same names for them, will be very various, and so the significations of those names very uncertain. 14. Thirdly, to co-existing qualities which are

known

but imperfectly. Besides, there

is

particular thing existing, which, in

scarce any some of its

which make up the complex ideas, being most of them powers, in relation to changes which they are apt to make in, or receive from other bodies, are almost infinite. He that shall but observe what

simple ideas, does not communicate with a greater, and in others a less number of particular beings: who shall determine in this case which are

a great variety of alterations any one of the baser metals is apt to receive, from the different appli-

by the specific name? or can with any just authority prescribe, which obvious or common qualities are to be left out; or which

how much a greater number of changes any of them will receive in the hands of a chymist, by the application of other bodies, will not think it strange that I count the

cation only of fire; and

properties of any sort of bodies not easy to be col-

and completely known, by the ways of inquiry which our faculties are capable of. They being therefore at least so many, that no man can lected,

know

and

number, they are differently discovered by different men, according to their various skill, attention, and ways of the precise

^h. 2

vi.

Cf. Bk. II. ch.

viii.

definite

those that are to that

is

make up

the precise collection

to be signified

more secret, or more particular, are to be put into the signification of the name of any substance? All which together, seldom or never fail to produce that various and doubtful signification in the names of substances, which causes such uncertainty, disputes, or mistakes, when we come to a philosophical use of them. 1

5.

With

this imperfection, they

but not wellfor philosophical use. It

may is

serve for civil,

true, as to civil

and common conversation, the general names of substances, regulated in their ordinary signification by some obvious qualities, (as by the shape

CONCERNING

CHAP. DC and

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

figure in things of known seminal propaga-

tion,

and

in other substances, for the

most part

by colour, joined with some other sensible qualido well enough to design the things men would be understood to speak of: and so they usually conceive well enough the substances meant by the word gold or apple, to distinguish the one from the other. But in philosophical inquiries and debates, where general truths are to be established, and consequences drawn from positions laid down, there the precise signification of the names of substances will be found not only not to be well established, but also very hard to be so. For example: he that shall make malleaties),

bility,

or a certain degree of fixedness, a part of

complex idea of gold, may make propositions concerning gold, and draw consequences from them, that will truly and clearly follow from his

289

each of them made it a sign of a different complex idea. This made them perceive that the main of their dispute was about the signification

and that they differed very little in and subtle matter, passing through the conduits of the nerves; though it was not so easy to agree whether it was to be called liquor or no, a thing, which, when considered, they thought it not worth the of that term;

their opinions concerning some fluid

contending about. 1

7. Instance, gold.

How much this is the case in

the greatest part of disputes that

men

are en-

perhaps have an occasion in another place to take notice. Let us only here consider a little more exactly the forementioned instance of the word gold, and we shall see how hard it is precisely to determine its

gaged so hotly

in, I shall

make it stand body of a certain yellow shining colour;

signification. I think all agree to

gold, taken in such a signification: but yet such

for a

man can never be forced to admit, nor be convinced of their truth, who makes not malleableness, or the same degree of fixedness, part

which being the idea to which children have annexed that name, the shining yellow part of a

as another

of that complex idea that the

use of

it,

name

gold, in his

peacock's

tail is

properly to them gold. Others

finding fusibility joined with that yellow colour in certain parcels of matter,

stands for.

make

of that

com-

a natural and almost unavoidable imperfection in almost all the

bination a complex idea to which they give the name gold, to denote a sort of substances; and so

names of substances, in all languages whatsoevwhich men will easily find when, once passing from confused or loose notions, they come to more strict and close inquiries. For then they will be convinced how doubtful and obscure those words are in their signification, which in ordinary use appeared very clear and determined. I was once in a meeting of very learned and ingenious physicians, where by chance there arose a question, whether any liquor passed through the

exclude from being gold all such yellow shining bodies as by fire will be reduced to ashes; and admit to be of that species, or to be comprehended under that name gold, only such substances as, having that shining yellow colour, will by fire be reduced to fusion, and not to ashes. Another, by the same reason, adds the weight, which, being a quality as straightly joined with that colour as its fusibility, he thinks has the same reason to be joined in its idea, and to be signified by its name: and therefore the other made up of body, of such a colour and fusibility, to be imperfect;

1

6. Instance, liquor.

This

is

er,

filaments of the nerves.

managed a good

The debate having been

while, by variety of arguments

on both

sides, I (who had been used to suspect, that the greatest part of disputes were more about the signification of words than a real difference in the conception of things) desired, that, before they went any further on in this dispute, they would first examine and establish amongst

them, what the word liquor signified. They at were a little surprised at the proposal; and had they been persons less ingenious, they might perhaps have taken it for a very frivolous or extravagant one: since there was no one there that thought not himself to understand very perfectiy what the word liquor stood for; which I think, too, none of the most perplexed names of substances. However, they were pleased to comply with my motion; and upon examination found that the signification of that word was not so setfirst

tled or certain as they

had

all

imagined; but that

and so on of all the rest: wherein no one can show a reason why some of the inseparable qualities, that are always united in nature, should be put into the

why

nominal essence, and others

left

out: or

word gold, signifying that sort of body the ring on his finger is made of, should determine that sort rather by its colour, weight, and fusibility, than by its colour, weight, and solubility in aqua regia: since the dissolving it by that liquor is as inseparable from it as the fusion by fire; and they are both of them nothing but the relation which that substance has to two other bodies, which have a power to operate differently upon it. For by what right is it that fusibility comes to be a part of the essence signified by the word gold, and solubility but a property of it? Or why is its colour part of the essence, and its malleableness but a property? That which I mean is the

.

JOHN LOCKE

2 go this,

That these being all but properties, dependits real constitution, and nothing but pow-

ing on

ers, either active

or passive, in reference to other

bodies, no one has authority to determine the signification of the word gold (as referred to such

a body existing in nature) more to one collection of ideas to be found in that body than to another: whereby the signification of that name must un-

avoidably be very uncertain. Since, as has been said, several people observe several properties in the same substance; and I think I may say nobody all. And therefore we have but very imperfect descriptions of things, and words have very uncertain significations. 1 8. The names of simple ideas the least doubtful. From what has been said, it is easy to observe what has been before remarked, viz. that the

BOOK

III

And next to them, simple modes. By the same names of simple modes are, next to those of simple ideas, least liable to doubt and uncertainty; especially those of figure and number, of which men have so clear and distinct ideas. Who ever that had a mind to understand them mistook the ordinary meaning of seven, or a triangle? 19.

rule, the

And in general the least compounded ideas in every kind have the least dubious names. 20. The most doubtful are the names of very compounded mixed modes and substances. Mixed modes, therefore, that are made up but of a few and obvious simple ideas, have usually names of no very uncertain signification. But the names of mixed modes which comprehend a great number of commonly of a very doubtful

simple ideas, are

and undetermined meaning,

as has

been shown.

names of simple ideas are, of all others, the least liable to mistakes, and that for these reasons. First, Because the ideas they stand for, being each but

The names of substances, being annexed

one single perception, are much easier got, and more clearly retained, than the more complex ones, and therefore are not liable to the uncertainty which usually attends those compounded ones of substances and mixed modes, in which the precise number of simple ideas that make

are liable to yet greater imperfection

stances, proceeding, for the

them up

want of knowledge, and inability to penetrate in-

are not easily agreed, so readily kept in mind. And, Secondly, Because they are never referred to any other essence, but barely that perception they immediately signify: which reference is that which renders the signification of the

to ideas

that are neither the real essences, nor exact rep-

resentations of the patterns they are referred to, tainty, especially

when we come

and uncer-

to a philosophi-

cal use of them. 2

1

Why this imperfection charged upon words. The

great disorder that happens in our

names of sub-

most part, from our

to their real constitutions, it may probably be wondered why I charge this as an imperfection rather upon our words than understandings.

guage which they are acquainted with, the use and signification of the name of simple ideas. White and sweet, yellow and bitter, carry a very obvious meaning with them, which every one precisely comprehends, or easily perceives he is ignorant of, and seeks to be informed. But what

This exception has so much appearance of justice, that I think myself obliged to give a reason why I have followed this method. I must confess, then, that, when I first began this Discourse of the Understanding, and a good while after, I had not the least thought that any consideration of words was at all necessary to it. But when, having passed over the original and composition of our ideas, 2 I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, 3 I found it had so near a connexion with words, that, unless their

precise collection of simple ideas modesty or fru-

force

names

and that do

of substances naturally so perplexed,

gives occasion to so

many disputes. Men

not perversely use their words, or on purpose set themselves to cavil, seldom mistake, in any lan-

gality

stand

for, in

not so certainare apt to think we

another's use,

is

known. And however we enough know what is meant by gold or iron; yet the precise complex idea others make them the signs of is not so certain: and I believe it is very seldom that, in speaker and hearer, they ly

well

stand for exactly the same collection. Which must needs produce mistakes and disputes, when they are made use of in discourses, wherein men have to do with universal propositions, and

would

settle in their minds universal truths, and consider the consequences that follow from them. 1

l

Gf. Bk. II. ch. vi. § 2; also Bk. II. ch.

viii.

and manner

of signification were

observed, there could be very

little

first

well

said clearly

and pertinently concerning knowledge: which being conversant about truth, had constantly to do with propositions. And though it terminated in things, yet it was for the most part so much by the intervention of words, that they seemed scarce separable from our general knowledge. At least they interpose themselves so much between our understandings, and the truth which it would contemplate and apprehend, that, like the medium through which visible objects pass, the obscurity and disorder do not seldom cast a mist before our eyes, and impose upon our un2

InBk.

II.

3i n Bk. IV.

—

.

CONCERNING

CHAP. X

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

derstandings. If we consider, in the fallacies

men

put upon themselves, as well as others, and the mistakes in men's disputes and notions, how great a part is owing to words, and their uncertain or mistaken significations, we shall have reason to think this no small obstacle in the way to knowledge; which I conclude we are the more carefully to be warned of, because it has been so far from being taken notice of as an inconven-

ience, that the arts of

made

improving

the business of men's study,

and

the reputation of learning

it have been and obtained

subtilty, as

shall see in the following chapter.

1

But

I

we

am apt

to imagine, that, were the imperfections of language, as the instrument of knowledge, more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the controversies that make such a noise in the world, would of themselves cease; and the way to knowledge, and perhaps peace too, lie a great deal opener than it does. 22. This should teach us moderation in imposing our

own

sense of old authors.

cation of words in

much on

that uses them,

This

I

am that the signifi-

languages, depending very

the thoughts, notions,

certainty to try.

all

Sure

is

and ideas of him

must unavoidably be of great un-

men of the same language and coun-

so evident in the

signification of their

in flesh,

words then, though to us it would become

human

we ought

magnify

another in our interpretations or misunderstandings of those ancient writings; which, though of great concernment to be understood, are liable to the unavoidable difficulties of speech, which (if we except the names of simple ideas, and some very obvious things) is not capable, without a constant defining the terms, of conveying the sense and intention of the speaker, without any manner of doubt and uncertainty to the hearer.

to

And

in discourses of re-

and morality, as they are matters of the highest concernment, so there will be the

ligion, law,

greatest difficulty. 23. Especially of the

Old and New Testament Scrip-

The volumes of interpreters and commentators on the Old and New Testament are but too manifest proofs of this. Though everything

tures.

said in the text be infallibly true, yet the reader 1

See especially §§ 6-22.

all

the frailties

and incon-

nature, sin excepted.

And

he hath spread before all the world such legible characters of his works and providence, and given all mankind so sufficient a light of reason, that they to whom this written word never came, could not (whenever they set themselves to search) either doubt of the being of a God, or of the obedience due to him. Since then the precepts of Natural Religion are plain, and very intelligible to all mankind, and seldom come to be controverted; and other revealed truths, which are conveyed to us by books and languages, are liable to the

come

to

common and

ficulties

his goodness, that

natural obscurities and

incident to words methinks ;

it

dif-

would be-

more careful and diligent in oband less magisterial, positive, and imperious, in imposing our own sense and us to be

serving the former,

interpretations of the latter.

Chap. X. Of

the

Abuse of Words

Woeful abuse of words. Besides the imperfecis naturally in language, and the ob-

1

tion that

and confusion that is so hard to be avoided in the use of words, there are several wilful scurity

and neglects which men are guilty of in this whereby they render these signs less clear and distinct in their signification than naturally they need to be. 2 faults

way

now they are lost and unknown; us to be charitable one

was subject to

veniences of

Greek authors, that

he that shall peruse their writings will find in almost every one of them, a distinct language, though the same words. But when to this natural difficulty in every country, there shall be added different countries and remote ages, wherein the speakers and writers had very different notions, tempers, customs, ornaments, and figures of speech, &c, every one of which influenced the

291

may be, nay, cannot choose but be, very fallible in the understanding of it. Nor is it to be wondered, that the will of God, when clothed in words, should be liable to that doubt and uncertainty which unavoidably attends that sort of conveyance, when even his Son, whilst clothed

2.

of communication,

Words

are often employed without any, or with-

First, In this kind the first and most palpable abuse is, the using of words without clear and distinct ideas; or, which is worse, signs without anything signified. Of these there are two sorts: I. Some words introduced without clear ideas annex-

out clear ideas.

ed

to

them, even in their first original.

serve, in all languages, certain

One may

words

that,

if

obthey

be examined, will be found in their first original, their appropriated use, not to stand for any clear and distinct ideas. These, for the most part, the several sects of philosophy and religion have introduced. For their authors or promoters, either affecting something singular, and out of the way of common apprehensions, or to support some strange opinions, or cover some weakness of their hypothesis, seldom fail to coin new words,

and

2

Cf.

fori.

Novum Organum, Bk.

I.

ap. 60,

on the

idola

JOHN LOCKE

292

as, when they come to be examined, may justly be called insignificant terms. For, having

and such either

nexed

had no determinate collection of ideas anto them when they were first invented; or 1

well examined, will be found no wonder, if, afterwards, in the vulgar use of the same party, they remain empty sounds, with little or no signification, amongst those who think it enough to have them often in at least such as, inconsistent,

their

if

it is

mouths, as the distinguishing characters of

Church or School, without much troubling their heads to examine what are the precise ideas they stand for. I shall not need here to heap up instances; every man's reading and conversation their

will sufficiently furnish

him.

Or if he wants to be

better stored, the great mintmasters of this kind

of terms,

I

mean

the

Schoolmen and Metaphy-

(under which I think the disputing natural and moral philosophers of these latter ages may be comprehended) have wherewithal abundantly to content him. sicians

3. II.

Other words,

to

which ideas were annexed at

Others abuse yet further, who take so little care to lay by words, which, in their primary notation have scarce any clear and dis-

first,

used afterwards without distinct meanings.

there be

who extend

this

tinct ideas which they are annexed to, that, by an unpardonable negligence, they familiarly use words which the propriety of language has affixed to very important ideas, without any distinct meaning at all. Wisdom, glory, grace, &c, are words frequent enough in every man's mouth;

but if a great many of those who use them should be asked what they mean by them, they would be at a stand, and not know what to answer: a plain proof, that, though they have learned those sounds, and have them ready at their tongues ends, yet there are no determined ideas laid up in their minds, which are to be expressed to others by them. 2 4. This occasioned by men learning names before they have the ideas the names belong to. Men having been accustomed from their cradles to learn words which are easily got and retained, before they

knew

or had framed the complex ideas to which they were annexed, or which were to be found in the things they were thought to stand for, they

usually continue to do so all their lives; and without taking the pains necessary to settle in their minds determined ideas, they use their words for such unsteady and confused notions as they have, contenting themselves with the same words other people use; as if their very sound necessarily car-

^ee

"Epistle to the Reader," pp. 91, 92. Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxii. § 8; xxix. § 9; xxxi. § 8; Bk. III. ch. iv. § 6. 2

BOOK

ried with

though

it

III

same meaning. This, a shift with in the ordinary where they find it necessary

constantly the

men make

occurrences of life, to be understood, and therefore they make signs till they are so; yet this insignificancy in their

words,

when

they

come

to reason

concerning

ther their tenets or interest, manifestly

fills

ei-

their

abundance of empty unintelligand jargon, especially in moral matters, where the words for the most part standing for arbitrary and numerous collections of ideas, not regularly and permanently united in nature, discourse with ible noise

sounds are often only thought on, or and uncertain notions annexed to them. Men take the words they find in use amongst their neighbors; and that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for, use them confidently, without much troubling their heads about a certain fixed meaning; whereby, besides the ease of it, they obtain this advantage, That, as in such discourses they seldom are in the right, so they are as seldom to be convinced that they are in the wrong; it being all one to go about to draw those men out of their mistakes who have no settled notions, as to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation who has no settled abode. This I guess to be so; and every one may observe in himself and others whether it be so or not. their bare

at least very obscure

5.

Unsteady application of them. Secondly, Another is inconstancy in the use of

great abuse of words

them.

any one

It is

hard

to find a discourse written

subject, especially of controversy, shall not observe,

if

on

wherein

he read with attention,

same words (and those commonly the most material in the discourse, and upon which the argument turns) used sometimes for one collection of simple ideas, and sometimes for another; which is a perfect abuse of language. Words being intended for signs of my ideas, to make them known to others, not by any natural signification, but by a voluntary imposition, it is plain cheat and abuse, when I make them stand sometimes for one thing and sometimes for another; the wilful doing whereof can be imputed to the

nothing but great folly, or greater dishonesty. a man, in his accounts with another may, with as much fairness make the characters of numbers stand sometimes for one and sometimes for another collection of units: v.g. this character 3, stand sometimes for three, sometimes for four, and sometimes for eight, as in his discourse or reasoning make the same words stand for different collections of simple ideas. If men should do so in their reckonings, I wonder who would have to do with them? One who would speak thus in the affairs and business of the world, and call 8

And

CONCERNING

CHAP. X

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

sometimes seven, and sometimes nine, as best served his advantage, would presently have clapped upon him, one of the two names men are

commonly

disgusted with.

and learned ings passes

contests, the

commonly

for

And

yet in arguings

same sort of proceedwit and learning; but

to me it appears a greater dishonesty than the misplacing of counters in the casting up a debt; and the cheat the greater, by how much truth is of greater concernment and value than money. 6. Ill Affected obscurity, as in the Per ipate tick and other sects oj philosophy. Thirdly, Another abuse of language is an affected obscurity; by either applying old words to new and unusual significations; or introducing new and ambiguous terms, without defining either; or else putting them so together, as may confound their ordinary meaning. Though the Peripatetick philosophy has been most eminent in this way, yet other sects have not been wholly clear of it. There are scarce any of them that are not cumbered with some difficulties (such is the imperfection of human knowledge,) which they have been fain to cover with

obscurity of terms, and to confound the signifi-

cation of words, which, like a mist before people's eyes, might hinder their weak parts from being discovered. That body and extension in common use, stand for two distinct ideas, is plain to any one that will but reflect a little. For were their signification precisely the same, it would be as proper, and as intelligible to say, "the body of an extension," as the "extension of a body"; and yet there are those

found their

1

who

find

signification.

To

it

necessary to con-

this abuse,

and the

mischiefs of confounding the signification of words, logic, and the liberal sciences as they have

been handled in the schools, have given reputaand the admired Art of Disputing 2 hath added much to the natural imperfection of languages, whilst it has been made use of and fitted to perplex the signification of words, more than to discover the knowledge and truth of things: and he that will look into that sort of learned writings, will find the words there much more obscure, uncertain, and undetermined in their meaning, than they are in ordinary conversation. 7. Logic and dispute have much contributed to this. This is unavoidably to be so, where men's parts and learning are estimated by their skill in disputing. And if reputation and reward shall attend these conquests, which depend mostly on the fineness and niceties of words, it is no wonder if the wit of man so employed, should perplex, tion;

involve,

and subtilize the

signification of sounds,

*Cf. Bk. II. ch. xiii. §§ n, 21-24. 2 Cf. Bk. IV. ch. vii. § 11.

293

want something to say in opposing or defending any question; the victory being adjudged not to him who had truth on his side, but the last word in the dispute. so as never to

This, though a very useand that which I think the direct opposite to the ways of knowledge, hath yet passed hitherto under the laudable and esteemed names of subtlety and acuteness, and has had the applause of the schools, and encouragement of one part of the learned men of the world. And no wonder, since the philosophers of old, (the disputing and wrangling philosophers I mean, such as Lucian wittily and with reason taxes), and the Schoolmen since, aiming at glory and esteem, for their great and universal knowledge, easier a great deal 8. Calling it "subtlety."

less skill,

pretended to than really acquired, found a good expedient to cover their ignorance, with a curious and inexplicable web of perplexed words, and procure to themselves the admiration to be this

by unintelligible terms, the apter to produce wonder because they could not be underof others,

it appears in all history, that these profound doctors were no wiser nor more useful than their neighbours, and brought but small advantage to human life or the societies wherein

stood: whilst

they lived unless the coining of new words, where they produced no new things to apply them to, :

or the perplexing or obscuring the signification

and so bringing all things into quesand dispute, were a thing profitable to the life of man, or worthy commendation and reward. of old ones, tion

9.

This learning very little

benefits society.

For, not-

withstanding these learned disputants, these

all-

knowing doctors, it was to the unscholastic statesman that the governments of the world owed their peace, defence, and liberties; and from the illiterate and contemned mechanic (a name of disgrace) that they received the improvements of useful arts. Nevertheless, this artificial igno-

and learned gibberish, prevailed mightily by the interest and artifice of those who found no easier way to that pitch of authority and dominion they have attained, than by amusing the men of business, and ignorant, with hard words, or employing the ingenious and idle in intricate disputes about unintelligible terms, and holding them perpetually entangled in that endless labyrinth. Besides, there is no such rance,

in these last ages,

way to gain admittance, or give defence to strange and absurd

doctrines, as to guard them round about with legions of obscure, doubtful, and undefined words. Which yet make these retreats more like the dens of robbers, or holes of foxes, than the fortresses of fair warriors: which, if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the strength

JOHN LOCKE

294

that is in them, but the briars and thorns, and the obscurity of the thickets they are beset with. For untruth being unacceptable to the mind of

man, there

is

no other defence

but obscurity. 10. But destroys communication.

left for

absurdity

knowledge and

Thus learned ignorance, and

this

keeping even inquisitive men from true knowledge, hath been propagated in the world, and hath much perplexed, whilst it pretended to inform the understanding. For we see that other well-meaning and wise men, whose education and parts had not acquired that acuteness, could intelligibly express themselves to one another; art of

and

in

plain use

its

make

a benefit of language.

But though unlearned men well enough understood the words white and black, &c, and had constant notions of the ideas signified by those words yet there were philosophers found who had learning and subtlety enough to prove that snow was black; i.e. to prove that white was black. Whereby they had the advantage to destroy the ;

instruments and means of discourse, conversation, instruction, and society; whilst, with great art and subtlety, they did no more but perplex and confound the signification of words, and thereby render language less useful than the real it had made it; a gift which the illitehad not attained to. n. As useful as to confound the sounds that the letters of the aplhabet standfor. These learned men did equally instruct men's understandings, and pro-

defects of

rate

fit

their lives, as

he

who

should alter the

signifi-

cation of known characters, and, by a subtle device of learning, far surpassing the capacity of

and vulgar, should in his A for B, and D no small admiration and bene-

the illiterate, dull,

writing show that he could put for E, fit

&c,

to the

of his reader. It being as senseless to put black,

a word agreed on to stand for one senput it, I say, for another, or the contrary idea; i.e. to call snow black, as to put this mark A, which is a character agreed on to stand for one modification of sound, made by a certain motion of the organs of speech, for B, which is agreed on to stand for another modification of sound, made by another certain mode of the organs of speech. 1

which

is

sible idea, to

12.

hath

This art has perplexed religion and justice. this

curious

Nor

mischief stopped in logical niceties, or

empty

speculations;

great concernments of

it

hath invaded the

human

life

and

society;

obscured and perplexed the material truths of law and divinity; brought confusion, disorder, and uncertainty into the affairs of mankind; and if l Cf. Bk. IV. ch. xvii. §§ 4-8, On Syllogism.

III

not destroyed, yet in a great measure rendered two great rules, religion and justice. What have the greatest part of the com-

useless, these

ments and disputes upon the laws of God and

man the instruments of

BOOK

served

for,

but to make the meaning more What have been

doubtful, and perplex the sense?

the effect of those multiplied curious distinctions,

and acute ty,

niceties,

but obscurity and uncertain-

leaving the words more unintelligible, and the

reader more at a loss? How else comes it to pass that princes, speaking or writing to their servants, in their ordinary commands are easily understood; speaking to their people, in their laws, are not so? And, as I remarked before, doth it not

happen that a man of an ordinary capa-

often

city very well

understands a text, or a law, that he consults an expositor, or goes to counsel; who, by that time he hath done explaining them, makes the words signify either nothing at all, or what he pleases.

he reads,

And

13.

any

till

ought not

to

pass for learning.

Whether

have occasioned this, I will not here examine; but I leave it to be considered, whether it would not be well for mankind, whose concernment it is to know things as they are, and to do what they ought, and not to spend their lives in talking about them, or tossing words to and fro; whether it would not be well, I say, that the use of words were made plain and direct; and that language, which was given us for the improvement of knowledge and bond of society, should not be employed to darken truth and unsettle people's rights; to raise mists, and render unintelligible both morality and religion? Or that at least, if this will happen, it should not be thought learning or knowledge to do so? by-interests of these professions

—

14. I

V By

taking words for things. Fourthly,

other great abuse of words,

is

An-

the taking them for

This, though it in some degree concerns all

things.

names

in general, yet

more

particularly affects

abuse those men are most subject who most confine their thoughts to any one system, and give themselves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received hypothesis: whereby they come to be persuaded that the terms of that sect are so suited to the nature of things, that they perfectly correspond with their real existence. Who is there that has been bred up in the Peripatetick philosophy, who does not think the Ten Names, under which are ranked the Ten Predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the nature of things? Who is there of that school that is not persuaded that substantial forms, vegetative those of substances.

souls,

2

To

this

abhorrence of a vacuum, intentional species.

2Cf. Aristotle,

On

the Soul,

Bk. II.

&c,

CONCERNING

CHAP. X

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

are something real? These words men have learned from their very entrance upon knowledge, and have found their masters and systems lay great stress

upon them: and

therefore they

cannot quit the opinion, that they are conformable to nature, and are the representations of

something that really exists. The Platonists have their soul of the world, and the Epicureans their endeavour towards motion in their rest.

1

There

is

scarce

any

atoms when

at

sect in philosophy has

terms that others understand which, in the weakness of human understanding, serves so well to palliate men's ignorance, and cover their errors, not a distinct

not.

But yet

set of

this gibberish,

comes, by familiar use amongst those of the same tribe, to seem the most important part of language, and of all other the terms the most significant: and should aerial and mtherial vehicles come once, by the prevalency of that doctrine, to be generally received anywhere, no doubt those terms would make impressions on men's minds, so as to establish them in the persuasion of the reality of such things, as much as Peripatetick forms

and

intentional species

15. Instance, in matter.

have heretofore done.

How much

names taken

for things are apt to mislead the understanding,

the attentive reading of philosophical writers

would abundantly discover; and that perhaps in words little suspected of any such misuse. I shall instance in one only, and that a very familiar one. How many intricate disputes have there been about matter, as if there were some such thing really in nature, distinct from body; as it is evident the word matter stands for an idea distinct from the idea of body? For if the ideas these two terms stood for were precisely the same, they might indifferently in all places be put for one another. But we see that though it be proper to say, There is one matter of all bodies, one cannot say, There is one body of all matters: we familiarly say one body is bigger than another but it ;

sounds harsh (and I think is never used) to say one matter is bigger than another. Whence comes this, then? Viz. from hence: that, though matter and body be not really distinct, but wherever there is the one there is the other; yet matter and body stand for two different conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but a part of the other. For body stands for a solid extended figured substance, whereof matter is but a partial and more confused conception; it seeming to me to be used for the substance and solidity of body, without taking in its extension and figure: and therefore it is that, speaking of matter, we speak 1

Cf. Lucretius,

251-93.

On

the

Nature of Things,

ii.

2 1 6,

of

it

295

always as one, because in truth

it

expressly

contains nothing but the idea of a solid substance,

which

everywhere the same, everywhere uniwe no more conceive or speak of different matters in the world than we do of different solidities; though we both conceive and speak of different bodies, because extension and figure are capable of variation. But, since solidity cannot exist without extension and figure, the taking matter to be the name of something really existing under that precision, has no doubt produced those obscure and unintelligible discourses and disputes, which have filled the heads and books of philosophers concerning materia prima; which imperfection or abuse, how far it may concern a great many other general terms I leave to be considered. This, I think, I may at least say, that we should have a great many fewer disputes in the world, if words were taken for what they are, the signs of our is

form. This being our idea of matter,

ideas only;

and not

for things themselves. 2 For,

when we argue about matter, or any the like term, we truly argue only about the idea we express by that sound, whether that precise idea agree anything really existing in nature or no. And tell what ideas they make their words stand for, thpre could not be half that obscurity or wrangling in the search or support of to

if

men would

truth that there 16.

is.

3

This makes errors lasting. But whatever in-

convenience follows from this mistake of words, this I am sure, that, by constant and familiar use, they charm men into notions far remote from the truth of things. It would be a hard matter to persuade any one that the words which his father, or schoolmaster, the parson of the parish, or such a reverend doctor used, signified nothing that really existed in nature: which perhaps is none of the least causes that men are so hardly drawn to quit their mistakes, even in opinions purely philosophical, and where they have no other interest but truth. For the words they have a long time been used to, remaining firm in their minds,

no wonder that the wrong notions annexed them should not be removed. 7.V. By setting them in the place of what they can-

it is

to

1

not signify. Fifthly setting

them

by no means signify.

general

Another abuse of words

in the place of things

names

the

We may observe

that in the

of substances whereof the nomi-

nal essences are only

them

is

which they do or can

known

to us

when we put

and affirm or deny anything about them, we do most commonly tacitly into propositions,

*Cf.ch.ii. §§2,3. 3

Cf. Aristotle, Physics, the Soul, iii. 4.

and On

i.

9;

Metaphysics,

vii. 3;

JOHN LOCKE

296

suppose or intend, they should stand for the real essence of a certain sort of substances. For, when a man says gold is malleable, he means and would insinuate something more than this. That what I call gold is malleable, (though truly it amounts to no more,) but would have this understood, viz. That gold, i.e. what has the real essence of gold,

BOOK

Hence we think change of our complex ideas of This shows us the reason why in mixed modes any of the ideas that make the composition of the complex one being left out or changed, it is allowed to be 19.

substances not to change their species.

another thing,

knowing wherein that real essence consists, the connexion in his mind of malleableness is not truly with an essence he knows not, but only with the sound gold he puts for it. Thus, when we say that animal rationale is, and animal implume bipes latis unguibus is not a good definition of a man; it

ence of that

"a two-legged animal with broad nails, and without feathers." For else, why might not Plato as properly make the word avdpojTros, or man, stand for his complex idea, made up of the idea of a body, distinguished from others by a certain shape and other outward appearthat real essence than

ances, as Aristotle

make

the complex idea to

which he gave the name av6po)iros, or man, of body and the faculty of reasoning joined together; unless the name avOpojiros, or man, were supposed to stand for something else than what it signifies; and to be put in the place of some other thing than the idea a man professes he would express by it? 1

8.

V.g. Putting them for the real essences of subthe names of substances would

to be of

another species, as

is

The reason whereof is, because the comname is the real as well

cide,

is plain we suppose the name man in this case to stand for the real essence of a species, and would signify that "a rational animal" better described

i.e.

plain in chance-medley, manslaughter, murder, parri-

malleable; which amounts to thus much, that malleableness depends on, and is inseparable from the real essence of gold. But a man, not is

III

&c.

plex idea signified by that

nominal essence; and there is no secret refername to any other essence but that. But in substances, it is not so. For though in that called gold, one puts into his complex idea what another leaves out, and vice versa: yet men do 1

as

not usually think that therefore the species is changed: because they secretly in their minds refer that name, and suppose it annexed to a real

immutable essence of a thing those properties depend.

existing,

on which

He that adds to his com-

plex idea of gold that of fixedness and solubility

which he put not in it before, is not thought to have changed the species; but only to have a more perfect idea, by adding another simple idea, which is always in fact joined with those other, of which his former complex idea consisted. But this reference of the name to a thing, whereof we have not the idea, is so far from helping at all, that it only serves the more to involve us in difficulties. For by this tacit reference to the real essence of that species of bodies, the word gold (which, by standing for a more or less perfect collection of simple ideas, serves to in aqua regia,

design that sort of body well enough in

civil dis-

stances. It is true

course) comes to have no signification at

much more useful, and propositions made in them much more certain, were the real essences

ing put for

minds which those words signified. And it is for want of those real essences that our words convey so little knowledge or certainty in our discourses about them; and therefore the mind, to remove that imperfection as much as it can, makes them, by a se-

body

be thought all one, yet, if well considered, it will be found a quite different thing, to argue about gold in name, and about a parcel in the body itself, v.g. a piece of leaf-gold laid before us; though in

cret supposition, to stand for a thing having that

the thing.

be

of substances the ideas in our

if thereby it made some nearer approaches to it. For, though the word man or gold signify nothing truly but a complex idea of properties united together in one sort of substances; yet there is scarce anybody,, in the use of these words, but often supposes each of those names to stand for a thing having the real essence on which these properties depend. Which is so far from diminishing the imperfection of our words, that by a plain abuse it adds to it, when we would make them stand for something, which, not being in our complex idea, the name we use can no ways be the sign of.

real essence, as

at

all,

and

20.

so can signify nothing at

itself is

discourse

we

That which

I

to substitute their is

when

it

are fain to substitute the

The cause of this abuse, a

species,

all,

away. For however

working always regularly, cies.

all,

be-

somewhat whereof we have no idea the

may

name

for

supposition of nature's

in setting boundaries to spe-

think very

names

much disposes men

for the real essences of

the supposition before mentioned, that

nature works regularly in the production of things, and sets the boundaries to each of those species, by giving exactly the same real internal constitution to each individual which we rank under one general name. Whereas any one who observes their different qualities can hardly doubt, that

many of the individuals, called by the same name, iCf. ch. v. § 14.

—

;

CONCERNING

CHAP. X

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

are, in their internal constitution, as different one

from another as several of those which are ranked under different specific names. This supposition, however, that the same precise and internal constitution goes always with the same specific name, makes men forward to take those names for the representatives of those real essences though indeed they signify nothing but the complex ideas they have in their minds when they use them. So that, if I may so say, signifying one thing, and being supposed for, or put in the place of another, they cannot but, in such a kind of use, cause a great deal of uncertainty in men's discourses; especially in those who have thoroughly imbibed ;

the doctrine of substantial forms,

whereby they

firmly imagine the several species of things to be

determined and distinguished. 1 2 1 This abuse contains two false suppositions. But however preposterous and absurd it be to make our names stand for ideas we have not, or (which .

we know

being in effect to make our words the signs of nothing yet it is evident to any one who ever so little reflects on the use men make of their words, that there is nothing more familiar. When a man asks whether this or that thing he sees, let it be a drill, or a monstrous foetus, be a man or no; it is evident the question is not, Whether that particular thing agree to his complex idea expressed by the name man: but whether it has in it the real essence of a species of things which he supposes his name man to stand for. In which way of using is all

one) essences that

names

the

not,

it

of substances, there are these false

suppositions contained: First, that there are certain precise essences ac-

cording to which nature makes all particular things, and by which they are distinguished into species. That everything has a real constitution,

whereby it is what it is, and on which qualities depend,

is

past doubt: but

I

its

sensible

think

it

has

been proved that this makes not the distinction of species as we rank them, nor the boundaries of their names. Secondly, this tacitly also insinuates, as

had

ideas of these

if

we

proposed essences. For to what to inquire whether this or that

purpose else is it, thing have the real essence of the species man, if we did not suppose that there were such a specifick essence

known? Which yet

is

utterly false.

And

therefore such application of names as would make them stand for ideas which we have not, must needs cause great disorder in discourses and reasonings about them, and be a great inconvenience in our communication by words. 1

Cf. Bk. IV. chh.

iii.

§§ 9-17; xiv, xv.

*97

VI. By proceeding upon the supposition that the words we use have a certain and evident signification which 22.

men cannot but understand. Sixthly, there remains yet another more general, though perhaps less observed, abuse of words and that is, that men having by a long and familiar use annexed to them certain ideas, they are apt to imagine so

other

;

near and necessary a connexion between the names and the signification they use them in, that they forwardly suppose one cannot but understand what their meaning is; and therefore one ought to acqui-

esce in the

doubt

words delivered, as

that, in the use of those

sounds, the speaker and hearer the

same

were past

if it

common received had

necessarily

Whence presuming,

that they have thereby, as it were, set before others the very thing they talked of. And so likewise taking the words of others as naturally standing for just precise ideas.

when they have in discourse used any term,

what they themselves have been accustomed apply them to, they never trouble themselves

to to

explain their own, or understand clearly others'

meaning. From whence commonly proceeds noise, and wrangling, without improvement or information whilst men take words to be the constant regular marks of agreed notions, which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unsteady ;

signs of their

strange,

if

own

ideas.

And

yet

in discourse, or (where

solutely necessary) in dispute,

men it is

think

it

often ab-

one sometimes asks

meaning of their terms: though the arguings one may every day observe in conversation make it evident, that there are few names of complex ideas which any two men use for the same just precise collection. 1 1 is hard to name a word which the

will not

be a clear instance of this. Life

is

a term,

none more familiar. Any one almost would take it for an affront to be asked what he meant by it. And yet if it comes in question, whether a plant that lies ready formed in the seed have life whether the embryo in an egg before incubation, or a man in a swoon without sense or motion, be alive or no it is easy to perseive that a clear, dis;

;

tinct, settled

idea does not always

accompany the

a word as that of life is. Some gross and confused conceptions men indeed ordinarily have, to which they apply the common

use of so

known

words of their language and such a loose use of their words serves them well enough in their ordinary discourses or affairs. But this is not suffi;

cient for philosophical inquiries.

Knowledge and

reasoning require precise determinate ideas. And though men will not be so importunately dull as

not to understand what others say, without demanding an explication of their terms; nor so troublesomely critical as to correct others in the

JOHN LOCKE

298

use of the words they receive from them: yet, where truth and knowledge are concerned in the case, I know not what fault it can be, to desire the explication of words whose sense seems dubious; or why a man should be ashamed to own his ignorance in what sense another man uses his words; since he has no other way of certainly knowing it but by being informed. This abuse of taking words upon trust has nowhere spread so far, nor with so ill effects, as amongst men of letters.

The

multiplication and obstinacy of dis-

which have so laid waste the intellectual is owing to nothing more than to this ill use of words. For though it be generally believed putes,

world,

that there

is

great diversity of opinions in the

volumes and variety of controversies the world is distracted with; yet the most I can find that the contending learned men of different parties do, in their arguings one with another, is, that they speak different languages. For I am apt to imagine, that when any of them, quitting terms, think upon things, and know what they think, they think all the same: though perhaps what they would have be different. 23. The ends of language: First, to convey our ideas. To conclude this consideration of the imperfection and abuse of language. The ends of language in our discourse with others being chiefly these three: First, to make known one man's thoughts or ideas to another; Secondly, to do it with as much ease and quickness as possible; and, Thirdly, thereby to convey the knowledge of things: language is either abused of deficient, when it fails of any of these three. First,

Words fail

in the first of these ends,

and

open one man's ideas to another's view: When men have names in their mouths without any determinate ideas in their minds, whereof lay not 1

.

they are the signs: or, 2. When they apply the common received names of any language to ideas, to

common use of that language does them: or, 3. When they apply them

which the

not apply very unsteadily, making them stand, now for one, and by and by for another idea. 24. To do it with quickness. Secondly, Men fail of conveying their thoughts with all the quickness and ease that may be, when they have complex ideas without having any distinct names for them. This is sometimes the fault of the language itself, which has not in it a sound yet applied to such a signification; and sometimes the fault of the man, who has not yet learned the name for that idea he would show another. 25. Therewith to convey the knowledge of things.

Thirdly, There

is no knowledge of things conveyed by men's words, when their ideas agree

BOOK

III

not to the reality of things. Though it be a defect that has its original in our ideas, which are not so conformable to the nature of things as atten-

when we

and application might make them, not to extend itself to our words too, use them as signs of real beings, which

yet never

had any

tion, study,

yet

it fails

26.

How

reality or existence.

men's words fail in

used without any ideas. First,

all these: First,

He

when

that hath words

any language, without distinct ideas in his mind to which he applies them, does, so far as he uses them in discourse, only make a noise withof

out any sense or signification; and how learned soever he may seem, by the use of hard words or learned terms, is not much more advanced thereby in knowledge, than he would be in learning, who had nothing in his study but the bare titles of books, without possessing the contents of them. For all such words, however put into discourse, according to the right construction of grammatical rules, or the harmony of well-turned periods, do yet amount to nothing but bare sounds, and nothing else. 27. to

When complex

them. Secondly,

names annexed that has complex ideas,

ideas are without

He

without particular names for them, would be in no better case than a bookseller, who had in his

warehouse volumes that lay there unbound, and without titles, which he could therefore make known to others only by showing the loose sheets, and communicate them only by tale. This man is hindered in his discourse, for want of words to communicate his complex ideas, which he is therefore forced to make known by an enumeration of the simple ones that compose them; and so is fain often to use twenty words, to express

what another man signifies in one. 28. When the same sign is not put for Thirdly,

He

the

same

idea.

same the same words

that puts not constantly the

same

idea, but uses one and sometimes in another signification, ought to pass in the schools and conversation for as fair a man, as he does in the market and exchange, who sells several things under the same name. 29. When words are divertedfrom their common use. Fourthly, He that applies the words of any language to ideas different from those to which the common use of that country applies them, however his own understanding may be filled with truth and light, will not by such words be able to convey much of it to others, without defining his terms. For however the sounds are such as are familiarly known, and easily enter the ears of those who are accustomed to them; yet standing for other ideas than those they usually are annexed

sign for the

sometimes

in

.

CONCERNING

CHAP. X

and are wont

to,

to excite in the

hearers, they cannot

of him

who

When

30.

Fifthly,

make known

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

mind

of the

the thoughts

they are

names of fantastical imaginations.

that imagined to himself substances

such as never have been, and filled his head with which have not any correspondence with the real nature of things, to which yet he gives settled and defined names, may fill his discourse, and perhaps another man's head with the fantastical imaginations of his own brain, but will be very far from advancing thereby one jot in real and true knowledge. 3 1 Summary. He that hath names without ideas, wants meaning in his words, and speaks only empty sounds. He that hath complex ideas without names for them, wants liberty and dispatch ideas

till

his

his feet fail

that idea which others call and signify by this sound, covetousness 4. 1 may use any of those names with inconstancy. 5. But, in modes and relations, .

cannot have ideas disagreeing to the existence modes being complex ideas, made by the mind at pleasure, and relation being but by way of considering or comparing two things together, and so also an idea of my own making, these ideas can scarce be found to disagree with anything existing; since they are not in the mind I

of things: for

as the copies of things regularly

made by nature,

and unminded or not underHe that applies his names to ideas different

internal constitution or essence of any substance;

phrases.

He

is

that uses his words loosely

their

common

use,

wants propriety

in his

language, and speaks gibberish. And he that hath the ideas of substances disagreeing with the real existence of things, so far wants the materials of true knowledge in his understanding,

and hath

instead thereof chimeras.

How

men's words fail when they stand for subIn our notions concerning Substances, we are liable to all the former inconveniences: v.g. he that uses the word tarantula, without having any imagination or idea of what it stands for, pronounces a good word; but so long means nothing at all by it. 2. He that, in a newly-discovered country, shall see several sorts of animals and 32.

and humour be

nor as properties inseparably flowing from the

and

steadily will either be not

from

299

his colour

necessitated to use peri-

in his expressions,

stood.

till

tongue trips, and his eyes look red, him; and yet not know that it is to be called drunkenness. 3. I may have the ideas of virtues or vices, and names also, but apply them amiss: v.g. when I apply the name frugality to altered,

and

thus uses them.

He

a man's drinking

stances.

unknown

him before, may have

but, as it were, patterns lodged in my memory, with names annexed to them, to denominate actions and relations by, as they come to exist. But the mistake is commonly in my giving a wrong

name to my conceptions; and so using words in a different sense from other people: I am not understood, but am thought to have wrong ideas of them, when I give wrong names to them. Only if I put in my ideas of mixed modes or relations any inconsistent ideas together,

I fill

so with chimeras; since such ideas,

ined, cannot so less

any

much

as exist in the

real being ever be

my head alwell

exam-

mind,

much

if

denominated from

them. 34. Seventhly, language speech.

is

often abused by figurative

Since wit and fancy find easier entertain-

as

ment in the world than dry truth and real knowl-

true ideas of them, as of a horse or a stag; but

edge, figurative speeches and allusion in language

can speak of them only by a description,

hardly be admitted as an imperfection or abuse of it. I confess, in discourses where we seek rather pleasure and delight than information and improvement, such ornaments as are borrowed from them can scarce pass for faults. But yet if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness; all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheats: and therefore, however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language or person that makes use

vegetables,

to

till

he

names the natives call them by, or give them names himself. 3. He that uses the word body sometimes for pure extension, and sometimes for extension and solidity together, shall either take the

will talk

very fallaciously.

4.

He

that gives the

name horse to that idea which common usage calls mule, talks improperly, 5.

and willnot be understood.

He that thinks the name centaur stands for some

real being, imposes

words

on himself, and mistakes

for things.

33. How when they stand for modes and relations. In Modes and Relations generally, we are liable only to the four first of these inconveniences; viz. 1

.

1

may have in my memory the names of modes,

and yet not have any preannexed in my thoughts to those names. 2. I may have ideas, and not know the names that belong to them: v.g. I may have the idea of as gratitude or charity,

cise ideas

will

;

JOHN LOCKE

3 oo

What and how various they are,

be

of them. superfluous here to take notice; the books of rhetoric which abound in the world, will instruct will

who want to be observe how little

informed: only I cannot the preservation and imbut provement of truth and knowledge is the care and those

concern of mankind; since the arts of fallacy are

endowed and

men

preferred. It

love to deceive

is

evident

and be deceived,

how much since rhe-

powerful instrument of error and deestablished professors, is publicly taught, and has always been had in great reputation: and I doubt not but it will be thought great boldness, if not brutality, in me to have said thus much against it. Eloquence, like the fair sex, toric, that

ceit,

has

its

has too prevailing beauties in it to suffer itself ever to be spoken against. And it is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving, wherein

men find

pleasure to be deceived. 1

Chap. XI. Of

the Remedies of the Foregoing Imperfections and Abuses of Words

i Remedies are worth seeking. The natural and improved imperfections of languages we have seen above at large: and speech being the great bond that holds society together, and the common conduit, whereby the improvements of knowledge are conveyed from one man and one generation to another, it would well deserve our most serious thoughts to consider, what remedies are to be found for the inconveniences above .

mentioned. 2. Are not easy to find. I am not so vain as to think that any one can pretend to attempt the perfect reforming the languages of the world, no not so much as of his own country, without rendering himself ridiculous. To require that men should use their words constantly in the same sense, and for none but determined and uniform ideas, would be to think that all men should have the same notions, and should talk of nothing but what they have clear and distinct ideas of: which is not to be expected by any one who hath not vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with men to be very knowing or very silent. And he must be very little skilled in the world, who thinks that a voluble tongue shall accompany only a good understanding; or that men's talking much or little should hold proportion only to their knowledge. 3. But yet necessary to those who search after truth. But though the market and exchange must be left to their

own ways

of talking,

and gossipings

not be robbed of their ancient privilege: though the schools, and men of argument would perhaps take it amiss to have anything offered, to abate l

Cf. Bk. II. ch. xi. § 2.

BOOK

the length or lessen the

III

number of their disputes

yet methinks those who pretend seriously to search

maintain truth, should think themselves how they might deliver themselves without obscurity, doubtfulness, or equiafter or

obliged to study

vocation, to which men's words are naturally liable, if care be not taken. 4.

Misuse of words

the great cause of errors.

that shall well consider the errors

For he

and obscurity,

and confusion, that are spread in ill use of words, will find some reason to doubt whether language, as it has been employed, has contributed more to the improvement or hindrance of knowledge amongst mankind. How many are there, that, when they would think on things, fix their thoughts only on words, especially when they would apply their minds to moral matters? And who then can wonder if the result of such contemplations and reasonings, about little more than sounds, whilst the ideas they annex to them are very confused and very unsteady, or perhaps none at all; who can wonder, I say, that such thoughts and reasonings end in nothing but obscurity and mistake, without any clear judgment or knowledge? 5. Has made men more conceited and obstinate. This inconvenience, in an ill use of words, men suffer in their own private meditations: but much more manifest are the disorders which follow from it, in conversation, discourse, and arguings with others. For language being the great conduit, whereby men convey their discoveries, reasonings, and knowledge, from one to another, he that makes an ill use of it, though he does not corrupt the fountains of knowledge, which are in things the mistakes

the world by an

themselves, yet he does, as

much

as in

him

lies,

break or stop the pipes whereby it is distributed to the public use and advantage of mankind. He that uses words without any clear and steady meaning, what does he but lead himself and others into errors? And he that designedly does it, ought to be looked on as an enemy to truth and knowledge. And yet who can wonder that all the sciences and parts of knowledge have been so overcharged with obscure and equivocal terms, and insignificant and doubtful expressions, capable to make the most attentive or quicksighted very little, or not at all, the more knowing or orthodox: since subtlety, in those who make profession to teach or defend truth, hath passed so much for a virtue: a virtue, indeed, which, consisting for the most part in nothing but the fallacious and illusory use of obscure or deceitful terms, is only fit to make men more conceited in their ignorance, their errors.

and more obstinate

in

CONCERNING

CHAP. XI

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

6. Addicted to wrangling about sounds. Let us look into the books of controversy of any kind, there we shall see that the effect of obscure, unsteady,

or equivocal terms is nothing but noise and wrangling about sounds, without convincing or bettering a man's understanding. For if the idea be not agreed on, betwixt the speaker and hearer, for which the words stand, the argument is not about things, but names. As often as such a word whose signification is not ascertained betwixt them, comes in use, their understandings have no other object wherein they agree, but barely the sound; the things that they think on at that time, as expressed by that word, being quite dif-

what the learning of disputation is, and how well they are employed for the advantage of themselves or others, whose business is only the vain ostentation of sounds; i.e. those who spend ered,

and controversies. When any of those combatants strip all his terms of ambiguity and obscurity, (which every one may do in the words he uses himself) I shall think him a champion for knowledge, truth, and peace, and not the slave of vain-glory, ambition, their lives in disputes see

I shall

,

or a party. 8.

Remedies.

To remedy

the defects of speech

some degree, and to prevent the inconveniences that follow from them, before mentioned to

imagine the observation of these following rules be of use, till somebody better able shall judge it worth his while to think more maturely on this matter, and oblige the world with his thoughts on it. First remedy: To use no word without an idea anI

ferent. 7. Instance, bat

301

and

Whether a bat be a bird Whether a bat be another

bird.

or no, is not a question, thing than indeed it is, or have other qualities than indeed it has; for that would be extremely absurd to doubt of. But the question is, ( 1 ) Either between those that acknowledged themselves to

have but imperfect ideas of one or both of this sort of things, for which these names are supposed to stand. And then it is a real inquiry concerning the nature of a bird or a bat, to

make

their yet

imperfect ideas of it more complete; by examining whether all the simple ideas to which, com-

bined together, they both give the name bird, be all to be found in a bat: but this is a question only of inquirers (not disputers) who neither affirm nor deny, but examine: Or, (2) It is a question between disputants; whereof the one affirms, and the other denies that a bat is a bird. And then the question is barely about the signification of one or both these words; in that they not having both the same complex ideas to which they give these two names, one holds and the other denies, that these two names may be affirmed one of another. Were they agreed in the signification of these two names, it were impossible they should dispute about them. For they would presently and clearly see (were that adjusted between them), whether all the simple ideas of the more general name bird were found in the complex idea of a bat or no; and so there could be no doubt whether a bat were a bird or no. And here I desire it may be considered, and carefully examined, whether the greatest part of the disputes in the world are not merely verbal, and about the signification of words; and whether, if the terms they are made in were defined, and reduced in their signification (as they must be where they signify anything) to determined collections of the simple ideas they do or should stand for, those disputes would not end of themselves, and immediately vanish. I leave it then to be consid-

may

nexed to it. First, A man shall take care to use no word without a signification, no name without an idea for which he makes it stand. This rule will not seem altogether needless to any one who shall take the pains to recollect

how

often he has

met with such words as instinct, sympathy, and antipathy,

&c,

in the discourse of others, so

made

use

of as he might easily conclude that those that used

ideas in their minds to which they applied them, but spoke them only as sounds, which usually served instead of reasons on the like occasions. Not but that these words, and the like, have very proper significations in which they may be used; but there being no natural con-

them had no

nexion between any words and any ideas, these, and any other, may be learned by rote, and pronounced or writ by men who have no ideas in their minds to which they have annexed them, and for which they make them stand; which is necessary they should, if men would speak intel-

even to themselves alone.

ligibly 9.

Second remedy: To have distinct, determinate ideas words, especially in mixed modes.

annexed

to

ly, It is

not enough a

Second-

man uses his words as signs

some ideas: those he annexes them to, if they be simple, must be clear and distinct; if complex, must be determinate, 1 i.e. the precise collection of simple ideas settled in the mind, with that sound of

annexed to it, as the sign of that precise determined collection, and no other. This is very necessary in names of modes, and especially moral words; which, having no settled objects in nature, from whence their ideas are taken, as from their original, are apt to be very confused. Justice is

^ee

a

word

in every

man's mouth, but most

"Epistle to the Reader," p. 91.

.

JOHN LOCKE

3°2

commonly with a very undertermined,

loose sig-

nification; which will always be so, unless a man has in his mind a distinct comprehension of the component parts that complex idea consists of:

be decompounded, must be able to reon, till he at last comes to the simple ideas that make it up: and unless this be done, a man makes an ill use of the word, let it be justice, for example, or any other. I do not say, a

and

if it

solve

it still

BOOK

may

as

be to such ideas as

common

ter the ideas

they are affixed

to;

or at least,

he

is

there

ysis at large,

every time the word justice comes way: but this at least is necessary, that he have so examined the signification of that name, and settled the idea of all its parts in his mind, that he can do it when he pleases. If any one who makes his complex idea of justice to be, such a treatment of the person or goods of another as is according to law, hath not a clear and distinct idea what law is, which makes a part of his com-

notice of

in his

at least should be, to be understood;

it is

plain his idea of justice

be confused and imperfect. This exactness will, perhaps, be judged very troublesome; and therefore most men will think they may be itself will

excused from settling the complex ideas of mixed modes so precisely in their minds. But yet I must say, till this be done, it must not be wondered, that they have a great deal of obscurity and confusion in their own minds, and a great deal of wrangling in their discourse with others. 1 10. And distinct and conformable ideas in words that stand for substances. In the names of substances, for a right use of them, something more is required than barely determined ideas. In these the names must also be conformable to things as they exist; but of this I shall have occasion to speak more at large by and by. 2 This exactness is absolutely necessary in inquiries after philosophical knowledge,

and in controversies about truth. And though it would be well, too, if it extended itself to common conversation and the ordinary affairs of life; yet I think that is scarce to be expected. Vulgar notions suit vulgar discourses: and both, though confused enough, yet serve pretty well the market and the wake. Merchants and lovers, cooks and tailors, have words wherewithal to dispatch their ordinary affairs: and so, I think, might philosophers and disputants too, if they had a mind to understand, and to be clearly understood. 1 1 Third remedy: To apply words to such ideas as common

use has annexed them

enough that men have

to.

ideas,

Thirdly,

it is

determined

not

ideas,

x The famous discussion in the first and second Books of Plato's Republic, of the "mixed mode"

named 2

Cf. §

n-17.

relevant in this connexion. 24; also Bk. IV. chh. hi. §§ 11-17;

justice,

is

iv.

use has an-

nexed themto. For words, especially of languages already framed, being no man's private possession, but the common measure of commerce and communication, it is not for any one at pleasure to change the stamp they are current in, nor al-

man needs stand to recollect, and make this anal-

plex idea of justice,

III

which they make these signs stand; but they must also take care to apply their words as near

for

a necessity to do

is

it.

so,

Men's intentions

bound

when

to give

in speaking are. or

which cannot be without frequent explanations, demands, and other the like incommodious interruptions, where men do not follow common use. Propriety of speech is that which gives our thoughts entrance into other men's minds with the greatest ease and advantage: and therefore deserves some part of our care and study, especially in the names of moral words. The proper signification and use of terms is best to be learned from those who in

and discourses appear to have had and applied to them their terms with the exactest choice and fitness. This way of using a man's words, according to the propriety of the language, though it have not always the good fortune to be understood; yet most commonly leaves the blame of it on him who is their writings

the clearest notions,

so unskilful in the language he speaks, as not to

understand 1

we

it

when made use of as it ought to be.

Fourth remedy: To declare the meaning

2.

use them. Fourthly, But,

because

in

which

common

use

has not so visibly annexed any signification to words, as to make men know always certainly what they precisely stand for: and because men, in the improvement of their knowledge, come to have ideas different from the vulgar and ordinary received ones, for which they must either make new words, (which men seldom venture to do, for fear of being though guilty of affectation or novelty), or else must use old ones in a new signification: therefore, after the observation of the foregoing rules, it is sometimes necessary, for the ascertaining the signification of words, to declare their meaning; where either common use has left it uncertain and loose, (as it has in most names of very complex ideas) or where the term, being ;

very material in the discourse, and that upon

which

it

chiefly turns,

is

liable to

any doubtful-

ness or mistake.

the ideas men's 1 3. And that in three ways. As words stand for are of different sorts, so the way of

making known the

there

is

occasion,

is

ideas they stand for,

also different.

when

For though de-

be thought the proper way to make known the proper signification of words; yet there are

fining

COjXCERjXIXG

CHAP. XI

human uxderstaxdlxg

some words that will not be defined. as there are others whose precise meaning cannot be made known but by definition: and perhaps a third, which partake somewhat of both the other, as we shall see in the names of simple ideas, modes, and substances. 1

14. J.

In simple ideas, either by synonymous terms, or

by showing examples. First,

of the

name

ceives

is

when

a

man makes use

of any simple idea, which he pernot understood, or is in danger to be mistaken, he is obliged, by the laws of ingenuity

and the end of speech, to declare his meaning, and make known what idea he makes it stand for. This, as has been shown, cannot be done by definition: and therefore, when a synonymous word fails to do it, there is but one of these ways left. First. Sometimes the naming the subject wherein that simple idea is to be found, will make its name to be understood by those who are acquainted with that subject, and know it by that name. So to make a countryman understand

what jeuillemorte colour tell

him,

it is

signifies,

it

may suffice

to

the colour of withered leaves falling

autumn. Secondly, but the only sure way of

in

making known the signification of the name of any simple idea, is by presenting to his senses that subject which may produce it in his mind, and make him actually have the idea that word stands for. 15. II. In

mixed modes, by

Mixed modes,

definition.

Secondly.

especially those belonging to

morality, being most of

them such combinations

303

avoided, for a quite contrary reason, as

by and

see

we

shall

by.

Morality capable of demonstration. Upon this ground it is that I am bold to think that morality 16.

is

capable of demonstration, 2 as well as mathe-

matics: since the precise real essence of the things

moral words stand for may be perfectly known. and so the congruity and incongruity of the things themselves be certainly discovered in which consists perfect knowledge. Nor let any one object, ;

that the

names of substances

are often to be

made

use of in morality, as well as those of modes, from

which

will arise obscurity. For, as to substances,

when concerned

in

moral discourses,

natures are not so

much

their divers

inquired into as sup-

when we say that man is subject to we mean nothing by man but a corporeal rational creature: what the real essence or other qualities of that creature are in this case is no way posed: v.g.

law.

considered. And, therefore, whether a child or

changeling be a man, in a physical sense, may amongst the naturalists be as disputable as it will, it concerns not at all the moral man, as I may call him, which is this immovable, unchangeable idea, a corporeal rational being. For, were there a monkey, or any other creature, to be found that had the use of reason to such a degree, as to be able to understand general signs, and to deduce consequences about general ideas, he would no doubt be subject to law, and in that sense be a man, how much soever he differed in shape from

of ideas as the mind puts together of its own choice,

others of that name.

and whereof there are not always standing patterns to be found existing, the signification of their names cannot be made known, as those of simple ideas, by any showing but. in recompense thereof, may be perfectly and exacdy defined. For

they be used in them as they should, can no more disturb moral than they do mathematical dis-

:

they being combinations of several ideas that the of man has arbitrarily put together, with-

mind

men may, if they exacdy know the ideas that go to each composition, and so both use these words in a certain and undoubted signification, and perfectly declare, when there is occasion, what they stand for. This, if well considered, would lay great blame on those who make not their discourses about moral things very clear and distinct. For

out reference to any archetypes, please,

since the precise signification of the

mixed modes,

or,

which

is

all

names

of

one, the real es-

The names

of substances,

if

if the mathematician speaks of a cube or globe of gold, or of any other body, he has his clear, settled idea, which varies not. though it may by mistake be applied to a particular body to which it belongs not. 7. Definitions can make moral discourses clear. This I have here mentioned, by the by. to show of what consequence it is for men, in their names of mixed modes, and consequendy in all their moral discourses, to define their words when there is occasion: since thereby moral knowledge may be brought to so great clearness and certainty. And it must be great want of ingenuousness (to say no worse of it) to refuse to do it: since a definition is

courses; where,

1

the only

way whereby

the precise

meaning

of

sence of each species is to be known, they being not of nature's, but man's making, it is a great negligence and perverseness to discourse of moral things with uncertainty and obscurity; which is

moral words can be known; and yet a way whereby their meaning may be known certainly, and without leaving any room for any contest about

more pardonable

of mankind cannot be excused,

stances, 2

in treating of natural sub-

where doubtful terms are hardly

Cf. ch.

iii.

§§ 4-14.

to

be

And

it.

2

therefore the negligence or perverseness

Cf. Bk. IV. chh.

§8.

iii.

if

§§ 18-20;

their discourses iv.

§§ 7-8;

xii.

.

JOHN LOCKE

3 o4 in morality be not

much more

book

clear than those

20. Ideas of the leading qualities of substances are

about ideas

These leading sensible qualiwhich make the chief ingredients of our specific ideas, and consequently the most observable and invariable part in the definitions

in natural philosophy: since they are

mind, which are none of them false or disproportionate; they having no external beings for the archetypes which they are referred to and must correspond with. It is far easier for men to frame in their minds an idea, which shall be the standard to which they will give the name justice; with which pattern so made, all actions that agree shall pass under that denomination, than, having seen Aristides, to frame an idea that shall in all things be exactly like him; who is as he is, let men make what idea they please of him. For the one, they need but know the combination of ideas that are put together in their own minds; in the

best got by showing.

are those

ties

of our specific names, as attributed to sorts of sub-

stances coming under our knowledge. For though

the sound man, in

its

own

nature, be as apt to

complex idea made up of animality and rationality, united in the same subject, as to signify any other combination; yet, used as a mark signify a

to stand for a sort of creatures

own fied

by the word man,

why

as

and

therefore,

unguibus should not be a

8.

And

is the

only

way

in

which

the

meaning of

of our as nec-

complex idea, signiany other we find in it:

latis

various qualities of a thing existing without them.

is

essary to be taken into our

nature,

must inquire into the whole and abstruse hidden constitution, and

we count

kind, perhaps the outward shape

for the other, they

1

in

the

Plato's animal implume bipes

good definition of

name man, standing for that sort of creatures,

will not

be easy to show: for

it is

the shape, as

mixed modes can be made known. Another reason that

the leading quality, that seems more to determine

makes the defining of mixed modes so necessary, is what I mentioned a little before, viz. that it is the only way whereby the signification of the most of them can be known

that species, than a faculty of reasoning, which appears not at first, and in some never. And if this be not allowed to be so, I do not know how they can be excused from murder who kill monstrous births, (as we call them), because of an unordinary shape, without knowing whether they have a rational soul or no; which can be no more discerned in a well-formed than ill-shaped infant, as soon as born. And who is it has informed us that a rational soul can inhabit no tenement, unless it has just such a sort of frontispiece; or can join itself to, and inform no sort of body, but one that is just of such an outward structure? 2 1 And can hardly be made known otherwise. Now these leading qualities are best made known by showing, and can hardly be made known otherwise. For the shape of a horse or cassowary will be but rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the mind by words; the sight of the animals doth it

especially of moral words,

with certainty. For the ideas they stand for, being for the most part such whose component parts nowhere exist together, but scattered and mingled with others, it is the mind alone that collects them, and gives them the union of one idea: and it is only by words enumerating the several simple ideas which the mind has united, that we can make known to others what their names stand for; the assistance of the senses in this case not helping us, by the proposal of sensible objects, to show the ideas which our names of this kind stand for, as it does often in the names of sensible simple ideas, and also to some degree in those of substances.

showing and by deThirdly, for the explaining the signification of the names of substances, as they stand for 19. III. In substances, both by

fining.

the ideas

we have

of their distinct species, both

the forementioned ways, viz. of showing

many

and de-

be made use of. For, there being ordinarily in each sort some leading qualities, to which we suppose the other ideas which make up our complex idea of that species annexed, we forwardly give the specific name to that thing wherein that characteristical mark is found, which we take to be the fining, are requisite, in

cases, to

most distinguishing idea of that species. These leading or characteristical (as I may call them) animals and vegetables, are (as has been before remarked, ch. vi. § 29, and ch. ix. § 15) mostly figure; and in inanimate bodies, colour; and in some, both together. Now, ideas, in the sorts of

a thousand times better. And the idea of the particular colour of gold is not to be got by any description of it, but only by the frequent exercise of the eyes

who

about

it;

as

are used to this metal,

is

evident in those

who

will frequently

distinguish true from counterfeit, pure from adulsight, where others (who have as but yet by use have not got the precise nice idea of that peculiar yellow) shall not perceive any difference. The like may be said of those other simple ideas, peculiar in their kind

terate,

good

to

by the

eyes,

any substance;

for

which

precise ideas there

The

particular ringing

are no peculiar names.

sound there

is

in gold, distinct

from the sound of

other bodies, has no particular name annexed to it, no more than the particular yellow that belongs to that metal.

;

CONCERNING

CHAP. XI 22.

The Ideas of

known by

definition.

ple ideas that

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

powers of substances are best But because many of the simthe

make up our

stances are powers

which

specific ideas of sub-

lie

not obvious to our

senses in the things as they ordinarily appear; therefore, in the signification of our

some part of the

stances, better

names of sub-

signification will be

made known by enumerating those simple

than by showing the substance itself. For, he that to the yellow shining colour of gold, got by sight, shall, from my enumerating them, have

ideas,

the ideas of great ductility, fusibility, fixedness,

and

solubility in aqua regia, will

have a perfecter

idea of gold than he can have by seeing a piece of gold, and thereby imprinting in his mind only

obvious qualities. But

its

if

the formal constitu-

tion of this shining, heavy, ductile thing, (from

whence

all

these

its

properties flow) lay open to ,

our senses, as the formal constitution or essence of a triangle does, the signification of the word gold might as easily be ascertained as that of triangle. 23.

A

reflection

on the knowledge of corporeal things

from bodies. Hence we may take notice, how much the foundation of all

possessed by spirits separate

our knowledge of corporeal things lies in our senses. For how spirits, separate from bodies, (whose knowledge and ideas of these things are certainly much more perfect than ours), know them, we have no notion, no idea at all. The whole extent of our knowledge or imagination reaches not beyond our own ideas limited to our ways of perception. Though yet it be not to be doubted that spirits of a higher rank than those immersed in flesh may have as clear ideas of the radical constitution of substances as we have of a triangle,

and

so perceive

how

all their

properties and

operations flow from thence: but the manner how they come by that knowledge exceeds our con-

305

used to that sort of things, and are experienced in them. For, since it is intended their names should stand for such collections of simple ideas as

do

really exist in things themselves, as well as

for the

complex idea in other men's minds, which

in their ordinary acceptation they stand for, therefore, to define their

history

is

names right, natural and their proper-

to be inquired into,

with care and examination, to be found it is not enough, for the avoiding inconveniences in discourse and arguings about natural bodies and substantial things, to have learned, from the propriety of the language, the common, but confused, or very imperfect, idea to which each word is applied, and to keep them to that idea in our use of them; but we must, by acquainting ourselves with the history of that sort of things, rectify and settle our complex idea belonging to each specific name; and in discourse with others, (if we find them mistake us), we ought to tell what the complex idea is that we make such a name stand for. This is the more necessary to be done by all those who search afties are,

out.

ter

For

knowledge and philosophical

verity, in that

children, being taught words, whilst they have

but imperfect notions of things, apply them at

random, and without much thinking, and seldom frame determined ideas to be signified by them. Which custom (it being easy, and serving well enough for the ordinary affairs of life and conversation) they are apt to continue when they are

men: and so begin at the wrong end, learning words first and perfectly, but make the notions to which they apply those words afterwards very overtly. By this means it comes to pass, that men speaking the language of their country, i.e. according to grammar rules of that language, do yet speak very improperly of things themselves

to explain the

and, by their arguing one with another, make but small progress in the discoveries of useful truths, and the knowledge of things, as they are to be found in themselves, and not in our imagi-

for

nations;

ceptions. 24. Ideas of substances must also be conformable things.

to

Fourthly, But, though definitions will serve

names of substances as they stand our ideas, yet they leave them not without great imperfection as they stand for things. For our names of substances being not put barely for our ideas, but being made use of ultimately to represent things, and so are put in their place, their signification must agree with the truth of things as well as with men's ideas. And therefore, in substances, we are not always to rest in the ordinary complex idea commonly received as the signification of that word, but must go a little further, and inquire into the nature and properties of the things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our ideas of their distinct species; or else learn them from such as are

and it matters not much for the improvement of our knowledge how they are called. 25. Not easy to be made so. It were therefore to be wished, That men versed in physical inquiries, and acquainted with the several sorts of natural bodies, would set down those simple ideas wherein they observe the individuals of each sort constantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that confusion which comes from several persons applying the same name to a collection of a

smaller or greater

number

of sensible qualities,

proportionably as they have been more or less acquainted with, or accurate in examining, the qualities of any sort of things

which come under

JOHN LOCKE

306 one denomination. But a dictionary of containing, as too

it

this sort,

were, a natural history, requires

many hands

as well as too

much

time, cost,

and sagacity ever to be hoped for; and till that be done, we must content ourselves with such definitions of the names of substances as explain the sense men use them in. And it would be well, where there is occasion, if they would afford us so much. This yet is not usually done but men talk to one another, and dispute in words, whose meaning is not agreed between them, out of a mistake that the significations of common words are certainly established, and the precise ideas they stand for perfectly known; and that it is a shame to be ignorant of them. Both which suppositions are false; no names of complex ideas pains,

;

having so settled determined significations, that they are constantly used for the same precise ideas. Nor is it a shame for a man not to have a certain knowledge of anything, but by the necessary ways of attaining it and so it is no discredit not to know what precise idea any sound stands for in another man's mind, without he declare it to me by some other way than barely using that sound, there being no other way, without such a declaration, certainly to know it. Indeed the necessity of communication by language brings men to an agreement in the signification of common words, with;

in some tolerable latitude, that

may serve for ordi-

nary conversation: and so a man cannot be supposed wholly ignorant of the ideas which are annexed to words by common use, in a language familiar to him. But common use being but a very uncertain rule, which reduces

itself at last to

the

BOOK

a clearer idea of apium or

from a

ibex,

little

IV

print

of that herb or beast, than he could have from a long definition of the names of either of them.

And so no doubt he would have of strigil and and

sis-

(which are the English names dictionaries render them by,) he could see stamped in the margin small pictures of these instruments, as they were in use trum,

if,

instead of currycomb

cymbal,

amongst the ancients. Toga, tunica, pallium, are words easily translated by gown, coat, and cloak; but we have thereby no more true ideas of the fashion of those habits amongst the Romans, than we have of the faces of the tailors who made them. Such things as these, which the eye distinguishes by their shapes, would be best let into the mind by draughts made of them, and more determine the signification of such words, than any other words set for them, or made use of to define them. But this is only by the bye. 26. V. Fifth remedy: To use the same word constantly same sense. Fifthly, If men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their words, and in the

definitions of their terms are not to be had, yet this

the least that can be expected, that, in all

is

discourses wherein one

man pretends to instruct

or convince another, he should use the same word

same sense. If this were done, (which nobody can refuse without great disingenuity,) many of the books extant might be spared; many of the controversies in dispute would be at an end several of those great volumes, swollen with ambiguous words, now used in one sense, and by and by in another, would shrink into a very narrow compass; and many of the philosophers, (to mention no other) as well as poets works, might be contained in a nutshell. constantly in the

;

men, proves often but a very variable standard. But though such a Dictionary as I have above mentioned will require too much time, cost, and pains to be hoped for in this age;

But

yet methinks

not unreasonable to propose, that words standing for things which are known

in respect to that infinite variety of thoughts, that

and distinguished by their outward shapes should be expressed by little draughts and prints made

will,

ideas of particular

it is

A

vocabulary made after this fashion would perhaps with more ease, and in less time,

of them.

teach the true signification of many terms, especially in languages of remote countries or ages,

and

men's minds of several things, whereof we read the names in ancient authors, than all the large and laborious comments of learned critics. Naturalists, that treat of plants and animals, have found the benefit of this way: and he that has had occasion to consult them will have reason to confess that he has settle truer ideas in

27.

When not so used,

the variation is to be explained.

after all, the provision of

men, wanting terms

words

is

so scanty

to suit their precise notions,

notwithstanding their utmost caution, be

forced often to use the same different senses.

word

And though in

in

somewhat

the continuation

of a discourse, or the pursuit of an argument, there

can be hardly room to digress into a particular definition, as often as a

man varies the significa-

any term; yet the import of the discourse will, for the most part, if there be no designed fallacy, sufficiently lead candid and intelligent readers into the true meaning of it; but where tion of

is not sufficient to guide the reader, there concerns the writer to explain his meaning, and show in what sense he there uses that term.

there

it

CHAP.

CONCERNING

I

BOOK Chap.

I.

Of Knowledge

Our knowledge

1.

IV.

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

Of Knowledge and reduced

in

General

and

conversant about our ideas only.

Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is

evident that our knowledge

is

only conversant

about them. 1

of and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. 2 In this alone it consists. Where

perception

3

is,

there

is

knowledge, and where

though we may fancy, guess, or we always come short of knowledge. For when we know that white is not black, what do we else but perceive, that these two ideas do not agree? When we possess ourselves with the it is

not, there,

believe, yet

utmost security of the demonstration, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but perceive, that equality to two right ones does necessarily agree to,

and

is

inseparable from, the three angles of a

tri-

angle?

But to understand a little more distinctly wherein this agreement or disagreement consists, I think we may reduce it all to these four sorts:

sorts.

I. Identity,

or

diversity.

II. Relation.

III. Co-existence, or necessary connexion.

IV. Real 4.

it

existence.

Of identity,

first sort tity

or diversity in ideas. First,

As

to the

of agreement or disagreement, viz. iden-

or diversity. It is the

first

act of the mind,

has any sentiments or ideas at

all,

when

to perceive

its ideas; and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutely necessary, that without it there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, no imagination, no distinct thoughts at all. By this the mind clearly and infallibly perceives each idea to agree with itself, and to be what it is; and all distinct ideas to disagree, i.e. the one not to be the other: and

this

for ready application in all cases,

may

be occasion to

reflect

on

it:

wherein there

yet

it is

certain

about particular ideas. A man infallibly knows, as soon as ever he has them in his mind, that the ideas he that the

first

exercise of this faculty

is

and round are the very ideas they are; and that they are not other ideas which he calls red or square. Nor can any maxim or proposition in the world make him know it clearer or surer than he did before, and without any such general rule.

4

This then is the first agreement or disagree-

ment which the mind perceives in its ideas; which it always perceives at first sight: and if there ever happen any doubt about it, it will always be found to be about the names, and not the ideas themselves, whose identity and diversity will always be perceived, as soon and clearly as the ideas themselves are; nor can 5.

it

possibly be otherwise.

Of abstract relations between ideas.

Secondly, the

next sort of agreement or disagreement the perceives in any of its ideas may,

I

mind

think, be called

and is nothing but the perception of the between any two ideas, of what kind soever, whether substances, modes, or any other. relative,

must eternally be and so be universally

For, since all distinct ideas

known not

to be the same,

and constantly denied one of another, there could be no room for any positive knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any relation between our ideas, and find out the agreement or disagreement they have one with another, in several ways the mind takes of comparing them. 6.

Of

their necessary co-existence in substances.

Thirdly,

The

ment

be found in our ideas, which the percep-

to

tion of the

third sort of agreement or disagree-

mind is employed about,

is

co-existence

or non-co-existence in the same subject; and this belongs particularly to substances. Thus when we

pronounce concerning gold, that it is fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more but this, that fixedness, or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed, is an idea that always accompanies and yellowness,

is

joined with that particular sort of fusibility, malleableness,

weight,

and solubility in aqua regia, which make our complex idea signified by the word gold,

and distinction. And though men of art have

7. Of real existence agreeing to any idea. Fourthly, The fourth and last sort is that of actual real exist-

x Cf. Locke's First Letter to Stillingfleet, p. 83; also Third Letter, pp. 245-47.

'Cf.ch. Cf. Bk.

3

general rules, What is, is, same thing to be and not to

does without pains, labour, or deduction; first view, by its natural power of percep-

it

but at tion

this into those

It is impossible for the

relation

This agreement or disagreement may be any offour

3.

Probability

calls white

Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas. Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion 2.

this

be,

307

xiv.

§§3, 4. II. ch. xxi. § 5.

agreeing to any idea. Within these four sorts of agreement or

ence

4

Cf. chh.

vii., viii.

dis-

JOHN LOCKE

3 o8

agreement is, I suppose, contained all the knowledge we have, or are capable of. For all the inquiries we can make concerning any of our ideas, all that we know or can affirm concerning any of them,

is,

That

it is,

or

is

not, the

same with

other; that it does or does not always cowith some other idea in the same subject; that it has this or that relation with some other idea; or that it has a real existence without the mind. Thus, "blue is not yeliow," is of identity. "Two triangles upon equal bases between two parallels are equal, " is of relation. Iron is susceptible of magnetical impressions," is of co-exist-

some

exist

'

'

"God is," is of real existence. Though iden1

ence.

truly nothing but relathey are such peculiar ways of agreement or disagreement of our ideas, that they deserve well to be considered as distinct heads, tity

and co-existence are

tions, yet

and not under

relation in general; since they are

grounds of affirmation and negation, easily appear to any one, who will but re-

so different as will

on what

flect

is

said in several places of this

Essay. I

should

now proceed

to

examine the several

degrees of our knowledge, but that

word 8.

it is

necessary

to consider the different acceptations of the

first,

knowledge.

Knowledge is either actual or habitual. There are ways wherein the mind is possessed of

several

each of which is called knowledge. There is actual knowledge, which is the present view the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas, or of the relation they have one to another. II. A man is said to know any proposition, which having been once laid before his thoughts, he evidently perceived the agreement or disagreement of the ideas whereof it consists and so lodged it in his memory, that whenever that proposition comes again to be reflected on, he, without doubt or hesitation, embraces the right side, assents to, and is certain of the truth of it. This, I think, one truth; I.

;

may call habitual knowledge. And know all

thus a

man may

which are lodged in his memory, by a foregoing clear and full perception, whereof the mind is assured past doubt as often as it has occasion to reflect on them. For our finite understandings being able to think clearly and distinctly but on one thing at once, if men had no knowledge of any more than what they actually thought on, they would all be very ignorant: and he that knew most, would know but one truth, that being all he was able to think on at one time. 2 be said to

those truths

*Cf. ch. iv. *Cf. Bk. II. chh. x.

8, 9; xxvii. § 10.

9.

BOOK

Habitual knowledge

is

IV

Of habit-

of two degrees.

ual knowledge there are, also, vulgarly speaking,

two degrees:

The one

is of such truths laid up in the whenever they occur to the mind, it actually perceives the relation is between those ideas. 3 And this is in all those truths whereof we have an intuitive knowledge; where the ideas themselves, by an immediate view, discover their agreement or disagreement one with another.

First,

memory

as,

The other is of such truths whereof mind having been convinced, it retains the

Secondly, the

memory of the

conviction, without the proofs}

Thus, a

man that remembers certainly that he once perceived the demonstration, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones,

knows

tain that he

is

cer-

because he cannot doubt the truth of it. In his adherence to a truth, where the demonstration by which it was at first known is forgot, though a man may be thought rather to believe his memory than really to know, and this way of entertaining a truth seemed formerly to me like something between opinion and knowledge; a sort of assurance which exceeds bare belief, for that relies on the testimony of another; yet upon a due examination I find it comes not short of perfect certainty, and is in effect true knowledge. That which is apt to mislead our first thoughts into a mistake in this matter is, that the agreement or disagreement of the ideas in this case is not perceived, as it was at first, by an actual view of all the intermediate ideas whereby the agreement or disagreement of those in the proposition was at first perceived; but by other intermediate ideas, that show the agreement or disagreement of the ideas contained in the proposition whose certainty we remember. For example: in this proposition, that "the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, one who has seen and clearly perceived the demonstration of this truth knows it to be true, when that demonstration is gone out of his mind; so that at present it is not actually in view, and possibly cannot be recollected: but he knows it in a different way from what he did before. The agreement of the two ideas joined in that proposition is perceived but it is by the intervention of other ideas than those which at first produced that perception. He remembers, i.e. he knows (for remembrance is but the reviving of some past knowledge) that he was once certain of the truth of this proposition, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones. The immuit,

—

'

'

;

tability of the

same

*Cf. Bk. II. ch. x. Cf. ch. xvi. § 2.

4

relations

between the same

CHAP.

CONCERNING

II

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

immutable things is now the idea that shows him, if the three angles of a triangle were once equal to two right ones, they will always be equal to two right ones. And hence he comes to be certain, that what was once true in the case, is always true; what ideas once agreed will always agree; and consequently what he once knew to that

be true, he will always know to be true; as long as he can remember that he once knew it. Upon this ground it is, that particular demonstrations in mathematics afford general knowledge. If then the perception, that the

same ideas

will eternally

have the same habitudes and relations, be not a sufficient ground of knowledge, there could be no knowledge of general propositions in mathematics; for no mathematical demonstration would be any other than particular: and when a man had demonstrated any proposition concerning one triangle or circle, his knowledge would not reach beyond that particular diagram. If he would extend it further, he must renew his demonstration in another instance, before he could know it to be true in another like triangle, and so on: by which means one could never come to the knowledge of any general propositions. Nobody, I think, can deny, that Mr. Newton certainly knows any proposition that he now at any time reads in his book 1 to be true; though he has not in actual view that admirable chain of intermediate ideas whereby he at first discovered it to be true. Such a memory as that, able to retain such a train of particulars, may be well thought beyond the reach of human faculties, 2 when the very discovery, perception, and laying together that wonderful connexion of ideas,

is

found

to

surpass most readers' comprehension. But yet

it

evident the author himself knows the proposition to be true, remembering he once saw the connexion of those ideas; as certainly as he knows

is

such a man wounded another, remembering that he saw him run him through. But because the memory is not always so clear as actual perception, and does in all men more or less decay in this, amongst other differences, is one which shows that demonstrative knowledge is much more imperfect than intuitive, as we shall

length of time,

see in the following chapter.

Chap. 1

.

Of

II.

Of the

Degrees of our Knowledge

the degrees, or differences in clearness, of our

I. Intuitive. All our knowledge consisthave said, in the view the mind has of its own ideas, which is the utmost light and greatest certainty we. with our faculties, and in our

knowledge: ing, as I

Newton, 2

Principia. Cf. "Epistle to the

Cf. Bk. II. ch.

x.§ 9.

Reader."

3°9

of knowledge, are capable of, it may not be amiss to consider a little the degrees of its evidence. The different clearness of our knowledge seems to me to lie in the different way of perception the mind has of the agreement or disagree-

way

of any of its ideas. For if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we will find, that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other: and this I think we may call intuitive knowledge. For in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth as the eye doth light, only by being directed towards it. Thus the mind perceives that white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more than two and equal to one and two. Such kinds of truths the mind per-

ment

by

ceives at the first sight of the ideas together,

bare intuition; without the intervention of any other idea: and this kind of knowledge is the clearest

and most certain that human

frailty

is

capable of. This part of knowledge is irresistible, and, like bright sunshine, 3 forces itself immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the mind turns

its

view that way; and leaves no room

hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the is

presently filled with the clear light of it.

this intuition that

for

mind

It is

on

depends all the certainty and evidence

4 of all our knowledge;

which certainty every one he cannot imagine, and

finds to be so great, that

therefore not require a greater: for a man cannot conceive himself capable of a greater certainty

than to

know

that any idea in his

mind

is

such

and that two ideas, wherein he perceives a difference, are different and not precisely the same. He that demands a greater certainty than this, demands he knows not what, and shows only that he has a mind to be a sceptic, without being able to be so. Certainty depends so wholly on this intuition, that, in the next degree of knowledge which I call demonstrative, as he perceives it to be;

this intuition is

necessary in

all

the connexions

of the intermediate ideas, without which we can-

not attain knowledge and certainty. 2. II. Demonstrative. The next degree of knowl-

edge is, where the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, but not immediately. Though wherever the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas, there be certain knowledge; yet it does not always happen, that the mind sees that agreement or disagreement, which there is between them, even where it is discoverable; and in that case remains in ignorance, and at most gets no fur3 «

Cf. Introd. § 5; Bk. IV. ch. Cf. Bk. II. ch. i. § 2.

iii.

§ 20.

JOHN LOCKE

3 io ther than a probable conjecture.

The reason why

the mind cannot always perceive presently the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, is, because those ideas, concerning whose agreement or disagreement the inquiry is made, cannot by the mind be so put together as to show it. In this case then, when the mind cannot so bring its ideas together as by their immediate comparison, and as it were juxta-position or application one to another, to perceive their agreement or disagreement, it is fain, by the intervention of other ideas (one or more, as it happens) to discover the agreement or disagreement which it searches; and this is that which we call reasoning. Thus, the mind being willing to know the agreement or disagreement in bigness between the three angles of a triangle and two right ones, cannot by an immediate view and comparing them do it: because the three angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once, and be compared with any other one, or two, angles; and so of this the mind has no immediate, no intuitive knowledge. In this case the

mind

is

some other

fain to find out

angles, to

which the three angles of a triangle have an equality; and, finding those equal to two right ones, comes to know their equality to two right ones. 3.

Demonstration depends on clearly perceived proofs.

Those intervening ideas, which serve to show the agreement of any two others, are called proofs; and where the agreement and disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is

called demonstration;

it

being shown to the un-

BOOK

IV

Another difference between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge is, that, though in the latter all doubt be removed when, by the intervention of the intermediate ideas, the agreement or disagreement is perceived, yet before the demonstration there was a doubt; which in intuitive knowledge cannot happen to the mind that has its faculty of perception left to a degree capable of distinct ideas; no more than it can be a doubt to the eye (that can distinctly see white and black) Whether this ink and this paper be all of a colour. If there be sight in

precedent to the demonstration.

,

the eyes,

it

will, at first

glimpse, without hesita-

words printed on

this paper from the colour of the paper: and so if the mind have the faculty of distinct perception, it will perceive the agreement or disagreement of those ideas that produce intuitive knowledge. If the eyes have lost the faculty of seeing, or the

tion, perceive the

different

mind of perceiving, we in vain inquire after the quickness of sight in one, or clearness of perception in the other. 6.

Not

so clear as intuitive knowledge. It is true,

the perception produced by demonstration is also

very clear; yet it is often with a great abatement of that evident lustre and full assurance that al-

ways accompany that which I call intuitive: like a face reflected by several mirrors one to another, where, as long as it retains the similitude and agreement with the object, it produces a knowledge; but

it is still, in every successive reflection, with a lessening of that perfect clearness and dis-

tinctness

which

in the first; till at last, after has a great mixture of dimness,

is

derstanding, and the

many removes,

A quickness in termediate ideas, (that shall discover the agreement or disagreement of any other,) and to apply

and is not at first sight so knowable, especially to weak eyes. Thus it is with knowledge made out

mind made to see that it is the mind to find out these in-

so.

them

right,

is,

I

suppose, that which

is

called

sagacity.

As

certain, but not so easy

demonstration the mind does at last perceive the agreement or disagreement of the ideas it considers; yet it is not without pains and attention: there must be more than one transient view to find

it.

A steady application and pursuit are re-

quired to

and there must be a mind certainty, and come to

this discovery:

progression by steps and degrees, before the

can in

this

way

arrive at

perceive the agreement or repugnancy between

two ideas that need proofs and the use of reason to show it. 5.

by a long train of proof. 7. Each step in demonstrated knowledge must have intuitive evidence.

and ready as intuitive knowledge. This knowledge, by intervening proofs, though it be certain, yet the evidence of it is not altogether so clear and bright, nor the assent so ready, as in intuitive knowledge. For, though in 4.

The demonstrated

conclusion not without doubt,

it

Now,

in demonstrative

in every step reason makes knowledge, there is an intui-

knowledge of that agreement or disagreeit seeks with the next intermediate idea which it uses as a proof: for if it were not so, that yet would need a proof; since without the perception of such agreement or disagreement, there is no knowledge produced: if it be perceived by itself, it is intuitive knowledge if it cannot be perceived by itself, there is need of some intervening idea, as a common measure, to show their agreement or disagreement. By which it is plain tive

ment

:

that every step in reasoning that produces knowledge, has intuitive certainty; which when the mind perceives, there is no more required but to remember it, to make the agreement or disagreement of the ideas concerning which we inquire visible

and

certain.

So that

to

make anything

a

CHAP.

COXCERXLXG

II

demonstration,

it is

HUMA\ U\DERSTA\DLXG

necessary to perceive the im-

mediate agreement of the intervening ideas, whereby the agreement or disagreement of the two ideas under examination (whereof the one is always the first, and the other the last in the account)

is

found. This intuitive perception of

but because, in comparing their equality or exthe modes of numbers have every the least difference very clear and perceivable: and though in extension every the least excess is not so perceptible, yet the mind has found out ways to examine, and discover demonstratively, the cess,

the agreement or disagreement of the intermedi-

just equality of

each step and progression of the demonstration, must also be carried exactly in the mind, and a man must be sure that no part is left out which, because in long deductions, and

ures:

ex praecognitis, et praecon-

curate a distinction of their differences as to per-

many

proofs, the

memory

does not

al-

ways so readily and exactly retain; therefore it comes to pass, that this is more imperfect than intuitive knowledge, and men embrace often falsehood for demonstrations. 8.

Hence

The

the mistake,

1

and both

ceive, or find

soning, gave occasion,

ity,

imagine, to that mistaken axiom, That all reasoning was ex prcecognitis et prcBconcessis: which, how far it is a mistake, I shall I

have occasion to show more at large, when to consider propositions,

I

come

and particularly those

propositions which are called maxims, and to

posed to

by a mistake that they are supbe the foundations of all our knowledge it is

and reasonings. 1 9.

Demonstration not limited

to ideas

of mathemati-

has been generally taken for granted, that mathematics alone are capable of demonstrative certainty: but to have such an agreement or disagreement as may intuitively be

cal quantity. It

imagine, not the privilege of the ideas of number, extension, and figure perceived, being, as

I

it may possibly be the want of due method and application in us, and not of sufficient evidence in things, that demonstration has been thought to have so little to do in other parts of knowledge, and been scarce so much as aimed at by any but mathematicians. For whatever ideas we have wherein the mind can perceive the immediate agreement or disagreement that is between them, there the mind is capable of intuitive knowledge; and where it can perceive the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, by an intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement they have with any intermediate ideas, there the mind iscapable of demonstration which

alone,

:

is

not limited to ideas of extension, figure, and their modes.

num-

ber,

10.

reason

Why it has been thought to be so limited. The why it has been generally sought for, and

supposed to be only in those,

I imagine has been, not only the general usefulness of those sciences: 1

Cf. ch.

vii.

these,

.

in each step of scientifical or demonstrative rea-

show that

angles, or extensions, or fig-

necessity of this intuitive knowledge,

:

cessis.

two

i.e. numbers and figures, can be set down by visible and lasting marks, wherein the ideas under consideration are perfectly determined: which for the most part they are not, where they are marked only by names and words. 1 Modes of qualities not demonstrable like modes of quantity. But in other simple ideas, whose modes and differences are made and counted by degrees, and not quantity, we have not so nice and ac-

ate ideas, in

the use of

3"

ways

to measure, their just equal-

or the least differences. For those other sim-

ple ideas, being appearances of sensations pro-

by the size, figure, number, and mominute corpuscles singly insensible; their different degrees also depend upon the variation duced

in us,

tion of

of some or of all those causes: which, since

it cannot be observed by us. in particles of matter whereof each is too subtile to be perceived, it is impossible for us to have any exact measures of the different degrees of these simple ideas. For, supposing the sensation or idea we name whiteness be produced in us by a certain number of globules, which, having a verticity about their

own

centres, strike

upon

the retina of the eye,

with a certain degree of rotation, as well as progressive swiftness; it will hence easily follow, that the

more

the superficial parts of any

body are

so

ordered as to reflect the greater number of globules of light, and to give them the proper rotation, which is fit to produce this sensation of white in us, the more white will that body appear, that from an equal space sends to the retina the greater number of such corpuscles, with that peculiar sort of motion. I do not say that the nature of light consists in very small round globules; nor of whiteness in such a texture of parts as gives a certain rotation to these globules

them:

for

I

am

not

now

when it reflects

treating physically of

But this I think I may say. that would be glad any one would make intelligible that he did) conceive how bodies without us can any ways affect our senses, but by the immediate contact of the sensible bodies themselves, as in tasting and feeling, or the impulse of some sensible particles coming from them, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; by the different impulse of which parts, caused by their light or colours. I

cannot (and

I

;

JOHN LOCKE

3 i2 different size, figure,

sensations

and motion, the variety of

produced

is

12. Particles of light

here

I

BOOK

think

we

are provided with an evidence

that puts us past doubting. For

in us.

and simple ideas of

colour.

Whether he be not self of

they have a verticity about their own centres that produces the idea of whiteness in us; this is cer-

the sun by day, and thinks on

more particles of light are reflected from a body, fitted to give them that peculiar motion which produces the sensation of whiteness in us; and possibly too, the quicker that peculiar motion is, the whiter does the body appear from which the greatest number are reflected, as is evident in the same piece of paper put in the sunbeams, in the shade, and in a dark hole; in each of which it will produce in us the idea of white-

—

ness in far different degrees. 1

3.

The secondary

by demonstration.

number

Not knowing, therefore, what what motion of them,

of particles, nor

to

;

distinguish every the least real difference, the only

help

ask any one.

a different perception,

when he it

looks on by night; when

he actually tastes wormwood, or smells a rose, or only thinks on that savour or odour? We as plainly find the difference there is between any

own memory, and actually coming into our minds by our senses, as we do between any two distinct ideas. If any one say, a dream may do the same thing, and all these ideas may be produced in us without any idea revived in our minds by our

external objects; he

make him

may

please to

—

That

dream

that

I

no great matter, whether I remove his scruple or no where all is but dream, reasoning and arguments are of no use, truth and knowledge nothing. 2. That this

answer:

1.

it is

:

qualities of things not discovered

produce any precise degree of whiteness, we cannot demonstrate the certain equality of any two degrees of whiteness because we have no certain standard to measure them by, nor means to is fit

I

invincibly conscious to him-

Whether then they be globules or no; or whether

tain, that the

IV

we have being from our senses, which in this

I believe he will allow a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in the fire, and being actually in it. But yet if he be resolved to appear

so sceptical as to maintain, that

what

I

call be-

nothing but a dream; and that we cannot thereby certainly know, that any such thing as fire actually exists without us: ing actually in the

fire is

as to

fail us. But where the difference is so great produce in the mind clearly distinct ideas, whose differences can be perfectly retained, there

I answer, That we certainly finding that pleasure or pain follows upon the application of cer-

these ideas or colours, as we see in different kinds,

or

point

as blue

and

as ideas of

red, are as capable of demonstration

number and

extension.

here said of whiteness and colours, true in all secondary qualities 1

4. Sensitive

and

What

I

have

think holds

I

their modes.

knowledge of the particular existence of These two, viz. intuition

finite beings without us.

and demonstration, are the degrees of our knowlwhatever comes short of one of these, with what assurance soever embraced, is but faith or

tain objects to us,

dream

certainty

that is

we

whose existence we perceive, perceive, by our senses; this

as great as

our happiness or misery,

beyond which we have no concernment to know or to be. So that, I think, we may add to the two former sorts of knowledge this also, of the existence of particular external objects, by that perception and consciousness we have of the actual entrance of ideas from them, and allow these

edge;

three degrees of knowledge, viz.

opinion,

each of which there are different degrees and ways of evidence and cer-

but not knowledge, at least in

all

general

There is, indeed, another perception of the mind, employed about the particular existence offinite beings without us, which, going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to truths.

either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, pass-

under the name of knowledge. There can be nothing more certain than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds: this is intuitive knowledge. But whether there be anything more than barely that idea in our minds whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of anything without us, which corresponds es

1

to that idea,

is

that whereof some

may be a question made;

men think there

because men may have such ideas in their minds, when no such thing exists, no such object affects their senses. But yet l

Cf. ch. xi.

trative,

and

intuitive,

demons-

sensitive: in

tainty. 1

5.

Knowledge not always clear, where

the ideas that

But since our knowledge is founded on and employed about our ideas only, will it not follow from thence that it is conformable to our ideas; and that where our ideas are clear and distinct, or obscure and confused, our knowledge will be so too? To which I answer, No: for our knowledge consisting in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two enter into

ideas,

its

it

are clear.

clearness or obscurity consists in the and not

clearness or obscurity of that perception,

in the clearness or obscurity of the ideas

them-

man

that has as clear ideas of the angles of a triangle, and of equality to two right ones, as any mathematician in the world, may selves: v.g. a

yet have but a very obscure perception of their

,

CHAP.

CONCERNING

Ill

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

3*3

agreement, and so have but a very obscure knowledge of it. *But ideas which, by reason of their

extent of our ideas: because between two differ-

obscurity or otherwise, are confused, cannot produce any clear or distinct knowledge; because,

find such

as far as

any ideas are confused, so far the mind cannot perceive clearly whether they agree or

parts of the deduction;

disagree.

Or to express the same thing in a way less apt to be misunderstood: he that hath not determined ideas to the words he uses, cannot make propositions of them of whose truth he can

tion.

be certain.

reaching no further than the existence of things actually present to our senses, 2 is yet much narrower than either of the

ent ideas

we would examine, we cannot always mediums as we can connect one to

another with an intuitive knowledge in all the and wherever that fails, we come short of knowledge and demonstra5. Sensitive

knowledge narrower than

either.

Fifth-

Sensitive knowledge

ly,

former.

Chap.

III.

Of

the Extent of

6.

Human Knowledge i

.

been

Extent of our knowledge. Knowledge, as has said, lying in the perception of the agree-

ment or disagreement of any of our lows from hence That, It extends

no further than

we have

ideas,

it fol-

we

ideas.

no further than

we can

perceive their

That we can have no knowledge further than we can have/wagreement or disagreement. Secondly,

agreement or disagreement. Which i Either by intuition, or the immediate comparing any two ideas; or, 2. By reason, examining the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, by the intervention of some others; ception of that

perception being:

or, 3.

.

By sensation, perceiving the existence of par-

ticular things: 3. Intuitive

hence

it

also follows:

knowledge extends

itself not to all the re-

we cannot have an intuitive knowledge that shall extend itself to all our ideas, and all that we would know about them; because we cannot examine and perceive all the relations they have one to another, by juxta-position, or an immediate comparison one with another. Thus, having the ideas of an obtuse and an acute angled triangle, both drawn from equal bases, and between parallels, I can, by intuitive knowledge, perceive the one not to be the other, but cannot that way know whether they be equal or no: because their agreement or disagreement in equality can never be perceived by an immediate comparing them: the difference of figure makes their parts incapable of an exact lations of all our ideas.

Thirdly, That

immediate application; and therefore there is need of some intervening qualities to measure them by, which is demonstration, or rational knowledge. 4. Nor does demonstrative knowledge. Fourthly, It follows, also, from what is above observed, that our rational knowledge cannot reach to the whole 1

Cf. Locke's, Third Letter to Stillingfleet, pp. 7 1

72, 75-78.

therefore,

comes not only short of the

reality of things, but

own

narrower than our

From all which it is evident, that the

extent of our knowledge

to

ideas. First,

can have knowledge no further than we have 2. It extends

Our knowledge,

ideas. Sixthly,

even of the extent of our

Though our knowledge be limited our ideas, and cannot exceed them either in exideas. 3

tent or perfection; and though these be very narrow bounds, in respect of the extent of All-being, and far short of what we may justly imagine to be in some even created understandings, not tied down to the dull and narrow information that is to be received from some few, and not very acute, ways of perception, such as are our senses; yet it would be well with us if our knowledge were but as large as our ideas, and there were not many doubts and inquiries concerning the ideas we have,

whereof we are not, nor I believe ever shall be in this world resolved. Nevertheless, I do not question but that human knowledge, under the present circumstances of our beings and constitutions, may be carried much further than it has hitherto been, if men would sincerely, and with freedom of mind, employ all that industry and labour of thought, in improving the means of discovering truth, which they do for the colouring or support of falsehood, to maintain a system, interest, or party they are once engaged in. But yet after all, I think I may, without injury to human perfection, be confident, that our knowledge would never reach to all we might desire to know concerring those ideas we have; nor be able to surmount all the difficulties, and resolve all the questions that might arise concerning any of them. We have the ideas of a square, a circle, and equality; and yet, perhaps, shall never be able to find a circle equal to a square, and certainly know that it is so. We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some *Cf. ch. 3

xi.

Cf. chh.

i.

§§9, § 4;

11. iii.

§ 8.

:

JOHN LOCKE

3i4

systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter, so disposed, a thinking immaterial substance it

being, in respect of our notions, not

much more

BOOK

IV

knowledge; but also, that it is of use to us to discern how far our knowledge does reach; for the state sion,

we are at present we must in many

in, not being that of vithings content ourselves

sense,

with faith and probability: and in the present question, about the Immateriality of the Soul, if our faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative certainty, we need not think it strange. All the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured, without philosophical proofs of the soul's immateriality; since it is evident, that he who made us at the beginning to subsist here, sensible intelligent beings, and for several years continued us in such a state, can and will restore us to the like state of sensibility in another world, and make us capable there to receive the retribution he has designed to men, according to their doings in this life. And therefore it is not of such mighty necessity to determine one way or the other, as some,

perception, and thought though, as I think I have proved, Bk. iv. ch. 10, § 14, &c, it is no less than

over-zealous for or against the immateriality of the soul, have been forward to make the world

remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd to it

another substance with a faculty of thinking; since

we know not wherein thinking

consists,

nor to

Almighty has been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any created being, but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator. Whether Matter may not be made by God to think is more than man can know. For 2 1 see no contradic-

what

sort of substances the

1

tion in

or

it,

that the

Omnipotent

first

Eternal thinking Being,

Spirit, should, if he pleased, give

to certain systems of created senseless matter,

together as he thinks

fit,

some degrees of

put

:

Who, either on the one side, indulging much their thoughts immersed altogether in

a contradiction to suppose matter (which is eviits own nature void of sense and

believe.

dently in

too

thought) 3 should be that Eternal first-thinking

matter, can allow no existence to what is not material: or who, on the other side, finding not cogitation within the natural powers of matter, examined over and over again by the utmost intention of mind, have the confidence to conclude

Being.

What certainty of knowledge can any one

have, that

some

perceptions, such

as, v.g., pleas-

ure and pain, should not be in some bodies themselves, after a certain

moved,

manner

modified and an im-

as well as that they should be in

upon the motion of the parts of body: Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only to strike and affect body, and motion, material substance,

according to the utmost reach of our ideas, being able to produce nothing but motion; so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain, or the idea of a colour or sound, we are fain to quit our reason, go beyond our ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our Maker. For, since we must allow He has annexed effects to motion which we can no way conceive motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude that He could not order them as well to be produced in a subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a subject we cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operate upon? 4 1 say not this, that I would any way lessen the belief of the soul's immateriality: I am not here speaking of probability, but knowledge;

and I think not only that it becomes the modesty of philosophy not to pronounce magisterially, where we want that evidence that can produce 1

Cf. Cf. 3 Cf. 4 Cf. 2

405.

Locke's, First Letter to Stillingfleet, p. 67. Bk. II. ch. xxiii. § 5. ch. x. Locke's Third Letter to Stillingfleet, pp. 398-

— That Omnipotency tion

and thought

itself

cannot give percep-

to a substance

modification of solidity.

He

which has the

that considers

how

hardly sensation is, in our thoughts, reconcilable to extended matter; or existence to anything that has no extension at all, will confess that he is very far

from certainly knowing what

his soul

is.

It is

a point which seems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge: and he who will give himself leave to consider freely, and look into the

dark and intricate part of each hypothesis, will scarce find his reason able to determine him fixedly for or against the soul's materiality. Since, on which side soever he views it, either as an unextended substance, or as a thinking extended matter,

the difficulty to conceive either will, whilst either alone is in his thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side.

An

unfair

way which some men

take

with themselves: who, because of the inconceivableness of something they find in one, throw themselves violently into the contrary hypothesis, though altogether as unintelligible to an unbiassed understanding. 5 This serves not only to show the weakness and the scantiness of our knowledge, but the insignificant triumph of such sort of arguments; which, drawn from our own views, may satisfy us that we can find no certain5

Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxiii. §§ 15-32.

.

CHAP.

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CONCERNING

Ill

ty on one side of the question: but do not at all thereby help us to truth by running into the opposite opinion; which, on examination, will be found clogged with equal difficulties. For what safety, what advantage to any one is it, for the avoiding the seeming absurdities, and to him unsurmountable rubs, he meets with in one opin-

which is built on something altogether as inexplicable, and as far remote from his comprehension? It is past controversy, that we have in us something that thinks; our very doubts about what it is, confirm the certainty of its being, though we must content ourion, to take refuge in the contrary,

selves in the ignorance of what kind of being

and

it is:

go about to be sceptical in this, as it is unreasonable in most other cases to be positive against the being of anything, because we cannot comprehend its nature. For I would fain know what substance exists, that has not something in it which manifestly baffles our unit is

in vain to

derstandings. Other spirits,

the nature

who

see

and inward constitution

what it is, and to be different from any other. 3 9. Of their co-existence, extends only a very little way. Secondly, as to the second sort, which is the agreement or disagreement of our ideas in co-existence, in this our knowledge is very short; though in this consists the greatest and most material part of our knowledge concerning substances. For our ceive to be

ideas of the species of substances being, as I have showed, 4 nothing but certain collections of simple ideas united in one subject, and so co-existing together; v.g. our idea of flame is a body hot, luminous, and moving upward; of gold, a body heavy to a certain degree, yellow, malleable, and fusible: for these, or some such complex ideas as these, in men's minds, do these two names of the different substances, flame and gold, stand for. When we would know anything further concern-

ing these, or any other sort of substances,

do we

1

ready to forget one before we have hunted out another; 2 we may guess at some part of the happiness of superior ranks of spirits, who have a quicker and more penetrating sight, as well as a larger field of knowledge. But to return to the argument in hand: our knowledge, I say, is not only limited to the pau-

and imperfections of the ideas we have, and which we employ it about, but even comes short city

reaches, let us

now in-

quire. 7.

How jar

we

The affirmawe make concerning the ideas

our knowledge reaches.

have, may, as

eral,

I

have before intimated

be reduced to these four

co-existence, relation,

examine how

far

and

in gen-

sorts, viz. identity,

real existence.

I

shall

our knowledge extends in each

Our knowledge of

identity

and

diversity in ideas

extends asfar as our ideas themselves. First, as to iden-

and diversity. In this way of agreement or disagreement of our ideas, our intuitive knowledge is as far extended as our ideas themselves: and there can be no idea in the mind, which it does not, presently, by an intuitive knowledge, pertity

1

Cf. Bk. II. ch. x.

*Cf. ch.

know what

other

or do not co-exist with those that

make up

that

complex idea? 10. Because the connexion between simple ideas in

substances

is

for the most part unknown. This,

how

weighty and considerable a part soever of human science, is yet very narrow, and scarce any at all. The reason whereof is, that the simple ideas whereof our complex ideas of substances are made up are, for the most part, such as carry with them, in their own nature, no visible necessary connexion or inconsistency with any other simple ideas, whose co-existence with them we would inform ourselves about. 1 1

Especially of the secondary qualities of bodies.

The ideas that our complex ones of substances are made up of, and about which our knowledge concerning substances is most employed, are those of their secondary qualities; which depending all (as has been shown) upon the primary qualities of their minute and insensible parts; or, if not upon them, upon something yet more remote from our comprehension; 5 it is impossible we should know which have a necessary union or inconsistency one with another. For, not knowing the root they spring from, not knowing

of these: 8.

Which is nothsimple ideas do,

these substances have or have not?

ing else but to

them at one glance to see the connexion and agreement of very many ideas, and readily supplies to them the intermediate proofs, which we by single and slow steps, and long poring in the dark, hardly at last find out, and are often

tions or negations

what what other qualities or powers

of things,

enables

how far it

inquire, but

and know

how much must they exceed us in knowledge? To which, if we add larger comprehension, which

of that too: but

3i5

ii.

§9. §§2-13.

what and texture of parts they are, on which depend, and from which result those qualities which make our complex idea of gold, it is impossible we should know what other qualities result from, or are incompatible with, the same size, figure,

3

On

the ideas of 'identity

and

diversity,' cf.

II. ch. xxvii. § 1 ; also Bk. IV. ch. i. § 4. 4 Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxiii.; Bk. III. ch. vi. 6

Cf. Bk. II. ch.

viii. etc.

Bk

JOHN LOCKE

3 i6

BOOK

IV

constitution of the insensible parts of gold; and so consequently must always co-exist with that complex idea we have of it, or else are inconsist-

tween them and any of the secondary qualities: which is necessary to be done before we can cer-

ent with

let

it.

12. Because necessary connexion between

ary and the primary qualities

is

any second-

undiscoverable by us.

Besides this ignorance of the primary qualities of the insensible parts of bodies, on which depend all their

secondary qualities, there

is

yet another

and more incurable part of ignorance, which sets us more remote from a certain knowledge of the co-existence or inco-existence

same

(if I

may

so say) of

and that is, that there is no discoverable connexion between any secondary quality and those primary qualities which it depends on. different ideas in the

subject;

1

13.

We

have no perfect knowledge of their primary

That the size, figure, and motion of one body should cause a change in the size, figure, and motion of another body, is not beyond our conception the separation of the parts of one body upon the intrusion of another; and the change from rest to motion upon impulse; these and the like seem to have some connexion one with another. And if we knew these primary qualities of bodies, we might have reason to hope we might be able to know a great deal more of these operations of them one upon another: but our minds not being able to discover any connexion betwixt these primary qualities of bodies and the sensations that are produced in us by them, we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted rules of the consequence or co-existence of any secondary qualities, though we could discover the size, figure, or motion of those invisible parts which immediately produce them. We are so far from knowing what figure, size, or motion of parts produce a yellow qualities.

;

colour, a sweet taste, or a sharp sound, that we can by no means conceive how any size, figure, or motion of any particles, can possibly produce in us the idea of any colour, taste, or sound whatsoever: there is no conceivable connexion between the one and the other. 1

4.

And seek in vain for certain and universal knowl-

edge of unperceived qualities in substances. In vain, therefore, shall

we endeavour to discover by our way of certain and universal

ideas (the only true

knowledge) 2 what other ideas are to be found constantly joined with that of our complex idea of

any substance: since we neither know the real constitution of the minute parts on which their qualities do depend; nor, did we know them, could we discover any necessary connexion be*Cf. Bacon, Novum Orgenum, II. 13-16. Cf. Hume's Inquiry concerning Human Understandings Sect, iv.; also Sect. vii. 2

tainly know their necessary co-existence. So, that,

our complex idea of any species of substances be what it will, we can hardly, from the simple ideas contained in it, certainly determine the necessary co-existence of any other quality what-

soever.

Our knowledge

reaches very

little

in all these inquiries

further than our experience.

Indeed some few of the primary qualities have a necessary dependence and visible connexion one with another, as figure necessarily supposes extension; receiving or

communicating motion by

impulse, supposes solidity. But though these, and perhaps some others of our ideas have: yet there

them that have a visible connexion one with another, that we can by intuition or demonstration discover the co-existence of very few of the qualities that are to be found united are so few of

and we are left only to the assistance of our senses to make known touswhat qualities they contain. For of all the qualities that are co-existent in any subject, without this dependence and evident connexion of their ideas one with another, we cannot know certainly any two to co-exist, any further than experience, by our senses, informs us. Thus, though we see the yellow colour, and, upon trial, find the weight, malin substances:

leableness, fusibility,

and

fixedness that are unit-

ed in a piece of gold, yet; because no one of these ideas has any evident dependence or necessary connexion with the other, we cannot certainly

know

that

where any four of these

how

will be there also,

are, the fifth

highly probable soever

it

may be; because the highest probability amounts not to certainty, without which there can be no true knowledge. For this co-existence can be no further known than it is perceived; and it cannot be perceived but either in particular subjects, by the observation of our senses, or, in general, by the necessary connexion of the ideas themselves. 3 15. Of repugnancy to co-exist^ our knowledge is larger.

repugnancy to coany subject may have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once v.g. each particular extension, figure, number of parts, motion, excludes all other of each kind. The like also is certain of all sensible ideas peculiar to each sense; for whatever of each kind is present in any subject, excludes all other of that sort: v.g. no one subject can have two smells or two colours at the same time. To this, perhaps will be said, Has not an opal, or the infusion of lignum nephriticum, two col-

As

to the incompatibility or

existence,

we may know

that

:

3

Cf.

Hume,

ing, Sect. iv.

Inquiry concerning

Human

Understand-

CHAP.

CONCERNING

Ill

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

317

these bodies, to eyes differently placed, may at the same time afford different colours: but I take

pend on. And it were to be wished that it were more improved. We find the advantages some men's generous pains have this way brought to

liberty also to say, to eyes differently placed,

the stock of natural knowledge.

To which

ours at the same time?

I

answer, that

it is

different parts of the object that reflect the par-

and therefore it is not the same part and so not the very same subject, which at the same time appears both yellow and azure. For, it is as impossible that the very same particle of any body should at the same time differently modify or reflect the rays of light, as that it should have two different figures and textures at the same time. ticles of light:

of the object,

1

6.

Our knowledge of

the co-existence of

bodies extends but a very little way.

powers

in

But as to the powers

of substances to change the sensible qualities of other bodies, which make a great part of our inquiries about them, and is no inconsiderable

branch of our knowledge; I doubt as to these, whether our knowledge reaches much further than our experience; or whether we can come to the discovery of most of these powers, and be certain that they are in any subject, by the connexion with any of those ideas which to us 2 make its essence. Because the active and passive powers of bodies, 3 and their ways of operating, consisting in a texture and motion of parts which we cannot by any means come to discover; it is but in very few cases we can be able to perceive their dependence on, or repugnance to, any of those ideas which make our complex one of that sort of things. I have here instanced in the corpuscularian hypothesis, as that which is thought to go furthest in an intelligible explication of those qualities of bodies; and I fear the weakness of 1

human understanding is scarce able to substitute another, which will afford us a fuller and clearer

discovery of the necessary connexion and co-

which are to be observed united in several sorts of them. This at least is

existence of the powers certain, that,

whichever hypothesis be clearest

it is not my business to determine,) our knowledge concerning corpor-

and

truest, (for of that

eal substances will be very little

we

made

advanced by any

what qualities and powers of bodies have a necessary connexion or repugnancy one with another; which in the of them,

till

are

to see

present state of philosophy to a very small degree:

I

and

think I

we know but

doubt whether,

with those faculties we have, we shall ever be able to carry our general knowledge (I say not particular experience) in this part

Experience

is

much further. we must de-

that which in this part

*Cf. Bk. II. ch. viii. 2 Cf. Bk. III. ch. xvi. 3 Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxi.

23-26.

if

others, es-

it is easy to conclude dark in reference to naturally have no ideas but what we draw from that of our own, by reflecting on the operations of our own souls within us, as far as they can come within our observation. But how inconsiderable a rank the spirits that inhabit our bodies hold amongst those various and possibly innumerable kinds of nobler beings; and

operations of bodies,

I

much more 4 spirits; whereof we

in the

we

are

how far short

think

come of the endowments and cherubim and seraphim, and infinite sorts of spirits above us, is what by a transient hint in another place 5 1 have offered to my they

perfections of

reader's consideration. 18.

easy

to

Of

relations between abstracted ideas

say

how far

it is

not

our knowledge extends. Thirdly,

As

to the third sort of our knowledge, viz. the agree-

ment

or disagreement of any of our ideas in any

this, as it is the largest field of our knowledge, so it is hard to determine how far it may extend: because the advances that are made in this part of knowledge, depending on our sagacity in finding intermediate ideas, that may show the relations and habitudes of ideas whose co-existence is not considered, it is a hard matter to tell when we are at an end of such discoveries; and when reason has all the helps it is capable of, for the finding of proofs or examining the agreement or disagreement of remote ideas. They that are ignorant of Algebra cannot imagine the wonders in this kind are to be done by it: and what further improvements and helps advantageous to other parts of knowledge the sagacious mind of man may yet find out, it is not easy to determine. This at least I believe, that the ideas of quantity are not those alone that are capable of demonstration and knowledge; and that other, and perhaps more useful, parts of contemplation,

other relation:

would afford us

certainty,

if

vices, passions,

and

domineering interest did not oppose or menace such endeavours. Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, Pt. III. 34. Cf. Bk. II. chh. x. § 9; xxiii. § 13.

4

"5-

And

by fire, who pretend to it, had been so wary in their observations, and sincere in their reports as those who call themselves philosophers ought to have been, our acquaintance with the bodies here about us, and our insight into their powers and operations had been yet much greater. 17.O/ the powers that co-exist in spirits yet narrower. If we are at a loss in respect of the powers and pecially the philosophers

5

JOHN LOCKE

3.8

Morality capable of demonstration. The idea of a supreme Being, infinite in power, goodness, and

wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the idea of ourselves, as

BOOK

be gone over more than once, without any danger of the least change in the ideas. This cannot be thus done in moral ideas: we have no sen-

marks that resemble them, whereby we can them down; we have nothing but words to express them by; which, though when written

sible

understanding, rational creatures, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such foundations of our

set

duty and rules of action as might place morality

for

wherein

amongst the sciences capable of demonstration: 1 I doubt not but from self-evident propositions, by necessary consequences, as incon-

persons. 2

mathematics, the measures of right and wrong might be made out, to any one that will apply himself with the same indifferency and attention to the one as he does to the

difficulty in ethics

testible as those in

The relation of other modes

other of these sciences.

may

certainly be perceived, as well as those of

number and extension and I cannot see why they :

should not also be capable of demonstration, if due methods were thought on to examine or pursue their agreement or disagreement. "Where there is no property there is no injustice," isaproposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid: for the idea of property being a right to any-

and the idea to which the name "injustice" given being the invasion or violation of that right, it is evident that these ideas, being thus thing,

is

and these names annexed to them, can as certainly know this proposition to be true, as that a triangle has three angles equal to two right ones. Again: "No government allows absolute liberty." The idea of government being the

established, I

establishment of society upon certain rules or laws

which require conformity to them; and the idea do what-

of absolute liberty being for any one to

ever he pleases;

I

am as capable of being certain

of the truth of this proposition as of

any

in the

mathematics. 1

9.

Two

things have

made moral

ideas to be thought

incapable of demonstration: their unfitness for sensible representation,

and

their complexedness.

That which

in this respect has given the advantage to the ideas

and made them thought more capable of certainty and demonstration, is, First, That they can be set down and represented by sensible marks, which have a greater and nearer correspondence with them than any words or sounds whatsoever. Diagrams drawn on paper are copies of the ideas in the mind, and not liable to the uncertainty that words carry in of quantity,

their signification.

drawn

An

angle, circle, or square,

and cannot be mistaken: it remains unchangeable, and may at leisure be considered and examined, and the demonstration be revised, and all the parts of it l

in lines, lies

open

to the view,

Cf. Bk. III. ch. xi. § 16.

IV

may

they remain the same, yet the ideas they stand may change in the same man; and it is very seldom that they are not different in different Secondly, Another thing that makes the greater is, That moral ideas are commonly more complex than those of the figures

ordinarily considered in mathematics. whence these two inconveniences follow :

that their

From

— First,

names ar e of more uncertain significa-

simple ideas they stand for not being so easily agreed on; and so the sign that is used for them in communication always, and in thinking often, does not steadily tion, the precise collection of

carry with it the same idea. 2 Upon which the same disorder, confusion, and error follow, as would

a man, going to demonstrate something of an heptagon, should, in the diagram he took to do it, leave out one of the angles, or by oversight make the figure with one angle more than the name ordinarily imported, or he intended it should when at first he thought of his demonstration. This often happens, and is hardly avoidable in very complex moral ideas, where the same name being retained, one angle, i.e. one simple idea, is left out, or put in the complex one (still called by the same name) more at one time than another. Secondly, From the complexedness of these moral ideas there follows another inconvenience, viz. that the mind cannot easily retain those precise combinations so exactly and perfectly as is necessary in the examination of the habitudes and correspondences, agreements or disagreements, of several of them one with another; especially where it is to be judged of by long deif

and the intervention of several other complex ideas to show the agreement or disagreement of two remote ones. The great help against this which mathematicians find in diagrams and figures, which remain unalterable in their draughts, is very apparent, and the memory would often have great ductions,

difficulty otherwise to retain

whilst the

mind went over

them

so exactly,

the parts of them step

by step to examine their several correspondences.

And though

in casting

up a long sum

either in

addition, multiplication, or division, every part be only a progression of the mind taking a view of its

own

ideas,

and considering their agreement

*Cf. Bk. III. chh. v;

ix.

§§ 6, 7;

xi.

§§ 15-18.

CHAP.

CONCERNING

Ill

or disagreement,

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

and the resolution of the ques-

tion be nothing but the result of the whole,

up

of such particulars, whereof the

made

mind has

clear perception: yet, without setting

down

a

the

by marks, whose precise significaknown, and by marks that last, and remain in view when the memory had let them go, it would be almost impossible to carry so many different ideas in the mind, without confounding or letting slip some parts of the reckoning, and thereby making all our reasonings about it useless. In which case the cyphers or marks help not the mind at all to perceive the agreement of any two or more numbers, their equalities or proportions; that the mind has only by intuition of its own ideas of the numbers themselves. But the several parts tions are

numerical characters are helps to the memory, to record and retain the several ideas about which the demonstration is made, whereby a man may

know how far

his intuitive

knowledge

in survey-

ing several of the particulars has proceeded; that so he

may without confusion go on to what is yet

unknown; and

him

at last

the result of

all his

have

in

one view before

perceptions and reason-

20. Remedies of our difficulties in dealing demonstra-

One part of these disadvanwhich has made them be thought not capable of demonstration, may in a

tively

with moral ideas.

tages in moral ideas

good measure be remedied by ting

ceived into his breast so ugly a thing as a lie? Whilst the parties of men cram their tenets down all men's throats whom they can get into their power, without permitting them to examine their truth or falsehood and will not let truth have fair play in the world, nor men the liberty to search after it: what improvements can be expected of this kind? What greater light can be hoped for in the moral sciences? The subject part of mankind in most places might, instead thereof, with Egyptian bondage, expect Egyptian darkness, were not the candle of the Lord set up by him2 self in men's minds, which it is impossible for the breath or power of man wholly to extinguish. 3 ;

21.O/ the

three real existences of which

tain knowledge. Fourthly,

down

definitions, 1 set-

that collection of simple ideas,

which

every term shall stand for: and then using the terms steadily and constantly for that precise collection. And what methods algebra, or something of that kind, may hereafter suggest, to remove the other difficulties, it is not easy to foretell. Confident I am, that, if men would in the same method, and with the same indifferency, search after moral as they do mathematical truths, they would find them have a stronger connexion one with another, and a more necessary consequence from our clear and distinct ideas, and to come nearer perfect demonstration than is commonly imagined. But much of this is not to be expected, whilst the desire of esteem, riches, or power makes men espouse the well-endowed opinions in fashion, and then seek arguments either to make good their beauty, or varnish over and cover their deformity. Nothing being so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind; nothing so deformed and irreconcilable to the understanding as a lie. For though many a man can with satisfaction enough own a no very handsome wife in his bosom; yet who is bold enough openly to avow that he has espoused a falsehood, and re»Cf. Bk. III. ch.

xi.

§§ 15-18.

As

we have cer-

to the fourth sort of

our knowledge, viz. of the real actual existence of things, we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of a God: of the existence of anything

we have no other but a sensitive knowledge; which extends not beyond the objects present else,

to our senses. 4

Our

Our knowledge

being perhaps give us some light into the present state of our minds if we look a little into the dark side, and take a view of our ignorance; which, being infinitely larger than our knowledge, may serve much to the qui22.

ignorance great.

so narrow, as

ings.

319

I

have shown,

eting of disputes,

knowledge;

if,

it

will

and improvement of

discovering

useful

how far we have clear

and distinct ideas, we confine our thoughts within the contemplation of those things that are within the reach of our understandings, and launch not out into that abyss of darkness, (where not eyes to see, nor faculties to perceive anything) out of a presumption that nothing is beyond our comprehension. 5 But to be satisfied of the folly of such a conceit, we need not go far.

we have

,

He

that

knows anything, knows

this, in

the

first

place, that he need not seek long for instances of

The meanest and most obvious come in our way have dark sides, that the quickest sight cannot penetrate into. The clearest and most enlarged understandings of

his ignorance.

things that

men find themselves puzzled and at a every particle of matter. We shall the less wonder to find it so, when we consider the causes thinking

loss in

2 Cf. Introd. § 5; Bk. IV. ch. ii. § 1. 3Cf. Bk. III. ch. xi. §§ 16, 17; Bk. IV. ch.

xii.

§8. 4 The possible 'extent' of a human 'knowledge' of the three realities is touched here and there in Bk. IV. already in ch. ii. § 14; afterwards in chh. iv, ix, x, xi, and occasionally, by implication, in chh. v-viii; also in Bk. II. chh. xxiii. and xxvii. § 2. ^ Cf. Introd. §§5-7.

—

— JOHN LOCKE

3 20

which, from what has been said, suppose will be found to be these three:

of our ignorance; I

Want of ideas. Want of a discoverable connexion

Its causes. First,

Secondly,

between the ideas we have. Thirdly,

Want

Want

cause of our ignorance

of simple ideas that other creatures in other

parts of the universe

may

have. First, all

the simple

we have are confined (as I have shown) to those we receive from corporeal objects by sensation, and from the operations of our own minds as the objects of reflection. But how much these ideas

few and narrow inlets are disproportionate to the vast whole extent of all beings, will not be hard to persuade those who are not so foolish as to think their span the measure of all things. What other simple ideas

it is

possible the creatures in other

parts of the universe of senses

and

may have, by the assistance

faculties

more or

have, or different from ours,

perfecter than it is

we

not for us to

determine. But to say or think there are no such, because we conceive nothing of them, is no better

an argument than

positive in

and

it,

if

a blind

man

should be

that there was no such thing as sight

colours, because he

had no manner of idea by any means frame

of any such thing, nor could

to himself any notions about seeing. The ignorance and darkness that is in us no more hinders nor confines the knowledge that is in others, than

IV

the intellectual

and sensible world are in this perfectly alike: that that part which we see of either of them holds no proportion with what we see not; and whatso-

we can reach with our eyes or our thoughts them is but a point, almost nothing

of either of in

want of ideas. First, There are some things, and those not a few, that we are ignorant of, for want of ideas.

One

BOOK

may confidently say of it, That

ever

and examining our

of tracing

ideas. 23.

I

comparison of the rest. Want of simple ideas

that men are capable of having, but have not, because of their remoteness. Sec-

24.

ondly, Another great cause of ignorance is the want of ideas we are capable of. As the want of ideas which our faculties are not able to give us shuts us wholly from those views of things which it is

reasonable to think other beings, perfecter

than we, have, of which we know nothing; so the want of ideas I now speak of keeps us in ignorance of things we conceive capable of being known to us. Bulk, figure, and motion we have ideas of. But though we are not without ideas of these primary qualities of bodies in general, yet not knowing what is the particular bulk, figure, and motion, of the greatest part of the bodies of the universe, we are ignorant of the several powers, efficacies, and ways of operation, whereby the effects which we daily see are produced These are hid from us, in some things by being too remote, and in others by being too minute. When we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the world, and the reasons we have to think that what lies within our ken is but a .

small part of the universe,

we shall then discover

a huge abyss of ignorance. What are the particular fabrics of the great masses of matter which

the blindness of a mole

make up

ness of the Creator of all things will find reason

far they are extended; what is and how continued or communicated; and what influence they have one upon

is an argument against the quicksightedness of an eagle. He that will consider the infinite power, wisdom, and good-

it was not all laid out upon so inconsidmean, and impotent a creature as he will, find man to be; who in all probability is one of

to think

erable,

the lowest of ties,

all intellectual

beings.

What facul-

therefore, other species of creatures

have

to

penetrate into the nature and inmost constitutions of things; what ideas they may receive of

them far

the whole stupendous frame of corpor-

eal beings;

how

their motion,

another, are contemplations that at first glimpse our thoughts lose themselves in. If we narrow our contemplations, and confine our thoughts to this little canton I mean this system of our sun, and the grosser masses of matter that visibly move about it, What several sorts of vegetables, ani-

—

and

mals,

intellectual corporeal beings, infinite-

we know not. This we know and certainly find, that we want several other views of them besides those we have, to make discoveries of them more perfect. And we may be convinced that the ideas we can attain to by

ly different

our faculties are very disproportionate to things themselves, when a positive, clear, distinct one of substance itself, which is the foundation of all the rest, 1 is concealed from us. But want of ideas of this kind, being a part as well as cause of our ignorance, cannot be described. Only this I think

ural means, either by sensation or reflection, to

different

from

ours,

*Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxiii: Bk. III. ch.

vi.

may

from those of our

little

spot of earth,

there probably be in the other planets, to

the knowledge of which, even of their outward and parts, we can no way attain whilst

figures

we

are confined to this earth; there being no nat-

convey their certain ideas into our minds? They are out of the reach of those inlets of all our knowledge: and what sorts of furniture and inhabitants those mansions contain in them we cannot so

much

as guess,

ideas of them.

much less have clear and distinct

CONCERNING

chap, in

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

25. Because of their minuteness. If a great, nay, far the greatest part of the several ranks of bodies

321

under names, and we think ourselves best acquainted with, we have but very imperfect and

in the universe escape

incomplete ideas

ness, there are others that are

sorts of bodies that fall

under the examination

of our senses perhaps we

may have: but adequate

our notice by their remoteno less concealed from us by their minuteness. These insensible corpuscles, being the active parts of matter, and the great instruments of nature, on which depend not only all their secondary qualities, but also most of their natural operations, our want of precise distinct ideas of their primary qualities keeps us in an incurable ignorance of what we desire to know about them. I doubt not but if we could discover the figure,

and motion of

size, texture,

the minute constituent parts of any two bodies, we should know without trial several of their

operations one

upon another;

as

we do now the Did we know

1 properties of a square or a triangle.

the mechanical affections of the particles of rhu-

man, as a watchmaker does those of a watch, whereby it performs its operations; and of a file, which by rubbing on them will alter the figure of any of the wheels; barb, hemlock, opium, and a

us for

Distinct ideas of the several

we have

ideas, I suspect,

them.

of.

not of any one amongst

And though the former of these will serve common use and discourse, yet whilst we

want the latter, we are not capable of scientifical knowledge nor shall ever be able to discover gen;

unquestionable truths concerning them. Certainty and demonstration are things we must not, in these matters, pretend to. By the eral, instructive,

and

and other sensiand distinct ideas of sage and hemlock, as we have of a circle and a triangle: but having no ideas of the particular primary qualities of the minute parts of either of these plants, nor of other bodies which we would apply them to, we cannot tell what effects they colour, figure, taste, ble qualities,

we have

smell,

as clear

when we see those we so much as guess, much less know, will produce; nor

effects

their

can

man-

beforehand that rhu-

ner of production. Thus, having no ideas of the

and opium make a man sleep: as well as a watchmaker can, that a little piece of paper laid on the balance will keep the watch from going till it be removed; or that, some small part of it being rubbed by a file, the machine would quite lose its motion, and the watch go no more. The dissolving of silver in aqua fortis, and gold in aqua regia, and not vice versa, would be then perhaps no more difficult to know

particular mechanical affections of the minute

we should be barb

than

able to

will purge,

it is

tell

hemlock

to a smith to

kill,

understand

ing of one key will open a lock,

ing of another. But whilst

why

the turn-

and not the turn-

we

are destitute of

enough to discover the minute particles of bodies, and to give us ideas of their mechanical affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their properties and ways of operation; nor can we be assured about them any further than some few trials we make are able to reach. But whether they will succeed again another

senses acute

time,

we cannot be certain. This hinders our cer-

knowledge of universal truths concerning natural bodies: and our reason carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of fact. tain

26. Hence no science of bodies within our reach.

therefore

I

And

am apt to doubt that, how far soever

human industry may advance useful and experimental philosophy in physical things, scientifical still be out of our reach: because we want perfect and adequate ideas of those very bodies which are nearest to us, and most under our command. Those which we have ranked into classes will

1

Cf.

Bacon, Novum Organum, the opening apho-

risms of Bk. II.

parts of bodies that are within our view and reach,

we

are ignorant of their constitutions, powers,

and operations: and of bodies more remote we are yet more ignorant, not knowing so much as their very outward shapes, or the sensible and grosser parts of their constitutions. 27.

at

Much

first

less

will

knowledge

a science of unembodied

spirits.

This

show us how disproportionate our

whole extent even of matewhich if we add the consideration of that infinite number of spirits that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our knowledge, whereof we have no cognizance, nor can frame to ourselves any distinct ideas of their several ranks and sorts, we shall find this cause of ignorance conceal from us, in an impenetrable obscurity, almost the whole intellectual world; a greater certainly, and more beautiful world than the material. For, bating some very few, and those, if I may so call them, superficial ideas of spirit, which by reflection we get of our own, and from thence the best we can collect of is

to the

rial beings; to

the Father of all

spirits,

the eternal independent

Author of them, and us, and all things, we have no certain information, so much as of the existence of other spirits, but by revelation. Angels of all sorts are naturally beyond our discovery; and all those intelligences, whereof it is likely there are more orders than of corporeal substances, are things whereof our natural faculties give us no certain account at all. That there are minds and thinking beings in other

men

as well as himself.

JOHN LOCKE

322

man

has a reason, from their words and actions, to be satisfied: and the knowledge of his own mind cannot suffer a man that considers, to be ignorant that there is a God. But that there are degrees of spiritual beings between us and the great God, who is there, that, by his own search

every

and

we

ability,

can come to know?

Much

less

have

distinct ideas of their different natures, con-

ditions, states, powers,

and

several constitutions

wherein they agree or differ from one another and from us. And, therefore, in what concerns their different species

and properties we are

in

absolute ignorance. 28. Another cause,

between ideas

we

want of a

discoverable connexion

have. Secondly,

What

a small part

of the substantial beings that are in the universe

want

open

our knowledge, we have seen. In the next place, another cause of ignorance, of no less moment, is a want of a discoverable connexion between those ideas we have. For wherever we want that, we are utterly incapable of universal and certain knowledge; and are, in the former case, left only to observation and experiment: which, how narrow and confined it is, how far from general knowledge we need not be told. I shall give some few instances of this cause of our ignorance, and so leave it. It is evident that the bulk, figure, and motion of several bodies about us produce in us several the

of ideas leaves

to

BOOK

IV

regular connexion in the ordinary course of things; yet that connexion being not discoverable in the ideas themselves, which appearing to have no necessary dependence one on another, we can attribute their connexion to nothing else but the arbitrary determination of that All-wise Agent who has made them to be, and to operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak understandings to conceive. 29. Instances. In some of our ideas there are certain relations, habitudes, and connexions, so visibly included in the nature of the ideas themselves, that we cannot conceive them separable

from them by any power whatsoever. And in these only we are capable of certain and universal knowledge. Thus the idea of a right-lined triangle necessarily carries with it an equality of its angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceive this relation, this connexion of these two ideas, to be possibly mutable, or to depend on any arbitrary power, which of choice made it thus, or could make it otherwise. But the coherence and continuity of the parts of matter; the production of sensation in us of colours and sounds, &c, by impulse and motion nay, the original rules and communication of motion being such, wherein we can discover no natural connexion with any ideas we have, we cannot but ascribe them to the arbi;

and good pleasure of the Wise Archineed not, I think, here mention the resur-

trary will

sensations, as of colours, sounds, tastes, smells,

tect. I

pleasure,

and pain, &c. These mechanical affechaving no affinity at all with those ideas they produce in us, (there being no conceivable connexion between any impulse of any sort of body and any perception of a colour or smell which we find in our minds,) we can have no distinct knowledge of such operations beyond our experience; and can reason no otherwise about them, than as effects produced by the appointment of an infinitely Wise Agent, which perfectly surpass our comprehensions. As the ideas of sensible secondary qualities which we have in our minds, can by us be no way deduced from bodily causes, nor any correspondence or connexion be found between them and those primary qualities which (experience shows us) produce them in us so, on the other side, the operation of our minds upon our bodies is as inconceivable. How any thought should produce a motion in body is as remote from the nature of our ideas, as how any body should produce any thought in the mind. That it is so, if experience did not convince us, the consideration of the things themselves would

rection of the dead, the future state of this globe

tions of bodies

of earth,

1

;

never be able in the least to discover to us. These, like, though they have a constant and

and the 1

Cf. ch.

ii.

§ i.

and such other things, which are by every one acknowledged to depend wholly on the determination of a free agent. The things that, as our observation reaches, we constantly find to proceed regularly, we may conclude do act by a law set them; but yet by a law that we know not: whereby, though causes work steadily, and effects constantly flow from them, yet their connexions and dependencies being not discoverable in our ideas, we can have but an experimental knowledge of them. From all which it is easy to perceive what a darkness we are involved in, far as

how

little it is

that

we

shall

of Being,

and the things that

are capable to know.

do no injury

And

are,

we when we

therefore

to our knowledge,

modestly think with ourselves, that we are so far to comprehend the whole nature of the universe and all the things contained in it, that we are not capable of a philosophical knowledge of the bodies that are about us, and make a part of us: concerning their secondary qualities, powers, and operations, we can have no universal certainty. Several effects come every day within the notice of our senses, of which we have so far sensitive knowledge: but the causes,

from being able

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CONCERNING

CHAP. IV

manner, and certainty of their production, for the two foregoing reasons, we must be content to be very ignorant of. In these we can go no further than particular experience informs us of matter of fact, and by analogy to guess what effects the like bodies are, upon other trials, like to produce. But as to a perfect science of natural bodies,

(not to mention spiritual beings,) so far I

30.

I

think,

labour to seek after it. third cause, want of tracing our ideas. Third-

conclude

A

it

lost

Where we have adequate

ly,

we are,

from being capable of any such thing, that

ideas,

and where

world, involved

all in

323

the obscurity of uncertain

and doubtful ways of talking, volumes writ of navigation and voyages, theories and stories of zones and tides, multiplied and disputed; nay, ships built, and fleets sent out, would never have taught us the way beyond the line; and the Antipodes would be still as much unknown, as when it was declared heresy to hold there were any. But having spoken sufficiently of words, and the ill

I

or careless use that is commonly made of them, 3

shall not say

3

1

.

anything more of it here.

Extent of human knowledge

in respect to its uni-

the ideas themselves that they would consider,

Hitherto we have examined the extent of our knowledge, in respect of the several sorts of beings that are. There is another extent of it, in respect of universality, which will also deserve to be considered; and in this regard, our knowledge follows the nature of our ideas. If the ideas are abstract, whose agreement or disagreement we perceive, our knowledge is universal. For what is known of such general ideas, will be true of every particular thing in whom that essence, i.e. that abstract idea, is to be found: and what is once known of such ideas, will be perpetually and for ever true. So that as to all general knowledge we must search and find it only in our minds; and it is only the examining of our own ideas that furnisheth us with that. Truths belonging to essences of things (that is, to abstract ideas) are eternal; and are to be found out by the contemplation only of those essences: as the existence of things is to be known only from experience. But having more to say of this in the chapters 4 where I shall speak of general and real knowledge, this may here suffice as to the universality of our

and not sounds instead of them, have avoided

knowledge

a certain and discoverable connexion between them, yet we are often ignorant, for want of tracing those ideas which we have or may have; and for want of finding out those intermediate ideas, which may show us what habitude of agreement or disagreement they have one with another. And thus many are ignorant of mathematical truths, not out of any imperfection of their faculties, or uncertainty in the things themselves, but for want of application in acquiring, examining, there

is

and by due ways comparing those ideas. That which has most contributed to hinder the due tracing of our ideas, and finding out their relations, and agreements or disagreements, one with another, has been, It is

I

suppose, the

impossible that

men

ill

use of words. 1

should ever truly seek

or certainly discover the agreement or disagree-

ment

of ideas themselves, whilst their thoughts

flutter about, or stick

and uncertain

only in sounds of doubtful

significations.

Mathematicians

abstracting their thoughts from names, and ac-

customing themselves to

set before their

minds

thereby a great part of that perplexity, puddering, and confusion, which has so much hindered men's progress in other parts of knowledge. For whilst they stick in words of undetermined and uncertain signification, they are unable to distinguish true from false, certain from probable, consistent from inconsistent, in their own opinions. This having been the fate or misfortune of a great part of men of letters, the increase brought into the stock of real knowledge has been very little, in proportion to the schools, disputes, and writings, the world has been filled with; whilst students, being lost in the great wood of words, 2 knew not whereabouts they were, how far their discoveries were advanced, or what was wanting in their own, or the general stock of knowledge. Had men, in the discoveries of the material, done as they have in those of the intellectual

^eeBk. 2

III. chh. ix, x.

Cf. Berkeley, Principles, Introd. §§ 23-25.

versality.

in general.

Chap. IV. Of

the Reality of

°

Knowledge*

Knowledge placed in our ideas may be doubt not but my reader, by this time, may be apt to think that I have been all this while only building a castle in the air; and be ready to say to me: "To what purpose all this stir? Knowledge, say you, is only the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas: but who knows what those ideas may be? Is there anything so extravagant as the imaginations of men's brains? Where is the head that has no chimeras in it? Or if there be a sober and a wise man, what difference will there be, by your rules, between his knowledge and that of the most extravagant fancy in the world? They both have their ideas, and 1

.

Objection.

all unreal or chimerical." I

3 4

InBk.

III.

Bk. IV. chh. v-viii. 5 Cf. Bk. II. chh. viii, xxx.

.

'

'

:

JOHN LOCKE

324

book

iv

perceive their agreement and disagreement one with another. If there be any difference between them, the advantage will be on the warm-headed

be two sorts of ideas that we may be assured agree with things.

man's side, as having the more ideas, and the more lively. And so, by your rules, he will be the more knowing. If it be true, that all knowledge lies only in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas, the visions of an enthusiast and the reasonings of a sober man will be equally certain. It is no matter how things are: so a man observe but the agreement of his own imaginations, and talk conformably, it is all truth, all certainty. Such castles in the air will

First,

1

be as strongholds of truth, as the demonstrations

That an harpy

is not a centaur is by knowledge, and as much a truth, as that a square is not a circle."

of Euclid. this ;

way

as certain

'But of

what use

is all

this fine

men's own imaginations, to a

man

is

are,

it is

and

what

:

'

and not of dreams '

Not so, where ideas agree with things. To which I answer, That if our knowledge of our ideas terminate in them, and reach no further, where there is something further intended, our most serious thoughts will be of little more use than the reveries of a crazy brain; and the truths built thereon of no more weight than the discourses of a man who sees things clearly in a dream, and with great assurance utters them. But I hope, before I have done, to make it evident, that this way of certainty, by the knowledge of our own ideas, goes a little further than bare imagination 2 and I believe it will appear that all the certainty of general truths a man has lies in nothing else. 3 3. But what shall be the criterion of this agreement? It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. 4 Our knowledge, therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But what shall be here the criterion? How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves? This, though it seems not to want difficulty, 5 yet, I think, there 1

Cf. Bk. I. ch. iii. § 25. Gf. Locke's Third Letter to Stillingfleet, p. 245. 3 Cf. ch. iii. § 31. 4 Cf. Hume, Inquiry, sect. xii. 5 Cf. ch. i. § 2; also Locke's Third Letter to Stillingfleet, p. 246. 2

to things.

are simple ideas, which since the

mind, as has been shown, can by no means make to itself, must necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind, in a natural way, and producing therein those perceptions which by the Wisdom and Will of our Maker they are ordained and adapted to. From whence it follows, that simple ideas are not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of things without us, really operating upon us; and so carry with them all the conformity which is intended or which our state requires for they represent to us things under those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us: whereby we are en:

;

abled to distinguish the sorts of particular sub-

fancies."

2 Answer:

first

stances, to discern the states they are in,

the knowledge of things

of things as they really are,

simple ideas are really conformed

all

The

knowledge of

only to be prized it is this alone gives a value to our reasonings, and preference to one man's knowledge over another's, that it is that

As

that inquires

after the reality of things? It matters not

men's fancies

4.

and so them for our necessities, and apply them to our uses. Thus the idea of whiteness, or bitterto take

mind, exactly answering that any body to produce it there, has all the real conformity it can or ought to have,

ness, as

it is

in the

power which

is

in

with things without us. And this conformity between our simple ideas and the existence of things, 5 is sufficient for real knowledge. 5.

their

All complex ideas, except ideas of substances, are

own

archetypes.

Secondly, All

our complex

ideas, except those of substances, being archetypes of

the mind's

own making,

not intended to be the

copies of anything, nor referred to the existence of

anything, as to their originals, cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge. For that which is not designed to represent anything but itself, can never be capable of a wrong representation, nor mislead us from the true apprehension of anything,

by its dislikeness to

it:

and such,

excepting those of substances, are all our complex ideas. Which, as I have shown in another place, 6 are combinations of ideas, which the mind, by its free choice, puts together, without considering any connexion they have in nature.

And hence

it is,

that in

all

these sorts the ideas

themselves are considered as the archetypes, and things no otherwise regarded, but as they are conformable to them. So that we cannot but be

knowledge we atreal, and reaches things themselves. Because in all our thoughts, reasonings, and discourses of this kind, we intend things no further than as they are conformable to our ideas. So that in these we cannot miss of a certain and undoubted reality. infallibly certain, that all the

tain concerning these ideas

5 6

is

Cf. chh. ix, xi; also Bk. II ch. xxi. § 2. Cf. Bk. III. ch. v.

CONCERNING

CHAP. IV 6.

Hence

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

the reality of mathematical knowledge. I

doubt not but it will be easily granted, that the knowledge we have of mathematical truths is not only certain, but real knowledge; and not the bare empty vision of vain, insignificant chimeras of the brain: find that

and yet,

if

we will consider, we shall own ideas. The mathe-

only of our

it is

so

little

325

care and regard (as

it

may

seem) to the

most of those diswhich take up the thoughts and engage

real existence of things: since

courses

the disputes of those who pretend to

make it their

and certainty, will. I presume, upon examination, be found to be general propositions, and notions in which existbusiness to inquire after truth

matician considers the truth and properties belonging to a rectangle or circle only as they are in idea in his own mind. For it is possible he nev-

ence is not at all concerned. All the discourses of the mathematicians about the squaring of a

er found either of them existing mathematically,

matics, concern not the existence of

precisely true, in his

i.e.

life.

But yet the knowl-

edge he has of any truths or properties belonging to a circle, or any other mathematical figure, are nevertheless true and certain, even of real things existing: because real things are no further concerned, nor intended to be meant by any such propositions, than as things really agree to those archetypes in his mind. Is it true of the idea of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right ones? It is true also of a triangle, wherever

circle,

conic sections, or any other part of mathe-

exactly practises his rules,

pattern of a virtuous

it really exists.

and which

it is

idea. If it

Whatever other figure exists, that not exactly answerable to that idea of a triangle in his mind, is not at all concerned in that proposition.

And

therefore he

is

knowledge concerning such ideas

certain all his is

real

knowl-

edge: because, intending things no further than they agree with those his ideas, he is sure what he

knows concerning those

figures,

barely an ideal existence in his

of them also when they have a ter: his

ures,

they

when

mind,

will

they have hold true

real existence in

mat-

consideration being barely of those

fig-

which are the same wherever or however exist.

And of moral. And hence it follows that moral knowledge is as capable of real certainty as 7.

mathematics. For certainty being but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, and demonstration nothing but the perception of such agreement, by the intervention of other ideas or mediums; our moral ideas, as

well as mathematical, being archetypes themselves,

and

so adequate

and complete

ideas; 1 all

the agreement or disagreement which find in

we

them will produce real knowledge,

shall

as well

as in mathematical figures. 8. Existence not required to

make

2

For the attaining of knowledge and certainthat we have determined ideas: and, to make our knowledge real, it is requisite that the ideas answer their archetypes. Nor let it be wondered, that I place the certainty of our knowledge in the consideration of our ideas, with

real.

ty, it is requisite

1

2

Cf.

§9.

Cf. Locke's Third Letter to Stillingfleet, pp. 69, 72; also ch. ii. § 15.

existed

and

lives

up

to that

man which he has given us,

nowhere when he writ but

be true in speculation,

i.e.

in

in idea, that

murder deserves death, it will also be true in reality of any action that exists conformable to that idea of murder. As for other actions, the truth of that proposition concerns them not. And thus it is of all other species of things, which have no other essences but those ideas which are in the minds of men. 9. Nor will it be less true or certain, because moral own making and naming. But it will if moral knowledge be placed in the contemplation of our own moral ideas, and those, as other modes, be of our own making, What strange notions will there be of justice and temperance? What confusion of virtues and vice, if every one may make what ideas of them he ideas are of our

here be said, that

pleases?

No

confusion or disorder in the things

themselves, nor the reasonings about them; no

more than

(in mathematics) there would be a disturbance in the demonstration, or a change in

the properties of figures, to another,

if

a

and

their relations

one

man should make a triangle with

four corners, or a trapezium with four right angles: that

abstract knowledge

any of those

but their demonstrations, which depend on their ideas, are the same, whether there be any square or circle existing in the world or no. In the same manner, the truth and certainty of moral discourses abstracts from the lives of men, and the existence of those virtues in the world whereof they treat: nor are Tully's Offices less true, because there is nobody in the world that figures:

is,

change the names by one name, which ordinarily by another. For,

in plain English,

of the figures,

and

call that

mathematicians call a man make to himself the idea of a figure with three angles, whereof one is a right one, and call it, if he please, equilaterum or trapezium, or anything else; the properties of, and demonstrations about that idea will be the same as if he called it a rectangular triangle. I confess the change of the name, by the impropriety of speech, will at first let

disturb

him who knows not what

idea

it

stands

.

JOHN LOCKE

326

drawn, the confor: sequences and demonstrations are plain and clear. Just the same is it in moral knowledge: let a man have the idea of taking from others, withbut as soon as the figure

is

out their consent, what their honest industry has possessed them of, and call this justice if he please. He that takes the name here without the idea put to it will be mistaken, by joining another idea of his own to that name: but strip the idea of that name, or take it such as it is in the speaker's mind, and the same things will agree to it, as if you called it injustice. Indeed, wrong names in moral

discourses breed usually

more

disorder, because

they are not so easily rectified as in mathematics,

where the the

name

of a sign,

figure,

useless

when

once drawn and seen, makes force. For what need

and of no

the thing signified

is

present and

But in moral names, that cannot be so easily and shortly done, because of the many decompositions that go to the making up the complex ideas of those modes. But yet for all this, the miscalling of any of those ideas, contrary to the usual signification of the words of that language, hinders not but that we may have certain and demonstrative knowledge of their several agreements and disagreements, if we will carefully, as in mathematics, keep to the same precise ideas, and trace them in their several relations one to another, without being led away by their names. If we but separate the idea under consideration from the sign that stands for it, our knowledge goes equally on in the discovery of real truth and certainty, whatever sounds we make use of. in view?

10.

Misnaming

of,

One

disturbs not the certainty of the

more we are to take notice That where God or any other law-maker,

knowledge.

thing

hath defined any moral names, there they have

made name

the essence of that species to

and there

which that

not safe to apply or use them otherwise: but in other cases it is bare impropriety of speech to apply them contrary to the common usage of the country. But yet even this too disturbs not the certainty of that knowledge, which is still to be had by a due conbelongs;

it is

templation and comparing of those even nick-

named 1 1

ideas.

Our complex

ideas of substances have their arche-

and here knowledge comes short. Thirdly, There is another sort of complex ideas, which, being referred to archetypes without us, may differ from them, and so our knowledge about them may come short of being real. Such are our ideas of substances, which, consisting of a collection of simple ideas, supposed taken from the works of nature, may yet vary from them; by having more or different ideas united in them types without us;

BOOK

IV

than are to be found united in the things themselves. From whence it comes to pass, that they may, and often do, fail of being exactly conformable to things themselves. 12.

1

So far as our complex ideas agree with those

archetypes without us, so far our knowledge concerning

substances

may

say, then, that to have ideas of by being conformable to things,

is real. I

substances which,

afford us real knowledge,

it is

not enough,

as in modes, to put together such ideas as

inconsistence,

have no though they did never before so

exist: v.g. the ideas of sacrilege

or perjury,

&c,

and true ideas before, as after the existence of any such fact. But our ideas of substances, being supposed copies, and referred to archetypes without us, must still be taken from something that does or has existed they must not were

as real

:

consist of ideas put together at the pleasure of our

thoughts, without any real pattern they were taken from, though we can perceive no inconsistence in such a combination. The reason whereof is, because we, knowing not what real constitution

whereon our simand which really is the cause union of some of them one with anit is

of substances

ple ideas depend,

of the strict

other, and the exclusion of others; there are very few of them that we can be sure are or are not inconsistent in nature, any further than experience and sensible observation reach. 2 Herein, therefore, is founded the reality of our knowledge concerning substances That all our complex ideas of them must be such, and such only, as are made up of such simple ones as have been discovered 3 to co-exist in nature. And our ideas being thus true, though not perhaps very exact

—

copies, are yet the subjects of real (as far as

we

have any) knowledge of them. Which (as has been already shown) will not be found to reach very far: but so far as it does, it will still be real knowledge. Whatever ideas we have, the agreement we find they have with others will still be knowledge. If those ideas be abstract, it will be general knowledge. But to make it real concerning substances, the ideas must be taken from the real existence of things. Whatever simple ideas have been found to co-exist in any substance, these we may with confidence join together again, and so make abstract ideas of substances. For whatever have once had an union in nature,

may

be united again.

we must connames or speby names. This, if we rightly con-

13. In our inquiries about substances,

sider ideas, cies

and not

supposed set out

confine our thoughts to

iCf. Bk. II. ch. xxiii. § 2 Cf. Bk. II. ch. i. § 2. 3Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxiii. §

1.

1.

CONCERNING

CHAP. IV

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

327

and confine not our thoughts and abstract if there were, or could be no other sorts of things than what known names had

thoughts or opinions, nor distinguishes them according to names and species of our contrivance.

already determined, and, as it were, set out, we should think of things with greater freedom and

we

sider,

ideas to names, as

confusion than perhaps we do. It would posthought a bold paradox, if not a very

less

sibly be

dangerous falsehood, if I should say that some who have lived forty years together, without any appearance of reason, are something between a man and a beast: which prejudice is founded upon nothing else but a false supposition, that these two names, man and beast, stand for distinct species so set out by real essences, that there can come no other species between them: whereas if we will abstract from those names, and the supposition of such specific essences made by nature, wherein all things of the same denominations did exactly and equally partake; if we would not fancy that there were a certain number of these essences, wherein all things, as in moulds, were cast and formed; we should find that the idea of the shape, motion, and life of a man without reason, is as much a changelings,

and makes as much a distinct sort man and beast, as the idea of the shape of an ass with reason would be different from either that of man or beast, and be a species of an animal between, or distinct from both. distinct idea,

of things from

And we

know so little of this present world may, I think, content ourselves without being peremptory in defining the different states which creatures shall come into when they go off this stage. It may suffice us, that He hath are

that

in,

made known

to all those

who

are capable of in-

and reasoning, that they shall come to an account, and receive according to what they have done in this body. 15. What will become of changelings in a future struction, discoursing,

state?

But, Secondly,

men's question

(viz.

I

answer, The force of these Will you deprive change-

is founded on one of these two suppositions, which are both false. The first is, That all things that have the outward shape and appearance of a man must necessarily be designed to an immortal future being after this life: or, secondly, That whatever is of human birth must be so. Take away these imaginations, and such questions will be groundless and ridiculous. I desire then those who think there is no more but an accidental difference between themselves and changelings, the essence in both being exactly the same, to consider, whether they can imagine immortality annexed to any outward

lings of a future state?)

between a

shape of the body; the very proposing it is, I suppose, enough to make them disown it. No one yet, that ever I heard of, how much soever immersed in matter, allowed that excellency to any

will

figure of the gross sensible

14. Objection against a changeling being something

man and beast, answered. Here everybody be ready to ask, If changelings may be supposed something between man and beast, pray what are they? I answer, changelings; which is as good a word to signify something different from the signification oiman or

beast, as

the

names man

and beast are to have significations different one from the other. This, well considered, would resolve this matter, and show my meaning without any more ado. But I am not so unacquainted with the zeal of some men, which enables them to spin consequences, and to see religion threatened, whenever any one ventures to quit their forms of speaking, as not to foresee what names 1

such a proposition as this is like to be charged with: and without doubt it will be asked, If changelings are something between man and beast,

what

will

become

of

them

in the other

To which I answer, 1. It concerns me not know or inquire. To their own master they stand or fall. It will make their state neither better nor worse, whether we determine anything of it or no. They are in the hands of a faithful Creator and a bountiful Father, who disposes world? to

not of his creatures according to our narrow 1

Cf. Bk. III. ch. vi. § 26.

affirm eternal

sequence of it; after

its

after to

outward parts, as to due to it, or a necessary conor that any mass of matter should, life

dissolution here, be again restored here-

an everlasting

state of sense, perception,

and knowledge, only because it was moulded into this or that figure, and had such a particular frame of its visible parts. Such an opinion as this, placing immortality in a certain superficial

fig-

ure, turns out of doors all consideration of soul

upon whose account alone some corpohave hitherto been concluded immortal, and others not. This is to attribute more to the outside than inside of things; and to place the excellency of a man more in the external or spirit:

real beings

shape of his body, than internal perfections of his soul: which is but little better than to annex the great and inestimable advantage of immortality and life everlasting, which he has above other material beings, to annex

it,

I

say, to the cut of

For this or outward mark of our bodies no more carries with it the hope of an eternal duration, than the fashion of a man's suit gives him reasonable grounds to imagine it will never wear out, or that his beard, or the fashion of his coat.

that

JOHN LOCKE

328

make him immortal.

perhaps be said, that nobody thinks that the shape makes anything immortal, but it is the shape is the sign of a rational soul within, which is immortal. I wonder who made it the sign of any such thing: it

will

It will

for barely saying it, will not make it so. It would require some proofs to persuade one of it. No figure that I know speaks any such language. For

may as rationally be concluded, that the dead body of a man, wherein there is to be found no more appearance or action of life than there is

it

in a statue, has yet nevertheless a living soul in it,

because of

its

shape; as that there

is

a rational

soul in a changeling, because he has the outside

of a rational creature,

when

his actions carry far

marks of reason with them, in the whole life, than what are to be found in

less

course of his

many

a beast. 1

Monsters. But it is the issue of rational parand must therefore be concluded to have a rational soul. I know not by what logic you must 1

6.

ents,

so conclude.

I

men nowhere

am

sure this

is

For

a conclusion that

they did, they would not make bold, as everywhere they do, to destroy ill-formed and mis-shaped productions. Ay, but these are monsters. Let them be so: what will your drivelling, unintelligent, intractable changeling be? Shall a defect in the body make a monster; a defect in the mind (the far more allow

noble, and, in the

of.

common

if

phrase, the far

essential part) not? Shall the

want of a

more

nose, or

make

a monster, and put such issue out men; the want of reason and understanding, not? This is to bring all back again to what was exploded just now: this is to place

a neck,

of the rank of

all in the shape, and to take the measure of a man only by his outside. To show that according to the ordinary way of reasoning in this matter, people do lay the whole stress on the figure, and

resolve the (as they

whole essence of the species of man it) into the outward shape, how

make

unreasonable soever it be, and how much soever they disown it, we need but trace their thoughts and practice a little further, and then it will plainly appear. The well-shaped changeling is a man, has a rational soul, though it appear not: this is past doubt, say you: make the ears a little longer, and more pointed, and the nose a little flatter than ordinary, and then you begin to boggle: make the face yet narrower, flatter, and longer, and then you are at a stand: add still more and more of the likeness of a brute to it, and let the head be perfectly that of some other animal, then presently it is a monster; and it is demonstration with you that it hath no rational soul, 1

Gf. ch.

iii.

§ 6; also

Bk. II. ch. xxi. §

2.

BOOK

IV

and must be destroyed. Where now (I ask) shall be the just measure; which the utmost bounds of that shape, that carries with

For, since there have been

it

a rational soul?

human

foetuses produced, half beast and half man; and others three parts one, and one part the other; and so it is possible they may be in all the variety of approaches to the one or the other shape, and may have several degrees of mixture of the likeness of a man, or a brute; I would gladly know what are those precise lineaments, which, according to this hypothesis, are or are not capable of a rational soul to be joined to them. What sort of out-

—

side

is

the certain sign that there

is

or

is

not such

an inhabitant within? For till that be done, we talk at random of man: and shall always, I fear, do so, as long as we give ourselves up to certain sounds, and the imaginations of settled and fixed species in nature,

we know

not what. But, after

may be considered,

that those who think they have answered the difficulty, by tellall, I

desire

it

ing us, that a mis-shaped foetus into the

same

is

a monster, run

fault they are arguing against;

constituting a species between

man and

by

beast.

For what else, I pray, is their monster in the case, (if the word monster signifies anything at all,) but something neither man nor beast, but parof either? And just so is the mentioned. So necessary is it to quit the common notion of species and essences, if we will truly look into the nature of things, and examine them by what our faculties can discover in them as they exist, and not by groundless fancies that have been taken up about them. Words and species. I have mentioned this 1 7. here, because I think we cannot be too cautious that words and species, in the ordinary notions which we have been used to of them, impose not on us. For I am apt to think therein lies one great obstacle to our clear and distinct knowledge, especially in reference to substances: and from thence has risen a great part of the difficulties about truth and certainty. Would we accustom ourselves to separate our contemplations and reasonings from words, we might in a great measure remedy this inconvenience within our own thoughts: but yet it would still disturb us in our discourse with others, as long as we retained

taking

somewhat

changeling before

the opinion, that species

and

their essences

were

anything else but our abstract ideas (such as they are) with names annexed to them, to be the signs of them. 18. Recapitulation. Wherever we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, there is certain knowledge: 2 and wherever we are 2

Cf. Locke's Third Letter to Stillingfleet, p. 289.

—

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CONCERNING

CHAP. V

sure those ideas agree with the reality of things, there is certain real knowledge. Of which agreeof our ideas with the reality of things, hav-

ment

ing here given the marks, I think, I have shown 1 wherein it is that certainty, real certainty, consists. Which, whatever it was to others, was, I confess,

me

to I

heretofore, one of those desiderata

found great want

of.

Chap. V. Of Truth i

What

.

many

truth

is.

in

General

What is truth? was an

ages since; and

mankind

which

it

inquiry

being that which

all

2 either do, or pretend to search after,

cannot but be worth our while carefully to exit consists; and so acquaint ourselves with the nature of it, as to observe how the mind distinguishes it from falsehood.

attentively

us

made use of,

what are

329

serve for a

those things

we have

mark

clear

to show and per-

not. For if we way our mind takes in we shall find, I suppose,

and what

fect established ideas of,

will curiously observe the

thinking and reasoning,

when we make any

propositions within our thoughts about white or black, sweet or bitter, a triangle or a circle, we can and often do frame in our minds the ideas themselves, without reflecting on the names. But when we would conthat

own

sider, or

make

propositions about the

plex ideas, as of a man, usually put the

name

more com-

vitriol, fortitude, glory,

for the idea:

names stand

being for the most

it

ideas these

amine wherein

part imperfect, confused, and undetermined,

2.

A

Things signi-

The

propositions. In substances, as has been already

right joining or separating of signs,

i.e.

either

Truth, then, seems to me, in the proper import of the word, to signify nothing but the joining or separating of Signs, as the

them do agree or disagree one with another. 3

joining or separating of signs here meant,

by another name we

there are two sorts, viz. ideas

what

So that truth propositions: 4 whereof mental and verbal: as

there are two sorts of signs of, viz.

is

call proposition.

properly belongs only to

commonly made

use

and words.

3. Which make mental or verbal propositions. To form a clear notion of truth, it is very necessary to consider truth of thought, and truth of words, distinctly one from another: but yet it is very dif-

ficult to treat of

them asunder. Because

it is

un-

avoidable, in treating of mental propositions, to

make

we

on the names themselves, because they are more clear, certain, and distinct, and readier occur to our thoughts than the pure ideas: and so we make useof these words instead of the ideas themselves, even when we would meditate and reason within ourselves, and make tacit mental

ideas or words.

fied by

for,

we

because the

use of words: and then the instances given

reflect

noticed, this

is

occasioned by the imperfections

we making the name stand for the real essence, of which we have no idea at all. In modes, it is occasioned by the great number of of our ideas:

simple ideas that go to the making them up. For many of them being compounded, the name occurs much easier than the complex idea itself,

which requires time and attention lected,

and exactly represented

to

be recol-

to the mind,

even in those men who have formerly been at the pains to do it; and is utterly impossible to be done by those who, though they have ready in their

memory

the greatest part of the

common

of mental propositions cease immediately to be

words of that language, yet perhaps never trou-

barely mental, and

become verbal. For a mental being nothing but a bare consideration of the ideas, as they are in our minds, stripped of names, they lose the nature of purely mental propositions as soon as they are put into words. 4. Mental propositions are very hard to be treated of. And that which makes it yet harder to treat of mental and verbal propositions separately is, that most men, if not all, in their thinking and reasonings within themselves, make use of words

bled themselves in

proposition

precise ideas the

instead of ideas; at least

when the subject of their

meditation contains in it complex ideas. Which is a great evidence of the imperfection and uncertainty of our ideas of that kind, and may, if 1

2

Cf. chh. ii. § 14; iii. § 21; ix; xi. Cf. Locke's letter to Collins, Oct. 29,

ch. xix. § 1. 3 Cf. ch. xxi. §4. 4 Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxii. §

1.

1

703; also

all their lives to

consider what

most of them stood for. Some confused or obscure notions have served their turns; and many who talk very much of religion and conscience, of church and faith, of power and

and humours, melancholy and would perhaps have little left in their thoughts and meditations if one should desire them to think only of the things themselves and

right,

of obstructions

choler,

lay by those words with which they so often confound others, and not seldom themselves also. 5. Mental and verbal propositions contrasted. But to return to the consideration of truth: we must, I say, observe two sorts of propositions that we are capable of making: First, mental, wherein the ideas in our understandings are without the use of words put together, or separated, by the mind perceiving or judging of their agreement or disagreement. Secondly, Verbal propositions, which are

JOHN LOCKE

33 o

words, the signs of our ideas, put together or separated in affirmative or negative sentences. By which way of affirming or denying, these signs, made by sounds, are, as it were, put together or separated one from another. So that proposition consists in joining or separating signs;

and truth

consists in the putting together or separating

those signs, according as the things

which they

stand for agree or disagree. 6. When mental propositions contain real truth, and when verbal. Every one's experience will satisfy him, that the mind, either by perceiving, or supposing, the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas, does tacitly within itself put them into a kind of proposition affirmative or negative; which I have endeavoured to express by the terms putting together and separating. But this action of the mind, which is so familiar to every thinking and reasoning man, is easier to be conceived by reflecting on what passes in us when we affirm or deny, than to be explained by words. When a man has in his head the idea of two lines, viz. the side and diagonal of a square, whereof the diagonal is an inch long, he may have the idea also of the division of that line into a certain number of equal parts: v.g. into five, ten, a hundred, a thousand, or any other number, and may have the idea of that inch line being divisible, or not divisible, into such equal parts, as a certain number of them will be equal to the sideline. Now, whenever he perceives, believes, or supposes such a kind of divisibility to

agree or disagree to his idea of that line, he, as it were, joins or separates those two ideas, viz. the idea of that line, and the idea of that kind of divisibility;

which

is

and

so

makes a mental proposition,

true or false, according as such a kind of

a divisibility into such aliquot parts, does really agree to that line or no. When ideas are so put together, or separated in the mind, as they or the things they stand for do agree or not, divisibility;

that

is,

as

I

may

call

it,

mental

truth.

But

truth of

something more; and that is the affirming or denying of words one of another, as the

words

is

ideas they stand for agree or disagree:

again fling,

is

two-fold; either purely verbal

which

I

shall

speak

of,

(chap,

and and

viii.,)

this tri-

or real

and instructive; which is the object of that real knowledge which we have spoken of already. 7. Objection against verbal truth, that "thus it may all be chimerical." But here again will be apt to occur the same doubt about truth, that did about knowledge: and it will be objected, that if truth be nothing but the joining and separating of words in propositions, as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree in men's minds, the knowledge

BOOK

IV

is not so valuable a thing as it is taken nor worth the pains and time men employ in the search of it: since by this account it amounts to no more than the conformity of words to the chimeras of men's brains. Who knows not what odd notions many men's heads

of truth to be,

and what strange ideas all men's brains are capable of? But if we rest here, we know the truth of nothing by this rule, but of the visionary words in our own imaginations; nor are filled with,

have other truth, but what as much concerns harpies and centaurs, as men and horses. For those, and the like, may be ideas in our heads, and have their agreement or disagreement there, as well as the ideas of real beings, and so have as true propositions made about them. And it will be altogether as true a proposition to say all cenmen are animals; and the certainty of one as great as the other. For in both the propositions, the words are put together according to the agreement of the ideas in our minds: and the agreement of the idea of animal with that of centaur is as clear and visible to the mind, as the agreement of the idea of animal with that of man; and so these two propositions are equally true, equally certain. But of what use is all such truth to us? 8. Answered, "Real truth is about ideas agreeing to things." Though what has been said in the foregoing chapter to distinguish real from imaginary knowledge might suffice here, in answer to this doubt, to distinguish real truth from chimerical, or (if you please) barely nominal, they depending both on the same foundation; yet it may not be amiss here again to consider, that though our words signify nothing but our ideas, yet being designed by them to signify things, the truth they contain when put into propositions will be only verbal, when they stand for ideas in the mind that have not an agreement with the reality of taurs are animals, as that all

things.

may

And

therefore truth as well as knowledge

come under

the distinction of verbal being only verbal truth, wherein terms are joined according to the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for; without regarding whether our ideas are such as really have, or are capable of having, an existence in nature. But then it is they contain real truth, when

and

well

real; that

these signs are joined, as our ideas agree; and are such as we know are capable

when our ideas

of having an existence in nature: which in subwe cannot know, but by knowing that

stances

such have existed. 9. Truth and falsehood

in general. Truth is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas as it is. Falsehood is the mark-

.

CONCERNING

CHAP. VI ing

down

ment

in

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

words the agreement or disagree-

of ideas otherwise than

it is.

And

so far as

marked by sounds, agree to is the truth real. The knowledge of this truth consists in knowing what these ideas, thus

their archetypes, so far only

ideas the words stand for,

and the perception of

the agreement or disagreement of those ideas, according as it is marked by those words. 10.

General propositions

to

be treated of more at

But because words are looked on as the great conduits of truth and knowledge, and that in conveying and receiving of truth, and comlarge.

monly in reasoning about it, we make use of words and propositions, I shall more at large inquire wherein the certainty of real truths contained in propositions consists, and where it is to be had; and endeavour to show in what sort of universal propositions

we

are capable of being

certain of their real truth or falsehood. I

shall begin with general propositions, 1 as

employ our thoughts, and exercise our contemplation. General truths are most looked after by the mind as those that most enlarge our knowledge; and by their comprethose which most

hensiveness satisfying us at once of many particulars, enlarge our view, and shorten our way to knowledge. 1 1 Moral and metaphysical truth. Besides truth taken in the strict sense before mentioned, there are other sorts of truths: As, 1. Moral truth, which is speaking of things according to the persuasion of our own minds, though the proposition we speak agree not to the reality of things; 2. Metaphysical truth, which is nothing but the real existence of things, conformable to the ideas to which we have annexed their names. This, though it seems to consist in the very beings of things, yet, when considered a little nearly, will appear to include a tacit proposition, whereby

the mind joins that particular thing to the idea it had before settled with the name to it. But these

considerations of truth, either having been before taken notice of, or not being

present purpose,

it

may suffice

much

our here only to have to

mentioned them.

Chap. VI. Of their

Universal Propositions:

Truth and Certainty

Treating of words necessary to knowledge. Though the examining and judging of ideas by themselves, their names being quite laid aside, be the best and surest way to clear and distinct 1.

knowledge:

through the prevailing custom I think it is very seldom practised. Every one may observe how common Chh. vi, vii, viii. yet,

of using sounds for ideas, 1

33i

made use of, instead of the when men think and reason within their own breasts; especially if the ideas be very complex, and made up of a great it is

for

names

to

be

ideas themselves, even

makes the consideration of words and propositions so necessary a part of the Treatise of Knowledge, that it is very collection of simple ones. This

hard

to

speak intelligibly of the one, without ex-

plaining the other. 2 2.

General truths hardly

to be

understood, but in verb-

we have, being only of particular or general truths, it is evident that whatever may be done in the former of these, the latter, which is that which with reason is most sought after, can never be well made known, and is very seldom apprehended, but as al propositions. All

the knowledge

conceived and expressed in words. It is not, therefore, out of our way, in the examination of our knowledge, to inquire into the truth and certainty of universal propositions. 3.

Certainty twofold

— of truth and of knowledge.

But that we may not be misled in this case by that which is the danger everywhere, I mean by the doubtfulness of terms,

it is fit

to observe that cer-

twofold: certainty of truth and certainty of knowledge. Certainty of truth is, when words are tainty

is

so put together in propositions as exactly to ex-

agreement or disagreement of the ideas for, as really it is. Certainty of knowledge is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas, as expressed in any proposition. This we usually call knowing, or being certain of the truth of any proposition. 4. No proposition can be certainly known to be true, press the

they stand

where the real essence of each species mentioned is not Now, because we cannot be certain of the

known.

truth of any general proposition, unless the precise bounds

terms stand

and extent of the

for, it is

necessary

the essence of each species, constitutes

and bounds

we know

species

its

we should know

which

is

that which

it.

and modes, is not hard For in these the real and nominal essence being the same, or, which is all one, the abstract idea which the general term stands for being the sole essence and boundary that is or can be supposed of the species, there can be no doubt how This, in all simple ideas

to do.

far the species extends, or

what things are com-

prehended under each term; which, it is evident, are all that have an exact conformity with the idea it stands for, and no other. But in substances, wherein a real essence, distinct from the nominal, is supposed to constitute, determine, and bound the species, the extent of 2 Cf. Locke's 353-54.

Third Letter to Stillingfleet, pp.

JOHN LOCKE

33 2

the general word is very uncertain; because, not knowing this real essence, we cannot know what is, or what is not of that species and, consequently, what may or may not with certainty be af;

firmed of it. And thus, speaking of a man, or gold, or any other species of natural substances, as supposed constituted by a precise and real essence

which nature regularly imparts to every individual of that kind, whereby it is made to be of that species, we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation or negation made of it. For man or gold, taken in this sense, and used for species of things constituted by real essences, different from the complex idea in the mind of the speaker, stand for we know not what; and the extent of these species, with such boundaries, are so un-

known and undetermined,

that

it is

impossible

with any certainty to affirm, that all men are rational, or that all gold is yellow. But where the nominal essence is kept to, as the boundary of each species, and men extend the application of any general term no further than to the particu-

which the complex idea it stands for is to be found, there they are in no danger to mistake the bounds of each species, nor can be in doubt, on this account, whether any proposition be true or not. I have chosen to explain this uncertainty of propositions in this scholastic way, and have made use of the terms of essences, and species, on purpose to show the absurdity and inconvenience there is to think of them as of any lar things in

other sort of realities, than barely abstract ideas with names to them. To suppose that the species of things are anything but the sorting of them under general names, according as they agree to 1

which we make those confound truth, and intro-

BOOK

made up

we cannot be sure. The for how can we be sure that this or that quality is in gold, when we know not what is or is not gold? Since in this way of of such terms

reason whereof

speaking, nothing

possible for us to in

tell

which we know

it.

This more particularly concerns substances. The names of substances, then, whenever made to

stand for species which are supposed to be constituted

by

real essences

which we know

not, are

not capable to convey certainty to the understanding. Of the truth of general propositions *Cf. Bk. III. ch. ter,

p. 358.

iii.

§ 13; also

Locke's Third Ut-

it is

for a blind

of a pansy

man is

or

to is

not,

is,

v.g. in

what

parcels of

know that this or that quality or idea has a necessary connexion with a real essence of which we have no idea at all, whatever species that supposed real essence may be imagined to for us to

constitute. 6.

The

truth offew universal propositions concerning

substances

names

is to be

known.

On

the other side, the

when made

use of as they should be, for the ideas men have in their minds, though they carry a clear and determinate signification with them, will not yet serve us to make many universal propositions of whose truth we can be certain. Not because in this use of

of substances,

them we are uncertain what things are signiby them, but because the complex ideas they

ideas.

5.

as

matter the real essence of gold is, yet could we not be sure that this or that quality could with truth be affirmed of gold; since it is impossible

these things might, to people not possessed with

tainty with

know

not to be found, whilst he has no idea of the colour of a pansy at all. Or if we could (which is impossible) certainly know where a real essence,

as carry not with

way; yet those wrong notions of essences or species having got root in most people's minds who have received any tincture from the learning which has prevailed in this part of the world, are to be discovered and removed, to make way for that use of words which should convey cer-

gold but what partakes of

what flower the colour

names the signs, is to duce uncertainty into all general propositions that can be made about them. Though therefore,

clearer

is

:

an essence, which we, not knowing, cannot know where it is or is not, and so cannot be sure that any parcel of matter in the world is or is not in this sense gold; being incurably ignorant whether it has or has not that which makes anything to be called gold; i.e. that real essence of gold whereof we have no idea at all. This being as im-

fied

and

plain

is

several abstract ideas of

scholastic learning, be treated of in a better

IV

stand for are such combinations of simple ones them any discoverable connexion or repugnancy, but with a very few other

7.

Because necessary co-existence of simple ideas

substances can in few cases be known.

ideas that our

names

properly stand ties as

in

The complex

for,

of the species of substances are collections of such quali-

have been observed to co-exist in an un-

known substratum, which we call substance; but what other qualities necessarily co-exist with such combinations, we cannot certainly know, unless we can discover their natural dependence; which, in their primary qualities, we can go but a very little way in; and in all their secondary qualities we can discover no connexion at all: for the reasons mentioned, chap, iii. 2 Viz. 1. Because we know not the real constitutions of substances, on which each secondary quality partic2

Cf. Bk. II. ch.

viii.

§§ 7-26.

CONCERNING

CHAP. VI

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

ularly depends. 2. Did we know that, it would serve us only for experimental (not universal) knowledge; and reach with certainty no further

than that bare instance: because our understandings can discover no conceivable connexion between any secondary quality and any modification whatsoever of any of the primary ones. therefore there are very few general propo-

And

be made concerning substances, which can carry with them undoubted certainty. 8. Instance in gold. "All gold is fixed," is a proposition whose truth we cannot be certain of, how universally soever it be believed. For if, according to the useless imagination of the Schools, any one supposes the term gold to stand for a species of things set out by nature, by a real essence belonging to it, it is evident he knows not what parsitions to

ticular substances are of that species;

and so can-

not with certainty affirm anything universally of gold. But if he makes gold stand for a species de-

termined by

its

nominal essence, let the nominal complex idea of a

essence, for example, be the

body of a certain yellow colour, malleable, fuand heavier than any other known; in this proper use of the word gold, there is no difficulty to know what is or is not gold. But yet no other quality can with certainty be universally affirmed or denied of gold, but what hath a dis-

—

sible,

coverable

connexion or inconsistency with that

nominal essence. Fixedness, for example, having no necessary connexion that we can discover, with the colour, weight, or any other simple idea of our complex one, or with the whole combinait is impossible that we should cerknow the truth of this proposition, that all

tion together;

tainly

gold 9.

is

between nom-

and other simple ideas. As there is no discoverable connexion between fixedness and the colour, weight, and other simple ideas of that nominal essence of gold; so, if we make our complex idea of gold, a body yellow, fusible, ductile, weighty, and fixed, we shall be at the same uncertainty concerning solubility in aqua regia, and for the same reason. Since we can never, from consideration of the ideas themselves, with certainty affirm or deny of a body whose complex idea is made up of yellow, very weighty, ductile, fusible, and fixed, that it is soluble in aqua regia: and so on of the rest of its qualities. I would gladly meet with one general affirmation concerning any quality of gold, that any one can certainly know is true. It will, no doubt, be presently objected, Is not this an universal proposition, All gold is malleable? To which I answer, It

a very certain proposition,

a part of the complex idea the

word gold stands

But then here is nothing affirmed of gold, but that that sound stands for an idea in which malleableness is contained: and such a sort of truth for.

and certainty as this it is, to say a centaur is fourBut if malleableness make not a part of

footed.

the specific essence the name of gold stands for,

if

malleableness be

it

not a certain proposition. Because, let the complex idea of gold be made up of whichsoever of its other qualities you please, malleableness will not appear to depend on that complex idea, nor follow from any simple one contained in it: the connexion that malleableness has (if it has any) with those other qualities being only by the intervention of the real is

plain, all gold is malleable,

constitution of

we know

not,

its

it is

insensible parts; which, since

10.

ties

them

As far

we should perceive we could discover that

impossible

that connexion, unless

which

is

together.

as any such co-existence can be known, so

far universal propositions may be certain. But this will go but a little way. The more, indeed, of these coexisting qualities we unite into

one complex idea, under one name, the more precise and determinate we make the signification of that word; but never yet

make

it

thereby more capable of uni-

versal certainty, in respect of other qualities not contained in our complex idea: since we perceive not

connexion or dependence on one another; being ignorant both of that real constitution in which they are all founded, and also how they flow from it. For the chief part of our knowledge concerning substances is not, as in other things, barely of the relation of two ideas that may exist separately; but is of the necessary connexion and their

co-existence of several distinct ideas in the

fixed.

No discoverable necessary connexion

inal essence of gold

is

333

subject, or of their

repugnancy

same

so to co-exist.

Could we begin at the other end, and discover what it was wherein that colour consisted, what made a body lighter or heavier, what texture of parts made it malleable, fusible, and fixed, and fit to be dissolved in this sort of liquor, and not in another; if, I say, we had such an idea as this of bodies, and could perceive wherein all sensible qualities originally consist, and how they are 1

—

produced; we might frame such abstract ideas of them as would furnish us with matter of more general knowledge, and enable us to make universal propositions, that should carry general truth and certainty with them. But whilst our

complex ideas of the sorts of substances are so remote from that internal real constitution on which their sensible qualities depend, and are made up of nothing but an imperfect collection of those apparent qualities our senses can discov1

Gf. Introd. § 7.

JOHN LOCKE

334

there can be few general propositions concerning substances of whose real truth we can be certainly assured; since there are but few simple er,

ideas of whose connexion and necessary coexistence we can have certain and undoubted knowledge. I imagine, amongst all the secondary

and the powers relating to them, there cannot any two be named, whose necessary co-existence, or repugnance to coexist, can certainly be known; unless in those of the same sense, which necessarily exclude one qualities of substances,

another, as

have elsewhere shown. 1

I

think,

by the colour that

tainly

know what smell,

qualities

it

has,

is

in

No

one,

any body, can

I

cer-

taste, sound, or tangible nor what alterations it is capable

to make or receive on or from other bodies. The same may be said of the sound or taste, &c. Our specific names of substances standing for any collections of such ideas, it is not to be wondered that we can with them make very few general propositions of undoubted real certainty. But yet so far as any complex idea of any sort of substances contains in it any simple idea, whose necessary co-existence with any other may be discov-

may with cercould any one discover a necessary connexion between malleableness and the colour or weight of gold, or any other part of the complex idea signified by that name, he might make a certain universal proposition concerning gold in this respect; and the ered, so far universal propositions

tainty be

made concerning it:

v.g.

real truth of this proposition, that all gold able,

would be

is

malle-

as certain as of this, the three angles

of all right-lined triangles are all equal

to

two right

ones. 1

1

.

The

qualities

which make our complex ideas of

and unsuch ideas of substances as to know what real constitutions produce those sensible qualities we find in them, and how those qualities flowed from thence, we could, by the specific ideas of their real essences in our own minds, more certainly find out their properties, and discover what qualities they had or had not, than we can now by our senses: and to know the properties of gold, it would be no more necessary that gold should exist, and that we should make experiments upon it, than it is necessary for the knowing the properties of a triangle, that a triangle should exist in any matter, the idea in our minds would serve for the one as well as the other. But we are so far from being admitted into the substances depend mostly on external, remote,

perceived causes.

Had we

secrets of nature, that

approach the

we 1

we

scarce so

much

as ever

entrance towards them. For are wont to consider the substances we meet

Cf. ch.

iii.

first

§§

1

1

-i

3.

BOOK

with, each of them, as an entire thing by

having

all its

itself,

and independent overlooking, for the most part,

qualities in

of other things;

IV

itself,

the operations of those invisible fluids they are

encompassed with, and upon whose motions and operations depend the greatest part of those qualities which are taken notice of in them, and are made by us the inherent marks of distinction whereby we know and denominate them. Put a piece of gold anywhere by itself, separate from the reach and influence of all other bodies, it will immediately lose all its colour and weight, and perhaps malleableness too; which, for aught I know, would be changed into a perfect friability. Water, in which to us fluidity is an essential quality, left to itself, would cease to be fluid. But if inanimate bodies owe so much of their present state to other bodies without them, that they would not be what they appear to us were those bodies that environ them removed; it is yet more so in vegetables, which are nourished, grow, and produce leaves, flowers, and seeds, in a constant succession.

And

state of animals,

we look a little nearer into the we shall find that their depend-

if

motion, and the most consideris so wholly on extrinsical causes and qualities of other bodies that make no part of them, that they cannot subsist a moment without them: though yet those bodies on which they depend are little taken notice of, and make no part of the complex ideas we frame of those animals. Take the air but for a minute from the greatest part of living creatures, and they presently lose sense, life, and motion. This the necessity of breathing has forced into our knowledge. But how many other extrinsical and possibly very remote bodies do the ence, as to

life,

able qualities to be observed in them,

depend on, which are not vulgarly observed, or so much as thought on; and how many are there which the springs of these admirable machines

severest inquiry

can never discover? The inhab-

itants of this spot of the universe,

yet

though

re-

many millions of miles from the sun, depend so much on the duly tempered mo-

moved

so

coming from or agitated by it, removed but a small part of the distance out of its present situation, and tion of particles

that were this earth

placed a

little

further or nearer that source of

more than probable that the greatest part of the animals in it would immediately perish: since we find them so often destroyed by an heat,

it is

excess or defect of the sun's

accidental position in

some

warmth, which an

parts of this our

little

globe exposes them to. The qualities observed in a loadstone must needs have their source far beyond the confines of that body; and the ravage

CONCERNING

CHAP. VI

made

often

on several

sorts of

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

animals by

ble causes, the certain death (as

we

invisi-

are told) of

some of them, by barely passing the line, or, as it is certain of other, by being removed into a neighbouring country; evidently show that the concurrence and operations of several bodies, with which they are seldom thought to have anything to do, is absolutely necessary to make them be what they appear to us, and to preserve those qualities by which we know and distinguish them.

we

We

are then quite out of the way,

when

think that things contain within themselves the appear to us in them; and we in

qualities that

vain search for that constitution within the body of a fly or an elephant, upon which depend those qualities and powers we observe in them. For

335

much as that size,

and texture of their minute and active parts, which is really in them; much less the different motions and impulses made in and upon them by bodies from without, upon which depends, and by which is formed the greatest and most remarkable part of those qualities we observe in them, and of which our complex ideas of them are made up. This consideration alone is enough to put an end to discover so

figure,

our hopes of ever having the ideas of their real which whilst we want, the nominal essences we make use of instead of them will be able to furnish us but very sparingly with any general knowledge, or universal propositions capable of all

essences;

real certainty. 13.

Judgment of probability concerning substances

which, perhaps, to understand them aright, we ought to look not only beyond this our earth and atmosphere, but even beyond the sun or remotest star our eyes have yet discovered. For how much the being and operation of particular substances in this our globe depends on causes utterly beyond our view, is impossible for us to determine. We see and perceive some of the motions and grosser operations of things here about us; but whence the streams come that keep all these curious machines in motion and repair, how conveyed and modified, is beyond our notice and apprehension: and the great parts and wheels, as I may so say, of this stupendous structure of the universe, may, for aught we know, have such a

may reach further: but that is not knowledge. We are not therefore to wonder, if certainty be to be found in very few general propositions made concerning substances: our knowledge of their qualities and properties goes very seldom further than our senses reach and inform us. Possibly inquisitive and observing men may, by strength of judgment, penetrate further, and, on probabilities taken from wary observation, and hints well laid together, often guess right at what experience has not yet discovered to them. But this is but guessing still; it amounts only to opinion, and has not that certainty which is requisite to knowledge. For all general knowledge lies only in our own thoughts, and consists barely in the

connexion and dependence in their influences and operations one upon another, that perhaps things in this our mansion would put on quite another face, and cease to be what they are, if some one of the stars or great bodies incomprehensibly remote from us, should cease to be or move as it does. This is certain: things, however absolute and entire they seem in themselves, are but retainers to other parts of nature, for that which they are most taken notice of by us. Their observable qualities, actions, and powers are owing to something without them; and there is not so complete and perfect a part that we know of nature, which does not owe the being it has, and the excellences of it, to its neighbours; and we must not confine our thoughts within the surface of any body, but look a great deal further,

contemplation of our own abstract ideas. Wherever we perceive any agreement or disagreement amongst them, there we have general knowl-

to

comprehend

in

it.

perfectly those qualities that are

12. Our nominal essences of substances furnish few universal propositions about them that are certain. If

this be so, it is not to be wondered that we have very imperfect ideas of substances, and that the

real essences,

on which depend

and operations, are unknown

their properties

to us.

We

cannot

1

edge; and by putting the

names of those

ideas to-

gether accordingly in propositions, can with certainty

pronounce general

truths.

But because

the abstract ideas of substances, for which their specific

distinct

names stand, whenever they have any and determinate signification, have a

discoverable connexion or inconsistency with but a very few other ideas, the certainty of universal propositions concerning substances is very narrow and scanty, in that part which is our principal inquiry concerning them; and there

names of substances, let the applied to be what it will, of which we can generally, and with certainty, pronounce, that it has or has not this or that other quality belonging to it, and constantly co-existing or inconsistent with that idea, wherever it is to be found. 14. What is requisite for our knowledge of subare scarce any of the

idea

it is

stances.

Before

edge of 1

we can have any tolerable knowlwe must First know what

this kind,

Cf. ch.

i.

§ 2;

ch. xiv.

JOHN LOCKE

336

changes the primary qualities of one body do regularly produce in the primary qualities of another, and how. Secondly, We must know what primary qualities of any body produce certain sensations or ideas in us. This is in truth no 2 less than to know all the effects of matter, under 1

divers modifications of bulk, figure, cohesion

its

and rest. Which, I think every body will allow, is utterly impossible to be known by us without revelation. Nor if it were revealed to us what sort of figure, bulk, and motion of corpuscles would produce in us the sensation of a yellow colour, and what sort of figure, bulk, and texture of parts in the superficies of any body were fit to give such corpuscles their due motion to produce that colour; would that be enough to of parts, motion

make universal propositions with certainty, concerning the several sorts of them; unless we had faculties acute enough to perceive the precise bulk, figure, texture, and motion of bodies, in those minute parts, by which they operate on our

we might by

those frame our abhave mentioned here only corporeal substances, whose operations seem to lie more level to our understandings. For as to the operations of spirits, both their thinking and

senses, so that

stract ideas of them. I

moving of bodies, we at a loss;

our thoughts a of bodies

how

at first sight find ourselves

though perhaps, when we have applied

and

little

nearer to the consideration

their operations,

and examined

our notions, even in these, reach with any clearness beyond sensible matter of fact, we shall be bound to confess that, even in these too, our discoveries amount to very little beyond perfect ignorance and incapacity. 1

far

5.

Whilst our complex ideas of substances contain we can make but

not ideas of their real constitutions,

few

general certain propositions concerning them.

This

BOOK

whereby they are united together

ford us very

the terms used in

little

universal certainty. Because

our ideas of them are not made up of that on which those qualities we observe in them, and would inform ourselves about, do depend, or with which they have any certain connexion: v.g. let the ideas to which we give the name man be, as it commonly is, a body of the ordinary shape, with sense, voluntary motion, and reason joined to it. This being the abstract idea, and consequently the essence of our species, man, we can make but very few general certain propositions concerning man, standing for such an idea. Because, not knowing the real constitution on 1

2

Cf. Bk. II. ch. viii. Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxi.

1

6.

Wherein lies the general certainty of propositions.

general propositions, of what kind

soever, are then only capable of certainty,

them stand

when

for

such ideas,

whose agreement or disagreement,

as there ex-

capable to be discovered by us. And we are then certain of their truth or falsehood, when we perceive the ideas the terms stand for to agree or not agree, according as they are affirmed or denied one of another. Whence we may take notice, that general certainty is never to be found but in our ideas. Whenever we go to seek it elsewhere, in experiment or observations without us, our knowledge goes not beyond particulars. It is the contemplation of our own abpressed,

is

stract ideas that alone

knowledge. §2.

same

which we can perceive them to have a necessary connexion: and therefore we cannot with certainty affirm: That all men sleep by intervals; That no man can be nourished by wood or stones; That all men will be poisoned by hemlock: because these ideas have no connexion nor repugnancy with this our nominal essence of man, with this abstract idea that name stands for. We must, in these and the like, appeal to trial in particular subjects, which can reach but a little way. We must content ourselves with probability in the rest: but can have no general certainty, whilst our specific idea of man contains not that real constitution which is the root wherein all his inseparable qualities are united, and from whence they flow. Whilst our idea the word man stands for is only an imperfect collection of some sensible qualities and powers in him, there is no discernible connexion or repugnance between our specific idea, and the operation of either the parts of hemlock or stones upon his constitution. There are animals that safely eat hemlock, and others that are nourished by wood and stones: but as long as we want ideas of those real constitutions of different sorts of animals whereon these and the like qualities and powers depend, we must not hope to reach certainty in universal propositions concerning them. Those few ideas only which have a discernible connexion with our nominal essence, or any part of it, can afford us such propositions. But these are so few, and of so little moment, 3 that we may justly look on our certain general knowledge of substances as almost none at all.

To conclude:

evident, the abstract

in the

subject, there are very few other qualities with

complex ideas of substances, for which their general names stand, not comprehending their real constitutions, can afis

IV

which sensation, power of motion, and reasoning, with that peculiar shape, depend, and

3

Cf. ch.

vii. § 5.

is

able to afford us general

CHAP.

CONCERNING

VII

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

Chap. VII. Of Maxims i Maxims or axioms are self-evident propositions. There are a sort of propositions, which, under the name of maxims and axioms, have passed for principles of science: and because they are selfevident, have been supposed innate, without that anybody (that I know) ever went about to show the reason and foundation of their clearness or cogency. It may, however, be worth while to inquire into the reason of their evidence, and see whether it be peculiar to them alone; and also to examine how far they influence and govern our other knowledge. 2 2. Wherein that self-evidence consists. Knowledge, as has been shown, consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Now, where that agreement or disagreement is perceived immediately by itself, without the intervention or help of any other, there our knowledge is self-evident. This will appear to be so to any who will but consider any of those propositions which, without any proof, he assents to at .

1

them he will find that the from that agreement or disagreement which the mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in those ideas answering first

sight: for in all of

reason of his assent

is

the affirmation or negation in the proposition. 3. Self-evidence not peculiar to received

axioms. This

being so, in the next place, let us consider whether this self-evidence be peculiar only to those propositions which commonly pass under the

name of maxims, and have the dignity of axioms allowed them. And here it is plain, that several other truths, not allowed to be axioms, partake equally with them in this self-evidence. This we shall see, if we go over these several sorts of agreement or disagreement of ideas which I have above mentioned, viz. identity, relation, coand real existence; which will discover to us, that not only those few propositions which have had the credit of maxims are self-evident, but a great many, even almost an infinite num-

existence,

ber of other propositions are such. 4. I. As to identity and diversity, all propositions are equally self-evident. For, First, The immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement of identity being founded in the mind's having distinct ideas, this affords us as

propositions as

we have

many

self-evident

distinct ideas.

Every one

that has any knowledge at all, has, as the foundation of it, various and distinct ideas: and it is

the 1

first

act of the

it

Cf. Locke's Third Letter to Stillingfleet, pp.

44. 2

mind (without which

ibid., p.

322.

can 340-

337

never be capable of any knowledge) to know every one of its ideas by itself, and distinguish it from others. Every one finds in himself, that he knows the ideas he has; that he knows also, when any one is in his understanding, and what it is; and that when more than one are there, he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another; which always being so, (it being impossible but that he should perceive what he perceives,) he can never be in doubt when any idea is in his mind, that it is there, and is that idea it is; and that two distinct ideas, when they are in his mind, are there, and are not one and the same idea. So that all such affirmations and negations are made without any possibility of doubt, uncertainty, or hesitation, and must necessarily be assented to as soon as understood; that is, as soon as we have in our minds determined ideas, which the terms in the proposition stand for. And, therefore, whenever the mind with attention considers any proposition, so as

two ideas signified by the terms, and affirmed or denied one of the other to be the same or different; it is presently and infalto perceive the

such a proposition; equally whether these propositions be in terms standing for more general ideas, or such

libly certain of the truth of

and

this

as are less so: v.g. whether the general idea of Being be affirmed of itself, as in this proposition, "whatsoever is, is"; or a more particular idea be affirmed of itself, as "a man is a man" or, "whatsoever is white is white"; or whether the idea of being in general be denied of not-Being, which is the only (if I may so call it) idea different from it, as in this other proposition, "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be": or any idea of any particular being be denied of another different from it, as "a man is not a horse"; "red is not blue." The difference of the ideas, as soon as the terms are understood, makes ;

the truth of the proposition presently visible,

and that with an equal certainty and easiness in the less as well as the more general propositions; and all for the same reason, viz. because the mind perceives, in any ideas that it has, the same idea to be the same with itself; and two different ideas to be different, and not the same; and this it is equally certain of, whether these ideas be more or less general, abstract, and comprehensive. It

is

not, therefore, alone to these

—

two general propositions "whatsoever is, is"; and "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be" that this sort of self-evidence belongs by any peculiar right. The perception of being, or not being, belongs no more to these vague ideas, signified by the terms whatsoever, and

—

JOHN LOCKE

338

thing, than it does to any other ideas. These two general maxims, amounting to no more, in short, but this, that the same is the same, and the same is not different, are truths known in more particular

book

have framed

many axioms

iv

concerning that one

also in particular instances, before

"equals taken from equals, the remainder will be equal"; which, with the rest of that kind, however they are received for maxims by the mathematicians, and are unquestionable truths, yet, I think, that any

these general maxims are ever thought on; and draw all their force from the discernment of the mind employed about particular ideas. There is nothing more visible than that the mind, with-

one who considers them will not find that they have a clearer self-evidence than these, that "one and one are equal to two" that" if you take from the five fingers of one hand two, and from

out the help of any proof, or reflection on either

the five fingers of the other

of these general propositions, perceives so clearly, and knows so certainly, that the idea of white is

maining numbers will be equal." These and a thousand other such propositions may be found in numbers, which, at the very first hearing, force the assent, and carry with them an equal, if not greater clearness, than those mathemati-

instances, as well as in those general

and known

the idea of white,

maxims;

and not the idea of blue; and

that the idea of white,

when

it is

in the

mind,

is

and is not absent; that the consideration of these axioms can add nothing to the evidence there,

relation of equality. As,

—

;

hand two,

the re-

cal axioms.

IV. Concerning

we have

knowledge. Just so it is (as every one may experiment in himself) in all the ideas a man has in his mind: he knows each to be itself, and not to be another; and to be in his mind, and not away when it is there, with a certainty that cannot be greater; and, therefore, the truth of no general proposition can be known with a greater certainty, nor add anything to this. So that, in respect of identity, our intuitive knowledge reaches as far as our ideas. And we are capable of making as many self-evident propositions, as we have names for distinct ideas. And I appeal to every one's own mind, whether this proposition, "a circle is a circle," be not as

what maxims have upon the other parts of our knowledge. The rules established in the schools, that all reasonings are Ex prcecognitis et prceconcessis, seem to lay the foun-

self-evident a proposition as that consisting of

dation of

more general

and

or certainty of

its

terms, "whatsoever

is,

is";

and

7.

real existence,

knowledge. In the next place let us consider,

influence these received

to

all

other knowledge in these maxims,

suppose them

meant

to

be

be not a proposition that the mind can no more doubt of, as soon as it understands the words, than it does of that axiom, "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be?" And so of

these axioms are those truths that are

the like. In co-existence

sitions. Secondly,

we havefew

self-evident propo-

as to co-existence, or such a neces-

sary connexion between two ideas that, in the subject where one of

them

supposed, there the other must necessarily be also: of such agreement or disagreement as this, the mind has an

immediate perception but

And

therefore in this sort

intuitive

very

is

in very

few of them.

we have but very little

knowledge: nor are there to be found

many

propositions that are self-evident,

though some there

are: v.g. the idea of filling a place equal to the contents of its superficies, being annexed to our idea of body, I think it is a

self-evident proposition, that

two bodies cannot

be in the same place.

As

to the relations

these

two

things:

first,

first

that

known

to the mind; and, secondly, that upon them the other parts of our knowledge depend. 9. Because maxims or axioms are not the truths we first knew. First, That they are not the truths first

known to the mind is evident to experience, as we have shown in another place. (Bk. I. chap,

Who

i.)

perceives not that a child certainly

is not its mother; that its not the rod, long before he knows that "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be?" And how many truths are there about numbers, which it is obvious to observe that the mind is perfectly acquainted with, and fully convinced of, before it ever thought on these general maxims, to which mathematicians,

knows that a stranger sucking-bottle

is

do sometimes refer them? Whereof the reason is very plain: for that which makes the mind assent to such propositions, bein their arguings,

ing nothing else but the perception

we may have many. Thirdof modes, mathematicians

6. III. In other relations ly,

think, are

Whereby,

prcecognita.

I

5. II.

no

connexion with any other of our ideas, but that of ourselves, and of a First Being, we have in that, concerning the real existence of all other beings, not so much as demonstrative, much less a self-evident knowledge: and, therefore, concerning those there are no maxims. 1 8. These axioms do not much influence our other

again, whether this proposition, "blue is not red,"

all

none.

Fourthly, as to real existence, since that has

agreement or disagreement of 1

Cf. ch.

ii.

its

it

has of the

ideas, accord-

§ 14; also ch. iv. § 18.

:

CHAP.

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CONCERNING

VII

them affirmed or denied one of another in words it understands; and every idea being known to be what it is, and every two ing as

finds

it

known not

distinct ideas being

to be the same;

must necessarily follow, that such self-evident truths must be first known which consist of ideas

it

that are

first

the mind,

in the

mind.

And

the ideas

first

in

evident, are those of particular

it is

things, from whence, by slow degrees, the understanding proceeds to some few general ones; which being taken from the ordinary and familiar objects of sense, are settled in the mind, with

general names to them. first

Thus particular

ideas are

received and distinguished, and so knowl-

edge got about them; and next to them, the less general or specific, which are next to particular. For abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children, or the yet unexercised mind, as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men, it is only because by constant and familiar use they

are

made

so.

For,

when we

nicely reflect

upon

them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle, (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult,) for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon; but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist; an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together. 1 It is true, the mind, in this imperfect state, has need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge; to both which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection; 2 at

least,

this

is

enough

to

show

and general ideas are not and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest knowledge

that the most abstract those that the

is

mind

is first

conversant about. i

o.

Because on perception of them the other parts of

from what magnified maxims are not the principles and foundations of all our other knowledge. For if there be a great many other truths, which have as much self-evidence as they, and a great many that we our knowledge do not depend. Secondly,

has been said

it

plainly follows, that these

know

before them, it is impossible they should be the principles from which we deduce all othx Cf. Berkeley, Principles, Introd. § 13. »Cf. Bk. II. ch. x. §9.

339

know

and two are equal to three, but by virtue of this, or some such axiom, viz. "the whole is equal to all its parts taken together?" Many a one knows that one and two are equal to three, without having heard, or thought on, that or any other axiom by which it might be proved; and knows it as certainly as any other man knows, that "the whole is equal to all its parts," or any other maxim; and all from the same reason of self- evidence the equality of those ideas being as visible and certain to him without that or any other axiom as with it, it needing no proof to make it perceived. Nor after the knowledge, that the whole is equal to all its parts, does he know that one and two are equal to three, better or more certainly than he did before. For if there be any odds in those ideas, the whole and parts are more ober truths. Is

impossible to

it

scure, or at least

mind than

the

indeed,

all

difficult to

be settled in

and three. And may ask these men, who will

those of one, two,

think,

I

needs have

more

that one

I

knowledge, besides those general

depend on general, inand self-evident principles. What principle is requisite to prove that one and one are two, that two and two are four, that three times two are six? Which being known without any proof, do evince, That either all knowledge does not depend on 3 certain prcecognita or general maxims, principles themselves, to nate,

called principles; or else that these are principles:

and if these are to be counted principles, a great part of numeration will be so. To which, if we add

all

the self-evident propositions which

made about

may

our distinct ideas, principles will be almost infinite, at least innumerable, which men arrive to the knowledge of, at differbe

ent ages;

all

and a great many

of these innate prin-

come to know all their lives. But whether they come in view of the mind earciples they never

lier

or later, this

known by

is

true of them, that they are

all

their native evidence; are wholly in-

dependent; receive no light, nor are capable of any proof one from another; much less the more particular from the

more

general, or the

more

simple from the more compounded; the more simple and less abstract being the most familiar, and the easier and earlier apprehended. But whichever be the clearest ideas, the evidence and certainty of all such propositions is in this, That a man sees the same idea to be the same idea, and infallibly perceives two different ideas to be different ideas. For when a man has in his understanding the ideas of one and of two, the idea of yellow, and the idea of blue, he cannot but certainly know that the idea of one is the idea of one, *Cf. ch.

iv.

§§

7, 8.

JOHN LOCKE

340

and not the idea of two; and that the idea of yellow is the idea of yellow, and not the idea of blue. For a man cannot confound the ideas in his mind, which he has distinct that would be to have them confused and distinct at the same time, which is a contradiction: and to have none distinct, is to have no use of our faculties, to have no knowledge at all. And, therefore, what idea soever is affirmed of itself, or whatsoever two entire distinct ideas are denied one of another, the mind cannot but assent to such a proposition as infallibly true, as soon as it understands the terms, without hesitation or need of proof, or regarding those made in more general terms and called maxims. 1 1 What use these general maxims or axioms have. :

.

What shall we

then say? Are these general maxims of no use? By no means; though perhaps their use is not that which it is commonly taken to be. 1 But, since doubting in the least of what hath been by some men ascribed to these maxims may be apt to be cried out against, as overturning the foundations of all the sciences; it may be worth while to consider them with respect to other parts of our knowledge, and examine more particularly to what purposes they serve, and to what not. (i) It is evident from what has been already said, that they are of no use to prove or confirm less

general self-evident propositions. 2

they are not, nor have been the foundations whereon any science hath been built. There is, I know, a great deal of talk, propagated from scholastic men, of sciences and the maxims on which they are built: but it has been my ill-luck never to meet with any such sciences; much less any one built upon these two maxims, what is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be. And I would be glad to be shown where any such science, erected upon these or any other general axioms is to be found: and should be obliged to any one who would lay before me the frame and system of any science so built on these or any such like maxims, that could not be shown to stand as Brm without any consideration of them. I ask, Whether these general maxims have not the same use in the study of (2) It is as plain that

divinity,

and

in theological questions, that they

have in other sciences? They serve here, too, to silence wranglers, and put an end to dispute. But

BOOK

IV

it, and without revelation these maxims had never been able to help us to it. When we find out an idea by whose intervention we discover the connexion of two others, this is a revelation from God to us by the voice of reason: for

ceived

we then come to know a know before. When God

truth that declares

we

did not

any truth

to

a revelation to us by the voice of his Spirit, and we are advanced in our knowledge. But in neither of these do we receive our light or knowledge from maxims. But in the one, the things themselves afford it: and we see the truth in them by perceiving their agreement or disagreement. In the other, God himself affords it us, this is

immediately to us: and we see the truth of what he says in his unerring veracity. (3) They are not of use to help men forward

advancement of sciences, or new discoverunknown truths. Mr. Newton, in his never enough to be admired book, 3 has demonstrated several propositions, which are so many new truths, before unknown to the world, and are further advances in mathematical knowledge: but, for the discovery of these, it was not the general maxims, "what is, is;" or, "the whole in the ies

of yet

is bigger than a part,"or the like, that helped him. These were not the clues that led him into the discovery of the truth and certainty of those propositions. Nor was it by them that he got the knowledge of those demonstrations, but by finding out intermediate ideas that showed the agreement or disagreement of the ideas, as expressed in the propositions he demonstrated. This is the

greatest exercise

and improvement of human

understanding in the enlarging of knowledge, and advancing the sciences; wherein they are far enough from receiving any help from the contemplation of these or the like magnified maxims. Would those who have this traditional admiration of these propositions, that they think no step can be made in knowledge without the support of an axiom, no stone laid in the building of the sciences without a general maxim, but distinguish between the method of acquiring knowledge, and of communicating it; between the method of raising any science, and that of teaching they would it to others, as far as it is advanced see that those general maxims were not the foun-

—

dations on which the

first

discoverers raised their

think that nobody will therefore say, that the Christian religion is built upon these maxims, or that the knowledge we have of it is derived from

admirable structures, not the keys that unlocked and opened those secrets of knowledge. Though afterwards, when schools were erected, and sci-

from revelation we have re-

ences had their professors to teach what others had found out, they often made use of maxims, i.e. laid down certain propositions which were

I

these principals. It 1

is

Cf. Locke's Third Letter to Stillingfleet, p. 340; also p. 263. 2 Cf. ch. ii. § 4.

3

The

Principia.

CHAP.

CONCERNING

VII

self-evident, or to

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

be received for true; which be-

ing settled in the minds of their scholars as unquestionable verities, they on occasion made use

how much

this

is

341

a mistake, hath been already

shown.

stances, that

How maxims came to be so much in vogue. This method of the Schools, which have been thought the fountains of knowledge, introduced, as I sup-

as those general

pose, the like use of these

to convince

of,

them

of truths in particular in-

were not so familiar to their minds axioms which had before been inculcated to them, and carefully settled in their

minds. Though these particular instances, when well reflected on, are no less self-evident to the understanding than the general maxims brought to confirm them: and it was in those particular instances that the first discoverer found the truth, without the help of the general maxims: and so

may any one siders

who with

else do,

attention con-

them.

Maxims discovered,

of use in the exposition of what has been in silencing obstinate wranglers. To

and

come, therefore, to the use that is made of maxims. ( i ) They are of use, as has been observed, in the ordinary methods of teaching sciences as far as they are advanced but of little or none in advancing them further. :

(2) They are of use in disputes, for the silencing of obstinate wranglers, and bringing those contests to some conclusion. Whether a need of them to that end came not in the manner following, I crave leave to inquire. The Schools hav-

ing

made

disputation the touchstone of men's

and the criterion of knowledge, adjudged victory to him that kept the field: and he that had the last word was concluded to have the abilities,

better of the argument,

means

if

not of the cause. But

was like to be no decombatants, whilst one never failed of a medius terminus to prove any probecause by

cision

this

between

there

skilful

and the other could as constantly, without or with a distinction, deny the major or miposition;

maxims

into a great

part of conversation out of the Schools, to stop the mouths of cavillers, whom any one is excused from arguing any longer with, when they deny these general self-evident principles received by all reasonable men who have once thought of them: but yet their use herein is but to put an end to wrangling. They in truth, when urged in such cases, teach nothing: that is already done by the intermediate ideas made use of in the debate, whose connexion may be seen without the help of those maxims, and so the truth known before the maxim is produced, and the argument brought to a first principle. Men would give off a wrong argument before it came to that, if in their disputes they proposed to themselves the finding and embracing of truth, and not a contest for victory. And thus maxims have their use to put a stop to their perverseness, whose ingenuity should have yielded sooner. But the method of the Schools having allowed and encouraged men to oppose and resist evident truth till they are baffled, i.e. till they are reduced to contradict themselves, or some established principles: it is no wonder that they should not in civil conversation be ashamed of that which in the Schools is counted a virtue and a glory, viz. obstinately to maintain that side of the question they have chosen, whether true or false, to the last extremity; even after conviction. A strange way to attain truth and knowledge and that which I think the rational part of mankind, not corrupted by :

running

education, could scarce believe should ever be admitted amongst the lovers of truth, and stu-

out of disputes into an endless train of syllogisms, certain general propositions most of them, in-

dents of religion or nature, or introduced into the seminaries of those who are to propagate the

nor; to prevent, as

much

as could be,

—

—

deed, self-evident were introduced into the Schools: which being such as all men allowed and agreed in, were looked on as general measures of truth, and served instead of principles (where the disputants had not lain down any other between

them) beyond which there was no going, and which must not be receded from by either side. And thus these maxims, getting the name of principles, beyond which men in dispute could not retreat, were by mistake taken to be the originals and sources from whence all knowledge began, and the foundations whereon the sciences were Because when in their disputes they came these, they stopped there, and went no further; the matter was determined. But built.

to

any of

truths of religion or philosophy

amongst the

ig-

norant and unconvinced. How much such a way of learning is like to turn young men's minds from the sincere search and love of truth; nay, and to make them doubt whether there is any such thing, or, at least, worth the adhering to, I shall not now inquire. This I think, that, bating those places, which brought the Peripatetick Philosophy into their schools, where it continued many ages, without teaching the world anything but the art of wrangling, these maxims were nowhere thought the foundations on which the sciences were built, nor the great helps to the advancement of knowledge.

Of great

use to stop wranglers in disputes, but of lit-

JOHN LOCKE

342 tie

use to the discovery of truths.

maxims, therefore, they

As

to these general

are, as

I

have

said, of

great use in disputes, to stop the mouths of wranglers; but not of much use to the discovery of untruths, or to help the mind forwards in search after knowledge. For who ever began to build his knowledge on the general proposition, what is, is; or, it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be: and from either of these, as from

known its

a principle of science, deduced a system of useful knowledge? Wrong opinions often involving con-

one of these maxims, as a touchstone, show whither they lead. But yet, however fit to lay open the absurdity or mistake of a man's reasoning or opinion, they are of very little use for enlightening the understanding: and it will not be found that the mind receives much help from them in its progress in knowledge; which would be neither less, nor less certain, were these two general propositions never thought on. It is true, as I have said, they tradictions,

may

serve well to

sometimes serve in argumentation to stop a wrangler's mouth, by showing the absurdity of what he saith, and by exposing him to the shame of contradicting what all the world knows, and he himself cannot but own to be true. But it is one thing to show a man that he is in an error, and another to put him in possession of truth; and I would fain know what truths these two propositions are able to teach, and by their influence make us know, which we did not know be-

know without them. Let us reason from them as well as we can, they are only

fore, or

could not

about identical predications, and influence, if any at all, none but such. Each particular proposition concerning identity or diversity is as clearly and certainly known in itself, if attended to, as

either of these general ones: only these gen-

eral ones, as serving in all cases, are therefore

more inculcated and general maxims,

insisted on.

As

to other less

many of them are no more than

bare verbal propositions, and teach us nothing but the respect and import of names one to another. "The whole isequaltoall its parts" what real truth, I beseech you, does it teach us? What more is contained in that maxim, than what the signification of the word totum, or the whole, does of itself import? And he that knows that the word whole stands for what is made up of all its parts, knows very little less than that the whole is equal :

to all

its

parts.

And, upon the same ground,

I

"A hill is higher than like, may also pass for

think that this proposition,

a valley," and several the maxims. But yet masters of mathematics, when they would, as teachers of what they know, initiate others in that science,

do not without reason

BOOK

place this and some other such

maxims

IV

at the

entrance of their systems; that their scholars, having in the beginning perfectly acquainted their thoughts with these propositions, made in such general terms, may be used to make such reflections, and have these more general propositions, as formed rules and sayings, ready to apply to all particular cases. Not that if they be equally weighed, they are more clear and evident than the particular instances they are brought to confirm; but that, being more familiar to the mind, the very naming them is enough to satisfy the understanding. But this, I say, is more from our custom of using them, and the establishment they have got in our minds by our often thinking of them, than from the different evidence of the things. But before custom has settled methods of thinking and reasoning in our minds, I am apt to imagine it is quite otherwise; and that the child, when a part of his apple is taken away, knows it better in that particular instance, than by this general proposition, "The whole is equal to all parts"; and that, if one of these have need to be confirmed to him by the other, the general has more need to be let into his mind by the particular, than the particular by the general. For in particulars our knowledge begins, and so spreads itself, by degrees, to generals. Though afterwards the mind takes the quite contrary course, and having drawn its knowledge into as general propits

ositions as

it

can,

makes those familiar

thoughts, and accustoms

itself to

to

its

have recourse

to them, as to the standards of truth and falsehood. By which familiar use of them, as rules to measure the truth of other propositions, it comes in time to be thought, that more particular propositions have their truth and evidence from their conformity to these more general ones, which, in discourse and argumentation, are so frequently urged, and constantly admitted. And this I think

to be the reason why, amongst so many selfevident propositions, the most general only have had the title of maxims. 2. Maxims, if care be not taken in the use of words, may prove contradictions. One thing further, I think, 1

may not be amiss to observe concerning these general maxims, That they are so far from improving or establishing our minds in true knowlit

edge, that

if

our notions be wrong,

loose, or

un-

and we resign up our thoughts to the sound of words, rather than fix them on settled, determined ideas of things; I say these general maxims will serve to confirm us in mistakes; and in such a way of use of words, which is most common, will serve to prove contradictions: v.g. he that with Descartes shall frame in his mind an steady,

CHAP.

CONCERNING

VII

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

idea of what he calls body to be nothing but extension, may easily demonstrate that there is no

vacuum, i.e. no space void of body, by this maxim, What is, is. For the idea to which he annexes the name body, being bare extension, his knowledge that space cannot be without body, is certain. For he knows his own idea of extension

343

knowledge of our own ideas, more general or comprehensive, can assure us of nothing that passes without the mind their certainty is founded only upon the knowledge we have of each idea by itself, and of its distinction from others, about which we cannot be mistaken whilst they are in our minds; though we may be and often are mistaken :

clearly

when we

it is,

use them confusedly, sometimes for one and some-

and distinctly, and knows that it is what and not another idea, though it be called

by these three names,

— extension, body, space.

names without the

retain the

ideas; or

times for another idea. In which cases the force

and

Which three words, standing for one and the same

of these axioms, reaching only to the sound,

may, no doubt, with the same evidence and certainty be affirmed one of another, as each of itself: and it is as certain, that, whilst I use them all to stand for one and the same idea, this predication is as true and identical in its signification, that "space is body," as this predication is true and identical, that "body is body," both in signification and sound. 13. Instance in vacuum. But if another should come and make to himself another idea, different from Descartes's, of the thing, which yet with Descartes he calls by the same name body, and make his idea, which he expresses by the word body, to be of a thing that hath both extension and solidity together; he will as easily demon-

not the signification of the words, serves only to lead us into confusion, mistake, and error. It is

idea,

may be a vacuum or space without a body, as Descartes demonstrated the contrary. Because the idea to which he gives the name space being barely the simple one of extension, and the idea to which he gives the name body being the complex idea of extension and resistibility or solidity, together in the same subject, these two ideas are not exactly one and the same, but in the understanding as distinct as the ideas of one and two, white and black, or as strate, that there

of corporeity

and

humanity,

if I

may

use those

barbarous terms: and therefore the predication of them in our minds, or in words standing for them, is not identical, but the negation of them one of another; viz. this proposition: "Extension or space is not body," is as true and evidently certain as this maxim, It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, can make any proposition. 14.

But

they prove not the existence of things without

But yet, though both these propositions (as you see) may be equally demonstrated, viz. that there may be a vacuum, and that there cannot be a vacuum, by these two certain principles, viz. what is, is, and the same thing cannot be and not be: yet neither of these principles will serve to prove to us, that any, or what bodies do exist: for that us.

we

are left to our senses to discover to us as far as they can. Those universal and self-evident principles being only our constant, clear, and distinct

to show men that these maxims, however cried up for the great guards of truth, will not secure them from error in a careless loose use of their

words, that I have made this remark. In all that is here suggested concerning their little use for the improvement of knowledge, or dangerous use in undetermined ideas, I have been far enough from saying or intending they should be laid aside; as some have been too forward to charge me. I affirm them to be truths, self-evident truths; and so cannot be laid aside. As far as their influ-

ence will reach, it is in vain to endeavour, nor will I attempt, to abridge it. But yet, without any injury to truth or knowledge, I may have reason to think their use is not answerable to the great stress which seems to be laid on them; and I may warn men not to make an ill use of them, for the confirming themselves in errors. 1 5. They cannot add to our knowledge of substances, and their application to complex ideas is dangerous. But let them be of what use they will in verbal propositions, they cannot discover or prove to us the least knowledge of the nature of substances, as they are found and exist without us, any further than grounded on experience. And though the

consequence of these two propositions, called principles, be very clear, and their use not dangerous or hurtful, in the probation of such things wherein there is no need at all of them for proof, but such as are clear by themselves without them, viz. where our ideas are [determined] and known by the names that stand for them: yet when these principles, viz. what

is, is,

and

it is

impossible for

same thing to be and not to be, are made use of in the probation of propositions wherein are words standing for complex ideas, v.g. man, horse, gold, virtue; there they are of infinite danger, and most the

commonly make men

receive and retain falsehood for manifest truth, and uncertainty for demonstration: upon which follow error, obstinacy, and all the mischiefs that can happen from wrong

reasoning.

The

reason whereof is not, that these

principles are less true or of less force in proving

3° HN LOCKE

344 propositions

made of terms standing for complex

rational

BOOK

IV

men, who have actually denied that they

ideas,

are men.

though the ideas they stand

makes up the complex idea which he calls man, only out of the ideas of body in general, and the powers of language and reason, and leaves out

than where the propositions are about simple ideas. But because men mistake generals—thinking that where the same terms are preserved, the propositions are about the same things, ferent, therefore these

for are in truth dif-

maxims

are

made

use of

sound and appearance are contradictory propositions; and is clear in the demonstrations above mentioned about a vacuum. So that whilst men take words for things, as usually they do, these maxims may and do commonly serve to prove contradictory propositions; to support those

which

as shall yet be further 1

in

made

manifest.

6. Instance in demonstrations

about man, which can

For instance: let man be that concerning which you would by these first principles demonstrate anything, and we shall see, that so far as demonstration is by these principles, it is only verbal, and gives us no certain, universal, true proposition, or knowledge, of any being existing without us. First, a child having framed the idea of a man, it is probable that his idea is only be verbal.

just like that picture

which the painter makes of and such

the visible appearancesjoined together;

a complication of ideas together in his understanding makes up the single complex idea which calls man, whereof white or flesh-colour in England being one, the child can demonstrate to you that a negro is not a man, because white colour was one of the constant simple ideas of the complex idea he calls man; and therefore he can demonstrate, by the principle, It is impossible

he

to be and not to be, that a negro is a man; the foundation of his certainty being not that universal proposition, which perhaps he

for the same thing not

never heard nor thought of, but the clear, distinct perception he hath of his own simple ideas of black and white, which he cannot be persuaded to take, nor can ever mistake one for another, whether he knows that maxim or no. And to this child, or any one who hath such an idea, which he calls man, can you never demonstrate that a man hath a soul, because his idea of man includes no such notion or idea in it. And therefore, to him, the principle of What is, is, proves not this matter; but it depends upon collection and observation, by which he is to make his complex idea called man. 17. Another instance. Secondly, Another that hath gone further in framing and collecting the idea he calls man, and to the outward shape adds laughter and rational discourse, may demonstrate that infants and changelings are no men,

by be

this

maxim,

and not

to be;

it is

and

impossible for the same thing to I

have discoursed with very

18.

A

third instance.

Thirdly, Perhaps another

the shape wholly: this man

is

able to demonstrate

man may have no

hands, but be quadrupes, neither of those being included in his idea of man:

that a

and in whatever body or shape he found speech and reason joined, that was a man; because, having a clear knowledge of such a complex idea, it is certain that What is, is. 19. Little use of these maxims in proofs where we have clear and distinct ideas. So that, if rightly considered, I think we may say, That where our ideas are determined in our minds, and have annexed to them by us known and steady names under those settled determinations, there

is little

need,

or no use at all of these maxims, to prove the agree-

ment or disagreement of any of them. He that cannot discern the truth or falsehood of such propositions, without the help of these and the like maxims, will not be helped by these maxims to do it: since he cannot be supposed to know the truth of these maxims themselves without proof, if he cannot know the truth of others without proof, which are as self-evident as these. Upon this ground it is that intuitive knowledge neither requires nor admits any proof, one part of it more than another. He that will suppose it does, takes away the foundation of all knowledge and certainty; and he that needs any proof to make him certain,

and give

his assent to this proposition,

that two are equal to two, will also have need of

a proof to make him admit, that what is, is. He that needs a probation to convince him that two are not three, that white is not black, that a triangle is not a circle, &c, or any other two [determined] distinct ideas are not one and the same, will need also a demonstration to convince him that

It is impossible for the

same thing

to

be

and not

to be.

20. Their use dangerous, where our ideas are not determined.

And

as these

maxims

are of

little

use

where we have determined ideas, so they are, as I have shown, of dangerous use where our ideas are not determined and where we use words that are not annexed to determined ideas, but such as are of a loose and wandering signification, sometimes standing for one, and sometimes for another idea: from which follow mistake and error, which these maxims (brought as proofs to ;

establish propositions, wherein the terms stand for

undetermined ideas) do by

confirm and

rivet.

their authority

— CHAP.

.

edge.

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CONCERNING

VIII

Chap. VIII. Of i

.

Trifling Propositions

Some propositions bring no

Whether

the

maxims

evident proposition of oyster,

increase to our knowl-

treated of in the fore-

going chapter be of that use to real knowledge as is generally supposed. I leave to be considered. This, I think, may confidently be affirmed, That there are universal propositions, which, though they be certainly true, yet they add no light to our understanding; bring no increase to our

knowledge. Such are 2.

As

identical propositions. First,

tical propositions.

All purely iden-

These obviously and at

first

blush appear to contain no instruction in them;

when we

affirm the said term of itself, whethbe barely verbal, or whether it contains any clear and real idea, it shows us nothing but what we must certainly know before, whether such a proposition be either made by, or proposed to us. Indeed, that most general one, what is, is, may serve sometimes to show a man the absurditv he is guilty of, when, by circumlocution or equivocal terms, he would in particular instances deny the same thing of itself; because nobody will so openly bid defiance to common sense, as to affirm visible and direct contradictions in plain words; or, if he does, a man is excused if he breaks off any further discourse with him. But yet I think I may say, that neither that received maxim, nor any other identical proposition, teaches us anything; and though in such kind of propositions this great and magnified maxim, boasted to be the foundation of demonstration, may be and often is made use of to confirm them, yet all it proves amounts to no more than this, That the same word may with great certainty be affirmed of itself, without any doubt of the truth of any such proposition; and let me add, also, without any real knowledge. 3. Examples. For, at this rate, any very ignorant person, who can but make a proposition, and knows what he means when he says ay or no, may make a million of propositions of whose truth he may be infallibly certain, and yet not know one thing in the world thereby; v.g. "what is a soul, is a soul"; or, "a soul is a soul" "a spirit is a spirit"; "a fetiche is a fetiche," &c. These all being equivalent to this proposition, viz. what is, is; 1 i.e. what hath existence, hath existence; or, who hath a soul, hath a soul. What is this more than trifling with words? It is but like a monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other: and had he but words, might no doubt have said, "Oyster in for

er

it

;

right 1

hand

Cf. ch.

Analytics,

I.

is 1.

subject, §

4;

iii.

345

predicate": and so might have

and oyster § 8;

in left

hand

also .Aristotle,

32; Metaphysics, Bk. IV. chh.

iii,

is

Prior iv, vii.

and

i.e.

made

cyster

is

a selfoyster;

not have been one whit the wiser or more knowing: and that way of handling the matter would much at once have satisfied the monkey's hunger, or a man's understanding, and they would have improved in yet,

with

all this,

knowledge and bulk together.

How

identical propositions are trifling. I

know

some who, because identical propositions are self-evident, show a great concern for them, and think they do great service to philosophy by crying them up; as if in them was contained all knowledge, and the understanding were led into all truth by them only. I grant as forwardly as any one, that they are all true and there are

self-evident.

I

grant further, that the foundation

knowledge lies in the faculty we have of perceiving the same idea to be the same, and of discerning it from those that are different; as 2 I have shown in the foregoing chapter. But how that vindicates the making use of identical propositions, for the improvement of knowledge, from the imputation of trifling, I do not see. Let any one repeat, as often as he pleases, that ''the will is the will," or lay what stress on it he thinks fit; of what use is this, and an infinite the like propositions, for the enlarging our knowledge? Let a man abound, as much as the plenty of words which he has will permit, in such propositions as these: *'a law is a law," and "obligation of all our

is

obligation"; "right

is

right,"

and "wrong

is

—

wrong": will these and the like ever help him to an acquaintance with ethics, or instruct him or others in the knowledge of morality? Those who know not, nor perhaps ever will know, what is right and what is wrong, nor the measures of them, can with as much assurance make, and infallibly know, the truth of these and all such propositions, as he that

is

best instructed in

mo-

can do. But what advance do such propositions give in the knowledge of anything necessary cr useful for their conduct? He would be thought to do little less than trifle, who, for the enlightening the understanding in any part of knowledge, should be busy with identical propositions and insist on such maxims as these: "substance is substance," and 'body is body' "a vacuum is a vacuum, and 'a vortex is a vortex"; "a centaur is a centaur," and "a chimera is a chimera," &c. For these and all such are equally true, equally certain, and equally self-evident. But yet they cannot but be counted trifling, when made use of as principles rality

1

'

'

of instruction, 2

See also ch.

and ii.

'

'

;

§

stress laid 1

on them

as helps to

JOHN LOCKE

346

knowledge; since they teach nothing but what every one who is capable of discourse knows without being told, viz. that the same term is the

same term, and the same idea the same idea. And upon this account it was that I formerly did, and do still think, the offering and inculcating such propositions, in order to give the understanding

any new

light, or inlet into the

knowledge of

no better than trifling. lies in something very different; and he that would enlarge his own or another's mind to truths he does not yet know, must find out intermediate ideas, and then lay them in such order one by another, that the understanding may see the agreement or disagreement of those in question. Propositions that do this are instructive; but they are far from such as affirm the same term of itself; which is no way to advance one's self or others in any sort of knowledge. It no more helps to that than it would help any one in his learning to read, to have such things,

Instruction

propositions as these inculcated to is

as well

able to

him

— ''An A

B is a B" which a man may know as any schoolmaster, and yet never be read a word as long as he lives. Nor do

an A, " and

these, or

'

'a

;

any such identical propositions help

him one jot forwards in the skill of reading, let him make what use of them he can. If those who blame my calling them trifling had but read and been at the pains to understand what I have above writ in very plain English, they could not but have seen that by identical propositions I mean only such wherein the same term, importing the same idea, is affirmed of itself: which I take to be the proper signification of identical propositions; and concerning all such, I think I may continue safely to say, that to propose them as instructive is no better than trifling. For no one who has the use of reason can miss them, where it is necessary they should be taken notice of; nor doubt of their truth when he does take notice of them. But if men will call propositions identical, wherein the same term is not affirmed of itself, whether they speak more properly than I, others

propositions

must judge;

this

is

certain, all that they say of

propositions that are not identical in

concerns not

me

nor what

I

have

my

sense,

said; all that

BOOK IV

4. II. Secondly, propositions in

complex idea

is

which apart oj any

Another

predicated oj the whole.

idea is predicated oj the

is,

word

the definition of the

Such are

defined.

propositions wherein the genus the species, or

sort

when apart oj the complex name oj the whole; a part of

of trifling propositions

is

all

predicated of

more comprehensive

of less

com-

prehensive terms. For what information, what knowledge, carries this proposition in it, viz. ''Lead is a metal" to a man who knows the complex idea the name lead stands for? All the simple ideas that go to the complex one signified by the term metal, being nothing but what he before

comprehended and

signified

by the name lead.

Indeed, to a man that knows the signification of the word metal, and not of the word lead, it is a shorter

word

way

to explain the signification of the

by saying

lead,

expresses several of

a metal, which at once simple ideas, than to enu-

it is

its

merate them one by one,

telling

him

it is

a body

very heavy, fusible, and malleable. 5.

As part

oj the definition oj the term defined. Alike

any other part of the defterm defined, or to affirm any one of the simple ideas of a complex one of the name of the whole complex idea; as, "All gold is fusible." For fusibility being one of the simple ideas that goes to the making up the complex one the sound gold stands for, what can it be but playing with sounds, to affirm that of the name gold, which is comprehended in its received signification? It would be thought little better than ridictrifling

it is

to predicate

inition of the

ulous to affirm gravely, as a truth of moment, that gold is yellow; and I see not how it is any

more material

to say it is fusible, unless that out of the complex idea, of which the sound gold is the mark in ordinary speech. What instruction can it carry with it, to tell one that which he hath been told already, or he is

jot

quality be

left

supposed to know before? For

know

the signification of the

I

am supposed

to

word another uses

he is to tell me. And if I know that stands for this complex idea of body, yellow, heavy, fusible, malleable, it will not much instruct me to put it solemnly afterwards in a proposition, and gravely say, all gold is fusible. Such propositions can only serve to show the disingenuity of one who will go from to

me, or

the

else

name gold

own

have said relating to those propositions wheresame term is affirmed of itself. And I would fain see an instance wherein any such can be made use of, to the advantage and improvement of any one's knowledge. Instances of other kinds, whatever use may be made of them, concern not me, as not being such as I call

ever certain they be.

identical.

knowledge of things than

I

the definition of his

in the

him sometimes

of

it;

terms, by reminding

but carry no knowledge

with them, but of the signification of words, how6. Instance, man and palfrey. "Every man is an animal, or living body," is as certain a proposition as can be; but no more conducing to the

to say, a palfrey

is

an

— CHAP.

CONCERNING

VIII

ambling

horse, or a neighing,

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

ambling animal,

both being only about the signification of words,

—

and make me know but this That body, sense, and motion, or power of sensation and moving, are three of those ideas that I always comprehend and signify by the word man: and where they are not to be found together, the name man belongs not to that thing: and so of the other That body, sense, and a certain way of going, with a certain kind of voice, are some of those ideas which I always comprehend and signify by the word palfrey; and when they are not to be found together, the name palfrey belongs not to that thing. It is just the same, and to the same purpose, when any term standing for any one or

more of the simple ideas, that altogether make up that complex idea which is called man, is affirmed of the term man: v.g. suppose a Roman signified by the word homo all these distinct ideas

—

united in one subject,

corporietas, sensibilitas, po-

tentia se movendi, rationalitas, risibilitas;

he might,

no doubt, with great

certainty,

affirm one, more, or

of these together of the

word word

all

universally

more than say that the homo, in his country, comprehended in its signification all these ideas. Much like a romance knight, who by the word palfrey signified these ideas: body of a certain figure, four-legged, homo, but did no

—

with sense, motion, ambling, neighing, white, used to have a woman on his back might with the same certainty universally affirm also any or all of these of the word palfrey: but did thereby teach no more, but that the word palfrey, in his

—

or romance language, stood for

all these,

and was

not to be applied to anything where any of these

was wanting. But he that

shall tell me, that whatever thing sense, motion, reason, and laughter, were united, that thing had actually a notion of God, or would be cast into a sleep by opium, made indeed an instructive proposition: because neither having the notion of God, nor being cast into sleep by opium, being contained in the idea signified by the word man, we are by such propositions taught something more than barely what the word man stands for: and therefore the knowledge contained in it is more than

in

verbal. 7.

For

to

and makes an

347 unintelligible noise.

therefore he trifles with words who makes such a proposition, which, when it is made, contains no more than one of the terms does, and which a man was supposed to know before: v.g. a triangle hath three sides, or saffron is yellow. And this is no further tolerable than where a man goes to explain his terms to one who is supposed or declares himself not to understand him; and then it teaches only the signification of that word,

And

and the use of that 8.

But adds no

sign.

real knowledge.

We can know then

the truth of two sorts of propositions with per-

The one is, of those trifling propwhich have a certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, but not instructive. And, secondly, we can know the truth, and so may be certain in propositions, which affirm something of another, which is a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it:

fect certainty.

ositions

as that the external angle of all triangles

is

bigger

than either of the opposite internal angles. Which relation of the outward angle to either of the opposite internal angles, making no part of the complex idea signified by the name triangle, this is a real truth, and conveys with it instructive real

knowledge.

General propositions concerning substances are often trifling. having little or no knowledge of 9.

We

what combinations there be

of simple ideas ex-

isting together in substances,

but by our senses,

we cannot make any

universal certain proposi-

tions concerning them, any further than our nominal essences lead us. Which being to a very few and inconsiderable truths, in respect of those which depend on their real constitutions, 1 the general propositions that are made about substances, if they are certain, are for the most part but trifling; and if they are instructive, are uncertain, and such as we can have no knowledge of their real truth,

how much soever constant ob-

and analogy may assist our judgment in guessing. Hence it comes to pass, that one may often meet with very clear and coherent discourses, that amount yet to nothing. For it is plain that names of substantial beings, as well as

servation

have relative significations may, with great truth, be joined

others, as far as they this teaches but the signification of words.

Be-

man makes any proposition, he is supposed understand the terms he uses in it, or else he talks like a parrot, only making a noise by imitation, and framing certain sounds, which he has learnt of others; but not as a rational creature, using them for signs of ideas which he has in his mind. The hearer also is supposed to understand the terms as the speaker uses them, or else he

fore a

talks jargon,

affixed to them,

negatively and affirmatively in propositions, as

make them fit to be so and propositions consisting of such terms, may, with the same clearness, be deduced one from another, as those that convey the most real truths: and all this without any knowledge of the their relative definitions

joined;

nature or reality of things existing without us. 1

Cf. Bk. II. ch.

viii.

By

.

JOHN LOCKE

348

this method one may make demonstrations and undoubted propositions in words, and yet thereby advance not one jot in the knowledge of the

truth of things: v.g. he that having learnt these following words, with their ordinary mutual relative acceptations annexed to them: v.g. sub' stance,

man, animal, form,

rational,

tions

may make

soul, vegetative, sensitive,

several

undoubted proposiall what

about the soul, without knowing at

the soul really

is:

and of this sort, a man may find

an infinite number of propositions, reasonings, and conclusions, in books of metaphysics, schooldivinity, and some sort of natural philosophy: and, after all, know as little of God, spirits, or bodies, as he did before he set out. 10. And why. He that hath liberty to define, i.e. determine the signification of his names of substances (as certainly every one does in effect, who

to

makes them stand

for his

own

ideas),

and makes

their significations at a venture, taking

them

from his own or other men's fancies, and not from an examination or inquiry into the nature of things themselves; may with little trouble demonstrate them one of another, according to those several respects and mutual relations he has given them one to another; wherein, how-

ever things agree or disagree in their

own nature,

he needs mind nothing but his own notions, with the names he hath bestowed upon them: but thereby no more increases in his own knowledge than he does his riches, who, taking a bag of counters, calls one in a certain place a pound, another in another place a shilling, and a third in a third place a penny; and so proceeding, may undoubtedly reckon right, and cast up a great sum, according to his counters so placed, and standing for more or less as he pleases, without being one jot the richer, or without even knowing how much a pound, shilling, or penny is, but only that one is contained in the other twenty times, and contains the other twelve: which a man may also do in the signification of words, by making them, in respect of one another, more or less, or equally comprehensive. 1 1

them.

Thirdly, using words variously

is trifling

with

Though yet concerning most words used in

and controversial, there is this more to be complained of, which is the worst sort of trifling, and which sets us yet further from the certainty of knowledge we hope to attain by them, or find in them; viz. that most writers are so far from instructing us in the nature and knowledge of things, that they use their words loosely and uncertainly, and do not. by using them constantly and steadily in the same significations, make plain and clear deduc-

discourses, equally argumentative

BOOK

IV

one from another, and make their and clear, (how little soever they were instructive); which were not difficult

tions of words

discourses coherent

to do, did they not find

it

convenient to shelter

under the obscurity and perplexedness of their terms: to which, perhaps, inadvertency and ill custom do in many their ignorance or obstinacy

men much 12.

contribute.

Marks

of verbal propositions.

Barely verbal propositions these following marks:

may

To conclude. known by

be

Predication in abstract. First, All propositions

wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about the signification of sounds. For since no abstract idea can be the same with any other but itself, when its abstract name is affirmed of any other term, it can signify no more but this, that it may, or ought to be called by that name; or that these two names signify the same idea. Thus, should any one say that parsimony is frugality, that gratitude is justice, that this or that action is or is not temperate: however specious these and the like propositions may at first sight seem, yet when we come to press them, and examine

what they contain, we shall find that it all amounts to nothing but the signification of those

nicely

terms. 13.

A

part of the definition predicated of any term.

Secondly, All propositions wherein a part of the complex idea which any term stands for is predi-

cated of that term, are only verbal: v.g. to say that gold is a metal, or heavy. And thus all propositions

wherein more comprehensive words,

called genera, are affirmed of subordinate or less

comprehensive, called species, or individuals, are barely verbal.

When

rules we have examined make up the discourses we

by these two

the propositions that

and out of books, them than is usually suspected are purely about the signification of words, and contain nothing in them but the use and application of these ordinarily meet with, both in

we shall perhaps find

that a greater part of

signs.

This I think I may lay down for an infallible That, wherever the distinct idea any word stands for is not known and considered, and something not contained in the idea is not affirmed or denied of it, there our thoughts stick rule,

wholly in sounds, and are able to attain no real truth or falsehood. This, perhaps, if well heeded,

might save us a great deal of useless amusement and dispute; and very much shorten our trouble

and wandering knowledge.

in the search of real

and true

.

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CONCERNING

CHAP. X

our Threefold Knowledge

Chap. IX. Of i

.

come not

ter,

of Existence

Hitherto 1

own

we have only

short of the highest degree of cer-

Chap. X. Of

considered the

our

Knowledge of

Existence of a

essences of things; which being only abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from

1

particular existence, (that being the proper op-

a God.

eration of the mind, in abstraction, to consider an idea under no other existence but what it has

of himself; though he has

no knowledge of real existence at all. Where, by the way, we may take notice, that universal propositions of whose truth or falsehood we can have certain knowledge concern not existence: and further, that all particular affirmations or negations that would not be certain if they were made general, are

his being; 6 yet

in the understanding,) gives us

only concerning existence; they declaring only the accidental union or separation of ideas in things existing, which, in their abstract natures, have no known necessary union or repugnancy. 2.

A

leaving

threefold knowledge of existence. But,

the nature of propositions,

and

different

ways of

predication to be considered more at large in another place, let us proceed now to inquire concerning our knowledge of the existence of things, 2

and how we come by it.

I

say, then, that

the knowledge of our own existence

by

we have

intuition;

of the existence of God by demonstration; other things

by

and of

sensation. 3

3. Our knowledge of our own existence is intuitive. As for our own existence, we perceive it so plainly and so certainly, that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof. For nothing can be more evident to us than our own existence. I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain: can any of these be more evident to me than my own existence? If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. For if I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as certain perception of my own existence, as of the existence of the pain I feel: or if I know I doubt, I have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I call doubt} Experience 5 then convinces us, that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are. In every act of sen-

sation, reasoning, or thinking, 1

Especially

in

we

are conscious

chh. v-viii; also Bk. III. chs.

3

stamped no original

characters on our minds, wherein

we may read

having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not left himself without witness: since we have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as

we

carry

ourselves

about us. Nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this great point; since he has so plentifully provided us with the means to discover and know him; so far as is necessary to the end of our being, and the great concernment of our happiness. But, though this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers, and though its evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical certainty: yet it requires thought and attention; and the mind must apply itself to a regular deduction of it from some part of our intuitive knowledge, or else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other propositions, which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration. To show, therefore, that we are capable of knowing, i.e. being certain that there is a God, and how we may come by this certainty, I think we need go no further than ourselves, and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence. 2. For man knows that he himself exists. I think it is beyond question, that man has a clear idea of his own being; he knows certainly he exists, and that he is something. He that can doubt whether he be anything or no, I speak not to; no more than I would argue with pure nothing, or endeavour to convince nonentity that it were something. If any one pretends to be so sceptical as to deny his own existence, (for really to doubt of it is

manifestly impossible,)

let

him for me enjoy

beloved happiness of being nothing, until hunger or some other pain convince him of the contrary. This, then, I think I may take for a truth, which every one's certain knowledge ashis

sures

him of, beyond

that he

is

the liberty of doubting, viz.

something that actually

He knows

exists.

1

also that nothing cannot produce a be-

n-

ing; therefore something must have existedfrom eternity.

Cf. Bk. II. chh. xxiii. and xxviii. § 2. Cf. Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly

certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce any

Cf. chh.

i.

§ 7;

ii.

§ 14;

iii.

§ 21; iv. §§ 1-4,

18. 4

the

God

We are capable of knowing certainly that there is Though God has given us no innate ideas

3.

v, vi. 2

349

being; and, in this mat-

tainty.

General propositions that are certain concern not

existence.

our

to ourselves of

In the next place,

Conducting the Reason, iv. 6 Cf. ch. ii. § 14; ch. xi.

6

7

Cf. Bk. Cf. ch.

I.

ch.

ix. § 3.

iii.

man

knows, by an intuitive

§§ 8-16.

— JOHN LOCKE

350

1

If it can be equal to two right angles. not that nonentity, or the absence of all being, cannot be equal to two right angles, it is impossible he should know any demonstration in Euclid. If, therefore, we know there is real being, than

a

man knows

some

real being,

duce any

and that nonentity cannot proit is an evident demonstra-

real being,

theless,

BOOK

IV

any one should be found so senselessly ar-

rogant, as to suppose

man

wise, but yet the product of

alone knowing and mere ignorance and

chance; and that all the rest of the universe acted only by that blind haphazard; I shall leave with him that very rational and emphatical rebuke of Tully (1. ii. De Leg.), to be considered at his leisure 'What can be more sillily arrogant and misbecoming, than for a man to think that he has a mind and understanding in him, but yet in all the universe beside there is no such thing? Or that those things, which with the utmost stretch of his reason he can scarce comprehend, should be moved and managed without any reason at all?" Quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse oportere tarn stulte arrogantem, ut in se mentem et rationem putet inesse, in ccelo mundoque non putet? Aut ea qua vix summa k

tion,

that/rom

eternity there

has been something; since

what was not from eternity had a beginning; and what had a beginning must be produced by something

And

else.

Being must be most powerful. Next, it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from another, must also have all that which is in and belongs to its being from another too. All the powers it has must be owing to and received from the same source. This eternal 4.

that eternal

source, then, of all being

and

original of all power;

must be

must also be the source and so this eternal Being

also the most powerful.

And most knowing. Again, a man finds in himself perception and knowledge. We have then got one step further; and we are certain now that there is not only some being, but some knowing, intelligent being in the world. There was a time, then, when there was no knowing being and when knowledge began to be; or else there has 5.

been also a knowing being from eternity. If it be said, there was a time when no being had any knowledge, when that eternal being was void of all un-

was impossible there should ever have been any knowledge: it

derstanding;

I

reply, that then

it

being as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any perception, should produce a knowing being, as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should put into itself sense, perception, and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles than two right ones. 2 6. And therefore God. Thus, from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth,

That

there is

an eternal, most powerful, and most know-

which whether any one

:

ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri

pu-

tet?

From what has been said, it is plain to me we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a God, than of anything our senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I

may say, is

that

we more certainly know that there

a God, than that there

When

is

anything else without

say we know, I mean there is such a knowledge within our reach which we cannot us.

miss,

do

if

I

we will but apply our minds to that,

as we

to several other inquiries. 7.

Our

of a God.

idea of a most perfect Being, not the sole proof

How far the idea of a most perfect being,

which a man may frame in his mind, does or does not prove the existence of a God, I will not here examine. For in the different make of men's tempers and application of their thoughts, some arguments prevail more on one, and some on another, for the confirmation of the

But

yet, I think, this I

may

same

say, that

it is

truth.

an

ill

way of establishing this truth, and silencing atheists,

to lay the

as this

upon

whole stress of so important a point and take some

that sole foundation:

men's having that idea of

God

in their minds,

evident some men have none, and some worse than none, and the most very different,) for the only proof of a Deity; and out of an over fondness of that darling invention, cashier, or at least endeavour to invalidate all other argu(for

it is

never-

ments; and forbid us to hearken to those proofs, as being weak or fallacious, which our own existence, and the sensible parts of the universe offer so clearly and cogently to our thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considering man to

Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxi. § 1 ; ch. xxvi. § 1 ; also Locke's First Letter to Stillingfleet, pp. 1 35-6. 2 Cf. ch. iv. § 6. 3 Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxiii. § 33-36.

withstand them. For I judge it as certain and clear a truth as can anywhere be delivered, that "the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by

ing Being;

will please to

God, it matters not. The thing is evident; 3 and from this idea duly considered, will easily be

call

deduced ought 1

all

those other attributes,

to ascribe to this eternal Being.

which we If,

— CONCERNING

CHAP. X

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

35'

rational

duce in itself so much as motion: the motion it has must also be from eternity, or else be produced, and added to matter by some other being more powerful than matter; matter, as is evident, having not power to produce motion in itself. But let us suppose motion eternal too: yet matter, incogitative matter and motion, whatever changes it might produce of figure and bulk, could never produce thought: knowledge will still be as far beyond the power of motion and matter to produce, as matter is beyond the power of nothing or nonentity to produce. And I appeal to every one's own thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced by nothing, as thought to be produced by pure matter, when, before, there was no such thing as thought or an intelligent being existing? Divide matter into as many parts as you will, (which we are apt to imagine a sort of spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it,) vary the figure and motion of it as much as you please a globe, cube, cone, prism, cylinder, &c, whose diam-

creatures to conclude, that something has existed

eters are but 100,000th part of a gry, 2 will oper-

from eternity; must be.

ate

the things that are

made, even

his eternal

power

and Godhead." Though our own being furnishes have shown, with an evident and incontestible proof of a Deity; and I believe nobody can avoid the cogency of it, who will but as carefully attend to it, as to any other demonstration of so many parts: yet this being so fundamental a truth, and of that consequence, that all religion and genuine morality depend thereon, I doubt not but I shall be forgiven by my reader if I go over some parts of this argument again, and enus, as I

large a

little

more upon them.

—

something from eternity. There is no truth more evident than that something must be from eternity. I never yet heard of any one so 8. Recapitulation

unreasonable, or that could suppose so manifest a contradiction, as a time wherein there was perfectly nothing. This being of all absurdities the greatest, to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect

negation and absence of

all

beings, should

—

ever produce any real existence. It being, then,

9.

Two

let

unavoidable for

all

us next see what kind of thing that

sorts of beings, cogitative

and

incogitative.

There are but two sorts of beings in the world that man knows or conceives. First, such as are purely material, without sense, perception, or thought, as the clippings of

our beards, and parings of our nails. Secondly, sensible, thinking, perceiving beings, such as we find ourselves to be. Which, if

you

please,

we

will hereafter call cogitative

incogitative beings; if

for

nothing

else,

which

to

and

our present purpose,

are perhaps better terms than

material and immaterial. 10. Incogitative being cannot produce a cogitative be-

must be something eternal, let it must be. And to that it is very obvious to reason, that it must necessarily be a cogitative being. For it is as impossible to conceive that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent being, as that nothing should of itself produce matter. Let us suppose any parcel of matter eternal, great or small, we shall find it, in itself, able to produce nothing. For example: let us suppose the matter of the next pebble we meet with eternal, closely united, and the parts firmly at rest together; if there were no other being in the world, must it not eternally remain so, a dead inactive lump? Is it possible to conceive it can add motion to itself, being' purely matter, or produce anything? Matter, then, by its own strength, cannot proing. If,

us see

then, there

what

sort of being

1

x

no otherwise upon other bodies of propor-

tionable bulk, than those of an inch or foot diam-

Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxi. § 2.

eter;

and you may

as rationally expect to pro-

and knowledge, by putting and motion, gross particles of matter, as by those that are the very minutest that do anywhere exist. They knock, impel, and resist one another, just as the greater do; and that is all they can do. So that, if we will duce

sense, thought,

together, in a certain figure

suppose nothing first or eternal, matter can never begin to be: if we suppose bare matter without motion, eternal, motion can never begin to be: if we suppose only matter and motion first, or eternal, thought can never begin to be. 3 For it is impossible to conceive that matter, either with or without motion, could have, originally, in and from itself, sense, perception, and knowledge; as is evident from hence, that then sense, perception, and knowledge, must be a property eternally inseparable from matter and every particle of it. Not to add, that, though our general or specific conception of matter makes us speak of it as 2 'Agry is one-tenth of a line, a line one-tenth of an inch, an inch one-tenth of a philosophical foot, a philosophical foot one-third of a pendulum, whose diadroms, in the latitude of forty-five degrees, are each equal to one second of time, or onesixtieth of a minute. I have affectedly made use of this measure here, and the parts of it, under a decimal division, with names to them; because I think it would be of general convenience that this should be the common measure in the Commonwealth of Letters.' Locke. 3

See Locke's correspondence with Molyneux and Jan. 1693.

in Dec. 1692

.

JOHN LOCKE

352

BOOK

IV

not one indione thing, yel really all matter vidual thing, neither is there any such thing exist-

would

ing as one material being, or one single body that we know or can conceive. And therefore, if mat-

of their minds, or the discourse, the demonstra-

were the eternal first cogitative being, there would not be one eternal, infinite, cogitative being, but an infinite number of eternal, finite, cogitative beings, independent one of another, of limited force, and distinct thoughts, which could never produce that order, harmony, and beauty which are to be found in nature. Since, therefore, whatsoever is the first eternal being must necessarily be cogitative; and whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it, and actually have, at least, all the perfections that can ever after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it hath not either actually in it-

proved necessarily

is

ter

at least, in a higher degree;

it

necessarily

follows, that the first eternal being

cannot be

self, or,

matter. 1 1

Therefore, there has been an eternal cogitative Be-

ing. If, therefore, it

necessarily

must

be evident, that something

exist

from

eternity,

evident, that that something

it is

also as

must necessarily be

a cogitative being: for it is as impossible that incogitative matter should produce a cogitative be-

negation of all being, should produce a positive being or matter. 12. The attributes of the eternal cogitative Being. Though this discovery of the necessary existence of an eternal Mind does sufficiently lead us into the ing, as that nothing, or the

knowledge of God; since it will hence follow, that all other knowing beings that have a beginning must depend on him, and have no other ways of knowledge or extent of power than what he gives them; and therefore, if he made those, he made also the less excellent pieces of this universe,

—

ing Being

tion

is

material;

it

granted, that this know-

and then,

out

letting slide

whereby an eternal knowing Being was

would argue all to be is, an eternal cogitative Being: whereby they are so far from to exist,

matter, and so deny a God, that

establishing, that they destroy their own hypoth-

For, if there can be, in their opinion, eternal matter, without any eternal cogitative Being, they manifestly separate matter and thinking, and suppose no necessary connexion of the one with the other, and so establish the necessity of esis.

an eternal Spirit, but not of matter; since it has been proved already, that an eternal cogitative Being is unavoidably to be granted. Now, if thinking and matter may be separated, the eternal existence of matter will not follow from the eternal existence of a cogitative Being, and they suppose it to no purpose. 14. Not material: first, because each particle of matter is not cogitative. But now let us see how they can satisfy themselves, or others, that this eternal

thinking Being

is

material.

would ask them, whether they imagine

I. I

that all matter, every particle of matter, thinks? I suppose, they will scarce say; since then

This,

would be

there

as

many

eternal thinking beings

as there are particles of matter,

of gods.

And

and

so

an

infinity

they will not allow matter as every particle of matter, to be as

yet, if

matter, that is, well cogitative as extended, they will have as hard a task to make out to their own reasons a cogitative being out of incogitative particles, as

an extended being out of unextended

may

parts,

ter

if I

so speak.

15. II. Secondly, because one particle alone of

all

inanimate beings, whereby his omniscience, power, and providence will be established, and

willingly have

mat-

matter does not think, be only one atom that does

cannot be cogitative. If all

next ask, Whether it This has as many absurdities as the other; for then this atom of matter must be alone eternal I

other attributes necessarily follow: yet, to clear up this a little further, we will see what

so?

doubts can be raised against

or not. If this alone be eternal, then this alone, by its powerful thought or will, made all the rest

all his

1

3.

Whether

the eternal

it.

Mind may

be also material

Perhaps it will be said, that, though be as clear as demonstration can make it, that there must be an eternal Being, and that Being must also be knowing: yet it does not follow but that thinking Being may also be material. Let it be so, it equally still follows that there is a God. For if there be an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent Being, it is certain that there is a God, whether you imagine that Being to be material or no. But herein, I suppose, lies the danger and deceit of that supposition: there being no way to avoid the demonstration, that there is an eternal knowing Being, men, devoted to matter, or no. First, it

—

And so we have the creation of matter by a powerful thought, which is that the materialists stick at; for if they suppose one single thinking atom to have produced all the rest of of matter.

matter, they cannot ascribe that pre-eminency to it upon any other account than that of its thinking, the only supposed difference. But al-

by some other way which is above our it must still be creation; and these men must give up their great maxim, Ex nihilo nil

low

it

to be

conception,

be said, that all the rest of matter is equalthinking atom, it will be to say anything at pleasure, though ever so absurd. For

Jit.

If it

ly eternal as that

CONCERNING

CHAP. X

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

matter eternal, and yet one small particle in knowledge and power infinitely above all the rest, is without any the least appearance of reason to frame an hypothesis. Every particle of matter, as matter, is capable of all the same figures and motions of any other; and I challenge any one, in his thoughts, to add anything else to one above another. to suppose all

1

6. III.

Thirdly, because a system of incogitative

matter cannot be cogitative. If then neither

culiar

one pe-

atom alone can be this eternal thinking be-

i.e. every particle only remains, that it is some certain system of matter, duly put together, that is this thinking eternal Being. This is that which, I imagine, is that notion which men are aptest to have of God; who would have him a material being, as most readily suggested to them by the ordinary conceit they have of themselves and other men, which they take to be material thinking beings. But this imagination, however more natural, is no less absurd than the other: for to suppose the eternal thinking Being to be nothing else but a composition of particles

ing;

nor

all

matter, as matter,

of matter, can be

it;

it

of matter, each whereof cribe

all

the

is

incogitative,

wisdom and knowledge

is

to as-

of that eter-

nal Being only to the juxta-position of parts; than which nothing can be more absurd. For un-

thinking particles of matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them, but a new relation of position, which it is impossible should give thought and knowledge to them. 1 7. And that whether this corporeal system is in motion or at rest. But further: this corporeal system either has all its parts at rest, or it is a certain motion of the parts wherein its thinking consists. If it be perfectly at rest, it is but one lump, and so can have no privileges above one atom. If it be the motion of its parts on which its thinking depends, all the thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental and limited; since all the particles that by motion cause thought, being each of them in itself without any thought, cannot regulate its own motions, much less be regulated by the thought of the whole; since that thought is not the cause of motion, (for then it must be antecedent to it, and so without it,) but the consequence of it; whereby freedom, power, choice, and all rational and wise thinking or acting, will be quite taken away: so that such a thinking being will be no better nor wiser than pure blind matter; since to resolve all into the accidental unguided motions of blind matter, or into thought depending on unguided motions of blind matter, is the same thing: not to mention

353

the narrowness of such thoughts and knowledge that must depend on the motion of such parts. But there needs no enumeration of any more ab-

and impossibilities in this hypothesis (however full of them it be) than that before

surdities

mentioned;

system be all it is impossible that any one particle should either know since, let this thinking

or a part of the matter of the universe, its

own, or the motion of any other

particle, or

the whole know the motion of every particle;

and

own

thoughts or motions, or indeed have any thought resulting from such moso regulate

its

tion.

Matter not co-eternal with an eternal Mind. Others would have Matter to be eternal, notwithstanding that they allow an eternal, cogitative, immaterial Being. This, though it take not away the being of a God, yet, since it denies 18.

Secondly,

one and the

first

great piece of his workmanship,

it a little. Matter must be allowed eternal: Why? because you cannot conceive how it can be made out of nothing: why do you not also think yourself eternal? You will answer, perhaps, Because, about twenty or forty years since, you began to be. But if I ask you, what that you is, which began then to be, you can scarce tell me. The matter whereof you are made began not then to be: for if it did, then it is not eternal: but it began to be put together in such a fashion and frame as makes up your body; but yet that frame of particles is not you, it makes not that thinking thing you are; (for I have now to do with one who allows an eternal, immaterial, thinking Being, but would have unthinking Matter eternal too;) therefore, when

the creation, let us consider

did that thinking thing begin to be? If it did nev-

have you always been a thinking thing from eternity; the absurdity whereof I need not confute, till I meet with one who is so void of understanding as to own it. If, therefore, you can allow a thinking thing to be er begin to be, then

made

out of nothing, (as

eternal

must

be,)

why

all

also

things that are not

can you not allow

possible for a material being to be

made out

it

of

nothing by an equal power, but that you have the experience of the one in view, and not of the other? Though,

when

well considered, creation

of a spirit will be found to require

no

less

power

than the creation of matter. Nay, possibly, if we would emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts, as far as they would reach, to a closer contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at some dim and seeming conception how matter might at first be made, and begin to exist, by the power of that eternal first Being: but to give beginning and being to

.

JOHN LOCKE

354

would be found a more inconceivable efomnipotent power. But this being what would perhaps lead us too far from the notions on which the philosophy now in the world is built, it would not be pardonable to deviate so far from them; or to inquire, so far as grammar itself would authorize, if the common settled opinion opposes it: especially in this place, where the received doctrine serves well enough to our present purpose, and leaves this past doubt, that the creation or beginning of any one substance a

spirit

fect of

out of nothing being once admitted, the creation of all other but the Creator himself, may, with the same ease, be supposed. 19. Objection: "Creation out of nothing" But you will say, Is it not impossible to admit of the making anything out of nothing, since we cannot possibly conceive it? I answer, No. Because it is not reasonable to deny the power of an infinite being, because we cannot comprehend its operations. We do not deny other effects upon this ground, because we cannot possibly conceive the

manner of their production.

how anything but impulse body; and yet that

We cannot conceive of

body can move

not a reason sufficient to possible, against the constant exis

make us deny it perience we have of it in ourselves,

in all our voluntary motions; which are produced in us only by the free action or thought of our own minds, and are not, nor can be, the effects of the impulse or determination of the motion of blind matter in or upon our own bodies; for then it could not be in our power or choice to alter it. For example: my right hand writes, whilst my left hand is still: What causes rest in one, and motion in the other? Nothing but my will, a thought of my mind; my thought only changing, the right hand rests, and the left hand moves. This is matter of fact, which cannot be denied: explain this and make it intelligible, and then the next step will be to understand creation. For the giving a new determination to the motion of the animal spirits (which some make use of to explain voluntary motion) clears not the difficulty one jot. To alter the determination of motion, being in this case no easier nor less, than to give motion itself: since the new determination given to the animal spirits must be either immediately by thought, or by some other body put in their way by thought which was not in their way before, and so must owe its motion to thought: either of which leaves voluntary motion as unintelligible as it was before. In the meantime, it is an overvaluing ourselves to reduce all to the narrow measure of our capacities, and to conclude all things impossible to be done, whose manner of doing exceeds our com-

—

BOOK

prehension. This infinite,

or

God

is

to

finite,

Re-

make our comprehension when what He can do is

what we can conceive of it. If you do not understand the operations of your own finite mind, that thinking thing within you, do not deem it strange that you cannot comprehend the operations of that eternal infinite Mind, who limited to

made and governs

all things,

whom

and

the

heaven of heavens cannot contain.

Chap. XI. Of

our

Knowledge of

the

Existence of Other Things

Knowledge of the existence of other finite beings is had only by actual sensation. The knowledge of our own being we have by intuition. The existence of a God, reason clearly makes known to us, as has been shown. The knowledge of the existence of any other thing we can have only by sensation: 1 for there being no necessary connexion of real existence with 1

to be

any idea a man hath in his memory; nor of any other existence but that of God with the existence of any particular man: no particular man can know the existence of any other being, but only when, by actual operating upon him, it makes itself perceived by him. For, the having the idea of anything in our mind, no more proves the existence of that thing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the visions of a dream make thereby a true history. 2. Instance:

whiteness of this paper. It

is

therefore

the actual receiving of ideas from without that gives

us notice of the existence of other things, and

makes us know, that something doth exist at that time without us, which causes 2 that idea in us; though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it. For it takes not from the certainty of our senses, and the ideas we receive by them, that we know not the manner wherein they are produced: v.g. whilst I write this, I have, by the paper affecting my eyes, that idea produced in my mind, which, whatever object causes, I call

by which I know that that quality or ac(i.e. whose appearance before my eyes always causes that idea) doth really exist, and hath white;

cident

a being without me. And of this, the greatest assurance I can possibly have, and to which my faculties can attain, is the testimony of my eyes, which are the proper and sole judges of this thing; whose testimony I have reason to rely on as so certain, that I can no more doubt, whilst I write this, that I see white and black, and that something really exists that causes that sensation in me, than that I write or move my hand; which x Cf. ch. ii. § 14; also Bk. II. ch. *Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxi. §2.

viii.

— CONCERNING

CHAP. XI

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

a certainty as great as human nature is capable of, concerning the existence of anything, but a is

man's

This

3.

and of God.

self alone,

may

be called knowledge,

the existence of things without us.

and proves

The notice we have

by our senses of the existing of things without us, though it be not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge, or the deductions of our reason employed about the clear abstract ideas of our own minds; yet it is an assurance that deserves the

If we persuade ourour faculties act and inform us right

name of knowledge.

selves that

concerning the existence of those objects that affect them, it cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence: for I think nobody can, in earnest, be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels. At least, he that can doubt so far, (whatever he may have with his own thoughts,) will never have any controversy with me; since he can never be sure I say anything contrary to his own opinion. As to myself, I think God has given me assurance enough of the existence of things without me: since, by their different application, I can produce in myself both pleasure and pain, which is one great concernment of my present state. This is certain: the confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us, is the greatest assurance we are capable of concerning the existence of material beings. For we cannot act anything but by our faculties; nor talk of knowledge itself, but by the help of those faculties which are fitted to apprehend even what knowledge is. But besides the assurance we have from our senses themselves, that they do not err in the information they give us of the existence of things without us, when they are affected by them, we are further confirmed in this assurance by other concurrent reasons: Confirmed by concurrent reasons:

4. I.

cause

we

senses:

—

First, be-

cannot have ideas of sensation but by the inlet

of the senses. It

duced

is

plain those perceptions are pro-

by exterior causes affecting our because those that want the organs of any in us

sense, never

can have the ideas belonging to that

sense produced in their minds. This is too evident to be doubted:

and therefore we cannot but be come in by the organs of that

assured that they

and no other way. The organs themselves, do not produce them: for then the eyes of a man in the dark would produce colours, and

sense, it is

plain,

but we see nobody gets the relish of a pineapple, till he goes

his nose smell roses in the winter:

to the Indies,

where

5. II. Secondly,

it is,

and

tinct perceptions.

355

and anotherfrom memory, are

Because sometimes

I

tastes

it.

Because we find that an idea from

very dis-

find that /

cannot avoid the having those ideas produced in

notice by our senses, though not so certain as

demonstration, yet

actual sensation,

my mind.

For though, when my eyes are shut, or windows fast, I can at pleasure recal to my mind the ideas of light, or the sun, which former sensations had lodged in my memory; so I can at pleasure lay by that idea, and take into my view that of the smell of a rose, or taste of sugar. But,

if I

turn

my

noon towards the sun, I cannot avoid the ideas which the light or sun then produces in me. So that there is a manifest difference between the ideas laid up in my memory, (over which, if they were there only, I should have constantly the same power to dispose of them, and lay them by at pleasure,) and those which force themselves upon me, and I cannot avoid having. And therefore it must needs be some exterior cause, and the brisk acting of some objects without me, whose efficacy I cannot resist, that produces those ideas in my mind, whether I will or no. Besides, there is nobody who doth not perceive the difference in himself between contemplating the sun, as he hath the idea of it in his memory, and actually looking upon it: of which two, his eyes at

1

perception

is

so distinct, that

few of his ideas are

more distinguishable one from another. And therefore he hath certain knowledge that they

are not both

and

memory, or the

actions of his mind,

fancies only within him; but that actual see-

ing hath a cause without. 6. III. Thirdly, because pleasure or pain,

which ac-

companies actual sensation, accompanies not the returning of those ideas without the external objects. this,

that

many

Add

to

of those ideas are produced in us

which afterwards we remember without the least offence. Thus, the pain of heat or cold, when the idea of it is revived in our minds, gives us no disturbance; which, when felt, was very troublesome; and is again, when actually repeated which is occasioned by the disorder the external object causes in our bodies when applied to them: and we remember the pains of hunger, thirst, or the headache, without any pain at all; which would either never disturb us, or else constantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but ideas floating in our minds, and appearances entertaining our fancies, without the real existence of things affecting us from abroad. The same may be said of pleasure, accompanying several actual sensations. And

with pain,

:

though mathematical demonstration depends not upon sense, yet the examining them by diagrams gives great credit to the evidence of our sight, and seems to give it a certainty approach1

Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxi. § 2.

:

JOHN LOCKE

356

ing to that of demonstration itself. For, it would be very strange, that a man should allow it for an undeniable truth, that two angles of a figure,

which he measures by lines and angles of a diagram, should be bigger one than the other, and yet doubt of the existence of those lines and angles, which by looking on he makes use of to measure that by. j. IV. Fourthly, because our

senses assist one anoth-

er's testimony of the existence of

enable us

witness

to predict.

to the truth

Our

outward

senses in

things,

many

of each other's report,

and

cases bear

concerning

the existence of sensible things without us.

He

he doubt whether it be anything more than a bare fancy, feel it too; and be convinced, by putting his hand in it. Which certainly could never be put into such exquisite pain by a bare idea or phantom, unless that the pain be a fancy too: which yet he cannot, when that sees a

fire,

may,

if

is well, by raising the idea of it, bring upon himself again. Thus I see, whilst I write this, I can change the appearance of the paper; and by designing the letters, tell beforehand what new idea it shall exhibit the very next moment, by barely drawing my pen over it: which will neither appear (let me fancy as much as I will) if my hands stand still; or though I move my pen, if my eyes be

the burn

shut: nor,

when

those characters are once

made

on the paper, can I choose afterwards but see them as they are; that is, have the ideas of such letters as I

have made. Whence

that they are not barely the sport

it is

manifest,

and play of my

own imagination, when I find that the characters that were made at the pleasure of my own thoughts, do not obey them; nor yet cease to be,

whenever

I

shall fancy

it,

but continue to affect

my senses constantly and regularly, according to the figures

I

made them. To which

if

we

will

from another beforehand design they shall stand for, there will be little reason left to doubt that those words I write do really exist without me, when they cause a long series of regular sounds to affect my ears, which could not be the effect of my imagination, nor could add, that the sight of those

man, draw such sounds

as

shall,

I

BOOK

IV

be a dream, then he doth but dream that he makes the question, and so it is not much matter that a waking man should answer him. But yet, if he pleases, he may dream that I make him this answer, That the certainty of things existing in rerum natura when we have the testimony of our senses for it is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs. For, our faculties being suited not to the full extent of being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple; but to the preservation of us, in whom they are; and accommodated to the use of life: they serve to our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those things, which are convenient or inconvenient to us. For he that sees a candle burning, and hath experimented the force of its flame by putting his finger in it, will little doubt that this is something existing without him, which does him harm, and puts him to great pain which is assurance enough, when no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by than

what

is

as certain as his actions themselves.

And

our dreamer pleases to try whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace be barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy man's fancy, by putting his hand into it, he may perhaps be wakened into a certainty greater than he could wish, that it is something more than bare imagination. So that this evidence is as great as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain, i.e. happiness or misery; beyond which we have no concernment, either of knowing or being. Such an assurance of the existence of things without us is if

good and avoiding the evil which is caused by them, which is the important concernment we have of sufficient to direct us in the attaining the

being made acquainted with them. 9. But reaches no further than actual sensation. In fine, then, when our senses do actually convey into our understandings any idea, we cannot but be satisfied that there doth something at that time really exist without us, which doth affect our senses, and by them give notice of itself to our

as great as our condition needs.

apprehensive faculties, and actually produce that idea which we then perceive: and we cannot so far distrust their testimony, as to doubt that such collections of simple ideas as we have observed by

any one will be so sceptiand to affirm that all we see and hear, feel and taste, think and do, during our whole being, is but the series and deluding appearances of a long dream, whereof there is no reality; and therefore will question the existence of all things, or our knowledge of anything: I must desire him to consider, that, if all

our senses to be united together, do really exist together. But this knowledge extends as far as the present testimony of our senses, employed about particular objects that do then affect them, and no further. For if I saw such a collection of simple ideas as is wont to be called man, existing together one minute since, and am now alone, I cannot be certain that the same man exists now,

my memory retain them in 8.

But

This certainty

is

yet, if after all this

cal as to distrust his senses,

that order.

:

.

CONCERNING

CHAP. XI

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

no necessary connexion of his existence a minute since with his existence now: by a thousand ways he may cease to be, since I had the since there

is

testimony of my senses for his existence. And if I cannot be certain that the man I saw last to-day is now in being, I can less be certain that he is so who hath been longer removed from my senses, and I have not seen since yesterday, or since the last year: and much less can I be certain of the existence of men that I never saw. And, therefore, though it be highly probable that millions

do now exist, yet, whilst I am alone, writhave not that certainty of it which we strictly call knowledge; though the great likelihood of it puts me past doubt, and it be reasonable for me to do several things upon the conof men

ing

this, I

(and men also of my have to do) now in but probability, not knowl-

fidence that there are

the world: but this

men

whom

acquaintance, with

is

I

edge. 10. Folly to expect demonstration in everything.

Whereby

we may observe how

foolish and narrow knowledge, who having reason given him to judge of the different evidence and probability of things, and to be swayed accordingly; how vain, I say, it is to expect demonstration and certainty in things not capable of it; and refuse assent to very rational propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear truths, because they cannot be made out so evident, as to surmount every the

yet

vain a thing

it is

for a

man

of a

least (I will not say reason, but) pretence of

doubting.

He that,

in the ordinary affairs of life,

would admit of nothing but direct plain demonstration, would be sure of nothing in this world, but of perishing quickly. The wholesomeness of meat or drink would not give him reason to venture on it: and I would fain know what it is he could do upon such grounds as are capable of no doubt, no objection. 1 1 1 Past existence of other things is known by memory. As when our senses are actually employed about any object, we do know that it does exist; so by our memory we may be assured, that heretofore things that affected our senses have existed. And thus his

we have knowledge

of the past existence of sev-

357

always an undoubted proposition to me, that water did exist the 10th of July, 1688; 2 as it will also be equally true that a certain number of very fine colours did exist, which at the same time I saw upon a bubble of that water: but, being now quite out of sight both of the water and bubtains

it

bles too,

it is

no more certainly known to

the water doth

now

me that

than that the bubbles or colours therein do so: it being no more necessary that water should exist to-day, because it existed yesterday, than that the colours or bubbles exist to-day, because they existed yesterday, though it be exceedingly much more probable; because water hath been observed to continue long in existence, but bubbles, and the colours on them, quickly cease to be. 12. The existence of other finite spirits not knowable, and rests on faith. What ideas we have of spirits, and how we come by them, I have already shown. 3 But though we have those ideas in our minds, and know we have them there, the having the ideas of spirits does not make us know that any such things do exist without us, or that exist,

there are any finite spirits, or beings, but the Eternal

any other spiritual God. We have ground

from revelation, and several other reasons, to believe with assurance that there are such creatures

but our senses not being able to discover them,

we want

the

means

of

knowing

their particular

For we can no more know that there are finite spirits really existing, by the idea we have of such beings in our minds, than by the ideas any one has of fairies or centaurs, he can come to know that things answering those ideas do really exist. And therefore concerning the existence of finite spirits, as well as several other things, we must content ourselves with the evidence of faith; 4 but universal, certain propositions concerning this matter are beyond our reach. For however true existences.

may be, v.g., that all the intelligent spirits that God ever created do still exist, yet it can never it

make a part of our certain knowledge. These and the like propositions we may assent to, as highly probable, but are not, ble of knowing.

We

I fear,

in this state capa-

are not, then, to put others

eral things,

upon demonstrating, nor

us,

of universal certainty in all those matters; where-

whereof our senses having informed our memories still retain the ideas; and of this we are past all doubt, so long as we remember

But

knowledge also reaches no further than our senses have formerly assured us. Thus, seeing water at this instant, it is an unquestionable truth to me that water doth exist: and remembering that I saw it yesterday, it will also be always true, and as long as my memory re-

well.

1

this

Cf. Introduction, §§ 5-7.

ourselves

upon search

we are not capable of any other knowledge, but what our senses give us in this or that parin

ticular. 13. 2

3

ch. 4

Only particular propositions concerning

Cf. Bk. See Bk. iii.

concrete

II. ch. xiv. § 29.

II. ch. xxiii. §§ 5, 15,

19-22, 28; Bk. IV.

§ 27.

Cf. ch. xv. § 3; ch. xviii. § 2; ch.

ix. § 3.

JOHN LOCKE

35 8 existences are knowable.

By which

it

appears that

stract ideas, so as to be true, they will,

—

anything answerable to such an idea: as having the idea of an elephant, phoenix, motion, or an angel, in my mind, the first and natural inquiry is, Whether such a thing does anywhere exist? And this knowledge is only of particulars. No existence of anything without us, but only of God, can certainly be known further than our senses inform us. (2) There is another sort of propositions, wherein is expressed the agreement or disagreement of our abstract ideas, and their dependence on one another. Such propositions may be universal and certain. So, having the idea of God and myself, of fear and obedience, I cannot but be sure that God is to be feared and obeyed by me: and this proposition will be certain, concerning man in general, if I have made an abstract idea of such a species, whereof I am one particular. But yet this proposition, how certain soever, that "men ought to fear and obey God" proves not to me the existence of men in the world; but will be true of all such creatures, whenever they do exist: which certainty of such general propositions depends on the agreement or disagreement to be discovered in those abstract ence of

And

habitudes one to another, propositions concerning any abstract ideas that are once true must

needs be

1.

of

all

them indeed

men

he applies

his

thoughts to the consideration of his

know the truth of certain propositions

that

from the agreement or disagreement which he will perceive in his own ideas. Such will arise

propositions are therefore called eternal

truths, not because they are eternal propositions actually formed, and antecedent to the understanding that at any time makes them; nor because they are imprinted on the mind from any patterns that are anywhere out of the mind, and existed before: but because, being once made about ab-

is

not got

common

from maxims.

It

having

received opinion amongst

of letters, that maxims were the foundation

and that the sciences were each of them built upon certain praecognita from whence the understanding was to take its rise, and by which it was to conduct itself in its inquiries into the matters belonging to that science, the beaten road of the Schools has been, to lay down in the beginning one or more general propositions, as foundations whereon to build the knowledge that was to be had of that subject. These doctrines, thus laid down for foundations of any science, were called principles, as the beginnings from which we must set out, and look no further backwards in our inquiries, as we have already observed. 1

2.

{The

occasion of that opinion.)

One

thing

which might probably give an occasion to this way of proceeding in other sciences, was (as I suppose) the good success it seemed to have in mathematics, wherein men, being observed to attain a great certainty of knowledge, these sciences

came by pre-eminence and Madrjais,

to be called MaOrjfiaTa,

learning, or things learned, thor-

oughly learned, as having of

written, all or

ideas,

Improvement

of all knowledge;

are so; not from being

any of them, in the minds of all men; or that they were any of them propositions in any one's mind, till he, having got the abstract ideas, joined or separated them by affirmation or negation. But wheresoever we can suppose such a creature as man is, endowed with such faculties, and thereby furnished with such ideas as we have, we must conclude, he must needs, when

Knowledge

been the

:

and

the

of our Knowledge

known to be true concern abstract ideas. In the former case, our knowledge is the consequence of the existence of things, producing ideas in our minds by our senses in the latter, knowledge is the consequence of the ideas (be they what they will) that are in our minds, producing there general certain prop-

Many of these are called aeternae veritates,

eternal verities.

Chap. XII. Of

all general propositions that are

ositions.

whenever

and the same ideas having immutably the same

ideas. 4.

rv

they can be supposed to be made again at any time, past or to come, by a mind having those ideas, always actually be true. For names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same ideas,

(i) There there are two sorts of propositions: is one sort of propositions concerning the exist-

1

book

.

greatest certainty, clearness,

all

others

and evidence

the in

them. 3. But from comparing clear and distinct ideas. But if any one will consider, he will (I guess) find,

advancement and certainty of knowledge which men arrived to in these sciences, was not owing to the influence of these principles, nor derived from any peculiar advantage they received from two or three general maxims, laid down in the beginning; but from the clear, distinct, complete ideas their thoughts were employed about, and the relation of equality and excess so clear between some of them, that they had an intuitive knowledge, and by that a way to discover it in others; and this without the help of those maxims. For I ask, Is it not possible for a young lad to know that his whole that the great

real

1

Ch.

vii.

!

CHAP. body

is

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CONCERNING

XII

bigger than his

but by

little finger,

vir-

tainly

know

359

any parcel of matter, with an-

that

tue of this axiom, that the whole is bigger than a part; nor be assured of it, till he has learned that

other parcel of matter joined to it, is bigger than either of them alone, will never be able to

maxim? Or cannot a country wench know that, having received a shilling from one that owes her three, and a shilling also from another that owes her three, the remaining debts in each of their hands are equal? Cannot she know this, I

know

say, unless she fetch the certainty of

maxim, that

if you

it

from

this

take equals from equals, the re-

mainder will be equals, a

maxim which

possibly

any one from what has been elsewhere said, which is known first and clearest by most people, the particular instance, or the general rule; and which it is that gives life and birth to the other. These general rules are but the comparing our more general and abstract ideas, which are the workmanship of the mind, made, and names she never heard or thought of?

I

desire

to consider,

given to them for the easier dispatch in

its

rea-

and drawing into comprehensive terms and short rules its various and multiplied observations. But knowledge began in the mind, and was founded on particulars; though afterwards, perhaps, no notice was taken thereof: it being natural for the mind (forward still to enlarge its knowledge) most attentively to lay up those general notions, and make the proper use of them, which is to disburden the memory of the cumbersome load of particulars. For I desire it may be considered, what more certainty there is to a child, or any one, that his body, little finger, and all, is bigger than his little finger alone, after you have given to his body the name whole, and to his little finger the name part, than he could have had before; or what new knowledge concerning his body can these two relative terms give him, which he could not have without them? Could he not know that his body was bigger than his little finger, if his language were yet so imperfect that he had no such relative terms as whole and part? I ask, further, when he has got these names, how is he more certain that his body is a whole, and his little finger a part, than he was or might be certain before he learnt those terms, that his body was bigger sonings,

than

his little finger?

Any one may

as reason-

it by the help of these two relative terms, whole and part, make of them what maxim you

please. 4.

Dangerous

build upon precarious principles.

to

But be it in the mathematics as it will, whether it be clearer, that, taking an inch from a black line of two inches, and an inch from a red line of two inches, the remaining parts of the two lines will be equal, or that if you take equals from equals, the remainder will be equals:

these two to

is

any one

the clearer and to determine,

first

it

which,

I

known,

say, of I

leave

not being material

my present occasion. That which

I have here be the readiest way to knowledge to begin with general maxims, and build upon them, it be yet a safe way to take the principles which are laid down in any other science as unquestionable truths; and so receive them without examination, and adhere to them, without suffering them to be doubted of, because mathematicians have been so happy, or so fair, to use none but self-evident and undeniable. If this be so, I know not what may not pass for truth in morality, what may not be introduced and proved in natural philosophy. Let that principle of some of the old philosophers, That all is Matter, and that there is nothing else, be received for certain and indubitable, and it will be easy to be seen by the writings of some that have revived it again in our days, what consequences it will lead us into. Let any one, with Polemo, take the world; or with the Stoics, the aether, or the sun; or with Anaximenes, the air, to be God; and what a divinity, religion, and worship must we needs have Nothing can be so dangerous as principles thus

to

to do,

is

to inquire, whether,

if it

taken up without questioning or examination; espe-

they be such as concern morality, which and give a bias to all their actions. Who might not justly expect another kind of life in Aristippus, who placed happiness in bodily pleasure and in Antisthenes, who made cially if

influence men's lives,

;

virtue sufficient to felicity?

And

he who. with

knowledge of have his thoughts raised to other contemplations than those who look not beyond Plato, shall place beatitude in the

ably doubt or deny that his little finger is a part of his body, as that it is less than his body. And he that can doubt whether it be less, will as cer-

God,

doubt whether it be a part. So that the maxim, the whole is bigger than a part, can

which are

never be made use of to prove the little finger less than the body, but when it is useless, by being brought to convince one of a truth which he knows already. For he that does not cer-

and wrong, honest and dishonest, are defined only by laws, and not by nature, will have other measures of moral rectitude and pravity, than those who take it for granted that we are under

tainly

will

and those perishing things had in it. He that, with Arche-

this spot of earth,

to be

laus, shall lay

it

down

as a principle, that right

JOHN LOCKE

360 obligations antecedent to

human

all

constitu

To

do so

is

no certain

way

to truth.

If,

there-

fore, those that pass for principles are not certain,

(which we must have some way to know, that we may be able to distinguish them from those that are doubtful,) but are only made so to us by our blind assent, we are liable to be misled

by them; and instead of being guided into truth, we shall, by principles, be only confirmed in mistake and error. 6. But to compare clear, complete names.

like this,

in

But since the knowledge of the certainty

pends only upon the perception we have of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, the way to improve our knowledge is not, I am sure, blindly, and with an implicit faith, to receive and swallow principles; 1 but is, I think, to get and fix in our minds clear, distinct, and complete ideas, as far as they are to be had, and annex to them proper and constant names. And thus, perhaps, without any other principles, but barely considering those perfect ideas,

and by comparagreement

ing them one with another, finding their

and disagreement, and their several relations and habitudes; we shall get more true and clear knowledge by the conduct of this one rule than by taking up principles, and thereby putting our minds into the disposal of others. 2 The

method of advancing knowledge is by considering our abstract ideas. must, therefore, true

We

we will proceed as reason advises, adapt our methods of inquiry to the nature of the ideas we examine, and the truth we search after. General and certain truths are only founded in the habitudes and relations of abstract ideas. A sagacious and methodical application of our thoughts, for if

the finding out these relations,

discover

all

tude, may not in time be found out, I will not determine. This, I think, I may say, that if other ideas that are the real as well as nominal es-

sences of their species, were pursued in the

is

the only

that can be put with truth

way to

and

cer-

them into general propositions. By what steps we are to proceed in these, is to be learned in the schools of the mathematicians, who, from very plain and easy beginnings, by gentle degrees, and a continued chain of reasonings, proceed to the discovery and demtainty concerning

onstration of truths that appear at

first

sight be-

yond human capacity. The art of finding proofs, and the admirable methods they have invented for the singling out and laying in order those intermediate ideas that demonstratively show the equality or inequality of unapplicable quan-

way

would carry

familiar to mathematicians, they

our thoughts further, and with greater evidence and clearness than possibly we are apt to imagine. 8.

ideas, under steady

of principles, as well as of all other truths, de-

7.

IV

respect of other ideas, as well as those of magni-

tions. 5.

whether something

coveries: but

BOOK

By which

This gave

me

conjecture,

that morality

morality also

which is

may

be

made

clearer.

the confidence to advance that I

suggest,

(chap,

iii.)

viz.

capable of demonstration as well

mathematics 3 For the ideas that ethics are

as

.

conversant about, being all real essences, and such as I imagine have a discoverable connexion and agreement one with another; so far as we can find their habitudes and relations, so far we shall be possessed of certain, real, and general truths; and I doubt not but, -if a right method were taken, a great part of morality might be made out with that clearness, that could leave, to a considering man, no more reason to doubt, than he could have to doubt of the truth of propositions in mathematics, which have been demonstrated to him. 9. Our knowledge of substances is to be improved, not by contemplation of abstract ideas, but only by experience.

In our search after the knowledge of

our want of ideas that are suitable to of proceeding obliges us to a quite different method. We advance not here, as in the other, (where our abstract ideas are real as well as nominal essences,) by contemplating our substances,

such a

way

ideas, and considering their relations and correspondences; that helps us very little, for the reasons, that in another place we have at large set

down. 4 By which

I

think

it is

substances afford matter of very

evident, that little general

knowledge; and the bare contemplation of their abstract ideas will carry us but a very little way

and certainty. What, then, improvement of our knowledge in substantial beings? Here we are to take a quite contrary course: the want of ideas of their real essences sends us from our own thoughts in the search of truth

are

we

to

do

for the

to the things themselves as they exist. Experience

me what reason cannot: and it is by I can certainly know, what other qualities co-exist 5 with those of my complex idea, v.g. whether that yellow, heavy, fusible

here must teach trying alone,

that which has carried them so far, and produced such wonderful and unexpected dis-

that

tities, is

Cf. Bk. III. ch. xi. §§ 16-18; IV. ch. 19-

!Cf. Bk. 2

Cf.

§9.

I.

ch.

iii.

§24.

4

Bk. II. ch.

6

Cf. ch. xi. § 9.

xxiii; III. ch. vi.

iii.

§§ 18-

CHAP.

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CONCERNING

XII

be malleable, or no; which exway ever it prove in that particular body I examine) makes me not certain, that it is so in all, or any other yellow, heavy, fusible bodies, but that which I have tried. Because it is no consequence one way or the other

body

I

call gold,

perience (which

from

my

complex

idea: the necessity or incon-

sistence of malleability

hath no visible connexion

with the combination of that colour, weight, fusibility in any body. What I have said here of the nominal essence of gold, supposed to consist of a body of such a determinate colour, weight, and fusibility, will hold true, if malle-

and

and

ableness, fixedness,

solubility in aqua regia

be added to it. Our reasonings from these ideas 1 will carry us but a little way in the certain discovery of the other properties in those masses of matter wherein all these are to be found. Because the other properties of such bodies, depending not on these, but on that unknown real essence on which these also depend, we cannot by them discover the rest; we can go no further than the simple ideas of our nominal essence will carry us, which is very little beyond themselves; and so afford us but very sparingly any certain, universal, trial,

all

and

useful truths. For,

and

others of that colour, weight,

that

upon

having found that particular piece (and I

fusibility,

ever tried) malleable, that also makes

now, perhaps, a part of my complex idea, part my nominal essence of gold: whereby though I make my complex idea to which I affix the name gold, to consist of more simple ideas than

of

before; yet

still,

it

not containing the real

sence of any species of bodies, certainly to

know

(I

it

helps

es-

me not it may

say to know, perhaps

be to conjecture) the other remaining properties of that body, further than they have a visible connexion with some or all of the simple ideas that make up my nominal essence. For example, I cannot be certain, from this complex idea, whether gold be fixed or no; because, as before, there is no necessary connexion or inconsistence to be discovered betwixt a complex idea of a body yellow, heavy, fusible, malleable; betwixt these, I say, and know, that

fixedness;

so that

I

may

certainly

whatsoever body these are found, there fixedness is sure to be. Here, again, for assurance, I must apply myself to experience; as far as that reaches, I may have certain knowledge, but no further. 10. Experience may procure us convenience, not science. I deny not but a man, accustomed to rational and regular experiments, shall be able to see further into the nature of bodies and guess 1

in

Cf. Bk. III. ch. vi.

righter at their yet

one that

361

unknown

properties than

a stranger to them: but yet, as I have said, this is but judgment and opinion, not knowledge and certainty. This way of getting and is

improving our knowledge in substances only by expe-

and

rience

which

history,

is

that the weakness

all

which makes me

of our faculties in this state of mediocrity

we

are in in this world can attain to,

suspect that natural philosophy

is

not capable of being

made a science. We are able, I imagine, to reach very little general knowledge concerning the species of bodies

and

their several properties.

Experiments and historical observations we may have, from which we may draw advantages of ease and health, and thereby increase our stock of conveniences for this life; but beyond this I fear our talents reach not, nor are our faculties, as

guess, able to advance.

I 1 1

We are fittedfor moral science,

.

but only for prob-

able interpretations of external nature.

From whence

obvious to conclude that, since our faculties are not fitted to penetrate into the internal fabric and real essences of bodies; but yet plainly discover to us the being of a God and the knowledge of ourselves, enough to lead us into a full and clear discovery of our duty and great concernment; it will become us, as rational creatures, to employ those faculties we have about what they are most adapted to, and follow the direction of nature, where it seems to point us out the way. For it is rational to conclude that our proper employment lies in those inquiries, it is

knowledge which is most and carries in our greatest interest, i.e. the condition of our

and

in that sort of

suited to our natural capacities, it

eternal estate. that morality

mankind fitted to

Hence

is

I

think

may

conclude and business of

I

the proper science

in general,

(who are both concerned and summum bonum;) as sev-

search out their

eral arts, conversant ture, are the lot

men

for the

their

own

about several parts of na-

and private

common

talent of particular

use of

human

life

and

particular subsistence in this world.

Of what consequence

the discovery of one natu-

body and its properties may be to human life the whole great continent of America is a convincing instance: whose ignorance in useful arts, and want of the greatest part of the conveniences of life, in a country that abounded ral

with

all sorts

of natural plenty,

I

think

may

be

attributed to their ignorance of what was to be found in a very ordinary, despicable stone; I the mineral of iron. And whatever we think of our parts or improvements in this part of the world, where knowledge and plenty seem

mean

to vie with each other; yet to

any one that

will

JOHN LOCKE

362

seriously reflect on it, I suppose it will appear past doubt, that, were the use of iron lost among

we should

few ages be unavoidably reduced to the wants and ignorance of the ancient savage Americans, whose natural endowments us,

in a

and provisions come no way short of those of the most flourishing and polite nations. So that he who first made known the use of that contemptible mineral, may be truly styled the father of arts, and author of plenty. 2. In the study of nature we must beware of hypotheses and wrong principles. I would not, therefore, be thought to disesteem or dissuade the study of nature. I readily agree the contemplation of his works gives us occasion to admire, revere, and glorify their Author: and, if rightly directed, may be of greater benefit to mankind than the

monuments

of

exemplary charity that have at by the founders of

so great charge been raised hospitals

and almshouses. He that

first

invented

printing, discovered the use of the compass, or

made

public the virture and right use of kin did more for the propagation of knowledge, for the supply and increase of useful commodities, and saved more from the grave, than kina,

2

those

who

built colleges, workhouses,

pitals. All that I

would say

is,

that

and hos-

we should

not be too forwardly possessed with the opinion or expectation of knowledge, where

it is not to be had, or by ways that will not attain to it: that we should not take doubtful systems for complete sciences; nor unintelligible notions for scientifical demonstrations. In the knowledge of bodies, we must be content to glean what we can from particular experiments: since we cannot, from a discovery of their real essences, grasp at a time whole sheaves, and in bundles comprehend the nature and properties of whole species together. Where our inquiry is concern-

ing co-existence, or repugnancy to co-exist, which by contemplation of our ideas we cannot discover; there experience, observation, and natural history, must give us, by our senses and by retail, an insight into corporeal substances. The knowledge of bodies we must get by our senses, warily employed in taking notice of their qualities and operations on one another: and what we hope to know of separate spirits 3 in this world, we must, I think, expect only from revelation. He that shall consider how little general maxims, precarious principles, and hypotheses laid down at pleasure, 4 have promoted true knowledge, or l

Ci. Bk. II. ch. xxi.

2

quinine. kin kina Cf. ch. xi. § 12. Cf. Bk. I. ch. iii. §§ 22-24,

3

4

—

improvements; how little, I say, the end 5 has, for many ages together, advanced men's progress, towards the knowledge of natural philosophy, will think we have reason to thank those who in this latter age have taken another course, and have trod out to us, though not an easier way to learned ignorance, yet a surer way to profitable knowlafter real

edge. 13.

vii.

Not that we may any phenomena of nature, make

true use of hypotheses.

use of any probable hypotheses whatsoever: hypotheses,

if

they are well made, are at least great

memory, and often direct us to new But my meaning is, that we should not take up any one too hastily (which the mind, that would always penetrate into the causes of things, and have principles to rest on, is very apt do do,) till we have very well examined particulars, and made several experiments, in that thing which we would explain by our hypothesis, and see whether it will agree to them all; helps to the

discoveries. 6

whetherourprincipleswillcarryusquite through, and not be as inconsistent with one phenomenon of nature, as they seem to accommodate and explain another. And at least that we take care that the name of principles deceive us not, nor

impose on us, by making us receive that for an unquestionable truth, which is really at best but a very doubtful conjecture; such as are most (I

had almost said

all)

of the hypotheses in natu-

7 ral philosophy. 1

4.

Clear and distinct ideas with settled names, and

the finding of those intermediate ideas

which show

agreement or disagreement, are the ways

to

their

enlarge our

But whether natural philosophy be capable of certainty or no, the ways to enlarge our knowledge, as far as we are capable, seem to me, in short, to be these two: First, The first is to get and settle in our minds determined ideas of those things whereof we have general or specific names; at least, so many of them as we would consider and improve our knowledge in, or reason about. And if they be specific ideas of substances, we should endeavour also to make them as complete as we can, whereby I mean, that we should put together as many simple ideas as, being constantly observed to co-exist, may perfectly determine the species; and each of those simple ideas which are the ingredients of our complex ones, should be clear and distinct in our minds. For it being evident

knowledge.

—

6

ch.

The

not, to explain

5

and Bk. IV.

IV

men

setting out at that

1

1

BOOK

helped to satisfy the inquiries of rational

7

Cf. Introduction, § 7. Cf. Bacon, Novum Organum, I. 19. Cf. Bk. I. ch. iii. §§ 23, 24; ch. vii.

..

CHAP.

CONCERNING

XIII

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas; as far as they are either imperfect, confused, or

obscure,

we cannot expect

to

Chap. XIII. Some

Further Considerations Concerning our Knowledge

have certain, per-

or clear knowledge. Secondly, The other is the art of finding out

fect,

363

1

Our knowledge partly

Our knowledge,

necessary, partly voluntary.

as in other things, so in this,

has

those intermediate ideas, which may show us the agreement or repugnancy of other ideas,

so great a conformity with our sight, that

which cannot be immediately compared. 15. Mathematics an instance of this. That these two (and not the relying on maxims, and drawing consequences from some general propositions) are the right methods of improving our knowledge in the ideas of other modes besides those of quantity, the consideration of mathematical knowledge will easily inform us. Where

If our knowledge were altogether necessary, all men's knowledge would not only be alike, but every man would know all that is knowable; and if it were wholly voluntary, some men so little regard or value it that they would have extreme little, or none at all. Men that have senses cannot choose but receive some ideas by them; and if they have memory, they cannot but retain some of them; and if they have any distinguishing faculty, cannot but perceive the agreement or disagreement of some of them one with another; as he that has eyes, if he will open them by day, cannot but see some objects and perceive a difference in them. But though a man with his eyes open in the light, cannot but see, yet there be certain objects which he may choose whether he will turn his eyes to; there may be in his reach a book containing pictures and discourses, capable to delight or instruct him, which yet he may never have the will to open, never take the pains

first

we

and

clear idea of those angles or figures of

shall find that

he that has not a perfect

which

he desires to know anything, is utterly thereby incapable of any knowledge about them. Suppose but a man not to have a perfect exact idea of a right angle, a scalenum, or trapezium, and there is nothing more certain than that he will in vain seek any demonstration about them. Further, it is evident that it was not the influence of those maxims which are taken for principles in mathematics that hath led the masters of that science into those wonderful discoveries they have made. Let a man of good parts know all the maxims generally

made

perfectly,

and contemplate

sequences as

much

their assistance,

know

use of in mathematics ever so

I

and conhe will, by

their extent

as he pleases,

suppose, scarce ever

come

to

that the square of the hypothenuse in a

right-angled triangle the two other sides.

is

equal to the squares of that "the

The knowledge

is equal to all its parts," and "if you take equals from equals, the remainder will be equal,"

whole

&c, helped him

not,

I

presume, to

this

demon-

and a man may, I think, pore long enough on those axioms without ever seeing one jot the more of mathematical truths. They have been discovered by the thoughts otherwise applied: the mind had other objects, other views before it, far different from those maxims, when it first got the knowledge of such truths in mathematics, which men, well enough acquainted stration:

with those received axioms, but ignorant of their method who first made these demonstrations, can never sufficiently admire. And who knows what methods to enlarge our knowledge in other parts of science may hereafter be invented, answering that of algebra in mathematics, which so readily finds out the ideas of quantities to measure others by; whose equality or proportion we could otherwise very hardly, or, perhaps, never come to know?

it is

neither wholly necessary, nor wholly voluntary.

to look into. 2

The

application of our faculties voluntary; but,

they being employed,

we know

as things are, not as

we

There is also another thing in a man's power, and that is, though he turns his eyes sometimes towards an object, yet he may choose whether he will curiously survey it, and with an intent application endeavour to observe accurately all that is visible in it. But yet, what he does

please.

he cannot see otherwise than he does. It depends not on his will to see that black which appears yellow; nor to persuade himself that what actually scalds him, feels cold. The earth will not appear painted with flowers, nor the fields covered with verdure, whenever he has a mind to it: in the cold winter, he cannot help seeing it white and hoary, if he will look abroad. Just thus is it with our understanding: all that is voluntary in our knowledge is the employing or withholding any of our faculties from this or that sort of objects, and a more or less accutare survey of them: see,

but, they being employed, our will hath no power termine the knowledge of the

that

is

mind one way

to de-

or another;

done only by the objects themselves, as

far as they are clearly discovered.

And therefore,

men's senses are conversant about external objects, the mind cannot but receive those ideas which are presented by them, and be informed of the existence of things without: and so as far as

JOHN LOCKE

364

men's thoughts converse with their own determined ideas, they cannot but in some measure observe the agreement or disagreement that is to be found amongst some of them, which is so far knowledge and if they have names for those ideas which they have thus considered, they must needs be assured of the truth of those propositions which express that agreement or disagreement they perceive in them, and be undoubtedly convinced of those truths. For what a man sees, he cannot but see; and what he perceives, he cannot but know that he perceives. 3. Instance in numbers. Thus he that has got the ideas of numbers, and hath taken the pains to compare one, two, and three, to six, cannot choose but know that they are equal: he that hath got the idea of a triangle, and found the ways to measure its angles and their magnitudes, is certain that its three angles are equal to two right ones; and can as little doubt of that, as of this far as

:

truth, that be,

it is

and not

impossible for the same thing to

He

the idea of an intelligent, but

frail

made by and depending on

also that

hath

and weak be-

another,

who

is

eternal, omnipotent, perfectly wise and good, will

as certainly

know

that

man

is

to honour, fear,

when he he hath but the ideas of two such beings in his mind, and will turn his thoughts that way, and consider them, he will as certainly find that the inferior, finite, and dependent is under an obligation to obey the supreme and infinite, as he is certain to find that three, four, and seven are less than fifteen; if he will consider and compute those numbers nor can he be surer in a clear morning that the sun is risen; if he will but open his eyes and turn them that way. But yet these tru t hs, being ever so certain, ever so clear, he may be ignorant of either, or all of them, who will never take the pains to employ his faculties, as he should, to inform himself about them. and obey God,

sees

it.

For

as that the sun shines

if

:

Chap. XIV. Of Judgment 1.

else.

Our knowledge

IV

till

the twilight, as

I

may so say,

of probability; suit-

presume, to that state of mediocrity and probationership he has been pleased to place us in here; wherein, to check our over-confidence and presumption, we might, by every day's experience, be made sensible of our short-sightedness and liableness to error; the sense whereof might be a constant admonition to us, to spend the days of this our pilgrimage with industry and able,

I

care, in the search and following of that way which

might lead us

to be.

4. Instance in natural religion.

ing,

BOOK

he infallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed, will have little else to do but to sit still and perish. 2. What use to be made of this twilight state. Therefore, as God has set some things in broad daylight; as he has given us some certain knowledge, though limited to a few things in comparison, probably as a taste of what intellectual creatures are capable of to excite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state: so, in the greatest part of our concernments, he has afforded us only will not stir

being short,

The understanding

we want something

faculties being given to

man, not barely for speculation, but also for the conduct of his life, man would be at a great loss if he had nothing to direct him but what has the certainty of true knowledge. For that being very short and scanty, as we have seen, he would be often utterly in the dark, and in most of the actions of his life, perfectly at a stand, had he nothing to guide him in the absence of clear and certain knowledge. He that will not eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish him; he that

to a state of greater perfection. It being highly rational to think, even were revela-

tion silent in the case, that, as talents

God

an end

to their labours.

men employ those

has given them here, they shall accordingly receive their rewards at the close of the day, when their sun shall set and night shall put 3.

Judgment, or assent

to probability,

supplies our

want of knowledge. The faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge, in cases where that cannot be had, is judgment: whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree; or, which

is

the same,

any proposi-

tion to be true or false, without perceiving a dem-

onstrative evidence in the proofs.

The mind some-

times exercises this judgment out of necessity, where demonstrative proofs and certain knowledge are not to be had; and sometimes out of

even where demonstrative and certain proofs are to be had. Men often stay not warily to examine the agreement or disagreement of two ideas which they are desirous or concerned to know; but, either incapable of such attention as is requisite in a long train of gradations, or impatient of delay, lightly cast their eyes on, or wholly pass by the proofs; and so, without making out the demonstration, determine of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, as it were by a view of them as they are at a distance, and take it to be the one or the other, as seems most likely to them upon such a loose survey. This faculty of the mind, when it is exercised immediately about things, is called judgment; when about truths delaziness, unskilfulness, or haste,

livered in words,

is

most commonly called

assent

— CONCERNING

CHAP. XV

.

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

or dissent: which being the most usual way, wherein the mind has occasion to employ this faculty, I shall, under these terms, treat of it, as least liable in our language to equivocation. 4. Judgment is the presuming things to be

so,

with-

mind has two faculties conversant about truth and falsehood: First, KNO WLEDGE, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas. out perceiving

it.

Thus

the

Secondly JUDGMENT, which is the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so; which is, as the word imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears. And if it

so unites or separates

are,

it is

them

Chap. XV. Of 1

.

as in reality things

right judgment.

Probability

is the

Probability

appearance of agreement upon

is the showing the agreement or disagreement of two ideas by the intervention of one or more proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible connexion one with another; so probability is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement by the intervention of proofs, whose connexion is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false, rather than the contrary. For example: in the demonstration of it a man perceives the certain, immutable connexion there is of equality between the three angles of a triangle, and those intermediate ones which are made use of to show their equality to two right ones; and so, by an intuitive knowledge of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate ideas in each step of the progress, the whole series is continued with an evidence, which clearly shows the agreement or disagreement of those three angles in equality to two right ones: and thus he has certain knowledge that it is so. But another man, who never took the pains to observe the demonstration, hearing a mathematician, a man of credit, affirm the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two

fallible proofs.

As

demonstration

right ones, assents to

it, i.e.

receives

it

for true:

which case the foundation of his assent

365

that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, that which makes him take these ideas to agree, without knowing them to do so, is the wonted veracity of the speaker in other cases, or his supposed veracity in this. 2 // is to supply our want of knowledge. Our knowledge, as has been shown, being very narrow, and we not happy enough to find certain truth in everything which we have occasion to consider;

sition,

most of the propositions we think, reason, discourse nay, act upon, are such as we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth: yet some of them border so near upon certainty, that we make no doubt at all about them; but assent to them as firmly, and act, according to that assent, as resolutely as if they were infallibly demonstrated, and that our knowledge of them was perfect and certain. But there being degrees herein, from the very neighbourhood of certainty and demonstration, quite down to improbability and unlikeness, even to the confines of impossibility; and also degrees of assent from full assurance and confidence, quite down to conjecture, doubt, and distrust: I shall come now, (having, as I think, found out the bounds of human knowledge and cer-

—

the next place, to consider the several deand grounds of probability, and assent or faith. 2 3. Being that which makes us presume things to be true, before we know them to be so. Probability is likeliness to be true, the very notation of the word signifying such a proposition, for which there be arguments or proofs to make it pass, or be received for true. The entertainment the mind gives this sort of propositions is called belief, assent, or opinion, which is the admitting or receiving any proptainty f) in

grees

osition for true,

upon arguments or

are found to persuade us to receive

without certain knowledge that herein

lies

it

it is

as true, so.

the difference between probability

certainty, faith,

of

proofs that

and knowledge, that

knowledge there

is

its

nexion in

so.

not

and

in all the parts

each immediand certain conThat which makes me

intuition;

ate idea, each step has belief,

And

visible

something extraneous to the thing I believe; something not evidently joined on both sides to, and so not manifestly showing the agreement or disagreement of those ideas that are unbelieve,

is

der consideration. 4. The grounds of probability

are two: conformity

probability of the thing; the proof being such as

with our own experience, or the testimony of others' experience. Probability then, being to supply the de-

most part carries truth with it: the man on whose testimony he receives it, not being wont

fails, is

in

is

the

for the

to affirm anything contrary to or besides his knowledge, especially in matters of this kind: so that that which causes his assent to this propo-

knowledge and to guide us where that always conversant about propositions whereof we have no certainty, but only some infect of our

1

See ch.

2

Cf. Introd.

i-xi.

§3.

JOHN LOCKE

366

ducements to receive them for true. The grounds of it are, in short, these two following: First, The conformity of anything with our own knowledge, observation, and experience. Secondly, The testimony of others, vouching their observation and experience. In the testi-

6.

—

and circumstances of the

these grounds depends the probability of any and as the conformity of our knowl-

edge, as the certainty of observations, as the frequency and constancy of experience and the

number and

do more any proposition in itself more or less probable. There is another, I confess, which, though by itself it be no true ground of probability, yet is often made use of for one, by which men most commonly regulate their assent, and upon which they pin their faith more than anything else, and that is, the opinion of others; though there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on, nor more likely to mislead one; since there is much more falsehood and error among men than truth and knowl-

5.

In

this, all the

relation. 6.

arguments pro and con ought

we come

to

to be

a judgment. Probability

wanting that intuitive evidence which infallibly determines the understanding and produces certain knowledge, the mind, if it will proceed rationally, ought to examine all the grounds of probability, and see how they make more or less for or against any proposition, before dissents

from

it

edge.

is

and persuasions of and think well of, be a men have reason to be Hea-

the opinions

in Turkey, Papists England, and Lutherans

Sweden. But of this wrong ground of assent I have occasion to speak more at large in

in

shall

—

another place. 2 ice, it is

past

Chap. XVI. Of

knowledge. But if another tells me he saw a man in England, in the midst of a sharp winter, walk upon water hardened with cold, this has so great conformity with what is usually observed to happen that I am disposed by the nature of the thing itself to assent to it; unless some manifest suspicion attend the relation of that matter of fact. But if the same thing be told to one born between the tropics, who never saw nor heard of any such thing before, there the whole probability relies on testimony: and as the it is

more in number, and of more credit, and have no interest to speak contrary to the truth, so that matter of fact is like to find more or less belief. Though to a man whose experience has always been quite contrary, and who has never heard of anything like it, the most untainted

1

credit of a witness will scarce be able to find belief. 1

The king of Siam. As it happened to a Dutch ambassador, who entertaining the king of Siam with the particularities of Holland, which he was

amongst other things told him would sometimes, in cold weather, be so hard that men walked upon it, and that it would bear an elephant, if he were there. To which the king replied, Hitherto I have

.

Our

laid

the

Degrees of Assent

assent ought to be regulated by the grounds

of probability.

down

The grounds of probability we have

in the foregoing chapter: as they are

the foundations on which our assent are they also the measure

whereby

.

least, in

the first judgment or search that the

makes.

I

confess, in the opinions

men

mind

have, and

firmly stick to in the world, their assent

is

not

al-

at

being in many cases almost impossible, and in most, very hard, even for those who have very admirable memories, to retain all the proofs which, upon a due examination, made them embrace that side of the question. It suffices that they have once with care and fairness sifted the matter as far as they could; and first

prevailed with them:

it

that they could imagine to give

lie.

are

ways from an actual view of the reasons that

that they have searched into

upon you as a sober fair man, but now I am sure you

we

:

whatever grounds of probability there may be, they yet operate no further on the mind which searches after truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear; at

that the water in his country

I look

built, so

several de-

to take notice that,

inquisitive after,

believed the strange thingsyou have told me, because

is

its

grees are, or ought to be regulated only

relators are

*Cf. ch. xvi. § 13.

so

whom we know

in Spain, Protestants in

whole, reject firm assent, proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on one side

probability;

if

it,

ground of assent, thens in Japan, Mahometans

assents to or

and,

or the other. For example: If I myself see a man walk on the

And

others,

upon a due balancing the or receive it, with a more or less

it;

credibility of testimonies

or less agree or disagree with

Contrary testimonies. examined, before

iv

Upon

proposition:

mony of others is to be considered: i. The number. 2. The integrity. 3. The skill of the witnesses. 4. The design of the author, where it is a testimony out of a book cited. 5. The consistency of the parts,

book

Probable arguments capable of great variety.

all

the particulars,

any

question; and, with the best of their

the account

light to the

skill,

cast

upon the whole evidence: and

up

thus,

having once found on which side the probability appeared to them, after as full and exact an inquiry as they can make, they lay up the conclu2

See chh.

xvii, § 19; xx. §§ 17, 18.

CONCERNING

CHAP. XVI

memories

sion in their

as a truth they

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

have

dis-

covered; and for the future they remain satisfied with the testimony of their memories that this is the opinion that, by the proofs they have once

seen of

it,

deserves such a degree of their assent

as they afford 2.

it.

These cannot always be actually in view; and then

we must content ourselves with the remembrance that we saw groundfor such a degree of assent. This is all that the greatest part of men are capable of doing, in regulating their opinions and judgments; unless a man will exact of them, either to retain distinctly in their memories all the proofs concerning any probable truth, and that too, in the same order, and regular deduction of consequences in which they have formerly placed or seen them; which sometimes is enough to fill a large volume on one single question: or else they must require a man, for every opinion that he embraces, every day to examine the proofs: both once

which are impossible.

It is unavoidable, therememory be relied on in the case, and that men be persuaded of several opinions, whereof the proofs are not actually in their thoughts; nay, which perhaps they are not able

fore, that the

actually to recall. Without

this,

the greatest part

men must be either very sceptic; or change every moment, and yield themselves up to whoever, having lately studied the question, offers them arguments, which, for want of memory, they are not able presently to answer.

of

3.

The

ill

consequence of

this, if

our former judg-

cannot but own, that men's sticking to their past judgment, and adhering firmly to conclusions formerly made, is

ments were not rightly made.

I

often the cause of great obstinacy in error

and

mistake. But the fault is not that they rely on their

memories for what they have before well judged, but because they judged before they had well examined. May we not find a great number (not to say the greatest part) of

men

that think they

have formed right judgments of several matters; and that for no other reason, but because they never thought otherwise? that imagine themselves to have judged right, only because they never questioned, never examined, their own opinions? Which is indeed to think they judged right, because they never judged at all. And yet these, of all men, hold their opinions with the greatest stiffness; those being generally the most fierce and firm in their tenets, who have least examined them. What we once know, we are certain is so: and we may be secure, that there are no latent proofs undiscovered, which may overturn our knowledge, or bring it in doubt. But, in matters of probability,

it is

not in every case

we

367 we have all the particulars beany way concern the question; and

can be sure that fore us, that

that there is no evidence behind, and yet unseen, which may cast the probability on the other side, and outweigh all that at present seems to preponderate with us. Who almost is there that hath the leisure, patience, and means to collect together all the proofs concerning most of the opinions he has, so as safely to conclude that he hath a clear and full view; and that there is no more to be alleged for his better information?

And

yet

we

are forced to determine ourselves

on the one side or other. The conduct of our lives, and the management of our great concerns, will not bear delay: for those

depend, for

the most part, on the determination of our judg-

ment

wherein we are not capable of demonstrative knowledge, and

in points

certain

and

wherein it is necessary for us to embrace the one side or the other. 4. The right use of it, mutual charity and forbearance, in a necessary diversity of opinions Since, there.

unavoidable to the greatest part of men, not all, to have several opinions, without cer-

fore, if

it is

and indubitable proofs of their truth; and an imputation of ignorance, lightness, or folly for men to quit and renounce their former tenets presently upon the offer of an argument which they cannot immediately answer, and show the insufficiency of: it would, methinks, become all men to maintain peace, and the common offices of humanity, and friendship, tain it

carries too great

in the diversity of opinions; since we cannot reasonably expect that any one should readily and obsequiously quit his own opinion, and embrace ours, with a blind resignation to an authority which the understanding of man acknowledges not. For however it may often mistake, it can own no other guide but reason, nor blindly submit to the will and dictates of another. If he you would bring over to your sentiments be one that examines before he assents, you must give him leave at his leisure to go over the account again, and, recalling what is out of his mind, examine all the

on which side the advantage and if he will not think our arguments of weight enough to engage him anew in so much pains, it is but what we often do ourselves in the like case; and we should take it amiss if others particulars, to see

lies:

should prescribe to us what points we should study. And if he be one who takes his opinions upon trust, how can we imagine that he should renounce those tenets which time and custom have so settled in his mind, that he thinks them self-evident, and of an unquestionable certainty; or which he takes to be impressions he has received

;

JOHN LOCKE

368 from God

himself, or

How can we expect,

I

tled should be given

from men sent by him?

1

say, that opinions thus set-

up

to the

there never fails to be, where men find themselves should do well to commiserate treated?

We

ill

our mutual ignorance, and endeavour to remove it in all the gentle and fair ways of information

and not instantly treat others ill,

as obstinate

and

perverse, because they will not renounce their

own, and receive our opinions, or at

least those

we would force upon them, when it is more than probable that we are no less obstinate in not embracing some of theirs. For where is the man that has incontestable evidence of the truth of all that he holds, or of the falsehood of all he condemns; or can say that he has examined to the bottom all his own, or other men's opinions? The neces-

without knowledge, nay often upon very slight grounds, in this fleeting state of action and blindness we are in, should make us more busy and careful to inform ourselves than constrain others. At least, those who have not thoroughly examined to the bottom all their own sity of believing

must confess they are unfit to prescribe and are unreasonable in imposing that as truth on other men's belief, which they themselves have not searched into, nor weighed the arguments of probability, on which they should receive or reject it. Those who have fairly and truly examined, and are thereby got past doubt in all the doctrines they profess and govern themselves by, would have a juster pretence to require others to follow them: but these are so few in number, and find so little reason to be magisterial in their opinions, that nothing insolent and imperious is to be expected from them: and there is reason to think, that, if men were better instructed themselves, they would be less imposing on others.

IV

viz. particular matter

offact.

arguments or au-

thority of a stranger or adversary, especially if there be any suspicion of interest or design, as

BOOK

Concerning the first of these,

Where any

I.

particular thing, consonant to

and others comes attested by the concurrent reports of all that mention it, we receive it as easily, and build as firmly upon it, as if it were certain knowledge; and we reason and act thereupon with as little doubt as if it were perfect demonstration. Thus, if all Englishmen, who have occasion to mention it, should affirm that it froze in England the last winter, or that there were swallows seen there in the summer, I think a man could almost as little doubt of it as that seven and four are eleven. The first, therefore, and highest the constant observation of ourselves

in the like case,

degree of probability,

men,

is,

when

the general consent

it can be known, concurs with a man's constant and never-failing experience in like cases, to confirm the truth of any particular matter of fact attested by fair witnesses: such are all the stated constitutions and

of

all

in all ages, as far as

and the regular proceedings and effects in the ordinary course of nature. This we call an argument from the nature of things themselves. For what our own and other properties of bodies, of causes

tenets,

men's

to others;

same manner, that we with reason conclude to be the effect of steady and regular causes; though they come not within the reach of our knowledge. Thus, That fire warmed a man, made lead fluid, and changes the colour or consistency in wood or charcoal; that iron sunk in water, and swam in quicksilver: these and the like proposi-

5. Probability is either of sensible matter offact, capable of human testimony, or of what is beyond the evi-

dence of our senses.

assent,

and the

But to return to the grounds of several degrees of

we are to we receive

it,

take notice, that the propositions

upon inducements of probability are of two sorts: some particular existence, or,

either concerning as

it is

falling

usually termed, matter of fact, which, under observation, is capable of human

testimony; or else concerning things, which, being beyond the discovery of our senses, are not capable of any such testimony. 6. The concurrent experience of all other men with ours, produces assurance approaching to knowledge.

*Cf. Bk.

I.

ch.

iii.

§§ 22-24; Bk. IV. ch.

vii.

constant observation

has found always to be

after the

tions about particular facts, being agreeable to our constant experience, as often as we have to do with these matters; and being generally spoke of (when mentioned by others) as things found constantly to be so, and therefore not so much as controverted by anybody we are put past doubt that a relation affirming any such thing to have been, or any prediction that it will happen again in the same manner, is very true. These probabilities rise so near to certainty, that they govern our thoughts as absolutely, and influence all our actions as fully, as the most evident demonstration; and in what concerns us we make little or no difference between them and certain knowledge. Our belief, thus grounded, rises to

—

assurance. 7.

II.

Unquestionable testimony, and our

own

ex-

perience that a thing is for the most part so, produce confidence.

by

The next degree of probability is, when

my own experience,

others that mention

part

so,

attested

it,

I

find

and the agreement of all a thing to be for the most

and that the particular instance of it is by many and undoubted witnesses: v.g.

.

CONCERNING

CHAP. XVI

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

an account of men in all as far as I had an opportunity to observe, confirming it, that most men prefer their private advantage to the pubhistory giving us such

my own experience,

and

ages,

lic: if all

extremely probable. And in this case, our assent has a sufficient foundation to raise itself to a degree which we may call conso, it is

Fair testimony, and the nature of the thing indifferent, produce unavoidable assent. In things that 8. III.

happen indifferently, as that a bird should fly this or that way; that it should thunder on a man's right or left hand, &c, when any particular matter of fact is vouched by the concurrent testimony of unsuspected witnesses, there our assent unavoidable.

Rome:

is

also

Thus: that there is such a city in Italy

that about one thousand seven hun-

it a man, called was a general, and that he won a battle against another, called Pompey. This, though in the nature of the thing there be nothing for nor against it, yet being related by historians of credit, and contradicted by no one writer, a man cannot avoid believing it, and can as little doubt of it as he does of the being and actions of his own acquaintance, whereof he him-

dred years ago, there lived in

Julius Caesar; that he

self is 9.

a witness.

Experience and testimonies clashing infinitely vary

Thus far the matter goes easy enough. Probability upon such grounds carthe degrees of probability.

much evidence with it, that it naturally determines the judgment, and leaves us as little liberty to believe or disbelieve, as a demonstration does, whether we will know, or be ignorant. ries so

The

difficulty

common

produce

fitted to

tertainments, as

in the

we

mind such

different en-

call belief, conjecture, guess,

doubt, wavering, distrust, disbelief,

&c.

10. Traditional testimonies, the further less their

proof becomes. This

is

sent in matters wherein testimony of:

concerning which,

I

think,

removed the

what concerns it

is

made

as-

use

may not be amiss

law of England which is, That though the attested copy of a record be good proof, yet the copy of a copy, ever so well attested, and by ever so credible witto take notice of a rule observed in the

fidence.

as

gree to preponderate on either side; so they are

historians that write of Tiberius, say that

Tiberius did

369

is,

when

experience,

testimonies contradict

and the reports of

history

and witnesses clash with the ordinary course of nature, or with one another; there it is, where diligence, attention, and exactness are required, to form a right judgment, and to proportion the assent to the different evidence and probability of the thing: which rises and falls, according as those two foundations of credibility, viz. common observation in like cases, and particular testimonies in favour or contradict it. These are liable to so great variety of contrary observations, circumstances, reports, different that particular instance,

qualifications, tempers, designs, oversights,

of the reporters, that

it is

impossible to reduce to

precise rules the various degrees wherein their assent. This only

&c,

may

men give

be said in general,

That as the arguments and proofs pro and con, upon due examination, nicely weighing every particular circumstance, shall to any one appear, upon the whole matter, in a greater or less de-

;

nesses, will not

cature. This

is

be admitted as a proof in judi-

so generally

and suited

approved

as reason-

wisdom and caution

to be used in our inquiry after material truths, that I never yet heard of any one that blamed it. This practice, if it be allowable in the decisions of right and wrong, carries this observation along with it, viz. That any testimony, the further off it is from the original truth, the less force and proof it has. The being and existence of the thing itself, is what I call the original truth. A credible man vouching his knowledge of it is a good proof; but if another able,

to the

equally credible do witness

it

from his report, the

weaker: and a third that attests the hearsay of an hearsay is yet less considerable. So that in traditional truths, each remove weakens testimony

is

the force of the proof: and the

more hands the

tradition has successively passed through, the less

strength and evidence does

it

receive from them. 1

This I thought necessary to be taken notice of: because I find amongst some men the quite contrary commonly practised, who look on opinions to gain force by growing older; and what a thousand years since would not, to a rational man contemporary with the first voucher, have appeared at all probable, is now urged as certain beyond all question, only because several have since, from him, said it one after another. Upon this ground propositions, evidently false or doubtful enough in their first beginning, come, by an inverted rule of probability, to pass for authentic truths; and those which found or deserved little credit

from the mouths of their first authors, grow venerable by age, are urged

are thought to

as undeniable. 1 1 Yet history is of great use. I would not be thought here to lessen the credit and use of history: it is all the light we have in many cases, and

we have

in

many

cases,

and we receive from

it

a great part of the useful truths we have, with a convincing evidence. I think nothing more val-

uable than the records of antiquity: I wish we had more of them, and more uncorrupted. But 1 Gf. Bacon, Advancement of Learning, Bk. I.

JOHN LOCKE

370

BOOK

this truth itself forces

me to say, That no probcan rise higher than its first original. What has no other evidence than the single testimony of one only witness must stand or fall by his only

therefore can appear

ability

as they

testimony, whether good, bad, or indifferent; and though cited afterwards by hundreds of

vation. Analogy in these matters

others,

one

after another,

is

so far

from receiv-

ing any strength thereby, that it is only the weaker. Passion, interest, inadvertency, mistake of his meaning, and a thousand odd reasons, or capricios, men's minds are acted by, (impossible to be discovered,)

may make one man

quote another man's words or meaning wrong. He that has but ever so little examined the citations of writers, cannot doubt how little credit

the great rule of probability. [Secondly],

we have

is

The prob-

hitherto mentioned are only

such as concern matter of fact, and such things as are capable of observation and testimony. There remains that other sort, concerning which men entertain opinions with variety of assent, though the things be such, that falling not under the reach of

Such are, and operations of finite

our senses, they are not capable of testimony. i

.

The

existence, nature

immaterial beings without us; as spirits, angels, &c. Or the existence of material beings which, either for their smallness in themselves or remoteness from us, our senses cannot take notice of as, whether there be any plants, animals,

devils,

—

and

intelligent inhabitants in the planets,

manner

is

the only help

from that alone we draw

all

our grounds of probability. Thus, observing that the bare rubbing of two bodies violently one upon another, produces heat, and very often fire itself, we have reason to think, that what we call

and fire consists in a violent agitation of the imperceptible minute parts of the burning mat-

heat

ter.

tions of pellucid bodies

;

observation, that there

and

world,

which are

is

a gradual connexion of one

it is

cover the bounds betwixt them;

see in the

not easy to dis-

we have

reason

persuaded that, by such gentle steps, things ascend upwards in degrees of perfection. 1 It is a hard matter to say where sensible and rational to be

and where insensible and irrational end: and who is there quick-sighted enough to determine precisely which is the lowest species of living things, and which the first of those which have no life? Things, as far as we can observe, lessen and augment, as the quantity does in a regular cone; where, though there be a manifest odds betwixt the bigness of the diameter at a remote distance, yet the difference between the upper and under, where they touch one another, is hardly begin,

discernible.

of operation in most parts of the

tween some

2.

we

so closely linked together, that,

in the several ranks of beings,

Concern-

other mansions of the vast universe. ing the

it is

tween, in all that great variety of things

it.

In things which sense cannot discover, analogy

abilities

have, and

with another, without any great or discernible gaps be-

from whom he received 2.

we

knowledge and obser-

force in the mouth or made use of it than in his

still it is from the and has always less

further

1

tion to other parts of our

original, the less valid

wanting; and consequently how much less quotations of quotations can be relied on. This is certain, that what in one age was affirmed upon slight grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future ages by being often repeated. But the

writing of him that last

more or less probable, only

agree to truths that are established in our minds, and as they hold proporless

Observing likewise that the different refracproduce in our eyes the different appearances of several colours and also, that the different ranging and laying the superficial parts of several bodies, as of velvet, watered silk, &c, does the like, we think it probable that the colour and shining of bodies is in them nothing but the different arrangement and refraction of their minute and insensible parts. Thus, finding in all parts of the creation, that fall under human

the quotations deserve, where the originals are

it is,

more or

IV

The difference is exceeding great bemen and some animals: but if we will

works of nature: wherein, though we see the sen-

unknown, and we perceive not the ways and manner how they sible effects, yet their causes are

are produced.

We

see animals are generated,

nourished, and move; the loadstone draws iron;

and the parts

of a candle, successively melting, turn into flame, and give us both light and heat.

we see and know: but and the manner they are produced in, we can only guess and probably conjecture. For these and the like, coming not withThese and the

like effects

the causes that operate,

in the scrutiny of

human

senses,

cannot be ex-

amined by them, or be attested by anybody; and

1 "It is an assured truth, and a conclusion of experience, that a little, or superficial knowledge of philosophy may incline the mind of man to atheism, but a further proceeding therein doth bring the mind back again to religion; for in the entrance to philosophy, when the second causes, which are next unto the senses, do offer themselves to the mind of man, if it dwell and stay there, it may induce some oblivion of the highest cause; but when a man passeth on further, and seeth the dependence of causes, and the works of Providence; then, according to the allegory of the poets, he will easily believe that the highest link of nature's chain must needs be tied to the foot of Jupiter's chair." Ba-

con, Advancement of Learning,

Book

I.

.

CONCERNING

CHAP. XVII

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

compare the understanding and abilities of some men and some brutes, we shall find so little dif-

leaves no

be hard to say, that that of or larger. Observing, I clearer either is man the say, such gradual and gentle descents downwards in those parts of the creation that are beneath man, the rule of analogy may make it probable, that it is so also in things above us and our observation; and that there are several ranks of intelligent beings, excelling us in several degrees

tion,

of perfection, ascending upwards towards the infinite perfection of the Creator, by gentle steps

dence of

ference, that

it

will

one at no great This sort of probability, which is the best conduct of rational experiments, and the rise of hypothesis, has also its use and influence; and a wary reasoning from

and

differences, that are every

distance from the next to

it.

analogy leads us often into the discovery of truths

and

useful productions,

which would otherwise

13.

One

case where contrary experience lessens not

the testimony.

Though

the

common

the strangeness of the fact lessens not the assent

room

371 for

doubt or

hesita-

we must be sure that it be a divine revelaand that we understand it right: else we shall expose ourselves to all the extravagancy of enthusiasm, and all the error of wrong principles, if we

have faith and assurance elation.

And

in

what is not divine rev-

therefore, in those cases, our assent

can be rationally no higher than the evidence of its being a revelation, and that this is the meaning of the expressions

it is

delivered

in. If

the evi-

being a revelation, or that this is its true sense, be only on probable proofs, our assent can reach no higher than an assurance or its

diffidence, arising

from the more or

less

appar-

ent probability of the proofs. But offaith, and the

precedency it ought to have before other arguments of persuasion, I shall speak more hereafter 2 ;

where

I

treat of

as

it

it is

ordinarily placed, in

contradistinction to reason; though in truth else

but an

it

be

assent founded on the highest rea-

son.

experience

and the ordinary course of things have justly a mighty influence on the minds of men, to make them give or refuse credit to anything proposed to their belief; yet there is one case, wherein

of

tion. Only

nothing

concealed.

lie

manner

Chap. XVII. Of Reason Various significations of the word "reason".

1

word

The

English language has different significations: sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles: sometimes for clear and fair dereason in the

to a fair testimony given of it. For where such supernatural events are suitable to ends aimed at by Him who has the power to change the

ductions from those principles and sometimes for the cause, and particularly the final cause. But

course of nature, there, under such circumstances,

signification different

may be the fitter to procure belief, by how much the more they are beyond or contrary to

as it stands for a faculty in man, that faculty whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts, and wherein it is evident he much sur-

that

ordinary observation. This is the proper case of which, well attested, do not only find credit themselves, but give it also to other truths, which need such confirmation. 1 4. The bare testimony oj divine revelation is the high-

miracles,

est certainty.

Besides those

we have

hitherto

men-

one sort of propositions that chalupon bare testimony, whether the thing proposed agree or disagree with common experience, and the ordinary course of things, or no. The reason whereof is, because the testimony is of such an one as cannot deceive nor be deceived and that is of God himself. This carries with it an assurance beyond doubt, evidence beyond exception. This is called by a peculiar name, revelation, and our assent to it, faith, 1 which as absolutely determines our tioned, there

is

lenge the highest degree of our assent,

:

minds, and as perfectly excludes all wavering, as our knowledge itself; and we may as well doubt of our own being, as we can whether any revela-

:

the consideration

I

have of it here is in a from all these; and that is,

shall

passes them. 3 2.

Wherein reasoning

consists. If

agreement or disagreement of our own and the knowledge of the existence of all things without us 5 (except only of a God, whose existence every man may certainly know and demonstrate to himself from his own existence), be had only by our senses, what room is there for the exercise of any other faculty, but outward sense and inward perception? What need it there of reason? Very much: both for the enlargement of our knowledge, and regulating our assent. For it hath to do both in knowledge and opinion, and is necessary and assisting to all our other intellectual faculties, and indeed contains two of them, viz. sagacity and illation. By the one, it finds out; and by the other, it so orders the intermediate ideas tion of the

ideas,

2

a settled

Ch.

3

and sure principle of assent and assurance, and

4

Cf. Bk. II. ch. xi. § 10. Ch. i. § 2; ch. vi.

tion

1

from God be

true.

Gf. ch. xviii. § 2.

So that faith

is

general knowl-

edge, as has been shown, 4 consists in a percep-

6

xviii.

Cf. ch. ix. § 3; Bk. II. ch.

i.

§ 4.

— JOHN LOCKE

372

what connexion there is in each link of the chain, whereby the extremes are held together; and thereby, as it were, to draw into view the truth sought for, which is that which we call illation or inference, and consists in nothing as to discover

but the perception of the connexion there is between the ideas, in each step of the deduction; whereby the mind comes to see, either the certain agreement or disagreement of any two ideas,

4.

BOOK

Whether syllogism

is the

IV

great instrument of rea-

There is one thing more be considered concerning reason; and that is, whether syllogism, as is generally thought, be the proper instrument of it, son: first cause to doubt this.

which

I

and the

shall desire to

usefullest

The causes

way

of exercising this faculty.

fain to substitute assent in-

have to doubt are these: First, Because syllogism serves our reason but in one only of the forementioned parts of it; and that is, to show the connexion of the proofs in any one instance, and no more; but in this it is of no great use, since the mind can perceive such connexion, where it really is, as easily, nay, perhaps better, without it. Men can reason well who cannot make a syllogism. If we will observe the actings of our own minds,

stead of knowledge, and take propositionsfor true, without being certain they are so, we have need

we shall find that we reason best and clearest, when we only observe the connexion of the proof,

and compare the grounds

without reducing our thoughts to any rule of syl-

as in demonstration, in

which

it

arrives at knowl-

probable connexion, on which it gives or withholds its assent, as in opinion. Sense and intuition reach but a very little way. The greatest part of our knowledge depends upon deductions and intermediate ideas: and in those edge; or their

cases

where we are

to find out, examine,

of their probability. In both these cases, the faculty

which

plies

finds out the

means, and rightly ap-

them, to discover certainty in the one, and

probability in the other, reason. For, as

is

that

which we

call

reason perceives the necessary and

indubitable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to another, in each step of any demonstration that produces knowledge; so it likewise perceives the probable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to another, in every step of a discourse, to which it will think assent due. This is the lowest degree of that which can be truly called reason. For where the mind does not perceive this probable connexion, where it does not discern whether there be any such connexion or no; there men's opinions are not the product of judgment, or the consequence of reason, but the effects of chance and hazard, of a mind floating at all adventures, without choice and without direction. 3. Reason in its jour degrees. So that we may in reason consider thesefour degrees: the first and high-

and finding out of truths; and methodical disposition of them, and laying them in a clear and fit order, to make their connexion and force be plainly and easily perceived; the third is the perceiving their connexion; and the fourth, a making a right conclusion. These several degrees may be observed in any mathematical demonstration; it est

is

the discovering

the second, the regular

being one thing to perceive the connexion of each demonstration is made by another; another to perceive the dependence of the conpart, as the

clusion on all the parts; a third, to make out a demonstration clearly and neatly one's self; and something different from all these, to have first found out these intermediate ideas or proofs by

which

it is

made.

I

And therefore we may take notice, that many men that reason exceeding clear and rightly, who know not how to make a syllogism. He that will look into many parts of Asia and America, will find men reason there perhaps as acutely as himself, who yet never heard of a logism.

there are

any one argument to any one makes syllogisms in reasoning within himself. Indeed syllogism is made use of, on occasion, to discover syllogism, nor can reduce

those forms:

and

I

believe scarce

a fallacy hid in a rhetorical flourish, or cunningwrapt up in a smooth period; and, stripping an absurdity of the cover of wit and good language, show it in its naked deformity. But the weakness or fallacy of such a loose discourse it shows, by the artificial form it is put into, only to those who have thoroughly studied mode and ly

figure,

and have so examined the many ways that

three propositions may be put together, as to know

which of them does certainly conclude right, and which not, and upon what grounds it is that they do so. All who have so far considered syllogism,

why in three propositions laid together in one form, the conclusion will be cer-

as to see the reason

tainly right, but in another not certainly so, I grant are certain of the conclusion they draw from the premises in the allowed modes and figures. But they who have not so far looked into those forms, are not sure by virtue of syllogism, that the conclusion certainly follows from the premises; they

only take

it

to be so

by an implicit

faith in their

teachers and a confidence in those forms of argumentation; but this is still but believing, not be-

mankind those who in comparison of those who cannot; and if, of those few ing certain.

Now,

if,

of all

can make syllogisms are extremely few

who have been

taught

logic, there

is

but a very

CONCERNING

CHAP. XVII

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

small number who do any more than believe that syllogisms, in the allowed modes andfigures do con-

clude right, without knowing certainly that they so: if syllogisms must be taken for the only proper instrument of reason and means of knowledge, it will follow, that, before Aristotle there was not one man that did or could know anything by reason; and that, since the invention of syllogisms, there is not one of ten thousand that

do

Aristotle. But God has not been so sparing to men to make them barely two-legged creatures,

make them rational, them that he could get so to ex-

to Aristotle to

left it

those few of

i.e.

and cumbersome fetters of several syllogisms, that clog and hinder the mind, which proceeds from one part to another quicker and clearer without them: and the probability which she easily perceives in things thus in their native state would be quite lost, if this argument were managed learnedly, and proposed in mode and figure. For

out tying them

very often confounds the connexion; and, I one will perceive in mathematical demonstrations, that the knowledge gained thereby comes shortest and clearest without sylit

think, every

doth.

and

373

together in those artificial

logism.

Inference

is

looked on as the great act of the

and so it is when it is rightly made: but the mind, either very desirous to en-

amine the grounds of syllogisms, as to see that, in above three score ways that three propositions

rational faculty,

may be laid together, there are but about fourteen wherein one may be sure that the conclu-

large its knowledge, or very apt to favour the sen-

sion

is

right;

and upon what grounds

in these few, the conclusion

is

certain,

and in the

much

haste, before

God has been more bountiful to man than so. He has given them a mind that

and penetration

acuteness,

views,

of

thought and strength of judgment, few have equalled; and who, in this very invention of

forms of argumentation, wherein the conclusion may be shown to be rightly inferred, did great service against those who were not ashamed to

deny anything. And

I

readily own, that all right

may

be reduced to his forms of syllogism. 1 But yet I think, without any diminution to him, I may truly say, that they are not the only nor the best way of reasoning, for the leadreasoning

ing of those into truth

who

are willing to find

it,

may of their reason, for the attainment of knowledge. And he and

desire to

make the

best use they

plain, found out some forms to be and others not, not by the forms themselves, but by the original way of knowledge, i.e. by the visible agreement of ideas. Tell a country gentlewoman that the wind is south-west, and the weather lowering, and like to rain, and she

himself,

it is

conclusive,

understand it is not safe for her to go abroad thin clad in such a day, after a fever: she clearly sees the probable connexion of all these, viz. south-west wind, and clouds, rain, wetting, taking cold, relapse, and danger of death, withwill easily

l

C&. Bk. III. ch. x. §§

1

1

-i 3.

has once imbibed,

inferences;

can reason, without being instructed in methods of syllogizing: the understanding is not taught to reason by these rules; it has a native faculty to perceive the coherence or incoherence of its ideas, and can range them right, without any such perplexing repetitions. I say not this any way to lessen Aristotle, whom I look on as one of the greatest men amongst the ancients; whose large

it

make

other not.

kind

timents

that,

it is,

is

very forward to

and therefore often makes too it

perceives the connexion of

the ideas that must hold the extremes together. Syllogism does not discover ideas, or their connexions.

To infer,

nothing but by virtue of one proposito draw in another as true, i.e. to see or suppose such a connexion of the two ideas of the inferred proposition. V.g. Let this be the proposition laid down, "Men shall be punished in another world," and from thence be inferred this other,' 'Then men can determine themtion laid

is

down as true,

The question now is, to know whether mind has made this inference right or no: if

selves."

the

made it by finding out the intermediate and taking a view of the connexion of them, placed in a due order, it has proceeded rationally, and made a right inference: if it has done it without such a view, it has not so much made an inference that will hold, or an inference of right reason, as shown a willingness to have it be, or it

has

ideas,

be taken for such. But in neither case is it syllogism that discovered those ideas, or showed the connexion of them; for they must be both found out, and the connexion everywhere perceived, before they can rationally be made use of in syllogism: unless it can be said, that any idea, without considering what connexion it hath with the two other, whose agreement should be shown by will do well enough in a syllogism, and may be taken at a venture for the medius terminus, to prove any conclusion. But this nobody will say; because it is by virtue of the perceived agreement of the intermediate idea with the extremes, that the extremes are concluded to agree; and therefore each intermediate idea must be such as in the whole chain hath a visible connexion with those two it has been placed between, or else thereby the conclusion cannot be inferred or it,

374 drawn

JOHN LOCKE in: for

wherever any

link of the chain

is

BOOK

right and conclusive

IV

modes and figures or no, and

and without connexion, there the whole strength of it is lost, and it hath no force to infer or draw in anything. In the instance above mentioned, what is it shows the force of the inference, and consequently the reasonableness of it, but a

so are not at all helped

view of the connexion of all the intermediate ideas

the logicians themselves, they see the connexion of each intermediate idea with those it stands be-

loose

draw

that

in the conclusion, or proposition in-

"Men shall be punished"; "God the punisher" "Just punishment;" "The punished guilty"; "Could have done otherwise"; "Freedom"; "Self-determination"; by which chain of ferred? V.g. ;

ideas thus visibly linked together in train,

i.e.

each intermediate idea agreeing on each side with those two it is immediately placed between, the ideas of men and self-determination appear to be connected, i.e. this proposition "men can determine themselves" is drawn in or inferred from this, "that they shall be punished in the other world." For here the mind, seeing the connexion there is between the idea of merf s punishment in the other world and the idea of God punishing; between God punishing and the justice of the punishment; between justice of punishment and guilt; between guilt and a power to do otherwise; between a power to do otherwise and freedom; and between freedom and self-determination, sees the connexion between men

and

self-determination.

The connexion must into syllogisms.

be discovered before

it

can be put

Now I ask, whether the connexion

of the extremes be not more clearly seen in this simple and natural disposition, than in the perplexed repetitions, and jumble of five or six sylI must beg pardon for calling it jumble, somebody shall put these ideas into so many syllogisms, and then say that they are less jumbled, and their connexion more visible, when they are transposed and repeated, and spun out to a

logisms. till

greater length in artificial forms, than in that, and natural plain order they are laid down

short

wherein everyone may see it, and wherein they must be seen before they can be put into a in here,

train of syllogisms. For the natural order of the

connecting ideas must direct the order of the syllogisms, and a man must see the connexion of each intermediate idea with those thatitconnects, before he can with reason make use of it in a syl-

And when all those syllogisms are made, neither those that are nor those that are not logicians will see the force of the argumentation, i.e., logism.

the connexion of the extremes, one jot the better. ['For those that are not men of art, not knowing

the true forms of syllogism, nor the reasons of

them, cannot x

know whether

This sentence

original.

is

they are

made

in

bracketed by Locke in the

by the forms they are put though by them the natural order, wherein the mind could judge of their respective connex-

into;

ion, being disturbed, renders the illation

much

more uncertain than without them.] And

as for

tween, (on which the force of the inference depends,) as well before as after the syllogism is made, or else they do not see it at all. For a syl-

logism neither shows nor strengthens the connexion of any two ideas immediately put together, but only by the connexion seen in them shows what connexion the extremes have one with another. But what connexion the intermediate has with either of the extremes in the syllogism, that no syllogism does or can show. That the mind only doth or can perceive as they stand there in that juxta-position only by its own view, to which the syllogistical form it happens to be in gives no help or light at all: it only shows that if the intermediate idea agrees with those it is on both sides immediately applied to; then those two re-

mote ones,

they are called, extremes, do cerand therefore the immediate connexion of each idea to that which it is applied to on each side, on which the force of the reasoning or, as

tainly agree;

depends, is as well seen before as after the syllogism is made, or else he that makes the syllogism could never see it at all. This, as has been already observed, is seen only by the eye, or the perceptive faculty, of the mind, taking a view of them laid together, in a juxta-position; which view of any two it has equally, whenever they are laid together in any proposition, whether that proposition be placed as a major or a minor, in a syllogism or no. Use of syllogism. Of what use, then are syllogisms? I answer, their chief and main use is in the Schools, where men are allowed without shame to deny

do manifestly agree; who from thence have learned without shame to deny the connexion of ideas, which even to themselves is visible. But to an ingenuous searcher after truth, who has no other aim but to find it, there is no need of any such form to force the allowing of the inference: the truth and reasonableness of it is better seen in ranging of the ideas in a simple and plain order: and hence it is that men, in their own inthe agreement of ideas that

or out of the Schools, to those

quiries after truth, never use syllogisms to con-

vince themselves or in teaching others to instruct willing learners. Because, before they can put them into a syllogism, they must see the connexion that is between the intermediate idea and the

CONCERNING

CHAP. XVII

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING now

375

two other ideas it is set between and applied to, to show their agreement; and when they see that, they see whether the inference be good or no; and so syllogism comes too late to settle it. For to make use again of the former instance, I ask whether the mind, considering the idea of justice, placed as an intermediate idea between the punishment of men and the guilt of the punished, (and till it does so consider it, the mind cannot

intermediate ideas naked in their due order, shows the incoherence of the argumentation better than syllogism; not only as subjecting each link of the chain to the immediate view of the mind in its proper place, whereby its connexion is best observed; but also because syllogism shows the incoherence only to those (who are not one of ten thousand)

make

the reason

use of

as a medius terminus,) does not as

it

and strength of the inferformed into a syllogism. To a very plain and easy example; let ani-

plainly see the force

when

ence as

show it in

it is

mal be the intermediate idea or medius terminus that the mind makes use of to show the connexion of homo and vivens; I ask whether the mind does not more readily and plainly see that connexion in the simple and proper position of the connecting idea in the middle thus:

Homo — Animal — Vivens, than in

this

perplexed one,

Animal

— Vivens — Homo — Animal:

tion, I

who

mode and figure, and upon which those forms are established; whereas a due and orderly placing of the ideas upon which the inference is made, makes

is

the position these ideas have in a syllo-

show the connexion between homo and by the intervention of animal. Not the only way to detect fallacies Indeed syllogism is thought to be of necessary use, even to the lovers of truth, to show them the fallacies that gism, to vivens

.

are often concealed in florid, witty, or involved But that this is a mistake will appear,

discourses.

we consider, that the reason why sometimes men who sincerely aim at truth are imposed upon

if

by such

loose, and, as they are called, rhetorical

discourses,

some

is,

that their fancies being struck with

metaphorical representations, they neglect to observe, or do not easily perceive, what lively

upon which the inference depends. Now, to show such men the weakness of such an argumentation, there needs no more but are the true ideas

to strip

if

of the superfluous ideas, which, blend-

ed and confounded with those on which the inference depends, seem to show a connexion where there

is

none; or at least to hinder the discovery

want of it; and then to lay the naked ideas on which the force of the argumentation depends in their due order; in which position the mind, taking a view of them, sees what connexion they have, and so is able to judge of the inference without any need of a syllogism at all. I grant that mode and figure is commonly made of the

use of in such cases, as if the detection of the incoherence of such loose discourses were wholly

owing

to the syllogistical form;

formerly thought,

till,

upon a

and

so I myself

stricter

examina-

perfectly understand

every one, whether logician or not logician, who understands the terms, and hath the faculty to perceive the agreement or disagreement of such ideas, (without which, in or out of syllogism, he cannot perceive the strength or weakness, coherence or incoherence of the discourse) see the want of connexion in the argumentation, and the absurdity of the inference. And thus I have known a man unskilful in syllogism, who at first hearing could perceive the weakness and inconclusiveness of a long artific-

and plausible

wherewith others and I believe there are few of my readers who do not know such. And indeed, if it were not so, the debates of most princes' councils, and the business of assemblies, would be in danger to be mismanaged, since those who are relied upon, and have cial

which

find, 1 that laying the

discourse,

better skilled in syllogism have been misled:

usually a great stroke in them, are not always such who have the good luck to be perfectly knowing in the forms of syllogism, or expert in mode and figure. And if syllogism were the only, or so

much

as the surest

way

artificial discourses; I

to detect the fallacies of

do not think that

all

man-

kind, even princes in matters that concern their

crowns and dignities, are so much in love with falsehood and mistake, that they would everywhere have neglected to bring syllogism into the debates of moment; or thought

much

as to offer

them in

it

ridiculous so

affairs of

consequence;

a plain evidence to me, that men of parts and who were not idly to dispute at their ease, but were to act according to the result of their debates, and often pay for their mistakes penetration,

with their heads or fortunes, found those scholastic forms were of little use to discover truth or fallacy, whilst both the one and the other might be shown, and better shown without them, to those who would not refuse to see what was visibly shown them. Another cause 1

to

doubt whether syllogism be the only

Gf. Locke's, Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity, 1697; also Locke's Thoughts concerning Education, 1693, § § 188, 189.

JOHN LOCKE

376

proper instrument of reason, in the discovery of truth. Secondly,

Another reason that makes

me doubt

whether syllogism be the only proper instrument of reason, in the discovery of truth, is, that of whatever use mode and figure is pretended to be in the laying open of fallacy, (which has been above considered,)

ways of

and for this I appeal to common observation, which has always found these artificial methods of reasoning more adapted to catch and entangle the mind, than to instruct and inform the understanding. And hence it is that men, even when they are baffled and silenced in this scholastic way, are seldom or never convinced, and so brought over to the conquering side: they perhaps acknowledge their adversary to be the more skilful disputant, but rest nevertheless persuaded of the truth on their side, and go away, worsted as they are, with the same opinion they brought with them: which they could not do if this way of argumentation carried light and conviction with it, and made men see where the truth lay; and therefore syllogism has been thought more proper for the attaining victory in dispute, argumentation;

than for the discovery or confirmation of truth in fair inquiries. And if it be certain, that fallacies can be couched in syllogism, as it cannot be denied; it must be something else, and not syllogism, that must discover them. 1 I have had experience how ready some men are, when all the use which they have been wont to ascribe to anything is not allowed, to cry out, that I am for laying it wholly aside. But to prevent such unjust and groundless imputations, I tell them, that I am not for taking away any helps to the understanding in the attainment of knowledge. And if men skilled in and used to syllogisms, find them assisting to their reason in the discovery of truth, I think they ought to make use of them. All that I aim at, is, that they should not ascribe more to these forms than belongs to them, and think that men have no use, or not so full an use, of their reasoning faculties without them.

Some and

eyes

want

distinctly;

therefore say

them: those

spectacles to see things clearly

but

tation,

let

not those that use

nobody can

them

see clearly without

who do so will be thought,

in favour

I

IV

argumen-

see consequences or inconsequences in

am not so unreasonable as to be against knows what best fits him not thence conclude who use not just the same helps

the using them. Every one his

own

all in

but

sight;

the dark,

let

that he finds a need

those scholastic forms of discourse

are not less liable to fallacies than the plainer

BOOK

5.

ability.

I

of.

Syllogism helps little in demonstration,

may

But however truly say,

it

it is

less in prob-

be in knowledge,

of far

less, or

think

I

no use at all in

For the assent there being to be determined by the preponderancy, after due weighing of all the proofs, with all circumstances on both sides, nothing is so unfit to assist the mind in that as syllogism; which running away with one assumed probability, or one topical argument, pursues that till it has led the mind quite out of sight of the thing under consideration; and, forcing it upon some remote difficulty, holds it fast there; entangled perhaps, and, as it were, manacled, in the chain of syllogisms, without allowing it the liberty, much less affording it the

probabilities.

helps, requisite to

considered,

is

show on which side,

all

things

the greater probability.

6. Serves not to increase our knowledge, but to fence

with the knowledge we suppose we have. But

help

let it

may

be said) in convincing men of their errors and mistakes: (and yet I would us (as perhaps fain see the

man that was forced out of his opin-

still it fails our reanot its highest perfection, is yet certainly its hardest task, and that which we most need its help in; and that is the finding out of proofs, and making new discoveries. The rules of syllogism serve not to furnish the mind with those intermediate ideas that may show the connexion of remote ones. This way of reasoning discovers no new proofs, but is the art of marshalling and ranging the old ones we have al-

ion by dint of syllogism,) yet

son in that part, which,

ready.

The

if

forty-seventh proposition of the

first

book of Euclid is very true; but the discovery of it, I think, not owing to any rules of common logic. A man knows first, and then he is able to prove syllogistically. So that syllogism comes after knowledge, and then a man has little or no need of it. But it is chiefly by the finding out those ideas that show the connexion of distant ones, that our stock of knowledge is increased, and that useful arts and sciences are advanced. Syllogism, but the art of fencing with the

of art (which, perhaps, they are beholden to,) a

at best,

much to depress and discredit nature. Reason, by its own penetration, where it is strong

knowledge we have, without making any addition to it. And if a man should employ his reason all this way, he will not do much otherwise than he who, having got some iron out of the bowels of the earth, should have it beaten up all into swords, and put it into his servants' hands to fence with and bang one another. Had the King

little

and

too

exercised, usually sees quicker

without syllogism. so

dimmed 1

14.

Cf.

its

and

clearer

If use of those spectacles

sight, that it

has cannot without them

Bacon on Syllogism, Novum Organum,

I.

M-

is

little

CONCERNING

CHAP. XVII

employed the hands of his people, and so, he had brought to light but

of Spain his

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

Spanish iron

of that treasure that lay so long hid in the dark entrails of America. And I am apt to think, that he who shall employ all the force of his reason only in brandishing of syllogisms, will discover very little of that mass of knowledge which lies yet concealed in the secret recesses of nature; and which, I am apt to think, native rustic reason (as it formerly has done) is likelier to open a little

way

to,

and add

to the

common

stock of

man-

any scholastic proceeding by of mode and figure.

kind, rather than

the strict rules 7.

Other helps

to

reason than syllogism should be

doubt not, nevertheless, but there are ways to be found to assist our reason in this most useful part; and this the judicious Hooker en-

sought. I

courages

me to say, who in his Eccl.

Pol.

1. i.

§ 6,

speaks thus: "If there might be added the right helps of true art and learning, (which helps, I must plainly confess, this age of the world, carrying the name of a learned age, doth neither much

know nor

generally regard,) there would un-

doubtedly be almost as much difference in maturity of judgment between men therewith inured, and that which men now are, as between men that are now, and innocents." I do not pretend to have found or discovered here any of those "right helpsof art," this greatmanof deep thought mentions: but that is plain, that syllogism and the logic now in use, which were as well known in his days, can be none of those he means. It is sufficient for me, if by a Discourse, perhaps something out of the way, I am sure, as to me, wholly new and unborrowed, I shall have given occasion to others to cast about for new discoveries, and to seek in their own thoughts for those right helps of art, which will scarce be found, I fear,

by those who

that no syllogistical reasoning can be right

this sort of cattle, (as

sition in it. As if we could not reason, and have knowledge about particulars: whereas, in truth, the matter rightly considered, the immediate object of all our reasoning and knowledge, is nothing but particulars. Every man's reasoning and knowledge is only about the ideas existing in his own mind; which are truly, every one of them, particular existences: and our knowledge and reason about other things is only as they correspond with those particular ideas. So that the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our particular ideas is the whole and utmost of all our

knowledge. Universality is but accidental to it, and consists only in this, that the particular ideas about which it is are such as more than one particular thing can correspond with and be represented by. But the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, and consequently our knowledge, is equally clear and cer-

an observing

Roman

whether

tain,

either, or both, or neither of those

be capable of representing more real beings than one, or no. One thing more I crave leave to offer about syllogism, before I leave it, viz. May one not upon just ground inquire whether the form syllogism now has, is that which in reason it ought to have? For the medius terminus being to join the extremes, i.e. the intermediate ideas, by ideas,

its

show the agreement or disin question, would not the the medius terminus be more natural,

intervention, to

agreement of the two position of

and show the agreement or disagreement of the extremes clearer and better, if it were placed in the middle between them? Which might be easily done

by transposing the propositions, and mak-

ing the medius terminus the predicate of the

and the subject of the second. As Omnis homo

For beaten tracks lead

est

Omne animal

calls

them,) whose thoughts reach only to imitation, Non quo eundum est, sed quo itur. But I can be bold to say, that this age is adorned with some men of that strength of judgment and largeness of comprehension, that, if they would employ their thoughts on this subject, could open new and un-

and

conclusive, but what has at least one general propo-

servilely confine themselves to the

rules and dictates of others.

377

animal.

est vivens.

Ergo, omnis homo

Omne

I

first,

thus:

est vivens.

corpus est extensum et solidum.

Nullum extensum

et

Ergo, corpus non

est

need not trouble

solidum

pura

my

est

pur a

extensio.

extensio.

reader with instances

discovered ways to the advancement of knowl-

whose conclusions are particular. The same reason hold for the same form in them,

edge.

as well as in the general.

8.

We can reason about particulars;

and the immedi-

in syllogisms

9.

Our reason oftenfails us. Reason, though it pene-

and

ate object of all our reasonings is nothing but particular

trates into the depths of the sea

Having here had occasion to speak of syllogism in general, and the use of it in reasoning, and the improvement of our knowledge, it is fit,

vates our thoughts as high as the stars, and leads us through the vast spaces and large rooms of this

ideas.

before

I

leave this subject, to take notice of one

manifest mistake in the rules of syllogism: viz.

earth, ele-

mighty fabric, yet it comes far short of the real extent of even corporeal being. And there are

many instances wherein

it fails

us: as,

— JOHN LOCKE

378 I.

In cases when

we have no

ideas. It

perfectly

fails

us where our ideas fail. 1 It neither does nor can extend itself further than they do. And therefore, wherever we have no ideas, our reasoning stops,

and we are at an end of our reckoning: and if at any time we reason about words which do not stand for any ideas, it is only about those sounds, and nothing else. 10. II. Because our ideas are often obscure or im-

Our reason is often puzzled and at a loss because of the obscurity, confusion, or imperfection of the ideas it is employed about; and there we are involved in difficulties and contradictions. Thus, not having any perfect idea of the least extension of matter, nor of infinity, we are at a loss about the divisibility of matter; 2 but having perfect, clear, and distinct ideas of number, our reason meets with none of those inextricable difficulties in numbers, nor finds itself involved in any contradictions about them. Thus, we having but imperfect ideas of the operations of our minds, and of the beginning of motion, or thought how the mind produces either of them in us, and much imperfecter yet of the operation of God, run into perfect.

great difficulties about free created agents, which

reason cannot well extricate

n.

III. Because

we perceive

itself out of.

3

not intermediate ideas

show conclusions. Our reason is often at a stand because it perceives not those ideas, which could serve to show the certain or probable agreement or disagreement of any other two ideas: and in this some men's faculties far outgo others. Till algebra, that great instrument and instance of human sagacity, was discovered, men with amazement looked on several of the demonstrations of ancient mathematicians, and could scarce forbear to think the finding several of those proofs to be something more than human. 12. IV. Because we often proceed upon wrong principles. The mind, by proceeding upon false printo

ciples,

often engaged in absurdities and diffibrought into straits and contradictions,

is

culties,

without knowing how to free itself: and in that it is in vain to implore the help of reason, unless it be to discover the falsehood and reject

case

the influence of those is

so far

wrong

from clearing the

principles. 4

difficulties

Reason which the

foundations brings a man into, that if he will pursue it, it entangles him the more, and engages him deeper in perplexibuilding

upon

Cf.ch.

iii.

§

4.

1

Our highest degree of knowledge is intuitive, with-

out reasoning.

Some

of the ideas that are in the

mind, are so there, that they can be by themselves immediately compared one with another:

and in these the mind is able to perceive that they agree or disagree as clearly as that it has them. Thus the mind perceives, that an arch of a circle is less than the whole circle, as clearly as it does the idea of a circle: and this, therefore, as has said, I call intuitive knowledge; 6

which is cerbeyond all doubt, and needs no probation, nor can have any; this being the highest of all been

tain,

human certainty.

In this consists the evidence of nobody has any doubt about, but every man (does not, as is said, only assent to, but) knows to be true, as soon as ever those maxims which

all

they are proposed to his understanding. In the discovery of and assent to these truths, there

is

no

use of the discursive faculty, no need of reasoning, but they are known by a superior and higher de-

gree of evidence. And such, if I

may guess at things

unknown, I am apt to think that angels have now, and the spirits ofjust men made perfect shall have, in a future state, of thousands of things which

now

either wholly escape our apprehensions, or

which our short-sighted reason having got some grope after. The next is got by reasoning. But though we have, here and there, a little of this clear light, some sparks of bright knowledge, yet the greatest part of our ideas are such, that we cannot discern their agreement or disagreement by an immediate comparing them. And in all these we have need of reasoning, and must, by discourse and inference, make our discoveries. Now of these faint glimpse of, we, in the dark, 15.

which mention here again:

there are two sorts,

I

shall take the liberty

i.

chh.

i.

ii.

iii.:

Through reasonings that are demonstrative.

6

Letter to Stillingfleet, p. 50. I.

servable.

Those whose agreement or disagreement, though it cannot be seen by an immediate putting them together, yet may be examined by the intervention of other ideas which can be compared with them. In this case, when the agreement or dis-

Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxiii. §§ 30, 31; also Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, sect. xii. p. 506. 3 Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxi. §§ 8-55; also Locke's First

Cf. Bk.

13. V. Because we often employ doubtful terms. As obscure and imperfect ideas often involve our reason, so, upon the same ground, do dubious words and uncertain signs, often, in discourses and arguings, when not warily attended to, puzzle men's reason, and bring them to a nonplus. 5 But these two latter are our fault, and not the fault of reason. But yet the consequences of them are nevertheless obvious; and the perplexities or errors they fill men's minds with are everywhere ob-

to

2

*

IV

false

ties. l

BOOK

IV. ch.

vii.

6

Cf. Bk. III. Cf. ch. ii. §

1 ;

iii.

§ 3.

First,

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CONCERNING

CHAP. XVII

agreement of the intermediate idea, on both sides, with those which we would compare, is plainly discerned: there it amounts to demonstration whereby knowledge is produced, which, though it be 1

certain, yet it is not so easy, nor altogether so clear

as intuitive knowledge. Because in that there is barely one simple intuition, wherein there is no

room for any the least mistake or doubt seen

is

true, there

all

:

is

it

intuition too, but not altogether

must be a remembrance of the agreement of the medium, or intermediate idea, with that we compared it with before, when we compare it with the other: and where there be many mediums, there the danger of the mistake is the greater. For each agreement or disagreement of the ideas must be observed and seen in each step of the whole train, and retained in the memory, just as it is; and the mind must be sure that no part of what is necessary to make up the demonstration is omitted or overlooked. This makes some demonstrations long and perplexed, and too hard for those who have at once; for there intuition of the

not strength of parts distinctly to perceive, and exactly carry so

And

heads.

many particulars orderly in their who are able to master

even those

such intricate speculations, are fain sometimes to go over them again, and there is need of more than one review before they can arrive at certainty. But yet where the mind clearly retains the intuition it had of the agreement of any idea with another, and that with a third, and that with a fourth, &c, there the agreement of the first and the fourth is a demonstration, and produces certain knowledge; which may be called rational? knowledge, as the other 1

6.

To

intuitive

is

supply the narrowness of demonstrative and

probablereasoning. Secondly, There are other ideas,

whose agreement or disagreement can no otherwise be judged of but by the intervention of others which have not a certain agreement with the extremes, but an usual or likely one: and in these it is that the judgment is properly exercised; which is the acquiescing of the mind, that any ideas do agree, by comparing them with such probable mediums. This, though it never amounts to knowledge, no, not to that which is the lowest degree of it 3 yet sometimes the intermediate ideas tie the extremes so firmly together, and the prob;

ability

is

so clear

The :

2 3

it,

and

strong, that assent as neces-

as knowledge does demonstration.

great excellency

and use of the judgment

knowledge

is

the perception of the

agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately compared together. Rational knowledge

is

the perception of the

cer-

agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, by the intervention of one or more other ideas. Judgment is the thinking or taking two ideas to agree or disagree, by the intervention of one or more ideas, whose certain agreement or disagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath observed to be frequent and usual. tain

18. Consequences of words,

Though

and consequences of ideas.

the deducing one proposition from an-

other, or

making

inferences in words, be a great

part of reason, and that which it is usually employed about; yet the principal act of ratiocinathe finding the agreement or disagreement of

two

ideas one with another, by the intervention of a third.

As

tion

is

a man, by a yard, finds two houses to be of the same length, which could not be brought together to measure their equality by juxta-position. Words have their consequences, as the signs of such ideas: and things agree or disagree, as really they are; but we observe it only by our ideas. 4 19. Four sorts of arguments. Before we quit this subject, it may be worth our while a little to re-

on four sorts of arguments, that men, in their reasonings with others, do ordinarily make use flect

of to prevail on their assent; or at least to

them as I.

awe

to silence their opposition.

Argumentum ad verecundiam.

The first is,

to al-

men, whose parts, learning, eminency, power, or some other cause has gained a name, and settled their reputation in the common esteem with some kind of authority. When men are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach of modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question the authority lege the opinions of

intuitive.

knowledge we have nothing but judgment upon

sarily follows

17. Intuitive certain

the truth

perfectly at once. In demonstration,

is

379

and take a true estimate of the force and weight of each probability; and then casting them up all right together, choose that side which has the overbalance. to observe right,

is

Cf. chh. ii. §§ 2-13; iii. §§ 18-20; x.; xi. § 10. Cf. chh. xiv. xv. xvi. Cf. chh. ii. § 14; iii. § 15; xi. §§ 8, 9.

men who are in possession of it. This is apt to be censured, as carrying with it too much pride, when a man does not readily yield to the determination of approved authors, which is wont to be received with respect and submission by others: and it is looked upon as insolence, for a man to set up and adhere to his own opinion against the current stream of antiquity; or to put it in the balance against that of some learned doctor, or otherwise approved writer. Whoever backs his tenets with such authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the cause, and is ready to style it impudence in any one who shall stand out of

4

Cf. Berkeley, Principles, Introd. § 22.

JOHN LOCKE

3 8o

I think may be called argumentum ad verecundiam. 20. II. Argumentum ad ignorantiam. Secondly,

against them. This

Another way that men ordinarily use

ad ignorantiam. 1 1 1 Argumentum adhominem. Thirdly, A third 2 way is to press a man with consequences drawn from his own principles or concessions. This is already known under the name of argumentum ad 1

.

.

hominem. 22.

IV Argumentum ad judicium. The jour th alone '.

and judgment. The fourth drawn from any of the foun-

advances us in knowledge is

the using of proofs

dations of knowledge or probability. This I call argumentum adjudicium. This alone, of all the four, it, and advances us our way to knowledge. For, 1. It argues not another man's opinion to be right, because I, out of respect, or any other consideration but that of conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It proves not another man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same with him, because I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another man is in the right way because he has shown me that I am in the wrong. I may be modest, and therefore not oppose another man's persuasion: I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better: I may be in an error, and another may show me that I am so. This may dispose me, perhaps, for the reception of truth, but helps me not to it: that must come from proofs and arguments, and light arising from the nature of things themselves, and not from my shamefacedness,

brings true instruction with

in

ignorance, or error. 23. Above, contrary, and according

to

reason. By.

what has been before said of reason, we may be able to make some guess at the distinction of

and

reason,

suppose, sometimes taken.

is, I

be in

it

itself

to

reason are

such propositions whose truth we can discover by examining and tracing those ideas we have from sensation and reflection; and by natural deduction find to be true or probable. 2. Above reason are such propositions whose truth or probability we cannot by reason derive from those principles. 3. Contrary to reason are such propositions as are inconsistent with or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct ideas. Thus the existence of one God is according to reason; the existence of more than one God, contrary to reason; the resurrection of the dead, above reason. Above reason also may be taken in a double sense, viz.

a very improper

way

of speaking,

yet common use has so authorized it, that it would

oppose or hope to remedy it. not be amiss to take notice that, however faith be opposed to reason, faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind: which, if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to anything but upon good reason; and so cannot be opposite to it. He that believes without having any reason for believing, may be in love with his own fancies; but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning faculties he has given him, to keep him out of mistake and error. He that does not this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lights on truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the luckiness of the accident will excuse the irregularity of his proceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be accountable for whatever mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes use of the light and faculties God has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover truth by those helps and abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature, that, though he should miss truth, he will not miss the reward of it. For he governs his assent right, and places it as he should, who, in any case or matter whatsoever, believes or disbelieves according as reason directs him. He that doth be

folly either to

Only

I

think

may

it

otherwise, transgresses against his

own light, and

misuses those faculties which were given him to no other end, but to search and follow the clearer evidence since reason

we

posed,

According

There is another use of the word

reason, wherein it is opposed to faith: which, though

chapter.

.

to

24. Reason and faith not opposite, for faith must be

things into those that are according to, above, 1

in that large sense also, contrary

regulated by reason.

and contrary

to reason.

IV

either as signifying above probability, or above certainty:

to drive

othersandforcethemtosubmittotheirjudgments, and receive their opinion in debate, is to require the adversary to admit wha t they allege as a proof, or to assign a better. And this I call argumentum

BOOK

and

will so

and greater probability. But faith are by some men opconsider them in the following

Chap. XVIII. Of Faith and Reason, and 1.

Necessary

their Distinct Provinces to

know

their boundaries. It

has been

That we are of necessity ignorant, and want knowledge of all sorts, where we want ideas. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational knowledge, where we want proofs. 3. That we want certain knowledge and certainty, as far as we want clear and determined specific ideas. 4. That we want probability to direct our assent in matters where we have neither knowlabove 1 shown,

1

Gf. chh.

iii.

1

.

xvii. §§

9-1

1.

CONCERNING

CHAP. XVIII

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

edge of our own nor testimony of other men to bottom our reason upon. From these things thus premised, I think we may come to lay down the measures and boundaries between faith and reason: the want whereof may possibly have been the cause, if not of great disorders, yet at least of great disputes,

and per-

haps mistakes in the world. For till it be rehow far we are to be guided by reason, and how far by faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavour to convince one another in matsolved

ters of religion. 2.

Faith and reason, what, as contradistinguished. I

find every sect, as far as reason will help them,

make

use of

they cry out,

it

and where it fails them, matter of faith, and above rea-

gladly:

It is

do not see how they can argue with any one, or ever convince a gainsayer who makes use of the same plea, without setting down strict boundaries between faith and reason; which son.

And

I

381

Thus whatever things were discovered to St. when he was rapt up into the third heaven; whatever new ideas his mind there received, all the description he can make to others of that place, is only this, That there are such things, "as eye Paul,

hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath into the heart of

it

entered

man to conceive." And suppos-

God

should discover to any one, supernatua species of creatures inhabiting, for example, Jupiter or Saturn, (for that it is possible there may be such, nobody can deny,) which had six senses; and imprint on his mind the ideas conveyed to theirs by that sixth sense: he could no ing

rally,

more, by words, produce in the minds of other those ideas imprinted by that sixth sense, than one of us could convey the idea of any colour, by the sound of words, into a man who, having the other four senses perfect, had always totally wanted the fifth, of seeing. For our simple

men

ideas, then,

which are the foundation, and

sole

take to be the discovery of the certainty

matter of all our notions and knowledge, we must depend wholly on our reason; I mean our natural faculties; and can by no means receive them, or any of them, from traditional revelation. I say,

or probability of such propositions or truths

traditional revelation, in distinction to original reve-

ought to be the first point established in tions where faith has anything to do.

all

ques-

Reason, therefore, here, as contradistinguished to faith,

I

which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz. by sensation or reflection.

Faith,

on the other

proposition, not thus

side,

is

the assent to

any

made out by the deductions

upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication. This way of discovering truths to men, we call revelation. of reason, but

No new simple idea can be conveyed by traditional revelation. First, Then I say, that no man inspired 3.

by

God can

new simple

by any revelation communicate

to others

any

had not before from sensaFor, whatsoever impressions he

ideas which they

tion or reflection.

may have from the immediate hand of God, this revelation, if it be of new simple ideas, cannot be conveyed to another, either by words or any other signs. Because words, by their immediate operation on us, cause no other ideas but of their natural sounds: and it is by the custom of using them for signs, that they excite and revive in our minds latent ideas; but yet only such ideas as were there before. For words, seen or heard, recall to our thoughts those ideas only which to us they have been wont to be signs of, but cannot introduce any perfectly new and formerly unknown simple ideas. The same holds in all other signs; which cannot signify to us things of which we have before never had any idea at himself

all.

lation.

By the

one,

I

mean

that

first

impression

which is made immediately by God on the mind of any man, to which we cannot set any bounds; and by the other, those impressions delivered over to others in words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions one to another. 4. Traditional revelation may make us know propositions

the

same

the

same

and conveyed down from

reve-

knowable also by reason, but not with

certainty that reason doth. Secondly, I

truths

may

be discovered,

which are discoverable

say that

and by those ideas we naturally may have. So God might, by revelation, discover the truth of any proposition in Euclid; as well as men, by the natural use of their faculties, come to make the discovery themselves. In all things of this kind there is little need or use of revelation, God having furnished us with natural and surer means to arrive at the knowledge of them. For whatsoever truth we come to the clear discovery of, from the knowledge and contemplation of our own ideas, will always be certainer to us than those which are conveyed to lation,

to

us by reason,

revelation. For the knowledge we have that this revelation came at first from God can never be so sure as the knowledge we have from the clear and distinct perception of the agreement or disagreement of our Own ideas: v.g. if it were revealed some ages since, that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right ones, I might assent to the truth of that proposition, upon the credit of the tradition, that it was revealed:

us by traditional

JOHN LOCKE

382

BOOK

IV

but that would never amount to so great a cer-

assent due to all such, if

knowledge of it, upon the comparing and measuring my own ideas of two right angles, and the three angles of a triangle. The like holds in matter of fact knowable by our senses; v.g. the history of the deluge is conveyed to us by writings which had their original from revelation: and yet nobody, I think, will say he has as certain and clear a knowledge of the flood as Noah, that saw it; or that he himself would have had, had he then been alive and seen it. For he has no greater an assurance than that of his senses, that it is writ in the book supposed writ by Moses inspired: but he has not so great an assurance that Moses wrote that book as if he had seen Moses write it. So that the assurance of its being a revelation is less still than the assurance of his

Because this would be to subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and assent whatsoever: and there would be left no difference between truth and falsehood, no measures of credible and incredible in the world, if doubtful propositions shall

tainty as the

senses. 5.

Even original revelation cannot be admitted against In propositions, then,

the clear evidence of reason.

whose certainty is built upon the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, attained either by immediate intuition, as in self-evident propositions, or by evident deductions of reason in demonstrations we need not the assistance of revelation, as necessary to gain our assent, and introduce them into our minds. Because the natural ways of knowledge could settle them there, or had done it already; which is the greatest assurance we can possibly have of anything, unless where God immediately reveals it to us: and there too our assurance can be no greater than our knowledge is, that it is a revelation from God. But yet nothing, I think, can, under that title, shake or overrule plain knowledge; or rationally prevail with any man to admit it for true, in

a direct contradiction to the clear evi-

dence of his own understanding. For, since no evidence of our faculties, by which we receive such revelations, can exceed, if equal, the certainty of our intuitive knowledge, we can never receive for a truth anything that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct knowledge; v.g. the ideas of one body and one place do so clearly agree,

and the mind has

so evident a perception

of their agreement, that

we can never

assent to

a proposition that affirms the same body to be in two distant places at once, however it should pretend to the authority of a divine revelation: since the evidence, selves, in ascribing

first, it

to

that

we deceive

not our-

God; secondly, that we

understand it right; can never be so great as the evidence of our own intuitive knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible for the same body to be in two places at once. And therefore no proposition

can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the

it

be contradictory to our clear

intuitive knowledge.

take place before self-evident; and what we certainly know give way to what we may possibly

be mistaken in. In propositions therefore contrary to the clear perception of the

agreement of any of our

agreement or

dis-

be in vain to urge them as matters of faith. They cannot move our assent under that or any other title whatsoever. For faith can never convince us of anything that contradicts our knowledge. Because, though faith be founded on the testimony of God (who cannot lie) revealing any proposition to us: yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a divine revelation greater than our own knowledge. Since the whole strength of the certainty depends upon our knowledge that God revealed it; which, in this case, where the proposition supposed revealed contradicts our knowledge or reason, will always have this objection hanging to it, viz. that we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from God, the bountiful Author of our being, which, if received for true, must overturn all the principles and foundations of knowledge he has given us; render all our faculties useless; wholly destroy the most excellent part of his workmanship, our understandings; and put a man in a condition wherein he will have less light, less conduct than the beast that perisheth. For if the mind of man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not so clear) evidence of anything to be a divine revelation, as it has of the principles of its own reason, it can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of its reason, to give a place to a proposition, whose revelation has not a greater evidence than those ideas,

it

will

principles have. 6. Traditional revelation much less. Thus far a man has use of reason, and ought to hearken to it, even

in immediate and original revelation, where it is supposed to be made to himself. But to all those who pretend not to immediate revelation, but

are required to pay obedience,

and

to receive the

truths revealed to others, which, by the tradition of writings, or

down

word

of mouth, are conveyed

to them, reason has a great deal

more

to

that only which can induce us to receive them. For matter of faith being only divine revelation, and nothing else, faith, as we use the do,

and

is

word, (called commonly divine faith), has to do with no propositions, but those which are sup-

CONCERNING

CHAP. XVIII

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

posed to be divinely revealed. So that I do not how those who make revelation alone the sole object of faith can say that it is a matter of faith, and not of reason, to believe that such or such a proposition, to be found in such or such a book, is of divine inspiration; unless it be revealed that that proposition, or all in that book, was communicated by divine inspiration. Without such a revelation, the believing, or not believing, that proposition, or book, to be of divine authority, can never be matter of faith, but matter of reason; and such as I must come to an assent to only by the use of my reason, which can never require or enable me to believe that which is contrary to itself: it being impossible for reason ever to procure any assent to that which to itself appears unreasonable. In all things, therefore, where we have clear evidence from our ideas, and those principles of knowledge I have above mentioned, reason is the proper judge; and revelation, though it may, in consenting with it, confirm its dictates, yet cannot in such cases invalidate its decrees: nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident sentience of reason, to quit it for the contrary opinion, under a pretence that it is matter of faith: which can have no authority against the see

plain 7.

and

clear dictates of reason.

Things above reason

are,

when

revealed, the prop-

But, Thirdly, There being

er matter of faith.

things wherein

we have very imperfect

or none at

and other

all;

things, of

present, or future existence,

of our faculties, all;

many

notions,

whose

past,

by the natural use

we can have no knowledge

at

beyond the discovery of our and above reason, are, when re-

these, as being

natural faculties,

vealed, the proper matter of faith. Thus, that part of the angels rebelled against God, and thereby

happy state: and that x the dead and live again: these and the like, being beyond the discovery of reason, are purely matters of faith, with which reason has directly lost their first

shall rise,

nothing to do. 8. Or not contrary to reason, if revealed, are matter oj faith; and must carry it against probable conjectures of reason. But since God, in giving us the light of reason, has not thereby tied up his own hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the light of revelation in any of those matters wherein our natural faculties are able to give a probable determination; revelation, where God has been pleased to give

it,

must carry

it

against the probable

Because the mind not being certain of the truth of that it does not evidently

conjectures of reason.

1

Cf. Locke's Reply to Second Letter of Stillingfleet,

pp. 165-21

1.

know, but only yielding

383

to the probability that

appears in it, is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony which, it is satisfied, comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet, it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being a revelation, and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered. Indeed, if anything shall be thought revelation which is contrary to the plain principles of reason, and the evident knowledge the mind has of its own clear and distinct ideas; there reason must be hearkened to, as to a matter within its province. Since a man can never have so certain a

knowledge that a proposition which contradicts the clear principles and evidence of his own knowledge was divinely revealed, or that he understands the words rightly wherein it is delivered, as he has that the contrary is true, and so is bound to consider and judge of it as a matter of reason, and not swallow it, without examination, as a

matter of faith.

9. Revelation in matters

where reason cannot judge,

or but probably, ought to be hearkened

to.

First,

What-

whose truth our mind, by its natural faculties and notions, cannot judge, that is purely matter of faith, and above

ever proposition

is

revealed, of

reason.

Secondly, All propositions whereof the mind, by the use of its natural faculties, can come to determine and judge, from naturally acquired

matter of reason; with this difference concerning which it has but an uncertain evidence, and so is persuaded of their truth only upon probable grounds, which still admit a possibility of the contrary to be true, without doing violence to the certain evidence of its own knowledge, and overturning the principles of all reason; in such probable propositions, I say, an evident revelation ought to determine our assent, even against probability. For where the principles of reason have not evidenced a proposition to be certainly true or false, there clear revelation, as another principle of truth and ground of assent, may determine; and so it may be matter of faith, and be also above reason. Because reason, in that particular matter, being able to reach no higher than probability, faith gave the determination where reason came short; ideas, are

still,

that, in those

and revelation discovered on which

side the

truth lay. 1

o.

In matters where reason can afford certain knowl-

edge, that is to be hearkened

to.

Thus far

the domin-

ion of faith reaches, and that without any violence or hindrance to reason; which is not injured or disturbed, but assisted and improved by

new

discoveries of truth,

coming from the

eter-

JOHN LOCKE

384

nal fountain of all knowledge. Whatever God hath revealed is certainly true: no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper object of faith: but

whether it be a divine revelation or no, reason must judge; which can never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence to embrace what is less evident, nor allow

it

to entertain probability in

opposition to knowledge and certainty. There can be no evidence that any traditional revelation is of divine original, in the words tain as

we understand it,

fore Nothing that the clear to be

we receive it, and

and so certhat of the principles of reason: and there-

in the sense

and

is

so clear

urged or assented

to

Chap. XIX. Of Enthusiasm' Love of truth necessary. He that would seriousupon the search of truth ought in the first place to prepare his mind with a love of it. For i

.

ly set

he that loves it not will not take much pains to get it; nor be much concerned when he misses it.

There ing

is

nobody

who does

in the

commonwealth

of learn-

not profess himself a lover of truth: not a rational creature that would

and there

is

not take

amiss to be thought otherwise

it

yet, for all this,

may truly say,

one

And

of.

that there are

as a matter offaith, wherein

Whatsoever

in earnest,

to,

and inconsistent with,

ought to overrule

is

divine rev-

our opinions, prejudices, and interest, and hath a right to be received with full assent. Such a submission as this, of our reason to faith, takes not away the landmarks of knowledge: this shakes not the foundations of reason, but leaves us that use of our faculties for which they were given us. ii. If the boundaries be not set between faith and elation,

IV

very few lovers of truth, for truth's sake, even amongst those who persuade themselves that they are so. How a man may know whether he be so

contrary

self-evident dictates of reason, has a right

reason hath nothing to do.

BOOK

all

reason, no enthusiasm or extravagancy in religion can

be contradicted. If the provinces of faith

and

rea-

son are not kept distinct by these boundaries, there will, in matters of religion, be no room for reason at all; and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies that are to be found in the several religions of the world will not deserve to be blamed. For, to this crying up of faith in opposition to reason, we may, I think, in good measure ascribe those absurdities that fill almost all the religions which possess and divide mankind. For men having been principled with an opinion that they must not consult reason in the things of religion, however apparently contradictory to common sense and the very principles of all their knowledge, have let loose their fancies and natural superstition; and have been by them led into so strange opinions, and extravagant practices in religion, that a considerate man cannot but stand amazed at their follies, and judge them so far from being acceptable to the great and wise God, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous and offensive to a sober good man. So that, in effect, religion, which should most distinguish us from beasts, and ought most peculiarly to elevate us, as rational creatures, above brutes, is that wherein men often appear most irrational, and more senseless than beasts themselves. Credo, quia impossibile est: I believe, because it is impossible, might, in a good man, pass for a sally of zeal; but would prove a very ill rule for men to choose their opinions or religion by.

is worth inquiry: and I think there is one unerring mark of it, viz. The not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than

the proofs

it is

built

upon will warrant. Whoever

goes beyond this measure of assent,

it is

plain, re-

ceives not the truth in the love of

it;

loves not

truth for truth's sake, but for some other bye-end.

For the evidence that any proposition is true (except such as are self-evident) lying only in the proofs a man has of it, whatsoever degrees of assent he affords it beyond the degrees of that evidence,

it is

ance

owing

is

plain that to

all

the surplusage of assur-

some other affection, and not

to

being as impossible that the love of truth should carry my assent above the evidence there is to me that it is true, as that the love of truth should make me assent to any proposition for the sake of that evidence which it has the love of truth:

not, that

it is

it

true:

a truth, because

which

it is

is

in effect to love

it

possible or probable that

as it

may

not be true. In any truth that gets not possession of our minds by the irresistible light of self-evidence, 2 or by the force of demonstration, 3 the arguments that gian it assent 4 are the vouch-

and gage of its probability to us; and we can it for no other than such as they deliver it to our understandings. Whatsoever credit or authority we give to any proposition more than it receives from the principles and proofs it supports itself upon, is owing to our inclinations that way, and is so far a derogation from the love of truth as such: which, as it can receive no evidence from our passions or interests, so it should receive no tincture from them. ers

receive

2.

A forwardness

whence. 1

to dictate

The assuming an

Cf. Locke's letter to

another's beliefs,

Molyneux, Oates, April

16952 3 4

from

authority of dictating

Cf. chh. ii. § 1; xvii. § 14. Cf. chh. ii. §§ 2-13: xvii. § 15. Cf. chh. xiv-xvii.

6,

CONCERNING

CHAP. XIX to others,

and a forwardness

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

to prescribe to their

a constant concomitant of this bias and corruption of our judgments. For how almost can it be otherwise, but that he should be ready to impose on another's belief, who has already imposed on his own? Who can reasonably expect arguments and conviction from him in dealing with others, whose understanding is not accustomed to them in his dealing with himself? opinions,

Who

is

own faculties, tyranown mind, and usurps the prerog-

does violence to his

nizes over his

which is to comi.e. by that evidence which it car-

ative that belongs to truth alone,

mand and ries

assent

by only

in proportion to with it.

own

its

authority,

385

immeand frequent communications from the Divine Spirit. God, I own, cannot be denied to be able to enlighten the understanding by a ray darted into the mind immediately from the fountain of light: this they understand he has promised to do, and who then has so good a title to expect it as those who are his peculiar people, chosen by him, and depending on him? 6. Enthusiastic impulse. Their minds being thus prepared, whatever groundless opinion comes to settle itself strongly upon their fancies is an illumination from the Spirit of God, and presently of divine authority: and whatsoever odd actered themselves with a persuasion of an

diate intercourse with the Deity,

Force oj enthusiasm, in which reason is taken away.

tion they find in themselves a strong inclination

Upon this occasion I shall take the liberty to consider a third ground of assent, which with some men

concluded to be a call or and must be obeyed: it is a commission from above, and they cannot err in executing it. 7. What is meant by enthusiasm. This I take to be properly enthusiasm, which, though founded neither on reason nor divine revelation, but rising from the conceits of a warmed or overweening brain, works yet, where it once gets footing, more

3.

has the same authority, and is as confidently reon as either faith or reason; I mean enthusiasm: which, laying by reason, would set up revelation without it. Whereby in effect it takes away lied

both reason and revelation, and substitutes in the

room of them the ungrounded fancies of a man's own brain, and assumes them for a foundation both of opinion and conduct. 4.

Reason and

revelation.

Reason

is

natural revela-

whereby the eternal Father of light and founcommunicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within

tion,

tain of all knowledge,

the reach of their natural faculties: revelation natural reason enlarged

by a new

is

set of discoveries

communicated by God immediately; which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives that they come from God. So that he that takes away reason to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both, and does muchwhat the same as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star 5.

Rise oj enthusiasm.

by a telescope. Immediate revelation be-

ing a much easier way for men to establish their opinions and regulate their conduct than the tedious and not always successful labour of strict reasoning,

it is

no wonder that some have been

very apt to pretend to revelation, and to persuade themselves that they are under the peculiar guidance of heaven in their actions and opinions, especially in those of them which they cannot account for by the ordinary methods of knowledge

and

principles of reason.

all ages,

men

in

whom

Hence we

see that, in

melancholy has mixed

with devotion, or whose conceit of themselves has them into an opinion of a greater familiarity with God, and a nearer admittance to his favour than is afforded to others, have often flatraised

to do, that impulse

is

direction from heaven,

powerfully on the persuasions and actions of men than either of those two, or both together: men being most forwardly obedient to the impulses

they receive from themselves; and the whole man is sure to act more vigorously where the whole man is carried by a natural motion. For strong conceit, like a new principle, carries all easily with it,

when got above common sense, and freed from

of reason and check of reflection, it heightened into a divine authority, in concurrence with our own temper and inclination. all restraint is

8.

Enthusiasm accepts its supposed illumination with-

and proof Though the odd opinions and extravagant actions enthusiasm has run men into out search

.

were enough to warn them against this wrong principle, so apt to misguide them both in their belief and conduct: yet the love of something extraordinary, the ease and glory it is to be inspired, and be above the common and natural ways of knowledge, so flatters many men's laziness, ignorance, and vanity, that, when once they are got into this way of immediate revelation, of illumination without search, and of certainty without proof and without examination, it is a hard matter to get them out of it. Reason is lost upon them, they are above it: they see the light infused into their understandings, and cannot be mistaken; it is clear and visible there, like the light of bright sunshine; shows itself, and needs no other proof but its own evidence: they feel the

hand

of

God moving them

within,

and

JOHN LOCKE

386

the impulses of the Spirit, and cannot be mistaken in what they feel. Thus they support themselves, and are sure reasoning hath nothing to do with what they see and feel in themselves: what they have a sensible experience of admits no doubt, needs no probation. Would he not be ridiculous,

him

to

It is its

who should

require to have

it

proved

and that he sees it? and can have no other. When

that the light shines,

own

proof,

the Spirit brings light into our minds, it dispels see it as we do that of the sun at

darkness.

We

noon, and need not the twilight of reason to show it us. This light from heaven is strong, clear, and pure; carries its own demonstration with it: and

we may

as naturally take a

us to discover the sun, as to

ray by our 9.

dim candle,

Enthusiasm how

to

glow-worm to assist examine the celestial

reason. 1

be discovered.

This is the way

of talking of these men: they are sure, because

they are sure: and their persuasions are right, because they are strong in them. For, when what they say is stripped of the metaphor of seeing and feeling, this

similes so

is all it

amounts

to:

and yet

these

impose on them, that they serve them and demonstration

for certainty in themselves,

to others. 1

The supposed

o.

examine a

internal light examined.

But to

and on which they build so much. These men have, they say, clear light, and they see they have awakened sense, and they feel: this cannot, they are sure, be disputed them. For when a man says he sees or feels, nobody can deny him that he does so. But here let me ask: This seeing, is it little

soberly this internal light,

this feeling

;

the perception of the truth of the proposition, or of

that

this,

it

is

a revelation from

God? This

a perception of an inclination or fancy to do something, or of the Spirit of God feeling,

is it

moving that inclination? These are two very difand must be carefully distinguished, if we would not impose upon our-

ferent perceptions,

selves. I

may perceive

the truth of a proposition,

and yet not perceive that it is an immediate revelation from God. I may perceive the truth of a proposition in Euclid, without

perceiving ceive

I

it

being, or

to be, a revelation: nay, I

came not by

way, and so

its

may

this

knowledge

conclude

it

my

may per-

it is a revelation of God. Because there be spirits which, without being divinely

commissioned, may excite those ideas in me, and them in such order before my mind, that I may perceive their connexion. So that the knowledge of any proposition coming into my mind, I know not how, is not a perception that it is from x

Cf. ch.

ii.

§ 1.

Much

less is

a strong persuasion that

IV

it is

from God, or so much as true. But however it be called light and seeing, I suppose it is at most but belief and assurance: and the proposition taken for a revelatrue, a perception that

it is

is not such as they know to be true, but take to be true. For where a proposition is known to be true, revelation is needless: and it is hard to conceive how there can be a revelation to any one of what he knows already. If therefore it be a proposition which they are persuaded, but do not know, to be true, whatever they may call it, it is not seeing, but believing. For these are two ways whereby truth comes into the mind, wholly distinct, so that one is not the other. What I see, I know to be so, by the evidence of the thing itself: what I believe, I take to be so upon the testimony of another. But this testimony I must know to be given, or else what ground have I of believing? I must see that it is God that reveals this to me, or else I see nothing. The question then here is:

tion

How do I know that God is the revealer of this to me; that this impression is made upon my mind by his Holy Spirit; and that therefore I ought to obey it? If I know not this, how great soever the assurance 2 is that I am possessed with, it is groundless; whatever light I pretend to, it is but enthusiasm. For, whether the proposition supposed to be revealed be in itself evidently true, or visibly probable, or, by the natural ways of knowledge, uncertain, the proposition that must be well grounded and manifested to be true, is this, That God is the revealer of it, and that what I take to be a revelation is certainly put into my mind by Him, and is not an illusion dropped in by some other spirit, or raised by my own fancy. For, if I mistake not, these men receive it for true, because they presume God revealed it. Does it not, then, stand them upon to examine upon what grounds they presume it to be a revelation from God? or else all their confidence is mere presumption: and this light they are so dazzled with is nothing but an ignisfatuus, that leads them constantly

round

in this circle; It

cause they firmly believe it is

in a natural

revealed, without

perceiving that

lay

God.

BOOK

1

it;

and

is

a revelation, be-

they believe

it,

because

a revelation. 1.

Enthusiasm fails of evidence, that the proposition

from God. In all that is of divine revelation, there is need of no other proof but that it is an inspiration from God: for he can neither deceive nor be deceived. But how shall it be known that any proposition in our minds is a truth infused by God; a truth that is revealed to us by him, which he declares to us, and therefore we ought to believe? Here it is that enthusiasm fails of the is

2Cf. ch.

iv. § 18.

CONCERNING

CHAP. XIX

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

For men thus possessed, boast of a light whereby they say they are enlightened, and brought into the knowledge of this or that truth. But if they know it to be a truth, they must know it to be so, either by its evidence

own

it

pretends

self-evidence to natural reason, or

rational proofs that see

to.

and know

it

make

it

out to be

by the

so. If

to be a truth, either of these

they

two

ways, they in vain suppose it to be a revelation. For they know it to be true the same way that any other man naturally may know that it is so, without the help of revelation. For thus, all the truths, of what kind soever, that men uninspired are enlightened with, came into their minds, and are established there. If they say they

know

it

to

be true, because it is a revelation from God, the reason is good: but then it will be demanded how they know it to be a revelation from God. If they say, by the light it brings with it, which shines bright in their minds, and they cannot resist: I beseech them to consider whether this be any more than what we have taken notice of already, viz. that it is a revelation, because they strongly believe it to be true. For all the light they speak of is but a strong, though ungrounded persuasion of their own minds, that it is a truth. For rational grounds from proofs that it is a truth, they must acknowledge to have none; for then it is not received as a revelation, but upon the ordinary grounds that other truths are received: and if they believe it to be true because it is a revelation, and have no other reason for its being a revelation, but because they are fully persuaded, without any other reason, that it is true, then they believe it to be a revelation only because they strongly believe it to be a revelation; which is a very unsafe ground to proceed on, either in our tenets or actions. And what readier way can there be to run ourselves into the most extravagant errors and miscarriages, than thus to set up fancy for our supreme and sole guide, and to believe any proposition to be true, any action to be right, only because we believe it to be so? The strength of our persuasions is no evidence at all of their own rectitude: crooked things may be as stiff and inflexible as straight: and men may be as positive and peremptory in error as in truth. How come else the untractable zealots in different and opposite parties? For if the light, which every one thinks he has in his mind, which in this case is nothing but the strength of his own persuasion, be an evidence that it is from God, contrary opinions have the same title to be inspirations; and God will be not only the Father of lights, but of opposite and contradictory lights, leading men con-

387

and contradictory propositions will be divine truths, if an ungrounded strength of assurance be an evidence that any proposition trary ways;

is

a Divine Revelation. 12.

Firmness ofpersuasion no proof that any proposi-

tion is from

God. This cannot be otherwise, whilst

firmness of persuasion

made

is

the cause of be-

and confidence of being in the right is made an argument of truth. St. Paul himself believed he did well, and that he had a call to it, lieving,

when he persecuted

whom

the Christians,

confidently thought in the wrong: but yet he,

and not

men

they,

who were

mistaken.

it

he

was

Good men

and are sometimes warmly engaged in errors, which they take for divine truths, shining in their minds with the are

liable to mistakes,

still

clearest light. 13. Light in the mind, what.

the

mind

is,

Light, true light, in

or can be, nothing else but the evi-

dence of the truth of any proposition; and if it be not a self-evident proposition, all the light it has, or can have, is from the clearness and validity of those proofs

upon which

To

light in the

is

talk of

any other

received.

power by our own con-

to put ourselves in the dark, or in the

of the Prince of Darkness, and, sent, to give ourselves

a

it is

understanding

lie.

For,

if

up

to delusion to believe

strength of persuasion be the light

which must guide us; I ask how shall any one distinguish between the delusions of Satan, and the inspirations of the Holy Ghost? He can transform himself into an angel of light. And they who are led by this Son of the Morning are as fully satisfied of the illumination,

i.e.

are as strongly per-

suaded that they are enlightened by the Spirit of God as any one who is so: they acquiesce and rejoice in it, are actuated by it: and nobody can be more sure, nor more in the right (if their own belief may be judge) than they. 14. Revelation must be judged of by reason. He, therefore, that will not give himself up to all the extravagances of delusion and error must bring this guide of his light within to the trial. God when he makes the prophet does not unmake the man. He leaves all his faculties in the natural state, to enable him to judge of his inspirations, whether they be of divine original or no. When he illuminates the mind with supernatural light, he does not extinguish that which is natural. If he would have us assent to the truth of any proposition, he either evidences that truth by the usual methods of natural reason, or else makes it known to be a truth which he would have us assent to by his authority, and convinces us that it is from him, by some marks which reason cannot be mistaken in. Reason must be our last judge and guide in every-

;

JOHN LOCKE

388

thing. I do not mean that we must consult reason, and examine whether a proposition revealed from God can be made out by natural principles, and if it cannot, that then we may reject it: but consult it we must, and by it examine whether it be a revelation from God or no: and if reason finds it to be revealed from God, reason then declares for it as much as for any other truth, and makes it one of her dictates. Every conceit that thoroughly warms our fancies must pass for an

inspiration,

if

there be nothing but the strength

of our persuasions,

whereby

to

judge of our per-

reason must not examine their truth by something extrinsical to the persuasions them-

suasions:

if

selves, inspirations

and delusions, truth and same measure, and will

falsehood, will have the

not be possible to be distinguished.

we

internal

any proposition which under that

title

take for inspired, be conformable to the prin-

word

God, which is attested revelation, reason warrants it, and we may safely receive it for true, and be guided by it in our belief and actions: if it receive no testimony nor evidence from either of these rules, we ciples of reason, or to the

cannot take true,

till

elation,

we

it

of

for a revelation, or so

much as for

we have some other mark that it is a revbesides our believing that it is so. Thus

see the holy

men

of old,

who had

revelations

from God, had something else besides that internal light of assurance in their tify to

them

left to their

that

it

own

own

minds, to

tes-

was from God. They were not persuasions alone, that those

persuasions were from God, but had outward signs tions.

it was from God though the Scripture does not everywhere mention their demanding or having such proofs. 16. Criteria of a divine revelation. In what I have said I am far from denying, that God can, or doth sometimes enlighten men's minds in the apprehending of certain truths or excite them to good actions, by the immediate influence and assistance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary signs accompanying it. But in such cases too we have reason and Scripture; unerring rules to know whether it be from God or no. Where the truth embraced is consonant to the revelation in the written word of God, or the action conform-

able to the dictates of right reason or holy writ, assured that we run no risk in enter-

we may be

it as such: because, though perhaps it be not an immediate revelation from God, extraordinarily operating on our minds, yet we are sure it is warranted by that revelation which he has given us of truth. But it is not the strength of our private persuasion within ourselves, that can

warrant it to be a light or motion from heaven: nothing can do that but the written Word of God without us, or that standard of reason which is common to us with all men. Where reason or Scripture is express for any opinion or action, we

may receive it as of divine authority: but it is not the strength of our own persuasions which can by itself give it that stamp. The bent of our own minds may favour it as much as we please: that may show it to be a fondling of our own, but will by no means prove it to be an offspring of heavand of divine original. 1

en,

them

of the Author of those revelathey were to convince others, they had a power given them to justify the truth of their commission from heaven, and by visible signs to assert the divine authority of a message they were sent with. Moses saw the bush burn to convince

IV

taining

15. Belief no proof of revelation. If this

light, or

BOOK

proof, a sufficient evidence that

Chap.

And when

without being consumed, and heard a voice out of it: this was something besides finding an impulse upon his mind to go to Pharaoh, that he might bring his brethren out of Egypt: and yet he thought not this enough to authorize him to go with that message, till God, by another miracle of his rod turned into a serpent, had assured

him of a power to testify his mission, by the same miracle repeated before them whom he was sent to. Gideon was sent by an angel to deliver Israel from the Midianites, and yet he desired a sign to convince him that this commission was from God. These, and several the like instances to be found among the prophets of old, are enough to show that they thought not an inward seeing or persuasion of their own minds, without any other

1

.

XX. Of

Wrong

Assent, or Error 2

Causes of error, or how men come

to

give assent con-

Knowledge being to be had and certain truth, error is not a

trary to probability.

only of visible

knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment giving assent to that which is not true. But if assent be grounded on likelihood, if the proper object and motive of our assent be probability, and that probability consists in what is fault of our

laid down in the foregoing chapters, it will be demanded how men come to give their assents contrary

For there is nothing more common than contrariety of opinions; nothing more obvious than that one man wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of, and a third stedfastly believes and firmly adheres to. The reasons whereof, though they may be very various, yet, I suppose may all be reduced to to probability.

these four: 1

2

Cf. Locke's letter to Molyneux, April 10, 1697. Cf. Bacon, Novum Organum, Bk. I.

CONCERNING

CHAP. XX

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING quire).

.

.

2. First cause

of error, want of proofs. First,

opinions,

By

do not mean only the want of those proofs which are nowhere extant, and so are nowhere to be had; but the want even of those proofs which are in being, or might be procured. And thus men want proofs, who have not I

the convenience or opportunity to make experiments and observations themselves, tending to the proof of any proposition; nor likewise the

convenience to inquire into and collect the testimonies of others: and in this state are the greatest part of mankind, who are given up to labour, and enslaved to the necessity of their mean condition, whose lives are worn out only in the provisions for living. These men's opportunities of

knowledge and inquiry are commonly as narrow as their fortunes; and their understandings are but little instructed, when all their whole time and pains are laid out to still the croaking of their

own

bellies,

Are the current and licensed guides of every country evidence and security to every man to

to their happiness or misery?

.

want of proofs,

389

Have the bulk of mankind no other guide but accident and blind chance to conduct them

Want of proofs. Want of ab ility to use them 11 III. Want of will to see them IV. Wrong measures of probability. I.

or the cries of their children. It

is

not to be expected that a man who drudges on all his life in a laborious trade, should be more knowing in the variety of things done in the world than a packhorse, who is driven constantly forwards and backwards in a narrow lane and dirty road, only to market, should be skilled in the

geography of the country. Nor is it at all more possible that he who wants leisure, books, and languages, and the opportunity of conversing with variety of men, should be in a condition to collect those testimonies and observations which are in being, and are necessary to make out many, nay most, of the propositions that, in the societies of men, are judged of the greatest moment; or to find out grounds of assurance so great as the belief of the points he would build on them is thought necessary. So that a great part of mankind are, by the natural and unalterable state of things in this world, and the constitution of human affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible ignorance of those proofs on which others build, and which are necessary to establish those opinions: the greatest part of men, having much to do to get the means of living, are not in a condition to look after those of learned and laborious inquiries.

" What shall become of those who want What shall we say, then? Are the greatest part of mankind, by the necessity of their condition, subjected to unavoidable ignor3. Objection.

proofs?" Answered.

ance in those things which are of greatest importance to them? (for of those it is obvious to in-

sufficient

venture his great concernments on; nay, his everlasting happiness or misery? Or can those be the certain and infallible oracles and standards of truth, which teach one thing in Christendom and another in Turkey? Or shall a poor countryman be eternally happy, for having the chance to be born in Italy; or a day-labourer be unavoidably lost, because he had the ill-luck to be born in England? How ready some men may be to say some of these things, I will not here examine: but this I am sure, that men must allow one or other of these to be true, (let them choose which they please,) or else grant that God has furnished men with faculties sufficient to direct them in the way they should take, if they will but seriously employ them that way, when their ordinary vocations allow them the leisure. No man is so wholly taken up with the attendance on the means of living, as to have no spare time at all to think of his soul, and inform himself in matters of religion. Were men as intent upon this as they are on things of lower concernment, there are none so enslaved to the necessities of life who might not find many vacancies that might be husbanded to this advantage of their knowledge. 4. People hindered from inquiry. Besides those whose improvements and informations are straitened by the narrowness of their fortunes, there are others whose largeness of fortune would plentifully enough supply books, and other requisites for clearing of doubts, and discovering of truth: but they are cooped in close, by the laws of their countries, and the strict guards of those whose it is to keep them ignorant, lest, knowing more, they should believe the less in them. These are as far, nay further, from the liberty and opportunities of a fair inquiry, than these poor and wretched labourers we before spoke of: and however they may seem high and great, are confined to narrowness of thought, and enslaved in that which should be the freest part of man, their understandings. This is generally the case of all those who live in places where care is taken to propagate truth without knowledge; where men are forced, at a venture, to be of the religion of the country; and must therefore swallow down opinions, as silly people do empiric's pills, without knowing what they are made of, or how they will work, and having nothing to do but believe that they will do the cure: but in this are much more miserable than they, in that they are not at

interest

JOHN LOCKE

39° liberty to refuse swallowing

what perhaps they

had rather let alone; or to choose the physician, to whose conduct they would trust themselves. 5.

Second cause of

Secondly,

want of want skill to

error,

Those who

they have of probabilities;

skill to use proofs.

use those evidences

who cannot carry a train

of consequences in their heads; nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary proofs and testimonies,

making every circumstance

its

due

al-

may

be easily misled to assent to positions that are not probable. There are some men of one, some but of two syllogisms, and no more; and others that can but advance one step further. These cannot always discern that side on which the strongest proofs lie; cannot constantly follow that which in itself is the more probable opinion. Now that there is such a difference between men, in respect of their understandings, I think nobody, who has had any conversation with his neighbours, will question: though he never was at Westminster-Hall or the Exchange on the one hand, nor at Alms-houses or Bedlam on the oth-

lowance;

Which great difference in men's intellectuals, whether it rises from any defect in the organs of the body particularly adapted to thinking; or in

er.

the dullness or untractableness of those faculties for

want of use;

or, as

some

think, in the natural

differences of men's souls themselves; or some, all of these together; it matters not here to examine: only this is evident, that there is a difference of degrees in men's understandings, appre-

or

hensions,

and reasonings,

to so great a latitude,

that one may, without doing injury to mankind, affirm that there

is

a greater distance between

some men and others in this respect than between some men and some beasts. But how this comes about is a speculation, though of great

BOOK

tional assent to, probabilities they are concerned to know, though they lie so much within their view that, to be convinced of them, they need but turn their eyes that way. We know some men will not read a letter which is supposed to bring ill news; and many men forbear to cast up their

much as think upon their estates, reason to fear their affairs are in no

accounts, or so

who have

very good posture. How men, whose plentiful fortunes allow them leisure to improve their understandings, can satisfy themselves with a lazy ignorance, I cannot tell: but methinks they have a low opinion of their souls, who lay out all their incomes in provisions for the body, and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of knowledge; who take great care to appear always in a neat and splendid outside, and would think themselves miserable in coarse clothes, or a patched coat, and yet contentedly suffer their minds to appear abroad in a piebald livery of coarse patches and borrowed shreds, such as it has pleased chance, or their country tailor (I mean the common opinion of those they have conversed with) to clothe them in. I will not here mention how unreasonable this is for men that ever think of a future state, and their concernment in it, which no rational man can avoid to do sometimes: nor shall I take notice what a shame and confusion it is to the greatest contemners of knowledge, to be found ignorant in things they are concerned to know. But this at least is worth the consideration of those who call themselves gentlemen, That, however they may think credit, respect, power, and authority the concomitants of their birth and fortune, yet they will

consequence, yet not necessary to our present

find all these still carried

purpose.

of lower condition,

6.

Third cause of error, want of will to use them. There are another sort of people that

IV

those that might do otherwise, pass their lives without an acquaintance with, much less a ra-

edge.

They who

who

away from them by men surpass them in knowl-

are blind will always be led by into the ditch:

and he

Thirdly,

those that see, or else

want

certainly the most subjected, the most enslaved, who is so in his understanding.

proofs, not because they are out of their

reach, but because they will not use them: who though they have riches and leisure enough and want neither parts nor other helps, are yet never the better for them. Their hot pursuit of pleasure, or constant drudgery in business, engages some men's thoughts elsewhere: laziness and oscitancy in general, or a particular aversion for books, study, and meditation, keep others from any serious thoughts at all; and some out of fear that an impartial inquiry would not favour those opinions which best suit their prejudices, lives, and designs, content themselves, without examination, to take upon trust what they find convenient and in fashion. Thus, most men, even of

fall

is

In the foregoing instances some of the causes

have been shown of wrong assent, and how it comes to pass that probable doctrines are not always received with an assent proportionable to the reasons which are to be had for their probability: but hitherto we have considered only such probabilities whose proofs do exist, but do not appear to him who embraces the error. 7.

Fourth cause of

error,

wrong measures of proba-

There remains yet the last sort, who, even where the real probabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do not admit bility.

Fourthly,

of the conviction, nor yield unto manifest rea-

.

CONCERNING

CHAP. XX sons, but

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

either tirkxw, suspend their assent,

do

it to the less probable opinion. And to danger are those exposed who have taken up

or give this

wrong measures of probability, which are: Propositions that are not in themselves certain

I.

and evident, but doubtful andfalse, taken up for principles.

1

Received hypotheses

11.

Predom inant passions or inclinations. IV. Authority. 8. I. Doubtful propositions taken for principles. The first and firmest ground of probability is the III.

conformity anything has to our own knowledge; especially that part of our knowledge which we have embraced, and continue to look on as principles. These have so great an influence upon our opinions, that it is usually by them we judge of

and measure probability; to that degree, that what is inconsistent with our principles, is so far from passing for probable with us, that it will not be allowed possible. The reverence borne to these principles is so great, and their authority so paramount to all other, that the testimony, not only of other men, but the evidence truth,

of our

own

offer to

senses are often rejected,

vouch anything contrary

lished rules. principles,

How much

when they

to these estab-

the doctrine of innate

and that principles are not to be proved

or questioned, has contributed to

this, I will

not

here examine. This I readily grant, that one truth cannot contradict another: but withal I take leave also to say, that every one ought very carefully to beware what he admits for a principle, to examine it strictly, and see whether he certainly knows it to be true of itself, by its own evidence, or whether he does only with assurance believe it to be so upon the authority of others. For he hath a strong bias put into his understanding, which will unavoidably misguide his assent, who hath imbibed wrong principles, and has blindly given himself up to the authority of any opin-

ion in

itself

not evidently true.

There is nothing more ordinary than children's receiving into their minds propositions (especially about matters of 9. Instilled in childhood.

religion)

from

their parents, nurses, or those

about them: which being insinuated into their

unwary as well as unbiassed understandings, and fastened by degrees, are at last (equally whether true or false) riveted there by long custom and education, beyond reflecting

upon

of being pulled they are grown up,

all possibility

out again. For men,

when

and finding those their minds as their

their opinions,

of this sort to be as ancient in very memories, not having observed their early 1

Cf. Bk.

I.

ch.

iii.

§ 24; also

Bk. IV.

insinuation, nor

391

by what means they got them,

they are apt to reverence them as sacred things, and not to suffer them to be profaned, touched, or questioned: they look on them as the Urim

and Thummim set up in their minds immediately by God himself, to be the great and unerring deciders of truth and falsehood, and the judges to which they are to appeal in all manner of controversies. 10.

Of

irresistible efficacy.

principles (let

This opinion of

them be what they

his

will) being

once established in any one's mind, it is easy to be imagined what reception any proposition

how

shall find,

invalidate

clearly soever proved, that shall

their

authority, or

at

all

thwart

these internal oracles; whereas the grossest absurdities

and improbabilities, being but agreeago down glibly, and are

ble to such principles, easily digested.

found

in

men

The

great obstinacy that

is

to be

firmly believing quite contrary

opinions, though

many

times equally absurd, in

the various religions of mankind, are as evident

a proof as they are an unavoidable consequence of this way of reasoning from received traditional

So that men will disbelieve their own renounce the evidence of their senses, and give their own experience the lie, rather than admit of anything disagreeing with these sacred tenets. Take an intelligent Romanist that, from the first dawning of any notions in his understanding, hath had this principle constantly inculcated, viz. that he must believe as the church principles.

eyes,

(i.e.

those of his

the pope

is

communion) believes, or that and this he never so much

infallible,

heard questioned, till at forty or fifty years old he met with one of other principles: how is he prepared easily to swallow, not only against all probability, but even the clear evidence of his senses, the doctrine of transubstantiation? This principle has such an influence on his mind, that he will believe that to be flesh which he sees to be bread. And what way will you take to convince a man of any improbable opinion he holds, who, with some philosophers, hath laid down this as a foundation of reasoning, That he must believe his reason (for so men improperly call arguments drawn from their principles) against his senses? Let an enthusiast be principled that he or his teacher is inspired, and acted by an immediate communication of the Divine Spirit, and you in vain bring the evidence of clear reaas

sons against his doctrine. Whoever, therefore,

have imbibed wrong principles, are not, in things inconsistent with these principles, to be moved by the most apparent and convincing probabilities, till they are so candid and ingenu-

JOHN LOCKE

392

BOOK

IV

ous to themselves, as to be persuaded to examine even those very principles, which many never suffer themselves to do.

one translation

Next to these are men whose understandings are cast into a mould, and

which cross men's appetites and prevailing passions run the same fate. 3 Let ever so much probability hang on one side of a covetous man's reasoning, and money on the other; it is easy to foresee which will outweigh. Earthly minds, like mud walls, resist the strongest batteries: and though, perhaps, sometimes the force of a clear argument may make some impression, yet they nevertheless stand firm, and keep out the enemy, truth, that would captivate or disturb them. Tell

1

1. II.

Received hypotheses.

fashioned just to the size of a received hypothesis} these and the former, is, that they will admit of matter of fact, and agree

The difference between

with dissenters in that; but

differ only in assign-

ing of reasons and explaining the manner of operation. These are not at that open defiance with

can endure to hearken to their information a little more patiently; but will by no means admit of their retheir senses, with the former: they

ports in the explanation of things; nor be pre-

which would convince them that things are not brought about just after the same manner that they have decreed within

vailed on by probabilities,

themselves that they are.

Would

it

not be an in-

sufferable thing for a learned professor,

would blush

and that

have his authority of forty years, standing, wrought out of hard rock, Greek and Latin, with no small expense of time and candle, and confirmed by general tradition and a reverend beard, in an instant overturned by an upstart novelist? Can any one expect that he should be made to confess, that what he taught his scholars thirty years ago was all error and mistake; and that he sold them hard words and ignorance at a very dear rate.

which

What

his scarlet

probabilities,

vail in such a case?

I

at, to

say, are sufficient to pre-

And who

ever,

afresh of

new

with the other, Fatiez penitence, do penance. 12.

notions? All the arguments that

can be used will be as little able to prevail, as thewind did with the traveller to part with his cloak, which he held only the faster. To this of wrong hypothesis may be reduced the errors that may be occasioned by a true hypothesis, or right principles, but not rightly understood. 2 There is

Predominant passions.

III.

man passionately in love that he is jilted; bring a score of witnesses of the falsehood of his mistress, it is ten to one but three kind words of hers Quod voluour wishes, is forwardly believed, is, I suppose, what every one hath more than once experimented: and though men cannot always openly gainsay or resist the shall invalidate all their testimonies.

mus, facile credimus;

what

suits

force of manifest probabilities that

make

against

them, yet yield they not to the argument. Not but that it is the nature of the understanding constantly to close with the more probable side; but yet a man hath a power to suspend and restrain its inquiries, and not permit a full and satisfactory examination, as far as the matter in question is capable, and will bear it to be made. Until that be done, there will be always these two ways left of evading the most apparent probabilities: 3.

1

Two means of evading probabilities:

I.

fallacy latent in the words employed. First,

Supposed

That the

arguments being (as for the most part they are) brought in words, there may be a fallacy latent in them: and the consequences being, perhaps,

many

in train, they

may

be some of them inco-

herent. There are very few discourses so short,

which most men may enough to themselves, raise this doubt; and from whose conviction they may

clear,

and

consistent, to

not, with satisfaction

not, without reproach of disingenuity or unrea-

sonableness, set themselves free with the old reply,

Non

persuadebis, etiamsi persuaseris;

nothing more familiar than this. The instances of men contending for different opinions, which they all derive from the infallible truth of the Scripture, are an undeniable proof of it. All that call themselves Christians, allow the text that says, fxeravoeire, to carry in it the obligation to a very weighty duty. But yet how very erroneous will one of their practices be, who, understanding nothing but the French, take this rule with

cannot answer,

Cf. Bacon on the abuse of hypothesis, in Book of the Novum Organum. 2 Cf. Novum Organum, I. 19.

is

1

Probabilities

a

by the most

cogent arguments, will be prevailed with to disrobe himself at once of all his old opinions, and pretences to knowledge and learning, which with hard study he hath all this time been labouring for; and turn himself out stark naked, in quest

to be, Repentez-vous, repent; or

14.

I

though

I

will not yield.

Supposed unknown arguments for

the contrary.

Secondly, Manifest probabilities may be evaded, and the assent withheld, upon this suggestion,

That I know not yet all that may be said on the contrary side.

And

though I be beaten, it is not should yield, not knowing what

therefore,

necessary

I

forces there are in reserve behind. This

against conviction so open

and

hard to determine when a

man

is

I

the verge of 3

it.

Cf. Bacon,

Novum Organum,

I.

is

a refuge

so wide, that

49.

it

quite out of

CONCERNING

CHAP. XX

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

What probabilities naturally determine the assent. But yet there is some end of it; and a man having carefully inquired into all the grounds of probability and unlikeliness; done his utmost to inform himself in all particulars fairly, and cast up the sum total on both sides; may, in most cases, come to acknowledge, upon the whole 15.

matter, on which side the probability rests: wherein some proofs in matter of reason, being

upon universal experience, are so cogent and clear, and some testimonies in matter suppositions

of fact so universal, that he cannot refuse his assent.

So that

I

propositions,

think

we may

conclude, that, in

where though the proofs

in

view

are of most moment, yet there are sufficient grounds to suspect that there is either fallacy in words, or certain proofs as considerable to be produced on the contrary side; there assent, suspense, or dissent, are often voluntary actions. But where the proofs are such as make it highly probable, and there is not sufficient ground to suspect that there is either fallacy of words (which sober and serious consideration may discover) nor equally valid proofs yet undiscovered, latent on the other side (which also the nature of the thing may, in some cases, make plain to a considerate man) there, I think, a man who has weighed them can scarce refuse his assent to the ;

on which the greater probability appears. Whether it be probable that a promiscuous jum-

side

ble of printing letters should often fall into a

method and order, which should stamp on paper a coherent discourse; or that a blind fortuitous concourse of atoms, not guided by an understanding agent, should frequently constitute the bodies of any species of animals: in these and the

nobody that considers them

like cases, I think,

can be one jot at a stand which side to take, nor at all waver in his assent. Lastly, when there can be no supposition (the thing in its own nature indifferent, and wholly depending upon the testi-

mony of witnesses)

that there

is

as fair testimony

which by inquiry is to be learned, v.g. whether there was one thousand seven hundred years ago such against, as for the matter of fact attested;

a

man at Rome as Julius Caesar: in all such cases,

I

say, I think

it is

not in any rational man's power

to refuse his assent; but that it necessarily follows,

and

with such probabilities. In other less it is in man's power to suspend his assent; and perhaps content himself with the proofs he has, if they favour the opinion that suits with his inclination or interest, and so stop from further search. But that a man should closes

clear cases, I think

afford his assent to that side

on which the

probability appears to him, seems to

less

me utterly

393

impracticable, and as impossible as

it is

to be-

same thing probable and improbable same time.

lieve the

at the

Where it is in our power to suspend ourjudgment. is no more arbitrary than perception; so, I think, assent is no more in our power than knowledge. When the agreement of any two ideas appears to our minds, whether imme1

6.

As knowledge

by the assistance of reason, I can no more refuse to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than I can avoid seeing those objects which I turn my eyes to, and look on in daylight; and what upon full examination I find the most probable, I cannot deny my assent to. But, though we cannot hinder our knowledge, where the agreement is once perceived; nor our assent, where the probability manifestly appears upon due considdiately or

all the measures of it: yet we can hinder both knowledge and assent, by stopping our inquiry, and not employing our faculties in the search of any truth. If it were not so, ignorance, error, or infidelity, could not in any case be a fault. Thus, in some cases we can prevent or suspend our assent: but can a man versed in modern or ancient history doubt whether there is such a place as Rome, or whether there was such a man as Julius Caesar? Indeed, there are millions of truths that a man is not, or may not think himself concerned to know; as whether our king Richard the Third was crooked or no; or whether Roger Bacon was a mathematician or a magician. In these and such like cases, where the assent one way or other is of no importance to the interest of any one; no action, no concernment

eration of

of his following or depending thereon, there

it is

not strange that the mind should give itself up to the common opinion, or render itself to the first comer. These and the like opinions are of so little weight and moment, that, like motes in the sun, their tendencies are very rarely taken notice of. They are there, as it were, by chance, and the mind lets them float at liberty. But where the mind judges that the proposition has concernment in it: where the assent or not assenting is thought to draw consequences of moment after it, and good and evil to depend on choosing or

and the mind sets itself and examine the probability: there I think it is not in our choice to take which side we please, if manifest odds appear on either.

refusing the right side, seriously to inquire

The greater probability,

I

think, in that case will

determine the assent: and a man can no more avoid assenting, or taking it to be true, where he perceives the greater probability, than he can avoid knowing it to be true, where he perceives the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas.

—

.

JOHN LOCKE

394 If this

be

so,

the foundation of error will

lie

in

1

wrong measures of probability; as the foundation of vice in wrong measures of good. 7. IV. Authority .The fourth and last wrong measure of probability I shall take notice of, and which keeps in ignorance or error more people than all the other together, is that which I have 1

mentioned in the foregoing chapter: I mean the giving up our assent to the common received opinions, either of our friends or party, neigh-

bourhood or country. How many men have no other ground for their tenets, than the supposed honesty, or learning, or number of those of the same profession? As if honest or bookish men could not err; or truth were to be established by the vote of the multitude: yet this with most men serves the turn. The tenet has had the attestation of reverend antiquity; it comes to me with the passport of former ages, and therefore I am secure in the reception I give it: other men have been and are of the same opinion, (for that is all is

said,)

and therefore

it is

reasonable for

me

to

embrace it. A man may more justifiably throw up cross and pile for his opinions, than take them up by such measures. All men are liable to error, and most men are in many points, by passion or interest, under temptation to it. If we could but

men of name and learning in the world, and the leaders of parties, we should not always find that it was see the secret motives that influenced the

the embracing of truth for its own sake, that made them espouse the doctrines they owned and maintained. This at least is certain, there is

not an opinion so absurd, which a man may not upon this ground. There is no error to be named, which has not had its professors: and a man shall never want crooked paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right way, wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow. 18. Not so many men in errors as is commonly supposed. But, notwithstanding the great noise is receive

made

in the world about errors and opinions, I must do mankind that right as to say, There are not so many men in errors and wrong opinions as is commonly supposed. Not that I think they embrace the

truth; but indeed, because concerning those doc-

keep such a stir about, they have no thought, no opinion at all. For if any one should

trines they

a little catechise the greatest part of the partizans of most of the sects in the world, he would not find, concerning those matters they are so zealous for, that they have any opinions of their own: much less would he have reason to think that they took them upon the examination of ar-

guments and appearance of probability. They x

Cf.

Bacon, Novum Organum,

I.

61, 122.

book

iv

are resolved to stick to a party that education or interest has

engaged them

in;

and

there, like the

common soldiers of an army, show their courage and warmth as their leaders direct, without ever examining, or so much as knowing, the cause they contend for. If a man's life shows that he has no serious regard for religion; for what reason should we think that he beats his head about and troubles himself examine the grounds of this or that doctrine? It is enough for him to obey his leaders, to have his hand and his tongue ready for the support of the common cause, and thereby approve himself to those who can give him credit, preferment, or the opinions of his church, to

Thus men become and combatants for, those opinions

protection in that society. professors of,

they were never convinced of nor proselytes no, nor ever

had

so

much

to;

as floating in their

heads: and though one cannot say there are fewer improbable or erroneous opinions in the

world than there

are, yet this

is

certain; there are

fewer that actually assent to them, and mistake them for truths, than is imagined.

Chap. XXI. Of Science

1

may

the Division of the Sciences 2

be divided into three sorts. All that

within the compass of human understanding, being either, First, the nature of things, as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner of operation or, Secondly, that which man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end, especially happiness: 3 or, Thirdly, the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and communicated; I think science may be divided properly into these

can

fall

:

three sorts:

The knowledge of things, as own proper beings, their con-

2. Physica. First,

they are in their

stitution, properties,

and operations; whereby

I

mean

not only matter and body, but spirits also, which have their proper natures, constitutions, and operations, as well as bodies. This, in a little more enlarged sense of the word, I call ^vglkt], or natural philosophy. The end of this is bare speculative truth and whatsoever can afford the mind of man any such, falls under this branch, whether it be God himself, angels, spirits, bodies; or :

any of

their affections, as

number, and

figure,

&c. 3. Practica. Secondly,

UpaKTLKr},

The skill of right

applying our own powers and actions, for the attainment of things good and useful. The most considerable under this head 2 3

is ethics,

II. ch. viii; III. ch. vi;

Cf. Bk. Cf. Bk. II. chh. xxi, xxvii.

IV. ch.

which iii.

is

§ 26.

chap, xxi

CONCERNING

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

the seeking out those rules and measures of human actions, which lead to happiness, and the

The end

not bare speculation and the knowledge of truth; but right, and a conduct suitable to it.

means

to practise

4. ZrjfjLeLCOTLKrj.

them.

Thirdly, the third

of this

is

branch

may

be called ZrjyueiamKi), or the doctrine of signs; the most usual whereof being words, it is aptly enough termed also A071/07, logic: the business whereof is to consider the nature of signs, the mind makes use of for the understanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others. For, since the things the mind contemplates are none of them, besides itself, present to the understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a sign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and these are ideas. And because the scene of ideas that makes one man's thoughts cannot be laid open to the immediate view of another, nor laid up anywhere but in the mem1 ory, a no very sure repository: therefore to communicate our thoughts to one another, as well as record them for our own use, signs of our ideas are also necessary: those which men have found

contemplation

395

who would take a view of human the whole extent of it. And per-

knowledge in haps if they were

distinctly weighed, and duly would afford us another sort and critic, than what we have been

considered, they of logic

hitherto acquainted with. 2

and most general division of the This seems to me the first and most general, as well as natural division of the objects of our understanding. For a man can employ his thoughts about nothing, but either, the contemplation of things themselves, for the discovery of truth; or about the things in his own power, which are his own actions, for the attainment of his own ends; or the signs the mind makes use of both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them, for its clearer information. All which three, viz, things, as they are in themselves knowable; actions as they depend on us, in order to happiness; and the right use of signs in order to knowledge, being toto coelo different, they seemed to me to be the three great provinces of the intellectual world, wholly sepa5.

This

is the first

objects of our understanding.

rate

and

distinct

one from another. 3

most convenient, and therefore generally make use

of,

are articulate sounds.

The

consideration,

and words as the great instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable part of their then, of ideas

*Cf. Bk. II. ch. x. §§4, 5,8, 9.

2

Cf. Bk.

ganum, 3

Cf.

map

I.

I.

ch.

iii.

§ 25.

So Bacon, Novum Or-

n -19.

Bacon, Advancement of Learning, Bk. II, the World; also Hobbes, Levi-

of the Intellectual athan, Pt. I. ch. ix.

GEORGE BERKELEY THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE George Berkeley, 685-1 753 i

and Addison entertained

Berkeley, the eldest son of an English settler in Ireland, was born March 12, 1685, probably at

his paper, the Guardian,

Dysert Castle, near Thomastown in County Kilkenny. At the age of eleven he was enrolled in Kilkenny school and because of his precocity was assigned to the second class. At fifteen he entered Trinity College, Dublin. He gained a

1721 Berkeley spent in travel on the continent. Swift secured him an appointment as chaplain to Lord Peterborough, special ambassador for the coronation of the King of Sicily, and he spent the

scholarship in 1702, took his bachelor's degree

two years

degree in

ter's

and upon completing

later, 1

his

mas-

707, he obtained a junior fellow-

examinations with great 709 he was ordained deacon in

ship, after passing the

distinction. In

1

the Anglican church.

The Common

became interested in philosophy through the influence of Newton, Boyle, and Locke. In 1705 he had formed a society to discuss the "new philosophy," and his notes indicate that he was soon convinced that he had discovered a "new principle" which enabled him to overcome the difficulties he encountered in Locke. His first publications were two short mathematical treatises, which appeared in 1707. His own philosophical doctrine was applied for the first time in An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision (1709) and given full statement a year later in his

first

concerning

Treatise

the

Principles

Knowledge. His concern with moral

of

and

Human social

problems became evident at this time in a series of sermons he delivered in the college chapel, which were subsequently published as A DisIn

1

7 13

his

Berkeley obtained a leave of absence

academic

responsibilities

and went

to

He

intended to arrange for the publication of his Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, written in answer to objections against his Principles, and also to "make acquaintance with men of merit." In London his charm and

England.

wit were instantly appreciated.

duced him

from power of his friends, and, being unable an appointment to his liking, he accepted another opportunity to travel on the con-

fall

to obtain

of Clogher,

who had

Bishop

presided at his ordination.

Berkeley held this position from 1 7 16 until 1 72 1 He spent most of the time in Italy where, in addition to his tutorial work, he explored antiquities

and

art treasures

and devoted consid-

erable attention to the observation of natural

phenomena. vius while

it

On one occasion he climbed Vesuwas erupting, and his notes on the

event were later published in the Transactions of the Philosophical Society.

Berkeley returned to England in 1721 to find the country in the midst of the social crisis caused

by the bursting of the South Sea Bubble. He published his view of the affair in the Essay towards preventing the Ruin of Great Britain, in which he proposed extensive sumptuary laws, encouragement of the arts, and return to a simpler life. Soon afterwards, he conceived his project for the

encouragement of religion among the Amer-

ican natives by the establishment of a college

course on Passive Obedience.

from

Cato.

greater part of 1714 in France and Italy. His return at the end of that year coincided with the

tinent, this time as tutor to the son of the

Place Book he kept during these

early years at Trinity College reveal that Berkeley

him with wine at the premiere of his Most of the time between 17 14 and

Swift intro-

and recorded the event in "That Mr. Berkeley is a very ingenious man, and I have mentioned him to all the Ministers, and I will favour him as much as I can." Pope made him the gift of "a very ingenious new poem," Steele invited him to write for at court

his journal:

399

in

Bermuda. To his friend, Lord had dedicated the Theory

whom he

sent his verses

Percival, to of Vision,

he

"Westward the way," and in a letter

prophesying,

course of Empire takes

its

declared his determination "to spend the rest of my days in the island of Bermuda." In 1723

Esther Vanhomrigh, Swift's "Vanessa," somewhat mysteriously left him half of her property, amounting to four thousand pounds, although Berkeley claimed that she was "a perfect stranger." A year later he was appointed to the rich Deanery of Derry. The resulting improvement of his fortunes made it possible for him to pursue his Bermuda project with greater vigor. In

BIOGRAPHICAL

400 1

724 he returned to London and published

pamphlet

entitled

A

ing of Churches in our Foreign Plantations and for Converting the Savage Americans to Christianity. In

addition to obtaining

many

For the

his

Proposal for the Better Supply-

private subscrip-

he persuaded Parliament to promise a grant of twenty thousand pounds, and obtained a royal charter for his projected coltions for his plan,

NOTE last

eighteen years of his

him

to publish his Siris, or a Chain of Philo-

led

In 1728 he married the daughter of the chief justice of Ireland and with three companions departed for America. The group settled first at Newport, Rhode Island, with the aim of buying lands and stock to supply the college at Bermuda and of encouraging commerce between the island and the mainland. But with Berkeley away from London, Parliament showed no inclination to forward the promised grant, and in it became clear that the project was a 1 73 1 failure. During the rest of his sojourn in America, Berkeley devoted himself to study, preached occasionally, and wrote his Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher. On his departure he left his farm,

sophical Reflexions

plans lively

and library to Yale. Although his own had failed, he continued to follow with interest

the

progress of education

in

America and on several later occasions donated books to both Yale and Harvard.

Berkeley

1

lege.

house,

life

was Bishop of Cloyne in Ireland. The year he became bishop he published his Analyst (1734), in which he criticised Newtonian mathematics and suggested certain corrections. Between 735 and 1737 he published a series of papers entitled The Querist, which dealt with the welfare of Ireland. The plague years of 1740 and 1741 and Enquiries concerning

the Vir-

Tar- Water (1744). He had encountered the medicinal use of tar-water while in America,

tues of

and its

in this

work he endeavored

to account for

by means which he had

allegedly universal curative powers

of certain neo-Platonic doctrines,

studied during his stay in

Rhode

Island.

which had begun to fail, was seriously affected by the death of his eldest son in 1750. He had long wanted to retire to Oxford and now in order to be with his younger son, who was studying there, he took the extraBerkeley's health,

ordinary step of resigning his bishopric. The King refused to accept his resignation and declared that he might live where he chose but he must die a bishop. Berkeley moved to Oxford in 1752. He died there the following year on January 14 and was buried in Christ

Church.

3

CONTENTS: THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE Biographical Note, 399 Dedication, 403

Preface, 404

Introduction, 405

The

Principles of

Human Knowledge,

401

41

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE, &c, KNIGHT OF THE MOST NOBLE ORDER OF THE GARTER AND ONE OF THE LORDS OF HER MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL

My

Lord,

You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who has not the honour to be known to your lordship, should presume to address you in this manner. But that a man who has written something with a design to promote Useful Knowledge and Religion in the world should make choice of your lordship for be thought strange by any one that is not altogether unacquainted with the present state of the church and learning, and consequently ignorant how great an ornament and support you are to both. Yet, nothing could have induced me to make you this present of my poor endeavours, were I not encouraged by that candour and native goodness which is so bright a part in your lordship's character. I might add, my lord, that the extraordinary favour and bounty you have been pleased to show towards our Society gave me hopes you would not be unwilling to countenance the studies of one of its members. These considerations determined me to lay this treatise at your lordship's feet, and the rather because I was ambitious to have it known that I am with the truest and most profound respect, on account of that learning and virtue which the world so justly admires in your lordship, his patron, will not

My

Lord,

Your lordship's most humble and most devoted servant, George Berkeley

403

PREFACE What to

I

here

make

public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry, seemed

me evidently true and not unuseful to be known — particularly to

those

who

want a demonstration of the existence and immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of the soul. Whether it be so or no I am content the reader should impartially examine; since I do not think myself any farther concerned for the success of what I have written than as it is agreeable to truth. But, to the end this may not suffer, I make it my request that the reader suspend his judgment till he has once at least read the whole through with that degree of attention and thought which the subject-matter shall seem to deserve. For, as there are some passages that, taken by themare tainted with Scepticism, or

selves, are

very liable (nor could

it

be remedied) to gross misinterpretation,

and to be charged with most absurd consequences, which, nevertheless, upon an entire perusal will appear not to follow from them; so likewise, though the whole should be read over, yet, if this be done transiently, it is very probable

my sense may be mistaken;

but to a thinking reader, I flatter myself it will be throughout clear and obvious. As for the characters of novelty and singularity which some of the following notions may seem to bear, it is, I hope, needless to make any apology on that account. He must surely be either very weak, or very little acquainted with the sciences, who shall reject a truth that is capable of demonstration, for no other reason but because it is newly known, and contrary to the prejudices of mankind. Thus much I thought fit to premise, in order to prevent, if possible, the hasty censures of a sort of men apt to condemn an opinion before they rightly comprehend it.

404

who

are too

INTRODUCTION consequences which cannot be maintained or

Philosophy being nothing else but the study i of wisdom and truth, it may with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater clearness and evidence of .

made consistent. We should believe that God has more bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a strong desire for that knowledge

dealt

which he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever appe-

knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the

tites it

high-road of plain common sense, and are governed by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that is familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of evidence in their senses, and are out of all danger of becoming Sceptics. But no sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a superior principle, to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds concerning those things

which before we seemed

fully to

ly

we advance

made use of,

the whole,

I

them with such means as, if rightwill not fail to satisfy

am

them.

Upon

inclined to think that the far

if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves that we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see. 4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those Principles are which have introduced all that doubtfulness and uncertainty,

greater part,

—

compre-

and contradictions, into the insomuch that the

those absurdities

hend. Prejudices and errors of sense do from all parts discover themselves to our view; and, endeavouring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and

grow upon us

may have implanted in the creatures, doth

usually furnish

several sects of philosophy; wisest

men have

ness it is

thought our ignorance incur-

to arise from the natural duland limitation of our faculties. And surely a work well deserving our pains to make a

able, conceiving

it

inquiry concerning the First Principles of

in speculation,

till

strict

many

in-

Human Knowledge, to sift and examine them on

tricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism.

especially since there may be some grounds to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which stay and embarrass the mind in its search after truth, do not spring from any darkness and

at length,

2.

as

having wandered through

The cause

of this

is

all sides,

thought to be the oband im-

scurity of things, or the natural weakness

intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the

perfection of our understandings. It

said, the

understanding, so

much as from false

and those designed by nature for the support and comfort of life, and not to penetrate into the inward essence and constitution of things. Besides, the mind of man being finite, when it treats of things which partake of infinity, it is not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities and contradictions, out of which it is

which have been

insisted on,

faculties

we have

is

are few,

been avoided.

3.

we may be

too partial to our-

selves in placing the fault originally in ties,

and not rather

in the

our facul-

far better eyes.

wrong use we make of

them. It is a hard thing to suppose that right deductions from true principles should ever end in

may

—

is finite.

But, perhaps,

How difficult

and discouraging soever this seem, when I consider how many great and extraordinary men have gone before me in the like designs, yet I am not without some hopes upon the consideration that the largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is short-sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped 5.

attempt

impossible it should ever extricate itself, it being of the nature of infinite not to be comprehended

by that which

Principles

and might have

6.

In order to prepare the

mind

of the reader

for the easier conceiving what follows,

to premise

405

it is

proper

somewhat, by way of Introduction,

GEORGE BERKELEY

406

And,

manner, by considering mofrom the body moved,

concerning the nature and abuse of Language. But the unravelling this matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part in ren-

colour.

dering speculation intricate and perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties in almost all parts of knowledge. And

idea of motion is framed; which equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may be perceived by sense. 9. And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of qualities or modes, so does it, by the same precision or mental separation, attain abstract

that is the opinion that the mind hath a power of framing abstract ideas or notions of things. He

who is not a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes of philosophers must needs acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract ideas. These are in a

more especial man-

ner thought to be the object of those sciences which go by the name of Logic and Metaphysics, and of all that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime learning, in all which one shall scarce find any question handled in such a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is well acquainted with them. 7. It is agreed on all hands that the qualities or modes of things do never really exist each of them apart by itself, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together, several in the

same

object. B.ut,

we

are

mind being able

to consider each qualifrom those other qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to itself abstract ideas. For example, there is perceived by sight an object extended, coloured, and moved: this mixed or compound idea told, the

ty singly, or abstracted

the

mind resolving

into

its

simple, constituent

and viewing each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without extension; but only that the mind can frame to itself by abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of both colour and extension. parts,

8. Again, the mind having observed that in the particular extensions perceived by sense there is something common and alike in all, and some other things peculiar, as this or that figure

or magnitude,

another;

it

which distinguish them one from

considers apart or singles out by

that which

is

common, making

abstract idea of extension, which surface, nor solid, nor has

any

itself

thereof a most is

neither line,

magnian idea entirely prescinded from all these. So likewise the mind, by leaving out of the particular colours perceived by sense that which distinguishes them one from another, and retaining that only which is common to all, makes an idea of colour in abstract which is neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate tude, but

is

figure or

in like

tion abstractedly not only

but likewise from the figure particular directions

and

it

describes,

and

all

velocities, the abstract

more compounded beings which include several coexistent qualities. For example, ideas of the

the mind having observed that Peter, James, and John resemble each other in certain common

agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves out of the complex or compounded idea it has of Peter, James, and any other particular man, that which is peculiar to each, retaining only what is common to all, and so makes an abstract idea wherein all the particulars equally partake ab-

—

from and cutting off all those circumstances and differences which might determine it to any particular existence. And after this manner it is said we come by the abstract idea of man, or, if you please humanity, or human nature; wherein it is true there is included colour, because there is no man but has some colour, but then it can be neither white, nor black, nor any particular colour, because there is no one particular colour wherein all men partake. So likewise there is included stature, but then it is neither tall stature, nor low stature, nor yet middle stature, but something abstracted from all these. And so of the rest. Moreover, their bestracting entirely

;

ing a great variety of other creatures that partake in some parts, but not all, of the complex idea of man, the mind, leaving out those parts

which are peculiar

to

men, and retaining those

only which are common to all the living creatures, frames the idea of animal, which abstracts not only from all particular men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes,

and

insects.

The

constituent

parts of the abstract idea of animal are body,

life,

and spontaneous motion. By body is meant body without any particular shape or figure, there being no one shape or figure common to all animals, without covering, either of hair, or feathers, or scales, &c, nor yet naked: hair, feathers, scales, and nakedness being the distinsense,

guishing properties of particular animals, and for that reason left out of the abstract idea.

the

Upon

same account the spontaneous motion must

be neither walking, nor flying, nor creeping; it nevertheless a motion, but what that motion

is

is it is

10.

not easy to conceive.

Whether others have

this

wonderful facul-

—

—

INTRODUCTION ty of abstracting their ideas, they best can tell: for myself, I find indeed I have a faculty of im-

agining, or representing to myself, the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of

variously

compounding and dividing them.

can imagine a

man with two heads,

I

or the upper

parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it

must have some particular shape and colour.

Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract from one another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can frame a general notion, by abstracting from which last particulars in the manner aforesaid are the two proper acceptations of abstraction. And there are grounds to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case. The generality of men which are simple and illiterate never pretend to abstract notions. It is said they are difficult and not to be attained without pains and study; we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are confined only to the learned. 1 1 I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence of the doctrine of abstraction, and try if I can discover what it is that inclines the men of speculation to embrace an opinion so remote

—

.

from common sense as that seems to be. There has been a late deservedly esteemed philosopher who, no doubt, has given it very much countenance, by seeming to think the having abstract general ideas is what puts the widest difference in point of understanding betwixt man and beast. "The having of general ideas." saith he, "is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto. For, it is evident we observe no foot-steps in them of making use of general signs for universal ideas;

407

from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no use of words or any other general signs." And a little after: "Therefore, I think, we may suppose that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated

from men, and

it is that proper difference wherewholly separated, and which at last widens to so wide a distance. For, if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare/ machines (as some would have them), we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do, some of them, in certain instances reason as that they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they receive them from

in they are

their senses.

They

are the best of

them

tied

up

within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind Essay on Human Understanding, of abstraction." II. ii. 10 and 1 1. 1 readily agree with this learned author, that the faculties of brutes can by no means attain to abstraction. But then if this be made the distinguishing property of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of those that pass for men must be reckoned into their number. The reason that is here assigned why we have no grounds to think brutes have abstract general ideas is, that we observe in them no use of words or any other general signs; which is built on this supposition that the making use of words implies the having general ideas. From which it follows that men who use language are able to abstract or generalize their ideas. That this is the sense and arguing of the author will further appear by his answering the question he in another place puts: "Since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms?" His

—

is: "Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas." Essay on Human Understanding, IV. iii. 6. But it seems that a word becomes general by being made

answer

an abstract general idea, but any one of which it indifferently suggests to the mind. For example, when it is said "the change of motion is proportional to the impressed force," or that "whatthe sign, not of

of several particular ideas,

ever has extension is divisible," these propositions are to be understood of motion and extension in general; and nevertheless it will not follow that they suggest to my thoughts an idea of motion without a body moved, or any determinate direction and velocity, or that I must conceive an abstract general idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, neither great nor small, black, white, nor red, nor of any other determinate colour. It is only implied that

GEORGE BERKELEY

408

whatever particular motion I consider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular, horizontal, or oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerning it holds equally true. As does the other of every particular extension, it matters not whether line, surface, or solid, whether of this or that

magnitude or 1

figure.

By observing how ideas become general we

2.

may the better judge how words are made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny ab-

is

none of the most abstract, comprehensive, for it must be neither oblique nor

yet

and

difficult)

;

rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor

scalenon, but

all

and none of these at once? In

ef-

something imperfect that cannot exist, an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together. It is true the mind in this imperfect state has need of such

fect, it

ideas,

is

and makes

all

them it can, for and enlargeboth which it is naturally

the haste to

the conveniency of communication

solutely there are general ideas, but only that

ment

of knowledge, to

there are any abstract general ideas; for, in the passages we have quoted wherein there is men-

very

much

it is always supposed that they are formed by abstraction, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and 9. Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall ac-

At least this is enough to show that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest knowledge is conversant If any man has the faculty of framing about." in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is that the reader would fully and certainly inform

tion of general ideas,

knowledge that an idea which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being

made

to represent or stand for all other particu-

same sort. To make this plain by an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular lar ideas of the

inclined.

But yet one has reason to

suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection.

—

himself whether he has such an idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard task for anyone to

9) which is as follows -."Abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children or the yet unexer-

perform. What more easy than for anyone to look a little into his own thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond with the description that is here given of the general idea of a triangle, which is "neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once?" 14. Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry with them, and the pains and skill requisite to the forming them. And it is on all hands agreed that there is need of great toil and labour of the mind, to emancipate our thoughts from particular objects, and raise them to those sublime speculations that are conversant about abstract ideas. From all which the natural consequence should seem to be, that so difficult a thing as the forming abstract ideas was not necessary for communication, which is so easy and familiar to all sorts of men. But, we are told, if they seem obvious and easy to grown men, it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. Now, I would fain know at what time

mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men it is only because by constant and

ficulty,

line, is nevertheless

with regard to

tion general, since, as

it is

its

there used,

significait

repre-

sents all particular lines whatsoever; so that

what

is

demonstrated of it

lines, or, in

is

demonstrated of all

other words, of a line in general. And,

becomes general by being a sign, so the name "line," which taken ab-

as that particular line

made

solutely

by being a sign is made owes its generality being the sign of an abstract or general

is

general.

particular,

And

as the former

not to its but of all particular right lines that may pos-

line,

must be thought to derive same cause, namely, the various particular lines which it indifferently desibly exist, so the latter its

generality from the

notes. 1 3. To give the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of abstract ideas, and the uses they are thought necessary to, I shall add one more passage out of the Essay on Human Understanding, (IV.

vii.

cised

made so. For, when we niceupon them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some pains and familiar use they are ly reflect

skill to

form the general idea of a triangle (which

it is

men

are

employed

in

surmounting that

and furnishing themselves with

dif-

those

necessary helps for discourse. It cannot be when they are grown up, for then it seems they are not

conscious of any such painstaking; it remains therefore to be the business of their childhood. And surely the great and multiplied labour of framing abstract notions will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing to

— INTRODUCTION sides are of a

make

the diagram

1

5.

use of?

Nor do

I

think

them a whit more needful

for the enlargement of knowledge

than for communi-

know, a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to which I fully agree: but then it doth not appear to me that those notions are formed by abstraction in the manner premised universality, so far as I can comprehend, cation. It

is,

I

not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented

by

it;

by virtue whereof it

is

that things, names,

own nature particular, are rendered universal. Thus, when I demonstrate or notions, being in their

any proposition concerning triangles, it is to be I have in view the universal idea of a triangle; which ought not to be understood as if I could frame an idea of a triangle which was supposed that

neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor equicru-

but only that the particular triangle I conwhether of this or that sort it matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all rectilinear triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense universal. All which seems very plain and not to include any difficulty in it. 16. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any proposition to be true of all particular triangles, except we have first seen it demonral;

sider,

strated of the abstract idea of a triangle which equally agrees to all? For, because a property may be demonstrated to agree to some one particular triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally belongs to any other triangle, which in all respects is not the same with it. For example, having demonstrated that the three angles of an isoceles rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I cannot therefore conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles which have neither a right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore that, to be certain this proposition is universally true, we must either make a particular demonstration for every particular triangle,

which it

is

impossible, or once for

all

demonstrate

of the abstract idea of a triangle, in

which

all

the particulars do indifferently partake and by which they are all equally represented. To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in view whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an isosceles rectangular triangle whose

409

determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilin-

imagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of their sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till they have first tacked together numberless inconsistencies, and so framed in their minds abstract general ideas, and annexed them to every common name they

ear triangles, of what sort or bigness soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides are

concerned in the demonstration. It is true I have in view includes all these particulars, but then there is not the least mention made of them in the proof of the proposition. It is not said the three angles are equal to two right ones, because one of them is a right angle, or beat all

cause the sides comprehending length.

Which

sufficiently

it

are of the

same

shows that the right

angle might have been oblique, and the sides unand for all that the demonstration have held good. And for this reason it is that I con-

equal,

clude that to be true of any obliquangular or scalenon which I had demonstrated of a particular right-angled equicrural triangle, and not because I demonstrated the proposition of the abstract idea of a triangle And here it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the particular qualities of the angles, or relations of

may abstract; but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract, general, inconsistent idea of a triangle. In like manner we may consider Peter so far forth as man, or so far forth as animal, without framing the fore-mentioned abstract idea, either of man or of animal, inasmuch as all that is perceived is not the sides. So far he

considered. 17. It

were an endless

as well as

an useless

thing to trace the Schoolmen, those great masters of abstraction, through all the manifold in-

and dispute which and notions

extricable labyrinths of error

their doctrine of abstract natures

seems to have led them

into.

What

bickerings

and controversies, and what a learned dust have been raised about those matters, and what mighty advantage has been from thence derived to mankind, are things at this day too clearly known :o need being insisted on. And it had been well if the ill effects of that doctrine were confined to those only who make the most avowed profession of

it.

When men

consider the great

and parts that have for so many ages been laid out on the cultivation and advancement of the sciences, and that notwithstanding all this the far greater part of them remains full of darkness and uncertainty, and disputes that are like never to have an end, and even those that are thought to be supported by the most clear and cogent demonstrations contain in them paradoxes which are perfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men, and that, takpains, industry,

GEORGE BERKELEY

410

ing all together, a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion and

amusement is

—

I

say the consideration of

all this

apt to throw them into a despondency and per-

contempt of all study. But this may perhaps upon a view of the false principles that have obtained in the world, amongst all which there is none, methinks, hath a more wide and extended sway over the thoughts of speculative men than this of abstract general ideas. fect

cease

1

8. I

come now

prevailing notion,

to consider the source of this

and that seems

to

me

to be

language. And surely nothing of less extent than reason itself could have been the source of an opinion so universally received. The truth of this appears as from other reasons so also from the plain confession of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas,

who acknowledge

that they are

order to naming; from which

made

in

a clear consequence that if there had been no such things as speech or universal signs there never had been any thought of abstraction. See III. vi. 39, and elsewhere of the Essay on Human Understanding. it is

Let us examine the manner wherein words have

—

contributed to the origin of that mistake. First then, it is thought that every name has, or ought to have, one only precise and settled signification, which inclines men to think there are certain abstract, determinate ideas that constitute the true and only immediate signification of each general name; and that it is by the mediation of these abstract ideas that a general name comes to signify any particular thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to any general name, they all signifying indifferently a great

number

of particular ideas. All

which doth

evi-

dently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly appear to anyone by a little reflexion. To this it will be objected that every name that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certain signification. For example, a triangle is defined to be "a plain surface compre-

hended by three right lines," by which that name limited to denote one certain idea and no other. To which I answer, that in the definition it is is

not said whether the surface be great or small, black or white, nor whether the sides are long or short, equal or unequal, nor with what angles they are inclined to each other; in all which there may be great variety, and consequently there is no one settled idea which limits the signification of the word triangle. It is one thing for to keep

a name constantly to the same definition, and another to make it stand everywhere for the same

idea; the one

is

necessary, the other useless

and

impracticable.

how words produce the doctrine of abstract ideas, it must be observed that it is a received opinion that language has no other end but the communicating our ideas, and that every significant name stands for an idea. This being so, and it being withal certain that names which yet are not thought altogether insignificant do not always 1

9.

came

But, to give a farther account

to

mark out particular conceivable ideas, it is straightway concluded that they stand for abThat there are many names in use amongst speculative men which do not always sug-

stract notions.

gest to others determinate, particular ideas, or in all, is what nobody will deny. a little attention will discover that it is not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) significant names which stand for ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to stand for in reading and discoursing, names being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra, in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for. 20. Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some particular disposition to which the former is in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I think does

truth anything at

And

—

—

not unfrequently happen in the familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to reflect with himself, and see if it doth not often happen, either in hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred, admiration, disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain words, without any ideas coming between. At first, indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas that were fitting to produce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be found that, when language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the sounds or sight of the characters is oft immediately attended with those passions which at first were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas that are now quite omitted. May we not, for example, be affected with the promise of a good thing, though we have not an idea of what it is? Or is not the being threatened with danger sufficient to excite

.

INTRODUCTION

411

think not of any particular

way to extricate myself out of that fine and subtle

nor yet frame to ourselves an idea of danger in abstract? If any one shall join ever so little reflexion of his own to what has been said, I believe that it will evidently appear to him that general names are often used in the propriety of language without the speaker's de-

net of abstract ideas which has so miserably perplexed and entangled the minds of men; and that

them for marks of ideas in his own, which he would have them raise in the mind of the hearer. Even proper names themselves do not seem always spoken with a design to bring into our view the ideas of those individuals that are supposed to be marked by them. For example, when a schoolman tells me "Aristotle hath said it," all I conceive he means by it is to dispose me to embrace his opinion with the deference and submission which custom has annexed to that

long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have an idea which I have not. It is not

a dread, though

we

evil likely to befal us,

signing

name. And this effect is often so instantly produced in the minds of those who are accustomed to resign their judgment to authority of that philosopher, as it is impossible any idea either of his person, writings, or reputation should go before. Innumerable examples of this kind may be

why should I insist on those things which every one's experience will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him? 2 We have, I think, shewn the impossibility of Abstract Ideas. We have considered what has been said for them by their ablest patrons; and endeavored to show they are of no use for those ends to which they are thought necessary. And lastly, we have traced them to the source from whence they flow, which appears evidently to be language. It cannot be denied that words are of excellent use, in that by their means all that stock of knowledge which has been purchased by given, but

1

—

the joint labours of inquisitive

and nations may be drawn

men

in all ages

view and made the possession of one single person. But at the same time it must be owned that most parts of knowledge have been strangely perplexed and darkened by the abuse of words, and general ways of speech wherein they are delivered. Since therefore words are so apt to impose on the understanding, whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into into the

my view, keeping out of my thoughts so far as I am able, those names which long and constant use hath so strictly united with them;

from which

I

may

expect to derive the follow-

ing advantages:

be sure to get clear of all conthe springing up of which weeds in almost all the sciences has been a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound knowledge. Secondly, this seems to be a sure 22. First, I shall

troversies purely verbal

—

circumstance, that by how and more curious was the wit of any man, by so much the deeper was he likely to be ensnared and faster held therein. Thirdly, so

with

this peculiar

much

the finer

possible for

me

to

imagine that any of

my own

ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly

so.

To

discern the agreements or disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what ideas are included in any compound idea and what not, there is nothing more requisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my own understanding. 23. But the attainment of all these advantages doth presuppose an entire deliverance from the deception of words, which I dare hardly promise myself; so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an union so early begun, and confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words and ideas. Which difficulty seems to have been very much increased by the doctrine of abstraction. For, so long as men thought abstract ideas were annexed to their words, it doth not seem strange that they should use words for ideas it being found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word, and retain the abstract idea in the mind, which in itself was perfectly inconceivable. This seems to me the principal cause why those men who have so

—

emphatically recommended to others the laying aside all use of words in their meditations, and contemplating their bare ideas, have yet failed to perform it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of the absurd opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out of the abuse of words. And, in order to remedy these evils, they advise well, that we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from the words which signify them. But, how good soever this advice may be they have given others, it is plain they could not have a due regard to it themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate use of words was to signify ideas, and that the immediate signification of every general name was a determinate abstract idea. 24. But, these being known to be mistakes, a man may with greater ease prevent his being imposed on by words. He that knows he has no other than particular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the abstract idea an-

GEORGE BERKELEY

412

nexed to any name. And he that knows names do not always stand for ideas will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas where there are none to be had. It were, therefore, to be wished that everyone would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider, separating from them all that dress and incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind the judgment and divide the attention. In

vain do we extend our view into the heavens and pry into the entrails of the earth, in vain do we consult the writings of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity we need only draw the curtain of words, to hold the fairest tree of

—

knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand. 25. Unless we take care to clear the First Prin-

Knowledge from the embarras and dewe may make infinite reasonings upon them to no purpose; we may draw consequences from consequences, and be never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose ourselves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes. Whoever ciples of

lusion of words,

therefore designs to read the following sheets,

entreat his

own

same

him

make my words

to

thinking,

and endeavour

to attain the

train of thoughts in reading that

writing them.

By

him to discover

He will

this

means

it

I

the occasion of

I

had

in

will be easy for

the truth or falsity of what

I

say.

be out of all danger of being deceived by my words, and I do not see how he can be led into an error by considering his own naked, undisguised ideas.

A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

i. It is

who takes a survey human knowledge, that they are

either ideas actually imprinted else

That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor by the imagination, exist without the mind, is what everybody will allow. And it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever ob-

evident to any one

of the objects of

on the

3.

ideas formed

senses; or

such as are perceived by attending to the

and operations of the mind; or lastly, memory and imaginaeither compounding, dividing, or barely

passions

ideas formed by help of

tion

—

representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By sight I have the ideas of

and and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more and less either as to quantity or

light

and

colours, with their several degrees

variations.

By touch

I

perceive hard

me

degree. Smelling furnishes

with odours; the

and hearing conveys sounds all their variety of tone and

palate with tastes; to the

mind

composition.

in

And

as several of these are ob-

accompany each other, they come be marked by one name, and so to be re-

served to to

puted as one thing. Thus, colour, taste, smell, figure

example a certain and consistence hav-

for

ing been observed to go together, are accounted

one distinct thing, signified by the name

applet-

other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree,

a book, and the like sensible things

— which

as they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the

passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, 2.

But, besides

all

and

so forth.

that endless variety of ideas

or objects of knowledge, there

is

likewise some-

thing which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing,

imagining, re-

membering, about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein, they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived for the existence of an idea

—

consists in being perceived.

jects they

in a

compose), cannot exist otherwise than

mind perceiving them.

may

—

I

think an intui-

be obtained of this by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term exists, when applied to sensible things. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odour, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percepi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them. 4. It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own

413

tive

knowledge

—

GEORGE BERKELEY

4 i4

ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination

of them, should exist unperceived? 5. If

we thoroughly examine

this tenet it will,

perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of abstract ideas. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects

from

their being per-

ceived, so as to conceive

them

existing unper-

ceived? Light

and

colours, heat

and

cold, exten-

—

and figures in a word the things we see and what are they but so many sensations, nofeel tions, ideas, or impressions on the sense? and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part, I might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from sion

—

each other, those things which, perhaps I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself. So far, I will not deny, I can abstract if that may properly be called abstrac-

—

tion

which extends only

rately such objects as ist

to the conceiving sepa-

it is

possible

may really ex-

or be actually perceived asunder. But

ceiving or imagining

yond the

my con-

power does not extend be-

possibility of real existence or percep-

Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or anything without an actual sensation of that

tion. feel

thing, so

is it

impossible for

me

to conceive in

our, figure, motion, smell, taste, etc.,

8.

But, say you, though the ideas themselves

do not

exist

without the mind, yet there

an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we look but never so little into our thoughts,

we

shall find

impossible for us to conceive a

it

likeness except only

between our

any

single part of

them an

exist-

ence independent of a spirit. To be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived. 7. From what has been said it follows there is not any other Substance than Spirit, or that which perceives. But, for the fuller proof of this point, let it be considered the sensible qualities are col-

ideas.

Again,

I

ask whether those supposed originals or external things, of which

our ideas are the pictures or rep-

resentations, be themselves perceivable or no? If

they are, then they are ideas and we have gained our point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which is intangible; and so of the rest. 9. Some there are who make a distinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities. By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the

colours, sounds, tastes,

to attribute to

be

in

latter they

all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit— it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction,

may

things like them, whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind

from the sensation or perception of it. 6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that their being is to be perceived or known; that conse-

istence at

the ideas

substratum of those ideas.

my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct

quently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no ex-

i. e.

perceived by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction, for to have an idea is all one as to perceive; that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities exist must perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no unthinking substance or

denote

all

other sensible qualities, as

and

so forth.

The

ideas

we have of these

they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of anything existing without the mind, or unperceived, but they will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call Matter. By Matter, therefore, we are to understand

an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist. But it is evident from what we have already shown, that extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes

can

exist in

an unperceiving substance. Hence, it is plain that the very notion of what is called Matter or corporeal substance 10.

involves a contradiction in

They who

assert that figure, motion,

it.

and

the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat, cold, and suchlike secondary qualities,

do not

— which they

tell

us are sensations

.

PRINCIPLES OF existing in the

mind

alone, that

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

depend on and

are occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of matter. This they take for an undoubted truth, which they

can demonstrate beyond

all

exception.

Now,

if

be certain that those original qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. But I desire any one to it

reflect

and

try

whether he can, by any abstrac-

tion of thought, conceive the extension

tion of a ties.

For

body without

my own

part,

and mo-

other sensible qualisee evidently that it is

all I

not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable.

Where

there-

fore the other sensible qualities are, there

these be also, to wit, in the

must

mind and nowhere

else. 1 1 Again, great and small, swift and slow, are allowed to exist nowhere without the mind, being entirely relative, and changing as the frame or position of the organs of sense varies. The extension therefore which exists without the mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow, that is, they are nothing at all. But, say you, they are extension in general, and

motion

in general: thus

we

see

how much

the

tenet of extended movable substances existing

without the mind depends on the strange doctrine of abstract ideas. And here I cannot but remark how nearly the vague and indeterminate description of Matter or corporeal substance,

which the modern philosophers are run into by their

own

principles, resembles that antiquated

and so much ridiculed notion of materia prima, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers. Without extension solidity cannot be conceived; since therefore it has been shewn that extension exists not in an unthinking substance, the same must also be true of solidity. 12.

That number is entirely the creature of the

mind, even though the other qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as the mind views it with different respects. Thus, the same extension is one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly relative, and dependent on men's understanding, that it is strange to think how any one should give it an

415

absolute existence without the mind. We say one book, one page, one line, etc. all these are equally units, though some contain several of the others. And in each instance, it is plain, the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put together by the mind. 13. Unity I know some will have to be a sim;

uncompounded

accompanying all I have any such idea answering the word unity I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could not miss finding it: on the contrary, it should be the most familiar to my understanding, since it is said to accompany all other ideas, and to be perceived by all the ways of sensation and reflexion. To say no more, it is an abstract idea. 14. I shall farther add, that, after the same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to have no existence in Matter, or without the mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and cold are affections only of the mind, and not at ple or

idea,

other ideas into the mind. That

all

patterns of real beings, existing in the corpor-

which excite them, for that the same body which appears cold to one hand seems eal substances

warm to another. Now, why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter, because to the same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture at the same station,

they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images of anything settled and determinate with-

out the mind? Again, it is proved that sweetness is not really in the sapid thing, because the thing remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say that motion is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the

mind become

motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower without any alteration in any

swifter, the

external object? 1 5. In short, let any one consider those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colours and taste exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion. Though it must be confessed this method of arguing does not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in an outward object, as that we do not know by sense which is the true extension or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing plainly shew it to be impossible that any colour or extension at all, or other sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an un-

GEORGE BERKELEY

4 i6

thinking subject without the mind, or in truth, any such thing as an out-

ceived by sense. But what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the

ward

mind, from what we perceive, since the very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary connexion betwixt them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though there were no bodies existing without resembling them. Hence, it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always in the same order, we see them in at present, without their concurrence. 1 9. But, though we might possibly have all our sensations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of their production, by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise; and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said; for, though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the production of ideas or sensations in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose Matter or corporeal substances, since that is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with or without this supposition. If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so, must needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings that are entirely use-

that there should be

6.

1

ion.

object.

But let us examine a little the received opin-

—

is

a

and that Matter

is

It is said

of Matter,

supports

it.

extension

mode

or accident

the substratum that

Now I desire that you would explain

me what

is meant by Matter's supporting exSay you, I have no idea of Matter and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you have no positive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, you must at least have a relative idea of Matter; though you know not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant by its supporting them. It is evident "support" cannot here be

to

tension.

—

taken in its usual or literal sense as when we say that pillars support a building; in what sense therefore must it be taken? 17. If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare themselves to

we

mean by ma-

them acknowledge they have no other meaning annexed to those

terial substance,

shall find

sounds but the idea of Being in general, together with the relative notion of its supporting accidents. The general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting accidents, this, as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the common sense of those words; it must therefore be taken in some other sense, but what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the two parts or branches which make the signification of the words material substance, I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material substratum or

support of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose they have an exis-. tence without the mind? And is not this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable? But, though

were possible that solid, figured, movable substances may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bod1

ies,

8.

As

how is it possible for us to know this? we must know it by sense or by reason. our senses, by them we have the knowl-

yet

Either for

less,

edge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will: but they do not inform us that things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge. It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must be by reason, inferring their existence from what is immediately per-

and serve

20. In short,

it

to if

no manner of purpose. there were external bodies,

it

we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were that we have is

impossible

—

now. Suppose what no one can deny possible an intelligence without the help of external bodies, to be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask whether that intelligence hath not all the

—

reason to believe the existence of corporeal substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting

them

mind, that you can possibly have for same thing? Of this there can be no which one consideration were enough

in his

believing the

question

—

.

PRINCIPLES OF make any reasonable person

to

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

suspect the

strength of whatever arguments he may think himself to have, for the existence of bodies with-

out the mind. 2

Were

1

it

necessary to

add any farther proof

against the existence of Matter after what has been said, I could instance several of those er-

and difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from that tenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion. But I shall not enter into the detail of them in this place, as well because I think arguments a posteriori are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I mistake not, sufrors

demonstrated a priori, as because I shall hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them. 22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly prolix in handling this subject. For, to what purpose is it to dilate on that which may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one that is capable of the least ficiently

reflexion? Itisbutlookingintoyour own thoughts,

whether you can conceive it posa sound, or figure, or motion, or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived. This easy trial may perhaps make you see that what you contend for is a downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole upon this issue: If you can but conceive it possible for one extended movable substance, or, in general, for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiv-

and

so trying

sible for

—

up the cause. And, as compages of external bodies you contend for, I shall grant you its existence, though you cannot either give me any reason why you believe it exists, or assign any use to it when it is ing

it,

I

shall readily give

for all that

supposed to exist. I say, the bare possibility of your opinions being true shall pass for an argu-

ment that

it is so.

23. But, say you, surely there

than for

me

is

nothing easier

to imagine trees, for instance, in a

park, or books existing in a closet,

and nobody

by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you yourself perceive or think of

them

all

the while?

This therefore is nothing to the purpose; it only shews you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind: but it does not shew that you can conceive it possible the objects of your

may

thought out

this, it is

exist

4i7

without the mind.

To make

necessary that you conceive

them

unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost

existing unconceived or

we own

to conceive the existence of external bodies,

are

the while only contemplating our

all

But the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or exideas.

ist

in

A little attention will discover to any

itself.

one the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of material substance. 24. It

very obvious, upon the least inquiry

is

into our thoughts, to for us to

know whether it is possible

understand what

is

meant by the

abso-

lute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or with-

out the mind.

To me it is evident those words mark

out either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no

way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own thoughts; and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions does appear, surely nothing

readier or fairer

more

is

requisite for the conviction. It

therefore that

I insist,

is

on

this

to wit, that the absolute

existence of unthinking things are words with-

out a meaning, or which include a contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, and earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader. 25. All

things

our ideas, sensations, notions, or the

which we perceive, by whatsoever names

may

be distinguished, are visibly inactive nothing of power or agency included in them. So that one idea or object of thought cannot produce or make any alteration in another. To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since they and every part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived: but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power or activity; there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A little attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies they

— there

is

passiveness is

and

inertness in

it,

insomuch that

it

impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strict-

be the cause of anything: neither be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is evident from sect. 8. Whence it

ly speaking, to

can

it

plainly follows that extension, figure,

and mo-

tion cannot be the cause of our sensations. say, therefore, that these are the effects of

To

pow-

.

GEORGE BERKELEY

4 i8 ers resulting

motion, and

be

from the configuration, number, must certainly

size of corpuscles,

unthinking agents or of exciting ideas exclusive we only amuse ourselves with words. 29. But, whatever power I may have over my

of volition,

false.

26.

grounded on experience; but when we think of

We perceive a continual succession of ideas,

changed or toThere is therefore some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is clear from the preceding section. It must therefore be a substance; but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal or material substance: it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an

own thoughts,

incorporeal active substance or Spirit.

them.

some are anew

excited, others are

tally disappear.

2 7.

ing

A spirit is one simple, undivided, active be-

— as

it

perceives ideas

it is

called the under-

and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the will. Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert {vide sect. 25), they cannot represent unto us, by way of image

standing,

or likeness, that which acts.

make

it

A little attention will

plain to any one, that to have an idea

which shall be like that active principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects which it produceth. If any man shall doubt of the truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can frame the idea of any power or active being, and whether he has ideas of two principal powers, marked by the names will and understanding, distinct from each other as well as from a third idea of Substance or Being in general, with a relative notion of its supporting or being the subject of the aforesaid

—

powers which is signified by the name soul or This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words will, soul, spirit, do not stand for spirit.

different ideas, or, in truth, for

any idea

at

all,

but for something which is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. Though it must be owned at the same time that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind: such as willing, loving, hating inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words. 28. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as

—

I

think

fit.

straightway and by the

It is

no more than willing, and

this or that idea arises in

same power

my fancy;

obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain and it is

find the ideas actually perceived

I

by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces ;

30.

and

The

ideas of Sense are

more

strong, lively,

than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, distinct

and are not excited are the effects of

regular train or

random,

at

human

series,

as those

which

but in a the admirable connexion wills often are,

whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. Now the set rules or established methods wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the laws of nature; and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things. This gives us a sort of foresight which en3 ables us to regulate our actions for the benefit of life. And without this we should be eternally at a loss; we could not know how to act anything that might procure us the least pleasure, or remove the least pain of sense. That food nourishes, 1

sleep refreshes,

the seed-time

and

is

the

warms us; that to sow in way to reap in the harvest;

fire

and in general that to obtain such or such ends, such or such means are conducive all this we know, not by discovering any necessary connexion between our ideas, but only by the observation of the settled laws of nature, without which we should be all in uncertainty and confusion,

—

and a grown man no more know how himself in the affairs of life than an

to

manage

infant just

born. 32.

And

yet this consistent uniform working,

which so evidently displays the goodness and wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose Will constitutes the laws of nature, is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, that it rather sends them wandering after second causes. For, when we perceive certain ideas of Sense constantly

fol-

lowed by other ideas and we know this is not of our own doing, we forthwith attribute power and agency to the ideas themselves, and make one the cause of another, than which nothing can be

PRINCIPLES OF

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

unintelligible. Thus, for examhaving observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called heat, we do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like manner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended with sound, we are inclined to think

more absurd and ple,

the latter the effect of the former.

The

ideas imprinted

excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed ideas, or images of things, which they copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid

and

distinct, are nevertheless ideas, that

is,

they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are also less dependent on the spirit, or thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of another and more powerful spirit; yet still they are ideas, and certainly no idea, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it. 34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we spend some time in answering objections which may probably be made against the principles we have hitherto laid down. In doing of which, if I seem too prolix to those of quick apprehensions, I hope it may be pardoned, since all men do not equally apprehend things of this nature, and I am willing to be understood by every one. First, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world, and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place. All things that exist, exist only in the mind, that is, they are purely notional. What therefore be-

comes of the sun, moon and stars? What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies? Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy? To

which, and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I answer, that by the principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or anywise conceive or understand remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a rerum natura, and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force. This is evident from sect. 29, all

30,

and

33,

where we have shewn what

is

meant

things in opposition to chimeras or ideas of

our own framing; but then they both equally exist in the mind, and in that sense they are alike ideas.

35. 1 do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflexion. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I

on the Senses by the Author of nature are called real things; and those 33.

by real

4i9

make not

the least question.

The only

thing

whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist indeed will want the colour of an empty name to support his impiety; and the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great handle for trifling and disputation. 36. If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of things, he is very far from understanding what hath been premised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take here an abThere are spiritstract of what has been said: ual substances, minds, or human souls, which

—

will or excite ideas in themselves at pleasure;

but

and unsteady in respect of others they perceive by sense which, being impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves the effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. These latter are said to have more reality in them than the former: by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perthese are faint, weak,

—

—

ceiving them.

And in this sense the sun that I see

by day is the real sun, and that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense here given of

reality it is

etable, star, mineral,

evident that every vegin general each part of

and

the mundane system, is as much a real being by our principles as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the term reality different from I do, I entreat them to look into their own thoughts and see. 37. It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal sub-

what

stances. To this

my answer is, that if the word sub-

—

be taken in the vulgar sense for a combination of sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like this we cannot be accused of taking away: but if it be taken in a philosophic sense for the support of accidents or qualities without the mind— then indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination. 38. But after all, say you, it sounds very harsh stance

—

—

GEORGE BERKELEY

420

to say we eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so— the word idea not being used in common discourse to signify the several combinations of sensible qualities which are called things; and it is certain that any expression which varies from the familiar use of language will seem harsh and ridiculous. But

doth not concern the truth of the proposiwhich in other words is no more than to say, we are fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by our senses. The hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure, or suchlike qualities, which this

tion,

combined together constitute the several sorts of victuals and apparel, have been shewn to exist only in the mind that perceives them; and this is all that is meant by calling them ideas; which word if it was as ordinarily used as thing, would sound no harsher nor more ridiculous than it. I

am not for disputing about the propriety, but the truth of the expression. If therefore you agree with me that we eat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of sense, which cannot exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall readily grant it is more proper or conformable to custom that they should be called things rather than ideas.

39. If

it

be

demanded why

I

make

—

is

generally supposed to de-

note somewhat existing without the mind; secondly, because thing hath a more comprehensive signification than idea, including spirit or thinking things as well as ideas. Since therefore the ob-

mind, and are with-

jects of sense exist only in the al

thoughtless and inactive,

by the word 40.

I

chose to

mark them

which implies those properties, But, say what we can, some one perhaps idea,

may be apt to reply, he will still believe his senses, suffer any arguments, how plausible

and never

Be it so; assert the evidence of sense as high as you please, we are willing to do the same. That what I see, hear, and feel doth exist, that is to say, is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own being. But I do not see how the testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence of anything which is not perceived by sense. We are not for having any man turn sceptic and disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give them all the stress and assurance imaginable; nor are there any principles more opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down, soever, to prevail over the certainty of them.

as shall be hereafter clearly

shewn.

do but put your hand into it and you will be convinced with a witness. This and the like may be urged in opposition to our tenets. To all which the answer is evident from what hath been already said; and I shall only add in this place, that if real fire be very different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain that it occasions very

see,

from the idea of the same pain, and yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, in an unperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than its idea. different

42. Thirdly,

it

will be objected that

we

see

things actually without or at distance from us,

and which consequently do not exist in the mind; it being absurd that those things which are seen at the distance of several miles should be as near to us as

desire

do

oft

tance

it

own thoughts. In answer to this, I may be considered that in a dream we

our

perceive things as existing at a great disoff,

and yet

for all that, those things are

acknowledged to have their existence only in the mind.

use of the

word idea, and do not rather in compliance with custom call them things; I answer, I do it for two first, because the term thing in contrareasons: distinction to idea,

41. Secondly, it will be objected that there is a great difference betwixt real fire for instance, and the idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt, and actually being so: if you suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you

43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point,

it

may be worth while to consider how it is that we perceive distance and things placed at a distance

by sight. For, that we should in truth see external space,

and bodies actually

existing in

it,

some

seems to carry with it some opposition to what hath been said of their existing nowhere without the mind. The consideration of this difficulty it was that gave birth to my "Essay towards a New Theory of Vision," which was published not long since, wherein it nearer, others farther

off,

shewn that distance or outness is neither immeby sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by lines and angles, or anyis

diately of itself perceived

thing that hath a necessary connexion with it; but that it is only suggested to our thoughts by certain visible ideas and sensations attending

which in their own nature have no manner of similitude or relation either with distance or things placed at a distance; but, by a connexion taught us by experience, they come to signify vision,

and suggest them to us, after the same manner that words of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for; insomuch that a man born blind and afterwards made to see, would not, at first sight, think the things he saw to be without his mind, or at any distance from him. See sect. 41 of the forementioned treatise. 44.

The ideas of sight and touch make two spe-

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

PRINCIPLES OF cies entirely distinct

and heterogeneous. The

former are marks and prognostics of the latter. That the proper objects of sight neither exist without mind, nor are the images of external things, was shewn even in that treatise. Though throughout the same the contrary be supposed not that to suppose that true of tangible objects vulgar error was necessary for establishing the notion therein laid down, but because it was beside my purpose to examine and refute it in a discourse concerning Vision. So that in strict

—

truth the ideas of sight, when we apprehend by them distance and things placed at a distance,

do not suggest or mark out

to us things actually

admonish us what minds at such and such distances of time, and in consequence of such or such actions. It is, I say, evident from what has been said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, and in sect. 147 and elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, that visible ideas are the Language whereby the Governing Spirit on whom we depend informs us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in case we excite this or that motion in our own bodies. But for a fuller information in this point existing at a distance, but only

ideas of touch will be imprinted in our

I

refer to the Essay 45. Fourthly,

it

itself.

will be objected that

foregoing principles

it

from the

follows things are every

moment annihilated and created anew. The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived;

421

chargeable with those pretended absurdities. It is thought strangely absurd that upon closing my

around me should be reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what philosophers commonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands that light and colours, which alone are the proper and immediate obeyelids all the visible objects

mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived? Again, it may to some perhaps seem very incredible that things should be every moment creating, yet this very

jects of sight, are

notion

is

commonly taught

in the schools.

For

the Schoolmen, though they acknowledge the existence of Matter, and that the whole mun-

dane fabric

framed out of it, are nevertheless it cannot subsist without the divine conservation, which by them is expounded is

of opinion that

to be a continual creation.

thought will discover to us the existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will unavoidably fol47. Farther, a little

that though

we allow

low, from the principles which are

now generally

admitted, that the particular bodies, of what kind soever, do none of them exist whilst they are not perceived. For, it is evident from sect. 11 and the following sections, that the Matter philoso-

phers contend for is an incomprehensible somewhat, which hath none of those particular qualities whereby the bodies falling under our senses are distinguished one from another. But, to make this more plain, it must be remarked that the in-

Matter

now universally al-

the trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs

finite divisibility of

in the parlour, no longer than while there

lowed, at least by the most approved and considerable philosophers, who on the received principles demonstrate it beyond all exception.

somebody by

my eyes

all

to nothing,

to perceive them.

the furniture in the

Upon

room

is

is

shutting

reduced

and barely upon opening them

it is

again created. In answer to all which, I refer the reader to what has been said in sect. 3, 4, &c, and desire he will consider whether he means anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could make, I am not able to discover that anything else is meant by those words; and I once more entreat the reader to

sound to be it

his own thoughts, and not suffer himself imposed on by words. If he can conceive

possible either for his ideas or their archetypes

to exist without being perceived, then I give

up

he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to stand up in defence of he knows not what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity the not assenting to those propositions which at bottom have no meaning in them. 46. It will not be amiss to observe how far the received principles of philosophy are themselves the cause; but

if

Hence,

it

follows there

is

is

an

infinite

number

of

parts in each particle of Matter which are not

perceived by sense.

The reason

any particular body seems

nitude, or exhibits only a finite to sense,

in itself

is,

it

not because

it

therefore that

to be of a finite

number

mag-

of parts

contains no more, since

contains an infinite

number

of parts,

but because the sense is not acute enough to discern them. In proportion therefore as the sense is rendered more acute, it perceives a greater

number

of parts in the object, that

appears greater, and in

its

extremities

able appearing lines

its

is,

the object

figure varies, those parts

which were before unperceiv-

now to bound it in very different

and angles from those perceived by an ob-

tuser sense.

And

at length, after various

changes

and shape, when the sense becomes infinitely acute the body shall seem infinite. During all which there is no alteration in the body, but only in the sense. Each body therefore, considered in itself, is infinitely extended, and conof size

.

GEORGE BERKELEY

422

sequently void of all shape or figure. From which it follows that, though we should grant the existence of Matter to be never so certain, yet it is withal as certain, the materialists themselves are

by

their

own

principles forced to acknowledge,

that neither the particular bodies perceived

by

anything like them, exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and each particle thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless, and it is the mind that frames all that variety of bodies which compose the visible world, any one whereof does not exist longer than it is perceived. 48. If we consider it, the objection proposed in sect. 45 will not be found reasonably charged on the principles we have premised, so as in truth to make any objection at all against our notions. For, though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude they have no existence except only while they are perceived by us, since there may be some other spirit that perceives them though we do not. Wherever bodies are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does not therefore follow from the foregoing principles that bodies are annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of them. 49. Fifthly, it may perhaps be objected that if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended and figured; since extension is a mode or attribute which (to speak with the schools) is predicated of the subject in which it exists. I answer, those qualities are in the mind only as they are perceived by it that is, not by way of mode or attribute, but only by way sense, nor

—

and it no more follows the soul or mind extended, because extension exists in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those colours are on all hands acknowledged to exist

of idea; is

it, and nowhere else. As to what philosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very ground-

in

and unintelligible. For instance, in this prop"a die is hard, extended, and square," they will have it that the word die denotes a subject or substance, distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure which are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot compreless

osition

me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things which are termed its modes or accidents. And, to say a die is hard, extended, and square is not to attribute those qualities to a subject distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaning of the word hend: to

die.

you will say there have been a great by matter and motion; take away these and you destroy the whole corpuscular philosophy, and undermine those mechanical principles which have been applied with so much success to account for the phenomena. In short, whatever advances have been made, either by ancient or modern philosophers, in the study of nature do all proceed on the supposition that corporeal substance or Matter doth really exist. To this I answer that there is not any one phenomenon explained on that supposition which may not as well be explained without it, as might easily be made appear by an induction of particulars. To explain the phenomena, is all one as to shew why, upon such and such occasions, we are affected with such and such ideas. But how Matter should operate on a Spirit, or produce any idea in it, is what no philosopher 50. Sixthly,

many

will

things explained

pretend to explain;

it is

therefore evident

there can be no use of Matter in natural philos-

ophy. Besides, they who attempt to account for things do it not by corporeal substance, but by figure, motion, and other qualities, which are in truth no more than mere ideas, and, therefore, cannot be the cause of anything, as hath been already shewn. See sect. 25. 5 1 Seventhly, it will upon this be demanded whether it does not seem absurd to take away natural causes, and ascribe everything to the immediate operation of Spirits? We must no longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or water cools, but that a Spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner? I answer, he would so; in such things we ought to "think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar." They who to demonstration are convinced of the truth of the Copernican system do nevertheless say "the sun rises," "the sun sets," or "comes to the meridian"; and if they affected a contrary style in common talk it would without doubt appear very ridiculous. A little reflexion on what is here said will make it manifest that the common use of language would receive no manner of alteration or disturbance from the admission of our tenets.

52. In the ordinary affairs of

life,

any phrases

may

be retained, so long as they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in such a manner as is necessary for our well-being, how false soever they may be if taken in a strict and speculative sense. Nay, this is unavoidable, since, propriety being regulated by custom, language is

suited to the received opinions,

always the

truest.

Hence

it is

which are not

impossible, even in

PRINCIPLES OF

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

the most rigid, philosophic reasonings, so far to alter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak, as never to give a

handle for cavillers to pretend

and inconsistencies. But, a fair and ingenuous reader will collect the sense from the scope and tenor and connexion of a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate modes of speech which use has made inevitable. 53. As to the opinion that there are no Corporeal Causes, this has been heretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by others among the modern philosophers, who though they allow Matter to exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate efficient cause of all things. These men saw that amongst all the objects of sense there was none which had any power or activity included in it; and that by consequence this was likewise true of whatever boddifficulties

ies they supposed to exist without the mind, like unto the immediate objects of sense. But then, that they should suppose an innumerable multitude of created beings, which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one effect in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose, since God might have done everything as well without them: this I say, though we should allow it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable and extravagant supposi-

55.

423

But secondly, though we should grant a

notion to be never so universally and steadfastly adhered to, yet this is weak argument of its truth to whoever considers what a vast number of prejudices and false opinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost tenaciousness, by the unreflecting (which are the far greater) part of mankind. There was a time when the antipodes and motion of the earth were looked upon as

monstrous absurdities even by men of learning: and if it be considered what a small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find that at this day those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable footing in the world. 56.

But

it is

demanded

of this prejudice,

that

and account

we

assign a cause

for its obtaining

To this I answer, that men knowing they perceived several ideas, whereof they themselves were not the authors as not being excited from within nor depending on the operation of in the world.

—

their wills

— this

made them maintain

ideas, or objects of perception

those

had an existence

independent of and without the mind, without ever dreaming that a contradiction was involved in those words. But, philosophers having plainly seen that the immediate objects of perception do not exist without the mind, they in some degree corrected the mistake of the vulgar; but at the

tion.

same time run

54. In the eighth place, the universal concurrent assent of mankind may be thought by some an invincible argument in behalf of Matter, or the existence of external things. Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken? And if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominant an error? I answer, first, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will not perhaps be found so

absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects really existing without the mind, or having a subsist-

many as is imagined do really believe the existence of Matter or things without the mind. Strictly speaking, to believe that which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it, is impossible; and whether the foregoing expressions are not of that sort,

I

refer

it

to the impartial ex-

amination of the reader. In one sense, indeed, men may be said to believe that Matter exists, that is, they act as if the immediate cause of their sensations, which affects them every moment, and is so nearly present to them, were some senseless unthinking being. But, that they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by those words, and form thereof a settled speculative is what I am not able to conceive. This not the only instance wherein men impose upon themselves, by imagining they believe those propositions which they have often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in them.

opinion, is

into another

which seems no

less

ence distinct from being perceived, of which our ideas are only images or resemblances, imprinted by those objects on the mind. And this notion of the philosophers owes its origin to the same cause with the former, namely, their being conscious that they were not the authors of their own sensations, which they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and which therefore must have some cause distinct from the minds on which they are imprinted.

But why they should suppose the ideas of by things in their likeness, and not rather have recourse to Spirit which alone can act, may be accounted for, first, because they were not aware of the repugnancy there is, as well in supposing things like unto our 57.

sense to be excited in us

them power or activity. Secondly, because the Supreme Spirit which excites those ideas in our minds, is not marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite collection of sensible ideas existing without, as in attributing to

human

agents are by their size, comand motions. And thirdly, because His operations are regular and uniform. Whenever the course of nature is interrupted by ideas, as

plexion, limbs,

GEORGE BERKELEY

424

a miracle, men are ready to own the presence of a superior agent. But, when we see things go on in the ordinary course they

do not excite

in us

any reflexion; their order and concatenation, though it be an argument of the greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their creator, is yet so constant and familiar to us that we do not think them the immediate effects of a Free Spirit; especially since inconsistency acting,

as a

and mutability

though it be an imperfection,

mark

is

in

looked on

of freedom.

58. Tenthly,

we advance

will

it

be objected that the notions

are inconsistent with several sound

truths in philosophy and mathematics. For example, the motion of the earth is now universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on the clearest and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoing principles, there can be no such thing. For, motion being only an idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it exists not; but the motion of the earth is not perceived by sense. I answer, that tenet, if rightly understood, will be found to agree with the principles we have premised; for, the question whether the earth moves or no amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have reason to conclude, from what has been observed by astronomers, that if we were placed in such and such circumstances, and such or such a position and distance both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects like one of them; and this, by the established rules of nature which we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the 59.

of the train and succession of ideas in our minds, often make, I will not say uncertain conjectures,

but sure and well-grounded predictions concern-

we

be affected with pursuant and be enabled to pass a right judgment of what would have appeared to us, in case we were placed in circumstances very different from those we are in at present. Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which shall

to a great train of actions,

may

preserve

ently with

its

use and certainty very consist-

what hath been

said. It will

be easy

to apply this to whatever objections of the like sort

may

stars, or

be drawn from the magnitude of the any other discoveries in astronomy or

nature. 60. In the eleventh place,

will be

demanded

what purpose serves that curious organization and the animal mechanism in the parts of animals; might not vegetables grow, and shoot forth leaves of blossoms, and animals perform all to

of plants,

that va-

and

put together; which, being ideas, have nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary connexion with the effects ascribed to them? If it be a Spirit that immediately produces every effect by a fiat or act of his will, we must think

all

that

is

man

fine

and

artificial in the

works,

made in vain. By this doctrine, though an artist hath made the spring and wheels, and every movement of a whether of

or nature, to be

watch, and adjusted them in such a manner as he knew would produce the motions he designed, yet he must think all this done to no purpose, and that it is an Intelligence which directs the index, and points to the hour of the day. If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making the movements and putting them together? Why does not an empty case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass that whenever there is any fault in the going of a watch, there is some corresponding disorder to be found in the movements, which being mended by a skilful hand all is right again? The

may be said of all the clockwork of nature, great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope. In short, it will be asked, how, upon our like

any tolerable account can be given,

principles,

or any final cause assigned of an innumerable

multitude of bodies and machines, framed with the most exquisite art, which in the common philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explain abundance of phe-

To

which I answer, first, that though some difficulties relating to the administration of Providence, and the uses by it assigned to the several parts of nature, which I could not solve by the foregoing principles, yet 61

.

all

there were

this objection

the truth

could be of small weight against

and certainty of those things which

may be proved a priori, and

with the utmost evidence

rigor of demonstration. Secondly, but nei-

ther are the received principles free from the like it may still be demanded to what end God should take those roundabout methods of effecting things by instruments and machines, which no one can deny might have been effected by the mere command of His will without all that

difficulties; for,

apparatus; nay, it

all

nomena?

phenomena.

We may, from the experience we have had

ing the ideas

motions as well without as with

their

riety of internal parts so elegantly contrived

if

we narrowly

may

consider

it,

we

be retorted with greater force on those who hold the existence of those machines without of mind; for it has been made evident that solidity, bulk, figure, motion, and the like have no activity or efficacy in them, so shall find the objection

PRINCIPLES OF

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE and awe men

425 an acknowledgement

as to be capable of producing any one effect in nature. See sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes

surprise

them to exist (allowing the supposition possible) when they are not perceived does it manifestly

but seldom, otherwise there is a plain reason why they should fail of that effect. Besides, God seems to choose the convincing our reason of His attributes by the works of nature, which discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make, and are such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, rather than to astonish us into a belief of His Being by anomalous

to

no purpose; since the only use that

to them, as they exist unperceived,

is

is

assigned

that they

produce those perceivable effects which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything but Spirit. 62. But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed that though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not absolutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary to the producing of things in a constant regular way according to the laws of nature. There are certain general laws that run through the whole chain of natural effects; these are learned

by the observation and study of nature, and are by men applied as well to the framing artificial things for the use and ornament of life as to the explaining various phenomena which explication consists only in shewing the conformity any

—

particular phenomenon hath to the general laws of nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering the uniformity there is in the production of

natural effects; as will be evident to whoever wherein philosophers pretend to account for appearances. That there is a great and conspicuous use in these regular constant methods of working observed by the Supreme Agent hath been shewn in sect. 3 1 And it is no less visible that a particular size, figure, motion, and disposition of parts are necessary, though not absolutely to the producing any effect, yet to the producing it according to the standing mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot be denied that God, or the Intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinary course of things, might if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all the motions on the dialplate of a watch, though nobody had ever made the movements and put them in it: but yet, if He will act agreeably to the rules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends established and maintained in shall attend to the several instances

.

the creation,

it is

necessary that those actions of

whereby he makes the movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the production of the aforesaid motions; as also that any disorder in them be attended with the perception of some corresponding disorder in the movements, which being once corrected all is right the watchmaker,

again. 63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the Author of nature display His overruling power in producing some appearance out of the ordinary series of things. Such exceptions from the general rules of nature are proper to

into

of the Divine Being; but then they are to be used

and surprising

To

events.

matter in a yet clearer light, I what has been objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no more than this: ideas are not anyhow and at random produced, there being a certain order and connexion between them, like to that of cause and effect; there are also several combinations of them made in a very regular and artificial manner, which seem like so many instruments in the hand of nature that, being hid as it were behind the scenes, have a secret operation in producing those appear64.

set this

shall observe that

—

ances which are seen on the theatre of the world, being themselves discernible only to the curious

eye of the philosopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another, to what purpose is that connexion? And, since those instruments,

being barely

inefficacious perceptions in

the mind,

are not subservient to the production of natural

demanded why they

are made; or, what reason can be assigned why God should make us, upon a close inspection into

effects, it is

in other words,

His works, behold so great variety of ideas so artand so much according to rule; it not being credible that He would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of all that art and regularity to no purpose.

fully laid together,

65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect, but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of it. In like manner ihe noise that I hear is not the effect of this or that motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof. Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines, that is, artificial and regular combinations, is the same with that for combining letters into words. That a few original ideas may be made to signify a great number of effects and actions, it is necessary they be variously combined together. And, to the end their use be permanent and universal, these combinations must be made by rule, and with wise contrivance. By this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning what we are

.

GEORGE BERKELEY

426

to expect from such and such actions and what methods are proper to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas; which in effect is all that I

of

conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said that, by discerning a figure, texture, and mech-

a nonentity I desire may be considered. But, say you, it is the unknown occasion, at the presence of

anism of the inward parts of bodies, whether nat-

the nature of the thing.

which ideas are excited in us by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything can be present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion, nor capable of producing any

66. Hence, it is evident tha t those things which, under the notion of a cause co-operating or con-

any form, nor

ural or artificial, eral uses

we may attain

to

know

the sev-

and properties depending thereon, or

curring to the production of effects, are altogethand run us into great absurdi-

er inexplicable,

ties, may be very naturally explained, and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them, when they are considered only as marks or signs for our information. And it is the searching after and en-

deavouring to understand those signs instituted by the Author of Nature, that ought to be the

employment of the natural philosopher; and not the pretending to explain things by corporeal causes, which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the minds of men from that active principle, that supreme and wise Spirit "in whom we live, move, and have our being."

may

perhaps be objected that though it be clear from what has been said that there can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, figured, movable substance existing without the mind, such 67. In the twelfth place,

it

—

as philosophers describe

Matter

— yet,

if

any man

shall leave out of his idea of matter the positive

and motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert, senseless substance, that exists without the mind or unperceived, which is the occasion of our

its standing under or supporting. But then it must be observed that it supports nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to the description of

idea in our minds, nor

whereof God is pleased doth not appear but that

to excite ideas in us:

it

Matter taken in this sense may possibly exist. In answer to which I say, first, that it seems no less absurd to suppose a substance without accidents, than it is to suppose accidents without a substance. But secondly, though we should grant this

unknown substance may

where can

possibly exist, yet

be supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind is agreed; and that it exists not in place is no less certain since all place or extension exists only in the mind, as hath been already proved. It remains therefore that it exists noit

—

where

at all extended, nor

any

place.

hath

The words "to

be present," when thus applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning, and which I am not able to comprehend. 69. Again, let us examine what is meant by occasion. So far as I can gather from the common use of language, that word signifies either the agent which produces any effect, or else something that is observed to accompany or go before it in the ordinary course of things. But when it is applied to Matter as above described, it can be taken in neither of those senses; for Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot be an agent or efficient cause. It

is

also unperceivable, as be-

and so cannot be the occasion of our perceptions in the latter sense: as when the burning my finger is said to be the occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can be meant by calling matter an occasion? The term is either used in no sense at all, or else in some very distant from its received siging devoid of all sensible qualities,

nification.

ideas of extension, figure, solidity

ideas, or at the presence

is

exists in

it

70. You will perhaps say that Matter, though be not perceived by us, is nevertheless per-

ceived by God, to

whom it is

the occasion of ex-

citing ideas in our minds. For, say you, since

we

observe our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it is but reasonable to suppose there are certain constant and regular

That is to say, permanent and distinct

occasions of their being produced.

that there are certain

parcels of Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as being altogether passive and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to God, by whom they art perceived, as it were so many occasions to remind Him when and what ideas to imprint on our minds; that so things may go on in a constant

meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance; which is a definition entirely made up

uniform manner. In answer to this, I observe that, as the no7 tion of Matter is here stated, the question is no longer concerning the existence of a thing distinct from Spirit and idea, from perceiving and being perceived; but whether there are not cer-

of negatives, excepting only the relative notion

tain ideas of

at

all.

68. Let us is

examine a

little

here given us of matter.

ceives, nor

is

It

the description that

neither acts, nor per-

perceived; for

this is all that

is

1

I

know

not what

sort, in the

mind of

PRINCIPLES OF God which are rect

so

many marks

HUMAN KNO WLEDGE

or notes that di-

Him how to produce sensations in our minds

and regular method— much after as a musician is directed by the manner the same notes of music to produce that harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a tune, though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may be entirely ignorant of them. But, this notion of Matter seems too extravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is in effect no objection against what we have advanced, viz. that there is no senseless unperceived substance. in a constant

follow the light of reason, we shall, from the constant uniform method of our sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the 72. If

Spirit all

we

who

that

excites

can

I

them in our minds; but

see

this

is

reasonably concluded from

ter; nay, that it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing, so long as that word is taken to denote an unthinking substratum of qualities or accidents wherein they exist without the mind. 74. But though it be allowed by the materialists themselves that Matter was thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents, and, the reason entirely ceasing, one might expect the mind should naturally, and without any reluctance at

quit the belief of

all,

in nature by it, or shew any manner of reason, though in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for its existence, or even make any tolerable sense or meaning of that sup-

phenomenon

position. For, as to

have, to us it

I

it is

must

its

think, evidently

no occasion.

be, if at

all,

being an occasion, we shewn that with regard

It

remains therefore that

the occasion to

God

of excit-

ing ideas in us; and what this amounts to we have just

now

seen.

worth while to reflect a little on the motives which induced men to suppose the existence of material substance; that so having observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons, we may proportionably withdraw the assent that was grounded on them. First, therefore, it was thought that colour, fig73. It

is

ure, motion,

and the

rest of the sensible qualities

or accidents, did really exist without the mind;

and for this reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking substratum or substance wherein they did to exist

time,

exist, since

they could not be conceived

by themselves. Afterwards,

in process of

men being convinced that colours,

sounds,

and the rest of the sensible, secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they stripped this substratum or material substance of those qualities, leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike, which they still conceived to exist without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a material support. But, it having been shewn that none even of these can possi-

solely

grounded

riveted so deeply in

itself is indefensible, at least to

far as I

it is

is

our thoughts, that we can scarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, since the thing

ances of nature. But, as for inert, senseless Matter, nothing that I perceive has any the least connexion with it, or leads to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one explain any the meanest

say,

what was

thereon; yet the prejudice

which we apply

I

Mind

which perceives them it follows that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Mat-

evident that the being of a spirit infinitely wise, good, and powerful is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appear-

To me,

thence.

427

bly exist otherwise than in a Spirit or

to

retain the name,

know not what

abstracted indefinite notions of being, or occasion,

and

I

though without any show of reason, at least so can see. For, what is there on our part, or what do we perceive, amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted on our minds, either by sense or reflexion, from whence may be inferred the existence of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion? and, on the other hand, on the part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that should make us believe or even suspect He is directed by an inert occasion to excite ideas in our minds?

a very extraordinary instance of the and much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a fondness, against all the evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless somewhat, by the interposition 75. It

is

force of prejudice,

whereof it would as it were screen itself from the Providence of God, and remove it farther off from the affairs of the world. But, though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of Matter, though, when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our opinion on the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge ourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to make out that poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is, that there are certain unknown

mind of God; for this, if anything, is conceive to be meant by occasion with regard to God. And this at the bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the name. Ideas in the

that

all

76.

the

I

Whether therefore there are such Ideas in of God, and whether they may be

mind

by the name Matter, I shall not dispute. you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or support of extension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is most evidently impossible there should be any such called

But,

if

.

GEORGE BERKELEY

428

thing; since it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities should exist in or be supported by an

unperceiving substance. 77. But, say you. though it be granted that there is no thoughtless support of extension and the other qualities or accidents which we perceive, yet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving substance or substratum of some other qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours are to a man born blind, because we have not a sense adapted to them. But, if we had a new sense, we should possibly no more doubt of their existence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light and colours. I answer, first, if what you mean by the word Matter be only the unknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether there is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us; and I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about what we know not what, and we know not why. 78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense it could only furnish us with new ideas or sensations; and then we should have the same reason against their existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already offered with relation to figure, motion, colour and the like. Qualities, as hath been shewn, are nothing else but sensations or ideas, which exist only in a mind perceiving them; and this is true not only of the ideas we are acquainted with at present, but likewise of all possible ideas whatsoever.

you

what

have no reason to believe the existence of Matter? what if I cannot assign any use to it or explain anything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that word? yet still it is no contradiction to say that Matter exists, and that this Matter is in general a substance, or occasion of ideas; though indeed to go about to unfold the meaning or adhere to any particular explication of those words may be attended with great difficulties. I answer, when words are used without a meaning, you may put them together as you please without danger of running into a contradiction. You may say, for example, that twice two is equal to seven, so long as you declare you do not take the words of that proposition in their usual acceptation but for marks of you know not what. And, by the same reason, you may say there is an inert thoughtless substance without accidents which is the occasion of our ideas. And we shall understand just as much by one proposition as the other. 80. In the last place, you will say, what if we give up the cause of material Substance, and stand to it that Matter is an unknown somewhat neither substance nor accident, spirit nor idea, 79. But,

will insist,

if I

—

inert, thoughtless, indivisible,

immovable, unex-

tended, existing in no place. For, say you, whatever may be urged against substance or occasion, or

any other positive or relative notion of Matter, hath no place at all, so long as this negative definition of Matter is adhered to. I answer, you may, if so it shall seem good, use the word "Matter" in the same sense as other men use "nothing," and so make those terms convertible in your style. For, after all, this is what appears to me to be the result of that definition, the parts whereof

when

I

consider with attention, either collective-

from each other, I do not find that any kind of effect or impression made on my mind different from what is excited by the term nothing.

ly or separate

there

81.

is

You

will reply, perhaps, that in the fore-

said definition

distinguish

it

included what doth sufficiently from nothing the positive ab-

is

—

stract idea of quiddity, entity, or existence.

I

own,

who

pretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as if they had such an idea, which is, say they, the most abstract and general notion of all; that is, to me, the most incomprehensible of all others. That there are a great variety of spirits of different orders and capacities, whose faculties both in number and extent are far exceeding those the Author of my being has bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. And for me to pretend to deterindeed, that those

my own

few, stinted narrow inlets of what ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spirit may imprint upon them were certainly the utmost folly and presumption

mine by

perception,

—

since there may be, for aught that I know, innumerable sorts of ideas or sensations, as different from one another, and from all that I have perceived, as colours are from sounds. But, how ready soever I may be to acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension with regard to the endless variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any one to pretend to a notion of Entity or Existence, abstracted from spirit and idea, from perceived and being perceived, is, I suspect, a downright repugnancy and trifling

with words. jections

—

It

remains that we consider the ob-

which may possibly be made on the part

of Religion. 82. Some there are who think that, though the arguments for the real existence of bodies which are drawn from Reason be allowed not to amount to demonstration, yet the Holy Scrip-

tures are so clear in the point as will sufficiently

convince every good Christian that bodies do really exist, and are something more than mere ideas; there being in Holy Writ innumerable

— PRINCIPLES OF

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

which evidently suppose the reality and stone, mountains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies. To which I answer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane, which use those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have a meaning in them, are in danger of having their truth called in question by our doctrine. That all those things do really exist, that there are bodies, even facts related

of timber

corporeal substances,

when taken

in the vulgar

been shewn to be agreeable to our principles; and the difference betwixt things and ideas, realities and chimeras, has been distinctly explained. See sect. 29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either what philosophers call Matter, or the existence of objects without the mind, is anywhere mentioned in Scripture. 83. Again, whether there can be or be not external things, it is agreed on all hands that the proper use of words is the marking our conceptions, or things only as they are known and perceived by us; whence it plainly follows that in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing inconsistent with the right use and significancy of language, and that discourse, of what kind soever, sense, has

so far as

it is

intelligible,

remains undisturbed.

But all this seems so manifest, from what has been largely set forth in the premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it. 84. But,

it

will

be urged that miracles do, at

much of their stress and import by our principles. What must we think of Moses' rod? least, lose

was

not really turned into a serpent; or was there only a change of ideas in the minds of the spectators? And, can it be supposed that our Saviour did no more at the marriage-feast in Cana than impose on the sight, and smell, and taste of the guests, so as to create in them the appearance or idea only of wine? The same may be said of all other miracles; which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must be looked upon only it

as so

many

cheats, or illusions of fancy.

To

this

was changed into a real serpent, and the water into real wine. That this does not in the least contradict what I have elsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of real and imaginary has been already so plainly and fully explained, and so often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so easily answered from what has gone before, that it were an affront to the reader's understanding to reI

reply, that the rod

sume the explication of it in its place. I shall only observe that if at table all who were present should see, and smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me there could be no doubt of its reality; so that at bottom the scru-

429

ple concerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on the received principles, and consequently makes rather for than against what

has been said. 85. Having done with the Objections, which endeavoured to propose in the clearest light, and gave them all the force and weight I could, we proceed in the next place to take a view of our tenets in their Consequences. Some of these appear at first sight as that several difficult and obscure questions, on which abundance of speculation has been thrown away, are entirely banished from philosophy. "Whether corporeal substance can think," "whether Matter be infinitely I

—

and "how it operates on spirit" and like inquiries have given infinite amusement to philosophers in all ages; but de-

divisible,"

these

pending on the existence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our principles. Many other advantages there are, as well with regard to

re-

which it is easy for any one to deduce from what has been premised; but this will appear more plainly in the sequel. 86. From the principles we have laid down it follows human knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads that of ideas and that of spirits. Of each of these I shall treat in order. ligion as the sciences,

—

And first as to ideas or

unthinking things.

Our

knowledge of these hath been very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led into very dangerous errors, by supposing a twofold existence of the objects of sense telligible

— the one

or in the mind, the other real

in-

and with-

out the mind; whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural subsistence of their own distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, which, if I mistake not, hath been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is the very root of Scepticism; for, so long as men thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to real things, it follows they could not be certain they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known that the things which are perceived are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind? 87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing

them which is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or images, referred to things or archetypes existing without the mind, then are we involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, or motion of in

.

GEORGE BERKELEY

430

anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our senses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or even whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really existing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that,

aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel may be only phantom and vain chimera, and not at all agree with the real things existing in rerum natura. All this scepticism follows from our supposfor

ing a difference between things and

ideas,

and that

the former have a subsistence without the mind or unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject, and show how the arguments urged by sceptics in all

ages depend on the supposition of ex-

ternal objects. 88.

So long

as

we

attribute a real existence to

unthinking things, distinct from their being perit is not only impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real unthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence it is that we

ceived,

see philosophers distrust their senses,

of the existence of heaven

any

feel,

even of their

after all their labour

thought, to

and doubt

earth, of every-

own bodies. and struggle of they are forced to own we cannot attain

thing they see or

And,

and

self-evident or demonstrative

knowledge

of the existence of sensible things. But,

all this

and confounds mind and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes if we annex a meaning to our words, and not amuse ourselves with the terms "absolute," "external," "exist, "and suchlike, signifying we know not what. I can as well doubtfulness, which so bewilders the

doubt of my own being as of the being of those things which I actually perceive by sense; it being a manifest contradiction that any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight, or touch, and at the same time have no existence in nature, since the very existence of an unthinking being consists in being perceived. 89. Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be proof against the assaults of Scepticism, than to lay the beginning in

a distinct explication of what is meant by thing, for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words. Thing or Being is the most general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the name, viz. spirits and ideas. The former are reality, existence;

active, indivisible substances: the latter are inert,

dependent beings, which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in

fleeting,

minds or

spiritual substances.

We comprehend

our own existence by inward feeling or reflexion, and that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict sense we have not ideas. In like manner, we know and have a notion of relations between things or ideas which relations are dis-

—

tinct

from the ideas or things

related,

inasmuch

may be

perceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that ideas, as the latter

spirits,

and

relations are all in their respective

human knowledge and suband that the term idea would be

kinds the object of ject of discourse;

improperly extended to signify everything we or have any notion of. 90. Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really exist; this we do not deny, but we deny they can subsist without the minds which perceive them, or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing without the mind; since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in being perceived, and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the things perceived by sense may be termed external, with regard to their origin in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself, but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives them. Sensible objects may likewise be said to be "without the mind" in another sense, namely when they exist in some other mind; thus, when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in another mind. 9 1 It were a mistake to think that what is here said derogates in the least from the reality of things. It is acknowledged, on the received prin-

know

—

ciples, that extension,

motion, and in a word

all

have need of a support, as not being able to subsist by themselves. But the objects perceived by sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities, and consequently cannot subsist by themselves. Thus far it is agreed on all hand. So that in denying the things perceived by sense an existence independent of a substance of support wherein they may exist, we detract nothing from the received opinion of their reality, and are guilty of no innovation sensible qualities

in that respect. All the difference

is

that, accord-

ing to us, the unthinking beings perceived by sense have no existence distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any other

substance than those unextended indivisible substances or spirits which act and think and perceive them; whereas philosophers vulgarly hold

1

PRINCIPLES OF

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

43

that the sensible qualities do exist in an inert, extended, unperceiving substance which they call Matter, to which they attribute a natural subsist-

doth Idolatry likewise in all its various forms depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon,

ence, exterior to all thinking beings, or distinct

only so

from being perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the eternal mind of the Creator, wherein they suppose only ideas of the corporeal substances created by him; if indeed they allow them to be at all created. 92. For, as we have shewn the doctrine of Matter or corporeal substance to have been the main pillar and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion. Nay, so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive Matter produced out of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient philosophers, even of those who maintained the being of a God, have thought Matter to be uncreated and coeternal with Him. How great a friend material substance has been to Atheists in all ages were needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary a dependence on it that, when this corner-stone is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground, insomuch that it is no longer worth while to bestow a particular consideration on the absurdities of every wretched sect of Atheists. 93. That impious and profane persons should readily fall in with those systems which favour their inclinations, by deriding immaterial substance, and supposing the soul to be divisible and subject to corruption as the body; which exclude all freedom, intelligence, and design from the formation of things, and instead thereof make a self-existent, stupid, unthinking substance the root and origin of all beings; that they should hearken to those who deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior Mind over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole series of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity arising from the impulse of one body or another all this is very natural. And, on the other hand, when men of better principles observe the enemies of

—

religion lay so great a stress

and

all

of them use so

to reduce everything

on

unthinking Matter,

much industry and artifice to it, me thinks they should

them deprived of their grand supand driven from that only fortress, without which your Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like, have not even the shadow of a pretence, but become the most cheap and easy triumph in the rejoice to see

port,

world. 94.

The

existence of Matter, or bodies unper-

main support of but on the same principle

ceived, has not only been the

Atheists

and

Fatalists,

and stars, and every other object of the senses are many sensations in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and

worship their

homage

own ideas,

to that

but rather address their

Eternal

Invisible

Mind which

produces and sustains all things. 95. The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with the articles of our faith, has occasioned no small difficulties to Christians. For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples and objections have been raised by Socinians and others? But do not the most plausible of them de-

pend on the supposition that a body is denominated the same, with regard not to the form or that which is perceived by sense, but the material substance, which remains the same under several forms?

Take away

this material substance,

about the identity whereof all the dispute is, and mean by body what every plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is immediately seen and felt which is only a combination of sensible qualities or ideas, and then their most unanswerable objections come to nothing. 96. Matter being once expelled out of nature drags with it so many sceptical and impious notions, such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions, which have been thorns in

and work for mankind, that if the arguments we have produced against it are the sides of divines as well as philosophers,

made

so

much

fruitless

not found equal to demonstration (as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge, peace, and religion have reason to wish they were. 97. Beside the external existence of the objects

of perception, another great source of errors

and

with regard to ideal knowledge is the doctrine of abstract ideas, such as it hath been set difficulties

forth in the Introduction.

The

plainest things in

we

are most intimately acquainted with and perfectly know, when they are

the world, those

considered in an abstract way, appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible. Time, place, and motion, taken in particular or concrete, are

what everybody knows,

but, having passed through the hands of a metaphysician, they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary sense. Bid your servant meet you at such a time in such a place, and he shall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of those words; in conceiving that particular time and place, or the motion by which he is to get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But if time be

GEORGE BERKELEY

432 taken exclusive of all

those particular actions

and

ideas that diversify the day, merely for the continuation of existence or duration in abstract,

then

it

will

perhaps gravel even a philosopher to

comprehend

it.

98. For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly and is participated by all beings, I am lost

and embrangled

in inextricable difficulties. I

have no notion of it at

all,

only

I

hear others say

and speak of it in such a manner as leads me to entertain odd thoughts of my existence; since that doctrine lays one under an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he passes away innumerable ages without a thought, it is

infinitely divisible,

or else that he

is

annihilated every

moment of his

both which seem equally absurd. Time therefore being nothing, abstracted from the

life,

sucession of ideas in our minds,

it

follows that the

must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or mind. Hence, it is a duration of any

finite spirit

plain consequence that the soul always thinks;

and

in truth

whoever

shall

go about to divide in

his thoughts, or abstract the existence of a spirit

from

its cogitation,

will, I believe, find

it

no easy

task.

99.

So likewise when we attempt to abstract

extension and motion from

all

other qualities,

and consider them by themselves, we presently lose sight of them, and run into great extravagances. All which depend on a twofold abstraction;

first, it is

ample,

supposed that extension, for ex-

may be abstracted from all other sensible

words stand all

for general notions, abstracted

particular persons

and

rendered morality very

actions,

difficult,

from seems to have and the study

And in effect the doctrine of abstraction has not a little contributed towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowlthereof of small use to mankind.

edge. 1 01. The two great provinces of speculative science conversant about ideas received from sense, are Natural Philosophy and Mathemat-

ics; with regard to each of these I shall make some observations. And first I shall say somewhat of Natural Philosophy. On this subject it is

that the sceptics triumph. All that stock of ar-

guments they produce to depreciate our faculties and make mankind appear ignorant and low, are drawn principally from this head, namely, that we are under an invincible blindness as to the true and real nature of things. This they exaggerate, and love to enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say they, by our senses, and amused only with the outside and show of things. The real essence, the internal qualities and constitution of every the meanest object, is hid from our view; something there is in every drop of water, every grain of sand, which it is beyond the power of human understanding to fathom or comprehend. But, it is evident from what has been shewn that all this complaint is groundless, and that we are influenced by false principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses, and think we know nothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend. 102. One great inducement to our pronounc-

qualities;

ing ourselves ignorant of the nature of things is the current opinion that everything includes

sion

within

and secondly, that the entity of extenmay be abstracted from its being perceived.

But, whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he says, will, if I mistake not,

acknowledge that

and

all

sensible qualities are alike

there

is

itself

in

the cause of

its

properties; or that

each object an inward essence which

the source whence its discernible qualities flow, and whereon they depend. Some have pretended to account for appearances by occult qualiis

where the exteni.e., in his mind, and that their archetypes can exist only in some other mind; and that the objects of sense are nothing but those sensations combined, blended, or (if one may so speak) concreted together; none of all which can be supposed to exist un-

but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical causes, to wit. the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities, of insensible particles; whereas, in truth, there is no other agent or efficient cause than spirit, it being evident that

perceived.

ert.

sensations

sion

is,

there

alike real; that

is

the colour, too,

100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every one may think he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happiness, prescinded from all particular pleasure, or of goodness from everything that is good, this is what few can pretend to. So likewise a man may be just and virtuous without having precise ideas of justice and virtue. The opinion that those and the like

ties,

motion, as well as all other ideas, is perfectly inSee sect. 25. Hence, to endeavour to explain the production of colours or sounds, by figure, motion, magnitude, and the like, must needs be labour in vain. And accordingly we see the attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory. Which may be said in general of those instances

wherein one idea or quality is assigned for the cause of another. I need not say how many hypotheses and speculations are

left

out,

and how

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

PRINCIPLES OF

much the study of nature is abridged by this doctrine.

The

103.

vogue

is

great mechanical principle

now

in

That a stone falls to the earth, towards the moon, may to some

attraction.

or the sea swells

sufficiently explained thereby. But how we enlightened by being told this is done by attraction? Is it that that word signifies the man-

appear are

ner of the tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of bodies instead of their being impelled or protruded towards each other? But, nothing is determined of the manner or action, and it may as truly (for aught we know) be termed "impulse," or "protrusion," as "attraction." Again,

we see cohere firmly together, accounted for by attraction; but,

the parts of steel

and

this also

is

in this as in the other instances,

that anything for as to the

is

I

do not perceive

signified besides the effect itself;

manner

of the action

whereby

it is

produced, or the cause which produces it, these are not so much as aimed at. 104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several

phenomena, and compare them together, we may observe some likeness and conformity between them. For example,

in the falling of a stone

to the ground, in the rising of the sea towards the

moon,

in cohesion, crystallization, etc., there

is

something alike, namely, an union or mutual approach of bodies. So that any one of these or the like

phenomena may not seem strange or surpris-

ing to a

man who

pared the

has nicely observed and com-

For that only is thought so which is uncommon, or a thing by itself, and out of the ordinary course of our observation. That bodies should tend towards the centre of the earth is not thought strange, because it is what we perceive every moment of our lives. But, that they should have a like gravitation toeffects of nature.

wards the centre of the moon may seem odd and unaccountable to most men, because it is discerned only in the tides. But a philosopher, whose thoughts take in a larger compass of nature, having observed a certain similitude of appearances, as well in the heavens as the earth, that argue innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendency towards each other, which he denotes by the general name "attraction," whatever can be reduced to that he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he explains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous globe towards the moon, which to him does not appear odd or anomalous, but only a particular example of a general rule or law of nature.

we consider the difference betwixt natural philosophers and other men, with regard to their knowledge of the phe105. If therefore

there

is

433

nomena, we shall find it consists not in an exacter knowledge of the efficient cause that produces them for that can be no other than the will of a spirit but only in a greater largeness of comprehension, whereby analogies, harmonies, and agreements are discovered in the works of nature, and the particular effects explained, that is, reduced to general rules, see sect. 62, which rules, grounded on the analogy and uniformness

— —

observed in the production of natural effects, are most agreeable and sought after by the mind; for that they extend our prospect beyond what is present and near to us, and enable us to make very probable conjectures touching things that may have happened at very great distances of time and place, as well as to predict things to come; which sort of endeavour towards omniscience is much affected by the mind. 106. But we should proceed warily in such things, for we are apt to lay too great stress on analogies, and, to the prejudice of truth, humour

mind whereby it is carried knowledge into general theorems. For example, in the business of gravitation or mutual attraction, because it appears in many instances, some are straightway for pronouncing it universal; and that to attract and be attracted by every other body is an essential quality inherent in all bodies whatsoever. Whereas it is evident the fixed stars have no such tendency towards each other; and, so far is that gravitation from being essential to bodies that in some instances a quite contrary principle seems to shew itself; as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and the elasticity of the air. There is nothing necessary or essential in the case, but it depends entirely on the will of the Governing Spirit, who that eagerness of the to extend

its

causes certain bodies to cleave together or tend

towards each other according to various laws, whilst

He keeps others at a fixed distance; and to

some He

gives a quite contrary tendency to fly

asunder just as 107. After

may it is

lay

He

sees convenient.

what has been premised,

down

I

think

we

the following conclusions. First,

plain philosophers

amuse themselves in vain,

when they inquire for any natural efficient cause, from a mind or spirit. Secondly, consideris the workmanship of a wise and good Agent, it should seem to become philosophers to employ their thoughts (contrary to what some hold) about the final causes of things; and I confess I see no reason why pointing out the various ends to which natural things are adapted, and for which they were originally with unspeakable wisdom contrived, should not be thought one good way of accounting for them, distinct

ing the whole creation

GEORGE BERKELEY

434

and altogether worthy a philosopher. Thirdly, from what has been premised no reason can be

drawn why

the history of nature should not still be studied, and observations and experiments made, which, that they are of use to mankind, and enable us to draw any general conclusions, is not the result of any immutable habitudes or relations between things themselves, but only of God's goodness and kindness to men in the administration of the world. See sect. 30 and 31. Fourthly, by a diligent observation of the phenomena within our view, we may discover the general laws of nature, and from them deduce the other phenomena; I do not say demonstrate, for all deductions of that kind depend on a supposition that the Author of nature always operates uniformly, and in a constant observance of those rules we take for principles: which we can-

not evidently know. 1

08.

Those men who frame general

rules

from

phenomena and afterwards derive the phenomena from those rules, seem to consider signs the

rather than causes.

A man may well understand

natural signs without knowing their analogy, or

being able to say by what rule a thing is so or so. And, as it is very possible to write improperly, through too strict an observance of general grammar rules; so, in arguing from general laws of nature,

it is

analogy too

not impossible

far,

we may extend

and by that means run

the

into mis-

takes.

reading other books a wise man will thoughts on the sense and apply it to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical remarks on the language; so, in perusing the volume of nature, it seems beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing each particular phenomenon to general rules, or shewing how it follows from them. We should propose to ourselves nobler views, namely, to recreate and exalt the mind with a prospect of the beauty, order, extent, and variety of natural things: hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator; and lastly, to make the sev1

09.

As

choose to

in

fix his

eral parts of the creation, so far as in us

lies,

sub-

servient to the ends they were designed for, God's glory, selves

and the sustentation and comfort of ourand fellow-creatures.

1 1 o. The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural Science will be easily acknowledged to

be a certain celebrated Treatise of Mechanics. In the entrance of which justly admired treatise, Time, Space, and Motion are distinguished into absolute

and

and

vulgar;

relative, true

which

and apparent,

distinction, as

it is

mathematical at large ex-

plained by the author, does suppose these quantities to have an existence without the mind; and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to sensible things, to

which nevertheless

in their

own

nature they bear no relation at all. As for Time as it is there taken in an ab1 solute or abstracted sense, for the duration or perseverance of the existence of things, I have nothing more to add concerning it after what has been already said on that subject. Sect. 97 and 98. For the rest, this celebrated author holds there is an absolute Space, which, being unperceivable to sense, remains in itself similar and immovable; and relative space to be the measure thereof, which, being movable and defined by 1

its

1

,

.

situation in respect of sensible bodies,

is

vul-

garly taken for immovable space. Place he defines to be that part of space which is occupied by any body; and according as the space is absolute or relative so also is the place. Absolute Motion is said to be the translation of a body from absolute place to absolute place, as relative motion is from one relative place to another. And, because the parts of absolute space do not fall under our senses, instead of them we are obliged to use their

and so define both place and motion with respect to bodies which we regard as immovable. But, it is said in philosophical matters we must abstract from our senses, since it may be that none of those bodies which seem to be quiescent are truly so, and the same thing which is moved relatively may be really at rest; as likewise one and the same body may be in relative rest and motion, or even moved with contrary relative motions at the same time, according as its place is variously defined. All which ambiguity is to be found in the apparent motions, but not at all in the true or absolute, which should therefore be alone regarded in philososensible measures,

phy.

And the true as we are told are distinguished

from apparent or ing properties. all

relative motions

by the follow-

— First, in true or absolute motion

parts which preserve the

same

position with

respect of the whole, partake of the motions of

the whole. Secondly, the place being moved, that which is placed therein is also moved; so that a body moving in a place which is in motion doth participate the motion of its place. Thirdly, true motion is never generated or changed otherwise than by force impressed on the body itself. Fourthly, true motion is always changed by force impressed on the body moved. Fifthly, in circular motion barely relative there is no centrifugal force, which, nevertheless, in that which is true or absolute, is proportional to the quantity of

motion.

.

PRINCIPLES OF

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

112. But, notwithstanding what has been said, I must confess it does not appear to me that there can be any motion other than relative; so that to conceive motion there must be at least conceived two bodies, whereof the distance or position in regard to each other is varied. Hence, if there was one only body in being it could not possibly be moved. This seems evident, in that the idea I have of motion doth necessarily include relation. 1 13. But, though in every motion it be necessary to conceive more bodies than one, yet it may be that one only is moved, namely, that on which the force causing the change in the distance or

situation of the bodies,

ever some

may

is

impressed. For, how-

define relative motion, so as to

term that body moved which changes its distance from some other body, whether the force or action causing that change were impressed on it or no, yet as relative motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded in the ordinary affairs of life, it

should seem that every man of com-

mon sense knows what it is as well as the best phiNow,

ask any one whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets, the stones he passes over may be said to move, because losopher.

I

they change distance with his feet?

To me

it

ap-

pears that though motion includes a relation of

one thing to another, yet it is not necessary that each term of the relation be denominated from it. As a man may think of somewhat which does not think, so a body may be moved to or from another body which

is

not therefore

itself in

mo-

tion. 1

14.

As the place happens to be variously demotion which is related to it varies.

fined, the

A man

in a ship

may

be said to be quiescent

with relation to the sides of the vessel, and yet move with relation to the land. Or he may move eastward in respect of the one, and westward in respect of the other. In the common affairs of life men never go beyond the earth to define the place of any body; and what is quiescent in respect of that is accounted absolutely to be so. But philosophers, who have a greater extent of thought, and juster notions of the system of things, discover even the earth itself to be moved. In order therefore to fix their notions they seem to conceive the corporeal world as finite, and the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby they estimate true motions. If we sound our own conceptions, I believe we may find all the absolute motion we can frame an idea of to be at bottom no other than relative motion thus defined. For, as hath been already observed, absolute motion, exclusive of all external relation, is incomprehensible; and to this kind of rel-

435

motion all the above-mentioned properties, causes, and effects ascribed to absolute motion will, if I mistake not, be found to agree. As to what is said of the centrifugal force, that it does not at all belong to circular relative motion, I do not see how this follows from the experiment which is brought to prove it. See Philosophiae Naative

turalis Principia

Mathematica,

in Schol. Def. VIII.

For the water in the vessel at that time wherein it is said to have the greatest relative circular motion, hath, I think, no motion at all; as is plain from the foregoing section. 1 5. For, to denominate a body moved it is re1 quisite, first, that it change its distance or situation with regard to some other body; and secondly, that the force occasioning that change be applied to it. If either of these be wanting, I do not think that, agreeably to the sense of kind, or the propriety of language, a

man-

body can

be said to be in motion. I grant indeed that it is possible for us to think a body which we see

change its distance from some other to be moved, though it have no force applied to it (in which sense there may be apparent motion), but then it is because the force causing the change of distance is imagined by us to be applied or impressed on that body thought to move; which indeed shews we are capable of mistaking a thing to be in motion which is not, and that is all. 1 16. From what has been said it follows that the philosophic consideration of motion does not imply the being of an absolute Space, distinct from that which is perceived by sense and related bodies; which that it cannot exist without the

mind

is

clear upon the

same

principles that

onstrate the like of all other objects of sense.

perhaps,

if

we

inquire narrowly,

we

dem-

And

shall find

we cannot even frame an

idea of pure Space ex-

clusive of all body. This

I

must confess seems

impossible, as being a most abstract idea. I

When

motion in some part of my body if it or without resistance, I say there is Space;

excite a

be free but if I find a resistance, then I say there is Body; and in proportion as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is more or less pure. So that when I speak of pure or empty space, it is not to be supposed that the word "space" stands for an idea distinct from or conceivable without body and motion though indeed we are apt to think every noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separated from all others which has occasioned infinite mistakes When, therefore, supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body, I say there still remains pure Space, thereby nothing else is meant but only that I conceive it possible for

—

;

GEORGE BERKELEY

436

be moved on all sides but if that, too, were annihilated then there could be no motion, and consequently no Space. Some, perhaps, may think the sense of seeing doth furnish them with the idea of pure space; but it is plain from what we have elsewhere shewn, that the ideas of space and distance are not obtained by that sense. See the Essay concerning Vision. 117. What is here laid down seems to put an end to all those disputes and difficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned concerning the nature of pure Space. But the chief advantage arising from it is that we are freed from that dangerous dilemma, to which several who have employed their thoughts on that subject imagine themselves reduced, to wit, of thinking either that Real Space is God, or else that there is something beside God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. Both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is certain that not a few divines, as well as the limbs of

without the

my body

to

least resistance,

philosophers of great note, have, from the

diffi-

culty they found in conceiving either limits or

annihilation of space, concluded vine.

And some

it

must be

di-

of late have set themselves par-

shew the incommunicable attributes it. Which doctrine, how unworthy soever it may seem of the Divine Nature, yet I do not see how we can get clear of it, so ticularly to

of

God

long as

agree to

we adhere

18.

gether free from mistakes, there lurks

some

if

secret error

in their principles

which

is

common

to the professors of those sciences with the rest of mankind. Mathematicians, though they deduce their theorems from a great height of evi-

dence, yet their first principles are limited by the consideration of quantity: and they do not ascend into any inquiry concerning those trans-

cendental maxims which influence all the particular sciences, each part whereof, Mathematics not excepted, does consequently participate of the errors involved in them. That the principles laid down by mathematicians are true, and their

way

of deduction from those principles

we do not deny; but, we be certain erroneous maxims of greater extent than the object of Mathematics, and for that reason not expressly mentioned,

clear

and

incontestible,

hold there

may

tacitly

of those secret

supposed throughout the whole

and that the ill effects unexamined errors are diffused

through

all

the branches thereof.

To

be plain,

we

suspect the mathematicians are as well as other men concerned in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general ideas,

and the

existence of objects without the mind. 1

1

9.

Arithmetic has been thought to have for

object abstract ideas of Number; of which to understand the properties and mutual habitudes, its

supposed no mean part of speculative knowlThe opinion of the pure and intellectual nature of numbers in abstract has made them in esteem with those philosophers who seem to have affected an uncommon fineness and elevation of thought. It hath set a price on the most trifling numerical speculations which in practice are of no use, but serve only for amusement; and hath therefore so far infected the minds of some, that they have dreamed of mighty mysteries involved in numbers, and attempted the explication of natural things by them. But, if we inquire into our own thoughts, and consider what has been premised, we may perhaps entertain a low opinion of those high flights and abstractions, and look on all inquiries, about numbers only as so many difficiles nugae, so far as they are not is

edge.

subservient to practice, and promote the benefit of

to the received opinions.

Hitherto of Natural Philosophy: we come now to make some inquiry concerning that other great branch of speculative knowledge, to wit, Mathematics. These, how celebrated soever they may be for their clearness and certainty of demonstration, which is hardly anywhere else to be found, cannot nevertheless be supposed alto1

though

progress of that science;

life.

120.

ered in

Unity

we have before considfrom which and what has been

in abstract

sect. 13,

said in the Introduction, is

it

plainly follows there

number being defined we may conclude that,

not any such idea. But,

a "collection of units," if there be no such thing as unity or unit in ab-

no ideas of number in abstract denoted by the numeral names and figures. The

stract, there are

theories therefore in Arithmetic,

if

they are ab-

from the names and figures, as likewise from all use and practice, as well as from the particular things numbered, can be supposed to have nothing at all for their object; hence we may see how entirely the science of numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune and trifling it becomes when considered as a matter of mere speculation. 121. However, since there may be some who, deluded by the specious show of discovering abstracted

stracted verities, waste their time in arithmetical

theorems and problems which have not any use, will not be amiss if we more fully consider and expose the vanity of that pretence; and this will plainly appear by taking a view of Arithmetic it

in

its

infancy,

originally put

and observing what

men on

it

was that

the study of that science,

PRINCIPLES OF and

to

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

what scope they directed it. It is natural men, for ease of memory

to think that at first,

and help of computation, made use of counters, or in writing of single strokes, points, or the like, each whereof was made to signify an unit, i. e., some one thing of whatever kind they had occasion to reckon. Afterwards they found out the more compendious ways of making one character stand in place of several strokes or points.

And,

lastly,

came

ians

the notation of the Arabians or Indby the repetition of

into use, wherein,

a few characters or figures, and varying the signification of each figure according to the place it obtains, all numbers may be most aptly expressed; which seems to have been done in imitation of language, so that an exact analogy is observed betwixt the notation by figures and names, the nine simple figures answering the nine first numeral names and places in the former, corresponding to denominations in the latter. And agreeably to those conditions of the simple and local value of figures, were contrived methods of finding, from the given figures or marks of the parts, what figures and how placed are proper to denote the whole, or vice versa. And having found the sought figures, the same rule or analogy being observed throughout, it is easy to read them into words; and so the number becomes perfectly known. For then the number of any particular things is said to be known, when we know the name of figures (with their due arrangement) that according to the standing analogy belong to them. For, these signs being known, we can by the operations of arithmetic know the signs of any part of the particular sums signified by them; and, thus computing in signs (because of the

twixt

them and

whereof one

is

able rightly to

connexion established be-

the distinct multitudes of things

taken for an unit),

sum

we may be

not

but the signs, which nevertheless are not regarded for their own sake, but because they direct us how to act with relation to things, and dispose rightly of them. Now, agreeably to what we have before observed of words in general (sect. 19, Introd.) it happens here likewise that abstract ideas are thought to be signified by numeral names or characters, while they do not suggest ideas of particular things to our minds. I shall not at present enter into a more particu-

on this subject, but only observe evident from what has been said, those things which pass for abstract truths and theoit is

is

the ob-

it is

the principal occasion of all that nice

and extreme subtilty which renders the study of Mathematics so difficult and tedious. Hence, if we can make it appear that no finite extension contains innumerable parts, or

we

is

infinitely di-

shall at

once clear the

science of Geometry from a great

number of dif-

visible,

follows that

it

and contradictions which have ever been esteemed a reproach to human reason, and withficulties

al

make

may

the attainment thereof a business of

less

124.

we regard

things,

that

ing; so

been.

intend to

which, considered as relative,

Geometry. The infinite divisibility of finite extension, though it is not expressly laid down either as an axiom or theorem in the elements of that science, yet is throughout the same everywhere supposed and thought to have so inseparable and essential a connexion with the principles and demonstrations in Geometry, that mathematicians never admit it into doubt, or make the least question of it. And, as this notion is the source from whence do spring all those amusing geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct repugnancy to the plain common sense of mankind, and are admitted with so much reluctance into a mind not yet debauched by learn-

we

122. In Arithmetic, therefore,

lar dissertation

Extension,

ject of

much

number. the

rems concerning numbers, are in reality conversant about no object distinct from particular numeral things, except only names and characters, which originally came to be considered on no other account but their being signs, or capable to represent aptly whatever particular things men had need to compute. Whence it follows that to study them for their own sake would be just as wise, and to as good purpose as if a man, neglecting the true use or original intention and subserviency of language, should spend his time in impertinent criticisms upon words, or reasonings and controversies purely verbal. 123. From numbers we proceed to speak of

up, divide, and propor-

tion the things themselves that

437

time and pains than

Every particular

finite

it

hitherto has

extension which

possibly be the object of our thought

is

an

only in the mind, and consequently each part thereof must be perceived. If, therefore, I cannot perceive innumerable parts in any finite extension that I consider, it is certain they are not contained in it; but, it is evident that I idea existing

cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any particular line, surface, or solid,

which

I

either per-

my mind: conclude they are not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer to me than that the extensions I have in view are no other than my own ideas; and it is no less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas into an infinite numceive

by

sense, or figure to myself in

wherefore

I

— GEORGE BERKELEY

438 ber of other ideas, that

is,

that they are not in-

by finite extension be meant something distinct from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so cannot affirm or deny anything of it. But if the terms "extension," "parts," &c, are taken in any sense confinitely divisible. If

since

regarded not in

it is

but as

itself,

it is

uni-

and it is universal only in its signification, whereby it represents innumerable lines greater than itself, in which may be distinguished ten thousand parts or more, though there may not be above an inch in it. After this manner, the

versal;

for ideas, then to say a finite

properties of the lines signified are (by a very

quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number is so manifest a contradiction, that every

usual figure) transferred to the sign, and thence,

ceivable, that

one at it is

first

is,

sight

impossible

it

acknowledges

it

to be so;

and

through mistake, though to appertain to sidered in

should ever gain the assent of

127.

its

own

Because there

any reasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle and slow degrees, as a converted

great but

it is

is

is

and those propositions which once obtain the force and credit of a principle, are not only themselves, but likewise whatever is deducible from them, thought privileged from all examination. And there is no absurdity so gross, which, by this means, the mind of man may not

for the things signified

divisible.

exist

is

infinitely

And one who thinks the objects of sense

without the mind will perhaps

in virtue

thereof be brought to admit that a line but an

may

contain innumerable parts though too small to be discerned. These errors are grafted as well in the minds of geometricians as of other men, and have a like influence on their reasonings; and it were no difficult thing to shew how the arguments from Geometry made use of to support the infinite divisibility of extension are bottomed on them. At present we shall only observe in general whence it is the mathematicians are all so fond and tenainch long

really existing,

cious of that doctrine.

hath been observed in another place and demonstrations in Geometry are conversant about universal ideas (sect. 126. It

that the theorems 15, Introd.);

this

where

it is

explained in what sense

ought to be understood, to

lar lines

and

wit, the particu-

figures included in the

diagram are

supposed to stand for innumerable others of different sizes; or, in other words, the geometer considers them abstracting from their magnitude which does not imply that he forms an abstract idea, but only that he cares not what the particular magnitude is, whether great or small, but looks on that as a thing different to the demonstration. Hence it follows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must be spoken of as though it contained ten thousand parts,

—

be a line con-

said to contain

is

more than any assignable number; which

parts

ideas of sense) extension in abstract

may

taining more, the inch-line

Gentile to the belief of transubstantiation. Anand rooted prejudices do often pass into

be prepared to swallow. 1 25. He whose understanding is possessed with the doctrine of abstract general ideas may be persuaded that (whatever be thought of the

con-

no number of parts so

possible there

cient

principles;

it

nature.

true, not of the inch taken absolutely,

by

it.

but only

But men, not

re-

taining that distinction in their thoughts, slide into a belief that the small particular line de-

innumno such thing as the ten-thousandth part of an inch; but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth, which may be signified by that inch. When therefore I delineate a triangle on paper, and take one side not above an inch, for example, in length to be the radius, scribed on paper contains in itself parts erable.

There

is

this I consider as

divided into 10,000 or 100,000

parts or more; for, though the ten-thousandth

part of that line considered in all,

itself is

nothing at

and consequently may be neglected without

an error or inconveniency, yet these described being only marks standing for greater quantities, whereof it may be the ten-thousandth

lines,

part is very considerable, it follows that, to prevent notable errors in practice, the radius must be taken of 10,000 parts or more. 128. From what has been said the reason is plain why, to the end any theorem versal in

its

use,

lines described

it is

necessary

on paper

as

become

we speak

uni-

of the

though they con-

tained parts which really they do not. In doing of which, if we examine the matter thoroughly,

perhaps discover that we cannot conof, or being divisible into, a thousand parts, but only some other line which is far greater than an inch, and

we

shall

ceive an inch itself as consisting

and that when we say a line is we must mean a line which is infinitely great. What we have here observed seems to be the chief cause why, to suppose the represented by

it;

infinitely divisible,

infinite divisibility of finite extension has

been

thought necessary in geometry.

The several absurdities and contradicwhich flowed from this false principle might, one would think, have been esteemed so many demonstrations against it. But, by I know not what logic, it is held that proofs a posteriori 129.

tions

PRINCIPLES OF

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

are not to be admitted against propositions relating to infinity, as though it were not impossible

even

for

an

infinite

mind

to reconcile contra-

if anything absurd and repugnant could have a necessary connexion with truth or flow from it. But, whoever considers the weakness of this pretence will think it was contrived

dictions; or as

on purpose to humour the laziness of the mind which had rather acquiesce in an indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go through with a severe examination of those principles it has ever embraced for true. 130. Of late the speculations about Infinities have run so high, and grown to such strange notions, as have occasioned no small scruples and disputes among the geometers of the present age. Some there are of great note who, not content with holding that finite lines

may be divided

an infinite number of parts, do yet farther maintain that each of those infinitesimals is itself subdivisible into an infinity of other parts or infinitesimals of a second order, and so on ad into

infinitum.

These,

I

say, assert there are infinitesi-

mals of infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c, without ever coming to an end; so that according to them an inch does not barely contain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of an infinity of an infinity ad infinitum of parts. Others there be who hold all orders of infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at all; thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is any positive quantity or part of extension which, though multiplied infinitely, can never equal the smallest given extension. And yet on the other hand it seems no less absurd to think the square, cube or other power of a positive real root, should itself be nothing at all; which they who hold infinitesimals of the first order, denying all of the subsequent orders, are obliged to maintain. 131. Have we not therefore reason to conclude they are both in the wrong, and that there is in effect no such thing as parts infinitely small, or an infinite number of parts contained in any finite quantity? But you will say that if this doctrine obtains it will follow the very foundations of Geometry are destroyed,

who have

and those great men

raised that science to so astonishing a

height, have been all the while building a castle in the air.

ever

is

To

this

it

may

be replied that what-

useful in geometry,

benefit of

human

life,

does

and promotes the remain firm and

still

unshaken on our principles; that science considered as practical will rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what has been said. But to set this in a due light may be the proper

439

business of another place. For the rest, though

should follow that some of the more intricate subtle parts of Speculative Mathematics may be pared off without any prejudice to truth, yet I do not see what damage will be thence derived to mankind. On the contrary, I think it were highly to be wished that men of great abilit

and

and obstinate application would draw off from those amusements, and employ them in the study of such things as lie nearer the concerns of life, or have a more direct influence on the manners. ities

their thoughts

132. It is be said that several theorems undoubtedly true are discovered by methods in

infinitesimals are made use of, which could never have been if their existence included a contradiction in it; I answer that upon a thorough examination it will not be found that in any instance it is necessary to make use of or

which

conceive infinitesimal parts of

finite lines,

even quantities less than the minimum nay, it will be evident this is never done,

or

sensible; it

being

impossible. 133.

By what we have premised, it is plain numerous and important errors have

that very

taken their rise from those false Principles which were impugned in the foregoing parts of this

and the opposites of those erroneous same time appear to be most fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innumerable

treatise;

tenets at the

consequences highly advantageous to true philosophy as well as to religion. Particularly Matter, or the absolute existence of corporeal objects, hath been shewn to be that wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of all knowledge, whether human or divine, have ever placed their chief strength and confidence. And surely, if by distinguishing the real existence of unthinking things from their being perceived, and allowing them a subsistance of their own out of the minds of spirits, no one thing is explained in nature, but on the contrary a great many inexplicable difficulties arise; if the supposition of Matter is barely precarious, as not being grounded on so much as one single reason; if its consequences cannot endure the light of examination and free inquiry, but screen themselves under the dark and general pretence of "infinites being incomprehensible"; if withal the removal of this Matter be not attended with the least evil consequence; if it be not even missed in the world, but everything as well, nay much easier conceived without it; if, lastly, both Sceptics and Atheists are for ever silenced

only is

spirits

and

ideas,

and

this

perfectly agreeable both to

upon supposing scheme of things Reason and Re-

GEORGE BERKELEY

440 methinks we

ligion:

may expect

it

should be ad-

mitted and firmly embraced, though it were proposed only as an hypothesis, and the existence of Matter had been allowed possible, which yet I

think

is

not.

evidently demonstrated that

we have

it

True

it

that, in

is

consequence of the

foregoing principles, several disputes and speculations which are esteemed no mean parts of learning, are rejected as useless. But, how great

a prejudice soever against our notions this may who have already been deeply engaged, and make large advances in studies of that nature, yet by others we hope it will not give to those

be thought any just ground of dislike to the and tenets herein laid down, that they abridge the labour of study, and make hu-

principles

sciences far

more

clear,

compendious and

attainable than they were before.

upon inquiry they could not find they had an idea of it. That an idea which is inactive, and the existence whereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or likeness of an agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no other refutation than barely attending to what is meant by those words. But, perhaps you will say that though an idea cannot resemble a spirit in its thinking, acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects; and it is not necessary that an idea or image be in all respects

135.

Having despatched what we intended

to treat of Spirits

to

— with regard to which, per-

human knowledge

vulgarly imagined.

The

is

not so deficient as

great reason that

like the original.

does not in those menit should represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the power of willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing else wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For, by the word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives; 138. I answer,

tioned,

say concerning the knowledge of Ideas, the method we proposed leads us in the next place haps,

is even probable that this opinion may have produced a doubt in some whether they had any soul at all distinct from their body

soul. It

since

134.

man

many absurd and heterodox tenets, and much scepticism about the nature of the have risen

is

is

as-

this,

it is

and

if it

impossible

this alone, constitutes the signification

signed for our being thought ignorant of the nature of spirits is our not having an idea of it. But, surely it ought not to be looked on as a

of the term. If therefore

human understanding that it does not perceive the idea of spirit, if it is manifestly impossible there should be any such idea. And this if I mistake not has been demonstrated in

spirit.

defect in a

which I shall here add that a spirit has been shewn to be the only substance or support wherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist; but that this substance which supports or perceives ideas should itself be an idea or like an section 27; to

idea

is

evidently absurd.

we want a to know substances withal, which, if we had, we might know our own soul as we do a triangle. To this I answer, that, in case we had a new sense bestowed upon us, we could only receive thereby some new sensations or ideas of sense. But I be136. It will

sense (as

lieve

perhaps be said that

some have imagined) proper

nobody will say that what he means by the soul and substance is only some particular

terms

sort of idea or sensation.

We may therefore infer

duly considered, it is not more reasonable to think our faculties defective, in that they do not furnish us with an idea of spirit or active thinking substance, than it would be if we should blame them for not being able to comprehend a round square. 137. From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the manner of an idea or sensation that, all things

it is

impossible that any

degree of those powers should be represented in an idea, it is evident there can be no idea of a

1

39.

But

it

will

be objected that,

idea signified by the terms

if

there

soul, spirit,

is

no

and sub-

they are wholly insignificant, or have no in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing, which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them. What I am myself, that which I denote by the term /, is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance. If it be said that this is only quarreling at a word, and that, since the immediately significations of other names are by common consent called ideas, no reason can be assigned why stance,

meaning

that

which

is

signified

by the name

spirit

or soul

may

not partake in the same appellation. swer, all the unthinking objects of the

I

an-

mind

agree in that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in bei ng perceived where;

as a soul or spirit

ence consists

is

an active being, whose

exist-

not in being perceived, but in

perceiving ideas and thinking. It

is

therefore

necessary, in order to prevent equivocation

confounding natures perfectly disagreeing unlike, that we distinguish between spirit idea. See sect. 27. 140. In a large sense, indeed, we may be to have an idea or rather a notion of spirit;

and and and said

that

PRINCIPLES OF

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

the meaning of the word, not affirm or deny anything of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be resemblances of

we understand we could

is,

otherwise

them; so we know other

own

soul

spirits

— which in that sense

idea of them; spirits that

it

having a

by means of our is the image or

like respect to

blueness or heat by

other

me perceived has

by another. must not be supposed that they who

to those ideas perceived 141. It

assert the natural immortality of the soul are of opinion that it is absolutely incapable of annihilation even by the infinite power of the Creator who first gave it being, but only that it is not liable to be broken or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or motion. They indeed who hold the soul of man to be only a thin vital flame, or system of animal spirits, make it perishing and corruptible as the body; since there is nothing more easily dissipated than such a being, which it is naturally impossible should survive the ruin of the tabernacle wherein it is enclosed. And this notion has been greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind, as the most effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue and religion. But it has been made evident that bodies, of what frame or texture soever, are barely passive ideas in the mind, which is more distant and heterogeneous from them than light is from darkness. We have

shewn that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer than that the motions, changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural bodies (and which is what we mean by the course of nature) cannot possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance; such a being therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature; that is to say, "the soul of man is naturally immortal." 142. After

what has been

said,

it

pose, plain that our souls are not to be

the

same manner

or by

way

is,

I

sup-

known

in

as senseless, inactive objects,

of idea. Spirits

and

ideas are things so

wholly different, that when we say "they exist," "they are known," or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing alike or common in them: and to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our faculties we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle, seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound. This is inculcated because I imagine it may be of moment towards clearing several important questions, and preventing some very

441

dangerous errors concerning the nature of the soul.

We may

not,

I

think, strictly be said to

have an idea of an active being, or of an action, although we may be said to have a notion of them. I have some knowledge or notion of my mind, and its acts about ideas, inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by these words. What I know, that I have some notion of. I will not say that the terms idea and notion may not be used convertibly, if the world will have it so; but yet it conduceth to clearness and propriety that

we

distinguish things very differ-

remarked an act of the mind, we cannot so properly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion of the relations and habitudes between things. But if, in the modern way, the word idea is extended to spirits, and relations, and acts, this is, after all, an affair of verent by different names. It

is

also to be

that, all relations including

bal concern. 143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doc-

had no small share in rendering those sciences intricate and obscure which are particularly conversant about spiritual things. Men have imagined they could frame abstract notions of the powers and acts of the mind, and consider them prescinded as well trine of abstract ideas has

from the mind or spirit itself, as from their respective objects and effects. Hence a great number of dark and ambiguous terms, presumed to stand for abstract notions, have been intoduced into metaphysics and morality, and from these have grown infinite distractions and disputes amongst the learned. 144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging men in controversies and mistakes with regard to the nature and operations of the mind, than the being used to speak of those things in terms borrowed from sensible ideas. For example, the will is termed the motion of the soul; this infuses a belief that

mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that is by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors of dangerous consequence in morality. All which, I doubt not, may be cleared, and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but philosophers be prevailed on to retire into themselves, and the

own meaning. From what has been said, it is plain that we cannot know the existence of other spirits attentively consider their 145.

otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them excited in us. I perceive several motions, changes,

inform

me

and combinations of

ideas, that

there are certain particular agents,

GEORGE BERKELEY

442 like myself,

which accompany them and concur Hence, the knowledge I

in their production.

not immediate, as is the but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or con-

have of other knowledge of

comitant

spirits

my

is

ideas;

signs.

though there be some things which convince us human agents are concerned in producing them; yet it is evident to every one 146. But,

unthinking herd that they cannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see a man, we should believe that He is, and believing obey His commands. But alas, we need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things, with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow-creatures. Not that I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate view; or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that which represents

which are called the Works of

them

in the essence of

Nature, that is, the far greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not produced

must

confess, to

that those things

by, or

since

men. There is them; repugnant that they should subsist by

dependent on, the

some other

therefore it is

wills of

Spirit that causes

themselves. See sect. 29. But, if we attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising

beauty, and perfection of the and the exquisite contrivance of the

magnificence, larger,

smaller parts of creation, together with the exact

harmony and correspondence

of the whole, but

above all the never-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or natural

and passions of animals; I say if we consider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, we shall clearly perceive inclinations, appetites,

"who

that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit,

works

all in all,"

and "by

whom all

things con-

sist."

Hence, it is evident that God is known as and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men; because the effects of nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents. There is not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which does not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author of Nature. 147.

certainly

For,

it is

evident that in affecting other persons man has no other object than barely

the will of

the motion of the limbs of his body; but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite any idea in the mind of another, depends wholly

on the

will of the Creator.

"upholding

all

He

things by the

alone

word

er," maintains that intercourse

whereby they are able of each other.

And

between

who, pow-

spirits

to perceive the existence

yet this pure

which enlightens every one 148. It

it is

of His

is

and

clear light

itself invisible.

seems to be a general pretence of the

is

when

idea;

God, which doctrine is, incomprehensible. But

I I

—

meaning; A human spirit or not perceived by sense, as not being an

shall explain

person

me

my

therefore

we

see the colour, size,

and motions of a man, we perceive only

figure,

certain sensations or ideas excited in our

own

minds; and these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man if by man is meant that which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do but only such a

—

—

certain collection of ideas as directs us to think

moaccompanying and represented by it. And after the same manner we see God; all the difference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas dethere

is

a distinct principle of thought and

tion, like to ourselves,

human mind, we do at

whithersoever times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity: everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God; as is our perception of those very motions which are produced by men. 1 49. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any one that is capable of the least reflexion than the existence of God, or a Spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence, in short "in whom we live, and move, and have our being." That the discovery of this great truth, which lies so near and obvious to the mind, should be attained to by the reason of so notes a particular

we

direct our view,

very few,

is

all

a sad instance of the stupidity and

inattention of men, who, though they are surrounded with such clear manifestations of the Deity, are yet so

they seem, as

it

little affected by them that were, blinded with excess of

light. 1

50.

But you

Hath Nature no share and must the immediate and sole

will say,

in the production of natural things,

they be

all

ascribed to

PRINCIPLES OF

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

operation of God? I answer, if by Nature is meant only the visible series of effects or sensations imprinted on our minds, according to certain fixed and general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense, cannot produce anything at all. But, if by Nature is meant some being distinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature, and things perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound with-

out any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But, it is more unaccountable that it

should be received

among

Christians, pro-

which constantly ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wont to impute to Nature. "The Lord He causeth the vapours to ascend; He maketh lightnings with rain; He bringeth forth the wind out of his treasures." Jerem. 10. 13. "He turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the day dark with night." Amos, 5. 8. "He visiteth the earth, and maketh it soft with showers: He blesseth the springing thereof, and crowneth the fessing belief in the

Holy

Scriptures,

year with His goodness; so that the pastures are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn." See Psalm 65. But, notwithstanding that this is the constant language of Scripture, yet we have I know not what aversion from believing that God concerns Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a great distance off, and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in His stead, though (if we may believe Saint Paul) "He be not far from every one of us." 151. It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow and gradual methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem to have for their cause the immediate hand of an Almighty Agent. Besides, monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in desert places, miseries incident to human life, and the like, are so many arguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and superintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer to this objection is in a good measure plain from sect. 62 it being visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary, in order to working by the most simple and general rules, and after a steady and consistent manner; which argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine of nature that, whilst its motions and various phe;

nomena

strike

on our

actuates the whole

443 senses, the

is itself

hand which

unperceivable to men (saith the prophet)

and blood. "Verily"

of flesh

"thou art a God that hidest thyself." Isaiah, 45. 15. But, though the Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy, who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet to an unbiased and attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible than the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who fashions, regulates and sustains the whole system of beings. It is clear, from what we have elsewhere observed, that the operating according to general

and stated laws

is

so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life,

and

letting us into the secret of nature, that

reach and compass of thought, all and design, could serve to no manner of purpose; it were even impossible there should be any such faculties or powers in the mind. See sect. 3 1 Which one consideration abundantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise. 152. We should further consider that the very blemishes and defects of nature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of variety, and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We

without

human

it all

sagacity

.

would

likewise

do well

to

examine whether our

taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals, before

come to full maturity, as an imprudence in Author of nature, be not the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent and saving mortals. In man indeed a thrifty management of those things which he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed wisdom. But, we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal or vegetable costs the great Creator any more they the

pains or trouble in

its

production than a pebble

does; nothing being

more evident than that an

Omnipotent

can indifferently produce

Spirit

everything by a mere fiat or act of His will. Hence, it is plain that the splendid profusion of natural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the agent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the riches of His power. 153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world, pursuant to the general laws of nature, and the actions of finite, imperfect spirits, this, in the state

we

are in at present,

indispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are too narrow. We take, for is

instance, the idea of

some one particular pain

GEORGE BERKELEY

444 into our thoughts,

and account

it evil;

whereas,

enlarge our view, so as to comprehend the various ends, connexions, and dependencies of things, on what occasions and in what proporif

we

tions

we

are affected with pain

the nature of

and

pleasure,

human

freedom, and the design are put into the world; we shall

with which we be forced to acknowledge that those particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked with the whole system of beings. 54. From what has been said, it will be manifest to any considering person, that it is merely for want of attention and comprehensiveness of 1

mind that there are any favourers of Atheism or Manichean Heresy to be found. Little and un-

the

may

indeed burlesque the works and order whereof they have not capacity, or will not be at the pains, to comprehend; but those who are masters of any justness and extent of thought, and are withal used to reflect, can never sufficiently reflecting souls

of Providence, the beauty

admire the divine traces of Wisdom and Goodness that shine throughout the Economy of Nature. But what truth is there which shineth so strongly on the mind that by an aversion of thought, a wilful shutting of the eyes,

we may

not escape seeing it? Is it therefore to be wondered at, if the generality of men, who are ever intent on business or pleasure, and little used to fix

or open the eye of their mind, should not

have all that conviction and evidence of the Being of God which might be expected in reasonable creatures? ! 55- We should rather wonder that men can be found so stupid as to neglect, than that neglecting they should be unconvinced of such an

evident and

momentous

be feared that too

truth.

many

And

of parts

yet

and

it is

to

leisure,

who

live in Christian countries, are, merely through a supine and dreadful negligence, sunk into Atheism. Since it is downright impossible that a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough sense of the omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that Almighty Spirit should persist in a remorseless violation of His laws. We ought, therefore, earnestly to meditate and dwell on those important points; that so we may attain conviction without all scruple "that the eyes of the Lord are in every place beholding the evil and the good; that He is with us and keepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat and raiment to put on"; that He is present and conscious to our innermost thoughts; and that we have a most absolute and immediate dependence on Him. A clear view of which great truths cannot choose but fill our hearts with an awful circumspection and holy

which is the strongest incentive to Virtue, and the best guard against Vice. 156. For, after all, what deserves the first

fear,

place in our studies

is

the consideration of

God

and our Duty; which to promote, as it was the main drift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless and ineffectual if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire my readers with a pious sense of the Presence of

God; and, having shewn the

falseness or vanity

which make the employment of learned men, the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the salutary truths of the Gospel, which to know and of those barren speculations chief

to practice

nature.

is

the highest perfection of

human

DAVID HUME AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING

UNDERSTANDING

HUMAN

,

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE David Hume,

Hume was born at Edinburgh on April 26, the younger son in a

1

7

1

171 1- 1776

which enjoyed such success that a second edition was brought out the following year. At that time he also issued a second volume of essays.

1

good but not wealthy fam-

"who passed for a man of parts," when Hume was still a child, and he was brought up by his mother at the family estate of Ninewells, near Berwick. About 723 he entered ily.

His father,

He

died

1

the University of Edinburgh, and, according to his Autobiography, "passed through the ordinary

course of education with success." His letters

show that when he returned to Ninewells about three years later he had acquired a fair knowledge of Latin, slight acquaintance with Greek, and a literary taste inclining to "books of reasoning and philosophy, and to poetry and the polite authors." His studious disposition led his family to believe that law was the proper profession for him, but he "found an insurmountable aversion to everything but the pursuits of philosophy and general learning; and while they fancied I was poring upon Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil were the authors which I was secretly devouring." A too "ardent application" to his studies threatened his health, and in 1 734, determined to try a complete change of scene and occupation, Hume entered a business house in Bristol. In a few months he found "the scene totally unsuitable," and he set out for France, resolved "to make a very rigid frugality supply my deficiency of fortune, to maintain unimpaired my independency, and to regard every object as contemptible, except the improvement of my talents in literature."

He

aide-de-camp to the general." He remarks that these two years (1746-48), "almost the only interruption which my studies have received during the course of my life," enabled him to return to Scotland "master of near a thousand pounds." During his absence from England in 1 748 his Philosophical Essays was published. Afterwards

An Enquiry concerning Human Understandwas a re-casting of the first part of the Treatise by which he hoped to gain a larger audience. But the first reception of the work was little more favorable than that accorded to the Treatise. In 1 751 he re-cast the third book of the Treatise and published it as An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. That same year he was entitled ing, it

visited Paris, resided

time at Rheims, and then settled at La Fleche, where Descartes had gone to school. During his three years in France he wrote the Treatise 0/ Human Nature, and in 1737 returned to London to attend to its publication. It appeared in three volumes during 1739-40. Confor a

trary to his expectations, his

first effort "fell

dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots."

Upon the failure of his book Hume retired to Ninewells and devoted himself to study, mainly and economics. In 1741 he published volume of his Essays, Moral and Political,

continued to look about for a position that

would secure him independence, and in 1744 tried hard to obtain the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. Failing in this attempt, he accepted the post of tutor to the Marquis of Annandale, who had been declared a lunatic by the court. Upon his dismissal a year later, Hume accepted the office of secretary to General St. Clair, a distant relative, who was engaged in an "expedition which was at first meant against Canada, but ended in an incursion on the coast of France." After the failure of this venture he accompanied the general on a "military embassy to the courts of Vienna and Turin" on which he "wore the uniform of an officer and was introduced at these courts as

again unsuccessful in his attempt to obtain a Edinburgh, this time as the successor to his friend, Adam Smith, in the chair of logic. The following year, despite accusations of heresy, he received the post of librarian at the Advocates' Library, which though small in salary provided excellent facilities for literary work. During his years as librarian Hume attained his greatest success as a man of letters. He continued his essays and in 1757 brought out the Four Dissertations, one of which was devoted to professor's chair at

in politics

the Natural History of Religion.

the

cerning Natural Religion

first

447

The

Dialogues con-

were also completed, but

BIOGRAPHICAL

44 8

on che advice of poned until after

friends publication his death.

Most

was

post-

of his efforts,

however, were devoted to the writing of history, to which he may have turned his attention because of the success of his political and economic essays. Adam Smith had recommended that he begin with Henry VII, but he chose to start

with the period of James

I,

"an epoch when,

I

thought, the misrepresentations of faction began chiefly to take place." Although Hume was disappointed by the reception of the first volume, which appeared in 1753, his History of England

NOTE

Rousseau accompanied him, to seek shelter in England. The association was of short duration; it ended in a violent and sensational quarrel for which Rousseau seems to have been largely to blame. living at Paris."

persuaded by

Hume

Hume, after serving as undersecretary at the Foreign Office for a year (1767-68), retired to Edinburgh, where he built himself a new house, and settled down "with the prospect of enjoying long my ease, and of seeing the increase of my reputation."

In the spring of 1 775

Hume was stricken with

was well received, and within a few years it brought the author a larger revenue than had ever before been obtained in his country from literature. The work was completed by 1761,

a troublesome though not painful illness. Preparing himself for "a speedy dissolution," he

although Hume continued to revise it throughout most of the remainder of his life, excising

was

from it all the "villainous seditious Whig strokes" and "plaguy prejudices of Whiggism" that he could detect.

Although "not only independent but opuand determined never more to set foot

lent

.

.

.

out of" his native country, Hume in 1763 accepted an invitation to go to Paris as acting secretary of the embassy. For three years he enjoyed Parisian society. Meeting with men and women of all ranks and stations, he noted "the

more I resiled from their excessive civilities, the more I was loaded with them." He returned home, convinced "there is a real satisfaction in

wrote a short autobiography, in which he drew his own character. "I am," he wrote, "or rather (for that is the style,

I

must now use in

speaking of myself; which emboldens me the more to speak my sentiments) I was, I say, a man of mild dispositions, of command of temper, and of an open, social, and cheerful humour, capable of attachment, but little susceptible of enmity; and of great moderation in all

my passions. Even my love

of literary fame,

ruling passion, never soured

withstanding

A visit

my

my

my

temper, notfrequent disappointments."

Bath in 1776 seemed at first to relieve his sickness, but on the return journey more alarming symptoms developed, his strength rapidly sank, and, little more than a month later, he died in Edinburgh on August 25, 776. to

1

CONTENTS:

CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

Biographical Note Of the different Species of Philosophy 1. 11. Of the Origin of Ideas ra. Of the Association of Ideas rv. Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding v. Sceptical Solution of these Doubts vi. Of Probability vii. Of the Idea of necessary Connexion vni. Of Liberty and Necessity ix. Of the Reason of Animals x. Of Miracles xi. Of a particular Providence and of a future State xii. Of the academical or sceptical Philosophy

449

447 451

455 457

458 463 469 470 478 487 488 497 503

ADVERTISEMENT Most

of the principles, and reasonings, contained in this

volume, were published in a work in three volumes, called

A

Human

Treatise of

thor

had projected

A

Nature:

work which

before he left College,

the

wrote and published not long after. But not finding cessful, he

early,

was

and he

Au-

and which he it

suc-

sensible of his error in going to the press too

cast the

whole anew

in the following pieces,

where some negligences in his former reasoning and more in the expression, are, he hopes, corrected. Yet several writers,

who have honoured have taken care

the

Authors Philosophy with answers,

to direct all their

batteries against that

juvenile work, which the Author never acknowledged,

have affected

to

triumph

in

imagined, they had obtained over trary to all rules of candour

and

any advantages, which, they

A

it:

practice very con-

and fair-dealing, and a strong

instance of those polemical artifices,

which a bigotted zeal

thinks itself authorized to employ. Henceforth, the Author desires, that the following Pieces

may

alone be regarded as

containing his philosophical sentiments and principles.

450

AM ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

als,

Sect.

I.

Of the

different Species of

Philosophy

Moral philosophy, or the science of human may be treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and i

.

nature,

may

contribute to the entertainment, instruc-

and reformation of mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action; and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one object, and avoiding another, according to the value which these objects seem to possess, and according to the light in which they present themselves. As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this species of philosophers paint her in the most amiable colours; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner, and such as is best fitted to please the imagination, and engage the affections. They select the most striking observations and instances from common life; place opposite characters in a proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the soundest precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us feel the difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments; and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour, they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their tion,

and deformity, without being able to determine the source of these distinctions. While they attempt this arduous task, they are deterred by no difficulties; but proceeding from particular instances to general principles, they still push on their enquiries to principles more general, and ty

rest not satisfied

man

considers

than an and endeavours to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners. They in the light of a reasonable rather

active being,

regard

human

nature as a subject of specula-

and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in order to find those principles, which regulate our understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action;

tion, or behaviour. all literature,

fixed,

They

think

it

they arrive at those original

tion of posterity. 3. It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more useful than the other. It enters more into common life; moulds the heart and affections; and, by touching those principles which actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them nearer to that

model of perfection which

it

describes.

On

the

contrary, the abstruse philosophy, being found-

ed on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into business

The other species of philosophers

till

by which, in every science, all human curiosity must be bounded. Though their speculations seem abstract, and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the approbation of the learned and the wise; and think themselves sufficiently compensated for the labour of their whole lives, if they can discover some hidden truths, which may contribute to the instrucprinciples,

labours. 2.

and criticism; and should for ever and falsehood, vice and virtue, beau-

reasoning,

talk of truth

and

action, vanishes

when

the philos-

opher leaves the shade, and comes into open day; nor can its principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our passions, the vehemence of our affections, dissipate all its conclusions, and reduce the profound philosopher to a

mere plebeian. 4. This also must be

confessed, that the

most

a reproach to

durable, as well as justest fame, has been acquired

that philosophy should not yet have

by the easy philosophy, and that abstract reaseem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary reputation, from the caprice or ignor-

beyond controversy, the foundation of mor-

soners

45 x

DAVID

452

ance of their own age, but have not been able to support their renown with more equitable posterity. It is easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtile reasonings; and one mistake is the necessary parent of another, while he pushes on his consequences, and is not deterred from embracing any conclusion, by its unusual appearance, or its contradiction to pop-

who

purposes

sense of

mankind

ular opinion. But a philosopher,

only to represent the

common

more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by accident he falls into error, goes no farther; but renewing his appeal to common sense, and the natural sentiments of the mind, returns into the right path, and secures himself from any dangerous illusions. The fame of Cicero flourishes at in

present; but that of Aristotle

La Bruyere

is

utterly decayed.

and still maintains his reputation: But the glory of Malebranche is confined to his own nation, and to his own age. passes the seas,

And

Addison, perhaps, will be read with pleasure, when Locke shall be entirely forgotten. The mere philosopher is a character, which is commonly but little acceptable in the world, as being supposed to contribute nothing either to the advantage or pleasure of society; while he lives remote from communication with mankind,

and

is

wrapped up

in principles

and notions

equally remote from their comprehension. the other hand, the

mere ignorant

is still

On

more

anything deemed a surer sign of an illiberal genius in an age and nation where the sciences flourish, than to be entirely destitute of all relish for those noble entertainments. The most perfect character is supposed to lie between those extremes; retaining an equal ability and

despised; nor

is

taste for books,

company, and

business; preserv-

and delicacy which arise from polite letters; and in business, that probity and accuracy which are the ing in conversation that discernment

natural result of a just philosophy. In order to

and cultivate so accomplished a characnothing can be more useful than composi-

diffuse ter,

and manner, which draw require no deep application or retreat to be comprehended, and send back the student among mankind full of noble sentiments and wise precepts, applicable to every exigence of human life. By means of such compositions, virtue becomes amiable, science agreeable, company instructive, and retirement tions of the easy style

not too

much from life,

entertaining.

Man

is a reasonable being; and as such, refrom science his proper food and nourishment: But so narrow are the bounds of human understanding, that little satisfaction can be

ceives

HUME

SECT.

I

hoped for in this particular, either from the extent of security or his acquisitions.

no

Man is a sociable,

than a reasonable being: But neither can he always enjoy company agreeable and amusing, or preserve the proper relish for them. Man is also an active being; and from that disposition, as well as from the various necessities of human life, must submit to business and occupation: But the mind requires some relaxation, and cannot always support its bent to care and industry. It seems, then, that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to the less

human

and

race,

secretly

admonished them

to

allow none of these biasses to draw too much, so as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments. Indulge your passion for science,

human, and such a direct reference to action and soAbstruse thought and profound researches

says she, but let your science be as

may have

ciety.

and will severely punish, by the penmelancholy which they introduce, by the endless uncertainty in which they involve you, and by the cold reception which your pretended discoveries shall meet with, when communicated. Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your phiI

prohibit,

sive

losophy, be

Were

still

a man.

mankind contented and profound, without throwing any blame or con5.

the generality of

to prefer the easy philosophy to the abstract

tempt on the

latter, it

might not be improper,

perhaps, to comply with this general opinion, and

allow every his is

own

man

taste

to enjoy, without opposition,

and sentiment. But

as the matter

often carried farther, even to the absolute re-

jecting of

all

commonly

profound reasonings, or what

called metaphysics,

we

shall

now

is

pro-

ceed to consider what can reasonably be pleaded in their behalf. We may begin with observing, that one considerable advantage, which results from the accurate and abstract philosophy, is, its subserviency to the easy and humane; which, without the former, can never attain a sufficient degree of exactness in

its

sentiments, precepts, or rea-

sonings. All polite letters are nothing but pic-

human

tures of ations;

and

life

in various attitudes

and

situ-

inspire us with different sentiments,

of praise or blame, admiration or ridicule, ac-

cording to the qualities of the object, which they An artist must be better qualified to succeed in this undertaking, who, besides a delicate taste and a quick apprehension, possesses set before us.

an accurate knowledge of the internal

fabric, the

operations of the understanding, the workings of the passions, and the various species of senti-

ment which discriminate

vice

and

virtue.

How

SECT.

CONCERNING

I

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

painful soever this inward search or enquiry may appear, it becomes, in some measure, requisite

who would describe with success the ob-

to those,

outward appearances of life and manpresents to the eye the most hideous and disagreeable objects; but his science is useful to the painter in delineating even a Venus or an Helen. While the latter employs all the richest colours of his art, and gives his figures the most graceful and engaging airs; he must still carry his attention to the inward structure of the vious and

ners.

The anatomist

human body,

the position of the muscles, the fab-

ric of the bones,

and the use and

figure of every

part or organ. Accuracy is, in every case, advantageous to beauty, and just reasoning to delicate sentiment. In vain

would we exalt the one by de-

preciating the other.

we may observe, in every art or proeven those which most concern life or ac-

Besides, fession,

tion, that

a spirit of accuracy, however acquired,

them nearer their them more subservient

and

carries all of

perfection,

renders

to the interests

453

But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy,

is

objected

to,

not only as painful and

fatiguing, but as the inevitable source of uncer-

and error. Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable tainty

part of metaphysics, that they are not properly

a science; but arise either from the fruitless

human

forts of

vanity,

ef-

which would penetrate

into subjects utterly inaccessible to the under-

standing, or from the craft of popular supersti-

which, being unable to defend themselves ground, raise these intangling brambles to cover and protect their weakness. Chased from the open country, these robbers fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist, if he remit his watch a moment, is oppressed. And many, through cowardice and folly, open the gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence and submission, tions,

on

fair

as their legal sovereigns.

a philosopher may live remote from business, the genius of philosophy, if carefully cultivated by several, must gradual-

7. But is this a sufficient reason, why philosophers should desist from such researches, and leave superstition still in possession of her retreat?

whole society, and bestow a similar correctness on every art and call-

Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy? In vain do we hope, that men, from frequent disappointment, will at last abandon such airy sciences, and

of society.

And though

ly diffuse itself throughout the

ing.

The

politician will acquire greater foresight

and subtility, in the subdividing and balancing of power the lawyer more method and finer principles in his reasonings; and the general more regularity in his discipline, and more caution in his plans and operations. The stability of modern governments above the ancient, and the accuracy of modern philosophy, have improved, and probably will still improve, by similar gradations. 6. Were there no advantage to be reaped from these studies, beyond the gratification of an in;

nocent curiosity, yet ought not even this to be despised as being one accession to those few safe and harmless pleasures, which are bestowed on the ;

human

race. The sweetest and most inoffensive path of life leads through the avenues of science and learning; and whoever can either remove any obstructions in this way, or open up any new prospect, ought so far to be esteemed a benefactor to mankind. And though these researches may appear painful and fatiguing, it is with some minds as with some bodies, which being endowed with vigorous and florid health, require severe exercise, and reap a pleasure from what, to the generality of mankind, may seem burden-

some and ful to the

light

laborious. Obscurity, indeed,

mind

is

pain-

as well as to the eye; but to bring

from obscurity, by whatever labour, must

needs be delightful and rejoicing.

human reason. many persons find too sensible

discover the proper province of For, besides, that

an

interest in perpetually recalling

besides this,

I say,

such topics;

the motive of blind despair can

never reasonably have place in the sciences since, however unsuccessful former attempts may have proved, there is still room to hope, that the in;

dustry,

good fortune, or improved sagacity of suc-

ceeding generations may reach discoveries unknown to former ages. Each adventurous genius will still leap at the arduous prize, and find himself stimulated, rather that discouraged, by the failures of his predecessors; while he hopes that the glory of achieving so hard an adventure is reserved for him alone. The only method of freeing learning, at once, from these abstruse questions,

is

to enquire seriously into the nature of

human understanding, and show, from an exact powers and capacity, that it is by such remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue, in order to live at ease ever after: And must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to deanalysis of

its

no means

fitted for

stroy the false to

some

and

adulterate. Indolence, which,

persons, affords a safeguard against this

deceitful philosophy,

is,

with others, overbal-

DAVID

454

anced by curiosity; and despair, which, at some moments, prevails, may give place afterwards to sanguine hopes and expectations. Accurate and just reasoning is the only catholic remedy, fitted

and

for all persons

all

dispositions;

and

is

alone

able to subvert that abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon, which, being mixed up with popular superstition, renders it in a manner im-

penetrable to careless reasoners, and gives air of science 8.

it

the

and wisdom.

SECT.

most uncertain and disa-

many

I

not beyond the compass of human understanding. There are many obvious distinctions

which

lie

of this kind, such as those between the will

and

understanding, the imagination and passions, which fall within the comprehension of every hu-

man creature; and the finer and more philosophno less real and certain, though more difficult to be comprehended. Some

ical distinctions are

instances, especially late ones, of success in these

enquiries,

Besides this advantage of rejecting, after de-

liberate enquiry, the

HUME

tainty

And

may give

and

shall

us a juster notion of the cer-

branch of learning. worthy the labour of a

solidity of this

we esteem

it

human

philosopher to give us a true system of the planand adjust the position and order of those remote bodies; while we affect to overlook those,

remarkable concerning the operations of the mind, that, though most intimately

who, with so much success, delineate the parts of the mind, in which we are so intimately con-

become the obseem involved in obscurity; nor can the eye readily find those lines and boundaries, which discriminate and distinguish them. The objects are too fine to remain long in the same aspect or situation; and must be apprehended in an instant, by a superior penetration, derived from nature, and improved by habit and reflexion. It becomes, therefore, no inconsider-

cerned?

greeable part of learning, there are tive

posi-

advantages, which result from an accurate

scrutiny into the powers nature. It

and

faculties of

is

present to us, yet, whenever they

ets,

ject of reflexion, they

able part of science barely to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from class them under their proper and to correct all that seeming disorder, in which they lie involved, when made the object of reflexion and enquiry. This talk of ordering and distinguishing, which has no merit, when

each other, to heads,

performed with regard to external bodies, the objects of our senses, rises in

its

value,

when

di-

rected towards the operations of the mind, in pro-

portion to the difficulty and labour, which

we

performing it. And if we can go no farther than this mental geography, or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind, it is at least a satisfaction to go so far; and the more obvious this science may appear (and it is by no means obvious) the more contemptible still must the ignorance of it be esteemed, in all pre-

meet with

in

tenders to learning and philosophy.

Nor can

there remain any suspicion, that this

uncertain and chimerical; unless we should entertain such a scepticism as is entirely subversive of all speculation, and even action. It cannot be doubted, that the mind is endowed science

is

with several powers and faculties, that these powfrom each other, that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be

ers are distinct

distinguished by reflexion; and consequently, that there sitions

on

is

a truth

and falsehood in all propoand a truth and falsehood,

this subject,

9.

But

may we

not hope, that philosophy,

and encouraged by the

cultivated with care,

may

tention of the public, still

farther,

and

its

researches

discover, at least in

gree, the secret springs

the

carry

human mind

is

and

principles,

actuated in

its

if

at-

some deby which

operations?

Astronomers had long contented themselves with proving, from the phaenomena, the true motions, order, and magnitude of the heavenly bodies: Till a philosopher, at last, arose, who seems, from the happiest reasoning, to have also determined the laws and forces, by which the revolutions of the planets are governed and directed. The like has been performed with regard to other parts of nature. And there is no reason to despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental powers and economy, if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution. It is probable, that one operation and principle of the mind depends on another; which, again, may be resolved into one more general and universal: And how far these researches

may

possibly be carried,

it

will

even after, a careful trial, exactly to determine. This is certain, that attempts of this kind are every day made even by those who philosophize the most negligently: And nothing can be more requisite than to enter upon the enterprize with thorough care and attention; that, if it lie within the compass of human understanding, it may at last be happily achieved; if not, it may, however, be rejected with some confidence and security. This last conclusion, surely, is not desirable; nor ought it to be embraced too rashly. For how much must we diminish from the beauty and value of this species of philosophy, upon such a supposition? Moralists have hitherto been accustomed, when they considered the vast multitude and diversity of be

difficult for us, before, or

!

.

SECT.

CONCERNING

II

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING These

455

may mimic or copy the per-

those actions that excite our approbation or dislike, to search for some common principle, on

tion.

which this variety of sentiments might depend. And though they have sometimes carried the matter too far, by their passion for some one general

ly

it must, however, be confessed, that they are excusable in expecting to find some general principles, into which all the vices and virtues were justly to be resolved. The like has been

represent their object in so lively a manner, that

principle;

and even

faculties

ceptions of the senses; but they never can entire-

reach the force and vivacity of the original The utmost we say of them, even when they operate with greatest vigour, is, that they

sentiment.

we could almost say we feel or see it: But, except the mind be disordered by disease or madness, they never can arrive at such a pitch of vivacity,

pol-

as to render these perceptions altogether undis-

their attempts been wholly though perhaps longer time, greater accuracy, and more ardent application may

splendid, can never paint natural objects in such

the endeavour of critics, logicians, iticians:

Nor have

unsuccessful;

bring these sciences

still

nearer their perfection. pretensions of this kind

To throw up at once all may justly be deemed more

tinguishable. All the colours of poetry,

a

manner

as to

make the description be taken The most lively thought is

for a real landskip. still

inferior to the dullest sensation.

We may

rash, precipitate,

observe a like distinction to run

and dogmatical, than even the boldest and most

through

affirmative philosophy, that has ever attempted

man in a fit of anger,

to impose

its

crude dictates and principles on

mankind. 10. What though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract, and of difficult

comprehension? This affords no presumption of their falsehood. On the contrary, it seems impossible, that what has hitherto escaped so many wise and profound philosophers can be very obvious and easy. And whatever pains these researches

may cost us, we may think ourselves suf-

rewarded, not only in point of profit but if, by that means, we can make any addition to our stock of knowledge, in subjects of such unspeakable importance. But as, after all, the abstractedness of these speculations is no recommendation, but rather a disadvantage to them, and as this difficulty may perhaps be surmounted by care and art, and the avoiding of all unnecessary detail, we have, in the following enquiry, attempted to throw some light upon subjects, from which uncertainty has ficiently

of pleasure,

however

all

the other perceptions of the mind.

A

actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me, that any person is in love, I easily understand your meaning, and form a just conception of his situation; but never can mistake that conception for the real disorders and agitations of the passion. When we reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly; but is

which it employs are faint and dull, comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed. It requires no nice discernment or metaphysical head to mark the distinction between them. 12. Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different dethe colours

in

and vivacity. The less forcible and commonly denominated Thoughts or The other species want a name in our lan-

grees of force lively are Ideas.

ig-

guage, and in most others; I suppose, because it was not requisite for any, but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general term or ap-

unite the boundaries

pellation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom,

of the different species of philosophy, by recon-

them Impressions; employing that word somewhat different from the usual. By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel,

hitherto deterred the wise,

norant.

Happy,

we can

if

and obscurity the

ciling profound enquiry with clearness,

and truth

And still more happy, if, reasoning in this easy manner, we can undermine the foundations of an abstruse philosophy, which seems to have hitherto served only as a shelter to with novelty!

superstition,

and a cover

Sect. II. 1 1

Every one

Of the

to absurdity

and error

Origin of Ideas

will readily allow, that there is

a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate

and when he afterwards

recalls to his

this sensation, or anticipates it

by

his

warmth,

memory imagina-

and

call

in a sense

or love, or hate, or desire, or will.

And

impres-

from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned. 13. Nothing, at first view, may seem more unbounded than the thought of man, which not only escapes all human power and authority, but is not even restrained within the limits of nature and reality. To form monsters, and join incongruous shapes and appearances, costs the imagsions are distinguished

;

DAVID

45^

ination no more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar objects. And while the body is confined to one planet, along which it creeps with pain and difficulty; the thought can in an instant transport us into the most distant regions of the universe or even beyond the universe, into the unbounded chaos, where nature is supposed to lie in total confusion. What never was seen, or heard of, may yet be conceived; nor is any thing beyond the powei of thought, except what implies an absolute contradiction. But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the ;

HUME

SECT.

II

Secondly. If it happen, from a defect of the 1 organ, that a man is not susceptible of any species of sensation, we always find that he is as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas. A blind 5.

man

can form no notion of colours; a deaf

of sounds. Restore either of

them

man

that sense in

by opening this new inlet you also open an inlet for the ideas; and he finds no difficulty in conceiving

which he

is

deficient;

for his sensations,

miliar to us. In short, all the materials of think-

these objects. The case is the same, if the object, proper for exciting any sensation, has never been applied to the organ. A Laplander or Negro has no notion of the relish of wine. And though there are few or no instances of a like deficiency in the mind, where a person has never felt or is wholly incapable of a sentiment or passion that belongs to his species; yet we find the same observation to take place in a less degree. A man of mild manners can form no idea of inveterate revenge or cruelty; nor can a selfish heart easily conceive the heights of friendship and generosity. It is readily allowed, that other beings may possess many senses of which we can have no conception because the ideas of them have never been introduced to us in the only manner by which an idea can have access to the mind, to wit, by the actual

ing are derived either from our outward or in-

feeling

compounding, transposing, augmentby the senses and experience. When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two consistent ideas, gold, and mountain, with which we were formerly acquainted. A virtuous horse we can conceive; because, from our own feeling, we can conceive virtue; and this we may unite to the figure and shape of a horse, which is an animal fafaculty of

ing, or diminishing the materials afforded us

ward sentiment:

and composition of the mind and will. Or, to

the mixture

these belongs alone to

express myself in philosophical language, ideas or

more

impressions or 1

4.

all

our

feeble perceptions are copies of our

more

lively ones.

To prove this, the two following arguments

hope, be sufficient. First, when we analyze our thoughts or ideas, however compounded or will, I

we always

themselves into such simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment. Even those ideas, which, at first view, seem the most wide of

sublime,

find that they resolve

upon a nearer scrutiny, to be derived from it. The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being, arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom. We may prosecute this enquiry to what length we please; where we shall always find, that every idea which we examine is copied from a similar impression. Those who would assert that this position is not this origin, are found,

universally true nor without exception, have only one, and that an easy method of refuting it;

by producing that idea, which, in their opinion, is not derived from this source. It will then be incumbent on us, if we would maintain our doctrine, to produce the impression, or lively perception, which corresponds to it.

and sensation. There is, however, one contradictory phenomenon, which may prove that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to arise, independent 16.

of their correspondent impressions. will readily

I

believe

it

be allowed, that the several distinct

which enter by the eye, or those which are conveyed by the ear, are different from each other; though, at the

ideas of colour,

of sound, really

same time, resembling. Now if this be true of different colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the same colour; and each shade produces a distinct idea, independent of the rest. For if this should be denied, it is possible, by the continual gradation of shades, to run a colour insen-

what is most remote from it; and if you any of the means to be different, you cannot, without absurdity, deny the exsibly into

will not allow

tremes to be the same. Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly acquainted with colours of all kinds except one particular shade of blue, for instance,

which

fortune to meet with. Let

it

never has been his

all

the different shades

of that colour, except that single one, be placed

before him, descending gradually from the deepit is plain that he will perceive

est to the lightest;

a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be is a greater distance in that place between the contiguous colours than in

sensible that there

SECT.

CONCERNING

Ill

any other. him, from

Now

deficiency,

and raise up

his

I

be possible for imagination, to supply this

ask,

own

whether

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

to himself the idea of that

particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there are

few but will be of opinion that he can: and this may serve as a proof that the simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions; though so singular, that

it is

this instance

is

scarcely worth our observ-

and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim. 7. Here, therefore, is a proposition, which not only seems, in itself, simple and intelligible; but, if a proper use were made of it, might render every dispute equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon, which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn disgrace upon them. All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and obscure: the mind has but ing,

1

a slender hold of them: they are apt to be confounded with other resembling ideas; and when we have often employed any term, though without a distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine it has a determinate idea annexed to it. On the contrary, all impressions, that

is,

all sensations,

outward or inward, are strong and vivid: them are more exactly determined: nor is it easy to fall into any error or mis-

either

the limits between

take with regard to them.

When we

entertain,

any suspicion that a philosophical employed without any meaning or idea

therefore,

term

is

but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning (as

is

their nature

and

reality. 1

probable that no more was meant by those, innate ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our impressions; though it must be confessed, that the terms, which they employed, were not chosen with such caution, nor so exactly defined, as to prevent all mistakes about their doctrine. For what is meant by innate? If innate be equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural, in whatever sense we take the latter word, whether in opposition to what is uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant, contemporary to our birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous; nor is it worth while to enquire at what time thinking begins, whether before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word idea, seems to be commonly taken in a very loose sense, by Locke and others; as standing for any of our perceptions, our 1

457

it

It is

who denied

Now

sensations and passions, as well as thoughts. in this sense, I should desire to know, what can be

Sect. III.

Of

the Association of Ideas

evident that there is a principle of connexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that, in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity. In our more serious thinking or discourse this is so observable that any particular 18.

It

is

thought, which breaks in

upon the regular

tract

immediately remarked and rejected. And even in our wildest and most wandering reveries, nay in our very dreams, we shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a connexion upheld among the different ideas, which succeeded each other. Were the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, there would immediately be observed something which connected it in all its transitions. Or where this is wanting, the person who broke the thread of discourse might still inform you, that

or chain of ideas,

there

had

is

secretly revolved in his

cession of thought,

mind a

suc-

which had gradually led him

from the subject of conversation. Among different languages, even where we cannot suspect the least connexion or communication, it is found, that the words, expressive of ideas, the most compounded, do yet nearly correspond to each other: a certain proof that the simple ideas, comprehended in the compound ones, were bound together by some universal principle, which had an equal influence on all mankind. 19.

Though

it

be too obvious to escape obser-

vation, that different ideas are connected toI do not find that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of association; a subject, however, that seems worthy of curiosity. To me, there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, namely, Resemblance, Contiguity in time or

gether;

place,

and Cause or

meant by

Effect.

asserting, that self-love, or resentment of between the sexes is not

injuries, or the passion

innate?

But admitting these terms, impressions and ideas, above explained, and understanding by innate, what is original or copied from no precedent perception, then may we assert that all our impressions are innate, and our ideas not innate. To be ingenuous, I must own it to be my opinion, that Locke was betrayed into this question by the schoolmen, who, making use of undefined in the sense

draw out their disputes to a tedious length, without ever touching the point in question. A like ambiguity and circumlocution seem to run through that Philosopher's reasonings on this as well as most other subjects. terms,

.

:

DAVID

458 That will not,

these principles serve to connect ideas picture I believe, be much doubted.

A

1 naturally leads our thoughts to the original: the building naturin apartment a mention of one

ally introduces

an enquiry or discourse concern-

ing the others: 2

and

if

we

think of a wound,

we

HUME

SECT. IV

can never imply a contraconceived by the mind with the

possible; because diction,

same

and

is

and

facility

formable to morrow is no implies no

it

distinctness, as

reality.

That

if

ever so con-

the sun will not rise to-

less intelligible

a proposition, and

more contradiction than the

affirma-

We

can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it. 3 But that this enumeration is complete, and that there are no other principles of association except these, may be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the reader, or even to a man's own satisfaction. All we can do, in such cases, is to run over several instances, and

should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. It may, therefore, be a subject worthy of curiosity, to enquire what is the nature of that evi-

examine carefully the principle which binds the

dence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the records of our memory. This part of philosophy, it is observable, has been little cultivated, either by the ancients or moderns; and therefore our doubts and errors, in the prosecution of so important an enquiry, may be the more excusable; while we march through such difficult paths without any guide or direction. They may even prove useful, by exciting curios-

different thoughts to each other, never stopping

we render the principle as general as possi4 The more instances we examine, and the more care we employ, the more assurance shall we acquire, that the enumeration, which we till

ble.

form from the whole,

is

complete and

entire.

Sect. IV. Sceptical Doubts concerning the

Operations of the Understanding

Part

ity,

I

enquiry

naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit,

Relations of Ideas,

and Matters

of Fact.

Of the

first

kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. That three times five is equal to the half of thirty,

expresses

a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is

anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence. 2 Matters of fact, which are the second ob1

jects of

human reason,

are not ascertained in the

same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing.

The contrary

1

Resemblance.

2

Contiguity.

it

will

rise.

and destroying that implicit faith and sewhich is the bane of all reasoning and

curity,

20. All the objects of human reason or

may

tion, that

of every matter of fact

is still

3

Cause and effect. For instance Contrast or Contrariety is also a connexion among Ideas: but it may, perhaps, be considered as a mixture of Causation and Resemblance. Where two objects are contrary, the one de4

stroys the other; that is, the cause of its annihilation, and the idea of the annihilation of an object, implies the idea of its former existence.

The

discovery of defects in the if any such there be, will not, I presume, be a discouragement, but rather an incitement, as is usual, to attempt something more full and satisfactory than has yet been proposed to the public. 22. All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a man, why he believes any matter of fact, which is absent; for instance, that his friend is in the country, or in France; he would give you a reason; and this reason would be some other fact; as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises. A man finding a watch or any other machine in a desert island, would conclude that there had once been men in that island. All our reasonings concerning fact are of the same nafree enquiry.

common

philosophy,

And

here it is constantly supposed that a connexion between the present fact and that which is inferred from it. Were there nothing to bind them together, the inference would be entirely precarious. The hearing of an articulate voice and rational discourse in the ture.

there

is

dark assures us of the presence of some person Why? because these are the effects of the human make and fabric, and closely connected with it. If we anatomize all the other reasonings of this nature, we shall find that they are founded on

PART

CONCERNING

I

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

the relation of cause and effect, and that this relation is either near or remote, direct or collateral.

Heat and

and the one

light are collateral effects of fire,

effect

may justly

be inferred from

the other. 23. If

we would

satisfy ourselves, therefore,

concerning the nature of that evidence, which assures us of matters of fact, we must enquire how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect. I

shall venture to affirm, as a general proposi-

which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other. Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities; if that tion,

object be entirely

new

to him, he will not be

by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of its causes or effects. Adam, though his rational faculties be able,

supposed, at the very

first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity and transpar-

ency of water that it would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume him. No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact. 24. This proposition, that causes and effects are discoverable, not by reason but by experience, will ily

read-

be admitted with regard to such objects, as

we remember to have once been altogether unknown to us; since we must be conscious of the utter inability, which we then lay under, of foretelling what would arise from them. Present two smooth pieces of marble to a man who has no

a tiger?

But the same truth may not appear, at first have the same evidence with regard to events, which have become familiar to us from our first appearance in the world, which bear a close analogy to the whole course of nature, and which are supposed to depend on the simple qualities of objects, without any secret structure of parts. We are apt to imagine that we could discover these effects by the mere operation of our reason, without experience. We fancy, that were we brought on a sudden into this world, we could at first have inferred that one billiardball would communicate motion to another upon impulse; and that we needed not to have waited for the event, in order to pronounce with certainty concerning it. Such is the influence of custom, that, where it is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even conceals itself, and seems not to take place, merely because it is found in the highest degree. 25. But to convince us that all the laws of nature, and all the operations of bodies without exception, are known only by experience, the following reflections may, perhaps, suffice. Were any object presented to us, and were we required to pronounce concerning the effect, which will result from it, without consulting past observation; after what manner, I beseech you, must the mind proceed in this operation? It must invent or imagine some event, which it ascribes sight, to

to the object as its effect; and it is plain that this invention must be entirely arbitrary. The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examiis totally different from and consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first;

nation. For the effect

the cause,

tincture of natural philosophy;, he will never dis-

nor

cover that they will adhere together in such a manner as to require great force to separate them in a direct line, while they make so small a resistance to a lateral pressure. Such events,

smallest hint of the other.

as bear little

analogy to the

common

course of

nature, are also readily confessed to be

known

only by experience; nor does any man imagine that the explosion of gunpowder, or the attraction of a loadstone, could ever be discovered by arguments a priori. In like manner, when an effect is supposed to depend upon an intricate

machinery or secret structure of parts, we make no difficulty in attributing all our knowledge of it to experience. Who will assert that he can give the ultimate reason, why milk or bread is

459

proper nourishment for a man, not for a lion or

is

there anything in the one to suggest the

A

stone or piece of

metal raised into the air, and left without any support, immediately falls: but to consider the matter a priori, is there anything we discover in this situation which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than an upward, or any other motion, in the stone or metal? And as the first imagination or invention of a particular effect, in bitrary,

all

natural operations,

is

ar-

where we consult not experience; so

must we also esteem the supposed tie or connexion between the cause and effect, which binds

them together, and renders it impossible that any other effect could result from the operation of that cause.

When I see, for instance, a billiard-

DAVID

460

ball moving in a straight line towards another; even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me, as the result of

their contact or impulse;

may

I

not conceive,

hundred different events might as well follow from that cause? May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction? All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable. Why then should we give the preference to one, which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest? that a

All our reasonings a priori will never be able to

show us any foundation

for this preference.

In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be dis-

covered in the cause, and the first invention or conception of it, a priori, must be entirely arbitrary. And even after it is suggested, the conjunction of it with the cause must appear equally arbitrary; since there are always many other effects, which, to reason, must seem fully as consistent and natural. In vain, therefore, should we pretend to determine any single event, or infer any cause or effect, without the assistance of observation and experience. 26. Hence we may discover the reason why no philosopher, who is rational and modest, has ever pretended to assign the ultimate cause of

any natural operation, or to show distinctly the action of that power, which produces any single effect in the universe. It

is confessed, that the reason is to reduce the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and observation. But as to the causes of these

utmost

effort of

general causes,

human

we should in vain attempt their we ever be able to satisfy

discovery; nor shall

by any particular explication of them. These ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry. Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, communication of motion by impulse; these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature; and we may esteem ourselves sufficiently happy, if, by accurate enquiry and reasoning, we can trace up the particular phe-

HUME

SECT. IV

philosophy, and meets us at every turn, in spite of our endeavours to elude or avoid

Nor

it.

geometry, when taken into the assistance of natural philosophy, ever able to rem27.

is

edy

this defect, or lead us into the knowledge of ultimate causes, by all that accuracy of reasoning for which it is so justly celebrated. Every part

of mixed mathematics proceeds

upon the suppo-

by nature and abstract reasonings are

sition that certain laws are established

in her operations;

employed, either to assist experience in the discovery of these laws, or to determine their influence in particular instances, where it depends upon any precise degree of distance and quantity. Thus, it is a law of motion, discovered by experience, that the

body in motion

is

moment

in the

or force of any

compound

portion of its solid contents and consequently, that a small force

its

ratio or provelocity;

and

may remove the

greatest obstacle or raise the greatest weight,

by any contrivance or machinery, we can crease the velocity of that force, so as to

if,

in-

make

it

an overmatch for its antagonist. Geometry assists us in the application of this law, by giving us the just dimensions of all the parts and figures which can enter into any species of machine; but still the discovery of the law itself is owing merely to experience, and all the abstract reasonings in the world could never lead us one step towards the knowledge of it. When we reason a priori, and consider merely any object or cause, as it appears to the mind, independent of all observation,

it

never could suggest to us the notion of

any distinct object, such as its effect; much less, show us the inseparable and inviolable connexion between them. A man must be very sagacious who could discover by reasoning that crystal is the effect of heat, and ice of cold, without being previously acquainted with the operation of these qualities.

ourselves,

Part 28.

II

But we have not yet attained any

toler-

able satisfaction with regard to the question first proposed. Each solution still gives rise to a new

question as difficult as the foregoing, and leads us on to farther enquiries.

What

When

it

is

asked,

nature of all our reasonings concerning matter offact? the proper answer seems to be, that is the

they are founded on the relation of cause and When again it is asked, What is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that relation? it may be replied in one word, Experience. But if we still carry on our sifting hu-

nomena to, or near to, these general principles. The most perfect philosophy of the natural kind

effect.

only staves off our ignorance a little longer: as perhaps the most perfect philosophy of the moral or metaphysical kind serves only to discover larger portions of it. Thus the observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all

clusions from experience? this implies

mour, and

ask,

What

is the

foundation of all con-

a

new

ques-

PART tion,

CONCERNING

II

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

which may be of more difficult solution and

explication. Philosophers, that give themselves airs of superior wisdom and sufficiency, have a hard task when they encounter persons of inquisitive dispositions, who push them from every corner to which they retreat, and who are sure at last to bring them to some dangerous dilem-

ma. The best expedient to prevent this confuis to be modest in our pretensions; and even

sion,

to discover the difficulty ourselves before

jected to us.

it is

ob-

By this means, we may make a kind

of merit of our very ignorance. I shall content myself, in this section, with an

easy task, and shall pretend only to give a negative answer to the question here proposed. I say then, that, even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclufrom that experience are not founded on reasoning, or any process of the understanding.

sions

This answer

and

we must endeavour both

to explain

to defend.

must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of 29. It

a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of those objects entirely depends. Our senses inform us of the colour, weight, and consistence of bread; but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities which fit it for the nourishment and support of

a

human

body. Sight or feeling conveys an idea

of the actual motion of bodies; but as to that

wonderful force or power, which would carry on a moving body for ever in a continued change of place, and which bodies never lose but by communicating it to others; of this we cannot form the most distant conception. But notwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers 1 and principles, we always presume, when we see like sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers, and expect that effects, similar to those which we have experienced, will follow from them. If a body of like colour and consistence with that bread, which we have formerly eat, be presented

we make no scruple of repeating the experiment, and foresee, with certainty, like nourishment and support. Now this is a process of the mind or thought, of which I would willingly know the foundation. It is allowed on all hands to us,

no known connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; and conthat there

is

x The word, Power, is here used in a loose and popular sense. The more accurate explication of it would give additional evidence to this argument. See Sect. 7.

mind

461

not led to form such a conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction, by anything which it knows sequently, that the

of their nature.

As

allowed to give

direct

is

it can be information of

to past Experience,

and

certain

and that precise perunder its cognizance: but why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for aught we know, may be only in appearance similar; this is the main question on which I would insist. The bread, which I formerly eat, nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible qualities was, at that time, endued with such secret powers: but does it follow, that other bread must also nourish me at another time, and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret powers? The consequence seems nowise necessary. At least, it must be acknowledged that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind; those precise objects only,

iod of time, which

fell

is a certain step taken; a process of thought, and an inference, which wants to be

that there

explained. These two propositions are far from

being the same, / have found

that such

always been attended with such an

effect,

an object has

and Iforesee,

that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar,

will be attended with similar

effects. I

shall allow,

if

one proposition may justly be inferred from the other: I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning. The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent on those to produce

you

it,

please, that the

who

gin of

assert that

all

it

really exists,

and

is

the ori-

our conclusions concerning matter of

fact.

This negative argument must certainly, become altogether convincing, if many penetrating and able philosophers shall turn their enquiries this way and no one be ever able to discover any connecting proposition or intermediate step, which supports the 30.

in process of time,

understanding in this conclusion. But as the question is yet new, every reader may not trust so far to his

own penetration,

as to conclude, be-

cause an argument escapes his enquiry, that therefore it does not really exist. For this reason it may be requisite to venture upon a more difficult task; and enumerating all the branches of human knowledge, endeavour to show that none of them can afford such an argument.

DAVID

462

may

be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact and existence. That there are no demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident; since it implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. May I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body, falling from the clouds, and which, in all other respects, resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling of All reasonings

fire? Is

there

any more

intelligible proposition

than to affirm, that all the trees will flourish in December and January, and decay in May and June? Now whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument or abstract reasoning a priori. If

we

be, therefore,

engaged by arguments to

put trust in past experience, and make it the standard of our future judgement, these arguments must be probable only, or such as regard matter of fact and real existence, according to the division above mentioned. But that there is no argument of this kind, must appear, if our explication of that species of reasoning be admitted as solid and satisfactory. We have said that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a

circle,

and taking that

for granted,

which

is

the very point in question. 31. In reality, all

arguments from experience

we discover natural objects, and by which we are induced to expect effects similar to those which we are founded on the similarity which

among

have found to follow from such objects. And though none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to dispute the authority of experience, or to reject that great guide of human life, it may surely be allowed a philosopher to have so

much

examine the prinwhich gives this mighty authority to experience, and makes us draw advantage from that similarity which nature has curiosity at least as to

ciple of

placed

human

among

which appear This

is

the

nature,

different objects. similar

sum

we expect

From

causes

similar effects.

of all our experimental conclu-

HUME

SECT. IV

Now

seems evident that, if this conclusion were formed by reason, it would be as perfect at first, and upon one instance, as after ever so long a course of experience. But the case is far otherwise. Nothing so like as eggs; yet no one, on account of this appearing similarity, expects the same taste and relish in all of them. It is only after a long course of uniform experiments in sions.

it

any kind, that we

attain a firm reliance

and

curity with regard to a particular event.

se-

Now

where is that process of reasoning which, from one instance, draws a conclusion, so different from that which it infers from a hundred instances that are nowise different from that single one? This question I propose as much for the sake of information, as with an intention of raising difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine

any such reasoning. But I keep my mind still open to instruction, if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it on me. 32. Should it be said that, from a number of uniform experiments, we infer a connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers this, I must confess, seems the same difficulty, couched in different terms. The question still recurs, on what process of argument this inference is founded? Where is the medium, the interposing ideas, which join propositions so very wide of each other? It is confessed that the colour, consistence, and other sensible qualities of bread appear not, of themselves, to have any connexion with the secret powers of nourishment and support. For otherwise we could infer these secret powers from the first appearance of these ;

sensible qualities, without the aid of experience;

contrary to the sentiment of all philosophers, and contrary to plain matter of fact. Here, then, is our natural state of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objects. How is this remedied by experience? It only shows us a number of uniform effects, resulting from cer-

and teaches us that those particular were endowed with such powers and forces. When a new object, endowed with similar sensible qualities, is produced, we expect similar powers and forces, and look for a like effect. From a body of like colour and consistence with bread we expect like nourishment and support. But this surely is a step or progress of the mind, which wants to be tain objects,

objects, at that particular time,

explained.

When

a

man

says, / have found, in all

past instances, such sensible qualities conjoined with such secret powers; ble qualities will cret powers,

he

is

And when

he says, Similar

sensi-

always be conjoined with similar senot guilty of a tautology, nor are

these propositions in

any respect the same. You

— PART

CONCERNING

II

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

463

say that the one proposition is an inference from the other. But you must confess that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative: Of what nature is it, then? To say it is experi-

ent subject, there are some considerations which seem to remove all this accusation of arrogance

mental, is begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with simi-

peasants

be any suspicion change, and that be no rule for the future, all exper-

lar sensible qualities. If there

that the course of nature

the past

may

may

ience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, there-

any arguments from experience can resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue so. In vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience. Their secret nature, and consequently all their effects and influence, may change, without any change in their sensible qualities. This happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects: Why may it not happen always, and with regard to fore, that

prove

this

What

logic, what process of arguyou against this supposition? My practice, you say, refutes my doubts. But you mistake the purport of my question. As an agent, all

objects?

ment

secures

am quite satisfied in the point;

but as a philoshas some share of curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I want to learn the foundation of this inference. No reading, no enquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty, or give me satisfaction in a matter of such importI

opher,

ance.

who

Can I do better than propose

or suspicion of mistake. It is certain

that the most ignorant

improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance. If you assert, therefore, that the understanding of the child is led into this conclusion by any process of argument or ratiocination, I may justly require you to produce that argument; nor have you any pretence to refuse so equitable a demand. You cannot say that the argument is abstruse, and may possibly escape your enquiry; since you confess that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you

moment, or if, after reflecyou produce any intricate or profound argument, you, in a manner, give up the question, and confess that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects from causes which are, hesitate, therefore, a tion,

to appearance, similar. This

which

though all the learned, for several have employed themselves in fruitless search upon any subject, it may still, perhaps, be rash to conclude positively that the subject must, therefore, pass all human comprehension. Even though we examine all the sources of our knowledge, and conclude them unfit for such a subject, there may still remain a suspicion, that the enumeration is not complete, or the examination not accurate. But with regard to the presages, should

the proposition

Sect. V. Sceptical Solution of these Doubts

Part

to the public,

confess that,

is

intended to enforce in the present section. If I be right, I pretend not to have made any mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a very backward scholar; since I cannot now discover an argument which, it seems, was perfectly familiar to me long before I was out of my cradle. I

the difficulty

even though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining a solution? We shall at least, by this means, be sensible of our ignorance, if we do not augment our knowledge. 33. I must confess that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance who concludes, because an argument has escaped his own investigation, that therefore it does not really exist. I must also

and stupid

— nay infants, nay even brute beasts

34.

The passion

I

for philosophy, like that for re-

seems liable to this inconvenience, that, it aims at the correction of our manners, and extirpation of our vices, it may only serve, by imprudent management, to foster a predominant inclination, and push the mind, with more determined resolution, towards that side which already draws too much, by the bias and propensity of the natural temper. It is certain that, while ligion,

though

we

aspire to the

magnanimous

firmness of the

philosophic sage, and endeavour to confine our pleasures altogether within our own minds, we

may,

our philosophy like that of Stoics, only a more refined system of selfishness, and reason ourselves out of all virtue as well as social enjoyment. While we study with attention the vanity of human life, at last, render

Epictetus,

and other

DAVID

46 4

our thoughts towards the empty and and honours, we are, perhaps, all the while flattering our natural indolence, which, hating the bustle of the world, and drudgery of business, seeks a pretence of reason to give itself a full and uncontrolled indulgence. There is, however, one species of philosophy which seems little liable to this inconvenience, and that because it strikes in with no disorderly passion of the human mind, nor can mingle itself with any natural affection or propen-

and turn

all

transitory nature of riches

sity;

and that

losophy.

is

the

Academic or Sceptical phi-

The academics always talk of doubt and

suspense of judgement, of danger in hasty determinations, of confining to very narrow bounds

and of re-

the enquiries of the understanding,

nouncing

all

speculations which

the limits of common

life

and

lie

not within

practice. Nothing,

therefore, can be more contrary than such a philosophy to the supine indolence of the mind, its rash arrogance, its lofty pretensions, and its superstitious credulity.

Every passion

is

mortified

except the love of truth; and that passion never is, nor can be, carried to too high a degree. It is surprising, therefore, that this philosophy,

by

it,

which, in almost every instance, must be harmless and innocent, should be the subject of so much groundless reproach and obloquy. But, perhaps, the very circumstance which renders it so innocent is what chiefly exposes it to the public hatred and resentment. By flattering no irregular passion, it gains few partizans: By opposing

many vices and follies, it raises to itself abundance of enemies, who stigmatize it as libertine, profane, and irreligious. Nor need we fear that this philosophy, while it endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life, should ever undermine the reasonings of common life, and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action, as well as speculation. Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever. so

Though we should

conclude, for instance, as in all reasonings from experience, there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported by any argument or procthe foregoing section, that, in

understanding; there is no danger that on which almost all knowledge depends, will ever be affected by such a discovery. If the mind be not engaged by argument to ess of the

these reasonings,

make

must be induced by some other principle of equal weight and authority; and this step,

it

its influence as long nature remains the same. What that principle is may well be worth the pains of en-

that principle will preserve

as

human

quiry.

HUME

SECT.

V

Suppose a person, though endowed with and reflection, to be brought on a sudden into this world; he would, indeed, immediately observe a continual succession of objects, and one event following another; but he would not be able to discover anything farther. He would not, at first, by any rea35.

the strongest faculties of reason

soning, be able to reach the idea of cause

and

powers, by which all natural operations are performed, never appear to the senses; nor is it reasonable to conclude,

effect; since the particular

merely because one event, in one instance, precedes another, that therefore the one is the cause, the other the effect. Their conjunction may be arbitrary

and

casual.

There may be no reason from the appearance

to infer the existence of one

of the other. And in a word, such a person, without more experience, could never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact, or be assured of anything beyond what was immediately present to his memory and senses.

Suppose, again, that he has acquired more exand has lived so long in the world as to have observed familiar objects or events to be constantly conjoined together; what is the consequence of this experience? He immediately infers the existence of one object from the appearance of the other. Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object produces the other; nor is it, by any process of reasoning, he is engaged to draw this inference. But still he finds himself determined to draw it: And though he should be convinced that his understanding has no part in the operation, he would nevertheless continue in the same course of thinking. There is some other principle which determines him to form such a conclusion. 36. This principle is Custom or Habit. For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the effect of Custom. By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of human nature, which is universally acknowlperience,

is well known by its effects. Perhaps we can push our enquiries no farther, or pretend to give the cause of this cause; but must rest contented with it as the ultimate principle, which we can assign, of all our conclusions from

edged, and which

experience. It

is

sufficient satisfaction, that

we

can go so far, without repining at the narrowness

PART

CONCERNING

I

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

of our faculties because they will carry us no farAnd it is certain we here advance a very in-

ther.

telligible proposition at least, if

when we

not a true one,

assert that, after the constant conjunc-

— —

heat and flame, for instance, tion of two objects weight and solidity we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other. This hypothesis seems even the only one which explains the difficulty, why we draw, from a thousand instances, an inference which we are not able to draw from one instance, that is, in no respect, different from them. Reason is incapable of any such variation. The conclusions

which it draws from considering one circle are the same which it would form upon surveying all the circles in the universe. But no man, having seen only one body move after being impelled by another, could infer that every other body will move after a like impulse. All inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of

reasoning. 1 1 Nothing is more useful than for writers, even, on moral, political, or physical subjects, to distinguish between reason and experience, and to suppose, that these species of argumentation are entirely different from each other. The former are taken for the mere result of our intellectual faculties, which, by considering a priori the nature of things, and examining the effects, that must follow from their

operation, establish particular principles of science and philosophy. The latter are supposed to be derived entirely from sense and observation, by which we learn what has actually resulted from the operation of particular objects, and are thence able to infer, what will, for the future, result from them. Thus, for instance, the limitations and restraints of civil government, and a legal constitution, may be defended, either from reason, which reflecting on the great frailty and corruption of human nature, teaches, that no man can safely be trusted with unlimited authority; or from experience and history, which inform us of the enormous abuses, that ambition, in every age and country, has been found to make of so imprudent a confidence. The same distinction between reason and experience is maintained in all our deliberations concerning the conduct of life; while the experienced statesman, general, physician, or merchant is trusted and followed; and the unpractised novice, with whatever natural talents endowed, neglected and despised. Though it be allowed, that reason may form very plausible conjectures with regard to the consequences of such a particular conduct in such particular circumstances; it is still supposed imperfect, without the assistance of experience, which is alone able to give stability and certainty to the maxims, derived from study and reflection. But notwithstanding that this distinction be thus universally received, both in the active speculative scenes of'life, I shall not scruple to pronounce, that it is, at bottom, erroneous, at least, superficial. If we examine those arguments, which, in any of the sciences above mentioned, are supposed to be

Custom, then, It

is

is

465

the great guide of human

life.

which renders our exand makes us expect, for

that principle alone

perience useful to us, the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past. Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. We

should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect.

There would be an end

at

once

of all action, as well as of the chief part of speculation.

37. But here it may be proper to remark, that though our conclusions from experience carry us beyond our memory and senses, and assure us of matters of fact which happened in the most dis-

the mere effects of reasoning and reflection, they will be found to terminate, at last, in some general principle or conclusion, for which we can assign no reason but observation and experience. The only difference between them and those maxims, which are vulgarly esteemed the result of pure experience, is, that the former cannot be established without some process of thought, and some reflection on what we have observed, in order to distinguish its circumstances, and trace its consequences: Whereas in the latter, the experienced event is exactly and fully familiar to that which we infer as the result of any particular situation. The history of a Tiberius or a Nero makes us dread a like tyranny, were our monarchs freed from the restraints of laws and senates: But the observation of any fraud or cruelty in private life is sufficient, with the aid of a little thought, to give us the same apprehension; while it serves as an instance of the general corruption of human nature, and shows us the danger which we must incur by reposing an entire confidence in mankind. In both cases, it is experience which is ultimately the foundation of our inference and conclusion. There is no man so young and unexperienced, as not to have formed, from observation, many general and just maxims concerning human affairs and the conduct of life; but it must be confessed, that, when a man comes to put these in practice, he will be extremely liable to error, till time and farther experience both enlarge these maxims, and teach him their proper use and application. In

every situation or incident, there are many particular and seemingly minute circumstances, which the man of greatest talent is, at first, apt to overlook, though on them the justness of his conclusions, and consequently the prudence of his conduct, entirely depend. Not to mention, that, to a young beginner, the general observations and maxims occur not always on the proper occasions, nor can be immediately applied with due calmness and distinction. The truth is, an unexperienced reasoner could be no reasoner at all, were he absolutely unexperienced; and when we assign that character to any one, we mean it only in a comparative sense, and suppose him possessed of experience, in a smaller and more imperfect degree.

— DAVID

4 66

and most remote ages, yet some fact must always be present to the senses or memory, from which we may first proceed in drawing these conclusions. A man, who should find in a tant places

desert country the remains of pompous buildings,

HUME

SECT. V

our most restless and curious But still our curiosity will be pardonable, perhaps commendable, if it carry us on to still farther researches, and make us examine more accurately the nature of this belief, and of here at

last, after

enquiries.

whence it is derived. By means we may meet with some explications

would conclude that the country had, in ancient times, been cultivated by civilized inhabitants;

the customary conjunction,

but did nothing of this nature occur to him, he could never form such an inference. We learn the events of former ages from history; but then

and analogies that

we must peruse the volumes in which this instruction is contained, and thence carry up our inferences from one testimony to another, till we arrive at the eyewitnesses

and spectators of these we proceed not upon

distant events. In a word,

if

some

memory

fact,

present to the

this

uncertainty.

As to readers of a different taste; the

remaining part of this section is not calculated for them, and the following enquiries may well be understood, though it be neglected.

or senses, our

why you believe any parwhich you relate, you must tell me some reason; and this reason will be some other fact, connected with it. But as you cannot proceed after this manner, in infinitum, you must at last terminate in some fact, which is present to your memory or senses; or must allow that your real existence. If

I

ask

ticular matter of fact,

belief 38.

is

entirely without foundation.

What,

matter?

A

then, is the conclusion of the whole simple one; though, it must be con-

fessed, pretty

remote from the

common

theories

of philosophy. All belief of matter of fact or real

derived merely from some object, memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between that and some other object. Or in other words; having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects flame and heat, snow and cold have always been conjoined together; if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to believe that such a quality does exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the pasexistence

is

present to the

—

when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations

sion of love,

are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent. At this point, it would be very allowable for us to stop our philosophical researches. In most questions we can never make a single step further; and in all questions we must terminate

and can be

entertained v/ith speculations, which, however accurate, may still retain a degree of doubt and

Part

reasonings would be merely hypothetical; and

however the particular links might be connected with each other, the whole chain of inferences would have nothing to support it, nor could we ever, by its means, arrive at the knowledge of any

will give satisfaction; at least

to such as love the abstract sciences,

II

Nothing is more free than the imagination and though it cannot exceed that original stock of ideas furnished by the internal and external senses, it has unlimited power of mixing, compounding, separating, and dividing these ideas, in all the varieties of fiction and vision. It can feign a train of events, with all the appearance of reality, ascribe to them a particular time and place, conceive them as existent, and paint 39.

of man;

them out

to itself with every circumstance, that belongs to any historical fact, which it believes with the greatest certainty. Wherein, therefore,

between such a fiction and merely in any peculiar idea, which is annexed to such a conception as commands our assent, and which is wanting to every known fiction. For as the mind has authority over all its ideas, it could voluntarily annex this particular idea to any fiction, and consequently be able to believe whatever it pleases; contrary to what we find by daily experience. We can, in our conception, join the head of a man to the body of a horse; but it is not in our power to believe that such an animal has ever really consists the difference belief? It lies not

existed. It follows, therefore, that the difference be-

tween fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure. It must be excited by nature, like all other sentiments; and must arise from the particular situation, in which the mind is placed at any particular juncture. Whenever any object is presented to the memory or senses, it immediately, by the force of custom, carries the imagination to conceive that object,

usually conjoined to it; and this concepattended with a feeling or sentiment, different from the loose reveries of the fancy. In this

which tion

is

is

1

;

PART

CONCERNING

II

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

whole nature of belief. For as there is no matter of fact which we believe so firmly that we cannot conceive the contrary, there would be no difference between the conception assented to and that which is rejected, were it not for some sentiment which distinguishes the one from the other. If I see a billiard-ball moving towards another, on a smooth table, I can easily consists the

conceive

it

to stop

upon contact. This conception

implies no contradiction; but still

it

feels

very dif-

from that conception by which I represent to myself the impulse and the communication of motion from one ball to another. ferently

Were we to attempt a definition of this sentiwe should, perhaps, find it a very difficult, an impossible task; in the same manner as

40.

ment, if

not

we should endeavour to define the feeling of cold or passion of anger, to a creature who never had any experience of these sentiments. Belief is if

the true

one

is

and proper name of this feeling; and no know the meaning of that

ever at a loss to

term; because every

man

is

every

moment

con-

by it. It may not, however, be improper to attempt a description of this sentiment; in hopes we may, by that means, arrive at some analogies, which may af-

scious of the sentiment represented

ford a

more

perfect explication of it.

that belief is nothing but a

say, then,

I

more vivid,

lively, for-

conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain. This variety of terms, which may seem so unphil-

cible, firm, steady

osophical,

is

intended only to express that act of

what is taken for such, more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination. Provided we agree about the the mind, which renders realities, or

thing,

it is

needless to dispute about the terms.

has the command over all ideas, and can join and mix and vary them, in

The imagination

the ways possible. It

dent that belief consists not in the peculiar nature or order of ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and in their feeling to the mind. I impossible perfectly to explain of conception.

We may

make use of words which express something near it. But its true and proper name, as we observed which is a term that every one understands in common life. And in philosophy, we can go no farther than assert, before,

is belief;

sufficiently

them more

;

hear at present, for instance, a person's whom I am acquainted; and the sound comes as from the next room. This impression of my senses immediately conveys my thought to the person, together with all the surrounding objects. I paint them out to myself as existing at present, with the same qualities and relations, of which I formerly knew them possessed. These ideas take faster hold of my mind than ideas of an enchanted castle. They are very different to the feeling, and have a much greater influence of every kind, either to give pleasure or pain, joy or sorrow. Let us, then, take in the whole compass of this doctrine, and allow, that the sentiment of belief is nothing but a conception more intense and steady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, and that this manner of conception arises from a customary conjunction of the object with something present to the memory or senses: I believe that it will not be difficult, upon these suppositions, to find other operations of the mind analogous to it, and to trace up these pheactions.

I

voice, with

nomena 41

.

to principles

still

more

general.

We have already observed that nature has

established connexions

among

particular ideas,

and that no sooner one idea occurs to our thoughts than it introduces its correlative, and carries our attention towards it, by a gentle and insensible movement. These principles of connexion or association

we have reduced to three, namely, and Causation: which

semblance, Contiguity

Reare

and beget that regular

it is impossible that this faculty of imagination can ever, of itself, reach belief, it is evi-

manner

fictions of the imagination. It gives

weight and influence; makes them appear of greater importance enforces them in the mind and renders them the governing principle of our

all

may

their true colours, just as they might have existed.

it is

467

felt

the only bonds that unite our thoughts together,

But as

this feeling or

is

its

conceive fictitious objects with all the circumstances of place and time. It may set them, in a manner, before our eyes, in

confess, that

something

by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgement from the that belief

train of reflection or dis-

course, which, in a greater or less degree, takes all mankind. Now here arises a on which the solution of the present difficulty will depend. Does it happen, in all these relations, that, when one of the objects is presented to the senses or memory, the mind is not

place

among

question,

only carried to the conception of the correlative, but reaches a steadier and stronger conception of it than what otherwise it would have been able to attain? This seems to be the case with that belief

which

arises

from the relation of cause and

And if the case be the same with the other relations or principles of associations, this may

effect.

be established as a general law, which takes place mind.

in all the operations of the

We may, therefore, observe, as the first experi-

DAVID

4 68

ment to our present purpose, that, upon the appearance of the picture of an absent friend, our idea of him is evidently enlivened by the resemblance, and that every passion, which that idea occasions, whether ofjoy or sorrow, acquires new force and vigour. In producing this effect, there concur both a relation and a present impression. Where the picture bears him no resemblance, at least was not intended for him, it never so much as conveys our thought to him: And where it is absent, as well as the person, though the mind may pass from the thought of the one to that of the other, it feels its idea to be rather weakened than enlivened by that transition. We take a pleasure in viewing the picture of a friend, when it is set before us; but when it is removed, rather choose to consider him directly than by reflection in an image, which is equally distant and obscure. of the Roman Catholic relibe considered as instances of the same nature. The devotees of that superstition usually plead in excuse for the mummeries, with which they are upbraided, that they feel the good effect of those external motions, and postures, and actions, in enlivening their devotion and quickening their fervour, which otherwise would decay, if directed entirely to distant and immaterial objects. We shadow out the objects of our faith, say they, in sensible types and images, and render

The ceremonies

gion

may

them more present

to us

by the immediate pres-

ence of these types, than it is possible for us to do merely by an intellectual view and contemplation. Sensible objects have always a greater influence on the fancy than any other; and this influence they readily convey to those ideas to which they are related, and which they resemble. I shall onlv infer from these practices, and this reasoning, that the effect of resemblance in enlivening the ideas is very common; and as in every case a resemblance and a present impression must concur, we are abundantly supplied with experiments to prove the reality of the foregoing principle. 42.

We may add force to these experiments by

others of a different kind, in considering the effects of contiguity as well as of resemblance. It is certain that distance diminishes the force of every

and that, upon our approach to any object; though it does not discover itself to our senses; it operates upon the mind with an influence, which imitates an immediate impression. The thinking on any object readily transports the mind to what is contiguous; but it is only the actual presence of an object, that transports it with a superior vivacity. When I am a few miles from idea,

HUME

SECT.

home, whatever

relates to

it

touches

V

me more

when I am two hundred leagues dis-

nearly than

tant; though even at that distance the reflecting on anything in the neighbourhood of my friends or family naturally produces an idea of them. But as in this latter case, both the objects of the mind are ideas; notwithstanding there is an easy transition between them; that transition

alone

not able to give a superior vivacity to

is

any of the

ideas, for

want of some immediate

impression. 1 43.

No

one can doubt but causation has the as the other two relations of re-

same influence semblance and

contiguity. Superstitious people

and holy men, same reason, that they seek after types or images, in order to enliven their devotion, and give them a more intimate and strong conception of those exemplary lives, which they desire are fond of the reliques of saints

for the

Now it is evident, that one of the best which a devotee could procure, would be the handywork of a saint; and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be considered in this light, it is because they were once at his disposal, and were moved and affected by him; in which to imitate.

reliques,

respect they are to be considered as imperfect ef-

and as connected with him by a shorter chain of consequences than any of those, by which we learn the reality of his existence. Suppose, that the son of a friend, who had been long dead or absent, were presented to us; it is evident, that this object would instantly revive its correlative idea, and recal to our thoughts fects,

all

past intimacies

and familiarities,

in

more live-

than they would otherwise have appeared to us. This is another phaenomenon, which seems to prove the principle above menly colours

tioned. 44.

We may observe,

that, in these

phaenom-

is always presupposed; without which the relation could

ena, the belief of the correlative object

have no 1 li

dam,

effect.

Naturane ut,

cum

The

influence of the picture sup-

nobis, inquit,

datum dicam, an

errore quo-

ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos

viros acceperimus

multum

esse versatos,

magis moveamur,

quam siquando eorum ipsorum

aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod legamus? Velut ego nunc moveor. Venit enim mihi Plato in mentem, quern accepimus primum hie disputare solitum: cuius etiam illi hortuli propinqui non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo hie ponere. Hie Speusippus, hie Xenocrates, hie eius auditor Polemo; cuius ipsa ilia sessiojuit, quam vide-

mus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram, Hostiliam dico, non banc novam, quae mihi minor esse videtur postquam est maior, solebam intuens, Scipionem, Catonem, Laelium, nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare. Tanta vis admonitionis est in locis; ut non sine causa ex his memoriae deducta

sit disciplina."

Cicero, de finibus,

Book V.

PART

CONCERNING

II

poses, that isted.

we

believe

Continguity to

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

our friend to have once exhome can never excite our

ideas of home, unless we believe that it really exI assert, that this belief, where it

ists.

Now

reaches beyond the memory or senses, is of a similar nature, and arises from similar causes, with the transition of thought and vivacity of conception here explained. When I throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to conceive, that

it

augments, not extinguishes

the flame. This transition of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason. It derives

origin altogether

its

perience.

And

as

it first

present to the senses,

it

from custom and ex-

begins from an object,

renders the idea or con-

ception of flame more strong and lively than any loose, floating reverie of the imagination. That

The thought moves inand conveys to it all that force of conception, which is derived from the impression present to the senses. When a sword is levidea arises immediately.

stantly towards

elled at

my

and pain

it,

breast, does not the idea of

strike

glass of wine

is

me more

strongly, than

wound when a

presented to me, even though by

accident this idea should occur after the appearance of the latter object? But what is there in this

whole matter to cause such a strong conception, except only a present object and a customary transition to the idea of another object, which we have been accustomed to conjoin with the former? This is the whole operation of the mind, in all our conclusions concerning matter of fact and existence; and it is a satisfaction to find some analogies, by which it may be explained. The transition from a present object does in all cases give strength

and

solidity to the related idea.

a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and concep-

Here, then,

is

tions have still, we find, gone on in the same train with the other works of nature. Custom is that principle, by which this correspondence has been effected; so necessary to the subsistence of our species, and the regulation of our conduct, in every circumstance and occurrence of human life. Had not the presence of an object, instantly excited the idea of those objects, commonly conjoined with it, all our knowledge must have been limited to the narrow sphere of our memory and senses; and we should never have been able to adjust means to ends, or employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or avoiding of evil. Those, who delight in the discovery and contemplation of final causes, have

469 wonder and

here ample subject to employ their admiration. 45. I shall add, for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory, that, as this operation of the mind, by which causes,

and

we infer like effects from like

vice versa, is

so essential to the subsist-

ence of all human creatures, it is not probable, that it could be trusted to the fallacious deductions of our reason, which is slow in its operations; appears not, in any degree, during the first years of infancy; and at best is, in every age and period of human life, extremely liable to error and mistake. It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind, by some instinct or mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding. As nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us the knowledge of the muscles and nerves, by which they are actuated; so has she implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to that which she has established among external objects; though we are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which this regular course and succession of objects totally depends. Sect. VI.

Of

Probability*

Though

there be no such thing as Chance our ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the understanding, and begets a like species of belief or 46.

in the world;

opinion.

There is certainly a probability, which arises from a superiority of chances on any side; and according as this superiority encreases, and surpasses the opposite chances, the probability receives a proportionable encrease,

and begets

a higher degree of belief or assent to that side, in which we discover the superiority. If a die were marked with one figure or number of spots on four sides, and with another figure or still

number of spots on the two remaining sides, it would be more probable, that the former would turn up than the latter; though, if it had a thousand sides marked in the same manner, and only one side different, the probability would be Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonand probable. In this view, we must say, that it is only probable all men must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But to conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities. By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition. 1

strative

DAVID

47o

much

and our belief or expectation of more steady and secure. This process of the thought or reasoning may seem trivial and obvious; but to those who consider it more higher,

the event

narrowly, it may, perhaps, afford matter for curious speculation. It seems evident, that, when the mind looks

forward to discover the event, which may result from the throw of such a die, it considers the turning up of each particular side as alike probable; and this is the very nature of chance, to render

all

the particular events,

comprehended

it, entirely equal. But finding a greater number of sides concur in the one event than in the other, the mind is carried more frequently to

in

that event,

and meets

it

oftener, in revolving the

various possibilities or chances, on which the

ultimate result depends. This concurrence of several views in one particular event begets im-

mediately, by an inexplicable contrivance of nature, the sentiment of belief,

and

gives that

event the advantage over its antagonist, which is supported by a smaller number of views, and recurs less frequently to the mind. If we allow, that belief is nothing but a firmer and stronger conception of an object than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, this operation may, perhaps, in some measure, be accounted for. The concurrence of these several views or glimpses imprints the idea more strongly on the imagination; gives it superior force and vigour; renders its influence on the passions and affections more sensible; and in a word, begets that reliance or security, which constitutes the na-

and opinion. is the same with the probability of causes, as with that of chance. There are some causes, which are entirely uniform and constant in producing a particular effect; and no instance has ever yet been found of any failure or irreguture of belief 47.

The

case

larity in their operation. Fire has

always burned,

HUME

SECT. VII

mined by custom

to transfer the past to the

where the past has been entirely regular and uniform, we expect

future, in all our inferences;

and leave no room for any contrary supposition. But where different effects have been found to follow from causes, which are to appearance exactly similar, all these various effects must occur to the mind in transferring the past to the future, and enter the event with the greatest assurance,

into our consideration,

when we determine Though we give

the

probability of the event.

the preference to that which has been found most usual, and believe that this effect will exist, we

must not overlook the other effects, but must assign to each of them a particular weight and authority, in proportion as we have found it to be more or less frequent. It is more probable, in almost every country of Europe, that there will be frost sometime in January, than that the weather will continue open throughout that

whole month; though

this probability varies ac-

cording to the different climates, and approaches to a certainty in the more northern kingdoms. Here then it seems evident, that, when we transfer the past to the future, in order to determine the effect, which will result from any cause,

we

same proportion as they have appeared in the past, and conceive one to have existed a hundred times, for instance, another ten times, and another once. As a great number of views do here concur in one event, they fortify and confirm it to the imagination, beget that sentiment which we call belief, and give its object the preference above the contrary event, which is not supported by an equal number of experiments, and recurs not so transfer all the different events, in the

frequently to the thought in transferring the past to the future. Let any one try to account for this operation of the mind upon any of the received systems of philosophy, and he will be sensible of the difficulty. For my part, I shall think it

and water suffocated every human creature: The production of motion by impulse and gravity is an universal law, which has hitherto ad-

sufficient, if the present hints excite the curiosity

mitted of no exception. But there are other

such curious and such sublime subjects.

which have been found more irregular and uncertain; nor has rhubarb always proved

Sect. VII.

and make them

of philosophers, defective all

common

sensible

how

theories are in treating of

causes,

a purge, or opium a soporific to every one, who has taken these medicines. It is true, when any cause fails of producing its usual effect, philosophers ascribe not this to any irregularity in nature; but suppose, that some secret causes, in the particular structure of parts, have prevented the operation. Our reasonings, however, and conclusions concerning the event are the same as if this principle had no place. Being deter-

Of

the Idea of necessary

Part

Connexion

I

The

great advantage of the mathematical above the moral consists in this, that the ideas of the former, being sensible, are always 48.

sciences clear

and determinate, the smallest

between them the

is

same terms are

ideas,

distinction

immediately perceptible, and still

expressive of the

without ambiguity or variation.

An

same oval

PART is

an

ellipsis.

itself,

occasions, the definition for

struct the progress of the former, require supe-

The

circle,

isosceles

nor an hyperbola and scalenum are

more exact than and wrong. If any term be

distinguished by boundaries vice

and

virtue, right

defined in geometry, the substitutes,

on

all

mind

readily, of

the term defined Or even when no definition is employed, the object itself may be presented to :

the senses,

471

prudent enquiry. As moral philosophy seems hitherto to have received less improvement than either geometry or physics, we may conclude, that, if there be any difference in this respect among these sciences, the difficulties, which ob-

never mistaken for a

for

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CONCERNING

I

But the

and capacity

to be

surmounted.

and

49. There are no ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain, than those

finer sentiments of

ofpower, force, energy or necessary connexion, of which

and by that means be

clearly apprehended.

rior care

steadily

every moment necessary for us to treat in our disquisitions. We shall, therefore, endeav-

the mind, the operations of the understanding, the various agitations of the passions, though

it is

really in themselves distinct, easily escape us,

our, in this section, to

when surveyed by

meaning of these terms, and thereby remove some part of that obscurity, which is so much

power

reflection;

nor

is it

in our

to recal the original object, as often as

we

have occasion to contemplate it. Ambiguity, by this means, is gradually introduced into our reasonings: Similar objects are readily taken to be the same: And the conclusion becomes at last very wide of the premises. One may safely, however, affirm, that, if we consider these sciences in a proper light, their advantages and disadvantages nearly compensate each other, and reduce both of them to a state of equality. If the mind, with greater facility, retains the ideas of geometry clear and determinate, it must carry on a much longer and

more

intricate chain of reasoning,

and compare

much wider of each other, in order to reach the abstruser truths of that science. And if moral ideas

ideas are apt, without extreme care, to

fall

into

obscurity and confusion, the inferences are al-

ways much shorter in these disquisitions, and the intermediate steps, which lead to the conclusion, much fewer than in the sciences which treat of quantity and number. In reality, there is scarcely a proposition in Euclid so simple, as not

more parts, than are to be found in any moral reasoning which runs not into chimera and conceit. Where we trace the principles of

to consist of

the

human mind through

a few steps,

we may

all

fix, if

possible, the pre-

cise

complained of in this species of philosophy. It seems a proposition, which will not admit of much dispute, that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions, or, in other words, that

it is

impossible for us to think of anything,

which we have not antecedently/^, either by our external or internal senses. I have endeavoured 1 to explain and prove this proposition, and have expressed my hopes, that, by a proper application of it,

men may reach a greater clear-

and precision in philosophical reasonings, than what they have hitherto been able to attain. Complex ideas may, perhaps, be well known by definition, which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts or simple ideas, that compose them. But when we have pushed up definitions to the most simple ideas, and find still some ambiguity and obscurity; what resource are we then possessed of? By what invention can we throw light upon these ideas, and render them altogether precise and determinate to our intellectual view? Produce the impressions or original sentiments, from which the ideas are copied. These impressions are all strong and sensible. They admit not ness

of ambiguity.

They

are not only placed in a full

light themselves, but

may throw

light

on

their

any conclusion. And, perhaps, our progress in natural philosophy is chiefly retarded by the want of proper experi-

correspondent ideas, which lie in obscurity. And by this means, we may, perhaps, attain a new microscope or species of optics, by which, in the moral sciences, the most minute, and most simple ideas may be so enlarged as to fall readily under our apprehension, and be equally known with the grossest and most sensible ideas, that can be the object of our enquiry. 50. To be fully acquainted, therefore, with the idea of power or necessary connexion, let us examine its impression; and in order to find the impression with greater certainty, let us search

ments and phaenomena, which are often

for

be very well satisfied with our progress; considering how soon nature throws a bar to all our enquiries concerning causes, and reduces us to an acknowledgment of our ignorance. The chief obstacle, therefore, to our improvement in the moral or metaphysical sciences is the obscurity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms. The principal difficulty in the mathematics is the length of inferences and compass of thought, requisite to the forming of

dis-

covered by chance, and cannot always be found,

when

requisite,

even by the most diligent and

it

in all the sources,

sibly be derived.

Section

II.

from which

it

may

pos-

DAVID

472

When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover

any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects: Consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion. From the first appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect, even without experience; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it, by mere dint of thought and reasoning. In reality, there is no part of matter, that does ever, by its sensible qualities, discover any power or energy, or give us ground to imagine, that it could produce any thing, or be followed by any other object, which we could denominate its effect. Solidity,

extension, motion; these qualities

are all complete in themselves, and never point out any other event which may result from them. The scenes of the universe are continually shifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted succession; but the power of force, which actuates the whole machine, is entirely concealed from us, and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of body. We know, that, in fact, heat is a constant attendant of flame; but what is the connexion between them, we have no room so much as to conjecture or imagine. It is impossible, therefore, that the idea of power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies, in single instances of their operation; because no bodies ever discover any power, which can be the original of this idea. 1 51. Since, therefore, external objects as they

appear to the

senses, give us no idea of power or necessary connexion, by their operation in par-

ticular instances, let us see,

whether

this idea

be

1 Mr. Locke, in his chapter of power, says that, finding from experience, that there are several new productions in matter, and concluding that there must somewhere be a power capable of producing them, we arrive at last by this reasoning at the idea of power. But no reasoning can ever give us a new,

original, simple idea; as this philosopher himself confesses. This, therefore, can never be the origin of that idea.

HUME

SECT. VII

derived from reflection on the operations of our own minds, and be copied from any internal impression. It may be said, that we are every moment conscious of internal power; while we feel, that, by the simple command of our will, we can

move

the organs of our body, or direct the facour mind. An act of volition produces

ulties of

motion in our limbs, or raises a new idea in our imagination. This influence of the will we know

by consciousness. Hence we acquire the idea of power or energy; and are certain, that we ourselves and all other intelligent beings are possessed of power. This idea, then, is an idea of reflection, since it arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and on the command which is exercised by will, both over the organs of the body and faculties of the soul. 52. We shall proceed to examine this pretension; and first with regard to the influence of voover the organs of the body. This influobserve, is a fact, which, like all other natural events, can be known only be experience, and can never be foreseen from any apparent energy or power in the cause, which connects it with the effect, and renders the one lition

ence,

an

we may

infallible

tion of our

consequence of the other. The mo-

body

follows

upon the command of

our will. Of this we are every moment conscious. But the means, by which this is effected; the energy, by which the will performs so extraordinary an operation; of this we are so far from being immediately conscious, that it must for ever escape our most diligent enquiry. For first; is there any principle in all nature more mysterious than the union of soul with body; by which a supposed spiritual substance acquires such an influence over a material one, that the most refined thought is able to actuate

Were we empowered, by a remove mountains, or control the

the grossest matter? secret wish, to

planets in their orbit; this extensive authority

would not be more extraordinary, nor more beyond our comprehension. But if by consciousness we perceived any power or energy in the will, we must know this power; we must know its connexion with the effect; we must know the secret union of soul and body, and the nature of both these substances; by which the one is able to operate, in so many instances, upon the other. Secondly, We are not able to move all the organs of the body with a like authority; though we cannot assign any reason besides experience, for so remarkable a difference between one and the other. Why has the will an influence over the tongue and fingers, not over the heart or

PART

CONCERNING

I

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

This question would never embarrass us, were we conscious of a power in the former case, not in the latter. We should then perceive, inde-

liver?

pendent of experience, why the authority of will over the organs of the body is circumscribed within such particular limits. Being in that case fully acquainted with the power or force, by which it operates, we should also know, why its influence reaches precisely to such boundaries,

and no farther. A man, suddenly struck with palsy in the leg or arm, or who had newly lost those members, frequently endeavours, at first to move them, and employ them in their usual offices. Here he is as much conscious of power to command such limbs, as a

power

man

in perfect health

to actuate

is

conscious of

any member which remains

in

natural state and condition. But consciousness never deceives. Consequently, neither in the

its

one case nor

in the other, are

of any power.

we

ever conscious

teaches us,

how one

event constantly follows an-

other; without instructing us in the secret con-

nexion, which binds

them

them together, and renders

inseparable.

Thirdly, We learn from anatomy, that the immediate object of power in voluntary motion, is not the member itself which is moved, but cer-

tain muscles, and nerves, and animal spirits, and, perhaps, something still more minute and more unknown, through which the motion is successively propagated, ere itself

whose motion

volition.

is

it

reach the

member

the immediate object of

Can there be a more certain proof,

that

which this whole operation is performed, so far from being directly and fully known by an inward sentiment or consciousness, is, to the last degree, mysterious and unintelligible? Here the mind wills a certain event: Imthe power, by

mediately another event,

and

totally different

unknown

to ourselves,

from the one intended,

is

produced: This event produces another, equally unknown: Till at last, through a long succession, the desired event is produced. But if the original power were felt, it must be known: Were it known, its effect also must be known; since all

power is relative to its effect. And vice versa, if the be not known, the power cannot be known

effect

How

indeed can we be conscious of a move our limbs, when we have no such power; but only that to move certain animal nor

felt.

power

to

which, though they produce at last the motion of our limbs, yet operate in such a manner as is wholly beyond our comprehension? We may, therefore, conclude from the whole,

spirits,

and

That

motion follows the coma matter of common experience, like other natural events: But the power or office.

mand

their

of the will

energy by which

is

this

is

effected, like that in other

unknown and inconceivable. 53. Shall we then assert, that we are conscious of a power or energy in our own minds, when, by an act or command of our will, we raise up a new idea, fix the mind to the contemplation natural events,

of

1

is

turn it on all sides, and at last dismiss it some other idea, when we think that we have

it,

for

surveyed the

it

with sufficient accuracy?

same arguments

command

will prove, that

of the will gives us

no

I

believe

even

this

real idea of

force or energy.

We learn the influence of our will

from experience alone. And experience only

473

hope, without any temerity, though with assurance; that our idea of power is not copied from any sentiment or consciousness of power within ourselves, when we give rise to animal motion, or apply our limbs to their proper use I

must be allowed, that, when we know we know that very circumstance in the

First, It

a power,

by which it is enabled to produce the efFor these are supposed to be synonimous. We must, therefore, know both the cause and effect, and the relation between them. But do we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human soul and the nature of an idea, or the aptitude of the one to produce the other? This is a real creation a production of something cause,

fect:

;

out of nothing: Which implies a power so great, that it may seem, at first sight, beyond the reach

any being, less than infinite. At least it must be owned, that such a power is not felt, nor known, nor even conceivable by the mind. We only feel the event, namely, the existence of an idea, consequent to a command of the will: But of

1

It

may

be pretended, that the resistance which

we meet with

in bodies, obliging us frequently to exert our force, and call up all our power, this gives us the idea of force and power. It is this nisus, or strong endeavour, of which we are conscious, that is the original impression from which this idea is copied But, first, we attribute power to a vast number of objects, where we never can suppose this resistance of exertion of force to take place; to the Supreme Being, who never meets with any resistance; to the mind in its command over its ideas and limbs, in common thinking and motion, where the effect follows immediately upon the will, without any exertion or summoning up of force; to inanimate matter, which is not capable of this sentiment. Secondly, This sentiment of an endeavour to overcome resistance has no known connexion with any event: What follows it, we know by experience; but could not know it a priori. It must, however, be confessed, that the animal nisus, which we experience, though it can afford no accurate precise idea of power, enters very much into that vulgar, inaccurate idea, which is formed of it.

DAVID

474

the manner, in which this operation is performed, the power by which it is produced, is entirely beyond our comprehension. Secondly, self

is

The command

limited, as well as

of the

its

mind over

command

it-

over the

body; and these limits are not known by reason, or any acquaintance with the nature of cause and effect, but only by experience and observation, as in all other natural events and in the operation of external objects. Our authority over our sentiments and passions is much weaker than that over our ideas; and even the latter authority is circumscribed within very narrow boundaries. Will any one pretend to assign the ultimate reason of these boundaries, or show why the power is deficient in one case, not in another. Thirdly, This self-command is very different at different times. A man in health possesses more of it than one languishing with sickness. We are more master of our thoughts in the morning than in the evening: Fasting, than after a full meal. Can we give any reason for these variations, except experience? Where then is the power, of which we pretend to be conscious? Is there not here, either in a spiritual or material substance, or both, some secret mechanism or structure of parts, upon which the effect depends, and which, being entirely unknown to us, renders the power or energy of the will equally unknown and incomprehensible? Volition is surely an act of the mind, with which we are sufficiently acquainted. Reflect upon it. Consider it on all sides. Do you find anything in it like this creative power, by which it raises from nothing a new idea, and with a kind of Fiat, imitates the omnipotence of its Maker, if I may be allowed so to speak, who called forth into existence all the various scenes of nature? So far from being conscious of this energy in the will, it requires as certain experience as that of which we are possessed, to convince us that such extraordinary effects do ever result from a simple act of volition. 54.

The

generality of mankind never find

any

accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature such as the descent of heavy bodies, the growth of plants, the generation of animals, or the nourishment of bodies by food: But suppose that, in all these cases, they perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by which it is connected with its efdifficulty in

—

fect,

and

They

is for ever infallible in its operation. acquire, by long habit, such a turn of

mind, that, upon the appearance of the cause, they immediately expect with assurance its usual

HUME

SECT. VII

attendant, and hardly conceive

it

possible that

any other event could result from it. It is only on the discovery of extraordinary phaenomena, such as earthquakes, pestilence, and prodigies of any kind, that they find themselves at a loss to assign a proper cause, and to explain the manner in which the effect is produced by it. It is usual for men, in such difficulties, to have recourse to some invisible intelligent principle as the immediate cause of that event which surprises them, and which, they think, cannot be accounted for from the common powers of nature. But philosophers, who carry their scrutiny 1

immediately perceive that, even most familiar events, the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as in the most unusual, and that we only learn by experience the frequent Conjunction of objects, without being ever able to comprehend anything like Connexion between them. 55. Here, then, many philosophers think themselves obliged by reason to have recourse, on all occasions, to the same principle, which the vulgar never appeal to but in cases that appear miraculous and supernatural. They acknowledge a

little

farther,

in the

mind and mate and

intelligence to be, not only the ulti-

original cause of all things, but the

immediate and

sole cause of every event which appears in nature. They pretend that those ob-

which are commonly denominated causes, and that the true and direct principle of every effect is not any power or force in nature, but a volition of the Supreme Being, who wills that such particular objects should for ever be conjoined with each other. Instead of saying that one billiard-ball moves another by a force which it has derived from the author of nature, it is the Deity himself, they say, who, by a particular volition, moves the second ball, being determined to this operation by the impulse of the first ball, in consequence of those general laws which he has laid down to himself in the government of the universe. But philosophers advancing still in their jects

are in reality nothing but occasions;

inquiries, discover that, as

we

are totally ignor-

ant of the power on which depends the mutual operation of bodies, we are no less ignorant of that power on which depends the operation of mind on body, or of body on mind; nor are we able, either from our senses or consciousness, to assign the ultimate principle in one case more than in the other. The same ignorance, therefore, reduces them to the same conclusion. They assert that the Deity is the immediate cause of the union between soul and body; and that they ^eds

d™

firjxwhs (deus ex machine)

.

PART

CONCERNING

I

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

are not the organs of sense, which, being agitated by external objects, produce sensations in

the mind; but that

a particular volition of our omnipotent Maker, which excites such a sensation, in consequence of such a motion in the it is

organ. In like manner, it is not any energy in the will that produces local motion in our members: It

is

God

himself,

who

is

pleased to second

our will, in itself impotent, and to command that motion which we erroneously attribute to our

own power and

efficacy.

Nor do

philosophers

stop at this conclusion. They sometimes extend the same inference to the mind itself, in its internal operations. tion of ideas

is

Our mental vision

or concep-

nothing but a revelation

made

by our Maker. When we voluntarily turn our thoughts to any object, and raise up its image in the fancy, it is not the will which creates to us

that idea: It

covers

it

is

the universal Creator,

to the

mind, and renders

who

it

theory, they

diminish, instead of magnifying, the grandeur

much

to

more power in the degree of power to

Deity to delegate a certain than to produce every thing by his own immediate volition. It argues more wisdom to contrive at first the fabric of the world with such perfect foresight that, of itself, and by its proper operation, it may serve all the purposes of providence, than if the great Creator were obliged every moment to adjust its parts, and animate by his breath all the wheels of that stupendous machine. But if we would have a more philosophical confutation of this theory, perhaps the two following reflections may suffice. 57. First, it seems to me that this theory of the universal energy and operation of the Supreme Being is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man, sufficiently apprized of the weakness inferior creatures

of human reason,

and the narrow limits to which confined in all its operations. Though the chain of arguments which conduct to it were ever so logical, there must arise a strong suspi-

it is

cion,

if

not an absolute assurance, that

it

has

carried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties,

when

it

life

and ex-

We are got into fairy land, long ere we

have reached the last steps of our theory; and there we have no reason to trust our common methods of argument, or to think that our usual analogies and probabilities have any authority. Our line is too short to fathom such immense abysses. And however we may flatter ourselves that we are guided, in every step which we take, by a kind of verisimilitude and experience, we may be assured that this fancied experience has no authority when we thus apply it to subjects that

entirely out of the sphere of experience.

lie

But on wards 1

this

we shall have occasion to touch after-

.

Secondly, I

cannot perceive any force in the arthis theory is founded. We

guments on which are ignorant,

it is

true, of the

manner

in

which

ergy is entirely incomprehensible: But are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by which a mind, even the supreme mind, operates either on itself or on body? Whence, I beseech you, do we acquire any idea of it? We have no sentiment or consciousness of this power in ourselves. We have no idea of the Supreme Being but what we learn from reflection on our own faculties. Were our ignorance, therefore, a good reason for rejecting anything, we should be led into that principle of denying all energy in the Supreme Being as much as in the grossest matter. We surely comprehend as little the opera-

Thus, according to these philosophers, is full of God. Not content with the principle, that nothing exists but by his will, that nothing possesses any power but by his concession: They rob nature, and all created beings, of every power, in order to render their dependence on the Deity still more sensible and immed-

celebrate. It argues surely

475

common

present

56.

of those attributes, which they affect so

perience.

remote from

so

bodies operate on each other: Their force or en-

every thing

They consider not that, by this

and

dis-

to us.

iate.

nary,

leads to conclusions so extraordi-

one as of the other. Is it more difficult motion may arise from impulse than that it may arise from volition? All we know 2 is our profound ignorance in both cases. tions of

to conceive that

1

Section

xii.

need not examine at length the vis inertiae which is so much talked of in the new philosophy, and which is ascribed to matter. We find by experience, that a body at rest or in motion continues for ever in its present state, till put from it by some 2

1

that a body impelled takes as much motion from the impelling body as it acquires itself. These are facts. When we call this a vis inertiae,

new cause; and we

mark

these facts, without pretending to inert power; in the same manner as, when we talk of gravity, we mean certain effects, without comprehending that active power. It was never the meaning of Sir Isaac Newton to rob second causes of all force or energy; though some of his followers have endeavoured to establish that theory upon his authority. On the contrary, that great philosopher had recourse to an etherial active fluid to explain his universal attraction; though he was so cautious and modest as to allow, that it was a mere hypothesis, not to be insisted on, without more experiments. I must confess, that there is something in the fate of opinions a little extraordinary. Descartes insinuated that doctrine of

only

have any idea of the

DAVID

476

Part

II

58. But to hasten to a conclusion of this argument, which is already drawn out to too great a length: We have sought in vain for an idea of power or necessary connexion in all the sources from which we could suppose it to be derived. It appears that, in single instances of the operation of bodies, we never can, by our utmost scrutiny, discover anything but one event following another, without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the cause operates, or any connexion between it and its supposed effect. The same difficulty occurs in contemplat-

mind on body — where we motion of the latter to follow upon

ing the operations of

observe the

the volition of the former, but are not able to

observe or conceive the the motion

the

and

tie

which binds together energy by which

volition, or the

mind produces

this effect.

own

The and

authority of

is not a whit more comprehensible: So that, upon the whole, there appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of connexion which is conceiv-

the will over

its

faculties

able by us. All events

seem

ideas

entirely loose

and

One

event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected. And as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when separate.

employed

common

either in philosophical reasonings or

life.

remains one method of and one source which we have not yet examined. When any natural 59.

But there

avoiding

still

this conclusion,

object or event

is

presented,

it is

impossible for

by any sagacity or penetration, to discover, or even conjecture, without experience, what event will result from it, or to carry our foresight beyond that object which is immediately present to the memory and senses. Even after one instance or experiment where we have observed us,

a particular event to follow

upon another, we

are not entitled to form a general rule, or foretell

what will happen

the universal insisting

on

in like cases;

it

being justly

and sole efficacy of the Deity, without Malebranche and other Cartesians

it.

made it the foundation of all their philosophy. It had, however, no authority in England. Locke, Clarke, and Cudworth, never so much as take notice of it, but suppose all along, that matter has a real, though subordinate and derived power. By what means has it become so prevalent among our modern metaphysicians?

HUME

SECT. VII

esteemed an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course of nature from one single experiment, however accurate or certain. But when one particular species of event has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other, and of employing that reasoning, which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence. We then call the one object, Cause; the other, Effect. We suppose that there is some connexion between them; some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates with the greatest certainty It

and

strongest necessity.

appears, then, that this idea of a necessary

connexion

among

events arises from a

number

which occur of the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But of similar instances

there ferent

is

nothing in a number of instances,

from every

single instance,

which

is

dif-

sup-

posed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression

from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion. Nothing farther is in the case. Contemplate the subject on all sides; you will never find any other origin of that idea. This is the sole difference between one instance, from which we can never receive the idea of connexion, and a number of similar instances, by which it is suggested. The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of two billiard balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was connected: but only that it was conjoined with the other. After he has observed several instances of this nature, he then pronounces them to be connected. What alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of connexion? Nothing but that he now feels these events to be connected in his imagination, and can readily foretell the existence of one from the appear-

ance of the other. When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's existence: A conclusion which is somewhat extraordinary, but which seems founded on sufficient evidence. Nor will its evidence be weakened by any gen-

PART

CONCERNING

II

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING two

eral diffidence of the understanding, or sceptical

these

suspicion concerning every conclusion which is new and extraordinary. No conclusions can be

idea of

more agreeable

to scepticism

than such as make

discoveries concerning the weakness and limits of human reason and capacity.

narrow

60. And what stronger instance can be produced of the surprising ignorance and weakness of the understanding than the present? For surely, if there be any relation among objects which it imports to us to know perfectly, it is that of cause and effect. On this are founded all our reasonings concerning matter of fact or existence. By means of it alone we attain any assurance concerning objects which are removed from the present testimony of our memory and senses. The only immediate utility of all sciences, is to teach us, how to control and regulate future events by their causes. Our thoughts and

enquiries are, therefore, every

moment, em-

Yet so imperfect are the ideas which we form concerning it, that it ployed about

this relation:

is impossible to give any just definition of cause, except what is drawn from something extraneous and foreign to it. Similar objects are always conjoined with similar. Of this we have experience. Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an object, followed by an-

other,

and where

all the objects similar to the jirst are

followed by objects similar

words

to the second.

Or

in other

where, if the first object had not been, the sec-

existed. The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind, by a customary tran-

ond never had

sition, to the

idea of the effect.

Of

this also

we

have experience. We may, therefore, suitably to this experience, form another definition of cause,

and

call

it,

an object followed by another, and whose

appearance always conveys the thought

to that other.

But though both these definitions be drawn from circumstances foreign to the cause, we cannot remedy this inconvenience, or attain any more perfect definition, which may point out that circumstance in the cause, which gives it a connexion with its effect. We have no idea of this connexion, nor even any distinct notion what it is we desire to know, when we endeavour at a conception of

it.

We

say, for instance, that the vi-

bration of this string lar sound.

is

the cause of this particu-

But what do we mean by that

mation?

We either mean

lowed by

this sound,

and

affir-

that this vibration is fol-

that all similar vibrations

have been followed by similar sounds: Or, that this vibration is followed by this sound,

and

that upon the

appearance of one the mind anticipates the senses, and forms immediately an idea of the other. We may consider the relation of cause and effect in either of

61.

it.

To

lights;

477

but beyond these,

we have no

1

recapitulate, therefore, the reasonings

of this section: Every idea

is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment; and where we cannot find any impression, we may be certain that there is no idea. In all single instances of the operation of bodies or minds, there is nothing that produces any impression, nor consequently can suggest any idea of power or necessary connexion. But when many uniform instances appear, and the same object is always followed by the same event; we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connexion. We then/**/ a new sentiment or impression, to wit, a customary connexion in the thought or imagination between one object and its usual attendant; and this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for. For as this idea arises from a number of similar instances, and not from

any

single instance,

it

must

arise

from that

cir-

cumstance, in which the number of instances dif1 According to these explications and definitions, che idea of power

is

relative as

much

as that of cause;

and both have a reference to an effect, or some other constantly conjoined with the former. When consider the unknown circumstance of an object, by which the degree or quantity of its effect is fixed and determined, we call that its power: And accordingly, it is allowed by all philosophers, that the effect is the measure of the power. But if they had any idea of power, as it is in itself, why could not they Measure it in itself? The dispute whether the force of a body in motion be as its velocity, or the square of its velocity; this dispute, I say, need not be decided by comparing its effects in equal or unequal times; but by a direct mensuration and ,-vent

,ve

comparison.

As er,

to the frequent use of the words, Force,

Energy,

&c, which every where occur

in

Powcom-

mon

conversation, as well as in philosophy; that is proof, that we are acquainted, in any instance, with the connecting principle between cause and effect, or can account ultimately for the production of one thing to another. These words, as commonly used, have very loose meanings annexed to them; and their ideas are very uncertain and confused. No animal can put external bodies in motion without the sentiment of a nisus or endeavour; and every animal has a sentiment or feeling from the stroke or blow of an external object that is in motion. These sensations, which are merely animal, and from which we can a priori draw no inference, we are apt to transfer to inanimate objects, and to suppose, that they have some such feelings, whenever they transfer or receive motion. With regard to energies, which are exerted, without our annexing to them any idea of communi-

no

cated motion, we consider only the constant experienced conjunction of the events; and as we feel a customary connexion between the ideas, we transfer that feeling to the objects; as nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation, which they occasion.

DAVID

478

from every individual instance. But this customary connexion or transition of the imagination is the only circumstance in which they dif-

fer

fer. first

In every other particular they are alike. The instance which we saw of motion commu-

nicated by the shock of two billiard balls (to return to this obvious illustration) is exactly similar to

any instance that may,

to us; except only, that

at present, occur

we could

not, at

first,

one event from the other; which we are enabled to do at present, after so long a course of uniform experience. I know not whether the reader will readily apprehend this reasoning. I am afraid that, should I multiply words about it, or throw it into a greater variety of lights, it infer

would only become more obscure and intricate. In all abstract reasonings there is one point of view which, if we can happily hit, we shall go farther towards illustrating the subject than by all the eloquence and copious expression in the world. This point of view we should endeavour to reach, and reserve the flowers of rhetoric for subjects which are more adapted to them.

HUME

SECT. VIII

over their antagonists. It is true, if men attempt the discussion of questions which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, such as those concerning the origin of worlds, or the economy of the intellectual system or region of spirits, they

may

long beat the air in their

and never

fruitless contests,

any determinate conclusion. But if the question regard any subject of common life and experience, nothing, one would think, could preserve the dispute so long undecided but some ambiguous expressions, which keep the antagonists still at a distance, and hinder them from grappling with each other. 63. This has been the case in the long disputed question concerning liberty and necessity; and to so remarkable a degree that, if I be not much mistaken, we shall find, that all mankind, both learned and ignorant, have always been of the same opinion with regard to this subject, and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controversy. I own that this dispute has been so much canvassed on all hands, and has led philosophers inarrive at

to such a labyrinth of obscure sophistry, that

Sect. VIII.

Of

Liberty and Necessity

Part

is

no wonder,

if

it

a sensible reader indulge his ease

so far as to turn a deaf ear to the proposal of such I

a question, from which he can expect neither in-

It might reasonably be expected in questions

struction or entertainment. But the state of the

which have been canvassed and disputed with

argument here proposed may, perhaps, serve to

great eagerness, since the

his attention; as it has more novelty, promises at least some decision of the controversy, and will not much disturb his ease by any intricate or obscure reasoning. I hope, therefore, to make it appear that all men have ever agreed in the doctrine both of necessity and of liberty, according to any reasonable sense, which can be put on these terms; and that the whole controversy has hitherto turned merely upon words. We shall begin with examining the doctrine of necessity. 64. It is universally allowed that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a necessary force, and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted from it. The degree and direction of every motion is, by the laws of nature, prescribed with such exactness that a living creature may as soon arise from the shock of two bodies in motion in any other degree or direction than what is actually produced by it. Would we,

62

.

first

origin of science

and philosophy, that the meaning of

all the

terms, at least, should have been agreed

among

the disputants;

and our

upon

enquiries, in the

course of two thousand years, been able to pass from words to the true and real subject of the controversy. For how easy may it seem to give exact definitions of the terms employed in reasoning, and make these definitions, not the mere sound of words, the object of future scrutiny and examination? But if we consider the matter more

narrowly, we shall be apt to draw a quite oppoconclusion. From this circumstance alone,

site

that a controversy has been long kept

and remains that there

is

on

foot,

undecided, we may presume some ambiguity in the expression, still

and that the disputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the controversy. For as the faculties of the mind are supposed to be naturally alike in every individual; otherwise noth-

ing could be

more

pute together;

it

fruitless than to reason or diswere impossible, if men affix the

same ideas to their terms,

that they could so long

renew

therefore,

form a just and precise idea of necessity,

they communicate their views, and

we must consider whence that idea arises when we apply it to the operation of bodies.

each party turn themselves on all sides, in search of arguments which may give them the victory

It seems evident that, if all the scenes of nature were continually shifted in such a manner that

form different opinions of the same subject; especially

when

PART

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CONCERNING

I

no two events bore any resemblance to each othbut every object was entirely new, without any similitude to whatever had been seen before, we should never, in that case, have attained the least idea of necessity, or of a connexion among these objects. We might say, upon such a supposition, that one object or event has followed another; not that one was produced by the other. The relation of cause and effect must be utterly unknown to mankind. Inference and reasoning concerning the operations of nature would, from that moment, be at an end; and the memory and senses remain the only canals, by which the knowledge of any real existence could possibly have access to the mind. Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation arises entirely from the er,

uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where similar objects are constantly con-

Mankind

to the latter.

chief use

is

men

come acquainted with

human

quainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other external objects, by the experiments which he forms concerning them. Nor are the

to those

it

appear, therefore, that

all

mankind have

voluntary actions of men, and in the operations of mind;

it

must

follow, that all

mankind have

ever agreed in the doctrine of necessity, and that they have hitherto disputed, merely for not understanding each other. 65. As to the first circumstance, the constant and regular conjunction of similar events, we may possibly satisfy ourselves by the following considerations. It is universally acknowledged

that there tions of

is

men,

a great uniformity in all nations

human nature remains still

and

among ages,

the ac-

and that

the same, in

its

prin-

and operations. The same motives always produce the same actions: The same events follow from the same causes. Ambition, avarice,

ciples

self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, spirit: these passions,

mixed

public

in various degrees,

and distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprises, which have ever been observed among mankind. Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? Study well the temper and actions of the French and English: You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former most of the observations which you have made with regard

the regular springs of

and behaviour. These records of wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions, are so many collections of experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his science, in the same manner as the physician or natural philosopher becomes acaction

Beyond the constant conjunction of similar oband the consequent inference from one to the other, we have no notion of any necessity or conIf

nature, by show-

uations,

Aristotle,

ever allowed, without any doubt or hesitation, that these two circumstances take place in the

human

in all varieties of circumstances

earth, water,

nexion.

the same, in

and sitand furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations and being

mind is determined by one from the appearance of the other. These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity, which we ascribe to matter.

much

only to discover the constant and

universal principles of

custom

jects,

are so

times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its all

joined together, and the to infer the

479

and other elements, examined by and Hippocrates, more like to those which at present lie under our observation than the men described by Polybius and Tacitus are

who now govern

Should a

the world.

from a far counbring us an account of men, wholly different from any with whom we were ever acquainted; traveller, returning

try,

men, who were entirely divested of avarice, ambition, or revenge; who knew no pleasure but friendship, generosity, and public spirit; we should immediately, from these circumstances, detect the falsehood, and prove him a liar, with the same certainty as if he had stuffed his narration with stories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and prodigies. And if we would explode any forgery in history, we cannot make use of a more convincing argument, than to prove, that the actions ascribed to any person are directly contrary to the course of nature, and that no hu-

man

motives, in such circumstances, could ever induce him to such a conduct. The veracity of Quintus Curtius is as much to be suspected, when he describes the supernatural courage of Alexander, by which he was hurried on singly to attack multitudes, as when he describes his supernatural force and activity, by which he was able to resist them. So readily and universally do we acknowledge a uniformity in human motives and actions as well as in the operations of body.

Hence

likewise the benefit of that experience,

acquired by long life and a variety of business and company, in order to instruct us in the principles of human nature, and regulate our future conduct, as well as speculation. By means of this guide, we mount up to the knowledge of men's inclinations

and motives, from

their actions, ex-

DAVID

480

and again descend from our knowledge of their motives and inclinations. The general observations treasured up by a pressions,

and even

gestures;

to the interpretation of their actions

course of experience, give us the clue of human nature, and teach us to unravel all its intricacies. Pretexts and appearances no longer deceive us. Public declarations pass for the specious colouring of a cause.

And though

virtue

and honour

be allowed their proper weight and authority, that perfect disinterestedness, so often pretended to, is never expected in multitudes and parties; seldom in their leaders; and scarcely even in individuals of any rank or station. But were there no uniformity in human actions, and were every experiment which we could form of this kind irregular and anomalous, it were impossible to collect any general observations concerning mankind; and no experience, however accurately digested by reflection, would ever serve to any purpose. Why is the aged husbandman more skilful in his calling than the young beginner but because there is a certain uniformity in the operation of the sun, rain, and earth towards the production of vegetables; and experience teaches the old practitioner the rules

by

governed and directed. 66. We must not, however, expect that this uniformity of human actions should be carried to such a length as that all men, in the same circumstances, will always act precisely in the same manner, without making any allowance for the

which

this

operation

is

and opinions. Such a uniformity in every particular, is found in no part of nature. On the contrary, from observing the variety of conduct in different men, we are enabled to form a greater variety of maxims, which still suppose a degree of uniformity and regularity. Are the manners of men different in different ages and countries? We learn thence the great force of custom and education, which mould the human mind from its infancy and form it into a fixed and established character. Is the behaviour and conduct of the one sex very unlike that of the other? Is it thence we become acquainted with the different characters which nature has impressed upon the sexes, and which she preserves with constancy and regularity? Are the actions of the same person much diversified in the different periods of his life, from diversity of characters, prejudices,

infancy to old age? This affords

room

for

many

general observations concerning the gradual

change of our sentiments and inclinations, and the different maxims which prevail in the different ages of

human

creatures.

Even the charac-

HUME ters,

SECT. VIII

which are peculiar

to

each individual, have

a uniformity in their influence; otherwise our acquaintance with the persons and our observation of their conduct could never teach us their dispositions, or serve to direct our behaviour with regard to them. 67. I grant it possible to find some actions, which seem to have no regular connexion with any known motives, and are exceptions to all the measures of conduct which have ever been established for the

government of men. But

if

we would willingly know what judgement should be formed of such irregular and extraordinary we may consider the sentiments commonly entertained with regard to those irregular events which appear in the course of nature, and the operations of external objects. All causes are not conjoined to their usual effects with like uniformity. An artificer, who handles only dead matter, may be disappointed of his aim, as well as the politician, who directs the conduct of actions,

sensible

The

and

intelligent agents.

vulgar,

who

take things according to

their first appearance, attribute the uncertainty

of events to such an uncertainty in the causes as

makes the

latter often fail of their usual influ-

ence; though they meet with no impediment in their operation. But philosophers, observing that, almost in every part of nature, there is contained a vast variety of springs and principles, which are hid, by reason of their minuteness or remoteness, find, that it is at least possible the contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency in the cause, but from the secret operation of contrary causes. This possibility is converted into certainty by farther observation, when they remark that, upon an exact scrutiny, a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes, and proceeds from their mutual opposition. A peasant can give no better reason for the stopping of any clock or watch than to say that it does not commonly go right:

But an

same force pendulum has always the same

artist easily perceives that the

in the spring or

on the wheels; but fails of its usual perhaps by reason of a grain of dust, which puts a stop to the whole movement. From influence

effect,

the observation of several parallel instances, philosophers form a maxim that the connexion between all causes and effects is equally neces-

and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of

sary,

contrary causes. Thus, for instance, in the human body, when the usual symptoms of health or sickness disappoint our expectation; when medicines op-

PART

CONCERNING

I

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

wonted powers; when irregfrom any particular cause; the philosopher and physician are not surprised at the matter, nor are ever tempted to deny, in general, the necessity and uniformity of those principles by which the animal economy is conducted. They know that a human body is a mighty complicated machine: That many secret powers lurk in it, which are altogether beyond our comprehension: That to us it must often appear very uncertain in its operations: And that therefore the irregular events, which outwardly discover themselves, can be no proof erate not with their

ular events follow

that the laws of nature are not observed with

the greatest regularity in

its

internal operations

68. The philosopher, if he be consistent, must apply the same reasoning to the actions and volitions of intelligent agents. The most irregular and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by those who know every particular circumstance of their character and situation. A person of an obliging disposition gives a peevish answer: But he has the

toothache, or has not dined.

A

stupid fellow

uncommon alacrity in his carriage:

discovers an

But he has met with a sudden piece of good fortune. Or even when an action, as sometimes happens, cannot be particularly accounted for, either by the person himself or by others; we know, in general, that the characters of men are, to a certain degree, inconstant

and

irregu-

manner, the constant character of human nature; though it be applicable, in a more particular manner, to some persons who have no fixed rule for their conduct, but pro-

lar.

This

is,

in a

ceed in a continued course of caprice and inconstancy. The internal principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner, notwithstanding these seeming irregularities; in the same manner as the winds, rain, clouds, and other variations of the weather are supposed to be governed by steady principles; though not easily discoverable by 69.

human

Thus

it

sagacity

and enquiry.

appears, not only that the con-

and voluntary actions and uniform as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature; but also junction between motives

is

as regular

that this regular conjunction has been univer-

acknowledged among mankind, and has never been the subject of dispute, either in philosophy or common life. Now, as it is from past experience that we draw all inferences concerning the future, and as we conclude that objects will always be conjoined together which we find to have always been conjoined; it may seem sally

superfluous to prove that this experienced uniformity in human actions is a source whence we

draw

inferences concerning them. But in order to throw the argument into a greater variety of lights we shall also insist, though briefly, on this

latter topic.

The mutual dependence

of

men

is

so great in

any human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some reference to the actions of others, which are requisite to make it answer fully the intenall societies

that scarce

The poorest artificer, who labours alone, expects at least the protection of the magistrate, to ensure him the enjoyment of tion of the agent.

the fruits of his labour.

when he

and government.

481

He

also expects that,

goods to market, and offers them at a reasonable price, he shall find purchasers, and shall be able, by the money he acquires, to engage others to supply him with those commodities which are requisite for his subsistence. In proportion as men extend their dealings, and render their intercourse with others more complicated, they always comprehend, in their schemes of life, a greater variety of voluntary actions, which they expect, from the proper motives, to co-operate with their own. In all these conclusions they take their measures from past experience, in the same manner as in their reasonings concerning excarries his

ternal objects;

well as

all

operations, the

them.

and firmly

believe that

men,

as

the elements, are to continue, in their

same that they have ever found

A manufacturer reckons upon

the labour

work as which he employs, and would be equally surprised were his expectaof his servants for the execution of any

much

as

upon

the tools

tions disappointed. In short, this experimental

inference

and reasoning concerning the actions much into human life that no

of others enters so

man, while awake, employing affirm that

is

ever a

moment without

Have we not reason, therefore, all mankind have always agreed

it.

to in

the doctrine of necessity according to the fore-

going definition and explication of it? 70. Nor have philosophers ever entertained a different opinion from the people in this particular. For, not to mention that almost every action of their life supposes that opinion, there are even few of the speculative parts of learning to which it is not essential. What would become of history, had we not a dependence on the veracity of the historian according to the experience which we have had of mankind? How could politics be a science, if laws and forms of government had not a uniform influence upon society? Where would be the foundation of morals, if par-

— DAVID

482

had no certain or determinate produce particular sentiments, and if these sentiments had no constant operation on actions? And with what pretence could we employ our criticism upon any poet or polite author, if we could not pronounce the conduct and sentiments of his actors either natural or unnatural to such characters, and in such circumstances? It seems almost impossible, therefore, to engage either in science or action of any kind without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, and this inference from motive to voluntary actions, from characters to conduct.

HUME

SECT. VIII

and shake and tumble my house about my change the suppositions.

ticular characters

arise,

power

ears. I shall therefore

to

And natural

indeed,

when we

consider

and moral evidence

how

link together,

aptly

and

I shall say that I know with certainty that he is not to put his hand into the fire and hold it there till it be consumed: And this event, I think I can foretell with the same assurance, as that, if he throw himself out at the window, and meet with

no obstruction, he will not remain a moment suspended in the air. No suspicion of an unknown frenzy can give the least possibility to the former event, which is so contrary to all the

known

principles of

human

nature.

A man who

noon leaves his purse full of gold on the pavement at Charing Cross, may as well expect that at

it

will fly

away like

a feather, as that he will find

form only one chain of argument, we shall make no scruple to allow that they are of the same nature, and derived from the same principles.

reasonings contain inferences of a similar nature, attended with more or less degrees

A prisoner who has

of certainty proportioned to our experience of

neither

money nor

interest,

it

untouched an hour

after.

Above one

half of

human

discovers the impossibility of his escape, as well

the usual conduct of mankind in such particular

when he

situations.

considers the obstinacy of the gaoler,

as the walls

and bars with which he

ed; and, in

all

rather to one, than

The same

is surroundattempts for his freedom, chooses

work upon the stone and iron of the upon the inflexible nature of the other.

when conducted to the scafdeath as certainly from the con-

prisoner,

fold, foresees his

stancy and fidelity of his guards, as from the operation of the axe or wheel. His mind runs

along a certain train of ideas: The refusal of the soldiers to consent to his escape; the action of the executioner; the separation of the head and body; bleeding, convulsive motions, and death. Here is a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions; but the mind feels no difference between them in passing from one link to another: Nor is less certain of the future event than if it were connected with the objects present to the memory or senses, by a train of causes, cemented together by what we are pleased to call a physical necessity. The same experienced union has the same effect on the mind, whether the united objects be motives, volition, and actions; or figure and motion. We may change the name of things; but their nature and their operation on the understanding never change. Were a man, whom I know to be honest and opulent, and with whom I live in intimate friend-

come into my house, where I am surrounded with my servants, I rest assured that he is not to stab me before he leaves it in order to rob me of my silver standish; and I no more ship, to

suspect this event than the falling of the house

which is new, and solidly built and foundBut he may have been seized with a sudden and unknown frenzy. So may a sudden earthquake itself,

ed.

—

have frequently considered, what could why all mankind, though they have ever, without hesitation, acknowledged the doctrine of necessity in their whole practice and reasoning, have yet discovered such a reluctance to acknowledge it in words, and have rather shown a propensity, in all ages, to 7

1

.

I

possibly be the reason

profess the contrary opinion.

The matter,

I

think,

may

be accounted for after the following manner. If we examine the operations of body, and the production of effects from their causes, we shall find that all our faculties can never carry us farther in our knowledge of this relation than barely to observe that particular objects are

and that the mind by a customary transition, from the appearance of one to the belief of the other. But though this conclusion concerning human ig-

constantly conjoined together, is

carried,

norance be the result of the

strictest scrutiny of

men still entertain

a strong propenthey penetrate farther into the powers of nature, and perceive something like a necessary connexion between the cause this subject,

sity to believe that

When again they turn their retowards the operations of their own minds, and feel no such connexion of the motive and the action; they are thence apt to suppose, that there is a difference between the effects and the

effect.

flections

which result from material force, and those which arise from thought and intelligence. But being once convinced that we know nothing farther of causation of any kind than merely the constant conjunction of objects, and the consequent inference of the mind from one to another, and finding that these two circumstances are universally

PART

CONCERNING

I

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

allowed to have place in voluntary actions; we may be more easily led to own the same neces-

common to all causes. And though this may contradict the systems of many

sity

reasoning

philosophers, in ascribing necessity to the deter-

minations of the

will,

we

tion, that they dissent

shall find,

from

it

in

upon

reflec-

words only, not

in their real sentiment. Necessity, according to

the sense in which it is here taken, has never yet been rejected, nor can ever, I think, be rejected by any philosopher. It may only, perhaps, be pretended that the mind can perceive, in the operations of matter, some farther connexion between the cause and effect; and connexion that has not place in voluntary actions of intelligent beings. Now whether it be so or not, can only appear upon examination; and it is incumbent on these philosophers to make good their assertion, sity,

by defining or describing that neces-

and pointing

it

out to us in the operations

483

dent that these have a regular conjunction with motives and circumstances and characters, and as we always draw inferences from one to the other, we must be obliged to acknowledge in words that necessity, which we have already avowed, in every deliberation of our lives, and in every step of our conduct and behaviour. 1 73. But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the question of liberty and necessity; the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science; it will not require many words to prove, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty as well as in that of necessity,

and that the whole

dis-

pute, in this respect also, has been hitherto merely verbal.

For what

is

meant by liberty, when apWe cannot surely

plied to voluntary actions?

The prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted for, from another cause, viz. a false sensation or seeming experience which we have, or 1

of material causes.

may

would seem, indeed, that men begin at the wrong end of this question concerning liberty and necessity, when they enter upon it by examining the faculties of the soul, the influence of the understanding, and the operations of the will. Let them first discuss a more simple question, namely, the operations of body and of brute unintelligent matter; and try whether they can there form any idea of causation and neces-

our actions. The necessity of any action, whether of matter or of mind, is not, properly speaking, a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or intelligent being, who may consider the action; and it consists chiefly in the determination of his thoughts to infer the existence of that action from some preceding objects; as liberty, when opposed to necessity, is nothing but the want of that determination,

72. It

except that of a constant conjunction of and subsequent inference of the mind from one to another. If these circumstances form, sity,

objects,

in reality, the

whole of that

necessity,

which we

conceive in matter, and if these circumstances be also universally acknowledged to take place in the operations of the mind, the dispute is at an end; at least, must be owned to be thenceforth merely verbal. ly suppose, that

necessity

But

as long as

we have some

we

will rash-

farther idea of

and causation in the operations of exsame time, that we can

ternal objects; at the

find nothing farther in the voluntary actions of

the mind; there is no possibility of bringing the question to any determinate issue, while we proceed upon so erroneous a supposition. The only method of undeceiving us is to mount up higher; to examine the narrow extent of science when applied to material causes; and to convince our-

we know of them is the constant conjunction and inference above mentioned. We may, perhaps, find that it is with difficulty we are induced to fix such narrow limits to human understanding: But we can afterwards find

selves that all

no

difficulty

when we come

to

trine to the actions of the will.

apply this docFor as it is evi-

have, of liberty or indifference, in

many

of

certain looseness or indifference, which we passing, or not passing, from the idea of one object to that of any succeeding one. Now we may observe, that, though, in reflecting on human actions, we seldom feel such a looseness, or indifference, but are commonly able to infer them with considerable certainty from their motives, and from the dispositions of the agent; yet it frequently happens, that, in performing the actions themselves, we are sensible of something like it: And as all resembling objects are readily taken for each other, this

and a

feel, in

has been employed as a demonstrative and even intuitive proof of human liberty. We feel, that our actions are subject to our will, on most occasions; and imagine we feel, that the will itself is subject to nothing, because, when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel, that it moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself (or a Velle'ity, as it is called in the schools) even on that side, on which it did not settle. This image, or faint motion, we persuade ourselves, could, at that time, have been compleated into the thing itself; because, should that be denied, we find, upon a second trial, that, at present, it can. We consider not, that the fantastical desire of shewing liberty, is here the motive of our actions. And it seems certain, that, however we may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition. Now this is the very essence of necessity, according to the foregoing doctrine.

DAVID

484

mean

that actions have so

little

connexion with

and circumstances,

motives, inclinations,

that

one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other, and that one affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the other. For these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact. By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according

to the

determinations of the will; that

choose to remain at to

rest,

move, we also may.

erty

is

who

we may;

if

is, if

we

we choose

Now this hypothetical lib-

universally allowed to belong to every one

not a prisoner and in chains. Here, then, no subject of dispute. 74. Whatever definition we may give of liberty, we should be careful to observe two requiis

is

site

circumstances;^™*, that

it

be consistent with

plain matter of fact; secondly, that it be consistent

with itself. If we observe these circumstances, and render our definition intelligible, I am persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with regard to it. It is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its existence, and that chance, when strictly examined, is a mere negative word, and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in nature. But it is pretended that

some causes are necessary, some not necessary. Here then is the advantage of definitions. Let any one define a cause, without comprehending, as a part of the definition, a necessary connexion

and

him show

HUME liberty,

SECT. VIII

when opposed

to necessity, not to con-

same thing with chance; which universally allowed to have no existence.

straint,

is

the

Part

is

II

75. There is no method of reasoning more common, and yet none more blameable, than, in

philosophical disputes, to endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis, by a pretence of its dan-

gerous consequences to religion and morality. When any opinion leads to absurdities, it is certainly false; but it is not certain that an opinion is false, because it is of dangerous consequence. Such topics, therefore, ought entirely to be forborne; as serving nothing to the discovery of truth, but only to make the person of an antagonist odious. This I observe in general, without pretending to draw any advantage from it. I frankly submit to an examination of this kind, and shall venture to affirm that the doctrines, both of necessity and of liberty, as above explained, are not only consistent with morality, but are absolutely essential to its

support.

may be defined two ways, conformably to the two definitions of cause, of which it Necessity

makes an essential part. It consists either in the constant conjunction of like objects or in the inference of the understanding from one object to

another. Now necessity, in both these senses, (which, indeed, are at bottom the same) has uni-

and I shall But if the foregoing explication of the matter be received, this must be absolutely impractic-

though tacitly, in the schools, in the and in common life, been allowed to belong to the will of man; and no one has ever pretended to deny that we can draw inferences concerning human actions, and that those inferences

Had not objects a regular conjunction with

are founded on the experienced union of like ac-

with

its effect;

let

distinctly the

by the definition; readily give up the whole controver-

origin of the idea, expressed

sy.

able.

each other, we should never have entertained any notion of cause and effect; and this regular

versally, pulpit,

tions,

with

and

cir-

particular in which

any

like motives, inclinations,

cumstances.

The only

that either, perhaps, he will

conjunction produces that inference of the unis the only connexion, that

one can

derstanding, which

refuse to give the

we can have any comprehension of. Whoever at-

erty of human actions: But as long as the

tempts a definition of cause, exclusive of these circumstances, will be obliged either to employ unintelligible terms or such as are synonymous to the term which he endeavours to define. 1 And if the definition above mentioned be admitted; 1 Thus, if a cause be defined, that which produces

understood, I hope the word can do no harm: Or that he will maintain it possible to discover something farther in the operations of matter. But this, it must be acknowledged, can be of no consequence to morality or religion, whatever it may be to natural philosophy or metaphysics. We may here be mistaken in asserting that there is no idea of any other necessity or connexion in the actions of body: But surely we ascribe nothing to the actions of the mind, but what everyone does, and must readily allow of. We change no circumstance in the received orthodox system with regard to the will, but only in that with regard to material objects and

any thing;

easy to observe, that producing is syto causing. In like manner, if a cause be defined, that by which any thing exists; this is liable to the same objection. For what is meant by these words, by which? Had it been said, that a cause is that after which any thing constantly exists; we should it is

nonimous

have understood the terms. For

this is, indeed, all of the matter. And this constancy forms the very essence of necessity, nor have we any other idea of it.

we know

ing

is

differ,

is,

name

of necessity to this prop-

mean-

PART

CONCERNING

II

causes. Nothing, therefore, can be than this doctrine.

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

more inno-

cent, at least,

76. All laws being founded on rewards and punishments, it is supposed as a fundamental principle, that these motives have a regular and uniform influence on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions. We

may give to

this influence

what name we

please;

but as it is usually conjoined with the action, it must be esteemed a cause, and be looked upon as

an instance of that

necessity,

which we would

here establish. The only proper object of hatred or vengeance

a person or creature, endowed with thought and consciousness; and when any criminal or injurious actions excite that passion, it is only by is

their relation to the person, or

connexion with

him. Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy if evil. The actions themselves may be blameable; they may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion: But the person is not answerable for them; and as they proceeded from nothing in him that is durable and constant, and leave nothing of that nature behind them, it is impossible he can, upon their account, become the object of punishment or vengeance. According to the principle, therefore, which denies necessity, and consequently causes, a man is as pure and untainted, after having committed the most horrid crime, as at the first moment of his birth, nor is his character anywise concerned in his actions, since they are not derived from it, and the wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof of the depravity of the other. Men are not blamed for such actions as they perform ignorantly and casually, whatever may be the consequences. Why? but because the principles of these actions are only momentary, and terminate in them alone. Men are less blamed for such actions as they perform hastily and unpremeditately than for such as proceed from deliberation. For what reason? but because a hasty temper, though a constant cause or principle in the mind, operates only by intervals, and infects not the whole character. Again, repentance wipes off every crime, if attended with a reformation of life and manners. How is this to be accounted for? but by asserting that actions render a person criminal merely as they are proofs of criminal principles in the mind; and when, by an alteration of these principles, they cease to be just proofs, they likewise cease to be criminal.

485

upon the doctrine of necessity, they never were just proofs, and consequently never

But, except

were criminal. be equally easy to prove, and from same arguments, that liberty, according to that definition above mentioned, in which all men agree is also essential to morality, and that no human actions, where it is wanting, are susceptible of any moral qualities, or can be the ob77. It will

the

jects either of

approbation or dislike. For as acour moral sentiment, so far

tions are objects of

only as they are indications of the internal character, passions, and affections; it is impossible that they can give rise either to praise or blame, where they proceed not from these principles, but are derived altogether from external violence. 78. 1 all

pretend not to have obviated or removed

objections to this theory, with regard to ne-

cessity

and

liberty. I

can foresee other objections,

derived from topics which have not here been treated of. It may be said, for instance, that, if voluntary actions be subjected to the same laws of necessity with the operations of matter, there is a continued chain of necessary causes, preordained and pre-determined, reaching from the original cause of all to every single volition of every human creature. No contingency any-

where in the universe; no indifference; no liberty. While we act, we are, at the same time, acted upon. The ultimate Author of all our volitions is the Creator of the world, who first bestowed motion on this immense machine, and placed all beings in that particular position, whence every subsequent event, by an inevitable necessity, must result. Human actions, therefore, either can have no moral turpitude at all, as proceeding from so good a cause; or if they have any turpitude, they must involve our Creator in the same guilt, while he is acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author. For as a man, who fired a mine, is answerable for all the consequences whether the train he employed be long or short; so wherever a continued chain of necessary causes infinite,

is

fixed, that Being, either finite or

who produces the first, is likewise the au-

rest, and must both bear the blame and acquire the praise which belong to them. Our clear and unalterable ideas of morality establish this rule, upon unquestionable reasons, when we examine the consequences of any human action; and these reasons must still have greater force when applied to the volitions and intentions of a Being infinitely wise and power-

thor of all the

ful.

Ignorance or impotence

so limited a creature as

may be

man; but

pleaded for

those imper-

DAVID

4 86

fections have no place in our Creator. He foresaw, he ordained, he intended all those actions of men, which we so rashly pronounce criminal. And we must therefore conclude, either that they

HUME

SECT. VIII

are not criminal, or that the Deity, not man, is accountable for them. But as either of these positions is absurd and impious, it follows, that the doctrine from which they are deduced cannot possibly be true, as being liable to all the same objections. An absurd consequence, if necessary, proves the original doctrine to be absurd; in the same manner as criminal actions render criminal the original cause, if the connexion between

where they now excite such acute torments. These enlarged views may, for a moment, please the imagination of a speculative man, who is placed in ease and security; but neither can they dwell with constancy on his mind, even though undisturbed by the emotions of pain or passion; much less can they maintain their ground when attacked by such powerful antagonists. The affections take a narrower and more natural survey of their object; and by an economy, more suitable to the infirmity of human minds, regard alone the beings around us, and are actuated by such events as appear good or

them be necessary and

ill

evitable.

we human

nerves,

to the private system.

The

This objection consists of two parts, which

80.

examine separately; First, that, if actions can be traced up, by a necessary chain, to the Deity, they can never be criminal; on account of the infinite perfection of that Being from whom they are derived, and who can intend nothing but what is altogether good and laudable. Or, Secondly, if they be criminal, we must retract the attribute of perfection, which we ascribe to the Deity, and must acknowledge him to be the ultimate author of guilt and moral tur-

physical

shall

pitude in 79.

all his

creatures.

The answer to the first objection seems ob-

and convincing. There are many philosophers who, after an exact scrutiny of all the phenomena of nature, conclude, that the whole, considered as one system, is, in every period of vious

its

existence, ordered with perfect benevolence;

and that the utmost the end, result to

all

possible happiness will, in

created beings, without any

mixture of positive or absolute ill or misery. Every physical ill, say they, makes an essential part of this benevolent system, and could not possibly be removed, even by the Deity himself, considered as a wise agent, without giving entrance to greater ill, or excluding greater good, which will result from it. From this theory, some philosophers, and the ancient Stoics among the rest, derived a topic of consolation under all afflictions,

while they taught their pupils that those

under which they laboured were, in reality, goods to the universe; and that to an enlarged view, which could comprehend the whole system of nature, every event became an object of joy and exultation. But though this topic be specious and sublime, it was soon found in practice weak and ineffectual. You would surely more irritate than appease a man lying under the racking pains of the gout by preaching up to him the rectitude of those general laws, which produced the malignant humours in his body, and led them through the proper canals, to the sinews and ills

ill.

is the same with moral as with cannot reasonably be supposed,

case It

that those remote considerations, which are

found of so little efficacy with regard to one, will have a more powerful influence with regard to the other. The mind of man is so formed by nature that, upon the appearance of certain characters, dispositions, and actions, it immediately feels the sentiment of approbation or blame; nor are there any emotions more essential to its frame and constitution. The characters which engage our approbation are chiefly such as contribute to the peace and security of human society; as the characters

which

excite

blame are

chiefly

such as tend to public detriment and disturbance: Whence it may reasonably be presumed, that the moral sentiments arise, either mediately or immediately, from a reflection of these opposite interests. What though philosophical meditations establish a different opinion or conjecture; that everything is right with regard to the

whole, and that the

qualities,

which disturb

so-

main, as beneficial, and are as suitable to the primary intention of nature as those which more directly promote its happiness and welfare? Are such remote and uncertain speculations able to counterbalance the senticiety, are, in the

from the natural and immeA man who is robbed of a considerable sum; does he find his vexation for the loss anywise diminished by these sublime reflections? Why then should his moral resentments which

arise

diate view of the objects?

ment against the crime be supposed incompatible with them? Or why should not the acknowledgement of a real distinction between vice and

virtue be reconcileable to all speculative systems

of philosophy, as well as that of a real distinction

between personal beauty and deformity? Both these distinctions are founded in the natural sentiments of the human mind: And these sentiments are not to be controuled or altered by any philosophical theory or speculation whatsoever.

!

.

CONCERNING

SECT. IX

The

81

and

second objection

admits not of so easy

an answer; nor

satisfactory

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

is it

possible to

explain distinctly, how the Deity can be the mediate cause of all the actions of men, without be-

and moral turpitude. These which mere natural and unassisted reason is very unfit to handle; and whatever system she embraces, she must find herself involved in inextricable difficulties, and even contradictions, at every step which she takes with regard ing the author of sin are mysteries,

to

such subjects.

To

reconcile the indifference

and contingency of human actions with prescience; or to defend absolute decrees, and yet Deity from being the author of sin, has been found hitherto to exceed all the power of philosophy. Happy, if she be thence sensible of her temerity, when she pries into these sublime free the

animals.

487

We shall make trial of this

with regard

by which we have, in the foregoing discourse, endeavoured to account for all experimental reasonings; and it is hoped, that this new point of view will serve to confirm all our former observations. 83. First, It seems evident, that animals as well as men learn many things from experience, and infer, that the same events will always follow from the same causes. By this principle they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually, from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the nato the hypothesis,

ture of fire, water, earth, stones, heights, depths,

&c, and

of the effects

operation.

which

result

from

their

The ignorance and

mod-

inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old, who have learned, by long observation, to avoid what

her true and proper province, the examination of common life; where she will find difficulties enough to employ her enquiries, without launching into so boundless an ocean of doubt,

hurt them, and to pursue what gave ease or pleasure. A horse, that has been accustomed to the field, becomes acquainted with the proper height which he can leap, and will never at-

mysteries; ties

and

and leaving a scene

so full of obscuri-

perplexities, return, with suitable

esty, to

uncertainty,

Sect.

and contradiction

IX. Of

the

Reason of Animals

All our

reasonings concerning matter of founded on a species of Analogy, which leads us to expect from any cause the same events, which we have observed to result from 82.

fact are

similar causes.

Where

the causes are entirely

analogy is perfect, and the inference, drawn from it, is regarded as certain and conclusive: nor does any man ever entertain a doubt where he sees a piece of iron, that it will have weight and cohesion of parts; as in all other instances, which have ever fallen under his observation. But where the objects have not so exact a similarity, the analogy is less perfect, and. the inference is less conclusive; though still it has some force, in proportion to the degree of similarity and resemblance. The anatomical observations, formed upon one animal, are, by this species of reasoning, extended to all animals; similar, the

and

it is

certain, that

the blood, for instance,

when is

the circulation of

have forms

clearly proved to

place in one creature, as a frog, or fish, it a strong presumption, that the same principle

has place in

may

all.

These analogical observations

be carried farther, even to

this science, of

which we are now treating; and any theory, by which we explain the operations of the understanding, or the origin and connexion of the passions in man, will acquire additional authority, if we find, that the same theory is requisite to explain the same phenomena in all other

tempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old greyhound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chace to the younger, and will place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles; nor are the conjectures, which he forms on this occasion, founded in any thing but his observation and experience. This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards and punishments, may be taught any course of action, and most contrary to their natural instincts and propensities. Is it not experience which renders a dog apprehensive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him? Is is not even experience, which makes him answer to his name, and infer, from such an arbitrary sound, that you mean him rather than any of his fellows, and intend to call him, when you pronounce it in a certain manner, and with a certain tone and accent? In

all

these cases,

we may

observe, that the

beyond what immediately strikes his senses; and that this inference is altogether founded on past experience, while the creature expects from the present object the same consequences, which it has always found in its observation to result from similar objects. animal

infers

some

84. Secondly, It

is

fact

impossible, that this infer-

ence of the animal can be founded on any process of argument or reasoning, by which he con-

must follow like objects, and that the course of nature will always be reg-

cludes, that like events

DAVID

4 88

its operations. For if there be in reality any arguments of this nature, they surely lie too

ular in

abstruse for the observation of such imperfect understandings; since it may well employ the

utmost care and attention of a philosophic genius to discover and observe them. Animals, therefore, are not guided in these inferences by reasoning: Neither are children: Neither are the generality of mankind, in their ordinary actions and conclusions: Neither are philosophers themselves, who, in all the active parts of life, are, in the main, the same with the vulgar, and are governed by the same maxims. Nature must have provided some other principle, of more

more general use and application; nor can an operation of such immense conse-

ready, and

quence

in

life,

as that of inferring effects

from

causes, be trusted to the uncertain process of

reasoning and argumentation. Were this doubtwith regard to men, it seems to admit of no question with regard to the brute creation; and

ful

the conclusion being once firmly established in the one,

we have

a strong presumption, from all it ought to be univer-

the rules of analogy, that

without any exception or reserve. custom alone, which engages animals, from

sally admitted, It

is

HUME

given of this operation, in all the higher, as well as lower classes of sensitive beings, which fall

under our notice and observation. 1 1

Since all reasonings concerning facts or causes is derived merely from custom, it may be asked how it happens, that men so much surpass animals in reasoning, and one man so much surpasses another? Has not the same custom the same influence on all? We shall here endeavour briefly to explain the great difference in human understandings: After which the reason of the difference between men and animals will easily be comprehended.

When we have lived any time, and have been accustomed to the uniformity of nature, we acquire a general habit, by which we always transfer the i

.

known to the unknown, and conceive the latter to resemble the former. By means of this general habitual principle, we regard even one experiment as the foundation of reasoning, and expect a similar event with some degree of certainty, where the experiment has been made accurately, and free from all foreign circumstances. It is therefore considered as a matter of great importance to observe the consequences of things; and as one man may very much surpass another in attention and memory and observation, this will make a very great difference in their reasoning. 2. Where there is a complication of causes to produce any effect, one mind may be much larger

X

But though animals learn many parts of knowledge from observation, there are also many parts of it, which they derive from the original hand of nature; which much exceed the share of capacity they possess on ordinary occasions; and in which they improve, little or nothing, by the longest practice and experience. These we denominate Instincts, and are so apt to admire as something very extraordinary, and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understanding. But our wonder 85.

their

perhaps, cease or diminish,

will,

sider,

when we con-

that the experimental reasoning

itself,

which we possess in common with beasts, and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves; and in its chief operations, is not directed by any such relations or comparisons of ideas, as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties. Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an instinct, which teaches a man to avoid the fire; as much as that, which teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art of incubation, and the whole economy and order of its nursery.

every object, that strikes their senses, to infer its usual attendant, and carries their imagination,

from the appearance of the one, to conceive the other, in that particular manner, which we denominate belief. No other explication can be

SECT.

Sect.

X. Of Miracles

Part 86.

I

There is, in Dr. Tillotson's writings, an argu-

ment against the real presence, which

is

as concise,

than another, and better able to comprehend the whole system of objects, and to infer justly their consequences. 3. One man is able to carry on a chain of consequences to a greater length than another. 4. Few men can think long without running into a confusion of ideas, and mistaking one for another;

and there are various degrees of this infirmity. 5. The circumstance, on which the effect depends, is frequently involved in other circumstances, which are foreign and extrinsic. The separation of it often requires great attention, accuracy, and subtilty. 6. The forming of general maxims from particular observation is a very nice operation; and nothing is more. usual, from haste or a narrowness of mind, which sees not on all sides, than to commit mistakes in this particular. 7. When we reason from analogies, the man, who has the greater experience or the greater promptitude of suggesting analogies, will be the better reasoner. 8. Byasses from prejudice, education, passion, party, &c. hang more upon one mind than another. 9. After we have acquired a confidence in human testimony, books and conversation enlarge much more the sphere of one man's experience and thought than those of another. It would be easy to discover many other circumstances that make a difference in the understandings of men.

PART

CONCERNING

I

and elegant, and strong

as

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

any argument can

possibly be supposed against a doctrine, so

little

worthy of a serious refutation. It is acknowledged on all hands, says that learned prelate, that the authority, either of the scripture or of tradition,

is

founded merely in the testimony of

the apostles, who were eye-witnesses to those miracles of our Saviour, by which he proved his

divine mission.

Our evidence,

then, for the truth

is less than the evidence our senses; because, even in the first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and it is evident it must diminish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can any one rest such

of the Christian religion

for the truth of

confidence in their testimony, as in the immediate object of his senses. But a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger; and therefore, were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly

revealed in scripture,

it

were directly contrary to

the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to It contradicts sense, though both the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry not such evidence with them as sense;

it.

when they are considered merely as external evidences, and are not brought home to every one's breast,

by the immediate operation of the Holy

Spirit.

Nothing

ment

is

so convenient as a decisive argu-

which must at least silence the most arrogant bigotry and superstition, and free us from their impertinent solicitations. I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures. For so long, I presume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history, sacred and proof this kind,

fane. 87. Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact; it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors.

One, who

in our climate, should expect

any week of June than in one would reason justly, and conform-

better weather in

of December,

ably to experience; but it is certain, that he may happen, in the event, to find himself mistaken. However, we may observe, that, in such a case, he would have no cause to complain of experience; because it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we may learn from a diligent observation. All effects follow not with like certainty from their supposed causes. Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been

489

constantly conjoined together: Others are found to

have been more variable, and sometimes to

disappoint our expectations; so that, in our reasonings concerning matter of fact, there are all

imaginable degrees of assurance, from the highmoral evi-

est certainty to the lowest species of

dence.

A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions as are founded

on an

infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event. In other cases, he proceeds with more caution: He weighs the opposite experiments: He considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments: to that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful

expectation of any event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree

of assurance. In

all cases,

we must balance

the

opposite experiments, where they are opposite,

and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to

know

the exact force of the superior

evidence.

To apply these principles to a particular we may observe that there is no speof reasoning more common, more useful,

88.

instance; cies

and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators. This species of reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. I shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other printhan our observation of the veracity of huand of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their conciple

man

testimony,

stant

and regular conjunction;

it is

evident that

we ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favour of human testimony, whose connexion with any event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any other. Were not the memory tenacious to

DAVID

490

a certain degree; had not men commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity; were they not sensible to shame, when detected in a falsehood: Were not these, I say, discovered by experience to be qualities, inherent in human nature,

dence noted

we should never

in

human

repose the least confi-

testimony.

for falsehood

and

A man delirious,

villany, has

or

no manner

of authority with us.

And

from witnesses founded on past expe-

as the evidence, derived

and human testimony, rience, so

it

is

varies with the experience,

and

is

re-

HUME

SECT,

x

we perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences; of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force, which remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testi-

mony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of assurance against the fact, which they endeavour to establish; from which contra-

garded either as & proof or a. probability, according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of object has been found to be constant or variable. There are a number

diction there necessarily arises a counterpoize, and mutual destruction of belief and authority.

of circumstances to be taken into consideration

Cato,

in all

judgements of this kind; and the ultimate

standard, by which we determine all disputes, that may arise concerning them, is always derived from experience

and observation. Where

experience is not entirely uniform on any side, it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgements, and with the same oppothis

and mutual destruction of argument as in every other kind of evidence. We frequently hesitate concerning the reports of others. We balance the opposite circumstances, which cause

sition

any doubt or uncertainty; and when we discover a superiority on any side, we incline to it; but still

with a diminution of assurance, in propor-

tion to the force of

its

antagonist.

89. This contrariety of evidence, in the present

may

be derived from several different causes; from the opposition of contrary testimony; from the character or number of the witnesses; from the manner of their delivering their testimony; or from the union of all these circumstances. We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witnesses contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a doubtful character; when they have an interest in what they affirm; when they deliver their testimony with hesitation, or on the contrary, with too violent asseverations. There are many other particulars of the same kind, which may diminish or destroy the force of any argument, derived from case,

human

testimony.

Suppose, for instance, that the fact, which the testimony endeavours to establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that

from the testimony, admits of a diminution, greater or less, in propor-

case, the evidence, resulting

tion as the fact

is

more or

less

unusual.

The

rea-

son why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived from any connexion, which

/ should not

believe such a story

was a proverbial saying

in

were

it

told

me by

Rome, even dur-

ing the lifetime of that philosophical patriot. 1 incredibility of a fact, it was allowed, might invalidate so great an authority. The Indian prince, who refused to believe the

The

first

relations concerning the effects of frost, rea-

soned justly; and

it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts, that arose from a state of nature, with which he was unacquainted ,and which bore so little analogy to those events, of which he had had constant and uniform experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it. 2 90. But in order to encrease the probability against the testimony of witnesses, let us suppose,

that the fact, which they affirm, instead of being 1

Plutarch, Marcus Cato. Indian, it is evident, could have experience that water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a situation quite unknown to him; and it is impossible for him to tell a priori what will result from it. It is making a new experiment, the consequence of which is always uncertain. One may sometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow; but still this is but conjecture. And it must be confessed, that, in the present case of freezing, the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy, and is such as a rational Indian would not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not gradual, according to the degrees of cold; but whenever it comes to the freezing point, the water passes in a moment, from the utmost liquidity to perfect hardness. Such an event, therefore, may be denominated extraordinary, and requires a pretty strong testimony to render it credible to people in a warm climate: But still it is not miraculous, nor contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all the circumstances are the same. The inhabitants of Sumatra have always seen water fluid in their own climate, and the freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: But they never saw water in Muscovy during the winter; and therefore they cannot reasonably be positive what would there be the consequence. 2

No

PART

CONCERNING

II

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

only marvellous, is really miraculous; and suppose also, that the testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that

proof against proof, of which the prevail, but still with a diminuforce, in proportion to that of its an-

case, there

strongest tion of

its

is

must

tagonist.

A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and

as a firm

and unalterable experience has es-

tablished these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any

argument from experience can possibly be imWhy is it more than probable, that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these agined.

laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent

them? Nothing

is

esteemed a miracle,

if it

ever

happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appella-

And

tion.

as a

proof, there

is

uniform experience amounts to a here a direct and full proof, from

the nature of the fact, against the existence of any

miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but site proof,

which

is

by an oppo-

superior. 1

The plain consequence is (and it is a genmaxim worthy of our attention), "That no

91.

eral

testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unthe testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact,

less

which

endeavours to establish; and even in is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurit

that case there

1 Sometimes an event may not, in itself, seem to be contrary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it might, by reason of some circumstances, be denominated a miracle; because, in fact, it is contrary to these laws. Thus if a person, claiming a divine authority, should command a sick person to be well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in short, should order many natural events, which immedi-

ately follow

upon

his

command;

these might justly

be esteemed miracles, because they are really, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature. For if any suspicion remain, that the event and command concurred by accident, there is no miracle and no

491

ance suitable to that degree of force, which remains, after deducting the inferior." When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to

command my

belief or opinion.

Part

II

92 In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed that the testimony, upon which a miracle is founded, may possibly amount to an entire proof, and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy: But it is easy to shew that we have been a great deal too liberal in our concession, and that there never was a miraculous event established on so full an evidence. For first, there is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good-sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected in any falsehood; and at the same time, attesting facts performed in such a public manner and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable All which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance in the tes.

:

timony of men. 93. Secondly. We may observe in human nature a principle which, if strictly examined, will be found to diminish extremely the assurance, which we might, from human testimony, have, in any kind of prodigy. The maxim, by which we

transgression of the laws of nature. If this suspicion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a transgression of these laws; because nothing can be more contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a man should have such an influence. miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent. miracle may either be discoverable by men or not. This alters not its nature and essence. The raising of a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle. The raising of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a force requisite for that purpose, is as real a miracle, though not so sensible with regard to us.

A

A

DAVID

492

commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings, is, that the objects, of which we have no experience, resemble those, of which we have; that what we have found to be most usual is always most probable; and that where there is an oppoarguments, we ought to give the preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of past observations. But though, in proceedsition of

ing by this rule, we readily reject any fact which unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree;

is

yet in advancing farther, the mind observes not always the same rule; but when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous, it rather the more readily admits of such a fact, upon account of that very circumstance, which ought to

destroy

and

all its

authority.

The

passion of surprise

from miracles, being an

wonder, arising

agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency to-

wards the derived.

belief of those events,

from which

it is

And this goes so far, that even those who

immediately, nor can believe those miraculous events, of which they are informed, yet love to partake of the satisfaction at second-hand or by rebound, and place a pride and delight in exciting the admiration of

cannot enjoy

this pleasure

others.

With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received, their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relations of wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners? But if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense; and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretensions to authority.

A re-

may

be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality: he may know his narrative to be false, and yet persevere in it, with the best intentions in the world, for the sake of promoting so holy a cause: or even where this delusion has not place, vanity, excited by so strong a temptation, operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any other circumstances; and self-interest with equal force. His auditors may not have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgement to canvass his evidence: what judgement they have, they renounce by principle, in these sublime and mysterious subjects: or if they were ever so willing to employ it, passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of its operations. Their credulity inligionist

creases his impudence:

and his impudence over-

powers their credulity. Eloquence,

when

at

room for reason

its

highest pitch, leaves

or reflection; but addressthe fancy or the affections, captivates the willing hearers, and subdues their little

ing

itself entirely to

HUME

SECT.

X

understanding. Happily, this pitch it seldom attains. But what a Tully or a Demosthenes could scarcely effect over a

Roman or Athenian

audi-

ence, every Capuchin, every itinerant or station-

ary teacher can perform over the generality of mankind, and in a higher degree, by touching such gross and vulgar passions. The many instances of forged miracles, and prophecies, and supernatural events, which, in all ages, have either been detected by contrary evidence, or which detect themselves by their absurdity, prove sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the marvellous, and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations of this kind. This is our natural way of thinking, even with regard to the

most

common and most credible

events. For inThere is no kind of report which rises so and spreads so quickly, especially in coun-

stance: easily,

and provincial towns, as those concerning marriages; insomuch that two young persons of equal condition never see each other twice, but the whole neighbourhood immediately join them together. The pleasure of telling a piece of news so interesting, of propagating it, and of being the first reporters of it, spreads the try places

And this is so well known, that no man of sense gives attention to these reports, till intelligence.

he find them confirmed by some greater evidence. Do not the same passions, and others still stronger, incline the generality of mankind to be-

and report, with the greatest vehemence and assurance, all religious miracles? 94. Thirdly. It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural and miraculous relations, that they are observed chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever given admission to any lieve

of them, that people will be found to have received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with that inviolable sanction and authority, which always attend re-

ceived opinions.

When we peruse

the

first

histo-

we are apt to imagine ourselves transported into some new world; where the

ries of all nations,

whole frame of nature is disjointed, and every element performs its operations in a different manner, from what it does at present. Battles, revolutions, pestilence, famine and death, are never the effect of those natural causes, which we experience. Prodigies, omens, oracles, judgements, quite obscure the few natural events, that are intermingled with them. But as the former grow thinner every page, in proportion as we advance nearer the enlightened ages, we soon learn, that there is nothing mysterious or super-

PART

CONCERNING

II

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

natural in the case, but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of mankind towards the

marvellous, and that, though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from sense and learning, it can never be thoroughly extirpated

Men's inclination

493

to the marvellous has full op-

portunity to display itself. And thus a story, which is universally exploded in the place where

was first started, shall pass for certain at a thousand miles distance. But had Alexander

it

from human nature.

fixed his residence at Athens, the philosophers of

a judicious reader is apt to say, upon the perusal of these wonderful historians,

ly spread,

It is strange,

happen

in our days.

hope, that

men should

that such prodigious events never

But it is nothing strange, lie

in all ages.

I

You must

surely have seen in-

enough of that frailty. You have yourself heard many such marvellous relations started, which, being treated with scorn by all the wise and judicious, have at last been abandoned even

stances

by the vulgar. Be assured, that those renowned which have spread and flourished to such a monstrous height, arose from like beginnings; but being sown in a more proper soil, shot up at last into prodigies almost equal to those which lies,

they relate. It was a wise policy in that false prophet, Alexander,

who though now

forgotten,

was once so

famous, to lay the first scene of his impostures in Paphlagonia, where, as Lucian tells us, the people were extremely ignorant and stupid, and ready to swallow even the grossest delusion. People at a distance, who are weak enough to think the matter at all worth enquiry, have no

opportunity of receiving better information. The come magnified to them by a hundred circumstances. Fools are industrious in propagating the imposture; while the wise and learned are contented, in general, to deride its absurdity, without informing themselves of the particular facts, by which it may be distinctly refuted. And thus the impostor above mentioned was enabled to proceed, from his ignorant Paphlagonians, to the enlisting of votaries, even among the Grecian stories

philosophers,

and

and men of the most eminent rank

distinction in

Rome:

nay, could engage the

attention of that sage emperor so far as to

make him

Marcus Aurelius;

trust the success of a mili-

tary expedition to his delusive prophecies.

The advantages are so great, of starting an imposture among an ignorant people, that, even

of learning had immediatethroughout the whole Roman empire, their sense of the matter; which, being supported

that

renowned mart

by so great authority, and displayed by all the force of reason and eloquence, had entirely opened the eyes of mankind. It is true; Lucian, passing by chance through Paphlagonia, had an opportunity of performing this good office. But, though much to be wished, it does not always happen, that every Alexander meets with a Lucian, ready to expose and detect his impostures. 95. 1 may add as a fourth reason, which diminishes the authority of prodigies, that there

is

no

testimony for any, even those which have not been expressly detected, that is not opposed by an infinite number of witnesses; so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of testimony, but the testimony destroys itself. To make this the better understood, let us consider, that, in matters of religion, whatever is different is contrary;

and that

Rome,

it is

impossible the religions of ancient

and of China should, on any solid foundation. Every miracle, therefore, pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions (and all of them abound in miracles), as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed; so has it the same force, though more all

of Turkey, of Siam,

of them, be established

indirectly, to

overthrow every other system. In

destroying a rival system, it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles, on which that system

was

established; so that all the prodigies of dif-

ferent religions are to be regarded as contrary

and the evidences of these prodigies, whether weak or strong, as opposite to each other. According to this method of reasoning, when we believe any miracle of Mahomet or his successors, we have for our warrant the testimony of a few barbarous Arabians: And on the other hand, we are to regard the authority of Titus

facts,

though the delusion should be too gross to impose on the generality of them {which, though seldom, is sometimes the case) it has a much better

Livius, Plutarch, Tacitus, and, in short, of all

chance

in their particular religion;

if

the

for succeeding in

first

remote countries, than

scene had been laid in a city renowned

and knowledge. The most ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry the report abroad. None of their countrymen have a large correspondence, or sufficient credit and authority to contradict and beat down the delusion.

for arts

the authors and witnesses, Grecian, Chinese, and

Roman Catholic, who have related any miracle I

say,

we

are to re-

gard their testimony in the same light as if they had mentioned that Mahometan miracle, and had in express terms contradicted it, with the same certainty as they have for the miracle they relate. This argument may appear over subtile and refined; but -is not in reality different from

DAVID

494

the reasoning of a judge, who supposes that the credit of two witnesses, maintaining a crime against any one, is destroyed by the testimony of

two others, who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues distant, at the same instant when the crime is said to have been committed. 96.

One of the best attested miracles in all pro-

which Tacitus reports of VesAlexandria, by means of his spittle, and a lame man by the mere

fane history, pasian,

is

that

who cured a blind man in

touch of

his foot; in

obedience to a vision of the

god Serapis, who had enjoined them to have recourse to the Emperor, for these miraculous cures.

The

story

may

be seen in that fine histo-

where every circumstance seems to add weight to the testimony, and might be displayed at large with all the force of argument and eloquence, if any one were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous superstition .The gravity, solidity, age, and probity of so great an emperor, who, through the whole course of his life, conversed in a familiar manner with his friends and courtiers, and never rian; 1

affected those extraordinary airs of divinity as-

sumed by Alexander and Demetrius. The

histo-

contemporary writer, noted for candour and veracity, and withal, the greatest and most

rian, a

penetrating genius, perhaps, of all antiquity; and so free from any tendency to credulity, that he even lies under the contrary imputation, of atheism and profaneness: The persons, from whose authority he related the miracle, of established character for

we may

judgement and

veracity, as

well presume; eye-witnesses of the fact,

and confirming their testimony, after the Flavian family was despoiled of the empire, and could no longer give any reward, as the price of a lie. Utrumque, qui interfuere, nunc quoque memorant,

To which if we add the public nature of the facts, as related, it will appear, that no evidence can well be supposed stronger for so gross and so palpable a

postquam nullum mendacio pretium.

falsehood.

There is also a memorable story related by Cardinal de Retz, which may well deserve our consideration.

When that intriguing

politician

avoid the persecution of his enemies, he passed through Saragossa, the capital of Aragon, where he was shewn, in the cathedral, a man, who had served seven years as a doorkeeper, and was well known to every body in town, that had ever paid his devotions at that church. He had been seen, for so long a time, wanting a leg; but recovered that limb by the fled into Spain, to

1

Histories, v. 8.

account, Lives of

Suetonius gives nearly the same (Vespasian).

the Caesars

HUME rubbing of holy

SECT. oil

X

upon the stump; and the carhim with two legs.

dinal assures us that he saw

This miracle was vouched by all the canons of the church; and the whole company in town were appealed to for a confirmation of the fact; whom the cardinal found, by their zealous devotion, to be thorough believers of the miracle. Here the relater was also contemporary to the supposed prodigy, of an incredulous and libertine character, as well as of great genius; the miracle of so singular a nature as could scarcely admit of a counterfeit, and the witnesses very numerous, and all of them, in a manner, spectators of the fact, to which they gave their testimony. And what adds mightily to the force of the evidence, and may double our surprise on this occasion, is, that the cardinal himself, who relates the story, seems not to give any credit to it, and consequently cannot be suspected of any concurrence in the holy fraud. He considered justly, that it was not requisite, in order to reject a fact of this nature, to be able accurately to disprove the testimony, and to trace its falsehood, through all the circumstances of knavery and credulity which produced it. He knew, that, as this was commonly altogether impossible at any small distance of time and place; so was it extremely difficult, even where one was immediately present, by reason of the bigotry, ignorance, cunning, and roguery of a great part of mankind. He therefore concluded, like a just reasoner, that such an evidence carried falsehood upon the very face of it, and that a miracle, supported by any human testimony, was more properly a subject of derision than of argument. There surely never was a greater number of miracles ascribed to one person, than those, which were lately said to have been wrought in France upon the tomb of Abbe Paris, the famous Jansenist, with whose sanctity the people were so long deluded. The curing of the sick, giving hearing to the deaf, and sight to the blind, were every where talked of as the usual effects of that holy sepulchre. But what is more extraordinary; many of the miracles were immediately proved upon the spot, before judges of unquestioned integrity, attested

by witnesses of credit and disand on the most emin-

tinction, in a learned age,

ent theatre that

is

now

in the world.

Nor

is

this

a relation of them was published and dispersed everywhere; nor were the Jesuits, though a learned body, supported by the civil magistrate, and determined enemies to those opinions, in whose favour the miracles were said to have been wrought, ever able distinctly to refute or detect them. Where shall we find such a number all:

PART

CONCERNING

II

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

of circumstances, agreeing to the corroboration

And what have we to oppose

of one fact?

to such

a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events, which they relate? And this surely, in the eyes of all reasonable people, will alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation. 97. Is the

consequence just, because some hu-

man testimony has the utmost force and authority in some cases, when it relates the battle of Philippi or Pharsalia for instance; that therefore

kinds of testimony must, in all cases, have equal force and authority? Suppose that the Caesarean and Pompeian factions had, each of them, claimed the victory in these battles, and that the historians of each party had uniformly ascribed the advantage to their own side; how could mankind, at this distance, have been able to determine between them? The contrariety is equally strong between the miracles related by Herodotus or Plutarch, and those delivered by Mariana, Bede, or any monkish historian. The wise lend a very academic faith to every report which favours the passion of the reporter; whether it magnifies his country, his family, or himself, or in any other way strikes in with his natural inclinations and propensities. But what greater temptation than to appear a missionary, a prophet, an ambassador from heaven? Who would not encounter many dangers and difficulties, in order to attain so sublime a character? Or if, by the help of vanity and a heated imaginaall

tion, a

man

has

first

made

a convert of himself,

and entered seriously into the delusion; who ever scruples to of so holy

The

make

use of pious frauds, in support

and meritorious a cause?

smallest spark

may

here kindle into the

495

need not mention the difficulty of detecting a falsehood in any private or even public history, at the place, where it is said to happen; much I

more when

the scene is removed to ever so small a distance. Even a court of judicature, with all the authority, accuracy, and judgement, which they can employ, find themselves often at a loss to distinguish between truth and falsehood in the most recent actions. But the matter never comes to any issue, if trusted to the common method of altercations and debate and flying rumours; especially when men's passions have taken part on either side.

In the infancy of new religions, the wise and learned commonly esteem the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention or regard. And when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat, in order to undeceive the deluded multitude, the season is now past, and the records and witnesses, which might clear up the matter, have perished beyond recovery. No means of detection remain, but those which must be drawn from the very testimony

and these, though always with the judicious and knowing, are commonly too fine to fall under the comprehen-

itself

of the reporters:

sufficient

sion of the vulgar. 98. Upon the whole, then, it appears, that no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever

amounted to a probability, much less to a proof; and that, even supposing it amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by another proof; derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would endeavour to establish. It is experience only, which gives authority to human testimony; and it is the same experience, which assures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds

we have nothing

greatest flame; because the materials are always

of experience are contrary,

prepared for it. The avidum genus auricular um, 1 the gazing populace, receive greedily, without examination, whatever sooths superstition, and promotes wonder. How many stories of this nature have in all ages, been detected and exploded in their infancy? How many more have been celebrated for a time, and have afterwards sunk into neglect and oblivion? Where such reports, therefore, fly about, the solution of the phenomenon is obvious; and we judge in conformity to regular experience and observation, when we account for it by the known and natural principles of credulity and delusion. And shall we, rather than have a recourse to so natural a solution, allow of a miraculous violation of the most established laws

do but substract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, either on one side or the other, with that assurance which arises from the remainder. But according to the principle here ex-

of nature? 1

Lucretius.

plained, this substraction, with regard to

all

to

pop-

amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion. ular religions,

99. I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I own, that otherwise, there may

possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony; though, perhaps, it will be impossible to find any such in all the

'

^

DAVID

496

HUME

SECT.

X

become a whit more prob-

records of history. Thus, suppose all authors, in all languages, agree, that, from the first of Jan-

upon

uary 1600, there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days: suppose that the tra-

tributes or actions of such a Being, otherwise than

dition of this extraordinary event

is still

strong

that account,

able; since

it is

impossible for us to

know

from the experience which we have of

the at-

his pro-

ductions, in the usual course of nature. This

still

all travellers,

reduces us to past observation, and obliges us to

return from foreign countries, bring us accounts of the same tradition, without the least

compare the instances of the violation of truth in the testimony of men, with those of the violation of the laws of nature by miracles, in order to judge which of them is most likely and probable. As the violations of truth are more com-

and

lively

among

the people: that

who

it is evident, that our present philosophers, instead of doubting the

variation or contradiction:

fact,

ought to receive

it

as certain,

and ought

to

search for the causes whence it might be derived. The decay, corruption, and dissolution of nature, is an event rendered probable by so many

any phenomenon, which seems to have a tendency towards that catastrophe, comes within the reach of human testimony, if that testimony be very extensive and uniform. But suppose, that all the historians who treat of England, should agree, that, on the first ofJanuary 1600, Queen Elizabeth died; that both before and after her death she was seen by her physicians and the whole court, as is usual with persons of her rank; that her successor was acknowledged and proclaimed by the parliament; and that, after being interred a month, she again appeared, resumed the throne, and governed England for three years: I must confess that I should be surprised at the concurrence of so many odd circumstances, but should not have the least inclination to believe so miraculous an event. I should not doubt of her pretended death, and of analogies, that

those other public circumstances that followed

mon

concerning religious mirthan in that concerning any other matter of fact; this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony, and make us form a general resolution, never to lend any attention to it, with whatever specious pretence it may be in the testimony

acles,

covered.

Lord Bacon seems to have embraced the same

"We ought," says he, "to make a collection or particular history of all monsters and prodigious births or productions, and in a word of everything new, rare, and extraordinary in nature. But this must be done with the most severe scrutiny, lest we depart from truth. Above all, every relation must be considered as suspicious, which depends in any degree upon religion, as the prodigies of Livy: And no less so, everything that is to be found in the writers of natural magic or alchemy, or such authors, who seem, all of them, to have an unconquerable appetite for falsehood and fable." 1 100. I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here delivered, as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends or disguised enemies to the Christian Religion, who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is, by no means, fitted to endure. To make this more eviprinciples of reasoning.

should only assert it to have been pretended, it neither was, nor possibly could be real. You would in vain object to me the difficulty, and almost impossibility of deceiving the world in an affair of such consequence; the wisdom and solid judgement of that renowned queen; with the little or no advantage which she could reap from so poor an artifice: All this might astonish me; but I would still reply, that the knavery and folly of men are. such common phenomena, that I should rather believe the most extraordinary events to arise from their concurrence, than admit of so signal a violation of the laws of nature. But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion; men, in all ages, have been so

writer

much imposed on by

ridiculous stories of that

consider a book, presented to us by a barbarous

would be a full proof of a cheat, and sufficient, with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but even reject it without farther examination. Though the Being to whom the miracle is ascribed, be, in this case, Almighty, it does not,

and ignorant people, written in an age when they were still more barbarous, and in all prob-

it: I

and that

kind, that this very circumstance

dent, let us examine those miracles, related in scripture; field, let

and not

to lose ourselves in too

us confine ourselves to such as

which we

wide a

we

find

examine, according to the principles of these pretended in the Pentateuch,

Christians, not as the

shall

word or testimony of God mere human Here then we are first to

himself, but as the production of a

and

historian.

ability long after the facts which it relates, corroborated by no concurring testimony, and resembling those fabulous accounts, which every 1

Novum Organum,

II,

aph. 29.

CONCERNING

SECT. XI

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

nation gives of its origin. Upon reading this book,

we

find

it

full

of prodigies

and

miracles. It gives

world and of human nature entirely different from the present: Of our fall from that state: Of the age of man, extended to near a thousand years: Of the destruction of the world by a deluge: Of the arbitrary choice of one people, as the favourites of heaven; and

an account of a

state of the

countrymen of the author: Of their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing imaginable: I desire anyone to lay his hand upon his heart, and after a serious consideration declare, whether he thinks that the falsehood of such a book, supported by such a testimony, would be more extraordinary and miraculous than all the miracles it relates; which that people the

and

497

and was never cramped, even in most extravagant principles, by any creeds,

its

toleration,

concessions, or penal statutes. For, except the

banishment of Protagoras, and the death of Socwhich last event proceeded partly from other motives, there are scarcely any instances rates,

met

to be

with, in ancient history, of this bigot-

ted jealousy, with which the present age

much

is

so

Epicurus lived at Athens to an advanced age, in peace and tranquillity: Epicureans 1 were even admitted to receive the sacinfested.

erdotal character,

and

to officiate at the altar, in

the most sacred rites of the established religion:

And

the public encouragement 2 of pensions

and was afforded equally, by the wisest of all

salaries

the

Roman emperors, 3 to

the professors of every

How

requisite such kind of

is,

however, necessary to make it be received, according to the measures of probability above es-

sect of philosophy.

tablished.

will easily

and indeed,

treatment was to philosophy, in her early youth, be conceived, if we reflect, that, even at present, when she may be supposed more hardy and robust, she bears with much difficulty the inclemency of the seasons, and those harsh

as

winds of calumny and persecution, which blow

i

oi

.

What we have

applied, without

said of miracles

any variation,

may

be

to prophecies;

all prophecies are real miracles, and such only, can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did not exceed the capacity of human nature to foretell future events, it would be absurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a divine mission or authority from heaven. So that, upon the whole, we may conclude, that the Christian Religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince

in his

own

1

02. I

friend, as the singular

with superstition, separates himself

after allying

casions of such furious dispute, could not possi-

and gives him a determost contrary to cus-

is

experience.

XL

Of

was

lately

who

a particular Providence

engaged

entirely

Speculative

dogmas

of religion, the present oc-

bly be conceived or admitted in the early ages

when mankind, being wholly illitformed an idea of religion more suitable to their weak apprehension, and composed their sacred tenets of such tales chiefly as were the objects of traditional belief, more than of argument of the world; erate,

and of a future a friend

my

And whoever is moved by Faith

mination to believe what

Sect.

admire, says

good fortune of philosophy, what seems to result from the natural course of things, and to be unavoidable in every age and nation. This pertinacious bigotry, of which you complain, as so fatal to philosophy, is really her offspring, who,

conscious of a continued miracle person, which subverts all the princiit, is

ples of his understanding,

tom and

her.

You

from the interest of his parent, and becomes her most inveterate enemy and persecutor.

us of its veracity: to assent to

upon

State

in conversation

with

loves sceptical paradoxes; where,

though he advanced many principles, of which I can by no means approve, yet as they seem to be curious, and to bear some relation to the chain of reasoning carried on throughout this enquiry, I shall here copy them from my memory as accurately as I can, in order to submit them to the judgement of the reader. Our conversation began with my admiring the singular good fortune of philosophy, which, as it requires entire liberty above all other privileges, and chiefly flourishes from the free opposition of sentiments and argumentation, received its first birth in an age and country of freedom

or disputation. After the

first

alarm, therefore,

was over, which arose from the new paradoxes and principles of the philosophers; these teachers seem ever after, during the ages of antiquity, to have lived in great harmony with the established superstition, and to have made a fair partition of mankind between them; the former claiming all the learned and wise, the latter possessing all the vulgar and illiterate. 103. It seems then, say I, that you leave politics entirely out of the question, and never sup1

Lucian,

(tv/jltt.

fj

Aa7ri0cu

[

The Banquet,

piths]. 2 3

Lucian, evvovxos [The Eunuch], Lucian and Dio.

or the

La-

DAVID

498

pose, that a wise magistrate can justly be jealous of certain tenets of philosophy, such as those of Epicurus, which, denying a divine existence, and

consequently a providence and a future state, seem to loosen, in a great measure, the ties of morality, and may be supposed, for that reason, pernicious to the peace of civil society.

know, replied he, that in fact these persecutions never, in any age, proceeded from calm reason, or from experience of the pernicious consequences of philosophy; but arose entirely from passion and prejudice. But what if I should advance farther, and assert, that if Epicurus had been accused before the people, by any of the sycophants or informers of those days, he could easily have defended his cause, and proved his I

principles of philosophy to be as salutary as those

who endeavoured, with such expose him to the public hatred and

of his adversaries, zeal, to

SECT. XI

examine, at leisure, the question the most sublime, but at the same time, the most speculative of all philosophy.

The

religious philosophers, not satisfied with

the tradition of your forefathers, of your priests (in

you would

your eloquence upon so extraordinary a topic, and make a speech for Epicurus, which might satisfy, not the mob of Athens, if you will allow that ancient and polite city to have contained any mob, but the more philosophical part of his audience, such as might be supposed capable of comprehending his arguments. The matter would not be difficult, upon such conditions, replied he: And if you please, I shall suppose myself Epicurus for a moment, and make you stand for the Athenian people, and shall deliver you such an harangue as will fill all the urn with white beans, and leave not a black one to gratify the malice of my adversaries. Very well: Pray proceed upon these supposiwish, said

I,

try

tions.

come

O ye Athenians, to justify

which

I

and doctrine

willingly acquiesce),

indulge a rash curiosity, in trying

how

far they

can establish religion upon the principles of rea-

and they thereby excite, instead of satisfywhich naturally arise from a diligent and scrutinous enquiry. They paint, in the most magnificent colours, the order, beauty, and wise arrangement of the universe; and then

son;

ing, the doubts,

if such a glorious display of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous concourse of atoms, or if chance could produce what the greatest genius can never sufficiently admire. I shall not examine the justness of this argument. I shall allow it to be as solid as my antagonists

ask,

and accusers can

jealousy? I

HUME

desire. It

is

sufficient, if I

can

prove, from this very reasoning, that the ques-

and

when, in deny a providence and a future state, I undermine not the foundations of society, but advance principles, which they themselves, upon their own topics, if they argue consistently, must allow to be solid and satisfactory. 105. You then, who are my accusers, have acknowledged, that the chief or sole argument for tion

my

is

entirely speculative,

philosophical disquisitions,

that,

I

a divine existence (which I never questioned) is derived from the order of nature; where there appear such marks of intelligence and design, that you think

it

extravagant to assign for

its

and unguided that this is an argu-

cause, either chance, or the blind

You allow, ment drawn from effects to

force of matter.

causes.

From

the

your assembly what I maintained in my and I find myself impeached by furious antagonists, instead of reasoning with calm and

order of the work, you infer, that there must have been project and forethought in the workman. If you cannot make out this point, you allow, that your conclusion fails; and you pretend

dispassionate enquirers. Your deliberations, which of right should be directed to questions of public good, and the interest of the commonwealth, are diverted to the disquisitions of speculative philosophy; and these magnificent, but perhaps fruitless enquiries, take place of your more familiar but more useful occupations. But so far as in me lies, I will prevent this abuse. We shall not here dispute concerning the origin and

not to establish the conclusion in a greater latitude than the phenomena of nature will justify. These are your concessions. I desire you to mark the consequences. When we infer any particular cause from an effect, we must proportion the one to the other, and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities, but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect. A body of ten

1

04.

I

hither,

in

school,

government of worlds.

We

shall only enquire

how far such questions concern est.

And

if I

the public inter-

can persuade you, that they are enpeace of society and se-

tirely indifferent to the

curity of government, I hope that you will presently send us back to our schools, there to

ounces raised in any scale may serve as a proof, that the counterbalancing weight exceeds ten ounces; but can never afford a reason that it exceeds a hundred. If the cause, assigned for any effect, be not sufficient to produce it, we must either reject that cause, or add to it such quali-

CONCERNING

SECT. XI

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

a just proportion to the effect. But if we ascribe to it farther qualities, or affirm it capable of producing other effects, we can ties as will give

it

only indulge the licence of conjecture, and arbitrarily suppose the existence of qualities and energies, without reason or authority. The same rule holds, whether the cause as-

signed be brute unconscious matter, or a rational intelligent being. If the cause be known only by the effect, we never ought to ascribe to it any qualities, beyond what are precisely requisite to

produce the

effect:

Nor can we, by

back from the and infer other effects from it, beyond those by which alone it is known to us. No one, merely from the sight of one of Zeuxis's pictures, could know, that he was also a statuary or architect, and was an artist no less skilful in stone and marble than in colours. The talents and taste, displayed in the particular work before us;

any

rules of just reasoning, return

cause,

these

we may

safely conclude the

workman

to

The cause must be proportioned if we exactly and precisely pro-

be possessed

of.

to the effect;

and

You

find certain

499

phenomena

You

in nature.

You imagine that you afterwards become so en-

seek a cause or author.

have found him.

You

amoured imagine

of this offspring of your brain, that

disorder.

You

you

impossible, but he must produce something greater and more perfect than the present scene of things, which is so full of ill and it

forget, that this superlative intel-

and benevolence are entirely imaginary, or at least, without any foundation in reason; and that you have no ground to ascribe to him any qualities, but what you see he has actually exerted and displayed in his productions. Let ligence

your gods, therefore, O philosophers, be suited to the present appearances of nature: and presume not to alter these appearances by arbitrary suppositions, in order to suit

butes,

which you

them

to the attri-

so fondly ascribe to

your

deities.

107.

When

priests

your authority,

and

poets, supported

by

O Athenians, talk of a golden or

which preceded the present state of and misery, I hear them with attention and

silver age,

vice

it any qualities, an inference concerning any other design or performance. Such qualities must be somewhat beyond what is merely requisite for producing the effect, which

with reverence. But when philosophers, who pretend to neglect authority, and to cultivate reason, hold the same discourse, I pay them not, I own, the same obsequious submission and pious

we examine.

lestial regions,

1 06. Allowing, therefore, the gods to be the authors of the existence or order of the universe;

cils

portion

it,

we

shall never find in

that point farther, or afford

deference. of the

who carried them into the cewho admitted them into the coungods, who opened to them the book I

ask;

of fate, that they thus rashly affirm, that their

call in the

have executed, or will execute, any purpose beyond what has actually appeared? If they tell me, that they have mounted on the steps 01 by the gradual ascent of reason, and by drawing

and flattery to supply the defects of argument and reasoning. So far as the traces of any attributes, at present, appear,

from effects to causes, I still insist, that they have aided the ascent of reason by the wings of imagination; otherwise they could not thus

it

follows, that they possess that precise degree

and benevolence, which workmanship; but nothing far-

of power, intelligence,

appears in their

ther can ever be proved, except

we

assistance of exaggeration

so far

may we

conclude these attributes to ex-

The

supposition of farther attributes is mere hypothesis; much more the supposition, that, in

ist.

distant regions of space or periods of time, there

has been, or will be, a more magnificent display

and a scheme of administramore suitable to such imaginary virtues. We can never be allowed to mount up from the universe, the effect, to Jupiter, the cause; and then descend downwards, to infer any new effect from that cause; as if the present effects alone were not entirely worthy of the glorious attributes, which we ascribe to that deity. The knowledge of the cause being derived solely from the effect, they must be exactly adjusted to each other; and

of these attributes, tion

the one can never refer to anything further, or be the foundation of any new inference and conclusion.

deities

inferences

change their manner of inference, and argue from causes to effects; presuming, that a more perfect production than the present world would be more suitable to such perfect beings as the gods, and forgetting that they have no reason to ascribe to these celestial beings any perfection or any attribute, but what can be found in the present world.

Hence

all the fruitless industry to account for appearances of nature, and save the honour of the gods; while we must acknowledge the reality of that evil and disorder, with which the world so much abounds. The obstinate and in-

the

ill

tractable qualities of matter,

we

are told, or the

observance of general laws, or some such reais the sole cause, which controlled the power and benevolence of Jupiter, and obliged him to create mankind and every sensible creature so

son,

DAVID

iOO

imperfect and so unhappy. These attributes then, are, it seems, beforehand, taken for granted, in their greatest latitude. And upon that supposition, I own that such conjectures

may, perhaps, be admitted as plausible solutions of the ill phenomena. But still I ask; Why take these attributes for granted, or to the cause

any

Why

ascribe

SECT. XI

human

and moderation the only source of and happiness. I never balance between the virtuous and the vicious course of life; life,

tranquillity

but am sensible, that, to a well-disposed mind, every advantage is on the side of the former. And what can you say more, allowing all your suppositions and reasonings?

You

tell

me,

in-

what actually ap-

deed, that this disposition of things proceeds

torture your brain to

from intelligence and design. But whatever it proceeds from, the disposition itself, on which depends our happiness or misery, and consequently our conduct and deportment in life is still the same. It is still open for me, as well as you, to regulate my behaviour, by my experience of past events. And if you affirm, that, while a divine providence is allowed, and a su-

qualities but

pear in the effect?

why

HUME

upon suppositions, which, for aught you know, may be entirely imaginary, and of which there are to be found no traces in the course of nature? The religious hypothesis, therefore, must be considered only as a particular method of accounting for the visible phenomena of the uni-

justify the course of nature

verse: but

preme

infer

ought to expect some more particular reward of the good, and punishment of the bad, beyond

no just reasoner will ever presume to from it any single fact, and alter or add to the phenomena, in any single particular. If you

think, that the appearances of things prove such

causes,

it is

allowable for you to

draw an

infer-

ence concerning the existence of these causes. In such complicated and sublime subjects, every one should be indulged in the liberty of conjecture and argument. But here you ought to rest. If you come backward, and arguing from your inferred causes, conclude, that any other fact has existed, or will exist, in the course of na-

which may serve as a fuller display of parmust admonish you, that you have departed from the method of reasoning, attached to the present subject, and have certainly added something to the attributes of the cause, beyond what appears in the effect; otherwise you could never, with tolerable sense or propriety, add anything to the effect, in order to render it more worthy of the cause. 08. Where, then, is the odiousness of that doctrine, which I teach in my school, or rather, which I examine in my gardens? Or what do you find in this whole question, wherein the security of good morals, or the peace and order of sociture,

ticular attributes; I

1

ety,

is

in the least concerned?

I deny a providence, you say, and supreme governor of the world, who guides the course of events, and punishes the vicious with infamy and disappointment, and rewards the virtuous with honour and success, in all their undertakings. But surely, I deny not the course itself of events, which lies open to every one's inquiry and examination. I acknowledge, that, in the present order of things, virtue is attended with more peace of mind than vice, and meets with a more favourable reception from the world. I am sensible, that, according to the past experience of mankind, friendship is the chief joy of

distributive justice in the universe,

the ordinary course of events;

same

fallacy,

to detect.

which

You

I

I

I

here find the

have before endeavoured

persist in imagining, that, if

we

grant that divine existence, for which you so earnestly contend, you may safely infer consequences from it, and add something to the experienced order of nature, by arguing from the attributes which you ascribe to your gods. You seem not to remember, that all your reasonings on this subject can only be drawn from effects to causes; and that every argument, deducted from causes to effects, must of necessity be a gross sophism; since it is impossible for you to know anything of the cause, but what you have antecedently, not inferred, but discovered to the full,

in the effect.

109.

But what must a philosopher think of

those vain reasoners, who, instead of regarding the present scene of things as the sole object of their contemplation, so far reverse the

whole

course of nature, as to render this life merely a passage to something farther; a porch, which leads to a greater,

and

vastly different building;

a prologue, which serves only to introduce the piece, and give it more grace and propriety? Whence, do you think, can such philosophers derive their idea of the gods? From their own conceit and imagination surely. For if they derived

it

from the present phenomena,

it

would

never point to anything farther, but must be exactly adjusted to them. That the divinity may possibly be endowed with attributes, which we have never seen exerted; may be governed by principles of action, which we cannot discover

But and hypothesis. We infer any attributes, or

to be satisfied: all this will freely be allowed. still

this

is

mere

possibility

never can have reason to

CONCERNING

SECT. XI

any principles of action in him, but so to have been exerted and

know them

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

far as

we

satisfied.

any marks of a distributive justice in the world? If you answer in the affirmative, I conclude, that, since justice here exerts itself, it is satisfied. If you reply in the negative, I conclude

Are

there

that you have then no reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the gods. If you hold a medium between affirmation and negation, by say-

ance?

501

And could you not return again, from this

inferred cause, to infer

new

additions to the

ing, that the justice of the gods, at present, ex-

the sands or inundation of the waters.

but not in its full extent; I answer, that you have no reason to give it any particular extent, but only so far as you see it,

do you

erts itself in part,

at present, exert itself.

no. Thus

I

bring the dispute,

O Athenians,

my antagonists. The course to my contemplation as well

to a short issue with

of nature

lies

open

The experienced train of events is great standard, by which we all regulate our

as to theirs.

the

conduct. Nothing else can be appealed to in the or in the senate. Nothing else ought ever to be heard of in the school, or in the closet. In vain would our limited understanding break through those boundaries, which are too narrow for our fond imagination. While we argue from field,

and infer a particular inwhich first bestowed, and still preserves order in the universe, we embrace a principle, which is both uncertain and useless. the course of nature, telligent cause,

uncertain; because the subject lies entirely beyond the reach of human experience. It is useIt is

because our knowledge of this cause being derived entirely from the course of nature, we can never, according to the rules of just reasoning, return back from the cause with any new inference, or making additions to the common

less;

and experienced course of nature, establish any new principles of conduct and behaviour. in. I observe (said I, finding he had finished his harangue) that you neglect not the artifice of the demagogues of old and as you were pleased to make me stand for the people, you insinuate yourself into my favour by embracing those principles, to which, you know, I have always expressed a particular attachment. But allowing you to make experience (as indeed I think you ought) the only standard of our judgement concerning this, and all other questions of fact; I doubt not but, from the very same experience, to which you appeal, it may be possible to refute this reasoning, which you have put into the mouth of Epicurus. If you saw, for instance, a ;

ef-

and conclude, that the building would soon be finished, and receive all the further improvements, which art could bestow upon it? If you saw upon the sea-shore the print of one human foot, you would conclude, that a man had passed that way, and that he had also left the traces of the other foot, though effaced by the rolling of

fect,

Why then

admit the same method of reasoning with regard to the order of nature? Consider the world and the present life only as an imperfect building, from which you can infer a superior intelligence; and arguing from that superior intelligence, which can leave nothing imperfect; why may you not infer a more finished scheme or plan, which will receive its completion in some distant point of space or time? Are not these methods of reasoning exactly similar? And under what pretence can you embrace the one, while you reject the other? 112.

refuse to

The infinite difference of the subjects,

re-

a sufficient foundation for this difference in my conclusions. In works of human art and contrivance, it is allowable to advance from the effect to the cause, and returning back from

plied he,

is

the cause, to form effect,

new inferences concerning the

and examine the

alterations,

which

it

has

probably undergone, or may still undergo. But what is the foundation of this method of reasoning? Plainly this; that man is a being, whom we

know by experience, whose motives and designs we are acquainted with, and whose projects and inclinations

have a certain connexion and co-

herence, according to the laws which nature has

government of such a creawe find, that any work has proceeded from the skill and industry of man; as we are otherwise acquainted with the nature of the animal, we can draw a hundred inferences concerning what may be expected from him; and these inferences will all be founded, in experience and observation. But did we know man only from the single work or production which we examine, it were impossible for us to argue in this manner; because our knowledge of all the qualities, which we ascribe to him, being in that case derived from the production, it established for the ture.

is

When,

therefore,

impossible they could point to anything far-

surrounded with heaps of

be the foundation of any new inference. The print of a foot in the sand can only prove, when considered alone, that there was some fig-

and stone and mortar, and all the instruments of masonry; could you not infer from the effect, that it was a work of design and contriv-

ure adapted to it, by which it was produced: but the print of a human foot proves likewise, from our other experience, that there was probably

half-finished building,

brick

ther, or

DAVID another foot, which also left its impression, though effaced by time or other accidents. Here we mount from the effect to the cause; and descending again from the cause, infer alterations but this is not a continuation of the same simple chain of reasoning. We comprehend in this case a hundred other experiences and observations, concerning the usual figure and members of that species of animal, without which this method of argument must be in the efffect;

considered as fallacious and sophistical. 113. The case is not the same with our reasonings from the works of nature. The Deity is known to us only by his productions, and is a single being in the universe, not

comprehended

under any species or genus, from whose experienced attributes or qualities, we can, by analogy, infer any attribute or quality in him. As the universe shews wisdom and goodness, we infer wisdom and goodness. As it shews a particular degree of these perfections, we infer a particular degree of them, precisely adapted to the effect which we examine. But farther attributes or farther degrees of the same attributes, we can never be authorised to infer or suppose, by any rules of just reasoning. Now, without some such licence of supposition, it is impossible for us to argue from the cause, or infer any alteration in the effect, beyond what has immediately fallen under our observation. Greater good produced by this Being must still prove a greater degree of goodness: a more impartial distribution of rewards and punishments must proceed from a greater regard to justice and equity. Every supposed addition to the works of nature makes an addition to the attributes of the Author of nature; and consequently, being entirely unsupported by any reason or argument, can never be admitted but as mere conjecture and hypothesis. 1

The

great source of our mistake in this sub-

and of the unbounded licence of conjecture, which we indulge, is, that we tacitly consider ourselves, as in the place of the Supreme Being, and conclude, that he will, on every occasion, ject,

it may, I think, be established as a that where any cause is known only by its particular effects, it must be impossible to infer any new effects from that cause; since the qualities, which are requisite to produce these new effects along with the former, must either be different, or superior, or of more extensive operation, than those which simply produced the effect, whence alone the cause is supposed to be known to us. can never, therefore, have any reason to suppose the existence of these qualities. To say, that the new effects proceed only from a continuation of the same energy, which is already known from the first ef1

In general,

maxim,

We

HUME

SECT. XI

we

ourselves,

would have embraced

as reason-

observe the same conduct, which in his situation,

able and eligible. But, besides that the ordinary

may convince us, that almost everything is regulated by principles and maxims very different from ours; besides this, I say, it must evidently appear contrary to all rules of course of nature

analogy to reason, from the intentions and promen, to those of a Being so different, and so much superior. In human nature, there is a certain experienced coherence of designs and inclinations; so that when, from any fact, we have discovered one intention of any man, it may often be reasonable, from experience, to infer another, and draw a long chain of conclusions concerning his past or future conduct. But this method of reasoning can never have place with regard to a Being, so remote and incomprehensible, who bears much less analogy to any other being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper, and who discovers himself only by some faint traces or outlines, beyond which we have no authority

jects of

to ascribe to

him any

attribute or perfection.

What we imagine to be a superior perfection, may really be a defect. Or were it ever so much a perfection, the ascribing of it to the Supreme it appears not to have been really exerted, to the full, in his works, savours more of flattery and panegyric, than of just reasoning and sound philosophy. All the philosophy, therefore, in the world, and all the religion, which is nothing but a species of philosophy, will never be able to carry us beyond the usual course of experience, or give us measures of conduct and behaviour different from those which are furnished by reflections on common life. No new fact can ever be inferred from the religious hypothesis; no event foreseen or foretold; no reward or punishment expected or dreaded, beyond what is already known by practice and observation. So that my apology for Epicurus will still appear solid and satisfactory; nor have the political interests of society any connexion with the philosophical disputes concerning metaphysBeing, where

ics

and

religion.

not remove the difficulty. For even granting this to be the case (which can seldom be supposed), the very continuation and exertion of a like energy (for it is impossible it can be absolutely the same), I say, this exertion of a like energy, in a different period of space and time, is a very arbitrary supposition, and what there cannot possibly be any traces of in the effects, from which all our knowledge of the cause is originally derived. Let the inferred cause be exactly proportioned (as it should be) to the known effect; and it is impossible that it can possess any qualities, from which new or diffects, will

ferent effects

can be

inferred.

CONCERNING

SECT. XII

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

1 4. There is still one circumstance, replied 1 I, which you seem to have overlooked. Though I should allow your premises, I must deny your conclusion. You conclude, that religious doctrines and reasonings can have no influence on life, because they ought to have no influence; never considering, that men reason not in the same manner you do, but draw many consequences from the belief of a divine Existence, and suppose that the Deity will inflict punishments on vice, and bestow rewards on virtue, beyond what appear in the ordinary course of nature. Whether this reasoning of theirs be just or not, is no matter. Its influence on their life and conduct must still be the same. And, those, who attempt to disabuse them of such prejudices, may, for aught I know, be good reasoners, but I cannot allow them to be good citizens and politicians; since they free men from one restraint

and make the infringement of the laws of society, in one respect, more easy and secure. After all, I may, perhaps, agree to your general conclusion in favour of liberty, though upon different premises from those, on which you endeavour to found it. I think, that the state ought

upon

is

there an instance, that any government has suffered in

There

political interests by such indulgence. no enthusiasm among philosophers;

its

is

their doctrines are not very alluring to the peo-

can be put upon their reawhat must be of dangerous consequence to the sciences, and even to the state, by paving the way for persecution and oppression in points, where the generality of mankind are more deeply interested and concerned. ple;

Sect.

XII. Of

and no

restraint

sonings, but

115. But there occurs to me (continued I) with regard to your main topic, a difficulty, which I shall just propose to you without insisting on it;

the academical or

sceptical Philosophy

their passions,

to tolerate every principle of philosophy; nor

503

reasonably follow in inferences of this nature; both the effect and cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and causes, which we know, and which we have found, in many instances, to be conjoined with each other. I leave it to your own reflection to pursue the consequences of this principle. I shall just observe, that, as the antagonists of Epicurus always suppose the universe, an effect quite singular and unparalleled, to be the proof of a Deity, a cause no less singular and unparalleled; your reasonings, upon that supposition, seem, at least, to merit our attention. There is, I own, some difficulty, how we can ever return from the cause to the effect, and, reasoning from our ideas of the former, infer any alteration on the latter, or any addition to it.

Part

I

There is not a greater number of philosophdisplayed upon any subject, than those, which prove the existence of a Deity, and refute the fallacies of Atheists; and yet the most religious philosophers still dispute whether any man can be so blinded as to be a speculative 116.

ical reasonings,

atheist.

How shall we reconcile these contradic-

who wandered about world of dragons and giants, never entertained the least doubt with regard to the tions?

The

knights-errant,

to clear the

existence of these monsters.

The

Sceptic is

another enemy of religion,

who

naturally provokes the indignation of all divines

and graver philosophers; though it is certain, that no man ever met with any such absurd creature, or conversed with a man, who had no opinion or principle concerning any subject, either of action or speculation. This begets a very nat-

What

meant by a sceptic? And push these philosophical

lead into reasonings of too nice and delicate a nature. In a word, I much doubt whether

ural question;

be possible for a cause to be known only by its you have all along supposed) or to be of so singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel and no similarity with any other cause or object, that has ever fallen under our observation. It is only when two species of objects are found to be constantly conjoined, that

doubt and uncertainty? There is a species of scepticism, antecedent to all study and philosophy, which is much inculcated by Des Cartes and others, as a sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgement. It recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties; of whose veracity, say they, we must assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some original principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful. But neither is there any such original principle which has a prerogative above others, that are

lest it

it

effect (as

we can

infer the one from the other; and were an effect presented, which was entirely singular, and could not be comprehended under any known species, I do not see that we could form any conjecture or inference at all concerning its cause. If experience and observation and analogy be, indeed, the only guides which we can

how far it is

is

possible to

principles of

self-evident

and convincing: or

if

there were,

DAVID

)04

HUME

sect,

xn

could we advance a step beyond it, but by the use of those very faculties, of which we are supposed to be already diffident. The Cartesian doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be attained by

hood. There are other more profound arguments against the senses, which admit not of so easy a

any human creature

solution.

(as

it

plainly

is

not)

would

be entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction

upon any

subject.

must, however, be confessed, that this species of scepticism, when more moderate, may be understood in a very reasonable sense, and is a It

necessary preparative to the study of philosophy, by preserving a proper impartiality in our judge-

ments, and weaning our prejudices,

mind from

all

those

which we may have imbibed from

To

begin with clear and self-evident principles, to advance by timorous and sure steps, to review frequently our conclusions, and examine accurately all their con-

education or rash opinion.

sequences; though by these means we shall make both a slow and a short progress in our systems; are the only methods, by which we can ever hope to reach truth,

and

attain a proper stability

and

certainty in our determinations. 1

1

7.

There

is

another species of scepticism,

consequent to science

and enquiry, when men are

supposed to have discovered, either the absolute fallaciousness of their mental faculties, or their unfitness to reach any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of speculation, about which they are commonly employed. Even our very senses are brought into dispute, by a certain species of philosophers;

mon

life

and the maxims of comsame doubt as the

are subjected to the

most profound principles or conclusions of metaand theology. As these paradoxical tenets (if they may be called tenets) are to be met with in some philosophers, and the refutation of them in several, they naturally excite our curiosity, and make us enquire into the arguments, on which they may be founded. I need not insist upon the more trite topics, employed by the sceptics in all ages, against the evidence of sense; such as those which are derived from the imperfection and fallaciousness of our organs, on numberless occasions; the crooked appearance of an oar in water; the various aspects physics

of objects, according to their different distances; the double images which arise from the pressing

one eye; with many other appearances of a like nature. These sceptical topics, indeed, are only sufficient to prove, that the senses alone are not

depended on; but that we must and by considerations, derived from the nature of the medium, the distance of the object, and the disposiimplicitly to be

correct their evidence by reason,

tion of the organ, in order to render them, within their sphere, the proper criteria of truth

and false-

1 18. It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exist, though we and every sensible creature were ab-

sent or annihilated.

governed by a lief

Even the animal creation are and preserve this be-

like opinion,

of external objects, in all their thoughts, de-

and

signs,

actions.

seems also evident, that, when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion, that the one are nothing but representations of the other. This very table It

which we

see white,

and which we

hard,

feel

is

believed to exist, independent of our perception,

and to be something external to our mind, which it. Our presence bestows not being on

perceives it:

its

our absence does not annihilate it. It preserves existence uniform and entire, independent of

the situation of intelligent beings,

or contemplate

But

who

perceive

it.

and primary opinion of all soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: but the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that the

men

this universal

is

existences, house

and

which we consider, when we

that tree,

say, this

are nothing but perceptions in

the mind, and fleeting copies or representations of other existences,

which remain uniform and

independent. 119.

So

far,

then, are

we

necessitated

by rea-

soning to contradict or depart from the primary instincts of nature, and to embrace a new system with regard to the evidence of our senses. But here philosophy finds herself extremely embarrassed,

when

she would justify this

and obviate the

cavils

new

and objections

system,

of the seep-

PART tics.

CONCERNING

I

She can no longer plead

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

the infallible

and

irresistible instinct of nature: for that led us to

a

quite different system, which is acknowledged fallible and even erroneous. And to justify this

pretended philosophical system, by a chain of clear and convincing argument, or even any appearance of argument, exceeds the power of all

human

\o^

here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to

your reason, which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove, that the perceptions are connected with any ex-

satisfy

ternal objects. 122.

There

is

another sceptical topic of a

like

nature, derived from the most profound philoso-

capacity.

By what argument can

it

be proved, that the

phy; which might merit our attention, were

it

perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them,

requisite to dive so deep, in order to discover ar-

though resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invis-

serve to

and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us? It is acknowlible

edged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not from anything external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases. And nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner, in which body should so operate upon mind as ever to con-

vey an image of

itself to

a substance, supposed

and even contrary a nature. It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, reof so different,

sembling them:

how shall

this question

be deter-

mined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning. 1

20.

Supreme

recourse to the veracity of the Being, in order to prove the veracity of is

surely

making a very unexpected

were at all concerned in this matter, our senses would be entirely infallible; because it is not possible that he can ever deceive. Not to mention, that, if the external world be once called in question, we shall be at a loss to find arguments, by which we may prove the existence of that Being or any of his attributes. 121. This is a topic, therefore, in which the profounder and more philosophical sceptics will always triumph, when they endeavour to introduce an universal doubt into all subjects of human knowledge and enquiry. Do you follow the circuit. If his veracity

and propensities of nature, may they But these lead you to believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external object. Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are instincts

say, in assenting to the veracity of sense?

only representations of something external?

You

so

little

any serious purpose. It is universally allowed by modern enquirers, that all the sensible qualities of objects, such as hard, soft, hot, cold,

white, black, &c. are merely secondary,

and

ex-

not in the objects themselves, but are perceptions of the mind, without any external archetype or model, which they represent. If this be allowed, with regard to secondary qualities, it ist

must also follow, with regard to the supposed primary qualities of extension and solidity; nor can the latter be any more entitled to that denomination than the former.

The

idea of extension

is

en-

acquired from the senses of sight and feeling; and if all the qualities, perceived by the senses, be in the mind, not in the object, the same conclusion must reach the idea of extension which is wholly dependent on the sensible ideas or the ideas of secondary qualities. Nothing can save us from this conclusion, but the asserting, tirely

that the ideas of those primary qualities are attained by Abstraction, an opinion, which, if we ex-

amine ligible,

To have

our senses,

guments and reasonings, which can

it

accurately,

we

shall find to

and even absurd.

An

be unintel-

extension, that

is

neither tnagible nor visible, cannot possibly be conceived: and a tangible or visible extension,

which

is neither hard nor soft, black nor white, is equally beyond the reach of human conception.

Let any man try to conceive a triangle in general, which is neither Isosceles nor Scalenum, nor has any particular length or proportion of sides; and he will soon perceive the absurdity of all the scholastic notions with regard to abstraction and general ideas. 1 1 This agrument is drawn from Dr. Berkeley; and indeed most of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of scepticism which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not excepted. He professes, however, in his title-page (and undoubtedly with

great truth) to have composed his book against the sceptics as well as against the atheists and freethinkers. But that all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are, in reality, merely sceptical, appears from this, that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that

momentary amazement and fusion,

which

is

irresolution

the result of scepticism.

and con-

DAVID

>o6

Thus

123.

the

first

philosophical objection to

the evidence of sense or to the opinion of external existence consists in if rested

and

that such an opinion,

this,

on natural instinct,

is

contrary to reason,

HUME

SECT. XII

most natural; nor is it possible for us to allow the premises without admitting the consequences. Nothing can be more convincing and satisfactory than all the conclusions concerning the

and

contrary to natural instinct, and at the same time carries no rational evidence with it, to convince an impartial enquirer. The second objection goes farther, and represents this opinion as contrary to reason: at

properties of circles

be a principle of reason, that all sensible qualities are in the mind, not in the object.

cle in infinitum, this angle of contact

if

referred to reason,

is

least, if it

Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary, you in a manner annihilate it, and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something, as the cause of our perceptions; a notion so imperfect, that no sceptic will think

it

worth while

to

Part 1

24. It

contend against

it.

II

may seem a very extravagant attempt of

the sceptics to destroy reason by

argument and

grand scope of all their enquiries and disputes. They endeavour to find objections, both to our abstract reasonings, and to those which regard matter of fact and ex-

ratiocination; yet

is

this the

triangles;

these are once received,

and

how can we

yet,

when

deny, that

the angle of contact between a circle and its tangent is infinitely less than any rectilineal angle,

you may increase the diameter of the cirbecomes still less, even in infinitum, and that the angle of contact between other curves and their tangents may be infinitely less than those between any circle and its tangent, and so on, in infinitum? The that as

demonstration of these principles seems as unexceptionable as that which proves the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones, though the latter opinion be natural and easy, and the former big with contradiction and absurdity. Reason here seems to be thrown into a kind of amazement and suspence, which, without the suggestions of any sceptic, gives her a diffidence

and of the ground on which she treads. which illuminates certain but that light borders upon the most pro-

of herself,

She

sees a full light,

places;

quantity, containing quanti-

found darkness. And between these she is so dazzled and confounded, that she scarcely can pronounce with certainty and assurance concerning any one object. 125. The absurdity of these bold determinations of the abstract sciences seems to become, if possible, still more palpable with regard to time than extension. An infinite number of real parts of time, passing in succession, and exhausted one after another, appears so evident a contradiction, that no man, one should think, whose judgement is not corrupted, instead of being improved, by the sciences, would ever be able to admit of it. Yet still reason must remain restless, and unquiet, even with regard to that scepticism, to which she is driven by these seeming absurdities

ties infinitely less

than itself, and so on in infinian edifice so bold and prodigious, that too weighty for any pretended demonstra-

and contradictions.

tum; this

can contain circumstances, contradictory to itself, or to any other clear, distinct idea, is abso-

istence.

The

chief objection against all abstract reasonderived from the ideas of space and time; ideas, which, in common life and to a careless view, are very clear and intelligible, but when they pass through the scrutiny of the profound ings

is

sciences (and they are the chief object of these

which seem full of aband contradiction. No priestly dogmas, invented on purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind, ever shocked common sense more than the doctrine of the infinitive disciences) afford principles,

surdity

with its consequences; as they are pompously displayed by all geometricians and metaphysicians, with a kind of tri-

visibility of extension,

umph and exultation. A real less

it is

than any

finite

quantity, infinitely

is

tion to support, because

it

shocks the clearest and

most natural principles of human reason. 1 But what renders the matter more extraordinary, is, that these seemingly absurd opinions are supported by a chain of reasoning, the clearest and Whatever disputes there may be about mathematical points, we must allow that there are physical points; that is, parts of extension, which cannot be divided or lessened, either by the eye or imagination. These images, then, which are pres1

ent to the fancy or senses, are absolutely indivisible, and consequently must be allowed by mathe-

How any clear, distinct idea

and is, perhaps, as absurd as any proposition, which can be formed. So that nothing can be more sceptical, or more full of doubt and hesitation, than this scepticism lutely incomprehensible;

itself,

which

arises

from some of the paradoxical

maticians to be infinitely less than any real part of extension; and yet nothing appears more certain to reason, than that an infinite number of them

composes an infinite extension. How much more an infinite number of those infinitely small parts of extension, which are still supposed infinitely divisible.

CONCERNING

PARTn

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

conclusions of geometry or the science of quantity. 1

1

26. The sceptical objections to moral evidence,

or to the reasonings concerning matter of fact, are either popular or philosophical. The popular

objections are derived from the natural weakness of human understanding; the contradictory opinions,

which have been entertained

in differ-

ent ages and nations; the variations of our judgement in sickness and health, youth and old age, prosperity

and

adversity; the perpetual contra-

diction of each particular man's opinions

sentiments; with It is

and

many other topics of that kind.

needless to insist farther

on

this

objections are but weak. For as, in

head. These

common life,

507

found researches. Here he seems to have ample matter of triumph; while he justly insists, that all our evidence for any matter of fact, which lies beyond the testimony of sense or memory, is derived entirely from the relation of cause and effect; that we have no other idea of this relation than that of two objects, which have been frequently conjoined together; that we have no argument to convince us, that objects, which have, in our experience, been frequently conjoined, will likewise, in other instances, be conjoined in

same manner; and that nothing leads us to but custom or a certain instinct of our nature; which it is indeed difficult to resist, the

this inference

but which,

like

other instincts,

may be fallacious

we reason every moment concerning fact and ex-

and

and cannot possibly subsist, without continually employing this species of argument, any popular objections, derived from thence, must

these topics, he shows his force, or rather, indeed,

istence,

be insufficient to destroy that evidence. The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life. These principles may flourish and triumph in the schools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of the real objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined sceptic in the same

principles of scepticism

condition as other mortals.

The

127.

sceptic, therefore,

had

better keep

within his proper sphere, and display those phi. losophical objections, which arise from more pro. 1

It

seems to

me not

impossible to avoid these ab-

and contradictions, if it be admitted, that no such thing as abstract or general ideas,

surdities

there

is

properly speaking; but that all general ideas are, in reality, particular ones, attached to a general term, which recalls, upon occasion, other particular ones, that resemble, in certain circumstances, the idea, present to the mind. Thus when the term

pronounced, we immediately figure to ourselves the idea of a black or a white animal, of a particular size or figure: But as that term is also usually appiied to animals of other colours, figures and sizes, these ideas, though not actually present to the imagination, are easily recalled; and our reasoning and conclusion proceed in the same way, as if they were actually present. If this be admitted (as seems reasonable) it follows that all the ideas of quantity, upon which mathematicians reason, are nothing but particular, and such as are suggested by the senses and imagination, and consequently, cannot be infinitely divisible. It is sufficient to have dropped this hint at present, without prosecuting it any farther. It certainly concerns all lovers of Horse

is

science not to expose themselves to the ridicule and contempt of the ignorant by their conclusions; and this seems the readiest solution of these difficulties.

While the sceptic

deceitful.

insists

upon

own and our weakness; and seems, for the time at least, to destroy all assurance and conviction. These arguments might be displayed at greater length, if any durable good or benefit to society could ever be expected to result from them. 128. For here is the chief and most confounding objection to excessive scepticism, that no durable good can ever result from it; while it remains in its full force and vigour. We need only ask such a sceptic, What his meaning is? And what he proposes by all these curious researches? He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer. A Gopernican or Ptolemaic, who supports each his different system of astronomy, may hope to produce a conviction, which will remain constant and durable, with his audience. A Stoic or Epicurean displays principles, which may not be durable, but which have an effect on conduct and behaviour. But a Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: or if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, his

that all

human

must perish, were his princiand steadily to prevail. All disaction would immediately cease; and life

ples universally

course, all

men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an

able existence. It little

is

end to their miseran event is very

true; so fatal

to be dreaded.

Nature

is

always too strong

And though

a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and specu-

for principle.

with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in lation,

.

DAVID

5 o8

any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to

remove the objections, which may be

raised

against them.

There

is,

III

indeed, a

The

more

mitigated scepti-

mankind are naand dogmatical in

greater part of

turally apt to be affirmative

and while they see objects only on one side, and have no idea of any counterpoising argument, they throw themselves precipitately into the principles, to which they are inclined; nor have they any indulgence for those their opinions;

who

entertain opposite sentiments.

To

hesitate

or balance perplexes their understanding, checks their passion,

and suspends

are, therefore,

impatient

state,

which to them

their action.

They

they escape from a is so uneasy: and they think, till

that they could never remove themselves far enough from it, by the violence of their affirmations and obstinacy of their belief. But could such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of the

strange infirmities of human understanding, even in its most perfect state, and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations; such a reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve, and diminish their fond opinion of themselves, and their prejudice against antagonists.

The illiterate may reflect on

the disposition of the learned, who, amidst

all

the

advantages of study and reflection, are common-

and if any of the learned be inclined, from their natural temper, to haughtiness and obstinacy, a small tincture of Pyrrhonism might abate their pride, by showing them, that the few advantages, which ly still diffident in their determinations:

may have attained over their fellows, are but inconsiderable, if compared with the universal perplexity and confusion, which is inherent in human nature. In general, there is a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner. they

enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding.

The imagination

of

man is naturally sublime,

lighted with whatever

de-

remote and extraordinary, and running, without control, into the most distant parts of space and time in order to avoid the objects, which custom has rendered too fait.

is

A correct Judgement observes a con-

trary method,

cism or academical philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism, when its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common sense and reflection.

SECT. XII

130. Another species of mitigated scepticism which may be of advantage to mankind, and which may be the natural result of the Pyrrhonian doubts and scruples, is the limitation of our

miliar to

Part 129.

HUME

and avoiding

and high and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and experience; leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of poets and orators, or to the arts of priests and politicians. To bring us to so salutary a determination, nothing can be more servenquiries, confines itself to

all

distant

common

life,

iceable, than to be once thoroughly convinced

and of the powcould free us from it. Those

of the force of the Pyrrhonian doubt,

impossibility, that anything, but the strong

er of natural instinct,

who have

a propensity to philosophy, will still continue their researches; because they reflect, that, besides the immediate pleasure, attending such an occupation, philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond common life, so long as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate operations. While we cannot give a satisfactory reason, why we believe, after a thousand experiments, that a stone will fall, or fire burn; can we ever satisfy ourselves concerning any determination, which we may form, with regard to the origin of worlds, and the situation of nature, from, and to eternity? This narrow limitation, indeed, of our enquiries, is, in every respect, so reasonable, that it suffices to make the slightest examination into the natural powers of the human mind and to compare them with their objects, in order to recommend it to us. We shall then find what are the proper subjects of science and enquiry. It seems to me, that the only objects of the 1 3 abstract science or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this 1

more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace,

mediums,

by a variety of through

their equality or inequality,

PART

CONCERNING

III

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

509

man

their different appearances.

guish the sun; or the wish of a

rected by juster definitions. That

planets in their orbits. It is only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another. 1 Such is the foundation of moral reasoning, which forms the greater part of human knowledge, and is the source of all human action and behaviour. Moral reasonings are either concerning par-

But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corhypothenuse

is

equal

to the

the square of the

squares of the other two sides,

cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where

there is no property, there can be no injustice, it

only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only is

proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. 132. All other enquiries of men regard only matter of fact and existence; and these are evidently incapable of demonstration. Whatever is may not be. No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction.

The

non-existence of any being,

as

its

existence.

is

The

is

no contradiction. its

cause or

and these arguments are founded If

revelation.

a

new

fact, to wit,

the general tastes

of mankind, or

school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or

number? No. Does

it

contain any experimental reason-

ing concerning matter offact and existence?

mit

No.

Com-

then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. it

That impious maxim of the ancient philosophy, by which the creation of matter was excluded, ceases to be a maxim, according to this philosophy. Not only the will of the supreme 1

be proved by arguments from

on experience.

and divine

some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry. When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or

The existence, therefore, of any being can only fect;

is faith

Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and endeavour to fix its standard,

we regard

equal to the half of 10, is a false proposition, and can never be distinctly conceived. But that Caesar, or the angel Gabriel, or any being never existed, may be a false proposition, but still is perfectly conceivable, and implies

tion

proposition,

The case is different with the sciences, properly so called. Every proposition, which is not true, is there confused and unintelligible. That the cube root of 64

ticular or general facts. All deliberations in life regard the former; as also all disquisitions in history, chronology, geography, and astronomy. The sciences, which treat of general facts, are politics, natural philosophy, physic, chemistry, &c. where the qualities, causes and effects of a whole species of objects are enquired into. Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, and the immortality of souls, is composed partly of reasonings concerning particular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation in reason, so far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most solid founda-

as clear

and distinct an idea which affirms it not to be, however false, is no less conceivable and intelligible, than that which affirms it to be. without exception,

control the

we reason

its ef-

entirely

a priori, anything

may appear able to produce anything. The falling of a pebble may, for aught we know, extin-

Ex

nihilo, nihil fit,

may create matter; but, for aught we know a the will of any other being might create it, or any other cause, that the most whimsical imagination can assign. Being

priori,

ARCHBISHIP MITTY HIGH SCHOOL Library

5000 Mitty Avenue San Jose, CA 95129-1397 PRINTED IN THE

U.

S.

A.

^^?^ *^& ?^r?^~?^ ~^Sr*^ «^^~?^r*^

~?'^r*r

r

:

:r

r

r

THE GREAT IDEAS, V^^P^ T^r-Z^r^^r^r^r^sr^&r-t^r^r&r^^r^^r^^r^^ -^«. 7^7^^

Volumes 2 and 3

?^'V^ V^ V^V-^ 'y^V^V^r>V^^?^^y^r,^«^ ,

:

:

-».«. -«.«.

—

T5S^^^-. -^^-^s^. -•.«. -•.«.

s^s^in^,

^^ y^PV^P". -•.«.

—.«.

•

-f^-Zr&r; -•.«. -».«.

TZmSjr^

,

^£v5£-, ^-ir^Ar^»-'y5r-'.

ANGEL ANIMAL ARISTOCRACY ART

^^

ASTRONOMY

^p^£-.

BEAUTY

-•.«. -•.«.

•

J^a^^a^. -».«. -•.«.

r^S^r^^i

«^P^

«^h

BEING CAUSE

FAMILY FATE

V=

FORM GOD

•^

GOOD AND EVIL GOVERNMENT

*^

^ ^ ^ _^ _ I

^ I

"£

^ ^

HONOR

CITIZEN

IDEA

CONSTITUTION COURAGE

IMMORTALITY INDUCTION

CUSTOM AND CONVENTION

INFINITY

JUDGMENT

y^y^ ?^v^

DEFINITION

JUSTICE

«^^ «^^

DEMOCRACY

KNOWLEDGE

DESIRE

LABOR LANGUAGE LAW

«>^

^ ^ ^

HABIT HAPPINESS HISTORY

CHANCE CHANGE

:S^V^Sy^-y^^

'.

"£

HYPOTHESIS

"^

^£-^£-,

«£^^y^v^-

«^^ i?£^ -•.«. -•.«,

^Sr

v^Sr

?5p^^

«^^

«£-«^

DIALECTIC

*^s>-?^-

DUTY

«^^ «£^ ;^^ p^y^

££^ ^-^^v P^-S^S*"*

«^££ ££?=£

?£H^ £s^£

-y!

-^ -y!

^ ^ ~! -^1

«N^ «£v^

EDUCATION ELEMENT EMOTION ETERNITY EVOLUTION

-^ -? -5s

-^ -y

? •^

^ £ ? ? ?

LIBERTY LIFE

AND DEATH

LOGIC LOVE

MAN

-^ r-

EXPERIENCE

MATHEMATICS

V y V

££^ «£^£

«^^= — —

-».«.

?:

^v£^

^^^^^-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^=j^

— r^ -^v*J^^V2A^A^2Jr^V5^?o ?^?* W7V»^«r r^'^r'^-^=5 ^7^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ v ^.V^7^V*V* «•**>•.* -•*«

-* r

r

r

J

«A»^

rv^v^r^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^i ^~^^^?^^^^T^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^i^^^^^^^^^7^^^^^ «,

^*.

*^-*j

^^^^

~^' _.

ft

—«— .

.

» -•.«.

_.«. -^*. -«.«. -•.

«,

-v.*. -••

«.

-»-

«.

-•-

«.

-•-

«.

-•-

«.

-^

«,

—

.

* -•- * -•-«,-•.«.-•.«

-»

V

^^£ MATTER MECHANICS

RELATION

MEDICINE

REVOLUTION RHETORIC SAME AND OTHER

MEMORY AND IMAGINATION METAPHYSICS MIND

RELIGION

MONARCHY

SCIENCE SENSE SIGN AND SYMBOL

NATURE

SIN

NECESSITY

AND

CONTINGENCY OLIGARCHY ONE AND MANY OPINION OPPOSITION PHILOSOPHY PHYSICS PLEASURE

SLAVERY SOUL SPACE STATE

TEMPERANCE THEOLOGY TIME

TRUTH AND PAIN TYRANNY

POETRY PRINCIPLE

PROGRESS

PROPHECY PRUDENCE PUNISHMENT QUALITY QUANTITY REASONING

UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR VIRTUE AND VICE WAR AND PEACE

WEALTH WILL

WISDOM WORLD >

MM»»M«MMM

tM

>??&iZ&i2^&Z&^^^

S-^^^^^

^?^^^^^^^^^^^^7^^^^^^^^^^=