Works by Kant [42, 1 ed.] 0852291639

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GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 5^H^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^s^^,

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12.

LUCRETIUS EPICTETUS MARCUS AURELIUS

13.

VIRGIL

14.

PLUTARCH

15.

TACITUS

16.

PTOLEMY

Introductory Volumes: 1.

2.

3.

The Great Conversation

The Great The Great

Ideas

I

Ideas II

***********************************************

4.

5.

HOMER

COPERNICUS KEPLER

AESCHYLUS SOPHOCLES

17.

PLOTINUS

18.

AUGUSTINE

19.

THOMAS AQUINAS

I

THUCYDIDES

20.

THOMAS AQUINAS

II

7.

PLATO

21.

DANTE

8.

ARISTOTLE

I

22.

CHAUCER

9.

ARISTOTLE

II

23.

HIPPOCRATES GALEN

MACHIAVELLI HOBBES

24.

RABELAIS

EUCLID

25.

MONTAIGNE

ARCHIMEDES APOLLONIUS

26.

SHAKESPEARE

I

NICOMACHUS

27.

SHAKESPEARE

II

EURIPIDES

ARISTOPHANES 6.

10.

11.

HERODOTUS

'~?^>-?^~r^7-?^

GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD GILBERT GALILEO

41.

GIBBON

HARVEY

42.

KANT

CERVANTES

43.

AMERICAN STATE

29. 30.

FRANCIS BACON

28.

II

PAPERS THE FEDERALIST J. S. MILL

DESCARTES SPINOZA

44.

BOSWELL

32.

MILTON

45.

LAVOISIER FOURIER

33.

PASCAL

34.

NEWTON

31.

FARADAY 46.

HEGEL

47.

GOETHE

48.

MELVILLE

49.

DARWIN

50.

MARX

HUYGENS 35.

LOCKE BERKELEY

HUME 36.

SWIFT STERNE

ENGELS 37.

38.

FIELDING

MONTESQUIEU ROUSSEAU

51.

TOLSTOY

52.

DOSTOEVSKY

39.

ADAM SMITH

53.

WILLIAM JAMES

40.

GIBBON

54.

FREUD

I

""

\

»

GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS, EDITOR IN CHIEF

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42.

KANT

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Mortimer J. Adler,

Associate Editor

Members ofthe Advisory Board: Stringfellow Barr, Scott Buchanan, John Erskine,

Clarence H. Faust, Alexander Meiklejohn, Joseph J. Schwab, Editorial Consultants: A. F. B.

Clark,

F. L.

Wallace Brockway,

Lucas,

Mark Van Doren.

Walter Murdoch.

Executive Editor

miiiittumt t t i Mtmn

The

*»"> "

>

Duty

(My own

-

my

also

is

(The Happiness

which jurisprudence altogether abstracts. In the case of the moral imperative, and the supposition of freedom which it necessarily involves, the law, the power (to fulfil it) and the rational will that determines the maxim, constitute all the elements that form the notion of juridical duty. But in the imperative, which commands the duty of virtue, there is added, besides the notion of self-constraint, that of an end; not one that we have, but that we ought to have, which,

"o

therefore, pure practical reason has in itself,

XII. Preliminary Notions of the Susceptibility of the Mind for Notions of Duty generally

whose

highest, unconditional

end (which, how-

ever, continues to be duty) consists in this: that

virtue

men.

is

is

its

also

brightly as

own end and, by deserving well its own reward. Herein it shines an ideal to human perceptions,

of so it

seems to cast in the shade even holiness itself, which is never tempted to transgression. 2 This, however, is an illusion arising from the fact that as we have no measure for the degree of strength, except the greatness of the obstacles which might have been overcome (which in our case are the inclinations), we are led to mistake the subjective conditions of estimation of a magni1

2

[Cf. Science oj Right, p. 398.

So that one mi^ht vary two well-known lines of

Haller thus:

With

all his failings,

man

is still

Better than angels void oj wiU.

>>

tion)

Q

~

Perfec-

The Law which

is

£ also Spring c

of Others)

*->

4

Q

3

On which

-

The End which

is "3

also Spring

On which

the

Morality

c

the

Legality

of every free determination of will rests

The Formal Element

of the

Duty

of Virtue

These are such moral qualities as, when a man does not possess them, he is not bound to acquire them. They are: the moral feeling, conscience, love of one's neighbour, and respect for our-

There is no obligation to have these, since they are subjective conditions

selves (self-esteem).

of susceptibility for the notion of duty, not

objective conditions of morality.

They

are

all

and antecedent, but natural capacities of mind (prcedispositio) to be affected by notions of duty; capacities which it cannot be regarded as a duty to have, but which every man has, and by virtue of which he can be brought under oblisensitive

gation.

The consciousness

of

them

is

not of

empirical origin, but can only follow on that of a

moral law. as an

effect of the

same on the mind.

OF ETHICS A.

This

The Moral Feeling

the susceptibility for pleasure or dis-

is

pleasure, merely

from the consciousness of the

agreement or disagreement of our action with the law of duty. Now, every determination of the elective will proceeds from the idea of the possible action through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure in taking an interest in it or its effect to the deed; and here the sensitive state (the affection of the internal sense)

pathological or a moral feeling.

is

either a

The former

is

the feeling that precedes the idea of the law, the

which may follow it. cannot be a duty to have a moral feeling, or to acquire it; for all consciousness of obligation supposes this feeling in order that one latter that

Now

it

may become lies in

conscious of the necessitation that

the notion of duty; but every

man

(as a

moral being) has it originally in himself; the obligation, then, can only extend to the cultivation of it and the strengthening of it even by admiration of its inscrutable origin; and this is effected by showing how it is just, by the mere conception of reason, that it is excited most strongly, in its own purity and apart from every pathological stimulus; and it is improper to call this feeling a moral sense; for the word sense generally

means a

theoretical

power of percep-

tion directed to an object; whereas the moral

and displeasure in general) something merely subjective, which supplies no knowledge. No man is wholly destitute of moral feeling, for if he were totally unsusceptible of this sensation he would be morally dead; and, to speak in the language of physicians, if the moral vital force could no longer produce any effect on this feeling, then his humanity would be dissolved (as it were by chemical laws) into mere animality and be irrevocably confounded with the mass of other physical beings. But we have no special sense for (moral) good and evil any more than for truth, although such expressions are often used; but we have a susfeeling (like pleasure

is

ceptibility of the free elective will for being

moved by pure practical reason and its law; and it is this that we call the moral feeling. B.

Of Conscience

Similarly, conscience

is

not a thing to be ac-

quired, and it is not a duty to acquire it; but every man, as a moral being, has it originally within him. To be bound to have a conscience

would be

as

much

as to say to be

to recognize duties.

under a duty For conscience is practical

reason which, in every case of law, holds before

man

375

duty for acquittal or condemnation; consequently it does not refer to an object, but only to the subject (affecting the moral feeling by its own act) so that it is an inevitable fact, not an obligation and duty. When, therefore, it is said. "This man has no conscience," what is meant is that he pays no heed to its dictates. For if he really had none, he would not take credit to himself for anything done according to duty, nor reproach himself with violation of duty, and therefore he would be unable even to conceive the duty of having a conscience. I pass by the manifold subdivisions of conscience, and only observe what follows from what has just been said, namely, that there is no such thing as an erring conscience. No doubt it is possible sometimes to err in the objective judgement whether something is a duty or not; but I cannot err in the subjective whether I have compared it with my practical (here judicially acting) reason for the purpose of that judgement: for if I erred I would not have exercised practical judgement at all, and in that case there is neither truth nor error. U neons cientiousness is not want of conscience, but the propensity not to heed its judgement. But when a man is conscious of having acted according to his cona

his

;

science, then, as far as regards guilt or inno-

more can be required of him, bound to enlighten his understanding as to what is duty or not; but when it comes or has come to action, then conscience speaks incence, nothing

only he

is

voluntarily and inevitably.

To

act conscientious-

ly can, therefore, not be a duty, since otherwise it

would be necessary

to

have a second con-

science, in order to be conscious of the act of

the

first.

The duty here

is

only to cultivate our con-

science, to quicken our attention to the voice of

the internal judge, and to use

obedience to

it,

C.

Love

is

and

is

all

means

to secure

thus our indirect duty. 1

Of Love to Men

a matter of feeling, not of will or voli-

and

I cannot love because I will to do so, because I ought (I cannot be necessitated to love) hence there is no such thing as a duty to love. Benevolence, however (amor tion,

still

less

;

benevolentice)

,

as a

mode

of action,

may be

sub-

ject to a law of duty. Disinterested benevolence

often called (though very improperly) love; even where the happiness of the other is not concerned, but the complete and free surrender of all one's own ends to the ends of another (even a superhuman) being, love is spoken of as is

^Cf. Note on Conscience,

p. 379-1

— METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS

376

duty is necessitation be self-constraint according to a law. But what is done from constraint is not done from love. It is a duty to do good to other men according to our power, whether we love them or not. and this duty loses nothing of its weight, although we must make the sad remark that our species, alas! is not such as to be found particularly being also our duty. But or constraint, although

all

may

it

worthy of love when we know it more closely. Hatred of men, however, is always hateful: even though without any active hostility it consists only in complete aversion from mankind (the solitary misanthropy). For benevolence still remains a duty even towards the manhater, whom one cannot love, but to whom we can show kindness.

To

duty, but a will

men

hate vice in

mere

neither duty nor against

is

feeling of horror of vice, the

having no influence on the feeling nor the

feeling on the will. Beneficence

who

purpose succeed, comes at

whom said: this

is

a duty.

He

often practises this, and sees his beneficent

he has benefited.

"Thou

last really to love

When,

shalt love thy

therefore,

him it

is

neighbour as thyself,"

does not mean, "Thou shalt

first

of

all

love,

and by means of this love (in the next place) u do him good"; but: Do good to thy neighbour, and this beneficence will produce in thee the

men

love of

(as a settled habit of inclination to

beneficence)."

The

love of complacency {amor complacenwould therefore alone be direct. This is a pleasure immediately connected with the idea of the existence of an object, and to have a duty tice)

to this, that

is,

ure in a thing,

is

to be necessitated to find pleas-

a contradiction.

D. Of Respect Respect (reverentia) is likewise something merely subjective; a feeling of a peculiar kind not a judgement about an object which it would be a duty to effect or to advance. For if considered as duty it could only be conceived as such by means of the respect which we have for it. To have a duty to this, therefore, would be as much as to say to be

When,

bound

therefore,

self-esteem/' this

it

is

duty to have a duty. "Man has a duty of improperly stated, and we

is

in

said:

ought rather to say: "The law within him inevi-

from him respect for his own being, feeling (which is of a peculiar kind) is a

tably forces

and

this

basis of certain duties, that

which

may

is.

of certain actions

be consistent with his duty to himself." But we cannot say that he has a duty of

respect for himself; for he

must have respect

for the law within himself, in order to be able to conceive

duty

at

all.

XIII. General Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in the treatment of Pure Ethics First.

A

duty can have only a single ground if two or more proofs of it are

of obligation; and

adduced, this is a certain mark that either no valid proof has yet been given, or that there are several distinct duties which have been regard-

ed as one.

For all moral proofs, being philosophical, can only be drawn by means of rational knowledge from concepts, not like mathematics, through the construction of concepts. The latter science admits a variety of proofs of one and the same theorem because in intuition a priori there may ;

be several properties of an object, all of which lead back to the very same principle. If, for instance, to prove the duty of veracity, an argu-

ment

is

drawn

first

from the harm that

a

lie

causes to other men; another from the worthlessness of a liar and the violation of his own

what is proved in the former argua duty of benevolence, not of veracity, to say, not the duty which required to be

self-respect,

ment that

is

is

proved, but a different one. Now, if, in giving a variety of proofs for one and the same theorem,

we

flatter ourselves that the multitude of reasons will compensate the lack of weight in each taken separately, this is a very unphilosophical resource, since it betrays trickery and dishon-

esty; for several insufficient proofs placed be-

side one another

do not produce certainty, nor even probability. They should advance as reason and consequence in a series, up to the sufficient reason, and it is only in this way that they can have the force of proof. Yet the former is the usual device of the rhetorician.

Secondly. The difference between virtue and vice cannot be sought in the degree in which certain

maxims

are followed, but only in the

specific quality of the

maxims

(their relation to

the law). In other words, the vaunted principle of Aristotle, that virtue is the mean between

two 1

vices,

is

false.

The common

1

For instance, suppose that

classical

formulae of ethics

medio

tutissimus ibis; omne mimium vertitur in vitium ; est modus in rebus, etc., medium tenuere beati; virtus est medium vitiorum et utrinque reductum ["You will go

—

most safely

middle" (Virgil); 'Every excess develops into a vice"; "There is a mean in all things, etc." (Horace); "Happy they who steadily pursue a middle course": "Virtue is the mean between two vices and equally removed from either" (Horace).] contain a poor sort of wisdom, which has no definite principles; for this mean between two extremes, who will assign it in the

—

OF ETHICS

377

is it a duty to possess it (otherwise we should be in duty bound to have a duty), but it commands, and accompanies its command with

good management is given as the mean between two vices, prodigality and avarice; then its origin as a virtue can neither be denned as the gradual diminution of the former vice (by sav-

a moral constraint (one possible

ing), nor as the increase of the expenses of the

nal freedom).

miserly. These vices, in fact, cannot be viewed

ible,

as

if

they, proceeding as

directions,

met together

but each of them has

were in opposite good management; own maxim, which

it

in its

necessarily contradicts that of the other.

For the same reason, no vice can be denned an excess in the practice of certain actions beyond what is proper (e.g., Prodigalitas est excessus in consumendis opibus) or, as a less as

;

exercise of

them than

is

fitting (Avaritia est de-

For since in this way the degree is left quite undefined, and the question whether conduct accords with duty or not, turns wholly on this, such an account is of no use as a definilectus, etc.).

nor

strength

Thirdly. Ethical virtue

by the power we

requisite,

and the degree of

this

strength can be estimated only by the magni-

tude of the hindrances which himself,

by

man

creates for

brood of

his inclinations. Vices, the

unlawful dispositions, are the monsters that he has to combat; wherefore this moral strength as fortitude (fortitudo moralis) constitutes the

greatest and only true martial glory of

man;

it

wisdom, namely, the practical, because it makes the ultimate end of the existence of man on earth its own end. Its posis

also called the true

session alone

makes man

free, healthy, rich,

a

king, etc., nor can either chance or fate deprive

him of

must not be estimated

attribute to

man

the law but, conversely, the moral ;

estimated by the law, which ically; not, therefore,

edge that we have of

of fulfilling

power must be

commands

categor-

by the empirical knowlmen as they are, but by

the rational knowledge how, according to the ideas of humanity, they ought to be.

maxims

These three

of the scientific treatment of ethics are

opposed to the older apophthegms: i. There is only one virtue and only one vice. 2. Virtue is the observance of the mean path between two opposite vices. 3. Virtue (like prudence) must be learned

from experience.

this, since

All the

humanity

he possesses himself, and the

in

General

not exhaust the

notion;

reward, yet in it

will.

But such

strength might also belong to a holy (super-

human)

being, in

whom

no opposing impulse

counteracts the law of his rational will;

who

therefore willingly does everything in accord-

ance with the law. Virtue then is the moral strength of a man's will in his obedience to duty; and this is a moral necessitation by his own law giving reason, inasmuch as this constitutes itself a power executing the law. It is not itself a duty, for me? Avarice (as a vice) is not distinguished from frugality (as a virtue) by merely being the latter pushed too far; but has a quite different principle (maxim), namely placing the end of economy not in the enjoyment of one's means, but in the mere possession of them, renouncing enjoyment; just as the vice of prodigality is not to be sought in the excessive enjoyment of one's means, but in the bad maxim which makes the use of them, without regard to their maintenance, the sole

as its

Virtue considered in is,

own end, so own reward.

itself, as it is its

must be regarded

its

if

also

complete perfection

therefore, regarded not as

had for

ideal of

in its

virtue, but as

Virtue signifies a moral strength of

does

encomiums bestowed on the

moral perfection can lose nothing of their practical reality by the examples of what men now are, have been, or will probably be hereafter; anthropology which proceeds from mere empirical knowledge cannot impair anthroponomy which is erected by the unconditionally legislating reason; and although virtue may now and then be called meritorious (in relation to men, not to the law), and be worthy of

in the

XIV. Of Virtue

end.

is

by laws of inter-

should be irresist-

this

virtuous cannot lose his virtue.

tion.

this

But since

if

man

possessed

virtue possessed the man, since

former case it would appear as though he had the choice (for which he would

still

then require another virtue, in order to select virtue from all other wares offered to him). To conceive a plurality of virtues (as we unavoidably must) is nothing else but to conceive various moral objects to which the (rational) will is led by the single principle of virtue and it is the same with the opposite vices. The expression which personifies both is a contrivance for af;

fecting the sensibility, pointing, however, to a moral sense. Hence it follows that an aesthetic of morals is not a part, but a subjective exposition of the Metaphysic of Morals; in which the emotions that accompany the necessitating force of the moral law make the efficiency of that force to be felt; for example: disgust, horror, etc., which gives a sensible form to the moral aversion in order to gain the precedence from the merely sensible incitement.

;

METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS

78

XV. Of

the Principle on which Ethics

is

separated from Jurisprudence

and those of internal freewhich alone are ethical. internal freedom which is the condiethical duty must be discussed as a

into those of external

the this

tion of

of

latter

all

preliminary

just

prceliminaris),

(discursus

as

above the doctrine of conscience was discussed as the condition of

all

A

emotion

therefore not so

resentment)

(e.g.,

is

closely related to vice as passion

This separation on which the subdivision of moral philosophy in general rests, is founded on this: that the notion of freedom, which is common to both, makes it necessary to divide duties

dom; Hence

that this storm soon subsides.

duty.

the other hand, into a

is

propensity to

permanent inclination

(e. g..

a true vice. Virtue, therefore, in so far as

Habit (habitus)

is

a facility of action

subjective perfection of the elective

not every such facility

and a But

will.

a free habit (habitus

is

custom (assuetudo), that is, a uniformity of action which, by frequent repetition, has become a necessity, then it is not a habit proceeding from freedom, and therefore not a moral habit. Virtue therefore cannot be libertatis); for

if it is

defined as a habit of free law-abiding actions, unless indeed

by

action habit

is

we add

''determining itself in

is

will,

but

adopting a rule also declares it to be a universal law, and it is only such a habit that can be reck-

oned as virtue. Two things are required for internal freedom; to be master of oneself in a given case (animus sui compos) and to have command over oneself (imperium in semetipsum), that is to subdue his emotions and to govern his passions.

With these

(indoles)

is

it is

conditions, the character

noble (erecta)

;

in the opposite case,

ignoble (indoles abjecta serva).

XVI.

;

XVII. Virtue

Virtue requires,

first

of

all,

Command

over Oneself

Emotions and passions are essentially distinct the former belong to feeling in so far as this

coming before

reflection

makes

it

more

necessarily presupposes

its

a faculty that in

difficult

even impossible. Hence emotion is called hasty (animus prceceps). And reason declares through the notion of virtue that a man should collect himself; but this weakness in the life of or

This word (apathy) has come into bad pute, just as

if

it

meant want of

to the objects of the elective will;

it is supposed This misconception may be avoided by giving the name moral apathy to that want of emotion which is to be distinguished from indifference. In the former, the

feelings arising

from

sensible impressions lose

on the moral feeling only because the respect for the law is more powerful than all of them together. It is only the apparent strength of a fever patient that makes even the lively sympathy with good rise to an emotion, or rather degenerate into it. Such an emotion is called enthusiasm, and it is with reference to this that we are to explain the moderation which is usually recommended in virtuous practheir influence

tices:

Insani sapiens

Ultra

quam

nomen

satis est

ferat, cequus uniqui

virtutem

si

For otherwise

(Untugend), and as it were a weak and childish which may very well consist with the best will, and has further this one good thing in it,

re-

and

to be a weakness.

could be too wise or too virtuous.

thing,

feeling,

therefore subjective indifference with respect

one's understanding, joined with the strength of

only a lack of virtue

Apathy

(considered as Strength)

a mental excitement,

is

based on

command

for man, namely, that he should bring all his powers and inclinations under his rule (that of reason) and this is a positive precept of command over himself which is additional to the prohibition, namely, that he should not allow himself to be governed by his feelings and inclinations (the duty of apathy); since, unless reason takes the reins of government into its own hands, the feelings and inclinations play the master over the man.

the idea of the law"; and then this

not a property of the elective

of the rational will, which

is

it

internal freedom, contains a positive

the Doctrine of Virtue on the Principle of Internal Freedom

Of

grown

hatred in

contrast to resentment). The calmness with which one indulges it leaves room for reflection and allows the mind to frame principles thereon for itself; and thus when the inclination falls upon what contradicts the law, to brood on it. to allow it to root itself deeply, and thereby to take up evil (as of set purpose) into one's maxim; and this is then specifically evil, that is. it is

REMARKS

Passion, on

is.

the sensible appetite

1

it

is

absurd to imagine that one The emotion

man bear the name of fool, just of unjust, if he pursue virtue herself bethe proper bounds."]

Horace. ["Let the wise

and the

yond

petat ipsam. 1

OF ETHICS no matter by

always belongs to the sensibility, what sort of object it may be excited. The true strength of virtue is the mind at rest, with a firm, deliberate resolution to bring its

practice.

That

is

law into

the state of health in the moral

on the contrary, the emotion, even when

life;

it

by the idea of the good, is a momentary glitter which leaves exhaustion after it. We may apply the term fantastically virtuous to is

excited

man who

the in

will

admit nothing to be indifferent

who

respect of morality (adiaphora), and

strews

and

all his

steps with duties, as with traps,

will not allow it to

man

be indifferent whether a

eats fish or flesh, drink beer or wine,

when

both agree with him; a micrology which, if adopted into the doctrine of virtue, would make its

rule a tyranny.

REMARK Virtue is always in progress, and yet always begins from the beginning. The former follows from the fact that, objectively considered, it is

an ideal and unattainable, and yet it is a duty constantly to approximate to it. The second is founded subjectively on the nature of man which is affected by inclinations, under the influence of which virtue, with its maxims adopted once for all, can never settle in a position of rest; but, if it is not rising, inevitably falls; because moral maxims cannot, like technical, be based on custom (for this belongs to the physical character of the determination of will) but even if the practice of them become a custom,

379

when he

thinks to escape.

He may

indeed stupe-

fy himself with pleasures and distractions, but cannot avoid now and then coming to himself or awaking, and then he at once perceives its awful voice. In his utmost depravity, he may, indeed, pay no attention to it, but he cannot

avoid hearing

Now

it.

this original intellectual

and (as a con-

ception of duty) moral capacity, called conit,

that although

man

with himself,

science, has this peculiarity in its

business

is

a business of

yet he finds himself compelled by his reason to transact son.

it

as

if

at the

command

For the transaction here

is

of another perthe conduct of a

(causa) before a tribunal. But that he who accused by his conscience should be conceived as one and the same person with the judge is an absurd conception of a judicial court; for then the complainant would always lose his case. Therefore, in all duties the conscience of the man must regard another than himself as the judge of his actions, if it is to avoid self-contradiction. Now this other may be an actual or a merely ideal person which reason frames to it2 self. Such an idealized person (the authorized judge of conscience) must be one who knows trial

is

the heart; for the tribunal

ward part of man;

at the

also be all-obliging, that

is,

is set up in the msame time he must must be or be con-

ceived as a person in respect of are to be regarded as his

science

is

whom

commands;

the inward judge of

all

all

duties

since con-

free actions.

;

the agent would thereby lose the freedom in the

choice of his maxims, which freedom character of an action done from duty.

is

the

Now,

must at the same heaven and earth),

since such a moral being

time possess all power (in since otherwise he could not give his commands their proper effect (which the office of judge necessarily requires), and since such a moral

ON CONSCIENCE The consciousness

being possessing power over

1

of an internal tribunal in

all is called God, hence conscience must be conceived as the sub-

(before which "his thoughts accuse or ex-

jective principle of a responsibility for one's

cuse one another") is Conscience. Every man has a conscience, and finds him-

deeds before God; nay, this latter concept is contained (though it be only obscurely) in every moral self-consciousness.

man

self observed by an inward judge which threatens and keeps him in awe (reverence combined with fear) and this power which watches over the laws within him is not something which he himself (arbitrarily) makes, but it is incorpo;

rated in his being. It follows

him

like his

shadow,

x

Not

2

[In

part of original text.

Kant

From

Tugendlehre

:

p.

2Q3Ü.

explains this double personality of a man as both the accuser and the judge, by reference to the homo noumenon and its specific difference from the rationally endowed homo sensibilis.]

a

foot-note,

CONTENTS GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS General Divisions of the Metaphysic of Morals, 383 Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 385

,38i

GENERAL DIVISIONS OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS AS A SYSTEM OF DUTIES GENERALLY

I.

All duties are either duties of right, that

i. is,

virtue, s.

titled

that

ethica).

is,

ethical duties

Juridical

duties

(officio,

virtutis

be promulgated by external legislation; ethical duties are those for which such legislation is not possible. The reason why the latter can-

in these duties,

and which

it is

ternal legislation can cause

a duty

But no

for the individual to have as such.

any one

to

ex-

adopt

a particular intention, or to propose to himself a certain purpose; for this depends upon an internal condition or act of the mind itself. However, external actions conducive to such a

condition

tal

may

sity

of morals, or moral philosophy,

is

of

referred to duty, in view of this twofold qual-

the science

commonly

science

terminations

its

being implied that the individual will of neces-

make them an end to himself. But why, then, it may be asked,

—the

(homo noumenon), in distinction from the same person as a man modified with these determinations (homo phenomenon). Hence the conceptions of right and end when

men-

be commanded, without

by Cicero

—

not be properly made the subject of external legislation is because they relate to an end or final purpose, which is itself, at the same time,

embraced

especially

—

may

are such as

—

duty and not also the science of right, since duties and rights refer to each other? The reason is this. We know our own freedom from which all moral laws and consequently all rights only through the as well as all duties arise moral imperative, which is an immediate injunction of duty; whereas the conception of right as a ground of putting others under obligation has afterwards to be developed out of it. 2. In the doctrine of duty, man may and ought to be represented in accordance with the nature of his faculty of freedom, which is entirely supra-sensible. He is, therefore, to be represented purely according to his humanity as a personality independent of physical de-

juridical duties (officio, juris), or duties of

en-

ity,

give the following division:

THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS ACCORDING TO THE OBJECTIVE RELATION OF THE LAW OF DUTY

DIVISION OF

I.

I.

Juridical

Others

II.

Oneself

Ethical Duties

to or

Others

II.

As right

Humanity

person (juridical duties towards Perfect

The Right of Mankind in others (juridical duties The End in

towards others)

Humanity

of

our person (ethical duties towards oneself)

IV. The End of Mankind in others (ethical duties towards others)

Imperfect

Duty

THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS ACCORDING TO RELATIONS OF OBLIGATION

DIVISION OF

between whom a relation of apprehended whether it acor not admit of being conceived

the subjects

and duty

tually exists

of

own

Duty

III. II.

our

oneself)

to or

Duties

The Right in

Oneself

is

—

—

each other, anbe proposed from this point

in various juridical relations to

383

other division

may

of view as follows:

3«4

DIVISION POSSIBLE ACCORDING TO THE SUBJECTIVE RELATION OF THOSE WHO BIND UNDER OBLIGATIONS, AND THOSE

WHO ARE BOUND UNDER The

juridical

beings

who have

man

of

relation

The juridical relation of man to beings who have both rights and duties: Adest. There is such a relation, for it

to

neither right nor duty:

There is no such relation, Vacat. for such beings are irrational, and they neither put us under obligation, nor can

we be put under

obligation by

OBLIGATIONS

is

men

the relation of

to

men.

them

3-

The

relation

juridical

who have

beings

only

man

of

duties

The

to

and no

being

(God):

rights:

Vacat.

There

is

no such

such beings would be

Vacat. There is no such relation in mere philosophy, because such a being is not an object of possible experience.

relation, for

men without

ju-

personality, as slaves of bonds-

ridical

relation of man to a has only rights and no duties

juridical

who

men.

A

between right and duty

is

therefore found, in this scheme, only in No.

2.

real relation

which we form for ourselves. But the conception of this object is not entirely

ject of thought

On

The reason why such

empty.

No. 4

tion in relation to ourselves

is not likewise found in would constitute a transcendent duty, that is, one to which no corresponding subject can be given that is external and capable of imposing obligation. Consequently the relation from the theoretical point of view is here merely ideal; that is, it is a relation to an obis

because

it

III.

the contrary,

it is

a fruitful concep-

and the maxims of

our inner morality, and therefore in relation to practice generally. all

And

the duty involved

it is

in this bearing that

and practicable for us

such a merely ideal relation

lies.

DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS AS A SYSTEM OF DUTIES GENERALLY

According to the constituent principles and the method of the system I.

Principles

I.

II.

I.

Duties of Right

II.

Duties of Virtue, all

but

that

refers

etc.

not

And only

Private Right Public Right on, including

so to

the

materials,

form

of a system of morals, when the metaphysical investigation of the elements has completely traced out the universal principles constituting the whole. also

scientific

II.

Method

I.

II.

Didactics Ascetics

to

the

architectonic

in

GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS I.

THE RELATION OF THE FACULTIES OF THE HUMAN MIND TO THE MORAL LAWS

The active faculty of the human mind, as the faculty of desire in its widest sense, is the power which man has, through his mental rep-

which attach to them on account of the

qualities

modifications of the subject

—

as,

for instance,

—

corresponding to these representations. The capacity of a being to act in conformity with his own representations is what constitutes the life

and such like are referred as constituent elements of knowledge to objects, whereas pleasure or pain felt in connection with what is red or sweet express absolutely nothing that is in the object, but mere-

of such a being.

ly a relation to the subject.

resentations, of

It

is

becoming the cause of objects

to be observed, first, that with desire or

always connected pleasure or which is called feeling. But the converse does not always hold for there may be a pleasure connected, not with the desire of an object, but with a mere mental representation, it being indifferent whether an object corresponding to the representation exist or not. And second, the pleasure or pain connected with the object of desire does not always precede the activity of desire; nor can it be regarded in every case as the cause, but it may

aversion there

is

pain, the susceptibility for

;

as well be the effect of that activity.

The

ca-

in reference to red, sweet,

just

stated,

And

for the reason

pleasure and pain considered in

themselves cannot be more precisely denned. All that can be further done with regard to

them they

is

merely to point out what consequences

may have

make

in certain relations, in

them

the knowledge of

order to

available prac-

tically.

The pleasure which is necessarily connected with the activity of desire, when the representation of the object desired affects the capacity of feeling, may be called practical pleasure. And this designation is applicable whether the pleasure

is

the cause or the effect of the desire.

On

pacity of experiencing pleasure or pain on the

the other hand, that pleasure which

occasion of a mental representation is called "feeling," because pleasure and pain contain

essarily connected with the desire of an object,

only what

existence of the object, but

is

subjective in the relations of our

mental activity. They do not involve any relation to an object that could possibly furnish a knowledge of it as such; they cannot even give us a knowledge of our own mental state. For even sensations, 1 considered apart from the 1

The

fined

sensibility as the faculty of sense may be deto the subjective nature of our repre-

by reference

sentations generally. It is the understanding that first refers the subjective representations to an object; it alone thinks anything by means of these representations. Now, the subjective nature of our representations might be of such a kind that they could be related to objects so as to furnish knowledge of them, either in regard to their form or matter in the former relation by pure perception, in the latter by sensation proper. In this case, the sense-faculty, as the capacity for receiving objective representations, would be properly called senseperception. But mere mental representation from its subjective nature cannot, in fact, become a constituent of objective knowledge, because it contains merely the relation of the representations to the subject, and includes nothing that can be used for attaining a knowledge of the object. In this case, then, this receptivity of the mind for subjective representations is called feeling.

—

385

and which, therefore,

is

is

not nec-

not a pleasure in the is

merely attached may be called

to a mental representation alone,

inactive complacency, or pleasure.

The

mere contemplative

feeling of this latter kind of pleas-

is what is called taste. Hence, in a system of practical philosophy, the contemplative pleas-

ure

ure of taste will not be discussed as an essential constituent conception, but need only be referred to incidentally or episodically. But as re-

gards practical pleasure,

it is

otherwise. For the

determination of the activity of the faculty of desire or appetency, which is necessarily preceded by this pleasure as its cause, is what properly constitutes desire in the strict sense of the

term. Habitual desire, again, constitutes incli-

nation; and the connection of pleasure with the It includes the effect of the representations, whether sensible or intellectual, upon the subject; and it belongs to the sensibility, although the representation itself may belong to the understanding or the reason.

INTRODUCTION

386

connection

activity of desire, in so far as this

judged by the understanding to be valid according to a general rule holding good at least

is

for

the individual,

is

what

called interest.

is

eluded the volitional act of choice, and also the mere act of wish, in so far as reason may deter-

mine the faculty of desire

The

in its activity.

act of choice that can be determined

by pure That act

Hence, in such a case, the practical pleasure is an interest of the inclination of the individual. On the other hand, if the pleasure can only fol-

reason constitutes the act of free-will. which is determinable only by inclination as a sensuous impulse or stimulus would be irra-

low a preceding determination of the faculty it is an intellectual pleasure, and the interest in the object must be called a rational

tional

The

(arbitrium brutum).

brute choice

of desire,

human

interest; for were the interest sensuous, and not based only upon pure principles of reason, sensation would necessarily be conjoined with the pleasure, and would thus determine the ac-

by such impulses or stimuli, but is not determined by them; and it is, therefore, not pure in itself when taken apart from the acquired habit of determination by reason. But it may be determined to action by the pure will. The freedom of the act of volitional

Where an

tivity of the desire.

entirely pure in-

in

act of choice, however, as

human,

is

fact affected

be viewed, not as the cause, but as the effect of the rational interest; and we might call it the

independence of being determined stimuli. This forms the negative conception of the free-will. The positive conception of freedom is given by the fact that the will is the capability of pure reason to be practical of itself. But this is not possible otherwise than by the maxim of every action being subjected to the condition of being practicable as a universal law. Applied as pure reason to the act of choice, and considered apart from its objects, it may be regarded as the

non-sensuous or rational inclination (propensio concupiscence is to be

faculty of principles; and, in this connection, it is the source of practical principles. Hence it

distinguished from the activity of desire

is

terest of reason

must be assumed,

it is

not

le-

an interest of inclination surreptitiously. However, in order to gitimate to introduce into

conform so

far with the

we may allow

it

common

phraseology,

the application of the

term "in-

clination" even to that which can only be the

object of an "intellectual" pleasure in the sense of a habitual desire arising from a pure interest of reason. But such inclination

would have

to

intellectualis). Further,

as a stimulus or incitement to It is

its

itself,

determination.

always a sensuous state of the mind, which itself attain to the definiteness of an

does not

power of

act of the

The

activity of

desire.

may

the faculty of desire

in

according to liking. In so far as the activity

is

ac-

companied with the consciousness of the power it forms

of the action to produce the object,

an act of choice; if this consciousness is not conjoined with it, the activity is called a wish.

The

faculty of desire, in so far as

ciple of determination as the

or predilection

lies in

constitutes the will.

inner prin-

its

ground of

its

liking

the reason of the subject,

The

will

is

therefore the

faculty of active desire or appetency, viewed

not so

much

in relation to the action

the relation of the act of choice relation

to

—

—which

is

as rather in

the principle that determines the

power of choice

to the action. It has, in itself,

is its

to be

viewed as a lawgiving faculty. But as upon which to construct a law is

the material

not furnished to of the is

accordance with conceptions; and in so far as the principle thus determining it to action is found in the mind, and not in its object, it constitutes a power of acting or not acting

proceed

choice

by sensuous impulses or

maxim

it,

it

can only

make

the

form

of the act of will, in so far as

available as a universal law, the

it

supreme law

and determining principle of the will. And as the maxims, or rules of human action derived from subjective causes, do not of themselves necessarily agree with those that are objective

and universal, reason can only prescribe

this su-

preme law as an absolute imperative of prohibition or command. The laws of freedom, as distinguished from the laws of nature, are moral laws. So far as

they refer only to external actions and their lawfulness, they are called juridical; but if they also require that, as laws, they shall themselves be the determining principles of our actions, they are ethical. The agreement of an action with juridical laws is its legality; the agreement of an action with ethical laws is its morality.

The freedom

to

which the former laws

can only be freedom

refer,

in external practice;

but

the freedom to which the latter laws refer

is

properly no special principle of determination, but in so far as it may determine the voluntary

exercise of the activity of the will in so far as

act of choice,

it is

Under

it

is

the practical reason

itself.

may

be in-

the will, taken generally,

freedom

in the internal as well as the external

determined by laws of reason. So, in theoit is said that only the ob-

retical philosophy,

TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS

387

jects of the external senses are in space, but all

or the internal action of the will,

the objects both of internal and external sense

pure practical laws of reason for the free ac-

because the representations of both, as being representations, so far belong all to the internal sense. In like manner, whether

time be inner principles for its determination, although they may not always be considered in

freedom

this relation.

are in

time;

is

viewed

in reference to the external

II.

It has

tivity of the will generally,

must

its

laws, as

at the

same

THE IDEA AND NECESSITY OF A METAPHYSIC OF MORALS

been shown in The Metaphysical PrinNature that there must

ciples a priori as a foundation for

may sound

it.

For how-

ciples of the Science of

ever plausible

be principles a priori for the natural science that has to deal with the objects of the external senses.

even prior to experience, can comprehend by what means we may attain to a lasting enjoyment of the real pleasures of life, yet all that is

sible,

taught on this subject a priori

And it was further shown that it is posand even necessary, to formulate a system of these principles under the name of a "meta-

it

to say that reason,

is

either tauto-

assumed wholly without foundaonly experience that can show what

logical, or is

physical science of nature," as a preliminary to

tion. It is

experimental physics regarded as natural science

will

applied to particular objects of experience. But

directed towards nourishment, the sexual in-

be taken to keep its error, may accept many propositions as universal on the evidence of experience, although if the term "universal" be taken in its strict sense, these would necessarily have to be deduced by the metaphysical

stinct, or the

this latter science, if care

generalizations

free

from

science from principles a priori. Thus Newton accepted the principle of the equality of action

and reaction as established by experience, and it as a universal law over the whole of material nature. The chemists go even farther, grounding their most general laws regarding the combination and decomposition of the materials of bodies wholly upon experience; and yet they trust so completely to the universality and necessity of those laws that they have no anxiety as to any error being found in propositions founded upon experiments conducted in accordance with them. But it is otherwise with moral laws. These,

yet he extended

in

contradistinction to natural laws, are only

valid as laws, in so far as they can be rationally

comprehended as necessary. In fact, conceptions and judgements regarding ourselves and our conduct have no moral significance, if they contain only what may be learned from experience; and when any one is. so to speak, misled into making a moral principle out of anything derived from this lat-

established a priori and

ter source,

he

is

the coarsest and If

already in danger of falling into

most

fatal errors.

bring us enjoyment.

The

natural impulses

tendency to rest and motion, as

well as the higher desires of honour, the acquisition of knowledge,

and such like, as developed with our natural capacities, are alone capable of showing in what those enjoyments are to be found. And, further, the knowledge thus acquired is available for each individual merely

own way; and it is only thus he can learn means by which he has to seek those enjoy-

in his

the

ments. All specious rationalizing a priori, in this is nothing at bottom but carrying facts of experience up to generalizations by in-

connection,

duction (secundum principia generalia non universalia) and the generality thus attained is still so limited that numberless exceptions must be allowed to every individual in order that he may ;

mode of life to his particular inclinations and his capacity for pleasure. And, after all, the individual has really adapt the choice of his

own

to acquire his

prudence at the cost of

his

own

suffering or that of his neighbors.

But

it is

of morality.

quite otherwise with the principles They lay down commands for ev-

ery one without regard to his particular inclina-

and merely because and so far as he is and has a practical reason. Instruction in the laws of morality is not drawn from obsertions, free,

vation of oneself or of our animal nature, nor from perception of the course of the world in regard to what happens, or how men act. 1 But reason commands how we ought to act, even al-

the philosophy of morals were nothing

more than a theory of happiness (eudaemonism), it would be absurd to search after prin-

1 This holds notwithstanding the fact that the term "morals," in Latin mores, and in German sitten, signifies originally only manners or mode of life.

INTRODUCTION

388

though no example of such action were to be found; nor does reason give any regard to the

of man. This science would contain only the

subjective conditions that hinder or favor the

advantage which may accrue to us by so acting, and which experience could alone actually show.

realization in practice of the universal moral

For. although reason allows us to seek what is for our advantage in every possible way. and

gating, spreading,

although, founding upon the evidence of experience, it may further promise that greater adwill probably follow on the average from the observance of her commands than from their transgression, especially if prudence

vantages

guides the conduct, yet the authority of her precepts as commands does not rest on such consid-

They are used by reason only as counand by way of a counterpoise against seductions to an opposite course, when adjusting beforehand the equilibrium of a partial balance in the sphere of practical judgement, in order erations.

sels,

thereby to secure the decision of this judgement, according to the due weight of the a priori principles of a

pure practical reason.

Metaphysics designates any system of knowledge a priori that consists of pure conceptions. Accordingly, a practical philosophy not having nature, but the freedom of the will for its object, will presuppose and require a metaphysic of morals. It is even a duty to have such a metaphysic and every man does, indeed, possess it in himself, although commonly but in an obscure way. For how could any one believe that he has a source of universal law in himself, ;

without principles a priori? And just as in a metaphysics of nature there must be principles

laws

in

human

nature, with the

means

of propa-

and strengthening the moral principles as by the education of the young and the instruction of the people and all other such doctrines and precepts founded upon experience and indispensable in themselves, although

—

—

they must neither precede the metaphysical investigation of the principles of reason, nor be

mixed up with it. For. by doing so, there would be a great danger of laying down false, or at least very flexible moral laws, which would hold forth as unattainable what is not attached only because the law has not been comprehended and presented in its purity, in which also its strength

and mixed momight be adopted instead of what is dutiful and good in itself; and these would furnish no certain moral principles either for the guidance consists. Or, otherwise, spurious

tives

of the

judgement or for the

discipline of the

heart in the practice of duty. It

is

only by pure

reason, therefore, that duty can and

must be

prescribed.

The higher division of philosophy, under which the division just mentioned stands, is into theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy. Practical philosophy is just moral philosophy in its widest sense, as has been explained elsewhere. 1 All that is practicable and possible, according to natural laws, the activity of art, and

is

its

the special subject of

precepts and rules en-

regulating the application of the universal su-

tirely

depend on the theory of nature.

preme

principles of nature to objects of experi-

what

is

ence, so there cannot but be such principles in

dom

that can have principles independent of

the metaphysic of morals;

and we

will

often

have to deal objectively with the particular nature of man as known only by experience, in order to show in it the consequences of these universal moral principles. But this mode of dealing with these principles in their particular

way detract from their throw doubt on their a priori

applications will in no rational purity, or origin.

In other words, this

amounts

to saying

that a metaphysic of morals cannot be founded

on anthropology as the empirical science of num. but may be applied to it.

The counterpart of a metaphysic of morals, and the other member of the division of practical philosophy, would be a moral anthropology, as the empirical science of the moral nature

It is

only

practicable according to laws of free-

no theory in relation to what determinations of nature. Philosophy therefore cannot embrace under its practical division a technical theory, but only a morally practical doctrine. But if the dexterity of the will in acting according to laws of freedom, in contradistinction to nature, were to be also called an art, it would necessarily indicate an art which would make a system of freedom possible like the system of nature. This would truly be a Divine art, if we were in a position by means of it to realize completely what reason prescribes to us, and to put the idea theory, for there

is

passes beyond the

into practice. l

In the Critique of Judgement (1790).

TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS III.

THE DIVISION OF A METAPHYSIC OF MORALS

whether relating to internal or external action, and whether prescribed a priori by mere reason or laid down by the will of another, involves two elements: First, a law which represents the action that ought to happen as necessary objectively, thus making the action a duty; second, a motive which connects All legislation,

the principle determining the will to this action with the mental representation of the law subjectively, so that the law

of the action. is

By

the

makes duty the motive

first

element, the action

represented as a duty, in accordance with the

mere

theoretical

knowledge of the possibility of

determining the activity of the will by practical rules. By the second element, the obligation so to act

is

connected

in the subject

with a deter-

mining principle of the will as such. All legislation, therefore, may be differentiated by reference to

its

motive-principle. 1

The

legislation

which makes an action a duty, and this duty at the same time a motive, is ethical. That legislation which does not include the motive-principle in the law, and consequently admits another motive than the idea of duty itself, is juridical.

In respect of the latter,

it is

evident that the

motives distinct from the idea of duty, to which it may refer, must be drawn from the subjective (pathological) influences of inclination

and

of aversion, determining the voluntary activity,

and especially from the latter; because it is a legislation which has to be compulsory, and not merely a mode of attracting or persuading. The agreement or non-agreement of an action with the law, without reference to its motive, is its legality; and that character of the action in which the idea of duty arising from the law at the same time forms the motive of the action, is

its

morality.

Duties specially in accord with a juridical legislation can only be external duties. For this

mode

389

of legislation does not require that the

idea of the duty, which

is internal, shall be of the determining principle of the act of will; and as it requires a motive suitable to the nature of its laws, it can only connect what is

itself

external with the law. Ethical legislation, on the other hand, makes internal actions also duties,

but not to the exclusion of the external, for it embraces everything which is of the nature of 1 This ground of division will apply, although the action which it makes a duty may coincide with another action that may be otherwise looked at from another point of view. For instance, actions may in all cases be classified as external.

And

duty.

just because ethical legislation in-

cludes within

its

law the internal motive of the

action as contained in the idea of duty,

it

volves a characteristic which cannot at

enter

all

in-

is external. Hence, ethicannot as such be external, not even when proceeding from a Divine will, although it may receive duties which rest on an

into the legislation that

cal legislation

external legislation as duties, into the position of motives, within

its

own

legislation.

From what

has been said, it is evident that all duties, merely because they are duties, belong to ethics; and yet the legislation upon

which they are founded in all cases

is

not on that account

On

contained in ethics.

many of them lies Thus ethics commands that the law of

the contrary,

outside of ethics. I

must

fulfil

a

promise entered into by contract, although the other party might not be able to compel me to do so. It adopts the law (pacta sunt servanda) and the duty corresponding to it, from jurisprudence or the science of right, by which they are established. It is not in ethics, therefore, but in jurisprudence, that the principle of the legislation

lies,

"promises made and accepted

that

must be kept." Accordingly, teaches that

if

ethics

specially

the motive-principle of external

compulsion which juridical legislation connects with a duty is even let go, the idea of duty alone

motive. For were and were the legislation itself not juridical, and consequently the duty arising from it not specially a duty of right as distinguished from a duty of virtue, then fidelity in the performance of acts, to which the individual may be bound by the terms of a contract, would have to be classified with acts of benevolence and the obligation that underlies them, which cannot be correct. To keep one's promise is not properly a duty of virtue, but a duty of right, and the performance of it can be enforced by external compulsion. But to keep one's promise, even when no compulsion can be applied to enit

is

not

force

sufficient of itself as a

so,

it, is,

at the

and a proof of

same

time, a virtuous action,

virtue.

Jurisprudence as the science of right, and ethics as the science of virtue, are therefore distinguished not so much by their different duties, as rather by the difference of the legislation which connects the one or the other kind of motive with their laws.

Ethical legislation

is

that which cannot be

external, although the duties

it

prescribes

may

be external as well as internal. Juridical legislation is that which may also be external. Thus

— INTRODUCTION

390

entered it is an external duty to keep a promise into by contract; but the injunction to do this merely because it is a duty, without regard to

any other motive, belongs exclusively

to

the

internal legislation. It does not belong thus to the ethical sphere as being a particular kind of

duty or a particular mode of action to which we are bound for it is an external duty in but it is beethics as well as in jurisprudence

—

—

cause the legislation in the case referred to is internal, and cannot have an external lawgiver, that the obligation

is

reckoned as belonging to

For the same reason, the duties of benevolence, although they are external duties as

ethics.

man-

obligations to external actions, are, in like

reckoned as belonging to ethics, because they can only be enjoined by legislation that is internal. Ethics has no doubt its own peculiar such as those towards oneself but it duties has also duties in common with jurisprudence, only not under the same mode of obligation. In ner,

—

—

short, the peculiarity of ethical legislation

is

to

enjoin the performance of certain actions merely because they are duties, and to make the principle of

IV.

duty

itself

—whatever be

its

source or

—the

motive of the acThus, then, there are many ethical duties that are directly such; and the all and inner legislation also makes the others

occasion

sole sufficing

tivity of the will.

—

each of them indirectly ethical. The deduction of the division of a system is the proof of its completeness as well as of its continuity, so that there sition

the

may

be a logical tran-

from the general conception divided

members

to

of the division, and through the

whole series of the subdivisions without any break or leap in the arrangement (divisio per saltum). Such a division is one of the most difficult conditions for the architect of a system to fulfil. There is even some doubt as to what is the highest conception that is primarily divided into right and wrong (aut fas aut nejas). It is assuredly the conception of the activity of the free-will in general. In like manner, the expounders of ontology start from something and nothing, without perceiving that these are already members of a division for which the highest divided conception is awanting, and which can be no other than that of thing in general.

GENERAL PRELIMINARY CONCEPTIONS DEFINED AND EXPLAINED (Philosophia practica universalis)

The conception of freedom is a conception of pure reason. It is therefore transcendent in so far as regards theoretical philosophy; for it is a conception for which no corresponding instance

able to the pure will, but as often contrary to

these laws appear as imperatives

it,

commanding

or prohibiting certain actions; and as such they are

categorical

or

unconditional imperatives.

example can be found or supplied in any possible experience. Accordingly freedom is not presented as an object of any theoretical knowledge that is possible for us. It is in no respect a constitutive, but only a regulative conception; and it can be accepted by the speculative reason as at most a merely negative principle. In the practical sphere of reason, however, the reality of freedom may be demonstrated by certain practical principles which, as laws, prove a causality of the pure reason in the process of de-

Their categorical and unconditional character distinguishes them from the technical imperatives which express the prescriptions of art, and which always command only conditionally. According to these categorical imperatives, certain actions are allowed or disallowed as being mor-

termining the activity of the will that

a pleasure or pain of a peculiar kind,

or

pendent of

And

all

is

inde-

empirical and sensible conditions.

thus there

is

established the fact of a pure

will existing in us as the

source of

all

moral

conceptions and laws.

On the

this positive

practical

conception of freedom in

relation

certain

practical laws are founded,

unconditional

and they specially

ally possible or impossible;

and certain of them

or their opposites are morally necessary and obligatory. Hence, in reference to such actions,

there arises the conception of a duty whose ob-

servance or transgression

is

accompanied with

known

as

moral feeling. We do not, however, take the moral feelings or sentiments into account in considering the practical laws of reason. For they do not form the foundation or principle of practical laws of reason, but only the subjective effects that arise in the

mind on

the occasion

of our voluntary activity being determined

by

constitute moral laws. In relation to us as human beings, with an activity of will modified

these laws.

by sensible influences so

the moral laws in the judgement of reason, such

as not to be

conform-

And

while they neither add to nor take from the objective validity or influence of

— TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS may vary

according to the differences of the individuals who experience them. The following conceptions are common to

sentiments

jurisprudence and ethics as the two main divisions of the metaphysic of morals. Obligation is the necessity of a free action

when viewed

in relation to a categorical

An

tive of reason.

imperative

impera-

a practical rule

is

action, otherwise contingent in it-

by which an self, is made

necessary. It

is

distinguished

from

a practical law in that such a law, while likewise representing the action as necessary, does not consider whether it is internally necessary as involved in the nature of the agent

—

holy being

man

or

—say

as a

contingent to him, as in the

is

we

him; for where the first condition holds good, there is in fact no imperative. Hence an imperative is a rule which not only represents but makes a subjectively contingent action necessary; and it, accordingly, case of

as

find

represents the subject as being (morally) necessitated to act in accordance with this rule.

categorical or unconditional imperative

is

A

one

which does not represent the action in any way mediately through the conception of an end that is to be attained by it; but it presents the action

mind

to the

as objectively necessary

by

the

mere representation of its form as an action, and thus makes it necessary. Such imperatives cannot be put forward by any other practical science than that which prescribes obligations, and it is only the science of morals that does this. All other imperatives are technical, and they are altogether conditional. The ground of the possibility of categorical imperatives

lies

they refer to no determination of the activity of the will by which a purpose might be assigned to it, but solely to its freedom. Every action is allowed (licitum) which is not in the fact that

contrary to obligation; and this freedom not beby an opposing imperative, consti-

391

the categorical imperative

command

or prohibition, according as the doing

or not doing of an action

An

duty.

action which

indifferent

merae

It

mandati

hibitiva, lex

order that one act, or to

If

(il-

Duty

is

the

which anyone

it

were

is

may

be free in such relations to

so,

the moral right in question would

—

his choice in the exercise of his will.

—

as the actor or doer of the deed

Duty

is,

imputed

to him.

therefore, nothing but the

of ourselves in different states of the identity of

our existence. Hence li follows that a person is properly subject to no other laws than those he

down

A

thing

for himself, either alone or in con-

is

what

is

alis).

one and the same, and yet we in various ways.

may

be bound to

it

is

ject of imputation.

obligation. It

be

is

Moral personality freedom of a rational being under moral laws; and it is to be distinguished from psychological freedom as the mere faculty by which we become conscious

his actions

bound by an

may

The agent

regarded through the act, the author of its effect; and this effect, along with the action itself, may be imputed to him, if he previously knew the law in virtue of which an obligation rested upon him. A person is a subject who is capable of having

dom,

as regards the action concerned

—

as,

to

obligation.

also

;

any action all

is

ferent in themselves (adiaphora) for no special law would be required to establish such a right, considered according to moral laws. An action is called an act or moral deed in so far as it is subject to laws of obligation, and consequently in so far as the subject of it is regarded with reference to the freedom of

designation of

therefore the subject-matter of

there

vetiti),

forbear from acting, at his pleasure?

tivity of the will,

licita).

et

not, in all cases, refer to actions that are indif-

once eviillicit

may

required a permissive law (lex permissiva), in

junction with others.

this it is at

commanded

(indifferens,

facultatis).

lays

From

represented as a

adiaphoron, res be asked whether there are such morally indifferent actions; and if there are, whether in addition to the preceptive and prohibitive law (lex praeceptiva et proally

tutes a moral right as a warrant or title of action

(facultas moralis).

is

neither

is

nor forbidden is merely allowed, because there is no law restricting freedom, nor any duty in respect of it. Such an action is said to be mor-

ing limited

dent what actions are disallowed or

a law either of

is

is

incapable of being the sub-

Every object which

of the free ac-

void of freetherefore called a thing (res corporeis itself

Right or wrong applies, as a general quality, an act (rectum aut minus rectum), in so far as it is in accordance with duty or contrary to duty (factum licitum aut illicitum) no matter what may be the subject or origin of the duty itself. An act that is contrary to duty is called a transgression (reatus). to

J

The

categorical imperative, as expressing an

obligation in respect to certain actions, is a morally practical law. But because obligation involves not merely practical necessity expressed in a

law as such, but also actual necessitation,

An which

unintentional is,

transgression

of

a duty,

nevertheless, imputable to a person,

— INTRODUCTION

392 is

called a

mere

transgression

—

An

fault (culpa).

that

intentional

an act accompanied with

is,

the consciousness that

it

a transgression

is

same time

constitutes a crime (dolus).

Whatever

juridically in accordance with

is

external laws

is

and whatever

said to be just (jus, instum)

with external laws

A

;

not juridically in accordance

is

collision of duties or obligations (collisio s. obligationum) would be the result

officiorum

of such a relation between

them

that the one

would annul the other, in whole or in part. Duty and obligation, however, are conceptions which express the objective practical necessity of certain actions, and two opposite rules cannot be objective and necessary at the same time; for it is a duty to act according to one of them, is

not only no duty to act according to an op-

posite rule, but to do so

Hence a

to duty.

tions

is

would even be contrary and obliga-

collision of duties

entirely

(obligationes

inconceivable

is

known by

also valid objectively can

For reason brings the principle any action to the test, by calling

cal imperative.

or

maxim

of

upon the agent with

it

to think of himself in connection

same time laying down

as at the

is

so qualified as to be

for entering into such

fit

a universal legislation.

The

simplicity of this law, in comparison wiili

the great and manifold consequences which

may

be drawn from it, as well as its commanding authority and supremacy without the accom-

paniment of any certainly at

first

motive or sanction, must appear very surprising. And we

visible

may

determine the activity of the

non obligan-

a uni-

versal law, and to consider whether his action

grounds of obligation (rationes obligandi), connected with an individual under a rule prescribed for himself, and yet neither the one nor the other may be sufficient to constitute an actual obligation (rationes obligandi

place, ac-

the criterion of the categori-

non colliduntur) There may, however, be two .

first

cording to their subjective principle; but whether this principle

if it

must

as a universal law." Actions

therefore be considered, in the

only be

unjust (unjustum).

is

may be rendered by the following formula: "Act according to a maxim which can be adopted at the generally what constitutes obligation. It

well

wonder

at the

power

idea of the qualification of a

of our reason to will

by the mere

maxim

for the uni-

versality of a practical law, especially

when we

are taught thereby that this practical moral law first

reveals a property of the will which the

come up-

tes);

speculative reason would never have

losophy does not say that the stronger obligation is to keep the upper hand (fortior obligatio

on either by principles a priori, or from any experience whatever; and even if it had ascertained the fact, it could never have theoretically established its possibility. This practical law, how-

and in that case the one of them is not a duty. If two such grounds of obligation are actually in collision with each other, practical phi-

vincit), but that the stronger

gation

is

ground of

obli-

to maintain its place (fortior obligandi

Obligatory is

Laws

for

which an external

legis-

possible are called generaPy external

Those external laws, the obligatoriness of which can be recognised by reason a priori even without an external legislation, are called natural laws. Those laws, again, which are not oblig-

laws.

atory without actual external legislation, are called

positive

An

laws.

external

containing pure natural laws,

is

legislation,

therefore con-

ceivable; but in that case a previous natural law

must be presupposed to establish the authority of the lawgiver by the right to subject others to obligation through his

The duty

is

ty of the will, which

is

Hence

it

freedom, but irrefutably will be less surprising to find that the moral laws are undemonstrable, and yet apodeictic, like the mathematical postulates; and that they, at the same time, open up before us a whole field of practical knowledge, from which reason, on its theoretical side, must find itself entirely excluded with its speculative idea of freedom and all such ideas of the superestablishes

ratio vincit).

lation

ever, not only discovers the fact of that proper-

own

principle which

a practical law.

act of will.

makes

The

a certain action a

rule of the agent or

it.

sensible generally.

The conformity of an action to the law of duty constitutes its legality; the conformity of the maxim of the action with the law constitutes its

morality.

A maxim

ciple of action,

rule for himself as to

On

is

thus a subjective prin-

which the individual makes a

how

in fact

he will act.

the other hand, the principle of duty

is

which he forms as a principle for himself on subjective grounds, is called his maxim. Hence, even when the law is one and invariable, the maxims of the agent may yet be very dif-

what reason absolutely, and therefore objectively and universally, lays down in the form of a

ferent.

The supreme principle of the science of morals accordingly is this: "Act according to a

actor,

The

categorical

imperative

only expresses

command

to the individual, as to

how he ought

to act.

TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS maxim which can likewise be valid as sal law." Every maxim which is not according to this condition

is

a univerqualified

contrary to

Mo-

Laws

from the will, viewed generally as reason; maxims spring from the activ-

arise

practical

ity of the will in the process of choice.

man

is

what constitutes

free-will.

The The

lat-

will

which refers to nothing else than mere law can neither be called free nor not free, because it does not relate to actions immediately, but to the giving of a law for the maxim of actions; it is therefore the practical reason itself. Hence as a faculty,

and It

is

is,

393

servum; because the empirical proposition does not assert that any particular s.

characteristic necessarily belongs to the con-

ception in question, but this

rality.

ter in

trium brutum

it is

absolutely necessary in

itself,

not subject to any external necessitation. therefore, only the act of choice in the

voluntary process that can be called jree. The freedom of the act of will, however,

requisite in the

is

Freedom

process of definition.

in relation to the

internal legislation of reason can alone be prop-

power; the possibility of diverging is an incapacity or want of power. How then can the former be defined erly called a

from the law thus given

by the

latter? It could only be

by a

the free-will,

exercise as

its

rience; but this

would be

shown by expe-

a hybrid definition

which would exhibit the conception

A morally practical

law

is

a proposition which

He who commands by

He

choosing to act for or against the law. The vol-

not always the author of the law

untary process, indeed, viewed as a phenomenal appearance, gives many examples of this choosing in experience; and some have accordingly

latter case, the

made knowable by

the moral law,

is

it

is

known

only as a negative property in us, as constituted fact of not being necessitated to act by sensible principles of determination. Regarded

by the as a

man

noumenal

reality,

however,

in reference to

as a pure rational intelligence, the act of

the will cannot be at all theoretically exhibited; nor can it therefore be explained how this power can act necessitatingly in relation to the sensible activity in the process of choice, or consequent-

is

is

the

the author of the

lawgiver or legislator.

first

command.

a law (imperans)

not to be defined as a liberty of indifference (libertas indifferentae), that, is, as a capacity of

so defined the free-will. For freedom, as

in a false

light.

contains a categorical imperative or is

definition

which would add to the practical conception of

obligation that accompanies the law, but he itself.

is

In the

law would be positive, continand arbitrary. The law which is imposed upon us a priori and unconditionally by our own reason may also be expressed as proceeding from the will of a supreme lawgiver or the Divine will. Such a will as supreme can consequently have only rights and not duties; and it only indicates the idea of a moral being whose will is law for gent,

all,

without conceiving of him as the author of

that will.

Imputation, in the moral sense,

ment by which anyone

is

is

the judge-

declared to be the

author or free cause of an action which regarded as his moral fact or deed, and

When

is

then

is

sub-

what the positive quality of freedom consists. Only thus much we can see into and comprehend, that although man, as a being be-

is

longing to the world of sense, exhibits as experience shows a capacity of choosing not only

declaratory {imputatio dijudicatoria) That per-

ly in

—

—

conformably to the law but also contrary to it, his freedom as a rational being belonging to the world of intelligence cannot be defined by reference merely to sensible appearances. For sensible

phenomena cannot make

—such

—

a super-sensible

nor can freedom ever be placed in the mere fact that the rational subject can make a choice in conflict with his own law-giving reason, although experience may prove that it happens often enough, notwithstanding our inability to conceive how it is possible. For it is one thing to admit a proposition as based on experience, and another thing to make it the defining principle and the universal differentiating mark of the

object

as free-will

act of free-will, in

its

is

intelligible;

distinction

from the

arbi-

jected to law.

down

the judgement likewise lays

the juridical consequences of the deed,

judicial or valid (imputatio judiciaria

ida)

otherwise

;

it

s.

it

val-

would be only adjudicative or .

son

—individual

or collective

—who

invested with the right to impute actions judicially, is called a judge or a court (judex s. forum). When any one does, in conformity with duty, more than he can be compelled to do by the is

said to be meritorious (meritum). done only in exact conformity with the law, is what is due (debitum). And when less is done than can be demanded to be done by the law, the result is moral demerit (demeritum)

law,

it

What

is

is

or culpability.

The juridical effect or consequence of a culpable act of demerit is punishment (paena); that of a meritorious act is reward (praemium) ,

assuming that this reward was promised in the law and that it formed the motive of the

394 action.

The coincidence

or exact conformity of

conduct to what is due has no juridical effect. Benevolent remuneration (remuneratio s. repensio benefica) has no place in juridical rela-

the natural hindrances in the sphere of sense,

and the

much

The good

as also

stranger from great distress, and at very con-

the performance of an obligated action

from

—

from

—cannot be imputed The agent (modus imputationis good consequences of a meritorious action — a wrongful action bad consequences —may be imputed the agent (modus imputaa meritorious action

tollens).

to the

as

of

also the

to

tionis poneus).

The degree

of the imputability of actions

to be reckoned according to the

the moral hindrance of duty, so

more

failing to per-

or bad consequences arising

the consequences arising

less

is a good deed imputed as meriThis may be seen by considering such examples as rescuing a man who is an entire

tions.

form

the hindrances or obstacles which it has been necessary for them to overcome. The greater

is

magnitude of

the

torious.

siderable sacrifice. Conversely, the less the nat-

and the greater the hindrance on the ground of duty, so much the more is a transgression imputable as culpable. Hence the state of mind of the agent or doer of a deed makes a difference in imputing its consequences, according as he did it in passion or performed it with coolness and deliberation. ural hindrance,

CONTENTS

THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT Introduction to the Science of Right General Definitions and Divisions A. What the Science of Right is 397 B.

What

is

Legislative Power 408 There May, However, Be an External Mine and Thine Found as a Fact in the State of Nature, but it is only Provisory 408 Chap. II. The Mode of Acquiring Anything

Right?

397 398 C. Universal Principle of Right D. Right is Conjoined with the Title or Authority to Compel 398 E. Strict Right may be also Represented as the Possibility of a Universal Reciprocal Compulsion in harmony with the Freedom of All is

9.

External 10.

Laws 398 Supplementary Remarks on Equivocal Right (Jus 1.

11.

Aequivocum)

Sect. 11.

Natural Right and Positive Right Innate Right and Acquired Right

401 14.

401 C. Methodical Division of the Science of Right 402 The Science of Right First Part. Private Right The System of Those Laws which Require no External Promulgation The Principles of the External I.

The Meaning

of

410 410

a Real Right?

The

of such Acquisition

is

the Original

Community of the Soil Generally The Juridical Act of this Original

411 Acquisi-

Occupancy 412 Only within a Civil Constitution that Anything can be Acquired Peremptorily, whereas in the State of Nature Acquisition tion

Mine and

of

Having Anything Ex-

Own "Mine"

in

Right

(Meum

Juris) 2.

is

is

can only be Provisory 412 Exposition of the Conception of a Primary Acquisition of the Soil 414

Deduction of the Conception of the Original Primary Acquisition 414 Property 415 Sect. ii. Principles of Personal Right 18. Nature and Acquisition of Personal Right 17.

Of the Mode

ternal as One's 1.

Principles of Real Right

15. It is

16.

Thine Generally

Chap.

i.

What

bility

B. Universal Division of Rights

11.

409

First Acquisition of a Thing can only be that of the Soil 411 13. Every Part of the Soil may be Originally Acquired; and the Principle of the Possi12.

Division of the Science of Right A. General Division of the Duties of Right 400 (Juridical Duties) I.

Principle of External Acqui-

Division of the Subject of the Acquisition of the External Mine and Thine 410

399 399 400

Equity The Right of Necessity

The General sition

according to Universal

F.

only Possible in a Juridical or Civil State

of Society under the Regulation of a Public

403

Juridical Postulate of the Practical

Reason

416 416 417 417

by Contract Acquired by Contract?

19. Acquisition

3.

Possession and Ownership

403 404

20.

What

4.

Exposition of the Conception of the External

21.

Acceptance and Delivery

Mine and Thine 5.

Definition of the Conception of the External

Sect. hi. Principles of Personal Right that Real in Kind (Jus Realiter Personale)

6.

Mine and Thine 404 Deduction of the Conception of a Purely

404

Juridical Possession of an External Object

(Possessio 7.

Noumenon)

of Experience 8.

405

Application of the Principle of the Possibility of an External Mine and Thine to Objects

To Have Anything

407 External as One's

Own 395

is

is

Nature of Personal Right of a Real Kind 418 23. What is Acquired in the Household? 418 The Rights of the Family as a Domestic Society Title i. Conjugal Right (Husband and W ife) 24. The Natural Basis of Marriage 419 25. The Rational Right of Marriage 419 26. Monogamy and Equality in Marriage 419 22.

T

)

CONTENTS

396

Contract of Marriage 420 Title ii. Parental Right (Parent and Child 420 28. The Relation of Parent and Child 27. Fulfilment of the

29.

The Rights

Title

hi.

45.

The Form

46.

The

Master of a

421 the Rights Capable

49.

What What

I.

is

Juridical

423

II. is a Book? The Unauthorised Publishing

is Rightly Prohibited 425 Confusion of Personal and Real Right 426 Episodical Section. The Ideal Acquisition of External Objects of the Will 32. The Nature and Modes of Ideal Acquisition 426 ^t,. I. Acquisition by Usucapion (Acquisitio per Usucapionem) 426

after

Chap.

427 of a

ing

Conditioned by the Principle of a Public Court 429 I. The Contract of Donation (Pactum 37. Donationis) 429

39. III.

of

ties in the

50. Juridical

Offices

443 and Digni-

State

444

Relations of

51.

the

Citizen

to

his

Other Countries. EmigraBanishment; Exile tion; Immigration; 449 The Three Forms of the State. Autocracy:

Country and

Aristocracy; 52. Historical

to

Democracy

Origin

and

Changes.

A

450 Pure

Republic. Representative Government

450 II.

55.

of an

State Generally

441

The

The Right of Punishing and Pardoning 1. The Right of Punishing 446 11. The Right of Pardoning 449

E.

54.

by the Taking Oath (Cautio Juratoria) 432 Transition from Mine and Thine in the State of Nature to the Mine and Thine in the Juridical

Secular and Church Lands.

Church

Lost (Vindicatio)

431

Rights.

D. The Right of Assigning

53.

The Right

of Nations and International

Law (Jus Gentium) Nature and Division of the Right of Nations 452 Elements of the Right of Nations 452 Right of Going to War as related to the Subjects of the State

56.

Right of Going to

War

452 in relation to

Hostile

States 453 Right during War 454 58. Right after War 454 59. The Rights of Peace 455 60. Right as against an Unjust Enemy 455 61. Perpetual Peace and a Permanent Congress of Nations 455 III. The Universal Right of Mankind (Jus Cosmopoliticum) 62. Nature and Conditions of Cosmopolitical 57.

Related to the Natural and

Civil State

433

The Postulate of Public Right 434 Part II. Public Right The System of Those Laws Which Require 42.

Public Promulgation

The Principles of Right

in Civil

Society

and Division of Public Right 435 Right of the State and Constitutional

43. Definition

Law

Reform

spection

Loan (Commodatum)

40. IV. Acquisition of Security

I.

Revolution;

C. Relief of the Poor. Foundling Hospitals.

430 The Revindication of what has been

41. Public Justice as

the Nature of the Civil Union the Supreme Power; Treason;

of

Rights of Taxation; Finance; Police; In-

Death (Bona Fama Defuncti) 428 Conditioned by the

The Contract

438

439

III. Acquisition

II.

from

Land

B.

36.

38.

of the State

Dethronement;

Good Name

Sentence of a Public Judicatory How and What Acquisition is Subjectively

of

436 the State and the Original Con437

A. Right

by Inheritance (Acquisitio

haereditatis)

The Continuing Right

Members

of

Contrary to the Principles of

35. III.

the

Constitutional and Juridical Consequences aris-

425

Books is Right, and

Power and

Mutual Relations and Characteristics of the Three Powers 437 Distinct Functions of the Three Powers.

Autonomy

Book

Money?

34. II. Acquisition

435 Three Powers

tract

Concep422 Illustration of Relations of Contract by the Conceptions of Money and a Book a

Legislative

47. Dignities in

48.

Money and

its

430

Systematic Division of all of Being Acquired by Contract tions of

of the State and

the State

Servant 30. Relation and Right of the

31. Divisions of Contracts:

Union and Public Right

421

of the Parent

Household Right (Master and

Household

44. Origin of the Civil

(Jus Civitatis)

Right

CONCLUSION

456 457

INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT

GENERAL DEFINITIONS AND DIVISIONS A.

What

the Science of Right

in general, is

and what

recognised. All this

The

the laws which

all

is

A

object the

even from the practical

his empirical principles for a time

is

one

who

be

jurist until

he abandon and search

in the pure reason for the sources of such judgements, in order to lay a real foundation for ac-

emmay, indeed, furnish him with exguidance; but a merely empirical system

tual positive legislation. In this search, his pirical laws

cellent

that

practical jurisconsult (jurisperi-

tus), or a professional lawyer,

may

entirely hidden

possible to

called a jurist or jurisconsult (juris-

consultus).

and unjust,

its

promulgate by external legislation. Where there is such a legislation, it becomes, in actual application to it, a system of positive right and law; and he who is versed in the knowledge of this

system

just

it is

Science of Right has for

principles of

is

may remain

void of rational principles

is

wooden head

is

in

the fable of

is,

like the

Phaedrus, fine

laws,

enough in appearance, but unfortunately wants brain.

ed as belonging to jurisprudence {jurispruden-

i. The conception of right as referring to a corresponding obligation which is the moral aspect of it in the first place, has regard only to

But the

the external and practical relation of one person

knowledge of positive external and who can apply them to cases that may occur in experience. Such practical knowledge of positive right, and law, may be regardskilled in the

tial in the original sense of the term.

theoretical

—

—

knowledge of right and law in prinfrom positive laws and

to another, in so far as they can

ciple, as distinguished

upon each

empirical cases, belongs to the pure science of

their actions as facts.

right (juris s cientia)

The

.

science of right thus

philosophical

the

have influence

other, immediately or mediately,

by

In the second place, the conception of right does not indicate the relation of the action of an individual to the wish

and systematic knowledge of the principles of natural right. And it is from this science that the immutable principles of all positive legislation must be derived by practical jurists and lawgivers. designates

it

or the

mere

2.

desire of another, as in acts of be-

nevolence or of unkindness, but only the relation of his free action to the

of the other.

3.

And,

freedom of action

in the third place, in this

reciprocal relation of voluntary actions, the con-

B.

What

may

This question

is

ception of right does not take into consideration the matter of the act of will in so far as the end

Right?

be said to be about as em-

which any one

barrassing to the jurist as the well-known question, all

"What

the

more

is

truth?"

so, if,

on

is

to the logician. It

reflection,

is

he strives to

avoid tautology in his reply and recognise the fact that a reference to what holds true merely of the laws of some one country at a particular time is not a solution of the general problem thus proposed. It is quite easy to state what may be right in particular cases (quid sit juris), as being what the laws of a certain place and of a certain time say or may have said; but it is much

more

difficult to

have enacted

is

determine whether what they

right in itself,

universal criterion

by which

and

to lay

right

down

a

and wrong

is

may have

in

concerned. In other words,

view it is

in willing

not asked

it

in a

question of right whether any one on buying goods for his own business realizes a profit by the transaction or not but only the form of the transaction is taken into account, in considering the relation of the mutual acts of will. Acts of will or voluntary choice are thus regarded only in so far as they are free, and as to whether the action of one can harmonize with the freedom of another, according to a universal ;

law.

Right, therefore, comprehends the whole of the conditions under which the voluntary actions of

397

any one person can be harmonized

in

THE SCIENCE

398

reality with the voluntary actions of every other person, according to a universal law of free-

a hindrance of freedom, according to universal

dom.

is

C. Universal Principle of Right

sal law."

my

my

action or

condition general-

ing to universal laws,

it is

wrong; and the comis opposed to it is

right,

as being a hindering of a hindrance of

freedom, and as being in accord with the freedom which exists in accordance with universal laws. Hence, according to the logical principle of contradiction,

wrong who hinders me

pulsion to bear on any one

this action, or in the

in fact.

in the performance of maintenance of this condition. For such a hindrance or obstruction cannot coexist with freedom according to univer-

with an implied

it

maxims

maxim, that

is.

be adopted as

shall itself

make

that I shall

the

it

my

maxim

For any one may be free, although his freedom is entirely indifferent to me, or even if I wished in my heart to infringe it, so long as I do not actually violate that freedom by my external action. Ethics, however, as distinguished from jurisprudence, imposes upon me the obligation to make the fulfilment actions.

of right a

The

maxim of my

universal law of right

may

then be ex-

manner

may be able freedom of all others, according to a universal law." This is undoubtedly a law which imposes obligation upon me; but it does not at all imply and still less command that I ought, merely on account of this obligation, to limit my freedom to these very conditions. Reathat the free exercise of thy will to coexist with the

son in this connection says only that stricted thus far

by

its idea,

and

may

thus limited in fact by others; and as a postulate which

is

what

it

is

re-

be likewise it

lays this

not capable of fur-

ther proof. As the object in view virtue, but to explain

is

not to teach

thus far the law of right, as thus laid down, may not and should not be represented as a motive-principle right

is,

of action.

who may

violate

it

be also Represented as the

of All according to

—obligation according

D. Right

who

the part of one

ComFreedom Universal Laws

to a law,

and

a title

on

has bound another by his

own

free choice to compel him to perform. But imports that the conception of right may be viewed as consisting immediately in the possibility of

a universal reciprocal compulsion, in

harmony with

the freedom of its

all.

object only what

in actions, strict right, as that with

ing ethical

is

As

right in

is

external

which noth-

intermingled, requires no other

motives of action than those that are merely exit is then pure right and is unmixed with any prescriptions of virtue. A strict right, ternal; for

then, in the exact sense of the term,

is

that

which alone can be called wholly external. Now such right is founded, no doubt, upon the consciousness of the obligation of every individual according to the law; but if it is to be pure as such, it neither may nor should refer to this consciousness as a motive by which to determine the free act of the will. For this purpose, however, it founds upon the principle of the possibility of an external compulsion, such as may coexist with the freedom of every one according to universal laws. Accordingly, then, it is said that a creditor has a right to de-

where Conjoined with the Title or Authority to Compel

is

a debtor the

resistance which effect

of this effect and

is

is

opposed to any hin-

in reality a

furtherance

accordance with its accomplishment. Now, everything that is wrong is is

in

payment

mean merely

this

does not

him

to feel in his

to do this; but

drance of an

the

it

mand from

The

accompanied com-

is

This proposition means the right is not to be regarded as composed of two different elements

general has for

conduct.

pressed thus: "Act externally in such a

down

right

harmony with

pulsion in

cannot be demanded

as a matter of right, that this universal princi-

my

all

or warrant to bring

Possibility of a Universal Reciprocal

It follows also that

of

title

may

E. Strict Right

sal laws.

all

to freedom.

pulsion of constraint which

can coexist with the freedom of every other, according to a universal law, any one does me a ly

ple of

made

a hindrance or resistance

Consequently, if a certain exercise of freedom is itself a hindrance of the freedom that is accord-

"Every action is right which in itself, or in the maxim on which it proceeds, is such that it can coexist along with the freedom of the will of each and all in action, according to a univerIf, then,

laws; and compulsion or constraint of any kind

it

of his debt,

that he can bring

mind that reason obliges him means that he can apply an

external compulsion to force any such one so to pay,

and that

sistent with the

this compulsion is quite confreedom of all, including the

parties in question, according to a universal law.

OF RIGHT Right and the

same

title

to compel, thus indicate the

science of right, to which we are now about to advance; and we may consider them now by way of supplement to these introductory ex-

repre-

planations, in order that their uncertain condi-

thing.

The law

of right, as thus enunciated,

is

sented as a reciprocal compulsion necessarily in accordance with the freedom of every one, un-

tions

der the principle of a universal freedom. It is it were, a representative construction

right.

of the conception of right, by exhibiting

it in a pure intuitive perception a priori, after the analogy of the possibility of the free motions of bodies under the physical law of the equality of action and reaction. Now, as in pure mathe-

we cannot deduce

the properties of

its

objects immediately from a mere abstract conception, but can only discover

them by

figura-

tive construction or representation of its con-

ceptions; so

it is

ciple of right. It

manner with the prinnot so much the mere for-

in like is

mal conception of right, but rather that of a universal and equal reciprocal compulsion as harmonizing with it, and reduced under general

may

not exert a disturbing influence on

the fixed principles of the proper doctrine of

thus, as

matics,

399

F.

Supplementary Remarks on Equivocal Right (Jus aequivocum)

With every

right,

(jus strictum), there

compel. But

it is

in is

the strict acceptation

conjoined a right to

possible to think of other rights

of a wider kind (jus latum) in which the

title

compel cannot be determined by any law. Now there are two real or supposed rights of this kind equity and the right of necessity. The first alleges a right that is without compulsion; the second adopts a compulsion that is without right. This equivocalness, however, can be easily shown to rest on the peculiar fact that to

—

there are cases of doubtful right, for the de-

which no judge can be appointed.

laws, that

makes representation of that conception possible. But just as those conceptions presented in dynamics are founded upon a merely

cision of

formal representation of pure mathematics as presented in geometry, reason has taken care also to provide the understanding as far as pos-

Equity (aequitas), regarded objectively, does not properly constitute a claim upon the moral duty of benevolence or beneficence on the part of others; but whoever insists upon anything on the ground of equity, founds upon his right to the same. In this case, however, the conditions are awanting that are requisite for the function of a judge in order that he might determine what or what kind of satisfaction can be done to this claim. When one of the partners of a mercantile company, formed under the condition of equal profits, has, however, done more than the other members, and in consequence has also lost more, it is in accordance with eq-

with intuitive presentations a priori in behoof of a construction of the conception of right. The right in geometrical lines {rectum) is opposed, as the straight, to that which is curved and to that which is oblique. In the first opposition, there is involved an inner quality of the lines of such a nature that there is only sible

one straight or right

line possible

between two

given points. In the second case, again, the positions of

two intersecting or meeting

lines are of

such a nature that there can likewise be only one line called the perpendicular, which is not more inclined to the one side than the other, and it divides space on either side into two equal parts. After the manner of this analogy, the science of right aims at determining what every one shall have as his own with mathematical exactness; but this is not to be expected in the ethical science of virtue, as it cannot but allow a certain latitude for exceptions. But, without passing into the sphere of ethics, there are two cases known as the equivocal right of equity and necessity which claim a juridical decision, yet for which no one can be found to give such a decision, and which, as regards their relation

—

—

to rights, belong, as

it

were, to the "Intermun-

we must at the outset take apart from the special exposition of the

dia" of Epicurus. These

i.

Equity

demand from the company more than merely an equal share of advantage

uity that he should

with the if

we

rest.

— —he

But, in relation to strict right

think of a judge considering his case

can furnish no definite data to establish how much more belongs to him by the contract; and in case of an action at law, such a demand would be rejected. A domestic servant, again, who might be paid his wages due to the end of his year of service in a coinage that became deit would was when he entered on his engagement, cannot claim by right to be kept from loss on account of the unequal value of the money if he receives the due amount of it. He can only make an appeal on the ground of equity, a dumb goddess who

preciated within that period, so that

not be of the same value to

—

him

as

it

THE SCIENCE

4oo

—

cannot claim a hearing of right, because there was nothing bearing on this point in the contract of service, and a judge cannot give a decree on the basis of vague or indefinite conditions.

Hence

follows, that a court of equity, for

it

disputed

of

decision

the

questions

would involve a contradiction.

of

right,

only where

It is

rights are concerned, and in matwhich he can decide, that a judge may or ought to give a hearing to equity. Thus, if the Crown is supplicated to give an indemnity to

own proper

his

ters in

certain persons for loss or injury sustained in service,

its

may

it

undertake the burden of do-

ing so, although, according to strict right, the

claim might be rejected on the ground of the pretext that the parties in question undertook the performance of the service occasioning the

own risk. The dictum of equity may be put thus: "The strictest right is the greatest wrong" (summum loss, at their

jus

summa

But

injuria).

this evil

cannot be ob-

viated by the forms of right, although

relates

it

to a matter of right; for the grievance that

it

It is clear that the assertion of is

such a right

not to be understood objectively as being in

accordance with what a law would prescribe, but merely subjectively, as proceeding on the assumption of how a sentence would be pronounced by a court in the case. There can, in fact, be no criminal law assigning the penalty of death to a man who, when shipwrecked and struggling in extreme danger for his life, and in order to save it, may thrust another from a plank on which he had saved himself. For the punishment threatened by the law could not possibly have greater power than the fear of the loss of life in the case in question. Such a penal law would thus fail altogether to exercise its intended effect; for the threat of an evil which is still uncertain such as death by a jucould not overcome the fear of dicial sentence an evil which is certain, as drowning is in such

—

—

An

circumstances. tion, then,

act of violent self-preserva-

ought not to be considered as alto-

gether beyond condemnation (inculpabile)

;

it is

only to be adjudged as exempt from punishment (impunibile)

Yet

.

this subjective condition of

gives rise to can only be put before a "court of

impunity, by a strange confusion of ideas, has

conscience" (jorum poli), whereas every ques-

been regarded by

must be taken before a

tion of right

(forum

court

civil

The dictum

soli).

jurists as equivalent to objec-

tive lawfulness.

of the right of necessity

is

put

"Necessity has no law" (Necessitas non habet legem). And yet there cannot in these terms:

ii.

The

The Right of Necessity

so-called right of necessity (jus neces-

sitatis)

is

the supposed right or

the danger of losing the

life

of another

my own

who

title, in

life,

case of

away

to take

has, in fact,

done

me no

be a necessity that could

make what

and "the

It is

evident that, viewed as a doctrine of

sity," the equivocations involved arise

this

must involve a contradiction, For

interchange

makupon my life, and whom anticipate by depriving him of his own (jus not the case of a wrongful aggressor

I

inculpatae tutelae)

;

nor consequently

is

question merely of the recommendation of

it

a

mod-

eration which belongs to ethics as the doctrine of

i

irtue,

and not to jurisprudence as the doc-

trine of right. It

is

a question of the allowable-

ness of using violence against one

who has used

none against me.

of

the

objective

re-

right of neces-

right,

this is

wrong

judgements

It is apparent, then, that in

lating both to "equity"

harm.

ing an unjust assault

is

lawful.

from an and subjective

grounds that enter into the application of the principles of right, when viewed respectively by reason or by a judicial tribunal. What one may have good grounds for recognising as right,

may

in itself,

of justice;

wrong, in a court.

not find confirmation in a court

and what he must consider

itself,

And

may

the reason of this

ception of right

is

to

be

obtain recognition in such is

that the con-

not taken in the two cases in

one and the same sense.

DIVISION OF THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT A. General Division of the Duties of Right (Juridical Duties)

In this division we may very conveniently follow Ulpian, if his three formulae are taken in a general sense, which may not have been quite

clearly in his mind, but

which they are capable

of being developed into or of receiving.

They

are the following:

i.

Honeste vive. "Live rightly." Juridical rechonour (honestas juridica), consists

titude, or

OF RIGHT in

own worth

maintaining one's

tion to others. This

the proposition:

duty

"Do

not

as a

may

man

in rela-

There

be rendered by

make

thyself a

for the use of others, but be to

means

mere them

independence of the compulsory and in so far as it can coexist with the freedom of all according to a universal law, it is the one sole original, inborn right belonging to every man in virtue of his humanity. There is, indeed, an innate equality belonging to every man which consists in his right to be independent of being bound by others to any-

Freedom

(lex justi).

laede.

"Do wrong

to

no one."

This formula may be rendered so as to mean: "Do no wrong to any one, even if thou shouldst be under the necessity, in observing this duty, to cease from all connection with others and to avoid 3.

all

is

his

is

more than

that to

which he

ciprocally bind them. It

is,

may

also re-

consequently, the

man in virtue of which own master by right (sui

inborn quality of every

he ought to be his

cuique tribue. "Assign to every one own." This may be rendered, "En-

wrong cannot be avoided,

ter, if

thing

society" (lex juridica).

Suum

what

Freedom

will of another;

be explained likewise an end." This duty in the next formula as an obligation arising out of the right of humanity in our own person

Neminem

only one Innate Right,

is

the Birthright of

will

2.

401

juris).

There

is,

also, the natural quality of just-

ness attributable to a

into a society

man

as naturally of

unim-

may have secured own." If this formula were to be simply translated, "Give every one his own," it would express an absurdity, for we cannot give any one what he already has. If it is to have a definite meaning, it must therefore run thus: "Enter into a state in which every

peachable right (justi), because he has done no wrong to any one prior to his own juridical ac-

one can have what is his own secured against the action of every other" (lex justitiae).

it;

with others in which every one to

him what

is

his

tions.

And, further, there

common action on the that he may do towards

of

is

others what does not

infringe their rights or take is

also the innate right

part of every man, so

away anything

such as merely to communicate thought, to anything, or to promise something

narrate

whether truly and honestly, or untruly and

These three

classical formulae, at the

same

time, represent principles which suggest a division of the

system of juridical duties into

inter-

nal duties, external duties, and those connecting duties

from

which contain the

latter as

the principle of the former

deduced

I. Natural Right and Positive Right. The system of rights, viewed as a scientific system of doctrines, is divided into natural right and positive right. Natural right rests upon pure

rational principles a priori; positive or statutory is

what proceeds from the

honestly

(veriloquim aut jalsiloquim)

,

dis-

for

it

upon these others whether they believe or trust in it or not. 1 But all these

rests entirely will

rights or titles are already included in the principle of innate

freedom, and are nut really disit, even as dividing members

tinguished from

by subsumption.

B. Universal Division of Rights

right

that

theirs unless they are willing to appropriate

will of a legis-

under a higher species of right. The reason why such a division into separate rights has been introduced into the system of natural right, viewed as including all that is innate, was not without a purpose. Its object was to enable proof to be more readily put forward in case of any controversy arising about an acquired right, and questions emerging either with reference to a fact that might be in doubt, or, if

lator.

Innate Right and Acquired Right. The system of rights may again be regarded in reference to the implied powers of dealing morally II.

with others as bound by obligations, that furnishing a legal

title

is,

as

of action in relation to

them. Thus viewed, the system is divided into innate right and acquired right. Innate right is that right which belongs to every one by nature,

independent of all juridical acts of experience. Acquired right is that right which is founded upon such juridical acts. Innate right may also be called the "internal mine and thine" (meum vel tuum internum) for external right must always be acquired. ;

1 It is customary to designate every untruth that is spoken intentionally as such, although it may be in a frivolous manner, a lie, or falsehood (mendacium), because it may do harm, at least in so far as any one who repeats it in good faith may be made a laughing-stock of to others on account of his easy credulity. But in the juridical sense, only that untruth is called a lie which immediately infringes the right of another, such as a false allegation of a contract having been concluded, when the allegation is put forward in order to deprive some one of what is his (falsiloquim dolosum). This

distinction of conceptions so closely allied is not without foundation; because on the occasion of a simple statement of one's thoughts, it is always free for another to take them as he may; and yet the resulting repute, that such a one is a man whose word cannot be trusted, comes so close to the opprobrium of directly calling him a liar, that the boundary-line separating what, in such a case, belongs to jurisprudence, and what is special to ethics, can hardly be otherwise drawn.

— 402 that were established, in reference to a right under dispute. For the party repudiating an obligation, and on whom the burden of proof (onus probandi) might be incumbent, could

C. Methodical Division of the Science of Right The highest division of the system of natural

—

right should not be

into "natural right''

as

it

is

frequently put

and "social

right," but into

The

thus methodically refer to his innate right of

natural right and civil right.

freedom as specified under various relations in detail, and could therefore found upon them

tutes private right; the second, public right. For

equally as different

titles

In the relation of innate right, and consequently of the internal mine and thine, there is therefore not rights, but only one right. And, accordingly, this highest division of rights into

innate and acquired, which evidently consists of two tents

is

members extremely unequal

it is

that

of right.

in their con-

properly placed in the introduction

t^e subdivisions of the science of right

;

and be

may

referred in detail to the external mine and thine.

first

consti-

not the "social state" but the "civil state" is opposed to the "state of nature"; for in

the "state of nature" there

some

kind, but there

may

well be society

no "civil" society, as an institution securing the mine and thine by public laws. It is thus that right, viewed under of

is

reference to the state of nature, called private right.

The whole

of right will therefore

fall to

is

specially

of the principles

be expounded under

the two subdivisions of private right and public right.

THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT FIRST PART. PRIVATE RIGHT The System of Those Laws which Require no External Promulgation. The Principles of the External Mine and Thine Generally Chapter

Of

I.

Mode

the

of

The Meaning

"Mine"

of

(Meum

Juris)

The is

me

consent, he would do

rightfully it,

it

that

if

without

a lesion or injury.

subjective condition of the use of anything

possession of

An

is

contrary to the principle of

For an object of any act of my will, is someit would be physically within my power to use. Now, suppose there were things that by right should absolutely not be in our power, or, in other words, that it would be wrong or inconsistent with the freedom of all, accordthing that

Right

in

Anything is "mine" by right, or is mine, when I am so connected with any other person should make use of

my

as res nullius, right.

Own

thing External as One's i.

Having Any-

it.

ing to universal law, to this supposition,

make

use of them.

freedom would so

priving itself of the use of

its

On

far be de-

voluntary activity,

in thus putting useable objects out of all possi-

external thing, however as such could

Hence it would be a contradiction have anything external as one's own, were not the conception of possession capable of two

In practical relations, this would be to annihilate them, by making them res nullius, notwithstanding the fact that acts of will in relation to such things would formally harmonize, in the actual use of them, with the external freedom of all according to universal laws. Now the pure practical reason lays down only formal

different meanings, as sensible possession that

laws as principles to regulate the exercise of the

only be mine, if I may assume it to be possible that I can be wronged by the use which another might make of it when it is not actually in my possession. to

is

perceivable by the senses, and rational pos-

session that

By

is

perceivable only by the intellect.

the former

is

to be understood a physical

by the the same

possession, and

latter, a

possession of

object.

purely juridical

it is

me

as a subject," or that

me, and to

also "a thing placed outside of

be found elsewhere in space or time." Taken in the first sense, the term possession signifies rational possession; and, in the second sense,

must mean empirical possession. intelligible possession,

if

possession viewed apart

A

it

rational or

such be possible,

is

from physical holding

or detention (detentio). 2.

Juridical Postulate of the Practical

It is possible to

my

will as

have any external object of

mine. In other words, a were it to become law

—

Reason

maxim

— that

to

any object on which the will can be exerted must remain objectively in itself without an owner, this effect

will;

and therefore abstracts from the matter of

the act of will, as regards the other qualities of the object, which

as

it

403

is

considered only in so far

an object of the activity of the

is

Hence

The description of an object as "external to me" may signify either that it is merely "different and distinct from

bility of use.

will.

the practical reason cannot contain, in

reference to such an object, an absolute prohibition of its use, because this

would involve a

contradiction of external freedom with

An I

object of

itself.

my free will, however, is one which

have the physical capability of making some

use of at

will, since its

(in potentia).

This

is

use stands in

my power

to be distinguished

from

having the object brought under my disposal (in potestatem meam reductum), which supposes not a capability merely, but also a particular act of the free-will. But in order to consider something merely as an object of my will as such, it is sufficient to be conscious that I have it in my power. It is therefore an assumption a priori of the practical reason to regard and treat every object within the range of my free exercise of will as objectively a possible

or thine.

mine

THE SCIENCE

404

This postulate may be called "a permissive law" of the practical reason, as giving us a special title which we could not evolve out of the

mere conceptions of

And

right generally.

upon

constitutes the right to impose

title

this all

spot.

For any one who,

former appear-

in the

ances of empirical possession, might wrench the

my

apple out of

my

me away from me in

hand, or drag

resting-place, would, indeed, injure

respect of the inner "mine" of freedom, but not

others an obligation, not otherwise laid upon them, to abstain from the use of certain objects

in respect of the external

of our free choice, because we have already taken them into our possession. Reason wills

even when not actually holding it physically. And if I could not do this, neither could I call

that this shall be recognised as a valid principle,

the apple or the spot mine.

does so as practical reason; and it is enabled by means of this postulate a priori to

thing

and

it

enlarge

was

"mine," unless

I

could

in the possession of the object,

B. I cannot call the performance of some-

by the action

"mine,"

range of activity in practice.

its

assert that I

the

of

will

I can only say "it has

if

another

of

come

into

my

possession at the same time with a promise"

{pactum Possession and Ownership

3.

Any one who would must be

as his

Were he

not

in

its

assert the right to a thing

possession of

it

as an object.

actual possessor or owner, he

could not be wronged or injured by the use which another might make of it without his con-

anything external to him, and no way connected with him by right, affect

sent. For. should in

re initum)

assert "I

it could not affect himself as a subnor do him any wrong, unless he stood in a relation of ownership to it.

am

;

but only

if

am

I

able to

in possession of the will of the

other, so as to determine him to the performance of a particular act, although the time for the performance of it has not yet come." In the latter case, the promise belongs to the nature of things actually held as possessed, and as an active obligation I can reckon it mine; and this holds good not only if I have the thing prom-

—

as in the first case

—already

my

pos-

this object,

ised

ject,

even although I do not yet possess it in fact. Hence, I must be able to regard myself in thought as independent of that empirical form of possession that is limited by the condition of time and as being, nevertheless, in pos-

4.

Exposition 0} the Conception of the External Mine and Thine

session of the object.

There can only be three external objects of

my will in the activity of choice: (1) A corporeal thing external

me;

because I

(2) The free-will of another in the performance of a particular act (praestatio) ;

(3)

The

C. I cannot call a wife, a child, a domestic,

any other person "mine" merely

or, generally,

to

state of another in relation to

my-

self.

These correspond to the categories of suband reciprocity ; and they form the practical relations between me and external

stance, causality,

objects, according to the laws of freedom.

ing to

my

command them

at present as belong-

household, or because I have them

under control, and in my power and possession. But I can call them mine, if, although they may have withdrawn themselves from my control and I do not therefore possess them empirically, I can still say "I possess them by my mere will, provided they exist anywhere in space or time; and, consequently,

my

possession of

They belong, in only when and so far

purely juridical." A. I can only call a corporeal thing or an object in space

"mine." when, even although not

in physical possession of

that I

am

in

it,

I

am

it

in

another real non-

possession of

physical sense. Thus. I

am

am

laid

may

lie."

it

out of

my

it, although I hand, and wherever it

In like manner.

I

am

say of the ground, on which myself down, that therefore it

my

I

I

matter of

5.

is

my

as I can as-

right.

Definition of the Conception of the

External Mine and Thine

A nominal merely to distinguish the object defined from all other objects, and it springs out of a complete and definite exposiDefinitions are nominal or real.

definition

is

sufficient

not entitled to

tion of

may have

suffices for a

laid

is mine; but only can rightly assert that it still remains in possession, although I may have left the

when

sert this as a

not entitled to call

entitled to say, "I possess

have

possessions,

them

fact, to

able to assert

an apple mine merely because I hold it in my hand or possess it physically; but only when I

in

session, but

its

conception.

fined, so as to furnish a

of the object.

A

real definition further

deduction of the conception de-

knowledge of the

The nominal

reality

definition of the

external "mine" would thus be:

"The

external

OF RIGHT mine is anything outside of myself, such that any hindrance of my use of it at will would be doing me an injury or wrong as an infringement of that freedom of mine which may coexist with the freedom of all others according to a

The

universal law."

real definition of this con-

may be put thus: 'The external mine is anything outside of myself, such that any prevention of my use of it would be a wrong, although I may not be in possession of it so as ception

it as an object." I must be in some kind of possession of an external object, if the object is to be regarded as mine;

to be actually holding

for, otherwise,

anyone interfering with

this

ob-

405

All propositions of right sitions

But the

as pos-

analytical; for

—

tion

direct contradiction to the

is in

The proposition

an empirical rightful possession does not

therefore go beyond the right of a person in ref-

of the object in the sphere of sensible appear-

ternal to me, after abstraction of

ance (possessio phenomenon), although the object which I possess is not regarded in this prac-

ditions of empirical possession in space

—accordthe exposition of the Transcendental Anthe Critique of Pure Reason—but a

ing to

phenomenon

as

alytic in

Pure Reason the interest of reason turns upon the theoretical knowledge of the nature of things and how far reason can go in such knowledge. But here reason has to deal with the practical

a thing in

For

itself.

in the Critique of

axiom of

expressing the principle

erence to himself.

tical relation as itself

says

—

there is to be rightly an external mine and thine. Empirical possession is thus only phenomenal possession or holding (detention) sible, if

it

my consent as, for instance, in wrenching an apple out of my hand affects and detracts from my freedom as that which is internally mine; and consequently the maxim of his acout

of

to § 4, a rational possession

noumenon) must be assumed

(possessio

is

nothing more than what follows by the principle of contradiction, from the conception of such possession; namely, that if I am the holder of a thing in the way of being physically connected with it, any one interfering with it with-

Hence, according

not, in doing so, affect

as juridical propo-

juridical proposition a priori respecting

empirical possession

right.

would

—

are propositions a priori, for they are

practical laws of reason (dictamina rationis).

me; nor, consequently, would he thereby do me any wrong. ject

—

On

the other hand, the proposition expressing

the possibility of the possession of a thing ex-

—

all

the con-

and time consequently presenting the assumption of

the possibility of a possessio

noumenon

—goes

beyond these limiting conditions; and because this proposition asserts a possession even without physical holding, as necessary to the concep-

tion of the external thetical.

And

thus

mine and thine, it is synbecomes a problem for

it

how such a proposition, extendrange beyond the conception of empiri-

reason to show ing

its

determination of the action of the will according to laws of freedom, whether the object is

cal possession, is possible a priori.

perceivable through the senses or merely think-

ing possession of a particular portion of the soil

able

by the pure understanding. And right, as under consideration, is a pure practical concep-

is

tion of the reason in relation to the exercise of

out being an act of usurpation. founds upon the innate right of

the will under laws of freedom.

session of the surface of the earth, and

And, hence,

it is

not quite correct to speak of

"possessing" a right to this or that object, but it should rather be said that an object is possessed in a purely juridical way; for a right itself

is

the rational possession of an object, and

would be an expres-

to "possess a possession,"

sion without meaning. 6.

Deduction of the Conception of a Purely Juridical Possession of an External Object (Possessio Noumenon)

The

question,

"How

is

an external mine and

thine possible?" resolves itself into this other

question:

"How

is

a merely juridical or rational

possession possible?"

And

second question "How is a synthetic proposition in right possible a priori?" this

resolves itself again into a third:

In this manner, for instance, the act of taka

mode

exercising the private free-will with-

The possessor

common

universal will corresponding a priori to

allows a private possession of the

soil;

pos-

upon the it, which because

what are mere things would be otherwise made in themselves and by a law into unappropriable objects. Thus a first appropriator acquires originally by primary possession a particular portion of the ground; and by right (jure) he resists every other person who would hinder him in

the private use of

it,

although, while the

"state of nature" continues, this cannot be done juridical means (de jure), because a public law does not yet exist. And although a piece of ground should be regarded as free, or declared to be such, so as to be for the public use of all without distinction, yet it cannot be said that it is thus free by nature and originally so, prior to any juridical

by

THE SCIENCE

406

For there would be a real relation already incorporated in such a piece of ground by the very fact that the possession of it was denied

done to him. The

any particular individual; and as this public freedom of the ground would be a prohibition

its

act.

to

every particular individual, this presupposes a common possession of it which cannot take effect without a contract. A piece of ground, however, which can only become publicly free by contract, must actually be in the posof

it

to

disturb the

occupier or holder of a portion

first

of the soil in his use of

therefore a

title

"It

is

common

well

it is

a lesion or

wrong

taking of possession has

of right (titulus possessionis) in

favour, which

original

first

simply the principle of the

is

possession; and the saying that

who are in possession'' when one is not bound to

for those

(beati possidentes),

authenticate his possession,

is a principle of natural right that establishes the juridical act of

who

taking possession, as a ground of acquisition

mutually interdict or suspend each other, from

upon which every first possessor may found. It has been shown in the Critique of Pure Reason that in theoretical principles a priori, an intuitional perception a priori must be supplied in connection with any given conception; and, consequently, were it a question of a purely theoretical principle, something would have to be added to the conception of the possession of an object to make it real. But in respect of

session of

those associated together,

all

any particular or private use of

it.

This original community of the

soil and of the upon it (communio fundi originaria)As an idea which has objective and practical juridical reality and is entirely different from the idea of a primitive community of things, which is a fiction. For the latter would have had to be founded as a form of society, and must have taken its rise from a contract by which all renounced the right of private possession, so that by uniting the property owned by each into a whole, it was

things

common

thus transformed into a

possession.

But had such an event taken place, history must have presented some evidence of it. To regard such a procedure as the original

mode

of taking

possession, and to hold that the particular possessions of every individual

be grounded upon

it,

is

may and

ought to

evidently a contradic-

the practical principle under consideration, the

procedure

just the converse of the theoretical

is

process; so that

all

the conditions of perception

which form the foundation of empirical possession must be abstracted or taken away in order to extend the range of the juridical conception

beyond the empirical sphere, and

in order to

be

able to apply the postulate, that every external

object of the free activity of I

have

it

session of

my

will,

so far as

my

in

it,

power, although not in the posmay be reckoned as juridically

mine.

tion.

Possession (possessio)

from habitation

as

is

be distinguished

to

mere residence (sedes)

;

and

the act of taking possession of the soil in the in-

once for

The possibility of such a possession, with consequent deduction of the conception of a nonempirical possession,

is

founded upon the

juridi-

also to be

cal postulate of the practical reason, that "It is

distinguished from settlement or domicile (inco-

a juridical duty so to act towards others that

tention of acquiring

latus),

which

is

it

all, is

a continuous private possession

what

is

external and useable

become

may come

into the

some one."

dependent on the presence of the individual upon it. We have not here to deal

possession or

with the cjuestion of domiciliary settlement, as that is a secondary juridical act which may fol-

certainly not suffi-

what is externally founded upon a possession, that is not physical. The possibility of such a possession, thus conceived, cannot, however, be proved or comprehended in itself, because it is a rational conception for which no empirical perception can be furnished; but it follows as an immediate consequence from the postulate that has been enunciated. For, if it is necessary to act

as mine. Relative

according to that juridical principle, the rational

of a place that

is

may not occur at all; could not involve an original possession, but only a secondary possession derived low upon possession, or for as such

it

from the consent of others. Simple physical possession, or holding of the soil,

involves already certain relations of right

to the thing, although

cient to enable

me

it

to others, so far as they first

possession in

is

to regard

it

know,

appears as a harmony with the law of ex-

ternal freedom; and, at the

it

same

braced in the universal original

empossession which time,

it is

contains a priori the fundamental principle of the possibility of a private possession. Hence to

And

this postulate

is

the property of

conjoined with the exposi-

tion of the conception that

one's

own

is

or intelligible condition of a purely juridical

possession must also be possible.

It need astonno one, then, that the theoretical aspect of the principles of the external mine and thine is lost from view in the rational sphere of pure intelligence and presents no extension of knowl-

ish

OF RIGHT edge; for the conception of freedom upon which they rest does not admit of any theoretical deduction of its possibility, and it can only be inferred from the practical law of reason, called the categorical imperative, viewed as a fact.

407

freedom.

Now

is

it

from

just in abstraction

my

physical possession of the object of

free-will

in the sphere of sense, that the practical

wills that a rational possession of

reason

be

shall

it

thought, according to intellectual conceptions

which are not empirical, but contain a priori 7.

Application of the Principle of the Possibility of an External Mine and Thine to Objects of

Experience of a purely juridical posses-

not an empirical conception dependent on conditions of space and time, and yet it has is

must be applicable to objects of experience, the knowledge of which is independent of the conditions of space and time. The rational process by which the conception of

practical reality.

As such

it

brought into relation to such objects so as to constitute a possible external mine and thine, is as follows. The conception of right, being contained merely in reason, cannot be immeright

is

diately applied to objects of experience, so as to

give the conception of an empirical possession,

but must be applied directly to the mediating conception, in the understanding, of possession in general; so that, instead of physical holding (detentio) as an empirical representation of possession,

the formal conception or thought of

having, abstracted from

and time,

is

all

conditions of space

conceived by the mind, and only as

implying that an object

my

is

in

my

power and

at

mea positum esse). In term external does not signify existence in another place than where I am, nor my resolution and acceptance at another time than the moment in which I have the offer of a thing: it signifies only an object different from disposal (in polestate

this relation, the

or other than myself.

Now

the practical reason

by its law of right wills, that I shall think the mine and thine in application to objects, not according to sensible conditions, but apart from these and from the possession they indicate; because they refer to determinations of the activity of the will that are in accordance with the laws of freedom. For it is only a conception of the understanding that can be brought under the rational conception of right. I may therefore say that I possess a field, although it is in quite a

from that on which I actually For the question here is not con-

different place find myself.

cerning an intellectual relation to the object, but have the thing practically in my power and at

I

my disposal,

which

is

a conception of possession

by the understanding and independent of relations of space and it is mine, because my will, in determining itself to any particular use realized

;

of

it, is

is

we found

in this fact, that

it

the ground of the

validity of such a rational conception of posses-

The conception sion

Hence

the conditions of rational possession.

not in conflict with the law of external

sion (possessio

noumenon)

as a principle of a

universally valid legislation. For such a legislais implied and contained in the expression, "This external object is mine" because an obligation is thereby imposed upon all others in respect of it, who would otherwise not have been

tion

obliged to abstain

The mode,

from the use

of this object.

then, of having something external

to myself as mine, consists in a specially juridical

connection of the

will of the subject

with

that object, independently of the empirical relations to it in space and in time, and in accordance with the conception of a rational possession.

nally

A

particular spot on the earth

mine because

I

occupy

it

is

with

not exter-

my

body;

for the question here discussed refers only to

my

external freedom, and consequently

fects only the possession of myself,

which

it

af-

is

not

a thing external to me, and therefore only in-

volves an internal right. But in possession of the spot,

myself away from

it

if I continue to be although I have taken

and gone

only under that condition

is

to another place,

my

external right

concerned in connection with it. And to make the continuous possession of this spot by my person a condition of having it as mine, must either be to assert that it is not possible at all to have anything external as one's own, which is contrary to the postulate in § 2, or to require, in order that this external possession sible,

that I shall be in

time.

But

in a place

this

amounts

and also not

two places

may

to saying that I in

it,

which

be pos-

same must be

at the

is

contradic-

tory and absurb.

This position may be applied to the case in which I have accepted a promise; for my having and possession in respect of what has been promised become established on the ground of external right. This right is not to be annulled by the fact that the promiser having said at one time, "This thing shall be yours," again at a subsequent time says, "My will now is that the thing be yours." In such relations of rational hold just the same as if the promiser had, without any interval of time between them, made the two declarations of his will, "This shall be yours," and also "This shall shall not

right, the conditions

THE SCIENCE

408

which manifestly contradicts

not be yours'

it-

8.

self.

thing holds, in like manner, of the

The same

To Have Anything External

conception of the juridical possession of a person as belonging to the Having of a subject, be a wife, a child, or a servant.

The

If,

and

some

it

the reciprocal possession of

all its

members, are

by word or deed.

declaration that every other person

from the use of

to abstain

external mine and thine, as in the former cases,

juridical act

upon the assumption of the possipurely rational possession, without the accompaniment of physical detention or

this act at the

that I

lar abstention

holding of the object.

what

is

forced to a critique of

juridically

its

am is

towards every other

my

in respect of

question arises from a universal rule regulating the external juridical relations.

likewise secures

act in relation to

let

Hence

I

am

not

alone what another person declares

For these give rise to an inevitable dialectic, in which a thesis and an antithesis set up equal claims to the validity of two conflicting conditions. Reason is thus compelled, in its as it was practical function in relation to right

make

this object of

externally theirs; for the obligation in

garding the possibility of such a form of pos-

—

a

obliged

same time involves the admission

obliged to

—

make

is

obliged reciprocally to observe a simi-

conception of the external mine and thine, by the antinomy of the propositions enunciated resession.

will that

which no one would be under, without such a on my part. But the assumption of

rests entirely

function in special reference to the

is

exercise of will; and this imposes an obligation

bility of a

Reason

my

I declare

external thing shall be mine, I

not annulled by the capability of separating from each other in space; because it is by juridical relations that they are connected, and the

practical

Own

Power

Legislative

relations of right involved in a household,

whether

as One's

only Possible in a Juridical or Civil State of Society under the Regulation of a Public

to be externally his, unless every other person

me by what

a guarantee that he will is

mine, upon the same

principle. This guarantee of reciprocal tual abstention

from what belongs

and mu-

to others does

not require a special juridical act for its establishment, but is already involved in the concep-

a distinc-

tion of an external obligation of right, on ac-

phenomenal appearance presented to the senses, and that possession which is rational and thinkable only by the un-

count of the universality and consequently the

derstanding.

an external and consequently contingent possession, cannot serve as a compulsory law for all, because that would be to do violence to the freedom which is in accordance with universal laws. Therefore it is only a will that binds every one, and as such a common, collective, and authoritative will, that can furnish a guarantee of security to all. But the state of men under a universal, external, and public legislation, conjoined with

function

in its theoretical

tion

between possession as

Thesis.

—The

to

a

thesis, in

this case,

is:

"It

is

possible to have something external as mine, al-

though

I

am

Antithesis. sible to

not in possession of

—The

antithesis

is:

it."

"It

is

not pos-

have anything external as mine,

not in possession of

—The

if I

am

it.''

"Both ProposiI mean empirical possession (possessio phaenomenon, the latter when I understand by the same term, a Solution.

solution

tions are true"; the

is:

former when

purely rational possession (possessio

noumenon)

.

But the possibility of a rational possession, and consequently of an external mine and thine, cannot be comprehended by direct insight, but must be deduced from the practical reason. And in this relation it is specially noteworthy that

reciprocity of the obligatoriness arising from a

universal Rule.

Now

a single will, in relation to

authority and power, is called the civil state. There can therefore be an external mine and thine only in the civil state of society.

Consequence. if

it

is

—

It follows, as a corollary, that,

juridically possible to have an external

object as one's own. the individual subject of

possession must be allowed to compel or constrain every person with

whom

a dispute as to

may arise,

the practical reason without intuitional percep-

the mine or thine of such a possession

and even without requiring such an element a priori, can extend its range by the mere

to enter along with himself into the relations of

tions,

elimination of empirical conditions, as justified by the law of freedom, and can thus establish synthetical propositions a priori.

The proof of be shown

this in the practical connection, as will

afterwards, can be adduced in an analytical

manner.

a civil constitution. 9.

There May, However, Be an External Mine and Thine Found as a Fact in the State of Nature, but

it is

Natural right tion

only Provisory

in the state of a civil constitu-

means the forms

of right which

may

be

OF RIGHT deduced from principles a priori as the conditions of such a constitution. It

is

therefore not

by the statutory laws of such a constitution; and accordingly the juridical principle remains in force, that, "Whoever proceeds upon a maxim by which it becomes impossible to be infringed

have an object of the exercise of my as mine, does me a lesion or injury." For a

me

for will

to

constitution is only the juridical condition under which every one has what is his own merely secured to him, as distinguished from its being specially assigned and determined to him. All guarantee, therefore, assumes that civil

everyone to

whom

a thing

is

secured

is

already

own. Hence, prior to the an external or apart from it civil constitution mine and thine must be assumed as possible, and along with it a right to compel everyone with whom we could come into any kind of intercourse to enter with us into a constitution in which what is mine or thine can be secured. There may thus be a possession in expectation or in preparation for such a state of security, as can only be established on the law of the common will; and as it is therefore in accordance with the possibility of such a state, it constitutes a provisory or temporary juridical possession; whereas that possession which is found in reality in the civil state of society will be a peremptory in possession of

it

as his

—

—

409

consist in the fact that, because the possessor

has the presumption of being a rightful man, it unnecessary for him to bring forward proof

is

that he possesses a certain thing rightfully, for this position applies only to a case of disputed right.

But

it is

because

which he

is

naturally prepared,

the individual rightfully resists those

who

will

not adapt themselves to it, and who would disturb him in his provisory possession; because, if

the will of

all

except himself were imposing

from a cerwould still be only a one-sided or unilateral will, and consequently it would have which can be properly just as little legal title

upon him an

obligation to withdraw

tain possession,

it

—

—

based only on the universalized will to contest a claim of right as he would have to assert it. Yet he has the advantage on his side, of being in accord with the conditions requisite to the introduction and institution of a civil form of society. In a word, the mode in which anything external may be held as one's own in the state of nature, is just physical possession with a presumption of right thus far in its favour, that by union of the wills of all in a public legislation it will be made juridical; and in this expectation it holds comparatively, as a kind of potential juridical possession.

This prerogative of

right, as arising

fact of empirical possession,

is

in

from the

accordance

with the formula: "It is well for those who are in possession" (Beati possidentes) It does not .

is

own

invested with the faculty of having as his

any external object upon which he has exerted his will; and, consequently, all actual possession is

a state whose rightfulness

that postulate

is

by an anterior

established

upon

act of will.

And

be no prior possession of the same object by another opposed to it, does, therefore, provisionally justify and entitle me, according to the law of external freedom, to restrain anyone who refuses to enter with me into a state of public legal freedom from all pretension to the use of such an object. For such a procedure is requisite, in conformity with the postulate of reason, in order to subject to my proper use a thing which would otherwise be such an

act, if there

practically annihilated, as regards

of

all

proper use

it.

Chapter

II.

The Mode

of Acquiring

Any-

thing External 10.

The General Principle of External Acquisition

or guaranteed possession. Prior to entering into this state, for

accords with the pos-

it

tulate of the practical reason, that everyone

I acquire a thing

when

I act (efficio) so that

it

becomes mine. An external thing is originally mine when it is mine even without the intervention of a juridical act.

An

acquisition

is

original

and primary when it is not derived from what another had already made his own. There is nothing external that is as such originally mine but anything external may be originally acquired when it is an object that no other person has yet made his. A state in which the mine and thine are in common cannot be conceived as having been at any time original. Such a state of things would have to be acquired by an external juridical act, although there may be an original and common possession of an exter;

nal object.

Even

if

we

think hypothetically of a

which the mine and thine would be originally in common as a communio mei et tui originaria, it would still have to be distinguished from a primeval communion (communio primaeva) with things in common, sometimes supposed to be founded in the first period of the relations of right among men, and which could not be regarded as based upon principles like the former, but only upon history. Even under that condition the historic communio, as a supstate in

THE SCIENCE

4io

posed primeval community, would always have to be viewed as acquired and derivative (communio derivativa). principle of external acquisition, then,

The

expressed thus "Whatever I bring under power according to the law of external freedom, of which as an object of my free activity of will I have the capability of making use ac-

may be

:

my

these acts are juridical, they consequently pro-

ceed from the practical reason, and therefore, in the

may

become mine

I will to

in

common

practical elements

right, abstraction

is

mine," thus becomes a correct inference from

the external fact of sensible possession to the internal right of rational possession.

The

original

primary acquisition of an exter-

nal object of the action of the will,

is

called oc-

cupancy. It can only take place in reference to substances or corporeal things. Now when this

(momenta attendenda)

occupation of an external object does take place,

mine."

The

is

of the empirical conditions in-

will,

with the idea of a possible united is

conformity

made

volved, and the conclusion, "the external object

cording to the postulate of the practical reason,

and which

question as to what

be

em-

constitutive of the process of original acquisi-

the act presupposes, as a condition of such

tion are:

pirical possession, its priority in

i. Prehension or seizure of an object which belongs to no one; for, if it belonged already to some one, the act would conflict with the free-

act of any other who may also be willing to enter upon occupation of it. Hence the legal maxim: "qui prior tempore, potior jure." Such occupation as original or primary is, further, the effect only of a single or unilateral will; for were a bilateral or twofold will requisite for it, it would be derived from a contract of two or more persons with each other, and consequently it would be based upon what another or others had al-

dom

of others, that

laws. This

of

my

is

is,

according to universal

the taking possession of an object

free activity of will in space

and time; the

possession, therefore, into which I thus put self

my-

sensible or physical possession (possessio

is

phenomenon); Declaration of the possession of this object

2.

by formal designation and the will in interdicting

ing

my

free-

every other person from us-

as his;

it

3.

act of

Appropriation, as the act, in idea, of an ex-

common

ternally legislative

and each are obliged formity with

The

my act

will,

to respect

by which

all

and act in con-

of will.

validity of the last element in the proc-

ess of acquisition, as that

on which the conclu-

sion that "the external object

is

mine"

rests, is

what makes the possession valid as a purely rational and juridical possession (possessio noumenon). It is founded upon the fact that, as all

time before the

ready made their own. It is not easy to see how such an act of free-will as this would be could really form a foundation for every one having his own. However, the first acquisition of a thing

on that account not quite exactly the same as it. For the acquisition of a public juridical state by union of the wills of all in a universal legislation would be such an is

the original acquisition of

original acquisition, seeing that'no other of the

kind could precede

and yet

it,

it

rived from the particular wills of

would be de-

all

the individ-

and consequently become all-sided or omnilateral; for a properly primary acquisition can onlyproceed from an individual or unilateral will. uals,

Division of the Subject of the Acquisition of the

External Mine and Thine I.

In respect of the matter of object of acqui-

sition, I acquire either a

corporeal thing (sub-

stance), or the performance of something

by

another (causality), or this other as a person in respect of his state, so far as I have a right to dispose of the same (in a relation of reciprocity with him). II.

In respect of the form or

mode

of acquisi-

tion, it is either a real right (jus reale), or a personal right (jus personale), or a real-personal right (jus realiter personale), to the possession

although not to the use. of another person as he were a thing. III. In respect of the

title (titulus)

member

—which, properly,

is

of the division of rights,

but rather a constituent element of the mode of anything external is acquired exercising them

—

by a certain

free exercise of will that

either

is

unilateral, as the act of a single will (facto), or bilateral, as the act of

two

munity together Section

I.

(lege).

Principles of Real Right

n. What

The

omcom-

wills (pacto), or

nilateral, as the act of all the wills of a

if

ground of right or the

of acquisition

not a particular

is

a Real Right?

usual definition of real right, or "right in

a thing" (jus reale, jus in re),

is

that "it

is

a right

;

OF RIGHT

411

a cor-

the earth could properly neither have nor ac-

nominal definition. But what is it that entitles me to claim an external object from any one who may appear as its possessor, and to compel him. per vindicationem. to put me again.

quire any external thing as his own; because, be-

as against every possessor of it" This

is

rect

in place of himself, into possession of it? Is this

external juridical relation of

my

kind of

will a

immediate relation to an external thing? If so, whoever might think of his right as referring not immediately to persons but to things would have to represent it, although only in an obscure way. somewhat thus. A right on one side has always a duty corresponding to it on the other, so that an external thing, although away from the hands of

its first

possessor, continues to be

still

con-

nected with him by a continuing obligation; and thus it refuses to fall under the claim of any other possessor, because it is already bound to another. In this way my right, viewed as a kind

tween him

and

as a person

external things as

all

material objects, there could be no relations of obligation.

There

is

therefore.literally.no direct

right in a thing, but only that

properly called

''real"

to

who

is

as constituted against a person,

mon

right

which belongs

possession of things with

is

to be

any one in com-

others in the

all

civil state of society.

12.

The

First Acquisition of a Thing can only be that of the Soil

By the soil is understood all habitable Land. In relation to everything that is moveable upon is

it

it,

mode

the

and the moveables is

And

just as. in the

to be regarded as a substance,

of

the

existence

viewed as an inherence

of

in

it.

theoretical acceptance, accidents cannot exist

of good genius accompanying a thing and pre-

apart from their substances, so. in the practical

external attack, would refer an

moveables upon the soil cannot be regarded as belonging to any one unless he is supposed to have been previously in juridical

serving

it

from

all

me!

however, absurb to think of an obligation of persons towards things, and conversely; although it may alien possessor always to

be allowed

in

any particular case

the juridical relation kind, and to express

The

It

by

it

real definition

is.

to represent

a sensible image of this

in this

way.

would run thus: ''Right

in

a right to the private use of a thing, of which I am in possession original or derivative in common with all others." For this is the one condition under which it is alone possible a thing

is

—

—

from quempossessorem). For. except by pre-

relation,

possession of the

ered to be

soil,

so that

thus consid-

it is

his.

For. let it be supposed that the soil belongs to no one. Then I would be entitled to remove every moveable thing found upon it from its place, even to total loss of it. in order to occupy that place, without infringing thereby on the freedom of any other: there being, by the hypothesis, no possessor of it at all. But everything

that I can exclude every other possessor

that can be destroyed, such as a tree, a house,

the private use of the thing (jus contra

and such like moveable and

libet

hujus rei

supposing such a common collective possession, cannot be conceived how. when I am not in actual possession of a thing. I could be injured it

or wronged by others who are in possession of it and use it. By an individual act of my own will I cannot oblige any other person to abstain from the use of a thing in respect of which he would otherwise be under no obligation; and. accordingly, such an obligation can only arise from the collective will of all united in a relation of common possession. Otherwise. I would have to think of a right in a thing, as if the thing has an obligation towards me. and as if the right as against every possessor of it had to be derived from this obligation in the thing, which is an absurb way of representing the subject. Further, by the term real right (jus reale) is meant not only the right in a thing (jus in re),

—

:

as regards its matter at least if

we

moved without

be

call a

destruction of

immoveable, the mine and thine derstood as applying to that which is adherent to

its it

—

is

thing which cannot its

in

form an

it is

not un-

substance, but to

and which does not

essentially constitute the thing itself.

Every Part of the Soil may be Originally Acquired; and the Principle of the Possibility of such Acquisition is the Original Community of the Soil Generally

13.

The

first

clause of this proposition

is

founded

upon the postulate of the

practical reason (§ 2)

the second

by the following proof. any juridi-

All

men

is

established

are originally and before

cal act of will in rightful possession of the soil:

that

is.

they have a right to be wherever nature them without their will.

or chance has placed

the laws

Possession (possessio), which is to be distinguished from residential settlement (sedes> as a

which relate to the real mine and thine. It is. however, evident that a man entirely alone upon

voluntary, acquired, and permanent possession, becomes common possession, on account of the

but also the constitutive principle of

all

— THE SCIENCE

412 connection with each other of

all

the places on

the surface of the earth as a globe. For, had the

surface of the earth been an infinite plain, men could have been so dispersed upon it that they

might not have come into any necessary communion with each other, and a state of social community would not have been a necessary

consequence of their existence upon the earth. Now that possession proper to all men upon the earth,

which

is

prior to

common

The conception

of such an original,

possession of things ence, nor as

their particular jurid-

all

constitutes an original possession in (communio possessionis originaria).

acts,

ical

is it

is

practical relation with each other.

will

an obligation which is contingent in itself. This requires an omnilateral or universal will, which is not contingent, but a priori, and which is therefore necessarily united and legislative. Only in accordance with such a principle can there be agreement of the active free-will of each individual with the freedom of all, and consequently rights in general, or even the possibility of an external mine and thine.

common

not derived from experi-

Only within a Civil Constitution that Anything can be Acquired Peremptorily, whereas in the State of Nature Acquisition can only be Provisory

15. It is

dependent on conditions of time, indemon-

community of posHence it is a practical

strable fiction of a primaeval

session in actual history.

A

civil

constitution

is

conception of reason, involving in itself the only principle according to which men may use the place they happen to occupy on the surface of

contingent. Hence, there

the earth, in accordance with laws of right.

acquisition

The

14.

is

Occupancy ,

as

beginning the physical appropriation of a corporeal thing in space (possessionis physicae), can accord with the law of the external freedom of all, under no other condition than

being at

its

priority in respect of time. In this rela-

that of

its

tion

must have the characteristic of

it

a first act

way of taking possession, as a free exercise will. The activity of will, however, as deter-

in the

of

real natural

—

mining that the thing in this case a definite separate place on the surface of the earth shall be mine, being an act of appropriation, can-

upon an soil.

tion than individual or unilateral (voluntas unis.

propria).

Now, occupancy

quisition of an external object act of will.

The

is

the ac-

by an individual

original acquisition of such an

object as a limited portion of the fore only be accomplished

soil

can there-

by an act of occupa-

tion.

The

possibility of this

mode

of acquisition

cannot be intuitively apprehended by pure reason in any way, nor established by its principles, but

is

an immediate consequence from the pos-

tulate of the practical reason. tical

The

will as prac-

reason, however, cannot justify external

acquisition otherwise than only in so far as

it

is

included in an absolutely authoritative with which it is united by implication; or. in other words, only in so far as it is contained within a union of the wills of all who come into itself will,

right,

is

subjected.

original

community

as

of right in

founded to the

all

And because a possession in the phenomenal

sphere of sense can only be subordinated to that is in accordance with rational

possession which

conceptions of right, there must correspond to this physical act of possession a rational

by elimination

of taking possession

of

mode

all

the

empirical conditions in space and time. This

form of possession establishes the prop"whatever I bring under my power

rational

osition that

accordance with laws of external freedom, and will that it shall be mine, becomes mine."

in

The

not be otherwise in the case of original acquisilateralis

law of is

reality

its

connected with it a to which all external

is

(apprehensio physicd)

possession

act of taking possession (apprehensio)

The

objectively necessary

as a duty, although subjectively

The empirical title of acquisition has been shown to be constituted by the taking physical

Juridical Act of this Original

Acquisition

indi-

applies to

all

the case with the imaginary and

is

For an

a —and the same —cannot impose on dual or other particular

vidual, unilateral will

only

rational title of acquisition can therefore originally in the idea of the will of

lie

all

united implicitly, or necessarily to be united,

which

is

here tacitly assumed as an indispensable

condition (conditio sine qua non). For by a sin-

cannot be imposed upon others an by which they would not have been otherwise bound. But the fact formed by wills actually and universally united in a legislation

gle will there

obligation

constitutes the civil state of society. Hence,

it

only in conformity with the idea of a civil state of society, or in reference to it and its realiis

zation, that anything external can be acquired. realized, and in anticipawhich would otherwise be derived, is consequently only provisory. The acquisition which is peremptory finds place only

Before such a state tion of

it,

is

acquisition,

in the civil state.

Nevertheless, such provisory acquisition

is

OF RIGHT real acquisition. For, according to the postulate

of the juridically practical reason, the possibil-

whatever state men may one another, and

ity of acquisition in

happen to be

living beside

therefore in the state of nature as well,

is

a prin-

And in accordance with every one is justified or entitled to exercise that compulsion by which it alone ciple of private right. this principle,

becomes possible to pass out of the state of nature and to enter into that state of civil society which alone can make all acquisition peremptory.

It is a

question as to

how

far the right of tak-

ing possession of the soil extends.

The answer

is,

under one's power extends; that is, just as far as he who wills to appropriate it can defend it, as if the soil were to say: "If you cannot protect me, neither can you command me." In this way the controversy about what constitutes a free or closed sea must be decided. Thus, within the range of a cannon-shot no one has a right to intrude on the coast of a country that already

So far as the capability of having

it

belongs to a certain state, in order to fish or gather amber on the shore, or such like. Further, the question

by

is

put, "Is cultivation of the

sary in order to

its

form a separation between them. Again: "May one have a thing as his, on a soil of which no one has appropriated any part as his own?" Yes. In Mongolia, for example, any one may let lie whatever baggage he has. or bring back the horse that has run

acquisition?" No. For, as

away from him

into his possession as

own, because the whole soil belongs to the people generally, and the use of it accordingly belongs to every individual. But that any one can have a moveable thing on the soil of another his

own

as his

is

only possible by contract. Finally,

"May one of two neighbouring nations or tribes resist another when attempting to impose upon them a certain mode there

is

the question:

of using a particular soil; as, for instance, a tribe of hunters

making such an attempt

in rela-

tion to a pastoral people, or the latter to agricul-

and such like?" Certainly. For the mode which such peoples or tribes may settle themselves upon the surface of the earth, provided they keep within their own boundaries, is a matter of mere pleasure and choice on their own part (res merae jacultatis). turists in

soil,

building, agriculture, drainage, etc., neces-

413

belong to them both in common, and would not be without an owner (res nullius), just because it would be used by both in order to ally

er,

As a further question, it may be asked whethwhen neither nature nor chance, but merely

our

own

will,

brings us into the neighbourhood

these processes as forms of specification are

of a people that gives no promise of a prospect

only accidents, they do not constitute objects of immediate possession and can only belong to the

of entering into civil union with us, we are to be considered entitled in any case to proceed with force in the intention of founding such

subject in so far as the substance of

been already recognized as question of the

first

his.

them has

When

it

is

a

acquisition of a thing, the

cultivation or modification of

it

by labour forms

nothing more than an external sign of the fact that it has been taken into possession, and this can be indicated by many other signs that cost less trouble.

Again:

"May any

one be hindered

in the act of taking possession, so that neither

one nor other of two competitors shall acquire the right of priority, and the soil in consequence may remain for all time free as belonging to no one?" Not at all. Such a hindrance cannot be allowed to take place, because the second of the two, in order to be enabled to do this, would himself have to be upon some neighbouring soil, where he also, in this manner, could be hindered from being, and such absolute hindering would involve a contradiction. It would, however, be quite consistent with the right of occupation, in

a union, and bringing into a juridical state such

men

American Indians, the HotHollanders; or and the case is not much better whether we may establish colonies by deceptive purchase, and so become owners of their soil, and, in general, as the savage

tentots,

and the

New

—

—

without regard to their first possession, make use at will of our superiority in relation to them? Further, may it not be held that Nature herself, as abhorring a vacuum, seems to demand such a procedure, and that large regions in other continents,

that

are

now

magnificently peopled,

would otherwise have remained unpossessed by civilized inhabitants and might have for ever remained thus, so that the end of creation would have so far been frustrated? It is almost unnecessary to answer; for all

it is

this flimsy veil of injustice,

to the Jesuitism of

making

easy to see through

which just amounts good end justify

a

the case of a certain intervening piece of the

any means. This mode of acquiring the

unused as a neutral ground for the separation of two neighbouring states; but under such a condition, that ground would actu-

therefore, to be repudiated.

soil,

to let

it lie

The

soil is,

indefiniteness of external acquirable ob-

jects in respect of their quantity, as well as

THE SCIENCE

4 i4 their quality,

mary

makes the problem them one of the to solve. There must, however, be of the sole pri-

external acquisition of

most difficult some one first acquisition of an external object; for

every Acquisition

Hence, the problem

is

cannot be derivative. not to be given up as in-

soluble or in itself as impossible. If

by reference contract

human

is

tablishment of the civil state. But if they are opposed to entering into the civil state, as long as this opposition lasts

would

it

still

the civil state

Exposition of the Conception of a Primary Acquisition of the Soil

men

common

are originally in a

possession of the

soil

collective

of the whole earth (com-

and they have naturally each a will to use it (lex justi). But on account of the opposition of the free will of one to that of the other in the sphere of action, which is inevitable by nature, all use of the soil would be prevented did not every will contain at the same

munio fundi

originaria),

time a law for the regulation of the relation of all wills in action, according to which a particular possession can be determined to every one

upon the common soil. This is the juridical law (lex juridica). But the distributive law of the mine and thine, as applicable to each individual on the soil, according to the axiom of external freedom, cannot proceed otherwise than from a primarily united will a priori which does not presuppose any juridical act as requisite for this union. This Law can only take form in the civil

—

i

lex justitiae distributiv ae)

;

as

be-

it,

founded upon a duty.

We

have found the

it is

in this

of acquisition in a

title

community

of the soil, under an external acquisition in space; and the mode of acquisition is contained

conditions

of

in the empirical fact of taking possession (appre-

hensio), conjoined with the will to have an external object as one's own. It to unfold,

is

further necessary

from the principles of the pure

ically practical reason involved in the tion, the juridical acquisition

ject

—

that

is,

the external

jurid-

concep-

proper of an ob-

mine and thine

that

from the two previous conditions, as rational possession (possessio noumenon). The juridical conception of the external mine follows

and

thine, so far as

it

involves the category of

substance, cannot by "that which

me" mean merely

is

external to

"in a place other than that in

which I am"; for it is a rational conception. As under the conceptions of the reason only intellectual conceptions can be embraced, the expression in question can only signify "something that is different and distinct from me" according to the idea of a non-empirical possession through,

as

it

were, a continuous activity in taking posses-

sion of an external object; and

it

involves only

and what

my power, which indicates the connection of an object with

the constitution of Right. In reference to this

myself, as a subjective condition of the possi-

state alone that the united

mines what is

is

universal original the

All

the effect of

Deduction of the Conception of the Original Primary Acquisition

17.

re-

main but provisional. 1 6.

all

solved

it is

extended so as to include the whole

under

carries

cause the advance from the state of nature to

to the original contract, unless this

race, acquisition

it

a guaranteed juridical acquisition with

state,

is

however

right,

—and —

what

common

is

will deter-

rightful,

prior to

its

establishment

and in view of it it is provisorily a duty for every one to proceed according to the law of external acquisition; and accordingly it is a juridical procedure on the part of the will to lay every one under obligation to recognise the act of possessing and appropriating, although it be

the notion of having something in

bility of

making use of

intellectual

Now we

it.

This forms a purely

conception of the understanding.

can leave out or abstract from the sen-

sible conditions of possession, as relations of a

person to objects which have no obligation. This process of elimination just gives the rational

and it is such by an obligation in

relation of a person to persons;

only unilaterally. Hence a provisory acquisition of the soil, with all its juridical consequences, is

that he can bind

possible in the state of nature.

precedes the juridical state, and as merely in-

conformable to the axiom of freedom, the postulate of right, and the universal legislation of the common will, conceived as united a priori. This is therefore the rational intelligible possession of things as by pure right, although they are objects of sense.

it is not yet peremptory; and this favour does not extend farther than the date of the consent of the other co-operators in the es-

tation, or transformation generally, of a portion

Such an acquisition, however, requires and also obtains the favour of a permissive law (lex permissiva),

in

respect of the determination of

the limits of juridically possible possession. For it

them

all

reference to the use of things through his act of will, so far as it is

troductory to

It is

evident that the

first

modification limi-

OF RIGHT of the

cannot of

soil

furnish a

itself

title to its

acquisition, since possession of an accident does not form a ground for legal possession of the substance. Rather, conversely, the inference as

mine and thine must be drawn from own-

to the

ership of the substance according to the rule: Accessarium sequitur suum principale. Hence

one who has spent labour on a piece of ground that was not already his own. has lost his effort and work to the former owner. This position is so evident of itself that the old opinion to the opposite effect, that is still spread far and wide.

can hardly be ascribed to any other than the prevailing illusion which unconsciously leads to

415

But as there is no site for occupation upon the wide sea itself, possible possession cannot be extended so far. and the open sea is free (mare liberum) But in the case of men. or things that belong to them, becoming stranded on the clausuni).

.

shore, since the fact

is

not voluntary,

it

cannot

be regarded by the owner of the shore as giving him a right of acquisition. For shipwreck is not an act of will, nor is its result a lesion to him;

and things which soil,

as

still

may have come

thus upon his

belonging to some one, are not to

be treated as being without an owner or res nullius. On the other hand, a river, so far as possession of the

bank reaches, may be

originally

the personification of things; and, then, as if they could be bound under an obligation by the

acquired, like any other piece of ground, under

labour bestowed upon them to be at the service of the person who does the labour, to regard them as his by immediate right. Otherwise it is

sion of both

probable that the natural question cussed

— already

dis-

—would not have been passed over with

so light a tread, namely:

"How

is

a right in a

thing possible?" For, right as against every pos-

means only

sible possessor of a thing

the claim

of a particular will to the use of an object so far as

it

may

be included in the all-comprehending

universal will, and can be thought as in har-

mony

with

its

law.

As regards bodies

situated

upon

a piece of

ground which is already mine, if they otherwise belong to no other person, they belong to me without my requiring any particular juridical act for the purpose of this acquisition: they are mine not facto, but lege. For they may be regarded as accidents inhering in the substance of the soil, and they are thus mine jure rei meae. To this category also belongs everything which is so connected with anything of mine that it cannot be separated from what is mine without altering it substantially. Examples of this are gilding on an object, mixture of a material belonging to me with other things, alluvial deposit, or even alteration of the adjoining bed of a stream or river in my favour so as to produce an increase of my land, etc.

must

By

the

same

principles, the question

whether the acquir-

also be decided as to

may

extend farther than the existing land, so as even to include part of the bed of the sea, with the right to fish on my own shores, to gather amber and such like. So far as I have the

able soil

my own site, as the my soil from the at-

mechanical capability from place I occupy, to secure

tack of others

—and.

therefore, as far as

—

cannon

can carry from the shore all is included in my possession, and the sea is thus far closed {mare

the above restrictions, its

by one who

is

in posses-

banks.

Property

An

external object, which, in respect of

its

substance can be claimed by some one as his own, is called the property {dominium) of that

person to whom all the rights in it as a thing belong like the accidents inhering in a substance and which, therefore, he as the proprie-

— —

tor (dominus) can dispose of at will (jus disponendi de re sua). But from this it follows at once that such an object can only be a corporeal thing towards which there is no direct personal obligation. Hence a man may be his own master (sui juris) but not the proprietor of himself (sui dominus), so as to be able to dispose of himself at will, to say nothing of the possibility of such a relation to other men; because he is responsible to humanity in his own person. This point, however, as belonging to the right of

such, rather than to that

humanity as men,

of individual

would not be discussed at its proper place here, but is only mentioned incidentally for the better elucidation of what has just been said. It may be further observed that there may be two full proprietors of one and the same thing, without there being a mine and thine in common, but only in so far as they are

common

possessors of

what belongs only to one of them as his own. In such a case the whole possession, without the use of the thing, belongs to one only of the coproprietors (condomini) longs

all

session.

;

while to the others be-

the use of the thing along with

The former

as

its

pos-

the direct proprietor

(dominus directus) therefore, restricts the latter as the proprietor in use (dominus utilis) to the condition of a certain continuous performance, .

with reference to the thing ing him in the use of it.

itself,

without limit-

— THE SCIENCE

4i6 Section 1 8.

Nature and Acquisition of Personal Right

possession of the active free-will of another person, as the power to determine it by my will to a certain action, according to laws of

The

is a form of right relating to the exmine and thine, as affected by the cauof another. It is possible to have several

freedom, ternal sality

such rights

in reference to the

to different persons.

tem

of laws, according to

possession, is

The

is

same person or

principle of the sys-

which

I

can be in such

that of personal right,

The two

;

forms of concluding the transaction, are promise (promissum) and acceptance (acceptatio). For an offer cannot constitute a promise before it can be judged that the thing offered (oblatum) is something that is agreeable to the party to whom it is offered, and this much is shown by the first two declarations; but by them alone there

is

nothing as yet acquired.

Further,

it

is

neither

by

the particular will

of the promiser nor that of the acceptor that

The acquisition of a personal right can never be primary or arbitrary; for such a mode of acquiring it would not be in accordance with the harmony

acts.

preparatory acts, as forms of treating in the transaction, are offer (oblatio) and approval (approbatio) the two constitutive acts, as the

and there

only one such principle.

principle of the

and two of them constitutive

acts,

Principles of Personal Right

II.

of the

freedom of

my

with the freedom of every other, and it would therefore be wrong. Nor can such a right will

be acquired by means of any unjust act of another (facto injusti alterius), as being itself contrary to right; for if such a wrong as it im-

the property of the former passes over to the latter.

This

by the combined

effected only

is

or united wills of both, and consequently so far only as the will of both

declared at the

is

same time or simultaneously. Now. such simultaneousness is impossible by empirical acts of declaration, which can only follow each other in

time and are never actually simultaneous. if I have promised, and another person is

For

plies

now merely

mand

before actual acceptance, however short

were perpetrated on me, and I could desatisfaction from the other, in accordance with right, yet in such a case I would only be entitled to maintain undiminished what was mine, and not to acquire anything more than what I formerly had. Acquisition by means of the action of another, to which I determine his will according to laws of right, is therefore always derived from what that other has as his own. This derivation, as a juridical act, cannot be effected by a mere negative relinquishment or renunciation of what is his (per derelictionem aut renunciationem) because such a negative act would only amount to a cessation of his right, and not to the acquirement of a right on the part of another. It is therefore only by positive transference (translatio) or conveyance, that a personal right can be acquired; and this is only possible by means of a common will, through which objects come into the power of one or other, so that as one renounces a particular thing which he holds under the common right, the same ob;

,

ject

when accepted by another, in consequence will, becomes his. Such

may

be, I

far

retract

free; and,

still

tor, for the

self

willing to accept, during the interval

my

offer,

because

on the other

I

it

may

am

thus

side, the

accep-

same reason, may likewise hold him-

not to be bound, up

till

the

moment

of ac-

ceptance, by his counter-declaration following

upon the promise. The external formalities or solemnities (solemnia) on the conclusion of a contract

—such

as shaking hands or breaking a

straw (stipula) laid hold of by two persons and all the various modes of confirming the declarations on either side, prove in fact the

embarrassment of the contracting parties as to how and in what way they may represent declarations, which are always successive, as existing simultaneously at the same moment and these forms fail to do this. They are, by their very ;

nature, acts necessarily following each other in time, so that

when

the one act

is,

the other

not yet or is no longer. It is only the philosophical transcendental deduction of the conception of acquisition by contract that can remove all these difficulties. In a

either

is

my

of a positive act of

juridical external relation,

transference of the property of one to another

of the free-will of another, as the cause that

is

termed its alienation. The act of the united two persons, by which what belonged to one passes to the other, constitutes contract.

determined

wills of

first

it

taking possession

to a certain act,

empirically by

is

conceived at

means of the declaration

and counter-declaration of the

free-will of

each

of us in time, as the sensible conditions of tak19.

Acquisition by Contract

In every contract there are four juridical acts of will involved; two of them being preparatory

ing possession;

and the two

juridical acts

must

necessarily be regarded as following one another in time.

But because

this

relation,

viewed as

— OF RIGHT juridical,

is

purely rational in itself, the will as

a law-giving faculty of reason represents this possession as intelligible or rational (possessio noumenon), in accordance with conceptions of

417

sion.

I

have become the richer

by the

(locupletior)

in possession

acquisition of an active

upon the freedom and capability of another. This my

obligation that I can bring to bear

however,

only a personal right, valid

freedom and under abstraction of those empiriAnd now, the two acts of promise and acceptance are not regarded as follow-

right,

manner of a pactum re initum, as proceeding from a common will, which is expressed by the term "at the same time," or "simultaneous," and the object

of his will, so that he shall perform something

cal conditions.

ing one another in time, but, in the

promised

(promissum)

is

under

represented,

is

only to the effect of acting upon a particular physical person and specially upon the causality for me. It

not a real right upon that moral

is

person, which

identified with the idea of the

is

united will of all viewed a priori, and through which alone I can acquire a right valid against

elimination of empirical conditions, as acquired

every possessor of the thing. For,

according to the law of the pure practical reason.

that

That

this is the true

and only possible deduc-

tion of the idea of acquisition sufficiently attested

by contract

is

by the laborious yet always

all

The

transfer or transmission of

to another

by

what

the categorical imperative implied; just as

or the acceptor, but their united will in

writers

—

it

is

of the object

an object

it would thus be acquired origiwhich is contrary to the idea of a contract. This continuity, however, implies that it is not the particular will of either the promiser

nally,

tional syllogisms that in order to construct a

hence

—

must take three lines so far an anaof which three lines any two together must be greater than the third a synthetical proposition, and like the former a priori.

—

—

a postulate of the pure reason that

It is

we

would acquire a thing that had no

for. otherwise, I

in this state as

that transfers

triangle I

moment

not interrupted for a

is

during this act;

impossible for the geometrician to prove by ra-

lytical proposition

mine

the law of continuity (lex continui). Possession

possessor, and

of

striving

is

contract, takes place according to

on jurisprudence such as Moses Mendelssohn in his Jerusalem to adduce a proof of its rational possibility. The question is put thus: "Why ought I to keep my Promise?" For it is assumed as understood by all that I ought to do so. It is, however, absolutely impossible to give any further proof of futile

in this

it is

right in a thing consists.

what

is

mine

to

common,

another.

And

not accomplished in such a manner that the promiser first relinquishes (derelinquit) his possession for the benefit of another, it is

or renounces his right (renunciat), and there-

upon the other or conversely.

at the

The

same time enters upon

transfer (translatio)

is

it;

there-

ought to abstract from all the sensible conditions of space and time in reference to the conception of right; and the theory of the possibility of such abstraction from these conditions, without taking away the reality of the posses-

parabolic path of a projectile the object on

sion, just constitutes the transcendental

ing,

tion of the conception of acquisition tract.

It is quite akin to

deduc-

by con-

What

is

Acquired by Contract?

But what is that, designated as external, which I acquire by contract? As it is only the causality of the active will of another, in respect of the performance of something promised to

me,

I

do not immediately acquire thereby an

external thing, but an act of the will in question, whereby a thing is brought under my power so that I

make

mine.

By

at the

same time

reaching

its

moment

as at the

and as

highest point

to both, just as in the

may

be regarded for a

same time both rising and fallthus passing in fact from the ascend-

ing to the falling motion.

what was presented

under the last title, as the theory of acquisition by occupation of the external object. 20.

fore an act in which the object belongs for a

moment

21.

A

thing

is

Acceptance and Delivery not acquired in a case of contract

by the acceptance (acceptatio) of the promise, but only by the delivery (traditio) of the object promised. For all promise is relative to performance; and if what was promised is a thing, the performance cannot be executed otherwise than by an act whereby the acceptor is put by the promiser into possession of the thing; and this is delivery. Before the delivery and the reception of the thing, the performance

the contract, therefore,

of the act required has not yet taken place; the

acquire the promise of another, as distinguished from the thing promised; and yet some-

the other and, consequently, has not been ac-

it

I

thing

is

thereby added to

my having and

posses-

thing has not yet passed from the one person to

quired by that other.

Hence the

right arising

— THE SCIENCE

4l8

from

a contract

only becomes a

A

only a personal right; and

is

by

real right

it

delivery.

contract upon which delivery immediately (pactum re initum) excludes any inter-

follows

between

val of time

its

cution; and as such

conclusion and

exe-

its

requires no further par-

it

one

will take a thing destined for the use of

an-

On

the

other into his charge at his

own

contrary, a special contract

necessary for this

is

arrangement, according to which the alienator its owner during a

of a thing continues to be

must bear the

certain definite time, and

whatever

may happen

to

it;

ticular act in the future

can only be regarded by the

may

when he has delayed

is

by which one person what is his. But if there agreed upon or indefinite

transfer to another

a time

—

definite

—

risk.

beyond the date

at

risk of

while the acquirer seller as the

owner

to enter into possession

which he agreed to take de-

between them for the delivery, the question then arises whether the thing has already before

livery. Prior to the possessory act, therefore, all

become the acceptor's by the con-

sonal right; and the acceptor can acquire an ex-

that time

tract, so that his right is a right in the thing;

or

whether a further special contract regarding the delivery alone must be entered upon, so that the right that is acquired by mere acceptance is

only a personal right, and thus

come

that

That

must be determined according to alternative will be clear from what

follows.

conclude a contract about a thing such as a horse and that I wish to acquire that I take it immediately into my stable, or otherwise into my possession; then it is mine

Suppose

I

But

if

my

and

(vi pacti re initi), thing.

—

—

I leave

it

right

in the

is

a right in the

hands of the

seller

without arranging with him specially in whose physical possession or holding (detentio) this thint: shall

be before

my

taking possession of

it

(apprehensio) and consequently, before the ac,

change of possession, the horse is not yet mine; and the right which I acquire is only a right against a particular person namely, the seller of the horse to be put into possession of the object (poscendi traditionem) as the sub-

tual

—

jective condition of

My right

is

from the

seller the

(praestatio) thing.

any use of

Now,

to put if

performance of

me

re

at

his

my

will.

demand promise

into possession of the

the contract does not contain the

condition of delivery at the

pactum

it

thus only a personal right to

same time

—

—and consequently an

initum

val of time intervenes

as a

inter-

22.

Nature of Personal Right of a Real Kind is

the right to

the possession of an external object as a thing,

and to the use of it as a person. The mine and thine embraced under this right relate specially to the family and household; and the relations involved are those of free beings in reciprocal real interaction

with each other. Through their

and influence as persons upon one another, in accordance with the principle of external freedom as the cause of it, they form a society composed as a whole of members standrelations

community with each other

ing in

as persons:

and this constitutes the household. The mode in which this social status is acquired by individuals, and the functions which prevail within it, proceed neither by arbitrary individual action (facto), nor by mere contract (pacto), but by law (lege). And this law as being not only a right,

but also as constituting possession

in ref-

erence to a person, is a right rising above all mere real and personal right. It must, in fact, form the right of humanity in our own person; and, as such,

it

has as

its

consequence a natural

permissive law, by the favour of which such acquisition

becomes possible

to us.

between the conclusion 23.

object of acquisition, I cannot obtain possession

The

it

only a per-

delivery.

Personal right of a real kind

of the contract and the taking possession of the of

by

is

Section III. Principles of Personal Right that is Real in Kind. (Jus Realiter Personale)

the relation the latter

acquired by the contract

ternal thing only

does not be-

it

a right in the thing until delivery?

is

during this interval otherwise than by ex-

ercising the particular juridical activity called

is,

What

is

Acquired

acquisition that

is

in the

Household?

founded upon

as regards its objects, threefold.

this

law

The man

acquires a wife; the husband and wife acquire children, constituting a family; and the family

a possessory act (actum possessorium), which constitutes a special contract. This act consists in my saying. "I will send to fetch the horse," to which the seller has to agree. For it is not

acquire domestics. All these objects, while acquirable, are inalienable; and the right of possession in these objects is the most strictly per»

self-evident or universally reasonable that

sonal of

any

all rights.

OF RIGHT

The Rights

419

of the Family as a Domestic Society

human organism

sition of a part of the

Title

I.

24.

Conjugal Right. (Husband and Wife) The Natural Basis of Marriage

The domestic riage,

founded on mar-

relations are

and marriage

is

founded upon the natural

reciprocity or intercommunity

(commercium)

of the sexes. 1 This natural union of the sexes proceeds according to the mere animal nature

(vaga libido, venus vulgivaga, fornicatio), or according to the law. The latter is marriage

(matrimonium) which

the union of two per-

is

,

sons of different sex for life-long reciprocal possession of their sexual faculties. The end of producing and educating children may be regarded as always the end of nature in implanting mutual desire and inclination in the sexes; but it is not necessary for the rightfulness of marriage

on account of

when

the production of children ceased.

And even assuming

that enjoyment in the re-

endowments

an end of marriage, yet the contract of marriage is not on that account a matter of arbitrary will, but is a contract necessary in its nature by the law of humanity. In other words, if a man and a woman have the will to enter on reciprocal enjoyment in accordance with their sexual nature, they must necessarily marry each other; and this necessity is in accordance with the juridical laws of pure reason. ciprocal use of the sexual

is

in relation to the other,

The Rational Right

—

—

ment other.

for which the one person

In

this

relation

the

is

is

the personal right thus acquired

is

individual

acquired by the other

same person

is,

at the

same

time, real in kind; and this characteristic of

it

by the fact that if one of the married persons run away or enter into the possession of another, the other is entitled, at any time, and incontestably, to bring such a one back to the former relation, as if that person were a thing. is

established

26.

Monogamy and

Equality in Marriage

For the same reasons, the relation of the married persons to each other is a relation of equality as regards the mutual possession of their persons, as well as of their goods.

quently marriage

nogamy;

is

Conse-

only truly realized in

for in the relation of

mo-

polygamy the

who is given away on the one side, gains only a part of the one to whom that person is given up, and therefore becomes a mere res. person

But

they have severrenounce the use of any part of them, although only by a special contract. in respect of their goods,

ally the right to

From

the principle thus stated, is

it

also follows

as little capable of being

a contract as this latter relation would imply,

only possible under the one condition,

that as the one person

not only permissible

enjoy-

makes himself a res, which is contrary to the right of humanity in his own person. This, however,

is

a usus

given up to the

human

follows that

brought under a contract of right as the hiring of a person on any one occasion, in the way of a pactum fornicationis. For, as regards such

of Marriage

as For, this natural commercium membrorum sexualium alterius is an

it

under the condition of marriage, but is further only really possible under that condition. But

that concubinage 25.

being,

same time the

the surrender and acceptation of, or by, one sex

who marry

the marriage would be dissolved of itself

unity, at the

acquisition of the whole person,

should set this before themselves as the end of their union, otherwise that those

its

must be admitted by all that any one who might enter into it could not be legally held to the fulfilment of their promise if they wished to

it

resile

from

it.

And

as regards the former, a

contract of concubinage would also

pactum turpe; because

fall

as a

as a contract of the hire

also equally acquires

(locatio, conductio), of a part for the use of

the other reciprocally, and thus regains and re-

another, on account of the inseparable unity of

as a res, that

establishes the rational personality. 1

Commercium

sexuale est usus

The

membrorum

acquiet jacul-

tatum sexualium alterius. This "usus" is either natural, by which human beings may reproduce their own kind, or unnatural, which, again, refers either to a person of the same sex or to an animal of another species than man. These transgressions of all law, as crimina carnis contra naturam, are even "not to be named"; and, as wrongs against all humanity in the person, they cannot be saved, by any limitation or exception whatever, from entire reprobation.

members of a person, any one entering into such a contract would be actually surrendering the

as a res to the arbitrary will of another.

Hence

any party may annul a contract like this if entered into with any other, at any time and at pleasure; and that other would have no ground, in the circumstances, to

complain of a lesion of

The same holds

likewise of a morganatic or "left-hand" marriage, contracted in his right.

— THE SCIENCE

420

order to turn the inequality in the social status of the two parties to advantage in the way of

supremacy of the one

establishing the social

over the other; for, in fact, such a relation is not really different from concubinage, according to the principles of natural right,

and therefore

does not constitute a real marriage. Hence the question may be raised as to whether it is not contrary to the equality of married persons

when

the law says in

any way of the husband

and reciprocally manner, from the fact of procreation in the union thus constituted, there follows the duty of preserving and rearing children as the products of this union. Accord-

to acquire one another really

by marriage. In

like

ingly, children, as persons,

have, at the same

time, an original congenital right

from mere hereditary

right

care of their parents

till

—

—distinguished

to be reared

by the

they are capable of

maintaining themselves; and this provision be-

in relation to the wife,

comes immediately

so that he

particular juridical act being required to de-

"he shall be thy master," represented as the one who com-

is

mands, and she is the one who obeys. This, howcannot be regarded as contrary to the natural equality of a human pair, if such legal

termine

supremacy

based only upon the natural su-

is

periority of the faculties of the husband compared with the wife, in the effectuation of the

to

right

ical process. it is

is

a person, and

it

And

hence, in the practical relation,

quite a correct and even a necessary idea

by

interest of the household,

to regard the act of generation as a process

which a person is brought without his consent into the world and placed in it by the respon-

is

sible free will of others.

This

act, therefore, at-

taches an obligation to the parents to

—

make

—

their

power goes contented with the condition thus acquired. Hence parents children

27.

thus produced

is

impossible to think of a being endowed with personal freedom as produced merely by a phys-

is

command

and if the based merely upon this fact. For this right may thus be deduced from the very duty of unity and equality in relation to the end involved.

common

by law, without any

it.

For what

ever,

theirs

Fulfilment of the Contract of Marriage

as far as their

a manner, a

The contract of marriage is completed only by conjugal cohabitation. A contract of two

cannot regard their child

persons of different sex, with the secret understanding either to abstain from conjugal co-

with freedom cannot be so regarded. Nor, consequently, have they a right to destroy it as if

habitation or with the consciousness on either side of incapacity for it, is a simulated contract;

it

it

does not constitute a marriage, and

it

may

dissolved by either of the parties at will. But

be if

the incapacity only arises after marriage, the right of the contract

is

not annulled or dimin-

a contingency that cannot be legally

by

ished

thing of their

own making;

as,

in

for a being

endowed

were their own property, or even to leave it have brought a being into the world who becomes in fact a citizen of the world, and they have placed that being in a state which they cannot be left to treat with indifference, even according to the natural concep-

to chance; because they

tions of right.

blamed.

The

We

acquisition of a spouse, either as a hus-

band or as a

— that

wife,

is

therefore not constituted

—

that

cannot even conceive

God can

how

it

create free beings; for

is it

possible

appears

by cohabitation without a preceding contract; nor even pacto by a mere

as

contract of marriage, without subsequent co-

the chain of natural necessity, and that, there-

facto

is,

habitation; but only lege, that

consequence two persons on the basis other, which

is,

of the obligation that

as a juridical is

formed by

their future actions,

mined by that fore,

first act,

being predeter-

would be contained

in

free. But as men we are proved by the categorical imthe moral and practical relation as

they could not be

free in fact, as

is

perative in

of a reciprocal possession of each

an authoritative decision of reason; yet reason cannot make the possibility of such a relation of cause to effect conceivable from the theoretical point of view, because they are both suprasensible. All that can be demanded of reason under these conditions would merely be to prove that there is no contradiction involved in the conception of a creation of free beings; and this may be done by showing that contradiction only arises when, along with the category of causality, the condition of time is transferred

possession at the

same time

is

only

by the reciprocal usus facul-

tatum

st'xualiiim alterius.

Title

II.

Parental Right. (Parent and Child)

The Relation of Parent and Child

From

—

the duty of man towards himself that towards the humanity in his own person there thus arises a personal right on the part of

is,

the

all

entering into a sexual union solely

effected in reality

28.

—

if

members

of the opposite sexes, as persons,

OF RIGHT This conimplying that the cause of an effect

421 a personal right that

constituted

to the relation of suprasensible things.

kind, that

dition, as

and exercised after the manner of a

must precede the

effect as its reason, is inevita-

ble in thinking the relation of objects of sense

and if this conception of causality were to have objective reality given to it in the theoretical bearing, it would also have to be referred to the suprasensible sphere. But the contradiction vanishes when the pure category, apart from any sensible conditions, is applied from the moral and practical point of view, and to one another;

consequently as in a non-sensible relation to the conception of creation. The philosophical jurist will not regard this investigation, when thus carried back even to the ultimate principles of the transcendental philosophy, as an unnecessary subtlety in a met-

It

is

is.

therefore evident that the

-

of a per-

and personal right, the division of two being not complete. For, if the right of the parents to the children were treated as if it were merely a real right to a part of what belongs to their house, they could not found only upon the duty of the children to return to them in claiming them when they run away, but they would be then entitled to seize them and 'mpound them like things or runaway real

right

rights into these

cattle.

Title III Household Right. (Master and Servant)

and Right of the of a Household

30. Relation

doing justice in this inquiry to the

ultimate relations of the principles of right.

real right

title

sonal right of a real kind must necessarily be added, in the science of right, to the titles of

aphysic of morals, or as losing itself in aimless obscurity, when he takes into consideration the difficulty of

is

The

Master

children of the house, who, along with

the parents, constitute a family, attain majority,

The Rights of

29.

the Parent

necessarily arises the right of the parents to the

and become masters of themselves (majoreneven without a contract of release from their previous state of dependence,

management and

by

From

as its

the duty thus indicated, there further

it is itself

body

as

training of the child, so long

incapable of making proper use of

an organism, and of

mind

its

as an

understanding. This involves its nourishment and the care of its education. This includes, in general, the function of forming and developing it may be able in the future and advance itself, and also its moral culture and development, the guilt of neglecting it falling upon the parents. All this training is to be continued till the child reaches the period of emancipation (emancipatio) as the age

it

practically, that

to maintain

.

The parents then parental right to com-

nes, sui juris),

their actually attaining to the capability of

self-maintenance. This attainment arises, on the

one hand, as a state of natural majority, with the advance of years in the general course of nature; and, on the other hand, it takes form, as a state in accordance with their own natural condition. They thus acquire the right of being their own masters, without the interposition of any special juridical act, and therefore merely by law (lege) and they owe their parents nothing by way of legal debt for their education, just as the parents, on their side, are now re;

from their obligations to the children in same way. Parents and children thus gain or regain their natural freedom; and the domestic society, which was necessary according to

of practicable self-support.

leased

virtually renounce the

the

mand,

as well as all claim to

repayment for

their

previous care and trouble; for which care and trouble, after the process of education

is

com-

they can only appeal to the children, by of any claim, on the ground of the obliga-

plete,

way

tion of gratitude as a

From

duty of virtue.

the fact of personality in the children,

it further follows that they can never be regarded as the property of the parents, but only as belonging to them by way of being in their possession, like other things that are held apart from the possession of all others and that can

be brought back even against the will of the subjects. Hence the right of the parents is not a purely real right, and it is not alienable (jus personalissimum) But neither is it a merely .

personal right;

it

is

a personal right of a real

the law of right,

is

thus naturally dissolved.

however, may resolve to continue the household, but under another mode of

Both

parties,

obligation. It may assume the form of a relation between the head of the house, as its master, and the other members as domestic servants, male or female; and the connection between

them

in this

new regulated domestic economy

(societas herilis) tract.

The master

may

be determined by con-

of the house, actually or vir-

with the children, of themselves; or, if there be no children in the family, with other free persons constituting the membership of the household; and thus there is established tually, enters into contract

now become major and masters

THE SCIENCE

422

a domestic relationship not founded on social equality, but such that one commands as master, and another obeys as servant (imperantis et subjecti domestici).

The domestics or servants may then be regarded by the master of the household as thus

cumstances is not left merely to the master, but also competent to the servants, who ought never to be held in bondage or bodily servitude as slaves or serfs. Such a contract cannot, therefore, be concluded for life, but in all cases only for a definite period, within which one party

is

far his.

may

session of them, they belong to

connection. Children, however, including even

As regards the form or mode of his poshim as if by a real right; for if any of them run away, he is entitled to bring them again under his power by a unilateral act of his will. But as regards the matter of his

make

right, or the use

he

is

entitled to

of such persons as his domestics, he

is

not entitled to conduct himself towards them as

if

he was their proprietor or owner {dominus

servi)

;

because they are only subjected to his

power by contract, and by

a contract under cer-

tain definite restrictions. For a contract by which the one party renounced his whole freedom for the advantage of the other, ceasing thereby to be a person and consequently having no duty even to observe a contract, is selfcontradictory, and is therefore of itself null and void. The question as to the right of property in relation to one who has lost his legal personality by a crime does not concern us

here.

This contract, then, of the master of a house-

intimate to the other a termination of their

owing

to a crime, are

debt which he is bound to pay. Even a slave, if it were in his power, would be bound to educate his children

without being entitled to count and

reckon with them for the cost; and in view of his own incapacity for discharging this function, the

possessor of a slave, therefore, enters

upon the obligation which he has rendered the slave himself unable to

fulfil.

Here, again, as under the clear that there

is

first

two

titles, it is

a personal right of a real kind,

in the relation of the

master of a house to his

domestics. For he can legally

demand them

as

belonging to what is externally his, from any other possessor of them; and he is entitled to

them back

hold with his domestics, cannot be of such a

fetch

nature that the use of them could ever rightly become an abuse of them; and the judgement

reasons that

as to what constitutes use or abuse in such cir-

who

has become enslaved always free. For every man is born free, because he has at birth as yet broken no law; and even the cost of his education till his maturity cannot be reckoned as a

the children of one

to his house,

may have

led

even before the to run away,

them

and their particular right in the circumstances, have been juridically investigated.

Systematic Division of all the Rights Capable of Being Acquired by Contract is not a part, but the juridically necessary consequence of the contract. Considered again

ery,

31. Division of Contracts. Juridical

of It is

Money and

reasonable to

cal science of right shall

nitely determine the

a

demand

Conceptions

Book

subjectively, or as to whether the acquisition,

that a metaphysi-

completely and

members

defi-

of a logical divi-

conceptions a priori, and thus establish them in a genuine system. All empirical division, on the other hand, is merely fragmension of

its

tary partition, and

it

as to whether there

may

still

leaves us in uncertainty

not be more

members

required to complete the whole sphere of

the divided conception. A division that is made according to a principle a priori may be called, in

contrast to

all

empirical partitions, a dog-

matic division.

Every contract, regarded in itself objectively, consists of two juridical acts: the promise and its acceptance. Acquisition by the latter, unless it be a pactum re initum which requires deliv-

which ought to happen as a necessary consequence according to reason, will also follow, in fact, as a physical

consequence, it is evident that have no security or guarantee that this will happen by the mere acceptance of a promise. There is, therefore, something externally required connected with the mode of the conI

tract, in reference to the certainty of acquisition

by

and

can only be some element commeans necessary to the attainment of acquisition as realizing the purpose of the contract. And in his connection it;

this

pleting and determining the

and behoof, three persons are required to intervene the promiser, the acceptor, and the cau-

—

The importance of the cauevident; but by his intervention and his special contract with the promiser, the actioner or surety. tioner

is

.:

OF RIGHT worker under

ceptor gains nothing in respect of the object but the means of compulsion that enable him to obtain what is his own.

According to these rational principles of

3. Mandate (mandatum). The contract of mandate is an engagement to perform or execute a certain business in place and in

logi-

name

indicated here.

The cautionary

C.

.

fulfilment of the promise of another.

Onerous contracts, with reciprocal acquisition; or

3.

C. Cautionary contracts, with no acquisition,

but only guarantee of what has been already acquired. These contracts may be gratuitous

on the one side, and onerous on the other.

yet, at the

same time,

Personal

{pacta gratuita)

gratuitous contracts

Depositation (depositum), involving the

preservation of some valuable deposited in

Commodate (commodatum)

a

loan

of

the use of a thing;

Donation (donatio), a free

3.

B.

The onerous

gift.

contracts are contracts either

of permutation or of hiring.

Contracts of permutation or reciprocal exchange (permutatio late sic dicta) 1. Barter, or strictly real exchange (permutatio stride sic dicta). Goods exchanged I.

for goods. 2.

Purchase and

sale

(emptio venditio).

Goods exchanged for money. 3. Loan (mutuum). Loan of under condition of

its

kind: corn for corn, or

a

fungible

being returned in

money

for

money.

Contracts of letting and hiring (locatio conductio) 1. Letting of a thing on hire to another per-

II.

:

son

who

is

to

make

use of

it

(locatio rei).

If the thing can only be restored in specie,

These appear to be enand it may therefore seem questionable whether they are entitled to a place tirely

(translatio)

.

empirical,

a metaphysical science of right. For, in such

in

must be made according and hence the matter of the juridical relation, which may be conventional, ought to be left out of account, and only its form should be taken into consideration. Such conceptions may be illustrated by taking the instance of money, in contradistinction from all other exchangeable things as wares and merchandise; or by the case of a book. And considering these as illustrative examples in this connection, it will be shown that the conception of money as the greatest and most useable of all the means of human intercommunication through things, in the way of purchase and sale in commerce, as well as that of books as the greatest means of carrying on the interchange a science, the divisions

of thought, resolve themselves into relations

that are purely intellectual and rational.

hence

it

will

And

be made evident that such concep-

from the purity of scheme of pure rational contracts, by

tions do not really detract

the given

empirical admixture.

may

be the subject of an onerous contract combining the consideration of interest with it (pactum usurarium) 2. Letting of work on hire (locatio operae). Consent to the use of my powers by another for a certain price (merces). The

it

obsidis).

to principles a priori;

trust; 2.

(praestatio

objects or instruments required for such trans-

are: i.

security

Guarantee of personal performance. This list of all modes in which the property of one person may be transferred or conveyed to another includes conceptions of certain ference

The

contracts (cautiones) are:

Pledge (pignus). Caution by a moveable deposited as security. 2. Suretyship Caution for the (fide jus sio)

sition; or

A.

is

but

1.

A. Gratuitous contracts, with unilateral acquiB.

in the place of another,

not, at the same time, in his name, it is performance without commission (gestio negotii)] but if it is rightfully performed in name of the other, it constitutes mandate, which as a contract of procuration is an onerous contract (mandatum onerosum).

the circle of the metaphysical science of right,

founded upon a purpose of and are either:

of another person. If the action

merely done

whose rational modes of contract can alone be All contracts are

this contract is

ant (mercenarius).

cal division, there are properly only three pure and simple modes of contract. There are, however, innumerable mixed and empirical modes, adding statutory and conventional forms to the principles of mine and thine that are in accordance with rational laws. But they lie outside of

acquisition,

423 a hired serv-

Illustration of Relations of Contract by the

ceptions of

Money of,

is

Con-

Money and a Book I. What is Money?

a thing which can only be

made use

by being alienated or exchanged. This

is

a

;

THE SCIENCE

424

good nominal definition, as given by Achenwall and it is sufficient to distinguish objects of the will of this kind from all other objects. But it

goods to be sold; and because the seller would then have to expend more labour upon his goods than the buyer on the equivalent, the money

gives us no information regarding the rational

coming

money

possibility of such a thing as

is.

Yet we

much by the definition: (i) that the alienation in this mode of human intercommusee thus

nication and exchange

but

is

not viewed as a

is

mode

intended as a

gift,

of reciprocal acquisi-

by an onerous contract; and (2) that it is regarded as a mere means of carrying on commerce, universally adopted by the people, but having no value as such of itself, in contrast to other things as mercantile goods or wares which tion

have a particular value in relation to special wants existing among the people. It therefore represents all exchangeable things.

A as a

bushel of corn has the greatest direct value means of satisfying human wants. Cattle

may

be fed by

it;

and these again are subservi-

ent to our nourishment and locomotion, and

in to

him more

rapidly, the labour ap-

plied to the preparation of goods

and indus-

try generally, with the industrial productivity

the source of the public wealth, would same time dwindle and be cut down. Hence bank notes and assignations are not to be regarded as money, although they may take its place by way of representing it for a time;

which

is

the

at

because

it

costs almost no labour to prepare

them, and their value is based merely upon the opinion prevailing as to the further continuance of the previous possibility of changing them in-

money. But on its being in any way found out that there is not ready money in sufficient quantity for easy and safe conversion of such notes or assignations, the opinion gives way, and a fall in their value becomes inevitable.

to ready

Thus

who work

the industrial labour of those

our stead. Thus, by means are multiplied and supported, who

the gold and silver mines in Peru and Mexico

not only act again in reproducing such natural

in the application of fruitless efforts to discover

products, but also by other artificial products

new

they can come to the relief of all our proper wants Thus are men enabled to build dwellings,

ably even greater than what

they even labour

men

of corn,

in

and

to prepare clothing,

to supply all the ingen-

ious comforts and enjoyments which

the products of industry.

money

the value of

be

On

make up

the other hand,

only indirect. It cannot

is

enjoyed, nor be used directly for en-

itself

joyment; it is, however, a means towards this, and of all outward things it is of the highest utility.

We may

found a real definition of money

provisionally

upon these considerations.

It

may

thus be defined as the universal means of carrying on the industry of men in exchanging in-

tercommunications with each other. Hence national wealth, in so far as it can be acquired by

means

of

money,

is

properly only the

sum of men

the industry or applied labour with which

pay each

money The

other,

and which

in circulation

thing which

is

it,

represented by the the people.

to be called

much

therefore, have cost as

duce

is

among

or even to put

it

money must,

industry to pro-

into the hands of oth-

may

—

especially on account of the frequent failures

veins of these precious metals

of his

servants and court, has enforced

Thus

it

may have been

gold, or silver, or cop-

per, or a species of beautiful shells called

mat

ruler of the country

exchanged. For if it were easier to procure the material which is called money than the goods that are required, there would be

is

more money

in the

market than

the

tribute of his subjects in this kind of material.

products, for which

it

prob-

into poverty, did not the industry of Europe, stimulated in turn by these very metals, proportionally expand at the same time so as constantly to keep up the zeal of the miners in their work by the articles of luxury thereby offered to them. It is thus that the concurrence of industry with industry, and of labour with labour, is always maintained. But how is it possible that what at the beginning constituted only goods or wares, at length became money? This has happened wherever a sovereign as great and powerful consumer of a particular substance, which he at first used merely for the adornment and decoration

gro slaves, as on the Guinea Coast.

as

is

sink

be equivalent to the industry or labour required for the acquisition of the goods or wares or merchandise, as natural or artificial

ers,

—

expended in the manufacture of goods in Europe. Hence such mining labour, as unrewarded in the circumstances, would be abandoned of itself, and the countries mentioned would in consequence soon is

ries,

or even a sort of

Congo; or ingots of

cow-

called makutes, as in

iron, as in Senegal; or

Ne-

When

the

demanded such

things as

imposts, those whose labour had to be put in

motion to procure them were also paid by means them, according to certain regulations of

of

— OF RIGHT commerce

appears to me, it is only thus that a particular species of goods came to be made a legal means of carrying on the indusexchange. As

became money. The rational conception of money, under

cally

which the empirical conception

is

embraced,

is

therefore that of a thing which, in the course of the public permutation or exchange of possessions (permutatio publica), determines the

or goods

all

the other things that form products

—under which term even the sciences

are included, in so far as they are not taught gratis to others.

ple

II.

The quantity

constitutes their wealth

price (pretium)

is

of

it

among

a peo-

(opulentia). For

is

discourse

addressed by some one to the public, through visible signs of speech. It is a matter of indifference to the present considerations whether it is written by a pen or imprinted by types, and on

He who

few or many pages. in his

lic

own name

speaks to the pub-

the author.

is

He who

the author

the publisher.

is

When

ad-

name

dresses the writing to the public in the

of

a publisher

does this with the permission or authority of the author, the act is in accordance with right, and he is the rightful publisher; but if this is done without such permission or authority, the act is contrary to right, and the publisher is a counterfeiter or unlawful publisher. The whole

of a set of copies of the original called

an

document

is

edition.

the public judgement about

the value of a thing, in relation to the proportionate abundance of

what forms the universal

means

in circulation for carrying

representative

What

a Book?

A book is a writing which contains a

it

trial labour of the subjects in their commerce with each other, and thereby forming the medium of the national wealth. And thus it practi-

price of

425

then established, as in a market or

The Unauthorized Publishing

of Books is Contrary to the Principles of Right, and is Right'

ly Prohibited

on the reciprocal interchange of the products of industry or labour. 1

The precious

metals,

A

writing

is

not an immediate direct presen-

tation of a conception, as

is

the case, for in-

are not merely weighed but also

stance, with an engraving that exhibits a por-

stamped or provided with a sign indicating how are worth, form legal money, and

course addressed in a particular form to the pub-

when they

much they

are called coin.

lic

According to Adam Smith: "Money has become, in all civilized nations, the universal instrument of commerce, by the intervention of which goods of all kinds are bought and sold or exchanged for one another." This definition expands the empirical conception of money to it, by taking regard only to form of the reciprocal performances

the rational idea of

the implied

trait,

onerous contracts, and thus abstracting conformable to the conception of right in the permutation and ex-

ly

;

or a bust or cast

and the author

by means

again, speaks

workman

by a

may

sculptor. It

a dis-

be said to speak public-

of his publisher.

by the

is

The

publisher,

aid of the printer as his

own name, would be the author, but in the name of the author; and he is only entitled to do so in virtue of a mandate given him to that effect by the author. Now the unauthorized printer and publisher speaks by an assumed (operarius), yet not in his

for otherwise he

in the

authority in his publication; in the

from

deed of the author, but without a mandate to that effect (gerit se mandatarium absque mandato). Consequently such an unauthorized publication is a wrong committed upon the authorized and only lawful publisher, as it amounts to a pilfering of the profits which the latter was entitled and able to draw from the use of his proper right (furtum usus). Unauthorized printing and publication of books is, therefore, forbidden as an act of counterfeit and piracy on the ground of right. There seems, however, to be an impression

their matter. It is thus

change of the mine and thine generally (commutatio late sic dicta). The definition, therefore, accords with the representation in the above synopsis of a dogmatic division of contracts a priori, and consequently with the metaphysical principle of right in general.

Hence where commerce

is extensive neither gold nor specially used as money, but only as constituting wares; because there is too little of the first and too much of the second for them to be easily brought into circulation, so as at once to have the former in such small pieces as are necessary in payment for particular goods and not to have the latter in great quantity in case of the smallest acquisitions. Hence silver more or less alloyed with copper is taken as the proper material of money and the measure of the calculation of all prices in the great commercial intercommunications of the world; and the other metals and still more nonmetallic substances can only take its place in the case of a people of limited commerce. 1

copper

is

—

—

—

—

name

in-

—

that there

is

a sort of

common

right to print

and publish books; but the slightest reflection must convince any one that this would be a great injustice. The reason of it is found simply in the fact that a book, regarded from one point of view, is an external product of mechanical

THE SCIENCE

426 art (opus mechanicum) by any one who may be .

of a copy; and

that can be imitated in rightful possession

therefore his by a real right.

it is

But. from another point of view, a book is not merely an external thing, but is a discourse of the publisher to the public, and he

only entitled to do this publicly under the mandate of and this conthe author (praestatio operae) stitutes a personal right. The error underlying is

person acquiring acquires from another who either is not yet, and who can only be regarded as a possible being, or who is just ceasing to be, or who no longer is. Hence such

liarity that the

mode of attaining to possession is to be regarded as a mere practical idea of reason. a

from an interchange and confusion of these two

There are three modes of ideal acquisition: I. Acquisition by usucapion; II. Acquisition by inheritance or succession; III. Acquisition by undying merit (meritum immortale), or the claim by right to a good

kinds of right in relation to books.

name

;

referred

impression

the

to,

therefore,

arises

Confusion of Personal Right and Real Right

The confusion

of personal

right

with real

may

be likewise shown by reference to a difference of view in connection with another contract, falling under the head of contracts right

of hiring

(B n.

i).

namely, the contract of lease

The question is proprietor when he has

(jus incolatus).

raised as to

whether

sold a house

a

at death.

These three modes of acquisition can. as a matter of fact, only have effect in a public juridical state of existence, but they are not founded merely upon the civil constitution or upon arbitrary statutes; they are already contained a priori in the conception of the state of nature, and are thus necessarily conceivable prior to their empirical manifestation. The laws regarding them in the civil constitution ought to be

or a piece of ground held on lease, before the expiry of the period of lease, was bound to add

regulated

the condition of the continuance of the lease to

S3.

the contract of purchase; or whether

it

Acquisition by Usucapion. (Acquisitio

i.

I

may

acquire the property of another merely

by long possession and use of it (usucapio). Such property is not acquired, because I may legitimately presume that his consent is given to this nor beeffect (per consensum praesumptum) cause I can assume that, as he does not oppose my acquisition of it, he has relinquished or abandoned it as his (rem derelictam). But I acquire

farm would be regarded as having a burden lying upon it. constituting a real right acquired in it by the lessee; and this might well enough be carried out by a clause merely indorsing or ingrossing the contract of lease in the deed of sale. But as it would no longer then be a simple lease; another contract would properly be required to be conjoined, a matter which few lessors would be disposed to grant. The proposition, then, that "Pur-

existence,

chase breaks hire" holds in principle; for the

the time of

the former view, a house or

full right in

a thing as a property overbears

personal right, which

is

inconsistent with

it.

all

But

there remains a right of action to the lessee, on the ground of a personal right for indemnification

on account of any

loss arising

from break-

ing of the contract.

Episodical Section. The Ideal Acquisition of External Objects of the Will 2>2.

The Nature and Modes of Ideal Acquisition

I call that

involves no

mode

of acquisition ideal which

that rational conception.

per Usucapionem)

should

be held that "purchase breaks hire," of course under reservation of a period of warning determined by the nature of the subject in use. In

—

by

;

it

thus because, even

if

there were any one ac-

tually raising a claim to this property as its

true owner, I of

my

may

exclude him on the ground

long possession of

ignore his previous

it,

and proceed as

if

he existed during

my possession

as a

mere abstraction,

may have been

subsequently apprized of his reality as well as of his claim. This mode of acquisition is not quite correctly designated acquisition by prescription (per praealthough

I

other

scriptionem)

;

claimants

to be regarded as only the conse-

is

for

the

exclusion of

all

quence of the usucapion; and the process of acquisition must have gone before the right of exclusion. The rational possibility of such a mode of acquisition has now to be proved. Any one who does not exercise a continuous

in time, and which is founded upon a mere idea of pure reason. It is nevertheless actual, and not merely imaginary acquisition; and it is not called real only be-

possessory activity (actus possessorius) in relation to a thing as his is regarded with good

cause the act of acquisition is not empirical. This character of the act arises from the pecu-

as he does not qualify himself with a title as its

causality

right as sessor.

one who does not at

all

exist as its pos-

For he cannot complain of

possessor.

And even

if

lesion so long

he should afterwards lay

— OF RIGHT claim to the thing taken possession of

when another has already

he only says he was once on a time owner of it, but not that he is so still, or that his possession has continued without init,

427

from

juridical claims

acquisition.

The

is

commonly

also called

prescriptive title of the older

possessor, therefore, belongs to the sphere of

natural right {est juris naturae).

terruption as a juridical fact. It can, therefore,

—

Acquisition by Inheritance. (Acquisitio

only be a juridical process of possession, that has been maintained without interruption and is proveable by documentary fact, that any one

34.

can secure for himself what is his own after ceasing for a long time to make use of it.

(translatio) of the property or goods of one is

For, suppose that the neglect to exercise this possessory activity had not the effect of ena-

takes the estate (haeredis instituti) and the re-

bling another to found

upon

his hitherto lawful,

undisputed and bona fide possession, and irrefragable right to continue in its possession so that

may

11.

haereditatis)

Inheritance

the will of both.

mine and

legalis).

Anyone who has neglected

his possessory act in a

embody

to

documentary

has

title

lost his claim to the right of being possessor for the time; and the length of the period of his which need not necessarily neglecting to do so

—

— can be referred

who

leaves

it,

who be-

same moment

thine, take place in the

time

ical sense;

acquisition

acquisition of the heir

ing the acts that constitute the exchange of the

would only be provisory and temporary. This is evident on the ground that there are no historical records available to carry the investigation of a title back to the first possessor and his act of acquisition. The presumption upon which acquisition by usucapion is founded is, therefore, not merely its conformity to right as allowed and just, but also the presumption of its being right {praesumtio juris et de jure), and its being assumed to be in accordance with compulsory laws (suppositio all

The

linquishment of the testator

of

but

who

dying to a survivor, through the consent of

regard the thing that is thus in his possession as acquired by him. Then no acquisition would ever become peremptory and secured,

he

by the transfer

constituted

is

in

articulo

mortis

—and

the testator ceases to be. There

when

just

therefore no

is

special act of transfer {translatio) in the empir-

for that would involve two succesby which the one would first divest himself of his possession, and the other would sive acts,

thereupon enter into it. Inheritance as constituted by a simultaneous double act is, therefore, an ideal mode of acquisition. Inheritance is inconceivable in the state of nature without a testamentary disposition {dispositio ultimae voluntatis) and the question arises as to whether this mode of acquisition is to be regarded as a ;

contract of succession, or a unilateral act instituting an heir by a mill {testamentum) The de.

termination of this question depends on the further question, whether and how, in the very

same moment

in

which one individual ceases to

be, there can be a transition of his property to

it

another person. Hence the problem, as to how a mode of acquisition by inheritance is possible, must be investigated independently of the va-

cally practical reason to maintain that

rious possible forms in

be particularly defined

to only

as establishing the certainty of this neglect.

And

would contradict the postulate of the juridione hitherto unknown as a possessor, and whose possessory activity has at least been interrupted, whether by or without fault of his own, could always at any time re-acquire a property; for this would be to make all ownership uncertain (dominia rerum incerta jacere). But if he is a member of the commonwealth or civil union, the state session for

him

may

maintain his pos-

vicariously, although

it

may

be

which

it

is

practically

carried out, and which can have place only in

a commonwealth. "It

is

possible to acquire

by being

instituted

or appointed heir in a testamentary disposition."

For the testator Caius promises and de-

clares in his last will to Titius,

who knows

ing of this promise, to transfer to

him

noth-

his es-

tate in case of death, but thus continuing as long as he lives sole

owner of

it.

Now

by a mere

uni-

interrupted as private possession; and in that

lateral act of will,

case the actual possessor will not be able to

mitted to another person, as in addition to the promise of the one party there is required acceptance {acceptatio) on the part of the other, and a simultaneous bilateral act of will {voluntas simultanea) which, however, is here awanting. So long as Caius lives, Titius cannot expressly accept in order to enter on acquisition, because Caius has only promised in case of

prove a

title

of acquisition even

cupation, nor to found upon a

from a

title

first

oc-

of usucapion.

But, in the state of nature, usucapion

is

univer-

ground of holding, not properly as a juridical mode of requiring a thing, but as a ground for maintaining oneself in possession of it where there are no juridical acts. A release sally a rightful

nothing can in fact be trans-

THE SCIENCE

428

death; otherwise the property would be for a

moment

at least in

common

possession, which

is not the will of the testator. However, Titius acquires tacitly a special right to the inheritance as a real right. This is constituted by the

and exclusive right to accept the estate (jus in re jacente), which is therefore called at that point of time a haereditas jacens. Now as every man because he must always gain and never sole

—

lose

by

it

—

necessarily, although tacitly, accepts

such a right, and as Titius after the death of Caius is in this position, he may acquire the succession as heir by acceptance of the promise.

And

the estate is not in the meantime entirely without an owner (res nullius), but is only in abeyance or vacant (vacua) because he has exclusively the right of choice as to whether he ;

will actually

his

own

make

the estate bequeathed to

him

or not.

Hence testaments

are valid according to

mere

ends

man may

admitted that a

it, it is

thing that

is

exists in the

his own, even when he no longer world of sense as a visible person

(homo phaenomenon) his survivors

or strangers

.

—

—whether

name

as a matter of right, on the ground that unproved accusations subject them all to the

danger of similar treatment after death. Now that a man when dead can yet acquire such a right

is

a peculiar and, nevertheless, an undeni-

able manifestation in fact, of the a priori law-

giving reason thus extending

mand

present

If

life.

some one then spreads

The Continuing Right of a Good (Bona fama Defuncti)

Name

It would be absurd to think that a dead person could possess anything after his death, when he no longer exists in the eye of the law, if the matter in question were a mere thing. But a

good name is a congenital and external, although merely ideal, possession, which attaches inseparably to the individual as a person.

Now we

can and must abstract here from all consideration as to whether the persons cease to be after death or still continue as such to exist; because, in considering their juridical relation to others,

we regard persons merely according to their humanity and as rational beings (homo noumenon). Hence any attempt to bring the reputation or good name of a person into evil and false repute after death, is always questionable, even although a well-founded charge may be for to that extent the brocard "De nil nisi bene" 1 is wrong. Yet to spread against one who is absent and cannot

—

honoured him when living, or even made him despicable, any one who can adduce a proof that this accusation is intentionally false and

may

publicly

declare

him who thus

repute to be a dishonour to him in turn. This would not be allowable unless it were legitimate to assume that the dead person was injured by the accusation, although he is dead, calumniator, and

ill

affix

and that a certain to

just satisfaction was done him by an apology, although he no longer

sensibly exists.

A

title to

act the part of the vin-

dicator of the dead person does not require to

be established; for every one necessarily claims this of himself, not merely as a duty of virtue regarded ethically, but as a right belonging to

him

in virtue of his

humanity. Nor does the vin-

show any special personal damage, accruing to him as a friend or relative, from a stain on the character of the deceased, to justify him in proceeding to censure it. That such a form of ideal acquisition, and even a right in an individual after death against surdicator require to

is thus actually founded, cannot, therebe disputed, although the possibility of such a right is not capable of logical deduction.

vivors, fore,

There

is

no ground for drawing visionary

in-

ferences from what has just been stated, to the

allowed mortuis

presentiment of a future life and invisible relations to departed souls. For the considerations connected with this right turn on nothing more than the purely moral and juridical relation

charges

which subsists among men, even

defend himself, shows at least a want of magnanimity. By a blameless life and a death that worthily ["Let nothing be said of the dead but what vourable."] 1

a charge

regarding a dead person that would have dis-

brings the dead person into

in.

law of com-

its

or prohibition beyond the limits of the

untrue

—

relatives

are entitled to defend his good

however, is to be understood in the sense that they are capable and worthy of being introduced and sanctioned in the civil state, whenever it is instituted. For it is only the common will in the civil state that maintains the possession of the inheritance or succession, while it hangs between acceptance or rejection and specially belongs to no particular individual.

after Death.

further held that

It is

and successors

natural right (sunt juris naturae). This assertion

35.

acquire a

(negatively) good reputation constituting some-

is fa-

life,

in the present

as rational beings. Abstraction

made from

all

is,

however,

that belongs physically to their

existence in space and time; that

is,

men

are

considered logically apart from these physical

concomitants of their nature, not as to their

OF RIGHT State

when

actually deprived of them, but only

being spirits they are in a condition that might realize the injury done them by calumniators. Any one who may falsely say some-

in so far as

me a hundred years hence injures even now. For in the pure juridical relation, which is entirely rational and surprasensible, thing against

me

abstraction

is

tions of time,

made from

the physical condi-

and the calumniator

is

as cul-

he had committed the offence in my lifetime only this will not be tried by a criminal process, but he will only be punished with that loss of honour he would have caused to another, and this is inflicted upon him by public opinion pable as

if

;

according to the lex

Even

talionis.

from a dead author, although

it

prives

him

Chapter

How

is

yet propright.

Conditioned by

is

Subjectively

Conditioned by the Principle of a Public

issue. And yet they may co-exist with each other, because they are delivered from two different, yet respectively true, points of view: the one from regard to private right,

and opposite

from the idea of public right. They contract of donation (pactum donations); II. The contract of loan (commodatum) III. The action of real revindication (vindicatio) and IV. Guarantee by oath (juramentum). the other are:

Natural right, understood simply as that right which is not statutory, and which is knowable purely a priori, by every man's reason, will include distributive justice as well as commutative justice. It is manifest that the latter, as is

valid

between

persons in their reciprocal relations of intercourse with one another, must belong to natural right. But this holds also of distributive justice, in so far as it can be known a priori; and decisions or sentences regarding it must be reg-

by the law of natural right. The moral person who presides

ulated

of justice and administers

it is

in the sphere

called the

Court

of Justice, and, as engaged in the process of official duty, the judicatory; the sentence deliv-

ered in a case, is the judgement (judicium). All this is to be here viewed a priori, according to the rational conditions of right, without taking into consideration

how su.h

I.

The

;

;

It is a

tion

common

error on the part of the jurist

a constitution

is

to

by a

This

is

attention to

Court.

constituting the justice that

which

in

tacit assumption (vitium subreptionis). done by assuming as objective and absolute the juridical principle which a public court of justice is entitled and even bound to adopt in its own behoof, and only from the subjective purpose of qualifying itself to decide and judge upon all the rights pertaining to individuals. It is therefore of no small importance to make this specific difference intelligible, and to draw

human

and What Acquisition

and there are four cases

does not tar-

the Sentence of a Public Judicatory 36.

;

to fall here into the fallacy of begging the ques-

of a part of his property,

III. Acquisition

distinguished

the two forms of judgement have a different

a plagiarism

nish the honour of the deceased, but only deerly regarded as a lesion of his

429

it.

—

The Contract of Donation. 1. Donationis)

37.

The

(Pactum

contract of donation signifies the gratu-

itous alienation (gratis) of a thing or right that is

mine. It involves a relation between

me

as

the donor (donans), and another person as the

donatory (donatarius)

,

accordance with the

in

principle of private right,

mine

is

by which what

is

transferred to the latter, on his accept-

it, as a gift (donum). However, it is not presumed that I have voluntarily bound myself thereby so as to be compelled to keep my promise, and that I have thus given away my freedom gratuitously, and, as it were, to that extent thrown myself away. Nemo suum jactare praesumitur. But this is what would hap-

ance of

to be

pen, under such circumstances, according to the principle of right in the civil state; for in this

sphere the donatory can compel me, under cerperform my promise. If, then,

tain conditions, to

be actually established or organized, for which particular statutes, and consequently empirical

the case comes before a court, according to the

principles, are requisite.

sumed

The

question, then, in this connection,

is

not

merely "What is right in itself?" in the sense in which every man must determine it by the judgement of reason; but "What is right as applied to this case?" that is, "What is right and just as viewed by a court?" The rational and the judicial points of view are therefore to be

conditions of public right,

it

must

either be pre-

that the donor has consented to such

compulsion, or the court would give no regard, in the sentence, to the consideration as to

wheth-

er he intended to reserve the right to resile

from

promise or not; but would only refer to what is certain, namely, the condition of the promise and the acceptance of the donatory. Although the promiser, therefore, thought as his

—

THE SCIENCE

430

may

—

supposed that he could not be promise in any case, if he "rued"

easily be

bound by

his

was actually carried out, yet the court assumes that he ought expressly to have reserved this condition if such was his mind; it

before

and tion,

if

it

make such an express reservabe held that he can be compelled to

he did not will

it

implement his promise. And this principle is assumed by the court, because the administration of justice would otherwise be endlessly impeded, or even made entirely impossible. 38.

—

11.

The Contract of Loan. (Commodatum)

In the contract of commodate-loan

datum)

some one

give

I

something that

is

(commo-

the gratuitous use of

mine. If

it

is

a thing that

is

given on loan, the contracting parties agree that the borrower will restore the very same thing

But the receiver of same time, assume that the owner of the thing lent (commodans) will take upon himself all risk (casus) of any possible loss of it, or of its useful quality, that may arise from having given it into the possession of the receiver. For it is

to the

power of the

lender.

me

to assert that I

had no further concern with

the cloak but to return

it

as

it

was,

or, in

the

only to mention the fact of the theft; and that, in any case, anything more required would be but an act of courtesy in expressing sympathy with the owner on account latter

case,

of his loss, seeing he can claim nothing on the

ground of right. It would be otherwise, however, if, on asking the use of an article, I discharged myself beforehand from all responsibility, in case of its coming to grief while in my hands, on the ground of my being poor and unable to compensate any incidental loss. No one could find such a condition superfluous or ludicrous, unless the borrower were, in fact, known to be a well-to-do and well-disposed man; because in such a case it would almost be an insult not to act on the presumption of generous compensation for any loss sustained.

the loan (commodatarius) cannot, at the

not to be understood of itself that the owner, besides the use of the thing, which he has grant-

ed to the receiver, and the detriment that

is in-

separable from such use, also gives a guarantee or warrandice against

from such

use.

On

all

damage

that

may

arise

the contrary, a special acces-

sory contract would have to be entered into for this purpose. The only question, then, that can

be raised is this: "Is it incumbent on the lender or the borrower to add expressly the condition of undertaking the risk that may accrue to the thing lent; or, if this is not done, which of the parties is to be presumed to have consented and agreed to guarantee the property of the lender, up to restoration of the very same thing or its equivalent?" Certainly not the lender; because it cannot be presumed that he has gratuitously agreed to give more than the mere use of the thing, so that he cannot be supposed to have also

undertaken the risk of loss of his property. But this may be assumed on the side of the borrower; because he thereby undertakes and performs nothing more than what is implied in the contract.

For example, I enter a house, when overtaken by a shower of rain, and ask the loan of a cloak. But through accidental contact with colouring matter, it becomes entirely spoiled while in my possession; or on entering another house, I lay it

aside and

stances,

it

is

stolen.

Under such circum-

everybody would think

it

absurd for

Now possible

by the very nature of this contract, the damage (casus) which the thing lent

may undergo

cannot be exactly determined in any agreement. Commodate is therefore an uncertain contract (pactum incertum), because the consent can only be so far presumed. The judgement, in any case, deciding upon whom the incidence of any loss must fall, cannot therefore be determined from the conditions of the contract in itself, but only by the principle of the court before which it comes, and which can only consider what is certain in the contract; and the only thing certain is always the fact as to the possession of the thing as property.

Hence

the judgement passed in the state of nature will

be different from that given by a court of justice in the civil state.

The judgement from

the

standpoint of natural right will be determined by regard to the inner rational quality of the

and will run thus: "Loss arising from damage accruing to a thing lent falls upon the borrower" (casum sentit commodatarius);

thing,

whereas the sentence of a court of justice in the civil state will run thus: "The loss falls upon the lender" (casum sentit dominus). The latter judgement turns out differently from the former as the sentence of the mere sound reason, because a public judge cannot found upon presumptions as to what either party may have thought; and thus the one who has not obtained release

from

all

loss in the thing,

accessory contract, must bear the

by

a special

loss.

Hence

the difference between the judgement as the

court must deliver

each individual

by

is

it

and the form

entitled to hold

his private reason, is a

it

in

which

for himself,

matter of importance,

— OF RIGHT and

is

not to be overlooked in the consideration

of juridical judgements. 39.

—

have

Lost. (Vindicatio) It is clear

from what has been already said mine which continues to exist re-

that a thing of

mains mine, although ous occupation of

it;

mine without a

to be

I

not be in continuit does not cease

A

evident that a right

belongs in consequence it,

the possession of another.

may

be lost (res amissa) and thus

come into other hands in an honourable bona fide way as a supposed "find" or it may come to me by formal transfer on the part of one who is in possession of it, and who professes to ;

be

its

am

my

not bound, nor even

I the right, to investigate the title of the

for this process of investigation would have to go on in an ascending series ad infinitum. Hence on such grounds I ought to be regarded, in virtue of a regular and formal purchase, as not merely the putative, but the real owner of seller;

But against this position, there immediately up the following juridical principles. Any acquisition derived from one who is not the owner of the thing in question is null and void. I cannot derive from another anything more than what he himself rightfully has; and although as regards the form of the acquisition

it is

(jus personale), against every holder of

thing

I

the horse.

and not merely against some particular person. But the question now arises as to whether this right must be regarded by every other person as a continuous right of property per se, if I have not in any way renounced it, although the thing is in

therefore unimpeachable on

juridical act of dereliction

in this thing (jus reale)

me

may

is

and as buyer

and that

or alienation. Further,

to

of acquisition side;

The Revindication of what has been

in.

431

owner, although he

is

not

so.

Taking the

start

—

modus acquirendi I may proceed in accordance with all the conditions of right when I deal in a stolen horse exposed for sale in the market, yet a real title warranting the acquisition was awanting; for the horse was not really the property of the seller in question. However the

I may be a bona fide possessor of a thing under such conditions, I am still only a putative owner,

and the

real

owner has the

right of vindica-

me (rem suam vindicandi). may be again asked, what is right and

latter case, the question arises whether, since I

tion against

cannot acquire a thing from one who is not its owner (a non domino), I am excluded by the fact from all right in the thing itself, and have

just in itself regarding the acquisition of exter-

merely a personal right against a wrongful possessor? This is manifestly so, if the acquisition is judged purely according to its inner justifying grounds and viewed according to the state of nature, and not according to the convenience of a court of justice.

For everything alienable must be capable of being acquired by anyone. The rightfulness of acquisition, however, rests entirely upon the

form

accordance with which what

in

session of another,

is

transferred to

is

in pos-

me and

ac-

cepted by me. In other words, rightful acquisition depends upon the formality of the juridical act of

commutation or interchange between the

possessor of the thing and the acquirer of

without

its

being required to ask

how

it,

the former

came by

it; because this would itself be an inon the ground that: Quilibet praesumitur bonus. Now suppose it turned out that the said possessor was not the real owner, I cannot admit

jury,

that the real

owner

is

entitled to hold

me

di-

Now,

it

among men in their intercourse with one another viewed in the state of nature according to the principles of commutative justice? And it must be admitted in this connection that whoever has a purpose of acquiring anything must regard it as absolutely necessary to investigate whether the thing which he wishes to acquire does not already belong to another person. For although he may carefully observe the formal conditions required for appropriating what may belong to the property of another, as in buying a horse according to the usual terms in a market, yet he can, at the most, acquire only a personal right in relation to a thing (jus ad rem) so long as it is still unknown to him whether another than the seller may not be the real owner. Hence, if some other person were tc come forward and prove by documentary evidence a prior right of property in the thing, nothing would remain for the putative new owner but the advantage which he has drawn as a bona fide possessor of it up to that moment. nal things

rectly responsible, or so entitled with regard to

Now

any one who might be holding the thing. For I have myself taken nothing away from him, when, for example, I bought his horse according to the law (titulo empti venditi) when it was

absolutely

offered for sale in the public market.

The

title

series

it is

of

—

frequently impossible to discover the first original

owner of a thing

putative owners,

who

derive

in the

their

from one another. Hence no mere exchange of external things, however well it may agree with the formal conditions of commutaright

THE SCIENCE

43 2

an absolutely

tive justice, can ever guarantee

guided, in order to proceed with

all

possible

safety in delivering judgement on the rights o„

certain acquisition.

individuals.

Here, however, the juridically law-giving reason comes in again with the principle of distributive justice;

and

—

40

adopts as a criterion of the

it

rightfulness of possession, not

what

is

in itself

each individual in the state of nature, but only the consideration of how it would be adjudged by a court

in reference to the private will of

of justice in a civil state, constituted by the united will of all. In this connection, fulfilment of the formal conditions of acquisition, that in

iv. Acquisition of Security by the Taking of an Oath. (Cautio Juratoria)

Only one ground can be assigned on which men are bound in the juridical relation to believe and to confess that there are gods, or that there is a God. It is that they may be able to swear an oath and that thus by the fear of an all-seeing Supreme Power, whose revenge they must solemnly invoke upon themit

could be held that

;

themselves only establish a personal right, is postulated as sufficient; and they stand as an equivalent for the material conditions which

selves in case their utterance should be false,

properly establish the derivation of property from a prior putative owner, to the extent of

ity but

making what

plies that

in itself only a personal right,

is

valid before a court, as a real right.

horse which I bought

when exposed

Thus

the

for sale in

the public market, under conditions regulated

by the municipal

the conditions of

all

becomes my property if purchase and sale have been

law,

exactly observed in the transaction; but always

under the reservation that the

real

owner con-

tinues to have the right of a claim against the seller,

on the ground of

possession.

My

his prior unalienated

otherwise personal right

is

thus

transmuted into a real right, according to which may take and vindicate the object as mine wherever I may find it, without being responsible for the way in which the Seller had come

I

into possession of

it.

only in behoof of the requirements of juridical decision in a court (in favorIt is therefore

em

justitae distributivae) that the right in re-

spect of a thing

which

it is

is

regarded, not as personal,

in itself, but as real,

because

it

can

thus be most easily and certainly adjudged; and it is thus accepted and dealt with according to

Upon this principle, various statutory laws come to be founded which specially aim at laying down the conditions under which alone a mode of acquisition shall be legitimate, so that the judge may be able to assign every one his own as easily and a pure principle a priori.

certainly as possible. Thus, in the brocard, "Pur-

chase breaks hire," what by the nature of the namely the hire is subject is a real right

—

—

taken to hold as a merely personal right; and, conversely, as in the case referred to above,

merely a personal right is held to be valid as a real right. And this is done only when the question arises as to the principles by which a court of justice in the civil state is to be

what

is

in itself

they

may

ment and

be constrained to be truthful in statefaithful in promising. It is not moral-

merely blind superstition that is reckoned upon in this process; for it is evident it im-

no certainty is mere solemn declaration

to be expected

from a

in matters of right be-

fore a court, although the duty of truthfulness

must have always appeared

self-evident to

all,

matter which concerns the holiest that can be among men namely, the right of man. Hence recourse has been had to a motive founded on mere myths and fables as imaginary guarantees. Thus among the Rejangs, a heathen people in Sumatra, it is the custom according to the testimony of Marsden to swear by the bones of their dead relatives, although they have no belief in a life after death. In like manner the negroes of Guinea swear by their fetish, a bird's feather, which they imprecate under the belief that it will break their neck. And so in other cases. The belief underlying these oaths is that an invisible power whether it has understanding or not by its very nature possesses magical power that can be put into action by such invocations. Such a belief which is commonly called religion, but which ought to be called superstition is, however, indispensable for the administration of justice; because, without referring to it, a court of justice would not have adequate means to ascertain facts otherwise kept secret, and to determine rights. A law making an oath obligatory is therefore only given in behoof of the judicial authority. in a

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

But then the question

what the upon that would

arises as to

obligation could be founded

bind any one in a court of justice to accept the oath of another person as a right and valid proof of the truth of his statements which are to put

an end to obliges

me

all

dispute.

In other words, what

juridically to believe that another

person when taking an oath has any religion at all, so that I should subordinate or entrust my

OF RIGHT And, on

right to his oath?

like grounds, con-

versely, can I be

bound

It is evident that

both these questions point to

at all to take

what is in itself morally wrong. But in relation to a court of generally in the civil state there are no other

means

—

if

it

an oath?

—

and be assumed

justice

433

stings of conscience which a man must feel who to-day regards a subject from a certain point of view, but who will very probably to-morrow find it quite improbable from another point of

Any

view.

who

one, therefore,

take such an oath,

is

is

compelled to

subjected to an injury.

of getting to the truth

than by an oath, it must be adopted. In regard to religion, under the supposition that every one has it, it may be utilized as a necessary means (in causu necessitatis), in behoof of the legitimate procedure of a court in certain cases

Transition from the Mine and Thine in the State

of Nature to the Mine and Thine in the JuridGenerally

ical State

41. Public Justice as Related to the Natural

and the

The

Civil State

men

court uses this form of spiritual compulsion (tortura spiritualis) as an available means, in conformity with the superstitious pro-

one another which contains the conditions under which it is alone possible for every one to obtain

pensity of mankind, for the ascertainment of what is concealed; and therefore holds itself

the possibility of actually participating in such

of justice.

The

The legislative power, howfundamentally wrong in assigning this authority to the judicial power, because even in the civil state any compulsion with regard to the taking of oaths is contrary to the inalienable

juridical state

the right that

his due.

is

viewed

is

that relation of

The formal

right,

universally legislative will,

freedom of man.

lic

justice

the possession of objects ter of the activity of

which are usually promissory,

(justitia

might well be changed into assertory oaths, to be taken at the end of a year or more of actual administra-

tice,

swearing to the faithfulness of his discharge of duty during that time. This would bring the conscience more into action than the promissory oath, which always gives room for the internal pretext that, with the best intention, the difficulties that arose during the administration of the official function were not foreseen. And, further, violations of duty, under tion, the official

the prospect of their being summed up by future censors, would give rise to more anxiety as

when they

are merely repreand forgotten. As regards an oath taken concerning a matter of belief {de credulitate) it is evident that no such oath can be demanded by a court, i. For, first, it contains in itself a contradiction. Such belief, as intermediate between opinion and knowledge, is a thing on which one might venture to lay a wager but not to swear an oath. 2. And, second, the judge who imposes an oath of

to censure than

belief, in

to his

order to ascertain anything pertinent or even to the common good,

own purpose

commits a great offence against the conscientiousness of the party taking such an oath. This he does in regard both to the levity of mind,

which he thereby helps

to engender,

and

to the

may

— regarded the mat—according as

to

thus be divided into protective

commutative

justice

commutativa), and distributive justice

(justitia distributiv a)

,

in the first

mode

of jus-

the law declares merely what relation

the second,

it

in-

is

form (lex justi) in declares what is likewise exter-

ternally right in respect of

;

nally in accord with a law in respect of the ob-

and what possession is rightful (lex juridand in the third, it declares what is right, and what is just, and to what extent, by the judgement of a court in any particular case coming under the given law. In this latter relation,

ject, ical)

;

the public court

is

called the justice of the coun-

and the question whether there actually is or is not such an administration of public justice may be regarded as the most important of

try;

all

juridical interests.

The

sented, one after the other,

,

public justice. Pub-

the will

justice (justitia testatrix),

being taken on entering upon an office, to the effect that the individual has sincere intention to administer his functions dutifully,

is

be considered in relation either

to the possibility, or actuality, or necessity of

laws. It Official oaths,

in

may

principle of

accordance with the idea of a

justified in so doing.

ever,

is

to

non-juridical state

society in which there It is

commonly

is

is

that condition of

no distributive

naturalis), or the state of nature. It social state, as

be in that

Achenwall puts

it,

is

not the

for this

may

an artificial state (status artificialis) to be contradistinguished from the "nat-

itself

,

is

ural" state. is

justice.

called the natural state (status

The opposite

of the state of nature

the civil state (status civilis) as the condition

of a society standing under a distributive jus-

In the state of nature, there may even be forms of society such as marriage, parental authority, the household, and such like. For none of these, however, does any law a pritice.

—

juridical

ori lay

it

down

as an incumbent obligation:

THE SCIENCE

434

"Thou

shalt enter into this state."

may be men who

But

it

said of the juridical state that: "All may even involuntarily come into relations of

one another ought to enter into

right with

this

natural or non-juridical social state

may

be viewed as the sphere of private right, and the civil state may be specially regarded as the

The

sphere of public right.

latter state contains

no more and no other duties of men towards each other than what may be conceived in connection with the former state; the matter of private right is, in short, the very same in both.

The laws

of the civil state, therefore, only turn

upon the

juridical

men under

a

form of the coexistence of

common

respect, these laws

and conceived

The

constitution; and, in this

must necessarily be regarded

union (unio

civil

cannot, in the

civilis)

be properly called a society; for no sociality in common between the ruler (imperans) and the subject (subditus) un-

there

is

der a

civil constitution.

They

are not co-ordi-

nated as associates in a society with each other, but the one is subordinated to the other. Those who may be co-ordinated with one another must consider themselves as mutually equal, in so far as they stand under

may

common

The

making a

civil

much

society.

The Postulate of Public Right

42.

From

laws.

therefore be regarded not so

as being, but rather as

natural state, there arises the postulate of pub-

may

own

is

therefore under no obliga-

he acquires practical prudence cost; for he can perceive in himself

evidence of the natural inclination of men to play the master over others, and to disregard the claims of the right of others, when they feel themselves their superiors by might or fraud. And thus it is not necessary to wait for the

melancholy experience of actual hostility; the individual is from the first entitled to exercise a rightful compulsion towards those who already threaten him by their very nature. Quilibet praesumitur malus, donee securitatem dederit oppositi.

and continue freedom prevails, men may be said to do no wrong or injustice at all to one another, even when they wage war against each other. For what seems competent as good for the one is equally valid for the other, as if it were so by mutual agreement. Uti partes de jure suo disponunt, ita jus est. But generally they must be considered as being in the highest state of wrong, as being and willing to be in a condition which is not juridical, and in which, therefore, no one can be secured against violence, in the possession of his own.

be thus expressed: "In the re-

live

in this state of externally lawless

The

the conditions of private right in the

lic right. It

at his

He

till

So long as the intention to

as public laws.

strict sense,

union

tion of others.

tion to wait

state."

The

ence with his possession. Nor does he require to wait for proof by experience of the need of this guarantee, in view of the antagonistic disposi-

distinction

and what

is

between what

is

only formally

also materially wrong,

and unjust,

finds frequent application in the science of right.

An enemy who, on occupying

a besieged for-

lation of unavoidable coexistence with others,

tress, instead of

thou shalt pass from the state of nature into a juridical union constituted under the con-

tions of a capitulation, maltreats the garrison on

The

principle

unfolded

analyti-

dition of a distributive justice."

of

this

postulate

may

be

from the conception of right in the external relation, contradistinguished from mere might

cally

as violence.

No

one

is

under obligation to abstain from

in-

terfering with the possession of others, unless

they give him a reciprocal guarantee for the observance of a similar abstention from interfer-

honourably

fulfilling the

condi-

marching out, or otherwise violates the agreement, cannot complain of injury or wrong if on another occasion the same treatment is inflicted upon themselves. But, in fact, all such actions fundamentally involve the commission of wrong and injustice, in the highest degree; because they take all validity away from the conception of right, and give up everything, as it were by law itself, to savage violence, and thus overthrow the rights of men generally.

OF RIGHT

435

SECOND PART. PUBLIC RIGHT The System

of Those

The 43. Definition

Laws which Require Public Promulgation.

Principles of Right in Civil Society

and Division of Public Right

embraces the whole of the laws that require to be universally promulgated in order to produce a juridical state of society. It is therefore a system of those laws that are

Public

Right of the State and Constitutional

I.

Law. (Jus

right

requisite for a people as a multitude of

men

forming a nation, or for a number of nations, in their relations to each other. Men and nations, on account of their mutual influence on one

Civitatis)

44. Origin of the Civil

Union and Public Right

from any experience prior

to the

appearance of an external authoritative

legisla-

It is not

we learn of the maxim of natural vioamong men and their evil tendency to engage in war with each other. Nor is it assumed tion that

lence

here that

it is

merely some particular historical

another, require a juridical constitution uniting them under one will, in order that they may par-

condition or fact, that makes public legislative

This relation of the individuals of a nation to each other constitutes the civil union in the social state; and, viewed

or favourable to right

ticipate in

what

is

right.

as a whole in relation to its constituent members, it forms the political state (civitas). 1.

The

state, as constituted

by the common

interest of all to live in a juridical union, is called, in

view of

its

form, the commonwealth

or the republic in the wider sense of the term i^res publica latius sic dicta). The principles of

constraint necessary; for however well-disposed

men may be

considered

to be of themselves, the rational idea of a state

by right, must be taken as our starting-point. This idea implies of society not yet regulated

that before a legal state of society can be pub-

men, nations, and

licly established, individual

can never be safe against violence from each other; and this is evident from the consideration that every one of his own will naturally states,

does what seems good and right in his

own

eyes,

right in this sphere thus constitute the first de-

entirely independent of the opinion of others.

partment of public right as the right of the

Hence, unless the institution of right is to be renounced, the first thing incumbent on men is to

state

(jus civitatis) or national right.

2.

The

viewed in relation to other peoples, power (potentia), whence arises the idea of potentates. Viewed in relation to the supposed hereditary unity of the people comstate, again,

is

called a

posing

it,

the state constitutes a nation (gens).

Under the general conception

of public right,

in addition to the right of the individual state, there thus arises another department of right,

constituting the right of nations (jus gentium)

or international right. of the earth

is

3.

Further, as the surface

not unlimited in extent, but

is cir-

cumscribed into a unity, national right and international right necessarily culminate in the idea of a universal right of mankind, which may be called Cosmopolitical Right (jus cosmopolitism). And national, international, and cosmopolitical right are so interconnected, that, if

any

one of these three possible forms of the juridical relation fails to

embody

the essential principles

that ought to regulate external freedom

the structure of legislation reared will also

would

by law, by the others

be undermined, and the whole system

at last fall to pieces.

accept the principle that

it is

necessary to leave

the state of nature, in which every one follows his

own inclinations, and to form a union of all who cannot avoid coming into reciprocal

those

communication, and thus subject themselves

common

to the external restraint of public

pulsory laws.

Men

thus enter into a

civil

in

com-

union,

which every one has it determined by law what shall be recognized as his; and this is secured to him by a competent external power distinct from his own individuality. Such is the primary obligation, on the part of all men, to enter

in

into the relations of a civil state of society.

The on

this

natural condition of

mankind need

not,

ground, be represented as a state of abso-

lute injustice, as

if

there could have been no

among men but what was merely determined by force. But this natural condition must be regarded, if it ever existed, as a state of society that was void of regulation by right (status justitiae vacuus), so that if a matter of right came to be in dispute (jus controversum), no competent judge was found to other relation originally

THE SCIENCE

436 give an authorized legal decision upon

it.

It is

therefore reasonable that any one should constrain another

by

force, to pass

juridical state of life

from such

a non-

and enter within the

juris-

diction of a civil state of society. For. although

on the basis of the ideas of right held by viduals as such, external things

by occupancy or

may

indi-

be acquired

contract, yet such acquisition

only provisory so long as

it

is

has not yet obtained

the sanction of a public law. Till this sanction

reached, the condition of possession

is

is

ing to the law (potestas legislatoria, rectoria, et

These three powers may be compared to the three propositions in a practical syllogism: the major as the sumption laying down the universal law of a will, the minor presenting the command applicable to an action according to the law as the principle of the subsumption, and the conclusion containing the judiciaria).

sentence, or judgement of right, in the particular case

mined by any public distributive justice, nor is it secured by any power exercising public right.

46.

The

men were

quisition at

way

—prior

all

Legislative

Power and

the

Members

of the State

The If

under consideration.

not deter-

legislative power,

viewed

in its rational

not disposed to recognize any ac-

principle, can only belong to the united will of

in a provisional

all right ought to proceed power, it is necessary that its laws should be unable to do wrong to any one whatever. Now, if any one individual determines any-

as rightful

—even

to entering into the civil state, this

state of society

would

itself

be impossible. For

the laws regarding the mine and thine in the

the people. For. as

from

this

state of nature, contain formally the very

same when it

thing in the state in contradistinction to an-

thing as they prescribe in the civil state,

other,

viewed merely according to rational conceptions: only that in the forms of the civil state the conditions are laid down under which the formal prescriptions of the state of nature attain realization conformable to distributive justice. Were there, then, not even provisionally, an external meum and tuum in the state of nature, neither would there be any juridical duties in relation to them; and, consequently, there would be no obligation to pass out of that state

wrong on that other; but this is never possible when all determine and decree what is to be Law to themselves. Volenti non fit injuria. Hence it is only the united and consenting will of all ihe people in so far as each of them determines the same thing about all, and all determine the same thing about each that ought to have the power of enacting law in the state.

into another.

stituting a

is

45.

A

The Form of

the State and

state (civitas)

men under

is

its

Three Powers

the union of a

juridical laws.

number

These laws,

are to be regarded as necessary a priori

is

always possible that he

may

perpe-

—

—

The members

of a civil society thus united

for the purpose of legislation, state,

are

and thereby concitizens; and

called its

there are three juridical attributes that insepa-

rably belong to

them by

right.

These

are:

—

1.

of

constitutional freedom, as the right of every

as such,

citizen to have to obey no other law than that to which he has given his consent or approval; 2.

—

that

is,

from the conceptions as merely established by statute. The form of the state is thus involved in the idea of the state, viewed as as following of themselves

it

trate a

—and not

civil equality, as

the right of the citizen to recog-

ought to be according to pure principles of and this ideal form furnishes the normal criterion of every real union that constitutes a

one as a superior among the people in relation to himself, except in so far as such a one is as subject to his moral power to impose obligations, as that other has power to impose obligations upon him; and 3. political independence, as the right to owe his existence and con-

commonwealth. Every state contains

another, but to his

of external right generally

it

right;

nise no

tinuance in society not to the arbitrary- will of

powers, the universal united will of the people being thus

member

personified in a political triad. These are the leg-

ly,

power, the executive power, and the judiciary power. 1. The legislative power of the

self.

islative

in itself three

—

sovereignty in the state

is

embodied

own rights and powers as a commonwealth, and, consequent-

the possession of a civil personality, which cannot be represented bv anv other than him-

in the per-

son of the lawgiver; 2. the executive power is embodied in the person of the ruler who admin-

Law; and 3. the judiciary power, embodied in the person of the judge, is the function of assigning every one what is his own, accordisters the

of the

The

capability of voting

by possession of the

suffrage properly constitutes the political qualification of a citizen as a

But

this, again,

member

of the state.

presupposes the independence or

self-sufficiency of the individual citizen

among

OF RIGHT

437

who is not a mere incidental commonwealth, but a member of it acting of his own will in community with others.

is

The

from

the people, as one

part of the

involved neces-

last of the three qualities

between active and passive citizenship; although the latter con-

sarily constitutes the distinction

ception appears to stand in contradiction to the definition of a citizen as such. The following

may serve to remove this difficulty. The apprentice of a merchant or tradesman, a servant who is not in the employ of the state, a minor (naturaliter vel civiliter), all women, and, generally, every one who is compelled to maintain himself not according to his own industry, but as it is arranged by others (the state exexamples

cepted), are without civil personality, and their existence is only, as it were, incidentally includ-

The woodcutter whom I employ the smith in India who carries his

ed in the state.

on

my

estate;

anvil, and bellows into the houses where he is engaged to work in iron, as distinguished from the European carpenter or smith,

hammer,

who can

offer the

independent products of his

labour as wares for public sale; the resident tutor as distinguished from the schoolmaster;

freedom of all the people and the equality that conformable thereto; and it must therefore

made

be

possible for

them

to raise themselves

this passive condition in the state to the

condition of active citizenship. 47. Dignities in the State

and the Original

Contract All these three

powers

in the state are digni-

and, as necessarily arising out of the idea

ties;

of the state and essential generally to the foun-

dation of its constitution, they are to be regarded as political dignities. They imply the relation

between a universal sovereign as head of the which according to the laws of freedom state can be none other than the people itself united into a nation and the mass of the individuals of the nation as subjects. The former member of the relation is the ruling power, whose function is to govern (imperans) the latter is the ruled constituents of the state, whose function is to obey (subditi). The act by which a people is represented as constituting itself into a state, is termed the

—

—

;

original contract. This

is

properly only an out-

from the farmer

ward mode of representing the idea by which

and such like, illustrate the distinction in quesIn all these cases, the former members of the contrast are distinguished from the latter by

the rightfulness of the process of organizing the

the

ploughman

as distinguished

may be made

conceivable. Accord-

tion.

constitution

being mere subsidiaries of the commonwealth and not active independent members of it, be-

all and each of the people give up their external freedom in order to receive it immediately again as members of a

cause they are of necessity commanded and proby others, and consequently possess no

commonwealth. The commonwealth is the people viewed as united altogether into a state. And

political self-sufficiency in themselves. Such dependence on the will of others and the consequent inequality are, however, not inconsistent with the freedom and equality of the individuals

thus

tected

as

men

rather

helping to constitute the people. is it

the case that

it is

conditions that a people can

Much

only under such

become a

enter into a civil constitution. But

state

all

and

are not

equally qualified to exercise the right of suffrage

under the constitution, and to be full citizens of the state, and not mere passive subjects under its

protection. For, although they are entitled

ing to this representation,

it

is

not to be said that the individual in

the state has sacrificed a part of his inborn ex-

freedom for a particular purpose; but he

ternal

has abandoned his wild lawless freedom wholly, in order to find all his proper

and undiminished, but

tire

freedom again enthe form of a

in

regulated order of dependence, that state regulated

by laws of

right.

dependence thus arises out of his law giving will. 48.

is,

own

regulative

Mutual Relations and Characteristics of the Three Powers

to demand to be treated by all the other citizens according to laws of natural freedom and equality, as passive parts of the state, it does not fol-

relations to each other, are, therefore:

low that they ought themselves to have the right

ordinate with one another as so

to deal with the state as active to reorganize

it,

members of by way

or to take action

may

The

three powers in the state, as regards their

and the one

it,

sons,

of

other in the

introducing certain laws. All they have a right in

be no more than that whatever be the mode in which the positive laws are enacted, these laws must not be contrary to the natural laws that demand the their circumstances to claim

in a civil

This relation of

way

is

(1) coper-

many moral

thus the complement of the

of completing the constitution

of the state; (2) they are likewise subordinate to one another, so that the one cannot at the

same time usurp the function of the other by whose side it moves, each having its own principle and maintaining its authority in a particu-

THE SCIENCE

438

but under the condition of the will of a superior: and further, (3) by the union of both these relations, they assign distributively to every subject in the state his own rights. Considered as to their respective dignity, the three powers may be thus described. The will of the sovereign legislator, in respect of what constitutes the external mine and thine, is to be regarded as ir reprehensible; the executive function of the supreme ruler is to be regarded as irresistible; and the judicial sentence of the supreme judge is to be regarded as irreversible,

governor of his power, depose him, or reform his administration, but not punish him. This is the proper and only meaning of the common saying in England. "The King as the supreme executive power can do no wrong." For any such application of punishment would necessarily be an act of that very executive power to which the supreme right to compel according to law pertains, and which would itself be thus subjected to coercion; which is self-contradictory.

being beyond appeal.

cial function,

lar person,

49. Distinct

Functions of the Three Powers.

Autonomy 1.

of the State

The executive power belongs

nor or regent of the state, whether it assumes the form of a moral or individual person, as the king or prince (rex, princeps). This executive authority, as the supreme agent of the state, appoints the magistrates, and prescribes the rules

is

their

may

by

free choice as their representatives

and even specially for every process or cause. For the judicial sentence is a for this purpose,

special act of public distributive justice per-

formed by a judge or court as

ently with the

any one what

own conformably its

to the law,

application.

each case

Regarded

as

a moral person, this executive authority constitutes the government.

The orders

to the people

issued by the and the magistrates,

power is

to

the people being merely passive in this relation to the

supreme power, either the executive or him wrong in

the legislative authority might do

their determinations in cases of dispute regard-

ing the property of individuals. It

the people themselves

tors of the state (gubernatio)

who pronounced

,

are rescripts or

decision of particular cases, and are given forth

A

government acting as an same time laying down the law as the legislative power, would be a despotic government, and would have to be contradistinguished from a patriotic government. A paas unchangeable.

executive, and at the

government, again, is to be distinguished from a paternal government (regimen paternale) which is the most despotic government of all. the citizens being dealt with by it as mere children. A patriotic government, however, is one in which the state, while dealing with the subjects as if they were members of a family, still treats them likewise as citizens, and according to laws that recognize their independence, each individual possessing himself and not being dependent on the absolute will of another beside him or above him. 2. The legislative authority ought not at the same time to be the executive or governor: for triotic

the governor, as administrator, should stand un-

der the authority of the law. and under the supreme control of the legislative authority

may

is

bound by

legislator.

it

The

therefore deprive the

determine and assign to

Every individual among

his.

as well as to the higher ministerial administra-

decrees, and not laws; for they terminate in the

a constitutional

administrator of the law. to a subject as one of the people. Such an act is not invested inher-

accordance with which indi-

being brought under

government

power ought to exercise the judibut only appoint judges as magistrates. It is the people who ought to judge themselves, through those of the citizens who are

acquire anything or maintain what

to the people, in

viduals

Further, neither the legislative power nor

3.

the executive

elected

to the gover-

—

—

who

would not be

thus determined, or

the judgements of "guilty" or

"not guilty" regarding their fellow-citizens. For it is to the determination of this issue in a cause that the court has to apply the law: and it is by means of the executive authority, that the judge holds power to assign to every one his own.

Hence judge

is

it

in a

only the people that properly can although indirectly by rep-

—

—

cause

resentatives elected and deputed as in a jury. It

by themselves,

would even be beneath the

dig-

nity of the sovereign head of the state to play

the judge; for this would be to put himself into it would be possible to do wrong, and thus to subject himself to the demand for an appeal to a still higher power (a rege male injormato ad regem melius injorman-

a position in which

dum). It is

— the —

by the co-operation of these three powers legislative, the executive,

that

the

autonomy

state

realizes

its

and the judicial autonomy. This

consists in its organizing, forming,

and maintaining

itself in accordance with the laws of freedom. In their union the welfare of

the state lex. 1

1

By

is

realized. Salus reipublicae

this is not to

suprema

be understood merely the

[''The health of the state

is

the highest law."]

— OF RIGHT individual well-being and happiness of the

—

zens of the state; for this

end

may

as

Rousseau

Hence

citi-

asserts

perhaps be more agreeably and

439 it

supreme power in and no (compulsory)

follows, that the

the state has only rights,

duties towards the subject. Further,

if

the ruler

in the state of nature,

or regent, as the organ of the supreme power,

or even under a despotic government. But the welfare of the state, as its own highest good,

proceeds in violation of the laws, as in imposing taxes, recruiting soldiers, and so on, contrary to the law of equality in the distribution of the political burdens, the subject may oppose complaints and objections (gravamina) to this injustice, but not active resistance.

more desirably attained

signifies

that condition in which the greatest

harmony

is attained between its constitution and the principles of right a condition of the state which reason by a categorical imperative makes it obligatory upon us to strive after.

—

There cannot even be an Article contained

in

make

it

the political constitution that would

Constitutional and Juridical Consequences arising from the Nature of the Civil Union

Supreme Power; Treason; Dethronement; Revolution; Reform

A. Right of the

The

supreme power is practically by the people who are placed under

origin of the

inscrutable

authority. In other words, the subject need not reason too curiously in regard to its origin its.

in the practical relation, as if the right of the

obedience due to

it

were

to be

doubted (jus con-

trover sum). For as the people, in order to be able to abjudicate with a title of right regarding the supreme power in the state, must be regarded as already united under one common legislative will, it cannot judge otherwise than as the present supreme head of the state (summus imperans) wills. The question has been raised as to whether an'actual contract of subjection (pactum subjectionis civilis) originally preceded the civil government as a fact; or whether the power arose first, and the law only followed afterwards, or may have followed in this order. But such questions, as regards the people already actually living under the civil law, are either entirely aimless, or even fraught with subtle danger to the state. For, should the subject, after having dug down to the ultimate origin of the state, rise in

opposition to the present ruling au-

he would expose himself as a citizen, according to the law and with full right, to be punished, destroyed, or outlawed. A law which is so holy and inviolable that it is practically a thority,

crime even to cast doubt upon it, or to suspend its operation for a moment, is represented of itself as necessarily derived from some supreme,

unblameable lawgiver. And this is the meaning of the maxim, "All authority is from God", which proposition does not express the historical foundation of the civil constitution, but an ideal principle of the practical reason. It may be otherwise rendered thus: "It is a duty to obey the law of the existing legislative power, be its origin what it may."

possible for a

power

in the state, in case of the

transgression of the constitutional laws

supreme authority,

by

the

even to restrict it in so doing. For, whoever would restrict the supreme power of the state must have more, or at least equal, power as compared with the power that is so restricted; and if competent to command the subjects to resist, such a one would also have to be able to protect them, and if he is to be considered capable of judging what is right in every case, he may also publicly order resistance. But such a one, and not the actual authority, would then be the supreme power; which is contradictory. The supreme sovereign power, then, in proceeding by a minister who is at the same time the ruler of the state, consequently becomes despotic; and the expedient of giving the people to imagine when they have properly only legislative influence that they act by their to resist or

—

deputies by

way

—

of limiting the sovereign au-

mask and disguise the actual despotism of such a government that it will not appear in the measures and means adopted by the minister to carry out his function. The peothority, cannot so

ple,

while represented by their deputies in par-

liament, under such conditions,

may have

in

these warrantors of their freedom and rights,

who are keenly interested on their own account and their families, and who look to such

persons

a minister for the benefit of his influence in the

army, navy, and public

offices.

And

hence, in-

stead of offering resistance to the undue pretensions of the

government

—whose public declara-

tions ought to carry a prior accord on the part of

the people, which, however, cannot be allowed in peace, they are rather always ready to play into the hands of the government. Hence

the so-called limited political constitution, as a constitution of the internal rights of the state,

an unreality; and instead of being consistent with right, it is only a principle of expediency. And its aim is not so much to throw all possible obstacles in the way of a powerful violator of is

popular rights by his arbitrary influence upon

THE SCIENCE

440

the government, as rather to cloak it over under the illusion of a right of opposition conceded to

considered as the source of the laws, the sovereign himself can do no wrong. Of all the abomi-

the people.

nations in the overthrow of a state by revolution,

Resistance on the part of the people to the supreme legislative power of the state is in no

even the murder or assassination of the monarch is not the worst. For that may be done by the people out of fear, lest, if he is allowed to live, he may again acquire power and inflict punishment upon them; and so it may be done, not as an act of punitive justice, but merely from regard to self-preservation. It is the formal execution of a monarch that horrifies a soul filled with ideas of human right; and this feeling occurs again and again as often as the mind realizes the scenes that terminated the fate of Charles I or Louis XVI. Now how is this feeling to be ex-

case legitimate; for

it is

only by submission to

the universal legislative will, that a condition of law and order is possible. Hence there is no

and

still

longing to the people.

And

right of sedition,

less of rebellion, be-

least of all,

when

the

supreme power is embodied in an individual monarch, is there any justification, under the pretext of his abuse of power, for seizing his per-

son or taking away his life (monarchomachismus sub specie tyrannicidii). The slightest attempt of this kind is high treason (proditio eminens) and a traitor of this sort who aims at the overthrow of his country may be punished, as a ;

even with death. It is the duty of the people to bear any abuse of the supreme power, even then though it should be conpolitical parricide,

sidered to be unbearable.

any

And

the reason

is

that

resistance of the highest legislative author-

can never but be contrary to the law, and must even be regarded as tending to destroy the whole legal constitution. In order to be entitled to offer such resistance, a public law would be ity

required to permit

it.

But the supreme

legisla-

tion would by such a law cease to be supreme, and the people as subjects would be made sovereign over that to which they are subject; which is a contradiction. And the contradiction becomes more apparent when the question is

put:

"Who

is

to be the judge in a controversy

between the people and the sovereign?" For the people and the sovereign are to be constitutionally or juridically regarded as two different moral persons; but the question shows that the people would then have to be the judge in their

own

cause.

The dethronement of a monarch may be also conceived as a voluntary abdication of the crown, and a resignation of his power into the hands of the people; or it might be a deliberate surrender of these without any assault on the monarch may be But, however it hap-

royal person, in order that the

relegated into private

life.

pen, forcible compulsion of

it, on the part of the people, cannot be justified under the pretext of a right of necessity (casus necessitatis) and ;

be shown for punishing the sovereign on the ground of previous maladministration. For all that has been already done in the quality of a sovereign must be regarded as done outwardly by right; and, least of all can the slightest right

is not a mere aesthetic feeling, arising from the working of the imagination, nor from sympathy, produced by fancying ourselves in

plained? It

On

the place of the sufferer.

the contrary,

it is

a

moral feeling arising from the entire subversion all our notions of right. Regicide, in short, is regarded as a crime which always remains such and can never be expiated (crimen immortale }

of

inexpiabile) and it appears to resemble that sin which the theologians declare can neither be forgiven in this world nor in the next. The explana;

tion of this phenomenon in the human mind appears to be furnished by the following reflec-

upon it; and they even shed some light upon the principles of political right. Every transgression of a law only can and must be explained as arising from a maxim of the transgressor making such wrong-doing his rule of action; for were it not committed by him as a free being, it could not be imputed to him. But it is absolutely impossible to explain how any rational individual forms such a maxim tions

against the clear prohibition of the law-giving

reason; for it is only events which happen according to the mechanical laws of nature that are capable of explanation. Now a transgressor or criminal

may commit

according to the

maxim

his

wrong-doing either

of a rule supposed to be

valid objectively and universally, or only as an exception from the rule by dispensing with its

obligation for the occasion. In the latter case, he only diverges from the law, although intentionally. He may, at the same time, abhor his own transgression, and without formally renouncing his obedience to the law only wish to avoid it. In the former case, however, he rejects the authority of the law itself, the validity of which, however, he cannot repudiate before his own reason, even while he makes it his rule to act against it. His maxim is, therefore, not merely defective as being negatively contrary to the

OF RIGHT law, but

it

is

even positively

illegal,

as being

diametrically contrary and in hostile opposition

So far as we can see into and understand it would appear as if it were impossible for men to commit wrongs and crimes of a wholly useless form of wickedness, and yet the idea of such extreme perversity cannot be overlooked in a system of moral philosophy. to

it.

the relation,

There is thus a feeling of horror at the thought of the formal execution of a monarch by his people. And the reason it is that, whereas an act of assassination must be considered as only an exception from the rule which has been constituted a maxim, such an execution

must be regarded

as a complete perversion of

by an arbitrary combination of the people to coerce the government into a certain active procedure; for this would be to assume to perform an act of the executive itself. All that can rightly be allowed, is only a negative resistance, amounting to an act of refusal on the part of the people to concede all the demands which the executive may deem it necessary to make in behoof of the political administration. And if this right were never exercised, it would be a sure sign that the people were corrupted, their representatives venal, the supreme head of the government despotic, and his ministers practically betrayers of right of active resistance, as

the people.

Further,

the principles that should regulate the relation

For

between a sovereign and

his

makes the people, who owe

their constitutional

people.

it

441

a

new

when on

the success of a revolution

constitution has been founded, the unlaw-

fulness of its beginning and of

its

institution

from the sovereign, to be the ruler over him. Hence mere violence is thus elevated with bold brow, and as it were by principle, above the holiest right; and, appearing like an abyss to swallow up everything without recall, it seems like suicide committed by the state upon itself and a crime that is capable of no atonement. There is therefore reason to assume that the consent that is

cannot release the subjects from the obligation of adapting themselves, as good citizens, to the new order of things; and they are not entitled to refuse honourably to obey the authority that

accorded to such executions is not really based upon a supposed principle of right, but only springs from fear of the vengeance that would be taken upon the people were the same power to revive again in the state. And hence it may

ing into the private life of a citizen he prefers his

existence to the legislation that issued

be held that the formalities accompanying them have only been put forward in order to give these deeds a look of punishment from the accompaniment of a judicial process, such as could not go along with a mere murder or assassination. But such a cloaking of the deed entirely fails of its purpose, because this pretension on the part of the people is even worse than murder itself, as it implies a principle which

would necessarily make the restoration of a

when once overthrown, an

state,

An

alteration of the

still

impossibility.

defective constitu-

may sometimes be quite necessuch changes ought only to proceed from the sovereign power in the way of reform, and are not to be brought about by the people

tion of the state sary.

But

all

way

of revolution; and when they take they should only effect the executive, and not the legislative, power. A political constitution which is so modified that the people by their representatives in parliament can legally resist the executive power, and its represenin the

throned monarch,

is

called a limited constitution.

Yet even under such

a constitution there

is

no

who

is not to be called to account on the ground of his former administration; and still less may he be punished for it, when withdraw-

olution,

own

quiet and the peace of the state to the un-

certainty of exile, with the intention of maintaining his claims for restoration at

all

hazards,

and pushing these either by secret counter-revolution or

by the

However,

if

assistance of other powers. he prefers to follow the latter course, his rights remain, because the rebellion that drove him from his position was inherently unjust. But the question then emerges as to whether other powers have the right to form themselves into an alliance in behalf of such a dethroned monarch merely in order not to leave the crime committed by the people unavenged, or to do away with it as a scandal to all the states; and whether they are therefore justified and called upon to restore by force to another state a formerly existing constitution that has been removed by a revolution. The discussion of this question, however, does not belong to this department of public right, but to the following section, concerning the right of nations.

place,

tative minister,

A dehas survived such a rev-

has thus attained the power in the state.

B.

Land

Rights. Secular and Church Lands. Rights of Taxation; Finance; Police; Inspection

viewed as embodying the power, to be regarded as the supreme proprietor of the soil, or only as the highest Is the sovereign,

legislative

THE SCIENCE

442

ruler of the people by the laws? As the soil is the supreme condition under which it is alone possible to have external things as one's own,

possible possession and use constitute the

its

acquirable basis of external right. Hence all such rights must be derived from

first

all

external things severally (divisim) belong;

and as such he assigns distributively to every one what is to be his. Hence there cannot be any corporation in the state, nor any class or order, that as proprietors

supreme proprietor of the land (dominus territorii). The people, as forming the mass of

can transmit the land for a sole exclusive use to all time (ad infinitum), according to certain fixed statutes. The state may annul and abrogate all such statutes at any time, only under the condition of indem-

the subjects, belong to the sovereign as a peo-

nifying survivors for their interests.

ple; not in the sense of his being their propri-

of knights, constituting the nobility regarded as

that

it is

paramount

the sovereign as overlord and

perior of the

soil, or,

as

it

may

su-

be better put,

as the

the following generations for

The order

of real right, but as their su-

a mere rank or class of specially titled individ-

preme commander or chief in the way of personal right. This supreme proprietorship, how-

uals, as well as the order of the clergy, called

etor in the

ever,

way

only an idea of the

is

civil constitution,

objectified to represent, in accordance with ju-

necessary union of the

ridical conceptions, the

private property of lic

the people under a pub-

all

The

universal possessor.

sented in order that

it

relation

may form

is

so repre-

a basis for the

determination of particular rights in property. It

does not proceed, therefore, upon the prinmere aggregation, which advances em-

ciple of

pirically

from the parts

to the whole, but

from

the necessary formal principle of a division of

the soil according to conceptions of right. In

accordance

with

principle,

this

the

supreme

universal proprietor cannot have any private

property in any part of the soil; for otherwise he would make himself a private person. Private property

in the soil

belongs only to the people,

taken distributively and not collectively; from which condition, however, a nomadic people

must be excepted at all in the soil.

as having

no private property

The supreme

proprietor ac-

cordingly ought not to hold private

estates,

either for private use or for the support of the court. For, as

pleasure

would be

how in

it

would depend upon

his

own

far these should extend, the state

danger of seeing

all

property in the

land taken into the hands of the government,

and soil

all

bondsmen of the As possessors only of

the subjects treated as

(glebae adscripti).

what was the private property of another, they might thus be deprived of all freedom and regarded as serfs or slaves. Of the supreme pro-

may

be said that he possesses nothing as his own, except himself; for if he possessed things in the state alongside of others, dispute and litigation would be possible with these others regarding those things, and there would be no independent judge to settle the cause. But it may also be said that he possesses everything; for he has the supreme right of sovereignty over the whole people, to whom prietor of the land,

it

the church, are both subject to this relation.

They can never be privileges with

entitled

which they

by any hereditary

may

be favoured, to acquire an absolute property in the soil transmissible to their successors. They can only acquire the use of such property for the time be-

opinion has ceased, on account of other arrangements, to impel the state to proing. If public

from negligence in the national defence by appeal to the military honour of the knightly order, the estates granted on that contect itself

dition may be recalled. And, in like manner, the church lands or spiritualities may be reclaimed by the state without scruple, if public opinion has ceased to impel the members of the state to maintain masses for the souls of the dead, prayers for the living, and a multitude of clergy, as means to protect themselves from eternal fire. But in both cases, the condition of indemnifying existing interests must be observed. Those who in this connection fall under the movement of reform are not entitled to complain that their property is taken from them; for the foundation of their previous possession lay only in the opinion of the people, and it can be valid only so long as this opinion lasts. As soon as this public opinion in favour of such institutions dies out, or is even extinguished in the judgement of those who have the greatest claim by their acknowledged merit to lead and

represent tion

must

it,

the putative proprietorship in ques-

cease, as

if

by a public appeal made

male injormato ad regem melius injormandum). On this primarily acquired supreme propriregarding

it

to the state (a rege

etorship in the land rests the right of the sovereign, as universal proprietor of the country,

to assess the private proprietors of

the

soil,

and to demand taxes, excise, and dues, or the performance of service to the state such as may be required in war. But this is to be done so that it is actually the people that assess them-

OF RIGHT selves, this being the

only

mode

through the

who

medium

be effected

body of deputies

of the

represent the people. It

of proceeding

may

according to laws of right. This

also permissible,

is

circumstances in which the state is in imminent danger, to proceed by a forced loan, as a right vested in the sovereign, although this may

in

be a divergence from the existing law. Upon this principle is also founded the right of administering the national

economy, includ-

The

ing the finance and the police.

police has

specially to care for the public safety, conven-

and decency. As regards the

ience,

—

last of these

the feeling or negative taste for public pro-

priety

—

by such

it is

important that

be not deadened

it

influences as begging, disorderly noises,

offensive smells, public prostitution

{Venus vul-

443

For the existence of persons with property in the state implies their submission under it for protection and the provision by the state of what is necessary for their existence; and accordingly the state founds a right upon an obligation on their part to contribute of their means for the preservation of their fellowcitizens. This may be carried out by taxing the property or the commercial industry of the citizens, or by establishing funds and drawing interest from them, not for the wants of the state as such, which is rich, but for those of the people. And this is not to be done merely by voluntary contributions, but by compulsory exactions as state-burdens, for

we

are here con-

sidering only the right of the state in relation

Among

to the people.

the voluntary

modes of

givaga), or other offences against the moral

raising such contributions, lotteries ought not

greatly facilitates the government

to be allowed, because they increase the number of those who are poor, and involve danger

sense, as

it

in the task of regulating the life of the people

by

to the public property. It

law.

may

be asked whether

state there fur-

the relief of the poor ought to be administered

a right of inspection (jus in-

out of current contributions, so that every age

spections), which entitles the public authority

should maintain its own poor; or whether this were better done by means of permanent funds and charitable institutions, such as widows' homes, hospitals, etc.? And if the former method is the better, it may also be considered whether the means necessary are to be raised by a legal assessment rather than by begging, which is generally nigh akin to robbing. The former method must in reality be regarded as the only one that is conformable to the right of the state, which cannot withdraw its connection from any one who has to live. For a legal current provision does not make the profession of poverty a means of gain for the indolent, as is to be

For the preservation of the ther belongs to to see that

gious, exists

it

no secret

among

society, political or reli-

the people that can exert a

upon the public weal. Acrequired by the police, no such secret society may refuse to lay open its constitution. But the visitation and search of private houses by the police can only be justified in a case of necessity; and in every particular instance, it must be authorized by a higher

prejudicial influence

cordingly,

when

it is

authority.

Relief of the Poor. Foundling Hospitals.

C.

The Church

poses essentially connected with their own preservation. Such are, in particular, the relief of

is the case with pious foundations when they grow with the number of the poor; nor can it be charged with being an unjust or unrighteous burden imposed by the government on the

the poor, foundling asylums, and ecclesiastical

people.

The

sovereign, as undertaker of the duty of

the people, has the right to tax

them

for pur-

feared

establishments, otherwise designated charitable

i.

by

The people have

their

common

in fact united themselves

will into

a society, which has

to be perpetually maintained

;

and for

this pur-

pose they have subjected themselves to the internal power of the state, in order to preserve the members of this society even when they are not able to support themselves. By the fundamental principle of the state, the government is justified

and entitled to compel those who are

able, to furnish the

means necessary

to preserve

who are not themselves capable of providing for the most necessary wants of nature. those

2.

The

state has also a right to

impose upon

the people the duty of preserving children ex-

or pious foundations.

posed from want or shame, and who would otherwise perish for it cannot knowingly allow this increase of its power to be destroyed, however ;

unwelcome a

difficult

most

in

some respects

may be. But it is how this may

it

question to determine

justly be carried out. It might be consid-

ered whether

it

would not be right to exact confrom the unmarried

tributions for this purpose

persons of both sexes who are possessed of means, as being in part responsible for the evil;

and further, whether the end best carried out

in

by foundling

view would be hospitals, or in

THE SCIENCE

444

what other way consistent with

right.

But

this is

the

humanity

in their

And

a problem of which no solution has yet been offered that does not in some measure offend

highest rights.

against right or morality.

ters for the people.

3.

is here regarded as an ecclesiestablishment merely, and as such it

The church

astical

must be carefully distinguished from religion, which as an internal mode of feeling lies wholly beyond the sphere of the action of the civil power. Viewed as an institution for public worto whose opinion ship founded for the people the church esor conviction it owes its origin tablishment responds to a real want in the state. This is the need felt by the people to regard themselves as also subjects of a Supreme Invisible Power to which they must pay homage,

—

and which

may

—

often be brought into a very un-

desirable collision with the civil power.

The

cannot of

own persons and

to their

therefore the supreme power

itself resolve

and decree

in these

As regards the

mat-

cost of main-

taining the ecclesiastical establishment, for similar

reasons this must be derived not from the

from the section

public funds of the state, but of the people

who

profess the particular faith of

the church; and thus only ought burden on the community.

it

to fall as a

D. The Right of Assigning Offices and Dignities the State

in

The

supreme authority

right of the

in the

state also includes: 1.

The

distribution of offices, as public and

paid employments;

The conferring

not to be regarded as the right of constitu-

of dignities, as unpaid disfounded merely on honour, but establishing a gradation of higher and lower

tional legislation in the church, so as to organize

orders in the political scale; the latter, although

may seem most advantageous for itself, or prescribe and command its faith and ritual

under obligation determined by the public law to obey the former so far as they are also entitled to command; 3. Besides these relatively beneficent rights,

state has therefore a right in this relation; but it

it

to

is

as

forms of worship (ritus) left entirely to

for

;

all this

must be

the teachers and rulers which

the church has chosen for itself.

The function

of the state in this connection, only includes the

2.

tinctions of rank,

free in themselves, being

the supreme

As regards

negative right of regulating the influence of these public teachers upon the visible political

monwealth, that

it

may

com-

not be prejudicial to the

public peace and tranquillity. Consequently the state has to take measures,

on occasion of any

internal conflict in the church, or on occasion of

any

collision of the several

other, that civil concord

is

churches with each

not endangered; and

province of the police. beneath the dignity of the supreme power

this right falls within the

It is

to interpose in determining

what particular

faith

the church shall profess, or to decree that a cer-

and that the For in doing so. the supreme power would be mixing itself up in a scholastic wrangle, on a footing of equality with its subjects; the monarch would be making himself a priest; and the churchmen might even reproach the supreme power with understanding nothing about matters of faith. Especially would this hold in respect of any prohibition of internal reform in the church; for what the people as a whole cannot determine upon for themselves cannot be determined for the people by the legislator. But no people can ever rationally determine that they will never advance farther tain faith shall be unalterably held,

church

may

not reform

itself.

power

in the state

is

also invested

with the right of administering punishment. civil offices, the

question arises as

whether the sovereign has the right, after bestowing an office on an individual, to take it again away at his mere pleasure, without any crime having been committed by the holder of the office. I say, "No." For what the united will of the people would never resolve, regarding their civil officers, cannot (constitutionally) be determined by the sovereign regarding them. The people have to bear the cost incurred by the appointment of an official, and undoubtedly it must be their will that any one in office should be completely competent for its duties. But such competency can only be acquired by a long preparation and training, and this process would necessarily occupy the time that would be required for acquiring the means of support by a different occupation. Arbitrary and frequent changes would therefore, as a rule, have to

the effect of filling offices with functionaries

who

have not acquired the skill required for their duties, and whose judgements had not attained maturity by practice. All this is contrary to the purpose of the state. And besides it is requisite in the interest of the

possible

people that

for every individual

to

it

should be

rise

from a

in their insight into matters of faith, or resolve

lower

that they will never reform the institutions of

would otherwise fall into incompetent hands, and that competent officials generally should

the church; because this would be opposed to

office to the

higher

offices, as

these latter

;

OF RIGHT Civil dignities include not only such as are

but also those the possessors of them, without any

connected with a public

office,

which make accompanying services

to the state,

a higher class or rank.

The

members

of

latter constitute the

whose members are distinguished from the common citizens who form the mass of the people. The rank of the nobility is inherited by male descendants; and these again communicate it to wives who are not nobly born. Female nobility,

descendants of noble families, however, do not communicate their rank to husbands who are not of noble birth, but they descend themselves into the common civil status of the people. This being

so,

the question then emerges as to wheth-

er the sovereign has the right to

found a heredi-

tary rank and class, intermediate between himself

and the other citizens? The import of

question does not turn on whether

it

is

this

con-

formable to the prudence of the sovereign, from

own and the people's interests, to have such an institution; but whether it is in accordance with the right of the people that they should have a class of persons above them, who, while being subjects like themselves, are yet born as their commanders, or at least as privileged superiors? The answer to this question, as in previous instances, is to be derived from the principle that "what the people, as constituting the whole mass of the subjects, could not determine regarding themselves and their associated citizens, cannot be constitutionally determined by the sovereign regarding regard to his

the people."

Now

a hereditary nobility

is

a

rank which takes precedence of merit and is hoped for without any good reason a thing of the imagination without genuine reality. For if an ancestor had merit, he could not transmit it to his posterity, but they must always acquire it for themselves. Nature has in fact not so arranged that the talent and will which give rise to merit in the state, are hereditary. And because it cannot be supposed of any individual that he will throw away his freedom, it is impossible that the common will of all the people should agree to such a groundless prerogative, and hence the sovereign cannot make it valid. It may happen, however, that such an anomaly as that of subjects who would be more than citizens, in the manner of born officials, or hereditary professors, has slipped into the mechanism of government in olden times, as in the case of the feudal system, which was almost entirely organized with reference to war. Under such circumstances, the state cannot deal oth-

—

445

erwise with this error of a wrongly instituted

have some guarantee of life-long provision.

rank in

its

midst, than

by the remedy of a grad-

ual extinction through hereditary positions be-

ing left unfilled as they

fall

vacant.

The

has therefore the right provisorily to nity in

title

let

state

a dig-

continue, until the public opinion

matures on the subject. And

from the threefold

this will thus pass

into

division

nobles, and people, to the twofold

sovereign,

and only nat-

ural division into sovereign and people.

No

individual in the state can indeed be enwithout dignity; for he has at least that of being a citizen, except when he has lost his civil status by a crime. As a criminal he is still maintained in life, but he is made the mere instrument of the will of another, whether it be the state or a particular citizen. In the latter position, in which he could only be placed by a juridical judgement, he would practically become a slave, and would belong as property (dominium) to another, who would be not merely his master (herus) but his owner (dominus). Such an owner would be entitled to exchange or tirely

alienate

him

him

as a thing, to use

for shameful purposes,

and

at will except

to dispose of his

powers, but not of his life and members. No one can bind himself to such a condition of dependence, as he would thereby cease to be a person, and it is only as a person that he can

make one

a contract. It may, however, appear that

man may

bind himself to another by a con-

tract of hire, to discharge a certain service that

permissible in its kind, but is left entirely undetermined as regards its measure or amount and that as receiving wages or board or protection in return, he thus becomes only a servant subject to the will of a master (subditus) and not a slave (servus). But this is an illusion. For if masters are entitled to use the powers of such subjects at will, they may exhaust these powers as has been done in the case of Negroes in the Sugar Island and they may thus reduce their servants to despair and death. But this would imply that they had actually given themselves is

—

—

away

to their masters as property; which, in the

case of persons,

is

impossible.

A

person can,

perform work that defined both in quality and quantity, either a day-labourer or as a domiciled subject. In

therefore, only contract to is

as

the latter case he

may

enter into a contract of

lease for the use of the land of a superior, giv-

ing a definite rent or annual return for

zation

by

himself, or he

may

its utili-

contract for his

service as a labourer upon the land. But he does not thereby make himself a slave, or a bondsman, or a serf attached to the soil (glebae ad-

THE SCIENCE

44 6

would thus divest himself of his personality; he can only enter into a temporary or at most a heritable lease. And even if

treatment his inborn personality has a right to protect him, even although he may be con-

by committing a crime he has personally become

found guilty and punishable, before there can be any thought of drawing from his punishment any benefit for himself or his fellow-citizens. The penal law is a categorical imperative; and woe to him who creeps through

scriptus), as he

subjected to another, this subject-condition does not become hereditary; for he has only brought it upon himself by his own wrongdoing. Neither can one who has been begotten by a slave be claimed as property on the ground of the cost of his rearing, because such rearing is an absolute duty naturally incumbent upon parents; and in case the parents be slaves, it devolves upon their masters or owners, who, in undertaking the possession of such subjects, have also made themselves responsible for the

performance of their duties. E.

The Right i.

The

of Punishing

and of Pardoning

The Right of Punishing

right of administering

right of the sovereign as the

punishment is the supreme power to

pain upon a subject on account of a crime committed by him. The head of the state caninflict

not therefore be punished; but his supremacy may be withdrawn from him. Any transgression of the public law which

makes him who com-

incapable of being a citizen, constitutes crime, either simply as a private crime

mits

it

a (crimen), or also as a public crime {crimen publicum). Private crimes are dealt with by a civil court; public crimes by a criminal court. Embezzlement or speculation of money or goods entrusted in trade, fraud in purchase or sale, if done before the eye? of the party who suffers, are private crimes. On the other hand, coining false

money

robbery,

or forging bills of exchange, theft,

etc.,

are public

crimes, because the

commonwealth, and not merely some particular individual, is endangered thereby. Such crimes

may

be divided into those of a base character and those of a violent char-

(indolis abjectae)

acter (indolis violentiae).

punishment (poena fofrom natural punishment (poena naturalis), in which crime as vice punishes itself, and does not as such come Judicial or juridical

rensis)

is

to be distinguished

within the cognizance of the legislator. Juridical

punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but must in all cases be imposed only

because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime. For one man ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another, nor be mixed

up with the subjects of

real right.

Against such

demned first

to lose his civil personality.

He must

be

the serpent-windings of utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge him from the justice of punishment, or even from the due measure of it, according to the Pharisaic

maxim:

"It

is

better that one

man

should die

than that the whole people should perish." For justice and righteousness perish, human life would no longer have any value in* the world. What, then, is to be said of such a proposal as to keep a criminal alive who has been condemned to death, on his being given to under-

if

stand that, experiments

if

he agreed to certain dangerous

performed upon him, he would be allowed to survive if he came happily through them? It is argued that physicians might thus obtain new information that would be of value to the commonweal. But a court of justice would repudiate with scorn any proposal of this kind if made to it by the medical faculty; for justice would cease to be justice, if it were bartered away for any consideration being

whatever.

But what is the mode and measure of punishment which public justice takes as its principle and standard? It is just the principle of equality, by which the pointer of the scale of justice is made to incline no more to the one side than the other. It may be rendered by saying that the undeserved evil which any one commits on another is to be regarded as perpetrated on himself. Hence it may be said: "If you slander another, you slander yourself; if you steal from another, you steal from yourself; if you strike another, you strike yourself; if you kill another, you kill yourself." This is the right of retaliaand, properly understood,

tion

(jus talionis);

it

the only principle which in regulating a

is

public court, as distinguished from

mere private

judgement, can definitely assign both the quality and the quantity of a just penalty. All other standards are wavering and uncertain; and on account of other considerations involved in them, they contain no principle conformable to the sentence of pure and strict justice. It may appear, however, that difference of social status would not admit the application of the principle of retaliation, which is that of "like with like." But although the application may not in all

OF RIGHT cases be possible according to the letter, yet as

may

always be attained in practice, by due regard being given to the disposition and sentiment of the parties in the higher social sphere. Thus a pecuniary penalty regards the effect

it

on account of a verbal injury

may have no

di-

ought to be done in order that every one may and that bloodguiltiness may not remain upon the people for otherwise they might all be regarded as particirealize the desert of his deeds,

;

pators in the murder as a public violation of justice.

The

rect proportion to the injustice of slander; for

one who

is

wealthy

may

be able to indulge him-

own

447

equalization of punishment with crime

therefore only possible

is

by the cognition of

Yet

the judge extending even to the penalty of death,

the attack committed on the honour of the party aggrieved may have its equivalent in the pain inflicted upon the pride of the aggressor,

according to the right of retaliation. This is manifest from the fact that it is only thus that

self in this offence for his

gratification.

he is condemned by the judgement of the court, not only to retract and apologize, but to submit to some meaner ordeal, as kissing the hand of the injured person. In like manner, if a man of the highest rank has violently assaulted an innocent citizen of the lower orders, he may be condemned not only to apologize but to undergo a solitary and painful imprisonment, whereby, in addition to the discomfort endured, especially

if

the vanity of the offender would be painfully affected, and the very shame of his position

would constitute an adequate

retaliation after

But how then would we render the statement: "If you steal from another, you steal from yourself?" In this way, that whoever steals anything makes the property of all insecure; he therefore robs himthe principle of "like with like."

self of all security in property,

right of retaliation.

according to the

Such a one has nothing, and

can acquire nothing, but he has the will to live; this is only possible by others supporting him. But as the state should not do this gratuitously, he must for this purpose yield his powers to the state to be used in penal labour; and thus he falls for a time, or it may be for life, into

and

a condition of slavery. But whoever has committed murder, must die. There is, in this case, no juridical substitute or surrogate, that can be given or taken for the satisfaction of justice.

There is no likeness or proportion between life, however painful, and death; and therefore there is no equality between the crime of murder and the retaliation of it but what is judicially accomplished by the execution of the criminal. His death, however, must be kept free from all maltreatment that would make the humanity suffering in his person loathsome or abominable.

Even

a civil society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its members as might be

if

supposed

—

in the case of a

people inhabiting an

island resolving to separate

and scatter them-

—

throughout the whole world the last murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out. This selves

a sentence can be pronounced over

all criminals proportionate to their internal wickedness; as

may

be seen by considering the case when the

punishment of death has to be inflicted, not on account of a murder, but on account of a political

A

crime that can only be punished capitally.

hypothetical case, founded on history, will

il-

lustrate this. In the last Scottish rebellion there

—

were various participators in it such as Balmerino and others who believed that in taking part in the rebellion they were only discharging their duty to the house of Stuart; but there were also others who were animated only by private motives and interests. Now, suppose that the judgement of the supreme court regarding them had been this: that every one should have liberty to choose between the punishment of death or penal servitude for life. In view of such an alternative, I say that the man of honour would choose death, and the knave would choose servitude. This would be the effect of their human nature as it is; for the honourable man values his honour more highly than even life itself, whereas a knave regards a life, although covered with shame, as better in his eyes than not to be. 1 The former is, without gainsaying, less guilty than the other; and they can only be proportionately punished by death being inflicted equally upon them both; yet to the one it is a mild punishment when his nobler temperament is taken into account, whereas it is a hard punishment to the other in view of his baser temperament. But, on the other hand, were they all equally condemned to penal servitude for life, the honourable man would be too severely punished, while the other, on account of his baseness of nature, would be too mildly punished. In the judgement to be pronounced over a number of criminals united in such a conspiracy, the best equalizer of punishment and crime in the form of public justice is death. And besides all this, it has never been heard of that a criminal condemned to death on account

—

1

83.

Animam "To

praeferre pudori, Juvenal. prefer life to reputation."]

[Satirae,

viii.

THE SCIENCE

448

of a murder has complained that the sentence inflicted on him more than was right and just; and any one would treat him with scorn if he

expressed himself to this effect against it. Otherwise it would be necessary to admit that, although wrong and injustice are not done to the criminal by the law, yet the legislative power is not entitled to administer this mode of punish-

ment; and

did so,

if it

it

would be

in contradic-

tion with itself.

However many they may be who have com-

what he will to

ished,

more

wills,

and

it is

be punished. if

I

impossible for any one to

To

say, "I will to be

pun-

murder any one," can mean nothing

than, "I submit myself along with

other citizens to the laws";

and

if

all

the

there are

any criminals among the people, these laws will include penal laws. The individual who, as a colegislator, enacts

penal law cannot possibly be

same person who,

as a subject, is punished according to the law; for, qua criminal, he cannot possibly be regarded as having a voice in the

the

mitted a murder, or have even commanded it, or acted as art and part in it, they ought all to suffer death; for so justice wills it, in accord-

legislation, the legislator being rationally

ance with the idea of the juridical power, as founded on the universal laws of reason. But the number of the accomplices (correi) in such

pure juridically law-giving reason (homo noumenon). which subjects him as one capable of crime, and consequently as another person (homo phenomenon), along with all the others in the civil union, to this penal law. In other words, it is not the people taken distributively,

a deed might happen to be so great that the

be without such criminals, danger of soon also being deprived of subjects. But it will not thus dissolve itself, neither must it return to the much worse constate, in resolving to

would be

in

which there would be no Nor. above all, should it deaden

viewed any one. then, enact a penal law against himself as a criminal, it must be the as just

and holy.

If

but the tribunal of public justice, as distinct

from the

criminal, that prescribes capital pun-

not to be viewed as

dition of nature, in

ishment; and

external justice.

promise of all the individuals to allow themselves to be punished, thus disposing of themselves and their lives. For if the right to punish must be grounded upon a promise of the wrongdoer, whereby he is to be regarded as being willing to be punished, it ought also to be left to him to find himself deserving of the punishment; and the criminal would thus be his own judge. The chief error

the sensibilities of the people

of justice being exhibited in the

by the spectacle mere carnage of

a slaughtering bench. In such circumstances the

sovereign must always be allowed to have his

power

to take the part of the

—

it

in

judge upon

and to deliver a judgement which, instead of the penalty of death, shall assign some other punishment to the criminals and thereby preserve a multitude

himself as a case of necessity

of the people.

The penalty

of deportation

is

relevant in this connection. Such a form of judgement cannot be carried out according to a public law, but only by an authoritative act of the royal prerogative, and it may only be

applied as an act of grace in individual cases.

Against these doctrines, the Marquis Beccaria has given forth a different view.

Moved

by the compassionate sentimentality of

mane

feeling,

he has asserted that

all

a hucapital

punishment is wrong in itself and unjust. He has put forward this view on the ground that the penalty of death could not be contained in the original civil contract; for, in that case, every

one of the people would have had to consent to if he murdered any of his fellow-

lose his life

citizens. But,

argued, such a consent is imno one can thus dispose of his own life. All this is mere sophistry and perversion of right. No one undergoes punishment because he has willed to be punished, but because he has willed a punishable action; for it is in fact no punishment when any one experiences it is

possible, because

it

is

if

the

social contract contained the

(ttp&tov \pevdos)

of this sophistry consists in

regarding the judgement of the criminal him-

by

self,

necessarily determined

he

under obligation to undergo the loss of his as a judgement that must be grounded on

is

life,

his reason, that

away

himself;

a resolution of his will to take

it

and thus the execution of the

right in question

represented as united in one and the same person with the adjudication of the right. There are, however, two crimes worthy of death, in respect of which it still remains doubtful whether the legislature have the right to deal with them capitally. It is the sentiment of is

honour that induces their perpetration. The one originates in a regard for womanly honour, the other in a regard for military honour; and in both cases there is a genuine feeling of honour incumbent on the individuals as a duty. The former is the crime of maternal infanticide (injanticidium maternale) the latter is the crime of killing a fellow-soldier in a duel (commili;

tonicidium). the

Now

shame of an

legislation cannot take

away

illegitimate birth, nor wipe off

the stain attaching from a suspicion of coward-

OF RIGHT ice, to an officer who does not resist an act that would bring him into contempt, by an effort of

449

must be

called homicide,

and not murder, which

involves evil intent (homicidium dolosum). In all instances the acts are undoubtedly punish-

by the

pardoning (jus aggratiandi),

of

right

in relation to the criminal, is the right

of mitigating or entirely remitting his punish-

On

ment.

most

the side of the sovereign this

delicate of

as

all rights,

it

may

is

the

be exercised

and yet so as to do a great wrong by it. It ought not to be exercised in application to the crimes

of the law which it is

thus born

way, its destruction might also be ignored; nor can the shame of the mother, when her unmarried confinement is known, be removed by any legal ordinance. A subordinate officer, again, on whom an insult is inflicted, sees himself comthis

by the public opinion of his associates to obtain satisfaction; and, as in the state of nature, the punishment of the offender can only be

pelled

a duel, in which his

own

life is

ex-

posed to danger, and not by means of the law in a court of justice. The duel is therefore adopted as the means of demonstrating his courage as that characteristic upon which the honour of his profession essentially rests; and this is done even if it should issue in the killing of his adversary. But as such a result takes place publicly and under the consent of both parties, although it may be done unwillingly, it cannot properly be called murder (homicidium dolosum). What then is the right in both cases as relating to criminal justice? Penal justice is here in fact brought into great straits, having apparently either to declare the notion of honour, which is certainly no mere fancy here, to be nothing in the eye of the law, or to exempt the crime from its due punishment; and thus it would become either remiss or cruel. The knot thus tied is to be resolved in the following way.

The

The viewed

of Pardoning

so as to set forth the splendour of his dignity,

properly regulates marriage, and

by

The Right

II.

su-

beyond the pale or constitutional protection of the law. Such a child is introduced, as it were, like prohibited goods, into the commonwealth, and as it has no legal right to existence in

effected

upheld among the people

illegitimate child

able; but they cannot be punished

preme power with death. An comes into the world outside

is

themselves.

own that is superior to the fear of death. Hence it appears that, in such circumstances, his

the individuals concerned are remitted to the state of nature; and their acts in both cases

which

tively to that

exempfrom punishment (impunitas criminis) would be the greatest wrong that could be done to them. It is only an occasion of some form

of the subjects against each other; for tion

of treason (crimen laesae majestatis) as a lesion .

against himself, that the sovereign should

use of this right.

And

it

make

should not be exercised

even in this connection, if the safety of the people would be endangered by remitting such punishment. This right is the only one which properly deserves the

name

ma-

of a "right of

jesty."

Juridical Relations of the

50.

Citizen to his

Country and to Other Countries. Emigration; Immigration ; Banishment ; Exile

The land virtue of

or territory

its political

whose inhabitants

—

in

constitution and without

the necessary intervention of a special juridical act

—

the

are, by birth, fellow-citizens same commonwealth, is called

and

of one

their coun-

A foreign country is one in which they would not possess this condition, but would be living abroad. If a country abroad form part of the territory under the same government as at home, it constitutes a province, try or fatherland.

according to the

Roman

usage of the term. It

does not constitute an incorporated portion of the empire (imperii) so as to be the abode of equal fellow-citizens, but

is

only a possession of

the government, like a lower house; and

it

must

therefore honour the domain of the ruling state as the

categorical imperative of penal justice, that

1.

A

"mother country" (regio domina). subject, even regarded as a citizen, has

the killing of any person contrary to the law

the right of emigration; for the state cannot re-

must be punished with death, remains in force; but the legislation itself and the civil constitu-

only carry

tion generally, so long as they are

tinguished from his fixed possessions. However,

and incomplete, are

at fault.

And

still

barbarous

this is the rea-

son why the subjective motive-principles of honour among the people do not coincide with the standards which are objectively conformable to another purpose; so that the public justice issuing

from the

state

becomes

injustice rela-

tain

him

as

if

he were

its

away with him

property. But he his

moveables as

may dis-

is entitled to sell his immovable property, and take the value of it in money with him. 2. The supreme power, as master of the country, has the right to favour immigration and the settlement of strangers and colonists. This will hold even although the natives of the country

he

!

THE SCIENCE

450

may

be unfavourably disposed to is not diminished or

their pri-

it, if

vate property in the soil

in-

who

In the case of a subject

ted a crime that renders low-citizens with

him

has commit-

society of his fel-

all

prejudicial to the state,

supreme power has also the right of inflicting banishment to a country abroad. By such deportation, he does not acquire any share in the rights of citizens of the territory to which the

he

banished.

is

The supreme power has

4.

imposing a citizen

is

And

because

authority thus withdraws

from the

by which

sent abroad into the wide world as

"out-land."

the

also the right of

exile generally (jus exilii),

citizen, this

all

amounts

supreme

the

legal

an "outlaw" within the territory of his own country.

complex of all by uniting the will of all so as to form a people; and then it has to appoint a sovereign over this common union, which sovereign is no other than the united will

ochlocracy, as well as the discussion of the so-

mixed constitutions, may be passed over

called

here as not essential, and as leading into too

much

detail.

As regards the administration

is

be said that the simplest mode is also the best; but as regards its bearing on right itself, it is also the most dangerous for the peo-

view of the despotism to which simplic-

realiza-

said that the people should be satisfied with the

;

which and viewed

the objective practical

This supreme bead is the sovereign; but conceived only as a representation of the whole state.

people, the idea

still

requires physical embodi-

ment in a person, who may exhibit the supreme power of the state and bring the idea actively to bear upon the popular will. The relation of the supreme power to the people is conceivable in three different

rules over all;

forms: either one in the state

or some, united in relation of

equality with each other, rule over ers;

or

is

tocratic,

or is

the othall

The form

dividually, including themselves.

the state

narchic

all

together rule over each and

all

of

whereas the former merely represents

the sovereignty. It

is

evident that an autocracy

An

is

state,

one only

the simplest

being consti-

as king, to the peo-

who

is

the lawgiv-

form of government, is, however, compounded of the union of two reer.

racy,

monarchy, regarded as an autoc-

the best political constitution,

is

monarch

is

good, that

But

as well as the will to do right.

evasion and belongs to the

that "the best constitution

is

is

the

mere

class of wise

amounts to saying that by which the

supreme administrator of the is,

this is a

common

tautological phrases. It only

best ruler"; that

if

he has the judgement

is, if

state

is

made

the

that the best constitution

the best 52. Historical Origin

A Pure It is

and Changes.

Republic. Representative

Government

vain to inquire into the historical origin

of the political

mechanism;

for

it is

no longer

possible to discover historically the point of time at

which

civil

society took

its

beginning. Sav-

ages do not draw up a documentary record of their having submitted themselves to law;

and

may be inferred from the nature of uncivilized men that they must have set out from a state of violence. To prosecute such an inquiry

it

form of government in the tuted by the relation of one, ple, so that there is

reflection that

The expression mo-

not so suitable as autocratic for the

conception here intended; for a monarch is one who has the highest power, an autocrat is one who has all power, so that this latter is the sovereign,

plification in the

in-

therefore either autocratic, or aris-

democratic.

of right in the

may

state, it

supreme head of the

emanates from the a priori reason it

considera-

undoubtedly a rational maxim to aim at simmachinery which is to unite the people under compulsory laws, and this would be secured were all the people to be passive and to obey only one person over them; but the method would not give subjects who were also citizens of the state. It is sometimes

lations of the united will of the people

such

The

is

conception of a public government generally (res publica latius dicta), are only so many re-

as

itself.

in

ity of administration so naturally gives rise. It

three powers in the state, involved in the

tion of the pure idea of a

ways

which these forms are adulterated by the intrusion of violent and illegitimate usurpers of power, as in oligarchy and tion of the

ple, in

The Three Forms of the State. Autocracy; Aristocracy ; Democracy 51.

The

democracy, again, is the most the forms of the state, for it has

to begin

protection

making him

to

power

A

to the people.

terfered with. 3.

other as the lawgivers, thereby constituting the sovereignty, and that of this sovereign

aristocracy, as a

lations: that of the nobles in relation to

one an-

in the intention of finding a pretext for altering

no less would amount to revolution, that could only be carried out by an insurrection of the people, and the existing constitution

than penal. For such a

by violence

mode

is

of alteration

OF RIGHT not by constitutional modes of legislation. But insurrection against an already existing constitution, is an overthrow of all civil and juridical

and of

relations, is

right generally;

not a mere alteration of the

but a dissolution of

it.

It

mode

to

a

of

transition

and hence

it

civil constitution,

would thus form a better

constitution

by palingenesis and not by mere metamorphosis; and it would require a new social contract, upon which the former original contract, as then annulled, would have no influence. It

must, however, be possible for the sover-

eign to change the existing constitution,

if it is

not actually consistent with the idea of the orig-

In doing so

inal contract.

it is

essential to give

form of government which will properly constitute the people into a state. Such a change cannot be made by the state deliberately altering its constitution from one of the three forms to one of the other two. For examexistence to that

ple, political

by

changes should not be carried out

the aristocrats combining to subject them-

selves to an autocracy, or resolving to fuse into a democracy, or conversely; as

pended on the arbitrary choice and sovereign what constitution he the people. For, even

if

it

all

de-

liking of the

may impose on

as sovereign he resolved

if

democracy, he might be doing wrong to the people, because they might hold such a constitution in abhorrence, and regard either of the other two as to alter the constitution into a

more suitable The forms

to

them

of the state are only the letter

may

therefore remain so long

as they are considered,

the only enduring political con-

is

it the law is itself sovereign, and no longer attached to a particular person. This is the ultimate end of all public right, and the state in which every citizen can have what is his own peremptorily assigned to him. But so long as the form of the state has to be represented, according to the letter, by many different moral persons invested with the supreme power, there can only be a provisory internal right, and not an absolutely juridical state of

stitution, as in

is

civil society.

Every

true republic

is

and can only be consti-

tuted by a representative system of the people.

Such a representative system is instituted in name of the people, and is constituted by all the citizens

being united

means of

together,

order,

in

by

and secure But as soon as a supreme head of

their deputies, to protect

their rights.

the state in person

—be

it

as king, or nobility,

body of the people in a democratic becomes also representative, the united

or the whole

union

—

people

then

does

not

merely represent the

sovereignty, but they are themselves sovereign. It is in the

people that the supreme power orig-

and it is accordingly from this power that all the rights of individual citizens as mere subjects, and especially as officials of the state, must be derived. When the sovereigninally resides,

ty of the people themselves

republic

is

established; and

is

thus realized, the

it is

no longer nec-

essary to give up the reins of government into

in the circumstances.

(littera) of the original constitution in the civil

union; and they

451

This

letter.

from ancient and long

the hands of those

by

whom

they have been

hitherto held, especially as they might again

destroy

all

the

new

institutions

by

their arbi-

trary and absolute will.

habit (and therefore only subjectively), to be

necessary to the machinery of the political con-

But the (anima pacti

that original con-

stitution.

spirit of

tract

originarii) contains

and im-

poses the obligation on the constituting power

make

mode

It was therefore a great error in judgement on the part of a powerful ruler in our time, when he tried to extricate himself from the embarrass-

ment

arising

from great public

debts,

by

trans-

government conform-

ferring this burden to the people, and leaving

if this cannot be effected change it gradually and continuously till it harmonize in its working with the only rightful constitution, which is that of a pure republic. Thus the old empirical and statutory forms, which serve only to effect the political subjection of the people, will be resolved into the original and rational forms which alone take freedom as their principle, and even as the condition of all compulsion and constraint. Compul-

to undertake and distribute them among themselves as they might best think fit. It thus became natural that the legislative power, not only in respect of the taxation of the subjects,

to

able to

the

its

of the

idea; and,

at once, to

sion

is

in fact requisite for the realization of

a

juridical constitution, according to the proper

idea of the state; and

it

will lead at last to the

realization of that idea, even according to the

them

but in respect of the government, should come into the hands of the people. It was requisite that they should be able to prevent the incurring of new debts by extravagance or war; and in consequence, the supreme power of the monarch entirely disappeared, not by being merely suspended, but by passing over in fact to the people, to whose legislative will the property of every subject thus became subjected. Nor can it be said that a tacit and yet obligatory prom-

THE SCIENCE

452

ise must be assumed as having, under such circumstances, been given by the national assembly, not to constitute themselves into a sov-

ing perpetual peace.

The

difference

right of individual

men

or families as related

ereignty, but only to administer the affairs of

right of the nations

each other

to

between the

in the state of nature,

among

and the

themselves, consists

the sovereign for the time, and after this was

in this, that in the right of nations

government again into the monarch's hands. Such a supposed contract would be null and void. The right of the supreme legislation in the commonwealth is not an alienable right, but is the most person-

consider not merely a relation of one state to

done

al

of

to deliver the reins of the

all

rights.

Whoever

possesses

it

can only

dispose by the collective will of the people, in respect of the people; he cannot dispose in re-

spect of the collective will

ultimate foundation of

all

itself,

which

is

the

public contracts.

back their

of another state, as well as to that state as a

whole. This difference, however, between the right of nations

The Right

II.

of

is

"No

a contradiction.

54.

Nations and Inter-

Law. (Jus Gentium) Nature and Division of the Right of Nations

The

individuals,

who make up

a people,

may

be regarded as natives of the country sprung by natural descent from a common ancestry (congeniti), although this in detail. Again,

they

may not hold entirely true may be viewed according

and juridical relation, as born of a common political mother, the republic, so that they constitute, as it were, a public family or nation (gens, natio) whose members are all related to each other as citizens of the state. As members of a state, they do not mix with

The elements

those

who

live beside

them

States,

1.

ages

savages, on account of have chosen, regard themselves as superior to civilized peoples; and they constitute tribes and even races, but not states. The public right of states (jus publicum civitatum), in their relations to one another, is what we have to consider under the designation of the "right of nations." Wherever a state, viewed as a moral person, acts in relation to another existing in the condition of natural freedom, and consequently in a state of continual war, such right takes it

—are naturally

3.

An

be divided into:

1. the right of going war; and 3. right after war, the object of which is to constrain the nations mutually to pass from this state of war and to found a common constitution establish-

to war;

2.

right during

it;

alliance of nations, in accordance with

the idea of an original social contract,

is

neces-

sary to protect each other against external aggression and attack, but not involving interfer-

ence with their several internal

difficulties

and

disputes; 4.

This mutual connection by alliance must

dispense with a distinct sovereign power, such as

is

set

up

in the civil constitution;

it

can only

take the form of a federation, which as such

may be revoked on any occasion, and must consequently be renewed from time to time. This is therefore a right which comes in as an accessory (in subsidium) of another original order to prevent the nations from fallfrom right and lapsing into the state of actual war with each other. It thus issues in the idea of a foedus amphictyonum. right, in

ing

right of nations in relation to the state

may

in their exter-

like lawless sav-

in a non-juridical condition;

tually to pass out of

55.

The

—

This natural condition

rise.

of war

viewed as nations,

is a state of war in which the right of the stronger prevails; and although it may not in fact be always found as a state of actual war and incessant hostility, and although no real wrong is done to any one therein, yet the condition is wrong in itself in the highest degree, and the nations which form states contiguous to each other are bound mu-

in the state of na-

Yet these the lawless freedom they

of the right of nations are as

nal relations to one another

to the intellectual

ture, considering such to be ignoble.

Elements of the Right of Nations

follows:

2.

national 53.

in

A

be consistent with their position as a legislative power, and yet it would be made binding upon

one can serve two masters,"

and the right of individuals

mere state of nature, requires to be determined by elements which can easily be deduced from the conception of the latter. the

would be bound authority again, would not

the people; which, on the principle that

to

another as a whole, but also the relation of the individual persons in one state to the individuals

contract, by which the people to give

we have

We

Right of Going to War as related to the Subjects of the State

have then to consider,

in the first place,

the original right of free states to go to

war

with each other as being still in a state of nature, but as exercising this right in order to establish some condition of society approaching

OF RIGHT the juridical state. And, tion arises as to

tion to its to

own

make war

their property

what

first

of

all,

the ques-

right the state has in rela-

subjects, to use

them

in order

employ

against other states, to

and even

their lives for this pur-

them to hazard and such a way that it does not depend upon their own personal judgement whether they will march into the field of war pose, or at least to expose

danger; and

all

this in

or not, but the supreme

command

of the sov-

ereign claims to settle and dispose of

them

thus.

This right appears capable of being easily established. It may be grounded upon the right which every one has to do with what is his own as he will. Whatever one has made substantially for himself, he holds as his incontestable property. The following, then, is such a deduction as a mere jurist would put forward. There are various natural products in a country which, as regards the number and quantity in which they exist, must be considered as spe-

453

own, to war, as if it were to the chase, and even to march them to the field of battle, as if it were on a pleasure excursion. This principle of right may be supposed to float dimly before the mind of the monarch, and it certainly holds true at least of the lower animals which may become the property of man. But such a principle will not at all apply to men, especially when viewed as citizens who must be tions of his

regarded as members of the state, with a share in the legislation,

and not merely as means for

others but as ends in themselves.

must give

resentatives,

war

As such they

their free consent, through their rep-

not only to the carrying on of

generally, but to every separate declara-

tion of war;

and

it is

only under this limiting

condition that the state has a right to

demand

their services in undertakings so full of danger.

cially

We would therefore deduce this right rather from the duty of the sovereign to the people than conversely. Under this relation, the people must be regarded as having given their sanction;

state; for the country

and, having the right of voting, they

produced (artefacta) by the work of the would not yield them to such extent were it not under the constitution of the state and its regular administrative government, or if the inhabitants were still living in

to themselves individually, to

—

most useful of their kind swine, and such like, would either be used up as necessary food or destroyed by beasts of prey in the district in which I live, so that they would entirely the

disappear, or be found in very scant supplies,

were

it

not for the government securing to the

inhabitants their acquisitions and property. This

holds likewise of the population

itself,

as

we

American deserts; and even were the greatest industry applied in those which is not yet done there might be regions but a scanty population. The inhabitants of any country would be but sparsely sown here and there were it not for the protection of government; because without it they could not spread themselves with their households upon a territory which was always in danger of being devastated by enemies or by wild beasts of prey; and see in the case of the

—

—

further, so great a multitude of

men

as

now

live

any one country could not otherwise obtain sufficient means of support. Hence, as it can be said of vegetable growths, such as potatoes, in

as well as of domesticated animals, that because

the abundance in which they are found

is

a

product of human labour, they may be used, destroyed, and consumed by man; so it seems that it may be said of the sovereign, as the supreme power in the state, that he has the right to lead his subjects, as being for the most part produc-

be

be active in so far

as they represent the sovereignty

the state of nature. Sheep, cattle, domestic fowl

—

may

considered, although thus passive in reference

56.

War

Right of Going to

itself.

in relation

to Hostile States

Viewed as in the state of nature, the right of nations to go to war and to carry on hostilities is the legitimate way by which they prosecute their rights by their own power when they regard themselves as injured and this is done because in that state the method of a juridical process, although the only one proper to settle such disputes, cannot be adopted. ;

The threatening of war is to be distinguished from the active injury of a first aggression, which again is distinguished from the general outbreak of hostilities. A threat or menace may be given by the active preparation of armaments, upon which a right of prevention (jus praeventionis) is founded on the other side, or merely by the formidable increase of the power of another state (potestas tremenda) by acquisition of territory. Lesion of a less powerful country may be involved merely in the condition of a more powerful neighbour prior to any action at all; and in the state of nature an attack under such circumstances would be warrantable. This international relation is the foundation of the right of equilibrium, or of the "balance of power," among all the states that are in active contiguity to each other.

The

right to go to

war

is

constituted

by any

J

THE SCIENCE

454

overt act of injury. This includes any arbitrary retaliation or act of reprisal (retorsio) as a satisfaction taken by one people for an offence

committed by another, without any attempt being

made

to obtain reparation in a peaceful

Such an act of

retaliation

way.

would be similar

in

state would thus make itself unfit to be regarded as a person capable of participating in equal rights in the international relations according to the right of nations. Among these forbidden means are to be reckoned the appointment of subjects to act as spies, or engaging subjects or

kind to an outbreak of hostilities without a previous declaration of war. For if there is to be any right at all during the state of war, some-

even strangers to act as assassins, or poisoners (in which class might well be included the so-

thing analogous to a contract must be assumed,

dividuals), or even employing agents to spread

called sharpshooters

who

word,

lurk in

ambush

for in-

forbidden to use any

involving acceptance on the side of the declara-

false news. In a

on the other, and amounting to the fact that they both will to seek their right in this way.

such malignant and perfidious means as would destroy the confidence which would be requi-

tion

The determination in war. is the

most

site to establish a lasting

War

Right during

57.

difficult

right

it is

very dif-

way

of forcibly depriving individuals of their

problem of the is

even to form a conception of such a right, or to think of any law in this lawless state withficult

out falling into a contradiction. Inter lent leges. 1 It

must then be

arma

si-

just the right to

carry on war according to such principles as

render

it

always

still

possible to pass out of that

natural condition of the states in their external relations to each other,

and

to enter into a con-

and contributions upon

property. For this would be robbery, seeing

posed on the country or the province

of independent states against each

lum punitivum). For punishment

is

only in place

under the relation of a superior (imperantis) to a subject (subditum) and this is not the relation of the states to one another. Neither can an international war be "a war of extermination" (bellum internicinum) nor even "a war of subjugation" (bellum subjugatorium); for this would issue in the moral extinction of a state by its people being either fused into one mass with the conquering state, or being reduced ;

,

Not

it

was not the conquered people but the state under whose government they were placed that carried on the war by means of them. All exactions should be raised by regular requisition, and receipts ought to be given for them, in order that when peace is restored the burden im-

58.

other can rightly be a war of punishment (bel-

to slavery.

a

may

be

proportionately borne.

dition of right.

No war

peace thereafter.

war

to impose exactions conquered enemy; but not legitimate to plunder the people in the

It is permissible in

of what constitutes right

of nations and international law. It

it is

that this necessary

attaining to a condition of peace

means of

is itself

con-

tradictory to the right of a state; but because the idea of the right of nations includes merely the conception of an antagonism that

is

in ac-

The right the moment

Right after

War

that follows after war, begins at of the treaty of peace and refers

to the consequences of the war.

lays

down

The conqueror

the conditions under which he will

agree with the conquered power to form the

conclusion of peace. Treaties are drawn up; not indeed according to any right that

it

per-

him to protect, on account of an alleged lesion by his opponent, but as taking this question upon himself, he bases the right to decide it upon his own power. Hence the conqueror may not demand restitution of the cost of the war; because he would then have to declare the war of his opponent to be unjust. And even tains to

although he should adopt such an argument, he not entitled to apply it; because he would have to declare the war to be punitive, and he

cordance with principles of external freedom, in order that the state may maintain what is properly its own. but not that it may acquire a condition which, from the aggrandizement of its power, might become threatening to other

is

states.

out regard to equality of numbers. Neither the conquered state nor its subjects

Defensive measures and means of are allowable to a state that

1

["Id

Cicero.

the

them midst

unfit of

kinds

forced to war,

is

except such as by their use would jects using

all

would thus

in

turn

inflict

an injury. To

this right

belongs also the exchange of prisoners, which is to be carried out without ransom and with-

lose their political liberty

by conquest of the

make

the sub-

country, so as that the former should be de-

to be citizens;

for the

graded to a colony, or the latter to slaves; for otherwise it would have been a penal war. which is contradictory in itself. A colony or a prov-

arms the

laws are

silent."

OF RIGHT ince

by

constituted

is

own

constitution,

a people

legislation,

which has its and territory,

where persons belonging to another state are merely strangers, but which is nevertheless subject to the supreme executive power of another state. This other state is called the mother-country. It is ruled as a daughter, but has at the same time its own form of government, as in a separate parliament under the presidency of a viceroy (civitas hybridd). Such was Athens in relation to different islands; and such is at present (1796) the relation of Great Britain to Ireland. Still less

institution,

war; for

can slavery be deduced as a rightful from the conquest of a people in

this

would assume that the war was of

a punitive nature.

And

least of all

can a basis

be found in war for a hereditary slavery, which is absurd in itself, since guilt cannot be in-

from the criminality of another.

herited

Further, that an amnesty

is

involved in the is already im-

of public treaties, with regard to which it may be assumed that any such violation concerns all nations by threatening their freedom, and that they are thus summoned to unite against such

away the power of commitBut this does not include the right to partition and appropriate the country, so as to make a state as it were disappear from the earth; for this would be an injustice to the peoa wrong and to take

ting

in

peace when war

is

in

the neighbourhood, or the right of neutrality. 2. The right to have peace secured so that it

may

that 3.

to a in

is,

continue

when

it

has been concluded,

the right of guarantee.

The

right of the several states to enter in-

mutual

common

alliance, so as to

against

all

defend themselves

external or even internal

attacks. This right of federation, however, does not extend to the formation of any league for external aggression or internal aggrandizement. 60.

The

Right as against an Unjust

Enemy

right of a state against an unjust

enemy

has no limits, at least in respect of quality as distinguished from quantity or degree. In other words, the injured state may use not, indeed

—

—

any means, but yet all those means that are permissible and in reasonable measure in so far as they are in its power, in order to assert its

own. But what then is an to the conceptions of the right of nations, when, as holds generally of the state of nature, every state is judge in its own cause? It is one whose publicly expressed will, whether in word or deed, betrays a maxim which, if it were taken as a universal rule, would make a state of peace among the nations impossible, and would necessarily perpetuate the state of nature. Such is the violation right to

unjust

what

is

its

enemy according

to

unite into

lose their original

a

war.

may

be said that the expression in the state of nature" is pleonastic; for the state of nature is itself a state of injustice. A just enemy would be one to whom I would do wrong in offering resistance; but such a one would really not be my Further,

it

"an unjust enemy

enemy.

The

are:

who cannot

commonwealth, and to adopt such a new constitution as by its nature would be unfavourable to the inclination for right

Perpetual Peace and a Permanent Congress of Nations

61.

The Rights of Peace

The rights of peace 1. The right to be

it.

ple of that state,

conclusion of a treaty of peace plied in the very idea of a peace. 59.

455

natural state of nations as well as of in-

dividual

men

out

in order to

of,

is

a state which

Hence, before right of nations

it is

transition

this

and

a

duty to pass

enter into a legal state.

all

occurs,

all

the

the external property

of states acquirable or maintainable

by war are

merely provisory; and they can only become peremptory in a universal union of states analogous to that by which a nation becomes a state. It is thus only that a real state of peace could be established. But with the too great extension of such a union of states over vast regions, any government of it, and consequently the protection of its individual members, must at last become impossible; and thus a multitude of such corporations would again bring round a state of war. Hence the perpetual peace, which is the ultimate end of all the right of nations, becomes in fact an impracticable idea. The political principles, however, which aim at such an end, and which enjoin the formation of such unions among the states as may promote a continuous approximation to a perpetual peace, are not impracticable; they are as practicable as this approximation itself, which is a practical problem involving a duty, and founded upon the right of individual

Such a union of

men and

states.

maintain be called a permanent congress of nations; and it is free to every neighbouring state to join in it. A union of this kind, so far

peace,

states, in order to

may

at least as regards the formalities of the right

THE SCIENCE

456

of nations in respect of the preservation of peace, was presented in the first half of this cen-

Assembly of the States-General at In this Assembly most of the EuroHague. the pean courts, and even the smallest republics, brought forward their complaints about the hostilities which were carried on by the one against the other. Thus the whole of Europe appeared tury, in the

federated state, accepted as umpire by the several nations in their public differences. But in place of this agreement, the like a single

of nations afterwards survived only in

right

books;

it

disappeared from the cabinets,

force had been already used, in

the

it

or, after

was relegated

form of theoretical deductions

to the

may

It

appear that seas put nations out of

all

communion with each other. But this is not so; for by means of commerce, seas form the happiest

And

natural provision the

more

for their

intercourse.

there are of neighbouring coast-

lands, as in the case of the Mediterranean Sea,

intercourse becomes the

this

more animated.

And hence communications with such

lands, es-

where there are settlements upon them connected with the mother countries giving occasion for such communications, bring it about that evil and violence committed in one place of our globe are felt in all. Such possible abuse pecially

obscurity of archives.

By

an attempt in this direction, while a foreign nation would not be entitled to treat them on this account as enemies. This right, in so far as it relates to a possible union of all nations, in respect of certain laws universally regulating their intercourse with each other, may be called "cosmopolitical right" (jus cosmopoliticum).

such a congress

is

here meant only a vol-

combination of different states that would be dissoluble at any time, and not such a union as is embodied in the United States of America, founded upon a political constitution, and therefore indissoluble. It is only by a congress of this kind that the idea of a public right of nations can be established, and that the settlement of their differences by the mode of a civil process, and not by the barbarous means of war, can be realized. untary

cannot, however, annul the right of

man

as a

world to attempt to enter into communion with all others, and for this purpose to visit all the regions of the earth, although citizen of the

does not constitute a right of settlement territory of another people (jus in-

this

upon the colatus),

for

which a special contract

is

re-

quired.

The Universal Right

III.

of

But the question

Mankind.

ple 62.

The

Nature and Conditions of Cosmo political Right

may come

raised as to whether, in

all

may

claim the right to settle (accolatus),

and to occupy possessions

in the

neighbourhood

of another people that has already settled in

rational idea of a universal, peaceful,

not yet friendly, union of

is

the case of newly discovered countries, a peo-

(Jus Cosmopoliticum)

the nations

if

upon

that region; and to do this without their consent.

tinguished from philanthropic or ethical prin-

Such a right is indubitable, if the new settlement takes place at such a distance from the seat of the former that neither would restrict

ciples.

Nature has enclosed them altogether

or injure the other in the use of their territory.

within

definite

the earth that

with each other,

is

into active relations

a juridical principle, as dis-

boundaries,

in

virtue

of

the

form of their abode as a globus terraqueus; and the possession of the soil upon which an inhabitant of the earth may live can spherical

only be regarded as possession of a part of a limited whole and, consequently, as a part to which every one has originally a right. Hence

But

in the case of

nomadic peoples, or

tribes of

shepherds and hunters (such as the Hottentots, the Tungusi, and most of the American Indians), whose support is derived from wide desert tracts, such occupation should never take place by force, but only by contract; and any such contract ought never to take advantage of

community of the community of possession

the ignorance of the original dwellers in regard

(communio), nor consequently of the use or

alleged that such acts of violent appropriation

all

nations originally hold a

soil,

but not

a.

juridical

but only of a possible

proprietorship of the

soil,

physical intercourse

(commercium) by means

to the cession of their lands.

may

commonly

if

sufficiently justi-

fying grounds were furnished for them, partly

peoples

with one another, and they have a right to make

Busching

it.

it is

be justified as subserving the general good

of the world. It appears as

In other words, they are placed in such thoroughgoing relations of each to all the rest that they may claim to enter into intercourse

of

Yet

by reference (as

the civilization of barbarous

to

by

a

tries to

pretext of this kind even excuse the bloody introduc-

:

OF RIGHT tion of the Christian religion into

Germany),

and partly by founding upon the necessity of purging one's own country from depraved criminals, and the hope of their improvement or that of their posterity, in another continent like

New

Holland. But all these alleged good purposes cannot wash out the stain of injustice in the means employed to attain them. It may be objected that, had such scrupulousness about making a beginning in founding a legal state

with force been always maintained, the whole

have been in a state of lawlessBut such an objection would as little an-

earth would ness.

still

nul the conditions of right in question as the pre-

when become degenerate, it belongs to the people to transform it by force. This would amount generally to being unjust text of the political revolutionaries that,

a

constitution has

once and for justice the

all,

more

in order thereafter to

surely,

and to make

it

found

flourish.

Conclusion prove that a thing is, he may it is not. And if he succeeds in doing neither (as often occurs), he may still ask whether it is in his interest to accept one If one cannot

try to prove that

or other of the alternatives hypothetically, from the theoretical or the practical point of view.

In other words, a hypothesis

may

either in order to explain a certain

be accepted

phenomenon

(as in astronomy to account for the retrogression and stationariness of the planets), or in

order to attain a certain end, which again may be either pragmatic, as belonging merely to the sphere of art, or moral, as involving a purpose which it is a duty to adopt as a maxim of action. Now it is evident that the assumption (suppositio) of the practicability of such an end, though presented merely as a theoretical and problematical judgement, may be regarded as constituting a duty; and hence it is so regarded in this case. For although there may be no positive obligation to believe in such an end, yet even if there were not the least theoretical probability of action being carried out in accordance with it, so long as its impossibility cannot be demonstrated, there still remains a duty incumbent upon us with regard to it. Now, as a matter of fact, the morally practical reason utters within us its irrevocable veto There shall be no war. So there ought to be no war, neither between me and you in the condition of nature, nor between us as members of states which, although internally in a condition of law, are

still

externally in their relation to

457

each other in a condition of lawlessness; for this is not the way by which any one should prosecute his right. Hence the question no longer is as to whether perpetual peace is a real thing or not a real thing, or as to whether we may not be deceiving ourselves when we adopt the former alternative, but we must act on the its being real. We must work for what may perhaps not be realized, and establish that constitution which yet seems best adapted

supposition of

about (mayhap republicanism in all and separately). And thus we put an end to the evil of wars, which have

to bring

it

states, together

may

been the chief interest of the internal arrangements of all the states without exception. And although the realization of this purpose may always remain but a pious wish, yet we do certainly not

maxim

deceive ourselves in adopting the

of action that will guide us in

incessantly for

it;

for

it is

working

a duty to do this.

To

suppose that the moral law within us is itself deceptive, would be sufficient to excite the horrible wish rather to be deprived of all reason than to live under such deception, and even to see oneself, according to such principles, degraded like the lower animals to the level of the mechanical play of nature. It may be said that the universal and lasting establishment of peace constitutes not merely a part, but the whole final purpose and end of the science of right as viewed within the limits of reason. The state of peace is the only condition of the mine and thine that is secured and guaranteed by laws in the relationship of men living in numbers contiguous to each other, and

who

are thus

rule

is

those

combined

in a constitution

whose

derived not from the mere experience of

who have found

it

the best as a normal

guide for others, but which must be taken by the reason a priori from the ideal of a juridical

union of all

men under

public laws generally. For

particular examples or instances, being able

only to furnish illustration but not proof, are deceptive, and at all events require a metaphysic to establish them by ciples.

those

And this is conceded who turn metaphysics

its

necessary prin-

by when

indirectly even into ridicule,

they say, as they often do: "The best constitution is that in which not men but laws exercise the power." For what can be more metaphysically sublime in its own way than this very idea of theirs, which according to their own assertion has, notwithstanding, the most objective reality? This may be easily shown by reference to actual instances. And it is this very idea

458 which alone can be carried out practically, if it is not forced on in a revolutionary and sudden way by violent overthrow of the existing defeclive constitution; for this would produce for the time the

momentary

annihilation of the

whole juridical state of society. But if the idea is carried forward by gradual reform and in accordance with fixed principles, it may lead by a continuous approximation to the highest political good, and to perpetual peace.

1

CONTENTS THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT Preface to the First Edition, 1790 I.

II.

461

Introduction Division of Philosophy The Realm of Philosophy in General

The Critique

III.

is

The judgement

Judgement as a Means of two parts of Philosophy in a

13.

grounds The pure judgement of taste charm and emotion

14.

Exemplification

15.

The judgement

of

467 V. Principle of formal finality of Nature is a transcendental Principle of Judgement. 467 VI. The Association of Feeling of Pleasure with the Concept of Finality of Nature 470 VII. The Aesthetic Representation of the Finality 47 of Nature VIII. The Logical Representation of the Finality

473 of Nature IX. Joinder of the Legislations of Understanding and Reason by means of Judgement 474

First

16.

A

17.

The

is

20.

478

Comparison

of the three specifically different

kinds of delight 479 Definition of the Beautiful derived from the First

Moment

479

Second Moment.

Moment 6.

The

Of the Judgement

Taste:

of Quantity is that which, apart from conrepresented as the object of a univer-

beautiful

cepts,

is

sal delight 7.

of

480

acteristic

In a judgement of taste the universality of delight is only represented as subjective 480 9. Investigation of the question of the relative priority in a judgement of taste of the feeling of pleasure and the estimating of the object 482 Definition of the Beautiful drawn from the Second

483

Third Moment. Of Judgements of Taste: Moment of the relation of the Ends brought under Review in such Judgements 10. Finality in general

11.

The

sole

486

by which an object

described as beautiful, under the condition of a definite concept, is not pure 488 taste

Ideal of beauty

from

this

483 foundation of the judgement of taste

459

is

489 Third 491

Of the Judgement of Taste: of the Modality of the Delight in the

Nature of the modality

in

a

judgement of 491

The subjective necessity attributed to a judgement of taste is conditioned 492 The condition of the necessity advanced by a the idea of a

common

reason for presupposing a

common

judgement of 21.

22.

taste

is

492

Have we sense

?

The

necessity of the universal assent that

492 is

thought in a judgement of taste, is a subjective necessity which, under the presupposition

a

of

common

sense,

is

represented as

objective

492

Definition of the Beautiful

drawn from

the Fourth

Moment 493 General Remark upon the First Section of the Analytic 493 Book

Analytic of the Sublime of estimating the beautiful to that of estimating the sublime 495 24. Subdivision of an investigation of the feeling of the sublime 496 II.

23. Transition

A.

from the faculty

The Mathematically Sublime

25. Definition of the

26.

The estimation

term "sublime" magnitude of

497

of the

natural things requisite for the idea of

8.

Moment

485 485 entirely independent

sense

479

Comparison of the beautiful with the agreeable and the good by means of the above char-

priori

Object 18.

477 coupled with inter-

est 5.

judgement of

Moment

independent of all interest 476 Delight in the agreeable is coupled with in-

the good

a

484 independent of

Moment

is

Delight in

is

is

upon

Fourth Moment.

19.

Judgement

Analytic of Aesthetic Judgement

terest 4.

of taste

rests

taste

ment of Quality 1. The judgement of taste is aesthetic 476 2. The delight which determines the judgement of 3.

taste

Definition of the Beautiful derived

Book I. Analytic of the Beautiful Moment. Of the Judgement of Taste: Mo-

taste

of

of the concept of perfection

First Part Critique of Aesthetic

mode 484

12.

prescribed a priori

I.

of an object (or

it)

463 464

Connecting the whole 465 IV. Judgement as a Faculty by which Laws are

Section

form of finality

the

of representing

the sublime 27.

28. 2C.

498

Quality of the delight in our estimate of the sublime 501 B. The Dynamically Sublime in Nature Nature as Might 502 Modality of the judgement on the sublime in

nature General Remark

505

upon the Exposition of Aesthetic Reflective Judgements 506 Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgements 30. The deduction of aesthetic judgements upon

2

CONTENTS

460

objects of nature must not be directed to what we call sublime in nature, but only to the

65.

5"

66.

beautiful

objective principle of taste

The problem

principle of taste

power

of the general

is

of

is

514 not possi-

515 the subjective principle

judgement 5:5 judgements of

of a deduction of

516

taste

37- What exactly it is that is asserted a priori of 5 10 an object in a judgement of taste 38.

Deduction of judgements of taste

5J7

39.

Remark The communicability

5*7 518 518 520 521

40. Taste as a

The The

of a sensation

kind of sensus communis

empirical interest in the beautiful intellectual interest in the beautiful

43- Art in general 44- Fine art

5

23

69. 70. 71.

nomy

73

None

finality of

of taste

and genius

in

prod-

ucts of fine art

52.

53-

53

The division of the fine arts The combination of the fine the same product

53 2 arts in

one and 534

Comparative estimate of the aesthetic worth of the fine arts

54.

x

Section

II.

Dialectic of Aesthetic

Judgement

5556.

Representation of the antinomy of taste

57-

Solution of the antinomy of taste

58.

Remark 1. Remark 2. The idealism

75-

ture

64.

7S.

570 of

human understanding

The union mechanism

of

that

of a physical

end pos-

the principle of the

572 universal

of

matter

with

the

teleological

575

Appendix: Theory of the Method of Applying the Teleological Judgement 79. Whether teleology must be treated as a branch of natural science 80.

578

The necessary subordination of the principle of mechanism to the teleological principle in the explanation of a thing regarded as a physi-

end

cal

g

The

578

mechanism with the teleowhich we apply to the explana-

association of

of nature

The

581

544

system in the extrinsic relations of organisms 582 83. The ultimate end of nature as a teleological system 584 84. The final end of the existence of a world, that

546 548

85.

and

82.

is,

550

teleological

of creation itself

86.

Physico-Theology Ethico-Theology

87.

Remark The moral proof proof

551 intrinsic, final-

553

distinctive character of things considered

555

91.

587 588 591

of the existence of

88. Limitation of the validity of the

Sq.

as physical ends

568

principle in the technic of nature

90.

The

judgement

makes the conception

Judgement

from

a critical principle of reason for the use

sible for us

objective finality ity of nature

is

567

of an objective finality of na-

Remark The peculiarity

Purely formal, as distinguished from material,

63. Relative, as distinguished

The conception

of the reflective

Judgement 62.

nature dogmatically springs from

tion of a physical end considered as a product

Second Part

[Introduction] First Division: Analytic of Teleological

of

logical principle

of art, as the unique principle of the aesthetic

Critique of Teleological 61. Objective finality in nature.

566

540 540 543

judgement Beauty as the symbol of morality Appendix: The methodology of taste

do

564 pro-

540

542 of the finality alike of nature

it

the inexplicability of a physical end

535 537

Remark

above systems does what

impossibility of treating the concept of a

technic

5 28

The combination

The

of systems dealing with the

nature

of the

fesses to 74-

is

genius

5i.

es-

564

The various kinds

524

Fine art is the art of genius 525 Elucidation and confirmation of the above ex526 planation of genius The relation of genius to taste 52 7 The faculties of the mind which constitute

50.

is

Second Division: Dialectic of Teleological Judgement Nature of an antinomy of judgement ^62 Exposition of this antinomy 562 Introduction to the solution of the above anti-

72

an art, so far as it has at the same time the appearance of being nature 525

45- Fine art

49.

in general

timated teleologically as a system of ends 559 68. The principle of teleology considered as an in560 herent principle of natural science

36.

48.

558

on which nature

513

ble

47-

estimated

is

principle

judgement of taste. Second peculiarity of judgement of taste

The

46.

intrinsic finality in

67.

35-

42.

The

on which the

Si

An

41.

principle

of taste 32. First peculiarity of Si-

550

The

organisms

Of the method of the deduction of judgements

31.

Things considered as physical ends are organisms

God

593 593

moral 596

Remark 599 The use of the moral argument 599 The type of assurance in a teleological proof 600 of the existence of God The type of assurance produced by a practical faith

General

Remark on Teleology

603 607

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION The

from a priori prinbe called pure reason, and the gen-

faculty of knowledge

may

ciples

eral investigation into its possibility

haves as

and partly

and bounds

also to lead understanding, in its study of nature, according to a principle of completeness, unattainable as this remains for it, and

the same use of terms in our first work, is only intended to denote reason in its theoretical employment, and although there is no desire to its

That

its

tique

then, an investigation addressed simply

is,

so to

special principles as such.

promote the ultimate aim of all knowledge. it was understanding

—

Properly, therefore,

which, so far as

it

contains constitutive a priori

cognitive principles, has

faculty as practical rea-

son and

had thus determined these bounds

as those of the possibility of all things generally,

the Critique of Pure Reason. This is permissible although "pure reason," as was the case with

bring under review

if it

1790

special realm,

its

way

that the Critique, called in a general

knowing things a priori. Hence makes our cognitive faculties its sole concern,

was intended

to our faculty of

of pure reason

it

cure but particular possession against competitors. In the same

to the exclusion of the feeling of pleasure or

displeasure

among

and the faculty of

the cognitive faculties

tention to understanding and ciples, to

it

desire;

confines

its

and

one, moreover, in our faculty of knowledge

Cri-

and

—

that

to establish in se-

way

all

other

reason, which

contains constitutive a priori principles solely in respect of the faculty of desire, gets its hold-

its at-

ing assigned to

a priori prin-

the exclusion of judgement and rea-

it

by The Critique of

Practical

Reason.

But now comes judgement, which

son, (faculties that also belong to theoretical

in the or-

turns out in the sequel

der of our cognitive faculties forms a middle

that there is no cognitive faculty other than understanding capable of affording constitutive a priori principles of knowledge. Accordingly

also got independent a priori principles? If so,

cognition,) because

it

term between understanding and reason. Has

it

are they constitutive, or are they merely regula-

thus indicating no special realm? And do they give a rule a priori to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, as the middle term be-

the critique which sifts these faculties one and all, so as to try the possible claims of each of

tive,

the other faculties to a share in the clear pos-

from roots of its own, rewhat understanding prescribes a priori as a law for nature as the complex of phenomena the form of these being similarly session of knowledge

tween the faculties of cognition and

tains nothing but

as understanding prescribes laws a priori for the

former and reason for the latter? This is the topic to which the present Critique is devoted.

—

furnished a priori. All other pure concepts relegates to the rank of ideas, 1

A

it

which for our

faculty of theoretical cognition are transcendent; though they are not without their use nor

redundant, but discharge certain functions as regulative principles. 2 For these concepts serve partly to restrain the officious pretentions of

understanding, which, presuming on its ability to supply a priori the conditions of the possibility of

all

things which

it is

desire, just

capable of knowing, be-

[The word is defined on pp. 489, 542. See Critique Pure Reason, pp. 113-118: "I understand by idea a necessary conception of reason, to which no corresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense." 1

of

(Ibid., p. 117.) "They contain a certain perfection, attainable by no possible empirical cognition; and they give to reason a systematic unity, to which the unity of experience attempts to approximate, but can never completely attain." (Ibid., p. 173-)] 2 [Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 193-200.]

critique of pure reason,

i.e.,

of our faculty

would be incomplete if the critical examination of judgement, which is a faculty of knowledge, and as such lays claim to independent principles, were not dealt with separately. Still, however, its principles cannot, in a system of pure philosophy, form a separate constituent part intermediate between the theoretical and practical divisions, but may when needful be annexed to one or other as occasion requires. For if such a system is some day worked out under the general name of metaphysic and its full and complete execution is both possible and of the utmost importance for the employment of reason in all departments of its activity the critical examination of the ground for this edifice must have been previously carried down to the very

461

of judging on a priori principles,

—

—

PREFACE

462

depths of the foundations of the faculty of principles independent of experience, lest in some quarter it might give way, and sinking, inevitably bring with it the ruin of all. We may readily gather, however, from the nature of the faculty of judgement (whose cor-

employment

is

so necessary

ly requisite that

it

is

rect

and universal-

just this faculty that

is

intended when we speak of sound understanding) that the discovery of a peculiar principle

belonging to

it

—and some such

in itself a priori, for otherwise

it

it

must contain would not be

a cognitive faculty the distinctive character of which is obvious to the most commonplace crit-

—must

thing to the unknowable supersensible and, in-

employ some such principle, though itself and the knowledge of nature. For in these cases the application of deed, must

with a regard only to

such an a priori principle for the cognition of what is in the world is both possible and neces-

and withal opens out prospects which are But here there is no immediate reference to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. But this is precisely the riddle in the principle of judgement that necessary,

profitable for practical reason.

sitates a separate division

the critique

—

for there

for this faculty in

was nothing

to prevent

the formation of logical estimates according to

that these are the property of understanding,

concepts (from which no immediate conclusion can ever be drawn to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure) having been treated, with a critical statement of its limitations, in an appendage to

and judgement

the theoretical part of philosophy.

icism

difficulties.

be a task involving considerable

For

this principle is

one which must

not be derived from a priori concepts, seeing is

only directed to their applica-

tion. It has, therefore, itself to furnish a

and one from which, properly, we get no cognition of a thing, but which it can itself employ as a rule only but not as an objective rule to which it can adapt its judgement, because, for that, another faculty of judgement would again be required to enable us to decide whether the case was one for the application of cept,

—

the rule or not.

1

It is chiefly in those estimates that are called

and which relate to the beautiful and sublime, whether of nature or of art, that one meets A'ith the above difficulty about a princiit

investigation of taste, as a faculty

of aesthetic judgement, not being undertaken

with a view to the formation or culture of taste (which will pursue its course in the future, as in the past, independently of such inquiries), but

being merely directed to

its

transcendental as-

pects, I feel assured of its indulgent criticism in

respect of any shortcomings on that score. But in all that is relevant to the transcendental as-

aesthetic,

ple (be

The present

con-

subjective or objective).

And

yet the

judgement

it must be prepared to stand the test of most rigorous examination. Yet even here I venture to hope that the difficulty of unravelling a problem so involved in its nature may serve as an excuse for a certain amount of hardly avoid-

pect the

able obscurity in

tique of this faculty. For, although they do not

its solution, provided that the accuracy of our statement of the principle is proved with all requisite clearness. I admit that

of themselves contribute a whit to the knowl-

the

edge of things, they still belong wholly to the faculty of knowledge, and evidence an immedi-

ment from

critical search for a principle of

their case

is

in

the most important item in a cri-

ate bearing of this faculty

upon the

feeling of

pleasure or displeasure according to

some a

mode

that

is

subject lieve I

of deriving the

rightly is

phenomena

that principle has not

all

demanded elsewhere, where by concepts, and that I

cognition

have

of judge-

the lucidity

in fact attained in the

the

be-

second part

and do so without confusing this principle with what is capable of being a determining ground of the faculty of desire, for

of this work.

the latter has

principles a priori in concepts

nal part, in order, as far as possible, to snatch

of reason. Logical estimates of nature, however,

from my advancing years what time may yet be favourable to the task. It is obvious that no separate division of doctrine is reserved for the faculty of judgement, seeing that, with judgement, critique takes the place of theory; but,

priori principle,

its

stand on a different footing.

They

deal with

cases in which experience presents a conformity

which the understanding's genis no longer adequate to render intelligible or explicable, and in which judgement may have recourse to itself to law in things,

eral concept of the sensible

With

this, then, I

dertaking to a close.

bring

my

I shall

entire critical un-

hasten to the doctri-

following the division of philosophy into theoretical

and

practical,

and of pure philosophy

same way, the whole ground will be covered by the metaphysics of nature and

for a principle of the reference of the natural

in

* [See Kant's general remarks on judgement in the Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 60-61. J

of morals.

the

INTRODUCTION ulty of desire and, as such,

Division of Philosophy

I.

Philosophy may be

many natural

said to contain the princi-

just one of the

is

causes in the world, the one, name-

which acts by concepts; and whatever

ly,

is

rep-

ples of the rational cognition that concepts af-

resented as possible (or necessary) through the

ford us of things (not merely, as with logic, the form of thought in general irre-

efficacy of will is called practically possible (or

spective of the objects), and, thus interpreted, the course, usually adopted, of dividing it into

its

principles of the

theoretical this

and practical

is

perfectly sound.

But on

imperative a specific distinction

makes

the part of the concepts

by which the

principles

of this rational cognition get their object assigned to them, for if the concepts are not distinct they fail to justify a division,

which always

necessary): the intention being to distinguish possibility (or necessity)

from the physical

possibility or necessity of an effect the causality

whose cause is not determined to its producby concepts (but rather, as with lifeless matter, by mechanism, and, as with the lower animals, by instinct). Now, the question in reof

tion

spect of the practical faculty: whether, that to say, the concept,

presupposes that the principles belonging to the

the will gets

rational cognition of the several parts of the sci-

freedom,

The

ence in question are themselves mutually exclu-

is

is

by which the causality of

its rule, is

a concept of nature or of

here left quite open.

latter distinction,

however,

is

essential.

For, let the concept determining the causality be

sive.

Now there are but two kinds of concepts, and these yield a corresponding number of distinct principles of the possibility of their objects. The

a concept of nature, and then the principles are

concepts referred to are those of nature and that of freedom. By the first of these, a theoreti-

in the division of a rational science the differ-

cal cognition

from a

priori principles

becomes

technically-practical ; but, let it be a concept of freedom, and they are morally-practical. Now,

ence between objects that require different principles for their cognition

possible. In respect of such cognition,

which everything

the second, by its more than a negative

tical principles

however, very concept, imports no principle (that of simple

antithesis), while for the determination of the

on the other hand, it establishes fundamenwhich enlarge the scope of its activity, and which on that account are called pracwill,

the division of philosophy falls

Hence

properly into two parts, quite distinct in their principles a theoretical, as philosophy of na-

—

ture,

and a

(for this

is

All technically-practical rules

and with them to the division of philosophy, a practical according to concepts of nature has

been taken as identical with what is practical according to the concept of freedom, with the result that a division has been made under these heads of theoretical and practical, by which, in effect, there has been no division at all (seeing that both parts might have similar principles).

—

for this

a

and

skill

skill 1 in

(i.e.,

those of

generally, or even of prudence, as

exercising an influence over

men and

their wills) must, so far as their principles rest

the possibility of things according to concepts

gross misuse of the terms has prevailed; for what

will

art

practical legislation of rea-

sions to the division of the different principles,

The

technically-prac-

upon concepts, be reckoned only as corollaries to theoretical philosophy. For they only touch

son by the concept of freedom is called). Hitherto, however, in the application of these expres-

is

the difference on

morals

practical, as philosophy of

what the

is

Hence

belong to theoretical philosophy (natural science), whereas those morally-practical alone form the second part, that is, pracical philosophy (ethical science).

tal principles

tical.

turns.

is

what

is

said

—

is

the fac-

463

of nature, and this embraces, not alone the

means discoverable

in nature for the purpose, but even the will itself (as a faculty of desire, and consequently a natural faculty), so far as it is determinable on these rules by natural motives. Still these practical rules are not called laws (like physical laws), but only precepts. This is due to the fact that the will does not stand simply under the natural concept, but also under the concept of freedom. In the latter con-

nection 1

[Cf.

its

principles are called laws, and these

Fundamental Principles

of the

Metaphysic of

Morals, p. 266; also Critique of Pure Reason, 235.)

THE CRITIQUE

464

what follows from them, alone constitute the second or prac-

principles, with the addition of

part of philosophy.

tical

The etry

is

solution of the problems of pure geomnot allocated to a special part of that

means of

its formal laws, and where, therefore, they are morally-practical, i.e., not merely precepts and rules in this or that interest, but laws

independent of

science, nor does the art of land-surveying merit the name of practical, in contradistinction to

pure, as a second part of the general science of geometry, and with equally little, or perhaps less, right can the mechanical or chemical art of experiment or of observation be ranked as a prac-

part of the science of nature, or, in fine, domestic, agricultural, or political economy, the

ics,

or even general instruction as to the attainof happiness, or as much as the control of

ment

the inclinations or the restraining of the affections with a view thereto, be denominated practical

philosophy

—not

to

mention forming these

second part of philosophy in general. them all, the above contain nothing more than rules of skill, which are thus only the skill being directed to technically practical producing an effect which is possible according latter in a

For, between

—

to natural concepts of causes

and

effects.

As

The Realm

II.

antecedent reference to ends

of Philosophy in General

The employment from

principles,

of our faculty of cognition

and with

philosophy,

it

is

coex-

tensive with the applicability of a priori concepts.

Now

tical

art of social intercourse, the principles of dietet-

all

or aims.

a division of the complex of

all

the ob-

which those concepts are referred for the purpose, where possible, of compassing their knowledge, may be made according to the varied competence or incompetence of our faculty in

jects to

that connection.

Concepts, so far as they are referred to obfrom the question of whether knowledge of them is possible or not, have their field, jects apart

which is determined simply by the relation in which their object stands to our faculty of cognition in general. The part of this field in which knowledge is possible for us is a territory (territorium) for these concepts and the requisite

The

these concepts belong to theoretical philosophy,

cognitive faculty.

they are subject to those precepts as mere corollaries of theoretical philosophy (i.e., as corolla-

which they exercise legislative authority is the realm (ditio) of these concepts, and their appro-

ries of natural science),

and so cannot claim any

priate

cognitive

part of the territory over

faculty.

Empirical

concepts

place in any special philosophy called practical.

have, therefore, their territory, doubtless, in na-

On

ture as the complex of

the other hand, the morally practical pre-

which are founded entirely on the concept of freedom, to the complete exclusion of grounds taken from nature for the determination of the cepts,

will,

form quite

a

special

kind of precepts.

all sensible objects, but they have no realm (only a dwelling-place, domicilium), for, although they are formed ac-

cording to law, they are not themselves legislative,

but the rules founded on them are empiri-

These, too, like the rules obeyed by nature, are, without qualification, called laws though they

cal and, consequently, contingent.

do

that of natural concepts and that of the concept

—

on sensible conditions, but upon a supersensible principle and they must needs have a separate part of philosophy allotted to them as their own, corresponding to the theoretical part, and termed practical phinot, like the latter, rest

—

losophy.

Hence

Our

entire faculty of cognition has

of freedom, for through both

practical.

But the territory upon which

established, and over which

evident that a complex of practical precepts furnished by philosophy does not form

legislative authority,

a special part of philosophy, co-ordinate with the theoretical, by reason of its precepts being for that they might be. notwithstandpractical ing that their principles were derived wholly from the theoretical knowledge of nature (as technically-practical rules). But an adequate reason only exists where their principle, being in no way bonowed from the concept of nature, which is always sensibly conditioned, rests consequently on the supersensible, which the concept of freedom alone makes cognizable by

ence, taken as no

—

prescribes laws

a priori. In accordance with this distinction, then, philosophy is divisible into theoretical and is

it is

it

two realms,

is still

the complex of the objects of

it

its

realm

exercises

its

always confined to all

possible experi-

more than mere phenomena, for otherwise legislation by the understanding in respect of them is unthinkable. The function of prescribing laws by means of concepts of nature is discharged by understand-

ing and is theoretical. That of prescribing laws by means of the concept of freedom is discharged by reason and is merely practical. It is

only in the practical sphere that reason can prescribe laws; in respect of theoretical

(of nature)

it

knowledge

can only (as by the understanding

OF JUDGEMENT advised in the law) deduce from given laws their logical consequences,

restricted to nature.

which still always remain But we cannot reverse this

and say that where rules are practical reason is then and there legislative, since the rules might be technically practical. Understanding and reason, therefore, have two distinct jurisdictions over one and the same territory of experience. But neither can interfere with the other. For the concept of freedom just as

little

disturbs the legislation of nature, as the

concept of nature influences legislation through the concept of freedom. That it is possible for us at least to think without contradiction of

both these jurisdictions, and their appropriate

465

pass from the former to the latter (by means of the theoretical

employment

of reason), just as

they were so many separate worlds, the first of which is powerless to exercise influence on the second still the latter is meant to influence the former that is to say, the concept of freedom is meant to actualize in the sensible world if

:

—

by its laws; and nature must consequently also be capable of being regarded in such a way that in the conformity to law of its form it at least harmonizes with the possibility of the ends to be effectuated in it according to the laws of freedom. There must, therefore, be a ground of the unity of the supersensible the end proposed

faculties, as co-existing in the

that lies at the basis of nature, with what the concept of freedom contains in a practical way, and although the concept of this ground neither

detecting their dialectical illusion.

theoretically nor practically attains to a knowledge of it, and so has no peculiar realm of its own, still it renders possible the transition from

same subject, was shown by the Critique of Pure Reason, since it disposed of the objections on the other side by

how does

Still,

happen that these two difform one realm, seeing that,

it

ferent realms do not

mode

the

of thought according to the principles

while they do not limit each other in their legis-

of the one to that according to the principles of

they continually do so in their effects in the sensible world? The explanation lies in the fact that the concept of nature represents its

the other. 1

lation,

III.

objects in intuition doubtless, yet not as things-

in a

in-themselves, but as mere phenomena, whereas the concept of freedom represents in

what

is

make

it

no doubt a

properly speaking no realm in respect of objects; for it is not a doctrine, its sole business being to investigate whether, having regard to

it

capable, therefore, of fur-

object (or

its

—

the basis of the possibility of all those objects of experience, although it cannot itself ever be

elevated or extended into a cognition. entire cognitive faculty

is,

therefore, pre-

sented with an unbounded, but, also, inaccessible

we

—the

field of the supersensible

—

in

which

seek in vain for a territory, and on which,

therefore,

we can have no realm

cognition, be

it

for theoretical

for concepts of understanding or

of reason. This field

we must indeed occupy with

ideas in the interest as well of the theoretical as

the practical

employment of

reason, but, in con-

nection with the laws arising from the concept of

freedom,

which deals with what our cogni-

and further that neither the is

nishing a theoretical cognition of

field

critique

tive faculties are capable of yielding a priori has

,

even of the thinking subject) as a thing-in-itself, the or, as this would be, of the supersensible idea of which has certainly to be introduced as

Our

The

object

whole

does not

thing-in-itself but

intuitable,

one nor the other

its

The Critique of Judgement as a means of connecting the two parts of Philosophy

we cannot procure

for these ideas

the general bearings of our faculties, a doctrine is

possible

by

their

means, and

if so,

how. Its

extends to all their pretentions, with a view to confining them within their legitimate bounds. field

But what phy may

is

shut out of the division of philoso-

still

be admitted as a principal part

into the general critique of our faculty of pure

cognition, in the event, namely, of

its

containing

principles which are not in themselves available

employment. Concepts of nature contain the ground of all theoretical cognition a priori and rest, as we saw,

either for theoretical or practical

upon the

legislative authority of understanding.

The concept all

of freedom contains the ground of sensuously unconditioned practical precepts

a priori, and rests upon that of reason. Both

any

but practical reality, which, accordingly, fails to advance our theoretical cognition one step to-

wards the supersensible. Albeit, then, between the realm of the natural concept, as the sensible, and the realm of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible, there is a great gulf fixed, so that it is not possible to

1 [Cf. p. 473, et seq.; also Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 236-37. This problem is discussed in the Critique of Practical Reason under the heading "Of the Typic of the Pure Practical Judgement," p. 319, et seq.; "It seems absurd to expect to find in the world of sense a case which, while as such it depends only on the law of nature, yet admits of the application to it of a law of freedom, and to which we can apply the supersensible idea of the morally good which is to be exhibited in concreto."]

THE CRITIQUE

466

faculties, therefore, besides their application in point of logical form to principles of whatever

their

have, in addition,

origin,

own

peculiar

jurisdiction in the matter of their content,

and

so, there being no further (a priori) jurisdiction above them, the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical is justified. But there is still further in the family of our higher cognitive faculties a middle term between understanding and reason. This is judgement, of which we may reasonably presume by analogy that it may likewise contain, if not a special

authority to prescribe laws,

still

a principle pe-

upon which laws are sought, although one merely subjective a priori. This principle, even if it has no field of objects appropriate to it as its realm, may still have some culiar

to

itself

territory or other with a certain character, for

which just

this

very principle alone

may

be

islative, if (as

sidered on

But

in addition to the is

yet (to judge

above considerations

by analogy) a further

ground, upon which judgement

own account

may

of theoretical cognition,

is

free of confusion

phenomenon) it by means

possible for us to prescribe laws

pure concepts of understanding. For the faculty of desire, as a higher faculty operating under the concept of freedom, only reason (in which alone this concept has a place) prescribes laws a priori. Now between the faculties of knowledge and desire stands the feeling of pleasure, just as judgement is intermediate between understanding and reason. Hence we may, provisionally at least,

assume that judgement likewise its own, and

contains an a priori principle of

that, since pleasure or displeasure is necessarily

cedent to

ther derivation

from a common ground: the

faculty of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and the faculty of desire. 1 For the to suppose that a relation subbetween concepts that are used as empirical principles and the faculty of pure cognition a priori, it is worth while attempting, in consideration of this connection, to give them a transcendental definition a definition, that is, by pure categories, so far as these by themselves adequately indicate the distinction of the concept in question from others. This course follows that of the mathematician, who leaves the empirical data of his problem indeterminate, and only brings their relation in pure synthesis under the concepts of pure arithmetic, and thus generalizes his solution. I have been taken to task for adopting a similar procedure (Critique of Practical Reason, Preface, p. 291) and fault had been found with my definition of the faculty of desire as a faculty which by means of its representations is the

—

cause of the actuality of the objects of those representations: for mere wishes would still be desires, and yet in their case every one is ready to abandon all claim to being able by means of them alone to call their object into But this proves no more than the presence existence. of desires in man by which he is in contradiction with himself. For in such a case he seeks the production of the object by means of his representation alone, without any hope of its being effectual, since he is conscious that his mechanical powers (if I may so call those which are not psychological), which would have to be determined by that representation, are either unequal to the task of realizing the object (by the intervention of means, therefore) or else are addressed to what is quite impossible, as, for example, to undo the past (0 mihi praeteritos,etc.) or, to be able to annihilate the interval that, with intolerable delay, divides us from the wished-

—

it

ante-

from the faculty of pure knowledge, from the realm of concepts of nature, to

transition

that of the concept of freedom^, just as in

employment it makes possible the from understanding to reason.

logical

its

transi-

Hence, despite the fact of philosophy being only divisible into two principal parts, the theoretical all

and the practical, and despite the fact of we may have to say of the special prinof judgement having to be assigned to its

that

theoretical part,

sists

—

desire (be

principle, as with the lower desires,

with the higher, only supervening upon its determination by the moral law), it will effect a

ciples

Where one has reason

its

or, as

tion

faculties of the soul, or capacities, are re-

is

of

a priori concepts of nature, which are properly

For

all

leg-

con-

referred to nature, in

respect of which alone (as

i.e.,

ducible to three, which do not admit of any fur-

is

it is

with the faculty of desire) this faculty, as that

be brought into line with another arrangement of our powers of representation, and one that appears to be of even greater importance than that of its kinship with the family of cognitive faculties.

1

its

must be the case where

combined with the faculty of

valid.

there

faculty of cognition understanding alone

i.e.,

to rational cognition ac-

—

for moment. Now, conscious as we are in such fantastic desires of the inefficiency of our representations (or even of their futility), as causes of their objects, there is still involved in every wish a reference of the same

as cause, and therefore the representation of its causality, and this is esDecially discernible where the wish, as longing, is an affection. For such affections, since they dilate the heart and render it inert and thus exhaust its powers, show that a strain is kept on being exerted and re-exerted on these powers by the representations, but that the mind is allowed continually to relapse and get languid upon recognition of the impossibility before it. Even prayers for the aversion of great, and, so far as we can see, inevitable evils, and many superstitious means for attaining ends impossible of attainment by natural means, prove the causal reference a causality which of representations to their objects not even the consciousness of inefficiency for producing from straining deter can towards it. But why effect the our nature should be furnished with a propensity to consciously vain desires is a teleological problem of anthropology. It would seem that were we not to be determined to the exertion of our power before we had assured ourselves of the efficiency of our faculty for producing an object, our power would remain to a large extent unused. For as a rule we only first learn to know our powers by making trial of them. This deceit of vain desires is therefore only the result of a beneficent disposition in our nature.

—

OF JUDGEMENT cording to concepts of nature: of Pure Reason, which

must

still

the Critique

settle this

question before the above system

hand, so as to substantiate sists of

its

whole

taken in possibility, conis

three parts: the Critique of pure under-

and of pure reawhich faculties are called pure on the ground

standing, of pure judgement, son,

prescribe

467 it

to nature, for reflection on the laws

of nature adjusts itself to nature, and not nature to the conditions according to

to obtain a concept of

it

which we

—a concept that

strive

is

quite

contingent in respect of these conditions.

Now

the principle sought can only be this: as

universal laws of nature have their ground in

of their being legislative a priori.

our understanding, which prescribes them to

IV. Judgement as a Faculty by which

nature (though only according to the universal concept of it as nature), particular empirical

Laws

are

prescribed a priori

Judgement

in general

is

laws must be regarded, in respect of that which

the faculty of think-

ing the particular as contained under the universal.

If the universal (the rule, principle, or law)

judgement which subsumes the particular under it is determinant. This is so even where such a judgement is transcendental is

given, then the

and, as such, provides the conditions a priori in

conformity with which alone subsumption under that universal can be effected. If, however, only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, then the judgement is simply reflective.

in

them by these universal would

have if an understanding (though it be not ours) had supplied them for the benefit of our cognitive faculties, so as to render possible a

system

of experience according to particular natural laws. This

is not to be taken as implying that such an understanding must be actually assum-

ed (for

it is

only the reflective judgement which

avails itself of this idea as a principle for the

purpose of reflection and not for determining anything) but this faculty rather gives by this means a law to itself alone and not to nature. Now the concept of an object, so far as it contains at the same time the ground of the actuality of this object, is called its end, and the agreement of a thing with that constitution of things which is only possible according to ends, is called the finality of its form. Accordingly the principle of judgement, in respect of the form of the things of nature under empirical laws generally, is the finality of nature in its multiplicity. In other words, by this concept nature is represented as if an understanding contained the ground of the unity of the manifold of its empirical ;

The determinant judgement determines under universal transcendental laws furnished

by un-

subsumptive only; the law is marked out for it a priori, and it has no need to devise a law for its own guidance to enable it

derstanding and

is

to subordinate the particular in nature to the

universal.

undetermined

is left

laws, according to a unity such as they

But there are such manifold forms

of nature, so

many

modifications, as

it

were, of

the universal transcendental concepts of nature,

undetermined by the laws furnished by pure understanding a priori as above mentioned, and for the reason that these laws only touch the general possibility of a nature (as an object of sense), that there must needs also be laws in this behalf. These laws, being empirical, may be contingent as far as the light of our understanding goes, but still, if they are to be called laws (as the concept of a nature requires), they must be left

regarded as necessary on a principle, unknown though it be to us, of the unity of the manifold. The reflective judgement which is compelled to ascend from the particular in nature to the universal stands, therefore, in need of a principle.

This principle it cannot borrow from experience, because what it has to do is to establish just the unity of all empirical principles under higher, though likewise empirical, principles, and thence the possibility of the systematic subordination of higher and lower. Such a transcendental principle, therefore, the reflective judgement can only give as a law from and to itself. It cannot derive it from any other quarter (as it would then be a determinant judgement). Nor can it

laws.

The

finality of nature

is,

therefore, a particu-

which has its origin solely judgement. For we cannot as-

lar a priori concept,

in the reflective

cribe to the products of nature anything like a

reference of nature in them to ends, but we can make use of this concept to reflect upon

only

them

nexus of phenomena in nexus given according to empirical laws. Furthermore, this concept is entirely difin respect of the

nature ferent

—a

from

practical finality (in

even morals), though

it

is

human

art or

doubtless thought

after this analogy.

V. The Principle of the formal finality of Nature is a transcendental Principle of Judgement

A transcendental principle is one through which we represent a priori the universal condition under which alone things can become objects of our cognition generally. A principle, on

THE CRITIQUE

468 the other hand,

called metaphysical

is

where

it

represents a priori the condition under which alone objects whose concept has to be given

empirically

may become

Thus

priori.

further determined a

the principle of the cognition of

bodies as substances, and as changeable substances, is transcendental where the statement is

in natura)

for

all

its

;

vast variety in empirical laws

that, unity

cipia praeter necessitatem

non sunt multiplican-

da)"; and so forth. If

we propose

mentary

rules,

logical lines,

to assign the origin of these ele-

and attempt

we go

For they

to

do so on psycho-

straight in the teeth of their

not what happens,

that their change must have a cause: but it is metaphysical where it asserts that their change

sense.

must have an external cause. For,

actually discharge their functions, and

in the first

need only be thought through ontological predicates (pure concepts of understandcase, bodies

ing)

e.g.,

as substance, to enable the proposition

to be cognized a priori; whereas, in the case, the empirical concept of a

able thing in space)

body

second

(as a

must be introduced

port the proposition, although, once this

mov-

to supis

done,

may

be seen quite a priori that the latter predicate (movement only by means of an external cause) applies to body. In this way, as I shall it

show

presently, the principle of the finality of

nature (in the multiplicity of

its

empirical laws)

For the concept of objects, regarded as standing under this princiis

a transcendental principle.

ple, is

only the pure concept of objects of possiand involves

ble empirical cognition generally,

On

nothing empirical.

the other hand, the prin-

ciple of practical finality, implied in the idea of

would be a

the determination of a free will,

metaphysical principle, because the concept of a faculty of desire, as will, has to be given pirically,

i.e.,

is

not included

among

em-

transcen-

dental predicates. But both these principles are,

none the

less,

not empirical, but a priori princi-

no further experience is required for the synthesis of the predicate with the empirical concept of the subject of their judgements, but it may be apprehended quite a priori. ples; because

That the concept of a

finality of

nature be-

abundantly evident from the maxims of judgement upon which we rely a priori in the investigation of nature, and which yet have to do with no more than the possibility of experience, and consequently of the knowledge of nature but of nature not merely in a general way, but as determined by a manifold of particular laws. These maxims crop up frequently enough in the course of this science, though only in a scattered way. They are aphorisms of metaphysical wisdom, making their appearance in a number of rules the necessity of which cannot be demonstrated from concepts. "Nature takes the shortest way {lex parsimoniae) yet it makes no leap, either in the sequence of its changes, or in the juxtaposition of specifically different forms (lex continui longs to transcendental principles

is

—

;

is

under a few principles (prin-

tell us,

i.e.,

according to what rule our powers of judgement

how we ought

how we

and we cannot get this logical objective necessity where the principles are merely empirical. Hence the finality of nature for our cognitive faculties and their employment, which manifestly radiates from them, is a transcendental principle of judgements, and so needs also a transcendental deduction, by means of which the ground for this judge, but

mode

of judging

to judge;

must be traced

to the a priori

sources of knowledge.

Now,

looking at the grounds of the possibility

of an experience, the

first thing,

of course, that

—

something necessary namely, the universal laws apart from which nature in general (as an object of sense) cannot be thought. These rest on the categories, applied to the formal conditions of all intuition possible for us,

meets us

is

so far as

it is

also given a priori.

Under these

judgement is determinant; for it has nothing else to do than to subsume under given laws. For instance, understanding says: all change has its cause (universal law of nature); transcendental judgement has nothing further to do laws,

than to furnish a priori the condition of subsumption under the concept of understanding placed before

it:

this

we

get in the succession of

the determinations of one and the

Now

for nature in general, as

ble experience, that law

is

same

thing.

an object of possi-

cognized as absolutely

necessary. But besides this formal time-condition, the objects of empirical cognition are de-

termined, or, so far as

we can judge

a priori,

are determinable, in divers ways, so that specifically differentiated natures,

they have in

common

eral, are further finite

over and above what

as things of nature in gen-

capable of being causes in an in-

variety of ways; and each of these

modes

must, on the concept of a cause in general, have its rule, which is a law, and. consequently, imports necessity: although owing to the constitution and limitations of our faculties of cognition

we may

entirely fail to see this necessity. Ac-

cordingly, in respect of nature's merely empirical laws, we must think in nature a possibility of an endless multiplicity of empirical laws, which yet are contingent so far as our insight goes, i.e.,

OF JUDGEMENT In respect of these we estimate the unity of nature according to cannot be cognized a

priori.

empirical laws, and the possibility of the unity of experience, as a system according to empirical laws, to be contingent. But, now, such a unity is one which must be necessarily presupposed and assumed, as otherwise we should not have a thoroughgoing connection of empirical cognition in a whole of experience. For the universal laws of nature, while providing, certainly, for such a

connection

among

things generically, as things

of nature in general, do not do so for

them

spe-

469

has its seat a priori in our understanding. This understanding is no doubt a priori in possession of universal laws of nature, apart from which nature would be incapable of being an object of all. But over and above this it needs a certain order of nature in its particular rules which are only capable of being brought to its knowledge empirically, and which, so far

experience at

as

it

concerned are contingent. These

is

rules,

without which we would have no means of advance from the universal analogy of a possible experience in general to a particular, must be regarded by understanding as laws, i.e., as necesfor otherwise they would not form an orsary der of nature though it be unable to cognize or

such particular things of nature. Hence judgement is compelled, for its own guidance, to adopt it as an a priori principle, that what is for human insight contingent in the particular (empirical) laws of nature contains nev-

ever get an insight into their necessity. Albeit, then, it can determine nothing a priori in respect

ertheless unity of law in the synthesis of its

of these (objects),

manifold in an intrinsically possible experience unfathomable, though still thinkable, as such unity may, no doubt, be for us. Consequently, as the unity of law in a synthesis, which is cognized by us in obedience to a necessary aim (a need of understanding), though recognized at

empirical so-called laws, lay at the basis of

cifically

as

—

same time

the

as contingent,

finality of objects

is

represented as a

(here of nature), so judge-

ment, which, in respect of things under possible (yet to be discovered) empirical laws, is merely reflective, must regard nature in respect of the latter according to a principle of finality for our cognitive faculty, which then finds expression in

the above

maxims

of judgement.

Now

this tran-

scendental concept of a finality of nature is neither a concept of nature nor of freedom, since i.e.,

it

attributes nothing at

all

to the object,

to nature, but only represents the unique

mode in which we must proceed in our upon the objects of nature with a view

reflection to getting

a thoroughly interconnected whole of experience, and so

is

a subjective principle,

i.e.,

maxim,

of judgement. For this reason, too, just as

were a lucky chance that favoured

we

if it

—

—

reflection

must, in pursuit of such

upon them an a

possible according to them.

kind

is

There

all

priori principle, to the

namely, that a cognizable order of nature

effect, is

it

A principle

of this

expressed in the following propositions.

is

in nature a subordination of genera

species comprehensible

by

Each

us:

and

of these

genera again approximates to the others on a common principle, so that a transition may be possible

from one

to the other,

higher genus: While

it

seems

and thereby to a at the outset un-

avoidable for our understanding to assume for the specific variety of natural operations a like

number

may

of various kinds of causality, yet these

be reduced to a small number of principles, the quest for which is our business; and so forth. This adaptation of nature to our cognitive faculties is presupposed a priori by judgement on behalf of its reflection upon it according to empirical laws. But understanding all the while all

recognizes

it

objectively as contingent, and

merely judgement that attributes transcendental finality,

i.e.,

it

it is

to nature as

a finality in respect

are re-

of the subject's faculty of cognition. For, were

joiced (properly speaking, relieved of a want)

it not for this presupposition, we should have no order of nature in accordance with empirical laws, and, consequently, no guiding-thread for an experience that has to be brought to bear

us,

where we meet with such systematic unity under merely empirical laws: although we must necessarily assume the presence of such a unity, apart from any ability on our part to apprehend or prove its existence. In order to convince ourselves of the correctness of this deduction of the concept before us,

and the necessity of assuming

it

as a transcen-

dental principle of cognition, let us just bethink

ourselves of the magnitude of the task. to

We have

form a connected experience from given per-

ceptions of a nature containing a

maybe

multiplicity of empirical laws, and this

endless

problem

upon these

in all their variety, or for

an investi-

gation of them.

For it is quite conceivable that, despite all the uniformity of the things of nature according to universal laws, without which we would not have the form of general empirical knowledge all,

at

the specific variety of the empirical laws of

nature, with their effects, might as to

make

it

still

be so great

impossible for our understanding

to discover in nature an intelligible order, to

THE CRITIQUE

470 divide

its

products into genera and species so as

to avail ourselves of the principles of explana-

and comprehension of one for explaining and interpreting another, and out of material coming to hand in such confusion (properly speaking only infinitely multiform and illadapted to our power of apprehension) to make tion

a consistent context of experience.

Thus judgement,

equipped with an a

also, is

priori principle for the possibility of nature, but

only

subjective respect.

in a

By means

of this

it

prescribes a law, not to nature (as autonomy), but to itself (as heautonomy), to guide its re-

upon nature. This law may be

motion applicable to matter. Their any regard to our cognitive faculties, seeing that it is only by their means that we first come by any conception of the meaning of a knowledge of things (of nature), and they of necessity apply to nature as object of our cognition in general. But it is contingent, so far as we can see, that the order of

as the laws of

origin does not presuppose

nature in

its

particular laws, with their wealth of

and heterogeneity tranpowers of comprehension, actual fact be commensurate with

at least possible variety

scending should

our

all

still

in

these powers.

To

find out this order

is

an under-

called the

taking on the part of our understanding, which

law of the specification of nature in respect of its empirical laws. It is not one cognized a priori in nature, but judgement adopts it in the interests of a natural order, cognizable by our understanding, in the division which it makes of

pursues it with a regard to a necessary end of its own, that, namely, of introducing into nature unity of principle. This end must, then, be attributed to nature by judgement, since no law can be here prescribed to it by understanding. The attainment of every aim is coupled with a feeling of pleasure. Now where such attain-

flection

when it seeks to suborthem a variety of particular laws. So

nature's universal laws

dinate to

when sal

it

is

said that nature specifies its univer-

laws on a principle of finality for our cogni-

tive faculties,

i.e.,

understanding and

of suitability for the its

human

necessary function of

finding the universal for the particular presented to

it

by perception, and again

for

varieties

(which are. of course, common for each species) connection in the unity of principle, we do not thereby either prescribe a law to nature, or learn one from

it

by observation

—although the

prin-

ciple in question may be confirmed by this means. For it is not a principle of the determinant but merely of the reflective judgement. All that is intended is that, no matter what is the order and disposition of nature in respect of its

universal laws,

we must

investigate

its

empirical

laws throughout on that principle and the maxims founded thereon, because only so far as that principle applies can we make any headway in the

employment

of our understanding in experi-

ence, or gain knowledge.

VI. The Association of the Feeling of Pleasure with the Concept of the Finality of Nature

The conceived harmony of nature in the manifold of its particular laws with our need of finding universality of principles for it must, so far as our insight goes, be deemed contingent, but withal indispensable for the requirements of our understanding:, and. consequently, a finality by which nature is in accord with our aim. but only so far as this is directed to knowledge. The universal laws of understanding, which are equally laws of nature, are, although arising from spontaneity, just as necessary for nature

ment has

—

ori

ment

for

its

condition a representation a pri-

as here a principle for the reflective judgein general

—

the feeling of pleasure also

is

determined by a ground which is a priori and valid for all men and that, too, merely by virtue of the reference of the object to our faculty of cognition. As the concept of finality here takes no cognizance whatever of the faculty of desire, :

it

differs entirely

from

all

practical finality of

nature.

As a matter of

fact,

we do

not,

find in ourselves the slightest effect

ing of pleasure

and cannot, on the feel-

from the coincidence of percep-

tions with the laws in accordance with the uni-

versal concepts of nature (the categories), since

understanding necessarily follows own nature without ulterior aim. But, while this is so, the discovery, on the other hand, that two or more empirical heterogeneous laws of nature are allied under one principle that embraces them both, is the ground of a very appreciable pleasure, often even of admiration, and such, too. as does not wear off even though we are already familiar enough with its object. It is true that we no longer notice any decided in their case

the bent of

its

pleasure in the comprehensibility of nature, or in the unity of its divisions into

genera and spe-

without which the empirical concepts, that afford us our knowledge of nature in its particucies,

lar laws,

would not be

possible. Still

it is

certain

that the pleasure appeared in due course,

and

only by reason of the most ordinary experience being impossible without it, has it become gradually fused with simple cognition, and no longer arrests particular attention. Something,

OF JUDGEMENT then, that makes us attentive in our estimate of nature to its finality for our understanding an

—

endeavour to bring, where possible, its heterogeneous laws under higher, though still always empirical, laws is required, in order that, on meeting with success, pleasure may be felt in this their accord with our cognitive faculty, which accord is regarded by us as purely contin-

—

gent.

As

against this, a representation of nature

would be altogether displeasing to us, were we to be forewarned by it that, on the least investigation carried beyond the commonest experience,

we should come geneity of

its

in contact with such a hetero-

laws as would

make

the union of

particular laws under universal empirical

its

pose of knowledge),

presented conjointly. In the sense-representation of external things, the quality of space in

which we

intuite

my

them

the merely subjective

is

them (by which what the things are in themselves as objects is left quite open), and it is on account of that refside of

representation of

erence that the object in being intuited in space

thought merely as phenomenon. But purely subjective quality, space is

also

is

despite

its

a constituent of the knowledge of things as

still

phenomena.

Sensation

(here

external)

also

agrees in expressing a merely subjective side of

which

tively final specification of nature in its genera,

we

and with our own

as space

judgement

logical validity. In the

is its

cognition of an object of sense, both sides are

laws impossible for our understanding. For this conflict with the principle of the subjec-

would

471

for the determination of the object (for the pur-

our representations of external things, but one is properly their matter (through which are given something with real existence), just

mere a

thereof.

bility of their intuition;

form of the possiand so sensation is, none

Yet this presupposition of judgement is so indeterminate on the question of the extent of the prevalence of that ideal finality of nature for

employed

in the cognition of exter-

nal objects.

our cognitive faculties, that if we are told that a more searching or enlarged knowledge of nature, derived from observation, must eventually bring us into contact with a multiplicity of laws that no human understanding could reduce to a

ed with

principle,

reflective

in respect

we can reconcile ourselves still we listen more gladly

thought. But ers

who

to

the

to oth-

hold out to us the hope that the more

we come to know the secrets of nawe are able to compare it with external members as yet unknown to us, the more simple shall we find it in its principles, and intimately

ture, or the better

the further our experience advances the

harmonious

we

more

apparent heterogeneity of its empirical laws. For our judgement makes it imperative upon us to proceed on the principle of the conformity of nature to our shall

find

it

in the

faculty of cognition, so far as that principle ex-

—

tends, without deciding

for the rule

is

—

not giv-

en to us by a determinant judgement whether bounds are anywhere set to it or not. For, while in respect of the rational employment of our cognitive faculty, bounds may be definitely determined, in the empirical field no such determination of bounds is possible. VII. The Aesthetic Representation of the Finality of Nature

That which

is

i.e.,

what constitutes

reference to the subject, not to the object, in

its

is its

On the other hand, that which such a representation serves, or is available.

aesthetic quality.

less, also

priori

But that subjective side of a representation which is incapable of becoming an element of cognition,

is

it;

1

the pleasure or displeasure connectfor through

it

I cognize

nothing in

the object of the representation, although easily be the result of the operation of

nition or other.

Now

it

may

some cog-

the finality of a thing, so

far as represented in our perception of

it, is

in

no way a quality of the object itself (for a quality of this kind is not one that can be perceived), although

it

may

be inferred from a cognition of

things. In the finality, therefore, to the cognition of

which is prior an object, and which, even

apart from any desire to sentation of

it

make

use of the repre-

for the purpose of a cognition,

yet immediately connected with

it,

subjective quality belonging to

it

we have that

is

is

the

inca-

pable of becoming a constituent of knowledge. Hence we only apply the term final to the object

on account of its representation being immediately coupled with the feeling of pleasure: and this representation itself is an aesthetic representation of the finality.

The only question

whether such a representation of at

is

finality exists

all.

is connected with the mere apprehension {apprehensio) of the form of an object of intuition, apart from any reference it may

If pleasure

have

purely subjective in the repre-

sentation of an object,

the

the

is

to a concept for the

cognition, this does not

purpose of a definite

make

the representation

[Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, p. 32: "All in our cognition that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations. The feelings of pain and pleasure, and the will are not cognitions, are excepted." Also see ibid., p. 235.] 1

THE CRITIQUE

472

referable to the object, but solely to the subject.

In such a case, the pleasure can express nothing but the conformity of the object to the cognitive faculties brought into play in the reflective

judgement, and so far as they are in play, and hence merely a subjective formal finality of the object. For that apprehension of forms in the imagination can never take place without the reflective judgement, even when it has no intention of so doing, comparing them at least with its

faculty of referring intuitions to concepts. If,

now,

in

comparison, imagination (as the is undesignedly

this

faculty of intuitions a priori)

brought into accord with understanding (as the faculty of concepts), by means of a given representation, and a feeling of pleasure is thereby aroused, then the object must be regarded as final for the reflective judgement. A judgement of this kind

is

an aesthetic judgement upon the

which does not depend upon any present concept of the object, and does not provide one. When the form of an object (as opposed to the matter of its representation, as sensation) is, in the mere act of reflecting upon it, without regard to any concept to be obtained from it, estimated as the ground of a pleasure in the representation of such an object, then this pleasure is also judged to be combined necessarily with the representation of it, and so not merely for the subject apprehendfinality of the object,

ing this form, but for

all

in general

who

pass

judgement. The object is then called beautiful; and the faculty of judging by means of such a pleasure (and so also with universal validity) is called taste. For since the ground of the pleasure is made to reside merely in the form of the object for reflection generally, consequently not in any sensation of the object, and without any reference, either, to any concept that might have something or other in view, it is with the conformity to law in the empirical employment of judgement generally (unity of imagination and understanding) in the subject, and with this alone, that the representation of the object in

which are univeraccords. And, as this accord-

reflection, the conditions of

sally valid a priori,

ance of the object with the faculties of the subject is contingent, it gives rise to a representation of a finality on the part of the object in re-

enable us to regard as necessarily connected with the representation of an object. It must

always be only through reflective perception that it is cognized as conjoined with this representation. As with all empirical judgements, it is, consequently, unable to announce objective necessity or lay claim to a priori validity. But,

judgement of

then, the

taste in fact only lays

claim, like every other empirical judgement, to

be valid for every one, and, despite its inner contingency this is always possible. The only point that is strange or out of the way about it is that it is not an empirical concept, but a feeling of pleasure (and so not a concept at all), that is yet exacted from every one by the judgement of taste, just as if it were a predicate united to the cognition of the object, and that is meant to be conjoined with its representation.

A

examjudgement of one who perceives a movable drop of water in a rock-crystal, rightly looks to every one finding the fact as stated, since the judgement has been formed according singular empirical judgement, as for

ple, the

to the universal conditions of the determinant

judgement under the laws of a possible experience generally. In the same way, one who feels pleasure in simple reflection on the form of an object, without having any concept in mind, rightly lays claim to the agreement of every one, although this judgement is empirical and a singular judgement. For the ground of this pleasure is found in the universal, though subjective, condition of reflective judgements, namely the

harmony of an object (be it a product of nature or of art) with the mutual relation of the faculties of cognition (imagination and underfinal

standing), which are requisite for every empiri-

The pleasure

cal cognition.

taste

is,

in

judgements of

therefore, dependent doubtless on an

empirical representation, and cannot be united

a priori to any concept (one cannot determine

a priori what object will be in accordance with one must find out the object that taste or not but then it is only made the determining is so)

—

;

judgement by virtue of our conresting simply upon reflection and the universal, though only subjective, conground of

this

sciousness of

ditions of the

its

harmony

of that reflection with

spect of the cognitive faculties of the subject.

the knowledge of objects generally, for which

Here, now, is a pleasure which as is the case with all pleasure or displeasure that is not brought about through the agency of the concept of freedom (i.e., through the antecedent determination of the higher faculty of desire by means of pure reason) no concepts could ever

the

—

—

form of the object is final. is why judgements of taste are subjected a critique in respect of their possibility. For

This to

their possibility presupposes an a priori principle,

although that principle

is

neither a cog-

nitive principle for understanding nor a prac-

OF JUDGEMENT tical principle for the will,

determinant a

and

is

thus in no

way

may

priori.

Susceptibility to pleasure arising

from

reflec-

on the forms of things (whether of nature or of art) betokens, however, not only a finality on the part of objects in their relation to the reflective judgement in the subject, in accordance with the concept of nature, but also, conversely, a finality on the part of the subject, answering to the concept of freedom, in respect of the form, or even formlessness of objects. The result is that the aesthetic judgement refers not merely, as a judgement of taste, to the tion

473

set before ourselves as

be nature in

its

Or the agent

an end.

technic (as in the case of

into it our own concept of an end to assist our estimate of its product. In this case what is represented is not

organic bodies),

when we read

a mere finality of nature in the form of the thing, but this very product as a natural end. Although our concept that nature, in its empirical laws, is subjectively final in its forms is in no way a concept of the object, but only a principle of judgement for providing itself with

concepts in the vast multiplicity of nature, so that

it

may

be able to take

its

bearings, yet, on were a regard to

beautiful, but also, as springing

the analogy of an end, as

intellectual feeling, to

our cognitive faculties is here attributed to nature. Natural beauty may, therefore, be looked

from a higher the sublime. Hence the

above-mentioned Critique of Aesthetic Judgement must be divided on these lines into two

main

parts.

on i.

it

as the presentation of the concept of formal,

e.,

merely subjective,

finality

and natural ends

as the presentation of the concept of a real,

VIII. The Logical Representation of the Finality of Nature

There

are two

ways

in

which

finality

may

be

represented in an object given in experience. It

may

be made to turn on what In this case the object

tive.

respect of

its

form

is

purely subjec-

is

considered in

as present in apprehension

(apprehensio) prior to any concept; 1 and the harmony of this form with the cognitive facul-

promoting the combination of the intuition

ties,

with concepts for cognition generally,

is

repre-

and reason (logically according to concepts). On these considerations is based the division of the Critique of Judgement into that of the aesthetic and the teleological judgement. By the first is

finality

meant the faculty

by the

by

the sec-

feeling of pleasure or displeasure,

ond, the faculty of estimating the real finality (objective)

Or, on the other hand, the representation of

reason.

may

be made to turn on what is objecwhich case it is represented as the harmony of the form of the object with the possibility of the thing itself according to an antecedent concept of it containing the ground of this form. We have seen that the representation of the former kind of finality rests on the pleasure immediately felt in mere reflection on the form of the object. But that of the latter kind of finality, as it refers the form of the object, not to the subject's cognitive faculties engaged tive, in

of estimating formal

(otherwise called subjective)

sented as a finality of the form of the object. finality

i.e.,

The former of these we estimate by taste (aesthetically by means of the feeling of pleasure), the latter by understanding objective, finality.

of

nature by understanding and

In a Critique of Judgement the part dealing with aesthetic judgement is essentially relevant, as it alone contains a principle introduced by judgement completely a priori as the basis of its reflection upon nature. This is the principle of nature's formal finality for our cognitive facula printies in its particular (empirical) laws ciple without which understanding could not feel itself at home in nature: whereas no reason

—

is

assignable a priori, nor

possibility of one apparent

is

so

much

as the

from the concept of

in its apprehension, but to a definite cognition

nature as an object of experience, whether in

of the object under a given concept, has noth-

universal or in

ing to do with a feeling of pleasure in things, but only understanding and its estimate of them. Where the concept of an object is given, the function of judgement, in its employment of that concept for cognition, consists in presenta-

should be objective ends of nature,

tion (exhibitio),

i.

e.,

in placing beside the con-

cept an intuition corresponding to

it.

Here

it

may

be that our own imagination is the agent employed, as in the case of art, where we realize a preconceived concept of an object which we 1

[Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 41, 42, 86, 87.]

its

particular aspects,

why i.

e.,

its

there things

only possible as natural ends. But it is only judgement that, without being itself possessed a priori of a principle in that behalf, in actually occurring cases (of certain products) contains the rule for

making use of the concept of ends

in the interest of reason, after that the

above

transcendental principle has already prepared understanding to apply to nature the concept of an end (at least in respect of

But the transcendental

its

principle

form).

by which a

a

THE CRITIQUE

474

nature in its subjective reference to our cognitive faculties, is represented in the

finality of

form of a thing as a principle of its estimation, leaves quite undetermined the question of where and in what cases we have to make our estimate of the object as a product according to a principle of finality, instead of simply acIt resigns to

cording to universal laws of nature. the aesthetic judgement

the task of deciding

the conformity of this product (in

form) to

its

our cognitive faculties as a question of taste (a matter which the aesthetic judgement decides, not by any harmony with concepts, but by feeling). On the other hand, judgement as ideolog-

employed assigns the determinate conditions under which something (e. g., an organized body) is to be estimated after the idea of an end of nature. But it can adduce no principle from the concept of nature, as an object of exically

perience, to give

it

its

authority to ascribe a

even only

priori to nature a reference to ends, or

indeterminately to assume them from actual ex-

The

perience in the case of such products.

rea-

have a theoretical knowledge of

it

in a possible

Reason prescribes laws a

experience.

freedom and

priori for

peculiar causality as the super-

its

we may have a The realm of the

sensible in the subject, so that

purely practical knowledge.

concept of nature under the one legislation, and that of the concept of

are completely cut off

freedom under the other, from all reciprocal influ-

ence, that they might severally (each according to its

own

principles) exert

upon the

other,

by

the broad gulf that divides the supersensible

from phenomena. The concept of freedom determines nothing in respect of the theoretical cognition of nature; and the concept of nature likewise nothing in respect of the practical laws

To that extent, then, it is not posthrow a bridge from the one realm to the other. Yet although the determining grounds of causality according to the concept of freedom (and the practical rule that this contains) have no place in nature, and the sensible cannot determine the supersensible in the subject; still of freedom. sible to

the converse

is

possible (not,

it is

true, in re-

merely em-

spect of the knowledge of nature, but of the

pirically to cognize objective finality in a cer-

consequences arising from the supersensible and much indeed is implied in the concept of a causality by freedom, the operation of which, in conformity with the formal laws of freedom, is to take effect in the word. The word cause, however, in its appli-

son of this

that, in order to be able

is

tain object,

many

must

particular experiences

be collected and reviewed under the unity of their principle. Aesthetic

judgement

is,

there-

faculty of estimating according

fore, a special

to a rule, but not according to concepts. teleological

The

not a special faculty, but only

is

general reflective judgement proceeding, as

always does

in theoretical cognition,

it

according

to concepts, but in respect of certain objects

of nature, following special principles

—

those,

namely, of a judgement that is merely reflective and does not determine objects. Hence, as regards its application, it belongs to the theoretical part of philosophy, and on account of its special principles, which are not determinant, as principles belonging to doctrine have to be, it

must

On

also

form

a special part of the Critique.

the other hand, the aesthetic judgement con-

tributes nothing to the cognition of its objects.

Hence

it

must only be allocated

of the judging subject and of

knowledge so

far as these

art-

to the Critique its

faculties of

capable of pos-

sessing a priori principles, be their use (theoretical or practical)

Critique which

is

otherwise what

it

the propaedeutic of

may all

—

phi-

losophy.

IX. Joinder of the Legislations of Understanding and Reason by means of Judgement

Understanding prescribes laws a priori for nature as an object of sense, so that we may

bearing on the sensible). So

cation to the supersensible only signifies the

ground that determines the causality of things of nature to an effect in conformity with their appropriate natural laws, but at the same time also in unison with the formal principle of the laws of reason a ground which, while its possibility is impenetrable, may still be completely

—

cleared of the charge of contradiction that alleged to involve. 1

The

it is

accordance with the concept of freedom is the final end which (or the manifestation of which in the sensible world) is to exist, and this presupposes One of the various supposed contradictions in this effect in

1

complete distinction of the causality of nature from that through freedom is expressed in the objection that when I speak of hindrances opposed by nature to causality according to laws of freedom (moral laws) or of assistance lent to it by nature. I am all the time admitting an influence of the former upon the latter. But the misinterpretation is easily avoided, if attention is only paid to the

meaning

of the statement. The resistance or furnot between nature and freedom, but between the former as phenomenon and the effects of the latter as phenomena in the world of sense. Even the causality of freedom (of pure and practical reason) is the causality of a natural cause subordinated to freedom (a causality of the subject regarded as man, and consequently as a phenomenon), and one, the ground of whose determination is contained in the intelligible, that is thought under freedom, in a manner that is not further or otherwise explicable (just as in the case of that intelligible that forms the supersensible substrate of nature.)

therance

is

OF JUDGEMENT

475

any pleasure of

the condition of the possibility of that end in

practical without mediation of

nature (i. e., in the nature of the subject as a being of the sensible world, namely, as man). It is so presupposed a priori, and without regard

and which determines for it, end that is attended at the same time with pure intellectual delight in the object. Judgement's concept of a finality of nature falls, besides, under the head

to the practical,

by judgement. This

faculty,

concept of a finality of nature, provides us with the mediating concept between concepts a conof nature and the concept of freedom with

its

whatsoever

origin,

as a higher faculty, the final

of natural concepts, but only as a regulative

—although

—

principle of the cognitive faculties

from the

the aesthetic judgement on certain objects (of

pure theoretical [legislation of understanding] to the pure practical [legislation of reason] and from conformity to law in accordance with the former to final ends according to the latter.

nature or of art) which occasions that concept, is a constitutive principle in respect of the feel-

cept that

makes

possible the transition

For through that concept we cognize the possibility of the final end that can only be actualized in nature and in harmony with its laws. Understanding, by the possibility of its supplying a priori laws for nature, furnishes a proof of the fact that nature is -cognized by us only as phenomenon, and in so doing points to its

having a supersensible substrate; but this substrate it leaves quite undetermined. Judgement by the a priori principle of its estimation of nature according to its possible particular laws

ing of pleasure or displeasure.

whose harmonious accord contains the ground of this pleasure, makes the concept in question, in its consequences, a suitable mediating link connecting the realm of the concept of nature with that of the concept of freedom, as this accord

same time promotes the sensibility of mind for moral feeling. 1 The following table

at the

the

may

facilitate the

ulties in their

List of

Cognitive

well as without us) with deter minability through

Feeling

the intellectual faculty.

law.

of

faculties

pleasure

and displeasure

But reason gives deterits

review of

all

the above fac-

systematic unity. 2

Mental Faculties

provides this supersensible substrate (within as

mination to the same a priori by

The spontaneity

in the play of the cognitive faculties

Cognitive Faculties

Understanding

Judgement Reason

Faculty of desire

practical

Thus judgement makes possible the tranfrom the realm of the concept of nature

A

priori Principles

Application

sition

Conformity to law

Nature

to that of the concept of freedom.

Finality

Art

In respect of the faculties of the soul generregarded as higher faculties, i. e., as faculties containing an autonomy, understanding is the one that contains the constitutive a priori

ally,

principles for the faculty of cognition (the the-

knowledge of nature). The feeling of pleasure and displeasure is provided for by the judgement in its independence from concepts and from sensations that refer to the determination of the faculty of desire and would thus be capable of being immediately practical. For the faculty of desire there is reason, which is oretical

Final i

End

Freedom

[Cf. p. 548.]

2 It has been thought somewhat suspicious that my divisions in pure philosophy should almost always come out threefold. But it is due to the nature of the case. If a division is to be a priori it must be either analytic, according to the law of contradiction and then it is always twofold (quodlibet ens est aut A aut non A) -or else it is synthetic. If it is to be derived in the latter case from a priori concepts (not, as in mathematics, from the a priori intuition corresponding to the concept), then, to meet the requirements of synthetic unity in general, namely (1) a condition, (2) a conditioned, (3) the concept arising from the union of the conditioned with its condition, the division must of necessity be tri-

—

chotomous.

—

J

FIRST PART

CRITIQUE OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT SECTION

ANALYTIC OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT

I.

Book

I.

Analytic of the Beautiful

Moment. Of the Judgement Tasted Moment oj Quality

First

forms the basis of a quite separate faculty of

oj

discriminating and estimating, that contributes

nothing to knowledge. All §

I.

The judgement oj

we wish

If

to discern

taste

is

aesthetic

whether anything

is

to the subject

pleasure.

perhaps

(acting

with understanding)

and

we

in

mind

conjunction

feeling of pleasure or dis-

its

of taste, therefore,

is

ject

not a cognitive judgement, and so not logical,

—which

means

is

aesthetic

subjective. is

that

it

is

it

signifies the real in

an

The one exception

to

empirical representation). this

is

is

conscious in the feeling of

which the its

state.

(to its feeling), they are always to that

The delight which determines the judgement oj taste is independent oj all interest

§ 2.

Every reference of representations

capable of being objective, even that of sen-

sations (in which case

compare

extent aesthetic.

one whose determining ground cannot be other than but

to

is

Given representations in a judgement may be empirical, and so aesthetic; but the judgement which is pronounced by their means is logical, provided it refers them to the object. Conversely, be the given representations even rational, but referred in a judgement solely to the sub-

refer the representation

The judgement

does

entire faculty of representations of

beau-

we do not refer the representation of it to the object by means of understanding with a view to cognition, but by means of the tiful or not,

imagination 2

it

the given representation in the subject with the

The

delight

which we connect with the repre-

sentation of the real existence of an object called interest.

the feeling of pleasure or displeasure.

Such a

is

delight, therefore, always

This denotes nothing in the object, but is a feeling which the subject has of itself and of the manner in which it is affected by the repre-

involves a reference to the faculty of desire,

sentation.

Now, where

To apprehend

a

regular

and

either as

its

determining ground, or else as nec-

essarily implicated with its determining ground.

appropriate

is

beautiful,

the question

whether something to know, whether or even could be, conis

we do not want

building with one's cognitive faculties, be the

we, or any one

mode

this representation

cerned in the real existence of the thing, but rather what estimate we form of it on mere contemplation (intuition or reflection). If any one

sation of delight.

asks

of representation clear or confused,

is

quite a different thing from being conscious of

ferred wholly to

with an accompanying senHere the representation is rethe subject, and what is more

to its feeling of life 3 feeling

of

pleasure

—under or

the

name

this

by

this judgement in its reflection, I have followed the guidance of the logical functions of judging (for a judgement of taste always Involves a reference to understanding). I nave brought the moment of quality first under review, because this i- what the aesthetic judgement on the beautiful looks to in the first in-tance. 2

3

[Cf. p. 493[Cf. p. 495-]

that I do not care for things of that sort that

are merely in the

The

definition of taste here relied upon is that it is the faculty of estimating the beautiful. Hut the discovers of what i> required for calling an object beautiful must be reserved for the analysis of judgements of taste. In my >earch for the moments to which attention is paid 1

me whether I consider that the palace I me is beautiful, I may, perhaps, reply

see before

of the

—and

displeasure

else, are,

made

same

to be

gaped

at.

Or

I

may

reply

sachem who Paris pleased him better

strain as that Iroquois

said that nothing in

than the eating-houses. I

may even

go a step

further and inveigh with the vigour of a Rous-

seau against the vanity of the great who spend the sweat of the people on such superfluous things. Or, in fine, I may quite easily persuade

myself that if I found myself on an uninhabited without hope of ever again coming among men, and could conjure such a palace island,

476

a

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT into existence

by a mere

wish, I should

still

not

trouble to do so, so long as I had a hut there

was comfortable enough for me. All this be admitted and approved; only it is not the point now at issue. All one wants to know is whether the mere representation of the object is to my liking, no matter how indifferent I may be

477

a par in everything relevant to their effect upon the feeling of pleasure, for this would be agree-

that

ableness in the sensation of one's state;

may

since, in the last resort, all the elaborate

to the real existence of the object of this repre-

sentation. It

is

quite plain that in order to say

and to show that I have taste, everything turns on the meaning which I can give to this representation, and not on any factor which makes me dependent on the real existence of the object. Every one must allow that a judgement on the beautiful which is tinged with the slightest interest, is very partial and not a pure judgement of taste. 1 One must that the object

is

beautiful,

of our faculties

ties

gratification

attained

which they promise. How this is the end immaterial; and, as the

is in

means is here the only thing that can make a difference, men might indeed blame one another for folly or imprudence, but never for baseness or wickedness; for they are all, each according to his own way of looking at things, pursuing one goal, which for each is the choice of the

gratification in question.

When

a modification of the feeling of pleas-

ure or displeasure

complete indifference in play the part of judge in matters of taste. This proposition, which is of the utmost importance, cannot be better explained than by contrasting the pure disinterested 2 delight which appears in the judgement of taste with that especially if we can also allied to an interest assure ourselves that there are no other kinds of interest beyond those presently to be men-

pression

tioned.

THE AGREEABLE

in the

credit our facul-

with no other appreciation of things and

real existence of the thing,

—

and unite

issue in

we could

the worth of things, than that consisting in the

not be in the least prepossessed in favour of the

but must preserve this respect, in order to

must

practical as its goal,

and

work

is

termed sensation,

this ex-

given quite a different meaning to that which it bears when I call the representais

tion of a thing (through sense as a receptivity pertaining to the faculty of knowledge) sensation. For in the latter case the representation is

referred to the object, but in the former it is referred solely to the subject and is not avail-

any cognition, not even for that by which the subject cognizes itself. Now in the above definition the word sensation is used to denote an objective representaable for

COUpUd With

tion of sense; and, to avoid continually running the risk of misinterpretation, we shall call that

That is agreeable which the senses find pleas-

which must always remain purely subjective, and is absolutely incapable of forming a representation of an object, by the familiar name of

§ 3.

Delight IN

is

interest

ing in sensation. This at once affords a convenient opportunity for

condemning and directing

3

particular attention to a prevalent confusion of

the double meaning of which the capable. All delight (as

is

itself

is

word sensation

said or thought)

is

sensation (of a pleasure). Consequently

everything that pleases, and for the very reason that it pleases, is agreeable and according to

—

different degrees, or its relations to other

its

agreeable

sensations,

is

attractive,

1

subjective sensation, resented;

[Cf. pp. *85, 520.]

A

judgement upon an object of our delight may be wholly disinterested but withal very interesting * i.e., it relies on no interest, but it produces one. Of this kind are all pure moral judgements. But, of themselves judgements of taste do not even set up any interest whatsoever. Only in society is it interesting to have taste point which will be explained in the sequel. * [Cf. pp. 520, et seq.; 522, et seq. Also Cf. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 265.]

—

by which no object

is

rep-

through which the object is regarded as an object of delight (which involves no cognition of the object).

Now,

charming,

But if this is conceded, then impressions of sense, which determine inclination, or principles of reason, which determine the will, or mere contemplated forms of intuition, which determine judgement, are all on delicious, enjoyable, etc.

2

feeling. The green colour of the meadows belongs to objective sensation, as the perception of an object of sense; but its agreeableness to

its

i.e.,

to feeling,

that a judgement on an object

agreeableness

is

by which

affirmed, expresses an inter-

evident from the fact that through provokes a desire for similar objects, consequently the delight presupposes, not est in

it, is

sensation

it

the simple judgement about its real

existence has

upon

affected

by such an

object.

it,

but the bearing

my

state so far as

Hence we do not

merely say of the agreeable that it pleases, but that it gratifies. I do not accord it a simple approval, but inclination is aroused by it, and where agreeableness is of the liveliest type a 3 [Cf. footnote in the first section of the Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 385.]

THE CRITIQUE

478

judgement on the character of the object is so entirely out of place that those who are always intent only on enjoyment (for that is the

word used to denote intensity of gratification) would fain dispense with all judgement.

the palate with spices and other condiments that

—

owning is agreeable not good: because, while

it

the senses,

coupled with

is

same

interest

sess

good which by means of reason commends itself by its mere concept. We call that good for something (useful) which only pleases as a means; but that which pleases on its own account we call good in itself. In both cases the concept of an end is implied, and conse-

That

is

quently

relation

the

possible)

reason

of

to

and thus a delight

willing,

existence of an object or action,

least

(at

i.e.,

the

in

some

in-

terest or other.

To deem something good,

I

must always know

sort of a thing the object

what

is

intended to be, is not

must have a concept of it. That necessary to enable me to see beauty in a

i.

I

e.,

Flowers,

twining

patterns,

free

lines

aimlessly

—

— technically

signification,

thing. inter-

termed foliage have no depend upon no definite concept,

and yet please. Delight in the beautiful must depend upon the reflection on an object precursory to some (not definitely determined) concept.

It is

thus also differentiated from the

agreeable, which rests entirely

many

In

upon sensation.

no doubt, the agreeable and

cases,

the good seem convertible terms.

commonly

said that

all

Thus

is

it

(especially lasting) grat-

which is almost equivpermanently agreeable and to be good are identical. But it is readily apparent that this is merely a vicious confusion ification

is

of itself good;

alent to saying that to be

of words, for the concepts appropriate to these

expressions are far from interchangeable.

The

agreeable, which, as such, represents the object solely in relation to sense,

must

in the first in-

under principles of reason through the concept of an end, to be, as an object of will, called good. But that the reference to delight is wholly different where what gratifies is at the same time called good, is evident

stance be brought

from the always good,

i.

is

fact that wiih the u'ood the question

whether

e.,

it

is

mediately or immediately

useful or good in itself; whereas with

the agreeable this point can never arise, since the

word always means what pleases immediand it is just the same with what I call

ately

—

Even in everyday parlance, a drawn between the agreeable and

the good.

is

We

do not scruple to say of a dish that stimulates

Even

it,

it

is i.

pains. But,

is

it

satisfies i.

in

e.,

if

in

our estimate of health, this

be traced. To all that posimmediately agreeable at least as remoteness of all bodily e.,

may

we

—

are to say that

it

is

good,

we

must further apply to reason to direct it to ends, that is, we must regard it as a state that puts us in a congenial mood for all we have to do. Finally, in respect of happiness every one believes that the greatest aggregate of the pleas-

ures of

life,

taking duration as well as

into account, merits the

name

number

of a true, nay

even of the highest, good. But reason sets its face against this too. Agreeableness is enjoyment. But if this is all that we are bent on, it would be foolish to be scrupulous about the means that procure it for us whether it be obtained passively by the bounty of nature or actively and by the work of our own hands. But that there is any intrinsic worth in the real existence of a man who merely lives for enjoyment, however busy he may be in this respect, even when in so doing he serves others all equally with himself intent only on enjoyment as an excellent means to that one end, and does so, moreover, because through sympathy he shares all their gratifications this is a view to which reason will never let itself be brought round. Only by what a man does heedless of enjoyment, in complete freedom, and independently of what he can procure passively from the hand of nature, does he give to his existence, as the real existence of a person, an absolute worth. Happiness, with all its plethora of pleasures, is far from being an unconditioned good. 1 But, despite all this difference between the agreeable and the good, they both agree in being invariably coupled with an interest in their object. This is true, not alone of the agreeable, § 3. and of the mediately good, i. e., the useful, which pleases as a means to some pleasure, but also of that which is good absolutely and from every point of view, namely the moral good which carries with it the highest interest. For the good is the object of will, i. e., of a rationally determined faculty of desire). But to will

—

—

—

—

An obligation to enjoyment is a patent absurdity. the same, then, must also be said of a supposed obligation to actions that have merely enjoyment for their aim, no matter how spiritually this enjoyment may be refined in thought (or embellished), and even if it be a mystical, so-called heavenly, enjoyment. And

distinction

the while that

immediately

mediately displeasing,

is

distinction

negatively,

1

beautiful.

it

the eye of reason that looks ahead to the con-

sequences.

the good

Delight in

§4.

it

all

a

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT something, and to take a delight in its existence, to take an interest in it, are identical.

i.e.,

§

Comparison of the three

5.

specifically

diferent kinds of delight

Both

the agreeable and the good involve a

reference to the faculty of desire, and are thus attended, the former with a delight pathologically conditioned

(by stimuli), the

latter

with a

pure practical delight. Such delight is determined not merely by the representation of the object, but also by the represented bond of connection between the subject and the real exis not merely the ob-

istence of the object. It ject,

but also

existence, that pleases.

its real

the other hand, the judgement of taste

contemplative,

i.

e.,

is

a judgement which

it is

indifferent as to the existence of an object,

only decides

how

its

On

simply is

and

character stands with the

feeling of

pleasure and displeasure. But not

even

contemplation

is

this

itself

directed to con-

judgement of taste is not a cognitive judgement (neither a theoretical one nor a practical), and hence, also, is not grounded on cepts; for the

479

want, or calls one forth; and, being a ground determining approval, deprives the judgement

on the object of its freedom. So far as the interest of inclination in the case of the agreeable goes, every one says "Hunger is the best sauce; and people with a healthy appetite relish everything, so long as it is something they can eat." Such delight, consequently, gives no indication of taste having anything to say to the choice. Only when men have got all they want can we tell who among the crowd has taste or not. Similarly there may be correct habits (conduct) without virtue, politeness without good-will, propriety without honour, etc. For where the moral law dictates, there is, objectively, no room left for free choice as to what one has to do; and to show taste in the way one carries out these dictates, or in estimating the way others do so, is a totally different matter from displaying the moral frame of one's mind. For the latter involves a command and produces a need of something, whereas moral taste only plays with the objects of delight without devoting itself sincerely to any.

concepts, nor yet intentionally directed to them.

The

agreeable, the beautiful, and the good

thus denote three different relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, as a feeling in respect of

guish different objects or tion. Also, the

which we

modes

distin-

of representa-

corresponding expressions which

indicate our satisfaction in

them are

is what gratifies a man; the what simply pleases him; the good esteemed (approved) i.e., that on which

beautiful is

—

;

—

to favour, or to respect.

For favour

is

mode

the

the faculty of estimating an object

by means of a defrom any interest. The

of representation

light or aversion apart

object of such a delight

Second Moment. Taste:

,

he sets an objective worth. Agreeableness is a significant factor even with irrational animals; beauty has purport and significance only for human beings, i.e., for beings at once animal and rational (but not merely for them as rational but only for them as at intelligent beings once animal and rational) whereas the good is good for every rational being in general proposition which can only receive its complete justification and explanation in the sequel. Of all these three kinds of delight, that of taste in the beautiful may be said to be the one and only disinterested and free delight; for, with it, no interest, whether of sense or reason, extorts approval. And so we may say that delight, in the three cases mentioned, is related to inclination,

—

Taste or a

from

is

called beautiful.

different.

The agreeable what

Definition of the Beautiful derived First Moment

is

the only

free liking. An object of inclination, and one which a law of reason imposes upon our desire, leaves us no freedom to turn anything into an

object of pleasure. All interest presupposes a

§ 6.

Moment

The beautiful

is

Of the Judgement

that which, apart

from con-

cepts, is represented as the Object of a

versal

of

of Quantity

uni-

delight.

This definition of the beautiful is deducible from the foregoing definition of it as an object of delight apart from any interest. For where any one is conscious that his delight in an object is with him independent of interest, it is inevitable that he should look on the object as one

containing a ground of delight for since the delight

is

all

men. For,

not based on any inclination

of the subject (or on

any other deliberate

in-

terest), but the subject feels himself completely

free in respect of the liking which he accords to

the object, he can find as reason for his delight

no personal conditions to which his own subjective self might alone be party. Hence he must regard it as resting on what he may also presuppose in every other person; and therefore he must believe that he has reason for demanding a similar delight from every one. Accord-

THE CRITIQUE

480

that

(forming a cognition of the object by concepts of it); although it is only aesthetic,

delight

logical

and contains merely

a reference of the represen-

tation of the object to the subject; because it still bears this resemblance to the logical judge-

ment, that it may be presupposed to be valid for all men. But this universality cannot spring from concepts. For from concepts there is no transition to the feeling of pleasure or displeas(save in the case of pure practical laws,

calls

a thing

beautiful, he

it

from

the

same

He

judges not merely for men, and then speaks of

others.

himself, but for

on a pedestal

demands

all

beauty as if it were a property of things. Thus he says the thing is beautiful; and it is not as if he counted on others agreeing in his judgement of liking owing to his having found them in such agreement on a number of occasions, but he demands this agreement of them. He blames them if they judge differently, and de-

them taste, which he still requires of them something they ought to have; and to this extent it is not open to men to say: "Every one has his own taste." This would be equivalent to saying that there is no such thing at all as taste, i.e., no aesthetic judgement capable of

ure

nies

which, however, carry an interest with them; and such an interest does not attach to the pure

as

judgement of taste). The result is that the judgement of taste, with its attendant consciousness of detachment from all interest, must involve a claim to validity for all men, and must do so apart from universality attached to objects, i.e.. there must be coupled with it a

;

and

when he puts

but

ingly he will speak of the beautiful as if beauty were a quality of the object and the judgement

making a

rightful claim

men. Yet even

upon the assent of

in the case of the agreeable,

we

all

find

men form do betray a prevagreement among them, which leads to

that the estimates

claim to subjective universality.

alent

Comparison oj the beautiful with the agreeable and the good by means oj the above

our crediting some with taste and denying it to others, and that, too, not as an organic sense

characteristic

but as a

§ 7.

As regards

the agreeable, every one concedes

which he bases on a private which he declares that an object restricted merely to himself per-

that his judgement, feeling,

and

pleases him. sonally.

in is

Thus he does not take

it

amiss

if,

when

he says that Canary-wine is agreeable, another corrects the expression and reminds him that he

ought to say: "It is agreeable to me." This applies not only to the taste of the tongue, the

and the throat, but to what may with any one be agreeable to eye or ear. A violet colour is to one soft and lovely: to another dull and faded. One man likes the tone of wind

palate,

instruments, another prefers that of string in-

struments. idea of correct

To

quarrel over such points with the

condemning another's judgement when it differs from our own, as

as inif

the

opposition between the two judgements were logical, would be folly. With the agreeable, therefore, the axiom holds good:

own taste (that of sense). The beautiful stands on quite

Every one has

ing.

It

a different foot-

would, on the contrary, be ridiculous

if

any one who plumed himself on his taste were to think of justifying himself by saying: 'This object (the building we see, the dress that person has on, the concert we hear, the poem submitted to our criticism) is beautiful for me." For if it merely pleases him, he must not call it beautiful. Many things may for him possess charm and agreeableness no one cares about

—

who knows how

to en-

enjoyment such a way that one

tertain his guests with pleasures (of

through all the senses) in and all are pleased, we say that he has taste. But the universality here is only understood in a comparative sense; and the rules that apply like all empirical

are,

rules, general only, not

what the judgement upon the beautiful deals or claims to It is a judgement in respect of sociabil-

universal, the latter being of taste

deal

in.

ity so far as resting

spect of the good,

on empirical

it

is

rules.

In re-

true that judgements

also rightly assert a claim to validity for every

only represented as an obby means of a concept, the case neither with the agreeable nor

one; but the good

is

ject of universal delight

which

is

the beautiful. § 8.

In a judgement oj taste the universality of is only represented as subjective

delight

This

his

critical faculty in respect of the agree-

able generally. So of one

particular

form of the universality of is to be met in

an aesthetic judgement, which a judgement of taste,

is

a significant feature,

not for the logician certainly, but for the transcendental philosopher. It calls for no small effort

on

his part to discover its origin, but in re-

turn

it

brings to light a property of our cogni-

tive faculty which, without this analysis, would have remained unknown. First, one must get firmly into one's mind that by the judgement of taste (upon the beau-

— OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT tiful) the delight in an object is imputed to every one, yet without being founded on a concept (for then it would be the good), and that this claim to universality is such an essential

factor of a judgement

be ranked as agreeable. For in respect of the agreeable, every one is allowed to have his own opinion, and no one insists upon others agreeing with his judgement of taste, which

is

what

is

invariably done in the judgement of taste about

may

judgement, provided we add objec-

tive universal validity,

to distinguish

the merely subjective validity which

is

it

from

always

aesthetic.)

Now

by which we describe

anything as beautiful, that were it not for its being present to the mind it would never enter into any one's head to use this expression, but everything that pleased without a concept would

The

tity of the

481

a judgement that has objective universal

validity has always got the subjective also, if

the judgement

is

contained under a given concept,

also for all

who

i.e.,

valid for everything which

is

it is

valid

by means

represent an object

of

But from a subjective universal validity, i. e., the aesthetic, that does not rest on any concept, no conclusion can be drawn to the logical; because judgements of that kind have no bearing upon the object. But for this very this concept.

call the taste

reason the aesthetic universality attributed to

of sense, the second, the taste of reflection: the first laying down judgements merely private,

a judgement must also be of a special kind, seeing that it does not join the predicate of beauty

beauty.

of these I

first

the second, on the other hand, judgements os-

to the concept of the object taken in its entire

tensibly of general validity (public), but both

logical sphere,

alike being aesthetic (not practical)

judgements

about an object merely in respect of the bearings of its representation on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Now it does seem strange that while with the taste of sense it is not alone experience that shows that

its

judgement (of

pleasure or displeasure in something)

is

not uni-

versally valid, but every one willingly refrains

from imputing

this

agreement to others (de-

spite the frequent actual prevalence of a con-

siderable consensus of general opinion even in

these judgements), the taste of reflection, which,

enough to put up with a rude dismissal of its claims to universal validity of its judgement (upon the beauas experience teaches, has often

tiful),

can (as

it

actually does) find

it

possible

and yet does extend

this predi-

cate over the whole sphere of judging subjects.

In their logical quantity,

all

judgements of must

taste are singular judgements. 1 For, since I

present the object immediately to

my

feeling

of pleasure or displeasure, and that, too, with-

out the aid of concepts, such judgements cannot have the quantity of judgements with objective general validity. Yet

by taking the

singular rep-

resentation of the object of the judgement of

and by comparison converting it into a concept according to the conditions determining that judgement, we can arrive at a logically uni-

taste,

versal judgement.

ment

am

For instance, by a judge-

of the taste I describe the rose at which I

looking as beautiful.

The judgement, on

the

other hand, resulting from the comparison of a

for all that to formulate judgements capable of demanding this agreement in its universality. Such agreement it does in fact require from every one for each of its judgements of taste the persons who pass these judgements not

number

quarreling over the possibility of such a claim, but only failing in particular cases to come to terms as to the correct application of this

we have here to note that a uniwhich does not rest upon concepts of the object (even though these are only empirical) is in no way logical, but aesthetic, i. e., does not involve any objective quantity of the judgement, but only one that is subjective. For this

is also, no doubt, an aesthetic and singujudgement, but then it is not one of taste but of sense. For it has this point of difference from a judgement of taste, that the latter imports an aesthetic quantity of universality, i. e., of validity for everyone which is not to be met with in a judgement upon the agreeable. It is only judgements upon the good which, while also determining the delight in an object, possess logical and not mere aesthetic universality; for

universality I use the expression general valid-

it is

faculty.

First of all

versality

ity,

which denotes the validity of the reference

of a representation, not to the cognitive faculties,

but to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure

for every subject. ever,

may also

(The same expression, how-

be employed for the logical quan-

of singular representations: "Roses in

general are beautiful," 2

is

no longer pronounced

as a purely aesthetic judgement, but as a logical

judgement founded on one that

Now

the judgement,

"The

rose

is

is

aesthetic.

agreeable" (to

smell)

lar

as involving a cognition of the object that they are valid of it, and on that account valid for everyone. In forming an estimate of objects merely

UCf.p. 2

51s.] [Cf. p. 485, P. 486,

and

p. 515.]

— THE CRITIQUE

482

from concepts, all representation of beauty goes by the board. There can, therefore, be no rule according to which any one is to be compelled to recognize anything as beautiful. Whether a dress, a house, or a flower is beautiful is a matupon which one declines to allow one's judgement to be swayed by any reasons or principles.

ter

We own

want to get a look at the object with our eyes, just as if our delight depended on

sensation.

1

And

yet,

upon so doing, we

if

we

the object beautiful,

call

believe ourselves to be

speaking with a universal voice, and lay claim to the concurrence of everyone, whereas no private sensation would be decisive except for the

observer alone and his Here, now, we

may

Were

ment

of taste

is

meant

to allow to the represen-

would be For a pleasure of that kind would be nothing but the feeling of mere agreeableness to the senses, and so, from its very nature, would possess no more than private validity, seeing that it would be immediately dependent on the representation through which tation of the object, such a sequence

self-contradictory.

the object

given.

is

Hence it is the universal capacity for being communicated incident to the mental state in the given representation which, as the subjective

liking.

perceive that nothing

is

condition of the judgement of taste, must be,

postulated in the judgement of taste but such a universal voice in respect of delight that it is

its

not mediated by concepts; consequently, only the possibility of an aesthetic judgement capa-

tion

same time deemed valid for The judgement of taste itself does not

ble of being at the

everyone.

the pleasure in a given object to be the

antecedent, and were the universal communicability of this pleasure to be all that the judge-

postulate the agreement of everyone (for

it

is

fundamental, with the pleasure in the object as consequent. 2 Nothing, however, is capable

communicated but cogniand representation so far as appurtenant to cognition. For it is only as thus appurtenant that the representation is objective, and it is of being universally

this alone that gives

it

a universal point of ref-

only competent for a logically universal judgement to do this, in that it is able to bring for-

erence with which the power of representation

only imputes this agreement

the determining ground of the judgement as to

to everyone, as an instance of the rule in respect

communicability of the represenmerely subjective, that is to say, to be conceived independently of any concept of the object, it can be nothing else than the mental state that presents itself in the mutual relation of the powers of representation so far

ward reasons); of which

it

it

looks for confirmation, not from

concepts, but from the concurrence of others.

The

universal voice

resting is

is,

therefore, only an idea

upon grounds the investigation of which

here postponed. It

may

tainty whether a person

down

be a matter of uncer-

who

thinks he

is

laying

judgement of taste is, in fact, judging in conformity with that idea; but that this idea is what is contemplated in his judgement, and that, consequently, it is meant to be a judgement of taste, is proclaimed by his use of the a

of every one

is

obliged to harmonize.

If, then,

this universal

tation

is

to be

as they refer a given representation to cognition in general.

The

cognitive powers brought into play

by

expression "beauty." For himself he can be certain on the point from his mere consciousness of

engaged in a free play, since no definite concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. Hence the mental state in this representation must be one of a feeling of the free play of the powers of repre-

the separation of everything belonging to the

sentation in a given representation for a cogni-

agreeable and the good from the delight remain-

tion in general.

ing to him; and this

an object

which he promises himself the agreement of everyone a claim which, under these conditions, he would also be warranted in making, were it not that he frequently sinned against them, and thus passed an erroneous judgement of taste. is all

for

—

§ o. Investigation of the

question of the relative

judgement of taste of the feeling of pleasure and the estimating of the object priority in a

The

solution of this problem

the Critique of taste, and so attention. 1

[Cf.p. 5M-]

is

is

the key to

worthy of

all

this representation are here

become

is

Now

a representation,

whereby

given, involves, in order that

a source of cognition at

all,

it

may

imagination

for bringing together the manifold of intuition, and understanding for the unity of the concept uniting the representations. This state of free

play of the cognitive faculties attending a representation by which an object is given must

admit

of

cognition,

universal as

communication:

because

a definition of the object with

which given representations (in any subject whatever) are to accord, is the one and only representation which is valid for everyone. As the subjective universal communicability 2

CCf.$37.]

— ;

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT mode

of the

of taste

is

of representation in a judgement

to subsist apart

from the presuppo-

it can be nothing mental state present in the free play of imagination and understanding (so far as these are in mutual accord, as is requisite

any

sition of

definite concept,

else than the

for cognition in general)

;

for

we

are conscious

that this subjective relation suitable for a cogni-

must be

tion in general

just as valid for every

one, and consequently as universally

communi-

would be intellectual (as in the objecschematism of judgement dealt with in

relation tive

the Critique). But, then, in that case the judge-

ment would not be

the predicate of beauty. There

in the

harmony

of the cognitive faculties. Again,

the above-described universality of the subjective conditions of estimating objects

forms the

sole foundation of this universal subjective val-

which we connect with the

idity of the delight

representation of the object that

we

call

beau-

That an

ability to

communicate one's mental

be only in respect of our attended with a pleasure, is a fact which might easily be demonstrated from the natural propensity of mankind to social life, i.e., empirically and psychologically. But what we have here in view calls for something more than this. In a judgement of taste, the pleasure felt by us is exacted from every one else as necessary, just as if, when we call something beautiful, beauty was to be regarded as a quality of the object forming part of its inherent determination according to concepts; although beauty is for itself, apart from any reference to

even though

it

cognitive faculties,

is

state,

by

the feeling of the subject, nothing.

But the

dis-

cussion of this question must be reserved until

we have answered

the further one of whether,

and how, aesthetic judgements are possible a priori.

At present we are exercised with the lesser way in which we become conscious, in a judgement of taste, of a reciprocal subjective common accord of the powers of cognition. Is it aesthetically by sensation and our mere internal sense? Or is it intellectually by

question of the

consciousness

of

our

intentional

activity

Now

if

the given representation occasioning

therefore, no

make itself known than The quickening of both facul-

in question to

(imagination and understanding) to an in-

definite, tion,

but yet, thanks to the given representaactivity, such as belongs to

harmonious

cognition generally,

is

whose uni-

the sensation

communicability is postulated by the judgement of taste. An objective relation can, of course, only be thought, yet in so far as, in reversal

spect of

be

its

conditions,

felt in its effect

case of a relation

it is

subjective,

it

may

upon the mind, and, in the (like that of the powers of

representation to a faculty of cognition general-

which does not

on any concept, no othpossible beyond that through sensation of its effect upon the mind an effect consisting in the more facile play of both mental powers (imagination and understanding) as quickened by their mutual accord. A representation which is singular and independent of comparison with other representations, rest

er consciousness of

it

is

and, being such, yet accords with the conditions is the general concern one that brings the cognitive faculties into that proportionate accord which we require for all cognition and which we therefore deem valid for every one who is so constituted as to judge by means of understanding and sense conjointly (i.e., for every man).

of the universality that of understanding,

is

Definition of the Beautiful drawn the Second Moment

The

beautiful

is

that which, apart

from

from

a con-

cept, pleases universally.

Third Moment. Of Judgements

Moment

of Taste:

relation of the Ends brought under Review in such Judgements of the

§ 10. Finality in general

in

bringing these powers into play?

is,

for the subjective unity of the re-

sensation.

ly)

tiful.

way

other

ties

purely subjective (aesthetic) estimating of the object, or of the representation through which it is given, is antecedent to the pleasure in it, and is the basis of this pleasure

of taste determines the object, independ-

ently of concepts, in respect of delight and of

condition. this

respect to

But, now, the judge-

a judgement of taste.

ment

lation

Now

down with

laid

pleasure and displeasure, and so would not be

is any indeterminate cognition, which always rests upon that relation as its subjective

cable, as

483

Let

us define the meaning of "an end" in transcendental terms (i.e., without presuppos-

the judgement of taste were a concept which

ing anything empirical, such as the feeling of

united understanding and imagination in the estimate of the object so as to give a cogni-

pleasure).

tion of the object, the consciousness of this

the object (the real ground of

An end

is

far as this concept

the object of a concept so is

regarded as the cause of its

possibility)

—

.

THE CRITIQUE

4 84

and the causality of a concept in respect of its object is finality (jorma finalis). Where, then, not the cognition of an object merely, but the object itself (its form or real existence) as an

thought to be possible only through a it, there we imagine an end. The representation of the effect is here the determining

effect, is

concept of

cause and takes the lead of it. The consciousness of the causality of a representa-

ground of

its

tion in respect of the state of the subject as

one

is an aesthetic and not a cognitive judgement, and so does not deal with any concept of the nature or of the internal or external possibility, by this or that cause, of the object, but simply with the relative bearing of the representative powers so far as determined by a represen-

of taste

tation.

Now ment

whereas displeasure is that representation which contains the ground for

tation

called pleasure;

converting the state of the representations into their opposite

(

for hindering or

removing them)

1

faculty of desire, so far as determinable

The

only through concepts, i.e., so as to act in conformity with the representation of an end, would 2

But an object, or state of mind, or even an action may, although its possibility does not necessarily presuppose the representation of an end, be called final simply on account of its possibility being only explicable and intelligible for us by virtue of an assumption on our part of fundamental causality according to ends, i.e., a will that would have so ordained it accordbe the

will.

ing to a certain represented rule. Finality, therefore,

may

from an end, in so far as the causes of this form in a will,

locate

but yet are able to render the explanation of its possibility intelligible to ourselves only by deriving

from a

it

will.

Now we

are not always

obliged to look with the eye of reason into

what

we observe (i.e., to consider it in its possibility). So we may at least observe a finality of form, and trace it in objects though by reflection only without resting it on an end (as the ma-

—

—

terial of the

§ ii.

(or

finalis).

the

form of finality

of representing

judgement of of an object

it)

it

an end is regarded as a source of always imports an interest as deter-

mining ground of the judgement on the object of pleasure. Hence the judgement of taste cannot rest on any subjective end as its ground. But neither can any representation of an objective i.e.,

of the possibility of the object itself

on principles of final connection, determine the judgement of taste, and, consequently, neither can any concept of the good. For the judgement [Cf. p. 4S5.] [Cf. Introduction to the PP. 385-387.]

1

2 i..

is

just as incapable of containing the de-

termining ground of the judgement as the representation of the perfection of the object or the

concept of the good.

We

are thus left with the

subjective finality in the representation of an

any end (objective or sub-

object, exclusive of

jective)

—consequently the bare form of

ity in the representation

given to us, so far as as that which

is

we

final-

whereby an object are conscious of

is

it

alone capable of constituting the

from any concept, we esticommunicable, and so of forming the determining ground of the judgement of taste. delight which, apart

mate

as universally

§ 12.

The judgement

of taste rests

upon

a priori

grounds

To determine

a priori the connection of the

feeling of pleasure or displeasure as an effect,

with some representation or other (sensation or concept) as its cause, is utterly impossible; for that

would be a causal relation which (with ob-

jects of experience)

is

always one that can only

be cognized a posteriori and with the help of experience. True, in the Critique of Practical Reason we did actually derive a priori from univer-

moral concepts the feeling of respect (as a

Metaphysk

ing

which does not

strictly

answer either

pleasure or displeasure which empirical objects). But there

Whenever

end,

by the judge-

hence an agreeableness attending the represen-

sal

sole foundation of the

is

mode

delight,

is

particular and peculiar modification of this feel-

The

taste

nexus

is

coupled with the

of taste pronounced valid for every one;

exist apart

we do not

when an object

is

feeling of pleasure. This pleasure

tending to preserve a continuance of that state, may here be said to denote in a general way what is

this relation, present

characterized as beautiful,

of Morals, sect.

to the

we receive from we were further

able to cross the border of experience and call

on a supersensible atnamely that of freedom.

in aid a causality resting

tribute of the subject,

But even there it was not this feeling exactly that we deduced from the idea of the moral as cause, but from this was derived simply the determination of the will. But the mental state present in the determination of the will by any means is at once in itself a feeling of pleasure and identical with it, and so does not issue from it as an effect. Such an effect must only be assumed where the concept of the moral as a good precedes the determination of the will by the

— OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT law; for in that case

it

would be

futile to derive

the pleasure combined with the concept this concept as a mere cognition.

Now

from

the pleasure in aesthetic judgements

stands on a similar footing: only that here

it is

merely contemplative and does not bring about an interest in the object; whereas in the moral judgement it is practical. The consciousness of mere formal finality in the play of the cognitive faculties of the subject attending a representa-

tion

whereby an object

itself,

because

it

is

given,

is

the pleasure

485

have been accredited as intrinsic beauties, and consequently the matter of delight passed off for the form. This is a misconception which, like many others that have still an underlying element of truth, may be removed by a careful definition of these concepts.

A judgement of taste which is uninfluenced by charm or emotion (though these may be associated 1 with the delight in the beautiful), and whose determining ground, therefore, is simply finality of form, is a pure judgement of taste.

involves a determining ground § 14. Exemplification

of the subject's activity in respect of the quick-

ening of its cognitive powers, and thus an internal causality (which is final) in respect of cognition generally, but without being limited to a definite cognition, and consequently a mere form

Aesthetic,

just

like

theoretical

(logical)

judgements, are divisible into empirical and pure.

The

first

are those

by which agreeableness by which

or disagreeableness, the second those

of the subjective finality of a representation in

beauty

an aesthetic judgement. This pleasure is also in no way practical, neither resembling that form the pathological ground of agreeableness nor that from the intellectual ground of the represented good. But still it involves an inherent causality, that, namely, of preserving a continuance of the state of the representation itself and the active engagement of the cognitive powers without ulterior aim. We dwell on the contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself. The case is analogous (but analogous only) to the way we linger on a charm in the representation of an object which keeps arresting the attention, the mind all the while remaining passive.

representation.

is

predicated of an object or

The former

its

mode

of

are judgements of

sense (material aesthetic judgements), the latter

judgements of taste proper. only pure so far as its determining ground is tainted with no merely empirical delight. But such a taint is always present where charm or emotion have a share in the judgement by "which something is to be described as beautiful. (as formal) alone

A

judgement of

Here now there

taste, therefore, is

is

a recrudescence of a

num-

ber of specious pleas that go the length of putting forward the case that

charm

is

not merely a

necessary ingredient of beauty, but is even of itself sufficient to merit the name of beautiful.

A

mere

colour, such as the green of a plot of

mere tone (as distinguished from sound or noise), like that of a violin, is described by most people as in itself beautiful, notwithstanding the fact that both seem to depend merely on the matter of the representations in other words, simply on sensation which only entitles them to be called agreeable. But it will at the same time be observed that sensations of colour as well as of tone are only entitled to be immediately regarded as beautiful where, in either case, they are pure. This is a determination which at once goes to their form, and it is the only one which these representations possess

grass, or a § 13.

The pure judgement of taste is independent of charm and emotion

Every and robs

interest vitiates the it

of

its

judgement of

impartiality. This

is

taste

especially

so where, instead of, like the interest of reason,

making

finality take the lead of the feeling of

—

it grounds it upon this feeling which what always happens in aesthetic judgements upon anything so far as it gratifies or pains. Hence judgements so influenced can either lay no claim at all to a universally valid delight, or else must abate their claim in proportion as sen-

pleasure, is

sations of the kind in question enter into the determining grounds of taste. Taste that requires an added element of charm and emotion for its delight, not

to speak of adopting this as the

measure of its approval, has not yet emerged from barbarism. And yet charms are frequently not alone ranked with beauty (which ought properly to be a question merely of the form) as supplementary to the aesthetic universal delight, but they

—

that admits with certainty of being universally

communicated. For it is not to be assumed that even the quality of the sensations agrees in all subjects, and we can hardly take it for granted that the agreeableness of a colour, or of the

tone of a musical instrument, which we judge to be preferable to that of another, is given a like preference in the estimate of every one. Assuming with Euler that colours are isoch1

[Cf. pp. 486, 49S-]

THE CRITIQUE

4 86

ronous vibrations (pulsus) of the aether, as tones are of the air set in vibration by sound, and. what is most important, that the mind not alone perceives by sense their effect in stimulating the organs, but

also,

by

reflection, the regu-

impressions (and consequently the form in which different representations are which I, still, in no way doubt then united) colour and tone would not be mere sensations. They would be nothing short of formal deterlar play of the

—

—

minations of the unity of a manifold of sensaand in that case could even be ranked as

tions,

intrinsic beauties.

But the purity of a simple mode of sensation means that its uniformity is not disturbed or broken by any foreign sensation. It belongs merely to the form; for abstraction may there be miide from the quality of the mode of such sensation (what colour or tone, if any, it represents). For this reason, all simple colours are regarded as beautiful so far as pure. Composite

admitted, it is only this form that gives them a place of honour. All form of objects of sense (both of external also, mediately, of internal sense) is either

and

figure or play. In the latter case

it is

either play

mimic and dance), or mere play of sensations (in time). The charm of colof figures (in space:

ours, or of the agreeable tones of instruments,

may

be added but the design in the former and composition in the latter constitute the proper object of the pure judgement of taste. To :

the

say that the purity alike of colours and of tones, seem to contribute

or their variety and contrast, to beauty,

by no means

is

to imply that, because

themselves agreeable, they therefore yield an addition to the delight in the form and one on a in

The real meaning rather is that they form more clearly, definitely, and completely intuitable, and besides stimulate the representation by their charm, as they excite and sustain the attention directed to the object

par with

make

it.

this

colours have not this advantage, because, not being simple, there is no standard for estimat-

itself.

ing whether they should be called pure or im-

i.e.,

pure.

constituent in the complete representation of the

But as for the beauty ascribed to the object on account of its form, and the supposition that it is capable of being enhanced by charm, this is a common error and one very prejudicial to gen-

object, in

taste does

so only

is

uine,

uncorrupted. sincere taste. Nevertheless

charms may be added to beauty to lend to the mind, beyond a bare delight, an adventitious interest in the representation of the object, and thus to advocate taste and its cultivation. This applies especially where taste is as yet crude and untrained. But they are positively subversive of the judgement of taste, if allowed to obtrude themselves as grounds of estimating beauty. For so far are they from contributing to beauty that it is only where taste is still weak and untrained that, like aliens, they are admitted as a favour, and only on terms that they do not violate that beautiful form.

In painting, sculpture, and in fact in all the formative arts, in architecture and horticulture, so far as fine arts, the design is what is essential. Here it is not what gratifies in sensation but merely what pleases by its form, that is the fundamental prerequisite for taste. The colours which give brilliancy to the sketch are part of the charm. They may no doubt, in their own way, enliven the object for sensation, but make it really worth looking at and beautiful they cannot. Indeed, more often than not the requirements of the beautiful form restrict them to a very narrow compass, and, even where charm is

Even what what

is

is

called ornamentation (parerga),

only an adjunct and not an intrinsic

augmenting the delight of by means of its form. Thus it

with the frames of pictures or the drapery on statues, or the colonnades of palaces. But if the ornamentation does not itself enter into the composition of if it is introduced like a the beautiful form gold frame merely to win approval for the pic-

—

—

by means of its charm it is then called away from the genuine beauty. Emotion a sensation where an agreeable feeling is produced merely by means of a momentary check followed by a more powerful outture

finery and takes

—

—

pouring of the vital force is quite foreign to beauty. Sublimity (with which the feeling of emotion is connected) requires, however, a different standard of estimation from that relied

A pure judgement of taste has, determining ground neither charm nor emotion, in a word, no sensation as matter of the aesthetic judgement.

upon by

taste.

then, for

§ 15.

its

The judgement of

taste is entirely

independent of the concept of perfection Objective finality can only be cognized by of a reference of the manifold to a definite end, and hence only through a concept. This alone makes it clear that the beautiful, which is estimated on the ground of a mere formal finality, i.e., a finality apart from an end, is wholly independent of the representation of the good.

means

For the

latter

presupposes an objective

finality,

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT the reference of the object to a definite end. Objective finality is either external, i.e., the

i.e.,

utility, or internal,

i.

the perfection, of the

e.,

That the delight in an object on account of which we call it beautiful is incapable of resting on the representation of its utility, is abundantly evident from the two preceding articles; for in that case, it would not be an immediate delight in the object, which latter is the essential condition of the judgement upon beauty. But in an objective, internal finality, i.e., perfection, we have what is more akin to the predicate of beauty, and so this has been held even by philosophers of reputation to be object.

convertible with beauty, though subject to the

where it is thought in a confused way. 1 In a critique of taste it is of the utmost importance to decide whether beauty is really reducible to the concept of perfection. For estimating objective finality we always require the concept of an end, and, where such finality has to be, not an external one (utility), but an internal one, the concept of an internal qualification:

end containing the ground of the internal possiNow an end is in general that, the concept of which may be regarded as the ground of the possibility of the object itself. So in order to represent an objective finality in a thing we must first have a concept of what sort of a thing it is to be. The agreement of the manifold in a thing with this concept (which supplies bility of the object.

the rule of

its

synthesis)

is

the qualitative per-

fection of the thing. Quantitative perfection is entirely distinct from this. It consists in the

completeness of anything after

its

kind, and

is

a mere concept of quantity (of totality). In its case the question of what the thing is to be is

regarded as definitely disposed of, and we only ask whether it is possessed of all the requisites that go to

make

it

What

such.

representation of a thing,

i.e.,

formal in the the agreement of is

manifold with a unity (i.e., irrespective of what it is to be), does not, of itself, afford us any cognition whatsoever of objective finality. For since abstraction is made from this unity as end (what the thing is to be) nothing is left but the

its

,

subjective finality of the representations in the

mind

487

and if I do not then form any representation of an end, as that it is meant to be used, say, for cle,

country dances, then not the least hint of a conis given by the mere form. To suppose a formal objective finality that is yet devoid of an end, i.e., the mere form of a perfection (apart from any matter or concept of cept of perfection

that to which the agreement relates, even though

there was the to law)

is

mere general idea of

a conformity

a veritable contradiction.

Now the judgement of taste is an aesthetic judgement, i.e., one resting on subjective grounds. No concept can be its determining ground, and hence not one of a definite end. Beauty, therefore, as a formal subjective finality, involves no thought whatsoever of a perfection of the object, as a would-be formal finality which yet, for all that, is objective: and the distinction between the concepts of the beautiful and the good, which represents both as differing only in their logical form, the first being merely a confused, the second a clearly defined, concept of perfection, while otherwise alike in content and origin, all goes for nothing: for then there would be no specific difference between them, but the judgement of taste would be just as much a cognitive judgement as one by which something is described as good just as the man in the street, when he says that deceit is wrong, bases his judgement on confused, but the philosopher on clear grounds, while both appeal in reality to identical principles of reason. But I have already stated that an aesthetic judgement is quite unique, and affords absolutely no (not even a confused) knowledge of the object. It is only through a logical judgement that we get knowl-

—

The aesthetic judgement, on the other hand, refers the representation, by which an ob-

edge.

ject

is

given, solely to the subject, and brings to

our notice no quality of the object, but only the final form in the determination of the powers of representation engaged upon it. The judgement is called aesthetic for the very reason that its determining ground cannot be a concept, but is rather the feeling (of the internal sense) of the concert in the play of the mental powers as a thing only capable of being felt. If, on the other

imagination, but no perfection of any object,

confused concepts, and the objective judgement based on them, are going to be called aesthetic, we shall find ourselves with an understanding judging by sense, or a sense representing its objects by concepts a mere choice of

the latter not being here thought through any

contradictions.

concept. For instance,

confused or be they clear, is understanding; and although understanding has (as in all judge-

of the subject intuiting. This gives a cer-

tain finality of the representative state of the

subject, in at

home

which the subject

feels itself quite

in its effort to grasp a given

if in

form

a forest I light

in the

upon

a plot of grass, round which trees stand in a cir1

[Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 29-31.]

hand,

—

ments)

The

its role in

faculty of concepts, be they

the judgement of taste, as an

THE CRITIQUE

488

its role there is not that of a faculty for cognizing an object, but of a faculty for determining that judgement and its representation (without a concept) according to its relation to the subject and its internal feeling,

aesthetic judgement,

and for doing so

in so far as that

judgement

is

ty of a horse, or of a building (such as a church,

summer-house), presupposes

palace, arsenal, or

a concept of the end that defines what the thing has to be, and consequently a concept of its

perfection; and

beauty.

Now,

is

therefore merely appendant

just as

it is

a clog on the purity of

the judgement of taste to have the agreeable (of

possible according to a universal rule.

sensation) joined with beauty to which properly §

of taste by which an object described as beautiful, under the condition

A judgement

thing; the other kind of beauty, being attached

is relevant, so to combine the good with beauty (the good, namely, of the manifold to the thing itself according to its end) mars its purity. Much might be added to a building that would immediately please the eye, were it not intended for a church. A figure might be beautified with all manner of flourishes and light but regular lines, as is done by the New Zealanders with their tattooing, were we dealing with anything but the figure of a human being. And here is one whose rugged features might be softened and

ascribed

given a more pleasing aspect, only he has got to

1

6.

is

of a definite concept,

is

not pure

are two kinds of beauty: free beauty

There

(pulchritudo vaga), or beauty which dependent (pulchritudo adhaerens).

is

merely

The

first

presupposes no concept of what the object should be; the second does presuppose such a concept and, with it, an answering perfection of the object. Those of the first kind are said to be (self-subsisting) beauties of this thing or that to a concept (conditioned beauty),

to objects

is

which come under the concept of a

Flowers are free beauties of nature. Hardly anyone but a botanist knows the true nature of a flower, and even he, while recognizing in the flower the reproductive organ of the plant, pays no attention to this natural end when using his taste to judge of its beauty. Hence no perfection no internal finality, as something of any kind to which the arrangement of the manifold is re-

—

— underlies

this

judgement.

Many

birds

(the parrot, the humming-bird, the bird of paradise),

and a number of Crustacea, are self-subwhich are not appurtenant to

sisting beauties

any object defined with respect to its end, but please freely and on their own account. So designs ä la grecque, foliage for framework or on wall-papers, etc., have no intrinsic meaning; they represent nothing no object under a defiand are free beauties. 1 We may nite concept also rank in the same class what in music are

—

—

called fantasias (without a theme), and, indeed,

music that

all

is

be a man, or

not set to words.

In the estimate of a free beauty (according to

mere form) we have the pure judgement of taste. No concept is here presupposed of any end

perhaps, a warrior that has to

which the manifold should serve the given and which the latter, therefore, should an incumbrance which would only represent restrict the freedom of the imagination that, as it were, is at play in the contemplation of the outward form. But the beauty of man (including under this head that of a man, woman, or child), the beau-

Now

the delight in the manifold of a thing,

in reference to the internal its possibility, is

Taste,

it is

ic.

For

sal, it

by

this

it

becomes

com-

fixed, and, while not univer-

enables rules to be prescribed for

it

in re-

spect of certain definite final objects. But these rules are then not rules of taste, but

merely rules

for establishing a union of taste with reason,

of the beautiful with the good

—

rules

i.e.,

by which

becomes available as an intentional instrument in respect of the latter, for the purpose of bringing that temper of the mind which

the former

self-sustaining and of subjective universal va-

is

lidity to the

[Cf. p. 478, et seq.]

true, stands to gain

bination of intellectual delight with the aesthet-

for

—

end that determines on a concept,

a delight based

whereas delight in the beautiful is such as does not presuppose any concept, but is immediately coupled with the representation through which the object is given (not through which it is thought). If, now, the judgement of taste in respect of the latter delight is made dependent upon the end involved in the former delight as a judgement of reason, and is thus placed under a restriction, then it is no longer a free and pure judgement of taste.

object,

i

is,

have a warlike appearance.

particular end.

lated

only the form

mode

support and maintenance of that

of thought which, while possessing objec-

tive universal validity, can only

be preserved by

a resolute effort. But, strictly speaking, perfec-

by beauty, nor beauty by peris rather this, when we compare the representation through which an object is given to us with the object (in respect of what tion neither gains fection.

The

truth

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT

489

judgement. But in cases like this, although such a person should lay down a correct judgement of taste, since he would be estimating the object as a free beauty, he would still be found fault with by another who saw nothing in its beauty but a dependent quality (i.e., who looked to the end of the object) and would be accused by him of false taste, though both would, in their own way, be judging correctly: the one ac-

one who imitates a model, while showing skill commensurate with his success, only displays taste as himself a critic of this model. 1 Hence it follows that the highest model, the archetype of taste, is a mere idea, which each person must beget in his own consciousness, and according to which he must form his estimate of everything that is an object of taste, or that is an example of critical taste, and even of universal taste itself. Properly speaking, an idea signifies a concept of reason, and an ideal the representation of an individual existence as adequate to an idea. Hence this archetype of taste which rests, indeed, upon reason's indeterminate idea of a maximum, but is not, however, capable of being represented by means of concepts, but only in an individual presentation may more appropriately be called the ideal of the beautiful. While not having this ideal in our possession, we still

cording to what he had present to his senses, the other according to what was present in his

strive to beget it within us. But it is bound to be merely an ideal of the imagination, seeing that

thoughts. This distinction enables us to settle

it rests,

many

entation

it is

meant

to be)

by means of

not help reviewing

it

sation in the subject.

a concept,

we

also in respect of the sen-

Hence

there results a gain

to the entire faculty of our representative

when harmony

er

can-

pow-

prevails between both states

of mind.

In respect of an object with a definite internal end, a judgement of taste would only be pure

where the person judging either has no concept of this end, or else

makes abstraction from

in

it

his

disputes about beauty on the part of crit-

ics; for

we may show them how one

side

is

deal-

—

—

not upon concepts, but upon the pres-

— the faculty of presentation being the

imagination.

Now, how do we

beauty? Is

arrive at such an

ing with free beauty, and the other with that

ideal of

which is dependent: the former passing a pure judgement of taste, the latter one that is applied

Further, what species of the beautiful admits of an ideal?

intentionally.

First of all, we do well to observe that the beauty for which an ideal has to be sought cannot be a beauty that is free and at large, but must be one fixed by a concept of objective finality. 2 Hence it cannot belong to the object of an altogether pure judgement of taste, but must attach to one that is partly intellectual. In other words, where an ideal is to have place among the grounds upon which any estimate is formed, then beneath grounds of that kind there must

§ 17.

The Ideal of beauty

There

can be no objective rule of taste by is beautiful may be defined by means of concepts. For every judgement from that source is aesthetic, i.e., its determining

which what

ground is the feeling of the subject, and not any concept of an object. It is only throwing away labour to look for a principle of taste that affords a universal criterion of the beautiful definite concepts; because

what

is

sought

by

is

a

it

a priori or empirically?

some idea of reason according to determinate by which the end underlying the in-

lie

concepts,

thing impossible and inherently contradictory.

ternal possibility of the object

But

priori.

in the

universal communicability of the

—

—

a communifrom any concept

sensation (of delight or aversion) cability, too, that exists apart

in the accord, so far as possible, of all ages

and nations

as to this feeling in the representa-

is

unthinkable. But,

fixed

agreement in estimating the forms under which objects are given to them. For this reason some products of taste are looked on as exemplary not meaning thereby

—

by imitating others taste may be acquired. For taste must be an original faculty; whereas that

it

may

view,

also be impossible to

represent an ideal of a beauty dependent on def-

presumption, of the derivation of a taste, thus confirmed by examples, from grounds deepseated and shared alike by all men, underlying their

determined a

inite ends, e.g., a beautiful residence, a beautiful tree,

raise a

is

ideal of beautiful flowers, of a beau-

tiful suite of furniture, or of a beautiful

we have the empirical weak indeed and scarce sufficient to

tion of certain objects, criterion,

An

a beautiful garden, etc., presumably because their ends are not sufficiently defined and

by

their concept, with the result that their

1 Models of taste with respect to the arts of speech must be composed in a dead and learned language; the

to prevent their having to suffer the changes that inevitably overtake living ones, making dignified expressions become degraded, common ones antiquated, and ones newly coined after a short currency obsolete: the second to ensure its having a grammar that is not subject to the caprices of fashion, but has fixed rules of first,

its

own. 2

[Cf. § 16.]

THE CRITIQUE

490 finality is nearly as free as

real existence

its

with beauty that

Only what has

quite at large.

— only man

in itself the

that

is

is

end of

able himself

by reason, or, where he has to derive them from external perception, can still compare them with essential and universal ends, and then further pronounce aesthetically upon their accord with such ends, only he, to determine his ends

among

objects in the world, admits, there-

all

fore, of

an ideal of beauty, just as humanity in admits of the

his person, as intelligence, alone

ideal of perfection.

Two

factors are here involved. First, there

the aesthetic normal idea, which

is

an individual intuition (of the imagination). This represents the norm by which we judge of a man as a member of a particular animal species. Secondly, there

is

is

the rational idea. This deals with the

ends of humanity so far as capable of sensuous representation, and converts them into a principle for estimating his outward form, through

wishes to judge normal size determined upon a comparative estimate, then imagination (to my

mind) allows a great number of these images (perhaps the whole thousand) to fall one upon the other, and,

if

I

may

be allowed to extend to

the case the analogy of optical presentation, in

where they come most together, and

the space

within the contour where the place

is

illuminat-

ed by the greatest concentration of colour, one gets a perception of the average size, which alike in height and breadth is equally removed from the extreme limits of the greatest and smallest statures; and this is the stature of a beautiful man. (The same result could be obtained in a mechanical way, by taking the measures of all the thousand, and adding together their heights, and their breadths [and thicknesses], and dividing the sum in each case by a thousand.) But the power of imagination does all this by means of a dynamical effect upon the organ of internal sense, arising from the frequent apprehension of

man we

which these ends are revealed in their phenomenal effect. The normal idea must draw from experience the constituents which it requires for the form of an animal of a particular kind. But

such forms.

the greatest finality in the construction of this

country where the comparFor this reason a Negro must necessarily (under these empirical conditions) have a different normal idea of the beauty of forms from what a white man has, and the Chinaman one different from the European. And the process would be just the same with the model of a beautiful horse or dog (of a particular breed). This normal idea is not derived from proportions taken from experience as definite

—

form

norm

that which

would serve as a universal

for forming an estimate of each individual

of the species in question

—the image

that, as

it

were, forms an intentional basis underlying the technic of nature, to which no separate individual,

but only the race as a whole,

has

its

merely

seat

subject. Ye!

is,

it

is

adequate,

in the idea of the

with

all

its

judging

proportions, an

aesthetic idea, and, as such, capable of being fully presented in concreto in a

Now, how

this effected?

is

process

the

who can her?),

to

model image.

In order to render

some extent

intelligible

(for

nature's whole secret from attempt a psychological expla-

wrest

let

us

nation. It is of

note that the imagination, in a manner

quite incomprehensible to us,

is able on occaeven after a long lapse of time, not alone to recall the signs for concepts, but also to reproduce the image and shape of an object out

sion,

of a countless

number

of others of a different,

or even of the very same, kind. And, further,

mind

if

engaged upon comparisons, we may well suppose that it can in actual fact, though the

is

the process is unconscious, superimpose as it were one image upon another, and from the coincidence of a number of the same kind arrive at a mean contour which serves as a common

standard for all. Say, for instance, a person has seen a thousand full-grown men. Now if he

If, again, for

our average

seek on similar lines for the average head, and for this the average nose,

and so on, then we get

the figure that underlies the normal idea of a

beautiful ison

is

rules:

1

man

in the

instituted.

rather

is it

according to this idea that

rules for forming estimates first

become pos-

an intermediate between all singular intuitions of individuals, with their manifold variations a floating image for the whole genus, which nature has set as an archetype underlying those of her products that belong to the same species, but which in no single case she sible. It is

—

1 [Cf. p. 489. A partial anticipation of this section is contained in the Critique 0} Pure Reason, p. 173-4

"Such is the constitution of the ideal of reason, which is always based upon determinate conceptions, and serves as a rule and a model for imitation or for criticism Very different is the nature of the ideals of the imagination. Of these it is impossible to present an intelligible conception; they are a kind of monogram, drawn according to no determinate rule, and forming rather a vague picture the production of many diverse experiences than a determinate image. Such are the ideals which painters and physiognomists profess to have in their minds, and which can serve neither as a model for production nor as a standard for appreciation. They may be termed, though improperly, sensuous ideals, as they are declared to be models of certain possible empirical intuitions. They cannot, however, furnish rules or standards for explanation or examination."]

—

—

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT seems to have completely attained. But the normal idea is far from giving the complete archetype of beauty in the genus. It only gives the form that constitutes the indispensable condition of

all

such a standard can never be purely aesthetic, and that one formed according to an ideal of beauty cannot be a simple judgement of taste. Definition of the Beautiful derived from

beauty, and, consequently, only cor-

rectness in the presentation of the genus. It

famous "Doryphorus" of Polycletus was (and Myron's "Cow" might be similarly employed for its kind). It cannot, for

called, the rule

that very reason, contain anything specifically

would not be the normal idea for the genus. Further, it is not by beauty that its presentation pleases, but merely because it does not contradict any of the conditions under which alone a thing belonging to this it

genus can be beautiful. The presentation merely academically correct. 1

Beauty

man

figure.

Here

only to be sought in the huthe ideal consists in the ex-

pression of the moral, apart from which the object

would not please

at once universally

and

positively (not merely negatively in a presentation academically correct).

The

sion of moral ideas 2 that govern can, of course, only be

visible expres-

men

inwardly

drawn from experience;

but their combination with all that our reason connects with the morally good in the idea benevolence, purity, of the highest finality

—

strength, or equanimity, etc. it

—may be made,

as

were, visible in bodily manifestation (as ef-

fect of

what

is

internal),

and

this

embodiment

involves a union of pure ideas of reason and great imaginative power, in one

form an estimate of

it,

who would even

not to speak of being the

author of its presentation. The correctness of such an ideal of beauty is evidenced by its not permitting any sensuous charm to mingle with

which it still allows us to take a great interest. This fact in turn shows that an estimate formed according to the delight in

its

object, in

— —

1 It will be found that a perfectly regular face one that a painter might fix his eye on for a model ordinarily conveys nothing. This is because it is devoid of anything characteristic, and so the idea of the race is expressed in it rather than the specific qualities of a person. The exaggeration of what is characteristic in this way, i.e., exaggeration violating the normal idea (the finality of the race), is called caricature. Also experience shows that these quite regular faces indicate as a rule internally only a mediocre type of man; presumaif one may assume that nature in its external form bly expresses the proportions of the internal because, where none of the mental qualities exceed the proportion requisite to constitute a man free from faults, nothing can be expected in the way of what is called genius, in

—

which nature seems to make a departure from its wonted relations of the mental powers in favour of some special one. [Cf. p. 527» et seq.] 2 [Cf. p. S49-]

form of

the

finality in

an object, so

apart from the representa-

it

an end. 3

tion of

Fourth Moment. Of the Judgement of Taste: Moment of the Modality of the Delight in the Object

Nature of the modality

§ 18.

in a

judgement

of taste

may

assert in the case of every representa-

tion that the synthesis of a pleasure with the

representation (as a cognition)

Of what

ble.

in

mind

is

at least possi-

I call agreeable I assert that

tually causes pleasure in me.

its

ac-

part to delight. However,

this necessity is of a special kind. It

—such

theoretical objective necessity let

it

But what we have

in the case of the beautiful is a neces-

sary reference on

is

as

not a

would

us cognize a priori that every one will feel

this delight in the object that is called beautiful

by me. Nor yet which

is

it

a practical necessity, in

case, thanks to concepts of a

pure rational

which free agents are supplied with a rule, this delight is the necessary consequence of an objective law, and simply means that one ought absolutely (without ulterior object) to act in a certain way. Rather, being such a necessity as is thought in an aesthetic judgement, it can only be termed exemplary. In other words

will in

it is

a necessity of the assent of all to a judge-

ment regarded judgement

is

as exemplifying a universal rule

formulation.

incapable of

ment, this necessity and so it

Since an aesthetic

not an objective or cognitive judge-

nite concepts, is

—

is

far as perceived in

I

But the ideal of the beautiful is still somefrom its normal idea. For reasons it is

Moment

is

thing different

already stated

Third

this is,

as the

characteristic; for otherwise

491

inferable

is

is

not derivable from definot apodeictic.

Much

less

from universality of experience

3 As telling against this explanation, the instance may be adduced that there are things in which we see a form suggesting adaptation to an end,* without any end being cognized in them as, for example, the stone implements frequently obtained from sepulchral tumuli and supplied with a hole, as if for [inserting] a handle; and although these by their shape manifestly indicate a finality, the end of which is unknown, they are not on that accpunt described as beautiful. But the very fact of their being regarded as art-products involves an immediate recognition that their shape is attributed to some purpose or other and to a definite end. For this reason

—

there is no immediate delight whatever in their contemplation. A flower, on the other hand, such as a tulip, is regarded as beautiful, because we meet with a certain finality in its perception, which, in our estimate of it, is not referred to any end whatever. * [Cf. p. 523, et seq.]

THE CRITIQUE

492

(of a thoroughgoing agreement of judgements about the beauty of a certain object). For, apart from the fact that experience would hardly furnish evidences

numerous

sufficiently

for this

purpose, empirical judgements do not afford any foundation for a concept of the necessity of these judgements.

The subjective necessity attributed

§ 19.

judgement oj

taste

is

to

a

conditioned

The judgement of taste exacts agreement from every one; and a person who describes something as beautiful insists that every one ought to give the object

in

question his approval

and follow suit in describing it as beautiful. The ought in aesthetic judgements, therefore, despite an accordance with all the requisite data for passing judgement, is still only pronounced conditionally. We are suitors for agreement from every one else, because we are fortified with a ground common to all. Further, we would be able to count on this agreement, provided we were always assured of the correct subsumption of the case under that ground as the rule of approval. § 20.

The condition oj by a judgement oj

the necessity advanced taste

common

is

the idea oj a

sense

Such a principle,

however, could only be regarded as a common sense. This differs essentially from common understanding, which

is

mon

communis) is not one by

sense (sensus

also

sometimes called com:

for the judge-

ment of the latter feeling, but always one by concepts, though usually only in the shape of obscurely represented principles. The judgement of taste, therefore, depends

on our presupposing the existence of a common sense. (But this is not to be taken to mean some external sense, but the effect arising from the free play of our powers of cognition.) Only un-

der the presupposition,

mon

sense, are

of taste.

we

I repeat,

able to lay

Have we reason

common

of such a

down

com-

a judgement

jor presupposing a

sense?

Cognitions and judgements must, together with their attendant conviction, 1 admit of being universally communicated; for otherwise a correspondence with the object would not be due to them. They would be a conglomerate constituting a mere subjective play of the powers of representation, just as scepticism would have it. But if cognitions are to admit of communication, then our mental state, i.e., the way the cognitive powers are attuned for cognition generally, and, in fact, the relative proportion suitable for a representation (by which an object is given to us) from which cognition is to result, must also admit of being universally communicated, as, without this, which is the subjective condition of the act of knowing, knowledge, as an effect, would not arise. And this is always what actually happens where a given object, through the intervention of sense, sets the imagination at work in arranging the manifold, and the imagination, in turn, the understanding in giving to this arrangement the unity of concepts. But this disposition of the cognitive powers has a relative proportion differing with the diversity of the objects that are given. in

which

for both

However, there must be one

this internal ratio suitable for

ing (one faculty

Were judgements of taste (like cognitive judgements) in possession of a definite objective principle, then one who in his judgement followed such a principle would claim unconditioned necessity for it. Again, were they devoid of any principle, as are those of the mere taste of sense, then no thought of any necessity on their part would enter one's head. Therefore they must have a subjective principle, and one which determines what pleases or displeases, by means of feeling only and not through concepts, but yet with universal validity.

§ 21.

by the other)

mental powers

is

quicken-

best adapted

in respect of cognition

(of given objects) generally; and this disposition can

only be determined through feeling (and not by concepts). Since, now this disposition itself must admit of being universally communicated, and hence also the feeling of it (in the case of a given representation), while again, the universal communicability of a feeling pre-

supposes a common sense: it follows that our assumption of it is well founded. And here, too,

we do not have

to take our stand

on psychologi-

common

sense

as the necessary condition of the universal

com-

cal observations,

but

we assume

a

municability of our knowledge, which

is

presup-

posed in every logic and every principle of knowledge that is not one of scepticism. §22. The necessity oj the universal assent that is thought in a judgement oj taste, is a subjective necessity which, under the presupposition oj a

common

sense,

is

represented as

objective

In

judgements by which we describe anywe tolerate no one else being of a different opinion, and in taking up this position we do not rest our judgement upon conall

thing as beautiful,

1

[Cf. Critique oj Pure Reason, pp. 240-43.]

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT cepts, but only on our feeling. Accordingly we introduce this fundamental feeling not as a private feeling, but as a public sense. Now, for this pur-

pose, experience cannot be

common

made

the ground of

invoked to justify judgements containing an "ought." The assertion is not that every one will fall in with our judgement, but rather that every one ought to agree with it. Here I put forward my judgement of taste as an example of the judgement of common sense, and attribute to it on that account exemplary validity. Hence common sense is a mere ideal norm. With this as presupposition, a judgement that accords with it, as well as the delight in an object expressed in that judgement, is rightly converted into a rule for everyone. For the principle, while it is only subthis

sense, for the latter

jective, being yet

assumed

is

as subjectively uni-

versal (a necessary idea for everyone), could, in

what concerns the consensus of

ing subjects,

demand

different judg-

universal assent like an

objective principle, provided of our subsumption under

it

we were

assured

being correct.

This indeterminate norm of a common sense as a matter of fact, presupposed by us; as is shown by our presuming to lay down judgements of taste. But does such a common sense 1 is,

in fact exist as a constitutive principle of the

possibility of experience, or

a regulative principle

by

a

formed

is it still

for us as

higher principle

of reason, that for higher ends first seeks to be-

get in us a

common

sense? Is taste, in other

words, a natural and original faculty, or is it only the idea of one that is artificial and to be acquired by us, so that a judgement of taste,

with its demand for universal assent, is but a requirement of reason for generating such a consensus, and does the "ought," i. e., the objective necessity of the coincidence of the feeling of all with the particular feeling of each, only betoken the possibility of arriving at some sort of unanimity in these matters, and the judgement of taste only adduce an example of the application of this principle? These are questions which as

yet

we

are neither willing nor in a position to in-

vestigate.

For the present we have only

solve the faculty of taste into

its

to re-

elements, and

to unite these ultimately in the idea of a

mon

Definition of the Beautiful drawn

Fourth

The cept,

com-

sense.

is

from

the

Moment

is that which, apart from a concognized as object of a necessary delight.

beautiful

1 [Cf. §40; also pp. 482, 505, et seq.; 543, et seq.; 549-]

493

General Remark on the First Section of the Analytic

The

be extracted from the foregoing That everything runs up into the concept of taste as a critical faculty by which an object is estimated in reference to the free conformity to law of the imagination. If, now, imagination must in the judgement of taste be regarded in its freedom, then, to begin with, it is not taken as reproductive, as in its subjection to the laws of association, but as productive and exerting an activity of its own (as originator of arbitrary forms of possible intuitions). 2 And although in the apprehension of a given object of sense it is tied down to a definite result to

analysis

is

in effect this:

form of this object and, to that extent, does not enjoy free play (as it does in poetry), 3 still it is easy to conceive that the object may supply ready-made to the imagination just such a form of the arrangement of the manifold as the imagination, if it were left to itself, would freely protect in harmony with the general conformity to law of the understanding. But that the imagination should be both free and of itself conformable to law, i. e., carry autonomy with it, is a contradiction. The understanding alone gives the law. Where, however, the imagination is compelled to follow a course laid down by a definite law, then what the form of the product is to be is determined by concepts; but, in that case, as already shown, the delight is not delight but in the good (in perfection, though it be no more than formal perfection), and the judgement is not one due to taste. Hence it is only a conformity to law without a law, and a subjective harmonizing of the imagination and the understanding without an objective one which latter would mean that the in the beautiful,

—

representation was referred to a definite concept of the object that can consist with the

—

free conformity to law of the understanding

(which has also been called finality apart from an end) and with the specific character of a judgement of taste.

Now

geometrically regular figures, a

square, a cube, and the like, are

circle,

a

commonly

brought forward by critics of taste as the most simple and unquestionable examples of beauty. And yet the very reason why they are called regular, is because the only way of representing them is by looking on them as mere presentations of a determinate concept by which the figure has its rule (according to which alone it 2

3

[Cf. p. 528, et seq.] [Cf. pp. 528; 530, et seq.; 533, et seq.]

THE CRITIQUE

494

possible) prescribed for it. One or other of these two views must, therefore, be wrong:

is

either the verdict of the critics that attributes

our own, which from any concept neces-

beauty

to such figures, or else

makes

finality apart

sary for beauty. One would scarce think

necessary for a

it

man

have taste to take more delight in a circle than in a scrawled outline, in an equilateral and equiangular quadrilateral than in one that is all lop-sided, and, as it were, deformed. The requirements of common understanding ensure to

such a preference without the least demand taste. Where some purpose is perceived, as. for instance, that of forming an estimate of

upon

the area of a plot of land, or rendering intelligible the relation of divided parts to one another to the whole, then regular figures,

and

and those

of the simplest kind, are needed; and the delight does not rest immediately upon the way the fig-

ure strikes the eye, but upon its serviceability for all manner of possible purposes. A room

with the walls making oblique angles, a plot laid in a similar

way, even any viola-

symmetry, as well

in the figure of ani-

out in a garden tion of

mals

(e. g.,

being one-eyed) as in that of build-

ings, or of flower-beds, is displeasing its

way

in respect of

thing to

because of

perversity of form, not alone in a practical

may

manner

all

judgement of

when

some

definite use to

which the

be put. but for an estimate that looks of possible purposes. taste the case

is

With the

different.

For,

combines delight or aversion immediately with the bare contemplation of the object irrespective of its use or of any end. it

The

is

pure,

it

regularity that conduces to the concept

of an object

is,

in fact, the

indispensable con-

qua non) of grasping the representation and giving to

dition (conditio sine

object as a single the manifold

its determinate form. This determination is an end in respect of knowledge; and in this connection it is invariably coupled with delight (such as attends the accomplishment of any, even problematical, purpose). Here, however, we have merely the value set upon the solution that satisfies the problem, and not a free and indeterminately final entertainment of the mental powers with what is called beautiful. In the latter case, understanding is at the service of imagination, in the former, this relation is

reversed.

With

a

thin«;

that

owes

its

possibility to a

purpose, a building, or even an animal,

its

regu-

symmetry, must express the unity of the intuition accompanying the concept of its end, and belongs with it to cognition. larity,

which consists

in

But where all that is intended is the maintenance of a free play of the powers of representation (subject, however, to the condition that there is to be nothing for understanding to take exception to), in ornamental gardens, in the decoration of rooms, in all kinds of furniture that shows good taste, etc., regularity in the shape of constraint is to be avoided as far as possible. Thus English taste in gardens, and fantastic taste in furniture, push the freedom of imagina-

—

the idea tion to the verge of what is grotesque being that in this divorce from all constraint of rules the precise instance is being afforded where taste can exhibit its perfection in projects of the imagination to the fullest extent.

All stiff regularity (such as borders

matical regularity)

is

on mathe-

inherently repugnant to

taste, in that the contemplation of it affords us no lasting entertainment. Indeed, where it has neither cognition nor some definite practical end expressly in view, we get heartily tired of it. On the other hand, anything that gives the imagination scope for unstudied and final play is always fresh to us. We do not grow to hate the very sight of it. Marsden, in his description of Sumatra, observes that the free beauties of nature so surround the beholder on all sides that they cease to have much attraction for him. 1 On the other hand he found a pepper garden full of charm, on coming across it in mid-forest with its rows of parallel stakes on which the plant twines itself. From all this he infers that wild, and in its appearance quite irregular beauty, is only pleasing as a change to one whose eyes have become surfeited with regular beauty. But he need only have made the experiment of passing one day in his pepper garden to realize that once the regularity has enabled the understanding to put itself in accord

with the order that

is

the constant requirement,

instead of the object diverting

him any

longer,

imposes an irksome constraint upon the imagination: whereas nature subject to no constraint of artificial rules, and lavish, as it there is, in its luxuriant variety can supply constant food for his taste. Even a bird's song, which we can reduce to no musical rule, seems to have

it

more freedom

in it, and thus to be richer for than the human voice singing in accordance with all the rules that the art of music prescribes; for we grow tired much sooner of frequent and lengthy repetitions of the latter. Yet here most likely our sympathy with the mirth of a dear little creature is confused with taste,

1

[The History of Sumatra, by W. Marsden

1783),

p. if3.]

(

London,

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT the beauty of

by man

its

song, for

(as has been

if

exactly imitated

sometimes done with the 1 it would strike our

field, as

495

on the incentive

in poetic fiction,

i.

e.,

in the peculiar fancies with

notes of the nightingale)

which the mind entertains

ear as wholly destitute of taste.

continually stirred

Further, beautiful objects have to be distin-

the eye. It

is

just

receives to indulge

it

itself as it is

being

by the variety that strikes as when we watch the chang-

guished from beautiful views of objects (where

ing shapes of the fire or of a rippling brook:

the distance often prevents a clear perception). 2

neither of which are things of beauty, but they

In the latter case, taste appears to fasten, not so much on what the imagination grasps in this

convey a charm

Book § 23. Transition

from

II.

the beautiful to that of estimating the sublime

The

beautiful and the sublime agree on the

own

its

to the imagination, because they

free play.

Analytic of the Sublime

the faculty of estimating

point of pleasing on their

sustain

account. Further

they agree in not presupposing either a judgement of sense or one logically determinant, but

one of reflection. Hence it follows that the delight does not depend upon a sensation, as with the agreeable, nor upon a definite concept, as does the delight in the good, although it has, for all that, an indeterminate reference to concepts. Consequently the delight is connected with the

tended with a feeling of the furtherance of life, is thus compatible with charms and a playful imagination. On the other hand, the feeling of the sublime is a pleasure that only arises indirectly, being brought about by the feeling of a momentary check to the vital forces followed at once by a discharge all the more powerful, and so it is an emotion that seems to be no sport, but dead earnest in the affairs of the imagina-

and

tion.

Hence charms are repugnant to it; and, mind is not simply attracted by the

since the

object, but

is

also alternately repelled thereby,

the delight in the sublime does not so

much

in-

to express the accord, in a

volve positive pleasure as admiration or respect, i. e., merits the name of a negative pleasure.

given intuition, of the faculty of presentation, or the imagination, with the faculty of concepts

But the most important and vital distinction between the sublime and the beautiful is cer-

mere presentation and is thus taken

or faculty of presentation,

that belongs to understanding or reason, in the

sense of the former assisting the latter.

Hence

both kinds of judgements are singular, and yet such as profess to be universally valid in respect of every subject, despite the fact that their claims are directed merely to the feeling of pleasure and not to any knowledge of the are,

and

is

a question of the

form

The

strik-

beautiful

ject of our delight, that which, without our in-

of the object,

whereas the sublime is to be found in an object even devoid of form, so far as it immediately involves, or else by its presence provokes a representation of limitlessness, yet with a superadded thought of its totality. Accordingly, the beautiful seems to be regarded as a presentation of an indeterminate concept of understanding, the sublime as a presentation of an indeterminate concept of reason. Hence the delight is in the former case coupled with the representation of quality, but in this case with that of quantity. Moreover, the former delight is very different from the latter in kind. For the beautiful is directly at1

2

this consists in limitation,

[Cf. p. 523, et seq.] [Cf. p. S33-]

that whereas

self-subsisting) con-

is

in its form making the object apwere, preadapted to our power of judgement, so that it thus forms of itself an ob-

however, also important and

ing differences between the two. in nature

ment with nature), we observe natural beauty (such as

veys a finality pear, as

object.

There

if, as is allowable, we here conour attention in the first instance to the sublime in objects of nature (that of art being always restricted by the conditions of an agree-

tainly this: that

fine

it

dulging in any refinements of thought, but, simply in our apprehension of of the sublime,

it,

excites the feeling

may

appear, indeed, in point of form to contravene the ends of our power of

judgement, to be ill-adapted to our faculty of it were, an outrage on the imagination, and yet it is judged all the more sublime on that account. From this it may be seen at once that we express ourselves on the whole inaccurately if we term any object of nature sublime, although we may with perfect propriety call many such objects beautiful. For how can that which is apprehended as inherently contra-final be noted with an expression of approval? All that we can presentation, and to be, as

say

is

that the object lends itself to the presen-

tation of a sublimity discoverable in the mind.

THE CRITIQUE

496

For the sublime, in the strict sense of the word, cannot be contained in any sensuous form, but rather concerns ideas of reason, which, although no adequate presentation of them is possible, may be excited and called into the mind by that very inadequacy itself which does admit of sensuous presentation. Thus the broad ocean agi-

by storms cannot be called sublime. Its aspect is horrible, and one must have stored one's mind in advance with a rich stock of ideas,

and makes the theory of the sublime a mere appendage to the aesthetic estimate of the finality of nature, because

resentation.

tated

if

such an intuition

a feeling which

is

to raise

is

it

§ 24.

Subdivision of an investigation of the feeling of the sublime

to the pitch of

In the division of the moments of an aesthetic

be-

estimate of objects in respect of the feeling of

sublime

itself

—sublime

cause the mind has been incited to abandon sensibility and employ itself upon ideas involv-

able to follow the

ing higher finality.

alysis of

Self-subsisting natural beauty reveals to us a

technic of nature which shows

does not give a represen-

it

any particular form in nature, but involves no more than the development of a final employment by the imagination of its own reptation of

it

in the light of

the sublime, the course of the Analytic will be

same

principle as in the an-

judgements of taste. For, the judgement being one of the aesthetic reflective judgement, the delight in the sublime, just like that

must

be shown

a system ordered in accordance with laws the

in the beautiful,

not to be found within the 1 range of our entire faculty of understanding. This principle is that of a finality relative to the

to be universally valid, in its quality independ-

principle of which

is

employment of judgement in respect of phenomena which have thus to be assigned, not merely to nature regarded as aimless mechanism, but also to nature

analogy of

art.

Hence

it

regarded after the

gives a veritable exten-

our knowledge of objects of nature, but to our conception of nature itself nature as mere mechanism being enlarged to an extension the conception of nature as art sion, not, of course, to

—

—

profound inquiries as to the possibility of such a form. But in what we are wont to call sublime in nature there is such an absence of anything leading to particular objective principles and corresponding forms of nature that it is rather in its chaos, or in its wildest and most irregular disorder and desolation, provided it gives signs of magnitude and power, that nature inviting

chiefly excites the ideas of the sublime.

we is

Hence

see that the concept of the sublime in nature far less important

than that of

its

and

consequences

rich in

beauty. It gives on the whole no

indication of anything final in nature itself, but

only

in the possible

employment

of our intui-

own

ent of interest, in

and the

its

latter, in its

in its quantity

relation subjective finality,

modality, necessary. Hence

method here will not depart from the lines followed in the preceding section: unless something is made of the point that there, where the

the

aesthetic object,

judgement bore on the form of the

we began with

the investigation of

its

whereas here, considering the formlessness that may belong to what we call sublime, we begin with that of its quantity, as first moment of the aesthetic judgement on the sublime a divergence of method the reason for which is evident from § 23. But the analysis of the sublime obliges a diquality,

—

by that of the

vision not required

namely one

beautiful,

into the mathematically

and the dynamically sublime. For the feeling of sublime involves as its characteristic feature a mental movement combined with the estimate of the object, whereas taste in respect of the beautiful presupposes that the mind is in restful contemplation, and it in this state. But this movement has be estimated as subjectively final (since the sublime pleases). Hence it is referred through

preserves to

of a finality quite independent of nature.

the imagination either to the faculty of cognition or to that of desire; but to whichever fac-

the beautiful in

ulty the reference

tions of

it

in

inducing a feeling

in

our

selves

For nature we must seek a ground

is

made, the

external to ourselves, but for the sublime one

given representation

merely

of these faculties (apart

in ourselves

and the attitude of mind

that introduces sublimity into the representation of nature. This

is a very needful preliminary remark. It entirely separates the ideas of the sublime from that of a finality of nature, i [This may be compared with the first paragraph of the Introduction to the Critique of Teleologkal Judgement ; p. 550, below. Cf. pp. 487, 512, et seq.; 516, et seq.; 518, et seq.; 531.]

is

finality of the

estimated only in respect

from end or

interest).

Accordingly the first is attributed to the object as a mathematical, the second as a dynamical, affection of the imagination.

Hence we

get the

above double mode of representing an object as sublime. 2 2 [Cf. p. 507. Also Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 43, 67.]

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT A.

The Mathematically Sublime

§25. Definition of the term "sublime"

Sublime is the name given to what is absolutely great. But to be great and to be a magnitude are entirely different concepts (magnitudo and quantitas). In the same way, to assert without qualification (simpliciter) that something is great is quite a different thing from saying that it is absolutely great (absolute, non comparative magnum). The latter is what is beyond all comparison great. What, then, is the meaning of the assertion that anything

medium

size?

What

is

is

concept of understanding, of sense; and just as

great, or small, or of

indicated

still less

little

is

it

not a pure

is

497

greatness is ascribed to it pre-eminently among many other objects of a like kind, yet without the extent of this pre-eminence being deter-

an intuition

a concept of

mined. Hence a standard

is

certainly laid at the

which standard is presupposed to be one that can be taken as the same for every one, but which is available only for an aesthetic estimate of the greatness, and not for one that is logical (mathematically determined), for the standard is a merely subjective one underlying the reflective judgement upon the greatness. Furthermore, this standard

basis of the judgement,

may

be empirical,

men known

of the

as, let

us say, the average size

to us, of animals of a certain

kind, of trees, of houses, of mountains, and so

Or

forth.

it

may

be a standard given a priori,

does not import any principle of cognition. It must, therefore, be a concept of judgement, or have its source in one, and must

which by reason of the imperfections of the

reason, for

it

judging subject

is

restricted to subjective condi-

tions of presentation in concreto; as, in the

introduce as basis of the judgement a subjective with reference to

practical sphere, the greatness of a particular

finality of the representation

virtue, 1 or of public liberty

power of judgement. Given a multiplicity of the homogeneous together constituting one thing, and we may at once cognize from the thing itself that it is a magnitude (quantum).

country;

the

No

comparison with other things is required. But to determine how great it is always requires something else, which itself has magnitude, for its measure. Now, since in the estimate of magnitude we have to take into account not merely the multiplicity (number of units) but also the magnitude of the unit (the measure), and since the magnitude of this unit in turn always requires something else as its measure and as the standard of its comparison, and so on, we see that the computation of the magnitude of phe-

nomena

is,

in all

cases,

utterly incapable of

or, in

and justice

in a

the theoretical sphere, the great-

ness of the accuracy or inaccuracy of an experi-

ment or measurement,

etc.

Here, now, it is of note that, although we have no interest whatever in the object, i. e., its real existence may be a matter of no concern to us, still its mere greatness, regarded even as devoid of form, is able to convey a universally

communicable delight and

so involve the con-

sciousness of a subjective finality in the employ-

ment

of our cognitive faculties, but not, be

remembered, a delight latter

may

tion to

what

in

it

the object, for the

be formless, but, in contradistincis the case with the beautiful, where

the reflective judgement finds itself set to a key that

is final

in respect of cognition generally, a

affording us any absolute concept of a magni-

delight in an extension affecting the imagination

tude, and can, instead, only afford one that

itself.

is

always based on comparison. If, now, I assert without qualification that anything is great, it would seem that I have nothing in the way of a comparison present to my mind, or at least nothing involving an objective measure, for no attempt is thus made to determine how great the object is. But, despite the standard of comparison being merely subjective, the claim of the judgement is none the less one to universal agreement; the judgements: "That man is beautiful" and "He is tall" do not purport to speak only for the judging subject, but, like theoretical judgements, they

demand

Now

the assent of everyone. in a

judgement that without

tion describes anything as great,

qualifica-

not merely meant that the object has a magnitude, but it is

If (subject as above) we say of an object, without qualification, that it is great, this is not a mathematically determinant, but a mere re-

judgement upon its representation, which is subjectively final for a particular employment of our cognitive faculties in the estimation of magnitude, and we then always couple flective

with the representation a kind of respect, just as we do a kind of contempt with what we call absolutely

small.

Moreover, the estimate of

things as great or small extends to everything,

even to all their qualities. Thus we call even their beauty great or small. The reason of this is to be found in the fact that we have only got to present a thing in intuition, as the precept of

judgement directs (consequently 1

[Cf.p.497,c^eg.]

to represent

it

THE CRITIQUE

498 aesthetically), for

it

nomenon, and hence

to be in its entirety a phe-

a

however, we call anything not alone great, but, without qualification, absolutely, and in every respect (beyond all comparison) great, that If,

is it

to say, sublime,

standard outside is it

we soon perceive

that for this

not permissible to seek an appropriate

is

itself,

but merely in

itself. It

a greatness comparable to itself alone. Hence comes that the sublime is not to be looked for

in the

things of nature, but only in our

own

But it must be left to the deduction to show in which of them it resides. The above definition may also be expressed in this way: that is sublime in comparison with which all else is small. Here we readily see that nothing can be given in nature, no matter how ideas.

we may judge it to be, which, regarded in some other relation, may not be degraded to the great

level of the infinitely little,

which

in

standard

and nothing so small

comparison with some

may

still

smaller

not for our imagination be en-

larged to the greatness of a world. Telescopes

have put within our reach an abundance of material to go upon in making the first observation, and microscopes the same in making the second. Nothing, therefore, which can be an object of the senses is to be termed sublime when treated on this footing. But precisely because there is a striving in our imagination towards progress ad infinitum, while reason ity,

demands absolute totalsame inability on the

as a real idea, that

part of our faculty for the estimation of the

magnitude of things of the world of sense to attain to this idea, is the awakening of a feeling of a supersensible faculty within us; and it is the use to which judgement naturally puts particular objects on behalf of this latter feeling, and not the object of sense, that is absolutely great, and every other contrasted employment small. Consequently it is the disposition of soul evoked by a particular representation engaging the attention of the reflective judgement, and not the object, that

is

to be called sublime.

The foregoing formulae

nite concepts of

how

great anything

is

by having

recourse to numbers (or, at any rate, by get-

quantum.

defining the sublime

ting approximate measurements by means of numerical series progressing ad infinitum), the unit being the measure; and to this extent all logical estimation of magnitude is mathematical.

But, as the magnitude of the measure has

assumed as a known quantity, if, to form this, we must again have recourse to numbers involving another standard for their unit, and consequently must again proceed

to be

an estimate of

mathematically,

we can never

arrive at a

first

or fundamental measure, and so cannot get any definite concept of a given magnitude.

The

es-

timation of the magnitude of the fundamental

measure must, therefore, consist merely in the immediate grasp which we can get of it in intuition, and the use to which our imagination can put this in presenting the numerical concepts: i. e., all estimation of the magnitude of objects of nature

is

in the last resort aesthetic (i.e., sub-

and not objectively determined). Now for the mathematical estimation of magnitude there is, of course, no greatest possible (for the power of numbers extends to infinity), jectively

but for the aesthetic estimation there certainly is and of it I say that where it is considered an absolute measure beyond which no greater is possible subjectively (i.e., for the judging subject), it then conveys the idea of the sublime

can evoke (unless in

emotion which no matheby numbers so far as the fundamental

aesthetic measure

kept vividly present to the

and

calls forth that

matical estimation of magnitudes

is

imagination): because the latter presents only the relative magnitude due to comparison with

others of a like kind, whereas the former presents magnitude absolutely, so far as the

can grasp

To

it

in

take in a

mind

an intuition.

quantum

intuitively in the imag-

ination so as to be able to use

it

or unit for estimating magnitude

as a measure,

by numbers,

involves two operations of this faculty: appre-

hension (apprehensio) and comprehension (comprehensio aestheticd) Apprehension presents no .

may, therefore, be supplemented by yet another: The sublime is that, the mere capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind

process can be carried on ad infinitum; but with the advance of apprehen-

transcending every standard of sense.

every step and soon attains

§ 26.

The estimation

of the magnitude of natu-

ral things requisite for the idea of the

sublime

The

estimation of magnitude by means of concepts of number (or their signs in algebra) is

mathematical, but that in mere intuition (by is aesthetic. Now we can only get defi-

the eye)

difficulty: for this

sion comprehension

becomes more its

difficult

at

maximum, and

this is the aesthetically greatest fundamental measure for the estimation of magnitude. For if the apprehension has reached a point beyond which the representations of sensuous intuition in the case of the parts first apprehended begin to disappear from the imagination as this advances to the apprehension of yet others, as

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT much, then, is lost at one end as is gained at the other, and for comprehension we get a maximum which the imagination cannot exceed. This explains Savary's observations in his account of Egypt, 1 that in order to get the full emotional effect of the size of the Pyramids we must avoid coming too near just as much as remaining too far away. For in the latter case the representation of the apprehended parts (the tiers of

no

stones)

effect

is

but obscure, and produces

upon the aesthetic judgement of the

Subject. In the former, however,

the bewilderment,

which, as

is

sort

of perplexity,

said, seizes the visitor

tering St. Peter's in

comes home

or

to

on

Rome. For here

him of

colossal

the

is

mere presentation of a con-

almost too great for presentation, for i.e., borders on the relatively monstrous; the end to be attained by the presentation of a concept is made harder to realize by the intuition of the object being almost too great for our cept which

is

faculty of apprehension. A pure judgement upon the sublime must, however, have no end be-

longing to the object as if it is

to be aesthetic

first

en-

a feeling

the inadequacy of his

Since whatever

is

to be a source of pleasure,

apart from interest, to the merely reflective

judgement must involve nality

—though

—

it

ground for universally valid demere estimation of magnitude, and that, too, in a case where it is pushed to the point at which our faculty of imagination breaks and proves unequal to

in presenting the

concept of a magnitude,

its

task?

In the successive aggregation of units requisite for the representation of magnitudes, the imagination of itself advances ad infinitum with-

—

are to give a suitable example

out let or hindrance understanding, however, conducting it by means of concepts of number for which the former must supply the schema. This procedure belongs to the logical estimation of magnitude, and, as such, is doubtless something objectively final according to the concept of an end (as all measurement is), but it is not anything which for the aesthetic judgement is

we

final or pleasing. Further, in this intentional fi-

—

myself to the remark that if the aesthetic judgement is to be pure (unmixed with any teleological judgement which, as such, belongs to fine

we

it

so as to yield a

down

if

fi-

the does in the case of the beautiful) question arises: What is the subjective finality, and what enables it to be prescribed as a norm (as

upon itself, but in so doing sucan emotional delight. At present I am not disposed to deal with the ground of this delight, connected, as it is, with a representation in which we would least a representation, namely, that of all look for it lets us see its own inadequacy, and consequently its subjective want of finality for our judgement in the estimation of magnitude but con-

it

representation

form of the object underlies our estimate of

cumbs

—

its

here, however, no finality of the

limit, recoils

to

in

subjective, and, as such, universally valid

light in the

reason), and

determining ground, to be tainted with

any judgement of understanding or reason.

imagination for presenting the idea of a whole within which that imagination attains its maximum, and, in its fruitless efforts to extend this

of

its

and not

takes the

it

eye some time to complete the apprehension from the base to the summit; but in this interval the first tiers always in part disappear before the imagination has taken in the last, and so the comprehension is never complete. The same explanation may also sufficiently account for

The

499

for the Critique of aesthetic judgement,

works of art, e.g., buildings, statues and the like, where a human end determines the form as well as the

nality there

magnitude, nor yet in things of nature, that in their very concept import a definite end, e.g., animals of a recognized natural order, but in rude nature merely as involving magnitude (and only in this so far as it does not convey any charm or any emotion arising from actual dan-

as to enlarge the size of the measure,

and thus

make

many

must not point

to the sublime in

ger). For, in a representation of this kind, na-

ture contains nothing monstrous (nor either magnificent or horrible)

what

is

—the magnitude

apprehended may be increased to any extent provided imagination is able to grasp it all in one whole. An object is monstrous where by its size it defeats the end that forms its concept. 1

[Lettres sur I'Egypte, 1787.]

is

nothing compelling us to tax the

utmost powers of the imagination, and drive as far as ever

it

can reach in

its

it

presentations, so

the single intuition holding the

in

one (the comprehension) as great as possible. For, in the estimation of magnitude by the understanding (arithmetic),

we

get just as far,

whether the comprehension of the units is pushed to the number 10 (as in the decimal scale) or only to 4 (as in the quaternary) the further production of magnitude being carried out ;

by the succesive aggregation of units, or, if the quantum is given in intuition, by apprehension, merely progressively (not comprehensively), according to an adopted principle of progression. In this mathematical estimation of magni-

THE CRITIQUE

500 tude, understanding

is

as

well served and as

sat-

whether imagination selects for the unit a magnitude which one can take in at a glance,

isfied

a foot, or a perch, or else a German mile, D the earth's diameter, the apprehension

cl:..

of which

hension it

at

is

in

indeed possible, but not its comprean intuition of the imagination (i.e.,

not possible by means of a comprehensio sthi tied, thought quite so by means of a comis

prehensio logica in a numerical concept). In each case the logical estimation of magnitude

advances ad infinitum with nothing to stop it. The mind, however, hearkens now to the voice of reason, which for all given magnitudes even for those which can never be completely apprehended, though (in sensuous representarequires tion) estimated as completely given totality, and consequently comprehension in one

—

from a theoretical point of view that looks

to

the interests of our faculty of knowledge, but as

mind

from another empass beyond the narrow confines of

a broadening of the

that

(the practical) point of view feels itself

powered

to

sensibility.

Nature, therefore,

phenomena

sublime in such of

is

as in their intuition

of their infinity.

But

this

its

convey the idea

can only occur through

the inadequacy of even the greatest effort of

our imagination in the estimation of the magnitude of an object. But, now, in the case of the mathematical estimation of magnitude, imagination is quite competent to supply a measure equal to the requirements of any object. For

For it is only through this faculty and its idea of a noumenon, which latter, while not itself admitting of any

the numerical concepts of the understanding can by progressive synthesis make any measure adequate to any given magnitude. Hence it must be the aesthetic estimation of magnitude in which we get at once a feeling of the effort towards a comprehension that exceeds the faculty of imagination for mentally grasping the progressive apprehension in a whole of intuition, and, with it, a perception of the inadequacy of this faculty, which has no bounds to its progress, for taking in and using for the estimation of magnitude a fundamental measure that understanding could turn to account without the least trouble. Now the proper unchangeable fundamental measure of nature is its absolute whole, which, with it, regarded as a phenomenon, means infinity comprehended. But, since this fundamental measure is a self-contradictory concept (owing to the impossibility of the absolute totality of an endless progression), it follows that where the size of a natural object is such that the imagination spends its whole faculty of comprehension upon it in vain, it must carry our concept of nature to a supersensible substrate (underlying both nature and our faculty of thought) which is great beyond every standard of sense. Thus, instead of the object, it is

intuition, is yet introduced as substrate

rather the cast of the

—

intuition, and which calls for a presentation answering to all the above members of a progressively increasing numerical series, and does not exempt even the infinite (space and time

past)

1

from

ders

it

inevitable for us to regard this infinite

this

requirement, but rather ren-

judgement of common reason) as com-

(in the

pletely given

But the

(i.e.,

infinite

given in is

its totality).

absolutely

(not merely

comparatively) great. In comparison with this all else (in the way of magnitudes of the same order) tance

small.

is

But the point of capital impormere ability even to think it

that the

is

as a whole indicates a faculty of

mind

tran-

scending every standard of sense. For the latter

would

entail a

comprehension yielding as unit

a standard bearing to the infinite ratio express-

numbers, which is impossible. Still the even to think the given infinite without contradiction, is something that re-

ible in

mere

ability

quires the presence in the

ulty that

is

human mind

of a fac-

itself supersensible.

lying the intuition of the world as

under-

mere phe-

.

that

nomenon,

we have

that the infinite of the world of sense, the pure intellectual estimation of magnitude, is completely comprehended under a con-

its

cept, although in the

bring out

in

mathematical estimation by means of numerical concepts it can never be

completely thought. Even a faculty enabling the infinite of supersensible intuition to be regarded as given (in its intelligible substrate), transcends every standard of sensibility and is great beyond all comparison even with the faculty of mathematical estimation: not, of course, 1

(.Cf

.

Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 130-1.]

mind

in appreciating

it

to estimate as sublime.

Therefore, just as the aesthetic judgement in estimate of the beautiful refers the imagina-

tion in its free play to the understanding, to its

agreement with the concepts of from their determi-

the latter in general (apart

nation) it

:

so in

its

estimate of a thing as sublime

refers that faculty to reason to bring out its

subjective accord with ideas of reason (inde-

temper which the influence of definite (practical) ideas would produce upon feeling, and in common accord with it.

terminately indicated), of

mind conformable

i.e.,

to induce a

to that

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT

501

This makes it evident that true sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the judging subject, and not in the object of nature that occasions this attitude by the estimate formed of it. Who would apply the term "sublime" even to shapeless mountain masses towering one

and unchangeable measure except the absolute whole. But our imagination, even when taxing itself to the uttermost on the score of this required comprehension of a given object in a whole of intuition (and so with a view to

above the other in wild disorder, with their pyramids of ice, or to the dark tempestuous ocean, or such like things? But in the contemplation of them, without any regard to their form, the mind abandons itself to the imagination and to a reason placed, though quite apart

its inadequacy, but still, at the proper vocation of making itself adequate to the same as law. Therefore the feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our own vocation, which we attribute to an object of nature by a certain subreption (substitution of a respect for the object in place of one for the idea of humanity in our own self the subject) and this feeling renders, as it were, intuitable the supremacy of our cognitive faculties on the rational side over the greatest fac-

from any definite end, in conjunction therewith, and merely broadening its view, and it feels itself elevated in its own estimate of itself on finding all the might of imagination still unequal to its ideas.

We

get examples of the mathematically sublime of nature in mere intuition in all those instances where our imagination is afforded, not so

much

a greater numerical concept as a large

measure (for shortening the numerical series). A tree judged by the height of man gives, at all events, a standard for a mountain; unit as

and, supposing this

similarly the earth's

the greatness of the number, as in the fact that

our onward advance

we always arrive at proThe systematic divi-

portionately greater units.

sion of the cosmos conduces to this result. For

becoming

that

all

little;

is

or, to

great in nature as in turn

be more exact,

sents our imagination in

and with

it

all

its

it

repre-

boundlessness,

nature, as sinking into insignificance

before the ideas of reason, once their adequate presentation

is

its

—

;

ulty of sensibility.

The feeling of the sublime is, therefore, at once a feeling of displeasure, arising from the inadequacy of imagination in the aesthetic estimation of magnitude to attain to its estimation

by reason, and a simultaneously awakened from this very judgement of

pleasure, arising

the inadequacy of the greatest faculty of sense

such systems, which go by the name of nebulae, likely in turn themselves form such a system, holds out no prospect of a limit. Now in the aesthetic estimate of such an immeasurable whole, the sublime does not lie so much in

represents

and

time,

being in accord with ideas of reason, so far as

it

and most

it

limits

same

can

say, a mile high,

planetary system; this again for the system of the Milky Way; and the immeasurable host of

in

the presentation of the idea of reason), betrays its

number expressing the as to make it intuitable; diameter for the known

is,

serve as unit for the earth's diameter, so

sally valid

attempted.

the effort to attain to these

for us a law. It

is

is,

in other

words, for us a law (of reason), which

goes to

make

us what

we

are, that

we should

comparison with ideas of reason everything which for us is great in nature as an object of sense; and that which makes us esteem as small

in

alive to the feeling of this supersensible side of

our being harmonizes with that law. Now the greatest effort of the imagination in the presentation of the unit for the estimation of magnitude involves in itself a reference to something absolutely great, consequently a reference also to the law of reason that this alone is to be adopted as the supreme measure of what is great. Therefore the inner perception of the inadequacy of every standard of sense to serve for the rational estimation of magnitude is a coming into accord with reason's laws, and a

displeasure that

makes us

alive to the feeling

of the supersensible side of our being, according § 27. Quality of the delight in our estimate of

to

which

it is final,

and consequently a pleasure,

to find every standard of sensibility falling short

the sublime

of the ideas of reason.

The

feeling of our incapacity to attain to an

idea that

is

a law for us, is respect. 1

idea of the comprehension of any

may

be given

Now

the

phenomenon

whole of intuition, is an idea imposed upon us by a law of reason, which recognizes no definite, univerwhatever, that

1

us, in a

[Cf. Critique of Practical Reason, p. 323, et seq.]

The mind

motion

feels itself set in

in the rep-

resentation of the sublime in nature; whereas in the aesthetic

ful therein

it is

judgement upon what

is

beauti-

in restful contemplation. This

may

be

with a rapidly

al-

ternating repulsion and attraction produced

by

movement, especially in compared with vibration,

its

inception,

i.e.,

THE CRITIQUE

502

one and the same object. The point of excess for the imagination (towards which it is driven in the apprehension of the intuition) is like an 1

abyss

in

which

it

fears to lose itself, yet again

for the rational idea of the supersensible it is not excessive, but conformable to law, and di-

rected to drawing out such an effort on the part and so in turn as much a

of the imagination:

source of attraction as it was repellent to mere sensibility. But the judgement itself all the while steadfastly preserves its aesthetic charac-

The

quality of the feeling of the sublime con-

sists in its

being, in respect of the faculty of

forming aesthetic estimates, a feeling of displeasure at an object, which yet, at the same a representime, is represented as being final tation which derives its possibility from the fact that the subject's very incapacity betrays the consciousness of an unlimited faculty of the same subject, and that the mind can only form an aesthetic estimate of the latter faculty by

—

means

of that incapacity.

represents, without being ground-

In the case of the logical estimation of mag-

ed on any definite concept of the object, merely the subjective play of the mental powers (im-

nitude, the impossibility of ever arriving at ab-

because

ter,

it

by

agination and reason) as harmonious

virtue

of their very contrast. For just as in the estimate of the beautiful imagination and understanding by their concert generate subjective finality of the mental faculties, so imagination and reason do so here by their conflict that is

—

to say they induce a feeling of our possessing

a pure and self-sufficient reason, or a faculty for the estimation of magnitude, whose preeminence can only be made intuitively evident by the inadequacy of that faculty which in the presentation of magnitudes (of objects of sense) is itself unbounded. Measurement of a space (as apprehension) is at the same time a description of it. and so an objective movement in the imagination and a progression. On the other hand, the comprehension of the manifold in the unity, not of thought, but of intuition, and consequently the comprehension of the successively apprehended parts at one glance, is a retrogression that re-

moves

the time-condition in the progression of

the imagination,

and renders coexistence

able. Therefore, since the time-series

is

intuit-

a con-

dition of the internal sense and of an intuition,

movement of the imagination does violence to the internal sense a violence which must be proportionately

it is

a subjective

by which

—

more

it

striking the greater the

the imagination

The

comprehends

quantum which in

one intuition.

effort, therefore, to receive in a single intui-

tion a

measure for magnitudes which

it

takes an

appreciable time to apprehend, is a mode of representation which, subjectively considered, is contra-final, but objectively, is requisite for the

estimation of magnitude, and is consequently final. Here the very same violence that is

wrought on the subject through the imagination estimated as final for the whole province of the mind.

solute totality

by the progressive measurement

of things of the sensible world in time and space

was cognized

as an objective impossibility, i. e.. one of thinking the infinite as given, and not as simply subjective, i.e., an incapacity for grasping it; for nothing turns there on the amount of the comprehension in one intuition, as measure, but everything depends on a numerical concept. But in an aesthetic estimation of magnitude the numerical concept must drop out of count or undergo a change. The only thing that is final for such estimation is the comprehension on the part of imagination in respect of the unit of measure (the concept of a law of the successive production of the concept of magnitude being consequently avoided). If, now, a magnitude begins to tax the utmost stretch of our faculty of comprehension in an intuition, and still numerical magnitudes in respect of which we are conscious of the boundlessness of our faculty call upon the imagination for aesthetic comprehension in a greater unit, the mind then gets a feeling of being aesthetically confined within bounds. Nevertheless, with a view to the extension of imagination necessary for adequacy with what is unbounded in our faculty of

—

—

reason,

namely the idea of the absolute whole,

the attendant

displeasure,

and, consequently,

the want of finality in our faculty of imagination, is still represented as final for ideas of reason and their animation. But in this very way

the aesthetic judgement itself

subjectively

is

reason as source of ideas,

i.e., of such an intellectual comprehension as makes all aesthetic comprehension small, and the object is received as sublime with a pleasure that is only possible through the mediation of a displeasure.

final for

B.

The Dynamically Sublime

in

Nature

is

§ 28.

Might

1

[Cf. P- 537. et seq.; p. 509, et seq.]

Nature as Might

power which is superior to great hindrances. It is termed dominion if it is also is

a

— OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT superior to the resistance of that which itself

we

503

readily call these objects sublime, because

possesses might. Nature, considered in an aes-

they raise the forces of the soul above the height

judgement as might that has no dominion

of vulgar commonplace, and discover within us

thetic

sublime,

a power of resistance of quite another kind, which gives us courage to be able to measure ourselves against the seeming omnipotence of

fear

nature.

over us, If

we

is

dynamically sublime.

are to estimate nature as dynamically

it must be represented as a source of (though the converse, that every object that is a source of fear, in our aesthetic judgement, sublime, does not hold). For in forming an aesthetic estimate (no concept being present) the superiority to hindrances can only be estimated according to the greatness of the resistance. Now that which we strive to resist is an evil, and, if we do not find our powers commensurate to the task, an object of fear. Hence the aesthetic judgement can only deem nature a might, and so dynamically sublime, in so far as it is looked upon as an object of fear.

But we may look upon an object as fearful, and yet not be afraid of it, if, that is, our estimate takes the form of our simply picturing to

In the immeasurableness of nature and the incompetence of our faculty for adopting a standard proportionate to the aesthetic estimaits realm, we found

tion of the magnitude of

our

own

limitation.

in our rational

But with

this

we

also

found

faculty another non-sensuous

standard, one which has that infinity itself un-

der it as a unit, and in comparison with which everything in nature is small, and so found in

our minds a pre-eminence over nature even in immeasurability. Now in just the same way the irresistibility of the might of nature forces

it

upon us the recognition of our physical helplesssame time

ness as beings of nature, but at the

some

reveals a faculty of estimating ourselves as in-

and recognizing that all such resistance would be quite futile. So the right-

dependent of nature, and discovers a pre-eminence above nature that is the foundation of a self-preservation of quite another kind from that which may be assailed and brought into danger by external nature. This saves humanity in our own person from humiliation, even though as mortal men we have to submit to external violence. In this way, external nature is not estimated in our aesthetic judgement as sublime so far as exciting fear, but rather because it challenges our power (one not of nature) to regard as small those things of which we are wont to be solicitous (worldly goods, health, and life), and hence to regard its might (to which in these matters we are no doubt subject) as exercising over us and our personality no such rude dominion that we should bow down before it, once the question becomes one of our highest principles and of our asserting or forsaking them. Therefore nature is here called sublime merely because it raises the imagination to a presentation of those cases in which the mind can make itself sensible of the appro-

ourselves the case of our wishing to offer resistance to

eous

man

it

fears

God without

being afraid of

Him, because he regards the case to resist

of his wishing

God and His commandments

which need cause him no anxiety. But

as one

in

every

such case, regarded by him as not intrinsically impossible, he cognizes Him as One to be feared.

One who

is

in a state of fear can

no more play

the part of a judge of the sublime of nature

than one captivated by inclination and appetite can of the beautiful. He flees from the sight of an object filling him with dread; and it is impossible to take delight in terror that

entertained.

is

seriously

Hence the agreeableness

arising

from the cessation of an uneasiness is a state of joy. But this, depending upon deliverance from a danger, is a rejoicing accompanied with a resolve never again to put oneself in the of the danger: in fact

we do not

way

like bringing

to mind how we felt on that occasion not to speak of going in search of an opportunity for experiencing it again.

back

Bold, overhanging, and, as

it

were, threaten-

ing rocks, thunderclouds piled up the vault of

heaven, borne along with flashes and peals, volcanoes in all their violence of destruction, hur-

priate sublimity of the sphere of its

own

being,

even above nature. This estimation of ourselves loses nothing by the fact that

we must

see ourselves safe in order

—

ricanes leaving desolation in their track, the

to feel this soul-stirring delight

boundless ocean rising with rebellious force, the high waterfall of some mighty river, and the like, make our power of resistance of trifling moment in comparison with their might. But, provided our own position is secure, their aspect

as little seriousness in the sublimity of our fac-

is all

the

more

attractive for its fearfulness;

and

a fact from which it might be plausibly argued that, as there is no seriousness in the danger, so there is just ulty of soul. For here the delight only concerns the province of our faculty disclosed in such a case, so far as this faculty has its root in our

THE CRITIQUE

504

nature; notwithstanding that its development and exercise is left to ourselves and remains an obligation. Here indeed there is truth no matter how conscious a man, when he stretches

—

his reflection so far abroad,

may be

of his actual

present helplessness.

This principle has, doubtless, the appearance

sion, prostration,

and a feeling of utter helpless-

more

to constitute the attitude of

ness seem

an oband to be that also more customarily associated with the idea of it on the occasion of a natural phenomenon of this kind. In religion, as

mind

befitting the manifestation of such

ject,

bowed head,

a rule, prostration, adoration with

of being too far-fetched and subtle, and so of lying beyond the reach of an aesthetic judge-

coupled with contrite, timorous posture and voice, seems to be the only becoming demeanour

ment. But observation of men proves the reand that it may be the foundation of the commonest judgements, although one is not al-

presence of the Godhead, and accordingly most nations have assumed and still observe it. Yet this cast of mind is far from being intrinsically and necessarily involved in the idea of the sublimity of a religion and of its object. The

verse,

ways conscious of

its

presence. For what

is

it

even to the savage, is the object of the greatest admiration? It is a man who is undaunted, who knows no fear, and who, therefore, does not give way to danger, but sets manfully that,

to

work with

full deliberation.

Even where

civ-

has reached a high pitch, there remains this special reverence for the soldier; only that there is then further required of him that he ilization

should also exhibit

all

the virtues of peace 1

—

in

man

that

is

in himself

actually in a state of fear, finding

good reason

to

be

so,

because he

is

conscious of offending with his evil disposition

by a will from being

against a might directed sistible

of

mind

and

just, is far

at once irrein the

frame

for admiring divine greatness, for which

a temper of calm reflection and a quite free

judgement are required. Only when he becomes

and even becoming thought for his own person; and for the reason that in this we recognize that his mind is above the threats of danger. 2 And so, comparing the statesman and the general, men may argue as they please as to the pre-eminent respect which is due to either above the other; but the verdict of the aesthetic judgement is for the latter. War itself, provided it is conducted with order and

conscious of having a disposition that is upright and acceptable to God, do those operations of might serve to stir within him the idea of the

a sacred respect for the rights of civilians, has

the form of an uncompromising judgement

something sublime about it, and gives nations that carry it on in such a manner a stamp of mind only the more sublime the more numerous the dangers to which they are exposed, and which they are able to meet with fortitude. On the other hand, a prolonged peace favours the predominance of a mere commercial spirit, and with it a debasing self-interest, cowardice, and effeminacy, and tends to degrade the character

his shortcomings, which,

with consciousness of good intentions, might readily be glossed over

of the nation.

apprehension of the all-powerful Being to whose man sees himself subjected, yet without according Him due honour. From this nothing can arise but grace-begging and vain adulation, instead of a religion consisting

gentleness,

sympathy,

So far as sublimity

is

predicated of might,

concept of it appears at variance with the fact that we are wont to represent God in the tempest, the storm, the earthquake, and the like, as presenting Himself in His wrath, but at the same time also in His sublimity, and yet here it would be alike folly and presumption to imagine a pre-eminence of our minds over the operations and, as it appears, even over the direction of such might. Here, instead of a feeling of the sublimity of our own nature, submisthis solution of the

> [Cf. King Henry's address before Harfleur; Shakespeare, King Henry V, Act III, Scene i.J 2 TCf. Aristotle's remarks on Courage, in the Ethics,

III, 6, et seq.)

sublimity of this Being, so far as he recognizes the existence in himself of a sublimity of disposition consonant with His will, and is thus raised above the dread of such operations of nature, in which he no longer sees God pouring forth

the vials of the wrath.

Even

humility, taking

upon

on the ground of the frailty of human nature, is a sublime temper of the mind voluntarily to undergo the pain of remorse as a means of more and more effectually eradicating its cause. In

way

this

from

religion

is

intrinsically distinguished

which

latter rears in the mind, not reverence for the sublime, but dread and

superstition,

will terror-stricken

in a

good

life.

Sublimity, therefore, does not reside in any of the things of nature, but only in our

own

mind, in so far as we may become conscious of our superiority over nature within, and thus also over nature without us (as exerting influence upon us). Everything that provokes this feeling in us, including the might of nature which challenges our strength, is then, though improperly, called sublime, and it is only under presupposi-

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT tion of this idea within us,

we

that

and

in relation to

it,

are capable of attaining to the idea of

the sublimity of that Being which inspires deep

by the mere display of its nature, but more by the faculty which

505

account of his adto be ventures? But the mind of Sassure was bent on able to give a thrilling

the instruction of mankind, and soul-stirring

man

respect in us, not

sensations that excellent

might

the reader of his travels got

in

planted in us of estimating that might without fear, and of regarding our estate as exalted

is

above § 29.

it.

Modality of the judgement on the sublime in nature

Beautiful nature contains countless things we at once take every one as in their

indeed had. and

them thrown

into

the bargain.

But the fact that culture is requisite for the judgement upon the sublime in nature (more than for that upon the beautiful) does not inits being an original product of culture and something introduced in a more or less conventional way into society. 2 Rather is it in hu-

volve

as to which

man

judgement concurring with our own. and as to which we may further expect this concurrence without facts finding us far astray. But in respect of our judgement upon the sublime in nature, we cannot so easily vouch for ready acceptance by others. For a far higher degree of culture. 1 not merely of the aesthetic judgement, but also of the faculties of cognition which lie at its basis, seems to be requisite to enable us to lay down a judgement upon this high distinc-

in fact, in that which, at

nature that

derstanding,

and

may

ity for

its

foundations are laid, and, once with common un-

we may expect every one

to possess

require of him, namely, a native capacthe feeling for

(practical)

ideas,

i.e..

presupposition of this susceptibility and of the

moral feeling. This, now. is the foundation of the necessity of that agreement between other men's judgements upon the sublime and our own. which we make our own imply. For just as we taunt a man who is quite inappreciative when forming an estimate of an object of nature in which we see beauty, with want of taste, so we say of a man who remains unaffected in the presence of what we consider sublime, that he has no feeling. 3 But we demand both taste and feeling of every man, and. granted some degree of culture,

straining of the imagination to use nature as a

we

tion of natural objects.

The proper mental mood for a feeling of the sublime postulates the mind's susceptibility for ideas, since it is precisely in the failure of nature

—and consequently only under

to attain to these

schema for ideas

—that there

is

something for-

bidding to sensibility, but which, for

all that,

has

an attraction for us, arising from the fact of its being a dominion which reason exercises over sensibility with a view to extending it to the requirements of its own realm (the practical) it look out beyond itself into the inwhich for it is an abyss. In fact, without the development of moral ideas, that which,

and

letting

finite,

thanks to preparatory culture, we call sublime, merely strikes the untutored man as terrifying. He will see in the evidences which the ravages of nature give of her dominion, and in the vast scale of her might, compared with which his own is

diminished to insignificance, only the misery.

would compass the man mercy. So the simpleminded, and, for the most part, intelligent. Savoyard peasant, (as Herr von Sassure relates), unhesitatingly called all lovers of snowmountains fools. And who can tell whether he would have been so wide of the mark, if that student of nature had taken the risk of the dangers to which he exposed himself merely, as most travellers do. for a fad, or so as some day

peril,

and

distress that

who was thrown

1

to its

[Cf. p. 518, et seq.~\

for

give

him

credit for both. Still,

we do

so with

this difference: that, in the case of the former,

since judgement there refers the imagination merely to the understanding, as the faculty of concepts, we make the requirement as a matter of course, whereas in the case of the latter, since here the judgement refers the imagination to reason, as a faculty of ideas, we do so only un-

der a subjective presupposition (which, however, we believe we are warranted in making), namely, that of the moral feeling in man. And, on this assumption, we attribute necessity to

the latter aesthetic

In

this

judgement

also.

modality of aesthetic judgements,

namely, their assumed necessity,

lies what is for Judgement a moment of capital importance. For this is exactly what makes an

the Critique of

a priori principle apparent in their case,

them out

and

lifts

of the sphere of empirical psychology,

which otherwise they would remain buried amid the feelings of gratification and pain (only

in

with the senseless epithet of finer feeling), so as to place them, and, thanks to them, to place the faculty of judgement itself, in the class of judgements of which the basis of an a priori

2[Cf.p. 4 93.] 3

[Cf. pp. 523; 549, et seq.]

THE CRITIQUE

S o6

principle

is

the distinguishing feature, and, thus them into transcen-

law of action from duty,

i.e.,

of the representa-

distinguished, to introduce

tion of this as sublime, or even as beautiful,

dental philosophy.

without forfeiting sult were one to

General Remark upon the Exposition of

The

In relation to the feeling of pleasure an object is to be counted either as agreeable, or beautiful, or sublime, or good (absolutely), (incundum, pule hr urn. sublime, honestum).

As the motive of desires the agreeable is invariably of one and the same kind, no matter what its source or how specifically different the representation (of sense and sensation objectively considered).

in-

fluence

its

charms (simultaneous or successive) is alone revelant, and so only, as it were, the mass of the agreeable sensation, and it is only by the quantity,

therefore, that this can be

made

intelligible.

no way conduces to our culture, hut belongs only to mere enjoyment. The beautiful, on the other hand, requires the represenFurther

in

it

purity it

—an impossible

naturally

re-

bound up

with the feeling of the agreeable.

Aesthetic Reflective Judgements

Hence in estimating its upon the mind, the multitude of

its

make

net result to be extracted from the ex-

position so far given of both kinds of resthetic

judgements

may

be

summed up

in the following

brief definitions:

The beautiful is what pleases in the mere estimate formed of it (consequently not by intervention of any feeling of sense in accordance with a concept of the understanding). From this it follows at once that it must please apart from all interest.

The sublime

is

what pleases immediately by

opposition to the interest of sense. Both, as definitions of aesthetic universally

reason of

its

valid estimates,

have reference to subjective

grounds. In the one case the reference

grounds of

is

to

sensibility, in so far as these are final

on behalf of the contemplative understanding, in the other case in so far as, in their opposition

they are, on the contrary,

tation of a certain quality of the object, that

to sensibility,

permits also of being understood and reduced to concepts (although in the aesthetic judgement

reference to the ends of practical reason. Both,

it is

not so reduced), and

it

cultivates, as

it

in-

structs us to attend to finality in the feeling of

pleasure.

The sublime

relation exhibited

consists merely in the by the estimate of the serv-

iceability of the sensible in the representation

however, as united in the same subject, are final moral feeling. The beautiful prepares us to love something, even nature, apart from any interest: the sublime to esteem something highly even in opposition to our in reference to the

(sensible) interest.

The sublime may be described

of nature for a possible supersensible employ-

ment. The absolutely good, estimated subjectively according to the feeling it inspires (the object of the moral feeling), as the determinabiiity of the

powers of the subject by means

of the representation of an absolutely necessitating

law,

is

principally distinguished

by the

final in

in this

way:

an object (of nature) the representation of which determines the mind to regard the elevation of nature beyond our reach as equivalent It

is

to a presentation of ideas.

In a cal

literal

sense and according to their logi-

import, ideas cannot be presented. But

if

we

moddlity of a necessity resting upon concepts a priori, and invoking not a mere claim, but a command upon every one to assent, and belongs

enlarge our empirical faculty of representation

intrinsically not to the aesthetic, but to the

forward, as the faculty concerned with the independence of the absolute totality, and calls forth the effort of the mind, unavailing though it be, to make representation of sense adequate to this totality. This effort, and the feeling of

pure judgement. Further, it is not ascribed to nature but to freedom, and that in a determinant and not a merely reflective judgement. But the detvrminability of the subject intellectual

by means of

this idea, and, what is more, that of a subject which can be sensible, in the way of a modification of its state, to hindrances on

the part of sensibility, while, at the

same

(mathematical or dynamical) with a view to the intuition of nature, reason inevitably steps

the unattainability of the idea agination,

is

itself

tive finality of

by means

of im-

a presentation of the subjec-

our mind in the employment of

time.

the imagination in the interests of the mind's

can by surmounting them feel superiority it over them a determinability. in other words, as moral feeling is still so allied to aesthetic

tively to think nature itself in its totality as a

presentation of something supersensible, with-

judgement and

out our being able to effectuate this presenta-

—

—

its

formal conditions as to be

capable of being pressed into the service of the aesthetic representation of the conformity to

supersensible province, and compels us subjec-

tion objectively.

For we readily see that nature

in

space and

— OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT

507

time falls entirely short of the unconditioned, consequently also of the absolutely great, which still the commonest reason demands. And by this we are also reminded that we have only to

through imagination, for the purpose of feeling the might of this faculty in combining the movement of the mind thereby aroused with its serenity, and of thus being superior to internal

do with nature as phenomenon, and that this itself must be regarded as the mere presentation of a nature-in-itself (which exists in the idea

and, therefore, to external, nature, so far as the

But this idea of the supersensible, which no doubt we cannot further determine so that we cannot cognize nature as its presen-

of reason).

tation, but only think in us

as such

it

—

is

awakened

aesthetic estimating of

by an object the

which strains the imagination to its utmost, whether in respect of its extension (mathematical), or of its might over the mind (dynamical). For it is founded upon the feeling of a sphere of the mind which altogether exceeds the realm of nature (i.e., upon the moral feeling), with regard to which the representation of the object estimated as subjectively final. As a matter of fact, a feeling for the sublime in nature is hardly thinkable unless in association with an attitude of mind resembling the is

moral.

And

though, like that feeling, the

imme-

can have any bearing upon our feeling of For the imagination, in accordance with laws of association, makes our state of conlatter

well-being.

tentment dependent upon physical conditions. But acting in accordance with principles of the schematism of judgement (consequently so far as it is subordinated to freedom), it is at the same time an instrument of reason and its ideas. But in this capacity it is a might enabling us to assert our independence as against the influences of nature, to degrade what is great in respect of the latter to the level of what is little, and thus to locate the absolutely great only in the proper estate of the subject. This reflection of aesthetic judgement by which it raises itself to the point of adequacy with reason, though without any determinate concept of reason, is still a representation of the object as subjectively

final,

by

virtue even of the objective inadequacy of the greatest extension for meeting

diate pleasure in the beautiful in nature pre-

imagination in

supposes and cultivates a certain liberality of thought, i.e., makes our delight independent of

the

any mere enjoyment of sense, still it represents freedom rather as in play than as exercising a law-ordained function, which is the genuine characteristic of human morality, where reason has to impose its dominion upon sensibility. There is, however, this qualification, that in the aesthetic judgement upon the sublime this do-

been already adverted to, that in the transcendental aesthetic of judgement there must be no question of anything but pure aesthetic judgements. Consequently examples are not to be selected from such beautiful or sublime objects as presuppose the concept of an end. For then the finality would be either teleological, or based upon mere sensations of an object (gratification or pain) and so, in the first case, not aesthetic, and, in the second, not merely formal. So, if we call the sight of the starry heaven sublime, we must not found our estimate of it upon any concepts of worlds inhabited by rational beings, with the bright spots, which we see filling the space above us, as their suns moving in orbits prescribed for them with the wisest regard to

minion

is

represented as exercised through the

imagination is

is

itself as

an instrument of reason.

Thus, too, delight in the sublime in nature only negative (whereas that in the beautiful that

positive):

imagination by

its

is

to say,

own

it

is

a feeling of

act depriving itself of

freedom by receiving a final determination accordance with a law other than that of its empirical employment. In this way it gains an extension and a might greater than that which it sacrifices. But the ground of this is concealed its

in

from

it,

and

in its place

deprivation, as well as

subjected.

feels the sacrifice or

it

its

cause, to which

it is

The astonishment amounting almost

to terror, the

awe and

that takes hold of one

thrill

of devout feeling,

when

gazing upon the

prospect of mountains ascending to heaven, deep ravines and torrents raging there, deep-

shadowed

solitudes that invite to brooding mel-

ancholy, and the like

assured of our

Rather

is

it

own

—

all

this,

when we

are

not actual fear. an attempt to gain access to it safety,

is

its

demands of reason (as the faculty of ideas). Here we have to attend generally to what has

But we must take it, just as it strikes the and all-embracing canopy: and it is merely under such a representation that we may posit the sublimity which the pure aesthetic judgement attributes to this object. Similarly, ends.

eye, as a broad

as to the prospect of the ocean,

we

are not to

minds stored with knowledge on a variety of matters (which, however, is not contained in the immediate intuition), are wont to represent it in thought, as, let us say, a spacious realm of aquatic creatures, or as the mighty reservoirs from which are drawn the vapours that fill the air with clouds regard

it

as we, with our

— THE CRITIQUE

5o8

of moisture for the good of the land, or yet as an element which no doubt divides continent

from continent, but at the same time affords the means of the greatest commercial interfor in this way we get course between them nothing beyond teleological judgements. Instead of this we must be able to see sublimity in the

—

—though —whilst turn

in the interest of inner free-

something

dom

in

it

reveals in us an unfath-

this supersensible faculty, the

omable depth of

consequences of which extend beyond reach of the eye of sense), it follows that the delight, looked at from the aesthetic side (in reference to sensibility) is negative, i.e., opposed to this

calm, a clear mirror of water

but from the intellectual side, positive and bound up with an interest. Hence it follows that the intellectual and intrinsically final

bounded only by the heavens, or, be it disturbed, as threatening to overwhelm and engulf everything. The same is to be said of the sublime and

being represented as beautiful, must rather be represented as sublime, with the result that it

ocean, regarding to

it.

as the poets do, according

what the impression upon the eye

as, let

us say, in

its

reveals,

interest,

(moral) good, estimated aesthetically, instead of

human form. Here, for determining grounds of the judgement, we must not have recourse to concepts of ends subserved by all its limbs and members, or allow their accordance with these ends to influence our aesthetic judgement (in such case no longer pure), although it is certainly also a necessary condition of aesthetic delight that they should not

arouses more a feeling of respect (which disdains charm) than of love or of the heart being

conflict with these ends. Aesthetic finality is the conformity to law of judgement in its freedom. The delight in the object depends upon the reference which we seek to give to the imagination,

represented as a might of the mind enabling

subject to the proviso that

must dwell a while on the latter point. The idea of the good to which affection is superadded is enthusiasm. This state of mind appears to be

beautiful in the

mind

it is

to entertain the

in a free activity. If, on the other hand, something else be it sensation or concept of determines the judgement, the understanding it is then conformable to law, no doubt, but not an act of free judgement. Hence to speak of intellectual beauty or sub-

limity

—

is

—

to use expressions which, in the first

For these are aesthetic modes of representation which would be entirely foreign to us were we merely pure intelligences (or if we even put ourselves in thought in

place, are not quite correct.

the position of such). Secondly, although both, as objects of an intellectual (moral) delight, are

compatible with aesthetic delight to the extent of not resting

upon any

other hand, there

is

interest,

still,

a difficulty in the

on the

way

of

their alliance with such delight, since their func-

tion is to produce an interest, and, on the assumption that the presentation has to accord

with delight

in

the aesthetic estimate, this inter-

by means of an intercombined with it in the presenta-

est could only be effected est of sense tion.

But

in

this

way

the intellectual finality

would be violated and rendered impure. The object of a pure and unconditioned intellectual delight is the moral law in the might which it exerts in us over all antecedent motives of the mind.

Now.

since it is only through sacrimight makes itself known to us aesthetically (and this involves a deprivation of

fices that this

—

it for human nature does not own proper motion accord with the good,

drawn towards of

its

but only by virtue of the dominion which reason exercises over sensibility. Conversely, that, too,

which we

call

sublime

in external nature, or

internal nature (e.g., certain affections)

is

even only it

overcome this or that hindrance of sensibility by means of moral principles, and it is from this to

that

it

derives

its interest.

I

sublime

so

:

much

so that there

is

a

common

say-

ing that nothing great can be achieved without it.

But now every affection 1

the choice of

its

is

blind either as to

end, or, supposing this has been

way it is effected movement whereby the ex-

furnished by reason, in the for

it is

ercise

that mental

upon fundamental view to determining oneself

of free deliberation

principles, with a

is rendered impossible. On this accannot merit any delight on the part of reason. Yet, from an aesthetic point of view, enthusiasm is sublime, because it is an effort of

accordingly,

count

it

one's powers called forth

by ideas which give to more enduring efficacy than the stimulus afforded by sensible representations. But (as seems strange) even freedom from affection (apatheia phle gma in significatu bono) in a mind that strenuously follows its unswerving principles is sublime, and the

mind an impetus

of far stronger and

,

1 There is a specific distinction between affections and passions. Aftections are related merely to feeling; passions belong to the faculty of desire, and are inclinations that hinder or render impossible all determinability of the elective will by principles. Affections are impetuous and irresponsible; passions are abiding and deliberate. Thus resentment, in the form of anger, is an affection: but in the form of hatred (vindictiveness) it is a passion. Under no circumstances can the latter be called sublime; for, while the freedom of the mind is, no doubt, impeded in the case of affection, in passion it is

abrogated.

— ;

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT that, too, in a

manner

vastly superior, because

has at the same time the delight of pure reason on its side. Such a stamp of mind is alone it

called noble. This expression, however,

—

comes

time to be applied to things such as buildgarment, literary style, the carriage of provided they do not one's person, and the like

in

ings, a

—

so

much

excite astonishment (the affection at-

tending the representation of novelty exceeding expectation) as admiration (an astonishment

which does not cease when the novelty wears and this obtains where ideas undesignedly off) and artlessly accord in their presentation with

—

aesthetic delight.

Every that er

of

affection of the

strenuous type

(such,

as excites the consciousness of our

is,

overcoming every resistance

strenuus])

is

aesthetically sublime,

pow-

[animus

e.g.,

anger,

even desperation (the rage of forlorn hope but not faint-hearted despair). affection of the

On

the other hand,

languid type (which converts

509

down

method by which alone we can become acceptable to the Supreme of

mind

are set

as the

—

Being these have neither lot nor fellowship with what may be reckoned to belong to beauty, not to speak of sublimity, of mental temperament. But even impetuous movements of the mind be they allied under the name of edification with ideas of religion, or, as pertaining merely to culture, with ideas involving a social interest

—

no matter what tension of the imagination they produce, can in no way lay claim to the honour of a sublime presentation, if they do not leave behind them a temper of mind which, though it be only indirectly, has an influence upon the consciousness of the mind's strength and resoluteness in respect of that which carries with it pure intellectual finality (the supersensible). For, in the absence of this, all these emotions belong only to motion, which we welcome in the interests of good health. The agree-

may

the very effort of resistance into an object of dis-

able lassitude that follows

pleasure [animus languidus~\ has nothing noble about it, though it may take its rank as possess-

in that

ing beauty of the sensuous order. Hence the emotions capable of attaining the strength of an affection are very diverse.

We have spirited, and

we have tender emotions. When

the strength of

the latter reaches that of an affection they can be turned to no account. The propensity to indulge in them is sentimentality. A sympathetic grief that refuses to be consoled, or one that has to do with imaginary misfortune to which we deliberately give way so far as to allow our

fancy to delude us into thinking indicates and goes to

make

it

actual fact,

a tender, but at the

way by

no more than what the Eastern volupwhen they get their bodies massaged, and all their muscles and joints softly pressed and bent only that in the first case

comes

to

tuaries find so soothing

;

the principle that occasions the chiefly internal, ternal.

Thus,

whereas here

many

a

man

own person something quite other than their happiness), and in general incapable of all firm principles; even a religious discourse which recommends a cringing and abject grace-begging and favour-seeking, abandoning all reliance on our own ability to resist the for the worth of

evil

rights of

humanity

in our

men (which

is

within us, in place of the vigorous resolution

to try to get the better of our inclinations

by

means of those powers which, miserable sinners though we be, are still left to us; that false humility by which self-abasement, whining hypocritical repentance and a merely passive frame

movement

it is

is

entirely ex-

believes himself edi-

by a sermon in which there is no establishment of anything (no system of good maxims) or thinks himself improved by a tragedy, when

fied

lectual side of our nature

and the

a

from

the restoration of the equilibrium of the various

(though falsely so) noble sentiments, but in fact stern precepts of duty, and incapable of respect

is

vital forces within us. This, in the last resort,

he

the heart enervated, insensitive to the

up

stirred

fruition of the state of well-being arising

same time weak, soul, which shows a beautiful side, and may no doubt be called fanciful, but never enthusiastic. Romances, maudlin dramas, shallow homilies, which trifle with so-called

make

upon being

the play of the affections,

merely glad

having got well rid of the Thus the sublime must in every case have reference to our way of thinkis

at

feeling of being bored.

ing,

i.e.,

to

maxims

directed to giving the intel-

and the ideas of reason supremacy over sensibility. We have no reason to fear that the feeling of the sublime will suffer from an abstract mode of presentation like this, which is altogether negative as to what is sensuous. For though the imagination, no doubt, finds nothing beyond the sensible world to which it can lay hold, still this thrusting aside of the sensible barriers gives

it

unbounded; and that removal thus a presentation of the infinite. As such feeling of being

a is it

can never be anything more than a negative presentation but still it expands the soul. Perhaps there is no more sublime passage in the Jewish Law than the commandment: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or

—

THE CRITIQUE

5io

ment can alone explain the enthusiasm which

sensible) nature, whose laws alone we know, without being able to attain to an intuition of that which the supersensible faculty within us

the Jewish people, in their moral period, felt for

contains the ground of this legislation.

any likeness of any thing that

in

is

heaven or on

command-

earth, or under the earth, etc." This

their religion

when comparing themselves with

by Mohammedanism. The very same holds good of our representation of the moral law and of our native capac-

others, or the pride inspired

The

ity for morality.

fear that,

we

if

divest this

representation of everything that can

commend

to the senses, it will thereupon be attended only with a cold and lifeless approbation and not with any moving force or emotion, is wholly unwarranted. The very reverse is the truth. For it

when nothing any longer meets the eye of sense, and the unmistakable and ineffaceable idea of morality

is left

in

possession of the

field,

there

would be need rather of tempering the ardour of an unbounded imagination to prevent it rising to enthusiasm, than of seeking to lend these ideas the aid of images and childish devices for fear of their being wanting in potency. For this reason, fully this

governments have gladly let religion be equipped with these accessories, seeking in

way

to relieve their subjects of the exertion,

but to deprive them, ability,

same time, of the

at the

required for expanding their spiritual

powers beyond the limits arbitrarily laid down for them, and which facilitate their being treated as though they were merely passive. This pure, elevating, merely negative presentation of morality involves, on the other hand, no fear of fanaticism, which is a delusion that would will some vision beyond all the bounds of sensibility ; i.e.. would dream according to principles (rational raving).

The safeguard

is

the

purely negative character of the presentation.

For the inscrutability of the idea of freedom all positive presentation. The moral law, however, is a sufficient and original source

precludes

of determination within us: so

moment permit

it

does not for a

us to cast about for a ground of

determination external to

enthusiasm is comparable to delirium, fanaticism may be compared to mania. Of these, the latter is least of all compatible with the sublime, for it is profoundly ridiculous. In enthusiasm, as an affection, the imagination is unbridled; in fanaticism, as a deep-seated, brooding passion, it is anomalous. The first is a transitory accident to which the healthiest understanding is liable to become at times the victim; the second is an undermining itself. If

disease.

Simplicity (artless finality) style

adopted by nature

that of morality.

The

in the

latter

is

is,

as

it

were, the

sublime. It

is

also

a second (super-

—

The delight in the subthan in the beautiful, by reason of its universal communicability not alone is plainly distinguished from other aesthetic judgements, One

further remark.

no

lime,

less

but also from this same property acquires an in(in which it admits of such

terest in society

communication). Yet, despite

this,

we have

to

note the fact that isolation from all society looked upon as something sublime, provided

is it

upon ideas which disregard all sensible interest. To be self-sufficing, and so not to stand in rests

need of society, yet without being unsociable, i.e., without shunning it, is something approaching the sublime a remark applicable to all superiority to wants. On the other hand, to shun our fellow men from misanthropy, because of enmity towards them, or from anthropophobia, because we imagine the hand of every man is

—

against us,

There

is

partly odious, partly contemptible.

however, a misanthropy (most improperly so called), the tendency towards which is to be found with advancing years in many rightis,

minded men,

that, as far as

good

will goes, is

no

doubt, philanthropic enough, but as the result of long and sad experience, is widely removed

from delight

in

mankind.

We

see evidences of

propensity to recluseness, in the fanciful desire for a retired country seat, or else (with the young) in the dream of the happiness this in the

of being able to spend one's life with a little

family on an island unknown to the rest of the world material of which novelists or writers of Robinsonades know how to make such good use. Falsehood, ingratitude, injustice, the pueril-

—

ity of the

ends which we ourselves look upon as

great and

momentous, and to compass which upon his brother man all imaginable evils these all so contradict the idea of what men might be if they only would, and are so at variance with our active wish to see them better, that, to avoid hating where we cannot love, it seems but a slight sacrifice to forego all the joys

man

inflicts

—

of fellowship with our kind. This sadness, which not directed to the evils which fate brings down upon others (a sadness which springs from is

sympathy ). hut to those which they inflict upon themselves (one which is based on antipathy in questions of principle), is sublime because it is founded on ideas, whereas that springing from

sympathy can only be accounted beautiful. Saswho was no less ingenious than profound,

sure,

in the description of his

Alpine travels remarks

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT Bonhomme, one

of

of the Savoy mountains:

511

empirical anthropology. But, besides that, there

no denying the fact that

representations

"There reigns there a certain insipid sadness."

is

He

within us, no matter whether they are objective-

is

recognized, therefore, that, besides this, there

an interesting sadness, such as

is

inspired

by

which men might fain withdraw themselves so as to hear no more of the world without, and be no longer versed in its affairs, a place, however, which must yet not be so altogether inhospitable as only to afford a most miserable retreat for a the sight of

some desolate place

into

being. I only make this observation as a reminder that even melancholy, (but not dispir-

human

ited sadness)

,

may

take

its

orous affections, provided ideas.

If,

however,

pathy, and, as such,

it is

the languid affections. tention to the mental first

case alone

is

is

place

it

has

among

its

the vig-

root in moral

grounded upon sym-

lovable,

And

it

belongs only to

this serves to call at-

temperament which

in the

sublime.

ly

merely sensible or wholly

of the sublime and beautiful

would bring

us.

Burke, 1 who deserves to be called the foremost author in this method of treatment, deduces, on these lines, "that the feeling of the sublime is

grounded on the impulse towards self-preservation and on fear, i.e., on a pain, which, since it

it is a modification of the subject, can be indifferent.) We must even admit that, as Epicurus maintained, gratification and pain though proceeding from the imagination or even

so far as

from representations of the understanding, are always in the

from any

last resort corporeal, since

feeling of the bodily organ life

or the reverse,

i.e., of the furtherance or hindrance of the vital forces. For, of itself alone,

mind

is all life

But

if

we

attribute the delight in the object

wholly and entirely to the gratification which it affords through charm or emotion, then we must not exact from any one else agreement with the aesthetic judgement passed by us. For, in such matters each person rightly consults his own personal feeling alone. But in that case there is an end of all censorship of taste unless the exam-

—

by others

held over us as principle

sort of delightful horror, a sort of tranquil-

ment

The

which he would

beautiful,

he grounds on love (from which, still, have desire kept separate), he reduces to "the relaxing, slackening, and enervating of the fibres of the body, and consequently a softening, a dissolving, a languor, and a fainting, dying, and melting away for pleasure." And this explanation he supports, not alone by instances in

which the feeling of the beautiful as well as of

the sublime

is

capable of being excited in us by

the imagination in conjunction with the understanding, but even by instances when it is in conjunction with sensations. As psychological observations, these analyses of our mental phe-

nomena

are extremely fine, and supply a wealth

of material for the favourite investigations of 1 See p. 223 of the German translation of his work: Philosophical Investigations as to the Origin of our Conceptions of the Beautiful and Sublime. Riga, published by Hartknock, 1773.

(the life-principle itself), and

hindrance or furtherance has to be sought outside it, and yet in the man himself consequently in the connection with his body.

whether fine or gross, of a dangerous and troublesome encumbrance, are capable of producing delight; not pleasure but a tinged with terror."

apart

would

be merely a consciousness of one's existence, and could not include any feeling of well-being

ple afforded

lity

still

however imperceptible either of these may be. (For these representations one and all have an influence on the feeling of life, and none of them,

does not go the length of disordering the bodily parts, calls forth movements which, as they clear the vessels,

intellectual, are

subjectively associable with gratification or pain,

the

The transcendental exposition of aesthetic judgements now brought to a close may be compared with the physiological, as worked out by Burke and many acute men among us, so that we may see where a merely empirical exposition

all

as the result of a contin-

gent coincidence of their judgements

commanding our

assent.

we would presumably

resent,

is

to be

But this and ap-

peal to our natural right of submitting a judgeto our own sense, where it rests upon the immediate feeling of personal well-being, in-

stead of submitting

it

to that of others.

Hence if the import of the judgement of taste, where we appraise it as a judgement entitled to require the concurrence of every one, cannot be

but must necessarily, from its inner nabe allowed a pluralistic validity, i.e., on account of what taste itself is, and not on account of the examples which others give of their taste, then it must found upon some a priori principle (be it subjective or objective), and no amount of prying into the empirical laws of the changes that go on within the mind can succeed in establishing such a principle. For these laws only yield a knowledge of how we do judge, but they do not give us a command as to how we ought to judge, and, what is more, such a command as is unconditioned and commands of this kind are presupposed by judgements of taste, inasmuch egoistic,

ture,

—

THE CRITIQUE

512

whether

as they require delight to be taken as immedi-

question suggests

ately connected with a representation. Accord-

the exposition of

ingly,

though the empirical exposition of aesjudgements may be a first step towards accumulating the material for a higher investigation, yet a transcendental examination of this faculty is possible, and forms an essential part of the Critique of Taste. For, were not taste in

judgement of

thetic

to give a deduction of its claim to

possession of a priori principles,

it

could not pos-

judgement upon the judgements of others and pass sentence of commendation or condemnation upon them, with even the least semblance of authority. sibly

in

sit

The remaining aesthetic

part of the Analytic of the

judgement contains

first

of

all

the:

Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgements The deduction of aesthetic judgements upon objects of nature must not be directed to what we call sublime in nature, but only to

§ 30.

this kind,

in addition to

thought in an aesthetic

is

we may be called upon some (subjec-

tive) a priori principle.

This we

may meet with

the reply that the sub-

improperly so called, and that sublimity should, in strictness, be attributed merely to the attitude of thought, or, rather, to that which serves as basis for this in human nature. The apprehension of an object otherwise formless and in conflict with ends supplies the mere occasion 1 for our coming to a consciouslime in nature

is

ness of this basis; and the object

put to a subjectively-final use, but

is in this

way

not

esti-

it is

mated as subjectively-final on its own account and because of its form. (It is, as it were, a species finalis accepta, non data.) Consequently the exposition we gave of judgements upon the sublime in nature was at the same time their deduc-

the beautiful

tion. For, in our analysis of the reflection on the part of judgement in this case, we found that in

The

such judgements there

claim of an aesthetic judgement to uni-

versal validity for every subject, being a judge-

ment which must

rely

on some a priori principle,

stands in need of a deduction of

itself,

what

its title).

(i.e.,

a derivation

Further, where the delight or aver-

sion turns on the

form of

the object this has to

is a final relation of the cognitive faculties, which has to be laid a priori at the basis of the faculty of ends (the will), and

which is therefore itself a priori final. This, then, at once involves the deduction, i.e., the justification of the claim of such a

judgement

to univer-

be something over and above the exposition of the judgement. Such is the case with judgements

sally-necessary validity.

of taste upon the beautiful in nature. For there

the deduction of judgements of taste,

foundation in the object and although it does not signify its outward form the reference of this to other objects according to concepts (for the purpose of cognitive judgements), but is merely concerned in general with

judgements upon the beauty of things of nature, and this will satisfactorily dispose of the problem for the entire aesthetic faculty of judgement.

the finality has

its

—

the apprehension of this

form so

proves accordant in the mind with the faculty of concepts as well as with that of their presentation (which is identical with that of apprehension).

With regard fore, we may

far as

it

to the beautiful in nature, therestart a

number

of questions touch-

ing the cause of this finality of their forms:

how we

are to explain

why

e.g.,

nature has scattered

beauty abroad with so lavish a hand, even in the depth of the ocean where it can but seldom be reached by the eye of man for which alone it is

final?

— nature—

But the sublime in if we pass upon it a pure aesthetic judgement unmixed with concepts of perfection, as objective finality, which would make the judgement teleological may be regarded as completely wanting in form or figure, and none the less be looked upon as an object of pure delight, and indicate a subjective finality of the given representation. So, now, the

—

Hence we may confine our search

§ 31.

Of the method of

to

one for i.e.,

of

the deduction of

judgements of

taste

The

obligation to furnish a deduction, i.e.. a guarantee of the legitimacy of judgements of a particular kind, only arises where the judgement lays claim to necessity. This

where

it

is the case even requires subjective universality, i.e.,

the concurrence of every one, albeit the judgement is not a cognitive judgement, but only one of pleasure or displeasure in a given object,

i.e.,

an assumption of a subjective finality that has a thoroughgoing validity for every one, and which, since the judgement is one of taste, is not to be grounded upon any concept of the thing.

Now. in the latter case, we are not dealing with a judgement of cognition neither with a theoretical one based on the concept of a nature in general, supplied by understanding, nor

—

net p.

518.]

— OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT with a (pure) practical one based on the idea of freedom, as given a priori by reason and so we are not called upon to justify a priori the valid-

—

judgement which represents either what a thing is, or that there is something which I ought to do in order to produce it. Consequently, if for judgement generally we demonstrate the universal validity of a singular judgement expressing the subjective finality of an empirical representation of the form of an object, we shall do all that is needed to explain how it is possible that something can please in the mere formation ity of a

(without sensation or concept), and how, just as the estimate of an object for the sake of a cognition generally has univer-

of an estimate of

it

for every other.

rule

of the subject passing judgement on the (in the given

feeling of pleasure tion),

i.e.,

upon

his

own

taste,

representa-

and yet

is

also not

from concepts; then it follows and such the judgement that such a judgement has a double and also logical of taste in fact is to be derived

—

—

peculiarity. For, first,

smell gives it,

it

but

it

it

gives another a headache.

we

has universal validity a

Now

what

suppose from this than that its beauty is to be taken for a property of the flower itself 2 which does not adapt itself to the diverelse are

to

heads and the individual senses of the

sity of

multitude, but to which they must adapt themselves, if they are going to pass it.

And

yet this

is

not the

For the judgement of

way

judgement upon

the matter stands.

taste consists precisely in

a thing being called beautiful solely in respect of that quality in which

of taking

it

adapts

itself to

our

mode

to

show

it in.

Besides, every judgement which

the taste of the individual,

Now if this universal validity is not to be based on a collection of votes and interrogation of others as to what sort of sensations they experience, but is to rest, as it were, upon an autonomy

own proper claim to the The agreeableness of its no claim at all. One man revels in

to repeating its

delight of everyone.

any one person may be

sal rules, the delight of

pronounced as a

mount

513

is

is

required to be an

independent judgement of the individual himself. There must be no need of groping about among other people's judgements and getting previous instruction from their delight in or aversion to the same object. Consequently his judgement should be given out a priori, and not

on the general pleasure a One would think, however, that a judgement a priori must involve as an imitation relying

thing gives as a matter of fact.

a concept of the object for the cognition of

which

ment

contains the principle. But the judge-

it

without having a logical universality according to concepts, but only the universality of a singular judgement. Secondly, it has a necessity (which must invariably rest upon a pri-

is not founded on concepts, and is no way a cognition, but only an aesthetic judgement.

one which depends upon no a

low himself to be dissuaded from the conviction

priori, yet

ori grounds), but

by the representation of which it would be competent to enforce the assent which the judgement of taste demands of every one.

priori proofs

The

solution of

these logical peculiarities,

which distinguish a judgement of taste from all cognitive judgements, will of itself suffice for a deduction of this strange faculty, provided we

from all content of the judgement, viz., from the feeling of pleasure, and merely compare the aesthetic form with the form of objective judgements as prescribed by logic. 1 We shall first try, with the help of exam-

abstract at the outset

ples, to illustrate istic

and bring out these character-

properties of taste.

§32. First peculiarity of the judgement of taste

The

judgement of

taste determines its object

beauty) with a claim to the agreement of every one, just as if in respect of delight (as a thing of

it

were objective. To say: "This flower 1

[Cf.p.476.]

of taste

in

Hence that his

beautiful,"

is

tanta-

poem

that a youthful poet refuses to al-

is

beautiful, either

by the judge-

And even if he lends them an ear, he does so, not because he has now come to a different judgement, but because, though the whole public, at least so far as his work is concerned, should have false taste, he still, in his desire for recognition, finds good reason to accommodate himself to the popular error (even against his own judgement). It is only in aftertime, when his judgement has been ment

of the public or of his friends.

sharpened by exercise, that of his own free will and accord he deserts his former judgements behaving in just the same way as with those of his judgements which depend wholly upon reason. Taste lays claim simply to autonomy. To make the judgements of others the determining ground of one's own would be heteronomy. The fact that we recommend the works of the ancients as models, and rightly too, and call their authors classical, as constituting a sort of

nobility is

it is

among

writers that leads the

way and

thereby gives laws to the people, seems to indi2

[Cf.pp. 480, 544.]

— THE CRITIQUE

5i4

cate a posteriori sources of taste and to contradict the

autonomy

of taste in each individual.

But we might just as well say that the ancient mathematicians, who, to this day, are looked upon as the almost indispensable models of perfect thoroughness and elegance in synthetic methods, prove that reason also is on our part only imitative, and that it is incompetent with the deepest intuition to produce of itself rigor-

ous proofs by means of the construction of concepts. There is no employment of our powers, no

matter how free, not even of reason itself (which must create all its judgements from the common a priori source), which, if each individual had always to start afresh with the crude his natural state, would not get itinvolved in blundering attempts, did not those of others lie before it as a warning. Not

equipment of self

that predecessors

make

those

who

follow in their

tion matters stand just as they would were that judgement simply subjective. If any one does not think a building, view, or

poem

beautiful, then, in the first place, he re-

inmost conviction goes, to allow approval to be wrung from him by a hundred voices all lauding it to the skies. Of course he may affect to be pleased with it, so as not to be considered as wanting in taste. He may even begin to harbour doubts as to whether he has formed his taste upon an acquaintance with a sufficient number of objects of a particular kind fuses, so far as his

(just as one

who

wood which every ,

one else regards as a town, becomes doubtful of the judgement of his own eyesight). But, for all that, he clearly perceives that the approval of others affords no valid proof, available for the

He recognizes that others, may see and observe for him, and what many have seen in one and the same

estimate of beauty.

perchance,

own, often better, course. Even in religion where undoubtedly every one has to derive his rule of conduct from himself, seeing that he himself remains responsible for it and, when he goes wrong, cannot shift the blame upon others

therefore logical, judgement, serve as an ade-

their

—

as teachers or leaders

—

general precepts learned

at the feet either of priests or philosophers, or

even drawn from ones' own resources, are never so efficacious as an example of virtue or holiness, which, historically portrayed, does not dispense with the autonomy of virtue drawn from the spontaneous and original idea of morality (a priori), or convert this into a mechanical process of imitation. Following which has reference to a precedent, and not imitation, is the proper expression for all influence which the products of an exemplary author may exert upon others and this means no more than going to the same sources for a creative work as those to which he went for his creations, and learning from one's predecessor no more than the mode of availing oneself of such sources. Taste, just because its judgement cannot be determined by concepts or precepts, is among all faculties and talents the very one that stands most in need of examples of what has in the course of culture maintained itself longest in esteem. Thus it avoids an early lapse into crudity and a return to the rudeness of

its earliest efforts.

§33. Second peculiarity of the judgement oj taste

Proofs are of no

avail

whatever for determin-

ing the judgement of taste, and in this connec-

\

in the distance recognizes, as

he believes, something as a

mere imitators, but by their methods they set others upon the track of seeking in themselves for the principles, and so of adopting steps

J

«

that

way may,

for the purpose of a theoretical,

and

quate ground of proof for him, albeit he believes he saw otherwise, but that what has pleased others can

never serve him as the ground of an

aesthetic judgement.

The judgement

where unfavourable

to

of others,

may, no doubt, rightly make us suspicious in respect of our own, but convince us that it is wrong it never can. Hence there is no empirical ground of proof that can coerce any one's judgement of taste. ours,

In the second place, a proof a priori according is still less capable of determining the judgement as to beauty. If any one reads me his poem, or brings me to a play, which, all to definite rules

and done,

said

fails to

commend

itself to

my

him adduce Batteux or Lessing, or still older and more famous critics of taste, with all the host of rules laid down by them, as a proof of the beauty of his poem; let certain passages particularly displeasing to me accord completely with the rules of beauty (as set out by taste,

then

let

these critics and universally recognized)

my

:

I stop

do not want to hear any reasons or any arguing about the matter. I would prefer to suppose that those rules of the critics were at ears: I

have no application, than to judgement to be determined by a priproofs. I take my stand on the ground that judgement is to be one of taste, and not one

fault, or at least

allow ori

my

my

of understanding or reason.

This would appear to be one of the chief reawhy this faculty of aesthetic judgement has been given the name of taste. For a man may recount to me all the ingredients of a dish, sons

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT and observe of each and every one of them that is

it

just

commend

am

what I like, and, in addition, rightly the wholesomeness of the food; yet I

these arguments. I try the dish tongue and palate, and I pass judgement according to their verdict (not according to universal principles). As a matter of fact, the judgement of taste is invariably laid down as a singular judgement upon the object. The understanding can, from

deaf to

with

all

my own

illustration,

515

by the

mutual subjective

analysis of examples, of their finality, the

form of which

in

a given representation has been shown above to the beauty of their object.

constitute

Hence

with regard to the representation whereby an object is given, the critique of taste itself is only subjective; viz.,

it is

the art or science of re-

ducing the mutual relation of the understanding and the imagination in the given representation (without reference to antecedent sensation or

the comparison of the object, in point of delight,

concept), consequently their accordance or dis-

with the judgements of others, form a universal judgement, e.g.: "All tulips are beautiful." But that judgement is then not one of taste, but is a logical judgement which converts the

with regard to their conditions. It is art if it only illustrates this by examples it is science if it de-

reference of an object to our taste into a predicate belonging to things of a certain kind. But it

only the judgement whereby I regard an individual given tulip as beautiful, i.e., regard my is

delight in

it

as of universal validity, that

judgement of

taste.

Its peculiarity,

consists in the fact, that, although

subjective validity,

still it

it

extends

is

a

however,

has merely

its

claims to

cordance, to rules, and of determining them

;

duces the possibility of such an estimate from the nature of these faculties as faculties of

knowledge

in general. It is only with the latter,

as trancendental critique, that

we have here any

concern. Its proper scope

the development

and

justification of the subjective principle of

taste, as

an

is

an a priori principle of judgement. As merely looks to the physiological

art, critique

(here psychological) and, consequently, empiri-

would if it were an objective judgement, resting on grounds of cognition and capable of being proved to

proceeds (passing by the question of their pos-

demonstration.

its

all

subjects, as unreservedly as

§ 34.

An

it

A

principle of taste would mean a fundamental premiss under the condition of which one might subsume the concept of an object, and then, by a syllogism, draw the inference that it is beautiful. That, however, is absolutely impossible. For I must feel the pleasure immediately in the representation of the object, and I cannot be talked into it by any grounds of proof.

Thus although critics, as Hume says, are able to reason more plausibly than cooks, they must still share the same fate. For the determining ground of their judgement they are not able to look to the force of demonstrations, but only to

upon

his

own

state

(of pleasure or displeasure), to the exclusion of

precepts and rules.

There is, however, a matter upon which it is competent for critics to exercise their subtlety, and upon which they ought to do so, so long as it tends to the rectification and extension of our judgements of taste. But that matter is not one of exhibiting the determining ground of aesthetic judgements of this kind in a universally appliwhich is impossible. Rather is cable formula

—

it

the investigation of the faculties of cognition

and their function

in these

sibility)

and seeks

objects.

The

which

to apply

in actual fact taste

them

latter critique

in estimating criticizes

the

products of fine art, just as the former does the faculty of estimating them.

objective principle of taste is not possible

the reflection of the subject

cal rules, according to

judgements, and the

§35. The principle of taste is the subjective principle of the general power of judgement

The

judgement of taste is differentiated from judgement by the fact that, whereas the latter subsumes a representation under a concept of the object, the judgement of taste does not subsume under a concept at all for, if it did, necessary and universal approval would be capable of being enforced by proofs. And yet logical

—

does bear this resemblance to the logical judgement, that it asserts a universality and necessity, not, however, according to concepts of the object, but a universality and necessity that are, consequently, merely subjective. Now the concepts in a judgement constitute its content (what belongs to the cognition of the obit

ject).

But the judgement of

taste is not deter-

minable by means of concepts. Hence it can only have its ground in the subjective formal condition of a judgement in general. The subjective condition of all judgements is the judging faculty itself, or judgement. Employed in respect of a representation whereby an object is given, this requires the harmonious accordance of two powers of representation. These are: the imagination (for the intuition and the

THE CRITIQUE

5 i6

arrangement of the manifold of intuition), and the understanding (for the concept as a representation of the unity of this arrangement). Now, since no concept of the object underlies the judgement here, it can consist only in the subsumption of the imagination itself (in the case of a representation whereby an object is

given) under the conditions enabling the under-

standing

general to advance from the intuiThat is to say, since the free-

in

ment

is

must

lie

schematizes without a concept, the

possible for judgements of this kind), but, even

it

judgement of taste must found upon a mere sensation of the mutually quickening activity of the imagination in its freedom, and of the understanding with its conformity to law. It must therefore rest upon a feeling that allows the object to be estimated by the finality of the representation (by which an object is given) for the furtherance of the cognitive faculties in their free play.

Taste, then, as a subjective

power of

judgement, contains a principle of subsumption, not of intuitions under concepts, but of the faculty of intuitions or presentations,

i.e.,

of the

imagination, under the faculty of concepts,

i.e.,

the understanding, so far as the former in its

dum

accords with the latter in

ity to laic.

its

conform-

1

as such,

it

requires a deduction to

how an

is concerned with the a priori principles of pure judgement in

i.e., not those in which (as judgements) it has merely to subsume under objective concepts of understanding, and in which it comes under a law, but rather those in which it is itself, subjectively, object

aesthetic judgements, in theoretical

as well as law.

We may also put the problem in this way: How a judgement possible which, going mereupon the

individual's

resentation of the

§ 36.

The problem of

judgements of taste

To form diately

I

a cognitive judgement we may immeounce with the- perception of an object t

the concept of an object in general, the empirical

predicates of which are contained in that perception. In this way, a judgement of experience

produced. Now this judgement rests on the foundation of a priori concepts of the synthetical unity of the- manifold of intuition, enabling

is

to be

thought as the determination of an ob-

These concepts (the- categories) call for a deduc tion, and SUCfa was supplied in the Critique of Pure Reason. That deduction enabled us to solve the problem: I low are synthetical a priori cognitive judgements possible? This problem had. accordingly, to do with the a priori principles of pure understanding and its theoretical ject.

judgements.

But we may 1

also

immediately connect with a

[Cf. pp. 471. 476. 495. 512.]

feeling of pleasure

same object

in

every other

in-

and does so a priori, i.e., without being allowed to wait and see if other people will be of the same mind? It is

a deduction of

own

an object independent of the concept of it, estimates this as a pleasure attached to the repin

dividual,

logical form.

intel-

possible? This problem, therefore,

judgements of this kind, and consequently the mere consideration of their of

it

aesthetic

avail ourselves of the guidance of the formal

peculiarities

make

judgement can lay claim to necessity. That, now, is what lies at the bottom of the problem upon which we are at present engaged, i.e.: How are judgements of taste ligible

ly

For the discovery of this title by means of a deduction of judgements of taste, we can only

it

a priori principle.

at its basis as its

of the imagination consists precisely in the

fact that

frei

and not cognitive. Now, if such a judgenot merely one of sensation, but a formal judgement of reflection that exacts this delight from everyone as necessary, something thetic

This principle may, indeed, be a mere subjective one (supposing an objective one should be im-

tion to concepts.

dom

perception a feeling of pleasure (or displeasure)

and a delight attending the representation of the object and serving it instead of a predicate. In this way there arises a judgement which is aes-

easy to see that judgements of taste are

synthetic, for they go

beyond the concept and even the intuition of the object, and join as predicate to that intuition something which is not even a cognition at all, namely, the feeling of pleasure (or displeasure). But, although the predicate (the personal pleasure that is connet ted with the representation) is empirical, still

we need not go further than what

is

involved

the expressions of their claim to see that, so far as concerns the agreement required of in

everyone, they are a priori judgements, or to pass for such.

mean

This problem of the Critique

of Judgement, therefore,

is

part of the general

problem of transcendental philosophy: How are synthetic a priori judgements possible? § 37.

What

exactly it is that is asserted a priori of an object in a judgement of taste

The immediate synthesis of the representation of an object with pleasure can only be a matter of internal perception, and, were noth-

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT would ing more only yield a mere empirical judgement. For with no representation can I a priori connect a deterthan this sought to be indicated,

minate feeling (of pleasure or displeasure) except where I rely upon the basis of an a priori principle in reason determining the will. The truth is that the pleasure (in the moral feeling) is the consequence of the determination of the will by the principle. It cannot, therefore, be compared with the pleasure in taste. For it requires a determinate concept of a law: whereas the pleasure in taste has to be connected immediately with the sample estimate prior to

concept. For the

ments of

same reason,

also, all

any

judge-

taste are singular judgements, for they

unite their predicate of delight, not to a concept, but to a given singular empirical representation.

Hence, in a judgement of taste, what is represented a priori as a universal rule for the judgement and as valid for everyone, is not the pleasure but the universal validity of this pleasure perceived, as it is, to be combined in the mind

with the mere estimate of an object. 1 A judgement to the effect that it is with pleasure that I perceive and estimate some object is an empiri-

judgement. But

cal

object beautiful,

asserts that I think the

if it

i.e.,

that I

may

delight to everyone as necessary,

attribute that it

is

then an

Deduction of judgements of taste

Admitting that in a pure judgement of taste Jhe delight in the object is connected with the mere estimate of its form, then what we feel to be associated in the mind with the representation of the object tive finality for

is

nothing else than

its

subjec-

judgement. Since, now, in re-

spect of the formal rules of estimating, apart

from all matter (whether sensation or concept), judgement can only be directed to the subjective conditions

of

its

employment

in

general

not restricted to the particular mode of sense nor to a particular concept of the understanding), and so can only be directed to that

(which

men

we may presuppose

in

(as requisite for a possible experience

generally),

it

representation

follows that the accordance of a

with

these

conditions

of

the

judgement must admit of being assumed valid a priori for

warranted

every one. In other words, we are from every one the pleas-

in exacting

ure or subjective finality of the representation in respect of the relation of the cognitive facul1

517

in the estimate of a sensible object

in general. 2

Remark

What makes

this deduction so easy is that it spared the necessity of having to justify the objective reality of a concept. For beauty is not

is

a concept of the object, and the judgement of taste

is

not a cognitive judgement. All that

holds out for

is

that

we

it

are justified in presup-

posing that the same subjective conditions of

judgement which we

find in ourselves are uni-

man, and further that subsumed the given object un-

versally present in every

we have

rightly

der these conditions.

The

no doubt, has which do not affect the logical judgement. (For there the subsumption is under concepts; whereas in the aesthetic judgement it is under a mere sensible relation of the imagination and understanding mutually harmonizing with one another in the represented form of the object, in which case the subsumption may easily prove fallacious.) But this in no way detracts from the legitimacy of the claim of the judgement to count upon universal agreement a claim which amounts to no latter,

to face unavoidable difficulties

—

more than

this:

the correctness of the principle

of judging validly for every one

upon subjective

grounds. For as to the difficulty and uncertainty

upon the legitimacy of the claim to this validity on the part of an aesthetic judgement generally, or, therefore, upon the principle itself, than the mistakes

(though not so often or easily

in-

curred), to which the subsumption of the logical

judgement under its principle is similarly liable, can render the latter principle, which is objective, open to doubt. But if the question were: How is it possible to assume a priori that nature a complex of objects of taste? the problem would then have reference to teleology, because it would have to be regarded as an end of na-

is

is

subjective factor which all

engaged

concerning the correctness of the subsumption under that principle, it no more casts a doubt

a priori judgement. § 38.

ties

[Cf. p. 482, et seq.]

2

In order to be justified in claiming universal agreefor an aesthetic judgement merely resting on subjective grounds, it is sufficient to assume: (1) that the subjective conditions of this faculty of aesthetic judgement are identical with all men in what concerns the relation of the cognitive faculties, there brought into action, with a view to a cognition in general. This must be true, as otherwise men would be incapable of communicating their representations or even their knowledge; (2) that the judgement has paid regard merely to this relation (consequently merely to the formal condition of the faculty of judgement), and is pure, i.e.. is free from confusion either with concepts of the object or sensations as determining grounds. If any mistake is made in this latter point, this only touches the incorrect application to a particular case of the right which a law gives us, and does not do away with the right generally.

ment

THE CRITIQUE

5i8 ture belonging essentially to

should exhibit forms that are

concept that

its

final for

it

our judge-

ment. But the correctness of this assumption may still be seriously questioned, while the actual existence of beauties of nature is patent to

every appropriate occasion to this moral birth-

we may

right,

still

demand

that delight

from

everyone; but we can do so only through the moral law, which, in its turn, rests upon concepts of reason.

The

experience.

pleasure in the beautiful

is,

on the other

hand, neither a pleasure of enjoyment nor of an § 39.

The communicabihty of vims,

a sensation

as the real in perception,

referred to knowledge,

is

activity according to law, nor yet

where

called organic sensa-

and its specific quality may be represented as completely communicable to others in a like mode, provided we assume that every one has a like sense to our own. This, however, is an absotion

lutely inadmissible presupposition in the case

Thus

of an organic sensation.

a person

who

is

without a sense of smell cannot have a sensation of this kind communicated to him, and, even if he does not suffer from this deficiency, we still cannot be certain that he gets precisely the same

we get from it. But more divergent must we consider men to be

sensation from a flower that still

in respect of the agreeableness or disagreeableness derived from the sensation of one and the same object of sense, and it is absolutely out of

the question to require that pleasure in such objects

should be acknowledged by every one.

Pleasure of this kind, since

mind through sense passive one

—our

—may be

it

enters into the

role, therefore,

being a

called the pleasure of en-

joyment.

On

one of a racontemplation according to ideas,

but rather of mere reflection. Without any guiding-line of

the

end or principle, this pleasure attends apprehension of an object by

ordinary

means

of the imagination, as the faculty of in-

tuition,

but with a reference to the understand-

ing as

faculty of concepts, and through the

operation of a process of judgement which has also to be invoked in order to obtain the com-

monest experience. In the

moral character is not a pleasure of enjoyment, but one of self-asserting activity and in this coming up to the idea of what it is meant to be. But this feeling, which is called the moral feeling, requires concepts and is the presits

entation of a finality, not free, but according to law. It. therefore, admits of communication

only through the instrumentality of reason and, if the pleasure is to be of the same kind for everyone, by means of very determinate practical concepts of reason.

The pleasure

in

the sublime in nature, as one

of rationalizing contemplation, lays claim also to universal participation, but

still

it

presup-

latter case,

however,

functions are directed to perceiving an empirical objective concept, whereas in the former its

(in the aesthetic mode of estimating) merely to perceiving the adequacy of the representation for engaging both faculties of knowledge in their

freedom in an harmonious (subjectively final) employment, i.e., to feeling with pleasure the subjective bearings of the representation. This pleasure must of necessity depend for every one

upon the same conditions, seeing that they are the subjective conditions of the possibility of a cognition in general, and the proportion of these cognitive faculties which

the other hand, delight in an action on the

score of

tionalizing

is

requisite for taste

requisite also for ordinary

sound understandpresence of which we are entitled to presuppose in every one. And, for this reason also, one who judges with taste (provided he does not make a mistake as to this consciousness, and does not take the matter for the form, or charm for beauty) can impute the subjective finality, is

ing, the

i.e., his delight in the object, to everyone else and suppose his feeling universally communicable, and that, too, without the mediation of

concepts. § 40.

Taste as a kind of sensus communis

The name

of sense

ment where what

is

often given to judge-

attracts attention

is

not so

poses another feeling, that, namely, of our su-

much

persensible sphere, which feeling, however ob-

speak of a sense of truth, of a sense of propriety,

scure

it

there

is

may

be, has a

moral foundation. But

absolutely no authority for

posing that others

will

pay attention

my

presup-

to this

and

take a delight in beholding the uncouth dimensions of nature (one that in truth cannot be

ascribed to

its

aspect, which

is

terrifying rather

than otherwise). Nevertheless, having regard to the fact that attention ought to be paid upon

its

reflective act as

or of justice, etc.

And

merely

its result.

So we

we know, enough to know, that a sense cannot be the true abode of these concepts, not to speak of its being competent, even in the slightest degree, to pronounce universal rules. yet, of course,

or at least ought well

On

the contrary,

we

tion of this kind, be ty,

recognize that a representa-

it of truth, propriety, beauor justice, could never enter our thoughts

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT were we not able to

raise ourselves

above the

level of the senses to that of higher faculties of

Common human understanding which mere sound (not yet cultivated) understanding, is looked upon as the least we can expect from any one claiming the name of man, has therefore the doubtful honour of having the name of common sense (sensus communis) bestowed upon it and bestowed, too, in an acceptation of the word common (not merely in our own language, where it actually has a double meaning, but also in many others) which makes it amount to what is vulgar what is everywhere to be met with a quality which by no means confers credit or distinction upon its cognition.

as

;

—

—

However, by the name sensus communis

is

to

be understood the idea of a public sense, i. e., a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account (a priori) of the

mode

of everyone else, in order, as

of representation

were, to weigh judgement with the collective reason of mankind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from subjective and personal conditions which could it

its

readily be taken for objective, an illusion that

would exert a prejudicial influence upon

its

judgement. This is accomplished by weighing the judgement, not so much with actual, as rather with the merely possible, judgements of others, and by putting ourselves in the position of everyone else, as the result of a mere abstraction

by

from the limitations which contingently

own

estimate. This, in turn,

is

effected

so far as possible letting go the element of

matter,

i.

e.,

sensation, in our general state of

representative activity, and confining attention to the formal peculiarities of our representation

or general state of representative activity. it

of a never-passive reason. To be given to such passivity, consequently to heteronomy of reason, is called prejudice; and the greatest of all prejudices is that of fancying nature not to be subject to rules which the understanding by

im

virtue of i.

e.,

tion this

its

own

essential laws lays at its basis,

superstition.

Emancipation from supersti-

enlightenment; 1 for although term applies also to emancipation from is

called

prejudices generally,

still superstition deserves pre-eminently (in sensu eminenti) to be called a prejudice. For the condition of blindness into which superstition puts one, which is as much

as

demands from one as an obligation, makes by others, and consequent-

the need of being led

ly the passive state of the reason, pre-eminently

possessor.

affect our

519

may seem

Now

that this operation of reflection

is

second maxim belonging we have quite got into the way of calling a man narrow (narrow, as opposed to being of enlarged mind) whose talconspicuous.

As

to the

to our habits of thought,

fall short of what is required for employment upon work of any magnitude (especially that involving intensity). But the question here

ents

is not one of the faculty of cognition, but of the mental habit of making a final use of it. This, however small the range and degree to which man's natural endowments extend, still indicates a man of enlarged mind: if he detaches himself

from the subjective personal conditions of

his

judgement, which cramp the minds of so many others, and reflects upon his own judgement from a universal standpoint (which he can only determine by shifting his ground to the standpoint of others). ly,

The

third

of consistent thought

—

maxim is

—

that,

name-

the hardest of at-

tainment, and is only attainable by the union of both the former, and after constant attention to them has made one at home in their observance.

We may

say:

The

first

of these

is

the

maxim

of

too artificial to be attributed to the faculty

understanding, the second that of judgement,

which we call common sense. But this is an appearance due only to its expression in abstract formulae. In itself nothing is more natural than

the third of that reason.

to abstract

from charm and emotion where one

looking for a judgement intended to serve as a universal rule. is

While the following maxims of common huunderstanding do not properly come in

man

here as constituent parts of the critique of taste, they may still serve to elucidate its fundamental

They are these: (i) to think for (2) to think from the standpoint of everyone else; (3) always to think consistently.

propositions. oneself;

The

first is

the

maxim

of unprejudiced thought,

the second that of enlarged thought, the third that of consistent thought.

The

first is

the

max-

I resume the thread of the discussion interrupted by the above digression, and I say that taste can with more justice be called a sensus communis than can sound understanding; and that the aesthetic, rather than the intellectual, 1 We readily see that enlightenment, while easy, no doubt, in thesi, in hypothesi is difficult and slow of realization. For not to be passive with one's reason, but always to be self-legislative, is doubtless quite an easy matter for a man who only desires to be adapted to his essential end, and does not seek to know what is beyond his understanding. But as the tendency in the latter direction is hardly avoidable, and others are always coming and promising with full assurance that they are able to satisfy one's curiosity, it must be very difficult to preserve or restore in the mind (and particularly in the public mind) that merely negative attitude (which constitutes enlightenment proper).

THE CRITIQUE

520

sense. 1

judgement can bear the name of a public i.

taking

e.,

we

that

it

are prepared to use the

word sense of an effect that mere reflection has upon the mind; for then by sense we mean the feeling of pleasure.

We

might even define taste what makes our

as the faculty of estimating feeling

a

in

given

representation

universally

communicable without the mediation of a con-

non

consequential which

valet

applied to

is

cognitive judgements, holds good here in the

case of aesthetic judgements.

Now

this

"some-

may

be something empirical, such as an inclination proper to the nature of human thing else"

beings, or it may be something intellectual, as a property of the will whereby it admits of rational determination a priori. Both of these in-

volve a delight in the existence of the object,

cept.

The aptitude

of

men

communicating their a relation between the

for

thoughts requires, also, imagination and the understanding, in order to

connect intuitions with concepts, and concepts, in turn, with intuitions, which both unite in cognition. But there the agreement of both mental

powers

according to law, and under the conOnly when the im-

is

straint of definite concepts.

agination in

its

freedom

stirs the

understanding,

and so can lay the foundation for an interest in what has already pleased of itself and without regard to any interest whatsoever.

The

empirical interest in the beautiful exists

only in society. pulse to society

And is

if

we admit

that the im-

natural to mankind, and that

the suitability for and the propensity towards it, i.e.,

sociability,

requirements of

is

a property essential to the

man

as a creature intended for

and the understanding apart from concepts puts

society,

and one, therefore, that belongs to hu-

the imagination into regular play, does the rep-

manity,

it is

communicate

resentation

not as thought,

itself

but as an internal feeling of a

final state of the

mind.

Taste

is,

therefore, the faculty of forming an

inevitable that

we should

also look

upon taste in the light of a faculty for estimating whatever enables us to communicate even our feeling to every one else, and hence as a means of promoting that upon which the natural

a priori estimate of the communicability of the

inclination of everyone

feeling that, without the mediation of a con-

With no one to take into account but himself, a man abandoned on a desert island would not adorn either himself or his hut, nor would he

cept, are connected with a given representation.

Supposing, now, that we could assume that

mere universal communicability of our feelmust of itself carry with it an interest for us (an assumption, however, which we are not entitled to draw as a conclusion from the character of a merely reflective judgement), we

is set.

the

look for flowers, and

ing

the object of providing himself with personal

should then be

in

§41. The empirical interest

Abundant show

how

a position to explain

judgement of taste comes acted from everyone as a sort of duty. feeling in the

the

to be ex-

in the beautiful 2

proof has been given above to

judgement of

still

them, with

less plant

adornments. Only in society does it occur to him to be not merely a man, but a man refined after the manner of his kind (the beginning of civilization)— for that

is the estimate formed has the bent and turn for communicating his pleasure to others, and who is not

of one

who

quite satisfied with an object unless his feeling of delight in it can be shared in communion with others. Further, a regard to universal

communi-

by which something is declared beautiful must have no interest as its determining ground. But it does not follow from this that, after it has once been

cability

posited as a pure aesthetic judgement, an inter-

charms, e. g., colours for painting oneself (roucou among the Caribs and cinnabar among the

that

the

taste

cannot then enter into combination with it. This combination, however, can never be anything but indirect. Taste must, that is to say, est

first

of

all

something reflection

be represented in conjunction with else,

if

the delight attending the

upon an object

further conjoined with

it

is

to

admit of having

a pleasure in the real

existence of the object las that wherein terest consists).

mere

For the saving,

a posse

all in-

ad esse

Taste may be designated m munis aesthcticus. common human understanding a sensus com1

munis 2

logicus.

[Cf. p. 510, et seq.]

which every one expects and requires from every one else, just as if it were part of an original compact dictated by humanity itself. And thus, no doubt, at first only is

a thing

Iroquois), or flowers, sea-shells, beautifully coloured feathers, then, in the course of time, also beautiful forms (as in canoes, wearing-apparel, etc.)

which convey no gratification,

of enjoyment,

become

of

moment

i.

e.,

delight

in society

and

attract a considerable interest. Eventually, when civilization has reached its height it makes this

work

of communication almost the main business of refined inclination, and the entire value of sensations is placed in the degree to which 3

[."From possibility to actuality."]

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT they permit of universal communication. At this stage, then, even where the pleasure which each

one has in an object

is

but insignificant and

possesses of itself no conspicuous interest, the idea of

its

indefinitely

still

universal communicability almost

augments

its

value.

This interest, indirectly attached to the beautiful by the inclination towards society, and, consequently, empirical, is, however, of no im-

we have what can have a bearing a priori, even though indirect, upon the judgement of taste. For, if even in this form an associated interest should betray itself, taste would then reveal a transition on the part of our critical faculty from the enjoyment of sense to the moral feeling. 1 This would not merely mean that we should be supplied with a more effectual guide for the final employment of taste, but taste would further be presented as a link in the chain of the human faculties a priori upon which all legislation must depend. This much may cerportance for us here. For that to which alone to look

is

tainly be said of the empirical interest in objects

of taste, and in taste itself, that as taste thus

may combine

521

with

it

will

hardly consort with

the moral, and certainly not on grounds of inner affinity.

Now

I willingly

admit that the interest

in the

beautiful of art (including under this heading the artificial use of natural beauties for personal

adornment, and so from vanity) gives no evidence at all of a habit of mind attached to the morally good, or even inclined that way. But, on the other hand, I do maintain that to take an immediate interest in the beauty of nature (not merely to have taste in estimating it) is always a mark of a good soul; and that, where this interest is habitual, it is at least indicative of a temper of mind favourable to the moral feeling that it should readily associate itself with the contemplation of nature. It must, however, be borne in mind that I mean to refer strictly to the beautiful forms of nature, and to put to one side the charms which she is wont so lavishly to

combine with them; because, though the interis no doubt immediate, it is never-

est in these

theless empirical.

One who alone (and without any

intention of

pays homage to inclination, however refined, such interest will nevertheless readily fuse also with all inclinations and passions, which in society attain to their greatest variety and highest

communicating

degree, and the interest in the beautiful,

even at the risk of some misadventure to himself so far from there being any prospect of advantage to him such a one takes an immediate, and in fact intellectual, interest in the beauty of nature. This means that he is not alone pleased with nature's product in respect of its form, but is also pleased at its existence, and is so without any charm of sense having a share in the matter, or without his associating with it any end whatsoever. In this connection, however, it is of note that were we to play a trick on our lover of the beautiful, and plant in the ground artificial flowers (which can be made so as to look just like natural ones), and perch artfully carved birds on the branches of trees, and he were to find out how he had been taken in, the immediate interest which these things previously had for him would at once vanish though, perhaps, a different interest might intervene in its stead, that, namely, of vanity in decorating his room with them for the eyes of others. The fact is that our intuition and reflection must have as their concomitant the thought that the beauty in question is nature's handiwork; and this is the sole basis of the immediate interest that is taken in it. Failing this, we are either left with a bare judgement of taste void of all interest

is

made

its

if

this

ground, can but afford a very am-

biguous transition from the agreeable to the good. We have reason, however, to inquire

whether this transition may not still in some way be furthered by means of taste when taken in its purity. § 42.

The

intellectual interest in the beautiful

It has been with the best intentions that those who love to see in the ultimate end of humanity,

namely the morally good, the goal of all activities to which men are impelled by the inner bent of their nature, have regarded it as a mark of a good moral character to take an interest in the beautiful generally. But they have, not without reason, been contradicted, by others, who ap-

peal to the fact of experience, that virtuosi in matters of taste, being not alone often,

but one might say as a general rule, vain, capricious, and addicted to injurious passions, could perhaps more rarely than others lay claim to any pre-eminent attachment to moral principles. And so it would seem, not only that the feeling for the beautiful

is

specifically different

from

the moral feeling (which as a matter of fact is the case), but also that the interest which we 1

[Cf. p. 548.]

his observations to others) re-

gards the beautiful form of a wild flower, a bird, an insect, or the like, out of admiration and love of them, and being loath to let in nature,

—

—

—

them escape him

THE CRITIQUE

522

whatever, or else only with one that is combined with an interest that is mediate, involving,

delight (a delight

namely, a reference to society; which latter affords no reliable indication of morally good

it

habits of thought.

part of nature of

The

superiority which

over that of

art,

natural

even where

it

beauty has excelled

is

by

the latter in point of form, in yet being alone

awaken an immediate interest, accords and well-grounded habits of

able to

with the refined

thought of all men moral feeling. If a

who have man with

cultivated their taste

enough to

judge of works of fine art with the greatest correctness and refinement readily quits the room in which he meets with those beauties that minvanity

ister to

or, at least, social joys,

and be-

which we cognize a priori as

a law for every one without being able to ground

upon proofs). That being

reason must

so,

take an interest in every manifestation on the

some such accordance. Hence mind cannot reflect on the beauty of nature without at the same time finding its interest engaged. But this interest is akin to the moral. the

who

One, then,

takes such an interest in the

beautiful in nature can only do so in so far

deep in the morally good. On these grounds we have reason for presuming the presence of at least the germ of a good moral disas he has previously set his interest

foundations

of

the

man

position in the case of a

beauty of nature

is

to

whom

the

a matter of immediate in-

takes himself to the beautiful in nature, so that may there find as it were a feast for his soul

terest.

a train of thought which he can never completely evolve, we will then regard this his

aesthetic judgements on the basis of kinship

he in

choice even with veneration, and give

him

credit

which no connoisseur or art collector can lay claim on the score of the interest which his objects have for him. Here, now, are two kinds of objects which in the judgement of mere taste could scarcely contend with one another for a superiority. What then, for a beautiful soul, to

is

the distinction that

makes us hold them

in

such different esteem?

We have a faculty of judgement which is merely aesthetic a faculty of judging of forms without the aid of concepts, and of finding, in the mere estimate of them, a delight that we at the same time make into a rule for every one, without this judgement being founded on an interest, or yet producing one. On the other hand, we have also a faculty of intellectual judgement for the mere forms of practical maxims (so far as they are of themselves qualified for universal a faculty of determining an a legislation) priori delight, which we make into a law for everyone, without our judgement being founded on any interest, though here it produces one. The pleasure or displeasure in the former judge-

—

—

ment

called that of taste; the latter

is

is

called

is

further interested in ideas

(for which in our moral feeling

it

brings about

an immediate interest), having also objective reality.

1

That

is

to say,

it

is

of interest to rea-

son that nature should at least show a trace or give a hint that it contains in itself some ground or other 2 for assuming a uniform accordance of

its i

2

will

be said that this interpretation of

with our moral feeling has far too studied an

appearance to be accepted as the true construction of the cypher in which nature speaks to us figuratively in its beautiful forms. But, first of all,

this

ture

is

immediate interest

not in fact

common.

products with our wholly disinterested

[Cf. pp. 517, 528, 546; also p. 496.] [Cf. p. 548.]

in the

beauty of na-

It is peculiar to those

whose habits of thought are already trained to the good or else are eminently susceptible of such training; and under the circumstances the analogy 3 in which the pure judgement of taste that, without relying upon any interest, gives us a feeling of delight, and at the same time represents it a priori as proper to mankind in general, stands to the moral judgement that does just the same from concepts, is one which, without any clear, subtle, and deliberate reflection, conduces to a like immediate interest being taken in the objects of the former judgement as in those of the latter with this one

—

difference, that the interest in the first case is free, while in the latter

one founded on obis our admiration of Nature, which in her beautiful products displays herself as art, not as mere matter it is

jective laws. In addition to this, there

of chance, but, as

it

were, designedly, according

to a law-directed arrangement,

apart from any end.

that of the moral feeling.

But, now, reason

It

and as

such an end outside ourselves, look for

it

finality

As we never meet with

in ourselves, and,

we

naturally

in fact, in that

which constitutes the ultimate end of our existence the moral side of our being. (The inquiry into the ground of the possibility of such a natural finality will, however, first come un-

—

der discussion in the Teleology.) The fact that the delight in beautiful art does not, in the pure judgement of taste, involve an 3

[Cf. pp. 547, 548.]

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT immediate

may

nature,

mer

is

as does that in beautiful

interest,

be readily explained. For the for-

either such an imitation of the latter as

goes the length of deceiving us, in which case

upon us

acts

it

in

the character of a natural

we take

beauty, which

it

to be; or else

it is

an

523

to enjoy the country air, their

and has done so to

huge satisfaction, by hiding

in a thicket

who (with a reed or mouth) knew how to reproduce this

a rogue of a youth

rush in

his

note so

as to hit off nature to perfection.

stant one realizes that

is all

it

endure listening to

But the

in-

a fraud no one

intentional art obviously directed to our delight.

will long

In the latter case, however, the delight in the product would, it is true, be brought about im-

was regarded as so attractive. And it is just the same with the song of any other bird. It must be nature, or be mistaken by us for nature, to enable us to take an immediate interest in the beautiful as such; and this is all the more so if we can even call upon others to take a similar interest. And such a demand we do in fact make, since we regard as coarse and low the habits of thought of those who have no

mediately by taste, but there would be nothing but a mediate interest in the cause that lay beneath an interest, namely, in an art only

—

capable of interesting by

its

end, and never in

perhaps, be said that this

itself. It will,

also

is

the case where an object of nature only inter-

by its beauty so far as a moral idea is brought into partnership therewith. But it is not the object that is of immediate interest, but rather the inherent character of the beauty qualifying it for such a partnership a character, therefore, that belongs to the very essence ests

—

this

song that be-

fore

nature

for beautiful

feeling

word we use

(for

this

is

the

for susceptibility to an interest in

the contemplation of beautiful nature), and

who devote themselves

to the

mere enjoyments

of sense found in eating and drinking.

of beauty. § 43.

The charms

in natural beauty, 1 which are found blended, as it were, so frequently with beauty of form, belong either to the modifications of light (in colouring) or of sound (in tones). For these are the only sensations which permit not merely of a feeling of the senses, but also of reflection upon the form of these modifications of sense, and so embody as it were a language in which nature speaks to us and which has the semblance of a higher meaning. Thus the white colour of the lily seems to dispose the mind to ideas of innocence, and the other seven colours, following the series from

to be

Art

Art in general

from nature as makfrom acting or operating in general (agere). and the product or the result of the former is distinguished from that of the latter as work (opus) from operation (effectus). (1.)

ing (facere)

By dom,

right i.e.,

distinguished

is

is

it is only production through freethrough an act of will that places

reason at the basis of

its

action, that should be

termed art. For, although we are pleased to call what bees produce (their regularly constituted cells) a work of art, we only do so on the strength of an analogy with art; that

is

the red to the violet, similarly to ideas of (i)

as soon as

sublimity, (2) courage, (3) candour, (4) ami(5) modesty, (6) constancy, (7) tenderness. The bird's song tells of joyousness and

eration forms the basis of their labour,

ability,

contentment with interpret nature

or not.

But

its

existence.

—whether such

it is

At

least so

be

its

purpose

the indispensable requisite of

the interest which

we here take

in beauty, that

the beauty should be that of nature, and ishes completely as soon as

we

of having been deceived, and that

work

—

we

so completely that

it

van-

are conscious it is

only the

even taste can then no longer find in it anything beautiful nor sight anything attractive. What do poets set more store on than the nightingale's bewitching and beautiful note, in a lonely thicket on a still summer evening by the soft light of the moon? And yet we have instances of how, where no such songster was to be found, a jovial host has played a trick on the guests with him on a visit 1

of art

[Cf. p. 521, et seq.]

we

once that

at

it is

and

instinct),

we

call to

ascribe

it

it

mind

to say,

that no rational delib-

we say

a product of their nature (of is

only to their Creator that

as art.

sometimes happens, in a search through light on a piece of hewn wood, we do not say it is a product of nature but of art. Its producing cause had an end in view to which the object owes its form. Apart from such cases, we recognize an art in everything formed in such a way that its actuality must have been preceded by a representation of the thing in its cause (as even in the case of the bees), although the effect could not have been thought by the cause. But where anything is called absolutely a work of art, to distinguish it from a natural If, as

a bog,

we

product,

then some work of

man

is

always

understood. (2.) Art, as

from science

human

skill, is

(as ability

distinguished also

from knowledge) as ,

a

THE CRITIQUE

5 24

from a theoretical faculty, as technic from theory (as the art of surveying from geometry). For this reason, also, what one can do the moment one only knows what is to be done, hence without anything more than sufficient knowledge of the desired result, is not practical

To

called art.

art that alone belongs for

which

the possession of the most complete knowledge

does not involve one's having then and there the skill to do it. Camper 1 describes very exactly how the best shoe must be made, but he. doubtless, was not able to turn one out himself. 2

The

is

further distinguished from handi-

first is

called free, the other

called industrial art.

We

may

be

look on the former as

something which could only prove final (be a success) as play, i.e., an occupation which is agreeable on its own account; but on the second as labour, i.e.. a business, which on its own account is disagreeable (drudgery), and is only attractive by means of what it results in (e.g., the pay), and which is consequently capable of being a compulsory imposition. Whether in the list of arts and crafts we are to rank watchmakers as artists, and smiths on the contrary craftsmen, requires a standpoint different

as

There a

from that here adopted

—

one, that

is

to say,

taking account of the proposition of the talents

which the business undertaken in either case must necessarily involve. Whether, also, among the so-called seven free arts some may not have been included which should be reckoned as sciences, and many, too, that resemble handi-

is

critique.

Fine art

no science of the beautiful, but only Nor, again, is there an elegant

(schöne) science, but only a fine (schöne)

art.

For a science of the beautiful would have to determine scientifically, i.e., by means of proofs, whether a thing was to be considered beautiful or not; and the judgement upon beauty, consequently, would,

if

belonging to science,

fail

to

be a judgement of taste. As for a beautiful science a science which, as such, is to be beau-

—

tiful,

(3.) Art craft.

§ 44.

a nonentity. For

is

we were we would be put science,

What

mots).

off

this,

it

as a

and proofs,

with elegant phrases (bons

has given rise to the current ex-

pression elegant sciences

than

treating

if,

to ask for reasons

that

common

is,

doubtless, no

more

observation has, quite

accurately, noted the fact that for fine art, in the fulness of

science

is

its

perfection, a large store of

required, as, for example, knowledge

of ancient languages, acquaintance with classical authors, history, antiquarian learning, etc.

Hence these

sciences, owing to the form the necessary preparation and groundwork for fine art, and partly also owing to the fact that they are taken to comprise even the knowledge of the products of fine art (rhetoric and poetry), have by a conhistorical

fact that they

fusion of words, actually got the

name

of ele-

gant sciences.

Where

this: that in all free arts

something of a com-

merely seeking to actualize a poswhich it is adequate, does whatever acts are required for that purpose, then it is mechanical. But should the feeling of pleasure be what it has immediately in view, it is then termed aesthetic art. As such

pulsory character

required, or, as

it

craft,

a matter I will not discuss here. It

is

is

not amiss, however, to remind the reader of

is

still

it

is

mechanism, without which the soul, which in art must be free, and which alone gives life to the work, would be bodyless and evanescent (e.g., in the poetic art there must be correctness and wealth of language, likewise prosody and metre). For not a few leaders of a newer school 3 believe that the best way to promote a free art is to sweep away all restraint and convert it from labour into mere play.

called, a

1

[Peter

scientist,

Camper (1722-89),

and author

a

of anatomical

Dutch physician and and medical works.

|

In my part of the country, if you set a common man a problem like that of Columbus and hi.- egg, he says, "There is no art in that, it i> only science": i.e. you can do it if you know /tow; and he says just the same of all the would-be arts of jugglers. To that of the tight-rope dancer, on the other hand, he has not the least compunction in giving the name of art. 3 [Cf. pp. 525; 5 26, et seq.; 531. et seq.; 538, et seq.] 2

art,

sible object to the cognition of

may

be either agreeable or fine

scription "agreeable art" applies of the art

is

art.

The

de-

where the end

that the pleasure should

accompany

the representations considered as mere sensations, the description "fine art" where it is to

accompany them considered

as

modes

of cog-

nition.

Agreeable arts are those which have mere enjoyment for their object. Such are all the charms that can gratify a dinner party: entertaining narrative, the art of starting the whole table in unrestrained and sprightly conversa-

with jest and laughter inducing a cerof gaiety. Here, as the saying goes, there may be much loose talk over the glasses, without a person wishing to be brought to book

tion, or

tain air

for

all

he utters, because

the entertainment of the lasting matter to

it is

only given out for

moment, and not as a be made the subject of reflec-

—a OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT (Of the same sort is also the enjoyment, or, at large banquets, the music of the orchestra quaint idea intended to act on the mind merely as an agreeable noise fostering a genial spirit, which, without any one paying the smallest attention to the composition, promotes the free flow of conversation between guest and guest.) In addition must be included play of every kind which is attended with no further interest than that of making the time pass by unheeded. Fine art, on the other hand, is a mode of representation which is intrinsically final, and which, although devoid of an end, has the effect of advancing the culture of the mental powers in the interests of social communication. The universal communicability of a pleasure involves in its very concept that the pleasure is not one of enjoyment arising out of mere sensation, but must be one of reflection. Hence aesthetic art, as art which is beautiful, is one having for its standard the reflective judgement and not organic sensation.

525

by means of a concept. But in both cases mere estimate i.e., not as fine art, but rather as mechan-

tion or repetition.

please

art of arranging the table for

the art would please, not in the

—

of

it,

ical art.

Hence

the finality in the product of fine art,

it be, must not have the appearance of being intentional; i.e., fine art must be clothed with the aspect of nature, although we recognize it to be art. But the way in which a product of art seems like nature is by the presence of perfect exactness in the agreement with rules prescribing how alone the product can be what it is intended to be, but with an absence of laboured effect (without academic form betraying itself), i.e., without a trace appearing of the artist having always had the

intentional though

his

Fine art

is

A

product of fine art must be recognized to be art and not nature. Nevertheless the finality in its form must appear just as free from the constraint of arbitrary rules as if it were a product of mere nature. Upon this feeling of freedom in the play of our cognitive faculties which play has at the same time to be final rests that pleasure which alone is universally communicable without being based on concepts. Nature proved beautiful when it wore the appearance of art; and art can only be termed beautiful, where we are conscious of its being art, while yet it has the appearance of nature. For, whether we are dealing with beauty of nature or beauty of art, we may make the uni-

—

That is beautiful which mere estimate of it (not in sensation or by means of a concept). Now art has versal

statement:

pleases in the

always got a definite intention of producing something. 1 Were this "something," however, to be mere sensation (something merely subjective), intended to be accompanied with pleasure, then such product would, in our estimation of it, only please through the agency of the feeling of the senses.

On

the other hand,

were the intention one directed to the production of a definite object, then, supposing this

were attained by

art,,

the object

would only

1 [Cf. pp. 526, 527, 528, 530, 532, et seq.; 546, et seq.; 549, et seq.]

of

having fettered

its

mental powers. § 46. Fine art

is

the art of genius

Genius is the talent (natural endowment) which gives the rule to art. Since talent, as an innate productive faculty of the artist, belongs itself to nature,

an art, so far as it has at the same time the appearance of being nature

§ 45.

him and

rule present to

the

is

innate

we may put it this way: Genius mental aptitude (ingenium)

through which nature gives the rule to art. Whatever may be the merits of this definition, and whether it is merely arbitrary, or whether it is adequate or not to the concept usually associated with the word genius (a point which the following sections have to clear up), it

may

still

be shown at the outset that, accord-

ing to this acceptation of the word, fine arts

must necessarily be regarded as arts of genius. For every art presupposes rules which are laid down as the foundation which first enables a product,

if it is

to be called

one of

art, to

The concept

represented as possible.

of

be

fine

art, however, does not permit of the judgement upon the beauty of its product being derived from any rule that has a concept for its determining ground, and that depends, consequently,

on a concept of the way possible. Consequently

which the product cannot of its own self excogitate the rule according to which it is to effectuate its product. But since, for all that, a product can never be called art unless in

fine art

is

there

is

a preceding rule,

it

follows that nature

in the individual

(and by virtue of the harmony

of his faculties)

must give the

rule to art,

i.e.,

only possible as a product of genius. From this it may be seen that genius (1) is a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given, 2 and not an aptitude in the fine art is

way 2

of cleverness for what can be learned ac-

[Cf. pp. 530, 543, et seq.]

THE CRITIQUE

526

and that consequently primary property. (2)

cording to some rule;

must be

originality

its

may also be original nonsense, its products must at the same time be models, i.e.. be exemplary; and. consequently, though not themselves derived from imitation, they must serve that purpose for others, i.e., as a standard Since there

Newton had to take from the first elements of geometry to his greatest and most profound discoveries were such as he could steps that

make

intuitively evident

and plain

to

follow,

not only for himself but for every one else. On the other hand, no Homer or Wieland can show

how

his ideas, so rich at

once in fancy and

in

cannot indicate (3) scientifically how it brings about its product, but rather gives the rule as nature. Hence, where an author owes a product to his genius,

thought, enter and assemble themselves in his

he does not himself know how the ideas for it have entered into his head, nor has he it in his power to invent the like at pleasure, or methodi-

differs

or rule of estimating.

It

and communicate the same to others

cally,

in

such precepts as would put them in a position to produce similar products. (Hence, presumderived from genius, and guiding spirit given to a man at his birth, by the inspiration of which those original ideas were obtained.) (4) Nature prescribes the rule through genius not to science but to art, and this also only in so

word Genie

ably, our

is

as the peculiar guardian

far as

it is

be

to

fine art.

1

good reason that he does not himknow, and so cannot teach others. In mat-

brain, for the self

ters of science, therefore, the greatest inventor

only in degree from the most laborious

and apprentice, whereas he differs from one endowed by nature for fine art. No disparagement, however, of those great men, to whom the human race is so deeply indebted, is involved in this comparison of them with those who on the score of their talent imitator

specifically

for fine art are the elect of nature.

science

for

is

vances of greater perfection in knowledge, with its dependent practical advantages, as also for imparting the same to others. Hence sciencan boast a ground of considerable superi-

tists

and confirmation of the

above explanation of genius

Every one

is

agreed on the point of the com-

plete opposition

between genius and the

Now

of imitation.

since learning

is

spirit

nothing but

imitation, the greatest ability, or aptness as a

pupil (capacity), to genius.

is still,

Even though

as such, not equivalent

a

man weaves

his

own

thoughts or fancies, instead of merely taking in what others have thought, and even though

he go so far as to bring fresh gains to art and science, this does not afford a valid reason for calling such a man of brains, and often great brains, a genius, in contradistinction to one

who

name of shallow-pate, because he can never do more than merely learn and follow a lead. For what is accomplished in this way

goes by the

something that

is

Hence

it

all lies in

could

have been learned.

the natural path of investi-

gation and reflection according to rules, and so

not specifically distinguishable

is

may

be

acquired

as

the

result

from what of

industry

backed up by imitation. So all that Newton has set forth in his immortal work on the Principles of Natural Philosophy may well be learned, however great a mind it took to find it all

we cannot learn to write in a no matter how complete all the

out, but

poetic vein,

cepts of the poetic art cellent its models. 1

[Cf. pp. 490, 527.]

may

be, or

The reason

is

true pre-

however exthat all the

talent

all

ority over those § 47. Elucidation

The

formed for the continued ad-

who merit

the honour of being

called geniuses, since genius reaches a point at

which art must make a halt, as there is a limit imposed upon it which it cannot transcend. This limit has in all probability been long since attained. In addition, such skill cannot be

com-

municated, but requires to be bestowed directly from the hand of nature upon each individual, and so with him it dies, awaiting the day when nature once again endows another in the same way one who needs no more than an example

—

to set the talent of

work on

which he

Seeing, then, that the natural art

conscious

at

endowment

of

is

similar lines.

(as fine art)

must furnish the

rule,

what

kind of rule must this be? It cannot be one set

—

down in a formula and serving as a precept for then the judgement upon the beautiful would be determinable according to concepts. Rather must the ance, 2

i.e.,

from the performfrom the product, which others may

rule be gathered

own talent to the test, so as to serve as a model, not for imitation, but for following. The possibility of this is difficult to use to put their let it

The artist's ideas arouse like ideas on the part of his pupil, presuming nature to have

explain.

visited him with a like proportion of the mental powers. For this reason, the models of fine art are the only means of handing down this art to posterity. This is something which cannot be done by mere descriptions (especially not in 2

[Cf. p. 548, et seq.]

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT the line of the arts of speech), and in these arts,

If

we

527

consider genius as the talent for fine

word from this which must con-

only those models can become classical of which the ancient, dead languages,

art (which the proper signification of the

preserved as learned, are the medium.

point of view into the faculties

Despite the marked difference that distinguishes mechanical art, as an art merely depending upon industry and learning, from fine art, as that of genius, there is still no fine art

cur to constitute such a talent,

furthermore,

imports), and

if

we would

analyse

it

it is

imperative

determine the difference between beauty of nature, which it only requires taste to estimate, and beauty of art, at the outset accurately to

which something mechanical, capable of becomprehended and followed in obeand consequently something rules, to dience

which requires genius for its possibility (a possibility to which regard must also be paid in

academic, does not constitute the essential condition of the art. For the thought of something as end must be present, or else its product would not be ascribed to an art at all, but would be

A beauty of nature is a beautiful thing; beauty of art is a beautiful representation of a

But the effectuation of an end necessitates determinate rules which

as such, I

in

ing at once

a

mere product

of chance.

we cannot venture

to dispense with.

ing that originality of talent

is

Now,

see-

one (though

not the sole) essential factor that goes to make up the character of genius, shallow minds fancy

estimating such an object).

thing.

me to estimate a beauty of nature, do not need to be previously possessed of a concept of what sort of a thing the To

enable

object to

intended to be,

is

know

its

i.e.,

I

am

not obliged

material finality (the end), but,

that the best evidence they can give of their being full-blown geniuses is by emancipating

rather, in forming an estimate of it apart from any knowledge of the end, the mere form pleases on its own account. If, however, the object is presented as a product of art, and is

themselves from

as such to be declared beautiful, then, seeing

academic constraint of rules, one cuts a finer figure on the back of an ill-tempered than of a trained horse. Genius can do no more than furnish rich material for products of fine art; its elaboration and its form require a talent academically trained, so that it may be employed in such a way as to stand the test of judgement. But, for a person all

in the belief that

to hold forth and pass sentence like a genius in matters that fall to the province of the most

patient rational investigation,

the extreme. 1 to laugh

One more at

is

is

ridiculous in

know whether who envelops which we are given

at a loss to

the impostor

—

himself in such a cloud in fuller scope to our imagination at the expense

—

or at the of all use of our critical faculty simple-minded public which imagines that its inability clearly to cognize and comprehend this masterpiece of penetration is due to its being invaded by new truths en masse, in comparison with which, detail, due to carefully weighed exposition and an academic examination of rootprinciples, seems to it only the work of a tyro. § 48.

The

relation of genius to taste

For estimating what

is

required

is

beautiful

objects,

as

taste; but for fine art,

such,

i.e.,

the

production of such objects, one needs genius. 2 1 [In the Critique of Practical Reason, p. 361, Kant spoke of "the extravagances of genius, by which, as by the adepts of the philosopher's stone, without any methodical study or knowledge of nature, visionary treasures are promised and the true are thrown away."] 2 [Cf. pp. 491, 548.]

that art always presupposes an end in the cause

(and its causality), a concept of what the thing intended to be must first of all be laid at its basis. And, since the agreement of the manifold in a thing with an inner character belonging to it as its end constitutes the perfection of the thing, it follows that in estimating beauty of art the perfection of the thing must be also taken into account a matter which in estimating a beauty of nature, as beautiful, is quite irrevelant. It is true that in forming an estimate, especially of animate objects of nature, e.g., of is

—

man or a horse, objective finality is also commonly taken into account with a view to judgement upon their beauty; but then the judgement also ceases to be purely aesthetic, i.e., a mere judgement of taste. Nature is no longer a

estimated as

appears like

art, but rather in so though superhuman art; and the teleological judgement serves as a basis and condition of the aesthetic, and one which the latter must regard. In such a case, where one says, for example, "That is a beautiful woman," what one in fact thinks is only this, that in her form nature excellently portrays the ends present in the female figure. For one has to extend one's view beyond the mere form to a concept, to enable the object to be thought in such manner by means of an aesthetic judgement logically

far as

it

it

actually

is art,

conditioned.

Where

fine art

evidences

the beautiful descriptions

it

its

superiority

is in

gives of things that

THE CRITIQUE

528 in nature

be ugly or displeasing. 1

would

The

Furies, diseases, devastations of war, and the

can (as evils) be very beautifully described, in pictures. One kind of ugliness alone is incapable of being represented

like,

nay even represented

that table appointments, or even a moral dissertation, and, indeed, a sermon, must bear this form of fine art, yet without its ap-

we demand

pearing studied. But one would not call them on this account works of fine art. A poem, a

all

musical composition, a picture-gallery, and so

and consequently artistic beauty, namely, that which excites disgust. For, as in this strange sensation, which depends purely on

forth, would, however, be placed under this head; and so in a would-be work of fine art we may frequently recognize genius without

conformably

to

nature without destroying

aesthetic delight,

the imagination, the object sisting, as

it

is

represented as in-

were, upon our enjoying

it,

our face against it, the artificial representation of the object is no longer distinguishable from the nature of the object itself in our sensation, and so it cannot possibly be regarded still

and

§ 49.

in

another taste without genius.

The

faculties of the

set

as beautiful. in

taste,

we

while

its

nature, direct

The

art of sculpture, again, since

products art has

is

excluded

almost confused with

from

its

creations

the

representation of ugly objects, and, inthe repre-

stead, only sanctions, for example,

sentation of death (in a beautiful genius), or

by means of an which wear a pleasant

mind which

constitute genius

Of

products

certain

which

expected,

are

partly at least, to stand on the footing of fine art,

we say they

we

find nothing to censure in

are soulless; and this, although

them

as far as

A poem may be very pretty and elegant, but is soulless. A narrative has precision and method, but is soulless. A speech on taste goes.

some

festive occasion

may be good in substance may be soulless. Conver-

of the warlike spirit (in Mars),

and ornate withal, but

allegory, or attributes

sation frequently is not devoid of entertainment, but yet soulless. Even of a woman we

and so only indirectly, through an interpretation on the part of reason, and not for the pure aesthetic judgement. So much for the beautiful representation of an object, which is properly only the form of the presentation of a concept and the means by which the latter is universally communicated. To give this form, however, to the product of fine art, taste merely is required. By this the artist, having practised and corrected his taste by a variety of examples from nature or art, controls his work and, after many, and often laborious, attempts to satisfy taste, finds the form which commends itself to him. Hence this form is not, as it were, a matter of inspiration, or of a free swing of the mental powers, but rather of a slow and even painful process of improvement, directed to making the form adequate to his thought without prejudice to th( freedom in the play of those powers. Taste is, however, merely a critical, not a productive faculty; and what conforms to it is not, merely on that account, a work of fine art. It may belong to useful and mechanical art, or even to science, as a product following definite rules which are capable of being learned and which must be closely followed. But the pleasing form imparted to the work is only the vehicle of communication and a mode, as it were, of execution, in respect of which one remains to a certain extent free, notwithstanding being otherwise tied down to a definite end. So guise,

1

[Cf. Aristotle's Poetics, Iv; and Rhetoric,

I,

xi.]

may

well say, she

but soulless.

is

Now

pretty, affable, and refined, what do we here mean by

"soul"?

Soul (Geist) in an aesthetical sense,

signifies

the animating principle in the mind. But that

whereby

this principle

animates the psychic sub-

— the material which employs that purpose — that which the mental

stance (Seele) for

it

sets

is

powers into a swing that is final, i.e., into play which is self-maintaining and which

a

strengthens those powers for such activity. 2 Now my proposition is that this principle

nothing else

than

the

faculty

of

by an aesthetic idea

aesthetic ideas. But,

is

presenting I

mean

that

representation of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the possibility of

any

definite thought whatever,

cept, being adequate to

i.e.,

con-

and which language, can never get quite on level

consequently,

it,

terms with or render completely intelligible. It is easily seen, that an aesthetic idea is the counterpart (pendant) of a rational idea, which, conversely,

is

a concept, to which no intuition

(representation

the

of

imagination)

can

be

adequate.

The imagination cognition)

is

(as a productive faculty of

a powerful agent for creating, as

were, a second nature out of the material it by actual nature. It affords us

it

supplied to

entertainment where experience proves too commonplace; and we even use it to remodel 2

[Cf. pp. 483, 484.]

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT

Those forms which do not constitute the pres-

experience, always following, no doubt, laws that are based on analogy, but

still

also follow-

ing principles which have a higher seat in reason

(and which are every whit as natural to us as by the understanding in laying hold of empirical nature). By this means we get a sense of our freedom from the law of association 1 (which attaches to the empirical employment of the imagination), with the result that the material can be borrowed by us from nature in accordance with that law, but be worked up by us into something else namely, those followed

—

what surpasses nature. Such representations of the imagination may be termed ideas. This is partly because they at least strain after something lying out beyond the confines of experience, and so seek to approximate to a presentation of rational concepts intellectual ideas),

(i.e.,

thus giving to these

529

entation of a given concept

itself,

but which,

as secondary representations of the imagination, express the derivatives

and

its

connected with

it,

kinship with other concepts, are called

(aesthetic) attributes of an object, the concept

of which, as an idea of reason, cannot be ade-

quately presented. In this way Jupiter's eagle, with the lightning in its claws, is an attribute of the mighty king of heaven, and the peacock of

stately queen.

its

They do

not, like logical

(aesthetic) attributes of an object, the concept of the sublimity and majesty of creation, but

rather

something

else

—something

that

the imagination an incentive to spread

gives

its flight

over a whole host of kindred representations that provoke more thought than admits of expression in a concept determined by words. They furnish an aesthetic idea, which serves the

portant reason, that no concept can be wholly

above rational idea as a substitute for logical presentation, 3 but with the proper function, however, of animating the mind by opening

adequate to them as internal intuitions. The poet essays the task of interpreting to sense

resentations stretching beyond

concepts the semblance of an objective reality. But, on the other hand, there

is

this

most im-

out for

it

a prospect into a field of kindred repits

ken.

But

it

of the blessed, hell, eternity, creation, etc.

not alone in the arts of painting or sculpture, where the name of attribute is customarily em-

Or, again, as to things of which examples occur

ployed, that fine art acts in this way; poetry

the rational ideas of invisible beings, the king-

dom

in experience, e.g., death, envy,

as also love, fame,

and the

like,

and

all

vices,

transgressing

the limits of experience he attempts with the aid of an imagination

play of reason in

its

which emulates the

dis-

attainment of a maximum,

body them forth to sense with a completeness of which nature affords no parallel and it to

;

is

in fact precisely in the poetic art that the

faculty of aesthetic ideas can

advantage. solely

on

its

This

faculty,

own

account,

show

itself to full

however, regarded properly no more

is

than a talent (of the imagination). 2 If, now, we attach to a concept a representation of the imagination belonging to its presentation, but inducing solely on its own account such a wealth of thought as would never admit of comprehension in a definite concept, and, as a consequence, giving aesthetically an unbounded expansion to the concept itself, then the imagination here displays a creative activity, and it puts the faculty of intellectual ideas (reason) into motion a motion, at the instance of a representation, towards an extension of thought, that, while germane, no doubt, to the concept of the object, exceeds what can be laid hold of in that representation or clearly ex-

is

and rhetoric also drive the soul that animates their work wholly from the aesthetic attributes of the objects attributes which go hand in hand with the logical, and give the imagination an impetus to bring more thought into play in the matter, though in an undeveloped man-

—

ner, than allows of being

embrace of a concept,

l[Cf.p. 4 93.J 2

[Cf. pp. 525, 530.]

being

definitely formulated in language.

of brevity I

For the sake must confine myself to a few ex-

amples only. When the great king expresses himself in one of his poems by saying: Oui, finissons sans trouble, et

mourons

sans regrets,

En

laissant

VUnivers comble de nos

bienjaits.

Ainsi VAstre du jour, au bout de sa carriere,

Repand sur Vhorizon une douce

lu-

miere,

Et

—

pressed.

brought within the

or, therefore, of

les derniers

rayons

qu'il

darde dans

les airs

Sont

les derniers soupirs qu'il

donne

ä V Univers;

he kindles in this way his rational idea of a cosmopolitan sentiment even at the close of life, with the help of an attribute which the imagination (in remembering 3

[Cf. p. 506.J

all

the pleasures of a

a

THE CRITIQUE

530

—

memory

not so much objectively for cognition, as subjectively for quickening the cognitive facul-

serene evening) annexes to that representation,

ties,

and which stirs up a crowd of sensations and secondary representations for which no expression can be found. On the other hand, even an

may

summer's day that is over and gone of which pleasures is suggested by a

fair

may

of,

and hence also indirectly for cognitions,

it

be seen that genius properly consists in the happy relation, which science cannot teach nor industry learn, enabling one to find out

serve, conversely, as

ideas for a given concept, and, besides, to hit

attribute for a representation of sense, and so

upon the expression for them the expression by means of which the subjective mental condition induced by the ideas as the concomitant of a concept may be communicated to others. This latter talent is properly that which is termed soul. For to get an expression for what is indefinable in the mental state accompanyinj a particular representation and to make it universally communicable be the expression in

intellectual concept

animate the sensible;

latter with the idea of the super-

but only by the aesthetic factor sub-

jectively attaching to the consciousness of the

supersensible being employed for the purpose. So, for example, a certain poet says in his de-

scription

of

beautiful

a

morning:

arose, as out of virtue rises peace."

"The sun The con-

we put our-

sciousness of virtue, even where

selves only in thought in the position of a vir-

tuous man, diffuses in the mind a multitude of

sublime and tranquillizing feelings, and gives a boundless outlook into a happy future, such as no expression within the

compass of a

nite concept completely attains.

In a word, the aesthetic idea tion of the imagination,

defi-

1

—

—

language or painting or statuary is a thing requiring a faculty for laying hold of the rapid and transient play of the imagination, and for unifying it in a concept (which for that very reason

is

original,

and reveals

a

new

rule

which

not have been inferred from any preceding principles or examples) that admits

could

a representa-

is

annexed to a given con-

with which, in the free employment of

cept,

—

communication without any constraint of

of

rules.

imagination, such a multiplicity of partial representations are

bound

up. that no expression

indicating a definite concept can be found for

—one

it

which on that account allows a concept to be supplemented in thought by much that is indefinable in words, and the feeling of which quickens the cognitive faculties, and with language, as a mere thing of the letter, binds up the spirit

(soul) also.

The mental powers whose union

in a certain

relation constitutes genius are imagination

understanding.

Now,

employment on behalf

its

and

since the imagination, in of cognition,

is

sub-

jected to the constraint of the understanding

and the restriction of having

to be

to the concept belonging thereto,

thetically

it is

free to furnish of its

conformable whereas aes-

own

accord,

over and above that agreement with the conundeveloped material for the understanding, to which the latter paid no re-

cept, a wealth of

gard

in its

concept, but which

it

can

make

use

Perhaps there has never been a more sublime utterance, or a thought more sublimely expressed, than the well-known inscription upon the Temple of I>i> (Mother Suture): "I am all that is, and that was, and that shall be, and no mortal hath raised the veil from before my lace." Seiner* made use of this idea in a >uggestive vignette on the frontispiece of his Natural Philosophy, 1

order to inspire nil pupil at the threshold of that temple into which he was about to lead him. with >uch a holy awe as would dispose his mind to serious at ten in

tion. *

[Johann Andreas V. Segner, 704-1 777. Professor and Mathematics at the Univei

Physics Gottingen.] of

1

If,

after this analysis,

upon the above genius,

—not rules

we

we

definition

find: First, that

cast a glance back

of what it is

is

called

a talent for art

one for science, in which clearly known must take the lead and determine the pro-

Secondly, being a talent in the line of art, presupposes a definite concept of the product as its end. Hence it presupposes under-

cedure. it

—

standing, but, in addition, a representation, indefinite

though

it

be, of the material,

i.e.,

of the

intuition, required for the presentation of that

concept, and so a relation of the imagination to the understanding. Thirdly, it displays itself, not so much in the working out of the projected

end

in the presentation of a definite concept, as rather in the portrayal, or expression of aes-

thetic ideas containing a wealth of material for

effecting that intention.

agination

from

all

Consequently the imrepresented by it in its freedom guidance of rules, but still as final for is

the presentation of the given concept. Fourthly, and lastly, the unsought and undesigned subjective finality in the free

harmonizing of the imagination with the understanding's conformity law presupposes a proportion and accord between these faculties such as cannot be brought about by any observance of rules, whether of to

science or mechanical imitation, but can only be produced by the nature of the individual.

Genius, according to these presuppositions,

1

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT is

the exemplary originality of the natural en-

dowments of an individual in the ment of his cognitive faculties. On

free

employ-

this

showing,

53

however, where the manner of carrying the idea into execution in a product of art is aimed made appropri-

at singularity, instead of being

mannerism

properly as-

the product of a genius (in respect of so much in this product as is attributable to genius, and

ate to the idea, that

not to possible learning or academic instruction) is an example, not for imitation (for that would mean the loss of the element of genius, and just the very soul of the work), but to be

{precieux), forced, and affected styles, intended

—

followed by another genius one whom it arouses to a sense of his own originality in putting freedom from the constraint of rules so into force in his art that for art itself a new

—which be exemplary. Yet, —a type nature's rule

won 1

is

what shows a

is

since the genius

that

elect

as but a rare

minds is

his

phenomenon

example gives

is

such

a school, that

to say a methodical instruction according to

a product.

is

The

ostentatious

mark one out from

soul

is

stage to be gaped at

—action which invariably

betrays a tyro. § 50.

The combination of

taste

and genius

in products of fine art

one of

for other clever

rise to

to

the common herd (though wanting), resemble the behaviour of a man who, as we say, hears himself talk, or who stands and moves about as if he were on a

to

talent to

must be regarded

—

cribed

To ask whether more stress should be laid in matters of fine art upon the presence of genius or upon that of taste, is equivalent to asking whether more turns upon imagination or upon

for

judgement. Now, imagination rather entitles an art to be called an inspired {geistreiche) than a fine art. It is only in respect of judge-

such persons a matter of imitation, for which nature, through the medium of a genius, gave

ment that the name of fine art is deserved. Hence it follows that judgement, being the in-

the rule.

dispensable condition {conditio sine qua non),

rules, collected, so far as the

circumstances ad-

from such products of genius and peculiarities. And, to that extent, fine art

mit,

But

this imitation

their is

becomes aping when the

pupil copies everything

down

to the deformi-

which the genius only of necessity suf-

ties

fered to remain, because they could hardly be removed without loss of force to the idea.

This courage has merit only genius.

A

in the case of a

certain boldness of expression and, in

many a deviation from the common becomes him well, but in no sense is it a thing worthy of imitation. On the contrary it

general, rule

remains all through intrinsically a blemish, which one is bound to try to remove, but for which the genius is, as it were, allowed to plead a privilege, on the ground that a scrupulous carefulness would spoil what is inimitable in the impetuous ardour of his soul. Mannerism an aping of peculiarity is another kind of aping (originality) in general, for the sake of removing oneself as far as possible from imitators, while the talent requisite to enable one to be at the same time exemplary is absent. There are, in fact, two modes {modi) in general of

—

arranging one's thoughts for utterance. The one is called a manner {modus aestheticus) the ,

other a method {modus logicus). tion

between them

is

this: the

The

distinc-

former possesses

no standard other than the feeling of unity in the presentation, whereas the latter here follows definite principles. As a consequence, the for-

mer 1

is

alone admissible for fine art. It

[Cf. p. 530.]

is

only,

at least what one must look to as of capital importance in forming an estimate of art as fine art. So far as beauty is concerned, to be fertile and original in ideas is not such an imperative requirement as it is that the imagination in its freedom should be in accordance with the understanding's conformity to law. For, in lawless freedom, imagination, with all its wealth, produces nothing but nonsense; the power of judgement, on the other hand, is the faculty that makes it consonant with understanding. Taste, like judgement in general, is the disciis

pline

(or

corrective)

of

genius.

It

severely

and makes it orderly or polished; but at the same time it gives it guidance directing and controlling its flight, so that it may preclips its wings,

serve

its

clearness

character of finality. It introduces a

and

order

the

into

plenitude

of

thought, and in so doing gives stability to the ideas, and qualifies them at once for permanent and universal approval, for being followed by others, and for a continually progressive culture. And so, where the interests of both these qualities clash in a product, and there has to be

a sacrifice of something, then it should rather be on the side of genius; and judgement, which in

matters of fine art bases

own proper

principles, will

its

more

decision on

its

readily endure

an abatement of the freedom and wealth of the imagination than that the understanding should be compromised.

THE CRITIQUE

532

The

requisites

for

art

fine

are,

therefore,

imagination, understanding, soul, and taste. 1 § 51.

The

division of the fine arts

Beauty (whether

may

in

it

be of nature or of art) 2

general be termed the expression of

But the provision must be added beauty of art this idea must be excited through the medium of a concept of the object, whereas with beauty of nature the bare reflection upon a given intuition, apart from any concept of what the object is intended to be, is sufficient for awakening and communicating the idea of which that object is regarded as the aesthetic ideas.

that with

expression.

Accordingly,

if

we wish

to

make

a division of

we can choose for that purpose, more convenient principle analogy which art bears to the mode of

the fine arts,

were a serious business of the understanding. Thus the orator announces a serious business, and for the purpose of entertaining his audience conducts it as if it were a mere play with ideas. The poet promises merely an entertaining play with ideas, and yet for the understanding there enures as much as if the promotion of its business had been his one intention. The combination and harmony of the two faculties of cognition, sensibility and understanding, which, though doubtless indispensable to one another, do not readily permit of being united without compulsion and reciprocal abatement, must have the appearance of being undesigned and a spontaneous occurrence otherwise it is not fine art. For this reason, what is studied and laboured must be here avoided. 4 For fine art must be it

—

tentatively at least, no

free art in a double sense:

than the

sense opposed to contract work, as not being a

men

i.e.,

not alone in a

in

work the magnitude of which may be estimated,

speech with a view to communicating themselves to one another as completely as possible, i.e.,

standard, but free also in the sense that, while

not merely in respect of their concepts but in

the mind, no doubt, occupies itself,

respect of their sensations also. 3 Such expres-

so without ulterior regard to

expression of which

avail

themselves

and tone (articuand modulation). It is the

exacted, or paid for, according to a definite

sion consists in word, gesture,

yet with a feeling

lation, gesticulation,

tion (independent of reward).

combination of these three modes of expression which alone constitutes a complete communication of the speaker. For thought, intuition, and sensation are in this way conveyed to others simultaneously and in conjunction. Hence there are only three kinds of fine art: the art of speech, formative art, and the art of the play of sensations (as external sense impressions). This division might also be arranged as a dichotomy, so that fine art

would be divided

into that of the expression of thoughts or intuitions, the latter being

subdivided according to

form and the mathowever, in that case appear too abstract, and less in line with pop-

The

of the imagination.

the contrary,

poetry. Rhetoric

of is

speech are rhetoric and the art of transacting a se-

rious business of the understanding as

if it

were

a free play of the imagination; poetry that of conducting a free play of the imagination as if

The first by means of 1

three faculties are first brought into union the fourth. Hume, in his history, informs that although they are second in their

English to no other people in the world in respect of the evidences they afford of the three first qualities separately considered, -till in what unite- them thej- must yield to their neighbours, the French.

the

work-

*[Cf.p.

seq.) 3 The reader is not to consider this scheme for a possible division of the fine arts as a deliberate theory. It is only one of the various attempts that can and ought to

be made.

,4.1,. ft

The

poet's promise, on

a modest one, and a mere play

is

with ideas is all he holds out to us, but he accomplishes something worthy of being made a serious business, namely, the using of play to provide food for the understanding, and the giving of life to

arts

On

standing to some end.

nation.

The

something which an entertaining play the other hand, there is

viz.,

something in which he fails to come up to his promise, and a thing, too, which is his avowed business, namely, the engagement of the under-

ter (sensation). It would,

(1)

does

orator, therefore, gives

he does not promise,

the distinction between the

ular conceptions.

still it

any other end, and of satisfaction and stimula-

its

Hence

concepts by means of the imagi-

the orator in reality performs less

than he promises, the poet more. (2) The formative arts, or those for the expression of ideas in sensuous intuition (not by

means

mere imagination by words) are arts either of

of representations of

that are excited

sensuous truth or of sensuous semblance. The first

is

called plastic art, the second painting.

Both use

figures in space for the expression of

ideas: the former

makes

figures discernible to

two senses, sight and touch (though,- so the latter sense

is

far as

concerned, without regard to

beauty), the latter makes them so to the former The aesthetic idea (archetype, origi-

sense alone. nal)

is the fundamental basis of both in the imagination; but the figure which constitutes its 4

[Cf.p.. 525.]

OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT expression (the ectype, the copy) in its bodily extension (the

way

is

given either

the object itself

or else in accordance with the picture which it forms of itself in the eye (according to its appearance when projected on a flat sur-

exists)

face). Or, whatever the archetype

is,

either the

reference to an actual end or only the semblance

may

of one

be imposed upon reflection as

its

latter consists in

ture presents

it

to our view, only arranged dif-

ferently and in obedience to certain ideas.

The

beautiful arrangement of corporeal things,

how-

ever,

is

also a thing for the eye only, just like

—the

painting

condition.

533

no more than decking out the ground with the same manifold variety (grasses, flowers, shrubs, and trees, and even water, hills, and dales) as that with which na-<