War and Peace in Rumeli: 15th to Beginning of 19th Century (Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies) 9781617191510, 1617191515

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War and Peace in Rumeli

Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies

100

A co-publication with The Isis Press, Istanbul, the series consists of collections of thematic essays focused on specific themes of Ottoman and Turkish studies. These scholarly volumes address important issues throughout Turkish history, offering in a single volume the accumulated insights of a single author over a career of research on the subject.

War and Peace in Rumeli

15th to Beginning of 19th Century

Rossitsa Gradeva

The Isis Press, Istanbul

güfgiaS {JPeSS 2010

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2010 by The Isis Press, Istanbul Originally published in 2008 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of The Isis Press, Istanbul. 2010

ISBN 978-1-61719-151-0

Printed in the United States of America

A graduate of the History Department at Sofia University, Rossitsa Gradeva holds a doctorate from the Institute of Balkan Studies, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, on the kadi institution in the Balkans, 15 th -17 th centuries. Since 1989 she has been a Research Fellow at the Institute of Balkan Studies, and since 2004, has been teaching at American University in Bulgaria (Blaoevgrad). She has also lectured at several Bulgarian and foreign universities. Her research interests are mainly in the field of Ottoman institutions of provincial administration, application of Islamic law in the Ottoman Empire, various aspects of the status of non-Muslim communities and everyday life in the Ottoman Balkan provinces, the Ottoman Danube frontier and the development of the decentralization processes in the region in the pre Tan/i mat period. Her previous book, Rumeli under the Ottomans i 5 t h - i ( 5 t h Centuries: Institutions and Communities, was published by the Isis Press in 2004.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

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I. The Danube Frontier: 1. "Osman Pazvantoglu of Vidin: Between Old and New", in F. Anscombe (ed.), The Ottoman Balkans, 1750-1830, Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006, 115-162/ published also in a special issue of Princeton Papers: Interdisciplinary Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. XIII, 2005, 115-161 2. "Secession and Revolution in the Ottoman Empire: Osman Pazvantoglu and Rhigas Velestinlis," in A. Anastasopoulos and E. Kolovos (eds), Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760-1850, Conflict, Transformation, Adaptation, Proceedings of an international conference held in Rethymno, Greece, 13-14 December 2003, Rethymno: University of Crete, E>epartment of History and Archaeology, 2007,73-94 3. "Shipping along the lower course of the Danube (end of the 17 th century)," in: E. Zachariadou (ed.), The Kapudan Pasha. His Office and His Domain. Halcyon Days in Crete IV. A Symposium Held in Rethymno, 7-9 January 2000. Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2002, 301-323

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II. Ottoman Justice and Administration: 4. "On the Judicial Functions of Kadi Courts: Glimpses from Sofia in the Seventeenth Century," in M. Kurz (ed.), Islam am Balkan, special issue of Wiener Zeitschrift zur Geschichte der Neuzeit, 5/2, 2005, 15-43. Expanded version 5. "On Judicial Hierarchy in the Ottoman Empire: the Case of Sofia from the Seventeenth to the Beginning of the Eighteenth century," in M. Masud, R. Peters, D. Powers (eds), Dispensing Justice in Islam: Qadis and their Judgments, Leiden-Köln: Brill, 2006, 271298

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6. "On Zimmis and Their Church Buildings: Four Cases from Rumeli", in E. Kermeli and O. Ozel (eds), The Ottoman Empire: Myths, Realities and "Black Holes". Contributions in Honour of Colin Imber, Istanbul: Isis Press, 2006, 203-37

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III. Everyday Life: 7. "Towards the Portrait of "the Rich" in Ottoman Provincial Society: Sofia in the 1670s," in A. Anastasopoulos (ed.) Provincial Elite in the Ottoman Empire, Halcyon Days in Crete V. A Symposium Held in Rethymno, 10-12 January 2003, Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2005, 149-199 8. "On 'Frenk' Objects in Everyday Life in Ottoman Balkans: the Case of Sofia, mid-17 th - mid-18 th centuries", in: Relazioni Economiche tra Europa e mondo islamico, secc. XIII-XVIIl/ Europe's Economic relations with the Islamic World, 13th-18th centuries, Atti della "Trentottesima Settimana di Studi, Fondazione Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica "F. Datini", Prato, 1-5 Maggio 2006, a cura di S. Cavaci occhi, 2007, 769-799 9. "Villagers in International Trade: The Case of Chervena Voda, Seventeenth to the beginning of Eighteenth Century", in E. Boyar and K. Fleet (eds), The Ottomans and Trade, Oriente Moderno, XXV n.s. (LXXXVI), 1, 2006, 1-20 10. "Ottoman and Bulgarian Sources on Earthquakes in Central Balkan Lands (17 th - 18 th centuries)," in: E. Zachariadou (ed.), Natural Disasters in the Ottoman Empire. Halcyon Days in Crete III. A Symposium Held in Rethymno, 10-12 January 1997. Rethymno: Crete University Press, 1999, 55-65

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INTRODUCTION

This book brings together studies on three themes of the history of Ottoman Rumeli*: the frontier, the system of dispensing justice and everyday life. The articles in the first part explore, on the example of the region of the lower Danube, the effect of War on the government in the border areas and more generally, on developments in frontier society. The rest deal with several aspects of the functioning of the Ottoman administration and the relations between the rulers and non-Muslims as well as with various dimensions of material life and mentality of the Ottoman subjects living in the Balkan provinces, in short, activities, mechanisms and phenomena which one would associate mainly with Peace. War and Peace were closely intertwined in Rumeli, especially in the frontier provinces, which makes very provisional any strict division along these lines. From the late 17th century the population of many territories deep in the Balkans, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, experienced the immediate and long-term consequences of war. War had a lasting effect on the fortunes and patterns of life of people even in times of peace, in the field of inter-confessional relations as well as of their economic activities. Yet, it rarely disrupted completely the 'peaceful' activities either, exchange of goods and travel across the borders seem to have persisted even during the hostilities. The importance of the Danube in the region is difficult to overestimate. It was also understood by the local rulers and they generally used the natural water barrier to establish the major defence line along its course. The large waterway and the strongholds on it, however, have never been a serious enough obstacle in front of raiders and conquerors from the north. Ever since the large-scale settlement of Slavic and Turkic tribes south of the Danube in the 5 t h to 7 t h century, and even before, the attraction of the fertile land, the milder climate, the riches produced by the sedentary population of the peninsula and the geo-strategic importance of the region have proven a driving force that no fortifications could block. Neither did the river stop attempts at conquest from the south. Beginning with the Romans, every power in the region tried to expand and establish front-posts and even provinces north of the

The term Rumeli is being employed in its widest meaning, as the 'land of the Orthodox Christians,' the Balkan parts of the Ottoman empire, the changes in the boundaries of the administrative unit of the same name over the centuries are not taken special account of.

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Danube. Thus the Ottoman policy in the region at the time of the expansion was not exceptional. After several short-lived attempts at the direct conquest of the Wallachian and the Moldavian Principalities, the Ottomans established the border along the river concentrating their efforts to the north-east, towards the delta of the Danube and the Crimean Khanate, and to the north-west, against Hungary and the Habsburgs. Wallachia and Moldavia, however, were exposed to a growing pressure by the Ottoman state which, despite the general decline in the political and military might of the empire, culminated in the 18 th and the beginning of the 19 th century. From the conquest in the late 14 t h and until mid-19 t h century the Danube was both "their river" and a frontier for the Ottomans. Over the centuries the river continued to serve as the actual border for the Ottomans who adjusted their defences according to the realities and threats in the region. Symbolically, although probably by an oversight in the decisions of the Berlin Congress (1878), they remained de jure and de facto present on the river and members of the European Commission of the Danube until after the demise of the Empire (1924). As soon as they reached the river the Ottomans established an armed fleet on it to guard their possessions from incursions and invasion f r o m the north. They preserved a string of forts and fortresses on the south river bank manned with increasingly larger garrisons and occupied several strongholds on the north one, which allowed them a better control over the traffic. Indeed, the river made the war and its effect tangible even in territories that were distant from the theatre of military activities. But the Danube was not only a dividing and defence line. As before, during the Ottoman period it was a link, bringing together the territories of modern Central and South-eastern Europe, the North and the South. The river created opportunities for trade and livelihood for the local people but also from distant parts of the empire. It did not prevent individual or massive migrations. Bulgarians and Serbs, Greeks and Albanians settled north of it, sometimes as part of large population movements forced by war, but also in search of better conditions for life and work. Several towns in Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia flourished as centres of regional trade, not without the active participation of visitors and settlers f r o m the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman empire, who formed communities on the basis of their common roots and religion (Orthodox Christianity). They were engaged in the exchange of goods with the Balkans, but were also involved in the publication of books for the needs of the non-Muslims' education and cult and supported the Orthodox church. On their part, in search of jobs, Wallachs settled south of the river. These migrations led to the emergence, especially in the Ottoman provinces on the lower course of the river, of religiously and ethnically mixed

INTRODUCTION

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cities, including Muslims from all corners of the empire, Orthodox Christians (Bulgarians, G r e e k s , Serbs, A l b a n i a n s , Wallachs), A r m e n i a n s , J e w s (Ashkenazim, Sephardim, Romaniots). Wallach boyars and Phanariots bought or built houses in the ports and in prosperous villages deep in North Bulgaria; they sponsored church and monastery repair and construction, Orthodox education and cult not only on Mount Athos but also in various other places in Rumeli. This exchange was not limited to the Orthodox Christians although it was probably most active among them. Jews and Armenians f r o m Rumeli were integrated in important trade networks straddling the state boundaries in the region which served in parallel the needs of the respective educational and confessional systems. In the course of time some subjects of the sultan, Muslims as well as Christians, started acquiring land on the northern bank, setting up farms and other enterprises in the vast and underpopulated Wallachian plain. Despite the objections of the various political agents involved, this practice continued throughout the Ottoman centuries. The first part of the book revolves around the Danube as a frontier of the Ottoman state, the effect of the frontier and the wars on local society and on the development of decentralisation processes in one specific part of the region, Vidin. Although recently there has been a marked scholarly interest in the period of the late 18 t h and early 19 th century and the role of the great warlords in Rumeli in particular, many aspects of their policy regarding the central authority, the population of their possessions and the international actors in regional politics still remain to be researched into. The personality of one of them, Osman Pazvantoglu of Vidin, his rise as one of the m a j o r opponents to the reforms of Sultan Selim III (1789-1807), with an emphasis on his relations with the local n o n - M u s l i m s and with the emerging revolutionary movements of the Balkan Christian peoples, is the focus of two of the articles included in the volume. The role of the Danube in more peaceful aspects of life, in the exchange of ideas, experiences, and news, and in trade along and across the river transpires also in the other articles. T h e Ottoman judicial system in the Balkans, the kadi court in particular, is another focus in this book. Until the pre-Tanzimat period the kadi court had remained the focal point of Ottoman provincial administration and of the Ottoman system of dispensation of justice, a major factor for the unification of the administrative and legal practices in the empire. It functioned as the core element in a complex system of concurrent and hierarchical jurisdictions in which various institutions were officially granted legal competences with regard to smaller or larger groups of the population of the Ottoman empire, to a limited range of cases, or on a territorial basis. Of particular importance among them were the judicial prerogatives of the non-

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Muslim religious authorities and the respective religious courts of the faiths, those of the aga of the janissaries over members of the corps involved in criminal cases, and others. In parallel, on the edge of official recognition, there existed institutions of territorial (especially in rural areas) and professional (the esnafi,) self-rule, which dealt with minor but also more important legal cases involving their members where customary law was applied. Of course, at the top of this system of intertwining and overlapping competences stood the sultan and the Imperial Divan. The second part of the collection addresses various aspects of the functioning of the kadi courts as judicial institutions and the issue of the existence of hierarchy in the Ottoman Sharia court system. A specific and very revealing angle with a view to the study of the realities of the non-Muslims' legal status in the empire is the treatment of the zimmi houses of prayer by the Ottoman authorities. This problem is explored against the backdrop of the specificities of the Ottoman judicial-administrative system and the changing f a t e of several concrete places in Rumeli as the result of war, the developments in domestic policy and international relations. The studies included in the third part and dedicated to various themes related to the everyday life of provincial elite and rank-and-file Ottoman subjects, citizens and peasants offer glimpses of the lifestyle and the mentality of Muslims and non-Muslims who lived in the region, people who in War and Peace made the history of Rumeli. One thing that I have always liked about my work is that it has brought me in contact with many interesting people. I owe a lot to my friends and colleagues in Bulgaria, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, the Netherlands, Turkey, the U K and the USA. They have helped me a lot in my work and have been a moral support. I wish to express my gratitude to all of them. My special thanks goes also to the Andrew Mellon Fund and ARITIstanbul and to Max-Planck Institute for the History of European L a w (MPIER)-Frankfurt, Germany which have provided me with the opportunity to pursue my scholarly goals despite the difficulties that still f a c e most Bulgarian historians.

OSMAN PAZVANTOGLU OF VIDIN: BETWEEN OLD AND NEW1

Osman Pazvantoglu's star rose in the midst of the anarchy which spread in the central Balkan provinces of the Ottoman empire in the last decades of the eighteenth, and descended almost simultaneously with the subsidence of chaos at the beginning of the nineteenth century. His secession from the empire was an integral part of a social phenomenon that left a lasting imprint on the historical memory of the people living in these territories during the period labelled as the "kircali time." 2 This period was marked by considerable disruption in the functioning of the institutions of central authority in the provinces. Power in Rumili was parcelled out among numerous local ayans who ruled over smaller or larger territories with varying degrees of independence. Against this backdrop of chaos and autocracy, there rose in numerous centres of power (but also of lawlessness and anarchy, which overlapped in the central Balkan lands) local despots who established almost unrestrained rule: the Bu§atlis in northern Albania and some adjacent regions, Ali I'as a of Tepedelen in Yanya [Ioannina] and much of modern continental Greece, Osman Pazvantoglu [var. Pasvanoglu/ Pasvantoglu/ Pasbanoglu] of Vidin in modern northwestern Bulgaria and eastern Serbia, Ismail Tirseniklioglu in Rus§uk [Ruse] and part of modern northeastern Bulgaria, Ismail Bey of Serrai [Serres], in modern northeastern Greece, and others. 3 They all achieved some level of independence from central authority, but two — Osman Pazvantoglu and Ali Pa§a — seem to have gone beyond mere attempts to ensure financial and administrative autonomy under the Ottoman cloak and constructed "proto-states." 4 The process of fragmentation was 1 Here I refer to the title of a book devoted to the reign of Sultan Selim III. Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) (Cambridge] Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). 2 A document of 1785 speaks of the "kircali e$kiyasi," that is, kircali bandits. Soon this term seems to have been replaced in Ottoman documentation by "dagli e§kiyasi." In Bulgarian folklore and literature, however, kircali was preserved as the only term for this phenomenon. See a definition of the term and the phenomenon in Vera Mutafchieva, Kardzhaliisko vreme [Kircali Time] (Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1977), 59-63, [French translation of the book, Vera Moutaftchieva, L'anarchie dans les Balkans a la fin du XVIIIe siecle (Istanbul: The Isis Press 2005)].

^ On the secession in central Rumili see the above-cited monographs of Mutafchieva and Shaw, passim. According to M. Glenny these acted as a bridge between the Ottoman Empire and the nationstates that eventually emerged on the peninsula, a statement which is of course anachronistic. Misha Glenny, Balkans, 1804 -1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers (London: Granta Books, 2000), 5. 4

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closely intertwined with the first serious attempt at modernization in the Ottoman state, the reforms in the ruling and military systems undertaken by Sultan Selim III (r. 1789 — 1807). Finding support mainly among the circles which openly opposed these reforms, Osman Pasa and Ali Pa§a themselves actually introduced reforms in their own possessions, acting in many ways as predecessors of the policy of Mehmed Ali in Egypt. However, their activities met with opposition, and not only f r o m the still very strong empire. They also had to reckon with the very complicated international situation after the outbreak of the French Revolution and the successful march of French armies eastward to the Balkan boundaries of the Ottoman empire. The two had little chance for success in a situation where the traditional enemies of the Ottoman state, the Russians and the Austrians, supported legitimism and the integrity of the Ottoman state. Finally, the ultimate success of their secession f r o m the empire was highly dependent on, and in general complicated by, the effect of the ideas of the French Revolution on the Balkan peoples (the Greeks, in particular), the first signs of the "National Awakening," and the first attempts at political liberation of Balkan peoples. While interesting as an historical p h e n o m e n o n in itself, O s m a n Pazvantoglu's secession also provides an interesting angle in the discussion of contemporary events in several directions. In the first place it offers a glimpse into the reaction to Selim I l l ' s reforms among rank-and-file Muslims and Christians in the Balkan provinces, and into the roots and the reasons for the opposition to their introduction among all strata of Ottoman society. Of particular interest is the fact that, like the other noteworthy secessionists, O s m a n Pazvantoglu found wide support in various circles in Christian societies. During his short life the Vidin rebel came in contact with some of the first leaders of several Balkan peoples' Awakening. Legendary and historical evidence relates him to the Greek revolutionary Rhigas Velestinlis, to the Bulgarian bishop of Vratsa, Sofronii, and even to Kara George, the leader of the First Serbian Uprising. None of these Balkan leaders can be regarded as a close associate of Osman Pazvantoglu, as each followed his own path. Yet these paths at some point crossed that of the Vidin pasa and ran parallel with his for a shorter or longer while. Driven by sometimes contradictory motives, many non-Muslims—including members of Rhigas's hetairia, high Orthodox clergy, and local merchants—were active participants in Pazvantoglu's diplomatic and political moves. The geographic location and the c o m p l e x international relations in the region contributed t o the considerable interest in his personality manifested by the Great Powers. In this context, it is difficult to name all famous personalities of the time who came to know Pazvantoglu and established contact with him, but they included the French foreign minister Talleyrand and even Napoleon himself, the Russian tsar, his ministers and generals, and high Austrian state officials. Diplomatic correspondence of the 1790s and 1800s f r o m and to the Ottoman Empire

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abounds in information about his deeds and conjectures concerning his further moves. Despite the considerable interest in Pazvantoglu shown by his contemporaries, his life has rarely been the object of study, the only two works being published several decades ago. 1 It seems that the subsequent events—the Serbian Uprising, the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-12, the Napoleonic wars, the rise of Ali Pa§a of Yanya (whose longer rule brought him the recognition to which Osman Pazvantoglu aspired), 2 the strong philhellenism dominating Western society during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the Greek War of Independence—have overshadowed the image of the Vidin rebel in fiction and scholarly works. This paper does not aim to provide a biography of Osman Pa§a of Vidin—a task that has yet to be undertaken and requires further research in various Ottoman and diplomatic archives. The purpose here is more limited and is concentrated around two major circles of problems. In the first place, I analyse the views and the "domestic policy" of Osman Pazvantoglu in his possessions, as revealed in available Ottoman and diplomatic sources. This should contribute to a clearer picture of Ottoman decentralization at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, to a better understanding of the processes at work in Ottoman society at the time, and to the reasons for the fierce opposition to the reforms undertaken by Selim III. It should also provide firmer ground for discussion of the reasons for the popularity of Pazvantoglu and other significant separatists who applied similar

1 Maria Theophilowa, Die Rebellion des Paschas Paswan-Ogllou und ihre Bedeutung fiir die bulgarische Befreiungsbewegung im XIX Jahrhundert (Zurich: Gebr. Leeman, 1914). Later translated into Bulgarian: Maria Teofilova, Buntat na Pazvanoglu i negovoto znachenie za bdlgarskolo osvoboditelno dvizhenie v XIX vek. Prinos kam predistoriyata na bdlgarskoto osvoboditelno dvizhenie (Sofia: Hemus, 1932); Simeon Vankov, Osman Paspanoglu, Vidinski pasha. Stranisti ot istoriyata na lztochniya vdpros [Osman Pazvantoglu, Pasha of Vidin. Pages from the History of the Eastern Question], Voennoistoricheski sbornik 62 (Sofia, 1947). The following titles, though touching upon many of the problems I discuss treat Osman Pazvantoglu as an element of the broader picture of the situation in the Balkans at the end of the eighteenth beginning of the nineteenth centuries. Mutafchieva, Kdrdzhaliisko vreme, passim; Viktor Grachev, Balkanskie vladeniia Osmanskoi imperii na rubezhe XVIII XIX vv. [The Balkan Possessions of the Ottoman Empire at the Turn of the 19th Century], (Moscow: Nauka, 1990), 43-50 and passim. The pages on Pazvantoglu in Shaw's, Between Old and New, consider him mainly as one of the obstacles to the reforms of Selim III rather than as an independent political factor. Finally, there is an article dedicated to Pazvantoglu as an example of the merger of aitisanship, Janissaries (yamaks), and Bektashism in the Ottoman state, which despite some very interesting points actually rests on some uncorrect assumptions: Deena Sadat, "Ayan and Aga: The Transformation of the Bektashi Corps in the Eighteenth Century," The Muslim World 63, no. 3 (July 1973): 206-19. Of course here should also be cited the articles of Fehim Bajraktarevic, "Paswan-Oghlu," in EI2, vol. 8 (Leiden, 1995), 284-85, and A. Cevat Eren, "Pazvand-oglu," in islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 9 (Istanbul, 1964), 532-35. After this study was submitted for publication one more article had appeared dedicated to Pazvantoglu, Robert Zens, "Pasvanoglu Osman Paga and the Pagalik of Belgrade, 1791-1807," International Journal of Turkish Studies 8, nos. 1 & 2 (Spring 2002): 88-104. 2 To my knowledge the latest study on him is that of Katherine E. Fleming, The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha's Greece (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).

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methods in government, among various circles of Ottoman Muslim socicty and, to some extent, among the Christians living in their territories. The latter forms the second area of focus. Particular attention is devoted to the relations between Pazvantoglu and various groups among the non-Muslim population. Here I analyze the attitude of the "speechless" masses who have left practically no explicit expression of their views. This is done on the basis of indirect evidence found mainly in Ottoman official documentation and in diplomatic sources. Another level of this attitude is displayed in the relations between Pazvantoglu and his closest associates, w h o helped him in his diplomatic relations with the Ottoman authorities, with the princes of the D a n u b e Principalities and with the representatives of the Great Powers in the region: wholesale merchants, high Orthodox clergy, and physicians, who often served more than one master. Of particular interest here are his relations with the leaders of the young national movements of the Balkan peoples—Rhigas, Bishop Sofronii, and the Serbs after the outbreak of the First Serbian Uprising. The aims of the paper require a note on sources and their shortcomings. Ottoman court records (kadi sicilh) have great value, 1 as do diplomatic correspondence 2 and travellers' accounts. 3 All shed light on the shaping of

1 A large number of these documents have been published, though with some inaccuracies in the translation by D. Ihchiev. See Diamandi Ihchiev, "Turski darzhavni dokumenti za kârdzhaliite" [Turkish State Documents on the Kircahs], Sbornik za narodni umotvoreniia, nauka i knizhnina (hereafter SbNUNK) 22-23 (Sofia, 1906-1907): 1-71, providing the general background of the kircalil dagh unrest; idem, 'Turski darzhavni dokumenti za Osman Pazvantoglu Vidinski" [Turkish State Documents about Osman Pazvantoglu of Vidin] (hereafter TDDOPV), SbNUNK 24, no. 1 (Sofia, 1908): 1-126. Both publications contain documents from the kadi registers of Sofia and Vidin. ^ L. Popov, "Prinos za izuchavane minaloto na balgarskoto otechestvo" [Contribution to the Study of the Past of the Bulgarian Fatherland], SbNUNK 24, no. 1 (Sofia, 1908): 1-157 (Austrian, Prussian and French diplomatic correspondence); Ivan Pavlovic, "Ispisi iz francuskih arhiva o Pazvantoglu (od 1795 do 1807 godina)" [Excerpts about Pazvantoglu from the French Archives], Spomenik Srpske kraljevske akademije, Pt. 3 (Belgrade, 1890): 105-28 (French documents); Pavel Oreshkov, "Niakolko dokumenta za Pazvantoglu i Sofroniia Vrachanski (1800-1812)" [Several Documents about Pazvantoglu and Sofronii of Vratsa (1800-1812], Sbornik na BAN 3 (Sofia, 1914): 1-54 (Russian diplomatic documents); Dimitar Yotsov, "Materiali za Pazvant-oglu, izvlecheni iz ruskite arhivi" [Materials about Pazvantoglu from the Russian Archives], Periodichesko spisanie na BKD v Sofia 68 (Sofia, 1908): 749-55 (Russian documents); Documente privind Istoria Românici (hereafter DPIR), Collectia Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki (séria noua), vol. 4, Rapoarte diplomatiçe Ruse (1797-1806) (Bucharest: Ed. §tin,tifica, 1974). See also the notes of Colonel A. Ménage, who came to Vidin a couple of months after the death of Pazvantoglu and stayed there more than a year. Grégoire Iakichitch, "Notes sur Passvan Oglou par 1'adjutant-commandant Ménage," Revue slave 1 (1906) : 26179; 418-29; 2 (1907): 139-44, 436-48; 3 (1907): 138-44, 278-88. Although his information was collected some months after the death of Pazvantoglu, Ménage provides very interesting and mostly reliable data that is at least to some extent corroborated by our other sources. 3

François C. H. I. Pouqueville, Travels through Morea, Albania, and several other parts of the Ottoman Empire to Constantinople during the years 1798,1799,1800, and 1801 (London, 1806), 100; Guillaume-Antoine Olivier, Voyage dans l'Empire ottomane, l'Egypte et la Perse, fait par ordre du gouvernement pendant les six premières années de la République, vol. 1 (Paris, an 9/1801), 192-222. I have used the latter in Bulgarian translation in: Bistra Tsvetkova, ed., Frenski Pâtepisi za Balkanite, XV-:XVIII v. [French Travel Accounts about the Balkans, 15thlth centuries] (Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1975), 458-502.

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policies regarding events in the Ottoman Empire, on the prejudices and fears of governments, but also on the moods reigning a m o n g the relatively "speechless" multitude of the lower ranks of Ottoman society. The diplomatic reports vary in terms of reliability because of the circulation of numerous rumours about Pazvantoglu. Of further interest are, of course, the works of Rhigas and his associates or adherents, 1 of Bishop Sofronii 2 and the short inscriptions in manuscript and early printed books reflecting the views and feelings of his Bulgarian contemporaries living through the hell of the kircah time. 3 W e must admit that the information about Pazvantoglu's views and deeds originates mainly f r o m circles openly hostile to him. When sources claim to express his views, usually through an intermediary, they vary greatly depending on the addressee. Even his so-called proclamations are known only by the trace they have left in the diplomatic correspondence. Though French, Austrian, and Russian sources mention them, 4 and they were apparently sent to the respective foreign office bureaus, we have been unable to retrieve any original document of the kind. N o other documents have been preserved revealing Pazvantoglu's direct relations with any of the above-mentioned groups, traces of which surface in the diplomatic correspondence. Of course all this leaves grounds for speculation regarding his real motivation and aims. Unfortunately, at present, we can only make educated guesses about them.

Some notes on Vidin and its district at the end of the eighteenth

century

The area of Vidin had enjoyed a specific status and agrarian regime ever since its conquest by the Ottomans at the end of the fourteenth century. One of the main features was the sweeping introduction of the miri regime, without any sigificant agrarian miilk and vakif. In the course of the subsequent two centuries the timar system was in practice gradually abolished in this

See Rhigas's selected works published in Bulgarian and Greek, in Rigas Velestinlis, Revoliutsionno [Revolutionary] (Sofia: Izdatelska käshta Ivan Vazov, 1998). An interesting short biography of Pazvantoglu was written and published in 1800 by a contemporary Greek author, Konstantinos Gueorguiades Kutsikos. See Värban Todorov, "Malko izvestno izdanie za Osman Pazvantoglu" [Little-known Publication about Osman Pazvantoglu], Istoricheski Pregled, no. 3 (Sofia, 1990): 84-91. 2

Sofronii Vrachanski, Zhitie i stradanie greshnago Sofroniia [The Life and Tribulations of Sinful Sofronii], ed. N. Dyilevskii (Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1989). 3 V. Nachcv and N. Fermandzhiev, eds., Pisakme da se znae. Pripiski i letopisi [Be It Known. Marginal Notes and Annals], (Sofia: OF, 1984). 4 See for example DPIR, doc. 28, Anexa IV, p. 107, of 11 December 1797, Russian diplomatic information from Bucharest: "Pazvandoglo published a manifesto compiled by himself, [containing] three articles" or Popov, "Prinos za izuchavane na minaloto," report of M-r Chalgrin to Louis XVIII, of March 1797, doc. 9, 4; and a dispatch of the Austrian internuntius Rath Keal of 25 January 1798, in ibid., doc. 5, 23-24.

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district, mainly to the benefit of imperial hasses. The Vidin nezaret founded during the seventeenth century expanded particularly after the war with the Holy League at the end of the century. Afterwards timar holders entirely disappear from the local records. The sancak was divided into several mukataas. Their revenues provided the salaries of the paid troops in the sancak and in several other fortresses and provinces, such as T e m e s v a r , Isakgca, and those of the captains and crews of the river ships stationed in several fortified places up the Danube. This regime, combined with the displacement of villagers during the wars at the end of the seventeenth and in the first half of the eighteenth century, led to the formation of a specific system of land ownership in the area. Tapu deeds were no longer in the possession of peasants cultivating the land, but in the hands of new agents who intervened between the nazirs, acting as representatives of the sultan, and the direct cultivators. The tapus were bought usually by citizens of Vidin, mainly Janissaries, depriving villagers of their legal possession rights on the land. Towards the end of the eighteenth century this process was given additional impetus by another series of wars, the devastation of the countryside, plagues, and especially by the regime of Osman Pazvantoglu. The transformation of villages into gospodarlik corresponds to the process of citlucenje taking place in the adjacent Belgrade Pa$ahk. It meant that the peasants no longer paid the traditional taxes, which were replaced by a single tax to the owner of the tapu and one to Pazvantoglu (in the Vidin area) who had acquired the prerogatives of the former voyvodas of the imperial hasses and of the nazir. Pazvantoglu was himself an active participant in the process of divesting the peasants of their ownership rights on cultivable land. 1 Vidin as a city and fortress also underwent considerable changes, especially after the war with the Holy League. In 1689-90 it fell into Austrian hands for about ten months. This occupation apparently caused considerable problems for local Muslims, and twenty years later they still referred to the "occupation of the city by the infidels" as the reason for the flight of many local people, as well as for the destruction of local places of worship. 2 This 1 This short exposé on agrarian relations in the region is based on Strashimir Dimitrov, Vastanieto ot 1850 g. v Balgariia [The Uprising of 1850 in Bulgaria] (Sofia: BAN, 1972), 13-34. There is useful information on the subject also in Hristo Gandev, "Zarazhdane na kapitalisticheski otnosheniia v chiflishkoto stopanstvo v Severozapadna Balgariia prez XVIII vek" [Emergence of capitalist relations in the chiftlik economy in Northwetsren Bulgaria during the 18lh century], in idem, Problemi na Balgarskoto Vazrazhdane [Problems of the Bulgarian National Awakening], (Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1976), 271-394. [See in more detail on the evolution of the timar system and the military structure in the earlier period Rossitsa Gradeva, "Between the Hinterland and the Frontier: Ottoman Vidin, fifteenth to eighteenth century", m Andrew Peacock (ed.), The Frontiers of the Ottoman World: Fortifications, trade, pilgrimage and slavery, Proceedings of the British Academy (forthcoming). 2

NBKM (St. St. Cyril and Methodius National Library), Or. Dept., S 38 (Vidin kadi register, of 1705-13), passim.

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shock, along with the even more disastrous war of 1715-18, when the district was once again one of the theatres of military hostilities, laid a lasting imprint on the mentality of the Muslim inhabitants of the town. After the pcace treaty of Passarowitz (1718) when the Ottomans lost Banat, the important fortresses of Temesvar and Belgrade, and even two kazas of the Vidin sancak, Vidin again became part of the serhad. Many fugitives from the lost territories settled there. It was then that, following an application on the part of local Janissaries alluding to the kanun-i serhad, Christians were forced to move out of the fortified part of the town. They were required to build houses of wood, not stone, so that these could not serve as a shelter for the enemy in case of an attack. The Christians' houses were sold to Muslims, and the two main faiths in the city were spatially separated. 1 Similar attitudes can be detected as late as the first half of the nineteenth century, when Janissaries in Vidin claimed that, in compliance with the old law, property rights on land in the border areas belonged exclusively to Muslim soldiers from these fortresses. 2 Another consequence of these events was the sharp increase in the number of military men, especially those involved in one way or another in the Janissary units in Vidin. In fact, it seems that nearly the whole Muslim population of the town must have been involved in its d e f e n s e . 3 All these circumstances contributed to the emergence of an atmosphere of militant spirit combined with strong religious feelings among local Muslims. No doubt this climate, the regime of land possession, and the closeness of the border triggered the emergence of secessionist opportunities. Indeed, on several occasions before Pazvantoglu we hear of Janissary riots in Vidin. However, they became particularly dangerous with the rise of the Pazvantoglu family.

Osman Pazvantoglu: sketches from his biography and political

career

Despite all that was written at the time of Osman's rise and afterwards, there is still much to be clarified about the family of the rebel and the early history of his rebellion. Here I shall only summarize some facts from his life and rise to power.

1 NBKM, Or. Dept., Vidin, muhafiz, a.u. 2534. For more detail on these events Svetlana Ivanova, "Widdin," in EI 2, vol. 11, 205-208. 2 Dimitrov, Västanieto ot 1850, 32. a See Rossitsa Gradeva, "War and Peace along the Danube: Vidin at the End of the 17th Century," in The Ottomans and the Sea, K. Fleet, ed., Oriente moderno 20 (81X no. 1 (2001): 149-75.

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Contemporary sources advance several theories of his family's origins. The most popular one, based on the notes of the French officer Meriage and adopted by the majority of scholars who have studied this period, attributes to him Bosnian background and even Slavic and Christian roots. 1 More recently V. Mutafchieva, on the basis of the few Ottoman documents relating to the Pazvantoglu family before the rise of Osman, 2 advanced a "Vidin" hypothesis—that his parents belonged to well-established Vidin families. 3 It is quite possible to "marry" the two theses: without refuting a more distant Bosnian background, it is indeed possible to claim that by the time of Osman Pazvantoglu the family was well entrenched in the Ottoman provincial elite in Vidin. The sources are unanimous about several points in the history of the Pazvantoglu family. Osman Pazvantoglu reportedly inherited considerable wealth from his father. Moreover, by the time of Osman's rise to power, the family was an important factor in the military elite in Vidin. His father was aga (in some sources alemdar) of the 31st Janissary orta (he is mentioned as such in documents of 1764 about events prior to that date, and in 1787). By 1787 Osman, too, had become one of the commanders of the same orta. Osman followed the family traditions in yet another direction. Contemporary authors speak of the long record of his father (and even grandfather) as a rebel against Ottoman central authority. The somewhat fabulous stories related by western authors are confirmed to a considerable extent by the scanty Ottoman documentation about the early history of the family. On at least two occasions there was an open conflict between Omer Pazvantoglu and the central authority. Prior to 1764, already aga of the 31st Janissary orta, he was exiled to Belgrade for unknown misdemeanors. It is not clear when he was allowed to return to Vidin, but in 1787 a ferman of the sultan condemned him (as well as Osman and seven other Janissaries from other ortas) to capital punishment. They were accused of having conspired against the central authority, planning a general revolt which could open to enemies the road to the Ottoman capital. Within six months (by June 1788) Omer Pazvantoglu was executed and his estate divided among his heirs. Strangely, Osman was among them and had apparently been spared by the sultan's justice. This is the time when Osman

1 Iakichitch, "Notes sur Passvan Oglou," 265-69. See also Stojan Novakovic, Tursko carstvo pred srpski ustanak [The Turkish Empire before the Serbian Uprising] (Belgrade, 1906), 330ff.; Ciprien Robert, Les Slaves de Turquie, vol. 2 (Paris: Passard, 1852), 294, who might be considered an independent source, based on stories circulated in the area when he visited it. It is repeated in several later works dedicated to that period. See for example Konstantin Irechek, Istoriia na bälgarite [History of the Bulgarians] (Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1978), 529. There are also variations of the family history, for example, in Todorov, "Malko izvestno izdanie," 87. 2 Ihchiev, 'TDDOPV," 9-12; NBKM, Or. Dept., S 59, p. 86. 3 See Mutafchieva, Kärdzhaliisko vreme, 69-76.

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Pazvantoglu entered official records, already with some experience in challenging the sultan's authority (even before Selim I l l ' s ascension to the throne) and with an important position in the military hierarchy. From here on, the milestones of Pazvantoglu's rise are much better known. Documents of various types provide information about O s m a n ' s life, mainly f r o m 1792 onwards. In the first place they are related to his creation of an independent power centre. 1 All sources of the time consider this power centre inseparable f r o m the kircali unrest. By 1791-92 it had become clear that he was also in alliance with the Janissaries banished f r o m Belgrade, providing them with shelter and support. Not only that, he armed the reaya in the regions adjacent to the Pa§alik of Belgrade and forced them to take pari in the military activities on the side of the kircalis and Janissaries. 2 In 1793, Vidin and its district served as a shelter for the dagli bands and rose as a centre of Janissary opposition to the central authorities and the reforms introduced by Selim III, supporting especially the Janissaries banished f r o m Belgrade. In 1794 Osman Pazvantoglu was already undisputed master of Vidin. His troops and the kircali bands connected with him started infesting more distant places like §ehirkoy [Pirot, Serbia], Belgrade, and Pleven (in north central Bulgaria). His growing popularity and power caused the Ottoman authorities to undertake the first siege of Vidin at the end of 1795. This siege is not well documented but the outcome is clear. In February 1796, the troops of the Porte were forced to withdraw. A year later Pazvantoglu started a massive offensive against places that were under the rule of hostile ayan or were still faithful to the central authority. Tarnovo, Sevlievo, and Nigbolu [Nikopol] were all attacked by Pazvantoglu's men, and his possessions expanded. Pazvantoglu's great popularity and the expansion of his dependencies led to the organization of a second counteroffensive by the Porte. The preparations began in the fall of 1797, but even in early 1798 his troops still besieged Ismail Tirseniklioglu in Rusguk, his main adversary and rival in 1 There are no significant differences between the contemporary sources concerning the political events in which he was involved. Here I follow Mutafchieva, Kardzhaliisko vreme, passim; Grachev, Balkanskie vladeniia, passim; Ihchiev, "TDDOPV," passim; Shaw, Between Old and New, passim. 2

Mutafchieva, Kardzhaliisko vreme, 101. Similar acts were undertaken by the central authorities. As early as 1785 the Porte started appealing to the reaya to organize, resist, repulse, and even attack the bandits. Soon these appeals were addressed not only to the local Muslims, but also to the entire population of these regions. Thus in 1793 the authority began to arm all[ including the Christians, which came in direct contradiction with age-old traditions forbidding Christians to bear arms. Ibid., 103-104. Shaw places this event in 1799, when the governor of the Belgrade Pa$alik allowed the local knezes to organize and arm native Serbian troops as auxiliaries. They were to be supported directly by the local population without the necessity of new Ottoman taxes, Shaw, Between Old and New, 306. See also Glenny (Balkans, 6), who says that in 1799 Selim III issued a ferman permitting the Christians to carry weapons—a rifle, two pistols, and a yatagan. This allowed the peasants to form armed units in aid of the sipahis and the supporters of Selim's reforms against the Janissaries.

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north Bulgaria, and the ayan of Hacioglu Pazan [Dobrich, northeastern Bulgaria], Pazvantoglu held all of what is today northwestern and north central Bulgaria, as well as some territories of present-day northeastern Serbia and, for a short time, even Sofia. In February 1798 he started to withdraw toward Vidin, keeping only his elite forces. His capital city was well prepared For a long siege by the huge Ottoman army, which according to contemporary sources numbered a hundred thousand men. The siege of 1798 was very strange. Slowly moving toward Vidin, the pagas, each in command of his own troops, finally formed a loose circle around the fortified centre of Pazvantoglu's possessions. By October it had become clear that Osman was the winner. In fact, the Ottoman authorities were rather keen to stop these military activities, as from September the Ottoman state was at war with the French Republic in Egypt. At this time Russia also supported the legitimacy of the sultan in the conflict with Pazvantoglu, and sultan and rebel had to reach an agreement. After long negotiations Osman received his long-desired rank of vezir, or three-tail pa§a of Vidin, and the Ottoman troops withdrew. The third siege of Vidin took place in 1800, when Pazvantoglu concluded an alliance with Cengiz Ghiray (in other sources Mehmed), one of the Tatar sultans based in Varbitsa, northeastern Bulgaria. This presented not just a military but also an ideological menace to the Ottoman dynasty, because of the Ghiray hans' legitimacy. Though supported by Austria and Russia, the Ottoman armies could not do more than during the previous sieges. After 1800 Osman was left almost entirely on his own. From 1802 until his death there emerged some kind of division of the territory of northern Bulgaria between him and Ismail Tirseniklioglu, succeeded by Mustafa Bayraktar. Blocked in Vidin to the north by Russia and Austria, now eager to come to the rescue of the sultan, by Ismail Tirseniklioglu to the east and, after the beginning of the First Serbian Uprising, by the Serbs to the west, he had to content himself with the small corner he had had almost from the very beginning of his rise in the region of Vidin. Osman Pazvantoglu spent his last years in Vidin surrounded by enemies, deserted by most of his supporters and soldiers among the Christian population and actually in open war with the latter. Toward the end of his life he suffered another humiliation. Despite his rank of vezir, it was Mustafa Bayraktar who was appointed commander of the Ottoman troops against Russia in the war of 1806-12. Along with his political career Osman Pazvantoglu also managed to continue the family traditions in the accumulation of properties.1 According to some [foreign] sources he left to his heirs 25 million akge, including gold and 1 Ihchiev, "TDDOPV," docs. VT-VIII, 15-16, concerning his appointment to collect the cizye of Gypsies in the vilayets of Vidin and Nikopol.

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precious stones, huge stores of food and arms, and land possessions amounting to almost one third of the territory of his mini-state, a strip of land along the Danube 50 miles long and 20-25 miles wide, 1 comprising two hundred villages, some inherited but the majority his own acquisitions. 2 He died on 5 February 1807, probably of tuberculosis, leaving behind a small, almost independent territory and properties whose exact dimensions have yet to be delineated. Pazvantoglu's properties were divided among his wife, son, and aunt. 3 Shortly after his death his widow married his close associate, Molla Idris Pa§a, who inherited not only his possessions and family but also the administrative position of Osman. The central Ottoman authorities did not dare to claim any rights over the properties of Osman Pazvantoglu until after the death of Molla Idris Pa§a, in March 1814. 4 Thirty or more years after his death we see Pazvantoglu's name in the kadi sicills as the person who distributed the villages in the region to his agas and other notables in Vidin.

The attitude of the Ottoman

authorities

As mentioned, Osman came to be noticed by the Ottoman authorities as early as 1787, when he was named in a ferman as an organizer of a general revolt in Vidin against the sultan. By the beginning of the 1790s, despite the ups and downs in the history of the family, Osman had emerged as one of the greatest dangers to Ottoman centralism, to the dynasty and to the reforms which Sultan Selim III was trying to introduce. From the very beginning of his open rebellion he was treated as a "rebel" and a "bandit" in all Ottoman documentation originating from the central authorities. He was accused of breaching the laws, opposing the legal authority, and committing crimes whose main victims were the reaya. Gradually his revolt became the main concern for the Ottoman authority, leading not only to the three sieges of Vidin and many attempts at creating opposition to his rule among the Vidin notables and at his murder, but also to 1

Oreshkov, "Niakolko dokurnenta za Pazvantoglu," 25. Popov, "Prinos za izuchavane na minaloto," 6. 3 The last news of Pazvantoglu's son comes in 1811, when an English traveller, John Gait, passed through Vidin. He heard of the marriage of the widow and tells a curious story about the son of Osman, Ali, who must have been a spoilt young man. John Gait, Voyages and Travels, in the Years 1809, 1810, and 1811; Containing Statistical, Commercial, and Miscellaneous Observations on Gibraltar, Sardinia, Sicily, Malta, Serigo, and Turkey (London, 1812). I have used the Bulgarian translation in María Todorova, ed., Angliiski patepisi za Balkanite, kraya na XVI v.-30te godini na XIX v. [English Travel Accounts about the Balkans, end of the 1 6 t h century - the T830s] (Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1987), 535, 539. 2

4

See the ferman ordering confiscation in Ihchiev, "TDDOPV," doc. CVI, 125-28.

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the need for a religious and legal justification of the military campaigns against him. Such a justification was particularly needed, due to his popularity among Muslims of all ranks. His ideas were bringing together all opponents of Sultan Selim I l l ' s reforms and were in agreement with the mentality of pious Muslims, earning him numerous partisans not only among those who suffered most f r o m the reforms, the taxpayers, but also among the highest functionaries of the Ottoman state. It is not surprising that he was always well informed about the decisions of the state council, and that a number of pagas lost their lives on accusation of being his secret supporters. Thus, in 1797 the sultan felt the need to secure fetvas f r o m the seyhiUisldm, appealing to all Muslims to participate in the suppression of the rebellion and in the extermination of the rebel pa§a and his closest adherents. 1 These four juridical documents provide the ideological basis of the "holy war" against Osman Pazvantoglu. Those participating in the battles against him were called gazis, and those killed were proclaimed §ehids, titles associated with holy war against "infidels." H e was accused of being a ringleader and, as such, "of killing people in public, shedding human blood, threatening the sultan's subjects, devastating towns and villages, terrorizing the poor Muslims and the reaya, and committing a number of other crimes." The second and more important accusation was of "having proclaimed himself an independent ruler, being disobedient to the sultan, and having settled in one of the sultan's fortresses, attacking the peaceful (Muslim) communities." 2 A series of fermans

addressed to local authorities in Rumili, read in

public in the Sheriat courts, contain "horror stories" about the slaughter of faithful Muslims and their families by Pazvantoglu's hordes. They invariably compared his deeds to those of the armies of the "infidels" during the war (of 1787-91), including bombardment of fortresses, taking Muslims prisoner, burning Islamic cult places and eighty villages, roasting alive women and children (Muslims and reaya

alike), and pillaging the possessions of the

3

population. N o doubt these were not just groundless accusations but part of everyday life in Rumili for the decades of the kircali

time, but the main

purpose was to convince Muslims that their religious duty lay with the sultan's cause.

1

The date is not indicated in the fetvas but they were recorded with other documents from 1797. Besides, in December 1797 the Austrian ambassador informed his government that "cet homme remuant et coupable venoit d'être dépouillé de tous ses droits, maudit et proscrit" [this restless and reprehensible man has just been stripped of all his rights, accursed and outlawed]. Popov, "Prinos za izuchavane minaloto," doc. 39, 18. The French texts are rendered in their original spelling. 2 Ihchiev, "TDDOPV," doc. XXVII, 35-37. 3 Ibid., doc. XXX, 41-42; doc. XXXIII, 45-46; doc. XXXIV, 50; doc. XXXV, 51, all of November 1797; doc. XXXVIII, 53-54, of December 1797, and others.

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The popularity of Pazvantoglu among the Janissaries made the sultan resort to yet another measure. The Janissary aga in the capital convened a meeting of the officers and veterans at which were read all the reports and requests for help from the administrative bodies in Nigbolu, Kula, Silistra, Rusçuk, and elsewhere. At the meeting the Janissaries swore allegiance to the sultan and declared that Osman had to be stripped of the privileges he enjoyed as a Janissary. Then the aga sent a circular to all provincial ocaks (including the one in Vidin) informing them of the decisions and condemning those who had sided with the secessionist. 1 He appealed to the population of Vidin in particular to surrender Osman to the authorities and refrain from resistance. 2 Finally, the diplomatic correspondence mentions some acts of despair undertaken by the Ottoman authorities. The head of Pazvantoglu was priced ever higher. In December 1797 it already was worth 60,000 piastres, which according to the Austrians was still too low, considering his popularity. Because, the diplomat continued, "dans l'opinion publique il est le défenseur des anciennes lois de l'Empire, l'ennemi des innovations onéreuses, prêt d'ailleurs à devenir plus fidèle des sujets, si l'on réformoit les abus oppresifs." 3 Two weeks later, unable to stop the circulation of rumors about the rout of the sultan's army and the victory of the rebel, the authorities closed the cafés and forbade public discussion of the troubles around the revolt of Pazvantoglu and even the mentioning of his name. 4 Despite the propaganda, Pazvantoglu invariably emerged victorious in his conflicts with the sultan and the forces sent against him, and apparently enjoyed a very high reputation among Muslims to the end of his life.

Pazvantoglu's

views of the Ottoman government and "domestic"

policy

Some of the accusations in the documents of the central authority find strong support in diplomatic correspondence. According to their evidence, Osman Pazvantoglu not only challenged the new sultan's policy of reforms and established an independent rule in one part of the empire like his powerful contemporaries in Albania, Yanya, Rusçuk, and elsewhere. He also planned to usurp the throne and replace the Ottoman dynasty. General J.-F. Carra1

Quoted from Mutafchieva, Kârdzhaliisko vreme, 159-60. Ihchiev, "TDDOPV," 40-43. J Popov, "Prinos za izuchavane na minaloto," doc. 40, 20 [in public opinion he is the defender of the ancient laws of the Empire, an enemy of the onerous innovations, moreover, ready to become the most faithful of the subjects if the oppressive abuses were to be corrected!. 4 Ibid., doc. 43, 20-21. The prohibition against mentioning the name of Pazvantoglu is also reported on two occasions by Ruffin, the French chargé d'affaires in 1798. Ibid., doc. 6, 134: doc. 10,140. 2 'Î

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Saint-Cyr, French chargé d'affaires in the capital in 1797-98, writes in November 1798: "Il veut parvenir au Thrône, il réunit donc tous les mécontents de l'Empire." 1 In this case, the general refers to what one of Pazvantoglu's closest associates, Dimitri Turnavity, had shared with him in a face-to-face discussion. Another, "milder" version envisioned the enthronement of one of the Ghiray hans who allied with him. This was closer to Ottoman reality, as the Ghirays were officially recognized dynastic heirs, in case the line of Ottoman rulers failed. In this version Pazvantoglu reserved for himself the office of grand ve/ir. 2 Whatever his real intentions, no doubt his political and military successes and his popularity were considered extremely dangerous by the sultan, especially since the Vidin rebel was probably the first to challenge the Ottoman dynasty as such. Previous pretenders to the throne either belonged or claimed to belong to the family. As for the other contemporary secessionists, they were either too far from the capital or preferred independence within the borders of their possessions without openly threatening the dynasty's positions and the sultan's policy. Indeed, Pazvantoglu did other thing to keep the Ottoman sultan on the alert. Thus, apart from the declared designs on the rule of the state, the diplomatic sources mention that he was minting his own currency. In January 1798 Russian diplomats relate that a Venetian, suspected of having earlier counterfeited Turkish money, had moved to Vidin and had started minting for Pazvantoglu. 3 At the same time General Carra St. Cyr wrote that the Vidin rebel had started minting coins which bore the inscription "il n'y a qu'un seul Dieu" [there is only one God], on the one side, and "Liberté" [Liberty] on the other. The French diplomat was told that this currency already circulated in the capital. 4 Other sources say that his money was struck in Austrian mints. 5 There must have been something to these reports, however strange they sound, as a coin called "pazvantche" is mentioned in later Bulgarian sources. It appears in a letter of 1853, listed along with other currently circulating coins — maccar, adliya, zwanziger, ikilik, and others. 6 It is also defined in the Dictionary of Bulgarian Language, compiled by N. Gerov during the 1 Ibid., doc. 11, 136 [He wants to get to the throne, therefore he has united all the discontented in the Empire). 2 Oreshkov, "Niakolko dokumenta za Pazvantoglu," 13, doc. 7, 37-38, of 23.02.1802; Pavlovic, "Ispisi iz francuskih arhiva," doc. XX, 122-23; doc. XXI, 124, of 22.09.- 22.10.1801; Popov, "Prinos za izuchavane na minaloto," 116, of March 1800; Mutafchieva, Kardzhaliisko vreme 210. The rumour is also reported by Bishop Sofronii. Sofronii Vrachanski, Zhitie i stradanie ereshnago Sofroniia, 75, n. 298,109. 3 DP1R, doc. 37, Anexa III, 125. 4 Popov, "Prinos za izuchavane na minaloto," doc. 7, 135. 5 Irechek, Istoriia na balgarite, 531. 6 Rumiana Radkova, Vazrozhdenetsat Hristo Dupnichanin [Hristo Dupnichanin the RevivalistJ (Sofia: BAN, 1997), 88-89.

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second half of the nineteenth century, as a "small copper coin minted by the i n d e p e n d e n t pa§a of Vidin Pazvantoglu at the beginning of this [the nineteenth] century," 1 The rumours about this coin continued to circulate even after the liberation of Bulgaria. Thus in 1894 the director of the National Museum in Sofia was still trying to find at least one of these coins for the museum's collection. In a letter to one of the descendants of D. Hadzhitoshev he summarizes the existing information about the "pazvantche" as a coin minted by the pa.¡a in 1803. It cost 30 paras and was covered by a thin layer of tin or probably silver. 2 Unfortunately, there is much to be clarified about the "pazvantche" yet. What might be considered certain is that Pazvantoglu tried by all possible means to claim and show his independence. It is difficult to imagine that a slogan for a change of the dynasty in itself would have earned Pazvantoglu such wide popularity among the Muslims. It was openly articulated, through his non-Muslim agents, only in front of French politicians and diplomats, the only ones who would not have opposed such a change. But in these negotiations he also agreed to surrender all territories claimed by the French and even to accept French domination over the Ottoman state. In 1801, in front of Talleyrand, his emissaries offered the French Consulate the following: 1. De concourir de tous les moyens à tous les changements, que le Gouvernemen français croiroit utiles dans le Gouvernemen de l'Empire ottoman; 2. Si la Republique française se propose d'attaquer la Puissance Ottomane Pasvand-Oglou s'engage à la seconder de tous ses moyens et de Coopperer auvertement ... à la Seule Condition qu'il lui laisserait une province où il pouroit vivre tranquillement sous la protection des Lois française, lui Pasvand-Oglou et son amis Gingis Métrémèt Gucray Sultan... In case France decided to conclude pcace with the Ottoman Empire, moreover, Pazvantoglu was hoping to receive an amnesty with the help of France. He also declared himself protector of French trade in his paçalik and W a l l a c h i a and invited the French g o v e r n m e n t to establish a trade commissioner in Vidin for the district and adjacent territories. 3 These designs may have been contemplated in reality or may have been gambits serving

1 Naiden Gerov, compiler, Rechtiik na balgarskiia ezik [Dictionary of Bulgarian Language] vol. 4, pt. 2, ed. T. Panchev (Plovdiv, 1901), 5. 2 Valeria Tarashoeva and others, eds., Semeen arhiv na Hadzhitoshevi [Family Archive of the Hadzhitoshevs], vol. 2 (1827 - 1878) (Sofia:BG Print, 2002), doc. 496,454. 3 Pavlovic, "Ispisi iz francuskih arhiva," doc. XX, 121-22 [1. To work with all means towards all the changes that the French Government will deem useful in the government of the Ottoman empire; 2. If the French Republic contemplates attacking the Ottoman Power, Pasvand-Oglou undertakes to assist it with all his means and to openly cooperate ... with the single condition that a province be left to him where he and his friend Gingis Metremet Gueray Sultan could live peacefully under the protection of French laws].

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other projects: to learn the plans of France for the region or to establish contacts with the only power that at the moment was interested in changes to the status quo. Pazvantoglu seems to have had a story for each of the Great Powers, his Christian associates and the Muslims, and it did not necessarily envisage a dynastic change. The very fact that, only a few months after swearing allegiance to N a p o l e o n , his e n v o y N . Popovits visited the R u s s i a n ambassador in Paris, requesting political asylum for his master in Russia, is quite revealing about the complicated situation, the flexibility it required, and the conflicting messages Pazvantoglu was sending to the Great Powers in his attempt to survive and succeed. Russian and Austrian diplomats also heard of his designs as a persistent rumour or simply presented it in their reports as an undoubted truth. These sources, however, claim that he held very high esteem for the first Ottoman sultans, Siileyman the Magnificent in particular, and planned to restore their type of rule. According to the Austrian internuntius Rath Keal: "Sous le prétexte de réformer non seulement dans la ville de Widdin mais aussi dans les environs les défauts du nouveau Gouvernemen en particulier les impôts nouveaux (Nizami Gedid) et de rétablir le système sur le pied de Sultan Suleiman II Kanouni, il a réussi sous main saturer la confiance des habitants voisins..." 1 What the sources seem to be unaninimous about, however, are the ideas reflected in his "proclamations." Russian, Austrian, and French diplomatic agents in the capital of the empire and in the Danube Principalities wrote similar reports of the contents of these documents. Thus, although we have not seen any copy of them, w e may assume that they really were circulated and were the closest to the image Pazvantoglu wanted to earn himself among the Muslim (and non-Muslim) population of the Ottoman state. T h e core of the information provided by the diplomats on other occasions confirms this. These ideas can be summarized as follows: he was against the "new order" (nizam-i cedid) introduced by Sultan Selim III. H e declared his staunch support for the sultan himself but blamed evil advisers for the introduction of illegal (from an Islamic legal point of view) and onerous taxes, which laid a heavy burden on all Ottoman subjects, and f o r the establishment of the new military detachments at the expense of the Janissary corps. Russian diplomatic sources f r o m Bucharest report in December 1797 that 1 Popov, "Prinos za izuchavane minaloto "doc. 39, 17, of 1797 [Under the pretext of reforming not only in the city of Widdin but also in its neighborhood the faults of the new Government, in particular with regards to the new taxes (Nizami Gedid) and to reestablish the system on the footing of Sultan Siileyman II Kanouni, he has succeeded underhand to swamp the trust of the neighboring inhabitants]. The diplomat goes on to say that Pazvantoglu's projects were to "push things till he gets the throne."

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"Pazvandoglo published a manifesto compiled by himself, [containing] three articles: 1. That the sultan should be the only autocrat and ruler without any councils; 2. That the Janissaries should, according to the ancient usage, be the foremost army in the whole empire; and 3. That all new institutions must be destroyed in the entire empire and the ones of the olden times be restored in their place."' Several months earlier, in March 1797, Chalgrin wrote to Louis XVIII (the report is included in the Austrian diplomatic correspondence) that the worrisome news of Pazvantoglu's expansion toward Tarnovo, Nikopol, and Belgrade had arrived at the Porte together with a proclamation issued by the rebel. It announced that he was in command not of bandits or thieves but of true and pious Muslims who were inspired by the desire to preserve the Islamic faith and to maintain the purity and integrity of the old Ottoman customs against a corrupt government and the European "impiousness and perversions" it had introduced. Pazvantoglu concluded that he would render himself in person in Constantinople at the head of a hundred thousand men to remove these fatal innovations that threatened the foundations of the Ottoman Empire. 2 In January 1798, Rath Keal speaks of "his manifestos" and letters aimed at earning the favor of the Janissaries. 3 It is noteworthy that none of these anti-European appeals appear in the French diplomatic correspondence, as if the news of these program documents somehow bypassed the French diplomats. They are not mentioned in front of French politicians either. On the contrary, there we hear even "revolutionary" rhetoric and admiration for the ideas and the leaders of the French Revolution. Thus, f r o m the point of view of his contemporaries, Pazvantoglu emerges primarily as a champion of the old militia (the Janissaries) against all the novelties inspired by Western influences. 4 All this, combined with his support for the Janissaries in Belgrade, explains why, as the observers of the 1 DPIR, doc. 28, Anexa IV, p. 107, of 11 December 1797. At the end of November the Prussian diplomatic agent in the capital, Knobelsdorff, speaks of probably the same document: "He says he is faithful to his master but has risen against those who surround him and who, by their evil advice, have encouraged him to institute the Nizam-i cedid, the name of the regulation for the new taxes." Popov, "Prinos za izuchavane minaloto," 120. 2 Ibid., doc. 9, 4-5. The information about the demands of Pazvantoglu sent by Rath Keal at the beginning of April 1797 may also have been drawn from one of these documents: 'Tout en vantant sa fidélité au Sultan ce chef s'éleve contre les nouveautés militaires, flatte le corps si redoutable et si mécontent des Janissaires, blame la docilité des Toptchis à adopter la discipline des Infidèles, et offre sa protection aux Rayas contre le Nizami-gedid, proscrit par la loi Mahométan" [While boasting of his loyalty to the Sultan, this chief rises against the military novelties, flatters the so formidable and so dissatisfied corps of Jannisaries, criticizes the docility with which the Toptchis adopt the discipline of the Unbelivers, and offers his protection to the Rayas, against the Nizami-gedid prohibited by the Moslem law]. Ibid., doc. 10, 5. 3 Ibid., doc. 3, 22: Pazvantoglu sent a letter to the bazirgânba^i of the Janissaries in which he demanded the seven-year arrears of the salaries of the Janissaries in Vidin and nine-year ones of those in Belgrade. 4

Ibid., doc. 38,17, of November 1797, Rath Keal.

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time point out, all Janissaries expressed very high respect for Pazvantoglu, refused to take part in the punitive campaigns against him, and were ready to side with him whenever possible. 1 He became a hero in their eyes, and they sang chants dedicated to him: After a hundred thousand bombs have been thrown against Widdin, I, Paswan Oglu, the dog of the sultan, and the slave of the sultana Valide, have erected the standard of defence. I, Paswan Oglu, the dog of the grand seignior, bark at his ministers. I wish to be submissive to my master, and I kiss the dust from his feet. I, Paswan Oglu, &c. 2 While it is not difficult to understand why he was so popular among the Janissaries, it remains to explore the reasons for such support in the wider circles of the Balkan Muslim population. Thus, one of the dragomans at the Austrian embassy, Fleischackl, wrote in the spring of 1797 that on his way between Edirne and Istanbul everyone spoke of Pazvantoglu, praised him and hoped that he would emerge victorious. According to the same observer the rebel in Vidin had informants in all villages throughout the European territories of the empire. 3 Maybe another fact, which appealed to the rank-andfile Muslims, was his obvious religiosity. Very often in publications dedicated to Pazvantoglu, or just mentioning him, it is stated that he was a Bektashi. 4 This may be attributed to the resemblances between him and Ali Pa§a of Yanya, 5 especially in that they both were surrounded by numerous Christian aides and showed some limited toleration f o r their Christian "subjects." However, unlike the case of Ali Pa§a, none of the contemporaries ever qualified Pazvantoglu as a Bektashi. Here we are unable to analyze all

1 Olivier, Voyage dans /' Empire ottomane, 473. This popularity and high esteem, as well as the main reasons for the Janissaries' support are also confirmed by G. Kutsikos (Todorov, "Malko izvestno izdanie," 89): "The Janissaries regard him as their God"; Robert, Les Slaves de Turquie, 298: "Plus le sultan s'éloignait des janissaires et favorisait les institutions des ghiaours, plus des janissaires s'agrissaient contre le sultan et contre les frères des ghiaours" [The more the sultan estranges from the Janissaries and favours the ghiaours' institutions, the more the Janissaries are getting embittered against the sultan and the brothers of the ghiaours]. 2 Pouqueville, Travels through Morea, 100. See also the Pazvandoglu Destani, in Osman Keskioglu, Bulgaristan'da Musliimanlar ve islam. Eserleri (n. p. and n. d.), 99-101; Vankov, Osman Paspanoglu, 87-88. 3 Popov, "Prinos za izuchavane minaloto," doc. 14, 8. 4 See for example Sadat, "Ayan and Aga," passim. 5 F. W. Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans, vol. 2 (New York: Octagon Books, 1973), 593. This author makes the direct connection: "He (Osman Pazvantoglu) seems to have been a strong partisan of the Janissaries...and of the ancien régime, and his fief of Kirja or Kirja Ali...has been in its time an important Bektashi centre as containing the tomb of the saint Said Ali." Recently Ali Pasa's Bektashism was also subjected to critical investigation. See Nathalie Clayer, "The Myth of Ali Pasha and the Bektashis. The Construction of an 'Albanian Bektashi National History'," in Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer, eds., Albanian Identities. Myth and History (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), 127-133.

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elements of his religious policy but shall only trace some aspects of his religiosity as revealed by documentary and material evidence. Diplomatic sources, whatever their origins and prejudices, agree that he was in the first place a pious Muslim, who opposed the " d a n g e r o u s " innovations introduced with the "new order" and regarded as "European" and "infidel" by the Muslim population. In 1797, for example, Chalgrin reported to Louis XVIII that "il est surtout musulman austère; il se fait appeller Sultan Osman, du nom de ce fameux Calife, qui successeur d ' O m a r l'an 644 se distingua par son attachement à la foi musulmane dont la conservation f u t l'objet de toute son attention." 1 French Republican sources, too, stress his fidelity to Islam. General Carra St. Cyr, who had direct contacts with D. Turnavity, a close associate of Pazvantoglu, desribed him to Talleyrand as "fidèle à 1'Alcoran, il semble n'être inspiré que par Mahomet et n'avoit pour but que le bonheur du Peuple et la gloire du nom musulman." 2 Pazvantoglu's envoys to the French Directory explicitly stated in front of Talleyrand that he was ready to make many concessions to the French and follow the orders of the French government, provided they were not contrary to the beliefs of the true Muslims. 3 Finally, a secret Russian report f r o m Bucharest, referring to information originating f r o m the Venetian physician of Pazvantoglu, says that he regarded himself as ordained by God to exterminate all corruption rooted in the rule of Selim III and to restore the justice of the caliphs and the ancient O t t o m a n s . 4 K. Kutsikos also adds to the romantic image of the pious and righteous "ruler": Pazvantoglu was humane, compassionate, amiable, but just and punished severely all, even minor, crimes. H e made many donations to poor widows and orphans and erected hans which supported travellers at no charge lor two days. 5 His construction projects satisfied primarily pragmatic needs, both military and urban. Here one should mention the Cross barracks, the repairs and renovation of the fortress walls where he followed European models, a palace as his residence, the repair of the four main roads going out of the city Popov, "Prinos za izuchavane minaloto," doc. 9, 5 [He is above all an austere Muslim; he is called Sultan Osman after the name of that famous caliph, who, a successor to Omar, in 644 distinguished himself by his attachment to the Islamic faith to whose preservation he devotes all his attention]. Ibid., doc. 11, 135 [faithful to the Alcoran he seems to be inspired by Mahomet only and to have as his one aim the good fortune of the people and the glory of the name of the Muslims], 3 Pavlovid, "Ispisi iz francuskih arhiva," doc. XX, 122, of 22.09.-22.10.1801: "Pasvand-Oglou promet d'entreprendre avec son audace ordinaire l'Exécution des ordres du Gouvernemen françai de telle nature qu'ils soient en supposant toujours qu'ils ne seront points dirigés contre la Croyance des vrais Musulmans" [Pasvand-Oglou promises to undertake with his usual audacity to carry out the orders of the French government, of whatever nature they may be, taking fot granted that they will not be in contradiction with the beliefs of the true Moslems. | 4 5

DPIR, doc. 27, 102, of November 1797. Todorov, "Malko izvestno izdanie," 90.

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of Vidin, and the regulation of the city street network. Along with the secular buildings there were also several pious ones - a ktilliye (a compound of a mosque, medrese, and library), and a hanegah dedicated to Salaheddin Baba, a local hero and saint, who perished defending Vidin from the Austrians in 1689. Again in line with the Islamic tradition he provided the town with ge§mes, a mosluk and a sebil with an icehouse. 1 According to one of the lists of the books, compiled in the 1830s, the so-called Pazvantoglu Library contained over two thousand volumes. At its core were books bearing the seal of his father Omer, or donor inscriptions of his mother Rukiyc, and several other outstanding citizens of Vidin. Pazvantoglu is also the donor of a second, smaller library, at the zaviye of Salaheddin Baba. Unfortunately, the majority of the books belonging to these libraries are not in Bulgaria, being submitted to the Ottoman authorities after 1878, and only some six hundred and fifty manuscripts and old printed books remain in the National Library in Sofia. The books were listed under twentytwo headings in line with the traditional Islamic classification of sciences. The majority are books on Islamic law, including collections of Ottoman fetvas. Next come grammar studies. There are also a considerable number of historical and biographical works, Persian poetry, medical treatises, etc. The Library also possessed many of the titles published by Ibrahim Muteferrika's press, exclusively secular books. 2 Nothing in the list of books, however, indicates any preference for Bektashi literature or Bektashi leanings of the donor; neither do any of the buildings constructed by the pa§a. Nothing speaks of the attachment of Salaheddin Baba to the Bektashi dervish brotherhood. All this

1 On his construction work in Vidin, see: Ivanova, "Widdin"; Machiel Kiel, "Urban Development in Bulgaria in the Turkish Period," International Journal of Turkish Studies 4, no. 2 (1989): 101-102, Plates 20 and 21; Mihaila Staynova, "Ottoman Libraries in Vidin," Etudes balkaniques, no. 2 (Sofia, 1979); idem, "Za vakafskata deinost na Osman Pazvantoglu vav Vidin i Vidinskiia krai" [On the vakf activity of Osman Pazvantoglu in Vidin and the region of Vidin], Vekove, no. 6 (Sofia, 1982); idem, Osmanskite biblioteki v balgarskite zemi, XV XIX v. [Ottoman Libraries in Bulgarian Lands, 15 th -19 ,h centuries], (Sofia: NBKM, 1982); Todor Zlatev, Balgarskite gradove po r. Dunav prez epohata na Vazrazhdaneto [Bulgarian Towns on the Danube during the Age of the Awakening] (Sofia: Nauka i Izkustvo, 1962), 11-58. 2 On the books and the libraries founded by Osman Paga see the works of Ivanova and Staynova cited in n. 64, as well as Svetlana Ivanova, ' T h e Sicills of the Ottoman Kadis. Observations on the Sicill Collection of the National Library in Sofia, Bulgaria," in Kemal. Ci^ek, ed., Pax Ottomana. Studies in Memoriam Prof. Dr. Nejat Goyttng (Ankara: Yeni Turkiye, 2001), 70; Stoyanka Kenderova and Zorka Ivanova, compilers, From the Collections of Ottoman Libraries in Bulgaria during the 18th-19th centuries: Catalogue of the Exhibition of Manuscripts and Old Printed Books, Sofia, May 1998 (Sofia: NBKM, 1999), 20 - 25; M. L. Maleev, "Opis na neduhovnite knigi ot vidinskata biblioteka na Pazvantoglu Osman aga" [Inventory of the non-religious books from the Vidin library of Pazvantoglu Osman aga], SbNUNK 3 (1890): 405-409.

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gives me grounds to support the recently voiced doubts concerning Pazvantoglu's adherence to the Bektashi order.1 Perhaps his popularity will find further explanation if we add some more information from diplomatic sources. All diplomats are unanimous about one important fact: the new taxes providing financial means for the reforms and the new military detachments were abolished in the territories controlled by Pazvantoglu. Instead of the heavy burden of the taxes on silk, grains, and wine, Pazvantoglu seems to have levied one single tax, harac, paid by the reaya (by this time a term applied only to the taxpaying Christian population) 2 at the amount ol' 110 paras? The Muslim population might have paid even less, but this factor for popular esteem is usually mentioned in the context of Christian taxpayers. Probably this is because, as mentioned above, Christians were the majority of the taxpayers in the region of Vidin, while Muslims were fewer and to a large extent included in the ranks of various military or paramilitary detachments. This, along with the relative security he could provide for the population of his mini-state where the robber bands were forbidden to pillage (at the expense of neighboring lands of hostile ayans or of Wallachia), attracted many people, Muslims and Christians alike, to settle in the Vidin region. Of course they could hardly protect themselves from the sultan's armies during the three sieges of Vidin which devastated the whole region. Besides, the "borders" of his possession shifted repeatedly over the years. Yet these events did not necessarily undercut his reputation as the lesser evil. It is clear that the news of his policy spread in and attracted various circles of Ottoman society. 4

Liubomir Mikov, "Dva kSsni osmanski pametnika v Severozapadna Balgariia" [Two late Ottoman monuments in Northwestern Bulgaria], in Evgenia Mitseva, ed., Prostranstva na drugostta (Spaces of otherness], (Sofia: A1 "Marin Drinov, 2005), 97-99. The author correctly points out that there is no explicit evidence about Salaheddin's belonging to the Bektashi order; that not all Janissaries professed Bektashism; that Bektashis showed a rather formal attitude to the mosque as a cult building. He also turns our attention to the names of the members of the Pazvantoglu family, Omer and Osman, the names of two of the righteous caliphs, in respect to which there was a religious taboo among the Bektashis. Here one may also add the association in name with the third caliph, association which according to the diplomatic correspondence was particularly prized by Pazvantoglu. The names, however, may be misleading as an indicator in this respect, as Osman's son's name is Ali, the name of the fourth righteous caliph, who was particularly revered by Bektashis. Here I am more inclined to see an association with the caliphs consciously sought by Osman, rather than anything else. 2

On the evolution of the meaning of the term in Ottoman documentation see Joseph Kabrda, "Raia," Izvestiia na Istoricheskoto Druzhestvo v Sofia 14-15 (1937): 176-85; [Suraiya Faroqhi, "Raiyya," in El 2, vol. VIII (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 404.] •5 J Popov, "Prinos za izuchavane minaloto," doc. 10, 6. This meant about two kuru§. See §evket Pamuk, "Appendix," in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, eds. Halil Inalcik and Donald Quatert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 967. Unfortunately, I am not aware of studies where the tax burden of peasants in "ordinary" Ottoman provinces is estimated. 4 See a report of a police informant about moods in Istanbul cafes. One trader for example said: "earlier people spoke of the great equity shown by this man. There were even cases when he treated with care the people in the conquered territories while from the reaya he collected one golden piece as harac," NBKM, Or. Dept., 9/32. Quoted from Mutafchieva, Kardzhaliisko vreme, 172.

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The above-listed elements of his policy can be regarded as some of the reasons why he would be supported by the rank-and-file Bulgarians and Serbs who lived in his territories. His possessions formed a small island where no new taxes were introduced. His policy brought to his side not only his own reaya,

but also people living in the lands of other ayans

in Northern

Bulgaria. Un grand nombre de Rayas de Sistow [Svishtov], de Tirnowa des environs de Widdin etc. surchargés d'impôts sur les soi, les blés et les vins abandonnèrent leurs cultures, et ayant réclamé la protection de Paswandoglou trouvèrent chez lui des terrains à faire valoir sous l'unique charge de 110 paras de haradsch. Les autres propriétaires voyant déserter leurs paysans, jetterent des hauts cris contre Paswandoglou, dont les possessions deviennent florissantes à leurs dépens... ' Not only that, at harvest and haymaking time he personally stayed with the peasants, defending them from the attacks of brigands. 2 Occasionally he punished those who pillaged territories belonging to his possessions. 3 According to Mériage, Bulgarian peasants said that Pazvantoglu was an enemy only of the Turks, who feared him extremely and hid when he was in town. 4 All diplomats reporting on the events in this Ottoman province also mention that Bulgarians comprised a good part of Pazvantoglu's troops. In 1801, L. Kirico reported that a considerable part of the Vidin garrison consisted of Bulgarians. 5 The same year, according to that Russian diplomat, there was one detachment of pandurs, only Bulgarians, in Pazvantoglu's military forces. T w o of their commanders with ninety-six men changed sides, joined the nazir of Braila, and applied for amnesty to the central authorities. 6 In assessing this phenomenon one should take into account that such great social upheavals as the one witnessed during the "kircali time" can lead to 1 Popov, "Prinos za izuchavane minaloto," doc. 10, 6 [A large number of Rayas from Sistow, Tirnowa in the surroundings of Widdin etc. overloaded with the taxes on silk, grains, and wine leave their arable lands, and having begged Paswandoglou's protection they find with him plots to cultivate with one single burden of 110 paras of haradsch. The other landlords having seen their peasants desert them, cry out against Paswandoglou whose possessions flourish at their expense]. Compare also with n. 65. On the other hand, Shaw writes that when Pazvantoglu invaded Kraina which previously enjoyed specific tax and administrative status, all privileges of local Christians were curbed and the taxes were increased, while yamaks fleeing from Belgrade introduced a ferocious regime in the area. Shaw, Between Old and New, 240-41. 2 Report of the Russian diplomat Kirico, based in Wallachia, DP1R, 322. 3 Again evidence of Kirico from 1804, who says that this was how Pazvantoglu tried to keep his credit high with local Christians. Quoted from Grachev, Balkanskie vladeniia, 101. 4 Iakichitch, "Notes sur Passvan Oglou," 284. 5 DP/K. 319. 6 Grachev, Balkanskie vladeniia, 87.

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relative blurring of earlier divisions. This made possible the participation of Muslims and Christians in the bands on (almost) equal footing, and the rise of Christians as leaders of some of them. Indeed, we see Christians among Pazvantoglu's most famous commanders. 1 It is strange that Bulgarians, who formed the majority of Pazvantoglu's subjects and who must have benefited most from the above privileges, left no description of their pa§a. It is even more surprising if we take into account that one of the best-educated and most intelligent Bulgarians of the time, the author of the first autobiography in modern Bulgarian literature, Bishop Sofronii, lived in Vidin between 1800 and 1803. Neither the autobiography nor any other work of his, including the two Vidin collections compiled by him during his stay in the city, contain any trace of his personal attitude to the pa§a. The same applies to the inscriptions in the manuscript books that have survived to the present day. All one sees in them and in the autobiography are monotonous descriptions of the devastation of one or another town or village in the region, by one or another kircali band, by the troops of Pazvantoglu, or by the troops sent by the central authorities to stamp out the revolt. Pazvantoglu's troops are invariably called "Pazvandzhi's bandits." The bands came and went, did their job, and the peasants seem to have regarded them as part of their lives—comparable to the plague. The bandits, whom they obviously joined in an attempt to change their positions from objects to subjects, were their only link with the pa§a, except for the tax collectors. Judging from Sofronii, being inside or outside the territory of the pa§a seemed to make little difference. No mention of the lower taxes or the just treatment appears. Soon after the First Serbian Uprising began (1804), most of Pazvantoglu's Christian commanders and soldiers joined the ranks of the rebels. It should be pointed out that at the beginning Pazvantoglu refrained from open conflict with the Serbs, but his (armed) neutrality gradually turned into a total divergence between the pa§a and his Christian subjects, to the extent that they became open enemies. The Serbian uprising posed a serious dilemma to the Vidin rebel. On the one hand, the Belgrade Janissaries had been among his allies from the beginning of his revolt in the early 1790s, and ever since then he had never missed the opportunity to defend their demands and 1 DP1R, doc. 8, 74, of 22.04.1797, from Bucharest: "il [Pazvantoglu] compte en tout sur la fidélité des Grecs qu'il a à sa solde" [he [Pazvantoglu] relies in everything on the fidelity of the Greeks whom he has in his payroll]; Irechek, Istoriia tia balgarite, 538; Mutafchieva, Kdrdzhaliisko vreme, 339 - 57, etc. Mutafchieva in particular claims that this period was decisive in the accumulation of political and military experience by Bulgarians, taking part in the bands of many ayans and defending their places from these bands. This was the time when arms entered the houses of many local people who were sometimes forced to use them by the local or the central authority.

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interests before the central authority. That is why he immediately sent one of his "generals," Gu§an§ah Halil, with one thousand kircalis in aid of the four dahis. On the other hand, he had to reckon with the situation in his own possessions, particularly with the fact that the Christians—Bulgarians and Serbs—were the vast majority of his subjects. To prevent their siding with the Serbian insurrectionists, the Vidin pa§a satisfied all the demands of his Christian subjects. This included further reduction of the tax and prohibition of any additional claims of his representatives in these regions; replacement of his suba§is with the knezes of the Christians as his administrative officers; and permission and even assistance for the construction of churches. All this, according to Russian diplomatic sources, he did in order to keep the Bulgarians on his side. 1 The complex situation is reflected in Russian diplomatic correspondence, which followed the events in the region very closely and is in many ways the most reliable source about them. In 1805, the Russian diplomats reported that Pazvantoglu's forces, led by Gu§ancah Halil, acted in alliance with Kara George 2 against the troops of the central authorities, and that Pazvantoglu congratulated the Serbs on their victories with special letters. This, according to the Russians, he did "in order to reduce the influence of Serbs over Bulgarians." 3 Despite all efforts to preserve the status quo, however, he was quickly losing his Bulgarian soldiers, who chosc to fight under the command of Christians and were deserting the Vidin rebel in masses. The period 1805-1806 marked a threshold in the relations between Christians and Pazvantoglu. In November 1805, when the town of Smederevo was taken by the Serbian insurrectionists, the Janissary garrison was allowed to retire to Vidin. 4 By that time the Serbian uprising had already acquired the features of a national liberation struggle not only against the four dahis but against Ottoman rule in general. Bulgarians under Pazvantoglu obviously understood the turn in the e v e n t s because despite the concessions, not only did they join the Serbs, but

1 Shteriu Atanasov, Selskite vâstaniia v Balgariia kâm kraia na XVIII i nachaloto na XIX v. i sâzdavaneto na Bâlgarskata zemska voiska [The Peasant Uprisings in Bulgaria toward the End of the 18 th and the Beginning of the 19 th Century and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Territorial Army] (Sofia: Darzhavno voenno izdatelstvo, 1958), 142, 151. 2 On Kara George, see, for example, M. Vukiievic, Karadjordje, [Kara George], vols. 1-2 (Belgrade, 1907-1912). It was probably then that emerged the legend told in Robert. Les Slaves de Turquie, 295: "En 1791, il [Pazvantoglu] se lia, dit-on, d'amitié avec le héros de la Serbie, Tserni George. Les Grecs, amis de merveilleux, racontent que ces deux grands haïdouks, après avoir communié ensemble, s'unirent dans une église par le vlam o u p o b r a t s t v o (serment de fraternité)" [In 1791, he struck, it is said, a friendship with the hero of Serbia, Tserni George. Greeks, with their fondness for the marvellous, tell how these two great haïdouks, after having partaken of communion, were united in a church by the vlam or pobratstvo (oath of brotherhood)]. 3 Atanasov, Selskite vâstaniia, 152. 4 Shaw, Between Old and New, 327.

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many villages rose against his rule. 1 In 1805, one of the administrators of Pa/vantoglu, Pintso, a Christian who ruled the westernmost territories of the pagahk, sided with the Serbs. He was routed by Pazvantoglu's troops and managed to escape with the Serbs, but the inhabitants of four of the villages that supported him were massacred. 2 A year later Pazvantoglu ordered the slaughter of the bishop of Vidin and many Bulgarian notables and priests on the accusation of secret relations with the Serbs. 3 This seems to have put an end to the "marriage of convenience" between the pa$a and his Orthodox Christian subjects. The available "domestic" Bulgarian sources imply that there was no love from the very beginning.

Pazvantoglu's Christian allies and aides While Pazvantoglu's military commanders were majority Muslims and minority Christians, probably Bulgarians, his diplomats were mainly " G r e e k s . " 4 It is not always clear whose agent a particular person was, however. Lambo Dzhanoglu, one of Pazvantoglu's doctors, acted as his adviser but seems to have been also an informant for the Russians. 5 This is also valid of Bishop ICalinikos 6 and others. Very often it is difficult to understand the "division of labour" among his assistants and associates, as well as their professional specialization—one combined the functions of a merchant, bazirganba^i, and doctor; another doctor was also a "diplomat"; and a merchant-revolutionary was also his messenger to the French in the capital, to the Russian consuls in Moldavia and Wallachia, and his negotiator with the Ottomans. Indeed, one of the most influential groups of non-Muslims around Pazvantoglu was that of his physicians — Greeks, Venetians, Jews — all of them being involved in various political-diplomatic schemes. 7 1

Dimitar Koscv and others, eels., Istoriia na Balsariia [History of Bulgarial, vol. 5 (Sofia- BAN 1985), 176. 2 Oreshkov, "Niakolko dokumenta za Pazvantoglu," 25; Iakichitch, "Notes sur Passvan Oglou," Oreshkov, "Niakolko dokumenta za Pazvantoglu," 24, 48; Popov, "Prinos za izuchavane na minaloto," 101. 4

In the pre-nationalist age, "Greek" or "Rum" was a generic name for all Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire, and especially for those who belonged to the Constantinople Patriarchate. 5

Oreshkov, "Niakolko dokumenta za Pazvantoglu," doc. 3, 35, of 1801, a letter from L. Dzhanoglu to L. Kirico which reveals him as an intermediary between the Russians and Pazvantoglu; DP1R, docs. 466-68, 567-69, of October-December 1804, discussing the reasons why L. Dzhanoglu was put to death by Pazvantoglu. 6 Oreshkov, "Niakolko dokumenta za Pazvantoglu," doc. 2, 34, of December 1800 doc 4 35 of January 1801; DPIR, doc. 253, 384, of June 1802, doc. 11, 414-16, July-August 1802 doc' 327, 445-46, of November 1802. ' There must have been some truth in ail the stories circulating about Pazvantoglu's special relations with this profession. See for example the stories told by Meriage in Iakichitch, "Notes sur Passvan Oglou," 285, but also many documents relating to him "importing" doctors.

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And here we touch further upon the subject of the broader relations between Pazvantoglu and non-Muslims, beyond the simple relaxation of taxes and the relative security. To a large extent the situation and the atmosphere in the region of Vidin resembled those of the earliest Ottoman period, when many Christians joined the conquerors in a similar urge for plunder. Yet, despite the resemblance, there were also many differences. These, of course, derived from the different times: the changed balance of power between the Ottomans and their neighbors, but most of all from the age of nationalism that had stepped into the Balkans. The French revolution, the chaos in political alignments at the time, and the wars gave additional impetus to processes that had already started in Balkan societies.

Pazvantoglu, Rhigas and his

organization^]

It is not surprising that Pazvantoglu was assisted by "Greeks" in many of his undertakings, and particularly in his diplomatic relations with the Christian powers. According to G. Olivier, Pazvantoglu was aware that he needed the support of the "Greeks" (i.e., Orthodox Christians) in the first place because they comprised the larger part of the population in European Turkey. For that reason he tried to win them over to his cause by introducing the ancient laws of Sultan Siileyman in the hope of improving their situation. According to the same author, he promised the Orthodox freedom of religion and the removal of the humiliating position of the reaya, employing the slogan of "freedom and justice," words which had a magic effect on the Greeks. That was why they regarded him as their future liberator. 2 During the French Revolution Greek society gradually began to split around the subject of liberation and the power from which this could be expected. The wars of the Republic, which brought the revolutionary armies very close to Greek lands, combined with the growing disappointment of some Greeks after Russian foreign policy turned toward preservation of the status quo, made some Greek intellectuals, especially among those living in Western Europe, look for another protector in the French Republic. The time was also considered convenient for a general uprising because of the increasing disintegration of the Ottoman Empire under the pressure of its neighbors 1 [Most of the problems tackled in this chapter are discussed in depth in Rossitsa Gradeva, "Secession and Revolution in the Ottoman Empire: Osman Pazvantoglu and Rhigas Velestinlis," in Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760-1850, Conflict, Transformation, Adaptation, Proceedings of an international conference held in Rethymno, Greece, 13-14 December 2003, eds A. Anastasopoulos and E. Kolovos (Rethymno: University of Crete, Department of History and Archaeology, 2007), 73-94.] 2 Olivier, Voyage dans 1' Empire ottomane, 473.

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without and rebellious pagas within. One of those who greeted the outbreak of the French Revolution was Rhigas Velestinlis. 1 He established contacts with French emissaries in the Danube Principalities and with many of his conationals who served the Republic. Under the influence of the ideas of the French Revolution Rhigas became a staunch republican. H e started preparing the programme documents of a future all-Balkan revolution and a plan for an uprising whose success depended on the decisive assistance of France. 2 Among these documents was also his Battle-song (Thourios), written probably in 1796 or in the beginning of 1797 under the impact of the Marseillaise, an exultant hymn of the anti-Ottoman revolution in which he appealed to Balkan peoples and some of the secessionists in the Ottoman state to rise against the sultan. It was in this context that I first regarded the evidence of Chr. Perraivos about Rhigas's close relations with Pazvantoglu, as well as the text of the often-discussed verses in Rhigas's Thourios: Passavanoglou, why dost thou so long remain impassive? Rush towards the Balkans, it is there that thou shouldst like the eagle build thy nest. Let not owls nor crows worry thee. Join the rayas if thou wishest to conquer. Silistrie, Braila, Ismaila and Chilie, Bcnsderi and Chotzin stretch out their arms to thee. Send reinforcements and they will fall at thy feet As they no longer bear to live under tyranny. Georgian! Sleep no longer, leap up, Here is the occasion to do like the one from Broussa. And thou who in Aleppo dreamst of liberty, rise. Pasha! Appear forthwith on the battlefields. Rise at the head of thine armies, Otherwise thou wilt remain under the orders of Stamboul. Lions of Egypt, above all elect a king from among your beys. Let not the kharatch from Egypt appear in Stamboul So that perishes the wolf that tyrannizes you. 3

We are unable to list here the complete bibliography on Rhigas, but see, for example, Notis Botzaris, Visions balkaniques dans la préparation de la révolution greque (1789-1821) (Genève-Paris, 1962); Apostolos Daskalakis, "'Thourios Hymnos' le chant de la liberté de Rhigas Velestinlis," Balkan Studies 4, no. 2 (1963): 315-46; A. J. Manessis, "L'activité et les projets politiques d'un patriote Grec dans les Balkans vers la fin du XVIIIe siècle," Balkan Studies 3, no. 1 (1962): 75-118; Georgios Zoidis, Rigas Velestinlis (Sofia: OF, 1973, also published in Greek), and many others, especially after 1998, when the 200th anniversary of Rhigas's tragic end was commemorated. 2 These documents included New Political Administration of the Inhabitants of Rumeli, Asia Minor, the Mediterranean Islands and Wallachia-Bogdania, which contained a Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Constitution of the Free State, based on the Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen and the Jacobin constitution of 1793, and adapted to the conditions in the Ottoman state. i wuuiu like to thank the anonymous translator of the Thourios into English. He will recognize his piece of work. Cf. Daskalakis, '"Thourios Hymnos'," 347.

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In fact, the mere list of the pasas addressed by Rhigas hardly suggests anything beyond the desires of an ardent revolutionary seeking help for the liberation of his co-nationals wherever possible. Its closer analysis reveals that although it may look like some sort of an alliance of all oppositional elements in the empire at the time—if not real, at least in the imagination of the Greek revolutionary—it is clear that it is far f r o m being so. In fact, two of the major power centres in Rumili were obviously consciously left out: Ali Pa§a Tepedelenli and the Busatlis. Despite their successes against the central authority they were not considered allies, the main reason probably being that both of them ruled over Greeks, and waged wars on groups among their Orthodox Christian populations: Ali Pa§a on the Suliots, and the Bu§atlis on the Montenegrin tribes. 1 The death of Kara Mahmut Bugatli in Montenegro at about this time may well also have been a factor. Judging also f r o m the fact that in later versions of the song the whole passage about Pazvantoglu and the other Ottoman separatists is missing, w e may conclude that the original text of the Thourios reflects to a great extent what Rhigas was hoping for rather than any reality. And I would have maintained this rather skeptical view about any direct relations between the Greek revolutionary and the Vidin rebel had I not come across two documents related to the mission, sent to Paris by Pazvantoglu in the hope of establishing direct contact with Napoleon and the Directory in 1801. 2 The two envoys, Nedelko Popovits and Polisoi Kondon, related in front of Talleyrand the story of Pazvantoglu and his attempts to establish contacts with France. Among other interesting details, the two said that: Il [Pazvantoglu] n'est dans aucune relation avec l'Autriche et la Russie. Il fait seulement que cette dernière Puissance n'entreprendra rien contre lui, si elle a l'assurance qu'il ménagera la Moldavie. Quant à l'Autriche, elle se borne jusqu'à présent à servir les inquiétudes de la Porte en lui envoyant de tems en tems des Grecs résidens en Allemagne, et dont on découvre les intelligences avec le Pacha de Vidin. Il y a quelques années, on découvrit à Vienne une vaste conspiration contre la Turquie dont les agens de Passavan-Oglou conduisoient les ressorts. Polisoi Condon en étois, huit Grecs furent livrés au Pacha de Belgrade qui les fut étrangler. Polisoi assure qu'ils étaient les plus grands hommes de sa nation. Quinze ou vingt furent exilés dans différentes provinces de la maison d'Autriche. Lui, Polisoi ne fut que soupçonné et il fut seulement privé de sa chaire de Literature grecque à Vienne. La découverte de Cette Conspiration fut l'effet de la mission d'un homme que Passavan-Oglou envoyoit au Premier Consul et qui fut arrêté. Les papiers dont il étoit porteur conduisirent l'inquisition Autrichienne à 1

See for example Dennis Skiotis, "From Bandit to Pasha: First Steps in the Rise to Power of Ali

of Tepelen, 1750-1784," IJMES 2 (1971): 219-44; Grachev, Balkanskie vladeniia, 36-42. 2

Pavlovic, "Ispisi iz francuskih arhiva," docs. XX and XXI, 121-26, of 22.09.-22.10. 1801.

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rechercher les Agens du Pacha et leurs Correspondances. Depuis cette échec Passavan-Oglou a sans cesse envoyé des députés, mais sans munir de papiers. Ils ont tous été arrêtés ou assassinés. Nedelko est le seul qui soit parvenu à éxécuter les ordres de Son Maître...1 The exposé of P a z v a n t o g l u ' s envoys may be regarded as some corroboration of the more "physical" contacts between Pazvantoglu and Rhigas as it gives the story of Rhigas's hetairia. Indeed, in 1796, when the armies of the Directory invaded Italy and then took the Ionian islands, reaching the Ottoman border, Rhigas decided that the time had come to prepare the uprising in Greece. He left Bucharest and went to Vienna, where he published his Battle-song, the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and the constitution of the future republic. His plans were to move to the Morea with his followers and proclaim the uprising. In Vienna he worked on the organization of his revolutionary network in the Danube Principalities, Austria, and Greece. Toward the end of 1797, however, he was betrayed to the Austrian police and arrested. He was interrogated in Trieste and Vienna and then surrendered with seven associates to the Ottoman authorities. In June 1798 Rhigas and his friends were strangled at the order of the muhafiz of the Belgrade fortress. On the other hand, the story told by the emissaries may have been merely a ploy on the part of Pazvantoglu. H e could easily have been informed about the events and manipulated them for his own purposes. Judging f r o m the diplomatic correspondence, the news of the tragic death and the fate of Rhigas's hetairia had spread immediately throughout the Balkans. Russian diplomatic sources in Bucharest and Yassi reported almost immediately the news of the arrest and further fate of Rhigas and his companions. 2

Ibid., p. 125 [He [P.] has no relations with Austria or Russia. He only acts so that the latter Power does not undertake anything against him if she is convinced that he will be careful with Moldavia. As for Austria, she limits herself for the time being to attend to the worries of the Porte by sending her from time to time Greek residents in Germany who are known to be in contact with the Pasha of Vidin. A few years back, a wide conspiracy against Turkey was discovered in Vienna led by agents of Passavan-oglou. Polisoi Condon was involved in it, eight Greeks were handed over to the Pasha of Belgrade who had them strangled. Polisoi claims that they were the greatest men of his nation. Fifteen to twenty were sent in exile to various Habsburg provinces. Polisoi himself, was only suspected and managed to get away by being deprived from his chair of Greek literature in Vienna. The conspiracy was given away by the arrest of a man that Passavan-oglou had sent to the First Consul. The papers he was carrying led the Austrian Inquisition to look for the agents of the Pasha and their letters. After this failure, Passavan-Oglou went on ceaselessly sending agents but without providing them with any papers. They all have been arrested or murdered. Nedelko is the only one who has been able to carry out His Master's orders]. Although this document is well known in Serbian and Bulgarian historiography, it has never been analyzed in the context of eventual relations between Pazvantoglu and Rhigas. 2

DPIR,

doc. 33, 115, of 8.01.1798; doc. 34, 117, 10.01.1798.

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In his memoirs Chr. Perraivos, one of the closest friends of Rhigas, refers to a romantic meeting between the two in 1788 when Rhigas, "eparhos" 1 of Craiova at that time, saved the life of Pazvantoglu, who was being prosecuted on the Wallachian prince's order. 2 However fabulous it may sound, it seems that at some point Pazvantoglu had indeed crossed the border, persecuted by the enemies of his father in Vidin, and had found asylum in Austria where "il fut fort bien traité" [he was very well treated]. 3 Other evidence may place this event a little bit earlier, at the time of the execution of his father or shortly afterwards, that is, around 1788, but this has yet to be researched. Taking into account Pazvantoglu's family and friendship ties across the Danube, it is likely. It is also known that in 1790 Rhigas accompanied his patron Baron de Langerfeld to Vienna, where he stayed more than six months. No doubt he not only visited Vienna and other Austrian towns but also stayed in contact with the Greek communities there. 4 Pazvantoglu did indeed have problems with the Wallachian prince and took part in the war with the Austrians in 1787-91. Thus, there are many chances that the story of the personal acquaintance of Rhigas and Pazvantoglu be at least partly true. In any case the conditions on both sides of the river and the border make such an encounter quite probable. The contacts between the Greek communities in Vidin and Bucharest are also well documented. Finally, we know of at least one person who not only knew both men but was very close to Pazvantoglu and a member of Rhigas's movement, and could have served as a link between them. Dimitri Turnavity was well known to contemporary diplomats and politicians in the Ottoman capital, the Danube Principalities, and to Pazvantoglu. A Greek merchant, "barataire"5 of France, he was a favourite of Wallachian princes and served as their envoy to Vidin. He was also one of the merchants who supplied provisions to the Wallachian army and Pazvantoglu's troops. On the other hand, he communicated with Russian and French

1 It is not quite clear what "eparhos" meant in this case, and this period of Rhigas's life is also unclear, but generally the term means administrator, governor. 2 Leandros Vranousis, Rhigas Velestinlis (Athens, 1954), p. 24, tells the story on the basis of the narration of Christophoros Perraivos, Apomnemoneumata polemika [War Memoirs] (Athens, 1836). 3 Austrian sources say this happened in 1792, when he was about twenty-years old. Popov, "Prinos za izuchavane minaloto," doc. 10, 6, of April 1797. 4 Daskalakis, "'Thourios Hymnos'," passim; Zoidis, Rigas Velestinlis, 48. 5 "Barataire'V'baratais" comes from the Turkish beratli, holder of a berat, a patent. See a detailed explanation of the term in Alexander de Groot, "Protection and Nationality. The Declinc of the Drogmans," in Istanbul et les langues orientales: Actes du colloque organise par l'IFEA et riNALCO. Istanbul, 29-31 mai 1995, ed. Frederick Hitzel, Varia Turcica, 31 (ParisMontreal: l'Harmattan, 1997), 235-55.

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diplomats as a representative of Pa/vantoglu.' As summarized by the Austrian internuntius on the occasion of Turnavity's murder, "ever since the Svishtov peace treaty he was playing a dangerous role in Wallachia, dedicated to the French, employed by the princes, and making frequent trips to Vidin." 2 It is also significant that Turnavity was arrested and murdered in Istanbul shortly after the detention of Rhigas. If we accept that there existed some connection and even collaboration between Rhigas and Osman Pazvantoglu, we have to deal with at least one disputable issue, that of precedence. The p a p a ' s envoys claimed in front of Talleyrand that Rhigas and the other Greeks were members of Pazvantoglu's conspiracy, while all Greek sources, Perraivos in particular, insist that Rhigas exerted powerful influence on the pa§a. It seems to me that it is not very difficult to reconcile these contradictor)' opinions. It is quite probable that both parties were interested in the other's participation and collaboration and tried to use it for their own purposes. Pazvantoglu, though aiming at the preservation of the Ottoman Empire and strengthening it on the basis of the principles of ancient times, or at his own ascension to the throne (or at least as grand vezir), relied on the services of "Greeks" to cairy out his foreign policy and in his relations with Wallachia and the central authorities. In the short run, he might even have regarded an uprising of the Christian population in the Balkans as another dcstabil'zing factor that would eventually shatter the sultan's position and bring him the throne. Rhigas, too, m a y have seen in this cooperation a useful thing, but only for the purposes of Greek revolution. N o wonder that after Rhigas's death and after his own fall f r o m the political scene Pazvantoglu disappeared f r o m the later versions of the Thourios. The above-discussed contacts between Pazvantoglu and the French Directory of 1801 take us to at least two other important groups among the Orthodox Christians who supported the rebel. Both, although not numerous, were very influential among the local population, for they were wealthy and enjoyed a monopoly over spiritual life: they were the merchants and the high Orthodox clergy.

See, for example, DP1R, doc. 28, Anexa IV, 107, December 1797, messenger of the Wallachian prince and the Ottoman authorities to Pazvantoglu; doc. 30, Anexa 1, December 1797, bringing a letter in Turkish from Pazvantoglu to Kirico, the Russian diplomatic representative in Bucharest; Popov, "Prinos za izuchavane minaloto," 133, October 1797, bringing a letter from Pazvantoglu to the French ambassador; doc. 16, 138, February 1798, about his coming to the capital to negotiate with the Ottoman authorities, but also with the French, sent by Pazvantoglu. 9 Popov, "Prinos za izuchavane minaloto," doc. 6, 26, 24 February 1798.

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merchants

Merchants apparently enjoyed specific privileges and freedoms under his rule, including the care he showed for their caravans and security. In 1798, diplomatic sources reported: "il traite avec douceur les habitants, contient par une discipline sevère sa Soldatesque, abolit partout les nouveau impôts, protège les voyageurs et les Caravanes." 1 The offers which Pazvantoglu sent to Napoleon in 1801, listed above, also speak of the special attention paid to the development of trade in his possessions, and of the importance he attributed to international trade in particular, inviting a French trade consul to Vidin. I shall discuss Pazvantoglu's relations with two men in particular. Nedelko Popovits, Pazvantoglu's envoy to Napoleon, was, like Turnavity, a well-to-do merchant. According to what he himself declared, he was living in Vidin, near Pazvantoglu, as the bazirgânba§i of the governor, but his official title was "doctor of the pa§a." His main obligations in the papa's government were to direct his finances and international correspondence. Nedelko explained that he managed to obtain a passport as a merchant f r o m an Imperial (Austrian) vice-consul in Galani, in the Danube Principalities, who was "devoted to the association of the Greeks in Germany." The merchant went there f r o m Vidin on a boat belonging to a Jew. Then he moved to Vienna, where he was already expected by his companion Polisoi. Both managed to get passports to attend the trade fair in Leipzig, Nedelko as an "Armenian merchant," Polisoi as a professor who wanted to re-publish his works in Greek literature. Their next stop was Dresden, whence, with the help of representatives of the French Consulate, they finally reached Paris. All this he told Talleyrand, who remarked that the merchant spoke German. The foreign minister also remarked that the "physician" had an exuberance of spirit which he had obviously learnt to suppress in the court of the Turkish governor. This is what the merchant himself decided to reveal. More information about him, however, is contained in other sources, and it makes him an even more interesting personality. First, we have to explain that there is no chance that he was an ethnic "Armenian." The name suggests either Bulgarian or Serbian nationality. [So he either lied bluntly or! he did not mean an ethnic affiliation but rather an institution. Armenian merchants f r o m Asia Minor and even Iran started settling in the Balkan provinces of the Empire during the seventeenth century and gradually became 1 Popov, "Prinos za izuchavane minaloto," doc. 3, 22, of January 1798" [he treats with mildness the inhabitants, controls with a harsh discipline his Warriors, abolishes everywhere the new taxes, protects the travellers and the Caravans]. This fact is also confirmed by the envoys of Osman to Napoleon. Pavlovic, "Ispisi iz francuskih arhiva," doc. XXI, 125, of 1801.

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some of the main agents in the international and inter-regional trade, enjoying also a specific tax and c o m m u n a l regime. 1 While this is a plausible explanation, there are other disputable issues. For example, why did he need to be "doctor of the pascr if he already had other important positions, and it is certain that Pazvantoglu had several other physicians? It should also be pointed out that N e d e l k o withheld some information f r o m Talleyrand. Apparently he was a well-known merchant, with important deals in Vienna amounting to tens of thousands of piastres, and a name known to Russian and Austrian diplomats in the Ottoman capital and in the Danube Principalities. H e also did not mention that he was a "Russian subject" (probably "barataire"). His importance is made clear by the documents issued by both Russian and Austrian chancelleries concerning his deals and trips, which confirm that he had special relations with Pazvantoglu, but also enjoyed the protection of Ipsilanti, "prince and dragoman at the Porte." Like Turnavity, Popovits was involved in supplying provisions for the troops of Pazvantoglu. His deals in Vienna, we learn from the reference to two judicial processes (of 1796) taking place there, were within the framework of the company of "Alexis son of George and Nedelko Popovits and Co.," called "Greek merchants" by the Austrian ambassador in Istanbul, Rath Keal, who issued to them a letter of recommendation at the express request of Ipsilanti. In 1802, Popovits, who obviously stayed in Paris after his audience with Talleyrand, visited the Russian ambassador in the French capital, Count Markov. This time the main purpose of Pazvantoglu's envoy was to seek the benevolence and protection of the Russian tsar for his master. In 1803 in a letter to the Wallachian prince Kalinikos, the bishop of Vidin, insisted that Popovits's only purpose in Paris was to meet Count Markov and submit Pazvantoglu's application for Russian protection and citizenship. 2 Unfortunately, for the time being, I have been unable to retrieve more consistent evidence about Popovits, except for the fact that he stayed in Vidin after the death of Pazvantoglu and in 1807 served as an envoy of the Ottoman government to Kara George. 3 After this decade of active participation in politics and in the economy of the region he disappears from the available documentation. Popular memory and some material objects relate to Pazvantoglu yet another interesting personality of the time, Dimitraki H a d z h i t o s h e v . According to local tradition in Vratsa, one of the few towns in northwestern 1 See Svetlana Ivanova, "The empire's "own" foreigners. Armenians and acem tiiccar in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries," in The Ottoman Capitulations: Text and Context, M. H. van den Boogert and K. Fleet, eds, Oriente moderno 22 (83), no. 3 (2003): 681-703. 2 See Popov, "Prinos za izuchavane minaioto," doc. 27, 34, of 1798; Oreshkov, "Niakolko dokumenta za Pazvantoglu," doc. 2, 34, doc. 7, 37-38; DPIR, doc. 297, 507, of 1803; Vankov, Osman Paspanoglu, 115. 3 Vankov, Osman Paspanoglu, 114.

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Bulgaria which managed to repulse Pazvantoglu's troops twice, Bulgarian notables there were divided into two "parties" in their feelings for the ruler of Vidin. After the second siege of Vidin in 1798, Pazvantoglu bribed the richest and most influential çorbaci in the town, Dimitraki, sending him many precious objects. However, in the attempt to submit the town to the paça, Dimitraki encountered the opposition of other powerful Bulgarian families. 1 Dimitraki preserved his good relations with Pazvantoglu and his successor in Vidin and on several occasions served as a mediator between them and other Christians. 2 In another version, mainly of his descendants, Dimitraki received the said objects in 1806 again from Pazvantoglu — but as a show of respect. 3 Dimitraki's later life is much better known, since he was among the earliest active fighters for a Bulgarian clcrical hierarchy and against the Greek bishops in Bulgaria. This struggle brought about his sentencing to death in 1827 on the accusation of political relations with Russia and with the Serbian prince M i l o s , and of incitement of the local population to rebellion and disobedience.4 In 1805, two Jews, Abraham and Isaac, served Pazvantoglu in Vienna, where Abraham was also established as a merchant. The main purpose of the latter's stay in the Austrian capital city was to provide information about political events in Europe. 5 There were probably others who contributed information and maintained the international relations of the Vidin pasa whose names have remained unknown to us. It seems, however, that Pazvantoglu 1

Yordan Gueorguiev, "Grad Vratsa" (The Town of Vratsa], SbNUNK 20 (1904), 11. Andrei Tsvetkov, "Politicheskoto dvizhenie vav Vratsa ot kraia na XVIII i nachaloto na XIX vek" [The Political movement in Vratsa at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19lh eenturyl in Istoriia na grad Vratsa [History of the Town of Vratsa], vol. 1, Ot drevnostta do osvobozhdenieto [From Ancient Times till the Liberation] (Sofia: OF, 1976), 177. 3 The issue of the bribe/gift given by Pazvantoglu to this powerful Bulgarian remains open. A list of books, documents, and precious objects purchased by the National Library and the National Museum from the descendants of Dimitraki (in 1894) mentions among them the following: a tobacco-pouch of Persian silk, a spoon of tortoise shell decorated with corals, but also a purse lavishly embroidered with gold presented to Dimitraki by a Serbian girl enslaved by the pa$a who escaped with the help of the Bulgarian notable. Several years later one of Dimitraki's grandsons included in a list of the so-called gift from Pazvantoglu, which were still with the family, fubuks (long tobacco pipe), a white kalpak (fur hat) around which he used to wind a nice silk cloth, two enteris (loose robe), an outer guha (broadcloth) garment, a beautiful fermene (short braided waistcoat) of green plush and embroidered with gold, the abovementioned tortoise-shell spoon with corals, a silver cartridge-box and a pouch for gunpowder. Valeria Tarashoeva and others, eds., Semeen arhiv, doc. 493,450; doc. 503, 464. 4 Dimitraki's father, Hadzhi Tosho, the founder of this powerful clan, and the early history of the Hadzhitoshevs still await historical research, especially given the fact that in their case we have one of the earliest family archives in Bulgarian history. See Kirila Vazvazova-Teodorova and others, eds., Semeen arhiv na Hadzhitoshevi [Family Archive of the Hadzhitoshev Family] (1754-1827), vol. 1 (Sofia: BAN, 1984) and the above-cited vol. 2. On Dimitraki see details in Svetla Ianeva "Dimitraki Tsenov HADZHITOSHEV," in Koi koi e sred balgarite, XV-XIX v. [Who is who among Bulgarians], ed. Iliia Todev (Sofia: Anubis, 2000), 281-283, and the bibliography cited there. 5 Iakichitch, "Notes sur Passvan Oglou," 444-46. Meriage also mentions another Christian envoy, the "Greek" Atanas, who was earlier sent to Archduke Charles. 2

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indeed had had a special attitude to the merchants and had somehow won their support. "Il peut puiser dans la bourse de tous les negocians de ses Gouvernemens, qui se sont engagés par écrit à lui devouer leurs fortunes," Popovits proudly told Talleyrand. 1 This may or may not have been true. It may also have been forced upon them. Yet all this scattered evidence really speaks of a special attitude on the part of the merchants as well. 2

Pazvantoglu and the Orthodox clergy The other envoy to Paris who claimed to have been member of Rhigas's organization, Polisoi Condon, in his own words a priest and professor in Greek and Latin literature in Vienna, presents us with no fewer surprises than Nedelko. In all probability, this was Polyzois Kontos. 3 Here we shall not dwell on details of his biography, as he was a well-known Greek intellectual of the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. Of importance here are the coincidences in his biography with the fact of the above-mentioned mission in Paris. Polyzois Kontos had been a teacher, in Vienna, of the sons of Prince Adam Czartoryski, the future Russian minister of foreign affairs. In 1795 he was invited by the Orthodox community in Pest, where he served as a priest and teacher in the Greek school, then moved again, to Tokay and Vienna. In 1801-1802 he was in Paris, where we sec him probably in the capacity of Pazvantoglu's envoy. There he wrote an ode dedicated to Napoleon, which he read in the presence of Napoleon himself and the academicians. Then Polyzois went to London and back to Vienna, where he stayed until he moved to Wallachia in 1805. He was one of the leading specialists in Hellenic Studies and knew French and Italian (Talleyrand only mentions Italian). He was also one of the most outstanding representatives of the "reaction" against the ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution in Greek society. One of his most famous works in this vein is the Dialogues of the Dead, published in 1793 and regarded as an open indictment of Voltaire, who is held responsible for many evils. In 1802, he 1 Pavlovic, "Ispisi iz francuskih arhiva," 125 [he can dip into the purses of all the merchants in the territory under his rule who have undertaken by writing to devote their fortunes to him], ^ Meriage tells a sentimental story. A Bulgarian merchant Gallo had lent money to many Turks who avoided paying their debts to him, which brought the man to such despair that he attempted suicide. He was saved, the pa§a heard of the case, summoned all involved, and ordered their punishment (beating with a stick) and the payment of all debts within 24 hours. Iakichitch, "Notes sur Passvan Oglou," 283-84. 3 About him see C. Sathas, Neohellenic Literature (Athens, 1868), p. 652 (in Greek); Konstantinos Staikos, Greek Editions from the Time of the Neohellenic Enlightenment (Athens: Europaiko Politiko Kentro-Delfon, 1998), 62, 92, 125, 130, 170, 175 (in Greek and English). I wish to thank Prof. N. Danova for helping me identify Polisoi with Polyzois.

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informed the Austrian authorities about A. Korais's intention to disseminate in Turkish-occupied lands his own translation of Cesare Beccaria's Crimes and Punishments, published during the same year. The Austrian government reacted immediately, ordering the police in Vienna to prevent the dispatch of the books. All these facts make it implausible that Polyzois Kontos could have been in any way associated with the conspiracy of the ardent admirer of the ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Republic and of the slogan of Equality-Fraternity-Liberty, Rhigas. Yet, if we set apart the ideas, all other facts fit perfectly with the information about Pazvantoglu's envoy. There is, however, another, though less probable, possibility for the identification of Polisoi. Russian diplomatic correspondence mentions a different name as Nedelko Popovits's companion in Paris-a certain Hazo. In a letter to C. Ipsilanti in Bucharest, the bishop of Vidin, too, spoke of a "Hazo" who "n'avait ni mission, ni même connaissance de celle dont Popowitch était chargé." This probably meant that the said Hazo was not aware of the fact that Popovits had to meet Count Markov rather than anybody else. If we take into account the name of the envoy as rendered to Talleyrand and the "Russian" version, this may take us to Dimitrios Chat/.i Polyzou (Polyzos). He too moved in Greek educational circles, being a teacher in Pest, in HungroWallachia, in Leipzig and Vienna. In 1791, he published Vengeance Most Just.. .on Ignorance, and Errors made in Ignorance by the Printer, and in 1800, an Essay on Orthography from [the Grammar of] Theodoras Gazis. 1 For the time being I am more inclined to identify Polisoi Condon with Polyzois Kontôs. Another group of interesting characters among the Orthodox clergy who cooperated with Pazvantoglu are the Orthodox metropolitans who resided in Vidin. Officially Gregory was metropolitan in Vidin between 1791 and 1801, but he managed to escape from Vidin in 1798. Interestingly, we see him also in business relations with Nedelko Popovits. Between 1798 and 1801 there was no metropolitan of Vidin residing in the city, and Pazvantoglu tried to secure the appointment of one of his closest associates, the monk Kalinikos. For that reason he and Kalinikos invited Sofronii, the Bulgarian bishop of Vratsa, to Vidin in 1800 and kept him there until 1803. 2 The latter

1 (W)ho "had neither a mission nor was knowledgeable about the one with which Popowitch was entrusted."About him see DPIR, doc. 297,507; Staikos, Greek editions, 140,142, 160. 2 There is extensive literature in Bulgarian on Sofronii of Vratsa, devoted both to his political and literary activities. See Nina Vutova, ed., Sofronii Vrachanski, 1739-1813: Bio-bibliografski ukazatel [Sofronii of Vratsa, 1739-1813: Bio-bibliographical reference book] (Sofia: NBKM, 1989). See also Jacque Feuillet, Sofroni Vracanski: Vie et tribulations du pecheur Sofroni (Sofia: Sofia-Press, 1986); Louis Leger, "La Bulgarie sous Pasvan Oglou. Mémoires de l'évêque Sofroni," in his La Bulgarie (Paris, 1885), 81-141. Sofronii is also the founder of the first, and only, Phanariot family of Bulgarian background, that of the Bogoridi/Bogorides.

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was among those who helped Kalinikos rcccive the Vidin see in 1803. In 1803, Sofronii moved to Wallachia. For a short while, in 1804, another metropolitan, Benedict, was appointed by the patriarch. However, he was beheaded soon after his appointment, during the same year, and Kalinikos was restored to the position. In 1806, Kalinikos too lost his head. His successor Dionysius managed to survive. While Benedict was executed for failing to pay the sum of money promised to the pa§a, Kalinikos and Sofronii are much more interesting for our purpose here. Kalinikos was a faithful assistant to the pas a in his relations with the Christian reaya and with the Orthodox political factors in the region. It was mainly through him that Pazvantoglu maintained his relations with Russia. H e also wrote the letter expressing the wish of his master to become a subject of the tsar. It is not quite clear how much he knew about all the schemes of Pazvantoglu. In any case, some of the Russian correspondence mentions him as one of the very few people, if not the only one, in whom the pa$a trusted entirely. However, when the Serbian uprising began, he apparently finally changed sides—and was murdered with several Bulgarian priests and other notables, on accusation of being in secret contact with the Serbs. Sofronii is even more enigmatic. Despite the three years spent in Vidin, he does not say a word about the pa§a in his autobiography and on several occasions complained of having been kept in prison and being unable to visit his flock. However, recently it became clear that during his "three years of imprisonment" in Vidin he had visited Wallachia several times in 1802 and had even ordained priests before finally settling there in 1803. It was during these visits that he intervened in front of the Wallachian metropolitan in favour of the appointment of Kalinikos to the Vidin see. 1 The silence of Sofronii and his subsequent engagement in a political initiative aimed at gaining some autonomy for Bulgarians has led V. Mutafchieva to the thought that during his stay in Vidin he participated in a vast political conspiracy, which made him silent about these years in his autobiography. 2 1 tend instead to agree with another, recently voiced, interpretation. 3 Taking into account Sofronii's rather reluctant participation in the political action in question, I think it most probable that his close contacts with the Phanariot princes and 1 Nicolae Dura, "New Discoveries—on the Basis of Original Documentary Materials—on the Life and Activity of Bishop Sofronij Vrafianski (1739-1813) in Wallachia, His Adoptive Country (1802-1813)," Bulgarian Historical Review, no. 1 (1991): 30-31. 2 Vera Mutafchieva, Kniga za Sofronii [A Book on Sofronii], (Sofia: Voenno Izdatelstvo 1978) 161-62ff. Vania Racheva, "Vaprositelni okolo politicheskata deinost na Sofronii Vrachanski" [Questionable moments in the political activity of Sofronii of Vratsal, Istoriia, no. 1 (Sofia 1995): 31-40.

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boyars of Wallachia, and his boundless respect and admiration for Russia, contributed much to his aversion f r o m the rebel. W c should not also forget that at the time he wrote his Autobiography, his grandson Stefan Bogoridi, the future prince of the island of Samos, had already entered the ranks of the high Ottoman bureaucracy as a dragoman. N o wonder he would try to be careful in expressing views that could harm his grandson's career. It is also possible to draw a parallel between the attitude of Rhigas to Ali Pa§a Tepedelenli and that of Sofronii to Pazvantoglu. The two pasas, as mentioned above, were among the most important opponents of the Ottoman sultan, and rose in open revolt against the central authority. At the time of the writing of the Thourios, however, Ali I'asa was also at war with the Suliots, and this could hardly make him a potential ally of the Greek revolutionaries in their struggle for liberation from Ottoman rule. The same is also true for the attitude of Sofronii to Pazvantoglu. It is not clear whether Sofronii was planning to publish his autobiography and what audience he addressed in it. The date of its writing is also unknown, but it is certain that it was finished after he left Vidin (it ends with his stay there) in 1803, most probably after 1805 (it is included in a manuscript with another work of his dated 1805). By that time, however, the paths of the Vidin pa§a and his Christian subjects had already separated. Not only that, Pazvantoglu had ordered the slaughter of the metropolitan and of many Bulgarian elders and priests on suspicion of being supporters of the Serbian uprising in January 1806. In this situation it is understandable that Sofronii would avoid emphasizing his relations with Pazvantoglu and any services he might have done for the latter, and would include no praise of his "just" rule. Despite ups and downs in his contacts with his Christian subjects and other groups in Balkan Christian societies, in his relations with the Great Powers, with the Danube Principalities, and even with the Porte, Pazvantoglu relied almost exclusively on the assistance of his Orthodox Christian merchants, clerics, and physicians. It was with their help that O s m a n Pazvantoglu successfully f o u n d his way in the c o m p l e x labyrinth of contemporary international relations and managed to keep the Great Powers interested in his personality and actions. Apparently he carefully followed developments in international relations and in the European states. H e had developed a network of spies, Christians and Jews, who kept him informed to a surprising degree. He knew of changes in the French political structure, information he owed primarily to his " G r e e k " spies, but what was more important, he was well aware of the complex interests of each of the European states in the region and managed to play his game with each of them, making them compete for his attention.

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Conclusion When considering the figure of Osman Pazvantoglu, one should take into account all aspects of his activities and relations with various strata of Ottoman society and abroad. One should also not forget the features of the time and place in which he lived, and the nature of the border area, which imposed its own rules for those who wanted to administer it. The border life probably contributed to the emergence (or rather to the preservation) of a border spirit close to that of the early Ottoman uc and its atmosphere. Yet in many ways it differed considerably, because this was also the beginning of the age of nationalism for Balkan peoples. In fact, Vidin brought together many of the outstanding leaders of the Awakening of Balkan peoples—Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs. In a way Osman Pazvantoglu was a man of his time, and he too was aiming at a revival. Despite all variations in his policy, despite all expectations and worries of the foreign powers and the promises he gave to each of these powers, throughout his life Pazvantoglu followed one policy, aiming at the restoration of the former glory of the Ottoman empire and of the Janissary corps as the e m b o d i m e n t of its power in the classical age. Sources vary in their interpretations of P a z v a n t o g l u ' s a i m — w h e t h e r he planned to establish independent rule in northern Bulgaria with Vidin as his capital, or to overthrow the reigning dynasty and take the throne in Constantinople, or, again in a change of the dynasty, to become the grand vezir. The important thing for him was to restore the principles of government f r o m the time of Sultan Siileyman and block the introduction of novelties, especially ones influenced by Europe. In fact, no matter what he said to French diplomats, or what suspicions Austrian diplomats held regarding h i m , Pazvantoglu invariably remained a staunch supporter of Islam and its principles in both his public and his private life. He was an intelligent man with a wide network of spies who kept him well informed of the priorities of his adversaries and partners. Thus, in 1801 the French learned that he admired their revolution and their consul. He declared he was ready to serve them — but only if they did not in any way infringe on the pious feelings of Muslims. At the same time and through the same envoy he started negotiations with the Russians, requesting Russian citizenship and expressing admiration for the tsar. Only a few years earlier the Austrians had discussed quite seriously with the Porte what to do if Pazvantoglu asked for political asylum in Austria. One may suspect that his relations with the leaders of the Balkan nations had the same entirely pragmatic basis, each expecting profits f r o m the other. He may have used the rhetoric he applied in his contacts with the Great

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Powers also to the corresponding groups of the Balkan peoples — the "democratic" and "revolutionary" for France and Rhigas, but mere submission to the orders of the tsar for Russia and the Orthodox hierarchs. It is my deep belief, however, that his true self appeared in his contacts with the Muslims and in his opposition to the innovations that, in his opinion, undermined the bases of the empire. What he was aiming at was not a republic after the French model, and he was far from introducing equality and freedom in his mini-state. Yet he also had to reckon with the situation in his territories. Despite the great number of Janissaries, the majority of the population were Christians, Bulgarian and Serbian peasants. He had to make their conditions of life bearable by introducing measures that improved the situation of the reaya while complying with Islamic principles. His political aims also forced him to rely on "his" Christians for his military expansion and for his diplomatic contacts. His policy earned him recognition—but mainly f r o m outside rather than within his territories. The relations with the reaya were based primarily on cold calculation on both sides. Pazvantoglu never intended to reform the empire in favor of the Christians. W h a t he probably planned was some improvement of the situation of the reaya in line with Islamic tradition and the principles of the Ottoman government f r o m the "golden age" of Stileyman the Magnificent. Christians living on his territory replied with the same level of trust, which did not imply sincere loyalty. Once the Serbian uprising began, the reaya sided with their co-religionists. Pazvantoglu was also deserted by his associates f r o m the Rhigas circle. For them he had been an opportunity for further pressure on the empire, and for a short while their paths went in parallel. With the destruction of R h i g a s ' s hetairia their paths diverged, and when the Greek War of Independence began, Pazvantoglu was no longer alive and no longer interesting to them, living only in the memory of the companions of Rhigas. The same applied to those w h o regarded Russia as the liberator of Orthodox Christians, mainly in the circles of the high Christian hierarchy but also among the merchants. Even Kalinikos, who had stayed with Pazvantoglu for nearly a decade, seems to have deserted him at the end. There was probably only one exception, Nedelko Popovits, but this exception only underscores the rule. By that time the Vidin pa§a had lost his struggles for independence and for the revival of the Ottoman state. Pressed in his corner by the Russians, the Serbs, and the Austrians, betrayed by his Christian subjects and allies, all he could hope for was to preserve his rule. It was among the Janissaries and the rank-and-file Muslims that Pazvantoglu earned his real and lasting fame. They created and circulated songs for him in which he emerges as a true hero. The age of nationalism had set in in the Balkans.

SECESSION AND REVOLUTION IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AT THE END OF THE 18TH CENTURY: OSMAN PAZVANTOGLU AND RHIGAS VELESTINLIS

Passavanoglou, why doest thou so long remain impassive? Rush towards the Balkans, it is there that thou shouldst like the eagle build thy nest. Let not owls nor crows worry thee. Join the rayas if thou wishest to conquer. Silistrie, Braila, Ismaila and Chilie, Bensderi and Chotzin stretch out their arms to thee. Send reinforcements and they will fall at thy feet as they no longer bear to live under tyranny. Georgian! Sleep no longer, leap up, Here is the occasion to do like the one from Broussa. And thou who in Aleppo dreamst of liberty, rise. Pasha! Appear forthwith on the battlefields. Rise at the head of thine armies, Otherwise thou wilt remain under the orders of Stamboul. Lions of Egypt, above all elect a king from among your beys. Let not the kharatch from Egypt appear in Stamboul So that perishes the wolf that tyrannises you. Rhigas Velestinlis, Thourios' In the dreams of Rhigas Velestinlis this must have been a list of the centres of discontent and secession, nuclei of resistance against the central authority among the Ottoman governors and potential allies of the Greeks in the struggle for freedom and for the subversion of the Ottoman state. This stanza of the Battle-song composed by Rhigas, along with stories related by some of his contemporaries, 2 have given grounds for speculation concerning the closc relations between the Greek revolutionary and Osman Pazvantoglu, an Ottoman provincial notable in Vidin, a town on the Danube in what is

1 I would like to thank the anonymous translator of the Thourios into English. He will recognise his piece of work. Cf. also A. Daskalakis, 'Thourios Hymnos' le chant de la liberté de Rhigas Velestinlis,' Balkan Studies 4/2 (1963), 347; Rhigas Velestinlis, Revolyutsionno [Revolutionary], Sofia 1998, 113-23 (parallel edition in Greek and Bulgarian). 2 C. Nicolopoulo, 'Notice sur Rhigas (Notice sur la vie et les écrits de Rhigas, l'un des auteurs principaux de la révolution qui a pour but l'indépendance cle la Grèce),' Revue Encyclopédique, Paris, 21 (janvier 1824) (reprint: Delphi 1998), 275-80; I. Philimon, Dokimion historikon péri tes Philikes Hetairias [Historical Essay on the Philiki Hetairia], Athens [n.y.] (reprint of the original edition, Nauplio 1834); C. Perraivos, Syntomos viografia tou aoidimou Rega Pheraiou tou Thettalou [Concise Biography of Rhigas Pheraios of Thessaly], Athens 1973 (reprint of the original edition, Athens 1860); Idem, Apomnemoneumata polemika [War Memoirs], Athens, 1836, quoted in I,. Vranousis, Regas Velestinlis, Athens, 1954.1 would like to thank Prof. Nadia Danova for having translated the Greek texts used in this study and for sharing with me her knowledge about Greek society and Greek revolutionary movement in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

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now north-western Bulgaria, who led one of the most dangerous secession attempts at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. In the present essay I shall analyse the elements of this potential 'alliance,' as well as the reasons why some of the major secessionists, especially in the Balkans, were excluded from Rhigas' vision. The second part I devote to the appeal to Osman Pazvantoglu, the only historical figure who is clearly recognisable in the song, my primary objective being to examine his contacts, imaginary or real, with the Greek revolutionary movement and Rhigas in particular, as well as the channels through which they might have been effected. In this undertaking I shall rely exclusively on Russian, Austrian and French diplomatic correspondence, which, until more documents of local issuance are discovered, will remain the main body of sources about the complex international relations in the region and about the role of the leading provincial notables in them. Scholars assign the date of writing of the Thourios to between 1796, when Rhigas began the practical preparations for the revolution, and December 1797, the time of his arrest by the Austrian police. According to N. Botzaris, Rhigas sang the hymn in front of his companions as early as October 1796. ' On the basis of content analysis A. Daskalakis offers a more precise dating before or around August 1796, when Rhigas moved to Vienna where in September he recited the Thourios in the houses of friends. In terms of the activities of Pazvantoglu this makes sense and I am inclined to accept this date. 2 Other authors are less confident setting only the terminus ante quern, prior to Rhigas's arrest and his death in 1798. 3 The time of its composition is important in view of identifying the personae in the revolutionary anthem. Later versions of the Thourios sung during the Greek War of Independence do not contain references to these potential allies among Ottoman provincial notables and to Muslims in general. 4 At that time most of them, the "Egyptian lions" in the first place, were either inappropriate or obsolete, or 1 N. Botzaris, Visions balkaniques dans la préparation de la révolution greque (1789 - 1821), Genève-Paris, 1962, 20. 1796 is adopted also by N. Danova in N. Danova and A. Hristakoudis, Istoriya na nova Gârtsiya [History of Modern Greece], Sofia 2003, 100. 2 Daskalakis, 'Thourios Hymnos', 320-21. Indeed, despite the growing tension in Rumelia in 1796 - between the central authority and the kircahs, the Vidin rebel was not directly involved in the conflict. He had just withstood the first siege of Vidin (late 1795-January 1796) which concluded with his official amnesty in February 1796. In July 1796 the sultan's army began an offensive against the kircali ringleaders who were generally associated with Pazvantoglu but he himself remained quiet. He started a counter-offensive only in February 1797. See V. Mutafchieva, Kârdzhaliisko vreme [The Age of the Kircali], Sofia 1977, 125-41 [See a French translation of the book V. Moutaftchieva, L'anarchie dans les Balkans à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, Istanbul 2005]. 3

Cf. K. Staikos, Greek Books from the Time of the Neohellenic Enlightenment. Catalogue of an Exhibition Accompanying the International Symposium from Enlightenment to Revolution: Rhigas and His World, Athens 1998, 274. 4 Daskalakis, 'Thourios Hymnos', 344-45, v.101-114.

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both. Thus the verses cited above should be regarded mainly as representing Rhigas' perspective and as a momentary picture of the enemies of centralism in the last years of the eighteenth century. Let us now turn to these centres of dissent. T h e cities — which, according lo Rhigas, were ready to surrender to Pazvantoglu, if he joined the reaya and sent reinforcements, and were therefore considered potential allies in the Greek liberation struggle — confront us with difficult moments. Data corroborating Rhigas' statement that Silistra, Braila, Ismail, Kili, Bender and Hotin were ready to fall at his feet are scanty. At the beginning of November 1797 Kara Mustafa, one of Pazvantoglu's 'generals,' mentioned in front of his friends in Bucharest that the fortresses of Silistra and Braila were prepared to surrender. T w o months later Dimitri Turnavity, a trusted messenger of Pazvantoglu, also claimed that the Pasha of Vidin had received letters f r o m these two cities in which they declared their willingness to do so. 1 It is not clear who had sent these letters.[ 2 ] Moreover, the information about them dates from around a year after the supposed compilation of the Thourios. None of the cities ever fell into the hands of Pazvantoglu. Actually, around 1794-95 Silistra, along with the Deliorman, was occupied by the former kircali ringleader Yihkoglu in his new capacity of ayan. He became one of the most faithful allies of Osman Pazvantoglu till the death of the Pasha. 3 According to Russian diplomatic sources, ir. December 1797, again in the course of Pazvantoglu's campaign, the Tatars who had settled in the vicinity of Ismail in Bessarabia sent messengers to assure the Pasha that they wanted to live under his rule. 4 Silistra may then be regarded as somehow related to the Vidin rebel; the information about Ismail and Braila is rather uncertain; for the rest of the cities even such evidence is lacking. The identity of the ' G e o r g i a n ' is enigmatic. I consider it highly improbable that Rhigas would be interested in events in Georgia proper, as is usually suggested in the analyses of the song. At that time the Caucasus was 1 Documente privind lstoria Romaniei: Collectia Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki (seria tioua) [Documents on Romanian History: Collection of Eudoxios Hurmuzaki (New Series)]. Vol. 4: Rapoarte diplomatice Ruse, 1797-1806 [Russian Diplomatic Reports (1797-1806)], Bucharest, 1974, doc. 27, 101, and doc. 34, 117. [Bearing in mind that in many cities the local population, and especially the notables, ere divided in their preferences for the Pasha of Vidin, they might have been sent by 'his' party. This, however, did not mean that this was the dominant party. See for example the case of Viratsa, in R. Gradeva, "Osman Pazvantoglu of Vidin: Between Old and New", in F. Anscombe (ed.), The Ottoman Balkans, 1750-1830,Me$hur Princeton 2006, 142-43.1 i On Yihkoglu see i. H. Uzun?ar§ih, Rumeli Ayanlanndan Tirsenikli ismail, Yihkoglu Siileyman Agalar ve Alemdar Mustafa Paja [Tirsenikli Ismail Aga and Yilikoglu SUleyman Aga, Famous Ayan ofRumelia, and Alemdar Mustafa Pa§a], Istanbul 1942; V. Grachev, Balkanskie vladenia Osmanskoi imperii na rubezhe XVIII-XIX w. [The Balkan Possessions of the Ottoman Empire at the End of the Eighteenth and the Beginning of the Nineteenth century], Moscow 1990, 62; Mutafchieva, Kardzhaliisko vreme, 195, and passim. 4 Documente lstoria Romaniei, vol. 4, doc. 28, Anexa IV, 106.

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gradually being incorporated in the Russian sphere of political influence and no secession movement of any importance is known there. One of the possible identifications is with Tayyar Mahmud Pa§a, grandson of Canikli Ali Pa§a (1720-85). While not ethnic Georgians, throughout the eighteenth century the family was involved in the administration and military affairs in the region and in Georgia in particular. 1 During the war of 1787-92 Tayyar Pa§a and his father, Battal Hiiseyin Pa§a, were assigned to defend the Caucasus and Anapa against the Russians, but switched sides and entered Russian service, under General Suvorov. However, in 1793, Tayyar M a h m u d was dismissed and imprisoned on accusations of being in secret correspondence with the Porte and attempting to organise a revolt of the Crimean Tatars against the Russian rule. Within a year he managed to escape and father and son found asylum with Ibrahim Efendi, the governor of Bender. In 1798, their host managed to secure the position of governor of Trabzon and Kr/urum for Battal Pa§a. 2 The stay of Tayyar Pa§a in Bender fits perfectly with the time of writing of the Thourios. It might also be a clue to the insertion of this fortress among the potential allies of Pazvantoglu. No doubt his complicated relations with the Porte must have been well known in the region. In 1798, however, he served the sultan in the Balkans, presumably in co-operation with Giirci Osman Pa§a against Pazvantoglu and the kircali bands. Only later, in 1801, was he appointed governor of Canik and Samsun, inheriting also the family possessions. In 1802 he captured the rebellious Giirci Pa§a and surrendered him to Sultan Selim III. However, his conflict with the central authority did not wane. He expanded his territory, made himself completely independent in his provinces and ravaged adjacent lands. In his proclamations, Tayyar Pa§a declared his opposition to the Nizam-i Cedid reforms, refusing to allow the levy of men or provision of f u n d s or supplies for the new army f r o m his domain. After his initial successes he was defeated by the rival families of the Karaosmanoglus and the (^apanoglus, who officially supported Sultan Selim I l l ' s reforms. This forced him again to flee to Russia (in 1805) while some of his relatives sought asylum in Varna, on the present-day Bulgarian Black Sea coast, expecting, according to Russian diplomatic sources, "support f r o m Pazvantoglu's party." Many of his contemporaries, as well as modern scholars, compare and seek similarities between the rebel of

1 On the founder of the family and his descendants see R. Karagöz, Canikli Ali Pa§a, Ankara 2003, and the bibliography quoted in it, on Tayyar Pa§a, see in particular, 150-53. ^ Ibid., see also S. J. Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III (1789 -1807), Cambridge, Mass. 1971, 216-17. According to R. Karagöz, Canikli Ali Pa§a, 14748, 150, father and son were war captives (esir) rather than voluntarily seeking asylum with the Russians.

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Vidin and Canikli Tayyar Pa§a as the major opposition to the reforms and secessionists. 1 Another 'candidate' for Rhigas' 'Georgian' (Giirci, in Turkish), at least in terms of sobriquet, would be Giirci Osman Pa§a, the Pasha of Silistra who was engaged in two subsequent sieges of Vidin in 1797-98 and 1800 (against Pazvantoglu) and served as governor (vali) of Silistra and Rumelia. It was only in 1801 that he was accused of collaboration with the Vidin rebel and the Porte tried to remove him from Rumelia. In 1803 the Pasha lost his life, first having been repulsed from Silistra by its ayan and citizens, and then captured by Tayyar Pa§a in Anatolia. 2 I have not been able to identify any other contemporary Ottoman statesman of importance bearing the same nickname or who could be associated in any other way with Georgia. It seems, however, that Tayyar Papa's biography most closely fits the chronology of the events in the region and the description in the Thourios. The reference to separatism in the region of Bursa is opaque, 3 as is the identity of "the one in Aleppo." At the end of the 18th century the pashas or governors of Aleppo were changed far too often to be able to exercise any real power, being only nominees of the central authority in Istanbul. The strong personality in the region was not the pasha but the tax collcctor (muhassil) in the province (vilayet), Ibrahim A g a K a t a r a g a s i , o b v i o u s l y of local background. He was appointed pasha of Aleppo only in 1803 but was actually ruling the city and the region before that date, being an important factor there as early as 1791. Although ibrahim Aga was recognised by the Porte as the master of the city, in fact he was not absolutely so — not only because he had yet to become the official holder of the position, but also because he had both the janissaries and the local esraf (descendants of the Prophet) to contend with. Emerging as a powerful local figure, he never openly challenged the central authority, and often resorted to the support of his influential friends in the capital. What he aimed at was self-government within the confines of the vilayet, but his actions never challenged the Ottoman 'cloak.' 4

1

Shaw, Between Old and New, 283-85, 398-400; A. Miller, Mustafa Pacha Bairaktar, Bucarest 1975,110-11. ' M. Siireyya, Sicill-i Osmani [Ottoman Register], ed. S. A. Kahraman, vol. 4, Istanbul 1996, 1305 (s.v. Haci Osman Paga). On the relations between the secessionist in Vidin and this high Ottoman official and on the latter's conduct in Rumelia, cf. Mutafchieva, Kardzhaliisko vreme, assim. Among the more important and long-lived families in the region Shaw, Between Old and New, 215, mentions the Nazuhoglus in Gediz and the Kalyoncuoglus in Bilecik, but none in Bursa itself, and certainly no one that would be worth mentioning among the most outstanding local notables at the time of Sultan Selim III. 4 Siireyya, Sicill-i Osmani, vol. 3, 783-84. On the situation in the region, see H. Bodman, Political Factions in Aleppo 1760-1826, Chapel Hill 1963,116-21.

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Actually, one of the most prominent local semi-independent rulers was Ahmed Cezzar Pa§a, governor of Acre (1775), Sidon (1775) and Damascus (1785). He expanded his authority and influence throughout much of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. After defeating Napoleon with British assistance in 1799, he became the master of the coastline between Tripoli and Sinai. 1 According to A. Djika, the Russian Consul General in Ragusa in 1789-99, around 1794 Cezzar Pa§a of Damascus, Bu§ath Mahmud Pa§a of Shkoder and Ali Pa§a of Tepedelen formed a kind of triumvirate of the most powerful governors who usurped authority in large parts of European and Asian Turkey. In his opinion, the Porte could do nothing to limit their power. 2 Neither ibrahim Aga Kataragasi nor Ahmed Cezzar Pa§a, nor any other powerful local notable, however, corresponds fully to the description in the Thourios, and it is not quite clear why Aleppo, and not Damascus, for example, should be singled out among the provincial power centres in the Ottoman Empire. The situation is probably clear only with the "lions of Egypt", the Mamluks who had been causing serious problems for the Porte for nearly a century. According to Stanford J. Shaw, by 1671 the transition from Ottoman to Mamluk control over Egypt had been by and large completed, with most of the administrative and military positions being filled by members of the Mamluk factions. Only the post of governor (vali) continued to be reserved for viziers appointed by Istanbul. By 1783 a Mamluk faction had emerged victorious in the internal strife and stopped the payments to the capital. It was only then that Istanbul intervened and sent a military expedition to curb them and restore the status quo, that is, the payment of the annual taxes. As a result of the re-established rivalry between Mamluk factions, by 1798 Egypt was in political, social and economic turmoil. The French intervention in 1798 additionally complicated the situation, with Mohammed Ali emerging victorious in local power struggles only much later. 3 Obviously the problems of the Ottoman Sultans with the Mamluk factions and the process of gradual detachment of Egypt from the Empire were well known and they seem to have been reflected in the Thourios. Although at a first glance this 'list' may appear to be some sort of an alliance of the oppositional elements in the Empire at the time, it is clear that it is far from being so. These appeals might have resulted from the often exaggerated, probably even invented, news about 'revolutions' and rebellions published in contemporary media, and especially in the Greek newspaper in

1

Ibid., 121-22; Shaw, Between Old and New, 218-19, 258, 291-92. Quoted in G. L. Arsh, Alhaniya i Epir v kontse XVIIJ-nachale XIX v. [Albania and Epirus at the end of the Eighteenth and the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century], Moscow 1963, 187. 3 Shaw, Between Old and New, 217-18. 2

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Vienna which presented the Ottoman Empire as a state on the brink of dissolution. 1 In fact, with few exceptions, the list hardly suggests anything beyond the desires of an ardent revolutionary seeking help for the liberation of his co-nationals in all possible directions. Interestingly, e x c e p t f o r Pazvantoglu, none of the leading ayan in Rumelia are included. Furthermore, in his battle-song Rhigas refers to the defeats inflicted by the kircalis on the Ottoman troops, but only to prove that the Ottomans are not invincible. 2 T w o of the major power centres in European Turkey, however, seem to have been consciously left out: those of Tepedelenli Ali Pa§a and the Bu§atlis — but also Ismail Tirseniklioglu in Rus§uk (Bulgarian, Ruse), Ismail Bey of Siroz (Greek, Serres), among many others of local importance. Here I shall not explore in depth the similarities and differences in the policies of the three most powerful pashas in Rumelia which I shall do elsewhere. The reason for referring to some of them is only with a view to the analysis of why two of them should have been omitted from the Thourios and one should have been considered a major 'ally.' 3 The Bujatlis assumed power in the region of Shkoder in 1756, and with a few short breaks kept it till the 1830s. Under the most famous member of the family, Kara Mahmud I'asa (1775-96), the pasahk became more or less a state within the state. Twice (in 1787 and 1793) the Porte undertook largescale military campaigns to remove him f r o m his bastion and twice it was defeated and had to confirm him in his post of governor with the title of vizier. Like most of the Rumelia governors who were his contemporaries, M a h m u d Pa§a pursued a specific domestic policy, mainly in the field of taxation and religious affairs, earning him strong support among local Catholics - merchants, religious functionaries, and Albanian tribes. Yet, like the other two pashas he remained a staunch Muslim, a fact he emphasised in all his international and domestic acts and initiatives. He played a careful game with the international powers, trying to achieve his goals at home with foreign support. Whereas the Bu§atlis were descendants of the old Albanian feudal clan of the Dukagjins, Kara Mahmud chose to declare himself an heir of the national Albanian hero, Skenderbeg. His message still needs to be analysed 1

Daskalakis, 'Thourios Hymnos," 344-45 |v. 95-100]. Velestinlis, Revotyutsionno, 121. This overview is based mainly on Arsh, Albaniya i Epir, and on S. Dimitrov and K. Manchev, Istoriya na balkanskite narodi [History of the Balkan Peoples]. Vol. 1: XV-XIX vek [FifteenthNineteenth centuries], 2nd ed., Sofia 1999, 154-156; Grachev, Balkanskie vladenia, 36-42; K. Fleming, The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha's Greece, Princeton, N.J. 1999; D. Skiotis, 'From Bandit to Pasha: First Steps in the Rise to Power of Ali of Tepelen, 1750-1784,' IJMES, 2 (1971), 219-44. [See also Br. McGowan, "The age of the ayans, 16991812", in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, H. Inalcik and D. Quataert, eds, Cambridge 1994, 665-668. 2 3

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against the backdrop of his 'internal' policy but he does not seem to have envisaged the establishment of an independent Albanian state. On the contrary, whatever his proclamations announced or what intentions he expressed in front of representatives of foreign countries and despite his military confrontation with the central authority, he invariably declared his subordination to the Sultan. In turn, this occasionally would lead to conflicts with the Christians living in his dominions. What he probably aimed at was the establishment of an autonomous hereditary principality within the empire, without openly challenging its integrity. Also of no less importance is the fact that despite the widely acknowledged religious 'tolerance' shown by the ISusail i family, and by Mahmud Pa§a in particular, it concerned only their 'subjects.' On several occasions Mahmud Pas a tried without success to expand his semiindependent pcqalik at the expense of the Montenegrin tribes whom elsewhere in the song Rhigas lists among the potential allies of Greeks. In fact, the Pasha perished in a battle during his last campaign against them, in July 1796. Chronologically his death fits in perfectly with the writing of the Thourios, as the news of this event would have, no doubt, very quickly reached the Danube Principalities. It was followed by turmoil in which the central authority tried to restore its grip on northern Albania. Finally, his brother Ibrahim managed to take over the post of governor but this took him more than a couple of years, actually long after Rhigas was arrested. The situation with Ali Pa§a is only slightly different. His road to power was more difficult - he had to earn it himself and, as was often the case at that time, from being a ringleader he was soon appointed to fight with his former companions. He obtained the rank of a pasha in 1783-4 and his rule lasted until 1822. Ali Pasa showed an admirable political flair and gradually built up a quasi-state. Throughout his life, although preparing for an eventual final clash, he carefully avoided open confrontation with the Sultan. During his half-century rule the Pasha of Yanya often refrained from fulfilling his military obligations, sometimes even sabotaging the Porte's acts, but he always managed to soothe his strained relations with the central authorities and never failed to submit the taxes due from his province to the capital. It was only when the central authority finally decided to smash him that he engaged in armed conflict with it. In the process of expansion he established a quasi-independent principality with several 'dependent' territories ruled by his relatives, including most of modern Greece, and parts of Macedonia and southern Albania. Ali Pasa also built up an enormous financial empire based on landed estates (giftliks), customs duties, extortion, and confiscation. He pursued a complex foreign policy, flirting with the international powers involved in the politics

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of the region, in which he was assisted mainly by leading Greek religious functionaries, merchants, and scholars. Within his domain, Ali Pa§a seems to have enjoyed some support f r o m his subjects, mainly among the upper social strata of Christians but also to a certain degree among Albanian peasants. This may be attributed to the relative security he, like Mahmud Pa§a and Osman Pazvantoglu, ensured in his possessions, providing better opportunities for trade. 1 The troops of both Albanian pashas consisted of Albanians, primarily Muslim, but also Catholic and Orthodox, as well as Greeks. Some of the administrative positions in Ali Pa§a's council (divan) were also occupied by Christians. Like Mahmud Pa§a and Osman Pazvantoglu, Ali Pa§a allowed some limited ' f r e e d o m ' of religious beliefs, and gave permissions for restoration, and even construction of new churches. He also promoted Greek education and under his rule Yanya became one of the major centres of Greek scholarship. Ali Pasa, too, clearly felt the need to construct a 'dynastic' mythology. According to Russian diplomatic correspondence, he circulated 'prophecies' about himself through wandering Bektashi dervishes: that "in his time he would becomc the greatest and most powerful among the Muslims," that "he would conquer Venice and would implant the religion of Muhammad there," that he "was destined to found an independent Albanian kingdom." 2 Yet, Ali Pa§a was not considered an 'ally' by Rhigas. What could be the reasons for this obvious neglect or negative attitude? In the first place, he ruled over Greeks, who actually formed the bulk of his subjects. This made him a rival, rather than an ally of an eventual Greek state. Such an attitude on the part of Rhigas was justified also by Ali Pa§a's wars on Souli (1792, 1800-3), and on Himara (1785, 1797-98). Souliots, as well as 'Albanians f r o m Epirus' were among the groups to whom Rhigas addressed his appeal for a rebellion against the Ottoman authority. T h e bitter conflict between the Pasha and these two groups must have made him more an enemy than a potential ally.

This seems to have been a general pattern with the most significant derebeys and ayan in Anatolia, the Arab lands, and the Balkans. See R. Clogg, 'Aspects of the Movement for Greek Independence,' in Idem, Kath'imas Anatoli: Studies in Ottoman Greek History, Istanbul 2004, 241.

2

^ I shall not discuss the issue of Ali Pa§a's belonging - or not - to the Bektashi tarikat. Until recently this was considered a truism. It was convincingly subjected to criticism by N. Clayer, 'The Myth of Ali Pasha and the Bektashis. The Construction of an 'Albanian Bektashi National' History," in St. Schwandner-Sievers and B. Fischer (eds), Albanian Identities. Myth and History, London 2002, 127-33, who claims that Ali Pa§a's special attitude to Bektashis was a later invention aimed at forming an Albanian national identity associated with the Bektashi religious affiliation. Contemporary Russian diplomatic correspondence, however, mentions Bektashi dervishes as propagators of these prophecies (quoted in Arsh, Albaniya i Epir, 273). This does not necessarily contradict Clayer's conclusions but probably reflects the popularity of the Bektashi tarikat, whereby all wandering dervishes would be classified as its members.

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Why then should Osman Pazvantoglu be attributed such a central position in Rhigas' Thourios? Greek sources give an outright answer to this question. As early as 1824, Konstantinos Nikolopoulos, 1 a librarian at the Institut de France and member of the pro-Korais circles, wrote in the first known systematic biography of Rhigas that: "Rhigas parvint, on ne sait comment, à faire entrer dans sa société plusieurs Turcs puissans, entre autres le fameux Passvan-Oglou, qui résista si long tems à toutes les forces de la Porte." 2 Further, the author relates that, fearing that Pazvantoglu would free these 'honorables victimes,' the Ottoman authorities in Belgrade threw them into the Danube. 3 This, to my knowledge, is chronologically the earliest published reference to connections between Rhigas and Pazvantoglu. The author does not specify his sources, but we may assume that he might have heard rumours about them during his stay in Bucharest shortly after the arrest of the Greek revolutionary. The theme was further developed by Ioannis Philimon, himself a m e m b e r of the Friendly Society (Philiki Hetairia), in his major work on Greek national liberation movement, published in 1834, and particularly by Christophoros Perraivos in his memoirs and in the biography of Rhigas Velestinlis. Their texts are essential in construing the Greek national narrative immediately after the War of Independence. The two authors relate a more or less similar story about the friendship and collaboration between Rhigas and Pazvantoglu, but Perraivos, an associate of Rhigas f r o m 1793, provides its m o s t d e v e l o p e d version: that the actual a c q u a i n t a n c e of the G r e e k revolutionary with the future Pasha dated f r o m the time of the war of 17871791; at that time Rhigas, as the 'governor' of Craiova, saved the life of young Osman when he was pursued by the Wallachian Prince; on the death of Prince Mavrogenis, the rebel who had been in hiding around Vidin, came in person to Bucharest in order to pay his homage and to endow his saviour with rich gifts. This, according to Perraivos, was the time when Rhigas initiated Pazvantoglu to his ideas and instructed him to rise up against the Sultan and against the bey s and the agas who had caused trouble in Vidin. Then Osman returned to Vidin, where he seemingly followed Rhigas' advice. Unfortunately, the authors do not discuss the mechanisms of communication between the two men. Pazvantoglu is again mentioned by the two authors in relation to the 1 Nikolopoulos (1786-1841) was bora in Smyrna, studied in Bucharest mainly under Lambros Photiades, and then moved to Paris. There he stayed during the Greek War of Independence and until the end of his life. He was among the editors of the literary journal Melissa [The Bee], See more on him in K. Dimaras, Neohellenikos Diaphotismos [Modern Greek Enlightenment], Athens 1982, 102, 326, 368-70. 2 Nicolopoulo, 'Notice sur Rhigas,' 276. I have kept the original orthography in rendering the quotations from the documents. 3 Ibid., 278.

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arrest and death of Rhigas and his companions, when he presumably tried to save them. 1 Philimon claims that the Ottoman notable was assigned a significant role in the military plans of Rhigas. He was expected to divert the Sultan's army from Epirus and Thessaly where the Greek revolution was to break out, supported by 20,000 French soldiers. 2 Interestingly, in the 1820s the plans of the Friendly Society concerning Ali Pa§a of Tepedelen were similar. An example in this respect is the conduct of Ioannis Paparrigopoulos, a trusted advisor of the Russian Consul General in the Morea. At a secret meeting in April 1820 he assured the Pasha of the Russians' full support in the event of an armed conflict with the Porte, despite the fact that this did not square with the Tsarist policy of preservation of the status-quo. The purpose was to encourage the Pasha in his opposition to the Sultan and thus divert the Ottoman armed forces from the regions of the planned Greek uprising. 3 To this Perraivos adds that Rhigas sent the statutes of his organisation (organismos), along with his plans explaining the reasons for his rebellion (sic!).4 So far no traces of such documents have been found on the Vidin side. Many of these stories are repeated or even further elaborated on by later authors. 5 Without referring to new sources, they sometimes add fabulous new details about the relationship between Rhigas and Pazvantoglu. A typical example is the story told by Notis Botzaris to the effect that "according to tradition" the Pasha of Vidin was the founder of a masonic lodge in Vidin as a branch of the Société des Bons Cousins established in 1780 in Vienna. The Society's main goal was to set up masonic lodges across the Balkans in order to encourage the preparation for the liberation from Ottoman domination. The Society was dissolved in 1798, after the arrest of Rhigas, who was among its members. By the end of the century masonic lodges seemingly also existed in Belgrade, Athens, Corfu, and elsewhere.6 It is difficult to judge which parts of these stories were true and which invented, to what extent reality was adorned. However fabulous the story of the lucky encounter between the Greek revolutionary and the Ottoman rebel may sound, it seems that Pazvantoglu had indeed crossed the border, chased by the enemies of his father in Vidin, and had found asylum in Austria where "il 1 Some of these issues are also discussed in A. Vclkov, 'Ti stekis Pasvantoglou, toson ekstatikos' [Pazvantoglou, why dost thou so long remain impassive], in Praktika III diethnous synedriou 'Pherai-Velestino-Rhigas' IProceedings of the 3 rd International Conference 'PheraiVelestino-Rhigas'], Athens 2002, 617-21. 2 o Philimon, Philiki Hetairia, 91. - Arsh, Albaniya i Epir, 315-16. 4 Perraivos, Viografia, 39. 5 See for example, G. Gazis and K. Sathas, quoted in G. Zoidis, Rhigas Velestinlis, Sofia 1973, 48; G. Kordatos, Ho Regas Pheraios kai he valkatiike homospondia [Rhigas Pheraios and the Balkan Federation], Athens 1945, 109-10. 6 Botsaris, Visions balkaniques, 72.

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fut fort bien traite." 1 Other evidcncc may place this event a little earlier, at the time of the execution of his father or shortly afterwards, that is, around 1788, but this has yet to be researched. Pazvantoglu did indeed have problems with the Wallachian Prince and took part in the war with the Austrians in 1787-91. Taking into account his family and friendship ties across the Danube, which I shall discuss elsewhere, it is likely that he spent some time in the Banat. Thus, there is every likelihood that the story about Rhigas and Pazvantoglu is true, at least where the physical meeting is concerned. The conditions in the border area along the river make such an encounter probable. For these reasons I tend to agree with Leandros Vranoussis that although no positive data exist even for the 'physical' acquaintance of the two men, Rhigas could indeed have saved the life of the rebel from Vidin. 2 As other instances of cross-religion and across-the-border friendships show, history abounds in such 'improbable' stories and the plausibility of ours should not be rejected outright. There is also some evidence as to the existence of contacts, probably indirect, between the two men, which needs to be analysed in this context. Below I shall discuss some of this. The Thourios is not the only text where Rhigas refers to Pazvantoglu. Russian diplomatic sources from Bucharest relate that: "[W]e are informed from Vienna that, dreaming of freedom, one of the local Greek citizens, Rhigas, has published a manifesto in the Greek newspapers in which, announcing the contemporary affairs of the Porte with Pazvantoglu and the French ideas concerning Turkish oppression, he advises all his nation to take measures to liberate their fatherland from the yoke. The Turkish ambassador complained to the Caesar's government [about this] and demanded that the author mentioned be taken [under arrest] and that publications of newspapers in Greek be forbidden in the future. This was taken into consideration and the propagator is kept in custody." 3 This text refers, in all probability, to the revolutionary proclamation which, along with the republican constitution and the Thourios, was included in the first brochure Rhigas published in preparation for the revolution shortly before his departure for Trieste in November 1797. 4 Its compilation indeed coincides with the time of one of the largest-scale expansion campaigns undertaken by Pazvantoglu, a fact that in 1 Austrian sources date this to 1792, when he was about 20 years old. L. Popov, 'Prinos za izuchavane minaloto na balgarskoto otechestvo' [Contribution to the Study of the Past of the Bulgarian Fatherland], Sbornik za narodni umotvoreniya, nauka i kultura, 24/1, Sofia 1908, doc. 10 (April 1797), 6. ^ Vranousis, Rhigas Velestinles, 24. 3 Documente privind Istoria României, vol. 4, doc. 34, 117, containing news from the region for the period prior to 10 January 1798. The translation from Russian and emphasis are mine. 4 Daskalakis, 'Thourios Hymnos,' 315. French diplomatic sources in Bucharest also speak of this proclamation without providing details about its contents. Ibid., 316.

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itself has been regarded as proof of the close co-operation and collaboration between the revolutionary and the rebel. This could have been a mere coincidence, but also good information about developments, resulting f r o m direct and deliberate contact or just 'floating in the air.' A n o t h e r a r g u m e n t in f a v o u r of the p l a u s i b i l i t y of (direct) communications between Rhigas and Pazvantoglu is provided by the activities of Dimitri Turnavity. One of the numerous interesting personalities of the time, a real 'border-area' figure, he was well known to contemporary diplomats and the authorities in the Ottoman capital and the D a n u b e Principalities. Here I do not aim to draw a comprehensive portrait of this colourful person, but only to bring forward facts that relate to the issue in question. Turnavity was one of the richest merchants in Bucharest, 1 supplying provisions to the Wallachian army and to Pazvantoglu's troops. 2 He was a favourite of two Wallachian Princes and served as their envoy to Vidin. As Russian diplomats in Jassi reported: "[Turnavity] a été souvent employé par les Princes de Valachie dans les affaires qui concernoientt les Turcs; sous les deux derniers princes Ipsilanti et Hangerli il f u t envoyé plusieurs fois auprès de Pazwand-oglou; et se fut à son dernier retour de là, que le nouveau Prince de Valachie l'a expedié à Constantinople sous pretexte que le grand visir luim ê m e s'étoit proposé de le charger de quelques commissions auprès de P a z w a n d - o g l o u . " 3 It was this mission that ended with his strangulation. R u m o u r s named Turnavity as the connection b e t w e e n Hangerli and Pazvantoglu even before the appointment of the f o r m e r as Wallachian gospodar (Hospodar). Public opinion in the Principalities held that the Wallachian prince had sent the merchant to the capital in the hope of concealing his "evil deeds." Accordingly, local sources blamed Pazvantoglu for having submitted the correspondence to the Porte, which entailed the Prince's death sentence. 4 For contemporaries, French and Russian diplomats including, however, he was primarily associated with Pazvantoglu, 5 on whose behalf, until January 1798, he communicated with French and Russian diplomats. 6 As 1

Documente privind lstoria Romaniei, vol. 4, doc. 41,133. ^ Turnavity was also involved in collecting revenues from the salt mines in Wallachia - Ibid doc. 34, 148; doc. 37, Anexa III, 124-25; doc. 51, Anexa IV, 148; doc. 122, 246. 3 Ibid., doc. 41,133. 4 Ibid., doc. 114,240. ^ Russian sources call him "the old friend of the rebel." Ibid., doc. 27, Anexa IV, 107. ® See, for example, Ibid., doc. 28, Anexa IV, 107, for Turnavity as a messenger of the Wallachian Prince and the Ottoman authorities to Pazvantoglu; ibid., doc. 30, Anexa 1, for him bringing a letter in Turkish from Pazvantoglu to Kirico, the Russian Vice-consul in Bucharest. See also Popov, 'Prinos za izuchavane minaloto,' 133, for Turnavity bringing a letter from Pazvantoglu to the French ambassador. Ibid., doc. 16, 138, for him being sent by Pazvantoglu to the capital to negotiate on his behalf with the Ottoman authorities and with the French diplomats.

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Carra St-Cyr put it: "il m'a paru que Passavan-oglou n'a mis confiance entière qu'en un seul homme, et ce qui paraîtra le plus supprenant à qui connaît les Turcs." 1 Turnavity seems to have been Pazvantoglu's preferred messenger in his attempts to establish contacts with the French Republic. The Greek merchant was the perfect man for this purpose. He seems to have become "barataire"2 of France at the time of General Aubert du Bayet, the Republic's ambassador at the Sublime Porte, that is between December 1796 and D e c e m b e r 1797. 3 The first contact known so far of Turnavity on Pazvantoglu's behalf with the general, dates from the beginning of October 1797, roughly coinciding with the last stage of Rhigas' preparations for the Greek revolution. Wallachian boyars suspected that Turnavity's moves were also co-ordinated with the former French consul in Bucharest, Carra St-Cyr. 4 Available information does not allow an unequivocal statement that Turnavity had indeed served as a link between Rhigas and Pazvantoglu. The only source bringing together the Greek revolutionary and the Greek merchant from Bucharest, but only in the field of speculations, arc the reports of the Austrian internuntius in Istanbul. In them H. von Rathkeal urged the closer inspection of Turnavity's papers in his house in Bucharest: "Un autre qui doit avoir été en relation avec les conjures [that is, Rhigas and his arrested associates] est le nommé Demetrius Tournaviti, le confident de Paswandoglou dont le Capitan-Pascha vient de tirer une si prompte vengeance; je suggère, tant ici qu'à Bukareste, de faire examiner soigneusement les papiers de cet homme, qui pourroient fournir des traits de lumière; son frère par exemple, établi à Trieste, ne feroit il pas des révélations intéressantes, s'il étoit examiné 1

Ibid., doc. 11, 136, doc. 24, 142-43, also calling him "son ami et son confident." "Barataire'V'baratais" from the Turkish berath, holder of a berat, a patent. See a detailed explanation of the term in A. de Groot, "Protection and Nationality. The Decline of the Drogmans," in Fr. Hitzel (ed.), Istanbul et les langues orientates: Actes du culloque organise par I'IFEA et V1NALCO. Istanbul, 29-31 mai 1995, Varia Turcica, 31 Paris-Montreal, 1997, 235-55. The berats and fermans granted to the interpreters of foreign diplomatic missions and their servants afforded considerable privileges, particularly with regard to taxation and rendered their holders virtually immune from Ottoman jurisdiction. For this reason they were much sought after by the reaya merchants, who were willing to pay high prices for them. As the British ambassador to the Porte, Sir Robert Liston, put it to Lord Grenville, the British Foreign Secretary, in a dispatch of April 1795, trafficking in berats. was the "universal practice... It was natural that a patent which raised a tributary subject from a state of degradation and procured respect to his person, security to his property and the patronage of an Ambassador at the seat of Government should soon become an object of ambition." The going rate for a Russian berat which carried with it the valuable privilege of trading to the Black Sea, was as high as 10,000 guruj. Liston himself was able to make between £ 2,000 and £3,000 a year through selling berats. Clogg, 'Aspects of the Movement for Greek Independence,' 244, n. 3. 2

3 Popov, 'Prinos za izuchavane na minaloto,' doc. 11, 136. As Carra St-Cyr informed the French consul in Bucharest, Turnavity's being a French berat-holder became a bone of (some) contention between the Porte and the French diplomatic representative. According to Russian diplomatic sources, the Porte insisted that Turnavity himself had denied being under any foreign protection. This was only done in order to avoid French intervention in his defence as a French 'berat and patent' would imply. Documente privind Istoria Romaniei, vol. 4, doc. 46, 136. 4 Ibid., doc. 46,137.

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adroitement, et si l'on prenoit inspection de ses écrits avec les ménagemcns nécessaires pour la réputation et le crédit d'un homme qui peut-etre n'est point coupable." 1 During his stay in Bucharest, Rhigas maintained contacts with French diplomats there and with his co-nationals working for t h e m . Turnavity, too, had close relations with some of these same people, both in Bucharest and in the Ottoman capital. The conduct of many Christian associates of Tepedelenli Ali Pa§a, who, while serving him, actually pursued and defended the interests of Friendly Society, shows that double 'affiliations' were possible and certainly this was not a unique case in those troubled times. Chronologically the merchant's murder coincides with the arrest of Rhigas and his companions but is not necessarily related to it. This is also the time of the expansion campaign launched by Pazvantoglu. Turnavity was in the capital as a special envoy of the rebel while the Porte was preparing its counter-offensive. His relations with the French, and the imminent danger of uniting the French and the Vidin forces were sufficient reasons for the physical removal of the Greek merchant. Again in the opinion of contemporaries, Turnavity had lost his life solely because of his connections with Pazvantoglu: "On prétend que le malheureux Tournevit avoit fait des grandes découvertes d'une conspiration bien étendue en Turquie parmi les premiers d'entre les Turcs, fait contre le Grand Seigneur, et que ccttc conspiration tenoit à la rébellion de Pazwandoglou; et que le grand visir, ou bien pour venger les malheurs qui alloient fondre sur tant de têtes en Turquie, ou bien les prévenir, a fait cc pas envers T o u r n e v i t . " 2 T h e murder of Turnavity and of a "Turk belonging to Pazvantoglu's party" frightened many citizens of Bucharest 3 but it is not clear whether that was because of their association with the conspiracy, or because of the imminent danger that Pazvantoglu would strike back in revenge. Some arrests in Wallachia were also attributed to the arrest and interrogation of Turnavity w h e n he "revealed all secrets." In e f f e c t others were also c o m p r o m i s e d . 4 Hangerli, the Wallachian prince, was also accused of collaboration with Pazvantoglu via Turnavity. 5 None of those people seems

1 E. Legrand, Anekdota eggrapha peri Rega Velestinle km ton syn auto martyresanton ek ton en Vienne archeion exachthenta [Unpublished Documents from the Vienna Archives about Rhigas Velestinlis and his Co-Martyrs], Athens 1996, 46 (24 February 1798). See also docs 42 (14 February 1798), 52-54 (10 March 1798). Obtaining the papers along with the entire property of Turnavity became a goal also for other parties engaged in regional politics, Documente privind lstoria Romäniei, vol. 4, doc. 61 (April 1798), 163, about an official of the Porte sent to inventory the inheritance; ibid., doc. 139 (August 1799), 265, about Pazvantoglu's claims on the property. Ibid., doc. 44,133. 3 4 5

Ibid., doc. 46, 135 (before February 1798). Ibid., doc. 51, Anexa IV, 148. Ibid., doc. 116,240(1799).

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to have been associated with Rhigas, though. This, certainly, is not sufficient grounds to refute his possible involvement in Rhigas' organisation. The indirect evidence and the documents cited above do indeed leave certain room for conjecture as to the possible points where the roads of the three men could have crossed. As summarised by the Austrian internuntius

on the occasion of

Turnavity's murder, "ever since the Svishtov peace treaty he has played a dangerous role in Wallachia, dedicated to the French, employed by the princes, and making frequent trips to Vidin." 1 It should be pointed out that in his communications with French diplomats, via Turnavity or through other channels, Pazvantoglu does not allude in any way to any contacts with Rhigas or to the eventual Greek r e v o l u t i o n . 2 It is only in 1801 that he refers to his presumably close connections with Rhigas. We learn about this f r o m two documents related to a mission, sent by Pazvantoglu to Paris in the hope of establishing direct contact with Napoleon and the Directory. 3 In front of Talleyrand his two agents, Nedelko Popovich

and Polisoi

K o n d o n , told

the story

of

Pazvantoglu's attempts to establish contacts with France. 4 A m o n g other interesting details, the two related that: II [Pazvantoglu] n'est dans aucune relation avec l'Autriche et la Russie. Il fait seulement que cette dernière Puissance n'entreprendra rien contre lui, si elle a l'assurance qu'il ménagera la Moldavie. Quant à l'Autriche, elle se borne jusqu'à présent à servir les inquiétudes de la Porte en lui envoyant de tems en tems des Grecs résidens en Allemagne, et dont on découvre les intelligences avec le Pacha de Vidin. Il y a quelques années, on découvrit à Vienne une vaste conspiration contre la Turquie dont les agens de Passavan-Oglou condui soient les ressorts. Polisoi Condon en étois, huit Grecs furent livrés au Pacha de Belgrade qui les fut étrangler. Polisoi assure qu'ils étoient les plus grands hommes de sa nation. Quinze ou vingt furent exilés dans différentes provinces de la maison d'Autriche. Lui, Polisoi ne fut que soupçonné et il fut seulement privé de sa chaire de Literature grecque à Vienne.

1 Popov, 'Prinos za izuchavane minaloto,' doc. 6, 26. In the publication the textof this account is translated from German into Bulgarian. 2 Russian diplomatic sources register the interest in one of the detained Greeks displayed by Napoleon: "On écrit de Vienne aux marchands de Jassy qu'il s'y trouve un Grec parmi les compromis pour lequel le général Bounaparte s'intéresse beaucoup auprès des deux Cours, celle de Vienne et celle de Constantinople, mais on n'a rien dit de son nom." Documente privind Istoria României, vol. 4, doc. 42, 132. It is not clear if that was Rhigas or another person, but this makes it clear that French authorities were, too, aware of the developments. 3 I. Pavlovic, 'Ispisi iz francuskih arhiva o Pazvantoglu (od 1795 do 1807)' [Excerpts about Pazvantoglu from the French Archives (from 1795 till 1807)], Spomenik Srpske kraljevske akademije, Pt. 3, Belgrade, 1890, docs 20 and 21 (22 September - 22 October 1801),121-26. 4 Some of the issues discussed below I have analysed in Gradeva, 'Osman Pazvantoglu of Vidin,'136-46.

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La découverte de Cette Conspiration fut l'effet de la mission d'un homme que Passavan-Oglou envoyoit au Premier Consul et qui fut arrêté. Les papiers dont il étoit porteur conduisirent l'inquisition Autrichienne à rechercher les Agens du Pacha et leurs Correspondances. Depuis cette cchec Passavan-Oglou a sans cesse envoyé des députés, mais sans munir de papiers. Ils ont tous été arrêtés ou assassinés. Nedelko est le seul qui soit parvenu à éxécuter les ordres de Son Maître.1 The exposé of the emissaries may be regarded as a kind of post factum corroboration of the more "physical" contacts between Pazvantoglu and RJhigas as it relates in brief the story of the destruction of Rhigas' hetairia. Greek sources invariably assign the initiative and the leading role to Rhigas who had managed to introduce into his organisation several influential Turks, Pazvantoglu including. The Pasha of Vidin turns this perspective upside down. In his envoys' version Rhigas and his hetairia formed part of the rebel's vast conspiracy against the Ottoman state. He even asserted that the Greeks were detained following the arrest of one of Pazvantoglu's messengers to the First Consul. The papers he was carrying allegedly led to the discovery of the members of the network. Greek sources actually speak of a betrayal in Trieste, 2 while Russian ones point to a Greek bishop who had informed the patriarch of the preparations. 3 This contradictory information raises the problem of whether the story told by the emissaries was merely a ploy on the part of Pazvantoglu. H e could easily have been informed about the events and used them for his own ends. Judging from the diplomatic correspondence, the news of the tragic death and the fate of Rhigas's hetairia spread immediately throughout the Balkans. 4 A n o t h e r detail also m a k e s the story of P a z v a n t o g l u ' s close involvement with Rhigas' hetairia suspicious. It is the personalities of the two men who met Talleyrand on P a z v a n t o g l u ' s behalf. 5 Below I shall summarise the data we dispose of about them with a view to the topic. Nedelko Popovich, one of Pazvantoglu's envoys to Napoleon, declared that he was living in Vidin as the bazirgânbaçi of the governor, his official title being 'doctor of the Pasha'. In his own words, his main obligations in the Pasha's "government" were to conduct his finances and international correspondence. Apparently, he was a merchant with important deals in Vienna amounting to tens of thousands of guruand a name known to ^ Pavlovic, 'Ispisi iz francuskih arhiva o Pazvantoglu,' 125. 2

'i Zoidis, Rhigas Velestinlis, 62.

Documente privind Istoria Romaniei, vol. 4, doc. 33,115 (8.01. 1798). Shortly after these events the Russian diplomatic representatives in Bucharest and Jassi informed their governments about the arrest and the fate of Rhigas and his companions. Ibid, doc. 33, 115, (8.01.1798); doc. 34, 117 (10 January 1798). See in more detail, Gradeva, 'Osman Pazvantoglu.' 4

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Russian and Austrian diplomats in the Ottoman capital and in the Danube Principalities. He was a "Russian subject" (probably "barataire"). His importance is made clear by the documents issued by both Russian and Austrian chancelleries concerning his business and trips, which confirm that he had special relations with Pazvantoglu and enjoyed the protection of Hypsilantis. Popovich was also involved in supplying provisions for the troops of Pazvantoglu. He obviously stayed in Paris after his audience with Talleyrand. In 1802, again on behalf of Pazvantoglu, he visited Count Markov, the Russian ambassador in the French capital. This time his main objective was to seek the benevolence and protection of the Russian tsar for his master. 1 Unfortunately I have been unable, for the time being, to retrieve more consistent evidence about Popovich, except for the fact that after the death of Pazvantoglu he stayed in Vidin and in 1807 served as an agent of the Ottoman government to Karageorge. 2 After a decade of active participation in politics and in the economy of the region he disappears from the available documentation. Turnavity and Popovich seem to have been among the most trusted associates of Pazvantoglu in his contacts both with the French and the Russians. The similarities between the two allow me to delineate the portrait of the affluent merchant, engaged in international trade, in supplying provisions for the Vidin rebel but also in the economy of the Principalities and the deals of the Wallachian princes, one of the numerous 'trans-border' persons who played so important a role also in the regional diplomatic relations. It should be pointed out that they were not unique in their diverse occupations. Most of the grand notables in the Balkans - Tepedelenli Ali Pa§a, Mustafa Pasa Bu§atli, Ismail Tirseniklioglu, Alemdar Mustafa Pa§a — relied in their contacts with neighbouring states, with the Great Powers and with the central authority almost exclusively on the services of a group of affluent merchants, mainly non-Muslims - Christians of different ethnic backgrounds and denominations, Orthodox, Catholic, Armenians, and Jews, most of whom would also be berath of some foreign state. This fact should probably be attributed to their well-placed contacts and good knowledge about the situation in the region, their command of several languages, and to their being part of various networks that brought together people living in many 1 See Popov, 'Prinos za izuchavane minaloto,' doc. 27, 34 (1798); P. Oreshkov, 'Niakolko dokumenta za Pazvantoglu i Sofroniya Vrachanski (1800-1812)' [Some Documents concerning Pazvantoglu and Sofronii of Vratsa (1800-1812)], Sbornik na BAN, 3 (1912), doc. 2, 34, and doc. 7, 37-38; Documente privind Istoria României, vol. 4, doc. 297, 507, of 1803; S. Vankov, 'Osman Paspanoglu, Vidinski Pasha. Stranitsi ot istoriyata na Iztochniya VSpros' [Osman Pazvantoglu, Pasha of Vidin: Pages f r o m the History of the Eastern Question], Voennoistoricheski sbornik, 62 (Sofia 1947), 115. 2

Vankov, 'Osman Paspanoglu,' 114.

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countries and were a pool of information about current events. What made merchants all of a sudden such an active group and factor in regional politics, however, is a p h e n o m e n o n that still needs to be researched into. T h e provincial notables obviously valued them highly, providing the traders with security within their own domains and many privileges. Pazvantoglu's other envoy to Paris, Polisoi Condon, claimed to have been a member of Rhigas' organisation. According to his own account he was a priest and professor in Greek and Latin literature in Vienna. His personality presents us with no fewer surprises than Nedelko. In all probability, this was P o l y z o i s K o n t o s , 1 a well-known Greek intellectual of the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. In Vienna, Polyzois Kontos had been teacher of the sons of Prince Adam Czartoryski, who was to become Russian minister of foreign affairs. In 1795 he was invited by the Orthodox community in Pest to serve as a priest and teacher in the Greek school, and then moved again to Tokay and Vienna. In 1801-2 he was in Paris, where he probably served as Pazvantoglu's emissary. There he wrote an ode dedicated to Napoleon, which he read in the presence of the First Consul and the academicians. He was among the outstanding representatives of the 'reaction' against the ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution in Greek society. Among his most famous works is the Dialogues of the Dead, published in 1793 and regarded as an open indictment of Voltaire, who is held responsible for many evils. In 1802, he informed the Austrian authorities about Adamantios Korais' intention to disseminate in the Ottoman Empire his own translation of Cesare Beccaria's Crimes and Punishments, published during the same year. The Austrian government reacted immediately, ordering the police in Vienna to prevent the dispatch of the books. Russian diplomatic correspondence, however, mentions another name as N e d e l k o P o p o v i c h ' s companion in Paris - a H a z o . In a letter to Constantine Hypsilantis in Bucharest, the Bishop of Vidin also speaks of a " H a z o " who " n ' a v a i t ni mission, ni m ê m e connaissance de celle dont Popowitch était chargé." 2 If we take into account the name of the envoy as rendered to Talleyrand and the 'Russian' version, as well as the fact that the Hazo in question was not informed about the "Russian mission," this might take us to Dimitrios Chatzi Polyzou (Polyzos). He, too, moved in Greek educational circles, being a teacher in Pest, in Hungro-Wallachia, in Leipzig, and Vienna. He is the author of several works that bring him closer to the

About him see Staikos, Greek Books from the Time of the Neohellenic Enlightenment, 62,92, 125, 130, 170, 175. I wish to thank Prof. N. Danova for having helped me identify Polisoi with Polyzois. 2 Documente privind lstoria Romaniei, vol. 4, doc. 397, 507.

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Greek circles influenced by the ideas of the Enlightenment, but is not known as a member of the revolutionary organisation of Rhigas. 1 Although Polyzois Kontos can hardly be associated in any way with the conspiracy and with the ideas of the ardent admirer of the Enlightenment and the Revolution, he more closely corresponds to the person described in Talleyrand's accounts of the meeting to Napoleon. Though with a certain degree of insecurity, I am more inclined to regard him as the more probable 'candidate' for Pazvantoglu's emissary. Other Orthodox clerics, too, were deeply involved in some of the schemes of the Pasha, mainly in the contacts with Russia and Wallachia. Kontos could have easily pretended to be a member of the Greek revolutionary network. It must have been equally easy for Pazvantoglu to present himself as a revolutionary. In his contacts with Erench diplomats - through Turnavity, through Popovich, and probably others — Pazvantoglu skilfully employed the revolutionär}' rhetoric, the slogans of the French Revolution and showed himself well-versed in developments in the French Republic. For this, however, he did not need instruction from Rhigas, but simply good informants. The rebel seems to have grasped correctly the configuration of the Powers in the region and tried to exploit it in his favour. At that time the policy of Austria and Russia, the traditional enemies of the Ottoman Empire and its immediate neighbours, had undergone a radical change. The danger presented by the expanding French Republic and the political upheaval caused by the ideas of the Revolution turned the two monarchies into staunch supporters of the preservation of the status-quo in the Balkans and of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. For the Austrians, Pazvantoglu was an immediate danger. They regarded him as a promoter of the ideas of the Revolution, a true 'montagnard.' It was not just a tentative or an abstract threat. The Austrian authorities truly feared that his seemingly revolutionary ideas would spread across the border among their Slavic subjects. 2 Russia manifested a more sober attitude. She was aware that Pazvantoglu was not a 1 About him see Staikos, Greek Books from the Time of the Neohellenic Enlightenment, 140, 142, 160. Russian diplomats mention also of a Polyzo, a physician, who was suspected of being involved into Rhigas' network. Following a letter from the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna on 12 February 1798, he was detained by the police in Jassy, but was soon released and managed to escape, probably with the help of his influential uncle Andrei Paoli, banker of the Prince. Documente privind Istoria Romäniei, vol. 4, doc. 35,119; doc. 37, Anexa II, 123. Polyzo Chirija (Poliso Kirico Kiryca) was exiled in 1799 from Jassy to Yanya, where his father also lived, because he was found in possession of books in line with the ideas of the French revolution, Documente privind Istoria Romäniei, vol. 4, doc. 130, Anexa 1, 256. 2 The Austrians were not unique in finding the germs of the revolution everywhere. The British Minister to the Porte, Spencer Smith, for example, was convinced of the French influence on the Smyrna rebellion of the janissaries in 1797 ("a contagious consequence of the destructive doctrines so progressive in the present day"), which turned into an orgy of violence over the local non-Muslims and destruction of their property (quoted in Clogg, 'Aspects of the Movement for Greek Independence,' 242).

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revolutionary but rather considered him a barrier to her eventual expansion in the Balkans. Russian diplomats also carefully followed his relations with the local Christians who were regarded as potential allies. For the French, initially he was too distant and they relied on their traditionally good relations with the Ottomans as an ally against the other European Powers. The preparation for Napoleon's campaign in Egypt brought to the fore along with Tepedelenli Ali Pa§a, also the rebel from Vidin. This is probably one of the main reasons for the establishment of direct contacts between Pazvantoglu and the French diplomats around late 1797. In my opinion, however, international relations were only of secondary importance for the rebel. His ambitions were directed at the Ottoman state, which was undergoing a painful transformation. In his manifestos to the Ottoman M u s l i m s he announced as his mission the restoration of the Empire's former glory along the lines of the classic state structure of the reign of Sultan Stileyman the Magnificent (1520-1566). In some of his encounters with foreign visitors he even referred to the rule of the first caliphs playing on the coincidence of his name with that of Caliph Osman and emphasising his own 'Muslimness' and pre-occupation with the glorification of Islam. 1 From that perspective he regarded it as his major objective to remove the injustices and the innovations of more recent times, the Nizam-i Cedid in particular. The subversion of the Ottoman Sultan was never proclaimed as a goal in itself and it would not have earned him the massive support among the Muslims he enjoyed. He made it clear that he was struggling only with the "evil advisors" of Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) and the "infidel" innovations, but that the Sultan had already turned into an obstacle to the well-being of the empire. Yet, he was aware of the special status of the Tatar Girays as legal heirs to the Ottoman dynasty in the event of its becoming extinct, and he used the name of one of the members of that family for his purposes. Though aiming at the preservation of the Ottoman Empire and its strengthening on the basis of the principles of 'ancient' times until roughly 1805 Pazvantoglu relied largely on the services of 'Greeks' to carry out his foreign policy, as well as in his relations with Wallachia and the central authorities. T o ensure their support and in line with the 'ideal' rule of the Ottoman Classical Age, Pazvantoglu tried to regulate the position of his nonMuslim subjects, offering 'baits' to the various strands among them. In the short run, he might even have regarded an uprising of the Christian population in the Balkans as another destabilising factor that would eventually shatter the Sultan's position and cause a radical change in the rule. His attitude to the First Serbian Uprising (1804-13), however, is revealing as to his true feelings with regard to Christians' attempts to gain independence. It became the turning point in his relations with 'his' Christian reaya when he not just lost

1

Interestingly, his father's name was Omer (Umar in Arabic) while his son's was Ali.

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any support he must have had from any group of them - clerics, merchants, or peasants, R u s s o - or Francophiles — but f o u n d himself in isolation, surrounded by a hostile Christian majority. And he did not hesitate to strike back and order the murder of the local elders and priests and even that of one of his closest associates, Bishop Kallinikos, on the charge of being in secret contact with the Serbian rebels. Certainly the Serbian Uprising presented a grave danger for Pazvantoglu's projects. From its outset it was directed against his allies, the Janissaries in the Belgrade pa§alik. An eventual Greek uprising was expected to begin far f r o m Vidin and this probably made it more acceptable f o r the Pasha. W h a t is more difficult to agree with is the possibility of Pazvantoglu's involvement into Rhigas' organisation and, even less probable, his sincere association with the ideas of the French Revolution. R h i g a s ' plans for the restoration of the Greek state in boundaries that encompassed the entire Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor did not square at all with Pazvantoglu's views about the future of the Empire. Rhigas, too, may have seen in this co-operation a useful instrument, but for the purposes of the Greek revolution. Certainly the rebel in Vidin was not as dangerous for his purposes as the other powerful pashas in the Ottoman European provinces. Yet, it is much more likely that, if there was any intentional co-operation at all, both parties were interested in the other's collaboration only to achieve their own ends. When discussing the possible relations between Pazvantoglu and Rhigas one should not forget that all stories about their earlier and later contacts could have been a mere invention. In the case of the Vidin rebel this would be closely related to the pressing need for him to establish direct contacts with France and receive, if nothing else, at least international recognition, providing him with a kind of protection against Austria, Russia and even the Sultan, as well as some financial and military support. An explanation of the eventual fabrication of the story by Greek contemporaries can be sought in various directions. I suppose the very inclusion of those Muslims in the Battle-song must have perplexed them. If we look carefully into the text written by Nikolopoulos, it actually repeats the contents of the Thourios, but taking the next step. From an appeal to them, he has made them part of Rhigas' 'society,' mentioning Pazvantoglu in particular, who is also the only one clearly identifiable person among the listed 'powerful Turks' in the song. Such an explanation was even more important f o r Philimon and Perraivos, as participants in the G r e e k Revolution. Interestingly, Philimon, for example, declares Pazvantoglu to be

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a 'defender of the one who has stamped the Koran and protector of the reaya,'1 which is very much in line with the information contained in the Austrian diplomatic correspondence of the time, and probably the news in the contemporary newspapers, but also in a way justifies his being regarded as an ally by Rhigas. T h e national narrative usually insists on the independent development of the nation as a homogeneous entity without any contacts with the "national other." Such contacts would only be permissible in those cases when ' w c ' had a powerful beneficial influence on the 'other,' usually treated as a backward or underdeveloped group. 2 The stories about the friendship between Rhigas and Pazvantoglu would indeed have served the glorification of Rhigas, who at the time of the Greek War of Independence was beginning to turn into a national icon. They further adorned his image, showing the powerful impact of his ideas even on an Ottoman pasha, who was also a celebrity of the time. One should not forget that the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were a time of massive myth-construction. 3 Whatever the reality, Pazvantoglu seems to have been an independent factor, and his interests and aims ran contrary to the plans of Rhigas. Be the connection between Rhigas and Pazvantoglu a real fact or imaginary, in the minds of many contemporaries they were somehow connected as the two major preoccupations of the Porte at the end of the eighteenth century: " d ' u n côte à détruire la révolté de Paswandoglou, et de l'autre à opposer une digne à l'ésprit révolutionnaire qui c o m m e n c e à s'introduire en Grèce ou plutôt partout." 4 During the nineteenth century the Ottoman sultans managed to stamp out most of the rebellious pashas, but it was the 'revolutionary spirit' among the subjected peoples that finally brought about the demise of the Empire in the Balkans.

Philimon, Philiki Hetairia, 91. Excerpts from Philimon's history of the Greek national revolution were also translated into Bulgarian, probably by Neophyt Bozveli, to which the translator added his comments, mainly with thé purpose of glorifying Bulgarians at the expense of Greeks. The manuscript remained unpublished. Yet it is very interesting from the viewpoint of myth-creation on 'Bulgarian territory.' Bozveli is very selective in choosing parts that served his ideas in the struggle for a Bulgarian ecclesiastical hierarchy independent of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Besides, he declares Rhigas' father a 'Slav' but bitterly criticises the image of Pazvantoglu as protector of the Bulgarians and as a notable who levied fewer taxes which presumably had earned him his Christian subjects' love. See in detail N. Danova, "Malko poznat rakopis na Neofit Bozveli?" [A Little Known Manuscript of Neophyt Bozveli?], in R. Damianova and H. Manolakev (eds), Vazrozhdenskiyat rakopis, prochiti na literaturata i kulturata na Balgarskoto vâzrazhdane. V chest na 70-godishninata na Prof. Docho Lekov [The Revivalist Text, Perusals of the Literature and Culture of the Bulgarian Revival. In Honour of the 70th anniversary of Prof. Docho Lekov], Sofia 1998, 301-8. 2

See for a general framework A. Smith, National Identity, London 1991 (I have used the Bulgarian translation A. Smit, Natsionalnata identichnost, Sofia 2000). For Bulgarian realities, see N. Aretov, 'Balkanski identichnosti v bSlgarskata kultura ot modernata epoha (XIX-XX vek)' [Balkan Identities in Bulgarian Culture of the Modern Age, nineteenth-twentieth centuries], in N. Aretov and N. Chernokozhev (eds), Balkanski identichnosti v balgarskata kultura ot modernata epoha (XIX-XX vek) [Balkan Identities in Bulgarian Literature of the Modern Age, Nineteenth-Twentieth Centuries), Sofia 2001, 5-53. 3 For a collection of such inventions see volume 58/1 (2003) of the Annales, devoted specially to Histoire croisé and Imaginaires nationaux: origines, usages, figures. 4 Popov, 'Prinos za izuchavane minaloto,' doc. 3, 22 (10 January 1793), report by Rathkeal.

SHIPPING ALONG THE LOWER COURSE OF THE DANUBE, (end of 17th century)

Some history As early as the Antiquity, the Danube served the population along its banks as a source of subsistence and defence, as a military and trade route. The Roman Danube fleet emerged sometime in the second half of the second century AD, its ships being' distributed among all the Roman ports along the river. Two of these seem to have been more important than the rest - modern Archar, a village near Vidin, and Ruse. Actually, the latter emerged as part of the fortified limes along the river. Indeed the name of the fortress built by the Romans on the site of present-day Ruse, Sexaginta Prista, that is, sixty ships, was directly linked to its role as a major Roman harbour on the Danube. This fleet was actively engaged in the Dacian wars and in the defence of present-day Northern Bulgaria and Dobrudzha. Regarded as a border between the "civilised" and the "barbarous" worlds, the Danube and the fleet on it had a primarily military importance. The role of the Danube as a limes was preserved under the Byzantine rule in the region until the establishment of the barbarian kingdoms. No doubt it continued to serve as a border and a means of transport, but it seems that during the Early Middle Ages it was usually crossed from one bank to the other in both directions and was much less used as a link between the Central and South-eastern European parts. What may be one of the first accounts of the Danube as a trade link dates from the beginning of the 12th century, when Anna Comnena wrote that the Danube was a large and deep river flowing through many lands and carrying ships with much cargo. 1 No doubt its role continued to expand during the centuries which followed and gradually the fortified ports along the river became also centres of trade and exchange of commodities between the lands along its upper, middle and lower reaches, between the northern and southern parts of the continent. Until the Ottoman conquest of the three Bulgarian kingdoms towards the end of the 14th century, it seems that the Danube was used both as a trade link and a military defence line where ships served mainly as a means of transport. It also seems that all states bordering on the great river possessed warships ^Quoted from Y. Yurdanov, Istoriya na balgarskata targoviya do Osvobozhdenieto Bulgarian trade until the Liberation], (Sofia, 1938) p. 69.

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which were used both to transport troops across the river as well as along its course. Several facts in the political events of those times reveal that at the time of the conquest the Ottomans only moved across the river to attack the Wallachian territories, using the vessels of their vassals. A short Ottoman note of 1451, for example, says that in 1395, following the battle of Rovine and the conclusion of peace between the Wallachian voyvoda and Yildirim Han, the latter demanded boats from the last Bulgarian king, Ivan Shishman, who was seated in Nikopol, in order to cross the river back. When these were supplied, Bayezid caught Shishman and beheaded him. 1 A year later, in 1396, King Sigismond of Hungary organised a crusade against the Ottomans. According to contemporary sources the crusaders set out en route on ships, from Buda to Vidin, and on land. Thus the Anonymous Bulgarian chronicle of the 15th century says that the ships and the boats were so numerous that one could not see the water. 30 kattrgas from Venice joined the main body of the army at Nikopol and began the siege of the city. According to the plans, 10 ships of the Byzantine emperor were also supposed to join the united Christian forces. Finally, after the destruction of the crusaders their king and other commanders escaped by one of the ships on the Danube, then in the Black Sea, going through the Straits and into the Mediterranean. This narrow escape revealed again and again the balance of powers. By the time of Bayezid I (1389-1402), the Ottomans were unrivalled on land, but were practically impotent on the river and in sea battles. 2 During the long campaign of King Wladislav Jagello in 1444 the plans of the crusaders also included the invasion by Burgundian ships from the Black Sea up the river to Trieste. 3 In 1456, when Mehmed II besieged Belgrade, we find probably one of the first cases of use of ships on the Danube by the Ottomans not just to cross the river but also to take part in the battle, though, as it seems, mainly with auxiliary functions. According to Nc§ri, the Sultan ^See A. Decei, "Deux documents turcs concernants les expeditions des sultans Bayezid le Ier et Murad II dans le pays roumains," Revue roumaine d'histoire, XIII/ 3 (1974), p. 397-403. A Bulgarian translation of the note is included in P. Petrov and V. Gyuzelev, eds, Hristomatiya po istoriya na B51gariya [A Reader on the History of Bulgaria}. T. 2. Sashtinsko Srednovekovie (krayat na XII-XIV v.) [The High Middle Ages, end of the 12lh -14 th century, (Sofia, 1978), p. 201. 2 S e e an account of the events in "Bezimenna balgarska hronika" [Anonymous Bulgarian Chronicle], in P. Dinekov, Starobalgarski stranitsi. Antologiya [Old Bulgarian Pages. An Anthology], (Sofia, I960) p. 383-384; Mehmed Neshri, Ogledalo na sveta. Istoriya na osmanskiya dvor [The Mirror of the World. History of the Ottoman Court], transl. and ed. by M. Kalitsin, (Sofia 1984) p. 127; Jean le Maingre, called Boucicault, Marshal of France, in Frenski patepisi za Balkanite, XV-XVHI v. [French Travel Accounts about the Balkans, 15 t h -18 t h centuries], ed. by B. Tsvetkova (Sofia, 1975), p. 35; H. Matanov and R. Mihneva, Ot Galipoli do Lepanto [From Galipoli to Lepanto], (Sofia, 1988) p. 122-123; C. Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1481, (Istanbul, 1990) p. 46-47. 3 The journey and the military activities of the four galleys commanded by Waleran de Wawrin were described by his uncle Jehan de Wawrin; see Frenski patepisi, p. 66-69.

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ordered the founding of guns from the copper of the churches' crosses and bells in the capital. Then they were loaded on gemis and transported via the Danube to Belgrade. 1 In Jacopo de Promontorio's and Kemalpa§azade's accounts, the Sultan commanded the construction of 100 galleys on the Morava to invest Belgrade from the river. Zaganos Pa§a manned these ships with azaps and janissaries, while the Rumelian troops marched along the banks of the Morava and the Danube to protect the fleet. The fleet besieged the fortress f r o m the riverside. At the advance of the Hungarians of John Hunyadi, however, the Ottoman fleet was routed and driven back by the Hungarian ships. 2 In 14761477, Mehmed II again used ships prepared in the capital to support his campaign against the Moldavian prince Stephen the Great. 3 Throughout the 15th century the Ottoman chronicles and other Balkan sources record Ottoman raids carried out with Ottoman ships stationed on the Danube. Ships f r o m Vidin, for example, played the decisive role in the conquest of the Serbian fortress of Golubac in 1458, 4 not to mention the almost incessant incursions of the akincis into the Wallachian and Moldavian Principalities. Thus, sometime in the first half of the 15th century the Ottomans gradually began to overcome their weakness on the river. Partly this weakness was surmounted by the use of ships built in the capital, which sailed all the way from Istanbul by sea and then up the river to their final destination cither carrying munitions or intended to take part in the hostilities. However, as early as the first decades of the 15th century, the Ottomans realised the need of a locally stationed fleet, which had several purposes: guarding the Ottoman bank, carrying troops, munitions and provisions, helping the land army cross the rivers on their way, etc. As early as that time, Western intellectuals began to appreciate the role of the Danube in facilitating the Turks' communications with Panonia in Hungary and Dacia in Wallachia. 5 In the present paper we shall provide s o m e insights into the development of Ottoman shipping on the lower course of the Danube during the last decades of the 17th century. In the first place we shall discuss, as far as the available sources permit, the organisation of state and private shipping, the property on ships, types of ships and terms employed in Ottoman

^Mehmed Neshri, Ogledalo na sveta, p. 276. See a detailed account of the battle in H. Matanov and R. Mihneva, Ot Galipoli do Lepanto, p. 161; C. Imber, The Ottoman Empire, p. 166-169. ^Mehmed Neshri, Ogledalo na sveta, p. 320. 4 C . Imber, The Ottoman Empire, p. 174-175. ^See, for example, Flavio Biondo's appraisal in his Historiarum Romanorum imperii decades tres, written between 1438-1453, and based on the accounts of Papal missionaries of the previous century; quoted from R. Zaimova, Bàlgarskata tema v zapadnoevropeyskata knizhnina, XV-XV1I v. [The Bulgarian Theme in West European Literature, 15 th -17 centuries] (Sofia, 1992), p. 27. 2

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documentation, the crews, the participation of local population, the role of the Danube as an international route. In this we shall rely mainly on kadi sicilh from Rusjuk (Ruse) and Vidin. We have processed five sicilh from the former, dating from the last decades of the 17th century, as well as three from the latter city from the same time. This Ottoman material has been considerably complemented by the accounts of foreign travellers, mainly diplomats, such as Count Luigi Marsigli, Simpert Nigel, and others, and of Evliya £elebi, the famous Ottoman traveller of the second half of the 17th century. All these sources allow us not just to trace out the everyday functioning of the Ottoman fleet along the lower course of the river, but also some view of its characteristics, and the qualities of the Ottoman sailors and captains. Though going out of the period in question, we have also drawn considerably on the information contained in the kanuns of the Danubian cities dating from the second half of the 16th century, in the first place because they provide a lot more details on private shipping, but also because the documentation of the kadi sicilh confirms to a large extent the validity of the information from the kanuns in the 17th century as well. Whether in times of war or peace, the traffic on the Danube consisted of state-owned and private ships. Below we shall try to describe the specifics of the traffic of the two types of sailing vessels. The state-owned ships consisted of three groups: men-of-war, vessels carrying various types of provisions and munitions, boats serving the menzil system. Here it should be pointed out that on various occasions, especially in times of military action or other strain for the Empire, private ships were also mobilised or hired by the authorities especially for the transportation of the zahire to the stores in Belgrade, or to some other port.

The Ottoman Danube fleet The brief history of the Ottoman military activities on the Danube related above leads us to the conclusion that the first attempts of the Ottomans at organising their own fleet on the river should probably be placed in the first decades of the 15th century, the first ships being most probably captured from the conquered Christian states. This suggestion is supported by some information contained in the Ottoman tahrir defters. Thus a kapudan, Ahi Ali, is recorded as a timar holder, with an income of 1,200 akges, in 145455. A note adds that he had been in the port of Vidin for more than a decade previously and was paid a salary at the time, but later was included among the

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sipahh in the Vidin sancak.1 Kapudans are also mentioned in the defters of the Nikbolu (Nikopol, Bulgaria) sancak of the second half of the 15th century. 2 Unfortunately, no early records of the Silistra sancak have survived, but it seems quite possible that there had been a kapudan there as well. It is not quite clear what the organisation of the Ottoman fleet was in the 15th century. The rather sparse data lead to the conclusion that initially the kapudans were salaried, while later they were included in the timar system. However, it is not clear whether such a tendency was universally valid since no kapudans are recorded among the timar-holders of the three sancaks during the 16th century , though there are several indications that there were Ottoman military ships on the river. According to C. Imber, by 1566 there were three Ottoman admirals on the Danube and its tributaries. The first one's base was Buda and his squadron patrolled the upper reaches of the river within the borders of the Ottoman state. The second one was based in Mohacs while the third Ottoman flotilla was on the river Sava, and its admiral held a zeamet in Bosnia. 3 If these were all, the captains of the ports on the lower reaches of the river were then under the third's command. However, another possibility can also be suggested: that the captains of Vidin, Nikbolu, Silistra and elsewhere were commanded by the respective sancakhegi, or by the dizdar of the fortress where their quarters were. According to I. H. Uzungarfih, following the conquest of Hungary, the Ottoman fleet on the Danube was divided into two. One kapudanhk patrolled the river from its confluence with the Black Sea to Vidin, the other - from Vidin, up the river. They were further subdivided into smaller segments and the captains in charge had their fixed territory to control, their main task being to ensure the safety and the order of the traffic along and across the river. After the war with the Holy League and as a direct consequence of the territorial losses, the two kapudanhks were united into one Great Tuna (Danube) Kapudanlik, with its centre and tersane in Rusguk. 4 Indeed, it is clear that throughout that period till the end of the 17th century there were kapudanliks in the sancak centres, maybe in other important ports as well, consisting of the Tuna kapudanlik. Thus, according 1 D. Bojanic-Lukac, Vidin i Vidinskiyat sandzhak prez XVXVI vek. Dokumenti ot Tsarigradskite arhivi [Vidin and the Vidin Sancak, 15 t h - 1 6 t h centuries. D o c u m e n t s f r o m the Istanbul Archives], eds V. Mutafchieva and M. Staynova, (Sofia, 1975) p. 73. 2 Izvori za balgarskata istoriya. Seriya XV XVI vek [Sources for Bulgarian History. 15 th - 16 t h centuries Series], v. XIII, eds N. Todorov and B. Nedkov, (Sofia, 1966) p. 197 - a timar of Ishak, son of Kapudan; see also R. Kovachev, Opis na Nikopolskiya sandzhak ot 80-te godini na XV vek [Inventory of the Nikopol Sancak], (Sofia, 1997) p. 49. ''C. imber, "The navy of Siileyman the Magnificent," in Idem, Studies in Ottoman History and Law, (Istanbul, 1996) p. 62. ^1. H. Uzun?ar§ih, Osmanli Devletinin 403.

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to Evliya (^elebi, there was in Vidin in the 1660s a captain commanding ten boats with 300 sailors, whose main task was to prosecute brigands on the Danube islands or those who crossed the river from the opposite bank. This was the Vidin kapudanlik.1 Apart from the seat of the Tuna kapudanlik, R u s f u k seems to have had a kapudanlik of its own as well, as we see a Rusguk kapudam Ali Kapudan transporting zahire for the soldiers guarding Belgrade and Teme§var by an ocaklik sciyka.2 Twenty-one reises of ships obviously attached to the Rus§uk port came to the local Sheriat court to declare that they had received the payment for the transportation of the zahire from the kaza of Hezargrad (Razgrad), Rusfuk. §umnu (Shumen), Eski Cuma (Targovishte), Ala Kilise (Popovo) due for the 1074 (1663-1664). 3 Tul?a also had several (at least 16) ships attached to the port, which had to transport provisions from the local stores to Isakga. 4 Finally, wc learn from an order concerning the transportation of the i§tira from the sancaks of Silistra, of Nikbolu and of Vidin, that there were ships (sejine) appointed (tayin) to each of them that were commanded to take it to Belgrade. 5 It is not clear whether the ships Evliya mentions in Vidin, comprising the Vidin kapudanlik, and those we see in Ruscuk and Tulga belonged to the same type, the former obviously being a sort of warship, and their main purpose being to prosecute brigands, while the latter had to carry provisions and munitions. Most probably each significant, but also smaller port had ships of both types which served the purposes of the Ottoman policy and military machine in the region, and probably were regarded as part of the Great Tuna kapudanlik. Their commanders were probably the Tuna kapudanlar we often see in the earlier sicills, as addressees of orders concerning the transportation of various items for the needs of the serhad in Belgrade, 6 in return for their salaries received as ocaklik from the mukataas of Rusguk and Silistra.

^Evliya Chelebi, Patepis [A Travel Account], transl. and ed. S. Dimitrov, (Sofia: OF, 1972) p. 60; [See also Evliya (Jtelebi, Seyahatnamesi, eds Y. Dagli, S.A. Kahraman, I. Sezgin, vol. 6 (Istanbul: YKY, 2002), p. 98.] 2 N B K M (National Library Sts Cyril and Methodius), Or. Dept., R 2, f. 89a, doc. II, January 1699. %MR (Istoricheski Muzey/History Museum - Ruse), B 2919, f. 70a, doc. I. Dimitrov, V. Tonev and N. Zhechev, Istoriya na Dobrudzha [History of Dobrudzha], v. Ill, (Sofia, 1988), p. 58. 5 IMR, B 2919, f. 48a, doc. Ill, February 1664. 6 Ibid., f. 12b, doc. I, of April 1664, for the transportation of rice from the capital along the Danube to Belgrade; f. 33b, doc. I, of August 1663, issued on a similar occasion; f. 48b, doc. I, March 1664, an order to provide sufficient number of cerahor for the transportation of the miri zahire and ipira. It seems that the kapudan of the port of Rus9uk in 1663-1665 was a Mustafa Bege (see f. la, doc. II, f. 2a, doc. IV) or Kapudan Mustafa Bey b. Abdulmenan, as he is named in another document (f. 3b, doc. III).

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The local port kapudans were obliged to military service with their gemis and kayiks any time they were called to the banners. 1 It should be pointed out here that the Tuna kapudan does not appear in the pages of the skills dating from the last decades of the 17th century. However, we still do not know whether this was owing to an organisational change in the structure of the Danube fleet of the Ottomans or just some coincidence. Our impression from the documents in the sicills is that the term kapudan had a specific connotation, related to some administrative office, as opposed to the ordinary reise,s, the captains of the ships. Evliya also relates some information on the formation of the Tuna kapudanlik. According to him, during the reign of Sultan Ahmed I (16031617) a certain §ak§aki Pa§a, in his capacity of Tuna kapudam, was charged with the task of guarding the river as far as Estcrgom with 50 frigates (firkata). In winter he returned to the port of Rus^uk where his gemis found shelter. 2 This piece of information is corroborated by [documents about the salary of the commander of the Danube fleet, which specify the names of the commanders, respectively for 1603 - Ahmed Bey, and probably 1606 - Seyyid Mustafa; and later, by] a document entered in a sicill dating from 1656-57 and dealing with the obligations of peasants from the village of Mechka, near Rusguk, to provide gozgegirs for the Tuna kapudam? All this should move the date of the establishment of the central Tuna kapudanlik in Rusguk several decades back, towards the beginning of the 17th century, [probably during the Long War of 1593-1606,] if not even earlier, but for the time being we are still unable to say when exactly it came into being and what made its constitution necessary. While the existence of the institution seems well attested during the 17th century , or for the better part of it, soon after the war with the Holy League, [for the 18th the status of the commander of the Danube fleet and the location of his seat seems less clear.]

' i M R , B 2919, f. 7a, doc. II, •'See "Patuvane na Evliya Chetebi iz bâlgarskite zemi prez sredata na XVII vek," transi, by D. Gadzhanov, Periodichesko spisanie na BKD, v. LXX (XXI) (Plovdiv, 1909) p. 656-657; [see also Evliya Çelebi, Seyahatnamesi, eds Y. Dagh, S.A. Kahraman, vol. 3 (Istanbul: YKY, 1999), p. 180. Evliya Çelebi mentions the pa§a also elsewhere in his Book of Travels, where we learn that during the reign of Sultan Ahmed I he was governor of Ôzu (Ôziï hakimi), Ibid, vol. 5 (Istanbul: YKY, 2001), p. 64.] • [See C. Finkel, The Administration of Warfare: The Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606, (Wien: VWGO, 1988), p. 278 fn 172, whose information applies especially about 1603-1606]; NBKM, Or. Dept., R 1, f. 7a, doc. I.

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The commander of the Tuna donanma [At the end of] the 17th century he held the rank of pas a, and mirimiran or emir ul-iimera} but we also come across a probably lower rank of the holder of the same office. Thus, [at the beginning of the 17th century the commander of the Danube fleet held the rank of mirliva, respectively bey].2 In July 1700, in a berat for the appointment of a kapudan of the whirlpools at Ipek, we find that it was issued following an il&m by Ibrahim, kapuciba§i at the Sublime Porte and commander of the §aykas on the Danube (Tuna §aykalari ba$)? For the time being it is not possible to say whether [the rank of the commander of the Danube fleet had been elevated during the War with the Holy League, but had been lower before it, and was reduced again after it, or this is] another official, responsible only for the ¡aykas in the Tuna donanma. [Several years later, in 1706, the holder of the position is again pa§a, but whether he ranked as mirliva or mirimiran is not quite clear. Also not clear is his location. 4 An interesting detail about his functions surfaces in the records of the kadi of Vidin. Following the death of the dizdar of the palanka of Archar, a small fort on the Danube cast of Vidin, he had sent an arz suggesting the next appointee. 5 Whether this was a permanent component of his obligations, and for all ports on the Danube, is difficult to judge since this is so far unique document of this nature. It may also have to do with the specific developments in the sancak of Vidin after the war of 1683-99. This, however, remains to be studied in the available sources.]

^See, for example, a series of orders to Tuna kapudam All Pa§a, from 1106/ 1694, the first beginning with "Sen ki mirimirani ...", MD 106, p. 74, doc. I, II, III. See also S. Ivanova on the same person, "Ali Pa§a: Sketches from the life of a Kapudan Pa§a on the Danube," in The Kapudan Pasha and His Domain, ed. E. Zachariadou, (Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 2002), p. 325-45. It should be pointed out here that there was also a Kara Deniz Kapudan Pa§a at the same time. See a document addressed to his vekil and the kadi of Kili, of 1089/ 1678. BBOA, Istanbul, MD 96, p. 94, doc. IV. ^[See Finkel, The Administration of Warfare, p. 278, fn. 172: Ahmed Bey, mirliva-yi Tuna; Seyyid Mustafa, mirliva-yi nehr-i Tuna.] 3 NBKM, Or. Dept., S14, f. 36a, doc. I. 4 [See a buyuruldu of the Tuna kapudam Ayub Pa§a recorded in the sicil of the kadi of Vidin, and addressed to the kadis on the Danube until Babadag. Above it is a buyuruldu of Hasan Pasa, the governor of Belgrade, probably about the same issue, to the kadis on the Danube till Rus?uk. This may be taken as an indication that at that moment the seat of the admiral had been moved to the immediate serhad. NBKM, Or. Dept., S 38, f. 28r, docs I and II. In another document related to him he is titled emir ul-iimera el-ekarim, S 38, f. 14r, doc. I.] 5 [NBKM, Or. Dept., S 38, f. 13v, doc. II, f. 14r, doc. I (the berat), of 1705.]

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The number of the sailing vessels Comprising the Nehr-i Tuna Donanma-i Hiimayun is not quite clear. Available sources provide different figures, which may be attributed to various circumstances. It depends on what type of ships were considered part of the fleet, but also the fact that probably the number may have depended on whether it was in time of peace or war. As mentioned above, according to Evliya Çelebi, §ak§aki Pasa patrolled at the head of a fleet of 50 ships. Similar figures are provided by a source from the Mevkufat. In it, the size of the Danube fleet maintained by the Ottomans during the late 17th century wars was 52 vessels manned by a total of 4,070 crew. These were four galliotes (halite) each with a 227-man crew, 28 frigates (firkata) with 85 men each, and 20 flat-bottomed river boats (sayka) with 40 men each. 1 On the other hand, Uzunçarçih says that in 1696, there were, apart from the 12 ocaklik çayka supplied by Filordin, Ada-i Kebir, Ipek, Bogiirdelen, Rahova, Hirsova, Rusçuk and other places, also ocaklik §ayka provided by Ismail, the mUtevelli of Isakça, and others (one by each of them), by the nazir of Kili (2), and the voyvoda of Wallachia (5), and 10 kalite, 30 firkata, 39 §aykas, and 100 iistii açiks, duly armed with guns, provided by the state (hUkiimet). 2 After the conclusion of the Karlowatz peace treaty of 1699 there were 19 kalites, five big and 28 small firkatas, three çaykas, and 100 iistii açiks, that is, transport boats. 3 The sicill material from the time of the war with the Holy League seems to corroborate the latter data, with some modifications. So far we have not come across any kalite among the ships sailing on the Danube. This, however, may be attributed to the rather fluctuating terminology used as regards the vessels on the Danube. It is rather difficult to count all the iistii açiks functioning as part of the Danube fleet, but some indirect data confirm the number of about 100. There were ocaklik §aykas provided by several officials as well as by various ports, whose number varied obviously depending on the needs of the army. According to a document referring to the wintering of the donanma-i hiimayun in Rusçuk, of March 1699, there were also 28 small firkatas, and 39 miri §aykas.4 Marsigli confirms our suggestion. According to Mm, the Ottomans maintained a large number of well-armed vessels with sails and oars. In 1689', during the battle at Vidin, the fleet was composed of three "demie galères", six small "brigantines" and several other small vessels. After its destruction there, the

* Quoted from R. Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700, (UCL Press, 1999) p. 235, n. 12. H. Uzuncarçih, Bahriye, p. 403, n. 2. 3 Ibid„ p. 403-404. 4 NBKM, Or. Dept., R 2, f. 94a, doc. II.

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next year it appeared more numerous and in better order. In 1691, it was even larger, and caused much damage to the Habsburgs; this caused the creation of a similar Austrian fleet on the river, if not as abundant in oars, at least well supplied with guns. Marsigli says that during the years to follow, the Ottomans further reinforced this fleet. 1 It seems plausible, however, to suggest that the Tuna donanma consisted of a nucleus of ships that were under the direct command of the pa§a seated in Rus9uk, and other ships attached to the more important ports and the sancaks, which in times of war or other constraints joined the fleet Apart from the ships belonging to the Tuna donanma there were also ones sent from the capital and other, private property, that were mobilised to take part in military activities and for the transportation of provisions and munitions for the garrisons on the river; these we shall discuss in more detail below.

The Tuna donanma and its commander performed several functions In the first place it took part in military action during wars, mainly in support of the land troops. The same applies to its role during the war with the Holy League. Our Ottoman sources do not say anything on this, but we learn a lot from Count Marsigli, who wrote from the viewpoint of an eyewitness and participant in the battles. As mentioned above, the Ottoman fleet on the Danube, led by Danube Admiral Ali Pa§a, 2 was routed by the Austrians in 1689 during the battle for Vidin. In 1691 the reinforced Ottoman fleet managed to block the Danube and the Austrians were forced to take special precautions to stop its passage, by fortifying a small islet near the Cataracts. In 1691 the Ottoman fleet managed to cause damage to the Austrian stores of munitions which were on barges. During the siege of Belgrade, the artillery on the Ottoman ships again caused much damage to the Habsburg fleet and on land. 3 Despite these examples, it should be pointed out that only very rarely did the fleet on the Danube acquire the role of an independent military force, its main function being to support the land forces; the only exception was probably the relatively minor battle at Titel. 4

Comte Luigi di Marsigli, L'Etat militaire de l'Empire ottoman, ses progrès et sa décadence, v. II, Seconde partie, Opérations militaires des Turcs, (Amsterdam, 1732), p. 171. ^See on him S. Ivanova, "Ali Pasha." 3 Le Comte Luigi Marsigli, L'Etat militaire, p. 171-172. ^See J. von Hammer, Histoire de l'Empire ottoman (depuis son origines jusqu'à nos jours), v. XII (1676-1699), (Paris, 1838) p. 402-403.

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The local divisions of the fleet, as well as, probably, its nucleus, had to patrol the river. In their respective segment of the course of the Danube they had to prevent attacks of haydud on the islands and on the Ottoman bank and to guard the Ottoman ships. 1 The guards on the river were also charged with catching slaves and criminals trying to cross to the Wallachian side. One of the main functions of the river fleet, but also of all ships mobilised during the wars or sent from the capital, was the carrying of war material from Isakga, Kili, Akkerman, or straight from the capital to the battlefields and the serhad fortresses in Central Europe, most often to the stores at Belgrade. This seems to be the best-documented side of the role of the river fleet, and state-organised shipping in general. 2 The sicilh abound in documents related to the transportation of guns and artillery ammunition, cannon balls in particular 3 , lead and gunpowder, 4 rifles,5 and other items. Ships also carried various provisions to the major storehouses in Belgrade, which throughout the 17th century, and after the war, remained the main store for munitions and provisions for the Ottoman troops in the serhad on the western border, but also elsewhere - for wheat, barley, flour, rice, peksimed (hard biscuit), salt and other supplies. Other major storehouses were located in Isakca. to supply the serhad at the north-eastern Ottoman border. 6 The storehouses in Belgrade were supplied from the hinterland via other

iSee, for example, NBKM, Or. Dept., S 13, f. 20a, doc. II, of November-December 1698. According to this order the whole length of the river between Belgrade and Vidin was divided among the garrisons in the fortresses on the Danube and they had to ensure the safety of the traffic. 2 [See on the traffic on the Danube with provisions for the Ottoman army during another major war in the region, in 1593-1606, Finkel, The Administration of Warfare, passim. ] 3 IMR, B 2919, f. 8a, doc. I, of July 1663 about the transportation of 20,000 top famuri (?) and 3,000 cannon balls; f. 10b, doc. I, of the same time, 1,500 cannon balls from the capital to Belgrade; f. 49b, doc. II, of February 1664, about two sizes of cannon and other (top ve sair) balls, 12,000 of 14 okka each, and 3,000 of 9 okka each; f. 54b, doc. II, May 1664, of cannon balls from Belgrade to the port of Varna on the Black Sea; f. 70a, doc. Ill, April 1665, cannon balls from the port of Varna to Belgrade; f. 71a, doc. IV, May 1665, cannon copper (top bakin) from Belgrade to the capital; NBKM, Or. Dept., R 3, p. 46, doc. II, p. 47, doc. Ill, p. 48, doc. I, IV, March 1687, of men and munitions from the capital to Feth til-Islam; p. 47, doc. I, May 1687, speaking just of cebehane ships, p. 51, doc. VI, May 1687, a ship from the capital to Belgrade carrying 500 kantar of gunpowder, rifles, wooden spades and cebehane mUhimmatv, S 345, f. 4a, doc. Ill, of May 1697, about guns and munitions to Belgrade; R 2, f. 64b, doc. I, of March 1698, ammunition (muhimmati) from the capital for the cebehane in the defence of Belgrade, S 14, f. 38b, doc. II, of July 1701, concerning the transportation of miri guns from Kili via Bender and Belgrade to unspecified fortresses in the Bosnian serhad; f. 39a, doc. I, of the same date, about guns from Kameni9e via Akkerman and Rus^uk to Belgrade. 4 IMR, B 2919, f. 52a, doc. Ill, of March 1664, for the transportation of 300 kantar, that is about 16,200 kg, of lead, from the capital to Belgrade, f. 53b, doc. I, of May 1664, for the transportation of gunpowder and 300 kantar of lead; f. 54a, doc. Ill, May 1664, of gunpowder and brass; f. 55b, doc. I, June 1664, 18 miri gemi loaded with gunpowder, from Rusguk to Zi§tovi (Svishtov, Bulgaria). 5 IMR, B 2919, f. 54b, doc. Ill, of June 1664, transportation of 2,000 rifles (ttifenk) and 2,150 kantar (116,100 kg) of gunpowder, etc. ^Dimitrov, Tonev and Zhechev, Istoriya na Dobrudzha, p. 58.

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Danube ports. There were larger or smaller storehouses in each port. 1 Judging by the documents recorded in the Vidin and Rus§uk skills, the main direction of the ships passing by these ports was either f r o m one of these ports, or even f r o m the capital and the Black Sea coast towards the granaries and storehouses in Belgrade. When provisions were collected from the region in order to be taken to Belgrade, the emin of the Belgrade storehouses would send his representative to receive the commodity. Each procedure was carried out in the presence of local court officials, and all stages - weighing, handing over the money, issuing a receipt, are meticulously recorded in the skills.2 The next step was contracting with the captains of the ships which had to carry the provisions in a specified direction, particularly when the ships were private property. In these cases, the mubayaci appeared in court together with the captain and the latter declared the conditions of the contract. Thus on 3 May 1698 Kara Ahmed Aga, of the reis on the river Danube, declared in the presence of the officer charged with the collection of the miri mubaya Elhac Mehmed Aga, kapucihasi at the Sublime Porte, that he had received 96 gurus for the salaries and alimony of 8 prestoyka (a kind of porter), and 75 gurus navlo (freight) for the ship, which was his private property (mtilk), 171 guru§ altogether. In return he undertook the transportation of 1,000 Istanbuli kile of barley to Belgrade. There the captain was to get a receipt from the emin of the anbar-i amire and present it to the mubayaci? The conditions on which the captains were to transport the provisions to Belgrade had to be arranged between the state officials (usually the orders mention the local kadi and the relevant officer) and the kethiida of the gemici, that is, the owners of the ships. 4 Fairly often the captains seem to have diverted some quantities despite the httccet and the kefalet they declared in front of the Sheriat judge. Then the mubayaci and the kadi of the place where the contract was recorded had to

See, for example, a document concerning the state of the provisions stored in Vidin, N B K M , Or. Dept., S 14, f. 13a, doc. II, of September 1700, as well as the numerous documents about the collection of the ipira in the ports to be transported to Belgrade. IMR, B2919, f. 51a, doc. II, March 1674; R2, f. 91b, doc. II, of 1699, f. 102b, doc. I, M a y 1699, etc. See also Dimitrov, T o n e v , Zhechev, Istoriya na Dobrudzha, p. 58. There were stores also in Silistra, Babadag, T u l f a and other ports along the lower reaches of the Danube, which supplied Isak9a. 2 S e e , for example, N B K M , Or. Dept., S 14, f. 9b, doc. II and III, 33,024 okka salt given at Lomgrad, a port near Vidin, the document being recorded in the presence of an official f r o m the Sheriat court in Vidin; f. 3b, doc. I, September 1699, 8,291 Istanbul kile of wheat; S 13, f. 30b, doc. II, of September 1700, the delivery of 80,000 kile of flour and wheat, etc. ^ N B K M , Or. Dept., R 2, f. 41a, doc. I. A f t e r this document there follows a list of 15 captains with summarised data of their contracts - just the n a m e of the captain, the amount and type of the grains in kile and sacks, the number of men, the amount of money received f o r the salaries of the prestoykas and for the freight of the ship, some of them with a date, others without; see also ibid., f. 61a, doc. II; IMR, B 2919, f. 70a, doc. I, of 1663/4. ^This is specifically pointed out in an order to the kadis on the Danube in Vidin, Nikbolu and Silistra and the ipim officer, of 1664. IMR, B 2919, f. 51a, doc. II.

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force the captains to clear off the shortages. 1 To some extent the procedure was the same when the provisions came from other places - then the officer responsible for their transportation received a document confirming that they had duly passed through the port. 2 Occasionally we see ships loaded with provisions or munitions sailing from Belgrade to another major fortified centre.3 The ships that constituted part of the Ottoman fleet on the Danube carried relatively rarely soldiers and military detachments to and from the battlefields, the preferred route to Central Europe being the Via Militaris. In one case we see 79th janissary oda transported from Belgrade to Rusfuk by ships (kayik), and then by carts to Varna, and again by ships to Erzurum, its next destination. 4 This, however, may be considered almost unique. We have seen in the sicilh only very few documents indicating that ships transported military detachments on a basis organised by the state. 5 However, following a ferman and an order of the serdar of Belgrade, Hasan Paga, the kadis along the Danube had to provide six Muslims "saved from the infidels' lands" with ships, steersmen and cerahors to sail from Belgrade to Rusguk/' Some military men seem to have used the river transport to return from the battlefields individually. It is not clear how and why this happened, but we find occasionally in the sicilh the estates of members of different military corps who had arrived in Rus$uk and died there, or had died on the ships. Here is one typical case: "His name is unknown" says a note on top of the document, and then follows the text: "Of the janissary taife. On 21 Rebi I 1075 on his way back from the emperor's campaign he fell ill on the ship. Upon entering Rusguk by Allah's will he died. Since no heirs are known, all his estate is listed in the prcscncc of Ali Aga, the serdar of the taife in the 1 See, for example, NBKM, Or. Dept., R 2, f. 78b, doc. I, February 1698, f. 84b, doc. I, February 1699. In May 1698, Suleyman Aga, the officer responsible for the collection of barley in the kaza of Rusguk, started litigation against Elhac Ali, member of the taife of the rases, because in 1695/6 he had to transport 1,500 Istanbuli kiles of barley to the granaries in Belgrade and received 470 gurus t o PaY the prestoykas and for freight for the ship. However, the receipt said that he had actually submitted only 1,089 kiles, and he was to pay back 131 guruges, ibid., f. 63b, doc. II. j ' I M R , B 2919, f. 70a, doc. Ill, May 1665, about cannon balls carried from Varna towards Belgrade; NBKM, R 3, p. 53, doc. Ill, an order from January 1686 concerning an investigation into the quantities of zahire kept by the kapudan and in the stores (mahzen) in the ports on the Danube from Belgrade to Tuljea, Isak9a, and Ismail. 3 See for example IMR, B 2919, f. 53a, doc. II, of 1663-1664, about ships carrying 300 kantars of lead to Ozii, or f. 54b, doc. II, of May 1664, of ships carrying cannon balls from Belgrade to Varna. 4 MBKM, Or. Dept., S 13, f. 27a, doc. Ill, of May 1699. 5 I n one case we see six kayiks transporting sekbans from Ruscjuk to Zijtovi, together with 18 kayiks loaded with gunpowder. IMR, B 2919, f. 55b, doc. I, June 1664. In another, an order was issued for the recruitment of iistu afik kayiklari and at kayiklan at the ports of Rus^uk and Nikbolu in connection with the advance of the Tartar troops from Vidin to the closer bank

(Vidin taraftan beruyakaya). NBKM, Or. Dept., R 2, f. 71b, doc. I, June 1698. 6

NBKM, Or. Dept., S 14, f. 37b, doc. V, of May 1701.

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town, as a vekil. The latter also compiled an arz for the burial." Then comes the very modest list of belongings of the soldier, consisting of some clothes "trousers (valvar), an old vest, an old jacket (anteri), a raincoat (yagmurluk), a napkin (makreme)" and a few other items, and some arms - a sword (kihq), a rifle ( t i i f e n k ) , a mace ( k i i l e n k ) , and a small bag with g u n p o w d e r " . 1 Apparently these men had arranged their return on their own, and maybe the ships they used were not part of the state fleet but private property of captains who sailed up and down the river. Finally, wc should mention that the ships of the Tuna donanma were used to carry the instruments (alat) and other requisites ( m u h i m m a t ) of the arsenal (cebehane), 2 the sultan's mint (zarbhane), 3 and the imperial music {mehterhane-i

ami

re).4

While some of the ships carried their cargoes straight to their destination and the local kadis were obliged to provide them only with cerahors and other specialised services, 5 in very many cases it is clear that the ships took their loads only to the next kaza where the local kadi and other officers had to arrange their further transport to the next station. 6 The ports on the Danube were also important elements of the Ottoman menzil system. As early as the late 16th century, maybe even earlier there was a smoothly functioning chain of way stations {menzil), beginning f r o m the confluence of the Danube into the Black Sea up the river at a day-travel. 7 In fact the chain was double, one menzil on the river supplying couriers and officials with boats (usually the documents speak of kayik), cerahors, ulaks,

' I MR, B 2919, f. 63b, doc. I, Octobcr 1664. See in the same sicill the estates of several other men - f. 63a, doc. I, f. 64a, doc. Ill, VI, etc. 2 See, for example, NBKM, Or. Dept., R 2, f. 81b, doc. II, of November 1698. The kadi of the Rus^uk and the gtimruk emini of the port of Rus9uk were informed that an officer of the cebehane ocak at the Sublime Porte had been charged to take the cebehane muhimmati from Belgrade to Rus^uk by ship. In the latter place the local authorities had to prepare a sufficient number of ox carts and salaries for the cart drivers which were to take the requisites to Edirne. 3 Ibid., f. 82a, doc. II, of November 1698. The kadi of Rusjuk and the local notables and officials were informed that the previous year the instruments and the requisites of the sultan's zarbhane were carried from Belgrade to Nikbolu by part of the ¡ayka of the Tuna donanma, and then on four ox carts to Edirne. During the current year another route was ordered. The instruments and some of the servants of the zarbhane of the imperial army had to be taken by jaykas to Rusguk, and thence - again on four ox carts - to Edirne. ^Ibid., f. 82b, doc. I, of November 1698. The kadi of Rus£uk and the local notables were ordered to provide sufficient number of ox carts for the transportation of the instruments and requisites of the mehterhane-i amire, which were to arrive from Belgrade by ship (sefine). 5 See, for example, NBKM, Or. Dept., R 3, p. 43, doc. II, September 1685, p. 48, doc. IV, March 1687. 6 Ibid„ p. 45, doc. I, February 1687, p. 46, doc. II, March 1687. 7 Karaharman-Kostence-Isak5a (whence one can go to the ports of Kartal, Ismail, Kili) -Balkov (to Ma5in)- DanagolU (to Ayramit)-Hirsova-Rasova-Silistra-Tutrakan-Rus9uk (to Yergogi and Kulle)-Zigtovi-Nikbolu-Karalom-Vidin-Karindova-Mekine-Gu|ercinlik-Demir kapr etc. BBOA, M.A.D., K.K. 2555, s. 23-24. The information from this document was given to me by Mr. A. Antonov, for which I thank him.

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and probably food, 1 the other, on dry land, running parallel to the river, providing horses, fodder, food, and ulaks, to messengers, especially in winter when the river was not navigable. 2

On shipbuilding There is abundant evidence that during the 15th-16th century there were shipbuilding centres on the Danube. Some of this was mentioned above. Here we shall try to summarise available data on the construction and equipment of ships along the lower course of the Danube. Documents relating to the preparations for the last campaign of Sultan Siileyman in Hungary in 1566 reveal that by that date facilities had been established for the construction of ships at Smederevo, Vidin, Rusguk, Nikbolu, Zvornik, PoCega, Krugevac. 3 After the destruction of the Ottoman navy at Lepanto, in 1573-1574, ships were built, among other places, at Vidin, Belgrade, Pocega, Zvornik. 4 A century later, Marsigli informs that a tersane was functioning at Rusguk. 5 The sicilh from the 17th ccntury, both from Vidin and Rus