Religion, Economy, and State in Ottoman-Arab History (Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies): 32 1617199060, 9781617199066

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Religion, Economy, and State in Ottoman-Arab History

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Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies

32

A co-publication with The Isis Press, Istanbul, the series consists of collections of thematic essays focused on specific themes of Ottoman and Turkish studies. These scholarly volumes address important issues throughout Turkish history, offering in a single volume the accumulated insights of a single author over a career of research on the subject.

Religion, Economy, and State in Ottoman-Arab History

William Ochsenwald

The Isis Press, Istanbul

0ûr0ÎaS preSS 2010

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2010 by The Isis Press, Istanbul Originally published in 1998 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of The Isis Press, Istanbul. 2010

ISBN 978-1-61719-906-6

Reprinted from the 1998 Istanbul edition.

Printed in the United States of America

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

VII

1. Ottoman Sources for the History of the Hijaz. Studies in the History

of Arabia, Volume 1, Sources for the History

Arabia,

Part II (Riyad: University of Riyad Press, 1979),

of

pp. 163-175

1

2. The Recent Historiography of Western Arabia: A Critical Examination. Proceedings

of the Seminar for Arabian

Studies

22(1992), pp. 97-103

15

3. The Financial Basis of Ottoman Rule in the Hijaz, 18401877. William W. Haddad and William Ochsenwald (eds.), Nationalism Ottoman

in a Non-National Empire

State: The Dissolution

of the

(Columbus: Ohio State University Press,

1977), pp. 129-149

23

4. Ottoman Subsidies to the Hijaz, 1877-1886.

International

Journal of Middle East Studies 6 (1975), pp. 300-307

43

5. The Commercial History of the Hijaz Vilayet, 1840-1908. Arabian Studies 6 (1982), pp. 57-76

53

6. Muslim-European Conflict in the Hijaz: The Slave Trade Controversy, 1840-1895. Middle Eastern Studies 16 (1980), pp. 115-126 7. The Jidda Massacre of 1858. Middle

77 Eastern

Studies

13

(1977), pp. 314-326

93

8. Ironic Origins: Arab Nationalism in the Hijaz, 1882-1914. Rashid Khalidi etal. (eds.) The Origins of Arab

Nationalism

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 189-203

111

Oi l OMAN-ARAB

VI

HISTORY

9. The Vilayet of Syria, 1901-1914: A Re-Examination of Diplomatic Documents as Sources. Middle East Journal 22 (1968), pp. 73-87

125

10. The Impact of Ottoman Rule on Yemen, 1849-1914. V. Milletlerarasi Tebligler

Tiirkiye (Ankara:

Sosyal Turk

ve iktisat Tarih

Tarihi

Kongresi

Kurumu,

1990),

pp. 255-265

151

11. The Financing of the Hijaz Railroad. Die Welt des Islams 14 (1973), pp. 129-149

163

12. Opposition to Political Centralization in South Jordan and the Hijaz,

1900-1914.

The

Muslim

World

62

(1973),

pp. 297-306

183

13. A Modern Waqf: the Hijaz Railway, 1900-48. Arabian

Studies

3 (1976), pp. 1-12

193

14. Islam and the Ottoman Legacy in the Modern Middle East. L. Carl Brown (ed ). Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Impact the Balkans

and the Middle

East (New

University Press. 1996), pp. 263-283

York:

on

Columbia 207

INTRODUCTION

I have arranged the chapters in this book by topics and geographical areas rather than by the order in which they were originally published. The first topic, the historiography of the Hijaz in western Arabia during the late Ottoman period, is covered in chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 1, "Ottoman Sources for the History of the Hijaz," presents a survey of printed and archival sources in Ottoman and modern Turkish as well as comments on some materials in Arabic and English. In the time since chapter 1 was written some twenty years ago, opportunities for researchers to work in the Ottoman archives have increased, making the archives even more important as a source of data. I hope that young scholars embarking on the history of Ottoman-Arab provinces will find this essay still to be of some value. In chapter 2, "The Recent Historiography of Western Arabia: A Critical Examination," I analyze six items written by Arabs and dealing with the history of the Hijaz. In this essay I once again argue for an examination of the history of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire based on using sources in Ottoman Turkish, Arabic, and other languages, rather than relying on materials drawn from only one language source. Chapter 2 also seeks to encourage closer and more rapid scholarly communication, especially in regard to secondary works. The second topic, the economic histoiy of the Hijaz, is discussed in chapters 3, 4, and 5. Much of the material in these three chapters subsequently appeared in my book Religion, Society and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz Under Ottoman Control, 1840-1908 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984). The chief argument of chapters 3 and 4 is that ruling the Hijaz was expensive for the Ottomans, who obtained religious prestige but very few fiscal benefits. Since the original appearance of these chapters, much has been published on other Ottoman provinces. It would now be feasible and useful to undertake a more comparative study of which provinces were profitable and which ones were drains on the imperial treasury in different eras. Provincial budgets also provide a means of examining local elites and the importance attached by the central government to them. Budgets can illustrate a wide range of economic and

VIII

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

political issues, even though it is important to note their often provisional and incomplete character. Chapter 5, "The Commercial History of the Hijaz Vilayet, 1840-1908," reflects the need to establish basic data on the topic while also demonstrating the crucial importance of the pilgrimage as the pivotal event of the commercial cycle. I also touched in this chapter on a number of subjects which have subsequently proven of interest to other historians of Ottoman history, including technology, foreign influence, government building of infrastructure, and climate and geography. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 continue the discussion of the Hijaz during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but they focus more on interaction with Europeans than on economic issues. Chapters 6 and 7 were incorporated into Religion, Society and the State in Arabia. In chapter 6 , 1 discuss the highly controversial issue of slavery as an example of the conflict between western European and Ottoman-Arab values and policies. This conflict and a rivalry for power, influence, and economic advantage helped cause the 1858 Jidda massacre as seen in chapter 7. European-style nationalism eventually became the dominant ideology of the Middle East as I assert in chapter 8, but it was slow to take root in the Hijaz for reasons examined in this essay. In chapters 9 and 10 I turn to two other Ottoman-Arab provinces — Syria and Yemen. Chapter 9 looks at the possibility of using British diplomatic documents for the economic and social history of the Vilay et of Syria, 1901-1914. This chapter reflects the excitement I felt while a graduate student in the 1960s, as research into Ottoman-Arab history opened to new themes. In chapter 10, after twenty years of additional study, I compare some of the same topics — administrative, military, and educational — showing how Ottoman experiences in Yemen and the Hijaz were similar or different. Chapters 11, 12. and 13 concern the Hijaz Railroad, an Ottoman railway line from Damascus to Madina built in the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II. Chapters 11 and 12 were later republished in my book The Hijaz Railroad (Charlottesville: Universiy Press of Virginia, 1980). About one-third of the financing of the railroad came from donations which were inspired to some extent by Pan-Islamic sentiment. A s the construction of the railroad progressed, opposition to its completion increased, as seen in chapter 12. The story of the railroad as a holy endowment from 1900 to

INTRODUCTION

IX

1948 forms the basis of chapter 13, which traces the consequences of this Ottoman project for later times. Chapter 14, "Islam and the Ottoman Legacy in the Modern Middle East", is not only the most recently written of the chapters in this book, it also can serve as a summary essay touching on many of the themes discussed in earlier chapters. However, the region and time covered are considerably wider, as reflected in the broadening of my interests, a process which eventually resulted in the publication of my fourth and fifth revised editions of Sydney N. Fisher's The Middle East: A History (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990 and 1997). In chapter 14, I deal with the intersecting subjects of religion and politics, as situated in the historical experience and legacy of the Ottoman Empire. The analysis and data deriving from the first thirteen chapters provide much of the basis for chapter 14. I continue to hope that this chapter will provoke a vigorous dialogue about the intriguing issues connected with the question of the Ottoman legacy for the twentiethcentury world. After much deliberation, I decided to leave the chapters basically as they were written. I have corrected some typographical errors, but I have not revised the texts so as to make spelling uniform. Nor have I changed the bibliography or footnotes to reflect scholarship appearing since the chapters were originally published. As all who are conneced with Ottoman and Arab history will understand, there has been a vast flood of new studies, often based on exciting and informative research, but revising my work so as to include the analyses of these studies seemed to be beyond the purposes of this particular book. However, it might be useful to mention here two recent and very valuable works that deal with the Hijaz: Joshua Teitelbaum, "The Rise and Fall of the Hashimite Kingdom of the Hijaz, 1916-1925: A Failure of State Formation in the Arabian Peninsula," (Ph. D. Dissertation, Tel Aviv University, 1996), and Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). I wish to thank all those who have helped me in so many ways over the years, including my family and friends, my teachers and colleagues, innumerable librarians and archivists, groups who provided funding for travel and research, and critical readers and reviewers who helped me rethink many of my earlier ideas. I particularly would like to thank Sinan Kuneralp,

OTTOMAN-ARAB

X whose

persistence

and

determination

HISTORY have

brought

this

project

to

completion. The following publishers reprint materials in this book: University Press, Cambridge Columbia University Press, and

or groups kindly granted me permission to Seminar for Arabian Studies, Ohio State University Press, Frank Cass and Co., E. J. Brill. William Ochsenwald Blacksburg, Virginia August, 1997

OTTOMAN SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY OF THE HIJAZ

From the 16th century to the beginning decades of the 20th century the Hijaz was part of the Ottoman Empire. Although the central government's power in the Hijaz was relatively weak compared to areas nearer Istanbul, the Ottoman archives contain records for the Hijaz covering a wide variety of subjects over the long period of Ottoman rule. The Prime Ministry Archives (Ba§bakanlik Ar§ivi) in Istanbul are particularly valuable as a source of information for historians interested in Hijazi history. It was estimated in 1960 that only about four million of the total forty million items in the Archives have been catalogued. It is, therefore, impossible fully to describe the nature of all the documents to be found there. However, for the material which is catalogued certain generalizations can be made. Records are relatively scanty before the 1450s; after the 1550s many more categories are preserved. In early classification attempts by Ali Emiri, ibniilemin Mahmud Kemal, and Muallim Cevdet about 400,000 items were arranged more or less topically. Now documents are categorized according to the issuing agency, and inside these groups by date. 1 In general, most items fall into two divisions: (1) single papers (evrak) and (2) compilations (defters), usually bound together. However, on examination, evrak may turn out to be dossiers with many individual items dealing with the same subject arranged together; defters, on the other hand, may be quite short as well as long. Nearly all documents are written in Ottoman Turkish, not Arabic. The chief exception to this is petitions sent from the Hijaz to Istanbul. Even in this case however, a Turkish translation has been provided and is in the same dossier. Some Persian vocabularly is also used — an example is, guze^te, meaning past due, overdue, or interest on money. The documents are usually quite legible. The greatest problem for a reader of Arabic first encountering the Ottoman archives would be some of the financial documents which are in siyakat script. Also, the Muhimme series and the Stanford Shaw, "Archival sources for Ottoman history: the archives of Turkey," Journal of the American Oriental Society LXXX: 1 (January-March, I960), pp. 1-12; Bernard Lewis, "Ba§vekalet Ar§ivi," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., I, 1089-1091.

2

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

rough drafts in the Yildiz collection are difficult to read. A firm foundation in Turkish grammar and vocabulary would be necessary even for a person highly proficient in Arabic. Permission to work and to make copies in the Prime Ministry or in any other archives or libraries in Turkey must be secured in advance of arrival by means of an application to the Turkish Embassy in the researcher's country. Once permission is gained, the chief method for finding the right categories of documents for research, and a major help in conducting that research, is the staff of the Archives. In addition, the researcher should be completely familiar with the invaluable guide to the Archives by its former director, Midhat Sertoglu. 1

DOCUMENT C ATEGORIES A N D THEIR USEFULNESS By far the most useful and accessible category for the history of the Hijaz is the irade collection for the years 1255/1839-40 to 1309/1891-92. There are at least 1,000 entries in this category that deal with the Hijaz out of a total of 100,000 items listed. This category is divided, inside each year's entries, into the following areas: Dahiliye (interior and general), Hariciye (foreign), Meclis-i Vala (Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances), §ura-yi Devlet (Council of State), and Meclis-i Mahsus-i Viikela (Special Council of Ministers). A number of subjects recur from year to year in the irades. The most important are the documents dealing with the yearly expenditures, ceremonies and appointments for the pilgrimage to Mecca and Madina. Reports from the Haramayn and Evkaf Treasuries, letters requesting and acknowledging gifts, the accounting for local expenditures, reports on conditions and problems in the Hijaz, descriptions of the repair of religious and charitable buildings — all of these can be found in large quantities in the irade collection. Another frequently appearing source is letters from the members of the Hashimite family other than the ruling Amir. The following Table, which deals with a small sample of five years, indicates the numbers of documents to be found in each of the chief recurring topics inside the irades:

^Midhat Sertoglu, Muhteva llakimindan Ba^vekdlet 1955).

Ar^ivi (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu,

OTTOMAN SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY OF THE HIJAZ

3

TABLE 1 Selected topics 1258 Appointments, honors, and medals Military and tribes Gifts Expenditures, including salaries Pilgrimage Political Religion, culture, education, health Total as part of all documents on the Hijaz

Hijri vears 1279 1269

1289

1310

8 3 10

10 4 8

4 4 5

9 2 7

6 6 2

14 3 3

9 2 2

10 1 2

6 2 3

4 0 3

3

5

3

5

6

29 of 39

34 of 37

44 of 48

40 of 43

27 of

Evidently decision making was tightly centralized in Istanbul. There are a number of documents involving perennially recurring issues which might well have been settled in the Hijaz at the local level which are instead referred back to the central government. One example among many is the naming of two Zamzam water carriers, a rather humble case of local patronage, sent to Istanbul for approval. 1 Certain subjects appear rarely or not at all. There are relatively few reports on politics, i.e., the struggle for influence among notables and inside the Amir's household. What political information does occur is sketchy, especially on Madina. Indeed there is little available on Madina for any topic. Topics totally absent include customs' receipts, religious court decisions, and most economic data. 2 Apparently the only document bearing on the whole subject of banking, credit arrangements, and commercial payments is a denunciation of excessive interest being charged in Madina in 1268/1852.3 The registers of the Madina Shar'i court were sent in ten boxes by order of the Ottoman Army to Damascus before the capture of Madina. 4 Although the Qadl of Damascus acknowledged receipt of them, these sijills 1 Bagbakanlik Ar§ivi (hereafter B. B. A.), Meclis-i al-Awwal 1269.

o

Vala (hereafter M.V.) 9 9 6 4 for 15 Jumada

Much of the economic data may be in the Maliyeden Mudewere category, which has not yet been consulted for the Arabian Peninsula. B.B.A., M.V. 9 0 4 7 , 2 2 Dhu'l-Hijja 1268. ^Great Britain. Public Record Office. Foreign Office 686/59, Sadiq Bey Y a h y a to the Egyptian Army.

4

Oi l O M A N - A R A B

HISTORY

have not subsequently been found in Damascus or Istanbul. Presumably there were also court records for M e c c a and Jedda as well, but they do not seem to have been taken to Istanbul or Ankara. Their location remains unknown. In passing it should be noted that there is a great deal of material in the irade category on areas immediately bordering the Hijaz, especially 'Asir and Yemen for the periods after 1 2 8 2 / 1 8 6 5 and 1 2 9 2 / 1 8 7 5 - 7 6 , respectively. Less appears for Najd, although starting in 1287/1870-71 there are more documents dealing with it.

P R O B L E M S IN U S I N G T H E IRADE

COLLECTION

The chief difficulty in making use o f the irade

collection

is

undoubtedly the partial historical record contained in the documents in it. T h e compilers o f the irades assumed their readers' knowledge o f an on-going governmental process and relationships which now must be reconstructed de novo by the historian. This general problem for all historians dealing with state archives is compounded by an Ottoman tendency to deal with specific problems rather than large issues. The convenient overview provided by British consular reports unfortunately is missing in the Ottoman archives. 1 I am now putting together lists for the following offices: the o f the Hijaz, the Qa'im maqdms

o f Jedda, the Qadls

Walls

o f M e c c a and Madina,

the Shaykh al-Haram al -Nabawi in Madina, the muftis of the two harams, and the notables of the three major towns. Until such lists are complete, however, much of the material in the archival documents will not be particularly meaningful. This problem can be seen in petitions sent to Istanbul bearing the names of various dignitaries. Until each signer can be identified

and

placed

in

his

socio-economic

position,

the

political

importance of the document cannot be fully appreciated. A similar problem awaits the social and economic historian. I am constructing price lists lor major commodities — rice, wheat, barley, and ful — and also exchange rate tables for the Ottoman kuru§ and foreign currencies. This elementary task must be accomplished before the economic

^See W. L. Ochsenwald, "The: Vilayet of Syria, 1901-1914: a re-examination of diplomatic documents as sources, "The Middle East Journal XXII: 1 (Winter, 1968), pp. 73-87.

OTTOMAN SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY OF THE HIJAZ

5

history of the Hijaz can be understood. Much information for doing this can be gleaned from the Ottoman archival documents. Examples of the importance of this can be seen in the cost of renting houses to pilgrims or in the salaries paid to government officials. Was rent equitable? Could officials live on their salaries without bribes? The answers to these questions and many others can come only after the price structure and cost of living are carefully examined. A prime example of the rewards and ambiguities found in the Archives is in the area of education. The first time that a list of salaries of the teachers at the Madina Haram appears is in 1266/1849. 1 This does not necessarily mean that Istanbul had ignored the 'ulama' of the Haram before 1266. This document might more likely be interpreted to mean that until then there was no need for commenting on an existing satisfactory situation, but then an investigation or reform became necessary. Although the head of the Finance Ministry accountants certified the salaries, there is otherwise nothing in the document to indicate why it was written or whether a new or old situation is being described. The value and volume of the trades for the Hijaz starts to decline about 1884-85 as more and more administrative decisions are made directly in the palace by Sultan Abdiilhamid II rather than through the normal administrative machinery. 2 The 1892 arrangement of the trades by government ministries rather than by date also increases the difficulty of locating useful material in the irddes.

OTHER CATEGORIES OF DOCUMENTS IN THE PRIME MINISTRY ARCHIVES There are at least five other categories of documents at the Prime Ministry Archives which contain considerable quantities of information on the Hijaz: (1) Bâb-i Âli Evrak Odasi (B.A.E.O.); (2) Yildiz Esas Evraki (Yddiz); (3) Miihimme-i Misir; (4) Meclis-i Vtikela Mazbatalarr, (5) Mesaili Miihimme. By far the most voluminous are the defters of correspondence in the Bâb-i Âli Evrak Odasi.

'b.B.A., Dahi'dyc 11840,2 Muharram 1266. L. Tibawi, A modern Macmillan, 1969).

history of Syria, including

Lebanon and Palestine

(London:

6

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

The records in the B.A.E.O. category are copies of letters to and f r o m the office of the Grand Vezir after 1891. T h e 1,045 catalogues are f o r an estimated 352,000 documents. 1 There are eighteen defters which serve as indexes to documents which are directly relevant to the Hijaz in the 19th century. Numbers 716.30.1-2 deal with the Hijaz Railway for 1319-1332 Mali! 1902-17. Most of the incoming despatches are presently uncatalogued; however, about 1,700 outgoing items are available. Considerable information on Madina, the tribes of the area around it, and the construction of the Railway are summarized in these defters f r o m the documents. A suggested revision in the administration and organization of the Hijaz Vilayet is outlined in 936/2.59/4 for 1312-1314 Malil1896-1898. Apparently, however, the suggestions for reform were never put into execution in the Hijaz. Incoming and outgoing correspondence f r o m and to the A m i r for 1326-1334 A/a/j/1910-18 is contained in 769.40/1-2. S o m e examples of the wide range of information contained in the incoming despatches follow: (1) No. 280762, 15 RabV al-Awwal 1328, the Amir proposed, and Istanbul approved, the awarding of a medal to the Meccan pharmacist, a l - H a j j Ibrahim Husayn Efendi; (2) No. 287545 (No. 286902), the price of camels in Madina was discussed for the Mali year 1326/1910-11; (3) No. 293347, 1327 Mfl/i/1911-12, a telegram from the Amirate to Istanbul informed it that the March payments to the tribes had not been made — the telegram was then forwarded to tht Finance Ministry. The Ayniyat class of B.A.E.O. is even richer than the above. T h e documents cover the period 1812-90 and are listed in about 1,561 registers. 2 Although many of these defters contain documents primarily dealing with Y e m e n , and some are rough drafts duplicated in finished form later, Ayniyat catalogues numbers 871 877 and 1516-1521 also contain a great deal of original information about the Hijaz for the years 1283-1300/1866-83. All of these catalogues have summaries of letters and orders sent f r o m the Grand Vezir in Istanbul to the Wall and/or the Amir in Mecca. All aspects of Ottoman government are covered. Political information, for example, is contained in No. 871, 22 § (aban) 1283, sent to the Amir and Wall. It conveys the approval of the Meclis-i Vala for the suggested payments of

^Stanford Shaw, "Ottoman archival materials for the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: the archives of Istanbul", International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies VI: 1 (January, 1975), pp. 94-114, and especially p. 100. ¿Ibid.

OTTOMAN SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY OF THE HIJAZ

7

food to Zayn al-'Äbidin Efendi, a member of the majlis of Mecca. Religious information is in No. 871, 23 Muharram 1284, to the Madina Shaykh alHaram, relaying the petition of some Madinan Mälikis for gifts, grants, and salaries. The Grand Vezir wanted to know why the Shaykh al-Haram had not supplied these in the past. Even foreign policy is sometimes touched upon, as can be seen in No. 871, 28 Rajab 1284, to the Amir. The central government requested any information available in the Hijaz on recent events in the Hadramawt and the role of the English there. Military affairs, and especially internal security, were a source of constant concern for Istanbul. In No. 875, 13 RabV al-Awwal, to the Amir and Wäll, the importation of arms into the Hijaz is absolutely forbidden. Frequently it is possible to deduce what the original incoming message must have been, even though it was apparently not preserved. An announcement of the death of 'Abd Allah Shaybah, the key-keeper of the Ka'ba, presumably preceded the message of the Grand Vezir to the Amir, Wäli, and Finance Ministry concerning the disposition of his pension. 1 The request of the Wäli for more troops and the money to pay them in order to fight the Mutayr tribe east of Madina was acknowledged and approved by Istanbul. 2 The Waffs original request is not present. The second major non-irade category consists of the Yildiz records from the palace of Sultan Abdiilhamid II. Although there are, in certain parts of this category, quite useful items, the present cataloguing of them makes it difficult to locate and date particular documents. Butrüs Abü-Manneh 3 and I have located some sections that are valuable for the Hijaz, especially Kisims 13, 18, 30, 31, 33, and 36. One example is Kisim 13.112/3.112.6, the orders sent to the new Hijaz Wall, Osman Pa§a, in 1298/1881. The Mühimme-i Misir, 1119-1318/1707-1901, include not only important orders and state papers dealing with Egypt, but also with the Hijaz. Egypt and the Hijaz were linked, in the Ottoman period as earlier, both politically and economically. Unfortunately for the researcher, mentions of the Hijaz are scattered throughout the series with no index available. One example of an entry on the Hijaz is the telegram to the Khedive, relayed via MuhtarPa§a, in September 1892. The Ottoman Empire ^B.B.A. Bàb-I Ali Evrak Odasi (B.A.E.O.), Ayniyat No. 1517, 1297/1879-80, p. 238. B.B.A„ B.A.E.O., Ayniyat No. 1519,1298-99, p. 95. %utras Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdiilhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca (1880-1900)," Asian and African Studies IX: 1 (1973), pp. 1-21. 2

8

OT 1 O M A N - A R A B

HISTORY

resumed by virtue of this telegram direct administration over the villages of Wajh, Muwaylih, Daba, and 'Aqaba. They were to become part of the Hijaz Vilayet directly; Egyptian zaptiyes were to be removed. 1 Decisions of the Imperial Cabinet for 1302-1341/1885-1922 are in the Meclis-i Viikela Mazbatalari. After the restoration of the Constitution and the limitation of the Sultan's power in 1908-09, the Cabinet became even more influential in Ottoman administration than it had previously been. A rapid survey of the mazbatas for 1330-1333/1911-14 indicates that some references to the Hijaz exist there. Since the decisions are extremely numerous and arranged solely by date, rather than subject, a careful, detailed, and lengthy examination will be needed to determine exactly what information on Arabia is in this category. One section of the last category, Mesail-i Muhimme, specifically concerns the Hijaz: Harameyn-iMuhteremeynedair. The chronological range is brief, from 1258 to 1264/1842-48, but a number of important subjects are discussed there which are apparently not available elsewhere. The frequently sensitive nature of these documents can be seen in No. 2441, 11 Rajah 1261, from the Walt of Egypt to the central government. In this letter Muhammad All asks for the dismissal of the Hijaz Wall because of his lack of skill in governing and because of the problems of 'Asir. An equally delicate problem is treated in No. 2447, for 26 Ramadan 1262. A dispute between ishaq Ffendi, the "naqib al-ashraf" of Mecca, 2 and the Amir 'Abd al-Muttalib had arisen over certain waqf property. The central government resolved the dispute by paying ishaq compensation for 'Abd alMuttalib's having ignored preceding orders on the subject.

OTHER OTTOMAN ARCHIVES AND SOURCES In addition to the Prime Ministry Archives, there are several other Ottoman archives which may contain information on the Hijaz and the Arabian Peninsula. As yet, none of them have been fully examined in order to find all such information.

^B.B.A., Muhimme-i Misir XV page 101, 7 September 1892. Did the post of naqib al-ashraf of Mecca actually exist? This is one of several passing references to it, but no detailed description has yet been found.

2

OTTOMAN SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY OF THE HIJAZ

9

The Hariciye Ar^ivi (Foreign Ministry Archives) in Istanbul contain at least some material on Western Arabia: Yemen ve Hicaz No. 555, 46410/94. 1 Since there is almost nothing in the Prime Ministry Archives on such subjects as the consulates, tariffs, treatment of resident aliens, and other subjects involving foreigners, it is to be hoped that the Hariciye records contain even more than is now known to be there. A glance at the Topkapi Palace Archives indicates there are many documents dealing with the Hijaz before the 19th century in its holdings. Most important are the hatt-i humayuns, or imperial letters, stored there. Some of the topics discussed in them are as follows: the siirre (No. 868, 1203/1788-89), the Harb tribe (No. 1031, 1201/1786-87), a council in the Hijaz (No. 1826, 1217/1802-03), the customs of Jedda (No. 3508, 1220/1805-06), and the leader of the pilgrimage from Damascus (No. 40199, 1239/1823-24). It has been estimated that there are about 10,000 imperial letters in all including also some petitions and reports from the provinces. 2 Other archives which possibly possess holdings on the Hijaz are the Tapu ve Kadastro Umum Mudiirlugii Ar§ivi (land registry) in Ankara, the Bab-I Mesihat/Muftiiliik Ar§ivi (§eyhiilislam's archives) in Istanbul, and the military archives in Ankara. Ottoman archives were used for the compilation of official and semiofficial publications. Court historians compiled chronicles for the reigns of the sultans. Yearbooks (salnames) exist for the Empire as a whole and for most of the provinces as well. In the case of the Hijaz there are yearbooks for 1301/1883-84, 1303/1885-86 (also printed in Arabic as well as Turkish), 1305/1887-88, 1306/1888-89, and 1309/1891-92. A complete collection of the salnames is in the library of the Turkish Historical Society in Ankara. The information in the yearbooks should be used with caution since it is frequently repeated from year to year rather than being revised in accordance with new circumstances. Istanbul newspapers frequently printed government announcements. The most important printed source for governmental decrees

Salih M. al-'Amr, The Hijaz under Ottoman rule: 1869-1914: the Ottoman Vali, the Sharif of Mecca, and the growth of British influence, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation Leeds University, 1974), p. 297. ^Bernard Lewis, "Ba§vekalet Ar§ivi," pp. 1089-91.

10

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

and new laws is the series called Düstur.1 For 1863 to 1922 it contains a wealth of information on all parts of the Ottoman Empire and all aspects of Ottoman government.

CONCLUSIONS Ottoman sources are essential for the history of the Hijaz. Several histories have been produced without consulting them; the most notable, those of de Gaury and Dahlán, 2 provide excellent summaries of the political events of Mecca but only from the local perspective. B y making full use of Ottoman sources both sides of the Ottoman-Arab political relationship in the Hijaz can be seen. New types of information also can be added: provincial finances, subsidies from Istanbul and Cairo, the movement of troops, the actions of the town councils, appointments to religious and political positions, etc. Some historians have begun to use the Prime Ministry Archives for the Hijaz. In the works of Abü Manneh, Uzun£ar§ili, al-'Amr, and my own articles new facts and interpretations are beginning to appear. The microfilming project of Dr. 'Adnán Bakhít of Jordan also promises to make known a wider variety of archival information for the Ottoman Arab provinces. Other scholars are currently writing studies of Syria during the 18th century, and Mosul during the 19th century, based on the Ottoman archives. Once these and similar books are available comparisons between various Arab provinces t ould be written. Based upon a wider variety of sources and including for the first time the Ottoman point of view, a more objective and analytically more sophisticated history will in the future be possible.

' T h e complex printing histor\ of Diistur is discussed in Shaw, "Ottoman archival materials," pp. 99-100. Ahmad b. Zayni Dahlan, Khulasat al-kalam fl bayan umara' al-balad al-haram (Cairo: Matba'a al-Khayriyya 1305/1887-88).

OTTOMAN SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY OF THE HIJAZ

11

AN ANNOTATED SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR THE HISTORY OF THE HIJAZ I. Turkish language works: Cevdet Pa§a, Ahmet. Tezakir, ed. Cavid Baysun (3 vols.; Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1953-1963). Cevdet drew extensively upon the archives and other government sources for his histories and memoirs. Number 12 of the memoirs deals with Amir 'Abd al-Muttalib. Islam Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1965 ff.). This translated and expanded version of the Encyclopaedia of Islam has presently reached volume XII: Tarikat-Tugrai. For Ottoman subjects it is an invaluable source. Pakalin, Mehmet. Osmanli tarih deyimleri ve terimleri Sozlugii (3 vols.; Istanbul: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1971). Terms and concepts frequently found in documents and in late Ottoman usage are carefully explained at length. Redhouse, Sir James. Turkgeden Ingilizceye Liigat Kitabi (Constantinople: Matteosian, 1921). This, the most valuable Turkish-English dictionary alphabetized by the old script, has gone through numerous editions. It was recently reprinted in Beirut by Librairie du Li ban. Sertoglu, Midhat. Muhteva Bakimindan Ba§vekalet Ar§ivi (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1955). All researchers in the Ottoman archives should carefully read this excellent guide to the contents of the Prime Ministry Archives written by its former director. Unat, Faik Regit. Hicri tarihleri miladi tarihe gevirme kilavuzu (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1959).

12

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

Ottoman sources frequently use the special, governmental, Mali calendar as well as the Hijri and occasionally the Christian. Unat has provided the most easily used tables for conversion of dates for all three calendars. U/urigar§ili, Ismail Hakki. Mekke-i Tarih Kurumu, 1972)

Miikerreme

Emirleri

(Ankara: Turk

Basing his work almost exclusively on archival sources, Uzun§ar§ih here provides a survey of the Amirs of Mecca from the Ottoman conquest to the end of the Empire. See my review in Middle East Journal XXVIII: 2 (Spring, 1974), p. 209.

II. Arabic works on the Ottoman Empire as a whole: Anis, M u h a m m a d . Al-Dawla al-'Uthmaniyya w'al-Sharq 1914 (Cairo: Maktaba al-Anglo al-Misriyya, n.d.).

al-'Arabi,

1514-

This is one of the first general surveys of the Arab Middle East during the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Harraz, Rajab. Al-Dawla al-'Uthmaniyya wa Shibh Jazira 1909 (Cairo: Matba'a al-'Alamiyya, 1970).

al-Arab,

1840-

See my review in Middle East Journal XXVII: 1 (Winter, 1973), p. 99. Rafiq, 'Abd al-Karim. Al Arab w'al-'Uthmaniyyun, Alif-Ba', 1974).

1516-1916 (Damascus:

Along with Holt's work cited below, Rafiq provides the best overview of the Arab provinces of the Empire. However, Rafiq, Anis, and Holt do not discuss the Arabian Peninsula in depth and none of them has extensively used Turkish-language sources. See my review of Rafiq in Middle East Journal XXX: 2 (1976), p. 232.

III. Works in English Abu-Manneh, Butrus. ' Sultan Abdiilhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca (1880-1900)," Asian and African Studies IX: 1 (1973), pp. 1-21.

OTTOMAN SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY OF THE HIJAZ

13

Al-'Amr, Salih M. The Hijaz under Ottoman Rule, 1869-1914: the Ottoman Vali, the Sharif of Mecca, and the Growth of British Influence (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Leeds University, 1974). Although dealing primarily with English sources because of the nature of the subject, al-'Amr has also consulted and utilized the Ottoman and Egyptian archives. De Gaury, Gerald. Rulers of Mecca (London: Harrap, 1951). This is the standard account for the political history of Mecca. De Gaury apparently did not use the Ottoman archives or other Turkish sources. Lewis, Bernard. "Ba§vekalet Ar§ivi," Encyclopaedia 1089-1091.

of Islam, 2nd ed., I,

A short introduction to the Prime Ministry Archives. —, The Emergence 1966).

of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press,

This book, and the two volume work of Stanford Shaw soon to appear, are the best general surveys of the whole Ottoman Empire in English. —, "The Ottoman Archives as a Source for the History of the Arab Lands," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1951), pp. 139-155. Ochsenwald, William. "The Financial Basis of Ottoman Rule in the Hijaz," in W.W. Haddad and W. Ochsenwald, eds., Nationalism in a nonnational state: the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977). This article is based primarily on records found in the irade category of the B.B.A. —, The Hijaz Railroad: a Study in Ottoman-Arab Political Capacity and Autonomy. (Unpublished manuscript). — "The Jidda Massacre of 1858," Middle Eastern Studies (to appear in 1977).

14

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

This article is based on the 1858 files of the B.B.A., the French Foreign Ministry Archives, and the Public Record Office files. — , "Ottoman Subsidies to the Hijaz, 1877-1886," International Middle Eastern Studies VI: 3 (July, 1975), pp. 300-07.

Journal of

Most of the information for the article came from semi-official Ottoman sources. —, "The Vilayet of Syria, 1901-1914: a Re-examination of Diplomatic Documents as Sources," Middle East Journal XXII: 1 (Winter, 1968), pp. 73-87. This is an exploration of some of the problems associated with reading archival information for purposes other than those originally intended by the authors. Shaw, Stanford. "Archival Sources for Ottoman History: the Archives of Turkey," Journal of the American Oriental Society LXXX: 1 (JanuaryMarch, 1960), pp. 1-12. — , "Ottoman Archival Materials for the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries: the Archives of Istanbul," international Eastern Studies VI: 1 'January, 1975), pp. 94-114.

Journal of Middle

Shaw's comments on Sertoglu's outline of the Archives are based on extensive, firsthand knowledge. The two together are extremely valuable for the archival researcher. — , "The Yildiz Palace Ai chives of Abdulhamit II," Archivum 111(1971), pp.211-2.T7.

Ottomanicum

THE RECENT HISTORIOGRAPHY OF WESTERN ARABIA: ACRITICALEXAMINATION

The chief theme of my presentation originated after a careful reading of Albert Hourani's recent article on the history of the Middle East (Hourani, 1991: 125-36). This article was in most regards an excellent analysis of the current state of historiography dealing with the Islamic Middle East, but it did not mention any contemporary scholars living in that area who write primarily in Arabic or Turkish. Hourani's article thus illustrated a widespread problem among historians of the Middle East in Europe and North America: scholarly research published in the Middle East is often not read or cited in the West. Speaking more generally, the ideas, analyses, and information contained in secondary literature are only very slowly transmitted among the world-wide community of scholars who specialize in Middle Eastern studies. The benefits that have arisen from the rapid transmission of knowledge and the free flow of ideas across national and cultural barriers are so clear and so widely acknowledged that stressing them may seem to belabour the obvious, but I am convinced that there have been serious deficiencies in this regard. To be more concrete, examples can be cited from the history of the Hijaz when it formed a part of the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, and eary twentieth centuries. Given the nature of the Hijaz at that time — an Arabic-speaking region ruled by the Ottoman Turks—there was clearly a profound interaction between the two ethnic groups. There was also an interaction between the local history of the Hijaz, which has been recorded mostly in Arabic sources, and the history of the imperial centre in Istanbul, whose archives were mostly written in Ottoman Turkish. In addition, Mecca, the site of the most important Muslim pilgrimage, was a centre of interest for Muslims throughout the world, and for the governments of the lands from which the pilgrims originated. When European influence and control expanded throughout the Muslim world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, various non-

16

01 IOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

Muslim travellers, explorers, and diplomats focused their interests on the Hijaz. One should envisage this situation as a triangle, with the apex occupied by the villagers, townsmen, and nomads of the Hijaz, and the other two points occupied respectively by Ottoman Turks and Europeans. T o understand the history of the Hijaz one should grasp the point of view and the information presented by the peoples present at all three points of the triangle. However, very few scholars have consulted all three of the needed types of soure, i.e., Arab, Ottoman, and European. Almost no Arabs have worked with Ottoman sources on the H i j a z , very few Turks have used Arabic chronicles, and most Western scholars rely chiefly on Western archival or printed documents. In the last decade there has been a partial change in this situation, as more Arab and Turkish scholars have begun to use Western records, especially the British archives. These remarks on the use of primary sources may also be extended to the use of monographs and journal articles. The cultural preeminence of the West in today's world has created a situation where Arabs and Turks often use Western secondary studies, but Turks and Arabs do not usually read each others' secondary works. Unfortunately, many Western scholars, though eager to consult primary sources in Arabic or in Turkish, do not read the secondary literature published in those languages. I am going to examine just the Arab element in this historiographical triangular relationship. By looking at recent secondary works on the history of the Ottoman H i j a z written by Arabs I hope to demonstrate not only my chief theme, but also the importance given by many current Arab historians to political rather than religious, social, and economic history. I will examine six items written by Arab historians: two books published in Arabic in Saudi Arabia and Egypt; two journal articles published in Arabic in Saudi Arabia and Tunisia; and two doctoral dissertations written in English at American universities by Arabs. I shall consider these six, in the order of their historical coverage. The first two are Abdulrahman Alorabi's ('Abd al-Rahman al-'Urabl's) dissertation on Ottoman policy in the Hijaz from 1731 to 1788, which was submitted to the University of Utah in 1988, and Muhammad 'Abd al-

THE RECENT HISTORIOGRAPHY OF WESTERN ARABIA

17

Rahman Burj's article on the Hijaz from 1750 to 1800, which appeared in Arabic in Tunis in 1985. Alorabi reported that he tried to use the Egyptian and Ottoman archives but was not able to do so. While he consulted the most important Turkish-language book on the Hijaz (IJzun^ar^ili 1972), he cited no other Turkish or Ottoman sources. Instead, he relied chiefly on Arabic-language chronicles, some of which were available only in manuscript form. Western secondary sources were used, but not Western archives. The first half of Alorabi's dissertation was a rather old-fashioned political narrative, but in the second half he turned to political analysis of offices such as the amir of Mecca, the Ottoman governor, the qadi, the mufti, and the shaykh al~ haram. There was a short description of the Ottoman and local military forces, and a somewhat longer discussion of the pilgrimage, concentrating especially on the Syrian and Egyptian mahmals. The whole work suffered from a failure to consult the Ottoman archival sources, which have vast amounts of information on all these matters. Alorabi had little discussion of the changes in economic or social institutions or of the results of Ottoman rule on the Hijaz. Instead, he asserted that the Hijaz was unique within the Ottoman Empire because of its local autonomy. A comparison with other Ottoman provinces, such as Lebanon, the Crimea, the Rumanian principalities, or even Egypt in the eighteenth century would have shown that the Hijaz was not unique. The chief strengths of Alorabi's work were his very thorough treatment of political history, and a diligent and conscientious attempt to compare Arabic-language sources with each other and with Western secondary sources. Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman Burj's article covers the Hijaz from 1750 to 1800. Despite its chronological overlap with Alorabi's dissertation, Burj's article was almost completely different in content. Burj depended on the accounts of Western travellers such as Niebuhr and Burckhardt. Burj said that his purpose in writing the article was to show that such sources could cast light on the history of the Hijaz. Because of this purpose one would not expect the author to use Ottoman or Arabic sources. However, a comparison of the information from Western travellers with the picture of Hijazi history gained from Arab and Ottoman sources would have added immensely to the value of Burj's article. Almost all of the article consisted of economic

18

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

information, with very little political data. Causal relationships between economic and political events were not discussed, with the one important exception of the motivation of the Egyptian attack in 1770 on the Hijaz. (Alorabi also mentioned economic motivation as a cause of this attack.) Burj did not analyze his economic data, nor did he use it to examine religious, social, or institutional history. Alorabi did not cite Burj's article, published three years before Alorabi completed his Ph. D. dissertation. The last four of the six works to be discussed chronologically span the period from 1869 to 1925. They are Fa'iq a l - S a w w a f s book on the relations between the Ottoman state and the H i j a z , published in Cairo in 1978; Nabil Ridwan's monograph on the Ottomans and Western Arabia after the opening of the Suez Canal, issued in Jiddah in 1983; Khalid al-Sa'dun's article dealing with the resistance of the tribes to the Hijaz Railway, which appeared in Riyadh in 1988-89; and lastly, Abdlaziz Shebl's ('Abd al-'Aziz Shibl's) dissertation that discusses the emergence and demise of the kingdom of the H i j a z , 1916-1925. completed at the University of California, Los Angeles, in 1988. A l - S a w w a f in 1978 was assistant professor of modern history and head of the Islamic History Department at King 'Abd al-'Aziz University in Mecca. He wrote that he went to Istanbul, London, Cairo, Beirut, and Medina to undertake research for his book. He consulted private libraries including unpublished family documents. H e did not use the crucial Ottoman archives, nor the British or French archives. Al-Sawwaf read some Western secondary books, but he did not cite such important works as those of Gerald de Gaury (1951). While al- Sawwaf consulted Ottoman yearbooks for the Hijaz, they were not extensively used in his book. Instead, the work was based chiefly on printed Arabic works, some primary, and on newspapers, including alQiblah of Mecca. Al-Sawwaf adopted a favorable view of Ottoman Sultan Abdiilhamid II's pan-Islamic policy - - in the context of Saudi history, this opinion of a l - S a w w a f was remarkable. The author especially valued Abdiilhamid's building of the H i j a z Railway. A l - S a w w a f denigrated the non-religious motives for the Railway advanced by Western historians; indeed, he implied that British, French, and Zionist attacks on the Railway project were a way of undermining Abdiilhamid's pan-Islamic policy and thereby advancing imperialistic interests. Such a view of the Ottoman sultan and his policies should naturally be based on Ottoman sources, especially the Yildiz Palace

THE RECENT HISTORIOGRAPHY OF WESTERN A R A B I A

19

archives in Istanbul, which unfortunately the author did not use. While a few of the economic consequences of the Hijaz Railway appeared in this book, there was little socio-economic analysis of the Railway. The value of al-Sawwaf's book was in its summary of printed Arabic sources in one convenient location, and in its reinterpretation of Abdul hamid II from a new Saudi religious perspective. Nabil Ridwan's book covered the whole of Western Arabia after 1869, and was clearly designed to be an analytical work, rather than a monograph. His sources for the sections of the book on the Hijaz were printed Arabic-language works by such authors as al-Sawwaf and others. Very few Western authors were mentioned, and almost no Ottoman or Turkish sources were cited. In his introduction, Ridwan stated that his motives for writing the book included a desire to see the history of Western Arabia as a whole rather than as segments, and also to see the region on its own terms rather than as part of larger empires. He succeeded admirably in these purposes by using a geographical-historical approach centered on the effects of the Suez Canal and the Hijaz Railway. There was little discussion in Ridwan's book on religious history, though some space was devoted to economic matters. Ridwan's fine analysis of Ottoman policy would have benefitted from reading earlier books (Ochsenwald 1980; 1984). Still, Ridwan's book has become the single best work on the political effects of the Suez Canal on Western Arabia up to World War I. Khalid al-Sa'dun's article on the nomadic opposition to the Hijaz Railway in 1908-1909 was based almost entirely on the British and American diplomatic archives. He also read some Arabic-language sources, including Ridwan, but he did not cite the usual printed Arabic works. There were no Ottoman or Turkish sources listed, and he did not cite Ochsenwald's 1973 article on precisely this topic. Al-Sa'dun analyzed the information coming from his British and American sources in a rather sophisticated way and he found a good deal of new and detailed data on the events of those two years. His article should certainly be read by all those interested in the topic. He would, however, have benefitted enormously from consulting the Ottoman archives in Istanbul.

20

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

The sixth and lasl work to be considered is Abdlaziz Shebl's 1988 dissertation on the kingdom of the Hijaz. According to the author this was written to explain the collapse of the first Arab state to gain its independence from the Ottoman Empire. He aimed his work at internal history, thereby to a large extent avoiding a thicket of intensely controversial events in diplomatic history. The domestic history of the kingdom of the Hijaz by definition excluded a reliance on Ottoman sources, although Shebl's introductory sections would have profited from examining Turkish works on the Committee of Union and Progress. Shebl's chief sources were books by Westerners. He also used works by Arabs, and he read in the British Foreign Office records, but not in the French archives. Unfortunately, he used only a few issues of the newspaper al-Qiblah, a key source for his topic. The history of the Hijaz from 1916 to 1925 would be clearer for Shebl and other scholars as well if historical papers compiled by the Hashemite family could be found. According to the Jordanian scholar Sulayman Mousa, who has published key documents belonging to Amir Zayd ibn Husayn, whatever records existed in Mecca during that time have been lost. Similarly, the judicial registers of Mecca, Medina, and Jiddah have not as yet been located. Until such items are uncovered, all researchers, including Dr. Shebl, suffer from considerable handicaps in dealing with this aspect of Hijazi history. Shebl did not discuss at any length the economic circumstances of 1916 up to 1925. Especially noteworthy was his omission of the pilgrimages, except in regard to King Husayn's exactions from the pilgrims. This gap demonstrated the dangers of writing history "from the top" and thereby neglecting the history of the rest of society. Shebl acknowledged, however, the basic continuity of Husayn's regime with the earlier Ottoman economic system — a vital element in analysis. For the pre-1914 period Shebl discussed at length aspects of social history, but surprisingly his analysis of these subjects was drastically curtailed for events after 1914. Shebl's dissertation supplements Baker's 1979 book on the kingdom of the Hijaz, but by no means replaces it. From my reading of these works, I have drawn three conclusions. First, all the parties who are the heirs of the earlier historical triangle — Arabs, Turks, and Westerners — need to increase their reading of each

THE RECENT HISTORIOGRAPHY OF WESTERN A R A B I A

21

others' primary sources and secondary literature. Serious difficulties arise when scholars remain ignorant of the work of colleagues in other countries. T o keep up with the massive flood of secondary literature, including works published in a variety of languages, is a difficult but essential task. Making use of the crucial Ottoman archives for primary materials is now easier, following the Turkish government's decision to grant access in a rapid fashion to any qualified applicant. Second, in regard to the Arab "point" of the triangle, the analytical sophistication of books and articles would be improved by taking more fully into account social, economic, and cultural history. Vast strides have been made in the last few years in the study of the social and economic history of Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Iraq, as written by Arabs, Westerners, and Turks. Recent examples of new approaches include research undertaken by 'Abd al-Karim Rafiq of Damascus and the collection of Ottoman sijills in A m m a n . Such approaches should be pursued in the writing of the history of the Hijaz. Only when this is done can we properly discuss the interrelationship of socio-economic and political events in that significant region of the Middle East. Third, the most important aspect of Ottoman-Hijazi history for the world as a whole — the history of theology — has as yet hardly been touched upon by any contemporary historians, whether Arabs, Turks, or Westerners. New developments in Mecca and Medina during the Ottoman period relating to religion might well have been influential and important — but we can not say as yet whether this was the case or whether the Holy Cities were a bastion of conservative religious views. John Voll's exciting article published in 1980 on the impact of eighteenth century Medina scholars shows the rich possibilities that might result f r o m such research.

REFERENCES Alorabi, Abdulrahman. 1988. "The Ottoman Policy in the Hejaz in the Eighteenth Century: A Study of Political and Administrative Developments, 1143-1202 A.H./1731-1788 A.D." Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Utah. Baker, Randall. 1979. King Husain and the Kingdom of Hejaz. Cambridge. Burj, Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahmän. 1985. "Al-Hijäz fi al-'a§r a l - ' u t h m â n î . . . 1750-1800". Revue d'Histoire Maghrébine 12:473-81.

22

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

De Gaury, Gerald. 1951. Rulers of Mecca. London. Hourani, Albert. 1991. "How Should We Write the History of the Middle East?". International Journal of Middle East Studies 23:125-36. Ochsenwald, William. 1973. "Opposition to Political Centralization in South Jordan and the Hijaz, 1900-1914". Muslim World 62: 297-306. —. 1980. The Hijaz Railroad. Charlottesville, Virginia. —. 1984. Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz under Ottoman Control, 1840-1908. Columbus, Ohio. Ridwan, Nabil. 1983. Al-Dawlat al-'uthmaniyyah wa gharbi al-jazirat al'arabiyyah ba 'da iftitah qanat al-Suways (1286-1326/1869-1908). Jiddah. al-Sa'dun, Khalid. 1988-89. "Muqawamat al-qaba'il li sikkat hadid al-Hijaz ... 1908-1909 m." Al-Darah 14: 46-60. al-Sawwaf, Fa'iq. 1978. Al-Alaqat bayna al-dawlat al-'uthmaniyyah wa iqlim al-Hijaz fifatrat ma bayna 1293-1334 H. (1876-1916 M). Cairo. Shebl, Abdlaziz. 1988. "The Emergence and Demise of an Independent Arab State: the Kingdom of the Hejaz, 1916-1925". Ph. D. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles. Uzun§ar§ili, Ismail. 1972. Mekke-i mukerreme emirleri. Ankara. Voll, John. 1980. "Hadith Scholars and Tariqahs: An Ulama Group in the 18th Century Haramayn and Their Impact in the Islamic World." Journal of Asian and African Studies 15:264-73.

THE FINANCIAL BASIS OF OTTOMAN RULE IN THE HIJAZ, 1840-1877

If nineteenth-century Middle Eastern history is seen solely as a prelude to the growth of twentieth-century nationalisms, the positive aspects of the Ottoman Empire may be ignored. In the central Arab lands, Ottoman provincial administration endured for four centuries despite decentralization, depopulation, and economic decay. Despite the attacks by nationalists and Western critics, Ottoman rule must have had supporters and provided some benefits. The other side of the coin of modern nationalism is the history of the successful functioning of Ottoman institutions. To understand either the final collapse of the empire or its long existence necessitates analyses of each of the areas of the empire with attention both to the failings and successes of Ottoman rule. Although the Hijaz was both the birthplace of Arab political independence and the religious center of the Muslim world and the Ottoman Empire, its political history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is nearly unknown. Trying to reconstruct the history of the Hijaz brings to mind the fable of the blind seers and the elephant: each perceives a different kind of being depending on the source of information. The rare Christian traveler who managed to evade local authorities saw the Holy Cities during the pilgrimage as religious centers; European consuls, restricted to Jidda, knew that part of the merchant community which was engaged in international trade; chroniclers, later Arab nationalists, and the only fullscale history now available 1 all concentrated on the amirs of Mecca and their internal struggles and eventual leadership of the Arab revolt. If the role of the Hijaz in the modern period and its relationship to Arab nationalism are to be properly understood, these facets should be combined and one key missing ingredient added: the Ottoman part in Hijazi history. It is, however, easier to prescribe such an approach than to follow it. Ottoman records were not compiled with the purposes of the historian in mind. However, the slow piecing together of information from Ottoman sources, even when tentative

^Gerald de Gaury, Rulers of Mecca (London, 1951).

24

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

and incomplete can add new clues toward the solution of the puzzle of modern Hijazi history. Money, as always, was a major concern of the government. T h e financial relations of the Ottomans with the Hijaz were central to the actual existence of the people of the area as well as their attitude toward their rulers. Subsidies f r o m the central government to Mecca and Madina provided the chief rationale for the presence of the Ottomans in the Hijaz. T h e Ottoman Empire was the defender and economic support of the chief religious sites of Islam for the four centuries following the conquest of the Arab lands in the beginning of the sixteenth century. T h e Ottomans sent food for the subsistence of the Hijazis and the thousands of pilgrims w h o came to the Hijaz every year. In return the Ottoman sultan gained religious prestige. Mehmed Ali of Egypt had threatened the sultan's claim to be the protector of the Holy Places. Egypt administered the Hijaz for almost thirty years until 1840, when Ottoman administration directly linked to Istanbul was restored. The middle of the nineteenth century f r o m 1840 to 1877 constituted a discrete block of time in the Hijaz ending with the accession of Sultan Abdiilhamid II in Istanbul and the death of Amir 'Abd Allah in the Hijaz. The period 1840 to 1877 falls into three politically defined sections in the Hijaz: (1) 1840-51, the continuation of the reign of the Amir M u h a m m a d b.'Awn; (2) 1852-58, political turbulence with riots and massacres, first under 'Abd al-Muttalib and then the restored M u h a m m a d b. 'Awn as amirs; (3) 1859-1877, political stability under Amir 'Abd Allah. There were then only three amirs f r o m the family of the Prophet M u h a m m a d who governed in Mecca beside the Ottoman governor and administration during the thirty-seven years under discussion. In the same time there were nineteen Ottoman valis, or provincial governors. Before we turn to any one particular aspect of the financial relations between the central government and the province, it will be useful to establish a picture of the total cash budget and the changes in it f r o m 1257/1840-41 to 1294/1877-78. Each category of revenue and expenditure may then be compared with the totals in a more meaningful way. There are three especially important aspects of Ottoman-Hijazi relations that may be deduced from the cash totals (see table 1). First, there were the perpetual deficits. The average of the twelve available deficits is

THE F I N A N C I A L B A S I S OF O T T O M A N RULE IN THE HIJAZ

25

about 30,000 purses. 1 Local revenues were always inadequate to cover local expenditures. Usually the deficits were two-thirds of the total expenditures of the province. Even with the strictest economies, the Hijaz was necessarily dependent upon external subsidies to maintain its government. Second, the total sums involved were relatively small. In the year of greatest expenditure, 1279/1862-63, only about 47,300 purses, or keses, were spent on all aspects of government excluding the pilgrimage but including the military and gifts to local Bedouin leaders. Local revenue averaged around 11,000 purses. By comparison, Egypt's tribute payment to the Ottoman central government in Istanbul up to 1866 was 80,000 purses; after that it was 150,000. The revenue of Cyprus, perhaps more comparable in number of inhabitants, was 42,274 purses in 1868-69. 2 Finally the fluctuations in all categories show no over-all patterns or are inconclusive. Changes are usually explainable in terms of short-term accounting decisions made within the provincial administration rather than a long-range plan to alter the amounts of revenues or expenditures. An example is the income from the customs collected at the Red Sea ports. Major changes in total customs revenues resulted from the inclusion or exclusion of the Red Sea ports of Ottoman Yemen and the cession of Suakin and Massawa on the African coast of the Red Sea to the administration of Egypt. TABLE 1 T O T A L R E V E N U E A N D E X P E N D I T U R E FOR THE HIJAZ Year

Local Revenue

Expenditure

Deficit

1257/1841-42 1261/1845 1263/1846-47 1267/1850-51 1268/1851-52 1269/1852-53 1270/1853-54 1276/1859-60 1278/1861-62 1279/1862-63 1280/1863-64

10,743 12,991 (7,000) 13,418 6,669 7,389 (6,263) 17,203 (8,513) 13,607 14,346

34,361 (28,190) (37,926) 45,509 45,629 41,880 (36,506)

-23,618 -15,199 -30,926 -32,091 -38,960 -34,491 -30,243

(38,490) 47,306 (47,306)

-29,977 -33,699 -32,960

A purse, or kese, is equal to 500 Ottoman kurush. All Ottoman money as well as foreign currency has been converted to purses, which have been rounded to the nearest whole number. 2

Harry Luke, Cyprus under the Turks, 1571-1878 (London, 1969), pp. 239-47.

26 1281/1864-65 1282/1865-66 1289/1872-73

OTTOMAN-ARAB HISTORY (14,346) (16,646)

(42,420) (41,772) (41,140)

-28,074 -25,126

Note: All figures have been rounded to the nearest purse of 500 Ottoman kurush. Parentheses indicate estimates by the sources; audited amounts have no parentheses. Sources are as follows: Turkey, Ba§bakanlik Ar§ivi (B.B.A.) Meclis-i Vala (M.V.) 504 and Dahiliye (D.) 3548; M.V. 4889; M.V. 2948; M.V. 6334; D. 17876; Meclis-i Mahsus (M.M.) 1; Misir Defteri 592 Enclosure 26; M.V. 18661; M.M. 1120 and M.V. 24702; M.V. 22429 Enclosure 22; D. 37893; D. 45412. The figures for 1278, which originally covered a twenty-one month period, have been prorated for the year.

REVENUES T h e sources of revenue available to the Ottoman government of the Hijaz were limited by the peculiar religious, political, and economic position the province occupied in the empire. Because of its religious role, it was the recipient of gifts from the central government rather than a source of revenue for Istanbul. But even if the central government had wanted to collect large amounts of taxes, it would have been difficult to do so. The Hijaz was too poor, too distant, and too accustomed to near-autonomy to submit to taxation. Hijazis basically did not pay taxes except in the disguised form of higher prices for goods taxed on entry to the Hijaz by sea. T h e s e customs revenues were outweighed by external sources of money: direct subsidies to the local government f r o m Istanbul, gifts to individuals and religious groups (the surra), and food sent by Cairo and Istanbul. Despite these sources, money frequently had to be borrowed locally to tide the government over until the annual subsidies actually arrived in Mecca. Every year the vali faced the problem of securing the money needed to balance his expenditures. When the changeover to Ottoman administration occurred in 1257/1841-42, the financial and grain contributions of Egypt to the Hijaz once again became an issue. M e h m e d Ali of Egypt had annually sent 10,000 purses or their equivalent in grain as a gift in addition to his expenditures for military expenses in the Hijaz. H e had, however, suppressed at least some of the waqf income f r o m Egypt for the Holy Cities. In 1257/1841-42 he withheld a small part of the 10 t 000 purses despite protests I'rom Vali Osman Pasha. Osman estimated that the

THE F I N A N C I A L B A S I S OF OTTOMAN RULE IN THE HIJ AZ

27

Jidda customs would yield under 9,000 purses; 1 he thought he should receive another 8,000 from urban rents and agricultural property income from Egyptian waqfs. If Egypt provided its full 10,000 purses in gifts, the deficit would then be only about 3,000 purses. 2 Osman's estimates were over optimistic: he drastically underestimated expenditures. A complete list of revenues sent by the chief clerk of the Jidda local treasury to Istanbul showed actual receipts for 1257 as the following: (1) Jidda customs, 10,496 purses; (2) other local sources, 247; (3) Istanbul Treasury, 4,510; (4) Egypt had promised 8,000 in grain and cash but had delivered only 5,693; (5) grain already on hand in the Hijaz from Egypt, 2,856. The total of 23,802 purses, even if Egypt's missing contribution could be expected soon, was still far short of total expenditures. Short-term one-time measures were taken to raise about 7,000 purses. The remaining 3,500 purses of the deficit had to be sent from Istanbul. When 2,000 purses finally arrived, they were used to pay the troops in Madina and merchants in Jidda who were owed money by the local government. 3 The burden of the deficit fell on those groups, who frequently had to wait years to receive the money that was due them. The next year that provides sufficient information for analysis of revenues was 1261/1845. The tangled web of the financial records of the Hijaz for this year was not finally settled by the Ottoman accountants until five years after the completion of the year itself. In April 1849 a detailed examination of the books of the province showed that 13,326 purses had come from Istanbul directly or by drafts on Egypt. The proportion of the money from Egypt is not known, although three years before in 1258/184243 Egypt had been expected to pay 13,000 purses. Local revenues accounted for almost as much as the subsidies from Cairo and Istanbul in 1845. After a long dispute between two valis was adjudicated by the Istanbul treasury auditors, a relatively small deficit of about 1,800 purses remained to be paid for 1261. This money and 5,000 purses that had been borrowed from Jidda merchants to help cover the expenses of 1261 and 1262 were paid through Egypt. The banker of the vali of Egypt paid the vali of Jidda, and then Egypt was reimbursed by Istanbul. The Jidda customs in 1814 during the first years of Mehmed Ali's administration were estimated at 8,000 purses (J. L. Burckhardt, Travels in Arabia [London, 1829], p. 49). In 1829 it was said to be about 6,000 purses (Boislecomte [Alexandria] to French Foreign Minister, 3 July 1833, printed in Georges Douin, ed., La Mission du Baron de Boislecomte [Cairo, 1927], 126). urkey. Ba§bakanhk Argivi (B.B.A.). Meclis-i Välä (M.V.) 504. 3

B.B.A. Dahiliye (D.) 3548.

28

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

In the period of unstable Hijazi political history from 1268/1851-52 to 1275/1858-59, detailed information on finances is possible only for the years 1268 to 1270/1853 54. In 1268 Egypt paid the Hijaz on behalf of the Ottomans 19,623 purses for basic civilian expenditures. In addition to this there was a special 9,107-purse gift. Local revenues of almost 6,700 purses were a second source. The balance of the 45,000 purses — about 10,000 — came from the central treasury to the Hijaz in cash. It was planned that nearly the same allocation would take place in 1269/1852-53. However, in both years actual payments ran behind the promised amounts. Egypt paid for the Ottomans less than the customary 20,000 purses: only 16,859 in 1268 and 9,437 in 1269. On the other hand, audited accounts of expenditures showed that they also were lower than official estimates. 1 In 1270/1853-54 Egypt once again sent at least 20,000 purses from its total tribute owed to the imperial government. The complete records of the local revenues for 1269/1852-53 show the results of separating the Yemen ports' customs from Hijazi administration. This year, as in 1263/1845-46 and 1268/1851-52, a severe drop in revenue naturally resulted. Of the 7,389 purses left, over fivesevenths came from the customs of Jidda (2,919) and Suakin and Massawa (2,344). Another important source of local revenue was the tribute of 460 purses paid by Najd to the Hijaz in recognition of nominal Ottoman sovereignty. 2 Zakat (taxes for alms) receipts were only 206 purses. Initially, the projected deficit, based on 1268 figures, was 27,532. Another 7,000 purses had to come from Istanbul after the separation of the Yemen customs. 3 The Istanbul treasury also paid Egypt for the shipment in 1268 of 4,144 tons of wheat, 9,279 of barley, and 2,089 of Jul (Egyptian beans) to the Hijaz. In the two years 1269 and 1270/1853-54 the Nizamiye treasury supplied 20,140 purses. Egypt 20,000, and the imperial treasury 3,276 for grain to the Hijaz. 4

^B.B.A. D. 17876 Enclosure 8. 2

R. B. Winder, Saudi Arabia m the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1965), pp. 179-82, says that the payment of Maria Theresa $10,000 (about 460 purses) by the Saudis to the Hijaz was not made in 1846, leading to the campaign of the Amir in Najd that year. Muhammed b. ^Awn then secured the money, but there were again at least partial defaults in 1850 and 1854-55. 3 B.B.A. Meclis-i Mahsus (M.M.) I Enclosure 28. 4

B.B.A. D. 14696; D. 24863.

THE FINANCIAL BASIS OF OTTOMAN RULE IN THE HIJAZ

29

The need for cash led the valis to borrow money from local merchants. Even when the income from Istanbul permitted them to pay for expenditures, it was difficult to transfer the allotted funds from Istanbul to Mecca. Payments were months and sometimes years in arrears, with the threat of an audit awaiting the vali who manipulated his accounts. The defterdar, or treasurer, of the provincial administration seems, at least in some instances, to have possessed independence of action and a separate channel of communication with Istanbul. The risky business of providing credit could be undertaken only by the largest of merchants with a capital such that delays in payment would not ruin his other businesses. Even more preferable was a consortium of lenders who could share the risks and also apply more pressure on the vali in the event of a dispute than could one man. Faraj Yusr, an Indian Muslim, was the chief merchant of Jidda in the 1850s. His capital was estimated at between 24,000 and 30,000 purses. 1 He became the chief banker for the Hijaz. Yusr and another local merchant, Salim Sultan, lent the provincial government 1,600 purses in 1270. In 1271 Yusr advanced 4,300 purses to the Hijaz for the payment of soldiers and military expenses. He was to be repayed by drafts on Istanbul. The imperial treasury was ordered to pay Yusr's agent in Istanbul the total of both debts. 2 These loans plus others, unrecorded in their details, totalled 9,900 purses for 1270 and 1271. In 1272/1855-56 Faraj Yusr was asked for the large sum of 14,501 purses. Since payments in Jidda were actually made in riyals (Maria Theresa dollars), the rate of exchange between the kurush, treasury sight drafts, and the silver dollar was crucial to his undertaking such a large transaction. His agent at Istanbul demanded that the rate of exchange be fixed at thirty kurush per riyal rather than twenty-three; this would also make a difference of 2,000 purses in the payment of past debts that were due him. In 1273/1856-57 once again, Yusr paid for a large proportion of the grain imported into the Hijaz. In order to share the risk of these large sums, he formed syndicates. 3 Yusuf Banaja was one of those who also lent the Ottomans money. Banaja provided 2,982 purses in 1268 and 1269. His loan illustrated the

Richard Burton, Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to El-Medinah and Meccah (London, 1855-56), 1:47; Great Britain. Foreign Office (F.O.) 195/375 Qaimmaqam of Jidda to Page, 4 November 1856; Charles Didier, Séjour chez le Grand-Chérif de la Mekke (Paris, 1857), pp.

160-161. 2

B . B . A . M. V. 12723; M.V. 13320; D. 20141.

3

B.B.A. M.V. 15507; M.V. 15511; M.V. 16307; M.V. 19627.

30

OT'l O M A N - A R A B

HISTORY

slowness of the Ottoman bureaucracy. Although he was supposed to be reimbursed shortly after making the loan, his agents in Cairo and Istanbul did not receive the money; and in 1272 the case still had not been settled. 1 When Faraj Yusr was discharged as the treasury's chief agent in Jidda in 1276/1860, Ahmad Mashat and Salim Sultan became the province's chief bankers. The stated reasons for the change were the excessive profits Yusr was thought to be receiving, his slowness in supplying the money, and the rate of thirty-two kurush per riyal he wanted to use while the current rate was twenty-nine or twenty-nine and one-half. 2 Yusr's profit on exchange was estimated at eighteen percent. On the loan of 4,000 purses to the amir for military operations, which caused lively discussion in Istanbul, Yusr wanted a two percent commission plus the rate of thirty-two kurush per riyal. A competitor offered to make the same loan for the same commission but at twenty-nine per riyal. This would have given the amir more than 6,000 extra riyals, but the proposal was turned down in Istanbul. Yusr's agent there allegedly bribed the minister of the treasury to achieve this. Unfortunately there is insufficient evidence now available to determine whether the reasons for Yusr's eventual downfall were valid or a mere pretext for political or personal motives. Similarly, the profitability of most of the loans is not yet known; a five percent profit seems to have been the minimum expected. 3 The reign of the amir 'Abd Allah, which constituted the third period for analysis, witnessed no major changes from the preceding two segments. The year 1279/1862-63 may be taken as an example. Local revenue came chiefly from the Jidda customs, which yielded a profit of 6,000 purses, and those of Yemen, which also provided 6,000. The customs of Massawa and Suakin declined to only 133 purses. Although the Najd's tribute of 600 purses was listed as a source of money, it was not paid that year. 4 Egypt continued to be the chief source of payments. Every year, 20,000 purses from the Egyptian tribute to Istanbul had been used at the direction of the central government for the purchase of grain. When the decision was taken to send grain from Iraq rather than Egypt, part of the

^B.B.A. M.V. 15540. 2 3

B . B . A . M.M. 736.

A h m e d Cevdet Pasha, Tezdkir (Nos. 13-20, edited by Cavid Baysun; Ankara, 1960), 2: 9395. 4 B . B . A . M.V. 22429 Enclosure 22.

THE FINANCIAL BASIS OF OTTOMAN RULE IN THE HIJAZ

31

now-freed money was sent to Jidda for the operating expenses of the Hijaz and part was used to repay Ottoman debts to the Egyptian treasury for preceding years' expenditures in the Hijaz. 1 Local merchants continued to provide money pending payments from Istanbul. Mashat had provided over 27,000 purses in 1277-78, and he remained a large lender in 1279 with almost 8,000 purses. Yet Mashat's own capital was reported to be insufficient to cover payments if Istanbul was late in reimbursing him. 2 Surprisingly enough, Faraj Yusr is also mentioned as providing 8,000 and being paid back by drafts on the treasury. Other merchants loaned 6,800. They and Mashat were repaid when Egypt sent 15,000 purses to Jidda for the account of the imperial treasury. There remained, however, debts of 36,000 purses from 1277-78 still unpaid. The imperial treasury sent 10,000 purses in cash to the Hijaz, so that 1279 expenditures were balanced even though the backlog from previous years remained. The surra in 1279 amounted to 6,179 purses and stayed at about the same amount in the following years.

EXPENDITURES In the initial period of the restoration of Ottoman control, detailed information on expenditures is available only for the year 1257/1841-42. There were three major categories into which the local government's spending was divided. The largest was food. Grain and other items in storehouses cost 10,404 purses. This plus food for the military and the cost of transport of the grain was an additional 7,265 purses. Together they accounted for one-half of total expenditures. Most of the food went to recipients of pensions, government employees, the military, and the Bedouin. The second area of government spending was cash salaries to government employees, pensions to religious people, and money for the amir and the Bedouin. The bureaucracy took 4,075 purses and the other groups 3,853. Bashibozuks, or the irregular army, were paid 8,767 purses, or about one-quarter of the budget. 3

' B . H . A . M . V . 2 2 4 2 9 , Enclosures 5 2 and 29. 2

F.O. 195/681 Stanley (Jidda) to Bulwer, 22 February 1861.

3

B . B . A . D. 3548.

32

O T T O M A N - A R A B

HISTORY

In the second period of political instability, different categories were used in financial accounts. Allocations for the military in 1268/1851-52 included the cost of food Total military costs rose to 26,588 purses, or well over one-half of all spending. Second that year were the salaries paid to government workers and the pensions to sharifs, the Bedouin, and those who prayed in the Holy Cities. T h e final fifth of the budget was used for imperial gifts and miscellaneous categories. 1 Cash expenditures for 1269/1852-53 show the same preponderance of military spending as in 1268 but also demonstrate the duality of the Ottoman army in the Hijaz. Civil salaries and purchase of grain for civilians cost only 16,853 purses; the army consumed 25,027. However, this 25,000 was divided into two parts: the regular cavalry and infantry on the one hand and the Nizamiye infantry and artillery on the other. Judging by the total amounts spent, the regulars were more numerous, or at least more expensive, than the Nizamiye. The regulars' provisions were presumably paid for by the central government directly, whereas the cost of supplying the Nizamiye came from the Hijaz budget. In itself the cost for the Nizamiye that year and in others was deceptive because the first regiment of the Hijaz Division was permanently stationed in Istanbul. T h e 4,000 purses this regiment cost should be deducted every year f r o m the formal expenditures of the Hijaz in order to ascertain the actual cost to the empire of militarily defending the province. 2 The amount of grain sent by the Istanbul government to the Hijaz was substantial given the expense and distances involved. In the early and middle periods, it seems to have been sent f r o m Egypt alone, although later it came f r o m Iraq. Over 14,000 tons were sent to the Hijaz in 1269/185253. T o take only barley as an example, the 9,125 tons of it that were sent to the Hijaz were divided as follows: 4,867 tons went to the military; 473 to the civil government; and 3,785 were presumably reserved for civilian and pilgrim use. 3 The next year the commanding proportion of the army was increased. Although the actual amount spent decreased to 24,283 purses, other nonmilitary spending declined even more. About two-thirds of all expenditures

' B . B . A . D. 17876 Enclosure X. 2

B . B . A . M.M. I Enclosure 28.

3

B . B . A . M.M. I Enclosure 28.

THE F I N A N C I A L B A S I S OF OTTOMAN RULE IN THE HIJAZ

33

went to the military. Government salaries were only 6,446 purses, and pensions were an almost insignificant 2,81s. 1 A closer look at the kinds of expenditures in 1270 reveals the diverse types of activities that involved the Hijaz provincial government. The safeguarding of the pilgrimage and the carrying out of its ritual requirements were among the major undertakings of the vali. Moving grain to Mecca and Madina for the pilgrims and their military escorts cost 400 purses. The troops stationed in the Hijaz who were used to help protect the pilgrimage themselves cost the government about 2,300 purses. Amir 'Abd al-Muttalib received 540 purses just for his expenses relating to the pilgrimage. 2 Some money allocated specifically for the reconstruction of holy buildings in Madina was diverted to other purposes. It was used for salaries of the vali, the amir, the defterdar, the keeper of the keys to the Ka'ba, and for a number of other religious and political officials. None of the money seems to have been spent on buildings in Madina. 3 A long-standing system used in paying government employees, and probably soldiers as well, permitted some high officials of the Ottoman government to make money at the expense of their poorer colleagues. Pay warrants were issued instead of cash. These warrants were always subject to discount because it was only rarely that the recipient himself could go directly to the treasury that had issued them in order to cash them. Even when he could do so, the treasury might refuse payment, at least temporarily, pending bribes. Up to 1857, pay warrants in the Hijaz had been worth only 50-70 percent of their face value. Starting that year, it became harder to cash the warrants with the vilayet treasurer for cash; only too frequently the bearer had to settle for 40 percent of the real value. 4 Ten years later, in 1279/1862-63, there is the only complete account of the provincial budget by cities (see table 2). The Ottomans clearly attached greater importance to Mecca, for they spent twice as much there as in Madina. Mecca was larger, the seat of the amirate, and the more important of the two in religious terms. In the only two categories where spending in Madina was considerably greater than that in Mecca, the transport of grain and payments to Bedouins, special circumstances were ^B.B.A. Misir Defteri 592 Enclosure 26. B.B.A. Misir Defteri 592. 3 B.B.A. Misir Defteri 592. 4 F.O. 195/375 S. Page (Jidda) to Stratford de Redcliffe, 20 October 1857. 2

34

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

present. Madina was physically farther from the Red Sea coast, and the camel caravans carrying grain had to traverse land in the hands of nearly independent Bedouin tribes. Particularly in administration Mecca was more important as the residence, de facto, of the vali, although he nominally was based in Jidda. TABLE 2 E X P E N D I T U R E S OF T H E J I D D A E Y A L E T I N Category The amir, the sharifs, and others Servants of the haram Neighbors of God and the Prophet Civil servants Nizamiye Regular army Military supplies Navy Grain and transport* Living expenses Travel expenses, mail, etc. Bedouin Subtotal Miscellaneous Total Grand total

1279/1862-63

In Madina

In Mecca 5,376 78 617 4,208 9,774 6,404 594 190 260 1,216 799

16 782 506 4,437 5,411 268 2,426 507 276 152 14,781 400 15,181

29,516 2,600 32,116 47,297

Note: All figures have been rounded to the nearest purse of 500 Ottoman kurush. Source: B.B.A. M.V. 22429 Enclosure 14. * Also see table 3.

Well over half of the money in 1279 was spent on the armed forces. Food consumption from officially provided storehouses reflected the same financial priority (see table 3). Of 3,683 tons of barley, 1,527 went to cavalry based in Madina and 1,326 to military forces in Mecca. Civil servants were paid both in cash and in food. Grain was also given to religious persons in Mecca ("neighbors of God") and Madina ("neighbors of the Prophet"). Because of existing stores in warehouses in Yanbu', Rabigh and Jidda, the actual amount of grain to be purchased and laboriously transported to the Holy Cities was only 3,650 tons that year.

THE FINANCIAL B A S I S OF OTTOMAN RULE IN THE HIJAZ

35

A list of the individuals who received money and food in Madina and Yanbu' in 1280/1863-64 provides the first opportunity to see the reality of individuals behind the collective terms used in most records. The importance of this may be illustrated in the first category of table 4, sharifs and sayyids. The gross figures are, in themselves, only of importance when seen in comparison with other categories, i.e., a good deal more was spent on these descendants of the Prophet than on the servants of the Madina haram, who numbered at least twenty. If, however, the total money given the sharifs and sayyids is divided by thirty-eight, the number of recipients, they become more meaningful. On the average each sharif or sayyid received about 3,080 pounds of wheat, 1,805 TABLE3 FOOD TO BE PURCHASED BY THE JIDDA EYALET IN 1279/1862-63 Category In Mecca The amir, other sharifs, and sayyids Servants of the haram and neighbors of God Civil servants Military Total In Madina Sharifs Servants of the haram Neighbors of the Prophet Bedouin Civil servants Syrian pilgrimage Military Total Grand total

Ful

Barley

Wheat

103

282

137

1 4 503 611

26 53 1,326 1,687

120 6 1,060 1,323

53 2 5 48

35 42 11 27 41 32 1,593 1,781 3,468

58 27 16 426 13 20 601 1,161 2,484

66 109 283 894

Note: All figures have been converted to tons. Minor categories have been omitted, as have the amounts of coffee, sugar, etc. Totals, therefore, are larger than the sums listed here would indicate. Source: B.B.A. M.M. 1120 Enclosure 35.

pounds of barley, and 1,590 pounds of ful. The head of the Madina haram received 21,600 pounds per year of wheat. Presumably he maintained a large household and entertained many guests, so that much of the grain was used;

36

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

but he might also have been able to sell a good part of it. An official might get most of his pay in cash and some in grain. Pensions were given not only to retired civil servants but also to their children. In addition, payments of other sorts were also inheritable. The money originally given to the leader of a Bedouin tribe might be divided and redivided over the years. By 1280, for example, thirteen people were dividing 1,400 pounds of wheat and two hundred pounds of barley originally given to one person. Even spies were listed on the roster, though not by name. The pilgrimage from Syria, which brought part of the yearly influx of money needed so desperately in the Hijaz, also entailed expenditures by the provincial government. Official receptions and ceremonies in and near Madina marked the arrival and departure of the caravans; they cost 161 purses. Ottoman troops and officials rented camels from the Bedouins for 428 purses. The Bedouins who lived in the vicinity of the hajj route received 14,000 pounds of wheat, 424,000 of barley, and 280,000 of ful. Ottoman official hospitality to their Bedouin guests extended to 1,320 pounds of sugar to sweeten the coffee of their guests. Grain that was transported to Madina and Yanbu' for the pilgrims and their protectors was perhaps partially paid for by money from the surra. TABLE 4 C O N D E N S E D S T A T E M E N T OF T H E 1 2 8 0 / 1 8 6 3 - 6 4 E X P E N D I T U R E S FOR M A D I N A A N D Y A N B U ' Category Sharifs and sayyids Servants of the Madina haram Neighbors of the Prophet Civil servants, servants, etc. Storehouses of Madina, special occasions, some Bedouin Nizamiye army and artillery Salary Supplies

Money

Ful

Barley

Wheat

17

30

34

59

39 53

3

27 23

16 3

521

4

154 2,756 4,487

178

105

THE FINANCIAL BASIS OF OTTOMAN RULE IN THE HIJAZ 37 Cavalry and guards for roads Bedouin Pilgrimage, including grain bought for pilgrims Administration of Yanbu' Total

8,060 5,676

63

1,892

62

526 522

196

175

171

472

2,326

1,780

226 21,950

Note: All figures have been rounded to the nearest purse and the nearest ton. Some minor categories have been omitted. Totals, therefore, are larger than the sums listed here would indicate. Source: B.B.A. M.M. 1223 Enclosure 32.

Yanbu', the port of Madina, was a qaimmaqamate under the jurisdiction of Madina. With probably fewer than 5,000 people, Yanbu' nevertheless had a harbor that was filled with ships from Qussayr and Suez on the Egyptian coast and, during the pilgrimage season, was frequented also by ships from all the Muslim world. Its administration in 1280 cost 226 purses. Half of this consisted of the salary of the qaimmaqam, Khalil Pasha. Ten soldiers in the local garrison were paid three purses each per year. Payments to the Bedouin were divided into two sections corresponding to the tribal confederations of the Harb and the Juhayna. The Harb controlled the crucial passes from the Red Sea coast to Madina and some of the routes between Mecca and Madina. They received ten times more food than did the Juhayna. 1 Differences in the categories used make it difficult to compare with precision Madina's expenditures in 1280 with those of 1279. Two major changes seem to have taken place: (1) the pilgrimage is included in 1280 but not in 1279; (2) the expenses of all branches of the military went up by about 5,000 purses in 1280. The increase in military spending may have been caused by disputes with the Bedouin of Rabigh and Yanbu'. A few months after the report on 1280/1863-64 was written, the Yanbu'-Madina and Madina-Mecca roads were cut by the Harb Bedouin. 2 In the years following 1280, only scattered information on expenditures is available, with the exception of the salary schedule of ' b . B . A . M.M. 1223 Enclosure 32. ^French consul at Jidda to Ministry, 5 February 1864, and 10 August 1864, in René Tresse, Le Pèlerinage syrien aux villes saintes de l'Islam (Paris, 1937), p. 54; Adolphe d'Avril, L'Arabie contemporaine avec la description du pèlerinage de la Mecque (Paris, 1868), pp. 84-85.

38

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

1288/1871-72. Most documents deal with grain shipments to the Hijaz. From the taxes of Varna in the European section of the empire came 12,322 purses used for the purchase and shipment of food to the Hijaz in 1287/1870-71. In 1288/1871-72 Varna and other sancaks contributed 5,380 purses for grain and 2,130 for transportation. At least 4,474 purses were spent on the same items in 1291/1874-75.' The Ottoman central government went bankrupt in the 1870s because of excessive borrowing from Europe, the disastrous wars of that period, and the inability of the state to raise the level of the economy. In an initial attempt to cut expenditures, a careful investigation was made of the civil employees of the Hijaz in order to reduce their number and expense. In 1288/1871-72 total salaries were 15,737 purses. By eliminating some posts entirely, combining others, and cutting the salaries of some of those remaining, it was proposed to save 1,536 purses. The chief victims of the cuts were to be the vali. who would lose two-thirds of his 1,440-purses salary; the chief clerk, whose salary was cut by one-half and whose assistant was dismissed; and the Jidda qaimmaqam, whose post was to be abolished. It was suggested that the salary of the qaimmaqam of Mecca be raised from 120 to 180 purses per year and that he be responsible for the administration of Jidda rather than simply act as an aide to the vali. The reforms may have been implemented in part, but the Jidda qaimmaqamate was retained. The total number of employees of the Hijaz Ottoman government, from the vali to the coffee-maker in Madina (but excluding the police), was about 170. They shared 7,828 purses in 1288 but with a wide gap between the amir, with 2,160, and a water-carrier, who was paid under 2 purses annually. Intermediate ranks included clerks who received between 10 and 20 purses, a translator with 12, and teachers in Mecca who were paid 30 purses each. Religious-legal figures such as the deputy judges of Mecca and Madina had only 30 purses per year in salary. The Hanafi mufti of Mecca was paid the surprisingly low sum of 6 purses. Health officials got more: doctors in Jidda and Madina were paid 36 and 130 respectively, though quarantine officials received far less.

'B.R.A. D. 45149; D. 50455; D 49474.

THE F I N A N C I A L B A S I S OF O T T O M A N RULE IN THE H1JAZ

39

TABLE 5 C O N D E N S E D STATEMENT OF THE SALARIES OF THE H I J A Z VILAYET IN 1 2 8 8 / 1 8 7 1 - 7 2 Hijaz Mutasarrjflik Interior Amir of Mecca Vali Qaimmaqam of Mecca Chief clerk Zaptiye police Subtotal Treasury Defterdar Assistant Subtotal Total

Mecca Sancak

Interior Treasury Legal Education Commerce Public utilities Total

2,160 1,440 120 120 7.909 12,076 216 144 246 12822

Jidda Sancak Interior Qaimmaqam of Jidda Governor of Taif Governor of Rabigh Shaykh of Rabigh Muhafiz of Qunfuda Subtotal Treasury Commerce Subtotal Total Grand total

285 47 103 216 120 13 782

Madina Sancak

200 12 19 6 18 490 120 403 523 1,013

Interior Shaykh al-Haram Muhafiz of Madina Qaimmaqam of Yanbu' Subtotal Treasury Legal Commerce Subtotal Total

336 200 88 713 155 112 140 407 1,120

15,737

Note: All figures have been rounded to the nearest purse of 500 Ottoman kurush. Some categories have been omitted. Totals, therefore, are larger than the sums listed here would indicate. Source: B.B.A. D. 44765. The sole public utility in all the Hijaz that received government support was the spring that supplied water for Mecca. 1

*B.B.A. D. 44765.

40

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

CONCLUSION To obtain a complete idea of the scope and cost of government in the Ottoman Hijaz it would be necessary to obtain information on all the thirtyseven years involved rather than the fragmentary data now available. It would also be advisable to complete the survey of the history of the Hijaz to the end of the empire there in 1919, as well as obtaining comparable data on the other provinces of the region, before drawing definitive conclusions about the nature of Ottoman-Arab relations. The amirs of Mecca, who played such an important part in the Arab rebellion and subsequent Arab nationalism, enjoyed authority and power under the Ottomans. Their own financial history is nearly unknown, although it seems that the money they received from Istanbul remained stable throughout the nineteenth century at about 2,000 purses. 1 This was, however, by no means the only source of revenue available to them Granting that the financial evidence is both incomplete and perhaps in part misleading, it does help establish the major concerns of the Ottoman government in the Hijaz and the dependence of the area upon external sources of money and food. Most importantly, the primary role of the military is made clear. Although consuming the largest part of most years' budgets, the army managed to maintain order only in the main towns; the countryside, mostly desert, was outside its control. Because of the danger of first Egyptian and then European expansionism, the riots and rebellions of 'Abd al-Muttalib, and the continual menace of the Bedouin, it was impossible to reduce the level of spending for the military. In the central lands of the empire, 1840-77 was the period of the Tanzimat, the Crimean War, and military and administrative reform. These changes were apparently not felt in the Hijaz. Civil government was limited to record-keeping, the courts, minimal health precautions, and, most important, the buying, storage, and distribution of food purchased by Istanbul for the people and the pilgrims. The people of the Hijaz lived by means of religion. Pilgrims to Mecca and Madina provided probably the greatest source of income, but the

•'•The subsidy to the sharifs was said to be 1,920 purses in the 1810s; see Burckhardt, op. cit., p. 225. By 1267/1850-51 it was about 2,160 purses with 228 tons of barley and other goods whose value was estimated foi 1271/1854-55 at 285 purses per year; see B.B.A. D. 14524 and D. 21257.

THE FINANCIAL BASIS OF OTTOMAN RULE IN THE HIJAZ

41

gifts and subventions from the central Ottoman Empire and Egypt were certainly next in importance. Other than customs fees there were practically no taxable resources; the area was too poor to pay its own way. Yet at the same time there was a strong tradition of autonomy among the tribes and near-autonomy among the amirs of Mecca. There were, therefore, strong reasons both for loyalty to the Ottoman sultan and suspicion of any centralizing measures adopted by Istanbul. On balance Ottoman sovereignty in the Hijaz provided financial benefits for all groups that outweighed resentment caused by the limited degree of political interference. Arab nationalism did not exist in the Hijaz of 1840-77 but neither did strong Ottoman loyalty.

OTTOMAN SUBSIDIES TO THE HIJAZ 1877-18861

Students of nineteenth-century Ottoman political history have concentrated on the central provinces of the Empire. Students of Arab political history of the same period have concentrated on anti-Ottoman nationalism centered in Cairo and Beirut. Relatively little work has yet been done to illuminate the nature of Ottoman government in the Arab provinces. The picture that is presented by Western travelers, Arab nationalists reminiscing about their youth, and diplomatic reports has been incomplete, biased against the Imperial government, and sometimes factuallyinaccurate. Perhaps the Arab province most valuable to the Ottoman Sultan was the Hijaz Vilayet. The Hijaz had only a small amount of agricultural land, was peripheral to major world commerce, and provided almost no income from taxation. Its value lay in the prestige conferred on the Sultanate by protection of the two major Hijazi cities, Mecca and Medina, the most important centers of pilgrimage for the world's Muslims. The religious importance of the Hijaz was reflected in the nature of Ottoman administration in the province. Political control was shared between the Ottoman vali or governor and the emir, who was a §erif and chief among the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. The uneasy balance between the emir and the vali was frequently upset. It was dependent upon such factors as the influence of both with the sultan, the personal abilities of the two men, and the relations of the emir with the major Bedouin tribes. Even longevity could play a part in determining the relative position of the two. When the long tenure of the Emir 'Abd Allah Pa§a b. Muhammad b. 'Awn (1857-77) ended there ensued a period of rapid political maneuvering. Within five years three new emirs had been appointed: HUsayn b. Muhammad b. 'Awn (1877-80), 'Abd al-Muttalib b. Ghalib (1880-2), and 'Awn al-Rafiq b. Muhammad b. 'Awn (1882-1905). The vali's

I wish to acknowledge the help of Sandra Danforth of the University of Chicago and Hamid Algar of the University of California, Berkeley, in obtaining some of the materials used in this article. An earlier version of this article was read at the 183d Meeting of the American Oriental Society,Washington, D.C., 1973.

44

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

term of office tended to be even shorter than that of the emir. From 1857 to 1881 there were fifteen valis or an average of only 1.6 years per governor. On the basis of the fragmentary evidence now available, however, neither the instability of the period from 1877 to 1882 nor the ensuing battle for superiority between Emir 'Awn al-Raffq and Vali Osman Nuri Pa§a, which lasted to 1886, influenced the economic relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Hijaz Vilayet. Ottoman subsidies to the Hijaz seem to have been made independently of the political conditions existing in the province. The religious importance of the Hijaz to the Empire is probably the reason for the relative lack of economic pressure used for political effect. The Ottomans had 'made of the Hijaz the most privileged province in the Empire'. 1 It enjoyed internal autonomy and a low rate of taxation. The Hijaz was the recipient of subsidies not only from the Ottoman government but also from Egypt, Indian Muslim states, and Muslim private citizens throughout the world. 2 The nature of the economic relationship between the Ottoman central government and the Hijaz can be investigated through an examination of Ottoman records concerning the province. The Vilayet and Mecca budgets, expenditures for the siirre (annual gift of the sultan) and for the §ehadetname (testimonial payment), and the reconstruction of the water system of Mecca show some of the economic interests of the Empire in the Hijaz. It should be noted, however, that these official statements of financial subsidies were frequently incomplete because of supplements to Hijazi officials from other sources of income such as special service fees, extortion, and unofficial taxes on camel rentals. 3

T H E VILAYET AND MECCA BUDGETS O F 1300 MALIYE The most noticeable fact that emerges from the budgets of the Hijaz Vilayet and Mecca is the dependence of both upon the central Ottoman government. In 1300 Maliye, 1884-5, total income in the Hijaz Province 'France. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. Turquie, Politique intérieure: Arabie, Yemen — Pèlerinage de la Mecque I, L. Ouerry (Jidda) to Hanotaux, 10 August 1896. 2 A detailed discussion of donations by Egypt falls outside the scope of this article, but it should be noted that they were substantial. In this context see Ibrâhîm Rifat Pa§a, Mirât alHaramayn, 2 vols. (Cairo: Matba'a Dâr al-Kutub al-Misriyya, 1344/1925). ^Sources of unofficial incomc are discussed in C. Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1888), I, 164-5.

OTTOMAN

SUBSIDIES

TO

THE

HIJAZ

1877- 1886

45

was 25,518,905 kuru§ (k.) but only 1,533,934 came from locally raised revenue. The balance of 23,984,971 k. was from the Ottoman Treasury. Local taxes, excluding customs, were completely insufficient to even begin to pay for the Vilayet's expenditures.1 The local income of 64,241 k. in Mecca was even less than that of the province, when compared with Meccan revenue of 5,392,278 k. Meccan local income was derived from waqf rentals, not from taxation of either land or persons. Another noncentral government source of income was Egypt. The Egyptian government provided over 12,000 erdebs of wheat which cost 1,202,500 k. Most of Mecca's funds originated, however, from the Ottoman central government. About one-third of the Ottoman subsidies to Mecca came from the Evkaf Treasury and the rest was supplied by the central Treasury. 2 Expenditures for the Vilayet emphasized the central government's chief concern of internal security. In border areas such as the Hijaz the security of the Empire depended primarily upon maintaining military supremacy over rival centers of power whether they were foreign states or nomadic tribes. The unwavering loyalty of Ottoman Muslims, however, also contributed to internal security. This loyalty was reinforced by pious donations to the Holy Cities and the ulema who resided in them. Expenditures of the Hijaz Vilayet indicated these concerns. The largest group of expenditures was 14,471,634 k. for the army, navy, and police. 3 Next in size were some of the expenses of the pilgrimage. Part of these expenses should be included in military costs because they involved the protection of the pilgrims from Bedouin raids. Money paid to Bedouins not only bought security for the pilgrims but also gave the Bedouins enough income to decrease their raids of the areas which were under central government protection in the Hijaz. Almost 5,000,000 k. was spent for the sultan's yearly offering for sacred uses, the mahmil, and Bedouin payments. 4 Donations, gifts, and pensions to e§raf, seyyids, and the ulema in monetary form were 1,776,688 k. There was also an estimated 2,555,891 k. given in the form of food such as wheat, barley beans, and lentils distributed at

i Hicaz Vilayeti Salnamesi 1301 (Mecca: Hicaz Vilayeti Matbaasi, 1301/1885-1886) (hereafter HVS-I), pp. 168, 174. 2 HVS-I, pp. 178-180. 3 HVS-I, P. 175; a similar concern with internal security at the expense of other types of expenditures can be seen in the Vilayet of Syria budgets, Najib E. Saliba, "Wilayat Sûriyyâ, 1876-1909' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1971), pp. 355-67. 4 HVS-I, p. 173.

46

O T T O M A N - A R A B

HISTORY

Mecca, Medina, and Jidda. 1 Less than 1,730,000 k., a relatively small part of the total budget, went for civil governmental salaries. 2 Ottoman expenditures in the Hijaz were mostly in the form of cash or drafts but nearly one-fourth of total spending of 25.5 million kuru§ consisted of food given to individuals as part of their subsidy. The three largest items of the Mecca expenditures show an expectably greater proportion of the total budget spent on charity to the people of the city than in the Vilayet's budget. Payments to the e§raf and seyyids (1,544,064 k.), wheat purchased in Egypt (1,202,500 k.), and salaries for the officials of the Ka'ba (834,609 k.) composed about twothirds of all expenditures.

THE SURRE EXPENDITURES AND THEIR REFORM In the middle 1880s3 Ottoman funds sent to the Hijaz were 26,538,692 k. of which 8,039,889 k. was allocated to the surre and 18,498,803 k. to the Vilayet. A more detailed picture of the nature of Ottoman subsidies to the Hijaz is available in the surre figures than in the vilayet budgets for 1300 Maliye. About 2,900,000 k. of the 8,000,000 k. allocated to the surre were spent in the Holy Cities. Mecca received 984,908 k. and Medina 1,922,373 k. Both figures represent a trebling of amounts given earlier. 4 If the categories of payment in both cities are reordered according to those groups which received funds, the importance of the officials who were associated with the Ka'ba in Mecca and the Prophet's tomb in Medina can be seen. Religious aid to the Hija/ was given primarily for the purpose of aiding this

' H V S - l , p. 169. 2

H V S - I , p. 171.

T h e financial data provided by Eyyub Sabri Pa§a, Mir'at-iil Haremeyn, I, Part B, Mirat-i Mekke (Istanbul: Bahriye Matbaasi, 1306/1888-9) (hereafter Sabri), pp. 685-717, are not dated in the text. On the basis of internal evidence, however, Sabri is probably referring to the period 1297 Maliyc/1881 ! to 1306 H./1888-9 and most likely the same period as the information in HVS-I. 3

^Sabri, p. 691. Sabri seems to be confused about the gifts to Mecca and Medina. The surre figures provided on page 6 9 4 total about 2.9 million k. while on page 691 Sabri indicated Mecca and Medina received 1,074,865 and 2,416,701 k., respectively. Presumably the difference between the total of the latter numbers and the former represents a supplemental payment from outside the surre budget itself, but this is unclear in the text.

OTTOMAN

SUBSIDIES

TO

THE

HIJAZ

1877- 1886

47

special group which was intimately associated with the centers of the Muslim faith. Over one-half of the total 3,500,000 k. from the stirre and supplemental aid for the two cities was paid, directly or indirectly, to these mosque officials. In contrast, charity to the poor of the cities and religious education in them took only 847,000 k. Charitable institutions (hospitals and some tekkes), ulema not associated with the two great mosque complexes, and those who prayed for special purposes received only 448,000 k.1 The sources of the funds were primarily the central government's Treasury and the Evkaf Treasury. Unfortunately it is impossible to separate the evkaf contributions from funds given jointly with the Imperial Treasury. The joint gifts, evkaf especially donated by former sultans, and evkaf whose income was allocated specifically to the stirre provided 2,122,484 k. of the 3,500,000 k. total. These sources were supplemented by funds from the Imperial Treasury, the sultan's private treasury, the Treasury of the Haremeyn per se, and drafts written on the Syrian Vilayet. 2 The latter were paid by the provincial treasury of the Syrian Vilayet from its own revenues. The stirre funds were sent to the Hijaz in two ways. About two-thirds of them came in the form of coins sent in purses from Istanbul to Mecca and Medina. The other third consisted of drafts written on the Vilayet of Syria. 3 Registers showing the amounts, sources, and destinations of each type of gift were sent annually to the Holy Cities. 4 Most of the 8,000,000 k. appropriated for the stirre was not spent in Mecca and Medina. Over 4,000,000 k. was spent on transporting the stirre, the Syrian mah.mil, and the pilgrims from Istanbul via Damascus to Mecca. The three categories of stirre money spent primarily outside Mecca and Medina were the kildr or provisioning of the pilgrimage (3,600,000 k.), payments to the Bedouin chiefs (1,254,000 k.), and the salary and expenses of the head of the stirre, the stirre emini (523,250 k.). 5

'My calculations based on Sabri, pp. 687-90. 2

Ibid. pp. 687-90.

3

Ibid. pp.

4

686,690.

Ibid. pp. 693-4.

"'Sabri, pp. 694-5, 717. It is possible that these categories overlapped. Confusion in the accounts may exist because of the diverse sources and appropriation channels which were used to provide funds to the Hijaz.

48

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

Because of changes in transportation and communications as well as the pressing need of the central government to economize, a re-evaluation of these programs was undertaken. Eyyup Sabri Pa§a, after studying the Hijaz for seven years, concluded that the funds should be reduced in specific ways. His efforts may have been supported by Abu al-Huda al-Sayyada, 1 religious adviser to Sultan Abdiilhamid II, who wrote a commendatory preface to Sabri's three-volume history of the Hijaz. In analyzing the possible savings that could be found in the siirre, Sabri Pa§a began with the reductions of 150,000 k. in the salary of the siirre emini which had just been put into effect. With the opening of telegraph communication and quick sea transportation between the Hijaz and Istanbul certain other expenses of the siirre could also be eliminated. Registers need not be sent from the returning camel caravans. The official who sent perfume essences to the Hijaz could be more usefully employed elsewhere. Sabri wanted the 35,023 k. spent in Mecca by the emir on such items as buying a new horse and saddle for receiving the mahmil to be eliminated. 2 Another 18,000 k. was wastefully spent on the siirre emini's expenses in receiving guests. 3 Similarly much of the 24,000 k. expense of sending incense to Mecca should be halted. These expenses included such costs as 1,875 k. for building special boxes to contain the perfume. 4 Still another area of waste was the purchasing of tents by the siirre emini. At least 18,750 k. could be saved there, Sabri Pa§a argued. 5 The second major area of savings was in the contribution of 3,000,000 k. by the Imperial Treasury to the hilar. Of this sum, Sabri suggested, a reduction of at least 111,000 was possible. The chief area to be cut would be the 63,000 k., one-half of the total spent, that was used for hiring camels to transport grain from Muzayrib, southeast of Damascus, to Mada'in Salih in the northern Hijaz. Other savings would result from reductions in the salaries of clerks associated with the pilgrimage who would stay in Damascus and not make the pilgrimage. 6 An even more

^Abfl al-Huda al-Sayyada (7-1936/7), former nakibiile^raf of Aleppo, has not yet been the object of a detailed study. The most recent reference to his career is L. Hirszowicz, T h e Sultan and the Khedive, 1892 1908', Middle Eastern Studies, VIII, 3 (October 1972), 304 ff. 2

Sabri, pp. 708-10. Ibid. p. 711. 4 Ibid. p. 711. 5 Ibid. p. 713. 6 Ibid. pp. 713-15. 3

O T T O M A N S U B S I D I E S TO T H E H I J A Z 1 8 7 7 - 1 8 8 6

49

conspicuous example of waste was the fur-trimmed robes of honor for the ulema sent at the expense of the kilar to the sweltering Hijaz. The 70,000 k. cost had already been stopped. 1 Payments to the Bedouin tribes who lived in south Syria and the northern Hijaz composed a major part of the kilar budget and the third area of possible savings of Sabri Pa§a. Payments had been increased by 440,000 k. which was added to the payments of the Sakhr, Ruwalla, Wuld 'All, 'Anayza, and Hasan tribes, and the Bedouins living near Muzayrib. The total annual payment had become 1,254,500 k. Sabri argued that it should be possible to save 100,000 k. A detailed investigation of the tribal subsidies was underway in the Mtihimme Odasi. 2

REFORMS IN THE §EHADETNAME A N D THE iKRAMIYE Imperial charity in the Hijaz and the rest of the Empire was also channeled in part through the §ehadetname and the ikramiye. 3 Funds for the §ehadetname came from the d$iir tax on Ottoman governmental employees' March salaries. In the Hijaz 299 people were eligible to receive funds from this source. They were §erifi, seyyids, imams, preachers, the managers of charitable institutions, servants of the Harems, and those who prayed in the Holy Cities. Reductions in the §ehadetname and ikramiye, which supplemented the giving of the §ehadetname, were made in several ways. In 1297 Maliye/1881-1882, the §ura-yi Devlet reduced the §ehadetname from 7,034,750 to 4,988,550 k. 4 That part of the §ehadetname specifically set aside for individuals in Mecca and Medina was also reduced. The original 775,250 k. was cut by 286,760 k., or more than one-third. 5 The central government was determined to eliminate fraud and abuses in the awarding of the subsidies. False names had been entered on the registers. Recipients had sold their rights to agents in Istanbul who tried to

1

Ibid. p. 715. Ibid. p. 715.

2

The Ikramiye of the 1850s is discussed in Richard Burton, Personal Narrative Pilgrimage to Al-Medinah and Meccah (London: Tylston and Edwards, 1893), II, 7. 4 Sabri, p. 698. 5 Ibid. pp. 697,704.

of a

50

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

collect money when they were not entitled to it. Instead of going through established heads of professions individuals had petitioned the Sultan directly for favors. T o reform these practices the central government established new procedures for giving money to persons in Mecca and Medina. A f t e r 1881-2 tezkeres had to be produced in person in the Hijaz in order to collect money from the §ehadetname and Ikramiye. These numbered forms were issued every year and contained information on the name, age, eye color, and height of the recipient. 1 The following groups were forbidden to receive subsidies: employees of the Hijaz Vilayet Treasury, small children, slaves, servants, and merchants. A §ehadetname recipient could not receive an ikramiye grant at the same time. 2 Across the board reductions in both the §ehadetname and ikramiye were also made. They affected Mecca and Medina and the differing social groups which received them equally. Even the salaries of the fifteen Meccan §erifs, seyyids, imams, and preachers who received their gifts through the emir rather than directly from Ottoman officials were cut f r o m 5,500 k. to 3,660 k. 3

R E C O N S T R U C T I O N OF T H E W A T E R S Y S T E M O F M E C C A The bankruptcy ot the Ottoman Empire in the 1870s was primarily caused by a combination of fixed income, rising expenditures for westernizing the military, and war. In the Hijaz the financial troubles of the central government were most noticeable in their negative aspect: no new major construction or improvements were undertaken in the Holy Cities by the Ottomans. Conditions for the pilgrimage, the life blood of the Hijazi economy, were not markedly improved either in regard to the accommodations of pilgrims once they reached Mecca and Medina or their security and health on their way to the Hijaz. In the administration of the Emir 'Abd Allah b. M u h a m m a d b. 'Awn, 1857-77, there were no major repairs or new buildings reported at all. Although a few minor repairs were completed between 1878 and 1881, it was the accession of an energetic new vali, Osman Nuri Pa§a, that signaled

' A n example of a tezkere is in ¡bid. p. 704. Ibid. p. 706. 3 Ibid. pp. 699-701.

2

OTTOMAN

SUBSIDIES

TO T H E

HIJAZ

1877- 1886

51

the beginning of active construction. 1 In the first years of his administration Osman repaired and expanded the Davudiye Medrese, widened the Ibrahim Gate, and improved the 'All Gate in Mecca. The road from the Ibrahim Gate to the Ka'ba was widened and renewed. Osman moved the library that had been established by Sultan Abdiilmecid in 1845-6 to the Siileymaniye Medrese. 2 In 1882-3 Osman Pa§a, in cooperation with the Emir 'Awn alRafiq, ordered some minor repairs in the Harem. He also built a governmental konak, a police station, repaired the barracks at Ta'if, and built a barracks in Mecca for artillerymen. 3 Since the cost and the source of the funding of these projects is unknown, they can be evaluated only in terms of the functions they served. Most of them were improvements in military security. In the early 1880s, Osman Pa§a and the Emir 'Abd al-Muttalib were engaged in a struggle for power. Until that quarrel was won by Osman with the deposition of 'Abd alMuttalib in September 1882, military spending received top priority. In 1882 the vali turned his attention to the restoration of the water system of Mecca. About one-half of Mecca's water came from the spring called Ayn Zubayda through conduits to the taps of Mecca. The Ayn Zubayda water system had been repaired in 1770-1, 1819-20, and had received an additional extension in 1846-7 when a new well was added. 4 The water flow into Mecca had decreased because of failure to keep the conduits repaired and cleaned. In 1878 the generous Shaykh 'Abd alRahman Sarraj, the Hanafi Mufti of Mecca, restored the water system somewhat. He employed Indian pilgrims and Bedouins as laborers. Following this, in order to obtain a greater supply of water, the Sultan issued an irade in Muharrem 1296/December 1878-January 1879 creating a commission, headed initially by Sarraj, to supervise substantial alterations to Ayn Zubayda. 5

' Osman Nuri was in charge of the Ottoman side of the dual administration of the Hijaz even while the aged Ahmet Izzet was formally the vali from 1298/1880-1 to 1299/1881-2. Osman Paça was vali officially from June 1882 to December 1886 (HVS-I, p. 404; Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka, I, 176). 2 HVS-I, p. 22; Sabri, pp. 776-9. 3 HVS-I, pp. 23,41; Sabri, pp. 781-2. 4 Sabri, pp. 747-8. 5 Sabri, p. 750; HVS,I, p. 107. The head of the commission in 1301/1883-1884 was the son of a former emir, §erif Husayn b. ijerif Yahyâ. An Ottoman military officer, Sadik Bey, supervised the construction. See HVS-I, pp. 124-5.

52

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

The commission raised the money for the proposed changes from donations of rich Muslims in the Hijaz, Egypt, and India. At least 2,400,000 k. was donated. 1 The commission did not ask for money from the Ottoman Treasury because of the financial dilemma of the Empire at that time. Many aspects of the water system were changed. The Ayn Zafaran conduit was repaired. Water from the Hanin and Numan Wadis was brought to Mecca by building underground pipes, digging diversionary canals, and new reservoirs. The new system provided about 5,000,000 okas2 of running water per minute to Mecca. New reservoirs and water taps were built throughout the city. 3

CONCLUSION Ottoman aid to the Hijaz was large in comparison with locally raised funds, but the Hijaz's dependence on the central government does not seem to have been used as a direct weapon in the political struggle between the emir and the vali. Most of the money spent in the province, however, was used for supporting military forces that could provide backing for the vali. Another large category of aid went to the religious hierarchy of the mosques in the Holy Cities. This may have been given, in addition to reasons of personal piety, in order to help the Ottomans retain Muslim religious support in the Hijaz and el sewhere. Reforms aimed at eliminating waste and corruption in Ottoman aid were limited in scope and only partly implemented. Some obvious abuses may have been corrected by the tezkere system. The more significant 'Ayn Zubayda water system project represented a substantial improvement for Ottoman Mecca but the initiative in proposing the work and most of the funds for it were non-Ottoman.

'"["he names of some of the donors are provided in Sabri, pp. 750-2. The Egyptian newspaper 'al-Jawa'ib' was especially active in securing donations. Another repair of the water system of Ayn Zubayda occurred in 1906-8. Contributions for it also came from throughout the Muslim world. Great Britain, Foreign Office 95: 2224 M. Hussain (Jidda) to O'Conor, 25 July 1906. 2 One Egyptian oka, the measure used in Jidda, was the equivalent of 1,050 grams. 3 Sabri, pp. 754-8.

THECOMMERCIAL HISTORY OF THE HIJAZ VILAYET, 1840-19081

INTRODUCTION Political power in the Hijaz was restored to the Ottoman central government in Istanbul after the defeat of the armies of Mehmet Ali of Egypt in 1840. While Ottoman sovereignty in the Hijaz and control over appointments to the highest positions there had existed since the conquest of Egypt in 1516-1517, local groups had nevertheless been able to vie for power and influence with each other and with the Ottoman governor. In the period 1840-1908, the old struggle between centraiizers in Istanbul, powerful notables in the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, and nomads in the Hijaz deserts was diversified by the entry of newly strengthened competitors for economic influence—Europeans and Muslims under European protection. The prime determinant of the Hijazi economy was the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. When the numbers and wealth of the pilgrims rose or fell, the economy of Hijazi towns and Bedouins rose or fell in turn. The pilgrims frequently brought merchandise for sale in order to defray the cost of their trip; they also constituted the largest and richest market for products in the country. The future was judged by Hijazi merchants according to their predictions for the next year's pilgrimage. Innovations in the pilgrimage brought about primarily by Europeans or European-encouraged reform, such as regular steamship service, the construction of the Suez Canal, and increasing political order in the Ottoman Empire affected the merchant community of the Hijaz strongly. Because of the small amount of agriculture in the Hijaz, commercial groups, large-scale importers of goods, pilgrim guides, and those receiving payments from the Ottoman Government were the wealthiest segments of The research upon which this article is based was made possible by grants from the Social Science Research Council, the Faculty Research Abroad program of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the American Research Institute in Turkey. My thanks also go to Professor Donald Quataert of the University of Houston for his guidance on sources for an earlier version of this article which was presented at Hacettepe University's First International Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey, Ankara, 1977.

54

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

society rather than agricultural land-owners. However, the extreme ethnic diversity of the business élite, caused by the continual influx of new and ethnically diverse Muslims, meant that the ruling family of the Amirs of Mecca usually had little to fear politically from the fragmented commercial class. The Ottoman Government in Istanbul played a major role in providing food to the Hijaz but it apparently did not use its subventions directly to influence local politics. 1 Because of the pilgrimage, then, political and economic power seemed to be separate. Wealthy individuals in the commercial élite could and did secure special treatment for themselves, but they did not seek direct political power. Nevertheless, there was a close and continuing relationship between the merchants of the Hijaz and the local government.

THE ENVIRONMENT Before examining the nature of commerce in the Hijaz directly, several technical problems must be examined. To understand merchants we must understand the environment in which they functioned. In the Hijaz the financial environment was made difficult by the changing relative values of currencies, while the physical environment presented a constant challenge to all the peoples in the area, including merchants. Heat, humidity, lack of rainfall, coral reefs, and wind patterns formed a continually changing but basically consistent background for commercial activity. Throughout the period under discussion and in all parts of the Hijaz, Ottoman money was legal tender but it was not usually the sole currency actually employed in commercial exchange. Instead, there was a wide variety of coins, usually silver, including those of India, Great Britain, Egypt, France, Russia, Spain, Mexico, and other countries. Because of the diversity and a shortage of coins, the exchange rate between currencies was important. As pilgrims arrived, they brought coins from their home countries; this money was then used to pay for the enormous imports needed to support the pilgrims as well as the people of the Hijaz. The comparative worth of the most widely-used coins is presented in Table 1 below.

1 William Ochsenwald, 'Ottoman Subsidies to the Hijaz, 1877-1886', International Middle Eastern Studies IV: 3. July, 1975, 300-307.

Journal

of

55

C O M M E R C I A L HISTORY OF THE HIJAZ VILAYET

Values of coins fluctuated with time and circumstances, thereby creating uncertainty for export-import merchants. In the Ottoman Empire, even the government changed its own internal rate of exchange by revaluing the Mecidiye/Majidiyyah from twenty to nineteen kurush/qurush in 1880. In general, however, after 1844 the value of Ottoman currency vis-a-vis other European money was officially fixed: one gold Ottoman lira or pound (hereafter TL) equalled nine-tenths of a pound sterling and slightly less than twenty-three French francs.1 From city to city the exchange rate of the Ottoman lira in terms of Ottoman kurush varied depending upon supply and demand.2 Values of the same foreign coins also varied from city to city. In 1853 the pound sterling was worth 122 kurush in the Hijaz and 112 in Cairo.3 Values of foreign coins in the Hijaz changed when the pilgrimage was completed and most of the pilgrims had departed. Coins of all sorts became more valuable because they became scarcer4 after the pilgrims, who brought them into the country had left. Table 1: Exchange rates in the Hijaz (in Kurush unless otherwise indicated) Year

1814 1834 1844 a,b 1853 1859-1861 1868

Ottoman French pound

4.2$MT 4.2$MT 2 3 francs

Pound

Maria

sterling

dollar 9-11.5 5 francs

110 122 146

Theresa

271> 29.5-31

franc

4.39 5

20b

1873

4.5 francs 1875-1878

4.7$MT

97.5k 125c

Vedat Eidem, Osmanli ìmparatorlugunun iktisadi ¡artlari hakkinda bir tetkik, Ankara, 1970, 226-227. For convenience in making comparisons, wherever possible I have converted all other currencies into Ottoman //ras at these rates. 2 In 1891, for example, the Ottoman pound was worth 123 kurush in Beirut, 124 in Jerusalem, and a 125 in Damascus. Richard F. Burton, Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah reprinted New York, 1964,1, 127. 4

Saleh Muhammad al-Amr, The Hijaz under Ottoman rule, 1869-1914: the Ottoman Vali, the Sharif of Mecca, and growth of British influence,' Riyadh, 1978; France, Ministèro des Affaires Etrangères (hereafter F), Correspondance consulaire et commerciale de 1793 à 1901, Djeddah (hereafter FJ), de Costalet (Jidda) to Ministry, March 2, 1886.

56 1880 1880s 1883-1885 1893-1894 1895 1900-1902 1902 1903 1907 1908-1 l a a

OTTOMAN-ARAB 105b 108c 148-151 130

HISTORY 5

168-170

6 12.5 C

b

4b

b

100 283c

110 315c

100

109

12.6C

4b

11

4.3 4b

b

110 110b

F o r all the Ottoman Empire; ''official rate; Commercial

rate.

The Maria Theresa silver Thaler ($MT) played a peculiar role in Arabia among the Bedouins who came to accept it as the most reliable and desirable coinage and it continued to be minted in Austria for export. Despite the Bedouins' conviction that the Thaler was of unchanging value, it too fluctuated in intrinsic worth and in relation to other coins. The Thaler's popularity, and the shortage of other coins, made any attempt to curb its use, as in the Ottoman restrictions on the importation of all foreign coins in 1894, unworkable. This attempt, by the Imperial Government, was violated by many Hijazis. In March, 1895, the earlier order of January, 1894, was repeated; however, the Jidda customs office responded to the new order from Istanbul by saying that smuggling of coins into the Hijaz was widespread. 1 When the Jidda Majlis (Council) issued an order to reduce the value of all copper coins in relation to other coins by one-half of their face value, the futility of government regulation of the money supply became even clearer. The merchants in Jidda closed their shops in protest. At the suggestion of the foreign consuls to the Qaimmaqam, governor of Jidda, the order was rescinded and some of the Majlis members were dismissed. 2 A more important factor for the merchants was the maintenance of a two-tier system of exchange, with Ottoman Government offices calculating exchange at a more favourable rate than the current market situation would have indicated. There were also, at least theoretically, two types of kurush, 1

Great Britain, Foreign Office (hereafter FO), 195/1847 Richards (Jidda) to Currie, March 2, 1894; FJ, Pellissier (Jidda) to Ministry, November 10,1864; Ottoman Empire, Prime Ministers' Archives (hereafter BBA), Dahiliye Irade 1312-N-18, Ramazan 19, 1312. 2 A1-Amr, The Hijaz', 78, 82-K3.

C O M M E R C I A L HISTORY OF THE HIJAZ VILAYET

57

tariff (gold) and current (silver). A problem of the 1880s and 1890s was the fall in value of silver, not only in the Hijaz but throughout Asia. From 1888 to 1895 the number of current kurush necessary to purchase a pound sterling rose from 186 to 315, and for an Ottoman pound they rose from 170 to 283. 1 Considerable commercial fluctuations and crises were probably frequent because of three monetary factors: the absence of a large bank in the Hijaz, the Ottoman Government's inability to stabilize exchange rates, and the shortage of coins. In all likelihood, merchants were hampered rather than helped by the means of exchange. While seemingly easy efforts to standardize weights and measures failed, 2 the more difficult task of providing a reliable and regular money supply was surely beyond the institutional scope of the Ottoman Government in the Hijaz. To set the background for the history of commerce in Jidda the second factor with both permanent and variable features, the climate, should also be examined. The seasons and the extremes of heat and cold were, on the average, fixed ingredients. However, the alteration of the pilgrimage, as the lunar and solar calendars' interactions dictated, meant that the key trading season of the year would be sometimes in the summer and sometimes in the relatively cooler parts of the year. Especially before the advent of scheduled steamship services to Jidda, the regular yearly fluctuations of the wind pattern in the Red Sea also greatly affected the nature of commerce in the Hijaz. The chief port of the Hijaz, Jidda, in addition to coral reefs and poor anchorages, was beset by a combination of heat and humidity which frequently made life there extremely uncomfortable. The average and maximum daytime temperatures in the shade were as follows: DecemberMarch, 24 and 30° centigrade; March-May, 30 and 34"; June-September, 36 and 38°; October-November, 29 and 33°. On one day in Jidda in 1859 the temperature reached a scorching 55°; the same year the lowest recorded

! FJ. Guerry (Jidda) to Ministry, September 1, 1896; FO 195/1987 Devey (Jidda) to Currie, May 8, 1896; for the same phenomenon in Oman see Robert Landen, Oman since 1856: Disruptive modernization in a traditional Arab society, Princeton, 1967,128-130. 2 For weights and measures and the Ottoman plans to change them see Eyyup Sabri Pasha, Miratiilharemeyn, Istanbul: Bahriye Matbaasi, 1301-1306,1, 679-680.

58

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

temperature in Jidda was 14°.1 Average humidity in April, May and June varied from about 56 to 60% at 9:00 a.m., and 56 to 65% at 3:00 p.m. 2 Jidda averaged only nine days of rain and twenty-three millimetres of rainfall per year. 3 At Yanbu', also on the Red Sea Coast, similar conditions prevailed. Inland temperatures might be as high as along the coast, but they were usually lower and humidity less. The only known observations for Medina in the nineteenth century show a range of 6 to 45°c. At al-Ta'if the low temperature reached 0°. Al-Batanuni, an early twentieth century traveller, asserts that the low temperatures at Tabuk and Mada'in Salih in the interior reached from -5 to 15°, with strong winds. 4 Mecca ranged from 15 to 47°, with morning temperatures in February averaging 20°, but the average high temperature for August was 41 °.5 The impact of the climate of the Hijaz upon merchants and the general society was usually held to be enervating, particularly in Jidda. Reduced energy, a high mortality rate from disease, a slow pace of society and business, and an alleged 'Arab fatalism' were said to be caused by the weather. 6 On the other hand, the calmness and tranquillity of the town, and the clear view of the stars in the sky inspired some European observers to praise at least the nights, after the setting of the implacable sun. 7 It is clear that the physical environment presented great difficulties for merchants. Seaborne commerce was cheaper and less exposed to raids than that going overland through the heat and desert of the interior. On the coast, therefore, commerce flourished while climatic conditions harshly affected the health and energy of residents. 'France, Service Hydrographique de la Marine, Mer Rouge et Golfe d'Aden, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1942, 3; Great Britain, Parliament, Accounts and Papers (hereafter A + P), 1862, LIX 48-65. 2 FJ, Schnepp (Jidda) to Ministry, July 12,1866. ^France, Service Hydrographique, Mer Rouge, 24. On the other hand, occasionally there would be too much rainfall in the form of floods. In one incident fifty houses in Jidda were destroyed by heavy rainstorms, FO 195/2224 Husain (Jidda) to Chargé, November 12, 1906. ^Muhammad Labib al-Bataniini, Al-Rihlat al-Hijdziyyah... Cairo: 1329 H. 63, 314; 'Umar Rida Kahhâlah, Jughrâfiyyà Shibh Jazirat al-'Arab, 2nd ed.; Mecca, 1964, 133. ''Mustafa Hâmï Bey, Mandfï al-Hujjàj, Istanbul, 1280, 47-50; Kahhâlah, Jughrâfiyyà, 2nd. éd., 133. 6 FJ, Rousseau (Jidda) to Ministry, July 6,1859. 7 FJ, Dubreuill (Jidda) to Ministry, July 20,1870.

C O M M E R C I A L HISTORY OF THE HIJAZ VILAYET

59

Wind patterns in the northern Red Sea differed from the southern parts of the Sea. All year around, but especially from May to November, in the northern Red Sea, winds came primarily from the north-northwest. In the southern parts of the Red Sea, from October to May, the wind came from the south-southeast. 1 Delays for sailing vessels therefore were frequent during certain parts of the year.

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION Transportation and communication for merchants in the Hijaz were painfully slow, tedious, and subject to vagaries, not only of the wind and weather, but also interruptions caused by man. 'With the present method of communication one finds oneself here literally at the end of the world ...', wrote the French consul in Jidda in 1857. 2 Transportation by ship was slowed by adverse winds, fear of running aground on coral reefs, and the desire to have a full cargo before departing for the next port. The Suez-Jidda trip of 645 nautical miles for sailing ships averaged thirty-plus days because of these factors, and in one case even took fifty-eight days, although under happier circumstances it might take far less time. 3 Once steamships started to operate in the Red Sea they reduced the time needed for travelling. The direct Jidda to Suez route became a three day trip. The Ottoman Government did little to help sea-borne commerce. The Jidda harbour was surveyed and mapped completely by the British, not the Ottomans, in 1876. Jidda's dangerous harbour was neither dredged nor adequately buoyed, even though the Ottoman Prime Minister himself suggested the clearing of the small inner harbour channel in 1882. Security at sea was occasionally imperilled by pirates. If a ship anchored north of Jidda along the coast, payments to the local Bedouins were necessary to carry out trading. 4 Inland, transportation was equally slow, though it also increased in speed because of technological changes. The regular pilgrim caravan from Cairo to Mecca had taken about forty days. Mehmet Ali had speeded up this trip by about twenty days through establishing a regular camel relay service. 'France, Service Hydrographique, Mer Rouge, 14. FJ, de Monbrun (Jidda) to Ministry, March 9,1857. ^Maurice Tamisier, Voyage en Arabie, Paris, 1840,1, 17-62.

2

4

Ibid., 35; BBA, Ayniyat 1521, Prime Minister to Vali, Safer 8,1300.

60

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

However, it was only with the Hijaz telegraph in the 1860s and the introduction of the Hijaz Railway in 1900-1908 that a major saving in time took place. Letters to and from Istanbul, which had frequently been carried by the caravans accompanying the surre (contributions from the Sultan for upkeep of the Holy Places) were now conveyed more rapidly. 1 Even though the telegraph existed, however, the rates charged discouraged its extensive use. The rate per word from Mecca to Damascus or Istanbul was about sixteen kurush, while from Mecca to India it was thirty-one. 2 The JiddaSuez and Suez-Jidda mail was sent once a week in 1902 by Khedivial steamer. Mail was sent from Jidda to Mecca twice daily in the 1880s, but Mecca-Medina mail went only irregularly by camel. The Istanbul government recognized the slowness and difficulty of sending letters between Hijazi towns and from the Hijaz abroad as early as 1868. Two cures were suggested: establishing a postal office for handling mail from Mecca to Medina, and regular steamer service by the Ottomans along the coast so as to carry the mails. Little was actually done, however, to secure these changes. 3 The roughness of the terrain and the lack of any suitable roads prohibited carriages. There were only two carriages in Mecca and Medina in the 1880s. Instead, camels were the beasts of burden for transporting merchandise, passengers, and messages. 4 While the speed of camels varied greatly depending upon the load, type of camel, and availablity of fodder, Burton in the 1850s estimated that a caravan averaged only 2 miles per hour. The trip from Yanbu' to Medina by fast camel took two days, by slow camel four. Similarly, by the eastern desert path, the Mecca to Medina transit varied from five to eleven days or in some cases even longer. 5 The construction of the new telegraph line from Damascus south to the Hijaz in the 1860s linked Medina to a world-wide system but not directly to Mecca. When the Hijaz Railway was opened in 1908 Medina, again, was the only

'For a description of the mail and package system to Mecca from Istanbul see Jacob Landau, The Hejaz Raibvay and the Muslim Pilgrimage: a Case of Ottoman Political Propaganda, Detroit, 1971,90. ^Ottoman Empire, Hicaz Vilayeti Salnamesi 1301, Mecca: 1301 H, (Hereafter HVS), 66. 3 B B A , Ayniyat 871, Receb 9, 1285, Prime Minister to Vali of the Hijaz: Muhammed Bayram, Sajwat al-I'tibar, Cairo 1302-1311, V, 20. 4 For a discussion of the reasons for the prevalence of camels over wheeled vehicles in the Middle East see Richard Bulliet, The Camel and the Wheel, Cambridge, Mass, 1975. ^Bayram, Sajwat, V, 28; Burton, Personal, I, 244-281, II, 50-51; a 6,000 camel caravan in 1886 also averaged about two miles per hour from Mecca to Medina to Yanbu', FO 685/2/2 'Mohammed Abou Elewa's Pilgrimage.. .1886.'

C O M M E R C I A L HISTORY OF THE HIJAZ VILAYET

61

Hijaz town linked by railway to the rest of the Ottoman Empire; Jidda and Mecca were not part of the Ottoman railway system. 1 Even after the advent of the railway, most goods transported in the Hijaz continued to be carried by camel caravan. The safeguarding of the caravans from Bedouin raids was a major concern of local governments and one of the chief problems between foreign consuls, acting on behalf of their merchant protégés, and the Ottoman Valis (governors). The Vali, from the European point of view, was ultimately responsible for preserving law and order, even in the desert. One example, taken from many, where the Vali failed to do this was the robbery of a 400-camel Medina to Mecca caravan by the Ahàmidah subsection of the Harb tribe in 1893. Estimated losses totalled over TL 2,640, of which TL 399 was in cash belonging to a British-protected Indian merchant. The British sought compensation from the Ottomans for the merchant's losses. 2 One of the consequences of the problems in transportation and communications was to emphasize the importance of having branches of trading companies, with partners having full powers to decide issues, in all towns and villages where business was transacted. A second result was to emphasize the sharp division between Jidda, which was relatively in touch with the outside world, and Mecca, which was not. It was not only religious prejudices among Muslims which kept Europeans along the coast, but also the concentration of import-export and related commerce in Jidda. The unattractive climate of Jidda was counterbalanced for merchants by the relative ease of transporting large cargoes by water and receiving letters and telegrams there. A third consequence of the transport and communications pattern was the extraordinary isolation of Medina from the rest of the Hijaz. The provisioning of Medina was subject to the irregular Yanbu' caravans which were frequently raided by Bedouins. Great fluctuations of prices and occasional short-term monopolies ensued. Only about one-third of the grain consumed in Medina every day was locally produced. Some grain, as well as honey, sheep and charcoal were purchased from Bedouins, but most food had to be imported from the Red Sea ports or be brought overland from Syria. 3 Medina therefore was both isolated and dependent upon frail connections

'For the political and economic consequences of the Railway see William Ochsenwald, The Hijaz Railroad: a Study in Ottoman-Arab Political Capacity and Autonomy, Charlottesville, 1980. 2 3

FO 195/1805 Richards (Jidda) to Ford, March 4 , 1 8 9 3 . John Burckhardt, Travels in Arabia, London, 1829, 376-379.

62

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

with the rest of the Hijaz; it had little to do with the political and commercial life of the rest of the province. Fourthly, the poor harbours along the eastern coast of the Red Sea meant that Jidda's harbour, bad though it was, was the best available, and far superior to that of the chief port of Medina, Yanbu'. Other Hijazi ports did not seriously challenge the dominanceof Jidda.

TOTAL AMOUNT S OF GOODS IMPORTED AND EXPORTED As with all numbers emanating from the Hijaz the totals given in estimation of exports and imports need to be viewed with great scepticism. Even when Ottoman officials gave foreigners government customs records to examine there were doubts as to their accuracy. It was alleged that customs officials under-reported imports so as to conceal large-scale bribery and thefts. 1 Another reason why the official totals were too low was the records did not include Ottoman-owned vessels, which especially in the early middle nineteenth century would have substantially increased the totals if they had been included. Many vessels paid customs duties at other Ottoman ports and were therefore not required to register or pay customs again at Jidda. Much of the imported merchandise was either immediately or, after a period, reexported from Jidda to other ports. Also, caravans by land were not included in either government or foreign consuls' trade figures. There are also two periods of time for which there is little commercial information available from any source, 1840-1854 and 1865-1875. Given these problems it is still possible to detect general movements and the overall magnitude of foreign trade in the Hijaz between 1855 and 1908 (see table 2 below). There was a steady increase in imports and a modest increase in exports from 1855 to 1878-1881. After 1882 exports fell remarkably and remained at a low level until 1908. Imports decreased sharply around 1881-1883 and then remained relatively constant until 1903 when they began a steady rise until World War 1. Export and import fluctuations, both short- and long-term, were caused by a number of factors. Short-run, non-repetitive causes of changes included political disturbances which discouraged pilgrims, as in the slavery and succession struggle in Mecca in 1856, the massacre and bombardments

IpJ, Rousseau (Jidda) to Ministry, June 4, 1860; A + P, 1862, LIX, 48-65.

C O M M E R C I A L HISTORY OF THE HIJAZ VILAYET

63

of Jidda in 1858, and the quarrels between the Vali of the Hijaz and the Amir of Mecca in 1880-1882.1 Financial panics, diseases, or unusual prosperity in the Hijaz or in any of the main pilgrimage countries such as India or Egypt could affect Hijazi commerce. Some wars hurt Red Sea shipping, especially the Mahdist-British-Egyptian struggles of the 1880s and 1890s, the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-1878, and the ItalianOttoman War of 1911. Good harvests or failures of crops abroad or locally affected prices in the Hijaz. A drought in the Hijaz in 1903 caused the importation of sheep from the Sudan. Another example of harvests changing prices was the simultaneous failure of the Yemen harvest and the decline in Indian rice production in 1896-1899 which brought about a 20% increase in the price of rice in the Hijaz.2 When the number of pilgrims fell because of bad harvests abroad, the price of agricultural goods in the Hijaz would rise precisely when the Hijazis could least afford it.

Table 2: Value of goods imported and exported at Jidda (to the nearest TL 1,000) Year 1855 1856 1857 1859 1859-1860 1861 1863-1864 1868 1876 1878 1879 1880-1881 1883 1885 1886 1887 1890 1891

Imports 702-703 781-782 906-917 1,091 1,079 2,220 1,798 1,700 2,020 2,003 1,845 1,867 912 739

508-521 473

Exported 442-448 431-436 469-474 618 610 199 910 1,000 618 1,034 469 324 73 130 132 80 36-47 31

Total 1,144-1,151 1,212-1,218 1,375-1,391 1,709 1,689 2,419 2,708 2,700 2,638 3,037 2,314 2,192 985 869

544-568 504

FJ, de Monbrun (Jidda) to Ministry, March 9, 1857; for more information on the massacre of 1858 see William Ochsenwald, The Jidda Massacre of 1858', Middle Eastern Studies XIII: 3 October, 1977, 314-326; on the struggle between the Vali and the Amir, see Butros Abu Manneh, 'Sultan Abdiilhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca (1880-1900)', Asian and African Studies, IX: 1,1973,1-21. 2 A + P, 1903, LXXIX, 67-68.

64 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908

OT'lOMAN-ARAB 623 630-642 771 722 762 709

806 828 872 943

1,081 1,546 2,494

1,886 2,166 2,297

HISTORY 34 24 23 31 25

21 28 35 42 46 25

28 43 79 41 57

657 654-666 794 752 787 730 834 863 914 989 1,106 1,574 2,537 1,965 2,207 2,354

The crucial short-run, repetitive variable was the number of pilgrims who came to the Hijaz. For example, it was estimated that the pilgrims brought with them about TL 1,100,000 in 1885 and TL 2,600,000 in 1901 for their expenses. 1 These large sums fuelled all aspects of the economy. When the chief pilgrimage day was to fall on a Friday, which was considered especially propitious, many more Muslims went on the pilgrimage than normally would be expected. Therefore, in those years, imports were unusually high. Long-range fluctuations were caused primarily by changing currents in world commerce. Increased shipping between Europe and South and East Asia tended in part to go through the Red Sea. Intermediate stops between Aden and Suez were necessary for obtaining supplies of coal; Jidda therefore benefited. However, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 hurt the trade of Jidda in two ways. First, after 1868, the number of steamships in the Red Sea increased and they could more easily go directly to small ports, so Jidda's role as an entrepot for transshipment of goods practically disappeared. 2 Exports drastically decreased. Another reason for the decline of Jidda was improved steamship technology which meant that an intermediate stop for coaling in the Red Sea was no longer necessary. Ships tended to call only at the ports of Aden and Suez. Ipj, Guès (Jidda) to Ministry, November 10,1901; A + P, 1886, LXV, 305-310. 2

F j ' Malpertuy (Jidda) to Ministry, November 15, 1881; de Costalot (Jidda) to Ministry, March 2, 1886; R. J. Gavin, Aden under British Rule 1839-1967, London, 1975, 178 discusses changes in steamship technology; Landen Oman since 1856, 82-83, says that Muscat was also affected by steamers in a similar way, thus losing its role as an entrepot for the Gulf.

C O M M E R C I A L HISTORY OF T H E HIJAZ VILAYET

65

The impact of the opening of the Canal and changed technology interacted with the political events of the early 1880s in the Hijaz to lead to a marked decline in commerce which did not begin to recover until 1903. In the early 1880s a series of quarantines against Jidda in major pilgrim countries, the decline in the slave trade, and the fighting in the Sudan across the Red Sea combined to create a commercial crisis which, with the impact of the Canal finally taking full effect, ruined Jidda's trade and therefore that of the Hijaz. The causes of the increase, starting in 1903 at Jidda, are yet to be fully determined. 1 Probably the same fluctuations in commerce took place in other Red Sea ports. While figures for the trade of the other ports are presently unknown, as is the volume of the overland caravan trade, it seems quite likely that Jidda dominated the commerce of the Hijaz and set the tone for merchants everywhere in the area.

TYPES OF GOODS IMPORTED AND EXPORTED If one turns from the general figures on trade to more specific information, it is possible to trace changes in the level of trading in certain commodities and relative pre-eminence among the exporting nations. The major theme to be seen is the continuance of Britain and British India as the prime mover of sea cargo and the chief supplier of imported goods and food. Since little is known about the Bedouin market for goods and their role as suppliers of goods to the towns, it is certain that this picture of British and Anglo-Indian dominance of commerce is incomplete and it is perhaps even incorrect in detail though not overall. The little information on Bedouin commerce which exists indicates that they purchased the same types of food and cloth generally used in the towns as well as other commodities. Rifles, slaves and coffee were bought in Mecca, Medina and Jidda by the Bedouins. In return they and nearby villagers provided camels, sheep, samn (ghee), butter, white cheese, and attar of roses. Dates, grain, vegetables and fruit also came from the villagers of WadI Fatimah near Mecca to the townspeople. A camel caravan went from

'One factor in the increasing prosperity of the Hijaz in the 1900s was the increase in pilgrims. While the average number of sea-borne pilgrims in 1899-1902 was only 39,000, in 1903-1908 it was 87,000.

66

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

al-QasIm to Mecca with seventy men, 170 camels, and TL 2,200 worth of samn and butter in 1878. This example may or may not be typical of overland provisioning of the Hijazi towns; not enough cases are known to say. 1 Coffee had been the most valuable sea-borne export of the east coast of the Red Sea in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 2 The planting of coffee outside Arabia, especially in the Western Hemisphere in the eighteenth century, decreased the importance of Yemen coffee and, therefore, Jidda as an exporter of it. On the other hand, coffee locally continued to be a major article of commerce. In 1842 the pilgrimage caravan returning to Damascus from Mecca carried TL 1,400 worth of coffee, as compared to TL 8,000 worth of Indian cloth, the most valuable item of commerce on the trip. 3 Coffee from the northern Yemen was sent via Hudaydah and Qunfudah to Jidda. In 1855 about 1,670 tons were imported in six months, but 1,483 tons were soon re-exported from Jidda to Suez. The year's total imports were thought to be 3,400 tons. A kilo of coffee at Hudaydah cost roughly five kurush and in 1861 four kurush at Jidda. 4 In 1863-1864 about 4,500 tons of coffee were exported to Suez at a cost of about eleven kurush per kilo. Nearly one-half of the value of exports to Suez came from coffee. In 1868 the price of coffee for export from Jidda to Suez was seven kurush per kilo. 5 From a glance at Table 3, it can be seen that after 1875 the value of coffee imported into and re-exported from Jidda rapidly declined and stayed quite low until 1908 with only a slight increase in the years after 1903. Political events in the Yemen, including especially the Ottoman attempt to reimpose direct rule there and its eventual failure, probably adversely affected production and sales. The decline in the sale of coffee from Jidda was also caused by the development in Yemeni ports of direct sales to foreign and Ottoman purchasers as well as the increasing prevalence in the Charles M. Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta, reprinted. New York, 1936, II, 375, 429, 481-488, 511, 559, 561, 596; FO 84/1769 Jago (Jidda) to Rosebery, April 15, 1886 For commerce between 'As--r and the Hijaz see Kinahan Cornwallis, Aslr Before World War I: a Handbook, Cairo, 1916, reprinted, New York, 1976, 19-20. 2 For the history of coffee in the Red Sea area see Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edit, 'Kahwa,' IV, 449-455 and Jacques Jomier, Le mahmal et la caravane égyptienne des pèlerins de la Mecque, XIIF-XX' siècles, Cairo, 1953, 219-224. 3 René Tresse, Le pèlerinage syrien aux villes saintes de l'Islam, Paris, 1937, 265. 4 FJ Outry (Jidda) to Ministry, August 12, 1855; de Monbrey (Jidda) to Ministry, October 21, 1856; A + P, 1862, LIX, 48-65 5 M y calculations based on FJ, Pellissier (Jidda) to Ministry, November 10,1864; FJ, Dubreuill (Jidda) to Ministry, March 31, 1868.

67

C O M M E R C I A L HISTORY OF THE HIJAZ VILAYET

Middle East of coffee grown outside the area. In 1883 most of the money paid for coffee went for Javanese coffee; only about one-fourth was from the Yemen. In 1892-1893 about three-fourths of the coffee was from India and the remainder from the Yemen. 1 The decline was clearly because of the fall in Yemeni exports of coffee to Jidda for re-export elsewhere. If one turns from the relative luxury of coffee to the staples of consumption in Arabia, a different picture emerges. The basic commodities of everyday living were cotton goods for clothing, rice and wheat. The rise and fall of prices of these items and their availability vitally affected the lives of all the townspeople and Bedouins of the Hijaz. Table 3: Value of coffee imported at Jidda, 1855-1910 (rounded to the nearest TL 1,000) Year

Amount 155,000 154,000 159,000 121,000 271,000 69,000 116,000 65,000 36,000 14,000 20,000 34,000

1855 1856 1857 1861 1875 1877 1879 1883 1890 1892-1893 1893 1894-1910» a

Averaged for these years.

Table 4: Value of commodities imported at Jidda, 1855-1910 (rounded to the nearest T L 1,000) Year 1855 1861 1864 1875 1876 1877-1878 1885 1890-1891

Cotton Barley 265 272 396 273 303

goods

Rice

119 228 158 209 149 165a

Wheat

Sugar

50 62 13 23

1 Charles Huber, Journal d'un voyage en Arabie (1883-1884), 94, XCVII, 373-380.

125 4 3 27

Paris, 1891, 756; A + P, 1893-

68 1890 1891 1892 1892-1893 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1900 1892-1895* 1894-1910*

OTTOMAN-ARAB

175

96 44

22 12

138 146

68 b 78 b

19 37

10 9

326b-d 65 b 128b

57 41 43 61 82

12 1

112 144 196-199' 173-183t: 175 146 196 211 c

109 130 222

*Averaged for these years Indian rice only; ''also includes wheat ''includes other cereals. a

HISTORY

flour;

includes

all

types of

8 48 cloth;

Cotton goods and d e e were usually the two m a j o r imports. Although a good deal of silk was also imported, most of it seems to have been reexported rather than used locally. Clothing was usually m a d e f r o m cotton. T h e chief food was rice; wheat was less often eaten. Barley was imported almost exclusively by the Ottoman Government, probably to be used f o r the animals in the Ottoman army. Egyptian broad beans (Jul) were imported only in small quantities Because of the gaps in the available data it is not possible to analyze changes in the volume of each commodity imported. If the price per kilo f o r most goods remained roughly steady, the increase in the value of imports in the 1900s is the only really substantial change discernible over time. However, price data are too scanty as yet to allow much room f o r speculation on this point 1 T h e places from which imports came did change somewhat with the passing years, but British and Anglo-Indian dominance of the Jidda market place continued basically unaltered f r o m the 1840s to 1908. In 1864 and 1878 Britain provided 4 6 % of the imports for each year measured by value, while Austria was second with 32 and 30%, and France, a weak third with

* Although these conclusions are based on the value of goods rather than their quantity, it would seem that the prices of at least the two most important commodities, rice and wheat, did not sharply change from year to year. Therefore, it seems plausible that the value of goods does roughly correspond to the amounts consumed rather than sharp changes in prices. However, until the actual amounts of goods are known, the economic data and conclusions drawn from them must remain tentative.

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69

16 and 17%.1 India, in particular, exported to the Hijaz cloth, wheat, rice, some sugar, and coffee. It was cheaper to ship goods England-India-Jidda than to ship them from England directly to Jidda, even in the 1890s long after the opening of the Suez Canal. When a plague or quarantine hit India, as in 1897, Hijazi commerce suffered, especially in cotton goods' imports. India's share of the market can be seen as early as 1855 and 1856 when it and Britain sent nearly all the cotton and silk manufactured cloth imported at Jidda. In 1892-1895, the peak of Indian imports was reached when they were more than one half of all imports. India sent large quantities of dhurah, flour, and rice in those years. 2 From 1894 to 1910, however, India sent only 38% of the average value of imports, or about TL 451,000 per year. The greatest proportions were 45% in 1905, and about 50% in 1907. Thus the relative position of India as an exporter to the Hijaz declined slightly after the middle 1890s but nevertheless remained high. British goods replaced Indian manufactures in some cases, especially piece goods. India did keep, in this later period, on average 30% of the piece good market, over 90% of the rice, and one-half of the wheat and wheat flour imports. Wheat, barley, and rice also came from Egypt and Basra while Egypt supplied most of the Hijaz's sugar. Imported dates came from Basra and Muscat. While India and Great Britain provided most manufactured cloth, some also came from Egypt and the other provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Iran sent the Hijaz tobacco and carpets, while woods, largely used for houses, came from Singapore. Glass was listed for the first time as an import in 1895; it was used for new houses built in the European fashion. 3 Significantly missing from imported commodities were products which could be used for light or heavy manufacturing, agricultural implements, and, except for small quantities from Britain, most types of metal and chemicals. The items imported were intended only for consumption, not manufacturing. One item that was specifically forbidden to be imported was armaments of any sort. It nevertheless seems likely that large numbers of hand guns and rifles were smuggled into the Hijaz,

'pJ, Lucciana (Jidda) to Ministry, July 2, 1879. 2

M y calculations based on A + P, 1895, C, 903-907; 1897, XCIV, 119-123; 1898, XCIX, 209220; 1899, CIII, 99-104; 1903, LXXIX, 14, 76-80; 1906, CXXVIII, 890-895; 1908, CXVII 115-121; 1912-1913, C, 526-530. 3 FJ, Guerry (Jidda) to Ministry, September 1, 1896.

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especially for the Bedouin market. Another missing item from the imports list was drugs. 1 The types of goods imported reflected the economic nature of the Hijaz and its environment and society. Among the most interesting imports in the light of later history was petroleum from the United States and Russia. In 1875, 1,000 4 cwt. barrels worth about TL 9,000 were landed at Jidda. By 1890 and 1891 imports were up to about TL 13,000 to 17,000 mostly from the United States. Kerosene was used in lamps to light houses in the towns. The United States steamship India delivered to Jidda in 1892-1893 about TL 13,200 worth of petroleum. 2 After the petroleum was sold at Jidda, the empty tins were used by the Bedouins. In 1899 only Russian petroluem products were imported. From 1894 to 1910 an average of TL 22,000 worth of petroleum products were imported at Jidda. If one turns from imports to exports, and particularly to those exports that came from the Hijaz, the situation was one of considerable consistency. Exports, as opposed to re-exports, were worth only a very small amount of money; in 1894-1910 they averaged only 3% of imports. Salt, slaves, 3 pearls, coffee and cloth were sent by caravan or ship from Jidda, but in most cases they had been originally purchased elsewhere. The chief Hijazi exports were henna, gum and resinous products, beeswax, shells (including mother-of-pearl) and hides. There were 225 camel loads of henna in the returning Syrian pilgrimage caravan in 1842, and 152 in 1851. By the late nineteenth century mother-of-pearl and shells had become the chief exports. They were worth TL 154,000 in 1876, and 115,000 in 1879. 4 In 1886 there were 300 boats in the Red Sea engaged in securing mother-ofpearl, with a 'harvest' that paid them about TL 24,000-34,000. Most of the mother-of-pearl was taken by the fishers to the Sudan; the one-quarter of the total that came to Jidda was shipped mostly to Trieste. In 1891 mother-ofpearl exports were TL 5,000 lower because of customs rate changes by the Ottoman government. Alter 1902 the mother-of-pearl trade in Jidda was ruined. 5

'My thanks to Professor Donald Lach of the University of Chicago who first brought my attention to the question of drug commerce in the Red Sea. 2 A + P, 1876, LXXVI, 1654-1674; A + P, 1894, LXXXVIII, 485-496. 3 For a more extensive discussion of the slave trade in the Hijaz see 'Muslim-European conflict in the Hijaz: the slave trade controversey, 1840-1895', in Middle Eastern Studies, London, 1980, xvi, 115-26. ^Tresse, Le pèlerinage, 265-266; Huber, Journal, 757. 5

A + P, 1892, LXXXIV, 607-610; A + P, 1887, LXXXII, 679-680.

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71

Animals were exported from the Hijaz, but their export was occasionally stopped by the local authorities who feared shortages of food. The sending abroad of ghee and horses was banned several times. The export of sheep was forbidden in 1884 and at other times afterward, allegedly because of scarcity in the Hijaz, but probably the real reason was the Ottoman desire to stop trade with the Mahdist forces in the Sudan. Grain and cloth as well as sheep were smuggled out by the Zubayd Bedouins and some Jiddawis. 1 From 1894 to 1908 the skins of animals ranged from onethird to one-half of the total value of exports. Specie exports in 1902-1904 were estimated to average about TL 850,000 per year, with at least one half of them going to India. 2 Some bullion was sent to officials of the Istanbul government as bribes but in all likelihood most of the money sent from the Hijaz was used to pay for imports.

SHIPPING Shipping underwent several changes between 1840 and 1908. The most important was the introduction of steamships in large numbers and the decline in the role of sailing vessels. As can be seen in Table 5, the number of steamships rose remarkably after 1869, when the Suez Canal opened. Most of the available tonnage for cargo space came to be in steamships, not in the numerous, usually small, sailing vessels which still called at Jidda. Jidda had been an important ship-building centre for all of the Red Sea area. Jidda was, as well, a home port for shipowners and crews before the advent of foreign owned and operated steamships.

l 2

FO 84/1769 Jago (Jidda) to Salisbury, February 22, 1886. A + P, 1906, CXXVIII, 881 888.

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Table 5: Shipping at Jidda Year

1859 1863-1864 1864 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1881-1882 1883 1884 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 a

Steamers Egyptian 34 35 38 205 220 205 218 241 328 251 263 190 216 269 258 313 240 224 191 170 268 299 334 343 350 319 275

Tons

79 179 188 179 194 213 295 246 398 192 314 332 372 299 253 232 211 354 331 418 473 475 552 492 440

a

U.K. and Indian

Tons

a

steamers

steamers

85 104 101 124 116 132 128 104 75 78 102 97

52 56 58 53 80 116 69 96 67 57 66 54

106 105 128 158 154 198 235 248 268 233 207

93 123 119 142 150 230 87

57 44 8 2 15 9 8 0 0 0 0

In thousands of tons; rounded off to the nearest 1,000 tons.

The Amir Ghalib in the early nineteenth century had sent some of his own ships to India; 250 merchantmen were based on Jidda then. 1 In the 1850s about six ships were built per year at Jidda. They were two-masted, sometimes weighed as much as eighty tons, and were made from Malabar teakwood. Losses caused by the dangerous coral reefs and shifting wind

Burckhardt, Travels in Arabia, 21-22.

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patterns of the Red Sea were frequent; 1 therefore, new construction may have simply replaced older or destroyed vessels. In the 1880s and 1890s Jidda merchants owned ten 600-1,000 ton sailing ships which ventured as far away as Zanzibar, India and Singapore. Smaller ships of fifteen to 100 tons, sambuks, were engaged in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf trade. Between 200 and 400 of these ships operated out of Jidda. In the 1900s there were 210 lighters, sixty-five coasters, and twentyone fishing vessels at Jidda, 2 but new construction at Jidda declined to only two or three sailing ships per year. They were used increasingly only for the transshipment of goods from deep-water ships anchored offshore to the quays at the harbour and for the transport of pilgrims. Another source of employment for the decreasing sailing community of Jidda was pearling. Of a total fleet of 300 pearlers for all of the Red Sea in 1886, a majority belonged to the Banu Zubayd, who were located between Jidda and Yanbu1; about fifty operated out of Jidda. The ships were small, eight to ten tons, with one sail, and crews of five to twelve men, many of whom were slaves. Exhaustion of the pearl beds in the 1890s and 1900s and the custom policies of the Ottoman Government lowered the number of Jidda pearlers to six. Another seventy were scattered along the Hijaz coast, mostly at or near Ràbigh. 3 The first steamship in the Red Sea apparently was the Hugh Lindsay of India which travelled from Bombay to Suez via Aden and possibly Jidda in 1830. In 1837 a regular monthly mail service was established for the same route; this was supplemented in 1845 by a Hongkong-to-Suez line. 4 Steamships had two major advantages over sailing ships in the Red Sea: they could ignore the prevailing wind patterns and could also risk coming close to reefs. On the other hand, they were dependent upon supplies of coal. Before 1835 coal was sent via the Cape of Good Hope to Bombay and thence to Suez and the Red Sea. In 1835 coal was carried from the Mediterranean to Cairo and then by camel to Suez, thereby reducing its

' A + P, 1862, LIX, 48-65. 2

HVS, 277; A + P, 1898, XCIV, 209-220; A + P, 1906, CXXVIII, 881-888. A + P, 1887, LXXXII, 679-680; FO 195/2126 Devey (Jidda) to O'Conor, November 15, 1902. 4 Gavin, Aden, 27; Gordon Waterfield, Sultans o/Aden, London 1968, 18-24, 184. 3

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cost substantially. The Cairo-Suez Railway and the Suez Canal made coal still cheaper. 1 By 1860 there were 472 tons of coal stored in Jidda for steamships. In the 1870s the British merchants Wylde and Beyts, and Oswald were regularly supplying passing merchant and warships with coal from storage depots in Jidda. 2 More steamers registered in Great Britain and British India came to Jidda than from any other country. From 1880 to 1904 the British and Indians had from 40 to 60% of the tonnage per year. Other countries were far behind except for Egypt, the Khedivial service of which provided regular mail, cargo, and passenger service to the Hijaz. Before the Suez Canal was opened, the commerce of Jidda had been oriented largely toward India. The large vessels calling at Jidda were in the India trade or even went beyond India, to the Far East. They were few in number, averaging perhaps twenty per year that flew the British flag. The first French merchantmen to be seen in Jidda since the 1820s docked in 1848. Only one Ottoman-flag vessel was regularly engaged in trading with India in the 1850s. 3 Large vessels, whether steam or sail-powered, had to anchor as much as four miles from the land because of the coral reefs at Jidda. Cargoes were brought ashore by lighters manned by Jiddawis. As the number of steamers increased, they took over such cargo routes as Suakin-Jidda and pilgrim transport for Suez-Jidda from sailing vessels. Steamers began to venture even into the small, dangerous harbours of Lith and Qunfudah in the 1900s. A change appeared with the beginning of regular scheduled stops at Jidda harbour. The first company to do so, owned by the Egyptian Vali (later Khedive), began in 1858. 4 In 1863-1864 the renamed company, the 'Aziziyyah, sent ships twice per month to Jidda. In the Ottoman imperial order issued to establish the Majidiyyah ('Aziziyyah) Steamship Company the right to serve the ports of the Red Sea was specifically granted. In return, the company was obliged to transport grain for the Holy Cities at a reduced rate and government employees, when travelling on business, at

^Jomier, Le mahmal, 148-149. F O 685/1/1 Stanley (Jidda) to Admiralty, January 26, I860; FO 685/1/3 Admiralty to Foreign Office, December 20, 1879; FO 195/1451 Moncrieff to Foreign Office, January 11, 1883. 3 FJ Fresnel (Jidda) to Ministry, March 24, 1849; FJ, de Monbrun (Jidda) to Ministry, March 9,1857. ^FJ, Rousseau (Jidda) to Ministry, June 4, 1860. 2

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one-half of the regular fares. 1 Regular Egyptian service, including carrying the mails, lasted at least until 1904. The Ottoman government subsidized the Austrian Lloyd run from Trieste to Istanbul to Hudaydah, with a stop at Jidda. The Trieste-Jidda monthly trip took eleven days. Austrian ships were also available for taking grain from Basra to the Hijaz when needed. Other regular lines were a Russian-subsidized Odessa to the Persian Gulf service which included Jidda among its stops in the early twentieth century, a Persian company owned partly by the Shah, three Dutch companies including Amsterdam-Far East line in the 1890s. There were few German ships that came to Jidda; in 1900-1905 only two visited the Hijaz. Germany was actively expanding its economic influence and activity in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, but Germans had no commercial importance in the Hijaz at all, nor did they seem to be seeking any. 2 Most cargo and passenger business remained in the hands of such British and Indian lines as the Ocean, Anglo-Arabian, and Gulf Line Steamship Companies. The Ottoman Empire attempted to encourage the expansion and economic success of Ottoman-flag shipping. Whenever possible contracts to transport grain were given to Ottoman ships. The idare-i Mahsusa or Imperial Ottoman Steamship Company operated an Istanbul-Red Sea route by 1887. With the pilgrimage of 1894 the Mahsusa began Jidda to Bombay operations, in direct competition with the British steamers, but apparently this service was suspended in 1896. Though the nominal agent of the Mahsusa in Jidda was Zaynal 'All Rida, the de facto agent was Admiral Sami Pasha of the Ottoman Red Sea fleet, who applied pressure on merchants and pilgrims to use the Mahsusa. 3 The main intervention of the Ottoman authorities in shipping consisted of price fixing, i.e., co-ordination of a 'pool' of pilgrim brokers and shippers who limited competition and allocated customers and markets, and similar activities in connection with land transportation rates for pilgrims in the 1890s and 1900s. The Ottoman Empire maintained several small naval vessesls in the Red Sea to provide security for shipping as well as to transport officials and

'jomier Le mahmal, 149; Recueil de firmans impériaux ottomans addresses aux valis et aux khédives d'Egypte, Cairo: Institut Français d'Archéologie orientale, 1934, 267-268. 2 FO 195/2224 Devey (Jidda) to O'Conor, January 16, 1906. 3 BBA, Meclis-i Vâlâ 22429 Enclosure 13, Safer 17, 1280; FO 685/3/1 Abdur Razzak (Jidda) to India, October 14, 1894; FO 195/1943 Alban (Jidda) to Herbert, June 27, 1896.

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troops. Warships from the British and other European navies also regularly called at Jidda. Nevertheless, piracy along the southern coast of the Hijaz and 'Asir flourished. There were numerous pirate seizures of sailing vessels in the 1890s and 1900s. An example was the loss of $MT 5,000-worth of wheat and rice to Bedouins who captured a ship along the Red Sea coast near Jidda in 1892.1 CONCLUSIONS The level of commerce of the Hijaz was determined primarily by the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, but this was not the sole determinant. The physical and monetary environment set limits to the growth of business and, to a degree, influenced its nature. In particular, the agricultural weakness of the Hijaz meant that large imports of food were necessary for the townspeople, Bedouins, and pilgrims. Commerce was hindered by the slowness and precariousness of transportation and communications. Red Sea shipment of goods was preferred by merchants over transport by land, but the poor harbour of Jidda meant that sea-borne merchandise also faced risks. Since the Hijaz was dependent upon both pilgrims and imports from abroad for its welfare and sustenance, external changes over which local leaders could have little or no influence set the level of economic activity. Little was done by local authorities in the Hijaz to attempt to change this situation; the steady decline in exports from the Hijaz revealed a growing orientation toward foreign imports intended for consumption, not production, and a failure to try to increase local production for export. The rigours of the environment and the prohibition of Christians in the Holy Cities might have enabled the Hijazis to be able to resist the world-wide trend towards European domination of commerce. However, two new factors, the Sue/. Canal and improved steamship technology, contributed to maintain British and Indian economic influence in Jidda. The Canal injured Jidda as an entrepot for the Red Sea, new steamships did not have to coal at Jidda. In addition, trade with India and Europe was such a large proportion of total commerce that those merchants possessing cultural affinities or economic links with foreigners could act as brokers and economic mediators between Ottoman-Arab society and the new, powerful, imperial states. As a consequence, foreigners maintained and increased their control over the most important aspects of Hijazi commerce between 1840 and 1908.

' f O 195/1767 Wood (Jidda) to Foreign Office, May 14, 1892.

MUSLIM-EUROPEAN CONFLICT IN THE HIJAZ: THESLAVETRADECONTROVERSY, 1840-1895

I. MUSLIM ATTITUDES TOWARD CHRISTIAN EUROPEANS The value placed upon the Hijaz by Muslims made religious sentiments stronger there than elsewhere. Yet in the nineteenth century Muslims anywhere in the world considered themselves to be superior to Christians, irrespective of their physical location. Islam, the Muslims felt, gave the accurate version of God's message, as delivered through the Prophet Muhammad, who had lived in Mecca and Madina in the Hijaz. At the same time, Hijazi Muslims after the restoration of Ottoman control from Egypt in 1841 resented and feared the military and economic superiority of Europe. Especially after British rule was firmly established in India, Arab Muslims resented the Christian nations who gave their subjects, such as the Indian Muslims living in the Hijaz, advantages in tariff treatment, access to consuls who protected them from the rapacious local government, and the international security which permitted large scale credit arrangements. This resentment culminated in massacres of Christians by Muslims in Jidda in 1858 and 1895. The 1858 massacre of Christians by Muslims resulted in the bombardment of Jidda by the English, and the eventual public execution of the Muslim Arab ringleaders. However, generally, Muslim dislike of Christians was shown in less violent ways than massacres. Examples would include contempt demonstrated in personal relations, keeping non-Muslims on the coast far from the interior where the Holy Cities were, and such devices as forbidding Christian foreigners after 1867 to own land in the Hijaz. Another example of the personal contempt in which Christians were held is the treatment of prostitutes who had Christians as customers. Before the 1810s a Muslim prostitute who did this would have been killed, as though guilty of adultery. 1

^Maurice Tamisier, Voyage en Arabie (2 vols.; Paris: Desessart, 1840), I, 102-3.

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One of the major factors in maintaining hostility toward Christian Europeans in the Hijaz was the annual renewal of religious sentiment in connection with the pilgrimage ceremonies. Pilgrims naturally tended to be the most pious and also, frequently, the most xenophobic of Muslims. Even though many of the pilgrims came from lands ruled by Europeans, most lacked knowledge of European civilization. The Hijazis themselves, beyond a small elite, were contemptuous toward the Europeans — not only their religion but also their social mores. According to one source, the Muslims thought the Christians to be '... horrible monsters: their pale complexion gives the impression of ... leprosy: they cannot look up to Heaven, and, so, seldom walk with an upright carriage ..., men and women sit shame-lessly together and quaff wine: they are unclean, for they enter rooms with their dirty shoes ... they are of coarse manners, for they laugh loud like hyenas....' 1 There were several issues where Christians impinged so directly upon Muslim sensibilities that they could not be dismissed casually. The first was the question of consular representation. Since the consuls were usually European Christians they, like any other Christians, could not go to Mecca or Madina. The attempt to send Muslim agents there to act for the consuls, with full official standing, was opposed by the Ottoman government of the Hijaz. Protégés of Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands were therefore without consular protection in Mecca and Madina. If they died there, bought real estate, were robbed, or in any other way came into conflict with political authority, European intervention was nearly impossible. A second issue concerned the burial of Christians who died in Jidda. Before 1820 they were buried at sea or in a spot of land separated from the mainland by water, in order to avoid profanation of the land of the Prophet. 2 After the Egyptian conquest of the Hijaz, Christians were given a small graveyard on the mainland. The Christian burial site was enlarged, after much haggling and debate, in 1881. Consumption and sale of intoxicating beverages was a third source of controversy. The Qur'an forbids Muslims to drink such liquids. Taverns run by Muslim or Christian Ottoman subjects in the Hijaz were closed in p e r i o d i c bouts of reform . Taverns managed by European subjects could not 1 C. Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka in the Latler Part of the 19th Century (Leiden: Brill, 1970 reprint), p. 39. 2 J. L. Burckhardt, Travels in Arabia (London: Colburn, 1829), p. 207.

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79

be so easily closed. In 1858 the governor of Jidda took a step designed to secure the same pious goal: he threatened to arrest Muslims he saw drinking in the taverns. In an attempt at co-operating with the local officials, the French Consul secured from the French Ambassador and the Ottoman Foreign Minister a derogation from the Treaty of 1838 so that he could withdraw consular protection from tavern proprietors. In 1863 the English also co-operated with the Ottomans to try to stop the Muslims from what was considered by Muslims to be the abomination of drinking alcohol in the holy land. Several incidents of fighting and assault by drunken Ottoman sailors in 1874 and 1875 indicated that Christian tavern owners were once again selling spirits to Muslims. The consuls exerted pressure on their protégés, who feared the possibility of riots by the enraged Muslims. The same pattern was repeated over the decades: gradually liquor sales increase because of large profits and demand, Muslim public opinion becomes aroused, the consuls insist on measures against the sale of alcohol, and there is a temporary cessation of sales to Muslims before the renewal of the cycle. In all of these issues the underlying cause of disagreement was the Muslim attitude that since the Hijaz was a holy land, customs forbidden by Islam should not be permitted there. The mere presence of Europeans near the Holy Places was also a profanation of the Hijaz, equal, in the popular eye, to vices forbidden by the Qur'an.

II. CHRISTIAN EUROPEANS' ATTITUDES TOWARD MUSLIMS Most of the Europeans who lived in Jidda intensely disliked the town. They suffered from the hot climate, the isolation from Europe, and the smallness of the European community (which ranged from ten to 100). Other problems were created by their inability to go outside the walls of the town, the lack of personal success implied by being posted to a backwater, and the hostility of many of the Muslims. As one European put it in 1876:

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'Unfortunately Jidda is the refuge of all the adventurers, of all the outcasts, of all the ruined. There is here neither police nor surveillance; here we are isolated from everything ... it is like a penitentiary in the desert.'1 The Europeans regarded themselves as being entitled to more than this since they were, they thought, efficient, honest, and the representatives of states with world-wide political and military dominance. The local Muslims, on the other hand, were considered to be backward, exploitative, and fanatical. Some Christian Huropeans were at least partially influenced by a conception of religious superiority. An example was the French medical consul, Dr. Schnepp, who wrote to the French Foreign Ministry from Jidda in 1866 as follows: 'Would the ground of Mekka and Medina then be more profaned by the presence of Christians than is the Holy Land and Jerusalem by the presence of Turkish soldiers'?2 The feeling of superiority by Europeans was, however, usually based on non-religious factors. One was the European belief in alleged Muslim fatalism as opposed to the European concepts of progress and individualism. It was recognized though, that even Europeans might be 'corrupted' by fatalism or '...resignation, that absolute principle of Arab [feeling] which seizes forcibly the spirit of all Europeans called upon to live in the midst of Muslim society'. 3 A second factor was the primacy Europeans gave nationalism over religion. Europe had itself passed through a period when personal identity was religious rather than national; the Ottoman Empire was still in that period. A specific expression of the conflict over religious versus nationalist identity can be seen in the loss of national rights by pilgrims in Mecca. The Ottoman Vali, Safvet Pasha, expressed the Muslim view of the issue when he wrote the English Consul in 1888 as follows: 'All foreigners who are in Mecca the Holy, whatever may be their nationality, and whether they are permanent residents, or stopping there temporarily ... [will be dealt with]

^France, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, (hereaftere F), Djeddah (hereafter FJ), IV, Buez (Jidda) to Ministry, 10 November 1876. 2 FJ, II, Schnepp (Jidda) to Ministry, 18 April 1866. 3 FJ, I, Rousseau (Jidda) to Ministry, 6 July 1859.

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HIJAZ

81

without any [outside] intervention whatever'. 1 The English and French objected to this attitude and also to the lack of absolute sovereign control exercised by the Ottoman state over its own citizens. The government of the Hijaz was regarded as slow to act, inefficient, and incapable of providing security to Muslims or Europeans. The power of its rulers was shown to be weak by frequent incidents of robbery: caravans between the major cities were attacked by nomads. Ottoman control was limited to the towns where military garrisons maintained the Imperial authority. Even there, the Christians were afraid of possible repetitions of anti-Christian massacres. In order to overawe the Muslims of the Hijaz, European warships would visit Jidda frequently. The possibilty of direct annexation by Europe was, however, quite slight. Neither could Europeans reasonably expect rapid Europeanization of the Hijaz. Despite the quixotic observation of one English consul that the townspeople of Jidda had shared in English pleasures, such as cricket, racing, and regattas there was little hope that the Hijaz would change rapidly in the direction the Christian Europeans were imposing on most of the rest of the world in the nineteenth century.

III. SLAVERY AND THE SLAVE TRADE Slavery and the slave trade became one of the major friction points between Arab Muslims and Christian Europeans in the Hijaz during the nineteenth century. Slavery not only had existed in the Middle East since the earliest recorded times, it was considered by most Muslims to be natural, inevitable, and necessary. The Prophet Muhammad had recommended mercy, justice, and charity towards slaves. Enfranchisement was a positive moral act, but the institution of slavery itself was not opposed. It was in Western Europe that sudden changes in attitudes toward slavery resulted from the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and the humanitarian movement of the nineteenth. Subsequently, European powers, particularly Great Britain, sought to abolish the slave trade outside Europe, including the Middle East.

'Great Britain, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Archives (hereafter FO), 195/1610 Safvet to Wood, 2 December 1888.

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In the case of the Hijaz, most slaves were imported after being kidnapped or purchased in Africa and transported across the Red Sea. The most notable instances of brutal treatment took place while the slaves were being captured and taken to the coast. 1 A revealing indication of the attitude toward importing slaves to the Hijaz was that most slaves purchased were children or youths since they were held to be more flexible and healthy. Once the slaves reached Jidda, they were sold to one of three major groups of buyers: pilgrims, native Hijazis, and administrators of the Harams. Pilgrims bought slaves partially as investments. The hope was that the slave could be sold for more than the pilgrim's expenses when he returned home. Hijazis chiefly wanted servants for work in the home, though some slaves were used for manual, artisanal, and agricultural labour. In some cases slaves were used for concubines. It was widely held by European observers that the main reason for domestic slavery in the Hijaz was the Arab freeman's disdain for working with his hands. 2 The overseers of the Harams sought slaves who were eunuchs. Many of the staff of the Harams were eunuchs removed from Istanbul because of their age or as a form of polite exile. Other slave eunuchs were purchased, as in 1852, and as late as 1895, when eunuchs were sent from Africa to Madina for the haram there. 3 The restoration of Ottoman control to the Hijaz in 1841 did not affect the status of slavery in the province. Nor did the Western allies of the Ottomans intervene in Arabia when their influence in the Empire was strong. It was only in 1855 that for the first time the slave trade became a major issue in the Hijaz, but the cause in this instance was pressure by the central Ottoman government, not the European consuls. The perennial rivalry for power between the Valis and the Amirs also contributed to the outbreak of a major incident in Mecca. Vali Kamil Pasha tried to carry out the orders of the central government to stop the importation and sale of slaves while the Amir Abd al-Muttalib, fearing that orders for his deposition

^Richard Burton, Personal narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah, (2 vols.; New York: Dover, 1964), II, 12-13. 2 Allan Fisher and Humphrey Fisher, Slavery and Muslim Society in Africa (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1971-2). pp. 145-7; Antonin Jaussen, Coutumes des Arabes au pays de Moab (Paris: Lecoffre, 1908), pp. 125-6; Zafir al-Qasimi (ed.), Qamus al-Sina' at alShamiyya, (2 vol.; Paris: n.p. I960), II, 480-1; FJ, I, Fresnel (Jidda) to Ministry, 9 March 1840. ^Fisher and Fisher, pp. 171, 188; Bernard Lewis, Race and Colour in Islam (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 85

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were soon to be announced, favoured the popular view that slavery and the slave trade were both permissible and necessary. Abd al-Muttalib linked his own retention in office to the suppression of the anti-slave trade decree; his opponents, the backers of Sharif Muhammad ibn 'Awn, supported the Vali and the Imperial government. 1 The Vali, who was in Jidda, ordered the public reading of the order closing the slave markets and forbidding the importing of slaves. A last cargo of slaves was allowed to land in Jidda on October 29,1855. In Mecca, the ulama forced the Qadi to declare the Imperial ferman void, on the grounds that it was contrary to the shari'a. Widespread rioting broke out. Houses belonging to French and English protégés were looted. The ulama and mob of Mecca demanded the removal of the Qadi and Ottoman soldiers from Mecca, complete freedom for the institution of slavery, and the permanent expulsion of the consuls and all Christians from the Hijaz. While the Vali agreed for the moment to the first demand, he denied the others. In Jidda he reinforced the guards at the consulates. 2 The Meccan ulama did not act in a vacuum. They were secretly supported by the Amir from Taif, and publicly were joined by some sharifs and leaders of Mecca's quarters. Jamal Efendi, the head of the ulama, in addressing the notables of Mecca, called for a jihad against Christians and idolators. The Sharifs Fahd and Baz equated the Ottoman Turks with Christians and Europeans in arguing for rebellion. 3 On 15 or 17 November the appointment of Muhammad ibn 'Awn as the new Amir was announced in Jidda. 4 Abd al-Muttalib refused to accept his deposition from the Amirate and began fighting the Ottoman regular forces. He wrote Beduin chiefs and allegedly asked them 'to rise in the name of Mohamed and the true faith, as the Sultan had become a Christian the same as the Frank....' 5 Thus the slavery controversy openly assumed what had been its basic character from the start: a battle for political power and

1 F. Turquie, Djeddah (hereafter FJP), I, Qutrey (Jidda) to Ministry, 30 June 1855; Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, Tezakir, I 12 (Ankara: Tiirk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1953), p. 101. 2 FO 195/375 Page (Jidda) to Cumberbatch, 13 November 1855; Cevdet Pasha, pp. 117 9; FJP, I, Outrey (Jidda) to Ministry, 4 November 1855. 3 Cevdet Pasha, pp. 103-6, 111-3. 4

Cevdet Pasha, p. 121, says the 17th; FJP, I, Outrey (Jidda) to Ministry, 16 November 1855, says the 15th. 5

FO 195/375 Page (Jidda) to Cumberbatch, 23 November 1855.

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not an ideological or social issue.1 Further evidence of this could be found in the relative peacefulness of opposition to the slave trade ferman in Madina, where the deposition of the Amir was not so immediate a problem. 2 To assure the inhabitants of the Hijaz that slave owning itself was not under attack, the Sheyhülislam wrote a letter to the Qadi of Mecca in which it was argued that the just holding of property (i.e., slaves) was permissible, and that the Ottoman Sultans from the beginning of their dynasty had defended the shari'a. The alliance with England and France, the chief opponents of slavery, was needed in the Crimean War to crush the Russian enemy and therefore, it too, was permitted. 3 Only with the capture of Abd al-Muttalib in 1856 did the Ottomans and Muhammad ibn 'Awn end the rebellion that ostensibly was begun on the slave trade issue. Despite the 1855 incident the slave trade was openly conducted in Jidda, where a 25 per cent customs duty was paid on slaves. The Hadramawt merchants and shippers resident in Jidda continued to play a large role in the slave trade in the Red Sea. They also constituted the core of those who massacred the European community of Jidda in 1858.4 The central Ottoman government repeatedly ordered the Hijaz Vali and his subordinates to end the slave trade. Orders to this effect were sent in 1857, 1859, 1862, and 1865. In 1859 the acting British Vice-Consul, Polat, transmitted the Grand Vizier's letter on the slave trade to the Vali directly. 5 A general decree outlawed the slave trade in 1871. 6 The only change that took place as a result of these orders was that the open landing of slaves at Jidda and their public sale were abandoned in favour of secret landings and private sales. Otherwise the slave trade 'Saleh Muhammad Al-Amr, "The Hijaz under Ottoman rule 1869-1914: the Ottoman Vali, the Sharif of Mecca, and the growth of British influence," (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Leeds, 1974), p. 59. 2 FJP, I, Beillard (Jidda) to Ministry, 7 December 1855. -'Cevdet Pasha, pp. 134-5. 4

William Ochsenwald, "The Jidda Massacre of 1858," Middle Eastern Studies, vol. xiii, no. 3 (October, 1977); FO 195/375 Page (Jidda) to de Redcliffe, 4 August 1856 and 4 June 1857. % 0 685/1/1 Polat (Jidda) to Ambassador at Constantinople, 15 September 1859. 6 FO 881/2583 Confidential Print, "Suppression of the Slave Trade...," //13, //18, //22; FJP, II, Rousseau (Jidda) to Ministry, 6 September 1859; FJ, II, Pellissier (Jidda) to Ministry, 15 September 1864; Grégoire Aristarchi, Législation Ottomane (7 volumes; Constantinople: Nicolaides, 1873-1888), II, 36

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continued much as before. Suakin and Massawa, whether under Hijazi or Egyptian administration, were the Red Sea ports from which slaves were smuggled into the Hijaz. They were landed at fishing villages, marched to Jidda or Mecca, and sold. There were slave sales nearly every morning in Jidda. Ottoman government officials, Indian Muslims, and even Europeans continued to buy personal slaves. Some slaves were exported to Syria by the returning pilgrimage caravans; others provided with false letters of enfranchisement, were transported by ship to Suez and beyond to Istanbul. 1 In the first phase of the slavery controversy, from 1840 to 1877, the European states and the central Ottoman government failed to stop the slave trade or even significantly slow it down. There were a number of reasons for this failure. Perhaps the most important was that the motives which impelled the central government to its position did not act upon the Hijaz with equal weight. The Imperial ferman of 1857 to the Vali of Egypt, Sa'id Pasha, cited humanitarian reasons for stopping the slave trade: slaves died en route to their destination and from the new and different climate there. European pressure on Istanbul was not seen as important in Jidda. Sometimes officials would enforce the Imperial orders, as when Nuri, the Jidda Qaimmaqam, seized 85 slaves coming from Massawa and returned them to Africa in 1865. But more often government officials collaborated with the slave traders. The chief of police of Jidda collected from Maria Theresa (M.T.) 4 to $8 as a fee for the sale of each slave. 2 It was difficult to eradicate an institution that, as seen in 1855, enjoyed the backing both of the masses and the elite. Since the Ottoman government enjoyed only a precarious hold on the Hijaz under the best of circumstances, and could not enforce taxation or conscription there, it is not to be wondered at that it was not capable of stopping the slave trade. The second phase of the slavery dispute in the Hijaz involved a direct confrontation between the slave traders and purchasers on the one hand and the English consuls on the other, with the Valis in the awkward position of intermediaries. A new treaty against slavery in 1877 opened the period, and FO 685/1/1 Stanley (Jidda) to Colquohon, 8 October 1861 and 21 January 1862; René Tresse, Le pèlerinage syrien aux villes saintes de l'Islam (Paris: Chaumette, 1937), p. 267; FJ II, Pellissier (Jidda) to Ministry, 15 September 1864; FO 195/879 Calvert (Jidda) to Bulwèr, 3 November 1864. A Recueil de Firmans Impériaux Ottomans (Cairo: Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire, 1934), No. 854, pp. 268-70; FJ, II, de Sainte Marie (Jidda) to Ministry 10 April 1865; FJ, II, Dubreuill (Jidda) to Ministry, 4 June 1867.

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the anti-consul incident of 1895 closed it. The first part of this second phase, from 1877 to 1883, was one of active consular involvement with only limited success. The second part of this phase, from 1883 to 1895, saw external events in Egypt and the Sudan decrease the slave trade. In 1877 the Egyptian and British governments agreed to ban the slave trade on the high seas. If an Egyptian boat suspected of carrying slaves refused to stop, English ships were free to use force to search it for contraband slaves. However, there was no such agreement with the Ottoman government. As a result, the Anti-Slavery Red Sea patrol was only marginally effective in stopping the slave trade from Africa to Arabia. 1 When a strong, active English Consul in Jidda could secure the cooperation of the Vali effective measures were undertaken. An example occurred in 1879-80. By March, 1879, the connivance of the Qaimmaqam and Majlis of Jidda with the slave traders had become apparent. Slaves were being sold in the town and were publicly and openly moving through the gates guarded by the Qaimmaqam's police. 2 Even a tax of M.T. $2 per slave sold was being collected. The Ottoman gunboat sent to the Red Sea to stop slaving was ineffective. One of its officers bought three slaves. An even greater problem was the refusal of slaves to be manumitted. As Consul Zohrab said, 'It was evident they would not exchange comfort which appeared positive for a future of [free] uncertainty.' 3 In response to the Consulate's appeal the Jidda Majlis voted on 1 May to give the Qaimmaqam full power to stop the slave trade. Faced with complete responsibility, and probably having received new orders from the Vali, the Qaimmaqam suddenly captured and freed 38 slaves, and arrested seven slave dealers. Five of these were eventually exiled. 4 Despite this, over 700 slaves were secretly landed near Jidda between 2 May and 14 May. Public anger at the British and their Ottoman collaborators was also rising. In order to get the 38 freed slaves out of Jidda, the Ottoman garrison took the extreme step of boring a hole in the wall of their barracks which faced the sea, so that the slaves could leave the town directly and would not have to be taken through its streets. If the public saw the freed slaves the ^M Sabry, L'Empire Égyptien sous Ismail et l'Ingérence Anglo Française, 1863-1879 (Paris: Geùthner, 1933), p. 399. F O 84/1544 Zohrab (Jidda) to Salisbury, 24 March 1879 and 1 May 1879. 3 F O 195/1251 Zohrab (Jidda) to Salisbury, 3 May 1879. 4 F O 195/1544 Zohrab (Jidda) to Salisbury, 7 May 1879. 2

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authorities feared a riot would result.1 Four additional companies of troops were sent to Jidda to increase the size of the small force present there. Tension in Jidda was exacerbated even more by the English policy of granting freedom to any slave who set foot on their diplomatic property or vessels. Seventeen slaves gained refuge on H.M.S. Ready in Jidda harbour. Their owners applied to the Qaimmaqam but he was unable to persuade the captain of the Ready to return them. 2 The death of Vali Halit Pasha on 7 June 1879 did not stop the antislavery action. Nashid Pasha, the new Vali, confirmed his predecesors' acts, including the arrest of the Jidda chief of police. As a result, no slaves were landed at Jidda from May 1879 to March 1880. The slave market at Mecca was closed. Consul Zohrab and Halit Pasha had agreed on a plan to provide freedmen with work in the Hijaz if they did not wish to return to Africa. The slave was first registered as freed. He was then hired by private citizens who provided a bond and guaranteed to treat their servants as free and to pay them a monthly salary.-' The harassment of slave traders which had begun in 1877 was increased by the Ottoman anti-slavery convention of 1880. Article III of the Convention called for the Ottoman government '...to insure the freedom of such captured Africans, and to see that they are properly cared for'. Article V established the right of Ottoman and English personnel to search suspected vessels of the other nationality for slaves; however, if slaves were found they were to be turned over to the authorities who had supervision of the carding ship.4 The newly reappointed Amir Abd al-Muttalib did nothing in the early 1880s publicly to oppose Ottoman and English policy on the slave trade, even though he had led the pro-slave trade riots in the middle 1850s. Abd alMuttalib favoured slavery; he was also strongly anti-English and antiChristian. It is possible that his battle for power with Vali Osman Nuri Pasha made him dependent on the favour of the central government and, as a result, willing to accept even its most disagreeable policies. ' f O 195/1251 Zohrab (Jidda) to Layard, 27 June 1879. 2

FO 195/1251 Zohrab (Jidda) to Salisbury, 15 March 1879. FO 84/1571 Zohrab (Jidda) to Salisbury, 13 March 1880; FO 195/1251 Zohrab (Jidda) to Salisbury, 4 June 1879.

3

4

FO 84/1658 Goschen (Constantinople) to Foreign Office, 23 March 1881.

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For whatever reason, from 1881 to 1883, the English Consulate was active in liberating slaves. In the fifteen month period for which statistics exist, the Consulate secured the freedom of about 35 slaves, reconciled slaves and their masters in 20 other cases, and arranged the transfer of a slave to a new owner several times. 1 The liberated slaves had worked in a number of types of jobs: water carriers, door keepers, pearl divers, carriers of heavy goods in the port, personal slaves of Bedouins or townspeople, etc. In some of the instances of reconciliation, the slave returned to his master on condition that he be paid wages for his work. The Qaimmaqam of Jidda assisted the Consulate; in cases of mistreatment of a slave by an owner, the Qaimmaqam would liberate the slave. 2 The result of the activism displayed between 1877 and 1883 by the Consuls and the Indian Navy was not apparently the desired one of abolishing the slave trade between Africa and the Hijaz. However, the number of slaves imported decreased, slaves in the Hijaz were treated better, and the employment of free servants became more widespread. It would be logical to assume but it is impossible to say for sure that the purchase price of slaves increased. Available information about what was a clandestine operation is too scanty to provide reliable data, on changes in the prices of slaves. In the years from 1853 to 1887, in the few years when some prices are known, prices for young boys and girls seem to have been steady, at about L.T. 15, and perhaps L.T. 20 for adults. These prices are based on Jidda and Mecca figures, with almost none from Madina. It is also extremely difficult to evaluate the Ottoman and British success in decreasing the number of slaves imported into the Hijaz. In 1859, for instance, three widely differing estimates of the number of slaves were made; they ranged from 1900 to 3600 to 5000 slaves brought to Jidda in that year. 3 A conservative average figure, based on estimates only for nine years from the period 1859 to 1886, would be 2000 slaves per year. Fluctuations took place in response to demand as well as the supply of

l p O 84/1597 Zohrab (Jidda) to Granville, 15 April 1881 and 1 July 1881; FO 84/1597 Moncrieff (Jidda) to Granville 5 October 1881; FO 84/1642 Moncrieff (Jidda) to Granville, 3 August 1883. 2 FO »4/1642 Moncrieff (Jidda! to Granville, 12 January 1883. 3pO 881/848 Duca Paleologo and Company to Russell, 26 October 1859; FO 685/1/1 Polat (Jidda) to Ambassador at Constantinople, in September 1859; FJP, II, Rousseau (Jidda) to Ministry, 6 September 1859.

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slaves. In October 1884, only 230 slaves were offered for sale in Mecca. The low number was caused by the poverty of the pilgrims that year and the decreasing number of pilgrims who traveled overland and thereby avoided the British anti-slavery naval patrols. Newly captured slaves were brought to the vicinity of Jidda either directly from Africa or via Yemen. After being landed on the coast at fishing villages they were brought to the Hijazi towns in small parties and then sold at public or semi-public auction. Occasionally when a Vali, such as Ali Pasha (1858-62) strongly opposed slavery, the number of slaves imported would sharply decline, but even then the slave markets usually remained open. 1 From 1883 to 1895 the slave trade in the Hijaz entered a new stage. The fighting in the Sudan between the Mahdists and the Egyptian administration cut the roads and drastically reduced the number of slaves sent from the Sudan to Jidda. The English blockade of the Sudanese coast following 1886 also reduced the slave trade. 2 However, Ethiopian slaves captured by the Sudanese Khalifa Abd Allah were sent in numbers to Arabia in 1888. The Vali tried to stop this flood of slaves in 1888. He also learned of the arrangement between the Jidda customs chief and the chief of police splitting a M.T. $2 bribe for every slave sold. The open sale of slaves was forbidden and the slave market closed. The Jidda Qaimmaqam freed 58 newly landed slaves and arrested three slave dealers. A group of notables threatened civil war and the intervention of the Bedouin tribes if the order was not rescinded. Istanbul apparently refused to support the governor. As a result, the order closing the slave market was repealed and the market was reopened. 3 The Ottoman administration in the Hijaz did, however, uphold the legal rights of slaves and those slaves who were manumitted. The murderer of a slave girl was sentenced to 14 years in jail. A slave girl who became FO 195/956 Raby (Jidda), 'Report on the Slave Trade,' to Clarendon, 10 December 1869; FO 685/1/1 Stanley (Jidda) to Colquohun, 21 January 1861 and 27 July 1861; FO 84/1674 Jago (Jidda) to Granville, 21 October 1884. 2

FO 84/1849 Jago (Jidda) to Foreign Office, 9 July 1887; FO 84/1720 Jago (Jidda) to Wyndham, 10 February 1885. 3 FJP, V, Watbled (Jidda) to Ministry, 29 October 1888, 10 December 1888, and 12 April 1889; FO 84/1903 Wood (Jidda) to Salisbury, 27 October 1888.

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pregnant by her master would be freed by a court if an appeal to it was lodged. 1 There was a good deal of freedom of action for many slaves despite their servile status. At the request of the central government slaves were purchased in the Hijaz and sent to Istanbul for the Sultan's and prominent notables' harems. Before boarding ship the slaves would be freed by the Qadi of Jidda. 2 Despite the Imperial purchasing of slaves, in 1889 a new Anglo-Ottoman agreement which once again forbade the slave trade was concluded. The Jidda slave dealers did, as a result, close down their operations, but only to reopen them in a small village near Jidda. By bribes to the head of the police, slaves were passed into Jidda through the Mecca gate. 3 The European consulates in Jidda were involved in two differing problems in regard to the slave trade. First, they faced the problem of the freeing of slaves in Jidda and their futures there; secondly, since the European states dominated the Red Sea, they felt they had a responsibility for stopping the slave trade on it. There were diplomatically awkward possibilities in both problems. In 1883 a eunuch who worked at the Meccan Haram and who had formerly served Sultan Murad V, asked the British Consul for manumission. The latter sent him back to the haram, though the consul was unsure whether the eunuchs there were slaves or free men. 4 An Indian alim, a protégé of the English, had lived many years in Madina. When he came to Jidda in 1883 he brought with him five young slaves. The consul promptly arrested him and sent him to Bombay for trial. 5 In 1891 two runaway domestic slaves took refuge aboard H.M.S. Scout, then in Jidda harbour. Prince Louis Battenberg, the Scout's captain, refused to give up the slaves either to the consul or the Ottoman officials. 6 Slaves were sometimes freed on ships in the Red Sea. The Austrian and British Consuls took four slaves from an Austrian Lloyds steamer to the Jidda Qadi who freed them. Little could be done if they once were sent ' f O 195/1313 Zohrab (Jidda) to Layard, 13 March 1880; FO 195/1375 Zohrab (Jidda) to Granville, 7 March 1881. 2 FO 195/1451 Moncrieff (Jidda) to Wyndham, 23 January 1883; FO 195/1805 Abdur Razzack (Jidda) to Ambassador, 2 December 1893. 3 FO 195/1689 Abdur Razzack (Jidda) to Ambassador, 27 October 1890. 4 F O 195/1451 Moncrieff (Jidda) to Ambassador, 14 May 1883. 5 F O 195/1451 Moncrieff (Jidda) to Constantinople, 6 July 1883. 6 F O 84/2144 Wood (Jidda) to Battenberg, 14 January 1891.

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inland. At least 40 slaves went with the returning hajj caravan to Aleppo and Damascus in 1887.1

IV. CONCLUSIONS Muslims' attitudes toward Europeans in the nineteenth century can be seen in their purest form in the Hijaz. European Christians' perceptions of Muslims there also reflect general, widespread values. Each group regarded itself as superior. Necessarily, therefore, the other was thought to be inferior. Each showed a profound lack of interest in the religious life, the theology, and piety, of the other while expressing a lively concern over political, diplomatic, and military matters involving the opposing community. The slavery issue is the best example of the gap separating Europeans from Ottoman Muslims in the Hijaz. A basic clash in values took place in the 1840-77 period when the Ottoman central government, for reasons of diplomatic expediency, tried to stop the slave trade. Mass resentment in the Hijaz meant that imperial orders could not be carried out. The increased European naval presence in the Red Sea after the opening of the Suez Canal and more active consular intervention in 1877-95 probably resulted in a diminution in the slave trade but did not change people's minds on its validity. The massacre of 1895 and the long Amirate of 'Awn alRafiq (1882-1905) reduced European success in the slavery dispute even further. It is true that tension between Muslims and European Christians on the slavery issue was found outside the Hijaz. Nevertheless in the Hijaz it had a heightened importance because Muslims from around the world came there for the pilgrimage to Mecca and Madina. Such other problems as intervention by European states to guarantee safety for their own subjects and protégés, Muslim resistance to the sale of liquor, and Muslim objections to Christian access to Muslim religious shrines also existed in the Hijaz more acutely than elsewhere.

'FO 84/1849 Jago (Jidda) to Suakin, 28 October 1887; also see FO 195/1689 Brenton to Wood, 9 April 1890 for a similar incident; and FO 195/1583 Dickson (Damascus) to Foreign Office, 26 January 1887.

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The relationships between Muslims and European Christians in the Hijaz were not typical — they rather reflected one end of a spectrum whose other end included the Europeanising, secularising officials and intellectuals of Istanbul, Cairo, and Delhi. Similarly, Europeans in the Hijaz were in a situation different from that which existed in most of the Middle East. In the Hijaz, Europeans were relatively few, unable to travel, politically weak, and lacking in influence. Slavery and the slave trade continued despite European opposition. While most of the Muslim world came increasingly under European Christian rule or influence, the Hijaz remained a Muslim preserve. Pre-existing religious enmity there was reinforced by the political, economic, and social conflicts of the nineteenth century, and, in particular, the slave trade controversy.

THE JIDDA MASSACRE OF 1858

INTRODUCTION The history of the modern Middle East resembles an intricate Persian rug with almost as many patterns discernible as there are observers looking at it. Any given major event may be analysed differently by adherents of the different historiographical schools. Some would claim that Great Power manipulations were the determining factor in history while others opt for political structural changes, technological modernisation, or religious identity. In actuality, while the thread of any one of these factors may be traced through the whole it is necessary to examine all of them and their relationship to each other to reconstruct an event. The violence which broke out in Jidda in 1858 is an example of the interaction between religion, politics, and economic change. The tension that this mixture caused was released by violence but the violence was ultimately powerless to reverse the changes taking place in the 1850s. The Hijaz has been the focal point of Muslim religious feeling throughout the world but it has remained, after the first Hijri century, on the periphery of Islamic political power. Mecca and Madina are the two holiest Muslim cities. Events taking place there reverberated throughout the Muslim world. There existed the strong feeling among Muslims that the Hijaz should be entirely Muslim, i.e., the presence of non-Muslims was a desecration. By extension the geographical restriction which had applied originally only to Mecca and Madina came to embrace the whole Hijaz. Jidda however, was an anomaly since it was the port of Mecca and the major entrepot of commerce in the Red Sea. Christian merchants were tolerated there by order of the Ottoman Sultan, guardian of the two sacred cities since 1517. Despite a massacre of English merchants in 1727, a small foreign community resided in Jidda continuously in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Most of the trade, however, was either in the hands of Muslims, especially Indians, who were subjects of European states or with merchants from the Hadramawt settled in Jidda. The issue of Westernisation was seen in the Hijaz primarily in religious terms. The Muslim subjects of foreign powers provided in the Hijaz the crucial mediating role between East and

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West played elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire by the Greeks and other Ottoman Christians. Foreign consuls were restricted to Jidda. They had no authority whatever beyond the coast. The terribly hot climate, the high death rate, and the low prestige combined to ensure that the position of consul in Jidda would not be widely desired. The Hijaz lived on religion. Every year thousands of pilgrims came to Mecca and Madina in fulfillment of their religious obligation. The transport, housing, feeding and taxing of the pilgrims was the chief and nearly only business of the people and government of the Hijaz. Cairo and Istanbul annually sent gifts, subsidies, and grain to the Hijaz as religious acts of charity. In return protection of the Hijaz conferred upon the Sultan religious prestige and legitimacy, reinforced his claims to the Caliphate, and provided a means of showing his power to representatives of all the Muslims of the world. Local political power in the Hijaz was based on a religious claim. The amirs or sharifs of Mecca were descended from the Prophet Muhammad. While the Ottoman central government could choose the successor to the amirate and even depose a particularly obstreperous amir, the legitimacy of the ruling family was independent of, and in some respects superior to, that of the Ottoman dynasty. After the departure of Egyptian forces in 1841, the valis were responsible for the military and the customs and courts of Jidda. The central government appointed the administrators of the two Harams and judges for Mecca and Madina. All other power seems to have been left to the amir. Since his term of office was longer and his financial resources for bribery of Istanbul officialdom greater the amir tended to dominate the vali. The Hijaz was a distant and poor province. As long as the pilgrims were safe and the prestige of the Sultan maintained, the amir dominated the fluid politics of the Hija/..

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE 1850'S Resentment against Christians increased during the 1850's although it was true that England and France were the allies of the Ottomans against the Russians during the Crimean War. This assistance was seen in the Hijaz

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as on the same level as that rendered by other Ottoman clients such as Tunis and Egypt. The tolerance of Christians in Jidda and their greater status in the eyes of the central government was felt to be a blow to Islam. 1 What was worse was that the Tanzimat officials were themselves trying to europeanise the Empire. In 1855 there were riots in Mecca against the new decrees limiting the importation of slaves for sale. 2 In the 1850's Christians or Muslim protégés played an increased role in Red Sea commerce. Faraj Yusr, an Indian Muslim, was the chief merchant of Jidda and probably the richest person there in the 1850's. He had a capital of between £120,000 and £150,000. At one time associated with the firm of Toma Sava, he later entered business on his own and came to own eight ships. He was the banker of the Hijaz Vilayet and served as the financial transfer agent between the central and local governments. At the same time he was on such good terms with the English that he acted as vice-consul occasionally. 3 The chief European commercial house was Toma Sava and Company. It was a branch of Toma Myrialaki, A. D'Antonio and Company of Cairo which had been trading in the Red Sea for at least twenty years. By 1856 it was estimated that about one-quarter of all Red Sea commerce was in their hands. Toma Sava had branch offices in Mecca, Qusayr, al-Wajh, Yanbu, Suakin, Massawa, and Aden. They discounted notes on their correspondents in Cairo at 5 per cent. Some Hadrami merchants, the Bànâja family, and the Muhtasib of Jidda quarrelled with them in 1856. The muhtasib 'Abdullah led a boycott directed against Toma Sava; it was ended only by the intervention of the local authorities. 4 Toma Sava's profits from operations in Jidda in the fourteen months before the massacre were about £7,780. They had in hand on the day of the rioting property worth

'Great Britain. Foreign Office (F.O.), 195/345 Cole (Jidda) to Hardy, 17 April 1854. Ahmet Cevdet Pasa, Tezâkir, (1-12; Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1953), pn 10152. ^Turkey, Ba§bakanlik Arçivi (B.B.A.), Dahiliye 19768, Maliye to Grand Vizier, 7 Safer 1271/30 Oct. 1854; Richard Burton, Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to El-Medinah and Meccah, (London: Longmans, 1855-56), I, 47; F.O. 195/375 Qaimmaqam of Jidda to Page (Jidda), 4 Nov. 1856; Charles Didier, Séjour chez te Grand-Chérif de la Mekke (ParisHachette, 1857), pp. 160-1. 2

4 F.O. 195/375 Page to de Redclifïe, 13 Jan. 1857; Didier, Séjour, pp. 160-1; F.O. 195/579 Myrialaki to Walne (Cairo), 12 Aug. 1858.

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£56,925.' Another Cairo firm, which was smaller and more typical of European businesses in Jidda, was Messrs. Duca Paleologo, Cochilani and Company whose Jidda branch was established in 1857. They had £7,027 in Jidda when the massacre took place. The salary of their representative in Jidda, Sottiri Moldovano, was £500 per year. The ordinary rate of profit of such establishments in the Red Sea was a 25 per cent return on capital. 2 The extent of foreign commerce in Jidda may also be seen in shipping statistics. In 1855 twenty-four English flag vessels came to Jidda. By 1858 there were twenty-two in Jidda harbor on one day during the pilgrimage and thirty more in the Red Sea en route to Suez. In 1855-7 total exports and imports rose steadily from an estimated £1,046,178 to £1,264,600. 3 In a small town like Jidda, with perhaps only 15,000 4 or fewer people, the resident foreign community was highly noticeable. Several incidents in preceding years had revealed the strength of the tensions between the foreign communities and the people of Jidda. The French consul was attacked in 1851. An Ottoman soldier tried unsuccessfully to murder the acting English vice-consul in 1856. In neither instance was compensation made to the injured party. 5 The British and the Jidda Muslims blamed each other for mutually offensive enterprises. On 15 May 1858 Muslim merchants complained to the Qaimmaqam of Jidda that a shooting had just taken place in a shop selling liquor. The vali ordered all such shops closed. 6 The scandal of liquor sales in the centre of the Muslim world was matched, in Christian eyes, by the flourishing slave trade conducted between the African coast and Jidda. The communal tensions between Ottoman Muslims, foreign Muslims, and Christians were exacerbated by fear of technological change. In 1856 an Egyptian-owned steamship line was chartered to begin regular

Ip.O. 881/848 Brief Analysis of the Claims for Indemnity .... Walne, 7 March 1859. All claims expressed in Maria Theresa dollars have been converted to pounds at the rate of 4.5 toi. 2 F.O. 881/848 Walne, 7 Oct. 1859. 3 F O 195/275 Page to de Redcliffe, 7 May 1856; F.O. 881/848 Pullen to Admiralty, 25 June 1858; F.O. 685/1/1 Stanley (Jidda) to Colquohon, 22 Feb. 1861. ^Didier, Séjour, p. 122. 5

F.O. 195/375 Page to de Redcliffe, 9 June 1856; Adolphe d'Avril, L'Arabie contemporaine avec la description du pèlerinage de la Mecque (Paris: Maillett, 1868), pp. 75-6. 6 F.O. 195/579 Deposition of Nicholas Sabbidi, 30 July 1858.

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operations in the Red Sea. 1 More passengers and freight used the Red Sea route to Egypt and the Mediterranean from India in the 1850's. As the Suez Canal came closer to reality it became clear that the area would witness more and more long-range traffic and a larger European presence. Shipowners, crews, and stevedores from Yemen and the Hadramawt increasingly feared they would lose their jobs. 2 Politically Jidda and all the Hijaz had suffered from considerable instability in the 1850's. From the effective restoration of Ottoman control after the Egyptian evacuation of Mecca in 1841 until 1851 Muhammad b. 'Awn was amir. He was then replaced for four years by 'Abd al-Muttalib b. Ghalib, whose period of rule was marked by the pro-slavery and antiOttoman riot in Mecca. The Sultan restored Muhammad who arrived in Mecca on 17 April 1856.3 Fighting between supporters of the two rivals for the amirate ended only in May, 1856 when 'Abd al-Muttalib was captured and sent to Istanbul. Even when the amir Muhammad's legitimacy was generally accepted his actual power was delegated because of his age and health to his second son, 'All, and to his nephew, 'Abdullah b. Nasir. 4 The amir's eldest son, 'Abdullah, was kept in Istanbul by the Ottoman government as a guarantee of his father's loyalty. The amir Muhammad died on 28 March 1858. His death did not lead to the usual scramble for the succession. Instead, his eldest son was appointed amir and 'All, his brother, became deputy amir pending 'Abdullah's arrival in the Hijaz. This did not take place until 28 October 1858. From April to October the amirate was filled only by an acting amir who necessarily lacked the authority and power inherent in the post. 5 Moreover, the adherents of the former amir 'Abd al-Muttalib were still present and numerous.

Ipor the Imperial ferman establishing the operations see Recueil de firmans impériaux Ottomans (Cairo: Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire, 1934), pp. 267-8. ^Gerald de Gaury, Rulers of Mecca (London: Harrap, 1951), p. 250. ^D'Avril, L'Arabie, p. 74; Ismail Ilakki Uzunçargili, Mekke-i Miikerreme Emirleri (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1972), p. 127; F.O. 195/375 Page to de Redcliffe, 19 April 1856. 4

C . Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka (2 vols.; Hague: Nijhoff, 1888), I, p. 169.

•hjzunçarçili, Mekke, p. 137; Ahmad b. Zaynï Dahlän, Khulâsat al-kalâm fi bayân al-balad al-haräm (Cairo: al-Matba'a al-Khayriyya, 1305), p. 320.

umarä'

98

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The valis of Jidda, who led the other half of the dual SharifialOttoman power structure, had witnessed similar problems in the 1850's. From 1850 to 1858 there were five valis. Lacking knowledge of the unique political circumstances of the country, they no sooner had become familiar with the Hijaz than they were dismissed. Frequently they inherited in the bureaucracy their predecessors' mistakes. When Mehmed Namik Pa§a, a former commander of the army in Syria, arrived in Jidda as the new vali on 20 October 1857 he found that the post of muhtasib had been filled by the vali Mahmud Pa§a. The muhtasib was second in Jidda only to the qaimmaqam. A certain 'Abdullah had held the post up to 1854 when he was dismissed for fraud in government shipping contracts. He supported the Amir 'Abd al-Muttalib in 1855 and was said to have had a hand in the Mecca rioting. The vali Kamil Pa§a exiled him for his alleged plan to lead a massacre of Christians. In October, 1856, the vali Mahmud Pa§a reappointed him as Muhtasib of Jidda. 'Abdullah had close contacts with the Hadrami merchants. He was also the holder of the salt extraction monopoly for the Red Sea region in 1856.'

THE MASSACRE On 15 June 1858 there took place in Jidda a massacre of Europeans and European protégés. The immediate cause was a dispute involving the contested nationality of the Irani, a ship then in Jidda harbour. According to English sources the half owner of the vesel, Sàlih Jawhar, was an AngloIndian subject and the ship was registered as being British and had been flying the British flag. In 1858 Sàlih was called to account for his supervision of the financial interests of his nephews. Fearing adverse action by the acting vice-consul at Jidda, Faraj Yusr, who was a personal enemy, Sàlih claimed he was an Ottoman citizen. He requested and secured the permission of the Ottomans to change the ship's registration to allow it to fly the Ottoman flag. The British flag was lowered and the Ottoman one raised in its place. Now the case went to the qadi of Jidda who ruled in Sàlih's favour although Faraj Yusr argued that the Ottomans had no right to deal with the Irani question. According to British law if someone tried to change the nationality of a British ship in order to escape legal action the

1

F.O. 195/375 Page to de Redcliffe, 27 Oct. 1856 and 16 Jan. 1857.

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ship could be confiscated. Stephen Page, the British vice-consul, then returned from Suez. He and Captain William Pullen of H.M.S. Cyclops, in Jidda for a survey in preparation for a submarine telegraph cable, informed the Pa§a that the Irani had accordingly been seized. The Ottoman flag was lowered and the British flag once again raised. 1 Two Ottoman accounts present a version of the Irani dispute that differs from the consular despatches. According to the vali the ship was originally Ottoman. It was placed under the British flag after first having flown the Ottoman flag. Salih Jawhar was a Jidda merchant and therefore an Ottoman. In granting his request for permission to change registration and to raise the Ottoman flag the vali felt that the qaimmaqam had been perfectly correct. Since Salih was an Ottoman and owned half of the ship it seemed natural to count it as Ottoman. 2 A council of Jidda notables who made a careful investigation of the Irani case came to the same conclusions in their report to the vali, although they conceded that Salih did have foreign travel papers.3 The Ottoman flag, it was alleged, was trampled upon by the English sailors who lowered it and raised the British flag on the Irani on 15 June. 4 The evening of that same day twenty-two people were murdered in Jidda. They included the British vice-consul and the French consul and his wife. Of the twenty-two, seven were French subjects or under French protection, six British, seven Ottomans, one Russian, and one Greek. Three members of the Moscudi family, under British protection, were killed. This merchant family had been represented in Jidda since 1837. Other Christians under European protection managed to escape temporarily only to be killed later. Some swam to the Cyclops in Jidda harbour. A few were sheltered by friendly local inhabitants. Although the house of Faraj Yusr was attacked he and his family escaped harm. They were rescued by his neighbour, 'Abdullah Nasif, the Jidda agent of the amirs of Mecca. Ahmet Aga, the chief of the government storehouses, protected two of the Christians from certain death.

1 F.O. 8 8 1 / 8 4 8 Pullen to Admiralty, 19 and 25 June 1858; F.O. 195/579 Deposition of Nicholas Sabbidi, 3 0 July 1858; F.O. 195/579 Pullen to Governor General of the Hijaz, 15 June 1858.

^B.B.A. Meclis-i Mahsus (M.M.), 532/1 Enclosure 8, Namik Pa§a to the Grand Vizier, 13 Zilkade 1274/25 June 1858. 3B.B.A. 4 Dahlan

M.M. 532/1 Enclosure 9 , 7 Zilkade 1274/19 June 1858.

Khulasa, p. 321.

100

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The bodies of the victims were dragged naked through the streets and then cast into pits. 1 One survivor described his experiences vividly to the British consul at Cairo. Sottiri Moldovano had fainted from fear at the time of the massacre. All the people who had been around him were killed or robbed but he escaped unharmed. He managed to reach the qadi of Jidda. At first the qadi wanted him killed but when Moldovano converted to Islam the qadi protected him. He was then sent through the streets of Jidda to the qaimmaqam's with a guard of soldiers to protect him from the people. Moldovano stayed with the qaimmaqam for four days. When the qadi learned that Moldovano intended to board the Cyclops he accused him of intending apostasy, but Moldovano still managed to reach the ship. 2 Captain Pullen offered on the next morning after the massacre to assist the qaimmaqam in putting down the rioting. Not only was his assistance not accepted but the boats of the Cyclops were fired upon by the crowd as they took off refugees. The Ottoman garrison at Jidda was too small to be of much use either. Only 100 in normal times, some had been withdrawn to Mecca for the pilgrimage, and guards were needed at the gates of Jidda to protect them against the Bedu. The head of the garrison refused to send his men into the streets or to interfere in any way. 3 When the vali heard of the killings he was in Mecca with Sharif 'All b. Muhammad, the deputy to the absent amir, making plans for the pilgrimage. Namik Pa§a's first reaction was to send 120 cavalry to Jidda with a letter threatening punishment to the notables of Jidda if the peace were not immediately restored. A council was held in Mecca by order of the vali to deliberate on the next steps. The assembled notables are said to have suggested mobilising the Bedu tribes, sinking the British ship, and defying the European Powers. This was vehemently opposed by the vali who pointed out that the Christians could attack any of the other cities of Islam as a response; besides, a hundred ships could take the place of the Cyclops.

Ip.O. 195/579 Myrialaki and Co. to Walne, 12 Aug. 1858; de Gaury, Rulers, pp. 250-1; F.O. 881/848 Emerat (Jidda) to Walewski, and Bulwer (Constantinople) to Malmesbury, 27 July 1858; F.O. 881/848 Walne to Malmesbury, 16 March 1859 and enclosures. 2p.O. 195/579 Deposition of S. Moldovano in Paleologo and Co. to Walne, 12 Aug. 1858. 3F.O. 195/579 Pullen to qaimmaqam of Jidda, 16 June 1858; de Gaury, Rulers, pp. 250-1.

THE

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Won over by his arguments the council approved his policy in a report to the Sultan. 1 The vali then left for Jidda with more troops. Arriving close to Jidda on the morning of 18 June he delayed his entry to the town until the next day. According to local rumours he waited in order to receive bribes from Hadrami merchants so that they would not be punished for their part in the massacre. 2 Once inside Jidda, Namik sent fifteen Christians who had been sheltered in the town to the Cyclops. He then turned to re-establishing order in the streets. Finally his attention was given to the stream of messages coming from Captain Pullen and the still unsettled issue of the Irani? Referring to the joint sacrifices so recently made by Ottoman, British, and French forces in the Crimean War, Pullen demanded the vali's help. He wanted to go to the consulates to make a complete investigation of damages. The vali arranged for this but the British deputation was maltreated in the streets. In addition the vali partially exonerated the murderers, saying that it was natural that the townspeople should defend the Ottoman flag from the abuses of the British consul. Namik threatened Pullen that he would leave Jidda and abandon the town to chaos. To avoid this there was a compromise on the Irani. Pending a final decision on its legal status it remained in Jidda harbour under Ottoman control. 4 This victory for the Ottoman side of the dispute may have had a decisive effect in achieving quiet in Jidda. It is even more likely to have had a considerable impact on Pullen, whose personal attitude to the vali would be important later. The Cyclops left Jidda for Suez with many refugees aboard as well as a courier with messages from the vali to Istanbul. After ordering an investigation to be conducted by the qaimmaqam into the whole incident the vali left for Mecca where pilgrimage preparations were underway.

^Dahlän Khuläsa, p. 321. 2

F.O. 195/579 Myrialaki and Co. to Walne, 12 Aug. 1858.

3

B.B.A. M.M. 532/1 Enclosure 8,13 Zilkade 1274/25 June 1858.

•^F.O. 195/579 Pullen to Vali and Vali to Pullen, 21 and 24 June 1858; F.O. 881/848 Pullen to Admiralty, 25 June 1858.

102

O I T O M A N - A R A B HISTORY

THE WESTERN REACTION: BOMBARDMENT The repercussions of the Jidda massacre can be traced in a series of successive despatches between London and Istanbul. By far the most important reaction was the decision by the Earl of Malmesbury, the British foreign secretary, that Pullen 'should be ordered forthwith to repair to Jeddah and obtain summary punishment on the murderers . . . . ' H e was to use force if necessary. 1 The exceedingly slow communications inside the Ottoman Empire meant that the first news of the massacre to reach Istanbul came from the British Ambassador, Bulwer. In response to his news the Ottomans agreed to send an officer to Jidda. 2 A strong statement by Malmesbury was communicated to the Ottomans: the British Navy would 'seize the place [Jidda] if justice is not speedily obtained'. By 26 July Bulwer could assure Malmesbury that the Sultan's emissary had full powers and troops were on the way to the Hijaz. 3 The policy of Anglo-Franco-Ottoman co-operation that Bulwer then recommended was approved by the foreign office and the Ottoman government. However, the admiralty was informed only on 7 August of the new line of action and the co-operation of the Ottomans. In the meantime the energetic Pullen had returned from Suez to Jidda with his orders to secure the execution of the murderers and the instigators of the massacre at all costs. The vali and the acting amir had a conference with him on 22 July. They pointed out to Pullen that although the murderers were known, all death sentences in the Ottoman Empire had to be confirmed by the sultan. Therefore they could not carry out the executions until the arrival of orders from Istanbul. Pullen assumed this to be what he considered typical Ottoman procrastination. He delivered a thirtysix hour ultimatum to the qaimmaqam on the 23rd, and forbade ships to leave Jidda harbour. Two days later he began to bombard Jidda. 4 By the afternoon of the 25th there were at least seven known deaths in Jidda caused by the bombardment. Jiddawis fled to nearby villages, the desert, the mountains, and Mecca. The next day Pullen attacked ships in

'P.O. 881/848Malmesbury to Admiralty, 11 July 1858. 2

F . O . 881/848 Bulwer to Malmesbury, 14 July 1858.

3

F . O . 881/848 Bulwer to Malmesbury, 2 6 July 1858.

4

F . O . 881/848 Pullen to Nannk Pa§a, 25 July 1858; B.B.A. Hariciye 8566 Enclosure 10, Pullen to Qaimmaqam of Jidda 23 July 1858.

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Jidda harbour with shot, shell and rockets. To explain the attacks he issued a proclamation on behalf of the governments of Great Britain and France. In it he promised that as soon as the inhabitants of Jidda had delivered up the assassins to be executed the bombardment would cease; until then the town and ships would continue under fire. 1 The vali explained in a report to the grand vizier that the bombardment was the result of Pullen's rashness, not Ottoman lethargy or reluctance to execute Muslims who had only killed Christians. Investigation of the murders had been delayed because of the pilgrimage. Everyone was in Mecca. The religious, political, and economic highpoint of the year for the Hijaz was the period which in this year fell on 20-24 July. Even though witnesses had been interviewed there was not enough evidence to successfully try the guilty before the Shari'a court. Namik Paga hurried from 'Arafat back to Mecca when Pullen's first letters came to him. He pointed out to Pullen that he would be bombarding the pilgrims, as they returned from Mecca to Jidda, and the ships needed to transport them back to their homes. Despite this plea the British ship had fired over 100 cannon shots into the town of Jidda, the port, and the small neighbouring village of Ruways. Twenty-two ships were also damaged. 2 The Ottoman fort and batteries at Jidda were apparently not hit and in return they did not shoot at the attacking British ship. At length Pullen did consent to a temporary cessation of the bombardment so that the pilgrims could leave Jidda. During this pause Namik arrested those who were accused of the murders. They were tried and found guilty. The ceasefire was prolonged intentionally by the Ottomans who pleaded the necessity for consulting the vali in Mecca. Just as Pullen was impatiently about to resume the bombardment on 5 August, Ismail Pa§a, the Ottoman officer sent from Istanbul, arrived in Jidda. 3 Fifty-one days had elapsed from that of the massacre. The delay in sending someone from Istanbul had seemingly been responsible for the additional deaths and damage suffered in Jidda from the bombardment. In

I r O . 881/848 Henry Calvert (Alexandria) to Green, 8 Aug. 1858; F.O. 881/848 Pullen 'Proclamation' of 26 July 1858. 2

B.B.A. Hariciye 8566 Enclosure 1, Namik Pa§a to Grand Vizier, 27 Zilkade 1274/9 Aug. 1858. ^B.B.A. Hariciye 8566 Enclosure 5, ('Ali b. Muhammad?) to Grand Vizier, 25 Zilhicce 1274/6 Aug. 1858.

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reality, however, the fault did not lie with the Istanbul government itself but rather with the lack of rapid communications from Arabia to Anatolia. The news of the massacre first came to Ismail Pa§a only on 19 July. He left for Alexandria on the 23rd with his orders, authorisation to procure troops from the vali of Egypt, and an agreement for co-operation with the British and French. Ismail left Suez for Jidda with 494 Egyptian troops on 29 July. As soon as he arrived in Jidda Ismail read his instructions from the sultan to the vali and the notables, came to an agreement with Pullen about the site and timing of the executions of the murderers, and thus ended the threat of bombardment. 1 The next day, 6 August, eleven men were publicly executed in the presence of British sailors. Four others were held to be guilty to a lesser degree and therefore not deserving of capital punishment while one of the convicted prisoners had died in prison. Following the executions there was an exchange of salutes to the Ottoman and British flags to indicate the establishment of peaceful relations. On the 7th Pullen left for Suez — but not before sending the vali a note suggesting that the Irani be sent there also. Estimates of losses to the victims of the massacre were to be drawn up by ismail. 2 In the ensuing five months many aspects of the massacre and subsequent bombardment were resolved. While a search for his replacement went on in Istanbul the Sultan ordered the vali Namik Pa§a to improve security. The British Ambassador in Istanbul apologised to the Ottomans for the bombardment of Jidda. 3 He said that Pullen's impetuousity was the cause of the bombardment. If he had been slower to respond to his first set of orders the second set, ordering him to await the Ottoman commissioner and to co-operate with the Ottomans, would have reached him at Suez. The Ottomans accepted the apology reluctantly. 4 Ismail Pa§a left Jidda for Istanbul on 6 September with 36 prisoners. 5 Even the vexatious Irani case

1 B.B.A. Dahiliye 27019 Enclosure 1 , 6 Zilhicce 1274/18 July 1858; B.B.A. Misir Defteri No. 6 8 1 , 8 Zilhicce 1274/20 July 1858.

2 ß B.A. Hariciye 8566 Enclosure 1, and Enclosure 2, Ismail Pa§a to the Grand Vizier, 27 Zilhicce 1274/8 Aug. 1858; F.O. 881/848 Green to Malmesbury, 12 Aug. 1858. 3

Uzunsar§ih, Mekke, p. 137; F 0 . 881/848 Bulwer to Mahmud Pa§a, 7 Sept. 1858.

4

B . B . A . Hariciye 8566 Enclosure 12, Mahmud Pa§a to Ottoman Ambassador in London, 22 Sept. 1858. 5

F.O. 881/848 Cruttenden, Indian Navy, to Pullen, 12 Sept. 1858.

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was finally settled. On 2 November it was towed off to Bombay and an Anglo-Indian court.

COVER-UP AND COMPENSATION There remained, however, two questions which posed almost as many difficulties as the original events of June-August: (1) Had those who were really guilty of the murders been punished? (2) What compensation would be given to the victims of the violence? Three separate investigations were conducted in Jidda by the leading notables and government officials of the town. The report of the first, on 20 June, purported to describe the Irani dispute, the way the riot broke out, and its suppression. A second council began its sessions on the following day. By 15 July it had interviewed eye witnesses to the murders and established the guilt of sixteen individuals. It also began to draw up a list of damage. The third report in early October recounted still more interrogations of Jiddawis and sought to discover the ringleaders of the rioters. There served on all three councils the qaimmaqam of Jidda, Ibrahim Aga: the shari'a judge, 'Abd al-Qadir; the naqib al-sadat, 'Abdullah b. Ahmad Baharun; and the chief merchant of Jidda, 'Abd al-Ghaffar. The leading merchants of Jidda who were on all three councils were 'Umar b. 'Abdullah Ba Darb; Yusuf b. Ahmad Banaja; and Salim 'Ali Sultan. 'Abdullah Nasif served on two of the councils. Others who signed at least one of the reports included Ahmed Aga, director of the government storehouses; Sa'id b. Husayn al-'Amudi, the leader of the Hadramis; and Faraj Yusr. 1 The first two reports resulted in the arrest and conviction of sixteen people, mostly from the lower class of Jidda. They included among others two sailors, two pilots, three artisans, a beadmaker, and a slave. Ottoman eye witnesses and the foreigners who had escaped could agree that these persons were among those guilty. 2 It seemed unlikely, though, that they

*B.B.A. M M . 532/1 Enclosure 9, 7 Zilkade 1274/19 June 1858; B.B.A. Hariciye 8566 Enclosure 11, 2 (?) Zilhicce 1274/14 (?) July 1858. 'Abd al-Ghaffär, Bänäja, and Bä Darb had played a part in beginning the anti-slavery legislation furore in Mecca in 1855. See Cevdet, Tezakir, (1-12), pp. 101-2. 2

B.B.A. Hariciye 8566 Enclosure 5; F.O. 881/848 Calvert (Alexandria) to Green 8 Aug 1858.

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would have undertaken the massacre without approval from higher authority. The rioting was selective; it did not spill over against any of the notables except Faraj Yusr. As early as 25 June Pullen, on the basis of talks with survivors, accused some of Jidda's leading notables of complicity. 1 Their report of 20 June was an elaborate cover-up hiding their own guilt. By late July when Pullen had returned to Jidda with orders to ensure that the murderers would be punished he included among the guilty the name of the muhtasib, the chief merchant, the sharifs agent, and the qadi. The vali indignantly deniedthat they had anything to do with the case. Although he, the vali, did not have first hand evidence since he had been in Mecca, he nevertheless could say that they had all been with the qaimmaqam who could testify to their innocence of Pullen's charges. 'Abdullah Nasif had rescued Faraj Yusr from the mob. 2 They were the leading men of Jidda. The vali thought it impossible that they should be guilty. While Pullen came to agree eventually about Nasifs innocence the others, according to the refugees in Cairo, were guilty of inciting the rioters. Pullen thought that the qaimmaqam's testimony was worthless since he had been one of the chief instigators himself. His testimony on behalf of the others was proof of this. The muhtasib and the chief merchant, for instance, had actually led the attacks against the English and French consulates. 3 Bulwer in Istanbul agreed with Pullen. The British ambassador threatened the Ottomans with breaking off negotiations and allowing naval forces at Jidda to 'terminate affairs' there so as to obtain redress, justice, and a proper evaluation of the indemnity. The only way the Ottomans could avoid this would be to appoint an independent commissioner who would join British and French commissioners in Jidda. Sitting together they could investigate all aspects of the case independently of the Hijaz vilayet administration. 4 The sultan's government agreed and appointed Said Hamdi Pa§a who left immediately for Jidda.

1

F . O . 881/848 Pullen to Admiralty, 25 June 1858.

2

F . 0 . 8 8 1 / 8 4 8 Pullen to Namik Pa§a, 31 July 1858; Namik to Pullen, 2 Aug. 1858.

3

F . 0 . 8 8 1 / 8 4 8 Ayrton in Green to Malmesbury, 29 July 1858.

4

F . O . 881/848 Bulwer to Pisani, 25 Oct. 1858.

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Now a fourth investigation of the massacre was undertaken, with those who had signed the reports of the first three being the chief targets. After a month, 4 December 1858-2 January 1859, the three commissioners concluded that the rising had been planned and not accidental. In the interrogations conducted by the commissioners the Shari'a judge, the naqib al-sadat, and the leader of the Hadramis confessed and then accused the muhtasib who in turn implicated the qaimmaqam. On the day of the massacre, they said, the muhtasib 'Abdullah, acting in the name of the qaimmaqam and with his knowledge, ordered Sa'id al-'Amudi, the leader of the Hadramis, to rouse his compatriots. They were armed and led to the customs area at the port. There a council consisting of the three chiefs and 'Abdullah Baharun, 'Abd al-Ghaffar, Yusuf Banaja, 'Umar Ba Darb, Sa'id Baghlaf, Bakri al-Shami, and Salih Jawhar of the Irani met to discuss the massacre. Even though they all knew what was planned none of those present did anything to stop it happening. Other guilty persons included Hasan Bey, colonel of Artillery, who refused to rescue a European who was killed in front of his barracks; the qadi, 'Abd al-Qadir, who encouraged the killing even of Christians who had converted to Islam; and captain Mustafa Aga, who refused to defend the British consulate. The report called for death for the main instigators, life imprisonment for those present at the council, and five years in prison for the qadi and the two officers. 1 Although the vali was guilty of negligence and slowness in reacting to the massacre, he was only to be removed from his post. It took the threat of a new bombardment of Jidda made by the French commissioner to force the vali to agree to execute the muhtasib and al-'Amudi. On 12 January 1859 the muhtasib and the leader of the Hadramis were publicly executed. The qaimmaqam was removed from office, taken to Istanbul, and sentenced to life imprisonment. He was sent to Cyprus. The others who had been present at the council on 15 June plus the qadi and Sa'id Baghlaf were exiled from Jidda and were to be in prison or under supervision in Istanbul. 2

1 F.O. 881/848 'Report' of 1 Jan. 1859 in Walne (Jidda) to Malmesbury, 2 Jan. 1859; Dahlan, Khulasa, p. 322.

^De Gaury, Rulers, p. 252; B.B.A. M.M. 532/1 Enclosure 1,6 Zilhicce 1275/7 July 1859.

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HISTORY

The second major issue to be determined was that of compensation. It was hard to calculate because the records that were needed had been destroyed during the rioting itself. The Ottoman tactic during the negotiations at Jidda on compensation was one of delay. In April 1859, the whole process was moved to Istanbul. By October the necessary papers had still not arrived there from Jidda. Most of the property of those arrested and convicted of the murders was not seized by the Imperial government. After meticulous examination of initial claims, the British reduced them to about £126,500. An example is the claim advanced by Duca Paleologo and Co. which was lowered from £129,349 to £20,953. French demands for punitive damages were also sharply reduced. The other commissioners rejected, however, Hamdi Pa§a's attempt to introduce the issue of compensation for the Ottoman victims of Pullen's bombardment of Jidda. In 1860 the Ottoman government agreed to pay £T315,360 in settlement of all French and British claims. Disputes about individual claims lingered on for years afterward. 1

CONCLUSIONS The immediate consequences of the massacre of 1858 were spectacularly obvious in the bombardment of Jidda and the subsequent international investigation which led to the punishment of its instigators. However, the long-term political, commercial, and religious results of the massacre were at first glance almost nominal. The consuls were reestablished, with the new English vice-consul Stanley moving into the executed muhtasib's house for good measure. 2 Namik Pa§a was finally replaced in late February or early March, 1859 as vali by Ali Pa§a. In rapid order a new qaimmaqam of Jidda, vilayet treasurer, and qadi of Jidda were appointed. The qaimmaqam's selection had formerly been made by the vali; now it was to be made directly by Istanbul as a guarantee of his increased independence, responsibility, and prestige. This arrangement, however, lasted only two years. The vali was dismissed in 1278/1861-2. He had spent most of his two years in Mecca rather than Jidda. Not only was the qaimmaqam who had been appointed in 1858 ousted in 1861 but the new

' F.O. 195/580 Ayrton to Walne, 23 Sept. 1859; F.O. 195/580 Hamdi Pa§a to Walne, 9 March 1859; F.O. 195/580 Ayrton to Bulwer 2 Jan. 1861. 2

F.O. 681/1/1 Stanley (Jidda) to Foreign Secretary, 28 May 1859.

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vali was authorised to choose his replacement. The instability in the Ottoman bureaucracy was not matched by the amir. The amir 'Abdullah was building the power which would eventually result in a long and relatively peaceful reign; however, in the early 1860s he had only begun to do so. The political situation in the Hijaz resembled that existing before the death of the amir Muhammad in March, 1858.1 The balance between amir and vali was unchanged. The massacre caused little harm to the commerce of Jidda. The total of exports and imports in 1859 was about 25 per cent higher than in 1857. Most shipping continued to be British. Some of the same firms disrupted by 1858 reestablished their agencies in Jidda. Luca Paleologo were there again though in a difficult financial position because of severe competition in the early 1860s.2 Faraj Yusr remained one of the principal merchants of Jidda. His ships regularly sailed under the British flag to Suez, Hudayda, and Musqat. However, in February, 1861, he lost his position as chief banker to the vilayet. The cause was not his pro-British role in 1858 but rather what was considered by Istanbul to be the excessive commissions on money loaned to the vilayet. 3 Steamship service to Jidda continued in the early 1860s but became very irregular because the Majidiyya Company lost money on its Red Sea operations. 4 Foreign commerce and merchants and the new steamboat service seemed to be unaffected by the massacre. Unfortunately it is not yet known whether the small Hadrami shippers and sailors really lost anything. It has been suggested 5 that they started the massacre fearing commercial destruction but if their interests were damaged it was not recorded in available Ottoman or British sources. What would seem to be the most obvious result of the massacre of 1858 was the death, exile, and imprisonment of the notables of Jidda. Even this judicial process which seemed so final in January 1859, was however subject to change. Among the exiles 'Abdullah Baharun, 'Abd al-Ghaffar, ^B.B.A. M.M. 564 Grand Vizier to Sultan, 26 Rahiyiilahir 1275/3 Dec. 1858; F.O. 881/848 Bulwer to Malmesbury, 9 Dec. 1858 and 15 Dec. 1858; F.O. 685/1/1 Stanley to Colquohoun, 8 Jan. 1861; F.O. 195/681 Stanley to Bulwer, 14 Sept. 1861. 2 F.O. 685/1/1 Stanley to Colquohoun, 22 Feb. 1861; Stanley to Judge of H.M. Supreme Consular Court, 2 July 1861; Stanley to Auditors, 6 Jan. 1860. 3

B.B.A. M.M. 736,15 Receb 1276/7 Feb. 1860.

% . 0 . 685/1/1 Stanley to Colquohoun, 18 Sept. 1860. Although Stanley writes in his despatch F.O. 685/1/1 to Colquohoun of 4 Sept. 1861 that the service is ending, in 1862 there was an average of a steamer every three weeks to Suez. 5

D e Gaury, Rulers, p. 250.

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and Yusuf Bânâja died in exile. The qadi 'Abd al-Qâdir, 'Umar Bà Darb, Sa'id Baghlaf, Bakrï al-Shàmï, and Sàlih Jawhar of the Irani dispute eventually returned to the Hijaz. 1 The last three named came to Jidda in 1866 with a vizierial letter ordering them to live in Mecca or Taif. Sàlih Jawhar returned to India. The returned men enjoyed great popularity in Jidda and Mecca. 2 Popular opinion in Mecca had declared the muhtasib and the Shaykh al'Amûdï to be martyrs for the faith when they had been executed in 1859. 3 'Abdullah Bàhârûn was on the Administrative Council of Jidda in 1879. The son of the muhtasib, Muhammad b. 'Abdullah, received a medal from the Ottoman government in 1882. It is in the relationship between Christians and Muslims that the events of 1858 had their greatest impact. The great Indian mutiny was being crushed in early 1858. The risings against Christians and Jews in Damascus and the Lebanon in 1860 were to happen two years later. In all these cases an initial deep religious resentment was intensified by political and economic rivalry between elite Muslim or Druze circles versus foreigners and their protégés. Violence by Muslims was followed by even greater retributive violence by the European Powers. The idea of successful, direct, violent destruction of the European presence was tried out and discredited. With the partial exception of an incident in 1895 there were no similar riots, murders, or large-scale anti-foreign incidents in Jidda after 1858. The memory of the Jidda bombardment was widespread. Charles Doughty found it one of his chief protections in 1877 as he explored the northern Hijaz. 4 Even though with the opening of the Suez Canal the foreign community in Jidda increased they did so in peace. For many Muslims the possibilty of eventual Christian incursions inland and their growing economic strength on the coast remained a source of fear. For Europeans the slightly open door to the Hijaz remained open.

^Dahlän, Khuläsa, p. 323. 2

F.O. 195/879 de Gaspary (Jidda) to de Moustier, 24 Aug. 1866.

3

F.O. 881/848 Walne to Malmesbuiy, 19 Jan. 1859.

4

Charles M. Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta (London: Jonathan Cape, 1936), I, 208 and II, 104, and 520.

IRONIC ORIGINS: ARAB NATIONALISM IN THE HIJAZ, 1882-1914

The most significant expression of early Arab nationalism was the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman empire. Sharif Husayn of Mecca announced the revolt on June 10, 1916. This revolt became the key starting point not only for the independence of the short-lived kingdom founded by Husayn but also for the history of independent Iraq and Syria. The Hashemite kingdom of Jordan continues today as the direct heir of Husayn's action. The Arab Revolt of 1916 that began in the Hijaz (Hejaz) also involved promises of support made by the British to Husayn before June 1916. In these promises, according to the interpretation placed upon them by Arab nationalists, the British made commitments to Husayn that included, among other things, Arab control over Palestine. For all of these reasons, the Arab Revolt of 1916 was vitally important for Arab nationalism. It marked the end point of the beginning phase of Arab nationalist intellectual thought and development, and it was the only concrete result of the secret societies that had planned Arab independence since before World War I began. The revolt also signaled the second phase of Arab nationalism — a phase that involved independent or semiindependent Arab governments struggling to secure full control over their own destinies while at the same time spreading nationalist consciousness to the masses of Arab society. Yet the Arab Revolt was in many ways an ironic beginning for secular Arab nationalism and independence. The revolt was formed by and took place in a province of the Ottoman empire that was not at all nationalistic, and the first leader of the revolt, Sharif Husayn, was a very late recruit to the cause of Arab nationalism. The political, economic, military, and intellectual prerequisites for the emergence of nationalism among the elite were singularly lacking in the Hijaz during the period leading up to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Moreover, in the first declaration outlining the reasons for the revolt, Husayn said that the chief causes were religious rather than nationalistic. Thus, if one considers the initial impetus and place of origin, the Arab Revolt and its leaders developed a more nationalistic overtone only after 1916.

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The Hijaz, 1882-1908. Religion was the dominant force in the intellectual and political life of western Arabia in the nineteenth century. 1 Secularizing reforms had had little impact on the area, and the new ideas of nationalism that had begun to be discussed in Beirut, Damascus, and Cairo by the latter part of the century found few, if any, adherents in the Hijaz. 2 Mecca and Medina in one sense had been peripheral to the Ottoman empire since their inclusion in the state during the sixteenth century. They were far removed from Istanbul and were poor. The Hijaz paid very little in taxes other than import duties and provided no troops to the imperial armed forces. Instead, the Ottomans sent men, money, and food to the area because of the religious importance it held for Muslims throughout the world and because of the prestige provided the Ottoman sultans by the use of the title "servant of the Harams" of Mecca and Medina. The Ottoman Hijaz had little agriculture and few natural resources. Income for both the nomadic tribal majority and the settled minority of the population was largely derived from pilgrims who came to visit the Haram in Mecca and the Prophet Muhammad's tomb in Medina. Governmental power in the Hijaz reflected this close relationship between religion and the economy, for it was shared between the agent of the Ottoman state, the vali, and the amir or prince of Mecca, a descendant of Muhammad, who was selected by the Ottomans but whose family held this position because of its religious prestige. The local balance of power between amir and vali fluctuated according to several factors, including Istanbul's interventions, the personal abilities of the participants, and popular feeling. The amirs of Mecca operated within the Ottoman system and were, to a degree, Ottomanized in language and style of life. Many of the amirs in the nineteenth century had lived part of their lives in the imperial capital. When a new amir took office, he sought chiefly local autonomy, presents and subsidies from Istanbul, and guarantees from external attack. In return, the amir assisted the Ottomans in maintaining order, so as to protect the pilgrims, and he acknowledged the overlordship of the sultan. 3

'For a more detailed discussion of the Ottoman Hijaz (Hejaz) in the nineteenth century, see William Ochsenwald, Religion, Society and the State in Arabia. ^Randall Baker, King Husain and the Kingdom of the Hijaz, p. 33. 3

Ochsenwald, Religion, pp. 3 7.

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While it is extremely difficult to characterize with any certainty the political feelings of the Hijazis, who lived in towns, it would appear that most of them were reasonably happy with the Ottoman-amirate government. Popular goals that were generally achieved included minimal government, the continuation of gifts of grain and money from the Ottoman empire (including Egypt), security against marauders and robbers, and the carrying out of the holy law. There were few expressions of opposition to Ottoman rule by the townspeople. In the 1850s, riots and a massacre took place over the issuance of an imperial antislave trade edict, the deposition of an amir, and a commercial-religious rivalry between foreign Christian merchants in Jidda and Muslim Arab officials and merchants. But after 1859 the Hijaz towns were largely tranquil. On the other hand, nomads were often unhappy with the Ottomans, especially when the imperial forces shortchanged the protection money paid to the tribes as tribute for safe pilgrimage, or when the central government on rare occasions attempted to impose its rule directly in the countryside. This unhappiness usually found only an isolated and limited expression, and was easily assuaged by the amirate or imperial government. Both townspeople and tribesmen wanted the Hijaz to remain semiautonomous. In 1880-1882 the aged and irascible amir, 'Abd alMuttalib ibn Ghalib, faced severe problems that led to his recall; chief among these was the new and active vali, Osman Nuri, a personal favorite of Sultan Abdiilhamid II, who sought to increase the power of the central government and decrease the local autonomy of the amirate. 1 'Abd al-Muttalib's successor, Amir 'Awn al-Rafiq ibn Muhammad (r. 1882-1905), faced two challenges from Istanbul that were designed to decrease Hijazi autonomy. The first was the renewed attempt by the Vali Osman Nuri at direct rule; the second was Sultan Abdtilhamid's pan-Islamic policy that found a concrete expression in the Hijaz Railroad. Resistance by the amir to centralization was not based on nationalism, nor did it lead, at that time, to the development of political and intellectual alternatives to Ottoman rule. Rather, 'Awn al-Rafiq, in the 1880s and again in the 1900s,

'ibid., pp. 178-83; Turkey, Istanbul, Ba§bakanlik Arçivi, Yildiz 31.995.103.88, instructions to the vali-, 31.995.103.88, instructions to the vali and amir; 12.112/3.112.6, instructions to Osman. For a valuable general survey of relations between Istanbul and Mecca, see Butrus Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdiilhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca (1880-1900)," pp. 1-21. A recent Turkish discussion emphasizes the suspicions the sultan had in regard to the Hijaz; see

Ômer Kiirkçuoglu, Osmanli Devleti'ne Kar§i Arap Bagimsizlik Hareketi (1908-1918) [Arab independence movements against the Ottoman state], especially pp. 68-70.

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appealed to Hijazis to oppose centralization on the basis of preserving old local privileges and the special religious and political role of the Hijaz within the Ottoman state. Osman Nuri was dismissed as vali as a result of the amir's actions, and 'Awn al-Rafiq established his own political dominance in the Hijaz. The 1886-1905 period saw a stable rule wherein the amir gained money through pilgrimage and appointments, and then used bribes to the central authorities to stop centralizing measures. 'Awn al-Rafiq could also call upon some of the bedouin tribes to cut the trade and pilgrimage routes, so as to apply pressure upon pilgrims, pilgrimage officials, and merchants. Despite the mishandling of the cholera epidemic of the 1890s, and the frequent insecurity of the routes leading to the coast from the chief inland cities, 'Awn al-Rafiq overcame all opposition and retained imperial favor up to his death in 1905, when his nephew 'Ali ibn 'Abdallah (r. 1905-1908) succeeded him and continued his basic policies. The amirs did nothing to foster Arab nationalism, while the Ottomans, in desultory fashion, attempted to spread Ottoman patriotism through education and literature. Even though the cultural revival of Arabic learning was in full sway in Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt, there were no signs of a similar renaissance in the Hijaz. The professional groups so influential in the spread of nationalistic ideas elsewhere — secularly minded teachers, newspaper writers, army officers — were few in number and often were not ethnically Arabs. 1 Cultural life revolved around religion. Systems of thought and modes of expression were permeated by Islam. Most of the educated elite, and they were few, had attended private schools, where religious subjects predominated, or had studied with tutors; secular fields such as geography, politics, recent history, and economics, which were all possibly conducive to a development of nationalistic ideas, were not taught. Most of the population did not receive any formal education at all. The educational system was fragmented along linguistic lines; many of the private schools were established by the large expatriate non-Arab communities, particularly

'The crucial role of the press in Arab nationalism is stressed in most of the essays contained in Marwan R. Buheiry, ed., Intellectual Life in the Arab East, 1890-1939.

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the Indian Muslims. Only a few of the private tutors and teachers in the Harams were native Hijazis. 1 Government schools enrolled far fewer students than did the private schools, and most of the students in the Ottoman schools were the sons of officials who spoke Turkish as their first language. Most Arabs resisted sending their sons to government schools because the education received there was viewed as preparatory to government and military services, an unpopular career choice. 2 So the new secular subjects taught in Mecca, Medina, and Jidda in the government schools were generally taught in Turkish and to very few Arab students. In contrast, many more government schools were built in Syria and Arab attendance was much higher. Schools there served as vehicles for recruiting the elite into the Ottoman government, and concepts such as nationalism were often encountered, especially in the higher training schools in Istanbul. Authors in the Hijaz were often cosmopolitan and widely traveled, but they usually wrote on religious topics and often in verse in the form of commentaries, not in original works. Many writers had originally come to the Hijaz for religious reasons; very few, if any, were Arab nationalists. Books and newspapers from abroad, such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani alAsadabadi and M u h a m m a d 'Abdu's al- 'Urwaal-wuthqa

and the salafi writings

of 'Abdu and Rashid Rida, were read in western Arabia but only in small numbers. Also, press censorship in the Ottoman empire was strict, and the Ottoman censors were strongly antinationalistic. 3 The only printing press in the Hijaz up to 1908 was owned by the Ottoman government. There were no newspapers published before 1908, but more than thirty books in Arabic were issued. Most of these dealt with religious subjects, and no translations from books originally published in European languages appeared in the Hijaz from the local press.

'For a discussion of education in the Hijaz see Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shamikh, alia'lim fi makka wa al-madina [Education in Mecca and Medina] (Riyadh: n.p., 1973); Ochsenwald, Religion, pp. 74-84; and C. Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19th Century (Leiden: 1970 reprint), pp. 162-69. ^Al-Shamikh, al-Ta'lim, p. 33. •^Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shamikh, The Rise of Modern Prose in Saudi Arabia (Riyadh: King Saud University and University Libraries, 1984), pp. 9-20; and Caesar Farah, "Censorship and Freedom of Expression in Ottoman Syria and Egypt," in pp. 151-94.

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Just as there were apparently no nationally oriented teachers, writers, and newspapermen, there was also an absence of Arab nationalism in the army stationed in the Hijaz. By 1908 most of the government-sanctioned armed forces in the area consisted of regular (nizami) Ottoman soldiers. Since conscription did not exist in the Hijaz, and apparently no Hijazis volunteered for service, there were no Hijazis in the Ottoman army. However, the amirs of Mecca recruited their own armed forces from among tribesmen, sharifs, Meccans, and freed slaves. This small, diverse, and somewhat irregularly trained group was a source of power for the amirs, but it did not provide a training ground for nationalists, such as existed for some of the Arabs from Iraq and Syria who served in the Ottoman armed forces. Politics in the Hijaz, 1908-1914. While the Hijaz was a singularly infertile area for the emergence of nationalism, it did become somewhat more receptive after changes in the empire's central government, which were brought about by the restoration of the constitution in 1908, the overthrow of Sultan Abdiilhamid II in 1909, and the ultimate accession to power of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) during much of the period 19091914. In the Hijaz, the amir, the vali, and the governor of Medina were removed in 1908. The new amir, Sharif Husayn ibn 'Ali (r. as amir 19081916), almost immediately began a long struggle against the local CUP representatives. Husayn strongly opposed the centralizing and secularizing policies of the CUP while it feared his independence and sought to limit or abolish the autonomy of the Hijaz. Upon his arrival in Jidda, Sharif Husayn rebuffed the local CUP leadership, which was composed of ethnic Turks, and began an ultimately successful campaign to persuade Istanbul to remove valis he deemed to be interfering. Between 1908 and 1916 there were six valis, none of whom had the personal authority to best the amir. 1 Despite this conflict with the CUP and the valis, Husayn publicly remained loyal to the Ottoman empire. There were strong interests that bound him to the state. These included his long residence in Istanbul, where he had forged personal links to a number of high officials; the financial aid given him and the province by the Ottomans; Husayn's ambition to extend his influence into nearby areas (an ambition that could best be realized with the help of Ottoman troops); the amir's statement in 1911 that foreign

'Sulayman (Suleiman) Musa. al-Haraka al-'arabiyya [The Arab movement], pp. 49-52.

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117

powers posed a danger to the independence of Islam and the Ottomans could protect the holy places from the threat of their encroachments; and Ottoman assistance in providing security for the land pilgrimage that was crucial to the welfare of Mecca. 1 Husayn's political ideology was a pragmatic and flexible one. He had lived long in Istanbul and identified himself as an imperial official. He was, therefore, an Ottoman, but this was true only as long as the empire encouraged the application of the shari 'a and allowed for Hijazi autonomy. Husayn was not yet a nationalist of any sort — neither Ottoman nor Arab. Even though he generally supported the Ottoman empire at this time, Husayn opposed centralization and especially the Hijaz Railroad. Before he was appointed amir, the tribes of the northern Hijaz had attacked the railroad as it approached the city of Medina in 1908. They managed to stop its extension to its original goal of Mecca, but the ease of transporting troops to Medina from Syria still enabled the Ottoman government to directly administer the city. Medina was made a separate administrative unit directly under the Ottoman ministry of the interior, and Husayn's delegate in the city was deprived of much of his power. 2 Husayn and other Meccans feared that if the railroad was extended to Mecca the Ottoman government would also extend its direct political authority there, as it had done in Medina. In 1913-1914 the vali, Vehib Bey, and the CUP in Istanbul revived the plan of finishing the railroad to Mecca and Jidda. They also wished to bring the Hijaz under the Law of the Vilayets, of March 1913, a step that would have curbed the power of Amir Husayn and the autonomy of the Hijaz. In 1913, Husayn also objected strongly to the imposition of conscription in the Hijaz vilayet. The vali had contingency plans for removing the amir if he continued to oppose centralization. In response to these events, the nomads rose in rebellion, commerce came to a halt, there were riots in Mecca, and the grand vizier of the empire agreed to the amir's request that the extension of the railroad, conscription,

C. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, pp. 14-15, 50; and Musa, al-Haraka, p. 56. When Husayn went to 'Asir to lead the battle to regain that area for the empire, he spoke to the notables of Mecca of his sacrificing himself for "his country [hi/ad], and his nation fwatan], and his sultan" (ibid., pp. 53-55). Country and nation refer to the Ottoman Empire. William Ochsenwald, "Opposition to Political Centralization in South Jordan and the Hijaz, 1900-1914," pp. 303-4; and Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, p. 9.

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and the local implemenfation of the Law of the Vilayets be abandoned. 1 Although in public the central government officially abandoned its centralizing policies for the Hijaz, in private, Talat Pa§a (Talat Bey), the CUP leader and minister of the interior, told a son of the amir that if Husayn continued to oppose the railroad he would be deposed. On the other hand, if he supported the railroad's construction to Mecca, Husayn would receive a number of benefits. 2 While Husayn resisted CUP pressure after 1912, he and his sons began to assiduously cultivate ties with the Arab nationalists of Syria and with the British in Cairo. If the autonomy of Mecca was to come under direct assault, as seemed likely, Husayn hoped to turn to one or the other group for help. He received a good deal of encouragement from the Arab nationalists and, initially at least, polite discouragement from the British. The outbreak of World War I in Europe and Ottoman neutrality in regard to it seemed likely to alter such calculations made before the war. Husayn wrote the sultan asking the empire to stay out of the conflict. 3 When it entered the war on the side of Germany, a new, threatening, and radically different military-political situation was created for the Ottoman state and for the province of the Hijaz. Under the threat of foreign attack or, at the least, an embargo of the food and pilgrims upon which the Hijazis depended for their lives and livelihoods, independence from the Ottoman empire seemed a more desirable course of action than had earlier been the case. Also, the wartime leadership of the empire was now even more insistent on rigid centralized rule over the provinces than before the war began. These dual pressures might well have led to the loss of power for Husayn and his family; with independence, however, freedom for the Hijaz and restoration of the pilgrimage were certain, and the territory beyond the holy places might be brought under the sway of an independent Arab state, led by the

William Ochsenwald, The Hijaz Railroad, pp. 130-1; Musa, al-Haraka, pp. 75-78; Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, p. 17; and Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East, p. 50. T. E. Lawrence, Secret Despatches from Arabia (London: 1939), p. 27, claimed during World War I that the nomads of the Hijaz had been deadly enemies to the Turks for generations; this seems to be an exaggerated view, as is his discussion of the rise of nationalist sentiment in general (see p. 39). 2 Musa, al-Haraka, p. 79; Ochsenwald, The Hijaz Railroad, pp. 131-32. 3 Zeine N. Zeine, Emergence of Arab Nationalism, p. 105 n. 2, on entry into the war. A discussion of the contacts of Husayn with the nationalists and the British falls outside the scope of this paper.

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Hashemites. A separate nation-state, independent of the Ottoman empire, became enormously appealing under these circumstances. Culture and Ideology, 1908-1914. The transformation of the political situation of the Hijaz between 1908 and 1914 was matched by similar changes in its literary climate. New writers, especially in newspaper essays, called for general reforms and changes in society and welcomed Western influence in Arabic literature. Political culture, however, changed little at this time, in part because public critics of the Ottoman empire, such as Ibrahim ibn Hasan al-Uskubi (1847-1913), got into serious trouble with the imperial government as a result of expressing their views. Nationalism did not spread to significant numbers of the population, while those who wanted independence for the Hijaz were, for the most part, impractical foreigners who envisaged Mecca as the seat of an independent caliphate rather than the capital of an Arab nationalist state. Hijazi journalism really began after the revolution of 1908 in Istanbul. The first newspaper to appear was the official al-Hijaz in 1908; this was an organ of the vilayet administration. Al-Hijaz followed the policy line of the central government by calling for the unity of Arabs and Turks inside a reformed and reinvigorated Ottoman empire. The short-lived Meccan Shams al-Haqiqa in 1909 used as its motto "love of country [alwatan] is part of faith"; it was owned and managed by ethnic Turks who were sympathetic to the CUP. Sharif Husayn secured its closing.1 Al-Islah al-Hijazi of Jidda was a more influential journal. It was owned by a Syrian, Raghib Mustafa Tawakkul, and edited by a Lebanese, Adib Daud Hariri, and was dedicated to "service to the umma." Sharif Husayn supported the paper financially. Although it only lasted a few months, its articles, drawn in part from the Egyptian press, were controversial. It advocated purging the country of despots and the development of progress in the Ottoman empire. The other three newspapers published in the Hijaz province were too ephemeral or unimportant to merit discussion. Ultimately, the amir secured control over the press of the Hijaz by allowing the papers to die a natural death because of a lack of readership, by gaining approval from Istanbul for their suppression, and by influencing the vilayet administration in regard to the official newspaper. Despite this

^Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shamikh, al-Sihafa fi al-Hijaz 1908-1941 [The press in the Hijaz, 1908-1941], pp. 27-31, 38, 42.

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situation, there were in the schools and in private life individuals who were familiarizing themselves with the new thoughts coming from Syria and Egypt; in the 1930s and 1940s they would create a new intellectual and literary climate in western Arabia. 1 In education there were some reforms designed to improve the quality and quantity of students, but apparently little was done to substantially change education between 1908 and 1914, in part because the time period was so short. Official government schools increased in number in the towns. In the curricula by 1909 there was an emphasis on courses that might very well have inculcated both an awareness of the existence of national states elsewhere and Ottoman, though not Arab, loyalty. Courses included European and Ottoman geography, foreign languages such as French, and Ottoman history. The Meccan CUP even established a school of its own in 1910 with about fifty students for the purpose of promoting Ottomanism. In the government schools, including the new normal institute in Medina, students did study Arabic, and the languages of instruction were Turkish and Arabic. Still, popular opinion continued to identify these schools with serving in the Ottoman armed forces and in the government bureaucracy, and, as a result, their enrollments remained lower than those of the private schools. 2 The premier schools in the province were those of the haramayn (mosques of Mecca and Medina). The government reform decree of December 1913 was intended to regulate and regularize the organization of teaching in the Meccan Haram, where the language of instruction was Arabic. Lessons were to include logic, history, and mathematics, but religion naturally continued to dominate. 3 New private schools outside the harams began to open after 1908, and some new curricula were introduced as well. In Mecca in 1908 the Khayriyya religious school opened; by 1910 it had enrolled around three hundred students. The al-Falah school of Mecca began in 1912, and its curriculum included, significantly, the geography of the Arabian peninsula,

Al-Shamikh, al-Sihafa, pp. 45, 82; al-Shamikh, Rise of Modern Prose, p. 18; and 'Abdallah al-Jabbar, al-Tayyarat al adubiyya al-hadithafiqalb al-jazirat al-'arabiyya [Modern literary currents in the heart of the Arabian peninsula], pp. 136-41. I wish to thank Professor Ahmed Tarabein for drawing my attention to al-Jabbar's work. 2 A1-Shamikh, al Talim, pp. 3 1 - 3 4 , 7 5 , 8 1 - 8 2 . 3

Ibid., pp. 14-17.

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121

intended especially for Hijazi students. Many of al-Falah's students were the children of non-Arabic-speaking foreign residents. The al-Sawlatiyya school reformed its curriculum along Indian lines in 1913. 1 While these changes were transpiring in the Hijaz, some non-Hijazi Muslims living outside the Arabian peninsula began to think of an independent Hijaz. Even before 1908, rumors of plots in or about Mecca began to surface. In 1879, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri was said to be interested in establishing an Arab kingdom that would include Mecca and Medina. In 1883, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani al-Asadabadi erroneously suggested that Great Britain wanted to establish an Arabian caliphate based at Mecca. Some of these speculations were ultimately derived from British sources. 2 An elective Arab caliphate drawn from among the sharifs of Mecca was envisaged by 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi in 1900. In his fictional account of a congress held in Mecca to promote this goal, al-Kawakibi discussed Mecca as the capital of a new state and the center of an effort to revitalize and reform Islam. In 1905, Najib 'Azuri speculated about a separate Hijazi state with an Arab caliph as its sovereign. Mirza 'Ali Aqa Shirazi, a Persian writer who was a resident of Mecca in 1908-1909, published one issue of a newspaper there, in which he called for an assembly of Muslims to meet in Mecca to address religious reform. 3 These rumors and speculations found very little resonance in the Hijaz. Most Hijazis, in all probability, did not even know of them. And when in nearby areas circumstances created uprisings against Ottoman authority or political upheavals that might have been presumed to have a nationalistic tinge, there was almost no support or sympathy displayed in the Hijaz. This was the case for the 'Urabi events in Egypt in 1882, the Mahdiyya in the Sudan throughout the 1880s and 1890s, and the revolts in Yemen and 'Asir in 1902 -1905. 4

'ibid., pp. 42^44,50,57. 1 Zeine, Emergence of Arab Nationalism, p. 56 n. 23 (and see p. 59 n. 30); and Martin Kramer, Islam Assembled, pp. 10-18. Q J OchsenwaId, Religion, p. 201; Kramer, Islam Assembled, pp. 40-4\, 48-49; and Zeine, Emergence of Arab Nationalism, pp. 66-67. ^Ochsenwald, Religion, pp. 202-4.

122

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HISTORY

The reasons for the near absence of Arab nationalism in the Hijaz were numerous. Most important among them was the strength of religious identity and interests among the people and elites of the Hijaz. It was precisely religion that made the province important to the Ottomans, the British, and, in general, the outside world. The enthusiastic reception given by the Ottomans to the Prophet Muhammad's banner that was sent from Medina to Damascus and Jerusalem in December 1914 was an indication of this, as was the constant pressure from the imperial government upon the amir for his joining in the declaration of holy war {jihad) against the enemies of the empire during World War I. Great Britain sought an alliance with Husayn primarily for the same reason — to gain his religious prestige — as well as for the strategic location of the Hijaz and the amir's potential leadership of a general Arab insurrection in the other Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire. Within the Hijaz religion dominated most aspects of public life, and the power and prestige of the amirs rested upon a religious foundation.1 Secular nationalism was weak in the Hijaz because the sort of people who were nationalists elsewhere were largely missing from this region. There were few, if any, Arab nationalists among the resident teachers and journalists, while external nationalistic writings had veiy little appeal in Mecca, Medina, and Jidda. Because there was no conscription and Hijazis did not wish to volunteer there were probably no Hijazis in the Ottoman regular armedforces. Feuding factions among the ruling elite, and younger members of the ruling elite who sought to displace their elders, were recruits to nationalism elsewhere.2 In the Hijaz, the younger members of the amir's family were becoming nationalists in the 1910s, but there seem to have been few other Hijazis who felt as they did. One reason for this was the extraordinary ethnic and social diversity of the Muslim communities in the chief towns. Muslims from all parts of the world came to the Hijaz on pilgrimage, to study in the harams, and to conduct business. Many stayed, and large resident communities of Javanese, Indians, Malays, Algerians, Egyptians,

^George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, pp. 140, 147^18; and C. Snouck Hurgronje, The Revolt in Arabia (New York: 1917), pp. 5, 7. ^Philip S. Khoury, Urban Notables', and Rashid Khalidi, "Social Factors in the Rise of the Arab Movement in Syria," pp. 54,57.

ARAB

NATIONALISM

IN

THE

HIJAZ

123

and so on, came into existence. Insofar as there was a common identity among these peoples, it was based on religion, not on Arab ethnicity. Arab nationalism also spread among merchants, landowners, and bureaucrats in other places as a result of European encroachments or as a means by which an indigenous Christian minority might bridge the gap between themselves and fellow Arabs who were Muslims. In the Hijaz after 1858 there was little direct European encroachment, and because known Christians were not permitted to visit the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, there was no Christian European group in these towns. Similarly, nearly the entire population of the province was Muslim, so there was no large Ottoman Christian minority to become nationalist. Nationalism itself was a relatively new set of ideas and values in the Middle East in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Its terms, meaning, and implications were amorphous and were poorly understood even by those who sought decentralization or independence. In the Hijaz, localistic patriotism identified with a specific, usually small, territory, and group identity based on Sunni Islam certainly existed. The perception of a large number of people that "they belong to a community that is entitled to and capable of maintaining independent statehood and who grant that community ... primary terminal loyalty" 1 was clearly missing, unless it might take the form of loyalty to the universal Islamic umma. Despite the weakness of nationalism in the Hijaz, the Arab Revolt that began there in 1916 did succeed. The townspeople of Mecca and Jidda supported Sharif Husayn, and he received substantial backing from many of the nomads. The leaders of the towns and the tribes were strongly in favor of keeping the privileges of the Hijaz, including its exemption from conscription and many forms of taxes. They opposed the centralizing and secularizing policies of the CUP, as seen in the drive to extend the Hijaz Railroad to Mecca and Jidda, just as their predecessors had opposed similar attempts at changes during the Tanzimat and Hamidian periods. Sharif Husayn and his sons demonstrated considerable skill in leading the Hijazis toward independence; their personal abilities, prestige, rank, and courage Richard Cottam, "Nationalism in Aijomand, ed., From Nationalism Emergence of the Modern Middle West, pp. 105-9; William Haddad, p. 19; and Michael Hudson, Arab pp. 34-35.

the Middle East: A Behavioural Approach," in Said Amir to Revolutionary Islam, p. 29. Also see Albert Hourani, East, p. 186; Hisham Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and the "Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire," pp. 3-24, especially Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: 1977),

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HISTORY

were major ingredients in bringing about the success of the revolt. Also, the disasters that befell the Ottoman empire in the Balkans and North Africa before 1914, and the naval power of the British in the Red Sea during World War I, indicated that the Hijaz could no longer be protected by the Ottoman state, and that the leadership of that state was quite prepared to sacrifice the fragile economy of the Hijaz in its illusory pursuit of victory in the war. By 1916 the Hijazis faced an inescapable choice between economic destruction and possible foreign occupation, or independence and relative economic well-being under the leadership of the amir. 1 As a result, most Hijazis, despite the uncertainty about the outcome of the war, cooperated with Sharif Husayn when he announced the Arab Revolt. And Arab national independence began in the nonnationalistic Hijaz.

^Hourani, Emergence of the Modern Middle East, p. 203; Hurgronje, Revolt in Arabia, pp. 36-38; Gerald de Gaury, Rulers of Mecca (London: 1951), p. 264; Zayn Nur al-Din Zayn, "Asbab al-thawra al-'arabiyya al-kubra," in Dirasat fi al-thawra al-'arabiyya al-kubra [Studies on the great Arab revolt] (Amman: n.d.), pp. 39, 55; and Khayriyyah Qasimiyyah, al-Hukuma al-'arabiyya fi Dìmashq bayna 1918-1920 [The Arab government in Damascus between 1918 and 1920], pp. 24-25.

THE VILAYET OF SYRIA, 1901-1914: AREEXAMINATION OF DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS AS SOURCES

Diplomatic correspondence has generally served as the basis of research in the political history of the modern Middle East. The interpretation of analysis of a given society has been presented from the point of view of foreigners writing about a small administrative élite in terms of its success in achieving the goals of traditional government — tax collection, conscription, and the maintenance of a minimal degree of public security. Recently regional historians have begun to broaden the scope of their investigations to include such diverse subjects as economic development, social structure and value formation. In addition to the Imperial Ottoman and Egyptian national archives which are just beginning to be used extensively, diplomatic documents from Western European archives are being sifted to discover how valuable they may be to those who seek to go beneath the surface of political history. The most widely quoted source for British documents dealing with the Ottoman Empire in the period immediately before the war 1 contains extracts from the British Ambassador's Annual Report and his usually short letters to the Foreign Office — both types of document centering on political developments in Constantinople. The Embassy's "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey" 2 is more informative on administrative changes and popular enthusiasm but concentrates on the non-Arab provinces. Secondary sources rely heavily on the work of a small group of Arab nationalists, frequently in exile and often alienated from Ottoman administration. 3 Even in the study of formal political events little work has yet been done in the investigation of the administration of the Arab provinces.

l Gooch, G. P. and Temperley, Harold (Eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. V: The Near East 1903-9 (London, 1928); Vol. X: Part I: The Near and Middle East on the Eve of the War (London, 1936). 2 Cd. 4529, printed in Great Britain, State Papers 1909, Vol. CV. ^Even Zeine N. Zeine, in his ground-breaking Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut, 1958), which explicitly attempts to correct this point of view, supplies little about the local conditions of the Arab provinces immediately preceding the War.

126

O ITOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

The British consular reports from Damascus to Constantinople in the years 1900 to 1914 suggest that a thorough-going review of diplomatic records may be productive of new data concerning conditions in Syria and, by implication, in other Arab parts of the Empire. On the formal political level the chief concern of Ottoman government seems to have been the maintenance of public order which was widely threatened by quarrels and raids by the Druzes and the Bedouin. Following the Revolution of 1908 the spread of taxation, elections and conscription to areas already undergoing economic change caused by the construction of new railroads provoked large revolts, particularly among the Druzes and the Hauran. Other types of data could serve as illustrations of the practical impact of modernization upon a traditional society. The reports for 1901 included complaints that not enough gum was placed on the new postage stamps, comments on the increased use of the Hijaz Railroad by pilgrims, descriptions of labor unrest and the lessening of exports to Egypt of textiles caused by competition from China and England. Following the 1908 Revolution in Constantinople there emerged in the city of Damascus the political liberalization which can also be seen in the Imperial capital: newspapers engaged more freely in criticism of the government; political clubs were formed; previously suppressed or perhaps unfelt anti-Turkish sentiment became clear, especially in resentment against the non-Arabic speaking members of the judiciary. An example of the type of information which has been largely ignored and yet is revealing of the cleavages between reformers and traditionalists is contained in the October 1908, Quarterly Report. In a debate between the members of the Damascus branch of the Committee of Union and Progress and the 'ulama' over what type of clothes women should wear the CUP suggested that clothing should be left to the individual while the 'ulama' proposed mandatory "simple and enveloping" clothes. Only after the threat of military force did the CUP carry the day. The above anecdote reveals some of the problems which should be considered when dealing with the Damascus consular reports. They tend to be spotty, seldom following up one development over a period of time. Thus, although agriculture is mentioned frequently, prices of cereals are only

T H E V I L A Y E T OF S Y R I A ,

1 9 0 1 -1 9 1 4

127

sporadically included. 1 The sources of information available to the Consul may have been limited by language barriers, e.g. Consul Devey did not speak Arabic. 2 Since the reports deal largely with the city of Damascus, there is little discussion of such questions as the impact of the Revolution of 1908 on the other towns in the Vilayet. The reports are also overly concerned with administrative changes of personnel and the problem of corruption. Use of the consular reports has been hindered by the lack of any guide to their content. The following pages are intended to be an illustration of the types of information that can be gathered from them and an incentive for others to undertake a similar review of these records. The terms used in the column on the left serve a triple function: they test the desirability of using a preconceived list of political, social and economic categories in analysis of new documents, and generally proved sufficiently flexible that they might be suggested as a basis for categorization in a larger project; they are intended to show at a glance what any given precis deals with; they could easily be converted into a page index of the entire microfilm file of documents. The relative value of subject categories, a short precis, and simple title sentences as used by the Consuls and repeated in the last selections can be seen; the preferable combination would seem to be a precis providing relatively detailed information made readily usable by a subject index. This analysis of the Quarterly Reports from January 1901 to July 1914, does not include the following Reports which were missing from the microfilm roll made available by the Public Record Office from F. O. 618 No. 3: July and October, 1901; April, July and October, 1907; page 6 of January, 1909; October, 1911. It should also be noted that the January 1912 Report is incorrectly dated as January 1911. The outbreak of the ItaloOttoman War, which is discussed in the Report took place in September 1911; therefore the Report couid not have been written in January 1911. There are numerous cases of pages which have been misnumbered and must therefore be read out of their numerical order.

For more specific information on the Syrian economy at the end of the period see E. Weakley, "Report on the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in Syria," Great Britain. State Papers 1911, Vol. LXXXVII, reprinted in part in Charles Issawi (ed.), The Economic History of the Middle East 1800-1914 (Chicago, 1966). 2 Sir Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London, 1937), p. 71.

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HISTORY

Generally, those documents sent to Constantinople between Reports are discussed in the next Quarterly Report. To avoid repetition, only a sampling of these documents is given. Both pagination and spelling have been taken from the original documents. Quarterly Reports are all dated from Damascus. They were sent by the following: Consuls Richards (1901-1905) and Devey (1907-1914); Acting Consuls Monahan (1902-1903), Meshaka (1905-1906 and 1913), Edmonds (1906), and Young (1910).

p. 1 LAND CONTROL DRUZES FOREIGN COMMERCE RAILROADS

1901 January 7 A Druze and Muslim mixed commission settles a village border dispute. The competition of carts caused the Damascus-Beirut Railroad to lower its rates.

Telegraph lines to Medina are nearly complete. Grain crops partially fail. Cotton textiles are exported to Egypt and the Ottoman Empire chiefly. Artisan goods are deteriorating in quality. April 6 p. 6 Circassians are being settled in and near CIRCASSIANS Amman. URBAN GOVERNMENT Damascus municipal funds are being PUBLIC HEALTH spent TRANSPORTATION chiefly on a new hospital, the new government house, restoration work on POSTAL SERVICES the TAXATION, EFFECTIVENESS Great Mosque, and not on the city roads. Not enough gum is put on the new AGRICULTURE Imperial postage stamps. New sheep tax is not being collected since the assessors are being bribed to underrate the number of sheep. AGRICULTURE HANDICRAFT PRODUCTION

T H E V I L A Y E T OF S Y R I A ,

p. 10 TRANSPORTATION TAXATION AGRICULTURE, GOVERNMENT SUPPORT O F AGRICULTURE, PALESTINE

p. 19 ARTISANS, STRIKES AGRICULTURE TAXATION, RELIGIOUS MILITARY RAILROADS

p. 49 APPOINTMENTS ARTISANS, STRIKES TRANSPORTATION, RAILROADS

1901-1914

129

1902 January8 Hijaz Railroad is being built very slowly. In order to finance it, there is a 10% cut in all official salaries over 500 piasters. Damascus-BeirutRailroadrevenuesare increasing. The Vali has been ordered by an Imperial Irade to help those threatened by mulberry tree disease, chiefly in the Bekaa district. Palestinian olive crop fails; number of sheep and goats decline becaue of drought. April 5 Strike of silk workers and weavers who refuse to accept wage cuts caused by a decline in the silk trade. Fruit trees are ruined by coldness. There is a sudden campaign to obtain arrears in taxes which were due; especially for arrears in payments by the religious communities for exemption from military conscription. Discussion of progress in the construction of the Hijaz Railroad. July 10 New Defterdarand Chief Qadi. Striking silk workers, about 2,0003,000, go back to work and accept a 20% wage reduction. Discussion of plans for a projected railroad to Haifa and Egypt.

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OTTOMAN-ARAB

p. 83 DRUZES, SECURITY FÖRCHS MILITARY, PAY TRANSFORMATION RAILROADS

p. 1 DRUZES TAXATION, EFFECTIVENESS CHRISTIANS PUBLIC HEALTH MILITARY, PAY RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, ATTITUDETOWARD

p. 17 PUBLIC HEALTH, FOREIGN COMMERCE

HISTORY

October 8 Druze quarrels are settled by the arbitration of one of the Atrash sheikhs backed by two battalions of Ottoman infantry. Hijaz Railroad soldiers haven't been paid for five months. Despite decrease in rates on goods shipped on the Damascus-Beirut Railroad, there is no considerable increase in traffic or receipts. 1903 JanuarylO Policy by the Vali is conciliation with the Druzes. Vilayet Ministry of Finance estimates only one-half of all taxes are paid. Christians, especially those in the Bekaa, are leaving via Beirut with the encouragementof local shipping companies. There is heavy incidence of cholera in Damascus. Troops in Syrian Vilayet petition the Sultan over the telegraph for their back: pay; they eventually do get some of it. The Vali is accused of being proGerman. April 6 Quarantine in Lebanon which stops all goods from transit to Damascus by railroad. Cholera

T H E V I L A Y E T OF S Y R I A , TOURISTS GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH, HIERARCHY

p. 24 PUBLIC HEALTH RAILROADS, TYPE OF WORKERS p. 33 DRUZES, TAXATION PUBLIC HEALTH AGRICULTURE

p.l APPOINTMENTS PUBLIC HEALTH MILITARY, HOUSING FOREIGN INVESTMENT, MINING RAILROADS p. 10 RAILROADS

1901-1914

131

has caused economic disaster: tourists have not come in usual numbers. Announcement of changes in the Greek Orthodoxhierarchy. July 8 Cholera is serious in Hama. Hijaz Railroad workers number 6,000 which 4,000 are soldiers. October 3 Druzes are relatively calm during harvest season, although two tax collectors killed. Cholera is endemic in Damascus; exports areblocked. Abundant harvest.

of

the are all

1904 January 7 Vali is fored to cancel the appointment of a pro-Jumblatt sheikh. Cholera disappears from Damascus. HamidiehBarracksarerenovated. Discussion of possible phosphate mining by a British company and a consequent increase of railroad traffic. May 25 An offer to survey the progress of the Hijaz Railroad by an American steel company executive is rejected by the Vali. Haifa branch railroad has priority; small sub-contractors handle the actual construction.

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p. 18 DRUZES, ARMS PUBLIC HEALTH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, ATTITUDETOWARD AGRICULTURE CENSORSHIP

p. 27 MILITARY, LOGISTICS TAXATION GREEK ORTHODOX HIERARCHY INTERNALTRADE BUREAURACY, ROLE IN AGRICULTURE TRANSPORTATION URBAN

p.] TRANSPORTATION,

HISTORY

July 9 Druzes are paying five times the market value of rifles in Damascus. New hospital is dedicated in Damascus by the Vali whose special project it is. Muslims favor the Japanese while the Christians in the Vilayet are proRussian; the war is being followed with great interest locally. Grain crops are only about one-half of normal crop; fruit production is also low. Egyptian newspapers ordered banned by the Imperial government. October 10 Camel corps established to help guard the Hijaz Railroad and to assist in tax collection. Russian versus Hellenic factions inside the Greek Orthodox Church battle over appointments; the new Bishop of Zahleh is pro-Russian. Ahmet Izzet Pasha, the Sultan's Second Secretary, is raising money for shares in an electric tram company for Damascus. Crops, as had been expected, did generally fail. 1905 January4 Discussion of tram company; Consul doubts

T H E V I L A Y E T OF S Y R I A , URBAN RAILROADS BUREAUCRACY CHRISTIANS, EMIGRATION p. 8 DRUZES, RAIDING AGRICULTURE p. 13 COMMUNICATIONS TOURISTS AGRICULTURE FOREIGN INTERESTS, ARCHEOLOGY p. 15 DRUZES, RAIDING BEDOUIN

p.l NATIONALISM, ARAB CHRISTIANS, BUREAUCRACY COURTS

1901-1914

133

the possibility considering the narrowness of Damascus's streets. Hijaz Railroad top officials can not be bribed. Christian emigration to Egypt and the Americas continues to be heavy. April 4 Druzes and Bedouin are raiding. Grain production is normal. July 11 Telegraph from Maan to Aqaba is opened. Tourists number 1,100 — most are American, British, and German. Prices are high for grain and fruit. Baalbek excavations finished by German archeologists. October 3 Druzes lose fifty-five men in raid on a Bedouin village; great shock at this substantial defeat. 1906 January22 The only Arab Vali of the twenty-six in the Empire is the newly appointed Vali of Mosul, a brother of the Sultan's secretary, Izzet Pasha. A Christian assistant to the Inspector of the Ministry of Justice for Damascus and Beirut has been given equal status with his Muslim superior. April 4

p. 8 The former Vali, Nazim Pasha, has been APPOINTMENTS GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH discharged, the new Vali is Shukri Pasha. HIERARCHY The probable successors of the Greek

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RAILROADS URBAN AFFAIRS, POWER TRANSPORTATION

p. 28 CHRISTIANS, BUREAUCRACY AGRICULTURE p. 31 AGRICULTURE BEDOUIN, RAIDING PUBLIC SECURITY URBAN AFFAIRS

p.l PUBLIC SECURITY BUREAUCRACY AGRICULTURE, PRICES

p. 1 AGRICULTURE, PRICES BARLEY RAILROADS PILGRIMS MILITARY, LOGISTICS TRANSPORTATION,

HISTORY

Orthodox Patriarch are pro-Russian. Hijaz Railroad is now complete to Muddawarra. A power plant to produce electric energy for Damascus is now being built in the Anti-Lebanon mountains. July 11 The only Christian qaimakam in the entire Vilayet has been removed. Grain and fruit crops are good. October 2 Exceptionally good crops. Public safety is poor; the Bedouin raids have come close to the City of Damascus.

1907 January2 Murders and robberies increase, even against the Haj caravans coming from Persia and Iraq. The Vali is accused of inefficiency and lack of concern. Average crops but prices are up. 1908 January6 Failure of last year's crops and the increased export demand cause a doubling of the prices of cereals; barley is especially costly. Pilgrims to Medina now use trains chiefly. Still have 6,000 troops working on construction.

T H E V I L A Y E T OF S Y R I A ,

URBAN

1901-1914

135

Camel corps cavalry has expanded to 700. Electric trams have now been accepted by the Damascus public and are widely used. p. 4 April 1 Christian Bishopric of Tarsus is vacant CHRISTIANS, and likely to remain so; the people refuse to ARAB NATIONALISM deal with the Patriarch who is Arab while the MILITARY, people are "Greek." CONSCRIPTION Military draft is now extended to the TRANSPORTATION, descendents of the Algerian refugees who RAILROADS petition the Sultan for mercy. PILGRIMS Hijaz Railroad carries 10,000 passengers AGRICULTURE to TOURISTS and 15,000 from Medina. INTERNAL TRADE, Crops are good. BANKING Tourists are fewer than usual. Discount rate is now 12%, it is usually 9; the cause is an Egyptian financial panic which has tightened credit. p. 22 July 2 RAILROADS The Adm (also "Azm") family of Damasus PUBLIC WORKS are the purveyors to the Hijaz Railroad. TRANSPORTATION, Public construction includes seventy ROADS kilometres of road, and a new bridge across URBAN theBarada. AGRICULTURE Tram and electric lighting company profits are low. Crops are good. p. 66 October 1 YOUNG TURK REVOLUTION, Results of the coup in Constantinople PUBLIC ATTITUDE include large public celebrations costing APPOINTMENTS about 2,000 pounds. SECURITY FORCES Official changes include six qaimakams of

136

OTTOMAN-ARAB

POLITICAL IDEAS, PARTICIPATION IN ULEMA ARTISANS MILITARY, PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS ELECTIONS HAURAN REGIONALISM CLOTHING MILITARY ULEMA TRADITIONAL MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES ISMAILIANS RAILROADS STRIKES AGRICULTURE NATURAL RESOURCES WATER

HISTORY

cazas, thirty minor officials and the alaibey (chief) of police. Political clubs are formed by the ulema, doctors, shoemakers, and a local branch of the Union and Progress Committee. Parliamentary elections; first, select electors who then vote by cazas. Refusal of Hauran to elect a deputy or to participate in electoral process. Debate on women's clothing: The Society of Union and Progress favors free choice by the individual; the ulema propose mandatory regulations. The municipality of Damascus suppresses pensions which, with other economies, yields 3,000 pounds. Politial prisoners released; includes many confined to house arrest and not known to be prisoners. Ismailians released from religious persecution. Hijaz Railroad construction in the last seven years now includes, 1,460 kilometres; it is to be finished by August. At present the Railroad fears to extend the line to Mecca because of raids by Bedouin. Bedouin remain calm and detached, wait to see the results of the Revolution before supporting it.

THE V I L A Y E T OF S Y R I A ,

1901-1914

137

Strike of railroad and customs workers at Beirut is greeted with sympathy in Damascus — resentment at high profits and poor service by the Railroad. The strike has had little impact on the economy. Grain and fruit harvests are excellent with high prices. New spring water is piped into Damascus from Ain Fijeh. 1909 January2 Muhammad Pasha Adm, forced to resign from the Idara Mejlis (Damascus advisory ADVISORY COUNCILS council) has returned to it. Other officials YOUNG TURK REVOLUTION, who had been ousted by the Union and Progress Committee are returning. EFFECT ON Nazim Pasha, Vali of Beirut, is BUREAUCRACY appointed to APPOINTMENTS succeed Shukhri Pasha as Vali of Syria. MILITARY, PARTICINazim's appointment is at the behest of PATION IN POLITICS Major Assad Bey, the acting Aleibey of ULEMA Police, a liberal. SOCIETY OF UNION In October, 1908, the ulema had inspired AND PROGRESS a riot against Assad Bey and the liberal party. ELECTIONS Union and Progress Committee has been CHRISTIANS reorganized by two delegates from the TRANSPORTATION Salonica headquarters. It continues to be PILGRIMS secret. BEDOUIN Parliamentary election of eight deputies; no MANUFACTURING Christians are elected. The Muslim electors POLITICAL IDEAS had agreed in advance on non-Christian candidates. AGRICULTLURE, PRICES Pilgrimage is now safe from Bedouin raiding

p.l APPOINTMENTS POLITICAL GROUPS,

138

OTTOMAN-ARAB

FOREIGN COMMERCE INTERNAL TRADE FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, ATTITUDETOWARD NEWSPAPERS BUREAUCRACY, BRIBERY RAILROADS PILGRIMS DRUZES REGIONALISM MILITARY, CONSCRIPTION TAXATION AGRICULTURE TRANSPORTATION ELECTIONS DRUZES TRADITIONALISM

HISTORY

all the way to Mecca. Commercial Club is trying to raise 12,000 pounds by subscription to start a fez factory. One-half of the 3,000 shares is subsribed. The Hurriyet (Liberty) Club is chiefly social and is now inert politically. Wheat is five shillings per bushel; generally high prices but also a large crop. Boycott of Austrian goods from November, 1908; directed against imports through Beirut; caused by the Bosnian annexation crisis; small economic impact. There are three new newspapers in Damascus: a daily, a weekly, and a bi-weekly. Salaries have not been raised but fewer bribes are being given or accepted. Hijaz Railroad traffic department manages to lose money because of poor management. Only 5,000 pilgrims (compared to last year's 10,000) but the Railroad could not carry them all. The Druzes are restless, fearing that the Constitutional movement in Constantinople may result in the loss of their traditional exemption from conscription and taxes. Grain from the Hauran can be marketed more easily because of the Haifa branch railroad line. A deputy has been elected from Deraa, but few Druzes participated.

THE V I L A Y E T OF S Y R I A ,

p. 14 URBAN AFFAIRS ELECTIONS TAXATION POLITICAL GROUPS, ADVISORY COUNCILS TRANSPORTATION EDUCATION, PRIMARY TAXATION PUBLIC SECURITY COURTS, RELIGIOUS ULEMA PILGRIMS ARTISANS, STRIKES TAXATION URBAN AFFAIRS

p. 25 CONSULS URBAN AFFAIRS

1901-1914

139

The surplus funds of the Druzes are being spent on arms. April 1 Municipal elections; terms of office of municipal advisory council are extended; little money is available for reforms in Damascus. The Mejliss Umoumi (Vilayet advisory council) meets for the first time; created by new Imperial constitution: it has sixteen members at least one-half are Muslims; the President is the Vali. Suggestions include: construction of carriage roads, increase municipal revenues, improve primary education, establish Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture, improve the collection of taxes, increase public security, restore irrigation systems. The "Muhammadan Association" of Constantinople has spread to Damascus; it is circulating a petition for the use of Shari'a law. About 8,000 pilgrims this year. The Imperial Ministry of Justice announces that in the future all judicial posts will be appointive. The strike of butchers against a new tax is broken by the municipality of Damasus which supplies the city with meat itself. July 1 The Persian Government took nine months to appoint a new Consul-General for

140

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TAXATION UNION AND PROGRESS COMMITTEE

HISTORY

Damascus. Arif Effendi Kudsi, President of the municipality of Damascus, resigns because it has no money. POLITICAL GROUPS ULEMA Union and Progress Committee elects seven NEWSPAPERS new "managers" under the supervision of two BUREAUCRACY, BRIBERY inspectors from Constantinople. Three members of the "Muhammadan TAXATION Association" are arrested and sent to CHRISTIANS Constantinople. TAXATION BUREAUCRACY Newspapers in Damascus accuse the Vali of being too sympathetic to the old regime. MILITARY, LOGISTICS Corruption continues and is even increasing because bureaucrats can not now be removed on suspicion but must be proven to have accepted bribes. Appeals are made for volunatry contributions to the government; taxes are still being farmed. Christians fear local repetition of Adana massacres. Three squadrons of cavalry sent to Adana from the Vilayet. October 4 p. 34 A German Consul is appointed at CONSULS Damascus after a five year vacancy; the post was SECURITY FORCES, filled FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON in the interim by a local merchant. The gendarmerie is under the supervision COURTS, REFORMS IN of a BUREAUCRACY, BRIBERY Frenchman. Widespread dismissals among the UNION AND PROGRESS Ministry of Justice and the courts. COMMITTEE Major Jemil Bey, Commissioner of the CLOTHING

T H E V I L A Y E T OF S Y R I A , FOREIGN COMMERCE POLITICAL PRISONERS NATURAL DISASTERS APPOINTMENTS AGRICULTURE, PRICES TAXATION

p. 39 (of 1909 file) BUREAUCRACY SECURITY FORCES SHIHAB FAMILY PILGRIMS URBAN AFFAIRS, ELECTIONS NEWSPAPERS ARAB NATIONALISM TRANSPORTATION MILITARY, CONSCRIP-

1 90 1 -1 9 1 4

141

Union and Progress Committee, is setting up branches, settling disputes, and lecturing to army officers. Meetings are held to encourage the use of native fabrics for dress and to discourage imports; proposed increase of import duty to 15%. Amnesty for all political prisoners sentenced before July 23, 1908 and all prisoners who had served one-half their sentence. Little is done by the Vilayet to help flood victims in Horns. New Vali is Ferik Ismail Fazik Pasha. High prices for crops but low production. Tax collection is unusually equitable with less favoritism to the rich. 1910 January2 A commission composed of the Vali and his chiefs of department has fired the Aleibey of Police, five qaimakams, and over 100 clerks in the last quarter. The Shihab family of Lebanon has three members serving as qaimakams in the Vilayet and others elsewhere in the Empire. New municipal elections are ordered after the dissolution of the advisory council by the Vali.

142

OTTOMAN-ARAB

TION CHRISTIANS AGRICULTURE, GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

p.l FOREIGN AFFAIRS, RELIGIOUS ATTIIUDE RAILROADS COURTS ARAB NATIONALISM BANKS

p. 6 ARAB NATIONALISM BUREAUCRACY COURTS

HISTORY

The post of Haj Muhafizi is dissolved, the conveyance of the mahmal is given to a colonel of the Army. The editor of al-Muktabar is acquitted of charges of sedition; he had been accused of favoring an Arab Caliphate. Hamdi Bey of Baghdad wished to start an automobile service from Damascus to his home city. Conscription of non-Muslims starts in Damascus; about 250 are enlisted. The Vali prohibits grain exports as prices mount. April 4 Khedive of Egypt passes through Maan and Deraa but the Vali does not greet him; there is public criticism of the government for this slight against a Muslim ruler. The Hijaz Railroad is disrupted for a month by floods. New judges are appointed by the Ministry of Justice — four are from Damascus and eight are Turks. A branch of the Deutsch-Palestin Bank is opened in Damascus with a capital of 400,000 pounds; the only other large bank in the city is a branch of the Imperial Ottoman. July 12 Popular dislike of the Vali and of the Turks is increasing because of the following: the liberalism of the Young Turks, the autocratic

T H E V I L A Y E T OF S Y R I A ,

1901-1914

143

MILITARY

officials, lack of behavior of considerationfor BEDOUINRAIDING the sensibilities of local notables, court AGRICULTURE, PRICES decisions are given in Turkish. INTERNALTRADE Garrisons are reinforced in areas southeast of GOVERNMENT SUPPORT Damascus. Hoarding of grain by merchants in OF Aleppo MANUFACTURING and Damascus causes rioting; the government CAPITAL ACCUMULATION forces them to release grain; prices remain FOREIGN INVESTMENTS high; the harvest was 15-20% lower than URBAN AFFAIRS usual. MILITARY, REFORMS IN A glass factory is being built with local capital; there is foreign investment in a new ice factory. The whole municipal government resigns after the city treasurer of Damascus admits bankruptcy; there have been four presidents of the municipality in the last six weeks. Cavalry is being trained by a German officer. p. 22 October 11 Municipal elections upset by Vali's URBAN AFFAIRS selection of Muhammad Pasha Adm as president ELECTIONS even though another member of the council GOVERNMENT ROLE IN received more votes.

p.l MILITARY, CONSCRIPTION REFORMS IN DRUZES

1911 January3 Army is receiving better equipment as well as over 1,300 Druzes as conscripts. Vali obtains a fetwa approving of the stopping of a subsidy to the Bedouins for

144

OTTOMAN-ARAB

BEDOUIN, RAIDING APPOINTMENTS PILGRIMS COURTS, CRIMINAL p. 29

APPOINTMENTS ARAB NATIONALISM MILITARY, REFORMS IN POLITICAL GROUPS, ADVISORY COUNCILS MANUFACTURING ARAB NATIONALISM RAILROADS

PILGRIMS

HISTORY

their not raiding settled areas. The new Vali is Ali Ghalib Pasha. There were only 6,000 pilgrims this year. Over 2,300 criminal cases were tried in the Damascus courts in the last year. April

15

The new Vali knows only Turkish. Kerak Sanjak is under military government. In a reorganization of the Imperial Army former Vth Corps is now the Vlllth; the three constituent divisions are stationed at Damascus (currently on duty at Deraa), Aleppo, and Haifa. The Mejlis Umumi suggests the establishment of an electric power plant at Horns, rebuilding of several decayed mosques, and a requirement that all government officials know how to speak and write Arabic. Snow and a bad winter have closed the Damascus-Beirut Railroad for forty-three days, the longest period recorded. About 8,000 pilgrims have passed through Damascus. The Hijaz Railroad's total revenue was 110,000 pounds; most of it coming from pilgrims.

p. 41

July 13

MILITARY

Conscription continues to cause emigration, especially among the minority religions. Heavy incidence of "prison fever" among the prisoners in the Damascus jails. Corruption continues among the judges causing bitter complaints by the Consul to

CONSCRIPTION CHRISTIANS PUBLIC HEALTH BUREAUCRACY, CORRUPTION

T H E V I L A Y E T OF S Y R I A , COURTS CONSULS ARAB NATIONALISM MILITARY, LOGISTICS

p. 43 (of 1911 file) TRANSPORTATION FOREIGN COMMERCE PILGRIMS AGRICULTURE PUBLIC HEALTH NEWSPAPERS

p.l APPOINTMENTS REFUGEES PILGRIMS POLITICAL PARTIES CENSORSHIP PUBLIC SECURITY RAILROADS MILITARY, CONSCRIPTION

p. 25 CHRISTIANS NEWSPAPERS

1901-1914

145

the Vali. An Arab deputy in the Imperial Parliament complains that only 1% of the employees of the Ministry of Finance are Arabs. Eight battalions of the Vlllth Army go to Yemen. 1912 Januaryl6 War with Italy and the blockade of Beirut slow commerce. The number of pilgrims increases. Harvest seems to be above normal. Cholera returned to Damascus in September; there were few deaths. Newspapers in Damascus continue to campaign against the Vali. April 1, 1912 Nazim Pasha returns as Vali. Refugees from Beirut (400-500 Muslim women and children) come to Damascus; eighty Italians are expelled. There are about 8,000 pilgrims. The public seems to favor the Union and Liberty Party as opposed to the Society of Union and Progress. All newspapers are required to deposit 100 Turkish pounds as a guarantee. Blockhouses are being built along the railroads. Exemption from the Army costs thirty Turkish pounds. July 1 Emigration of Christians increases. Government attacks those newspaper editors

146

OTTOMAN-ARAB

AGRICULTURE EDUCATION

p. 37 PUBLIC HEALTH INTERNALTRADE AGRICULTURE ELECTIONS APPOINTMENTS AGRICULTURE, ORGANIZATION OF CENSORSHIP NEWSPAPERS, GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF

p. 3 APPOINTMENTS RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS MANUFACTURING FOREIGN INTEREST S

p. 21 APPOINTMENTS CENSORSHIP POLITICAL GROUPS,

HISTORY

most critical of the administration. Cereal crop is only 25% of the average production. A training institute for teachers is opened; it will eventually produce 300 teachers per year. October 2 Cholera was "serious" in July. Both commerce and agriculture are slow. All former deputies from the Vilayet are returned in the new elections except Adm who is new Imperial Minister of Evkaf (waqfs). The new Vali is Osman Rifaat Pasha Ferik. A Chamber of Agriculture is founded at Damascus. Several newspapers are sponsored by the government and have assumed a favorable attitude to the Society of Union and Progress. 1913 January 18 New Mushir, Kyazim Pasha, goes to office on the Muslim holiday of Bayram. The electric company, during an argument with the municipality of Damascus, turns off the public lighting system, which causes rioting against: the company and its subsidiary electric tram company. April 1 Arif Bey is the new Vali; the seventh in the four and one-half years since the adoption of the new Constitution.

T H E V I L A Y E T OF S Y R I A , ADVISORY COUNCILS COURTS ARAB NATIONALISM MANUFACTURING TEXTILES FOREIGN COMMERCE

p. 34 PUBLIC HEALTH MILITARY PUBLIC SECURITY

p. 51 AGRICULTURE, PRICES

p.l CENSORSHIP PUBLIC HEALTH

1901-1914

147

Egyptian newspapers are banned. Mejlis Umoumi calls for decentralization of the Vilayet and the installation of Arabicspeakingjudges. Boycott of the electric tram company is nearly universal. Textile production is drastically declining as the Egyptian demand for Syrian textilesdecreases. June Epidemic of scarlet fever; small pox vaccinations by the Sanitary Department. Two battalions of redif infantry revolt and retreat to the Great Mosque in Damascus; the Vali wants to starve them out but the Imperial Minister of War orders them to be freed unharmed; this creates doubts about the power of the central government to suppress other types of insurrections. November 1 Cost of wheat and barley has doubled in the last fifteen years.

1914 Januaryl4 Arrest of editors of opposition newspapers is assailed in speeches, e.g., one given by Shukhri Asali. Report on typhus and typhoid diseases; 25% of those who acquired the diease died; serum for diptheria from England andFrance.

148

OTTOMAN-ARAB

p. 21 ELECTIONS UNION AND PROGRESS COMMITTEE REGIONALISM POLITICAL GROUPS, ADVISORY COUNCILS EDUCATION COURTS AGRICULTURE

p. 39 POWER EDUCATION MILITARY, CONSCRIPTION CHRISTIANS

HISTORY

May 2 Elections are restricted to supporters of Union and Progress; widespread abstentions by secondary electors in Hama. Mejlis Umoumi's suggestions include more elementary schools, and an increase in the length of paved roads. A court to handle small claims is established in Damascus. Crops are good in the northern part of the Vilayet, but there was not enough rain in the south. July 9 Electricity is now widely used in Damascus. No money is available for more schools. New concription is feared, especially by the non-Muslims who are leaving in great numbers.

SELECTED INTERIM DOCUMENTS "Commission to explain the constitution to the Bedouins." p. 62

"Weakness of Ibn Rashid and Supremacy of Ibn Sooud in

September 17, 1908 The ministry of the Interior has ordered the Vali to send a commission to the Hauran and the Eastern tribes to explain to them the constitution and the new regime. September 23, 1908 Ibn Sooud has been paramount

recognized

as

THE V I L A Y E T OF S Y R I A , theNejd."

1901-1914

149

in all of the Nejd, even by the Shammar who

p. 63 are unusually weak at the moment. "Qaimakam of Kuneitra Attacked by Circassians." p. 38

October

18,1909

Shahir Effendi Henbeli who had attacked the position and authority of the Circassian beys and was friendly to the fellahin was attacked by a mob. They used the pretext of a gramophone being played on Bayram and were led by the ulema. Two squadrons of cavalry were sent from Damascus to restore order.

"Druzes: Forces at Deraa." p.]5

September 1, 1910 The Vth and I Army Corps have sent twenty-five battalions of artillery to the Deraa area recently. (This is about 18,000 men; see note of September 30, 1910, p. 19). They are equipped with search lights and field telephones.

"Majiali Arabs." p. 32

December 13,1910 The 2,500 pound subsidy given to the Majiali Arabs for guarding the Amman and Maan sections of the Hejaz Railroad is not being paid. The Bedouin as a result have burned several stations, killed the resident guards, and destroyed the telegraph. Troops can not be moved to attack the Bedouin because the railroad cars needed are on the other side of the break in the line.

THE IMPACT OF OTTOMAN RULE ON YEMEN, 1849-1914

The Ottoman Empire between 1839 and 1914 made strong efforts to extend its power over Yemen 1 and was able to accomplish this goal to a certain degree. Many historians who have briefly discused this Ottoman experience have concentrated on its various problems and ultimate failure; they have thereby neglected the substantial success of the Ottomans in some regions and in certain fields of activity. While the Ottomans did not control the whole of Yemen and they suffered appalling casualties, they nevetheless did influence Yemen and their experiences in Yemen were similar to their administration of nearby areas. Ottoman success was limited by a number of factors, including the geographical remoteness of Yemen, its difficult terrain, and the historical independence and rebelliousness of its tribes, but despite these and other problems, the Ottoman record in Yemen was not the unmitigated failure often depicted. The distance of Yemen from Istanbul, the center of reform, and the relative isolation of Yemenis from Europeans, who elsewhere encouraged the reforms, were powerful reasons for the slow pace of change. Another important reason was the ignoring of the new regulations and the violation of the new norms by Ottoman officials themselves. Still another factor was the religious reaction that the attempted reforms helped bring about. The Zaydi imams attacked Ottoman reforms, and claimed for themselves the right to appoint judges, punish criminals, administer evkaf, and collect the canonical taxes. No Christians or Jews were to be placed in authority over Muslims, according to the Zaydis. The imams also claimed that religious education of Muslims was abolished by the Ottomans 2 . Other problems resulted from the relatively short stay of the Ottoman Empire in the area. Although the Ottomans were present in the coastal Tihama from 1849, their occupation of most of central Yemen took place only in the 1870s and then

^Throughout this paper "Yemen" refers to the area of the Yemen Arab Republic as well as to Asir in what is today Saudi Arabia. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Middle East Studies Association Convention in Los Angeles, 1988. ^Robert W. Stookey, Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 160-164.

152

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

lasted only about forty years. Those years began with the Ottoman Empire in desperate conditions and this too weakened Ottoman rule in Arabia. Ottoman accomplishments included the building of hospitals; constructions of a few schools; and the development of the important telegraph system. Ottoman rule in Yemen also saw some advances in administration, the military, security, transportation, taxation, the status of non-Muslims, and education 1 . Most sources do not sufficiently recognize these, nor do they take into account the comparative aspects of the Ottoman experience in Yemen. The Ottoman record can be seen in a more favorable light if viewed in comparison with similar challenges that the Ottomans faced in the neighboring province of the Hijaz.

THE

OCCUPATION

With the withdrawal of Mehmet Ali's forces from Hudayda on April 22, 1840, Husayn ibn Ali, the sharif of Abu Arish, occupied most of coastal Yemen. The Ottoman Empire in 1843 officially recognized Husayn as a pa§a and governor, but the Tihama was occupied by the Ottomans in April 1849, and Husayn was pensioned off as the power of the imamate declined. Opposition to the Ottoman control of the Tihama gradually emerged, especially in Asir, as the Ottomans sought to extend their control there. The Aid family, later the Idrisis, and the sharifs of Abu Arish all usually opposed Ottoman rule. The Zaydi imams and the various tribes of Yemen, such as the Zaraniq, were fiercely resentful of Ottoman centralized authority, while the economic development of coastal Yemen was neglected and taxation was increased. Ottoman attempts to move into the mountainous interior included the brief occupation of Sana in 1849, when the substitution of the sultan's name for that of the imam in the khutbah led to an insurrection, the ouster of the Ottomans, and the assassination of the imam who had accepted the Ottoman presence. Other examples of expansion included a failed naval expedition to Mukalla and Shihr, and a disastrous try at collecting taxes from the Zaraniq. Under the leadership of the Aids Asir rose in rebellion in 1856, 1860, 1863-1865, 1867, and 1870. The Ottomans were sometimes besieged in Hudayda, Qunfuda, and other garrison towns,

' Stookey, Yemen, pp. 165-166.

T H E I M P A C T OF O T T O M A N R U L E ON Y E M E N

153

but with help from the sharifs of Mecca they were able to maintain a precarious foothold in Asir and the coast, while the rest of Yemen fell into near anarchy and Sana became virtually self-governing 1 . A two-pronged expansion by the Ottoman Empire in the Arabian Peninsula included both the east and west coasts. In the east, al-Hasa was occupied. In the west, determined Ottoman armies in 1870-1871 ensured the subjugation of Asir and the taking of the chief inland Yemeni towns. Sana, whose leaders had requested the Ottoman incursion fell on April 15 and Mocha in September, 1872. The Ottoman occupation was much easier after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and the Ottomans also obtained from the imam his tax registers. Ottoman policy in the interior was to curb the power of the imams by reducing their income and by appointing Ottomans as officials in governing positions. Ottoman policy in the Hijaz was similar in many ways to Yemen. In both cases the restoration of Ottoman rule was difficult, local opposition was led by prominent religious and tribal leaders, and Ottoman control was mostly limited to the coast. There were, however, a number of differences between the circumstances of the two neighboring provinces. These differences resulted in the Ottoman greater degree of success in the Hijaz. In 1840-1841, the Ottomans renewed their partnership with the sharifs and amirs of Mecca, who enjoyed considerable local prestige and respect. While most of the chief regional leaders of Yemen, and particularly the Zaydi imams, were strongly opposed to Ottoman rule, the sharifs of Mecca welcomed it as long as the Ottomans in return supported them. NonOttoman control of Mecca and Madina had lasted only for thirty-five years, but the first Ottoman administration of Yemen had ended more than 200 years earlier! Perhaps most important of all in explaining the relative ease of the Ottoman occupation of the Hijaz was its dependence upon external economic aid, food imports, and Ottoman guarantees of the pilgrimage. Yemen, on the other hand, was regarded as self-sufficient in food and a potential source of surplus tax revenues beyond local expenditures. Yemen's John Baldly, "Al-Yaman and the Turkish Occupation 1849-1914", Arabica 23 (1976), pp. 163-167; R. B. Seijeant, "The Post-Medieval and Modern History of Sana and the Yemen, ca. 953-1382/1515-1962", in R. B. Serjeant and Ronald Lewcock (eds.), Sana: An Arabian Islamic City (London: World of Islam Festival Trust, 1983), p. 90; Muhammad AI Zulfa, "Daur Asir fi ahdath al-Hijaz..„" Revue d'Histoire Maghrébine 29-30 (1983), pp. 47-60. For a general discussion of Yemen and Ottoman policy see W. Schmucker, "Zur Begründung der zweimaligen türkischen Besetzung des Jemen...," Archivum Ottomanicum 9 (1984), pp. 245-278 and Faruq Uthman Abazah, Al-hukm al-uthmani fi al-Yaman, 1872-1918 (Cairo: alHayat al-Misriyyah al-Ammah Ii al-Kitab, 1975).

154

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

agricultural base was considerably larger than that of the Hijaz and while the Hijaz was lightly taxed, the Yemenis were forced to pay and pay. Still, even in the Hijaz, there was in the first part of the reoccupation, a great feeling against Ottoman reforms, as was shown in the 1855 and 1858 riots, massacres, and rebellions in Mecca and Jidda 1 . A D M I N I S T R A T I O N

A N D

R E F O R M

The return to inland Yemen in 1872 took place during the reign of Sultan Abdiilaziz in the late Tanzimat era, during which time the Law of Vilayets had also been issued. This law called for some popular representation on advisory councils. A municipality was established in Sana, and it supervised cleaning the streets and collecting market dues. The provincial administrative council met twice a week in Sana. The council was composed of the vali, the Hanafi judge, the treasurer, the chief secretary, and the representatives of the Yemeni notables. The Yemen and Hijaz were partially excluded from many Tanzimat laws. One example that took place later involved the rule compelling officials to wear the fez; this rule was subsequently abandoned for Arab officials in the Yemen. The Ottomans did not apparently undertake a detailed census in Yemen, nor did their administration reach fully into the 6,000 villages where most Yemenis lived. However, Yemen did send two delegates to the imperial parliament in 1876-1877. A major cause of friction between the Ottomans and the Zaydi population of the interior was in the area of law. The court of appeals was established in 1872. Secularized western-oriented commercial and penal codes were to be administered by the Ottoman courts, irrespective of the subject person's religious sect, but judges were not trained to use the new procedures, corruption was widespread, courts were few and often located far away from plaintiffs, and the imams objected vehemently to the use of the new codes under any circumstances. Frequently judicial and other Ottoman officials did not know much Arabic, which led to important problems in communicating with the Yemenis, who knew little Turkish 2 .

^William Ochsenwald, Religion, Society and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz Under Ottoman Control, 1840-1908 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984), pp. 131-151. 2 Jon Mandaville, "Memduh Pasha and Aziz Bey: Ottoman Experience in Yemen," in B.R. Pridham (ed.), Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 25-26,28; Baldry, "Al-Yaman", p. 180; M. E. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East 1792 1923 (London: 1987), p. 263; ìdris Bostan, "Muhammad Hilal Efendi'nin Yemen'e dair iki lâyihasi", Osmanli Araçtirmalan 3 (1982), p. 305; ìhsan Siireyya Sirma, Osmanli Devletinin Yikihçinda Yemen ìsyanlan (Konya: Selâm Yayinevi, 1988), pp. 112-114.

T H E I M P A C T OF O T T O M A N R U L E O N Y E M E N

155

Other impediments to reform arose from the low quality and inexperience of many of the Ottoman personnel. The central government changed administrators frequently: from 1848 to 1910 the person holding the governorship or acting as deputy govenor was changed twenty-six times. The average term in office was only a little more than two years, although six valis served a total of about thirty-three of those sixty-two years. Many administrators took bribes. Reform commissions in the 1890s and the re-establishment of the Ottoman constitution in 1908 led to promises of reforms in Yemen. These reforms included the appointment of new officials, reorganization of the police, proper tax collection, more schools, a railway, the holding of law suits in religious courts, and the detaching of Asir from the vilayet. Abdulgani Seni (Yurdman), the Ottoman vilayet secretary, wrote in 19091910 a series of articles published in Istanbul calling for reforms in Yemen's administration. Debates in the restored imperial parliament covered these topics plus the granting of local autonomy over a portion of Yemen to the imam, but parliament reached no clear decision 1 . Instead, in 1911 an agreement at Daan between the Ottomans and the Imam signaled the end of his large-scale rebellion in return for local autonomy in the Yemen. The important Daan agreements showed the near bankruptcy of Ottoman administration and its reforms in many part of Yemen. The Zaydi regions, including Haraz and Taizz, were to receive Zaydi governors appointed by the imam, who was also to control the evkaf there. Shariah law would prevail in the imam's districts and he would name the members of an appeals court, subject to Ottoman ratification. The right to impose the death penalty was reserved for the sultan. The Ottomans were to administer directly Shafii regions and would select judges for Hanafis and Shafiis. Miri taxes were to be levied in accordance with the shariah. However, the Ottomans did retain control over the customs duties, market fees in the towns, and they would receive one-tenth of the imam's tax revenue. In 1913 when the Daan accords were finally ratified by the imperial

'Baldry, "Al-Yaman", p. 180; K. Kreiser, "Abduigani Seni (1871-1951) comme observateur de l'administration ottomane au Yemen," Revue d'Histoire Maghrébine 31-32 (1983), p. 318.

156

O ITOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

parliament, the Ottomans paid the imam about T. (Ottoman pounds) 2,500 per month 1 . Changes in Ottoman administration of the Yemen were similar to those carried out in the Hijaz. Reorganization of the vilayet and its subdivisions took place there between 1868 and 1873, there was considerable debate about the possible separation of Madina from the vilayet, Yemen was given an entirely separate administration, some civil courts were established, the sharifs strenuously opposed centralizing valis in 1884-1886 and 1908-1914, and weak consultative councils were created 2 . Reform commissions sent to the Hijaz in the early 1890s were ineffectual and the elaborate plans for changes suggested in 1896 were not put into effect. Local opposition in the Hijaz to Ottoman centralization became most apparent in 1908 and afterward, as the centralizing consequences of the Hijaz Railway led tribesmen, sharifs, and others to fear the loss of money and power. Opposition in Mecca, Madina, and among the tribes was strong enough to stop the extension of the railway south toward Mecca. As a result, a kind of de facto division of authority emerged whereby the amir of Mecca had a great degree of power. This local power was similar to, but not as great as, that of Imam Yahya in Yemen after 1911 3 . THE

M I L I T A R Y

A N D

S E C U R I T Y

Ottoman military strength and policy varied sharply from time to time, but the empire in general was willing to commit substantial resources to control most of Yemen from the coast up to Sana, Taizz, Sada, and Abha. Control over areas farther inland was not seriously pursued. The VII Army was based in Yemen, although Yemenis were not subject to conscription. Many of the soldiers and officers were Syrians and Iraqis, for whom Arabic; was their first language, but many also were Turks. The garrison of Sana in the late 1870s consisted of about 1,000 men. By the 1890s the fortifications of Sana had been strengthened to include more artillery, small fortified towers outside the walls, repairs to the citadel, and a fort near the Hudayda gate. In 1904 the garrison of Sana numbered about

'Seijeant, "Post-Medieval", p. 96; G. Wyman Bury, Arabia Infelix or the Turks in Yameti (London: Macmillan, 1915). pp. 24-36. nDchsenwald, Religion, pp. 53-154, 164-169, 186-190, 211-213. 3for the Hijaz during the period 1908-1914 see William Ochsenwald, The Hijaz (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1980), pp. 118-132.

Railroad

THE IMPACT

OF O T T O M A N

RULE ON Y E M E N

157

4,000 men. In addition to the army, which was stationed in garrisons around the region, there was also an Ottoman gendarmerie force. In 1878 Vali Ismail Hakki Pa§a tried to form a gendarmerie from among the Yemeni mountain tribes. Its purposes were to protect travelers, tax collectors, merchants, and markets; it was also supposed to help collect taxes and to provide intelligence information. The Tihama Arabs, Ethiopians, Yemeni blacks, and Somali cameleers provided many recruits. Some of the gendarmes were kept in Sana, including mounted police units. In the capital city they ensured that tribesmen did not carry weapons in the city. The police also were used for official postal and telegraph delivery and as official escorts for visitors. And they played a role in putting down disturbances — they were often more successful in doing this than was the army because the gendarmes were often of the same background as the persons they were fighting 1 . The Ottoman military forces in the Yemen also faced perennial problems with poor and irregular pay, illness, lack of adequate transportation, and communications subject to interruption. Despite these problems, security in the 1870s through the 1890s was reasonably well maintained. In most parts of Ottoman Yemen there were few uprisings or rebellions then. However, the new imam, al-Mansur Muhammad Hamid alDin (b. 1839) created serious disturbances in 1891 when Sana was besieged, and again in 1894-1896. Among other factors for his rebellion, the imam cited the changes of the Tanzimat. The response by the Ottoman authorities included building a series of forts around Sana. From 1898 to 1903 there were many small attacks against Ottoman facilities. By early 1904 the Ottomans had stationed about 25,000 troops in Yemen plus 9,000 more at Qunfuda 2 . The new imam, al-Mutawakkil Yahya Hamid al-Din, rose against the Ottomans. Since this revolt has been discused extensively elsewhere, it is sufficient here to recount some of the reasons he cited for his actions. The imam accused the Ottomans of religious laxity, corruption, and ceding part of Yemen to the British. Drought and crop failures also helped cause the revolt. Sana fell to the imam's forces on April 20, 1905. New Ottoman

'Abazah, Al-hukm, pp. 106-110; Bury, Arabia, pp. 167-176. ^Jacques Thobie, "Pouvoir, Espace, Finance: Le Hodeida-Sanaa, un chemin de fer dans les sables 1899-1913", a paper kindly given me by the author; Baldry, "AI-Yaman", pp. 168-174; Seijeant, "Post-Medieval", p. 93; Sinan Kuneralp, "Military Operations during the 1904-1905 Uprising in the Yemen," Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations 2 (1987), p. 64.

158

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

leaders at the head of more than 40,000 troops retook the interior of Yemen in late 1905, although an estimated 30,000 of them died, including 9,000 troop deaths from typhus 1 . The imam resumed the struggle, and along with risings in Asir, ultimately compelled the Ottomans to accept a compromise peace as the empire became preoccupied with developments in Europe.

TAXATION

The collection of taxes in Ottoman Yemen was complicated by the dual burden placed on the Yemenis. Those people living in areas where the imams and tribes were strong paid them in cash for the agricultural tithe on the assessed value of crops and also paid the zakat, in accordance with the shariah. In Ottoman-controlled areas the Ottomans collected taxes on their own behalf as well as customs duties on imported goods. Large-scale smuggling decreased the yield. In contested areas, where Ottoman and imamate authority were in dispute, peasants often had to pay taxes twice. Local wealthy persons often acted as tax farmers despite the supposed abolition of this practice throughout the Ottoman Empire. Coffee was heavily taxed by the Ottomans, who created new taxes on internal commerce in 1900. The new taxes were abolished in 1910 because of their unpopularity. Extortionate and unjust taxation frequently led to violent and prolonged resistance by the peasants2. In the early 1870s taxes, customs duties and fees yielded about f.T. 250,000, while expenditures were around f.T. 425,000 to 475,000. In the period 1887-1896, revenues (not including customs duties or the Public Debt funds) brought in about f.T. 430,000 and expenditures were f.T. 360,000. These figures represented about two percent of the Ottoman Empire's total budget. The chief sources of revenues were, in order, the agricultural tithe, taxes on property, and customs duties. The latter were valued at f.T. 57,000 in 1887-1888. Expenditures went chiefly for the army, navy, gendarmerie, and police. On average, these consumed 84% of the budgeted spending. In the late 1890s and early 1900s revenues were in the vicinity of f.T. 300,000. Of this sum, most continued to be spent on

' Haldry, "Al-Yaman", pp. 174-195; Kuneralp, "Military", pp. 66-70. ^Abazah, Al-hukm, pp. 110-112; Sirma, Osmanh, pp. 120-123; Sinan Kuneralp, "Some Notes on the Economy of Ottoman Yemen (1870-1918)", Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations 3 (1988), pp. 104-105.

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the military and only about £ T . 50,000 to 100,000 was available for all other purposes. In 1910-1911 total revenues were L.T. 491,000. ' As in many other parts of the Ottoman Empire, the Public Debt Administration drained off Yemen taxes for repayment of European bondholders. The Salif salt works near Hudayda produced around f.T. 8,000 per year in profit, and the tobacco monopoly and salt taxes another £.T. 20,000 (or perhaps less) — all of which was unavailable to the provincial treasury. Taxation was a prime difference in the administration of the Hijaz and Yemen. Although customs duties were important sources of revenue in both areas, the burden of taxation in the Hijaz was relatively light. Instead, many residents of Mecca and Madina received benefits from the imperial treasury in the form of pensions and gifts. The Ottoman Empire put far more into the Hijaz than it took out of it. In Yemen, the benefits of Ottoman rule were fewer. Some Yemenis in the chief towns received direct rewards for their cooperation in continued Ottoman rule, while those Yemenis who for various reasons wanted security from the tribes or from the Zaydi imams also were protected by the Ottomans.

N O N - M U S L I M S

In provinces such as the Hijaz and Yemen the new status of nonMuslims as decreed in the great reform edicts of the Tanzimat was fiercely opposed. The only substantial non-Muslim minority in Yemen was the small Jewish population, which was concentrated in Sana but was also present in other towns and some villages. The general insecurity in Yemen during the middle of the nineteenth century strongly affected all Yemenis, but it was especially felt by the Jewish minority. When the imams held power the position the Jewish communities reverted to their traditional position, as in 1905, when Imam Yahya issued a decree concerning the Jews of Sana. They were to pay the poll tax and were to be protected but were to be dealt with as inferiors. When Ottoman power was strong, the Jews enjoyed a somewhat better status. The Ottoman vali in Mandaville, "Memduh", pp. 28-29, 31; Baldry, "Al-Yaman", p. 173; K. Kreiser, "Der Haushalt der Provinz Jemen zwischen 1877/8 und 1910/1", Osmanli Ara$tirmalari 1 (1980), pp. 209-217; Ahmed Ra§id, Tarih i Yemen ve Sana (Istanbul: 1291), vol. 2, pp. 351-352.

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the 1870s appointed a hahambagi as spiritual and secular leader of all Yemeni Jews. Many Jews resisted this centralization of authority, so after 1878 only the title of deputy hahamba§i was awarded to a leader of the Jewish community who was selected by the Ottoman officials, and his powers were limited in scope 1 . Contacts with Europeans who visited Sana and whose travels were sponsored by the Alliance Israelite Universelle exposed a small number of Yemeni Jews to ideas of reform, secularism, and modern education. Eventually the Sana Jewish community in 1910 opened a community school for fifty students and, with the cooperation of Ottoman authorities, began to teach some subjects not earlier available. Zionist emigration to Ottoman Palestine began in 1882 although it was forbidden by the Ottomans in Yemen in 1883. Nevertheless it continued and grew in the 1900s2. Large-scale violence against non-Muslims broke out in the Hijaz in 1858. Part of the cause for this violence related to Tanzimat reforms, and particularly the abolition of the slave trade, but the non-Muslims involved in the Hijaz were mostly foreign Christian merchants and diplomats. The Hudayda Indian Muslim merchants under British protection were apparently not the victims of open attacks on the part of the Yemenis. Certainly most Yemenis had very little contact with foreigners or non-Muslims, while most Hijazis had a tremendous amount of interaction with foreign Muslim pilgrims. The intellectual contacts of Hijazis with the rest of the world were frequent although couched in conservative and religious modes; the impact of Europe and the rest of the world on Yemen was far more limited.

E D U C A T I O N

Most Yemenis probably received no formal schooling at all. Those who did studied basic religion, but other types of education eventually

' Yosef Tobi, "Histoire de la Communauté Juive du Yémen aux XIX e et XX e Siècles," in Joseph Chelhod (éd.), L'Arabie du Sud (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1984), vol. 2, pp. 119137. Shivtiel et al., "The Jews of Sana", in Serjeant and Lewcock (eds.), Sana, pp. 395-397, 418.

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became available as well. In the late 1890s Vali Hiiseyin Hilmi founded in Sana the Dar al-Maarif, mektebs, and a higher school which some children of sayyids attended. A teachers training school included Zaydi ulema appointed by the vali. The first printing press was brought to Yemen in 1877 by the Ottomans to produce a provincial newspaper and yearbook; nine of the latter were written between 1881 and 1895. In the late 1890s the official weekly newspaper Sana was published in Arabic and in Turkish. By 1904 the state of education had considerably improved. The Memduh reform commission that year pointed to the earlier decision to use 30 percent of the coffee tax for primary schools and the vocational schools in Hudayda and Sana. Part of the zakat was also to be used for schools and teachers. However, the vilayet spent less than one percent of its budget on education in the years 1887-1896. By 1901 there were over 1,600 students attending primary schools. An industrial trade school in Sana taught Arab boys such trades as carpentry, tailoring, and blacksmithing. New schools were opened in Zabid, Bajil, Rayma, Taizz, and Bait al-Faqih. In 1903 eighty Yemenis were sent to Istanbul to study in schools there 1 . Despite this growth in numbers of schools and students, most education in the Yemen as in the Hijaz remained private. Because of the religious interest in the Hijaz among pilgrims there were more funds available there for private schools. However, theological education in Yemen needs to be studied in greater depth before conclusions can be drawn about its extent or quality. Neither Hijaz nor Yemen seemed to participate in the revolutionary intellectual upheavals of nationalism and secularism.

CONCLUSIONS

Some tentative conclusions can be drawn from this study of reforms in Ottoman Yemen. Many of the policies of the Ottomans had a substantial impact upon Yemen, although the impact was often negative as well as positive. On the other hand, a large number of Ottoman actions found no substantial echo in Yemeni society and thus demonstrated the limits of centralizing authority in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In

'Mandaville, "Memduh", pp. 24-25,30; Serjeant, "Post-Medieval", pp. 93,98.

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some cases the results of Ottoman initiatives are not yet clearly understood because the basic research needed to do so has not been undertaken in the Ottoman archives. It is clear that viewing the Ottoman experience in Yemen in a comparative framework illuminates and broadens our understanding of it. Perhaps the most important consequence of the Ottoman experience in Yemen was the triggering effect it had on the tribal and Zaydi opposition which mushroomed, consolidated under the Hamid al-Din imams, and eventually achieved independence following World War I. Experiences with Ottoman law and taxation helped lead to reactions against those fields in later years. Despite vigorous denunciations by the post-1918 rulers, the Yemeni border with British-protected territories to the south has lasted. Some of the local Yemeni leaders who were prominent in the Tihama in the 1840s were eliminated as Ottoman rule there became widespread; this indirectly strengthened the position of the imams in the interior. The Ottoman military experience demonstrated two important lessons: (1) enough foreign troops could occupy and for a time control the coast, center and chief towns of Yemen; (2) tribal separatism, independence of spirit, and mountainous terrain made it almost impossible for even a large foreign army to control all of Yemen's interior. The Jewish minority began an opening to exterior influences during the late Ottoman period that ultimately had a profound impact upon it. Another new experience for most Yemenis resulted from such technological advances as the Ottomans were able to achieve, especially the telegraph service and the new buildings in Sana. On the other hand, the Ottoman occupation did not lead to substantial economic development. In particular, the chief groups that headed nationalist struggles in other Arab provinces did not emerge in Ottoman Yemen. There were few if any Yemeni newspapermen, teachers of modern subjects in schools, Yemeni (as opposed to Turkish) army officers, and few Arab government employees who served elsewhere in the empire or in Europe. The Ottomans had little direct impact upon the Yemeni majority who lived in villages. The attempt to build a railway failed. Both European secularism and Abdiilhamid II's Pan-Islam were rejected by most Yemenis. Despite these problems, the earlier extremely negative views of Ottoman history in Yemen need to be readjusted and a more balanced view, taking into account the accomplishments of the Ottomans in Yemen, should becomewidespread.

THE FINANCING OF THE HIJAZ RAILROAD

Between 1900 and 1908 the Ottoman Empire constructed the Hijaz Railroad to link Damascus with Madina and Mecca, hoping thereby to increase the number of pilgrims and promote the military capability of the Empire in Syria and Arabia. In appealing for funds for the Railroad Sultan Abdtilhamid II and journalists and organizers of committees inside and outside the Empire used Pan-Islamic arguments. The Railroad was, in fact, the only major Pan-Islamic project ever to be successfully executed. An examination of contributions to the Railroad and those who made and solicited them may illustrate the degree of success which Ottoman PanIslam enjoyed in reaching large numbers of Muslims in all parts of the world. In studying Pan-Islam most scholars have concentrated on certain key figures who formulated a response to Western imperialism. Especially prominent is the work and controversy surrounding Jamal al-Din al' Afghani, Shavkh Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida. In the long and still continuing debate over the nature of the response to the challenge of European imperialism these three men evolved a number of interrelated, usually vague, and sometimes contradictory suggestions. Their ideas can be defined in a negative fashion by labelling them as neither nationalist nor secularist. Despite a good deal of recent research the relationship between these thinkers and the political leaders of the Ottoman and other Muslim states is not yet clear. 1 Pan-Islam in the Ottoman Empire seems to have been nearly independent of such thinkers as al-'Afghani. Preliminary research indicates that it was a political movement, inspired by officeholders, solidifying underlying religious loyalties more than creating a new system or type of belief, always vague intellectually and difficult to evaluate politically. However, when expressed in a project with limited and concrete goals such

See among other works on this subject Nikki R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings ofSayyid Jamal al-din "al-Afghani" (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1968); Jacob M. Landau, "Al-Afghani's Panislamic Project," Islamic Culture XXVI: 3 (July, 1952), 50-54.

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as the financing of the Hijaz Railroad, its degree of appeal and success can beappraised. Since the total cost of the Railroad was over 4,000,000 Ottoman pounds the sum of money that was needed was large. The cost of the Railroad was about 15% of the total expenditures of the Ottoman Empire in 1909.1 To obtain such an amount was especially difficult because Ottoman financial resources were already committed to other projects. Borrowing for the Baghdad Railway, repayment of previous debts, and the expenses of the Army left the state nearly bankrupt every year. When bureaucrats and soldiers received their salaries irregularly it seemed impossible that a large new financial obligation could be satisfied. The finances of the Ottoman Empire are of importance to the history of the Hijaz Railroad because of the attempt to gain voluntary donations. The financial extractive capacity of the Empire in itself is outside the scope of this article. The two-thirds of the Railroad's income which was not gained from donations will be examined only briefly, for it was the campaign for donations which was unique. It was closely tied to the nature of the Railroad and the importance that the Railroad possessed for the Ottoman Empire. The Hijaz Railroad was presented to the Ottoman people as a work of religious charity. It was dedicated to improving the pilgrimage and to the protection and economic betterment of the Holy Cities of Islam. The religious aspect of the Railroad was used as an argument in favor of its being built and operated by the Empire rather than a foreign controlled private company. Only Muslims should construct a railroad to Mecca and Madina. If the railroad project were to be completely Muslim then its financing must also come from Muslim sources. Three different groups of Muslims provided the funds: Ottomans who were forced to provide money for the Railroad; Ottomans who voluntarily donated; and Muslims who lived outside the Empire. Appeals to these groups were made by fund raisers, Pan-Islamic newspapers, and Ottoman diplomats. Gifts were collected starting in 1900.

'[Hijaz Railroad], Hicaz Demiryolunun Varidat ve Masarif-i ve Terakki-i Injaati... Behind Sene 1330 [Istanbul: Evkafi Islamiye Matbaasi, 1334), pp. 4-21 (hereafter HD); Herbert Feis, Europe, the World's Bunker, 1870-1914 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 315-316 and 335-336.

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An examination of the contribution drive between 1900 and 1908 serves to illustrate the complex of emotions and ideas which centered around the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph as the major defender of Islam. Popular support for the Railroad is difficult to gauge accurately because of the lack of reliable data on donations. Although the circumstances surrounding some gifts are recorded, generalizations about donors cannot yet be made with any degree of accuracy. Describing Ottoman donations as either voluntary or forced is also a problem because of the reluctance of both donors and collectors to admit coercion. Yet the evidence that has been pieced together from contemporary Arabic sources indicates that most donations in Syria were at least partially forced. Popular support for the Railroad was greater outside the Empire. Campaigns for contributions took place in most Muslim lands. Available evidence indicates that the largest collections were made in Egypt and India. The total of all purely voluntary contributions is unknown but it was surely far less than the total of all gifts — over 1,100,000 Ottoman pounds (L.T.). The importance of the contributions was great when seen in the context of the economic life of the Ottoman Empire. Although the price and wage structure of the Empire around 1900 is largely unknown, the sacrifice gifts represented to their donors can be seen by an examination of some salaries and wages. A day laborer in Syria might have a cash income of L.T. 10 per year; a skilled workman's income could reach L.T. 20 or 30 per year. Skilled foreign workmen earned annually a maximum of L.T. 60. An Ottoman Army captain's yearly salary was about L.T. 50. 1 The upper ranks of the Ottoman bureaucracy earned more. A General of Brigade in 1907 was paid L.T. 600 per year. 2 A donation even of L.T. 10 was large by comparison to the income of most workers in the society. The meaning attached to the Railroad by the donors can be judged by the amount contributed; the degree to which the contributions were voluntary; and, where such information exists, the socio-economic level of the persons who gave money to the Hijaz Railroad.

1 [Muhammad Kurd 'All], "Sikka al-Hijaz," al-Muqtataf XXIX (November, 1904), (hereafter MKA-SAH1), pp. 970-972; "Thamarat al-Funun" (Beirut) (hereafter TF), 28 K al-A 1903, p. 4.

18Shubatl907, p. 4.

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Before contributions could begin a central financial administration had to be created. Ottoman efficiency and honesty at the center of the collection effort served as a spur to provincial officials to begin collecting money for the Railroad. In April, 1900, the Hijaz Railroad project was placed under a central Commission which met in Istanbul. The finances of the Railroad were supervised by a number of agencies as well as the Central Commission. The Ministry of Public Works, the Agricultural Bank, and the Treasury participated in the financial organization. After the Revolution of 1908 the Railroad's accounts came under the control first of the Prime Ministry, then the Ministry of Pious Foundations, and finally the Ministry of War. 1 A central collec tion committee was appointed by the Minister of the Treasury. Its chairman was a former official in the Ottoman Post Office. The functions of the committee were restricted to record keeping and the manufacture of certificates and medallions to give to donors. Certificates were printed in fifteen denominations so that even a donor who gave a small amount would obtain a token that the donation had been received. Such certificates could be displayed as symbols of piety. The committee realized that donors outside the Empire would not be able to read Ottoman so they printed certificates in several languages. One million Ottoman pounds worth of the certificates were authorized for the first printing. Medals were made for large donors. The type of medals given to donors depended upon the amount of the gift. Three classes existed: L.T. 5 to 50, 50 to 100, and over 100. 2 The central collection committee delegated most of the work of collection to provincial committees. The local provincial groups, in so far as their composition can be ascertained, seemed to be the chiefs of the Ottoman government in the area. With little outside supervision they had the possibility of committing embezzlements from the Hijaz Railroads funds. Only two cases of outright tampering with Railroad money were detected. The first involved Mehmed Zihni Efendi, the Qaimmaqam of ' h D , pp. 1-2; [Hijaz Railroad], Hicaz Demiryolu Layihasi (Istanbul: Servian Matbaasi, 1324) (hereafter HDL), pp. 1-4. ^Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, Kitab Khitat al-Sham [Damascus: Matba'a al-Taraqqi, 1925-1926), III, 188; TF, 25 Haziran 1900, p. 4;'I T al-A 1900, p. 6; 29 Nisan 1901, p. 5.

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Incesu in Anatolia, who was removed from his post. Murshïd Efendi of the accounting department of Hama misappropriated L.T. 400 of Railroad funds, was found guilty, and punished. 1 Despite the hurried formation of the central collection administration and the local committees they were able to perform their assigned tasks honestly.

OFFICIAL

DONATIONS

The first gift to the Hijaz Railroad was by the Sultan. Abdiilhamid's donation was soon followed by presents from the members of his court. He had given the equivalent of one month of his civil list. This set an example for other top officials. 2 The need to equal the Sultan's donations spread from the top of the court and bureaucracy to all parts of the Ottoman government. The Grand Vizier gave a total of L.T. 810 — this was one month's salary. 3 Hasan Pa§a, Minister of the Navy and chairman of the Central Commission of the Railroad, gave L.T. 1,500. Zihni Pa§a, the Minister of Public Works; the chief of naval operations; the head inspector of the Army; and 'Izzat Pa§a al-'Âbid all contributed substantial sums. Feeling pressure to imitate the generosity of the ministers, whole departments pledged contributions. The Istanbul employees of the Treasury promised L.T. 1,580. Muslim employees of the Tobacco Régie pledged one month's salaiy, as did the English workers in the Imperial Naval yards in Istanbul. The officials of the Ottoman state steamship company made a similar pledge. Some gifts were made in kind. The Eregli coal mines gave 458 tons of coal to the Railroad. Another gift was the 7,000 wooden crossties sent by the people of Mente§e. 4 Some provincial bureaucrats are also known to have made donations. The Vali of Beirut contributed L.T. 100. The Deputy Governor and the Vilayet's Treasurer each gave L.T. 25. Many members of the municipal

'IF, 18 Shubat 1901, p. 4; 3 Haziran 1901, p. 4; 16 T al-Th 1903, p. 3; 23 Tammuz 1906, p. 4. For a complaint made after the Revolution of 1908 that L.T. 700,000 was embezzled, see Francis McCullagh, The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid (London: Methuen and Co., 1910), p. 28 and Zihni Pa§a, Beyan hakikat (Istanbul: Ahmed thsan, 1327). ^TF, 2 Tammuz 1900, p. 4; 9 Tammuz 1900, p. 4; 7 Aylul 1903, p. 4; H. Slemman [Henri Lammens], "Le chemin de fer de Damas-La Mecque," Revue de l'Orient Chrétien V (1900) 524. 3 TF, 15 T ai-A 1900, p. 4; 1T al-A 1900, p. 6. 4 TF, 17 K al-A 1900, p. 4; 26 T al-Th 1900, p. 4; 29 Nisan 1901, pp. 4-5; 11 Ab 1902, p. 4.

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councils in the Beirut Vilayet sent in substancial sums. 'Abd al-Qädir Qabbani, head of the Beirut Municipality, who was also editor of the PanIslamic newspaper "Thamarat al-Funun", gave L.T. 30. Mustafa Efendi, president of the Haifa city council, gave L.T. 50. The heads of the councils in Tiberias, Nablus, and Tartus donated sums of money. Many local notables serving on city councils contributed L.T. 10 or 20. Religious leaders constituted another large group of official donors. The muftis of alNasira, Jabla, Tiberias, and Nablus were among the earliest to donate money. The director of pious foundations of Akka and the head of the ashraf in Nablus gave L.T. 10.1 An imperial order from Istanbul required that donations be made by all civil employees of the government. One month's wages were to be deducted from all salaries as a gift to the Railroad. This was to be taken as a reduction from each month's pay. This tax disguised in the form of a donation was even applied to Christians. The tax on Christian employees was ended only in 1902.2

P R I V A T E

O T T O M A N

D O N A T I O N S

The degree to which Ottoman officials exerted pressure, either implicitly or explicitly, to secure donations to the Railroad seems to have varied considerably from area to area and time to time. Some gifts were entirely voluntary and some were completely the result of official pressures. It seems probable on the basis of the instances discussed below that most of the donations inside the Empire were made by individuals and groups with mixed feelings. They felt that presents to the Railroad would secure governmental approval and at the same time express publicly a personal commitment to Islam Even where orders were sent out to collect set amounts of funds, donations may still have been at least partly voluntary. 3

'TF, 6 Ab 1900, p. 5. The names of donors in the Beirut Vilayet in the first donations campaign are listed in the following: TF, 2 Tammuz 1900, p. 5; 9 Tammuz 1900, p. 6; 16 Tammuz 1900, p. 6; 23 Tammuz 1900, p. 6 (cited collectively hereafter as Donor's List). 16 Adhar 1903, p. 4; 9 Tammuz 1900, p. 4; Antoine Guine (ed.), Les Communications en Syrie (Damascus: Office Arabe de presse et de documentation, 1968), p. 35; Angus Hamilton, Twenty Years in Baghdad and Syria (London: Simpkin, Marshall, 1916), p. 61; J. v. S., "Die Hedjaz-Eisenbahn," Mitteilungen, K K. Geog. Geschichte in Wien (1904), p. 51; France. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, (hereafter M.A.E.) Turquie. Chemins de fer: Réseau Asiatique, (hereafter FRA) CCCXIX Savoye (Damascus) to Delcassé, 1 May 1902. Slemman [H. Lammens], "Le chemin de fer de Damas-La Mecque," Revue de l'Orient Chrétien V (1900), 531-532.

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However, evidence exists of widespread complaints and resistance. The collection of donations came to meet with the same opposition that taxes of all kinds encountered in the Syrian area, where the most detailed information concerning gifts is available. French observers witnessed several cases of forced contributions made in parts of Syria. District governments established contribution schedules from their areas. They arbitrarily fixed amounts for each village, including Christian villages. Local irregular police were used to collect money. They withdrew from recalcitrant villages only when contributions were made. 1 Local notables in the villages kept part of the donations. 2 Indirect evidence of pressure for donations exists for Beirut. Beirutis who gave donations jointly received separate certificates showing that they had paid and could not be asked to do so again. In Lattakia, donations were tied to the area's tax yields. Local committees established quotas according to wealth. Under pressure for immediate funds, the Vali of Beirut ordered that the tax records of all those who were not poor or physically infirm should be examined to see if they had already given to the Railroad. 3 Some examples of private donations permit an evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the gifts. The Beirut merchants 'Abbud and HalbunI, whose trade was with Istanbul, gave L.T. 2,000 to the Railroad, on condition that a certain fraction of the total would be sent in for every 100 kilometers actually completed. They received decorations from the Sultan for their generosity. 'All Bey al-Katib, an Istanbul merchant, and M a h m u d Pa§a al-Jaza'iri, a Damascus notable, imitated the Beiruti merchants' caution in providing a sum for every 100 kilometers finished. The ex-Mufti of Aleppo, al-Hajj 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jabirl, gave L.T. 50. 4 Donations were made upon special occasions. While on the pilgrimage of 1903-1904 Ahmad Bey al-Ziyya gave about L.T. 10. Al-Hajj

^Tresse, Le pèlerinage syrien aux villes saintes de l'Islam (Paris: Chaumette, 1937) pp. 302303. ^Tresse, Le pèlerinage, May 1902.

p. 304; M. A. R, FRA CCCXIX Savoye (Damascus) to Delcassé, I

3 F. O. 78/5452 De Bunsen (Constantinople) to Lansdowne, 23 November 1900; TF, 15 Tammuz 1901, p. 4; C. E. B., "Notes sur le Panislamisme," Questions diplomatiques et coloniales XXVIII (1909), 646; F.O. 195/2075 Drummond-Hay (Beirut) to De Bunsen 22 November 1900. ^TF, 5 T al-Th 1900, p. 4; 20 Ab 1900, p. 5; 23 Tammuz 1900 p. 5; 7 K al-A 1903 p. 7.

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Hassan al-Nabulsi died and left L.T. 160 to the Hijaz Railroad in his will. The wife of Makki Bey of Salonika left the Railroad L.T. 100. A candy vendor in Damascus gave a part of his profits to the Railroad. Even Christian groups and individuals contributed. The arch rival of the Hijaz Railroad, the French-owned Damas, Hama et Prolongements Railroad, presented the Beirut donations committee with L.T. 84. The Ottoman Bank gave the Railroad L.T. 3,240. 1 The Sunni Muslim Beirut newspaper, "Thamarat al-Funun", was particularly active in soliciting contributions. The Lebanese Christian journal, "Lubnan" reprinted the arguments of the Greek Orthodox Bishop of Beirut, Jerasmius, who urged Christians to give to the Railroad. The newspaper then went on to urge that all those who loved their country strengthen the state. In particular, the construction of the Hijaz Railroad was a means of obtaining economic growth for the Ottoman Empire. 2 The first year of the campaign for collections was the most important since the Railroad needed money immediately in order to begin construction. Unfortunately for the provincial collectors, until construction was actually going on and had made discernible progress sceptics in the Muslim community could label it as only a paper project. Pledges were made by some provincial governors even before they began to receive any donations. The Valis of the Beirut, Aleppo, and Syria Vilayets promised to send in L.T. 40,000 each. Bursa pledged L.T. 75,000 and in the Hijaz the large sum of L.T. 200,000 was promised. The Vali of Mosul was more modest in his promise of L.T. 10,000. Some idea of the scope of these pledges can be gained by comparison to the budgets of the Vilayets. Pledged donations from the Vilayet of Syria amounted to nearly one-tenth of the total yearly tax receipts of that province. 3 The composition of the committes determined their effectiveness. These committees served as an intermediary between the central government and the local Muslim community. They resembled in their function other groups which apportioned taxes to individuals. By bringing together 'IF, 8 T al-Al 1900, p. 8; 11 Ab 1902, p. 4; 5 T al-Th 1900, p. 4; 23 Haziran 1902, p. 3; Slemman [Lammens], "Le chemin de fer de Damas," p. 525; William T. Bliss, "The Sultan's Dummy Railway," Harper's Weelky L (May, 1906), 734. 2 Slemman [Lammens], "Le chemin de fer de Damas," p. 525; TF, 9 Nisan 1906, p. 6; 30 Nisan 1906, p. 4; 3 Aylul 1906, p. 4. ^Tresse, Le pèlerinage, p. 303; F.O. 78/5452 Richards (Damascus) to O'Conor, 29 October 1900; F.O. 195/2312 Devey (Damascus) to Lowther, 14 September 1909.

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representatives of the government and local notables the process of gathering donations was made easier. They could be handled as though they were taxes. The Beirut committee consisted of Yahya Bey al-Shim'a. the commissioner of the gendarmerie; Muhammad Efendi Mustafa Bayhum, a distinguished notable and member of the city council of Beirut; Khalil alHisaml, the chief clerk of the city council; and Khalil al-Barbir, employed at the Port of Beirut. 1 A different committee was formed during the second major campaign for funds in 1906. The Vali was its chairman. The other members were the Secretary of the Vilayet, the Director of Records, and a member of the Court of Appeals. The first donors in the second campaign were the head of the ashraf, the mayor of Beirut, and the director of the Post Office. 2 Similar committees were formed in the Vilayets of Aleppo and Damascus. In Madina the Shaykh of the Prophet's Mosque headed the campaign for donations. Fragmentary evidence suggests that other vilayets followed the same procedure. The geographical distribution of donors in the Vilayet of Beirut in boh campaigns suggests that they were concentrated in those urban areas where Muslim ruling and commercial groups were numerous. Of the total of 643 donors in the Beirut Vilayet only 389 can be identified with some certainty, though about 250 more may be assumed to be from the city of Beirut. If this is true, about 585 of the 643 donors came from seven towns: Beirut, 430; Nablus, 39; Sur, 30; Saida, 27; Akka, 23; Tarablus, 15; Lattakia, 11. Non-Beiruti small donors are considerably underrepresented in these figures. A large but indeterminate number, including possibly some of those attributed to Beirut, came from towns and villages in Mount Lebanon. 3

' i f . 18 Haziran 1900, p. 5; 22 Tammuz 1901, p. 4. 2tF, 12 Adhar 1906, p. 4.

o

Donor's List and the following for the second wave of contributions in the Vilayet of Beirut: TF, 23 Nisan 1906, pp. 5-6; 26 Adhar 1906, p. 5; 14 Ayyar 1906, p. 3; 21 Ayyar 1906, p. 6 : 2 8 Ayyar 1906, p. 3; 18 Haziran 1906, p. 6; 2 Nisan 1906, p. 5; 7 Ayyar 1906. p. 5; 30 Nisan 1906, p. 6; 16 Nisan 1906, p. 3; 9 Nisan 1906, p. 6 (hereafter cited as Donor's List 2).

172

O T T O M A N - A R A B

D O N A T I O N S

O U T S I D E

T H E

HISTORY

O T T O M A N

E M P I R E

The coercion which marked donations inside the Ottoman Empire did not exist in areas beyond the reach of the Sultan's police. It may be assumed that the reverse was the case: colonial regimes put barriers in the way of those seeking to make donations. Donation campaigns occurred in areas where Ottoman diplomatic representation existed. Ottoman diplomats served as channels for making contributions and in some cases, notably in India, took an active part in soliciting them. Other causes of large scale contributions were the presence of numbers of Ottoman or ex-Ottoman subjects, usually traders; the campaigns launched by Pan-Islamic newspapers; and the activities of religious orders, especially the Naqshibandi. Donations to the Hijaz Railroad illustrate the nature and extent of Pan-Islamic sentiment outside the Ottoman Empire. More importantly, the importance and meaning of the Railway to Muslims throughout the world can be examined in the arguments used for making gifts and the type and extent of donations. The Railroad came to be seen as an anti-Western project which combined religion and the military strengthening of the SultanCaliph. India was the site of the largest number of collection committees. 1 Indian subjects replied quickly when, as in June, 1908, the Railroad said it needed money urgently. Through the correspondence of several of the leaders of the donation campaign the ways in which money was collected and the nature of the appeals used to secure it can be ascertained. Starting in July, 1900, Muslims began to contribute funds to the Hijaz Railroad. The three leading agents in organizing these collections were the Sayyid ' Abd al-Haqq al-'Azmi al-Azhari from Baghdad; Abd al-Qayyum of Hyderabad; and Muhammad Insha Allah. 'Abd al-Haqq, the imam of the Manarat Mosque in Bombay, inquired about the Hijaz Railroad project in September, 1900. He had been gathering money for religious works to be printed in Egypt. After hearing the news of ' For a sketch of the history of Pan-Islam in India before the beginning of the Hijaz Railroad see Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), Chapter IV, "Pan Islamism and Modernism."

T H E F I N A N C I N G OF T H E H I J A Z

RAILROAD

173

the Sultan's appeal from Abd al-Qayyum, he translated the appeal for funds into Urdu. The appeal was sent to merchants, notables, and religious men in Hyderabad. After corresponding with the Ottoman Consul in Bombay, he received certificates in both Ottoman and Urdu. He hoped to obtain for the Railroad the funds set aside every year by the Nizam of Hyderabad to help pilgrims. 1 The arguments 'Abd al-Haqq used for contributions were based upon an appeal to Islam and group loyalty. In a speech given at Amritsar to a Muslim literary club he argued that Abdiilhamid II was the commander of the faithful and the imam of all Muslims. His project of a railroad to Mecca was a service to all Muslims around the world, a benefit to both faith and nation. As a result, all Muslims and their governments should support the Railroad. Those who give "demonstrate the perfection of their faith" for "to present gifts for the realization of the Hijaz Railroad is to demonstrate the love of God and His prophet". In addition, "this line is the one way to protect the Hijaz from Christian threats". 'Abd al-Haqq ended his speech by appealing to the Indian Muslims to uphold their reputation for generosity. 2 Abd al-Qayyum wrote to "al-Mu'ayyad" of Cairo as well as "Thamarat al-Funun" telling of his life in the Deccan where he had worked for the Nizam's government. He was fired from one post in 1900 at the suggestion of the British. "Lisan al-Hal", a Beiruti newspaper, referred to him as being the leading servant of the Hijaz Railroad because of his extensive traveling and letter writing on its behalf. He gained permission from the government of India to collect money for the Railroad. He founded a number of committees for that purpose. The first was in Mysore, where in one week he claimed to have collected more than L.T. 50. In 1903 he founded collection committees in Madras and Malabar. 3 Abd al-Qayyum presented a plea on behalf of the Railroad to a meeting held in December, 1900. He said to the assembled ulema and newspapermen that the Hijaz Railroad was a "religious and national project". "By means of this Railroad God has gathered together the major resources of life in agriculture, commerce, and manufacturing (for the people of

^TF, 17 Aylul 1900, p. 2. F.O. 78/5452 De Bunsen (Constantinople) to Landsdowne, 23 November 1900; TF, 19 T alTh 1900, pp. 1-2. 3 TF, 9 Shubat 1903, p. 6; 7 K al-A 1906, p. 1. 2

174

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

Syria)..." Most importantly, "the pilgrimage will be made easier and the three great mosques linked". 1 Muhammad Insha Allah, born in 1870, became a newspaper editor in Amritsar and later in Lahore. He claimed to be the originator of the idea of the Hijaz Railroad as well as the leading fund raiser in India. A correspondence with most of the major newspapers of the Arab lands and the press of Istanbul testified to his activities. The two newspapers he edited, "al-Wakil" of Amritsar and "al-Watan" of Lahore, were strongly PanIslamic. Both conducted appeals to their readers for donations to the Hijaz Railroad. Though pro-Ottoman, Insha Allah protested his loyalty to the Government of India. He urged upon the Ottomans a change in their foreign policy which was, he felt, too subservient to Germany. By March, 1904, he had collected about L.T. 963 for the Railroad. By 1910 Insha Allah had sent in a total of nearly L.T 6,500. 2 Several other propagandists for the Railroad are known to have gone to India from Ottoman lands. The Qadi of Madina also served as a channel of information about the Railroad by supplying Indian pilgrims with donation certificates and news of construction. The amount contributed in India is not known. There is, however, some information on the areas where contributions were made. Over 150 committees were formed in the first few years after the Ottomans launched their appeal for donations in 1900. Of this total nearly 100 were established in the Deccan, where the Muslims were a ruling minority. Other committees existed in all parts of India — the areas directly ruled by the British, the princely districts, Burma, and Ceylon. The number of committees continued lo grow until 1908. In addition to the committees founded by the three chief fund raisers there was a committee in Peshawar;

•TF, 27 Ab 1900 p. 2; 14 K al-Th 1901, p. 2; F.O. 78/5452 O'Conor (Constantinople) to Salisbury, 15 August 1900: Henri Lammens, "Le pèlerinage de La Mecque en 1902," Missions Beiges de la Compagnie de Jésus (1904), p. 33. ^Muhammad Insha Allah, History of the Hamidia Hedjaz Railway Project (Lahore: Central Printing Works, n.d.); TF, 2 Tammuz 1900, p. 2; 21 Adhar 1904, p. 5; M.A.E., FRA CCCXXV Report by C. Bonin, "Le chemin de fer du Hedjaz," pp. 155-156; M.A.E. Indes... Question Musulman-Panislamisme (hereafter H P ) X Nicault (Calcutta) to Ministry, 23 June 1908; India Office. Political and Secret Department. L/P & S. 10/12: 3142/1903 "Arabia: the Hedjaz Railway, 1901-1912" (hereafter I.O.) 2848/10 Clipping from the "Homeward Mail" dated 11 June 1910.

THE

FINANCING

OF THE

HIJAZ

RAILROAD

175

the secretary of the Ottoman Consulate in Bombay had helped set it up. 1 Other organizations were formed in Rangoon, Benares, Jawnpore, Patna, and Bihar. 2 Examples of individual donors may suggest the type of Indian subject who was susceptible to an appeal couched in Islamic and pro-Ottoman terms. There is detailed information only for a small number of cases. Even these sometimes lack information on such subjects as occupation. Mirza Ali of Calcutta, a large donor, gave L.T. 5,000. Two Kashmiri shawl merchants, the brothers Habib Allah and Ghulam al-Din of Amritsar, gave about L.T. 37. The newspaper "Riad" of Lucknow gathered over L.T. 2,000 for the Railroad. Arif Ismail Bihram, a merchant of Calcutta, donated about L.T. 1,000.3 Total donations were estimated by the British in December, 1903, to be about L.T. 750,000. This estimate is extremely high since the total of all donations by 1904 was only L.T. 742,153. Indian Muslims by themselves must have given a far smaller amount than the total donations. English estimates are of importance not for their accuracy but because they are symptomatic of the concern felt by Europeans at the collection campaign. There were doubts about the loyalty of Indian Muslims in the event of a war between England and the Ottoman Empire. The reality of these fears was demonstrated during World War I when there were almost no manifestations of Pan-Islamic sentiment. Even before 1914, however, Muslims in India had been reluctant to allow the Sultan to manipulate Islamic symbols for Ottoman political and diplomatic purposes. For this reason the Ruler of Hyderabad, a leading Muslim prince in India, made his pledge to the Railroad of over L.T. 20,000 conditional upon the arrival of the Railroad at Madina. 4 Indians were interested primarily in the Mecca-Jidda and Mecca-Madina parts of the projected Hijaz Railroad system. When pilgrims landed at Jidda from India they would use only those parts of the Railroad. The sections north of Madina were of little direct help to Indian *Kurd 'Alï, Kitâb, III, 188; TF, 15 Tammuz 1901, p. 4; F.O. 78/5452 Clipping from "The Oriental Advertiser" of 28 June 1901; E. Eleftériadès, Les chemins de fer en Syrie et au Liban (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1944), p. 167. 26 T al-A 1903, p. 4; 30 Nisan 1906, p. 4; M.A.E., FRA CCCXXV Bonin, "Le chemin de fer," pp. 155-156. a J Kurd 'Alï, Kitâb, III, 188; S. G. Wilson, Modem Movements among Moslems (New York: Réveil, 1916), p. 74; TF, 3 K al-A 1900, pp. 1-2; F.O. 78/5452 Clipping from the "Levant Herald" of 6 October 1903; J. v. S., "Die Hedjaz-Eisenbahn," p. 49; TF, 19 T al-Th 1900, p. 5; 7 K al-A 1903, p. 1. ^TF, 7 K al-A 1903, p. 1.

176

01 TOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

pilgrims. 1 Because of this lack of interest and the extremely scattered data concerning donations it seems likely that Indian claims about donations were exaggerated. Total donations in the range of between L.T. 15,000 to L.T. 100,000 are more likely. The lower figure includes all the money definitely known to have been contributed while the higher number allows forunrecorded gifts. Although the Government of India granted permission for contributions to be made, British officials in Istanbul opposed the decision. The English Ambassador in Istanbul, O'Conor, thought it likely that the money would be diverted to other purposes. The Ottoman Ambassador in London, Musurus Pa§a, asked the British Foreign Minister in October, 1903, to give permission to Indian subjects to wear the Ottoman medals which acknowledged gifts to the Hijaz Railroad. Both the Foreign Minister and the India Office opposed this request. Medals were, however, sent covertly to India. 2 The second area where extensive contributions campaigns are known to have existed is Egypt. Egypt was nominally part of the Ottoman Empire and paid tribute to it annually. However, by the accession of ' A b b a s II in 1892 effective Ottoman political power had not existed in Egypt for some time. The ruling family and the English occupation forces divided political control. In the three way struggle between the ruling family, the occupiers, and a new group of liberal nationalists, the remaining attachments to the Ottoman Empire were used as a means of gaining popular support. Either of the two Egyptian forces could pose as being pro-Ottoman and Pan-Islamic. The Khedive 'Abbas II began contributions by giving construction material to the Railroad A central committee for donations was formed with H u s a y n Pa§a K a m i l of the Khedivial service as chairman. Activity in Gharbiyya Province was particularly great. The local committee there was headed by Ahmad Pa§a al-ManshawI who later headed the committee for all of Egypt. For his own part he gave more than L.T. 2,500.

^M.A.E., FIP X Martin (Bombay) to Pichon, 2 September 1907; Nicault (Culcutta) to Ministry, 22 May 1908. 2 F.O. 78/5452 Lansdowne's Aide Memoire of 21 October 1903; Lansdowne to Musurus Pa§a, 30 January 1904; I.O. 254 Viceroy to Foreign Office, 7 January 1904; I.O. 2777 "Levant Herald" dated 28 May 1904.

THE

FINANCING

OF

THE

HIJAZ

RAILROAD

177

A number of Egyptian newspapers supported the campaign for donations. In Zagazig Ahmad 'Abd Allah Husayn, the editor of the local "alSaban", began a campaign for contributions in 1900.1 Other newspapers supporting the Railroad were published in Cairo. They included "alMu'ayyad" and "al-Liwa" whose editor was the nationalist Mustafa Kamil. "Al-Mu'ayyad" collected over L.T. 1,000. "Al-Liwa" gained the approval of the Khedive for its support of the Hijaz Railroad. Sultan Abdiilhamid awarded Mustafa Kamil the rank of mirmiran for his efforts in collecting funds. By April, 1904, he had gathered over L.T. 3,000. His brother, 'All Kamil Bey, raised L.T. 2,000 in 1908. "Al-Ra'id al-Misri" wrote that the Hijaz line had in the Muslim world the importance of the Suez Canal in the economic world. Rashid Rida argued in "al-Manar" that a general love for God and His prophet could be manifested in a desire to protect the House of God in Mecca and the tomb of the Prophet in Madina. Making access to both easier as well as defending them was a duty for all Muslims. Bishara Taqla, the editor of "al-Ahram" wrote in favor of the Hijaz Railroad. 2 Large donors in the early period included an employee of the Egyptian department which sent the covering for the Ka'ba to Mecca, a merchant of al-Jamaliyya, an inspector of pious foundations, and the head of the ashraf of Tanta. 3 Donations in Egypt were typical of those made in other semiindependent and colonial Muslim states, such as Bukhara. The Muslim leader endorsed the Railroad. Then the leaders of the community made contributions. Collections were organized by newspapers, Naqshibandi shaykhs, and merchants. Such campaigns led to clashes with the colonial power. The Railroad as a symbol of allegiance or friendship with the Sultan-Caliph was unacceptable to foreign Christian rulers. In Egypt the collection of gifts was 'TF, 6 Ab 1900, p. 5; 20 Ab 1900, p. 5; 13 Ab 1900, p. 5; 13 Tammuz 1903, p. 4. 2

"Kaifiyya jama'a al-a'âna Sikka Hadïd al-Hijâz," al-Manâr VI (1903), p. 355; France. Documents Diplomatiques Français (1871-1914) (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale), 2e série, IV, Lecomte (Cairo) to Delcassé, 14 October 1903; [Muhammad Rashid Rida], "Muhabba Allah wa Rasuluhu fi a'âna al-Sikka al-Hadidiyya al-Hijàziyya," al-Manàr III (7 August 1900) 362-363; Tresse, Le pèlerinage, p. 301; TF, 5 T al-A 1903, p. 4; 4 Nisan 1904, p. 5; 11 Nisan 1904, p. 4; M.A.E. FRA CCCXXV Collomb (Damascus) to Pichon, 10 September 1908; "alAhràm," 31 July 1899, cited in Leon Zolondek, "al-Ahrâm and Westernization: Socio-Political Thought of Bishârah Taqlà (1853-1901)," Die Welt des Islams XII: 4 (1969), 182-195. 3 TF, 16 Tammuz 1900, p. 2; al-Manàr VI (1903), 280; TF, 7 K al-Th 1901; 19 Ab 1907 p 428 K al-A 1903, p. 4.

OTTOMAN-ARAB

178

HISTORY

not officially halted, but participation by Egyptian officials was discouraged. The Ottoman government suggested that Egyptians should contribute five piasters per person — the same tax imposed upon Ottoman Muslim households. This was opposed by the British. At the insistence of Lord Cromer, the Consul-General and head of the British administration in Egypt, Egyptian government employees were forbidden to belong to the committees set up in Cairo, Alexandria, and the rest of the country to collect money. The civil service was admonished to avoid any sort of pressure upon the people of Egypt to secure donations. 1 Despite the paucity of information on donations in India and Egypt and the scattered data on gifts in other parts of the world, it seems clear that at least some money was sent from all parts of the Muslim lands. In so far as this was the case, the Hijaz Railroad became more than just an Ottoman railroad. It was the property of all the world's Muslims. The Islamic interest in the cities of the Hijaz was broadened to include the Muslim-owned means of transportation leading to them.

TAXES

AND

OTHER

INVOLUNTARY

PAYMENTS

From the very beginning of the Hijaz Railroad it was clear that the Empire could not raise enough capital through soliciting voluntary donations. The income was both too irregular and too small. In an attempt to gain new sources of revenue the Sultan created two new major taxes, intended solely as aids for the Railroad. They affected nearly everyone in the Empire. The first was a poll tax of five piasters on all male Muslim heads of families. It yielded about L.T. 100,000 per year. 2 The second tax was a special stamp tax, probably modelled after the postal and fiscal stamp taxes issued for aid to immigrants starting in 1901. Revenue stamps of varying denominations had to be attached to a number of types of documents. 3

1 2

P.O. 78/5452 Cromer (Cairo) to Lansdowne, 30 June 1903.

F.O. 78/5452 Richards (Damascus) to O'Conor, 15 December 1903; Munrb al-Madi and Sulayman Miisa, Id'rtkh al-Urdun ji al-Qarn al-'Ishrin (Amman: n.p., 1959), p. 15; Frederick Peake, A History of Jordan and its Tribes (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1958), p. 97; TF, 29 Haziran 1903, p. 4; 7 K al-A 1903, p. 7; 20 Haziran 1904, .4. [Muhammad Nadfm Bey al-Sawwaf], "Taqrir hawla al-wad' al-shar'i li al-Khatt al-Hadidi al-Hijazi," (Damascus: mimeoed, 1964), p. 3; Young, Corps de droit Ottoman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905), V. 282-284; "Sikka Hadid al-Hijaz wa dariba liha jadida," al-Manar V (14 February 1903), 877: TF, 9 Shubat 1903; 16 Adhar 1903, p. 4; 24 Ab 1903, p. 4.

THE

FINANCING

OF

THE HIJAZ

RAILROAD

179

Another source of income was the recoinage of money from the Vilayets of Tripoli (Libya) and Yemen. Also the obligation to perform corvee labor on highways was converted into cash payments in Nablus and Akka. The income derived from this conversion went to the Hijaz Railroad. To provide ready cash for the Railroad's account L.T. 100,000 was borrowed from the Ottoman Agricultural Bank. By 1908 this sum was increased to nearly L.T 486,000. Since the capital of the Agricultural Bank was derived from taxes the "loan" from the Bank was in effect another tax. Money also came from the customs revenues of Beirut. 1 Starting with the pilgrimage of 1900-1901 a tax for the Railroad was collected from every pilgrim who was not too poor to pay it when landing at Jidda. Payment was graduated according to the area from which the pilgrims came. The professional guides collected the money and gave it to the Amir of Mecca who sent it on to Istanbul. In 1903-1904 the caravan leaving Madina for Egypt and Syria was halted until everyone had paid this tax. 2 Another of the sources of revenue for the Railroad was the sale of the skins of animals slain on the festival of al-Adha. After the approval of the §eyhiilislam in Istanbul, the Council of State sent orders to the vilayets to form committees in every municipality to be headed by the mufti of the area. In 1901, in one of the few cases where the results of the sales are known, committees in the Hijaz conducted sales which yielded L.T. 1,000. The total derived from this source in 1901 was L.T. 40,000. The sales were repeated in following years. 3

TOTAL

R E V E N U E S

The income of the Hijaz Railroad which came from donations, excluding the civil servants' ten per cent withholding tax and the five piaster household tax, amounted in August, 1908, to about L.T. 1,127,894 out of a total revenue of L.T. 3,975,443. This was about 28% of the total income.

'TF, 28 T al-A 1900, p. 4; Slenman [Lammens], "Chemin de fer," p. 533; F.O. 78/5452 Richards (Damascus) to De Bunsen, 29 October 1900. ^Ibrahim Rif'at Pa§a, Mirai al-Haramayn (Cairo: Matba'a Dàr al-Kutub al-Misriyya, 1344), 1,71-72; F.O. 78/5452 Devey (Jidda) to O'Conor, 11 April 1901; TF, 8Tammuz'l901, p. 3. 3 TF, 25 Adhar 1901, pp. 4-5; 3 Haziran 1901, p. 7; 10 Haziran 1901, p. 4; 8 Shubat 1904, p. 4.

180

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

In previous years donations had formed a much higher part of total income: 1903, 63%; 1904, 55%; 1905, 35%; 1906, 35%; and in 1907, 32%. This decline was paralleled by a decrease in the total sums donated each year. The amount given from the start of the appeal in 1900 until the end of 1901 was about L.T. 417,000. In the next two years there was an increase of nearly L.T. 329,000. In 1904-1905, on the other hand, only about L.T. 74,000 was given. The second campaign for contributions which began in 1906 took in during the next three years L.T. 308,000. 1 There is no evidence in the financial documents published by the Hijaz Railroad of substantial contributions for the period after 1908. After the completion of the line to Madina, income came mainly from operating revenue, special allocations for capital expenditures, and taxation.

THE

S I G N I F I C A N C E

OF

D O N A T I O N S

In seeking to evaluate the importance of the Hijaz Railroad contributions it should be remembered that the sums involved were fairly small. Donations were less than one-third of the total income of the Railroad in 1908. They became even less proportionately as capital expenditures mounted during the period after 1908. In comparison to the total budget of the Empire the donations were not large. Although accurate budgets are not available for most of this period, Ottoman income: had apparently averaged in 1890-1892 about L.T. 18,900,000. It gradually rose during the next fifteen years; by 1909 it was about L.T. 25,100,000. 2 Donations were thus around 4% of one year's income. On the other hand, the indebtedness of the Ottoman Empire and the scarcity of ready cash made the donations welcome in financing construction. The central financial administration of the Hijaz Railroad and the local collection committees were, as far as available evidence suggests, capable and honest in achieving the central government's goals. Given the hasty formation of the collection agencies, their success showed that the

I j F , 12 Aylul 1904, p. 4; 14 Aylul 1903, p. 4; 21 Ab 1905; 17 Aylul 1906, p. 4; 9 Aylul 1907, p. 4; Hermann Grothe, "Die Hedschasbahn von Damaskus nach Medina," Lander und Völker der Türkei VII (1907), 26; H. Schmidt, Das Eisenbahnwesen in der asiatischen Türkei (Berlin: Siemenroth, 1914), p. 129. %eis, Europe, the World's Bunker, pp. 313-316 and 335-336.

THE F I N A N C I N G OF THE H I J A Z R A I L R O A D

181

Ottoman bureaucracy was capable of being flexible and efficient when sufficientlypressed.

TABLEI Types of income over L.T. 10,000 a Types of Income

1904

1903

651,184 1. Gifts 2. Agricultural 150,000 Bank 3. Conversion of currency. . . 165,531 4. Taxes 5. Operating income . . . 6. Corvee . . . Total

1,033,465

1905

1906

1907

1908

742,153

738,616

884,482

1,028,773

1,127,894

150,446

253,777

303,993

419,992

485,993

251,439 192,217

359,665 551,120

369,991 920,548

393,078 1,236,905

402,893 1,648,692

34,690 12,234

61,903 14,675

133,428 19,237

225,310

2,532,376

3,188,690

3,975,443

1,326,370

2,054,570

a. For 1903 and 1905-1908 the figures cited cover the period ending in July; 1904 is the fiscal year 1903-1904 which ended in March, 1904. Sources by year are TF, 14 Aylul 1903, p. 3; 18 Nisan 1904, pp. 1-2; 18 Aylul 1905, p. 1; 17 Aylul 1906, p. 4; 9 Aylul 1907, p. 4. All the figures listed are Ottoman pounds; the totals are adjusted to include costs of the exchange of money, and are devalued from the artificial official rate of exchange maintained by the Ottoman government for the coinage. Other sources of income smaller than L.T. 10,000 are not included. Because of this and the revaluation, the figures given do not exactly comprise the sums listed under "Total". Coercion, whether or not explicitly applied, played a great part in internal collections. Spurred on by the central government, local officials felt compelled to supply money rapidly to Istanbul. The extractive capacity of the state was shown to be great. It can be assumed that most Ottoman internal donations did not reflect an identification with the Railroad or its purposes, since they were forced. However, in some cases donations were voluntary. They became a means of expressing personal piety. A s a result, the Railroad seemed to belong to the Muslim community of the Empire in general rather than just the dynasty or government. The Muslim character of the Hijaz Railroad, reinforced by the donation campaign, may explain the

OTTOMAN-ARAB

182

HISTORY

relative lack of opposition to the project on the part of the European states which exercised virtual control over most of the Ottoman economy. The Hijaz Railroad strengthened the Empire's

ability

to

resist

European military might. A t the same time, the Railroad improved the conditions of the pilgrimage. Donations in such areas as E g y p t and India were seen by local Muslims as a way of increasing the military capacity of the

Ottoman

Empire

and

displaying

public

loyalty

to

the

Islamic

community at the same time. They implied by these gifts a recognition of the Ottoman ruler as the leader of all Muslims. The donation campaign was important as an example of the w a y support for a state could be gained by an appeal to traditional religious loyalties. It emphasized the linkage between the Sultan as defender of the Holy Places in Madina and M e c c a and his role of

ruler of

attachments associated

the Ottoman Empire. All with Pan-Islam

of

the emotions

became attached to the

and Hijaz

Railroad. The fact that the Empire w a s at last compelled to seek other sources of income f o r about two-thirds of the Railroad's cost w a s not publicized at the time, although the Railroad's financial statements were published. T o most of those w h o were aware of the Railroad, its existence was a sign that the Ottoman Empire was able to mobilize loyalty, raise large sums of money, and successfully administer it — all without the help of European capitalists. Donations to the Hijaz Railroad played a role in creating the PanIslamic movement; that role and the movement itself remain to be fully explored. There is no doubt, on the other hand, that the donations had the result of contributing directly to the construction of the Hijaz Railroad. With the addition of IHKCS and other income the Ottoman Empire, a state notoriously unable to fund large projects on its own, w a s able to build the line. T h e financing of the Hijaz Railroad demonstrated that the Ottoman Empire could mobilize sufficient capital to undertake large scale public works by itself.

OPPOSITION TO POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION IN SOUTH JORDAN AND THE HIJAZ, 1900-1914

The process of centralizing political power has been a major concern of social scientists and historians who have examined the history of the Middle East in the 19th and 20th centuries. Concentration of political power has been considered a prelude to the formation of a nation state. Such a view of the extension of the political unit measures the success of this process in terms of the increase in the strength of the state. The costs centralization entails for the subjects of the state have not been examined. Those who pay with their money or lives for the extension and those newly brought into effective control have been ignored. Also, the investment of resources needed to successfully carry out centralization has not been compared with the returns achieved once the large political unit has been successful. Resistance to centralization has been studied largely from the point of view of a large political unit; an exception is the case of the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire during and following World War I. In this instance, there has been a detailed investigation of the leadership, motivation, and the degree of popular support for a rebellion against the central state. An examination of Southern Syria and the Hijaz during the 1900s provides an additional case of resistance to political centralization as well as evidence concerning the antecedents of the Arab revolt. Although the presently available infomation about the risings involved is not sufficient to permit an analysis of all the issues referred to above, a preliminary investigation may cast some light upon the issue of resistance to centralization. The expansion of Ottoman authority into what is now Jordan and the Hijaz had begun during the period following the retreat of Egyptian troops from Syria and the Hijaz in 1840. However, effective power in the area remained outside Ottoman hands. Most of the Ottoman centralizers were primarily interested in areas closer to the central lands of the Empire. The position of the Arabic-speaking peoples within the Empire became more important as the European parts of it decreased in size. Some Arabs in the provinces had always been brought into the Ottoman elite through assimilitation to Ottoman culture, education, and bureaucracy. It was with

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the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II that the number of high officials in the Empire's central government who were of Arab origin increased dramatically. On the other hand, the number of Arabic speakers in the upper civil service under Abdulhamid and his successors 1 apparently remained low in comparison to their numbers in the Empire. Yet the vast majority of Muslim Arabs remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire until the middle or end of World War I. 2 Sporadic anti-Ottoman risings nevertheless involved leaders who had been co-opted by the Ottoman ruling elite as well as large groups of Muslim Arabs. The basic reason for the revolts was a reaction by some Ottoman subjects against direct rule by the central government. Direct Ottoman rule cost them too much in terms of political power, the threat posed by conscription and land registration, and in general the loss of local autonomy. From the point of view of local notables and tribal leaders, the gains resulting from more direct rule were negligible. Ottoman infringement on local autonomy in some parts of the Arab areas was not only caused by the obvious desire to gain more money and military manpower. While the Vilayet of Syria was on the whole probably a financial asset to the empire, the southern parts of it were agriculturally poor, sparsely settled, and contained few if any natural resources. 3 Ottoman rule in the southern districts was restricted to a few towns and some villages. Conscription, disarmament, and land registration were not enforced. The Vilayet of the Hijaz was a considerable drain on the Imperial treasury. Hijazis paid no taxes except customs fees, were not liable for conscription, and were the object of private and state charity and subsidy. 'An analysis of the linguistic origins and the backgrounds of Arab deputies after 1908 is in Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks : the Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, ¡908-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 155 ; Ahmed Harran, "Turkish-Syrian Relations in the Ottoman Constitutional Period (1908-1914)" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1969), p. 159 n. 101. 2 The smallness of Arab nationalist organizations and their relative lateness in organizing compared to other linguistic groups has been emphasized in recent research. The Turkification process in education and the bureaucracy after 1912 and the Committee of Union and Progress's strict centralization were the chief impetus behind secessionist thinkers. For a more detailed discussion of these points, see C. E. Dawn, "The Rise of Arabism in Syria," Middle East Journal, XVI (1962), 145-168, and Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut: Khayat's, 1966). 3 Of the perhaps three million people who lived in Syria only about 285.000 lived in the Karak andHawrân Sanjaks. Great Britain, Foreign Office (hereafter referred to as F.O.), 195/2311 Devey (Damascus) to Lowther, March 18, 1909; Dawn, M. E. J„ XVI (1962), 149, n. 8; Vital Cuinet, Syrie, Liban et Palestine: géographie administrative (Paris: Leroux, 1896) ; "Alï al-Husnï, Tà'rikh Sûriyye al-Iqtisâdi (Damascus: Matba'at Badâ'i' al-Funùn, 1342H.)

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Abdiilhamid and his successors wanted to rule the area of South Syria and Hijaz for several reasons: the prestige to be gained from actually controlling the Holy Places of Islam in Mecca and Medina; the danger of continued independence serving as an inducement to external meddling; and the need for gaining better transportation and communication with the persistently rebellious Yemen. It is not yet possible to present a clear picture of the history of the population of Southern Syria and the Hijaz. The relationship between the local people and the state can be explained more fully only when the Ottoman archives have been employed. However, a general description can be undertaken on the basis of incomplete evidence. The area was governed by local leaders. Settled, semi-nomadic tribes dominated south Jordan. In the Holy Cities the Grand Sharif shared political authority with the local Ottoman military and civilian officials. Small Ottoman garrisons in Jedda, Mecca, Medina, and Ta'if were insufficient to keep order and protect the pilgrims. The Sharif's private forces and shifting alliances with Bedouin tribes maintained an uneasy peace. Ottoman subsidies were given to tribes in South Jordan and the Hijaz to ensure the safe passage of the pilgrimage caravans. A certain continuity was provided by the long terms of office of the Sharifs and the Ottoman governor of the Hijaz in the late 19th century: The Sharifs were 'Awn al-Rafiq (r. 1882-1905), 'All b. 'Abd Allah (19051908), and Husayn b. 'All (1908-1924). 'Awn al-Rafiq and 'All overlapped with the long tenure of Ratib Ahmed Pa§a as Vali ( 1893-1908). 1 Lack of mobility and particularly the expensive nature of what transport had been available was one of the major factors in stopping the expansion of Ottoman power south of Damascus. The Hijaz Railroad provided better, quicker, and less expensive military transportation, and became the chief tool for centralizing power. 2

'S. Musa, Al-Husayn ibn 'All wa al-Thawra Nashr, 1957), pp. 14-15.

al-'Arabiyya

al-Kubra

('Amman: Dar al-

^The history of the Hijaz Railroad during the Ottoman period is discussed in detail in W. L. Ochsenwald, "The Hijaz Railroad: A study in Otoman Political Capacity and Autonomy" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1971).

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Even before the railroad had reached Medina in 1908, it was used for moving troops. Ratib Pa§a obtained 3,000 men from Damascus to suppress Bedouin tribes between Yanbu' and Medina in 1904.1 Twenty-eight batallions were moved from Damascus to Ma'an by rail and then marched to 'Aqaba where they embarked for Yemen in 1905. In 1910 the Railroad permitted Sami Bey al-Faruqi to move rapidly against the Druze. Before the Hijaz Railroad, Ottoman policy had been one of expansion of central control combined with conciliation of certain tribes. Following the creation of the Railroad a more direct approach was taken. Ottoman power in the 1890s reached south of 'Amman toward the few villages which were close to the path of the annual pilgrimage from Damascus to Mecca. Once government control was established villagers in the areas of Southern Syria and the Hijaz had still to be treated with special care. They frequently retained ties with nomads as well as memories of the days when Ottoman tax collectors did not appear. Direct contact between the citizen and the central government was avoided. Ottoman centralization was opposed in different ways by three groups, Bedouins, villagers, and the Sharifs of Mecca. The large tribal groupings in the Hijaz opposed the Railroad from the beginning of its construction. By 1907 the 'Atiyya, Harb, and Billi were at the least unsympathetic to it. Ottoman reinforcements were sent to the garrison near Ma'an in early 1907 to guard against attacks by the Banu Sakhr. 2 In 1908 Bedouin opposition to the Railroad mounted to the point of open rebellion against the Empire. There was an uprising near Medina. When the Hijaz Railroad began to approach that city, the Sharif and the Vali of the Hijaz let it be known to the tribes that they were opposed to the Railroad. 3 To this secret encouragement the Bedouin added their own fear of the Railroad's competition with the camel caravan trade. They thought they would lose revenues from camel sales and protection of pilgrims. Kazim

^France. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. Turquie. Politique intérieure: Arabie, Yemen — Pèlerinage de la Mecque (hereafter FPM), II, Dubief (Jedda) to Ministry, April 3, 1904; F.O. 195/2165 Richards (Damascus) to O'Conor, March 15, 1904. 2 Ai-Ahràm (Cairo), July 1, 1904. p. 1: Thamarât al-Fumn (Beirut) (hereafter TF), June 27, 1904, p. 3, F.O. 371/350 * 24952 Maunsell, "Report, 1907," p. 12 ; F.O. 371/350 * 15856 Maunsell (Constantinople) to Gleichen, March 28, 1907. 3 F.O. 371/539 35265 Hussein (Jedda) to Lowther, Septembre 22, 1908.

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Paga1 came to Medina to oversee construction of the Railroad in the Hijaz, and immediately ordered the arrest of several tribal leaders. When he left for Rabigh on January 10/11, 1908, the first tribal uprising broke out. Part of the 'Awf section of the Harb attacked Kazim's 1,000-man cavalry escort. Despite his successful passage through the Harb attackers, the Yanbu'Medina route was closed to travelers. Only after Kazim released the leaders at the order of Istanbul was the route temporarily reopened, but even then it was not safe. The Egyptian mahmal was soon thereafter attacked in this same area and the rebellion began to spread. 2 In May, 1908, an escalation of arrests by Ottomans followed by Bedouin raids culminated in an attack by tribesmen on Medina. Most of the city's garrison was working on the rapidly approaching Railroad. The Vali appealed to local citizens to aid the 200 remaining soldiers, and many civilians fought against the tribesmen. Reinforcements from the railhead reached the city on May 11. The fighting then spread to Hadiyya, 170 kilometers north of Medina, which was attacked by Bedouin who were repulsed. Eight battalions of troops from the Fifth Army came to the railhead as reinforcements, bringing the total troop concentration there up to about 6,000. 3 By July these reinforcements and the mobility provided by the nearly completed Railroad allowed the Ottomans to defeat the Masruh section of the Harb in two battles. The leaders of their allies, the Banu 'Ali, werearrested. 4 The events in Istanbul in 1908 which weakened Abdiilhamid's power resulted in the downfall of the Sharif and of the Vali of the Hijaz. The tribes blamed these officials for their own opposition to the Hijaz Railroad. In return for acceptance of the Railroad, the Ottomans agreed to restore payments formerly given to the tribes. 5

ÏMiiçir Kazim Pat a had been Vali of Scutari. In 1902 he was the highest paid officer in all of Syria. F.O. 195/2122 Richards (Damascus) to O'Conor, March 13, was the Director of the Hijaz Railroad during construction between 1902 and 1908. 2 F. O. 371/539 / 6325 Monahan (Jedda) to O'Conor, February 3, 1908; France. Politique intérieure: Arabie-Yémen (hereafter FY), CXI, Bertrand (Jedda) to March 12, 1908; F. O. 195/2320 Monahan (Jedda) to Lowther, March 27, 1909. 3 F. O. 371/539 *22224 Monahan (Jedda) to Barclay, May 29, 1908; FY, CXI, (Jedda) to Pichon, May 28, 1908; F. 0 . 371/539 * 18759 Barclay (Constantinople) May 25, 1908; F.O. 195/2277 Devey (Damascus) to Barclay, May 18, 1908. 4 F. 0.195/2286 Husayn (Jedda) to Barclay, July 30, 1908. 5

F . O. 195/2286 Husayn (Jedda) to Lowther, September 22, 1908.

Ottoman 1902. He Turquie. Ministry Bertrand to Grey,

188

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HISTORY

The ensuing uneasy peace was broken when the Banu 'All resumed fighting near Medina in November because the subsidies were not paid. Caravans were again raided and to suppress this renewed unrest three thousand troops were sent to Medina by train. The Syrian mahmal left the city only after its pilgrims agreed to pay high prices for camel transport; the tribes which had begun the fighting received the unusually high fees. 1 Although large-scale fighting between the Bedouin tribes and the Army ended in 1908, a constant series of small attacks were made on the Hijaz Railroad afterward. Partial peace between 1910 and 1914 was due to measures taken to strengthen the defenses of stations. Most of the Railroad's stations south of Mada'in Salih had barbed wire fences, trenches, earthworks, and garrisons of troops even before World War I began. 2 Another cause was the prompt payment of subsidies. It became clear to the tribes that with the increased mobility of regular Ottoman troops the Railroad itself could not be attacked and held. On the other hand, Ottoman troops were not able to maintain military superiority beyond the Railroad's tracks. The major rebellion among villagers occurred in Karak in 1910. Karak, located about fifteen kilometers from the nearest Hijaz Railroad station at Qatrana, had a population of between two and three thousand in 1910. The tribes which lived in the town were dominated by al-Majall clan whose chief, Qadlr al-Majall, was elected to the Administrative Council of the Syrian Vilayet in 1910. When the Vali of Syria refused to accept his election, Qadir Bey began to plan revolt. However, it was Ottoman expansion in the form of conscription, confiscation of arms, the census, and land registration which won the bulk of the townspeople and neighboring tribes over to his rebellion. These measures had been enforced in the Hawran by the Ottomans after their defeat of the Druze. The Karak area seemed to be next. 3 When the Karakis rose against the Ottomans, they were soon joined by Bedouin tribes in the area. The Banu Sakhr had not received their subsidy of about L.T. 4,000 for guarding the Railroad. They robbed a train, killed

' f . O. 371/767 * 5067 Monahan (Jedda) to Lowther, January 20, 1909. A . J. Wavell, A Modern Pilgrimage lo Mecca (London: Constable, 1918), p. 72. 3 Munib al-Mädi and Sulaymän Müsä, Tä'rikh al-Urdun fi al-Qarn al-'Ishrln ('Amman: n.p., 1959), pp. 18-20 ; Peter Gubser, "Power and Politics in a small Arab town: a study of al-Karak" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University, 1969), pp. 43-45. 2

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some Railroad workers, and destroyed sections of track. The 'Atiyya tribe raided the Railroad near Ma'an. Qatrana station was destroyed, Hijaz Railroad employees there were killed, rolling stock was damaged, and rails were taken up. 1 The damage done to the Railroad by the tribes was estimated at about L. T. 80,000. 2 The immediate Ottoman military response was limited because many railroad cars were on the southern side of the break in the tracks and consequently could not be used to transport troops from Damascus to Karak. After a delay of eight days the track was repaired, troops were sent to Karak, and the revolt was suppressed. The Karakis had killed Ottoman officials and destroyed government property. When the town was taken by Ottoman troops, there were executions, arrests, and looting. 3 Karak and neighboring villages were rapidly brought under Ottoman control. The third major focus of resistance to Ottoman centralization was in the Hijaz. Sharifal power was in a delicate balance with Ottoman and Bedouin military force. The first encounter with the expanding Ottoman military took place in Medina. Ottoman officials in Medina in 1908 were the governor, the qadis and muftis, the head of the police, the commander of the small Ottoman garrison, and the chief shaykh of the Prophet's tomb. A Sharifal representative supervised all court cases involving Bedouin. The power of the Ottoman officials in Medina is not yet known. It is known that there were no taxes levied by the Ottomans, and that conscription and land registration did not exist. In 1903 the attempt by the Ottoman government to impose a street-cleaning tax resulted in riots. Disturbances in 1904 showed the garrison to be unreliable because it had intermarried with inhabitants of the city. After a mutiny of part of the garrison in 1906, the Shaykh al-Haram, 'Uthmiin Farid Pa§a, was appointed governor. He had

^ " U m r à n al-Karak," al-Muqtabas, V (1910), 710; Mark Sykes, The Caliphs' Last Heritage (London: Macmillan 1915), pp. 471-474; Tawfiq 'Alï Barrfl, al-'Arab wa al-Turk fi al-'Ahd al-Dustûri al-'Uthmânï (Cairo: The Arab League, Institute of Higher Arab Studies, 1960), p. 215; Hijaz Railroad, Hicaz Demiryolunun Varidat ve Masarif-i ve Terakki-i inçaati... 1330 (Istanbul: Evkafi Islamiye Matbaasi, 1334), p. 24. F. O. 195 /2370 Devey (Damascus) to Marling, January 11, 1911. 3

F. O. 618/3 Devey (Damascus) to Marling, December 13, 1910; Màdï, Urdun, p. 23; France. Turquie. Politique intérieure: Syrie, Liban (hereafter F), CXIV, Gueyrand (Jérusalem) to Pichon; December 15, 1910.

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been a key figure in local politics as the chief Ottoman representative in the city for over fifteen years.1 The extension of Ottoman control after 1908 had several results for Medina. The area around it was separated from the Hijaz Vilayet and made a separate Mutasarrifiyya. The Ottoman central government stated that the city was now directly under the Ministry of the Interior, not the Hijaz Vilayet. On the other hand, in the same communication the traditional rights of the Sharif in Medina were reasserted. Although little evidence is available concerning administration after 1908, the division of responsibility in religious appointments at least remained the same. 2 After 1908 the central government established two government schools and a local branch of the Committee of Union and Progress in Medina. The foundation of a college in the city was announced in 1913 and it was opened the next year. 3 A decisive change in the politics of the rest of the Hijaz was caused by the Revolution of 1908 in Istanbul. The decision was taken by the new government to oust the Sharif, the Vali, and the governor of Medina. The Sharif Husayn b. 'Ali 4 was installed in December, 1908, and acquired predominance in Mecca, Jedda, and Ta'if after he crushed the small local branches of the Committee of Union and Progress. He was able to force the ouster of governors with whom he disagreed and to arrange a series of alliances with Bedouin tribes. Of the four newspapers which came into existence after the restoration of the constitution in 1908 only one, which Husayn controlled, endured. Ottoman garrisons in all of the Hijaz totalled no more than 5,000 men in 1910.5 The effect of the Revolution of 1908 in the Hijaz was that the new Sharif gained more power. 6

''AH Hafiz, Fusül min tâ'rikh al-Madlna al-Munawwara (Jedda : Sharikat al-Munawwara li al-Tabà'a wa al-Nashr, n.d.), pp. 36-37; Ibrahim Rif'at Pa§a, Mir'at al-Haramayn (Cairo: Matba'at Dar al-Kutub al Miçriyya, 1344), II, 105-106; F.O. 195/2174 Husayn (Jedda) to O'Conor, May 23, 1904 and July 31, 1904. ^Muhammad al-Batanüni, al-Rihla al-Hijâziyya II Walï... 'Abbäs... (Cairo: Matba'at alJamäliyya, 1329 H.) p. 253: Abdullah, King of Transjordan, Memoirs of King Abdullah of Transjordan (London: J. Cape, 1950), p. 89; al-Mu'ayyad (Cairo), April 23, 1910. ^Hossein Kazem Zadeh, Relation d'un pèlerinage à la Mecque en 1910-1911 (Paris: Leroux, 1912), pp. 22-23; F, CXXIII, Couget (Beirut) to Doumergue, December 17, 1913. The regulations and plans for a university at Medina are in Düstür, 2ed., V, 319-322. 4 [ ' h e best treatment of his life is in Müsä, al-Husayn. 5FY, CXLII, Lepissier (Jedda) to Ministry, September 20, 1910. 6

A list of the f e w changes instituted in the Hijaz in the two years 1908-1910 is in F.O. 195/2350 Monahan (Jedda) to Lowther, June 7, 1910.

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191

In public the Sharifs had favored the construction of the Hijaz Railroad. Privately they may well have feared that its continuation to Mecca would decrease or even eliminate both their political and economic power. There is some evidence that the Sharif 'Awn al-Rafiq prompted Bedouin to attack the Hijaz telegraph line. 1 The Sharifs' opposition to the Railroad was supported by the Istanbul enemies of 'Izzat Pa§a. When the Vali Ratib Pa§a's papers were examined after his ouster, correspondence with several of the Sultan's favorites, including the Minister of the Interior, was discovered. The Vali had been encouraged to oppose the southern extension of the Railroad. 2 Support for the extension came from the Sharif 'All Haydar, a member of another branch of the Hashimite family of sharifs. His views were presumably intended to gain favor with the central government. 3 In 1914 the issue of extending the Hijaz Railroad south to Mecca was revived by the Vali, Vehib Bey, who wished to bring the Hijaz under the new Law of Vilayets. He discharged many officials and hinted at more reforms to come, including imposition of taxation for the first time. Bedouin tribes rose in rebellion and cut communication between the Red Sea coast and Mecca and Medina. Six batallions of troops were sent from Damascus to Medina. When dissatisfaction at Vehib's orders led to riots in Mecca, the Grand Vizier ordered the Vali to back down. A mob had gone to the Ottoman military headquarters in Mecca where it protested against the Vilayet Law and the Hijaz Railroad while praising the Sharif Husayn. Fearing urban and Bedouin uprisings, the Vali and the Sharif jointly sent a telegram to Istanbul asking for instructions. They suggested that peace could be restored if the Hijaz Railroad extension were abandoned, if there would be no conscription in the Hijaz, and if the Sharifal court in Jedda would retain jurisdiction over all Ottoman citizens. 4 Immediately after the telegram approving these points was made known in the Hijaz, commerce was resumed between Jedda and Mecca. Peace was rapidly restored. 5 While Vehib Bey was attempting direct means to bring the Hijaz under Ottoman control, Talaat Bey, the Ottoman Minister of the Interior, ^France. Turquie. Politique intérieure : Palestine (hereafter FP). CXXXI, Guès (Jedda) to Delcassé, April 20, 1902. September 7, 1908, pp. 4-5; September 14, 1908, p. 2. ^George Stitt, A Prince of Arabia : The Emir Sheree/Ali Haidar (London: Allen and Unwin 1940), p. 123. ^Abdullah, Memoirs, 1914. 5

p. 100; FT, CXLIV, Ottavi (Damascus) to Doumergue, March 31

FY, CXLIV, De Rettel (Jedda) to Ministry, March 22, 1914.

192

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HISTORY

embarked upon a parallel attack of his own. He said to the Sharif 'Abd Allah, a son of the Amir, that his father would be deposed if he opposed the Hijaz Railroad, but if the Amir would support the extension, the government would agree to put the Railroad under his control. The terms were that Husayn and his sons would be guaranteed inheritance of the post of Sharif; 250,000 Ottoman pounds would be given the Sharif for distribution to the Bedouin tribes; military forces used in construction would be under the Amir's orders; and one-third of the Hijaz Railroad's income would be given outright to the Sharif. 1 By 1914 the centralist regime which controlled the Empire seemed determined to impose its control on Medina and then on the rest of the Hijaz. Even though rule of such towns as Karak and Medina was not profitable, Ottoman soldiers repressed local inhabitants' desires to manage their own affairs. Bedouin, villagers, and townspeople rose in revolt against the threatened loss of (heir economic and political autonomy. Neither the centralizers nor the local elites measured the process of centralization in purely economic terms. Peasants and tribesmen followed their leaders and, in the case of the Hijaz, provided a method for leaders to publicly support centralization while privately subverting it. The widespread resistance to Ottoman centralization in 1900-1914 prepared the ground for the successful revolt during World War I.

1

Abdullah, Memoirs, pp. 120 122.

A MODERN WAQF: THE HIJAZ RAILWAY, 1900-481

Since 1900 the Hijaz Railway has been claimed by more countries and groups than perhaps any other railway in the world. At various times the Ottoman Empire, the Hashimite Kingdom of the Hijaz, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Mandate Palestine, Israel, Britain, and France have sought ownership or the right to manage the Railway. The Ottoman Caliph, the Muslims of the world considered as a whole, and the pilgrims to Mecca and Medina have been held by different parties to the dispute to be the ultimate owners for whom any one country would act as trustee. The argument over who owns the Hijaz Railway continues to the present day with no sign of abatement. Between 1900 and 1918 the Railway was clearly Ottoman though its legal status and administrative position within the Empire changed several times. However, the thirty years after the end of Ottoman rule in the Levant, from 1918 to 1948, saw new terms of discussion and claims being set. Present-day positions and policies were enunciated, at first tentatively and then with greater clarity. Half of the claimants withdrew. This formative period centred around the putative religious nature of the Railway. Was the Hijaz Railway a waqf? If it had been an Ottoman waqf then the implication was that it still should be a waqf under the Mandates. Muslims, not Christians, should control it. The anomaly of a railway as waqf was matched by the division of the lands through which the line ran among several different governments. If the Railway's being a waqf were once conceded, it seemed peculiar to have it in segments under the control of several different governments rather than united under one. While all the Arab states involved eventually agreed that the Hijaz Railway should be unified it proved to be impossible to find a method of creating a united Muslim administration. Ownership and control of the Railway became an issue between the Mandates and the Muslims of Palestine, Syria, and Transjordan and a diplomatic issue involving the Saudi Arabian government.

''the opportunity to perform the research for this paper was made possible by a grant from the Faculty Research Abroad Program of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

194 T H E

OTTOMAN-ARAB H A M I D I Y F

H I J A Z

HISTORY

R A I L W A Y ,

1 9 0 0 - 1 8

The Ottoman Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II began the construction of the Hijaz Railway in 1900. It was intended to go from Damascus to Mecca but eventually it reached only as far as Medina. There were several branches, the most important of which linked Haifa on the Mediterranean with Dar'a in Syria on the main line. 'Abd al-Hamid wanted the railway for a number of reasons: it would provide increased military mobility and therefore greater Ottoman control over South Syria and the Hijaz; it would provide internal lines of transportation against potential British attacks from Egypt and the Mediterranean or, alternatively, increase Ottoman ability to attack the Suez Canal; it would gain the Sultan religious prestige since it increased the speed and decreased the cost of the pilgrimage to the two Holy Cities. The Sultan provided most of the money for construction from taxes but perhaps as much as one-third was given by Muslims inside and outside the Ottoman Empire. 1 Control of the Railway was initially placed in the hands of special committees in Istanbul and Damascus. Under 'Abd al-Hamid it was not a part of the Ministry of Public Works and Communications. After 1908 the Railway was linked to ihe War Ministry for a short time. 2 According to the Ottoman Budget Law for the Hijaz Railway of 28 May 1911 the Administration of the Railway was directly responsible to the Prime Minister. From the beginning of the Railway in 1900 on the revenues collected by it had been set aside for its own use. Therefore the Railway's income and expenditure were not part of the regular Ottoman budget even though prior to 1911-12 they were technically printed with the budget. 3 All of the land and property of the Railway and its operations were transferred to the Ottoman Ministry of Evkaf (Awqaf) in August 1914. The Parliament and Sultan agreed that the Hijaz Railway Director-General would be appointed by the Sultan and report to the Minister of Evkaf. Also, the Railway's Administrative Council would be selected by the Evkaf. 4

'For a detailed study of the construction, financing, operations, and socio-economic impact of the Railway see my forthcoming The Hijaz Railway. ^"Taqrir hawl al-wad' al-shar'i li-'l-Khatt al-Hadidi al-Hijazi" (mimeoed; Damascus: Hijaz Railway, 1964) (hereafter HRR-WS), 5-6-Diistur, 2nd ed„ IV, 464. 3 Great Britain. Foreign Office (F.O.) 371/10855 Document E904, Arbitration under Article 47 of the Treaty of Lausanne, the case presented on behalf of Iraq, Palestine and TransJordan, 64, 66, and 67. 4 Ibid.; the text of the law is also quoted in Arabic translation in HRR-WS, pp. 7-8, and the draft law for the original is in Diistur, 2nd ed., VI, 161.

A M O D E R N WAQF:

THE HIJAZ RAILWAY,

1900-48

195

The shift to control by the Evkaf was probably caused by the Ottoman Empire's negotiations with the French government, starting in 1912, to obtain permission to raise money by selling bonds in Paris. In return the French asked the Ottomans for a number of concessions. Among these were rate fixing, a decrease in competition, and cession of certain port facilities by the Hijaz Railway to the French-owned Damas, Hamah et Prolongements Railway (D.H.P.). The French also sought effective control of the whole of the Hijaz line by trying to obtain the appointment of a French citizen as Director. In an agreement early in 1914 the Ottomans said that because of the special character of the Railway it could not be yielded to a concessionnaire but nevertheless agreed to give de facto control of the Haifa-Dar'a-Damascus section to the French. The subsequent law moving control of the Railway to the Evkaf Ministry was presumably aimed at ensuring that the Hijaz Railway would not be sold or yielded to anyone. As waqf it could not be alienated or divided. In particular it could not be administered by non-Muslims. The First World War stopped the FrancoOttoman agreement from ever coming into force. 1 Ironically, on 3 November 1914 the D.H.P. was placed under Ottoman control as enemy property. It was administered by the Hijaz system throughout the War. 2

E S T A B L I S H M E N T P O L I C I E S ,

OF

THE

M A N D A T E S '

1 9 1 8 - 2 3

The most dramatic aspect of the fighting in the Levant during the First World War was the attacks of the Hashimite Arabs accompanied by their adviser, T. E. Lawrence, against the Hijaz Railway. They succeeded in isolating Medina, disrupting traffic south of Ma'an, and destroying a great deal of rolling-stock and many bridges. With the conquest of Damascus the Arab forces and their British allies suddenly became the possessors of what they had been striving to destroy. They had to establish an administration to govern the former Ottoman provinces. The new governments would possess all state property and presumably would supervise all waqjs. An Arab directorate was established in Damascus to supervise reconstruction of the Railway. The former Amir of Mecca, now King, Husayn b. 'All, began to pay subsidies to the Bedouin tribes to keep them from raiding the Railway.

^France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. Turquie, Chemins de fer, Réseau Asiatique (F.R.A.) CCCXXXI, D.H.P. to Director of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 17 October 1913; and CCCXXXII, Bompard (Constantinople) to Ministry, 22 April 1914. "Eleuthcre Eleftériadès, Les Chemins de Fer en Syrie et au Liban, Beirut, 1944, 81.

196

OTTOMAN-ARAB HISTORY

Since the Damascus-Medina sector was entirely within Hashimite territory it was claimed that the whole system should be administered f r o m Damascus by the Arab government under King Faysal b. Husayn. 1 Effective control of most of the northern section of the line seems to have been initially in the hands of the British Army. In early 1919 the A r m y was paying all operating expenses and receiving all income. T h e Damascus-Dar'a section was still under British administration in June 1919 as were the Palestine branches. The southern parts of the system were administered by 'All b. Husayn f r o m Medina. There was a small amount of pilgrim passenger traffic to and f r o m Medina in 1919 and some repairs were made. 2 The British military wanted to construct a railway and oil pipeline f r o m Baghdad to Haifa in the future; to do this control of the Hijaz Railway was essential. Within Palestine the new British administration considered it vital for the sake of the economy that all methods of transport be controlled f r o m Jerusalem. A direct clash resulted when the A r a b Kingdom of Syria claimed in 1920 that all the Railway constituted one wucif. The H a i f a - D a r ' a branch was necessary to the success of the rest of the system, King Faysal's government said. 3 Many Palestine government officials argued, incorrectly, that Haifa-Dar'a was not part of the Hijaz Railway. It should be considered separately, they argued, since "it was not built with Moslem private subscriptions...". Strangely enough they nevertheless conceded that the branch was "religiously tinged"; therefore, complete control but not outright ownership was their goal. 4 For reasons that were never clearly explained the view that Haifa-Dar'a had not been an integral part of the Hijaz Railway periodically gained acceptance in Palestine. An example is the Zionist claim that Palestine's eastern lrontier should be east of the Jordan River but just

HRR-WS, p. 12; F.O. 371/10010 E4309, A. Kirkbride to H. Samuel, 26 March 1924; F.O. 686/70, Fu'ad al-Khatib, 15 December 1921; F.O. 141/589 f 8146, Wilson (Jiddah) to Arab Bureau, 1 July 1919. 2

F.O. 371/4217, 64042, Campbell (Egyptian Expeditionary Force) to War Office, 27 March 1919; F.O. 141/589/8146, Blakeney (Director of Railway Traffic) to Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 18 June 1919; F.O. 571/5091 E1849, Bols (Administrator, (O.E.T.A.), 13 January 1920. I wish to thank Mr. Suleiman Mousa of Amman for his assistance on this point and his help on a number of other aspects of early Jordanian history. 3 F.O. 371/4185, 155441, War Office to Field Marshal Allenby, Egypt, 14 November 1919; F.O. 371/4217, 176633, Deputy Chief Administrator (O.E.T.A., East), 7 January 1920; F.O. 371/5235 E5897, 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi to Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 29 April 1920. 4 F.O. 371/5235 E7463, Forbes Adam, Note, 5 July 1920.

A MODERN WAQF: THE HIJAZ RAILWAY, 1 9 0 0 - 4 8

197

west of the Railway. 1 They conceded that the Damascus-Dar'â-Medina sector, but not Haifa-Dar'â, was Arab and waqf. There was, however, confusion among the authorities in Palestine as to the implications of the waqf status of the Railway. Meinertzhagen, Chief Political Officer of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, argued that all the properties and perquisites of the Railway were also waqf. These included the port facilities at Haifa and the right to develop electrical power from the Yarmuk River. Malkin, on the Peace Conference staff in Paris, said that the Railway seemed to belong to itself as a juridical person. Admiral Webb in Istanbul suggested that the religious purpose of the Railway be somehow preserved but the theoretical legal difficulties of its status be ignored. 2 The violent seizure of Damascus by the French in 1920 introduced a new complication into an already complex problem. The Arab directorate of the Hijaz Railway was suppressed and the Railway was operated by the French military authorities. They made a profit of 475,000 Syrian pounds from the operations of the Syrian section of the Railway between 1920 and 1923. French policy toward Great Britain in the Levant was affected in part by the French desire to divert the trade of Damascus to Beirut. The French thought Haifa should handle freight only from the Dar'â and Hijaz regions served by the Railway. 3 The Hashimites, expelled by the French from Syria, eventually gained power in Iraq and Transjordan. From the latter there were raids against French Syria. Cooperation between King Husayn in the Hijaz, Amir 'Abdullah in Transjordan, the British in Palestine, and the French in Syria was difficult to obtain. Without it the Hijaz Railway could not be operatedsuccessfully. The Treaty of Sèvres was the first of two peace treaties which sought to settle the status of the formerly Ottoman territories in Asia. Ottoman ownership of the Railway as state property was claimed by the Sultan's representative at Sèvres where it was asked that its value be taken into account when reparations were calculated. In the Treaty itself, Article 360

'Aaron Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: the Cairo Conference of 1921, Baltimore, 1970,70 and 286. F.O. 371/4217 166082, Meinertzhagen to F.O., 8 December 1919; F.O. 371/4217 170461, Malkin in a minute dated 27 January 1920; F.O. 686/70 Webb to F.O., 12 January 1920. 3 HRR-WS, p. 12; F.O. 371/6389 E1926, W. Deedes to Curzon, 31 January 1921; F.O. 141/589/8146, H. Samuel to Curzon, 12 October 1920; F.O. 371/1016 E2662, W. Smart (Damascus) to F.O., 5 March 1924. 2

198

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

expressly renounced all Ottoman rights to the Railway while acknowledging its unusual religious position: The Turkish Government abandons whatever rights it possesses over the Hedjaz railway, and accepts such arrangements as shall be made for its working, and for the distribution of the property belonging to or used in connection with the railway, by the Governments concerned. In any such arrangements the special position of the railway from the religious point of view shall be fully recognized and safeguarded. 1 In settling the pressing disputes between British Palestine and French Syria the Hijaz Railway was finally partitioned between the two by the Convention of 23 December 1920. The French received the section from Damascus to Nasib (136 km.) and the line from the Jordan River and Lake Tiberias to Dar'â (75 km.). Palestine had eighty-seven kilometres of the main line plus the extensions built during World War I. The territory that became Transjordan eventually received 436, and the Hijaz (later Saudi Arabia), 730 km. British transit rights on the Jordan River-Dar'a Frenchcontrolled section were recognized. The actual delimitation of the frontier on the ground led to the anomalous situation of the short section Samakh to alHimmah being surrounded on either side by Palestine though the track itself was French. 2 The I wo mandatory powers agreed to cooperate in administering this sector and, in general, to work together for the good of the Railway. In the two years after Sèvres, repairs were undertaken and the operations of the Railway were improved while the legal status of the Railway remained as disputed as ever. King Husayn of the Hijaz sponsored some rebuilding of his part of the tracks; limited service was maintained between Medina and stations to the north. 3 The Transjordanian part of the Hijaz Railway was managed by H. St. J. B. Philby, the British

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923, New York, 1924, II, 927. 2rhe text of the Convention is in F.O. 371/6389 E16081/4164/44. Also see F.O. 371/9000 E1630, Shuckburgh (Colonial Office) to F.O., 12 June 1923. 3 F.O. 371/7716 E14631, R. V. Vernon (Colonial Office), "Note", 28 December 1922; Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, Kitäb Khitat al-Shäm, Beirut; 2nd ed., 1971, V, 182.

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199

Representative. He received £31,460 in revenue and spent £35,860 from 1921 to 1923. 1

MANDATORY

POLICY,

1923-25

It was the refusal of the Turks of Anatolia to accept the harsh terms of the Treaty of Sevres that led to new negotiations culminating in the Treaty of Lausanne. The Turkish delegation headed by ismet Pa§a (inonii) flatly opposed Article 360 of the Treaty of Sevres which renounced all claim to the Hijaz Railway. Instead Ismet said on 27 Januaiy 1923 that it was linked to the Caliphate and had been built with the money of all the Muslims. "It is then natural that its possession and administration stay with the Caliphate." 2 The British and French replied on the same day through a statement by the French delegate, Bompard, as follows: The Governments of France and Great Britain, acting on behalf of Syria, Palestine and Transjordania, and desiring to recognize the religious character of the Hejaz Railway, declare that they are ready to accept the constitution of an advisory council with power to submit to the administrations of the different sections of the railway lying in Syria, Palestine, Transjordania and the Kingdom of the Hejaz recommendations for the upkeep of the line and for the improvement of the conditions of the pilgrim traffic. This council will include four Moslem members appointed respectively by Syria, Palestine, Transjordania and the Hejaz and will itself choose its president, and two other members amongst the nationals of other Moslem countries interested in the pilgrimage. It will sit at Medina. 3 This joint declaration left the question of actual ownership of the Railway unclear but it was the definitive expression of British and French policy until the end of their control. However, the Treaty of Lausanne itself did not mention the Railway. Turkey therefore never officially agreed to the AngloFrench position on its ownership. In the House of Lords a Question asked in 1924 about the ownership of the Railway left the issue still unsettled. British Government policy was 'KO. 371/10010, 4309, Philby to High Commissioner in Palestine, 16 December 1923 and 15 January 1924. 2 F.O. 371/10855 E904. 3 F.O. 371/10011 E8418, Eyre Crowe (F.O.) to Sir Robert Home, 3 October 1924.

200

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

that the Government were acting as trustees for the pilgrims. All sections under their control or administration, both in Palestine and Transjordan, would have their profits used for the improvement of the Railway. 1 The second international decision taken in relation to the status of the Hijaz Railway addressed the question of ownership. It arose in the process of fixing the shares of the Arab states and mandates in the Ottoman Empire's debt. The issue was whether the Hijaz Railway had been the property of the Empire; if so, its value should be counted toward reparations. The gross receipts of the Railway during the Ottoman period had been included in the calculations of the revenues of Palestine and Transjordan. As a result their share of the Ottoman debt was substantially increased and that of Turkey was thereby decreased. This led to a reversal of Turkey's position as expressed by înôniï at Lausanne. The Republic of Turkey now argued that the Railway was a state enterprise with most of its construction paid for by taxes. Turkey also claimed that Railway revenue and expenditure were part of the general Ottoman budget until 1909/10. 2 The arbiter appointed by the League of Nations, Professor Eugène Borel, ruled that the Hijaz Railway had been the property of the Ottoman Empire. It was impossible to separate the Sultan-Caliph from the state under the Ottoman system, he argued. Since the Railway could not be attributed to any other proprietor it must have belonged to the Empire. This view completely ignored the question of waqf legislation in Islamic countries. As for the separate financial administration of the Railway, Borel believed that this was a voluntary act of the Ottoman Empire. The state could choose to allocate separately revenues but they still belonged to the state. 3 A clear implication of Borel's ruling was that since state property passed to new governments automatically in cases of secession or independence, the Hijaz Railway was the absolute property of those individual countries through which it ran, i.e. Mandated Palestine and Syria, Transjordan, and the Hijaz. The Borel decision of 1925 and the Bompard declaration of 1923 in combination gave the Mandate Powers the power to

'See the excerpt from the debate in the House of Lords on 28 May 1924 in F.O. 371/10011, 4782. 2 Arbitral Award of Professor Eugene Borel at Geneva, Geneva, 1925, 79. 3 Borel, 80.

A M O D E R N WAQF:

THE H I J A Z R A I L W A Y ,

1900-48

201

dispose of the Railway as they wished, but they chose to try to maintain its religiouscharacter.

ARAB POLICY

OPPOSITION

TO

FRANCO-BRITISH

The most vehement opposition to the division of the Railway and its control by Britain and France came f r o m the Hijaz. King H u s a y n ' s government argued even after the French takeover in Syria that the whole line f r o m Damascus to Medina should be under Hashimite management by right of conquest. 1 The weakness of H u s a y n ' s position became clear as Saudi forces gained control of parts of the Hijaz. The southern sections of the Railway which were operable were transferred f r o m the control of 'All, H u s a y n ' s son and successor, to 'All's brother, the A m i r ' A b d u l l a h , in A m m a n . Transjordan in this way gained the M a ' á n district in 1925. For the British the transfer of A m m a n - M a ' a n and south to Transjordan was a graceful way out of an embarrassing situation. Philby, acting on his own authority, had given that part of the Railway to the Hijaz authorities in M a ' á n in 1924. His action was subsequently disavowed by the British. 2 Now that M a ' á n was incorporated in Transjordan all of the Railway as far as Mudawwarah on the Hijaz-Saudi frontier could be operated by the Palestine Railways on behalf of the A m i r . At the time when the Palestine Railways began administering the Hijaz Railway in Transjordan the High Commissioner in Palestine guaranteed that all of the Railway under their supervision would be treated separately f r o m other railways; it was not to be incorporated into the state-owned railway system of Palestine. 3 These arrangements between Britain, Palestine, and Transjordan lasted substantially until 1935. In that year Transjordan reaffirmed its contention that the Railway was waqf and stated that it did not fall under the direct supervision of any government ministry. 4

'F.O./8936 E267, Naji al-Asil to Curzon, 3 January 1923; F.O. 371/8936, 1834, Marshall (Jiddah) to F.O., 28 January 1923. Elizabeth Monroe, Philby of Arabia, London, 1973, 131; F.O. 371/10010 E4309, A. Kirkbride to Samuel, 2 6 March 1924; F.O. 686/70, Cox to Amir 'Ali, 8 May 1924. 3 Kurd 'Ali, Kitdb, V, 183; F.O. 371/10101 4306, Samuel to Amir 'Abdullah, no date. ^Munib al-Madi and Sulayman Musa,Ta'rikh al-Urdunn fi I' Qarn al-'lshrin, Amman 1959, 253; F.O! 371/19015 E2632, Decision 832 of the Executive Council of Jordan, in Cox' (Amman) to High Commissioner for Palestine, 25 February 1935.

202

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

In Syria there were considerably more objections to the status quo. Arabs in Syria had an additional ground for complaint against the French besides the division of the Railway. It was turned over to its archrival, the D.H.P., in February 1924. The D.H.P. received a percentage of the net revenues as compensation for administering the Hijaz Railway but the D.H.P. did not own it. Indeed the French assured the League of Nations in 1925 that ownership was not vested in the Syrian Mandate governments and that profits would be used for the reconstruction of the Railway. Between 1924 and 1931 the net profit of the Hijaz Railway of 19,233,000 French francs was divided about evenly between the D.H.P. and the Hijaz Railway. The agreement between the French High Commission and the D.H.P. insured the latter profits and no losses and presented the D.H.P. with an opportunity to manipulate the rates and services of its major competitor. 1 Complaints against the D.H.P. administration were voiced in the influential Egyptian periodical al-Manâr and by Damascus newspapers. The French tried in 1924 to stop criticism by appointing as members of the "Commission de Gérance et d'Administration des biens, droits et intérêts constituant les dotations du Hedjaz" the Qadi of Damascus and several other Muslim notables. 2 There were no incidents under the new arrangements until 1931 when the D.H.P. took possession of the Hijaz Railway's main station in Damascus. The bazaars closed and meetings of protest were held. A Committee for the Defence of the Hijaz Railway, led by the Amir Sa'id b. 'Abd al-Qàdir al-Jazâ'iri, issued a proclamation in which the division of the Railway was deplored. The D.H.P. was accused of mismanagement and of stealing the train station. All of the Muslim world was invited to take action to restore the Railway's waqf status.3 The new ruler ol the Hijaz shared the view of the Syrian Arabs and Transjordanians that the Railway was waqf. The accession of 'Abd al-'Aziz ("Ibn Sa'ùd") and the heavy rains of 1925 meant that the southern sector of the Railway became inoperative and out of contact with the northern parts of

1 2

P.O. 371/16022 E648, E. C. Hole (Damascus), "Memorandum", 18 January 1932, 1-4.

"Sikkat al-Hadid al-Hijazivyah", al Mandr, XXV: 3 (4 March 1924), 200-5; F.O. 371/10161 E2367, telegram by Syrian notables to the King of England, no date; F.O. 371/10161 E2661, W. Smart (Damascus) to F.O., n.d. 3 F . O . 684/5/3489 File 2873/14, A. Napier (Damascus) to F.O., 27 October 1931 and inclosing the Proclamation of the Committee.

A MODERN WAQF: THE HIJAZ RAILWAY, 1 9 0 0 - 4 8

203

the line. Still, the possibility of rebuilding it remained open. King 'Abd al'Aziz argued that part of the surplus accruing to the Syrian sector should be used by him in repairing the Hijaz line. The British objected to this and, instead, presented to him the Bompard statement at Lausanne which he in turn did not accept. In June 1926 the Muslim Conference meeting at Mecca asserted that the Railway was waqf. The Conference requested that a Muslim Council be established to run the whole Railway. Nothing having come from this idea, the Conference which met at Haifa in 1928 to solve questions of technical cooperation foundered on the issue of the Railway's status. The Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs said that no other issues could be resolved until the ownership and unity of the Railway were settled. In private the Saudi King told George Antonius, a British representative engaged in other negotiations, that his public position was intended chiefly for foreign consumption. 'Abd al-'Aziz apparently did not regard the Railway question as being of real importance. 1 Since the Railway ran through Palestine it became involved in the three-cornered dispute between Arabs, Zionists, and the British. A Muslim Conference met under the leadership of the Mufti of Jerusalem in that city in December 1931. It unanimously passed resolutions which said that the Hijaz Railway and all its property were waqf and that the Mandatories should turn over a united Railway administration to a Muslim body which could represent the interests of the pilgrims. Britain ignored these resolutions so as to avoid giving any official recognition to the Conference which had issued them. 2 The next major change in the status of the Railway occurred as Syria gained actual independence from the French. In 1945 the D.H.P. and Hijaz Railway were separated. The special character of the Hijaz Railway was preserved by not placing it directly under the Ministry of Public Works. Syria proclaimed the Railway to be an "Islamic waqf' and a legal entity under the control of the Prime Ministry. In April 1948 a new step was taken in the attempt to rebuild and reunify the Railway. Three of the four countries through which it ran were by then independent of foreign control. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria ÏRO. 371/14455 E2313 file 52, C.F.A. Warner, "Ibn Saud's attitude regarding the Hejaz Railway", 3 May 1930; René Tresse, Le pèlerinage syrien aux villes saintes de l'Islam, Paris 1937, 353. 2

F.O. 371/16022 E3594, Mohd. Amin Husseini (sic) to High Commissioner, 30 March 1932.

204

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

formed a committee id study the rebuilding of the Railway. They invited Arab representation from Palestine.1 The events of 1948-9 led not only to the failure of an independent Arab Palestinian government but also to the collapse of the plans for reconstruction of the Railway. The branch of the Railway west of the Jordan River no longer was linked to the rest of the system.

CONCLUSIONS In the years after 1948 a number of plans have been made for the reconstruction of the Railway. Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan have established a Committee in Damascus for this purpose and extensive work has been done on the track in Southern Jordan and the Western Province of Saudi Arabia. The northern sections of the Railway have been operated smoothly by the Syrian and Jordanian governments. However, the historical origins of the Hija/. Railway have had an influence in retarding its reconstruction. The Railway was built to serve the needs of an Empire which ruled all the Near East and much of the Arabian Peninsula. Division of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of new states in its Arabic-speaking lands caused the disruption of most common services and institutions. The tangible presence of the Hijaz Railway track and rolling-stock and its religious character ensured that it would not disappear as had the Ottoman Army or post in the area. After 1918, however, its administration was fragmented, its financial position precarious, and its legal status vague. In the period 1918-48 ownership of the Railway or its status as a waqf was not decided. The Ottoman government and its successors in the area had recognized that a pilgrim railway to Medina had a special religious nature, but the Hijaz line also had a military and commercial importance. Those Muslim states and groups which desired the political unification of Arabia and Syria wanted the unification of the Hijaz Railway. Its status as a waqf was also a means by which Britain and France could be stopped from extending their control over the economy.

1

Ahmad al-Marawani,

Al-Khatt al-Hadidi al-Hijazi, Damascus, 1959, 8.

A MODERN WAQF: THE HIJAZ RAILWAY, 1 9 0 0 - 4 8

205

The Mandatory Powers were themselves unclear about the nature of the Railway. Bompard's declaration at Lausanne and the Borel adjudication were in essence contradictory. The Railway could not be both religious and state property, but this theoretical problem had few practical consequences up to the end of the Mandates. Nationalist and Muslim opposition was caused by many other issues; the Hijaz Railway became one of the long remembered but peripheral causes of opposition to the British and French presence in the Middle East between 1918 and 1948.

ISLAMANDTHEOTTOMAN LEGACY IN THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST

In considering the Ottoman religious legacy it is important to begin by analyzing the constructs of the Ottoman era and Islam. The Ottoman dynasty ruled for more than 600 years, from the late thirteenth century until 1923, and its dominion extended during that time over a widely varying area, with fluctuating populations whose religious beliefs and practices differed. The ruling elite itself occasionally changed the nature of religious institutions and the relationship of religion to political practices. The expression of Islam in political life was directly influenced by these developments. To take just a few examples characteristic of differing time periods, the way ghazi customs and beliefs influenced the early Ottoman state in the fourteenth century was somewhat different from the role of religion in the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire, influenced as the latter was by such factors as the new religious educational institutions of Istanbul and the problems posed by confronting the Shi'i Safavid dynasty in Iran. Both these situations differed from the nineteenth-century era of the Tanzimat reforms, when the public role of Islam in Ottoman life began to be limited by a secularizing trend in the education of the governing elite and yet was expanded by the ideology of the Pan-Islamic movement. Similarly, most Muslims living today have not been directly influenced by the Ottoman legacy because they were not alive in the Ottoman era. In the Middle East, Ottoman rule did not extend to Morocco, most of Iran, and some sections of the Arabian Peninsula. Some areas that were under the control of the Ottoman state were only superficially influenced by that experience, since Ottoman domination was either of relatively short duration, as in coastal eastern Arabia, or the Ottoman presence was often indirect, as in much of the Maghrib. Islam during the Ottoman centuries involved several subgroups of Muslims as well as relationships between Muslims and persons of other faiths. Since most Ottoman Muslims, including the ruling dynasty, were Sunnis, the policies of the empire were concerned primarily with Sunni Islam. Examination of the complex relationships between Sunni Islam and Shi'i Islam, Christianity, and Judaism lies outside the scope of this chapter.

208

OTTOMAN-ARAB

HISTORY

The most rewarding way of analyzing the Ottoman legacy for Islam in today's Middle East then is to consider primarily the last stage of the Ottoman experience, since it is closest chronologically to the present. Discussion is also limited to the lands that were part of the Ottoman Empire as of 1914, that are now inhabited by Sunni Muslims, either as a majority or as a significant minority, and that the Ottomans substantially influenced. In terms of contemporary political units, this involves Turkey; the Fertile Crescent countries of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and to some extent, Israel; Egypt; Libya; Yemen; and parts of Saudi Arabia, especially its western area of the Hijaz. Another preliminary consideration involves the ways in which scholars have treated the subject recently. Both Middle Eastern and outside scholars writing in the early and middle parts of the twentieth century have tended to view the Ottoman Empire's general impact upon the Middle East as extremely negative. Nationalistic and secular-minded Turks, including scholars, chose either pre-Ottoman Turkish societies or Western European nations as models for the reconstruction of Anatolia following the devastation of World War I and the struggle for independence in 1919-1922. T h e role of Islam in the Ottoman Empire was consciously rejected. In the Arab lands the Ottoman experience was similarly opposed by nationalists, whether of the local or Pan-Arab variety, and also by those favoring some limited degree of secularization. A r a b Muslims who wished to purify the faith from the accretions of the centuries since the period of the early caliphate also have viewed the Ottoman experience negatively. Following World War II many Turkish and Arab intellectuals initially became even more attached to such views, but by the 1970s and 1980s a more nuanced and balanced interpretation of the Ottoman experience began to evolve. Several factors contributed to this change: more time had elapsed since the disastrous end of the empire, thereby creating a greater opportunity for objectivity; the value of the Ottoman Empire as a protector against external imperialism was clearer; Arab and Turkish nationalisms were found wanting by many; and researchers in the Ottoman archives made available vast quantities of information on the functioning of the empire. While most religious fundamentalists in the Middle East continued to regard the former Ottoman state as having been detrimental to their cause some fundamentalists c a m e to regard it as beneficial.

I S L A M AND THE O T T O M A N

209

LEGACY

A gap continues to exist between most of those persons who studied Islam in the Ottoman Empire and those scholars who specialized in twentieth-century Islam. This gap reflects the feeling prevalent in the Middle East and elsewhere among both the general public and scholars that the Ottoman epoch had little positive relevance to the contemporary age. By the 1990s some favorable evaluations of the Ottoman experience and its legacy had emerged, but only among small groups. These included among others a few revisionist Saudi and Syrian historians; 1 Turkish social scientists oriented toward economic history, as well as the Foundation for Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations in Istanbul; 2 Abdeljelil Temimi and his associates in the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Ottomanes, Morisques, de Documentation et d'Information in Tunis ; some Israeli historians who perhaps detected in the Ottoman experience reconciling experiences between Jews and Muslims ; and some of the scholars associated with the British periodical Middle Eastern Studies. A majority of both secularizing modernizers and fundamentalist Muslims have still tended to deprecate the legacy of Sunni Islamic experience in the late Ottoman Empire for today's Middle East.

THE CONTINUITIES EXPERIENCE

OF

ISLAM

AND

THE

OTTOMAN

The basic set of beliefs that constituted the core of Islam were revealed in the Quran in the seventh century. The faith in the unity of God, the need to proclaim belief in Islam, the necessity of prayer, the obligations of fasting, the sanctity of pilgrimage, the expression of charity, the importance of struggling on behalf of the faith — all were stated definitively and were also expressed in the actions and example of the Prophet Muhammad. Subsequently, compilations of the sayings of the Prophet and, for Shi'is, the saying of the Imams, along with various biographies of these figures established a larger corpus for interpreting the sacred text and created opportunities for nuanced readings of it. The working-out of extrapolations from the practice of the Prophet, as agreed by the consensus of the ulama, was in most cases in definitive form no later than a few centuries after that time.

^William Ochsenwald, "The Recent Historiography of Western Arabia: A Examination," Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies 22 (1992); 97-103. 2 See its Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations Annual (vol. I, 1986-continuing).

Critical

210

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Of course, a clearer understanding, a more finely tuned appreciation, and a more complete commentary on the implications of these basic beliefs became available as they were studied further in later centuries. Indeed, farreaching developments in Islam took place after the collapse of the effective power of the Abbasid Empire around 950. Examples include the flowering of the Sufi mystical orders, the conversion of most of the population of the Middle East to Islam, development of an adherence to social customs that seemed to be integrated with religious values (as in the area of gender relations), and the evolution of more sophisticated concepts of the caliphate. 1 Thus the crucial elements in both Sunni and Shi'i Islam were fully in place by the time the Ottoman dynasty began its expansion outward from Bursa in Anatolia in the fourteenth century. The relationship between the Ottoman state and religion has captured the attention of historians, but for the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire the most important aspects of Islam were precisely those elements of personal faith and piety that were seldom discussed in written records. The comfort provided by belief in eternal life, the certainties established by codes of moral conduct, the group identity and occasional personal ecstacy made available through the Sufi organizations, the opportunity to supplicate and invoke God — all these and other similar matters helped Sunni Islam flourish during the Ottoman centuries. For the most part behavior and belief paralleled the Sunni religious synthesis established in the Arab-Muslim lands in earlier times. Some modifications however were made in Islamic orthopraxy during Seljuk and Ottoman times, e.g., the adoption of preexisting saints and holy places as fit for Muslim veneration, or the use of tobacco and coffee. 2 Earlier marginalized approaches to Sunni Islam, especially among the Sufis, were now taken into the mainstream of acceptable behavior and belief. 3 This 1 Marshall G. S. Hodgson. The Venture of Islam : Conscience and History in a World Civilization, especially volume 2, The Expansion of Islam in the Middle Periods (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974); Lra M. Lapidus, "Sufism and Ottoman Islamic Society," in Raymond Lifchez, ed., The Dervish Lodge : Architecture, Art, and Sufism in Ottoman Turkey (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 15-32.

Ralph S. Hattox, Coffee and Coffeehouse: The Origins of a Social Beverage in the Medieval Near East (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985). 3 This adoption of some non-Sunni practices often accompanied strong hostilitiy against such groups as the Druzes, as is pointed out in Abdul-Rahman Abu-Husayn, "Problems in the Ottoman Administration in Syria During the 16th and 17th Centuries : The Case of the Sanjak of Sidon-Beirut," International Journal of Middle East Studies 24 (1992): 666-67. For a thorough discussion of Sufism in the Ottoman Empire, see the essays in Raymond Lifchez, ed., The Dervish Lodge.

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acceptance in turn caused revivalists, such as Birgivi Mehmed (1522-1573) and the Kadizadelis, and later the Wahhabi unitarians of Arabia (starting in the 1740s), to reject the religious tolerance often shown by the Ottoman state. Perhaps the most significant change in the relationship of Islam and the state took place as the Ottomans organized the Sunni ulama. The state systematized the situation of the ulama in a number of ways. Clear hierarchical relations were created, the effectiveness of the ulama was expanded, even reaching into some of the villages; the Hanafi code of law was sponsored, but other Sunni codes were permitted and sultanic laws (kanuns) were decreed; and the institutional training and education of the ulama was advanced. 1 Ottoman supervision of the ulama, including even non-Hanafi dignitaries, usually resulted in the maintaining of high standards and credentials for teachers, judges, and interpreters of the faith. Sultans frequently sought ulama approval for their policies. Another consequence of this close supervision and clearer organization was that the ulama tended to become more subservient to the ruling elite in the state; however, in times when this elite was weak the ulama could then exert a substantial influence on it. In many aspects of political life the role of Islam under the Ottomans was a continuation of examples and modes established under earlier Muslim states. Indeed, the Ottoman dynasty and governing elite saw many parallels with the Abbasid Empire. The bases of legitimacy for the Ottoman state rested upon the twin pillars of Sunni Islam and Ottoman dynastic glory. The Ottomans expanded the realm of Islam through new and far-reaching conquests in Christian Europe starting in 1345. They later helped contain the expansion of the Shi'i Safavid and Christian Hapsburg states, thereby ensuring the victoiy of Sunnism in most parts of the Middle East and North Africa. The rulers actively promoted Sunni Islam through a wide variety of means, including maintaining the shari'ah, conserving the existing social order, and enforcing justice. They also helped Islam by establishing charitable foundations,

Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), see especially ch. 10 on law, and chs 16 through 20 on other aspects of Islam. Madeline Zilfi, The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age, 1600-1800 (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988) discusses the later period of change in the career patterns of the ulama as well as such matters as Sufism.

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building mosques, organizing advanced religious schools, supporting some Sufi orders, and partially codifying applications and procedures of the holy law. The state supported religious and scientific scholarship, as well as libraries, with an emphasis on legal studies and mathematics. After the conquest of the central Arab lands in the early sixteenth century, the Ottomans sponsored the pilgrimage to Mecca, and through subsidies to the Hijaz fostered Islam in its birthplace. The Ottoman rulers also venerated Jerusalem and gave its judges a high status. Often pre-Ottoman practices and patterns of religious behavior were more thoroughly organized and regularized by the Ottomans, but in some cases relatively new applications of Islamic institutions or structures were created. Examples of the latter could be seen in Istanbul's Siileymaniye and Edirne's Selimiye mosque complexes, among the most beautiful in the world, constructed at the command of the sultans. 1 Naturally, many aspects of public life did not involve religion to a significant degree, whether in the political or social arenas. And religious groups other than Sunni Muslims were also important for the Ottomans, though the relations between Sunni Muslims and others inside the empire were regulated for the most part according to standards acceptable to the ulama. The toleration usually shown by Ottoman elites toward minority religious groups and the more ecstatic Sufi organizations was remarkable, especially in comparison to the lack of religious toleration in many European countries at that time. Paradigms based upon the supposed decline of the Ottoman Empire from about 1600 to 1800 have been abandoned or have undergone modification recently. Il is now believed that in many facets of government and society the most important processes were those of readjustment rather than decay. 2 Still, the changing balance of power between Western Europe and the Ottoman realm in the eighteenth century made many elite Ottomans want military and technological change along European lines. During the nineteenth century the ever-increasing pressure of European imperialism —

' Raf'ec Hakky, "The Ottoman Kulliye Between the 14th and 17th Centuries: Its Urban Setting and Spatial Composition," Ph.D. dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1992. ^Examples of this historiographical trend may be found in Rifaat Ali Abou-El-Haj, The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics (Istanbul: Netherlands HistoricalArchaeological Institute, 1984), and Thomas Naff and Roger Owen, eds., Studies in Eighteenth-Century Islamic History (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977).

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whether military, economic, or cultural in nature — plus indigenous drives toward reform and renovation resulted in substantial changes in Ottoman government and, to a lesser degree, in Ottoman society. A few illustrations drawn from the issues where public life and Islam intersected illustrate the processes involved. While its Sunni Muslim subjects continued to grant political legitimacy to the Ottoman state on the basis of the twin pillars of dynastic and religious loyalty, 1 the religious identity of the empire underwent substantial modification. In 1826 the Bektashi Sufi order was suppressed, while in 1866 the leadership of the Sufi orders was consolidated under state control. The various religious ethnic minority communities at first sought equal status in treatment by government regardless of religious group (millet) membership, and by 1876 a written constitution derogated some powers from the ruler to the elected representatives of the people. Representation in the Ottoman parliament partially corresponded to millet identity, and thus religious community continued to be a basis for political power within the Ottoman state framework. Anti-Ottoman revolutionary movements based on ethnic nationalism among the non-Muslim population often were reinforced by bonds of religious identity, and these in turn were frequently couched in anti-Muslim terms. The idea of nationalism serving as an alternative to Islam as a basis for state power reached the predominantly Muslim Arab, Albanian, Turkish, and possibly the Kurdish regions at a later time than it affected the Christian and Jewish minorities, but by World War I dynasty and faith were no longer the only viable intellectual alternatives for Ottoman Muslims. 2 Christian Arabs played a prominent role in the earliest formulations of Arab nationalism, which tended to be relatively secular in tone. As Muslim Arabs started to be interested in nationalism, the balance between ethnic, linguistic, and religious characteristics in national identity became more problematic. Sultan Abdiilhamid II promoted the concept of Pan-Islam as a counterbalance to nationalism, hoping to gain support among Muslims outside as well as inside the Ottoman Empire. Pan-Islam was a positive ideology in that it was intended to promote the welfare, common identity,

A talk given in the Hijaz by an emissary from the Ottoman Sultan in 1892 showed the usefulness of these concepts: see Ottoman Archives (Istanbul), Yildiz 13.112/11/112 6, enclosure 2, draft of a speech for Ratib Pasha, no date (probably December 1891). ^Bernard Lewis, "The Ottoman Empire and Its Aftermath," Journal of Contemporary History 15, no. 1 (January 1980): 27.

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and strength of the Muslim community; at the same time, Pan-Islam also gained support from the opposition to European and Christian imperialisms. To give this concept concrete expression Abdiilhamid mandated in 1900 the building of the Hijaz Railroad, a holy railway designed to link the central Ottoman lands with the pilgrimage cities of Arabia, appealing for funds from Muslims around the world to help build the railway. 1 The sultan also emphasized Ottoman claims to the caliphate. Even though earlier Ottoman sultans had included this title among many others they used, the weight given it in the context of a Pan-Islamic policy was new. The sultan's Pan-Islamic policy presaged the later use of Islamic religious symbolism and appeals to the community of believers for political and moral support in the twentieth century by such organizations and leaders as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Saudi monarchy. Yet in a rather contradictory fashion, Abdiilhamid, like earlier Ottoman reformers, also promoted aspects of secularism. Two such cases were the growth in size and importance of government schools, which taught Islam but gave great weight to secular matters in the curricula, and the Mecelle law code completed in 1876, which though based on the holy law nevertheless represented a considerable departure from it in some ways. 2 Following the ouster of Abdiilhamid, the Committee of Union and Progress promoted Turkism, while maintaining parts of the Pan-Islamic movement. The emergence of various Christian communal ethnic-religious nationalisms, the spread of nationalism to several Ottoman Muslim ethnic groups, and the rise of Pan-Islamic ideology as sponsored by the state all contributed to a confused, inchoate, and occasionally contradictory political atmosphere in the Ottoman Empire during its last decades. This uncertainty about the identity and nature of the political community and its relationship to religion was matched later by similar problems that continued to bedevil many of the independent successor states following the end of the empire. Outside the scope of Ottoman government other forces also promoted secularism. Arab and Turkish intellectuals became intimately involved with the prevailing currents of thought in Europe, e.g., the debate over

'William Ochsenwald, The Hijaz Railroad

(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,

1980). ^Carter Findley, "Medjelle," tncyclopaedia

of Islam, New Edition.

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evolution. 1 Elites who in earlier days would have studied Persian now learned French and necessarily began to adapt to the values present in European societies where they often went to study. Some of the ulama started to devote their energies to reconciling Islam and the new secular ideas; Muhammad Abduh of Egypt (d. 1905) was only one of many religious thinkers who participated in this process. Debates raged over the social implications of Islam in such aspects of life as gender relations, clothing, personal and group honor, artistic creation, and, more generally, the desirability of innovation. As European countries gained direct control over various Muslim lands, millions of Sunni Muslims became refugees in an Ottoman Empire that while itself was shrinking nevertheless seemed to be the only Muslim state capable of resisting Eurpean imperialism. From the perspective of some Muslims, however, the Ottomans themselves with their Europeanizing reforms were losing credibility as the defenders of Sunni Islam. This view was especially held by Sunni revivalists including the Mahdists in the Sudan, the Sanusi brotherhood in Libya, and the WahhabiSaudi movement in Arabia. The ultimate cause of the disappearance of the empire came from multiple military defeats — in the war with Italy, the Balkan Wars, and most disastrous of all, World War I. The Ottoman call for jihad in 1914 was regarded by many Muslims as hypocritical in light of the Ottoman alliance with Christian Germany. 2 Other Middle Eastern Muslims concluded that an insufficient secularization and the resulting weakness of the Ottoman military as demonstrated during the war was the ultimate cause of the disappearance of the empire.

SUNNI ISLAM IN FORMERLY OTTOMAN LANDS During the twentieth century, a period noted for extraordinary changes and revolutionary upheavals throughout the world, the basic ritual and credal elements of Islam have proven to be extremely resilient and resistant to innovation. The important beliefs and rituals that constituted the core of Islam for personal faith, piety, and behavior have not changed greatly. Sources employed for arriving at the interpretation of the faith have also *Adei A. Ziadat, Western Science in the Arab World: The Impact of Darwinism, 1860-1930 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986). Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization (New York: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 99-103.

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continued to be those accepted by earlier generations. These elements and beliefs were continuously present for the community of believers, and thus were conveyed to the contemporary period through the generations of Muslims living in the Ottoman era, but they were not uniquely Ottoman in any profound sense. In the context of major challenges experienced by Muslims, Islam provided a bedrock of spiritual stability and continuity. The changes in Sunni Islam since 1918 were, in most parts of the Middle East outside the Turkish republic, neither direct effects of the Ottoman experience nor direct reactions against it. Many parallels can be seen, however, between the religious situation of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire and its twentieth-century successor states. The greatest changes were in the social expression of what earlier Muslims had construed to be God's will on this earth. Among many such matters two of the most salient for the late twentieth century involved population increase and evolving concepts of gender relations. An extraordinary increase in the population of the Middle East, most of which was Muslim, took place in the twentieth century — for instance Egypt's population grew from almost 13 million in 1917 to about 55 million in 1992. Fertility rates in Syria, Iraq, and Jordan after 1945 were among the highest in the world. The ability of Muslim religious institutions to reach their adherents was challenged by the increase in population and also by the considerable movement of people from the countryside to the cities Since spiritual guidance operating through traditional and government-approved means was often not available or was spread too thin to be effective, many Muslims sought alternatives, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (founded in 1928), a type of mass organization that had not existed in Ottoman days. As the number of Muslims grew, a strain was inevitably placed upon all sorts of religious institutions, including the pilgrimage to Mecca, as supervised by Saudi Arabia. While the rituals of the pilgrimage were practically unchanged for individuals, the regulation of the pilgrimage and the physical facilities needed to organize it on a mass basis were completely overhauled when compared to the pilgrimage system that

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had existed in the Hijaz in the last days of the Ottoman Empire. 1 Another consequence of the rapid population increase was a growing concern among theologians about family planning and related issues. The relationship between men and women, particularly members of Western-oriented upperclass groups, changed in many parts of the Middle East. 2 Heated debates on such issues as veiling, the legal rights of women in regard to child custody, employment opportunities, and the value of secular education for women had started before 1914, but these debates grew increasingly important as the century progressed. In the new media of the cinema, radio, and television, as well as in literature and drama, women assumed a more prominent place in public life and became more independent of men. In most countries women gained the franchise, e.g., in Syria in 1947; eventually they held posts in governments. Probably in households personal relations between husbands and wives also changed to reflect new values and behaviors. These trends were most prominent in Turkey, and in the cities of the Fertile Crescent, Egypt, and North Africa, while only limited change took place in most parts of the Arabian Peninsula and in rural areas. The differential rate of change often seemed directly related to the degree of former Ottoman power, but the real cause was found in the openness of such areas as Damascus or Cairo to Europeanization. Another twentieth-century change was in public life and participation in government. Until the 1979 creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the subsequent 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran War, open quarrels between Sunnis and Shi'is tended to be relatively muted compared to certain earlier centuries. This tentative and partial rapprochement sometimes took place because of a new ideological framework provided by the nation-state, and on other occasions it resulted from a reaction against mutual enemies. 3 For instance, Sunnis and Shi'is in Iraq during the Mandate, the monarchy, and the early republic to a limited extent began to see each other first as Iraqis and only second as members of differing religious communities — although power One example of change was the considerable reductions in the transmission of disease; while improvement in this area had started under the Ottomans, it was sharply increased under Saudi control. See William Ochsenwald, Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz Under Ottoman Control, 1840-1908 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 1984), especially ch. 3; and David Long, The Hajj Today: A Survey of the Contemporary Makkah Pilgrimage (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979). ^Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), has a careful discussion of changes in the status of Muslim women, centered around Egypt for the modern period. Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin; University of Texas Press, 1982).

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was still held primarily by Arabic-speaking Sunnis, who excluded both Arabic-speaking Shi'is and Kurdish-speaking Sunnis f r o m real influence. In Syria shared dislike of first France and later Israel tended to unite the Sunnis and various Shi'i groups. In many parts of the formerly Ottoman Middle East, the basis of governmental legitimacy shifted from the Ottoman blend of dynasty and Sunni Islam to populist nationalism, but one should not exaggerate this change. National communities still often defined themselves on the basis of religion. Complex and shifting views on the interrelationships of language, ethnicity, and religion in national identity had initially formed in the last years of the Ottoman Empire; 1 now, in the period after World W a r I, these views were more fully articulated and put into practice in Turkey, the new Arab states, and Israel. After the Armenian massacres and expulsions and the later population exchanges with Greece, Turkey became an almost completely Muslim country, in a way that Anatolia had not been in past centuries. Indeed, the only significant minority in the Turkish republic was the Kurdish population, but they, too, were Muslims. This overlap of religion and ethnic national identity existed despite the avowed secularism of the new Turkish nation-state 2 . Greater Lebanon, as created by the French in 1920, was notably dependent upon the spirit and system of politics established in Ottoman Mount Lebanon after 1860. Many countries continued with the old mixture of dynasty and faith — most notably Saudi Arabia, down to the present day, but also for a time Yemen, independent Libya, and others. Even very secularly minded republics sometimes sought the support of Islam and the approval of the ulama for their policies in much the same way as the Ottomans had done, Nasser's relations with the official ulama and al-Azhar being a good example. Still, the basic principle of government in the most heavily populated countries was populist nationalism, as had existed in the Ottoman Empire only in the few years when the 1876 constitution was actually in effect. Nationalists claimed greater priority should be given their ideology ^William W. Haddad and William Ochsenwald, eds., Nationalism in a Non-National State: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), especially eh. 1 by William Haddad, and ch. 2 by Roderic Davison; Rashid Khalidi et al., eds., The Origins of Arab Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). ^Lewis, "The Ottoman Empire and Its Aftermath," contains a succinct account of the changes in political group identity from the later imperial period to the Turkish republic:.

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than religion, and the status of the professional men of religion declined. To the secular nationalists the specialized knowledge of the ulama and Sufis was useless or even detrimental, and the social benefits of religious training were few. Explicit anti-ulama sentiment was seldom expressed publicly, but the net effect of putting the nation-state first was to lessen the political importance of Islam. Between 1920 and 1939, with major exceptions such as Turkey, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, real political power in most parts of the former Ottoman Empire was held by external imperial powers, whose populations and governments were at least nominally Christian. This situation tended to exacerbate suspicions directed toward indigenous Christians held by some Middle Eastern Muslims, as in Iraq in the 1930s. These suspicions were similar to those present in Ottoman Damascus and Lebanon in 1860, but the unity demonstrated by most Christians with Muslims in nationalistic struggles after World War I, such as in Egypt in 1919, mitigated such feelings. After World War II, as European direct power waned, political power in the more populated countries tended to gravitate toward leaders who in effect represented the viewpoints of the new middle class, often encapsulated partially within the military. In some cases the new rulers created a security state, using intelligence agencies and the secret police, as well as policy accomplishments, to maintain themselves in power. In societies like Ba'thist Iraq and Syria or Nasserist Egypt, government became far more interventionist in the economy, culture, and private life than had been the case even in the last days of the Ottoman Empire. Generally, such regimes tightly controlled religion and particularly the ulama, who tended to become mere servants of the state.1 Ironically, in the more conservative and rich oil monarchies the state also became far more powerful than the Ottoman regime had been locally, since these governments gained economic power from direct payment of petroleum royalties. Still, religion and society tended to be less rigorously controlled than in the security states. In Saudi Arabia, the ulama maintained a somewhat separate power base and could on occasion influence

1 Roger Owen, State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 40-41.

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government decisions, 1 as in the long delay until 1991 in the issuance of guidelines for a consultative council. The concept of shura or consultation drawn from the Quran was often used in these countries as a basis for representative councils Legitimacy in the conservative states rested in part on their sponsorship of Islam; Saudi Arabia in particular, as the supervisor of the pilgrimage, spent very large sums of money on improving transportation, housing, and access to the holy shrines in Mecca and Medina. In this regard, the Saudi government acted like the Ottomans, who had also sponsored and supervised the pilgrimage and subsidized the Hijazi holy cities. Attention paid to the personal behavior of the leader or ruler also differed between the more secular, revolutionary regimes and the more religious, conservative ones. While the revolutionary leaders were not especially pious, most of them did nevertheless quietly follow the prescripts of Islam in their private lives. The personal behavior of the ruler and his family was more important in the conservative societies, as in the criticism launched against some of the Saudi princes for their profligate lifestyles. Vast oil reserves and production gave the Middle East in the twentieth century an even greater importance for the rest of the world than it had possessed in the nineteenth century. Earlier, the chief significance of the Middle East was in its strategically and economically crucial location in the center of the Eastern Hemisphere, and in the spiritual attachment directed toward its religious sites and legacies by the world's major monotheistic faiths. The Ottoman Empire had played a role in the European balance of power system, and European and North American Christian and Jewish groups had sought to expand their religious and organizational influence into the Middle East. While these factors continued to play a role in the making of twentienth-centurv foreign policy, religion became somewhat less important as oil considerations grew in importance, particularly in the 1970s and afterward. The role of oil had only started to be felt in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, and even then Middle East production was limited to Iran and Baku; its significance in the Middle East was a twentiethcentury phenomenon.

'Ayman al-Yassini, Religion and Stale in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Boulder: Wcstvicw Press, 1985); William Ochsenwald, "The Islamic Revival in Saudi Arabia," in Shireen Hunter ed., The Politics of Islamic Revival (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), pp. 10315.

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Zionism also had begun in the last half century of the Ottoman Empire, but it came to world prominence with the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the following struggle between Arabs and Jews. Zionism itself was largely created in Europe, outside the Ottoman lands. While competition between Arabs and Jews was heatedly debated in the Ottoman parliament after 1908, 1 the most important elements in what became the Arab-Israeli dispute were associated with events that took place after the disappearence of the Ottoman state from Palestine. Arab Palestinian identity was usually expressed in terms of a secular nationalism, which both Christian and Muslim Palestinians supported. Even so, leadership of the Palestinian community in the 1930s was centered in the person of Hajj Amin al-Husaini, who held the post of Mufti of Jerusalem. Also, following the movement toward a compromise resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute by the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) in the late 1980s, some Palestinian Muslims rejected the P.L.O. and opted for a religiously based opposition to the existence of a Jewish state. The Palestinian Arab cause enjoyed support in other parts of the Middle East partially for nationalistic and moral reasons but many supported the P.L.O. because of Muslim religious solidarity. This question of Palestine preoccupied much of the Middle East for the second half of the twentieth century, contained serious ramifications for Muslim identity and group self-confidence, and led to repeated wars between the Jewish state of Israel and its predominantly Sunni Arab neighbors. The Arab-Israeli dispute after 1948 could be traced in part to factors that had first taken form in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, although the dispute evolved far beyond that situation. Other than in Palestine, where no independent Arab government held power, by the 1960s most of the Muslim Arabs of the former Ottoman lands usually lived under secularizing independent national governements. The victory of the secularizers in government was foreshadowed by the line of policy espoused earlier by some Ottoman reformers, as in the educational and legal changes enacted by the Committee of Union and Progress during World War I, but in many ways the Arab secularizers went a good deal farther in educational and legal reforms. 2 Mass public education increased literacy, and many more Muslims were able to read and understand religious texts and tracts than had been the ^Neville J. Mandel, The Arabs and Zionism Before War I (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976). 2 Owen, State, Power, and Politics, p. 40.

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case earlier. The educational process in most parts of the Middle East was increasingly secular in content, even though religion was still taught in the public schools. Higher education in particular was influenced by European beliefs about the desirability of a division between religion and the state. The theoretical implications of Western science for widespread customary beliefs attached to Islam by the masses were usually not made clear in public discourse. Still, for the scientifically educated elite a distancing process often took place. This sometimes led to an ignoring of religion or a decline in the prestige associated with piety. One example was the apparent change in the social status of pilgrims to Mecca, who increasingly were drawn from lower socioeconomic groups. Elements of the Ottoman legal code called the Mecelle remained in effect for many years in some parts of the former empire, including Jordan, Israel, Iraq, and, more generally, as an influence on the formulation of law in various areas. 1 The shari'ah was limited more and more often to the realm of personal status aspects of law, and even there modifications were made along secularizing lines. The authority of the government to create laws now came supposedly from the general will of the sovereign people, not from God's words as expressed in the Quran. Pious Muslims who opposed secularizing legal reforms favored the principle that Islam and not the people's will should be the basis of law. A reacting against excessive state power and secularism variously labeled as Muslim renewal, Islamism, Islamic fundamentalism, or Islamic revivalism developed. Milder approaches, such as the early twentieth-century Salafiyyah movement, did not gain a large popular base of support. Similarly, the Pan-Islamic movement attracted attention during the 1920s and 1930s, but it accomplished little.2 Following the abortive claims of Sharif Husayn, former Ottoman amir of Mecca and later King of the Hijaz, to the Caliphate in 1924, no other Muslim ruler gained recognition as caliph. The post-World War II expressions of Pan-Islam in the form of the Organization of the Islamic Conference or the World Muslim League also tended to be relatively ineffectual. 3 Then, after the loss of the 1967 Arab'Findley, "Medjelle," Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition. ^Martin Kramer, Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). ^Muslim solidarity and cooperation replaced total Pan-Islamic unity as a more realistic goal, particularly as sponsored by Saudi Arabia. For a thorough discussion of Pan-Islamic organizations and activities since 1945, see Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam, especally ch. 6.

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Israeli War, and with the seeming failure of secular nationalisms, many Arab Sunni Muslims turned toward thinkers like Sayyid Qutb of Egypt. In 1979 the ascent of fundamentalists to power in Shi'i Iran also encouraged the emergence of Sunni fundamentalist groups in the Arab states and in Turkey. When s o m e states moved toward democratic elections, as in Jordan in 1989, Sunni fundamentalists emerged as a major political force. The fundamentalists often rejected the accretion of religious interpretation that had taken place during the Ottoman era in favor of an earlier, pre-Ottoman, and pristine Islam. They often opted for a rigid, puritanical scripturalism that rejected the premodern synthesis of ulama and Sufi views. Although Sultan Abdiilhamid II's Pan-Islamic movement had parallels with late twentieth-century Pan-Islamic fundamentalism, for instance in a shared suspicion of the West, the differences were also substantial. One example of these differences was the Ottoman use of Sufi brotherhoods to spread Pan-Islamic concepts. 1 Post-World W a r II fundamentalists did not employ Sufi organizations in this way. At the other end of the political spectrum f r o m Pan-Islam and Islamic fundamentalism was Marxism, which had been espoused by a f e w small under-ground groups in the Middle East before the end of the Ottoman Empire, although its emergence as a substantial alternative to existing political systems came only after 1945. In Iraq after the 1958 revolution and in South Yemen after independence from Britain in 1967 Marxists became important players. In most parts of the Middle East they were usually suppressed by hostile governments or paralyzed by internal factionalism. One reason why Leninist-Stalinist Marxism had so little appeal in the Middle East was its avowed atheism. The challenge posed by Communism to Islam and the Muslim reaction against it in the twentieth century were somewhat parallel to the experiences of Marxists in the late Ottoman Empire, but differed in many ways because of the new international status of the Soviet Union and domestic changes taking place in formerly Ottoman countries.

'Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam, pp. 51-54.

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DIRECT O T T O M A N I N F L U E N C E S O N T W E N T I E T H - C E N T U R Y SUNNI ISLAM If one turns from parallels with limited causal connections to more direct examples of the religious heritage of the Ottoman Empire for twentieth-century Sunnis, probably the most profound consequence has been the predominance of a relatively tolerant and well-organized Sunni Islam in the Middle East. The Ottomans stopped European Christians f r o m conquering the Middle East for many centuries and thereby helped preserve the dominance of Islam there. At the same time the expansion of Shi'i Islam was vigorously opposed in the central Muslim lands. Ottoman tolerance of protected Christian and Jewish religious groups before nationalism was established set a precedent for the twentieth century that was often but not always followed. Ottoman systematization and bureaucratization of the Sunni ulama continued into post-Ottoman years in the former Arab provinces, wtih substantial consequences for the internal organization of the ulama and their relationship with the state and the Muslim community. While Sufi organizations were often derided and ignored in the twentieth century, their ability to persevere was related in part to the patronage that had been given them by the Ottomans in earlier times. The phenomenon of popular Sufism 1 side by side with an "official" Sufi hierarchy was another example of a parallel situation spanning Ottoman and post-Ottoman times. Among the various individual countries of the Middle East, it was in the Turkish republic that the legacy of the Ottoman Empire for Sunni Islam was most influential, at least in a negative sense. The leaders of Republican Turkey reacted strongly against the Ottoman experience in religion, while their policies and views were largely formed in the context of the last decade of the empire, when the Committee of Union and Progress had already begun a movement toward secularization. A major principle of the republic was secularism, and its implementation entailed serious changes from the Ottoman system of religion and government. 2 The caliphate claimed by the Ottoman sultans

' p o r a discussion of populai Sufism in recent times, see Valerie J. Hoffman-Ladd, "Devotion to the Prophet and His Family in Egyptian Sufism," International Journal of Middle East Studies 24 (1992), pp. 615-37. ^Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 2 (New York: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 384-88, has a concise discussion of secularism in the Turkish republic. Also see June Starr, Law as Metaphor: From Islamic Courts to the Palace of Justice (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992).

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was abolished in 1924, after the sultanate had also been ended. (Despite various efforts in other Muslim states, the caliphate was not reestablished elsewhere and this venerable religious-political institution vanished). Legal reforms completed the process of official secularization that had begun in the nineteenth century, as the shari'ah courts were dissolved. Sufi orders were outlawed and the call to prayer had to be in Turkish rather than Arabic. The 1925 uprising of Kurdish tribal, and Naqshibandi groups opposed to the secular reforms was suppressed by the republican government. Turkey adopted the Gregorian calendar associated with Christian Europe, while the Muslim dating system was only used to determine religious holidays. Pious foundations came completely under the control of the state, and most of the ulama were dismissed from official employment. All citizens were entitled to equality before the law, regardless of religion, according to the 1924 constitution. In the same document there was a statement that Islam was the religion of the state, but in 1928 this was removed. Religious schools were absorbed into the secular state system, which was rapidly expanded; eventually religious instruction in the schools was forbidden. Language and alphabet reform instituted by the regime had a profound impact upon religious culture. The whole basis of the state was transformed from the Ottoman synthesis of dynasty and Islam toward a populist, secular nationalism that looked more toward the early history of Central Asian Turkic groups for inspiration than to the Abbasids, Seljuks, and Ottomans. Social and symbolic changes were even more far reaching, since they often influenced Turkish Muslims more directly than political changes. Alcohol became legal for Muslims, the use of the veil by women was strongly discouraged, polygamy was outlawed, women were guaranteed by law equal rights with men in such areas as child custody, and many occupations that had formerly been reserved for men now had women working in them. Music, art, and architecture were oriented by the government away from earlier Islamic civilization and toward European models. A notable example was the erecting of public statues, especially of Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, the first president of the republic, and the leading figure in bringing about the secularizing changes.

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Yet despite these and other reforms, in many respects the Turkish republic continued to follow certain patterns of Islam that had existed during the Ottoman Empire. Most importantly, the government made no attempt to change the basic elements of faith. While the Quran in Arabic was more difficult to read, and the government encouraged the use of a Turkish translation, the original was available, and theology could still be privately studied, using the same texts and methods as before. Private faith, pious behavior, and even newly illegal acts probably often continued as earlier, especially in the countryside where the government's power was less effective. The need for Islam as a guidance to ethical conduct and eschatological belief persisted. In at least one way the new government ironically enough increased the role of Islam in public life. Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk was called the gazi or warrior for the faith because of his victories, while the War for Independence had some of the aspects of a holy war against the Greek Christians. Many early Ottoman rulers had been regarded as gazis, but military victories to support such a title had been few in the late nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire. As the Republican People's Party relaxed its tight control over public life following World War II, and particularly with the advent of multiparty freely contested elections in 1950, a new approach to state-mosque relations came into play. 1 Those in Turkish society who opposed the extreme secularism of the early republic were now able to express publicly at least some of their views, and their votes were actively sought by political parties. Study of the old alphabet was permitted, a program to build mosques with state funds was fully funded, religious training schools were legalized, religious instruction in the schools was restored, and the call to prayer in Arabic was once again heard. In the second half of the twentieth century a significant number of Turkish and foreign historians devoted their research to Ottoman history. New work was done on such topics as the processes of conversion from Byzantine Christianity to Islam, Ottoman-Safavid-Moghul relations, the functioning of pious foundations, career patterns among the ulama in the eighteenth century, the practical effects of the Tanzimat secularizing changes, and Abdiilhamid II's Pan-Islam. As the results of these projects began to influence the Turkish public, the former complete disdain for the 'The essays in Richard Tapper, ed., Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics, and Literature in a Secular State ilxmdon: I. B. Tauris, 1991) illuminate many aspects of Islam in Turkey after 1950.

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late Ottoman period was revised in some quarters to a more accepting attitude. Some Islamic fundamentalists and Europeanizing secularists objected to this revisionist approach to Ottoman history. The National Salvation Party favored Islamic reforms in education, culture, and national governmental policy, but neither it nor its successors sought a return to Ottoman political or religious systems. Underground Sufi groups conducted their services more openly in the 1970s, and books and journals dealing with various aspects of Islam sold many copies. Similarly, few leftists viewed the Ottoman experience favorably, and those Turks who wanted Turkey to join the European Economic Community, with the implication of eventual complete merger into a unified Europe, were basically content with the balance between religion and the state that had been struck under Atatiirk, so they also opposed the Ottoman religious-state synthesis. As military control of Turkish society following the coup of 1980 gradually relaxed, both fundamentalists and leftists emerged once more into the political system. New Sufi orders were founded. Yet, despite the growing popularity of the Sufi orders, the trend of Turkish society toward integration into Europe was resumed. In architecture, painting, literature, cinema, and cultural life in general (though perhaps not in music), Turks had earlier moved away from Ottoman legacies of style, expression, and content. While Ottoman and Islamic motifs were adopted from time to time, as in urban architecture and painting, these seem to have been limited in appeal even though the 1980s brought a fashionable interest in Ottoman history and art, including Sufism. 1 Atatiirk's changes have continued basically to the present. Thus, the Ottoman legacy has influenced Turkey chiefly in the way that the leaders of the interwar generation reacted against it. In other ways the Ottoman Empire left a more substantial legacy for Sunni Islam in today's Middle East. In the first half of the century much of the adult population consisted of persons who had lived in the last decades of the empire, and their earlier experiences inevitably influenced their later For a discussion of this trend that gives greater weight to the continued importance of Sufism and Islam in contemporary Turkey, see Cemal Kafadar, "The New Visibility of Sufism in Turkish Studies and Cultural Life," in Raymond Lifchez ed., The Dervish Lodge.

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behavior. Some former Ottoman officials and military officers became influential in the successor states, most notably in Turkey, but also in Iraq, Yemen, and Transjordan, among others. Very few of these influential persons, however, were drawn from the ranks of the ulama, Sufis, or other groups especially inclined toward religion. The physical remnants of the empire included many religious structures, ranging from impressive imperial mosques to more humble but still enduring buildings in the provinces. Among such remnants was the Hijaz Railway, established as a pious foundation ( w a q f ) to promote the pilgrimage. The fate of this pilgrimage railroad might stand as an examplar for the Islamic legacy of the empire. By 1926 control of the railway was divided between the British Mandate of Palestine, the French Mandate of Syria, the Hashimite Amirate of Transjordan, and the Saudis. Some sections of the railway continued to function, but the unity of the line was permanently disrupted, and the track in the Hijaz that had been destroyed during World War I was not rebuilt. Projects to restore the line after World War II faltered as the separate national interests of each country could riot be reconciled. Other contributing reasons for the inability to revive this Ottoman legacy revolved around Israeli control of the Hijaz Railway branch to the Mediterranean, the legal ambiguity inherent in a railway whose ultimate owner was God, and the evolution of new transportation patterns and technologies that made the pilgrimage railway outmoded. 1 While Turks were profoundly affected by the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, Muslims Arabs living in other former Ottoman lands were less influenced in religious matters by the Ottoman experience. Many parallels existed between nineteenth-century Ottoman experiences with Islam and those of twentieth-century Sunni Muslims in the Middle Hast, but often the similarities in these experiences were matched by equally striking differences. Secularism along lines initially experienced in European societies affected the nature of Islam substantially, particularly in the interaction between gov ernments and individuals. These two strands of Islam — its basic structures coming from pre-Ottoman periods, and the impact of non-Muslim Europe — were more important causally than the legacy of late Ottoman Islam.

1

William Ochsenwald, "A Modem Waqf," Arabian Studies 3 (1976), pp. 1-12.