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GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 5^H^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^s^^,
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12.
LUCRETIUS EPICTETUS MARCUS AURELIUS
13.
VIRGIL
14.
PLUTARCH
15.
TACITUS
16.
PTOLEMY
Introductory Volumes: 1.
2.
3.
The Great Conversation
The Great The Great
Ideas
I
Ideas II
***********************************************
4.
5.
HOMER
COPERNICUS KEPLER
AESCHYLUS SOPHOCLES
17.
PLOTINUS
18.
AUGUSTINE
19.
THOMAS AQUINAS
I
THUCYDIDES
20.
THOMAS AQUINAS
II
7.
PLATO
21.
DANTE
8.
ARISTOTLE
I
22.
CHAUCER
9.
ARISTOTLE
II
23.
HIPPOCRATES GALEN
MACHIAVELLI HOBBES
24.
RABELAIS
EUCLID
25.
MONTAIGNE
ARCHIMEDES APOLLONIUS
26.
SHAKESPEARE
I
NICOMACHUS
27.
SHAKESPEARE
II
EURIPIDES
ARISTOPHANES 6.
10.
11.
HERODOTUS
'~?^>-?^~r^7-?^
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD GILBERT GALILEO
41.
GIBBON
HARVEY
42.
KANT
CERVANTES
43.
AMERICAN STATE
29. 30.
FRANCIS BACON
28.
II
PAPERS THE FEDERALIST J. S. MILL
DESCARTES SPINOZA
44.
BOSWELL
32.
MILTON
45.
LAVOISIER FOURIER
33.
PASCAL
34.
NEWTON
31.
FARADAY 46.
HEGEL
47.
GOETHE
48.
MELVILLE
49.
DARWIN
50.
MARX
HUYGENS 35.
LOCKE BERKELEY
HUME 36.
SWIFT STERNE
ENGELS 37.
38.
FIELDING
MONTESQUIEU ROUSSEAU
51.
TOLSTOY
52.
DOSTOEVSKY
39.
ADAM SMITH
53.
WILLIAM JAMES
40.
GIBBON
54.
FREUD
I
""
\
»
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS, EDITOR IN CHIEF
+
«
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«
MMHMMMMMM HMnMH «
42.
KANT
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Mortimer J. Adler,
Associate Editor
Members ofthe Advisory Board: Stringfellow Barr, Scott Buchanan, John Erskine,
Clarence H. Faust, Alexander Meiklejohn, Joseph J. Schwab, Editorial Consultants: A. F. B.
Clark,
F. L.
Wallace Brockway,
Lucas,
Mark Van Doren.
Walter Murdoch.
Executive Editor
miiiittumt t t i Mtmn
The
*»"> "
>
Duty
(My own
-
my
also
is
(The Happiness
which jurisprudence altogether abstracts. In the case of the moral imperative, and the supposition of freedom which it necessarily involves, the law, the power (to fulfil it) and the rational will that determines the maxim, constitute all the elements that form the notion of juridical duty. But in the imperative, which commands the duty of virtue, there is added, besides the notion of self-constraint, that of an end; not one that we have, but that we ought to have, which,
"o
therefore, pure practical reason has in itself,
XII. Preliminary Notions of the Susceptibility of the Mind for Notions of Duty generally
whose
highest, unconditional
end (which, how-
ever, continues to be duty) consists in this: that
virtue
men.
is
is
its
also
brightly as
own end and, by deserving well its own reward. Herein it shines an ideal to human perceptions,
of so it
seems to cast in the shade even holiness itself, which is never tempted to transgression. 2 This, however, is an illusion arising from the fact that as we have no measure for the degree of strength, except the greatness of the obstacles which might have been overcome (which in our case are the inclinations), we are led to mistake the subjective conditions of estimation of a magni1
2
[Cf. Science oj Right, p. 398.
So that one mi^ht vary two well-known lines of
Haller thus:
With
all his failings,
man
is still
Better than angels void oj wiU.
>>
tion)
Q
~
Perfec-
The Law which
is
£ also Spring c
of Others)
*->
4
Q
3
On which
-
The End which
is "3
also Spring
On which
the
Morality
c
the
Legality
of every free determination of will rests
The Formal Element
of the
Duty
of Virtue
These are such moral qualities as, when a man does not possess them, he is not bound to acquire them. They are: the moral feeling, conscience, love of one's neighbour, and respect for our-
There is no obligation to have these, since they are subjective conditions
selves (self-esteem).
of susceptibility for the notion of duty, not
objective conditions of morality.
They
are
all
and antecedent, but natural capacities of mind (prcedispositio) to be affected by notions of duty; capacities which it cannot be regarded as a duty to have, but which every man has, and by virtue of which he can be brought under oblisensitive
gation.
The consciousness
of
them
is
not of
empirical origin, but can only follow on that of a
moral law. as an
effect of the
same on the mind.
OF ETHICS A.
This
The Moral Feeling
the susceptibility for pleasure or dis-
is
pleasure, merely
from the consciousness of the
agreement or disagreement of our action with the law of duty. Now, every determination of the elective will proceeds from the idea of the possible action through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure in taking an interest in it or its effect to the deed; and here the sensitive state (the affection of the internal sense)
pathological or a moral feeling.
is
either a
The former
is
the feeling that precedes the idea of the law, the
which may follow it. cannot be a duty to have a moral feeling, or to acquire it; for all consciousness of obligation supposes this feeling in order that one latter that
Now
it
may become lies in
conscious of the necessitation that
the notion of duty; but every
man
(as a
moral being) has it originally in himself; the obligation, then, can only extend to the cultivation of it and the strengthening of it even by admiration of its inscrutable origin; and this is effected by showing how it is just, by the mere conception of reason, that it is excited most strongly, in its own purity and apart from every pathological stimulus; and it is improper to call this feeling a moral sense; for the word sense generally
means a
theoretical
power of percep-
tion directed to an object; whereas the moral
and displeasure in general) something merely subjective, which supplies no knowledge. No man is wholly destitute of moral feeling, for if he were totally unsusceptible of this sensation he would be morally dead; and, to speak in the language of physicians, if the moral vital force could no longer produce any effect on this feeling, then his humanity would be dissolved (as it were by chemical laws) into mere animality and be irrevocably confounded with the mass of other physical beings. But we have no special sense for (moral) good and evil any more than for truth, although such expressions are often used; but we have a susfeeling (like pleasure
is
ceptibility of the free elective will for being
moved by pure practical reason and its law; and it is this that we call the moral feeling. B.
Of Conscience
Similarly, conscience
is
not a thing to be ac-
quired, and it is not a duty to acquire it; but every man, as a moral being, has it originally within him. To be bound to have a conscience
would be
as
much
as to say to be
to recognize duties.
under a duty For conscience is practical
reason which, in every case of law, holds before
man
375
duty for acquittal or condemnation; consequently it does not refer to an object, but only to the subject (affecting the moral feeling by its own act) so that it is an inevitable fact, not an obligation and duty. When, therefore, it is said. "This man has no conscience," what is meant is that he pays no heed to its dictates. For if he really had none, he would not take credit to himself for anything done according to duty, nor reproach himself with violation of duty, and therefore he would be unable even to conceive the duty of having a conscience. I pass by the manifold subdivisions of conscience, and only observe what follows from what has just been said, namely, that there is no such thing as an erring conscience. No doubt it is possible sometimes to err in the objective judgement whether something is a duty or not; but I cannot err in the subjective whether I have compared it with my practical (here judicially acting) reason for the purpose of that judgement: for if I erred I would not have exercised practical judgement at all, and in that case there is neither truth nor error. U neons cientiousness is not want of conscience, but the propensity not to heed its judgement. But when a man is conscious of having acted according to his cona
his
;
science, then, as far as regards guilt or inno-
more can be required of him, bound to enlighten his understanding as to what is duty or not; but when it comes or has come to action, then conscience speaks incence, nothing
only he
is
voluntarily and inevitably.
To
act conscientious-
ly can, therefore, not be a duty, since otherwise it
would be necessary
to
have a second con-
science, in order to be conscious of the act of
the
first.
The duty here
is
only to cultivate our con-
science, to quicken our attention to the voice of
the internal judge, and to use
obedience to
it,
C.
Love
is
and
is
all
means
to secure
thus our indirect duty. 1
Of Love to Men
a matter of feeling, not of will or voli-
and
I cannot love because I will to do so, because I ought (I cannot be necessitated to love) hence there is no such thing as a duty to love. Benevolence, however (amor tion,
still
less
;
benevolentice)
,
as a
mode
of action,
may be
sub-
ject to a law of duty. Disinterested benevolence
often called (though very improperly) love; even where the happiness of the other is not concerned, but the complete and free surrender of all one's own ends to the ends of another (even a superhuman) being, love is spoken of as is
^Cf. Note on Conscience,
p. 379-1
— METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS
376
duty is necessitation be self-constraint according to a law. But what is done from constraint is not done from love. It is a duty to do good to other men according to our power, whether we love them or not. and this duty loses nothing of its weight, although we must make the sad remark that our species, alas! is not such as to be found particularly being also our duty. But or constraint, although
all
may
it
worthy of love when we know it more closely. Hatred of men, however, is always hateful: even though without any active hostility it consists only in complete aversion from mankind (the solitary misanthropy). For benevolence still remains a duty even towards the manhater, whom one cannot love, but to whom we can show kindness.
To
duty, but a will
men
hate vice in
mere
neither duty nor against
is
feeling of horror of vice, the
having no influence on the feeling nor the
feeling on the will. Beneficence
who
purpose succeed, comes at
whom said: this
is
a duty.
He
often practises this, and sees his beneficent
he has benefited.
"Thou
last really to love
When,
shalt love thy
therefore,
him it
is
neighbour as thyself,"
does not mean, "Thou shalt
first
of
all
love,
and by means of this love (in the next place) u do him good"; but: Do good to thy neighbour, and this beneficence will produce in thee the
men
love of
(as a settled habit of inclination to
beneficence)."
The
love of complacency {amor complacenwould therefore alone be direct. This is a pleasure immediately connected with the idea of the existence of an object, and to have a duty tice)
to this, that
is,
ure in a thing,
is
to be necessitated to find pleas-
a contradiction.
D. Of Respect Respect (reverentia) is likewise something merely subjective; a feeling of a peculiar kind not a judgement about an object which it would be a duty to effect or to advance. For if considered as duty it could only be conceived as such by means of the respect which we have for it. To have a duty to this, therefore, would be as much as to say to be
When,
bound
therefore,
self-esteem/' this
it
is
duty to have a duty. "Man has a duty of improperly stated, and we
is
in
said:
ought rather to say: "The law within him inevi-
from him respect for his own being, feeling (which is of a peculiar kind) is a
tably forces
and
this
basis of certain duties, that
which
may
is.
of certain actions
be consistent with his duty to himself." But we cannot say that he has a duty of
respect for himself; for he
must have respect
for the law within himself, in order to be able to conceive
duty
at
all.
XIII. General Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in the treatment of Pure Ethics First.
A
duty can have only a single ground if two or more proofs of it are
of obligation; and
adduced, this is a certain mark that either no valid proof has yet been given, or that there are several distinct duties which have been regard-
ed as one.
For all moral proofs, being philosophical, can only be drawn by means of rational knowledge from concepts, not like mathematics, through the construction of concepts. The latter science admits a variety of proofs of one and the same theorem because in intuition a priori there may ;
be several properties of an object, all of which lead back to the very same principle. If, for instance, to prove the duty of veracity, an argu-
ment
is
drawn
first
from the harm that
a
lie
causes to other men; another from the worthlessness of a liar and the violation of his own
what is proved in the former argua duty of benevolence, not of veracity, to say, not the duty which required to be
self-respect,
ment that
is
is
proved, but a different one. Now, if, in giving a variety of proofs for one and the same theorem,
we
flatter ourselves that the multitude of reasons will compensate the lack of weight in each taken separately, this is a very unphilosophical resource, since it betrays trickery and dishon-
esty; for several insufficient proofs placed be-
side one another
do not produce certainty, nor even probability. They should advance as reason and consequence in a series, up to the sufficient reason, and it is only in this way that they can have the force of proof. Yet the former is the usual device of the rhetorician.
Secondly. The difference between virtue and vice cannot be sought in the degree in which certain
maxims
are followed, but only in the
specific quality of the
maxims
(their relation to
the law). In other words, the vaunted principle of Aristotle, that virtue is the mean between
two 1
vices,
is
false.
The common
1
For instance, suppose that
classical
formulae of ethics
medio
tutissimus ibis; omne mimium vertitur in vitium ; est modus in rebus, etc., medium tenuere beati; virtus est medium vitiorum et utrinque reductum ["You will go
—
most safely
middle" (Virgil); 'Every excess develops into a vice"; "There is a mean in all things, etc." (Horace); "Happy they who steadily pursue a middle course": "Virtue is the mean between two vices and equally removed from either" (Horace).] contain a poor sort of wisdom, which has no definite principles; for this mean between two extremes, who will assign it in the
—
OF ETHICS
377
is it a duty to possess it (otherwise we should be in duty bound to have a duty), but it commands, and accompanies its command with
good management is given as the mean between two vices, prodigality and avarice; then its origin as a virtue can neither be denned as the gradual diminution of the former vice (by sav-
a moral constraint (one possible
ing), nor as the increase of the expenses of the
nal freedom).
miserly. These vices, in fact, cannot be viewed
ible,
as
if
they, proceeding as
directions,
met together
but each of them has
were in opposite good management; own maxim, which
it
in its
necessarily contradicts that of the other.
For the same reason, no vice can be denned an excess in the practice of certain actions beyond what is proper (e.g., Prodigalitas est excessus in consumendis opibus) or, as a less as
;
exercise of
them than
is
fitting (Avaritia est de-
For since in this way the degree is left quite undefined, and the question whether conduct accords with duty or not, turns wholly on this, such an account is of no use as a definilectus, etc.).
nor
strength
Thirdly. Ethical virtue
by the power we
requisite,
and the degree of
this
strength can be estimated only by the magni-
tude of the hindrances which himself,
by
man
creates for
brood of
his inclinations. Vices, the
unlawful dispositions, are the monsters that he has to combat; wherefore this moral strength as fortitude (fortitudo moralis) constitutes the
greatest and only true martial glory of
man;
it
wisdom, namely, the practical, because it makes the ultimate end of the existence of man on earth its own end. Its posis
also called the true
session alone
makes man
free, healthy, rich,
a
king, etc., nor can either chance or fate deprive
him of
must not be estimated
attribute to
man
the law but, conversely, the moral ;
estimated by the law, which ically; not, therefore,
edge that we have of
of fulfilling
power must be
commands
categor-
by the empirical knowlmen as they are, but by
the rational knowledge how, according to the ideas of humanity, they ought to be.
maxims
These three
of the scientific treatment of ethics are
opposed to the older apophthegms: i. There is only one virtue and only one vice. 2. Virtue is the observance of the mean path between two opposite vices. 3. Virtue (like prudence) must be learned
from experience.
this, since
All the
humanity
he possesses himself, and the
in
General
not exhaust the
notion;
reward, yet in it
will.
But such
strength might also belong to a holy (super-
human)
being, in
whom
no opposing impulse
counteracts the law of his rational will;
who
therefore willingly does everything in accord-
ance with the law. Virtue then is the moral strength of a man's will in his obedience to duty; and this is a moral necessitation by his own law giving reason, inasmuch as this constitutes itself a power executing the law. It is not itself a duty, for me? Avarice (as a vice) is not distinguished from frugality (as a virtue) by merely being the latter pushed too far; but has a quite different principle (maxim), namely placing the end of economy not in the enjoyment of one's means, but in the mere possession of them, renouncing enjoyment; just as the vice of prodigality is not to be sought in the excessive enjoyment of one's means, but in the bad maxim which makes the use of them, without regard to their maintenance, the sole
as its
Virtue considered in is,
own end, so own reward.
itself, as it is its
must be regarded
its
if
also
complete perfection
therefore, regarded not as
had for
ideal of
in its
virtue, but as
Virtue signifies a moral strength of
does
encomiums bestowed on the
moral perfection can lose nothing of their practical reality by the examples of what men now are, have been, or will probably be hereafter; anthropology which proceeds from mere empirical knowledge cannot impair anthroponomy which is erected by the unconditionally legislating reason; and although virtue may now and then be called meritorious (in relation to men, not to the law), and be worthy of
in the
XIV. Of Virtue
end.
is
by laws of inter-
should be irresist-
this
virtuous cannot lose his virtue.
tion.
this
But since
if
man
possessed
virtue possessed the man, since
former case it would appear as though he had the choice (for which he would
still
then require another virtue, in order to select virtue from all other wares offered to him). To conceive a plurality of virtues (as we unavoidably must) is nothing else but to conceive various moral objects to which the (rational) will is led by the single principle of virtue and it is the same with the opposite vices. The expression which personifies both is a contrivance for af;
fecting the sensibility, pointing, however, to a moral sense. Hence it follows that an aesthetic of morals is not a part, but a subjective exposition of the Metaphysic of Morals; in which the emotions that accompany the necessitating force of the moral law make the efficiency of that force to be felt; for example: disgust, horror, etc., which gives a sensible form to the moral aversion in order to gain the precedence from the merely sensible incitement.
;
METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS
78
XV. Of
the Principle on which Ethics
is
separated from Jurisprudence
and those of internal freewhich alone are ethical. internal freedom which is the condiethical duty must be discussed as a
into those of external
the this
tion of
of
latter
all
preliminary
just
prceliminaris),
(discursus
as
above the doctrine of conscience was discussed as the condition of
all
A
emotion
therefore not so
resentment)
(e.g.,
is
closely related to vice as passion
This separation on which the subdivision of moral philosophy in general rests, is founded on this: that the notion of freedom, which is common to both, makes it necessary to divide duties
dom; Hence
that this storm soon subsides.
duty.
the other hand, into a
is
propensity to
permanent inclination
(e. g..
a true vice. Virtue, therefore, in so far as
Habit (habitus)
is
a facility of action
subjective perfection of the elective
not every such facility
and a But
will.
a free habit (habitus
is
custom (assuetudo), that is, a uniformity of action which, by frequent repetition, has become a necessity, then it is not a habit proceeding from freedom, and therefore not a moral habit. Virtue therefore cannot be libertatis); for
if it is
defined as a habit of free law-abiding actions, unless indeed
by
action habit
is
we add
''determining itself in
is
will,
but
adopting a rule also declares it to be a universal law, and it is only such a habit that can be reck-
oned as virtue. Two things are required for internal freedom; to be master of oneself in a given case (animus sui compos) and to have command over oneself (imperium in semetipsum), that is to subdue his emotions and to govern his passions.
With these
(indoles)
is
it is
conditions, the character
noble (erecta)
;
in the opposite case,
ignoble (indoles abjecta serva).
XVI.
;
XVII. Virtue
Virtue requires,
first
of
all,
Command
over Oneself
Emotions and passions are essentially distinct the former belong to feeling in so far as this
coming before
reflection
makes
it
more
necessarily presupposes
its
a faculty that in
difficult
even impossible. Hence emotion is called hasty (animus prceceps). And reason declares through the notion of virtue that a man should collect himself; but this weakness in the life of or
This word (apathy) has come into bad pute, just as
if
it
meant want of
to the objects of the elective will;
it is supposed This misconception may be avoided by giving the name moral apathy to that want of emotion which is to be distinguished from indifference. In the former, the
feelings arising
from
sensible impressions lose
on the moral feeling only because the respect for the law is more powerful than all of them together. It is only the apparent strength of a fever patient that makes even the lively sympathy with good rise to an emotion, or rather degenerate into it. Such an emotion is called enthusiasm, and it is with reference to this that we are to explain the moderation which is usually recommended in virtuous practheir influence
tices:
Insani sapiens
Ultra
quam
nomen
satis est
ferat, cequus uniqui
virtutem
si
For otherwise
(Untugend), and as it were a weak and childish which may very well consist with the best will, and has further this one good thing in it,
re-
and
to be a weakness.
could be too wise or too virtuous.
thing,
feeling,
therefore subjective indifference with respect
one's understanding, joined with the strength of
only a lack of virtue
Apathy
(considered as Strength)
a mental excitement,
is
based on
command
for man, namely, that he should bring all his powers and inclinations under his rule (that of reason) and this is a positive precept of command over himself which is additional to the prohibition, namely, that he should not allow himself to be governed by his feelings and inclinations (the duty of apathy); since, unless reason takes the reins of government into its own hands, the feelings and inclinations play the master over the man.
the idea of the law"; and then this
not a property of the elective
of the rational will, which
is
it
internal freedom, contains a positive
the Doctrine of Virtue on the Principle of Internal Freedom
Of
grown
hatred in
contrast to resentment). The calmness with which one indulges it leaves room for reflection and allows the mind to frame principles thereon for itself; and thus when the inclination falls upon what contradicts the law, to brood on it. to allow it to root itself deeply, and thereby to take up evil (as of set purpose) into one's maxim; and this is then specifically evil, that is. it is
REMARKS
Passion, on
is.
the sensible appetite
1
it
is
absurd to imagine that one The emotion
man bear the name of fool, just of unjust, if he pursue virtue herself bethe proper bounds."]
Horace. ["Let the wise
and the
yond
petat ipsam. 1
OF ETHICS no matter by
always belongs to the sensibility, what sort of object it may be excited. The true strength of virtue is the mind at rest, with a firm, deliberate resolution to bring its
practice.
That
is
law into
the state of health in the moral
on the contrary, the emotion, even when
life;
it
by the idea of the good, is a momentary glitter which leaves exhaustion after it. We may apply the term fantastically virtuous to is
excited
man who
the in
will
admit nothing to be indifferent
who
respect of morality (adiaphora), and
strews
and
all his
steps with duties, as with traps,
will not allow it to
man
be indifferent whether a
eats fish or flesh, drink beer or wine,
when
both agree with him; a micrology which, if adopted into the doctrine of virtue, would make its
rule a tyranny.
REMARK Virtue is always in progress, and yet always begins from the beginning. The former follows from the fact that, objectively considered, it is
an ideal and unattainable, and yet it is a duty constantly to approximate to it. The second is founded subjectively on the nature of man which is affected by inclinations, under the influence of which virtue, with its maxims adopted once for all, can never settle in a position of rest; but, if it is not rising, inevitably falls; because moral maxims cannot, like technical, be based on custom (for this belongs to the physical character of the determination of will) but even if the practice of them become a custom,
379
when he
thinks to escape.
He may
indeed stupe-
fy himself with pleasures and distractions, but cannot avoid now and then coming to himself or awaking, and then he at once perceives its awful voice. In his utmost depravity, he may, indeed, pay no attention to it, but he cannot
avoid hearing
Now
it.
this original intellectual
and (as a con-
ception of duty) moral capacity, called conit,
that although
man
with himself,
science, has this peculiarity in its
business
is
a business of
yet he finds himself compelled by his reason to transact son.
it
as
if
at the
command
For the transaction here
is
of another perthe conduct of a
(causa) before a tribunal. But that he who accused by his conscience should be conceived as one and the same person with the judge is an absurd conception of a judicial court; for then the complainant would always lose his case. Therefore, in all duties the conscience of the man must regard another than himself as the judge of his actions, if it is to avoid self-contradiction. Now this other may be an actual or a merely ideal person which reason frames to it2 self. Such an idealized person (the authorized judge of conscience) must be one who knows trial
is
the heart; for the tribunal
ward part of man;
at the
also be all-obliging, that
is,
is set up in the msame time he must must be or be con-
ceived as a person in respect of are to be regarded as his
science
is
whom
commands;
the inward judge of
all
all
duties
since con-
free actions.
;
the agent would thereby lose the freedom in the
choice of his maxims, which freedom character of an action done from duty.
is
the
Now,
must at the same heaven and earth),
since such a moral being
time possess all power (in since otherwise he could not give his commands their proper effect (which the office of judge necessarily requires), and since such a moral
ON CONSCIENCE The consciousness
being possessing power over
1
of an internal tribunal in
all is called God, hence conscience must be conceived as the sub-
(before which "his thoughts accuse or ex-
jective principle of a responsibility for one's
cuse one another") is Conscience. Every man has a conscience, and finds him-
deeds before God; nay, this latter concept is contained (though it be only obscurely) in every moral self-consciousness.
man
self observed by an inward judge which threatens and keeps him in awe (reverence combined with fear) and this power which watches over the laws within him is not something which he himself (arbitrarily) makes, but it is incorpo;
rated in his being. It follows
him
like his
shadow,
x
Not
2
[In
part of original text.
Kant
From
Tugendlehre
:
p.
2Q3Ü.
explains this double personality of a man as both the accuser and the judge, by reference to the homo noumenon and its specific difference from the rationally endowed homo sensibilis.]
a
foot-note,
CONTENTS GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS General Divisions of the Metaphysic of Morals, 383 Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 385
,38i
GENERAL DIVISIONS OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS AS A SYSTEM OF DUTIES GENERALLY
I.
All duties are either duties of right, that
i. is,
virtue, s.
titled
that
ethica).
is,
ethical duties
Juridical
duties
(officio,
virtutis
be promulgated by external legislation; ethical duties are those for which such legislation is not possible. The reason why the latter can-
in these duties,
and which
it is
ternal legislation can cause
a duty
But no
for the individual to have as such.
any one
to
ex-
adopt
a particular intention, or to propose to himself a certain purpose; for this depends upon an internal condition or act of the mind itself. However, external actions conducive to such a
condition
tal
may
sity
of morals, or moral philosophy,
is
of
referred to duty, in view of this twofold qual-
the science
commonly
science
terminations
its
being implied that the individual will of neces-
make them an end to himself. But why, then, it may be asked,
—the
(homo noumenon), in distinction from the same person as a man modified with these determinations (homo phenomenon). Hence the conceptions of right and end when
men-
be commanded, without
by Cicero
—
not be properly made the subject of external legislation is because they relate to an end or final purpose, which is itself, at the same time,
embraced
especially
—
may
are such as
—
duty and not also the science of right, since duties and rights refer to each other? The reason is this. We know our own freedom from which all moral laws and consequently all rights only through the as well as all duties arise moral imperative, which is an immediate injunction of duty; whereas the conception of right as a ground of putting others under obligation has afterwards to be developed out of it. 2. In the doctrine of duty, man may and ought to be represented in accordance with the nature of his faculty of freedom, which is entirely supra-sensible. He is, therefore, to be represented purely according to his humanity as a personality independent of physical de-
juridical duties (officio, juris), or duties of
en-
ity,
give the following division:
THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS ACCORDING TO THE OBJECTIVE RELATION OF THE LAW OF DUTY
DIVISION OF
I.
I.
Juridical
Others
II.
Oneself
Ethical Duties
to or
Others
II.
As right
Humanity
person (juridical duties towards Perfect
The Right of Mankind in others (juridical duties The End in
towards others)
Humanity
of
our person (ethical duties towards oneself)
IV. The End of Mankind in others (ethical duties towards others)
Imperfect
Duty
THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS ACCORDING TO RELATIONS OF OBLIGATION
DIVISION OF
between whom a relation of apprehended whether it acor not admit of being conceived
the subjects
and duty
tually exists
of
own
Duty
III. II.
our
oneself)
to or
Duties
The Right in
Oneself
is
—
—
each other, anbe proposed from this point
in various juridical relations to
383
other division
may
of view as follows:
3«4
DIVISION POSSIBLE ACCORDING TO THE SUBJECTIVE RELATION OF THOSE WHO BIND UNDER OBLIGATIONS, AND THOSE
WHO ARE BOUND UNDER The
juridical
beings
who have
man
of
relation
The juridical relation of man to beings who have both rights and duties: Adest. There is such a relation, for it
to
neither right nor duty:
There is no such relation, Vacat. for such beings are irrational, and they neither put us under obligation, nor can
we be put under
obligation by
OBLIGATIONS
is
men
the relation of
to
men.
them
3-
The
relation
juridical
who have
beings
only
man
of
duties
The
to
and no
being
(God):
rights:
Vacat.
There
is
no such
such beings would be
Vacat. There is no such relation in mere philosophy, because such a being is not an object of possible experience.
relation, for
men without
ju-
personality, as slaves of bonds-
ridical
relation of man to a has only rights and no duties
juridical
who
men.
A
between right and duty
is
therefore found, in this scheme, only in No.
2.
real relation
which we form for ourselves. But the conception of this object is not entirely
ject of thought
On
The reason why such
empty.
No. 4
tion in relation to ourselves
is not likewise found in would constitute a transcendent duty, that is, one to which no corresponding subject can be given that is external and capable of imposing obligation. Consequently the relation from the theoretical point of view is here merely ideal; that is, it is a relation to an obis
because
it
III.
the contrary,
it is
a fruitful concep-
and the maxims of
our inner morality, and therefore in relation to practice generally. all
And
the duty involved
it is
in this bearing that
and practicable for us
such a merely ideal relation
lies.
DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS AS A SYSTEM OF DUTIES GENERALLY
According to the constituent principles and the method of the system I.
Principles
I.
II.
I.
Duties of Right
II.
Duties of Virtue, all
but
that
refers
etc.
not
And only
Private Right Public Right on, including
so to
the
materials,
form
of a system of morals, when the metaphysical investigation of the elements has completely traced out the universal principles constituting the whole. also
scientific
II.
Method
I.
II.
Didactics Ascetics
to
the
architectonic
in
GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS I.
THE RELATION OF THE FACULTIES OF THE HUMAN MIND TO THE MORAL LAWS
The active faculty of the human mind, as the faculty of desire in its widest sense, is the power which man has, through his mental rep-
which attach to them on account of the
qualities
modifications of the subject
—
as,
for instance,
—
corresponding to these representations. The capacity of a being to act in conformity with his own representations is what constitutes the life
and such like are referred as constituent elements of knowledge to objects, whereas pleasure or pain felt in connection with what is red or sweet express absolutely nothing that is in the object, but mere-
of such a being.
ly a relation to the subject.
resentations, of
It
is
becoming the cause of objects
to be observed, first, that with desire or
always connected pleasure or which is called feeling. But the converse does not always hold for there may be a pleasure connected, not with the desire of an object, but with a mere mental representation, it being indifferent whether an object corresponding to the representation exist or not. And second, the pleasure or pain connected with the object of desire does not always precede the activity of desire; nor can it be regarded in every case as the cause, but it may
aversion there
is
pain, the susceptibility for
;
as well be the effect of that activity.
The
ca-
in reference to red, sweet,
just
stated,
And
for the reason
pleasure and pain considered in
themselves cannot be more precisely denned. All that can be further done with regard to
them they
is
merely to point out what consequences
may have
make
in certain relations, in
them
the knowledge of
order to
available prac-
tically.
The pleasure which is necessarily connected with the activity of desire, when the representation of the object desired affects the capacity of feeling, may be called practical pleasure. And this designation is applicable whether the pleasure
is
the cause or the effect of the desire.
On
pacity of experiencing pleasure or pain on the
the other hand, that pleasure which
occasion of a mental representation is called "feeling," because pleasure and pain contain
essarily connected with the desire of an object,
only what
existence of the object, but
is
subjective in the relations of our
mental activity. They do not involve any relation to an object that could possibly furnish a knowledge of it as such; they cannot even give us a knowledge of our own mental state. For even sensations, 1 considered apart from the 1
The
fined
sensibility as the faculty of sense may be deto the subjective nature of our repre-
by reference
sentations generally. It is the understanding that first refers the subjective representations to an object; it alone thinks anything by means of these representations. Now, the subjective nature of our representations might be of such a kind that they could be related to objects so as to furnish knowledge of them, either in regard to their form or matter in the former relation by pure perception, in the latter by sensation proper. In this case, the sense-faculty, as the capacity for receiving objective representations, would be properly called senseperception. But mere mental representation from its subjective nature cannot, in fact, become a constituent of objective knowledge, because it contains merely the relation of the representations to the subject, and includes nothing that can be used for attaining a knowledge of the object. In this case, then, this receptivity of the mind for subjective representations is called feeling.
—
385
and which, therefore,
is
is
not nec-
not a pleasure in the is
merely attached may be called
to a mental representation alone,
inactive complacency, or pleasure.
The
mere contemplative
feeling of this latter kind of pleas-
is what is called taste. Hence, in a system of practical philosophy, the contemplative pleas-
ure
ure of taste will not be discussed as an essential constituent conception, but need only be referred to incidentally or episodically. But as re-
gards practical pleasure,
it is
otherwise. For the
determination of the activity of the faculty of desire or appetency, which is necessarily preceded by this pleasure as its cause, is what properly constitutes desire in the strict sense of the
term. Habitual desire, again, constitutes incli-
nation; and the connection of pleasure with the It includes the effect of the representations, whether sensible or intellectual, upon the subject; and it belongs to the sensibility, although the representation itself may belong to the understanding or the reason.
INTRODUCTION
386
connection
activity of desire, in so far as this
judged by the understanding to be valid according to a general rule holding good at least
is
for
the individual,
is
what
called interest.
is
eluded the volitional act of choice, and also the mere act of wish, in so far as reason may deter-
mine the faculty of desire
The
in its activity.
act of choice that can be determined
by pure That act
Hence, in such a case, the practical pleasure is an interest of the inclination of the individual. On the other hand, if the pleasure can only fol-
reason constitutes the act of free-will. which is determinable only by inclination as a sensuous impulse or stimulus would be irra-
low a preceding determination of the faculty it is an intellectual pleasure, and the interest in the object must be called a rational
tional
The
(arbitrium brutum).
brute choice
of desire,
human
interest; for were the interest sensuous, and not based only upon pure principles of reason, sensation would necessarily be conjoined with the pleasure, and would thus determine the ac-
by such impulses or stimuli, but is not determined by them; and it is, therefore, not pure in itself when taken apart from the acquired habit of determination by reason. But it may be determined to action by the pure will. The freedom of the act of volitional
Where an
tivity of the desire.
entirely pure in-
in
act of choice, however, as
human,
is
fact affected
be viewed, not as the cause, but as the effect of the rational interest; and we might call it the
independence of being determined stimuli. This forms the negative conception of the free-will. The positive conception of freedom is given by the fact that the will is the capability of pure reason to be practical of itself. But this is not possible otherwise than by the maxim of every action being subjected to the condition of being practicable as a universal law. Applied as pure reason to the act of choice, and considered apart from its objects, it may be regarded as the
non-sensuous or rational inclination (propensio concupiscence is to be
faculty of principles; and, in this connection, it is the source of practical principles. Hence it
distinguished from the activity of desire
is
terest of reason
must be assumed,
it is
not
le-
an interest of inclination surreptitiously. However, in order to gitimate to introduce into
conform so
far with the
we may allow
it
common
phraseology,
the application of the
term "in-
clination" even to that which can only be the
object of an "intellectual" pleasure in the sense of a habitual desire arising from a pure interest of reason. But such inclination
would have
to
intellectualis). Further,
as a stimulus or incitement to It is
its
itself,
determination.
always a sensuous state of the mind, which itself attain to the definiteness of an
does not
power of
act of the
The
activity of
desire.
may
the faculty of desire
in
according to liking. In so far as the activity
is
ac-
companied with the consciousness of the power it forms
of the action to produce the object,
an act of choice; if this consciousness is not conjoined with it, the activity is called a wish.
The
faculty of desire, in so far as
ciple of determination as the
or predilection
lies in
constitutes the will.
inner prin-
its
ground of
its
liking
the reason of the subject,
The
will
is
therefore the
faculty of active desire or appetency, viewed
not so
much
in relation to the action
the relation of the act of choice relation
to
—
—which
is
as rather in
the principle that determines the
power of choice
to the action. It has, in itself,
is its
to be
viewed as a lawgiving faculty. But as upon which to construct a law is
the material
not furnished to of the is
accordance with conceptions; and in so far as the principle thus determining it to action is found in the mind, and not in its object, it constitutes a power of acting or not acting
proceed
choice
by sensuous impulses or
maxim
it,
it
can only
make
the
form
of the act of will, in so far as
available as a universal law, the
it
supreme law
and determining principle of the will. And as the maxims, or rules of human action derived from subjective causes, do not of themselves necessarily agree with those that are objective
and universal, reason can only prescribe
this su-
preme law as an absolute imperative of prohibition or command. The laws of freedom, as distinguished from the laws of nature, are moral laws. So far as
they refer only to external actions and their lawfulness, they are called juridical; but if they also require that, as laws, they shall themselves be the determining principles of our actions, they are ethical. The agreement of an action with juridical laws is its legality; the agreement of an action with ethical laws is its morality.
The freedom
to
which the former laws
can only be freedom
refer,
in external practice;
but
the freedom to which the latter laws refer
is
properly no special principle of determination, but in so far as it may determine the voluntary
exercise of the activity of the will in so far as
act of choice,
it is
Under
it
is
the practical reason
itself.
may
be in-
the will, taken generally,
freedom
in the internal as well as the external
determined by laws of reason. So, in theoit is said that only the ob-
retical philosophy,
TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
387
jects of the external senses are in space, but all
or the internal action of the will,
the objects both of internal and external sense
pure practical laws of reason for the free ac-
because the representations of both, as being representations, so far belong all to the internal sense. In like manner, whether
time be inner principles for its determination, although they may not always be considered in
freedom
this relation.
are in
time;
is
viewed
in reference to the external
II.
It has
tivity of the will generally,
must
its
laws, as
at the
same
THE IDEA AND NECESSITY OF A METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
been shown in The Metaphysical PrinNature that there must
ciples a priori as a foundation for
may sound
it.
For how-
ciples of the Science of
ever plausible
be principles a priori for the natural science that has to deal with the objects of the external senses.
even prior to experience, can comprehend by what means we may attain to a lasting enjoyment of the real pleasures of life, yet all that is
sible,
taught on this subject a priori
And it was further shown that it is posand even necessary, to formulate a system of these principles under the name of a "meta-
it
to say that reason,
is
either tauto-
assumed wholly without foundaonly experience that can show what
logical, or is
physical science of nature," as a preliminary to
tion. It is
experimental physics regarded as natural science
will
applied to particular objects of experience. But
directed towards nourishment, the sexual in-
be taken to keep its error, may accept many propositions as universal on the evidence of experience, although if the term "universal" be taken in its strict sense, these would necessarily have to be deduced by the metaphysical
stinct, or the
this latter science, if care
generalizations
free
from
science from principles a priori. Thus Newton accepted the principle of the equality of action
and reaction as established by experience, and it as a universal law over the whole of material nature. The chemists go even farther, grounding their most general laws regarding the combination and decomposition of the materials of bodies wholly upon experience; and yet they trust so completely to the universality and necessity of those laws that they have no anxiety as to any error being found in propositions founded upon experiments conducted in accordance with them. But it is otherwise with moral laws. These,
yet he extended
in
contradistinction to natural laws, are only
valid as laws, in so far as they can be rationally
comprehended as necessary. In fact, conceptions and judgements regarding ourselves and our conduct have no moral significance, if they contain only what may be learned from experience; and when any one is. so to speak, misled into making a moral principle out of anything derived from this lat-
established a priori and
ter source,
he
is
the coarsest and If
already in danger of falling into
most
fatal errors.
bring us enjoyment.
The
natural impulses
tendency to rest and motion, as
well as the higher desires of honour, the acquisition of knowledge,
and such like, as developed with our natural capacities, are alone capable of showing in what those enjoyments are to be found. And, further, the knowledge thus acquired is available for each individual merely
own way; and it is only thus he can learn means by which he has to seek those enjoy-
in his
the
ments. All specious rationalizing a priori, in this is nothing at bottom but carrying facts of experience up to generalizations by in-
connection,
duction (secundum principia generalia non universalia) and the generality thus attained is still so limited that numberless exceptions must be allowed to every individual in order that he may ;
mode of life to his particular inclinations and his capacity for pleasure. And, after all, the individual has really adapt the choice of his
own
to acquire his
prudence at the cost of
his
own
suffering or that of his neighbors.
But
it is
of morality.
quite otherwise with the principles They lay down commands for ev-
ery one without regard to his particular inclina-
and merely because and so far as he is and has a practical reason. Instruction in the laws of morality is not drawn from obsertions, free,
vation of oneself or of our animal nature, nor from perception of the course of the world in regard to what happens, or how men act. 1 But reason commands how we ought to act, even al-
the philosophy of morals were nothing
more than a theory of happiness (eudaemonism), it would be absurd to search after prin-
1 This holds notwithstanding the fact that the term "morals," in Latin mores, and in German sitten, signifies originally only manners or mode of life.
INTRODUCTION
388
though no example of such action were to be found; nor does reason give any regard to the
of man. This science would contain only the
subjective conditions that hinder or favor the
advantage which may accrue to us by so acting, and which experience could alone actually show.
realization in practice of the universal moral
For. although reason allows us to seek what is for our advantage in every possible way. and
gating, spreading,
although, founding upon the evidence of experience, it may further promise that greater adwill probably follow on the average from the observance of her commands than from their transgression, especially if prudence
vantages
guides the conduct, yet the authority of her precepts as commands does not rest on such consid-
They are used by reason only as counand by way of a counterpoise against seductions to an opposite course, when adjusting beforehand the equilibrium of a partial balance in the sphere of practical judgement, in order erations.
sels,
thereby to secure the decision of this judgement, according to the due weight of the a priori principles of a
pure practical reason.
Metaphysics designates any system of knowledge a priori that consists of pure conceptions. Accordingly, a practical philosophy not having nature, but the freedom of the will for its object, will presuppose and require a metaphysic of morals. It is even a duty to have such a metaphysic and every man does, indeed, possess it in himself, although commonly but in an obscure way. For how could any one believe that he has a source of universal law in himself, ;
without principles a priori? And just as in a metaphysics of nature there must be principles
laws
in
human
nature, with the
means
of propa-
and strengthening the moral principles as by the education of the young and the instruction of the people and all other such doctrines and precepts founded upon experience and indispensable in themselves, although
—
—
they must neither precede the metaphysical investigation of the principles of reason, nor be
mixed up with it. For. by doing so, there would be a great danger of laying down false, or at least very flexible moral laws, which would hold forth as unattainable what is not attached only because the law has not been comprehended and presented in its purity, in which also its strength
and mixed momight be adopted instead of what is dutiful and good in itself; and these would furnish no certain moral principles either for the guidance consists. Or, otherwise, spurious
tives
of the
judgement or for the
discipline of the
heart in the practice of duty. It
is
only by pure
reason, therefore, that duty can and
must be
prescribed.
The higher division of philosophy, under which the division just mentioned stands, is into theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy. Practical philosophy is just moral philosophy in its widest sense, as has been explained elsewhere. 1 All that is practicable and possible, according to natural laws, the activity of art, and
is
its
the special subject of
precepts and rules en-
regulating the application of the universal su-
tirely
depend on the theory of nature.
preme
principles of nature to objects of experi-
what
is
ence, so there cannot but be such principles in
dom
that can have principles independent of
the metaphysic of morals;
and we
will
often
have to deal objectively with the particular nature of man as known only by experience, in order to show in it the consequences of these universal moral principles. But this mode of dealing with these principles in their particular
way detract from their throw doubt on their a priori
applications will in no rational purity, or origin.
In other words, this
amounts
to saying
that a metaphysic of morals cannot be founded
on anthropology as the empirical science of num. but may be applied to it.
The counterpart of a metaphysic of morals, and the other member of the division of practical philosophy, would be a moral anthropology, as the empirical science of the moral nature
It is
only
practicable according to laws of free-
no theory in relation to what determinations of nature. Philosophy therefore cannot embrace under its practical division a technical theory, but only a morally practical doctrine. But if the dexterity of the will in acting according to laws of freedom, in contradistinction to nature, were to be also called an art, it would necessarily indicate an art which would make a system of freedom possible like the system of nature. This would truly be a Divine art, if we were in a position by means of it to realize completely what reason prescribes to us, and to put the idea theory, for there
is
passes beyond the
into practice. l
In the Critique of Judgement (1790).
TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS III.
THE DIVISION OF A METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
whether relating to internal or external action, and whether prescribed a priori by mere reason or laid down by the will of another, involves two elements: First, a law which represents the action that ought to happen as necessary objectively, thus making the action a duty; second, a motive which connects All legislation,
the principle determining the will to this action with the mental representation of the law subjectively, so that the law
of the action. is
By
the
makes duty the motive
first
element, the action
represented as a duty, in accordance with the
mere
theoretical
knowledge of the possibility of
determining the activity of the will by practical rules. By the second element, the obligation so to act
is
connected
in the subject
with a deter-
mining principle of the will as such. All legislation, therefore, may be differentiated by reference to
its
motive-principle. 1
The
legislation
which makes an action a duty, and this duty at the same time a motive, is ethical. That legislation which does not include the motive-principle in the law, and consequently admits another motive than the idea of duty itself, is juridical.
In respect of the latter,
it is
evident that the
motives distinct from the idea of duty, to which it may refer, must be drawn from the subjective (pathological) influences of inclination
and
of aversion, determining the voluntary activity,
and especially from the latter; because it is a legislation which has to be compulsory, and not merely a mode of attracting or persuading. The agreement or non-agreement of an action with the law, without reference to its motive, is its legality; and that character of the action in which the idea of duty arising from the law at the same time forms the motive of the action, is
its
morality.
Duties specially in accord with a juridical legislation can only be external duties. For this
mode
389
of legislation does not require that the
idea of the duty, which
is internal, shall be of the determining principle of the act of will; and as it requires a motive suitable to the nature of its laws, it can only connect what is
itself
external with the law. Ethical legislation, on the other hand, makes internal actions also duties,
but not to the exclusion of the external, for it embraces everything which is of the nature of 1 This ground of division will apply, although the action which it makes a duty may coincide with another action that may be otherwise looked at from another point of view. For instance, actions may in all cases be classified as external.
And
duty.
just because ethical legislation in-
cludes within
its
law the internal motive of the
action as contained in the idea of duty,
it
volves a characteristic which cannot at
enter
all
in-
is external. Hence, ethicannot as such be external, not even when proceeding from a Divine will, although it may receive duties which rest on an
into the legislation that
cal legislation
external legislation as duties, into the position of motives, within
its
own
legislation.
From what
has been said, it is evident that all duties, merely because they are duties, belong to ethics; and yet the legislation upon
which they are founded in all cases
is
not on that account
On
contained in ethics.
many of them lies Thus ethics commands that the law of
the contrary,
outside of ethics. I
must
fulfil
a
promise entered into by contract, although the other party might not be able to compel me to do so. It adopts the law (pacta sunt servanda) and the duty corresponding to it, from jurisprudence or the science of right, by which they are established. It is not in ethics, therefore, but in jurisprudence, that the principle of the legislation
lies,
"promises made and accepted
that
must be kept." Accordingly, teaches that
if
ethics
specially
the motive-principle of external
compulsion which juridical legislation connects with a duty is even let go, the idea of duty alone
motive. For were and were the legislation itself not juridical, and consequently the duty arising from it not specially a duty of right as distinguished from a duty of virtue, then fidelity in the performance of acts, to which the individual may be bound by the terms of a contract, would have to be classified with acts of benevolence and the obligation that underlies them, which cannot be correct. To keep one's promise is not properly a duty of virtue, but a duty of right, and the performance of it can be enforced by external compulsion. But to keep one's promise, even when no compulsion can be applied to enit
is
not
force
sufficient of itself as a
so,
it, is,
at the
and a proof of
same
time, a virtuous action,
virtue.
Jurisprudence as the science of right, and ethics as the science of virtue, are therefore distinguished not so much by their different duties, as rather by the difference of the legislation which connects the one or the other kind of motive with their laws.
Ethical legislation
is
that which cannot be
external, although the duties
it
prescribes
may
be external as well as internal. Juridical legislation is that which may also be external. Thus
— INTRODUCTION
390
entered it is an external duty to keep a promise into by contract; but the injunction to do this merely because it is a duty, without regard to
any other motive, belongs exclusively
to
the
internal legislation. It does not belong thus to the ethical sphere as being a particular kind of
duty or a particular mode of action to which we are bound for it is an external duty in but it is beethics as well as in jurisprudence
—
—
cause the legislation in the case referred to is internal, and cannot have an external lawgiver, that the obligation
is
reckoned as belonging to
For the same reason, the duties of benevolence, although they are external duties as
ethics.
man-
obligations to external actions, are, in like
reckoned as belonging to ethics, because they can only be enjoined by legislation that is internal. Ethics has no doubt its own peculiar such as those towards oneself but it duties has also duties in common with jurisprudence, only not under the same mode of obligation. In ner,
—
—
short, the peculiarity of ethical legislation
is
to
enjoin the performance of certain actions merely because they are duties, and to make the principle of
IV.
duty
itself
—whatever be
its
source or
—the
motive of the acThus, then, there are many ethical duties that are directly such; and the all and inner legislation also makes the others
occasion
sole sufficing
tivity of the will.
—
each of them indirectly ethical. The deduction of the division of a system is the proof of its completeness as well as of its continuity, so that there sition
the
may
be a logical tran-
from the general conception divided
members
to
of the division, and through the
whole series of the subdivisions without any break or leap in the arrangement (divisio per saltum). Such a division is one of the most difficult conditions for the architect of a system to fulfil. There is even some doubt as to what is the highest conception that is primarily divided into right and wrong (aut fas aut nejas). It is assuredly the conception of the activity of the free-will in general. In like manner, the expounders of ontology start from something and nothing, without perceiving that these are already members of a division for which the highest divided conception is awanting, and which can be no other than that of thing in general.
GENERAL PRELIMINARY CONCEPTIONS DEFINED AND EXPLAINED (Philosophia practica universalis)
The conception of freedom is a conception of pure reason. It is therefore transcendent in so far as regards theoretical philosophy; for it is a conception for which no corresponding instance
able to the pure will, but as often contrary to
these laws appear as imperatives
it,
commanding
or prohibiting certain actions; and as such they are
categorical
or
unconditional imperatives.
example can be found or supplied in any possible experience. Accordingly freedom is not presented as an object of any theoretical knowledge that is possible for us. It is in no respect a constitutive, but only a regulative conception; and it can be accepted by the speculative reason as at most a merely negative principle. In the practical sphere of reason, however, the reality of freedom may be demonstrated by certain practical principles which, as laws, prove a causality of the pure reason in the process of de-
Their categorical and unconditional character distinguishes them from the technical imperatives which express the prescriptions of art, and which always command only conditionally. According to these categorical imperatives, certain actions are allowed or disallowed as being mor-
termining the activity of the will that
a pleasure or pain of a peculiar kind,
or
pendent of
And
all
is
inde-
empirical and sensible conditions.
thus there
is
established the fact of a pure
will existing in us as the
source of
all
moral
conceptions and laws.
On the
this positive
practical
conception of freedom in
relation
certain
practical laws are founded,
unconditional
and they specially
ally possible or impossible;
and certain of them
or their opposites are morally necessary and obligatory. Hence, in reference to such actions,
there arises the conception of a duty whose ob-
servance or transgression
is
accompanied with
known
as
moral feeling. We do not, however, take the moral feelings or sentiments into account in considering the practical laws of reason. For they do not form the foundation or principle of practical laws of reason, but only the subjective effects that arise in the
mind on
the occasion
of our voluntary activity being determined
by
constitute moral laws. In relation to us as human beings, with an activity of will modified
these laws.
by sensible influences so
the moral laws in the judgement of reason, such
as not to be
conform-
And
while they neither add to nor take from the objective validity or influence of
— TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS may vary
according to the differences of the individuals who experience them. The following conceptions are common to
sentiments
jurisprudence and ethics as the two main divisions of the metaphysic of morals. Obligation is the necessity of a free action
when viewed
in relation to a categorical
An
tive of reason.
imperative
impera-
a practical rule
is
action, otherwise contingent in it-
by which an self, is made
necessary. It
is
distinguished
from
a practical law in that such a law, while likewise representing the action as necessary, does not consider whether it is internally necessary as involved in the nature of the agent
—
holy being
man
or
—say
as a
contingent to him, as in the
is
we
him; for where the first condition holds good, there is in fact no imperative. Hence an imperative is a rule which not only represents but makes a subjectively contingent action necessary; and it, accordingly, case of
as
find
represents the subject as being (morally) necessitated to act in accordance with this rule.
categorical or unconditional imperative
is
A
one
which does not represent the action in any way mediately through the conception of an end that is to be attained by it; but it presents the action
mind
to the
as objectively necessary
by
the
mere representation of its form as an action, and thus makes it necessary. Such imperatives cannot be put forward by any other practical science than that which prescribes obligations, and it is only the science of morals that does this. All other imperatives are technical, and they are altogether conditional. The ground of the possibility of categorical imperatives
lies
they refer to no determination of the activity of the will by which a purpose might be assigned to it, but solely to its freedom. Every action is allowed (licitum) which is not in the fact that
contrary to obligation; and this freedom not beby an opposing imperative, consti-
391
the categorical imperative
command
or prohibition, according as the doing
or not doing of an action
An
duty.
action which
indifferent
merae
It
mandati
hibitiva, lex
order that one act, or to
If
(il-
Duty
is
the
which anyone
it
were
is
may
be free in such relations to
so,
the moral right in question would
—
his choice in the exercise of his will.
—
as the actor or doer of the deed
Duty
is,
imputed
to him.
therefore, nothing but the
of ourselves in different states of the identity of
our existence. Hence li follows that a person is properly subject to no other laws than those he
down
A
thing
for himself, either alone or in con-
is
what
is
alis).
one and the same, and yet we in various ways.
may
be bound to
it
is
ject of imputation.
obligation. It
be
is
Moral personality freedom of a rational being under moral laws; and it is to be distinguished from psychological freedom as the mere faculty by which we become conscious
his actions
bound by an
may
The agent
regarded through the act, the author of its effect; and this effect, along with the action itself, may be imputed to him, if he previously knew the law in virtue of which an obligation rested upon him. A person is a subject who is capable of having
dom,
as regards the action concerned
—
as,
to
obligation.
also
;
any action all
is
ferent in themselves (adiaphora) for no special law would be required to establish such a right, considered according to moral laws. An action is called an act or moral deed in so far as it is subject to laws of obligation, and consequently in so far as the subject of it is regarded with reference to the freedom of
designation of
therefore the subject-matter of
there
vetiti),
forbear from acting, at his pleasure?
tivity of the will,
licita).
et
not, in all cases, refer to actions that are indif-
once eviillicit
may
required a permissive law (lex permissiva), in
junction with others.
this it is at
commanded
(indifferens,
facultatis).
lays
From
represented as a
adiaphoron, res be asked whether there are such morally indifferent actions; and if there are, whether in addition to the preceptive and prohibitive law (lex praeceptiva et proally
tutes a moral right as a warrant or title of action
(facultas moralis).
is
neither
is
nor forbidden is merely allowed, because there is no law restricting freedom, nor any duty in respect of it. Such an action is said to be mor-
ing limited
dent what actions are disallowed or
a law either of
is
is
incapable of being the sub-
Every object which
of the free ac-
void of freetherefore called a thing (res corporeis itself
Right or wrong applies, as a general quality, an act (rectum aut minus rectum), in so far as it is in accordance with duty or contrary to duty (factum licitum aut illicitum) no matter what may be the subject or origin of the duty itself. An act that is contrary to duty is called a transgression (reatus). to
J
The
categorical imperative, as expressing an
obligation in respect to certain actions, is a morally practical law. But because obligation involves not merely practical necessity expressed in a
law as such, but also actual necessitation,
An which
unintentional is,
transgression
of
a duty,
nevertheless, imputable to a person,
— INTRODUCTION
392 is
called a
mere
transgression
—
An
fault (culpa).
that
intentional
an act accompanied with
is,
the consciousness that
it
a transgression
is
same time
constitutes a crime (dolus).
Whatever
juridically in accordance with
is
external laws
is
and whatever
said to be just (jus, instum)
with external laws
A
;
not juridically in accordance
is
collision of duties or obligations (collisio s. obligationum) would be the result
officiorum
of such a relation between
them
that the one
would annul the other, in whole or in part. Duty and obligation, however, are conceptions which express the objective practical necessity of certain actions, and two opposite rules cannot be objective and necessary at the same time; for it is a duty to act according to one of them, is
not only no duty to act according to an op-
posite rule, but to do so
Hence a
to duty.
tions
is
would even be contrary and obliga-
collision of duties
entirely
(obligationes
inconceivable
is
known by
also valid objectively can
For reason brings the principle any action to the test, by calling
cal imperative.
or
maxim
of
upon the agent with
it
to think of himself in connection
same time laying down
as at the
is
so qualified as to be
for entering into such
fit
a universal legislation.
The
simplicity of this law, in comparison wiili
the great and manifold consequences which
may
be drawn from it, as well as its commanding authority and supremacy without the accom-
paniment of any certainly at
first
motive or sanction, must appear very surprising. And we
visible
may
determine the activity of the
non obligan-
a uni-
versal law, and to consider whether his action
grounds of obligation (rationes obligandi), connected with an individual under a rule prescribed for himself, and yet neither the one nor the other may be sufficient to constitute an actual obligation (rationes obligandi
place, ac-
the criterion of the categori-
non colliduntur) There may, however, be two .
first
cording to their subjective principle; but whether this principle
if it
must
as a universal law." Actions
therefore be considered, in the
only be
unjust (unjustum).
is
may be rendered by the following formula: "Act according to a maxim which can be adopted at the generally what constitutes obligation. It
well
wonder
at the
power
idea of the qualification of a
of our reason to will
by the mere
maxim
for the uni-
versality of a practical law, especially
when we
are taught thereby that this practical moral law first
reveals a property of the will which the
come up-
tes);
speculative reason would never have
losophy does not say that the stronger obligation is to keep the upper hand (fortior obligatio
on either by principles a priori, or from any experience whatever; and even if it had ascertained the fact, it could never have theoretically established its possibility. This practical law, how-
and in that case the one of them is not a duty. If two such grounds of obligation are actually in collision with each other, practical phi-
vincit), but that the stronger
gation
is
ground of
obli-
to maintain its place (fortior obligandi
Obligatory is
Laws
for
which an external
legis-
possible are called generaPy external
Those external laws, the obligatoriness of which can be recognised by reason a priori even without an external legislation, are called natural laws. Those laws, again, which are not oblig-
laws.
atory without actual external legislation, are called
positive
An
laws.
external
containing pure natural laws,
is
legislation,
therefore con-
ceivable; but in that case a previous natural law
must be presupposed to establish the authority of the lawgiver by the right to subject others to obligation through his
The duty
is
ty of the will, which
is
Hence
it
freedom, but irrefutably will be less surprising to find that the moral laws are undemonstrable, and yet apodeictic, like the mathematical postulates; and that they, at the same time, open up before us a whole field of practical knowledge, from which reason, on its theoretical side, must find itself entirely excluded with its speculative idea of freedom and all such ideas of the superestablishes
ratio vincit).
lation
ever, not only discovers the fact of that proper-
own
principle which
a practical law.
act of will.
makes
The
a certain action a
rule of the agent or
it.
sensible generally.
The conformity of an action to the law of duty constitutes its legality; the conformity of the maxim of the action with the law constitutes its
morality.
A maxim
ciple of action,
rule for himself as to
On
is
thus a subjective prin-
which the individual makes a
how
in fact
he will act.
the other hand, the principle of duty
is
which he forms as a principle for himself on subjective grounds, is called his maxim. Hence, even when the law is one and invariable, the maxims of the agent may yet be very dif-
what reason absolutely, and therefore objectively and universally, lays down in the form of a
ferent.
The supreme principle of the science of morals accordingly is this: "Act according to a
actor,
The
categorical
imperative
only expresses
command
to the individual, as to
how he ought
to act.
TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS maxim which can likewise be valid as sal law." Every maxim which is not according to this condition
is
a univerqualified
contrary to
Mo-
Laws
from the will, viewed generally as reason; maxims spring from the activ-
arise
practical
ity of the will in the process of choice.
man
is
what constitutes
free-will.
The The
lat-
will
which refers to nothing else than mere law can neither be called free nor not free, because it does not relate to actions immediately, but to the giving of a law for the maxim of actions; it is therefore the practical reason itself. Hence as a faculty,
and It
is
is,
393
servum; because the empirical proposition does not assert that any particular s.
characteristic necessarily belongs to the con-
ception in question, but this
rality.
ter in
trium brutum
it is
absolutely necessary in
itself,
not subject to any external necessitation. therefore, only the act of choice in the
voluntary process that can be called jree. The freedom of the act of will, however,
requisite in the
is
Freedom
process of definition.
in relation to the
internal legislation of reason can alone be prop-
power; the possibility of diverging is an incapacity or want of power. How then can the former be defined erly called a
from the law thus given
by the
latter? It could only be
by a
the free-will,
exercise as
its
rience; but this
would be
shown by expe-
a hybrid definition
which would exhibit the conception
A morally practical
law
is
a proposition which
He who commands by
He
choosing to act for or against the law. The vol-
not always the author of the law
untary process, indeed, viewed as a phenomenal appearance, gives many examples of this choosing in experience; and some have accordingly
latter case, the
made knowable by
the moral law,
is
it
is
known
only as a negative property in us, as constituted fact of not being necessitated to act by sensible principles of determination. Regarded
by the as a
man
noumenal
reality,
however,
in reference to
as a pure rational intelligence, the act of
the will cannot be at all theoretically exhibited; nor can it therefore be explained how this power can act necessitatingly in relation to the sensible activity in the process of choice, or consequent-
is
is
the
the author of the
lawgiver or legislator.
first
command.
a law (imperans)
not to be defined as a liberty of indifference (libertas indifferentae), that, is, as a capacity of
so defined the free-will. For freedom, as
in a false
light.
contains a categorical imperative or is
definition
which would add to the practical conception of
obligation that accompanies the law, but he itself.
is
In the
law would be positive, continand arbitrary. The law which is imposed upon us a priori and unconditionally by our own reason may also be expressed as proceeding from the will of a supreme lawgiver or the Divine will. Such a will as supreme can consequently have only rights and not duties; and it only indicates the idea of a moral being whose will is law for gent,
all,
without conceiving of him as the author of
that will.
Imputation, in the moral sense,
ment by which anyone
is
is
the judge-
declared to be the
author or free cause of an action which regarded as his moral fact or deed, and
When
is
then
is
sub-
what the positive quality of freedom consists. Only thus much we can see into and comprehend, that although man, as a being be-
is
longing to the world of sense, exhibits as experience shows a capacity of choosing not only
declaratory {imputatio dijudicatoria) That per-
ly in
—
—
conformably to the law but also contrary to it, his freedom as a rational being belonging to the world of intelligence cannot be defined by reference merely to sensible appearances. For sensible
phenomena cannot make
—such
—
a super-sensible
nor can freedom ever be placed in the mere fact that the rational subject can make a choice in conflict with his own law-giving reason, although experience may prove that it happens often enough, notwithstanding our inability to conceive how it is possible. For it is one thing to admit a proposition as based on experience, and another thing to make it the defining principle and the universal differentiating mark of the
object
as free-will
act of free-will, in
its
is
intelligible;
distinction
from the
arbi-
jected to law.
down
the judgement likewise lays
the juridical consequences of the deed,
judicial or valid (imputatio judiciaria
ida)
otherwise
;
it
s.
it
val-
would be only adjudicative or .
son
—individual
or collective
—who
invested with the right to impute actions judicially, is called a judge or a court (judex s. forum). When any one does, in conformity with duty, more than he can be compelled to do by the is
said to be meritorious (meritum). done only in exact conformity with the law, is what is due (debitum). And when less is done than can be demanded to be done by the law, the result is moral demerit (demeritum)
law,
it
What
is
is
or culpability.
The juridical effect or consequence of a culpable act of demerit is punishment (paena); that of a meritorious act is reward (praemium) ,
assuming that this reward was promised in the law and that it formed the motive of the
394 action.
The coincidence
or exact conformity of
conduct to what is due has no juridical effect. Benevolent remuneration (remuneratio s. repensio benefica) has no place in juridical rela-
the natural hindrances in the sphere of sense,
and the
much
The good
as also
stranger from great distress, and at very con-
the performance of an obligated action
from
—
from
—cannot be imputed The agent (modus imputationis good consequences of a meritorious action — a wrongful action bad consequences —may be imputed the agent (modus imputaa meritorious action
tollens).
to the
as
of
also the
to
tionis poneus).
The degree
of the imputability of actions
to be reckoned according to the
the moral hindrance of duty, so
more
failing to per-
or bad consequences arising
the consequences arising
less
is a good deed imputed as meriThis may be seen by considering such examples as rescuing a man who is an entire
tions.
form
the hindrances or obstacles which it has been necessary for them to overcome. The greater
is
magnitude of
the
torious.
siderable sacrifice. Conversely, the less the nat-
and the greater the hindrance on the ground of duty, so much the more is a transgression imputable as culpable. Hence the state of mind of the agent or doer of a deed makes a difference in imputing its consequences, according as he did it in passion or performed it with coolness and deliberation. ural hindrance,
CONTENTS
THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT Introduction to the Science of Right General Definitions and Divisions A. What the Science of Right is 397 B.
What
is
Legislative Power 408 There May, However, Be an External Mine and Thine Found as a Fact in the State of Nature, but it is only Provisory 408 Chap. II. The Mode of Acquiring Anything
Right?
397 398 C. Universal Principle of Right D. Right is Conjoined with the Title or Authority to Compel 398 E. Strict Right may be also Represented as the Possibility of a Universal Reciprocal Compulsion in harmony with the Freedom of All is
9.
External 10.
Laws 398 Supplementary Remarks on Equivocal Right (Jus 1.
11.
Aequivocum)
Sect. 11.
Natural Right and Positive Right Innate Right and Acquired Right
401 14.
401 C. Methodical Division of the Science of Right 402 The Science of Right First Part. Private Right The System of Those Laws which Require no External Promulgation The Principles of the External I.
The Meaning
of
410 410
a Real Right?
The
of such Acquisition
is
the Original
Community of the Soil Generally The Juridical Act of this Original
411 Acquisi-
Occupancy 412 Only within a Civil Constitution that Anything can be Acquired Peremptorily, whereas in the State of Nature Acquisition tion
Mine and
of
Having Anything Ex-
Own "Mine"
in
Right
(Meum
Juris) 2.
is
is
can only be Provisory 412 Exposition of the Conception of a Primary Acquisition of the Soil 414
Deduction of the Conception of the Original Primary Acquisition 414 Property 415 Sect. ii. Principles of Personal Right 18. Nature and Acquisition of Personal Right 17.
Of the Mode
ternal as One's 1.
Principles of Real Right
15. It is
16.
Thine Generally
Chap.
i.
What
bility
B. Universal Division of Rights
11.
409
First Acquisition of a Thing can only be that of the Soil 411 13. Every Part of the Soil may be Originally Acquired; and the Principle of the Possi12.
Division of the Science of Right A. General Division of the Duties of Right 400 (Juridical Duties) I.
Principle of External Acqui-
Division of the Subject of the Acquisition of the External Mine and Thine 410
399 399 400
Equity The Right of Necessity
The General sition
according to Universal
F.
only Possible in a Juridical or Civil State
of Society under the Regulation of a Public
403
Juridical Postulate of the Practical
Reason
416 416 417 417
by Contract Acquired by Contract?
19. Acquisition
3.
Possession and Ownership
403 404
20.
What
4.
Exposition of the Conception of the External
21.
Acceptance and Delivery
Mine and Thine 5.
Definition of the Conception of the External
Sect. hi. Principles of Personal Right that Real in Kind (Jus Realiter Personale)
6.
Mine and Thine 404 Deduction of the Conception of a Purely
404
Juridical Possession of an External Object
(Possessio 7.
Noumenon)
of Experience 8.
405
Application of the Principle of the Possibility of an External Mine and Thine to Objects
To Have Anything
407 External as One's
Own 395
is
is
Nature of Personal Right of a Real Kind 418 23. What is Acquired in the Household? 418 The Rights of the Family as a Domestic Society Title i. Conjugal Right (Husband and W ife) 24. The Natural Basis of Marriage 419 25. The Rational Right of Marriage 419 26. Monogamy and Equality in Marriage 419 22.
T
)
CONTENTS
396
Contract of Marriage 420 Title ii. Parental Right (Parent and Child 420 28. The Relation of Parent and Child 27. Fulfilment of the
29.
The Rights
Title
hi.
45.
The Form
46.
The
Master of a
421 the Rights Capable
49.
What What
I.
is
Juridical
423
II. is a Book? The Unauthorised Publishing
is Rightly Prohibited 425 Confusion of Personal and Real Right 426 Episodical Section. The Ideal Acquisition of External Objects of the Will 32. The Nature and Modes of Ideal Acquisition 426 ^t,. I. Acquisition by Usucapion (Acquisitio per Usucapionem) 426
after
Chap.
427 of a
ing
Conditioned by the Principle of a Public Court 429 I. The Contract of Donation (Pactum 37. Donationis) 429
39. III.
of
ties in the
50. Juridical
Offices
443 and Digni-
State
444
Relations of
51.
the
Citizen
to
his
Other Countries. EmigraBanishment; Exile tion; Immigration; 449 The Three Forms of the State. Autocracy:
Country and
Aristocracy; 52. Historical
to
Democracy
Origin
and
Changes.
A
450 Pure
Republic. Representative Government
450 II.
55.
of an
State Generally
441
The
The Right of Punishing and Pardoning 1. The Right of Punishing 446 11. The Right of Pardoning 449
E.
54.
by the Taking Oath (Cautio Juratoria) 432 Transition from Mine and Thine in the State of Nature to the Mine and Thine in the Juridical
Secular and Church Lands.
Church
Lost (Vindicatio)
431
Rights.
D. The Right of Assigning
53.
The Right
of Nations and International
Law (Jus Gentium) Nature and Division of the Right of Nations 452 Elements of the Right of Nations 452 Right of Going to War as related to the Subjects of the State
56.
Right of Going to
War
452 in relation to
Hostile
States 453 Right during War 454 58. Right after War 454 59. The Rights of Peace 455 60. Right as against an Unjust Enemy 455 61. Perpetual Peace and a Permanent Congress of Nations 455 III. The Universal Right of Mankind (Jus Cosmopoliticum) 62. Nature and Conditions of Cosmopolitical 57.
Related to the Natural and
Civil State
433
The Postulate of Public Right 434 Part II. Public Right The System of Those Laws Which Require 42.
Public Promulgation
The Principles of Right
in Civil
Society
and Division of Public Right 435 Right of the State and Constitutional
43. Definition
Law
Reform
spection
Loan (Commodatum)
40. IV. Acquisition of Security
I.
Revolution;
C. Relief of the Poor. Foundling Hospitals.
430 The Revindication of what has been
41. Public Justice as
the Nature of the Civil Union the Supreme Power; Treason;
of
Rights of Taxation; Finance; Police; In-
Death (Bona Fama Defuncti) 428 Conditioned by the
The Contract
438
439
III. Acquisition
II.
from
Land
B.
36.
38.
of the State
Dethronement;
Good Name
Sentence of a Public Judicatory How and What Acquisition is Subjectively
of
436 the State and the Original Con437
A. Right
by Inheritance (Acquisitio
haereditatis)
The Continuing Right
Members
of
Contrary to the Principles of
35. III.
the
Constitutional and Juridical Consequences aris-
425
Books is Right, and
Power and
Mutual Relations and Characteristics of the Three Powers 437 Distinct Functions of the Three Powers.
Autonomy
Book
Money?
34. II. Acquisition
435 Three Powers
tract
Concep422 Illustration of Relations of Contract by the Conceptions of Money and a Book a
Legislative
47. Dignities in
48.
Money and
its
430
Systematic Division of all of Being Acquired by Contract tions of
of the State and
the State
Servant 30. Relation and Right of the
31. Divisions of Contracts:
Union and Public Right
421
of the Parent
Household Right (Master and
Household
44. Origin of the Civil
(Jus Civitatis)
Right
CONCLUSION
456 457
INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT
GENERAL DEFINITIONS AND DIVISIONS A.
What
the Science of Right
in general, is
and what
recognised. All this
The
the laws which
all
is
A
object the
even from the practical
his empirical principles for a time
is
one
who
be
jurist until
he abandon and search
in the pure reason for the sources of such judgements, in order to lay a real foundation for ac-
emmay, indeed, furnish him with exguidance; but a merely empirical system
tual positive legislation. In this search, his pirical laws
cellent
that
practical jurisconsult (jurisperi-
tus), or a professional lawyer,
may
entirely hidden
possible to
called a jurist or jurisconsult (juris-
consultus).
and unjust,
its
promulgate by external legislation. Where there is such a legislation, it becomes, in actual application to it, a system of positive right and law; and he who is versed in the knowledge of this
system
just
it is
Science of Right has for
principles of
is
may remain
void of rational principles
is
wooden head
is
in
the fable of
is,
like the
Phaedrus, fine
laws,
enough in appearance, but unfortunately wants brain.
ed as belonging to jurisprudence {jurispruden-
i. The conception of right as referring to a corresponding obligation which is the moral aspect of it in the first place, has regard only to
But the
the external and practical relation of one person
knowledge of positive external and who can apply them to cases that may occur in experience. Such practical knowledge of positive right, and law, may be regardskilled in the
tial in the original sense of the term.
theoretical
—
—
knowledge of right and law in prinfrom positive laws and
to another, in so far as they can
ciple, as distinguished
upon each
empirical cases, belongs to the pure science of
their actions as facts.
right (juris s cientia)
The
.
science of right thus
philosophical
the
have influence
other, immediately or mediately,
by
In the second place, the conception of right does not indicate the relation of the action of an individual to the wish
and systematic knowledge of the principles of natural right. And it is from this science that the immutable principles of all positive legislation must be derived by practical jurists and lawgivers. designates
it
or the
mere
2.
desire of another, as in acts of be-
nevolence or of unkindness, but only the relation of his free action to the
of the other.
3.
And,
freedom of action
in the third place, in this
reciprocal relation of voluntary actions, the con-
B.
What
may
This question
is
ception of right does not take into consideration the matter of the act of will in so far as the end
Right?
be said to be about as em-
which any one
barrassing to the jurist as the well-known question, all
"What
the
more
is
truth?"
so, if,
on
is
to the logician. It
reflection,
is
he strives to
avoid tautology in his reply and recognise the fact that a reference to what holds true merely of the laws of some one country at a particular time is not a solution of the general problem thus proposed. It is quite easy to state what may be right in particular cases (quid sit juris), as being what the laws of a certain place and of a certain time say or may have said; but it is much
more
difficult to
have enacted
is
determine whether what they
right in itself,
universal criterion
by which
and
to lay
right
down
a
and wrong
is
may have
in
concerned. In other words,
view it is
in willing
not asked
it
in a
question of right whether any one on buying goods for his own business realizes a profit by the transaction or not but only the form of the transaction is taken into account, in considering the relation of the mutual acts of will. Acts of will or voluntary choice are thus regarded only in so far as they are free, and as to whether the action of one can harmonize with the freedom of another, according to a universal ;
law.
Right, therefore, comprehends the whole of the conditions under which the voluntary actions of
397
any one person can be harmonized
in
THE SCIENCE
398
reality with the voluntary actions of every other person, according to a universal law of free-
a hindrance of freedom, according to universal
dom.
is
C. Universal Principle of Right
sal law."
my
my
action or
condition general-
ing to universal laws,
it is
wrong; and the comis opposed to it is
right,
as being a hindering of a hindrance of
freedom, and as being in accord with the freedom which exists in accordance with universal laws. Hence, according to the logical principle of contradiction,
wrong who hinders me
pulsion to bear on any one
this action, or in the
in fact.
in the performance of maintenance of this condition. For such a hindrance or obstruction cannot coexist with freedom according to univer-
with an implied
it
maxims
maxim, that
is.
be adopted as
shall itself
make
that I shall
the
it
my
maxim
For any one may be free, although his freedom is entirely indifferent to me, or even if I wished in my heart to infringe it, so long as I do not actually violate that freedom by my external action. Ethics, however, as distinguished from jurisprudence, imposes upon me the obligation to make the fulfilment actions.
of right a
The
maxim of my
universal law of right
may
then be ex-
manner
may be able freedom of all others, according to a universal law." This is undoubtedly a law which imposes obligation upon me; but it does not at all imply and still less command that I ought, merely on account of this obligation, to limit my freedom to these very conditions. Reathat the free exercise of thy will to coexist with the
son in this connection says only that stricted thus far
by
its idea,
and
may
thus limited in fact by others; and as a postulate which
is
what
it
is
re-
be likewise it
lays this
not capable of fur-
ther proof. As the object in view virtue, but to explain
is
not to teach
thus far the law of right, as thus laid down, may not and should not be represented as a motive-principle right
is,
of action.
who may
violate
it
be also Represented as the
of All according to
—obligation according
D. Right
who
the part of one
ComFreedom Universal Laws
to a law,
and
a title
on
has bound another by his
own
free choice to compel him to perform. But imports that the conception of right may be viewed as consisting immediately in the possibility of
a universal reciprocal compulsion, in
harmony with
the freedom of its
all.
object only what
in actions, strict right, as that with
ing ethical
is
As
right in
is
external
which noth-
intermingled, requires no other
motives of action than those that are merely exit is then pure right and is unmixed with any prescriptions of virtue. A strict right, ternal; for
then, in the exact sense of the term,
is
that
which alone can be called wholly external. Now such right is founded, no doubt, upon the consciousness of the obligation of every individual according to the law; but if it is to be pure as such, it neither may nor should refer to this consciousness as a motive by which to determine the free act of the will. For this purpose, however, it founds upon the principle of the possibility of an external compulsion, such as may coexist with the freedom of every one according to universal laws. Accordingly, then, it is said that a creditor has a right to de-
where Conjoined with the Title or Authority to Compel
is
a debtor the
resistance which effect
of this effect and
is
is
opposed to any hin-
in reality a
furtherance
accordance with its accomplishment. Now, everything that is wrong is is
in
payment
mean merely
this
does not
him
to feel in his
to do this; but
drance of an
the
it
mand from
The
accompanied com-
is
This proposition means the right is not to be regarded as composed of two different elements
general has for
conduct.
pressed thus: "Act externally in such a
down
right
harmony with
pulsion in
cannot be demanded
as a matter of right, that this universal princi-
my
all
or warrant to bring
Possibility of a Universal Reciprocal
It follows also that
of
title
may
E. Strict Right
sal laws.
all
to freedom.
pulsion of constraint which
can coexist with the freedom of every other, according to a universal law, any one does me a ly
ple of
made
a hindrance or resistance
Consequently, if a certain exercise of freedom is itself a hindrance of the freedom that is accord-
"Every action is right which in itself, or in the maxim on which it proceeds, is such that it can coexist along with the freedom of the will of each and all in action, according to a univerIf, then,
laws; and compulsion or constraint of any kind
it
of his debt,
that he can bring
mind that reason obliges him means that he can apply an
external compulsion to force any such one so to pay,
and that
sistent with the
this compulsion is quite confreedom of all, including the
parties in question, according to a universal law.
OF RIGHT Right and the
same
title
to compel, thus indicate the
science of right, to which we are now about to advance; and we may consider them now by way of supplement to these introductory ex-
repre-
planations, in order that their uncertain condi-
thing.
The law
of right, as thus enunciated,
is
sented as a reciprocal compulsion necessarily in accordance with the freedom of every one, un-
tions
der the principle of a universal freedom. It is it were, a representative construction
right.
of the conception of right, by exhibiting
it in a pure intuitive perception a priori, after the analogy of the possibility of the free motions of bodies under the physical law of the equality of action and reaction. Now, as in pure mathe-
we cannot deduce
the properties of
its
objects immediately from a mere abstract conception, but can only discover
them by
figura-
tive construction or representation of its con-
ceptions; so
it is
ciple of right. It
manner with the prinnot so much the mere for-
in like is
mal conception of right, but rather that of a universal and equal reciprocal compulsion as harmonizing with it, and reduced under general
may
not exert a disturbing influence on
the fixed principles of the proper doctrine of
thus, as
matics,
399
F.
Supplementary Remarks on Equivocal Right (Jus aequivocum)
With every
right,
(jus strictum), there
compel. But
it is
in is
the strict acceptation
conjoined a right to
possible to think of other rights
of a wider kind (jus latum) in which the
title
compel cannot be determined by any law. Now there are two real or supposed rights of this kind equity and the right of necessity. The first alleges a right that is without compulsion; the second adopts a compulsion that is without right. This equivocalness, however, can be easily shown to rest on the peculiar fact that to
—
there are cases of doubtful right, for the de-
which no judge can be appointed.
laws, that
makes representation of that conception possible. But just as those conceptions presented in dynamics are founded upon a merely
cision of
formal representation of pure mathematics as presented in geometry, reason has taken care also to provide the understanding as far as pos-
Equity (aequitas), regarded objectively, does not properly constitute a claim upon the moral duty of benevolence or beneficence on the part of others; but whoever insists upon anything on the ground of equity, founds upon his right to the same. In this case, however, the conditions are awanting that are requisite for the function of a judge in order that he might determine what or what kind of satisfaction can be done to this claim. When one of the partners of a mercantile company, formed under the condition of equal profits, has, however, done more than the other members, and in consequence has also lost more, it is in accordance with eq-
with intuitive presentations a priori in behoof of a construction of the conception of right. The right in geometrical lines {rectum) is opposed, as the straight, to that which is curved and to that which is oblique. In the first opposition, there is involved an inner quality of the lines of such a nature that there is only sible
one straight or right
line possible
between two
given points. In the second case, again, the positions of
two intersecting or meeting
lines are of
such a nature that there can likewise be only one line called the perpendicular, which is not more inclined to the one side than the other, and it divides space on either side into two equal parts. After the manner of this analogy, the science of right aims at determining what every one shall have as his own with mathematical exactness; but this is not to be expected in the ethical science of virtue, as it cannot but allow a certain latitude for exceptions. But, without passing into the sphere of ethics, there are two cases known as the equivocal right of equity and necessity which claim a juridical decision, yet for which no one can be found to give such a decision, and which, as regards their relation
—
—
to rights, belong, as
it
were, to the "Intermun-
we must at the outset take apart from the special exposition of the
dia" of Epicurus. These
i.
Equity
demand from the company more than merely an equal share of advantage
uity that he should
with the if
we
rest.
— —he
But, in relation to strict right
think of a judge considering his case
can furnish no definite data to establish how much more belongs to him by the contract; and in case of an action at law, such a demand would be rejected. A domestic servant, again, who might be paid his wages due to the end of his year of service in a coinage that became deit would was when he entered on his engagement, cannot claim by right to be kept from loss on account of the unequal value of the money if he receives the due amount of it. He can only make an appeal on the ground of equity, a dumb goddess who
preciated within that period, so that
not be of the same value to
—
him
as
it
THE SCIENCE
4oo
—
cannot claim a hearing of right, because there was nothing bearing on this point in the contract of service, and a judge cannot give a decree on the basis of vague or indefinite conditions.
Hence
follows, that a court of equity, for
it
disputed
of
decision
the
questions
would involve a contradiction.
of
right,
only where
It is
rights are concerned, and in matwhich he can decide, that a judge may or ought to give a hearing to equity. Thus, if the Crown is supplicated to give an indemnity to
own proper
his
ters in
certain persons for loss or injury sustained in service,
its
may
it
undertake the burden of do-
ing so, although, according to strict right, the
claim might be rejected on the ground of the pretext that the parties in question undertook the performance of the service occasioning the
own risk. The dictum of equity may be put thus: "The strictest right is the greatest wrong" (summum loss, at their
jus
summa
But
injuria).
this evil
cannot be ob-
viated by the forms of right, although
relates
it
to a matter of right; for the grievance that
it
It is clear that the assertion of is
such a right
not to be understood objectively as being in
accordance with what a law would prescribe, but merely subjectively, as proceeding on the assumption of how a sentence would be pronounced by a court in the case. There can, in fact, be no criminal law assigning the penalty of death to a man who, when shipwrecked and struggling in extreme danger for his life, and in order to save it, may thrust another from a plank on which he had saved himself. For the punishment threatened by the law could not possibly have greater power than the fear of the loss of life in the case in question. Such a penal law would thus fail altogether to exercise its intended effect; for the threat of an evil which is still uncertain such as death by a jucould not overcome the fear of dicial sentence an evil which is certain, as drowning is in such
—
—
An
circumstances. tion, then,
act of violent self-preserva-
ought not to be considered as alto-
gether beyond condemnation (inculpabile)
;
it is
only to be adjudged as exempt from punishment (impunibile)
Yet
.
this subjective condition of
gives rise to can only be put before a "court of
impunity, by a strange confusion of ideas, has
conscience" (jorum poli), whereas every ques-
been regarded by
must be taken before a
tion of right
(forum
court
civil
The dictum
soli).
jurists as equivalent to objec-
tive lawfulness.
of the right of necessity
is
put
"Necessity has no law" (Necessitas non habet legem). And yet there cannot in these terms:
ii.
The
The Right of Necessity
so-called right of necessity (jus neces-
sitatis)
is
the supposed right or
the danger of losing the
life
of another
my own
who
title, in
life,
case of
away
to take
has, in fact,
done
me no
be a necessity that could
make what
and "the
It is
evident that, viewed as a doctrine of
sity," the equivocations involved arise
this
must involve a contradiction, For
interchange
makupon my life, and whom anticipate by depriving him of his own (jus not the case of a wrongful aggressor
I
inculpatae tutelae)
;
nor consequently
is
question merely of the recommendation of
it
a
mod-
eration which belongs to ethics as the doctrine of
i
irtue,
and not to jurisprudence as the doc-
trine of right. It
is
a question of the allowable-
ness of using violence against one
who has used
none against me.
of
the
objective
re-
right of neces-
right,
this is
wrong
judgements
It is apparent, then, that in
lating both to "equity"
harm.
ing an unjust assault
is
lawful.
from an and subjective
grounds that enter into the application of the principles of right, when viewed respectively by reason or by a judicial tribunal. What one may have good grounds for recognising as right,
may
in itself,
of justice;
wrong, in a court.
not find confirmation in a court
and what he must consider
itself,
And
may
the reason of this
ception of right
is
to
be
obtain recognition in such is
that the con-
not taken in the two cases in
one and the same sense.
DIVISION OF THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT A. General Division of the Duties of Right (Juridical Duties)
In this division we may very conveniently follow Ulpian, if his three formulae are taken in a general sense, which may not have been quite
clearly in his mind, but
which they are capable
of being developed into or of receiving.
They
are the following:
i.
Honeste vive. "Live rightly." Juridical rechonour (honestas juridica), consists
titude, or
OF RIGHT in
own worth
maintaining one's
tion to others. This
the proposition:
duty
"Do
not
as a
may
man
in rela-
There
be rendered by
make
thyself a
for the use of others, but be to
means
mere them
independence of the compulsory and in so far as it can coexist with the freedom of all according to a universal law, it is the one sole original, inborn right belonging to every man in virtue of his humanity. There is, indeed, an innate equality belonging to every man which consists in his right to be independent of being bound by others to any-
Freedom
(lex justi).
laede.
"Do wrong
to
no one."
This formula may be rendered so as to mean: "Do no wrong to any one, even if thou shouldst be under the necessity, in observing this duty, to cease from all connection with others and to avoid 3.
all
is
his
is
more than
that to
which he
ciprocally bind them. It
is,
may
also re-
consequently, the
man in virtue of which own master by right (sui
inborn quality of every
he ought to be his
cuique tribue. "Assign to every one own." This may be rendered, "En-
wrong cannot be avoided,
ter, if
thing
society" (lex juridica).
Suum
what
Freedom
will of another;
be explained likewise an end." This duty in the next formula as an obligation arising out of the right of humanity in our own person
Neminem
only one Innate Right,
is
the Birthright of
will
2.
401
juris).
There
is,
also, the natural quality of just-
ness attributable to a
into a society
man
as naturally of
unim-
may have secured own." If this formula were to be simply translated, "Give every one his own," it would express an absurdity, for we cannot give any one what he already has. If it is to have a definite meaning, it must therefore run thus: "Enter into a state in which every
peachable right (justi), because he has done no wrong to any one prior to his own juridical ac-
one can have what is his own secured against the action of every other" (lex justitiae).
it;
with others in which every one to
him what
is
his
tions.
And, further, there
common action on the that he may do towards
of
is
others what does not
infringe their rights or take is
also the innate right
part of every man, so
away anything
such as merely to communicate thought, to anything, or to promise something
narrate
whether truly and honestly, or untruly and
These three
classical formulae, at the
same
time, represent principles which suggest a division of the
system of juridical duties into
inter-
nal duties, external duties, and those connecting duties
from
which contain the
latter as
the principle of the former
deduced
I. Natural Right and Positive Right. The system of rights, viewed as a scientific system of doctrines, is divided into natural right and positive right. Natural right rests upon pure
rational principles a priori; positive or statutory is
what proceeds from the
honestly
(veriloquim aut jalsiloquim)
,
dis-
for
it
upon these others whether they believe or trust in it or not. 1 But all these
rests entirely will
rights or titles are already included in the principle of innate
freedom, and are nut really disit, even as dividing members
tinguished from
by subsumption.
B. Universal Division of Rights
right
that
theirs unless they are willing to appropriate
will of a legis-
under a higher species of right. The reason why such a division into separate rights has been introduced into the system of natural right, viewed as including all that is innate, was not without a purpose. Its object was to enable proof to be more readily put forward in case of any controversy arising about an acquired right, and questions emerging either with reference to a fact that might be in doubt, or, if
lator.
Innate Right and Acquired Right. The system of rights may again be regarded in reference to the implied powers of dealing morally II.
with others as bound by obligations, that furnishing a legal
title
is,
as
of action in relation to
them. Thus viewed, the system is divided into innate right and acquired right. Innate right is that right which belongs to every one by nature,
independent of all juridical acts of experience. Acquired right is that right which is founded upon such juridical acts. Innate right may also be called the "internal mine and thine" (meum vel tuum internum) for external right must always be acquired. ;
1 It is customary to designate every untruth that is spoken intentionally as such, although it may be in a frivolous manner, a lie, or falsehood (mendacium), because it may do harm, at least in so far as any one who repeats it in good faith may be made a laughing-stock of to others on account of his easy credulity. But in the juridical sense, only that untruth is called a lie which immediately infringes the right of another, such as a false allegation of a contract having been concluded, when the allegation is put forward in order to deprive some one of what is his (falsiloquim dolosum). This
distinction of conceptions so closely allied is not without foundation; because on the occasion of a simple statement of one's thoughts, it is always free for another to take them as he may; and yet the resulting repute, that such a one is a man whose word cannot be trusted, comes so close to the opprobrium of directly calling him a liar, that the boundary-line separating what, in such a case, belongs to jurisprudence, and what is special to ethics, can hardly be otherwise drawn.
— 402 that were established, in reference to a right under dispute. For the party repudiating an obligation, and on whom the burden of proof (onus probandi) might be incumbent, could
C. Methodical Division of the Science of Right The highest division of the system of natural
—
right should not be
into "natural right''
as
it
is
frequently put
and "social
right," but into
The
thus methodically refer to his innate right of
natural right and civil right.
freedom as specified under various relations in detail, and could therefore found upon them
tutes private right; the second, public right. For
equally as different
titles
In the relation of innate right, and consequently of the internal mine and thine, there is therefore not rights, but only one right. And, accordingly, this highest division of rights into
innate and acquired, which evidently consists of two tents
is
members extremely unequal
it is
that
of right.
in their con-
properly placed in the introduction
t^e subdivisions of the science of right
;
and be
may
referred in detail to the external mine and thine.
first
consti-
not the "social state" but the "civil state" is opposed to the "state of nature"; for in
the "state of nature" there
some
kind, but there
may
well be society
no "civil" society, as an institution securing the mine and thine by public laws. It is thus that right, viewed under of
is
reference to the state of nature, called private right.
The whole
of right will therefore
fall to
is
specially
of the principles
be expounded under
the two subdivisions of private right and public right.
THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT FIRST PART. PRIVATE RIGHT The System of Those Laws which Require no External Promulgation. The Principles of the External Mine and Thine Generally Chapter
Of
I.
Mode
the
of
The Meaning
"Mine"
of
(Meum
Juris)
The is
me
consent, he would do
rightfully it,
it
that
if
without
a lesion or injury.
subjective condition of the use of anything
possession of
An
is
contrary to the principle of
For an object of any act of my will, is someit would be physically within my power to use. Now, suppose there were things that by right should absolutely not be in our power, or, in other words, that it would be wrong or inconsistent with the freedom of all, accordthing that
Right
in
Anything is "mine" by right, or is mine, when I am so connected with any other person should make use of
my
as res nullius, right.
Own
thing External as One's i.
Having Any-
it.
ing to universal law, to this supposition,
make
use of them.
freedom would so
priving itself of the use of
its
On
far be de-
voluntary activity,
in thus putting useable objects out of all possi-
external thing, however as such could
Hence it would be a contradiction have anything external as one's own, were not the conception of possession capable of two
In practical relations, this would be to annihilate them, by making them res nullius, notwithstanding the fact that acts of will in relation to such things would formally harmonize, in the actual use of them, with the external freedom of all according to universal laws. Now the pure practical reason lays down only formal
different meanings, as sensible possession that
laws as principles to regulate the exercise of the
only be mine, if I may assume it to be possible that I can be wronged by the use which another might make of it when it is not actually in my possession. to
is
perceivable by the senses, and rational pos-
session that
By
is
perceivable only by the intellect.
the former
is
to be understood a physical
by the the same
possession, and
latter, a
possession of
object.
purely juridical
it is
me
as a subject," or that
me, and to
also "a thing placed outside of
be found elsewhere in space or time." Taken in the first sense, the term possession signifies rational possession; and, in the second sense,
must mean empirical possession. intelligible possession,
if
possession viewed apart
A
it
rational or
such be possible,
is
from physical holding
or detention (detentio). 2.
Juridical Postulate of the Practical
It is possible to
my
will as
have any external object of
mine. In other words, a were it to become law
—
Reason
maxim
— that
to
any object on which the will can be exerted must remain objectively in itself without an owner, this effect
will;
and therefore abstracts from the matter of
the act of will, as regards the other qualities of the object, which
as
it
403
is
considered only in so far
an object of the activity of the
is
Hence
The description of an object as "external to me" may signify either that it is merely "different and distinct from
bility of use.
will.
the practical reason cannot contain, in
reference to such an object, an absolute prohibition of its use, because this
would involve a
contradiction of external freedom with
An I
object of
itself.
my free will, however, is one which
have the physical capability of making some
use of at
will, since its
(in potentia).
This
is
use stands in
my power
to be distinguished
from
having the object brought under my disposal (in potestatem meam reductum), which supposes not a capability merely, but also a particular act of the free-will. But in order to consider something merely as an object of my will as such, it is sufficient to be conscious that I have it in my power. It is therefore an assumption a priori of the practical reason to regard and treat every object within the range of my free exercise of will as objectively a possible
or thine.
mine
THE SCIENCE
404
This postulate may be called "a permissive law" of the practical reason, as giving us a special title which we could not evolve out of the
mere conceptions of
And
right generally.
upon
constitutes the right to impose
title
this all
spot.
For any one who,
former appear-
in the
ances of empirical possession, might wrench the
my
apple out of
my
me away from me in
hand, or drag
resting-place, would, indeed, injure
respect of the inner "mine" of freedom, but not
others an obligation, not otherwise laid upon them, to abstain from the use of certain objects
in respect of the external
of our free choice, because we have already taken them into our possession. Reason wills
even when not actually holding it physically. And if I could not do this, neither could I call
that this shall be recognised as a valid principle,
the apple or the spot mine.
does so as practical reason; and it is enabled by means of this postulate a priori to
thing
and
it
enlarge
was
"mine," unless
I
could
in the possession of the object,
B. I cannot call the performance of some-
by the action
"mine,"
range of activity in practice.
its
assert that I
the
of
will
I can only say "it has
if
another
of
come
into
my
possession at the same time with a promise"
{pactum Possession and Ownership
3.
Any one who would must be
as his
Were he
not
in
its
assert the right to a thing
possession of
it
as an object.
actual possessor or owner, he
could not be wronged or injured by the use which another might make of it without his con-
anything external to him, and no way connected with him by right, affect
sent. For. should in
re initum)
assert "I
it could not affect himself as a subnor do him any wrong, unless he stood in a relation of ownership to it.
am
;
but only
if
am
I
able to
in possession of the will of the
other, so as to determine him to the performance of a particular act, although the time for the performance of it has not yet come." In the latter case, the promise belongs to the nature of things actually held as possessed, and as an active obligation I can reckon it mine; and this holds good not only if I have the thing prom-
—
as in the first case
—already
my
pos-
this object,
ised
ject,
even although I do not yet possess it in fact. Hence, I must be able to regard myself in thought as independent of that empirical form of possession that is limited by the condition of time and as being, nevertheless, in pos-
4.
Exposition 0} the Conception of the External Mine and Thine
session of the object.
There can only be three external objects of
my will in the activity of choice: (1) A corporeal thing external
me;
because I
(2) The free-will of another in the performance of a particular act (praestatio) ;
(3)
The
C. I cannot call a wife, a child, a domestic,
any other person "mine" merely
or, generally,
to
state of another in relation to
my-
self.
These correspond to the categories of suband reciprocity ; and they form the practical relations between me and external
stance, causality,
objects, according to the laws of freedom.
ing to
my
command them
at present as belong-
household, or because I have them
under control, and in my power and possession. But I can call them mine, if, although they may have withdrawn themselves from my control and I do not therefore possess them empirically, I can still say "I possess them by my mere will, provided they exist anywhere in space or time; and, consequently,
my
possession of
They belong, in only when and so far
purely juridical." A. I can only call a corporeal thing or an object in space
"mine." when, even although not
in physical possession of
that I
am
in
it,
I
am
it
in
another real non-
possession of
physical sense. Thus. I
am
am
laid
may
lie."
it
out of
my
it, although I hand, and wherever it
In like manner.
I
am
say of the ground, on which myself down, that therefore it
my
I
I
matter of
5.
is
my
as I can as-
right.
Definition of the Conception of the
External Mine and Thine
A nominal merely to distinguish the object defined from all other objects, and it springs out of a complete and definite exposiDefinitions are nominal or real.
definition
is
sufficient
not entitled to
tion of
may have
suffices for a
laid
is mine; but only can rightly assert that it still remains in possession, although I may have left the
when
sert this as a
not entitled to call
entitled to say, "I possess
have
possessions,
them
fact, to
able to assert
an apple mine merely because I hold it in my hand or possess it physically; but only when I
in
session, but
its
conception.
fined, so as to furnish a
of the object.
A
real definition further
deduction of the conception de-
knowledge of the
The nominal
reality
definition of the
external "mine" would thus be:
"The
external
OF RIGHT mine is anything outside of myself, such that any hindrance of my use of it at will would be doing me an injury or wrong as an infringement of that freedom of mine which may coexist with the freedom of all others according to a
The
universal law."
real definition of this con-
may be put thus: 'The external mine is anything outside of myself, such that any prevention of my use of it would be a wrong, although I may not be in possession of it so as ception
it as an object." I must be in some kind of possession of an external object, if the object is to be regarded as mine;
to be actually holding
for, otherwise,
anyone interfering with
this
ob-
405
All propositions of right sitions
But the
as pos-
analytical; for
—
tion
direct contradiction to the
is in
The proposition
an empirical rightful possession does not
therefore go beyond the right of a person in ref-
of the object in the sphere of sensible appear-
ternal to me, after abstraction of
ance (possessio phenomenon), although the object which I possess is not regarded in this prac-
ditions of empirical possession in space
—accordthe exposition of the Transcendental Anthe Critique of Pure Reason—but a
ing to
phenomenon
as
alytic in
Pure Reason the interest of reason turns upon the theoretical knowledge of the nature of things and how far reason can go in such knowledge. But here reason has to deal with the practical
a thing in
For
itself.
in the Critique of
axiom of
expressing the principle
erence to himself.
tical relation as itself
says
—
there is to be rightly an external mine and thine. Empirical possession is thus only phenomenal possession or holding (detention) sible, if
it
my consent as, for instance, in wrenching an apple out of my hand affects and detracts from my freedom as that which is internally mine; and consequently the maxim of his acout
of
to § 4, a rational possession
noumenon) must be assumed
(possessio
is
nothing more than what follows by the principle of contradiction, from the conception of such possession; namely, that if I am the holder of a thing in the way of being physically connected with it, any one interfering with it with-
Hence, according
not, in doing so, affect
as juridical propo-
juridical proposition a priori respecting
empirical possession
right.
would
—
are propositions a priori, for they are
practical laws of reason (dictamina rationis).
me; nor, consequently, would he thereby do me any wrong. ject
—
On
the other hand, the proposition expressing
the possibility of the possession of a thing ex-
—
all
the con-
and time consequently presenting the assumption of
the possibility of a possessio
noumenon
—goes
beyond these limiting conditions; and because this proposition asserts a possession even without physical holding, as necessary to the concep-
tion of the external thetical.
And
thus
mine and thine, it is synbecomes a problem for
it
how such a proposition, extendrange beyond the conception of empiri-
reason to show ing
its
determination of the action of the will according to laws of freedom, whether the object is
cal possession, is possible a priori.
perceivable through the senses or merely think-
ing possession of a particular portion of the soil
able
by the pure understanding. And right, as under consideration, is a pure practical concep-
is
tion of the reason in relation to the exercise of
out being an act of usurpation. founds upon the innate right of
the will under laws of freedom.
session of the surface of the earth, and
And, hence,
it is
not quite correct to speak of
"possessing" a right to this or that object, but it should rather be said that an object is possessed in a purely juridical way; for a right itself
is
the rational possession of an object, and
would be an expres-
to "possess a possession,"
sion without meaning. 6.
Deduction of the Conception of a Purely Juridical Possession of an External Object (Possessio Noumenon)
The
question,
"How
is
an external mine and
thine possible?" resolves itself into this other
question:
"How
is
a merely juridical or rational
possession possible?"
And
second question "How is a synthetic proposition in right possible a priori?" this
resolves itself again into a third:
In this manner, for instance, the act of taka
mode
exercising the private free-will with-
The possessor
common
universal will corresponding a priori to
allows a private possession of the
soil;
pos-
upon the it, which because
what are mere things would be otherwise made in themselves and by a law into unappropriable objects. Thus a first appropriator acquires originally by primary possession a particular portion of the ground; and by right (jure) he resists every other person who would hinder him in
the private use of
it,
although, while the
"state of nature" continues, this cannot be done juridical means (de jure), because a public law does not yet exist. And although a piece of ground should be regarded as free, or declared to be such, so as to be for the public use of all without distinction, yet it cannot be said that it is thus free by nature and originally so, prior to any juridical
by
THE SCIENCE
406
For there would be a real relation already incorporated in such a piece of ground by the very fact that the possession of it was denied
done to him. The
any particular individual; and as this public freedom of the ground would be a prohibition
its
act.
to
every particular individual, this presupposes a common possession of it which cannot take effect without a contract. A piece of ground, however, which can only become publicly free by contract, must actually be in the posof
it
to
disturb the
occupier or holder of a portion
first
of the soil in his use of
therefore a
title
"It
is
common
well
it is
a lesion or
wrong
taking of possession has
of right (titulus possessionis) in
favour, which
original
first
simply the principle of the
is
possession; and the saying that
who are in possession'' when one is not bound to
for those
(beati possidentes),
authenticate his possession,
is a principle of natural right that establishes the juridical act of
who
taking possession, as a ground of acquisition
mutually interdict or suspend each other, from
upon which every first possessor may found. It has been shown in the Critique of Pure Reason that in theoretical principles a priori, an intuitional perception a priori must be supplied in connection with any given conception; and, consequently, were it a question of a purely theoretical principle, something would have to be added to the conception of the possession of an object to make it real. But in respect of
session of
those associated together,
all
any particular or private use of
it.
This original community of the
soil and of the upon it (communio fundi originaria)As an idea which has objective and practical juridical reality and is entirely different from the idea of a primitive community of things, which is a fiction. For the latter would have had to be founded as a form of society, and must have taken its rise from a contract by which all renounced the right of private possession, so that by uniting the property owned by each into a whole, it was
things
common
thus transformed into a
possession.
But had such an event taken place, history must have presented some evidence of it. To regard such a procedure as the original
mode
of taking
possession, and to hold that the particular possessions of every individual
be grounded upon
it,
is
may and
ought to
evidently a contradic-
the practical principle under consideration, the
procedure
just the converse of the theoretical
is
process; so that
all
the conditions of perception
which form the foundation of empirical possession must be abstracted or taken away in order to extend the range of the juridical conception
beyond the empirical sphere, and
in order to
be
able to apply the postulate, that every external
object of the free activity of I
have
it
session of
my
will,
so far as
my
in
it,
power, although not in the posmay be reckoned as juridically
mine.
tion.
Possession (possessio)
from habitation
as
is
be distinguished
to
mere residence (sedes)
;
and
the act of taking possession of the soil in the in-
once for
The possibility of such a possession, with consequent deduction of the conception of a nonempirical possession,
is
founded upon the
juridi-
also to be
cal postulate of the practical reason, that "It is
distinguished from settlement or domicile (inco-
a juridical duty so to act towards others that
tention of acquiring
latus),
which
is
it
all, is
a continuous private possession
what
is
external and useable
become
may come
into the
some one."
dependent on the presence of the individual upon it. We have not here to deal
possession or
with the cjuestion of domiciliary settlement, as that is a secondary juridical act which may fol-
certainly not suffi-
what is externally founded upon a possession, that is not physical. The possibility of such a possession, thus conceived, cannot, however, be proved or comprehended in itself, because it is a rational conception for which no empirical perception can be furnished; but it follows as an immediate consequence from the postulate that has been enunciated. For, if it is necessary to act
as mine. Relative
according to that juridical principle, the rational
of a place that
is
may not occur at all; could not involve an original possession, but only a secondary possession derived low upon possession, or for as such
it
from the consent of others. Simple physical possession, or holding of the soil,
involves already certain relations of right
to the thing, although
cient to enable
me
it
to others, so far as they first
possession in
is
to regard
it
know,
appears as a harmony with the law of ex-
ternal freedom; and, at the
it
same
braced in the universal original
empossession which time,
it is
contains a priori the fundamental principle of the possibility of a private possession. Hence to
And
this postulate
is
the property of
conjoined with the exposi-
tion of the conception that
one's
own
is
or intelligible condition of a purely juridical
possession must also be possible.
It need astonno one, then, that the theoretical aspect of the principles of the external mine and thine is lost from view in the rational sphere of pure intelligence and presents no extension of knowl-
ish
OF RIGHT edge; for the conception of freedom upon which they rest does not admit of any theoretical deduction of its possibility, and it can only be inferred from the practical law of reason, called the categorical imperative, viewed as a fact.
407
freedom.
Now
is
it
from
just in abstraction
my
physical possession of the object of
free-will
in the sphere of sense, that the practical
wills that a rational possession of
reason
be
shall
it
thought, according to intellectual conceptions
which are not empirical, but contain a priori 7.
Application of the Principle of the Possibility of an External Mine and Thine to Objects of
Experience of a purely juridical posses-
not an empirical conception dependent on conditions of space and time, and yet it has is
must be applicable to objects of experience, the knowledge of which is independent of the conditions of space and time. The rational process by which the conception of
practical reality.
As such
it
brought into relation to such objects so as to constitute a possible external mine and thine, is as follows. The conception of right, being contained merely in reason, cannot be immeright
is
diately applied to objects of experience, so as to
give the conception of an empirical possession,
but must be applied directly to the mediating conception, in the understanding, of possession in general; so that, instead of physical holding (detentio) as an empirical representation of possession,
the formal conception or thought of
having, abstracted from
and time,
is
all
conditions of space
conceived by the mind, and only as
implying that an object
my
is
in
my
power and
at
mea positum esse). In term external does not signify existence in another place than where I am, nor my resolution and acceptance at another time than the moment in which I have the offer of a thing: it signifies only an object different from disposal (in polestate
this relation, the
or other than myself.
Now
the practical reason
by its law of right wills, that I shall think the mine and thine in application to objects, not according to sensible conditions, but apart from these and from the possession they indicate; because they refer to determinations of the activity of the will that are in accordance with the laws of freedom. For it is only a conception of the understanding that can be brought under the rational conception of right. I may therefore say that I possess a field, although it is in quite a
from that on which I actually For the question here is not con-
different place find myself.
cerning an intellectual relation to the object, but have the thing practically in my power and at
I
my disposal,
which
is
a conception of possession
by the understanding and independent of relations of space and it is mine, because my will, in determining itself to any particular use realized
;
of
it, is
is
we found
in this fact, that
it
the ground of the
validity of such a rational conception of posses-
The conception sion
Hence
the conditions of rational possession.
not in conflict with the law of external
sion (possessio
noumenon)
as a principle of a
universally valid legislation. For such a legislais implied and contained in the expression, "This external object is mine" because an obligation is thereby imposed upon all others in respect of it, who would otherwise not have been
tion
obliged to abstain
The mode,
from the use
of this object.
then, of having something external
to myself as mine, consists in a specially juridical
connection of the
will of the subject
with
that object, independently of the empirical relations to it in space and in time, and in accordance with the conception of a rational possession.
nally
A
particular spot on the earth
mine because
I
occupy
it
is
with
not exter-
my
body;
for the question here discussed refers only to
my
external freedom, and consequently
fects only the possession of myself,
which
it
af-
is
not
a thing external to me, and therefore only in-
volves an internal right. But in possession of the spot,
myself away from
it
if I continue to be although I have taken
and gone
only under that condition
is
to another place,
my
external right
concerned in connection with it. And to make the continuous possession of this spot by my person a condition of having it as mine, must either be to assert that it is not possible at all to have anything external as one's own, which is contrary to the postulate in § 2, or to require, in order that this external possession sible,
that I shall be in
time.
But
in a place
this
amounts
and also not
two places
may
to saying that I in
it,
which
be pos-
same must be
at the
is
contradic-
tory and absurb.
This position may be applied to the case in which I have accepted a promise; for my having and possession in respect of what has been promised become established on the ground of external right. This right is not to be annulled by the fact that the promiser having said at one time, "This thing shall be yours," again at a subsequent time says, "My will now is that the thing be yours." In such relations of rational hold just the same as if the promiser had, without any interval of time between them, made the two declarations of his will, "This shall be yours," and also "This shall shall not
right, the conditions
THE SCIENCE
408
which manifestly contradicts
not be yours'
it-
8.
self.
thing holds, in like manner, of the
The same
To Have Anything External
conception of the juridical possession of a person as belonging to the Having of a subject, be a wife, a child, or a servant.
The
If,
and
some
it
the reciprocal possession of
all its
members, are
by word or deed.
declaration that every other person
from the use of
to abstain
external mine and thine, as in the former cases,
juridical act
upon the assumption of the possipurely rational possession, without the accompaniment of physical detention or
this act at the
that I
lar abstention
holding of the object.
what
is
forced to a critique of
juridically
its
am is
towards every other
my
in respect of
question arises from a universal rule regulating the external juridical relations.
likewise secures
act in relation to
let
Hence
I
am
not
alone what another person declares
For these give rise to an inevitable dialectic, in which a thesis and an antithesis set up equal claims to the validity of two conflicting conditions. Reason is thus compelled, in its as it was practical function in relation to right
make
this object of
externally theirs; for the obligation in
garding the possibility of such a form of pos-
—
a
obliged
same time involves the admission
obliged to
—
make
is
obliged reciprocally to observe a simi-
conception of the external mine and thine, by the antinomy of the propositions enunciated resession.
will that
which no one would be under, without such a on my part. But the assumption of
rests entirely
function in special reference to the
is
exercise of will; and this imposes an obligation
bility of a
Reason
my
I declare
external thing shall be mine, I
not annulled by the capability of separating from each other in space; because it is by juridical relations that they are connected, and the
practical
Own
Power
Legislative
relations of right involved in a household,
whether
as One's
only Possible in a Juridical or Civil State of Society under the Regulation of a Public
to be externally his, unless every other person
me by what
a guarantee that he will is
mine, upon the same
principle. This guarantee of reciprocal tual abstention
from what belongs
and mu-
to others does
not require a special juridical act for its establishment, but is already involved in the concep-
a distinc-
tion of an external obligation of right, on ac-
phenomenal appearance presented to the senses, and that possession which is rational and thinkable only by the un-
count of the universality and consequently the
derstanding.
an external and consequently contingent possession, cannot serve as a compulsory law for all, because that would be to do violence to the freedom which is in accordance with universal laws. Therefore it is only a will that binds every one, and as such a common, collective, and authoritative will, that can furnish a guarantee of security to all. But the state of men under a universal, external, and public legislation, conjoined with
function
in its theoretical
tion
between possession as
Thesis.
—The
to
a
thesis, in
this case,
is:
"It
is
possible to have something external as mine, al-
though
I
am
Antithesis. sible to
not in possession of
—The
antithesis
is:
it."
"It
is
not pos-
have anything external as mine,
not in possession of
—The
if I
am
it.''
"Both ProposiI mean empirical possession (possessio phaenomenon, the latter when I understand by the same term, a Solution.
solution
tions are true"; the
is:
former when
purely rational possession (possessio
noumenon)
.
But the possibility of a rational possession, and consequently of an external mine and thine, cannot be comprehended by direct insight, but must be deduced from the practical reason. And in this relation it is specially noteworthy that
reciprocity of the obligatoriness arising from a
universal Rule.
Now
a single will, in relation to
authority and power, is called the civil state. There can therefore be an external mine and thine only in the civil state of society.
Consequence. if
it
is
—
It follows, as a corollary, that,
juridically possible to have an external
object as one's own. the individual subject of
possession must be allowed to compel or constrain every person with
whom
a dispute as to
may arise,
the practical reason without intuitional percep-
the mine or thine of such a possession
and even without requiring such an element a priori, can extend its range by the mere
to enter along with himself into the relations of
tions,
elimination of empirical conditions, as justified by the law of freedom, and can thus establish synthetical propositions a priori.
The proof of be shown
this in the practical connection, as will
afterwards, can be adduced in an analytical
manner.
a civil constitution. 9.
There May, However, Be an External Mine and Thine Found as a Fact in the State of Nature, but
it is
Natural right tion
only Provisory
in the state of a civil constitu-
means the forms
of right which
may
be
OF RIGHT deduced from principles a priori as the conditions of such a constitution. It
is
therefore not
by the statutory laws of such a constitution; and accordingly the juridical principle remains in force, that, "Whoever proceeds upon a maxim by which it becomes impossible to be infringed
have an object of the exercise of my as mine, does me a lesion or injury." For a
me
for will
to
constitution is only the juridical condition under which every one has what is his own merely secured to him, as distinguished from its being specially assigned and determined to him. All guarantee, therefore, assumes that civil
everyone to
whom
a thing
is
secured
is
already
own. Hence, prior to the an external or apart from it civil constitution mine and thine must be assumed as possible, and along with it a right to compel everyone with whom we could come into any kind of intercourse to enter with us into a constitution in which what is mine or thine can be secured. There may thus be a possession in expectation or in preparation for such a state of security, as can only be established on the law of the common will; and as it is therefore in accordance with the possibility of such a state, it constitutes a provisory or temporary juridical possession; whereas that possession which is found in reality in the civil state of society will be a peremptory in possession of
it
as his
—
—
409
consist in the fact that, because the possessor
has the presumption of being a rightful man, it unnecessary for him to bring forward proof
is
that he possesses a certain thing rightfully, for this position applies only to a case of disputed right.
But
it is
because
which he
is
naturally prepared,
the individual rightfully resists those
who
will
not adapt themselves to it, and who would disturb him in his provisory possession; because, if
the will of
all
except himself were imposing
from a cerwould still be only a one-sided or unilateral will, and consequently it would have which can be properly just as little legal title
upon him an
obligation to withdraw
tain possession,
it
—
—
based only on the universalized will to contest a claim of right as he would have to assert it. Yet he has the advantage on his side, of being in accord with the conditions requisite to the introduction and institution of a civil form of society. In a word, the mode in which anything external may be held as one's own in the state of nature, is just physical possession with a presumption of right thus far in its favour, that by union of the wills of all in a public legislation it will be made juridical; and in this expectation it holds comparatively, as a kind of potential juridical possession.
This prerogative of
right, as arising
fact of empirical possession,
is
in
from the
accordance
with the formula: "It is well for those who are in possession" (Beati possidentes) It does not .
is
own
invested with the faculty of having as his
any external object upon which he has exerted his will; and, consequently, all actual possession is
a state whose rightfulness
that postulate
is
by an anterior
established
upon
act of will.
And
be no prior possession of the same object by another opposed to it, does, therefore, provisionally justify and entitle me, according to the law of external freedom, to restrain anyone who refuses to enter with me into a state of public legal freedom from all pretension to the use of such an object. For such a procedure is requisite, in conformity with the postulate of reason, in order to subject to my proper use a thing which would otherwise be such an
act, if there
practically annihilated, as regards
of
all
proper use
it.
Chapter
II.
The Mode
of Acquiring
Any-
thing External 10.
The General Principle of External Acquisition
or guaranteed possession. Prior to entering into this state, for
accords with the pos-
it
tulate of the practical reason, that everyone
I acquire a thing
when
I act (efficio) so that
it
becomes mine. An external thing is originally mine when it is mine even without the intervention of a juridical act.
An
acquisition
is
original
and primary when it is not derived from what another had already made his own. There is nothing external that is as such originally mine but anything external may be originally acquired when it is an object that no other person has yet made his. A state in which the mine and thine are in common cannot be conceived as having been at any time original. Such a state of things would have to be acquired by an external juridical act, although there may be an original and common possession of an exter;
nal object.
Even
if
we
think hypothetically of a
which the mine and thine would be originally in common as a communio mei et tui originaria, it would still have to be distinguished from a primeval communion (communio primaeva) with things in common, sometimes supposed to be founded in the first period of the relations of right among men, and which could not be regarded as based upon principles like the former, but only upon history. Even under that condition the historic communio, as a supstate in
THE SCIENCE
4io
posed primeval community, would always have to be viewed as acquired and derivative (communio derivativa). principle of external acquisition, then,
The
expressed thus "Whatever I bring under power according to the law of external freedom, of which as an object of my free activity of will I have the capability of making use ac-
may be
:
my
these acts are juridical, they consequently pro-
ceed from the practical reason, and therefore, in the
may
become mine
I will to
in
common
practical elements
right, abstraction
is
mine," thus becomes a correct inference from
the external fact of sensible possession to the internal right of rational possession.
The
original
primary acquisition of an exter-
nal object of the action of the will,
is
called oc-
cupancy. It can only take place in reference to substances or corporeal things. Now when this
(momenta attendenda)
occupation of an external object does take place,
mine."
The
is
of the empirical conditions in-
will,
with the idea of a possible united is
conformity
made
volved, and the conclusion, "the external object
cording to the postulate of the practical reason,
and which
question as to what
be
em-
constitutive of the process of original acquisi-
the act presupposes, as a condition of such
tion are:
pirical possession, its priority in
i. Prehension or seizure of an object which belongs to no one; for, if it belonged already to some one, the act would conflict with the free-
act of any other who may also be willing to enter upon occupation of it. Hence the legal maxim: "qui prior tempore, potior jure." Such occupation as original or primary is, further, the effect only of a single or unilateral will; for were a bilateral or twofold will requisite for it, it would be derived from a contract of two or more persons with each other, and consequently it would be based upon what another or others had al-
dom
of others, that
laws. This
of
my
is
is,
according to universal
the taking possession of an object
free activity of will in space
and time; the
possession, therefore, into which I thus put self
my-
sensible or physical possession (possessio
is
phenomenon); Declaration of the possession of this object
2.
by formal designation and the will in interdicting
ing
my
free-
every other person from us-
as his;
it
3.
act of
Appropriation, as the act, in idea, of an ex-
common
ternally legislative
and each are obliged formity with
The
my act
will,
to respect
by which
all
and act in con-
of will.
validity of the last element in the proc-
ess of acquisition, as that
on which the conclu-
sion that "the external object
is
mine"
rests, is
what makes the possession valid as a purely rational and juridical possession (possessio noumenon). It is founded upon the fact that, as all
time before the
ready made their own. It is not easy to see how such an act of free-will as this would be could really form a foundation for every one having his own. However, the first acquisition of a thing
on that account not quite exactly the same as it. For the acquisition of a public juridical state by union of the wills of all in a universal legislation would be such an is
the original acquisition of
original acquisition, seeing that'no other of the
kind could precede
and yet
it,
it
rived from the particular wills of
would be de-
all
the individ-
and consequently become all-sided or omnilateral; for a properly primary acquisition can onlyproceed from an individual or unilateral will. uals,
Division of the Subject of the Acquisition of the
External Mine and Thine I.
In respect of the matter of object of acqui-
sition, I acquire either a
corporeal thing (sub-
stance), or the performance of something
by
another (causality), or this other as a person in respect of his state, so far as I have a right to dispose of the same (in a relation of reciprocity with him). II.
In respect of the form or
mode
of acquisi-
tion, it is either a real right (jus reale), or a personal right (jus personale), or a real-personal right (jus realiter personale), to the possession
although not to the use. of another person as he were a thing. III. In respect of the
title (titulus)
member
—which, properly,
is
of the division of rights,
but rather a constituent element of the mode of anything external is acquired exercising them
—
by a certain
free exercise of will that
either
is
unilateral, as the act of a single will (facto), or bilateral, as the act of
two
munity together Section
I.
(lege).
Principles of Real Right
n. What
The
omcom-
wills (pacto), or
nilateral, as the act of all the wills of a
if
ground of right or the
of acquisition
not a particular
is
a Real Right?
usual definition of real right, or "right in
a thing" (jus reale, jus in re),
is
that "it
is
a right
;
OF RIGHT
411
a cor-
the earth could properly neither have nor ac-
nominal definition. But what is it that entitles me to claim an external object from any one who may appear as its possessor, and to compel him. per vindicationem. to put me again.
quire any external thing as his own; because, be-
as against every possessor of it" This
is
rect
in place of himself, into possession of it? Is this
external juridical relation of
my
kind of
will a
immediate relation to an external thing? If so, whoever might think of his right as referring not immediately to persons but to things would have to represent it, although only in an obscure way. somewhat thus. A right on one side has always a duty corresponding to it on the other, so that an external thing, although away from the hands of
its first
possessor, continues to be
still
con-
nected with him by a continuing obligation; and thus it refuses to fall under the claim of any other possessor, because it is already bound to another. In this way my right, viewed as a kind
tween him
and
as a person
external things as
all
material objects, there could be no relations of obligation.
There
is
therefore.literally.no direct
right in a thing, but only that
properly called
''real"
to
who
is
as constituted against a person,
mon
right
which belongs
possession of things with
is
to be
any one in com-
others in the
all
civil state of society.
12.
The
First Acquisition of a Thing can only be that of the Soil
By the soil is understood all habitable Land. In relation to everything that is moveable upon is
it
it,
mode
the
and the moveables is
And
just as. in the
to be regarded as a substance,
of
the
existence
viewed as an inherence
of
in
it.
theoretical acceptance, accidents cannot exist
of good genius accompanying a thing and pre-
apart from their substances, so. in the practical
external attack, would refer an
moveables upon the soil cannot be regarded as belonging to any one unless he is supposed to have been previously in juridical
serving
it
from
all
me!
however, absurb to think of an obligation of persons towards things, and conversely; although it may alien possessor always to
be allowed
in
any particular case
the juridical relation kind, and to express
The
It
by
it
real definition
is.
to represent
a sensible image of this
in this
way.
would run thus: ''Right
in
a right to the private use of a thing, of which I am in possession original or derivative in common with all others." For this is the one condition under which it is alone possible a thing
is
—
—
from quempossessorem). For. except by pre-
relation,
possession of the
ered to be
soil,
so that
thus consid-
it is
his.
For. let it be supposed that the soil belongs to no one. Then I would be entitled to remove every moveable thing found upon it from its place, even to total loss of it. in order to occupy that place, without infringing thereby on the freedom of any other: there being, by the hypothesis, no possessor of it at all. But everything
that I can exclude every other possessor
that can be destroyed, such as a tree, a house,
the private use of the thing (jus contra
and such like moveable and
libet
hujus rei
supposing such a common collective possession, cannot be conceived how. when I am not in actual possession of a thing. I could be injured it
or wronged by others who are in possession of it and use it. By an individual act of my own will I cannot oblige any other person to abstain from the use of a thing in respect of which he would otherwise be under no obligation; and. accordingly, such an obligation can only arise from the collective will of all united in a relation of common possession. Otherwise. I would have to think of a right in a thing, as if the thing has an obligation towards me. and as if the right as against every possessor of it had to be derived from this obligation in the thing, which is an absurb way of representing the subject. Further, by the term real right (jus reale) is meant not only the right in a thing (jus in re),
—
:
as regards its matter at least if
we
moved without
be
call a
destruction of
immoveable, the mine and thine derstood as applying to that which is adherent to
its it
—
is
thing which cannot its
in
form an
it is
not un-
substance, but to
and which does not
essentially constitute the thing itself.
Every Part of the Soil may be Originally Acquired; and the Principle of the Possibility of such Acquisition is the Original Community of the Soil Generally
13.
The
first
clause of this proposition
is
founded
upon the postulate of the
practical reason (§ 2)
the second
by the following proof. any juridi-
All
men
is
established
are originally and before
cal act of will in rightful possession of the soil:
that
is.
they have a right to be wherever nature them without their will.
or chance has placed
the laws
Possession (possessio), which is to be distinguished from residential settlement (sedes> as a
which relate to the real mine and thine. It is. however, evident that a man entirely alone upon
voluntary, acquired, and permanent possession, becomes common possession, on account of the
but also the constitutive principle of
all
— THE SCIENCE
412 connection with each other of
all
the places on
the surface of the earth as a globe. For, had the
surface of the earth been an infinite plain, men could have been so dispersed upon it that they
might not have come into any necessary communion with each other, and a state of social community would not have been a necessary
consequence of their existence upon the earth. Now that possession proper to all men upon the earth,
which
is
prior to
common
The conception
of such an original,
possession of things ence, nor as
their particular jurid-
all
constitutes an original possession in (communio possessionis originaria).
acts,
ical
is it
is
practical relation with each other.
will
an obligation which is contingent in itself. This requires an omnilateral or universal will, which is not contingent, but a priori, and which is therefore necessarily united and legislative. Only in accordance with such a principle can there be agreement of the active free-will of each individual with the freedom of all, and consequently rights in general, or even the possibility of an external mine and thine.
common
not derived from experi-
Only within a Civil Constitution that Anything can be Acquired Peremptorily, whereas in the State of Nature Acquisition can only be Provisory
15. It is
dependent on conditions of time, indemon-
community of posHence it is a practical
strable fiction of a primaeval
session in actual history.
A
civil
constitution
is
conception of reason, involving in itself the only principle according to which men may use the place they happen to occupy on the surface of
contingent. Hence, there
the earth, in accordance with laws of right.
acquisition
The
14.
is
Occupancy ,
as
beginning the physical appropriation of a corporeal thing in space (possessionis physicae), can accord with the law of the external freedom of all, under no other condition than
being at
its
priority in respect of time. In this rela-
that of
its
tion
must have the characteristic of
it
a first act
way of taking possession, as a free exercise will. The activity of will, however, as deter-
in the
of
real natural
—
mining that the thing in this case a definite separate place on the surface of the earth shall be mine, being an act of appropriation, can-
upon an soil.
tion than individual or unilateral (voluntas unis.
propria).
Now, occupancy
quisition of an external object act of will.
The
is
the ac-
by an individual
original acquisition of such an
object as a limited portion of the fore only be accomplished
soil
can there-
by an act of occupa-
tion.
The
possibility of this
mode
of acquisition
cannot be intuitively apprehended by pure reason in any way, nor established by its principles, but
is
an immediate consequence from the pos-
tulate of the practical reason. tical
The
will as prac-
reason, however, cannot justify external
acquisition otherwise than only in so far as
it
is
included in an absolutely authoritative with which it is united by implication; or. in other words, only in so far as it is contained within a union of the wills of all who come into itself will,
right,
is
subjected.
original
community
as
of right in
founded to the
all
And because a possession in the phenomenal
sphere of sense can only be subordinated to that is in accordance with rational
possession which
conceptions of right, there must correspond to this physical act of possession a rational
by elimination
of taking possession
of
mode
all
the
empirical conditions in space and time. This
form of possession establishes the prop"whatever I bring under my power
rational
osition that
accordance with laws of external freedom, and will that it shall be mine, becomes mine."
in
The
not be otherwise in the case of original acquisilateralis
law of is
reality
its
connected with it a to which all external
is
(apprehensio physicd)
possession
act of taking possession (apprehensio)
The
objectively necessary
as a duty, although subjectively
The empirical title of acquisition has been shown to be constituted by the taking physical
Juridical Act of this Original
Acquisition
indi-
applies to
all
the case with the imaginary and
is
For an
a —and the same —cannot impose on dual or other particular
vidual, unilateral will
only
rational title of acquisition can therefore originally in the idea of the will of
lie
all
united implicitly, or necessarily to be united,
which
is
here tacitly assumed as an indispensable
condition (conditio sine qua non). For by a sin-
cannot be imposed upon others an by which they would not have been otherwise bound. But the fact formed by wills actually and universally united in a legislation
gle will there
obligation
constitutes the civil state of society. Hence,
it
only in conformity with the idea of a civil state of society, or in reference to it and its realiis
zation, that anything external can be acquired. realized, and in anticipawhich would otherwise be derived, is consequently only provisory. The acquisition which is peremptory finds place only
Before such a state tion of
it,
is
acquisition,
in the civil state.
Nevertheless, such provisory acquisition
is
OF RIGHT real acquisition. For, according to the postulate
of the juridically practical reason, the possibil-
whatever state men may one another, and
ity of acquisition in
happen to be
living beside
therefore in the state of nature as well,
is
a prin-
And in accordance with every one is justified or entitled to exercise that compulsion by which it alone ciple of private right. this principle,
becomes possible to pass out of the state of nature and to enter into that state of civil society which alone can make all acquisition peremptory.
It is a
question as to
how
far the right of tak-
ing possession of the soil extends.
The answer
is,
under one's power extends; that is, just as far as he who wills to appropriate it can defend it, as if the soil were to say: "If you cannot protect me, neither can you command me." In this way the controversy about what constitutes a free or closed sea must be decided. Thus, within the range of a cannon-shot no one has a right to intrude on the coast of a country that already
So far as the capability of having
it
belongs to a certain state, in order to fish or gather amber on the shore, or such like. Further, the question
by
is
put, "Is cultivation of the
sary in order to
its
form a separation between them. Again: "May one have a thing as his, on a soil of which no one has appropriated any part as his own?" Yes. In Mongolia, for example, any one may let lie whatever baggage he has. or bring back the horse that has run
acquisition?" No. For, as
away from him
into his possession as
own, because the whole soil belongs to the people generally, and the use of it accordingly belongs to every individual. But that any one can have a moveable thing on the soil of another his
own
as his
is
only possible by contract. Finally,
"May one of two neighbouring nations or tribes resist another when attempting to impose upon them a certain mode there
is
the question:
of using a particular soil; as, for instance, a tribe of hunters
making such an attempt
in rela-
tion to a pastoral people, or the latter to agricul-
and such like?" Certainly. For the mode which such peoples or tribes may settle themselves upon the surface of the earth, provided they keep within their own boundaries, is a matter of mere pleasure and choice on their own part (res merae jacultatis). turists in
soil,
building, agriculture, drainage, etc., neces-
413
belong to them both in common, and would not be without an owner (res nullius), just because it would be used by both in order to ally
er,
As a further question, it may be asked whethwhen neither nature nor chance, but merely
our
own
will,
brings us into the neighbourhood
these processes as forms of specification are
of a people that gives no promise of a prospect
only accidents, they do not constitute objects of immediate possession and can only belong to the
of entering into civil union with us, we are to be considered entitled in any case to proceed with force in the intention of founding such
subject in so far as the substance of
been already recognized as question of the
first
his.
them has
When
it
is
a
acquisition of a thing, the
cultivation or modification of
it
by labour forms
nothing more than an external sign of the fact that it has been taken into possession, and this can be indicated by many other signs that cost less trouble.
Again:
"May any
one be hindered
in the act of taking possession, so that neither
one nor other of two competitors shall acquire the right of priority, and the soil in consequence may remain for all time free as belonging to no one?" Not at all. Such a hindrance cannot be allowed to take place, because the second of the two, in order to be enabled to do this, would himself have to be upon some neighbouring soil, where he also, in this manner, could be hindered from being, and such absolute hindering would involve a contradiction. It would, however, be quite consistent with the right of occupation, in
a union, and bringing into a juridical state such
men
American Indians, the HotHollanders; or and the case is not much better whether we may establish colonies by deceptive purchase, and so become owners of their soil, and, in general, as the savage
tentots,
and the
New
—
—
without regard to their first possession, make use at will of our superiority in relation to them? Further, may it not be held that Nature herself, as abhorring a vacuum, seems to demand such a procedure, and that large regions in other continents,
that
are
now
magnificently peopled,
would otherwise have remained unpossessed by civilized inhabitants and might have for ever remained thus, so that the end of creation would have so far been frustrated? It is almost unnecessary to answer; for all
it is
this flimsy veil of injustice,
to the Jesuitism of
making
easy to see through
which just amounts good end justify
a
the case of a certain intervening piece of the
any means. This mode of acquiring the
unused as a neutral ground for the separation of two neighbouring states; but under such a condition, that ground would actu-
therefore, to be repudiated.
soil,
to let
it lie
The
soil is,
indefiniteness of external acquirable ob-
jects in respect of their quantity, as well as
THE SCIENCE
4 i4 their quality,
mary
makes the problem them one of the to solve. There must, however, be of the sole pri-
external acquisition of
most difficult some one first acquisition of an external object; for
every Acquisition
Hence, the problem
is
cannot be derivative. not to be given up as in-
soluble or in itself as impossible. If
by reference contract
human
is
tablishment of the civil state. But if they are opposed to entering into the civil state, as long as this opposition lasts
would
it
still
the civil state
Exposition of the Conception of a Primary Acquisition of the Soil
men
common
are originally in a
possession of the
soil
collective
of the whole earth (com-
and they have naturally each a will to use it (lex justi). But on account of the opposition of the free will of one to that of the other in the sphere of action, which is inevitable by nature, all use of the soil would be prevented did not every will contain at the same
munio fundi
originaria),
time a law for the regulation of the relation of all wills in action, according to which a particular possession can be determined to every one
upon the common soil. This is the juridical law (lex juridica). But the distributive law of the mine and thine, as applicable to each individual on the soil, according to the axiom of external freedom, cannot proceed otherwise than from a primarily united will a priori which does not presuppose any juridical act as requisite for this union. This Law can only take form in the civil
—
i
lex justitiae distributiv ae)
;
as
be-
it,
founded upon a duty.
We
have found the
it is
in this
of acquisition in a
title
community
of the soil, under an external acquisition in space; and the mode of acquisition is contained
conditions
of
in the empirical fact of taking possession (appre-
hensio), conjoined with the will to have an external object as one's own. It to unfold,
is
further necessary
from the principles of the pure
ically practical reason involved in the tion, the juridical acquisition
ject
—
that
is,
the external
jurid-
concep-
proper of an ob-
mine and thine
that
from the two previous conditions, as rational possession (possessio noumenon). The juridical conception of the external mine follows
and
thine, so far as
it
involves the category of
substance, cannot by "that which
me" mean merely
is
external to
"in a place other than that in
which I am"; for it is a rational conception. As under the conceptions of the reason only intellectual conceptions can be embraced, the expression in question can only signify "something that is different and distinct from me" according to the idea of a non-empirical possession through,
as
it
were, a continuous activity in taking posses-
sion of an external object; and
it
involves only
and what
my power, which indicates the connection of an object with
the constitution of Right. In reference to this
myself, as a subjective condition of the possi-
state alone that the united
mines what is
is
universal original the
All
the effect of
Deduction of the Conception of the Original Primary Acquisition
17.
re-
main but provisional. 1 6.
all
solved
it is
extended so as to include the whole
under
carries
cause the advance from the state of nature to
to the original contract, unless this
race, acquisition
it
a guaranteed juridical acquisition with
state,
is
however
right,
—and —
what
common
is
will deter-
rightful,
prior to
its
establishment
and in view of it it is provisorily a duty for every one to proceed according to the law of external acquisition; and accordingly it is a juridical procedure on the part of the will to lay every one under obligation to recognise the act of possessing and appropriating, although it be
the notion of having something in
bility of
making use of
intellectual
Now we
it.
This forms a purely
conception of the understanding.
can leave out or abstract from the sen-
sible conditions of possession, as relations of a
person to objects which have no obligation. This process of elimination just gives the rational
and it is such by an obligation in
relation of a person to persons;
only unilaterally. Hence a provisory acquisition of the soil, with all its juridical consequences, is
that he can bind
possible in the state of nature.
precedes the juridical state, and as merely in-
conformable to the axiom of freedom, the postulate of right, and the universal legislation of the common will, conceived as united a priori. This is therefore the rational intelligible possession of things as by pure right, although they are objects of sense.
it is not yet peremptory; and this favour does not extend farther than the date of the consent of the other co-operators in the es-
tation, or transformation generally, of a portion
Such an acquisition, however, requires and also obtains the favour of a permissive law (lex permissiva),
in
respect of the determination of
the limits of juridically possible possession. For it
them
all
reference to the use of things through his act of will, so far as it is
troductory to
It is
evident that the
first
modification limi-
OF RIGHT of the
cannot of
soil
furnish a
itself
title to its
acquisition, since possession of an accident does not form a ground for legal possession of the substance. Rather, conversely, the inference as
mine and thine must be drawn from own-
to the
ership of the substance according to the rule: Accessarium sequitur suum principale. Hence
one who has spent labour on a piece of ground that was not already his own. has lost his effort and work to the former owner. This position is so evident of itself that the old opinion to the opposite effect, that is still spread far and wide.
can hardly be ascribed to any other than the prevailing illusion which unconsciously leads to
415
But as there is no site for occupation upon the wide sea itself, possible possession cannot be extended so far. and the open sea is free (mare liberum) But in the case of men. or things that belong to them, becoming stranded on the clausuni).
.
shore, since the fact
is
not voluntary,
it
cannot
be regarded by the owner of the shore as giving him a right of acquisition. For shipwreck is not an act of will, nor is its result a lesion to him;
and things which soil,
as
still
may have come
thus upon his
belonging to some one, are not to
be treated as being without an owner or res nullius. On the other hand, a river, so far as possession of the
bank reaches, may be
originally
the personification of things; and, then, as if they could be bound under an obligation by the
acquired, like any other piece of ground, under
labour bestowed upon them to be at the service of the person who does the labour, to regard them as his by immediate right. Otherwise it is
sion of both
probable that the natural question cussed
— already
dis-
—would not have been passed over with
so light a tread, namely:
"How
is
a right in a
thing possible?" For, right as against every pos-
means only
sible possessor of a thing
the claim
of a particular will to the use of an object so far as
it
may
be included in the all-comprehending
universal will, and can be thought as in har-
mony
with
its
law.
As regards bodies
situated
upon
a piece of
ground which is already mine, if they otherwise belong to no other person, they belong to me without my requiring any particular juridical act for the purpose of this acquisition: they are mine not facto, but lege. For they may be regarded as accidents inhering in the substance of the soil, and they are thus mine jure rei meae. To this category also belongs everything which is so connected with anything of mine that it cannot be separated from what is mine without altering it substantially. Examples of this are gilding on an object, mixture of a material belonging to me with other things, alluvial deposit, or even alteration of the adjoining bed of a stream or river in my favour so as to produce an increase of my land, etc.
must
By
the
same
principles, the question
whether the acquir-
also be decided as to
may
extend farther than the existing land, so as even to include part of the bed of the sea, with the right to fish on my own shores, to gather amber and such like. So far as I have the
able soil
my own site, as the my soil from the at-
mechanical capability from place I occupy, to secure
tack of others
—and.
therefore, as far as
—
cannon
can carry from the shore all is included in my possession, and the sea is thus far closed {mare
the above restrictions, its
by one who
is
in posses-
banks.
Property
An
external object, which, in respect of
its
substance can be claimed by some one as his own, is called the property {dominium) of that
person to whom all the rights in it as a thing belong like the accidents inhering in a substance and which, therefore, he as the proprie-
— —
tor (dominus) can dispose of at will (jus disponendi de re sua). But from this it follows at once that such an object can only be a corporeal thing towards which there is no direct personal obligation. Hence a man may be his own master (sui juris) but not the proprietor of himself (sui dominus), so as to be able to dispose of himself at will, to say nothing of the possibility of such a relation to other men; because he is responsible to humanity in his own person. This point, however, as belonging to the right of
such, rather than to that
humanity as men,
of individual
would not be discussed at its proper place here, but is only mentioned incidentally for the better elucidation of what has just been said. It may be further observed that there may be two full proprietors of one and the same thing, without there being a mine and thine in common, but only in so far as they are
common
possessors of
what belongs only to one of them as his own. In such a case the whole possession, without the use of the thing, belongs to one only of the coproprietors (condomini) longs
all
session.
;
while to the others be-
the use of the thing along with
The former
as
its
pos-
the direct proprietor
(dominus directus) therefore, restricts the latter as the proprietor in use (dominus utilis) to the condition of a certain continuous performance, .
with reference to the thing ing him in the use of it.
itself,
without limit-
— THE SCIENCE
4i6 Section 1 8.
Nature and Acquisition of Personal Right
possession of the active free-will of another person, as the power to determine it by my will to a certain action, according to laws of
The
is a form of right relating to the exmine and thine, as affected by the cauof another. It is possible to have several
freedom, ternal sality
such rights
in reference to the
to different persons.
tem
of laws, according to
possession, is
The
is
same person or
principle of the sys-
which
I
can be in such
that of personal right,
The two
;
forms of concluding the transaction, are promise (promissum) and acceptance (acceptatio). For an offer cannot constitute a promise before it can be judged that the thing offered (oblatum) is something that is agreeable to the party to whom it is offered, and this much is shown by the first two declarations; but by them alone there
is
nothing as yet acquired.
Further,
it
is
neither
by
the particular will
of the promiser nor that of the acceptor that
The acquisition of a personal right can never be primary or arbitrary; for such a mode of acquiring it would not be in accordance with the harmony
acts.
preparatory acts, as forms of treating in the transaction, are offer (oblatio) and approval (approbatio) the two constitutive acts, as the
and there
only one such principle.
principle of the
and two of them constitutive
acts,
Principles of Personal Right
II.
of the
freedom of
my
with the freedom of every other, and it would therefore be wrong. Nor can such a right will
be acquired by means of any unjust act of another (facto injusti alterius), as being itself contrary to right; for if such a wrong as it im-
the property of the former passes over to the latter.
This
by the combined
effected only
is
or united wills of both, and consequently so far only as the will of both
declared at the
is
same time or simultaneously. Now. such simultaneousness is impossible by empirical acts of declaration, which can only follow each other in
time and are never actually simultaneous. if I have promised, and another person is
For
plies
now merely
mand
before actual acceptance, however short
were perpetrated on me, and I could desatisfaction from the other, in accordance with right, yet in such a case I would only be entitled to maintain undiminished what was mine, and not to acquire anything more than what I formerly had. Acquisition by means of the action of another, to which I determine his will according to laws of right, is therefore always derived from what that other has as his own. This derivation, as a juridical act, cannot be effected by a mere negative relinquishment or renunciation of what is his (per derelictionem aut renunciationem) because such a negative act would only amount to a cessation of his right, and not to the acquirement of a right on the part of another. It is therefore only by positive transference (translatio) or conveyance, that a personal right can be acquired; and this is only possible by means of a common will, through which objects come into the power of one or other, so that as one renounces a particular thing which he holds under the common right, the same ob;
,
ject
when accepted by another, in consequence will, becomes his. Such
may
be, I
far
retract
free; and,
still
tor, for the
self
willing to accept, during the interval
my
offer,
because
on the other
I
it
may
am
thus
side, the
accep-
same reason, may likewise hold him-
not to be bound, up
till
the
moment
of ac-
ceptance, by his counter-declaration following
upon the promise. The external formalities or solemnities (solemnia) on the conclusion of a contract
—such
as shaking hands or breaking a
straw (stipula) laid hold of by two persons and all the various modes of confirming the declarations on either side, prove in fact the
embarrassment of the contracting parties as to how and in what way they may represent declarations, which are always successive, as existing simultaneously at the same moment and these forms fail to do this. They are, by their very ;
nature, acts necessarily following each other in time, so that
when
the one act
is,
the other
not yet or is no longer. It is only the philosophical transcendental deduction of the conception of acquisition by contract that can remove all these difficulties. In a
either
is
my
of a positive act of
juridical external relation,
transference of the property of one to another
of the free-will of another, as the cause that
is
termed its alienation. The act of the united two persons, by which what belonged to one passes to the other, constitutes contract.
determined
wills of
first
it
taking possession
to a certain act,
empirically by
is
conceived at
means of the declaration
and counter-declaration of the
free-will of
each
of us in time, as the sensible conditions of tak19.
Acquisition by Contract
In every contract there are four juridical acts of will involved; two of them being preparatory
ing possession;
and the two
juridical acts
must
necessarily be regarded as following one another in time.
But because
this
relation,
viewed as
— OF RIGHT juridical,
is
purely rational in itself, the will as
a law-giving faculty of reason represents this possession as intelligible or rational (possessio noumenon), in accordance with conceptions of
417
sion.
I
have become the richer
by the
(locupletior)
in possession
acquisition of an active
upon the freedom and capability of another. This my
obligation that I can bring to bear
however,
only a personal right, valid
freedom and under abstraction of those empiriAnd now, the two acts of promise and acceptance are not regarded as follow-
right,
manner of a pactum re initum, as proceeding from a common will, which is expressed by the term "at the same time," or "simultaneous," and the object
of his will, so that he shall perform something
cal conditions.
ing one another in time, but, in the
promised
(promissum)
is
under
represented,
is
only to the effect of acting upon a particular physical person and specially upon the causality for me. It
not a real right upon that moral
is
person, which
identified with the idea of the
is
united will of all viewed a priori, and through which alone I can acquire a right valid against
elimination of empirical conditions, as acquired
every possessor of the thing. For,
according to the law of the pure practical reason.
that
That
this is the true
and only possible deduc-
tion of the idea of acquisition sufficiently attested
by contract
is
by the laborious yet always
all
The
transfer or transmission of
to another
by
what
the categorical imperative implied; just as
or the acceptor, but their united will in
writers
—
it
is
of the object
an object
it would thus be acquired origiwhich is contrary to the idea of a contract. This continuity, however, implies that it is not the particular will of either the promiser
nally,
tional syllogisms that in order to construct a
hence
—
must take three lines so far an anaof which three lines any two together must be greater than the third a synthetical proposition, and like the former a priori.
—
—
a postulate of the pure reason that
It is
we
would acquire a thing that had no
for. otherwise, I
in this state as
that transfers
triangle I
moment
not interrupted for a
is
during this act;
impossible for the geometrician to prove by ra-
lytical proposition
mine
the law of continuity (lex continui). Possession
possessor, and
of
striving
is
contract, takes place according to
on jurisprudence such as Moses Mendelssohn in his Jerusalem to adduce a proof of its rational possibility. The question is put thus: "Why ought I to keep my Promise?" For it is assumed as understood by all that I ought to do so. It is, however, absolutely impossible to give any further proof of futile
in this
it is
right in a thing consists.
what
is
mine
to
common,
another.
And
not accomplished in such a manner that the promiser first relinquishes (derelinquit) his possession for the benefit of another, it is
or renounces his right (renunciat), and there-
upon the other or conversely.
at the
The
same time enters upon
transfer (translatio)
is
it;
there-
ought to abstract from all the sensible conditions of space and time in reference to the conception of right; and the theory of the possibility of such abstraction from these conditions, without taking away the reality of the posses-
parabolic path of a projectile the object on
sion, just constitutes the transcendental
ing,
tion of the conception of acquisition tract.
It is quite akin to
deduc-
by con-
What
is
Acquired by Contract?
But what is that, designated as external, which I acquire by contract? As it is only the causality of the active will of another, in respect of the performance of something promised to
me,
I
do not immediately acquire thereby an
external thing, but an act of the will in question, whereby a thing is brought under my power so that I
make
mine.
By
at the
same time
reaching
its
moment
as at the
and as
highest point
to both, just as in the
may
be regarded for a
same time both rising and fallthus passing in fact from the ascend-
ing to the falling motion.
what was presented
under the last title, as the theory of acquisition by occupation of the external object. 20.
fore an act in which the object belongs for a
moment
21.
A
thing
is
Acceptance and Delivery not acquired in a case of contract
by the acceptance (acceptatio) of the promise, but only by the delivery (traditio) of the object promised. For all promise is relative to performance; and if what was promised is a thing, the performance cannot be executed otherwise than by an act whereby the acceptor is put by the promiser into possession of the thing; and this is delivery. Before the delivery and the reception of the thing, the performance
the contract, therefore,
of the act required has not yet taken place; the
acquire the promise of another, as distinguished from the thing promised; and yet some-
the other and, consequently, has not been ac-
it
I
thing
is
thereby added to
my having and
posses-
thing has not yet passed from the one person to
quired by that other.
Hence the
right arising
— THE SCIENCE
4l8
from
a contract
only becomes a
A
only a personal right; and
is
by
real right
it
delivery.
contract upon which delivery immediately (pactum re initum) excludes any inter-
follows
between
val of time
its
cution; and as such
conclusion and
exe-
its
requires no further par-
it
one
will take a thing destined for the use of
an-
On
the
other into his charge at his
own
contrary, a special contract
necessary for this
is
arrangement, according to which the alienator its owner during a
of a thing continues to be
must bear the
certain definite time, and
whatever
may happen
to
it;
ticular act in the future
can only be regarded by the
may
when he has delayed
is
by which one person what is his. But if there agreed upon or indefinite
transfer to another
a time
—
definite
—
risk.
beyond the date
at
risk of
while the acquirer seller as the
owner
to enter into possession
which he agreed to take de-
between them for the delivery, the question then arises whether the thing has already before
livery. Prior to the possessory act, therefore, all
become the acceptor's by the con-
sonal right; and the acceptor can acquire an ex-
that time
tract, so that his right is a right in the thing;
or
whether a further special contract regarding the delivery alone must be entered upon, so that the right that is acquired by mere acceptance is
only a personal right, and thus
come
that
That
must be determined according to alternative will be clear from what
follows.
conclude a contract about a thing such as a horse and that I wish to acquire that I take it immediately into my stable, or otherwise into my possession; then it is mine
Suppose
I
But
if
my
and
(vi pacti re initi), thing.
—
—
I leave
it
right
in the
is
a right in the
hands of the
seller
without arranging with him specially in whose physical possession or holding (detentio) this thint: shall
be before
my
taking possession of
it
(apprehensio) and consequently, before the ac,
change of possession, the horse is not yet mine; and the right which I acquire is only a right against a particular person namely, the seller of the horse to be put into possession of the object (poscendi traditionem) as the sub-
tual
—
jective condition of
My right
is
from the
seller the
(praestatio) thing.
any use of
Now,
to put if
performance of
me
re
at
his
my
will.
demand promise
into possession of the
the contract does not contain the
condition of delivery at the
pactum
it
thus only a personal right to
same time
—
—and consequently an
initum
val of time intervenes
as a
inter-
22.
Nature of Personal Right of a Real Kind is
the right to
the possession of an external object as a thing,
and to the use of it as a person. The mine and thine embraced under this right relate specially to the family and household; and the relations involved are those of free beings in reciprocal real interaction
with each other. Through their
and influence as persons upon one another, in accordance with the principle of external freedom as the cause of it, they form a society composed as a whole of members standrelations
community with each other
ing in
as persons:
and this constitutes the household. The mode in which this social status is acquired by individuals, and the functions which prevail within it, proceed neither by arbitrary individual action (facto), nor by mere contract (pacto), but by law (lege). And this law as being not only a right,
but also as constituting possession
in ref-
erence to a person, is a right rising above all mere real and personal right. It must, in fact, form the right of humanity in our own person; and, as such,
it
has as
its
consequence a natural
permissive law, by the favour of which such acquisition
becomes possible
to us.
between the conclusion 23.
object of acquisition, I cannot obtain possession
The
it
only a per-
delivery.
Personal right of a real kind
of the contract and the taking possession of the of
by
is
Section III. Principles of Personal Right that is Real in Kind. (Jus Realiter Personale)
the relation the latter
acquired by the contract
ternal thing only
does not be-
it
a right in the thing until delivery?
is
during this interval otherwise than by ex-
ercising the particular juridical activity called
is,
What
is
Acquired
acquisition that
is
in the
Household?
founded upon
as regards its objects, threefold.
this
law
The man
acquires a wife; the husband and wife acquire children, constituting a family; and the family
a possessory act (actum possessorium), which constitutes a special contract. This act consists in my saying. "I will send to fetch the horse," to which the seller has to agree. For it is not
acquire domestics. All these objects, while acquirable, are inalienable; and the right of possession in these objects is the most strictly per»
self-evident or universally reasonable that
sonal of
any
all rights.
OF RIGHT
The Rights
419
of the Family as a Domestic Society
human organism
sition of a part of the
Title
I.
24.
Conjugal Right. (Husband and Wife) The Natural Basis of Marriage
The domestic riage,
founded on mar-
relations are
and marriage
is
founded upon the natural
reciprocity or intercommunity
(commercium)
of the sexes. 1 This natural union of the sexes proceeds according to the mere animal nature
(vaga libido, venus vulgivaga, fornicatio), or according to the law. The latter is marriage
(matrimonium) which
the union of two per-
is
,
sons of different sex for life-long reciprocal possession of their sexual faculties. The end of producing and educating children may be regarded as always the end of nature in implanting mutual desire and inclination in the sexes; but it is not necessary for the rightfulness of marriage
on account of
when
the production of children ceased.
And even assuming
that enjoyment in the re-
endowments
an end of marriage, yet the contract of marriage is not on that account a matter of arbitrary will, but is a contract necessary in its nature by the law of humanity. In other words, if a man and a woman have the will to enter on reciprocal enjoyment in accordance with their sexual nature, they must necessarily marry each other; and this necessity is in accordance with the juridical laws of pure reason. ciprocal use of the sexual
is
in relation to the other,
The Rational Right
—
—
ment other.
for which the one person
In
this
relation
the
is
is
the personal right thus acquired
is
individual
acquired by the other
same person
is,
at the
same
time, real in kind; and this characteristic of
it
by the fact that if one of the married persons run away or enter into the possession of another, the other is entitled, at any time, and incontestably, to bring such a one back to the former relation, as if that person were a thing. is
established
26.
Monogamy and
Equality in Marriage
For the same reasons, the relation of the married persons to each other is a relation of equality as regards the mutual possession of their persons, as well as of their goods.
quently marriage
nogamy;
is
Conse-
only truly realized in
for in the relation of
mo-
polygamy the
who is given away on the one side, gains only a part of the one to whom that person is given up, and therefore becomes a mere res. person
But
they have severrenounce the use of any part of them, although only by a special contract. in respect of their goods,
ally the right to
From
the principle thus stated, is
it
also follows
as little capable of being
a contract as this latter relation would imply,
only possible under the one condition,
that as the one person
not only permissible
enjoy-
makes himself a res, which is contrary to the right of humanity in his own person. This, however,
is
a usus
given up to the
human
follows that
brought under a contract of right as the hiring of a person on any one occasion, in the way of a pactum fornicationis. For, as regards such
of Marriage
as For, this natural commercium membrorum sexualium alterius is an
it
under the condition of marriage, but is further only really possible under that condition. But
that concubinage 25.
being,
same time the
the surrender and acceptation of, or by, one sex
who marry
the marriage would be dissolved of itself
unity, at the
acquisition of the whole person,
should set this before themselves as the end of their union, otherwise that those
its
must be admitted by all that any one who might enter into it could not be legally held to the fulfilment of their promise if they wished to
it
resile
from
it.
And
as regards the former, a
contract of concubinage would also
pactum turpe; because
fall
as a
as a contract of the hire
also equally acquires
(locatio, conductio), of a part for the use of
the other reciprocally, and thus regains and re-
another, on account of the inseparable unity of
as a res, that
establishes the rational personality. 1
Commercium
sexuale est usus
The
membrorum
acquiet jacul-
tatum sexualium alterius. This "usus" is either natural, by which human beings may reproduce their own kind, or unnatural, which, again, refers either to a person of the same sex or to an animal of another species than man. These transgressions of all law, as crimina carnis contra naturam, are even "not to be named"; and, as wrongs against all humanity in the person, they cannot be saved, by any limitation or exception whatever, from entire reprobation.
members of a person, any one entering into such a contract would be actually surrendering the
as a res to the arbitrary will of another.
Hence
any party may annul a contract like this if entered into with any other, at any time and at pleasure; and that other would have no ground, in the circumstances, to
complain of a lesion of
The same holds
likewise of a morganatic or "left-hand" marriage, contracted in his right.
— THE SCIENCE
420
order to turn the inequality in the social status of the two parties to advantage in the way of
supremacy of the one
establishing the social
over the other; for, in fact, such a relation is not really different from concubinage, according to the principles of natural right,
and therefore
does not constitute a real marriage. Hence the question may be raised as to whether it is not contrary to the equality of married persons
when
the law says in
any way of the husband
and reciprocally manner, from the fact of procreation in the union thus constituted, there follows the duty of preserving and rearing children as the products of this union. Accord-
to acquire one another really
by marriage. In
like
ingly, children, as persons,
have, at the same
time, an original congenital right
from mere hereditary
right
care of their parents
till
—
—distinguished
to be reared
by the
they are capable of
maintaining themselves; and this provision be-
in relation to the wife,
comes immediately
so that he
particular juridical act being required to de-
"he shall be thy master," represented as the one who com-
is
mands, and she is the one who obeys. This, howcannot be regarded as contrary to the natural equality of a human pair, if such legal
termine
supremacy
based only upon the natural su-
is
periority of the faculties of the husband compared with the wife, in the effectuation of the
to
right
ical process. it is
is
a person, and
it
And
hence, in the practical relation,
quite a correct and even a necessary idea
by
interest of the household,
to regard the act of generation as a process
which a person is brought without his consent into the world and placed in it by the respon-
is
sible free will of others.
This
act, therefore, at-
taches an obligation to the parents to
—
make
—
their
power goes contented with the condition thus acquired. Hence parents children
27.
thus produced
is
impossible to think of a being endowed with personal freedom as produced merely by a phys-
is
command
and if the based merely upon this fact. For this right may thus be deduced from the very duty of unity and equality in relation to the end involved.
common
by law, without any
it.
For what
ever,
theirs
Fulfilment of the Contract of Marriage
as far as their
a manner, a
The contract of marriage is completed only by conjugal cohabitation. A contract of two
cannot regard their child
persons of different sex, with the secret understanding either to abstain from conjugal co-
with freedom cannot be so regarded. Nor, consequently, have they a right to destroy it as if
habitation or with the consciousness on either side of incapacity for it, is a simulated contract;
it
it
does not constitute a marriage, and
it
may
dissolved by either of the parties at will. But
be if
the incapacity only arises after marriage, the right of the contract
is
not annulled or dimin-
a contingency that cannot be legally
by
ished
thing of their
own making;
as,
in
for a being
endowed
were their own property, or even to leave it have brought a being into the world who becomes in fact a citizen of the world, and they have placed that being in a state which they cannot be left to treat with indifference, even according to the natural concep-
to chance; because they
tions of right.
blamed.
The
We
acquisition of a spouse, either as a hus-
band or as a
— that
wife,
is
therefore not constituted
—
that
cannot even conceive
God can
how
it
create free beings; for
is it
possible
appears
by cohabitation without a preceding contract; nor even pacto by a mere
as
contract of marriage, without subsequent co-
the chain of natural necessity, and that, there-
facto
is,
habitation; but only lege, that
consequence two persons on the basis other, which
is,
of the obligation that
as a juridical is
formed by
their future actions,
mined by that fore,
first act,
being predeter-
would be contained
in
free. But as men we are proved by the categorical imthe moral and practical relation as
they could not be
free in fact, as
is
perative in
of a reciprocal possession of each
an authoritative decision of reason; yet reason cannot make the possibility of such a relation of cause to effect conceivable from the theoretical point of view, because they are both suprasensible. All that can be demanded of reason under these conditions would merely be to prove that there is no contradiction involved in the conception of a creation of free beings; and this may be done by showing that contradiction only arises when, along with the category of causality, the condition of time is transferred
possession at the
same time
is
only
by the reciprocal usus facul-
tatum
st'xualiiim alterius.
Title
II.
Parental Right. (Parent and Child)
The Relation of Parent and Child
From
—
the duty of man towards himself that towards the humanity in his own person there thus arises a personal right on the part of
is,
the
all
entering into a sexual union solely
effected in reality
28.
—
if
members
of the opposite sexes, as persons,
OF RIGHT This conimplying that the cause of an effect
421 a personal right that
constituted
to the relation of suprasensible things.
kind, that
dition, as
and exercised after the manner of a
must precede the
effect as its reason, is inevita-
ble in thinking the relation of objects of sense
and if this conception of causality were to have objective reality given to it in the theoretical bearing, it would also have to be referred to the suprasensible sphere. But the contradiction vanishes when the pure category, apart from any sensible conditions, is applied from the moral and practical point of view, and to one another;
consequently as in a non-sensible relation to the conception of creation. The philosophical jurist will not regard this investigation, when thus carried back even to the ultimate principles of the transcendental philosophy, as an unnecessary subtlety in a met-
It
is
is.
therefore evident that the
-
of a per-
and personal right, the division of two being not complete. For, if the right of the parents to the children were treated as if it were merely a real right to a part of what belongs to their house, they could not found only upon the duty of the children to return to them in claiming them when they run away, but they would be then entitled to seize them and 'mpound them like things or runaway real
right
rights into these
cattle.
Title III Household Right. (Master and Servant)
and Right of the of a Household
30. Relation
doing justice in this inquiry to the
ultimate relations of the principles of right.
real right
title
sonal right of a real kind must necessarily be added, in the science of right, to the titles of
aphysic of morals, or as losing itself in aimless obscurity, when he takes into consideration the difficulty of
is
The
Master
children of the house, who, along with
the parents, constitute a family, attain majority,
The Rights of
29.
the Parent
necessarily arises the right of the parents to the
and become masters of themselves (majoreneven without a contract of release from their previous state of dependence,
management and
by
From
as its
the duty thus indicated, there further
it is itself
body
as
training of the child, so long
incapable of making proper use of
an organism, and of
mind
its
as an
understanding. This involves its nourishment and the care of its education. This includes, in general, the function of forming and developing it may be able in the future and advance itself, and also its moral culture and development, the guilt of neglecting it falling upon the parents. All this training is to be continued till the child reaches the period of emancipation (emancipatio) as the age
it
practically, that
to maintain
.
The parents then parental right to com-
nes, sui juris),
their actually attaining to the capability of
self-maintenance. This attainment arises, on the
one hand, as a state of natural majority, with the advance of years in the general course of nature; and, on the other hand, it takes form, as a state in accordance with their own natural condition. They thus acquire the right of being their own masters, without the interposition of any special juridical act, and therefore merely by law (lege) and they owe their parents nothing by way of legal debt for their education, just as the parents, on their side, are now re;
from their obligations to the children in same way. Parents and children thus gain or regain their natural freedom; and the domestic society, which was necessary according to
of practicable self-support.
leased
virtually renounce the
the
mand,
as well as all claim to
repayment for
their
previous care and trouble; for which care and trouble, after the process of education
is
com-
they can only appeal to the children, by of any claim, on the ground of the obliga-
plete,
way
tion of gratitude as a
From
duty of virtue.
the fact of personality in the children,
it further follows that they can never be regarded as the property of the parents, but only as belonging to them by way of being in their possession, like other things that are held apart from the possession of all others and that can
be brought back even against the will of the subjects. Hence the right of the parents is not a purely real right, and it is not alienable (jus personalissimum) But neither is it a merely .
personal right;
it
is
a personal right of a real
the law of right,
is
thus naturally dissolved.
however, may resolve to continue the household, but under another mode of
Both
parties,
obligation. It may assume the form of a relation between the head of the house, as its master, and the other members as domestic servants, male or female; and the connection between
them
in this
new regulated domestic economy
(societas herilis) tract.
The master
may
be determined by con-
of the house, actually or vir-
with the children, of themselves; or, if there be no children in the family, with other free persons constituting the membership of the household; and thus there is established tually, enters into contract
now become major and masters
THE SCIENCE
422
a domestic relationship not founded on social equality, but such that one commands as master, and another obeys as servant (imperantis et subjecti domestici).
The domestics or servants may then be regarded by the master of the household as thus
cumstances is not left merely to the master, but also competent to the servants, who ought never to be held in bondage or bodily servitude as slaves or serfs. Such a contract cannot, therefore, be concluded for life, but in all cases only for a definite period, within which one party
is
far his.
may
session of them, they belong to
connection. Children, however, including even
As regards the form or mode of his poshim as if by a real right; for if any of them run away, he is entitled to bring them again under his power by a unilateral act of his will. But as regards the matter of his
make
right, or the use
he
is
entitled to
of such persons as his domestics, he
is
not entitled to conduct himself towards them as
if
he was their proprietor or owner {dominus
servi)
;
because they are only subjected to his
power by contract, and by
a contract under cer-
tain definite restrictions. For a contract by which the one party renounced his whole freedom for the advantage of the other, ceasing thereby to be a person and consequently having no duty even to observe a contract, is selfcontradictory, and is therefore of itself null and void. The question as to the right of property in relation to one who has lost his legal personality by a crime does not concern us
here.
This contract, then, of the master of a house-
intimate to the other a termination of their
owing
to a crime, are
debt which he is bound to pay. Even a slave, if it were in his power, would be bound to educate his children
without being entitled to count and
reckon with them for the cost; and in view of his own incapacity for discharging this function, the
possessor of a slave, therefore, enters
upon the obligation which he has rendered the slave himself unable to
fulfil.
Here, again, as under the clear that there
is
first
two
titles, it is
a personal right of a real kind,
in the relation of the
master of a house to his
domestics. For he can legally
demand them
as
belonging to what is externally his, from any other possessor of them; and he is entitled to
them back
hold with his domestics, cannot be of such a
fetch
nature that the use of them could ever rightly become an abuse of them; and the judgement
reasons that
as to what constitutes use or abuse in such cir-
who
has become enslaved always free. For every man is born free, because he has at birth as yet broken no law; and even the cost of his education till his maturity cannot be reckoned as a
the children of one
to his house,
may have
led
even before the to run away,
them
and their particular right in the circumstances, have been juridically investigated.
Systematic Division of all the Rights Capable of Being Acquired by Contract is not a part, but the juridically necessary consequence of the contract. Considered again
ery,
31. Division of Contracts. Juridical
of It is
Money and
reasonable to
cal science of right shall
nitely determine the
a
demand
Conceptions
Book
subjectively, or as to whether the acquisition,
that a metaphysi-
completely and
members
defi-
of a logical divi-
conceptions a priori, and thus establish them in a genuine system. All empirical division, on the other hand, is merely fragmension of
its
tary partition, and
it
as to whether there
may
still
leaves us in uncertainty
not be more
members
required to complete the whole sphere of
the divided conception. A division that is made according to a principle a priori may be called, in
contrast to
all
empirical partitions, a dog-
matic division.
Every contract, regarded in itself objectively, consists of two juridical acts: the promise and its acceptance. Acquisition by the latter, unless it be a pactum re initum which requires deliv-
which ought to happen as a necessary consequence according to reason, will also follow, in fact, as a physical
consequence, it is evident that have no security or guarantee that this will happen by the mere acceptance of a promise. There is, therefore, something externally required connected with the mode of the conI
tract, in reference to the certainty of acquisition
by
and
can only be some element commeans necessary to the attainment of acquisition as realizing the purpose of the contract. And in his connection it;
this
pleting and determining the
and behoof, three persons are required to intervene the promiser, the acceptor, and the cau-
—
The importance of the cauevident; but by his intervention and his special contract with the promiser, the actioner or surety. tioner
is
.:
OF RIGHT worker under
ceptor gains nothing in respect of the object but the means of compulsion that enable him to obtain what is his own.
According to these rational principles of
3. Mandate (mandatum). The contract of mandate is an engagement to perform or execute a certain business in place and in
logi-
name
indicated here.
The cautionary
C.
.
fulfilment of the promise of another.
Onerous contracts, with reciprocal acquisition; or
3.
C. Cautionary contracts, with no acquisition,
but only guarantee of what has been already acquired. These contracts may be gratuitous
on the one side, and onerous on the other.
yet, at the
same time,
Personal
{pacta gratuita)
gratuitous contracts
Depositation (depositum), involving the
preservation of some valuable deposited in
Commodate (commodatum)
a
loan
of
the use of a thing;
Donation (donatio), a free
3.
B.
The onerous
gift.
contracts are contracts either
of permutation or of hiring.
Contracts of permutation or reciprocal exchange (permutatio late sic dicta) 1. Barter, or strictly real exchange (permutatio stride sic dicta). Goods exchanged I.
for goods. 2.
Purchase and
sale
(emptio venditio).
Goods exchanged for money. 3. Loan (mutuum). Loan of under condition of
its
kind: corn for corn, or
a
fungible
being returned in
money
for
money.
Contracts of letting and hiring (locatio conductio) 1. Letting of a thing on hire to another per-
II.
:
son
who
is
to
make
use of
it
(locatio rei).
If the thing can only be restored in specie,
These appear to be enand it may therefore seem questionable whether they are entitled to a place tirely
(translatio)
.
empirical,
a metaphysical science of right. For, in such
in
must be made according and hence the matter of the juridical relation, which may be conventional, ought to be left out of account, and only its form should be taken into consideration. Such conceptions may be illustrated by taking the instance of money, in contradistinction from all other exchangeable things as wares and merchandise; or by the case of a book. And considering these as illustrative examples in this connection, it will be shown that the conception of money as the greatest and most useable of all the means of human intercommunication through things, in the way of purchase and sale in commerce, as well as that of books as the greatest means of carrying on the interchange a science, the divisions
of thought, resolve themselves into relations
that are purely intellectual and rational.
hence
it
will
And
be made evident that such concep-
from the purity of scheme of pure rational contracts, by
tions do not really detract
the given
empirical admixture.
may
be the subject of an onerous contract combining the consideration of interest with it (pactum usurarium) 2. Letting of work on hire (locatio operae). Consent to the use of my powers by another for a certain price (merces). The
it
obsidis).
to principles a priori;
trust; 2.
(praestatio
objects or instruments required for such trans-
are: i.
security
Guarantee of personal performance. This list of all modes in which the property of one person may be transferred or conveyed to another includes conceptions of certain ference
The
contracts (cautiones) are:
Pledge (pignus). Caution by a moveable deposited as security. 2. Suretyship Caution for the (fide jus sio)
sition; or
A.
is
but
1.
A. Gratuitous contracts, with unilateral acquiB.
in the place of another,
not, at the same time, in his name, it is performance without commission (gestio negotii)] but if it is rightfully performed in name of the other, it constitutes mandate, which as a contract of procuration is an onerous contract (mandatum onerosum).
the circle of the metaphysical science of right,
founded upon a purpose of and are either:
of another person. If the action
merely done
whose rational modes of contract can alone be All contracts are
this contract is
ant (mercenarius).
cal division, there are properly only three pure and simple modes of contract. There are, however, innumerable mixed and empirical modes, adding statutory and conventional forms to the principles of mine and thine that are in accordance with rational laws. But they lie outside of
acquisition,
423 a hired serv-
Illustration of Relations of Contract by the
ceptions of
Money of,
is
Con-
Money and a Book I. What is Money?
a thing which can only be
made use
by being alienated or exchanged. This
is
a
;
THE SCIENCE
424
good nominal definition, as given by Achenwall and it is sufficient to distinguish objects of the will of this kind from all other objects. But it
goods to be sold; and because the seller would then have to expend more labour upon his goods than the buyer on the equivalent, the money
gives us no information regarding the rational
coming
money
possibility of such a thing as
is.
Yet we
much by the definition: (i) that the alienation in this mode of human intercommusee thus
nication and exchange
but
is
not viewed as a
is
mode
intended as a
gift,
of reciprocal acquisi-
by an onerous contract; and (2) that it is regarded as a mere means of carrying on commerce, universally adopted by the people, but having no value as such of itself, in contrast to other things as mercantile goods or wares which tion
have a particular value in relation to special wants existing among the people. It therefore represents all exchangeable things.
A as a
bushel of corn has the greatest direct value means of satisfying human wants. Cattle
may
be fed by
it;
and these again are subservi-
ent to our nourishment and locomotion, and
in to
him more
rapidly, the labour ap-
plied to the preparation of goods
and indus-
try generally, with the industrial productivity
the source of the public wealth, would same time dwindle and be cut down. Hence bank notes and assignations are not to be regarded as money, although they may take its place by way of representing it for a time;
which
is
the
at
because
it
costs almost no labour to prepare
them, and their value is based merely upon the opinion prevailing as to the further continuance of the previous possibility of changing them in-
money. But on its being in any way found out that there is not ready money in sufficient quantity for easy and safe conversion of such notes or assignations, the opinion gives way, and a fall in their value becomes inevitable.
to ready
Thus
who work
the industrial labour of those
our stead. Thus, by means are multiplied and supported, who
the gold and silver mines in Peru and Mexico
not only act again in reproducing such natural
in the application of fruitless efforts to discover
products, but also by other artificial products
new
they can come to the relief of all our proper wants Thus are men enabled to build dwellings,
ably even greater than what
they even labour
men
of corn,
in
and
to prepare clothing,
to supply all the ingen-
ious comforts and enjoyments which
the products of industry.
money
the value of
be
On
make up
the other hand,
only indirect. It cannot
is
enjoyed, nor be used directly for en-
itself
joyment; it is, however, a means towards this, and of all outward things it is of the highest utility.
We may
found a real definition of money
provisionally
upon these considerations.
It
may
thus be defined as the universal means of carrying on the industry of men in exchanging in-
tercommunications with each other. Hence national wealth, in so far as it can be acquired by
means
of
money,
is
properly only the
sum of men
the industry or applied labour with which
pay each
money The
other,
and which
in circulation
thing which
is
it,
represented by the the people.
to be called
much
therefore, have cost as
duce
is
among
or even to put
it
money must,
industry to pro-
into the hands of oth-
may
—
especially on account of the frequent failures
veins of these precious metals
of his
servants and court, has enforced
Thus
it
may have been
gold, or silver, or cop-
per, or a species of beautiful shells called
mat
ruler of the country
exchanged. For if it were easier to procure the material which is called money than the goods that are required, there would be
is
more money
in the
market than
the
tribute of his subjects in this kind of material.
products, for which
it
prob-
into poverty, did not the industry of Europe, stimulated in turn by these very metals, proportionally expand at the same time so as constantly to keep up the zeal of the miners in their work by the articles of luxury thereby offered to them. It is thus that the concurrence of industry with industry, and of labour with labour, is always maintained. But how is it possible that what at the beginning constituted only goods or wares, at length became money? This has happened wherever a sovereign as great and powerful consumer of a particular substance, which he at first used merely for the adornment and decoration
gro slaves, as on the Guinea Coast.
as
is
sink
be equivalent to the industry or labour required for the acquisition of the goods or wares or merchandise, as natural or artificial
ers,
—
expended in the manufacture of goods in Europe. Hence such mining labour, as unrewarded in the circumstances, would be abandoned of itself, and the countries mentioned would in consequence soon is
ries,
or even a sort of
Congo; or ingots of
cow-
called makutes, as in
iron, as in Senegal; or
Ne-
When
the
demanded such
things as
imposts, those whose labour had to be put in
motion to procure them were also paid by means them, according to certain regulations of
of
— OF RIGHT commerce
appears to me, it is only thus that a particular species of goods came to be made a legal means of carrying on the indusexchange. As
became money. The rational conception of money, under
cally
which the empirical conception
is
embraced,
is
therefore that of a thing which, in the course of the public permutation or exchange of possessions (permutatio publica), determines the
or goods
all
the other things that form products
—under which term even the sciences
are included, in so far as they are not taught gratis to others.
ple
II.
The quantity
constitutes their wealth
price (pretium)
is
of
it
among
a peo-
(opulentia). For
is
discourse
addressed by some one to the public, through visible signs of speech. It is a matter of indifference to the present considerations whether it is written by a pen or imprinted by types, and on
He who
few or many pages. in his
lic
own name
speaks to the pub-
the author.
is
He who
the author
the publisher.
is
When
ad-
name
dresses the writing to the public in the
of
a publisher
does this with the permission or authority of the author, the act is in accordance with right, and he is the rightful publisher; but if this is done without such permission or authority, the act is contrary to right, and the publisher is a counterfeiter or unlawful publisher. The whole
of a set of copies of the original called
an
document
is
edition.
the public judgement about
the value of a thing, in relation to the proportionate abundance of
what forms the universal
means
in circulation for carrying
representative
What
a Book?
A book is a writing which contains a
it
trial labour of the subjects in their commerce with each other, and thereby forming the medium of the national wealth. And thus it practi-
price of
425
then established, as in a market or
The Unauthorized Publishing
of Books is Contrary to the Principles of Right, and is Right'
ly Prohibited
on the reciprocal interchange of the products of industry or labour. 1
The precious
metals,
A
writing
is
not an immediate direct presen-
tation of a conception, as
is
the case, for in-
are not merely weighed but also
stance, with an engraving that exhibits a por-
stamped or provided with a sign indicating how are worth, form legal money, and
course addressed in a particular form to the pub-
when they
much they
are called coin.
lic
According to Adam Smith: "Money has become, in all civilized nations, the universal instrument of commerce, by the intervention of which goods of all kinds are bought and sold or exchanged for one another." This definition expands the empirical conception of money to it, by taking regard only to form of the reciprocal performances
the rational idea of
the implied
trait,
onerous contracts, and thus abstracting conformable to the conception of right in the permutation and ex-
ly
;
or a bust or cast
and the author
by means
again, speaks
workman
by a
may
sculptor. It
a dis-
be said to speak public-
of his publisher.
by the
is
The
publisher,
aid of the printer as his
own name, would be the author, but in the name of the author; and he is only entitled to do so in virtue of a mandate given him to that effect by the author. Now the unauthorized printer and publisher speaks by an assumed (operarius), yet not in his
for otherwise he
in the
authority in his publication; in the
from
deed of the author, but without a mandate to that effect (gerit se mandatarium absque mandato). Consequently such an unauthorized publication is a wrong committed upon the authorized and only lawful publisher, as it amounts to a pilfering of the profits which the latter was entitled and able to draw from the use of his proper right (furtum usus). Unauthorized printing and publication of books is, therefore, forbidden as an act of counterfeit and piracy on the ground of right. There seems, however, to be an impression
their matter. It is thus
change of the mine and thine generally (commutatio late sic dicta). The definition, therefore, accords with the representation in the above synopsis of a dogmatic division of contracts a priori, and consequently with the metaphysical principle of right in general.
Hence where commerce
is extensive neither gold nor specially used as money, but only as constituting wares; because there is too little of the first and too much of the second for them to be easily brought into circulation, so as at once to have the former in such small pieces as are necessary in payment for particular goods and not to have the latter in great quantity in case of the smallest acquisitions. Hence silver more or less alloyed with copper is taken as the proper material of money and the measure of the calculation of all prices in the great commercial intercommunications of the world; and the other metals and still more nonmetallic substances can only take its place in the case of a people of limited commerce. 1
copper
is
—
—
—
—
name
in-
—
that there
is
a sort of
common
right to print
and publish books; but the slightest reflection must convince any one that this would be a great injustice. The reason of it is found simply in the fact that a book, regarded from one point of view, is an external product of mechanical
THE SCIENCE
426 art (opus mechanicum) by any one who may be .
of a copy; and
that can be imitated in rightful possession
therefore his by a real right.
it is
But. from another point of view, a book is not merely an external thing, but is a discourse of the publisher to the public, and he
only entitled to do this publicly under the mandate of and this conthe author (praestatio operae) stitutes a personal right. The error underlying is
person acquiring acquires from another who either is not yet, and who can only be regarded as a possible being, or who is just ceasing to be, or who no longer is. Hence such
liarity that the
mode of attaining to possession is to be regarded as a mere practical idea of reason. a
from an interchange and confusion of these two
There are three modes of ideal acquisition: I. Acquisition by usucapion; II. Acquisition by inheritance or succession; III. Acquisition by undying merit (meritum immortale), or the claim by right to a good
kinds of right in relation to books.
name
;
referred
impression
the
to,
therefore,
arises
Confusion of Personal Right and Real Right
The confusion
of personal
right
with real
may
be likewise shown by reference to a difference of view in connection with another contract, falling under the head of contracts right
of hiring
(B n.
i).
namely, the contract of lease
The question is proprietor when he has
(jus incolatus).
raised as to
whether
sold a house
a
at death.
These three modes of acquisition can. as a matter of fact, only have effect in a public juridical state of existence, but they are not founded merely upon the civil constitution or upon arbitrary statutes; they are already contained a priori in the conception of the state of nature, and are thus necessarily conceivable prior to their empirical manifestation. The laws regarding them in the civil constitution ought to be
or a piece of ground held on lease, before the expiry of the period of lease, was bound to add
regulated
the condition of the continuance of the lease to
S3.
the contract of purchase; or whether
it
Acquisition by Usucapion. (Acquisitio
i.
I
may
acquire the property of another merely
by long possession and use of it (usucapio). Such property is not acquired, because I may legitimately presume that his consent is given to this nor beeffect (per consensum praesumptum) cause I can assume that, as he does not oppose my acquisition of it, he has relinquished or abandoned it as his (rem derelictam). But I acquire
farm would be regarded as having a burden lying upon it. constituting a real right acquired in it by the lessee; and this might well enough be carried out by a clause merely indorsing or ingrossing the contract of lease in the deed of sale. But as it would no longer then be a simple lease; another contract would properly be required to be conjoined, a matter which few lessors would be disposed to grant. The proposition, then, that "Pur-
existence,
chase breaks hire" holds in principle; for the
the time of
the former view, a house or
full right in
a thing as a property overbears
personal right, which
is
inconsistent with
it.
all
But
there remains a right of action to the lessee, on the ground of a personal right for indemnification
on account of any
loss arising
from break-
ing of the contract.
Episodical Section. The Ideal Acquisition of External Objects of the Will 2>2.
The Nature and Modes of Ideal Acquisition
I call that
involves no
mode
of acquisition ideal which
that rational conception.
per Usucapionem)
should
be held that "purchase breaks hire," of course under reservation of a period of warning determined by the nature of the subject in use. In
—
by
;
it
thus because, even
if
there were any one ac-
tually raising a claim to this property as its
true owner, I of
my
may
exclude him on the ground
long possession of
ignore his previous
it,
and proceed as
if
he existed during
my possession
as a
mere abstraction,
may have been
subsequently apprized of his reality as well as of his claim. This mode of acquisition is not quite correctly designated acquisition by prescription (per praealthough
I
other
scriptionem)
;
claimants
to be regarded as only the conse-
is
for
the
exclusion of
all
quence of the usucapion; and the process of acquisition must have gone before the right of exclusion. The rational possibility of such a mode of acquisition has now to be proved. Any one who does not exercise a continuous
in time, and which is founded upon a mere idea of pure reason. It is nevertheless actual, and not merely imaginary acquisition; and it is not called real only be-
possessory activity (actus possessorius) in relation to a thing as his is regarded with good
cause the act of acquisition is not empirical. This character of the act arises from the pecu-
as he does not qualify himself with a title as its
causality
right as sessor.
one who does not at
all
exist as its pos-
For he cannot complain of
possessor.
And even
if
lesion so long
he should afterwards lay
— OF RIGHT claim to the thing taken possession of
when another has already
he only says he was once on a time owner of it, but not that he is so still, or that his possession has continued without init,
427
from
juridical claims
acquisition.
The
is
commonly
also called
prescriptive title of the older
possessor, therefore, belongs to the sphere of
natural right {est juris naturae).
terruption as a juridical fact. It can, therefore,
—
Acquisition by Inheritance. (Acquisitio
only be a juridical process of possession, that has been maintained without interruption and is proveable by documentary fact, that any one
34.
can secure for himself what is his own after ceasing for a long time to make use of it.
(translatio) of the property or goods of one is
For, suppose that the neglect to exercise this possessory activity had not the effect of ena-
takes the estate (haeredis instituti) and the re-
bling another to found
upon
his hitherto lawful,
undisputed and bona fide possession, and irrefragable right to continue in its possession so that
may
11.
haereditatis)
Inheritance
the will of both.
mine and
legalis).
Anyone who has neglected
his possessory act in a
embody
to
documentary
has
title
lost his claim to the right of being possessor for the time; and the length of the period of his which need not necessarily neglecting to do so
—
— can be referred
who
leaves
it,
who be-
same moment
thine, take place in the
time
ical sense;
acquisition
acquisition of the heir
ing the acts that constitute the exchange of the
would only be provisory and temporary. This is evident on the ground that there are no historical records available to carry the investigation of a title back to the first possessor and his act of acquisition. The presumption upon which acquisition by usucapion is founded is, therefore, not merely its conformity to right as allowed and just, but also the presumption of its being right {praesumtio juris et de jure), and its being assumed to be in accordance with compulsory laws (suppositio all
The
linquishment of the testator
of
but
who
dying to a survivor, through the consent of
regard the thing that is thus in his possession as acquired by him. Then no acquisition would ever become peremptory and secured,
he
by the transfer
constituted
is
in
articulo
mortis
—and
the testator ceases to be. There
when
just
therefore no
is
special act of transfer {translatio) in the empir-
for that would involve two succesby which the one would first divest himself of his possession, and the other would sive acts,
thereupon enter into it. Inheritance as constituted by a simultaneous double act is, therefore, an ideal mode of acquisition. Inheritance is inconceivable in the state of nature without a testamentary disposition {dispositio ultimae voluntatis) and the question arises as to whether this mode of acquisition is to be regarded as a ;
contract of succession, or a unilateral act instituting an heir by a mill {testamentum) The de.
termination of this question depends on the further question, whether and how, in the very
same moment
in
which one individual ceases to
be, there can be a transition of his property to
it
another person. Hence the problem, as to how a mode of acquisition by inheritance is possible, must be investigated independently of the va-
cally practical reason to maintain that
rious possible forms in
be particularly defined
to only
as establishing the certainty of this neglect.
And
would contradict the postulate of the juridione hitherto unknown as a possessor, and whose possessory activity has at least been interrupted, whether by or without fault of his own, could always at any time re-acquire a property; for this would be to make all ownership uncertain (dominia rerum incerta jacere). But if he is a member of the commonwealth or civil union, the state session for
him
may
maintain his pos-
vicariously, although
it
may
be
which
it
is
practically
carried out, and which can have place only in
a commonwealth. "It
is
possible to acquire
by being
instituted
or appointed heir in a testamentary disposition."
For the testator Caius promises and de-
clares in his last will to Titius,
who knows
ing of this promise, to transfer to
him
noth-
his es-
tate in case of death, but thus continuing as long as he lives sole
owner of
it.
Now
by a mere
uni-
interrupted as private possession; and in that
lateral act of will,
case the actual possessor will not be able to
mitted to another person, as in addition to the promise of the one party there is required acceptance {acceptatio) on the part of the other, and a simultaneous bilateral act of will {voluntas simultanea) which, however, is here awanting. So long as Caius lives, Titius cannot expressly accept in order to enter on acquisition, because Caius has only promised in case of
prove a
title
of acquisition even
cupation, nor to found upon a
from a
title
first
oc-
of usucapion.
But, in the state of nature, usucapion
is
univer-
ground of holding, not properly as a juridical mode of requiring a thing, but as a ground for maintaining oneself in possession of it where there are no juridical acts. A release sally a rightful
nothing can in fact be trans-
THE SCIENCE
428
death; otherwise the property would be for a
moment
at least in
common
possession, which
is not the will of the testator. However, Titius acquires tacitly a special right to the inheritance as a real right. This is constituted by the
and exclusive right to accept the estate (jus in re jacente), which is therefore called at that point of time a haereditas jacens. Now as every man because he must always gain and never sole
—
lose
by
it
—
necessarily, although tacitly, accepts
such a right, and as Titius after the death of Caius is in this position, he may acquire the succession as heir by acceptance of the promise.
And
the estate is not in the meantime entirely without an owner (res nullius), but is only in abeyance or vacant (vacua) because he has exclusively the right of choice as to whether he ;
will actually
his
own
make
the estate bequeathed to
him
or not.
Hence testaments
are valid according to
mere
ends
man may
admitted that a
it, it is
thing that
is
exists in the
his own, even when he no longer world of sense as a visible person
(homo phaenomenon) his survivors
or strangers
.
—
—whether
name
as a matter of right, on the ground that unproved accusations subject them all to the
danger of similar treatment after death. Now that a man when dead can yet acquire such a right
is
a peculiar and, nevertheless, an undeni-
able manifestation in fact, of the a priori law-
giving reason thus extending
mand
present
If
life.
some one then spreads
The Continuing Right of a Good (Bona fama Defuncti)
Name
It would be absurd to think that a dead person could possess anything after his death, when he no longer exists in the eye of the law, if the matter in question were a mere thing. But a
good name is a congenital and external, although merely ideal, possession, which attaches inseparably to the individual as a person.
Now we
can and must abstract here from all consideration as to whether the persons cease to be after death or still continue as such to exist; because, in considering their juridical relation to others,
we regard persons merely according to their humanity and as rational beings (homo noumenon). Hence any attempt to bring the reputation or good name of a person into evil and false repute after death, is always questionable, even although a well-founded charge may be for to that extent the brocard "De nil nisi bene" 1 is wrong. Yet to spread against one who is absent and cannot
—
honoured him when living, or even made him despicable, any one who can adduce a proof that this accusation is intentionally false and
may
publicly
declare
him who thus
repute to be a dishonour to him in turn. This would not be allowable unless it were legitimate to assume that the dead person was injured by the accusation, although he is dead, calumniator, and
ill
affix
and that a certain to
just satisfaction was done him by an apology, although he no longer
sensibly exists.
A
title to
act the part of the vin-
dicator of the dead person does not require to
be established; for every one necessarily claims this of himself, not merely as a duty of virtue regarded ethically, but as a right belonging to
him
in virtue of his
humanity. Nor does the vin-
show any special personal damage, accruing to him as a friend or relative, from a stain on the character of the deceased, to justify him in proceeding to censure it. That such a form of ideal acquisition, and even a right in an individual after death against surdicator require to
is thus actually founded, cannot, therebe disputed, although the possibility of such a right is not capable of logical deduction.
vivors, fore,
There
is
no ground for drawing visionary
in-
ferences from what has just been stated, to the
allowed mortuis
presentiment of a future life and invisible relations to departed souls. For the considerations connected with this right turn on nothing more than the purely moral and juridical relation
charges
which subsists among men, even
defend himself, shows at least a want of magnanimity. By a blameless life and a death that worthily ["Let nothing be said of the dead but what vourable."] 1
a charge
regarding a dead person that would have dis-
brings the dead person into
in.
law of com-
its
or prohibition beyond the limits of the
untrue
—
relatives
are entitled to defend his good
however, is to be understood in the sense that they are capable and worthy of being introduced and sanctioned in the civil state, whenever it is instituted. For it is only the common will in the civil state that maintains the possession of the inheritance or succession, while it hangs between acceptance or rejection and specially belongs to no particular individual.
after Death.
further held that
It is
and successors
natural right (sunt juris naturae). This assertion
35.
acquire a
(negatively) good reputation constituting some-
is fa-
life,
in the present
as rational beings. Abstraction
made from
all
is,
however,
that belongs physically to their
existence in space and time; that
is,
men
are
considered logically apart from these physical
concomitants of their nature, not as to their
OF RIGHT State
when
actually deprived of them, but only
being spirits they are in a condition that might realize the injury done them by calumniators. Any one who may falsely say some-
in so far as
me a hundred years hence injures even now. For in the pure juridical relation, which is entirely rational and surprasensible, thing against
me
abstraction
is
tions of time,
made from
the physical condi-
and the calumniator
is
as cul-
he had committed the offence in my lifetime only this will not be tried by a criminal process, but he will only be punished with that loss of honour he would have caused to another, and this is inflicted upon him by public opinion pable as
if
;
according to the lex
Even
talionis.
from a dead author, although
it
prives
him
Chapter
How
is
yet propright.
Conditioned by
is
Subjectively
Conditioned by the Principle of a Public
issue. And yet they may co-exist with each other, because they are delivered from two different, yet respectively true, points of view: the one from regard to private right,
and opposite
from the idea of public right. They contract of donation (pactum donations); II. The contract of loan (commodatum) III. The action of real revindication (vindicatio) and IV. Guarantee by oath (juramentum). the other are:
Natural right, understood simply as that right which is not statutory, and which is knowable purely a priori, by every man's reason, will include distributive justice as well as commutative justice. It is manifest that the latter, as is
valid
between
persons in their reciprocal relations of intercourse with one another, must belong to natural right. But this holds also of distributive justice, in so far as it can be known a priori; and decisions or sentences regarding it must be reg-
by the law of natural right. The moral person who presides
ulated
of justice and administers
it is
in the sphere
called the
Court
of Justice, and, as engaged in the process of official duty, the judicatory; the sentence deliv-
ered in a case, is the judgement (judicium). All this is to be here viewed a priori, according to the rational conditions of right, without taking into consideration
how su.h
I.
The
;
;
It is a
tion
common
error on the part of the jurist
a constitution
is
to
by a
This
is
attention to
Court.
constituting the justice that
which
in
tacit assumption (vitium subreptionis). done by assuming as objective and absolute the juridical principle which a public court of justice is entitled and even bound to adopt in its own behoof, and only from the subjective purpose of qualifying itself to decide and judge upon all the rights pertaining to individuals. It is therefore of no small importance to make this specific difference intelligible, and to draw
human
and What Acquisition
and there are four cases
does not tar-
the Sentence of a Public Judicatory 36.
;
to fall here into the fallacy of begging the ques-
of a part of his property,
III. Acquisition
distinguished
the two forms of judgement have a different
a plagiarism
nish the honour of the deceased, but only deerly regarded as a lesion of his
429
it.
—
The Contract of Donation. 1. Donationis)
37.
The
(Pactum
contract of donation signifies the gratu-
itous alienation (gratis) of a thing or right that is
mine. It involves a relation between
me
as
the donor (donans), and another person as the
donatory (donatarius)
,
accordance with the
in
principle of private right,
mine
is
by which what
is
transferred to the latter, on his accept-
it, as a gift (donum). However, it is not presumed that I have voluntarily bound myself thereby so as to be compelled to keep my promise, and that I have thus given away my freedom gratuitously, and, as it were, to that extent thrown myself away. Nemo suum jactare praesumitur. But this is what would hap-
ance of
to be
pen, under such circumstances, according to the principle of right in the civil state; for in this
sphere the donatory can compel me, under cerperform my promise. If, then,
tain conditions, to
be actually established or organized, for which particular statutes, and consequently empirical
the case comes before a court, according to the
principles, are requisite.
sumed
The
question, then, in this connection,
is
not
merely "What is right in itself?" in the sense in which every man must determine it by the judgement of reason; but "What is right as applied to this case?" that is, "What is right and just as viewed by a court?" The rational and the judicial points of view are therefore to be
conditions of public right,
it
must
either be pre-
that the donor has consented to such
compulsion, or the court would give no regard, in the sentence, to the consideration as to
wheth-
er he intended to reserve the right to resile
from
promise or not; but would only refer to what is certain, namely, the condition of the promise and the acceptance of the donatory. Although the promiser, therefore, thought as his
—
THE SCIENCE
430
may
—
supposed that he could not be promise in any case, if he "rued"
easily be
bound by
his
was actually carried out, yet the court assumes that he ought expressly to have reserved this condition if such was his mind; it
before
and tion,
if
it
make such an express reservabe held that he can be compelled to
he did not will
it
implement his promise. And this principle is assumed by the court, because the administration of justice would otherwise be endlessly impeded, or even made entirely impossible. 38.
—
11.
The Contract of Loan. (Commodatum)
In the contract of commodate-loan
datum)
some one
give
I
something that
is
(commo-
the gratuitous use of
mine. If
it
is
a thing that
is
given on loan, the contracting parties agree that the borrower will restore the very same thing
But the receiver of same time, assume that the owner of the thing lent (commodans) will take upon himself all risk (casus) of any possible loss of it, or of its useful quality, that may arise from having given it into the possession of the receiver. For it is
to the
power of the
lender.
me
to assert that I
had no further concern with
the cloak but to return
it
as
it
was,
or, in
the
only to mention the fact of the theft; and that, in any case, anything more required would be but an act of courtesy in expressing sympathy with the owner on account latter
case,
of his loss, seeing he can claim nothing on the
ground of right. It would be otherwise, however, if, on asking the use of an article, I discharged myself beforehand from all responsibility, in case of its coming to grief while in my hands, on the ground of my being poor and unable to compensate any incidental loss. No one could find such a condition superfluous or ludicrous, unless the borrower were, in fact, known to be a well-to-do and well-disposed man; because in such a case it would almost be an insult not to act on the presumption of generous compensation for any loss sustained.
the loan (commodatarius) cannot, at the
not to be understood of itself that the owner, besides the use of the thing, which he has grant-
ed to the receiver, and the detriment that
is in-
separable from such use, also gives a guarantee or warrandice against
from such
use.
On
all
damage
that
may
arise
the contrary, a special acces-
sory contract would have to be entered into for this purpose. The only question, then, that can
be raised is this: "Is it incumbent on the lender or the borrower to add expressly the condition of undertaking the risk that may accrue to the thing lent; or, if this is not done, which of the parties is to be presumed to have consented and agreed to guarantee the property of the lender, up to restoration of the very same thing or its equivalent?" Certainly not the lender; because it cannot be presumed that he has gratuitously agreed to give more than the mere use of the thing, so that he cannot be supposed to have also
undertaken the risk of loss of his property. But this may be assumed on the side of the borrower; because he thereby undertakes and performs nothing more than what is implied in the contract.
For example, I enter a house, when overtaken by a shower of rain, and ask the loan of a cloak. But through accidental contact with colouring matter, it becomes entirely spoiled while in my possession; or on entering another house, I lay it
aside and
stances,
it
is
stolen.
Under such circum-
everybody would think
it
absurd for
Now possible
by the very nature of this contract, the damage (casus) which the thing lent
may undergo
cannot be exactly determined in any agreement. Commodate is therefore an uncertain contract (pactum incertum), because the consent can only be so far presumed. The judgement, in any case, deciding upon whom the incidence of any loss must fall, cannot therefore be determined from the conditions of the contract in itself, but only by the principle of the court before which it comes, and which can only consider what is certain in the contract; and the only thing certain is always the fact as to the possession of the thing as property.
Hence
the judgement passed in the state of nature will
be different from that given by a court of justice in the civil state.
The judgement from
the
standpoint of natural right will be determined by regard to the inner rational quality of the
and will run thus: "Loss arising from damage accruing to a thing lent falls upon the borrower" (casum sentit commodatarius);
thing,
whereas the sentence of a court of justice in the civil state will run thus: "The loss falls upon the lender" (casum sentit dominus). The latter judgement turns out differently from the former as the sentence of the mere sound reason, because a public judge cannot found upon presumptions as to what either party may have thought; and thus the one who has not obtained release
from
all
loss in the thing,
accessory contract, must bear the
by
a special
loss.
Hence
the difference between the judgement as the
court must deliver
each individual
by
is
it
and the form
entitled to hold
his private reason, is a
it
in
which
for himself,
matter of importance,
— OF RIGHT and
is
not to be overlooked in the consideration
of juridical judgements. 39.
—
have
Lost. (Vindicatio) It is clear
from what has been already said mine which continues to exist re-
that a thing of
mains mine, although ous occupation of
it;
mine without a
to be
I
not be in continuit does not cease
A
evident that a right
belongs in consequence it,
the possession of another.
may
be lost (res amissa) and thus
come into other hands in an honourable bona fide way as a supposed "find" or it may come to me by formal transfer on the part of one who is in possession of it, and who professes to ;
be
its
am
my
not bound, nor even
I the right, to investigate the title of the
for this process of investigation would have to go on in an ascending series ad infinitum. Hence on such grounds I ought to be regarded, in virtue of a regular and formal purchase, as not merely the putative, but the real owner of seller;
But against this position, there immediately up the following juridical principles. Any acquisition derived from one who is not the owner of the thing in question is null and void. I cannot derive from another anything more than what he himself rightfully has; and although as regards the form of the acquisition
it is
(jus personale), against every holder of
thing
I
the horse.
and not merely against some particular person. But the question now arises as to whether this right must be regarded by every other person as a continuous right of property per se, if I have not in any way renounced it, although the thing is in
therefore unimpeachable on
juridical act of dereliction
in this thing (jus reale)
me
may
is
and as buyer
and that
or alienation. Further,
to
of acquisition side;
The Revindication of what has been
in.
431
owner, although he
is
not
so.
Taking the
start
—
modus acquirendi I may proceed in accordance with all the conditions of right when I deal in a stolen horse exposed for sale in the market, yet a real title warranting the acquisition was awanting; for the horse was not really the property of the seller in question. However the
I may be a bona fide possessor of a thing under such conditions, I am still only a putative owner,
and the
real
owner has the
right of vindica-
me (rem suam vindicandi). may be again asked, what is right and
latter case, the question arises whether, since I
tion against
cannot acquire a thing from one who is not its owner (a non domino), I am excluded by the fact from all right in the thing itself, and have
just in itself regarding the acquisition of exter-
merely a personal right against a wrongful possessor? This is manifestly so, if the acquisition is judged purely according to its inner justifying grounds and viewed according to the state of nature, and not according to the convenience of a court of justice.
For everything alienable must be capable of being acquired by anyone. The rightfulness of acquisition, however, rests entirely upon the
form
accordance with which what
in
session of another,
is
transferred to
is
in pos-
me and
ac-
cepted by me. In other words, rightful acquisition depends upon the formality of the juridical act of
commutation or interchange between the
possessor of the thing and the acquirer of
without
its
being required to ask
how
it,
the former
came by
it; because this would itself be an inon the ground that: Quilibet praesumitur bonus. Now suppose it turned out that the said possessor was not the real owner, I cannot admit
jury,
that the real
owner
is
entitled to hold
me
di-
Now,
it
among men in their intercourse with one another viewed in the state of nature according to the principles of commutative justice? And it must be admitted in this connection that whoever has a purpose of acquiring anything must regard it as absolutely necessary to investigate whether the thing which he wishes to acquire does not already belong to another person. For although he may carefully observe the formal conditions required for appropriating what may belong to the property of another, as in buying a horse according to the usual terms in a market, yet he can, at the most, acquire only a personal right in relation to a thing (jus ad rem) so long as it is still unknown to him whether another than the seller may not be the real owner. Hence, if some other person were tc come forward and prove by documentary evidence a prior right of property in the thing, nothing would remain for the putative new owner but the advantage which he has drawn as a bona fide possessor of it up to that moment. nal things
rectly responsible, or so entitled with regard to
Now
any one who might be holding the thing. For I have myself taken nothing away from him, when, for example, I bought his horse according to the law (titulo empti venditi) when it was
absolutely
offered for sale in the public market.
The
title
series
it is
of
—
frequently impossible to discover the first original
owner of a thing
putative owners,
who
derive
in the
their
from one another. Hence no mere exchange of external things, however well it may agree with the formal conditions of commutaright
THE SCIENCE
43 2
an absolutely
tive justice, can ever guarantee
guided, in order to proceed with
all
possible
safety in delivering judgement on the rights o„
certain acquisition.
individuals.
Here, however, the juridically law-giving reason comes in again with the principle of distributive justice;
and
—
40
adopts as a criterion of the
it
rightfulness of possession, not
what
is
in itself
each individual in the state of nature, but only the consideration of how it would be adjudged by a court
in reference to the private will of
of justice in a civil state, constituted by the united will of all. In this connection, fulfilment of the formal conditions of acquisition, that in
iv. Acquisition of Security by the Taking of an Oath. (Cautio Juratoria)
Only one ground can be assigned on which men are bound in the juridical relation to believe and to confess that there are gods, or that there is a God. It is that they may be able to swear an oath and that thus by the fear of an all-seeing Supreme Power, whose revenge they must solemnly invoke upon themit
could be held that
;
themselves only establish a personal right, is postulated as sufficient; and they stand as an equivalent for the material conditions which
selves in case their utterance should be false,
properly establish the derivation of property from a prior putative owner, to the extent of
ity but
making what
plies that
in itself only a personal right,
is
valid before a court, as a real right.
horse which I bought
when exposed
Thus
the
for sale in
the public market, under conditions regulated
by the municipal
the conditions of
all
becomes my property if purchase and sale have been
law,
exactly observed in the transaction; but always
under the reservation that the
real
owner con-
tinues to have the right of a claim against the seller,
on the ground of
possession.
My
his prior unalienated
otherwise personal right
is
thus
transmuted into a real right, according to which may take and vindicate the object as mine wherever I may find it, without being responsible for the way in which the Seller had come
I
into possession of
it.
only in behoof of the requirements of juridical decision in a court (in favorIt is therefore
em
justitae distributivae) that the right in re-
spect of a thing
which
it is
is
regarded, not as personal,
in itself, but as real,
because
it
can
thus be most easily and certainly adjudged; and it is thus accepted and dealt with according to
Upon this principle, various statutory laws come to be founded which specially aim at laying down the conditions under which alone a mode of acquisition shall be legitimate, so that the judge may be able to assign every one his own as easily and a pure principle a priori.
certainly as possible. Thus, in the brocard, "Pur-
chase breaks hire," what by the nature of the namely the hire is subject is a real right
—
—
taken to hold as a merely personal right; and, conversely, as in the case referred to above,
merely a personal right is held to be valid as a real right. And this is done only when the question arises as to the principles by which a court of justice in the civil state is to be
what
is
in itself
they
may
ment and
be constrained to be truthful in statefaithful in promising. It is not moral-
merely blind superstition that is reckoned upon in this process; for it is evident it im-
no certainty is mere solemn declaration
to be expected
from a
in matters of right be-
fore a court, although the duty of truthfulness
must have always appeared
self-evident to
all,
matter which concerns the holiest that can be among men namely, the right of man. Hence recourse has been had to a motive founded on mere myths and fables as imaginary guarantees. Thus among the Rejangs, a heathen people in Sumatra, it is the custom according to the testimony of Marsden to swear by the bones of their dead relatives, although they have no belief in a life after death. In like manner the negroes of Guinea swear by their fetish, a bird's feather, which they imprecate under the belief that it will break their neck. And so in other cases. The belief underlying these oaths is that an invisible power whether it has understanding or not by its very nature possesses magical power that can be put into action by such invocations. Such a belief which is commonly called religion, but which ought to be called superstition is, however, indispensable for the administration of justice; because, without referring to it, a court of justice would not have adequate means to ascertain facts otherwise kept secret, and to determine rights. A law making an oath obligatory is therefore only given in behoof of the judicial authority. in a
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
But then the question
what the upon that would
arises as to
obligation could be founded
bind any one in a court of justice to accept the oath of another person as a right and valid proof of the truth of his statements which are to put
an end to obliges
me
all
dispute.
In other words, what
juridically to believe that another
person when taking an oath has any religion at all, so that I should subordinate or entrust my
OF RIGHT And, on
right to his oath?
like grounds, con-
versely, can I be
bound
It is evident that
both these questions point to
at all to take
what is in itself morally wrong. But in relation to a court of generally in the civil state there are no other
means
—
if
it
an oath?
—
and be assumed
justice
433
stings of conscience which a man must feel who to-day regards a subject from a certain point of view, but who will very probably to-morrow find it quite improbable from another point of
Any
view.
who
one, therefore,
take such an oath,
is
is
compelled to
subjected to an injury.
of getting to the truth
than by an oath, it must be adopted. In regard to religion, under the supposition that every one has it, it may be utilized as a necessary means (in causu necessitatis), in behoof of the legitimate procedure of a court in certain cases
Transition from the Mine and Thine in the State
of Nature to the Mine and Thine in the JuridGenerally
ical State
41. Public Justice as Related to the Natural
and the
The
Civil State
men
court uses this form of spiritual compulsion (tortura spiritualis) as an available means, in conformity with the superstitious pro-
one another which contains the conditions under which it is alone possible for every one to obtain
pensity of mankind, for the ascertainment of what is concealed; and therefore holds itself
the possibility of actually participating in such
of justice.
The
The legislative power, howfundamentally wrong in assigning this authority to the judicial power, because even in the civil state any compulsion with regard to the taking of oaths is contrary to the inalienable
juridical state
the right that
his due.
is
viewed
is
that relation of
The formal
right,
universally legislative will,
freedom of man.
lic
justice
the possession of objects ter of the activity of
which are usually promissory,
(justitia
might well be changed into assertory oaths, to be taken at the end of a year or more of actual administra-
tice,
swearing to the faithfulness of his discharge of duty during that time. This would bring the conscience more into action than the promissory oath, which always gives room for the internal pretext that, with the best intention, the difficulties that arose during the administration of the official function were not foreseen. And, further, violations of duty, under tion, the official
the prospect of their being summed up by future censors, would give rise to more anxiety as
when they
are merely repreand forgotten. As regards an oath taken concerning a matter of belief {de credulitate) it is evident that no such oath can be demanded by a court, i. For, first, it contains in itself a contradiction. Such belief, as intermediate between opinion and knowledge, is a thing on which one might venture to lay a wager but not to swear an oath. 2. And, second, the judge who imposes an oath of
to censure than
belief, in
to his
order to ascertain anything pertinent or even to the common good,
own purpose
commits a great offence against the conscientiousness of the party taking such an oath. This he does in regard both to the levity of mind,
which he thereby helps
to engender,
and
to the
may
— regarded the mat—according as
to
thus be divided into protective
commutative
justice
commutativa), and distributive justice
(justitia distributiv a)
,
in the first
mode
of jus-
the law declares merely what relation
the second,
it
in-
is
form (lex justi) in declares what is likewise exter-
ternally right in respect of
;
nally in accord with a law in respect of the ob-
and what possession is rightful (lex juridand in the third, it declares what is right, and what is just, and to what extent, by the judgement of a court in any particular case coming under the given law. In this latter relation,
ject, ical)
;
the public court
is
called the justice of the coun-
and the question whether there actually is or is not such an administration of public justice may be regarded as the most important of
try;
all
juridical interests.
The
sented, one after the other,
,
public justice. Pub-
the will
justice (justitia testatrix),
being taken on entering upon an office, to the effect that the individual has sincere intention to administer his functions dutifully,
is
be considered in relation either
to the possibility, or actuality, or necessity of
laws. It Official oaths,
in
may
principle of
accordance with the idea of a
justified in so doing.
ever,
is
to
non-juridical state
society in which there It is
commonly
is
is
that condition of
no distributive
naturalis), or the state of nature. It social state, as
be in that
Achenwall puts
it,
is
not the
for this
may
an artificial state (status artificialis) to be contradistinguished from the "nat-
itself
,
is
ural" state. is
justice.
called the natural state (status
The opposite
of the state of nature
the civil state (status civilis) as the condition
of a society standing under a distributive jus-
In the state of nature, there may even be forms of society such as marriage, parental authority, the household, and such like. For none of these, however, does any law a pritice.
—
juridical
ori lay
it
down
as an incumbent obligation:
THE SCIENCE
434
"Thou
shalt enter into this state."
may be men who
But
it
said of the juridical state that: "All may even involuntarily come into relations of
one another ought to enter into
right with
this
natural or non-juridical social state
may
be viewed as the sphere of private right, and the civil state may be specially regarded as the
The
sphere of public right.
latter state contains
no more and no other duties of men towards each other than what may be conceived in connection with the former state; the matter of private right is, in short, the very same in both.
The laws
of the civil state, therefore, only turn
upon the
juridical
men under
a
form of the coexistence of
common
respect, these laws
and conceived
The
constitution; and, in this
must necessarily be regarded
union (unio
civil
cannot, in the
civilis)
be properly called a society; for no sociality in common between the ruler (imperans) and the subject (subditus) un-
there
is
der a
civil constitution.
They
are not co-ordi-
nated as associates in a society with each other, but the one is subordinated to the other. Those who may be co-ordinated with one another must consider themselves as mutually equal, in so far as they stand under
may
common
The
making a
civil
much
society.
The Postulate of Public Right
42.
From
laws.
therefore be regarded not so
as being, but rather as
natural state, there arises the postulate of pub-
may
own
is
therefore under no obliga-
he acquires practical prudence cost; for he can perceive in himself
evidence of the natural inclination of men to play the master over others, and to disregard the claims of the right of others, when they feel themselves their superiors by might or fraud. And thus it is not necessary to wait for the
melancholy experience of actual hostility; the individual is from the first entitled to exercise a rightful compulsion towards those who already threaten him by their very nature. Quilibet praesumitur malus, donee securitatem dederit oppositi.
and continue freedom prevails, men may be said to do no wrong or injustice at all to one another, even when they wage war against each other. For what seems competent as good for the one is equally valid for the other, as if it were so by mutual agreement. Uti partes de jure suo disponunt, ita jus est. But generally they must be considered as being in the highest state of wrong, as being and willing to be in a condition which is not juridical, and in which, therefore, no one can be secured against violence, in the possession of his own.
be thus expressed: "In the re-
live
in this state of externally lawless
The
the conditions of private right in the
lic right. It
at his
He
till
So long as the intention to
as public laws.
strict sense,
union
tion of others.
tion to wait
state."
The
ence with his possession. Nor does he require to wait for proof by experience of the need of this guarantee, in view of the antagonistic disposi-
distinction
and what
is
between what
is
only formally
also materially wrong,
and unjust,
finds frequent application in the science of right.
An enemy who, on occupying
a besieged for-
lation of unavoidable coexistence with others,
tress, instead of
thou shalt pass from the state of nature into a juridical union constituted under the con-
tions of a capitulation, maltreats the garrison on
The
principle
unfolded
analyti-
dition of a distributive justice."
of
this
postulate
may
be
from the conception of right in the external relation, contradistinguished from mere might
cally
as violence.
No
one
is
under obligation to abstain from
in-
terfering with the possession of others, unless
they give him a reciprocal guarantee for the observance of a similar abstention from interfer-
honourably
fulfilling the
condi-
marching out, or otherwise violates the agreement, cannot complain of injury or wrong if on another occasion the same treatment is inflicted upon themselves. But, in fact, all such actions fundamentally involve the commission of wrong and injustice, in the highest degree; because they take all validity away from the conception of right, and give up everything, as it were by law itself, to savage violence, and thus overthrow the rights of men generally.
OF RIGHT
435
SECOND PART. PUBLIC RIGHT The System
of Those
The 43. Definition
Laws which Require Public Promulgation.
Principles of Right in Civil Society
and Division of Public Right
embraces the whole of the laws that require to be universally promulgated in order to produce a juridical state of society. It is therefore a system of those laws that are
Public
Right of the State and Constitutional
I.
Law. (Jus
right
requisite for a people as a multitude of
men
forming a nation, or for a number of nations, in their relations to each other. Men and nations, on account of their mutual influence on one
Civitatis)
44. Origin of the Civil
Union and Public Right
from any experience prior
to the
appearance of an external authoritative
legisla-
It is not
we learn of the maxim of natural vioamong men and their evil tendency to engage in war with each other. Nor is it assumed tion that
lence
here that
it is
merely some particular historical
another, require a juridical constitution uniting them under one will, in order that they may par-
condition or fact, that makes public legislative
This relation of the individuals of a nation to each other constitutes the civil union in the social state; and, viewed
or favourable to right
ticipate in
what
is
right.
as a whole in relation to its constituent members, it forms the political state (civitas). 1.
The
state, as constituted
by the common
interest of all to live in a juridical union, is called, in
view of
its
form, the commonwealth
or the republic in the wider sense of the term i^res publica latius sic dicta). The principles of
constraint necessary; for however well-disposed
men may be
considered
to be of themselves, the rational idea of a state
by right, must be taken as our starting-point. This idea implies of society not yet regulated
that before a legal state of society can be pub-
men, nations, and
licly established, individual
can never be safe against violence from each other; and this is evident from the consideration that every one of his own will naturally states,
does what seems good and right in his
own
eyes,
right in this sphere thus constitute the first de-
entirely independent of the opinion of others.
partment of public right as the right of the
Hence, unless the institution of right is to be renounced, the first thing incumbent on men is to
state
(jus civitatis) or national right.
2.
The
viewed in relation to other peoples, power (potentia), whence arises the idea of potentates. Viewed in relation to the supposed hereditary unity of the people comstate, again,
is
called a
posing
it,
the state constitutes a nation (gens).
Under the general conception
of public right,
in addition to the right of the individual state, there thus arises another department of right,
constituting the right of nations (jus gentium)
or international right. of the earth
is
3.
Further, as the surface
not unlimited in extent, but
is cir-
cumscribed into a unity, national right and international right necessarily culminate in the idea of a universal right of mankind, which may be called Cosmopolitical Right (jus cosmopolitism). And national, international, and cosmopolitical right are so interconnected, that, if
any
one of these three possible forms of the juridical relation fails to
embody
the essential principles
that ought to regulate external freedom
the structure of legislation reared will also
would
by law, by the others
be undermined, and the whole system
at last fall to pieces.
accept the principle that
it is
necessary to leave
the state of nature, in which every one follows his
own inclinations, and to form a union of all who cannot avoid coming into reciprocal
those
communication, and thus subject themselves
common
to the external restraint of public
pulsory laws.
Men
thus enter into a
civil
in
com-
union,
which every one has it determined by law what shall be recognized as his; and this is secured to him by a competent external power distinct from his own individuality. Such is the primary obligation, on the part of all men, to enter
in
into the relations of a civil state of society.
The on
this
natural condition of
mankind need
not,
ground, be represented as a state of abso-
lute injustice, as
if
there could have been no
among men but what was merely determined by force. But this natural condition must be regarded, if it ever existed, as a state of society that was void of regulation by right (status justitiae vacuus), so that if a matter of right came to be in dispute (jus controversum), no competent judge was found to other relation originally
THE SCIENCE
436 give an authorized legal decision upon
it.
It is
therefore reasonable that any one should constrain another
by
force, to pass
juridical state of life
from such
a non-
and enter within the
juris-
diction of a civil state of society. For. although
on the basis of the ideas of right held by viduals as such, external things
by occupancy or
may
indi-
be acquired
contract, yet such acquisition
only provisory so long as
it
is
has not yet obtained
the sanction of a public law. Till this sanction
reached, the condition of possession
is
is
ing to the law (potestas legislatoria, rectoria, et
These three powers may be compared to the three propositions in a practical syllogism: the major as the sumption laying down the universal law of a will, the minor presenting the command applicable to an action according to the law as the principle of the subsumption, and the conclusion containing the judiciaria).
sentence, or judgement of right, in the particular case
mined by any public distributive justice, nor is it secured by any power exercising public right.
46.
The
men were
quisition at
way
—prior
all
Legislative
Power and
the
Members
of the State
The If
under consideration.
not deter-
legislative power,
viewed
in its rational
not disposed to recognize any ac-
principle, can only belong to the united will of
in a provisional
all right ought to proceed power, it is necessary that its laws should be unable to do wrong to any one whatever. Now, if any one individual determines any-
as rightful
—even
to entering into the civil state, this
state of society
would
itself
be impossible. For
the laws regarding the mine and thine in the
the people. For. as
from
this
state of nature, contain formally the very
same when it
thing in the state in contradistinction to an-
thing as they prescribe in the civil state,
other,
viewed merely according to rational conceptions: only that in the forms of the civil state the conditions are laid down under which the formal prescriptions of the state of nature attain realization conformable to distributive justice. Were there, then, not even provisionally, an external meum and tuum in the state of nature, neither would there be any juridical duties in relation to them; and, consequently, there would be no obligation to pass out of that state
wrong on that other; but this is never possible when all determine and decree what is to be Law to themselves. Volenti non fit injuria. Hence it is only the united and consenting will of all ihe people in so far as each of them determines the same thing about all, and all determine the same thing about each that ought to have the power of enacting law in the state.
into another.
stituting a
is
45.
A
The Form of
the State and
state (civitas)
men under
is
its
Three Powers
the union of a
juridical laws.
number
These laws,
are to be regarded as necessary a priori
is
always possible that he
may
perpe-
—
—
The members
of a civil society thus united
for the purpose of legislation, state,
are
and thereby concitizens; and
called its
there are three juridical attributes that insepa-
rably belong to
them by
right.
These
are:
—
1.
of
constitutional freedom, as the right of every
as such,
citizen to have to obey no other law than that to which he has given his consent or approval; 2.
—
that
is,
from the conceptions as merely established by statute. The form of the state is thus involved in the idea of the state, viewed as as following of themselves
it
trate a
—and not
civil equality, as
the right of the citizen to recog-
ought to be according to pure principles of and this ideal form furnishes the normal criterion of every real union that constitutes a
one as a superior among the people in relation to himself, except in so far as such a one is as subject to his moral power to impose obligations, as that other has power to impose obligations upon him; and 3. political independence, as the right to owe his existence and con-
commonwealth. Every state contains
another, but to his
of external right generally
it
right;
nise no
tinuance in society not to the arbitrary- will of
powers, the universal united will of the people being thus
member
personified in a political triad. These are the leg-
ly,
power, the executive power, and the judiciary power. 1. The legislative power of the
self.
islative
in itself three
—
sovereignty in the state
is
embodied
own rights and powers as a commonwealth, and, consequent-
the possession of a civil personality, which cannot be represented bv anv other than him-
in the per-
son of the lawgiver; 2. the executive power is embodied in the person of the ruler who admin-
Law; and 3. the judiciary power, embodied in the person of the judge, is the function of assigning every one what is his own, accordisters the
of the
The
capability of voting
by possession of the
suffrage properly constitutes the political qualification of a citizen as a
But
this, again,
member
of the state.
presupposes the independence or
self-sufficiency of the individual citizen
among
OF RIGHT
437
who is not a mere incidental commonwealth, but a member of it acting of his own will in community with others.
is
The
from
the people, as one
part of the
involved neces-
last of the three qualities
between active and passive citizenship; although the latter con-
sarily constitutes the distinction
ception appears to stand in contradiction to the definition of a citizen as such. The following
may serve to remove this difficulty. The apprentice of a merchant or tradesman, a servant who is not in the employ of the state, a minor (naturaliter vel civiliter), all women, and, generally, every one who is compelled to maintain himself not according to his own industry, but as it is arranged by others (the state exexamples
cepted), are without civil personality, and their existence is only, as it were, incidentally includ-
The woodcutter whom I employ the smith in India who carries his
ed in the state.
on
my
estate;
anvil, and bellows into the houses where he is engaged to work in iron, as distinguished from the European carpenter or smith,
hammer,
who can
offer the
independent products of his
labour as wares for public sale; the resident tutor as distinguished from the schoolmaster;
freedom of all the people and the equality that conformable thereto; and it must therefore
made
be
possible for
them
to raise themselves
this passive condition in the state to the
condition of active citizenship. 47. Dignities in the State
and the Original
Contract All these three
powers
in the state are digni-
and, as necessarily arising out of the idea
ties;
of the state and essential generally to the foun-
dation of its constitution, they are to be regarded as political dignities. They imply the relation
between a universal sovereign as head of the which according to the laws of freedom state can be none other than the people itself united into a nation and the mass of the individuals of the nation as subjects. The former member of the relation is the ruling power, whose function is to govern (imperans) the latter is the ruled constituents of the state, whose function is to obey (subditi). The act by which a people is represented as constituting itself into a state, is termed the
—
—
;
original contract. This
is
properly only an out-
from the farmer
ward mode of representing the idea by which
and such like, illustrate the distinction in quesIn all these cases, the former members of the contrast are distinguished from the latter by
the rightfulness of the process of organizing the
the
ploughman
as distinguished
may be made
conceivable. Accord-
tion.
constitution
being mere subsidiaries of the commonwealth and not active independent members of it, be-
all and each of the people give up their external freedom in order to receive it immediately again as members of a
cause they are of necessity commanded and proby others, and consequently possess no
commonwealth. The commonwealth is the people viewed as united altogether into a state. And
political self-sufficiency in themselves. Such dependence on the will of others and the consequent inequality are, however, not inconsistent with the freedom and equality of the individuals
thus
tected
as
men
rather
helping to constitute the people. is it
the case that
it is
conditions that a people can
Much
only under such
become a
enter into a civil constitution. But
state
all
and
are not
equally qualified to exercise the right of suffrage
under the constitution, and to be full citizens of the state, and not mere passive subjects under its
protection. For, although they are entitled
ing to this representation,
it
is
not to be said that the individual in
the state has sacrificed a part of his inborn ex-
freedom for a particular purpose; but he
ternal
has abandoned his wild lawless freedom wholly, in order to find all his proper
and undiminished, but
tire
freedom again enthe form of a
in
regulated order of dependence, that state regulated
by laws of
right.
dependence thus arises out of his law giving will. 48.
is,
own
regulative
Mutual Relations and Characteristics of the Three Powers
to demand to be treated by all the other citizens according to laws of natural freedom and equality, as passive parts of the state, it does not fol-
relations to each other, are, therefore:
low that they ought themselves to have the right
ordinate with one another as so
to deal with the state as active to reorganize
it,
members of by way
or to take action
may
The
three powers in the state, as regards their
and the one
it,
sons,
of
other in the
introducing certain laws. All they have a right in
be no more than that whatever be the mode in which the positive laws are enacted, these laws must not be contrary to the natural laws that demand the their circumstances to claim
in a civil
This relation of
way
is
(1) coper-
many moral
thus the complement of the
of completing the constitution
of the state; (2) they are likewise subordinate to one another, so that the one cannot at the
same time usurp the function of the other by whose side it moves, each having its own principle and maintaining its authority in a particu-
THE SCIENCE
438
but under the condition of the will of a superior: and further, (3) by the union of both these relations, they assign distributively to every subject in the state his own rights. Considered as to their respective dignity, the three powers may be thus described. The will of the sovereign legislator, in respect of what constitutes the external mine and thine, is to be regarded as ir reprehensible; the executive function of the supreme ruler is to be regarded as irresistible; and the judicial sentence of the supreme judge is to be regarded as irreversible,
governor of his power, depose him, or reform his administration, but not punish him. This is the proper and only meaning of the common saying in England. "The King as the supreme executive power can do no wrong." For any such application of punishment would necessarily be an act of that very executive power to which the supreme right to compel according to law pertains, and which would itself be thus subjected to coercion; which is self-contradictory.
being beyond appeal.
cial function,
lar person,
49. Distinct
Functions of the Three Powers.
Autonomy 1.
of the State
The executive power belongs
nor or regent of the state, whether it assumes the form of a moral or individual person, as the king or prince (rex, princeps). This executive authority, as the supreme agent of the state, appoints the magistrates, and prescribes the rules
is
their
may
by
free choice as their representatives
and even specially for every process or cause. For the judicial sentence is a for this purpose,
special act of public distributive justice per-
formed by a judge or court as
ently with the
any one what
own conformably its
to the law,
application.
each case
Regarded
as
a moral person, this executive authority constitutes the government.
The orders
to the people
issued by the and the magistrates,
power is
to
the people being merely passive in this relation to the
supreme power, either the executive or him wrong in
the legislative authority might do
their determinations in cases of dispute regard-
ing the property of individuals. It
the people themselves
tors of the state (gubernatio)
who pronounced
,
are rescripts or
decision of particular cases, and are given forth
A
government acting as an same time laying down the law as the legislative power, would be a despotic government, and would have to be contradistinguished from a patriotic government. A paas unchangeable.
executive, and at the
government, again, is to be distinguished from a paternal government (regimen paternale) which is the most despotic government of all. the citizens being dealt with by it as mere children. A patriotic government, however, is one in which the state, while dealing with the subjects as if they were members of a family, still treats them likewise as citizens, and according to laws that recognize their independence, each individual possessing himself and not being dependent on the absolute will of another beside him or above him. 2. The legislative authority ought not at the same time to be the executive or governor: for triotic
the governor, as administrator, should stand un-
der the authority of the law. and under the supreme control of the legislative authority
may
is
bound by
legislator.
it
The
therefore deprive the
determine and assign to
Every individual among
his.
as well as to the higher ministerial administra-
decrees, and not laws; for they terminate in the
a constitutional
administrator of the law. to a subject as one of the people. Such an act is not invested inher-
accordance with which indi-
being brought under
government
power ought to exercise the judibut only appoint judges as magistrates. It is the people who ought to judge themselves, through those of the citizens who are
acquire anything or maintain what
to the people, in
viduals
Further, neither the legislative power nor
3.
the executive
elected
to the gover-
—
—
who
would not be
thus determined, or
the judgements of "guilty" or
"not guilty" regarding their fellow-citizens. For it is to the determination of this issue in a cause that the court has to apply the law: and it is by means of the executive authority, that the judge holds power to assign to every one his own.
Hence judge
is
it
in a
only the people that properly can although indirectly by rep-
—
—
cause
resentatives elected and deputed as in a jury. It
by themselves,
would even be beneath the
dig-
nity of the sovereign head of the state to play
the judge; for this would be to put himself into it would be possible to do wrong, and thus to subject himself to the demand for an appeal to a still higher power (a rege male injormato ad regem melius injorman-
a position in which
dum). It is
— the —
by the co-operation of these three powers legislative, the executive,
that
the
autonomy
state
realizes
its
and the judicial autonomy. This
consists in its organizing, forming,
and maintaining
itself in accordance with the laws of freedom. In their union the welfare of
the state lex. 1
1
By
is
realized. Salus reipublicae
this is not to
suprema
be understood merely the
[''The health of the state
is
the highest law."]
— OF RIGHT individual well-being and happiness of the
—
zens of the state; for this
end
may
as
Rousseau
Hence
citi-
asserts
perhaps be more agreeably and
439 it
supreme power in and no (compulsory)
follows, that the
the state has only rights,
duties towards the subject. Further,
if
the ruler
in the state of nature,
or regent, as the organ of the supreme power,
or even under a despotic government. But the welfare of the state, as its own highest good,
proceeds in violation of the laws, as in imposing taxes, recruiting soldiers, and so on, contrary to the law of equality in the distribution of the political burdens, the subject may oppose complaints and objections (gravamina) to this injustice, but not active resistance.
more desirably attained
signifies
that condition in which the greatest
harmony
is attained between its constitution and the principles of right a condition of the state which reason by a categorical imperative makes it obligatory upon us to strive after.
—
There cannot even be an Article contained
in
make
it
the political constitution that would
Constitutional and Juridical Consequences arising from the Nature of the Civil Union
Supreme Power; Treason; Dethronement; Revolution; Reform
A. Right of the
The
supreme power is practically by the people who are placed under
origin of the
inscrutable
authority. In other words, the subject need not reason too curiously in regard to its origin its.
in the practical relation, as if the right of the
obedience due to
it
were
to be
doubted (jus con-
trover sum). For as the people, in order to be able to abjudicate with a title of right regarding the supreme power in the state, must be regarded as already united under one common legislative will, it cannot judge otherwise than as the present supreme head of the state (summus imperans) wills. The question has been raised as to whether an'actual contract of subjection (pactum subjectionis civilis) originally preceded the civil government as a fact; or whether the power arose first, and the law only followed afterwards, or may have followed in this order. But such questions, as regards the people already actually living under the civil law, are either entirely aimless, or even fraught with subtle danger to the state. For, should the subject, after having dug down to the ultimate origin of the state, rise in
opposition to the present ruling au-
he would expose himself as a citizen, according to the law and with full right, to be punished, destroyed, or outlawed. A law which is so holy and inviolable that it is practically a thority,
crime even to cast doubt upon it, or to suspend its operation for a moment, is represented of itself as necessarily derived from some supreme,
unblameable lawgiver. And this is the meaning of the maxim, "All authority is from God", which proposition does not express the historical foundation of the civil constitution, but an ideal principle of the practical reason. It may be otherwise rendered thus: "It is a duty to obey the law of the existing legislative power, be its origin what it may."
possible for a
power
in the state, in case of the
transgression of the constitutional laws
supreme authority,
by
the
even to restrict it in so doing. For, whoever would restrict the supreme power of the state must have more, or at least equal, power as compared with the power that is so restricted; and if competent to command the subjects to resist, such a one would also have to be able to protect them, and if he is to be considered capable of judging what is right in every case, he may also publicly order resistance. But such a one, and not the actual authority, would then be the supreme power; which is contradictory. The supreme sovereign power, then, in proceeding by a minister who is at the same time the ruler of the state, consequently becomes despotic; and the expedient of giving the people to imagine when they have properly only legislative influence that they act by their to resist or
—
deputies by
way
—
of limiting the sovereign au-
mask and disguise the actual despotism of such a government that it will not appear in the measures and means adopted by the minister to carry out his function. The peothority, cannot so
ple,
while represented by their deputies in par-
liament, under such conditions,
may have
in
these warrantors of their freedom and rights,
who are keenly interested on their own account and their families, and who look to such
persons
a minister for the benefit of his influence in the
army, navy, and public
offices.
And
hence, in-
stead of offering resistance to the undue pretensions of the
government
—whose public declara-
tions ought to carry a prior accord on the part of
the people, which, however, cannot be allowed in peace, they are rather always ready to play into the hands of the government. Hence
the so-called limited political constitution, as a constitution of the internal rights of the state,
an unreality; and instead of being consistent with right, it is only a principle of expediency. And its aim is not so much to throw all possible obstacles in the way of a powerful violator of is
popular rights by his arbitrary influence upon
THE SCIENCE
440
the government, as rather to cloak it over under the illusion of a right of opposition conceded to
considered as the source of the laws, the sovereign himself can do no wrong. Of all the abomi-
the people.
nations in the overthrow of a state by revolution,
Resistance on the part of the people to the supreme legislative power of the state is in no
even the murder or assassination of the monarch is not the worst. For that may be done by the people out of fear, lest, if he is allowed to live, he may again acquire power and inflict punishment upon them; and so it may be done, not as an act of punitive justice, but merely from regard to self-preservation. It is the formal execution of a monarch that horrifies a soul filled with ideas of human right; and this feeling occurs again and again as often as the mind realizes the scenes that terminated the fate of Charles I or Louis XVI. Now how is this feeling to be ex-
case legitimate; for
it is
only by submission to
the universal legislative will, that a condition of law and order is possible. Hence there is no
and
still
longing to the people.
And
right of sedition,
less of rebellion, be-
least of all,
when
the
supreme power is embodied in an individual monarch, is there any justification, under the pretext of his abuse of power, for seizing his per-
son or taking away his life (monarchomachismus sub specie tyrannicidii). The slightest attempt of this kind is high treason (proditio eminens) and a traitor of this sort who aims at the overthrow of his country may be punished, as a ;
even with death. It is the duty of the people to bear any abuse of the supreme power, even then though it should be conpolitical parricide,
sidered to be unbearable.
any
And
the reason
is
that
resistance of the highest legislative author-
can never but be contrary to the law, and must even be regarded as tending to destroy the whole legal constitution. In order to be entitled to offer such resistance, a public law would be ity
required to permit
it.
But the supreme
legisla-
tion would by such a law cease to be supreme, and the people as subjects would be made sovereign over that to which they are subject; which is a contradiction. And the contradiction becomes more apparent when the question is
put:
"Who
is
to be the judge in a controversy
between the people and the sovereign?" For the people and the sovereign are to be constitutionally or juridically regarded as two different moral persons; but the question shows that the people would then have to be the judge in their
own
cause.
The dethronement of a monarch may be also conceived as a voluntary abdication of the crown, and a resignation of his power into the hands of the people; or it might be a deliberate surrender of these without any assault on the monarch may be But, however it hap-
royal person, in order that the
relegated into private
life.
pen, forcible compulsion of
it, on the part of the people, cannot be justified under the pretext of a right of necessity (casus necessitatis) and ;
be shown for punishing the sovereign on the ground of previous maladministration. For all that has been already done in the quality of a sovereign must be regarded as done outwardly by right; and, least of all can the slightest right
is not a mere aesthetic feeling, arising from the working of the imagination, nor from sympathy, produced by fancying ourselves in
plained? It
On
the place of the sufferer.
the contrary,
it is
a
moral feeling arising from the entire subversion all our notions of right. Regicide, in short, is regarded as a crime which always remains such and can never be expiated (crimen immortale }
of
inexpiabile) and it appears to resemble that sin which the theologians declare can neither be forgiven in this world nor in the next. The explana;
tion of this phenomenon in the human mind appears to be furnished by the following reflec-
upon it; and they even shed some light upon the principles of political right. Every transgression of a law only can and must be explained as arising from a maxim of the transgressor making such wrong-doing his rule of action; for were it not committed by him as a free being, it could not be imputed to him. But it is absolutely impossible to explain how any rational individual forms such a maxim tions
against the clear prohibition of the law-giving
reason; for it is only events which happen according to the mechanical laws of nature that are capable of explanation. Now a transgressor or criminal
may commit
according to the
maxim
his
wrong-doing either
of a rule supposed to be
valid objectively and universally, or only as an exception from the rule by dispensing with its
obligation for the occasion. In the latter case, he only diverges from the law, although intentionally. He may, at the same time, abhor his own transgression, and without formally renouncing his obedience to the law only wish to avoid it. In the former case, however, he rejects the authority of the law itself, the validity of which, however, he cannot repudiate before his own reason, even while he makes it his rule to act against it. His maxim is, therefore, not merely defective as being negatively contrary to the
OF RIGHT law, but
it
is
even positively
illegal,
as being
diametrically contrary and in hostile opposition
So far as we can see into and understand it would appear as if it were impossible for men to commit wrongs and crimes of a wholly useless form of wickedness, and yet the idea of such extreme perversity cannot be overlooked in a system of moral philosophy. to
it.
the relation,
There is thus a feeling of horror at the thought of the formal execution of a monarch by his people. And the reason it is that, whereas an act of assassination must be considered as only an exception from the rule which has been constituted a maxim, such an execution
must be regarded
as a complete perversion of
by an arbitrary combination of the people to coerce the government into a certain active procedure; for this would be to assume to perform an act of the executive itself. All that can rightly be allowed, is only a negative resistance, amounting to an act of refusal on the part of the people to concede all the demands which the executive may deem it necessary to make in behoof of the political administration. And if this right were never exercised, it would be a sure sign that the people were corrupted, their representatives venal, the supreme head of the government despotic, and his ministers practically betrayers of right of active resistance, as
the people.
Further,
the principles that should regulate the relation
For
between a sovereign and
his
makes the people, who owe
their constitutional
people.
it
441
a
new
when on
the success of a revolution
constitution has been founded, the unlaw-
fulness of its beginning and of
its
institution
from the sovereign, to be the ruler over him. Hence mere violence is thus elevated with bold brow, and as it were by principle, above the holiest right; and, appearing like an abyss to swallow up everything without recall, it seems like suicide committed by the state upon itself and a crime that is capable of no atonement. There is therefore reason to assume that the consent that is
cannot release the subjects from the obligation of adapting themselves, as good citizens, to the new order of things; and they are not entitled to refuse honourably to obey the authority that
accorded to such executions is not really based upon a supposed principle of right, but only springs from fear of the vengeance that would be taken upon the people were the same power to revive again in the state. And hence it may
ing into the private life of a citizen he prefers his
existence to the legislation that issued
be held that the formalities accompanying them have only been put forward in order to give these deeds a look of punishment from the accompaniment of a judicial process, such as could not go along with a mere murder or assassination. But such a cloaking of the deed entirely fails of its purpose, because this pretension on the part of the people is even worse than murder itself, as it implies a principle which
would necessarily make the restoration of a
when once overthrown, an
state,
An
alteration of the
still
impossibility.
defective constitu-
may sometimes be quite necessuch changes ought only to proceed from the sovereign power in the way of reform, and are not to be brought about by the people
tion of the state sary.
But
all
way
of revolution; and when they take they should only effect the executive, and not the legislative, power. A political constitution which is so modified that the people by their representatives in parliament can legally resist the executive power, and its represenin the
throned monarch,
is
called a limited constitution.
Yet even under such
a constitution there
is
no
who
is not to be called to account on the ground of his former administration; and still less may he be punished for it, when withdraw-
olution,
own
quiet and the peace of the state to the un-
certainty of exile, with the intention of maintaining his claims for restoration at
all
hazards,
and pushing these either by secret counter-revolution or
by the
However,
if
assistance of other powers. he prefers to follow the latter course, his rights remain, because the rebellion that drove him from his position was inherently unjust. But the question then emerges as to whether other powers have the right to form themselves into an alliance in behalf of such a dethroned monarch merely in order not to leave the crime committed by the people unavenged, or to do away with it as a scandal to all the states; and whether they are therefore justified and called upon to restore by force to another state a formerly existing constitution that has been removed by a revolution. The discussion of this question, however, does not belong to this department of public right, but to the following section, concerning the right of nations.
place,
tative minister,
A dehas survived such a rev-
has thus attained the power in the state.
B.
Land
Rights. Secular and Church Lands. Rights of Taxation; Finance; Police; Inspection
viewed as embodying the power, to be regarded as the supreme proprietor of the soil, or only as the highest Is the sovereign,
legislative
THE SCIENCE
442
ruler of the people by the laws? As the soil is the supreme condition under which it is alone possible to have external things as one's own,
possible possession and use constitute the
its
acquirable basis of external right. Hence all such rights must be derived from
first
all
external things severally (divisim) belong;
and as such he assigns distributively to every one what is to be his. Hence there cannot be any corporation in the state, nor any class or order, that as proprietors
supreme proprietor of the land (dominus territorii). The people, as forming the mass of
can transmit the land for a sole exclusive use to all time (ad infinitum), according to certain fixed statutes. The state may annul and abrogate all such statutes at any time, only under the condition of indem-
the subjects, belong to the sovereign as a peo-
nifying survivors for their interests.
ple; not in the sense of his being their propri-
of knights, constituting the nobility regarded as
that
it is
paramount
the sovereign as overlord and
perior of the
soil, or,
as
it
may
su-
be better put,
as the
the following generations for
The order
of real right, but as their su-
a mere rank or class of specially titled individ-
preme commander or chief in the way of personal right. This supreme proprietorship, how-
uals, as well as the order of the clergy, called
etor in the
ever,
way
only an idea of the
is
civil constitution,
objectified to represent, in accordance with ju-
necessary union of the
ridical conceptions, the
private property of lic
the people under a pub-
all
The
universal possessor.
sented in order that
it
relation
may form
is
so repre-
a basis for the
determination of particular rights in property. It
does not proceed, therefore, upon the prinmere aggregation, which advances em-
ciple of
pirically
from the parts
to the whole, but
from
the necessary formal principle of a division of
the soil according to conceptions of right. In
accordance
with
principle,
this
the
supreme
universal proprietor cannot have any private
property in any part of the soil; for otherwise he would make himself a private person. Private property
in the soil
belongs only to the people,
taken distributively and not collectively; from which condition, however, a nomadic people
must be excepted at all in the soil.
as having
no private property
The supreme
proprietor ac-
cordingly ought not to hold private
estates,
either for private use or for the support of the court. For, as
pleasure
would be
how in
it
would depend upon
his
own
far these should extend, the state
danger of seeing
all
property in the
land taken into the hands of the government,
and soil
all
bondsmen of the As possessors only of
the subjects treated as
(glebae adscripti).
what was the private property of another, they might thus be deprived of all freedom and regarded as serfs or slaves. Of the supreme pro-
may
be said that he possesses nothing as his own, except himself; for if he possessed things in the state alongside of others, dispute and litigation would be possible with these others regarding those things, and there would be no independent judge to settle the cause. But it may also be said that he possesses everything; for he has the supreme right of sovereignty over the whole people, to whom prietor of the land,
it
the church, are both subject to this relation.
They can never be privileges with
entitled
which they
by any hereditary
may
be favoured, to acquire an absolute property in the soil transmissible to their successors. They can only acquire the use of such property for the time be-
opinion has ceased, on account of other arrangements, to impel the state to proing. If public
from negligence in the national defence by appeal to the military honour of the knightly order, the estates granted on that contect itself
dition may be recalled. And, in like manner, the church lands or spiritualities may be reclaimed by the state without scruple, if public opinion has ceased to impel the members of the state to maintain masses for the souls of the dead, prayers for the living, and a multitude of clergy, as means to protect themselves from eternal fire. But in both cases, the condition of indemnifying existing interests must be observed. Those who in this connection fall under the movement of reform are not entitled to complain that their property is taken from them; for the foundation of their previous possession lay only in the opinion of the people, and it can be valid only so long as this opinion lasts. As soon as this public opinion in favour of such institutions dies out, or is even extinguished in the judgement of those who have the greatest claim by their acknowledged merit to lead and
represent tion
must
it,
the putative proprietorship in ques-
cease, as
if
by a public appeal made
male injormato ad regem melius injormandum). On this primarily acquired supreme propriregarding
it
to the state (a rege
etorship in the land rests the right of the sovereign, as universal proprietor of the country,
to assess the private proprietors of
the
soil,
and to demand taxes, excise, and dues, or the performance of service to the state such as may be required in war. But this is to be done so that it is actually the people that assess them-
OF RIGHT selves, this being the
only
mode
through the
who
medium
be effected
body of deputies
of the
represent the people. It
of proceeding
may
according to laws of right. This
also permissible,
is
circumstances in which the state is in imminent danger, to proceed by a forced loan, as a right vested in the sovereign, although this may
in
be a divergence from the existing law. Upon this principle is also founded the right of administering the national
economy, includ-
The
ing the finance and the police.
police has
specially to care for the public safety, conven-
and decency. As regards the
ience,
—
last of these
the feeling or negative taste for public pro-
priety
—
by such
it is
important that
be not deadened
it
influences as begging, disorderly noises,
offensive smells, public prostitution
{Venus vul-
443
For the existence of persons with property in the state implies their submission under it for protection and the provision by the state of what is necessary for their existence; and accordingly the state founds a right upon an obligation on their part to contribute of their means for the preservation of their fellowcitizens. This may be carried out by taxing the property or the commercial industry of the citizens, or by establishing funds and drawing interest from them, not for the wants of the state as such, which is rich, but for those of the people. And this is not to be done merely by voluntary contributions, but by compulsory exactions as state-burdens, for
we
are here con-
sidering only the right of the state in relation
Among
to the people.
the voluntary
modes of
givaga), or other offences against the moral
raising such contributions, lotteries ought not
greatly facilitates the government
to be allowed, because they increase the number of those who are poor, and involve danger
sense, as
it
in the task of regulating the life of the people
by
to the public property. It
law.
may
be asked whether
state there fur-
the relief of the poor ought to be administered
a right of inspection (jus in-
out of current contributions, so that every age
spections), which entitles the public authority
should maintain its own poor; or whether this were better done by means of permanent funds and charitable institutions, such as widows' homes, hospitals, etc.? And if the former method is the better, it may also be considered whether the means necessary are to be raised by a legal assessment rather than by begging, which is generally nigh akin to robbing. The former method must in reality be regarded as the only one that is conformable to the right of the state, which cannot withdraw its connection from any one who has to live. For a legal current provision does not make the profession of poverty a means of gain for the indolent, as is to be
For the preservation of the ther belongs to to see that
gious, exists
it
no secret
among
society, political or reli-
the people that can exert a
upon the public weal. Acrequired by the police, no such secret society may refuse to lay open its constitution. But the visitation and search of private houses by the police can only be justified in a case of necessity; and in every particular instance, it must be authorized by a higher
prejudicial influence
cordingly,
when
it is
authority.
Relief of the Poor. Foundling Hospitals.
C.
The Church
poses essentially connected with their own preservation. Such are, in particular, the relief of
is the case with pious foundations when they grow with the number of the poor; nor can it be charged with being an unjust or unrighteous burden imposed by the government on the
the poor, foundling asylums, and ecclesiastical
people.
The
sovereign, as undertaker of the duty of
the people, has the right to tax
them
for pur-
feared
establishments, otherwise designated charitable
i.
by
The people have
their
common
in fact united themselves
will into
a society, which has
to be perpetually maintained
;
and for
this pur-
pose they have subjected themselves to the internal power of the state, in order to preserve the members of this society even when they are not able to support themselves. By the fundamental principle of the state, the government is justified
and entitled to compel those who are
able, to furnish the
means necessary
to preserve
who are not themselves capable of providing for the most necessary wants of nature. those
2.
The
state has also a right to
impose upon
the people the duty of preserving children ex-
or pious foundations.
posed from want or shame, and who would otherwise perish for it cannot knowingly allow this increase of its power to be destroyed, however ;
unwelcome a
difficult
most
in
some respects
may be. But it is how this may
it
question to determine
justly be carried out. It might be consid-
ered whether
it
would not be right to exact confrom the unmarried
tributions for this purpose
persons of both sexes who are possessed of means, as being in part responsible for the evil;
and further, whether the end best carried out
in
by foundling
view would be hospitals, or in
THE SCIENCE
444
what other way consistent with
right.
But
this is
the
humanity
in their
And
a problem of which no solution has yet been offered that does not in some measure offend
highest rights.
against right or morality.
ters for the people.
3.
is here regarded as an ecclesiestablishment merely, and as such it
The church
astical
must be carefully distinguished from religion, which as an internal mode of feeling lies wholly beyond the sphere of the action of the civil power. Viewed as an institution for public worto whose opinion ship founded for the people the church esor conviction it owes its origin tablishment responds to a real want in the state. This is the need felt by the people to regard themselves as also subjects of a Supreme Invisible Power to which they must pay homage,
—
and which
may
—
often be brought into a very un-
desirable collision with the civil power.
The
cannot of
own persons and
to their
therefore the supreme power
itself resolve
and decree
in these
As regards the
mat-
cost of main-
taining the ecclesiastical establishment, for similar
reasons this must be derived not from the
from the section
public funds of the state, but of the people
who
profess the particular faith of
the church; and thus only ought burden on the community.
it
to fall as a
D. The Right of Assigning Offices and Dignities the State
in
The
supreme authority
right of the
in the
state also includes: 1.
The
distribution of offices, as public and
paid employments;
The conferring
not to be regarded as the right of constitu-
of dignities, as unpaid disfounded merely on honour, but establishing a gradation of higher and lower
tional legislation in the church, so as to organize
orders in the political scale; the latter, although
may seem most advantageous for itself, or prescribe and command its faith and ritual
under obligation determined by the public law to obey the former so far as they are also entitled to command; 3. Besides these relatively beneficent rights,
state has therefore a right in this relation; but it
it
to
is
as
forms of worship (ritus) left entirely to
for
;
all this
must be
the teachers and rulers which
the church has chosen for itself.
The function
of the state in this connection, only includes the
2.
tinctions of rank,
free in themselves, being
the supreme
As regards
negative right of regulating the influence of these public teachers upon the visible political
monwealth, that
it
may
com-
not be prejudicial to the
public peace and tranquillity. Consequently the state has to take measures,
on occasion of any
internal conflict in the church, or on occasion of
any
collision of the several
other, that civil concord
is
churches with each
not endangered; and
province of the police. beneath the dignity of the supreme power
this right falls within the
It is
to interpose in determining
what particular
faith
the church shall profess, or to decree that a cer-
and that the For in doing so. the supreme power would be mixing itself up in a scholastic wrangle, on a footing of equality with its subjects; the monarch would be making himself a priest; and the churchmen might even reproach the supreme power with understanding nothing about matters of faith. Especially would this hold in respect of any prohibition of internal reform in the church; for what the people as a whole cannot determine upon for themselves cannot be determined for the people by the legislator. But no people can ever rationally determine that they will never advance farther tain faith shall be unalterably held,
church
may
not reform
itself.
power
in the state
is
also invested
with the right of administering punishment. civil offices, the
question arises as
whether the sovereign has the right, after bestowing an office on an individual, to take it again away at his mere pleasure, without any crime having been committed by the holder of the office. I say, "No." For what the united will of the people would never resolve, regarding their civil officers, cannot (constitutionally) be determined by the sovereign regarding them. The people have to bear the cost incurred by the appointment of an official, and undoubtedly it must be their will that any one in office should be completely competent for its duties. But such competency can only be acquired by a long preparation and training, and this process would necessarily occupy the time that would be required for acquiring the means of support by a different occupation. Arbitrary and frequent changes would therefore, as a rule, have to
the effect of filling offices with functionaries
who
have not acquired the skill required for their duties, and whose judgements had not attained maturity by practice. All this is contrary to the purpose of the state. And besides it is requisite in the interest of the
possible
people that
for every individual
to
it
should be
rise
from a
in their insight into matters of faith, or resolve
lower
that they will never reform the institutions of
would otherwise fall into incompetent hands, and that competent officials generally should
the church; because this would be opposed to
office to the
higher
offices, as
these latter
;
OF RIGHT Civil dignities include not only such as are
but also those the possessors of them, without any
connected with a public
office,
which make accompanying services
to the state,
a higher class or rank.
The
members
of
latter constitute the
whose members are distinguished from the common citizens who form the mass of the people. The rank of the nobility is inherited by male descendants; and these again communicate it to wives who are not nobly born. Female nobility,
descendants of noble families, however, do not communicate their rank to husbands who are not of noble birth, but they descend themselves into the common civil status of the people. This being
so,
the question then emerges as to wheth-
er the sovereign has the right to
found a heredi-
tary rank and class, intermediate between himself
and the other citizens? The import of
question does not turn on whether
it
is
this
con-
formable to the prudence of the sovereign, from
own and the people's interests, to have such an institution; but whether it is in accordance with the right of the people that they should have a class of persons above them, who, while being subjects like themselves, are yet born as their commanders, or at least as privileged superiors? The answer to this question, as in previous instances, is to be derived from the principle that "what the people, as constituting the whole mass of the subjects, could not determine regarding themselves and their associated citizens, cannot be constitutionally determined by the sovereign regarding regard to his
the people."
Now
a hereditary nobility
is
a
rank which takes precedence of merit and is hoped for without any good reason a thing of the imagination without genuine reality. For if an ancestor had merit, he could not transmit it to his posterity, but they must always acquire it for themselves. Nature has in fact not so arranged that the talent and will which give rise to merit in the state, are hereditary. And because it cannot be supposed of any individual that he will throw away his freedom, it is impossible that the common will of all the people should agree to such a groundless prerogative, and hence the sovereign cannot make it valid. It may happen, however, that such an anomaly as that of subjects who would be more than citizens, in the manner of born officials, or hereditary professors, has slipped into the mechanism of government in olden times, as in the case of the feudal system, which was almost entirely organized with reference to war. Under such circumstances, the state cannot deal oth-
—
445
erwise with this error of a wrongly instituted
have some guarantee of life-long provision.
rank in
its
midst, than
by the remedy of a grad-
ual extinction through hereditary positions be-
ing left unfilled as they
fall
vacant.
The
has therefore the right provisorily to nity in
title
let
state
a dig-
continue, until the public opinion
matures on the subject. And
from the threefold
this will thus pass
into
division
nobles, and people, to the twofold
sovereign,
and only nat-
ural division into sovereign and people.
No
individual in the state can indeed be enwithout dignity; for he has at least that of being a citizen, except when he has lost his civil status by a crime. As a criminal he is still maintained in life, but he is made the mere instrument of the will of another, whether it be the state or a particular citizen. In the latter position, in which he could only be placed by a juridical judgement, he would practically become a slave, and would belong as property (dominium) to another, who would be not merely his master (herus) but his owner (dominus). Such an owner would be entitled to exchange or tirely
alienate
him
him
as a thing, to use
for shameful purposes,
and
at will except
to dispose of his
powers, but not of his life and members. No one can bind himself to such a condition of dependence, as he would thereby cease to be a person, and it is only as a person that he can
make one
a contract. It may, however, appear that
man may
bind himself to another by a con-
tract of hire, to discharge a certain service that
permissible in its kind, but is left entirely undetermined as regards its measure or amount and that as receiving wages or board or protection in return, he thus becomes only a servant subject to the will of a master (subditus) and not a slave (servus). But this is an illusion. For if masters are entitled to use the powers of such subjects at will, they may exhaust these powers as has been done in the case of Negroes in the Sugar Island and they may thus reduce their servants to despair and death. But this would imply that they had actually given themselves is
—
—
away
to their masters as property; which, in the
case of persons,
is
impossible.
A
person can,
perform work that defined both in quality and quantity, either a day-labourer or as a domiciled subject. In
therefore, only contract to is
as
the latter case he
may
enter into a contract of
lease for the use of the land of a superior, giv-
ing a definite rent or annual return for
zation
by
himself, or he
may
its utili-
contract for his
service as a labourer upon the land. But he does not thereby make himself a slave, or a bondsman, or a serf attached to the soil (glebae ad-
THE SCIENCE
44 6
would thus divest himself of his personality; he can only enter into a temporary or at most a heritable lease. And even if
treatment his inborn personality has a right to protect him, even although he may be con-
by committing a crime he has personally become
found guilty and punishable, before there can be any thought of drawing from his punishment any benefit for himself or his fellow-citizens. The penal law is a categorical imperative; and woe to him who creeps through
scriptus), as he
subjected to another, this subject-condition does not become hereditary; for he has only brought it upon himself by his own wrongdoing. Neither can one who has been begotten by a slave be claimed as property on the ground of the cost of his rearing, because such rearing is an absolute duty naturally incumbent upon parents; and in case the parents be slaves, it devolves upon their masters or owners, who, in undertaking the possession of such subjects, have also made themselves responsible for the
performance of their duties. E.
The Right i.
The
of Punishing
and of Pardoning
The Right of Punishing
right of administering
right of the sovereign as the
punishment is the supreme power to
pain upon a subject on account of a crime committed by him. The head of the state caninflict
not therefore be punished; but his supremacy may be withdrawn from him. Any transgression of the public law which
makes him who com-
incapable of being a citizen, constitutes crime, either simply as a private crime
mits
it
a (crimen), or also as a public crime {crimen publicum). Private crimes are dealt with by a civil court; public crimes by a criminal court. Embezzlement or speculation of money or goods entrusted in trade, fraud in purchase or sale, if done before the eye? of the party who suffers, are private crimes. On the other hand, coining false
money
robbery,
or forging bills of exchange, theft,
etc.,
are public
crimes, because the
commonwealth, and not merely some particular individual, is endangered thereby. Such crimes
may
be divided into those of a base character and those of a violent char-
(indolis abjectae)
acter (indolis violentiae).
punishment (poena fofrom natural punishment (poena naturalis), in which crime as vice punishes itself, and does not as such come Judicial or juridical
rensis)
is
to be distinguished
within the cognizance of the legislator. Juridical
punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but must in all cases be imposed only
because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime. For one man ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another, nor be mixed
up with the subjects of
real right.
Against such
demned first
to lose his civil personality.
He must
be
the serpent-windings of utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge him from the justice of punishment, or even from the due measure of it, according to the Pharisaic
maxim:
"It
is
better that one
man
should die
than that the whole people should perish." For justice and righteousness perish, human life would no longer have any value in* the world. What, then, is to be said of such a proposal as to keep a criminal alive who has been condemned to death, on his being given to under-
if
stand that, experiments
if
he agreed to certain dangerous
performed upon him, he would be allowed to survive if he came happily through them? It is argued that physicians might thus obtain new information that would be of value to the commonweal. But a court of justice would repudiate with scorn any proposal of this kind if made to it by the medical faculty; for justice would cease to be justice, if it were bartered away for any consideration being
whatever.
But what is the mode and measure of punishment which public justice takes as its principle and standard? It is just the principle of equality, by which the pointer of the scale of justice is made to incline no more to the one side than the other. It may be rendered by saying that the undeserved evil which any one commits on another is to be regarded as perpetrated on himself. Hence it may be said: "If you slander another, you slander yourself; if you steal from another, you steal from yourself; if you strike another, you strike yourself; if you kill another, you kill yourself." This is the right of retaliaand, properly understood,
tion
(jus talionis);
it
the only principle which in regulating a
is
public court, as distinguished from
mere private
judgement, can definitely assign both the quality and the quantity of a just penalty. All other standards are wavering and uncertain; and on account of other considerations involved in them, they contain no principle conformable to the sentence of pure and strict justice. It may appear, however, that difference of social status would not admit the application of the principle of retaliation, which is that of "like with like." But although the application may not in all
OF RIGHT cases be possible according to the letter, yet as
may
always be attained in practice, by due regard being given to the disposition and sentiment of the parties in the higher social sphere. Thus a pecuniary penalty regards the effect
it
on account of a verbal injury
may have no
di-
ought to be done in order that every one may and that bloodguiltiness may not remain upon the people for otherwise they might all be regarded as particirealize the desert of his deeds,
;
pators in the murder as a public violation of justice.
The
rect proportion to the injustice of slander; for
one who
is
wealthy
may
be able to indulge him-
own
447
equalization of punishment with crime
therefore only possible
is
by the cognition of
Yet
the judge extending even to the penalty of death,
the attack committed on the honour of the party aggrieved may have its equivalent in the pain inflicted upon the pride of the aggressor,
according to the right of retaliation. This is manifest from the fact that it is only thus that
self in this offence for his
gratification.
he is condemned by the judgement of the court, not only to retract and apologize, but to submit to some meaner ordeal, as kissing the hand of the injured person. In like manner, if a man of the highest rank has violently assaulted an innocent citizen of the lower orders, he may be condemned not only to apologize but to undergo a solitary and painful imprisonment, whereby, in addition to the discomfort endured, especially
if
the vanity of the offender would be painfully affected, and the very shame of his position
would constitute an adequate
retaliation after
But how then would we render the statement: "If you steal from another, you steal from yourself?" In this way, that whoever steals anything makes the property of all insecure; he therefore robs himthe principle of "like with like."
self of all security in property,
right of retaliation.
according to the
Such a one has nothing, and
can acquire nothing, but he has the will to live; this is only possible by others supporting him. But as the state should not do this gratuitously, he must for this purpose yield his powers to the state to be used in penal labour; and thus he falls for a time, or it may be for life, into
and
a condition of slavery. But whoever has committed murder, must die. There is, in this case, no juridical substitute or surrogate, that can be given or taken for the satisfaction of justice.
There is no likeness or proportion between life, however painful, and death; and therefore there is no equality between the crime of murder and the retaliation of it but what is judicially accomplished by the execution of the criminal. His death, however, must be kept free from all maltreatment that would make the humanity suffering in his person loathsome or abominable.
Even
a civil society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its members as might be
if
supposed
—
in the case of a
people inhabiting an
island resolving to separate
and scatter them-
—
throughout the whole world the last murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out. This selves
a sentence can be pronounced over
all criminals proportionate to their internal wickedness; as
may
be seen by considering the case when the
punishment of death has to be inflicted, not on account of a murder, but on account of a political
A
crime that can only be punished capitally.
hypothetical case, founded on history, will
il-
lustrate this. In the last Scottish rebellion there
—
were various participators in it such as Balmerino and others who believed that in taking part in the rebellion they were only discharging their duty to the house of Stuart; but there were also others who were animated only by private motives and interests. Now, suppose that the judgement of the supreme court regarding them had been this: that every one should have liberty to choose between the punishment of death or penal servitude for life. In view of such an alternative, I say that the man of honour would choose death, and the knave would choose servitude. This would be the effect of their human nature as it is; for the honourable man values his honour more highly than even life itself, whereas a knave regards a life, although covered with shame, as better in his eyes than not to be. 1 The former is, without gainsaying, less guilty than the other; and they can only be proportionately punished by death being inflicted equally upon them both; yet to the one it is a mild punishment when his nobler temperament is taken into account, whereas it is a hard punishment to the other in view of his baser temperament. But, on the other hand, were they all equally condemned to penal servitude for life, the honourable man would be too severely punished, while the other, on account of his baseness of nature, would be too mildly punished. In the judgement to be pronounced over a number of criminals united in such a conspiracy, the best equalizer of punishment and crime in the form of public justice is death. And besides all this, it has never been heard of that a criminal condemned to death on account
—
1
83.
Animam "To
praeferre pudori, Juvenal. prefer life to reputation."]
[Satirae,
viii.
THE SCIENCE
448
of a murder has complained that the sentence inflicted on him more than was right and just; and any one would treat him with scorn if he
expressed himself to this effect against it. Otherwise it would be necessary to admit that, although wrong and injustice are not done to the criminal by the law, yet the legislative power is not entitled to administer this mode of punish-
ment; and
did so,
if it
it
would be
in contradic-
tion with itself.
However many they may be who have com-
what he will to
ished,
more
wills,
and
it is
be punished. if
I
impossible for any one to
To
say, "I will to be
pun-
murder any one," can mean nothing
than, "I submit myself along with
other citizens to the laws";
and
if
all
the
there are
any criminals among the people, these laws will include penal laws. The individual who, as a colegislator, enacts
penal law cannot possibly be
same person who,
as a subject, is punished according to the law; for, qua criminal, he cannot possibly be regarded as having a voice in the
the
mitted a murder, or have even commanded it, or acted as art and part in it, they ought all to suffer death; for so justice wills it, in accord-
legislation, the legislator being rationally
ance with the idea of the juridical power, as founded on the universal laws of reason. But the number of the accomplices (correi) in such
pure juridically law-giving reason (homo noumenon). which subjects him as one capable of crime, and consequently as another person (homo phenomenon), along with all the others in the civil union, to this penal law. In other words, it is not the people taken distributively,
a deed might happen to be so great that the
be without such criminals, danger of soon also being deprived of subjects. But it will not thus dissolve itself, neither must it return to the much worse constate, in resolving to
would be
in
which there would be no Nor. above all, should it deaden
viewed any one. then, enact a penal law against himself as a criminal, it must be the as just
and holy.
If
but the tribunal of public justice, as distinct
from the
criminal, that prescribes capital pun-
not to be viewed as
dition of nature, in
ishment; and
external justice.
promise of all the individuals to allow themselves to be punished, thus disposing of themselves and their lives. For if the right to punish must be grounded upon a promise of the wrongdoer, whereby he is to be regarded as being willing to be punished, it ought also to be left to him to find himself deserving of the punishment; and the criminal would thus be his own judge. The chief error
the sensibilities of the people
of justice being exhibited in the
by the spectacle mere carnage of
a slaughtering bench. In such circumstances the
sovereign must always be allowed to have his
power
to take the part of the
—
it
in
judge upon
and to deliver a judgement which, instead of the penalty of death, shall assign some other punishment to the criminals and thereby preserve a multitude
himself as a case of necessity
of the people.
The penalty
of deportation
is
relevant in this connection. Such a form of judgement cannot be carried out according to a public law, but only by an authoritative act of the royal prerogative, and it may only be
applied as an act of grace in individual cases.
Against these doctrines, the Marquis Beccaria has given forth a different view.
Moved
by the compassionate sentimentality of
mane
feeling,
he has asserted that
all
a hucapital
punishment is wrong in itself and unjust. He has put forward this view on the ground that the penalty of death could not be contained in the original civil contract; for, in that case, every
one of the people would have had to consent to if he murdered any of his fellow-
lose his life
citizens. But,
argued, such a consent is imno one can thus dispose of his own life. All this is mere sophistry and perversion of right. No one undergoes punishment because he has willed to be punished, but because he has willed a punishable action; for it is in fact no punishment when any one experiences it is
possible, because
it
is
if
the
social contract contained the
(ttp&tov \pevdos)
of this sophistry consists in
regarding the judgement of the criminal him-
by
self,
necessarily determined
he
under obligation to undergo the loss of his as a judgement that must be grounded on
is
life,
his reason, that
away
himself;
a resolution of his will to take
it
and thus the execution of the
right in question
represented as united in one and the same person with the adjudication of the right. There are, however, two crimes worthy of death, in respect of which it still remains doubtful whether the legislature have the right to deal with them capitally. It is the sentiment of is
honour that induces their perpetration. The one originates in a regard for womanly honour, the other in a regard for military honour; and in both cases there is a genuine feeling of honour incumbent on the individuals as a duty. The former is the crime of maternal infanticide (injanticidium maternale) the latter is the crime of killing a fellow-soldier in a duel (commili;
tonicidium). the
Now
shame of an
legislation cannot take
away
illegitimate birth, nor wipe off
the stain attaching from a suspicion of coward-
OF RIGHT ice, to an officer who does not resist an act that would bring him into contempt, by an effort of
449
must be
called homicide,
and not murder, which
involves evil intent (homicidium dolosum). In all instances the acts are undoubtedly punish-
by the
pardoning (jus aggratiandi),
of
right
in relation to the criminal, is the right
of mitigating or entirely remitting his punish-
On
ment.
most
the side of the sovereign this
delicate of
as
all rights,
it
may
is
the
be exercised
and yet so as to do a great wrong by it. It ought not to be exercised in application to the crimes
of the law which it is
thus born
way, its destruction might also be ignored; nor can the shame of the mother, when her unmarried confinement is known, be removed by any legal ordinance. A subordinate officer, again, on whom an insult is inflicted, sees himself comthis
by the public opinion of his associates to obtain satisfaction; and, as in the state of nature, the punishment of the offender can only be
pelled
a duel, in which his
own
life is
ex-
posed to danger, and not by means of the law in a court of justice. The duel is therefore adopted as the means of demonstrating his courage as that characteristic upon which the honour of his profession essentially rests; and this is done even if it should issue in the killing of his adversary. But as such a result takes place publicly and under the consent of both parties, although it may be done unwillingly, it cannot properly be called murder (homicidium dolosum). What then is the right in both cases as relating to criminal justice? Penal justice is here in fact brought into great straits, having apparently either to declare the notion of honour, which is certainly no mere fancy here, to be nothing in the eye of the law, or to exempt the crime from its due punishment; and thus it would become either remiss or cruel. The knot thus tied is to be resolved in the following way.
The
The viewed
of Pardoning
so as to set forth the splendour of his dignity,
properly regulates marriage, and
by
The Right
II.
su-
beyond the pale or constitutional protection of the law. Such a child is introduced, as it were, like prohibited goods, into the commonwealth, and as it has no legal right to existence in
effected
upheld among the people
illegitimate child
able; but they cannot be punished
preme power with death. An comes into the world outside
is
themselves.
own that is superior to the fear of death. Hence it appears that, in such circumstances, his
the individuals concerned are remitted to the state of nature; and their acts in both cases
which
tively to that
exempfrom punishment (impunitas criminis) would be the greatest wrong that could be done to them. It is only an occasion of some form
of the subjects against each other; for tion
of treason (crimen laesae majestatis) as a lesion .
against himself, that the sovereign should
use of this right.
And
it
make
should not be exercised
even in this connection, if the safety of the people would be endangered by remitting such punishment. This right is the only one which properly deserves the
name
ma-
of a "right of
jesty."
Juridical Relations of the
50.
Citizen to his
Country and to Other Countries. Emigration; Immigration ; Banishment ; Exile
The land virtue of
or territory
its political
whose inhabitants
—
in
constitution and without
the necessary intervention of a special juridical act
—
the
are, by birth, fellow-citizens same commonwealth, is called
and
of one
their coun-
A foreign country is one in which they would not possess this condition, but would be living abroad. If a country abroad form part of the territory under the same government as at home, it constitutes a province, try or fatherland.
according to the
Roman
usage of the term. It
does not constitute an incorporated portion of the empire (imperii) so as to be the abode of equal fellow-citizens, but
is
only a possession of
the government, like a lower house; and
it
must
therefore honour the domain of the ruling state as the
categorical imperative of penal justice, that
1.
A
"mother country" (regio domina). subject, even regarded as a citizen, has
the killing of any person contrary to the law
the right of emigration; for the state cannot re-
must be punished with death, remains in force; but the legislation itself and the civil constitu-
only carry
tion generally, so long as they are
tinguished from his fixed possessions. However,
and incomplete, are
at fault.
And
still
barbarous
this is the rea-
son why the subjective motive-principles of honour among the people do not coincide with the standards which are objectively conformable to another purpose; so that the public justice issuing
from the
state
becomes
injustice rela-
tain
him
as
if
he were
its
away with him
property. But he his
moveables as
may dis-
is entitled to sell his immovable property, and take the value of it in money with him. 2. The supreme power, as master of the country, has the right to favour immigration and the settlement of strangers and colonists. This will hold even although the natives of the country
he
!
THE SCIENCE
450
may
be unfavourably disposed to is not diminished or
their pri-
it, if
vate property in the soil
in-
who
In the case of a subject
ted a crime that renders low-citizens with
him
has commit-
society of his fel-
all
prejudicial to the state,
supreme power has also the right of inflicting banishment to a country abroad. By such deportation, he does not acquire any share in the rights of citizens of the territory to which the
he
banished.
is
The supreme power has
4.
imposing a citizen
is
And
because
authority thus withdraws
from the
by which
sent abroad into the wide world as
"out-land."
the
also the right of
exile generally (jus exilii),
citizen, this
all
amounts
supreme
the
legal
an "outlaw" within the territory of his own country.
complex of all by uniting the will of all so as to form a people; and then it has to appoint a sovereign over this common union, which sovereign is no other than the united will
ochlocracy, as well as the discussion of the so-
mixed constitutions, may be passed over
called
here as not essential, and as leading into too
much
detail.
As regards the administration
is
be said that the simplest mode is also the best; but as regards its bearing on right itself, it is also the most dangerous for the peo-
view of the despotism to which simplic-
realiza-
said that the people should be satisfied with the
;
which and viewed
the objective practical
This supreme bead is the sovereign; but conceived only as a representation of the whole state.
people, the idea
still
requires physical embodi-
ment in a person, who may exhibit the supreme power of the state and bring the idea actively to bear upon the popular will. The relation of the supreme power to the people is conceivable in three different
rules over all;
forms: either one in the state
or some, united in relation of
equality with each other, rule over ers;
or
is
tocratic,
or is
the othall
The form
dividually, including themselves.
the state
narchic
all
together rule over each and
all
of
whereas the former merely represents
the sovereignty. It
is
evident that an autocracy
An
is
state,
one only
the simplest
being consti-
as king, to the peo-
who
is
the lawgiv-
form of government, is, however, compounded of the union of two reer.
racy,
monarchy, regarded as an autoc-
the best political constitution,
is
monarch
is
good, that
But
as well as the will to do right.
evasion and belongs to the
that "the best constitution
is
is
the
mere
class of wise
amounts to saying that by which the
supreme administrator of the is,
this is a
common
tautological phrases. It only
best ruler"; that
if
he has the judgement
is, if
state
is
made
the
that the best constitution
the best 52. Historical Origin
A Pure It is
and Changes.
Republic. Representative
Government
vain to inquire into the historical origin
of the political
mechanism;
for
it is
no longer
possible to discover historically the point of time at
which
civil
society took
its
beginning. Sav-
ages do not draw up a documentary record of their having submitted themselves to law;
and
may be inferred from the nature of uncivilized men that they must have set out from a state of violence. To prosecute such an inquiry
it
form of government in the tuted by the relation of one, ple, so that there is
reflection that
The expression mo-
not so suitable as autocratic for the
conception here intended; for a monarch is one who has the highest power, an autocrat is one who has all power, so that this latter is the sovereign,
plification in the
in-
therefore either autocratic, or aris-
democratic.
of right in the
may
state, it
supreme head of the
emanates from the a priori reason it
considera-
undoubtedly a rational maxim to aim at simmachinery which is to unite the people under compulsory laws, and this would be secured were all the people to be passive and to obey only one person over them; but the method would not give subjects who were also citizens of the state. It is sometimes
lations of the united will of the people
such
The
is
conception of a public government generally (res publica latius dicta), are only so many re-
as
itself.
in
ity of administration so naturally gives rise. It
three powers in the state, involved in the
tion of the pure idea of a
ways
which these forms are adulterated by the intrusion of violent and illegitimate usurpers of power, as in oligarchy and tion of the
ple, in
The Three Forms of the State. Autocracy; Aristocracy ; Democracy 51.
The
democracy, again, is the most the forms of the state, for it has
to begin
protection
making him
to
power
A
to the people.
terfered with. 3.
other as the lawgivers, thereby constituting the sovereignty, and that of this sovereign
aristocracy, as a
lations: that of the nobles in relation to
one an-
in the intention of finding a pretext for altering
no less would amount to revolution, that could only be carried out by an insurrection of the people, and the existing constitution
than penal. For such a
by violence
mode
is
of alteration
OF RIGHT not by constitutional modes of legislation. But insurrection against an already existing constitution, is an overthrow of all civil and juridical
and of
relations, is
right generally;
not a mere alteration of the
but a dissolution of
it.
It
mode
to
a
of
transition
and hence
it
civil constitution,
would thus form a better
constitution
by palingenesis and not by mere metamorphosis; and it would require a new social contract, upon which the former original contract, as then annulled, would have no influence. It
must, however, be possible for the sover-
eign to change the existing constitution,
if it is
not actually consistent with the idea of the orig-
In doing so
inal contract.
it is
essential to give
form of government which will properly constitute the people into a state. Such a change cannot be made by the state deliberately altering its constitution from one of the three forms to one of the other two. For examexistence to that
ple, political
by
changes should not be carried out
the aristocrats combining to subject them-
selves to an autocracy, or resolving to fuse into a democracy, or conversely; as
pended on the arbitrary choice and sovereign what constitution he the people. For, even
if
it
all
de-
liking of the
may impose on
as sovereign he resolved
if
democracy, he might be doing wrong to the people, because they might hold such a constitution in abhorrence, and regard either of the other two as to alter the constitution into a
more suitable The forms
to
them
of the state are only the letter
may
therefore remain so long
as they are considered,
the only enduring political con-
is
it the law is itself sovereign, and no longer attached to a particular person. This is the ultimate end of all public right, and the state in which every citizen can have what is his own peremptorily assigned to him. But so long as the form of the state has to be represented, according to the letter, by many different moral persons invested with the supreme power, there can only be a provisory internal right, and not an absolutely juridical state of
stitution, as in
is
civil society.
Every
true republic
is
and can only be consti-
tuted by a representative system of the people.
Such a representative system is instituted in name of the people, and is constituted by all the citizens
being united
means of
together,
order,
in
by
and secure But as soon as a supreme head of
their deputies, to protect
their rights.
the state in person
—be
it
as king, or nobility,
body of the people in a democratic becomes also representative, the united
or the whole
union
—
people
then
does
not
merely represent the
sovereignty, but they are themselves sovereign. It is in the
people that the supreme power orig-
and it is accordingly from this power that all the rights of individual citizens as mere subjects, and especially as officials of the state, must be derived. When the sovereigninally resides,
ty of the people themselves
republic
is
established; and
is
thus realized, the
it is
no longer nec-
essary to give up the reins of government into
in the circumstances.
(littera) of the original constitution in the civil
union; and they
451
This
letter.
from ancient and long
the hands of those
by
whom
they have been
hitherto held, especially as they might again
destroy
all
the
new
institutions
by
their arbi-
trary and absolute will.
habit (and therefore only subjectively), to be
necessary to the machinery of the political con-
But the (anima pacti
that original con-
stitution.
spirit of
tract
originarii) contains
and im-
poses the obligation on the constituting power
make
mode
It was therefore a great error in judgement on the part of a powerful ruler in our time, when he tried to extricate himself from the embarrass-
ment
arising
from great public
debts,
by
trans-
government conform-
ferring this burden to the people, and leaving
if this cannot be effected change it gradually and continuously till it harmonize in its working with the only rightful constitution, which is that of a pure republic. Thus the old empirical and statutory forms, which serve only to effect the political subjection of the people, will be resolved into the original and rational forms which alone take freedom as their principle, and even as the condition of all compulsion and constraint. Compul-
to undertake and distribute them among themselves as they might best think fit. It thus became natural that the legislative power, not only in respect of the taxation of the subjects,
to
able to
the
its
of the
idea; and,
at once, to
sion
is
in fact requisite for the realization of
a
juridical constitution, according to the proper
idea of the state; and
it
will lead at last to the
realization of that idea, even according to the
them
but in respect of the government, should come into the hands of the people. It was requisite that they should be able to prevent the incurring of new debts by extravagance or war; and in consequence, the supreme power of the monarch entirely disappeared, not by being merely suspended, but by passing over in fact to the people, to whose legislative will the property of every subject thus became subjected. Nor can it be said that a tacit and yet obligatory prom-
THE SCIENCE
452
ise must be assumed as having, under such circumstances, been given by the national assembly, not to constitute themselves into a sov-
ing perpetual peace.
The
difference
right of individual
men
or families as related
ereignty, but only to administer the affairs of
right of the nations
each other
to
between the
in the state of nature,
among
and the
themselves, consists
the sovereign for the time, and after this was
in this, that in the right of nations
government again into the monarch's hands. Such a supposed contract would be null and void. The right of the supreme legislation in the commonwealth is not an alienable right, but is the most person-
consider not merely a relation of one state to
done
al
of
to deliver the reins of the
all
rights.
Whoever
possesses
it
can only
dispose by the collective will of the people, in respect of the people; he cannot dispose in re-
spect of the collective will
ultimate foundation of
all
itself,
which
is
the
public contracts.
back their
of another state, as well as to that state as a
whole. This difference, however, between the right of nations
The Right
II.
of
is
"No
a contradiction.
54.
Nations and Inter-
Law. (Jus Gentium) Nature and Division of the Right of Nations
The
individuals,
who make up
a people,
may
be regarded as natives of the country sprung by natural descent from a common ancestry (congeniti), although this in detail. Again,
they
may not hold entirely true may be viewed according
and juridical relation, as born of a common political mother, the republic, so that they constitute, as it were, a public family or nation (gens, natio) whose members are all related to each other as citizens of the state. As members of a state, they do not mix with
The elements
those
who
live beside
them
States,
1.
ages
savages, on account of have chosen, regard themselves as superior to civilized peoples; and they constitute tribes and even races, but not states. The public right of states (jus publicum civitatum), in their relations to one another, is what we have to consider under the designation of the "right of nations." Wherever a state, viewed as a moral person, acts in relation to another existing in the condition of natural freedom, and consequently in a state of continual war, such right takes it
—are naturally
3.
An
be divided into:
1. the right of going war; and 3. right after war, the object of which is to constrain the nations mutually to pass from this state of war and to found a common constitution establish-
to war;
2.
right during
it;
alliance of nations, in accordance with
the idea of an original social contract,
is
neces-
sary to protect each other against external aggression and attack, but not involving interfer-
ence with their several internal
difficulties
and
disputes; 4.
This mutual connection by alliance must
dispense with a distinct sovereign power, such as
is
set
up
in the civil constitution;
it
can only
take the form of a federation, which as such
may be revoked on any occasion, and must consequently be renewed from time to time. This is therefore a right which comes in as an accessory (in subsidium) of another original order to prevent the nations from fallfrom right and lapsing into the state of actual war with each other. It thus issues in the idea of a foedus amphictyonum. right, in
ing
right of nations in relation to the state
may
in their exter-
like lawless sav-
in a non-juridical condition;
tually to pass out of
55.
The
—
This natural condition
rise.
of war
viewed as nations,
is a state of war in which the right of the stronger prevails; and although it may not in fact be always found as a state of actual war and incessant hostility, and although no real wrong is done to any one therein, yet the condition is wrong in itself in the highest degree, and the nations which form states contiguous to each other are bound mu-
in the state of na-
Yet these the lawless freedom they
of the right of nations are as
nal relations to one another
to the intellectual
ture, considering such to be ignoble.
Elements of the Right of Nations
follows:
2.
national 53.
in
A
be consistent with their position as a legislative power, and yet it would be made binding upon
one can serve two masters,"
and the right of individuals
mere state of nature, requires to be determined by elements which can easily be deduced from the conception of the latter. the
would be bound authority again, would not
the people; which, on the principle that
to
another as a whole, but also the relation of the individual persons in one state to the individuals
contract, by which the people to give
we have
We
Right of Going to War as related to the Subjects of the State
have then to consider,
in the first place,
the original right of free states to go to
war
with each other as being still in a state of nature, but as exercising this right in order to establish some condition of society approaching
OF RIGHT the juridical state. And, tion arises as to
tion to its to
own
make war
their property
what
first
of
all,
the ques-
right the state has in rela-
subjects, to use
them
in order
employ
against other states, to
and even
their lives for this pur-
them to hazard and such a way that it does not depend upon their own personal judgement whether they will march into the field of war pose, or at least to expose
danger; and
all
this in
or not, but the supreme
command
of the sov-
ereign claims to settle and dispose of
them
thus.
This right appears capable of being easily established. It may be grounded upon the right which every one has to do with what is his own as he will. Whatever one has made substantially for himself, he holds as his incontestable property. The following, then, is such a deduction as a mere jurist would put forward. There are various natural products in a country which, as regards the number and quantity in which they exist, must be considered as spe-
453
own, to war, as if it were to the chase, and even to march them to the field of battle, as if it were on a pleasure excursion. This principle of right may be supposed to float dimly before the mind of the monarch, and it certainly holds true at least of the lower animals which may become the property of man. But such a principle will not at all apply to men, especially when viewed as citizens who must be tions of his
regarded as members of the state, with a share in the legislation,
and not merely as means for
others but as ends in themselves.
must give
resentatives,
war
As such they
their free consent, through their rep-
not only to the carrying on of
generally, but to every separate declara-
tion of war;
and
it is
only under this limiting
condition that the state has a right to
demand
their services in undertakings so full of danger.
cially
We would therefore deduce this right rather from the duty of the sovereign to the people than conversely. Under this relation, the people must be regarded as having given their sanction;
state; for the country
and, having the right of voting, they
produced (artefacta) by the work of the would not yield them to such extent were it not under the constitution of the state and its regular administrative government, or if the inhabitants were still living in
to themselves individually, to
—
most useful of their kind swine, and such like, would either be used up as necessary food or destroyed by beasts of prey in the district in which I live, so that they would entirely the
disappear, or be found in very scant supplies,
were
it
not for the government securing to the
inhabitants their acquisitions and property. This
holds likewise of the population
itself,
as
we
American deserts; and even were the greatest industry applied in those which is not yet done there might be regions but a scanty population. The inhabitants of any country would be but sparsely sown here and there were it not for the protection of government; because without it they could not spread themselves with their households upon a territory which was always in danger of being devastated by enemies or by wild beasts of prey; and see in the case of the
—
—
further, so great a multitude of
men
as
now
live
any one country could not otherwise obtain sufficient means of support. Hence, as it can be said of vegetable growths, such as potatoes, in
as well as of domesticated animals, that because
the abundance in which they are found
is
a
product of human labour, they may be used, destroyed, and consumed by man; so it seems that it may be said of the sovereign, as the supreme power in the state, that he has the right to lead his subjects, as being for the most part produc-
be
be active in so far
as they represent the sovereignty
the state of nature. Sheep, cattle, domestic fowl
—
may
considered, although thus passive in reference
56.
War
Right of Going to
itself.
in relation
to Hostile States
Viewed as in the state of nature, the right of nations to go to war and to carry on hostilities is the legitimate way by which they prosecute their rights by their own power when they regard themselves as injured and this is done because in that state the method of a juridical process, although the only one proper to settle such disputes, cannot be adopted. ;
The threatening of war is to be distinguished from the active injury of a first aggression, which again is distinguished from the general outbreak of hostilities. A threat or menace may be given by the active preparation of armaments, upon which a right of prevention (jus praeventionis) is founded on the other side, or merely by the formidable increase of the power of another state (potestas tremenda) by acquisition of territory. Lesion of a less powerful country may be involved merely in the condition of a more powerful neighbour prior to any action at all; and in the state of nature an attack under such circumstances would be warrantable. This international relation is the foundation of the right of equilibrium, or of the "balance of power," among all the states that are in active contiguity to each other.
The
right to go to
war
is
constituted
by any
J
THE SCIENCE
454
overt act of injury. This includes any arbitrary retaliation or act of reprisal (retorsio) as a satisfaction taken by one people for an offence
committed by another, without any attempt being
made
to obtain reparation in a peaceful
Such an act of
retaliation
way.
would be similar
in
state would thus make itself unfit to be regarded as a person capable of participating in equal rights in the international relations according to the right of nations. Among these forbidden means are to be reckoned the appointment of subjects to act as spies, or engaging subjects or
kind to an outbreak of hostilities without a previous declaration of war. For if there is to be any right at all during the state of war, some-
even strangers to act as assassins, or poisoners (in which class might well be included the so-
thing analogous to a contract must be assumed,
dividuals), or even employing agents to spread
called sharpshooters
who
word,
lurk in
ambush
for in-
forbidden to use any
involving acceptance on the side of the declara-
false news. In a
on the other, and amounting to the fact that they both will to seek their right in this way.
such malignant and perfidious means as would destroy the confidence which would be requi-
tion
The determination in war. is the
most
site to establish a lasting
War
Right during
57.
difficult
right
it is
very dif-
way
of forcibly depriving individuals of their
problem of the is
even to form a conception of such a right, or to think of any law in this lawless state withficult
out falling into a contradiction. Inter lent leges. 1 It
must then be
arma
si-
just the right to
carry on war according to such principles as
render
it
always
still
possible to pass out of that
natural condition of the states in their external relations to each other,
and
to enter into a con-
and contributions upon
property. For this would be robbery, seeing
posed on the country or the province
of independent states against each
lum punitivum). For punishment
is
only in place
under the relation of a superior (imperantis) to a subject (subditum) and this is not the relation of the states to one another. Neither can an international war be "a war of extermination" (bellum internicinum) nor even "a war of subjugation" (bellum subjugatorium); for this would issue in the moral extinction of a state by its people being either fused into one mass with the conquering state, or being reduced ;
,
Not
it
was not the conquered people but the state under whose government they were placed that carried on the war by means of them. All exactions should be raised by regular requisition, and receipts ought to be given for them, in order that when peace is restored the burden im-
58.
other can rightly be a war of punishment (bel-
to slavery.
a
may
be
proportionately borne.
dition of right.
No war
peace thereafter.
war
to impose exactions conquered enemy; but not legitimate to plunder the people in the
It is permissible in
of what constitutes right
of nations and international law. It
it is
that this necessary
attaining to a condition of peace
means of
is itself
con-
tradictory to the right of a state; but because the idea of the right of nations includes merely the conception of an antagonism that
is
in ac-
The right the moment
Right after
War
that follows after war, begins at of the treaty of peace and refers
to the consequences of the war.
lays
down
The conqueror
the conditions under which he will
agree with the conquered power to form the
conclusion of peace. Treaties are drawn up; not indeed according to any right that
it
per-
him to protect, on account of an alleged lesion by his opponent, but as taking this question upon himself, he bases the right to decide it upon his own power. Hence the conqueror may not demand restitution of the cost of the war; because he would then have to declare the war of his opponent to be unjust. And even tains to
although he should adopt such an argument, he not entitled to apply it; because he would have to declare the war to be punitive, and he
cordance with principles of external freedom, in order that the state may maintain what is properly its own. but not that it may acquire a condition which, from the aggrandizement of its power, might become threatening to other
is
states.
out regard to equality of numbers. Neither the conquered state nor its subjects
Defensive measures and means of are allowable to a state that
1
["Id
Cicero.
the
them midst
unfit of
kinds
forced to war,
is
except such as by their use would jects using
all
would thus
in
turn
inflict
an injury. To
this right
belongs also the exchange of prisoners, which is to be carried out without ransom and with-
lose their political liberty
by conquest of the
make
the sub-
country, so as that the former should be de-
to be citizens;
for the
graded to a colony, or the latter to slaves; for otherwise it would have been a penal war. which is contradictory in itself. A colony or a prov-
arms the
laws are
silent."
OF RIGHT ince
by
constituted
is
own
constitution,
a people
legislation,
which has its and territory,
where persons belonging to another state are merely strangers, but which is nevertheless subject to the supreme executive power of another state. This other state is called the mother-country. It is ruled as a daughter, but has at the same time its own form of government, as in a separate parliament under the presidency of a viceroy (civitas hybridd). Such was Athens in relation to different islands; and such is at present (1796) the relation of Great Britain to Ireland. Still less
institution,
war; for
can slavery be deduced as a rightful from the conquest of a people in
this
would assume that the war was of
a punitive nature.
And
least of all
can a basis
be found in war for a hereditary slavery, which is absurd in itself, since guilt cannot be in-
from the criminality of another.
herited
Further, that an amnesty
is
involved in the is already im-
of public treaties, with regard to which it may be assumed that any such violation concerns all nations by threatening their freedom, and that they are thus summoned to unite against such
away the power of commitBut this does not include the right to partition and appropriate the country, so as to make a state as it were disappear from the earth; for this would be an injustice to the peoa wrong and to take
ting
in
peace when war
is
in
the neighbourhood, or the right of neutrality. 2. The right to have peace secured so that it
may
that 3.
to a in
is,
continue
when
it
has been concluded,
the right of guarantee.
The
right of the several states to enter in-
mutual
common
alliance, so as to
against
all
defend themselves
external or even internal
attacks. This right of federation, however, does not extend to the formation of any league for external aggression or internal aggrandizement. 60.
The
Right as against an Unjust
Enemy
right of a state against an unjust
enemy
has no limits, at least in respect of quality as distinguished from quantity or degree. In other words, the injured state may use not, indeed
—
—
any means, but yet all those means that are permissible and in reasonable measure in so far as they are in its power, in order to assert its
own. But what then is an to the conceptions of the right of nations, when, as holds generally of the state of nature, every state is judge in its own cause? It is one whose publicly expressed will, whether in word or deed, betrays a maxim which, if it were taken as a universal rule, would make a state of peace among the nations impossible, and would necessarily perpetuate the state of nature. Such is the violation right to
unjust
what
is
its
enemy according
to
unite into
lose their original
a
war.
may
be said that the expression in the state of nature" is pleonastic; for the state of nature is itself a state of injustice. A just enemy would be one to whom I would do wrong in offering resistance; but such a one would really not be my Further,
it
"an unjust enemy
enemy.
The
are:
who cannot
commonwealth, and to adopt such a new constitution as by its nature would be unfavourable to the inclination for right
Perpetual Peace and a Permanent Congress of Nations
61.
The Rights of Peace
The rights of peace 1. The right to be
it.
ple of that state,
conclusion of a treaty of peace plied in the very idea of a peace. 59.
455
natural state of nations as well as of in-
dividual
men
out
in order to
of,
is
a state which
Hence, before right of nations
it is
transition
this
and
a
duty to pass
enter into a legal state.
all
occurs,
all
the
the external property
of states acquirable or maintainable
by war are
merely provisory; and they can only become peremptory in a universal union of states analogous to that by which a nation becomes a state. It is thus only that a real state of peace could be established. But with the too great extension of such a union of states over vast regions, any government of it, and consequently the protection of its individual members, must at last become impossible; and thus a multitude of such corporations would again bring round a state of war. Hence the perpetual peace, which is the ultimate end of all the right of nations, becomes in fact an impracticable idea. The political principles, however, which aim at such an end, and which enjoin the formation of such unions among the states as may promote a continuous approximation to a perpetual peace, are not impracticable; they are as practicable as this approximation itself, which is a practical problem involving a duty, and founded upon the right of individual
Such a union of
men and
states.
maintain be called a permanent congress of nations; and it is free to every neighbouring state to join in it. A union of this kind, so far
peace,
states, in order to
may
at least as regards the formalities of the right
THE SCIENCE
456
of nations in respect of the preservation of peace, was presented in the first half of this cen-
Assembly of the States-General at In this Assembly most of the EuroHague. the pean courts, and even the smallest republics, brought forward their complaints about the hostilities which were carried on by the one against the other. Thus the whole of Europe appeared tury, in the
federated state, accepted as umpire by the several nations in their public differences. But in place of this agreement, the like a single
of nations afterwards survived only in
right
books;
it
disappeared from the cabinets,
force had been already used, in
the
it
or, after
was relegated
form of theoretical deductions
to the
may
It
appear that seas put nations out of
all
communion with each other. But this is not so; for by means of commerce, seas form the happiest
And
natural provision the
more
for their
intercourse.
there are of neighbouring coast-
lands, as in the case of the Mediterranean Sea,
intercourse becomes the
this
more animated.
And hence communications with such
lands, es-
where there are settlements upon them connected with the mother countries giving occasion for such communications, bring it about that evil and violence committed in one place of our globe are felt in all. Such possible abuse pecially
obscurity of archives.
By
an attempt in this direction, while a foreign nation would not be entitled to treat them on this account as enemies. This right, in so far as it relates to a possible union of all nations, in respect of certain laws universally regulating their intercourse with each other, may be called "cosmopolitical right" (jus cosmopoliticum).
such a congress
is
here meant only a vol-
combination of different states that would be dissoluble at any time, and not such a union as is embodied in the United States of America, founded upon a political constitution, and therefore indissoluble. It is only by a congress of this kind that the idea of a public right of nations can be established, and that the settlement of their differences by the mode of a civil process, and not by the barbarous means of war, can be realized. untary
cannot, however, annul the right of
man
as a
world to attempt to enter into communion with all others, and for this purpose to visit all the regions of the earth, although citizen of the
does not constitute a right of settlement territory of another people (jus in-
this
upon the colatus),
for
which a special contract
is
re-
quired.
The Universal Right
III.
of
But the question
Mankind.
ple 62.
The
Nature and Conditions of Cosmo political Right
may come
raised as to whether, in
all
may
claim the right to settle (accolatus),
and to occupy possessions
in the
neighbourhood
of another people that has already settled in
rational idea of a universal, peaceful,
not yet friendly, union of
is
the case of newly discovered countries, a peo-
(Jus Cosmopoliticum)
the nations
if
upon
that region; and to do this without their consent.
tinguished from philanthropic or ethical prin-
Such a right is indubitable, if the new settlement takes place at such a distance from the seat of the former that neither would restrict
ciples.
Nature has enclosed them altogether
or injure the other in the use of their territory.
within
definite
the earth that
with each other,
is
into active relations
a juridical principle, as dis-
boundaries,
in
virtue
of
the
form of their abode as a globus terraqueus; and the possession of the soil upon which an inhabitant of the earth may live can spherical
only be regarded as possession of a part of a limited whole and, consequently, as a part to which every one has originally a right. Hence
But
in the case of
nomadic peoples, or
tribes of
shepherds and hunters (such as the Hottentots, the Tungusi, and most of the American Indians), whose support is derived from wide desert tracts, such occupation should never take place by force, but only by contract; and any such contract ought never to take advantage of
community of the community of possession
the ignorance of the original dwellers in regard
(communio), nor consequently of the use or
alleged that such acts of violent appropriation
all
nations originally hold a
soil,
but not
a.
juridical
but only of a possible
proprietorship of the
soil,
physical intercourse
(commercium) by means
to the cession of their lands.
may
commonly
if
sufficiently justi-
fying grounds were furnished for them, partly
peoples
with one another, and they have a right to make
Busching
it.
it is
be justified as subserving the general good
of the world. It appears as
In other words, they are placed in such thoroughgoing relations of each to all the rest that they may claim to enter into intercourse
of
Yet
by reference (as
the civilization of barbarous
to
by
a
tries to
pretext of this kind even excuse the bloody introduc-
:
OF RIGHT tion of the Christian religion into
Germany),
and partly by founding upon the necessity of purging one's own country from depraved criminals, and the hope of their improvement or that of their posterity, in another continent like
New
Holland. But all these alleged good purposes cannot wash out the stain of injustice in the means employed to attain them. It may be objected that, had such scrupulousness about making a beginning in founding a legal state
with force been always maintained, the whole
have been in a state of lawlessBut such an objection would as little an-
earth would ness.
still
nul the conditions of right in question as the pre-
when become degenerate, it belongs to the people to transform it by force. This would amount generally to being unjust text of the political revolutionaries that,
a
constitution has
once and for justice the
all,
more
in order thereafter to
surely,
and to make
it
found
flourish.
Conclusion prove that a thing is, he may it is not. And if he succeeds in doing neither (as often occurs), he may still ask whether it is in his interest to accept one If one cannot
try to prove that
or other of the alternatives hypothetically, from the theoretical or the practical point of view.
In other words, a hypothesis
may
either in order to explain a certain
be accepted
phenomenon
(as in astronomy to account for the retrogression and stationariness of the planets), or in
order to attain a certain end, which again may be either pragmatic, as belonging merely to the sphere of art, or moral, as involving a purpose which it is a duty to adopt as a maxim of action. Now it is evident that the assumption (suppositio) of the practicability of such an end, though presented merely as a theoretical and problematical judgement, may be regarded as constituting a duty; and hence it is so regarded in this case. For although there may be no positive obligation to believe in such an end, yet even if there were not the least theoretical probability of action being carried out in accordance with it, so long as its impossibility cannot be demonstrated, there still remains a duty incumbent upon us with regard to it. Now, as a matter of fact, the morally practical reason utters within us its irrevocable veto There shall be no war. So there ought to be no war, neither between me and you in the condition of nature, nor between us as members of states which, although internally in a condition of law, are
still
externally in their relation to
457
each other in a condition of lawlessness; for this is not the way by which any one should prosecute his right. Hence the question no longer is as to whether perpetual peace is a real thing or not a real thing, or as to whether we may not be deceiving ourselves when we adopt the former alternative, but we must act on the its being real. We must work for what may perhaps not be realized, and establish that constitution which yet seems best adapted
supposition of
about (mayhap republicanism in all and separately). And thus we put an end to the evil of wars, which have
to bring
it
states, together
may
been the chief interest of the internal arrangements of all the states without exception. And although the realization of this purpose may always remain but a pious wish, yet we do certainly not
maxim
deceive ourselves in adopting the
of action that will guide us in
incessantly for
it;
for
it is
working
a duty to do this.
To
suppose that the moral law within us is itself deceptive, would be sufficient to excite the horrible wish rather to be deprived of all reason than to live under such deception, and even to see oneself, according to such principles, degraded like the lower animals to the level of the mechanical play of nature. It may be said that the universal and lasting establishment of peace constitutes not merely a part, but the whole final purpose and end of the science of right as viewed within the limits of reason. The state of peace is the only condition of the mine and thine that is secured and guaranteed by laws in the relationship of men living in numbers contiguous to each other, and
who
are thus
rule
is
those
combined
in a constitution
whose
derived not from the mere experience of
who have found
it
the best as a normal
guide for others, but which must be taken by the reason a priori from the ideal of a juridical
union of all
men under
public laws generally. For
particular examples or instances, being able
only to furnish illustration but not proof, are deceptive, and at all events require a metaphysic to establish them by ciples.
those
And this is conceded who turn metaphysics
its
necessary prin-
by when
indirectly even into ridicule,
they say, as they often do: "The best constitution is that in which not men but laws exercise the power." For what can be more metaphysically sublime in its own way than this very idea of theirs, which according to their own assertion has, notwithstanding, the most objective reality? This may be easily shown by reference to actual instances. And it is this very idea
458 which alone can be carried out practically, if it is not forced on in a revolutionary and sudden way by violent overthrow of the existing defeclive constitution; for this would produce for the time the
momentary
annihilation of the
whole juridical state of society. But if the idea is carried forward by gradual reform and in accordance with fixed principles, it may lead by a continuous approximation to the highest political good, and to perpetual peace.
1
CONTENTS THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT Preface to the First Edition, 1790 I.
II.
461
Introduction Division of Philosophy The Realm of Philosophy in General
The Critique
III.
is
The judgement
Judgement as a Means of two parts of Philosophy in a
13.
grounds The pure judgement of taste charm and emotion
14.
Exemplification
15.
The judgement
of
467 V. Principle of formal finality of Nature is a transcendental Principle of Judgement. 467 VI. The Association of Feeling of Pleasure with the Concept of Finality of Nature 470 VII. The Aesthetic Representation of the Finality 47 of Nature VIII. The Logical Representation of the Finality
473 of Nature IX. Joinder of the Legislations of Understanding and Reason by means of Judgement 474
First
16.
A
17.
The
is
20.
478
Comparison
of the three specifically different
kinds of delight 479 Definition of the Beautiful derived from the First
Moment
479
Second Moment.
Moment 6.
The
Of the Judgement
Taste:
of Quantity is that which, apart from conrepresented as the object of a univer-
beautiful
cepts,
is
sal delight 7.
of
480
acteristic
In a judgement of taste the universality of delight is only represented as subjective 480 9. Investigation of the question of the relative priority in a judgement of taste of the feeling of pleasure and the estimating of the object 482 Definition of the Beautiful drawn from the Second
483
Third Moment. Of Judgements of Taste: Moment of the relation of the Ends brought under Review in such Judgements 10. Finality in general
11.
The
sole
486
by which an object
described as beautiful, under the condition of a definite concept, is not pure 488 taste
Ideal of beauty
from
this
483 foundation of the judgement of taste
459
is
489 Third 491
Of the Judgement of Taste: of the Modality of the Delight in the
Nature of the modality
in
a
judgement of 491
The subjective necessity attributed to a judgement of taste is conditioned 492 The condition of the necessity advanced by a the idea of a
common
reason for presupposing a
common
judgement of 21.
22.
taste
is
492
Have we sense
?
The
necessity of the universal assent that
492 is
thought in a judgement of taste, is a subjective necessity which, under the presupposition
a
of
common
sense,
is
represented as
objective
492
Definition of the Beautiful
drawn from
the Fourth
Moment 493 General Remark upon the First Section of the Analytic 493 Book
Analytic of the Sublime of estimating the beautiful to that of estimating the sublime 495 24. Subdivision of an investigation of the feeling of the sublime 496 II.
23. Transition
A.
from the faculty
The Mathematically Sublime
25. Definition of the
26.
The estimation
term "sublime" magnitude of
497
of the
natural things requisite for the idea of
8.
Moment
485 485 entirely independent
sense
479
Comparison of the beautiful with the agreeable and the good by means of the above char-
priori
Object 18.
477 coupled with inter-
est 5.
judgement of
Moment
independent of all interest 476 Delight in the agreeable is coupled with in-
the good
a
484 independent of
Moment
is
Delight in
is
is
upon
Fourth Moment.
19.
Judgement
Analytic of Aesthetic Judgement
terest 4.
of taste
rests
taste
ment of Quality 1. The judgement of taste is aesthetic 476 2. The delight which determines the judgement of 3.
taste
Definition of the Beautiful derived
Book I. Analytic of the Beautiful Moment. Of the Judgement of Taste: Mo-
taste
of
of the concept of perfection
First Part Critique of Aesthetic
mode 484
12.
prescribed a priori
I.
of an object (or
it)
463 464
Connecting the whole 465 IV. Judgement as a Faculty by which Laws are
Section
form of finality
the
of representing
the sublime 27.
28. 2C.
498
Quality of the delight in our estimate of the sublime 501 B. The Dynamically Sublime in Nature Nature as Might 502 Modality of the judgement on the sublime in
nature General Remark
505
upon the Exposition of Aesthetic Reflective Judgements 506 Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgements 30. The deduction of aesthetic judgements upon
2
CONTENTS
460
objects of nature must not be directed to what we call sublime in nature, but only to the
65.
5"
66.
beautiful
objective principle of taste
The problem
principle of taste
power
of the general
is
of
is
514 not possi-
515 the subjective principle
judgement 5:5 judgements of
of a deduction of
516
taste
37- What exactly it is that is asserted a priori of 5 10 an object in a judgement of taste 38.
Deduction of judgements of taste
5J7
39.
Remark The communicability
5*7 518 518 520 521
40. Taste as a
The The
of a sensation
kind of sensus communis
empirical interest in the beautiful intellectual interest in the beautiful
43- Art in general 44- Fine art
5
23
69. 70. 71.
nomy
73
None
finality of
of taste
and genius
in
prod-
ucts of fine art
52.
53-
53
The division of the fine arts The combination of the fine the same product
53 2 arts in
one and 534
Comparative estimate of the aesthetic worth of the fine arts
54.
x
Section
II.
Dialectic of Aesthetic
Judgement
5556.
Representation of the antinomy of taste
57-
Solution of the antinomy of taste
58.
Remark 1. Remark 2. The idealism
75-
ture
64.
7S.
570 of
human understanding
The union mechanism
of
that
of a physical
end pos-
the principle of the
572 universal
of
matter
with
the
teleological
575
Appendix: Theory of the Method of Applying the Teleological Judgement 79. Whether teleology must be treated as a branch of natural science 80.
578
The necessary subordination of the principle of mechanism to the teleological principle in the explanation of a thing regarded as a physi-
end
cal
g
The
578
mechanism with the teleowhich we apply to the explana-
association of
of nature
The
581
544
system in the extrinsic relations of organisms 582 83. The ultimate end of nature as a teleological system 584 84. The final end of the existence of a world, that
546 548
85.
and
82.
is,
550
teleological
of creation itself
86.
Physico-Theology Ethico-Theology
87.
Remark The moral proof proof
551 intrinsic, final-
553
distinctive character of things considered
555
91.
587 588 591
of the existence of
88. Limitation of the validity of the
Sq.
as physical ends
568
principle in the technic of nature
90.
The
judgement
makes the conception
Judgement
from
a critical principle of reason for the use
sible for us
objective finality ity of nature
is
567
of an objective finality of na-
Remark The peculiarity
Purely formal, as distinguished from material,
63. Relative, as distinguished
The conception
of the reflective
Judgement 62.
nature dogmatically springs from
tion of a physical end considered as a product
Second Part
[Introduction] First Division: Analytic of Teleological
of
logical principle
of art, as the unique principle of the aesthetic
Critique of Teleological 61. Objective finality in nature.
566
540 540 543
judgement Beauty as the symbol of morality Appendix: The methodology of taste
do
564 pro-
540
542 of the finality alike of nature
it
the inexplicability of a physical end
535 537
Remark
above systems does what
impossibility of treating the concept of a
technic
5 28
The combination
The
of systems dealing with the
nature
of the
fesses to 74-
is
genius
5i.
es-
564
The various kinds
524
Fine art is the art of genius 525 Elucidation and confirmation of the above ex526 planation of genius The relation of genius to taste 52 7 The faculties of the mind which constitute
50.
is
Second Division: Dialectic of Teleological Judgement Nature of an antinomy of judgement ^62 Exposition of this antinomy 562 Introduction to the solution of the above anti-
72
an art, so far as it has at the same time the appearance of being nature 525
45- Fine art
49.
in general
timated teleologically as a system of ends 559 68. The principle of teleology considered as an in560 herent principle of natural science
36.
48.
558
on which nature
513
ble
47-
estimated
is
principle
judgement of taste. Second peculiarity of judgement of taste
The
46.
intrinsic finality in
67.
35-
42.
The
on which the
Si
An
41.
principle
of taste 32. First peculiarity of Si-
550
The
organisms
Of the method of the deduction of judgements
31.
Things considered as physical ends are organisms
God
593 593
moral 596
Remark 599 The use of the moral argument 599 The type of assurance in a teleological proof 600 of the existence of God The type of assurance produced by a practical faith
General
Remark on Teleology
603 607
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION The
from a priori prinbe called pure reason, and the gen-
faculty of knowledge
may
ciples
eral investigation into its possibility
haves as
and partly
and bounds
also to lead understanding, in its study of nature, according to a principle of completeness, unattainable as this remains for it, and
the same use of terms in our first work, is only intended to denote reason in its theoretical employment, and although there is no desire to its
That
its
tique
then, an investigation addressed simply
is,
so to
special principles as such.
promote the ultimate aim of all knowledge. it was understanding
—
Properly, therefore,
which, so far as
it
contains constitutive a priori
cognitive principles, has
faculty as practical rea-
son and
had thus determined these bounds
as those of the possibility of all things generally,
the Critique of Pure Reason. This is permissible although "pure reason," as was the case with
bring under review
if it
1790
special realm,
its
way
that the Critique, called in a general
knowing things a priori. Hence makes our cognitive faculties its sole concern,
was intended
to our faculty of
of pure reason
it
cure but particular possession against competitors. In the same
to the exclusion of the feeling of pleasure or
displeasure
among
and the faculty of
the cognitive faculties
tention to understanding and ciples, to
it
desire;
confines
its
and
one, moreover, in our faculty of knowledge
Cri-
and
—
that
to establish in se-
way
all
other
reason, which
contains constitutive a priori principles solely in respect of the faculty of desire, gets its hold-
its at-
ing assigned to
a priori prin-
the exclusion of judgement and rea-
it
by The Critique of
Practical
Reason.
But now comes judgement, which
son, (faculties that also belong to theoretical
in the or-
turns out in the sequel
der of our cognitive faculties forms a middle
that there is no cognitive faculty other than understanding capable of affording constitutive a priori principles of knowledge. Accordingly
also got independent a priori principles? If so,
cognition,) because
it
term between understanding and reason. Has
it
are they constitutive, or are they merely regula-
thus indicating no special realm? And do they give a rule a priori to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, as the middle term be-
the critique which sifts these faculties one and all, so as to try the possible claims of each of
tive,
the other faculties to a share in the clear pos-
from roots of its own, rewhat understanding prescribes a priori as a law for nature as the complex of phenomena the form of these being similarly session of knowledge
tween the faculties of cognition and
tains nothing but
as understanding prescribes laws a priori for the
former and reason for the latter? This is the topic to which the present Critique is devoted.
—
furnished a priori. All other pure concepts relegates to the rank of ideas, 1
A
it
which for our
faculty of theoretical cognition are transcendent; though they are not without their use nor
redundant, but discharge certain functions as regulative principles. 2 For these concepts serve partly to restrain the officious pretentions of
understanding, which, presuming on its ability to supply a priori the conditions of the possibility of
all
things which
it is
desire, just
capable of knowing, be-
[The word is defined on pp. 489, 542. See Critique Pure Reason, pp. 113-118: "I understand by idea a necessary conception of reason, to which no corresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense." 1
of
(Ibid., p. 117.) "They contain a certain perfection, attainable by no possible empirical cognition; and they give to reason a systematic unity, to which the unity of experience attempts to approximate, but can never completely attain." (Ibid., p. 173-)] 2 [Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 193-200.]
critique of pure reason,
i.e.,
of our faculty
would be incomplete if the critical examination of judgement, which is a faculty of knowledge, and as such lays claim to independent principles, were not dealt with separately. Still, however, its principles cannot, in a system of pure philosophy, form a separate constituent part intermediate between the theoretical and practical divisions, but may when needful be annexed to one or other as occasion requires. For if such a system is some day worked out under the general name of metaphysic and its full and complete execution is both possible and of the utmost importance for the employment of reason in all departments of its activity the critical examination of the ground for this edifice must have been previously carried down to the very
461
of judging on a priori principles,
—
—
PREFACE
462
depths of the foundations of the faculty of principles independent of experience, lest in some quarter it might give way, and sinking, inevitably bring with it the ruin of all. We may readily gather, however, from the nature of the faculty of judgement (whose cor-
employment
is
so necessary
ly requisite that
it
is
rect
and universal-
just this faculty that
is
intended when we speak of sound understanding) that the discovery of a peculiar principle
belonging to
it
—and some such
in itself a priori, for otherwise
it
it
must contain would not be
a cognitive faculty the distinctive character of which is obvious to the most commonplace crit-
—must
thing to the unknowable supersensible and, in-
employ some such principle, though itself and the knowledge of nature. For in these cases the application of deed, must
with a regard only to
such an a priori principle for the cognition of what is in the world is both possible and neces-
and withal opens out prospects which are But here there is no immediate reference to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. But this is precisely the riddle in the principle of judgement that necessary,
profitable for practical reason.
sitates a separate division
the critique
—
for there
for this faculty in
was nothing
to prevent
the formation of logical estimates according to
that these are the property of understanding,
concepts (from which no immediate conclusion can ever be drawn to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure) having been treated, with a critical statement of its limitations, in an appendage to
and judgement
the theoretical part of philosophy.
icism
difficulties.
be a task involving considerable
For
this principle is
one which must
not be derived from a priori concepts, seeing is
only directed to their applica-
tion. It has, therefore, itself to furnish a
and one from which, properly, we get no cognition of a thing, but which it can itself employ as a rule only but not as an objective rule to which it can adapt its judgement, because, for that, another faculty of judgement would again be required to enable us to decide whether the case was one for the application of cept,
—
the rule or not.
1
It is chiefly in those estimates that are called
and which relate to the beautiful and sublime, whether of nature or of art, that one meets A'ith the above difficulty about a princiit
investigation of taste, as a faculty
of aesthetic judgement, not being undertaken
with a view to the formation or culture of taste (which will pursue its course in the future, as in the past, independently of such inquiries), but
being merely directed to
its
transcendental as-
pects, I feel assured of its indulgent criticism in
respect of any shortcomings on that score. But in all that is relevant to the transcendental as-
aesthetic,
ple (be
The present
con-
subjective or objective).
And
yet the
judgement
it must be prepared to stand the test of most rigorous examination. Yet even here I venture to hope that the difficulty of unravelling a problem so involved in its nature may serve as an excuse for a certain amount of hardly avoid-
pect the
able obscurity in
tique of this faculty. For, although they do not
its solution, provided that the accuracy of our statement of the principle is proved with all requisite clearness. I admit that
of themselves contribute a whit to the knowl-
the
edge of things, they still belong wholly to the faculty of knowledge, and evidence an immedi-
ment from
critical search for a principle of
their case
is
in
the most important item in a cri-
ate bearing of this faculty
upon the
feeling of
pleasure or displeasure according to
some a
mode
that
is
subject lieve I
of deriving the
rightly is
phenomena
that principle has not
all
demanded elsewhere, where by concepts, and that I
cognition
have
of judge-
the lucidity
in fact attained in the
the
be-
second part
and do so without confusing this principle with what is capable of being a determining ground of the faculty of desire, for
of this work.
the latter has
principles a priori in concepts
nal part, in order, as far as possible, to snatch
of reason. Logical estimates of nature, however,
from my advancing years what time may yet be favourable to the task. It is obvious that no separate division of doctrine is reserved for the faculty of judgement, seeing that, with judgement, critique takes the place of theory; but,
priori principle,
its
stand on a different footing.
They
deal with
cases in which experience presents a conformity
which the understanding's genis no longer adequate to render intelligible or explicable, and in which judgement may have recourse to itself to law in things,
eral concept of the sensible
With
this, then, I
dertaking to a close.
bring
my
I shall
entire critical un-
hasten to the doctri-
following the division of philosophy into theoretical
and
practical,
and of pure philosophy
same way, the whole ground will be covered by the metaphysics of nature and
for a principle of the reference of the natural
in
* [See Kant's general remarks on judgement in the Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 60-61. J
of morals.
the
INTRODUCTION ulty of desire and, as such,
Division of Philosophy
I.
Philosophy may be
many natural
said to contain the princi-
just one of the
is
causes in the world, the one, name-
which acts by concepts; and whatever
ly,
is
rep-
ples of the rational cognition that concepts af-
resented as possible (or necessary) through the
ford us of things (not merely, as with logic, the form of thought in general irre-
efficacy of will is called practically possible (or
spective of the objects), and, thus interpreted, the course, usually adopted, of dividing it into
its
principles of the
theoretical this
and practical
is
perfectly sound.
But on
imperative a specific distinction
makes
the part of the concepts
by which the
principles
of this rational cognition get their object assigned to them, for if the concepts are not distinct they fail to justify a division,
which always
necessary): the intention being to distinguish possibility (or necessity)
from the physical
possibility or necessity of an effect the causality
whose cause is not determined to its producby concepts (but rather, as with lifeless matter, by mechanism, and, as with the lower animals, by instinct). Now, the question in reof
tion
spect of the practical faculty: whether, that to say, the concept,
presupposes that the principles belonging to the
the will gets
rational cognition of the several parts of the sci-
freedom,
The
ence in question are themselves mutually exclu-
is
is
by which the causality of
its rule, is
a concept of nature or of
here left quite open.
latter distinction,
however,
is
essential.
For, let the concept determining the causality be
sive.
Now there are but two kinds of concepts, and these yield a corresponding number of distinct principles of the possibility of their objects. The
a concept of nature, and then the principles are
concepts referred to are those of nature and that of freedom. By the first of these, a theoreti-
in the division of a rational science the differ-
cal cognition
from a
priori principles
becomes
technically-practical ; but, let it be a concept of freedom, and they are morally-practical. Now,
ence between objects that require different principles for their cognition
possible. In respect of such cognition,
which everything
the second, by its more than a negative
tical principles
however, very concept, imports no principle (that of simple
antithesis), while for the determination of the
on the other hand, it establishes fundamenwhich enlarge the scope of its activity, and which on that account are called pracwill,
the division of philosophy falls
Hence
properly into two parts, quite distinct in their principles a theoretical, as philosophy of na-
—
ture,
and a
(for this
is
All technically-practical rules
and with them to the division of philosophy, a practical according to concepts of nature has
been taken as identical with what is practical according to the concept of freedom, with the result that a division has been made under these heads of theoretical and practical, by which, in effect, there has been no division at all (seeing that both parts might have similar principles).
—
for this
a
and
skill
skill 1 in
(i.e.,
those of
generally, or even of prudence, as
exercising an influence over
men and
their wills) must, so far as their principles rest
the possibility of things according to concepts
gross misuse of the terms has prevailed; for what
will
art
practical legislation of rea-
sions to the division of the different principles,
The
technically-prac-
upon concepts, be reckoned only as corollaries to theoretical philosophy. For they only touch
son by the concept of freedom is called). Hitherto, however, in the application of these expres-
is
the difference on
morals
practical, as philosophy of
what the
is
Hence
belong to theoretical philosophy (natural science), whereas those morally-practical alone form the second part, that is, pracical philosophy (ethical science).
tal principles
tical.
turns.
is
what
is
said
—
is
the fac-
463
of nature, and this embraces, not alone the
means discoverable
in nature for the purpose, but even the will itself (as a faculty of desire, and consequently a natural faculty), so far as it is determinable on these rules by natural motives. Still these practical rules are not called laws (like physical laws), but only precepts. This is due to the fact that the will does not stand simply under the natural concept, but also under the concept of freedom. In the latter con-
nection 1
[Cf.
its
principles are called laws, and these
Fundamental Principles
of the
Metaphysic of
Morals, p. 266; also Critique of Pure Reason, 235.)
THE CRITIQUE
464
what follows from them, alone constitute the second or prac-
principles, with the addition of
part of philosophy.
tical
The etry
is
solution of the problems of pure geomnot allocated to a special part of that
means of
its formal laws, and where, therefore, they are morally-practical, i.e., not merely precepts and rules in this or that interest, but laws
independent of
science, nor does the art of land-surveying merit the name of practical, in contradistinction to
pure, as a second part of the general science of geometry, and with equally little, or perhaps less, right can the mechanical or chemical art of experiment or of observation be ranked as a prac-
part of the science of nature, or, in fine, domestic, agricultural, or political economy, the
ics,
or even general instruction as to the attainof happiness, or as much as the control of
ment
the inclinations or the restraining of the affections with a view thereto, be denominated practical
philosophy
—not
to
mention forming these
second part of philosophy in general. them all, the above contain nothing more than rules of skill, which are thus only the skill being directed to technically practical producing an effect which is possible according latter in a
For, between
—
to natural concepts of causes
and
effects.
As
The Realm
II.
antecedent reference to ends
of Philosophy in General
The employment from
principles,
of our faculty of cognition
and with
philosophy,
it
is
coex-
tensive with the applicability of a priori concepts.
Now
tical
art of social intercourse, the principles of dietet-
all
or aims.
a division of the complex of
all
the ob-
which those concepts are referred for the purpose, where possible, of compassing their knowledge, may be made according to the varied competence or incompetence of our faculty in
jects to
that connection.
Concepts, so far as they are referred to obfrom the question of whether knowledge of them is possible or not, have their field, jects apart
which is determined simply by the relation in which their object stands to our faculty of cognition in general. The part of this field in which knowledge is possible for us is a territory (territorium) for these concepts and the requisite
The
these concepts belong to theoretical philosophy,
cognitive faculty.
they are subject to those precepts as mere corollaries of theoretical philosophy (i.e., as corolla-
which they exercise legislative authority is the realm (ditio) of these concepts, and their appro-
ries of natural science),
and so cannot claim any
priate
cognitive
part of the territory over
faculty.
Empirical
concepts
place in any special philosophy called practical.
have, therefore, their territory, doubtless, in na-
On
ture as the complex of
the other hand, the morally practical pre-
which are founded entirely on the concept of freedom, to the complete exclusion of grounds taken from nature for the determination of the cepts,
will,
form quite
a
special
kind of precepts.
all sensible objects, but they have no realm (only a dwelling-place, domicilium), for, although they are formed ac-
cording to law, they are not themselves legislative,
but the rules founded on them are empiri-
These, too, like the rules obeyed by nature, are, without qualification, called laws though they
cal and, consequently, contingent.
do
that of natural concepts and that of the concept
—
on sensible conditions, but upon a supersensible principle and they must needs have a separate part of philosophy allotted to them as their own, corresponding to the theoretical part, and termed practical phinot, like the latter, rest
—
losophy.
Hence
Our
entire faculty of cognition has
of freedom, for through both
practical.
But the territory upon which
established, and over which
evident that a complex of practical precepts furnished by philosophy does not form
legislative authority,
a special part of philosophy, co-ordinate with the theoretical, by reason of its precepts being for that they might be. notwithstandpractical ing that their principles were derived wholly from the theoretical knowledge of nature (as technically-practical rules). But an adequate reason only exists where their principle, being in no way bonowed from the concept of nature, which is always sensibly conditioned, rests consequently on the supersensible, which the concept of freedom alone makes cognizable by
ence, taken as no
—
prescribes laws
a priori. In accordance with this distinction, then, philosophy is divisible into theoretical and is
it is
it
two realms,
is still
the complex of the objects of
it
its
realm
exercises
its
always confined to all
possible experi-
more than mere phenomena, for otherwise legislation by the understanding in respect of them is unthinkable. The function of prescribing laws by means of concepts of nature is discharged by understand-
ing and is theoretical. That of prescribing laws by means of the concept of freedom is discharged by reason and is merely practical. It is
only in the practical sphere that reason can prescribe laws; in respect of theoretical
(of nature)
it
knowledge
can only (as by the understanding
OF JUDGEMENT advised in the law) deduce from given laws their logical consequences,
restricted to nature.
which still always remain But we cannot reverse this
and say that where rules are practical reason is then and there legislative, since the rules might be technically practical. Understanding and reason, therefore, have two distinct jurisdictions over one and the same territory of experience. But neither can interfere with the other. For the concept of freedom just as
little
disturbs the legislation of nature, as the
concept of nature influences legislation through the concept of freedom. That it is possible for us at least to think without contradiction of
both these jurisdictions, and their appropriate
465
pass from the former to the latter (by means of the theoretical
employment
of reason), just as
they were so many separate worlds, the first of which is powerless to exercise influence on the second still the latter is meant to influence the former that is to say, the concept of freedom is meant to actualize in the sensible world if
:
—
by its laws; and nature must consequently also be capable of being regarded in such a way that in the conformity to law of its form it at least harmonizes with the possibility of the ends to be effectuated in it according to the laws of freedom. There must, therefore, be a ground of the unity of the supersensible the end proposed
faculties, as co-existing in the
that lies at the basis of nature, with what the concept of freedom contains in a practical way, and although the concept of this ground neither
detecting their dialectical illusion.
theoretically nor practically attains to a knowledge of it, and so has no peculiar realm of its own, still it renders possible the transition from
same subject, was shown by the Critique of Pure Reason, since it disposed of the objections on the other side by
how does
Still,
happen that these two difform one realm, seeing that,
it
ferent realms do not
mode
the
of thought according to the principles
while they do not limit each other in their legis-
of the one to that according to the principles of
they continually do so in their effects in the sensible world? The explanation lies in the fact that the concept of nature represents its
the other. 1
lation,
III.
objects in intuition doubtless, yet not as things-
in a
in-themselves, but as mere phenomena, whereas the concept of freedom represents in
what
is
make
it
no doubt a
properly speaking no realm in respect of objects; for it is not a doctrine, its sole business being to investigate whether, having regard to
it
capable, therefore, of fur-
object (or
its
—
the basis of the possibility of all those objects of experience, although it cannot itself ever be
elevated or extended into a cognition. entire cognitive faculty
is,
therefore, pre-
sented with an unbounded, but, also, inaccessible
we
—the
field of the supersensible
—
in
which
seek in vain for a territory, and on which,
therefore,
we can have no realm
cognition, be
it
for theoretical
for concepts of understanding or
of reason. This field
we must indeed occupy with
ideas in the interest as well of the theoretical as
the practical
employment of
reason, but, in con-
nection with the laws arising from the concept of
freedom,
which deals with what our cogni-
and further that neither the is
nishing a theoretical cognition of
field
critique
tive faculties are capable of yielding a priori has
,
even of the thinking subject) as a thing-in-itself, the or, as this would be, of the supersensible idea of which has certainly to be introduced as
Our
The
object
whole
does not
thing-in-itself but
intuitable,
one nor the other
its
The Critique of Judgement as a means of connecting the two parts of Philosophy
we cannot procure
for these ideas
the general bearings of our faculties, a doctrine is
possible
by
their
means, and
if so,
how. Its
extends to all their pretentions, with a view to confining them within their legitimate bounds. field
But what phy may
is
shut out of the division of philoso-
still
be admitted as a principal part
into the general critique of our faculty of pure
cognition, in the event, namely, of
its
containing
principles which are not in themselves available
employment. Concepts of nature contain the ground of all theoretical cognition a priori and rest, as we saw,
either for theoretical or practical
upon the
legislative authority of understanding.
The concept all
of freedom contains the ground of sensuously unconditioned practical precepts
a priori, and rests upon that of reason. Both
any
but practical reality, which, accordingly, fails to advance our theoretical cognition one step to-
wards the supersensible. Albeit, then, between the realm of the natural concept, as the sensible, and the realm of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible, there is a great gulf fixed, so that it is not possible to
1 [Cf. p. 473, et seq.; also Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 236-37. This problem is discussed in the Critique of Practical Reason under the heading "Of the Typic of the Pure Practical Judgement," p. 319, et seq.; "It seems absurd to expect to find in the world of sense a case which, while as such it depends only on the law of nature, yet admits of the application to it of a law of freedom, and to which we can apply the supersensible idea of the morally good which is to be exhibited in concreto."]
THE CRITIQUE
466
faculties, therefore, besides their application in point of logical form to principles of whatever
their
have, in addition,
origin,
own
peculiar
jurisdiction in the matter of their content,
and
so, there being no further (a priori) jurisdiction above them, the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical is justified. But there is still further in the family of our higher cognitive faculties a middle term between understanding and reason. This is judgement, of which we may reasonably presume by analogy that it may likewise contain, if not a special
authority to prescribe laws,
still
a principle pe-
upon which laws are sought, although one merely subjective a priori. This principle, even if it has no field of objects appropriate to it as its realm, may still have some culiar
to
itself
territory or other with a certain character, for
which just
this
very principle alone
may
be
islative, if (as
sidered on
But
in addition to the is
yet (to judge
above considerations
by analogy) a further
ground, upon which judgement
own account
may
of theoretical cognition,
is
free of confusion
phenomenon) it by means
possible for us to prescribe laws
pure concepts of understanding. For the faculty of desire, as a higher faculty operating under the concept of freedom, only reason (in which alone this concept has a place) prescribes laws a priori. Now between the faculties of knowledge and desire stands the feeling of pleasure, just as judgement is intermediate between understanding and reason. Hence we may, provisionally at least,
assume that judgement likewise its own, and
contains an a priori principle of
that, since pleasure or displeasure is necessarily
cedent to
ther derivation
from a common ground: the
faculty of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and the faculty of desire. 1 For the to suppose that a relation subbetween concepts that are used as empirical principles and the faculty of pure cognition a priori, it is worth while attempting, in consideration of this connection, to give them a transcendental definition a definition, that is, by pure categories, so far as these by themselves adequately indicate the distinction of the concept in question from others. This course follows that of the mathematician, who leaves the empirical data of his problem indeterminate, and only brings their relation in pure synthesis under the concepts of pure arithmetic, and thus generalizes his solution. I have been taken to task for adopting a similar procedure (Critique of Practical Reason, Preface, p. 291) and fault had been found with my definition of the faculty of desire as a faculty which by means of its representations is the
—
cause of the actuality of the objects of those representations: for mere wishes would still be desires, and yet in their case every one is ready to abandon all claim to being able by means of them alone to call their object into But this proves no more than the presence existence. of desires in man by which he is in contradiction with himself. For in such a case he seeks the production of the object by means of his representation alone, without any hope of its being effectual, since he is conscious that his mechanical powers (if I may so call those which are not psychological), which would have to be determined by that representation, are either unequal to the task of realizing the object (by the intervention of means, therefore) or else are addressed to what is quite impossible, as, for example, to undo the past (0 mihi praeteritos,etc.) or, to be able to annihilate the interval that, with intolerable delay, divides us from the wished-
—
it
ante-
from the faculty of pure knowledge, from the realm of concepts of nature, to
transition
that of the concept of freedom^, just as in
employment it makes possible the from understanding to reason.
logical
its
transi-
Hence, despite the fact of philosophy being only divisible into two principal parts, the theoretical all
and the practical, and despite the fact of we may have to say of the special prinof judgement having to be assigned to its
that
theoretical part,
sists
—
desire (be
principle, as with the lower desires,
with the higher, only supervening upon its determination by the moral law), it will effect a
ciples
Where one has reason
its
or, as
tion
faculties of the soul, or capacities, are re-
is
of
a priori concepts of nature, which are properly
For
all
leg-
con-
referred to nature, in
respect of which alone (as
i.e.,
ducible to three, which do not admit of any fur-
is
it is
with the faculty of desire) this faculty, as that
be brought into line with another arrangement of our powers of representation, and one that appears to be of even greater importance than that of its kinship with the family of cognitive faculties.
1
its
must be the case where
combined with the faculty of
valid.
there
faculty of cognition understanding alone
i.e.,
to rational cognition ac-
—
for moment. Now, conscious as we are in such fantastic desires of the inefficiency of our representations (or even of their futility), as causes of their objects, there is still involved in every wish a reference of the same
as cause, and therefore the representation of its causality, and this is esDecially discernible where the wish, as longing, is an affection. For such affections, since they dilate the heart and render it inert and thus exhaust its powers, show that a strain is kept on being exerted and re-exerted on these powers by the representations, but that the mind is allowed continually to relapse and get languid upon recognition of the impossibility before it. Even prayers for the aversion of great, and, so far as we can see, inevitable evils, and many superstitious means for attaining ends impossible of attainment by natural means, prove the causal reference a causality which of representations to their objects not even the consciousness of inefficiency for producing from straining deter can towards it. But why effect the our nature should be furnished with a propensity to consciously vain desires is a teleological problem of anthropology. It would seem that were we not to be determined to the exertion of our power before we had assured ourselves of the efficiency of our faculty for producing an object, our power would remain to a large extent unused. For as a rule we only first learn to know our powers by making trial of them. This deceit of vain desires is therefore only the result of a beneficent disposition in our nature.
—
OF JUDGEMENT cording to concepts of nature: of Pure Reason, which
must
still
the Critique
settle this
question before the above system
hand, so as to substantiate sists of
its
whole
taken in possibility, conis
three parts: the Critique of pure under-
and of pure reawhich faculties are called pure on the ground
standing, of pure judgement, son,
prescribe
467 it
to nature, for reflection on the laws
of nature adjusts itself to nature, and not nature to the conditions according to
to obtain a concept of
it
which we
—a concept that
strive
is
quite
contingent in respect of these conditions.
Now
the principle sought can only be this: as
universal laws of nature have their ground in
of their being legislative a priori.
our understanding, which prescribes them to
IV. Judgement as a Faculty by which
nature (though only according to the universal concept of it as nature), particular empirical
Laws
are
prescribed a priori
Judgement
in general
is
laws must be regarded, in respect of that which
the faculty of think-
ing the particular as contained under the universal.
If the universal (the rule, principle, or law)
judgement which subsumes the particular under it is determinant. This is so even where such a judgement is transcendental is
given, then the
and, as such, provides the conditions a priori in
conformity with which alone subsumption under that universal can be effected. If, however, only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, then the judgement is simply reflective.
in
them by these universal would
have if an understanding (though it be not ours) had supplied them for the benefit of our cognitive faculties, so as to render possible a
system
of experience according to particular natural laws. This
is not to be taken as implying that such an understanding must be actually assum-
ed (for
it is
only the reflective judgement which
avails itself of this idea as a principle for the
purpose of reflection and not for determining anything) but this faculty rather gives by this means a law to itself alone and not to nature. Now the concept of an object, so far as it contains at the same time the ground of the actuality of this object, is called its end, and the agreement of a thing with that constitution of things which is only possible according to ends, is called the finality of its form. Accordingly the principle of judgement, in respect of the form of the things of nature under empirical laws generally, is the finality of nature in its multiplicity. In other words, by this concept nature is represented as if an understanding contained the ground of the unity of the manifold of its empirical ;
The determinant judgement determines under universal transcendental laws furnished
by un-
subsumptive only; the law is marked out for it a priori, and it has no need to devise a law for its own guidance to enable it
derstanding and
is
to subordinate the particular in nature to the
universal.
undetermined
is left
laws, according to a unity such as they
But there are such manifold forms
of nature, so
many
modifications, as
it
were, of
the universal transcendental concepts of nature,
undetermined by the laws furnished by pure understanding a priori as above mentioned, and for the reason that these laws only touch the general possibility of a nature (as an object of sense), that there must needs also be laws in this behalf. These laws, being empirical, may be contingent as far as the light of our understanding goes, but still, if they are to be called laws (as the concept of a nature requires), they must be left
regarded as necessary on a principle, unknown though it be to us, of the unity of the manifold. The reflective judgement which is compelled to ascend from the particular in nature to the universal stands, therefore, in need of a principle.
This principle it cannot borrow from experience, because what it has to do is to establish just the unity of all empirical principles under higher, though likewise empirical, principles, and thence the possibility of the systematic subordination of higher and lower. Such a transcendental principle, therefore, the reflective judgement can only give as a law from and to itself. It cannot derive it from any other quarter (as it would then be a determinant judgement). Nor can it
laws.
The
finality of nature
is,
therefore, a particu-
which has its origin solely judgement. For we cannot as-
lar a priori concept,
in the reflective
cribe to the products of nature anything like a
reference of nature in them to ends, but we can make use of this concept to reflect upon
only
them
nexus of phenomena in nexus given according to empirical laws. Furthermore, this concept is entirely difin respect of the
nature ferent
—a
from
practical finality (in
even morals), though
it
is
human
art or
doubtless thought
after this analogy.
V. The Principle of the formal finality of Nature is a transcendental Principle of Judgement
A transcendental principle is one through which we represent a priori the universal condition under which alone things can become objects of our cognition generally. A principle, on
THE CRITIQUE
468 the other hand,
called metaphysical
is
where
it
represents a priori the condition under which alone objects whose concept has to be given
empirically
may become
Thus
priori.
further determined a
the principle of the cognition of
bodies as substances, and as changeable substances, is transcendental where the statement is
in natura)
for
all
its
;
vast variety in empirical laws
that, unity
cipia praeter necessitatem
non sunt multiplican-
da)"; and so forth. If
we propose
mentary
rules,
logical lines,
to assign the origin of these ele-
and attempt
we go
For they
to
do so on psycho-
straight in the teeth of their
not what happens,
that their change must have a cause: but it is metaphysical where it asserts that their change
sense.
must have an external cause. For,
actually discharge their functions, and
in the first
need only be thought through ontological predicates (pure concepts of understandcase, bodies
ing)
e.g.,
as substance, to enable the proposition
to be cognized a priori; whereas, in the case, the empirical concept of a
able thing in space)
body
second
(as a
must be introduced
port the proposition, although, once this
mov-
to supis
done,
may
be seen quite a priori that the latter predicate (movement only by means of an external cause) applies to body. In this way, as I shall it
show
presently, the principle of the finality of
nature (in the multiplicity of
its
empirical laws)
For the concept of objects, regarded as standing under this princiis
a transcendental principle.
ple, is
only the pure concept of objects of possiand involves
ble empirical cognition generally,
On
nothing empirical.
the other hand, the prin-
ciple of practical finality, implied in the idea of
would be a
the determination of a free will,
metaphysical principle, because the concept of a faculty of desire, as will, has to be given pirically,
i.e.,
is
not included
among
em-
transcen-
dental predicates. But both these principles are,
none the
less,
not empirical, but a priori princi-
no further experience is required for the synthesis of the predicate with the empirical concept of the subject of their judgements, but it may be apprehended quite a priori. ples; because
That the concept of a
finality of
nature be-
abundantly evident from the maxims of judgement upon which we rely a priori in the investigation of nature, and which yet have to do with no more than the possibility of experience, and consequently of the knowledge of nature but of nature not merely in a general way, but as determined by a manifold of particular laws. These maxims crop up frequently enough in the course of this science, though only in a scattered way. They are aphorisms of metaphysical wisdom, making their appearance in a number of rules the necessity of which cannot be demonstrated from concepts. "Nature takes the shortest way {lex parsimoniae) yet it makes no leap, either in the sequence of its changes, or in the juxtaposition of specifically different forms (lex continui longs to transcendental principles
is
—
;
is
under a few principles (prin-
tell us,
i.e.,
according to what rule our powers of judgement
how we ought
how we
and we cannot get this logical objective necessity where the principles are merely empirical. Hence the finality of nature for our cognitive faculties and their employment, which manifestly radiates from them, is a transcendental principle of judgements, and so needs also a transcendental deduction, by means of which the ground for this judge, but
mode
of judging
to judge;
must be traced
to the a priori
sources of knowledge.
Now,
looking at the grounds of the possibility
of an experience, the
first thing,
of course, that
—
something necessary namely, the universal laws apart from which nature in general (as an object of sense) cannot be thought. These rest on the categories, applied to the formal conditions of all intuition possible for us,
meets us
is
so far as
it is
also given a priori.
Under these
judgement is determinant; for it has nothing else to do than to subsume under given laws. For instance, understanding says: all change has its cause (universal law of nature); transcendental judgement has nothing further to do laws,
than to furnish a priori the condition of subsumption under the concept of understanding placed before
it:
this
we
get in the succession of
the determinations of one and the
Now
for nature in general, as
ble experience, that law
is
same
thing.
an object of possi-
cognized as absolutely
necessary. But besides this formal time-condition, the objects of empirical cognition are de-
termined, or, so far as
we can judge
a priori,
are determinable, in divers ways, so that specifically differentiated natures,
they have in
common
eral, are further finite
over and above what
as things of nature in gen-
capable of being causes in an in-
variety of ways; and each of these
modes
must, on the concept of a cause in general, have its rule, which is a law, and. consequently, imports necessity: although owing to the constitution and limitations of our faculties of cognition
we may
entirely fail to see this necessity. Ac-
cordingly, in respect of nature's merely empirical laws, we must think in nature a possibility of an endless multiplicity of empirical laws, which yet are contingent so far as our insight goes, i.e.,
OF JUDGEMENT In respect of these we estimate the unity of nature according to cannot be cognized a
priori.
empirical laws, and the possibility of the unity of experience, as a system according to empirical laws, to be contingent. But, now, such a unity is one which must be necessarily presupposed and assumed, as otherwise we should not have a thoroughgoing connection of empirical cognition in a whole of experience. For the universal laws of nature, while providing, certainly, for such a
connection
among
things generically, as things
of nature in general, do not do so for
them
spe-
469
has its seat a priori in our understanding. This understanding is no doubt a priori in possession of universal laws of nature, apart from which nature would be incapable of being an object of all. But over and above this it needs a certain order of nature in its particular rules which are only capable of being brought to its knowledge empirically, and which, so far
experience at
as
it
concerned are contingent. These
is
rules,
without which we would have no means of advance from the universal analogy of a possible experience in general to a particular, must be regarded by understanding as laws, i.e., as necesfor otherwise they would not form an orsary der of nature though it be unable to cognize or
such particular things of nature. Hence judgement is compelled, for its own guidance, to adopt it as an a priori principle, that what is for human insight contingent in the particular (empirical) laws of nature contains nev-
ever get an insight into their necessity. Albeit, then, it can determine nothing a priori in respect
ertheless unity of law in the synthesis of its
of these (objects),
manifold in an intrinsically possible experience unfathomable, though still thinkable, as such unity may, no doubt, be for us. Consequently, as the unity of law in a synthesis, which is cognized by us in obedience to a necessary aim (a need of understanding), though recognized at
empirical so-called laws, lay at the basis of
cifically
as
—
same time
the
as contingent,
finality of objects
is
represented as a
(here of nature), so judge-
ment, which, in respect of things under possible (yet to be discovered) empirical laws, is merely reflective, must regard nature in respect of the latter according to a principle of finality for our cognitive faculty, which then finds expression in
the above
maxims
of judgement.
Now
this tran-
scendental concept of a finality of nature is neither a concept of nature nor of freedom, since i.e.,
it
attributes nothing at
all
to the object,
to nature, but only represents the unique
mode in which we must proceed in our upon the objects of nature with a view
reflection to getting
a thoroughly interconnected whole of experience, and so
is
a subjective principle,
i.e.,
maxim,
of judgement. For this reason, too, just as
were a lucky chance that favoured
we
if it
—
—
reflection
must, in pursuit of such
upon them an a
possible according to them.
kind
is
There
all
priori principle, to the
namely, that a cognizable order of nature
effect, is
it
A principle
of this
expressed in the following propositions.
is
in nature a subordination of genera
species comprehensible
by
Each
us:
and
of these
genera again approximates to the others on a common principle, so that a transition may be possible
from one
to the other,
higher genus: While
it
seems
and thereby to a at the outset un-
avoidable for our understanding to assume for the specific variety of natural operations a like
number
may
of various kinds of causality, yet these
be reduced to a small number of principles, the quest for which is our business; and so forth. This adaptation of nature to our cognitive faculties is presupposed a priori by judgement on behalf of its reflection upon it according to empirical laws. But understanding all the while all
recognizes
it
objectively as contingent, and
merely judgement that attributes transcendental finality,
i.e.,
it
it is
to nature as
a finality in respect
are re-
of the subject's faculty of cognition. For, were
joiced (properly speaking, relieved of a want)
it not for this presupposition, we should have no order of nature in accordance with empirical laws, and, consequently, no guiding-thread for an experience that has to be brought to bear
us,
where we meet with such systematic unity under merely empirical laws: although we must necessarily assume the presence of such a unity, apart from any ability on our part to apprehend or prove its existence. In order to convince ourselves of the correctness of this deduction of the concept before us,
and the necessity of assuming
it
as a transcen-
dental principle of cognition, let us just bethink
ourselves of the magnitude of the task. to
We have
form a connected experience from given per-
ceptions of a nature containing a
maybe
multiplicity of empirical laws, and this
endless
problem
upon these
in all their variety, or for
an investi-
gation of them.
For it is quite conceivable that, despite all the uniformity of the things of nature according to universal laws, without which we would not have the form of general empirical knowledge all,
at
the specific variety of the empirical laws of
nature, with their effects, might as to
make
it
still
be so great
impossible for our understanding
to discover in nature an intelligible order, to
THE CRITIQUE
470 divide
its
products into genera and species so as
to avail ourselves of the principles of explana-
and comprehension of one for explaining and interpreting another, and out of material coming to hand in such confusion (properly speaking only infinitely multiform and illadapted to our power of apprehension) to make tion
a consistent context of experience.
Thus judgement,
equipped with an a
also, is
priori principle for the possibility of nature, but
only
subjective respect.
in a
By means
of this
it
prescribes a law, not to nature (as autonomy), but to itself (as heautonomy), to guide its re-
upon nature. This law may be
motion applicable to matter. Their any regard to our cognitive faculties, seeing that it is only by their means that we first come by any conception of the meaning of a knowledge of things (of nature), and they of necessity apply to nature as object of our cognition in general. But it is contingent, so far as we can see, that the order of
as the laws of
origin does not presuppose
nature in
its
particular laws, with their wealth of
and heterogeneity tranpowers of comprehension, actual fact be commensurate with
at least possible variety
scending should
our
all
still
in
these powers.
To
find out this order
is
an under-
called the
taking on the part of our understanding, which
law of the specification of nature in respect of its empirical laws. It is not one cognized a priori in nature, but judgement adopts it in the interests of a natural order, cognizable by our understanding, in the division which it makes of
pursues it with a regard to a necessary end of its own, that, namely, of introducing into nature unity of principle. This end must, then, be attributed to nature by judgement, since no law can be here prescribed to it by understanding. The attainment of every aim is coupled with a feeling of pleasure. Now where such attain-
flection
when it seeks to suborthem a variety of particular laws. So
nature's universal laws
dinate to
when sal
it
is
said that nature specifies its univer-
laws on a principle of finality for our cogni-
tive faculties,
i.e.,
understanding and
of suitability for the its
human
necessary function of
finding the universal for the particular presented to
it
by perception, and again
for
varieties
(which are. of course, common for each species) connection in the unity of principle, we do not thereby either prescribe a law to nature, or learn one from
it
by observation
—although the
prin-
ciple in question may be confirmed by this means. For it is not a principle of the determinant but merely of the reflective judgement. All that is intended is that, no matter what is the order and disposition of nature in respect of its
universal laws,
we must
investigate
its
empirical
laws throughout on that principle and the maxims founded thereon, because only so far as that principle applies can we make any headway in the
employment
of our understanding in experi-
ence, or gain knowledge.
VI. The Association of the Feeling of Pleasure with the Concept of the Finality of Nature
The conceived harmony of nature in the manifold of its particular laws with our need of finding universality of principles for it must, so far as our insight goes, be deemed contingent, but withal indispensable for the requirements of our understanding:, and. consequently, a finality by which nature is in accord with our aim. but only so far as this is directed to knowledge. The universal laws of understanding, which are equally laws of nature, are, although arising from spontaneity, just as necessary for nature
ment has
—
ori
ment
for
its
condition a representation a pri-
as here a principle for the reflective judgein general
—
the feeling of pleasure also
is
determined by a ground which is a priori and valid for all men and that, too, merely by virtue of the reference of the object to our faculty of cognition. As the concept of finality here takes no cognizance whatever of the faculty of desire, :
it
differs entirely
from
all
practical finality of
nature.
As a matter of
fact,
we do
not,
find in ourselves the slightest effect
ing of pleasure
and cannot, on the feel-
from the coincidence of percep-
tions with the laws in accordance with the uni-
versal concepts of nature (the categories), since
understanding necessarily follows own nature without ulterior aim. But, while this is so, the discovery, on the other hand, that two or more empirical heterogeneous laws of nature are allied under one principle that embraces them both, is the ground of a very appreciable pleasure, often even of admiration, and such, too. as does not wear off even though we are already familiar enough with its object. It is true that we no longer notice any decided in their case
the bent of
its
pleasure in the comprehensibility of nature, or in the unity of its divisions into
genera and spe-
without which the empirical concepts, that afford us our knowledge of nature in its particucies,
lar laws,
would not be
possible. Still
it is
certain
that the pleasure appeared in due course,
and
only by reason of the most ordinary experience being impossible without it, has it become gradually fused with simple cognition, and no longer arrests particular attention. Something,
OF JUDGEMENT then, that makes us attentive in our estimate of nature to its finality for our understanding an
—
endeavour to bring, where possible, its heterogeneous laws under higher, though still always empirical, laws is required, in order that, on meeting with success, pleasure may be felt in this their accord with our cognitive faculty, which accord is regarded by us as purely contin-
—
gent.
As
against this, a representation of nature
would be altogether displeasing to us, were we to be forewarned by it that, on the least investigation carried beyond the commonest experience,
we should come geneity of
its
in contact with such a hetero-
laws as would
make
the union of
particular laws under universal empirical
its
pose of knowledge),
presented conjointly. In the sense-representation of external things, the quality of space in
which we
intuite
my
them
the merely subjective
is
them (by which what the things are in themselves as objects is left quite open), and it is on account of that refside of
representation of
erence that the object in being intuited in space
thought merely as phenomenon. But purely subjective quality, space is
also
is
despite
its
a constituent of the knowledge of things as
still
phenomena.
Sensation
(here
external)
also
agrees in expressing a merely subjective side of
which
tively final specification of nature in its genera,
we
and with our own
as space
judgement
logical validity. In the
is its
cognition of an object of sense, both sides are
laws impossible for our understanding. For this conflict with the principle of the subjec-
would
471
for the determination of the object (for the pur-
our representations of external things, but one is properly their matter (through which are given something with real existence), just
mere a
thereof.
bility of their intuition;
form of the possiand so sensation is, none
Yet this presupposition of judgement is so indeterminate on the question of the extent of the prevalence of that ideal finality of nature for
employed
in the cognition of exter-
nal objects.
our cognitive faculties, that if we are told that a more searching or enlarged knowledge of nature, derived from observation, must eventually bring us into contact with a multiplicity of laws that no human understanding could reduce to a
ed with
principle,
reflective
in respect
we can reconcile ourselves still we listen more gladly
thought. But ers
who
to
the
to oth-
hold out to us the hope that the more
we come to know the secrets of nawe are able to compare it with external members as yet unknown to us, the more simple shall we find it in its principles, and intimately
ture, or the better
the further our experience advances the
harmonious
we
more
apparent heterogeneity of its empirical laws. For our judgement makes it imperative upon us to proceed on the principle of the conformity of nature to our shall
find
it
in the
faculty of cognition, so far as that principle ex-
—
tends, without deciding
for the rule
is
—
not giv-
en to us by a determinant judgement whether bounds are anywhere set to it or not. For, while in respect of the rational employment of our cognitive faculty, bounds may be definitely determined, in the empirical field no such determination of bounds is possible. VII. The Aesthetic Representation of the Finality of Nature
That which
is
i.e.,
what constitutes
reference to the subject, not to the object, in
its
is its
On the other hand, that which such a representation serves, or is available.
aesthetic quality.
less, also
priori
But that subjective side of a representation which is incapable of becoming an element of cognition,
is
it;
1
the pleasure or displeasure connectfor through
it
I cognize
nothing in
the object of the representation, although easily be the result of the operation of
nition or other.
Now
it
may
some cog-
the finality of a thing, so
far as represented in our perception of
it, is
in
no way a quality of the object itself (for a quality of this kind is not one that can be perceived), although
it
may
be inferred from a cognition of
things. In the finality, therefore, to the cognition of
which is prior an object, and which, even
apart from any desire to sentation of
it
make
use of the repre-
for the purpose of a cognition,
yet immediately connected with
it,
subjective quality belonging to
it
we have that
is
is
the
inca-
pable of becoming a constituent of knowledge. Hence we only apply the term final to the object
on account of its representation being immediately coupled with the feeling of pleasure: and this representation itself is an aesthetic representation of the finality.
The only question
whether such a representation of at
is
finality exists
all.
is connected with the mere apprehension {apprehensio) of the form of an object of intuition, apart from any reference it may
If pleasure
have
purely subjective in the repre-
sentation of an object,
the
the
is
to a concept for the
cognition, this does not
purpose of a definite
make
the representation
[Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, p. 32: "All in our cognition that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations. The feelings of pain and pleasure, and the will are not cognitions, are excepted." Also see ibid., p. 235.] 1
THE CRITIQUE
472
referable to the object, but solely to the subject.
In such a case, the pleasure can express nothing but the conformity of the object to the cognitive faculties brought into play in the reflective
judgement, and so far as they are in play, and hence merely a subjective formal finality of the object. For that apprehension of forms in the imagination can never take place without the reflective judgement, even when it has no intention of so doing, comparing them at least with its
faculty of referring intuitions to concepts. If,
now,
in
comparison, imagination (as the is undesignedly
this
faculty of intuitions a priori)
brought into accord with understanding (as the faculty of concepts), by means of a given representation, and a feeling of pleasure is thereby aroused, then the object must be regarded as final for the reflective judgement. A judgement of this kind
is
an aesthetic judgement upon the
which does not depend upon any present concept of the object, and does not provide one. When the form of an object (as opposed to the matter of its representation, as sensation) is, in the mere act of reflecting upon it, without regard to any concept to be obtained from it, estimated as the ground of a pleasure in the representation of such an object, then this pleasure is also judged to be combined necessarily with the representation of it, and so not merely for the subject apprehendfinality of the object,
ing this form, but for
all
in general
who
pass
judgement. The object is then called beautiful; and the faculty of judging by means of such a pleasure (and so also with universal validity) is called taste. For since the ground of the pleasure is made to reside merely in the form of the object for reflection generally, consequently not in any sensation of the object, and without any reference, either, to any concept that might have something or other in view, it is with the conformity to law in the empirical employment of judgement generally (unity of imagination and understanding) in the subject, and with this alone, that the representation of the object in
which are univeraccords. And, as this accord-
reflection, the conditions of
sally valid a priori,
ance of the object with the faculties of the subject is contingent, it gives rise to a representation of a finality on the part of the object in re-
enable us to regard as necessarily connected with the representation of an object. It must
always be only through reflective perception that it is cognized as conjoined with this representation. As with all empirical judgements, it is, consequently, unable to announce objective necessity or lay claim to a priori validity. But,
judgement of
then, the
taste in fact only lays
claim, like every other empirical judgement, to
be valid for every one, and, despite its inner contingency this is always possible. The only point that is strange or out of the way about it is that it is not an empirical concept, but a feeling of pleasure (and so not a concept at all), that is yet exacted from every one by the judgement of taste, just as if it were a predicate united to the cognition of the object, and that is meant to be conjoined with its representation.
A
examjudgement of one who perceives a movable drop of water in a rock-crystal, rightly looks to every one finding the fact as stated, since the judgement has been formed according singular empirical judgement, as for
ple, the
to the universal conditions of the determinant
judgement under the laws of a possible experience generally. In the same way, one who feels pleasure in simple reflection on the form of an object, without having any concept in mind, rightly lays claim to the agreement of every one, although this judgement is empirical and a singular judgement. For the ground of this pleasure is found in the universal, though subjective, condition of reflective judgements, namely the
harmony of an object (be it a product of nature or of art) with the mutual relation of the faculties of cognition (imagination and underfinal
standing), which are requisite for every empiri-
The pleasure
cal cognition.
taste
is,
in
judgements of
therefore, dependent doubtless on an
empirical representation, and cannot be united
a priori to any concept (one cannot determine
a priori what object will be in accordance with one must find out the object that taste or not but then it is only made the determining is so)
—
;
judgement by virtue of our conresting simply upon reflection and the universal, though only subjective, conground of
this
sciousness of
ditions of the
its
harmony
of that reflection with
spect of the cognitive faculties of the subject.
the knowledge of objects generally, for which
Here, now, is a pleasure which as is the case with all pleasure or displeasure that is not brought about through the agency of the concept of freedom (i.e., through the antecedent determination of the higher faculty of desire by means of pure reason) no concepts could ever
the
—
—
form of the object is final. is why judgements of taste are subjected a critique in respect of their possibility. For
This to
their possibility presupposes an a priori principle,
although that principle
is
neither a cog-
nitive principle for understanding nor a prac-
OF JUDGEMENT tical principle for the will,
determinant a
and
is
thus in no
way
may
priori.
Susceptibility to pleasure arising
from
reflec-
on the forms of things (whether of nature or of art) betokens, however, not only a finality on the part of objects in their relation to the reflective judgement in the subject, in accordance with the concept of nature, but also, conversely, a finality on the part of the subject, answering to the concept of freedom, in respect of the form, or even formlessness of objects. The result is that the aesthetic judgement refers not merely, as a judgement of taste, to the tion
473
set before ourselves as
be nature in
its
Or the agent
an end.
technic (as in the case of
into it our own concept of an end to assist our estimate of its product. In this case what is represented is not
organic bodies),
when we read
a mere finality of nature in the form of the thing, but this very product as a natural end. Although our concept that nature, in its empirical laws, is subjectively final in its forms is in no way a concept of the object, but only a principle of judgement for providing itself with
concepts in the vast multiplicity of nature, so that
it
may
be able to take
its
bearings, yet, on were a regard to
beautiful, but also, as springing
the analogy of an end, as
intellectual feeling, to
our cognitive faculties is here attributed to nature. Natural beauty may, therefore, be looked
from a higher the sublime. Hence the
above-mentioned Critique of Aesthetic Judgement must be divided on these lines into two
main
parts.
on i.
it
as the presentation of the concept of formal,
e.,
merely subjective,
finality
and natural ends
as the presentation of the concept of a real,
VIII. The Logical Representation of the Finality of Nature
There
are two
ways
in
which
finality
may
be
represented in an object given in experience. It
may
be made to turn on what In this case the object
tive.
respect of
its
form
is
purely subjec-
is
considered in
as present in apprehension
(apprehensio) prior to any concept; 1 and the harmony of this form with the cognitive facul-
promoting the combination of the intuition
ties,
with concepts for cognition generally,
is
repre-
and reason (logically according to concepts). On these considerations is based the division of the Critique of Judgement into that of the aesthetic and the teleological judgement. By the first is
finality
meant the faculty
by the
by
the sec-
feeling of pleasure or displeasure,
ond, the faculty of estimating the real finality (objective)
Or, on the other hand, the representation of
reason.
may
be made to turn on what is objecwhich case it is represented as the harmony of the form of the object with the possibility of the thing itself according to an antecedent concept of it containing the ground of this form. We have seen that the representation of the former kind of finality rests on the pleasure immediately felt in mere reflection on the form of the object. But that of the latter kind of finality, as it refers the form of the object, not to the subject's cognitive faculties engaged tive, in
of estimating formal
(otherwise called subjective)
sented as a finality of the form of the object. finality
i.e.,
The former of these we estimate by taste (aesthetically by means of the feeling of pleasure), the latter by understanding objective, finality.
of
nature by understanding and
In a Critique of Judgement the part dealing with aesthetic judgement is essentially relevant, as it alone contains a principle introduced by judgement completely a priori as the basis of its reflection upon nature. This is the principle of nature's formal finality for our cognitive facula printies in its particular (empirical) laws ciple without which understanding could not feel itself at home in nature: whereas no reason
—
is
assignable a priori, nor
possibility of one apparent
is
so
much
as the
from the concept of
in its apprehension, but to a definite cognition
nature as an object of experience, whether in
of the object under a given concept, has noth-
universal or in
ing to do with a feeling of pleasure in things, but only understanding and its estimate of them. Where the concept of an object is given, the function of judgement, in its employment of that concept for cognition, consists in presenta-
should be objective ends of nature,
tion (exhibitio),
i.
e.,
in placing beside the con-
cept an intuition corresponding to
it.
Here
it
may
be that our own imagination is the agent employed, as in the case of art, where we realize a preconceived concept of an object which we 1
[Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 41, 42, 86, 87.]
its
particular aspects,
why i.
e.,
its
there things
only possible as natural ends. But it is only judgement that, without being itself possessed a priori of a principle in that behalf, in actually occurring cases (of certain products) contains the rule for
making use of the concept of ends
in the interest of reason, after that the
above
transcendental principle has already prepared understanding to apply to nature the concept of an end (at least in respect of
But the transcendental
its
principle
form).
by which a
a
THE CRITIQUE
474
nature in its subjective reference to our cognitive faculties, is represented in the
finality of
form of a thing as a principle of its estimation, leaves quite undetermined the question of where and in what cases we have to make our estimate of the object as a product according to a principle of finality, instead of simply acIt resigns to
cording to universal laws of nature. the aesthetic judgement
the task of deciding
the conformity of this product (in
form) to
its
our cognitive faculties as a question of taste (a matter which the aesthetic judgement decides, not by any harmony with concepts, but by feeling). On the other hand, judgement as ideolog-
employed assigns the determinate conditions under which something (e. g., an organized body) is to be estimated after the idea of an end of nature. But it can adduce no principle from the concept of nature, as an object of exically
perience, to give
it
its
authority to ascribe a
even only
priori to nature a reference to ends, or
indeterminately to assume them from actual ex-
The
perience in the case of such products.
rea-
have a theoretical knowledge of
it
in a possible
Reason prescribes laws a
experience.
freedom and
priori for
peculiar causality as the super-
its
we may have a The realm of the
sensible in the subject, so that
purely practical knowledge.
concept of nature under the one legislation, and that of the concept of
are completely cut off
freedom under the other, from all reciprocal influ-
ence, that they might severally (each according to its
own
principles) exert
upon the
other,
by
the broad gulf that divides the supersensible
from phenomena. The concept of freedom determines nothing in respect of the theoretical cognition of nature; and the concept of nature likewise nothing in respect of the practical laws
To that extent, then, it is not posthrow a bridge from the one realm to the other. Yet although the determining grounds of causality according to the concept of freedom (and the practical rule that this contains) have no place in nature, and the sensible cannot determine the supersensible in the subject; still of freedom. sible to
the converse
is
possible (not,
it is
true, in re-
merely em-
spect of the knowledge of nature, but of the
pirically to cognize objective finality in a cer-
consequences arising from the supersensible and much indeed is implied in the concept of a causality by freedom, the operation of which, in conformity with the formal laws of freedom, is to take effect in the word. The word cause, however, in its appli-
son of this
that, in order to be able
is
tain object,
many
must
particular experiences
be collected and reviewed under the unity of their principle. Aesthetic
judgement
is,
there-
faculty of estimating according
fore, a special
to a rule, but not according to concepts. teleological
The
not a special faculty, but only
is
general reflective judgement proceeding, as
always does
in theoretical cognition,
it
according
to concepts, but in respect of certain objects
of nature, following special principles
—
those,
namely, of a judgement that is merely reflective and does not determine objects. Hence, as regards its application, it belongs to the theoretical part of philosophy, and on account of its special principles, which are not determinant, as principles belonging to doctrine have to be, it
must
On
also
form
a special part of the Critique.
the other hand, the aesthetic judgement con-
tributes nothing to the cognition of its objects.
Hence
it
must only be allocated
of the judging subject and of
knowledge so
far as these
art-
to the Critique its
faculties of
capable of pos-
sessing a priori principles, be their use (theoretical or practical)
Critique which
is
otherwise what
it
the propaedeutic of
may all
—
phi-
losophy.
IX. Joinder of the Legislations of Understanding and Reason by means of Judgement
Understanding prescribes laws a priori for nature as an object of sense, so that we may
bearing on the sensible). So
cation to the supersensible only signifies the
ground that determines the causality of things of nature to an effect in conformity with their appropriate natural laws, but at the same time also in unison with the formal principle of the laws of reason a ground which, while its possibility is impenetrable, may still be completely
—
cleared of the charge of contradiction that alleged to involve. 1
The
it is
accordance with the concept of freedom is the final end which (or the manifestation of which in the sensible world) is to exist, and this presupposes One of the various supposed contradictions in this effect in
1
complete distinction of the causality of nature from that through freedom is expressed in the objection that when I speak of hindrances opposed by nature to causality according to laws of freedom (moral laws) or of assistance lent to it by nature. I am all the time admitting an influence of the former upon the latter. But the misinterpretation is easily avoided, if attention is only paid to the
meaning
of the statement. The resistance or furnot between nature and freedom, but between the former as phenomenon and the effects of the latter as phenomena in the world of sense. Even the causality of freedom (of pure and practical reason) is the causality of a natural cause subordinated to freedom (a causality of the subject regarded as man, and consequently as a phenomenon), and one, the ground of whose determination is contained in the intelligible, that is thought under freedom, in a manner that is not further or otherwise explicable (just as in the case of that intelligible that forms the supersensible substrate of nature.)
therance
is
OF JUDGEMENT
475
any pleasure of
the condition of the possibility of that end in
practical without mediation of
nature (i. e., in the nature of the subject as a being of the sensible world, namely, as man). It is so presupposed a priori, and without regard
and which determines for it, end that is attended at the same time with pure intellectual delight in the object. Judgement's concept of a finality of nature falls, besides, under the head
to the practical,
by judgement. This
faculty,
concept of a finality of nature, provides us with the mediating concept between concepts a conof nature and the concept of freedom with
its
whatsoever
origin,
as a higher faculty, the final
of natural concepts, but only as a regulative
—although
—
principle of the cognitive faculties
from the
the aesthetic judgement on certain objects (of
pure theoretical [legislation of understanding] to the pure practical [legislation of reason] and from conformity to law in accordance with the former to final ends according to the latter.
nature or of art) which occasions that concept, is a constitutive principle in respect of the feel-
cept that
makes
possible the transition
For through that concept we cognize the possibility of the final end that can only be actualized in nature and in harmony with its laws. Understanding, by the possibility of its supplying a priori laws for nature, furnishes a proof of the fact that nature is -cognized by us only as phenomenon, and in so doing points to its
having a supersensible substrate; but this substrate it leaves quite undetermined. Judgement by the a priori principle of its estimation of nature according to its possible particular laws
ing of pleasure or displeasure.
whose harmonious accord contains the ground of this pleasure, makes the concept in question, in its consequences, a suitable mediating link connecting the realm of the concept of nature with that of the concept of freedom, as this accord
same time promotes the sensibility of mind for moral feeling. 1 The following table
at the
the
may
facilitate the
ulties in their
List of
Cognitive
well as without us) with deter minability through
Feeling
the intellectual faculty.
law.
of
faculties
pleasure
and displeasure
But reason gives deterits
review of
all
the above fac-
systematic unity. 2
Mental Faculties
provides this supersensible substrate (within as
mination to the same a priori by
The spontaneity
in the play of the cognitive faculties
Cognitive Faculties
Understanding
Judgement Reason
Faculty of desire
practical
Thus judgement makes possible the tranfrom the realm of the concept of nature
A
priori Principles
Application
sition
Conformity to law
Nature
to that of the concept of freedom.
Finality
Art
In respect of the faculties of the soul generregarded as higher faculties, i. e., as faculties containing an autonomy, understanding is the one that contains the constitutive a priori
ally,
principles for the faculty of cognition (the the-
knowledge of nature). The feeling of pleasure and displeasure is provided for by the judgement in its independence from concepts and from sensations that refer to the determination of the faculty of desire and would thus be capable of being immediately practical. For the faculty of desire there is reason, which is oretical
Final i
End
Freedom
[Cf. p. 548.]
2 It has been thought somewhat suspicious that my divisions in pure philosophy should almost always come out threefold. But it is due to the nature of the case. If a division is to be a priori it must be either analytic, according to the law of contradiction and then it is always twofold (quodlibet ens est aut A aut non A) -or else it is synthetic. If it is to be derived in the latter case from a priori concepts (not, as in mathematics, from the a priori intuition corresponding to the concept), then, to meet the requirements of synthetic unity in general, namely (1) a condition, (2) a conditioned, (3) the concept arising from the union of the conditioned with its condition, the division must of necessity be tri-
—
chotomous.
—
J
FIRST PART
CRITIQUE OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT SECTION
ANALYTIC OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT
I.
Book
I.
Analytic of the Beautiful
Moment. Of the Judgement Tasted Moment oj Quality
First
forms the basis of a quite separate faculty of
oj
discriminating and estimating, that contributes
nothing to knowledge. All §
I.
The judgement oj
we wish
If
to discern
taste
is
aesthetic
whether anything
is
to the subject
pleasure.
perhaps
(acting
with understanding)
and
we
in
mind
conjunction
feeling of pleasure or dis-
its
of taste, therefore,
is
ject
not a cognitive judgement, and so not logical,
—which
means
is
aesthetic
subjective. is
that
it
is
it
signifies the real in
an
The one exception
to
empirical representation). this
is
is
conscious in the feeling of
which the its
state.
(to its feeling), they are always to that
The delight which determines the judgement oj taste is independent oj all interest
§ 2.
Every reference of representations
capable of being objective, even that of sen-
sations (in which case
compare
extent aesthetic.
one whose determining ground cannot be other than but
to
is
Given representations in a judgement may be empirical, and so aesthetic; but the judgement which is pronounced by their means is logical, provided it refers them to the object. Conversely, be the given representations even rational, but referred in a judgement solely to the sub-
refer the representation
The judgement
does
entire faculty of representations of
beau-
we do not refer the representation of it to the object by means of understanding with a view to cognition, but by means of the tiful or not,
imagination 2
it
the given representation in the subject with the
The
delight
which we connect with the repre-
sentation of the real existence of an object called interest.
the feeling of pleasure or displeasure.
Such a
is
delight, therefore, always
This denotes nothing in the object, but is a feeling which the subject has of itself and of the manner in which it is affected by the repre-
involves a reference to the faculty of desire,
sentation.
Now, where
To apprehend
a
regular
and
either as
its
determining ground, or else as nec-
essarily implicated with its determining ground.
appropriate
is
beautiful,
the question
whether something to know, whether or even could be, conis
we do not want
building with one's cognitive faculties, be the
we, or any one
mode
this representation
cerned in the real existence of the thing, but rather what estimate we form of it on mere contemplation (intuition or reflection). If any one
sation of delight.
asks
of representation clear or confused,
is
quite a different thing from being conscious of
ferred wholly to
with an accompanying senHere the representation is rethe subject, and what is more
to its feeling of life 3 feeling
of
pleasure
—under or
the
name
this
by
this judgement in its reflection, I have followed the guidance of the logical functions of judging (for a judgement of taste always Involves a reference to understanding). I nave brought the moment of quality first under review, because this i- what the aesthetic judgement on the beautiful looks to in the first in-tance. 2
3
[Cf. p. 493[Cf. p. 495-]
that I do not care for things of that sort that
are merely in the
The
definition of taste here relied upon is that it is the faculty of estimating the beautiful. Hut the discovers of what i> required for calling an object beautiful must be reserved for the analysis of judgements of taste. In my >earch for the moments to which attention is paid 1
me whether I consider that the palace I me is beautiful, I may, perhaps, reply
see before
of the
—and
displeasure
else, are,
made
same
to be
gaped
at.
Or
I
may
reply
sachem who Paris pleased him better
strain as that Iroquois
said that nothing in
than the eating-houses. I
may even
go a step
further and inveigh with the vigour of a Rous-
seau against the vanity of the great who spend the sweat of the people on such superfluous things. Or, in fine, I may quite easily persuade
myself that if I found myself on an uninhabited without hope of ever again coming among men, and could conjure such a palace island,
476
a
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT into existence
by a mere
wish, I should
still
not
trouble to do so, so long as I had a hut there
was comfortable enough for me. All this be admitted and approved; only it is not the point now at issue. All one wants to know is whether the mere representation of the object is to my liking, no matter how indifferent I may be
477
a par in everything relevant to their effect upon the feeling of pleasure, for this would be agree-
that
ableness in the sensation of one's state;
may
since, in the last resort, all the elaborate
to the real existence of the object of this repre-
sentation. It
is
quite plain that in order to say
and to show that I have taste, everything turns on the meaning which I can give to this representation, and not on any factor which makes me dependent on the real existence of the object. Every one must allow that a judgement on the beautiful which is tinged with the slightest interest, is very partial and not a pure judgement of taste. 1 One must that the object
is
beautiful,
of our faculties
ties
gratification
attained
which they promise. How this is the end immaterial; and, as the
is in
means is here the only thing that can make a difference, men might indeed blame one another for folly or imprudence, but never for baseness or wickedness; for they are all, each according to his own way of looking at things, pursuing one goal, which for each is the choice of the
gratification in question.
When
a modification of the feeling of pleas-
ure or displeasure
complete indifference in play the part of judge in matters of taste. This proposition, which is of the utmost importance, cannot be better explained than by contrasting the pure disinterested 2 delight which appears in the judgement of taste with that especially if we can also allied to an interest assure ourselves that there are no other kinds of interest beyond those presently to be men-
pression
tioned.
THE AGREEABLE
in the
credit our facul-
with no other appreciation of things and
real existence of the thing,
—
and unite
issue in
we could
the worth of things, than that consisting in the
not be in the least prepossessed in favour of the
but must preserve this respect, in order to
must
practical as its goal,
and
work
is
termed sensation,
this ex-
given quite a different meaning to that which it bears when I call the representais
tion of a thing (through sense as a receptivity pertaining to the faculty of knowledge) sensation. For in the latter case the representation is
referred to the object, but in the former it is referred solely to the subject and is not avail-
any cognition, not even for that by which the subject cognizes itself. Now in the above definition the word sensation is used to denote an objective representaable for
COUpUd With
tion of sense; and, to avoid continually running the risk of misinterpretation, we shall call that
That is agreeable which the senses find pleas-
which must always remain purely subjective, and is absolutely incapable of forming a representation of an object, by the familiar name of
§ 3.
Delight IN
is
interest
ing in sensation. This at once affords a convenient opportunity for
condemning and directing
3
particular attention to a prevalent confusion of
the double meaning of which the capable. All delight (as
is
itself
is
word sensation
said or thought)
is
sensation (of a pleasure). Consequently
everything that pleases, and for the very reason that it pleases, is agreeable and according to
—
different degrees, or its relations to other
its
agreeable
sensations,
is
attractive,
1
subjective sensation, resented;
[Cf. pp. *85, 520.]
A
judgement upon an object of our delight may be wholly disinterested but withal very interesting * i.e., it relies on no interest, but it produces one. Of this kind are all pure moral judgements. But, of themselves judgements of taste do not even set up any interest whatsoever. Only in society is it interesting to have taste point which will be explained in the sequel. * [Cf. pp. 520, et seq.; 522, et seq. Also Cf. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 265.]
—
by which no object
is
rep-
through which the object is regarded as an object of delight (which involves no cognition of the object).
Now,
charming,
But if this is conceded, then impressions of sense, which determine inclination, or principles of reason, which determine the will, or mere contemplated forms of intuition, which determine judgement, are all on delicious, enjoyable, etc.
2
feeling. The green colour of the meadows belongs to objective sensation, as the perception of an object of sense; but its agreeableness to
its
i.e.,
to feeling,
that a judgement on an object
agreeableness
is
by which
affirmed, expresses an inter-
evident from the fact that through provokes a desire for similar objects, consequently the delight presupposes, not est in
it, is
sensation
it
the simple judgement about its real
existence has
upon
affected
by such an
object.
it,
but the bearing
my
state so far as
Hence we do not
merely say of the agreeable that it pleases, but that it gratifies. I do not accord it a simple approval, but inclination is aroused by it, and where agreeableness is of the liveliest type a 3 [Cf. footnote in the first section of the Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 385.]
THE CRITIQUE
478
judgement on the character of the object is so entirely out of place that those who are always intent only on enjoyment (for that is the
word used to denote intensity of gratification) would fain dispense with all judgement.
the palate with spices and other condiments that
—
owning is agreeable not good: because, while
it
the senses,
coupled with
is
same
interest
sess
good which by means of reason commends itself by its mere concept. We call that good for something (useful) which only pleases as a means; but that which pleases on its own account we call good in itself. In both cases the concept of an end is implied, and conse-
That
is
quently
relation
the
possible)
reason
of
to
and thus a delight
willing,
existence of an object or action,
least
(at
i.e.,
the
in
some
in-
terest or other.
To deem something good,
I
must always know
sort of a thing the object
what
is
intended to be, is not
must have a concept of it. That necessary to enable me to see beauty in a
i.
I
e.,
Flowers,
twining
patterns,
free
lines
aimlessly
—
— technically
signification,
thing. inter-
termed foliage have no depend upon no definite concept,
and yet please. Delight in the beautiful must depend upon the reflection on an object precursory to some (not definitely determined) concept.
It is
thus also differentiated from the
agreeable, which rests entirely
many
In
upon sensation.
no doubt, the agreeable and
cases,
the good seem convertible terms.
commonly
said that
all
Thus
is
it
(especially lasting) grat-
which is almost equivpermanently agreeable and to be good are identical. But it is readily apparent that this is merely a vicious confusion ification
is
of itself good;
alent to saying that to be
of words, for the concepts appropriate to these
expressions are far from interchangeable.
The
agreeable, which, as such, represents the object solely in relation to sense,
must
in the first in-
under principles of reason through the concept of an end, to be, as an object of will, called good. But that the reference to delight is wholly different where what gratifies is at the same time called good, is evident
stance be brought
from the always good,
i.
is
fact that wiih the u'ood the question
whether
e.,
it
is
mediately or immediately
useful or good in itself; whereas with
the agreeable this point can never arise, since the
word always means what pleases immediand it is just the same with what I call
ately
—
Even in everyday parlance, a drawn between the agreeable and
the good.
is
We
do not scruple to say of a dish that stimulates
Even
it,
it
is i.
pains. But,
is
it
satisfies i.
in
e.,
if
in
our estimate of health, this
be traced. To all that posimmediately agreeable at least as remoteness of all bodily e.,
may
we
—
are to say that
it
is
good,
we
must further apply to reason to direct it to ends, that is, we must regard it as a state that puts us in a congenial mood for all we have to do. Finally, in respect of happiness every one believes that the greatest aggregate of the pleas-
ures of
life,
taking duration as well as
into account, merits the
name
number
of a true, nay
even of the highest, good. But reason sets its face against this too. Agreeableness is enjoyment. But if this is all that we are bent on, it would be foolish to be scrupulous about the means that procure it for us whether it be obtained passively by the bounty of nature or actively and by the work of our own hands. But that there is any intrinsic worth in the real existence of a man who merely lives for enjoyment, however busy he may be in this respect, even when in so doing he serves others all equally with himself intent only on enjoyment as an excellent means to that one end, and does so, moreover, because through sympathy he shares all their gratifications this is a view to which reason will never let itself be brought round. Only by what a man does heedless of enjoyment, in complete freedom, and independently of what he can procure passively from the hand of nature, does he give to his existence, as the real existence of a person, an absolute worth. Happiness, with all its plethora of pleasures, is far from being an unconditioned good. 1 But, despite all this difference between the agreeable and the good, they both agree in being invariably coupled with an interest in their object. This is true, not alone of the agreeable, § 3. and of the mediately good, i. e., the useful, which pleases as a means to some pleasure, but also of that which is good absolutely and from every point of view, namely the moral good which carries with it the highest interest. For the good is the object of will, i. e., of a rationally determined faculty of desire). But to will
—
—
—
—
An obligation to enjoyment is a patent absurdity. the same, then, must also be said of a supposed obligation to actions that have merely enjoyment for their aim, no matter how spiritually this enjoyment may be refined in thought (or embellished), and even if it be a mystical, so-called heavenly, enjoyment. And
distinction
the while that
immediately
mediately displeasing,
is
distinction
negatively,
1
beautiful.
it
the eye of reason that looks ahead to the con-
sequences.
the good
Delight in
§4.
it
all
a
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT something, and to take a delight in its existence, to take an interest in it, are identical.
i.e.,
§
Comparison of the three
5.
specifically
diferent kinds of delight
Both
the agreeable and the good involve a
reference to the faculty of desire, and are thus attended, the former with a delight pathologically conditioned
(by stimuli), the
latter
with a
pure practical delight. Such delight is determined not merely by the representation of the object, but also by the represented bond of connection between the subject and the real exis not merely the ob-
istence of the object. It ject,
but also
existence, that pleases.
its real
the other hand, the judgement of taste
contemplative,
i.
e.,
is
a judgement which
it is
indifferent as to the existence of an object,
only decides
how
its
On
simply is
and
character stands with the
feeling of
pleasure and displeasure. But not
even
contemplation
is
this
itself
directed to con-
judgement of taste is not a cognitive judgement (neither a theoretical one nor a practical), and hence, also, is not grounded on cepts; for the
479
want, or calls one forth; and, being a ground determining approval, deprives the judgement
on the object of its freedom. So far as the interest of inclination in the case of the agreeable goes, every one says "Hunger is the best sauce; and people with a healthy appetite relish everything, so long as it is something they can eat." Such delight, consequently, gives no indication of taste having anything to say to the choice. Only when men have got all they want can we tell who among the crowd has taste or not. Similarly there may be correct habits (conduct) without virtue, politeness without good-will, propriety without honour, etc. For where the moral law dictates, there is, objectively, no room left for free choice as to what one has to do; and to show taste in the way one carries out these dictates, or in estimating the way others do so, is a totally different matter from displaying the moral frame of one's mind. For the latter involves a command and produces a need of something, whereas moral taste only plays with the objects of delight without devoting itself sincerely to any.
concepts, nor yet intentionally directed to them.
The
agreeable, the beautiful, and the good
thus denote three different relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, as a feeling in respect of
guish different objects or tion. Also, the
which we
modes
distin-
of representa-
corresponding expressions which
indicate our satisfaction in
them are
is what gratifies a man; the what simply pleases him; the good esteemed (approved) i.e., that on which
beautiful is
—
;
—
to favour, or to respect.
For favour
is
mode
the
the faculty of estimating an object
by means of a defrom any interest. The
of representation
light or aversion apart
object of such a delight
Second Moment. Taste:
,
he sets an objective worth. Agreeableness is a significant factor even with irrational animals; beauty has purport and significance only for human beings, i.e., for beings at once animal and rational (but not merely for them as rational but only for them as at intelligent beings once animal and rational) whereas the good is good for every rational being in general proposition which can only receive its complete justification and explanation in the sequel. Of all these three kinds of delight, that of taste in the beautiful may be said to be the one and only disinterested and free delight; for, with it, no interest, whether of sense or reason, extorts approval. And so we may say that delight, in the three cases mentioned, is related to inclination,
—
Taste or a
from
is
called beautiful.
different.
The agreeable what
Definition of the Beautiful derived First Moment
is
the only
free liking. An object of inclination, and one which a law of reason imposes upon our desire, leaves us no freedom to turn anything into an
object of pleasure. All interest presupposes a
§ 6.
Moment
The beautiful
is
Of the Judgement
that which, apart
from con-
cepts, is represented as the Object of a
versal
of
of Quantity
uni-
delight.
This definition of the beautiful is deducible from the foregoing definition of it as an object of delight apart from any interest. For where any one is conscious that his delight in an object is with him independent of interest, it is inevitable that he should look on the object as one
containing a ground of delight for since the delight
is
all
men. For,
not based on any inclination
of the subject (or on
any other deliberate
in-
terest), but the subject feels himself completely
free in respect of the liking which he accords to
the object, he can find as reason for his delight
no personal conditions to which his own subjective self might alone be party. Hence he must regard it as resting on what he may also presuppose in every other person; and therefore he must believe that he has reason for demanding a similar delight from every one. Accord-
THE CRITIQUE
480
that
(forming a cognition of the object by concepts of it); although it is only aesthetic,
delight
logical
and contains merely
a reference of the represen-
tation of the object to the subject; because it still bears this resemblance to the logical judge-
ment, that it may be presupposed to be valid for all men. But this universality cannot spring from concepts. For from concepts there is no transition to the feeling of pleasure or displeas(save in the case of pure practical laws,
calls
a thing
beautiful, he
it
from
the
same
He
judges not merely for men, and then speaks of
others.
himself, but for
on a pedestal
demands
all
beauty as if it were a property of things. Thus he says the thing is beautiful; and it is not as if he counted on others agreeing in his judgement of liking owing to his having found them in such agreement on a number of occasions, but he demands this agreement of them. He blames them if they judge differently, and de-
them taste, which he still requires of them something they ought to have; and to this extent it is not open to men to say: "Every one has his own taste." This would be equivalent to saying that there is no such thing at all as taste, i.e., no aesthetic judgement capable of
ure
nies
which, however, carry an interest with them; and such an interest does not attach to the pure
as
judgement of taste). The result is that the judgement of taste, with its attendant consciousness of detachment from all interest, must involve a claim to validity for all men, and must do so apart from universality attached to objects, i.e.. there must be coupled with it a
;
and
when he puts
but
ingly he will speak of the beautiful as if beauty were a quality of the object and the judgement
making a
rightful claim
men. Yet even
upon the assent of
in the case of the agreeable,
we
all
find
men form do betray a prevagreement among them, which leads to
that the estimates
claim to subjective universality.
alent
Comparison oj the beautiful with the agreeable and the good by means oj the above
our crediting some with taste and denying it to others, and that, too, not as an organic sense
characteristic
but as a
§ 7.
As regards
the agreeable, every one concedes
which he bases on a private which he declares that an object restricted merely to himself per-
that his judgement, feeling,
and
pleases him. sonally.
in is
Thus he does not take
it
amiss
if,
when
he says that Canary-wine is agreeable, another corrects the expression and reminds him that he
ought to say: "It is agreeable to me." This applies not only to the taste of the tongue, the
and the throat, but to what may with any one be agreeable to eye or ear. A violet colour is to one soft and lovely: to another dull and faded. One man likes the tone of wind
palate,
instruments, another prefers that of string in-
struments. idea of correct
To
quarrel over such points with the
condemning another's judgement when it differs from our own, as
as inif
the
opposition between the two judgements were logical, would be folly. With the agreeable, therefore, the axiom holds good:
own taste (that of sense). The beautiful stands on quite
Every one has
ing.
It
a different foot-
would, on the contrary, be ridiculous
if
any one who plumed himself on his taste were to think of justifying himself by saying: 'This object (the building we see, the dress that person has on, the concert we hear, the poem submitted to our criticism) is beautiful for me." For if it merely pleases him, he must not call it beautiful. Many things may for him possess charm and agreeableness no one cares about
—
who knows how
to en-
enjoyment such a way that one
tertain his guests with pleasures (of
through all the senses) in and all are pleased, we say that he has taste. But the universality here is only understood in a comparative sense; and the rules that apply like all empirical
are,
rules, general only, not
what the judgement upon the beautiful deals or claims to It is a judgement in respect of sociabil-
universal, the latter being of taste
deal
in.
ity so far as resting
spect of the good,
on empirical
it
is
rules.
In re-
true that judgements
also rightly assert a claim to validity for every
only represented as an obby means of a concept, the case neither with the agreeable nor
one; but the good
is
ject of universal delight
which
is
the beautiful. § 8.
In a judgement oj taste the universality of is only represented as subjective
delight
This
his
critical faculty in respect of the agree-
able generally. So of one
particular
form of the universality of is to be met in
an aesthetic judgement, which a judgement of taste,
is
a significant feature,
not for the logician certainly, but for the transcendental philosopher. It calls for no small effort
on
his part to discover its origin, but in re-
turn
it
brings to light a property of our cogni-
tive faculty which, without this analysis, would have remained unknown. First, one must get firmly into one's mind that by the judgement of taste (upon the beau-
— OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT tiful) the delight in an object is imputed to every one, yet without being founded on a concept (for then it would be the good), and that this claim to universality is such an essential
factor of a judgement
be ranked as agreeable. For in respect of the agreeable, every one is allowed to have his own opinion, and no one insists upon others agreeing with his judgement of taste, which
is
what
is
invariably done in the judgement of taste about
may
judgement, provided we add objec-
tive universal validity,
to distinguish
the merely subjective validity which
is
it
from
always
aesthetic.)
Now
by which we describe
anything as beautiful, that were it not for its being present to the mind it would never enter into any one's head to use this expression, but everything that pleased without a concept would
The
tity of the
481
a judgement that has objective universal
validity has always got the subjective also, if
the judgement
is
contained under a given concept,
also for all
who
i.e.,
valid for everything which
is
it is
valid
by means
represent an object
of
But from a subjective universal validity, i. e., the aesthetic, that does not rest on any concept, no conclusion can be drawn to the logical; because judgements of that kind have no bearing upon the object. But for this very this concept.
call the taste
reason the aesthetic universality attributed to
of sense, the second, the taste of reflection: the first laying down judgements merely private,
a judgement must also be of a special kind, seeing that it does not join the predicate of beauty
beauty.
of these I
first
the second, on the other hand, judgements os-
to the concept of the object taken in its entire
tensibly of general validity (public), but both
logical sphere,
alike being aesthetic (not practical)
judgements
about an object merely in respect of the bearings of its representation on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Now it does seem strange that while with the taste of sense it is not alone experience that shows that
its
judgement (of
pleasure or displeasure in something)
is
not uni-
versally valid, but every one willingly refrains
from imputing
this
agreement to others (de-
spite the frequent actual prevalence of a con-
siderable consensus of general opinion even in
these judgements), the taste of reflection, which,
enough to put up with a rude dismissal of its claims to universal validity of its judgement (upon the beauas experience teaches, has often
tiful),
can (as
it
actually does) find
it
possible
and yet does extend
this predi-
cate over the whole sphere of judging subjects.
In their logical quantity,
all
judgements of must
taste are singular judgements. 1 For, since I
present the object immediately to
my
feeling
of pleasure or displeasure, and that, too, with-
out the aid of concepts, such judgements cannot have the quantity of judgements with objective general validity. Yet
by taking the
singular rep-
resentation of the object of the judgement of
and by comparison converting it into a concept according to the conditions determining that judgement, we can arrive at a logically uni-
taste,
versal judgement.
ment
am
For instance, by a judge-
of the taste I describe the rose at which I
looking as beautiful.
The judgement, on
the
other hand, resulting from the comparison of a
for all that to formulate judgements capable of demanding this agreement in its universality. Such agreement it does in fact require from every one for each of its judgements of taste the persons who pass these judgements not
number
quarreling over the possibility of such a claim, but only failing in particular cases to come to terms as to the correct application of this
we have here to note that a uniwhich does not rest upon concepts of the object (even though these are only empirical) is in no way logical, but aesthetic, i. e., does not involve any objective quantity of the judgement, but only one that is subjective. For this
is also, no doubt, an aesthetic and singujudgement, but then it is not one of taste but of sense. For it has this point of difference from a judgement of taste, that the latter imports an aesthetic quantity of universality, i. e., of validity for everyone which is not to be met with in a judgement upon the agreeable. It is only judgements upon the good which, while also determining the delight in an object, possess logical and not mere aesthetic universality; for
universality I use the expression general valid-
it is
faculty.
First of all
versality
ity,
which denotes the validity of the reference
of a representation, not to the cognitive faculties,
but to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure
for every subject. ever,
may also
(The same expression, how-
be employed for the logical quan-
of singular representations: "Roses in
general are beautiful," 2
is
no longer pronounced
as a purely aesthetic judgement, but as a logical
judgement founded on one that
Now
the judgement,
"The
rose
is
is
aesthetic.
agreeable" (to
smell)
lar
as involving a cognition of the object that they are valid of it, and on that account valid for everyone. In forming an estimate of objects merely
UCf.p. 2
51s.] [Cf. p. 485, P. 486,
and
p. 515.]
— THE CRITIQUE
482
from concepts, all representation of beauty goes by the board. There can, therefore, be no rule according to which any one is to be compelled to recognize anything as beautiful. Whether a dress, a house, or a flower is beautiful is a matupon which one declines to allow one's judgement to be swayed by any reasons or principles.
ter
We own
want to get a look at the object with our eyes, just as if our delight depended on
sensation.
1
And
yet,
upon so doing, we
if
we
the object beautiful,
call
believe ourselves to be
speaking with a universal voice, and lay claim to the concurrence of everyone, whereas no private sensation would be decisive except for the
observer alone and his Here, now, we
may
Were
ment
of taste
is
meant
to allow to the represen-
would be For a pleasure of that kind would be nothing but the feeling of mere agreeableness to the senses, and so, from its very nature, would possess no more than private validity, seeing that it would be immediately dependent on the representation through which tation of the object, such a sequence
self-contradictory.
the object
given.
is
Hence it is the universal capacity for being communicated incident to the mental state in the given representation which, as the subjective
liking.
perceive that nothing
is
condition of the judgement of taste, must be,
postulated in the judgement of taste but such a universal voice in respect of delight that it is
its
not mediated by concepts; consequently, only the possibility of an aesthetic judgement capa-
tion
same time deemed valid for The judgement of taste itself does not
ble of being at the
everyone.
the pleasure in a given object to be the
antecedent, and were the universal communicability of this pleasure to be all that the judge-
postulate the agreement of everyone (for
it
is
fundamental, with the pleasure in the object as consequent. 2 Nothing, however, is capable
communicated but cogniand representation so far as appurtenant to cognition. For it is only as thus appurtenant that the representation is objective, and it is of being universally
this alone that gives
it
a universal point of ref-
only competent for a logically universal judgement to do this, in that it is able to bring for-
erence with which the power of representation
only imputes this agreement
the determining ground of the judgement as to
to everyone, as an instance of the rule in respect
communicability of the represenmerely subjective, that is to say, to be conceived independently of any concept of the object, it can be nothing else than the mental state that presents itself in the mutual relation of the powers of representation so far
ward reasons); of which
it
it
looks for confirmation, not from
concepts, but from the concurrence of others.
The
universal voice
resting is
is,
therefore, only an idea
upon grounds the investigation of which
here postponed. It
may
tainty whether a person
down
be a matter of uncer-
who
thinks he
is
laying
judgement of taste is, in fact, judging in conformity with that idea; but that this idea is what is contemplated in his judgement, and that, consequently, it is meant to be a judgement of taste, is proclaimed by his use of the a
of every one
is
obliged to harmonize.
If, then,
this universal
tation
is
to be
as they refer a given representation to cognition in general.
The
cognitive powers brought into play
by
expression "beauty." For himself he can be certain on the point from his mere consciousness of
engaged in a free play, since no definite concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. Hence the mental state in this representation must be one of a feeling of the free play of the powers of repre-
the separation of everything belonging to the
sentation in a given representation for a cogni-
agreeable and the good from the delight remain-
tion in general.
ing to him; and this
an object
which he promises himself the agreement of everyone a claim which, under these conditions, he would also be warranted in making, were it not that he frequently sinned against them, and thus passed an erroneous judgement of taste. is all
for
—
§ o. Investigation of the
question of the relative
judgement of taste of the feeling of pleasure and the estimating of the object priority in a
The
solution of this problem
the Critique of taste, and so attention. 1
[Cf.p. 5M-]
is
is
the key to
worthy of
all
this representation are here
become
is
Now
a representation,
whereby
given, involves, in order that
a source of cognition at
all,
it
may
imagination
for bringing together the manifold of intuition, and understanding for the unity of the concept uniting the representations. This state of free
play of the cognitive faculties attending a representation by which an object is given must
admit
of
cognition,
universal as
communication:
because
a definition of the object with
which given representations (in any subject whatever) are to accord, is the one and only representation which is valid for everyone. As the subjective universal communicability 2
CCf.$37.]
— ;
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT mode
of the
of taste
is
of representation in a judgement
to subsist apart
from the presuppo-
it can be nothing mental state present in the free play of imagination and understanding (so far as these are in mutual accord, as is requisite
any
sition of
definite concept,
else than the
for cognition in general)
;
for
we
are conscious
that this subjective relation suitable for a cogni-
must be
tion in general
just as valid for every
one, and consequently as universally
communi-
would be intellectual (as in the objecschematism of judgement dealt with in
relation tive
the Critique). But, then, in that case the judge-
ment would not be
the predicate of beauty. There
in the
harmony
of the cognitive faculties. Again,
the above-described universality of the subjective conditions of estimating objects
forms the
sole foundation of this universal subjective val-
which we connect with the
idity of the delight
representation of the object that
we
call
beau-
That an
ability to
communicate one's mental
be only in respect of our attended with a pleasure, is a fact which might easily be demonstrated from the natural propensity of mankind to social life, i.e., empirically and psychologically. But what we have here in view calls for something more than this. In a judgement of taste, the pleasure felt by us is exacted from every one else as necessary, just as if, when we call something beautiful, beauty was to be regarded as a quality of the object forming part of its inherent determination according to concepts; although beauty is for itself, apart from any reference to
even though
it
cognitive faculties,
is
state,
by
the feeling of the subject, nothing.
But the
dis-
cussion of this question must be reserved until
we have answered
the further one of whether,
and how, aesthetic judgements are possible a priori.
At present we are exercised with the lesser way in which we become conscious, in a judgement of taste, of a reciprocal subjective common accord of the powers of cognition. Is it aesthetically by sensation and our mere internal sense? Or is it intellectually by
question of the
consciousness
of
our
intentional
activity
Now
if
the given representation occasioning
therefore, no
make itself known than The quickening of both facul-
in question to
(imagination and understanding) to an in-
definite, tion,
but yet, thanks to the given representaactivity, such as belongs to
harmonious
cognition generally,
is
whose uni-
the sensation
communicability is postulated by the judgement of taste. An objective relation can, of course, only be thought, yet in so far as, in reversal
spect of
be
its
conditions,
felt in its effect
case of a relation
it is
subjective,
it
may
upon the mind, and, in the (like that of the powers of
representation to a faculty of cognition general-
which does not
on any concept, no othpossible beyond that through sensation of its effect upon the mind an effect consisting in the more facile play of both mental powers (imagination and understanding) as quickened by their mutual accord. A representation which is singular and independent of comparison with other representations, rest
er consciousness of
it
is
and, being such, yet accords with the conditions is the general concern one that brings the cognitive faculties into that proportionate accord which we require for all cognition and which we therefore deem valid for every one who is so constituted as to judge by means of understanding and sense conjointly (i.e., for every man).
of the universality that of understanding,
is
Definition of the Beautiful drawn the Second Moment
The
beautiful
is
that which, apart
from
from
a con-
cept, pleases universally.
Third Moment. Of Judgements
Moment
of Taste:
relation of the Ends brought under Review in such Judgements of the
§ 10. Finality in general
in
bringing these powers into play?
is,
for the subjective unity of the re-
sensation.
ly)
tiful.
way
other
ties
purely subjective (aesthetic) estimating of the object, or of the representation through which it is given, is antecedent to the pleasure in it, and is the basis of this pleasure
of taste determines the object, independ-
ently of concepts, in respect of delight and of
condition. this
respect to
But, now, the judge-
a judgement of taste.
ment
lation
Now
down with
laid
pleasure and displeasure, and so would not be
is any indeterminate cognition, which always rests upon that relation as its subjective
cable, as
483
Let
us define the meaning of "an end" in transcendental terms (i.e., without presuppos-
the judgement of taste were a concept which
ing anything empirical, such as the feeling of
united understanding and imagination in the estimate of the object so as to give a cogni-
pleasure).
tion of the object, the consciousness of this
the object (the real ground of
An end
is
far as this concept
the object of a concept so is
regarded as the cause of its
possibility)
—
.
THE CRITIQUE
4 84
and the causality of a concept in respect of its object is finality (jorma finalis). Where, then, not the cognition of an object merely, but the object itself (its form or real existence) as an
thought to be possible only through a it, there we imagine an end. The representation of the effect is here the determining
effect, is
concept of
cause and takes the lead of it. The consciousness of the causality of a representa-
ground of
its
tion in respect of the state of the subject as
one
is an aesthetic and not a cognitive judgement, and so does not deal with any concept of the nature or of the internal or external possibility, by this or that cause, of the object, but simply with the relative bearing of the representative powers so far as determined by a represen-
of taste
tation.
Now ment
whereas displeasure is that representation which contains the ground for
tation
called pleasure;
converting the state of the representations into their opposite
(
for hindering or
removing them)
1
faculty of desire, so far as determinable
The
only through concepts, i.e., so as to act in conformity with the representation of an end, would 2
But an object, or state of mind, or even an action may, although its possibility does not necessarily presuppose the representation of an end, be called final simply on account of its possibility being only explicable and intelligible for us by virtue of an assumption on our part of fundamental causality according to ends, i.e., a will that would have so ordained it accordbe the
will.
ing to a certain represented rule. Finality, therefore,
may
from an end, in so far as the causes of this form in a will,
locate
but yet are able to render the explanation of its possibility intelligible to ourselves only by deriving
from a
it
will.
Now we
are not always
obliged to look with the eye of reason into
what
we observe (i.e., to consider it in its possibility). So we may at least observe a finality of form, and trace it in objects though by reflection only without resting it on an end (as the ma-
—
—
terial of the
§ ii.
(or
finalis).
the
form of finality
of representing
judgement of of an object
it)
it
an end is regarded as a source of always imports an interest as deter-
mining ground of the judgement on the object of pleasure. Hence the judgement of taste cannot rest on any subjective end as its ground. But neither can any representation of an objective i.e.,
of the possibility of the object itself
on principles of final connection, determine the judgement of taste, and, consequently, neither can any concept of the good. For the judgement [Cf. p. 4S5.] [Cf. Introduction to the PP. 385-387.]
1
2 i..
is
just as incapable of containing the de-
termining ground of the judgement as the representation of the perfection of the object or the
concept of the good.
We
are thus left with the
subjective finality in the representation of an
any end (objective or sub-
object, exclusive of
jective)
—consequently the bare form of
ity in the representation
given to us, so far as as that which
is
we
final-
whereby an object are conscious of
is
it
alone capable of constituting the
from any concept, we esticommunicable, and so of forming the determining ground of the judgement of taste. delight which, apart
mate
as universally
§ 12.
The judgement
of taste rests
upon
a priori
grounds
To determine
a priori the connection of the
feeling of pleasure or displeasure as an effect,
with some representation or other (sensation or concept) as its cause, is utterly impossible; for that
would be a causal relation which (with ob-
jects of experience)
is
always one that can only
be cognized a posteriori and with the help of experience. True, in the Critique of Practical Reason we did actually derive a priori from univer-
moral concepts the feeling of respect (as a
Metaphysk
ing
which does not
strictly
answer either
pleasure or displeasure which empirical objects). But there
Whenever
end,
by the judge-
hence an agreeableness attending the represen-
sal
sole foundation of the
is
mode
delight,
is
particular and peculiar modification of this feel-
The
taste
nexus
is
coupled with the
of taste pronounced valid for every one;
exist apart
we do not
when an object
is
feeling of pleasure. This pleasure
tending to preserve a continuance of that state, may here be said to denote in a general way what is
this relation, present
characterized as beautiful,
of Morals, sect.
to the
we receive from we were further
able to cross the border of experience and call
on a supersensible atnamely that of freedom.
in aid a causality resting
tribute of the subject,
But even there it was not this feeling exactly that we deduced from the idea of the moral as cause, but from this was derived simply the determination of the will. But the mental state present in the determination of the will by any means is at once in itself a feeling of pleasure and identical with it, and so does not issue from it as an effect. Such an effect must only be assumed where the concept of the moral as a good precedes the determination of the will by the
— OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT law; for in that case
it
would be
futile to derive
the pleasure combined with the concept this concept as a mere cognition.
Now
from
the pleasure in aesthetic judgements
stands on a similar footing: only that here
it is
merely contemplative and does not bring about an interest in the object; whereas in the moral judgement it is practical. The consciousness of mere formal finality in the play of the cognitive faculties of the subject attending a representa-
tion
whereby an object
itself,
because
it
is
given,
is
the pleasure
485
have been accredited as intrinsic beauties, and consequently the matter of delight passed off for the form. This is a misconception which, like many others that have still an underlying element of truth, may be removed by a careful definition of these concepts.
A judgement of taste which is uninfluenced by charm or emotion (though these may be associated 1 with the delight in the beautiful), and whose determining ground, therefore, is simply finality of form, is a pure judgement of taste.
involves a determining ground § 14. Exemplification
of the subject's activity in respect of the quick-
ening of its cognitive powers, and thus an internal causality (which is final) in respect of cognition generally, but without being limited to a definite cognition, and consequently a mere form
Aesthetic,
just
like
theoretical
(logical)
judgements, are divisible into empirical and pure.
The
first
are those
by which agreeableness by which
or disagreeableness, the second those
of the subjective finality of a representation in
beauty
an aesthetic judgement. This pleasure is also in no way practical, neither resembling that form the pathological ground of agreeableness nor that from the intellectual ground of the represented good. But still it involves an inherent causality, that, namely, of preserving a continuance of the state of the representation itself and the active engagement of the cognitive powers without ulterior aim. We dwell on the contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself. The case is analogous (but analogous only) to the way we linger on a charm in the representation of an object which keeps arresting the attention, the mind all the while remaining passive.
representation.
is
predicated of an object or
The former
its
mode
of
are judgements of
sense (material aesthetic judgements), the latter
judgements of taste proper. only pure so far as its determining ground is tainted with no merely empirical delight. But such a taint is always present where charm or emotion have a share in the judgement by "which something is to be described as beautiful. (as formal) alone
A
judgement of
Here now there
taste, therefore, is
is
a recrudescence of a
num-
ber of specious pleas that go the length of putting forward the case that
charm
is
not merely a
necessary ingredient of beauty, but is even of itself sufficient to merit the name of beautiful.
A
mere
colour, such as the green of a plot of
mere tone (as distinguished from sound or noise), like that of a violin, is described by most people as in itself beautiful, notwithstanding the fact that both seem to depend merely on the matter of the representations in other words, simply on sensation which only entitles them to be called agreeable. But it will at the same time be observed that sensations of colour as well as of tone are only entitled to be immediately regarded as beautiful where, in either case, they are pure. This is a determination which at once goes to their form, and it is the only one which these representations possess
grass, or a § 13.
The pure judgement of taste is independent of charm and emotion
Every and robs
interest vitiates the it
of
its
judgement of
impartiality. This
is
taste
especially
so where, instead of, like the interest of reason,
making
finality take the lead of the feeling of
—
it grounds it upon this feeling which what always happens in aesthetic judgements upon anything so far as it gratifies or pains. Hence judgements so influenced can either lay no claim at all to a universally valid delight, or else must abate their claim in proportion as sen-
pleasure, is
sations of the kind in question enter into the determining grounds of taste. Taste that requires an added element of charm and emotion for its delight, not
to speak of adopting this as the
measure of its approval, has not yet emerged from barbarism. And yet charms are frequently not alone ranked with beauty (which ought properly to be a question merely of the form) as supplementary to the aesthetic universal delight, but they
—
that admits with certainty of being universally
communicated. For it is not to be assumed that even the quality of the sensations agrees in all subjects, and we can hardly take it for granted that the agreeableness of a colour, or of the
tone of a musical instrument, which we judge to be preferable to that of another, is given a like preference in the estimate of every one. Assuming with Euler that colours are isoch1
[Cf. pp. 486, 49S-]
THE CRITIQUE
4 86
ronous vibrations (pulsus) of the aether, as tones are of the air set in vibration by sound, and. what is most important, that the mind not alone perceives by sense their effect in stimulating the organs, but
also,
by
reflection, the regu-
impressions (and consequently the form in which different representations are which I, still, in no way doubt then united) colour and tone would not be mere sensations. They would be nothing short of formal deterlar play of the
—
—
minations of the unity of a manifold of sensaand in that case could even be ranked as
tions,
intrinsic beauties.
But the purity of a simple mode of sensation means that its uniformity is not disturbed or broken by any foreign sensation. It belongs merely to the form; for abstraction may there be miide from the quality of the mode of such sensation (what colour or tone, if any, it represents). For this reason, all simple colours are regarded as beautiful so far as pure. Composite
admitted, it is only this form that gives them a place of honour. All form of objects of sense (both of external also, mediately, of internal sense) is either
and
figure or play. In the latter case
it is
either play
mimic and dance), or mere play of sensations (in time). The charm of colof figures (in space:
ours, or of the agreeable tones of instruments,
may
be added but the design in the former and composition in the latter constitute the proper object of the pure judgement of taste. To :
the
say that the purity alike of colours and of tones, seem to contribute
or their variety and contrast, to beauty,
by no means
is
to imply that, because
themselves agreeable, they therefore yield an addition to the delight in the form and one on a in
The real meaning rather is that they form more clearly, definitely, and completely intuitable, and besides stimulate the representation by their charm, as they excite and sustain the attention directed to the object
par with
make
it.
this
colours have not this advantage, because, not being simple, there is no standard for estimat-
itself.
ing whether they should be called pure or im-
i.e.,
pure.
constituent in the complete representation of the
But as for the beauty ascribed to the object on account of its form, and the supposition that it is capable of being enhanced by charm, this is a common error and one very prejudicial to gen-
object, in
taste does
so only
is
uine,
uncorrupted. sincere taste. Nevertheless
charms may be added to beauty to lend to the mind, beyond a bare delight, an adventitious interest in the representation of the object, and thus to advocate taste and its cultivation. This applies especially where taste is as yet crude and untrained. But they are positively subversive of the judgement of taste, if allowed to obtrude themselves as grounds of estimating beauty. For so far are they from contributing to beauty that it is only where taste is still weak and untrained that, like aliens, they are admitted as a favour, and only on terms that they do not violate that beautiful form.
In painting, sculpture, and in fact in all the formative arts, in architecture and horticulture, so far as fine arts, the design is what is essential. Here it is not what gratifies in sensation but merely what pleases by its form, that is the fundamental prerequisite for taste. The colours which give brilliancy to the sketch are part of the charm. They may no doubt, in their own way, enliven the object for sensation, but make it really worth looking at and beautiful they cannot. Indeed, more often than not the requirements of the beautiful form restrict them to a very narrow compass, and, even where charm is
Even what what
is
is
called ornamentation (parerga),
only an adjunct and not an intrinsic
augmenting the delight of by means of its form. Thus it
with the frames of pictures or the drapery on statues, or the colonnades of palaces. But if the ornamentation does not itself enter into the composition of if it is introduced like a the beautiful form gold frame merely to win approval for the pic-
—
—
by means of its charm it is then called away from the genuine beauty. Emotion a sensation where an agreeable feeling is produced merely by means of a momentary check followed by a more powerful outture
finery and takes
—
—
pouring of the vital force is quite foreign to beauty. Sublimity (with which the feeling of emotion is connected) requires, however, a different standard of estimation from that relied
A pure judgement of taste has, determining ground neither charm nor emotion, in a word, no sensation as matter of the aesthetic judgement.
upon by
taste.
then, for
§ 15.
its
The judgement of
taste is entirely
independent of the concept of perfection Objective finality can only be cognized by of a reference of the manifold to a definite end, and hence only through a concept. This alone makes it clear that the beautiful, which is estimated on the ground of a mere formal finality, i.e., a finality apart from an end, is wholly independent of the representation of the good.
means
For the
latter
presupposes an objective
finality,
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT the reference of the object to a definite end. Objective finality is either external, i.e., the
i.e.,
utility, or internal,
i.
the perfection, of the
e.,
That the delight in an object on account of which we call it beautiful is incapable of resting on the representation of its utility, is abundantly evident from the two preceding articles; for in that case, it would not be an immediate delight in the object, which latter is the essential condition of the judgement upon beauty. But in an objective, internal finality, i.e., perfection, we have what is more akin to the predicate of beauty, and so this has been held even by philosophers of reputation to be object.
convertible with beauty, though subject to the
where it is thought in a confused way. 1 In a critique of taste it is of the utmost importance to decide whether beauty is really reducible to the concept of perfection. For estimating objective finality we always require the concept of an end, and, where such finality has to be, not an external one (utility), but an internal one, the concept of an internal qualification:
end containing the ground of the internal possiNow an end is in general that, the concept of which may be regarded as the ground of the possibility of the object itself. So in order to represent an objective finality in a thing we must first have a concept of what sort of a thing it is to be. The agreement of the manifold in a thing with this concept (which supplies bility of the object.
the rule of
its
synthesis)
is
the qualitative per-
fection of the thing. Quantitative perfection is entirely distinct from this. It consists in the
completeness of anything after
its
kind, and
is
a mere concept of quantity (of totality). In its case the question of what the thing is to be is
regarded as definitely disposed of, and we only ask whether it is possessed of all the requisites that go to
make
it
What
such.
representation of a thing,
i.e.,
formal in the the agreement of is
manifold with a unity (i.e., irrespective of what it is to be), does not, of itself, afford us any cognition whatsoever of objective finality. For since abstraction is made from this unity as end (what the thing is to be) nothing is left but the
its
,
subjective finality of the representations in the
mind
487
and if I do not then form any representation of an end, as that it is meant to be used, say, for cle,
country dances, then not the least hint of a conis given by the mere form. To suppose a formal objective finality that is yet devoid of an end, i.e., the mere form of a perfection (apart from any matter or concept of cept of perfection
that to which the agreement relates, even though
there was the to law)
is
mere general idea of
a conformity
a veritable contradiction.
Now the judgement of taste is an aesthetic judgement, i.e., one resting on subjective grounds. No concept can be its determining ground, and hence not one of a definite end. Beauty, therefore, as a formal subjective finality, involves no thought whatsoever of a perfection of the object, as a would-be formal finality which yet, for all that, is objective: and the distinction between the concepts of the beautiful and the good, which represents both as differing only in their logical form, the first being merely a confused, the second a clearly defined, concept of perfection, while otherwise alike in content and origin, all goes for nothing: for then there would be no specific difference between them, but the judgement of taste would be just as much a cognitive judgement as one by which something is described as good just as the man in the street, when he says that deceit is wrong, bases his judgement on confused, but the philosopher on clear grounds, while both appeal in reality to identical principles of reason. But I have already stated that an aesthetic judgement is quite unique, and affords absolutely no (not even a confused) knowledge of the object. It is only through a logical judgement that we get knowl-
—
The aesthetic judgement, on the other hand, refers the representation, by which an ob-
edge.
ject
is
given, solely to the subject, and brings to
our notice no quality of the object, but only the final form in the determination of the powers of representation engaged upon it. The judgement is called aesthetic for the very reason that its determining ground cannot be a concept, but is rather the feeling (of the internal sense) of the concert in the play of the mental powers as a thing only capable of being felt. If, on the other
imagination, but no perfection of any object,
confused concepts, and the objective judgement based on them, are going to be called aesthetic, we shall find ourselves with an understanding judging by sense, or a sense representing its objects by concepts a mere choice of
the latter not being here thought through any
contradictions.
concept. For instance,
confused or be they clear, is understanding; and although understanding has (as in all judge-
of the subject intuiting. This gives a cer-
tain finality of the representative state of the
subject, in at
home
which the subject
feels itself quite
in its effort to grasp a given
if in
form
a forest I light
in the
upon
a plot of grass, round which trees stand in a cir1
[Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 29-31.]
hand,
—
ments)
The
its role in
faculty of concepts, be they
the judgement of taste, as an
THE CRITIQUE
488
its role there is not that of a faculty for cognizing an object, but of a faculty for determining that judgement and its representation (without a concept) according to its relation to the subject and its internal feeling,
aesthetic judgement,
and for doing so
in so far as that
judgement
is
ty of a horse, or of a building (such as a church,
summer-house), presupposes
palace, arsenal, or
a concept of the end that defines what the thing has to be, and consequently a concept of its
perfection; and
beauty.
Now,
is
therefore merely appendant
just as
it is
a clog on the purity of
the judgement of taste to have the agreeable (of
possible according to a universal rule.
sensation) joined with beauty to which properly §
of taste by which an object described as beautiful, under the condition
A judgement
thing; the other kind of beauty, being attached
is relevant, so to combine the good with beauty (the good, namely, of the manifold to the thing itself according to its end) mars its purity. Much might be added to a building that would immediately please the eye, were it not intended for a church. A figure might be beautified with all manner of flourishes and light but regular lines, as is done by the New Zealanders with their tattooing, were we dealing with anything but the figure of a human being. And here is one whose rugged features might be softened and
ascribed
given a more pleasing aspect, only he has got to
1
6.
is
of a definite concept,
is
not pure
are two kinds of beauty: free beauty
There
(pulchritudo vaga), or beauty which dependent (pulchritudo adhaerens).
is
merely
The
first
presupposes no concept of what the object should be; the second does presuppose such a concept and, with it, an answering perfection of the object. Those of the first kind are said to be (self-subsisting) beauties of this thing or that to a concept (conditioned beauty),
to objects
is
which come under the concept of a
Flowers are free beauties of nature. Hardly anyone but a botanist knows the true nature of a flower, and even he, while recognizing in the flower the reproductive organ of the plant, pays no attention to this natural end when using his taste to judge of its beauty. Hence no perfection no internal finality, as something of any kind to which the arrangement of the manifold is re-
—
— underlies
this
judgement.
Many
birds
(the parrot, the humming-bird, the bird of paradise),
and a number of Crustacea, are self-subwhich are not appurtenant to
sisting beauties
any object defined with respect to its end, but please freely and on their own account. So designs ä la grecque, foliage for framework or on wall-papers, etc., have no intrinsic meaning; they represent nothing no object under a defiand are free beauties. 1 We may nite concept also rank in the same class what in music are
—
—
called fantasias (without a theme), and, indeed,
music that
all
is
be a man, or
not set to words.
In the estimate of a free beauty (according to
mere form) we have the pure judgement of taste. No concept is here presupposed of any end
perhaps, a warrior that has to
which the manifold should serve the given and which the latter, therefore, should an incumbrance which would only represent restrict the freedom of the imagination that, as it were, is at play in the contemplation of the outward form. But the beauty of man (including under this head that of a man, woman, or child), the beau-
Now
the delight in the manifold of a thing,
in reference to the internal its possibility, is
Taste,
it is
ic.
For
sal, it
by
this
it
becomes
com-
fixed, and, while not univer-
enables rules to be prescribed for
it
in re-
spect of certain definite final objects. But these rules are then not rules of taste, but
merely rules
for establishing a union of taste with reason,
of the beautiful with the good
—
rules
i.e.,
by which
becomes available as an intentional instrument in respect of the latter, for the purpose of bringing that temper of the mind which
the former
self-sustaining and of subjective universal va-
is
lidity to the
[Cf. p. 478, et seq.]
true, stands to gain
bination of intellectual delight with the aesthet-
for
—
end that determines on a concept,
a delight based
whereas delight in the beautiful is such as does not presuppose any concept, but is immediately coupled with the representation through which the object is given (not through which it is thought). If, now, the judgement of taste in respect of the latter delight is made dependent upon the end involved in the former delight as a judgement of reason, and is thus placed under a restriction, then it is no longer a free and pure judgement of taste.
object,
i
is,
have a warlike appearance.
particular end.
lated
only the form
mode
support and maintenance of that
of thought which, while possessing objec-
tive universal validity, can only
be preserved by
a resolute effort. But, strictly speaking, perfec-
by beauty, nor beauty by peris rather this, when we compare the representation through which an object is given to us with the object (in respect of what tion neither gains fection.
The
truth
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT
489
judgement. But in cases like this, although such a person should lay down a correct judgement of taste, since he would be estimating the object as a free beauty, he would still be found fault with by another who saw nothing in its beauty but a dependent quality (i.e., who looked to the end of the object) and would be accused by him of false taste, though both would, in their own way, be judging correctly: the one ac-
one who imitates a model, while showing skill commensurate with his success, only displays taste as himself a critic of this model. 1 Hence it follows that the highest model, the archetype of taste, is a mere idea, which each person must beget in his own consciousness, and according to which he must form his estimate of everything that is an object of taste, or that is an example of critical taste, and even of universal taste itself. Properly speaking, an idea signifies a concept of reason, and an ideal the representation of an individual existence as adequate to an idea. Hence this archetype of taste which rests, indeed, upon reason's indeterminate idea of a maximum, but is not, however, capable of being represented by means of concepts, but only in an individual presentation may more appropriately be called the ideal of the beautiful. While not having this ideal in our possession, we still
cording to what he had present to his senses, the other according to what was present in his
strive to beget it within us. But it is bound to be merely an ideal of the imagination, seeing that
thoughts. This distinction enables us to settle
it rests,
many
entation
it is
meant
to be)
by means of
not help reviewing
it
sation in the subject.
a concept,
we
also in respect of the sen-
Hence
there results a gain
to the entire faculty of our representative
when harmony
er
can-
pow-
prevails between both states
of mind.
In respect of an object with a definite internal end, a judgement of taste would only be pure
where the person judging either has no concept of this end, or else
makes abstraction from
in
it
his
disputes about beauty on the part of crit-
ics; for
we may show them how one
side
is
deal-
—
—
not upon concepts, but upon the pres-
— the faculty of presentation being the
imagination.
Now, how do we
beauty? Is
arrive at such an
ing with free beauty, and the other with that
ideal of
which is dependent: the former passing a pure judgement of taste, the latter one that is applied
Further, what species of the beautiful admits of an ideal?
intentionally.
First of all, we do well to observe that the beauty for which an ideal has to be sought cannot be a beauty that is free and at large, but must be one fixed by a concept of objective finality. 2 Hence it cannot belong to the object of an altogether pure judgement of taste, but must attach to one that is partly intellectual. In other words, where an ideal is to have place among the grounds upon which any estimate is formed, then beneath grounds of that kind there must
§ 17.
The Ideal of beauty
There
can be no objective rule of taste by is beautiful may be defined by means of concepts. For every judgement from that source is aesthetic, i.e., its determining
which what
ground is the feeling of the subject, and not any concept of an object. It is only throwing away labour to look for a principle of taste that affords a universal criterion of the beautiful definite concepts; because
what
is
sought
by
is
a
it
a priori or empirically?
some idea of reason according to determinate by which the end underlying the in-
lie
concepts,
thing impossible and inherently contradictory.
ternal possibility of the object
But
priori.
in the
universal communicability of the
—
—
a communifrom any concept
sensation (of delight or aversion) cability, too, that exists apart
in the accord, so far as possible, of all ages
and nations
as to this feeling in the representa-
is
unthinkable. But,
fixed
agreement in estimating the forms under which objects are given to them. For this reason some products of taste are looked on as exemplary not meaning thereby
—
by imitating others taste may be acquired. For taste must be an original faculty; whereas that
it
may
view,
also be impossible to
represent an ideal of a beauty dependent on def-
presumption, of the derivation of a taste, thus confirmed by examples, from grounds deepseated and shared alike by all men, underlying their
determined a
inite ends, e.g., a beautiful residence, a beautiful tree,
raise a
is
ideal of beautiful flowers, of a beau-
tiful suite of furniture, or of a beautiful
we have the empirical weak indeed and scarce sufficient to
tion of certain objects, criterion,
An
a beautiful garden, etc., presumably because their ends are not sufficiently defined and
by
their concept, with the result that their
1 Models of taste with respect to the arts of speech must be composed in a dead and learned language; the
to prevent their having to suffer the changes that inevitably overtake living ones, making dignified expressions become degraded, common ones antiquated, and ones newly coined after a short currency obsolete: the second to ensure its having a grammar that is not subject to the caprices of fashion, but has fixed rules of first,
its
own. 2
[Cf. § 16.]
THE CRITIQUE
490 finality is nearly as free as
real existence
its
with beauty that
Only what has
quite at large.
— only man
in itself the
that
is
is
end of
able himself
by reason, or, where he has to derive them from external perception, can still compare them with essential and universal ends, and then further pronounce aesthetically upon their accord with such ends, only he, to determine his ends
among
objects in the world, admits, there-
all
fore, of
an ideal of beauty, just as humanity in admits of the
his person, as intelligence, alone
ideal of perfection.
Two
factors are here involved. First, there
the aesthetic normal idea, which
is
an individual intuition (of the imagination). This represents the norm by which we judge of a man as a member of a particular animal species. Secondly, there
is
is
the rational idea. This deals with the
ends of humanity so far as capable of sensuous representation, and converts them into a principle for estimating his outward form, through
wishes to judge normal size determined upon a comparative estimate, then imagination (to my
mind) allows a great number of these images (perhaps the whole thousand) to fall one upon the other, and,
if
I
may
be allowed to extend to
the case the analogy of optical presentation, in
where they come most together, and
the space
within the contour where the place
is
illuminat-
ed by the greatest concentration of colour, one gets a perception of the average size, which alike in height and breadth is equally removed from the extreme limits of the greatest and smallest statures; and this is the stature of a beautiful man. (The same result could be obtained in a mechanical way, by taking the measures of all the thousand, and adding together their heights, and their breadths [and thicknesses], and dividing the sum in each case by a thousand.) But the power of imagination does all this by means of a dynamical effect upon the organ of internal sense, arising from the frequent apprehension of
man we
which these ends are revealed in their phenomenal effect. The normal idea must draw from experience the constituents which it requires for the form of an animal of a particular kind. But
such forms.
the greatest finality in the construction of this
country where the comparFor this reason a Negro must necessarily (under these empirical conditions) have a different normal idea of the beauty of forms from what a white man has, and the Chinaman one different from the European. And the process would be just the same with the model of a beautiful horse or dog (of a particular breed). This normal idea is not derived from proportions taken from experience as definite
—
form
norm
that which
would serve as a universal
for forming an estimate of each individual
of the species in question
—the image
that, as
it
were, forms an intentional basis underlying the technic of nature, to which no separate individual,
but only the race as a whole,
has
its
merely
seat
subject. Ye!
is,
it
is
adequate,
in the idea of the
with
all
its
judging
proportions, an
aesthetic idea, and, as such, capable of being fully presented in concreto in a
Now, how
this effected?
is
process
the
who can her?),
to
model image.
In order to render
some extent
intelligible
(for
nature's whole secret from attempt a psychological expla-
wrest
let
us
nation. It is of
note that the imagination, in a manner
quite incomprehensible to us,
is able on occaeven after a long lapse of time, not alone to recall the signs for concepts, but also to reproduce the image and shape of an object out
sion,
of a countless
number
of others of a different,
or even of the very same, kind. And, further,
mind
if
engaged upon comparisons, we may well suppose that it can in actual fact, though the
is
the process is unconscious, superimpose as it were one image upon another, and from the coincidence of a number of the same kind arrive at a mean contour which serves as a common
standard for all. Say, for instance, a person has seen a thousand full-grown men. Now if he
If, again, for
our average
seek on similar lines for the average head, and for this the average nose,
and so on, then we get
the figure that underlies the normal idea of a
beautiful ison
is
rules:
1
man
in the
instituted.
rather
is it
according to this idea that
rules for forming estimates first
become pos-
an intermediate between all singular intuitions of individuals, with their manifold variations a floating image for the whole genus, which nature has set as an archetype underlying those of her products that belong to the same species, but which in no single case she sible. It is
—
1 [Cf. p. 489. A partial anticipation of this section is contained in the Critique 0} Pure Reason, p. 173-4
"Such is the constitution of the ideal of reason, which is always based upon determinate conceptions, and serves as a rule and a model for imitation or for criticism Very different is the nature of the ideals of the imagination. Of these it is impossible to present an intelligible conception; they are a kind of monogram, drawn according to no determinate rule, and forming rather a vague picture the production of many diverse experiences than a determinate image. Such are the ideals which painters and physiognomists profess to have in their minds, and which can serve neither as a model for production nor as a standard for appreciation. They may be termed, though improperly, sensuous ideals, as they are declared to be models of certain possible empirical intuitions. They cannot, however, furnish rules or standards for explanation or examination."]
—
—
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT seems to have completely attained. But the normal idea is far from giving the complete archetype of beauty in the genus. It only gives the form that constitutes the indispensable condition of
all
such a standard can never be purely aesthetic, and that one formed according to an ideal of beauty cannot be a simple judgement of taste. Definition of the Beautiful derived from
beauty, and, consequently, only cor-
rectness in the presentation of the genus. It
famous "Doryphorus" of Polycletus was (and Myron's "Cow" might be similarly employed for its kind). It cannot, for
called, the rule
that very reason, contain anything specifically
would not be the normal idea for the genus. Further, it is not by beauty that its presentation pleases, but merely because it does not contradict any of the conditions under which alone a thing belonging to this it
genus can be beautiful. The presentation merely academically correct. 1
Beauty
man
figure.
Here
only to be sought in the huthe ideal consists in the ex-
pression of the moral, apart from which the object
would not please
at once universally
and
positively (not merely negatively in a presentation academically correct).
The
sion of moral ideas 2 that govern can, of course, only be
visible expres-
men
inwardly
drawn from experience;
but their combination with all that our reason connects with the morally good in the idea benevolence, purity, of the highest finality
—
strength, or equanimity, etc. it
—may be made,
as
were, visible in bodily manifestation (as ef-
fect of
what
is
internal),
and
this
embodiment
involves a union of pure ideas of reason and great imaginative power, in one
form an estimate of
it,
who would even
not to speak of being the
author of its presentation. The correctness of such an ideal of beauty is evidenced by its not permitting any sensuous charm to mingle with
which it still allows us to take a great interest. This fact in turn shows that an estimate formed according to the delight in
its
object, in
— —
1 It will be found that a perfectly regular face one that a painter might fix his eye on for a model ordinarily conveys nothing. This is because it is devoid of anything characteristic, and so the idea of the race is expressed in it rather than the specific qualities of a person. The exaggeration of what is characteristic in this way, i.e., exaggeration violating the normal idea (the finality of the race), is called caricature. Also experience shows that these quite regular faces indicate as a rule internally only a mediocre type of man; presumaif one may assume that nature in its external form bly expresses the proportions of the internal because, where none of the mental qualities exceed the proportion requisite to constitute a man free from faults, nothing can be expected in the way of what is called genius, in
—
which nature seems to make a departure from its wonted relations of the mental powers in favour of some special one. [Cf. p. 527» et seq.] 2 [Cf. p. S49-]
form of
the
finality in
an object, so
apart from the representa-
it
an end. 3
tion of
Fourth Moment. Of the Judgement of Taste: Moment of the Modality of the Delight in the Object
Nature of the modality
§ 18.
in a
judgement
of taste
may
assert in the case of every representa-
tion that the synthesis of a pleasure with the
representation (as a cognition)
Of what
ble.
in
mind
is
at least possi-
I call agreeable I assert that
tually causes pleasure in me.
its
ac-
part to delight. However,
this necessity is of a special kind. It
—such
theoretical objective necessity let
it
But what we have
in the case of the beautiful is a neces-
sary reference on
is
as
not a
would
us cognize a priori that every one will feel
this delight in the object that is called beautiful
by me. Nor yet which
is
it
a practical necessity, in
case, thanks to concepts of a
pure rational
which free agents are supplied with a rule, this delight is the necessary consequence of an objective law, and simply means that one ought absolutely (without ulterior object) to act in a certain way. Rather, being such a necessity as is thought in an aesthetic judgement, it can only be termed exemplary. In other words
will in
it is
a necessity of the assent of all to a judge-
ment regarded judgement
is
as exemplifying a universal rule
formulation.
incapable of
ment, this necessity and so it
Since an aesthetic
not an objective or cognitive judge-
nite concepts, is
—
is
far as perceived in
I
But the ideal of the beautiful is still somefrom its normal idea. For reasons it is
Moment
is
thing different
already stated
Third
this is,
as the
characteristic; for otherwise
491
inferable
is
is
not derivable from definot apodeictic.
Much
less
from universality of experience
3 As telling against this explanation, the instance may be adduced that there are things in which we see a form suggesting adaptation to an end,* without any end being cognized in them as, for example, the stone implements frequently obtained from sepulchral tumuli and supplied with a hole, as if for [inserting] a handle; and although these by their shape manifestly indicate a finality, the end of which is unknown, they are not on that accpunt described as beautiful. But the very fact of their being regarded as art-products involves an immediate recognition that their shape is attributed to some purpose or other and to a definite end. For this reason
—
there is no immediate delight whatever in their contemplation. A flower, on the other hand, such as a tulip, is regarded as beautiful, because we meet with a certain finality in its perception, which, in our estimate of it, is not referred to any end whatever. * [Cf. p. 523, et seq.]
THE CRITIQUE
492
(of a thoroughgoing agreement of judgements about the beauty of a certain object). For, apart from the fact that experience would hardly furnish evidences
numerous
sufficiently
for this
purpose, empirical judgements do not afford any foundation for a concept of the necessity of these judgements.
The subjective necessity attributed
§ 19.
judgement oj
taste
is
to
a
conditioned
The judgement of taste exacts agreement from every one; and a person who describes something as beautiful insists that every one ought to give the object
in
question his approval
and follow suit in describing it as beautiful. The ought in aesthetic judgements, therefore, despite an accordance with all the requisite data for passing judgement, is still only pronounced conditionally. We are suitors for agreement from every one else, because we are fortified with a ground common to all. Further, we would be able to count on this agreement, provided we were always assured of the correct subsumption of the case under that ground as the rule of approval. § 20.
The condition oj by a judgement oj
the necessity advanced taste
common
is
the idea oj a
sense
Such a principle,
however, could only be regarded as a common sense. This differs essentially from common understanding, which
is
mon
communis) is not one by
sense (sensus
also
sometimes called com:
for the judge-
ment of the latter feeling, but always one by concepts, though usually only in the shape of obscurely represented principles. The judgement of taste, therefore, depends
on our presupposing the existence of a common sense. (But this is not to be taken to mean some external sense, but the effect arising from the free play of our powers of cognition.) Only un-
der the presupposition,
mon
sense, are
of taste.
we
I repeat,
able to lay
Have we reason
common
of such a
down
com-
a judgement
jor presupposing a
sense?
Cognitions and judgements must, together with their attendant conviction, 1 admit of being universally communicated; for otherwise a correspondence with the object would not be due to them. They would be a conglomerate constituting a mere subjective play of the powers of representation, just as scepticism would have it. But if cognitions are to admit of communication, then our mental state, i.e., the way the cognitive powers are attuned for cognition generally, and, in fact, the relative proportion suitable for a representation (by which an object is given to us) from which cognition is to result, must also admit of being universally communicated, as, without this, which is the subjective condition of the act of knowing, knowledge, as an effect, would not arise. And this is always what actually happens where a given object, through the intervention of sense, sets the imagination at work in arranging the manifold, and the imagination, in turn, the understanding in giving to this arrangement the unity of concepts. But this disposition of the cognitive powers has a relative proportion differing with the diversity of the objects that are given. in
which
for both
However, there must be one
this internal ratio suitable for
ing (one faculty
Were judgements of taste (like cognitive judgements) in possession of a definite objective principle, then one who in his judgement followed such a principle would claim unconditioned necessity for it. Again, were they devoid of any principle, as are those of the mere taste of sense, then no thought of any necessity on their part would enter one's head. Therefore they must have a subjective principle, and one which determines what pleases or displeases, by means of feeling only and not through concepts, but yet with universal validity.
§ 21.
by the other)
mental powers
is
quicken-
best adapted
in respect of cognition
(of given objects) generally; and this disposition can
only be determined through feeling (and not by concepts). Since, now this disposition itself must admit of being universally communicated, and hence also the feeling of it (in the case of a given representation), while again, the universal communicability of a feeling pre-
supposes a common sense: it follows that our assumption of it is well founded. And here, too,
we do not have
to take our stand
on psychologi-
common
sense
as the necessary condition of the universal
com-
cal observations,
but
we assume
a
municability of our knowledge, which
is
presup-
posed in every logic and every principle of knowledge that is not one of scepticism. §22. The necessity oj the universal assent that is thought in a judgement oj taste, is a subjective necessity which, under the presupposition oj a
common
sense,
is
represented as
objective
In
judgements by which we describe anywe tolerate no one else being of a different opinion, and in taking up this position we do not rest our judgement upon conall
thing as beautiful,
1
[Cf. Critique oj Pure Reason, pp. 240-43.]
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT cepts, but only on our feeling. Accordingly we introduce this fundamental feeling not as a private feeling, but as a public sense. Now, for this pur-
pose, experience cannot be
common
made
the ground of
invoked to justify judgements containing an "ought." The assertion is not that every one will fall in with our judgement, but rather that every one ought to agree with it. Here I put forward my judgement of taste as an example of the judgement of common sense, and attribute to it on that account exemplary validity. Hence common sense is a mere ideal norm. With this as presupposition, a judgement that accords with it, as well as the delight in an object expressed in that judgement, is rightly converted into a rule for everyone. For the principle, while it is only subthis
sense, for the latter
jective, being yet
assumed
is
as subjectively uni-
versal (a necessary idea for everyone), could, in
what concerns the consensus of
ing subjects,
demand
different judg-
universal assent like an
objective principle, provided of our subsumption under
it
we were
assured
being correct.
This indeterminate norm of a common sense as a matter of fact, presupposed by us; as is shown by our presuming to lay down judgements of taste. But does such a common sense 1 is,
in fact exist as a constitutive principle of the
possibility of experience, or
a regulative principle
by
a
formed
is it still
for us as
higher principle
of reason, that for higher ends first seeks to be-
get in us a
common
sense? Is taste, in other
words, a natural and original faculty, or is it only the idea of one that is artificial and to be acquired by us, so that a judgement of taste,
with its demand for universal assent, is but a requirement of reason for generating such a consensus, and does the "ought," i. e., the objective necessity of the coincidence of the feeling of all with the particular feeling of each, only betoken the possibility of arriving at some sort of unanimity in these matters, and the judgement of taste only adduce an example of the application of this principle? These are questions which as
yet
we
are neither willing nor in a position to in-
vestigate.
For the present we have only
solve the faculty of taste into
its
to re-
elements, and
to unite these ultimately in the idea of a
mon
Definition of the Beautiful drawn
Fourth
The cept,
com-
sense.
is
from
the
Moment
is that which, apart from a concognized as object of a necessary delight.
beautiful
1 [Cf. §40; also pp. 482, 505, et seq.; 543, et seq.; 549-]
493
General Remark on the First Section of the Analytic
The
be extracted from the foregoing That everything runs up into the concept of taste as a critical faculty by which an object is estimated in reference to the free conformity to law of the imagination. If, now, imagination must in the judgement of taste be regarded in its freedom, then, to begin with, it is not taken as reproductive, as in its subjection to the laws of association, but as productive and exerting an activity of its own (as originator of arbitrary forms of possible intuitions). 2 And although in the apprehension of a given object of sense it is tied down to a definite result to
analysis
is
in effect this:
form of this object and, to that extent, does not enjoy free play (as it does in poetry), 3 still it is easy to conceive that the object may supply ready-made to the imagination just such a form of the arrangement of the manifold as the imagination, if it were left to itself, would freely protect in harmony with the general conformity to law of the understanding. But that the imagination should be both free and of itself conformable to law, i. e., carry autonomy with it, is a contradiction. The understanding alone gives the law. Where, however, the imagination is compelled to follow a course laid down by a definite law, then what the form of the product is to be is determined by concepts; but, in that case, as already shown, the delight is not delight but in the good (in perfection, though it be no more than formal perfection), and the judgement is not one due to taste. Hence it is only a conformity to law without a law, and a subjective harmonizing of the imagination and the understanding without an objective one which latter would mean that the in the beautiful,
—
representation was referred to a definite concept of the object that can consist with the
—
free conformity to law of the understanding
(which has also been called finality apart from an end) and with the specific character of a judgement of taste.
Now
geometrically regular figures, a
square, a cube, and the like, are
circle,
a
commonly
brought forward by critics of taste as the most simple and unquestionable examples of beauty. And yet the very reason why they are called regular, is because the only way of representing them is by looking on them as mere presentations of a determinate concept by which the figure has its rule (according to which alone it 2
3
[Cf. p. 528, et seq.] [Cf. pp. 528; 530, et seq.; 533, et seq.]
THE CRITIQUE
494
possible) prescribed for it. One or other of these two views must, therefore, be wrong:
is
either the verdict of the critics that attributes
our own, which from any concept neces-
beauty
to such figures, or else
makes
finality apart
sary for beauty. One would scarce think
necessary for a
it
man
have taste to take more delight in a circle than in a scrawled outline, in an equilateral and equiangular quadrilateral than in one that is all lop-sided, and, as it were, deformed. The requirements of common understanding ensure to
such a preference without the least demand taste. Where some purpose is perceived, as. for instance, that of forming an estimate of
upon
the area of a plot of land, or rendering intelligible the relation of divided parts to one another to the whole, then regular figures,
and
and those
of the simplest kind, are needed; and the delight does not rest immediately upon the way the fig-
ure strikes the eye, but upon its serviceability for all manner of possible purposes. A room
with the walls making oblique angles, a plot laid in a similar
way, even any viola-
symmetry, as well
in the figure of ani-
out in a garden tion of
mals
(e. g.,
being one-eyed) as in that of build-
ings, or of flower-beds, is displeasing its
way
in respect of
thing to
because of
perversity of form, not alone in a practical
may
manner
all
judgement of
when
some
definite use to
which the
be put. but for an estimate that looks of possible purposes. taste the case
is
With the
different.
For,
combines delight or aversion immediately with the bare contemplation of the object irrespective of its use or of any end. it
The
is
pure,
it
regularity that conduces to the concept
of an object
is,
in fact, the
indispensable con-
qua non) of grasping the representation and giving to
dition (conditio sine
object as a single the manifold
its determinate form. This determination is an end in respect of knowledge; and in this connection it is invariably coupled with delight (such as attends the accomplishment of any, even problematical, purpose). Here, however, we have merely the value set upon the solution that satisfies the problem, and not a free and indeterminately final entertainment of the mental powers with what is called beautiful. In the latter case, understanding is at the service of imagination, in the former, this relation is
reversed.
With
a
thin«;
that
owes
its
possibility to a
purpose, a building, or even an animal,
its
regu-
symmetry, must express the unity of the intuition accompanying the concept of its end, and belongs with it to cognition. larity,
which consists
in
But where all that is intended is the maintenance of a free play of the powers of representation (subject, however, to the condition that there is to be nothing for understanding to take exception to), in ornamental gardens, in the decoration of rooms, in all kinds of furniture that shows good taste, etc., regularity in the shape of constraint is to be avoided as far as possible. Thus English taste in gardens, and fantastic taste in furniture, push the freedom of imagina-
—
the idea tion to the verge of what is grotesque being that in this divorce from all constraint of rules the precise instance is being afforded where taste can exhibit its perfection in projects of the imagination to the fullest extent.
All stiff regularity (such as borders
matical regularity)
is
on mathe-
inherently repugnant to
taste, in that the contemplation of it affords us no lasting entertainment. Indeed, where it has neither cognition nor some definite practical end expressly in view, we get heartily tired of it. On the other hand, anything that gives the imagination scope for unstudied and final play is always fresh to us. We do not grow to hate the very sight of it. Marsden, in his description of Sumatra, observes that the free beauties of nature so surround the beholder on all sides that they cease to have much attraction for him. 1 On the other hand he found a pepper garden full of charm, on coming across it in mid-forest with its rows of parallel stakes on which the plant twines itself. From all this he infers that wild, and in its appearance quite irregular beauty, is only pleasing as a change to one whose eyes have become surfeited with regular beauty. But he need only have made the experiment of passing one day in his pepper garden to realize that once the regularity has enabled the understanding to put itself in accord
with the order that
is
the constant requirement,
instead of the object diverting
him any
longer,
imposes an irksome constraint upon the imagination: whereas nature subject to no constraint of artificial rules, and lavish, as it there is, in its luxuriant variety can supply constant food for his taste. Even a bird's song, which we can reduce to no musical rule, seems to have
it
more freedom
in it, and thus to be richer for than the human voice singing in accordance with all the rules that the art of music prescribes; for we grow tired much sooner of frequent and lengthy repetitions of the latter. Yet here most likely our sympathy with the mirth of a dear little creature is confused with taste,
1
[The History of Sumatra, by W. Marsden
1783),
p. if3.]
(
London,
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT the beauty of
by man
its
song, for
(as has been
if
exactly imitated
sometimes done with the 1 it would strike our
field, as
495
on the incentive
in poetic fiction,
i.
e.,
in the peculiar fancies with
notes of the nightingale)
which the mind entertains
ear as wholly destitute of taste.
continually stirred
Further, beautiful objects have to be distin-
the eye. It
is
just
receives to indulge
it
itself as it is
being
by the variety that strikes as when we watch the chang-
guished from beautiful views of objects (where
ing shapes of the fire or of a rippling brook:
the distance often prevents a clear perception). 2
neither of which are things of beauty, but they
In the latter case, taste appears to fasten, not so much on what the imagination grasps in this
convey a charm
Book § 23. Transition
from
II.
the beautiful to that of estimating the sublime
The
beautiful and the sublime agree on the
own
its
to the imagination, because they
free play.
Analytic of the Sublime
the faculty of estimating
point of pleasing on their
sustain
account. Further
they agree in not presupposing either a judgement of sense or one logically determinant, but
one of reflection. Hence it follows that the delight does not depend upon a sensation, as with the agreeable, nor upon a definite concept, as does the delight in the good, although it has, for all that, an indeterminate reference to concepts. Consequently the delight is connected with the
tended with a feeling of the furtherance of life, is thus compatible with charms and a playful imagination. On the other hand, the feeling of the sublime is a pleasure that only arises indirectly, being brought about by the feeling of a momentary check to the vital forces followed at once by a discharge all the more powerful, and so it is an emotion that seems to be no sport, but dead earnest in the affairs of the imagina-
and
tion.
Hence charms are repugnant to it; and, mind is not simply attracted by the
since the
object, but
is
also alternately repelled thereby,
the delight in the sublime does not so
much
in-
to express the accord, in a
volve positive pleasure as admiration or respect, i. e., merits the name of a negative pleasure.
given intuition, of the faculty of presentation, or the imagination, with the faculty of concepts
But the most important and vital distinction between the sublime and the beautiful is cer-
mere presentation and is thus taken
or faculty of presentation,
that belongs to understanding or reason, in the
sense of the former assisting the latter.
Hence
both kinds of judgements are singular, and yet such as profess to be universally valid in respect of every subject, despite the fact that their claims are directed merely to the feeling of pleasure and not to any knowledge of the are,
and
is
a question of the
form
The
strik-
beautiful
ject of our delight, that which, without our in-
of the object,
whereas the sublime is to be found in an object even devoid of form, so far as it immediately involves, or else by its presence provokes a representation of limitlessness, yet with a superadded thought of its totality. Accordingly, the beautiful seems to be regarded as a presentation of an indeterminate concept of understanding, the sublime as a presentation of an indeterminate concept of reason. Hence the delight is in the former case coupled with the representation of quality, but in this case with that of quantity. Moreover, the former delight is very different from the latter in kind. For the beautiful is directly at1
2
this consists in limitation,
[Cf. p. 523, et seq.] [Cf. p. S33-]
that whereas
self-subsisting) con-
is
in its form making the object apwere, preadapted to our power of judgement, so that it thus forms of itself an ob-
however, also important and
ing differences between the two. in nature
ment with nature), we observe natural beauty (such as
veys a finality pear, as
object.
There
if, as is allowable, we here conour attention in the first instance to the sublime in objects of nature (that of art being always restricted by the conditions of an agree-
tainly this: that
fine
it
dulging in any refinements of thought, but, simply in our apprehension of of the sublime,
it,
excites the feeling
may
appear, indeed, in point of form to contravene the ends of our power of
judgement, to be ill-adapted to our faculty of it were, an outrage on the imagination, and yet it is judged all the more sublime on that account. From this it may be seen at once that we express ourselves on the whole inaccurately if we term any object of nature sublime, although we may with perfect propriety call many such objects beautiful. For how can that which is apprehended as inherently contra-final be noted with an expression of approval? All that we can presentation, and to be, as
say
is
that the object lends itself to the presen-
tation of a sublimity discoverable in the mind.
THE CRITIQUE
496
For the sublime, in the strict sense of the word, cannot be contained in any sensuous form, but rather concerns ideas of reason, which, although no adequate presentation of them is possible, may be excited and called into the mind by that very inadequacy itself which does admit of sensuous presentation. Thus the broad ocean agi-
by storms cannot be called sublime. Its aspect is horrible, and one must have stored one's mind in advance with a rich stock of ideas,
and makes the theory of the sublime a mere appendage to the aesthetic estimate of the finality of nature, because
resentation.
tated
if
such an intuition
a feeling which
is
to raise
is
it
§ 24.
Subdivision of an investigation of the feeling of the sublime
to the pitch of
In the division of the moments of an aesthetic
be-
estimate of objects in respect of the feeling of
sublime
itself
—sublime
cause the mind has been incited to abandon sensibility and employ itself upon ideas involv-
able to follow the
ing higher finality.
alysis of
Self-subsisting natural beauty reveals to us a
technic of nature which shows
does not give a represen-
it
any particular form in nature, but involves no more than the development of a final employment by the imagination of its own reptation of
it
in the light of
the sublime, the course of the Analytic will be
same
principle as in the an-
judgements of taste. For, the judgement being one of the aesthetic reflective judgement, the delight in the sublime, just like that
must
be shown
a system ordered in accordance with laws the
in the beautiful,
not to be found within the 1 range of our entire faculty of understanding. This principle is that of a finality relative to the
to be universally valid, in its quality independ-
principle of which
is
employment of judgement in respect of phenomena which have thus to be assigned, not merely to nature regarded as aimless mechanism, but also to nature
analogy of
art.
Hence
it
regarded after the
gives a veritable exten-
our knowledge of objects of nature, but to our conception of nature itself nature as mere mechanism being enlarged to an extension the conception of nature as art sion, not, of course, to
—
—
profound inquiries as to the possibility of such a form. But in what we are wont to call sublime in nature there is such an absence of anything leading to particular objective principles and corresponding forms of nature that it is rather in its chaos, or in its wildest and most irregular disorder and desolation, provided it gives signs of magnitude and power, that nature inviting
chiefly excites the ideas of the sublime.
we is
Hence
see that the concept of the sublime in nature far less important
than that of
its
and
consequences
rich in
beauty. It gives on the whole no
indication of anything final in nature itself, but
only
in the possible
employment
of our intui-
own
ent of interest, in
and the
its
latter, in its
in its quantity
relation subjective finality,
modality, necessary. Hence
method here will not depart from the lines followed in the preceding section: unless something is made of the point that there, where the
the
aesthetic object,
judgement bore on the form of the
we began with
the investigation of
its
whereas here, considering the formlessness that may belong to what we call sublime, we begin with that of its quantity, as first moment of the aesthetic judgement on the sublime a divergence of method the reason for which is evident from § 23. But the analysis of the sublime obliges a diquality,
—
by that of the
vision not required
namely one
beautiful,
into the mathematically
and the dynamically sublime. For the feeling of sublime involves as its characteristic feature a mental movement combined with the estimate of the object, whereas taste in respect of the beautiful presupposes that the mind is in restful contemplation, and it in this state. But this movement has be estimated as subjectively final (since the sublime pleases). Hence it is referred through
preserves to
of a finality quite independent of nature.
the imagination either to the faculty of cognition or to that of desire; but to whichever fac-
the beautiful in
ulty the reference
tions of
it
in
inducing a feeling
in
our
selves
For nature we must seek a ground
is
made, the
external to ourselves, but for the sublime one
given representation
merely
of these faculties (apart
in ourselves
and the attitude of mind
that introduces sublimity into the representation of nature. This
is a very needful preliminary remark. It entirely separates the ideas of the sublime from that of a finality of nature, i [This may be compared with the first paragraph of the Introduction to the Critique of Teleologkal Judgement ; p. 550, below. Cf. pp. 487, 512, et seq.; 516, et seq.; 518, et seq.; 531.]
is
finality of the
estimated only in respect
from end or
interest).
Accordingly the first is attributed to the object as a mathematical, the second as a dynamical, affection of the imagination.
Hence we
get the
above double mode of representing an object as sublime. 2 2 [Cf. p. 507. Also Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 43, 67.]
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT A.
The Mathematically Sublime
§25. Definition of the term "sublime"
Sublime is the name given to what is absolutely great. But to be great and to be a magnitude are entirely different concepts (magnitudo and quantitas). In the same way, to assert without qualification (simpliciter) that something is great is quite a different thing from saying that it is absolutely great (absolute, non comparative magnum). The latter is what is beyond all comparison great. What, then, is the meaning of the assertion that anything
medium
size?
What
is
is
concept of understanding, of sense; and just as
great, or small, or of
indicated
still less
little
is
it
not a pure
is
497
greatness is ascribed to it pre-eminently among many other objects of a like kind, yet without the extent of this pre-eminence being deter-
an intuition
a concept of
mined. Hence a standard
is
certainly laid at the
which standard is presupposed to be one that can be taken as the same for every one, but which is available only for an aesthetic estimate of the greatness, and not for one that is logical (mathematically determined), for the standard is a merely subjective one underlying the reflective judgement upon the greatness. Furthermore, this standard
basis of the judgement,
may
be empirical,
men known
of the
as, let
us say, the average size
to us, of animals of a certain
kind, of trees, of houses, of mountains, and so
Or
forth.
it
may
be a standard given a priori,
does not import any principle of cognition. It must, therefore, be a concept of judgement, or have its source in one, and must
which by reason of the imperfections of the
reason, for
it
judging subject
is
restricted to subjective condi-
tions of presentation in concreto; as, in the
introduce as basis of the judgement a subjective with reference to
practical sphere, the greatness of a particular
finality of the representation
virtue, 1 or of public liberty
power of judgement. Given a multiplicity of the homogeneous together constituting one thing, and we may at once cognize from the thing itself that it is a magnitude (quantum).
country;
the
No
comparison with other things is required. But to determine how great it is always requires something else, which itself has magnitude, for its measure. Now, since in the estimate of magnitude we have to take into account not merely the multiplicity (number of units) but also the magnitude of the unit (the measure), and since the magnitude of this unit in turn always requires something else as its measure and as the standard of its comparison, and so on, we see that the computation of the magnitude of phe-
nomena
is,
in all
cases,
utterly incapable of
or, in
and justice
in a
the theoretical sphere, the great-
ness of the accuracy or inaccuracy of an experi-
ment or measurement,
etc.
Here, now, it is of note that, although we have no interest whatever in the object, i. e., its real existence may be a matter of no concern to us, still its mere greatness, regarded even as devoid of form, is able to convey a universally
communicable delight and
so involve the con-
sciousness of a subjective finality in the employ-
ment
of our cognitive faculties, but not, be
remembered, a delight latter
may
tion to
what
in
it
the object, for the
be formless, but, in contradistincis the case with the beautiful, where
the reflective judgement finds itself set to a key that
is final
in respect of cognition generally, a
affording us any absolute concept of a magni-
delight in an extension affecting the imagination
tude, and can, instead, only afford one that
itself.
is
always based on comparison. If, now, I assert without qualification that anything is great, it would seem that I have nothing in the way of a comparison present to my mind, or at least nothing involving an objective measure, for no attempt is thus made to determine how great the object is. But, despite the standard of comparison being merely subjective, the claim of the judgement is none the less one to universal agreement; the judgements: "That man is beautiful" and "He is tall" do not purport to speak only for the judging subject, but, like theoretical judgements, they
demand
Now
the assent of everyone. in a
judgement that without
tion describes anything as great,
qualifica-
not merely meant that the object has a magnitude, but it is
If (subject as above) we say of an object, without qualification, that it is great, this is not a mathematically determinant, but a mere re-
judgement upon its representation, which is subjectively final for a particular employment of our cognitive faculties in the estimation of magnitude, and we then always couple flective
with the representation a kind of respect, just as we do a kind of contempt with what we call absolutely
small.
Moreover, the estimate of
things as great or small extends to everything,
even to all their qualities. Thus we call even their beauty great or small. The reason of this is to be found in the fact that we have only got to present a thing in intuition, as the precept of
judgement directs (consequently 1
[Cf.p.497,c^eg.]
to represent
it
THE CRITIQUE
498 aesthetically), for
it
nomenon, and hence
to be in its entirety a phe-
a
however, we call anything not alone great, but, without qualification, absolutely, and in every respect (beyond all comparison) great, that If,
is it
to say, sublime,
standard outside is it
we soon perceive
that for this
not permissible to seek an appropriate
is
itself,
but merely in
itself. It
a greatness comparable to itself alone. Hence comes that the sublime is not to be looked for
in the
things of nature, but only in our
own
But it must be left to the deduction to show in which of them it resides. The above definition may also be expressed in this way: that is sublime in comparison with which all else is small. Here we readily see that nothing can be given in nature, no matter how ideas.
we may judge it to be, which, regarded in some other relation, may not be degraded to the great
level of the infinitely little,
which
in
standard
and nothing so small
comparison with some
may
still
smaller
not for our imagination be en-
larged to the greatness of a world. Telescopes
have put within our reach an abundance of material to go upon in making the first observation, and microscopes the same in making the second. Nothing, therefore, which can be an object of the senses is to be termed sublime when treated on this footing. But precisely because there is a striving in our imagination towards progress ad infinitum, while reason ity,
demands absolute totalsame inability on the
as a real idea, that
part of our faculty for the estimation of the
magnitude of things of the world of sense to attain to this idea, is the awakening of a feeling of a supersensible faculty within us; and it is the use to which judgement naturally puts particular objects on behalf of this latter feeling, and not the object of sense, that is absolutely great, and every other contrasted employment small. Consequently it is the disposition of soul evoked by a particular representation engaging the attention of the reflective judgement, and not the object, that
is
to be called sublime.
The foregoing formulae
nite concepts of
how
great anything
is
by having
recourse to numbers (or, at any rate, by get-
quantum.
defining the sublime
ting approximate measurements by means of numerical series progressing ad infinitum), the unit being the measure; and to this extent all logical estimation of magnitude is mathematical.
But, as the magnitude of the measure has
assumed as a known quantity, if, to form this, we must again have recourse to numbers involving another standard for their unit, and consequently must again proceed
to be
an estimate of
mathematically,
we can never
arrive at a
first
or fundamental measure, and so cannot get any definite concept of a given magnitude.
The
es-
timation of the magnitude of the fundamental
measure must, therefore, consist merely in the immediate grasp which we can get of it in intuition, and the use to which our imagination can put this in presenting the numerical concepts: i. e., all estimation of the magnitude of objects of nature
is
in the last resort aesthetic (i.e., sub-
and not objectively determined). Now for the mathematical estimation of magnitude there is, of course, no greatest possible (for the power of numbers extends to infinity), jectively
but for the aesthetic estimation there certainly is and of it I say that where it is considered an absolute measure beyond which no greater is possible subjectively (i.e., for the judging subject), it then conveys the idea of the sublime
can evoke (unless in
emotion which no matheby numbers so far as the fundamental
aesthetic measure
kept vividly present to the
and
calls forth that
matical estimation of magnitudes
is
imagination): because the latter presents only the relative magnitude due to comparison with
others of a like kind, whereas the former presents magnitude absolutely, so far as the
can grasp
To
it
in
take in a
mind
an intuition.
quantum
intuitively in the imag-
ination so as to be able to use
it
or unit for estimating magnitude
as a measure,
by numbers,
involves two operations of this faculty: appre-
hension (apprehensio) and comprehension (comprehensio aestheticd) Apprehension presents no .
may, therefore, be supplemented by yet another: The sublime is that, the mere capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind
process can be carried on ad infinitum; but with the advance of apprehen-
transcending every standard of sense.
every step and soon attains
§ 26.
The estimation
of the magnitude of natu-
ral things requisite for the idea of the
sublime
The
estimation of magnitude by means of concepts of number (or their signs in algebra) is
mathematical, but that in mere intuition (by is aesthetic. Now we can only get defi-
the eye)
difficulty: for this
sion comprehension
becomes more its
difficult
at
maximum, and
this is the aesthetically greatest fundamental measure for the estimation of magnitude. For if the apprehension has reached a point beyond which the representations of sensuous intuition in the case of the parts first apprehended begin to disappear from the imagination as this advances to the apprehension of yet others, as
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT much, then, is lost at one end as is gained at the other, and for comprehension we get a maximum which the imagination cannot exceed. This explains Savary's observations in his account of Egypt, 1 that in order to get the full emotional effect of the size of the Pyramids we must avoid coming too near just as much as remaining too far away. For in the latter case the representation of the apprehended parts (the tiers of
no
stones)
effect
is
but obscure, and produces
upon the aesthetic judgement of the
Subject. In the former, however,
the bewilderment,
which, as
is
sort
of perplexity,
said, seizes the visitor
tering St. Peter's in
comes home
or
to
on
Rome. For here
him of
colossal
the
is
mere presentation of a con-
almost too great for presentation, for i.e., borders on the relatively monstrous; the end to be attained by the presentation of a concept is made harder to realize by the intuition of the object being almost too great for our cept which
is
faculty of apprehension. A pure judgement upon the sublime must, however, have no end be-
longing to the object as if it is
to be aesthetic
first
en-
a feeling
the inadequacy of his
Since whatever
is
to be a source of pleasure,
apart from interest, to the merely reflective
judgement must involve nality
—though
—
it
ground for universally valid demere estimation of magnitude, and that, too, in a case where it is pushed to the point at which our faculty of imagination breaks and proves unequal to
in presenting the
concept of a magnitude,
its
task?
In the successive aggregation of units requisite for the representation of magnitudes, the imagination of itself advances ad infinitum with-
—
are to give a suitable example
out let or hindrance understanding, however, conducting it by means of concepts of number for which the former must supply the schema. This procedure belongs to the logical estimation of magnitude, and, as such, is doubtless something objectively final according to the concept of an end (as all measurement is), but it is not anything which for the aesthetic judgement is
we
final or pleasing. Further, in this intentional fi-
—
myself to the remark that if the aesthetic judgement is to be pure (unmixed with any teleological judgement which, as such, belongs to fine
we
it
so as to yield a
down
if
fi-
the does in the case of the beautiful) question arises: What is the subjective finality, and what enables it to be prescribed as a norm (as
upon itself, but in so doing sucan emotional delight. At present I am not disposed to deal with the ground of this delight, connected, as it is, with a representation in which we would least a representation, namely, that of all look for it lets us see its own inadequacy, and consequently its subjective want of finality for our judgement in the estimation of magnitude but con-
it
representation
form of the object underlies our estimate of
cumbs
—
its
here, however, no finality of the
limit, recoils
to
in
subjective, and, as such, universally valid
light in the
reason), and
determining ground, to be tainted with
any judgement of understanding or reason.
imagination for presenting the idea of a whole within which that imagination attains its maximum, and, in its fruitless efforts to extend this
of
its
and not
takes the
it
eye some time to complete the apprehension from the base to the summit; but in this interval the first tiers always in part disappear before the imagination has taken in the last, and so the comprehension is never complete. The same explanation may also sufficiently account for
The
499
for the Critique of aesthetic judgement,
works of art, e.g., buildings, statues and the like, where a human end determines the form as well as the
nality there
magnitude, nor yet in things of nature, that in their very concept import a definite end, e.g., animals of a recognized natural order, but in rude nature merely as involving magnitude (and only in this so far as it does not convey any charm or any emotion arising from actual dan-
as to enlarge the size of the measure,
and thus
make
many
must not point
to the sublime in
ger). For, in a representation of this kind, na-
ture contains nothing monstrous (nor either magnificent or horrible)
what
is
—the magnitude
apprehended may be increased to any extent provided imagination is able to grasp it all in one whole. An object is monstrous where by its size it defeats the end that forms its concept. 1
[Lettres sur I'Egypte, 1787.]
is
nothing compelling us to tax the
utmost powers of the imagination, and drive as far as ever
it
can reach in
its
it
presentations, so
the single intuition holding the
in
one (the comprehension) as great as possible. For, in the estimation of magnitude by the understanding (arithmetic),
we
get just as far,
whether the comprehension of the units is pushed to the number 10 (as in the decimal scale) or only to 4 (as in the quaternary) the further production of magnitude being carried out ;
by the succesive aggregation of units, or, if the quantum is given in intuition, by apprehension, merely progressively (not comprehensively), according to an adopted principle of progression. In this mathematical estimation of magni-
THE CRITIQUE
500 tude, understanding
is
as
well served and as
sat-
whether imagination selects for the unit a magnitude which one can take in at a glance,
isfied
a foot, or a perch, or else a German mile, D the earth's diameter, the apprehension
cl:..
of which
hension it
at
is
in
indeed possible, but not its comprean intuition of the imagination (i.e.,
not possible by means of a comprehensio sthi tied, thought quite so by means of a comis
prehensio logica in a numerical concept). In each case the logical estimation of magnitude
advances ad infinitum with nothing to stop it. The mind, however, hearkens now to the voice of reason, which for all given magnitudes even for those which can never be completely apprehended, though (in sensuous representarequires tion) estimated as completely given totality, and consequently comprehension in one
—
from a theoretical point of view that looks
to
the interests of our faculty of knowledge, but as
mind
from another empass beyond the narrow confines of
a broadening of the
that
(the practical) point of view feels itself
powered
to
sensibility.
Nature, therefore,
phenomena
sublime in such of
is
as in their intuition
of their infinity.
But
this
its
convey the idea
can only occur through
the inadequacy of even the greatest effort of
our imagination in the estimation of the magnitude of an object. But, now, in the case of the mathematical estimation of magnitude, imagination is quite competent to supply a measure equal to the requirements of any object. For
For it is only through this faculty and its idea of a noumenon, which latter, while not itself admitting of any
the numerical concepts of the understanding can by progressive synthesis make any measure adequate to any given magnitude. Hence it must be the aesthetic estimation of magnitude in which we get at once a feeling of the effort towards a comprehension that exceeds the faculty of imagination for mentally grasping the progressive apprehension in a whole of intuition, and, with it, a perception of the inadequacy of this faculty, which has no bounds to its progress, for taking in and using for the estimation of magnitude a fundamental measure that understanding could turn to account without the least trouble. Now the proper unchangeable fundamental measure of nature is its absolute whole, which, with it, regarded as a phenomenon, means infinity comprehended. But, since this fundamental measure is a self-contradictory concept (owing to the impossibility of the absolute totality of an endless progression), it follows that where the size of a natural object is such that the imagination spends its whole faculty of comprehension upon it in vain, it must carry our concept of nature to a supersensible substrate (underlying both nature and our faculty of thought) which is great beyond every standard of sense. Thus, instead of the object, it is
intuition, is yet introduced as substrate
rather the cast of the
—
intuition, and which calls for a presentation answering to all the above members of a progressively increasing numerical series, and does not exempt even the infinite (space and time
past)
1
from
ders
it
inevitable for us to regard this infinite
this
requirement, but rather ren-
judgement of common reason) as com-
(in the
pletely given
But the
(i.e.,
infinite
given in is
its totality).
absolutely
(not merely
comparatively) great. In comparison with this all else (in the way of magnitudes of the same order) tance
small.
is
But the point of capital impormere ability even to think it
that the
is
as a whole indicates a faculty of
mind
tran-
scending every standard of sense. For the latter
would
entail a
comprehension yielding as unit
a standard bearing to the infinite ratio express-
numbers, which is impossible. Still the even to think the given infinite without contradiction, is something that re-
ible in
mere
ability
quires the presence in the
ulty that
is
human mind
of a fac-
itself supersensible.
lying the intuition of the world as
under-
mere phe-
.
that
nomenon,
we have
that the infinite of the world of sense, the pure intellectual estimation of magnitude, is completely comprehended under a con-
its
cept, although in the
bring out
in
mathematical estimation by means of numerical concepts it can never be
completely thought. Even a faculty enabling the infinite of supersensible intuition to be regarded as given (in its intelligible substrate), transcends every standard of sensibility and is great beyond all comparison even with the faculty of mathematical estimation: not, of course, 1
(.Cf
.
Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 130-1.]
mind
in appreciating
it
to estimate as sublime.
Therefore, just as the aesthetic judgement in estimate of the beautiful refers the imagina-
tion in its free play to the understanding, to its
agreement with the concepts of from their determi-
the latter in general (apart
nation) it
:
so in
its
estimate of a thing as sublime
refers that faculty to reason to bring out its
subjective accord with ideas of reason (inde-
temper which the influence of definite (practical) ideas would produce upon feeling, and in common accord with it.
terminately indicated), of
mind conformable
i.e.,
to induce a
to that
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT
501
This makes it evident that true sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the judging subject, and not in the object of nature that occasions this attitude by the estimate formed of it. Who would apply the term "sublime" even to shapeless mountain masses towering one
and unchangeable measure except the absolute whole. But our imagination, even when taxing itself to the uttermost on the score of this required comprehension of a given object in a whole of intuition (and so with a view to
above the other in wild disorder, with their pyramids of ice, or to the dark tempestuous ocean, or such like things? But in the contemplation of them, without any regard to their form, the mind abandons itself to the imagination and to a reason placed, though quite apart
its inadequacy, but still, at the proper vocation of making itself adequate to the same as law. Therefore the feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our own vocation, which we attribute to an object of nature by a certain subreption (substitution of a respect for the object in place of one for the idea of humanity in our own self the subject) and this feeling renders, as it were, intuitable the supremacy of our cognitive faculties on the rational side over the greatest fac-
from any definite end, in conjunction therewith, and merely broadening its view, and it feels itself elevated in its own estimate of itself on finding all the might of imagination still unequal to its ideas.
We
get examples of the mathematically sublime of nature in mere intuition in all those instances where our imagination is afforded, not so
much
a greater numerical concept as a large
measure (for shortening the numerical series). A tree judged by the height of man gives, at all events, a standard for a mountain; unit as
and, supposing this
similarly the earth's
the greatness of the number, as in the fact that
our onward advance
we always arrive at proThe systematic divi-
portionately greater units.
sion of the cosmos conduces to this result. For
becoming
that
all
little;
is
or, to
great in nature as in turn
be more exact,
sents our imagination in
and with
it
all
its
it
repre-
boundlessness,
nature, as sinking into insignificance
before the ideas of reason, once their adequate presentation
is
its
—
;
ulty of sensibility.
The feeling of the sublime is, therefore, at once a feeling of displeasure, arising from the inadequacy of imagination in the aesthetic estimation of magnitude to attain to its estimation
by reason, and a simultaneously awakened from this very judgement of
pleasure, arising
the inadequacy of the greatest faculty of sense
such systems, which go by the name of nebulae, likely in turn themselves form such a system, holds out no prospect of a limit. Now in the aesthetic estimate of such an immeasurable whole, the sublime does not lie so much in
represents
and
time,
being in accord with ideas of reason, so far as
it
and most
it
limits
same
can
say, a mile high,
planetary system; this again for the system of the Milky Way; and the immeasurable host of
in
the presentation of the idea of reason), betrays its
number expressing the as to make it intuitable; diameter for the known
is,
serve as unit for the earth's diameter, so
sally valid
attempted.
the effort to attain to these
for us a law. It
is
is,
in other
words, for us a law (of reason), which
goes to
make
us what
we
are, that
we should
comparison with ideas of reason everything which for us is great in nature as an object of sense; and that which makes us esteem as small
in
alive to the feeling of this supersensible side of
our being harmonizes with that law. Now the greatest effort of the imagination in the presentation of the unit for the estimation of magnitude involves in itself a reference to something absolutely great, consequently a reference also to the law of reason that this alone is to be adopted as the supreme measure of what is great. Therefore the inner perception of the inadequacy of every standard of sense to serve for the rational estimation of magnitude is a coming into accord with reason's laws, and a
displeasure that
makes us
alive to the feeling
of the supersensible side of our being, according § 27. Quality of the delight in our estimate of
to
which
it is final,
and consequently a pleasure,
to find every standard of sensibility falling short
the sublime
of the ideas of reason.
The
feeling of our incapacity to attain to an
idea that
is
a law for us, is respect. 1
idea of the comprehension of any
may
be given
Now
the
phenomenon
whole of intuition, is an idea imposed upon us by a law of reason, which recognizes no definite, univerwhatever, that
1
us, in a
[Cf. Critique of Practical Reason, p. 323, et seq.]
The mind
motion
feels itself set in
in the rep-
resentation of the sublime in nature; whereas in the aesthetic
ful therein
it is
judgement upon what
is
beauti-
in restful contemplation. This
may
be
with a rapidly
al-
ternating repulsion and attraction produced
by
movement, especially in compared with vibration,
its
inception,
i.e.,
THE CRITIQUE
502
one and the same object. The point of excess for the imagination (towards which it is driven in the apprehension of the intuition) is like an 1
abyss
in
which
it
fears to lose itself, yet again
for the rational idea of the supersensible it is not excessive, but conformable to law, and di-
rected to drawing out such an effort on the part and so in turn as much a
of the imagination:
source of attraction as it was repellent to mere sensibility. But the judgement itself all the while steadfastly preserves its aesthetic charac-
The
quality of the feeling of the sublime con-
sists in its
being, in respect of the faculty of
forming aesthetic estimates, a feeling of displeasure at an object, which yet, at the same a representime, is represented as being final tation which derives its possibility from the fact that the subject's very incapacity betrays the consciousness of an unlimited faculty of the same subject, and that the mind can only form an aesthetic estimate of the latter faculty by
—
means
of that incapacity.
represents, without being ground-
In the case of the logical estimation of mag-
ed on any definite concept of the object, merely the subjective play of the mental powers (im-
nitude, the impossibility of ever arriving at ab-
because
ter,
it
by
agination and reason) as harmonious
virtue
of their very contrast. For just as in the estimate of the beautiful imagination and understanding by their concert generate subjective finality of the mental faculties, so imagination and reason do so here by their conflict that is
—
to say they induce a feeling of our possessing
a pure and self-sufficient reason, or a faculty for the estimation of magnitude, whose preeminence can only be made intuitively evident by the inadequacy of that faculty which in the presentation of magnitudes (of objects of sense) is itself unbounded. Measurement of a space (as apprehension) is at the same time a description of it. and so an objective movement in the imagination and a progression. On the other hand, the comprehension of the manifold in the unity, not of thought, but of intuition, and consequently the comprehension of the successively apprehended parts at one glance, is a retrogression that re-
moves
the time-condition in the progression of
the imagination,
and renders coexistence
able. Therefore, since the time-series
is
intuit-
a con-
dition of the internal sense and of an intuition,
movement of the imagination does violence to the internal sense a violence which must be proportionately
it is
a subjective
by which
—
more
it
striking the greater the
the imagination
The
comprehends
quantum which in
one intuition.
effort, therefore, to receive in a single intui-
tion a
measure for magnitudes which
it
takes an
appreciable time to apprehend, is a mode of representation which, subjectively considered, is contra-final, but objectively, is requisite for the
estimation of magnitude, and is consequently final. Here the very same violence that is
wrought on the subject through the imagination estimated as final for the whole province of the mind.
solute totality
by the progressive measurement
of things of the sensible world in time and space
was cognized
as an objective impossibility, i. e.. one of thinking the infinite as given, and not as simply subjective, i.e., an incapacity for grasping it; for nothing turns there on the amount of the comprehension in one intuition, as measure, but everything depends on a numerical concept. But in an aesthetic estimation of magnitude the numerical concept must drop out of count or undergo a change. The only thing that is final for such estimation is the comprehension on the part of imagination in respect of the unit of measure (the concept of a law of the successive production of the concept of magnitude being consequently avoided). If, now, a magnitude begins to tax the utmost stretch of our faculty of comprehension in an intuition, and still numerical magnitudes in respect of which we are conscious of the boundlessness of our faculty call upon the imagination for aesthetic comprehension in a greater unit, the mind then gets a feeling of being aesthetically confined within bounds. Nevertheless, with a view to the extension of imagination necessary for adequacy with what is unbounded in our faculty of
—
—
reason,
namely the idea of the absolute whole,
the attendant
displeasure,
and, consequently,
the want of finality in our faculty of imagination, is still represented as final for ideas of reason and their animation. But in this very way
the aesthetic judgement itself
subjectively
is
reason as source of ideas,
i.e., of such an intellectual comprehension as makes all aesthetic comprehension small, and the object is received as sublime with a pleasure that is only possible through the mediation of a displeasure.
final for
B.
The Dynamically Sublime
in
Nature
is
§ 28.
Might
1
[Cf. P- 537. et seq.; p. 509, et seq.]
Nature as Might
power which is superior to great hindrances. It is termed dominion if it is also is
a
— OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT superior to the resistance of that which itself
we
503
readily call these objects sublime, because
possesses might. Nature, considered in an aes-
they raise the forces of the soul above the height
judgement as might that has no dominion
of vulgar commonplace, and discover within us
thetic
sublime,
a power of resistance of quite another kind, which gives us courage to be able to measure ourselves against the seeming omnipotence of
fear
nature.
over us, If
we
is
dynamically sublime.
are to estimate nature as dynamically
it must be represented as a source of (though the converse, that every object that is a source of fear, in our aesthetic judgement, sublime, does not hold). For in forming an aesthetic estimate (no concept being present) the superiority to hindrances can only be estimated according to the greatness of the resistance. Now that which we strive to resist is an evil, and, if we do not find our powers commensurate to the task, an object of fear. Hence the aesthetic judgement can only deem nature a might, and so dynamically sublime, in so far as it is looked upon as an object of fear.
But we may look upon an object as fearful, and yet not be afraid of it, if, that is, our estimate takes the form of our simply picturing to
In the immeasurableness of nature and the incompetence of our faculty for adopting a standard proportionate to the aesthetic estimaits realm, we found
tion of the magnitude of
our
own
limitation.
in our rational
But with
this
we
also
found
faculty another non-sensuous
standard, one which has that infinity itself un-
der it as a unit, and in comparison with which everything in nature is small, and so found in
our minds a pre-eminence over nature even in immeasurability. Now in just the same way the irresistibility of the might of nature forces
it
upon us the recognition of our physical helplesssame time
ness as beings of nature, but at the
some
reveals a faculty of estimating ourselves as in-
and recognizing that all such resistance would be quite futile. So the right-
dependent of nature, and discovers a pre-eminence above nature that is the foundation of a self-preservation of quite another kind from that which may be assailed and brought into danger by external nature. This saves humanity in our own person from humiliation, even though as mortal men we have to submit to external violence. In this way, external nature is not estimated in our aesthetic judgement as sublime so far as exciting fear, but rather because it challenges our power (one not of nature) to regard as small those things of which we are wont to be solicitous (worldly goods, health, and life), and hence to regard its might (to which in these matters we are no doubt subject) as exercising over us and our personality no such rude dominion that we should bow down before it, once the question becomes one of our highest principles and of our asserting or forsaking them. Therefore nature is here called sublime merely because it raises the imagination to a presentation of those cases in which the mind can make itself sensible of the appro-
ourselves the case of our wishing to offer resistance to
eous
man
it
fears
God without
being afraid of
Him, because he regards the case to resist
of his wishing
God and His commandments
which need cause him no anxiety. But
as one
in
every
such case, regarded by him as not intrinsically impossible, he cognizes Him as One to be feared.
One who
is
in a state of fear can
no more play
the part of a judge of the sublime of nature
than one captivated by inclination and appetite can of the beautiful. He flees from the sight of an object filling him with dread; and it is impossible to take delight in terror that
entertained.
is
seriously
Hence the agreeableness
arising
from the cessation of an uneasiness is a state of joy. But this, depending upon deliverance from a danger, is a rejoicing accompanied with a resolve never again to put oneself in the of the danger: in fact
we do not
way
like bringing
to mind how we felt on that occasion not to speak of going in search of an opportunity for experiencing it again.
back
Bold, overhanging, and, as
it
were, threaten-
ing rocks, thunderclouds piled up the vault of
heaven, borne along with flashes and peals, volcanoes in all their violence of destruction, hur-
priate sublimity of the sphere of its
own
being,
even above nature. This estimation of ourselves loses nothing by the fact that
we must
see ourselves safe in order
—
ricanes leaving desolation in their track, the
to feel this soul-stirring delight
boundless ocean rising with rebellious force, the high waterfall of some mighty river, and the like, make our power of resistance of trifling moment in comparison with their might. But, provided our own position is secure, their aspect
as little seriousness in the sublimity of our fac-
is all
the
more
attractive for its fearfulness;
and
a fact from which it might be plausibly argued that, as there is no seriousness in the danger, so there is just ulty of soul. For here the delight only concerns the province of our faculty disclosed in such a case, so far as this faculty has its root in our
THE CRITIQUE
504
nature; notwithstanding that its development and exercise is left to ourselves and remains an obligation. Here indeed there is truth no matter how conscious a man, when he stretches
—
his reflection so far abroad,
may be
of his actual
present helplessness.
This principle has, doubtless, the appearance
sion, prostration,
and a feeling of utter helpless-
more
to constitute the attitude of
ness seem
an oband to be that also more customarily associated with the idea of it on the occasion of a natural phenomenon of this kind. In religion, as
mind
befitting the manifestation of such
ject,
bowed head,
a rule, prostration, adoration with
of being too far-fetched and subtle, and so of lying beyond the reach of an aesthetic judge-
coupled with contrite, timorous posture and voice, seems to be the only becoming demeanour
ment. But observation of men proves the reand that it may be the foundation of the commonest judgements, although one is not al-
presence of the Godhead, and accordingly most nations have assumed and still observe it. Yet this cast of mind is far from being intrinsically and necessarily involved in the idea of the sublimity of a religion and of its object. The
verse,
ways conscious of
its
presence. For what
is
it
even to the savage, is the object of the greatest admiration? It is a man who is undaunted, who knows no fear, and who, therefore, does not give way to danger, but sets manfully that,
to
work with
full deliberation.
Even where
civ-
has reached a high pitch, there remains this special reverence for the soldier; only that there is then further required of him that he ilization
should also exhibit
all
the virtues of peace 1
—
in
man
that
is
in himself
actually in a state of fear, finding
good reason
to
be
so,
because he
is
conscious of offending with his evil disposition
by a will from being
against a might directed sistible
of
mind
and
just, is far
at once irrein the
frame
for admiring divine greatness, for which
a temper of calm reflection and a quite free
judgement are required. Only when he becomes
and even becoming thought for his own person; and for the reason that in this we recognize that his mind is above the threats of danger. 2 And so, comparing the statesman and the general, men may argue as they please as to the pre-eminent respect which is due to either above the other; but the verdict of the aesthetic judgement is for the latter. War itself, provided it is conducted with order and
conscious of having a disposition that is upright and acceptable to God, do those operations of might serve to stir within him the idea of the
a sacred respect for the rights of civilians, has
the form of an uncompromising judgement
something sublime about it, and gives nations that carry it on in such a manner a stamp of mind only the more sublime the more numerous the dangers to which they are exposed, and which they are able to meet with fortitude. On the other hand, a prolonged peace favours the predominance of a mere commercial spirit, and with it a debasing self-interest, cowardice, and effeminacy, and tends to degrade the character
his shortcomings, which,
with consciousness of good intentions, might readily be glossed over
of the nation.
apprehension of the all-powerful Being to whose man sees himself subjected, yet without according Him due honour. From this nothing can arise but grace-begging and vain adulation, instead of a religion consisting
gentleness,
sympathy,
So far as sublimity
is
predicated of might,
concept of it appears at variance with the fact that we are wont to represent God in the tempest, the storm, the earthquake, and the like, as presenting Himself in His wrath, but at the same time also in His sublimity, and yet here it would be alike folly and presumption to imagine a pre-eminence of our minds over the operations and, as it appears, even over the direction of such might. Here, instead of a feeling of the sublimity of our own nature, submisthis solution of the
> [Cf. King Henry's address before Harfleur; Shakespeare, King Henry V, Act III, Scene i.J 2 TCf. Aristotle's remarks on Courage, in the Ethics,
III, 6, et seq.)
sublimity of this Being, so far as he recognizes the existence in himself of a sublimity of disposition consonant with His will, and is thus raised above the dread of such operations of nature, in which he no longer sees God pouring forth
the vials of the wrath.
Even
humility, taking
upon
on the ground of the frailty of human nature, is a sublime temper of the mind voluntarily to undergo the pain of remorse as a means of more and more effectually eradicating its cause. In
way
this
from
religion
is
intrinsically distinguished
which
latter rears in the mind, not reverence for the sublime, but dread and
superstition,
will terror-stricken
in a
good
life.
Sublimity, therefore, does not reside in any of the things of nature, but only in our
own
mind, in so far as we may become conscious of our superiority over nature within, and thus also over nature without us (as exerting influence upon us). Everything that provokes this feeling in us, including the might of nature which challenges our strength, is then, though improperly, called sublime, and it is only under presupposi-
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT tion of this idea within us,
we
that
and
in relation to
it,
are capable of attaining to the idea of
the sublimity of that Being which inspires deep
by the mere display of its nature, but more by the faculty which
505
account of his adto be ventures? But the mind of Sassure was bent on able to give a thrilling
the instruction of mankind, and soul-stirring
man
respect in us, not
sensations that excellent
might
the reader of his travels got
in
planted in us of estimating that might without fear, and of regarding our estate as exalted
is
above § 29.
it.
Modality of the judgement on the sublime in nature
Beautiful nature contains countless things we at once take every one as in their
indeed had. and
them thrown
into
the bargain.
But the fact that culture is requisite for the judgement upon the sublime in nature (more than for that upon the beautiful) does not inits being an original product of culture and something introduced in a more or less conventional way into society. 2 Rather is it in hu-
volve
as to which
man
judgement concurring with our own. and as to which we may further expect this concurrence without facts finding us far astray. But in respect of our judgement upon the sublime in nature, we cannot so easily vouch for ready acceptance by others. For a far higher degree of culture. 1 not merely of the aesthetic judgement, but also of the faculties of cognition which lie at its basis, seems to be requisite to enable us to lay down a judgement upon this high distinc-
in fact, in that which, at
nature that
derstanding,
and
may
ity for
its
foundations are laid, and, once with common un-
we may expect every one
to possess
require of him, namely, a native capacthe feeling for
(practical)
ideas,
i.e..
presupposition of this susceptibility and of the
moral feeling. This, now. is the foundation of the necessity of that agreement between other men's judgements upon the sublime and our own. which we make our own imply. For just as we taunt a man who is quite inappreciative when forming an estimate of an object of nature in which we see beauty, with want of taste, so we say of a man who remains unaffected in the presence of what we consider sublime, that he has no feeling. 3 But we demand both taste and feeling of every man, and. granted some degree of culture,
straining of the imagination to use nature as a
we
tion of natural objects.
The proper mental mood for a feeling of the sublime postulates the mind's susceptibility for ideas, since it is precisely in the failure of nature
—and consequently only under
to attain to these
schema for ideas
—that there
is
something for-
bidding to sensibility, but which, for
all that,
has
an attraction for us, arising from the fact of its being a dominion which reason exercises over sensibility with a view to extending it to the requirements of its own realm (the practical) it look out beyond itself into the inwhich for it is an abyss. In fact, without the development of moral ideas, that which,
and
letting
finite,
thanks to preparatory culture, we call sublime, merely strikes the untutored man as terrifying. He will see in the evidences which the ravages of nature give of her dominion, and in the vast scale of her might, compared with which his own is
diminished to insignificance, only the misery.
would compass the man mercy. So the simpleminded, and, for the most part, intelligent. Savoyard peasant, (as Herr von Sassure relates), unhesitatingly called all lovers of snowmountains fools. And who can tell whether he would have been so wide of the mark, if that student of nature had taken the risk of the dangers to which he exposed himself merely, as most travellers do. for a fad, or so as some day
peril,
and
distress that
who was thrown
1
to its
[Cf. p. 518, et seq.~\
for
give
him
credit for both. Still,
we do
so with
this difference: that, in the case of the former,
since judgement there refers the imagination merely to the understanding, as the faculty of concepts, we make the requirement as a matter of course, whereas in the case of the latter, since here the judgement refers the imagination to reason, as a faculty of ideas, we do so only un-
der a subjective presupposition (which, however, we believe we are warranted in making), namely, that of the moral feeling in man. And, on this assumption, we attribute necessity to
the latter aesthetic
In
this
judgement
also.
modality of aesthetic judgements,
namely, their assumed necessity,
lies what is for Judgement a moment of capital importance. For this is exactly what makes an
the Critique of
a priori principle apparent in their case,
them out
and
lifts
of the sphere of empirical psychology,
which otherwise they would remain buried amid the feelings of gratification and pain (only
in
with the senseless epithet of finer feeling), so as to place them, and, thanks to them, to place the faculty of judgement itself, in the class of judgements of which the basis of an a priori
2[Cf.p. 4 93.] 3
[Cf. pp. 523; 549, et seq.]
THE CRITIQUE
S o6
principle
is
the distinguishing feature, and, thus them into transcen-
law of action from duty,
i.e.,
of the representa-
distinguished, to introduce
tion of this as sublime, or even as beautiful,
dental philosophy.
without forfeiting sult were one to
General Remark upon the Exposition of
The
In relation to the feeling of pleasure an object is to be counted either as agreeable, or beautiful, or sublime, or good (absolutely), (incundum, pule hr urn. sublime, honestum).
As the motive of desires the agreeable is invariably of one and the same kind, no matter what its source or how specifically different the representation (of sense and sensation objectively considered).
in-
fluence
its
charms (simultaneous or successive) is alone revelant, and so only, as it were, the mass of the agreeable sensation, and it is only by the quantity,
therefore, that this can be
made
intelligible.
no way conduces to our culture, hut belongs only to mere enjoyment. The beautiful, on the other hand, requires the represenFurther
in
it
purity it
—an impossible
naturally
re-
bound up
with the feeling of the agreeable.
Aesthetic Reflective Judgements
Hence in estimating its upon the mind, the multitude of
its
make
net result to be extracted from the ex-
position so far given of both kinds of resthetic
judgements
may
be
summed up
in the following
brief definitions:
The beautiful is what pleases in the mere estimate formed of it (consequently not by intervention of any feeling of sense in accordance with a concept of the understanding). From this it follows at once that it must please apart from all interest.
The sublime
is
what pleases immediately by
opposition to the interest of sense. Both, as definitions of aesthetic universally
reason of
its
valid estimates,
have reference to subjective
grounds. In the one case the reference
grounds of
is
to
sensibility, in so far as these are final
on behalf of the contemplative understanding, in the other case in so far as, in their opposition
they are, on the contrary,
tation of a certain quality of the object, that
to sensibility,
permits also of being understood and reduced to concepts (although in the aesthetic judgement
reference to the ends of practical reason. Both,
it is
not so reduced), and
it
cultivates, as
it
in-
structs us to attend to finality in the feeling of
pleasure.
The sublime
relation exhibited
consists merely in the by the estimate of the serv-
iceability of the sensible in the representation
however, as united in the same subject, are final moral feeling. The beautiful prepares us to love something, even nature, apart from any interest: the sublime to esteem something highly even in opposition to our in reference to the
(sensible) interest.
The sublime may be described
of nature for a possible supersensible employ-
ment. The absolutely good, estimated subjectively according to the feeling it inspires (the object of the moral feeling), as the determinabiiity of the
powers of the subject by means
of the representation of an absolutely necessitating
law,
is
principally distinguished
by the
final in
in this
way:
an object (of nature) the representation of which determines the mind to regard the elevation of nature beyond our reach as equivalent It
is
to a presentation of ideas.
In a cal
literal
sense and according to their logi-
import, ideas cannot be presented. But
if
we
moddlity of a necessity resting upon concepts a priori, and invoking not a mere claim, but a command upon every one to assent, and belongs
enlarge our empirical faculty of representation
intrinsically not to the aesthetic, but to the
forward, as the faculty concerned with the independence of the absolute totality, and calls forth the effort of the mind, unavailing though it be, to make representation of sense adequate to this totality. This effort, and the feeling of
pure judgement. Further, it is not ascribed to nature but to freedom, and that in a determinant and not a merely reflective judgement. But the detvrminability of the subject intellectual
by means of
this idea, and, what is more, that of a subject which can be sensible, in the way of a modification of its state, to hindrances on
the part of sensibility, while, at the
same
(mathematical or dynamical) with a view to the intuition of nature, reason inevitably steps
the unattainability of the idea agination,
is
itself
tive finality of
by means
of im-
a presentation of the subjec-
our mind in the employment of
time.
the imagination in the interests of the mind's
can by surmounting them feel superiority it over them a determinability. in other words, as moral feeling is still so allied to aesthetic
tively to think nature itself in its totality as a
presentation of something supersensible, with-
judgement and
out our being able to effectuate this presenta-
—
—
its
formal conditions as to be
capable of being pressed into the service of the aesthetic representation of the conformity to
supersensible province, and compels us subjec-
tion objectively.
For we readily see that nature
in
space and
— OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT
507
time falls entirely short of the unconditioned, consequently also of the absolutely great, which still the commonest reason demands. And by this we are also reminded that we have only to
through imagination, for the purpose of feeling the might of this faculty in combining the movement of the mind thereby aroused with its serenity, and of thus being superior to internal
do with nature as phenomenon, and that this itself must be regarded as the mere presentation of a nature-in-itself (which exists in the idea
and, therefore, to external, nature, so far as the
But this idea of the supersensible, which no doubt we cannot further determine so that we cannot cognize nature as its presen-
of reason).
tation, but only think in us
as such
it
—
is
awakened
aesthetic estimating of
by an object the
which strains the imagination to its utmost, whether in respect of its extension (mathematical), or of its might over the mind (dynamical). For it is founded upon the feeling of a sphere of the mind which altogether exceeds the realm of nature (i.e., upon the moral feeling), with regard to which the representation of the object estimated as subjectively final. As a matter of fact, a feeling for the sublime in nature is hardly thinkable unless in association with an attitude of mind resembling the is
moral.
And
though, like that feeling, the
imme-
can have any bearing upon our feeling of For the imagination, in accordance with laws of association, makes our state of conlatter
well-being.
tentment dependent upon physical conditions. But acting in accordance with principles of the schematism of judgement (consequently so far as it is subordinated to freedom), it is at the same time an instrument of reason and its ideas. But in this capacity it is a might enabling us to assert our independence as against the influences of nature, to degrade what is great in respect of the latter to the level of what is little, and thus to locate the absolutely great only in the proper estate of the subject. This reflection of aesthetic judgement by which it raises itself to the point of adequacy with reason, though without any determinate concept of reason, is still a representation of the object as subjectively
final,
by
virtue even of the objective inadequacy of the greatest extension for meeting
diate pleasure in the beautiful in nature pre-
imagination in
supposes and cultivates a certain liberality of thought, i.e., makes our delight independent of
the
any mere enjoyment of sense, still it represents freedom rather as in play than as exercising a law-ordained function, which is the genuine characteristic of human morality, where reason has to impose its dominion upon sensibility. There is, however, this qualification, that in the aesthetic judgement upon the sublime this do-
been already adverted to, that in the transcendental aesthetic of judgement there must be no question of anything but pure aesthetic judgements. Consequently examples are not to be selected from such beautiful or sublime objects as presuppose the concept of an end. For then the finality would be either teleological, or based upon mere sensations of an object (gratification or pain) and so, in the first case, not aesthetic, and, in the second, not merely formal. So, if we call the sight of the starry heaven sublime, we must not found our estimate of it upon any concepts of worlds inhabited by rational beings, with the bright spots, which we see filling the space above us, as their suns moving in orbits prescribed for them with the wisest regard to
minion
is
represented as exercised through the
imagination is
is
itself as
an instrument of reason.
Thus, too, delight in the sublime in nature only negative (whereas that in the beautiful that
positive):
imagination by
its
is
to say,
own
it
is
a feeling of
act depriving itself of
freedom by receiving a final determination accordance with a law other than that of its empirical employment. In this way it gains an extension and a might greater than that which it sacrifices. But the ground of this is concealed its
in
from
it,
and
in its place
deprivation, as well as
subjected.
feels the sacrifice or
it
its
cause, to which
it is
The astonishment amounting almost
to terror, the
awe and
that takes hold of one
thrill
of devout feeling,
when
gazing upon the
prospect of mountains ascending to heaven, deep ravines and torrents raging there, deep-
shadowed
solitudes that invite to brooding mel-
ancholy, and the like
assured of our
Rather
is
it
own
—
all
this,
when we
are
not actual fear. an attempt to gain access to it safety,
is
its
demands of reason (as the faculty of ideas). Here we have to attend generally to what has
But we must take it, just as it strikes the and all-embracing canopy: and it is merely under such a representation that we may posit the sublimity which the pure aesthetic judgement attributes to this object. Similarly, ends.
eye, as a broad
as to the prospect of the ocean,
we
are not to
minds stored with knowledge on a variety of matters (which, however, is not contained in the immediate intuition), are wont to represent it in thought, as, let us say, a spacious realm of aquatic creatures, or as the mighty reservoirs from which are drawn the vapours that fill the air with clouds regard
it
as we, with our
— THE CRITIQUE
5o8
of moisture for the good of the land, or yet as an element which no doubt divides continent
from continent, but at the same time affords the means of the greatest commercial interfor in this way we get course between them nothing beyond teleological judgements. Instead of this we must be able to see sublimity in the
—
—though —whilst turn
in the interest of inner free-
something
dom
in
it
reveals in us an unfath-
this supersensible faculty, the
omable depth of
consequences of which extend beyond reach of the eye of sense), it follows that the delight, looked at from the aesthetic side (in reference to sensibility) is negative, i.e., opposed to this
calm, a clear mirror of water
but from the intellectual side, positive and bound up with an interest. Hence it follows that the intellectual and intrinsically final
bounded only by the heavens, or, be it disturbed, as threatening to overwhelm and engulf everything. The same is to be said of the sublime and
being represented as beautiful, must rather be represented as sublime, with the result that it
ocean, regarding to
it.
as the poets do, according
what the impression upon the eye
as, let
us say, in
its
reveals,
interest,
(moral) good, estimated aesthetically, instead of
human form. Here, for determining grounds of the judgement, we must not have recourse to concepts of ends subserved by all its limbs and members, or allow their accordance with these ends to influence our aesthetic judgement (in such case no longer pure), although it is certainly also a necessary condition of aesthetic delight that they should not
arouses more a feeling of respect (which disdains charm) than of love or of the heart being
conflict with these ends. Aesthetic finality is the conformity to law of judgement in its freedom. The delight in the object depends upon the reference which we seek to give to the imagination,
represented as a might of the mind enabling
subject to the proviso that
must dwell a while on the latter point. The idea of the good to which affection is superadded is enthusiasm. This state of mind appears to be
beautiful in the
mind
it is
to entertain the
in a free activity. If, on the other hand, something else be it sensation or concept of determines the judgement, the understanding it is then conformable to law, no doubt, but not an act of free judgement. Hence to speak of intellectual beauty or sub-
limity
—
is
—
to use expressions which, in the first
For these are aesthetic modes of representation which would be entirely foreign to us were we merely pure intelligences (or if we even put ourselves in thought in
place, are not quite correct.
the position of such). Secondly, although both, as objects of an intellectual (moral) delight, are
compatible with aesthetic delight to the extent of not resting
upon any
other hand, there
is
interest,
still,
a difficulty in the
on the
way
of
their alliance with such delight, since their func-
tion is to produce an interest, and, on the assumption that the presentation has to accord
with delight
in
the aesthetic estimate, this inter-
by means of an intercombined with it in the presenta-
est could only be effected est of sense tion.
But
in
this
way
the intellectual finality
would be violated and rendered impure. The object of a pure and unconditioned intellectual delight is the moral law in the might which it exerts in us over all antecedent motives of the mind.
Now.
since it is only through sacrimight makes itself known to us aesthetically (and this involves a deprivation of
fices that this
—
it for human nature does not own proper motion accord with the good,
drawn towards of
its
but only by virtue of the dominion which reason exercises over sensibility. Conversely, that, too,
which we
call
sublime
in external nature, or
internal nature (e.g., certain affections)
is
even only it
overcome this or that hindrance of sensibility by means of moral principles, and it is from this to
that
it
derives
its interest.
I
sublime
so
:
much
so that there
is
a
common
say-
ing that nothing great can be achieved without it.
But now every affection 1
the choice of
its
is
blind either as to
end, or, supposing this has been
way it is effected movement whereby the ex-
furnished by reason, in the for
it is
ercise
that mental
upon fundamental view to determining oneself
of free deliberation
principles, with a
is rendered impossible. On this accannot merit any delight on the part of reason. Yet, from an aesthetic point of view, enthusiasm is sublime, because it is an effort of
accordingly,
count
it
one's powers called forth
by ideas which give to more enduring efficacy than the stimulus afforded by sensible representations. But (as seems strange) even freedom from affection (apatheia phle gma in significatu bono) in a mind that strenuously follows its unswerving principles is sublime, and the
mind an impetus
of far stronger and
,
1 There is a specific distinction between affections and passions. Aftections are related merely to feeling; passions belong to the faculty of desire, and are inclinations that hinder or render impossible all determinability of the elective will by principles. Affections are impetuous and irresponsible; passions are abiding and deliberate. Thus resentment, in the form of anger, is an affection: but in the form of hatred (vindictiveness) it is a passion. Under no circumstances can the latter be called sublime; for, while the freedom of the mind is, no doubt, impeded in the case of affection, in passion it is
abrogated.
— ;
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT that, too, in a
manner
vastly superior, because
has at the same time the delight of pure reason on its side. Such a stamp of mind is alone it
called noble. This expression, however,
—
comes
time to be applied to things such as buildgarment, literary style, the carriage of provided they do not one's person, and the like
in
ings, a
—
so
much
excite astonishment (the affection at-
tending the representation of novelty exceeding expectation) as admiration (an astonishment
which does not cease when the novelty wears and this obtains where ideas undesignedly off) and artlessly accord in their presentation with
—
aesthetic delight.
Every that er
of
affection of the
strenuous type
(such,
as excites the consciousness of our
is,
overcoming every resistance
strenuus])
is
aesthetically sublime,
pow-
[animus
e.g.,
anger,
even desperation (the rage of forlorn hope but not faint-hearted despair). affection of the
On
the other hand,
languid type (which converts
509
down
method by which alone we can become acceptable to the Supreme of
mind
are set
as the
—
Being these have neither lot nor fellowship with what may be reckoned to belong to beauty, not to speak of sublimity, of mental temperament. But even impetuous movements of the mind be they allied under the name of edification with ideas of religion, or, as pertaining merely to culture, with ideas involving a social interest
—
no matter what tension of the imagination they produce, can in no way lay claim to the honour of a sublime presentation, if they do not leave behind them a temper of mind which, though it be only indirectly, has an influence upon the consciousness of the mind's strength and resoluteness in respect of that which carries with it pure intellectual finality (the supersensible). For, in the absence of this, all these emotions belong only to motion, which we welcome in the interests of good health. The agree-
may
the very effort of resistance into an object of dis-
able lassitude that follows
pleasure [animus languidus~\ has nothing noble about it, though it may take its rank as possess-
in that
ing beauty of the sensuous order. Hence the emotions capable of attaining the strength of an affection are very diverse.
We have spirited, and
we have tender emotions. When
the strength of
the latter reaches that of an affection they can be turned to no account. The propensity to indulge in them is sentimentality. A sympathetic grief that refuses to be consoled, or one that has to do with imaginary misfortune to which we deliberately give way so far as to allow our
fancy to delude us into thinking indicates and goes to
make
it
actual fact,
a tender, but at the
way by
no more than what the Eastern volupwhen they get their bodies massaged, and all their muscles and joints softly pressed and bent only that in the first case
comes
to
tuaries find so soothing
;
the principle that occasions the chiefly internal, ternal.
Thus,
whereas here
many
a
man
own person something quite other than their happiness), and in general incapable of all firm principles; even a religious discourse which recommends a cringing and abject grace-begging and favour-seeking, abandoning all reliance on our own ability to resist the for the worth of
evil
rights of
humanity
in our
men (which
is
within us, in place of the vigorous resolution
to try to get the better of our inclinations
by
means of those powers which, miserable sinners though we be, are still left to us; that false humility by which self-abasement, whining hypocritical repentance and a merely passive frame
movement
it is
is
entirely ex-
believes himself edi-
by a sermon in which there is no establishment of anything (no system of good maxims) or thinks himself improved by a tragedy, when
fied
lectual side of our nature
and the
a
from
the restoration of the equilibrium of the various
(though falsely so) noble sentiments, but in fact stern precepts of duty, and incapable of respect
is
vital forces within us. This, in the last resort,
he
the heart enervated, insensitive to the
up
stirred
fruition of the state of well-being arising
same time weak, soul, which shows a beautiful side, and may no doubt be called fanciful, but never enthusiastic. Romances, maudlin dramas, shallow homilies, which trifle with so-called
make
upon being
the play of the affections,
merely glad
having got well rid of the Thus the sublime must in every case have reference to our way of thinkis
at
feeling of being bored.
ing,
i.e.,
to
maxims
directed to giving the intel-
and the ideas of reason supremacy over sensibility. We have no reason to fear that the feeling of the sublime will suffer from an abstract mode of presentation like this, which is altogether negative as to what is sensuous. For though the imagination, no doubt, finds nothing beyond the sensible world to which it can lay hold, still this thrusting aside of the sensible barriers gives
it
unbounded; and that removal thus a presentation of the infinite. As such feeling of being
a is it
can never be anything more than a negative presentation but still it expands the soul. Perhaps there is no more sublime passage in the Jewish Law than the commandment: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or
—
THE CRITIQUE
5io
ment can alone explain the enthusiasm which
sensible) nature, whose laws alone we know, without being able to attain to an intuition of that which the supersensible faculty within us
the Jewish people, in their moral period, felt for
contains the ground of this legislation.
any likeness of any thing that
in
is
heaven or on
command-
earth, or under the earth, etc." This
their religion
when comparing themselves with
by Mohammedanism. The very same holds good of our representation of the moral law and of our native capac-
others, or the pride inspired
The
ity for morality.
fear that,
we
if
divest this
representation of everything that can
commend
to the senses, it will thereupon be attended only with a cold and lifeless approbation and not with any moving force or emotion, is wholly unwarranted. The very reverse is the truth. For it
when nothing any longer meets the eye of sense, and the unmistakable and ineffaceable idea of morality
is left
in
possession of the
field,
there
would be need rather of tempering the ardour of an unbounded imagination to prevent it rising to enthusiasm, than of seeking to lend these ideas the aid of images and childish devices for fear of their being wanting in potency. For this reason, fully this
governments have gladly let religion be equipped with these accessories, seeking in
way
to relieve their subjects of the exertion,
but to deprive them, ability,
same time, of the
at the
required for expanding their spiritual
powers beyond the limits arbitrarily laid down for them, and which facilitate their being treated as though they were merely passive. This pure, elevating, merely negative presentation of morality involves, on the other hand, no fear of fanaticism, which is a delusion that would will some vision beyond all the bounds of sensibility ; i.e.. would dream according to principles (rational raving).
The safeguard
is
the
purely negative character of the presentation.
For the inscrutability of the idea of freedom all positive presentation. The moral law, however, is a sufficient and original source
precludes
of determination within us: so
moment permit
it
does not for a
us to cast about for a ground of
determination external to
enthusiasm is comparable to delirium, fanaticism may be compared to mania. Of these, the latter is least of all compatible with the sublime, for it is profoundly ridiculous. In enthusiasm, as an affection, the imagination is unbridled; in fanaticism, as a deep-seated, brooding passion, it is anomalous. The first is a transitory accident to which the healthiest understanding is liable to become at times the victim; the second is an undermining itself. If
disease.
Simplicity (artless finality) style
adopted by nature
that of morality.
The
in the
latter
is
is,
as
it
were, the
sublime. It
is
also
a second (super-
—
The delight in the subthan in the beautiful, by reason of its universal communicability not alone is plainly distinguished from other aesthetic judgements, One
further remark.
no
lime,
less
but also from this same property acquires an in(in which it admits of such
terest in society
communication). Yet, despite
this,
we have
to
note the fact that isolation from all society looked upon as something sublime, provided
is it
upon ideas which disregard all sensible interest. To be self-sufficing, and so not to stand in rests
need of society, yet without being unsociable, i.e., without shunning it, is something approaching the sublime a remark applicable to all superiority to wants. On the other hand, to shun our fellow men from misanthropy, because of enmity towards them, or from anthropophobia, because we imagine the hand of every man is
—
against us,
There
is
partly odious, partly contemptible.
however, a misanthropy (most improperly so called), the tendency towards which is to be found with advancing years in many rightis,
minded men,
that, as far as
good
will goes, is
no
doubt, philanthropic enough, but as the result of long and sad experience, is widely removed
from delight
in
mankind.
We
see evidences of
propensity to recluseness, in the fanciful desire for a retired country seat, or else (with the young) in the dream of the happiness this in the
of being able to spend one's life with a little
family on an island unknown to the rest of the world material of which novelists or writers of Robinsonades know how to make such good use. Falsehood, ingratitude, injustice, the pueril-
—
ity of the
ends which we ourselves look upon as
great and
momentous, and to compass which upon his brother man all imaginable evils these all so contradict the idea of what men might be if they only would, and are so at variance with our active wish to see them better, that, to avoid hating where we cannot love, it seems but a slight sacrifice to forego all the joys
man
inflicts
—
of fellowship with our kind. This sadness, which not directed to the evils which fate brings down upon others (a sadness which springs from is
sympathy ). hut to those which they inflict upon themselves (one which is based on antipathy in questions of principle), is sublime because it is founded on ideas, whereas that springing from
sympathy can only be accounted beautiful. Saswho was no less ingenious than profound,
sure,
in the description of his
Alpine travels remarks
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT Bonhomme, one
of
of the Savoy mountains:
511
empirical anthropology. But, besides that, there
no denying the fact that
representations
"There reigns there a certain insipid sadness."
is
He
within us, no matter whether they are objective-
is
recognized, therefore, that, besides this, there
an interesting sadness, such as
is
inspired
by
which men might fain withdraw themselves so as to hear no more of the world without, and be no longer versed in its affairs, a place, however, which must yet not be so altogether inhospitable as only to afford a most miserable retreat for a the sight of
some desolate place
into
being. I only make this observation as a reminder that even melancholy, (but not dispir-
human
ited sadness)
,
may
take
its
orous affections, provided ideas.
If,
however,
pathy, and, as such,
it is
the languid affections. tention to the mental first
case alone
is
is
place
it
has
among
its
the vig-
root in moral
grounded upon sym-
lovable,
And
it
belongs only to
this serves to call at-
temperament which
in the
sublime.
ly
merely sensible or wholly
of the sublime and beautiful
would bring
us.
Burke, 1 who deserves to be called the foremost author in this method of treatment, deduces, on these lines, "that the feeling of the sublime is
grounded on the impulse towards self-preservation and on fear, i.e., on a pain, which, since it
it is a modification of the subject, can be indifferent.) We must even admit that, as Epicurus maintained, gratification and pain though proceeding from the imagination or even
so far as
from representations of the understanding, are always in the
from any
last resort corporeal, since
feeling of the bodily organ life
or the reverse,
i.e., of the furtherance or hindrance of the vital forces. For, of itself alone,
mind
is all life
But
if
we
attribute the delight in the object
wholly and entirely to the gratification which it affords through charm or emotion, then we must not exact from any one else agreement with the aesthetic judgement passed by us. For, in such matters each person rightly consults his own personal feeling alone. But in that case there is an end of all censorship of taste unless the exam-
—
by others
held over us as principle
sort of delightful horror, a sort of tranquil-
ment
The
which he would
beautiful,
he grounds on love (from which, still, have desire kept separate), he reduces to "the relaxing, slackening, and enervating of the fibres of the body, and consequently a softening, a dissolving, a languor, and a fainting, dying, and melting away for pleasure." And this explanation he supports, not alone by instances in
which the feeling of the beautiful as well as of
the sublime
is
capable of being excited in us by
the imagination in conjunction with the understanding, but even by instances when it is in conjunction with sensations. As psychological observations, these analyses of our mental phe-
nomena
are extremely fine, and supply a wealth
of material for the favourite investigations of 1 See p. 223 of the German translation of his work: Philosophical Investigations as to the Origin of our Conceptions of the Beautiful and Sublime. Riga, published by Hartknock, 1773.
(the life-principle itself), and
hindrance or furtherance has to be sought outside it, and yet in the man himself consequently in the connection with his body.
whether fine or gross, of a dangerous and troublesome encumbrance, are capable of producing delight; not pleasure but a tinged with terror."
apart
would
be merely a consciousness of one's existence, and could not include any feeling of well-being
ple afforded
lity
still
however imperceptible either of these may be. (For these representations one and all have an influence on the feeling of life, and none of them,
does not go the length of disordering the bodily parts, calls forth movements which, as they clear the vessels,
intellectual, are
subjectively associable with gratification or pain,
the
The transcendental exposition of aesthetic judgements now brought to a close may be compared with the physiological, as worked out by Burke and many acute men among us, so that we may see where a merely empirical exposition
all
as the result of a contin-
gent coincidence of their judgements
commanding our
assent.
we would presumably
resent,
is
to be
But this and ap-
peal to our natural right of submitting a judgeto our own sense, where it rests upon the immediate feeling of personal well-being, in-
stead of submitting
it
to that of others.
Hence if the import of the judgement of taste, where we appraise it as a judgement entitled to require the concurrence of every one, cannot be
but must necessarily, from its inner nabe allowed a pluralistic validity, i.e., on account of what taste itself is, and not on account of the examples which others give of their taste, then it must found upon some a priori principle (be it subjective or objective), and no amount of prying into the empirical laws of the changes that go on within the mind can succeed in establishing such a principle. For these laws only yield a knowledge of how we do judge, but they do not give us a command as to how we ought to judge, and, what is more, such a command as is unconditioned and commands of this kind are presupposed by judgements of taste, inasmuch egoistic,
ture,
—
THE CRITIQUE
512
whether
as they require delight to be taken as immedi-
question suggests
ately connected with a representation. Accord-
the exposition of
ingly,
though the empirical exposition of aesjudgements may be a first step towards accumulating the material for a higher investigation, yet a transcendental examination of this faculty is possible, and forms an essential part of the Critique of Taste. For, were not taste in
judgement of
thetic
to give a deduction of its claim to
possession of a priori principles,
it
could not pos-
judgement upon the judgements of others and pass sentence of commendation or condemnation upon them, with even the least semblance of authority. sibly
in
sit
The remaining aesthetic
part of the Analytic of the
judgement contains
first
of
all
the:
Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgements The deduction of aesthetic judgements upon objects of nature must not be directed to what we call sublime in nature, but only to
§ 30.
this kind,
in addition to
thought in an aesthetic
is
we may be called upon some (subjec-
tive) a priori principle.
This we
may meet with
the reply that the sub-
improperly so called, and that sublimity should, in strictness, be attributed merely to the attitude of thought, or, rather, to that which serves as basis for this in human nature. The apprehension of an object otherwise formless and in conflict with ends supplies the mere occasion 1 for our coming to a consciouslime in nature
is
ness of this basis; and the object
put to a subjectively-final use, but
is in this
way
not
esti-
it is
mated as subjectively-final on its own account and because of its form. (It is, as it were, a species finalis accepta, non data.) Consequently the exposition we gave of judgements upon the sublime in nature was at the same time their deduc-
the beautiful
tion. For, in our analysis of the reflection on the part of judgement in this case, we found that in
The
such judgements there
claim of an aesthetic judgement to uni-
versal validity for every subject, being a judge-
ment which must
rely
on some a priori principle,
stands in need of a deduction of
itself,
what
its title).
(i.e.,
a derivation
Further, where the delight or aver-
sion turns on the
form of
the object this has to
is a final relation of the cognitive faculties, which has to be laid a priori at the basis of the faculty of ends (the will), and
which is therefore itself a priori final. This, then, at once involves the deduction, i.e., the justification of the claim of such a
judgement
to univer-
be something over and above the exposition of the judgement. Such is the case with judgements
sally-necessary validity.
of taste upon the beautiful in nature. For there
the deduction of judgements of taste,
foundation in the object and although it does not signify its outward form the reference of this to other objects according to concepts (for the purpose of cognitive judgements), but is merely concerned in general with
judgements upon the beauty of things of nature, and this will satisfactorily dispose of the problem for the entire aesthetic faculty of judgement.
the finality has
its
—
the apprehension of this
form so
proves accordant in the mind with the faculty of concepts as well as with that of their presentation (which is identical with that of apprehension).
With regard fore, we may
far as
it
to the beautiful in nature, therestart a
number
of questions touch-
ing the cause of this finality of their forms:
how we
are to explain
why
e.g.,
nature has scattered
beauty abroad with so lavish a hand, even in the depth of the ocean where it can but seldom be reached by the eye of man for which alone it is
final?
— nature—
But the sublime in if we pass upon it a pure aesthetic judgement unmixed with concepts of perfection, as objective finality, which would make the judgement teleological may be regarded as completely wanting in form or figure, and none the less be looked upon as an object of pure delight, and indicate a subjective finality of the given representation. So, now, the
—
Hence we may confine our search
§ 31.
Of the method of
to
one for i.e.,
of
the deduction of
judgements of
taste
The
obligation to furnish a deduction, i.e.. a guarantee of the legitimacy of judgements of a particular kind, only arises where the judgement lays claim to necessity. This
where
it
is the case even requires subjective universality, i.e.,
the concurrence of every one, albeit the judgement is not a cognitive judgement, but only one of pleasure or displeasure in a given object,
i.e.,
an assumption of a subjective finality that has a thoroughgoing validity for every one, and which, since the judgement is one of taste, is not to be grounded upon any concept of the thing.
Now. in the latter case, we are not dealing with a judgement of cognition neither with a theoretical one based on the concept of a nature in general, supplied by understanding, nor
—
net p.
518.]
— OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT with a (pure) practical one based on the idea of freedom, as given a priori by reason and so we are not called upon to justify a priori the valid-
—
judgement which represents either what a thing is, or that there is something which I ought to do in order to produce it. Consequently, if for judgement generally we demonstrate the universal validity of a singular judgement expressing the subjective finality of an empirical representation of the form of an object, we shall do all that is needed to explain how it is possible that something can please in the mere formation ity of a
(without sensation or concept), and how, just as the estimate of an object for the sake of a cognition generally has univer-
of an estimate of
it
for every other.
rule
of the subject passing judgement on the (in the given
feeling of pleasure tion),
i.e.,
upon
his
own
taste,
representa-
and yet
is
also not
from concepts; then it follows and such the judgement that such a judgement has a double and also logical of taste in fact is to be derived
—
—
peculiarity. For, first,
smell gives it,
it
but
it
it
gives another a headache.
we
has universal validity a
Now
what
suppose from this than that its beauty is to be taken for a property of the flower itself 2 which does not adapt itself to the diverelse are
to
heads and the individual senses of the
sity of
multitude, but to which they must adapt themselves, if they are going to pass it.
And
yet this
is
not the
For the judgement of
way
judgement upon
the matter stands.
taste consists precisely in
a thing being called beautiful solely in respect of that quality in which
of taking
it
adapts
itself to
our
mode
to
show
it in.
Besides, every judgement which
the taste of the individual,
Now if this universal validity is not to be based on a collection of votes and interrogation of others as to what sort of sensations they experience, but is to rest, as it were, upon an autonomy
own proper claim to the The agreeableness of its no claim at all. One man revels in
to repeating its
delight of everyone.
any one person may be
sal rules, the delight of
pronounced as a
mount
513
is
is
required to be an
independent judgement of the individual himself. There must be no need of groping about among other people's judgements and getting previous instruction from their delight in or aversion to the same object. Consequently his judgement should be given out a priori, and not
on the general pleasure a One would think, however, that a judgement a priori must involve as an imitation relying
thing gives as a matter of fact.
a concept of the object for the cognition of
which
ment
contains the principle. But the judge-
it
without having a logical universality according to concepts, but only the universality of a singular judgement. Secondly, it has a necessity (which must invariably rest upon a pri-
is not founded on concepts, and is no way a cognition, but only an aesthetic judgement.
one which depends upon no a
low himself to be dissuaded from the conviction
priori, yet
ori grounds), but
by the representation of which it would be competent to enforce the assent which the judgement of taste demands of every one.
priori proofs
The
solution of
these logical peculiarities,
which distinguish a judgement of taste from all cognitive judgements, will of itself suffice for a deduction of this strange faculty, provided we
from all content of the judgement, viz., from the feeling of pleasure, and merely compare the aesthetic form with the form of objective judgements as prescribed by logic. 1 We shall first try, with the help of exam-
abstract at the outset
ples, to illustrate istic
and bring out these character-
properties of taste.
§32. First peculiarity of the judgement of taste
The
judgement of
taste determines its object
beauty) with a claim to the agreement of every one, just as if in respect of delight (as a thing of
it
were objective. To say: "This flower 1
[Cf.p.476.]
of taste
in
Hence that his
beautiful,"
is
tanta-
poem
that a youthful poet refuses to al-
is
beautiful, either
by the judge-
And even if he lends them an ear, he does so, not because he has now come to a different judgement, but because, though the whole public, at least so far as his work is concerned, should have false taste, he still, in his desire for recognition, finds good reason to accommodate himself to the popular error (even against his own judgement). It is only in aftertime, when his judgement has been ment
of the public or of his friends.
sharpened by exercise, that of his own free will and accord he deserts his former judgements behaving in just the same way as with those of his judgements which depend wholly upon reason. Taste lays claim simply to autonomy. To make the judgements of others the determining ground of one's own would be heteronomy. The fact that we recommend the works of the ancients as models, and rightly too, and call their authors classical, as constituting a sort of
nobility is
it is
among
writers that leads the
way and
thereby gives laws to the people, seems to indi2
[Cf.pp. 480, 544.]
— THE CRITIQUE
5i4
cate a posteriori sources of taste and to contradict the
autonomy
of taste in each individual.
But we might just as well say that the ancient mathematicians, who, to this day, are looked upon as the almost indispensable models of perfect thoroughness and elegance in synthetic methods, prove that reason also is on our part only imitative, and that it is incompetent with the deepest intuition to produce of itself rigor-
ous proofs by means of the construction of concepts. There is no employment of our powers, no
matter how free, not even of reason itself (which must create all its judgements from the common a priori source), which, if each individual had always to start afresh with the crude his natural state, would not get itinvolved in blundering attempts, did not those of others lie before it as a warning. Not
equipment of self
that predecessors
make
those
who
follow in their
tion matters stand just as they would were that judgement simply subjective. If any one does not think a building, view, or
poem
beautiful, then, in the first place, he re-
inmost conviction goes, to allow approval to be wrung from him by a hundred voices all lauding it to the skies. Of course he may affect to be pleased with it, so as not to be considered as wanting in taste. He may even begin to harbour doubts as to whether he has formed his taste upon an acquaintance with a sufficient number of objects of a particular kind fuses, so far as his
(just as one
who
wood which every ,
one else regards as a town, becomes doubtful of the judgement of his own eyesight). But, for all that, he clearly perceives that the approval of others affords no valid proof, available for the
He recognizes that others, may see and observe for him, and what many have seen in one and the same
estimate of beauty.
perchance,
own, often better, course. Even in religion where undoubtedly every one has to derive his rule of conduct from himself, seeing that he himself remains responsible for it and, when he goes wrong, cannot shift the blame upon others
therefore logical, judgement, serve as an ade-
their
—
as teachers or leaders
—
general precepts learned
at the feet either of priests or philosophers, or
even drawn from ones' own resources, are never so efficacious as an example of virtue or holiness, which, historically portrayed, does not dispense with the autonomy of virtue drawn from the spontaneous and original idea of morality (a priori), or convert this into a mechanical process of imitation. Following which has reference to a precedent, and not imitation, is the proper expression for all influence which the products of an exemplary author may exert upon others and this means no more than going to the same sources for a creative work as those to which he went for his creations, and learning from one's predecessor no more than the mode of availing oneself of such sources. Taste, just because its judgement cannot be determined by concepts or precepts, is among all faculties and talents the very one that stands most in need of examples of what has in the course of culture maintained itself longest in esteem. Thus it avoids an early lapse into crudity and a return to the rudeness of
its earliest efforts.
§33. Second peculiarity of the judgement oj taste
Proofs are of no
avail
whatever for determin-
ing the judgement of taste, and in this connec-
\
in the distance recognizes, as
he believes, something as a
mere imitators, but by their methods they set others upon the track of seeking in themselves for the principles, and so of adopting steps
J
«
that
way may,
for the purpose of a theoretical,
and
quate ground of proof for him, albeit he believes he saw otherwise, but that what has pleased others can
never serve him as the ground of an
aesthetic judgement.
The judgement
where unfavourable
to
of others,
may, no doubt, rightly make us suspicious in respect of our own, but convince us that it is wrong it never can. Hence there is no empirical ground of proof that can coerce any one's judgement of taste. ours,
In the second place, a proof a priori according is still less capable of determining the judgement as to beauty. If any one reads me his poem, or brings me to a play, which, all to definite rules
and done,
said
fails to
commend
itself to
my
him adduce Batteux or Lessing, or still older and more famous critics of taste, with all the host of rules laid down by them, as a proof of the beauty of his poem; let certain passages particularly displeasing to me accord completely with the rules of beauty (as set out by taste,
then
let
these critics and universally recognized)
my
:
I stop
do not want to hear any reasons or any arguing about the matter. I would prefer to suppose that those rules of the critics were at ears: I
have no application, than to judgement to be determined by a priproofs. I take my stand on the ground that judgement is to be one of taste, and not one
fault, or at least
allow ori
my
my
of understanding or reason.
This would appear to be one of the chief reawhy this faculty of aesthetic judgement has been given the name of taste. For a man may recount to me all the ingredients of a dish, sons
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT and observe of each and every one of them that is
it
just
commend
am
what I like, and, in addition, rightly the wholesomeness of the food; yet I
these arguments. I try the dish tongue and palate, and I pass judgement according to their verdict (not according to universal principles). As a matter of fact, the judgement of taste is invariably laid down as a singular judgement upon the object. The understanding can, from
deaf to
with
all
my own
illustration,
515
by the
mutual subjective
analysis of examples, of their finality, the
form of which
in
a given representation has been shown above to the beauty of their object.
constitute
Hence
with regard to the representation whereby an object is given, the critique of taste itself is only subjective; viz.,
it is
the art or science of re-
ducing the mutual relation of the understanding and the imagination in the given representation (without reference to antecedent sensation or
the comparison of the object, in point of delight,
concept), consequently their accordance or dis-
with the judgements of others, form a universal judgement, e.g.: "All tulips are beautiful." But that judgement is then not one of taste, but is a logical judgement which converts the
with regard to their conditions. It is art if it only illustrates this by examples it is science if it de-
reference of an object to our taste into a predicate belonging to things of a certain kind. But it
only the judgement whereby I regard an individual given tulip as beautiful, i.e., regard my is
delight in
it
as of universal validity, that
judgement of
taste.
Its peculiarity,
consists in the fact, that, although
subjective validity,
still it
it
extends
is
a
however,
has merely
its
claims to
cordance, to rules, and of determining them
;
duces the possibility of such an estimate from the nature of these faculties as faculties of
knowledge
in general. It is only with the latter,
as trancendental critique, that
we have here any
concern. Its proper scope
the development
and
justification of the subjective principle of
taste, as
an
is
an a priori principle of judgement. As merely looks to the physiological
art, critique
(here psychological) and, consequently, empiri-
would if it were an objective judgement, resting on grounds of cognition and capable of being proved to
proceeds (passing by the question of their pos-
demonstration.
its
all
subjects, as unreservedly as
§ 34.
An
it
A
principle of taste would mean a fundamental premiss under the condition of which one might subsume the concept of an object, and then, by a syllogism, draw the inference that it is beautiful. That, however, is absolutely impossible. For I must feel the pleasure immediately in the representation of the object, and I cannot be talked into it by any grounds of proof.
Thus although critics, as Hume says, are able to reason more plausibly than cooks, they must still share the same fate. For the determining ground of their judgement they are not able to look to the force of demonstrations, but only to
upon
his
own
state
(of pleasure or displeasure), to the exclusion of
precepts and rules.
There is, however, a matter upon which it is competent for critics to exercise their subtlety, and upon which they ought to do so, so long as it tends to the rectification and extension of our judgements of taste. But that matter is not one of exhibiting the determining ground of aesthetic judgements of this kind in a universally appliwhich is impossible. Rather is cable formula
—
it
the investigation of the faculties of cognition
and their function
in these
sibility)
and seeks
objects.
The
which
to apply
in actual fact taste
them
latter critique
in estimating criticizes
the
products of fine art, just as the former does the faculty of estimating them.
objective principle of taste is not possible
the reflection of the subject
cal rules, according to
judgements, and the
§35. The principle of taste is the subjective principle of the general power of judgement
The
judgement of taste is differentiated from judgement by the fact that, whereas the latter subsumes a representation under a concept of the object, the judgement of taste does not subsume under a concept at all for, if it did, necessary and universal approval would be capable of being enforced by proofs. And yet logical
—
does bear this resemblance to the logical judgement, that it asserts a universality and necessity, not, however, according to concepts of the object, but a universality and necessity that are, consequently, merely subjective. Now the concepts in a judgement constitute its content (what belongs to the cognition of the obit
ject).
But the judgement of
taste is not deter-
minable by means of concepts. Hence it can only have its ground in the subjective formal condition of a judgement in general. The subjective condition of all judgements is the judging faculty itself, or judgement. Employed in respect of a representation whereby an object is given, this requires the harmonious accordance of two powers of representation. These are: the imagination (for the intuition and the
THE CRITIQUE
5 i6
arrangement of the manifold of intuition), and the understanding (for the concept as a representation of the unity of this arrangement). Now, since no concept of the object underlies the judgement here, it can consist only in the subsumption of the imagination itself (in the case of a representation whereby an object is
given) under the conditions enabling the under-
standing
general to advance from the intuiThat is to say, since the free-
in
ment
is
must
lie
schematizes without a concept, the
possible for judgements of this kind), but, even
it
judgement of taste must found upon a mere sensation of the mutually quickening activity of the imagination in its freedom, and of the understanding with its conformity to law. It must therefore rest upon a feeling that allows the object to be estimated by the finality of the representation (by which an object is given) for the furtherance of the cognitive faculties in their free play.
Taste, then, as a subjective
power of
judgement, contains a principle of subsumption, not of intuitions under concepts, but of the faculty of intuitions or presentations,
i.e.,
of the
imagination, under the faculty of concepts,
i.e.,
the understanding, so far as the former in its
dum
accords with the latter in
ity to laic.
its
conform-
1
as such,
it
requires a deduction to
how an
is concerned with the a priori principles of pure judgement in
i.e., not those in which (as judgements) it has merely to subsume under objective concepts of understanding, and in which it comes under a law, but rather those in which it is itself, subjectively, object
aesthetic judgements, in theoretical
as well as law.
We may also put the problem in this way: How a judgement possible which, going mereupon the
individual's
resentation of the
§ 36.
The problem of
judgements of taste
To form diately
I
a cognitive judgement we may immeounce with the- perception of an object t
the concept of an object in general, the empirical
predicates of which are contained in that perception. In this way, a judgement of experience
produced. Now this judgement rests on the foundation of a priori concepts of the synthetical unity of the- manifold of intuition, enabling
is
to be
thought as the determination of an ob-
These concepts (the- categories) call for a deduc tion, and SUCfa was supplied in the Critique of Pure Reason. That deduction enabled us to solve the problem: I low are synthetical a priori cognitive judgements possible? This problem had. accordingly, to do with the a priori principles of pure understanding and its theoretical ject.
judgements.
But we may 1
also
immediately connect with a
[Cf. pp. 471. 476. 495. 512.]
feeling of pleasure
same object
in
every other
in-
and does so a priori, i.e., without being allowed to wait and see if other people will be of the same mind? It is
a deduction of
own
an object independent of the concept of it, estimates this as a pleasure attached to the repin
dividual,
logical form.
intel-
possible? This problem, therefore,
judgements of this kind, and consequently the mere consideration of their of
it
aesthetic
avail ourselves of the guidance of the formal
peculiarities
make
judgement can lay claim to necessity. That, now, is what lies at the bottom of the problem upon which we are at present engaged, i.e.: How are judgements of taste ligible
ly
For the discovery of this title by means of a deduction of judgements of taste, we can only
it
a priori principle.
at its basis as its
of the imagination consists precisely in the
fact that
frei
and not cognitive. Now, if such a judgenot merely one of sensation, but a formal judgement of reflection that exacts this delight from everyone as necessary, something thetic
This principle may, indeed, be a mere subjective one (supposing an objective one should be im-
tion to concepts.
dom
perception a feeling of pleasure (or displeasure)
and a delight attending the representation of the object and serving it instead of a predicate. In this way there arises a judgement which is aes-
easy to see that judgements of taste are
synthetic, for they go
beyond the concept and even the intuition of the object, and join as predicate to that intuition something which is not even a cognition at all, namely, the feeling of pleasure (or displeasure). But, although the predicate (the personal pleasure that is connet ted with the representation) is empirical, still
we need not go further than what
is
involved
the expressions of their claim to see that, so far as concerns the agreement required of in
everyone, they are a priori judgements, or to pass for such.
mean
This problem of the Critique
of Judgement, therefore,
is
part of the general
problem of transcendental philosophy: How are synthetic a priori judgements possible? § 37.
What
exactly it is that is asserted a priori of an object in a judgement of taste
The immediate synthesis of the representation of an object with pleasure can only be a matter of internal perception, and, were noth-
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT would ing more only yield a mere empirical judgement. For with no representation can I a priori connect a deterthan this sought to be indicated,
minate feeling (of pleasure or displeasure) except where I rely upon the basis of an a priori principle in reason determining the will. The truth is that the pleasure (in the moral feeling) is the consequence of the determination of the will by the principle. It cannot, therefore, be compared with the pleasure in taste. For it requires a determinate concept of a law: whereas the pleasure in taste has to be connected immediately with the sample estimate prior to
concept. For the
ments of
same reason,
also, all
any
judge-
taste are singular judgements, for they
unite their predicate of delight, not to a concept, but to a given singular empirical representation.
Hence, in a judgement of taste, what is represented a priori as a universal rule for the judgement and as valid for everyone, is not the pleasure but the universal validity of this pleasure perceived, as it is, to be combined in the mind
with the mere estimate of an object. 1 A judgement to the effect that it is with pleasure that I perceive and estimate some object is an empiri-
judgement. But
cal
object beautiful,
asserts that I think the
if it
i.e.,
that I
may
delight to everyone as necessary,
attribute that it
is
then an
Deduction of judgements of taste
Admitting that in a pure judgement of taste Jhe delight in the object is connected with the mere estimate of its form, then what we feel to be associated in the mind with the representation of the object tive finality for
is
nothing else than
its
subjec-
judgement. Since, now, in re-
spect of the formal rules of estimating, apart
from all matter (whether sensation or concept), judgement can only be directed to the subjective conditions
of
its
employment
in
general
not restricted to the particular mode of sense nor to a particular concept of the understanding), and so can only be directed to that
(which
men
we may presuppose
in
(as requisite for a possible experience
generally),
it
representation
follows that the accordance of a
with
these
conditions
of
the
judgement must admit of being assumed valid a priori for
warranted
every one. In other words, we are from every one the pleas-
in exacting
ure or subjective finality of the representation in respect of the relation of the cognitive facul1
517
in the estimate of a sensible object
in general. 2
Remark
What makes
this deduction so easy is that it spared the necessity of having to justify the objective reality of a concept. For beauty is not
is
a concept of the object, and the judgement of taste
is
not a cognitive judgement. All that
holds out for
is
that
we
it
are justified in presup-
posing that the same subjective conditions of
judgement which we
find in ourselves are uni-
man, and further that subsumed the given object un-
versally present in every
we have
rightly
der these conditions.
The
no doubt, has which do not affect the logical judgement. (For there the subsumption is under concepts; whereas in the aesthetic judgement it is under a mere sensible relation of the imagination and understanding mutually harmonizing with one another in the represented form of the object, in which case the subsumption may easily prove fallacious.) But this in no way detracts from the legitimacy of the claim of the judgement to count upon universal agreement a claim which amounts to no latter,
to face unavoidable difficulties
—
more than
this:
the correctness of the principle
of judging validly for every one
upon subjective
grounds. For as to the difficulty and uncertainty
upon the legitimacy of the claim to this validity on the part of an aesthetic judgement generally, or, therefore, upon the principle itself, than the mistakes
(though not so often or easily
in-
curred), to which the subsumption of the logical
judgement under its principle is similarly liable, can render the latter principle, which is objective, open to doubt. But if the question were: How is it possible to assume a priori that nature a complex of objects of taste? the problem would then have reference to teleology, because it would have to be regarded as an end of na-
is
is
subjective factor which all
engaged
concerning the correctness of the subsumption under that principle, it no more casts a doubt
a priori judgement. § 38.
ties
[Cf. p. 482, et seq.]
2
In order to be justified in claiming universal agreefor an aesthetic judgement merely resting on subjective grounds, it is sufficient to assume: (1) that the subjective conditions of this faculty of aesthetic judgement are identical with all men in what concerns the relation of the cognitive faculties, there brought into action, with a view to a cognition in general. This must be true, as otherwise men would be incapable of communicating their representations or even their knowledge; (2) that the judgement has paid regard merely to this relation (consequently merely to the formal condition of the faculty of judgement), and is pure, i.e.. is free from confusion either with concepts of the object or sensations as determining grounds. If any mistake is made in this latter point, this only touches the incorrect application to a particular case of the right which a law gives us, and does not do away with the right generally.
ment
THE CRITIQUE
5i8 ture belonging essentially to
should exhibit forms that are
concept that
its
final for
it
our judge-
ment. But the correctness of this assumption may still be seriously questioned, while the actual existence of beauties of nature is patent to
every appropriate occasion to this moral birth-
we may
right,
still
demand
that delight
from
everyone; but we can do so only through the moral law, which, in its turn, rests upon concepts of reason.
The
experience.
pleasure in the beautiful
is,
on the other
hand, neither a pleasure of enjoyment nor of an § 39.
The communicabihty of vims,
a sensation
as the real in perception,
referred to knowledge,
is
activity according to law, nor yet
where
called organic sensa-
and its specific quality may be represented as completely communicable to others in a like mode, provided we assume that every one has a like sense to our own. This, however, is an absotion
lutely inadmissible presupposition in the case
Thus
of an organic sensation.
a person
who
is
without a sense of smell cannot have a sensation of this kind communicated to him, and, even if he does not suffer from this deficiency, we still cannot be certain that he gets precisely the same
we get from it. But more divergent must we consider men to be
sensation from a flower that still
in respect of the agreeableness or disagreeableness derived from the sensation of one and the same object of sense, and it is absolutely out of
the question to require that pleasure in such objects
should be acknowledged by every one.
Pleasure of this kind, since
mind through sense passive one
—our
—may be
it
enters into the
role, therefore,
being a
called the pleasure of en-
joyment.
On
one of a racontemplation according to ideas,
but rather of mere reflection. Without any guiding-line of
the
end or principle, this pleasure attends apprehension of an object by
ordinary
means
of the imagination, as the faculty of in-
tuition,
but with a reference to the understand-
ing as
faculty of concepts, and through the
operation of a process of judgement which has also to be invoked in order to obtain the com-
monest experience. In the
moral character is not a pleasure of enjoyment, but one of self-asserting activity and in this coming up to the idea of what it is meant to be. But this feeling, which is called the moral feeling, requires concepts and is the presits
entation of a finality, not free, but according to law. It. therefore, admits of communication
only through the instrumentality of reason and, if the pleasure is to be of the same kind for everyone, by means of very determinate practical concepts of reason.
The pleasure
in
the sublime in nature, as one
of rationalizing contemplation, lays claim also to universal participation, but
still
it
presup-
latter case,
however,
functions are directed to perceiving an empirical objective concept, whereas in the former its
(in the aesthetic mode of estimating) merely to perceiving the adequacy of the representation for engaging both faculties of knowledge in their
freedom in an harmonious (subjectively final) employment, i.e., to feeling with pleasure the subjective bearings of the representation. This pleasure must of necessity depend for every one
upon the same conditions, seeing that they are the subjective conditions of the possibility of a cognition in general, and the proportion of these cognitive faculties which
the other hand, delight in an action on the
score of
tionalizing
is
requisite for taste
requisite also for ordinary
sound understandpresence of which we are entitled to presuppose in every one. And, for this reason also, one who judges with taste (provided he does not make a mistake as to this consciousness, and does not take the matter for the form, or charm for beauty) can impute the subjective finality, is
ing, the
i.e., his delight in the object, to everyone else and suppose his feeling universally communicable, and that, too, without the mediation of
concepts. § 40.
Taste as a kind of sensus communis
The name
of sense
ment where what
is
often given to judge-
attracts attention
is
not so
poses another feeling, that, namely, of our su-
much
persensible sphere, which feeling, however ob-
speak of a sense of truth, of a sense of propriety,
scure
it
there
is
may
be, has a
moral foundation. But
absolutely no authority for
posing that others
will
pay attention
my
presup-
to this
and
take a delight in beholding the uncouth dimensions of nature (one that in truth cannot be
ascribed to
its
aspect, which
is
terrifying rather
than otherwise). Nevertheless, having regard to the fact that attention ought to be paid upon
its
reflective act as
or of justice, etc.
And
merely
its result.
So we
we know, enough to know, that a sense cannot be the true abode of these concepts, not to speak of its being competent, even in the slightest degree, to pronounce universal rules. yet, of course,
or at least ought well
On
the contrary,
we
tion of this kind, be ty,
recognize that a representa-
it of truth, propriety, beauor justice, could never enter our thoughts
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT were we not able to
raise ourselves
above the
level of the senses to that of higher faculties of
Common human understanding which mere sound (not yet cultivated) understanding, is looked upon as the least we can expect from any one claiming the name of man, has therefore the doubtful honour of having the name of common sense (sensus communis) bestowed upon it and bestowed, too, in an acceptation of the word common (not merely in our own language, where it actually has a double meaning, but also in many others) which makes it amount to what is vulgar what is everywhere to be met with a quality which by no means confers credit or distinction upon its cognition.
as
;
—
—
However, by the name sensus communis
is
to
be understood the idea of a public sense, i. e., a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account (a priori) of the
mode
of everyone else, in order, as
of representation
were, to weigh judgement with the collective reason of mankind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from subjective and personal conditions which could it
its
readily be taken for objective, an illusion that
would exert a prejudicial influence upon
its
judgement. This is accomplished by weighing the judgement, not so much with actual, as rather with the merely possible, judgements of others, and by putting ourselves in the position of everyone else, as the result of a mere abstraction
by
from the limitations which contingently
own
estimate. This, in turn,
is
effected
so far as possible letting go the element of
matter,
i.
e.,
sensation, in our general state of
representative activity, and confining attention to the formal peculiarities of our representation
or general state of representative activity. it
of a never-passive reason. To be given to such passivity, consequently to heteronomy of reason, is called prejudice; and the greatest of all prejudices is that of fancying nature not to be subject to rules which the understanding by
im
virtue of i.
e.,
tion this
its
own
essential laws lays at its basis,
superstition.
Emancipation from supersti-
enlightenment; 1 for although term applies also to emancipation from is
called
prejudices generally,
still superstition deserves pre-eminently (in sensu eminenti) to be called a prejudice. For the condition of blindness into which superstition puts one, which is as much
as
demands from one as an obligation, makes by others, and consequent-
the need of being led
ly the passive state of the reason, pre-eminently
possessor.
affect our
519
may seem
Now
that this operation of reflection
is
second maxim belonging we have quite got into the way of calling a man narrow (narrow, as opposed to being of enlarged mind) whose talconspicuous.
As
to the
to our habits of thought,
fall short of what is required for employment upon work of any magnitude (especially that involving intensity). But the question here
ents
is not one of the faculty of cognition, but of the mental habit of making a final use of it. This, however small the range and degree to which man's natural endowments extend, still indicates a man of enlarged mind: if he detaches himself
from the subjective personal conditions of
his
judgement, which cramp the minds of so many others, and reflects upon his own judgement from a universal standpoint (which he can only determine by shifting his ground to the standpoint of others). ly,
The
third
of consistent thought
—
maxim is
—
that,
name-
the hardest of at-
tainment, and is only attainable by the union of both the former, and after constant attention to them has made one at home in their observance.
We may
say:
The
first
of these
is
the
maxim
of
too artificial to be attributed to the faculty
understanding, the second that of judgement,
which we call common sense. But this is an appearance due only to its expression in abstract formulae. In itself nothing is more natural than
the third of that reason.
to abstract
from charm and emotion where one
looking for a judgement intended to serve as a universal rule. is
While the following maxims of common huunderstanding do not properly come in
man
here as constituent parts of the critique of taste, they may still serve to elucidate its fundamental
They are these: (i) to think for (2) to think from the standpoint of everyone else; (3) always to think consistently.
propositions. oneself;
The
first is
the
maxim
of unprejudiced thought,
the second that of enlarged thought, the third that of consistent thought.
The
first is
the
max-
I resume the thread of the discussion interrupted by the above digression, and I say that taste can with more justice be called a sensus communis than can sound understanding; and that the aesthetic, rather than the intellectual, 1 We readily see that enlightenment, while easy, no doubt, in thesi, in hypothesi is difficult and slow of realization. For not to be passive with one's reason, but always to be self-legislative, is doubtless quite an easy matter for a man who only desires to be adapted to his essential end, and does not seek to know what is beyond his understanding. But as the tendency in the latter direction is hardly avoidable, and others are always coming and promising with full assurance that they are able to satisfy one's curiosity, it must be very difficult to preserve or restore in the mind (and particularly in the public mind) that merely negative attitude (which constitutes enlightenment proper).
THE CRITIQUE
520
sense. 1
judgement can bear the name of a public i.
taking
e.,
we
that
it
are prepared to use the
word sense of an effect that mere reflection has upon the mind; for then by sense we mean the feeling of pleasure.
We
might even define taste what makes our
as the faculty of estimating feeling
a
in
given
representation
universally
communicable without the mediation of a con-
non
consequential which
valet
applied to
is
cognitive judgements, holds good here in the
case of aesthetic judgements.
Now
this
"some-
may
be something empirical, such as an inclination proper to the nature of human thing else"
beings, or it may be something intellectual, as a property of the will whereby it admits of rational determination a priori. Both of these in-
volve a delight in the existence of the object,
cept.
The aptitude
of
men
communicating their a relation between the
for
thoughts requires, also, imagination and the understanding, in order to
connect intuitions with concepts, and concepts, in turn, with intuitions, which both unite in cognition. But there the agreement of both mental
powers
according to law, and under the conOnly when the im-
is
straint of definite concepts.
agination in
its
freedom
stirs the
understanding,
and so can lay the foundation for an interest in what has already pleased of itself and without regard to any interest whatsoever.
The
empirical interest in the beautiful exists
only in society. pulse to society
And is
if
we admit
that the im-
natural to mankind, and that
the suitability for and the propensity towards it, i.e.,
sociability,
requirements of
is
a property essential to the
man
as a creature intended for
and the understanding apart from concepts puts
society,
and one, therefore, that belongs to hu-
the imagination into regular play, does the rep-
manity,
it is
communicate
resentation
not as thought,
itself
but as an internal feeling of a
final state of the
mind.
Taste
is,
therefore, the faculty of forming an
inevitable that
we should
also look
upon taste in the light of a faculty for estimating whatever enables us to communicate even our feeling to every one else, and hence as a means of promoting that upon which the natural
a priori estimate of the communicability of the
inclination of everyone
feeling that, without the mediation of a con-
With no one to take into account but himself, a man abandoned on a desert island would not adorn either himself or his hut, nor would he
cept, are connected with a given representation.
Supposing, now, that we could assume that
mere universal communicability of our feelmust of itself carry with it an interest for us (an assumption, however, which we are not entitled to draw as a conclusion from the character of a merely reflective judgement), we
is set.
the
look for flowers, and
ing
the object of providing himself with personal
should then be
in
§41. The empirical interest
Abundant show
how
a position to explain
judgement of taste comes acted from everyone as a sort of duty. feeling in the
the
to be ex-
in the beautiful 2
proof has been given above to
judgement of
still
them, with
less plant
adornments. Only in society does it occur to him to be not merely a man, but a man refined after the manner of his kind (the beginning of civilization)— for that
is the estimate formed has the bent and turn for communicating his pleasure to others, and who is not
of one
who
quite satisfied with an object unless his feeling of delight in it can be shared in communion with others. Further, a regard to universal
communi-
by which something is declared beautiful must have no interest as its determining ground. But it does not follow from this that, after it has once been
cability
posited as a pure aesthetic judgement, an inter-
charms, e. g., colours for painting oneself (roucou among the Caribs and cinnabar among the
that
the
taste
cannot then enter into combination with it. This combination, however, can never be anything but indirect. Taste must, that is to say, est
first
of
all
something reflection
be represented in conjunction with else,
if
the delight attending the
upon an object
further conjoined with
it
is
to
admit of having
a pleasure in the real
existence of the object las that wherein terest consists).
mere
For the saving,
a posse
all in-
ad esse
Taste may be designated m munis aesthcticus. common human understanding a sensus com1
munis 2
logicus.
[Cf. p. 510, et seq.]
which every one expects and requires from every one else, just as if it were part of an original compact dictated by humanity itself. And thus, no doubt, at first only is
a thing
Iroquois), or flowers, sea-shells, beautifully coloured feathers, then, in the course of time, also beautiful forms (as in canoes, wearing-apparel, etc.)
which convey no gratification,
of enjoyment,
become
of
moment
i.
e.,
delight
in society
and
attract a considerable interest. Eventually, when civilization has reached its height it makes this
work
of communication almost the main business of refined inclination, and the entire value of sensations is placed in the degree to which 3
[."From possibility to actuality."]
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT they permit of universal communication. At this stage, then, even where the pleasure which each
one has in an object
is
but insignificant and
possesses of itself no conspicuous interest, the idea of
its
indefinitely
still
universal communicability almost
augments
its
value.
This interest, indirectly attached to the beautiful by the inclination towards society, and, consequently, empirical, is, however, of no im-
we have what can have a bearing a priori, even though indirect, upon the judgement of taste. For, if even in this form an associated interest should betray itself, taste would then reveal a transition on the part of our critical faculty from the enjoyment of sense to the moral feeling. 1 This would not merely mean that we should be supplied with a more effectual guide for the final employment of taste, but taste would further be presented as a link in the chain of the human faculties a priori upon which all legislation must depend. This much may cerportance for us here. For that to which alone to look
is
tainly be said of the empirical interest in objects
of taste, and in taste itself, that as taste thus
may combine
521
with
it
will
hardly consort with
the moral, and certainly not on grounds of inner affinity.
Now
I willingly
admit that the interest
in the
beautiful of art (including under this heading the artificial use of natural beauties for personal
adornment, and so from vanity) gives no evidence at all of a habit of mind attached to the morally good, or even inclined that way. But, on the other hand, I do maintain that to take an immediate interest in the beauty of nature (not merely to have taste in estimating it) is always a mark of a good soul; and that, where this interest is habitual, it is at least indicative of a temper of mind favourable to the moral feeling that it should readily associate itself with the contemplation of nature. It must, however, be borne in mind that I mean to refer strictly to the beautiful forms of nature, and to put to one side the charms which she is wont so lavishly to
combine with them; because, though the interis no doubt immediate, it is never-
est in these
theless empirical.
One who alone (and without any
intention of
pays homage to inclination, however refined, such interest will nevertheless readily fuse also with all inclinations and passions, which in society attain to their greatest variety and highest
communicating
degree, and the interest in the beautiful,
even at the risk of some misadventure to himself so far from there being any prospect of advantage to him such a one takes an immediate, and in fact intellectual, interest in the beauty of nature. This means that he is not alone pleased with nature's product in respect of its form, but is also pleased at its existence, and is so without any charm of sense having a share in the matter, or without his associating with it any end whatsoever. In this connection, however, it is of note that were we to play a trick on our lover of the beautiful, and plant in the ground artificial flowers (which can be made so as to look just like natural ones), and perch artfully carved birds on the branches of trees, and he were to find out how he had been taken in, the immediate interest which these things previously had for him would at once vanish though, perhaps, a different interest might intervene in its stead, that, namely, of vanity in decorating his room with them for the eyes of others. The fact is that our intuition and reflection must have as their concomitant the thought that the beauty in question is nature's handiwork; and this is the sole basis of the immediate interest that is taken in it. Failing this, we are either left with a bare judgement of taste void of all interest
is
made
its
if
this
ground, can but afford a very am-
biguous transition from the agreeable to the good. We have reason, however, to inquire
whether this transition may not still in some way be furthered by means of taste when taken in its purity. § 42.
The
intellectual interest in the beautiful
It has been with the best intentions that those who love to see in the ultimate end of humanity,
namely the morally good, the goal of all activities to which men are impelled by the inner bent of their nature, have regarded it as a mark of a good moral character to take an interest in the beautiful generally. But they have, not without reason, been contradicted, by others, who ap-
peal to the fact of experience, that virtuosi in matters of taste, being not alone often,
but one might say as a general rule, vain, capricious, and addicted to injurious passions, could perhaps more rarely than others lay claim to any pre-eminent attachment to moral principles. And so it would seem, not only that the feeling for the beautiful
is
specifically different
from
the moral feeling (which as a matter of fact is the case), but also that the interest which we 1
[Cf. p. 548.]
his observations to others) re-
gards the beautiful form of a wild flower, a bird, an insect, or the like, out of admiration and love of them, and being loath to let in nature,
—
—
—
them escape him
THE CRITIQUE
522
whatever, or else only with one that is combined with an interest that is mediate, involving,
delight (a delight
namely, a reference to society; which latter affords no reliable indication of morally good
it
habits of thought.
part of nature of
The
superiority which
over that of
art,
natural
even where
it
beauty has excelled
is
by
the latter in point of form, in yet being alone
awaken an immediate interest, accords and well-grounded habits of
able to
with the refined
thought of all men moral feeling. If a
who have man with
cultivated their taste
enough to
judge of works of fine art with the greatest correctness and refinement readily quits the room in which he meets with those beauties that minvanity
ister to
or, at least, social joys,
and be-
which we cognize a priori as
a law for every one without being able to ground
upon proofs). That being
reason must
so,
take an interest in every manifestation on the
some such accordance. Hence mind cannot reflect on the beauty of nature without at the same time finding its interest engaged. But this interest is akin to the moral. the
who
One, then,
takes such an interest in the
beautiful in nature can only do so in so far
deep in the morally good. On these grounds we have reason for presuming the presence of at least the germ of a good moral disas he has previously set his interest
foundations
of
the
man
position in the case of a
beauty of nature
is
to
whom
the
a matter of immediate in-
takes himself to the beautiful in nature, so that may there find as it were a feast for his soul
terest.
a train of thought which he can never completely evolve, we will then regard this his
aesthetic judgements on the basis of kinship
he in
choice even with veneration, and give
him
credit
which no connoisseur or art collector can lay claim on the score of the interest which his objects have for him. Here, now, are two kinds of objects which in the judgement of mere taste could scarcely contend with one another for a superiority. What then, for a beautiful soul, to
is
the distinction that
makes us hold them
in
such different esteem?
We have a faculty of judgement which is merely aesthetic a faculty of judging of forms without the aid of concepts, and of finding, in the mere estimate of them, a delight that we at the same time make into a rule for every one, without this judgement being founded on an interest, or yet producing one. On the other hand, we have also a faculty of intellectual judgement for the mere forms of practical maxims (so far as they are of themselves qualified for universal a faculty of determining an a legislation) priori delight, which we make into a law for everyone, without our judgement being founded on any interest, though here it produces one. The pleasure or displeasure in the former judge-
—
—
ment
called that of taste; the latter
is
is
called
is
further interested in ideas
(for which in our moral feeling
it
brings about
an immediate interest), having also objective reality.
1
That
is
to say,
it
is
of interest to rea-
son that nature should at least show a trace or give a hint that it contains in itself some ground or other 2 for assuming a uniform accordance of
its i
2
will
be said that this interpretation of
with our moral feeling has far too studied an
appearance to be accepted as the true construction of the cypher in which nature speaks to us figuratively in its beautiful forms. But, first of all,
this
ture
is
immediate interest
not in fact
common.
products with our wholly disinterested
[Cf. pp. 517, 528, 546; also p. 496.] [Cf. p. 548.]
in the
beauty of na-
It is peculiar to those
whose habits of thought are already trained to the good or else are eminently susceptible of such training; and under the circumstances the analogy 3 in which the pure judgement of taste that, without relying upon any interest, gives us a feeling of delight, and at the same time represents it a priori as proper to mankind in general, stands to the moral judgement that does just the same from concepts, is one which, without any clear, subtle, and deliberate reflection, conduces to a like immediate interest being taken in the objects of the former judgement as in those of the latter with this one
—
difference, that the interest in the first case is free, while in the latter
one founded on obis our admiration of Nature, which in her beautiful products displays herself as art, not as mere matter it is
jective laws. In addition to this, there
of chance, but, as
it
were, designedly, according
to a law-directed arrangement,
apart from any end.
that of the moral feeling.
But, now, reason
It
and as
such an end outside ourselves, look for
it
finality
As we never meet with
in ourselves, and,
we
naturally
in fact, in that
which constitutes the ultimate end of our existence the moral side of our being. (The inquiry into the ground of the possibility of such a natural finality will, however, first come un-
—
der discussion in the Teleology.) The fact that the delight in beautiful art does not, in the pure judgement of taste, involve an 3
[Cf. pp. 547, 548.]
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT immediate
may
nature,
mer
is
as does that in beautiful
interest,
be readily explained. For the for-
either such an imitation of the latter as
goes the length of deceiving us, in which case
upon us
acts
it
in
the character of a natural
we take
beauty, which
it
to be; or else
it is
an
523
to enjoy the country air, their
and has done so to
huge satisfaction, by hiding
in a thicket
who (with a reed or mouth) knew how to reproduce this
a rogue of a youth
rush in
his
note so
as to hit off nature to perfection.
stant one realizes that
is all
it
endure listening to
But the
in-
a fraud no one
intentional art obviously directed to our delight.
will long
In the latter case, however, the delight in the product would, it is true, be brought about im-
was regarded as so attractive. And it is just the same with the song of any other bird. It must be nature, or be mistaken by us for nature, to enable us to take an immediate interest in the beautiful as such; and this is all the more so if we can even call upon others to take a similar interest. And such a demand we do in fact make, since we regard as coarse and low the habits of thought of those who have no
mediately by taste, but there would be nothing but a mediate interest in the cause that lay beneath an interest, namely, in an art only
—
capable of interesting by
its
end, and never in
perhaps, be said that this
itself. It will,
also
is
the case where an object of nature only inter-
by its beauty so far as a moral idea is brought into partnership therewith. But it is not the object that is of immediate interest, but rather the inherent character of the beauty qualifying it for such a partnership a character, therefore, that belongs to the very essence ests
—
this
song that be-
fore
nature
for beautiful
feeling
word we use
(for
this
is
the
for susceptibility to an interest in
the contemplation of beautiful nature), and
who devote themselves
to the
mere enjoyments
of sense found in eating and drinking.
of beauty. § 43.
The charms
in natural beauty, 1 which are found blended, as it were, so frequently with beauty of form, belong either to the modifications of light (in colouring) or of sound (in tones). For these are the only sensations which permit not merely of a feeling of the senses, but also of reflection upon the form of these modifications of sense, and so embody as it were a language in which nature speaks to us and which has the semblance of a higher meaning. Thus the white colour of the lily seems to dispose the mind to ideas of innocence, and the other seven colours, following the series from
to be
Art
Art in general
from nature as makfrom acting or operating in general (agere). and the product or the result of the former is distinguished from that of the latter as work (opus) from operation (effectus). (1.)
ing (facere)
By dom,
right i.e.,
distinguished
is
is
it is only production through freethrough an act of will that places
reason at the basis of
its
action, that should be
termed art. For, although we are pleased to call what bees produce (their regularly constituted cells) a work of art, we only do so on the strength of an analogy with art; that
is
the red to the violet, similarly to ideas of (i)
as soon as
sublimity, (2) courage, (3) candour, (4) ami(5) modesty, (6) constancy, (7) tenderness. The bird's song tells of joyousness and
eration forms the basis of their labour,
ability,
contentment with interpret nature
or not.
But
its
existence.
—whether such
it is
At
least so
be
its
purpose
the indispensable requisite of
the interest which
we here take
in beauty, that
the beauty should be that of nature, and ishes completely as soon as
we
of having been deceived, and that
work
—
we
so completely that
it
van-
are conscious it is
only the
even taste can then no longer find in it anything beautiful nor sight anything attractive. What do poets set more store on than the nightingale's bewitching and beautiful note, in a lonely thicket on a still summer evening by the soft light of the moon? And yet we have instances of how, where no such songster was to be found, a jovial host has played a trick on the guests with him on a visit 1
of art
[Cf. p. 521, et seq.]
we
once that
at
it is
and
instinct),
we
call to
ascribe
it
it
mind
to say,
that no rational delib-
we say
a product of their nature (of is
only to their Creator that
as art.
sometimes happens, in a search through light on a piece of hewn wood, we do not say it is a product of nature but of art. Its producing cause had an end in view to which the object owes its form. Apart from such cases, we recognize an art in everything formed in such a way that its actuality must have been preceded by a representation of the thing in its cause (as even in the case of the bees), although the effect could not have been thought by the cause. But where anything is called absolutely a work of art, to distinguish it from a natural If, as
a bog,
we
product,
then some work of
man
is
always
understood. (2.) Art, as
from science
human
skill, is
(as ability
distinguished also
from knowledge) as ,
a
THE CRITIQUE
5 24
from a theoretical faculty, as technic from theory (as the art of surveying from geometry). For this reason, also, what one can do the moment one only knows what is to be done, hence without anything more than sufficient knowledge of the desired result, is not practical
To
called art.
art that alone belongs for
which
the possession of the most complete knowledge
does not involve one's having then and there the skill to do it. Camper 1 describes very exactly how the best shoe must be made, but he. doubtless, was not able to turn one out himself. 2
The
is
further distinguished from handi-
first is
called free, the other
called industrial art.
We
may
be
look on the former as
something which could only prove final (be a success) as play, i.e., an occupation which is agreeable on its own account; but on the second as labour, i.e.. a business, which on its own account is disagreeable (drudgery), and is only attractive by means of what it results in (e.g., the pay), and which is consequently capable of being a compulsory imposition. Whether in the list of arts and crafts we are to rank watchmakers as artists, and smiths on the contrary craftsmen, requires a standpoint different
as
There a
from that here adopted
—
one, that
is
to say,
taking account of the proposition of the talents
which the business undertaken in either case must necessarily involve. Whether, also, among the so-called seven free arts some may not have been included which should be reckoned as sciences, and many, too, that resemble handi-
is
critique.
Fine art
no science of the beautiful, but only Nor, again, is there an elegant
(schöne) science, but only a fine (schöne)
art.
For a science of the beautiful would have to determine scientifically, i.e., by means of proofs, whether a thing was to be considered beautiful or not; and the judgement upon beauty, consequently, would,
if
belonging to science,
fail
to
be a judgement of taste. As for a beautiful science a science which, as such, is to be beau-
—
tiful,
(3.) Art craft.
§ 44.
a nonentity. For
is
we were we would be put science,
What
mots).
off
this,
it
as a
and proofs,
with elegant phrases (bons
has given rise to the current ex-
pression elegant sciences
than
treating
if,
to ask for reasons
that
common
is,
doubtless, no
more
observation has, quite
accurately, noted the fact that for fine art, in the fulness of
science
is
its
perfection, a large store of
required, as, for example, knowledge
of ancient languages, acquaintance with classical authors, history, antiquarian learning, etc.
Hence these
sciences, owing to the form the necessary preparation and groundwork for fine art, and partly also owing to the fact that they are taken to comprise even the knowledge of the products of fine art (rhetoric and poetry), have by a conhistorical
fact that they
fusion of words, actually got the
name
of ele-
gant sciences.
Where
this: that in all free arts
something of a com-
merely seeking to actualize a poswhich it is adequate, does whatever acts are required for that purpose, then it is mechanical. But should the feeling of pleasure be what it has immediately in view, it is then termed aesthetic art. As such
pulsory character
required, or, as
it
craft,
a matter I will not discuss here. It
is
is
not amiss, however, to remind the reader of
is
still
it
is
mechanism, without which the soul, which in art must be free, and which alone gives life to the work, would be bodyless and evanescent (e.g., in the poetic art there must be correctness and wealth of language, likewise prosody and metre). For not a few leaders of a newer school 3 believe that the best way to promote a free art is to sweep away all restraint and convert it from labour into mere play.
called, a
1
[Peter
scientist,
Camper (1722-89),
and author
a
of anatomical
Dutch physician and and medical works.
|
In my part of the country, if you set a common man a problem like that of Columbus and hi.- egg, he says, "There is no art in that, it i> only science": i.e. you can do it if you know /tow; and he says just the same of all the would-be arts of jugglers. To that of the tight-rope dancer, on the other hand, he has not the least compunction in giving the name of art. 3 [Cf. pp. 525; 5 26, et seq.; 531. et seq.; 538, et seq.] 2
art,
sible object to the cognition of
may
be either agreeable or fine
scription "agreeable art" applies of the art
is
art.
The
de-
where the end
that the pleasure should
accompany
the representations considered as mere sensations, the description "fine art" where it is to
accompany them considered
as
modes
of cog-
nition.
Agreeable arts are those which have mere enjoyment for their object. Such are all the charms that can gratify a dinner party: entertaining narrative, the art of starting the whole table in unrestrained and sprightly conversa-
with jest and laughter inducing a cerof gaiety. Here, as the saying goes, there may be much loose talk over the glasses, without a person wishing to be brought to book
tion, or
tain air
for
all
he utters, because
the entertainment of the lasting matter to
it is
only given out for
moment, and not as a be made the subject of reflec-
—a OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT (Of the same sort is also the enjoyment, or, at large banquets, the music of the orchestra quaint idea intended to act on the mind merely as an agreeable noise fostering a genial spirit, which, without any one paying the smallest attention to the composition, promotes the free flow of conversation between guest and guest.) In addition must be included play of every kind which is attended with no further interest than that of making the time pass by unheeded. Fine art, on the other hand, is a mode of representation which is intrinsically final, and which, although devoid of an end, has the effect of advancing the culture of the mental powers in the interests of social communication. The universal communicability of a pleasure involves in its very concept that the pleasure is not one of enjoyment arising out of mere sensation, but must be one of reflection. Hence aesthetic art, as art which is beautiful, is one having for its standard the reflective judgement and not organic sensation.
525
by means of a concept. But in both cases mere estimate i.e., not as fine art, but rather as mechan-
tion or repetition.
please
art of arranging the table for
the art would please, not in the
—
of
it,
ical art.
Hence
the finality in the product of fine art,
it be, must not have the appearance of being intentional; i.e., fine art must be clothed with the aspect of nature, although we recognize it to be art. But the way in which a product of art seems like nature is by the presence of perfect exactness in the agreement with rules prescribing how alone the product can be what it is intended to be, but with an absence of laboured effect (without academic form betraying itself), i.e., without a trace appearing of the artist having always had the
intentional though
his
Fine art
is
A
product of fine art must be recognized to be art and not nature. Nevertheless the finality in its form must appear just as free from the constraint of arbitrary rules as if it were a product of mere nature. Upon this feeling of freedom in the play of our cognitive faculties which play has at the same time to be final rests that pleasure which alone is universally communicable without being based on concepts. Nature proved beautiful when it wore the appearance of art; and art can only be termed beautiful, where we are conscious of its being art, while yet it has the appearance of nature. For, whether we are dealing with beauty of nature or beauty of art, we may make the uni-
—
That is beautiful which mere estimate of it (not in sensation or by means of a concept). Now art has versal
statement:
pleases in the
always got a definite intention of producing something. 1 Were this "something," however, to be mere sensation (something merely subjective), intended to be accompanied with pleasure, then such product would, in our estimation of it, only please through the agency of the feeling of the senses.
On
the other hand,
were the intention one directed to the production of a definite object, then, supposing this
were attained by
art,,
the object
would only
1 [Cf. pp. 526, 527, 528, 530, 532, et seq.; 546, et seq.; 549, et seq.]
of
having fettered
its
mental powers. § 46. Fine art
is
the art of genius
Genius is the talent (natural endowment) which gives the rule to art. Since talent, as an innate productive faculty of the artist, belongs itself to nature,
an art, so far as it has at the same time the appearance of being nature
§ 45.
him and
rule present to
the
is
innate
we may put it this way: Genius mental aptitude (ingenium)
through which nature gives the rule to art. Whatever may be the merits of this definition, and whether it is merely arbitrary, or whether it is adequate or not to the concept usually associated with the word genius (a point which the following sections have to clear up), it
may
still
be shown at the outset that, accord-
ing to this acceptation of the word, fine arts
must necessarily be regarded as arts of genius. For every art presupposes rules which are laid down as the foundation which first enables a product,
if it is
to be called
one of
art, to
The concept
represented as possible.
of
be
fine
art, however, does not permit of the judgement upon the beauty of its product being derived from any rule that has a concept for its determining ground, and that depends, consequently,
on a concept of the way possible. Consequently
which the product cannot of its own self excogitate the rule according to which it is to effectuate its product. But since, for all that, a product can never be called art unless in
fine art
is
there
is
a preceding rule,
it
follows that nature
in the individual
(and by virtue of the harmony
of his faculties)
must give the
rule to art,
i.e.,
only possible as a product of genius. From this it may be seen that genius (1) is a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given, 2 and not an aptitude in the fine art is
way 2
of cleverness for what can be learned ac-
[Cf. pp. 530, 543, et seq.]
THE CRITIQUE
526
and that consequently primary property. (2)
cording to some rule;
must be
originality
its
may also be original nonsense, its products must at the same time be models, i.e.. be exemplary; and. consequently, though not themselves derived from imitation, they must serve that purpose for others, i.e., as a standard Since there
Newton had to take from the first elements of geometry to his greatest and most profound discoveries were such as he could steps that
make
intuitively evident
and plain
to
follow,
not only for himself but for every one else. On the other hand, no Homer or Wieland can show
how
his ideas, so rich at
once in fancy and
in
cannot indicate (3) scientifically how it brings about its product, but rather gives the rule as nature. Hence, where an author owes a product to his genius,
thought, enter and assemble themselves in his
he does not himself know how the ideas for it have entered into his head, nor has he it in his power to invent the like at pleasure, or methodi-
differs
or rule of estimating.
It
and communicate the same to others
cally,
in
such precepts as would put them in a position to produce similar products. (Hence, presumderived from genius, and guiding spirit given to a man at his birth, by the inspiration of which those original ideas were obtained.) (4) Nature prescribes the rule through genius not to science but to art, and this also only in so
word Genie
ably, our
is
as the peculiar guardian
far as
it is
be
to
fine art.
1
good reason that he does not himknow, and so cannot teach others. In mat-
brain, for the self
ters of science, therefore, the greatest inventor
only in degree from the most laborious
and apprentice, whereas he differs from one endowed by nature for fine art. No disparagement, however, of those great men, to whom the human race is so deeply indebted, is involved in this comparison of them with those who on the score of their talent imitator
specifically
for fine art are the elect of nature.
science
for
is
vances of greater perfection in knowledge, with its dependent practical advantages, as also for imparting the same to others. Hence sciencan boast a ground of considerable superi-
tists
and confirmation of the
above explanation of genius
Every one
is
agreed on the point of the com-
plete opposition
between genius and the
Now
of imitation.
since learning
is
spirit
nothing but
imitation, the greatest ability, or aptness as a
pupil (capacity), to genius.
is still,
Even though
as such, not equivalent
a
man weaves
his
own
thoughts or fancies, instead of merely taking in what others have thought, and even though
he go so far as to bring fresh gains to art and science, this does not afford a valid reason for calling such a man of brains, and often great brains, a genius, in contradistinction to one
who
name of shallow-pate, because he can never do more than merely learn and follow a lead. For what is accomplished in this way
goes by the
something that
is
Hence
it
all lies in
could
have been learned.
the natural path of investi-
gation and reflection according to rules, and so
not specifically distinguishable
is
may
be
acquired
as
the
result
from what of
industry
backed up by imitation. So all that Newton has set forth in his immortal work on the Principles of Natural Philosophy may well be learned, however great a mind it took to find it all
we cannot learn to write in a no matter how complete all the
out, but
poetic vein,
cepts of the poetic art cellent its models. 1
[Cf. pp. 490, 527.]
may
be, or
The reason
is
true pre-
however exthat all the
talent
all
ority over those § 47. Elucidation
The
formed for the continued ad-
who merit
the honour of being
called geniuses, since genius reaches a point at
which art must make a halt, as there is a limit imposed upon it which it cannot transcend. This limit has in all probability been long since attained. In addition, such skill cannot be
com-
municated, but requires to be bestowed directly from the hand of nature upon each individual, and so with him it dies, awaiting the day when nature once again endows another in the same way one who needs no more than an example
—
to set the talent of
work on
which he
Seeing, then, that the natural art
conscious
at
endowment
of
is
similar lines.
(as fine art)
must furnish the
rule,
what
kind of rule must this be? It cannot be one set
—
down in a formula and serving as a precept for then the judgement upon the beautiful would be determinable according to concepts. Rather must the ance, 2
i.e.,
from the performfrom the product, which others may
rule be gathered
own talent to the test, so as to serve as a model, not for imitation, but for following. The possibility of this is difficult to use to put their let it
The artist's ideas arouse like ideas on the part of his pupil, presuming nature to have
explain.
visited him with a like proportion of the mental powers. For this reason, the models of fine art are the only means of handing down this art to posterity. This is something which cannot be done by mere descriptions (especially not in 2
[Cf. p. 548, et seq.]
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT the line of the arts of speech), and in these arts,
If
we
527
consider genius as the talent for fine
word from this which must con-
only those models can become classical of which the ancient, dead languages,
art (which the proper signification of the
preserved as learned, are the medium.
point of view into the faculties
Despite the marked difference that distinguishes mechanical art, as an art merely depending upon industry and learning, from fine art, as that of genius, there is still no fine art
cur to constitute such a talent,
furthermore,
imports), and
if
we would
analyse
it
it is
imperative
determine the difference between beauty of nature, which it only requires taste to estimate, and beauty of art, at the outset accurately to
which something mechanical, capable of becomprehended and followed in obeand consequently something rules, to dience
which requires genius for its possibility (a possibility to which regard must also be paid in
academic, does not constitute the essential condition of the art. For the thought of something as end must be present, or else its product would not be ascribed to an art at all, but would be
A beauty of nature is a beautiful thing; beauty of art is a beautiful representation of a
But the effectuation of an end necessitates determinate rules which
as such, I
in
ing at once
a
mere product
of chance.
we cannot venture
to dispense with.
ing that originality of talent
is
Now,
see-
one (though
not the sole) essential factor that goes to make up the character of genius, shallow minds fancy
estimating such an object).
thing.
me to estimate a beauty of nature, do not need to be previously possessed of a concept of what sort of a thing the To
enable
object to
intended to be,
is
know
its
i.e.,
I
am
not obliged
material finality (the end), but,
that the best evidence they can give of their being full-blown geniuses is by emancipating
rather, in forming an estimate of it apart from any knowledge of the end, the mere form pleases on its own account. If, however, the object is presented as a product of art, and is
themselves from
as such to be declared beautiful, then, seeing
academic constraint of rules, one cuts a finer figure on the back of an ill-tempered than of a trained horse. Genius can do no more than furnish rich material for products of fine art; its elaboration and its form require a talent academically trained, so that it may be employed in such a way as to stand the test of judgement. But, for a person all
in the belief that
to hold forth and pass sentence like a genius in matters that fall to the province of the most
patient rational investigation,
the extreme. 1 to laugh
One more at
is
is
ridiculous in
know whether who envelops which we are given
at a loss to
the impostor
—
himself in such a cloud in fuller scope to our imagination at the expense
—
or at the of all use of our critical faculty simple-minded public which imagines that its inability clearly to cognize and comprehend this masterpiece of penetration is due to its being invaded by new truths en masse, in comparison with which, detail, due to carefully weighed exposition and an academic examination of rootprinciples, seems to it only the work of a tyro. § 48.
The
relation of genius to taste
For estimating what
is
required
is
beautiful
objects,
as
taste; but for fine art,
such,
i.e.,
the
production of such objects, one needs genius. 2 1 [In the Critique of Practical Reason, p. 361, Kant spoke of "the extravagances of genius, by which, as by the adepts of the philosopher's stone, without any methodical study or knowledge of nature, visionary treasures are promised and the true are thrown away."] 2 [Cf. pp. 491, 548.]
that art always presupposes an end in the cause
(and its causality), a concept of what the thing intended to be must first of all be laid at its basis. And, since the agreement of the manifold in a thing with an inner character belonging to it as its end constitutes the perfection of the thing, it follows that in estimating beauty of art the perfection of the thing must be also taken into account a matter which in estimating a beauty of nature, as beautiful, is quite irrevelant. It is true that in forming an estimate, especially of animate objects of nature, e.g., of is
—
man or a horse, objective finality is also commonly taken into account with a view to judgement upon their beauty; but then the judgement also ceases to be purely aesthetic, i.e., a mere judgement of taste. Nature is no longer a
estimated as
appears like
art, but rather in so though superhuman art; and the teleological judgement serves as a basis and condition of the aesthetic, and one which the latter must regard. In such a case, where one says, for example, "That is a beautiful woman," what one in fact thinks is only this, that in her form nature excellently portrays the ends present in the female figure. For one has to extend one's view beyond the mere form to a concept, to enable the object to be thought in such manner by means of an aesthetic judgement logically
far as
it
it
actually
is art,
conditioned.
Where
fine art
evidences
the beautiful descriptions
it
its
superiority
is in
gives of things that
THE CRITIQUE
528 in nature
be ugly or displeasing. 1
would
The
Furies, diseases, devastations of war, and the
can (as evils) be very beautifully described, in pictures. One kind of ugliness alone is incapable of being represented
like,
nay even represented
that table appointments, or even a moral dissertation, and, indeed, a sermon, must bear this form of fine art, yet without its ap-
we demand
pearing studied. But one would not call them on this account works of fine art. A poem, a
all
musical composition, a picture-gallery, and so
and consequently artistic beauty, namely, that which excites disgust. For, as in this strange sensation, which depends purely on
forth, would, however, be placed under this head; and so in a would-be work of fine art we may frequently recognize genius without
conformably
to
nature without destroying
aesthetic delight,
the imagination, the object sisting, as
it
is
represented as in-
were, upon our enjoying
it,
our face against it, the artificial representation of the object is no longer distinguishable from the nature of the object itself in our sensation, and so it cannot possibly be regarded still
and
§ 49.
in
another taste without genius.
The
faculties of the
set
as beautiful. in
taste,
we
while
its
nature, direct
The
art of sculpture, again, since
products art has
is
excluded
almost confused with
from
its
creations
the
representation of ugly objects, and, inthe repre-
stead, only sanctions, for example,
sentation of death (in a beautiful genius), or
by means of an which wear a pleasant
mind which
constitute genius
Of
products
certain
which
expected,
are
partly at least, to stand on the footing of fine art,
we say they
we
find nothing to censure in
are soulless; and this, although
them
as far as
A poem may be very pretty and elegant, but is soulless. A narrative has precision and method, but is soulless. A speech on taste goes.
some
festive occasion
may be good in substance may be soulless. Conver-
of the warlike spirit (in Mars),
and ornate withal, but
allegory, or attributes
sation frequently is not devoid of entertainment, but yet soulless. Even of a woman we
and so only indirectly, through an interpretation on the part of reason, and not for the pure aesthetic judgement. So much for the beautiful representation of an object, which is properly only the form of the presentation of a concept and the means by which the latter is universally communicated. To give this form, however, to the product of fine art, taste merely is required. By this the artist, having practised and corrected his taste by a variety of examples from nature or art, controls his work and, after many, and often laborious, attempts to satisfy taste, finds the form which commends itself to him. Hence this form is not, as it were, a matter of inspiration, or of a free swing of the mental powers, but rather of a slow and even painful process of improvement, directed to making the form adequate to his thought without prejudice to th( freedom in the play of those powers. Taste is, however, merely a critical, not a productive faculty; and what conforms to it is not, merely on that account, a work of fine art. It may belong to useful and mechanical art, or even to science, as a product following definite rules which are capable of being learned and which must be closely followed. But the pleasing form imparted to the work is only the vehicle of communication and a mode, as it were, of execution, in respect of which one remains to a certain extent free, notwithstanding being otherwise tied down to a definite end. So guise,
1
[Cf. Aristotle's Poetics, Iv; and Rhetoric,
I,
xi.]
may
well say, she
but soulless.
is
Now
pretty, affable, and refined, what do we here mean by
"soul"?
Soul (Geist) in an aesthetical sense,
signifies
the animating principle in the mind. But that
whereby
this principle
animates the psychic sub-
— the material which employs that purpose — that which the mental
stance (Seele) for
it
sets
is
powers into a swing that is final, i.e., into play which is self-maintaining and which
a
strengthens those powers for such activity. 2 Now my proposition is that this principle
nothing else
than
the
faculty
of
by an aesthetic idea
aesthetic ideas. But,
is
presenting I
mean
that
representation of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the possibility of
any
definite thought whatever,
cept, being adequate to
i.e.,
con-
and which language, can never get quite on level
consequently,
it,
terms with or render completely intelligible. It is easily seen, that an aesthetic idea is the counterpart (pendant) of a rational idea, which, conversely,
is
a concept, to which no intuition
(representation
the
of
imagination)
can
be
adequate.
The imagination cognition)
is
(as a productive faculty of
a powerful agent for creating, as
were, a second nature out of the material it by actual nature. It affords us
it
supplied to
entertainment where experience proves too commonplace; and we even use it to remodel 2
[Cf. pp. 483, 484.]
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT
Those forms which do not constitute the pres-
experience, always following, no doubt, laws that are based on analogy, but
still
also follow-
ing principles which have a higher seat in reason
(and which are every whit as natural to us as by the understanding in laying hold of empirical nature). By this means we get a sense of our freedom from the law of association 1 (which attaches to the empirical employment of the imagination), with the result that the material can be borrowed by us from nature in accordance with that law, but be worked up by us into something else namely, those followed
—
what surpasses nature. Such representations of the imagination may be termed ideas. This is partly because they at least strain after something lying out beyond the confines of experience, and so seek to approximate to a presentation of rational concepts intellectual ideas),
(i.e.,
thus giving to these
529
entation of a given concept
itself,
but which,
as secondary representations of the imagination, express the derivatives
and
its
connected with
it,
kinship with other concepts, are called
(aesthetic) attributes of an object, the concept
of which, as an idea of reason, cannot be ade-
quately presented. In this way Jupiter's eagle, with the lightning in its claws, is an attribute of the mighty king of heaven, and the peacock of
stately queen.
its
They do
not, like logical
(aesthetic) attributes of an object, the concept of the sublimity and majesty of creation, but
rather
something
else
—something
that
the imagination an incentive to spread
gives
its flight
over a whole host of kindred representations that provoke more thought than admits of expression in a concept determined by words. They furnish an aesthetic idea, which serves the
portant reason, that no concept can be wholly
above rational idea as a substitute for logical presentation, 3 but with the proper function, however, of animating the mind by opening
adequate to them as internal intuitions. The poet essays the task of interpreting to sense
resentations stretching beyond
concepts the semblance of an objective reality. But, on the other hand, there
is
this
most im-
out for
it
a prospect into a field of kindred repits
ken.
But
it
of the blessed, hell, eternity, creation, etc.
not alone in the arts of painting or sculpture, where the name of attribute is customarily em-
Or, again, as to things of which examples occur
ployed, that fine art acts in this way; poetry
the rational ideas of invisible beings, the king-
dom
in experience, e.g., death, envy,
as also love, fame,
and the
like,
and
all
vices,
transgressing
the limits of experience he attempts with the aid of an imagination
play of reason in
its
which emulates the
dis-
attainment of a maximum,
body them forth to sense with a completeness of which nature affords no parallel and it to
;
is
in fact precisely in the poetic art that the
faculty of aesthetic ideas can
advantage. solely
on
its
This
faculty,
own
account,
show
itself to full
however, regarded properly no more
is
than a talent (of the imagination). 2 If, now, we attach to a concept a representation of the imagination belonging to its presentation, but inducing solely on its own account such a wealth of thought as would never admit of comprehension in a definite concept, and, as a consequence, giving aesthetically an unbounded expansion to the concept itself, then the imagination here displays a creative activity, and it puts the faculty of intellectual ideas (reason) into motion a motion, at the instance of a representation, towards an extension of thought, that, while germane, no doubt, to the concept of the object, exceeds what can be laid hold of in that representation or clearly ex-
is
and rhetoric also drive the soul that animates their work wholly from the aesthetic attributes of the objects attributes which go hand in hand with the logical, and give the imagination an impetus to bring more thought into play in the matter, though in an undeveloped man-
—
ner, than allows of being
embrace of a concept,
l[Cf.p. 4 93.J 2
[Cf. pp. 525, 530.]
being
definitely formulated in language.
of brevity I
For the sake must confine myself to a few ex-
amples only. When the great king expresses himself in one of his poems by saying: Oui, finissons sans trouble, et
mourons
sans regrets,
En
laissant
VUnivers comble de nos
bienjaits.
Ainsi VAstre du jour, au bout de sa carriere,
Repand sur Vhorizon une douce
lu-
miere,
Et
—
pressed.
brought within the
or, therefore, of
les derniers
rayons
qu'il
darde dans
les airs
Sont
les derniers soupirs qu'il
donne
ä V Univers;
he kindles in this way his rational idea of a cosmopolitan sentiment even at the close of life, with the help of an attribute which the imagination (in remembering 3
[Cf. p. 506.J
all
the pleasures of a
a
THE CRITIQUE
530
—
memory
not so much objectively for cognition, as subjectively for quickening the cognitive facul-
serene evening) annexes to that representation,
ties,
and which stirs up a crowd of sensations and secondary representations for which no expression can be found. On the other hand, even an
may
summer's day that is over and gone of which pleasures is suggested by a
fair
may
of,
and hence also indirectly for cognitions,
it
be seen that genius properly consists in the happy relation, which science cannot teach nor industry learn, enabling one to find out
serve, conversely, as
ideas for a given concept, and, besides, to hit
attribute for a representation of sense, and so
upon the expression for them the expression by means of which the subjective mental condition induced by the ideas as the concomitant of a concept may be communicated to others. This latter talent is properly that which is termed soul. For to get an expression for what is indefinable in the mental state accompanyinj a particular representation and to make it universally communicable be the expression in
intellectual concept
animate the sensible;
latter with the idea of the super-
but only by the aesthetic factor sub-
jectively attaching to the consciousness of the
supersensible being employed for the purpose. So, for example, a certain poet says in his de-
scription
of
beautiful
a
morning:
arose, as out of virtue rises peace."
"The sun The con-
we put our-
sciousness of virtue, even where
selves only in thought in the position of a vir-
tuous man, diffuses in the mind a multitude of
sublime and tranquillizing feelings, and gives a boundless outlook into a happy future, such as no expression within the
compass of a
nite concept completely attains.
In a word, the aesthetic idea tion of the imagination,
defi-
1
—
—
language or painting or statuary is a thing requiring a faculty for laying hold of the rapid and transient play of the imagination, and for unifying it in a concept (which for that very reason
is
original,
and reveals
a
new
rule
which
not have been inferred from any preceding principles or examples) that admits
could
a representa-
is
annexed to a given con-
with which, in the free employment of
cept,
—
communication without any constraint of
of
rules.
imagination, such a multiplicity of partial representations are
bound
up. that no expression
indicating a definite concept can be found for
—one
it
which on that account allows a concept to be supplemented in thought by much that is indefinable in words, and the feeling of which quickens the cognitive faculties, and with language, as a mere thing of the letter, binds up the spirit
(soul) also.
The mental powers whose union
in a certain
relation constitutes genius are imagination
understanding.
Now,
employment on behalf
its
and
since the imagination, in of cognition,
is
sub-
jected to the constraint of the understanding
and the restriction of having
to be
to the concept belonging thereto,
thetically
it is
free to furnish of its
conformable whereas aes-
own
accord,
over and above that agreement with the conundeveloped material for the understanding, to which the latter paid no re-
cept, a wealth of
gard
in its
concept, but which
it
can
make
use
Perhaps there has never been a more sublime utterance, or a thought more sublimely expressed, than the well-known inscription upon the Temple of I>i> (Mother Suture): "I am all that is, and that was, and that shall be, and no mortal hath raised the veil from before my lace." Seiner* made use of this idea in a >uggestive vignette on the frontispiece of his Natural Philosophy, 1
order to inspire nil pupil at the threshold of that temple into which he was about to lead him. with >uch a holy awe as would dispose his mind to serious at ten in
tion. *
[Johann Andreas V. Segner, 704-1 777. Professor and Mathematics at the Univei
Physics Gottingen.] of
1
If,
after this analysis,
upon the above genius,
—not rules
we
we
definition
find: First, that
cast a glance back
of what it is
is
called
a talent for art
one for science, in which clearly known must take the lead and determine the pro-
Secondly, being a talent in the line of art, presupposes a definite concept of the product as its end. Hence it presupposes under-
cedure. it
—
standing, but, in addition, a representation, indefinite
though
it
be, of the material,
i.e.,
of the
intuition, required for the presentation of that
concept, and so a relation of the imagination to the understanding. Thirdly, it displays itself, not so much in the working out of the projected
end
in the presentation of a definite concept, as rather in the portrayal, or expression of aes-
thetic ideas containing a wealth of material for
effecting that intention.
agination
from
all
Consequently the imrepresented by it in its freedom guidance of rules, but still as final for is
the presentation of the given concept. Fourthly, and lastly, the unsought and undesigned subjective finality in the free
harmonizing of the imagination with the understanding's conformity law presupposes a proportion and accord between these faculties such as cannot be brought about by any observance of rules, whether of to
science or mechanical imitation, but can only be produced by the nature of the individual.
Genius, according to these presuppositions,
1
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT is
the exemplary originality of the natural en-
dowments of an individual in the ment of his cognitive faculties. On
free
employ-
this
showing,
53
however, where the manner of carrying the idea into execution in a product of art is aimed made appropri-
at singularity, instead of being
mannerism
properly as-
the product of a genius (in respect of so much in this product as is attributable to genius, and
ate to the idea, that
not to possible learning or academic instruction) is an example, not for imitation (for that would mean the loss of the element of genius, and just the very soul of the work), but to be
{precieux), forced, and affected styles, intended
—
followed by another genius one whom it arouses to a sense of his own originality in putting freedom from the constraint of rules so into force in his art that for art itself a new
—which be exemplary. Yet, —a type nature's rule
won 1
is
what shows a
is
since the genius
that
elect
as but a rare
minds is
his
phenomenon
example gives
is
such
a school, that
to say a methodical instruction according to
a product.
is
The
ostentatious
mark one out from
soul
is
stage to be gaped at
—action which invariably
betrays a tyro. § 50.
The combination of
taste
and genius
in products of fine art
one of
for other clever
rise to
to
the common herd (though wanting), resemble the behaviour of a man who, as we say, hears himself talk, or who stands and moves about as if he were on a
to
talent to
must be regarded
—
cribed
To ask whether more stress should be laid in matters of fine art upon the presence of genius or upon that of taste, is equivalent to asking whether more turns upon imagination or upon
for
judgement. Now, imagination rather entitles an art to be called an inspired {geistreiche) than a fine art. It is only in respect of judge-
such persons a matter of imitation, for which nature, through the medium of a genius, gave
ment that the name of fine art is deserved. Hence it follows that judgement, being the in-
the rule.
dispensable condition {conditio sine qua non),
rules, collected, so far as the
circumstances ad-
from such products of genius and peculiarities. And, to that extent, fine art
mit,
But
this imitation
their is
becomes aping when the
pupil copies everything
down
to the deformi-
which the genius only of necessity suf-
ties
fered to remain, because they could hardly be removed without loss of force to the idea.
This courage has merit only genius.
A
in the case of a
certain boldness of expression and, in
many a deviation from the common becomes him well, but in no sense is it a thing worthy of imitation. On the contrary it
general, rule
remains all through intrinsically a blemish, which one is bound to try to remove, but for which the genius is, as it were, allowed to plead a privilege, on the ground that a scrupulous carefulness would spoil what is inimitable in the impetuous ardour of his soul. Mannerism an aping of peculiarity is another kind of aping (originality) in general, for the sake of removing oneself as far as possible from imitators, while the talent requisite to enable one to be at the same time exemplary is absent. There are, in fact, two modes {modi) in general of
—
arranging one's thoughts for utterance. The one is called a manner {modus aestheticus) the ,
other a method {modus logicus). tion
between them
is
this: the
The
distinc-
former possesses
no standard other than the feeling of unity in the presentation, whereas the latter here follows definite principles. As a consequence, the for-
mer 1
is
alone admissible for fine art. It
[Cf. p. 530.]
is
only,
at least what one must look to as of capital importance in forming an estimate of art as fine art. So far as beauty is concerned, to be fertile and original in ideas is not such an imperative requirement as it is that the imagination in its freedom should be in accordance with the understanding's conformity to law. For, in lawless freedom, imagination, with all its wealth, produces nothing but nonsense; the power of judgement, on the other hand, is the faculty that makes it consonant with understanding. Taste, like judgement in general, is the disciis
pline
(or
corrective)
of
genius.
It
severely
and makes it orderly or polished; but at the same time it gives it guidance directing and controlling its flight, so that it may preclips its wings,
serve
its
clearness
character of finality. It introduces a
and
order
the
into
plenitude
of
thought, and in so doing gives stability to the ideas, and qualifies them at once for permanent and universal approval, for being followed by others, and for a continually progressive culture. And so, where the interests of both these qualities clash in a product, and there has to be
a sacrifice of something, then it should rather be on the side of genius; and judgement, which in
matters of fine art bases
own proper
principles, will
its
more
decision on
its
readily endure
an abatement of the freedom and wealth of the imagination than that the understanding should be compromised.
THE CRITIQUE
532
The
requisites
for
art
fine
are,
therefore,
imagination, understanding, soul, and taste. 1 § 51.
The
division of the fine arts
Beauty (whether
may
in
it
be of nature or of art) 2
general be termed the expression of
But the provision must be added beauty of art this idea must be excited through the medium of a concept of the object, whereas with beauty of nature the bare reflection upon a given intuition, apart from any concept of what the object is intended to be, is sufficient for awakening and communicating the idea of which that object is regarded as the aesthetic ideas.
that with
expression.
Accordingly,
if
we wish
to
make
a division of
we can choose for that purpose, more convenient principle analogy which art bears to the mode of
the fine arts,
were a serious business of the understanding. Thus the orator announces a serious business, and for the purpose of entertaining his audience conducts it as if it were a mere play with ideas. The poet promises merely an entertaining play with ideas, and yet for the understanding there enures as much as if the promotion of its business had been his one intention. The combination and harmony of the two faculties of cognition, sensibility and understanding, which, though doubtless indispensable to one another, do not readily permit of being united without compulsion and reciprocal abatement, must have the appearance of being undesigned and a spontaneous occurrence otherwise it is not fine art. For this reason, what is studied and laboured must be here avoided. 4 For fine art must be it
—
tentatively at least, no
free art in a double sense:
than the
sense opposed to contract work, as not being a
men
i.e.,
not alone in a
in
work the magnitude of which may be estimated,
speech with a view to communicating themselves to one another as completely as possible, i.e.,
standard, but free also in the sense that, while
not merely in respect of their concepts but in
the mind, no doubt, occupies itself,
respect of their sensations also. 3 Such expres-
so without ulterior regard to
expression of which
avail
themselves
and tone (articuand modulation). It is the
exacted, or paid for, according to a definite
sion consists in word, gesture,
yet with a feeling
lation, gesticulation,
tion (independent of reward).
combination of these three modes of expression which alone constitutes a complete communication of the speaker. For thought, intuition, and sensation are in this way conveyed to others simultaneously and in conjunction. Hence there are only three kinds of fine art: the art of speech, formative art, and the art of the play of sensations (as external sense impressions). This division might also be arranged as a dichotomy, so that fine art
would be divided
into that of the expression of thoughts or intuitions, the latter being
subdivided according to
form and the mathowever, in that case appear too abstract, and less in line with pop-
The
of the imagination.
the contrary,
poetry. Rhetoric
of is
speech are rhetoric and the art of transacting a se-
rious business of the understanding as
if it
were
a free play of the imagination; poetry that of conducting a free play of the imagination as if
The first by means of 1
three faculties are first brought into union the fourth. Hume, in his history, informs that although they are second in their
English to no other people in the world in respect of the evidences they afford of the three first qualities separately considered, -till in what unite- them thej- must yield to their neighbours, the French.
the
work-
*[Cf.p.
seq.) 3 The reader is not to consider this scheme for a possible division of the fine arts as a deliberate theory. It is only one of the various attempts that can and ought to
be made.
,4.1,. ft
The
poet's promise, on
a modest one, and a mere play
is
with ideas is all he holds out to us, but he accomplishes something worthy of being made a serious business, namely, the using of play to provide food for the understanding, and the giving of life to
arts
On
standing to some end.
nation.
The
something which an entertaining play the other hand, there is
viz.,
something in which he fails to come up to his promise, and a thing, too, which is his avowed business, namely, the engagement of the under-
ter (sensation). It would,
(1)
does
orator, therefore, gives
he does not promise,
the distinction between the
ular conceptions.
still it
any other end, and of satisfaction and stimula-
its
Hence
concepts by means of the imagi-
the orator in reality performs less
than he promises, the poet more. (2) The formative arts, or those for the expression of ideas in sensuous intuition (not by
means
mere imagination by words) are arts either of
of representations of
that are excited
sensuous truth or of sensuous semblance. The first
is
called plastic art, the second painting.
Both use
figures in space for the expression of
ideas: the former
makes
figures discernible to
two senses, sight and touch (though,- so the latter sense
is
far as
concerned, without regard to
beauty), the latter makes them so to the former The aesthetic idea (archetype, origi-
sense alone. nal)
is the fundamental basis of both in the imagination; but the figure which constitutes its 4
[Cf.p.. 525.]
OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT expression (the ectype, the copy) in its bodily extension (the
way
is
given either
the object itself
or else in accordance with the picture which it forms of itself in the eye (according to its appearance when projected on a flat sur-
exists)
face). Or, whatever the archetype
is,
either the
reference to an actual end or only the semblance
may
of one
be imposed upon reflection as
its
latter consists in
ture presents
it
to our view, only arranged dif-
ferently and in obedience to certain ideas.
The
beautiful arrangement of corporeal things,
how-
ever,
is
also a thing for the eye only, just like
—the
painting
condition.
533
no more than decking out the ground with the same manifold variety (grasses, flowers, shrubs, and trees, and even water, hills, and dales) as that with which na-<