Universal Minority Rights? A Transnational Approach: Proceedings of the 5th Kobe Lectures. Tokyo and Kyoto, December 1998 3515085041, 9783515085045

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Morigiwa Yasutomo, Ishiyama Fumihiko, Sakurai Tetsu (Eds.)

Universal Minority Rights? A Transnational Approach

ARSP Beiheft Nr. 96 Franz Steiner Verlag

Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie

Universal Minority Rights? ATransnational Approach

ARSP BEIHEFT 96

Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Archives de Philosophie duDroit et dePhilosophie Sociale

Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy Archivo

de Filosofía Jurídica y Social

Table

of Contents 7

Preface MORIGIWA Yasutomo

9

Introduction ISHIYAMA Fumihiko

The Fifth Kobe Lecture Universal Minority Rights? Will KYMLICKA

The Prospects forConsensus

13

Commentaries

andQuestions to Professor W.Kymlicka FUKADA Mitsunori A ‘Distinctively Liberal’Theory of Minority Rights? ISHIYAMA Fumihiko Comments onKymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship Comments

KATSURAGI Takao

WhenKymlicka Takes onAsia HIRAI Ryosuke

A Kind of Strategic Essentialism? A Commentary on Kymlicka INADA

Yasuaki

InDefense ofLiberal Imperialism

MORIMURA Susumu WhoSaves Whom? AShort Comment onMulticultural Citizenship OZAKI Ichiro Comments onWillKymlicka’s Thinking about the Rights ofIndigenous People HASEGAWA Ko Towards a Liberal Extension ofMulticulturalism: Focusing Attention onthe Present Conditions ofthe Korean Minority inJapan MOURI Yasutoshi

58 60

65

68 74

77 81

85 94

Reply Replies toCommentaries Will KYMLICKA

105

List ofContributors

125

MORIGIWA Yasutomo

Preface Itis withgreat pleasure thatmyfellow editors andI present onbehalf oftheJapanese National Section of the International Association for Philosophy of Lawand Social Philosophy (IVR Japan) and the Japan Association of Legal Philosophy (JALP), the proceedings oftheFifth KobeLecture. Theinvited lecturer, Professor WillKYMLICKA, inTokyo Universal Minority Rights? The Prospects forConsensus” read his Lecture “ andKyoto, attheUniversity ofTokyo andDoshisha University, respectively. Seminars werealsogiven inTokyo, Kyoto andSapporo, where interesting discussion tookplace, especially between thedesignated commentators andProfessor KYMLICKA. Somuch so, infact, that instead of the usual format of the Kobe Lecture, which is the publication ofthe lecture ina regular issue of the Archiv fürRechts- undSozialphilosophie (ARSP, the official publishing organ of the IVR), a project was developed to publish the lecture, commentaries andthelecturer’s replies tothecommentators ina single volume. With thekindunderstanding ofthemanaging editors oftheARSP, theproject became reality intheformyousee here, entitled “Universal minority rights? Atransnational approach.” Thetitle expresses twoaspects oftheproject. One,a discussion ofanattempt to justify minority rights innon-liberal nations withreasons independent ofliberal principles accepted in western political cultures. This is the approach Professor KYMLICKA has proposed in his lecture, the main title of which we have adopted for the volume. The other, anacademic exploration involving scholars fromtwodifferent nations, Canada andJapan, withlittle regard forthe cultural differences involved. Thearguments put forward anddiscussed aretransnational: onefinds thatinJapan wehaveourshare of libertarians, post-modernists andpost-liberals; references toculture aremadeonlyon theobject level oronpoints ofmethod, notforjustification ofarguments. Wehope that thevolume manifests thegrounds onwhich theproposed approach itself depends. TheKobe Lecture isaninternational lecture program founded in1988, commemorating the Thirteenth World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy held in August 1997inKobe, Japan. Thelectures areadministered byIVRJapan, incooperation withJALP. Asa rule, every twoyears, a scholar engaged increative research ofbasic issues of legal, social and political philosophy is invited to Japan. The lecturer usually gives one or twolectures in major cities of Japan inaddition to several informal seminars. Major works bythelecturer areusually translated intoJapanese andpublished before the lectures take place. Professor Ronald DWORKIN (Oxford andNewYork) gave theInaugural Lecture in 1990. Professor Ralf DREIER (Göttingen) was the second lecturer in 1992. In 1994, Professor Joseph RAZ(Oxford) gave the third series of Lectures. The Fourth Lecture was extraordinary in that it was given in the form of the First Asia Symposium in Jurisprudence, the first international conference to be held under the program. The Lawina changing world: Asian theme forthesymposium, heldinOctober 1996, was“ alternatives.”Professor Will KYMLICKA (Queens, Canada) gave the Fifth Lecture in 1998. The Sixth was given inthe year 2000 by Professor Randy BARNETT (Boston U). In2002, Professor Emilios CHRISTODOULIDIS (Edinburgh) gave the Seventh Lecture. IVRJapan andJALPhavedecided toholdtheKobeLectures every three years instead oftwohereon in.Thelectures arepublished intheARSP. Theproceedings oftheFourth Lecture arepublished as a special issue (Beiheft 72)ofthejournal, as isthis Lecture.

8

Morigiwa Yasutomo

The Kobe Lecture aims to advance ourunderstanding of legal, social andthe political spheres oflife. Important theoretical issues areexplored froma perspective that is philosophical yet sensitive to problems of implementation and administration. Through this program wehope toarrive at a deeper mutual understanding ofboththe similarities anddifferences among various forms of life. The editors wishtothank WillKYMLICKA forhis willingness to reply to the commentators

andforhispatience andcooperation inpreparing thepublication. Wewould also like to express our appreciation to the commentators for insights Professor KYMLICKA himself musthave enjoyed. Itis a pleasure toexpress ourgratitude once again (see Beiheft 72)toProf. Veronica TAYLOR, whose teamshesupervises hascomethrough yetagain todoa great jobofediting forgrammar, style andeffect thepapers written by ourJapanese colleagues. FortheFifth Lecture, theeditors werethemselves heavily involved initsorganization.

MORIGIWA Yasutomo, the president of IVRJapan during the Fifth Lecture, to gratitude ISHIYAMA Fumihiko, the chair of the organizing committee, for his contribution in making the lectures possible. The editors would like to thank KATSURAGI Takao, the present president, for managing the Tokyo lecture and seminars, andTSUNODA Takeshi forthose held inthe Kansai area. Wewould also like to express ourdeep gratitude for all those who had contributed their time and effort, working with the organizers to make this Lecture as fruitful as ithasturned outto be. The editors would like to thank President TAKESHITA Kenandthe executive board ofJALPfortheir unflinching support oftheprogram. Onbehalf ofthecontributors tothis volume, JALP andIVRJapan, wewishto express ourappreciation tothe managing editors ofARSP, Drs.Gerhard SPRENGER andhissuccessor Annette BROCKMÖLLER, for accepting our proposal and their thoughtful advice. Thanks are also due to Mr. Gregor HOPPEN ofFranz Steiner Verlag forhiseverquick andpositive response and help in the publication process.

ISHIYAMA Fumihiko

Introduction The purpose of this volume is to explore whether and howa liberal approach to minority rights canbe extended to societies that are notWestern democracies.

Recently, a growing amount of literature on minority nationalism and/or multiisbeing produced. Someauthors havetaken a liberal approach totheissue of minority rights: they reject the idea that the expression of ethnocultural diversity should be relegated totheprivate sphere, andclaim that minority rights thataccommodate andpublicly support diversity are consistent with, andeven based upon, liberal values. However, the liberal values referred to are of Western origin, while problems relating to minority rights are notexclusively a Western concern. The need to have peaceful andjustethnocultural relations isequally pressing inside andoutside theWest. Therefore it is of theoretical as well as practical importance to explore indetail the applicability of liberal approaches. Should a liberal approach to minority rights be applied onlytoWestern democracies? Cannon-Western societies learn anything from theWestern experience? Thisvolume attempts totake a steptowards answering these andother related questions. This publication has three parts. It begins with a chapter by Professor Will KYMLICKA, oneoftheleading representatives oftheliberal approach tominority rights. The chapter, entitled ‘Universal Minority Rights? The Prospects for Consensus’, is followed byeight commentaries byJapanese scholars, which represent a variety of theoretical andpolitical perspectives onhistheories. This issue concludes witha reply byKYMLICKA, inwhich he clarifies his position andexamines some ofthe issues raised inthe commentaries. culturalism

KYMLICKA begins his paper with a statement that his theory of minority rights was developed in twoof his previous publications, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford U.P., 1989) and Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford U.P., 1995). He explains that the which explores “ Western liberal theory ofminority rights,” itis best described as a “ shared experience of Western democracies”and is grounded in the principle of individual autonomy. By way of introducing the subject matter of this publication, KYMLICKA then asks whether this theory can be successfully applied to societies in suchas (ex hypothesi) those found inEast communitarian sentiment is strong” which “ Asia. KYMLICKA concludes that the first component ofthis theory, butnotthe second, is applicable to communitarian societies. As he summarizes it, his theory has two elements: first, an account ofjustice between ethnocultural groups, which calls for forminority groups against theexercise ofpower bythe numerous “ external protections” majority; andsecondly, anaccount ofjustice within ethnocultural groups, which rejects “ internal restrictions” that limit individual freedom within each group. He notes with regret thatthere is noprospect intheforeseeable future foraninternational consensus onthelatter partofhistheory. However, heargues that, withrespect totheformer part, communitarians andliberals canagree onthelegitimacy ofminority rights, which are justifiable onthe “ basic norms offairness andreciprocity.” To illustrate his argument, KYMLICKA first describes howWestern democracies andhowthe minority groups inthose states respond tothe are “nation-building states,”

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ISHIYAMA Fumihiko

threats posed tothembymajority-led nation-building projects. Hethen identifies similar nation-building phenomena in Asia, and similar responses from minorities. Hethus contends that minority groups face comparable threats from nation-building states, regardless ofwhether those states areWestern democracies orAsian “ communitarian” entities. Moreover, bothindividualists andcommunitarians canfindthese threats unjust forthesame reasons: namely, they violate basic norms ofreciprocity,” majorities “ deny ”andimpose onminorities the majority’s to minorities whattheyclaim forthemselves, “ collective identity. Assuch, thenature oftheinjustice caused bymajority nation-building projects is similar in communitarian anddemocratic states; andthe justification for minority rights is the same: i.e., to rectify this injustice. Insum, KYMLICKA maintains that the difference between liberals andcommunitarians is less relevant to issues of inter-group relations than to issues of intra-group relations. Heconcludes hispaper witha discussion ofsome possible objections to his theory.

Eachoftheeight commentaries inthis publication raises a great variety ofissues, only below. Onthe whole, three mainquestions are discussed inthecommentaries: first, inwhatsense istheapproach taken byKYMLICKA “ liberal” ? Second, is a liberal approach appropriate inthe first place? Andthird, is KYMLICKA’s theory applicable to Japan? distincAlthough KYMLICKA has claimed that his owntheory of minority rights is “ whenheattempts inthe Lecture thatformed thebasis ofhischapter to tively liberal,” defend minority rights innon-Western contexts, hedoes notappeal toliberal values, but morewidely shared values ofreciprocity anddecency found inbothWestern rather to“ slimming-down strategy,”as MOURI Yasutoshi calls it in and Eastern cultures.”This “ hiscommentary, invites several different interpretations ofKYMLICKA’s position with regard toliberal values. Forexample: perhaps hisoriginal defense ofliberal values was meant onlyinthecontext ofWestern societies; orperhaps hehasfundamentally revised his theory of minority rights. Alternatively, his previous theory may already have contained some latent inconsistencies with regard to liberal values, which have only become apparent inthe Lecture. While FUKADA Mitsunori andsomeoftheother commentators raise a question as tothe possibility ofthe first interpretation, ISHIYAMA Fumihiko believes that KYMLICKA has revised his theory. According to ISHIYAMA, KYMLICKA originally insisted in Chapter 8 ofMulticultural Citizenship thatilliberal minorities inWestern societies should have minority rights, because theywould best ensure the individual freedom ofthose minorities inthe long run.Thus, heoriginally grounded minority rights onliberal values. However, according to the Lecture, minority rights canbe justified –even inWestern without referring toliberal values atall.There-fore, ISHIYAMA concludes, his context –

a fewof which can be represented

theory ofminority rights is nolonger distinctively liberal (although itremains consistent withliberalism). ISHIYAMA maintains thatliberals should beconcerned as muchabout individual freedom inthe non-Western as inthe Western context. By contrast, KATSURAGI Takao finds that KYMLICKA’s theory has not changed. His theory on illiberal minorities according to KATSURAGI is a form of “ strategic andcomparable toJohn RAWLS’s concept of“political liberalism.” liberalism,” Therepolitical liberalism”is incoherent, as KYMLICKA claims it is, then so fore, if RAWLS’s “ strategic liberalism.” ishisown“ However, coherence isless important forKATSURAGI ; andhe finds that “strategic liberalism”maywell be a workable workab[ility]” than “ theory. This leads KATSURAGI to wonder if KYMLICKA is too optimistic about the

Introduction

11

possibility ofsocial stability inmulticultural societies, since heappears toassume that social stability isensured solely bythewillingness ofminorities toparticipate inthelarger

community. HIRAI Ryosuke also draws a comparison between KYMLICKA’s theory and political liberalism.”He goes on to argue that KYMLICKA’s theory needs Rawlsian “ further “ justice should notbe defined prior topolitics, butrather politicalization,” since “ within a process of political deliberation.”Hirai also notes that his commitment to intheLecture, which suggests thathistheory lost” comprehensive liberalism hasbeen“ wasinternally inconsistent fromthebeginning. KYMLICKA’s original commitment tothe whenhe discussed issues of illiberal lost” value of individual autonomy wasalready “ minorities in Chapter 8 of Multicultural Citizenship.

Some of the other commentators do not share KYMLICKA’s liberal viewpoints. In twocommentators discuss the idea ofnation-building that, inthe Lecture as wellas inhis other recent writings, is central to KYMLICKA’s theory. According to him, individual freedom isdependent uponthepresence ofa “ societal culture,” which, inturn, is created andmaintained through modern nation-building projects. Minority rights are required toenable national minorities toengage innation-building projects oftheir own. particular,

INADA Yasuaki worries inhiscommentary about the repressive effects ofnationbuilding projects. According to INADA, although protective measures forminorities are needed, allclaims ofidentity ordifference mustbeapproached withcaution, since any group identity tends tounderstate internal diversity andoverstate external differences. which has, like Janus, twofaces” Withrespect to nation-building, INADA notes that it“ extends freedom andequality to areinseparable fromeachother: while its“bright side” suppresses national minorities. Thus, as a postmodern critic, allcitizens, its“darkside” INADA agrees with KYMLICKA’s approach to minority rights onlyto the extent that his

canbe seen as a kindof“strategic essentialism.” Bycontrast, MORIMURA Susumu favors pre-modern empires coupled withthe idea of human rights andrule of law. Asa libertarian, he finds these empires more attractive thanmodern nation-states, since theydonotimpose anyparticular culture on

theory

the individuals within them. While MORIMURA agrees with KYMLICKA that the ethnocultural neutrality ofa state cannot berealized completely, heargues thatitshould nonetheless serve as a regulative ideal that “ wecannot reach butshould aspire to.” Using official languages as anexample, MORIMURA demonstrates thata state cannot beethnoculturally neutral ineffect, butitcanbesoinreason. Healsorefers inthis regard

tothedistinction between internal restrictions andexternal protections, which KYMLICKA

as an ideal despite the fact that this distinction cannot be realized completely either. Another critic of KYMLICKA’s theory is OZAKI Ichiro. In line with critical race theorists and critical feminist theorists, OZAKI ponders whether the concepts and principles of minority rights are inherently majority-oriented, suchthat they still make Heis also concerned about weak, insulted andmiserable.” minority individuals feel “ social stability, andponders whether minorities demand inclusion intothelarger society only reluctantly. OZAKI queries whether thetoleration of illiberal minorities byliberal majorities, which involves giving incentives forinternal liberal reforms, isanexample of “ soft paternalism,”which insults minority people in their “ pride, identity, and selfrespect.” The question ofwhether KYMLICKA’s theory of minority rights applies to Japan is taken up by the last two commentaries. firmly holds

12

ISHIYAMA Fumihiko

HASEGAWA Ko raises, inter alia, the issue of individualism in the context of collective rights” is unhelpful as collective rights. While KYMLICKA claims that the term“ group-differentiated citizenship,”including the rights of a label for diverse forms of “ national minorities, HASEGAWA asks how the rights of indigenous peoples can be derived within a framework based on individualism. KYMLICKA infers that this is possible; butHASEGAWA points outthat itwould notbe easy. HASEGAWA attempts to illustrate the difficulty of such an exercise with reference to a Japanese court decision involving the Ainu people, an indigenous minority in Japan. MOURI Yasutoshi asks howKYMLICKA’s theory could beextended toapply tothe Korean national minority inJapan. According toMOURI, whenextending histheory to that takes into account their unique non-Western societies, a “ deepening strategy” slimming-down strategy” that sets characteristics should be adopted, rather than a “ aside thedifferences between Western andnon-Western societies. MOURI argues that members of the Korean minority in Japan should not be seen as what KYMLICKA since itisinadequate toregard citizenship as a bundle ofrights; that metics,” defines as “ society as a network of interactions among this theory should incorporate a viewof “ people.” Assuch, MOURI believes that if KYMLICKA’s theory were applied to the Korean minority inJapan, itwould first benecessary toexplore thesense inwhich those individuals are members ofJapanese society as a whole. KYMLICKA devotes nearly half of his reply to the commentaries to explaining the relation between the Lecture andhisearlier theory ofminority rights. KYMLICKA explains thatthe Lecture andhisoriginal theory are the results oftwo distinct projects. Theearlier theory wasanattempt todevelop a ‘distinctly liberal’theory to identify theoutlines whereas the Lecture represents“anattempt “ ofminority rights,” ofa potential international consensus onminority rights thatcanbe supported byboth These correspond to the two liberals andtheir communitarian or collectivist critics.” develop minority rights tasks that hebelieves liberals areconfronted with: namely, to“ andto “ strengthen or norms that will protect minorities from nation-building states,” extend existing human rights norms tobetter protect individuals fromilliberal treatment Itisimportant tonotethat, bygovernments (whether majority orminority governments).” andcombining them is a separate,” according to KYMLICKA, those twotasks are “ “ dangerous strategy.”While the latter task is directed toward a long-term goal, he believes that liberals can–andshould –undertake theformer task inthe meantime. KYMLICKA thus makes itclear thattheattempt heundertook inthe Lecture does

notconstitute anabandonment of his earlier commitment to liberalism, andthat such commitment was not intended to be solely to Western societies. Inthis context, he further explains his understanding of the complicated relationship between his own political liberalism.” Inaddition, he comments theory andJohn RAWLS’s theory of “ briefly onthemerits oftaking a liberal approach tominority rights, as corn-pared toother approaches such as libertarianism, postmodernism, andcritical theory. KYMLICKA concludes his reply with comments onliberal neutrality andthe role of citizenship in achieving equal membership ina society. Thisvolume onlytakes a preliminary steptowards answering thequestions setforth above. However, bydemonstrating howdiverse the issues associated withthis topic are, it will hopefully invite many fruitful discussions.

Will KYMLICKA

Universal Minority Rights? The Prospects for Consensus 1. Introduction1

Itis a great honour tobeinvited togivetheKobe Lecture, andtopresent myideas on andnationalism toa Japanese audience. I hope thatthis Lecture will beofinterest andrelevance toanAsian audience. However, Ishould acknowledge right awaythattheorigins ofmyreflections onthese issues lieinCanada, andIsuspect that theCanadian experience continues toshape andinfluence mytheorizing, perhaps even inways that I amunaware of. Likemanyother Canadian liberals, Iwaspuzzled bythepersistence ofethnocultural conflicts inmycountry, andwanted tounderstand more bothabout thenature ofthese conflicts andabout what constitutes a fair or just settlement of them. So I tried to understand therationale underlying theclaims ofminority groups inCanada, andtosee which of these claims could be accommodated within a liberal theory of justice and multiculturalism

democracy. This is the origin of the l iberal theory of minority rights”which I developed in “ Liberalism, Community andCulture andMulticultural Citizenship. Whenwriting these books, Itried towiden myfocus toexamine thesituation ofother countries, starting with ourneighbour the United States, andthen other Western democracies. Canadians often imagine that they are unique in facing ethnocultural tensions, but I quickly discovered thatmanyother democracies inNorth America andWestern Europe faced similar issues. Andreflecting onthe experience ofother Western democracies helped metoidentify certain recurring patterns andstructures ofethnocultural relations, andto identify the sorts of issues that anytheory of minority rights must address. Myworktodate, therefore, isbestdescribed asa “ Western liberal theory ofminority . I have attempted to explore the shared experience ofWestern democracies rights” regarding ethnocultural relations, particularly regarding immigrant multiculturalism and minority nationalism. I believe that there are important commonalities intheWestern experience, andthat Western democracies canlearn fromeach other about howto respect ethnocultural diversity, andhowtomanage itina peaceful, democratic andjust manner. Butcanthis approach be extended further, tocountries inother parts oftheworld, withtheir owndistinctive history, political traditions andcivilization? I must confess that, whenwriting mybooks, Ididnotresearch indepth thesituation ofcountries inSouth or EastAsia, theMiddle East, Latin America, Africa, orthenewly-democratizing countries inpost-Communist Europe orCentral Asia. However, Ihavebeenpleasantly surprised bythe amount of attention myworkhas received around the world –including this andthis has encouraged meto explore thewider applicability of invitation toJapan! – my approach.

1

dlike tothank IVRJapan, andProf. Morigiwa Yasutomo andIshiyama Fumihiko inparticular, forthe I’ topresent this Lecture. Mythoughts onthis topic were initially stimulated byDr.Baogang s article: “ Can Kymlicka’s Theory of Minority Rights be Applied in East Asia?”(He 1998). I’d like He’ invitation

tothank Dr.Heforsending mehispaper, andforseveral helpful suggestions andcomments onthe paper. Forexcellent research assistance, I’ dlike tothank IdilBoran. Thanks also toDaniel A.Bell, Roland Pierik, Chandran Kukathas, Fernard DeVarennes andSue Donaldson forhelpful suggestions.

14

Will KYMLICKA

This Lecture isa preliminary stepinthatexploration, focusing inparticular onSouth andEast Asia.2 Myaimis todescribe (orperhaps more accurately, toredescribe) my approach insucha waythatwillmake iteasier tojudge which parts ofthetheory may

be applicable to non-Western countries. I will highlight what I take to be the key assumptions and preconditions which underlie the approach, and will suggest, in a tentative way,which ofthese assumptions andpreconditions are potentially ofwider application. Therelevance ofWestern models ofminority rights tonon-Western countries isnot justa matter ofacademic curiosity. AsIdiscuss insection 4, there isgrowing pressure for the codification of minority rights in international law. Many people would like to formulate a “ , tosupplement the 1948 Universal universal declaration ofminority rights” Declaration of Human Rights. Steps towards this goal have been taken at the United Nations andother international bodies andNGOs. Andjustasthe1948 Declaration has beendescribed (andcriticized) as universalizing a distinctly Western model ofhuman rights, so tootheemerging models ofminority rights under discussion ininternational bodies tendtobebased onWestern experiences. Ifthese pressures forcodification of minority rights aresuccessful, Western conceptions ofminority rights maybecome, not simply models thatother countries arefree toeither reject oraccept, butrather binding international principles that are imposed oncountries. Theinternational community isstill struggling withtherepercussions ofthefactthat Asian andAfrican countries hadlittle input into the formulation ofthe 1948 Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights. Today, wearemoresensitive totheneedforaninclusive approach to international law,anditis unlikely that anynewinternational declarations onminority rights could be formulated without theactive participation ofnon-Western countries. Butthere is still thetendency, bothinacademic theory andininternational law,totreat Western models as thenorm. Itis important, therefore, tothink clearly and carefully about the extent to which Western models of minority rights are applicable dialogue onminority rights.3 This Lecture inter-civilizational” elsewhere, andtostart an“ is intended as a small step inthat direction.

2. Can Western Theories of Rights be Universalized? There are manyreasons forbeing sceptical about universalizing Western models of rights, whether theybetraditional human rights theories ornewminority rights theories. Butthere is oneobjection inparticular which standardly arises whenever the issue is individualistic” societies ofthe West raised: namely, that theories developed forthe “ communitarian”societies of Asia or Africa. This is the cannot apply in the more “ objection I wanttoexplore indepth inthis Lecture. According tothis objection, Western societies share a common cultural heritage of therational autonomous individual” worshipping “ . This heritage is rooted inPlato and Aristotle, the Judeo-Christian tradition, Descartes, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, Luther andthe Protestant Reformation, the French andAmerican Revolutions

2 3

Inanother recent workI examine

2001b).

minority rights issues

in Eastern andCentral Europe

(Kymlicka

Onuma Yasuaki hasargued foran“ approach tohuman rights (Onuma 1997), and intercivilizational” there hasindeed beena vibrant cross-cultural dialogue onhuman rights inthelastdecade (e.g., AnNa’ imandDeng1990; An-Na’im1992; Bauer andBell1999). There hasbeenmuchless ofa crosscultural dialogue onminority rights.

Universal Minority Rights? The Prospects for Consensus

15

andthe Rights of Man. Perhaps itis possible to develop a theory of minority rights which applies toallWestern societies, given thatpeople’s beliefs andexpectations about the goodlife andthegoodsociety are shaped bythis cultural legacy ofWestern individualism. But surely any theory which is formed in this cultural milieu cannot apply to societies which areshaped bymorecommunalist traditions ofConfucian, Islam, Shinto, Hindu, Buddhist,

orindigenous

spirituality.

Thisobjection hasbeenraised mostvisibly intheEastAsian context, where several political leaders andintellectuals argue that the Confucian heritage ofthe region has resulted ina set of“ which arecommunal orcommunitarian, andatodds Asian values” withWestern liberalism. Indeed, theSingapore government declared in1989that“ comis one ofthefourdefining national “core values” munitarianism” , along withfamilism, consensual decision-making, and social and religious harmony (Beng-Huat 1997). Given this profound cultural difference between East andWest, it is unrealistic and

inappropriate to apply Western theories of minority rights to East Asia. Indeed, isn’t there a sortofpragmatic self-contradiction intrying toapply a theory sowidely: howcan atheory dedicated torespecting cultural diversity besoignorant ordismissive ofthevast cultural differences between East andWest, orNorth andSouth? This is a serious objection that deserves ananswer. Oneanswer is to reject the assumption thatthere areprofound cultural differences between WestandEast. Many scholars have disputed any homogenizing or essentialist account of the cultural communitarian East”andan “ differences between a “ individualistic West” . After all, there are great variations within the West inits levels orforms of individualism. For example, Greece is much less individualistic than the United States, and is often communitarian”society (Triandis 1995). Andif we look at subgroups considered a “ including indigenous peoples orreligious sects – wecanfind within Western countries – well-established islands ofcommunitarian ways oflife eveninthemostindividualistic

ofWestern societies. Moreover, weshouldn’t ignore thepresence ofimportant communitarian strands in Western history, witnessed bythestrength ofnationalism, patriotism, religious communities, fascism, communism andtherecent emergence ofaself-described “ communitarian intheUnited States. Liberal individualism isbutonestrand – movement” andnotalways the mostpowerful –ofWestern thought. Indeed, Michael Walzer says that communitarianism andliberalism are inextricably tied to each other inthe West, with periodic communitarian reactions tothe excesses ofliberal individualism, andliberal reactions tothe constraints ofcommunitarianism (Walzer 1990).

So the West is not monolithically “individualistic”: the level of individualism varies between groups within a country, between different countries, andovertime. Andof course the same is true of Asia. Some Asian countries (e.g., Korea) are more communitarian thanothers (e.g., India); within particular countries, some subgroups (e.g., Indians inMalaysia) aremoreindividualistic thanothers (e.g., theindigenous Dayaks). Moreover, as intheWest, there have been recurring cycles ofliberal-minded thinkers and reformers within Asia: from 17th-century Chinese neo-Confucian liberals like Postwar Enlightenment”liberals like Huang Tsung-hsi to 20th-century Japanese “ Masao Maruyama.4 AsTatsuo Inoue puts it, the division between individualism and notbetween West andAsia butwithin each ofthem” (Inoue communitarianism runs “ 1999).

4

Fora discussion ofthese twofigures, see Inoue 1999andlida 1997 respectively. Asother examples ofliberal orproto-liberal elements ofAsian culture, Inoue mentions theBuddhist idea of“pravrajya” movement. Sufism” (leaving home), andthe Islamic “

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This sortofessentializing talkisnotonlyinaccurate, itisalsosubject todangerous manipulation. IntheWest, ithasencouraged theviewthatEastandWestnotonlyform , butare inherently incompetition. Onthis “ civilizations” clash ofcivilizations” different “ view, gains to Asia are a threat to the West, so that the success ofthe West requires keeping Asian countries weak(e.g. Huntington 1993). InEastAsia, a similar rhetoric is invoked intheopposite direction byauthoritarian elites tosuppress dissent: elites claim reforms, suchas therights ofworkers Western” thatdissenters whoseektoencourage “ tojoinunions, orfreedom ofthepress, area “threat” tothemoral fabric ofAsian societies (Inoue 1999). Forthese andother reasons, weshould besceptical about over-simplified andovergeneralized comparisons between “ Western individualism”and “ Asian communita. We should challenge those in Asia whoview individualism as a “foreign” rianism” influence which threatens the local communitarian culture (andthose intheWestwho viewcommunitarianism as a foreign threat tothelocal culture). This is onewayto answer critics ofWestern models of rights. Inthis Lecture, however, Iwanttotrya different, butcomplementary, tack. Iwanttoask:whatifcommunioftheSingapore people, orofsome other EastAsian core value” tarianism really is a “ country? What difference would that make to debates about universalizing minority rights? Would that mean that Western models of minority rights are inapplicable to Singapore? AreWestern models ofminority rights grounded inthesortofindividualistic premises which communitarian societies reject? I think that the issue of individualism andcommunitarianism cannot be entirely avoided, particularly bythose whoare interested inthe universalizability of minority whofeelthatWestern rights. There are manypeople inAsia today –notjust elites – individualistic” , andthat a more communitarian liberal conceptions of rights are too “ approach is better suited totheir context. This sentiment appears particularly strong in some East Asian countries influenced byConfucian traditions, butis present inother non-Western contexts as well. Thestrength ofthis sentiment is manifested inthefact that even reformers whodemand democracy orcivil rights often doso onthe basis of communitarian arguments about the common good and national unity, rather than liberal arguments about individual autonomy.5 Moreover, social scientists have indeed found impressive evidence that some Western societies are more individualistic than some Asian societies (Triandis 1995).6 These differences maybe more a matter of degree thanofkind; ormorea matter ofcyclical variations rather thanstatic essences; ormorea matter ofperception thanreality. Butthefactremains thatsomepeople inAsia andAfrica see individualism as a Western import that isforeign totheir wayoflife, and a threat totheir more “communitarian”culture. Andinsomecountries, suchpeople are powerful, andhelp guide public policy. The picture of East Asia as a communitarian region maybe partly mythical andmanipulative, butit is widespread, andinfluences public debates, including debates about minority rights. Forso longas this isthecase, wecannot expect togetanunforced international consensus onanytheory ofminority rights which rests ondistinctively individualistic assumptions ofthesortwhich underlie Western liberalism.

5 6

Daniel Bellargues thatthis is true ofChinese dissidents, eventhose inexile inEurope orAmerica (Bell 1999). Ofcourse, evenwhere these differences exist, theyshould notbeseenas immutable. Ernest Gellner implies such a view when he says that liberal democracy is the West’s “ historical destiny” , while the states. Fora critique ofGellner, see Inoue communal developmentalist” destiny ofAsia istohave “

1999.

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So forthe purposes ofthis Lecture, I wantusto imagine a society which is –orat least perceives itself to be –communitarian. Myquestion is: cana theory of minority rights originally developed forWestern democracies beacceptable toa society where this sortofcommunitarian sentiment isstrong, notjustamong elites, butalso among the broader public, andinminority groups? There maybefewcountries thatactually fitthis

description. However, given the prominence of the individualism/communitarianism issue indebates about universalizing rights, itis important toexplore whether Western models of minority rights would be acceptable to societies which are (orwhich see themselves as) communitarian. So let’s imagine, exhypothesi, that oneormore East Asian countries are indeed genuinely communitarian. Or, more modestly, let’s assume that if we placed all countries of the world on a individualism-communitarianism continuum, then one or more East Asian countries would be closer tothecommunitarian endofthespectrum thantheaverage Western democracy. Howwillthis affect issues ofminority rights? Will “ communitarian”countries disagree with “ individualistic”countries on appropriate international standards of minority rights? That is the basic question I wantto address inthis Lecture. Toforeshadow my conclusion, I believe that one’s location onthe individualism/communitarianism continuum affects some issues ofminority rights butnotothers. Onsome issues, therefore, wecanhopetogetaninternational consensus onappropriate minority rights standards, acceptable tobothindividualistic andcommunitarian societies; onother issues, debates between individualists andcommunitarians are likely to make consensus difficult. Toexplain this conclusion, Ineedtosaya bitabout myowntheory ofminority rights. Ithastwomaincomponents: first, anaccount ofjustice between ethnocultural groups, which emphasizes the need for minorities to have certain protections against the external protections” ); andsecond, anaccount exercise ofmajority power (what Icall“ ofjustice within ethnocultural groups, which emphasizes thatindividual members ofthe minority group should notbe restricted intheir freedom to question andrevise group ). I have argued that a liberal internal restrictions” traditions andpractices (what I call “ theory of minority rights can accept many external protections that protect minority groups fromtheexercise ofmajority power, butcannot accept manyinternal restrictions thatlimit thescope fordissent andreform within a group. Myslogan tosummarize these equality two halves of the theory is that a liberal theory of minority rights requires “ (Kymlicka 1995:152). between groups, andfreedom within groups” Itis the first half ofthe theory –the account ofjustice between ethnocultural groups –that I think has a realistic chance of international consensus. Personally, I amalso i.e., tothedefense ofindividual freedom within groups committed tothesecond half– (including the freedom to exit groups). As a liberal, I care deeply about individual freedom. ButI recognize that mybelief inthe importance of individual freedom and autonomy will be disputed in communitarian societies. Some societies place great weight onduties tofamily, community andculture, which make exitfromgroups more difficult, and which reduce the scope for individual choice within groups. They mayalso place great weight onthevirtues ofpiety, deference toauthority, andthehonouring of ancestral traditions, which limit the scope fordissent andreform within groups. They mayalso be more willing to accept paternalism insocial relationships, andso grant greater power to parents over children, teachers over students, or employers over employees, thana liberal society would accept. Forexample, some Muslim societies maywishtoimpose legal penalties onthose whowishtoabandon the Muslim faith; some Confucian societies maywishtoimpose legal penalties onthose whoabandon their elderly parents; other societies maywishto

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pass lawswhich restrict blasphemy against theculture’s traditional deities. Ipersonally regret these sorts ofmeasures, butI recognize thattheyplaya long-standing (though often contested) role insome non-Western societies, andwillnotbevoluntarily given upintheforeseeable future. Given this fact, there is norealistic chance ofgetting an unforced consensus internationally onthe illegitimacy ofsuch internal restrictions. Having saidthis, there canandshould be some limits onsuchinternal restrictions. Forexample, itis onething tosaythat Muslims whoabandon their faith lose the right tobequeath their property; itisquite another tosaythatMuslims whoabandon their faith should beexecuted. Itis onething todiscourage married women fromworking outside the home by paying or promoting them less than men; it is another thing to say that married women canbe raped orbeaten bytheir husbands withimpunity. Theformer are thesorts ofinternal restrictions onwhich liberals andcommunitarians willdisagree; the latter arethesortofviolations ofbasic human rights which I hopewecanallagree are

unacceptable. So Iwillnotrelyhere onthedistinctly liberal principle thatthere should beminimal restrictions onindividual freedom within ethnocultural groups. While Istrongly endorse this principle, Irecognize thatitisunlikely tobeaccepted innon-Western societies that seethemselves ascommunitarian. Indeed, since communitarian values maybeshared byboththeminority andmajority insome non-Western societies, this particular feature ofmytheory ofminority rights maybeas objectionable totheminority as tothemajority. Myfocus, therefore, isonthepotential forconsensus onthefirst halfofmytheory: namely, theaccount ofjustice between ethnocultural groups, andinparticular theneed forcertain “ which reduce thevulnerability ofminority groups tothe external protections” economic, political ormilitary power ofthe majority. (From henceforth, therefore, when I speak of “minority rights” , I will mean external protections which regulate relations between minority andmajority, notinternal restrictions which regulate relations between a group andits ownmembers). Myquestion, then, is: dominorities innon-Western states needthesame sorts ofexternal protections against majority power thatminorities inWestern states need? Forexample, dotheTibetans needthesame sorts ofminority rights vis-à-vis the majority Hanin China as the Québécois claim vis-à-vis the majority anglophones inCanada? DotheAinuinJapan needthe same sorts ofminority rights vis-à-vis

the majority as Aborigines inAustralia?

Why do I think that this part of mytheory is potentially more likely to be accepted internationally thanthepartconcerned withinternal restrictions? There aretworeasons. First, I believe that minorities incommunitarian societies often face manyofthesame threats to their interests and identities as minorities in individualistic societies. The existence ofthese threats is due, I willargue below, tothe nature of modern nationprograms thattheyengage in.Nation-building states, andtothesortof“ nation-building” programs take different forms inindividualistic societies andcommunitarian societies,

yet in both cases the threats to minorities maybe similar. Whatever the cultural differences between East andWest, Asia is partofthesame world system ofmodern nation-states as Europe andNorth America, andit is inthe nature of modern nationstates to politicize culture inways that potentially harmandthreaten minorities. Buteven ifthethreats are similar, onwhatbasis doI saythatthese threats form injustices that need to be remedied or prevented through minority rights? Does this reflect a distinctively Western conception ofrights orjustice notshared bythose who havea morecommunitarian outlook? Thisiswhatsomepeople inEastAsiaclaim (e.g., He1998). Theyargue thatminority rights maymakesense within a Western conception ofjustice, butconflict withthe underlying communitarianism of East Asian societies.

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Itisnotclear tome,however, whytheclaim ofinjustice rests ondistinctively Western values, rather thanmorewidely shared values ofreciprocity anddecency found inboth Western andEastern cultures. Whenminorities inEast Asia object to coercive assimilation, theyoften doso notinthe name ofliberal autonomy, butinthe name ofcommunitarian values, suchas respecting their elders, honouring their ancestors, obeying traditional authorities, and fulfilling cultural duties. It is precisely these communitarian values that are violated byattempts at coercive assimilation. When minorities seek group autonomy, therefore, they are not necessarily disputing the communitarian values ofpiety andrespect, butrather seeking somefairness andreciprocity intheway these values are implemented. These, inbrief, are myreasons forthinking thatitisa worthwhile project toconsider theapplication of(one aspect of)mytheory ofminority rights tonon-Western communitarian countries: (a)minorities face similar threats fromnation-building states, whether these areindividualistic orcommunitarian states; (b)these threats canbeseenas unjust bybothindividualists andcommunitarians, since theyviolate basic norms ofreciprocity. It would be impossible, in the space of this Lecture, to defend these two points in depth, letalone to apply themto particular examples ofmajority-minority relations. All Icandoistogesture atsomeoftheissues that Ithink aremostrelevant tothedebate. Inthe nexttwosections, therefore, Iwillfocus on:(a)theways inwhich Western democracies are nation-building states (section 3); (b)whyminorities inWestern democracies feelthreatened bythese processes ofnation-building, andhowclaims tominority rights reflect a predictable response to these threats (section 4). Ineach case, I will suggest that parallels can be drawn with Asian states: wefind similar processes of nation-building inAsia, andwe can find minorities whofeel threatened insimilar sorts ofways, andrespond bydemanding similar sorts ofminority rights (section 5). These next three sections are thus descriptive: I will be describing howstates behave, andhowminorities respond. Insections 6 and7, Iwillshift towards more normative issues: howshould weevaluate thejustice ofthese minority claims? Inparticular, I will ask whether communitarian societies will evaluate these claims in a different manner fromliberal societies. I willsuggest thatthe realissue is neither individualism norcommunitarianism, butmore basic norms offairness andreciprocity. external protections” Onefinal preliminary point. I havetalked about theneedfor“ toprevent injustices which canarise fromthe exercise ofmajority power. IntheWest, , which isindeed whatIhave minority rights” these external protections areoften called “ maynotbe minority rights” called them in myprevious work. Butthis language of “ appropriate forcommunitarian societies, since itimmediately brings tomindadversarial procedures andjusticiable legal rights. Communitarian societies might putless emphasis onadversarial procedures orjusticiable legal rights forthe protection of minority interests, andmore onpublic education andconsensus-building negotiations.7 Anda communitarian society mayprefer to describe these policies andinstitutions, notas “ , orevensimply as policies oftoleration minority rights” , butrather as “minority policy” andcooperation.8 Itisnotimportant, frommypoint ofview, howexactly minority groups are protected fromthe unjust exercise of majority power: what matters is simply that 7 8

Onwaystoprotect thesubstantive

human interests underlying human rights without using theliberal , see Pogge 1995; Onuma 1997: 4; Taylor 1996. Butsee Inoue 1999, whoargues rights” language of“ that legally enforceable rights are notinconsistent withcommunitarian values. race relations”policy achieves a significant degree of This is also true of Britain, where the “ . See Favell 1998. It is notjust minority rights” ethnocultural justice, while eschewing the language of “ . rights-talks” Eastern societies which are sceptical ofthedistinctly American preoccupation with“

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these injustices do notoccur. So myargument is that ethnocultural justice requires reliable external protections forminorities. Whether these taketheformof(codified and is a separate matter, onwhich societies willlegiminority rights” legally justiciable) “ timately differ.

3. Nation-States and Nation-Building States

Weallknowthattheterm‘nation-state’ismisleading. There aresome 190independent states intheworld today, butmostcommentators agree thatthere are upward of5000– 8000 distinct ‘nations’. Simple arithmetic dictates that most states (atthe moment over 90%) are inevitably going tobe shared bymorethanonenational group, andoften by

dozens.

Andyet, inanother sense, theterm‘nation-state’isapt,since itdescribes a crucial aspiration ofmodern states. Modern states typically aspire tobenation-states, andhave adopted various nation-building programs toachieve greater national integration and homogeneity. Theymaynotbe nation-states, butmodern states are certainly nationnationalizing” states (Brubaker 1996, building states, orwhat Rogers Brubaker calls “

4). chap. 3– This claim is controversial, particularly amongst Western liberals, whothink that Western democracies have renounced andtranscended the needfornationalism and nation-building. Nation-building, they suggest, may be the goal of illiberal nationalists inEastern Europe ortheThird World, butWestern democracies have relinquished any

suchaspiration.

This is an important misperception that needs to be cleared up.ManyWestern liberals insist thata liberal state, inits normal operation, abides bya principle ofethnocultural neutrality. Thatis,thestate is‘neutral’withrespect totheethnocultural identities of its citizens, andindifferent tothe ability ofethnocultural groups to reproduce themselves overtime. Onthis view, liberal states treat culture inthe same wayas religion – i.e., as something which people should befree topursue intheir private life, butwhich is nottheconcern ofthestate (so longas people respect the rights ofothers). Just as liberalism precludes the establishment of an official religion, so too there cannot be official cultures thathavepreferred status overother possible cultural allegiances (e.g.

1). Walzer 1992: 100– In reality, however, this idea that liberal-democratic states are ethnoculturally neutral ismanifestly false, bothhistorically andconceptually. Thereligion model isaltogether misleading as an account of the relationship between the liberal-democratic state andethnocultural groups. Consider theactual policies oftheUnited States, which istheallegedly prototypically ‘neutral’state. Firstly, it is a legal requirement forchildren to learn the English language inschools. Secondly, itis a legal requirement forimmigrants (under theage of50)tolearn the English language toacquire American citizenship. Thirdly, itis a de facto requirement foremployment inorforgovernment thattheapplicant speak English. Fourthly, decisions about the boundaries ofstate governments, andthetiming oftheir admission into the federation, were deliberately made to ensure that anglophones would be a majority within eachofthefifty states oftheAmerican federation.9 These policies regarding thelanguage ofeducation andgovernment employment, therequirements ofcitizenship, andthedrawing ofinternal boundaries, areprofoundly 9

Fora detailed discussion ofthese fourpoints, see Kymlicka 2001a: chap. 5.

Universal Minority Rights?

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important. Theyarenotisolated exceptions tosomenormofethnocultural neutrality. On the contrary, they are tightly interrelated, andtogether they have shaped the very structure ofthe American state, andthe waythe state structures society. They have played a pivotal role indetermining which ethnolinguistic groups prosper, andwhich ones diminish. (Forexample, since governments account for30%-50% ofGNPinmost countries, decisions about thelanguage ofgovernment employment andcontracts are a major factor indetermining which language groups prosper andwhich diminish). These measures were alladopted withtheintention ofpromoting integration into whatIcalla “ societal culture” . Bya societal culture, I meana territorially-concentrated culture, centred ona shared language which is used ina wide range of societal in-

stitutions, in both public and private life (schools, media, law, economy, government, etc.). I call ita societal culture toemphasize that itinvolves a common language and social institutions, rather than common religious beliefs, family customs or personal lifestyles. Societal cultures within a modern liberal democracy are inevitably pluralistic, containing Christians as wellas Muslims, Jews andatheists; heterosexuals as wellas gays; urban professionals as wellas rural farmers; conservatives as wellas socialists.

Such diversity is the inevitable result ofthe rights andfreedoms guaranteed to liberal citizens –including freedom of conscience, association, speech, political dissent and rights to privacy –particularly when combined with an ethnically diverse population. TheAmerican government has deliberately promoted integration into sucha sothatis,ithasencouraged citizens toviewtheir life-chances astiedupwith cietal culture – participation incommon societal institutions thatoperate inthe English language. Nor istheUnited States unique inthis respect. Promoting integration intoa societal culture ispartofa ‘nation-building’project thatallliberal democracies haveengaged in.Indeed, manyother Western countries have beenmuchmoreaggressive andcoercive intheir attempts at nation-building. Obviously, the sense in which English-speaking Americans share a common “ culture” is a verythinone, since itdoes notpreclude differences inreligion, personal values, family relationships or lifestyle choices. While thin, it is far from trivial. On the contrary, as Idiscuss below, attempts tointegrate people intosucha common societal culture have often been metwithserious resistance. Some groups have vehemently rejected the idea that they should viewtheir life-chances as tied upwiththe societal institutions conducted inthe majority’s language. Soweneedtoreplace theideaofan‘ethnoculturally neutral’state witha newmodel ofa liberal democratic state –whatI callthe‘nation-building’model. While theidea of a culturally neutral state isa myth, this isnottosaythatgovernments canonlypromote onesocietal culture. Itispossible forgovernment policies toencourage thereproduction oftwoormoresocietal cultures within a single country –indeed, as Idiscuss below, this iswhatcharacterizes multination states like Canada, Belgium andSwitzerland. However, historically, virtually allliberal democracies have, atonepoint oranother, attempted todiffuse a single societal culture throughout alloftheir territory. Theyhave –that is,a process ofpromoting a comallengaged inthis process of“nation-building” monlanguage, anda sense ofcommon membership in,andequal access to,thesocial institutions based on that language.10 Decisions regarding official languages, core curriculum ineducation, andthe requirements foracquiring citizenship, allwere made 10 Fortheubiquity ofthisprocess, seeAnderson 1983. Switzerland isperhaps theonlyexception inthe West: its German-speaking majority didnotattempt to assimilate its francophone anditalophone minorities.

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of diffusing a particular culture throughout society, andof promoting a particular national identity based onparticipation inthat societal culture. Moreover, insome countries, these nation-building policies have been strikingly successful inextending a common societal culture throughout theentire territory ofthe state. Consider France orItaly. Whocould havepredicted in1750thatvirtually everyone within the current boundaries of France or Italy would share a common language and sense ofnationhood? Other paradigmatic ‘nation-states’intheWest include England andGermany. There areother countries, aswe’llsee inthenextsection, where certain minorities havestrongly andsuccessfully resisted nation-building policies. Butthequest to become a nation-state has been, andremains, a powerful one inmost Western withthe express intention

democracies.

Whyhas nation-building been so ubiquitous? This is a

profoundly important

question, butithasbeenalmost entirely ignored byliberal political theorists. Noneofthe major figures in the liberal tradition has engaged in a sustained discussion of the justification of nation-building policies, orof their permissible forms. Forexample, on whatbasis cana liberal state insist that immigrants learn the majority language as a condition ofcitizenship? Onelooks invainfora discussion ofthisorother nation-building policies in Locke, Kant, Mill, Popper, Rawls, or Dworkin. However, it is not difficult to see the motivation for nation-building. As Margaret the battery”which makes Western states run: the Canovan puts it, nationhood is “ existence of a common national identity motivates andmobilizes citizens to act for common political goals (Canovan 1996:80). Modern states needtobeable tomobilize what the state citizens inpursuit of a wide range of goals –as Cairns andWilliams putit, “ needs fromthecitizenry cannot besecured bycoercion, butonlycooperation andselfandnatio(Cairns andWilliams 1985:43) – restraint inthe exercise ofprivate power” of nabattery” nalism is oneofthe most effective means of mobilizing citizens. The“ tionalism canbeusedtopromote liberal goals (such as social justice, democratization, equality ofopportunity, economic development) orilliberal goals (chauvinism, xenophobia,militarism, andunjust conquest). Thefactthatthebattery ofnationalism canbeused forsomanyfunctions helps toexplain whyithasbeenso ubiquitous. Liberal reformers invoke nationhood to mobilize citizens behind projects ofsocial justice (e.g., comprehensive health care orpublic schooling); illiberal authoritarians invoke nationhood to mobilize citizens behind attacks onalleged enemies of the nation, be they foreign countries orinternal dissidents. This iswhynation-building isjust as common inauthoritarian regimes intheWestas indemocracies. Consider Spain under Franco, orGreece orLatin America under themilitary dictators. Authoritarian regimes also needa “battery” to helpachieve public objectives incomplex modern societies. Inshort, nation-building hasproven tobebothfeasible andfunctional intheWest. nation-state” hasbeenadopted by Itis notsurprising, therefore, thatthemodel ofthe“ manynon-Western countries as well, which have embarked ontheir ownnation-buildingprograms. InAsia, as intheWest, nation-building hasappealed tobothdemocratic reformers andauthoritarian conservatives, since it can be used to mobilize people behind a wide range ofpolitical projects. AndAsian governments have often usedthe same tools of nation-building as Western governments: regulating the language and content of education andpublic services; establishing a national media; controlling immigration

andnaturalization.11

80. See also section 6 below. 11 See, eg, Sheth 1989; Befu 1993; Qing 1997: 79–

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Onemight think thatAsian states areless prone tonation-building since fewer are democracies. Democracies must be sensitive to majority preferences, and since majority groups typically want to extend the reach of their language and culture, democracies face populist pressure fornation-building. Bycontrast, countries thatare notdemocratic can more easily ignore majority demands fornation-building, andbe more sensitive to minority claims. This indeed is what Lee KuanYewhas claimed regarding Singapore. Forexample, hisgovernment made English thedominant public language, eventhough 75%ofthe population is Chinese. Lee insists that democracy would have led to the adoption of Chinese as the dominant public language, with disastrous consequences: “ Supposing wehadchosen Chinese ortried tosponsor Chinese, howwould wemake a living? How could wefitourselves intotheregion andintotheworld? Andifwehadtaken thevote, wewould have had s childish rubbish. Weare leaders. We toadopt thatpolicy. So whenpeople say: Oh,askthepeople!’It’ knowtheconsequences... Theysaypeople ‘canthink forthemselves? Doyouhonestly believe thatthechap whocan’t pass primary sixknows theconsequences ofhischoice whenheanswers a question viscerally, onlanguage, culture andreligion? Butweknewtheconsequences. Wewould starve, wewould haveriots. Wewould disintegrate.”12

Singapore is an interesting example of a country that has suppressed majority nationalism as wellas minority nationalism. (Whether this has resolved ethnic conflict, orsimply postponed it,remains uncertain). Butitistheexception rather thantherule. Mostauthoritarian regimes inAsia, like mostauthoritarian regimes intheWest, have engaged inmajority nation-building: consider Burma/Myanmar, China, orthe Philippines under Marcos. Itmaybetruethatauthoritarian regimes can,inprinciple, ignore populist pressures more readily than democracies. Butit is a mistake, I think, to suppose that nationbuilding policies inthe West were adopted inresponse to populist pressure. Even in Western democracies, nation-building has almost always begun as an elite-initiated project, which onlylater became a matter ofpassion forthemasses. Farfrombeing the result of majoritarian preferences, nation-building policies were initially adopted by nationhood”amongst the elites precisely in order to create a cohesive sense of “ masses, whocould thenbe mobilized inpursuit ofvarious public objectives.13 And,as itapplies as much venoted, this needtomobilize citizens applies toallmodern states – I’ to authoritarian regimes as to democracies, andas muchto Asian countries as to Western countries. Thefactisthatstates today differ dramatically frompremodern orfeudal multiethnic empires. Inthe past, multiethnic empires were often content to simply let minorities alone, so long as they paid their taxes ortributes, obeyed the laws, andco-existed peacefully withother ethnic groups. Today, however, fewstates around theworld are content withthis sortofco-existence. Theywantminorities toexhibit a stronger sense of identification or loyalty with the state, so that they willactively participate andcooperate inthe projects ofthestate, bethey militaristic wars, economic modernization, orsocial justice. Andtogaintheactive support ofcitizens, states around theworld have adopted nation-building programs which aimtoturnco-citizens, bound onlyloosely to each other bycertain common laws andtaxes, into co-nationals, whoshare a strong bond invirtue of a common national identity anda common commitment to national projects. 12 Quoted in Kwang et al (1998), p. 134.

13 Onnation-building as anelite-initiated

phenomenon,

see Greenfeld 1992.

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4. Minority Responses toNation-Building

s assume thatthis nation-building model is indeed a moreaccurate account ofthe Let’ state thanthe neutrality model, both inthe West andEast. Howdoes this affect the claims of minorities? This is a complicated question, since nation-building programs impact differently on different types of groups. Letmestart withtheexperience ofWestern states, andthenconsider some possible analogies inAsia. AsCharles Taylor notes, theprocess ofnation-building inthe West inescapably privileges members ofthe majority culture: Ifa modern society hasan official’language, inthefullest sense oftheterm, thatis,astate-sponsored, andculture, in which both economy andstate function, then it is ‘ -inculcated, and -defined language obviously an immense advantage to people ifthis language andculture are theirs. Speakers ofother languages are at a distinct disadvantage (Taylor 1997: 34).

This means that minority cultures face a choice. Ifallpublic institutions are being runinanother language, minorities facethedanger ofbeing marginalized fromthemajor economic, academic, andpolitical institutions ofthe society. Faced withthis dilemma, minorities have (to oversimplify) three basic options: (i) they can accept integration into the majority culture, and perhaps attempt to renegotiate theterms ofintegration; (ii) theycanseekthesorts ofrights andpowers ofself-government needed tomaintain their ownsocietal culture –i.e., tocreate their owneconomic, political andeducational institutions intheir ownlanguage. Thatis,theycanengage intheir ownform of competing nation-building; (iii) theycanaccept permanent marginalization. Wecanfindethnocultural groups intheWestthatfiteachofthese categories (and other groups that are caught between them). Forexample, some immigrant groups choose permanent marginalization. This would seemto be true of the Hutterites in Canada or the Amish inthe United States. Butthe option of accepting marginalization isonlylikely tobeattractive toreligious sects whose theology requires themtoavoid all contact withthe modern world. TheHutterites andAmish are unconcerned about their marginalization fromuniversities orlegislatures, since theyviewsuch ‘worldly’institutions as corrupt. Virtually allother ethnocultural minorities, however, seekto participate inthe modernworld, andtodoso,theymusteither integrate intothemajority society orseekthe self-government needed tocreate andsustain their ownmodern institutions. Faced with this choice, ethnocultural groups have responded indifferent ways. I willbriefly discuss three types ofethnocultural groups thatarefound within Western democracies: national minorities, immigrants, andmetics. Ineach case, I willdiscuss howthey have been affected bymajority nation-building, whatsorts ofminority rights claims theyhavemade inresponse to this nation-building. Inthe following sections, Iwilldiscuss howweshould evaluate these claims, andwhether individualistic societies are likely toevaluate them differently fromcommunitarian societies.

(a)National Minorities: Bynational minorities, Imeangroups thatformed complete and functioning societies ontheir historic homeland prior tobeing incorporated intoa larger state. National minorities canbesubdivided intotwocategories: “ stateless nations” and “ indigenous peoples” . Stateless nations arenations which donotcurrently have a state inwhich they are a majority –a state literally to call their own–butwhich may have had sucha state inthepast, orwhich mayhave sought sucha state. Theyfindthemselves

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sharing a state withother nations fora variety of reasons. They mayhave been conquered orannexed bya larger state orempire inthe past; ceded fromone empire to another; orunited withanother kingdom through royal marriage. Ina fewcases, multination states arise from a more or less voluntary agreement between twoor more national groups to forma mutually beneficial federation. Indigenous peoples are peoples whose traditional lands have been overrun by settlers, andwhohavethenbeenforcibly, orthrough treaties, incorporated into states runbypeople theyregard as foreigners. While other minority nations dream ofa status like nation-states, with similar economic and social institutions and achievements, indigenous peoples typically seek something rather different: the ability to maintain certain traditional waysoflife andbeliefs while nevertheless participating ontheir own terms inthe modern world. Inaddition totheautonomy needed toworkoutthat sort of project, indigenous peoples also typically require of the larger society a respect and recognition to begin to make amends forindignities theysuffered fordecades orcenturies as second-class citizens (oreven non-citizens orslaves). The contrast between indigenous peoples and other stateless nations is not precise, andthere is nouniversally agreed definition of‘indigenous peoples’. Oneway todistinguish stateless nations fromindigenous peoples intheWestern context isthat the former were contenders butlosers inthe process of European state-formation, whereas the latter were entirely isolated fromthat process until very recently, andso retained a pre-modern wayof life until wellinto this century. Stateless nations would have liked toformtheir ownstates, butlost inthe struggle forpolitical power, whereas indigenous peoples existed outside this system of European states. The Catalans, Puerto Ricans, Flemish, Scots andQuébécois, then, arestateless nations, whereas the Sami, Inuit and American Indians are indigenous peoples. In both North America and Europe, the consequences of incorporation have been much more catastrophic for indigenous peoples thanforother national minorities. However theywere incorporated, national minorities haveoften beenthefirst target of majority nation-building programs, since one of the typical aims of nation-building states istodenythatthere ismorethanone‘nation’within thestate. Toachieve this aim, nation-building states often seekto (a)persuade orcoerce national minorities tointegrate into the majority’s societal culture; and(b) undermine the minority’s ability to reproduce itsownsocietal culture (e.g., byreplacing itstraditional educational, political and legal institutions with majority-controlled institutions). As a general rule, national minorities have active resisted such nation-building policies, andhave fought instead to maintain their traditional institutions, andto reproducetheir ownsocietal culture. Andthis hasrequired, ineffect, thatminorities adopt their owncompeting nation-building. Indeed, theyoften seektousethesame tools thatthe e.g., theyseekcontrol overthelanguage majority usestopromote this nation-building – andcurriculum ofschooling intheir region ofthecountry, thelanguage ofgovernment employment, immigration andnaturalization policies, andthedrawing ofinternal boundaries. Wecansee this clearly inthecase ofFlemish orQuébécois nationalism, which have been concerned precisely with gaining and exercising these nation-building powers. Increasingly indigenous peoples in North America are also adopting the language of ‘nationhood’.14 In short, national minorities have typically sought to maintain or enhance their political autonomy. Atthe extreme, this mayinvolve claims tooutright secession, but

14 Ontheadoption ofthelanguage ofnationhood byAboriginal peoples, see Jenson 1993; Alfred 1995; RCAP 1996.

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more usually itinvolves some formof regional autonomy. Andtheytypically mobilize nationhood” to describe andjustify these along nationalist lines, using the language of “ demands forself-government. While the ideology of nationalism has typically seen fullfledged independence as the ‘normal’or natural’end-point, economic ordemographic ‘ national minorities. Moreover, thehistorical reasons maymakethis infeasible forsome ideal ofa fully sovereign state isoften saidtobeincreasingly obsolete intoday’s world ofglobalized economics andtransnational institutions. Hence there isa growing interest inexploring other forms ofself-government, suchas federalism. Howhave liberal-democracies responded to such minority nationalist claims? Historically, liberal democracies have tried to suppress minority nationalisms, often ruthlessly. Atvarious points inthe eighteenth andnineteenth centuries, forexample, France banned theuseoftheBasque andBreton languages inschools orpublications, andbanned anypolitical associations which aimed topromote minority nationalism; the British colonial officials in Canada stripped the Québécois of their French-language rights andinstitutions, andredrew political boundaries sothatfrancophones didnotform a majority inanyprovince; Canada also made itillegal forAboriginals toformpolitical associations topromote their national claims; andwhentheUnited States conquered the Southwest inthewarwithMexico in1848, itstripped the long-settled Hispanics of their Spanish-language rights andinstitutions, imposed literacy tests tomake itdifficult for them to vote, and encouraged massive immigration into the area so that the Hispanics would become outnumbered. Allof these measures were intended to disempower national minorities, andto eliminate anysense ofpossessing a distinct national identity. This wasjustified onthe ground thatminorities thatviewthemselves as distinct ‘nations’would bedisloyal, and potentially secessionist. Moreover, it wassaid that economic development required access tothelands andresources inthe minority’s traditional territory. Anditwasoften were backward andunciviparticularly indigenous peoples – claimed that minorities – lized, andthatitwasintheir owninterests tobeincorporated (even against their will) into more civilized andprogressive nations. National minorities, therefore, were often the first target of majority nation-building campaigns.15 Buttheattitude ofliberal democracies towards minority nationalism haschanged inthiscentury. Itisincreasingly recognized thatthesuppression ofminority nationalism wasmistaken. Theevidence shows thatpressuring national minorities tointegrate into thedominant national group hassimply notworked. Western states badly misjudged the durability ofminority national identities. Liberal democratic governments have, attimes, usedallthetools attheir disposal todestroy thesense ofseparate identity amongst their national minorities, from the prohibition of tribal customs to the banning of minoritylanguage schools. Butdespite centuries of legal discrimination, social prejudice, and indifference, national minorities have maintained thesense offorming distinct nations, andthedesire fornational autonomy. Asa result, whenthe state attacks a minority’s sense of distinct nationhood, the result is often to promote rather than reduce thethreat ofdisloyalty andsecessionist movements.16 Inthe experience ofWestern democracies, the best wayto ensure the loyalty of national minorities has been to accept, notattack, their sense of distinct nationality. 15 This raises the question captured nicely inthetitle ofWalker Connor’s famous article: are nation(Connor 1972). Intruth, theyareboth. Nation-states Nation-Building orNation-Destroying?” states “ have typically sought tobuild a common nationhood bydestroying anypreexisting sense ofdistinct nationhood onthepart ofnational minorities. 16 Forsurveys ofethnic conflict which confirm this point, see Gurr1993; Hannum 1990; Lapidoth 1996.

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This trend towards accommodation is visible inmost Western democracies that contain national minorities. Forexample, Canada adopted a federal system which gives the Québécois significant language rights andregional autonomy; the United States granted language rights anda special formofregional autonomy to Puerto Rico; both Canada andthe United States, andthe Scandinavian countries, have accorded selfgovernment rights to indigenous peoples; andBelgium, Spain andBritain have also moved recently inthe direction of giving regional autonomy to their national minorities. Inallof these countries, the goal of eliminating minority national identities has been abandoned, anditis nowaccepted thatthese groups willcontinue tosee themselves as separate andself-governing nations within thelarger state intotheindefinite future. Asa result, an increasing number of Western democracies that contain national . They nation-states” states, rather than “ multination” minorities accept that they are “ accept that they contain twoor more nations within their borders, andrecognize that each constituent nation has an equally valid claim to the language rights andselfgovernment powers necessary to maintain itself as a distinct societal culture. Andthis multinational character is often explicitly affirmed inthe country’s constitution. Anincreasing number ofmultination states arealso recognizing thatthese national rights arebest protected through someformoffederalism, since federalism allows the creation of regional political units, controlled bythe national minority, withsubstantial (and constitutionally protected) powers of self-government. What we see emerging multinational federalwithin several Western democracies, therefore, isa newformof“ –i.e., a model ofthestate as a federation ofregionally-concentrated peoples or ism” nations, inwhich boundaries have beendrawn, andpowers distributed, insucha way as to ensure that each national group is able to maintain itself as distinct andselfgoverning societal cultures.17

b)Immigrants: Byimmigrants, Imeangroups formed bythedecision ofindividuals and families toleave their original homeland andemigrate toanother society, often leaving their friends andrelatives behind. Thisdecision istypically madeforeconomic reasons, although sometimes also forpolitical reasons, to move to a freer or more democratic country. But it is essential to immediately distinguish twocategories of immigrants – those whohave the right tobecome citizens, andthose whodonot. Muchconfusion in theacademic literature, andthewider public debate, hasarisen fromconflating these onlyfortheformer case, andwilldiscuss twocases. Iwillusetheterm“immigrant group” , below. metics” the latter case, which I will call “ Immigrants, then, are people whoarrive under an immigration policy which gives 5 years themtheright tobecome citizens after a relatively short period oftime–say,3– –subject onlyto minimal conditions (e.g. learning theofficial language, andknowing something about the country’s history andpolitical institutions). This has been the in countries ofimmigration” traditional policy governing immigration inthethree major “ theWest–namely, United States, Canada, Australia. Historically, immigrant groups have responded very differently to majority nationbuilding than national minorities. Unlike national minorities, the option of engaging in competing nation-building hasbeenneither desirable norfeasible forimmigrant groups inWestern democracies. Theyaretypically toosmall andterritorially dispersed tohope to recreate their original societal culture fromscratch ina newcountry. Instead, they havetraditionally accepted theexpectation thattheywillintegrate intothelarger societal culture. Indeed, fewimmigrant groups haveobjected totherequirement thattheymust 17 Formoreonthetheory andpractice ofmultinational federalism, see Kymlicka 2001a, chap. 5.

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as a condition ofcitizenship, orthattheir children mustlearn

the official language in school. They have accepted the assumption that their lifechances, and even more the life-chances of their children, will be bound upwith

participation in mainstream institutions operating in the majority language. So immigrants have notresisted majority nation-building campaigns to integrate theminto the mainstream society. What immigrants have tried to do,however, is to renegotiate theterms ofintegration. Indeed, recent debates over“ multiculturalism” in immigrant countries are precisely about the terms of integration. Immigrants are approach to integration that would allow multicultural” demanding a more tolerant or“ andenable immigrants tomaintain various aspects oftheir ethnic heritage evenas they integrate intocommon institutions operating inthemajority language. Immigrants insist that they should be free to maintain some oftheir oldcustoms regarding food, dress, recreation, religion, andtoassociate witheachother tomaintain these practices. This should notbeseenas unpatriotic or‘unamerican’. Moreover, theinstitutions ofthelarger society should beadapted toprovide greater recognition andaccommodation ofthese e.g., schools andother public institutions should accommodate their ethnic identities – religious holidays, dress, dietary restrictions, andso on. Howhave liberal democracies responded to such demands forimmigrant multiculturalism? Hereagain, liberal democracies have historically resisted these demands. Anglo-conUntil the 1960s, all three of the major immigrant countries adopted an “ formity”model of immigration. Immigrants were expected to assimilate to existing cultural norms, and, overtime, become indistinguishable fromnative-born citizens in their speech, dress, leisure activities, cuisine, family size, identities, andso on.This strongly assimilationist policy was seen as necessary to ensure that immigrants become loyal andproductive members of society. However, beginning in the 1970s, it was increasingly recognized that this assimilationist model isunrealistic andunnecessary. Itisunrealistic because nomatter how much pressure to assimilate is applied, immigrants never fully lose their distinctive identities andpractices. Immigrants doindeed integrate into common institutions and learn the dominant language, butthey often remain visibly, andproudly, distinctive in their ethnic identities andattachments. Pressuring immigrants to assimilate is also unnecessary, since the evidence shows that immigrants whomaintain a strong sense ofethnic identity andpride cannonetheless be loyal andproductive citizens. Asa result, theassimilationist model hasincreasingly beenrejected infavour ofa model ofintegration, which accepts thepremise ofmajority nationmulticultural” more“ building, butwhich revises the terms of integration.18 Immigrants have sought and gained changes within mainstream institutions –schools, workplaces, courts, police forces, andwelfare agencies –so as to make iteasier to participate within these institutions. These institutions have been reformed so as toprovide greater recognition of immigrants’ethnocultural identities, andgreater accommodation oftheir ethnocultural practices, sothatimmigrants willfeelmoreat homeinthese institutions. Thus schools nowprovide more information about theimmigrant experience; workplaces nowaccommodate immigrants’religious holidays ortraditional dresses; government agencies nowprovide health care andwelfare benefits ina waythatisculturally sensitive; andso

on.

Tobesure, liberal states continue toexpect immigrants tolearn thedominant lanas a condition ofgaining citizenship, aswellas something about thehistory and political institutions oftheir newsociety. Similarly, liberal democracies continue toinsist

guage

18 Fora more detailed defense ofthis claim, see Kymlicka 1998.

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thatthechildren ofimmigrants learn these things inschool. Infact, veryfewimmigrants within Western democracies oppose these requirements. Whenimmigrants demand multiculturalism, they are not rejecting the idea that they andtheir children have a responsibility tolearn about thelarger society, orthatthelarger society hasaninterest

ininstilling inchildren the sorts of knowledge andcapacities needed fordemocratic

citizenship.

In this sense, immigrant multiculturalism is not seen as competing with, or a substitute for,citizenship, butas theflipside ofcitizenship. Itisa recognition ofthefact that the integration of newcitizens is a two-way street. Just as immigrant citizens are expected to make a commitment totheir newsociety, andtolearn about its language, history and institutions, so too the larger society must express a commitment to its immigrant citizens, and adapt its institutions to accommodate their identities and practices. Justas immigrant citizens areexpected tomakea newhomeinthereceiving country, so the receiving country must make themfeel at home. These first twotypes ofgroups –national minorities andimmigrants –have bothbeen the targets of majority nation-building programs, inthe sense of being pressured to integrate into thecommon societal culture. Thefinal type ofgroup I willdiscuss –namely, metics –is different. Notonlyhave they notbeenpressured to integrate intothe majority culture, theyhaveinfactbeenprohibited fromintegrating. Whereas thefirst two types ofgroups have beenpressured tointegrate, eveniftheywanted toremain apart, metics have beenforcibly keptseparate, eveniftheywanted to integrate.

(c) Metics: There are some migrants whoare never given theopportunity tobecome citizens, either because theyentered thecountry illegally (e.g., North Africans inItaly), orbecause theyentered as students or‘guest-workers’buthaveoverstayed their initial visa (e.g. Turks inGermany). Whentheyentered thecountry, these migrants were not conceived ofas future citizens, orevenas long-term residents, andindeed theywould nothavebeenallowed toenter inthefirst place iftheywereseenas permanent residents andfuture citizens. However, despite theofficial rules, theyhave settled moreorless permanently. Inprinciple, andto some extent inpractice, manyface thethreat ofdeportation iftheyaredetected bytheauthorities, oriftheyareconvicted ofa crime. But theynonetheless formsizeable communities incertain countries, engage insomeform of employment, legal or illegal, and may marry and form a family. This is true, for example, ofMexicans inCalifornia, Turks inGermany, orNorth Africans inItaly orSpain. –that is, metics” Borrowing a termfromAncient Greece, Walzer calls these groups “ long-term residents whoare nonetheless excluded fromthepolis (Walzer 1983). Since legal, political, economic, social, and metics face enormous obstacles tointegration – psychological –they tend to exist in the margins of the larger society. Generally speaking, themostbasic claim ofmetics is toregularize their status as permanent residents, andtogainaccess tocitizenship. Theywant, ineffect, tobeable tofollow theimmigrant pathtointegration intothemainstream society, eventhough they were notinitially admitted as immigrants. Howhave Western democracies responded tothis demand foraccess tocitizenparticularly ship? Historically, theyhave responded indifferent ways. Some countries – thetraditional immigrant countries –havegrudgingly accepted these demands. Guestworkers whooverstay their visa are often able to gain permanent residence, and periodic amnesties are offered forillegal immigrants, so that overtime they become similar to immigrants intheir legal status andsocial opportunities.

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Butsome countries –particularly those which donotthink ofthemselves as immigrant countries –have resisted these demands. Notonly have these countries not admitted these particular individuals as immigrants, they have not admitted any immigrants, and may have no established process or infrastructure for integrating immigrants. Moreover, manyof these metics have either broken the lawto enter the country (illegal immigrants), orbroken their promise to return totheir country oforigin (guest-workers), andso are notviewed as worthy of citizenship. Moreover, countries withnotradition ofaccepting newcomers areoften morexenophobic, andprone toview all foreigners as potential security threats, or as potentially disloyal, or simply as unalterably ‘alien’. Inthese countries, ofwhich Germany, Austria andSwitzerland are thebest-known examples, theofficial policy has notbeentotrytointegrate metics into the national community, buttogetthemtoleave thecountry, either through expulsion orvoluntary return. We can see this policy reflected in the conception of ‘multiculturalism’ that has arisen formigrants whoare denied access to citizenship –a conception which is very different fromthatinimmigrant countries likeCanada orAustralia. Until recently inmany parts of Germany, forexample, the government keptTurkish children outof German schools, andinstead set upseparate classes forTurks, often taught inTurkish by teachers imported from Turkey, with a curriculum focused on preparing the children for life inTurkey. This wassometimes called “ multiculturalism” , butunlike multiculturalism inCanada orAustralia, itwasnotseenas a wayofenriching orsupplementing German citizenship. Rather, itwasadopted precisely because these children weren’t seen as German citizens. Itwasa wayofsaying that these children donotreally belong here, is inTurkey. Multiculturalism without the offer of citizenship is home” that their true “ almost invariably a recipe for, andrationalization of, exclusion. Inshort, thehopewasthatifmetics weredenied citizenship, sothattheyonlyhad a precarious legal status within thecountry, andiftheywere toldrepeatedly thattheir real home wasintheir country oforigin, andthat theywere notwanted as members of thesociety, thentheywould eventually gohome. But it is increasingly recognized that this approach is notviable. Empirically, it has become clear that metics whohave lived ina country forseveral years are unlikely to gohome, eveniftheyhaveonlya precarious legal status. This isparticularly true ifthe metics havemarried andhadchildren inthecountry. Atthis point, itistheir newcountry, . Indeed, itmaybe theonly nottheir country oforigin, which has become their “home” home that the metics’children and grandchildren know. Once they have settled, founded a family, andstarted raising their children, nothing short ofexpulsion is likely to get metics to return to their country of origin. So a policy based on the hope of voluntary return is unrealistic. Moreover, it endangers thelarger society. Forthelikely result ofsucha policy istocreate a permanently disenfranchised, alienated, andracially- orethnically-defined underclass. Metics maydevelop anoppositional subculture inwhich thevery idea ofpursuing success in mainstream institutions is viewed withsuspicion. Thepredictable consequences can involve some mixture ofpolitical alienation, criminality, andreligious fundamentalism amongst themetics, particularly thesecond-generation, which inturnleads toincreased racial tensions, evenviolence, throughout the society. Toavoid this, there is an increasing trend inWestern democracies, even innonimmigrant countries, towards adopting amnesty programs forillegal immigrants, and granting citizenship to guest-workers andtheir children. Ineffect, long-settled metics are increasingly viewed as if they were legal immigrants, andare allowed andencouraged tofollow the immigrant pathto integration.

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Inthis section, I have discussed three types ofethnocultural groups intheWest, and tried toshowhowtheir demands arebest understood inrelation to,andas a response to, majority nation-building. Eachgroup canbe seenas claiming that majority nationbuilding hasimposed certain injustices onthem, andas identifying theconditions under which majority nation-building would cease tobe unjust. Ofcourse, there areethnocultural minorities intheWestwhich donotfallneatly into anyofthese categories. Suchsuigeneris groups include theRomainCentral Europe, or African-Americans in the United States.19 Butthe three types of groups I have discussed are the mostcommon inthe West. Moreover, evenforthose groups which donotfallintothese three categories, Iwould argue thatthesame basic framework can be applied to their claims: whatever the group, minority rights claims are best understood as a response to perceived threats which arise as a result of majority nationbuilding. vediscussed, minorities arenotsaying Itisimportant tonotethatinallofthecases I’ theyarenotsupporting the thatnation-building programs areinherently impermissible – state. Buttheydoinsist thatnation-building programs neutral” classical liberal mythofa “ should be subject to certain conditions andlimitations. Ifwetryto combine andsummarize these different demands, wecansaythat, fromthepoint ofviewoftheminorities involved, majority nation-building ina liberal-democracy is legitimate under thefollowingconditions: (a) nogroups oflong-term residents arepermanently excluded frommembership inthe nation, suchas metics orracial caste groups. Everyone living ontheterritory must beable togaincitizenship, andbecome anequal member ofthenation iftheywish

to doso; (b) insofar as immigrant groups andother ethnocultural minorities are pressured to integrate into the nation, then theterms of integration should leave roomforthe expression ofindividual andcollective differences, bothinpublic andprivate, and public institutions should be adapted to accommodate the minority’s identity and practices. Putanother way, ifminorities are pressured to integrate into dominant

institutions, these institutions mustbe adapted toaccommodate these minorities; national minorities andindigenous peoples are allowed to engage intheir own nation-building, toenable themtomaintain themselves as distinct societal cultures. These three conditions have rarely beenmethistorically within Western democracies, butwecanseea clear trend within mostdemocracies towards greater acceptance ofthem. This trend partly reflects prudential reasons ofthesort I have emphasized in this section: earlier policies to suppress minority nationalisms, assimilate immigrants andexclude metics have simply failed to achieve their aims, andso newpatterns of ethnic relations arebeing tested. Butas Iwilldiscuss inthenextsection, this trend also reflects a recognition that previous policies were morally illegitimate. Thepatterns I have beendiscussing inthis section areofcourse generalizations, notironlaws. Some metics, immigrant groups andnational minorities have notmobilizedtodemand minority rights, andevenwhentheyhave, someWestern countries continue to resist these demands (e.g., France). Andeven where these demands have recently been accepted, they often remain controversial, vulnerable to changes in popular opinion orgoverning party. Still, thegeneral trend is clear: Western states today exhibit a complex pattern of nation-building constrained byminority rights. Ontheonehand, Western states remain “ nation-building” states: allWestern states continue toadopt thesorts ofnation-building

(c)

19 I discuss these cases in Kymlicka 2001b.

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policies I discussed insection 3, andnoWestern states have relinquished theright to adopt such policies. Onthe other hand, these policies are increasingly qualified and limited toaccommodate thedemands ofminorities whofeelthreatened. Minorities have demanded, and increasingly been accorded, various rights which help ensure that nation-building does notexclude metics andracial caste groups, orcoercively assimilate immigrants, orundermine the self-government of national minorities.

5. Comparisons with Minority Issues in Asia

Hasthe experience inAsia beensimilar totheWestern trends I have just discussed?

I noted

earlier that Asian states have adopted comparable sorts of nation-building as Western states. Have minority groups inAsia felt threatened bynationbuilding inthesame wayas Western minorities, andhavetheyresponded byclaiming similar sorts of minority rights? I lacktheexpertise toanswer this question ina definitive way.Butletmemake a ve been using even fewobservations. Thefirst question is whether the categories I’ , immigrants” make sense outside the Western democracies. Canwespeak about “ “ indigenous peoples” ,“ stateless nations” inthe Asian context, ordowe and“ metics” needanentirely different vocabulary? s Isuspect thatsomeofthese categories apply morereadily toAsiathanothers. It’ ve defined it is primarily immigrants”as I’ clear, for example, that the category of “ , such as the U.S., countries of immigration” applicable to the traditional Western “ Canada andAustralia. FewAsian countries (as indeed fewEuropean countries) have policies or procedures to admit immigrants with the right to gain citizenship. ButI think wecanfind examples ofthe other categories. Forexample, cases of national minorities demanding greater autonomy include the Karens andShans in Burma; the Tibetans and Uighurs in China; the Sikhs and Kashmiris in India; the Acehnese andWestIrians inIndonesia; theBouganvilleans inPapua NewGuinea; the Moros in Philippines; and the Tamils in Sri Lanka. There are strong parallels between these minority nationalisms and those in Western democracies, such as the Québécois, Flemish, Scottish orCatalans. Inboth contexts, these groups areseeking some formofregional autonomy; inbothcontexts, this mobilization wasoften triggered, orintensified, inresponse tothethreat posed by majority nation-building (e.g., imposing theSinhalese language onTamils inSriLanka; eliminating political autonomy inTibet); inbothcontexts, this has generated demands forthe adoption offederalism as a mechanism foraccommodating minority nationalisms;20 andinbothcontexts, there is thethreat ofsecession ifthis desire forautonomy programs

is not met.

Sothedemands ofnational minorities aresimilar. Moreover, inAsia, as intheWest, states have typically responded historically to minority nationalisms with suppression (outlawing political parties representing minority nationalists, closing minority language schools). And,as inthe West, this suppression has beenjustified onthe grounds that 20

Federalism isalready operating inIndia andMalaysia, andmanyreformers andacademic commentators have argued that federal or quasi-federal forms of territorial autonomy are the only viable solution forother states intheregion facing thechallenge ofminority nationalisms, including Afghanistan (Thier 1999); Burma/Myanmar (Smith 1997; Silverstein 1997); China (Jaiqi 1996; Davis 1999; Duara 1993); Sri Lanka (Shastri 1997; Krishna 1999; Edrisinha 2001); Pakistan (Ahmed 1997) and Indonesia (Anderson 2003), to name a few.

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(a) ‘national’minorities are likely to be disloyal; (b) the minority is backward and uncivilized andso needs to be brought into the modern world; and(c) the minority’s territory contains land and resources needed for the country’s economic development.21 This mixture ofsecurity concerns, paternalism anddesire forresources isfound overandoverindealings withnational minorities, fromCanada andBrazil toSiberia and Bangladesh. Indeed, as Walker Connor notes, thephenomenon ofminority nationalism isa truly universal one: countries affected byit

aretobefound inAfrica (forexample, Ethiopia), Asia(SriLanka), Eastern Europe (Romania), Western Europe (France), North America (Guatemala), South America (Guyana), andOceania (NewZealand). The listincludes countries thatareold(United Kingdom) aswellasnew(Bangladesh), large (Indonesia) aswell as small (Fiji), rich (Canada) as wellas poor(Pakistan), authoritarian (Sudan) as wellas democratic (Belgium), Marxist-Leninist (China) as well as militantly anti-Marxist (Turkey). The list also includes countries which are Buddhist (Burma), Christian (Spain), Moslem (Iran), Hindu (India), and Judaic (Israel).22

I also think –although this is more controversial –that it is possible to distinguish, theclass ofnational minorities, a separate subcategory of“indigenous peoples” intheAsian context. Some Asian governments claim thatthecategory of“indigenous peoples” does notapply to minorities inAsia. Forexample, the People’s Republic of only indigenous peoples” China hasargued atthe United Nations thattheconcept of“

within

applies inthe context of overseas European colonization. Hence allpeoples living in indigenous” , Asian countries prior to the era of European colonization are equally “ whether theyaremajority orminority. Itmakes nosense, onthis view, tosaythatsome ofthe minorities inChina orIndia are “indigenous”while the majority is not.23 tothecontext ofEuropean indigenous peoples” Thisattempt torestrict thescope of“ . Theterm“indigenous peoples”is saltwater thesis” colonization rests ontheso-called “ connected tothat ofcolonialism: indigenous peoples have hadtheir lands conquered andsettled bya colonizing society, andforcibly incorporated into a larger state dominated bythis colonizing society. A glance at history would suggest that this sort of colonialism hasoccurred inmanydifferent forms throughout theworld, butthesaltwater formofcolonialism involves colonizers coming from real” thesis claims that the only “ overseas (i.e., from Europe). The conquest andsettling of Ainu lands byJapan can’t be , onthis view, since theconquering settlers didn’t come fromovercalled “ colonialism” . indigenous” seas, andso theAinucan’t be called “ Restricting thecategories ofcolonialism andindigenous peoples tocases ofoverseas conquest is outofstep withthe usual usage ofthese terms. Forexample, it is almost universally accepted thattheSamiinScandinavia areanindigenous people, and Ithink there aregoodreasons forthis. After all,thewayinwhich their lands wereclaimed andsettled wasverysimilar tothewaythatthelands oftheInuit inCanada wereclaimed andsettled, withthesamedisastrous results. Itisnotclear whytheinjustice ofcolonizing thelands ofanother culture changes whenthecolonizing settlers comebyland(backed by an army), rather than by sea (backed by a navy). Ifwefocus onthis common experience ofcolonizing settlement, thenwecanfind fromtheAinuofJapan, tothe Hmong ofLaos andtheChittavarious groups inAsia –

21 Forexamples ofthese arguments forsuppressing theclaims ofnational minorities andindigenous

peoples in Asia, see Weiner 1997: 9– 24; Gurr 1993; Siddle 1996: 88– 94; Kingsbury 1999; 12, 23–

Penz 1992; 1993; Guha 1994.

4. 22 Connor 1999: 163– 23 See the discussion in Kingsbury 1995; 1999.

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gongHillTribes ofBangladesh – which would qualify as indigenous peoples.24 Theway inwhich their lands have beencolonized is similar tothatoftheSamiinScandinavia or the Inuit inCanada, andwasrationalized onsimilar grounds.25 Andtheir claims today arealsosimilar, including theprotection oftraditional lands, language rights andpolitical representation.

As inthe West, the dividing line between indigenous peoples andother national is notclear orprecise. I suggested earlier that oneimportant distinguishing feature istheextent towhich a group hasplayed a role intheprocess ofstate formation. IntheEuropean context, thereason whytheSamiareconsidered indigenous while the Catalans are notisthatthelatter were contenders butlosers intheprocess offorming thestate ofSpain, whereas theSamiwereisolated fromtheprocess offorming thestate minorities

of Sweden. Using this criteria, we can say that what distinguishes the indigenous suchas theKashmiris andSikhs Hmong orAinufromother national minorities inAsia– inIndia, ortheTamils inSriLanka –isthatthelatter havebeenactive contenders inmodern state-formation. Indeed, hadthe balance of power differed slightly, they could easily haveconsolidated themselves as independent states. Buttheylost, andnowface manyofthesame issues as stateless minorities inEurope. Wecandebate whether theterm“indigenous people”is thebest oneto markthis toEurope as theSami, indigenous” distinction. Inonesense, theCatalans arejustas “ andthe Tamils are just as indigenous to Asia as the Hmong. Butthere surely is an important distinction between the Catalans andthe Samiwhich needs to be marked. And I think that a similar sort of distinction is required between the Tamils and the has been used ininternaHmong. Forbetter orworse, theterm“ indigenous peoples” tional lawtodrawthis distinction. Perhaps a better termcould have beendevised, but whatever theterminology, itseems tomethatthebasic distinction between indigenous

peoples andstateless minorities isasapplicable intheAsian context as intheEuropean context. Inanyevent it would be a mistake, ineither context, to focus exclusively onthe differences between indigenous peoples andstateless nations while neglecting their important similarities. Both types of group resist majority nation-building, and are committed to maintaining their traditional institutions, operating intheir ownlanguage andculture, so that they can reproduce themselves as separate peoples within the larger state. Because oftheir historic isolation orfragile ecology, indigenous peoples maybemoreimmediately threatened bynation-building thanother national minorities, andhence moreurgently inneedofminority rights protection. Butthesameprinciple that underpins their claims mayalso apply to the claims of stateless nations, andviceversa.26

24

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26

According toGurr, other indigenous peoples inAsiainclude theKachins, Mons, Zomis andRohingya inBurma; the Assamese, Bodos, Mizos, Naga, Tripuras andScheduled Tribes inIndia; the Papuans in Indonesia; the Dayaks in Malaysia; the Igorots in Philippines; the Aboriginals in Taiwan; the Northern HillTribes inThailand, andMontagnards inVietnam (Gurr 1993). Forthe parallels between the treatment of the AinuandNorth American indigenous peoples, including the racist/paternalist justifications given fortheir dispossession, see Siddle 1997. Formore onthe relationship between stateless nations andindigenous peoples, see Kymlicka 2001a, chap. 6. Inhis account of indigenous rights ininternational law, James Anaya argues that indigenous peoples have beensingled out,notbecause theyhavegreater rights thanother national groups, but because the cultural and political rights they share with other national groups are more likely tohavebeenviolated, andtheneedtoremedy these violations is moreurgent. Inother words, theydiffer notintherights theycanclaim, butintherights-violations that needremedying (Anaya 1996). See also Kingsbury 1999, whodefends the applicability ofthetermindigenous peoples to Asia, butemphasizes thatgroups thatdonotqualify as indigenous mayhave similar claims.

Universal Minority Rights? The Prospects forConsensus

35

Finally, there arealsocases ofmetics inAsia, including theKoreans inJapan, who were stripped ofcitizenship after World WarII,since theydidnotfitintotheconception ofnationhood being adopted andpromoted bytheJapanese state. Like theTurks in Germany, itwasinitially hoped thattheKoreans would return toKorea, butitwasquickly realized that they are infact inJapan forgood, andthat Japan is the only home the children andgrandchildren know. Like theTurks, the Koreans have fought forcitizenship, which at first was only offered as a privilege, nota right, andonly to those whohad renounced their ethnic heritage andassimilated (e.g., byadopting Japanese names). And,liketheTurks, manyKoreans haverefused tonaturalize onthese terms, which they seeas a continuation, rather thanrepudiation, oftheearlier attitude thatanyone whois identifiably Korean cannot be a Japanese citizen.27 So there appear to be some parallels between minorities inAsia andinWestern democracies. Inat least some cases wefinda similar dynamic ofminority rights being claimed bystateless nations, indigenous peoples andmetics inreaction tothenationbuilding policies adopted bythe state. Ofcourse (as inthe West) there are many ethnocultural groups thatdonotfiteasily intothese basic categories. Forexample, Ted Gurrmentions a category ofgroup which is common inAsia (andAfrica) butvirtually

: groups communal contenders” unheard ofinEurope orNorth America, which hecalls “ which have a share of state power, andwhich have andcherish their ownseparate cultural institutions, butwhich donotseek territorial autonomy orindependent statehood. Theyinclude the Hazars, Pashtuns, Tajiks andUzbeks inAfghanistan, the Mohajirs, Pushtuns andSindhis of Pakistan, andthe Chinese andIndians inMalaysia. Unlike national minorities andindigenous peoples, they do notsee themselves as withrights toself-government; unlike immigrants, theydonotexpect nations” distinct “ tointegrate intothedominant nation; andunlike metics orracial caste groups, theyshare state power, rather than being excluded from it. So any typology of groups formulated for the West will need revising in the Asian context. Butthequestion Iwould askis notso muchwhether thespecific categories of groups arethesame, butrather whether theunderlying dialectic ofnation-building and minority rights issimilar. Ihavetried tooffer sometentative reasons forthinking thatthis dialectic mayindeed be common to East andWest. Allparts oftheworld have been integrated into a system ofmodern nation-states; mostmodern states have embarked on programs of nation-building which are often directed at minorities; these nationbuilding programs are perceived as a threat byminorities; minorities respond to this threat bydemanding certain minority rights which setconditions orlimitations onnationbuilding. I have nottried to conclusively prove that this description holds forboth East andWest, but I hope to have shown that ithas some initial plausibility, andso is worthy ofmore detailed investigation. Whatis less clear is whether these minority claims will orshould be evaluated inthe same wayinthe East andWest.

27 Foranoverview ofthestatus oftheKorean minority inJapan, seeOnuma 1993; Hicks 1997. Another formofdefacto metics maybethepeasants inChina whohave migrated tourban areas. Although theydonotcome froma foreign country, theyare discriminated against onthebasis ofa politically

sanctioned hereditary distinction between those born in rural areas and those born in urban households, andsome commentators have argued that their status is similar to that of metics in Germany or Japan (Solliner 1999).

36

6 Individualism andCollectivism intheMinority

Will KYMLICKA

Rights Debate

Sofar, Ihaveargued thatthere hasbeenanimportant shift recently inthewayWestern democracies think about minority rights, and a greater recognition of the claims of metics, immigrants and national minorities. Part of the explanation for this shift is pragmatic: previous policies ofsuppressing minority nationalism, coercively assimilatingimmigrants andexcluding metics simply failed toachieve their aims. Butpartofthe explanation isa shift inpeople’s attitudes towards themoral legitimacy ofthese policies: they are nowwidely viewed, notonlyas unworkable, butalso as unjust. Indeed, itisthebelief thatthese earlier policies areunjust, as wellas unworkable, which explains whysome people intheWestwishtoformulate international standards regarding minority rights. Ifthe problem wassimply thatthe policies were unworkable inparticular Western countries, then presumably other countries should befree totry to make such policies workintheir ownparticular circumstances. Butitis nowwidely believed that even ifitwere possible tosuppress, coerce orexclude minority groups, these would notbe permissible approaches toethnocultural diversity, andthat some minimal set of minority rights is needed to ensure ethnocultural justice. This push to codify a set of minority rights is reflected in several recent initiatives. Forexample, theOrganization onSecurity andCooperation inEurope adopted principles regarding the rights of national minorities in 1991, and established a High Commissioner onNational Minorities in 1993. The United Nations has adopted a Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1993), and is debating a Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. TheCouncil ofEurope adopted a treaty onminority language rights in1992 (the European Charter forRegional orMinority Languages), anda Framework ConventionontheProtection ofNational Minorities in1995. Andother examples could begiven. Inallofthese cases, respect fortherights ofminorities ispresented as a matter ofbasic principles of respect andjustice, notjust as pragmatic calculations. This raises thequestion withwhich I began theLecture: canwehopetoachieve a cross-cultural consensus on the principles underlying minority rights, or is this just another Western idéefixewhich isbeing imposed ontherestoftheworld? Inparticular, is the justification for minority rights acceptable to both communitarian and liberal societies, ordothese emerging models ofminority rights intheWestrestondistinctively individualistic premises? Onewaytorespond tothisquestion would betoclaim thatminority rights intheWest have manycommunitarian features. Indeed, one could point outthat, until recently, minority rights havetypically beendefended intheWestbycommunitarians, rather than liberals, and have been defended precisely on the grounds that they help to remedy the excesses ofWestern individualism.28 Onecould drawuponseveral influential communitarian defenses ofminority rights intheWesttosuggest reasons whycommunitarians outside the West could also accept minority rights. However, that itis notmystrategy.29 Iwillshowlater onthat minority rights canindeedpromote communitarian values intheAsian context. ButI canonlyshowthis ifI first explain whymostminority rights intheWestdonotpromote communitarian values. I believe that communitarians are simply wrong todescribe minority rights intheWest asa remedy against liberal individualism. Indeed, mostofmywritings onthistopic have 28 E.g., Van Dyke 1977, 1982; Garet 1983; McDonald 1991; Johnston 1989; Addis 1991. 29 Foronething, even ifminority rights were needed intheWest as a remedy against liberal dualism, itwouldn’t explain whytheyareneeded innon-liberal societies.

indivi-

Universal Minority Rights? The Prospects for Consensus

37

beenaimed atshowing that minority

rights intheWestareconsistent with, rather than remedies against, liberal individualism, andare demanded byminority groups which share thesame basic liberal values as the majority. This mayseemto simply confirm the suspicion that Western notions of minority rights are inapplicable tocommunitarian societies. Buttosaythat minority rights inthe West are consistent withliberal individualism is notto saythat they are onlyconsistent with liberal individualism. Onthe contrary, I willargue that the same arguments that (individualistic) minorities give intheWesttoexplain whytheyaretreated unjustly by (individualistic) majorities canalso begiven bycommunitarian minorities toexplain why theyaretreated unjustly bycommunitarian majorities. Thebasic argument forminority rights, I willsuggest, centres onarbitrariness andhypocrisy intheexercise ofmajority power, andthatargument, Ibelieve, isequally relevant tobothindividualist andcommunitarian societies. Insome countries, this misuse ofpower takes theformofindividualistic majorities oppressing individualistic minorities; inother countries, ittakes theform of communitarian majorities oppressing communitarian minorities. The nature ofthe injustice, andthesortofminority rights needed toprevent it,maybesimilar ineachcase. Onevirtue ofmyaccount, Ibelieve, isthatithelps explain theparadox thatminority rights have often been rejected inthe West as inconsistent with individualism, and rejected inthe East as inconsistent withcommunitarianism. I willargue that, inboth are misleading, anddonot and“ cases, appeals to“individualism” communitarianism” really explain the source ofopposition to minority rights. I will begin by arguing that in the case of Western liberals, this appeal to “indivias a basis forrejecting minority rights claims has often been selective and dualism” hypocritical, andsimply masks thepursuit ofthemajority’s collective interests (section 7).Ithensuggest thata similar sortofinconsistency maybepresent whencommunitarians in East Asia reject minority rights claims on the grounds that they conflict with collectivism (section 8). I will argue that the real issue is neither individualism nor collectivism, butmore basic norms offairness andreciprocity. This does notshowthat there won’t be deepandperhaps irresolvable disagreements between East andWest regarding theproper conception andscope ofminority rights. ButIhopetosuggest thatsimplistic appeals toindividualism andcommunitarianism donotadvance thedebate, andthatthepossibility ofa cross-cultural consensus may begreater thanitfirst appeared.

7. Minority

Rights

andWestern

Individualism

AsIjust noted, themostnatural waytoshowthatWestern notions ofminority rights are not “individualistic”would be to showthat they can be defended oncommunitarian grounds, asa remedy against theexcesses ofliberal individualism. Thisisprecisely how minority rights werediscussed intheWestuntil veryrecently. ButIthink this isa mistake that has hampered ourunderstanding ofthe issues. So letmeexplain whyI think this waswrong, before offering myownaccount ofthe moral basis ofminority rights inthe West.

Until quite recently, mostwriters intheWestassumed thatthedebate overminority communitarians” and“ rights wasessentially equivalent tothedebate between “ liberals” (orbetween “individualists” ).Whenpolitical theorists intheWestfirst and“ collectivists” started discussing minority rights inthe 1970s and1980s, after decades ofneglecting issues ofethnic relations, itwasnatural that theywould lookforanalogies withother,

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Will KYMLICKA

morefamiliar, topics, andthe liberal-communitarian debate seemed the most relevant andapplicable. Thenotion ofcommunitarianism present intheWestisnotnecessarily thesame as in East Asian societies, so I should explain what communitarianism means in the Western context. To oversimplify, the debate between liberals andcommunitarians essentially revolves around the priority of individual freedom. Liberals insist that individuals should be free to decide

ontheir ownconception ofthe good life, andapplaud

the liberation of indi-viduals fromanyunexamined adherence toascribed orinherited status. Liberal indivi-dualists argue thattheindividual ismorally prior tothecommunity: thecommunity matters onlybecause itcontributes tothewell-being ofthe individuals whocompose it. Ifthose individuals no longer find it worthwhile to maintain existing cultural practices, thenthecommunity hasnoindependent interest inpreserving those practices, andnoright to prevent individuals frommodifying orrejecting them. . Theyview autonomous individual” Communitarians dispute this conception ofthe“ inparticular social roles andrelationships, rather than as embedded” individuals as “ agents capable offorming andrevising their ownconception ofthegoodlife. Rather than viewing group practices as the product of individual choices, they tend to view individuals as the product ofsocial practices. Moreover, theyoften denythatthe interests ofcommunities canbe reduced totheinterests oftheir individual members. Privileging individual autonomy is therefore seen as destructive ofcommunities. Ahealthy community maintains a balance between individual choice andprotection forthecommunal wayoflife, andseeks tolimit theextent towhich theformer canerode thelatter. Until quite recently, itwasgenerally assumed thatone’s position onminority rights was dependent on, and derivative of, one’s position on the liberal-communitarian debate. Thatis, ifoneisa liberal whocherishes individual autonomy, thenonewilloppose minority rights as a dangerous departure from the proper emphasis on the individual. Communitarians, bycontrast, viewminority rights as anappropriate wayof protecting communities fromtheeroding effects ofindividual autonomy, andofaffirming the value of community. Ethnocultural minorities inparticular are worthy of such protection, partly because they are most at risk, but also because they still have a communal wayoflife tobeprotected. Unlike themajority, ethnocultural minorities have notyetsuccumbed toliberal individualism, andsohavemaintained a coherent collective way of life. This debate overthe priority andreducibility

ofcommunity interests to individual intheWestonminority rights.30 Bothdefenders andcritics ofminority rights shared this interpretation ofthedebate. Defenders agreed thatminority rights were inconsistent withliberalism’s commitment tomoral individualismandindividual autonomy, butargued thatthis just pointed outtheinherent flaws of liberalism. Inshort, defending minority rights required endorsing the communitarian critique of liberalism, since minority rights were seen as defending cohesive and communally-minded minority groups against theencroachment ofliberal individualism. It is increasingly recognized that this is an unhelpful wayto conceptualize the debate. Inreality, mostethnocultural groups within Western democracies donotwant to be protected from the forces of modernity unleashed in liberal societies. Onthe contrary, theywantto be fullandequal participants inmodern liberal societies. This is true of most immigrant groups, which seek inclusion and full participation in the mainstream of liberal-democratic societies, withaccess to its education, technology, interests dominated theearly literature

camp, see Narveson 1991; Hartney 1991; Galenkamp 1993. 30 Forrepresentatives ofthe“individualist” Forthe “ communitarian” camp, see the references innote 28.

Universal Minority Rights?

The Prospects forConsensus

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literacy, masscommunications, etc. Itisequally trueofmostnational minorities, likethe Québécois, Flemish orCatalans. Theyare seeking autonomy within a liberal democracy, butthis is notinorder tocreate anilliberal communitarian society, butrather to create their ownmodern liberal democratic society. The Québécois wishto create a ‘distinct society’, but it is a modern, liberal society. Indeed, almost all national groups within Western democracies nowshare a common civilization –i.e., theyallshare a modern, urban, secular, literate, pluralistic, industrialized, bureaucratized, democratic, consumerist masscivilization, incontrast to thefeudal, agricultural andtheocratic world ofourancestors. This is relatively recent: pockets ofquasi-feudal andquasi-theocratic agrarian societies existed intheWestwell intothetwentieth- century. Buttoday, majorities andminorities tendtoshare thesame basic principles of social and political organization.

Indeed, farfrom opposing liberal principles, public opinion polls showthere are often no statistical differences between national minorities and majorities in their adherence to liberal principles. Andimmigrants also quickly absorb the basic liberaldemocratic consensus, evenwhentheycamefromcountries withlittle ornoexperience ofliberal democracy.31 Tobesure, there aresomeimportant exceptions tothis rule. Forexample, there are a fewethnoreligious sects that voluntarily distance themselves fromthe larger world – the Hutterites, Amish, Hasidic Jews. Andsome ofthe more isolated ortraditionalist indigenous communities inNorth orSouth America fitthisdescription as ‘communitarian’ groups. These groups areritually invoked inphilosophical discussions ofmulticulturalism, eventhough theyareoften tiny, andhave beenmarginal tomostreal-world policies of minority rights. Thequestion of howliberal states should respond to such non-liberal groups is a tricky one, which I have discussed elsewhere.32 ButI would argue that the overwhelming majority ofdebates about minority rights intheWestare notdebates between a liberal majority andcommunitarian minorities, but debates amongst liberals about the meaning of liberalism. They are debates between themembers ofdifferent groups whoallendorse thebasic liberal-democratic consensus, butwhodisagree about theinterpretation ofthese principles inmultiethnic inparticular, theydisagree about theproper roleoflanguage, nationality, and societies – ethnic identities within liberal-democratic societies andinstitutions. Asa result, theterms ofthedebate havechanged dramatically intheWestinrecent years. Thequestion is nolonger howto protect communitarian minorities fromliberalism, butwhyminorities that share basic liberal principles nonetheless seek minority rights? Ifgroups are indeed liberal, whydotheywantminority rights? Whyaren’t they satisfied with the traditional common rights of citizenship? This is thefundamental question forminority rights advocates intheWest. Atthe most general level, the answer is that liberal states donotjust promote liberal individualism, theyalso promote nation-building. Andthese nation-building policies cause harmto minorities, harms that violate basic norms offairness andreciprocity. I can best explain this answer by giving specific examples. I will focus on the situation ofnational minorities, since this is more relevant totheAsian context thanthe situation of immigrants. I willdiscuss three cases where individual rights donotadequately protect theinterests ofnational minorities inthefaceofnation-building policies: decisions about internal migration/settlement policies, decisions about theboundaries

31 Onimmigrants, see Frideres 1997; Harles 1993. Onthe convergence inpolitical values anglophones andfrancophones inCanada, see Dion1991.

32

Kymlicka

1995: chapter 8; Kymlicka 2001a: chap. 4.

between

40

Will KYMLICKA

andpowers ofinternal political units, anddecisions about official languages. Iwilltryto show, ineach case, that even minorities that share liberal individualistic values need minority rights to prevent injustice as a result of nation-building. (a)internal migration/settlement policies: National governments haveoften encouraged people fromonepartofthecountry (ornewimmigrants) tomoveintothehistoric territory ofthenational minority. Suchlarge-scale settlement policies areoften deliberately used as a weapon against thenational minority, bothtobreak openaccess totheir territory’s natural resources, andtodisempower thempolitically, byturning theminto a minority evenwithin their owntraditional territory (McGarry 1998). Thisprocess hasoccurred inseveral Western countries. InCanada, thenineteenththese century Canadian Prime Minister, SirJohnA.MacDonald, saidofthe Métis that “ impulsive half-breeds ... must be kept down by a strong hand until they are swamped by .33Thesame process occurred intheAmerican Southwest, where the influx ofsettlers” immigration wasusedtodisempower theindigenous peoples andChicano populations whowereliving onthatterritory whenitwasincorporated intotheUnited States in1848. Ithasoccurred inseveral countries inEastern Europe (e.g., promoting ethnic Serbian settlement ofKosovo, orGeorgian settlement ofAbkhazia), andinBrazil. Possessing the common rights of citizenship does not protect national minorities fromsuchsettlement policies, since these policies needn’t deprive individual members ofthe minority oftheir civil andpolitical rights.34 Toprotect against these settlement policies, national minorities inthe West have demanded a variety of measures. For example, theymaymakecertain landclaims –insisting thatcertain lands be reserved fortheir exclusive useandbenefit. Ortheymaydemand that certain disincentives be placed on in-migration. Forexample, migrants mayneed to pass residency requirements before theycanvoteinlocal orregional elections. Ortheymaynotbeabletobring that is,theymaybe required toattend schools inthe their language rights withthem– local language, rather than having publicly-funded education intheir ownlanguage. Similarly, thecourts andpublic services maybeconducted inthelocal language. These measures are allintended to reduce the number of migrants into the homeland ofthe national minority, andtoensure thatthose whodocomearewilling tointegrate intothe local culture. which conflicts groupism” These claims areoften cited as examples ofthesortof“ withWestern individualism, andwhich should therefore berejected inliberal democraattachment to their landand communal” cies. Theyare said to reflect the minority’s “ culture. Butinfactthese demands have little ifanything todowiththecontrast between “ individualist” s ocieties also seek and“ communalist” individualist” s ocieties. Western “ protections against in-migration. Take anyWestern democracy. While the majority believes in maximizing their individual mobility throughout the country, they do not support theright ofindividuals outside thecountry toenter andsettle. Onthecontrary, Western democracies aretypically veryrestrictive about accepting newimmigrants into their society. NoWestern state has accepted the idea that transnational mobility is a basic human right. Andthose fewimmigrants whoare allowed in are pressured to integrate into the majority culture. Forexample, learning the majority language is a condition ofgaining citizenship, andpublicly-funded education istypically provided only inthe majority’s language. 33 MacDonald, quoted in Stanley 1961: 95.

34

Indeed, individual citizenship rights mayexacerbate the problem, since the right to free mobility theterritory ofa state istypically seenas oneofthese common rights ofcitizenship.

within

Universal Minority Rights?

The Prospects forConsensus

41

Western democracies impose these restrictions onimmigration into their country forprecisely thesame reason that national minorities seektorestrict in-migration into namely, massive settlement would threaten their society andculture. The their territory – majority, like theminority, hasnodesire tobeoverrun andoutnumbered bysettlers from another culture. Tosaythatthedesire ofnational minorities tolimit in-migration reflects

some sort of illiberal communalism is therefore hypocritical. When the majority says that mobility within a country is a basic human right, butthat mobility across borders is not,

they are not preferring

individual mobility over collective security. They are simply saying that their collective security willbe protected (by limits on immigration), butthat once their collective security is protected, then individual mobility will be maximized, regardless oftheconsequences forthecollective security ofminorities. Thisis,Ibelieve, hypocritical andunjust.35 If majority claims to limit mobility inthe name of collective security are morally legitimate, thenbasic norms of reciprocity require recognizing the legitimacy ofminority claims which are made onthesame basis.

(b) theboundaries andpowers ofinternal political subunits: Instates withterritorially concentrated national minorities, the boundaries of internal political subunits raise fundamental issues ofjustice. Since national minorities are usually territorially conceni.e., tocreate trated, these boundaries canbedrawn insucha wayastoempower them– political subunits within which thenational minority forms a local majority, andwhich can therefore be usedas a vehicle formeaningful autonomy andself-government. Inmanycountries, however, boundaries have been drawn so as to disempower national minorities. Forexample, a minority’s territory maybe broken upinto several units, so as to make cohesive political action impossible (e.g., the division of France into departments”after the Revolution, which intentionally subdivided the historical 83 “ regions ofthe Basques, Bretons andother linguistic minorities; orthe division of 19thcentury Catalonia); conversely, a minority’s territory maybe absorbed into a larger political subunit, soastoensure thattheyareoutnumbered within thesubunit asawhole (e.g. the boundaries of Florida were changed in the 19th-century so that Hispanics would be outnumbered). Even where the boundaries coincide more or less withthe territory of a national minority, thedegree ofmeaningful autonomy maybeundermined ifthecentral governmentusurps mostorallofthe subunit’s powers, andeliminates thegroup’s traditional mechanisms ofself-government. Andindeed, wecanfindmanysuchinstances inwhich a minority nominally controls a political subunit, buthasnosubstantive power, since the central government has(a)removed thetraditional institutions andprocedures ofgroup self-government; and(b)arrogated allimportant powers, eventhose affecting thevery e.g., jurisdiction overeconomic development, education, cultural survival ofthegroup – language. Possessing thecommon rights ofcitizenship protects national minorities frombeing stripped of their right to vote or runfor office. But it does not protect them from the majority’s efforts togerrymander theboundaries orpowers ofinternal political subunits insuch a wayas to disempower the national minority. Toprotect against this sort ofmanipulation, national minorities need rights to such things asself-government, group-based political representation, vetorights overissues that directly affect their cultural survival, andso on.Again, these demands are often 35 Itwould notbehypocritical tocriticize minority demands tolimit in-migration ifonealsocriticized state policies to limit immigration –i.e., if one defended a policy of open-borders. Butsuch a policy has virtually

no public support, and is not endorsed by most of the people whocriticize

minority demands.

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Will KYMLICKA

seenas conflicting withWestern individualism, andas proof oftheminority’s “ collectivism” . Butinreality, these demands simply helptoredress clear political inequalities.36 After all, themajority would equally reject anyattempt byforeign powers tounilaterally change its boundaries, institutions, or self-government powers. So whyshouldn’t national minorities also seekguarantees oftheir boundaries, institutions, andpowers? To reject the legitimacy ofthis demand, while accepting it inthe case of majorities, violates basic norms of reciprocity. (c) official language policy. In most democracies, governments have adopted the i.e., as thelanguage ofgovernment, majority’s language as theoneofficial language –

bureaucracy, courts, schools, andso on. Allcitizens are thenforced to learn this language inschool, andfluency initis required toworkfor,ordealwith, government. While this policy is often defended inthename ofefficiency, itis also adopted toensure the eventual assimilation of national minorities into the majority group. Minority-language educational institutions have therefore been oneofthefirst targets ofnation-building programs. Forexample, Spanish schools intheAmerican southwest wereclosed after 1848, andreplaced withEnglish-language schools. Similarly, French-language schools inWestern Canada wereclosed once English-speakers achieved political dominance. Here again, possessing common rights ofcitizenship does notprevent this process. Recent human rights declarations dopreclude anyattempt bythestate tosuppress the useofa minority language inprivate, andmayevenrequire state toleration ofprivatelyfunded schools which operate intheminority language. Buthuman rights doctrines say nothing about rights tothe useofone’s language ingovernment. Onsome interpretations ofmorerecent international conventions, public funding formother-tongue classes atelementary level mayunder some circumstances beseenas a “human right” . Butthis remains a controversial development thatisnotreflected inmostWestern constitutions orbills orrights.37 Moreover, mother-tongue education attheelementary level isclearly insufficient ifalljobs ina modern economy require education athigher levels conducted inthe majority language. Indeed, the requirement that education at senior levels be in the majority language maycreate a disincentive for minority parents to enrol their children inminority-language elementary schools inthefirst place.38 Toprevent majority attempts toimpose linguistic homogeneity, national minorities mayneedbroad-ranging language policies. There is evidence thatlanguage communities can only survive inter-generationally if they are numerically dominant within a particular territory, andiftheir language is the language ofopportunity inthatterritory. Butitisdifficult tosustain sucha predominant status fora minority language, particularly ifnewcomers totheminority’s territory areable tobecome educated andemployed in themajority language (e.g., ifnewcomers toQuebec areabletogotoschool inEnglish). It maynotbe enough, therefore, forthe minority simply to have the right to use its language inpublic. It mayalso be necessary that the minority language be the only

36 See Eisenberg 1998 fora discussion of howthe rhetoric of individualism versus collectivism has obscured the real issues involved in Aboriginal self-government in Canada, which concern the redress ofpost-colonial power imbalances. 37 Fora comprehensive review ofthecurrent status oflanguage rights ininternational human rights law,see deVarennes 1996. Fora survey of recent workonlanguage rights inpolitical theory, see Kymlicka

and Patten 2003.

38 Lowenrolment isthenoften (perversely) cited bymajority politicians as evidence thatmostmembers ofthe minority are notinterested inpreserving their language andculture, andthat it is only a few extremists inthe minority group whoare the cause ofethnic conflict.

43

Universal Minority Rights? The Prospects for Consensus

official language intheir territory.39 Ifimmigrants, ormigrants fromthe majority group, areable tousethemajority language inpublic life, this mayeventually undermine the predominant status, andhence viability, of the minority’s language. Inother words, minorities mayneed policies based notonpersonal bilingualism (inwhich individuals carry their language rights with them throughout the entire country), but rather on territorial bilingualism (inwhich people whochoose to move to the minority’s territory accept thatthe minority’s language willbetheofficial language inthatterritory). These demands forextensive language rights andterritorial bilingualism areoften . Buthereagain theminority isjust collectivism” described as evidence oftheminority’s “ seeking thesame opportunity to live andworkintheir ownlanguage thatthe majority takes forgranted. There isnoevidence thatthemajority attaches anyless weight totheir ability tousetheir language inpublic life. Todenythemoral legitimacy ofminority claims,

therefore, violates basic norms of reciprocity.

Itwould notbehypocritical tocriticize minority demands regarding self-government andlanguage rights ifoneapplied thesamestandard tomajorities. Forexample, onecould imagine letting theUnited Nations determine theboundaries andlanguage policies ofeachstate. Imagine thattheU.N., ina free anddemocratic vote, decided to merge allcountries intheAmericas (North, South andCentral) into a single Spanishspeaking state. Iftheanglophone majority inCanada ortheUnited States would accept sucha decision –i.e., iftheywerewilling toabandon their ownself-government powers and language rights –then it would not be hypocritical to criticize the demands of Francophone, Hispanic orAboriginal minorities inNorth America. ButIdon’t knowany English-speaking Canadians or Americans whowould agree to amalgamate into a single Spanish-speaking state, evenifthis merger wassupported bymostcountries in theAmericas (and/or bymostpeople living intheAmericas). Inreality, theanglophone majorities inboththe United States andCanada zealously guard their right to live ina state where they form a majority, andtheir right to have English recognized as a rights

language of public life. This defense of the boundaries and linguistic policies of existing nation-states is as “ collectivist” as thedemands ofminorities forprotection oftheir selfgovernment and language rights, and reciprocity requires that we apply the same standards to both majority andminority.

Onecould mention other issues where thecommon rights ofcitizenship areinsufficient for ensuring ethnocultural justice (e.g., public holidays, school curriculum, national symbols, dress codes etc). Butenough hasbeensaid, Ihope, tomakethegeneral point. There are infact twopoints I wishtodrawfromthese examples: – First, the three problems I have examined –migration, internal political subunits, andlanguage policy –areallrooted inthe‘nation-building’programs thatWestern states haveengaged in.AsInoted insection 3, every democratic state has,atone time oranother, attempted to create a single ‘national identity’amongst its citizens, andso has tried to undermine anycompeting national identities ofthe sort which national minorities often possess. Policies designed tosettle minority homelands, undermine their political andeducational institutions, andimpose a single common language have been important tools in these nation-building efforts. Wherever Western states are nation-building in this sense, then national minorities have sought minority rights, above andbeyond thestandard setofindividual citizenship rights.

, andis a widely-noted territorial imperative” 39 This is called the“ countries. Fora general account, see Laponce 1987.

phenomenon

inmultilingual Western

44

–

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Second, theneedforsuchrights arises evenwhentheminority isas“ individualistic” as the majority. Inmost cases, the goal of such minority rights is notto protect communitarian minorities fromtheencroachment ofliberal individualism, butrather to ensure basic reciprocity inethnocultural relations –i.e., to ensure thatthe state isnotbeing usedtopromote themajority’s (individualistic) identity andculture while suppressing the minority’s (individualistic) identity andculture.40 Toobject tosuch

on the ground that they violate Western principles of “individualism”is irrelevant andhypocritical. Theissue is notindividualism, butthefactthatthemajority is denying to the minority what it claims for itself. This explains whythedramatic convergence onliberal values between majorities andminorities intheWestinthetwentieth century hasnotdiminished thelevel ofethnocultural conflicts, as mostcommentators predicted. Onthecontrary, minority nationalist movements are stronger today inmost Western democracies than ever before (e.g., Quebec, Scotland, Catalonia, Flanders, Puerto Rico). Manypeople consider ita “ parathatminority nationalisms continue togrowevenasdifferences inbasic values fade dox” (e.g., Ignatieff 1993). This would indeed bea paradox ifminority rights weresought as protection against liberal individualism. Butifminority claims are responses to nationbuilding policies, thenweshould expect minority nationalism to endure foras long as states adopt nation-building policies, evenifdifferences inbasic values disappear. And that is precisely whatwesee intheWest. Inshort, mostconflicts between majorities andnational minorities intheWestare rooted, not indifferences in basic moral or political values, butrather inthe lack of reciprocity intheapplication ofshared values. Nation-building states haveimplemented and institutionalized shared liberal-democratic values in a waythat systematically privileges majorities andsubordinates minorities.41 vejustgiven differs substantially fromthestandard account ofethnoTheanalysis I’ cultural conflict intheWest, anditisworth summarizing these differences. Thestandard view starts from two assumptions. The first is that the liberal state, in its normal veargued insection 3 thatthis is inaccurate, and operation, is ethnoculturally neutral. I’ that weneedto replace itwitha model ofliberal states as nation-building states. The worldsecond assumption is that ethnocultural conflict is rooted indifferent values or“ vejustargued thatthis isinaccurate inmostcases, andthat (e.g., Parekh 1997). I’ views” weneedtoreplace itwitha focus onreciprocity between groups thatmayinfact share similar values. ? Whatdoes reciprocity require fornational Whatdoes itmeantoseek“reciprocity” minorities inthecontext ofa nation-building state? There is nowell-developed answer tothatquestion, either atthelevel ofpublic opinion oramongst scholars andtheorists. There is growing recognition that earlier forms of nation-building were unjust to minorities, butit is notyetclear whatwilltake their place. AndfewWestern political theorists have addressed the issue. Oneofthe manyunfortunate side-effects ofthe dominance of the ‘ethnocultural neutrality’ model of the liberal state is that liberal theorists have never explicitly addressed the question of reciprocity for national minorities in a nation-building state. rights

40 Torepeat, there arecommunitarian

minorities intheWest, particularly ethnoreligious cults like the andsome indigenous groups. Buttheyaretheexception, rather thanthe rule. 41 Putanother way,thesource ofethnic conflict intheWestisoften pinned on“troublesome minorities” , butIsuggest thatbehind mosttroublesome minorities wewillfinda troublesome majority which has acted ina biased andhypocritical way.

Amish,

Universal Minority Rights? The Prospects for Consensus

45

However, I think wecan identify twomanifestations ofthis shift towards a more reciprocity-based approach, oneatthelevel ofpolitical theory, theother atthelevel of public symbols. Atthe level oftheory, the burden of proof indebates about minority rights is slowly changing. According tothe standard account, inwhich thestate is assumed to be ethnoculturally neutral, the burden ofproof falls onnational minorities tojustify departing fromthenormofneutrality. Itis increasingly recognized, however, thatthis is misleading. Therelevant question is not‘whydepart fromthe normofneutrality?’, but rather ‘whyshould national minorities nothave thesame powers ofnation-building as . The majority has claimed the right to implement liberal-democratic the majority?” values viainstitutions thatprotect itsterritory, language andculture. National minorities typically share the same basic liberal-democratic values as the majority, butwantto implement these values ininstitutions that willprotect their territories, languages and societal cultures. Reciprocity suggests that ifthe majority’s claim is accepted, so too should the minority’ s. Or,putmore modestly, the burden ofproof rests onthose who would denynational minorities thesame powers ofnation-building as those which the national majority takes forgranted.42 Perhaps this burden ofproof canbemet.Perhaps there aregoodreasons whythis sort of reciprocity in ethnocultural relations cannot be achieved or sustained in a particular country. Forexample, as I noted insection 4, Western states usedtoargue that minorities which viewed themselves as distinct ‘nations’would be disloyal, and hence undermine thestability ofdemocratic states. Iftrue, this might justify supporting majority nation-building while rejecting minority nationalism. Inreality, however, the opposite hasproven tobetrue: itistheattempt tosuppress minority nationalisms which has ledtoethnic conflict andviolence, whereas accommodation hasoften helped to stabilize democracies. In myview, this burden of proof has rarely been met inthe West. The various reasons forrejecting the legitimacy of minority nationalism, like thefearofinstability, often collapse onexamination. Perhaps forthis reason, wecan see a second manifestation ofa shift towards a more reciprocity-based approach: namely, theincreased nation-states” but“multination willingness ofWestern states toaccept thattheyarenot“ states” , containing twoormorenational groups, eachwiththeright toprotect itsterritory, language andculture. States maycontain numerical majorities andminorities, butina multination state themodel ofmajority/minority is replaced withthatofa partnership or federation ofco-equal national groups, each ofwhich is seen as a constituent part or founding member ofthe state. This recognition of national minorities as partners, cofounders and constituent units of the state is increasingly made explicit in various constitutions, laws, orsymbolic declarations.43 Areciprocity-based approach to the claims of national minorities, then, willlikely contain these twoelements: a recognition thatinsofar as national minorities areseeking thesame powers ofnation-building as themajority exercises, thentheburden ofproof falls onthose whowould reject minority nationalism; anda recognition thatthestate is nota nation-state, in which national minorities are unwanted blots or stains, buta multination state, inwhich minorities areco-equal partners inthestate. Ofcourse, this

42

43

Reciprocity also requires that the minority’s nation-building powers should be subject to the same limitation as the majorities. Forexample, national minorities mustrespect the right ofother nations within their jurisdiction toprotect andbuild their ownnational institutions. TheQuébécois areentitled to assert national rights vis-à-vis the rest of Canada, but only ifthey respect the rights of Aboriginals within Quebec toassert national rights vis-à-vis the rest ofQuebec. 15 Formoreonmultination states, see Kymlicka 2001a, chaps. 11–

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is rather abstract, and does notyet tell us much about the specific sorts of claims which national minorities should have inanyparticular country. Idonotthink thatmuchmore canbesaidata general level: thespecification ofminority claims willvaryfromcountry to country, depending on the history and political culture of the society, and the demographic, economic andgeo-political context. Thegoalofa reciprocity-based viewis not

toprovide a formula forevaluating detailed claims byparticular groups, butrather toset

these claims ina newnormative frame: onewhich putsminority nationalism andmajority nation-building ona level playing field, bothinterms oftheburden ofproof, andinterms

ofsymbolic

legitimacy.

Ishould emphasize thateventhese vague claims about theburden ofproof and

symbolic legitimacy remain controversial inmanyWestern societies. TheWestern debate remains deeply influenced byolder assumptions about neutral states andnonliberal minorities. Manypeople continue tobelieve thatminority rights claims canbedismissed simply on the grounds that they violate neutrality and individualism. However, it is increasingly accepted that appeals to individualism do not help resolve real-world conflicts overminority rights. Theissue isnotthemerits ofliberal-democratic principles, butrather the appropriate forms, limits andconsequences ofnation-building policies, andthesorts ofbias andevenhypocrisy which typically accompany them.

8. Minority Rights in Communitarian Societies These shifts inthetheory andpractice ofminority rights intheWestconstitute some of themostimportant developments inWestern democracies inthetwentieth century. The shift fromsuppressing to accommodating minority nationalisms has, I believe, played a vital role inconsolidating anddeepening democracy inthe West. Butto whatextent, ifany, is this relevant to communitarian societies that donot vejusttold share Western liberal values? Onfirst glance, itmayappear thatthestory I’ simply confirms thata Western theory ofminority rights cannot apply tosuchsocieties. After all, Iwasinsisting thatmostminorities intheWestarenotcommunitarian, andthat thekeyquestion iswhyliberal minorities, whoshare themajority’s individualist values,

nonetheless wantorneed minority rights. InEast Asia, bycontrast, weare assuming (exhypothesi) that there are at least some countries inwhich communitarian sentiments aredeeply shared throughout the society. Weare assuming (forthesake ofargument) that Lee KuanYewis correct in saying that communitarianism is a core value shared across ethnic andracial lines in some East Asian countries. So we need a theory which asks whether and why communitarian minorities would seek minority rights. Atheory designed for liberalminded minorities intheWestdoes notseemhelpful here. Insuch a communitarian society, notonly does the minority see itself as communitarian, butso toodoes the majority. This is another important difference withthe West. Yetthis, paradoxically, creates animportant similarity between thetwocontexts. They are, in fact, mirror images of each other. In the West, we typically have individualistic minorities fighting individualistic majorities; inthose East Asian countries that define themselves as communitarian, wefindcommunitarian minorities struggling with communitarian majorities. This means thatthere arecertain structural similarities between the twocontexts. Forexample, inboth contexts, the nature ofthe conflict is typically notoverthe relative merits of individualism orcommunitarianism. Asa general rule, both minority andmajority share similar assessments onthis basic question –i.e., theyshare similar

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views about therelative importance

47

ofindividual autonomy versus cultural traditions. So

whatthen is the source of conflict between majorities andminorities? The answer, I suggest, maybe the same in both contexts: namely, nation-building programs. The fundamental problem isthatstate power is usedtoembark onnation-building programs thatthreaten minority interests andidentities. I noted in section 5 that Asian states have adopted nation-building programs. Indeed, they have often adopted the same sorts of policies relating to settlement, internal political subunits andlanguage rights that I discussed inthe previous section.

Consider government policies topromote ethnic Bengali settlement intheChittagong HillTracts ofBangladesh, orethnic Javanese settlement oftheAceharea ofIndonesia; orChristian settlement ofthe Moroareas ofthe Philippines; orethnic Hansettlement ofTibet andEastern Mongolia inChina; orViet settlement ofthe Champa andMontagnard areas ofVietnam; orArabsettlement ofthe Kurdish areas ofIraq. Orconsider the manycases inwhich minorities have beenstripped oftheir traditional self-government, either through thecentralization ofpower orthe redrawing ofboundaries. Asin theWest, thisdisempowering ofminorities hasoften occurred evenwhere promises had beenmadetorespect theautonomy ofminorities, as inBaluchistan inPakistan, Arakan andKachinland inBurma/Myanmar, South Moluccas inIndonesia, East Turkestan in China, orManipur andKerala inIndia. Orconsider the policies to impose the majority Sinhalese language ontheTamils inSriLanka; orthe Persian language onthe Arabistans inIran; orthe Urdulanguage onthe Sindhi inPakistan. Another similarity between EastandWestisthatinbothcontexts wefindminorities mobilizing to gain protections against government policies relating to settlement, linguistic homogenization, orthe denial of historical orpromised autonomy. Indeed, in mostcases ofmajor ethnic conflict inAsia, as intheWest, wecanfindoneormore of these three policies at the root of the conflict. Given these structural similarities between Western andAsian societies, itisworth asking whether there arealsosimilarities inthemoral debates about minority rights. On the surface, people inEast Asia andthe West mayseemto employ a different moral framework fordebating minority rights. Inthe West, minority rights have often been assessed interms ofindividualism; insome self-declared communitarian countries of East Asia, they have often been assessed interms ofcommunitarianism. YetIwould suggest thatunderneath this difference inmoral vocabulary, there may be a similar structure of argumentation. In each case, notions of individualism and communitarianism are being used, ormisused, tohide theexercise ofmajority power. veargued that intheWest, theclaim that minority rights violate individualism is I’ hypocritical. AsI’ vetried to show, majorities take several active measures to protect their collective identities andinterests. Whattheyobject tois giving minorities the power tosimilarly protect their collective identities andinterests. Individualism, inother words, is invoked selectively, andindeed hypocritically, todenyminorities thesame capacity topromote their collective identities thatthe majority takes forgranted. Itseems to methat a similar sort of problem can occur inappeals to ‘com-munitarianism’. Notions ofcommunitarianism canbe invoked selectively toencourage the expression ofthe majority’s collective identity while suppressing the minority’s collective identity.

ve just mentioned. As inthe West, minorities vary Consider the minorities inAsia I’ levels of individualism and communitarianism, but we are assuming (ex hypothesi) that at least some Asian minorities are genuinely communitarian: they emphasize the communal good over individual autonomy: for example, they value

in their

duties

tofamily, community andculture which makeexitfromgroups difficult, andwhich

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reduce the scope forindividual choice within groups. Theyalso place great weight on thevirtues ofpiety, deference toelders andtoauthority, andthehonouring ofancestral

traditions, all of which limit the scope for dissent and reform within groups. They also accept paternalism insocial relationships, andso grant greater power to parents over children, teachers over students, or employers over employees, than a liberal group would accept. These virtues aresincerely endorsed andpractised within communitarian minority groups. Insuchcases, therefore, bothminorities andmajorities arecommunitarian. What theybothwantis notanincrease inindividual autonomy –as themembers ofa liberal group might seek– butrather theability toexercise their basic communitarian virtues. Whythendothey have anyconflict? Because nation-building policies adopted bythe state strengthen the majority’s ability toexercise these virtues, while suppressing the minority’s ability. Take a simple case: consider thewayJapan forced manyAinutoadopt Japanese surnames inthe nineteenth century, andforced the Koreans to adopt Japanese surnames (until 1984) to become naturalized citizens. This seems directly inconflict with communitarianism: itprevents people fromhonouring their ancestors. Moregenerally, assimilationist policies, far from helping people to fulfil their communal obligations, pressure themtoleave their communities, andtodisobey their local elders andauthorities. Nation-building policies are a direct assault oncommunitarian values. Whenminorities inEast Asia resist these policies, theymaydoso notinthe name ofliberal individualism, butrather inthenameofcommunitarianism. Theymaydemand minority rights precisely to enable themto continue to act according to the common good, cultural traditions and respected authorities of their community andculture. Minority rights, inother words, ensure a basic reciprocity inthepursuit ofcommunitarian values; theyensure that minorities have thesame ability toactontheir communitarian values as the majority demands foritself. To criticize minority demands on the grounds that they violate communitarian values is, therefore, somewhat suspicious. Itseems to involve the same sort ofselectivity andhypocrisy that wesawinWestern appeals to individualism. There maybe legitimate reasons forpromoting majority nation-building while opposing minority rights, s difficult tosee howthese could becommunitarian reasons, since majority nationbutit’ building undermines people’s capacity to fulfil communitarian virtues, while minority rights enhance this capacity. Ifweapply communitarianism ina reciprocal way,rather than a biased or hypocritical way, it supports minority rights, just as the reciprocal application of individualism supports minority rights. Soitseems tomethatcommunitarians inEastAsia, as muchas liberals intheWest, canrecognize theinjustice ofmajority oppression ofminority cultures. Tobesure, they maydescribe this injustice indifferent ways. Liberals tendtosaythat members ofan ethnic group have a right to pass on their culture, if they so choose, and majority oppression violates this right. Communitarians, bycontrast, would saythatmembers of a group have a duty topass ontheir culture –a dutythattakes precedence over, and so limits, individual freedom ofchoice. Buttheresult isthesame: whether wedescribe thepassing oneofone’s culture asa right ora duty, theconclusion isthatminorities need protection from majority nation-building. Forcertain issues, itdoes matter whether weusethelanguage ofrights orduties. Inparticular, itmatters forwhatinsection 2 Icalled “internal restrictions” . Ifwesaythat people have a dutyto pass ontheir culture, this suggests that it is legitimate foran ethnocultural group toimpose internal restrictions onitsownmembers. Thegroup may restrict theability ofindividuals toexitordissent, soas topreserve group harmony and

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Bycontrast, ifwesaythat people have a right topass ontheir culture, then suchinternal restrictions arelikely tobeseenasillegitimate, since itisuptotheindividual todecide whether orhowshe wishes todrawuponcultural traditions inthefashioning tradition.44

of her life-plan. This reflects

a deepandenduring difference between liberals andcommunitarians. Communitarian groups often viewtheir culture, notas providing a set ofoptions from which individuals have a right tochoose, butrather as embodying a sacred trust which members have a duty to maintain anduphold.45 Whereas liberals strongly oppose internal restrictions as a violation of individual autonomy, communitarians will likely support a range ofinternal restrictions. AsI noted insection 2, Ipersonally defend the liberal viewonthis issue, butIrealize thatthis commitment toindividual autonomy is not a universal value, andthat there is norealistic expectation ofgaining a cross-cultural consensus onthe legitimacy orillegitimacy of such internal restrictions. ve set aside the issue of internal restrictions forthe purpose of this This is whyI’ Lecture. But howdoes this disagreement about internal restrictions affect claims to external protections? Itseems tomethatwhether wesee participation inone’s culture as a right ora duty, ineither case itishypocritical forthemajority todenyminorities the opportunity to exercise this right or fulfil this duty. The claim that people have a right to their culture should beconvincing toindividualists; theclaim thatpeople have a dutyto pass on their culture should be convincing to communitarians. If anything, this communitarian claim thatwehavea sacred dutytopass onourculture isanevenmore powerful argument forprotecting minorities fromcoercive assimilation. Sofaras Icantell, then, thedifference between liberals andcommunitarians matters a great dealforissues ofintra-group relations, butisless relevant toissues ofintergroup relations. Western states often appeal to individualism and East Asian states often appeal tocommunitarianism, butinbothcases this appeal mayactas a smokescreen forimposing the majority’s collective identity onthe minority. Andwhatmakes this imposition unjust is notanydistinctively Western values ofchoice orautonomy, but morebasic norms ofreciprocity: itis unjust formajorities todenytominorities whatthey claim forthemselves. Western individualIfIamright, thenthefamiliar rhetoric about conflicts between “ ism” Asian values” and“ maynotbe an insurmountable obstacle to developing and applying a common theory ofminority rights (intheformofexternal protections). Ifthere are civilizational differences on the value of individual auto-nomy, this maymake agreement impossible onissues of internal restrictions. Butonissues of inter-group relations, minorities maybevulnerable tothesame lackofreciprocity inboththeWest andEast, anda common theory of minority rights can help identify andrectify these vulnerabilities. Attheriskofoversimplifying, letmerestate mybasic argument initssimplest form. Imagine that wecould define a continuum of communitarianism/individualism, with American liberals nearoneendandChinese Confucians neartheother end.Andlet’s imagine thatwecould locate bothmajority andminority groups onthis continuum. Ihave made twobasic claims:

44 Theviewthat one has a dutyto pass oncultural traditions does notautomatically leadto such internal restrictions. Indeed, onecould argue thatcompelling people todotheir dutyis counterproductive: forcing people to lookafter their elderly parents, under threat oflegal sanction, mayerode 45

rather than support the virtue offamily piety For a helpful discussion, see Parekh 1997.

andrespect.

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(a) wherever they are onthis continuum,

majority groups are likely to adopt nationbuilding programs which threaten minority groups. Acommunitarian majority culture is just as likely to seek to impose its hegemony on minority cultures as an individualist majority culture; (b) wherever they are onthis continuum, minority groups are likely to resist majority nation-building programs, andseekvarious minority rights as a protection against them. Acommunitarian minority isjustas likely toseekthis sortofprotection as an individualistic minority. Putanother way, imagine that wewantto predict the attitude ofanethnocultural group towards minority rights. Tohelpusmakethis prediction, wecanaskeither W here or Doesthis“group does this group fitontheindividualism/communitarian continuum?” “ forma majority ora minority inthestate?” . Ibelieve thatthelatter isa much better predictor ofattitudes towards minority rights thantheformer. Itisa group’s place within the state that determines its attitude towards minority rights, notits place onthe individu-

alism/communitarianism continuum. Ofcourse, a majority group thatopposes minority rights willseekto rationalize its opposition. Hence individualistic majorities willsaythat minority rights violate individualism, andcommunitarian majorities willsaythatminority rights violate communitarianism. ButifIamright, these areoften just ideological rationalizations fortheexercise ofmajority power. This is confirmed bythefact thatwhentheyfindthemselves ina minority, bothindividualistic andcommunitarian groups arelikely tosupport minority rights. When Muslims are ina majority (as inPakistan), theyoppose minority rights; whentheyare ina minority (as inthePhilippines), theyendorse them. Similarly, intheWest, whenthe French areina majority (as inFrance) theyoppose minority rights, whentheyareina minority (as inCanada) they endorse minority rights.

9. A Few Objections Needless

tosay, there are manypossible

objections

tothe(over)-simplified

argument

Ihavejustgiven. Iwilldiscuss three suchobjections: theideal ofharmony; theneedfor stability;

andthe needforeconomic

development.

vemissed animportant aspect ofEast 1. Theideal ofharmony: Onemight argue that I’ Asian communitarianism, an aspect that distinguishes it from Western-style communitarianism. Insome East Asian traditions, communitarianism requires notonly a certain model ofintra-group relations (based onpiety anddeference), butalsoa certain model of inter-group relations. In particular, East Asian communitarianism seeks “ harmony” between ethnocultural groups (He1998). Andthis harmony requires notonly theabsence ofviolence, butalso a common moral order, andtheabsence ofmoral –a cosuniversal kingship” disagreement. Andthis inturn generates the ideal of a “ all under mopolitan world order. This is reflected in the Confucian ideal or principle of “ , which says that allethnocultural groups ought ideally to be unified under a Heaven” single ruler. Itis notenough, fromthis point ofview, foreach group to be well-ordered internally, interms ofthe basic values ofcommon goodandpiety. Inaddition, each of these communitarian groups should be integrated into a harmonious world order. Joseph Chan calls this the ideal of “ grand unificationism”(Chan 2001). This is indeed an interesting difference between East Asian and Western communitarianism, since thelatter istypically anti-cosmopolitan, andseeks community

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onlyinsmaller-scale, sub-national groupings.46 Buthowdoesthis desire forinter-group harmony affect claims to minority rights? In what ways, if any, are minority rights inconsistent withsuch harmony?

The Confucian ideal of harmony has often been cited bythe HanChinese as a justification forconquering andincorporating groups at the boundaries ofthe empire. Butthatisatleast partly duetothefactthattheharmony argument hasbeenconjoined withanother, verydifferent argument: namely, theclaim that minorities arebackward the “ barbarians” . civilize” anduncivilized, andso itis the responsibility ofthe Chinese to “ This justification forimperialism has a long andsordid history inboth the East and West. Itwascited bytheWestas grounds forcolonizing mostofAsiaandAfrica, aswell as colonizing indigenous peoples inthe Americas. Within Asia, it wascited bythe Japanese as grounds for annexing Ainu lands in the nineteenth century, and for annexing Korea inthetwentieth century, anditwascited bytheChinese as grounds for annexing Tibet.47 However, the idea that societies that are economically ormilitarily superior canannex less technologically advanced societies hasnowbeenuniversally rejected.

argument. barbarian” argument fromthe“ Soweneedtoseparate outthe“harmony” What does the ideal of harmony require orjustify ina multiethnic society where the

and minorities is not a distinction between civilized peoples andbarbarians? There is some evidence that, under these conditions, Confucian scholars sawunification as a voluntary process.48 Itistheforce ofmoral example, not the force of arms, which will attract minorities to join the ‘universal kingship’. Ifso, thenitseems to methat minority rights are notanobstacle toharmony, but rather its precondition. Indeed, minority rights canserve twofunctions: (a)theyprotect minorities fromanyattempt bythe majority toforcibly include them; and(b)they are likely tobe oneoftheterms under which minorities agree toenter a larger polity. We have manyexamples ofthis from boththe West andEast. Manyminorities doinfact seektobepartoflarger political communities, andhaveoften voluntarily agreed tojoin them. Butifwelookattheterms ofagreement, theyalmost always include respect for minority rights. Leaders inEast Turkestan andTibet were willing tojoinChina, so long astheir autonomy wasguaranteed. ThesameistrueofBaluchistan inPakistan, Arakan andKachinland inBurma/Myanmar, South Moluccas inIndonesia, andManipur and Kerala inIndia. Yetinallofthese cases, autonomy hasbeendenied, violating theterms ofagreement, andturning a voluntary unification intoaninvoluntary incorporation. And the result, inmost ofthese cases, was notharmony, butcivil war. Minority rights, inshort, arebotha precondition for,anda likely result of,a voluntary process ofunification. Whatother route to unification canpass thetest ofreciprocity? s assume thatallofthegroups share a desire forharmony, andso eachwishes to Let’ minimize moral disagreement amongst thevarious groups. Eachgroup therefore seeks to persuade other groups of the merits of its particular moral views. Butif voluntary persuasion ends anddisagreement remains, whatthen dowedo? Perhaps a majority group mayseek to forcibly impose its values onminorities; or perhaps a well-organized minority mayseektoimpose itsviews ona weakmajority. The distinction between majorities

46

7. Sandel 1984, p. 93; Cf. Miller 1989: 60– between Western andAsian uses ofthis argument

47 Thesimilarities 48

are notaccidental. Theearlier barbarians” wastransformed inthe nineteenth-century bythe influence of Confucian claim about “ Social Darwinist ideologies from the West. See Siddle 1996: 11. Chancites thefollowing passages insupport ofthis claim: Confucius, TheAnalects, ed.D.C. Lau (Penguin, 1979), Book XVI, 1; Xunzi: A Translation andStudy of the Complete Works, ed. John Knoblock (Stanford University Press, 1988), Book 11, 6.

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outcome of such struggles willdepend on the balance of power, which may be difficult

topredict. Butnomatter whattheoutcome, wehave noreason toaccord itanymoral under these conditions issimply a matter ofbrute harmony” legitimacy. Thepursuit of“ power, of “ might makes right” . Inother words, Iwould suggest thatsome setofminority rights is needed tomake isnotsimply a smokescreen forthepursuit ofmajority surethatthepursuit of“ harmony” hegemony. Inthe absence of minority rights, howcanwedistinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses ofthe harmony ideal? Howcanwedistinguish moral harmony from “ might makes right” ?

2. Stability: AsConfucian scholars themselves recognized, the pursuit of inter-ethnic “ harmony” is a utopian ideal, difficult toachieve inthe realworld. Butwhatwecanand must achieve is some minimal level of peace andstability. Weneed, above all, to minimize violence. Andthere maybesituations inEastAsiawhere recognizing minority nation-building” rights could lead to inter-communal violence. Ifso, then a phase of “ programs maybe needed to help create a sense of pan-ethnic solidarity, andthe recognition of minority rights mayneed to be deferred until ethnic relations are less volatile.

This is a legitimate concern, butit is nota distinctly Asian concern. AsI noted in 4, the same argument was given inthe West to defend state nation-building programs, andtoattack minority rights. IntheWest, there isincreasing recognition that this fear was overstated, andthat minority rights do notdestabilize states. ve Perhaps the situation incertain parts ofAsia is different.49 Butthe evidence I’ seendoes notsupport this view. Forexample, weknowthatsettlement policies arethe most common source of violent conflict inthe world. Indigenous peoples andother section

homeland minorities typically resist suchmassive settlement policies, evenwithforce, ifnecessary. Minority rights helpavoid this source ofviolence. Moregenerally, weknow that refusing or rescinding self-government rights is likely to escalate the level of conflict. These generalizations seemas true ofAsia as anyother part oftheworld.50 Butthis is anempirical matter, andI amnotanexpert inrisk-assessments. Inany event, this does notraise anycivilizational differences between EastandWest. Wecan all recognize the need for restrictions on rights (be they traditional human rights or minority rights) where theycreate a clear andpresent danger ofviolence. Wecanalso agree that assessing this level of risk requires a great deal of local knowledge (Bell 1996). Noneofthis affects thebasic principle Ihave beendefending sofar:namely, that reciprocity requires certain minority rights, andthat the burden of proof falls onthose whowould restrict suchrights, rather thanonthose whodefend them. Weshould affirm a principle ofminority rights, notbecause these rights areabsolute andexceptionless, butrather because those whowishto restrict themshould have to prove that these restrictions are infact needed toavoid violence orother emergencies.

3. Economic Development: A third objection to minority rights is that they impede economic development, which is (or should be) the most urgent priority of developing states. Here again, this argument is nota distinctively Asian one. AsI noted insection 4, the need for economic development was often used in the West to dispossess 49 This argument isoften madeabout ethnic 50

relations inSingapore inthe 1960s, andinMalaysia. See Seifert 1998; Bell 1996: 38. Noneofthemajor surveys ofglobal ethnic conflict resolution (e.g., Gurr1993, 2000; Hannum 1990; Lapidoth 1996) suggest that Asia is an exception to this generalization.

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national minorities oftheir lands andresources. Butit maybe particularly relevant to Asia today, since there are indeed manycases where the homelands of indigenous peoples include substantial landandresources thatcould helpalleviate poverty inthe larger society. Protecting the rights ofindigenous peoples maymake itmore difficult to ensure that the basic needs ofthe majority are met. This is an important issue. But again, there is no civilizational difference here. Western liberals also accept theneedtolimit certain rights inorder toachieve a basic minimum ofwell-being. Indeed, just such a proviso is built into the mostfamous con2). thatofJohn Rawls (Rawls 1971: 151– temporary Western theory ofliberal justice – Tobesure, Western liberals are sceptical that restrictions onrights really dopromote thewell-being ofthepoor. Andthere maybegoodreason forsuchscepticism inthecase ofsettlement ordevelopment policies thatviolate therights ofindigenous peoples. Many critics argue that when elites justify settlement policies in indigenous lands on the ground thatthese policies aidtheheartland poor, this isoften a dishonest rationalization fortheir ownenrichment; theelites makesurethattheyacquire title tothemostvaluable landormineral resources forthemselves (Swaney andOlson 1992). Butevenwhen well-intentioned, these forms ofsettlement areoften unsustainable. Forexample, turningrainforest intofarms justdoesn’twork–landclearance leads tosoildamage, erosion andpollution, withsoil exhaustion after one ortwoharvests, which leads to abandonmentofthelandandfurther deforestation (deOnis 1992). Perhaps theonlysustainable

forms of use are those already practised bythe indigenous peoples, which is not surprising since they knowmost about the possibilities and limits of their environment. Settlement plans arealmost always flawed inoneormoreofthese ways: theyserve therichrather thanthepoor; and/or theyleadtoenvironmental destruction rather than sustainable development. Butthis isanempirical question, which needs tobeexamined case-by-case. There mayindeed becases where anindigenous community claims an unfair share ofresources, andifso, itis legitimate forthestate to insist thatthecommunity progressively economize ontheuseofresources. However, evenhere, there are just andunjust ways of gaining access to indigenous resources. Rather than the involuntary appropriation of their lands, the state could instead impose some formof a resource tax(Penz 1993: 121). Itwould beuptotheindigenous peoples themselves to decide howtomanage their resources topayforthistax.Somecommunities maydecide tosellsome oftheir land, orlease it,ordevelop some oftheir mineral wealth, orinvite outside people to develop the wealth for them. The point is that if reciprocity is to be maintained, indigenous peoples mustbeactively involved intheprocess (e.g., through co-management), andtheextraction ofresources should seektominimize cultural harm (e.g., through limitations onsettlement).51 Here again, the point of affirming minority rights is not to make absolute claims, but rather to ensure that states which wish to violate these rights doso onlyinspecial circumstances, which are demonstrably justified, andonlyinthe least intrusive ways.

ve These issues ofpolitical stability andeconomic development arecomplicated, andI’ only been able to scratch the surface. Moreover, there surely are other sorts of ve tried to do inthis section is objections that could be raised to minority rights. What I’ nottoconclusively resolve these debates, butrather toreframe them, andtomovethem vetried toshow awayfromthesterile rhetoric ofindividualism andcommunitarianism. I’ howapparently opposite conceptions ofindividualism andcommunitarianism canbe used (ormisused) invirtually identical ways to suppress minority claims, andthat the

51 I develop this theme in more depth in Kymlicka 2001a, chap. 7.

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realissue inmostcases isreciprocity inthewayshared values areinstitutionalized. This doesn’t prove that itwillbe possible toachieve a cross-cultural consensus onminority rights. ButI hopetohaveatleast cleared awayoneofthemostcommon objections to sucha project. Bibliography andthe Rights of Ethnic Minorities” , Notre Dame 76. LawReview 67/3, 615– Ethnicity andInsurgency intheChittagong HillTracts Region” Ahmed, Aftab (1993) “ , Journal ofCommonwealth and Comparative Politics 31/3: 32– 66. Centralization, Authoritarianism andtheMismanagement ofEthnic Relations in Ahmed, Samina (1997) “ , in Brown and Ganguly (eds): 83–128 Pakistan” Alfred, Gerald (1995) Heeding the Voices of ourAncestors: Kahnawake Mohawk Politics and the Rise of Native Nationalism (Oxford University Press, Toronto). Anaya, S. James (1996) Indigenous Peoples inInternational Law(Oxford University Press, NewYork). Anderson, Benedict (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections ontheOrigin andSpread ofNationalism Individualism, Communitarianism Addis, Adeno (1992) “

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77. in Asia” , in Bauer and Bell (1999), 336– Krishna, Sankaran (1999) Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka andthe Question ofNationhood (University ofMinnesota Press, Minneapolis). Kwang, HanFooketal(eds) (1998) LeeKuanYew:TheManandHisIdeas (Times Editions, Singapore).

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Kymlicka, Will(1995) Multicultural Citizenship: ALiberal Theory ofMinority Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford). Kymlicka, Will(1998) Finding OurWay: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Oxford University Press, Toronto). Kymlicka, Will (2001a) Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship (Oxford University Press, Oxford). Western Political Theory andEthnic Relations inEastern Europe” Kymlicka, Will(2001b) “ , inWillKymlicka and Magda Opalski (eds) (2001) Can Liberal Pluralism Be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations inEastern Europe (Oxford University Press, Oxford). Kymlicka, WillandAlanPatten (eds) (2003) Language Rights andPolitical Theory (Oxford University Press, Oxford). Lapidoth, Ruth (1996) Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts (U.S. Institute of Peace Press,

Washington). Laponce, Jean (1987) Languages andtheir Territories (University ofToronto Press, Toronto). The Case for Ethnic Federalism in Multilingual Societies: Canada’s Regional Laponce, Jean (1993) “ , Regional Politics and Policy 3/1, 23–43. Imperative” McDonald, Michael (1991a) “ Questions about Collective Rights” , inD.Schneiderman (ed.) Language and the State: The Lawand Politics of Identity (Les Editions Yvon Blais, Cowansville). McDonald, Michael (1991b) “ Should Communities Have Rights? Reflections on Liberal Individualism” , 37. Canadian Journal ofLawandJurisprudence 4/2, 217– Demographic Engineering: TheState-Directed Movements ofEthnic Groups as a McGarry, John(1998) “ 38. Technique of Conflict Resolution” , Ethnic and Racial Studies 21/4, 615– Miller, David (1989) “ , Social Philosophy andPolicy 6/ InWhatSense MustSocialism beCommunitarian?”

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(1995) OnNationality (Oxford University Press, Oxford). Narveson, Jan(1991) “ 45. Collective Rights?” , Canadian Journal ofLawandJurisprudence 4/2, pp.329– Interplay Between Human Rights Activities and Legal Standards of Human Onuma, Yasuaki (1992) “ , Cornell International LawJournal 25/3, 515– Rights: ACase Study oftheKorean Minority inJapan” Miller, David

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, Human TheNeedforanIntercivilizational Approach toEvaluating Human Rights” Onuma, Yasuaki (1997) “ Rights Dialogue, 10. 62. Parekh, Bhikhu (1997) “ , Constellations 4/1, 54– Dilemmas ofa Multicultural Theory ofCitizenship” Development Refugees andDistributive Justice: Indigenous Peoples, Landandthe Penz, Peter (1992) “ Developmentalist State” , Public Affairs Quarterly 6/1,105–31, , inMichael Howard (ed.) Penz, Peter (1993) “ Colonization ofTribal Lands inBangladesh andIndonesia” 72. Asia’s Environmental Crisis (Westview Press, Boulder), 37– Pogge, Thomas (1995) “ HowShould Human Rights BeConceived” , inJahrbuch fürRecht undEthik, Vol. 120. 3, 103–

Qing, He(1997) “ 80. Nationalism andCosmopolitanism” , Chinese Studies inPhilosophy, 28/3, 75– Rawls, John (1971) ATheory ofJustice (Oxford University Press). RCAP–Royal Commission onAboriginal Peoples (1996) Report oftheRoyal Commission onAborignial Peoples. Volume 2: Restructuring the Relationship (Ottawa). Sandel, Michael (1984) “ , Political Theory 12/1, 81– The Procedural Republic andthe Unencumbered Self”

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Seifert, Franz (1998) “ A Cultural Challenge to Liberal Democracy in Southeast Asia?”(Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Political Science Series #53). , in Brown andGanguly Shastri, Amita (1997) “ Government Policy andthe Ethnic Crisis inSri Lanka” 63. (eds): 129– . Alternatives, Nation-Building inMulti-Ethnic Societies: TheExperience ofSouth Asia” Sheth, D.L.(1989) “

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Siddle, Richard (1996) Race, Resistance andtheAinuofJapan (Routledge, London). Silverstein, Josef (1997b) “ Federalism as a Solution totheEthnic Problem inBurma” , inGunther Bachler, ed.Federalism Against Ethnicity: Institutional, Legal andDemocratic Instruments toPrevent Violent 67. Minority Conflicts (Verlag Ruegger, Zurich): 261– Smith, Anthony (1993). “ OrtheNation ofEurope?” AEurope ofNations – , Journal ofPeace Research 30/

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Human Rights Issues inChinese Internal Migration: Insights fromComparisons Sollinger, Dorothy (1999) “ , in Bauer and Bell (1999), 285–312. with Germany and Japan” Spinner, Jeff (1994) TheBoundaries of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity andNationality inthe Liberal State (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore). Stanley, F.G. (1961) The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellions (University of Toronto Press, Toronto). Liberal Democracy and Group Rights: The Legacy of Individualism and its Svensson, Frances (1979) “ 39. , Political Studies 27/3, 421– Impact on American Indian Tribes” TheEconomics ofDiversity: Lives andLifestyles” Swaney, James andPaulette Olson (1992), “ , Journal of 25. Economic Issues 26/2: 1– , in AmyGutmann (ed.) Multiculturalism andthe The Politics of Recognition” Taylor, Charles (1992) “ ‘Politics of Recognition’( Princeton University Press, Princeton), 25– 73. , Dissent, Summer 1996. Taylor, Charles (1996) “ AWorld Consensus onHuman Rights?” , inJ. McMahan andR.McKim (eds), TheMorality of Nationalism andModernity” Taylor, Charles (1997) “ Nationalism (Oxford University Press, NewYork). Thier, Alexander (1999), “ Afghanistan: Minority Rights andAutonomy in a Multi-ethnic Failed State” , 88. Stanford Journal ofInternational Law35: 351– Triandis, Harry (1995) Individualism and Collectivism (Westview Press, Boulder). Tully, James (1995) Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge). VanDyke, Vernon (1977) “ TheIndividual, theState, andEthnic Communities inPolitical Theory” , World

69. Politics 29/3, 343– VanDyke, Vernon (1982) “ Collective Rights and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal-Democratic Thought” , Journal ofPolitics 44, 21– 40. deVarennes, Fernard (1996) Language, Minorities andHuman Rights (Kluwer, TheHague). Walzer, Michael (1983) Spheres of Justice (Basic Books, NewYork). 23. The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism” , Political Theory 18/1, 6– Walzer, Michael (1990) “ , inAmyGutmann (ed.) Multiculturalism andthe‘Politics ofRecognition’ Comment” Walzer, Michael (1992) “ (Princeton University Press, Princeton). Walzer, Michael (1997) OnToleration (Yale University Press, NewHaven). Weiner, Michael (ed) (1997) Japan’s Minorities: TheIllusion ofHomogeneity (Routledge, London). Young, Iris Marion (1990) Justice andthe Politics ofDifference (Princeton University Press, Princeton).

FUKADA Mitsunori

Comments andQuestions

to Professor W.Kymlicka

entitled “ Universal Minority Rights? The Prospects for Consensus,” Professor Kymlicka attempts toapply histheory onminority (group-differentiated) rights toEastAsian states orsocieties, andtoprove thathistheory isvalid forAsian minorities. Iappreciate Kymlicka’s liberal approach andendorse his viewof minority rights; Iwould like toadda fewimpressions ofmyown,andaskseveral questions.

In his chapter

Kymlicka refers in his paper to the basic values of fairness andreciprocity between majority andminority groups innation-states, which hepoints toasconstituting thebasis forminority rights. However, thecultures of East Asian states are broad anddiverse. Theyhave also beenaltered bytheinfluence ofWestern countries: concepts suchas constitutionalism, democracy, andthe ideal of human rights have allbeen introduced

into East Asia fromthe West. This filtering into Asia of Western concepts is reflected in the phenomenon of “ universalization andinternationalization ofhuman rights.” MostEastAsian states now have written constitutions and some form of a Bill of Rights. Allof them have ratified the International Covenant onthe Rights ofthe Child; manyhave also ratified the International Covenant onEconomic, Social, andCultural Rights andtheCovenant onCivil andPolitical Rights. Recently, eventhe People’s Republic ofChina hasjoined these covenants. Asa result, itiscertain thattheideal ofhuman rights hasbeenreceived and accepted byEast Asian states. However, itis equally apparent thattheforminwhich this ideal hasbeenexpressed inAsia todate is muchless developed thanitis inthe West. , cultural relativism, andthe We have seen assertions of “Asian human rights” priority of economic development bysome political leaders of East Asian states; but those assertions have generally beencriticized, andhavefailed toreceive widespread support. Wecantherefore safely saythatvalues suchas individual autonomy andliberty arevalid forEastAsia. Evenifinsomestates andsocieties theycurrently liedormant, orare latent, those values willnodoubt emerge inthe nearfuture. Asresult, itwould seemthatminority rights inEast Asia cannot bejustified simply byreferring tofairness orreciprocity between majorities andminorities. Rather, other values being accepted byAsian people –suchas individual autonomy –mustalso be included in the analysis. Moreover, ifone were to refer only to the notions of fairness andreciprocity, the concept ofaffirmative action could appear inconsistent withthem. Intheinternational community, manysuchapparent inconsistencies canbefound among groups, classes, regions, andpeoples. Ifthey were allcorrected as problems of rights, too manynew ). Fairness andreciprocity meanthat equal rights would be created (a “ flood of rights” groups mustbetreated equally. Thus, fairness alone appears insufficient tojustify both minority rights andhuman rights. Inhischapter, Kymlicka emphasizes thevalue ofindividual autonomy froma liberal perspective. This isclearly demonstrated byhisrejection ofinternal restrictions. Myfirst question is: does Kymlicka believe thatthevalue ofindividual autonomy is universally valid? Thatis,does hebelieve thatitisvalid onlyforWestern countries, oralsoforEast Asian states?

Comments

andQuestions to Professor W.Kymlicka

59

Mynextquestion is:does Kymlicka identify anyother universally valid values, such as equality andfairness, inaddition to individual autonomy? Ifso, whatarethey? also criticizes ethnocentrism and cultural imperialism in his chapter, and rejects internal restrictions. Hesupports people’s freedom to interpret, criticize, and revise their owncultures (ina broad sense), andsometimes even break awayfrom them. Historically, societies andcultures have changed through contact withother cultures. Some cultures (orparts ofthem) have subsequently survived anddeveloped; others havedisappeared. Cultures compete foracceptance. Does Kymlicka think that thecultures ofsocieties orstates makeprogress asa result ofsuchcultural interactions? Howisthatprogress evaluated? Iwould imagine thatcriteria exist forundertaking such anevaluation, especially relating tothe protection ofhuman life, person, liberty, and dignity. Inthis regard, howdoes Kymlicka assess thepractices andcustoms ofsome Islamic societies, such as the subordination of women, female circumcision, and punishments thattooutsiders might seemunusually cruel? Finally, I would like to reiterate myappreciation for Kymlicka’s liberal approach to minority rights. HisLectures have forced us to reexamine the issue of howvarious nations andethnic groups are to live together inmulticultural states. I also appreciate Kymlicka’s emphasis onthe importance ofliberal tolerance indenying internal restrictions. Conflicts among civilizations andcultures arelikely tointensify inthe21st Century, as international coexistence becomes increasingly crucial. I believe that Kymlicka’s suggestions areveryvaluable inhelping topoint thewaytowards aneffective solution forthose conflicts. Kymlicka

ISHIYAMA Fumihiko

A ‘Distinctively Liberal’Theory of Minority Rights?* WillKymlicka is one of the leading political philosophers whodefend minority rights from a liberal point ofview. Hehascriticized mainstream liberal theories forcherishing the mythofstate ethnocultural neutrality andthereby having either rejected thelegitimacy ofminority rights orneglected pressing issues ofethnocultural justice altogether. Hehas claimed that modern states are notethnoculturally neutral, andthat common rights of citizenship are notenough to ensure that minorities have equal access to their own ‘societal culture’that enables themto exercise their individual freedom meaningfully. Kymlicka has thus defended minority rights within a theoretical framework of liberal justice. Hisapproach towards minority rights hasbeen‘distinctively liberal’as hehimself characterized it.1 Inhislecture “Universal Minority Rights? TheProspects forConsensus,” 2Kymlicka says that hisprevious theory wasmeant primarily forWestern democracies, andtries toexplore ‘which parts ofthetheory [are] applicable tonon-Western countries,’3some ofwhich are, ex hypothesi, communitarian.4 Heclaims that modern states, bothinthe West andEast, are ‘nation-building’states.5 However, while inthe context ofWestern democracies he supports ‘external protections’(i.e., certain protections against the exercise ofmajority power) andatthesametimestrongly opposes ‘internal restrictions’ (i.e., restrictions onindividual freedom within ethnocultural groups), Kymlicka sets aside the latter issue anddefends onlytheformer whenhediscusses minority rights inthe non-Western context. Heclaims thatthe realissue intheminority rights debate, both inWestern andnon-Western societies, isnotthevalue ofindividual freedom, butbasic reciprocity between the majority andthe minority.6 I agree that modern states are notculturally neutral, but rather ‘nation-building’ states; and,forthesake ofthis brief commentary, I amevenwilling toassume that at least some East Asian countries are strongly communitarian. But when Kymlicka defends external protections inthecontext ofnon-Western societies without anytalkof internal restrictions, itseems tomethatherevises hisprevious theory ina fundamental way. Perhaps he brackets the latter issue because of his concern withthe ‘realistic chance ofgetting anunforced [international] consensus’7onthe legitimacy ofminority rights. However, Iwanttotaketheseparation ofthese twoissues asa theoretical matter, since itseems tohaveimportant implications forthesignificance ofthe‘societal cultures’ that played a crucial role inhisprevious theory, andthus has ledmetoaskwhether it is appropriate tocharacterize hisdefense ofminority rights as ‘distinctively liberal.’ Inwhatfollows, Iwillargue thatinneither theWestern northenon-Western context canwederive minority rights solely fromreciprocity, andwhatweneedas a basis of minority rights isone’s right towhatwemight callone’s ‘mother culture.’Iwillthenclaim

Iamgrateful toNoelWilliams, Professor ofLawatDaito Bunka University, Tokyo, forhisassistance * in editing mypaper. 1 W.Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: ALiberal Theory ofMinority Rights, Oxford University Press,

2 3

4 5 6 7

Oxford, 1995, p.75. Inthis volume. Kymlicka, “ Universal Minority Rights? 17. Ibid., pp. 15– Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,

TheProspects forConsensus,”p. 14.

sec. 3. 8. secs. 6– p. 18; see also pp. 14, 16, 17, 36, 37, 49.

A‘Distinctively

Liberal’Theory

of Minority Rights?˙

61

that, ifitispossible tojustify minority rights inthenon-Western context while bracketing theissue ofinternal restrictions, itisalso possible tojustify minority rights inthe Western context onthesame ground, that is, independently oftheissue ofinternal restrictions; andthat, therefore, Kymlicka’s defense ofminority rights intheWestern context inhis previous works was notactually liberal as he claimed. Finally, Iwillconclude that liberals should care about individual freedom within non-liberal cultures, whether intheWestern orinthe non-Western context.

I believe itis notdifficult tosee that wecannot derive

procity between

the majority andthe minority.

minority rights solely

fromreci-

In his lecture, Kymlicka claims that the real issue inthe minority rights debate is ‘the

factthatthe majority isdenying tothe minority whatitclaims foritself’.8Forexample, he

a story of merging all countries inthe Americas into a large Spanish-speaking state.9 Hesays thatiftheUnited Nations, ina free anddemocratic vote, were tomake that decision, theAnglophone majority inCanada andthe United States would vehemently oppose it, andthat reciprocity therefore requires self-government rights and language rights for French Canada, Spanish-speaking nations, and the Aboriginal tells

peoples inthe Americas. However, wecanalsotella story ofmaking thewhole world intoonelarge Englishspeaking country. Inthis case, since theUnited States andEnglish Canada would not oppose theidea, French Canada andother minority nations could notjustifiably oppose it. Since reciprocity does notgive uswhatothers donothave, wecannot justify minority rights solely on the basis of reciprocity to those who claim open borders, as Kymlicka himself notes inthelecture,10 ortothose whodefend a liberal empire, as Morimura Susumudoes inhis commentary inthis book.11 Iamnotsaying that reciprocity hasnovalue: Iamjust saying that itis notenough that weground minority rights solely onthe value of reciprocity. Perhaps Kymlicka simply means inhislecture thatwhatis actually discussed intheminority rights debate isreciprocity orthatinmostcases theminority isactually seeking thesamething aswhat the majority already has. Hemaynotactually meanthat the basis ofminority rights is thevalue ofreciprocity; butthen, whatarethebases ofminority rights? IntheWestern context, Kymlicka’s defense ofminority rights proceeds roughly as follows:12 individuals, whether they belong tothe majority orthe minority, have a right to live within the societal culture that they were bornandbrought upin–their ‘mother culture’–unless they are voluntary immigrants;13 however, the societal culture of minority groups isvulnerable tothemajority unless ithasexternal protections; therefore, minority groups needspecial rights. Itisnotdifficult tosee thatminority rights inthenonWestern context canbejustified inthesameway.Kymlicka can,andIamsurewill, claim thatindividuals, whether theybelong tothemajority ortheminority, have a right tolive within their mother culture unless theyarevoluntary immigrants; butthesocietal culture ofminority groups is vulnerable tothe majority unless ithas external protections, and, as such, minority groups need special rights.

8 Ibid., p. 44; see also p. 49. 9 Ibid., p. 43. 10 Ibid., fn. 35. InDefense ofLiberal Imperialism,”inthis volume. 11 Morimura Susumu, “ 12 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, chaps. 5, 6. 13 People ‘should be able to live andwork intheir ownculture,’although ‘this right can be waived’ through immigration. See ibid., p.96.

62

ISHIYAMA Fumihiko

Inshort, minority

rights, whether

inthe Western orthe non-Western context, are

based ontheright toone’s mother culture. Thenextquestion tobeasked isthen: why should one have this right? Whatvalue does one’s mother culture have?

Inthe Western context, Kymlicka defended minority rights fromthe standpoint ofliberalism. Heclaims notonlythat liberals should reject internal restrictions because they reduce individual freedom, butalso that liberals should at the same time support external protections because they would guarantee minorities equal access to their mother culture. Hesays, l iberals should ... take aninterest intheviability ofsocietal ‘ freedom ‘is dependent on the presence of a societal cultures’14because individual culture’:15one’s mother culture hasvalue onlyso longas itenables himtoexercise his

freedom meaningfully. Kymlicka’s defense ofexternal protections andhis rejection ofinternal restrictions arethusclosely related. Indeed, hestates, ‘theveryreasons wehavetosupport external protections are also reasons to oppose internal restrictions’.16Hedoes notjust claim that minority rights are consistent withliberalism orthatthey canbeliberal. Rather, he claims that minority rights are based onliberalism: minority rights areliberal. However, when talking about minority rights inthe non-Western context in his lecture, Kymlicka separates the‘twohalves’17ofhistheory: hedefends external protections while bracketing hiscommitment toindividual autonomy andtheissue ofinternal restrictions. Inso doing, whatare the bases ofthe right to one’s mother culture inthe non-Western societies? Whatvalue does a societal culture have inthe non-Western context? Kymlicka suggests atseveral points inthelecture thatsocietal cultures havevalue inensuring toethnocultural groups thecollective ability to‘acton’and‘fulfill’18their basic values in a waythat ‘express[es]’ and ‘promote[s] their collective identity’.19Since minorities innon-Western societies lack‘the ability to exercise their basic communitarian virtues,’20their societal cultures need external protections. However, this applies equally tominorities intheWestern societies: their societal cultures needexternal protections because they lack the ability to ‘implement [their] basic liberal-democratic values’21. Notonly inthe non-Western context, butinthe Western context as well, societal cultures enable ethnocultural groups to‘implement’and‘institutionalize’22their basic values ina waythat ‘promote[s] their collective identities’. Thus, societal cultures have thesame values, whether theyare liberal ornot. If it is possible to defend external protections inthe non-Western context while bracketing theissue ofinternal restrictions, itis therefore also possible todefend minority rights intheWestern context without committing oneself toliberalism. Eveninthe Western context, wedonothavetobe liberals tosupport minority rights. Itis important

to note that whatwehave here is notan overlapping consensus’forminority rights ‘ weareliberals orcommunitarians, we between liberals andcommunitarians. Whether cansupport minority rights forthesamereason. So,atheory thatdefends minority rights 14

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Ibid., p. 80. Ibid., p. 76. Ibid., p. 44. , p. 17. Universal Minority Rights?” Kymlicka, “ Ibid., p. 48. Ibid., p. 47. Ibid., p. 48. Ibid., p. 45. Ibid., p. 44.

A‘Distinctively

Liberal’ Theory

of Minority Rights?˙

63

onthisground cannot be‘distinctively liberal.’Although minority rights arestill consistent withliberalism, theyarenolonger based onit. Minority rights still canbeliberal, butthey nolonger are liberal inandofthemselves. Howshould wethink ofthis newdevelopment inKymlicka’s theory? Perhaps Kymlicka would feelthat, inorder todefend minority rights inthecontext ofnon-Western societies thatheregards, exhypothesi, as communitarian, there isno other waybuttobracket theissue ofindividual autonomy; andthis hasledhimtoassume that itis significant to implement basic values ofanethnocultural group ina waythat expresses its collective identity, whatever those basic values are. Histheory hasthus ceased to be a liberal one as faras defending minority rights is concerned. Based on this newtheory, illiberal minorities innon-Western countries have legitimate claims, not onlyforexternal protections, butalso forinternal restrictions, since their basic values require suppression of individual freedom. However, internal restrictions are exactly whatKymlicka himself hasconsistently opposed: eveninhisprevious works, hedidnotjustwrite about liberal minorities. Ashe notes inthe lecture,23 he also took upthe issue of non-liberal cultures inthe Western context anddiscussed howto cope withthem.24 Hecriticized the “ live

andlet live”approach, an ethic of reciprocal non-interference [that] allows forsome internal ... so long as [illiberal minorities] donotseek anysupport fromthe larger society.

restrictions

Kymlicka saidthatthis approach ‘is mistaken, notonlyabout theimpermissibility of external protections ... butalso about thelegitimacy ofinternal restrictions’(emphasis added). Further, ‘[t]here are... realconflicts between liberal principles andthedemands ofnon-liberal groups, andweneedtoface these conflicts openly’(emphasis added).25 Thus, Kymlicka didnotset aside the issue ofinternal restrictions: onthecontrary, he cared deeply about individual freedom within illiberal cultures. To be sure, Kymlicka then went onto say that ‘there is relatively little scope for legitimate coercive interference’26and ‘[l]iberals ... havetolearn tolive with[the factthat they] will be unable to prevent the violation of individual rights within the minority community’.27However, this isbecause ‘liberal institutions canonlyworkifliberal beliefs havebeeninternalized bythemembers oftheself-governing society’.28Thus, Kymlicka didnot mean that illiberal minorities have legitimate claims for internal restrictions. Rather, he was arguing that liberals have no other waybutto tolerate them outof prudential considerations. Heapproached the issue ina strategic way,andconcluded thatitwould bebetter forliberals inthelongruntoletthenon-liberal culture remain and encourage itsreform fromwithin, rather thantodestroy itandimpose a liberal, butalien,

one.

How,then, does Kymlicka viewnon-liberal societal cultures? Hehassaidthatit‘is worth remembering thatallexisting liberal nations hadilliberal pasts’; andsaidthatto ‘assume thatanyculture is inherently illiberal, andincapable toreform, is ethnocentric andahistorical’.29This shows that Kymlicka thinks non-liberal cultures should notbe destroyed since theyhave thepotential tochange their character towards a liberal one 23

24

25 26 27 28 29

Ibid., p. 39. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, chap. Ibid., p. 155. Ibid., p. 167. Ibid., p. 168. Ibid., p. 167. Ibid., p. 94.

8.

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eveniftheywereatonetime non-liberal. Icannot see whyitis notpossible totake the same view in the non-Western context as well: I think it is also possible to regard

communitarian societal cultures innon-Western societies as having values, so longas they have potential fordeveloping into a liberal one. If Kymlicka’s theory is to be ‘distinctively liberal,’it need not, nor should it, differentiate its approach towards non-liberal minority cultures, whether inthe Western or non-Western context. There is noneedforself-restraint even whenfaced with‘civilizational differences’.30Liberals should care about individual freedom, whether those individuals areintheWestorEast, andwhether theyareina liberal ornon-liberal culture.

30

, p. 49. Universal Minority Rights?” Kymlicka, “

KATSURAGI Takao

Comments

on Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship

On Kymlicka’s criticism of Rawls’political liberalism Rawls distinguishes Kymlicka criticizes Rawls’liberalism as incoherent. Hestates, “ political liberalism from the comprehensive liberalism of J. S. Mill” , or

his

hedistances himself froma commitment toautonomy, ontheground that some people donotsee their ends as potentially revisable, andtodefend liberal institutions onthis basis is sectarian.1 According to Kymlicka, interpreted inthis way, political liberalism amounts to the people arecommunitarians inprivate life, andliberals inpublic life. But assertion that” 2 For myself, I am quite sympathetic to his interpretation. is this a coherent position?” Contrary to Rawls’position, Kymlicka cites twocases fromtheCanadian andUnitedStates Supreme Courts; namely, Hofer v.Hofer andWisconsin v. Yoder, respectively.3 He asserts that both of those cases recongize minority group rights in a relatively straightforward manner, which reflects theCourts’conceptions ofliberalism, which differ from Rawls’political liberalism. InHofer v.Hofer, a group ofHutterites weregranted theright tolive inaccordance with their religious doctrine –even if that doctrine limited individual freedom by preventing members from leaving the colony without abandoning everything, even the clothes on their backs. Similarly, Wisconsin v. Yoder affirmed the right of an Amish group tolive inaccordance withtheir doctrine, evenifitlimited theindividual freedom of children by withdrawing them from school before the age of 16. Kymlicka states that Rawls’strategy of endorsing autonomy only in political “ 4The twocases above value, does notsucceed.” context, rather than as a general showthat even the l iberal’Supreme Courts of Canada andthe United States donot ‘ autonomy within a minority group, including the right to leave admit individual political the minority group itself andthe right to receive basic public education fromthe larger community. Thus, political liberalism is notworkable as a strategy to make minority groups more liberal. I agree withKymlicka onthis, too. Kymlicka himself stands with the comprehensive liberalism of J. S. Mill. However, itisclear thatendorsing autonomy ina comprehensive waydoes notsucceed either in persuading a minority group to become more liberal. Atthis point, Kymlicka introduces two separate questions on liberalism. First: ‘What sorts of minority claims are consistent with liberal principles?’Andsecond: ‘should liberals impose their views on minorities which do not accept some or all of these liberal principles?’Thefirst question is the oneof principle, butthe second is more strategic; andthis latter question is, I think, the very factor that moves Rawls towards political liberalism andawayfromthecomprehensive liberalism ofATheory of Justice. Therefore, Kymlicka’s criticism ofRawls’liberalism canbe directed against Kymlicka himself in the same way. That is, Kymlicka’s liberalism might be both incoherent

andunworkable. 1

2 3 4

WillKymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: ALiberal Theory ofMinority Rights (Oxford University Press,

1995), p.158. Ibid., p. 160. 162. Ibid., pp. 161– Ibid., p. 162.

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KATSURAGI Takao

That he uses bothprincipled liberalism andstrategic liberalism inhisargument is Hesays,

clear.

[r]elations between majority andminority nations ina multination state should be determined by peaceful negotiation, notforce (as withinternational relations). This means searching forsome basis of agreement. The most secure basis would be agreement onfundamental principles. Butiftwonational groups donotshare basic principles, andcannot be persuaded to adopt the other’s principles, they will have to relyonsome other basis ofaccommodation, suchas a modus vivendi.5

Kymlicka thus expresses strategic liberalism. Inaddition, hisstrategic liberalism is economic, notpolitical. After making a distinction between ‘coercively imposing liberalism’and offering various incentives for liberal reforms,’he defines offering various incentives‘forliberal reforms’inalmost economic terms: ‘

Forexample, thedesire offormer Communist countries toenter the EChasprovided leverage for Western democracies topushforliberal reforms inEastern Europe. Membership intheECis a powerful, butnon-coercive, incentive forliberal reform. Similarly, manypeople thought that the negotiations over theNorth American FreeTrade Agreement provided anopportunity topressure theMexican government into improving its human rights record. The Mexican desire fora continental free-trade agreement provided the United States andCanada with some leverage to push for liberal reforms within Mexico. Obviously, there aremanyanalogous opportunities fora majority nation toencourage national minorities, ina non-coercive way,to liberalize their internal constitutions.6 Considering Kymlicka’s strategic liberalism inthis way, I think that his liberalism is at least as incoherent as Rawls’liberalism, which is composed ofbothA incoherent – Theory ofJustice andPolitical Liberalism.7 However, Iamunsure whether ornotKymlicka’s liberalism is workable; although I would go so far as to say that it is less unworkable than Rawls’ liberalism. But, paradoxically, the more workable Kymlicka’s liberalism is, the less coherent it becomes. For my part, while I praise Kymlicka’s liberalism highly, I hope that he will consider the essence of liberalism is not whether it is coherent, butwhether itis workable.

OnKymlicka’s thesis thattherecognition ofminority group rights anddevelopment of minority societal culture neither provokes the majority’s sentiment of reverse discrimination norproduces social distrust anddisorder, butrather leads tomutual trust ina multicultural society. Kymlicka repeatedly uses the example of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec to illustrate thatthedevelopment ofa minority’s societal culture leads toitsliberalism and diversity:

TheQuebecois provide a nice illustration ofthis process. Before theQuiet Revolution, theQuebecois generally shared a rural, Catholic, conservative, andpatriarchal conception ofthe good. Today, after a rapid period of liberalization, most people have abandoned this traditional wayof life, andQuebecois 8 society nowexhibits allthe diversity that anymodern society contains.” Further, Kymlicka repeatedly emphasizes the fact that members groups want to participate within the mainstream of society:

of minority

most polyethnic demands are evidence that members of minority groups wantto participate within the mainstream ofsociety. Consider the case ofSikhs whowanted tojointhe Royal Canadian Mounted Police, but, because of their religious requirement to weara turban, could notdoso unless they were

5 6

7 8

168. Ibid., pp. 167– 168. Ibid., p.

John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia Ibid., p. 87.

University Press, 1993).

Comments

on Kymlicka’s Multicultural

Citizenship

67

exempted fromthe usual requirements regarding ceremonial headgear. Orthecase ofOrthodox Jews whowanted tojointheUSmilitary, butwhoneeded anexemption fromtheusual regulations sotheycould wear their yarmulka. Such exemptions are opposed by many people, whoview them as a sign of disrespect foroneofour‘national symbols’. Butthefactthatthese menwanted tobea partofthenational police force orthe national military is ample evidence oftheir desire toparticipate inandcontribute tothe larger community. Thespecial right theywere requesting could onlybeseenas promoting notdiscouragingtheir integration.9

Even the claims of self-government by indigenous people are interpreted by as showing a willingness toparticipate: heasserts that

Kymlicka

inmanycases, theaimofself-government istoenable smaller nations tointeract withlarger nations ona more equitable basis. Itshould be upto each culture to decide whenandhowthey willadopt the achievements of the larger world. It is one thing to learn formthe larger world; it is another thing to be swamped byit,andself-government rights maybeneeded forsmaller nations tocontrol thedirection and rate ofchange.10

On the other hand, as Kymlicka indicates, there is not only a widely-shared belief among themajority that minority rights are unfair anddivisive, butalso a growing fear that the public-spiritedness of citizens of liberal democracies may be in serious decline, andminority rights claims erode their sense ofcivic purpose andsolidarity.11 Does Kymlicka’s argument above succeed innegating sentiments ofthis sort? Is his argument based upon sufficient human emotions and a balanced analysis of human nature? Generally speaking, there are human emotions of envy orjealousy, vanity orpride, andsuspicion ordistrust against others’. These emotions also explain theseriousness anddifficulties ofethnic conflicts‘ inregions suchas Northern Ireland andthe former Yugoslavia. Inthose regions, the possibility that the country’s ethnic minority might become themajority iftheyareunited toa neighboring country amplifies thefearandanimosity among thecountry’s present majority. Inthis case, offering the right of self-government or even polyethnic rights maycause the whole situation to deteriorate, andresult insocial turmoil. Does Kymlicka fully consider these negative human emotions when arguing for group rights? Itseems tomethatemphasizing a minority’s willingness toparticipate in the larger community is notenough, andis too optimistic to be accepted as a solid argument for defending group rights in various conflict situations in multicultural societies.

9 Ibid., p. 177. 10 Ibid., p. 103–104. 11 Ibid., pp. 61, 176.

HIRAI Ryosuke

When Kymlicka Takes on Asia* AParadigm Shift inMinority

Rights Controversy

Multiculturalism hasoften beenassociated theoretically withtheliberal-communitarian mostwriters intheWestassumed that controversy. AsWillKymlicka notes inhispaper, “ the debate over minority rights was essentially equivalent to the debate between “ liberals” and“ itwasgenerally assumed that one’s position on communitarians,” and“ minority rights was dependent on, and derivative of, one’ s position on the liberal1Indeed, onemight evenargue thatthis isthewayitshould be: communitarian debate.” that multiculturalism is nothing more than a natural andlogical termination point for communitarian waysofunderstanding thehuman selfandtherelationship between that self andone’s community. Letusconsider verybriefly theCanadian communitarian andmulticulturalist philosopher Charles Taylor. As is well known, Taylor endorses multicultural “ politics of recognition” andminority cultural rights. Hebelieves thedistinct culture thatonebelongs to,andits recognition as suchbyothers, are vital toone’s authentic identity.2 Although this is anover-simplification ofTaylor’s theory, itillustrates oneofthetypical ways of linking communitarianism to multiculturalism. However, this wasonlyuntil Kymlicka came onthescene withhis“ liberal theory of Inhisground-breaking bookMulticultural Citizenship: ALiberal Theory minority rights.” of Minority Rights (Oxford University Press, 1995), Kymlicka showed that, contrary to the view held by many contemporary liberal thinkers, liberalism aptly grasped could – andshould –recognize special group-differentiated rights ofethnocultural minorities. Roughly speaking, Kymlicka’s basic argument is as follows: individuals should enjoy freedom andautonomy, which arecentral liberal values. Inorder todoso,theymustbe members oftheir ownparticular culture, since thatculture provides a context formaking meaningful choices. Therefore, ethnocultural minorities thatarethreatened withcultural marginalization andextinction bya majority culture require special rights toensure their cultural survival. Kymlicka thus demonstrates that one canbe at once a liberal andanardent supporter of minority rights. In myopinion, this is hugely significant. Kymlicka has changed theframework within which multiculturalism andminority rights arediscussed; itcould even be said that he has shifted the paradigm of contemporary political philosophy. At least, this is exactly whatKymlicka has done so impressively intheWestern context – but this is not the whole of his story, as we shall see below.

WhenWestMeets East liberal theory of minority rights”is I suspect most people have thought that Kymlicka’s ” intended tohave a universal basis andapplication beyond Western societies andtheir

1

2

I wish to express mygratitude to Professor * assistance inediting themanuscript.

Yasutomo Morigiwa

of Nagoya

University

for his

Will Kymlicka, “ Universal Minority Rights? The Prospects forConsensus” , in this volume, p. 37, 38. , in Multiculturalism, AmyGutmann, ed. (Princeton The Politics of Recognition” Charles Taylor, “ University Press, 1994).

When Kymlicka Takes on Asia

69

values. Indeed, sohave I.However, whenKymlicka sets outtoanswer thequestion of whether histheory is applicable toandworkable innon-Western societies, hecandidly Western liberal theory of minority rights”based upon the shared admits that his is a “ experience ofWestern democracies, anddevelops a modified approach thathehopes willenjoy cross-cultural acceptance. According toKymlicka, since there arefundamental differences between Eastand West, hedoes notrealistically expect theliberal parts ofhistheory tobeapplicable to communitarian Asian societies. Therefore, onecannot appeal toliberal values suchas freedom andautonomy inorder todiscuss andjustify minority rights inthatcontext. As such, Kymlicka instead relies onthe ‘nation-building’model ofmodern states andthe basic norms of reciprocity andfairness between ethnocultural groups. Letmebriefly sketch his argument. Modern Western states arenation-building states thathaveadopted various associated programs, such as official language policies, andaspire to achieve greater national integration. Butsince modern states contain more than one national group, minority groups are placed unavoidably ina disadvantaged position under thepolicies andprograms ledbythe dominant cultural group –notwithstanding the insistence of manyliberals that modern states should be ethnoculturally neutral. This bias toward a majority culture onthe part of nation-building states is unacceptable inthe eyes of minority group members; this iswhytheyhave protested against itanddemanded that their cultures andinterests be protected byspecial rights. Kymlicka believes that a structurally similar phenomenon hastaken place inAsian countries. Whatever differences mayexist between Western andAsian societies, minority groups inbothfeelthreatened bynation-building programs thatfavor dominant ethnocultural groups. Kymlicka does notsuggest thatnation-building attempts perseconstitute injustices among ethnocultural groups. Rather, his point is that there is an imbalance ofnationbuilding power between dominant cultural groups andminority groups, which mustbe rectified by vesting those minorities with special rights. In order to justify special rights forminorities without recourse toliberal orcommunitarian values, Kymlicka appeals to the notions of reciprocity andfairness. Indoing so, he assumes that reciprocity and fairness are common values widely sharable between Western andAsian societies. Butthe fairness.” The word”reciprocity”can meanvarious things, of course; so can “ norms Kymlicka refers toare relatively simple orweak: namely, that onecannot deny toothers theverythings thatoneneeds anddemands without a compelling justification, andwithout the danger of being guilty of hypocrisy andinconsistency. These norms might thus becalled a banonegoism ora double standard. Since reciprocity andfairness so understood cannot reasonably be refused byanyone, whether oneis liberal or communitarian, Canadian orJapanese, members of minority cultures disadvantaged byculturally biased nation-building measures should be able to demand the special rights that are essential to realize reciprocity andfairness. to minority rights sounds fairly different from reciprocity-based approach” This “ although equality between ethnocultural groups approach – Kymlicka’s original l iberal” “ of the integral parts of his theory. One might even argue that has always been one Kymlicka’s revised theory represents a second paradigm shift. Asmentioned above, Kymlicka showed inhisfirst paradigm shift thatliberalism atitsbestcould justify certain types ofspecial rights forethnocultural minorities thatweretraditionally often linked to communitarian political thought. Thatfirst shift wasnonetheless still within, orunder the scheme of,theliberal-communitarian controversy. Inhissecond paradigm shift, Kymlicka attempts tospeak a language thattranscends thedebate itself. Ifindthis strategy successful as faras the use of reciprocity is concerned.

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Unfortunately, something is lost inKymlicka’s second paradigm shift. Whatis lost, of course, is liberalism. Tosaythat Kymlicka’s original theory isa liberal onehastwomeanings. Forone, group-differentiated rights forcultural minorities arejustified ona liberal basis; that is, byshowing thatone’s ownculture isessential toone’s personal freedom andautonomy. That is whythose whoare culturally placed inminority groups candemand ” external protections” from the majority culture. In addition, this liberal means of justification entails consequences about whata cultural group canandcannot dointernally with respect to its ownmembers. Since the individual members ofa cultural group should have thefreedom toquestion, criticize andrevise their group traditions andpractices internal restrictions” are prohibited. froma liberal individualistic vantage point, illiberal ” However, inattempting todispense withtheindividualistic flavor ofhistheory, which heanticipates tobe unpopular inAsian societies, Kymlicka firmly discards (though not liberal” andarguably very best aspects of his epoch-making multiwithout regret) the “ cultural political theory. Ifwefollow his advice, weAsians can nolonger talk about minority rights

orjustice between ethnocultural groups inliberal terms. Worse, wecan

say little about our internal vulnerability to ourowncultures. Although Kymlicka implies hedoes notbelieve thatindividuals incommunitarian cultures enjoy noindividual rights

visà vistheir owncultural groups, thescope ofuniversal individual rights nonetheless

seems rather limited.3 Internal restrictions willtherefore loomlarge. This is badnews. Iamafraid thatnotallAsians willwelcome this change orpartial andWestern feminists suchas Susan Moller Okinsurely willnotwelcome it retreat – either.4 But I will not pursue this line of criticism anyfurther inthe rest of myessay, leaving it instead to someone else. Inanyevent, Kymlicka has come veryfaraway fromhisoriginal story. Rights

andConsensus

WhydidKymlicka dare tochoose hisnewstrategy atsucha total costtoliberalism? In other words, whatdoes hethink has beengained bythis move? I believe theanswer is that changing his theory enables a cross-cultural or international consensus on some minority rights issues. Because Kymlicka assumes forargument’s sake thatAsian countries aremoreor less communitarian societies andmanyof the major conflicts over minority rights in

those countries are between different butlargely communitarian orcollectivist cultural groups, a liberal-oriented approach to minority rights will probably not work well. Assuming hisobservations are correct onecould refer to some communitarian explanations oftheimportance ofcultural survival inorder toground minority rights as faras Asian societies areconcerned. However, those communitarian approaches aredoomedto failure inWestern societies, since their cultures are thought to be essentially liberal. It is impossible to formulate any widely acceptable philosophical theory that explains whya culture is so important to a person whobelongs to it. The reciprocity theory provides a basis ofconsensus that canbe shared across different cultures. Inshort, as heindicates inthetitle ofhispaper, Kymlicka relies uponconsensus to makepossible thediscussion of” minority rights. This makes mewonder what universal” significance andposition theconcept ofconsensus hasinKymlicka’s theory asa whole. Howgreat a role is itsupposed toplaytheoretically? 3 4

, p. 8. Universal Minority Rights? The Prospects for Consensus” Kymlicka, “ , in Boston Review, Vol.22, No.5 (1997). Is Multiculturalism Bad forWomen?” Susan Moller Okin, “

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71

Oneinterpretation is that Kymlicka appeals toconsensus forpragmatic reasons. Although he hopes that his liberal theory of minority rights is correct and has universal validity andapplication, hecannot expect itto have anypractical effect insocieties or groups whose members have mindsets, values andways ofseeing theworld that are significantly different from those of liberals. To be as effective as possible, therefore, onecanonlyrelyuponwhatisacceptable tothose individuals. Consensus thus comes into play as the second-best standard in applying a theory (orat least parts of it) in practice.

One might say, in fact, that consensus works here as an unavoidable compromise. Indeed, Kymlicka warns usto separate thequestion ofidentifying a defensible liberal theory from that of imposing it.5 He claims that illiberal groups should not be forced to submit to it. Itshould be noted inthis regard that Kymlicka does notwantto be arrogant or obtrusive; rather, he wishes to be very tolerant of illiberal individuals. AndI commend himforthat intention. However, while itmaysound paradoxical, this wayof phrasing his argument implies support for the first interpretation discussed above. Kymlicka nowexplicitly admits, however, that his liberal theory is based upon the experience of Western societies, andwasthus originally intended to apply only in those societies. This suggests that consensus has been accorded a central role to justify histheory. Myguess is this: Kymlicka thinks he candevelop a “ liberal” story in liberal societies just because mostpeople inthose societies, whether frommajority or minority cultures, arethought toshare thesame liberal values. Similarly, inenvisioning a universally valid theory of minority rights, one must ground it upon a universally sharable concept, whatever itmaybe.6Thatis, consensus is positioned as thebasis of minority rights. In Kymlicka’s case, the universally sharable concept is the allegedly basic normof reciprocity. If I am correct in this second interpretation, and this is indeed Kymlicka’s underlyingviewofjustification, itwould appear tohave several implications. Iwillmention only a fewofthem. To begin with, although Kymlicka has attempted to keep his distance from neutralist or political liberalist theories such as those developed byJohn Rawls andCharles Larmore,7 hisconsensus strategy as Iunderstand itseems tohave aspects incommon withthose versions ofliberalism. Starting withthe hardfact that reasonable pluralism prevails in modern societies, political liberal theorists try notto become involved in profound controversies over philosophical, religious and moral truths. Instead, they focus onwhatcanbe expected toconverge fromreasonable comprehensive doctrines as thecommon basis forjustice inmodern societies. Asis wellknown, Rawls calls this . Likewise, aiming to discover a sharable basis of cross“ overlapping consensus” cultural, international consensus onminority rights, Kymlicka wants to prescind from differences in values andworldviews, and refrain from specifying anycontroversial philosophical theory ofculture andperson. Hethenarrives atthe normofreciprocity, which heperceives as being endorsed as a common ground. Ibelieve this isakintothe

5 6

7

Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p.164. Here, hediscusses thequestion ofhowtodealwithand accommodate illiberal minority groups in liberal societies. Forexample: Kymlicka does notdeny the possibility of basic human rights with cross-cultural validity, butonthegrounds that violations ofthose rights, hehopes, are unacceptable toallpeople. See , p. 8. Kymlicka, “ Universal Minority Rights? The Prospects for Consensus” John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993); Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge University Press, 1987).

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avoidance strategy that political liberalism adopts. While Kymlicka does notidentify himself as a political liberal, he shares the spirit of political liberalism, as it were, as far as hisjustification strategy is concerned. Secondly, if weare to take consensus seriously, it is of particular importance to listen to and understand the real voices of minority groups suffering from nationbuilding programs initiated bya majority group. Inherrecent essay onjustice inresponse tosocial differences,8 Melissa Williams contrasts thejuridical model ofjustice toward groups with the political model. The former defines justice in a theoretical abstraction prior to politics. According to Williams, Kymlicka takes this approach. However, since theepistemic failure ofa theorist whoconstructs principles ofjustice is inevitable as a result of his or herinherent bias of experience andperspective, this approach cannot do sufficient justice to social differences. The political model is therefore preferred by Williams; that is, the notion that justice should not be defined prior to politics, butrather within a process of political deliberation. Putting aside the details of herarguments forthe moment, I find Williams’approach veryattractive inprinciple. Ifitcanbe saidthat recognizing others as theysee themselves, although notuncritically, is the core attitude of multiculturalism, thenthe actual exchanges ofdifferent experiences, perspectives andsufferings ofrealpeople would appear critical to multicultural justice. This is whyI believe weare inneed of a theory of cross-cultural dialogue anddemocracy. Inthis respect, multiculturalism still has much to learn from recent developments in discourse ethics and theories of deliberative democracy. After all, minority rights of recognition require that recognition

to be by real persons. Infact, Kymlicka emphasizes the necessity of a constructive dialogue between cultures, albeit inthe context ofcontemplating howto dealwithilliberal minorities in liberal societies.9 Unless his reference to dialogue merely pays lipservice to illiberal groups ornon-Western societies, Kymlicka’s theory ofminority rights requires greater politicalization. However, I do not intend to suggest that the juridical approach be totally replaced by the political one. Finally, ifmyobservations above are correct, theybring usbackto reconsidering some ofKymlicka’s basic understandings ofminority rights.

According to Kymlicka’s classification of group-differentiated minority rights in Multicultural Citizenship, those rights comprise three types: self-government rights, polyethnic rights and special representation rights (although it is not presupposed that eachethnocultural minority group candemand anyorallofthem). Ofthese three types of rights, Kymlicka seems to accord the third slightly different treatment thanthe other two. Self-government rights and polyethnic rights are supported by Kymlicka for reasons that relate closely to his core theory of person andculture. Hefinds special representation rights necessary, however, because hebelieves that unavoidable conflicts overthespecification oftheother twoforms ofrights mustbe resolved politically, andpolitical processes must be fair among ethnocultural groups.10 Assuch, special representation rights have a secondary status inhistheory. Thatis,those rights relate tohowtheother minority rights should beinterpreted, applied, andrealized inpractice. Inmypolitics-oriented understanding, special representation rights andother political rights are indeed special. However, this is not because they have secondary

8

Justice Toward Groups: Political notJuridical” Melissa Williams, “ , inPolitical Theory, Vol.23, No.1 (1995), p.67. See also her Voice, Trust and Memory (Princeton University Press, 1999). 9 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p.171. 10 Ibid., p.131f.

When Kymlicka Takes on Asia

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status, butrather because those rights concern theverypossibility offairandinclusive political processes through which minority rights in general should be justified in the first place.

INADA Yasuaki

A Kind of Strategic Essentialism?

ACommentary on Kymlicka

Professor Kymlicka’s previous works1 highlighted the crucial importance of what he forthefreedom andself-respect ofindividuals, todefend certain societal cultures” calls “ group rights forethnocultural minorities within a liberal theory ofjustice anddemocracy. According to Kymlicka, a societal culture, which tends to be territorially concentrated andbased ona shared language, is essential fortheautonomy andwell-being ofits people because itprovides notonlythecontext formeaningful choices, butalsoa secure sense ofbelonging, andsupports self-identity.2 Itistherefore veryclear thattheconcept ofa societal culture plays a central role inKymlicka’s theory ofminority rights. However, I amunsure ifI have clearly understood exactly whata societal culture means. When just as societal cultures are almost invariably national cultures, so Kymlicka says, “ 3 Iamconfused bytheapparently high nations are almost invariably societal cultures,” andthat ofa societal culture” degree of interdependence between the definition ofa “ “ nation.” This confusion could be alleviated onlyifoneassumed thattheexistence of distinct societal cultures, which arealiases ofnations ornational groups, wererelatively static, despite all political attempts by both states and national minorities, and their dynamics. Kymlicka’s recent works seemtoputmore emphasis onthefundamental cause of minority nationalism andother multicultural claims byvarious ethnocultural groups: that is, the “nation-building”programs that every modern nation-state has engaged in. According toKymlicka, “ itis inthenature ofmodern nation-states topoliticize culture in 4Thefundamental source ofconways that potentially harmandthreaten minorities.” flicts between majorities andminorities is therefore that the “ state power is used to 5 embark onnation-building programs which threaten minority interests andidentities.” Fromthis perspective, a set of minority group rights are needed to protect the basic interests andnational identity ofminorities intheface ofmajority nation-building policies, andtoplace national minorities onanequal footing withmajorities. Inother words, Kymlicka assumes thata setofgroup rights fornational minorities willenable themto engage intheir ownnation-building programs andthusensure their ownsocietal culture

and identity.

Itis important to note that Kymlicka stresses the bright side as wellas thedarkside ofnation-building projects. Heargues thatthekindofnation building thatseeks todiffuse a single societal culture throughout its entire territory should notbe seen “purely as a 6;rather, suchanattempt serves matter ofcultural imperialism orethnocentric prejudice” several important andlegitimate goals. First, modern economies require a mobile, educated, andliterate workforce. Second, standardized public education ina common language isessential forallcitizens tohaveequal opportunity toworkinsucha modern 1 2 3

4 5

6

I refer inparticular toMulticultural Citizenship: ALiberal Theory ofMinority Rights (Oxford University

Press, 1995) andLiberalism, Community, andCulture (Oxford University Press, 1989). 93. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp.75– Ibid., p.80. Kymlicka, “ Universal Minority Rights? The Prospects forConsensus,”inthis volume, p. 18. Ibid., p.38. Kymlicka, “ Ethnic Associations and Democratic Citizenship,”in Freedom Gutmann, ed. (Princeton University Press, 1998), p.181.

of Association, Amy

A Kind of Strategic Essentialism?

75

economy. Third, participation ina common societal culture isalsoessential togenerate thetypeofsolidarity thata modern welfare state needs inorder toensure a strong sense ofcommon identity andmembership among citizens. Inshort, “promoting integration intoa common societal culture hasbeenseenas essential tosocial equality andpolitical 7This means thattheprocess ofnation-building isnotsomecohesion inmodern states.” thing tobe rejected oropposed, butmustbe equally pursued andengaged inbyeach national group that has its ownsocietal culture andthedesire topreserve it. Nonetheless, as Kymlicka himself repeatedly stresses, the process of nation building by modern states has generated tremendous pressure on national minority groups toassimilate into the majority’s societal culture. Inbanning the useofminority languages orprohibiting traditional customs, the state-sponsored majority has systematically attempted to disempower minority nationalism andsuppress anydistinct identity among national minorities. Themodern project ofnation building therefore has, like Janus, twofaces: oneis liberal and the other illiberal. On the one hand, liberal nation building has extended freedom and equality to all citizens; on the other hand, illiberal nation building has ruthlessly suppressed national minorities. Whatfollows fromthis? Should weencourage allliberal-faced nation-building projects byallnational groups seeking them, andcriticize andoppose illiberal-faced projects? Kymlicka’s arguments seemtoanswer inthe

affirmative. However, Idoubt thatthese twofaces areindependent ofandeasily separable from each other. After all, every nation-building project necessarily involves intentional andpolitical efforts bythe majority tostandardize andnormalize ‘their own’ fromwhich other norm” societal culture andlanguage, which means establishing a “ cultures andtheir attributes willnecessarily deviate. This means, itseems to me,that within each societal culture there are always relatively normal andrelatively deviant members, suchthatthelatter are likely tobe under some sort ofpressure togetclose tothe norm. Moreover, anyidentity, including national identity, cannot stand byitself, since theconcept ofidentity isinherently dependent ontheconcept ofdifference. Those two concepts are related: identification within a group and differentiation between groups are the twosides of the same coin. To quote Nancy Fraser, “ differences and identities are performatively created through cultural processes ofbeing claimed and 8 Therefore, any attempt to re-create or reproduce one’s ownsocietal elaborated.” culture mustinclude someformofidentification/differentiation strategy. Anidentification strategy involves homogenizing projects within their ownsocietal culture; a differentiation strategy involves contrasting policies among different societal cultures. This iswhere theparadoxical character ofcurrent debates onmulticulturalism and cultural politics ofidentity anddifference becomes clear. Atoneendofthedebate, there aredifferentialist/pluralist multiculturalists, whotendtocelebrate allgroup identities and struggle forthe recognition of difference. Atthe other end, there are anti-essentialist/ deconstructionist multiculturalists, whoviewall identity/difference claims skeptically. anti-essentialism rejects anypolitics ... thatessentializes identity and AsFraser putsit,“ andconceptualizes “identities anddifferences as discursively constructed difference,” 9Theyconsider anygroup identity “fictional” because of instead ofas objectively given.”

7 8

in TheMorality of TheSource of Nationalism: Commentary onTaylor,” Ibid. See also, Kymlicka, “ 58; and Nationalism, Robert McKim andJeff McMahan, eds. (Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.56– 30. Kymlicka, States, Nations andCultures (VanGorcum, 1997), pp.28– Equality, Difference, andRadical Democracy: TheUnited States Feminist Debates Nancy Fraser, “ Revisited,” inRadical Democracy: Identity, Citizenship, andtheState, David Trend, ed.(Routledge, 1996), p.204.

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Yasuaki

itspolitically anddiscursively constructed character, consider it“ repressive” because of its understatement of internal diversity andits normalizing pressure, andconsider it “ exclusionary” because ofits overstatement ofexternal differences. Ibelieve thatallthese anti-essentialist criticisms against identity politics arelargely correct intheory. However, inpractice, totheextent thattheyoppose anydemand for the recognition of minority group identity andtheclaims ofa minority based onsuch identity, anti-essentialist criticisms willsimply amount tothenegation ofminority claims forjustice andequality, andresult intheperpetual disempowerment ofminorities. This

isthepoint withwhich Icannot agree, andthis iswhere Ifeela greater sympathy with

Kymlicka. I also agree with his basic claims that the liberal principles of equality and freedom necessitate some forms ofminority rights that protect against theexercise of majority power. Kymlicka is nota simple pluralist multiculturalist, since he refuses tocelebrate all minority rights bydistinguishing legitimate from illegitimate claims based onwhether Noris he an outright essentialist, as he seems to internal restrictions.” they involve “ refuse “ anyhomogenizing oressentialist account ofthecultural differences between a ‘communitarian East’and an ‘individualistic West.’” 10But Kymlicka does seem to be a tosome extent national identities mustbe sort ofessentialist, because heinsists that “ 11(emphasis intheoriginal). Ibelieve thatthis kindofessentialist view, taken as givens” strategic essentialism,”is an indispensable condition for minority which I shall call “ group rights. This is particularly evident when one considers the vulnerable and disadvantaged situations inwhich most national minorities exist within nation-states, andrecognizes thenecessity ofredressing injustices between majorities andminorities. Given this practical necessity, I agree withKymlicka’s approach to minority rights to the extent that his theory can be interpreted as a kindof “strategic essentialism.” However, Kymlicka’s account ofnation-building projects undertaken bynational minorities clearly puts muchgreater emphasis onthe sunny side ofthose projects thanontheir dark side.12 As Kymlicka himself argues (as cited above), if politicizing culture inways that potentially harmandthreaten minorities is “ then inthenature ofmodern nation-states,” nation-building projects bynational minorities cannot avoid having a similar effect. This suggests that itis equally important tobecautious oftherepressive effects ofminority nationalism, while supporting some formofminority group rights. After all, the harmful side of nation building may not be separable from its beneficial side.

9 Ibid. , p. 15. 10 Kymlicka, “Universal Minority Rights?” 11 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p.184. 12 Janet E. Halley makes similar points about Kymlicka’s account ofculture in“Culture Constrains,”in Is Multiculturalism BadForWomen?, Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, andMartha C. Nussbaum, eds. (Princeton University Press, 1999), pp.100–104.

MORIMURA Susumu

InDefense of Liberal Imperialism I learnt a great dealfrom Kymlicka’s book, Multicultural Citizenship: ALiberal Theory of Universal Minority Rights? The Prospect for Minority Rights1, andhis Kobe Lecture, “ 2While manypeople tendto resort to cheap polemics inthe debate on Consensus.” multiculturalism because oftheir pragmatic concerns, Kymlicka’s workisexemplified by itscareful argumentation andrichexamples. Hisdiscussion onminority groups inAsian countries, especially, gives usmuchmaterial forthought. Ialso agree withmanyofhis claims, andI wasenlightened onmanypoints. Thatbeing said, itwillbemoreproductive formetodiscuss some points onwhich I cannot agree withhim.Those points are notparticular local issues butmore general

ones: issues about the national-cultural neutrality ofthe state, which Kymlicka discussed inSection 3 of his Lecture. According to Kymlicka, since that kindof neutrality is impossible, evenliberal states mustpositively protect thecultures ofminority groups. The problem ofstate neutrality touches onthe veryfoundation of histheory, foritis a distinctive characteristic of his theory that he tries tojustify the group rights of minorities fromtheperspective ofegalitarian liberalism, while liberals ingeneral traditionally tend to be negative toward those rights. I shall argue, contrary to Kymlicka, that the ethnocultural neutrality ofstate is an ideal that liberal states should notabandon, even though it is impossible to achieve completely, andthat an appropriate model forthat ideal is a particular type of premodern empire rather than a modern nation-state. I shall also argue that Kymlicka societal culture” . Perhaps itisfair overestimates theunique importance ofwhathecalls “ tostate attheoutset thatthetheoretical basis ofmycriticism is classical liberalism or libertarianism; butsome of mycriticism is notspecifically libertarian. Inopposition to some liberals, whoargue that liberal states must treat notonly religion butalso national cultures as private matters ethnocultural neutrality, Kymlicka says,

andsubscribe to the principle of

this idea thatliberal-democratic states are ethnoculturally neutral is manifestly false, bothhistorically andconceptually. Thereligion model isaltogether misleading as anaccount oftherelationship between the liberal-democratic state andethnocultural groups.3

Forexample, he argues, even the United States, which is regarded as typically has neutral, uses English as its official language. Thus the American government “ encouraged citizens toviewtheir life-chances as tied upwithparticipation incommon and“ theidea ofa culturally societal institutions that operate inthe English Language” 4 Participation in a particular societal culture forms national neutral state is a myth.” identity.

Supporters ofstate neutrality can reply to Kymlicka as follows. Itis true that the adoption of language(s) as the official one(s) benefits native speakers; however, a liberal state mayuse a certain language as the official one, notbecause the state regards the language andits related culture as superior to others, butforthe purely pragmatic reason that, after all, the state needs a specified language for public

1 2 3 4

Oxford University Press, 1995. 57. Inthis volume, pp. 13– Universal Minority Rights? The Prospects Kymlicka, “ 21. Ibid., p.

, this volume, p. 20. for Consensus”

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MORIMURA Susumu

communication. Andit maywell be most convenient for this purpose to select the language that is the mother tongue of the majority of the citizens. To decide that a language is tobeanofficial oneis neutral inreason, eventhough notneutral ineffect. Ifthestate wants tobeneutral ineffect, too,perhaps itshould adopt anartificial ordead language, such as Esperanto or Latin –although to do so would be practically impossible. Iftheadoption ofanofficial language is undertaken as a matter ofconvenience for culturally neutral reasons, anyresulting inequality mayberegrettable, butisnotunjust; muchas itisnotunjust thatEnglish-speaking people arebenefited because nowadays English is the de facto common language of international business andacademia. States should adhere to equality under the law, but social andeconomic inequality resulting fromrelated policies is nota problem. Nonetheless, one might argue that a state must supply the funds necessary for those whose mother tongue is nottheofficial language to learn it,since those people would otherwise bedisadvantaged bythestate’s arrangement. Inanyevent, however, theexistence ofanofficial language itself does notnecessarily undermine theidea of state neutrality. Itmustbeacknowledged thatthere areactually often notonlypragmatic neutral considerations, but also nationalist reasons to promote dominant cultures through thelegitimization ofofficial languages. Interms ofeffect (asdistinguished from reason), a state cannot beperfectly neutral. Yet, inspite ofitall, liberals should notabandon as a myththenotion ofa culturally neutral state. Rather, theyought totake itas an ideal that wecannot reach butshould aspire to –a regulative idea, like “truth”in

science.

Almost the same thing can be said of Kymlicka’s theory itself. Onthe one hand, he forprotecting thesocietal culture ofa minority group; and external protections” defends “ ontheother hand, hedoes notallow “internal restrictions” thata group imposes onits members. However, “ external protections” and”internal restrictions”are infact often inseparable. Forexample: restricting theimport offoreign cultures inorder toprotect a national (internationally weak) culture greatly lessons the freedom of choice of the national culture’s citizens. Perhaps Kymlicka would admit this dilemma, butdoing so / internal restriction” diswould notlead himto conclude that the “ external protection” tinction is a mythto be abandoned. “ Ihavedefended state neutrality interms ofreason, andnotinterms ofeffect, onthe premise thata liberal state mustrestrict itself tothemaintenance ofanabstract, formal order oflaw,andnotcommit itself toa particular substantive culture. Genuine liberals should include the idea of ethnocultural neutrality of the state: forif a state tried to achieve a given cultural goal, itwould impose burdens onthose whodonotshare that goal. This would bevery muchlike the establishment ofa religion. Kymlicka claims thatthe idea ofequality demands that a state grant some group rights to minority groups, in order to protect their societal cultures.5 In his view, an individual’s choice makes sense only when it is made inthe context ofthe societal culture ofthenation towhich theperson belongs. Thesocietal culture ofthemajority can survive without governmental support, butthat of a minority group cannot. Minority groups should hence beentitled torights suchas self-government andrepresentation rights. Kymlicka’s argument begs the question: Whyshould ethnic cultures alone be protected against others? Inaddition toethnic societal cultures, there areinnumerable cultures interms ofsex, age, class, profession, religion, education andevenhobbies, 5

Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, ch.6,

sec. 1.

InDefense ofLiberal Imperialism

79

andweare connected with, rather belong to, various of these cultures to different degrees. Idonotclaim thatonekindofidentity ismoreimportant thananother. Indeed,

I have little sympathy with the emphasis placed on group identity in contemporary political theory, because itis based ontheidea ofa person notas anindividual butonly as a member ofa community. Iadmit that manypeople moreorless identify withtheir ownnations, andI have nointention to criticize them. Aliberal need notbe an individualist inrelation toways oflife –buthe mustoppose theauthorization ofsuchcommunity-based identification. Kymlicka might reply to mycriticism byarguing that societal cultures are the very basis of any other cultures, and without them it is impossible foranyone (except forfew cosmopolitans) to make meaningful choices; that other cultures, such as popular culture, are varied contents ofsocietal cultures; andthat societal cultures andother cultures belong todifferent orders. Butifwecharacterize societal cultures inthatway, they appear very formal. I knowan American from LosAngeles, whosubsequently settled nearBoston, andsaidhefeltthat hehadmoved toa foreign country. Perhaps inKymlicka’s view, however, allEnglish-speaking Americans share a common societal the sense in which English-speaking Americans culture: he himself acknowledges “ 6 share a common “ is a verythinone.” culture” Inanyevent, “ mustmeanmorethansimply thatitsmembers share societal culture” a common tongue, because anAmerican, anEnglishman, a Singaporean, anda South African willallbe said to belong different societal cultures, evenwhenthey allshare English astheir mother tongue. Doessocietal culture thenamount tosharing a common language andconstitution? Notexactly; foreveniftwocountries share a common official language andvery similar political andlegal systems, their societal cultures willbe different. Kymlicka understands thatmodern states promote distinctive national identities thataredefined bytheir respective languages, history, andterritories. Healsodescribes these nation-building programs favorably. Kymlicka writes: [S]tates today differ dramatically frompremodern orfeudal multiethnic empires. Inthepast, multiethnic empires wereoften content tosimply letminorities alone, solongas theypaidtheir taxortributes, obeyed thelaws, andco-existed peacefully withother ethnic groups. Today, however, fewstates around theworld arecontent withthis sortofco-existence. Theywantminorities toexhibit a stronger sense ofidentification orloyalty withthestate, sothattheywillactively participate andcooperate intheprojects ofthestate, be they militaristic wars, economic modernization, orsocial justice.7

militaristic wars,” but he believes it is quite Kymlicka would no doubt oppose “ legitimate fora state to pursue its ownparticular projects. I disagree withhimonthis point. Itis myopinion thata liberal state has noreason totrytodomorethanmaintain liberal order, the supply of public goods, and a minimum standard of living. For a state toforce unwilling citizens tocooperate ona particular national project, andevendemand loyalty to it from them, would be utterly presumptuous. That kind of project should be pursued only by those who think it worthwhile. Kymlicka himself claims tobea liberal, andcriticizes communitarianism. However, heconcedes toomuchtoit,as hebelieves that belonging toa nation is incomparably more important foralmost everyone than to possess other individual characteristics; andhegrants strong powers to nation-states, which bynature aretypically involuntary

groups.

6 7

, p. 21. Universal Minority Rights?” Kymlicka, “ Ibid., p. 23.

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MORIMURA Susumu

Liberals would findthepre-modern empires referred tobyKymlicka moreattractive thanmodern nation-states. Suchanempire does notexpect itscitizens toidentify with it; nordoes it impose particular ethnoculture(s) uponthem. Pre-modern empires are also more cosmopolitan than nation-states. However, in the eyes of liberals, premodern empires hadoneserious defect, namely: theydidnotsufficiently protect their external protections” tovarious ethnic citizens’rights andfreedoms. While theygranted “ groups, they also condoned the “ internal restrictions” implemented bythose groups. TheRoman magistrate Pontius Pilate, forexample, authorized theexe-cution ofJesus. Hence whatliberals should aspire tois a cosmopolitan liberal empire imbued withthe notion ofhuman rights anda rule oflaw.Aliberal state is nota “ political community” as some political theorists (such as Ronald Dworkin) claim, as its citizens do nottryto

achieve anyshared substantive aimthrough a political process. Rather, touseMichael Oakeshott’s vocabulary fromOnHuman Conduct, a liberal state is nota “ universitas” .8 societas” buta “

8

Michael Oakeshott,

OnHuman Conduct, Oxford University Press, 1975, ch.3.

OZAKI Ichiro

Who Saves Whom? AShort Comment on Multicultural Citizenship* Iwould like tomakea short commentary onMulticultural Citizenship: ALiberal Theory of Minority Rights by Professor Kymlicka.

Iwillfocus onthe“group-differentiated

ofa “national minority”(as opposed rights”

) composed of indigenous peoples such as the so-called Canadian ethnic group” to an “ Indian or those in provinces such as Quebec: previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultural entities that have been incorporated into a larger state suchas Canada. These peoples typically desire to maintain themselves as a distinct society alongside the majority culture, anddemand various forms mentto ensure their survival as such a distinct society.1

ofautonomy orself-govern-

group-diffeFromthe liberalist viewpoint, Professor Kymlicka presents twoforms of “

fora national minority: special group representation rights andselfrentiated rights” government rights.2 To summarize, he asserts that these rights are legitimate so long external as theyare notforpurposes ofimposing “internal restrictions,”butforcreating “ protections” ofthenational minority thataimstoreduce itsvulnerability totheeconomic pressures andpolitical decisions ofthelarger society.3 Kymlicka rejects thelibertarian that collective rights” theory which suggests that liberalism cannot accept whatthey call “ conflict with an individualistic construction of liberalism: according to him, almost all societal culture”of the group they belong to, which individuals live under the “ provides itsmembers withmeaningful waysoflife across thefullrange ofhuman activities including social, educational, religious, recreational, andeconomic life, encompassing both public andprivate spheres.4

This means that political life has aninescapably national dimension, whether it is inthe drawing ofboundaries and distributing ofpowers, orindecisions about thelanguage ofschooling, courts, andbureaucracies, orinthe choice ofpublic holidays. Moreover, these inescapable aspects oflife give a profound advantage tothe members ofmajority nations. Therefore, without those rights, talkof‘treating people as individuals’isitself just a cover forethnic andnational injustice.5

Between the two forms of group-differentiated rights available for a national minority, special group representation rights are the easiest forthe majority group to grant, because demands forsuch rights are “ primarily demands forinclusion, forfull 6Thus, theyarenotthreats tothestability orsolidarity membership inthelarger society.” ofthe society; butKymlicka points outthat

1 2

I would like to thank very muchDr.Andrew Pardieck, a lecturer inthe School of Lawat Hokkaido * University, for his help in editing mypaper. Anymistakes are, of course, of myown.

Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, (Oxford University

Press, 1995), p.10. 38. Here, Kymlicka presents another form of group-differentiated rights –polyethnic Ibid., pp.37–

rights

3 4 5 6

–foran“ethnic

Ibid.. Ibid., p. 76. Ibid., Ibid.,

p. 194. p. 192.

. group”

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OZAKI Ichiro

Self-government rights, however, doposea threat tosocial unity. Thesense ofbeing a distinct nation a larger country is potentially destabilizing. Ontheother hand, thedenial ofself-government rights isalsodestabilizing, since itencourages resentment andevensecession. Concerns about social unity will arise however werespond to self-government claims.7 within

This represents a dilemma about self-government rights. Kymlicka admits there notbea clear final answer tothis problem, and“ a fundamental challenge facing liberal theorists, therefore, istoidentify thesources ofunity ina democratic multination might

8 state.”

Atthis point Iwould like tosuggest a fewother issues concerning special group representation rights thatillustrate theexistence ofcommon deep-rooted problems under the scheme of both special group representation rights and self-government rights for national minorities (inaddition topolyethnic rights forethnic minorities). Itwould appear that Kymlicka does notmake a clear mention ofthese issues inhiswork. critical legal Asiswellknown, particularly intheUnited States, therecent so-called “ whoinclude critical race theorists andcritical feminism theorists, attempt to theorists,” showhowapparently modern andliberal legal systems arebiased andethnocentric (or male chauvinistic). They discuss the problems associated notonlywiththe majority presence of white male judges in courts andCongress, butalso the concepts and principles used inthose institutions, andhowthey are reproduced, through everyday communications, generation after generation. These theorists assert thattheconcepts andprinciples themselves aredominant group (middle-class white male) oriented (i.e.,

rooted inthe history ofthe group) andself-reproductive. This latter characteristic implies that, to use Kymlicka’s term, a societal culture ofthe majority group, evenifitis liberal anddemocratic andgrants special group representation rights tominority groups, isa self-reproductive nationalistic system. Theresult isa national minority which isresigned toa secondary position inthelarger society, evenifitenjoys a formal equality withthe majority.

Tobe moreconcrete, mypoint isthis: evenifa national minority group (ormember ofit)hasspecial group representation rights bywhich it(orshe) canrepresent itself (or herself) inCongress, etc., it(she) maynonetheless feelweak, insulted andmiserable, because the languages andwords it(she) is forced to use incommunication withthe majority arethose ofthemajority, andtheforum andprocedures inwhich it(she) shows itself (herself) are set bythe majority. Forexample, whenanCanadian Indian says to I have a property right tothis land,” an English Canadian ina state congress orcourt, “ ) and a she is already forced to think and talk in concepts (such as “property right” language (English, nothernative one,ofcourse) intheforum invented notbyhergroup butbythemajority. Critical theorists assert thatthis handicap further insults theminority andstrengthens the majority. Tomakematters worse, thefactthatspecial group representation rights aregiven to the national minorities allows the majority to feel expiated, notguilty, andto think that

the responsibility for solving the minorities’hardships is on (or has moved to) the minorities themselves. The societal culture of the majority, through these complex mechanisms, strengthens andreproduces itself. Professor Richard Delgado, a leading critical race theorist, has argued persuasively that the United States legal system is

andreproduced to reject, consciously (intentionally) orunconsciously (unintentionally), racial or sexual minority cultures based on their histories, languages,

designed

7 8

Ibid. Ibid.

WhoSaves Whom?

83

religions, andsoforth.9 Forexample: theaffirmative action program is nomorethana majoritarian device thatforces theminorities tomoldthemselves intoa model madeby whites, andexpiates the white majority.10 Canwe notfind an analogy between the problems ofaffirmative action andspecial group representation rights?

Twoadditional problems exist inrelation to “ special group representation rights.” First, as I referred to above, Kymlicka states that the demands for rights are primarily demands forinclusion, forfullmembership inthelarger society.” “ However, we demands for inclusion” are active or passive. If a should be aware of whether the “ demands” inclusion reluctantly, because itbelieves there is no national minority group “ other wayto live a minimally civilized life under the present circumstances, then we (especially the majority) cannot rest on the fact that “ they demand inclusion.”The Iftheenvironinclusion.” minority group musthave some complex feelings against the“ ment changes, those feelings maytransform themselves into strong aspirations for separation fromthe majority. Wemight be able to understand the recent situation in Eastern Europe as anexample ofthephenomenon. Second, evenifa minority group sincerely demands inclusion, itisnotself-evident that itwishes toaccept the majority’s moral, legal, andpolitical principles. Discussing toleration andits limits” inchapter 8 of Multicultural Citizenship, Kymthe problem of“ licka suggests thatwe“ should beskeptical ofimposing liberalism onnational minorities 11Weshould avoid coercive intervention except “ within a country.” inthecase ofgross andsystematic violation ofhuman rights, suchas slavery orgenocide ormass torture .12Nonetheless, Kymlicka asserts thatweshould offer various incentives andexpulsions” forliberal reforms andsupport the reform.13 This idea ofsoft paternalism might, however, looktominorities likea clever, meddlesome method ofassimilation. Itinsults pride, identity, andself-respect. This is another latent factor that is a threat tothestability or solidarity of the society.

thatIhavedescribed, Thepredicaments relating to“ special group representation rights” thatKymlicka presented inhisbook, self-government rights” andthedilemma posed to“ have certain basic questions in common. To be simplistic, they both start with the question “ [who saves whom]?” This or“[whodecides whatforwhominwhose way]?” whodecides [whodecides whatforwhominwhose leads tothehigher-level question, “ , thensuccessively toevenhigher ones: “[whodecides way]forwhominwhose way]?” [who decides [who decides for whom in whose way] in whose way] in whose way]?”... This infinite series of questions can and must be stopped, and solved in terms of “ societal culture” fromthe toplevel downto the bottom. Inother words, the solution is itself a core partofthesocietal culture. Isay“ because thesolution isclosely related core” tothelegitimacy andacceptability ofthebasic institutions ofthesociety toits members. 9

Delgado has published enormous numbers of articles, in which many spheres of U.S. law and are investigated from the viewpoint of critical race theory. See, for example, Richard Delgado, The Rodrigo Chronicles: Conversations about America andRace (NewYork University Press, 1995); do., The Coming Race War?: AndOther Apocalyptic Tales ofAmerica after Affirmative Action and Welfare (NewYork University Press, 1996); do., When Equality Ends: Stories about Race andResistance (Westview, 1999), foranoverview ofhistheories. Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or,DoYouReally Wanttobea Role Richard Delgado, “ , in Michigan LawReview, vol. 89 (1991), p. 1222. Model?” Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 167. politics

10

11 12 Ibid., p. 169. 13

Ibid.,

p.

168.

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Conflicts among societal cultures are, frommyviewpoint, the principal problems Theyareprincipal because theyrelate tothe multicultural citizenship.” thataccompany “ possibility and plausibility of what I shall call “ multi-societal-cultural citizenship;”something that Professor Kymlicka seems to wishto accomplish. Myquestion for Professor Kymlicka, then, is: are the three forms of group-differentiated rights necessary andsufficient devices formulti-societal-cultural citizenship ornot –and, regardless ofwhattheanswer is, aretheyproper devices?

HASEGAWA

Ko

Comments on Will Kymlicka’s Thinking about the Rights of Indigenous People* Iwould like tomakesomecomments regarding WillKymlicka’s liberal theory ofminority rights, focusing inparticular onthesignificance ofthe rights ofindigenous people. Letmemention first that, as anegalitarian liberal, I agree withKymlicka’s basic perspective. Still, I amalso sometimes drawn toanother, libertarian, position onthis issue. Theemphasis thatthelibertarian perspective places onliberty, spontaneity, and widetoleration touches ourdeepest sense ofindividuality. These libertarian conditions willhave certain significance forthe lives of indigenous people as individuals. Thus, fora deeper understanding ofKymlicka’s thinking, Iwishtocomment, inparticular froma critical viewpoint withthelibertarian perspective inmind, onthefollowing three points: first, on the effectiveness of Kymlicka’s distinction between external protections andinternal restrictions (canthe culture ofanindigenous people flourish through sucha distinction ofrights?); second, ontheconstitutional interpretation ofthe rights ofindigenous people, especially inJapan (howcanwederive rights ofindigenous peoples within Kymlicka’s liberal-egalitarian framework under the Japanese Constitution?); and third, on the cultural conflict between liberal cultures and minority cultures (howcantheliberalist’s claim ofautonomy bevalid inthedifferent context of minority culture?). I shall proceed withmycomments inthat order. Kymlicka madeanimportant distinction regarding thefunctional dimension ofthe rights of indigenous people in his book, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford University Press, 1995). Hedistinguished between external protections andinternal restrictions; this distinction illustrates twoaspects ofgroup rights. External protections ingroup rights –namely, those provided bythree common rights such as self-government rights, polyethnic rights, and special representation rights –function as a device forthe relief of the vulnerability of minority people and culture fromthe majority. Theythus attempt to realize equality between minority and majority groups. Internal restrictions ingroup rights function as a device formaintaining the coherence of individual group members byprohibiting deviant behaviors that are deemed conducive todestroying group identity. Theyrepresent aneffort torealize the common goodofthe enduring cultural coherence ofgroups. Kymlicka’s distinction isa veryingenious one:froma liberal point ofview, therights of indigenous people are significant at the level of external protections against the majority, yetinvalid inrelation to internal restrictions. Attheexternal level, itis evident thatthere isa certain structural imbalance between theminority andmajority; andfrom theideal ofequality embedded inliberalism, thisimbalance musttherefore becorrected. Attheinternal level, itisalsoevident thatpeople arefree as individuals, andshould not be subjected to the pressure to conform fromwithin group; fromthe ideal offreedom that isalsoembedded inliberalism, thepossibility ofunreasonable coercion musttherefore also beavoided. Theliberal spirit thus adapts togroup rights andjustifies bothstructural intervention forequality andindividualized exemption forfreedom. to Dr.Andrew Pardieck, former lecturer inthe School of I would like to express mysincere thanksin * Law at Hokkaido University, forhishelp editing these comments. I also heartily appreciate the questions andcomments fromtheparticipants, including Prof. Kymlicka, oftheHokudai Hougakukai Symposium onthe Rights ofIndigenous People, which washeldintheSchool ofLawat Hokkaido University onDecember 17, 1998.

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As Kymlicka emphasizes, this distinction is particularly important theoretically to the unnecessary misunderstanding that rights of indigenous people cannot be

avoid

individual rights, but must rather be a type of so-called “ collective”rights that are (in principle) inherently different. Ibelieve Kymlicka’s distinction canadequately serve this purpose; but I nevertheless worry whether this distinction can work effectively in maintaining the minority culture ofindigenous people. Ifwetrytoidentify a liberal view thatcanachieve this, wemustanticipate whattheactual consequences ofsucha view would be. Letustake theproblem oflanguage as a first example. Inrelation tothemajority, language rights aspolyethnic rights areimportant, because theyprotect thesurvival and development oftheindigenous culture through suchmeans as financial assistance to establish resources andopportunities fortheuseofthetraditional language. However, suchsupport willnotbeeffective ifindigenous persons (andother ordinary people who haveaninterest inspeaking thetraditional language) feelinclined tospeak itonlywithin their homes oramongst themselves. Toenhance theenvironment forlanguage use, it is necessary that indigenous people themselves enforce the use oftheir traditional language so as to establish rules regarding its use inordinary life. Ifthese kinds of internal restrictions are prohibited from a liberal viewpoint, however, projected enforcement cannot workand, if most people still use the majority language formost of their daily lives, the fate ofthe traditional language becomes uncertain. Itwillnotbe enough thatsome people have a great interest inlearning andspeaking thetraditional language within someprivate spheres. Forindigenous people whohavebeendeprived ofopportunities tocultivate their ownlanguage because ofthe structural orcoercive imposition of the majority language, the resurrection of their language is ultimately possible through theregulated, wider useofthetraditional language inordinary life. But ifliberalism requires that, while external protections such as financial support are acceptable, internal restrictions should notbepermitted, indigenous people mayfindthis approach to be nothing more than a self-delusion, as it is evident that the use of traditional language would become limited anddispersed, withtheultimate result that the language fails toflourish, andfades away. Asimilar concern exists inrelation tolandrights. Forexample, letusassume that an indigenous people holding self-government rights has determined that a certain range within itsterritory is common property andprohibited tofree trade, because that part of landis so sacred. If,under a liberal viewpoint, free trade inthe range is to be maintained onthegrounds thatitsprohibition constitutes aninternal restriction, thenthe fate ofthe landuse intheindigenous territory willbethesame as thatofthetraditional

language discussed above. Withregard tothe land use case, Kymlicka seems explicitly to recognize the importance ofinternal restrictions. Hemight thenalso recognize thenecessity ofinternal restrictions concerning language for the preservation of the identity of indigenous people. However, theproblem inbothcases becomes: onwhatgrounds canwesaythat weneed internal restrictions? This problem becomes clearer whenweconsider another example. Assume that some indigenous people determine that all its members must worship its traditional religion, andmembers whoworship other religions shall be excluded fromthe group because they are destroying its identity. Kymlicka does notaccept this religious restriction, because itviolates the religious autonomy ofthegroup’s members. Butwhy is this notalso thecase withthetwoexamples mentioned above? To better understand Kymlicka’s thinking, wemust assume that the problems of language andlandbelong tothedomain ofthe“ existence” ofculture, which isinvariable

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andforms the very basis forthe cultural identity of indigenous people. The issue of religion, onthe other hand, belongs to the domain ofthe “ character” ofculture, which

adapts as society changes over time. Wemust also assume that, while problems ofa culture canbecontrolled byinternal restrictions, problems existence” relating tothe“ character” canreject those restrictions. Arethese assumptions plausible? relating toits“ Astotheformer: whydoes notreligion belong tothedomain ofthe“ existence” of culture? During the period when the identity of indigenous people was formed, Christianity inNorth America, andBuddhism orConfucianism inJapan, wasanentirely alien religion. Where indigenous people’s traditional lives areimbued withtheworship oftheir owngod(s), andtheir ordinary lives feature manyreligious rituals, eventhose individuals whoare interested inother religions tendtocomply withandinternalize thetraditional one.This implies thatreligion isa basis ofthelife ofindigenous people, andthatrelated internal restrictions are therefore permissible, even though the members of the indigenous group are notconscious ofthem. I would like to point out inthis regard that the assumption of a personal consciousness maynotholdtrue forindigenous people whobelieve ina traditional religion. To such people, the traditional religion might be akin to air: it already andhas always constituted part of their mental environment. The assumption that a personal conscience with a particular critical power exists is merely one made under autonomyoriented liberalism. This issue leads us to the problem of cultural relativity, which I will discuss below. But allow me to mention one point now. Kymlicka claims that an ethnic minority group cannot claim itsautonomy against thenational majority, because ithas already waived such autonomy bybeing loyal to the majority culture. Thus, its own culture has become a mere sub-culture tothat ofthe majority, andwillbe maintained level cultural basis for existence” onlyintherealm ofprivate lives. Inthis respect, the“ level basis its own character” anethnic group would be the majority culture, andthe “ level cul(sub)culture. Ifso,thenwhycanthenational minority maintain its“ existence” tural basis as different from ethnic minorities? What is special about a national minority ingiving external protections against the majority? Kymlicka relates this to the arguments from equality andhistorical agreements between majority andminority groups. However, arethese really sufficient given thatwe mustanswer theveryquestion ofwhythose arguments are important forthe national minority andnotforethnic groups. Itseems that Kymlicka hascertain cases, suchas the Canadian Indians orInuit, whenhe refers to a national minority. Nonetheless, as Chandran Kukathas pointed out, the criteria used to identify a national minority are inherently problematic.1 AsKukathas astutely observes, there istremendous diversity within themembers ofa national minority interms oftheir life styles, living spaces, dialects, generations, manner ofassimilation, mobility andthelike, which demonstrate thata national minority is not so very different from an ethnic group. If this is an empirical fact, how can we determine whether a given people constitute a national minority oran ethnic group? Now,ifKymlicka wishes toanswer this question byidentifying certain criteria suchas land, language orreligion, andlabel these as thecore conditions ofa national minority, he mustalso recognize the basic importance ofthese factors forindigenous life. This relates backtomyinitial concern, namely, whether theprohibition ofinternal restrictions under liberalism areadequate tomaintain those basic conditions ofindigenous life. 1

Are There AnyCultural Rights?”Political Theory, Vol.20 (1992); do., “MulticulChandran Kukathas, “ turalism as Fairness,”Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 5 (1997). I had an opportunity in September 1998 to discuss this issue with Prof. Kukathas in Canberra. I am much grateful to his thoughtful responses to myquestions andopinions.

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Kymlicka mayhave a historically based response inmind: during modern nation building, indigenous people havebeenrelatively isolated fromthemainbodyofnationstates andbeenforming different kinds ofnationhood. Yet, whyshould wedivide their culture into twofacets? Kymlicka developed three basic justifications forthe rights ofindigenous people: equality, historical agreements withthe majority, anddiversity. The equality justification is structured as follows. The maintenance of a cultural structure is necessary forallpeople as a basis onwhich theycanmake autonomous choices intheir lives. One’s wayof life, including language, rituals and religious activities, is thesource ofidentity atthecore ofhuman well-being. Inthis respect, cultural structure is a primary social goodinthe Rawlsian sense oftheword. Now,because of thestructural inequality between majorities andminorities, theprotection ofthatprimary goodis often insufficient forminority people: the political oreconomic activities ofthe majority, forexample, caneasily destroy that primary goodforthe minority. Here the ideal of equality is introduced to correct the imbalance inthe protection of primary goods inparticular, selfbetween themajority andminority. Therights ofindigenous people – government rights, polyethnic rights andspecial representation rights – areneces-sary to reinforce that ideal. Kymlicka’s historical agreements argument is relatively simple inthesense that, if there are historical agreements withthe majority under which a minority’s rights and benefits were respected, butwhich have been ignored orrendered ineffective bythe majority, the minority can raise those agreements as a justification forasserting their minority rights. But, ofcourse, ifthe minority group wasunable to enter into voluntary agreements withthemajority, orifitwascoercively assimilated intothemajority, then this argument is superceded bythe equality justification. Ifseveral agreements were concluded overtime, the contents ofwhich are nowincompatible, wehave to select which agreement is valid (or not) on the basis of equality. Thediversity justification argues thattherecognition ofminority rights promotes the diversity ofexchanges among peoples. Kymlicka states thatthisargument isparticularly important inrespect oftherecognition ofpolyethnic rights, butis insufficient as a foundation forthe rights ofindigenous people because thebenefits brought bydiversity are often to the majority. Thus, the mainjustification for minority rights lies inthe ideal of equality. Iwould like toconcentrate ontheworking ofthat ideal inthefollowing. Froma legal perspective, the rights of indigenous people cannot be established sometimes, because the basic framework forthe provision of rights inmodern constitution isbased uponindividualism ortherespect ofindividuals, rather thangroups. The s, theAinupeople have Constitution ofJapan isnoexception. InJapan, since the1980’ beendemanding a newlawasserting their rights. TheAinuclaim thattheyneedfirst, a declaration of basic human rights inorder to eliminate discrimination; second, the protection of participatory rights in the national and local diet; third, the reinforcement ofgovernmental activities fortheprotection ofhuman rights; fourth, thepromotion ofthe FundforAinuSelf-Reliance;” Ainueconomy andculture; fifth, theestablishment ofa “ andfinally, theestablishment ofconsultative bodies onAinupolicies atboththenational andlocal levels. Intheir demands, theyhave raised theimportance oftherights ofthe Ainuas a people: that is, their rights ofself-determination, special representation (in boththe national andlocal diets), andother polyethnic rights.2

2

Iowethese translations tomycolleague, Prof. Teruki Tsunemoto, fromhisunpublished manuscript Rights and Identities of Ethnic Minorities inJapan” entitled “ .

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InMay1997, theso-called Ainu“ wasestablished. Thegoals ofthenew newlaw” lawwere recited as follows: thesituation ofthetradition andculture oftheAinuthatarethesource ofthepride tothe a society where thepride oftheAinuas a people is respected, and tothe development ofvarious cultures inJapan.

considering

Ainupersons, thegoals aretorealize

tocontribute

TheAinu’s indigenous nature wasnotmentioned inthenewlaw,asthegovernment recognized thatthisissue remains controversial bothinJapan andintheUnited Nations; itwastherefore necessary toavoid inorder forthenewlawtobe passed smoothly in theDiet. However, anepoch-making judicial decision washanded downinMarch 1997 in the Nibutani DamCase by the Sapporo District Court.3 Inthat decision, which demonstrates a sincere understanding ofthe sufferings of theAinupeople, theSapporo District Court declared thattheJapanese government’s approval of the Nibutani Damwas basically illegal, as it ignored the Ainu’s cultural interests inNibutani. The court pointed outthat the United Nations Human Rights B 1,26,27), andthatthegovernment Convention protects minority rights (under Articles 2– hadrecognized in 1991 at the Human Rights Convention Committee of the United Nations thattheAinuarea culturally distinct national minority. Thedecision cited Article 2 oftheConstitution ofJapan concerning ontherespect ofinternational treaties, and 98– reminded the government of its legal obligation to respect the UNconvention. Most importantly, the Sapporo District Court also referred to Article 13 of the Constitution ofJapan, which protects the general rights to life, liberty, andpursuit of happiness. Thecourt heldthatArticle 13applies notonlytoindividual citizens, butalso totheAinupeople as national minority, because minority culture hasitsinherent value against majority culture, andforindividual members ofa minority theright toenjoy itsownculture isas important oneastheright concerning his/her subsistence aspersons, andtherespect ofthese rights istorespect substantively individuals ... [which] alsoaccords withtheideal ofdemocracy inthat majority people trytounderstand andrespect minority people.

Inmyopinion, thelineofargument intheNibutani decision approximates Kymlicka’s equality-based justification for minority group rights: the ideal of equality is arguably usedas anauxiliary argument toassert group rights based onessentially individualistic rights, suchas those setforth inArticle 13oftheConstitution ofJapan. Myquestion here is whether this kind of legal interpretation is possible or not. Fromthe equality-oriented standpoint, thecentral problem forderiving rights lies always inthe imbalance among related interests. As such, there are notheoretical obstacles todetermining whether thesubject ofrights isanindividual ora group. Both caneasily bethesubject ofrights totheextent thattheessential problem issimply one ofcorrecting animbalance among competing interests. Thisalsoappears todemonstrate whyKymlicka candenytherelevance ofanindividual-collective distinction whenthinkingabout therights ofindigenous people. However, insomeforms oflegal practice, such as that in Japan, it still is a serious problem to adapt this kind of thinking to the basically individualistic framework fortheprovision ofrights through constitutional interpretation. Looking attheSapporo District Court decisions indetail, forexample, wefindthat theconditions under which eachindividual lives aredivergent,” thecourt first says that“ assuming this diversity ordifference, mutually different individuals should be andthat“ respected not formally but substantively, and the stronger people, without being arrogant, should carefortheweaker people inonedomain ofsociety, while divergent society 3

Hanrei Jiho, No. 1598 (1997).

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should be maintained anddeveloped as a whole withthepursuit ofhappiness.” Thus, thecourt seems tobetalking about thediversity ofindividuals, andyetsuddenly moves to the issue of group protection simply bysuggesting the analogy that “ seeing this [situation] intherelationship between majority andminority.” Towhatextent isthis move logically plausible? Kymlicka might argue that, through a structural extension oftheideal ofequality, the shift fromindividual togroup rights isa natural one.However, sucha structural extension alone is insufficient, because this claim must still show howthe extension from an individualistic understanding of rights to a group-level understanding is possible. To makethis extension plausible, theviewpoint ofequality mustestablish andspecify a normative ordering between individuals andgroup. Howshould this ordering bedone? Fromoneviewpoint, protection rights forminority members arejustanother formof individual rights. As the Sapporo District Court states, individuals have different backgrounds; andifitis possible tocompensate forthose differences onanindividual basis under Article 13, whyshould notitalso be possible to treat minority members as individuals, eachofwhomlacks necessary resources forhis/her well-being? Tosolve this problem, Kymlicka might emphasize that the contextualization of individuals is presupposed inthe individualistic understanding of interests. Inthat contextualization – particularly to create the possibility of individual autonomous choice – there are necessary prerequisites, suchas culture. Thus, ifindividual choice should be protected, itseems natural that culture should also be protected. However, I donotbelieve that individuals should be respected by respecting their backgrounds. Rather, I believe that it is natural forindividuals to be respected as individuals notwithstanding their backgrounds. Howcan this conflict be accommodated? Ofcourse, there are additional alternatives: to abandon the individualistic understanding ofrights provisions suchas Article 13,forexample; ortoinsert a specific article into the Constitution of Japan addressing indigenous people, such as that in the 1982 Canadian Constitution. However, withregard tothelatter, theproblem ofconsistency concerning anamendment nonetheless remains. Andwithregard totheformer alternative, there exists a larger problem ofconstitutional interpretation: wewould have to reinterpret every rights provision respecting civil liberties, subsistence, education, employment andthe like, inorder to make itsuitable fortheprotection ofindigenous people. Given that it would involve painstaking effort, it is doubtful that such a reinterpretation would everbe undertaken.

One more important problem remains: howis the protection of a national minority possible ina framework of liberalism? Kymlicka has developed a type of“ comprehensive” liberalism. Hetakes theprinciple ofpersonal autonomy as thecore value oftheliberal view. The principle of personal autonomy means that each individual has a basic interest inbeing able torationally assess andrevise his/her current needs inlife. Since Kymlicka adheres tothis viewwhenexplicating the liberal derivation ofminority rights, itseems to methat he creates a newproblem ofthe cultural conflict between liberal rights and minority claims of identity. WhenKymlicka grounds his recognition of minority rights onhis interpretation of liberalism, the cultural background of such a liberal view is highlighted. Yet there are other views andunderstandings of minority rights that differ from Kymlicka’ s: forexample, thelibertarian understanding orthedifference-based understanding ofminority rights.

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about the Rights

ofIndigenous

People

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The libertarian understanding of minority rights is represented byKukathas.4 He claims that, since wecannot adequately identify a minority people as a group because its members are so diverse within their ownunique circumstances, minority rights should beconsidered as a cluster ofindividual rights. According toKukathas, a minority group canbe tolerated as having its owninstitution, withthe necessary condition that theright foreachmember toexitthegroup isacknowledged. Thebasic tenet ofliberalismisthus notinfairness butintoleration, andliberalism cannot beextended toa paternalist protection of minority rights in the manner which Kymlicka’s understanding implies. Difference-based understanding is represented byseveral postmodernists, including Iris Marion Young, inthe form of the politics of difference.5 Fromthis viewpoint, the tendency ofliberalism tobeimpartial isinadequate, because itignores theparticular and concrete experiences ofminority people. These experiences cannot befully appreciated bydiscussions ofrights andother liberal concerns since theyare so diverse andfragmented. Asa result, the experiences should be taken into account notina formofa distributive paradigm, butrather as a deliberative type ofdemocratic participation. Kymlicka willcriticize these viewpoints under histheory ofcomprehensive liberalism. Forhim,background cultures ofliberalism grant persons theimportance ofautonomy. Now,this isnota problem perse ifoneaccepts andshares Kymlicka’s basic confidence inthecentral tenet ofliberalism. Still, Idoubt whether indigenous people canshare that confidence. Generally speaking, indigenous people attribute mostimportance tothesense of belonging. Much of their traditional life-style is very different from industrialized and urbanized people, and they take pride in maintaining their traditional life-style against whattheyperceive as superficial, hasty, rootless, andindividualistic people. Thelives ofindigenous people havemuchmoreintimate tieswithnature andtheearth, rather than with the artificially constructed environment of the city. Indigenous people are also closer, andencourage group cooperation among neighbors; eventhe interaction between people andgod(s) is very important. Thus, forpeople suchas these whohave a greater sense ofbelonging, liberal culture backed bythemodernized environment is foreign. Inseeking tomaintain their culture, Ithink indigenous people donotwishthatculture to serve as a background forpersonal autonomy. Rather, I believe that they wishto defend their own distinct culture to which they can belong. Thus the problem is howa liberal viewsuchas Kymlicka’s canhave anysignificance tothese indigenous people. If Kymlicka’s liberalism requires the core value of autonomy andthe derivation of minority rights to be dependent onthe recognition ofthat core value, howcansuch a liberalist claim ofrights represent theclaims ofindigenous people? There area couple ofpossibilities howitmight. Oneisthatevenindigenous people whodesire a sense ofbelonging should have a critical awareness oftheir tradition. However, this awareness is distinct fromthedemands ofthat people. Canliberalism denounce the sense ofbelonging ofanindigenous people as obsolete? Ithink not. In this respect, wemust be aware that this constitutes a limitation on comprehensive liberalism. Ofcourse, inexpressing sensitivity tothis kindofcultural relativity orincommensurability, one might somehow still claim the superiority of autonomy-oriented liberalism. Butliberalism nonetheless has to explain further whyautonomy is suchan 4

5

Kukathas, op.cit. Iris Marion Young, Justice andthe Politics of Difference (Princeton University Press, 1990); do., Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2002).

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important corevalue. Kymlicka seems toprepare forthiskindofargument bysuggesting thatevery person possesses a background forhis/her choice inthecontext ofhis/her culture. However, this initself is a liberal interpretation oftherelationship between persons andculture. AsI have mentioned earlier, indigenous people might notholdthe same view. Inthat case, howcan liberalism endorse its viewof indigenous people? Kymlicka hasintroduced a newargument onthis point inthepaper featured inthis publication: that is, the argument of reciprocity.6 Toputitsuccinctly, Kymlicka argues that allcultural backgrounds involve a certain modest normofreciprocity towhich the claim ofminority rights canresort. Fromthis standpoint, eveninsome illiberal cultures, minority people canassert their respective rights against themajority, which ofcourse liberalism cansupport fromitsownperspective. This seems a moreadvanced viewfor extending rights protections toanytype ofculture. Yet, onemustbe aware that, ifthis viewis taken seriously, Kymlicka’s commitment to autonomy-oriented liberalism becomes relativized. Itappears thatthereciprocity argument isa corollary oftheequality argument, which focuses onthestructural imbalance between groups. Assuch, allthat

justice would require under thereciprocity orequality arguments isprotections forminority people, notspecial rights for minorities. Inparticular, justice would not require specific rights whose function excludes internal restrictions. Itwould therefore seemthat Kymlicka still hastoprovide a rationale, inaddition totheargument based onreciprocity, forwhyweneed special protections of rights. In contrast to this approach, Kukathas introduced a view of liberalism that has toleration as its core value. Under this view, given thattheprimary value ofliberalism istoleration, majority people should letminority people alone. Thisisa relatively passive attitude towards minority people: itis less aggressive thantheautonomy-oriented liberalism, because itseems to make roomfordifferent people to resolve their problems according totheir ownconsiderations. Ofcourse, this kindofattitude cantendtobetoo permissive ofthe illiberal practices ofsome groups. However, itnonetheless creates a possibility forunderstanding the practices ofother groups rather thandismissing them as simply illiberal, as isthecase withthepractices ofmostindigenous peoples. What I amnowconcentrating on is this possibility. Ifthe people of a given group wish to maintain their ownsense ofbelonging, wemusttolerate andrespect thatdecision. Thesame conclusion canbedrawn froma difference-based approach. Commentators whodenytheviability ofliberalism andreplace itwithdifference-based politics will emphasize the importance of the identity of the national minority, which is entirely different fromthat ofthe majority people, andmight trytoaddress that difference ina confrontational way, such as by secession or independence. From this differencebased angle, the claims of minority people should be understood ina waythat they appreciate themselves. The rights claims of these people will be unique to the coherence oftheir group identity, which is again very different from individualistic rightsclaims. Thisviewmight bemorecompatible withtheopinions ofindigenous people than the liberal viewis. Ifso, thenthe question becomes: howcantheautonomy-oriented liberal viewstate thattherights-claims theyendorse arebetter thanthose espoused by thedifference-based view? Inanswering this question, wemight take into consideration John Rawls’viewof 7 Rawls’ idea of political”liberalism, which Kymlicka has attacked as ” “ incoherent.” political” “ justice, or overlapping consensus, suggests an application of liberalism to

6 7

inthis volume, p. 39,43f. Universal Minority Rights? TheProspects forConsensus,” WillKymlicka, “ John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1994); John Rawls, The Lawof Peoples (Oxford University Press, 1999)

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That is, as I understand it, to establish some public space that is responsive toevery type ofclaim, including those ofindigenous people, byutilizing the minimal con-ditions ofshared understanding among divergent peoples. Iamdrawn to this idea. Mysense is that ifwesolve the problem ofthe content bysimply reverting to acomprehensive ideasuchasautonomy, thepossibilities formutual understanding and communication between majority andminority narrows. Because there willarise the problem of cultural imperialism, or benign assimilationism. minority culture.

MOURI Yasutoshi

a Liberal Extension of Multiculturalism: Focusing Attention on the Present Conditions of the Korean Minority inJapan

Towards

Introduction

Today, manystates contain several ethnocultural groups, andface theproblem ofhow they should respond tothe various claims ofthose groups. Mainstream liberal democnon-discrimination” was racies once thought a policy based onthe principle of mere “ sufficient in such multicultural situations. According to that policy, the maintenance andpreservation ofethnocultural groups is left tothe discretion oftheir members; and the even ifthis process results inthe groups’extinction, weare forced to regard itas “ natural wayof things.” Many cultural minority groups have asserted an increasing number ofclaims torights under this policy, inorder topreserve their owncultures; and recently, a growing number of people have felt the necessity of acknowledging the legitimacy ofthese claims. Moreover, some people have come to disprove ofliberalismingeneral, forthe reason that itcannot acknowledge thelegitimacy ofa multiculturalism within which these proliferating rights claims are accepted.1 However, Will Kymlicka has lately defended this kind of multiculturalism as consistent with the viewpoint of his ownliberalism.2 It is therefore not surprising that Kymlicka’s theory is the center of attention in debates on multiculturalism; butthe reverse side of the coin is that his theory is the focus of much criticism. Indeed, the breadth and depth of his theory raises many issues. Asspace is limited inthis paper, I willfocus onthe dilemma of the Korean thelargest minority group inJapan –andfromthatperspective, comment on minority – a fewaspects of Kymlicka’s theoretical framework.

Relevance Outline

ofKymlicka’s Theory to theKorean Minority inJapan

of Kymlicka’s Theory

To do justice to Kymlicka’s multiculturalism, it is necessary to divide it into three aspects: hisownliberalism, conceptual devices forderiving practical guidelines from the same, andpractical guidelines formulticultural situations. Kymlicka’s liberalism is comprehensive, andrests ona commitment tothe values of autonomy andequality. Itis similar tothat ofJohn Rawls andRonald Dworkin.3 Kymlicka’s mainconceptual device forderiving practical guidelines is thecategorization ofethnocultural groups. Specifically, hedivides ethnocultural groups intothree categories: national minorities, immigrants, and metics. The first twowere already );thelastplays a pivotal Lecture” significant before hislecture inKobe (hereinafter, his“ role in his analysis of the Korean minority in that lecture.4 The categorization of

1

2 3

4

See, for example, Vernon Van Dyke,

“ Collective Rights and Minority Rights: Problems in LiberalJournal ofPolitics, vol. 44 (1981). Democratic Thought,” See WillKymlicka, Liberalism, Community, andCulture (Oxford University Press 1989); WillKymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford University Press, 1995). Ibid.

inthis volume, sec. 4. WillKymlicka, “ Universal Minority Rights? The Prospects forConsensus,”

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a Liberal Extension ofMulticulturalism

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minorities is determined in relation to Kymlicka’s concept of societal culture. He defines societal culture as a setofinstitutions, affecting bothpublic andprivate life and sharing a common language, that have historically developed over time in a given territory, providing people witha wide range ofchoices about howto lead their lives. has its ownsocietal culture, whereas ”immigrants”donot. national minority” Thus, a “ metics” are According to Kymlicka’s definition, “

some migrants whoarenever given theopportunity tobecome citizens, either because theyentered illegally ...orbecause they entered as students or‘guest-worker’buthave overstayed their initial visa...” 5

the country

Thepractical guidelines that Kymlicka sets forth arebased ontheliberal ideal that society isa collection offree andequal citizens, andthatgovernment should create, or at least preserve, it. According to his guidelines, multicultural situations should be managed bygiving each cultural minority group the group-differentiated rights appropriate forits minority type. Since autonomy requires a context ofchoice, allpeople, as at home.” equal citizens, should have access to a societal culture inwhich theyfeel “ More concretely: Kymlicka asserts that national minorities should have the rights necessary to preserve their ownsocietal cultures; and immigrants should have the rights necessary to be integrated tothe host society (which is often required to adapt to accommodate the identity andpractices of those immigrants, whoshould be able to feel at home in it). As to metics, Kymlicka proposes the following guidelines: nogroups oflong-term residents are permanently excluded frommembership inthenation, suchas orracial caste groups. Everyone ontheterritory mustbe able togaincitizenship, andbecome an equal member ofthenation iftheywishtodoso.6 metics

Ourquestion is whether Kymlicka’s theory is relevant to andadequate forthe present conditions ofthe Korean minority inJapan. Inorder toanswer this question, it will be helpful to have an overview of the zigzag transition of that minority’s legal status, which makes itclear that Kymlicka’s approach throws a fascinating light onthe problems ofthe Korean minority inJapan.

intheLegal Status oftheKorean Minority inJapan Before World WarII,Korea wasa Japanese colony. Therefore, although itistrue that Koreans didnothave exactly thesame legal status as Japanese people, theyat least hadJapanese nationality. However, after the War, in1952, they lost Japanese nationality as a result ofa single government proclamation. Since then, ontheonehandthe basis of their legal status in Japan has been unclear; but on the other hand, in individual legal institutions, progress hasbeenmadetoa certain extent inat least two ways. First, members ofthe Korean minority are now,forthe most part, permanent residents; andsecond, using the classical terms of T. H.Marshall,7 limited civil rights andsocial rights have been granted tothem.8 Mostpeople regard these changes as Changes

5 6 7

8

Ibid., Ibid.

sec.4.

T. H. Marshall and Tom Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class (Pluto Press, 1992). Among the rights Marshall included in his definition of citizenship, political rights are now under dispute. We cannot predict whether political rights willbe given tothe Korean minority inJapan. This problem is tooinvolved a subject tobeaddressed inthis paper, because todiscuss itwehavetoexamine the nature ofpolitical community ingeneral, interpretations oftheJapanese Constitution andtheextent ofthe Korean minorities’desire toconstitute a single political community withtheJapanese.

Forfurther

details,

see Onuma

Interplay Between Human Rights Activities Yasuaki, “

andLegal

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constituting considerable moral progress. However, wemustnotforget thatweare left with manyproblems. First, the legal status of minority Koreans is not, of course, the same as thatofJapanese people, anda substantial number ofthose Korean residents complain about certain aspects of this situation. Second, and more seriously, legal policies withrespect toKoreans inJapan oscillate unsteadily between seeing themas the object of police action andas equal members of Japanese society. These contradictory attitudes are mixed in many individual institutions, reflecting the fact that progress inthelegal status ofKorean residents hasbeenmadetoa great extent as a result ofinternal andexternal realpolitik. That is, Japanese legal policy onthe Korean minority is notsufficiently based onnormative principles. This instability inlegal status hastortured Korean residents. Inshort, there is fairly general agreement that thechanges that have occurred in the status ofthe Korean minority inJapan have hadboth manygoodandmanybad aspects froma normative point ofview; although there is disagreement about certain details. Wecould saythatthe goodaspects should be supported withfirm normative principles. Here, I think thatthefascination of Kymlicka’s approach is obvious: inmy opinion, he approaches problems by distinguishing between justifiable and nonjustifiable existing practices in the light of his political philosophy. This approach is intended to enable people to give a firm normative basis tojustifiable practices, and encourage people tochallenge the more problematic ones.9 However, whether Kymlicka’s theory is relevant to the present conditions of the

Korean minority

ornotis, ofcourse, a separate issue.

ofExtending Kymlicka’s Theory andtheRelevance oftheExtended Theory Inorder toexamine therelevance ofKymlicka’s theory, weneedtotake another short lookat the history ofthe Korean minority inJapan. proceeded” FewJapanese people think that Japanese society has already “ to a point at which liberalism canbe presumed without qualification. Theproblem today is to what extent the Korean minority can be treated as legally equal to the Japanese lags behind” , ina sense, as to multiculturalism. ForKymlicka’s majority. So, Japan “ type of multiculturalism emerged simultaneously with minority-rights movements claiming the positive acknowledgement of differences itself, which extends beyond merely treating people legally as equal regardless oftheir cultural backgrounds. On the other hand, the Korean minority is nowentering its fourth orfifth generation. Over time, many say, the assimilation of the Korean minority into Japanese culture has progressed considerably. This is whythe very existence of Korean culture (that is, Korean identity andpractices) in Japanese society, which should be preserved by multiculturalism, is very unclear. Multiculturalism, whether of Kymlicka’s type or not, maybetoolate. This situation demonstrates that Kymlicka’s theory before the Lecture needed to beexpanded, since theKorean minority is neither a national minority noranimmigrant Necessity

group, judging fromthe above. Therefore, itis notsurprising that Kymlicka himself tried

toextend histheory: inthe Lecture, hehighlights thecategory ofmetics andincludes theKorean minority inthatcategory. Moreover, heregards theguidelines formetics as explained inabove as applicable forthat minority.10 inCornell International Standards ofHuman Rights: ACase Study ontheKorean Minority inJapan,” LawJournal, Vol. 25 (1992). 9 Will Kymlicka, “ DoWe Need a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights? Reply to Carens, Young, Parekh inConstellations, Vol. 4, No.1 (1997), p.78. andForst,” , sec. 5, esp. p. 35. Universal Minority Rights?” 10 Kymlicka, “

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Itseems that Kymlicka’s extended theory is nowrelevant tothe Korean minority. Inaddition, hisdefinition of,andguidelines for, metics makes nomention oftheculture

of the minority. Therefore, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that his theory has nowgone beyond multiculturalism ina narrow sense toward a liberal theory ofminority rights ingeneral. It is clear that Kymlicka’s theory willbe fascinating ifthis extension succeeds. Thus, the question that we must consider next is whether his extended theory is adequate ornot. Inadequacies

ofKymlicka’s Extended

Theory

ofthe Korean Minority inJapan In order to examine the adequacy of Kymlicka’s theory, we need to address two questions. The first is whether or not Korean residents are metics. It is true that members oftheKorean minority are notmetics as defined byKymlicka, because they didnotcome to Japan as illegal immigrants. However, this is nota crucial problem because the Korean minority has certainly been marginalized inJapanese society, andwetherefore needonlyrevise thedefinition ofmetics a little. The second question is whether or not Kymlicka’s guidelines for metics are adequate for the Korean residents. According to those guidelines, Korean residents should be able togainJapanese citizenship. Fromthe legal point ofview, citizenship means official membership ina state, anda bundle ofrights andduties based onthat membership. However, I think that Kymlicka’s guidelines are inadequate for two reasons. First, this policy invites us to skip, even if unconsciously, a significant theoretical task. Second, this policy ofaccording citizenship cannot function toimprove the situation of the Korean minority inthe foreseeable future –at least ifthe theoretical Present Conditions

task remains undone.

To understand this, weneed to study inmore detail the present condition ofthe Korean minority inJapan. Itwould be helpful to imagine a series ofconcentric circles. The Japanese are inside the innermost circle; permanent residents, such as many Korean residents, are inthesecond circle; guest-workers andsoforth are inthenext circle; andillegal immigrants, etc., areintheoutermost circle. Using Marshall’s classical terminology, the Japanese have full citizenship, and therefore, civil rights, political rights, andsocial rights. Permanent residents, suchas theKorean minority, have only limited civil rights and social rights. Inadequacies: Practical andTheoretical

I think it is necessary to explain the ways inwhich the minorities inthe outer circles assume their different positions inJapanese society, andtoexplain point bypoint the justification foreach claim of rights made bythose minorities. Acitizenship-conferring policy removes the needofthis theoretical task, since toconfer citizenship is toconfer inlumpsuma bundle ofrights. However, this theoretical taskisalso significant inpractice. First, wecannot ignore

the probability that the citizenship-conferring policy would not work. The innermost circle inJapan seems veryhomogeneous interms ofculture, probably because Japan has notgone through the experience ofbeing animmigrant state. Therefore, gaining thatis,moving fromthesecond circle intotheinnermost –appears almost citizenship – equivalent to coming under pressure to assimilate to the homogeneous Japanese culture. This is likely to cause a conflict in the minds of naturalized Koreans, and

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tensions between naturalized andnon-naturalized Koreans. This is only one of the reasons whymany Koreans are reluctant to obtain Japanese citizenship, butit is a significant one. Therefore, wecanexpect thatalthough their numbers maydecrease, manyKoreans willremain permanent residents intheforeseeable future. Itis clear that the Korean minority has a firmposition inJapanese society insome respects. Though manyKoreans have fought forcitizenship, as Kymlicka points out,11 theessential point oftheir claim seems tometobethattheyarelegitimate members ofJapanese society, even ifnotofstate; andtheyshould have rights commensurate withthis membership –that is, citizenship in a sociological or psychological sense. Many Japanese people admit thegeneral legitimacy ofthis claim; butsubstantial disagreement remains about the details. As expected, the theoretical task set forth above is also significant in practice. Weshould explain the legitimate rights of Korean minority as permanent residents. Kymlicka mayobject that myapproach is conservative, inthat I regard the status quoof Japanese society as a given: he mayargue that Japanese society should become multicultural, following the steps of immigrant states, andthat the Korean minority should be accorded multicultural citizenship. I do notintend to exclude this objection outofhand: itmaywellbedesirable. Atleast, itwould beundesirable toset too high a threshold for gaining citizenship. However, I will argue that, if we are to proceed evena little inthis practical direction, weare also required to undertake the theoretical task described above. What must be noticed here is: first, that concrete rights constituting citizenship varydepending onthe historical experience ofthe community, andits citizens’consciousness of normative issues (amongst other factors); second, that the concrete rights constituting citizenship cannot always be harmonized;12 andthird, thatJapan does notyethave enough experience as a state thatconfers citizenship uponvarious people. Those whoobject to Korean minority members gaining Japanese citizenship would nodoubt askwhatconcrete rights those Koreans would gain in receiving that citizenship. To persuade such people, in considering the membership ofthe Korean minority inJapanese society, weneedtooffer reasons for whyit is illegitimate to refuse the Korean minority the rights constituting Japanese citizenship andto set toohigha threshold fortheir obtaining citizenship.13 The next question is then: whatcauses the practical andtheoretical inadequacy described here in Kymlicka’s theory?

ofInadequacy: TwoStrategies forthe Extension oftheTheory Wecan imagine twopossibilities: first, that Kymlicka’s theory, as a liberal theory of minority rights, is inadequate inthefirst place; andsecond, that Kymlicka’s strategy for extending histheory is inadequate. Weshall return tothefirst point later: the second Roots

point

is the main point of this paper.

As Kymlicka himself acknowledged,14 the starting point of his theory is the practices ofWestern liberal democracies, inparticular immigrant states, toward ethnocultural groups. Ofcourse, wecannot transplant this theory as it is onto non-Western societies such as Japan. Twoalternatives are therefore available to us: a slimming11

Ibid.

12 I suspect Kymlicka

13 14

40 (fn. 34).

would concede this point himself:

, p. see Kymlicka, “Universal Minority Rights?”

Besides which wewould also berequired tostudy therelationship between political community citizenship. , p.73. DoWe Need a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights?” Kymlicka, “

and

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down strategy, which depends upon the characteristics common to both Western

society and non-Western society; and a deepening strategy, which deepens the theoretical perspective totake into account thecharacteristics ofnon-Western societ-

ies.

In his Lecture, Kymlicka consciously chooses the slimming-down strategy: he supposes that liberalism cannot be presumed without qualification. Thus, hedepends upontheslimmed-down ideal ofreciprocity between majorities andminorities, namely, liberal majorities andliberal minorities inWestern society, andcommunitarian majorities andcommunitarian minorities innon-Western societies. Histheory hastwomain components: first, anaccount ofjustice between ethnocultural groups, which emphasizes the need for minorities to have certain protections against the exercise of ); andsecond, anaccount of external protections” majority power (what Kymlicka calls “ justice within ethnocultural groups, which emphasizes that individual members ofthe minority group should notbe restricted intheir freedom to question andrevise group ). Kymlicka also claims that internal restrictions” traditions andpractices (what he calls “ the slimming-down strategy causes an abandonment ofthe limits oninternal restrictions, andthe reservation of external protections.15 Theslimming-down strategy wasintended tooffer slimmer butcorrect guidelines, buthas turned outto give slimmer butinadequate external protection guidelines for atleast inthecase oftheKorean minority inJapan, as wehave external protections – seen above. Wecan nowunderstand one reason forthis. Kymlicka thought that the problems ofthe Korean minority inJapan are characterized bythefact that liberalism cannot be assumed inJapan without qualification. However, the problems ofthe Ko-

reanminority have beenalso marked bythehistorical conditions ofJapanese citizenthe relationship between state andsociety inJapan, the relationship between Japanese culture andJapanese citizenship, andthe characteristics ofthe membershipofthe Korean minority inJapanese society, amongst other factors. These factors, which were notallconsidered byKymlicka, render inadequate inJapan guidelines that are adequate inWestern states, andimmigrant states inparticular. Therefore, wecannot avoid adopting thedeepening strategy. Inwhatwaycanwe deepen Kymlicka’s theory so that it becomes anadequate liberal theory of minority rights? Before turning to this essential point, weneed to examine whether or nota ship,

ofminority rights candojustice tothe present conditions ofthe Korean inJapan inthe first place, as opinions onthis point mayvary.

liberal theory minority

FromMulticulturalism toa Liberal Theory ofMinority Rights inGeneral:

AnAlternative Applicability

Strategy forthe Extension

ofKymlicka’s Theory

of a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights

Those who doubt the applicability of a liberal theory of minority rights could attack it on

twopoints. Thefirst point isthatthis theory cannot helpbutrelyonsome liberal ideals, which are regarded with some suspicion inJapan; andthe second point is that the theory offers guidelines for conferring only some rights, which arguably cannot do justice tothe conditions ofthe Korean minority inJapan. Wewillexamine these two points one byone. 15

, sec. 2. Universal Minority Rights?” Kymlicka, “

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Canwepresume liberal ideals inJapan? Manyhave queried thedegree towhich hastaken root inJapan. However, wecanprobably saythat liberalism has taken root inJapanese society to the extent that the degree of its adoption is being discussed. ManyJapanese people are committed to some extent to liberal democracy,at least institutionally andmore orless take advantage ofthis system. So theJapanese mustexamine theimplications ofthis commitment fortheproblems oftheKorean minority inJapan. Itis notuntil this examination hasbeencompleted thatwecanconsider theconflict between a commitment toliberal democracy andother commitments, such as to the value of community, andcan proceed to the problems of relative priorities andtheadjustment ofvalues. Toputitanother way,Japanese society is not “ monolithically” communitarian, as Kymlicka himself admits.16 Asforthe guidelines forgranting rights, it maybe argued that such guidelines cannot do justice to the historical and current conditions of the Korean minority in Japan forat least tworeasons: their future orientation andthe fact that the political concepts underlying these guidelines are inadequate forthe Korean minority. Manythink thatthesituation ofthe Korean minority hasbeencaused byhistorical injustice, as we have seen above. If so, then must this injustice be redressed retrospectively? Indeed, as Kymlicka himself hasacknowledged,17 histheory does notdeal liberalism

with the problem of historical injustice; and in this sense, it fails to resolve all the problems ofminorities. However, as Kymlicka points outinanother context,18 the integration of immigrants under legitimate conditions impliedly demands that the attitude ofthe majority be adjusted suchthat it respects minorities andbehaves reasonably towards them. That is, the majority is also required to paya price inthefuture. I donot believe that the redress ofhistorical injustices canbe convincing to minorities without this cost to majorities. Therefore, debaters whostress historical injustice also have a reason to recognize the merits ofthefuture orientation of theguidelines. It is important to note that the policy of conferring rights seems to be based on a particular politico-philosophical paradigm that, intheterminology ofJ. G.A.Pocock,19 andopinions diverge regarding thelegitimacy wemaycalla “ law-centered paradigm;” ofthis paradigm. Theworks of Pocock, whoinvented the concept ofa law-centered paradigm, suggest thatthis paradigm is naturally inopposition tothe“ civic humanism,” orcivic republicanism. However, weshould notoverlook thefact thatthis paradigm is also opposed to that of the politics of identity and difference. I will not to explore the relationship between the law-centered paradigm and civic humanism, because to argue this point would carry us toofarawayfromthe purpose of this paper.20 Inthis paper, weshould examine the objections of debaters of the politics of identity and difference. Wecanclassify these debaters into twotypes. Some, suchas C.Taylor,21 makea point ofthemutual recognition of,orrespect for, identity anddifference among groups withdifferent cultural backgrounds, andemphasize thepolitics leading theway 16 Ibid. , p.73. 17 Kymlicka, “ DoWe Need a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights?” 18 See Will Kymlicka, “Ethnic Associations and Democratic Citizenship,”in Freedom of Association, AmyGutmann, ed. (Princeton University Press, 1998). 19 J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge University Press, 1985). 20 Italso seems reasonable to suppose that Kymlicka has already presented his ownviewofcivic

humanism orcivic republicanism interms ofliberal virtue. See WillKymlicka, “ Ethnic Associations ; do., “Liberal Egalitarianism andCivic Republicanism: Friends or and Democratic Citizenship” , in Debating Democracy᾽s Discontent, Anita L. Allen and Milton C. Regan, Jr., eds. Enemies?” (Oxford University Press, 1998). Taylor, et al., Multiculturalism (Princeton University Press, 1994).

21 See Charles

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tothis recognition. Others makea point oftheconflict between identity anddifference within

a person, and therefore make much of the “ agon”where persons compete with

each other over identity anddifference. I. M.Young22 andW. E. Connolly23 are examples of this latter group. Between these twogroups, the former need notbe considered inourcontext, since, as wehave seen, the Korean minority inJapan is nowin its fourth orfifth generation, andthe Korean culture that should survive seems to be becoming vaguer even to the Korean residents themselves. However, we cannot ignore the latter group.

Some Korean residents tryto preserve Korean culture orto learn itfromABC; in fact, some ofthemhave organized a movement todothis. Other Korean residents, on theother hand, regard Japanese culture virtually as their ownone,andtrytoassimilate positively into Japanese culture. Regardless ofthedifference inthese positions, the decision as towhich toadopt seems to be accompanied bygreater orlesser internal conflicts within theperson making thatchoice. InJapan, discrimination against Korean residents continues to exist, andit often surfaces when a Korean resident tries to marry a Japanese citizen orgeta jobat a Japanese company. These circumstances seem to obstruct the integration of members of the Korean minority into Japanese culture and society not only practically, but also psychologically. Minority Koreans Japanese” andbeing “Korean” . seemto be unable toavoid standing between being “ Fromthis perspective, wecannot reject the Young-Connolly viewthat the politics of difference is simply a facile product of the fashionable discourse of post-modernism. Thepolitics ofdifference may,ina sense, bethereality inwhich theKorean residents live day by day, whether they like it or not–so we need to take the politics of difference seriously. Moreover, manyconsider that, atleast fromtheperspective ofgeneral theoretical attitudes, thetheory ofthe politics ofdifference conflicts seriously withthe lawcentered paradigm. Fromthe viewpoint of the politics of difference, the law-centered paradigm allocates rights inadvance ofthepolitics ofdifference, andconsequently underestimates, belittles, anddiminishes the latter, which infact should have operated ahead ofthe former. However, this general theoretical conflict does not, I think, necessarily mean thatthere is nopractical point ofcontact between thetwo.Weshould notforget thatthe politics of identity anddifference are likely to be more severe for minorities than majorities, even ifthey can constitute an opportunity forcreating something new, as some post-colonialists orcreolists claim. This severity also seems to be increased by

theuncertain legal status oftheKorean minority. Therefore, advocates ofthepolitics of difference have good reason to recognize the merits of the law-centered paradigm, which willlead to the demand that the Korean minority inJapan be given solid legal status.24

Whatisalso worthy ofnote here isthat, whenadvocates ofthese politics propose institutional designs, their proposals are likely to overlap –at least partially –with Kymlicka᾽ s, andare supported byanargument very similar to his, namely, the main argument that equal treatment respects difference.25 22 See Iris Martin Young, Justice andthePolitics ofDifference

(Princeton University Press, 1990).

23 See William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Cornell University Press, 1991).

Justice toward Groups: arguments for such an opinion, see Melissa S. Williams, “ in Political Theory, Vol. 23 (1995). Political notJuridical,” See, Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, “Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory,”in Ethics, Vol. 104 (1994); and especially Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, op.cit..

24 For detailed

25

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MOURI Yasutoshi

Thus, a liberal theory ofminority rights canbeofconsiderable value forJapanese society anditsKorean minority. Extending Kymlicka᾽ s theory toa general liberal theory of minority rights by deepening theoretical perspective is therefore worthy of an attempt.

the Perspective Tobe adequate forJapanese society, including the Korean minority, a theory ofminority rights mustbeable toexplain therights ofresident aliens as wellas theconditions ofanadequate policy ofconferring citizenship, as wehave seenabove. Since thefirst problem is a blind-spot ofKymlicka᾽ s theory, ifwefocus onit,wewillbeable togeta goodclue as to howto deepen histheory. Itis helpful inthis respect tolookbackatthecore ofKymlicka᾽s theory. Atthecore Deepening

of his theory are the liberal ideals of autonomy and equality, a normative viewpoint,

andtheconcept ofsocietal culture, a concept atthelevel ofsocial ontology. Ina liberal society offree andequal persons, people ought tobeable tolive ina societal culture as sucha societal athome,” thatprovides a context forchoices inwhich theycanfeel“ culture is a prerequisite for autonomy, andthat prerequisite ought to be accorded equally toall. Thewayinwhich minorities relate toa societal culture differs depending onwhotheyare. National minorities havetheir ownsocietal culture; immigrants donot; andmetics are marginalized inthe host society᾽s societal culture. This difference in relations toa societal culture explains whytheguidelines forminorities varyaccording tominority type. Metics, suchas theKorean minority inJapan, ought tobede-marginalized. I amwilling to accept this argument so far. However, I think that Kymlicka oversimplified the problem whenheclaimed that obtaining citizenship is the onlywayto become de-marginalized. Nowweareina position toexamine where todeepen Kymlicka᾽s theory. Theengine ofKymlicka᾽s theory is the ideal ofequality, as wehave seen above. However, mostof uswould accept that citizens andpermanent residents (as a kindof alien) cannot betreated completely as equals inpublic policy. Theproblem istherefore to workoutinwhat sense andto what extent they ought to be treated equally. It is insufficient to presume the ideals ofautonomy andequality. This normative question brings ustothe second question, which is at the level of social ontology. We mayapproach the normative problem above from the pole of universalism, such as that of natural lawtheory, Kantian ethics andutilitarianism, as wellas fromthe pole of particularism, such as that ofAristotelian ethics. Atanyrate, bothperspectives explain thedifference andequality ofduties andrights byfocusing onthecharacteristics oftherelationships between people. Itistherefore insufficient to define metics negatively as a marginalized group: weneedtoexplain positively inwhat sense Korean minorities are members ofJapanese society, andwhatminority rights such membership justifies. I willconsider thesecond issue ahead ofthefirst. Since minority type is defined withregard to societal culture, weneedtodeepen theconcept ofsocietal culture so that itcanexplain positively whatexactly itmeans to belong to a society, andinwhatwaypeople belong toa society. Atthis point, I want to propose that we add to the concept of societal culture the viewofsociety as a network ofinteractions among people. According tothis concept, tobea member ofa society istobelong tosucha network. Theimportant point tonote is that the relations among points ina network canbe dense orthin; andwithin each network, there maybe a sub-network that is so dense that wecan call it a national

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minority. Immigrants froma similar cultural background maypreserve denser relationships among oneanother thanthey dowithmembers ofthe host society. Evenmore important is the lesson that some relationships among points ina network are reciprocal, andothers are one-way. Viewing the claims of the Korean minority fromthis concept ofsociety willgive usa clue as totheanswer tothefirst normative question. Most Korean residents inJapan preserve denser relationships withmembers of Japanese society thanwithcitizens oftheir motherland, andconsequently mayconfer considerable benefits –oroccasionally harms –to other members of Japanese society. Here, considerable numbers of Koreans claim that they not only have an unstable legal status, butare also treated non-reciprocally inillegitimate ways. I therefore agree with Kymlicka whenhe says that weshould develop a general theory of minority rights based on the ideal of reciprocity. However, I think that we should lookuponthe ideal ofreciprocity notas a slimmed-down ideal, as Kymlicka did inthe Lecture, butas an ideal with an internal relation to the ideal of freedom and equality. This is because weshould think oftheallocation offreedoms, rights, duties, andthe merits of social co-operation according to the wayinwhich each person, whether heis Japanese, Korean orother alien, belongs toJapanese society. Weare encouraged todothis bythefact that manythinkers, including J. Rawls, H.L.A.Hart, andD.Gauthier, havetried toclarify their legitimate allocation inthelight oftheideal of reciprocity among members ofthesame society. Thus, I propose the ideal of reciprocity as a deeper ideal at the normative level, andthe concept of society as a network of interactions at the social ontology level. However, I cannot denythatthis proposal causes difficult theoretical problems, some of which are worth mentioning here, for it would help us to be conscious of the characteristics ofthetheoretical taskthatweneedto undertake inorder todevelop a general theory of minority rights.

Some derivative predicaments The first predicament is that a purely reciprocity-based political philosophy leads to ambiguous practical consequences, forexample: egalitarian policies (early Rawls),26

political liberalism (recent Rawls),27 fairdistribution ofliberty (Hart),28 andlibertarian policy (Gauthier),29 among others. Obviously, some of these exist instrong tension with one another. Examining this tension involves stepping into one of the hottest debates in contemporary political philosophy. With regard to the second predicament relating to social ontology, Charles 30is often menTaylor᾽ Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate” s article “ tioned. Taylor has divided the ontological basis of political philosophy into individualismandcollectivism. However, Kymlicka᾽s societal culture isdescribed as a context of choice, anda context ofchoice seems incapable ofbeing reduced tocategories ofthe individual or the collective.31 This is probably one of the reasons whyontology and

26 See John Rawls, “Distributive Justice,”in Philosophy, Politics, and Society, Peter Laslett andW. G. Chapman, eds., 3rd Series (1967).

27 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993). , in Philosophical Review, Vol. 64 (1955). Are There Any Natural Rights?” 28 See H. L. A. Hart, “ 29 See David Gauthier, Morals byAgreement, (Clarendon, 1986).

30

Cross-Purposes: Charles Taylor, “ (Harvard University Press, 1995).

TheLiberal-Communitarian Debate,” inPhilosophical Arguments,

31 Intherecent discussion ofsociology, themaincontrast hasbeennotthatbetween theindividual and thecollective, butbetween micro phenomena, suchas action orinteraction, andmacro phenomena, suchas institutional frameworks orsocial structures (that is, a context ofchoice). Moreover, recent

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policy are at cross-purposes, as Taylor himself recognizes inhis paper. That is, ifwe are to develop Kymlicka᾽s line of thought, we need to consider difficult political problems on the horizon beyond the persistent theoretical distinction between the individual andthe collective. This is truer of the concept of society as a network of interactions thanthe concept of societal culture.

Conclusion

wehave seen that Kymlicka᾽s theory of multiculturalism will notapply to the problems oftheKorean minority inJapan until ithasbeenextended toa general liberal theory of minority rights, and that while it is worth developing such a general liberal theory ofminority rights inJapan, Kymlicka᾽s extended theory (i.e., hisliberal theory of minority rights), is still inadequate fortheKorean minority. This is because headopts a passive strategy, which Icallslimming-down strategy, andhaslefta crucial theoretical task undone. Therefore, wemusttake another positive strategy, which I call a deepening strategy; butthis strategy, inturn, leaves uswithmanytheoretical predicaments. In this paper, examining Kymlicka᾽s approach to the problems of the Korean minority inJapan, wehave discovered more theoretical predicaments thansolutions. Yet weshould not be discouraged bythis conclusion. Kymlicka᾽s theory remains a goodexample, inthatithasdefined manyviable andnormatively justifiable policies by shedding a politico-philosophical light on actual practices. In addition, he has tried to extend histheory so that itwould be relevant forJapan, andindoing so leaves uswith manyclues. Ina word, Kymlicka hastaken a firmfirst stepwhich invites ustocontinue thejourney. Thus,

sociology debates discuss themutual influences ofmicro andmacro phenomena. Forexample, see, TheMicro-Macro Link, Jeffrey C.Alexander, Bernhard Giesen, Richard Munch, andNielJ. Smelser,

eds. (University of California Press, 1987).

Will KYMLICKA

Reply

to Commentaries

Iwould like tobegin bythanking mycommentators fortheir thoughtful andchallenging questions, andforallowing metoclarify myposition, which Inowrealize wasas notas carefully formulated asitshould havebeen. Icannot respond toalloftheir queries, which cover a wide range ofissues, butI would like toaddress a couple ofthemainthemes that runthrough the commentaries. Some of the commentaries focus primarily on myearlier attempt in Multicultural theory ofminority rights, grounded in distinctly liberal” Citizenship (1995) todevelop a “ specifically liberal principles of individual autonomy; others focus primarily on my attempt inthis Kobe Lecture to identify the outlines of a potential international consensus onminority rights that can be supported byboth liberals andtheir communitarian or collectivist critics, in part by avoiding the issues that divide them. These are quite different projects, and the commentaries therefore raise very different issues. Tooversimplify, those commentators whofocus onmyoriginal attempt to develop a distinctly liberal theory of minority rights tend to think that it is too liberal. Bycontrast, those commentators whofocus onmynewattempt to identify a potential international consensus onminority rights tendtothink that itis notliberal enough. Letmestart withthis second set ofconcerns, forthefact that mycommentators fall intothese twobroad camps isitself indicative oftheproblem Iwastrying tograpple with inthe Lecture. In myview, there is no realistic prospect of gaining an international consensus intheforeseeable future onthemerits ofliberalism: somepeople wantmore liberalism, some less. Ifthat is true ofmyacademic commentators fromJapan inthis volume, itisevenmoretrueifwelooktotherange ofviews found amongst governments andpolitical leaders around theworld. So ifwehope to achieve aninternational consensus onsomeminority rights provisions, wecannot presuppose universal agreement on distinctly liberal premises. Some people believe there is an inexorable trend towards liberalism around the world, andthatitisjusta matter oftimebefore itcanprovide thebasis ofaninternational consensus. Perhaps thatistrue, butIamskeptical. While there isa clear andimportant international trend towards democratization, itisa mistake toassume thatallofthenew democracies are liberal democracies inanyinteresting sense. Manyof the newdemocracies have periodic elections, buthave restrictions onfreedom of the press or freedom ofassociation forpolitical parties, restrictions onthe civil rights forwomen or religious minorities, andtheabsence oftherule oflaw.This istrue ofseveral countries inLatin America (O᾽Donnell 1993; 1996); Eastern Europe (Linz andStepan 1996); East Asia (Bell et al 1995) andelsewhere inAfrica andAsia (Zakaria 1998). democracies, transitional” These illiberal democracies are often described as “ which implies thattheir natural orinevitable telos istodevelop intoliberal democracies. Butilliberal democracy hasproven tobea stable andsustainable formofpolitical regime insome countries, inpart because it often fits wellwiththe political culture ofthese countries, which aretraditionally authoritarian orculturally conservative, andwhich lack a strong local liberal tradition. I don᾽t wantto imply that these countries orcultures are somehow “essentially” essentially”liberal. As illiberal, incontrast to Western countries that are somehow “ toutcourt istoignore and Parekh rightly says, todescribe Western countries as l iberal” “ conservatism, render invisible long-standing andinfluential strands ofcommunitarianism,

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religious fundamentalism, fascism, Marxism andracism, tonamejusta fewofthenonliberal strands which have contended for public opinion in the West. To call Western is, he says, “ an ideologically biased act of linguistic appropriation” liberal” societies “ (Parekh 2000: 112). Conversely, to describe other countries as “ or “comilliberal” munitarian” is to ignore andrender invisible important strands of thought which have promoted ideals ofindividual freedom anddemocratic equality. AsFukada rightly stresses, allcultures –Eastern andWestern –contain multiple strands, some more hospitable to liberal ideals, others less. So cultures are notessentially liberal orilliberal: there is nocultural essence that either entails orprecludes liberalization. Nomatter howwell-established itssystem of liberal-democracy, every Western society remains vulnerable to illiberal movements; no matter howentrenched its illiberal political system, every non-Western society contains the potential seeds of liberalization.1 Indeed, it should be clear bynowthat there are noinherent geographical orcultural boundaries tothe spread ofliberalism. Some commentators usedtoargue that liberalism wasessentially a phenomenon of Protestant Northern Europe andits settler colonies, andcould nottake root in the Catholic countries ofsouthern Europe andLatin America, ortheOrthodox countries of Eastern Europe, let alone inthe non-Christian parts of the world. Such a viewwas difficult todisprove whenSpain, Portugal, Greece, andvirtually allofLatin America were runbymilitary dictatorships, andwhenallofEastern Europe wasCommunist. Buttoday wesee a profound shift towards liberal democracy inseveral ofthese countries, and indeed morebroadly, including countries inAsiaandAfrica, like South Africa, India and

Japan.

I expect this gradual diffusion ofliberalism willcontinue, albeit withsetbacks here

andthere. SoIdonotshare thepostmodernist belief thatliberalism isexhausted, orthat ithasbeenexposed as premised onhollow orfalse images ofself, society, agency or reason. Myexpectation andhope is that liberalism will become progressively more popular inside andoutside theWest. I᾽ mcertainly NOTsuggesting thatliberalism is in anywayinherently inappropriate fornon-Western countries, as Hirai suggests. Onthe contrary, Iassume thatliberal ideals are powerful andimportant resources forprogressive change inmostcountries, andwilllikely become stronger inthefuture. Butnoneofthis changes thefactthatliberalism is notuniversally shared amongst thegovernments whonegotiate international norms, noramongst their citizens. Liberal s countries, alongside democracies today represent, at best, one-third of the world᾽ illiberal/transitional democracies andnon-democratic authoritarian regimes (Gurr et al 2001). Mostcountries withnon-liberal regimes today have never hadanyexperience withliberal democracy, andhave deeply-rooted traditions andexpectations ofilliberal governance. There often is strong support, bothamongst elites andthe masses, for illiberal restrictions onthefreedom ofwomen, religious andethnic minorities, journalists, trade unions, political dissidents, orcriminal defendants. Theidea ofadopting liberal rights forthese groups isoften seenas a threat tothebasic values ortraditions oridentity ofthesociety. Indeed, itis often onlyinternational assistance andpressure that have kept some ofthe younger democracies fromslipping back into authoritarianism; the domestic sources of support are insufficient to maintain the liberal framework. 1

Since 1989,

ithasbeena constant concern ofmanyWestern observers thatanEastern European

country would elect a neo-fascist orneo-Nazi political party. Itturned out, however, thatthis danger wasactually greater intheWest: onesuchparty is nowa coalition partner inAustria; another such party is a partner inlocal governments inFrance.

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Under these circumstances,

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itseems tomethatwehavetwobasic options interms

of developing international norms of minority

rights protection. First,

we could develop

aninternational system ofminority protection thatislimited toliberal-democracies, and

that presupposes the basic institutions of liberal-democracy, andthat is grounded in distinctly liberal premises. Second, wecould seek a more global system of minority rights protection which encompasses illiberal democracies andauthoritarian regimes, and which, for that very reason, cannot be grounded on distinctly liberal premises. Thefirst option is certainly the more feasible ofthetwo.There is a growing consensus within the West on certain basic aspects of minority rights.2 AfewWestern democracies have hesitations about particular aspects of this newconsensus on minority rights, butthese disputes would notpreclude the adoption ofcertain minimal standards. Indeed, wesee the outlines of such a development withthe recent declarations oftheCouncil ofEurope andtheOSCE. These areessentially declarations bythewell-established Atlantic democracies about whattheWestviews astheminimal standards forthe treatment of minorities within liberal democracies. However, while this option is more feasible, ithas limited usefulness, since there is little needforinternational monitoring ofthetreatment ofminorities inthese countries. Precisely because theAtlantic democracies already havea reasonably strong domestic consensus infavour of (a minimal level of) minority rights, international monitoring or pressure is not needed to bring these countries into compliance with the minimum standards established bythe Council of Europe orthe OSCE.3 Codifying international norms that only apply to Western democracies is, therefore, primarily ofsymbolic importance: itisa symbolic statement ofwhat“ intheWesttake we” tobea civilized approach tominorities. These norms werenotadopted froma belief that aneffective setofinternational mechanisms wasneeded tooversee andcorrect failures ofdomestic legislation. NoWestern democracy seriously expected these international norms to be usedto challenge their domestic laws orpolitical processes.4 Infact, the main reason whythe Council of Europe andOSCE adopted these declarations inthe1990s wastoprovide guidelines fordealing withethnic conflict inthe

2

AsGurrnotes, “Relations between ethnic groups andgovernments changed inthe 1990s inways a widely heldset thatsuggest thata newregime governing minority-majority relations isbeing built –

ofprinciples about howtohandle intergroup relations inheterogenous states, a common repertoire ofstrategies forhandling crises, andanemerging domestic andinternational consensus onhowto respond toethnic repression andviolence. Thefirst andmostbasic principle ofthis emerging regime is recognizing andactively protecting minority peoples’s rights ... Western democracies have taken

theleadhere. After World WarII,theAtlantic democracies emphasized theprotection ofindividuals, butduring theearly 1990s, Western advocates shifted their emphasis fromindividual rights tothe

3 4

collective rights ofnational minorities... Virtually allEuropean democracies haveimplemented these principles”(Gurr 2000: 55– 6). I set aside here the special cases ofCyprus, Greece andTurkey, which are nominally part ofthe “ West”in virtue of membership in either the EU or NATO, but which geographically belong to the Balkans, andwhich share thesame illiberal approach tominorities as their Balkan neighbours. Forarguments that OSCE norms can andshould be used to challenge the status quo in some Western countries, see Heintze 2000, andFord1999, whosuggests thatinprinciple American Indian tribes could appeal toOSCEnorms toadvance some oftheir legal claims. However, as heacknowledges, this is highly unlikely toactually happen: neither the Indian tribes northeAmerican governmentviewtheOSCEdeclarations as regulative for,orevenrelevant to,their domestic negotiations. Some Western countries were initially nervous about theextent towhich these international norms would challenge their domestic laws: this is particularly true of France, which remains deeply sceptical oftheinternationalization ofminority rights. However, France, along withGreece, hasbeen able towater downtheprovisions insucha wayas toinsulate itsdomestic practices fromeffective international scrutiny.

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. rejoin Europe” post-communist countries of Eastern Europe which were aspiring to “ function of these norms, in other words, was notto regulate or monitor minority rights within the Western democracies themselves, butto provide a transitional democracies”in new democracies”or “ framework for pressuring the “ Eastern Europe toimprove their treatment ofminorities. There wasa sense ofurgency about this since several violent ethnic conflicts hadbroken outintheregion, particularly inthe Balkans andCaucuses. So theWestformulated international standards forthe treatment ofminorities, andthenpressured thenewdemocracies tocomply withthese standards as a condition foradmission intoEuropean institutions liketheOSCE, Council of Europe, NATOor the European Union. It was hoped that this would reduce the likelihood of new conflicts arising, and also provide a basis for resolving existing conflicts. This highlights a general feature ofthecontemporary international situation. The Western countries that are pushing for international norms on minority rights are primarily doing so as a wayofmonitoring andinfluencing hownon-Western countries dealwithethnic conflict. There are several reasons whyWestern states are taking a more active inhownon-Western countries deal withethnic conflict. First, there is an implicit assumption that various countries around theworld are unable toadequately manage ethnic conflict. This perception is undoubtedly partly rooted inethnocentrism andignorance. Butitis notentirely so.There is strong evidence thatconflicts between states andminorities tend to be worse (i.e., more violent; more destabilizing) innonliberal andnon-democratic countries (Gurr 2001).5 Second, these conflicts often have pernicious consequences forthelarger international community, in the form of mass refugee movements, or the spilling over of s often saidofthe Balkans that itproduces more conflicts into neighbouring states. It’ conflict thanitcanconsume domestically. Butthesame is true ofthecountries inthe Great Lakes region ofAfrica, orinCentral Asia, where state-minority relations inone country havegenerated instability inneighbouring countries. Bycontrast, eventhemost serious ethnic conflicts intheWestern democracies, betheysecessionist (like Quebec) orterrorist (like the Basque Country), have notledto refugee movements, inter-state wars, military coups, orthe intervention byonecountry inanother to protect their kin, acquire territory, ortolimit themovement ofarms, guerrillas orrefugees across borders. Itisthese regional andinternational implications which areoften invoked tojustify the need for international monitoring of howstates deal with minorities, andthey arise primarily, if not exclusively, in illiberal and authoritarian states. Third, public opinion in theWest has become increasingly sensitized toissues ofminority treatment, andcan often be mobilized to demand action on behalf of oppressed minorities, even where effects onregional stability (e.g., Tibet; East Timor).6 spillover” there are few“

The main practical

5

6

Katsuragi suggests that I have anover-optimistic account ofthe role ofminority rights inpromoting trust andstability. Perhaps, butthere is nowa verysizeable bodyofempirical literature showing that minority rights defuse conflict, andrefuting the idea that theyare likely instead toescalate conflict. Forthe summary of an exhaustive study that has tracked 300 state-minority conflicts around the world, confirming the peace-promoting qualities ofminority rights, see Gurr2000. The official justification for NATO involvement in Kosovo was the threat posed to international security bySerbia’s mistreatment oftheAlbanians, particularly the spillover effect ofrefugees and arms into Macedonia. Butmyownsense isthatthepublic pressure foraction hadlittle ifanything to dowiththese spillover effects (fewWesterners would be able to locate Macedonia ona map,let alone explain whyconflict inKosovo threatens Macedonia). Thepublic pressure foraction wasIthink dueto a sense of moral outrage overthe mistreatment of Kosovar Albanians, combined with guilt overtheWest’s inability tostoptheSerbian slaughter ofBosnian Muslims during theearlier warin

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For all of these reasons, it is likely, perhaps inevitable, that the international community willcontinue tointervene insomecases ofstate-minority conflict outside the West. However, there is currently noclear legal framework forthis sort ofinternational action. The international community has intervened in countries that have neither formally agreed toanyinternational codeofminority rights, noraccepted anymechanism forthe international monitoring orenforcement of such a code. Given this lackofa legal basis, international intervention instate-minority conflict remains mired inconfusion andcontradiction. Itis unclear whohasthelegitimate right to intervene, under what conditions, to protect which minorities from which sorts of rights-violations. Theresulting pattern ofinternational intervention isadhoc,andhighly selective. TheWestintervenes heavily insome cases (e.g., Kosovo; EastTimor), while ignoring equally serious conflicts inother countries (Chechnya; Tibet; Kurdistan). The inevitable result is that Western intervention is often seen as self-interested rather thanprincipled. Inmanyparts oftheworld, itis widely believed thatthe United States picks oncountries that are seenas enemies orobstacles toAmerican national interests, while ignoring equally serious minority conflicts incountries where theUShas strategic interests. Asa result, the humanitarian impulse that ought to underlie international efforts to protect minorities has been discredited by its selective andselfinterested application.7 Those of us whosupport international action in defense of minority rights are required, Ibelieve, totrytodevelop a clearer andmoreprincipled legal andmoral basis forinternational action. Weneedtotrytoforge aninternational consensus fora system ofinternational monitoring andinternational action thatdoes notdepend onthewhims orstrategic interests ofa fewpowerful Western states. Idon’t haveanyillusions thatit will be possible to gain complete unanimity for minority rights. We can’t expect cooperation fromrogue states like Afghanistan under theTaliban, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, orNorth Korea, which have norespect forinternational lawtobegin with. But aneffective andconsistent system ofinternational minority rights protection willrequire –states which well-ordered hierarchical societies” the consent of what Rawls calls “ respect the basic principles of international law, including human rights andnorms of non-aggression between peoples, butwhich arenotliberal democracies (Rawls 1999b: 544).

Bosnia. Another contributing factor, insome contexts, is the recognition thattheWest is complicit in putting minorities ina position ofvulnerability tostate oppression, andhence hassome responsibility to alleviate that vulnerability. Forexample, the reason whyKurds are vulnerable to oppression in

7

Turkey and Iraq is that the Western powers reneged on a promise to establish an independent Kurdistan after World WarI. More generally, economic andpolitical links withthe West are often without loans, weapons sales, and essential forstates toacquire themeans tooppress minorities – armytraining fromWestern countries, these states would lackthepower tooppress their minorities. Under these circumstances, itis increasingly difficult forWesterners tofeelthattheyaren’t already complicit instate-minority conflicts. Moreover, thelong-term results ofthis intervention mayactually becounter-productive fromthepoint ofviewofthe intended beneficiaries –namely, the minorities. Given the economic, political and military power possessed byWestern institutions, other countries maysometimes have little choice butto capitulate to Western demands for better treatment of minorities. Butthe result maynot provide much benefit to the minorities ifthese reforms are seen bythe state as illegitimate, and hence resented. Thestate willsabotage theactual implementation ofthese reforms, andwhenever Western pressure orattention is removed, the mistreatment of minorities willsimply resume, and perhaps even worsen. State-minority relations workbest when the terms of that relationship are mutually negotiated, rather thanimposed fromoutside. Fortheviewthatexternally-imposed forms of minority protection rarely work, see Burgess 1999.

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Ofcourse, this maybe hopelessly utopian. Perhaps the differences inculture, history, demographics, economic development andregional security are such as to make anyinternational consensus onminority rights unreachable. ButI think weare obliged totrytofindsucha consensus before asserting a unilateral right tointervene in state-minority conflicts. (And if we can’t find such a consensus, we need to think seriously about howthis affects the legitimacy of intervention). Tomymind, sucha consensus cannot arise intheforeseeable future ifitisdefined ordefended solely interms ofdistinctly liberal principles ofindividual autonomy. Most ofthegovernments intheworld –including almost allofthecountries withviolent statedonotfully accept liberal norms, andwillnotaccept anyconception minority conflicts – ofinternational lawwhich requires thecomprehensive liberalization oftheir cultures and politics. This istrue notonlyofstates andtheir dominant groups, butalso ofminorities. Inmanycountries, boththemajority andminority groups have political cultures thatare predominantly culturally and/or religiously conservative, with only weak strands of liberal dissent. Aregime ofinternational lawthat required cultures tocomprehensively liberalize would have little popular support amongst either majority orminority groups, andwould beviewed as illegitimate byboth. Moreover, evenifsucha liberal conception ofinternational lawweresomehow accepted, perhaps asa result ofWestern arm-twisting, itmight notactually helpminorities, andcould evenworsen their situation. After all, ifwesaythattheonlylegitimate kinds ofminority rights arethose exercised inaccordance withliberal norms, thenstates will invent orexaggerate theilliberal nature ofminorities as a pretext nottoaccord themany rights. This isa familiar strategy adopted bycountries around theworld todenyminority rights, bothintheWestandtheEast. Ifweinsist thatonlyliberal minorities canbeaccorded minority rights, itgives states anincentive todescribe thestate-minority conflict as one between a liberal majority andan illiberal minority, andhence a conflict over political values, rather than a conflict overpower andresources.8 vejust The charge that minorities are illiberal is notnecessarily false, since, as I’ noted, minorities in non-democratic states often have illiberal tendencies, although states typically exaggerate the depth of this illiberalism. Butthe charge is almost always misleading andhypocritical, since thestate anditsdominant group usually exhibit the same illiberal tendencies. Consider China’s argument that Tibet cannot be self-governing because itis anoppressive culture, orMexico’s claim that indigenous peoples cannot be self-governing because they are discriminatory towards women.9 For international lawtoinsist that minorities bethoroughly liberal before acquiring minority rights simply provides anexcuse for(non-liberal) majorities tomaintain oppressive rule overtheir (non-liberal) minorities. AsInoted intheLecture, conflicts between states andminorities arerarely conflicts over political values such as support for liberalism. Differences in political values between majority andminority tend to be small, sometimes non-existent. Minorities within stable liberal-democracies tendtoshare themajority’s liberal values; minorities within illiberal andauthoritarian regimes tendtoshare the majority’s authoritarian and conservative political values. This is partly because groups sharing thesameterritory 8 9

Forexamples ofthis tendency, see Burgess 1999. This parallels thedouble-standard noted inInada’s commentary, inwhich people invoke concerns about the repressive aspects of essentializing identities to reject minority rights while leaving the

(equally repressive andessentializing) majority identities andclaims untouched. The concern to s discriminatory to only apply this concern to minorities. So too avoid essentialism is legitimate, butit’ withconcerns about illiberal behaviour.

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haveoften beensubject tothesamehistorical influences, andpartly because minorities tendto adapt tothe political institutions andpolitical culture ofthe dominant group. Inmostcases, therefore, refusing self-government rights to non-liberal minorities doesn’t protect individual members of that group from illiberal treatment –it simply means that they are subject to the majority’s illiberal culture, rather thantheir own. It does notreduce illiberal behaviour, butsimply conceals majority hypocrisy. Ofcourse, international lawwould avoid this sort of hypocrisy ifthe same principle wasapplied consistently to majorities as wellas minorities –i.e., ifthe majority group could only maintain itsrights ofself-government ifitmetliberal standards. Butthatis notrealistic, since mostcountries around theworld failthetest. Indeed, whatwould itmeantosay thatthe HanChinese, forexample, have noright togovern themselves? Itisonething to say that a minority group can only acquire self-governing rights ifit abides by liberaldemocratic norms. This is coherent because there is a clear ifimplicit default position

–namely, ifthe minority is illiberal, itwillcontinue to be ruled bythecentral state. But onecannot apply thesame rule to majorities. Ifthe majority is illiberal, whothen rules theterritory? Would theinternational community takeitoverandrunitasa protectorate?

So the principle that liberalization is a precondition of self-government rights is always applied selectively: itsets upa barrier to minority groups that is notapplied to majority groups. Itsets upa double-standard thatworks tothesystematic disadvantage of minorities. Inanyevent, evenifthesameprinciple weresomehow applied consistently toboth minorities and majorities, it would simply putus back at square one. For in most countries around theworld, andparticularly incountries withviolent ethnic conflict, both sides would failthetest, andsointernational lawwould provide noanswer totheconflict at hand. Ifcomprehensive liberalization is a precondition forlegitimately exercising or sharing political power, thenboththestate andthe minority willbejudged illegitimate, leaving usnobasis onwhich todecide whattodo,andnobasis onwhich toidentify the harms andinjustices which one side is doing to the other. Inshort, the idea of basing international norms of minority rights on distinctly liberal premises hasseveral drawbacks: ithasnochance ofgaining thesupport ofmostofthe s states, andevenifitsomehow wereadopted, itwould nothelp. Atbest, itwould world’ leave uswithnoguidance about howtoresolve mostreal-world ethnic conflicts; andat worst, it would be invoked hypocritically as a pretext byilliberal states to maintain oppressive rule over minority groups. We need a wayof thinking about the fair resolution of ethnic conflicts that does not presuppose adherence toliberal norms, andwhich canbeapplied incountries where neither thestate northeminority fully endorse liberal values. Thatisthereality ofethnic conflict inmuchoftheworld today, andthatisthesituation forwhich weneedconsistent andmorally defensible international norms. Thecases weare mostconcerned with typically arise incountries that are transitional democracies, illiberal democracies or authoritarian regimes. Weneednorms forinternational action thatcanbeaccepted by such countries –at least bythewell-ordered ones whowishto be responsible international citizens, as opposed tothe rogue states –andwhich provide useful guidance

forsuch cases. Somygoalinthis Lecture wastothink about possible

norms orprinciples thatcould be endorsed by, andapplied in,states that are notfully liberal-democratic. As itstands, international intervention insuchcountries isincreasingly driven bythesense ofoutrage thatmanyWesterners feelabout thetreatment ofminorities, yetthisintervention isoften perceived outside theWestas yetanother formofWestern imperialism. Asa result, the

humanitarian impulse

toprotect minorities has become

rephrased

as anissue of“ the

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. This seems regrettable to me,andunnecessary. I donotthink Westversus the rest” that this sense of injustice driving Western intervention is rooted inuniquely Western values, or uniquely liberal values. I see noreason whycitizens of non-liberal states should notfeelequally outraged atwhathappens tominorities inmanycountries. Somy goalistofinda wayofdescribing theinjustices faced byminorities thatcanstrike a chord

amongst people ofvarying political beliefs, including people whoreject (orat least do not fully embrace) liberalism. wecannot hopetogainthesupport ofamoral Hereagain, myaimisnotunanimity – people wholackanysense ofjustice, justas wecannot gaintheconsent ofrogue states whohave norespect forinternational law. Butwecanhope togaintheagreement of “ decent” or “reasonable”people in“well-ordered”hierarchical societies, whohave a sense ofjustice andrespect forhuman rights andinternational law,butwhodonotfully embrace liberal values. Itseems tomethatthere should bea wayofjustifying minority rights thatcanappeal tosuchpeople insuchcountries, without presupposing distinctly liberal values ofindividual autonomy, anditwould worry me(andpuzzle me)ifwecould notfindsuchanargument. The tentative suggestion advanced inthe Lecture is that wecangain a crosscultural consensus onat least a minimal setofminority rights bygrounding themintwo premises. First, an elementary principle of reciprocity – namely, that dominant groups should accord toother groups thesame rights (subject tothesamelimitations) thatthey demand forthemselves.10 Ifdominant groups assert a right toprotect their historic lands froma large-scale influx ofmigrants, theyshould allow other national groups toassert thesame right. Ifdominant groups assert a sacred dutytomaintain their religious sites andpreserve their family names andtoponyms, theymustallow other groups tofulfil the same duty. This is nota distinctly liberal premise, although norofcourse is itinanyway illiberal or anti-liberal –rather, it is one of a range of virtues or principles, such as promise-keeping or honesty, which are common to all societies, andso potentially endorsable byboth liberals andcommunitarians. The second premise is the recognition that welive ina world of nation-building states whose nation-building aspirations andpolicies strongly incline themtoviolate the principle of reciprocity inpredictable ways. Inmyview, virtually allofthe major stateminority conflicts around the world today arise from state nation-building policies that violate this basic normofreciprocity. AsItried toshowat length intheLecture, stateminority conflicts donottypically arise fromdifferences inpolitical values between the majority andminority. Rather, theyarise because thedominant group refuses toallow theminority toactuponthesamevalues thatthemajority invokes. Thedominant group asserts certain rights orduties, manifested inpolicies of nation-building, butprevents the minority fromasserting exactly the same rights orduties. Ofcourse, members ofthedominant group often trytoinvent various excuses for whytheyhave rights orduties thatminority groups donothave. Butweknowthatthese excuses are fraudulent because the dominant group invariably changes its tune whenever some of its members live as minorities inanother nation-building state. For example, Turkey engages inanaggressive formof nation-building which denies that ethnic Kurds have any linguistic or cultural rights, yet it vehemently protests when nation-building policies in neighbouring countries lead to the denial of linguistic and cultural rights toethnic Turks. Similarly, Greece’s conception ofnation-building denies theveryexistence ofAlbanian andMacedonian minorities within Greece, yetitprotests when Albania’s nation-building policies limit the cultural rights of ethnic Greeks within

10

(Walzer 1990). Walzer calls this thetest ofthe“ nation thatcomes next”

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Albania. Romania claims that the demand by the ethnic Hungarian minority for “ collective rights” is immoral andilliberal, while demanding precisely thesame sorts of rights forethnic Romanians living inUkraine. Serbia refused to grant anything buta minimal cultural autonomy to Albanians inKosovo while simultaneously saying that a .11 insulting” similar offer of cultural autonomy to Serbians inCroatia was “ thedominant group andonecould givea verylonglistofthem– Inallofthese cases – exhibits a double-failure ofreciprocity. Itnotonlyfails togrant minorities thesame rights orduties itasserts foritself within thestate; italso fails togrant minorities thesame rights itasserts foritskinminorities inother states. Buttheveryexistence ofthissort ofdoublefailure shows that majority groups arequite aware oftheharmdone tominorities from nation-building and violations of reciprocity. Whenever it is their ethnic kin who are subject to reciprocity-denying forms of nation-building inother countries, they are the first torecognize andprotest theinjustice. Soitisnotjustthemembers ofWestern liberal nations whofeelthis outrage orsense ofinjustice, anditis onlybadfaith thatprevents dominant groups in illiberal states from extending this recognition to minorities within their ownstate. Mysuggestion is that wecould tryto emphasize the very general –I feeling of injustice whenreciprocity is violated, andsee ifitcan would say universal – be usedtobuild consensus ontheneedtoprotect minorities frompredictable forms of unjust nation-building policies. This is obviously a limited solution, from a liberal standpoint, since it leaves open thepossibility thatboththemajority andminority willgovern themselves inilliberal ways. It reduces the likelihood of the dominant group treating the minority unjustly, butit doesn’t prevent either the dominant group or the minority group from discriminating against someoftheir ownmembers (e.g., women, gays orreligious minorities), orfrom limiting certain liberties ofassociation, expression, andpolitical dissent.12 Ofcourse, both majority and minority must govern within the limits of existing human rights conventions ofinternational law,butthese conventions donotrequire comprehensive liberalization ofcultures orpolities. Infact, theyleave considerable scope forgovernments to limit individual liberties and individual autonomy, and myproposed account of minority rights would not reduce this already-existing scope in international lawfor governments toact illiberally. These sorts oflimitations ofindividual liberty are unjust, ona liberal view, anditwould be preferable to gain consensus that allexercises of political power, whether by majorities or minorities, should be subject to full liberaldemocratic constraints. I think liberals should be working toward this long-term goal, through strengthening orextending human rights norms inthe direction of liberalism. Andindeed wehave seensome progress inthatdirection.13 Butwearea longwayfrom gaining such a full consensus on liberalization, andinthe meantime, myreciprocity approach might at least reduce injustices between states andminorities. Onmyview, then, liberals are confronted withtwoseparate tasks atthe level of international law:oneistodevelop minority rights norms thatwillprotect minorities from nation-building states; theother istostrengthen orextend existing human rights norms

11 Formorediscussion ofthese andother examples fromtheEast European context, see Kymlicka and Opalski 2001.

side ofminority nationalism. I 12 I agree here entirely with Inada’s concerns about the potential “grim” think that minorities are just as likely to govern illiberally as dominant groups, andso should be subject tothesame safeguards andconstraints as dominant groups. This indeed ismycentral point: weneedtotreat minority nations anddominant nations ina moreeven-handed manner, bothinthe powers theyare granted, andintheconstraints imposed onthose powers. 13 Forexample, there have been important developments regarding women’s rights ininternational law, including the strengthening ofnon-discrimination provisions andreproductive rights.

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tobetter protect individuals fromilliberal treatment bygovernments (whether majority orminority governments). Some liberals wanttocombine these twotasks, bybuilding strong liberal constraints into the definition of minority rights, so that only liberal minorities canqualify forminority rights. Butthat is a dangerous strategy. Tobe sure, there is noreason togrant minorities anyexemption fromexisting international human rights standards, butnordoIsee anyreason toapply stricter standards ofliberalization ve to minorities thantodominant groups orcentral governments. Onthecontrary, as I’ tried to show, insisting that minorities should meet stricter standards of liberalization than central governments or dominant groups is notonly unrealistic andunfair, but would exacerbate rather than resolve real-world ethnic conflicts. Ifwewantto reduce thescope forminorities toadopt illiberal measures –as liberals should wanttodo–the onlyrealistic andfairwaytodosoisbyreducing thescope forallgovernments toadopt illiberal measures, through the progressive strengthening ofhuman rights norms. Sothatis a more involved, buthopefully also clearer, explanation ofmymotivation fortrying toidentify thepossible sources ofaninternational consensus onminority rights acceptable tobothliberal andnon-liberal states. I hopethis clarifies orresolves some oftheworries raised bymycommentators. Inparticular, there was a general worry that this newproject somehow involves abandoning the liberal conception ofthe self andsociety that I defended inmyearlier work, oras implying that these liberal conceptions are only appropriate forWestern societies (Hirai, Ishiyama, Fukada). Itshould beclear now,I hope, thatthis wasnotmy intention atall. Istand bythebasic arguments inmyearlier work, andcontinue tobelieve, as Ijust restated above, thatgovernments which behave illiberally areacting unjustly, andshould becriticized onthat score bothbyliberal reformers within thecountry and by liberal sympathizers and supporters outside the country. This applies, on myview,

to allcountries, West orEast, andalso to allgovernments within a country, whether majority orminority. So Ihave notabandoned myclaim inMulticultural Citizenship that liberal principles can andshould be usedto identify which forms of majority rule and minority rights

are just andwhich are unjust.14

Mynewproject is simply operating ata different level. Mynewproject is nottoask

what sorts of policies are unjust –this is already answered by the liberal theory of

buttoaskhowwecanprevent injustice tominorities. Whatcanwedo minority rights – about injustice tominorities, particularly given thatmanyofthemtakeplace instates that arenotliberal-democracies? And,tooversimplify, myargument canbeputthisway:(a) thatweneedaneffective system ofinternational monitoring andregulation toprevent this injustice; (b)thataneffective international system requires theagreement ofboth illiberal democracies orauthoritarian regimes; (c)that liberal-democracies and” decent” this agreement cannot be achieved on the basis of distinctly liberal premises of individual autonomy; and (d) that consensus might possibly be built on a norm of reciprocity. There is nothing here which is intended todispute orabandon myearlier s precisely because I dothink that the liberal theory of minority rights. Onthe contrary, it’ m liberal approach tominority rights is generally applicable, notjust intheWest, that I’ concerned to tryto prevent these injustices internationally. The current system isn’t working well, andthis is mybest guess about whatwould workbetter. Myapproach is, in this sense, partly strategic, as Katsuragi says. In part, I am avoiding appeal to distinctly liberal premises simply because of the regrettable but 14 Of course, liberals should not hold their beliefs dogmatically, but rather should view their beliefs as fallible, andbe opentothe possibility oflearning fromnon-liberals. Onthe importance ofthis, see Parekh 2000, and myreview in Kymlicka 2001.

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unavoidable factthatsome illiberal states havethepower toreject liberal principles. It is, inthis sense, a concession to the reality of unjust political regimes. But it is notjust strategic. Theregime ofinternational lawthatensures peace between states isa great moral good, andwe have a moral obligation to sustain it, andprevent it from being

byselective andself-interested manipulation. Moreover, as I noted earlier, todirectly implement liberal principles within international minority rights codes is notonly unfeasible butalso unfair under current circumstances. Some commentators seemto think that there is something paradoxical oreven dangerous about trying toprevent liberal injustice byappealing toa normofreciprocity thatis notdistinctly liberal. Ishiyama, forexample, suggests thatifreciprocity provides a valid argument for minority rights internationally, it could also be appealed to by communitarian groups within the West as a basis for demanding illiberal internal restrictions. According to Ishiyama, myargument implicitly appeals tothepremise that thereason whyminority cultures deserve protection isthattheyenable their members toactuponandpromote their values. InmostWestern cases, these values willprimarily be liberal values, butinsome Western cases, andsome non-Western cases, these values willbe morecommunitarian. Ineither case, however, theunderlying value ofa culture is its role inenabling the expression ofvalues. Butthat is notthe premise of myargument, either inMulticultural Citizenship orin this Lecture. InMulticultural Citizenship, myargument forthedefense ofthevalue of a premise thatexplains cultural membership is its role inenabling individual freedom – the illegitimacy ofinternal restrictions. Inthis Lecture, bycontrast, I amtrying toavoid appealing to anyspecific premise about whether orhowcultures have value fortheir members, since I think this question is subject to deepdisagreement internationally. Communitarian groups mayviewtheexpression andreproduction oftheir culture as a sacred duty, liberal groups view it as a personal choice. Conservative traditionalist groups believe intheimportance ofmaintaining cultural purity orauthenticity byresisting cultural change and foreign influence, liberal cosmopolitan groups believe in the desirability ornecessity ofcultural change andcultural interaction. There are a range ofsuchviews within andacross societies, andstates arefreeinourcontemporary worldorder toactuponthese different conceptions ofwhether orhowculture hasvalue toits members (within the limits set byexisting international human rights norms). Faced withthese different conceptions ofthevalue ofcultural membership, one strategy would betrytofindsomeelement ofcommonality underlying these differences, suchas theideathatcultures areworth protecting because theyenable theexpression ofa group’s basic values, which willbeliberal values forsomegroups, andcommunitarian values forother groups. This isthestrategy thatIshiyama assumes Ihaveadopted. But thatisn’t mystrategy, since Idonotthink evensucha vague general principle could be thattheimaccepted internationally. Manypeople would argue –rightly, inmyview– portance ofa group being abletoexpress itsbasic values depends inpartonthecontent of those values, andthe conditions under which they were formed. Liberals and communitarians willdisagree about theconditions under which itisofmoral importance that groups be able toexpress their basic values. So mystrategy is quite different. Myargument appeals to a side-constraint of reciprocity, rather thana substantive premise about thevalue ofculture. Theprinciple ofreciprocity doesnotsaythatevery group hasa right toexpress itsbasic values, a right thatmustthenberespected impartially. Rather itdefines a side-constraint. Reciprocity says that IFa dominant group claims theright ordutytoprotect its identity, language andculture, anddemands certain laws or powers to doso, then it must allow other groups tomakethesame arguments ofright ordutytoprotect their cultures, identities perverted

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andlanguages, andtoseeksimilar laws andpowers (subject tothesame limitations). Ifa liberal dominant group defends itsculture onthegrounds thatitpromotes individual choice, it must allow minorities to appeal to the same principle in defense of their cultures. Ifa communitarian dominant group defends its culture onthe grounds that it enables individuals to fulfil their duties to kinandcommunity, it must allow minority groups to appeal to the same principle indefense oftheir cultures. This principle ofreciprocity isobviously nottheonlymoral constraint onhowstates behave: itis a necessary condition ofa legitimate state, nota sufficient one. Itmaybe thatsomeofthelawsorpowers being claimed bya dominant group areillegitimate, even iftheyareextended tominority groups. Thiswould bethecase, forexample, ifthelaws orpowers involved violating international human rights norms. Here again, weneedto think of minority rights norms working intandem withhuman rights norms: theformer prevents dominant groups from treating minorities unjustly, the latter prevent either dominant orminority groups fromviolating certain basic rights ofindividual members. The key point, however, is that the reciprocity principle does not endorse any substantive principle ofthevalue ofcultural membership. Itdoes notpresuppose even a vague principle suchas that cultures are worth protecting because theyenable the expression ofa group’s basic values. Ithink itwould bedangerous toestablish sucha general principle as a normof international law: itcould easily be invoked byilliberal

groups to imply that they have a right to act upon illiberal values. Oneimplication of the reciprocity approach is that a minority’s claims to minority rights would depend onwhether or howthe dominant group is using state power to protect its territory, language andculture. Ifthe dominant group wasnotmaking any attempt to use state power to protect ordiffuse its language andculture, orto regulate admission into its territory, thena minority could notinvoke the principle ofreciprocity to demand minority rights. The dominant group would not be denying to minorities anything thatitclaims foritself. Since mystrategy inthis Lecture invokes nosubstantive principle ofthevalue ofcultural membership, itprovides nobasis forminorities toinsist onthe right to maintain their culture, independently of howthe state is (mis)treating

them.

Somemayviewthisisaweakness ofthereciprocity approach. Inmyview, however, itis a strength oftheapproach. AsI tried toemphasize inthe Lecture, I think thatthe claims ofminorities are best understood as a response totheinjustice ofvarious state nation-building policies. If,insome future world, dominant groups stopped engaging in nation-building, then wewould have to rethink the content of minority rights. BothKatsuragi andHirai havea different concern about myproject. Theybothnote overlapping consensus” that it bears certain similarities to Rawls’s quest for an “ between liberal andnon-liberal communitarian groups, a quest which iswidely seenas a failure. Indeed, I myself argued inMulticultural Citzienship that Rawls’s project was incoherent. WhythenamIpursuing thesamequest foranoverlapping consensus now? Katsuragi and Hirai are correct to say that myapproach has similarities with a s important to note that the idea of an Rawlsian overlapping consensus. But it’ overlapping consensus arises attwodifferent places inRawls’s work: (a)as partofhis liberal theory ofdistributive justice which applies todomestic institutions within a liberal state (Rawls 1993); (b) as part of his theory of ‘the law of peoples’, which applies to interactions between states (Rawls 1999a). Mycritique of Rawls in Multicultural Citizenship focused ontheformer, inwhich hetries toshowhowcommunitarian groups within liberal democracies canandshould accept a distinctly liberal account of civil rights anddistributive justice, onewhich privileges thedevelopment andexercise ofthe . Iclaimed thatRawls had capacity toform, revise andpursue a conception ofthegood”

“

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notgiven communitarian groups anygood reason to accept such a distinctly liberal conception of howdomestic institutions should operate. For Rawls to merely repolitical” rather describe the capacity toformandrevise a conception ofthe goodas “ does notgivecommunitarians a reason toaccept it,anddoes not comprehensive” than“ answer their concerns about it. Istill stand bythatcritique. Indeed, itpartly explains mynewproject. Contra Rawls, I believe there is nowayto paper overthedifferences between communitarians and liberals regarding thecapacity toformandrevise ourconceptions ofthegoodlife. Hence anyinternational consensus onminority rights that caninclude both (predominantly) liberal and(predominantly) communitarian societies cannot be based ona distinctly liberal conception ofthe relationship between culture andindividual choice. Agenuine overlapping consensus between liberals andcommunitarians would require leaving greater scope to communitarians to act upon non-liberal conceptions of the value of culture (within the limits of human rights). This is what myproposed overlapping consensus onreciprocity would allow. Ithink that Rawls himself recognizes this attheother level ofhistheory –namely, inhislawofpeoples. Here heaccepts thata consensus between liberal societies and well-ordered hierarchical societies willnot include the privileging of the capacity to form andpursue a conception ofthe good. So myaccount inthis Lecture is quite similar to hisaccount ofaninternational overlapping consensus ona LawofPeoples. Indeed, one could think ofthis Lecture as simply proposing that inaddition tothe seven principles Rawls claims could be consented to by both liberal and hierarchical societies as the basis ofaninternational LawofPeoples, onecould also adda principle ofreciprocity between dominant andminority groups. There is however onemajor difference between myproject andRawls’s account of the Lawof Peoples. Rawls seems to think that this overlapping consensus between liberal and hierarchical societies is the first-best account of international law: it represents a fully adequate and satisfactory form of international law, and liberals should notaspire even inthe long-term to firmer international guarantees of liberaldemocratic rights. Onmyview, bycontrast, as I noted earlier, a conception of international lawwhich leaves states free totreat their citizens unjustly is notfully satisfactory, andso liberals should viewthe (consensual) development ofstronger international guarantees ofliberal rights as a legitimate long-term goal. Iagree withRawls that societies, andthat international lawrequires theconsent of“ well-ordered hierarchical” this does not, inpresent circumstances, allow forthe comprehensive liberalization of human rights law. But I do notview this either as fully satisfactory or as necessarily permanent: I hope that overtime a consensus onthe protection of liberal rights will emerge, andthat it is legitimate and indeed essential for liberals to work in that direction.15

15

tonon-liberal societies andcultures. Ozaki suggests that myposition here willbeseenas “ insulting” Even if I amnotinfavour of imposing liberal norms, this commitment to trying to promote liberal ideals is, hesays, a formof“ soft paternalism” thatwillbe resented bynon-liberal groups. Butwhyis this insulting? Should I be insulted by the fact that Saudi Arabia spends quite a bit of money promoting Islam inWestern countries, including funding political advocacy groups andthepublishing ofmaterial promoting theMuslim point ofview? Ifnot,whyshould Saudi Arabians beinsulted bythe factthatWestern countries give money tohuman rights organizations inSaudi Arabia, orbroadcasts material witha liberal point ofviewonRadio Free Europe? Ofcourse, onemight object ifthere isa tremendous disparity in resources, such that the non-liberal side lacks the money to publicize its point of view, and only the liberal view is heard. But this doesn’t apply to Saudi Arabia or many other non-Western countries, where the schools, media andgovernment overwhelmingly present non-

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I hope these comments willdispel theconcern that myKobe Lecture represents an abandonment ofmycommitment toliberalism. Butthisjustleads directly intothesecond mainsetofobjections raised bymycommentators: namely, theconcern thatmyoriginal commitment in Multicultural Citizenship to a distinctly liberal conception of minority rights wasunjustified, andthat a truly multicultural theory ofminority rights mustbreak morefirmly fromliberalism. Thisobjection comes ina number offorms. Ozaki, forexample, argues thatthevery terminology of liberalism (rights, property, sovereignty) is culturally biased, and so unfairly privileges those cultures accustomed tothinking inthatlanguage. Hesuggests thatwhile minorities mayseemtobedemanding greater inclusion orparticipation inthe liberal regime, andmayoccasionally adopt ormimic liberal terminology andprinciples, this is really just passive acquiescence duetoa lackofviable alternatives. Hasegawa makes a similar argument, focused more specifically on the liberal principle ofautonomy, andargues thatsome cultures, particularly indigenous peoples, donotshare thisvalue, andhence donotaccept theliberal conception ofminority rights which follows from it. These objections are important, andraise profoundly difficult questions about the methods andaims ofpolitical theory, including a theory ofminority rights. Itis obvious thattheconceptual language andsubstantive principles ofliberalism arenotuniversally shared, andthattostart fromthese concepts andprinciples is therefore topotentially exclude ordisadvantage groups withdifferent traditions andvalues. Butthis danger, I think, applies to every political theory, andis in nowaya problem unique to liberal theories. Onehasto start somewhere, working fromthe principles one knows best or finds most compelling, andidentifying their implications, while simultaneously listening totheconcerns andobjections ofthose whoreject one’s starting points, andremaining opento the possibility that those starting points willrequire revision. It is a particular virtue ofliberalism, Ibelieve, thatitprovides space precisely forthis sortofquestioning of its ownpremises: it guarantees the rights of speech, association, press, access to information, experimentation andso onneeded forindividuals andgroups toformulate challenges to liberal principles. I can’t think of any other political tradition that provides similar scope forits ownopponents todissent, mobilize, speak, runforpolitical office,

andso on.

So while itmaybetrue thatsome groups donotshare liberal concepts orvalues, theyare notsilenced bythem, andare able to maketheir concerns heard. Noris this justanempty formality. There aremanycases where minority groups have, through the exercise of their liberal rights, successfully demanded reform to traditional liberal concepts and understandings. Indeed, this is true of the case discussed by both Ozaki

andHasegawa –namely, indigenous peoples inliberal democracies. There hasbeen a veritable conceptual revolution inthe jurisprudence of several Western countries resulting fromindigenous people’s objections to traditional liberal understandings of property andsovereignty andcriminal justice. Itisquite interesting, forexample, tosee white liberal scholars in NewZealand having to master the intricacies of Maori understandings of the Treaty of Waitangi (Mulgan 1989; Sharp 1997), or liberals in Canada having to master indigenous ideas of restorative justice and “ sentencing . Western countries are slowly learning to understand andemploy indigenous circles” liberal views. Andinanyevent, this is a problem ofunequal resources, not“ softpaternalism” . Idon’t see that there is anything insulting about Western countries promoting liberal ideals in Islamic countries, orabout Arabcountries promoting Islamic ideals inWestern countries, so long as this is done through thefree expression ofopinions, rather thanthrough force.

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concepts

ofself-government,

119 property, testimony

andevidence, andsoon.Liberalism

is a living tradition, capable ofcorrecting some of its original cultural biases, andindeed perhaps uniquely capable of this sort of self-correction. Some people have suggested that wecan avoid starting from anysubstantive premises, andinstead just start with “ , andthat the substantive premises dialogue” should only emerge through this dialogue. This is a major theme of Bhikhu Parekh’s new book–that a theory of multiculturalism should be grounded inprocedural norms of dialogue, rather thansubstantive norms ofliberalism (Parekh 2000). Itissuggested as wellinthecommentaries byOzaki andHirai. ButI believe thatthis is a mirage. Foras , we would reach dialogue” soon as we started to specify the ground-rules of this “

substantive issues onwhich liberals andnon-liberals disagree. For example, liberals will insist that dialogue be governed by rules of equal participation (noone is precluded fromparticipating), democratic representation and accountability (anyone claiming tospeak forothers musthavedemocratic authorization to doso), freedom ofspeech andinformation, rules ofevidence, andso on. Itis interesting tonote that Parekh’s account ofdialogue accepts these basic ground-rules: he rejects anyattempt bynon-liberal groups toexclude some people (e.g., women, blacks orheretics) fromparticipating inthepublic debate; herejects anyattempt toassert that onegroup hasthe natural ordivine authority to rule overothers (i.e., herequires that authorities havetheconsent ofthepeople theyclaim tospeak for); herejects attempts toinsulate anygroup’s claims fromcontestation. Ithink thesameapplies toother recent proposals forthe development of an inter-cultural dialogue on multiculturalism: they almost invariably presuppose basic liberal principles of civil rights and democratic accountability as theappropriate rules ofdialogue.16 Tobesure, onecould imagine someone rejecting someofthese ground-rules, and proposing instead a non-liberal conception ofdialogue. Butthepoint isthatthere is no waytoavoid taking a stand onthese issues: there is nowaytodefine a procedure of dialogue that does not rest on substantive assumptions about people’s rights to participate, speak, question authority, demand accountability, seekinformation, andso on.17 Anyaccount ofthemorality ofcross-cultural dialogue hastoanswer controversial questions about the preconditions ofdialogue, the right to participate init,the sort of information available toparticipants, thenorms ofaccountability andrepresentation, the decision-making rules, andthe mechanisms forenforcing decisions. Mytheory starts withliberal answers tothese questions. I acknowledge that these answers arecontroversial, andthatsome nonliberal groups willdispute them. Butany there isnomagic formula theory willmakeassumptions thatsome groups willcontest – that canavoid this problem. Thequestion is (a)whether these orformat of“dialogue” starting assumptions areprima facie plausible, and(b)whether thepeople whodonot find them plausible are able to contest them. I think liberalism passes both tests, although I remain opentosuggestions about alternative starting points. The commentators suggest various alternative starting points: Ozaki mentions critical race theory; Hasegawa mentions Iris Young’s politics ofdifference; Inada and Mouri mention postmodern deconstructionists; Mouri and Hasegawa also mention libertarian theories oftolerance ormutual benefit. Butnone ofthese alternatives are approaches to dialogical” 16 Formore detailed discussion ofthis alleged contrast between l iberal”and“ multiculturalism, see myreview ofParekh (Kymlicka 2001). “ . Butthere isno whosaves who” 17 Ozaki rightly saysthatmytheory makes implicit assumptions about “

waytoavoid making these assumptions: thequestion is whether these andallow roomforcontestation.

assumptions

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developed at length inthecommentaries, orintheliterature more generally. Indeed, I think this is oneofthemajor drawbacks ofthecurrent debate overmulticulturalism: we justdon’t have enough systematic theories onthetable tobeable tofairly assess their relative merits anddrawbacks. So I lookforward toseeing further elaboration ofthese alternative frameworks. s worth, I don’t think anyofthese are promising candidates. However, forwhatit’ Defenders ofthe politics ofdifference andpostmodernism mayusefully “ deconstruct” the dominant group’s traditional (illegitimate) view of nationhood, but they also often reject theminority’s (legitimate) sense ofbeing self-governing nations orpeoples. (The postmodernists arguably also deconstruct the sense ofindividual agency needed for anyeffective political engagement). Andwhile libertarian theories maybesufficient for groups which are prosperous or which can assert valid historical title, they cannot help groups which (legitimately) need positive assistance from the state, in the form of language rights or affirmative action.

Those aremy(sketchy) responses tothetwomainsets ofconcerns inthecommentaries. Ihopetheyhaveclarified whyIfirst tried todevelop a distinctly liberal theory ofminority rights inMulticultural Citizenship, andwhyI amnowtrying tofindanalternative basis for an international consensus on minority rights, and whythese are not (I hope) contradictory projects. There were manyother more specific questions raised inthecommentaries – too manyto discuss. However, I would like to pickuponjust twoofthem–oneabout the principle ofstate neutrality, the other about metics andcitizenship. First, Morimura argues that the state promotion ofa common language does not violate theprinciple ofliberal neutrality, andsoevenifthisstate policy benefits members ofthedominant group while burdening members ofthe minority group, this inequality isnotunjust. Liberal neutrality, heargues, isa matter ofjustification, noteffects, andthe state cangive a neutral justification forusing a common language. Itneedn’t saythat thedominant language is somehow intrinsically better thanthe minority language, but simply thatthere are pragmatic orefficiency reasons forhaving a common language. Morimura is quite correct that liberal neutrality is primarily about justification not effects, andthatonecangive a neutral justification fora common language. Butnote thatthesame istrue ofreligion: onecould saythatthestate should promote a national religion, notbecause itisthetrue orbetter religion, butsimply because society is more stable orharmonious ifeveryone shares thesamereligion. Thisindeed wasRousseau’s view, anditunderpins the oldprinciple that the religion ofa country should follow the religion of its king. Liberal neutrality, therefore, simply rules outcertain kinds ofarguments orjustifications for public policy –namely, those that appeal to a ranking of the intrinsic merits of conceptions of the good life. It does not rule out policies that promote a particular language orreligion solongas “ reasons areoffered forthese policies. Itshould neutral” be obvious, then, that passing thetest ofliberal neutrality does notguarantee that a policy is just or legitimate. The fact that there are neutral reasons for promoting a common religion does notmeanitis legitimate forthestate todeclare andpromote a national religion. Onthecontrary, liberals havefirmly endorsed theprinciple thatstates should notonlyavoid promoting a particular religion fornon-neutral reasons relating to controversial conceptions ofthe good, they should avoid promoting it at all, evenfor neutral reasons ofefficiency orsocial harmony. There should bea firm“ separation of . church andstate”

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Inother words, inthesphere ofreligion, liberals believe notonlyintheideaofliberal but also in the stronger idea of non-interference in religion, or what is benign neglect” sometimes called the “ of religion. There should be a strict separation neutrality,

of church and state which prohibits any policies to privilege one religion over another,

nomatter howneutral thejustification.

This is the model that manypeople have assumed should apply also to ethnocultural ethnocultural neutrality” . And diversity, andwhich Ielsewhere havecalled themodel of“ it is neutrality inthis sense that I argue is impossible inthe sphere of language and culture (although notinthecase ofreligion). Iagree withMorimura thatweshould retain liberal neutrality (i.e., neutrality of justification) as a regulative ideal, but we must abandon theexpectation thatthestate canavoid intervention inthespheres oflanguage andculture (i.e., we must abandon the myth of ethnocultural neutrality). The state cannot avoid actively intervening torecognize andpromote certain languages, literatures, calendars, historical figures, toponyms andso on.This means that weneedtothink about howtoapply principles offairness toissues ofthestate support forlanguages and cultures. State policies regarding support for languages and cultures involve the distribution of scarce resources, andaffect people’s life-chances andcapacity for democratic citizenship, andsoweneedtoincorporate these decisions intoourbroader theories ofjustice. Putanother way,while Iagree thata liberal conception ofcultural and linguistic policy must respect the requirement ofliberal neutrality, itmustalso respect therequirements ofliberal justice, including theRawlsian obligation toprevent involuntary andmorally arbitrary inequalities.18 Second, Mouri provides a detailed and interesting account of the situation of Koreans inJapan, andsuggests that mytheory cannot adequately account fortheir needs orclaims. I haddrawn ananalogy between this group andvarious groups inthe metics” ,whoarepermanent residents, often fortwoormoregenerations, Westknown as“ butnotcitizens.19 Inmyaccount oftherights ofsuchgroups, Isuggested thatcitizenship is thepreferred andmorally required solution. Mouri argues, however, thatcitizenship is notthesolution, since itis perceived as requiring assimilation, andhence as creating a conflict between thenaturalized andnon-naturalized members ofthecommunity. He prefers a model inwhich Koreans canbecome members ofJapanese society without becoming members ofthe Japanese state, a model which would involve visualizing inwhich norms ofmutual advantage apply. Insofar network ofinteractions” society as a “ as Koreans are active contributors to various networks of interaction in Japanese society (e.g., in paying taxes), they should benefit accordingly. Iamnotanexpert onthisparticular example, soIaminnoposition todispute Mouri’s myapproach isintriguing, as ishisideaof deepen” assessment. Ithink hisproposal to“ howtodisaggregate minority claims interms ofdifferent networks insociety. Butletme justexpress a reservation about Mouri’s argument forpaying less attention tocitizenship. Heargues thatemphasizing citizenship creates conflicts because itisseenas requiring assimilation. Butthis is itself an injustice: it is unjust, I argue, for states to expect assimilation as a condition of political equality. So the Japanese government has an

18 To saythat decisions about state support of languages andcultures should respect principles of liberal justice is notto saythat they should respect the normof neutrality ofeffects. This is both

19

impossible and undesirable, for reasons I have explained elsewhere (Kymlicka 1989). Rather, they should respect theRawlsian/Dworkinian idea ofremedying involuntary disadvantages. Mouri questions thisanalogy ontheground thattheKoreans, unlike metics intheWest, arenotillegal theywere legally immigrants. Butinfact manymetics intheWest are also notillegal immigrants – admitted either as refugee claimants oras labour migrants (e.g., theTurks inGermany).

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obligation todispel this perception, andtoassure people thatmembership inthestate does notrequire cultural assimilation. There maystill be reasons whysome metics donotwanttotake outcitizenship in a particular state –perhaps reasons relating toa history ofmistreatment, orforreligious reasons. It is important therefore that individuals be free to choose notto become citizens: naturalization onmyviewisa right ofmetics, nota duty.20 Thestate hasa duty tomakenaturalization possible (without assimilation), butmetics havenodutytoaccept this offer. So whenI saythat citizenship is central tojustice formetics, I meanthe offer of citizenship is a central obligation ofa state thatseeks toactjustly. I donotmeanthat itshould bea central aspiration ofindividual metics, whoarefree toreject theoffer. My guess is that if non-assimilationist conditions of naturalization were in place, an increasing number ofKoreans would accept it.After all,itisverydifficult toachieve equal membership ina society without having equal membership inthestate which regulates thatsociety. Thestrategy ofseeking economic prosperity without political membership is a veryoldone–itwaspursued byEuropean Jews forcenturies –butI donotthink it is a stable strategy, particularly inmodern societies, where the state is so tightly interconnected withsociety atsomanylevels. Whereas states usedtodolittle morethan runthe military andthe postal service, today they are involved inmost areas of life, including education, health care, the environment, workplace health andsafety regulations, professional accreditation, pensions, unemployment insurance, andsoon.To besure, metics cangainimportant rights andbenefits inthese areas ofsocial lifewithout becoming citizens, as hashappened withKoreans inJapan (orTurks inGermany), but intheend,theonlywaytoeffectively gainandmaintain co-ownership ofsociety istogain co-ownership of the state. Itistrue thatemphasizing theright togaincitizenship maycreate conflicts within a of the betrayal” community, particularly if some members view naturalization as a “ community. But this perception should fade once a non-assimilationist model of naturalization isinplace. Political equality isa right ofalllong-term residents ofa state, I believe, andmetics whowantto claim this right should notface either demands of assimilation fromthestate, norcharges ofbetrayal fromother members oftheir group. Itshould beseenas normal andnatural forpermanent residents tobecome citizens, without thiscoming atthecostoftheir cultural membership oridentity. Indeed, thisisone waytothink oftheaimofa liberal theory ofmulticultural citizenship: thatnooneshould have to abandon their cultural membership to exercise their basic right to equal citizenship.

References Daniel A.Bell, A.,David Brown, Kanishky Jayasuriya andDavid Jones (1995) Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia (Macmillan, London). AdamBurgess (1999) “ Critical Reflections onthe Return ofNational Minority Rights to East/West European , inKarlCordell (ed) Ethnicity andDemocratisation intheNewEurope (Routledge, London), Affairs”

60. 49–

Stuart Ford(1999) O SCE National Minority Rights inthe United States: The Limits ofConflict Resolution” , “ 55. Suffolk Transnational LawReview 23/1: 1– Ted Robert Gurr (2000) “Ethnic Warfare on the Wane” 64. , Foreign Affairs 79/3: 52–

20 Fora provocative

argument thatstates should automatically impose after, say, 15 years, see Rubio-Marin 2000.

orascribe citizenship tometics

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Ted Robert Gurr, Monty Marshall, andDeepa Khosla (2001) Peace andConflict 2001: A Global Survey of

Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, andDemocracy (Center forInternational Development andConflict Management, University ofMaryland, College Park). Hans-Joachim Heintz (2000) “Minority Issues inWestern Europe andtheOSCE HighCommissioner on National Minorities” , International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 7: 381– 92. Will Kymlicka (1989) “ Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality” 905. , Ethics 99/4: 883– Will Kymlicka (2001) “ Liberalism, Dialogue and Multiculturalism” 37. , Ethnicities 1/1: 128– WillKymlicka andMagda Opalski (2001) CanLiberal Pluralism Be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations inEastern Europe (Oxford University Press, Oxford). JuanLinzandAlfred Stepan (1996) Problems ofDemocratic Transition andConsolidation (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore). Richard Mulgan (1989) Maori, Pakeha andDemocracy (Oxford University Press). Guillermo O’Donnell (1993) O n the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin “ at Some Postcommunist Countries” , World Development 21/8: 1355– American ViewwithGlances

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51. , Journal ofDemocracy, 7/2: 34– Illusions about Consolidation” Guillermo O’Donnell (1996) “ Bhikhu Parekh (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Harvard University Press, Cambridge). John Rawls (1993) Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, NewYork). John Rawls (1999a) TheLawofPeoples (Harvard University Press, Cambridge). John Rawls (1999b) Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Harvard University Press, Cambridge). RuthRubio-Marin (2000) Immigration as a Democratic Challenge: Citizenship andInclusion inGermany andtheUnited States (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge). Zealand Andrew Sharp (1997) Justice andtheMoari: ThePhilosophy andPractice ofMoari Claims inNew (Oxford University Press). , Tanner Lectures onHuman Values, Volume 11,ed.Grethe Michael Walzer (1990) “ Nation andUniverse” Peterson (University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City). , Foreign Affairs, 76/6. Fareed Zakaria (1997) “ TheRise ofIlliberal Democracy”

Notes

on the Contributors

Will KYMLICKA, the 5th Kobe Lecturer, is Professor of Philosophy at Queen’s University, and Visiting Professor intheNationalism Studies program attheCentral European University inBudapest. Hisrecent publications include Finding OurWay: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations inCanada, Oxford University Press, 1998, Politics inthe Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism andCitizenship, Oxford University Press, 2001, andContemporary Political Philosophy: AnIntroduction, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 2002. Hishomepage is http://qsilver.queensu.ca/~philform FUKADA Mitsunori is Professor of Jurisprudence at the Faculty of Law, Doshisha University. He is the author of Houjisshoushugi to Kourishugi (or Legal Positivism andUtilitarianism), Bokutakusha, 1983, Houjisshoushugi Ronsou (orLegal Positivism Controversy), Horitsubunkasha, 1984, andGendaiJinkenron, (or Contemporary Human Rights Theories), Koubundou, 1999. He can be contacted at [email protected]

HASEGAWA Ko is Professor of Philosophy of Lawat the Graduate School of Law, Hokkaido University. Heistheauthor ofthree books including Kousei NoHoutetsugaku (orThePhilosophy ofFairness andLaw), Understanding Legal Interpretation” Shinzansha, 2001, andalso ofnumerous articles including “ , ARSP, , Hokkaido LawReview(Hokudai Beiheft, vol.30,1987, and“ Legal Reasoning andInterpretation ofJustice” Hougaku Ronshu), vol. 48, no.5, 1998. Hecanbe contacted at [email protected] HIRAI Ryosuke is Associate Professor of Lawand Political Theory at Kyoto Institute of Technology. haswritten manyarticles onphilosophy oflaw.Hecanbereached [email protected]

He

INADA Yasuaki is Student Adviser at the Faculty of Law, Tokyo University. His recent articles are “ Commentary onJeff Spinner’s TheBoundaries of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, andNationality in the Liberal State,” TheJournal oftheAssociation ofPolitical andSocial Sciences (Kokka-Gakkai-Zassi), April Postnational Citizenship noKanousei (orAPossibility of Postnational Citizenship),”TheAnnals 1997, and“ of Legal Philosophy (Houtetsugaku Nempo) 2001, 2002. He can be reached at [email protected]

ISHIYAMA Fumihiko is Professor ofJurisprudence at Daito Bunka University, Tokyo. Hispublications inMorigiwa andKatsuragi eds., include Reverse Discrimination Controversy’andthe Idea ofEquality,” Ningenteki “ ‘ Chitsujo (orHumane Order), Bokutakusha, 1987, “ in Language Policy andState Neutrality,” Inoue, Shimazu, andMatsuura eds., HouNoRinkai (or TheLawat a Critical Point) vol. 3, University of (aseries of6 articles), WillKymlicka andMulticulturalism as a Theory ofJustice” Tokyo Press, 1999, and” 15,2000– TheJournal oftheAssociation ofPolitical andSocial Sciences (Kokka-Gakkai-Zasshi), vols. 113–

2002. Hecan be contacted at [email protected]

KATSURAGI Takao is Professor of Public Philosophy at the Faculty of Law, Gakushuin University. Heis theauthor ofJiyuu toKaigi (orLiberty andScepticism), Bokutakusha, 1988, Sijokeizai noTetsugaku (or ThePhilosophy ofMarket Economy), Soubunsha, 1996, andJiyuushakai noHoutetsugaku (orTheLegal Philosophy ofLiberal Society), Koubundou, 1998. Hecanbe contacted [email protected] MORIGIWA Yasutomo is Professor ofJurisprudence attheGraduate School ofLaw,Nagoya University. Heistheco-editor ofNingenteki Titujo (orHumane Order) (Bokutakusha, 1987), editor ofTisiki toiuKankyo (orTheEnvironment Called Knowledge) (Nagoya University Press, 1996) andauthor ofnumerous articles Archiv für including “ The Semantic Sting inJurisprudence: H.L.A.Hart’s Theories of Language andLaw,” Rechts- undSozialphilosophie, Beiheft, vol.40,1991. Hecanbecontacted [email protected]

u.ac.jp MORIMURA Susumu is Professor of Jurisprudence at the Graduate School of Law, Hitotsubashi University. Heistheauthor offive books inJapanese including Locke Shoyuron noSaisei (orTheRebirth ofthe Lockean Theory ofProperty), Yuhikaku, 1997, andJiyu waDokomade Kano ka? (orHowMuch Freedom is Possible?), Kodansha, 2001, andnumerous articles including “ Self-Ownership andLiberARSP, vol.79, no.1, 1994. Hecanbe reached [email protected] tarianism,”

MOURI Yasutoshi is Associate Professor ofJurisprudence University. Hismostrecent articles include “ Hou-Teki-Jissen

at the Department ofLaw,Seinan Gakuin (or ToRisei NoShakai-Teki-Jouken (1)(2),”

126

Notes

onthe Contributors

99, 44, 1998– Legal Practices andtheSocial Conditions ofPractical Reason), Kyoto LawReview, vol.143– and“Hu-Kakujitsu-Na Shakai NiOkeru ‘Seiji-Teki-Na Mono’NoKousou,”(orOnthe conception ofthe Political intheUncertain Society: Deliberative Democracy andtheTheories ofRiskSociety), TheAnnals ofLegal Philosophy (Houtetsugaku Nempo) 2000, 2001. Hecanbecontacted [email protected] OZAKI Ichiro isAssociate Professor attheGraduate School ofLaw,Hokkaido University. Heistheauthor of Settling Disputes over Noise Among Neighbors: on Expansion andLimits ofLawTokyo Daigaku ToshiGyosei Kenkyukai Kenkyu Sosho, 1992, andofnumerous articles onlegal order in(sub)urban communities.

Hecanbecontacted [email protected]

SAKURAI Tetsu is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Cross-cultural Studies, Kobe University. His recent publications include “ TheTransformation ofAttitudes towards the Environment inSeventeenthinTakeshita, Hirano andTsunoda eds., Topics ofLegal Ideas, Houritsubunkacentury Western Europe,” The Individual inContemporary Liberal Democracy: Environment, Self-ownership, and sha, 2000, and“ Other Persons,” inPost-War Legal Philosophy as anIntellectual Resource –TheAnnals ofLegal Philosophy 1998, 1999. Hecanbecontacted at [email protected]

Contents MORIGIWA Yasutomo: Preface

INADA Yasuaki: A Kind of Strategie Essentialism? A Commentary on Kymlicka

ISHIYAMA Fumihiko: Introduction

MORIMURA Susumu: In Defense of Liberal Imperialism

The Fifth Kobe Lecture

OZAKI Ichiro: Who Saves Whom? A Short Comment on Multicultural Citizenship

Will KYMLICKA: Universal Minority Rights? The Prospects for Consensus

Commentaries FUKADA Mitsunori: Comments and Questions to Professor W. Kymlicka ISHIYAMA Fumihiko: A ‘Distinctively Liberal’ Theory of Minority Rights? KATSURAGI Takao: Comments on Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship HIRAI Ryosuke: When Kymlicka Takes on Asia

HASEGAWA Ko: Comments on Will Kymlicka’s Thinking about the Rights of Indigenous People MOURI Yasutoshi: Towards a Liberal Extension of Multiculturalism: Focusing Attention on the Present Conditions of the Korean Minority in Japan Reply Will KYMLICKA: Replies to Commentaries List of Contributors

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