Ottoman History and Society: Jewish Sources (Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies) 9781611431261, 1611431263

Citation preview

Ottoman History and Society

Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies

38

A co-publication with The Isis Press, Istanbul, the series consists of collections of thematic essays focused on specific themes of Ottoman and Turkish studies. These scholarly volumes address important issues throughout Turkish history, offering in a single volume the accumulated insights of a single author over a career of research on the subject.

Ottoman History and Society

Jewish Sources

Aryeh Shmuelevitz

1 aortas press

T h e Isis Press, Istanbul 2010

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2010 by The Isis Press, Istanbul Originally published in 1999 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of The Isis Press, Istanbul. 2010

ISBN 978-1-61143-126-1

Reprinted from the 1999 Istanbul edition.

Printed in the United States of America

Professor Aryeh Shmuclev il/ (BA and MA in History of the Middle East and Islamic Culture/Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Ph.D. in History of the Ottoman Empire/University of Wisconsin-Madison). Former Chair of the Department of Middle Eastern and African History/Tel Aviv University (TAU), and former Head of the Special Programs Division at the same university. Professor Shmuelevitz is one of the founders of the Shiloah Institute for Middle Eastern and African Studies (later the Moshe Dayan Center) and of its annual publication The Middle East Record, and is a Senior Research Fellow at that Center. His fields of specialization are the history and society of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey and Iran; and the Jews of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. He is the author of The Jews of the Ottoman Empire in the Late 15th and the 16th Centuries (Brill, 1984), Republican Turkey: Aspects of Internal Affairs and International Relations (The Isis Press, 1999) and numerous articles, chapters and monograph dealing with Turkish and Iranian politics as well as with the history and society of the Jews of the Ottoman Empire. He is also editor of Seder Eliyahu Zuta by Rabbi Eliyahu Capsali (History of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice, in three volumes, TAU and Ben Zvi Institute, 1975, 1977, 1983, in Hebrew), and co-editor of The Middle East Record (1960, 1961, 1967, 1968, 1969-70), and of The Hashemites in the Modern Arab World (Frank Cass, 1995).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

7

The Responsa as a Source for the History of the Ottoman Empire in The Jews of the Ottoman Empire in the Late Fifteenth and the Sixteenth Centuries. Leiden: E J . Brill, pp. 1-9

19

Capsali as a Source for Ottoman History, 1450-1523 in International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, (1978), pp. 339-344

29

vol. 9

The Jews in Cairo at the Time of the Ottoman Conquest: The Account of Capsali in S. Shamir (ed.), The Jews of Egypt, Boulder: Westview Press, 1987, pp. 3-8

37

Jewish Sources for the History and Society of Greece and its Jewish Communities in the 15th and 16th Centuries in I. K. Hassiotis (ed.), The Jewish Communities of S. E. Europe: From the 15th Century to the End of WWII. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1997, pp. 495-500.

43

The Battle of Khan Yunis, 1516. (Unpublished)

49

MS Pococke No. 31 as a Source for the Events in Istanbul in the Years 1622-24 International Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. Ill (1985-86), No. 2, pp. 107-121

55

Two Hebrew-Language Weeklies in Turkey: An Appeal to Revive Concept of a National Culture. in Turkiye'de Yabanci Dilde Basin, Istanbul University Yayinlan No. 3342, Basin-Yayin Yuksekokulu Yayinlari: 2, 1985, pp. 109-125

73

Relations Between Jews and Christians in the Ottoman Empire: The Armenian Case in XI Turk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1994, pp. 2029-2033

83

6

OTTOMAN

HISTORY

AND

SOCIETY

9. The Ottoman City in the Sixteenth Century — Aspects of Taxation as Reflected in Jewish Sources. (Unpublished)

89

10. The Archives of Tel Aviv-Jaffa as a Source for the letter Years of the Ottoman Empire in Palestine in M. Maoz (ed.), Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period. Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1975, pp. 548-556

93

INTRODUCTION

Scholars of Ottoman history and society began delving into the Empire's Jewish sources in the 1950s. They hoped that these sources, written in Hebrew, could deepen understanding of the historical and socio-economic developments within the Empire and of the Ottoman authorities' relations with the Jewish community. The latter was well established in the Empire, its members soundly integrated in daily affairs, particularly economic life. Jews were active in the areas of trade, peddling, craftsmanship, money-changing and handling, tax and customs collection, and so forth. Examination of the Jewish sources proved fruitful; they shed light on developments in the aforementioned areas with regard to the Jews, their Muslim and Christian neighbours, and the Ottoman authorities as well. Among the Jewish sources examined was the Responsa literature — questions on matters of religious law submitted to rabbis and their replies. This legal-judicial material spans a wide range of topics and contains much information on the social, economic, legal and administrative aspects of daily life in the Empire. Chronicles written by Jewish "historians" on the history of the Empire and its Jewish community constitute another source. They offer descriptions of, and comments, on political developments in the Empire (wars, conquests, "diplomatic" relations, court intrigues and internal struggles in the Imperial Court, the government and the military) and include references to both Muslim and non-Muslim communities, the Jewish one in particular. Jewish books or collections on such subjects as taxation or ethics also offer relevant information. Jewish magazines, journals and newspapers, in Hebrew, Lad ¡no, and French, published late in the nineteenth century and on into the twentieth, provided scholars with a wealth of material concerning the Jewish community, the Ottoman Empire, and Jewish communities beyond the Empire. Last but not least are Jewish documents in Hebrew on the Jewish community and its relations with its Muslim and Christian neighbours and the Ottoman authorities. These last are few in number and mostly from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as are the Jewish media mentioned above. Are there more sources, especially documents and manuscripts, in Hebrew and Ladino, in the archives and libraries of formerly Ottoman lands? No authoritative answer or information has yet been obtained, even from the Basbakanhk Ar§ivi or Stileymaniye Kiitiiphanesi both in Istanbul.

8

OTTOMAN

HISTORY

AND

SOCIETY

The articles included in this volume deal with almost all of the sources mentioned above: a) the Responsa are discussed in the introduction to my book on The Jews of the Ottoman Empire; (b) the chronicles are examined and used in the articles: " Capsali as a Source for Ottoman History...," "The Jews in Cairo at the Time of the Ottoman Conquest...," "Jewish Sources for the History and Society of Greece...," "The Battle of Khan Yunis, 1516," and "MS Pococke No. 31 as a Source for the Events in Istanbul..."; (c) two Jewish periodicals are discussed in: "Two H e b r e w - L a n g u a g e Weeklies in Turkey..." and "Relations between J e w s and Christians in the O t t o m a n Empire..."; (d) a book on taxation in Salonica is examined in the article on "The Ottoman City in the Sixteenth century — Aspects of Taxation..."; (e) the article on "The Archives of Tel Aviv-Jaffa as a Source for the Latter Years of the Ottoman Empire in Palestine" makes use of other documents. Noteworthy at this juncture is the scholars' realisation that the abovementioned Hebrew sources preserved echoes of life beyond the confines of the Jewish community in the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, they also have much to contribute to our knowledge and understanding of socio-political, economic, cultural and military developments in the Ottoman Empire at large. The best e x a m p l e , perhaps, is the battle of Khan Yunis, which took p l a c e b e t w e e n the O t t o m a n s and the M a m l u k s in D e c e m b e r 1516. Descriptions of this battle offered by Ottoman and Egyptian historians of the sixteenth century, as well as by Europeans of the same period, were to a large extent c o n f u s i n g . C a p s a l i ' s m o r e lucid a c c o u n t , based on information he received f r o m a Jew who had accompanied the Sultan and his army to Egypt, resolves much of the confusion over the Ottoman battle formation and tactics (see "The Battle of Khan Yunis — 1516," below).

The

Responsa In the last fifty years, the R e s p o n s a literature has been

mined

exhaustively as a source for the history of the Ottoman Empire and its Jewish community. Indeed, a great many scholarly articles and books on related topics were based on the Responsa of rabbis of the Empire. In most of those works, this corpus was tapped for information on Jewish society and economy, with special attention to the autonomous regime of the community and its internal administration (taxation, judicial p o w e r , e d u c a t i o n , worship c e r e m o n i e s , public property etc...) as well as to the c o m m u n i t y ' s relations with the authorities and with its Muslim and Christian neighbours.

9

INTRODUCTION

Some scholars found the Responsa to be a valuable source for their research on the Ottoman Empire proper, especially in the socio-economic field. As early as the 1950s, the late Professor Uriel Heyd discussed the matter in his article on "Osmanh Tarihi ibranice Kaynaklar." 1 He offered the example of the glass factory in Edirne to prove the importance of the Responsa as a source for the history of the Ottoman Empire. 1, too, devoted much time to study of the Responsa and found them a useful source for my book, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire? In it, I endeavour, inter alia, to demonstrate the utility of this source while discussing security along the trade routes in the Empire 3 and its main kinds of taxes and levies and the ways they were collected.4 Despite the thorough harvesting of the Responsa as a source for the history of the Ottoman Empire and its Jewish community, some scholars have gone over the same ground in recent years, ignoring those who preceded them. Such a scholar is Marc D. Angel, who delivered a paper on the "Responsa Literature in the Ottoman Empire as a Source for the Study of Ottoman Jewry" at a conference at Brandéis University on 10-12 May 1987, 5 The examples he offered to prove the importance of the Responsa had not been thoroughly examined. The reader might, for example, be confused to find that Candia was part of the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the sixteenth century 6 (it was conquered by the Ottomans only in the mid-seventeenth century), or that Jews in the Ottoman could carry out real estate transactions in a Jewish court of law according to Jewish Law without registering the transaction in a Muslim law court. 7 Had he read other research works based on the Responsa, he would have found that not only were Jews obligated to register property transactions in the Muslim law courts, they were in fact urged to do so by the rabbis — even if they had already carried out the transaction in a Jewish court of law. Moreover, the rabbis regarded property transactions conducted in the Muslim law courts as legal, and not only because "the law of the Kingdom is law": One of the three acts required by Jewish law to confirm the transaction, that is, the actual payment, was performed before the Qadi in the Muslim law court according to the Shari'ah. Only then did the Qadi give his judicial approval. 8

' i n VI. Türk Tarih Kongresi

(Ankara: 1967), pp. 295-303.

^ A . Shmuelevitz, The Jews of the Ottoman Centuries (Leiden: 1984). 3 Ibid., pp. 153-166.

Empire

in the Late Tifleenth

and the

^Ibid., pp. 81-127. 5

I n A . Levi, ed., The Jews of the Ottoman Empire (Princeton: 1994), pp. 669-685.

fybid., p. 677. 1

Ibid„

O

p. 681. r

°Shmuelevitz, The Jews of the Ottoman

Empire, pp. 55-60.

Sixteenth

10

OTTOMAN

HISTORY

AND

SOCIETY

The essential question is of course the reliability of the Responsa. This matter was discussed in more detail in the "Introduction" to The Jews of the Ottoman Empire..., reproduced below in this volume. Here it suffices to say that, because the responsa literature is essentially a collection of texts recording religious, legal deliberations, its credibility as an unbiased historical source is high. In this respect, the Responsa collections can be compared to the Fetvas collections of the §eyhtilislams, especially the leading ones whose collections were published and followed by their successors and other Muftis in the Empire. The same occurred with the collections of the Responsa. A comparison of the two sources with respect to certain aspects of the Jewish community in the Empire yields a more accurate picture of the Jews' status. Juxtaposition with the sicil (protocol) of the Muslim courts of law is yet more conducive to understanding certain developments, particularly in the judicial-legal field. The Responsa, insofar as it confirms information from Ottoman primary sources, is itself confirmed as a reliable source.

The

Chronicles

The chronicles discussed in some of the following articles are specifically, Seder Eliyahu Zuta (a history of the Ottoman Empire), written by Rabbi Eliyahu Capsali of Crete in the early 1520s, and a manuscript of an anonymous writer covering the years between 1622 and 1624, which is more of a socio-political diary of events in Istanbul and the Empire at large than a chronicle. How have these chronicles furthered our understanding of the history of the Ottomans and of their Jewish subjects? Both helped scholars determine the reliability of information that appeared in other sources, leading them to accept or reject it. No less important is how Jewish historians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries perceived developments within the Ottoman Empire, various imperial policies and viewpoints, and the attitudes of the authorities and of other peoples to the Jews. The two chronicles reserved most of their descriptions and comments for the Ottomans, the members of their Sultans' governments, wars, and so forth, but they did not neglect their own kinsmen when they obtained certain kinds of information about them. The chief problem for the scholar dealing with this material is that the chronicles are often the sole extant source. Such is also sometimes the case with material concerning the Ottomans at large, but this particular difficulty crops up more frequently in connection with developments and events in the Empire's Jewish community. In this instance, the scholar had to gauge the reliability, trustworthiness and authenticity of the chronicles. Although many of their descriptions and comments were confirmed by other primary sources, they are still regarded as circumspect in those areas for which no parallel, or

INTRODUCTION

11

corroborating sources exist. This is especially so regarding the chronicle of Capsali. The information it contains should be treated with precautions and reservations, and scholars should consider the limitation and shortcomings of the authors of that period. There are, nevertheless, two schools of thought concerning Capsali's chronicle where it offers the only available version of events: one rejects it, the other accepts it. An example in point is the question of whether Sultan M e h m e t II established a position of Chief Rabbi of the Jewish community in the Empire following the conquest of Constantinople. According to Capsali, the Sultan appointed his great uncle Rabbi Moses Capsali Chief Rabbi following the conquest. He undoubtedly received this information from his father, who had spent some time with his great uncle in Istanbul. However, other sources indicate that Moses had no authority over Jewish communities in the Empire outside of Istanbul. Nor is it clear that his successor in Istanbul, Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrahi, attained the position of Chief Rabbi, although he did have a hand in imposing a tax on members of the Jewish community in Salonica. The evidence available leads only so far as the assumption that Sephardic Jewish immigration to the Empire, by tipping the demographic balance of the Jewish community in favour of its Sephardic element, led to internal jockeying for the position of Chief Rabbi (if the position indeed existed). As a result, the community did not have a chief religious leader until the first half of the nineteenth century, in contrast to the other non-Muslim monotheistic communities.' Another example of information from a chronicle with no external corroborating material is Capsali's account of the Ottoman Sultans' attitudes toward the Jewish community in general and toward the waves of Jewish immigrants from Spain and Portugal in particular. Material exists relating to the immigration and how the immigrants were welcomed by the Ottomans, mainly in Jewish sources, but these sources relied heavily on Capsali's version of events. To date, hardly any Ottoman or Mamluk sources discussing or referring to the immigration have been found that can corroborate or refute Capsali's version. T h e expulsion of the Jews from Spain was undoubtedly a well known event at that time and it would defy reason to suggest that it went unnoticed and unmentioned in non-Jewish sources. Surely the Ottoman government issued some official documents regarding this incident and its aftermath. T h e problem is the dearth of source material remaining in the Ottoman Archives from the period before the mid-sixteenth century. 1 A. Shmuelevitz, S. Simonson, M. Benayahu, eds., Seder Eliyahu Zuta by Rabbi Eliyahu Capsali (Jerusalem: 1975), I: 11, 8 1 - 8 2 (in Hebrew); J. H e c k e r , "The 'Chief Rabbinate' in the Ottoman Empire in the 15th and 16th Centuries," Zion 4 9 (1984): 225-255 (in Hebrew); A . Shmuelevitz, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 18-24.

12

OTTOMAN

HISTORY

AND

SOCIETY

Nor have any sicils of the period of the immigration yet been found. A s they deal with many aspects of daily life (economic, fiscal, social, legal and criminal matters), protocols f r o m Muslim courts of law in the cities and towns where the immigrants settled would provide the scholar with m u c h pertinent material. They would also include a summary of the imperial edicts (fermans)

sent to the law court to be carried out by the qadi and this in turn

might contain, inter alia, edicts concerning the absorption of the Jewish immigrants that would confirm or confute Capsali's account. Such documents from the period in question, however, are not available. Thus constrained by the paucity of sources with which to reconstruct the past, the scholar must rely on Jewish sources, mainly Seder Eliyahu Zuta, to study the process of the immigrants' resettlement in the Ottoman Empire and their treatment at the hands of the authorities. In his Seder Eliyahu Zuta, Capsali discussed the history of the Ottoman E m p i r e , mainly under the rule of three Sultans: M e h m e t II ( 1 4 5 1 - 1 4 8 1 ) , Bayezit II (1481-1512), and Selim I (1512-1520) and the history of Spain and its Jewish community from the Islamic conquest of Spain until the expulsion of the Jews in 1492. 1 Capsali and especially his father and great uncle in Istanbul (Moses Capsali), were all deeply involved in helping the immigrants in Crete and in the Empire. Hence it comes as no surprise that Capsali devoted considerable space in his chronicle to the immigration process, from expulsion to resettlement in the Ottoman Empire with the blessing of the Ottoman authorities. Capsali, as some of the following articles illustrate, greatly admired the three Sultans portrayed in his chronicle: M e h m e t II, the c o n q u e r o r of Constantinople; his son Bayezit II, who opened the gates of the Empire to Jewish immigrants from Spain (although Capsali depicted him as a devout Muslim who closed newly built synagogues in Istanbul, and w h o took part in forcing Jews to convert to Islam — an act considered to be contrary to Islamic Law); a n d , of course, Selim I, the c o n q u e r o r of Syria, Palestine (Eretz Yisrael), and Egypt, a conquest that, according to Capsali, initiated the process of the redemption of the Jewish people. Capsali connected all three Sultans, directly or indirectly, with the resettlement of Jewish i m m i g r a n t s in the Empire. Sultan Bayezit II received the most attention and the highest praise for his deeds to facilitate the absorption of the Jewish immigrants from Spain. Capsali's high regard for M e h m e t gains expression in his attempt to portray this Sultan as beneficent toward the Spanish Jews. Sultan Mehmet II

' A . Shmuelevitz. et al„ eds.. Seder Eliyahu Zuta by R. Eliyahu vol. II (Jerusalem: 1977), vol. Ill (Tel Aviv: 1983).

Capsali, vol. I (Jerusalem: 1975),

INTRODUCTION

13

died twelve years before the expulsion of the Jews from Spain, but some Spanish Jews came to the Ottoman Empire before that, fleeing the occasional pogroms of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It seems that, for Capsali, all Jewish emigrants from Spain were part of a single wave, thus Mehmet II numbered among those Sultans that contributed to their absorption. One anecdote that offered to demonstrate Mehmet II's gracious attitude to the Spanish Jews concerned the rapport that developed between the Sultan and a musician of Spanish-Jewish origin. The musician managed to please the Sultan and in return the Sultan invited him to sing and play regularly in the palace, for which he paid him a generous salary. 1 It is difficult to prove the authenticity of this anecdote, although some elements, such as the name of the Spanish Jew, might be able to do so. From the historian's perspective, however, the anecdote is significant not because it may be objectively true, but because Capsali employed it to demonstrate Sultan Mehmet II's affection for the Spanish Jews. Capsali went on to construct a link between Sultans Mehmet II and Bayezit II concerning their attitude towards the immigrants: both father and son were most benevolent toward the Jews and allowed those who had come from other countries to "enjoy the cream of the land". 2 He added that Sultan Bayezit, like his father before him, treated the immigrants well. He did not cast out the Jews that had been expelled from Spain, Aragon, Portugal, and Sicily, and thus prevented the complete destruction of Spanish Jewry. 3 When he came to the deeds of Sultan Bayezit II, Capsali moved from generalities to details: According to the narrative, Sultan Bayezit, upon hearing what the King of Spain had done to the Jews and that the Jews were looking for a new place to settle, sent messengers to all parts of his Kingdom with a letter in which he ordered the governors of the provinces not to repel them or expel them, but to welcome them. 4 According to Capsali, the document reached the island of Khios (although the island was not yet under Ottoman rule) and the contents, somewhat distorted, found their way to Capsali. He mentioned them again in another chapter of his chronicle, reiterating Bayezit's decision to welcome the Spanish Jews and to invite them to settle in the Empire. 5 Capsali mentioned several times that the imperial decisions were included in an imperial letter (no doubt a Ferman) that was distributed among

^ Seder Eliyahu Zuta, I: 91-93. lbid„ p. 241. 3 / U d , p . 141. 4 lbid„ p. 218-219. S Ibid„ p. 239. 2

14

OTTOMAN

HISTORY

AND

SOCIETY

the governors and proclaimed in cities and towns throughout the Empire. Here again, scholars cannot confirm this information by comparing it with other sources (such as Ottoman documents) because nothing bearing on this topic has been unearthed. Historians must therefore, despite their reservations, continue to rely on Capsali. A t least one detail is certain: Sultan Bayezit II chose to open the gate to the immigrants because this group could enhance the economic prosperity of the Empire and augment its military power. Capsali reiterated that the O t t o m a n s w e r e most grateful to the immigrants for helping the Empire to modernize the army's f i r e a r m s . The improvements were a boon to Sultan Selim I in the campaigns against the Persians and the Mamluks and therefore, Capsali claimed, Sultan Selim was very generous to the Jewish c o m m u n i t y . The immigrants' involvement in military matters, as well as the sole confirmation of information in this field by the European traveller Nicolas de Nicolay, are discussed in the article: " Capsali as a Source for the Ottoman History, 1450-1523." Firearms and military tactics were no doubt much improved by the time of Sultan Selim I, but there is no confirmation of claims concerning the contributions of Jewish i m m i g r a n t s f r o m Spain to those i m p r o v e m e n t s . H o w e v e r , Capsali claimed that Sultan Selim I made gestures to the Jewish community to thank them for their contributions to the military. Capsali did not discuss all the gestures in detail, perhaps because they raised questions, directly, about Bayezit II's policy on the absorption of the Spanish J e w s . Capsali did mention Bayezit's decision to close the new synagogues built in Istanbul after the conquest of the city, but maintained that there were extenuating circumstances: The Sultan, a devout Muslim, had acted in this matter in accordance with Islamic law, which allowed those synagogues built before the Islamic conquest to remain, provided the place had not been taken by force, but forbade the construction of new ones. It seems that the Sultan's curtailing of the new immigrants' religious f r e e d o m discomfited Capsali (some of the synagogues Bayezit closed had probably been built by the same newcomers that he ostensibly welcomed to the Empire). In addition to ascribing to the Sultan motives grounded in piety, Capsali reported that his successor. Selim I, ordered the synagogues reopened to reward the Jews for their role in upgrading the imperial arsenal. This turn of events is echoed in Capsali's a c c o u n t of the f o r c e d conversion to Islam of a group of Jews by the order of Sultan Bayezit II, as a result of false accusations about which neither Capsali nor any other source provided information. Later, according to the account, Sultan Selim I allowed the converts to return to Judaism, a decision that was entirely forbidden by

I N T R O D U C T I O N

15

Islamic law (Shari'ah) (which mandates a sentence of immediate capital punishment for any Muslim who embraces another religion). Capsali again connected Selim's magnanimous gesture to his appreciation of the immigrants' contributions in the firearms field. The sultan's stark contravention of a cardinal rule of Islam only served to bolster Capsali's claims regarding imperial gratitude toward the newcomers and benevolence toward the Jewish community as a whole. Capsali apparently intended to suggest that Selim I softened the hard lines adopted by Sultan Bayezit against the Jews. 1 Capsali concentrated on relations between the Jews and the authorities, only rarely referring to daily life and interaction between the various communities that made up the Ottoman Empire. Perhaps this is because Capsali lived outside the Ottoman Empire, in Crete, under Venetian rule. He never visited any Muslim country . His information was strictly secondhand; his informants, Jews and non-Jews who lived or travelled in the Ottoman Empire, whose attitudes and comments undoubtedly influenced his own. If Capsali ardently admired the above-mentioned three Sultans, it stands to reason that so did his informants. A comparison between and the anonymous author of the Pococke Manuscript no. 31 (see the article on this MS. below), yields another perspective. The latter, who lived in Istanbul, was intimately familiar with daily life in the capital. Seder Eliyahu Zuta, for example contains no mention of blood libels, even those cases that were brought before the Sultans, such as that in the time of Sultan Mehmet II. 2 The Pococke MS records a blood libel against a Jewish congregation in Istanbul. Some Sipahis were involved — it was a typical case of daily life, especially as it was solved locally (for details see the article below). Capsali, relying on Jewish informants, was perhaps better informed about what was happening to Jewish communities in remote parts of the Empire. He wrote about Jews suffering in time of war: the pogrom in Safed during Selim I's campaign against the Mamluks for the conquest of Syria, Palestine and Egypt; and preparations for a pogrom against the Jewish community in Cairo on the eve of Selim's conquest of the city (see, the article on Cairo below; and on Safed see Capsali, I: 349-50). Although separated by time (Capsali wrote in the first half of the sixteenth century; the anonymous author of the Pococke MS, in the first half of the seventeenth), and distance, there are similarities in their writings. Both discussed the chaos in the capital in the interim between two sultans: Capsali covered the period following the death of Sultan Mehmet II until Sultan Bayezit II established himself as the sole ruler, and the dangers to the Jewish l

Ibid„ pp. 272-3. Shmuelevitz, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire, p. 63.

2

OTTOMAN

16

HISTORY

AND

SOCIETY

community in the capital (especially to his great uncle, who had to go into hiding). The unnamed historian recorded the turmoil in Istanbul following the dismissal and execution of Sultan Osman II until Sultan Murat IV established himself as the sole ruler. He too discussed the danger to the Jewish community in the capital — from the Sipahis, whereas the troublemakers Capsali described were Janissaries. In sum, the chronicles are important in four respects. They provide: (a) corroborating evidence of events described in other available sources; (b) information about events hitherto not discussed by other writers; (c) additional personal opinions concerning events and people; (d) supplemental viewpoints and approaches, often emerging for a belief in predestination.

The

Media

The Jewish media in Hebrew also contributed to our knowledge of the Ottoman Empire and its Jewish community. This volume contains an article on the contribution of two Hebrew weeklies from the beginning of the twentieth century: one in Istanbul, the other in Izmir. Another article in this volume, on the relations between the Jewish and the Armenian communities, was partially based on material from the weekly published in Istanbul. Both periodicals offer insight into the second and third decades of the nineteenth century — when Ottoman reforms were reaching their peak; the nationalist movements were in the final stages of their struggle for self-determination; and the Turkish national movement, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, waged its great campaign for independence. What can such publications contribute to our knowledge of the Ottoman Empire and its Jewish community? First and foremost (as indicated in the article below), they include much material on the Jewish community in the Ottoman Empire as a whole, with special attention to the development of the Jewish settlement in Palestine and the support extended by the Ottoman Jewish population centers to other parts of the Empire. The Zionist weekly, Hamevasser, published in Istanbul (1910-11), offered a broad overview of this topic; a more limited s u n e y appeared in the Izmir high school weekly, Haverenu, that concentrated mainly on describing the Jewish community in Izmir (1922). Both journals, especially the former, dedicated special columns to developments in the Ottoman Empire in the socio-political, economic and religious and cultural fields. While they can help the scholar to track developments in these spheres, so can numerous other sources. The importance of these weekly journals lies in the information they provide on

INTRODUCTION

17

Jewish approaches and attitudes toward the abovementioned developments, how they affected the status of Jews in the Empire, and to what extent Jews participated in them. Of course, no less important are the weeklies' discussions of matters concerning the Jewish community at large, Zionist movement activities in the Empire, and the establishment of Jewish settlements in Palestine in particular. The Jewish media in Hebrew, Ladino, and French, published in the Ottoman Empire, some of which espoused Jewish national tendencies, and especially the Zionist and pro-Zionist media, should not be overlooked by the scholar intent on examining all aspects of the Ottoman Empire and the Zionist movement.

Documents Two articles in this collection can be said to be based on documents. One discusses a booklet whose author enumerated all of the rules and regulations concerning tax collection in the Jewish community of Salonica. These had been prepared by the community during the sixteenth century and approved by its members. The article also examines the practical sides of tax collection, relying on other primary sources such as the sicil and the Responsa. The other article is based on the documents found in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa Archives and examines their contribution to better understanding the final years of Ottoman rule in Palestine. One collection of documents in the archives is undoubtedly exceptional — it comprises copies of articles written by a Jewish journalist living in Tel Aviv for several Russian newspapers. Their importance lies in their description of the general atmosphere in Palestine in the years of the Young Turks' revolution, and of the approaches and reactions to events in the Empire and, especially in Palestine and in Tel Aviv-Jaffa. In this context, there is no need to discuss the authenticity and importance of documents as a major source for historians of the Ottoman Empire. However, it bears emphasis that the collections of Jewish-Hebrew sources are very rich and of great importance to the study of Ottoman history and society.

THE RESPONSA AS A SOURCE FOR THE HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE*

In a paper on the Hebrew sources for the Ottoman history, the late Professor Heyd claimed that among the Hebrew sources the responsa were among the most important sources for the history of the Ottoman Empire. 1 The responsa collections, in fact, include much material on the socioeconomic life of the Empire as well as many details about the administration and judiciary. They can provide considerable information and comment and often, with the aid of other sources, shed new light on various aspects of the administrative, legal, economic and social life within the Empire. The responsa have been used as a source — even as a major source — by scholars doing research on the history of Jewish communities, their internal life and their institutions. Seldom have they been used, and then mostly indirectly, to widen the knowledge of the history of the countries in which Jewish communities existed. Among scholars using the responsa the most distinguished have been I. Epstein, S. Eidelberg, M. S. Goodblatt and I. M. Goldman. Each of the four based his research on the responsa of one of the most prominent rabbis in the era being studied, supplementing the research with other sources, among them responsa of other rabbis in the same period. Epstein chose the responsa of Rabbi Solomon ben Adreth as the main source for the history of the Jews in Spain, and the responsa of Rabbi Simon ben Zemach Duran as a main source for the history of the Jews in North Africa. Eidelberg took the responsa of Rabbi Israel Isserlein as the main source for the history of the Jewish community in Austria. Goodblatt used Rabbi Samuel de Medina's (Maharashdam) responsa as the main source for the history of the Jewish community in Salonica in the sixteenth century, while Goldman chose the responsa of Rabbi David ben Abi Zimra (Radbaz) as the main source for his description of the Jewish community life in Palestine and Egypt in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 2 They all considered the responsa as a reliable

*For details concerning rabbis whose responsa were used, see Appendix. 1 U . Heyd, "Osmanli Tarihi 19m Ibranice Kaynaklar," in VI. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara 1967 pp. 295-303.

I. Epstein, Studies in the Communal Life of the Jews of Spain, as Reflected in the Responsa of Rabbi Solomon ben Adreth and Rabbi Simon ben Zemach Duran, 2nd ed., New York, 1958; S. Eidelberg, Jewish Life in Austria in the XVth Century as Reflected in the Legal Writings of Rabbi Israel Isserlein and Contemporaries, Philadelphia, M. S. Goodblatt, 1962; Jewish Life in Turkey in the XVIth Century as Reflected in the Legal Writings of Samuel de Medina, New York, 1952; I. M. Goldman, The Life and Times of Rabbi David Ibn Abi Zimra, New York, 1970.

20

O T T O M A N

H I S T O R Y

A N D

S O C I E T Y

source although, to a certain extent, they were aware of the shortcomings. However, these scholars did not discuss the question of the responsa as an historical source. The question of the responsa's reliability was one of the m a j o r items in an article by Dov Weinrib on problems facing the scholar researching the history of the Jews in Palestine. 1 He sharply criticized the reliability of these legal deliberations, stressing in particular the casual nature of the topics brought up in the responsa and the vagueness and generality of the question submitted to the r a b b i s . 2 He was quite right in stressing these points; however, in his article he himself relied on the responsa, with no reference to these critical points, in order to reach decisive conclusions on the social and economic situation in Palestine under Ottoman rule. He also reached decisive conclusions, using the responsa, on the destruction of trade and the economy in the Middle East following the intensive use of the C a p e of Good Hope route between Europe and South Asia and the Far East; 3 on the A r m y as an i m p e d i m e n t to the e c o n o m y ; 4 and on the poor economic conditions of the Jews in Palestine, especially in Jerusalem. 5 Weinrib, probably by relying so heavily on the responsa, then came to the conclusion that with a critical approach and the help of widely diverse sources, the scholar could turn the responsa into a reliable source. 6 It has to be mentioned that Weinrib's reserved attitude towards the Ottoman sources is quite obsolete today because of the possibility of using the Ottoman archives extensively. 7 These archives can now help to prove the reliability of the responsa. Furthermore, Weinrib, for an unknown reason, ignored the fact that the responsa were legal documents and therefore could be considered as highly accurate.

Nevertheless, the responsa as an historical source undoubtedly h a v e certain limitations and problems, which o n e should stress and try to solve, such as (a) the exceptional character of the problems under discussion; (b) the subjective character of the questions submitted to the rabbis; (c) the subjective attitude of the rabbis according to their origin, school of education and the like; and (d) the lack of authentic names and dates and the limited information about economic and commercial data.

'DOV Weinrib, "Ba'ayot ha-Haqirah shel Toldot ha-Yehudim be-Eretz Yisrael" (Problems in the Research of the History of the Jews in Palestine), Zion, new series, second year, Jerusalem, 5697 (1937), pp. 189-215, third year, Jerusalem, 5698 (1938), pp. 58-83. 2

Ibid.

(1937), pp. 195-96,201-202.

3

Ibid„ p. 197.

4

Ibid„

p. 213.

%r-

j'^T'rP'» f* r

— ^

v

p^'^ruo

f

4

!

•

tf A b

^ c v * e>[

! toy

''¿op ^

i

¡ftp p>i •?>»/> p>p JnP;

""¿I - W p>* r i i o Joj

jv^ojiari?; j"4M

o p 3 - » t / ^ J ? ; o-.Wp

/vii'

39

40

O T T O M A N

H I S T O R Y

A N D

S O C I E T Y

Capsali's description raises many questions: H o w could the J e w s , who were dhimmis

(that is belonging to the protected non-Muslim communities

that w e r e subjected to n u m e r o u s restrictions, including a prohibition on carrying arms), organise for self-defence in the capital of a Muslim state? W h o were the leaders who initiated such measures? H o w did they procure firearms and learn how to use t h e m ? Why did the M a m l u k s suspect the J e w s of wishing for the victory of the O t t o m a n s and hoping for Ottoman rule in Egypt? Did they know of any actual collaboration between the Jews and the Ottomans? Why was there no looting in the Jewish Quarter by the Ottoman soldiers following the conquest? Had the Jews entered into secret agreement with the Ottomans, as a result of which they could open the gates of their quarter without fear of being plundered? Or perhaps the quarter was indeed plundered, but Capsali, as an ardent pro-Ottoman, preferred to gloss over the fact? W h o was this Samaritan mu'allim

Sedaqe, and why did he try to extort

money from the Jews and plunder their property? It is noteworthy that the events described by Capsali are not mentioned by the contemporary chronicles of the Ottoman conquest of Egypt, such as Ibn-Iyas, Ibn-Zunbul, and lbn-Tulun. 1 Ibn-Iyas in his chronicle details almost every noteworthy event in Cairo on the eve of, during, and following the Ottoman conquest, but he makes n o mention whatsoever of the attempt to storm the Jewish Quarter and the killing of thirty people by the Jewish defenders. In attempting to evaluate the veracity of this a c c o u n t , we should bear in mind that descriptions of the events of the Ottoman conquest of Syria and Egypt, although somewhat exaggerated, are by and large accurate and tally with the accounts given by the above-mentioned historians, especially IbnIyas. 2 Although Capsali lived outside the Ottoman and Mamluk domains, he managed to collect a considerable amount of correct information on various events f r o m people passing his native Candia, which was an important trading port on the Mediterranean. His main source of information on the Ottoman conquest was one Yitzhaq al-Hakim, described as a reliable and courageous man w h o had accompanied the Ottoman force throughout the entire campaign. He also heard accounts f r o m other people w h o had witnessed the events themselves and whose testimony he respected. T h e Hakims are mentioned in various sources dating from the first half of the sixteenth century, particularly

^Zayn al Din M u h a m m e d b. A h m a d Ibn-Iyas, Tarikh Misr (Bada'i' alZuhur fi Waqa'i' alDuhur), Bulaq A . H . 1312, Vol. 3, or Istanbul 1932, Vol. 5; Nur al-Din A h m a d b. 'Ali IbnZunbul, Tarikh al-Sultan Salim Khan b. al-Sullan Beyazid Khan ma'a Qansuh al-Ghawri Sultan Misr wa-A'maliha, Cairo A . H . 1278; Muhammad lbn-Tulun, Flam al-Wara, Damascus 1964; R. Hartman, Das Tübinger Fragment der Chronik des Ihn Tulun, Berlin 1926. 2

A . Shmuelevitz. "Capsali as a Source fro Ottoman History, 1450-1523," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES) 9 (1978). pp. 341-342; Seder Eliyahu Zuta, Vol. 3, p. 66.

T H E JEWS IN CA fRO A T T H E T I M E O F T H E O T T O M A N C O N Q U E S T

41

in Responsa collections, as a family with members in both Egypt and Istanbul. 1 One of their number possibly accompanied the Ottoman forces on their campaigns and later passed through Candia. Why Capsali's reports on events in the Jewish Quarter are not corroborated by contemporary Egyptian sources can perhaps be explained by the fact that his informants were mostly Jews and therefore naturally more concerned with events pertaining to their own kinfolk. However, Ibn-Iyas did take note of developments relating to the Jewish community and recorded them in his book, 2 and thus his disregard of the events reported by Capsali as having taken place in that community at the time of the conquest remains unexplained. Nevertheless, because Capsali's accounts are generally compatible with the information given by his contemporaries in Egypt and because his informants were mainly Jews who had detailed knowledge about the situation of their coreligionists, Capsali's description of the events relating to the Jews in Cairo should be considered basically accurate. The general circumstances of the time make Capsali's account quite plausible. Most of the Jews lived then in a walled quarter whose gates were closed at night, making it easy to organise defence. Firearms might have been introduced by Jews from Spain; various sources relate that the Jewish fugitives reaching the East included experts on firearms who initiated their local manufacture and facilitated their use by local troops, mostly of the Ottoman army. 3 Though the Mamluks, on their part, were reluctant to use rifles — considering them a cowardly weapon — this might have made it easier for the dhimmi Jews to use them. It is very likely that the Jews in Cairo indeed did not conceal their joy at the defeat of the Mamluks at whose hands they had suffered a great deal; these Jews knew that the Ottoman attitude toward Jews was entirely different. With a degree of caution, it might even be possible to accept as basically true the report given in certain Venetian documents that there was some kind of secret link between the Cairo community leaders and the Ottomans even before the conquest 4 and that this was known to the Mamluks. (It must, however, be stressed that Ibn-Iyas and other historians do not mention this.) This link would explain why the Jewish Quarter was not plundered and remained sufficiently prosperous to be able, for instance, soon after the conquest to raise funds in support of the Jewish community in Safed. It would

^Seder Elivahu Zuta, Vol. l , p . 11. 7 E. Ashtor, Toledot ha-Yehudim Jerusalem 1951, passim. 3 4

be-Mitzravim

u-be-Surya

Seder Eliyahu Zuta, Vol. 1, p. 272; Vol. 3, pp. 68-69. Marin Sanuto, IDiarii, Vol. 24, p. 165.

tahat

Shilton

hu-Mamlukim,

42

OTTOMAN

HISTORY

AND

SOCIETY

also explain how the Jews knew in advance of Sultan Selim's visit to Cairo even though its timing was supposed to have been kept secret. 1 With regard to the story of mu'allim

S e d a q a , w e may suggest the

following explanation. The name itself was in use among the Samaritan as well as among the Karaites and the Jews. lbn-Tulun mentions a Samaritan by the name of Sedaqa in the service of na'ib al-sham

in Damascus. W e know

from the chronicles that the Cairo Samaritans constituted the wealthiest nonMuslim community there. One of their number could therefore have held the position of director of the mint. Perhaps Sedaqa, who is mentioned by name by Capsali, feared Jewish competition for his position and exploited his influence at the sultan's court to destroy Jews financially. (Wealthy Jews had often headed the mint under the Mamluks and continued to do so under the Ottomans.) 2 Capsali's account of the Jewish community in Cairo leads us to the conclusion that the Jews regarded the Ottoman conquest as a considerable improvement in their conditions. The Mamluks had been unwilling to protect the J e w s , as is also seen from the fact that the sultan was ready to allow a wealthy Samaritan friend of his to extort money from them. The community's rejoicing at the final defeat of the Mamluks and at the execution of Tumanbay indicates that conditions under the Ottoman rule were expected indeed to be more secure. With all that, the successful defence of the Jewish Quarter in Cairo and the usage of f i r e a r m s by J e w s to f o r c e the m o b back remain a unique phenomenon in the realities of that time.

1 2

Seder Eliyahu Zuta, Vol. 1, pp. 344-351.

I b n - T u l u n , op. cit., pp. 157, 271 : Ibn-Iyas. op. cit., Istanbul 1932, Vol. 5, p. 51; Ashtor, op. cit., V o l . 2 , pp. 178-179,521-525.

JEWISH SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY AND SOCIETY OF GREECE AND ITS JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN THE 15TH AND 16TH CENTURIES

Historians dealing with the history of the Middle East and the Balkans and their Jewish communities, focus primarily on the contributions of Jewish sources to the understanding of the socio-economic, administrative, cultural and political developments of the Ottoman Empire as a whole and of the Jewish communities in general. This paper will examine the Jewish sources to the writing of the history of Greece and its surroundings under the Ottoman Empire, concentrating mainly on the contributions of one of the Jewish chronicles of the period under discussion — the chronicle of Rabbi Eliyahu Capsali of Candia/Crete, called Seder Eliyahu Zuta} Capsali's contribution to the understanding of the socio-political developments in Greece and its Jewish communities in the 15th-16th centuries have rarely been recognized if at all. The fact that Capsali had lived on a Greek island dominated by the Venetians enabled him to follow closely developments in Greece and especially in those areas which were still under Venetian rule. What have been Capsali's contributions to our knowledge concerning the events in Greece (a) The Ottoman conquest of Morea marked the fall of the last stronghold of what was once the Byzantine Empire in the Balkans. Capsali devoted much attention to this conquest and specially to the complicated relations between the brothers of the last Byzantine Emperor, Demetrius and Thomas, who had divided Morea between themselves following the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople. Capsali supported the position held by Demetrius that of establishing familial links with Sultan Mehmet II by giving the Sultan his daughter as a wife, in return for the preservation of Morea's independence; and criticized Thomas for attacking his brother and therefore initiating the chain of events which resulted in the conquest of Morea by the Ottomans. Mehmet II took advantage of the struggle for the throne between the two brothers and his close connections with Demetrius in order to bring the

' A r y e h Shmuelevitz, S. Simonson and M . Benayahu (eds.), Seder Eliyahu Zuta by Rabbi Eliyahu Capsali (History of the O t t o m a n Empire and Venice with introduction and notes), Vols I, II, Jerusalem, 1 9 7 5 , 1 9 7 7 , Vol. Ill, Tel Aviv, 1983.

44

OTTOMAN

HISTORY

AND

SOCIETY

Peninsula of M o r e a under his rule, o f f e r i n g Demetrius the governorship of o n e of t h e p r o v i n c e s of the Kmpire in return f o r his c o o p e r a t i o n . It s e e m s that Capsali expressed the viewpoint of the Venetian authorities in describing and e v a l u a t i n g the e v e n t s in M o r e a a n d , t h e r e f o r e , stressed t h e f a c t that the V e n e t i a n s t r o n g h o l d s in M o r e a w e r e n o w f a c i n g a d i r e c t t h r e a t by t h e O t t o m a n s although they had not y e t been attacked by t h e m . In o t h e r w o r d s , the collapse of the Greek rule in M o r e a , as a result of the struggle between the b r o t h e r s , o p e n e d t h e way to the O t t o m a n c o n q u e s t of the V e n e t i a n t r a d e colonies in and around the Morean Peninsula 1 . (b) T h e Ottoman conquest of the island of Evia (Euboia or N e g r o p o n t e ) w a s led by Sultan M e h m e t II h i m s e l f . T h e story of the c o n q u e s t is a n o t h e r e x a m p l e d e m o n s t r a t i n g the p r o f o u n d k n o w l e d g e of C a p s a l i

concerning

d e v e l o p m e n t s in a r e a s u n d e r V e n e t i a n c o n t r o l . Capsali w a s a c q u a i n t e d in details with the discussions in the V e n e t i a n f l e e t w h e t h e r or not to attack the bridge built by Sultan M e h m e t II to directly link the island with the m a i n l a n d . H e a c c u s e d the c o m m a n d e r of the V e n e t i a n fleet of hesitating to attack t h e b r i d g e a n d t h u s e n a b l i n g the O t t o m a n s to c o n q u e r the w h o l e i s l a n d . H e c l a i m e d that the V e n e t i a n s tried to r e c o n q u e r the i s l a n d , but acted too late. T h a n k s to the b r i d g e , the O t t o m a n s m a n a g e d to establish t h e m s e l v e s on the island and to defeat the Venetians. N o less important are Capsali's descriptions of the general a t m o s p h e r e in Candia as the n e w s of the defeat reached Crete. In fact, the authorities in the t o w n did not k n o w that the Fleet w a s retreating to C a n d i a and put the t o w n into a l a r m w h e n they saw a f l e e t c o m i n g . O n l y at t h e last m o m e n t t h e a u t h o r i t i e s m a n a g e d to identify the f l e e t as V e n e t i a n and to a v o i d c l a s h i n g with it 2 . (c) T h e O t t o m a n victory in the naval w a r b e t w e e n t h e O t t o m a n f l e e t under the c o m m a n d of the renowned North A f r i c a n pirate, K e m a l R e i s , and the V e n e t i a n - S p a n i s h - F r e n c h - P a p a l f l e e t u n d e r t h e c o m m a n d of the V e n e t i a n admiral A n t o n i o Grimani which began near t h e island of S a p i e n t z a (south of M o r e a ) and led to the expulsion of the V e n e t i a n s f r o m L e p a n t o , w h e r e they had f a i l e d to c o m e to the help of that i m p o r t a n t port t o w n , a n d later f r o m M o d o n and K o r o n in the southern end of the P e l o p o n n e s e . Capsali attributed the V e n e t i a n d e f e a t partly to the use of fire by the O t t o m a n fleet to burn the Venetian ships; but mainly to the highly tense relations b e t w e e n the V e n e t i a n f l e e t c o m m a n d e r , G r i m a n i . and o n e of t h e y o u n g o f f i c e r s , the G o v e r n o r of C o r f u , A n d r e a L o r e d a n . T h e latter d e m a n d e d to attack w i t h o u t being ready to j o i n him with the main f o r c e s . In fact Grimani a b a n d o n e d L o r e d a n , a f a c t

l

Ibid„ Vol. I, pp. 70-71.

2

Ibid„ Vol. I, pp. 100-103.

JEWISH SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY AND SOCIETY OF GREECE

45

which finally led to the defeat. T he enmity between Grimani and Loredan was based, according to Capsali, on their mutual competition and jealousy. Grimani was tried and sentenced to exile, but was later pardoned and became the Doge of Venice 1 . (d) The Ottoman conquest of the two Venetian strongholds of Modon and Koron which occurred around 1500 reveals another aspect of Capsali's contributions. He seems to present more accurate and logical information than other sources. He described the attempt of three Venetian ships to break through the Ottoman fleet besieging Modon in order to enter the port and bring supplies to the besieged. All sources speak of food supplies, while Capsali claims that it was a shipment of gunpowder that the defenders had run out o f 2 . The importance of such descriptions lies in the fact that they confirm what the contemporary historians knew from the Italian, Greek and Ottoman sources and help to establish a more accurate picture of events, while forcing them to re-examine certain historical developments. Furthermore, Capsali was, to a large extent, well informed on the developments in two important Greek islands: Rhodes, which was until 1522 under the rule of the Order of St. John (the Hospitallers) and Crete, his native island, which was under the rule of the Venetians. (e) The long war between the Knights of Rhodes and the Ottomans is thoroughly described and discussed by Capsali, who demonstrates intimate and surprising knowledge of the details. He discussed the attempt of Sultan Mehmet II to conquer Rhodes 3 , the naval activities of the Knight of Rhodes in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Aegean Sea against the Ottomans and finally the conquest of Rhodes by Sultan Suleyman. The raids by the Knights of Rhodes on the Ottoman ships and on the seashores of Anatolia and in the vicinity of the capital caught the attention of Capsali. Such information is rarely available if at all, in the sources of the period under discussion. One example is the raid on the shores of the Dardanelles not far from Gallipoli which was carried out by the Rhodesians, while Sultan Selim was visiting the area. Capsali is alone in discussing steps taken by the Sultan to punish the raiders in order to stop the raids. Another example is the Rhodesian interception of an Ottoman fleet of five ships, sailing from Alexandria to Constantinople, not far from Crete, near the cliff of Sitia at the north-east end of the island. In the gun battle, the Rhodesians

l

lbid., Vol. I, p. 241-247. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 247, note 5 (reference to other sources), 248-249. 3 Ibid„ Vol. I, pp. 116-118.

46

OTTOMAN

HISTORY

AND

SOCIETY

m a n a g e d to destroy the O t t o m a n s h i p s , w h i l e s u f f e r i n g certain losses, but did not m a n a g e to seize and p l u n d e r the ships b e f o r e they s a n k . T h e V e n e t i a n g o v e r n o r of Sitia c a m e to h e l p the O t t o m a n s and saved a certain n u m b e r of people with their belongings, but m o s t of t h e m d r o w n e d . A f t e r a t i m e the sea started to cast up p r e c i o u s things and the people of Sitia b e c a m e rich. S o m e t i m e later, the V e n e t i a n authorities sent O t t o m a n survivors in t w o V e n e t i a n ships to Istanbul. T h e incident w a s described also by Ibn Iyas, but h e did not m e n t i o n the V e n e t i a n h e l p , and c l a i m e d that o n e of the ships m a n a g e d to escape to Crete f r o m w h e r e the survivors were sent to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e 1 . T h e d i s c u s s i o n of the c o n q u e s t of R h o d e s by S u l t a n S u l e y m a n is perhaps o n e of the main contributions of Capsali to our k n o w l e d g e concerning the military and political events in 1522 in the east Mediterranean. N o scholar c a n t h o r o u g h l y e x a m i n e the military o p e r a t i o n s on the island of R h o d e s w i t h o u t referring to Capsali and especially to his deliberations o n the various m e t h o d s of using f i r e a r m s in this w a r by both the Knights of R h o d e s and t h e O t t o m a n s . Besides the detailed description of the various uses of the f i r e a r m s , Capsali's a c c o u n t of the battle is useful in a variety of w a y s . His e f f o r t s to be as o b j e c t i v e as p o s s i b l e in d e s c r i b i n g the c o u r s e of the battle can be well o b s e r v e d in his r e f e r e n c e to t h e delegation set by Sultan S u l e y m a n to t h e Knights to d e m a n d their surrender because the island belonged to the Ottoman s u l t a n s , o w i n g to their status as t h e s u c c e s s o r s to the B y z a n t i n e E m p e r o r s f o l l o w i n g t h e c o n q u e s t of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e

by S u l t a n M e h m e t I I . T h e

R h o d e s i a n a n s w e r w a s that the sultans could only be considered as successors if t h e y w e r e C h r i s t i a n s . As w a s m o s t o f t e n t h e c a s e , C a p s a l i related this e p i s o d e w i t h o u t taking a personal s t a n d . O t h e r i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t s of his description include: (1) T h e O t t o m a n Sultan's decision to cut all c o m m e r c i a l c o n n e c t i o n s with R h o d e s and h o w the d e c i s i o n w a s i m p l e m e n t e d ; (2) T h e K n i g h t s ' decision to keep the O t t o m a n slaves alive and to c o n t i n u e to e n j o y their s e r v i c e s , but to k e e p t h e m at night in p r i s o n , hand a n d leg c u f f e d ; (3) T h e e f f o r t s m a d e by the K n i g h t s to c o n v i n c e Gabriel M a r t i n e n g o , a well k n o w n V e n e t i a n e x p e r t in o r g a n i z i n g a n d c o m m a n d i n g t h e d e f e n c e of a f o r t i f i e d p l a c e , living in C o n c l i a (the native t o w n of C a p s a l i ) to take u p o n himself the leadership of the d e f e n c e of the fortress of R h o d e s . Capsali s e e m s to k n o w M a r t i n e n g o and he attributes to him the Knights' s u c c e s s f u l d e f e n c e of R h o d e s . Capsali felt sorrow f o r him a f t e r h e w a s severely w o u n d e d in this battle; (4) T h e a g r e e m e n t between the Sultan and the Knights a l l o w i n g t h e m to l e a v e the island freely raised in Capsali certain reservations b e c a u s e t h e K n i g h t s , v i s i t i n g C a n d i a . on t h e w a y to R o m e , w e r e a c c o r d i n g t o his a s s u m p t i o n s , the reason f o r the breakout of a p l a g u e 2 .

]

lbid.,

2

Vol. I, pp. 398-400 note 45 (the reference to Ibn Iyas).

lbid„ Vol. II, pp. 28-45.

JEWISH SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY AND SOCIETY OF GREECE

47

(f) The feelings and attitudes of peoples in the area were well known to Capsali. The information he provided in this regard cannot generally be found in other sources but seems to be circumstantially accurate. One example is the description of the general atmosphere in Rhodes concerning the Ottoman conquest of Syria and Egypt. Another example is the description of the life in Candia which contributes to our understanding of the socio-economic and the administrative developments in Crete. One of his primary contributions is the discussion of the situation in Candia during the great plague (mentioned above) of Summer 1523 — the tension between the Christians and the Jews in Candia, the sufferings of the whole population, the attempts to isolate families, houses and quarters, or to close oneself in one's home for weeks and months (as Capsali did), or to escape to the surrounding mountains and to live there until the plague was over, and finally the policy of the Venetian authorities and their failure to cope with the plague 1 . The above-mentioned examples and other descriptions and evaluations undoubtedly confirm the importance of the chronicle of Capsali as a source for the political, military and social developments in Greece and in the Balkans as a whole in the 15th and early 16th centuries.

^Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 106-110.

THE BATTLE OF KHAN YUNIS DECEMBER 1516'

The conquest of Palestine by Sultan Selim I at the end of 1516 was carried out through the well known route from Damascus to Cairo via Quneitra, the Jordan Valley, the Valley of Yizrael and then southward along the hills to Ramlah and Gaza. It was a very cold winter, which served well the Ottoman army, especially the rain which fell in northern Sinai while the Ottoman army was crossing it to Egypt. The rain provided the army with fresh sweet water and hardened the surface, preventing for a time sand moves and sand storms. Two major decisions were taken in connection with the conquest which led to the battle of Khan Yunis: (a) the decision of Sultan Selim to send in advance an army unit under the command of the Grand Vezir, Sinan Pasha, to take over Palestine down to the area between the Gaza district and northern Sinai, in order to facilitate the advance of the main army under his own command, and to prevent any attempt by the Mamluks to confront the main army before crossing Sinai, i.e., in the area surrounding Gaza; (b) the decision of the Mamluk Sultan, Tumanbay, to confront the Ottomans in the Gaza area by sending certain army units, under the command of the Mamluk Amir Janbirdi al-Ghazali, one of the most senior Amirs remaining after the Mamluk's defeat at the battle of Marj Dabiq, north of Aleppo in August 1516. It seems that the Mamluks tried to cause at least a delay in the Ottomans' advance through Sinai into Egypt, in order to gain time to re-organize their army and re-equip it, especially with field artillery, and thus to be better prepared for the battle, considered at that time to be the decisive one, between the Mamluks and the Ottomans.

' T h e article relies mainly on the short descriptions of the Khan Yunis battle extended by the following sources: J. de Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, traduit J.J. Heilert, Paris 1835-41, Tome IV pp. 301-302; Egyptian sources: Ibn Iyas, Ottoman Conquest of Egypt in the Year a. h. 922, trans. W. H. Salmon, London, 1921, pp. 86-87,95-98; Ibn Tulun, Mufakihah al-Khilan fi Hawadith al-Zaman (Ta'rikh Misr wa al-Sham), Cairo, 1964, Vol. II, pp. 40,44-45; Ibn Zunbul, Kitab Ta'rikh al Sultan Salim Khan Ibn al-Sultan Bayazid Khan ma'a Qansuh alGhawri Sultan Misr wa-A'maliha, Cairo, 1278h, pp. 29-30; Ottoman Sources: Feridun Bey Munsha'at al-Salatin, Istanbul, 1274h, Vol. I, pp. 452, 482-483; Sa'd al-Din, Taj al-Tawarikh', Istanbul, 1279/80, Vol. II, pp. 346-348; Solakzade, Solakzade Ta'rikhi, Istanbul, 1279h, pp. 395396; European sources: R. Knolles, The Turkish History from the Original of the Nation to the Growth of the Ottoman Empire, London, 1687, Vol. I, pp. 362-363; G. Sagredo, Aussfthrliche Histori (Ausführliche Beschreibung dess Ottomannaschen Kayserthums), Augspurg, 1694, pp. 95-96; A Jewish source: A. Shmuelevitz et al (ed.), Seder Eliyahu ïuta by Rabbi Eliyahu Capsali, Jerusalem, 1975, Vol. I, pp. 332-334. All the citations in the text are from the pages mentioned above, except the one in the following note.

50

OTTOMAN

HISTORY

AND

SOCIETY

These two decisions finally led to the battle between Sinan Pasha and Janbirdi al-Ghazali, in which the latter was severely defeat in what Ibn Iyas described as the most terrible fight, "enough to turn one's hair grey." T h e defeated Mamluk force returned, according to Ibn Iyas, who lived in Cairo at that time, "in the most pitiable state... S o m e of the imperial Mamluks came back on donkeys, some on camels, all having been deprived of uniforms, horses and arms." Thus the aim of Sultan T u m a n b a y to cause a delay in the Ottoman advance into Egypt did not materialize, and the O t t o m a n s could advance in very favourable conditions through northern Sinai and along the eastern flank of the Nile Delta, and to c o n f r o n t the Egyptian a r m y at Raydaniyyah near Cairo, where they managed to gain another victory and consequently to conquer Cairo. However, the importance of the battle of Khan Yunis was not only in paving the way to the Ottoman main force, but mainly in the unusual tactics introduced by the Grand Vezir, Sinan Pasha. This mini-battle served in fact, as an experimental field for testing some new ways in using the firearms (which passed certain modifications at that time with the help of Jewish firearms experts, expelled f r o m Spain) along with the use of traditional steel arms. Both sides had not much time to prepare for this collision because, according to the sources available, each commander was informed on the approach of his o p p o n e n t only a short time b e f o r e the c o n f r o n t a t i o n had started. T h i s situation, it seems, left no other choice to Sinan, and perhaps also to Ghazali, but to improvise and in this way to introduce new tactics in the battlefield. In addition, it seems that Sinan Pasha has some doubts concerning the ability of his cavalry and his infantr\ to successfully confront the Mamluk cavalry, and he was obliged to try the best combination to use the cavalry and the infantry together in order to surprise the Mamluk cavalry and to overcome them. T h e sources describing this battle give different versions as to the way the f i g h t w a s carried out. H o w e v e r , none of these versions d o entirely correspond with the regular way the Ottoman army operated in the battlefield: the Ottoman o r d e r of battle, at that t i m e , was based on the Janissaries (infantry equipped with arquebushes or muskets, as well as halberds — a kind of lance with a hook — and a dagger) in the centre, the light cavalry f r o m the Balkans and Anatolia on each of the right and left wings, and the artillery in the f r o n t between the infantry and the cavalry, with chains connecting the guns to prevent the enemy's cavalry f r o m crossing the line of the artillery. T h e M a m l u k s , it seems, maintained their regular order of arms with heavy cavalry in the centre and the light cavalry on the two wings. The sources, consulted, are divided as to the date of the battle as well as the place where it occurred. It took place either on Friday the 24 or on Monday the 27 of Dhu-al-Qa'dah, 922 (= 19 or 22 December, 1516), not far from the

THE BATTLE OF KHAN

YUNIS

51

Caravansaray of Khan Yunis. Some suggested at a place called Shri'ah near Baysan and Wadi Sa'b, in the surrounding of Khan Yunis. The problem is that the places carrying those names are relatively far from Khan Yunis. The Ottoman army was composed of light cavalry (the Sipahis) and musket equipped infantry (the Janissaries). According to most of the sources their number was about 4,000 up to 5,000. Only Knolles, based on Italian sources, claimed that Sinan Pasha was sent to conquer Palestine with 15,000 horsemen and a strong Regiment of Harquebusiers selected out of the Janissaries, and other soldiers. The Mamluk army was composed of light cavalry (Bedouins) and heavy cavalry (the Mamluks themselves). Some of the sources claim that their number was about 10,000 with ten commanders, one for each unit of a thousand horsemen. Others give different estimates: Knolles speaks of about 6,000 chosen horsemen and a great number of Arabians (Bedouins); Ibn Tulun mentions a firqah from the Egyptian army, while Ibn Iyas claims that al-Ghazali started for the expedition few days in advance of the main troops, and the latter did not manage to join him in the battle. He, therefore, reached the conclusion that the Mamluk army was smaller than the Ottoman army. Knolles too claims that the Turks far exceeded the Mamluks in number. Taking into consideration that some sources did exaggerate and that others made certain confusions between the various units participating in the battle and mentioned only one or two of them, one can reach the conclusion that on both sides there were about ten to twelve thousand soldiers. There is a general agreement among the sources available concerning the order of battle of the Egyptian-Mamluk army — it was according to the traditional system of the heavy Mamluk cavalry at the centre and the light cavalry, composed of non-Mamluk squadrons (especially Bedouin squadrons), at the two wings. As to the Ottoman order of battle, there are four major different versions: (a) The traditional one — infantry in the centre and cavalry at the two wings; (b) Sinan Pasha sent forward the infantry in order to encounter the Mamluk's first attack with a blow of muskets, and then he sent the cavalry to join the infantry and to inflict the final blow; (c) The cavalry was stationed in the centre to receive the first charge of the Mamluks, while the infantry in the two wings to a great length and in thin ranks in order to use their firearms at more liberty and with more ease to enclose the enemy; (d) The cavalry and the infantry were formed up together, by spreading the infantry among the horsemen, in order to obtain mutual defence between the infantry and the cavalry and to surprise the Mamluks by hiding the infantry among the horses at the first stages of the Mamluks' assault.

52

OTTOMAN

HISTORY

AND

SOCIETY

The sources agree in general that the Egyptian-Mamluk army attacked the Ottoman army first and was encountered at this stage with a shower of bullets fired by the infantry, whether they were in the centre, in f r o n t of the horsemen, among the horsemen, or on the two wings of the horsemen. T h e shower of bullets caused the Egyptian army severe casualties and especially the light cavalry, which as a result was, to a large extent, paralized. T h e M a m l u k s continued the assault, despite the casualties, and managed to penetrate the Ottoman cavalry lines. At this stage, mainly according to the Egyptian sources, the Ottomans introduced the use of hooks on their lances (the halberds), with which they dragged the horseman from his horse down to the ground and either killed him or took him as a prisoner of war. It seems, therefore, that at least part of the infantry was hidden among the horsemen and was occupied at the second stage with killing or taking as prisoners of war the Mamluk horsemen, who were pulled down by the hooks, while other infantry units were marshalled in the two wings and continued at this stage to paralyse the Egyptian light cavalry with continuous showers of bullets. Even the C o m m a n d e r of the Egyptian-Mamluk a r m y , Janbirdi al-Ghazali w a s , as he testified later according to Ibn Iyas, pulled down with hooks, while attacking "with much zeal and ardour," and penetrating the Ottoman lines. H e was immediately surrounded by Ottoman soldiers, but a group of his M a m l u k s managed, "with much courage and power, to release him." H e escaped with the few remaining alive back to Egypt. According to this description one can reach the conclusion that Sinan Pasha did not follow the traditional Ottoman order of battle and proved again that he was a highly talented and open minded c o m m a n d e r . Free of any traditional shackles, he did not hesitate to take the risk and to demonstrate much flexibility in manoeu\ ring the infantry and the cavalry at the battlefield between the centre and the wings. Furthermore, the ambush he prepared for the M a m l u k horsemen by using hooks to pull them d o w n and to kill them, w a s , perhaps, the major factor in winning a decisive victory in this battle. It is not surprising, therefore, thai after Sinan Pasha w a s killed at the battle of Raydaniyyah, Sultan Selim. while mourning his death said, according to some of the sources: 1 "I conquered Egypt but I lost Joseph." Capsali adds that the Sultan was in fact happy with the death of Sinan because he started to envy him for his military achievements. However, the sources in general attribute the defeat of the Mamluks mainly to the Ottoman use of fire a r m s , as Ibn Zunbul wrote: "... and nothing caused them [the Mamluks] the defeat but the bullets which really took them by surprise, because none of them knew f r o m where the bullets were coming..."

1

H a m m e r , IV p. 460 n. 43; Sagredo. p. 97; Solakzade, p. 404.

T H E B A T T L E OF KHAN Y U N I S

-

DECEMBER

53

The sources do not attribute the defeat to the unusual tactics introduced by Sinan Pasha, although one must admit that in using those tactics, the firearms were more effective because they were spread along the whole Ottoman frontline. However, it should be added that in the battles of the beginning of the 16th century more soldiers were killed or wounded by the horses, which panicked as a result of the noise produced by the firearms, than by bullets. What the sources did praise was Sinan Pasha's decision to hide certain number of Janissaries among the Sipahis, who ambushed successfully the Mamluk horsemen, and overcame them — a brilliant combination to cope with the superiority of the Mamluk cavalry in this battle. Was the manner in which Sinan Pasha combined the operation of the cavalry and the infantry in use both before and after the battle of Khan Yunis? A preliminary search of the sources available has not yielded a complete answer to this question. However, it does appear that the exact manner in which he used the cavalry and the infantry had not been introduced at least in the past, although the use of the hooks was well known. This can be concluded from the fact that Sinan's victory is widely covered in the sources, where the Pasha is showered with praise.

MS POCOCKE NO. 31 AS A SOURCE FOR THE EVENTS IN ISTANBUL IN THE YEARS 1622-1624*

The Pococke MS No. 31 at Oxford's Bodleian Library consists of 68 pages written in Hebrew characters. The many corrections in the margin, most of them in the same handwriting, is prima facie evidence that the document might well be the original one, rather than a copy. The document begins with a chronological listing of the Sultans from Osman Gazi to Sultan Ibrahim, giving the year of ascendance under each name and the number of years of the reign at the left of each name, except for the entry for Sultan ibrahim where only the name appears. The list is dated according to the Hijri calendar, and all the numbers are in Arabic characters. The first page is numbered 5a, continuing through page 38b, at which point the narrative ends abruptly. Page 38b was probably not the last page. According to the list of Sultans, the narrative could have been continued until the end of the reign of Sultan Murad IV. The narrative begins with the day on which Sultan Osman II was dethroned and deals with the short reign of the insane Sultan Mustafa and the beginning of the reign of Sultan Murad IV. It covers the years 5382-5385 of the Hebrew calendar, which correspond to the years 1031-1033 of the Hijri calendar and 1622-1624 according to the New Style — a critical period in the history of the Ottoman Empire. The identity of the author is not known. However, it is clear that he was a Jew and an important personage in the Ottoman capital. He was perhaps a physician, who might have attended the Sultan's court or the court of one of the high officials. He knew Turkish well, as is evident from the Hebrew transliteration of the Turkish names and terms mentioned in the text, although they are not always rendered with the greatest accuracy. He was not only well acquainted with the structure and the procedures of the ccntral administration, but he also knew who the functionaries were and seems to have possessed knowledge of their personalities. He was also familiar with every move or *At the Sixth Turkish History Congress, held in Ankara in 1959, the late Prof. Uriel Heyd cited M S N o . 31 as a Hebrew source for the history of the Ottoman Empire. I am grateful to Prof. Bernard Lewis for providing m e with a copy of the manuscript and encouraging m e to bring it to the knowledge of historians of the Middle East. A preliminary presentation was given at the 30th Congress of Orientalists in Mexico City in 1976.

56

O T T O M A N

H I S T O R Y

AND

S O C I E T Y

change within the central government, noting appointments and dismissals and even the exact number of days in office of each functionary. This fact, in particular, indicates that the a u t h o r is a credible source of important information. The vivid accounts of the frequent changes and reshufflings in the central government, and the dramatic descriptions of the dismissals — and sometimes the executions — of the high political and religious f i g u r e s effectively convey the atmosphere of terror they must have caused throughout the Ottoman capital. The feelings of the author and of the populace at large are so realistically described that one can almost experience the thrill of fear that must have followed such events as the dethronement and execution of Sultan Osman II and the excitement that accompanied the assemblies and marches of the capital mob demonstrating against or in favour of leading personalities of the regime, demanding their dismissal and execution, or their appointment, while stopping to rob and plunder on the way. The happenings are narrated with such a sense of immediacy as to lead one to believe that the author himself witnessed them. These convincing descriptions of events of the period 1622-1624 indicate that the manuscript should be regarded as an important source for the history of the Ottoman capital in those years. W h a t , then, is the kind of information that can be gleaned f r o m this source? It must be emphasized that this is not a chronicle similar to chronicles in Hebrew and Turkish such as those of Capsali, Ne§ri, A§ikpa§azade, or Solakzade. Rather it is a diary, not of the author's personal life but of political life in Istanbul. A l o n g with gossip c o n c e r n i n g d i s m i s s a l s , e x e c u t i o n s , property confiscations, and the like, there are entries on the more significant events that occurred at court, in the capital, a n d , in some instances, in other regions of the Empire. The diary is not, h o w e v e r , a day-to-day account of these events. The author was obviously familiar with Turkish chronicles of the period and followed their style. For example, following the obituary of a Sultan, he provides the reader with a list of high functionaries w h o had served under the Sultan, exactly as the Ottoman chronicles do. It is interesting to compare his list of the functionaries of the Sultan O s m a n II (pp. 1 Ob-1 la) with that of Naima. 1 Although the lists are almost identical, Naima mentions fewer functionaries than our writer and in a different order (which undoubtedly reflects his personal attitude towards them). A m o n g the manuscript's limitations are five that must be singled out: (1) being a diary, it includes many details of little importance to historians, as, for example, the movements of high functionaries to and f r o m the capital and the provinces; (2) for some reason the entries in the diary are not always

'Mustafa Naima, Naima Tarihi, vol. 2 (Istanbul, 1969), p. 786b (hereafter cited simply as Naima, followed by page nos.); the events of the period covered by the MS Pococke are recorded on pp. 736-962 of Naima's chronicle.

MS POCOCKE NO. 31 AS A SOURCE FOR EVENTS IN ISTANBUL

57

arranged chronologically; (3) much of the information given by the author can also be found in chronicles, memoirs, and various itineraries written by others who had lived in Istanbul or visited the city, as, for instance, the letters of the British ambassador to Istanbul, Sir Thomas Roe; 1 (4) unlike his references to events in the capital, his descriptions of events that occurred in the provinces relied mainly on hearsay or on confused details given by people coming to the capital from the area where the event had taken place; finally (5) the stand taken by the author on various issues must be understood in terms of his personal biases towards the leading personalities and groups in the capital. Some of the author's obvious biases were the following. He was an ardent supporter of Sultan Osman II, whom he described as a brilliant and talented young ruler, and of the Sultan's officers, believing that Osman's plan to put an end to the corrupt army of Yenigeris (Janissaries) and Sipahis (cavalry) was essential to bring order and security to the capital (pp. 10a-10b). He expressed satisfaction and joy at the retribution against persons and groups responsible for the deposition and execution of Sultan Osman (the Grand Vizier Davut Pa§a and his close associates and the Yeni9eris) (pp. 13b, 18a18b). He rejoiced at the persecution of the Yeni?eris by Abaza Mehmet Pa§a, the governor of Erzurum (although the governor was soon a f t e r w a r d s considered a rebel — see below). His attitude towards the insane Sultan Mustafa and his mother — the real power behind the scenes — is ambivalent. He vehemently opposed them because of their involvement in the deposition and execution of Sultan Osman, but at the same time he pitied Mustafa for his insanity and tried to be neutral towards his mother, perhaps because of her relations with the Jewish community. He supported the enthronement of Sultan Murad IV and appreciated the firm decision taken by the new administration to restore order in the Empire (pp. 236-249); but the pages descriting M u r a d ' s first year in power do not reveal the writer's attitude or feelings towards him personally, perhaps because the Sultan was still a boy. It must be emphasized, however, that in all of the author's writings the high religious functionaries were evaluated according to their deeds: their activities were simply recorded without any expression of feeling (although when the author evaluated an individual as corrupt, his attitude towards the person was negative). T h e real importance of the Pococke M S No. 31 to historians of the Ottoman Empire is to be found in its vivid rendering of the atmosphere in the capital and its recording of hitherto unknown details of certain events and of

' The Negotiations ...in his Embassy to the Ottoman Porte, ed. S. Richardson (London, 1740), pp.

58

O T T O M A N

H I S T O R Y

A N D

S O C I E T Y

contemporary attitudes toward them. These events are examined in the following sections. 1 The Deposition and Execution

ofOsman

Some details concerning the deposition of Sultan Osman II prove the author's familiarity with the goings-on in the royal court and the capital. These details have a special significance because they give a perspective on how a Jew connected with the ruling circles related to the events around him. One event described is a mob lynching of Suleyman Aga, the chief eunuch (a black) in charge of the harem: 2 the mob took Suleyman Aga outside and "did not leave him until they had thrust about 300 iron spears into his body making it a sieve ... seeing the enemy [the mob] at the gate the women burst into wild and bitter sobbing over this evil deed that we have never heard of before nor seen since ancient times ..." (p. 6b). The mob did not, however, harm the women or concubines. Another important event described is the first night of the rebellion, when Sultan Osman II had not yet been found. The rebels were afraid that he had already moved to the Asian side of the Bosphorus and would return with his supporters to suppress their revolt. They therefore went to sleep with their weapons at their side, ready to face the Sultan and his army (p. 7a). The descriptions of the treatment of the deposed Sultan, as viewed by the author, is particularly important and unique: "and they found the Sultan hiding in the house of the Aga of the Yeniferis ... the Sultan came out walking and was brought to Orta Mescit as someone of inferior status [for he was] without a turban on his head and without any majestic splendour ... Sultan Osman asked for a turban in order to speak to his servants because he felt ashamed ... but the\ refused to give him |a turban] or to hear him. The Sultan stood up and said 'please listen to me' ... and he spoke to them gently trying to pacify them ... he promised them many presents and expensive clothings ... [but] the mob stood still and God hardened their fornicating heart]s] and they refused to obey him ... They answered the Sultan with nasty and vulgar words cursing and insulting him as if he was one of them since not all of them were his sen ants but [some were] distressed and desperate...

' O t h e r w o r k s describing the events chronicled, with which the Pococke manuscript has been compared, are the following: Naima and Ibrahim Pe^evi, P e f e v i Tarihi (Istanbul, 1969), vol. 2 , pp. 4 6 0 - 4 7 7 , both dating f r o m around the time the events took place; Roe, Negotiations; P. Rycaut and R. Knolles, The Turkish History from the Original of that Nation to the Growth of the Ottoman Empire (London, 1638, 1687), vol. 2, chapter o n O s m a n II and M u s t a f a I (by Sir T h o m a s Roe) and chapter on Murad IV (by Rycaut); Joseph von H a m m e r Purgstall, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches ( G r a / . 1963), vol. 4, pp. 520-608, and vol. 5, pp. 1-45. ^ N a i m a , pp. 7 5 6 , 7 6 7 , 7 6 9 , and 771, mentions the involvement of this darussade agasi in Sultan Osman's plan to destroy the Yeni^eris.

MS POCOCKE NO. 31 AS A SOURCE FOR EVENTS IN ISTANBUL

59

When the Sultan heard these words he was panic-stricken. [And they led him] by the hand and put him in an inferior wagon, spread with straw and not with cushions ... and they conducted him to Yedikule under arrest 1 ... Sultan Osman asked the chief of the tower for food because he had not eaten since he left his palace and the chief of the tower gave him a fried egg ... He had just begun to eat when Davut Pa§a and his wicked men arrived . . . 2 when the Sultan saw them he almost lost his breath and assaulted them with all his might, alone [and] with no one to help him ... and they killed him by torture breaking all his bones from head to foot ... no one could save him and they brought his body still in its prime to the palace ..." (pp. 8a-9b). The author stresses the unique character of the execution of Sultan Osman by writing that such a wicked deed had never taken place since the foundation of the Kingdom of Yisma'el, i.e., the beginning of the Islamic era. The Sultan was buried in the tomb of his father and many people mourned him day and night, both in their homes and in the streets, because they viewed him as being "a mighty king with no fault except his exaltation, splendour, and his pride ... he paid persons back in their own coin and never allowed people to extort others [for he believed that] justice should prevail in the city ... now just hearing the voice of a Sipahi or Yeni§eri, nobles hid ..." (p. 10a10b). The author continues to describe the chaos in the capital following the execution, mentioning as one of the symptoms of this chaos the attempt to kill the brothers of Osman.

The Attempt

to Kill the

Princes

One of the most dramatic descriptions in the chronicle is that of the attempt, engineered by Sultan Mustafa's mother and Davut Pa§a, to kill the remaining children of Sultan Ahmet, using Mehmet A g a , the chief eunuch, who was responsible for the safety of the children, to perform the deed. Mehmet Aga was ordered to kill the children at night, a short time after the execution of Osman. The purpose of the plotters was, according to the author, to secure the reign of M u s t a f a by annihilating all potential rivals. However, the plan was unsuccessful, the wet-nurse was awakened by the footsteps of the would-be murderer and began to shout. This woke up others, who also began to shout. The noise woke the person in charge of finances, ' Y e d i k u l e was a tower on the southern flank of Istanbul's walls that was used as a prison. ^Davut Pa§a w a s the son-in-law of Sultan Mustafa's mother; he was among the leaders of the revolt against Sultan O s m a n and was appointed grand vizier f o l l o w i n g O s m a n ' s deposition. However, he w a s soon dismised and later executed. See Naima, pp. 7 7 7 , 7 8 4 , 791-93, and 804809.

60

O T T O M A N

H I S T O R Y

AND

S O C I E T Y

who then gathered his apprentices, armed youngsters of the court, w h o killed the A g a . ( W h y the person in charge of the E m p i r e f i n a n c e s , of all functionaries, happened to be around the palace, when both his h o m e and office were outside the court, is not explained; the author might perhaps have been referring to one of the igoglanlar

in charge of the Hazine-i Enderun.)

When the people came to the court the following day and heard what had happened they took the body of the Aga and hanged it in At Meydani (the hippodrome); they also demanded the execution of the "rascal Davut Pa§a," asserting that the attempt to kill the children was carried out on his advice. However, he came out to face the crowd carrying the Qur'an and swore on the book that he knew nothing of the plot; the Sultan's mother also asked for his life, and he was let off; but he lost his position as grand vizier to M e r e HUseyin Pa§a after just twenty-three days in office (pp. 13a-13b). 1 The author stresses that killing the princes would have left Sultan Mustafa as the only male in the Ottoman family and could have led to the disappearance of the dynasty. He adds that after the attempt the children were well guarded (p. 14a), which can be considered an important step in the consolidation of the institution of the kafes (an apartment in which the heir was brought up in seclusion) in the succession system to the throne of the Ottoman dynasty.

The Involvement

of Military

and

the Religious

Functionaries

in

Court

Politics An excellent e x a m p l e of the j o i n t i n v o l v e m e n t of military and religious f u n c t i o n a r i e s in politics is f o u n d in the events leading to the deposing of Sultan. In few lines, the author describes how the Sipahis and the Ulama gathered in Karaman street, whence they started a demonstration that soon attracted many people. The demonstrators demanded the execution of the grand vizier, Mere Htisexin Pa§a, because he had beaten an alim. T h e vizier took refuge at the house of the c o m m a n d e r of the Yeniijeris and there he convened a meeting of the Imperial Divan. T h e Divan unanimously decided, out of both friendship and fear, to support the grand vizier. A s a result of this meeting, the Yeni§eris attacked the demonstrators and killed thirteen of the religious functionaries; but they avoided clashing with the Sipahis. T h r e e months later the Sipahis convinced a group of Yeni§eris to join with them in obtaining the dismissal of the vizier. T h e y forced him to hand o v e r the Imperial Seal, which they then gave to Kemanke§ All Pa§a, their candidate for

'Mere HUseyin Pa§a served as a governor and a vizier and was twice grand vizier under Sultan Mustafa. He was executed soon after Sultan Murad IV was enthroned. See Pe9evi, Tarihi (hereafter simply Pe^evi) pp. 467-68, and Naima, pp. 758,791,793-94,809-810,820, and 823.

M S P O C O C K E NO. 31 A S A S O U R C E F O R E V E N T S IN I S T A N B U L

61

the position. 1 This act opened the way to the deposing a few days later of Sultan Mustafa. The decision to replace the insane Sultan with the fourteenyear-old Murad, the son of Sultan Ahmet, was taken by the administrative and religious functionaries and the military commanders, supported by their units, in close co-operation. According to the chronicle, the exchange brought much j o y to the people, who now hoped for a better administration and an end to the chaos that had prevailed under Sultan Mustafa (pp. 23a-24a). Only a few lines in the Pococke M S are devoted to these crucial events. The description is short and prosaic — the kind of description that one finds in a newspaper — with little dramatization and few words of comment. In this case the author considered the involvement of the military with the administrative and religious functionaries in court politics as natural and obvious, an entirely different viewpoint from that expressed in the description of the deposition and execution of Sultan Osman II. The reason for this difference can be found in the personal attitude of the author and of other people in the capital towards the two sultans: in the case of Sultan Osman, the people were angry and sad, and the author conveyed a feeling of despair along with several accusations against the Yenigeris and the administrative and religious functionaries; on the occasion of Sultan Mustafa's deposition, the author and the people were happy to have gotten rid of an insane ruler.

The Abaza Affair The rebellion of the governor of Erzurum, Abaza Mehmet Pa§a, is discussed in detail and with a certain sympathy on the part of the author, especially toward Abaza's systematic annihilation of the Yeni§eris and their families in revenge for what he considered their responsibility for the deposition and execution of Sultan Osman II. Although the author does not view Abaza Pa§a as a rebel, and to a certain extent even admires him for his policy towards the Yeni?eris, he nevertheless uses the term "rebellion" when describing his military activities. In his attitude toward Abaza the author shows his admiration for Sultan Osman II and his hatred of the Yeni§eris. Important

information

revealed about this event includes

the

descriptions of the general fear of Abaza, especially the fears of the commanders who were sent against him, and of the demands made by Abaza that Sultan Mustafa be dethroned and those involved in the plot against Sultan Osman prosecuted. However, it is somewhat surprising that a person so

Kemanke§ Ali Pa§a was a former governor of Baghdad who had managed to return to the capital. He was soon dismissed from his post as grand vizier by the new sultan, Murad IV, and was executed for treason and extortion. Se Naima, pp. 820-22, and 8 2 8 , and Peçevi, p. 474.

62

OTTOMAN

HISTORY

AND

SOCIETY

f a m i l i a r with t h e affairs in the capital could not be m o r e precise as to the aims of A b a z a ' s r e b e l l i o n . T h e r e a d e r r e m a i n s u n d e r t h e i m p r e s s i o n that t h e annihilation of t h e Yeni^eris in r e v e n g e f o r the e x e c u t i o n of Sultan O s m a n was the sole purpose of the rebellion. T h e author first m e n t i o n s A b a z a several m o n t h s after the e x e c u t i o n of Sultan O s m a n : "On T h u r s d a y 19 T e v e t (5383 -

22 December 1622| there

c a m e an e s c a p e e w h o told that w h e n A b a z a M e h m e t Pa§a, the G o v e r n o r of E r z u r u m , heard about the e x e c u t i o n of the Sultan he rebelled ... and killed many of the w i c k e d Yeni^eris. | H e ] slaughtered t h e m because of the w i c k e d deed they had carried o u t . . . [namelyl killing my Sultan w h o stood f o r j u s t i c e ... ( E v e r y w h e r e A b a z a went] he only killed Yeni§eris and asked that p e o p l e d e l i v e r this g r o u p into his h a n d s so that h e c o u l d a v e n g e t h e blood of t h e S u l t a n . W h e n the Y e n i ? e r i s heard |of A b a z a ' s d e e d s ] ... t h e y w e n t to the Sultan's Court [but] did not partake of the f o o d the Sultan o f f e r e d to t h e m ... [The Y e n i § e r i s | d e m a n d e d that Halil Pa§a, t h e K a p u d a n , be killed b e c a u s e A b a z a had been his servant, forgetting his |Halil's] good d e e d s ... the Sultan's servants refused [this requestl b e c a u s e he [Halil] w a s an honest m a n , loyal to the Sultan and had f o u g h t in [the Sultan's] w a r s and risked his life f o r h i m " (pp. 16b-17a).' A t first t h e Y e n i ^ e r i s tried to p r e s s u r e A b a z a by a t t a c k i n g his close f r i e n d s in the central g o v e r n m e n t , but s o o n they c h a n g e d their tactics and d e m a n d e d c o m p l i a n c e with Abaza's d e m a n d s : A f e w d a y s later the Yeni