An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 0198245955

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AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

JOHN LOCKE

AN ESSAY CONCFJRNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING EDITED WITH A FOREWORD BY

PETER H. NIDDITCH

CLARENDON PRESS-OXFORD

Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6DP Oxford New York Athem Auckland Bangkok Bogota Bombay Buenos Aires Calcutta Cape Town Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi Paris Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York This edition© Oxford University Press 1975 The text of Locke's Essay is reprinted (with corrections) from the Clarendon Edition, first published 1975 First issued as a paperback 1979 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press. Within the UK, exceptions are allowed in respect of any fair dealing for the purpose of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms of the licences issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms and in other countries should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Priss, at the address above This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out or otherwise circulated without the publisher's pril'r consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Locke, John An essay concerning human understanding. Clarendon edn. 1. Knowledge, Theory of I. Title II. Nidditch, Peter Harold 121 B/290 79-40403 ISBN 0-19-824595-5 (Pbk)

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CONTENTS FOREWORD

vu

AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

The Epistle Dedicatory

3

The Epistle to the Reader

6

The Contents

15

The Contents [with summaries of the sections]

17

Book II

43 104

Book III

402

Book IV

525

Book I

INDEX

723

FOREWORD To prejudg other mens notions before we have looked into them is not to shew their darkness but to put out our own eyes. LOCKE

The Present Edition THIS edition of the Essay contains a complete, critically established, an? um-i:iode�nized t:xt (including the author's index) that aims at bemg h1stoncally faithful to Locke's final intentions. The text is supplemented by footnotes detailing alterations of wording and others of significance in the early, authorized printings of the book. The text pages are reproduced from my full historico-critical edition of the &say in the Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke; although the introduction, the glossary, and the other editorial material in that volume are omitted here for reasons of economy and compactness, it has been possible in the new format to insert this short foreword, which offers information and sugges­ tions complementary to discussions the philosophical reader is likely to encounter elsewhere.

The Ascendancy of the Essay The &say has long been recognized as one of the great works of English literature of the seventeenth century., and one of the epoch­ making works in the history of philosophy. It has been one of the most repeatedly reprinted, widely disseminated and read, and profoundly ipfluential books of the past three centuries, since its initial publication in December 1689. In particular, it has been and continues to be actively studied by philosophers and students of philosophy the world over; the reasons for this are naturally complex, but two focal points may be singled out. (1) The Essay gained for itself a unique standing as the most thorough and plausible formulation of empiricism-a viewpoint that it caused to become an enduring powerful force. Philosophical terms ending in 'ism', e.g. 'empiricism', and their cognates and various other class or type terms are dangerous to apply because they may, and commonly do, conceal historical differences and even divergences; it may therefore be misleading to use them without definite clarification, and it may be impossible to give a

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satisfactory short account of the meaning of such a term because imprecision may be the price of brief comprehensiveness. The or­ dinary needs and habits of communication, however, override these difficulties to a great extent. The empiricism of Hobbes (15881679), Locke (1632-1704), and Hume (1711-76) should be seen as a compound of several doctrines, not all of them exclusively epistemological. Among them are, as a first approximation: that our natural powers operate in a social and physical environment that we seek to adapt ourselves to, and that the variable func­ tioning of these powers in that environment is the agency by which we get and retain all our ideas, knowledge, and habits of mind; that our capacities of conscious sense-experience and of feeling pleasure or discomfort are primary natural powers; that the abuse of language, especially in scholastic systems and indulgent specu­ lative hypotheses, is a troublesome source of errors and of ob­ stacles to intellectual improvement and moral and social stability; that religious fervour is contemptible and sectarian strife is deplor­ able; and that although science, which proceeds by reasoning about propositions whose terms represent existent ideas or realities, deserves our respect, its scope for attaining conclusive success is extremely limited at best. A marked difference between Hume's empiricism and Hobbes's and Locke's is his low estimation of the power of reason; Hume's assertion that reason 'can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey' the passions would have been abhorrent to Hobbes and Locke. The &say presents, for the first time, a systematic, detailed, reasoned, and wide-ranging philosophy of mind and cognition whose thrust, so far as it is in line with the future rather than the past, is empiricist. It must be acknowledged that it was Hobbes among British philosophers-concurrently with the Frenchman Gassendi (1592-1655)-who first produced in the modern era, especially in his Leviathan and De Corpore, a philosophy of mind and cognition that built on empiricist principles. A characteristic declaration of Hobbes's empiricism (and nominalism) is: No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense; and ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of Con­ sequence, which I have said before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditional!. No man can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, ha� been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but onely,

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that if This be, That is; if This has been, That has been; if This shall be, That shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing ( Leviathan, I. vii).

Nevertheless, that Hobbes was a forerunner does not detract from Locke's achievement and role.Hobbes did not manage to write a bo?k that could begin to match the quickly won and lasting popu­ lan ty of Locke's major work. His masterpiece, Leviathan, differs from the Essay in not being chiefly concerned with questions in the philosophy of mind and cognition, and it is these that have been largely dominant since the sixteenth century. Hobbes. did not undertake a systematic tracing of our ideas to their empirical origins; this was pioneered by Locke, who deployed in the process an original concept of experience divided into external ('sensation') and internal ('reflection'). Also, in contrast with Locke's emphatic dualism of mind and body, his moderate theism, and his ultimately libertarian account of action (II. xxi. 47-8), Hobbes's reduction of everything to bodies and motions, his suspected atheism, and his strict determinism were-along with his extreme egoism in ethics-repugnant to his contemporaries and to the next century and beyond; and his theory of matter was soon overtaken by that of Boyle (1627--91), from which Locke's derives. An additional, different sort of reason may be conjectured: Hobbes's name in his own period and in the next century did not, unlike that of the author of the Essay, resound with opposition to authoritarianism, with the vindication of toleration (i.e.religious freedom), and with other liberal values, with which the generality of advancing philo­ sophers and educationists associated themselves. (2) The Essay is rich in philosophical matter; this makes it a much sought-after quarry-both a source and a target. As a glance through the Contents (pp. 17 ff.) or the book itself reveals, it grapples with fundamental questions in the philosophy of mind and cognition, and with some in the philosophy of language, �he philosophy of logic, the philosophy of religion, and moral ph1l�­ _ sophy; and it touches on numerous other topics. �he book ts written in a broadly intelligible style (c( 9(6-11) (1.e. page 9, lines 6-11), 10(10--11)), and the gist of its teachi?gs and the out­ lines of its arguments are tolerably clear. So w�at 1t says about, for example, innateness, experience, sense-percept10�, self-knowledge, qualities, memory, space, time, number, mfimty, freedom and

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necessity, universals, substance, causality, personal identity, truth and falsity, meaning, knowledge, probability, belief, and the role of logical principles, is often found a convenient starting-point for further consideration by practising philosophers. But to the critically minded, even if they find the tenor of his work attrac­ tive, Locke's statements, assumptions, and arguments, amidst the rambling rose (and rows) of the Essay, are a continual provocation; this comes about especially through his simplicities and con­ flations, the ambiguities of key terms and hence of key assertions,. and inner tensions and clashes in his thought: these sometimes make him resemble Bunyan's Mr. Facing-bothways, Mr. Two­ tongues, and the 'Water-man, looking one way, and Rowing another'. On the other hand, the divisions and oppositions in his thought (e.g. between his perceptual idealism and realism, his naturalism and supernaturalism, and his factual claim that 'Number applies it self to . . . every thing' (IT. xvi. 1) and his nominalist claim that 'Names [are] necessary to Numbers' (IT. xvi. 5)) may well have been creative: ":ithout them, he might not have been driven to pursue his problems as persistently and devotedly as he did in preparing the Essay over many years­ and then, after its publication, recurrently touching it up and writing additions for it-in order to resolve them with full ex­ plicitness and coherence. Of course, he did not succeed. But has any other philosopher succeeded better, or been of more wide­ spread service to his fellows?

Locke's .Life and Works

Locke's biography, besides its intrinsic interest, affords essential knowledge of the context in which the Essay was produced, and of its place among his works. · John Locke (29 August 1632-28 October 1704) was the son of John Locke senior (1006-61), an attorney and small land-owner, and Agnes Locke (nee Keene) (1597-1654). He was born and brought up in a district of Somerset that was within ten miles of Bristol. One permanently formative part of his upbringing was his induction into his parents' determined Protestant faith; this led him in his manhood to be contemptuous and distrustful of religious enthusiasts, Catholics, and atheists.From the age of fourteen he was educated at Westminster School, which he later described as being a 'very severe schoole' because of the flogging practices there.

Foreword (In his Some Th�ugbts Concerni�g Education he counselled strongly . ag�u�st the pum�hment of children as a means of correcting or gmdmg them; kmd firmness should suffice.) From Westminster, _ where he r�ceived a thorough grounding in Latin and Greek, �ocke went m 1652 to Christ Church, Oxford, where, after follow­ mg_ the usual Arts course (in Classical studies, grammar, rhetoric, logic, geometry, and moral philosophy) with limited interest and with distaste for the disputatious exercises, he graduated B.A. in 1656. He shortly afterwards became a senior Student of his college and retained this status, with rooms and emoluments, until Charles II (1630-85) personally required his expulsion in 1684, in the wake of Shaftesbury's final fall. It was perhaps in the late 1650s that Locke first read, and was refreshed by, Descartes (1596--1650). About this time or a little later he began to take an interest in physical science, and then in medicine where he became a close associate of Sydenham (1624-89 ), the distinguished physi­ cian with notable empirical leanings. He was acquainted with Boyle, the chemist and physicist (whose liberal views on toleration Locke found persuasive) and probably with other originators of the budding Royal Society, of which he became a Fellow in 1668. He lectured on Greek and rhetoric and performed supervisory duties for his college until 1665, when he left the confines of the academic world, henceforth to mix at home and abroad with per­ sons of rank, affairs, and fortune, and with distinguished virtuosi, physicians, and scholars. In the winter of 1665-6 he was abroad for the first time, as secretary to Charles II's ambassador to the Elector of Brandenburg­ at Cleves, where, as he wrote to Boyle, the Calvinists, Lutherans, Catholics, and Anabaptists 'quietly permit one another to choose their way to heaven'. He returned home, his future course still uncertain. He desired to get exemption from the usual obligation of a Student to take holy orders, and to be allowed to remain a layman by qualifying as a physician with a higher degre�, and so, without waiting to fulfil the conditions for graduating M.B. first (he obtained this degree in 1675), he ma?e a bi? for the �egr�e of Doctor of Medicine; after a failure, he gamed his exemption m 1667, but not the degree. A chance encounter had occurred in 1666 that proved to be the decisive turning-point in Locke's life: he met Lord Ashley (162183; created Earl of Shaftesbury, 1672), at that time Chancellor of

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the Exchequer, who used his influence to get Locke gran�ed the _ latter's desired exemption from holy orders. Ashley soon mv1ted Locke to take up residence at his London house, where Locke lived, from 1667 to 1675, as confidant and medical adviser. Locke was responsible in 1668 for a life-saving surgical operation on Ashley, who remained duly grateful. He subsequently became Secretary to the Lords Proprietors of Carolina (of whom Ashley was the most important) and to the Council of Trade and Planta­ tions (of which Ashley was the President), and, during his patron's Lord Chancellorship, his Secretary for Presentations. These private and public roles were congenial to him. This was the happy period when the Essay was initially engendered, shaped, and de­ veloped. Without Ashley, there would have been no &say. Ashley's powerful personality, keen mind, and forward-looking outlook probably did much to strengthen and extend Locke's maturing liberalism, not least by adding an economic dimension to it. In November 1673 Shaftesbury (as Ashley had become) was dismissed by the King from the Lord Chancellorship; his other offices were then terminated, and the Council of Trade and Planta­ tions was abolished. Locke must have been dismayed by all this; he was a man who (in Sydenham's description) had more than 'naturall tenderness and delicacy of sence', i.e. was hypersensitive. The upset and Locke's resulting fear-those were harsh days of royal retribution-contributed to the return of his asthmatic cough, from which he often suffered till his death. There was an introverted, valetudinarian component in Locke's nature-which may have aided his self-preservation. He was a careful, cautious man, possessed of a good sense of business and method. Almost until he died he kept, with minute exactness, running accounts of all monies he received, spent, lent, or owed. He shied away from drinking parties and other hectic forms of social life, and from emotionality, high spirits, the dramatic, and even the aesthetic. He never married, and remained, it seems, completely continent; but he liked the attentions of lady admirers. He had many loyal friends, and got on especially well with some of his friends' children. His preference was for undisturbing circumstances and friendly surroundings where he could be active and industrious while maintaining an independence, calmness, self-control, and deliberation in all things; but from time to time unruly events and people unfortunately intruded.

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Locke's finances were much improved by an annuity to which Shaftesbury substantially contributed. With Shaftesbury's consent he went abroad, to France (where he had been for a few weeks' holiday in 1672); he stayed there, with bases first at Montpellier and then at Paris, from November 1675 till the end of April 1679, when he returned to England, as it happened promptly on Shaftes­ bury's resumption of public office. He occupied those years with travel, acting as a tutor-companion, diverse reading, translating (some of the Essais de morale of Pierre Nicole (1625--95)), social visits, and numerous scientific, medical, philosophical, and other intellectual interchanges; and with writing up his Journal that he commenced on his departure, filling it with records of books, medi­ cal and scientific notes, descriptions of his travels, money accounts, other memoranda, and a variety of philosophical sketches, many of them substantial and mostly on themes to be found in the Essay for which the sketches, after revision, were perhaps designed. It was during this period that he became a friend of the future Earl of Pembroke (1656-1733) to whom _the Essay is dedicated. (Pembroke achieved a remarkable double: he is also the dedicatee of Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge (1710).) When Locke returned from France in 1679, English politics were disturbed, and continued to be so for another ten years, by the consequences of the Catholicism of Charles H's younger brother James (1633-1701), the heir apparent. To many citizens-Locke among them-a papist King meant monarchical despotism, the forced conversion of the nation to a Catholic kingdom, its subservience to foreign powers, and persecution. A number of politicians, with Shaftesbury and his party, the Whigs, in the vanguard, wanted, even desperately, to get James's succession excluded by Act of Parliament. Charles, while an avowed Anglican, had shown that he was not without Catholic sympathies, and on his deathbed he entered the Church of Rome. Further, he saw that a victory for his opponents would affect his own powers. �e stood by his brother. The Whigs lost that battle. Shaftesbury, m 1681, now in poor health, was committed to the Tower of Lon�on ( where he had already spent a year in 1677-8) on a charg� of high treason; he had a moment of triumph when he was acqmtted by the grand jury, but, fearing revenge for the indignities he h�d inflicted on the King in recent years, he soon fled to Holland m November 1682 and died in Amsterdam a couple of months later.

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Locke, who, although he had not returned to Shaftesbury's em­ ployment in 1679, had actively continued his association _wit� him, liked and admired him both as a statesman concerned with liberty and toleration and for his personal qualities. Shaftesbury's body was brought back to England for burial; Locke attended the funeral. We have only sporadic pieces of Locke's philosophical writing during the years 1679-83, when perhaps his principal literary activity was harnessed to politics and toleration. This was inter­ rupted in August 1683. By this time a number of Whigs-peers, publicists, and ordinary followers-had been arrested and Locke, as a known Shaftesburian, planned his removal to Holland (tolerant, and convenient for keeping in touch with friends in England), where he arrived on 7 September into a second exile that was to last longer than his first, French one. It was during his stay in Holland that his decades of reading, thinking, note-making, and drafting leaped towards momentous and manifold authorship. He further drafted and rewrote material for the Essay, getting this into final shape; he also made an abridgement of the book which, appearing in French translation in a scholarly periodical in 1688, at once brought international attention to the Essay. He wrote his Epistola de Tolerantia ( Letter on Toleration), and possibly worked on the Two Treatises of Government. His Some Thoughts Concerning Educa­ tion was mostly composed from letters of this period that he sent to his friend and agent Edward Clarke (c. 1650-1710) about the upbringing of the latter's son Edward. Charles IT died in 1685 and James became King, speedily arousing hostility and agitations because some steps· and policies of his were markedly Catholic. William of Orange (1650-1702) and his wife Mary (1662-94), who were James's nephew and daughter, and Protestants, became joint King and Queen of England, after James had been compelled by events to withdraw to France in December 1688. William had landed in England in November 1688; Mary, like Locke, waited in Holland until all was settled, when they sailed, in February 1689, in the same yacht to Greenwich. After his return to England Locke lodged in London, which he continued to visit fairly frequently until 1700 from an estate called Oates, near High Laver (about twenty-five miles from London) in Essex, where from Christmas 1690 he stayed for periods as a paying guest, and then from 1692 settled as a resident in the house of Sir Francis Masham, M.P. (1645-1722) and his second 1

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wife, Damaris ( 1659-1 708), a daughter of the Cambridge Platonist, Ralph Cudworth (1617-88) : it was probably Damaris who invited Locke to make his home at Oates, and it was she who looked after him in his last days. Within a week of Locke's arrival in London in 1689 he was offered the post of English ambassador to the Elector of Branden­ burg (the future King Frederick I of Prussia). But he resolved, after th � d � ngers, discomforts, and interruptions of so many years, to remam m England; and he never left it again. He declined the King's offer on the grounds of 'that weak and broken constitution of my health which has soe long threatend my life', his inexperience in diplomatic business, and the disability from his being 'the soberest man in the Kingdom' who knew 'noe such rack in the world to draw out mens thoughts as a well managed Bottle'. The only occupation as a public servant he then accepted was as a Commissioner of Appeals in Excise; later he held the demanding and more important office of a Commissioner of the Board of Trade until 1700. From 1689 he took an active interest in parlia­ mentary affairs and contributed significantly towards the libera­ tion of printing and publishing from the constraints of the Licensing Act. Locke's refusal of a diplomatic appointment had been motivated not merely by considerations of his health and convenience. He had plans as an author that he was determined to accomplish. He urgently wanted to see the Essay and the Two Treatises of Govern­ ment properly i n print; the manuscripts of these were in their almost final state. The completed manuscript of his Epistola de Tolerantia had been left behind for printing in the care of his closest Dutch friend van Limborch ( 1643-1712), a scholar and theologian belonging to the heterodox Remonstrant sect of Dutch Calvinists who believed (as Locke did) that the sovereignty of God is com­ patible with man's freedom and does not entail predestinati� n; the book was published in Gouda in Spring 1689, and an English translation (by another hand) in London six months later. That Locke's first published book was on toleration and his next to appear, about mid November 1689 (only about a month before the Essay), was the Two Treatises, with its insistence that the authority of rulers is limited and conditioned by individuals' rights and the sake of 'the Publick Good', is syi:n bolic of Locke's _ moral priorities, which are largely i nfluenttal m the Essay too .

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He was already disposed towards the priority of the moral when a young man : his earliest surviving systematic writings, left unpublished, were on questions of toleration, political power, and natural law. He had, in one way or another, been working to­ wards the Epistola for nearly thirty years, the Essay for nearly twenty years, and the Two Treatises for a decade; the results of all these prolonged efforts, made in days of light and shadow, sud­ denly emerged into public view in 1689, which was indeed Locke's annus mirabilis. The Essay bore the author's name, as the already published abridgement had done; the other two books remained anonymous until after his death, when his acknowledgement of their author­ ship in his last will became known. Whether the anonymity of these and some of his other books was due solely to a wish to appear unegotistically concerned with principles or was in some degree motivated by self-protection against personal attacks by opponents is a matter of conjecture. Although Locke was approaching sixty, his energy for writing books was far from waning. Two additional pieces on toleration soon followed ( 1690, 1692; these and other book dates below are those on the title-page of the first printing); three on monetary matters (1692, 1695, 1695); Some Thoughts Concerning Education ( 1693); and The Reasonableness of Christianity ( 1695), and two de­ fences of it (1695, 1697), which represented Christianity, on the historical basis of scripture, in a latitudinarian spirit. Locke was certainly unorthodox; he was also devout. The last years of the 1690s were taken up with a lot of work relating to the Essay again. Locke wrote three successive replies­ the first two of moderate length, the third of 120,000 words-to criticisms of the Essay made by Edward Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester ( 163 5---99 ). He had carefully revised the Essay for the second edition (1694: see I I (1 ff)), substantially altering one chapter (II. xxi) and adding another (II. xxvii); he now renewed this task for the fourth edition ( 1700), and added two more chap­ ters (II. xxxiii and IV. xix). He actively supervised a French translation, and took some interest in the preparation of a Latin translation ( 1 700, I 701, re spec ti vel y). Locke's last completed book was the studious Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul; this was published posthumously (1705-7), as was a collection of other Posthumous Works (17o6),

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of which the most substantial item was 'Of the Conduct of the Underst �nding � , edited from an extensive and heavily amended ma�uscnpt w�1ch Locke had for some years been trying to finalize for mcorporatmg as a very long additional chapter into the Essay.

Objectives of the Essay During the seventeenth century educated opinion in England-to some extent paralleled on the Continent-drifted from an admiring preoccupation with the history, literature, and language of the ancient world, especially Rome, and from Christian theology and ritual, logical formality, scholastic thought, and authoritarianism, towards, in various degrees of proximity, a confidence in the superiority of modern novelties and modern powers, reasonable religion and secular values, personal expression and plain style, a critical appeal to reason and the rule of sensible evidence, and individualistic, egalitarian freedom of practice, thought, and judge­ ment. The Essay had this distinction, that in it Locke was a firm spokesman for all these currents at once, in association with an elaborated philosophy of mind and cognition. His progressive predecessors and contemporaries, such as Gilbert (1540-1003), Bacon (1561-1626), Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza (1632-77), and Bayle (1647-1700), favoured only some of them while opposing others, or did not connect them with a general philosophy suited to propelling them further. The propagation of these currents was a significant part of Locke's purpose in the book, whose prefatory Epistles immediately reveal his attitude in regard to several of them. Thus, he upheld novelty and the independence of individual judgement by saying that 'The Imputation of Novelty, is a terrible charge amongst those, who judge of Men's Heads, as they do of their Perukes, by the Fashion; and can allow none to be right, but the received Doctrines' (4(1-3)), and that the q�est of the Essay 'is the Entertainment of those, who let loose theu own Thoughts, and follow them in writing' (6(25-6)). He stress� d the vital role of the search and application of experienced fact . m �he accumulation and testing of truth; it is 'T_rial and _Ex:m1� at1on must give [Truth] price, and not any ant1ck Fashion (4,8 --9): 'antick' == 'antique'., 'antiquated'). He returned to these themes

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repeatedly; and with striking rhetoric near the end of the book (IV. xix. 2, xx. 11, 17; cf. 552 (15 ff.)) he launched attacks on both those who dictate opinions and those who submissively follow them, and derided the suffering of 'the learned Professor' whose 'Authority . . . [is] overturned by an upstart Novelist' (714(9-14) : 'Novelist' = 'innovator'). He also, influentially, complimented the attainments of the commonwealth of learning of his age, with its 'Master-Builders, whose mighty Designs, in advancing the Sciences, will leave lasting Monuments to the Admiration of Posterity' (9(35-7)), and blamed the 'learned but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible Terms, introduced into the Sciences' and 'Vague and insignificant Forms of Speech, and Abuse of Language, [which] have so long passed for Mysteries of Science' ( rn(7-12)) for the earlier lack of progress. These and other remarks of his soon, and have often since, struck readers as implying that the only profitable intellec­ tual pathway to the knowledge of things is through observational, experimental, and mathematical methods, the only alternative being idle, verbal speculation. And on _top of this Locke seemed to boost the branches of learning that use those methods, by describ­ ing in very modest terms his philosophical tasks, of analysing the understanding and the pathology and purgation of language, as if they were merely subservient to the smooth advancement of such knowledge (6(6-8), 9(33-4), 1o(3-5)). But his turns of phrase here were an ironic masking of his priority of concern with conduct over scientific inquisitiveness ( cf., e.g., 645(20)-646(17)). Accordingly, a philosophical inquiry into the nature and grounds of certainty was required above all to determine the application and scope of certainty in the most important cases, namely in religion and ethics. A passage in the Epistle to the Reader (7(16 ff.)) narrates the origin of Locke's engagement with his philosophical tasks : some friends of his at a meeting in his apartment found themselves in difficulties on all sides in the course of their discussion on a subject very remote from that of the understanding; whereupon-Locke now involving himself-'it came into my Thoughts, that we took a wrong course; and that, before we set our selves upon Enquiries of that Nature, it was necessary to examine our own Abilities, and see, what Objects our Understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with'. A partial hint of the subject of the discussion was

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provided in I. i. 6-7, where after postulating that 'Our Business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our Conduct' (46(31-2); c( 'Morality and Divinity, those parts of Knowledge, �hat � en _ are most con�ern'd to be _ clear in' (n(13-14)) and Morality is the proper Science, and Business of lvfankind in general' (646(12-13)); see also, e.g., 302(rn ff.)), a view he shared with Nicole, he went on to explain that 'This was that which gave the first Rise to this Essay concerning the Understanding. For I thought that the first Step towards satisfying several Enquiries, the Mind of Man was very apt to run into, was, to take a Survey of our own Understandings, examine our own Powers, and see to what Things they were adapted. Till that was done I suspected we began at the wrong end', this common mistake resulting in the multiplication of irresolvable disputes and in complete scepticism (46(37)-47(16)). This throws light on the programme he had just stated: it is 'my Purpose to enquire into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of humane Knowledge; together, with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent . . . It is therefore worth while, to search out the Bounds between Opinion and Knowledge; and examine by what Measures, in things, whereof we have no certain Knowledge, we ought to regulate our Assent, and moderate our Perswasions' (43(14-16), 44(17-20)). He readily assumed, because of his presupposed identification of what is in the mind and what may be consciously perceived (e.g. 5o(39)-51(2)), that an adequate ophthalmology of the eye of the understanding (c( 43(4-7)) can be discovered by a process of self-examination. But Locke did not regard this as being an a priori science that could be completed and made certain once and for all, as Kant (1724-1804) was later to do in respect of his articulation of reason in the first Critique. Locke conceded his fallibility (e.g. at 7(10) and n (10-25); c( 682(13-15)), admitting (too much _ for Kantian and post-Kantian tastes) the limitations and imperfections of his subject-the natural philosophy of mind and cognition, and semantics (c( IV. xxi. 2, 4). Locke's friend James Tyrrell (1642-1718), whose mte�es�s and views regarding politics and toleration were closely similar to Locke's, was present at the original meeting in Lock< s apartm�nt; he annotated the passage on the history of the �ssay i� the Epistle to the Reader, and recorded in his copy that the discus_si? n � ad been about 'the Principles of morality, and reveald Rehg10n . These

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were not neglected in the F..ssay; but Locke's version of those principles underlay his text much more than they were his main explicit topics.His direct treatment of those principles here was occasional, and clearer in what it denied than what it affirmed. The innateness of moral principles was controverted in I. iii; the thesis that moral science is capable of demonstration, as well as mathematics is, was adumbrated more than once (516(21 ff.), 549(17 ff.), 643 (26 ff.)), although never worked out, despite repeated requests by another friend, the Irishman William Moly­ neux (1656-98); and an account of moral conditions and relations was included in II. xx-xxi and xxviii. 4-16. These last passages supplied all that Locke wanted to state in the F..ssay about the norms of conduct. The source of the highest of these norms is the divine law, 'whether promulgated to [Men] by the light of Nature, or the voice of Revelation.. . . by comparing them to this Law, it is, that Men judge of the most considerable Moral Good or Evil of their Actions; that is, whether as Duties, or Sim, they are like to procure them happiness, or misery, from the hands of the ALMIGHTY' (352(15-26)). Locke was brief about this supreme matter because he, in part rightly and in part to avoid spoiling his case by the inclusion of controversial details, presumed his readers' awareness of the content of the moral life entailed by his references to 'the light of Nature', i.e. reason, which is 'natural Revelation' (698(25)), and to supernatural revelation in the Bible. Revealed religion was discussed in two chapters (IV. xviii, xix), in which he restricted it, obliquely, to the Christian scriptures by his distrust and contempt of other pretensions to revelation, and rationalistically emphasized (e.g.at 692(29 ff.)) that no supposed revealed proposition can contradict our knowledge or reason. There had been anticipations of this distrust, contempt, and rationalism earlier in the Restoration by, amongst others, Joseph Glanvil1 (1636-80) in his essays on 'The Usefulness of Real Philo­ sophy to Religion', 'The Agreement of Reason and Religion', and 'Anti-fanatical Religion and Free Philosophy'; and prior to the Restoration by Hobbes ( Leviathan, III. xxxii).Those attitudes and standards prefigured the militant deism and atheism of the eight­ eenth century, which adopted them against the Christian scrip­ tures too. Locke renewed his inquiry into the principles of revealed religion in his Reasonableness of Christianity. In this, as is clear from its first paragraph, he advocated a historical empiricism, plainness

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XXl

of s_en �e, and the rejection �f systems of divinity with their 'learned, artifici�l, and forc�d senses of expressions, in the understanding of the scn �tures, �hich w�re for him , �ith his simple faith, designed _ by God for the instruction of the illiterate bulk of Mankind in the way to Salvation; and therefore generally and in necessary points to be understood in the plain direct meaning of the words and phrases, such as they may be supposed to have had in the mouths o� the Speakers, who used them according to the Language of that Time and Country wherein they lived'. The considerations adduced here are_ analogous to or identical with fundamental grounds he utilized in the Bray. Locke did not labour to support them : they were what he built on and around.

Human Understanding It has frequently happened to great philosophers that they have been in the grip of contrastive pairs of fundamental convictions, valuations, or orientations, and hence commonly that what they have constructed is itself riddled with inner clashes and tensions; thus Plato's conceptions of the soul as movement and life, and as· allied to the Ideas which are unmoving and lifeless, were scarcely harmonious notions of reality, any more than were his conceptions that each Idea is a supreme reality and that the Ideas are sortally related in a hierarchical way; and underlying Kant's bifurcation of 'the starry heavens above and the moral law within' were his opposing principles about the regulated world of empirical ap­ pearances and the free world of spiritual values. Locke likewise was torn or driven in contrary directions. His committed anti­ scepticism was at odds with his chief epistemological stance, which was agnostic. His restriction of our proper business to knowledge of matters of conduct was, as perhaps he recognized and excused (at 6( IC>-13)), curious in an author of a large epistemological book that was distinctly reticent, yet not agnostic, about our knowledoe of such matters. His perceptual realism pulled against the idealism bound up with ways in which he persistently used the term 'idea' to stand for 'whatsoever is the Object of the Under­ standing when a Man thinks' (47(29-30)), a? d a�ainst his cor­ puscularian conception of the nature of mat: nal thmgs,_ :ogeth�r with his doctrine of secondary versus pnmary qualities. I: is rationalistic canon that 'Reason must be our last Judge and Gmde

XXll

Foreword

in every Thing' (704(20-1)) was not readily convergent with his empiricist or his Christian convictions. These illustrations should be complemented by another ob­ servation. In his constructive efforts Locke had to reconcile with one another his repudiation of sophistical speculation and the abuse oflanguage, his wish to be instructive, and his urbane concern that his philosophical output be fit and able to be 'brought into well­ bred Company, and polite Conversation' (1o(10-1 1): ' polite' = 'civilized'). The latter consideration imparts a new twist to the cause of plain simplicity of -utterance advocated a generation or two earlier by preachers and by spokesmen linked with the Royal Society, with the aims-which Locke also shared-of securely effecting moral or scientific improvement. One symptom of his not always successful struggle is that he entitled the book an 'Essay' which suggested a personal, informal, descriptive work catering widely for the ordinary educated reader; and yet within the text he sometimes called it a 'Treatise' (e.g. at 3(12, 26), 6(9)), which connoted a more ponderous, systematic, and learned book (c( 12(13-19)). One of the consequences of Locke's determination to be informal in the Essay was that he did not make clear near the beginning what he meant by the 'human understanding', and it was not until he reached II. vi. 2, after numerous, apparently synonymous references to 'the Mind' and 'the Understanding', that he turned, in passing, to elucidate these terms and the relation between their designations. He distinguished, following tradition, between the 'two great and principal Actions of the Mind', which are percep­ tion or thinking, and volition. The understanding-the term corresponded to the Latin intellectus, 'intellect'-is the mind's faculty, power, or ability to think; volition is the mind's faculty, power, or ability to will. Locke showed, at II. xxi. 6, 20, that he was aware of some problems about the meaning and use of 'faculty'; but he did not dwell on them. The term 'the Mind' is usually applied in the Essay to represent only the understanding. Further, this intellectual faculty is not uniform, but is exercised in a variety of ways, among them contemplating, remembering, distinguishing, comparing, compounding, abstracting, reasoning, judging, know­ ing, and believing (II. ix ff. and IV). With _a stab at Descartes's school, Locke excluded the passions, e.g. desire, love, hatred, and anger, from the faculty of volition

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XXlll

(249(29 ff. )). He described desire, feeling, and emotion as variants of pl�a � ure o � pai ?, which are states of the understanding. Not � urpnsmgly m �1ew o! his medi �al interests, he assigned an important place m the life of the mmd to the passions, especially to what he called uneasiness, 'All pain of the body of what sort soever, and disquiet of the mind' (251 (4-5)). It is uneasiness alone that determines the will (II. xxi. 29, 31, 33 ff.); nevertheless as Locke insisted in 'Of the Conduct of the Understanding' ;ith Socratic inteJlectualism, the will 'never fails in its Obedience to the Dictates of the Understanding' (c( 237 (6)). Hence a man's thoughts bear a responsible precedence in him as a cognitive and as an active agent. But neither the understanding nor the will are more than powers : 'it is the Mind that operates, and exerts these Powers; it is the Man that does the Action, . . . or is able to do' (243(5-6)). Why was the title of the Essay chosen to refer to 'human under­ standing'? The epithet 'human' made clear that the book was about man and not about the understanding belonging to God, angelic spirits (c( e.g. 557(27)-558(19)), or 'intellectual corporeal Beings, infinitely different from those of our little spot of Earth' elsewhere in the universe (555(20-32); c( 191(20-7)). The term 'under­ standing' was more appropriate than 'mind' or 'soul' partly because Locke's inqui ry was principally epistemological and partly because it was directly concerned just with conscious perceptions or thoughts, and these are precisely the extension of the understanding; mentality outside the understanding is pertinent only inasmuch as it gives rise to acts or objects of the understand­ ing; e. g. the discussion of the wiJ I, liberty, and necessity in II. xxi is relevant to the subject of the understanding inasmuch as the latter has ideas of them. Locke classified the understanding's acts of perception into three types; only the last two match our usual sense of 'to understand'. There are perceptions of ' Ideas in our Minds', of the si gnification of signs, and of 'the Connexion or Repugnancy, Agreement or Disagreement' between our ideas (236(21-7)); he took sto�k of these three sorts chiefly in Books II, III, and IV, respectively. He first investigated the origin of the ideas in our minds. He maintained that the individual's experience in 'Observation employ'd eit� er about ex�ernal, sensible ObJects; �r abo�t the inter�1al , Operations' of 1ts own 'p erceived and reflected on by itself ts that which

XXIV

Foreword

supplies it 'with all the materials of thinking' (II. i . 2 ; cf., e.g., II. xi. 14-17, II. xii. 1-2), a principle he pursued through Book II in reference not only to ideas thus plausibly derived from sense­ experience or reflection, but also to ideas, e. g. of space, time, number, infinity, and causality, which were a much sterner test of his hypothesis, this being, he trusted, all the more strongly confirmed by his empirical accounting of them. His assumptions, arguments, and conclusions in this connection were soon dis­ puted, notably by Leibniz (1646-1714), first in personal com­ munications to Locke and then in his long Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain. Perhaps Leibniz's most effective criticism resulted from deploying his doctrine of subconscious thought, the very possibility of which Locke had repeatedly rejected out of hand. Locke denied that we were born into the world with any completed or incorrigible knowledge, or with any of its conceptual constituents ; whether pertaining to the nature of things or to our conduct, an elimination he sought to justify in the main run of chapters of Book I, whose concluding chapter, against innate ideas (as distinct from innate principles, which he had already dealt with), afforded a suitable transition to Book II (cf. also I. ii. 1 5). Locke's epistemology is notoriously a 'way of ideas' : 'Having Ideas, and Perception [are] the same thing' (108(9-10)); "Tis evident, the Mind knows not Things immediately, but only by the intervention of the Ideas it has of them' (563 (27-8); cf., e. g., Descartes, Third Meditation, and the Port-Royal Logic, I. i-v). What exactly these intervening 'ideas' are, and whether experience can be satisfactorily resolved into them or so-called ideas of other sorts, are among Locke's immediate difficulties. Our general knowledge of things has two branches in his account-which runs in two divergent directions. He has a conventionalist (aprior­ ist) view of knowledge regarding our human concepts of the essences of things : 'Truths belonging to Essences of Things, (that is, to abstract Ideas) are eternal, and are to be found out by the contemplation only of those Essences' (562(12-14)). But he has at the same time an empiricist (aposteriorist) view of other aspects of the knowledge of things. First, the existence of things is to be known only from experience (562(14- 1 5); 5 53(2-4), 63 1(14 ff.)). Secondly, the knowledge of the coexistences of qualities of a (sort of) substance is limited by our mind's inabilities to conceive connections and depends on experience,

Foreword

XXV

since we neither know the real Constitution of the min ute Parts on which their Quali ties do depend ; nor, did we know them could we discover a �! neces_sary_ connexion between them, and any ' of the secondary �altttes : which 1s necessary to be done, before we can certainly know their necessary co-existence . . . . Our Knowledge in all these Enquiries, reaches very little farther than our Experience. . . . we are left only to the assistance of our Senses, to make known to us, what Qualities [S ubstances] contain. For of all the Qualities that are co-existent in any S ubject, without this dependence and evident connexion of their Ideas one with another, we cannot know certainly any two to co--exist any farther, than Experience, by our Senses, informs us (546(2-24)). For this and related reasons he maintains that inquiries into the nature of things have exceedingly limited prospects of attaining the status of strict science (c( IV. iii, and Some Thoughts Concerning 'Education, §§ 301-7). Since Locke, epistemology and the philosophy of science (and the philosophy of mathematics) have strained at the problem of the conflict between conventionalism and empiricism in respect of general knowledge, either by eliminating one of the alternatives­ conventionalism at the cost of certainty, or even rational proba­ bility; empiricism at the cost of meaningfulness, verifiability, or innovation-or by trying to show how they can be reconciled. This is one of many Lockian problems which have continued to attract philosophers' vigorous, and, happily, increasingly rigorous attention.

The Present Text and Notes

The present text is based on the original fourth edition of the Essay; readings in the other early authorized editions are ado_pte�, in appropriate form, where necessa�y, and recorded other�1 �e m the textual notes. Occasionally, readings from other early ed1t1ons, especially the French translation by Pierre Coste (1?68�174�), are also cited. Full information about textual methods 1s given m the Clarendon Locke edition (pp. xxxvii ff.), which also includes numerous details in a separate register of apparently trifling altera­ tions of punctuation, spelling, capitalization, italicization, etc., in the early printings.

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XXVl

The editorial symbols and abbreviations, with their meanings, used in the textual notes are the following:

1 2 3 4 5 6 W Coste Coste 2 er 1 T.er add. edit. om. ] / I

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the first edition ( 1690) the second edition (1694) the third edition ( 1695) the fourth edition (1 700) the fifth edition ( 1 706) the sixth edition ( 1 7rn) The TJ/orks of 1ohn Locke (1st edn., 1 714) Caste's translation (1st edn., 1 700) Caste's translation (2nd edn., 1 729) Errata (page in 1 , 2, 4, or 5 ; indicated by e.g. '2er') manuscript additions to the Errata page in Tyrrell's copy of 1 (British Library, C. 1 22, ( 1 4) added editorial omitted end of quoted expression from the text end-of-line marker separation sign between successive annotations of a quoted expression from the text editorial insertion

Grindleford, 1anuary 1978

P.H.N.

E s S A Y AN

C O N C E R NING

J}umant mnbtrstanbing. In Four B O O K S. I-written by J O HN L O C KE, Gent.-1 2

-The Fourth3 Edition, with large Additions.-

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4 -E c C L E S. XI. 5 .

(As thou knowefl not what is the way of the Spirit, nor how the bonej do grow in the Womb of her that is with Child: even thou knowefl not the works of God, who maketh all things.-4

Jo

�am helium efl velle con.fiteri potius nefcire quod nefcias, quam ifla ejfutientem naufeare, atque ipfum .fibi difplicere ! Cic. de Natur. Deor. /. 1 .

L O N D O N: 5

-printed for Awn}ham and 1ohn Churchil, 6 at the Black-Swan 7 in Pater-Nofler-Row; and Samuel Man}hip, at the Ship in Cornhill, near the Royal-&change, 8 •-5 MDCC. 9

[ The apparatur to thiI page ir overleaf.]

TITLE-PAGE

2 - 2 The . • . Additions.] add. 2 , 4-5 I The Third Written . . . Gent.] add. 2-5 4- 4 ECCL ES . . . . 3 Fourth] 4 I Fifth 5 I Third 3 I Second 2 3 s-s Printed . . . Royal-Exchange,] 2-5 I Printed by Eliz. Holt, thingI.] add. 4-5 for ��omai �aiittt, at the George in Fleetstreet, near St. Dunstan's Church. 1 . (Con­ cerning other issues of t and 2, v. pp. xvii and xxv above.) 6 Cburcbil) 2-4 I Churchill 5 8 Royal-Exchange] 4 I Royal Exchange 2-3, 5 1 Black-Swan] 4 I Black Swan 2-3, 5 9 MDCC.) 4 I MDCCVI. 5 I 1 695 . -3 I MDCXCIV. 2 ! " MDCXC. 1 1- 1

EDITION.

TO THE RIGHT H ONOURABLE

T H () M A S EARL OF

leembroke and Jllontgomerp, Baron Herbert of Cardiff, Lord Ross of Kendal, Par, Fitzhugh, Marmion, St. Quintin, and Shur­ land; Lord President of his Majesties most Honour­ able Privy-Council, and Lord Lieutenant of the County of Wilts, and of South Wales.

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My L O R D, T H I S Treatise, which is grown up under your Lordship's Eye, and has ventured into the World by your Order, does now, by a natural kind of Right, come to your Lordship for that Protection, which you several years since promised it. 'Tis not that I think any Name, how 1 s great soever, set at the beginning of a Book, will be able to cover the Faults are to be found in it. Things in print must stand and fall by their own Worth, or the Reader's Fancy. But there being noth­ ing more to be desired for Truth, than a fair unprejudiced Hearing, no body is more likely to procure me that, than your Lordship, who 20 are allowed to have got so intimate an Acquaintance with her, in her more retired recesses. Your Lordship is known to have so far advanced your Speculations in the most abstract and general Knowledge of Things, beyond the ordinary reach, or common Methods, that your Allowance, and Approbation of the Design 2s of this Treatise, will at least preserve it from being condemned without reading; and will prevail to have those Parts a little weighed, which might otherwise, perhaps, be thought to deserve no Consideration, for being somewhat out of the common road. (6-9) Lord . .. . and] 4-5 I Lord Ross o/Kendal, Par, Marmion, St. Quintin andShurland ; ( 1 0) and ofSouth Wales.] 4-5 I and o/So � th-W_ale_s; Lord Privy-Seal, 2-3 1 &c. l and one of Their Majesties most Honourable Privy- Council. 2-3 I and One of Thetr Ma1estzes ( 1 7) in it] l er-5 I it 1 most J-Ionourahle Privy Council. l

4

The Epistle Dedicatory

The Imputation of Novelty, is a terrible charge amongst those, who judge of Men's Heads, as they do of their Perukes, by the Fashion; and can allow none to be right, but the received Doctrines. Truth scarce ever yet carried it by Vote any where at its first 5 appearance: New Opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without any other Reason, but because they are not already common. But Truth, like Gold, is not the less so, for being newly brought out of the Mine. 'Tis Trial and Examination must give it price, and not any antick Fashion: And though it be not yet 1 0 current by the publick stamp; yet it may, for all that, be as old as Nature, and is certainly not the less genuine. Your Lordship can give great and convincing Instances of this, whenever you please to oblige the Publick with some of those large and comprehensive Discoveries, you have made, of Truths, hitherto unknown, unless 1 5 to some few, to whom your Lordship has been pleased not wholly to conceal them. This alone were a sufficient Reason, were there no other, why I should Dedicate this &say to your Lordship; and its having some little Correspondence with some parts of that nobler and vast System of the Sciences, your Lordship has made, so new, 20 exact, and instructive a Draught of, I think it Glory enough, if your Lordship permit me to boast, that here and there I have fallen into some Thoughts not wholly different from yours. If your Lordship think fit, that, by your encouragement, this should appear in the World, I hope it may be a Reason, some time or other, to lead your 25 Lordship farther; and you will allow me to say, That you here give the World an earnest of something, that, if they can bear with this, will be truly worth their expectation. This, my Lord, shews what a Present I here make to your Lordship; just such as the poor Man does to his Rich and Great Neighbour, by whom the Basket of 30 Flowers, or Fruit, is not ill taken, though he has more plenty of his own growth, and in much greater perfection. Worthless Things receive a Value, when they are made the Offerings of Respect, Esteem, and Gratitude : These you have given me so mighty and peculiar Reasons to have, in the highest degree, for your Lordship, 35 that if they can add a price to what they go along with, proportion­ able to their own Greatness, I can with Confidence brag, I here make your Lordship the richest Present, you ever received. This I am sure, I am under the greatest Obligation to seek all occasions to acknowledge a long Train of Favors, I have received from your ( 1 7) EIIa)'] 2-5 I piece 1

The Epistle Dedicatory

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Lordship; Favors, though great and important in themselves, yet made much more so by the Forwardness, Concern, and Kindness, and other obliging Circumstances, that never failed to accompany them. To all this you are pleased to add that, which gives yet more weight and relish to all the rest: You vouchsafe to continue me in s some degrees of your Esteem, and allow me a place in your good Thoughts, I had almost said Friendship. This, my Lord, your Words and Actions so constantly shew on all occasions, even to others when I am absent, that it is not Vanity in me to mention, what every body knows : But it would be want of good Manners 1 0 not to acknowledge what so many are Witnesses of, and every day tell me, I am indebted to your Lordship for. I wish they could as easily assist my Gratitude, as they convince me of the great and growing Engagements it has to your Lordship. This I am sure, I should write of the Understanding without having any, if I were not 1 5 extremely sensible of them, and did not lay hold on this Oppor­ tunity to testifie to the World, how much I am obliged to be, and how much I am, My Lord, Tour Lordship's Most Humble, and Most Obedient Servant,

Dorret Court 24th of ..Hay 1 689.

JOHN L O C KE . I

( 1 0) good] add. 4-5 ( 1 6) extremely] 2-5 certainly 1 . In some, but not all, copi�s of the Holt issue of 1 , 'certainly' TJJas altered in ink by the printers to 'extreamly' (or th!s ( 1 9) Dorset Court 24th of May 1 689.] add. 4-5 (not tn TJJord differently spelt). Coste). ( Cf p. XP above.)

20

THE

E P I S T LE TO THE

R E A I) E R Reader, I Here put into thy Hands, what has been the diversion ofsome ofmy idle and heavy Hours: Ifit has the good luck to prove so ofany ofthine, and thou hast but half so much Pleasure in reading, as I had in writing it, thou wilt as little think thy Money, as I do my Pains, ill bestowed. Mistake not this,for a 5 Commendation of my Work; nor conclude, because I was pleased with the doing of it, that therefore I am fondly taken with it now it is done. He that hawks at Larks and Sparrows, has no less Sport, though a much less consider­ able �arry, than he that flies at nobler Game: And he is little acquainted with the Subject of this Treatise, the UNDERSTANDING, who does not 1 0 know, that as it is the most elevated Faculty ofthe Soul, so it is employed with a greater, and more constant Delight than any ofthe other. Its searches after Truth, are a sort of Hawking and Hunting, wherein the very pursuit makes a great part of the Pleasure. Every step the Mind takes in its Progress towards Knowledge, makes some Discovery, which is not only new, but the 1 5 best too, for the time at least. For the Understanding, like the Eye, judging of Objects, only by its own Sight, cannot but be pleased with what it discovers, having less regret for what has scaped it, because it is unknown. Thus he who has raised himself above the Alms-Basket, and not content to live lazily on scraps of begg'd 20 Opinions, sets his own Thoughts on work, to find and follow Truth, will (whatever he lights on) not miss the Hunter's Satisfaction; every moment of his Pursuit, will reward his Pains with some Delight; and he will have Reason to think his time not ill spent, even when he cannot much boast ofany great Acquisition. 25 This, Reader, is the Entertainment of those, who let loose their own Thoughts, and follow them in writing; which thou oughtest not to envy (14) some] add. 2-5. In some, but not all, copies of the Holt issue of 1 , 'some' was inserted in ink by the printers.

The Epistle to the Reader

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them, since they afford thee an Opportunity ofthe like Diversion, ifthou wilt make use of thy own Thoughts in reading. ' Tis to them, if they are thy own, that I referr my self· But if they are taken upon Trust from others, 'tis no great Matter what they are, they not following Truth, but some meaner Consideration: and 'tis not worth while to be concerned, what he says or thinks, who says or thinks only as he is directed by another. Ifthoujudgest for thy self, I know thou u:ilt judge candidly; and then I shall not be harmed or offended, whatever be thy Censure. For though it be certain, that there is nothing in this Treatise of the Truth whereof I am not fully persuaded; yet I consider my self as liable to Mistakes, as I can think thee; and know, that this Book must stand or fall with thee, not by any Opinion I have of it, but thy own. Ifthou findest little in it new or instructive to thee, thou art not to blame me for it. It war not meant for those, that had already mastered this Subject, and made a through Acquaintance with their own Understandings; but for my own Information, and the Satisfaction of a few Friends, who ackn()wledged themselves not to have sufficiently considered it. Were it fit to trouble thee with the History of this Essay, I should tell thee that five or six Friends meeting at my Chamber, and discoursing on a Subf'ct very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the Difficulties that rose on every side. After we had a while puzzled our selves, withnut coming any nearer a Resolution of those Doubts which perplexed us, it came into my Thoughts, that we took a wrong course; and that, before 'IT� set our selves upon Enquiries of that Nature, it was necessary to exc:i mine our own Abilities, and see, what Objects our Understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the Company, who all readily issented; and thereupon it was agreed, that this should be our first Enquiry. S:1me hasty and undigested Thoughts, on a Subject I had never before consid�rell, which I set down against our next Meeting, gave the first entrance into t.',is Discourse, which having been thus begun by Chance, was continued by Intreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and, after long intervals of neglect, resum'd again, as my Humour or Occasions permitted; and at last, in a retirement, where an Attendance on my Health gave me leisure, it was brought into that order, thou now seest it. This discontinued way of writing may have occasioned, besides others, two contrary Faults, viz. that too little, and too much may be said in it. If thou findest any thing wanting, I shall be glad, that what I have writ, gives thee any Desire, that I should have gone farther: If it seems too much to thee, thou must blame the Subject; for when I first put Pen to Paper, I thought all I should have to say on this Matter, would have been contained in one sheet of (9) the • • • persuaded] 2-5 I whose Truth I am not persuaded 1

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The Epistle to the Reader

Paper; but thefarther I went, the larger Prospect I had: New Discoveries led me still on, and so it grew insensibly to the bulk it now appears in. I will not deny, but possihly it might be reduced to a narrower compass than it is; and that some Parts of it might be contracted: the way it has been writ in, by catches, and many long intervals of Interruption, being apt to cause some Repetitions. But to confess the Truth, I am now too lazie, or too busie to make it shorter. I am not ignorant how little I herein consult my own Reputation, when I knowingly let it go with a Fault, so apt to disgust the most judicious, who are alwtiys the nicest, Readers. But they who know Sloth is apt to content it self with any Excuse, will pardon me, if mine has prevailed on me, where, I think, I have a very good one. I will not therefore al/edge in my Defence, that the same Notion, having different Respects, may be convenient or necessary, to prove or illustrate several Parts ofthe same Discourse; and that so it has happened in many Parts of this: But waving that, I shall frankly avow, that I have sometimes dwelt long upon the same Argument, and ex­ pressed it different w,.,1ys, with a quite different Design. I pretend not to publish this Essay for the Information of Men of large Thoughts and quick Apprehensions; to such Jl,fasters of Knowledge I pr�fess my selfa Scholar, and therefore warn them before-hand not to expect any thing here, but what being spun out of my own course Thoughts, is fitted to .J;fen of my own size, to whom, perhaps, it will not be unacceptable, that I have taken some Pains, to make plain and familiar to their Thoughts some Truths, which established Prejudice, or the Abstractness of the Ideas themselves, might render difficult. Some Objects had need be turned on every side; and when the Notion is new, as I confess some of these are to me; or out of the ordinary Road, as I suspect they will appear to others, 'tis not one simple view of it, that will gain it admittance into every Understanding, or fix it there with a clear and lasting Impression. There are few, I believe, who have not observed in themselves or others, That what in one way of proposing was 1)ery obscure, another way of expressing it, has made very clear and intelligible: Though afterward the Mindfound little difference in the Phr�1ses, and wondered why one failed to be understood more than the other. But every thing does not hit alike upon every Jl;fan' s Imagination. fVe have our Understandings no less different than our Pali:ites; and he that thinks the same Truth shall be equally relished by every one in the same dress, may as well hope to feast every one with the same sort of Cookery: The Meat may be the same, and the Nourishment good, yet every one not be able to receive it with that Seasoning; and it must be dressed another way, ifyou will have it go down with some, even ofstrong Constitutions. The Truth is, those who advised me to publish it, advised me,

The Epistle to the Reader

9

for this Reason, to publish it as it is: and since I have been brought to let it go abroad, I desire it should he understood by whoever gives himself the Pains to read it. I have so little Affection to he in Print, that if I were not flattered, this &say might be ofsome use to others, as I think, it has been to me, I should have confined it to the view of some Friends, who gave the first Occasion s to it. My appearing therefore in Print, being on purpose to he as useful as I may, I think it necessary to make, what I have to say, as easie and intelligible to all sorts of Readers as I can. And I had much rather the speculative � and quick-sighted should complain of my being in some parts tedious, than that any one, not accustomed to abstract Speculations, or prepossessed with 1 0 different Notions, should mistake, or not comprehend my meaning. It will possibly be censured as a great piece of Vanity, or Insolence in me, to pretend to instruct this our knowing Age, it amounting to little less, when I own, that I publish this &say with hopes it may be useful to others. But if it may he permitted to speak freely of those, who with a feigned Modesty 1 s condemn as useless, what they themselves Write, methinks it savours much more of Vanity or Insolence, to publish a Book for any other end; and he fails very much of that Respect he owes the Publick, who prints, and consequently expects Men should read that, wherein he intends not they should meet with any thing of Use to themselves or others: and should nothing else be found 20 allowable in this Treatise, yet my Design will not cease to be so; and the Goodness ofmy intention ought to be some Excusefor the Worthlessness ofmy Present. ' Tis that chiefly which secures me from the Fear of Censure, which I expect not to escape more than better Writers. Men's Principles, Notions, and Relishes are so different, that. it is hard to find a Book which pleases or dis- 25 pleases all Men. I acknowledge the Age we live in, is not the least knowing, and therefore not the most easie to be satisfied. If I have not the good luck to please, yet no Body ought to be offended with me. Iplainly tell all my Readers, except half a dozen, this Treatise was not at first intended for them; and therefore they need not be at the Trouble to be of that number. But yet if any 30 one thinks fit to be angry, and rail at it, he may do it securely: For I shall find some better way of spending my time, than in such kind of Conversation. I shall always have the satisfaction to have aimed sincerely at Truth and Use­ fulness, though in one of the meanest ways. The Commonwealth of Learning, is not at this time without Master-Builders, whose mighty Designs, in ad- 3S vancing the Sciencer, will leave lasting Monuments to the Admiration of Posterity; But every one must not hope to be a Boyle, or a Sydenham; and (27-8) satisfied . . . (14) thiI Essay] 2-5 I it 1 (3 1) to] 1 ought yet Body no doe, to luck good the not ha-Pe ought] 2-5 I satisfied; '11Jhicb ifI 1-4; om. 5

I

(3) Affection] 4-5 Affectation 1 -3

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35

The Epistle to the Reader

in an Age that produces such Masters, as the Great -- Huygenius, and the incomparable Mr. Newton, with some other of that Strain; 'tis Ambition enough to be employed as an Under-Labourer in clearing Ground a little, and removing some of the Rubbish, that lies in the way to Knowledge; which certainly had been very much more advanced in the World, if the Endeavours of ingenious and industrious Men had not been much cumbred with the learned but frivolous use ofuncouth, affected, or un­ intelligible Terms, introduced into the Sciences, and there made an Art of, to that Degree, that Philosophy, which is nothing but the true Knowledge of Things, was thought unfit, or uncapable to be brought into well-bred Company, andpolite Conversation. Vague and insignificant Forms ofSpeech, and Abuse of Language, have so long passed for Mysteries of Science; And hard or misapply'd Words, with little or no meaning, have, by Prescription, such a Right to be mistaken for deep Learning, and heighth of Speculation, that it will not be easie to persuade, either those who speak, or those who hear them, that they are but the Covers of Ignorance, and hindrance of true Knowledge. To break in upon the Sanctuary ofVanity and Ignorance, will be, I suppose, some Service to Humane Understanding: Though so few are apt to think, they deceive, or are deceived in the Use of Words; or that the Language of the Sect they are of, has any Faults in it, which ought to be examined or corrected, that I hope I shall be pardon'd, if I have in the Third Book dwelt long on this Subject; and endeavoured to make it so plain, that neither the inveterateness ofthe Mischief, nor the prevalency ofthe Fashion, shall be any Excuse for those, who will not take Care about the meaning of their own Words, and will not suffer the Significancy of their &pressions to be en­ quired into. I have been told that a short Epitome of this Treatise, which was printed 1688, was by some condemned without reading, because innate Ideas were denied in it; they too hastily concluding, that if innate Ideas were not supposed, there would be little left, either of the Notion or ProofofSpirits. any one take the like Offence at the Entrance of this Treatise, I shall desire him to read it through: and then I hope he will be convinced, that the taking away false Foundations, is not to the prejudice, but advantage of Truth; which is never injur'd or endanger'd so much, as when mixed with, or built on, Falshood. In the Second Edition, I added as followeth:

If

(4) Ground] 4-5 I the Ground 1-3 (likewise Coste) ( 1 7) the] 5 I thiI 1--4 (28) (35) In . . . followeth:] add. 5. Imtead of thiI and 1 688] 4-5 I about twq TearI Iince 1-3 t�e remainder ofthe Epistle? 1 concluder here with thir paragraph: ' One thing more I murt ad-Per­ ttre my Reader of, and that tr, That the Summary ofeach Section iI printed in Italick Characterr, whereby_ the _Read�r may find the ContentI almort aI well aI if it had been printed in the Margin hy the r,de, if a little allowance he made for the Grammatical Comtruction, 'IZ)hicb in the Text

The Epistle to the Reader

II

7:'he Bookseller will not forgive me, if I say nothing ofthis Second Edition, which he has promised, hy the correctness of it, shall make amends for the many Faults committed in the former. He desires too, that it should he known, that it has one whole new Chapter concerning Identity, and many additions, and amendments in other places. These I must inform my Reader s are wt all new matter, hut most of them either farther confirmation of what I had said, or E.xplications to prevent others being mistaken in the sence of what was formerly printed, and not any variation in me from it; I must only except the alterations I have made in Book 2 . Chap. 2 1 . What I had there Writ concerning Liberty and the Will, I thought 1 0 deserv' d as accurate a review, as I was capable of- Those Subjects having in all Ages exercised the learned part of the World, with �estions and Difficulties, that have not a little perplex'd Morality and Divinity, those parts of Knowledge, that Men are most concern' d to be clear in. Upon a closer inspection into the working of Men's Minds, and a stricter examiria- 1 5 tion of those motives and views, they are turn'd by, I have found reason somewhat to alter the thoughts I formerly had concerning that, which gives the last determination to the Will in all voluntary actions. This I cannot forbear to acknowledge to the World, with as much freedom and readiness, as I at first published, what then seem'd to me to be right, thinking my self more 20 concern'd to quit and renounce any Opinion of my own, than oppose that of another, when Truth appears against it. For 'tis Truth alone I seek, and that will always he welcome to me, when or from whencesoever it comes. But what forwardness soever I have to resign any Opinion I have, or to recede from any thing I have Writ, upon the first evidence of any error in it; 25 yet this I must own, that I have not had the good luck to receive any light from those E.xceptions, I have met with in print against any part of my Book, nor have, from any thing has been urg'd against it, found reason to alter my Sense, in any of the Points have been question'd. Whether the Subject, I have in hand, requires often more thought and attention, than Cursory Readers, at 30 least such as are prepossessed, are willing to allow ? Or whether any obscurity in my expressions castr a cloud over it, and these notions are made difficult to others apprehension in my way of treating them ? So it is, that my meaning, Ifind, is often mistaken, and I have not the good luck to be every where rightly understood. There are so many Instances of this, that I think it 'Justice to my 3 5 i t te/f could not alwayt he IO ordered, m to make perfect Propositionr, which yet by the Wordt printed in lta/ick, may be emi/y gumed at. ' ( r) Second] 4-5 I New 2-3 (/ikew/se Coste) ( r-3 5) The . . . undmtood.] 2-5 5 . .In 2-4? _five paragraphs followet every where add. .] understood . There . . 2) (3 5 )- 1 2( 1 rightly understood.', which in 5 were placed instead tn a footnote at II. xxvm. 1 1 (see pp. 35 4-5 below).

12

The Epistle to the Reader

Reader and my self, to conclude, that either my Book is plainly enough written to be rightly understood hy those, who peruse it with that Attention and Indifferency, which every one, who will give himselfthe Pains to read, ought to imploy in reading; or else that I have writ mine so obscurely, that it is in s vain to go about to mend it. Which ever of these be that Truth, 'tis my self only am affected thereby, and therefore I shall he far from troubling my Reader with what I think might be said, in answer to those several Objections I have met with, to Passages here and there of my Book. Since I perswade my self, that he who thinks them ofMoment enough to be concerned, whether they Io are true or false, will be able to see, that what is said, is either not well founded, or else not contrary to my Doctrine, when I and my Opposer come both to be well understood. If any, careful that none of their good thoughts should be lost, have publish'd their censures of my Essay, with this honour done to it, that they I S will not suffer it to be an Essay, I leave it to the puhlick to value the obligation they have to their critical Pens, and shall not wast my Reader's time, in so idle or ill natur'd an employment of mine, as to lessen the satis­ faction any one has in himself, or gives to others in so hasty a confutation of what I have Written. The Booksellers preparing far the fourth Edition of my Essay, gave me 20 notice of it, that I might, if I had leisure, make any additions or alterations I should think .fit. Whereupon I thought it convenient to advertise the Reader, that besides several corrections I had made here and there, there was one alteration which it was necessary to mention, because it ran through the 2s whole Book, and is of consequence to be rightly understood. What I there­ upon said, was this: Clear and distinct Ideas are terms, which though familiar and frequent in Men's Mouths, I have reason to think every one, who uses, does not perfectly understand. And possibly 'tis but here and there one, who gives (5-6) self . . . far] W I self, 5-6 (1 2) v. 1 1 (3 5), n. (1 3-1 9) If . . . Written.] 2-5 ( 1 3) any] 5 I any other Authors 2-4 (1 6) Reader's] 5 1 Readers 2-4 ( 1 9) Residue of Epistle not in 2-3, which instead conclude: 'Besides what is already mentioned, this Second Edition has the Summaries of the several §§. not only Printed, as before, in a Table by them­ sehm, but in the Margent too. And at the end there is now an Index added. These two, with a great number of short additions, amendments, and alterations are advantages of this Edition, which the Bookseller hopes will make it sell. For as to the larger additions and alterations, I have obliged him, and he has promised me to print them by themselves, so that the former Edition may no! be wholl7 lost to those who have it, but by the inserting in their proper places the passages that wtll be reprinted alone, to that purpose, the former Book may be made as little defective as is possible.' Coste adds paragraph: ' C'est la ce que je jugeai necessaire de dire sur la seconde Edition de cet Ouvrage, et voici ce que j� suis oblige d'aJ? uter present�ment.' (20-5) The . • . understood.] 4-5 (20) the] 5 I this 4 (2 1 ) leisure,] 5 I leisure 4 · (22) I thought it] 5 1 it may be 4 (23) had] 5 I have 4 was] 5 1 is 4 (24) it was] 5 I I think 4 ran] 5 I runs 4 mention] 5 I mmtion here 4 (25-6) What • • . this:] add. 5 (27)- 14(1 4) Clear . . . Impression.] 4-5

The Epistle to the Reader

13

himself the trouhle to consider them so far as to know what he himself, or others precisely mean by them; I have therefore in most places chose to put determinate or determined, instead of clear and distinct, as more likely to direct Men's thoughts to my meaning in this matter. By those de�minations, I mean some object in the Mind, and consequently deternuned, i.e. such as it is there seen and perceived to be. This I think may fitly he called a determinate or determin'd Idea, when such as it is at any time objectively in the Mind, and so determined there, it is annex'd, and without variation determined to a name or articulate sound, which is to be steadily the sign ofthat very same object ofthe Mind, or determinate Idea. To explain this a little more particularly. By determinate, when applied to a simple Idea, I mean that simple appearance, which the Mind has in its view, or perceives in it self, when that Idea is said to he in it: By determined, when applied to a complex Idea, I mean such an one as consists of a deter­ minate number of certain simple or less complex Ideas, joyn'd in such a proportion and situation, as the Mind has before its view, and sees in it self when that Idea is present in it, or should be present in it, when a Man gives a name to it. I say should be: because it is not every one, nor perhaps any one, who is so careful of his Language, as to use no Word, till he views in his Mind the precise determined Idea, which he resolves to make it the sign of The want of this is the cause of no small obscurity and confusion in Men's thoughts and discourses. I know there are not Words enough in any Language to answer all the variety of Ideas, that enter into Men's discourses and reasonings. But this hinders not, but that when any one uses any term, he may have in his Mind a determined Idea, which he makes it the sign of, and to which he should keep it steadily annex'd during that present discourse. Where he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear or distinct Ideas: ' Tis plain his are not so: and therefore there can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion, where such terms are made use of, which have not such a precise determination. Upon this Ground I have thought determined Ideas a way ofspeaking less liable to mistake, than clear and distinct: and where Men have got such determined Ideas of all, that they reason, enquire, or argue about, they will find a great part of their Doubts and Disputes at an end. The greatest part of the §J.!!:_estions and Controversies that perplex Mankind depe�ding on the doubtful and uncertain use of !Fords, or (which is the same) mdeter­ mined Ideas, which they are made to stand for. I have made choice of these

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(4) By] 5 And hy 4

4-5

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(6) there] 5 there, 4

( 1 2) simple Idea] edit. I simple Idea

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15

20

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30

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The Epistle to the Reader

14

terms to. signifte, I . Some immediate object of the Mind, which it perceives and has before it distinct from the sound it uses as a sign of it. 2. That this Idea thus determined, i.e. which the Mind has in it self, and knows, and sees there he determined without any change to that name, and that name s determined to that precise Idea. If Men had such determined Ideas in their enquiries and discourses, they would both discern how far their own enquiries and discourses went, and avoid the greatest part of the Disputes and Wranglings they have with others. Besides this the Bookseller will think it necessary I should advertise the IO Reader, that there is an addition of two Chapters wholly new; the one of the Association of Ideas, the other of Enthusiasm. These with some other larger additions never before printed, he has engaged to print by themselves after the same manner, and for the same purpose as was done when this Essay had the Second Impression. IS In this fifth Edition, there is very little added or altered; the greatest part ofwhat is new, is contained in the 2 1 Chapter of the second Book, which any one, if he thinks it worth the while, may, with a very little Labour, transcribe into the Margent of the former Edition. ( 14)

-P.

1 2(27), n.

(1 5-1 8) In . . . Edition.] add. 5

(1 5) altered;] edit. I altered, 5

THE

C O N T E N T S1 BOOK I Of Innate Notions. CHAPTER

Introduction. No innate speculative Principles. 3 . No innate practical Principles. 4. Other Proofs against innate Prin­ cipler. I.

2.

BOOK II CHAPTER I. 2.

3. 4. 5.

6. 7.

8. 9. IO. II. 12.

13. 1 4. 15.

Of Ideas.

Of Ideas in general. Of simple Ideas. Of Ideas of one Sense. Of Solidity. Of simple Ideas of more than one Sense. Of simple Ideas of Reflection. Of simple Ideas both of Sensation and Reflection. Other Considerations concerning simple Ideas. Of Perception. Of Retention. Of Discerning. Of complex Ideas. Of Space, and its simple Modes. Of Duration. Of Extension and Duration con­ sidered together.

16. 17. 18. 19.

Of Number. Of Infinity. Of other simple Modes. Of the Modes of Thinking. 20. Of the Modes of Pleasure and Pain. 2 1 . Of Power. 22. Of mixed Modes. 23 . Of the complex Ideas of Substances. 24. Of the collective Ideas of Sub­ stances. 25. Of Relation. 26. Of Cause and Effect, and other Relations. 2 27. 3 -of Identity and Diversity. -3 28. Of other Relations. 29. Of clear and distinct, obscure and confused Ideas. 30. Of real and fantastical Ideas. 3 1 . Of adequate and inadequate Ideas. 32. Of true and false Ideas. 4-3 3 . Of the Association of Ideas.-4

BOOK III CHAPTER I. 2.

3.

4. 5.

6. 7.

Of Words.

Of Words and Language in general. Of the Signification of Words. Of general Terms. Of the Names of simple Ideas. Of the Names of mixed Modes and Relations. Of the Names of Substances. Of Particles.s

1 This Table (1JJhich is not included in Coste or in W), and the following Table with summaries of sections of chapters, preceded the main text of the Essay in 2-5, but were placed 2 Relations] 1-3, 5 (likewise Coste) I Relation 4 3- 3 Of . . . after it in 1 . Diversity.] add. 2-5. The chapters here numbered 2 8, . . . , 32 in 2-5 are numbered 2 7, . . . , 5 7 . of Particles.] edit. ; om. 1-5 4 -4 3 3 . . . . Ideas.] add. 4-5 3 1, respectively, in 1 .

Contents

16

8. Of abstract and concrete Terms. 1 9 . Of the Imperfection of Words.

I O. II.

Of the Abuse of Words. Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses.

B O O K IV Of Knowledge and Opinion. CHAPTER I . Of Knowledge in general. 2. Of the Degrees of our Knowledge. 3 . Of the extent of Humane Knowledge. 4. Of the Reality of our Knowledge. 5. Of Truth in general. 6. Of universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty.

7. Of Maxims. 8 . Of trifling Propositions. 9 . Of our Knowledge of Existence. I O. Of the Existence of t1 GOD. I 1.

12. I3.

1 4. 1 5. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21.

Of the Knowledge of the Existence of other Things. Of the Improvement of our Know­ ledge. Some other Considerations concerning our Knowledge. Of 1udgment. Of Probability. Of the Degrees of �4.nent. Of Reason. Of Faith and Reason, as contra distinguished. Of Enthusiasm. 2 Of wrong Assent, or Errour. The Division of the Sciences.

The chapterr here numbered 8, . . . , 1 1 are in the Table in 1-5 numbered 7, . . . , 1. o, 2 1 9. Of Enthuriarm.] add. 4-5. The chapterr here numbered rerpectively (cf. p. 1.5, n. 5). 2 0, 21. in 4-5 are numbered 1 9, 2 0, rerpectively, in 1-3.

1

THE

CONTENTS BOOK ! C HAPTE R I

Introduction.

5.

SECTION 1. 2.

3. 4. 5.

6.

7. 8.

An F.nquiry into the Understanding pleasant and useful. Design. Method. Useful to know the extent of our Comprehension. Our Capacity proportioned to our State and Concerns, to dis­ cover things useful to us. Knowing the extent of our Capacities will hinder us from useless Curiosity, Scepticism, and Idleness. Occasion of this Essay. 1 - What Idea stands far. -i

CHAPTER I I

No innate speculative Principles. SECTION

I . The way shewn how we come by

any Knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate. 2. General Assent the great Argu­ ment. 3 . Universal Consent proves nothing­ innate. 4. What is, is; and, It is im­ possible for the same thing 1 -1

What . • . for.] _2-5 j Apology for Idea. 1

6, 7. 8. 9-1 1 . 12.

l3 .

14. 1 5 , 16. 1 7. 1 8.

19. 20.

to be, and not to be, not universally assented to. Not on the Mind naturally im­ printed, because not known to Children, Idiots, etc. That Men know them when they come to the use of Reason, answer'd. If Reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate. ' Tis false that Reason discovers them. The coming to the Use of Reason, not the time we come to know these Maxims. By this, they are not distinguish­ edfrom other knowable Truths. If coming to the use of Reason were the time of their discovery, it would not prove them innate. The steps by which the Mind attains several Truths. Assenting as soon as proposed and understood, proves them not in­ nate. If such an Assent be a mark of innate, then that One and Two are equal to Three; that Sweetness is not Bitterness; and a thousand the like must be in­ nate. Such less general Propositions known before these universal Maxims. One and One, equal to Two, etc.

Contents

18

21.

22.

23 .

24. 25. 26.

27.

28.

not general nor ureful, ttn­ wered. There Maximr not being known rometimer till propored, pro'Pu them not innate. Implicitly known before pro­ posing, signifier that the Mind is capable of understanding them, or ehe rignifier nothing. The Argument of amnting on first hearing, is upon a faire rupporition of no precedent teaching. Not innate, becaure not uni­ Persally asrented to. These Maximr not the firrt known. And so not innate. Not innate, because they appear least, where what is innate rhewr it self clearest. Recapitulation.

Book I

8. Conrcience no Proof of any in­ nate Moral Rule. 9. Instancer of Enormities practised without remorse. IO. Men ha1Je contrary Practical Principles. n-1 3 . Whole Natiom reject se1Jeral Moral Rules. 14. Those who maintain innate practical Principlu, tell us not what they are. 1 5-19. LordHerbert's innate Principles examined. 20. Obj . Innate Principles may be corrupted, answered. 2 1 . Contrary Principles in the World. 22-26. How Men commonly come by their Principles. 27. Principles must be examined.

C H A P T E R IV CHAPTER I I I

No innate practical Principles. SECTION 1.

2.

3.

4. 5. 6. 7.

No moral Principles so clear and so generally recei1Jed, as the forementioned speculative Max­ im!. Faith and 1ustice not owned as Principles by all Men. Obj. Though Men deny them in their Practice, yet they admit them in their Thoughts, an­ wered. Moral Rules need a Proof, ergo not innate. Instance in keeping Compacts. Virtue generally approved, not because innate, but because profitable. Men's Actions convince us, that the Rule of Virtue iI not their internal Principle.

Other Considerations about innate Principles, both Speculative and Practical.

SECTION 1.

2,

3.

4, 5. 6. 7.

8-1 1 . 12.

1 3-16. 17.

Principles not innate, unless their Ideas be innate. Ideas, epecially those belonging to Principles, not born with Children. Identity an Idea not innate. Whole and Part not innate Ideas. Idea of Worship not innate. Idea of Goo not innate. Suitable to Goo's Goodness, that all Men should have an Idea of Him, therefore naturally im­ printed by Him; answered. Ideas of Goo various in different Men. If the Idea of Goo be not in­ nate, no other can be supposed innate.

Contents

Book Il

18. Idea of Subrtance not innate. 19. No Propositions can he innate, 20.

since no 1 Ideas are innate. -No Ideas are remember' d till after they have been intro­ duc'd.-2 Principles not innate, because of little use, or little certainty.

2

2 1 .3

19

Difference of Men's Discoveries depends upon the different appli­ cation of their Faculties. 23 . Men must think and know for themselves. 24. Whence the Opinion of innate Principles. 25. Conclusion.

22.

BOOK I I CHAPTER I

1 3 . Impossihle 1 0 to convince those

Of Ideas in genera/.4 SECTION I. 2.

3.

4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 1 0.

II. 12.

Idea is the Object of Thinking. All Ideas come from Sensation or Reflection. The Objects of Sensation one Sourse of Ideas. The Operations of our Minds5 the other Sourse of them. All our Ideas are of the one or the other of these. Observable in Children. Men are differently furnished with these, according to the different Objects they converse with. Ideas of Reflection later,6 because they need Attention. The Soul begins to have Ideas, when it begins to perceive. The Soul thinks not always; for this' wants Proofs. ItB is not always conscious of it. lf9 a sleeping Man thinks with­ out knowing it, the sleeping and waking Man are two Persons.

14. 15. 16.

17.

1 8.

19.

20--24.

25.

that sleep without dreaming, that they think. That1 1 Men dream without rememhring it, in vain urged. Upon this1 2 Hypothesis, the Thoughts of a sleeping Man ought to he most rational. On 1 3 this Hypothesis the Soul must have Ideas not derived from Sensation or Reflection, of which there is no appearance. If 1 4 I think when I know it not, no hody else can know it. How 1 s knows any one that the Soul always thinks ? For if it he not a self-evident Proposition, it needs proof That 16 a Man should he husie in thinking, and yet not retain it the next Moment, very im­ probable. No Ideas hut from Sensation or Reflection, evident, if we oh­ serve Children. In the reception of simple Ideas, the Understanding is most ofall passive.

2 -2 No . • . introduc'd.] add. 2-5 3 Sections here numbered 2 1 , no] add. 2-5 4 Cf. headin in text, 2 5 in 2-5 are numbered 2 0, • . . , 2 4, rerpectively, in 1 . � 6 Refi Ctzon later] 1 Ideas, semible t s Mindr] 2-5 I Mindr abo� i�c. : . _ 7 far this] 2-5 I far, Fzrrt, It ] 2-5 I zt l . 2-5 I Reflexion had later l 10 2-5 I Fo�rthly, Impomble] Thirdly, If 1 9 If] 2-5 I Secondly, It 1 _ 12 Upon thts] 211 That] 2-5 Fifthly, That 1 � I Szxthly, Impossible 1 1 4 If] 2-5 I Etghtly, If 1 1 3 On] 2-5 , Seventhly, On 1 Upon their l 16 That] 2-5 I Tenthly, That l 1 s How] 2-5 I Ninthly, How 1 1

�d

Contents

20

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER VII

Of simple Ideas.

Of Simple Ideas, both of Sensation and Reflection.

SECTION

Uncompounded Appearances. 3 . The Mind can neither make nor destroy them. 1.

2,

Book D

SECTION

Pleasure and Pain. 7. &istence and Unity. 8. Power. 9. Succession. I O. Simple Ideas the Materials of all our Knowledge.

1-6.

CHAPTER III Of Ideas of one Sense. SECTION 1. 2.

As Colours of Seeing, Sounds of Hearing. Few simple Ideas have Names.

CHAPTER IV Of Solidity SECTION l. 2.

3. 4. 5. 6.

We receive this Idea from touch. Solidity fills Space. Distinct from Space. From Hardness. On Solidity depends Impulse, Resistence, and Protrusion. What it is. 1

CHAPTER V Of simple Ideas by more than one Sense.

CHAPTER VIII Other Considerations concerning simple Ideas. SECTION l -6.

7, 8. 9,

IO.

I I , 12.

1 3 , 14. 1 5 -23 .

24, 25 . 26.

CHAPTER I X

CHAPTER VI Of simple Ideas of Reflection. SECTION I. 2.

Are the Operations of the Mind about its other Ideas. The Idea of Perception, and Idea of TVilling, we have from Rejlection. 2

Positive Ideas from privative Causes. Ideas in the Mind, �alities in Bodies. Primary and Secondary �ali­ ties. How primary �alities produce their Ideas. How Secondary. Ideas of primary �lities are resemblances; of secondary, not. Reason of our mistake in this. Secondary �alities two-fold; First, Immediately perceivable; Secondly, Mediately per­ ceivable.

Of Perception. SECTION

It is the first simple Idea of Re­ flection. 2-4. Perception is only when the Mind receives the Impression. 6. Children, though they have Ideas, 5, in the Womb, have none innate. 1.

1 What it ir] 1-3 (likewise Coste) I What ir it 4-5 ( Rrjlection 2-3) I the Reflection 4-5

2

Reflection] Reflexion 1-3

Book

n

Contents

7. Which Ideas first is not evident. Ideas of Sensation often changed hy the ;udgment. l 1-14. Perception puts the difference be­ t11Jeen Animals and inferiour Beings. l 5 . Perception, the inlet of Know­ ledge.

2I

16. Appeal to Experience. 17. Dark Room.

8-10.

CHAPTER XII Of Complex Ideas. SECTION

I . Made by the Mind out of simple

CHAPTER X

2.

3.

Of Retention. SECTION

I . Contemplatiun.

Memory. 3. Attention, Repetitiun, Pleasure, and Pain fix Ideas. 4, 5 . Ideas fade in the Memory. 6. Comtantly repeated Ideas can rcarce he fort. 7. In remembring the Mind is often active. 8. Two defects in the Memory, Obli'Pion and Slowness. 10. 1 Brutes ha'Pe Memory. 2.

·

4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

CHAPTER XIII Of Space, and its simple Modes. SECTION 1. 2.

CHAPTER XI Of Discerning, etc. SECTION

1 . No Knowledge without it. 2. The difference of Wit and ;udgment. 3 . Clearness alone hinders Confusion. 4. Comparing. 5 . Brutes compare but imperfectly. 6. Compounding. 7. Brutes compound but little. 8. Naming. 9. Abstraction. 10, I I . Brutes abrtract not. 12, I 3 . Idiots and mad Men. 14. Method. 1 5 . These are the beginnings of humane Knowledge. 1 1 o.] 2-5 I 9. 1

unes. Made voluntarily. Are either Modes, Substances, or Relations. Modes. Simple and mixed ..Modes. Subrtances Single or Collective. Relation. The abstrusest Ideas from the two Sources.

3. 4. 5, 6. 7-10. 1 l-14.

1 5-17. 1 8, 19. 20. 21. 22.

23 .

24, 25.

Simple Modes. Idea of Space. Space and Extension. Immensity. Figure. Place. &tension and Body not the same. Substance which we know not, no proof against Space without Body. Substance and Accidents of little use in Philosophy. A Vacuum beyond the utmost bounds of Body. The power of annihilation proves a Vacuum. Motion proves a Vacuum. The Ideas of Space and Body distinct. Extension being inseparable from Body, proves it not the same.

Contents

22

Ideas of Space and Solidity distinct. 27. Men differ little in clear simple Ideas.

Book Il

CHAPTER XV

26.

CHAPTER XIV Of Duration. SECTION

1 . Duration is fleeting Extension. 2-4. Its Idea from Reflection on the train of our Ideas. 5. The Idea of Duration applicable to things whilst we sleep. 6-8. The Idea of Succession not from Motion. 9-1 1 . The train of Ideas has a certain degree of quickness. 12. This train the measure of other Successions. 13-1 5 . The Mind cannotfix long on one invariable Idea. 16. Ideas, however made, include no sense of Motion. 17. Time is Duration set out by Measures. 1 8 . A good measure of Time must divide its whole Duration into equal periods. 19. The Revolutions of the Sun and Moon the properest Measures of Time. 20. But not by their motion, but periodical appearances. 2 1 . No two parts of Duration can be certainly known to be equal. 22. Time not the measure of Motion. 23 . Minutes, Hours, and Tears, not necessary measures of Duration. 24. The measure of Time two ways applied. 1 25-27. Our measure of Time applicable to Duration before Time. 28-3 1.2 Eternity.

Of Duration and Expansion con­ sidered together.

SECTION

1 . Both capable of greater and less. 2.

3.

4.

5. 6.

7.

8. 9. IO. 1I. 12.

Expansion not bounded by Matter. Nor Duration by Motion. Why Men more easily admit infinite Duration, than infinite Expansion. Time to Duration is as Place to Expansion. Time and Place are taken for so much ofeither, as are set out by the Existence and Motion of Bodies.3 Sometimes far so much of either, as we design by measures taken from the bulk or motion of Bodies. They belong to all Beings. All the parts of Extension are Extension; and all the parts of Duration, are Duration. Their parts inseparable. Duration is as a Line, Expansion as a Solid. Duration has never two parts together, Expansion altogether.

C HAPTER XVI Of Number.

SECTION

1 . Number the simplest and most universal Idea. 2. Its Modes made by Addition. 3 . &ch Mode distinct. 4. Therefore Demonstrations in Numbers the most precise. 5, 6. Names necessary to Numbers. 7. Why Children number not earlier.

1 This entry [or § 24 is in 1-5 (b t not i