Ottoman Reforms and Social Life: Reflections from Salonica, 1830-1850 (Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies) 9781617190940, 1617190942

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Ottoman Reforms and Social Life

Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies

A co-publication with The Isis Press, Istanbul, the series consists of collections of thematic essays focused on specific themes of Ottoman and Turkish studies are brought together in Analecta Isisiana.

These

scholarly

volumes

address

important

issues

throughout Turkish history, offering in a single volume the accumulated insights of a single author over a career of research on the subject.

Ottoman Reforms and Social Life

Reflections from Salónica, 1830-1850

Bülent Özdemir

The Isis Press, Istanbul

¡Jibias PtXSS 2010

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2010 by The Isis Press, Istanbul Originally published in 2003 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of The Isis Press, Istanbul. 2010

o

ISBN 978-1-61719-094-0

Printed in the L'nited States of America

Bülent Özdemir is a graduate from the History Department of the Faculty of Education, Marmara University, Istanbul. He holds a Master's degree from California State University al Long Beach (1997) and a Ph.D. from the University of Birmingham (2000). He is currently teaching in the History Department at Balikesir University in Turkey

to the memory of my father

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Notes on Transliteration Abbreviations Prefacc Introduction: The Sources

9 9 11 13

PARTI Theories and Methods 1. A Critical Review of the Literature on the Tanzimat 2. The Pattern of Reforms in the Decades Leading up to the Tanzimat

19 21

Part II: 3. 4. 5. 6.

The Study: Socio-economic Aspects Salonica: on the Eve of the Tanzimat The Commerce of Salonica Agricultural Production, Peasants and the Reforms Local Administration, Functionaries and the Reforms

PART III: Socio-cultural Aspects 7. Muslims of Salonica and the Reforms 8. The Jews of Salonica and the Reforms 9. The Orthodox Community of Salonica and the Reforms 10. General Conclusion Appendix A Appendix B Glossary Bibliography

53 67 69 89 135 155 175 177 187 205 229 239 246 254 256

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe a great deal to many people for their patience, help and encouragement in the completion of this study, a Ph.D. thesis submitted in 2000 at the School of Historical Studies of the University of Birmingham, U.K. 1 am indebted to Dr. Rhoads Murphey, my dissertation supervisor, for his invaluable advice and encouragement which provided enormous help in thinking through and shaping this study. I have to thank Dr. Eric Goldstein who supervised this study in the initial stage and shared his extensive knowledge of British archival sources. Professors Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj and Sherry Vetter deserve special mention and thanks for inspiring me to pursue this study during my Masters degree. I am grateful to my friends and teachers in the Centre for Byzantine, Ottoman and Modern Greek Studies for their support and assistance. I would like to thank the staffs of the Public Record Office in London, the Historical Archives of Macedonia in Thessaloniki and the Library of Birmingham University. Particular thanks go to the members of the Turkish Society of the Birmingham University and the Turkish community in Birmingham for their moral support. It is also my pleasure to thank Dr. Mevliyar Er for both her help on technical problems and good company in the study room. I should like to thank the Council of Higher Education of the Turkish Government and the Bahkesir University for financially supporting me through many years of graduate study till the completion of this book. I am grateful to my parents, Kadir and Emine Özdemir and my brother Levent for their support. Most of all I thank my wife, Sevil and my sons, Osman and Abdiilkadir, and my daughter, §irinnur for always helping me and sacrificing a lot to allow me to bring this book to a successful conclusion.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

9

Notes on Transliteration Turkish words, regardless of their language of origin, have been transcribed according to the official modern Turkish orthography mostly in italic forms. The anglicised forms are used for well-known placc-names (e.g., Salonica) and Turkish words (e.g., pasha). For the Ottoman documents the basic rules of transcription in the Redhousc dictionary are used.

Abbreviations PRO FO PPAP = BPP US NA = P TTK =

Public Record Office Foreign Office Parliamentary Papers Accounts and Papers Blunt's Private Papers National Archives of United States Piastre Turk Tarih Kurumu

PREFACE

The main purpose of this book is to contribute to the literature on the Tanzimat by carrying out a local study on Salonica. Since nincteenth-century Salonica is being examined as a case study, a related aim is to contribute to the history of the city and the region. The study is structured in three parts containing ten chapters; the first part is devoted thcorctical and methodological assertions and arguments along with a general review and evaluation of the present literature, while both the sccond and third parts deal with social, economic and cultural aspects of the city's transformation during the time of the Ottoman reforms. The approach taken in studying Ottoman change can best be described as a bottom-up view of the reforms. This study focuses not on the actions and decisions of the state or the central government's views and evaluations of the reforms, but rather upon local perceptions of the reforms. The effects of structural social, cultural and long-term economic changes upon the progress of reforms are described in the case study of Salonica. The capacity for mutual responsiveness between the central state and the local social elements is questioned in order to see the other side of the coin which is generally left unexamined in most of the political and diplomatic studies on the Tanzimat. Most writings on the Tanzimat still start with the state-centred approach of setting out the reforms and end by discussing the way in which they were implemented in society. In this book I argue that the central government initiated the reforms based upon observation of the gradual — in the nineteenth century, increasingly rapid — socio-economic transformation of Ottoman society. The state not only successfully observed the changes and seized the ongoing opportunities, but also made neccssary responses and set the context for reform at a general state level. Also, by accepting that society has always been changing to some degree, I contend that the idea of reform was not imported from the outside and alien to the Ottoman Empire at all. The intensification and importance of nineteenth century reforms should be taken into account as a parallel development in any survey of changes in society. This study should not be viewed as being fully applicable to the rest of the Empire. This book is nothing other than an enquiry for the study of the internal conditions of a vast Empire by doing local case studies to complete the picture.

INTRODUCTION: The Sources

How can one access first hand accurate information about Ottoman society as experienced in the Salónica of the 1840s is the first challenge to be confronted at the outset of this study. Needless to say, using archival sources as the primary source is a foremost requirement in any historical study. The main archival sources which have been used for this study are the Ottoman Court Records (§er'iye Sicilleri) in Salónica, the official correspondence of the British Consul in Salónica, the private papers of Charles Blunt (British Consul in Salónica), American consulate reports of Salónica, contemporary travellers' and other accounts, monographs, and treaties. Secondary sources, books, articles, etc. have been consulted as necessary. The Ottoman Judiciary Court Records which have been used for this study are preserved in the Historical Archive of Macedonia in Thessaloniki, Greece. Only a proportion of these registers, mostly the imperial fermans (orders) sections have been consulted to gain inside information on the central government's priorities in order to comprehend better how it sought to mould Ottoman society in Salónica between 1830 and 1850.1 am fully aware of the importance of the central Ottoman archives (Bajbakanlik Ar§ivi) in Istanbul, yet the relevance of the topic particularly on the city life and social changes in Salónica gives a rationale to concentrate on the Salónica Sicils. Secondly, the Ottoman Court Records are adequate to provide the required archival information for the objectives of this study. The consular reports which have been consulted were mainly the correspondence of British Consul Charles Blunt with both the British Embassy in Istanbul and the Foreign Office in London. Since Consul Charles Blunt was appointed to Salónica in 1835 as the first officially recognised Consul in the city and lived there until 1856, in our study, covering the period between 1830 and 1850, we relied very heavily on information given in his reports. Consequently, it is of some importance that the character of Charles Blunt's reporting be given consideration. We do not have much information about him even in the basic biographical reference books. However, one thing is clear: he was a very successful British consul in the Ottoman Empire. The long period of service to the British Empire, the very thorough knowledge of and integration in Ottoman society, and the fact that his son, John E. Blunt, followed his father's footsteps as a successful British Consul in the Ottoman Empire, all lend considerable credibility to his account. There is a clear need to put more emphasis on Consular reports than on European travellers' accounts, since there is little doubt that the former constitute a more reliable source for the early nineteenth century. First of all,

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consular reports were written by state officials who were responsible to their superiors for providing accurate information. Because they had official responsibilities in the cities, they were better placed than travellers in gaining access to the required data for their reports. Most of the time, there was mutual understanding and common interest between the local Ottoman government officials and the foreign consuls. They were given certain rights and privileges and these rights were protected by Ottoman law. In addition to this, they constituted a part of the higher echelons of the cities and were usually in close contact with the government officials. A t the same time, they also had other, more remote sources f o r their information. They had informants in the countryside and in different towns in order to learn about the state of affairs in the region. Second, their reports were not written for the public and usually neither published nor publicised; therefore there was no need for falsified or arbitrary estimates and criteria added for the purpose of attracting or convincing the general reader. T h e case in the travellers' accounts was precisely the opposite. Third, Consuls mostly sent their reports to two basic centres; one was to Istanbul, where the ambassador lived, and sometimes directly to the Foreign Office in London. T h e secrecy of their reports as official papers also increased their accuracy. They remained in the cities or regions f o r a long period of time (sometimes 25-30 years as in the case of Consul Blunt in Salonica) and they were familiar with all the special characteristics of the society, region and city, making their situation for reporting far superior to that of travellers. They often learned the language and were able to read the local press. They also compiled detailed tables and statistics on trade and military matters. Consul B l u n t ' s opinion of the way in which travellers obtained information in the Ottoman Empire was as follows: Strangers of any appearance of respectability when travelling in the interior of the Ottoman Empire are generally, in consequence of their travelling with ferman or buyruldu either quartered upon the Christian Bishops, or at the houses of the forbaci or rich Christian reayas. If at the house of the latter, his host in all probability a member of the community, will he give the requisite information and compromise himself? If he remains a day or two with the Bishop all the information he will obtain will most certainly mislead him. A passage through Turkey or a year or two in the country will not afford the necessary opportunities for obtaining the requisite information. 1 Thus, in this study, w e take the reports of the British Consul of Salonica between 1835 and 1850 to be among the more reliable and accurate sources of the time in a comparative study with the Ottoman Court Records. Now, let us take a closer look at the shortcomings of the travellers' a c c o u n t s . L i m i t a t i o n s in c o l l e c t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n ( l i n g u i s t i c a n d cultural barriers) along with their own ignorance, presumptions and prejudices 1

FO 195 / 176 Blunt to Ponsonby January 1841.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

15

respecting the country they visited and considerations of the intended audience all constitute major reasons why these accounts should be used with spccial care and attention. The nineteenth century European travellers in the Ottoman Empire were "not content to be passive recorders of the events"; 1 in general they were very m u c h under the influence of a d o m i n a n t political and ideological environment and set of prejudices. They looked at events and at social life in order to find things which were different and strange to contrast with their Western European cultural background. What was "news" was their primary interest. The information in the travel books was in the first place often no more than estimations and basic narration grounded in a mixture of their preliminary reading and what they saw in the cities where they spent some time. These visits sometimes lasted one or two days and sometimes not more than a month. T h e statistics were based on the information which they could get f r o m individuals, or, if they were lucky enough to meet some government officials, they could get more accurate information. One of the travellers' principal sources of information was again the consuls in the cities. It was through these consuls that they acquired m u c h of their i n f o r m a t i o n , particularly the statistics relating to trade, population, etc. W e should be highly sceptical about the accuracy of the figures in the travel books. Secondly, we should question the travellers themselves respecting their reputation in society, their background and assumptions, since naturally they would carry a variety of political, psychological, and ideological baggage. For instance, their political views and any prejudices against some groups in the Ottoman Empire, or a hidden sympathy for some other group or groups could play an influential role in their accounts. 2 They might come to the Ottoman Empire for different purposes such as a search for the exotic oriental or "The T h o u s a n d and One N i g h t s " , to f i n d ancient glories and to assess the achievement of the Empire. For example, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, the well-known w o m a n traveller in the Ottoman E m p i r e in the eighteenth century, remarked, in a letter dated 1 s t April 1717: ... we have but very imperfect relations of the manners and religion of these people, this part of the world being seldom visited but by merchants who mind little but their own affairs, or travellers who make too short a stay to be able to report anything exactly of their own knowledge. The Turks are too proud to converse familiarly with merchants ctc., who can only pick up some confused information which are generally false, and they can give no better an account of the ways here than a French refugee lodging in a Garret in Greek street could write of the Court of England. 1 Barbara Jelavich, "Balkans: The Abuses of Ottoman Administrators in the Slavonic Provinces", Slavic and East European Review, v. 30, n. 81, pp. 396-413. 2 Bernard Lewis, "Some English Travellers in the East", Middle Eastern Studies, v. 4, n. 3, (April 1968) pp. 296-316. For examples of the manipulation of population statistics in the travellers' accounts for political purposes by various ethnic and religious groups in the nineteenth century, see Kemal Karpat, Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics, (Madison: The Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1985) pp. 4-5. 3 Robert Halsband, (Ed.), The Complete Letters of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, 1708-1720, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965) pp. 315-316.

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At this point, I want to deal with the problematic use of the basic secondary literature in modern historiography. As is well-known, a considerable portion of the current literature on the East 1 is a direct outcome of the continuing study of every aspect of the East by Westerners. The driving force for studying the East was nothing but an attempt to ease the West's imperialist expansion. A close examination of the relations over time between Western imperialism and the development of orientalism will show the parallel progress of these two. 2 According to Edward Said, the basic duty of orientalism is to define and to explain the East, which docs not acknowledge even itself, in order to make it meaningful and comprehensible for the service of the West. Focusing on differences rather than on similarities constituted another characteristic feature of orientalism. 3 This tradition mainly started with travellers' accounts and memoirs and then evolved mainly in the nineteenth century into the more sophisticated and institutionalised forms given the name "orientalism". 4 In Western universities, studying the East became a scholarly enterprise and a profession. Consequently, within several decades, there emerged a vast literature dealing with every aspect of the East. My opinion concerning the use of this "orientalist" literature is that one has to be as careful with it as when using the travellers' accounts. Though most of this literature is the product of scholarly study and research and should not be compared to the travellers' accounts, it is not without its own problems. Needless to say, Western scholars used the available data of the time from both Eastern and Western sources in a careful professional way and contributed, in a sense, to the beginning of the scholarly study of the East. However, this type of secondary literature has been shaped by contemporary views and ideas about the East mixed with the presumptions and perceptions in the minds of Western people, including scholars. The problem is to determine when and how we should use these accounts as basic sources in historical research. The prevailing attitude concerning the use of orientalist literature is that whatever they have written about the East should be accepted at its face value. Now, when we deal with the orientalist literature, we have to keep in mind that the accounts are of things seen through Westerners' eyes and filtered through their own understanding, which can give rise to very idiosyncratic definitions and descriptions of things Eastern. 1 The term "East" was first used for the geographic area which covers the terrain from the east coasts of the Mediterranean to south-east Asia; however, later on the term mostly referred to the Islamic lands. See Bryan S. Turner, "Orientalism, Islam and Capitalism", Social Compass, v. 25, (1978), pp. 371-394. 2 Bryan S.Turner, "Orientalism, Islam and Capitalism", pp. 371-394. 3 For the elaboration of these issues see Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Random House, 1979). 4 This is particularly true of Great Britain where during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Grand Tour to the East formed part of an aristocratic education. Also, in Britain the Asiatic Society and the Royal Asiatic Society were founded as early as 1784 and 1821, while L'Institut d'Egypte and La Société Asiatique were established by Napoleon in France. The first chair of Arabic was founded at Cambridge University as early as 1633. See Bryan S. Turner, op. cit.

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To give an example, the misperception by Westerners of apostasy cases and of severe punishment for apostates results from Westerners' established background and perception of apostasy in their own religion, that is, in most eases, Christianity. In Christianity, apostasy was not an act which calls for the death penalty, as it does in Islam. The perception was that in the Christian religion, one can convert from one sect to another very easily (for instance from Orthodoxy to Protestantism); this was called apostasy and in the nineteenth century did not merit a severe punishment. Maybe the apostate was excommunicated from his own community. Since the boundaries between the Christian sects (Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant) had been drawn precisely, the conversion from one sect to another was a serious act but did not require the death penalty in the nineteenth century context. 1 However, in Islam, while conversion from one sect to another is not a serious matter mainly because Islam is not divided into several sects in terms of the fundamentals of faith and accepting or changing the scct is not regarded as apostasy. The term "apostasy" in the Islamic context is used only for the eases of conversion to any other religion; and the punishment of this action is death. 2 Now, in this context, the accounts in Western literature respecting apostasy cases in Islam might most probably seem severe and the critiques of Islam and of Islamic rules might also be excessively severe. Generalising from their own background and understanding of the issue, they might look at apostasy cases, say, in the Ottoman Empire, from a distance and might not comprehend the issue in its Islamic context. As a result, the punishment for apostasy in Islam continued to be regarded as a very cruel practice in the minds of the Westerners. The second problematic point here is the Western writers' use or misuse of contemporary Eastern accounts. Sincc the first initiative and opportunity were seized by Western writers to construct the literature, particularly the secondary literature of the East, they did so according to their own facts and contemporary perceptions. It should be borne in mind, then, that the West usually tells its own side of the story. We should not let accounts by foreigners be considered preferable to those of local native informants whose accounts have been suspected of bias. Moreover, we must seek alternatives among local sources to already asserted and established views. 3 To illustrate the above statement, consider some contemporary Eastern and Western accounts of the East, which were notably being ignored by both the Western and Eastern scholars because of pre-established labels, prejudices and false evaluations by the former. For instance, the well-known seventeenth century 1 See Timothy Ware, Eustratios Argenti, a Study of the Greek Church under Turkish (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) pp. 16-33. 2 For the details of the apostasy issue in nineteenth-century Salónica see Chapter 9. 3

Rule,

As an example of such an attempt, sec Virginia H. Aksan, "Enlightening the Ottomans: Tott & Mustafa III" Paper presented to International Conference on Learning and Education in the Ottoman World, Istanbul, 12-15 April 1999.

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traveller of the Ottoman Empire, Evliya (Telebi, was depicted as a great exaggcrator or romancer of his time in several accounts. Consequently, whatever he wrote falls under great suspicion. T h e r e f o r e , an important contemporary account is undervalued by many scholars. This treatment has also been extended to the accounts of the Ottoman statesmen w h o went to Europe and wrote their own observations of Europe upon their return to the Empire. One of the best known of these was the account of Halet Efendi w h o was in France for a period of time (1803-1806) during the reign of Sultan Selim III (1789-1808) as the Ottoman ambassador to Paris and who wrote his own account of France. However, his writings were treated by Western and Eastern scholars as traditional statements of a member of the ulema class and labelled as incompatible with and failing to comprehend the virtues of the West properly, because of the famous statement attributed to him made to the Sultan after his return to Istanbul: "I begged your majesty to pray for my safe return f r o m this land of infidels because I came all the way to Paris to find the Frankland which some people speak of with as much admiration as possible. But I do not know in what Europe these wise Franks and those astonishing things are to be f o u n d . " and " . . . you were asking about the prosperity of France. I think unbelief covered the whole place there ... the welfare and prosperity of France were not for the Muslims. I prayed to God to leave this place safely." 1 Though this observation of Halet Efendi may have been correct according to his background, expectations, values and perception of life, no credit has been given to his account of Europe in any writing in the present literature. 2

1 Enver Ziya Karal, Halet Efendinin Paris BiiyUk Elgiligi, 1802-1806, (Istanbul: Istanbul Universitesi Yayinlari, 102, Kenan Basimevi, 1940) pp. 32, 33. 2 As an example of this assertion, Halet Efendi was described as "... a convinced reactionary and hater of all things Western . . . " and also labelled "... in general concerned to paint as negative a picture as he can ..." by Bernard Lewis, when he cited Halet Efendi. See Bernard Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982) pp. 57, 290.

PARTI THEORIES AND METHODS

1 A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE TANZIMAT

The Tanzimat 1 , one of the most important aspects of nineteenthcentury Ottoman history, has been the subject of many studies and writings starting from the time of the promulgation of the Tanzimat decree to the present. First, it appeared in the chronicles of the official Ottoman historians (vakanuvis),

s u c h a s Tarih-i

Cevdet

a n d Tarih-i

Lutjt

in t e r m s of its

contemporary significance and consequences. They stressed the importance of the reforms according to their own views of the time and made some explanatory, mostly narrative, comments on it. In the late writings (Tezakir) of Cevdet Pasha, one can find some critiques of the Tanzimat policies, but Cevdet mainly confines himself to offering opinions of the statesmen including, Mustafa Re§id Pasha, whom Cevdet Pasha warmly supported. 2 The first critical literary evaluation of the Tanzimat was made in the Young Ottoman era. When Ziya Pasha, Namik Kemal, Ali Suavi, §inasi, etc. began to appear on the scene as the first relatively liberal intellectuals of the time in the Empire, the literature of the Tanzimat was changed from its official form to more liberally critical forms. These authors, who flourished some 20-25 years after the Tanzimat decree in 1839, started to question it under the influence of the problems of their own time, which, they believed, were the negative products of the Tanzimat. They took the initiative of voicing their criticism through the relatively free press and for the first time took a stance on the side of the people against a sort of oligarchic administration of the Empire by powerful bureaucrats. 3 In later periods, the writings about the Tanzimat mainly concentrated on the question of whether or not the Tanzimat constituted a starting point for the modernisation (Westernisation) of the Ottoman Empire. In the process of modernisation, the unique role of the Tanzimat under the impact of the West was the general answer to this question in the writings of many. 4

The Tanzimat was the process of reformation and change in many areas (social, cultural, administrative and political) of life in the Ottoman Empire which started by the proclamation of Tanzimat Decree on 3 November 1839 and ended with the closing of the first Ottoman Parliament on 14 February 1878. 2

Cevdet Pafa, Tezakir, 1-12, p. 8. For a well documented general overview of the Young Ottomans' writings see ihsan Sungu, 'Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlilar" in Tanzimat I, (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 1940) pp. 777-857. 4 For a general account of the opinions on this issue see Regat Kaynar. Mustafa Regit Pa§a ve Tanzimat, (Ankara: TTK Yayinlari, 1991) pp. 191-198. 3

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During the last fifty years, the Tanzimat has been analysed from different angles by taking up more specialised issues, for example economic, educational, administrative, etc. The literature of the last fifty years on the Tanzimat bears the clear imprint of the politics of different periods. Not only did the literature of the Tanzimat depend on the contemporary political climate, but it was also designed to serve a political purpose. A thick volume of studies entitled Tanzimat I, 1940 constitutes a very good example of this phenomenon of the 20 t h century Turkish historiographic tradition. Upon close examination, one cannot fail to see that some of the articles in this edited book were shaped according to the political climate of the time. When the authors were dealing with the Tanzimat and its implications upon different subjects, they were more inclined to make comparisons between the Tanzimat reforms and the reforms of the Turkish Republic in terms of their common successes than to analyse the issues in an open fashion. Their preoccupation with the official doctrines of the newly established Turkish state was all too apparent in their writings. 1 The fundamental characteristics of the 20th century Turkish historiographic tradition deserve some mention here. History was one of the major problematic topics of discussion confronting the newly created Turkish republic based on the idea of the nation-state in the early years of the republic. The question of how the new Turkish state, which was established on both the physical and moral ruins of the centuries-long Ottoman Empire, should conceptualise the past was addressed according to the precepts of the new state ideology. In the view of a respected Turkish historian the whole process could be classified as follows: The Ottoman Empire was a theocratic state and every aspect of life, including literature, had to be explained in terms of religious thinking. Therefore, history writing in the Ottoman Empire was irrational and wrong. From the Tanzimat onwards, there occurred some changes in the understanding of history after the opening of the new state schools and the introduction of the more liberal views of these aspects of life. However, since these changes only promoted another tradition, which was to write history for the sake of the Sultan or of the Ottoman dynasty, they failed to provide an acceptable basis for the development of objective historiography. At the end of the Empire, there was another stream of historiography based on the idea of ethnicity which to some extent prepared the ground for the historiography of the new Turkish state. Finally, modern national historiography in Turkey was formed during the early years of the republic on a more independent and objective basis. 2 For the present, the above brief outline still characterises the 20th century Turkish historical perception of the Ottoman past. If one wants to contribute anything to this literature, one has to start from the above premises.

1

I must exclude some valuable works in this volume from this assertion. Enver Ziya Karal, "Tanzimattan Bugune Kadar Tarihsiligimiz" in Turkiye'de Tarih (Ankara: Hacettepe iiniversitesi, Felsefe Grubu Seminerleri, 1975) pp. 255-267. 2

Egitimi,

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ON

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T A N Z I M A T

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For the most part present literature depicts the causes of the Tanzimat as arising from external factors namely the impact of the West. Stalling from Engelhardt's classic book, La Turquie et le Tanzimat, it stressed the importance of Tanzimatist statesmen's Western views and argued for the influence of the West upon their reformist ideas. Most of the work produced over the past 150 years conforms to this view. Even the very recent works approach and discuss the same assumptions. 1 In the literature of the last fifty years, the Tanzimat has been conceptualised as the start of the Turkish state's struggle to becomc a member of the modernised and civilised Western world, presented as an "immortal" ideal which is still alive and open to the Turkish republic even in the 1990s. 2 Although the Tanzimat was criticised in the early period of the new Turkish Republic because of its weaknesses and its incomplete commitment to full social transformation, the perception of the Tanzimat as the first serious attempt at Westernisation did not change for many. 3 An analytical framework based on the historically inaccurate notion of a uniform and monolitiiic "West" is valid to lead to confusion. However, the perception of the Tanzimat in Western countries was not the same. There was no unique Western response to the Tanzimat. As we can see from the varying reception according to the announcement of the Tanzimat in 1839 in the "western" press, it should be emphasised that Austria, as a member of the Western civilization, expressed a minority and dissenting opinion on the suitability and application of the reforms for Ottoman society of that time. 4 Also, British public opinion and the press were relatively quiet and did not make such an uproar as did the French. 5 Until recently, the Tanzimat was dealt with in the same vein by the repetition of familiar generalisations without undertaking original research into the situation at the time. One example was the article "Gulhane Hatt-i Humayununda Batinin Etkisi" (The impact of the West on Gulhane Hatt-i Humayunu) by Enver Ziya Karal prepared to commemorate the 125 th anniversary of the Tanzimat decree. 6 The dichotomy of the superior West and the inferior East and the view of the reforms as the outcome of a simple relation in which the West was always the independent core producer and the East was always the dependent receiver are See the discussion of Fatma Mtige Goçek's book, Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). In justification of this assertion, I cite some titles of papers which were presented in the conferences on the 150 th anniversary of the Tanzimat: Ali E. Oba, "Türkiye'nin Modernlegme Tarihinde Tanzimatin Dani ve Avrupa Topluluklanna Katilma Bajvurusu," Ercümcnt Kuran, ' T a n z i m a t Hareketinin Türk Batihla§ma Tarihinde Yeri," Orhan Türkdogan, "Tanzimatta Batilila§ma Tezi," in Tanzimat'in 150. Yildönümü Uluslararasi Sempozyumu, (Ankara: Milli Kiitüphane Matbaasi, 1991). 3 As an example see Niyazi Berkes, Development of Secularism in Turkey, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964). 4 See Metternich's letter to Baron de Stürmer, Austrian Ambassador to Istanbul in Mémoires de Metternich, (Paris, 1884) v. 6, pp. 378-386. 5 See London Times, 13 October 1839, p. 4. ® Enver Ziya Karal, "Gulhane Hatt-i HUmayununda Batinin Etkisi", Belleten, V. 24, (1964) pp. 581-601. 2

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very much apparent in the tone of this article. For instance, in the comparison of the Western and Ottoman perceptions of the Tanzimat, Karal dares to assert, without any reference to the original Ottoman sources, that the Tanzimat was misunderstood and opposed by the Ottoman people while the West applauded it as a very significant success. 1 These differences in the Western and Ottoman views of the Tanzimat, according to Karal, resulted mainly from the reality of belonging to different civilisations. Therefore, the problem was not simple. The problem was the East's intrinsic attachment to its religious beliefs and mysticism while the West had been able to transcend this stage and prosper. 2 Now, it was time for the Ottoman Empire as representative of the East to pursue its destiny by following the West in order to become a modernised and civilised entity. To accomplish this, according to this Eurocentric view, there had to be a few intelligent persons lucky enough to comprehend the West, through whose enlightenment and understanding the Ottoman Empire could be led out of its darkness. According to Karal, even some representatives of the Western civilisation such as the British Ambassador, Sir Stratford Canning, offered their help, prompted by strictly humanitarian feelings and their desire to "civilise" the Ottomans. 3 Karal concludes with a rather weak statement in which he finally accepts the relatively small impact of the internal dynamics on the transformation of the Empire as displayed in the Tanzimat decree itself. As wc have seen in the above example, this view of the Tanzimat was widespread in the Tanzimat literature of the last fifty years. Only one work, the PhD thesis of Halil inalcik should be excluded from this group of works. In his Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi, Inalcik touched on the social and economic issues, which were closely related to the reforms, and he made an outline for future research that the Tanzimat showed a realisation of the contemporary social and economic problems of the time. A few years later, he wrote about the Tanzimat again; and it can be seen in his two articles, "Tanzimatin Uygulanmasi ve Sosyal Tepkileri", and "Sened-i ittifak ve Giiihane Hatt-i Htimayunu" that his perception of Tanzimat did not change over time. 4

1 In contradiction of this view, Part II and III of this book clearly shows the intelligent position of the Ottoman people towards the Tanzimat reforms and their very good understanding and the supportive attitude to the reforms, regardless of their position in society whether educated or illiterate. 2 Enver Ziya Karal, "Giiihane Hatt-i..." pp. 584-585. For a fully detailed discussion of the dichotomy of the East and the West, and questions on the origins of Western civilisation, see Samir Amin, Eurocentrism, (London, 1989). 3 Enver Ziya Karal, "Giiihane Hatt-i..." p. 590. ^Both articles appeared in a special issue of Belleten for the 125 lh commemoration of the Tanzimat Decree in Belleten, 24, (1964) pp. 603-690. The article 'Tanzimatin Uygulanmasi ve Sosyal Tepkileri" can be found in English as "Application of Tanzimat and its Social Effects", in Archivum Ottomanicum, V, (1973) pp. 97-128.

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Towards the end of this period of fifty years, some dissenting voices began to be heard. 1 In the view of this camp of writers the Tanzimat was framed in its basic philosophy and served to initiate a general degeneration of Turkish culture. In their view, there was no need to venture into Westernization in all areas of social life. On the one hand, there should have been a separation between Western technology and Western institutions and values. On the other, they found fault with the Tanzimat for its wholesale acceptance of Western civilisation and the failure of the Tanzimat reforms to carry out a selective assessment. In some respects, these writings echo the ideas of Young Ottoman writers such as Narmk Kemal and Ziya Pasha. Here again, the impact of the West on the Tanzimat and its negative results were raised by an opposing group of writers. Starting from the 1980s, the new institutions and the reorganisation of the Ottoman Empire under the Tanzimat reforms were studied by a new generation of (young) Turkish historians. They have focused on unique issues such as the tax system, administration, industry and agriculture and elaborated on them in impressive detail. Living in a more politically and ideologically independent atmosphere than the generations of the 1940s, they have questioned the traditional views of the Tanzimat. 2 These works offer more than the repetition of familiar generalisations on the Tanzimat period presenting the results of research based on archival sources. However, most of these new works have been conceived from the perspective of Istanbul and are concerned primarily with the Ottoman state and central government and its transformation under the new reform measures. In these works, Ottoman society is almost missing from the scene. The perception of the Tanzimat among the ordinary people of the Empire, the reciprocal effects and counteractions between society and the reforms should be taken into account in order to approach the Tanzimat accurately. Otherwise, studying the state, its institutions, and the influential figures of the time make an incomplete picture. Studying statesmen and their thoughts and actions within the context in which the Tanzimat arose is a sterile exercise providing only a small place for its actual effects. In other words, writing history based upon the personal views and memoirs of some influential individuals gives rise to some cliché terms and phrases which might impede the understanding of particular events. In T a n z i m a t studies, f o r instance, the terms " W e s t e r n i z a t i o n " , "modernisation", "decline", "corruption" or "the impact of West", do not pave *Erol Giingor, Turk Külturü ve Milliyetplik, (Istanbul, 1976), Seraiha Ayverdi, Turk Tarihinde Osmanli Asirían, (Istanbul, 1975), Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar, 19. Asir Turk Edebiyatl Tarihi (Istanbul, 1976). Musa ^adirci, Tanzimat Doneminde Anadolu Kentleri'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapilari, (Ankara : Tiirk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1990), Abdtillatif §ener, Tanzimat Donemi Osmanli Vergi Sistemi, (Istanbul : Igaret Yayinevi, 1990), Bilàl Eryilmaz, Tanzimat ve Yonetimde Modernlejme, (Istanbul: t§aret Yaymlan, 1992), Ahmet Gijkjen, Tanzimat Donemi Osmanli Ceza Kanunlari, (Istanbul, 1989), Hakkt Dursun Yildiz, (Ed.) 150. Yilinda Tanzimat, (Ankara: Tiirk Tarih Kurumu Yaymlan, 1992), Tanzimafln 150. Yildonümü Uluslararasi Sempozyumu, (Ankara: Tiirk Tarih Kurumu Yayinlari, 1994).

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the way to any other possible thinking or explanation. These empty phrases and typologies were accepted as facts without questioning their accuracy and appropriateness in explaining the Ottoman past. However, one thing is clear: that as the study of the Tanzimat continues, new approaches and possibilities in studying it will emerge to enrich our understanding. On the 150 th anniversary of the Tanzimat Decree, there appeared three different volumes of Tanzimat studies in 1989 and the years following. The most comprehensive and important was 150. Yilinda Tanzimat edited by Hakki Dursun Yildiz and published by the Turk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish Historical Society) in 1992. 1 Leading scholars of nineteenth century Ottoman history contributed to the literature of the Tanzimat in terms of different aspects of the reforms. Certain specialised subjects were picked out and explained by scholars. No doubt, the articles are a great contribution to Tanzimat studies, but there is no general account to establish a new and different approach to the Tanzimat. As Roderic H. Davison stressed at the end of his article in the same volume, Western Publications on the Tanzimat, there is a great need for local and regional perspectives on the Tanzimat to fill the gaps in our understanding of it. The other two volumes were compiled from the papers presented in two symposiums. One was held by the Turkish Historical Society from 31 October to 3 November 1989 and consisted of 39 valuable articles 2 and the other was held by Millt Kutiiphane Ba^kanligi (National Library) under the sponsorship of the Turkish Ministry of Culture between 25 - 27 December 1989 and contained 38 papers. 3 Recently, scholars have begun to show a preference for the study of society, and emphasising socio-economic aspects among the factors which shape history. The term "social change" became a kind of "magic phrase" in the explanation of historical events. This school of history writing began a trend of questioning certain well-established historical "facts" or "events", leading to a re-examination of their accuracy and consequently to reevaluations based on new findings. The new historiography has also been supported by the continuously growing number of unique, mostly local studies, thanks to the richness of the Ottoman archives and their increasing exploitation by scholars. At present, the topic of "changing society" has become the main object of study. An awareness of the importance of ordinary people and of collective social forces shaping the course of history has led to a desire to follow the lead of the archival documentation in the writing of history, largely ignoring the presuppositions and presumptions of the cliche discourses.

* Hakki Dursun Yildiz, (Ed.) 150. Yihnda Tanzimat, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayinlan, 1992). Tanzimat'in 150. Yildönümü Uluslararasi Sempozyumu, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayinlari, 1994). 3 Tanzimat'm 150. Yildönümü Uluslararasi Sempozyumu, (Ankara: Milli Kiitiiphane Matbaasi, 1991). 2

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In the historiography of the Ottoman reform m o v e m e n t in the 19th century, there are disagreements and debates between historians. T h e main question is whether the course of 19th century O t t o m a n r e f o r m s was determined by the impact of external forces or of internal forces. Basically, there arc two theoretical approaches : they may be named as the classical Orientalist school 1 and the relatively new socio-economic interpretations. 2 The Orientalist tradition is particularly concerned with the problem of external causes which are European "superior" military, diplomatic, and economic forces and tends to concentrate on political and diplomatic history giving special emphasis to state-centred explanations. R e c e n t s o c i o - e c o n o m i c approaches, conversely, stress the problems of social structure and the importance of internal causes in the process of beginning and shaping the Ottoman reforms within the regional context and socio-economic realities of society. Most diplomatic and political studies regard the nineteenth-century Ottoman reforms as efforts of the state's centralization policy in reaction against eighteenth-century decentralization. Therefore, if the need for those reform policies comes from the eighteenth century decentralization, we have to look at the causes of the decentralization which reflected the changes in social, political and economic structure of the Ottoman Empire. How did the socioeconomic and political changes in the society affect the decision making process for the Ottoman reforms? What was the role of social forces in the emergence of those r e f o r m ideas at the political level? Did the central reformers look at Ottoman society before taking steps to institute reform? Can we see the nineteenth century Ottoman reforms just as centralization policies aimed at controlling the material sources of the Ottoman Empire?

Especially for the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman reforms see H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilisation on Muslim Culture in the Near East, vol. I, (London: Oxford University Press, 1950). Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968). §erif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernisation of Turkish Political Ideas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). Roderic Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). F. E. Bailey, British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations,1826-1853 (New York: H. Fertig, 1970). Stanford J. Shaw , Between Old and New (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964). 2

For the description of this discourse sec Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Random House, 1979). Bryan S. Turner, Marx and the End of Orientalism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1978). Roger Owen, ' T h e Middle East in the Eighteenth Century, An Islamic Society in Decline: A Critique of Gibb and Bowen's 'Islamic Society and the West'," Review of Middle East Studies, 1(1975) p. 101-112. I. Wallerstein, "The Ottoman Empire and the Capitalist World Economy: Some Questions for research", Review, v. II, n. 3, (Winter 1979), p. 389-98. Huri islamoglu inan (ed.), The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Rifa'at Ali Abou-ELHaj, Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991). I. Wallerstein, H. Decdeli, R. Kasaba, "Incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the WorldEconomy", Huri Islamoglu Inan, (Ed.), The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 88-97. Donald Quatacrt, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881-1908 ( New York, 1983).

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According to the general view of the issue, the first attempts to introduce reforms into the Ottoman Empire were mainly concerned with the Ottoman army in the final quarter of the 18th century, because it was at this time that the Ottoman Empire began to realise that it had been overwhelmed by European military power. 1 In the interior, the major concern was the decentralisation of the empire or the rising power of the provincial forces at the time. Military defeats and the loss of control by the central government over the provinces were seen as symptoms of the need for reform. 2 Beginning with Mahmut II, however, reforms were initiated in almost every field of life, particularly in the system of central government and administration of the provinces and also in areas such as education, taxation, law, economy and the status of non-Muslim subjects. The Orientalist school tried to explain the causes of the reforms in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire with the so-called "decline thesis". After reviewing the works of this school, it is possible to conclude that every attempt made by the Ottoman government for reforms was a reflection of the decline or dissolution of the Ottoman State and the corruption of its institutions. 3 The assumption was that Ottoman society, as a characteristic Islamic society, was not changing over time becausc of its static social structure in which ethnicity, religion, and tribalism were the only determinants in establishing groups. Ottoman society, it was thought, did not contain dynamic elements which could accommodate society to the needs of the time. Therefore, the activities of the state per se and external forces — European price inflation, the influx of Spanish silver, the shifts in world trade routes, the unfavourable balance of trade with Europe, and European military and economic superiority — were the causes of change in the Ottoman Empire. The view of the reforms by the Orientalists is that while the nineteenth century Ottoman reforms were the products of external forces, the Ottoman state and ruling class were the main instruments introducing the reforms under 1 Bernard Lewis, Emergence pp. 45-50. Jerif Mardin, The Genesis, pp. 136-137. Roderic Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, pp. 21-22. 2 F. E. Baily, British Policy, p. 150. See also Davison, Reform, p. 31 and Lewis, Emergence pp. 82-85. 3 See the works of Niyazi Berkes, Roderic Davison, Robert DcvereuK, Stanford Shaw, Frank E. Bailey, Bernard Lewis, which reflect the same pattern or even the same terms such as "decline" and "corruption" adopted from the contemporary Ottoman writings. For a contrary opinion, see Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Modern State. By analysing nasihatname literature, such as writings of Ko§i Bey and Mustafa Ali, he discusses the issue of the introduction of new elements into the Ottoman ruling class and the struggle within the ruling elite. Also he points out the misuse and misinterpretation of the nasihatname literature in the writings of the historians, in which K o p Bey's and Mustafa A l i ' s writings are taken into account without further investigation as proof for the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Unlike most of the historians, he interprets the literature by dealing with those writers' personal backgrounds, status in society, and their careers in bureaucracy. Thus, Abou-El-Haj argues that in the circumstances of the socio-political and economic changes within Ottoman society, those writers did not represent an objective view of historical reality, as members of the ruling class. They were not unbiased observers at that time.

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the impact of external forces. 1 By these nineteenth century reforms, the old institutions were entirely destroyed because of the impossibility of revitalising all the original institutions and replacing them by new ones imported from the West and imposed upon Ottoman society. 2 The major problem, according to the Orientalist school, was the accommodation of those Western-style reforms within traditional Ottoman society. In this sense, it was clear that Ottoman society would be unable to accommodate the newly adopted Western reforms with its traditional and conservative social structure. By assuming that a link with Western civilisation is the only criterion for Ottoman reforms, the Orientalist school judges the Ottoman Empire as missing out the stages of Western civilisation such as the ages of humanism and reason, commercial revolution and industrial revolution. 3 Their argument concludes that the Ottoman Empire failed to take advantage of Western civilisation in the process of adaptation to the reforms because of the usual problems of a traditional Islamic society, namely the nature of Ottoman society as static, traditional and religious. 4 Among the external forces, the interests and activities of the Great Powers in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century were often taken into account as a major force behind the process of initiating the reforms. 5 There is no doubt that the political impact of the West upon the policies of the reforms intensified during the Tanzimat in the form of diplomatic intervention by the European Powers. European diplomatic and economic agents in the empire were always crucial in determining the reform policies. Their close relationships with the Ottoman ruling group are often emphasised in the works of the Orientalist school. 6 In general, "The millet system" 7 and "the capitulations" 8 were used by the Great Powers for intervening in Ottoman affairs. The position of non-Muslim millets and their relationship with the reforms were the central theme, according to the Orientalists, in the rivalries of the European powers over the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the assertion is that the ground for the nineteenth-century reforms was prepared by the European powers in order to take advantage of the process of reform and the subsequent economic problems. While the position of non-Muslim millets was used "as a cover for power politics," the establishment of banks and the

1

Roderic Davison, Reform p. 64. Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 11. Niyazi Berkes, The Development, p. 20. 3 Davison, Reform, pp. 14, 15. 4 See Bernard Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982) pp. 295-308. 5 Harold Temperley, "British Policy Towards Parliamentary Rule and Constitutionalism in Turkey (1830-1914)", The Cambridge Historical Journal, v. 4, n. 2, pp. 156-191. 6 See the works of Bailey, Davison, Devereux, Lewis, Berkes, Shaw. 7 institutionalised communal system based on the people's religious affiliations in the Ottoman Empire. 8 Commercial and judicial privileges given to some of Euroepan states by the Ottoman government. 2

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codification of penal and commercial laws contributed to the increase of European economic power in the empire. For instance, Temperley simply argues that the British political and economic interests in the Ottoman Empire were the driving force behind the British statesmen's efforts to induce the Ottoman Empire to reform itself. 1 In his words, the British Ambassador in Istanbul, Stratford Canning was the major figure preparing the Western inspired reforms, which were "of a purely administrative and humanitarian character" and were "transparently idealistic and sincere". 2 Believing in these, Temperley even goes further and questions Palmerston's and Canning's reluctance to support parliamentary rule in the Ottoman Empire. When he puts this assumption as the basis of his argument, he finds no difficulty in seeing the whole of the reform process of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century as an episode of British foreign policy in the Middle East. Temperley speaks about the reforms as they were convincingly promoted by the British government against the unwillingness of the Ottomans, and says that in so doing they may have used every means of exerting pressure for this purpose. 3 In like manner, also, the state and the ruling class emerged as the main agents in the process of bringing about the European inspired reforms. 4 The assumption is that "the reforms were not the products of the aspirations of the Ottoman society or of the rising middle class but rather the creation of traditional political authority". 5 Since the Ottoman society was a typical Islamic society composed of ineffective ethnic and religious groups, the Orientalists concluded that there was no organised pressure from below. Therefore, the ruling group had to be the reforming group. The ruling group initiated the reforms because it needed to maintain its existence and power. As a result, they never looked at society itself and the reforms were not concerned about the changes to be made in all aspects of the society. They simply looked at the West in order to find remedies for the decentralisation of the state and the corruption of its institutions. Furthermore, the close relationship over the centuries between the ruling class and the West in the form of diplomatic links and the growing European military, economic, commercial, and diplomatic superiority paved the way for an idea that the only solution required for the problems of the empire was to adopt Western-inspired reforms. 6

' In support of this assertion, Maria Todoroya stresses the Russian factor in the British Middle Eastern policy. See Maria Todorova, "British and Russian Policy Towards the Reform Movement in the Ottoman Empire", Etudes Balkaniques, n. 3, 1977, pp. 17-41. 2 Harold Temperley, "British Policy", p. 159. 3 Harold Temperley, "British Policy", p. 162. 4 For a general review of this phenomenon in the literature of sociology sec Fatma Miige Gö?ek, Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) pp. 12-19. 5 Berkes, The Development, p. 133. Davison, Reform, p. 64. 6 Davison, Reform, p.29.

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The world-system perspective, 1 formulated by I. Wallerstein, developed a theoretical framework for Ottoman history. 2 This approach argues the necessity of considering the Ottoman economy as part of a world-wide economic system. Therefore, the Ottoman transformation took place in the context of "peripheralization" of the Ottoman socio-economic structure, after it came in contact with world economic forces. In this interpretation, "trade" constitutes the most important type of economic activity. 3 Determining factors of the change in the Ottoman social structure are taken into consideration from a perspective in which forces of capitalist world economy prevail. 4 According to the world-system perspective, the nineteenth century Ottoman reforms were the political manifestations of the peripheralization process of the Empire, which were inevitable outcomes of the incorporation of the Ottoman Hmpire into the world-economy. The capitalist world economy was responsible for reshaping the productive systems and the state structure of the Ottoman Empire and for organising the ideology of its social life. 5 First, the economic integration of the Ottoman Empire in the capitalist world economy occurred in consequence of the development of the commercialisation of production and of the activities of its distribution which depended on the demands of the capitalist world economy. This change in the economic structure of the empire created conflicts with the old state institutions and determined the changes also at the political level. 6 All the reform measures in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, therefore, came from the very need to fulfil the requirements of the economic integration into the world market. 7 The Tanzimat reforms and modern institutions that emerged under the impact of Western economic penetration are seen as instruments "to make possible its functioning as part of the world interstate system and to respond to global economic forces". 8

' f o r a general view of this perspective, see I. Wallerstein, The Capitalist World System. Essays by Immanuel Wallerstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 2 For the application of this school to the Ottoman Empire, see I. Wallerstein, "The Ottoman Empire and the Capitalist World Economy: Some Questions for Research", Review, (II, 3, Winter 1979, p. 389-98). I. Wallerstein, H. Decdeli, R. Kasaba, "Incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the World-Economy", in Huri islamoglu Inan, (Ed.), The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 88-97. Huri islamoglu Inan and £aglar Keyder, "Agenda for Ottoman History", in Huri Islamoglu Inan, (Ed.), The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 42-62. Rc§at Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, the 19th Century (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988) 3 Huri Islamoglu Inan, "Introduction" in Huri Islamoglu Inan (Ed.), The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 9. 4 Huri islamoglu Inan, "Introduction", p. 12. 5 I. Wallerstein, H. Decdeli, R. Kasaba, "Incorporation of the Ottoman Empire" p. 96. 6 Huri I. inan and Caglar Keyder, "Agenda for Ottoman History", p. 61. 7 Huri I. inan, "Introduction", p. 21. Q . . Huri I. Inan, "Introduction", p. 11.

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In this context, the world-system perspective conceptualised the nineteenth century Ottoman reform movements as a complex process involving both external and internal factors. Internally, on the one hand, reforms were the political responses to the changing socio-economic conditions of the Ottoman Empire under the impact of capitalist world economy. Externally, on the other hand, the Ottoman reforms were initiated by the ruling elite in the direction of the requirements of the peripheral status of the empire and channelled by capitalist world forces in order to take further steps in the peripheralization process. Thus, one can conclude that the importance of outside forces, namely the European capitalist economy, was responsible for nineteenth-century Ottoman changes. 1 This approach is not totally immune from a certain Eurocentricism. While, to some extent, trying to criticise Orientalism, the world-system theory reduplicates or reinterprets the history of European expansion. 2 Within this general framework of the world-system perspective, there are different interpretations or points of view on the issue of the nineteenth century Ottoman transformation. For instance, both Re§at Kasaba in The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, the 19th Century3 and §evket Pamuk in The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1829-1913, deal with the nineteenth century changes in the Ottoman Empire from the standpoint of the European capitalist system by examining the trade relations and political factors. For both of them, the global political and economic networks, the Ottoman political structure, and the social structure of Ottoman Empire constitute the important elements in the explanation of the Ottoman transformation. In the end, they reach different conclusions. While Pamuk emphasises the central bureaucracy as the key agent of change in the empire in the nineteenth century, Kasaba concludes that the activities of the groups of intermediaries — financiers, tax-farmers, merchants — were responsible for change in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. 4 For both of them, Tanzimat reforms were an attempt to re-establish the central government's control over existing socio-economic conditions and changes. In the meantime, those reform policies were supported by the European powers, because ultimately they served the interests of world capitalist forces. Donald Quataert in Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881-1908,5 examines the resistance of specific economic groups to the European economic penetration after the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world economy. He stresses the importance of the 1

islamoglu and Keyder, "Agenda for Ottoman History", p. 61. For example see, Regat Kasaba, Qaglar Keyder, Faruk Tabak, "Eastern Mediterranean Port Cities and Their Bourgeoisies", Review, v. X, n. 1, (Summer 1986), pp. 121-135. ^ Re§at Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, the 19th Century (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988). 4 Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire, p. 85. ^ Donald Quataert, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire,18811908 ( New York, 1983). 2

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resistance of non-elite social groups — miners, railway workers, smugglers and boycotters — in the process of socio-cconomic and political change in the ninetecnth-ccntury Ottoman Empire. In Quataert's account, those social groups were the opponents of the European economic forces, and were very effective in the internal politics of the Empire.,This opposes Kasaba's point of view that the intermediaries should be considered as components of the European economic forces and take their place in the peripheralization of the Ottoman Empire. A f t e r criticising the assumptions of the Orientalist school, recent regional socio-economic studies stress that f r o m the very start it is necessary to recognise the fact that the Ottoman socio-economic structure was subject to transformation under the impact of internal socio-economic forces, long before massive European i n f l u e n c e accclerated this t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . 1 Thus the nineteenth century Ottoman reforms should have been a gradual and natural response of the Ottoman ruling class to the social and economic changes and pressures f r o m below. 2 B y looking at the Ottoman society as a class-based social structure, recent studies treat Ottoman r e f o r m s in terms of the importance of the internal dynamics of the society. There were classes and intra- and intcr-class relations in Ottoman society, which was a dynamic and changing one. 3 In what follows we review some of the studies of this new trend in the historiography of the Ottoman Empire in order to appreciate a bottom-up view of the nineteenth century Ottoman reforms. It is generally accepted that both external and internal factors were involved in the process of socio-economic change in the Ottoman Empire. T h e argument here is that the transformation of the Ottoman state in the nineteenth century was not just the outcome of foreign dictate. There probably were effective internal changes in the determination of the Ottoman reforms. According to this n e w approach, a view of Ottoman society itself, as a dynamic structure, is missing f r o m the Orientalist school's explanations of the nineteenth-century Ottoman reforms. The school is criticised for seeing the state as the only actor in the process of the Ottoman reforms, and equating the state with Ottoman society, thereby portraying the people outside the state as ineffective in joining the process of reform. Consequently, it is emphasised that changes in the structure of property holding, in tax collection, in the increasing volume of foreign trade, consumption practices, social relations between groups and with the state and also in relations of production are the issues to e x a m i n e in order to understand the internal dynamics and the transformation of the Ottoman Empire. 4

1 Beshara Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1900 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995) p. 4. 2 Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Modern State, p. 66. 3 Huri I. Inan, "Introduction" p. 2. 4 Ibid., pp. 1-24.

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In Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries, Professor Abou-El-Haj argues that the nineteenth century Ottoman reforms have to be examined in terms of internal forces which were more crucial than the external forces in the determination of the reforms. The socio-economic changes of the prior centuries, as dynamic internal factors, affected and prepared the ground for the nineteenth century Ottoman reforms. 1 He argues that the change in tax collection and in the structure of property holding paved the way for the local ruling elite to achieve power and considerable independence from the central state. The relations of a powerful local elite with the central ruling class and their conflicting group ideologies formed the central dynamics of internal change in the Ottoman society. Moreover, the growing commercial and economic interests of those ruling classes required corporations for the purpose of centralisation of the state in the nineteenth century. In this account it is possible to see the nineteenth century Ottoman reforms as "the result of a continuous process dating back at least two hundred years." 2 To illustrate the argument, Abou-ElHaj stresses the importance of social conflicts especially in the seventeenth century, usually in the forms of peasant resistance and rebellion as the evidence of socio-economic change in Ottoman society. He points out, in addition, the evolution of the office of ReisiilkUttab as an example of the development of modern bureaucratic practices resulting from the internal needs of the bureaucratic specialisation in order to accommodate the new functions and requirements of the state. 3 Recently, Beshara Doumani in Rediscovering Palestine, a history of provincial life in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, contributed to the bottom-up view of Ottoman history by emphasising the importance of urbanrural dynamics during the process of Ottoman reforms and of European economic expansion. According to D o u m a n i , before the Ottoman administrative reforms, there were major changes such as commoditization of land, urban-rural integration, monetization of the rural economy and peasant differentiation in the provinces. All these changes in the Ottoman socioeconomic structure contributed to shaping the Ottoman reforms. 4 Thus, the nineteenth century Ottoman reforms and policies can be seen as responses of the central government to changing economic conditions of the empire. According to Doumani, Tanzimat reforms, for example, the Advisory Councils were not the product of Western-inspired modernisation, but rather an accommodation of two forces, which were the local elite and the central government. Both the local elites (who were the product of changing economic conditions in the empire and composed of tax farmers, ruling

1

Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, Formation

2

Ibid., p. 65.

3

Ibid., pp. 16,17. Beshara Doumani, Rediscovering

4

of the Modern State, p. 66.

Palestine,

p. 4.

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families, religious functionaries, and merchants) and the central government were mainly concerned about "gaining access to and controlling the rural surplus." 1 A f t e r examining the Nablus A d v i s o r y Council rccords, Doumani pointed out that the Ottoman government in the nineteenth century usually used the local elites as an instrument to impose government policies and reforms, because the government realised the local elites' powerful position in dominating the commercial, cultural and social networks of the provinces. 2 For their part, the local elites also benefited f r o m government reform policies and new institutions which protected their privileges and allowed them to expropriate the rural surplus. For instance, the originality and integrity of the Tanzimat reforms were manipulated by local elites, who dominated the local councils, according to their priorities and interests. 3 As explained by Doumani, socio-economic changes in the structure of Ottoman society created new conditions f o r the traditional Ottoman policy, which was based on a flexible and pragmatic approach. During the Tanzimat era, the Ottoman government maintained the same policy which was a kind of co-operation with the local forces in a political arena by acknowledging the changes in society and the newly emerging local forces. 4 At the same time, the negative and positive responses of local forces, both the old local ruling families and the new local merchants, to the Ottoman government's offers constituted another dimension of Tanzimat reform policies. It is clear that "the story of relations between the central government and the local forces during the T a n z i m a t era is not a b o u t the i m p o s i t i o n of W e s t e r n - i n s p i r e d modernisation f r o m above and knee-jerk resistance by old-l'ashioned traditional elements f r o m below. Rather, it is a story about the clashing interests of two forces that spoke the same language and that heavily, though unequally, depended on each other." 5 The argument here is that the Ottoman reform policies could be seen as the responses of the Ottoman government to long-term internal changes within the Empire. T o sum up, the process of the determination and application of the Tanzimat reforms is very much concerned and involved with internal changes. It is clear that the depiction of the impact of external forces as the only determining agent in this process is misleading unless we also take the internal dynamics of the Ottoman Empire into account. As we have seen so for, the transformation of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century is to be explained by different theoretical models: topd o w n , in-out, and bottom-up. T h e t o p - d o w n model, formulated by the Orientalist school, conceptualises the Ottoman society as a mosaic of groups 1 2 3 4 5

Beshara Doumani, Rediscovering Ibid., p. 153. Ibid., p. 242. Ibid., p. 217. Ibid., pp. 216, 217.

Palestine, pp. 216, 217.

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which are relatively ineffective in the process of change. Within those groups, since the economic relations are unimportant when compared to the relations of ethnicity, religion and tribe, the causes of change should be looked for in terms of external forces. 1 The in-out model emphasises the importance of world market conditions in the nineteenth century Ottoman transformation. Basically, the economy is perceived in terms of trade activities. Control of trade and the distribution of production are seen as the main determinants of economic relations; and relations of production are partly omitted by this model. For this model nineteenth century Ottoman transformation has to be explained not only in terms of the internal dynamics of the Ottoman Empire but also mostly in terms of the impact of world capitalist forces. According to the bottom-up model, the Ottoman society should be conceptualised as a class-based social structure, because socio-economic relations are the real determinants of the Ottoman social stratification. Moreover, the change in the Ottoman Empire occurs from the consequences of the intra- and inter-class relations. Differentiations, which come from the changing conditions of the property structure, relations of production, surplus extraction and trade relations, between the socio-economic relations of social groups are the main determining causes of change in the Ottoman Empire.

Some Thoughts on the Literature and Established

Views

The majority of scholars tend to refer to the scholarly consensus that the causes of the changes in Ottoman society in the nineteenth century resulted from "the impact of European civilisation", European enlightenment and the revolutionary movements after the French Revolution and played a very important role in the modernisation and secularisation of the Ottoman E m p i r e . 2 Starting from the early diplomatic contacts with Europe, and continuing with the increasing power of bureaucrats and their enlightened ideas rooted in the European civilisation of the eighteenth century, new radical openings and changes in the Ottoman Empire were promoted. With the way thus prepared, more comprehensive reforms were implemented in the nineteenth century. According to Mardin, even the word nizam, which means "order", was foreign to the Ottomans until a European officer pronounced it in a reform proposal in the eighteenth century. 3 The notion that the push for 1 For a discussion of the mosaic model see Bryan S. Turner, Marx and the End of Orientalism.. (London: Allen & Unwin ltd., 1978) pp. 39-52. 2 On the contrary, the impact of the French Revolution particularly in the form of revolutionary ideas was operating among the non-Muslim elites who were in close contact with Europe through trade or diplomacy. The French Revolution and its outcomes did not play an important role among the Muslim people of the Ottoman Empire during Selim Ill's reign. Most of the revolutionary ideas were unknown to the Ottoman people. Compare Berkes, Development of Secularism, with Lewis, The Muslim Discovery, pp. 51, 52. 3 §erif Mardin, "The Influence of the French Revolution on the Ottoman Empire", International Social Science Journal, v. 41, (1989), p. 17.

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reforms in the Ottoman Empire came beyond doubt f r o m the assumption of E u r o p e a n superiority that was well understood only by the Ottoman bureaucrats who had opportunities to get into close contact with European civilisation is explicit in these writings. Contrary to the above assertion, I propose to look at different aspects of the causes and effects of the Ottoman reforms. In the first place, the role of socio-economic changes in any society should not be overlooked, when we talk about major transformations of society. Looking at the reforms of the nineteenth century f r o m the point of view which holds that the reforms were the outcome of "the idea of a purposeful change for the improvement of the Ottoman society" 1 clearly brings us, as it did many scholars, to think that the reforms were imposed upon Ottoman society by a process of implantation which was itself foreign to the social structure. Then, this starting point leads us to consider every reform as an innovation made by the governing authority under the influences of the outside world, needless to say the West. T h e dynamic opposition of the West and its role in challenging the stagnating influence of "tradition", is a commonplace notion in many writings on the Tanzimat. There is however still no clear definition of what "tradition" is apart from its portrayal as the source of every evil in society and the ultimate cause of its backwardness. This is true if we can assume the reformers to be the agents of change, though it is a clear contradiction of the principles of sociology to contend that: "to make people want to change and make them believe that change is possible and d e s i r a b l e " 2 can result only f r o m the lead provided by "enlightened" bureaucrats. Completing this picture of the top-down source of inspiration for reforms in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, it should not be forgotten that the Sultan himself somehow suddenly and semi-miraculously "becomes an enlightened m o n a r c h " , " a popular f i g u r e " , and " a s y m b o l of the unfamiliar" 3 for nineteenth century traditional Ottoman society, because of his privileged contact with a modernising West. Finally, Berkes asserts that "the weakest point in the Turkish political transformation lay in the fact that the new conception of government was not the product of the aspirations of a rising middle class but rather the creation of the traditional political authority in its struggle to maintain its existence". 4 The above statements are, according to Berkes, the explanation of the process of change in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. As we have seen, it has all the basics of the traditional Orientalist approach. There is a society that is traditional, which m e a n s static, u n c h a n g e a b l e within its internal dynamics, and thus different from Western societies. If this society

1 2 3 4

Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism p. 93. Ibid., p. 93. Ibid., p. 94. Ibid., p. 133.

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needs to improve or renew itself in every aspect of social life, it has to get rid of its obstacles by an indiscriminate adoption of everything Western. There should be someone first to conceptualise (as opposed to actually seeing and comprehending the problems of the society) and then to perform this duty, which consists of the simple imitation and implantation of everything derived from the superior society, the West. These reformers have to convince the people that change along these lines is going to be beneficial for them. To be sure, there will be opposition from different sections of society to this topdown process of change, but those opponents can conveniently be blamed and stigmatised as "traditional," "backward," or labelled as interest groups which have a material motive for opposing change and want to maintain the status quo. Such dissent is moreover helpful in showing people that what has been proposed is right by exposing the motives behind those groups' objections to the changes. 1 If one views the changes as originating from the impact of external forces, one has to explain the reasons for a particular reform measure according to the external political and diplomatic situation and treat the changing society as a dependent variable without taking the internal dynamics of this society into account as a relevant factor. 2 For instance, the causes for the reform measure concerning equality for Muslims and non-Muslims before the law are typically sought in the prerogatives of international politics and its changing dimensions. If we look at the factors: the interests of the Great Powers in the Ottoman empire, the nationality problem in consequence of the French Revolution, protection of the Ottoman religious minorities by the European powers, changing British Near Eastern policy, and Russian pan-Slavism are the basic factors cited in most books dealing with the issue of millet? At the same time, it is clear that internal social changes and prerogatives played a great part in the formulation of this reform measure in the Ottoman Empire. In particular, economic factors have to be examined in terms of their impacts on the non-Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire. Since the very early period of the Ottoman state non-Muslim subjects were the leading merchants, artisans and bankers of the Ottoman Empire. Their strength in the economy developed over centuries accelerated by the capitalist expansion of Europe in the nineteenth century under favourable economic circumstances. They became economically more powerful and increasingly independent. This paved the way for group consciousness, better education, close relations with the European powers and most importantly their role as internal driving factors to induce the Ottoman government to accommodate itself to these changes. Thus, the overall nineteenth Ottoman century reforms concerning the non-Muslim 1 In the Ottoman case, this group of people who represented "tradition" and "backwardness" was the ulema. 2 In some respects, we can cite the "world-system perspective" as an example of this approach. ^ Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism, p. 96.

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subjects of the Empire can be seen as no more than timely responses to changing social conditions in the Empire. These issues will be dealt with broadly in the case study of Salonica, and the above assertion will be supported by specific illustrations at the local level. At this point, if the Ottoman reformers borrowed reform measures from contemporary Western examples in order to resolve their problems, this does not mean that they slavishly adopted the European "superior" institutions or practices, because they had no choice or that they believed that a good society would result from it. Indeed, reforms had always been made, because the Ottoman Empire throughout its existence had remained in contact with the outside world, and had never formed a closed society. Whatever practices or technologies were regarded as helpful or socially beneficial the Ottomans did not hesitate to adopt. 1 But, we must not lose sight of the fact that state and Ottoman society were constantly changing over time. The institutions and practices of the Ottoman state responded to the requirements of change over time, sometimes in an evolutionary form and sometimes in more radical guises. Indeed, Sultan Mahmut had found the needed support for his reforms among his subjects, because they were in need of reform measures in their daily life. In other words, the people and the whole of society adopted change because of the rapid deterioration in the conditions of the Empire, both internally and externally. The reforms were nothing but the response of the Ottoman state to these social changes. Seeing Mahmut's reform measures as the product of a ruler's whim forces us to discover from whence he grasped these reform ideas, and whom he imitated in order to be successful. Thus, wc restrict our search to a particular, probable, superior and the most available factor, the West. If we look for alternatives in triggering the reforms of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, the breakdown of the old institutions and their unresponsiveness to changing social and economic conditions and the emergence of a degree of liberation in the minds of the people are the first factors which ought to be taken into account. Hence, the following study is the kind of inquiry which seeks the internal factors affecting in the first place the general conditions of the reforms. The basic problem in approaching these factors is the difficulty of finding contemporary accounts and inside information respecting the changes in Ottoman society. At the same time the available materials, mostly foreign accounts, arc biased. Foreign contemporary accounts looked upon Ottoman society and the reforms with prejudice, and generally in terms of their own interests. Missionaries, for instance, praised all reform measures respecting the equality of the non-Muslim subjects, because it was their special interest to

1 Rhoads Murphey, ' T h e Ottoman Attitude Towards the Adoption of Western Technology: The Role of the Efrenci Technicians in Civil and Military Applications" Turcica, Collection III, 1980, pp. 287-298.

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gain converts and equality of religions would help their mission. 1 Studying the diaries and travel literature of the period is another method of getting inside information about Ottoman society, but how far the travellers gave an accurate picture of actual conditions in society remains an unanswered question. W e know that Sultan M a h m u t established advisory councils f o r his newly structured government by replacing the old departments with ministries in order to draft plans and reports and to write up decisions for new reform measures. 2 These new councils, although they were made up of the members of the highest echelons of government, no doubt saw the actual conditions of the country reflected in the reports coming f r o m the interior. A n examination of the reform measures relating especially to local administration, agriculture and tax collection reveals that the r e f o r m measures were formulated in response to the problems of society. Limiting the scope of reform activities to the goal of creating a more secular or Westernised central state in Istanbul would be a very narrow approach. Such partial accounts seriously distort the real purpose of the reforms. 3 Another misleading approach is to ignore the impact of the reforms on Ottoman society. The depth of the effects of the reform on society and how and in what degree society responded to those Westernised reforms are important issues which have been tackled only very superficially by scholars. Of course, the difficulty of finding contemporary materials reflecting the state of Ottoman society both in Istanbul and particularly in the interior for the first half of the nineteenth century constitutes the main problem. H o w e v e r , conveniently avoiding this issue, scholars have mostly busied themselves with adapting historical situations into their predetermined agendas. For instance, some of M a h m u t ' s reforms concerning certain social practices in particular those relating to etiquette, taste and the like, e.g., the adoption of European headgear, music, trousers, have been taken very seriously as a sign of vital social change in Ottoman society in the early decades of the nineteenth century. However, we have to guard against the injustice of concluding that these adoptions f r o m Europe altered the traditional habits and customs of society. Changes of this kind were confined largely to urban populations, army personnel and officials and intellectuals in Ottoman society. Since the only available contemporary written materials of the time are travellers' a c c o u n t s , scholars tended to base their conclusions on the travellers' observations of the impact of the reforms. M a n y are content to cite the travellers in support of their thesis without any serious precautionary note regarding their prejudices, affiliations, backgrounds and particular knowledge of the country and matters they address in their works. For example, in respect 1

Frank E. Bailey, British Policy, p. 221. Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism, p. 98. See Berkes' tackling of the issue. His assertions respecting nineteenth century reforms suggest that the reforms were only concerned with the secularisation of the central Ottoman State.

2

3

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of M a h m u t ' s "superficial" reforms, Adolphus Slade wrote that "the chief feature of M a h m u t ' s reforms was contempt of their p r o p h e t ' s wisest law which justified the people in considering the Sultan and his ministers as little removed from infidels". 1 About a decade later, MacFarlane wrote " in effects of the reforms, the Turks became too knowledgeable of the West and too modern either to be awed by his [i.e., the Sultan'sJ superior attitude or to be irritated by his offensive and presumptuous conduct". 2 As the above examples show, two European travellers interpreted the same issue according to their own presumptions. Indeed, the minor reforms of Sultan M a h m u t neither paved the way for the people's disregard of religion nor brought the people to the knowledge of the West or to modernity. There is another interesting example in this tradition of writing. In a well-known study of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire by S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw, there is a passage entitled " T h e A w a k e n i n g of O t t o m a n S o c i e t y " , which d e p i c t s the issue of modernisation in the Empire and the awakening of Ottoman society to the changes in the living style of the elite of Istanbul, such as the adoption of European style dresses, music, palaces, public receptions, operas, even tables, chairs and carriages. Unfortunately, after having read this depiction respecting the awakening of Ottoman society, it is possible for one to misconccptualize easily the issue of modernisation and also to be misled and to continue interpreting the conditions of Ottoman society on the same lines even in academic writings. 3 Another assertion in the writings of many is the growing responsibility of the government as the agent of change and progress in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. Since the reforms were necessary to create a modern society, the only agent to implement them could be the central state. For such writers, the state played its leading role well in the field of administration, law, education, and all other social and cultural reforms, but in the economic field there were several factors mainly originating f r o m both the traditional structural features of Ottoman society and historically developed unfavourable conditions, which cripplcd its e f f o r t s . 4 This means, according to many scholars, that in the economic field the problem was not the unjust adoption of measures for economic reform, but the conditions of the nineteenth century and the intrinsic backwardness of the Ottoman Empire. At this point, it becomes extremely difficult for scholars to accept the failure of the reforms in the economy. W h o can defend the economic venture of the Trade Convention of 1838, which constituted the best example of a laissez-faire regime, at a time when most European states pursued national and protectionist economic policies? Especially in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, European 1

Quoted from Berkes, p. 126. Ibid., p. 126. S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977) II, p. 49. 4 Berkes, The Development, p. 134. Davison, Reform, p. 64. 2

(London:

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states had raised trade barriers even against one another in order to encourage their own industrial development. 1 While France prohibited imports of textiles, the German Zollverein taxed foreign manufactures. 2 The failure and conceptual bankruptcy of this policy cannot be disguised; trying to justify the inevitability of the Trade Convention of 1838 by noting that it was the outcome of the reversal of British policy towards the Ottoman Empire 3 or by asserting that the Ottoman Empire was in need of a friend in the international arena against Muhammad Ali of Egypt, whose economy would be harmed even more, fails to do so. 4 Indeed, we do not believe that the convention was that crucial to the success of the European powers or a principal explanation for the failure of the Ottoman Empire. First of all, as indicated very clearly in some of the studies on Ottoman economic history, the European economic penetration and its effects had begun very much earlier than 1838. Secondly, the archival materials in regard to the trade increase of Britain do not indicate any great change before 1850. Our argument here is that it would be wrong to consider the Trade Convention of 1838 as the outcome of the diplomatic and political conditions of the time, or as the beginning of the peripheralization of the Ottoman economy or as one of the main reform measures of the nineteenth century which was introduced to create a modernised and westernised state. After studying some of the archival materials relating to the internal conditions of Ottoman society just before the Convention of 1838, we can argue that the impact of internal conditions particularly in the interior occupied the first place in the decision to adopt the convention. These were mainly the irregularities in local administration (especially in the port cities) tax collection (particularly the iltizam system), and in the monopoly system of the early nineteenth century which had seriously begun to harm the social structure. This issue will be tackled in detail in the following study in terms of the above assertion. 5 According to Berkes, before the beginning of the political impact of the West upon the reform policies of the nineteenth century, conditions were ripe for it to assert its political right to interfere. A critical role was played by European economic penetration which sought the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire, who historically had been traders, bankers, usurers, in a position to benefit from this development. 6 A s a result, a number of mutual political and economic interests and relations had emerged by the early nineteenth century. Economically, the non-Muslim subjects became not the partners or internal components of the European economic forces but simply 1 A. L. Bowley, Short Account of England's p. 39. 2 Frank E. Bailey, British Policy, p. 73. 3

Foreign Trade in the 19th Century (London, 1905)

Ibid., p. 139. See Re§at Kaynar, Mustafa Resit Pa$a ve Tanzimat, pp. 127, 167. For more detailed argument of the same issue see Chapter 5. ® Berkes, Development of Secularism, p. 142.

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their appendages. Politically, they were the instruments to pursue economic and political policies on the basis of their claims to the right to protect the religious communities of the Empire. These developments led the Ottoman government to prepare more complex and diverse reform policies regarding the internal conditions of the empire after 1839. 1 Taking the direct impact of the West upon the reform policies of the Ottoman Empire as the most important positive aspect of the beginning of modernisation, we encounter again the contradictory nature of Western attitudes of the time towards the Ottoman Empire. On the one hand, the economic interests of the European Powers demanded a more open and liberal system within the economic practices of the Empire. But, on the other hand, they desired the perpetuation of the non-Muslim subjects' differentiation in the legal, political and educational fields. 2 When the European protectors of the non-Muslim religious communities spoke about equality before the law, they did not really mean equality under a single Ottoman nation. Rather, they were interested in gaining greater freedom and belter administration. By so doing, the European powers used the need of the Ottoman Empire to accommodate itself to the changing external and internal conditions of the time as an opportunity to suggest the means that best suited their own interests. W h e n they suggested the required reforms, they recommended what would best serve their own interests, because a simple glance at their own practices and institutions of the time respecting the same issues in their " m o d e r n " state structure reveals that they did not themselves adopt what they suggested for the Ottoman Empire. One can assume that the European Powers' proposals to the Ottoman Empire were as much influenced by the outcomes they wished for as by any claim to be concerned over the well-being of a troubled ally. At this point, I want to draw attention to two articles by Ezel Kural Shaw, "Integrity and Integration: A s s u m p t i o n s and Expectations behind Nineteenth Century Decision Making" 3 and "Tanzimat's Provincial Reforms as Compared with European M o d e l s " 4 , which discuss the issue using a comparative approach. The main argument is "what did Europe really have to offer in the way of examples?" during the ninetcenth-century Ottoman reform movement. In the early years of the nineteenth century, Europe did not constitute a stable, politically and ideologically consistent polity. While the liberal thinking of the French revolution had found acceptance among the middle class intellectuals, and had shaken traditional European state structure f r o m its roots, apart f r o m France all European states after the Congress of

1

Ibid., p. 144. Ibid., p. 147. 3 Ezel Kural Shaw, " Integrity and Integration: Assumptions and Expectations behind Nineteenth Century Decision Making" in E. Farah Caesar, (Ed.) Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire (Missouri: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993). 4 Idem. "Tanzimat's Provincial Reforms as Compared with European Models" in Hakki Dursun 2

v.1,1.

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i fi/i

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Vienna in 1815 embraced more strongly than ever the conservative policy of government. Under these circumstances in which Europe was resisting any form of change and liberal aspiration, how can it be asserted that the Ottoman enthusiasm for reform emerged through the influence of European examples? With some exceptions mainly related to the Ottoman Empire, such as the Greek W a r of Independence, the European conservative powers did not allow any liberal or nationalist initiatives in Europe and jointly suppressed any internal uprisings and revolts. In the meantime, surprisingly, the Ottoman government had promulgated the Tanzimat Decree in 1839 in which some articles made reference to the Declaration of the Rights of M a n and the Citizen of 1789.' Also, if we compare the Tanzimat Decree with the charters issued by the European monarchs in the 1830s for the satisfaction of middle class demands — more freedom, liberty and constitutional rights — it was more liberal in vision than those of the European states. Ezel Kural Shaw discusses the role of Britain in the Ottoman reformation process as a source of inspiration as follows: ... What did Britain have to offer? Was there toleration and equality in Britain in that time? The Catholic Emancipation Act was finally passed in 1829, in response to agitation in Ireland and fear of another rebellion. The Great Reform Bill of 1832 marked only the initial stages of a long process of parliamentary reform undertaken in response to fear of the spread of revolution on the one hand and growth of industrialisation on the other. The Factory Act of 1833 and similar measures that followed were attempts at remedying the inhuman conditions brought by rapid industrialisation. With its aristocratic social structure and a widening gap between the rich and poor, as symbolised in Benjamin Disraeli's The Two Nations, Britain was not the land of social, political, economic equality. In 1839, when the imperial Giilhane Decree was issued, it had numerous problems of its own and little to offer by way of example. 2 T h e decision of the Ottoman government to establish a quarantine regulation all over the e m p i r e in 1838, and the British g o v e r n m e n t ' s astonishing confusion in the face of this development well_ illustrates the position of the West, in which their only motive was self-interest. Daniel Panzac traces this interesting case in his book, La peste dans I'Empire Ottoman, 1700-1850. W h e n a quarantine regulation was imposed all over the Ottoman Empire in 1838, some European doctors were employed in the Quarantine Office. According to Panzac, contrary to popular assumption, Europe had never put pressure upon the Ottoman government to establish a quarantine regulation in the nineteenth century or earlier. 3 Most of those European doctors came to the Ottoman Empire to serve the interests of the ' For a comparison of the two see ibid., p. 67. Ibid., p. 54. Daniel Panzac, (Trans.) Serap Yilmaz, Osmanh imparatorlugunda Veba, 1700-1850, (La peste dans I'Empire Ottoman, 1700-1850) (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlan, 1997), p. 221. 2 3

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European powers. As early as 1837, the British government realised the danger that the Ottoman Empire would establish protective measures against its trade activities by using the example of earlier precedents in some other Mediterranean countries. 1 The Foreign Office communicated with the British Embassy in Istanbul on the subject. Instructions were sent to Lord Ponsonby explaining the obstacles which m i g h t arise to impair the f a v o u r a b l e conditions of the Trade Convention of 1838 and the actions which should be taken in order to prevent such a development. 2 By taking the lead, the British a m b a s s a d o r s u c c e e d e d in getting the support of the other E u r o p e a n ambassadors in Istanbul in order to explain to the Ottoman authorities that this development needed long-term trials and that the time was inappropriate. Somehow, the application of a quarantine regulation was postponed until 1840. Now, this unique ease clearly indicates that the Ottoman government issued some of the reform measures of the nineteenth century in the face of European opposition, nurtured by European self interest, which threatened to put the lives of millions in danger. 3 W h e n Bailey talks about the reform measures starting f r o m Sultan M a h m u t ' s time, he always mentions that the main trigger for these reforms was the great internal problems of the Ottoman Empire. According to Bailey, Sultan M a h m u t had understood this, but unfortunately he failed to adopt a more consistent program of Westernization, or to get the support of outside powers. 4 At this point, in 1834 McCulloch (....) concluded that the establishment of order and tranquillity throughout the country is beyond the ability of the Ottoman government. The abuses, which have reduced the empire to its present state of degradation, seem to be inherent in the structure of Turkish society, and to be in harmony with the habits and prejudices of the people. And if such be the case, that reform, which is so much to be wished for, must come from without, and not from within. 5 In addition to the above arguments, so many British consuls in different parts of the Ottoman Empire point out the same issue in their consular reports that the system of internal administration must be changed. 6 1 In particular, Austrian rigid quarantine regulation in the port cities was considered very detrimental to the British interests in the Mediterranean. For this issue, see Ronald E. Coons, "Austrian Maritime Quarantine Reforms during the First Half of the 19 th Century" in A. E. Vacalopoulos, (Ed.) Southeast European Maritime Commerce and Naval Policies from the MidEighteenth Century to 1914, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1988) pp. 321-343. "Palmers[(in made it clear in his dispatch to the British Ambassador in Istanbul that "... against the inconvenience of all kinds to which the establishment of this quarantine will give rise, both in impeding commerce, and in obstructing the intercourse of travellers." See FO 412 / 1 Palmerston to Ponsonby, 5 July 1838. 3

Daniel Panzac, (Trans.) Serap Yilmaz, Osmanll imparatorlugunda Veba, p. 225. Bailey, British Policy, p. 138. Quoted from Bailey, British Policy, p. 138. 6 Consul Blunt's several reports very subtly deal with the weaknesses and abuses of the system of internal government, which came, according to him, from both the practices of the system and the people who were in chargc of local government. 4

5

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Here, what has been pointed out as the main problem is correct, but the remedy suggested was the wrong one. Contemporary observers had seen that the need for change was coming from the internal dynamics of Ottoman society. What they suggested was to impose change on Ottoman society or make it change according to both their material and moral values, which they confidently considered to be as "the enlightened system." However, if we look at their observations carefully, we see that when they made their observations they were proceeding on two assumptions, the European feeling of superiority and the capitalistic view. The latter was always there, particularly in the reports of the Consuls, which were written for the purpose of securing a maximum benefit for Britain from the present situation of the Ottoman Empire. The former, they felt, gave them the right to induce the Ottoman government to change itself according to what would be proposed. For these reasons, we cannot accept as objective assertions the contemporary views of the Ottoman Empire respecting reforms. Since the main problems were internal, all reform measures were decided upon the consideration of how the Ottoman Empire could respond suitably to those problems. A brief examination of the main Tanzimat reforms will show that, on the contrary, the Ottoman reformers of the time were preoccupied with correcting the weaknesses of the system and not with responding to the will of outside powers or showing that they were becoming as civilised as Europe, or dully accepting Western institutions and practices as the only way to be rescued from corruption. Needless to say, the major problem was corruption in the civil service, especially in the provinces. 1 Bribery, venality, and favouritism were common among civil servants. 2 Until the Tanzimat reforms, the Ottoman government had tried to solve the irregularities in local government with the adaletname practices which meant issuing an imperial decree upon consideration of the common complaints and sending it to all provinces to compel the local governors to act according to it. Even the Tanzimat decree was interpreted by some scholars as a particularly good example of the adaletname tradition. 3 However, when we look at the contemporary writings, though they recognise that the problem had arisen from within Ottoman society, they all assert the need for intervention or help from an outside power. 4 According to the observations of the French military official Marshal Marmont, first of all the Ottoman Empire had to adopt a system of civil government which would make life and property more secure and "promote agriculture and commerce," but for this, there would have to be " ... men of commanding genius with sufficient energy of character" and " ... a number of enlightened and able

1

Bailey, British Policy, p. 139. David Urquhart, Turkey and Its Resources, (London, 1833) p. 117. See Halil inalcik, "Adaletnameler", Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, II, (1955), pp. 49-145. 4 See M. Marmont, The Present State of the Turkish Empire, translated by Sir Frederick Smith (London, 1839) p. 333. 2

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men, not only well informed as to the feelings of the nation, but acquainted with its capabilities ... " I n the end, Marmont concludes that "the required circumstances do not now exist and cannot be created" which means that the Ottoman internal dynamics were not strong enough to deal with its own internal problems, and outside help and intervention were its only hope. Another important mispcrception appears in the writings of scholars, who suggests that to consider the causes of Ottoman reforms as the outcome of British policy towards the Ottoman Empire. From one point of view, it may be understandable that some writers put a natural emphasis on the issues related to the changes in British foreign policy regarding the Ottoman Empire because their main objective is centred on this. 1 However, this should not be a major consideration when we try to understand the situation at the time and the actual causes of the Ottoman need to reform itself. It is a well established fact that Britain was convinced in the early part of the nineteenth century by the aggressive intervention of Russia in the affairs in the Ottoman Empire that the only way to maintain her policy in the Middle East was to assist the Ottoman Empire to reform itself. 2 Hence, British policy began mainly to be interested in ways to persuade the Ottoman Empire to have better military, civil and financial institutions. By so doing, Britain tried to advise the Sultan and his ministers as much as it could according to its own interests and objectives. It is perhaps surprising, in the British foreign ministry documents of the period, to see how closely Palmerston, as Foreign Secretary for most of that time, and his ambassador at Istanbul dealt with the reform issues of the Ottoman Empire. 3 And this is why we misperceive the real situation. Britain ably used any opportunity which arose in the political arena from the conditions of the time, most importantly the Egyptian question, in order to show its friendship in the shape of advice for the reforms. 4 But, as we noted earlier, the Ottoman government's idea of reform in the military, financial and administrative fields, was the outcomc of internal changes in the Ottoman Empire. For instance, Sultan Mahmut had recognised very early the problems of the tax system and tried to reform it by ordering that the taxes should be collected by the government officials, because he knew that the irregularities of the pashas and multezims in tax farming and iltizam practices were the causes of treasury deficits. In this change the scope of the British intervention was no more than a simple advice that the Ottoman government should make 1 To give some examples: Harold Temperley, "British Policy Towards Parliamentary Rule and Constitutionalism in Turkey (1830-1914)", The Cambridge Historical Journal, v. 4, n. 2, pp. 156191, Maria Todorova, "British and Russian Policy Towards the Reform Movement in the Ottoman Empire", Etudes Batkaniques, n. 3, 1977, pp. 17-41, G. H. Bolsover, "David Urquhart and the Eastern Question, 1833-37: A Study in Publicity and Diplomacy", The Journal of Modern History, n. 8, (1936), pp. 4 4 4 ^ 6 7 . 2 Harold Temperley, "British Policy", p. 157. 3 "Ponsonby was instructed to exhort the Ottoman ministers to pursue with increasing energy and perseverance that wise system of organisation, military, naval, financial, and administrative which had already been so successfully begun." Quoted from Bailey, British Policy, p. 145. 4 Ibid., p. 146.

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further improvements in the Empire's finances in order to "secure the means of maintaining the military force in a state of efficicncy". 1 When it was fell that a very radical change was required in the internal administration of the country, the question of "how" was taken very seriously by the Ottoman government. Mere imitation of European institutions was not the answer; on the contrary, as early as 1834 the central government invited local notables to Istanbul so as to establish an assembly to discuss the reform issues. 2 The assumption of the great influence of Britain in the reformation of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century creates some presumptions which oblige one to go ahead and ask some further questions in order to support the thesis. For instance, when we accept the role and the policy of Palmerston as the major instigator of the Ottoman reforms in the early nineteenth century, it is possible to question his reluctance to promote a constitutional regime in the Ottoman Empire while being an advocate of constitutionalism in Europe. Here, the writing goes far ahead of the thesis and raises another important and interesting question, so long as the thesis holds. In other words, the assumption is that the Ottoman reform process in the nineteenth century was started and continued under the impact of outside powers, namely Britain. If that is correct, we have to ask why Britain did not openly encourage constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire. But ultimately, all the above points serve only to perpetuate misunderstanding of the issue of Ottoman reform and a one-sided approach in the study of Ottoman history. However, if we want to contribute something to the above debate, we may say that on this issue, the promotion of constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire, Palmerston acted as a good example of an imperialist statesman of the nineteenth century, because pragmatism was the prime mover of imperialist thinking. Palmerston was interested in the well being of the Ottoman Empire only in so far as it remained vital for British interests. Explanations, to the effect that Palmerston believed an enlightened despotism was better suited to the existing conditions of the Ottoman Empire or that he was only interested in the improvement of the army and navy, fail to take account of the main reason, which was his attachment to imperialist pragmatism. 3 Also, it is interesting to recall that this pragmatic thinking was maintained for almost a century until 1908 by the British Foreign Secretaries as the major policy towards Ottoman Empire, a fact that lends support to our assertion. 4 At the end of the fourth chapter of his book, Bailey concludes,

1

FO 78 / 234, Palmerston to Ponsonby, 1 June 1834. Bailey says: " . . . beyond gathering a great quantity of information little was accomplished." See, Bailey, British Policy, p. 152. 3 H. W. V. Temperley, "British Policy", pp. 165,158. 4 Bailey, British Policy, p. 156. 2

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"Though England stood ready to help in every possible fashion, the reforms of the thirties were definitely M a h m u t ' s reforms." 1 It is vitally important to accept this fact when we try to understand the nature of the T a n z i m a t reforms, because they were no m o r e than the continuation of a process which started with the changes in Ottoman socicty which began in the early nineteenth century. In the first place, M a h m u l was the starter of the new thinking and spirit which insisted that reform was required and possible according to the needs and the evolution of society. 2 Secondly, Sultan M a h m u t prepared the ground by countering abuses in Ottoman society not in theory but in practice in order to m a k e significant changes later in the c e n t u r y ? Thirdly, M a h m u t ' s reforms (excepting some superficial reforms regarding changes in dress affecting mostly Istanbul) speak clearly and loudly that they were not imported f r o m outside but were the outcome of internal dynamics. Taking the above facts into account, it is very difficult to assert that the Tanzimat reforms were made for the sake of " i n s u r i n g the f a v o u r ol' Western nations, particularly B r i t a i n " . 4 T h e elaboration of Sultan M a h m u t ' s reforms as examples of the same thing will be made in the second chapter of this study. Taking such a view also leads some scholars to tackle the reform issue in the nineteenth century Ottoman E m p i r e as if the outside p o w e r s , particularly Britain, were more concerned about the well being of the Ottoman Empire than the Ottomans themselves. They even write as if the European states had to f o r c e the Sultan and the Ottoman statesmen to accept the necessity of the reforms. 5 T o make such an assumption requires their whole explanation of the process of the Tanzimat to be adjusted to correspond. First, there must have been someone, a well-qualified hero, who thought of the need for reform in the Ottoman Empire. However, he had to think that the only way to rescue the empire was to adopt European institutions and methods, rather than doing something within the society's own dynamics, and looking at its real needs. The question of how this would have been achieved had a very simple answer. T h e hero was going to be threatened because of his reform ideas by the "traditionalist" statesmen, and would have to seek help f r o m Europe. When he gained power, he would begin reforming the state on issues such as security of life and property, equality before the law, ending of the confiscation of property, public trials for offenders, not in response to the urgency of the situation but for the sake of imitating superior European practices. This is a common structure of thinking behind most of the writings about the Ottoman reform movement in the nineteenth century.

1

Ibid., Ibid., 3 Ibid., 4 Ibid., 5 Ibid., 2

p. p. p. p. p.

177. 174. 175. 179. 180.

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After finding the person or persons, now, one should provide an answer to the question of "how far Englishmen were responsible" for encouraging the reformers. Bailey examines the three important Englishmen of the time, Stratford Canning, Ponsonby and Palmerston. According to him, Canning was not the person who was the original sponsor of the reform ideas, though in his controversial and suspect memoirs, Lane-Poole states that he was. 1 As f o r Lord Ponsonby, all the archival documents indicate that he was not responsible for the reform ideas in the Tanzimat decree. 2 By taking in account the importance of the similarities of the ideas both in Re§id P a s h a ' s memorandum to Palmerston and in the Tanzimat decree, Bailey asserts that the person who had been the supporter and the sponsor of the reform ideas might have been Palmerston, or at least he maintains that Palmerston applauded the reforms more than the others. He writes: Internal reform was necessary if the Ottoman Empire was to stand alone. Yet, the mere fact that the two statesmen generally agreed on the problems to be solved is not proof that the British Foreign Secretary was Regid's principal sponsor and guide. That Palmerston rendered moral support to the hopes and plans of the Turkish statesmen no one can deny, but there is nothing in the documents to show any positive influence of the Foreign Secretary on the Hatt-i §erif. Of course the documents do not provide the complete story of Palmerston's attitude toward Re§id's reform programme, but they are indicative of the attitude of the Foreign Secretary toward the reformer in the twelve months before the Hat was issued. 3 Here is shown another dimension of the same thinking which tries to put the case entirely f r o m its o w n point of view. First of all, the question is who were the real agents behind the scenes? Naturally, Ottoman society, as a typical oriental and backward society, could not provide the dynamics to work for its own benefit. A s Canning says, "to suppose that the Porte is the best j u d g e of her own interests" is wrong. 4 Therefore, some European hands must have been involved with the Tanzimat reforms. If one finds that there were no direct European influences on the reforms, it is possible to merge and say that the Europeans acted as advisors on this issue. At least, one infers that the reformer was European-educated or had knowledge of European civilisation so that he could see the need for reform. In this kind of thinking, there is no need to look for something which would be good for society, within the dynamics of Ottoman society itself. A t the same time, we should not forget the very important point that the reform ideas of the Tanzimat decree were not new. They were simply the contemporary components of the steady development of nineteenth century 1

ibid., p. 186. Ibid., p. 187. 3 ¡bid., p. 189. ^ Quoted from Bailey, British Policy, p. 210. 2

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Ottoman reforms. As is well-known, the Tanzimat reforms were decided during the reign of Mahmut II as the final part of his previous reforms. 1 The participation of the Ottoman statesmen in the preparatory discussions of the Tanzimat reforms constitutes another important piece of evidence that the Tanzimat decree was Ottoman in origin and the end-result of internal needs and changes. 2 The main orientation of scholarly investigation of the Tanzimat during the past 70 years has followed from the assumption not just of the superiority of the West, but also of its influence especially in the intellectual, philosophical and cultural spheres. In our thesis we intend to look at not the spiritual life of the Ottomans or of the Ottoman policy makers but rather materia! conditions in a cosmopolitan, urbanised and slowly industrialised microcosm of the early 19 th -century Ottoman Empire. This emphasis on internal social and economic conditions (see especially chapters 4 and 5) allows us to approach the subject of the effects of the Tanzimat in the 1840's divorced from the straight jacket imposed by the Istanbul centric and Eurocentric intellectual agenda.

1 M. A. Ubicini, Letters on Turkey, (Jrans.) Lady Easthope, 2 vols. (London, 1856) vol. 1 p. 27. See also Rejat Kaynar, Mustafa Regit Paga ve Tanzimat, pp. 110-111. 2 London Times, 13 October 1839, p. 4.

2 THE PATTERN OF REFORMS IN THE DECADES LEADING UP TO THE TANZIMAT

It is important to stress that the methodological solution of attributing everything to a single cause — in this case, the impact of the West — is wrong. 1 Here I argue firstly that, the need for the nineteenth century reforms certainly came directly from the internal social, economic, and political changes in the Ottoman Empire. Secondly, the Tanzimat reforms were nothing other than the continuation of the reform process which had started in earlier centurics and was particularly noticeable at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Thirdly, the reforms proposed as solutions to the problems of the Empire were original responses of the Ottoman government, which means that those remedies were not imported from the outside to be applied or implemented in Ottoman society. In this chapter, we will discuss these issues by putting the pre-Tanzimat reforms of Sultan Selim III and of Mahmut II under close examination and assessing whether they presented the same pattern as outlined above or not. Let us start with the last point, which has been the main basis for the literature on the O t t o m a n r e f o r m m o v e m e n t . First of all, the conceptualisation of the word " r e f o r m " as " W e s t e r n i z a t i o n " or "modernisation" in the writings of so many has to be questioned. Should we understand and equate "reform" with "modernisation", while the definition of "modernisation" itself has always been problematic and controversial? In one way the answer may be "yes". If one consciously or unconsciously accepts the common tradition of recent writings on Ottoman history, there is no other way to look at the reform issue. But by accepting this premise at the very beginning, one is already committed to the presupposition — for many, the reality — that the Ottoman Empire was a typical Eastern state in which society always retains its traditional form. According to this view, the structure of society is composed of basic elements (religious groups, tribes)

The argument that the only way forward for the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century was to Westernise, is the most debated issue in the contemporary literature particularly in Turkey. As an example, the following statement of a Turkish historian who simply wants to emphasise the need for Westernization is interesting: "The Ottoman State would have been rejected by the Western world, if the necessary reforms which were the requirements for the prolongation of the political life of the Empire had not been promulgated." 28-30 Midhat Sertoglu, "Tanzimat'a Dogru" in Sultan II. Mahmud ve Reformlari Semineri: Haziran 1989, Bildiriler, (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basimevi, 1990) p. 2.

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forming major obstacles to change. As a result, Ottoman society was static and all influences for change had to come from the outside. Western society, conversely, is regarded as always changing because of a dynamic structure in which the elements (groups) are mobile. According to this theory, this is why Western society is now superior to others and capable of offering help to other societies if they submit to its institutions, laws and values. If the attempted reforms are unsuccessful and the conditions become worse than before, this is ascribed to the obstacles raised by the traditional social structure and not to the "modern", genuinely developed and superior methods offered by the Western model. In this sense, Sultan Mahmut and his reforms, especially that of the destruction of Janissaries, are always regarded as constituting a new starting point in the discourse on the nineteenth-century Ottoman reforms. Sultan Mahmut's reforms are referred to in many contemporary accounts of that time as the most useful and radical examples for future reforms. The effects of these reforms upon the people of the country were also diverse and had a very important influence on the course of the Tanzimat reforms as a whole. We can see that, before the Tanzimat, the reforms of Sultan Mahmut had made a very considerable impression on local affairs. It can be asserted that the Tanzimat was just the continuation of the reform process started during the reign of Sultan Selim III and continuing in the time of Sultan Mahmut II. 1 In the words of Abdurrahman §eref: "The ideas embodied in the Giilhane Charter were simply a formulation of those which had become more or less crystallised during the latter part of the Mahmut's reign. In fact, the contents of the Charter were under discussion before Mahmut's death." 2 It can even be argued that the partial successes of the Kopriilii family in the late seventeenth century served as the foundation for the subsequent reform policies of the later period. 3 We should consider the logical parallels between the internal problems and the struggle to find remedies to these problems which had lasted for centuries. If there were problems, there should have been some efforts to overcome these problems. If there was a so-called decentralisation problem in the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire, reforms should have been proposed in support of the centralised policies. Therefore, the reform process of the Ottoman Empire goes back at least three hundred years in dealing with the specific problems and conditions which needed to be changed. Reforms were not merely a phenomenon of the nineteenth century as has been assumed under the false assumptions of the current literature 1 Blunt says in 1845: "the general mal-administration of the interior was owing to the lack of energy on the part of the ministers of the Porte, arising either from their ignorance of the real state of the interior, of the country, or from their unwillingness to convince the Sultan that he had to follow up the energetic measures of the Sultan Mahmut to save the country." FO 195 / 240 Blunt to Canning 4 September 1845. 2 Abdurrahman Çeref, Tarih Musahebeleri (Istanbul, 1924), p. 48. 3 John Raphael Karaagac, The Politics of Reforms: A Study of Institutions, Ideas, and Individuals, PhD. Dissertation, (Johns Hopkins University, 1997) p. 338.

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which has placed too much emphasis on the unique character of the nineteenth century reforms undertaken according to Western models. Several specific issues support the hypothesis of the nineteenth century reforms as part of a far longer tradition. Taking the changes in the Ottoman bureaucracy as an example, Haim Gerber argues that a perceptible change was occurring in the structure of Ottoman society, not from the influence of the outside powers but from its unique internal dynamics. In his words, "... outside factors possibly contributed to the initial push" but did nothing stronger than this. 1 Needless to say, bureaucratic change in the nineteenthcentury Ottoman Empire was always portrayed as a complete change under the influence of the West. Not only were the old institutions replaced by imported ones, but also new bureaucrats came into power who were distinguished by their knowledge of foreign languages, European customs and attitudes towards bureaucracy and dress. According to Gerber, this view can be challenged when we look at the provincial administration and bureaucracy. Two important relationships, between provincial governors and the central government, and between the governor and the officials working under him, have to be examined. Before the nineteenth century, the provincial governorship was considered an independent post and governors had full discretion to use what power they had after they had done the specific tasks assigned to them by the central government. In particular, in the eighteenth century, this system of governance led to a serious decentralisation of power in the Empire. But, starting from the era of Sultan Mahmut, this changed with the reassertion of the central government's control over the provinces. Also, the relationship between the governor and his staff in the provinces before the nineteenth century had been very close and was based on mutual respect and obedience, which either disappeared or took a different form in the nineteenth century. 2 When we look at the official correspondence between the central government and the provinces, particularly in the 1830s, it is revealed that the central government's control over administrative, military, and financial affairs of the provinces was clear. One can point to several imperial orders with detailed guidelines for their application, regarding even marginal matters, routinely sent to the provinces. 3 For instance, when the system of muhtarlik was established and a muhtar (government official who supervised the administrative affairs of a village and was responsible directly to the government) was appointed to villages and the districts of a city in the year * Haim Gerber, "A New Look at the Tanzimat: The Case of the Province of Jerusalem," in David Kushner, (Ed.), Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986) pp. 3045. ^ After crushing the avails in the interior, Sultan Mahmut appointed local governors with a fixed salary, which made them more loyal to the central government, and by this means he tried to put an end to the old abuses in the local administration. 3 In the Ottoman Court Records (sicils) of Salonica, in the 1830s, 1 found several detailed imperial fermans which reflect the change of discourse and the immediate responses of local government to these issues. As examples of this phenomenon in the 1830s, sec Sicils 235: 88, 90, 91,95, and Sicils 2 2 9 : 1 3 , 2 0 , 2 8 , 3 1 , 3 6 .

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1250 (1834-35), the government closely supervised the process of providing the required number of seals (miihur) for the newly appointed muhtars} In another document, we see that these official seals were provided to the local authorities mostly for issuing certain permits to the people to legalise internal affairs of minor importance. Among them, the miirur tezkeresi (travel permit) was the most common one. In doing this, in contrast to the practices of the eighteenth century, the central government was able to supervise even the marginal internal affairs of the country. 2 Another important point is the noticeable change in the central government's actions and attitudes towards local administration. Mainly, the language of the central government changed from a threatening tone in the eighteenth century to the more co-operative and trustful one found in the fermans of the nineteenth century. Moreover, it can be seen that the central government not only trusted the local government officials, but also tried to persuade both the officials and the people by choosing a different mode of discourse from that of earlier centuries. By presenting the supporting facts and confirmation by the authorities (e.g., the religious officials) in the fermans, the central government both chose the people as its main audience and made its orders easier to understand and carry out. For instance, in both of the fermans sent to Salonica, one related to the quarantine regulation in 1838 and the other for the prohibition of abortion practices among the people, the central government cited the facts first, and then stressed that the decision was made in close consultation with the local authorities. In another ferman, respecting the statistical data of people in Salonica (yoklama defteri), a sample document was attached by the central government to explain how the gathering of data should be conducted and written down; and what kind of information was requested; and even what kind and size of paper should be used. 3 These important structural changes were very obvious in the Ottoman provincial bureaucracy of the nineteenth century, but the question is how and under what conditions these changes occurred. In fact, the usual process of change in all aspects of the Empire had been underway since the foundation of the Ottoman state and continued to its end.

1251, which officially established the muhtarllk system, 1 The ferman dated 3 Rebiulevvel explained the following issues as the reasons: memalik-i mahrusa ve memalik-i §ahanemde mutavattm ve mevcud olan kaffe-i ahali ve ibadin emniyet ve istirahatlari .... padijahanem iktizasindan olduguna niebni.. .¡evketdelil-i jahanemde fukara ve aceienin emniyet ve istirahat-i tdmmeleri if in her bir mahall&t ve kuraya .... mahal ve semti itibariyle ikifer muhtar nasb ve tayiniyle ... dersaadetimde karargir olan nizam-l mustahsenenin her bir eyalet ve elviye^ ve kasabat ve kurada dahi icrasi hususuna muteallik olan irade-i seniyye-i ¡ahanem ..." See Sicil 231:64, 3 Rebiulevvel 1251. According to another document, the number of seals for the Muslim muhtars in Salonica was 135, while the number for the non-Muslims was 56. See Sicil 231:65, Rebiulevvel 1251. 2 3

For the application of miirur tezkeresi by the muhtars see Sicil 232:45,28 Safer 1252. Sicil, 229: 4 9 , 1 5 Safer 1250.

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Scholars of Ottoman history agree that by the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman government was aware of the existence of decentralisation and the need to reassert the central government's authority in the interior. The efforts of Sultan Selim III and later Sultan Mahmut II were nothing but an acknowledgement of the danger implied in the present situation and an immediate response by the central government. Both sultans had recognised the need to reassert the central government's authority through effective military power and the development of a civil bureaucratic elite. In addition to this, by changing the regulations and the laws of the Empire, Sultan Mahmut II and to a lesser extent Sultan Selim III reasserted the legislative function of the central government in the interior. Effective military power was needed because the major cause of the decentralisation was the growing power of local elites, which had to be crushed. The new civil bureaucratic elite was designed to represent the centra! government's authority in the interior as an extension of the civil bureaucracy at the centre. The new regulations and laws were established so as both to increase the central government's control in the interior and to put an end to the exploitations and abuses of the old regulations by local powers, which generally had served to aggravate the problem of decentralisation. 1 As we have argued from the beginning, structural changes along with specific and conscious responses to those in Ottoman society were not the phenomenon only of the nineteenth century. From the very beginning of the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, significant changes took placc at all levels of social life. Consequently, the Ottoman administrative, cultural, political, social and economic institutions both evolved by creating new structures within themselves and accommodated to the changing conditions of the time. In this sense, Rhoads Murphey in his article, "Continuity and Discontinuity in Ottoman Administrative Theory and Practice during the Late Seventeenth Century", examines the Ottoman institutional response to the changing conditions after the Ottoman defeat at Vienna in 1683, which had been believed to be "the beginning of the end" for the Ottoman Empire, and finds "both increased levels and new dimensions of governmental activism". Firstly, Murphey rejects the constructed theories of early modernists under the influence of polemics, ideology and preconceptions without making reference to the primary sources and argues that the Ottoman bureaucratic tradition adapted itself very well to the demands of the time. 2 According to Murphey,

S. J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977) II, pp. 14-15. Also see idem, ' T h e Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-i Cedid Army of Sultan Selim III", Journal of Modern History, v. 37, (1965), pp. 291-306. Idem, "The Origins of Representative Government in the Ottoman Empire: An Introduction to the Provincial Councils, 1839-1876", in R. B. Winder, (Ed.), Near Eastern Round Table, (New York, 1969) pp. 53-142. Avigdor Levy, The Military Policy of Sultan Mahmud 11, 1808-1839, unpublished PhD. dissertation, (Harvard University, 1968). 2

Rhoads Murphey, "Continuity and Discontinuity in Ottoman Administrative Theory and Practice during the Late Seventeenth Century", Poetics Today, 14:2, (Summer, 1993), p. 420.

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in the seventeenth century, especially after the reign of Sultan Murat IV (1623-1640), the Ottoman administrative tradition underwent a gradual but lasting change from a sultan-centred tradition to a bureaucratic tradition. With enhanced powers and more specialised functions, the Ottoman bureaucracy u n d e r t o o k significant e x p e r i m e n t s and innovations in the seventeenth century. 1 He does not view the incompetence of the Ottoman government in dealing with the so-called Celdli rebellions as a serious or permanent failing. The military technology of the time was adopted ably and quickly. 2 T h e longterm minor and radical fiscal measures including the abolishment of the taxexemption of derbendgi (an irregular foot-soldier stationed on guard at a pass), abolishment of the narh regime (regulation of market prices) and control and transfer of the payments f r o m various imperial endowments were formulated by the government in response to the financial crises of the seventeenth century. 3 Murphey concludes as follows: Clearly, significant change was under way. However, any assertion that these changes were accompanied by ideological shifts, or were inspired or influenced by even partial or tentative adoption of a different system of values or governmental principals, needs to be viewed with caution ... The achievement of meaningful change without launching a full-fledged social revolution in the late seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire eloquently testifies to the powerful effect of Ottoman institutional flexibility coupled with an adherence to cultural traditionalism. 4 In a recent study on Cyprus in the nineteenth century, George A. D i o n y s s i o u notes an interesting case regarding the r e f o r m a t i o n of the Orthodox community of Cyprus prior to the Tanzimat reforms. W h e n the dissatisfaction of the Orthodox people increased because of the continuing irregularities in the affairs of the community, the Archbishop and some of the notables took the issue to Istanbul in order to remedy the present evils by the introduction of new reforms in the administrative structure of the community. This first attempt was made in 1830 and substantial changes were introduced to the administration of the Orthodox community. 5 T h e second attempt to reform the communal administration was made again in 1837 following the same line as in the early 1830s. Again the Ottoman government drafted the new administrative measures; and these measures remained in f o r c e until the Tanzimat reforms. 6 Now, there is no doubt that the above case specifically 1 Murphey gives the steady growth in the ranks of salaried statesmen in seventeenth century as an example of this assertion. See ibid., p. 426. 2 As an example, he gives the information that during the war in Crete in the 1660s, Ottoman war machines were not compatible which prolonged trench warfare. Ibid., p. 427. 3 Ibid., pp. 430-432. 4 Ibid., pp. 439-440. 5 See George A. Dionyssiou, The Implementation of the Tanzimat Reforms in Cyprus, 18391878, unpublished Masters Thesis, (The University of Birmingham, 1995) p. 12. 6 Ibid., p. 15.

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typifies the very nature of the reforms in the nineteenth century, which were devised in direct consequence of the internal needs and problems of Ottoman society. As we have seen in the above case, the initiatives for reform came from the people who proposed the required changes to the only recognised authority, the state, to carry out. Thus, the state responded positively. To be sure, this process of inducement from bottom to top was not always direct, as in the above case. Particularly, long-term structural socio-economic changes in society or the structural evolutionary transformations in certain institutions were instigated more often indirectly than directly. For instance, the evolution of some Ottoman administrative institutions provides examples showing that the changes in the bureaucracy occurred at particular junctures because of the requirements originating from internal Ottoman needs. In this context, the gradual development of the Office of Reisulkuttap (Foreign Ministry) provides a good example for modern bureaucratic practice. 1 As is well known, the Office of Reisulkuttap was established apart from the office of ni^anci in the sixteenth century because of the needs resulting from the growth in diplomatic and political external affairs of the Empire. 2 After the change of the name of the Office of Reisulkuttap to Hariciye Nazirligi in 1836, Hariciye Mustetjarligi was also instituted as the assistant of Hariciye Nazin. In 1838, the office of amedgi was divided into two offices, hariciye (external) and dahiliye (internal), because of the growing bureaucratic pressure. The muhimme odasi had been established by Sultan Selim III, and the terciime odasi (translation bureau) was founded by Sultan Mahmut to cope with the increasing importance and volume of work of the hariciye nezareti. In addition to these, the external structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was extended by the establishment of new embassies and consulates in Europe. 3 It was internal need and not the mere adoption for the sake of establishing a counterpart to European examples which drove the Ottoman government to re-shape the old Office of Reisulkuttap as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the modern sense. The continuing process of change in the land system of the Ottoman Empire also provides some supportive data for the objectives of this study. Starting from the massive application of the iltizam system in the fifteenth century — according to Halil inalcik this system existed from the earliest

Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Modern State, p. 66-67. For this subject also see Carter V. Findley, ' T h e Legacy of Tradition to Reform: Origins of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry", IJMES, v. 1, (1970), pp. 335-338. Idem, ' T h e Foundation of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry: The Beginnings of Bureaucratic Reform under Selim III and Mahmud II" IJMES v 3, (1972), pp. 388-416. 2

For more information see Yusuf Halafoglu, XIV-XVII. YUzyillarda Osmanlilarda Derlei Tegkilän ve Sosyal Yapi, (Ankara : Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1991). 3 Ismail Soysal, "Umur-i Hariciye Nezaretinin Kurulmasi, 1836" in Sullan ¡1. Mahmut ve Reformlari Semineri, bildiriler, (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakiiltesi Basimevi, 1990) pp. 71-81.

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times of the Empire 1 — considered the first radical change in the land system, modifications continued with the application of the malikâne (life-term basis) system instead of mukataa (rent-lease basis) during the reign of Sultan Mustafa II. With some changes due to the passing of time, both the iltizam and the malikâne systems continued with a number of negative effects on rural society through the eighteenth century. The first efforts were made by Sultan Selim III to mitigate the harmful effects of the malikâne system. Bygetting control of the administration of malikâne s under the central government, and by putting an end to the arbitrary acts of the malikâne holders, Sultan Selim planned to increase the revenues of the central government. Then, during the time of Sultan Mahmut II, the remains of the timar system were abolished. The unsuccessful attempt of Sultan Selim was reversed by Sultan Mahmut when he managed to bring the malikâne system under the control of the central government just before the promulgation of the Tanzimat decree. 2 In 1789, when Sultan Selim III acceded to the Ottoman throne, he fully recognised the problems of the Empire. He made several attempts to get correct first hand information about the conditions of the Empire. In his first meeting with Ottoman statesmen, he asked them to speak openly, hiding nothing regarding the real conditions of his empire. He was informed that the internal conditions of the E m p i r e needed close attention because of the corruption in its civil, financial and military administration. 3 Sultan Selim began to take action, starting with the military, since the Ottoman Empire was at war both with Austria and Russia, and was losing ground. This start, indeed, created the misperception that Sultan Selim's reforms, namely the Nizam-i Cedid (new order), were only concerned with the military. On the contrary, he was the man w h o had dealt with the problems of the Empire even before his reign began and had tried to find ways in which it could be saved. 4 His official rescripts, namely the hatt-i humayuns to Ottoman statesmen in Istanbul, clearly bear witness to the fact that he was aware of the problems in the Empire, but lacked the opportunities to do as much as he would have wished, and had too few supporters to carry through changes. 5

1 Halil Inalclk, ' T h e O t t o m a n D e c l i n e and Its E f f e c t s u p o n the Reaya" reprinted f r o m H e n r i k B i r n b a u m and Speros V r y o n i s , (Eds.) Aspects of the Balkans: continuity and change, ( P a r i s : T h e H a g u e , 1972) p. 341. 2 M . A. Ubicini, Turkiye, 1850, (Istanbul: T e r c u m a n 1001 T e m e l Eser) v . II, p, 2 7 6 . 3

C e v d e t Pa§a, Tarih-i Cevdet,

(Istanbul: U?dal N e f r i y a t , 1983) v. 2, pp. 1101, 1102.

E n v e r Z i y a Karal, Selim Ill'un Hatti Humayunlari,1789-1807, II. B a s k i ( A n a k a r a : T T K Y a y i n l a r i , 1988) p. 134. A f t e r s t u d y i n g the Hattl Humayuns of S e l i m III, Karal r e m a r k s that " r e f o r m i n g the military and the navy, w h i c h suggests the limited t h i n k i n g on the p r o b l e m s , w a s n o t t h e o n l y i n t e n t i o n of S u l t a n S e l i m , b u t h e c o n s i d e r e d v e r y c o m p r e h e n s i v e r e f o r m p r o g r a m m e s that covered all aspects of the p r o b l e m s of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e " . 4

5 See E n v e r Z i y a Karal, Selim. IWiin Y a y i n l a r i , 1988).

Hatti

Hiimayunlari,

1789-1807,

II. Baski (Ankara: T T K

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61

First of all, Sultan Selim tried to solicit the opinions of the Ottoman statesmen upon the subject of needed reform ideas by requesting their written reform proposals. 1 Twenty-two people, including two Christians, members of the ulema and leading statesmen, were asked to write reform proposals regarding not just the military problems but all aspects of the system which needed remedying. Most of these proposals dealt mainly with the military reforms; however, there were some thoughts on other subjects too. 2 For instance, while the kazasker Tatarcikli Abdullah E f e n d i 3 dealt mainly with the financial problems and particularly the adjustment of the value of Ottoman currency, the defterdar §erif Efendi also wrote about the budget deficient and its solutions. 4 According to Tarih-i Cevdet, §erif Efendi was also the first person who had pointed out the bad effects of the angarya (forced labour) in the country. This problem was taken u p by the T a n z i m a t reforms and abolished about forty years later. 5 Unfortunately, no successful attempts were made to resolve the economic and financial problems of the time, because Ottoman statesmen were preoccupied not with state interests but with personal interests of their own. Sultan Selim was conscious of the abuses resulting f r o m the irregularities of the functionaries in the civil administration of the country. Consequently, he ordered the statesmen to get together, think deeply and solve the problems accordingly. Then, new regulations were issued mainly respecting the appointment of officials such as governors, w h o ought not be dismissed so often, ayans who would be elected by the people and not appointed and kadis who would go without fail to their appointed places and not remain in Istanbul. 6 In addition, new criteria were accepted regarding the appointments of kadis to the provinces. T h e new vezirs would be selected f r o m the experienced and honest men. The Sultan and the sadrazam would be solely responsible for the appointments of vezirs. The vezirs would stay in the appointed place for at least three years and not more than five years. If the replacement of vezirs was necessary, they would be appointed to the nearest place. 7

It is interesting to see that some historians cannot imagine any new measure coming from the Ottoman mind; everything has to be related to or originally to come from Europe. For instance, Yusuf Akçura thinks that the idea of new reform proposals presented to Sultan Selim were originally inspired from the French "Cahier" after the French Revolution. See Yusuf Akçura, Osmanh Devletinin Dagilma Devri: 18. We 19. Asirlarda, (Ankara: T.T. K. Yayinlan, 1988) p. 40. 2 Cevdet Pa§a, Tarih-i Cevdet, v. 3, pp. 1406-1411. 3 He was a governor in the Balkans during Sultan Selim's reign, and he had the opportunity to see the real conditions of interior in the Empire. Cited in Bruce McGowan, Economic life in Ottoman Europe, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 133. 4 Yusuf Akçura, Osmanli Devletinin Dagtlma Devri, p. 42-43. 5 Cited in Ahmet Rasim, Osmanhda Battçin Ûc Evresi, III. Baski, (Istanbul: Evrim Yayinlan, 1989), p. 63. 6 Ibid., p. 115 and Karal, Selim Ill'im Hatti Humayunlart, pp. 117, 118. 7 Ibid., p. 118.

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There are several other important attempts during the reign of Sultan Mahmut to respond to the problems of the society by making new regulations beyond the centralisation policy and trying to deal with the problems of every class of people. Finally, in 1839 the Tanzimat Decree was promulgated as a comprehensive reform package for every part of the Empire. Thus, we can assert that the Tanzimat Reforms were the continuation of both Sultan Mahmut's reforms and of the central government's responses to the problems of the interior. "The governmental advances of Tanzimat were in essence no more than the development of two of Mahmut's innovations," says Berkes. 1 For instance, because of the notorious irregularities in the vakif (Muslim pious endowments) system, Sultan Mahmut regulated and centralised vakifi, by establishing the Evkaf-i Hiimayun Nezareti (General Administration of Vakifs.) in 1836, and consequently undermined the influence of the ulema. Indeed, there existed some even earlier regulations respecting the administration of vakifa. The General Administration of VakiJs was the end product of the evolution of the regulations from the early decades of the Ottoman Empire. Abdûlhamit I, father of Sultan Mahmut II, was the first Sultan who established a different office for his endowments. It can be argued that the motive behind Sultan Mahmut's decision to get all vakifs, together under one body of administration was purely financial. Since Sultan Mahmut intended to reform the Empire, firstly he needed money. The yearly income of the vakifs in the Empire after the deduction of expenses amounted to a large sum of money. This money was mainly used in support of persons who did research and studied science, but this was by no means always the case. 2 Thus, as we see also in this example, the new regulation for the administration of the vakifs, was the phenomenon or the requirement of that particular time which had no implications for the course of Westernization. There are several fermans addressed to the governor of Salonica respecting the proposed changes in the administration of vakifs in 1838. 3 By the same token, Sultan Mahmut intelligently perceived the main reason behind the maladministration of the vakifs,, and first in 1826 and then definitively in 1838 ended the old practice of the confiscation of an official's property after death, because it was the notorious practice of the time that, wealthy people, fearing confiscation of their property, were more inclined to fund a vakif which was to a greater extent safe from the state's intervention. 4

' Berkes, Development 2

of Secularism, p. 156.

Mehmet ìpjirli, "II Mahmud Döneminde Vakiflarin Idaresi" in Sultan II. Mahmud ve Reformlari Semineri: 28-30 Haziran 1989, Bildiriler, (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basimevi, 1990) pp. 49-57. B. Yediyildiz, "18. Asirda Türk Vakif Te§kilätl", Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi, (1982), n. 12, p. 179. 3 Sicil, 235: 29 §aban 1254 and see also Sicil 235: 92, 93,94. 4 M. A. Ubicini, TUrkiye, 1850, (Istanbul: Tercüman 1001 Temei Eser) eilt II, p. 265.

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63

The regulation of the cizye tax in 1834 was another important reform of Sultan Mahmut. The problems of the arbitrary taxation of non-Muslims and the deficiency in the collection of cizye were remedied justly when the three categories of cizye were applied according to the wealth of the people as 12 edna (low), 24 evsat (average), and 48 aid (high) kuru§} By doing this, Mahmut made a determined attempt to achicvc an equitable distribution of the tax burden among the reaya.1 There are two important documents both dated 1834 among the sicils of Salonica in respect of the new system of cizye collection. The first one, dated 25 Zilkade 1249, clearly outlines the ongoing irregularities and abuses of the present system and the need to rectify it. The second ferman, issued on 1 §evval 1249, established the new system of cizye collection in detail. The two main themes in the ferman were the position and the restricted responsibilities of the tax collectors and the equitable collection of cizye among the non-Muslim population of the Empire. 3 In addition, the first modern Ottoman census conducted in 1828-29 both in Europe and Anatolia was undertaken during the reign of Sultan Mahmut. According to Kemal Karpat, Sultan Mahmut was the great reformer of the nineteenth century and he became personally involved by ordering population registers to be set up and by supervising in person the conduct of censuses, because he well understood the importance of population surveys for all matters of government, especially financial matters. 4 In 1830, the Defatir Nezareti (Registrar's Office) was formed in order to collect the results of the census from all over the Empire and draw the required conclusions. Sait Efendi from the correspondence office of the Porte was appointed to this post with between five and ten secretaries. The basic unit for the functioning of this office was the kaza. In each kaza a population office was established and the official was asked to register all births, deaths and migrations. Moreover, statistics were conducted for movable and fixed properties such as shops in order to assess tax allocations. These reports would be assembled in Istanbul by the Defatir Nezareti.5 This being the case, how can it be argued that the new office for the population surveys was an imitation of the European one, particularly at this juncture? We are told in the relevant Ottoman documents that the main reason for conducting the new population registry was to achieve just taxation among the people of the Empire. As explained in the fermans, the unjust taxation of the people had resulted in serious grievances 1 In 1837, these amounts were changed to 15, 30 and 60. Ubicini, Turkiye, 1850, p. 268. Contrary to the Ottoman documents cited above, Ubicini puts these ratings as edna 15, evsat 30 and aid 60. 2

3

Sicil, 229:20, 25 Zilkade 1249 and Sicil, 229:27 1 ¡¡evval 1249. On the importance of the first Ottoman census, Sultan Mahmut remarked: " . . . semeresi ileride gorulecek cesim bir maslahat oldugu ve canhca yapi§ilmak gerektigi ..." quoted in Mahir Aydin, "Sultan II. Mahmud Doneminde Yapilan Nflfus Tahrirleri", in Sultan 11. Mahmud ve Reformlari Semineri: 28-30 Haziran 1989, Bildiriler, (Istanbul: Edebiyat Faktiltcsi Basimevi 1990) pp. 81-106. 4

5

Kemal Karpat, Ottoman Population 1830-1914: Demographic (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985) pp. 19-20.

and Social

Characteristics,

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from some parts of the population, and that constituted a negative factor of social disorder in the Ottoman society. This had to be remedied by taking the required steps. 1 This case clearly shows that the drive for new institutions camc from the internal needs of the time, and the Ottoman government responded to those needs according to its own perceptions. As a result of the census of 1831, the population and property registries were prepared for each province of the Empire. Tax allocations became more just. Every tax payee was able to know the time his tax was due and the amount he had to pay every year. Also, the government had a chance to predict the amount of taxes every year. Another interesting reform is related to the subject of iltizam. We see that just before the Tanzimat, the iltizam system was abolished in respect of customs duties, and all the administration of the customs was put under the direct control of the central government, which appointed some government officials to supervise the system. Similarly, inalcik mentions the negative effects of the iltizam system upon the people. 2 Some other important regulations such as the new quarantine regulation, which was officially introduced in 1838, and tahaffuzhanes (detention centres) were established in several places. According to a fermait sent to Salonica in 1835, the quarantine system had existed in the Aegean islands before 1838. 3 The abolishing of the state monopolies (yed-i vahid) by the 1838 Trade Treaty with Great Britain 4 in order to revitalise commercial life in the empire, and some preliminary preparations for the new criminal code, the edict making primary education compulsory and opening of new schools such as the Rii^diye Mektebleri (secondary schools), Mekteb-i Ulûm-i Edebiye, and Mekteb-i Ulûm-i Adlî (schools for the raising of state officials), the establishment of a regular postal service in the Empire, the issuing of passports for travelling were all brought about during the reign of Sultan Mahmut. 5

1 Mahir Aydin, "Sultan II. Mahmud Donemindc Yapilan Nufus Tahrirleri" pp. 83-84. 2 Halil Inalcik, "Tanzimatin Uygulanmasi ve Sosyal Tepkileri" pp. 623-649. 3 Sicil 231: 3 8 , 1 Muharrem 1251. ^ This is still a rather controversial issue among historians: whether Sultan Mahmut was convinced by the British that the abolishment would severely injure the economic power of Mehmet Ali of Egypt, or whether the Sultan himself had seen the practice of yed-i vahid as an obstacle to increases in production. So far, the literature based on some diplomatic and political documents and some memoirs has supported the former assertion. However, when we examine the social and economic conditions in the empire before the abolishment and the changes after that, it may be argued that the abolishment of the system of yed-i vahid was realised because of the internal socio-economic transformation that obliged the Ottoman government to act on this matter. For the former assertion and the documents see Regat Kaynar, Mustafa Re§it Pa§a ve Tanzimat, (Ankara: TTK Basimevi, 1991) and for the more detailed discussion of this issue see Chapter 4 of this book.

For a general account see M. A. Ubicini, Letters on Turkey, (Trans.) Lady Easthope, 2 vol. (London, 1856) and Sultan II. Mahmud ve Reformlari Semineri: 28-30 Haziran 1989, Bildiriler, (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakiiltesi Basimevi, 1990).

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65

It is possible to see the significance of the Ottoman reforms during the reign of Sultan Mahmut by looking at the mirror images in society. For instance, Consul Blunt reported of the situation in Salonica in 1839 that upon the news of the death of Sultan Mahmut the beys and such like who had gained the chief part of their living by plundering the people appeared pleased with the news. 1

1

FO 195 / 1 7 6 Blunt to Ponsonby 9 April 1840.

PART II THE STUDY: SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

3 SALONICA: ON THE EVE OF THE TANZIMAT

The city of Salonica, originally called Therona, was founded at the side of an old city and renamed as Thessalonike by the Macedonian King Cassander in honour of the sister of Alexander the Great in 316 BC. 1 The geographical position of Salonica in a central region of the south Balkans has formed one of the important features of the city throughout its history. It was established at the head of the Thermaic Gulf, near to the mouth of the Axios (Vardar) river, and faces Mount Olympus. Salonica is situated at the cross-roads of several major trading routes. Since Roman times, the Via Egnatia had been used for the east-west connection between Italy and Constantinople, while the Axios River was the main route from the city to the north. During the Roman and Byzantine Empires Salonica was the only metropolitan city of Macedonia. It was conquered by Murat II in 1430, and remained under Ottoman rule for nearly five centuries until the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. Being a port-city at the centre of the trade routes expanding from the Adriatic Sea to the Black Sea and from the Danube River to the Aegean Sea, Salonica had already become an important transit port and was integrated into the capitalist world market at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 2 Though until 1860 the urban structure of the city still remained intact inside the old city-walls, thanks to the advantages of its geographical position and mass immigrations from the countryside, the urbanisation of Salonica led to the eastward and westward expansion of the city. 3 For instance, according to the Ottoman census figures in 1831, the rate of immigrants to Salonica and the surrounding towns to the north and the west was 9.4%, which indicates the highest rate of immigration in the Empire. This migrant population constituted 20.3% of the Muslim population of Salonica in 1831. 4

' See Britannica, v. 11, pp. 705-706 and Everyman's Encyclopaedia, v. 10, p. 568. George Hoffman, 'Thessaloniki: The Impact of a Changing Hinterland', East European Quarterly, v. 2, n. 1, pp. 1-27. Mark Mazower, "Salonica Between East and West, 1860-1912", Hellenic Studies Review, n. 1, 1994, pp. 104-127. For a general account see also A. Vakaiopoulos, A History of Thessaloniki, (Salonica, 1963). 4 Daniel Panzac, (Trans.) Serap Yilmaz, Osmanh tmparatorlugunda Veba, p. 145. 2

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Divisions

Salónica was a mosaic as were most of the other cities of the Empire and, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, had a very diverse population consisting of mainly Muslim Turks, Orthodox Greeks, Jews, Bulgarians, Dônmes, Albanians, Gypsies, and Franks. The Muslim Turks including Donmes were dwelling in the north, near the citadel. The central quarters between the port and the trade centre of the city were occupied by the Jews, while the Christian Greeks were dwelling in the eastern part of the city. Catholic Franks were in the west part known as the "Frank Quarter." 1 The Muslim quarters (48 out of a total of 71 quarters) were always portrayed by the European travellers as the cleanest and the most healthy part of the city, while the Jewish quarters (11 out of 71) were in a very deplorable condition, subject to epidemics which were very common in the port-cities in the 18 th and 19 th centuries. The Christian Greek quarters (9 out of 71) were in a rather better condition than the Jewish ones. The wealthiest looking parts of the citywere the Frank quarters (3 out of 71), which were distinguished by the big luxurious residences of the wealthy Jews and Catholic Franks. 2 A French traveller, Boue, wrote the following description of the Frank quarter of the city: " ... houses made of stone, two storeys high, with glass windows and painted blinds ... the consulates of France, Spain, Austria, England and Russia are housed in even finer buildings, three storeys high. In some of them you might well imagine yourself in Europe". 3

Natural Calamities and Other

Problems

In the early nineteenth century, Salónica suffered mostly from the two natural calamities of fire and plague (earthquakes affected Salónica less, occurring in 1829,1858 and 1866) and the two problems which very much involved the human factor namely, continuous wars and bad administration. Fires were the inescapable elements of everyday life in Salónica during the entire nineteenth century. The very narrow streets of the city, the construction of wooden houses very close to each other without planning, and the absence of an effective regular fire brigade allowed devastating fires to break out in the 1 Basil C. Gounaris, "Selanik", in Çaglar Keyder, Y. Eyiip Ózveren, Donald Quataert, (Eds.) Dogu Akdeniz'de Liman Kentleri, 1800-1914, (Istanbul: Yurt Yayinlari, 1994) p. 103. 2 For more information on this issue see Mehmet Ali Gokaçti's article "1845 Yilinda Selanik" in Tarih ve Toplum, v. 28, n. 168, pp. 15-22. In this article, Gôkaçti gives some statistics and data respecting the ethnic, demographic, and economic realities of Salónica in the year 1845 according to the Ottoman temettuat vergisi (income tax) registries. According to V. Demetriades, in the first half of the nineteenth century the number of Greek quarters was 12 and of the Jewish quarters was 16, and the number of Turkish quarters was 43. See also Meropi Anastassiadou, Salonique, 1830-1912: Une ville ottomane à l'âge des réformes, (Leiden: Brill, 1997), pp. 60, 63,71. 3 Quoted from Mark Mazower, "Salónica Between East and West, 1860-1912", Hellenic Studies Review, n. 1, 1994, pp. 104-127.

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city. There were sixteen major Fires in Salónica during the nineteenth century, the worst being those in 1839, 1847, 1854, 1856 and 1890. 1 The only good thing was that though fires were very damaging materially, deaths were relatively few because of the people's well-developed caution which enabled them generally to escape the worst consequences. Apart f r o m bubonic plague, as the most deadly epidemic, several epidemics such as cholera and malaria ravaged the city during the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the plague of 1837-38 which caused 6000 deaths (according to Consul B l u n t ' s estimate, 10,000) was the deadliest o n e throughout the nineteenth century. 2 The lack of local preventive measures such as those to do with public hygiene, sanitary controls in the harbour, dirty and stagnant water and the humidity of the climate were the main reasons behind these disastrous epidemics. As is well-known, most of the time epidemics were transmitted from the ships arriving f r o m other ports. Though quarantine regulations were put into effect in Salónica as early as 1838, waves of plague continued until 1844 throughout the Ottoman Empire. 3 According to Panzac, the plague mysteriously disappeared in the Ottoman Empire in 1844 without any reasonable or logical explanation. 4 Unstable conditions and the wars of 1804, 1812, 1821, 1829 and 1839 in the Balkans also contributed to the rising p r o b l e m s of the city. Insurrections, brigands and the continuous propaganda of the agents of Mehmet Ali of Egypt made the governors of the city, who came mainly from military backgrounds, busy with security issues. They did not show any interest in the problems of the city which came f r o m the growing pace of urbanisation; or when they perceived the problems of the city, they did not h a v e the means and necessary k n o w l e d g e to eliminate the problems. Considering the city of Salónica as one of the places of exile of the Empire paved the way for entrusting the government of Salónica to persons who had Yitzchak Kerem, ' T h e Effects of Disasters on the Jewish Community of Salonica in the Nineteenth Century", in Scripta Hierosolymitana: Aspects of Ottoman History, Papers from CIEPO IX, Jerusalem, (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1994) pp. 49-61. 2 For a general account of plague in the Ottoman Empire see Daniel Panzac, (Trans.) Serap Yllmaz, Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Veba, 1700-1850, (La peste dans l'Empire Ottoman, 17001850) (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yaymlari, 1997). For an account of plague in Salonica see Joseph Nehama, Histoire des Israélites de Salonique, vols. 6 and 7, (Thessalloniki, 1978) and Apostolos E. Vaealopoulos, A History ofThessaloniki, (Thessaloniki, 1972). 3 An imperial ferman establishing the quarantine regulation in the port of Salonica reached the city in 1838, but the application of the regulation was delayed because of the hostile attitude of the European powers to the regulation, fearing that the quarantine system might be dangerous for their trade transactions in the Empire. See Sicil 235: 37-38, 1 Rebiiilevvel 1254. In an earlier Sicil dated 1835, there is an imperial order ( f e r m a n ) to the authorities establishing a quarantine regulation in the Aegean islands and the Dardancls, which allows us to argue that the Ottoman government considered putting quarantine regulations into effect earlier than 1838. See Sicil 231: 3 8 , 1 Muharrem 1251 (29 April 1835) "... ma'lum olaki bahr-i sefid'de kâin bazi sevahilve cezirelerde hastahk zuhuru rivayet olunmakda oldugundan bahr ve ... hifz-t sihhat... ceziresiyle bahr-i sefid bogazmda karantina usuluniin icrast zjmmnda mukteza-yi irade-i mulûkânem uzre taraf-t. devlet-i âliyemden mahsus rmmur tayin ve bu madde için bogaz-t mezkûrenin munasib mahallinde ..." 4

Daniel Panzac, Osmanli Jmparatorlugunda

Veba, p. 244.

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fallen out of power in Istanbul most of the time for political reasons. This practicc of appointing those whose basic intention in coming to Salonica was to get back their old political position in Istanbul, produced much misery for the city in the early nineteenth century. 1 Despite all these adverse conditions in the early nineteenth century, however, the city developed economically, the cultural life flourished and the population grew rapidly.

Demographic

Developments

T h e study of the demographic development of Salonica in the early nineteenth century is mainly based on the available data f r o m contemporary sources, Ottoman census records, consular reports and travellers' accounts. Ottoman census figures tend to be treated among the second category of sources, since Ottoman documents do not permit a complete estimate of the population; they mention only the male population or j u s t the number of families. However, we should take into account that at least the figures are based on actual survey and not mere estimates. Although the census of 1831 carried out mostly for fiscal purposes, covered the male population only and failed to employ a uniform system in collecting information by dividing the population according to age and failing to count the nomadic people in the E m p i r e , it is still the m o s t reliable statistical source of the time. In comparison, the figures in consular reports and travellers' accounts are basically less reliable because of their rough estimates and inadequate criteria. T h e population figures in the travellers' accounts were mostly based on the Ottoman tax registers; however, those calculations could be wrongly based, and they have to be compared with figures in other contemporary sources. Counting the houses in a city, measuring the diameter of a city and taking account of the yearly consumption of basic foods in a city were some other m e t h o d s used by travellers for their calculations. In the end, w e have to question the sources which they used for their estimates. Thus, it is better to be cautious about the accuracy of the numbers which are given in the travel books. A l s o , their political views and possible prejudices against some groups in the Ottoman Empire, or their sympathy with some other group or groups, might have had an influence on their estimates. 2 In addition to this, very much exaggerated numbers for the population of the cities of the Empire clearly indicated that their fantasies also played a role in their calculations. 3 For instance, at almost the same period, the population of Salonica was 1

See Meropi Anastassiadou, Salonique, pp. 82-83. For the examples of the manipulation of population statistics for political purposes by various ethnic and religious groups in the nineteenth century, see Kemal Karpat, Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics, (Madison: The Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1985) pp. 4, 5. 3 For instance, the travellers' estimates of the total number of the Bulgarian population between 1800 and 1878 ranged from 500,000 to 8,000,000 see ibid., p. 5.

2

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quoted in various travellers' books as 53,000, 60,000, 65,000, 70,000 and even 9 0 , 0 0 0 ^ Therefore, while hot ignoring the population figures in the European sources, we have to be mindful of the above points. According to Panzac, these European population figures can be employed in the calculation of the population of a city at a certain time, but not for the whole population of the Ottoman E m p i r e . 2 Also, Karpat points out that " . . . the majority of the European estimates were based on unfounded assumptions, erroneous information, and plain biased imagination, and consequently they must be used with extreme care .. ." 3 The population of Salonica in the first half of the nineteenth century shows a steady increase, though there were some temporary declines in periods such as during the Greek independence movement and long-lasting epidemics. T h e highest proportional increase during the first half of the nineteenth century was in the Jewish population of the city, from 15,000 in the 1800s to 30,000 in 1850. 4 T h e Muslim population was the second largest element between 1800 and 1850, f r o m 10,000 to 15,000 people. 5 T h e increase of the Christian population was 9,000 to 13,000 within this fifty-year period. 6 For this relatively modest rate among the Christian population, much attention was given by some sources to the negative consequences of the Greek war of Independence during the years 1821-1832. 7 However, in the contemporary Ottoman sources, mainly the Salonica judicial court records (sicils), there are a very f e w cases in 1835, directly after Greek independence, which note the sale of the property of former Greek subjects of the Empire in the public auction and also support the fact that there was no large-scale immigration

1 See Helen Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, The Eve of the Greek Revival: British Travellers' Perception of Early Nineteenth Century Greece, (London: Routledge, 1990) p. 57. 2 Daniel Panzac, Osmanh imparatorlugunda Veha, pp. 120-126. 3 Kemal Karpat, Ottoman Population, 1830-1914, p. 18. 4 During the whole of the eighteenth century, the Jewish population of Salonica declined from a possible 40,000 in the 1660s to 30,000 in 1715, 20,000 in 1734, 18,000 in 1783, and 12,000 in 1792. The Jewish population fell 50 to 20 percent during the eighteenth century. See T. Stoianovich, "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant," Journal of Economic History, v. 20 (June 1960), pp. 247, 251. See also Yitzchak Kerem, ' T h e Effects of Disasters on the Jewish..." pp. 42-61. 5

The Muslim population of Salonica in the eighteenth century increased from 30 to 55 percent of the total population. T. Stoianovich, "The Conquering ..." p. 251. 6 The Greek population may have increased from 20 to 25 percent in the eighteenth ccntury, ibid,, p. 251. 7

M. Anastassiadou argues that the fall of the Christian population in Macedonia started at the time of the national insurrection in Morea and increased after the establishment of the Greek state by the migration of the Christian Greeks from Salonica. "Next to this voluntary migration of a patriotic type, there were also the massive departures owed to persecutions that followed the uprising of the Orthodox of Macedonia. Also, there were also departures bound to the economic preoccupations." See Meropi Anastassiadou, Salonique, p. 62, and Kirki Georgiadou, "Les Grecs de Thessaloniki" in Gilles Veinstein, (Ed.), Salonique 1850-1918 (Paris: Autrement' 1992) pp. 119-128. I note, however, in Chapter 9 that there was a reverse flow of Greeks back to Macedonia from "free" Greece. Also, we need to be cautious about interpreting "official" statistics which are not always accurate, especially about conditions during a period of political instability.

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from Salonica to independent Greece. 1 At the same time, in another Ottoman document, we see that the Ottoman government was finding it difficult to settle the Muslim immigrants from Morea. According to the document, these immigrants temporarily settled in Salonica and some other small towns in the area and then in 1835 were transferred to regions further in the interior such as Varna. 2 The rapid growth of the Jewish population during the period between 1800 and 1850 was mainly attributed to a decrease in the death rate of newborn babies, while the Muslim and Christian populations of the city largely rose through immigration. 3 The Muslims increased through conversions to Islam and the continuous settlement of Turks into the region, especially after Greek independence, most of the Turkish families which had fled from Greece settled in the Salonica region. 4 The Christians for their part were strengthened by the arrival of Bulgarian and Vlach-speaking immigrants from the north. 5 In the first quarter of the century, there was plague in the city as in other parts of the Empire. Plague visited Salonica regularly until the midnineteenth century, leading to declining birth rates and a general restraint on the population of the city. The deadliest outbreak was in 1837, when an estimated 10,000 persons died of the plague. Abortion was also widely practised in Salonica as a means of birth control. According to the reports it was as common in this city as in the rest of the Empire. Abortion was carried out in the city with the assistance of Jewish midwives. Consul Blunt reported the situation as follows: U s i n g drugs to c a u s e a b o r t i o n is t o o general in Salonica as well as the o t h e r p a r t s of T u r k e y in t h e e a r l y n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . T h e r e a r e m o s t l y J e w i s h w o m e n w h o a r e e m p l o y e d solely in the c o m m i s s i o n of this c r i m e . T h e w a y they are d o i n g abortion is either a n operation is p e r f o r m e d o r the patient is taken f i v e o r six s u c c e s s i v e d a y s t o the T u r k i s h bath, w h e r e she is so r e d u c c d by the continual heat, that abortion is easily p r o d u c e d . T h i s c r i m e is c o m m i t t e d n o t only in the h a r e m s of the beys but also especially a m o n g s t the less wealthy classes of the T u r k i s h and G r e e k population. In t h e latter t h e e c o n o m i c r e a s o n s e e m s m o s t likely to b e t h e m a j o r f a c t o r of c o m m i t t i n g t h i s c r i m e . In t h e y e a r 1839, b e c a u s e of t h e g e n e r o s i t y of t h e s e c r i m e s e s p e c i a l l y in the interior i n d u c c d t h e O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t t o p u b l i s h a ferman in order to put an end to this c o m m i s s i o n , (sic.)

Sicil 231: 25, 28 Zilhicce 1250. "Selànik miitemekkinlerinden olup mukaddema firar eden ve malìk olan rum gàvurlarimn Selànik'de vàki canib-i miriden mazbut emlàklari bilmuzayede latiblerine furuhat olunmak ve firar eden muaccelàtin miktari ve mugterileri yedlerine ..." 2 Sicil 231:23,1 Zilkade 1250" ... Malum olaki Mora Muhacirlerinden Seiànik sancaginda vàki Karaferye kazasina mukaddema iskàn olunmug olup mudahhiran bazi uygunsuzluklari muktezasi irade-i seniyye-i §ahanem tìzre Varna cambine nakl olmalari zimmnda ...." ^ Basii C. Gounaris, "Selanik", p. 105. 4 There are several accounts in Salonica court records (sicils) of the time that the settlement of Muslim immigrants from Morea had remained one of the basic concerns of the Ottoman overnment. As an example see Sicil 231:23, 1 Zilkade 1250. N. Svoronos, "Administrative, Social, and Economic Developments", in M. B. Sakellariou, (Ed.), Greek Lands in History, Macedonia, (Athens, 1983) p. 356. 6 FO 195 / 1 0 0 Blunt to Ponsonby 9 January 1839.

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A s Consul Blunt mentioned in his report, the issue of abortion constituted the subject of an imperial ferman sent to Salónica in 1838. The ferman clearly prohibited the practice of abortion (iskat-i ceniri) explaining that this practice was considered by the Ottoman government to be murder. In this document, we see that the government not only j u s t prohibited the practice but also gave reasonable and convincing explanations respecting the evil nature of this practice by adding the supportive opinions of both the Patriarch and the Chief Rabbi (hahamba^i). Also, the document required the prohibition of the use of a special drug which eased the operation. The ferman was openly addressed to the people who prepared, used and sold this kind of drug f o r the purpose of abortion, saying that they would be severely punished. 1 The first Ottoman census, which was carried out in 1831 and covered only the male population, numbered the Muslim male population of the city as 4,294 (33.7 per cent), while the Christian male population was 2,759 (21 per cent) and the Jewish male population was 5,667 (44.6 per cent). Thus, the total number of males in Salónica was 12,720 in 1831. Simply, if we add the same number of females to this number, the approximate adult population of the city in 1831 was about 25,000 to 30,000 people. 2 Since, most probably the Ottoman census figures did not count anyone other than natives of Salónica, we have to add to these figures the growing number of immigrants who had been living in the vicinity of the city and were largely involving in its e c o n o m i c activities. T h e deterioration of living conditions in the countryside and consequently the climate of insecurity, available j o b opportunities because of the continuous growth of c o m m e r c c , and the improvement in general security in the cities can be considered as basic reasons for the rapid increase in the population of Salónica at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Thus, in the first half of the nineteenth century, Salónica was giving signs of b e c o m i n g an i m p o r t a n t attraction f o r immigrants. 3 In sum, according to different sources, Jews constituted about the half of the population of Salónica, while the second largest group was Muslim Turks. T h e Orthodox Christian population, thus, account for one-third of the total number in the 1840s. According to Blunt's estimate, the total population

Sicil 235: 96, 30 $aban 1254 "Meclis-i Umur-i Nafiye'de ve Dar-i jlura-yi Bab-i Ali ve Meclis-i Vala-l Ahkdm-i Adliye'de goruiulmu§, karar allnmij ve ilac-i iskat-i cenin'in verilmemesi tenbih olunmu$tur." 2

Enver Ziya Kara], Osmanh imparatorlugunda ¡Ik Niifus sayimi, ¡831, II. Baski (AnkaraDevlet Istatistik Enstitiisii Matbaasi, 1997) pp. 57-58. 3 The increasing number of imperial orders sent to the provinces respecting the proper application of miirur tezkeresi nizami, which was one of the regulations of Sultan Mahmut to prevent immigration particularly from the countryside to the cities, shows the seriousness of the immigration issue in the 1830s. For the fermans specifically dealing with this issue, see for example, Sicil 229: 3 1 , 1 0 Zilkade 1249, Sicil 229: 5 1 , 9 Rebiulevvel 1250.

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of S a l o n i c a i n 1 8 3 9 w a s r o u g h l y 6 0 , 0 0 0 , a s c a n b e s e e n in T a b l e 1. O t h e r c o n t e m p o r a r y figures are given in Tables 2 a n d 3.1 T a b l e 1 P o p u l a t i o n of

Salonica*

Muslims

15,000 5,000

Donmes Orthodox

13,000

Jews

25,000 1,000

Franks

59,000

Total

* A c c o r d i n g to B l u n t ' s R e p o r t in 1839. T a b l e 2 P o p u l a t i o n of S a l o n i c a *

35,000 15,000 13,000 2,000 65,000

Muslims Orthodox Chris. Jews Others Total

* A c c o r d i n g t o L e a k e ' s e s t i m a t i o n in the 1830s. T a b l e 3 P o p u l a t i o n of

Muslims O r t h o d o x Chris. Jews Total

Salonica*

10,000 6,000 12,000 28,000

* A c c o r d i n g to O t t o m a n c e n s u s in 1831.

1 FO 195 / 100 Blunt to Ponsonby 25 Jan 1839 and N. Svoronos, "Administrative, Social..." p. 359. Also some contemporary travellers' accounts indicated about the same figures, for example see G. F. Bowen, Mount Athos, Thessaly and Epirus: A Dairy of a Journey from Constantinople to Corfu (London, 1852) p. 28 and .1. J. Best, Excursions in Albania (London, 1842) p. 229. There are different figures in the travel books for the population of Salonica at the turn of the nineteenth century: E. Clarke quoted British Consul Charnaud as saying that the population was 53,000 in the 1810s, (Travels in Various Countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa, 4 th edition, VII [London, 18181 p. 463); F. Beaujour put it as 60,000 in the 1800s, (Tableau du Commerce de la Grece, [Paris, 1800] p. 53); W. M. Leake recorded it as 65,000 in the 1830s, of whom 35,000 were Turks, 15,000 Greeks, and 13,000 Jews, the remainder Franks and Gypsies, (Travels in Northern Greece, III, [London, 1835], p. 248); H. Holland stated that it was 70,000 in the 1810s, (Travels in the Ionian Isles, Albania, Thessaly, Macedonia, etc., during the Years 1812,1813 [London, 18151 p. 319).

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Organization

From the seventeenth century onwards, Salónica constituted one of the sancaks of the eyalet of Rumeii, and was administered by an Ottoman Pasha. Before 1826, under the classical Ottoman urban administrative system, civil and municipal duties were not separated from each other. 1 The kadi supervised various duties including municipal, associational and judicial duties in the local administration. In doing this, the kadi got help from his assistants and other organisations. H e had several assistants with different duties, such as Subaçi (for security), mimarbaçi (for architectural duties), Çôpliik Subaçisi (for the collection of rubbish). Also, imams, heads of the artisan associations and the heads of the non-Muslim communities were required to assist the kadi? In 1826, the ihtisab Müdürlügü (the office of market inspector) was created in the cities; and then inspection duties were put under the supervision of this office. Again in 1836, vakifidaresi (the office of charitable endowments) was founded, and thus only judicial duties remained under the direct authority of the kadi in the cities. The promulgation of the Tanzimat decree led to major changes in local administration. All the municipal functions of Ottoman cities came under the authority of local councils. These attempts should be seen as the Ottoman government's response to the changing social, economic, and cultural urban realities of the time in the Ottoman cities. Particularly in the port-cities of the Empire, because of their close commercial relations with the outside world, important structural changes were already under way in the nineteenth century. Those port-cities had to accommodate themselves to the changing world according to the requirements of their interaction with it, either by adopting the standards of the new commercial and service sectors or by improving their o w n . In this sense, it is p o s s i b l e to see that the f i r s t m u n i c i p a l administrations in the Ottoman Empire were established in the port-cities, such as Salónica. Other than tax-administration there was a sort of self-administration of the Christian and Jewish communities. Since the general structure of Ottoman society in the cities was f o r m e d by different communities living in the different quarters of the cities and interacting with each other and with the state with reference mainly to religious differences, namely as Christians or Jews, they had the right to establish self-administration within their communities. These community administrations were primarily responsible for carrying out duties on behalf of the state authority such as gathering and paying taxes, implementing orders from the state authorities, maintaining order within the 1 liber Ortayli, Tanzimattan Sonra Mahalli idareler, 1840-1878, (Ankara: Sevinc Matbaasi 1974) p. 110. 2 Musa Çadirci, 'Tanzimat'in Uygulanmasinda Karfilaçrlan Bazi Guçliikler" in Tanzimat'in 150. YilddniimU Uluslararasi Sempozyumu, Ankara, 31 Ekim - 3 Kasim 1989, (Ankara: TTK Basimevi, 1994) pp. 295-301.

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community and region, and fulfilling other state obligations. Conversely, each community head had the right to take measures on behalf of his own people and submit requests to the state authorities. The Ottoman court continued to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all penal offences, while the ecclesiastic or rabbinical court was responsible for matters involving the family and personal status of the Christians and Jews such as marriage, divorce and inheritance. In cases of dissatisfaction with the laws of the Orthodox and Jewish communities, however, the parties concerned could bring the matters before the Ottoman court. 1 After the reaffirmation of the privileges which had been granted to nonMuslims and the extension of the guarantees of life, property and equal rights by the promulgation of the Tanzimat decree, these non-Muslim communal administrations were also required to propose reforms in their internal organisations according to the changing conditions throughout Ottoman society. 2 Contemporary travellers such as Leake and Urquhart depicted this kind of self-administration of the religious communities as an "aristocratic administration" because of the position in the community of the deputies as being the most wealthy and influential people. 3 Indeed, the only imposition of its will on the self-administration of these communities was that the Ottoman government wanted them to choose representatives among their notables. For Urquhart, this self-administration played an important role by shaping the character and life of the Greeks. The preservation of their distinctive culture, language and strict unity with the Orthodox Church were the consequences of this institution. 4 On this subject, another contemporary, Finlay, asserts that the institution of self-administration of the Orthodox community enabled the Greeks in particular to Hellenize other ethnically different but Orthodox peoples. Moreover, in the long run this institution prepared and enabled the Greeks to achieve their independence. 5 The Jewish community was the largest community in Salonica in the nineteenth century. Having their own schools, hospitals and almshouses and dwelling in segregated communities, the Jews of Salonica showed all the characteristics of an ethnic group. Rabbis had special positions-in the Jewish 1 Haralampos K. Papastathis, "Communal Organisation" in toannis Koliopoulos and I. Hassiotis (Eds.), Modern and Contemporary Macedonia, (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis Publishing House, 1997) pp. 84-95, N. Pantazopoulos, "Community Laws and Customs of Western Macedonia under Ottoman Rule", Balkan Studies, v. 2, n. 3, (1961-62), pp. 1-22. 2 There is an interesting case in Cyprus even before the Tanzimat reforms that the Orthodox community of the island had proposed new reform measures respecting the changes in their community administration in both 1830 and 1837. At this time, the Ottoman government prepared a new administrative structure for the Orthodox community according to their proposal. For further details, see George A. Dionyssiou, The Implementation of the Tanzimat Reforms in Cyprus, 1839-1878, (MLitt. thesis, The University of Birmingham, 1995) pp. 11-13. 3 See W. M. Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, (London, 1835) p. 268 and David Urquhart, Turkey and Its Resources, (London, 1833) p. 33. 4 Urquhart, Turkey, p. 20-22. 5 G. Finlay, The History of Greece under Ottoman and Venetian Domination, (London, 1856) pp. 352-352.

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community of Salónica, because religion was the most important element of their culture.' They supervised all judicial matters such as marriage, divorce, and all kinds of litigation between members of the community. Although the Rabbis had the leadership of the community, they were not alone in managing the life of the Jews of Salónica. There was a council consisting of notables which played an important role in the affairs of the community as an advisory council. The Christian community of Salónica also had its communal organisation. The community was managed by an advisory council under the presidency of the Metropolitan and consisted of twelve notables who formed a kind of aristocracy, representing their quarters in the city. These members of the advisory council were clected for one year and were chiefly put in charge of collecting taxes from the community. They also took care of the management of the real estate belonging to the community and performed other duties such as nomination of the committees of schools and hospitals. There was a strong autonomy in the community. In the case of any collaboration to the detriment of the interests of the co-religionists, the Metropolitan had the authority and power to excommunicate. 2 In spite of the presence of advisory councils for the community, the Orthodox communal administration was dominated by a religious mechanism. Since the Metropolitan was the undisputed leader of the community both for the Ottoman government and for the Greek people, all affairs of the community including both state liabilities such as the collection of taxes and the business of personal rights such as marriages and divorces fell under his authority. 3 In Salónica, as in the other cities of the Ottoman Empire, as a result of the increasing religious diversity within the guild system, by the end of the seventeenth century the guild system had begun to transform itself into a body of professional unions dissociated from religion. The traditional economy was not divided along ethnic or religious lines. Therefore, by the nineteenth century typical guild membership consisted of a variety of different ethnoreligious groups. Local businesses were spread throughout the city regardless of religious and ethnic identities. According to Anastassiadou, in the Christian quarters of the city, there were forty-five different businesses, fifteen owned by Jews and ten by Muslims and the rest by Christians. 4 Though this pattern was generally prevalent, there were also ethnically or religiously separate guilds in Salónica. For example, while the guild of shoemakers consisted mostly of Turks, in the weavers' guild, the Jews formed the majority, and it was the

1

Konstandinos A. Vakalopoulos, Modem 1988) p. 130. 2

History of Macedonia,

1830-1912

(Thessaloiliki

Meropi Anastassiadou, Salonique, p. 64, N. Pantazopoulos, "Community Laws and Customs oi Western Macedonia under Ottoman Rule", Balkan Studies, v. 2, n. 3, (1961-62), pp. 1-22. 3 Kirki Georgiadou, "Les Grecs de Thessaloniki", p. 125. 4 Meropi Anastassiadou, Salonique, p. 326.

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same for the Greeks in the silk trade guilds. 1 An Ottoman document found in the sicils of Salonica interestingly stressed the continuing importance of the guild system for the artisans of Salonica in the 1830s. The dispute over the position of leadership of the debbag loncasi (guild of tanners) occurred when two different persons claimed the post by producing the required diploma (berat). Members of the guild applied to the authorities in Istanbul in favour of §eyh Musa, who held the berat of Ahi Evran Zaviyesi in Anatolia, which represented the traditional and also the official centre for this kind of appointment. 2

Local

Taxation

One of the main objectives of the Tanzimat was reorganisation of the existing taxation system, which had consisted of both §er't and orfi taxes and had proved to be problematic in the nineteenth century. The preliminary goals of the Tanzimat reforms in changing the fiscal system of the Empire were both to achieve just taxation by abolishing excise taxes and as many tax exemptions as possible, since these had contributed to social disorder in the Empire. The reforms sought also to provide new financial sources for the implementation of the Tanzimat reforms. According to the new system of taxation, apart from the tax on sheep (agnam resmi), cizye (capitation tax) and a$ar (tithes), the old taxes were abolished. A new tax, called temettu vergisi (income tax) was established. Another new tax, called cemaatin vergisi (community tax), replaced all the orfi taxes on reaya? The assessment of the new community tax was based on the same amount of orfi taxes in any district. The community tax was to be collected by the leaders of the communities and transmitted to the muhasil of the district as had been the case also before the Tanzimat. 4 The community tax was never auctioned in the Empire. Until 1845, it was paid in two instalments per year and each taxpayer had to pay his share according to the size of his property and income. 5 In 1839, there was a great increase in the division of taxation due to the economic decisions of the Tanzimat system. Community tax had run up to 194 P. (Piastres). According to the reports, as some contemporary writers asserted, the system of taxation was not particularly harsh or unjust when compared with those in other states. 6 The weight of taxation upon the reaya 1

N. Svoronos, "Administrative, Social,...", p. 382. Sicil, 229:67, 10 Cemaziyelahir 1250. For a general account of the new taxation see Abdullätif §ener, Osmanli Vergi Sistemi, (Ankara: I§aret Yayinlan, 1990). 4 Ibid., pp. 98-99. 5 Abdurrrahman Vefik, Tekalif Kavaidi, II, (Istanbul, 1330/1911) pp. 59, 60. 6 FO 195 / 100 Blunt to Ponsonby 18 December 1839. For the same kind of remark see W. M. Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, III, (London, 1835), pp. 251-252. R. J. More, Under the Balkans: Notes of A Visit to the District of Phitippopolis in 1876, (London, 1877), p. 125. Charles A. Brophy, A Residence in Bulgaria, (London, 1869) pp. 174-185. 2 3

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had rather decreased than otherwise during the previous nine years. Upon the division of the expenses of the town, or the taxation, the reaya had to pay in 1830 1838

230,752 P. = 240,288 P. =

Exchange rate: 77.5 Exchange rate: 104

£ 29,778 £23,109

W e have to take into account the expenses of the redif soldiers, which did not exist in 1830. The expenses of the redif soldiers in 1838, that is, the portion paid by the reaya of Salónica, was 37,412 P. = £ 3,591, so that this new tax had not greatly augmented the general burden, and if it had not existed there would be have been a reduction in taxation. For this reason, the reaya of Salónica had complained that it had gone up to 194 P. when it should have been 158 P. 1 This increase can be attributed to several causes, but in the first instance, the increase in taxation came f r o m the changcs in the system of administration, which increased expenses for the central government. T h e second one was the unstable situation of foreign affairs, especially in connection with M e h m e d Ali of Egypt, which added considerably to the military expenses of the Ottoman Empire. 2 Indeed, the cizye tax continued to be exacted under the name of bedel-i askeri, the tax f o r the exemption of non-Muslims f r o m military service, which was made mandatory to all citizens of the Empire after the Tanzimat. When voices were raised against the new measure of compulsory military scrvicc for non-Muslims by the leaders of Christian and Jewish communities, the old cizye tax was re-namcd the bedel-i askeri. According to an Ottoman document dated 1835, the number of non-Muslims held responsible for the cizye tax in Salónica was as follows: 3 Table 4 The number of non-Muslims held responsible for the cizye tax in Salonica in 1835. Non-Muslims Christians Jews Total

Alá, (rich) 48 gurus 250 205 455

Evsat (medium rich) 24 gurus 1280 862

Ednâ (lower) 12 gurus 655 2840

Total 2185 3907

2142 3495 6092 According to the document in the sicils of Salonica, Sicil, 229:110, 3 §evvàl 1250.

1

According to an Ottoman document dated 1836, the amount of one ru'us (share) was 157

guru}. See Sicil 232: 90, 1 Receb 1252. 2 F O 195/ 100 Blunt to Ponsonby 18December 1839. 3 Sicil, 229:110, 3 gevval 1250.

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Now, from the above numbers, we can draw some conclusions. In 1835, the number of rich Christian people who paid 48 guru§ was more than the number of rich Jewish people. Most of the Jewish cizye tax payers were categorised lower level, while most of the Christians were in the medium rich category. If we compare the numbers with the overall numbers of the Christian and Jewish population of Salonica in 1839, 1,185 out of 13,000 Christians (9 per cent) were held liable for cizye tax while the rate for the Jewish population was 3,907 out of 25,000 (15.6 per cent). The above facts, which are based on contemporary sources, clearly show the fair division of the cizye tax collection in the Empire in the nineteenth century even before the Tanzimat changes. These figures also rebut the overlapping assertions and generalisations about unjust measures in cizye tax collection system in the present literature. In 1840 Consul Blunt tried to write a report on the taxation system of the Ottoman Empire as he had seen it in the interior, but at the very beginning, he says he has become confused about the system. 1 Blunt mainly concentrated, I believe, on the provincial system which was the prevailing system of taxation for the expenses of the provinces long before the Tanzimat reforms. In the seventeenth century local expenses were limited to the maintenance of a menzilhane (internal network of imperial supply service) or of a small garrison of militia, but in the early nineteenth century, the taxes which were raised for district needs increased and the accounts of the local expenses became more detailed. 2 According to the Tanzimat reforms, the accounts of Salonica were kept by the §ekir kahyasi or city warden, who was attended in his office by two members of the polities or communities, one f r o m the Christian and the other from the Jewish. Blunt describes the situation as follows: "Every six months the accounts were made up by the §ehir kahyasi, the Pasha and the beys, they were then presented to the molla, who puts a question to the §ehir kahyasi and the members of the communities: 'are these accounts correct?' The reply was of course in the affirmative. The molla then gives his tlam or certificate, a copy of which together with a copy of the accounts was sent to Istanbul." 3 According to Blunt, the molla however never gave his tldm without a fee of about £200. The §ehir kahyasi then divided the gross amount of the masraf or expenses among the Christian and Jewish reaya both whom had to pay the amount of 380 ru'us making in all 760 ru'us, but, according to Blunt, since the Jewish population of Salonica was more than double that of the Christian, the

1 Consul Blunt even misspells the Ottoman term "ru'us" as "robussla", in his reports. I think the mistake stems from the Greek usage of the term. 2 Bruce McGowan, Economic life in Ottoman Europe, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981) p. 157. 3 FO 195 / 176 Blunt to Ponsonby 10 February 1840.

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division was becoming to some extent unjust. 1 The community tax had to be paid by every five adult persons w h o were eligible to pay tax, making one ru'us\ and this was adhered to in the town, but Blunt observes that in the villages and on the farms it was often extorted from every two persons. Taxation of the people for the local expenses in Salonica seems to have been the major irregularity of the local officials f o r their own benefit. 2 According to Blunt, one thing was clear: the people in the interior generally paid fully two-thirds more tax than was just, and in many cases even more than what was recorded in the "made up" accounts sent to Istanbul. 3 This information was true only for the taxes extorted for the support of the local government, not f o r general taxation. There is no information in Blunt's reports regarding the major taxes f o r the central government. For instance, the item of saman parasi or straw money was yearly passed as masraf or expenses in the Salonica accounts, which was, according to Blunt, a f e e for some of the rical (elite class) of Istanbul and varied f r o m 40,000 P. to 60,000 P. = £600. T h e most correct item to be passed in the accounts was the expenses of the redif soldiers, according to the Blunt reports. T h e item of prison fees was for the liberation of Christian imprisoned by the authorities for crimes and released upon the guarantee of the archbishop. T h e item of Sunday expenses was for the rent of the Bishop's palace, paving the streets and the salaries of persons employed by the community. Interest on money was sums of money raised by the c o m m u n i t y at f r o m 12 to 18 per cent interest per annum for the payment of taxes. 4

Change in

Consumption

Changes in the consumption practices of the Ottomans were beginning to be seen a m o n g almost all groups of society at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Indeed, this change had occurred among the high officials and wealthy families in Istanbul in earlier decades expressed in their taste for luxuries. Starting f r o m as early as the Tulip Period (1718-30), consumption of imported foreign goods had become increasingly common in Istanbul. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, imported goods, particularly f r o m Europe, had become very prestigious presents in the traditional practice of gift-exchange among the people of Istanbul. During the reign of Sultan Selim 1 For the distribution of ru'us and the amounts see Sicil 232: 90, 1 Receb 1252. In 1836, one ru'us was equal with 157 guru§ 33 para. 2 See Bruce McGowan, Economic Life, p. 155. He remarks that as early as the seventeenth century, provincial officials had begun to find ways to increase their incomes. 3 The situation was described by Tatarcikll Abdullah Efendi who was the governor of Rumeli during the reign of Sultan Selim III, in a letter to the Sultan, because the whole Macedonian populace including women and children were working day and night just to pay taxes. Cited in Bruce McGowan, Economic Life, p. 133. 4

FO 195 / 1 7 6 Blunt to Ponsonby 10 February 1840. For the same information see also Sicil 232: 90, 1 Receb 1252.

84

OTTOMAN

REFORMS

AND

SOCIAL

LIFE

III, special orders were issued to restrict the consumption of foreign goods. 1 By the early nineteenth century, this phenomenon was just beginning to be seen in the interior of the country. T w o factors, the benefits of the Commercial Convention of 1838 with fixed rates of duty, and the new reform measures of the Tanzimat, helped to increase the consumption of foreign manufactured goods, particularly British goods. From the late 1830s, British imports in particular enjoyed extremely favourable tariffs. Being free from any local competition, foreign goods became remarkably popular in the Ottoman market. Apart from these, the growing well-being of people, resulting from new social and economic conditions, contributed to their consumption of foreign goods. By this time, the previously prevailing spirit of selfsufficiency had started to change and most families had begun holding considerable amounts of cash, because of the dynamism in economy and, as a consequence, the consumption of foreign goods increased. The two variables which determined the increase in consumption were low prices and high earnings. Locally manufactured goods generally could not compete with the foreign ones in terms of price. Machine-made goods from Europe were always cheapcr than the native ones. In many of the towns in the interior, it was observed that the women had daily begun to throw off their old costumes and to adopt what were called Frank dresses, which had induced the importers to bring richer sorts of goods to market. 2 Prints and the finer sorts of fabrics very much changed the ancient costume of the Christian females. Indeed, such was the change in Salonica within a few years that the Frank dresses for women outnumbered the rest; the consequence was that the trade in fancy goods greatly increased in this city. 3 When a new kind of imported article was introduced on the market, attracting customers by new styles and colours combining better quality and cheaper prices, it was very easily sold in the 1840s. 4 At the same time, the accumulation of wealth through mostly commercial activities in certain sections of society paved the way for another important development in the building of luxury homes in new styles and of various sizes. In opposition to the traditional simplicity of Ottoman town houses, huge investments were made at this time in the construction and decoration of palatial houses in Salonica. Now, the old Frank quarter of the city, which had been known for the buildings of the wealthy Franks and of the

1

See EnverZiya Karal, Selim Ill'iin Hattl Humayunlari, p. 136. FO 195/176 Blunt to Canning January 1842. 3 FO 195/176 Blunt to Canning January 1845. 4 Consul Blunt reported that the introduction of a new kind of German nankeen with a greater beauty and variety in the stripes, which were made to resemble the patterns of Bursa silk and that of so called Istanbul ¡ah, made a great change in the consumption and affected the market for British nankeen. FO 78 / 265 Blunt to Ponsonby, 28 December 1835. 2

SALONICA:

ON T H E

EVE

OF

THE

TANZ1MAT

85

foreign consulates, was almost overwhelmed by the new luxury buildings. For instance, the new mansion of the Alatini family, one of the leading merchant families of Salonica, was constructed in the middle of the city. The increasing popularity of fancy goods and the consequent opening in 1842 of five new retail shops in Salonica, where formerly there had been just one, justified talk of an active and changing social structure in the city of S a l o n i c a . 1 Although this branch of trade was of minor importance, its increase brought with it evidence of the great change in the consumption habits and the general state of the people in the interior. This development in the consumption of fancy goods could be attributed to greater freedom and the improvement of economic well-being of the people which enabled them to fulfil their real and imaginary wants.

Some Notes on Industry From the beginning of the nineteenth century onwards, Ottoman markets had been invaded by European machine-made products. This development had also already made a few Ottoman industrial establishments redundant. The local industrial enterprises could not compete with the products of the big European factories, which were both cheap and usually better in quality. The main purpose of the esnaf organisations (guilds) in the cities was to eliminate competition and to control prices. Moreover, these esnajs were not in a position to produce manufactured goods for an expanding market, but they simply responded to local needs and the demands of the cities or wider areas. They did not try to expand their outlook, yet continued to hold their own in the face of foreign competition. On this matter, the Ottoman government tried as much as possible to support and protect the interests of local esnaf and enterprises. For instance, when the Sardinian Consul in Salonica enquired of the central government whether he could get a permit to establish a bakery which was going to provide French bread and peksimet to both the consulate and the Sardinian ships in Salonica port, the Porte took it extremely seriously and a decision was only made after communicating with the local government. According to the correspondence between the Porte and the local authorities in Salonica, first the central government asked whether this establishment would be harmful to the internal order of the city's esnaf organisations or if it would make any alterations to that order. Only after a positive reply did the central government authorise the Sardinian consul to proceed. 2 We see in the documents that the same kind of request was made by 1

FO 195/176 Blunt to Canning January 1843. Sicil, 235: 21, 55, 15 Muharrem 1254 " . . . ma'lum. olaki Seldnik iskelesinde bulunan Sardunya konsolosuyla tticcar \>c sair ademleritiin ... kifayet-i nefsi igin firancila vepeksimed tayin olmak Uzre emsali misillu miiceddeden bir bah firm kusadma ruhsat-t seniyye-i miilukanem erzan kihnmasi ... itibu kusad-i istid'a kilinan jjrina ruhsat verilmesinde nizam-i beldeye dokunur gezdirilmeyip mahzur olup olmadigi ... tayin olunacak francila ve peksimed $ar§i ve esvakda emsali misillu fakat kendi tebaa ve tuccarina fiiruhat olundugu halde nizam-i beldeye dokunur mahzur olmadigi..." 2

86

O T T O M A N

R E F O R M S

A N D

S O C I A I,

L I F E

Tuscany several months later and the Ottoman government went through the same process, again asking the governor of Salónica. 1 On another occasion, a Jewish manufacturer of (blown glass bottles) applied to the Porte with a claim that his factory was a vakif property rented and managed by him, and he held a permit for it; recently, however, he complained that someone else had started to manufacture and sell the same product in Salónica, causing him problems. The Porte, after investigating the situation, acted on behalf of the Jew. 2 The immediate effects of foreign competition were felt first in the cities and ports, which were more closely connected with European trade. Generally, in the more remote-country areas those branches of the industry which directly responded to the specific needs of the people mostly retained their former importance. In fact, the position of the Porte in this matter was rather weak, because it had long ago abandoned its protectionist policies and become an open market. 3 For their part, European capitalists at no time neither encouraged nor supported the development of industry in the Ottoman Empire. Their reluctance to invest was quite logical, when we take into account the position of the Ottoman Empire as a valuable market. On the other hand, the lack of local initiatives for the development of industry constituted a second major obstacle. Activities such as money lending, trade and investment in land were far more favourable for local capitalists than investing in industry, which was considered a dangerous adventure in which only the government dare involve itself. Thus, local capitalists ceased to have a profound or primary interest in the protection of industry. Also, the land-owning class did not want to protect the production of local commodities which were poorer in quality and more expensive than the European ones. It was well known that the growing commercial power and capital of Greek merchants in particular did not favour investment in industry; they chose rather to transfer the capital which they made in the Ottoman Empire to Europe and invest there. 4 In fact, under the shadow of the practice of "free trade" which had been shaped more precisely by the trade convention of 1838, nobody was brave enough to contemplate such an activity as investing in industry in the Ottoman Empire. Some attempts made by the Ottoman government in the practice of industrialisation faced a variety of difficulties such as lack of experience, dependence on imported machinery, lack of skilled labour and bureaucratic interference.

1

Sicil: 235:53, 30 Rebiulahir 1254. Sicil, 229:61,9 Rebiulahir 1250. 3 Nikolai Todorov, The Balkan City, p. 217-218. 4 See Richard Clogg, "The Greek Mercantile Bourgeoisie: 'progressive 1 or 'reactionary"? " in Richard Clogg, (Ed.), Balkan Society in the age of Greek Independence, (London: Macmillan Press, 1981) pp. 85-111. 2

SALONICA: Some

ON

Statistics

THE for

EVE

Salónica

Consul

Blunt's

OF in

THE 1839

TANZ1MAT according

87

to

Reports

Table 5 Schools in Salónica Muslim

Orthodox Christian

Jewish

Catholic Christian

Schools

8

2

21

1

School Masters

8

4

21

2

Scholars

30

35

800

20

Table 6 Religious buildings in Salónica Mosques

25

Orthodox Churches

12

Synagogues

56

Catholic Churches

1

Table 7 Religious people in Salónica Muslim

No:

Orthodox

No:

Jewish

No:

Catholic

No:

Ulemas

60

Bishops

8

High Priests

3

Priests

2

Imams

48

Priests

27

Priests

400

Dervi§ Tekkes

8

Monasteries

2

$eyh s

1

Arch Bishop

1

Derv/jes

100

Monks

22

OTTOMAN

REFORMS

AND

SOCIAL

LIFE

Table 8 Commercial Establishments 10

Turkish

5 3 8

English French Greek (Subjects) Greek (Hellen) Ionian Jewish Russians Austrian Total

3 3 10 3 3 48

Table 9 Foreign Consulates Consulates

Consul

Interpreters

Janissaries

Austrian

1

2

2

American

1

2

1

Belgian

1

I

1

British

1

2

2

Dutch

1

1

1

Danish

1

1

1

French

1

2

3

Greek

1

3

1

Neapolitan

1

1

-

Prussian

1

1

-

Russian

1

3

2

Sardinian

1

2

1

Spanish

1

1

-

Swedish

1

1

-

Tuscan

1

1

-

Total

15

24

15

4 THE COMMERCE OF SALONICA

In this chapter we will look at commerce in Salónica between the years 1835 and 1845 to try to find out the effect of commercial conditions on socioeconomic changes just before and after the promulgation of the Tanzimat decree. My argument here is that the Ottoman Empire had a very dynamic socio-economic structure in the nineteenth century, though it is usually depicted in the literature as a "period of decline." I also argue that this dynamism and both its direct and indirect consequences were the real causes of change in all aspects of Ottoman social life including the political changes of the period. In the following case study of the commerce of Salónica in the early nineteenth century, indicative factors of dynamism and transformation will be brought forward, such as the growth of a regional market, the increasing urban population, the spatial expansion of the city and the growing and wider distribution of wealth among the people will be examined. From early times, Salónica had been an important administrative, military and trade centre of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Peninsula. Providing easy access to its productive hinterland and to the far interior of the Balkans, Salónica had inevitably become an important commercial centre for both import and export trade at the end of the eighteenth century. The trade pattern between Salónica and the interior was conducted mainly by caravan transportation. Both import and export merchandise were brought to the markets of Salónica and then traded to the interior and the outside world. In the interior, trade fairs, which were opened all over Macedonia, particularly in Serres and Pirlepe, constituted an important element in the vitality of the commerce in this part of the Ottoman Empire. According to contemporary sources, at the end of the eighteenth century the number of merchant shops in Salónica totalled about 4,400. 1 During the nineteenth century, Salónica remained the unchallenged commercial centre of the region. Its geographically advantageous position, supported by the vast, rich outlet of its hinterland had been prominent cause of the dynamic nature of its economic success since the early days of its foundation. Since Salónica served as both a sea and an overland trade centre to more than two million people in the region, some contemporaries called Salónica the "lung" of this economically important region. According 1 J. R. Lampe and M. R. Jackson, Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950 (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1982) p. 40.

90

OTTOMAN

REFORMS

AND

SOCIAL

LIFE

lo Svoronos, during the second half of the eighteenth century, there was a steady increase in the activity of Salonica's port. The early years of the nineteenth century had been adversely affected by the 1821 Greek uprising. The following decade saw a considerable reduction in trade as continuing hostilities disrupted trade relations and a considerable portion of its trade was transferred to the newly liberated Greek State. 1 If we look at the general conditions of the commerce of Salónica for the years 1838 to 1845 according to Consul Blunt's reports, it can be seen that the returns of trade in both imports and exports show unstable growth due to various factors. Internally, it was the result of political events such as the question of Mehmet All in Egypt and of natural calamities such as the plague of 1837, together with the frequent major fires which were inescapable in nineteenth-century Salónica as well as failing harvests which always played an important role in trade fluctuations. Externally, fluctuating foreign demand and international crises determined the increases and decreases in the trade interactions of Salónica. Also, changes in transport conditions such as increases in the tonnage of ships and the appearance of steamers were the other factors which very much affected the trade of the city. In Ljuben Berov's calculation, "the number of ships and steamers which visited Salónica port in 1837-40, for instance, was 3.1 times greater than that of 1829-31, but the import value of the latter was 7.6 times bigger." 2 Venetian merchants were the only foreign merchants of the city until the arrival of the French merchants at the end of the seventeenth century. Families such as the Rongotti, Prasakaki, Charnaud, and Abbott arrived in the 1720s; and later in the century Italians, Dutch, Danes, Swedes, Austrians, Germans, Swiss, and Russians began to arrive at Salónica. Austria was represented by merchants such as Vianelli, Goch, Beyer, Werbeil, and B a r a h e l l . 3 Mostly these families were inclined to retain their foreign citizenship. Using the trade privileges which had been granted by the Ottoman government, the foreign merchants had advantages over the local native merchants. In addition, profiting by their stronger currency compared with the Ottoman one, they could pay high prices and get the finest quality of merchandise, which in the end, raised all commodity prices and adversely affected the local merchants. 4

1

See N. Svoronos, "Administrative, Social...", pp. 354-386. Ljuben Berov, ' T h e Course of Commodity Turnover at the Thessalonica Port and the West European Economic Cycle in 19th C. up to 1912", Etudes Balkaniques, n. 4 , 1 9 8 5 , pp. 72-88. 3 J. R. Lampe and M. R. Jackson, Balkan Economic History, p. 379. See also Constantin A. Vacalopoulos, "Commercial Development and Economic Importance of the port of Thessaloniki from the Late Eighteenth Century to 1856" in Southeast European Maritime Commerce and Naval Policies, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1988) pp. 301-307. 4 Constantin A. Vacalopoulos, "Commercial Development.." pp. 301-307. 2

THE

COMMERCE

OF

SALONICA

91

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Greeks enjoyed a very good position in the commercial networks of Salónica, while the Jews became more marginal elements in the large-scale trading enterprises of Salónica, limiting themselves mostly to local business operations. From the early eighteenth century onward Ottoman, mainly Turkish, landowners faced a noticeable change in world market conditions and slowly entered an important transition leading towards the commercialisation of agricultural production. The possession of land was no longer the only source of wealth. Now increased production was becoming a vital requirement for the amassing of wealth. Therefore, the land-owning class started to cultivate cash crops in order to acquire liquidity by means of transforming the mtri lands into giftliks,} The importance of the port of Salónica gradually increased in the early nineteenth century as a destination for the British cotton manufactures. The well-known centralisation policy of Sultan Mahmut including the abolition of the power of the local ayans, and the disbanding of the Janissaries in 1826 provided more secure conditions for commercial activities. Until the 1830s, the trade of Salónica was of little importance as regards Britain, but for France and Austria it was a little different. From France, a few articles were imported, such as coarse cloths, red caps and watches, but in return French merchants took cotton, tobacco, silk and wool for Marseilles. The Austrians exported their manufactures (cloths, nankeens, window glass) and a few colonial products (coffee, copper, drugs, sugar) to Salónica. Tobacco, silk, grain, linseed and cotton were exports to Trieste. According to the British consul in Salónica, until 1829 there had been no direct importation from Britain to the Salónica market. A very few British cotton manufactures had been imported mostly upon commission from Izmir and Istanbul. The first direct importation from Britain was made in 1829; and about fifty tons of British goods, principally cotton manufactures, were imported to Salónica, which, according to the Consul, left 20 percent profit to the exporter; since then the volume had gradually increased. 2 The export trade from Salónica to Britain was very trifling and what few goods were purchased were sent to tzmir and thence forwarded to the United Kingdom.

Remote Trade and Its Importance in the Interior The goods received at Salónica were chiefly for the interior; few sales were made on the spot. The procedure was that soon after the arrival of the imported goods, they were taken to the customs house and after examination and the payment of the inland duty a permit (tezkere-i miirur) was given * On this issue see Chapter 5. FO 78 / 265 Blunt to Ponsonby 28 December 1835.

2

92

OTTOMAN

REFORMS

AND

SOCIAL

LIFE

for transportation, mainly to Serres. From thcnce they went to the towns, where sales were made at from 3 to 8 months' credit. The importers in Salónica lacked sufficient capital for the import trade. For the most part, this was carried out by means of credits in Vienna. After sending the orders to Britain, the agent at Vienna charged at the rate of 6 percent (the rate at Salónica was 20 per cent). Since the importers sold the imported goods in the interior at an advance upon the invoice cost of from 10 to 14 per cent, they made a profit of from 4 to 8 per cent. For this reason, the Jews of Salónica were very influential in raising money in Vienna and by introducing British manufactures to places which had not seen them before. This type of indirect import trade diminished after the opening of commercial houses in Salónica and Serres and more direct trade was undertaken in the late 1840s. 1 Even though the direct import and export trade with Salónica fell during the period 1835-45, the interior was in great measure supplied from other more remote sources. This docs not mean that there were no commercial relations with European countries during this period, but rather that some important British manufactured goods were imported on Greek vessels from Syria and on Austrian steamers from Istanbul. The procedure of remote trade 2 was as follows: some of the Ottoman subjects had credits opened for them in Vienna, London and Liverpool. Agents could draw for reimbursement on these places and these persons ordered the British goods without difficulty according to their needs. There was a great demand for cash, credit being the usual method of payment in trade. The constant lack of cash, the velocity of minimal money circulation and the very small trading capital were the reasons behind the local traders' relying on European capital and credit. Generally, the local merchants aimed to sell their own produce for cash and to buy from the Europeans on credit. 3 Salónica was the only centre in the region which had organised banking facilities. Since carrying a large amount of cash was dangerous, the practice of using bills in commercial transactions had been introduced into Salónica by French merchants in earlier centuries. Gradually, the practice became more widely spread and the circulation of bills was increased. At the beginning of the nineteenth century bills were easily accepted in Salónica. For British merchants, there was no problem in the cashing of bills because of the existence of the British consulate in Salónica. 4 Commercial activities mainly depended on credits, which were restricted to only a few merchants. Credit facilities could not be extended more than a month after the arrival of goods. The high interest rate claimed by the local money-lenders and the lack of the ready money in circulation limited the incentive for the local merchants to 1

FO 195 / 1 7 6 Blunt to Ponsonby 20 January 1841. "Remote trade" was particularly the characteristic of the 1840s trade relations, later on replaced by more direct trade.

2

3 4

FO 195 / 1 7 6 Blunt to Ponsonby 20 January 1841. Helen Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, The Eve of the Greek Revival, p. 166.

THE

COM MERC E O F

SALONI CA

93

seek more business in the interior. The diversity of the currencies circulated in the market was very interesting and clearly showed how conditions of the time were affccting the market. According to an Ottoman document in the 1840s, there were 36 different currencies both silver and gold in circulation in the market of Salonica.' Taking the commercial traffic by flag and not by the actual origin of the imported goods might be misleading. For instance, Britain's actual share of the value of imports in Salonica port was far greater than the value recorded in the reports based on the number of ships entering the port under different flags. In the 1840s, as far as the British trade is concerned, there was no great direct capital investment in trade in Salonica. In 1841, the amount of British capital was £1,480 and the value of imported British manufactures was £6,000. 2 Yet indirect imports of British manufactures under the Greek flag from Syra and a portion of the amount under the Russian flag have to be added to this value. The Greek merchants were the main importers of British manufactures and other goods from Britain with a view to selling them in the Ottoman Empire. 3 As the agents of the British merchants, it was very easy for them to order and receive goods in Greece. This system was, however, by no means advantageous to cither the importer or the insurer. Hence, the exporter had decided to direct their agents in England to forward their goods direct, even if it cost more to do so. It is important in this connection to note that doing business or trade in the Ottoman Empire offered very flexible conditions, because of the privileges given to foreign merchants. For instance, when in 1840 Greek merchants and vessels were prohibited from engaging in shipping and trade along the coasts of the Ottoman Empire, many of the Greek vessels sailed under the Russian flag, which protection was afforded them without the least difficulty, and subject only to those fees that a Russian vessel paid. 4 The following table provides a yearly traffic of import and export articles and their quantities in the port of Salonica in 1835: 5

1

Sicil, 2 3 6 : 1 0 2 - 1 0 3 , 15 Rehiiilewel

2

F O 195 / 1 7 6 Blunt to Canning, January 1842.

1256. For the full text of the d o c u m e n t see A p p e n d i x B.

3 F O 195 / 176 B l u n t to Canning, January 1842. A f t e r the establishment of Greece in 1830, the s a m e c o m m e r c i a l privileges were given to the G r e e k merchants as w e r e given to the E u r o p e a n ones'. 4 5

F O 195 / 176 Blunt to Canning, January 1842.

B a s e d o n the report of U S C o n s u l at S a l o n i c a , U S N A , R e e l T 4 1 4 , W . B. L l e w e l l y n Salonica 3 1 D e c e m b e r 1835.

at

94

OTTOMAN

REFORMS

AND

SOCIAL

LIFE

Table 10 Traffic of import and export articles and their quantities in the port of Salonica in 1835* Nation

British Vessels

French Vessels

From where

Liverpool Cardiff

Marseilles

Trieste Alexandria Austrian Smyrna Vessels Constan.

Import Cargo

Export Cargo

180 tons 148 bales manufactures 50 boxes plates 21 chests indigo 4 barrels of jinn

6000 lamb skins 8000 caplets "aba" 180 bales tobacco 19 cases silk 3 packages foundries

900 bags coffee 3 sermons colonial 1600 Brazil hides 31 .... Wood 18 chcsts indigo 13 .... Sugar 5 bales manufactures 9 cases almonds 15 barrels cloves

469 bales sheep wool 27 cases silk 1344 pairs buffalo horns grapes ballast and passengers

40 barrels of jinn 76 bales manufactures 120 bags pepper 1350 reams paper 13 .... Wood 33 cases medicine 582 sacks coffee 20 .... Sugar 18 chests indigo 9 sermons cochineal 20 puncheons reem

427 bales sheep wool 30.000 kilos wheat 40.000 okcs linseed 1894 kilos honey 4 cases silk 461 bales tobacco

Destination

Smyrna

Marseilles Smyrna

Constantinople Trieste

THE Nation

Greek Vessels

COMMERCE

OF

From where Import Cargo 350 Bales water twist 48 chests indigo 460 bales manufactures 600 kentals soap 5924 kental resins 815 sacks coffee 6254 Brazil hides Syra 8304 Malta stones Smyrna 1780 kentals carobs Constan. 900.000 okes salt Marseilles 850.000 lemons and Trieste oranges Malta 1500 okes olives Genoa 1899 pieces Brazil wood 17.500 okes wine 42 puncheons reem 100 tons bar .... 48.300 okes olive oil 102.900 okes ....

SALONICA

95

Destination Export Cargo 15.450 ogees flour 112.000 pieces timber 162.300 kilos grain 7000 okes honey 1319 kentals Symrna Constan. biscuits Greece 557 bales capotes Marseilles 946 bales tobacco Trieste 5700 bales cotton wool Genoa 210.000 okes sheep wool 56 cases silk 2088 kilos sesame seed 1224 kentals valonia 400.000 okes filberts 1 case saffron

•Spelling as in original American consular report. For the definitions of some special terms see the glossary. in 1841, the report of trade shows an increase in the value of both imports and exports, compared with the year 1840. According to Consul Blunt, this increase can be attributed to the Tanzimat reforms which had conferred very considerable advantages on the traders. He reported that the benefits of the new reform measures had slowly begun to be seen in the interior after the rather chaotic and transitional year of 1840. 1 Table 11 Comparative table for the value of exports and imports in 1840 Years 1841 1840 Increase

Imports

Exports

£135.952 £88.517

£140.172

£47.435

£26.074

£114.098

According to B l u n t ' s report for the year 1842, there was a steady improvement in the commerce of Salónica when we look at the gross returns of trade. 2

1 2

FO 195 /176 Blunt to Canning, January 1841. FO 195 /176 Blunt to Canning, January 1842.

96

OTTOMAN

REFORMS

AND

SOCIAL

LIFE

Table 12 Comparative table for the value of import and export in 1842 Year

Imports

1842 1841 Increase

Tonnage 41.596 36.524 5.070

Exports Value £165.906 £135.952 £29.954

Tonnage 40.497 36.275 4.222

Value £163.293 £140.170 £23.123

F o r this increase m u c h credit was given in B l u n t ' s reports to the beneficial change in the local administration of the country in favour of the middle and lower classes of cultivators, who were now feeling more confident and calm than before. It is important to note that in 1842 there is no indication yet in Blunt's report of the good effects of the Trade Convention of 1838 on this general trade increase and improvement in social conditions. 1 Indeed, cyclic fluctuations in the capitalist economy of Western Europe, particularly the British, had an important influence on the trade with Salonica as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century. W h e n the industrial production of the Western European capitalist states reached a level at which these states saw themselves in crisis, cheap m a c h i n e products invaded territories such as the Ottoman Empire. For the port of Salonica, this phenomenon appeared from the 1830s onwards. The impact of the 1838 Trade Treaty with Great Britain and later on the other European states is clcar, when we r e m e m b e r that the British government had been trying to bring the Ottoman Empire to this point f r o m 1830 onwards. It was clear that the 1830s crises of surplus production in Britain had forced the British government to seek more favourable conditions in overseas markets, of which the Ottoman Empire was one of the most profitable. 2 T h e gross returns of both export and import trade at the port of Salonica in the year 1843 shows a considerable decrease when compared with the year preceding. Table 13 Comparative table for the value of imports and exports in 1843 Year

Imports Tonnage

1842 1843 Decrease

41.596 25.812 15.784

Exports Tonnage

Value £165.906 £112.296 £53.610

40.497 23.699 16.802

Value £163.293 £106.103 £57.190

1

FO 195 / 176 Blunt to Canning January 1843. Nikolai Todorov, The Balkan City, 1400-1900, 1983) pp. 216-217.

2

(London: University of Washington Press,

THE

COMMERCE

OF

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This decrease was chiefly attributed in the reports to two causes; the great fall in the circulation value of the coin of the Ottoman Empire and poor harvests. Although the gross returns of trade showed a considerable decrease, British trade with the port of Salonica was sustained. The value of trade was £74,019 in 1842 and £73,165 in 1843. It is certain that a great part of the Greek and Russian vessels arriving at Salonica in 1843 conveyed British manufactures from Izmir, Istanbul and Syra. There was a new finance measure in the Ottoman Empire, which established new fixed rates for all coins in circulation. The exceedingly high rales, when compared with the adjusted value of the goods, brought the importer a loss of more than 20 percent, because of early sales which had been negotiated before the new regulations were in place.'

A Reassessment of the 1838 Trade

Convention

The Trade Convention of 1838 was the direct culmination of the ongoing trends in trade between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire. Well before the convention, exports from the Ottoman Empire had been chiefly raw materials and agricultural products while the imports from Europe and particularly from Britain had mainly consisted of finished and colonial goods (see tables below). 2 This trend continued at a steadily increasing rate, mainly in terms of imports to the Empire after the Convention. Indeed, there were no sudden changes in the commerce between the Ottoman Empire and Britain. The 1838 Trade Convention also did not change the speed or rate of the steadily increasing trade between the two countries. The main feature of this trade was the increasing rate of British exports to the Ottoman Empire, which had doubled in value during the late 1820s and doubled again in the years after 1835 (see table below). It can be seen that annual British trade with the port of Salonica showed, if not a boom, a gradual increase owing to the Commercial Convention of 1838, and new reform measures, which were gradually becoming more widespread in the interior. The major effects of the Convention of 1838 and the internal reforms had to wait until the 1850s. If we look at the total import and export tables of the port of Salonica for the years 1838-1845, we find that there was not as much increase as Britain had expected after the 1838 Convention. There was even a decline in some years, mainly owing to bad harvests or natural causes such as plague. Only alter the 1850s did the 1838 Convention take effect in the commerce of the Empire and the simultaneous growth in British loans after 1854 bears witness to this fact. 1

FO 195 / 176 Blunt to Canning January 1843. Basic import articles from Great Britain: cotton goods and manufactures, refined sugar, tin, iron and steel, gun powder, woollens and manufactures, hardware and cutlery, tin plates, watches, silk goods. Basic export articles to Great Britain: raw cotton- raw silk, raw wool, madder root, raisins, oil, mohair yarn, valonia, figs and opium. 2

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Table 14 Official values of exports from Great Britain to the Ottoman Empire compared with imports from the Ottoman Empire to Great Britain between 1825 and 1845.1 Exports £1,079,671 £2,745,723 £2,706,591 £3,673,903 £7,620,140

Year 1825 1830 1835 1840 1845

Imports £1,207,172 £ 726,065 £ 879,089 £1,240,812 £1,465,972

Trade

Balance £ 127,501 £2,019,658 £1,827,502 £2,433,091 £6,154,138

Table 15 Tonnage and value lists of British vessels arriving at the port of Salonica from 1 January 1829 to 30 November 1835. 2 Years 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 Total

No of

Tonnage

Vessels 1 1 5 5 5 3 7 27

110 124 600 635 612 546 1,168 3,795

Table 16 Tonnage and value lists of British vessels arriving at the port of Salonica from 1838 to 1845. Years 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 Total

Tonnage

No of Vessels 3 2 —

4 13 14 17 24 77

356 400 -

846 2,255 2,129 2,274 3,985 12,245

Value £44,733 £14,522 -

£6,300 £61,100 £51,669 £60,776 £83,120 £322,220

By the 1838 Trade Convention, the earlier trade privileges had been augmented. All the monopolies (yed-i vahid) were abolished. Every product of

1 Taken from Sevim Ùnal, Anglo-Turkish Relations in 1838-1841: Commercial Aspects, Unpublished PhD Thesis, (Southampton University, 1972) p. 270. 2 FO 78 / 265 Blunt to Ponsonby 28 December 1835.

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the Ottoman Empire was allowed to be exported. The import duty on British commodities was fixed at 3 percent ad valorem and a 2 percent fixed duty. In contrast, high export duties were imposed, along with the privilege given to the British merchants of being free to trade and sell their merchandise any place in the Ottoman Empire. The duty would be 9 percent plus 3 percent export duty. All the internal taxes and levies on transit goods were abolished. Therefore, the total export duty had become 12 percent, while the total import duty was 5 percent. 1 Within a few years, all the other European nations engaged in trade with the Ottoman Empire concluded the same kind of trade treaty with the Ottoman Empire: France in 1838, Sardinia in 1839, SwedenNorway, Spain, Holland, and Prussia (on behalf of 18 German states) in 1840, Tuscany in 1841, Russia in 1846, and Belgium in 1856. 2 On the eve of the 1838 Convention, Britain's basic objectives were related to gaining more favourable conditions for their trade in the interior of the country. Britain was not trying to persuade the Ottoman government to fix the import duty at three percent, but was simply struggling to get rid of the increasing array of internal taxes on imports in the interior. Establishing fixed tariffs for import and export goods was a well-known practice of the Ottoman Empire. These were the periodic tables which showed the value of the import and export duties according to the goods' real values. The first of these for Britain was produced in 1805 and renewed in 1820. Britain had no problem with this fixed import duty, which in any case with the passing of time and by the increasing real value of goods was becoming less disadvantageous to the importers. However, when the Ottoman government began trying to find out new revenue sources for its declining economy in the early nineteenth century, it simply increased and created some internal taxes on goods sold in the interior. In addition to this, the Ottoman government started to use an old custom more extensively; to put a limit or prohibition upon the exportation of certain products, and to make them state monopolies. These practices of the Ottoman government coincided with the growing extensive trade activities of the British merchants in the interior of the Ottoman Empire. Before the turn of the nineteenth century, the British merchants' trade transactions were limited to the ports, and they were paying no more than a three percent import duty for their goods. But now, the

For the English version of the 1838 Trade Convention with the additional articles see "British and Turkish Convention of Commerce and Navigation, Presented to both Houses of Parliament 1839", British and Foreign Review, v. 9, July-Oct. 1839, pp. 247-272. 2

See Yusuf K. Tengirjenk, "Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanli Devletinin Harici Siyaseti" in Tanzimat 1, (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 1840) pp. 289-320. There are few fermans in the sicils of Salonica respecting these newly concluded trade treaties with several European states for the information of the local government of Salonica. According to one of these fermans, the subjects and merchants of Belgium and Holland would be treated exactly like the merchants of Britain and France in their commercial affairs in the Ottoman Empire until similar trade treaties could be concluded with these two states. Sicil, 236:88, 1 Zilkade 1255, and Sicil, 236:88 15 Sevval 1255.

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British merchants involved in even retail trade in the interior of the Empire were treated like native merchants, paying all the internal taxes just as they did. Therefore, the British government wanted to solve the two problems — the expansion of state monopolies and the increase of the internal taxes — by proposing the Trade Convention of 1838. 1 Politically, the British government acted very opportunistically in 1838, when the Ottoman Empire was busy with the problem of Mehmet Ali in Egypt. We know also that the signing of a commercial treaty with the Ottoman Bmpire to gain more favourable trade concessions had been one of Britain's basic objectives since the 1830s. Naturally, with the rapid economic development in Britain, as a colonial empire it sought the ideal of "free trade" more than any other nation in Europe and its political interests were mainly guided by economic concerns. The British government had tried hard to bring the Ottoman government to comply with its desires by exploiting the Russian threat against the Ottoman Empire. Britain's sole economic intention in broaching Ottoman internal affairs (such as the reform issue) and external affairs (such as the question of Mehmet Ali Pasha) are well described in the present literature, which leaves us no alternative but to think that the Ottoman government accepted the 1838 Convention, though it was very much against its interests, for political reasons, mainly to do with the problem of Mehmet Ali Pasha. This contention is repeated in the present literature on this issue. Most of the works referring to the British and Ottoman diplomatic sources (such as the Foreign Office correspondence which reveals exchanges with the Ottoman statesmen upon the subject) argue that Sultan Mahmut was convinced that the question of Mehmet Ali would be solved with the signing of the Convention, which would deprive him of his basic economic sources, namely the state revenues and monopolies. 2 The territorial possessions of Britain in the Mediterranean, such as the Ionian islands, steadily growing trade relations with the Ottoman Empire, particularly through the development of steam-ship transportation, and the geographical importance of the Ottoman Empire for Britain's easy access to India were the usual answers to the question of what were the reasons behind the changes of British policy towards the Ottoman Empire. In addition to these, Britain found the markets of the Ottoman Empire more-sympathetic at a time when the markets in Europe were closing due to the protectionist policies of the European states. 3

1 FO 78 / 332 Bulwer to Ponsonby 28 July 1838. ^ See Frank E. Bailey, British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement, 1826-1853 (London: Oxford University Press, 1942). V. J. Puryear, International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East, 1834-1853 (California, 1935). Re§at Kaynar, Mustafa Re§id Pa§a ve Tanzimat, (Ankara: TTK Yayinlari, 1991). Maria Todorova, "British and Russian Policy Towards the Reform Movement in the Ottoman Empire (the 30s - 50s of the nineteenth century), Etudes Balkaniques, n. 3, 1977, pp. 17-41. Yusuf K. Tengir§enk, ' T a n z i m a t Devrinde Osmanli Devletinin Harici Siyaseti" in Tanzimat I, (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 1940) pp. 289-320. 3 Frank E. Bailey, British Policy, p. 73.

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Although the Ottoman trade had very little significance in Britain's total c o m m e r c e , 1 it had the m o m e n t u m of steady increase, and most importantly, the large variety of agricultural products of the Ottoman Empire constituted an important factor in this regard. The Ottoman Empire was not interested in equalising its imports and exports; it was, in fact, very open to the regulations paving the way for the free exchange of goods. This meant that the Ottoman E m p i r e had to increase the quantity of its agricultural produce in order to pay for imported manufactured goods. 2 Bailey says: The complete absence of any protective system is an even more striking example of its commercial backwardness. From the time of Suleyman, the Turks allowed foreign goods to enter their country freely. A 3 percent of ad valorem duty on imports and a small anchorage fee were the only taxes on foreign trade. On the other hand, the Turks suffered an export duty of 12 percent on native products. Why the Turkish government reversed the usual action of tariffs has never been fully explained. Even the need of more money to manage their ever-growing governmental administration was not enough to induce them to change their traditional tariff policy.-' Under these circumstances, British traders did their best to induce the government, especially the Foreign O f f i c e , to act on behalf of their new interests in the Ottoman Empire. This opportunistic view of Englishmen can best be seen in the writings of David Urquhart in the 1830s. 4 In his book, Turkey and Its Resources, written in 1833, after the description of the Ottoman E m p i r e ' s resources and their availability to the British traders, he comes to the point by stating that: "But all the advantages that may accrue to us f r o m so f a v o u r a b l e a state of things, is contingent on her internal tranquillity and political reorganisation." This was the requirement in order to reach the " h e a v e n , " and this would h a v e been done in " . . . a field for diplomatic action of the noblest and most philanthropic character, where our interests are so much at stake to call forth our most strenuous exertions . . . " Then, at the end, he does not hesitate to add " . . . and where that interest is so reciprocal as to involve no selfish motives, and to introduce no invidious distinctions". 5 There is an interesting but f o r g o t t e n question: w h y , a m o n g the nineteenth century Ottoman reform measures, suggested by or imported f r o m the West, there was no reform proposal regarding the Ottoman economy and ways of putting it in order? If we believe that the European involvement in "In the period 1825-1870, exports to Turkey were on average 5.4% of total British exports while imports from Turkey were on average 1.8% of British total imports." Quoted in Oya Köymen, ' T h e Advent and Consequences of Free Trade in the Ottoman Empire, 19 lh Century", Etudes Balkaniques, n. 2, 1971, p. 47-55. 2 Frank E. Bailey, British Policy, p. 76. 3 Ibid., p. 78. 4 Ibid., p. 80. 5 David Urquhart, Turkey and Its Resources, (London, 1833) p. 216.

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nineteenth century Ottoman reforms originated from humanitarian, friendly or civilising sentiments, we have to answer this question. In point of fact, Bailey puts it correctly when he says that during the nineteenth century in general, there was no primary motive other than self-interest underlying the foreign policies of most European states. 1 This fact can be best seen in the process of British-Ottoman relations of the early nineteenth century which ended with the 1838 Trade Convention. As the economic and political rivalry among the European powers intensified at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Britain was by no means the only power in the affairs of the East. Along with France and Russia, Austria and some German states also carried on an extensive trade especially in the Balkans, bccause of their advantages in terms of location and their proximity to that region. Even the United States was recognised as an economic rival to the British interests though its trade with the Ottoman Empire was at its beginnings and was small in size. Thus, in this situation Britain made her own plans. First of all, in order to solve the problem of the rapid increase of production in the factories, she adopted a policy of free trade. 2 After the demise of the Levant Company in 1825, the British government passed an act regarding the new consular establishments in the Ottoman Empire as a means of encouraging and protecting British trade. 3 As the trade with the Ottoman Empire increased, the British government became more demanding in respect of the changes to be made in the trade restrictions of the Ottoman Empire, in response to complaints and pressures by British merchants. 4 These restrictions were on some internal transport duties and included the state monopoly of some products. An interesting fact was that the British duties for both exported and imported goods were higher than the Ottomans', and also that the prices of British goods were high. According to Urquhart, "for every £100 of English goods sold in the Ottoman Empire, the Porte exacted but £3 in custom duties, whereas English duties on Ottoman products of equal value amounted to £60." 5 However, why the British merchants did not consider their own government's higher duties as detrimental to their enterprises yet continued to complain about the Ottoman restrictions and .practices is an important issue to be carefully considered. According to Bailey, it was natural for the British merchants not to take into account the significance of changes in their own regulations because they were not yet ready to grasp it. In fact, this statement does not fully explain the issue. But, he continues to explain the issue from the other point of view. 1

Bailey, British Policy, p. 82. V. J. Puryear, International Economics, p. 181. 3 For this act, see L. Hertslet, A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions and Reciprocal Regulations ... Between Great Britain and Foreign Powers, 30 volumes, (London, 1840-1924) v. 4, pp. 484-489. 4 Bailey, British Policy, p. 120. 5 Ibid., p. 120. 2

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Though the Ottoman duties were lower than the British ones, there were some arbitrary internal duties and monopolies which were the real causes of the British merchants' complaints. To sum up, he regards the commercial convention of 1838 as the end product of the free trade theory- and practices which had been adopted earlier. 1 There are two basic factors interrelated with each other; firstly, when the British government realised the practicality of free trade, it meant that the free exchange of goods was possible and acceptable so long as it benefited the interests of Britain. Since British economic policy had been based on imperialist thinking, a free trade policy was possible only outside Britain. At the same time, the British merchants were not keen to demand lower duties from their own government because they and their enterprises were themselves products of the imperialistic process which had taught them to act in partnership with the government if they wanted to make progress. They had accustomed themselves to making progress at the expense of the other countries' weaknesses or wealth under conditions of colonialism. This practice led them to think not of the advantages occurring to them of lowered British internal duties, but of how to get as many concessions as possible from the Ottoman Empire. Secondly, it was a reality of the Ottoman tax system that the taxes levied on goods were various and sometimes complicated. In particular, in the interior of the Ottoman Empire, local government fees and taxes, such as derbent fees and licence fees were the source of complaints by the British merchants. Though these duties were not large, the British merchants regarded them as surcharges and restraints on trade. The British government was well aware of the economic potentialities of the Ottoman Empire during the early years of the nineteenth century. In 1833 David Urquhart was sent on a mission to assess and report on the resources of the Ottoman Empire. He did so, but at the same time his reports were based on the idea of furthering the mutual interests of the two countries, which would require also some sacrifices from Britain. The reports of Urquhart were significant for understanding the economic importance of the Ottoman Empire, but his demands were inconsistent with the traditional tenets of British policy. As Bailey noted, "Urquhart's thesis was that Mahmut's destruction of the Janissaries rendered the reform of the Ottoman Empire possible, if principles of self government, already existent in the Ottoman Empire, were developed; that Ottomans needed help in regeneration and England was best qualified to give it; England would profit from trade if the Ottoman Empire's resources could be developed". 2 Thus, Urquhart was labelled as pro-Turk and anti-Russian, and the traditional policy of the process of "wait and see" began and would remain in effect until an appropriate political opportunity arose. 1 2

Ibid., p. 120. Ibid., p. 162.

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F r o m the early 1830s until 1838, the British government tried hard to convince the Ottomans that monopolies constituted a major obstacle to both countries' interests. In a dispatch to Istanbul on 6 December 1833, the British Foreign Secretary Palmerston revealed B r i t a i n ' s desire respecting the monopolies as follows: Monopolies were not only at variance with the engagements subsisting between Great Britain and the Porte, but tend necessarily to limit and contrast the commercial intercourse between the subjects of His Majesty and those of the Sultan in a manner and to an extent which cannot fail to be injurious to the industry of both nations, and in the end detrimental to the financial interests of the Porte. 1 Also, Ponsonby admitted that Britain would benefit from the treaty, but insisted that this did not imply exploitation of the Ottoman Empire; it meant b e c o m i n g a very good c u s t o m e r . 2 In convincing the Sultan, the main argument was the negative effects of the monopolies on the economy of the Ottoman Empire acting as one of the principal causes of high prices, poverty and declining population. However, the British policy in this respect used another more important instrument; this was the desire of the Sultan to get rid of M e h m e t Ali f r o m Egypt. 3 The idea was that the abolition of monopolies would cut off one of the principal sources of power for Mehmet Ali in Egypt, because the practice of state m o n o p o l y in agriculture and c o m m e r c e maintained M e h m e t A l i ' s rule both in Egypt and in Syria. T h e following quotation f r o m one of Ponsonby's dispatches to the Foreign Office may be of interest regarding the question of why Britain was anxious to do away with the monopolies. In a conversation with Re§id Pasha, Ponsonby remarked: The question has two characters (commercial and political). The political part of the affair is however our strongest motive for the interest we take in this matter. We see that by monopolies and abuses Turkey is reduced in population and in its wishes, that it has become miserable and weak and is dependent upon us for its actual existence ... I then stated a variety of instances, adding that if such evils were destroyed and the empire in possession of its natural strength, Russia would not think of subjecting it ... The English had then a positive interest in the destruction of monopolies in Turkey, but an interest which was identified with the interests and prosperity of Turkey itself. 1 then pointed out the effects of the destruction of the monopolies ... and said, if the Sultan orders them to be destroyed in all his Empire, France and Austria and England will be so deeply interested in the measure, and it will be so warmly approved of and supported by the commercial community in every country, that the power of all those governments will certainly be employed to force Mehmet Ali to obey. What will become of his power? 4 ' FO 78 / 220 Palmerston to Ponsonby, 6 December 1833. FO 78 / 331 Ponsonby to Palmerston, 10 May 1838. P. E. Mosely, Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1S3H and 1839 (Massachusetts: Cambridge, 1934) p. 94. 4 FO 78 / 331 Ponsonby to Palmerston 10 May 1838. 2

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According to Bailey, "the political aspects of the monopoly question are far more important than the economic one", because the political practice of Britain was to use anything as a tool in order to decrease the importance of the Egyptian Question for the Sultan and make the Ottoman Empire less dependent upon Russia. 1 We cannot agree with Bailey at this point, but argue that the 1838 Trade Convention did not provide anything in terms of British policies in the Ottoman Empire in this period other than conferring the prestige of being the first European state to obtain "the most favoured nation" status. There is no logical explanation behind this assertion when we look at developments following the 1838 Convention. Both of Britain's objectives, preventing Russian involvement in Ottoman affairs and putting the Egyptian question in order, had become irrelevant, because just after the 1838 Convention Russia concluded the same kind of trade treaty with the Ottoman Empire as had the other European nations and Mehmet Ali of Egypt remained in power without being seriously affected by the hoped for negative consequences of the 1838 Convention. Looking at British trade in the period immediately after 1838, one can sec that the effects of the abolition of Ottoman monopolies and! the new commercial privileges did not result in an immediate increase in British commerce. On this basis, we should conclude not that the British motive was economic, but that the outcome or economic events failed to conform to their expectations. That British commercial enterprise in the Ottoman Empire steadily increased during the nineteenth century and both before and after the 1838 Trade Convention was due mostly to the fact that conditions were in general favourable and that the British export trade in particular increased significantly. Ironically, the effect of the convention was that while the Ottoman Empire lost significant revenues, Mehmet Ali managed to escape the worst effects of the abolition of the monopolies, and Russia remained a threat to the Ottoman Empire and British interests until the Crimean War of 1854-1856. 2 Indeed, it did not require a fortune-teller to predict Mehmet Ali's escape from the negative effects of the abolition of monopolies. The Austrian State Chancellor, Metternich, had already drawn attention to the inapplicability of the 1838 Convention to Egypt, particularly its abolition of monopolies. 3 If we assume that the Ottoman Empire signed the 1838 Trade Convention in the belief that the question of Mehmet Ali would be solved by the support of Britain and if we accept that the strongest motive behind the conclusion of this Convention was political, both for the Ottoman Empire and Britain at this juncture, then how are we to interpret the same kind of conventions concluded with almost all the other European states in the years immediately following?

1 2 3

Bailey, British Policy, p. 124. Mosely, Russian Diplomacy, p. 101. Tarih-iUttfi,v. 5, p. 112.

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The Foreign Office documents respecting the 1838 Trade Convention reveal that the basic concern of the British government was to promote more favourable commercial enterprise with the Ottoman Empire. Among the Foreign Office documents, there are official circulars in the years 1839, 1842 and 1844 addressed to all the British consuls in the Ottoman Empire respecting the making of reports as regards the execution and the working of the 1838 Trade Convention. These circulars consisted of very detailed questions, which in one respect clearly indicates that the British government was intent on getting positive results in favour of its commercial enterprise with the Ottoman Empire. The replies to these Foreign Office circulars, no doubt, helped very much to shape the future commercial policy of Britain. We see that directly after the signing of the Convention, copies of the full text of the treaty were sent to the British consuls in the Ottoman Empire with additional dispatches in order to inform the British merchants about the new commercial privileges. However, the Ottoman local authorities received no official information and instructions f r o m the Porte regarding the new situation for six months, and on some regions up to one year after the conclusion of the treaty. For instance, in the case of Salonica, Consul Blunt reported in March 12, 1839: "The local authorities of Salonica have not yet received any instructions, or any kind of information from the Sublime Porte, relating to the Commercial Convention." 1 There are two fermans among the sicils of Salonica dated 1 March 1839, which was the date that the convention would be effective, and 30 April 1839, which specifically deal with the convention of 1838 and with the prospective changes in the administration of customs houses, 2 but no specific information and instructions were given 3 to the local authorities respecting the new convention until August 1839, other than merely informing the local government that they would charge 12 per cent for exports and 5 per cent for imports as customs duty. 4 The above findings confirm that Consul Blunt was right in thinking that the required information regarding the new convention was not sent to the local authorities just after the signing of the treaty in 16 August 1838. Again, by the time of the effective date of the convention, which was 1 March 1:839, the local authorities had not received full instructions from Istanbul, but only a little information respecting the customs duties. This delay may be explained in 1

Parliamentary Papers, Accounts and Papers, hereafter PPAP, 1840, X U V , 541, p. 550. The Ottoman government traditionally farmed the customs houses at auction to the highest bidder; however after the Trade Convention of 1838, as we have seen in the Ottoman documents, the customs houses began to be administered by officials sent f r o m Istanbul. The reason for this was both the government's loss of significant revenues and unjust competition between the merchants. For the latter case, the merchants, who were auctioning the customs, could import and export their articles free of duty. For the former, the government realised the importance of the income provided by the customs. For instance, the customs of Bosnia were auctioned at a price of £6,776; the next year the Ottoman government undertook the collection of customs and received £23,980. See Kcmal Karpat, Ottoman Population, p. 97. 3 Sicil, 236:89,15 Cemaziyelahir 1255. 4 Sicil, 236:10,15 Zilhicce 1254 and Sicil, 236:12,15 Safer 1255. 2

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terms of the reluctance of the Porte, whose interests were not the same as those of Britain. In this sense, if the purpose of depriving Mehmet Ali Pasha of his basic financial sources, such as the state monopolies, was taken into account as the only cause of the conclusion of the Trade Convention of 1838, the Ottoman government should have been acting more energetically than this for the more rapid execution of the treaty. However, as we have seen, the Ottoman government was confused by the new situation and needed titne to adapt. In this regard, Consul Kerr at Edirne also reported the same information in 17 May 1839, ten months after the signing of the convention: "Although the time stipulated for this convention to begin to take effect has passed, no instructions on the subject have yet been forwarded to the authorities here ..."' In this case, there was probably another reason for the delay in sending information and instructions from the Porte to the authorities in Edirne. However, the same fermans which were sent to Salonica on 1 March 1839 and 30 April 1839 should have been sent to Edirne, according to the usual system of internal correspondence between the central government and the provinces which required general correspondence to be sent mainly in two directions, to the provinces in Rumeli and Anadolu. Therefore, it was most likely that Consul Kerr was misinformed by the local authorities of Edirne. Though they received communications from the central government respecting the new convention, they took the initiative and tried to resist the new conditions by delaying the application of the new regulations, which were to some extent against their interests. 2 The rapid implementation of the 1838 Convention was not carried out in the interior of the country. First of all, the new situation and the new trading conditions in the countryside were already in place; as far as free trade practices were concerned, these had been in effect in the interior for a long time. The 1838 Convention was nothing other than an acknowledgement of the real state of Ottoman commerce. As in the case of the abolition of the state monopolies (yed-i vahid), the Ottoman government acted in some respects to further its interests. It was the case particularly in the Balkan lands of the Ottoman Empire that when the level of output was high enough for internal and state needs, the surplus was exported to Europe. In the nineteenth century, this practice was changed to one of continued illegal exportation to Europe, basically because of two factors: 1) the increasing contacts with the European capitalist economy which paid for certain products of the Ottoman Empire at higher prices; 2) the relative increase in production which induced

1

PPAP, 1840, XLIV, 541, p. 573. See Consul Kerr's report upon the working of the new convention in Edirne. FO 195 / 100 Kerr to Ponsonby, Adrianople 20 July 1840.

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producers to look for buyers at higher prices than the government could pay. 1 If we add the weak position of the state authority in the region to these factors in the early nineteenth century, the existence of a well-developed "black market" can easily be envisaged. As early as 1804, there was a decision by individuals in the customs office to export wool from Salonica because of the abundance of the product. 2 Also illegal grain exportation from the Balkans to Europe was a well-known practice until the 1838 Convention, acknowledged by most of the travellers and foreign consuls in their reports. 3 Thus, the Ottoman government was well aware of the situation in the interior, when the state monopolies were abolished in the 1838 Trade Convention. By freeing the exportation of certain products at least the government was able to levy duties on export transactions and thus to increase slate revenues. In contrast to the export trade, imports had found it easy to enter the Empire for many centuries. There was no such policy as protectionism in the Ottoman Empire. In one respect, the practice of free trade was not alien to the Ottomans. Starting from the time of the first capitulations, the Ottoman Empire practised so-called laissez-faire trade policies in every meaning of the term. In this respect, some changes in the nineteenth century were important and different from the earlier centuries. In the first place, in the earlier centuries, the trade between Europe and the Ottoman Empire was connected on an almost equal basis both in terms of the quality and the quantity of goods. However, in the nineteenth century, the European manufactured products altered this situation in favour of Europe by flooding the Ottoman market with cheap products of better quality. Secondly, the increasing level of output and the selling of surpluses in the nineteenth century increased the people's purchasing power and consequently increased the consumption of imports.

Production increases in the region under examination was very often mentioned in both the British and the US Consular reports in the period 1835-45. Also selling of the agricultural produce to the European merchants was rather encouraged by the abolition of the monopolies. We are informed that after the 1838 Convention, the grain producers in some regions of the Empire found a very good price for their produce and had sold all the crop without leaving anything for use as seeds for the following year, which sometimes caused serious grain shortages in the Empire. See Mübahat Kütiikoglu, 'Tanzimat Devrinde Yabancilann Íktisadí Faaliyetleri", in Hakkt D. Yildiz, (Ed.), ISO. Yihnda Tanzimat, (Ankara: TTK Yaymlari, 1992) np. 91-138. Oya Köymen, ' T h e Advent and Consequences", p. 47-55. Blunt reported that all the merchants in Salónica were smuggling to some degree. See Private Papers of Charles Blunt (British consul in Salonica) preserved in the Special Collection of the University of Birmingham Library. Hereafter cited as BPP, Blunt to Canning 18 June 1850, No: 79, pp. 87-88 and T. Stoianovich, "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant "Journal of Economic History, v. 20 (June 1960), p. 260. The same kind of smuggling activities was present in other parts of the Empire for centuries, particularly shaped by foreign demands. For the smuggling of grain in the Antalya port in the 19th century, sec Suraiya Faroqhi, "Ondokuzuncu Yiizyilm Ba§larinda Antalya Limani" VIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi II. Cilt'ten ayri basim, (Ankara: TTK Basimevi, 1981) p. 1462. For the smuggling in Tekirdag in the 16th and 17th centuries see idem, "Istanbuí'un íasesi ve Tekirdag-Rodosciik Limani, 16. ve 17. Yiizyillar" ODTÜ Geli§me Dergisi Özel Sayisi, 1979-1980, pp. 139-154. 3

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The tendency towards imported fancy goods or extravagance, especially in the big cities, constitutes good evidence for this phenomenon. 1 Thirdly, the shortage and the inferior quality of the home products available in urban markets of the Ottoman Empire were other factors which have to be added to this change in the nineteenth century. Wc now know that well before the Trade Convention of 1838, foreign merchants had participated in internal trade by paying all internal duties on the sale and purchase of commodities. In theory, the foreign merchants were not allowed to carry out trade activities by buying and selling the goods in the interior. To quote Oya Koymen, "as early as 1802 an imperial decree claimed the payment by foreign merchants of the same duties as imperial merchants, when buying produce in one part of the Empire for sale in another." 2 By the 1838 Convention, the British merchants were not merely allowed to trade freely in the Ottoman Empire, but also freed from internal taxes, as had not been the case hitherto. There were some serious natural obstacles to foreign trade in the interior, which prevented the Ottoman government from putting all the newmeasures into execution. Thus, the Porte could not, strictly speaking, take upon itself to guarantee the implementation of its commercial treaties in the outposts and the interior of the country, owing to the arbitrary measures of the local authorities, and the traditional old customs which were still practised among the people. For instance, the derbent duties were still levied arbitrarily upon all commercial goods in the interior after the 1838 Convention. Since these derbent and mururiye dues were farmed by the Pashas of the interior, as permitted by ferments from the Porte, to the highest bidder, the purchaser of the duty levied what duties he pleased by disregarding the official tariff set by the Porte. Also it is often reckoned that the farmers of these derbent dues resold the right to a third party at a large profit and that the last buyer levied heavier charges than the official tariff allowed. Most of the time these increased tariffs were obtained from the local authorities. 3 This practice was a great hindrance to the internal trade of the country, though these arbitrary dues

1 "A Decree of 1827 addressed to the people of Yeni§ehir said that both the men and women of Yenifehir had been wearing highly ornamented and precious garments, and that they indulged in extravagances of many kinds. It was, therefore, ordered that they should live a more moderate life." Quoted in Oya Koymen, ' T h e Advent...", p. 47. Also Consul Blunt makes interesting remarks in his reports respecting the changes in the consumption habits of the people, the increasing number of shops selling fancy goods, and the people's tendency to buy European cotton products. For details see in Chapter 3, "Changes in consumption". 2

Oya Koymen, ' T h e Advent...", p. 48 Consul Blunt reported the following information: "... the farming of the derbent of Riistemiye in 1846 gave the government 12,000 P. and in 1847 it was farmed for 20,000 P., but the farmer resold these dues for 75,000 P., a profit of £500 or rather a fee to that amount for permission to plunder!... The yearly amount received by the Porte for farming the principal derbents in these districts is about 550,000 P. or £5,000 but with reference to what I have already stated, respecting the traffic with this iltizam, if the total amount of dues are received by the farmers of these dues be put at £15,000 — there is no exaggeration —." See BPP, Blunt to Canning 12 Aug 1850, No: 79, pp. 110-111. 3

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had always been refunded on application to the proper authorities. 1 However, they had become very injurious to the interests of the Ottoman government, yet some old practices in the interior of the country remained and successfully resisted the new measures brought in by the Convention. For example, we learn from the reports that local notables in some areas tried to retain their monopolies by using their influence upon the producers. 2 It is interesting to note that the instructions f r o m the Foreign O f f i c e to the Consuls acknowledged the existence of expected problems commonly encountered by the local authorities in the course of the implementing the Convention. Obviously, the Foreign Office warned the consuls in order to make them aware of the subordinate local authorities' attempts to circumvent the provisions of the convention. 3 Along with the arbitrary measures of the local authorities against the new conditions of the Convention, there were cases relating to British merchants' intentional and also unintentional reinterpretations of the Convention. Encouraged by the conclusion of the Convention in their favour and by the British government's close attention to their conditions as matter of state policy in Britain, the British merchants now began lodging complaints whenever anything went wrong or was contrary to their interests. The case of the Abbott Brothers, merchants of Salonica, may illustrate the argument here. After having been informed about the favourable conditions of the Convention, the Abbott Brothers applied to Consul Blunt to procure them a permit to fish for leeches in the lakes around Salonica. When Consul Blunt applied for the permit, he was told that all the leeches were sold to a merchant from Milan. Thereupon, the Abbott Bothers considering this was a monopoly and thus constituted an infringement of the stipulations of the treaty, made complaints both to the British Ambassador in Istanbul and to the Secretary of ' The following case is an example of the situation at the local level, Vice-Consul Charnaud at Izmir reported: "... Having been informed by Mr. John Werry, merchant of this place that he this day has sold one case of British manufactures to Ottoman subjects, and the same persons having been forced by the governor of this town, Hiiseyin bey, to pay the same usual duties as charged previous to the Commercial Convention. In consideration of such an act on the part of the governor, Mr. Werry is obliged to take the said goods back, and forced to forgo the sale, as the governor declared to this consulate that his instructions from government obliged him to charge the duties as hitherto levied on British goods; that he could not do otherwise but follow orders. 1 therefore in consequence of such a reply on the part of the governor, do protest against him for infringing the Treaty of 1838 ..." PPAP 1840, XLIV, 541, p. 572, Smyrna 28 May 1839. 2

The following incident may illustrate the situation, reported by Consul Kerr at Edirne on 31 May 1839: " It is a very general custom among the merchants established in this city to make advances to the cultivators of produce sometime before the different recoltas for the purpose of scouring the whole of their produce at certain prices agreed upon between them. In this manner, Messrs. Schnell about three months ago, advanced the sum of fifty thousand piastres among the owners of the different flocks in the above-mentioned district, for the purpose of securing their wool. The time arriving for receiving it, they dispatched some of their people there for the purpose, when the ayans prohibited the villagers from delivering a single pound, ordering them to pay back the advances which they had received saying that they themselves would purchase their wool." PPAP 1840, XLIV, 541, p. 573. 3 PPAP 1840, XLIV, 541, Official Circular, Palmerston to the Consuls in the Ottoman Empire, 10 January 1939.

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State. However, Consul Blunt made no protest to the local government because he did not see this as an infraction of the provisions of the treaty. Also, there was no prohibition against purchasing or exporting leeches from Salónica. All the leeches from the fisheries in the lakes and rivers were sold at official auction for £2,500 to a foreign merchant who was a competitor of the Abbott Brothers. In this case, the Abbott Brothers had misread the new measures of the Convention and were interpreting the conditions according to their own interests. 1 In any ease, the Ottoman government itself did not want suddenly to relinquish its interests. My premise here is that the Ottoman Empire cannot be expected to have been so liberal as to act to its own detriment during the nineteenth century. Often, the Porte can be seen to have tried not to apply those regulations of the trade convention that might have worked against its own interests, so long as they had the opportunity to make credible excuses. By making reference to spccial conditions such as the old traditions and practices of the people as if they represented cases against which the Porte could do nothing and also claiming some exceptions for special situations, the Ottoman government responded to the regulations of the trade convention and tried to modify them to serve its own interests. To illustrate the situation, we might look at the attitudes of the Porte respecting the application of the regulations of the convention relating to fairs. In Ottoman fairs, it was an old custom to take taxes other than the fixed customs duties for the entrance and departure of the merchandise to and from the fairs as duhuliye and huruciye. After the trade conventions, these taxes continued to be taken at the fairs despite the numerous complaints made by the foreign merchants that according to the new regulations once they paid the customs duties, they should not pay any taxes in the interior. 2 Another example of passive resistance of the Porte to the new regulations of the trade conventions was its different interpretations of the regulations. Particular articles and words were perceived and interpreted sometimes intentionally and sometimes inadvertently because of the differences in language. For the former case, the Porte sometimes had no other way of escaping from the harmful effects of some regulations, which were intentionally misinterpreted by the Ottoman government. The meaning of the statements in the English text might differ from that of the Turkish one and as a result problems naturally arose in the application of the regulations. There were several reports respecting the working of the trade convention of 1838 with Great Britain which mentioned the misinterpretations of the statements. Consul Kerr, the British consul at Edirne, reported the working of the 1838 Trade Convention with Great Britain as follows:

1 PPAP 1840, XLIV, 541, p. 551. ^ For the general account of the Ottoman fairs see Òmer §en, Osmanli Yiizyil, (Istanbul: Eren Yayincillk, 1996).

Panayirlari,

18-19.

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With some difficulties the treaty had been carried into execution. The difficulties were mostly coming from the old practices of local government, because as usual the revenues of the different districts had been farmed, and the ayans, who were mostly the purchasers, did not allow the duty of ihtisab to be done away with. Another difficulty was the muhasils of some places insistence on receiving the internal duties there, instead of allowing the articles to be sent to a place for shipment, where alone the internal duty should be exacted. The operation of the convention was very favourable in terms of the export trade, because of the establishing a fixed duty in lieu of all other internal duties, which had the effect of doing away with many abuses that existed in the former system. In terms of import trade, its effects were not yet so visible in 1840. Another advantage of greater importance was the doing away with the heavy exactions which used to be enforced by the local governors on all goods sold at the different fairs in Rumeli, where so large a portion of the British commercial transactions took place. 1 In addition to these, the new Trade Convention brought with it new conditions in the customs houses which were very liable to exploitation. A s we can see f r o m the imperial orders especially sent to the port cities in the provinces, the Ottoman government was faced with new, unfamiliar situations and abuses in the customs houses and immediately sought to take preventive measures. For instance, in the early years of the application of trade conventions, to distinguish which import and export articles were traded by the privileged European merchants constituted one of the main confusions in the customs houses. In order to solve the problem, the Ottoman government ordered the customs to issue a special seal to mark the goods which were exported and imported by the privileged merchants. In fact, in later periods, the conclusion of similar trade treaties with almost all of the European states made this measure needless. 2 In this sense, although it is asserted in the light of mass diplomatic archival sources cited in the present literature that the Convention was concluded almost solely with political objectives in mind, we may argue that it was implemented under conditions mainly shaped by both the traditional British economic objectives of the nineteenth century and the O t t o m a n s ' ambitions to make positive structural changes in the Empire. Of course, we do not know what the major figures of the time such as Sultan M a h m u t II, M u s t a f a R e j i d Pasha, Lord Palmerston, and Lord Ponsonby t h o u g h t or intended to do. W e cannot say anything other than what can be supported through a re-evaluation of the sources, not j u s t in terms of what was said to somebody or what was heard f r o m someone, but in terms of the aftermath of events. For us what is more significant than what was said is an assessment of what happened, what were the consequences of official statements. W e are able to make this assessment by taking advantage the opportunities of reexamining the past f r o m the perspective offered by our knowledge of later developments.

1 2

FO 195 / t o o Kerr to Ponsonby, Adrianople 20 July 1840. Sicil, 236:89,15 Cemaziyelahir 1255.

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Transportation In the Balkans in general, the amount of transport costs was also considered one of the important elements to be explained in terms of its effect on the development of both domestic and foreign trade. Since the internal and the international trade activities in the Balkan lands were mainly carried by overland transportation until the mid-nineteenth century, the effect of transport costs on trade should be dealt with here. Overland transportation in the Balkan lands played an important role not only in domestic trade, such as transporting merchandise between the distant fairs of the region, but also in international trade by providing access from the ports to the interior when the merchandise came to the ports for the internal distribution and from interior to the ports, when the agricultural products needed to be exported. The carriers came mainly from a class of inhabitants who lived in the areas near the sea or at the junction of trade routes and who could not find employment in agriculture and industry. 1 The overwhelming form of overland transportation was the caravan, which consisted of a pack of 20 to 50 animals guarded by 20 to 80 men. The principal animal in the Balkan caravans was the horse, which could carry a load of 130 kg. for eight hours a day. Various prices were applied according to the type of goods, season of the year, distance, and risk of attack. The daily journey of a caravan was not more than eight hours. For instance, the journey between Salonica and Monastir took 35 hours. Between Salonica and Serres took 20 hours, Salonica to Kavala 23 hours, Salonica to Uskiip (Skopje) 48 hours, and to Vienna 35 days. 2 The overland transport costs were also very influential in safeguarding the local producers against manufactured European commodities and made to some degree competition difficult for foreign goods from the eighteenth century onwards until the early nineteenth century. 3 In the early nineteenth century, overland freightage in Balkan lands was still very costly for the merchants, because the roads were so poor and the lives and property of the people bccame increasingly insecure. 4 The existence of relatively small commercial zones under the control of local powers in the region was an important obstacle to the faster and more efficient transport of the goods. Generally, merchants had to pay different prices for passage (derbent) in each different zone, which increased the costs of transportation. 1

T. Stoianovich, "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant," p. 269. Basil Gounaris, Social and Economic Change in Macedonia, 1871- 1912: The Role of the Railways, Ph.D. thesis, (Oxford University, 1988) p. 37. 2

^ Ljuben Berov, 'Transport Costs and Their Role in Trade in the Balkan Lands in the 16111 - 1 9 t h Centuries", Bulgarian Historical Review, 1975, n. 4, p. 82. Berov sees "the relative increase of the overland freight rates in the Balkan Lands of the Ottoman Empire" as the barriers of protectionist custom tariffs, "which did not exist in the Ottoman Empire." Ljuben Berov, "Transport Costs...", p. 85. Berov counted the difference of freight rate between the Ottoman Empire and western Europe as follows: "during the first half of the nineteenth century, the average level of the standard freight rate for the transportation of 100 kg of load in the Balkans reached up to 35 grams of silver as against only 12 to 25 grams in the west European countries, or a ratio of 2:1."

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Farming these passage fees to individuals and their reselling at higher prices to third parties almost doubled the passage dues. Instead of improving the conditions and the security of roads with the income from the farming of these passage fees, the government retained the practice of farming and continued to allow some people to become rich; but at the same time, not only overland trade but also trade activities in general were effected negatively by the derbent system. 1 However, we are told in the travellers' accounts that many local powers or notables were willing to maintain and even promote commercial activities in their zones. They provided security for transiting commercial traffic and safe passage through their territory. 2 According to Berov, "the costly internal land transport in the Balkan lands was one of the basic reasons why artisan production in the Balkan lands under Turkish rule began more specifically to feel the competition of European manufactured commodities only after the thirties and forties of the nineteenth century". 3 At the same time, Berov remarks that if we take, especially a smaller value per unit of weight, different European manufactured commodities into consideration, "the protectionist role of the higher overland freight rates" loses ground. For instance, in the case of textile commodities, "in the end of the eighteenth century, the customary price of the imported fabrics of quality in the Balkan lands in actual silver equivalent varied between 700 and 1,800 grams of silver for 100 kg of cloth, and under these circumstances the average overland freight rate of 26 to 35 grams of silver for the transportation of 100 kg over a distance of 100 km would have amounted to only two to five per cent of the price of merchandise". 4 Sea transport was steadily increasing in Salonica port in the early nineteenth century because of the positive effects of the increasing commercial activities and the introduction of steamships into the region. Consequently, the size of vessels increased and the steam vessels dramatically overwhelmed sailing-ships. Starting from as early as 1835, there were steamships operating in the Eastern Mediterranean. When Britain's Peninsular Steam Navigation Company extended its route to Alexandria in 1840, the Austrian Lloyd Company increased the number of its ships from 7 in 1836 to 26 in 1848. 5 Steamships began entering the port of Salonica in the 1840s. The regular weekly steam-service between Salonica and Istanbul was established by the Austrian Danube Steamship Company in 1840 and in 1842 the Austrian 1 BPP, Blunt to Canning 12 Aug 1850, No: 79, pp. 110 111. ^ Ali Pasha of Ioania might be a good example of the practice of maintaining and promoting commerce in the region under his control. There were several accounts regarding the security of commerce in his region in travellers' books. See Helen Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, The Eve of the Greek Revival, p. 191. 3 Ljuben Berov, 'Transport Costs...", p. 82. 4 Ljuben Berov, 'Transport Costs...", p. 87. ^ Christos Hatziiossif, "Conjunctural Crisis and Structural Problems in the Greek Merchant Marine in the 19 th Century: Reaction of the State and Private Interests", Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, v. XII, n. 4, (Winter, 1985) pp. 5-20.

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Lloyds Company took over the line and established some other direct lines between Salonica and other important port cities of the region. Then, in 1844, Ottoman steamers began coming to Salonica regularly from Istanbul, serving a series of smaller ports between the two cities. Following the Ottomans, French steamers introduced a regular schedule f r o m Marseilles to Salonica in the 1850s. 1 These developments in steam ship navigation were evaluated by Consul Blunt as follows: The employment of Steamers was far more advantageous to the Ottoman Empire than Austria during 1845. The Freights of the Ottoman boats together with the receipts for passengers averaging about £200 per voyage, whereas the Austrian boats did not clear half of that sum. The line of Ottoman boats was from Istanbul to Salonica and back again, but the Austrian opened a new line from Istanbul to Salonica, Syra and Candia, which was a complete failure and abandoned. 2 There were no port or tonnage dues for vessels arriving at the port of Salonica, neither were there dues upon clearance, but when a vessel was in need of bread, there was a charge of 10 P. f o r a permit. According to two Ottoman documents, both dated 1835, the overall number of people, of various ethnic origins, involved in the ship business in Salonica itself was 52. Most probably the numbers indicate the ownership of vessels, though there is no explanation in the document, where these people are called kalyoncu taifesi and held responsible for a certain tax (500 guru$ in 1835) each year as an exemption fee (bedel) obligatory services performed for the state. 3 Starting f r o m the 1830s on, there was a trifling increase in the numbers of Greek vessels, but it caused a considerable decrease in the tonnage of the other nations. T h e Austrians and Sardinians were f e a r f u l about the increasing number of Greek vessels, which would injure their carrying trade. Carrying at a lower rate of freight than any other nation because of cheap labour and provisions paved the way for a significant increase of Greek sea trade, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean. The lower consular dues, simplicity of life style of the Greek sailors in the ship (according to Blunt, a Greek sailor lives upon olives and bread) and the fact that a vessel was most often owned by captain and crew were the main reasons behind the cheap transportation. 4 Also, the Greek ship-owners exploited every opportunity open to them in the early nineteenth century. For instance, according to an Ottoman

1 See Mark Mazower, "Salonica Between East and West, 1860-1912", Hellenic Studies Review, n. 1, 1994, pp. 104-127 and Basil Gounaris, "Economic Developments in Macedonia" in Ioannis Koliopoulos (Ed.) Modern and Contemporary Macedonia, (Thessaloniki: Papazissis Publishers, no date) p. 70. 2 FO 195 / 240 Blunt to Canning 25 March 1846. 3 Sicil, 229:67,2 Rebiülohir 1250, and Sicil, 229:77, 3 Cemaziyelahir 1250. 4 FO 78 / 265 Blunt to Ponsonby 28 December 1835.

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document dated 1835, the Greek subjects of the Empire w h o were living in the Aegean islands took advantage of illegally sailing under foreign flags and paying the low customs duties that the European ships did. 1 One thing should be kept in mind, however: though the Greek vessels increased in numbers, the t o n n a g e of those vessels w a s very small. T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of steam navigation seriously affected the economic importance of sailing ships for a number of reasons. During the forties, when steamers began to compete, the relative numbers of vessels became unimportant because now a single steamer could carry as much as several small ships. The traditional coastal navigation by small sailing ships was worst affected by this development. For instance, in 1844, particularly in terms of the value of the goods, a single Austrian steamer's invoice total for 23 voyages was £15,420, while the invoice value of 237 Greek vessels was £24,949. Nevertheless, companies or merchants continued to prefer steam ships not only because of their speed, but also their safety and reliability. T h e carrying of valuable cargo, posts and passengers without insurance cover also increased steam ships' invoice values over those of sailing ships. Consequently, as they lost ground to steam ships, owners or captains of Greek sailing ships began to sink their ships in order to claim indemnity from the insurance companies. Thus, the insurance offices began to refuse to insure both Greek vessels and the goods which they carried because of the dishonesty of Greek captains. 2 However, the positive impact of the Ottoman reforms after 1840s was also felt in the Ottoman navigation sector. When a more favourable climate for the subjects of the Ottoman Empire was achieved by the Tanzimat reforms, Greek subjects of the Empire, particularly the shipmasters of some of the Aegean islands, were especially supported by the Ottoman g o v e r n m e n t in expanding their enterprises in the Eastern Mediteiranean. 3 Another important branch of the carrying trade in Salonica, which stimulated the increase of Greek vessels, was the yearly transport of pilgrims to and f r o m Palestine. This gave employment to 50 to 6 0 Greek vessels a year f r o m the port of Salonica. Each of these vessels, with a carrying capacity of 5 0 to 60 tons, took between 100 and 150 pilgrims. T h e expenses of these pilgrims were estimated at from 8,000 to 10,000 P. each (£80 to £100) which included all their expenses at Jerusalem, and their passage back to Salonica. 4

1 2 3 4

Sicil, 231:46, iOMuharrem 1251. Christos Hatziiossif, "Conjunctural Crisis", pp. 8-9. Ibid., p. 13. FO 78 / 265 Blunt to Ponsonby 28 December 1835.

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Fairs The internal market consisted of three separate forms of organisation: the big annual fairs, the weekly markets in the towns, and the permanent pazars. The Salonica pazars were always described by travellers as the richest of the region. The shop-owners and merchants were predominantly Jews and G r e e k s . 1 The travellers noted how full the shops in the city were of manufactured and colonial products. 2 The most important feature of the weekly markets in Salonica region was that they were well-supplied and cheap. The weekly markets were mostly held on Sundays, but occasionally on Fridays. The attendants of the weekly markets did not only come from the immediate surroundings of the countryside but also from a much wider area. Peasants brought in produce of various kinds to the market for sale or to exchange for manufactured products. There was also a special market, part of the main weekly market, for all kinds of livestock. The total accounts of the six month period of retail trade in the shops and market of Salonica in 1835 were recorded in the sicils of Salonica as 44,997 guru$ ; 6,749 guru§ (six per cent) was the amount of retail tax extracted from the total. 3 This clcarly shows the dynamism of the Salonica market in the 1830s. At the fairs in the region export and import goods were exchanged and distributed all over the country. Both the increase in the local agricultural production and the close contacts with the European capitalist economy stimulated the importance of the Ottoman fairs in the Balkans. The fairs in the region had become important instruments for the development of both international and local commercial enterprise. Through them the people of the region had become more trade-minded and they gained materially from the commercial development. Indeed, the lack of a powerful local commercial class, the slow development of urbanisation and the lack of local industry were main factors in the survival and the importance of the fairs in the region. The condition of the road network, and the state of agricultural production were the determinants of the success and failure of the fairs in a region. If we bear in mind that at Uzuncaabat (in the vicinity of Haskoy) in 1860, the number of people who attended the fair was more than 100,000 and the number of shops opened was around 5,000-6,000, we can understand the importance of the fairs in the region as commercial centres. 4 These annual fairs were held in different places at different times during the commercial year. No fairs were ever held simultaneously. It was an old practice of the region that the fairs followed one

1 According to an Ottoman document dated 1835, 7 out of 14 leading retail merchants were Jewish, while 7 out of 14 in the city were Christians. See Sicil, 229:94,30 Rebiulevvel 1250. 2 Helen Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, The Eve of the Greek Revival, p. 181. 3 Sicil, 229:94, 30 Rebiulevvel 1250. 4 Omer §en, Osmanli Panayirlari, p. 13.

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another all through the year; and it was important to hold them in the same places. Several fermans sent to Salonica in the 1840s contained government warnings about the negative effects of changing the traditional places and particular times of the fairs in the region. Also concerns such as the loss of revenue which appear in these fermans shows the importance of the fairs for the Ottoman g o v e r n m e n t in the region, as vital centres of commercial enterprise. 1 The recent research Osmanli Panayirlari, 18-19. Ytizyil, (The Ottoman Fairs in the 18 and 19th Centuries) carried out by Omer §en based on records kept for each fair (varidat defterleri) gives us lots of first-hand information about the Ottoman fairs. According to this research, the most sought-after goods in the Balkan fairs were cotton and wool textile products. A m o n g the minerals, iron was the m o s t in demand. T h e r e were local agricultural products in the fairs, but it is interesting that their proportion was small. The only exception was tobacco, which was mostly sold at fairs. T h e fairs were attended not only by all the local and neighbouring merchants but also by foreign merchants, coming f r o m very distant places. T h e foreign merchants who came over land to Salonica countries f r o m the north, such as Prussia, Austria and Russia, with their countries' goods also had the right to buy Ottoman merchandise and sell it at other fairs. These merchants could also buy goods at a fair to sell them within the Ottoman Empire as they returned home. Normally, in these transactions, domestic taxation was applied to the foreign merchants. However, after the 1838 Trade Convention with Britain and later on the other European countries, the practice worked against the interests of foreign merchants. B e f o r e the trade conventions, foreign merchants were paying only three per cent customs duty in the fairs, but afterward they paid 12 per cent under the new regulations. Complaints were made respecting their new rights as being foreign merchants under the trade conventions, but they continued to be considered as native merchants if they bought and sold goods within the Ottoman Empire. A ferrnan dated 1840 (1 Rebiiilevvel 1255) pointed out the precise regulation, upon an application to the Porte for the clear explanation of the issue, that regardless of whether the goods had been brought to the fairs by European or by native merchants, certain duhuliye (entrance) and huruciye (exit) taxes had to be paid. 2 It is interesting to note that foreign merchants had carried out buying and selling activities within the Ottoman borders well before the regulations of the 1838 Trade Convention.

1 Sicil, 236:8, 1 Rebiiilevvel 1255, Sicil, 236:21, 15 Rebiiilevvel 1255, Sicil, 236:25, 25 Rebiiilevvel 1255 According to the documents, changes in the traditional opening dates of some fairs caused them to be cancelled in the years 1836, 1837, 1838, because no merchants came for the fairs. Since the fairs could not be held, the treasury lost a considerable amount of revenue. 2 Sicil, 236:25, 25 Rebiiilevvel 1255 "... zikr olunan Pirlebe panayirma Siroz panayiri misillii etraf-i esnafin bermucib-i tarife resm-i giimrugiin edd olunduguna mebni giimruk mezkuresiyle gelen emtia ve efyalann Avrupa tiiccarimn olsun ve gerek sairenin bulunsun duhuliinde beher yiikiinden yirmibe} ve hurucunda otuz gurug resm-ipanayir tatbik olunmak babmda ..."

T H H C O M M E RGB

OF

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SALONICA

The belief that the 1838 Trade Convention made this practice free for the first time for foreign merchants is wrong. It appears that the Trade Convention of 1838 did not introduce but merely sought to regulate this ongoing practice. One thing was very clear in the fairs: namely that foreign goods were becoming more and more dominant. For instance, in the fair of Serres in 1835, Austrian goods representing 24.4 percentage of the total took first place among imported goods. 1 While French merchants had been seen at the fairs from the eighteenth century onwards, British merchants first appeared on the scene in the mid-nineteenth century. There were certain taxes for the goods entering and leaving the fairs. 2

Table 17 Some statistics on the fairs of the Salonica region.* Dues

Rate of transportation of 120 oke or 350 lbs

Places

Date

Duration

Serres

February

21 days

Pristine Selimnia

March

15

"

20 P.

60 P.

May

15

"

upon

70 P.

Pirlebe

June

15

"

arrival and

35 to 40 P.

Philipopolis July

15

"

Nevrocop

August

13

"

10 P. upon departure

Uzuncaabat

September

10

Lucca

December

22

Curr.

Curr.

Ster.

12%

50 P.

10%

14%

65 P.

13%

7, 8%

30 to 35 P.

6,7%

55 P.

11%

40 to 45 P.

8,9%

6,7 %

"

15 P.

3%

25 30 75 P. 25 30

5,6%

"

30 to 35 P. 80 P.

6%

»According to Consul Blunt's report on 28 December 1835

1 2

Òmer §en, Osmanli Panayirlari, p. 71. Òmer §en, Osmanli Panayirlari, p. 87.

Ster.

16%

to P.

15% to P.

5,6%

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Blunt described the activity of the fairs as follows: The fairs of Serres, Pirlebe, Uzuncaabat, and Lucca are the most considerable, where large stocks of foreign mainly British manufactures and colonials are sold. There is likewise, a very extensive outlet for low German clothes at all these fairs, but particularly at Serres and Uzuncaabat. The fair of Lucca only became important after 1834. The Fair of Selimnia was prior to the Russian war of 1829 much more considerable than any of the fairs of the present day, but now rank with the minor fairs. Pristine fair is attended chiefly by the Albanians where considerable purchases are made of the produce of the interior. The fairs of Nevrecop and Philipopolis (Filibe) are small fairs.

Export Trade of Salonica in the Years

1835-45

By the 1840s Salonica was already playing a certain role in the international market as a source of agricultural products, mainly grain, cotton, silk, tobacco and wool. Basically, France, Austria, and Great Britain were interested in these export commodities. Deficiencies and fluctuations resulting f r o m several (mainly natural) causes affecting agricultural exports of Salonica constituted an important reason for the reluctance of the European States to consider Salonica as a possible source of agricultural supplies. In 1840, there was a considerable decrease in the returns of trade in comparison with former years, notwithstanding the advantages of the 1838 Commercial Convention. 2 The reasons were numerous; firstly, what deterred those w h o had the means was the unsettled state of political a f f a i r s , particularly in this part of the world (notably the question of M e h m e t Ali in Egypt), together with a fear of general war. For instance, in respect to the British trade, there was no direct importation from Britain to Salonica and n o British vessels had arrived at the port during the year 1840. Also it can be observed that the import trade of France and Austria with Salonica had equally diminished by comparison with former years. 3 Secondly, local events such as the plague, and a devastating fire in Salonica greatly affected the capital resources of those engaged in the import trade. Thirdly, the bad effects of the falling off of crop production, exccpt grain, because we understand that the deficiency in the grain crop resulted rather f r o m the beys' hoarding of grain in order to sell it at a higher price. 4 In contrast, we see that the crops of cotton, sesame and tobacco, which were important articles of the export trade of Salonica, diminished. Also the quantity of wool brought to the market fell far short of that of former years.

1

FO 78 / 265 Blunt to Ponsonby 28 December 1835. FO 195 / 1 7 6 Blunt to Ponsonby 20 January 1841. 3 FO 195 / 176 Blunt to Canning January 1843. Both countries had engaged in trade with Salonica long before the British trade developed. 4 Ibid. This was a common occurrence in this part of the Ottoman Fmpire because of the monopolies granted to peasants to sell their products to certain men in towns. 2

THE

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121

Certain products of Salónica were exported to particular places. Cotton was mainly exported to England. Wool was mostly demanded both by France and by the U S A . M u c h of the silk produce was being sent to Europe, principally Marseilles. Most of the time tobacco was demanded by the Trieste and Genoa markets. Corn and grain were commonly sent to various countries of Europe. In the 1840s, generally speaking, the export trade was not as active as in former years. In particular, the grain market was very flat and supplies were abundant as a result of the exorbitant prices. 1 T h e largest quantity of barley was exported to Algeria, which accounted for 194 tons. Rye exports were only 20 tons; the rest was consumed in the country. Maize was exported mostly to Italy, totalling 134 tons. Another important agricultural product of Salónica was sesame seed, for which the demand was very high during the 1840s. In particular, orders were coming f r o m the Greek trading houses of Marseilles. Consequently, the prices increased and more attention was given to the cultivation of this seed, which was becoming a very valuable article of export. 2 The wool market was not active. Even the usual small purchases for the American market were not made. T h e value of the different articles exported f r o m Salónica for the year 1845 is shown in Table 9: 3 T a b l e 18 V a l u e of d i f f e r e n t a r t i c l e s e x p o r t e d f r o m S a l ó n i c a in 1845.

Goods R a w Silk Grain Tobacco Wool S e e d s (esp. S e s a m e ) Bones Timber Leeches L a m b Skins Abas Various

Value £92,000 £54,412 £6,174 £7,201 £16,957 £1,500 £7,810 £14,116 £1,500 £13,620 £3,351

Silk The silk production in Salonica was not particularly important for the city's economy in the early 1800s, though there was a rapid growth beginning in the late 1830s. In 1835, the quantity of silk production in Salonica was estimated by Consul Blunt at between 55,000 and 60,000 lbs. In the year 1836, there were 14 silk factories in Salonica for the spinning of silk thread.

^ Ibid. Total export of wheat during the year from Salonica was 125 tons. Ibid. The quantity exported from Salonica during the year of 1842 was 203 tons. FO 195 / 240 Blunt to Canning 25 March 1846.

2 3

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Each of these factories gave employment to 80 to 100 persons and the fuel required gave employment to numerous boats carrying from five to ten tons of fire-wood each. 1 The decision to make wool and silk a government monopoly in 1836 greatly affected the production of these articles and also certain classes of the population who were forced to migrate to other places. T h e value of silk exports in 1840 was £22,000. In 1846 it rose to £91,000. 2 In the midnineteenth century, despite the negative consequences of the increasing European import trade, the cultivation of silk was becoming one of the most important branches of the export trade of Salónica. It was predicted in the year of 1841 by Consul Blunt that by the increasing number of silk factories and by taking the monopoly of silk production out of the hands of the Jews with the opening of the French factories, the silks of Salónica would become equal with those of Bursa. 3 It should be noted here that silk factories remained in Salónica until the late 1800s as a dominant industrial enterprise. F o r m e r l y , the silk thread was drawn off in the villages by the producers, but starting f r o m the mid-1830s the cultivators found it more to their advantage to dispose of the cocoons to specialised spinners w h o f r o m the superiority of their workmanship obtained a better price for the silk. As far as is known, most of the silk of Salónica was sent to Izmir and Istanbul, and purchased there by the foreign merchants. In 1842, the spooling of silk was greatly improved in Salónica by the opening of new modern factories. 4 T h e old factories, which mostly belonged to Jews, were in a very primitive condition. N o attention was paid to the venting of either the steam or smoke f r o m the cauldrons or fires; the quality of the silk was thereby greatly diminished. In 1843, the silk trade was very active. In particular, a large quantity of f i n e quality silk was exported to France. T h e r e were very considerable cultivation increases; very large tracts of land were prepared for planting. That the cocoons were brought up f r o m both Bursa and Edirne was evidence of the improvement in the silk production of Salónica. 5 Also, in 1840 there was an increase in the selling prices of mulberry leaves which had been sold for 20/40 P. per oke in former years but in 1840 the price per oke was 40/55 P. 6 In 1844, there were 35 establishments, mostly the property of Franks, employed in drawing silk, working 6 0 7 reels in all and giving employment to 1,300 adults and 450 children. The quantity of silk produced

1

FO 78 / 314 Blunt to Ponsonby 27 January 1837. FO 78 / 441 Trade Report of 1840, 20 January 1841, Salónica and FO 78 / 700 Trade Report of 1846. 3 FO 78 / 441 Trade Report of 1840, 20 January 1841, Salónica and FO 195 / 176 Blunt to Ponsonby 20 January 1841. 4 FO 195 / 176 Blunt to Canning January 1843. "A person from Sicily who had under his direction the Royal Silk Factory at Catania, since 1840 for instance stimulated the competition in Salónica. Also some of this new silks were bought by the silk manufacturers of Lyons, who paid 20 percent above the other fine qualities of Salónica silks in 1842." 5 FO 78 / 441 Blunt to Ponsonby 25 March 1841. 6 FO 195 / 176 Blunt to Ponsonby 20 January I841and FO 78 / 441 Blunt to Ponsonby 25 June 1841. 2

THE

COMMERCE

OF

SALONICA

123

in Salonica in 1844 was: 41,250 lbs. fine quality; 17,875 lbs. low quality; making a total of 59,125 lbs., valued about £47,900. Of this about £38,500 was exported, which the lesser quality products were sold within the country. 1

Years 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845

Table 19 Some statistics of silk factories in Salónica.* Persons employed No of reels factories 625 280 10 739 34-6 12 1055 429 20 1103 459 35 1237 500 1447 590 1470 600 1977 795 -

No of

* According to Consul Blunt's reports on 20 January 1841 and 31 December 1845. The silk trade was a great source of wealth for certain classes, and there was scarcely a village in the vicinity of Salonica which did not produce at least some cocoons. In 1845, the conditions of employment in terms of earnings greatly improved. The persons employed in drawing silk were for the most part children, averaging from 14 to 15 years of age, who were working for about 14 hours a day. Thus, the improvement in this trade gave more income to the lower classes of the population. According to Consul Blunt, for the year of 1845, a poor family with two children, in the space of six months could earn £173.6, when the expenses of the whole family for a year did not amount to that sum. 2

Cotton The cotton exported f r o m the port of Salonica was mostly the produce of the vicinities of both Salonica and Serres. The major export f r o m the port of Salonica in the early 1800s was locally manufactured cotton twist. Forty percent of the annual cotton production was used for local manufactures. However, in the mid nineteenth century, British manufactured cottons invaded the fairs of the region as the direct result of the free trade policy and the overproduction by British factories. For instance, in 1837, according to the US Consul in Salonica, the value of British manufactures sold was $215,000 at a time when the total value of imported manufactures was $279,000. This

' F O 195 / 240 Blunt to Canning January 1844. FO 195 / 240 Blunt to Canning 31 December 1845.

2

124

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REFORMS

AND

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LIFE

means that three-quarters of the total imports were British manufactures. 1 In 1835 cotton was demanded, particularly f r o m Trieste, though in the year 1840 the entire amount exported was sold in the Italian ports. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, cotton production in Macedonia had begun to decline and continued to go down throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, paving the way for increasing production of another important crop of Macedonia, tobacco. T h e output of the Salonica region in the 1780s was put at 9,000 tons and its annual exports in the 1780s, mainly to Austria, Saxony, and France, at 6,000 tons. Around 1800 production was about 7,500 tons, of which 2,500 went to German states, partly overland and partlythrough Trieste, 650 to Italy and a variable quantity, never exceeding 1,250 tons, to France; export to Britain was negligible. A n d by the 1850s Salonica's level of export had fallen to a little over 1,000 tons. 2

Tobacco In the mid 1830s, the cultivation of tobacco diminished for t w o reasons: 1) the constant demand of the Porte for troops, which diminished the local work f o r c e and 2) the new duty which the cultivators had to pay. However, there was a considerable increase in tobacco production in the 1840s, while the production of the main crop of Macedonia, cotton, was decreasing. Tobacco which was shipped f r o m the port of Salonica came f r o m the immediate vicinity of the city, and crops produced in Drama were shipped f r o m Kavala. Tobacco was grown chiefly in the area f r o m the Axios river to the eastern end of the peninsula around Kavala. T h e tobacco produced in Drama was a strong mountain tobacco, while that of Yenice (Yenitsa) was a mild plant, which gained its f a m e f r o m the soil. Purchases were usually made at the place of growth. T h e best purchases w e r e made in the m o n t h of October. In 1835, the quantity of tobacco production was estimated at 2,000 tons. 3 In 1842, tobacco crops were more than usually abundant, and there were substantial stocks that remained unsold. T h e export trade was very limited o w i n g to crop failures. Since the Porte traditionally f a r m e d the customs of the Empire, the exporter always tried to make the best possible bargain with the customs houses. Regularly, by threatening the exporters, customs commissioners demanded 10 or 15 percent premium upon the gross amount of customs dues, which went up, in cases of refusal or complaints, to the level of Istanbul prices, always higher than the local ones. Of course, by

1

US NA, Reel T 414, W. B. Llewellyn at Salonica 31 December 1837. Charles Issawi, The Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980) p. 233. 3 FO 78 / 265 Blunt to Ponsonby 28 December 1835.

2

THE

COMMERCE

OF

SALONICA

125

this practice the article became more expensive and the increased rate of duty made the article too dear for the European market. For instance, in Salonica in 1841, the cost of tobacco was raised by this practice to at least 100 percent more than any tobacco sold locally in this part of the Ottoman Empire, which caused large quantities of tobacco to be left in the hands of the growers. 1 In 1843 the only incentive given to the tobacco growers was the arrival of an agent from the Régie of Paris with orders to purchase samples and to report upon the qualities produced in the different districts. In the year 1844, there was a general falling off with respect to the export trade, resulting from the low demand for grain and other products in the Italian and other European markets. For the first time tobacco was exported to France, but the prices paid were so exorbitantly high, that the Régie was reluctant to repeat its purchases. 2

Wool Since the sixteenth century there was a well-established and steady market for soldiers' uniforms and wool cloth for the needs of the rural population. But the wool of Salonica was no longer a valuable article in the early nineteenth century despite the fact that the land for grazing had increased owing to rural immigration to the cities. The fall in the production of aba (a coarse woollen cloth) owing to increasing foreign textile imports to the region left export as the only possibility for the wool production of the region. Since the production of woollen articles in Salonica was still a cottage industry, the producers could not compete with foreign manufacturers. However, several Ottoman documents dated from the 1840s reveal that the uniforms of certain groups of the Ottoman army were still being made in the region. In 1840, 2594 items of uniform were ordered and 11,175 P. (guruç) was paid by the authorities. 3 This is the only sign of the continuation of aba production and related sectors of the industry in the region in the midnineteenth century. Moreover, according to an Ottoman document, the traditional production of çuha for the needs of the Ottoman army in three villages in the Salonica region continued by altering the production from çuha to battan. These villages were thus exempted from certain ôrfî (state) taxes. What is more interesting in this document is that the first initiative to produce battan (wool for horse or saddle blankets) for the army came from the villagers. They wrote to the central government proposing to produce battan for the state, but they requested in exchange to be exempted from certain

1 2

3

FO 195 / 176 Blunt to Canning January 1842. FO 195 / 176 Blunt to Canning January 1843 and FO 195 / 240 Blunt to Canning January 1844.

Sicil, 236: 68, 23 $ewal 1255, and Sicil, 236: 15, Safer 1255.

126

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taxes. This shows, at least at a micro level, that local manufacturing was still alive in the region; and the people still had the courage to start up new businesses and the will to produce, despite all the negative effects of the internal and external factors influencing the economic climate of the time. 1 According to Consul Blunt, Salónica wool production was inferior in quality to the wool of Rumeli and did not yield above 25 per cent top quality goods. It was less clean and when it was transported, suffered a loss of weight of around 7.5 per cent, whereas Rumeli wool only suffered a loss of weight of 3.5 or 4 per cent. When it was washed, there was a loss of 45 per cent. Salónica wool was for the most part purchased by Austria, France and the United States. The quantity yearly brought to the market was about 1,000,000 lbs. 2

Grain Grain from Salónica region could be exported freely only after the grain department had acquired the quantity needed by the Ottoman government, which had monopoly rights on grain and grain exports. Since the government's main concern was to collect enough cereal for the needs of the capital, the grain of the Salónica region, which remained one of the preferred sources because of its geographical proximity to Istanbul, was usually purchased by the central government. There are imperial orders among the sicils sent from the central government to prohibit the selling of Salónica grain to anyone other than the state. According to an Ottoman document dated 23 Rebiülevvel 1249, the overall grain purchased from Salónica including wheat and barley in the same year was 114,250 kiyye ( a p p r o x i m a t e l y equivalent to 2,856.25 tons). 3 Though this monopolistic practice prevented the exorbitant rise of prices, the direct consequence was the increasing of illegal smuggling of the produce in the region in the nineteenth century. An imperial order sent to Salónica in 1835 claiming the residue of the previous two years' grain, which had been purchased and should have been sent to Istanbul is probably a very good indication of the smuggling of grain from that region to Europe, which consequently reduced the central government's grain receipts. 4 Also big landowners and beys had found ways to derive benefits from this monopoly. Most often, they claimed that the grain in their stocks was the product of their own fields or