The Jews and Minority Rights (1898–1919) 9780231894876

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THE JEWS AND MINORITY RIGHTS (1898-1919)

BY

OSCAR I. J A N O W S K Y , PH.D. Department of Hittory The College of the City of New York

WITH A FOREWORD BY

JUDGE JULIAN W. MACK

NEW

YORK

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS LONDON : P . S . K I N G & S O N , L T D .

1933

COL'Y K I C K T ,

1933

BY COLUMBIA

UNIVERSITY

1'KKSS

P K I N T E I ) IN I H K LINII'ÜÜ S T A T E S OK AMEK1CA

Φα DEAN PAUL

KLAPPER

TEACHER, GUIDE, FRIEND

FOREWORD THE history of the Minorities Treaties that resulted from the Peace Conference of 1 9 1 9 is vividly portrayed by Dr. Janowsky. The origin, development and underlying philosophy of National Rights f o r the Jewish People, recognition for which was sought through these treaties; the struggle between the forces of nationalism and assimilation both in Europe and in the United States; the emergence of the American Jewish Congress in which there were finally united practically all elements of J e w r y in this country; the unification of its representatives with those of the Jewries of Eastern and Central Europe in the Committee of Jewish Delegations in connection with the Peace Conference; the repeated attempts of this Committee to secure unified action with the delegates ot British and French J e w r y ; and the ultimate cooperation of all of these forces, constitute the subject of this profound study by the learned author. With a wealth of interesting details and an acute characterization of the men participating in the movement, the author gives us practically a day by day narrative of the Jewish activities from the cessation of hostilities in 1 9 1 8 until the final acceptance of these treaties by the several states. Without minimizing the differences between the several parties in Jewish life, the author emphasizes the unity of purpose of most of the leaders to preserve the inherited traditions and to protect the common interests of the Jewish People in the lands in which the equal rights of the individual Jew with those of his fellow men and of the Jewish People with those of the other ethnic or national groups had thereto-

FOREWORD

fore been or, because of an aroused national sentiment of the majority, would be in danger of denial or diminution. The author, moreover, emphasizes the protection thereby sought and granted not merely to the Jewish People but to every national minority group in the new or enlarged States of Eastern and Central Europe. President Wilson and his advisers assumed leadership in this phase of the tasks facing the Peace Conference because of their understanding of and interest in the problem; in time, however, they were warmly supported by the leaders and the experts of other nations and, as the author rightly points out, above all by Professor Headlam-Morley of Great Britain. The present work ends with the acceptance of the treaties. It is to be hoped that Dr. Janowsky will soon write the story of the treaties during the past decade; how and to what extent their provisions have been enforced nationally and internationally. JULIAN W .

MACK

PREFACE W O O D R O W W I L S O N , Georges Clemenceau and David Lloyd George, the " B i g Three " at the Paris Peace Conference, considered the question of minorities on May i , 1919, when clearing up " small matters." To-day, however, an increasing number of people have come to view the guaranties contained in the Minorities Treaties as a m a j o r achievement of the Peace Conference. T h e disintegration of AustriaHungary and the rise of national states in central and eastern Europe did not produce national contentment. More than thirty million people have remained as national, racial, or religious minorities more or less at the mercy of majorities, generally hostile. T h e Minorities Treaties constitute the only international guaranty against cultural oppression and national strife. But international guaranties depend for their enforcement upon an informed and sympathetic public opinion. The question of minorities is deserving of greater attention than it has received in current American literature.

This volume makes no attempt to treat the question of minorities in all its ramifications. I have traced only the origins of the Minorities Treaties and have considered primarily the contributions of one people, the Jews. T h e latter constituted only one factor in the development of the idea of minority rights, but a reading of the sources has convinced me that they played a decisive part in the enactment by the Paris Peace Conference of provisions for the protection of minorities. I have therefore described at some length the origins of the idea o f national minority rights among the Jews, its dissemination among the Jewish masses in eastern 7

8

PREFACE

Europe, and the contributions of west-European and American Jews, who sought to aid their east-European brethren. I have taken particular pains to chronicle the efforts made by Jewish representatives to induce the Peace Conference to act and have sought to discover and to present the direct influence of the J e w s on the very drafting of the clauses of the Minorities Treaties. But the Jews do not live in a vacuum any more than other peoples. It was necessary to refer to influences affecting the Jews as well as to the actions and reactions of the public opinion of the various countries which came under consideration. T o treat these matters exhaustively would have required several volumes. I have therefore limited myself to a discussion of those non-Jewish groups in which Jews were particularly active and to such influences as directly affected the Jews. Among the difficulties encountered in the preparation of this volume is the fact that the sources are written in so many foreign languages. The Jews generally employ the language of the country in which they live, and the wide range of the subject matter of the present study imposed a heavy burden upon me. Fortunately, the Jewish nationalists made it a point to publish materials in Hebrew or Yiddish. But the book would have been materially enriched had I had access to sources in Russian, Polish, etc. I have transliterated as we'll as translated Hebrew and Yiddish titles in order to acquaint the reader with the available materials. The transliteration approximates the equivalent in English pronunciation, without making a fetish of consistency. Where a certain spelling has come into general use, I have preferred that to my own phonetic equivalent. Thus in the spelling of Dubnow, Zhitlowsky and Sokolow, the " w " was used, whereas similar Russian names will be found to contain " v's ".

PREFACE

9

My greatest difficulty was to secure information, particularly unpublished material, because the records of the scattered Jewish groups are not to be found in centrally located or neatly indexed archives. I am therefore especially grateful to Mr. Bernard G. Richards, who, as Executive-Secretary of the American Jewish Congress not only made available the Congress and his personal files, but also gave lavishly of his time and was ready to put his staff at my disposal; to Dr. Cyrus Adler, who generously permitted me to read his valuable Diary; to Messrs. Morris D. Waldman and Harry Schneiderman of the American Jewish Committee; to Mr. Isaac Greenbaum of Warsaw; and to Professor Alexander Marx and Dr. Joshua Bloch and their respective staffs of the Jewish Theological Seminary Library and the New York Public Library. Valuable suggestions and assistance were rendered by Professors Nelson P. Mead, Holland Thompson and J . Salwyn Schapiro, and by Mr. Samuel Streicher of the College of the City of New York; by Professor Harry A. Wolfson, of Harvard University; by Professor Parker T. Moon of Columbia University; by Dr. Leo L. Honor of Chicago; by Dr. Harry S. Linfield and Messrs. Benjamin V. Cohen, I. Rivkind, A. G. Duker and N. S. Gorelik of New York City. With particular pleasure I acknowledge my indebtedness to my colleagues and friends, Professor Theodore Goodman whose apt suggestions removed many a foggy expression, and Dr. Michael Kraus who read the manuscript almost as many times as the present writer himself. The publication of the book would have been rendered much more difficult had it not been for the kindly interest of Professor Philip C. Jessup of Columbia University. Thanks are due to Dr. L. Bramson, Messrs. J. de Haas, M. J . Kohler, A. Liessin, L. Lipsky, Dr. J . Schatsky, Mr. M. Ussischkin, Dr. Stephen S. Wise and Dr. Chaim Zhitlowsky

ίο

PREFACE

for granting me interviews which served to clarify many doubtful points. Acknowledgement is also made to those who responded to requests for information. Particularly helpful were the letters of Dr. Cyrus Adler, Dr. R. S. Baker, Mr. Β. M. Baruch, Justice L. D. Brandeis, Professor S. M. Dubnow (Berlin), Dr. W. Filderman (Bucharest), Professor F. Frankfurter, Colonel Ε. M. House, Professor M. O. Hudson, Dr. L. Winkler (Vienna), Rabbi Jacob Meir, Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Palestine, Judge Julian W. Mack, Dr. D. H. Miller, Mr. J . Robinson (Kovno), Professor C. Seymour, Mr. N. Sokolow, President of the World Zionist Organization, Dr. A. Tartakower (Lodz), Mr. L. Wolf (London) and Mr. L. Wolf son (Ν. Y . ) . My greatest debt is to Professors Carlton J. H. Hayes and Salo Baron whose patient and sympathetic guidance made this study possible. I need hardly add that the acknowledgment of assistance in no way involves a delegation of responsibility. O. I. J. COLLEGE OF T H E C I T Y OF N E W MARCH,

1933.

YORK,

TABLE OF CONTENTS PACE

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTORY

1. Jewish autonomy prior to the eighteenth century . . .

16

2. Decline of Jewish autonomy in western and central Europe; peculiar circumstances in eastern Europe predisposing Jews to nationalism

22

3. Nationalism in the nineteenth century and early in the twentieth

29

4. Party differentiation among east-European Jews during the first decade of the twentieth century a. " Assimilationists " . b. Nationalists c. National socialists

32 33 34 36

P A R T THE

I

M O V E M E N T FOR J E W I S H N A T I O N A L

AUTONOMY

OR N A T I O N A L R I G H T S P R I O R T O T H E WORLD

WAR

CHAPTER

II

T H E BEGINNINGS OF THE

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

The The The The The The

MOVEMENT

doctrine of Chaim Zhitlowsky doctrine of Simon M . Oubnow Austrian Jewish autonomist, Nathan Birnbaum attitude of the Zionists toward national rights " Renascence " group Bund and national rights

51 57 62 64 68 72 11

12

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

PAGE

III

T H E G R O W T H O F A G I T A T I O N D U R I N G THE P E R I O D OF T H E RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

(1904-1907)

1. T h e Russian Revolution and the Jews 2. The activities of the middle classes a. T h e League for the Attainment of Equal R i g h t s for the Jewish People in Russia b. T h e formulation of a national program by the Russian Zionists c. T h e program of the People's Party (Folkspartei) . . d. T h e ambiguous position of the People's Group (Folks-

gruppe) 3. T h e activities of the proletarian groups a. T h e Bund committed to national-cultural autonomy . - . b. T h e national programs of the proletarian-Zionist parties. 4. Agitation for Jewish autonomy in Austria 5. Slight activity in the O t t o m a n Empire and in the United States CHAPTER

THE W O R L D W A R CHAPTER

F R O H THE O U T B R E A K

118 122 122 126 136 144

148 149 151 153

II

A C T I V I T Y IN B E H A L F O F J E W I S H N A T I O N A L DURING

98 114

1907-1914

In Russia . . . In Austria A n abortive attempt in the Ottoman Empire Non-recognition of Jewish nationalism by the Socialist International

P A R T

91

IV

T H E D E C L I N E OF THE M O V E M E N T ,

1. 2. 3. 4.

86 91

RIGHTS

(1914-1918)

V

OF THE W O R L D W A R TO THE

RUSSIAN

REVOLUTION

1. T h e movement for an American Jewish Congress: national rights a basic issue 2. T h e agitation of Jewish nationalists in central and western Europe 3. T h e activities of the western non-nationalists 4. T h e demands of eastern Jews for national recognition : Russia, Austria and the Russian provinces under German-Austrian occupation

161 190 200

201

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

13 PAGE

VI

F R O M THE R U S S I A N R E V O L U T I O N TO THE C O N C L U S I O N OF THE

WAR

Proposals for national autonomy in revolutionary Russia. • • • T h e experiment with national minorities in the U k r a i n e . . . . Agitation for Jewish national rights in the Russian provinces under German-Austrian occupation, and elsewhere in the " east " Minor activity in the United States and in western and central Europe

P A R T

212 230

240 245

III

T H E P R O B L E M OF J E W I S H N A T I O N A L R I G H T S A T T H E PARIS P E A C E

CONFERENCE

CHAPTER

VII

T H E JEWISH D E L E G A T I O N S A T THE P E A C E

CONFERENCE

T h e delegation of the A m e r i c a n Jewish C o n g r e s s T h e delegations of the anti-nationalists T h e nationalist delegations A t t e m p t s to unify the Jewish delegations T h e Committee of Jewish Delegations at the Peace Conference. CHAPTER UNSUCCESSFUL

264 268 272 282 309

VIII

E F F O R T S TO S E C U R E THE P R O T E C T I O N

MINORITIES—JANUARY-MAY,

OF

1919

T h e attempt to guarantee the rights of minorities in the L e a g u e Covenant . . . 321 Jewish efforts to induce the enactment of minorities guaranties by the Peace Conference 323 CHAPTER

IX

T H E C O M M I T T E E ON N E W S T A T E S A N D FOR THE OF M I N O R I T I F . S — F O R M U L A T I O N OF THE M I N O R I T I E S

AND

PROTECTION

ADOPTION

TREATIES

T h e struggle over the Polish Minorities Treaty 344 A n a l y s i s of the Polish Minorities Treaty 360 T h e treaties with Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, the Serb-CroatSlovene State and Greece 369

14

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS PAGE

4. Provisions for the protection of minorities in the treaties with defeated states—Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey . . 379 5. The protection of minorities elsewhere in Europe 380 CONCLUSION

384

BIBLIOGRAPHY

3gi

INDEX

413

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTORY

T H E statesmen of the victorious allies who assembled at Paris in 1919 found it difficult to effect a peace settlement on the basis of the idealistic war aims to which they stood committed. One of these ideals, the principle of national selfdetermination, emboldened the hopes and quickened the desires of many peoples and groups, but its practical applicability was soon exhausted. Conflicting claims perplexed the peace-makers, and it soon became evident that in some regions of southern and eastern Europe no boundary could be drawn without leaving minorities on both sides of the line. T h e rankling national hatreds and suspicions which the war engendered, however, convinced many observers that alien groups would suffer oppression. T h e necessity to protect such national, religious or racial enclaves produced the Minorities Treaties. T h e Jews, who nowhere constituted a majority, were particularly active in the movement for the protection of minorities. Jewish parties in Russia and Austria had for a decade before the W o r l d W a r been agitating for national recognition, and influential groups in western Europe and the United States sought, especially at the time of the Paris Peace Conference, to secure safeguards for their coreligionists in eastern Europe. It is to the Jewish efforts that this study is devoted. 15

16

THE

JEWS

AND

MINORITY

RIGHTS

I . J E W I S H AUTONOMY PRIOR TO T H E EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The opening years of the twentieth century found the Jews of Europe divided into two well-defined groups. Those residing in the countries of central and western Europe were of relatively small number 1 and enjoyed full equality as citizens, whereas the rights of the millions of tsarist Russia and of the alien Jews of Rumania were still restricted. The " western " Jews had discarded their peculiar language and many of their ancient customs, and particularly insisted that they constituted, not a national group, but a religious community. On the other hand, the vast majority of the eastern Jews, including those of Galicia and Bukowina, still lived in compact masses apart from the rest of the population; they spoke the Yiddish language and maintained separate educational and cultural institutions. Groups of intellectuals had even begun to demand that the Jews be recognized as a nationality and that they be endowed with what were vaguely called " national rights." These marked contrasts between eastern and western Jews are, however, of relatively recent origin. The middle ages and even early modern times knew of no such distinctions. If we are to understand the mainsprings of the Jewish 1 In igoo, of a total Jewish population of nearly 8,700,000 residing in Europe, less than 1,330,000 were in the countries of central and western Europe; i. e., Germany (exclusive of Posen), Austria (exclusive of Galicia, Bukowina and Hungary), Italy, France, England, etc. The Jewish population of eastern Europe was then over 7,360,000, of whom 5,175,000 dwelt in pre-war Russia, 811,000 in Galicia, 852,000 in Hungary, 96,000 in Bukowina and 267,000 in Rumania. See J . Lestschinsky, " The Development of the Jewish People During the Past Hundred Y e a r s , " Jüdisches Wissenschaftliches Institut, Shriften far Ekonomik un Statistik (Berlin, 1928), vol. i, p. 6; A . Ruppin, Soziologie der Juden (Berlin, 1930), vol. i, pp. 75-78. A t the beginning of the twentieth century, the Jewish population of Turkey was about 463,000, of whom nearly 189,000 were in European Turkey, including Constantinople. Jewish Encyclopedia ( Ν . Y . , 1901-1906), vol. xii, p. 286.

INTRODUCTORY

17

national movement in eastern Europe, it will therefore be necessary to survey briefly the state of Jewish self-government prior to the eighteenth century and to trace the subsequent developments which were instrumental in producing divergent views of Jewish group life. The status of the Jews throughout the middle ages and far into modern times was determined by the fact that they were strangers in European society. As aliens differing from the general population in religion and customs, they were without rights or standing unless special privileges were accorded them. The rulers, however, found in the Jewish traders, artisans or money-lenders a source of revenue, and so vouchsafed them protection. But the Jews remained a foreign tributary group. As such they could be expelled or recalled by the ruler; debts due them could be voided or reduced; their numbers could be limited; and the revenue derivable from them could be sold or mortgaged. They were the king's or baron's men (or, as the Germans came to call them in the thirteenth century, Kammerknechte), a type of urban serfs, taxed by their lord and protected by him. This condition was as true of England, France and Spain in the pre-expulsion periods as of Germany and Italy until the era of emancipation. One of the privileges which the Jews always sought and generally secured until the eighteenth century was autonomy in the management of all matters relating to the internal affairs of the group. Wherever Jews dwelt in sufficient numbers, there appeared an organized community with statutes, assemblies, magistrates and public institutions; and everywhere it constituted a little republic within the larger jurisdiction, a " state within the state." Nor was this communal corporation concerned merely with spiritual affairs. To be sure, religion played a prominent role in the life of the Jews and the rabbi was an honored official in every com-

18

THE

JEWS

AXD

MINORITY

RIGHTS

munity. But even he, in administering justice and in regulating marriage and divorce, performed functions which to-day would be termed civil, and the chief magistrates were usually laymen and most often sat as a council with a president at the head. The magistrates, assisted by numerous officials, were concerned with charity and education, with the regulation of the prices of commodities, with the imposition, assessment and collection of taxes. They regulated the sale and transfer of property; and we even find ordinances relating to the town wall and to measures of protection against invaders. T h e effectiveness of Jewish self-government was further augmented by efforts to unify or federate the scattered communities. Jewish leaders no doubt felt a need of cooperation in enterprises which transcended both the interests and the means of the local bodies. T h u s we find that, commencing with the tenth century, the rabbis and elders of the German, French, Italian or Spanish Jews assembled countrywide synods from time to time for the purpose of promoting common action and of ordering Jewish life. A t these conventions plural marriages were prohibited; divorce was regulated; the privacy of letters was enjoined; the rights of tenants, even where the landlord was not a Jew, were protected. One need hardly add that the perennial problems of taxation, justice, usury, relations with non-Jews and with the secular authorities, as well as those relating to morality and religion, likewise received careful consideration. 2 2 The references on the exceptional status of the Jews prior to the eighteenth century, and on communal self-government, are too numerous to cite. Good accounts will be found in J. E. Scherer, Die Rechtsverhältnisse der Juden in den deutsch-österreichischen Ländern (Leipzig, 1901), pp. 1-105; L. Finkelstein, Jewish Self-Government in the Middle Ages (Ν. Υ., 1924) ; Ε. Nübling, Die Judengemeinden des Mittelalters (Ulm, 1896), pp. 25-52, 241-261; Ο. Stobbe, Die Juden in Deutschland während des Mittelalters (Brunswick, 1866), pp. 8-19, 140-162; S. A s a f ,

INTRODUCTORY

19

Most often, however, it was not the efforts of the Jews but the desire of the rulers of the various countries to u n i f y responsibility for Jewish payments that was instrumental in welding the communities of a certain territory into a unit. In Bohemia we find a Jew appointed to gather the taxes imposed upon all his coreligionists, and in Castile and Portugal royal taxation was largely responsible for the unification of the Jews under chief rabbis. But thirteenth century England affords the best illustration of iron-clad unity under royal control. A Presbyter omnium Judaeorum was supreme over English Jews, but his powers and functions have not been determined with finality. A Jewish " parliament " was summoned by the sheriffs to advise with the king on a tallage of the Jews. A Jewish Exchequer functioned as a branch of the Great Exchequer of England with power to tax the Jews and to supervise their financial operations, to enforce claims of the crown, and to try causes between Christians and Jews. The institution thus centralized financial and judicial matters relating to the Jews, and not only served to supply the king with a stranglehold on the wealth of his alien subjects but set them apart from the rest of the population as an autonomous foreign body. 3 T h e development of " n a t i o n a l " monarchies in early modern times left the exceptional status of the Jews ungate ha-Din we-Sidrehem Achare Chathimath ha-Talmud (Jerusalem, 1924) ; idem,

Ha-Otteshin

Achare

1 9 2 2 ) ; " G e m e i n d e , " Encyclopedia

Chathimath Judaica

ha-Talmud

(Jerusalem,

(Berlin, 1928-1931), vol. vii,

pp. 191-210. 3 Cf. J. M . R i g g , Calendar of the Plea Rolls of the Exchequer of the Jews (London-Edinburgh, 1905-1910), esp. vol. ii, pp. v i i - x x i i i ; H . P . Stokes, Studies in Anglo-Jewish History (Edinburgh, 1913), pp. 18-47, 83-92; J. Jacobs, The Jews of Angevin England (London, 1893), pp. 372-373. T h e r e is difference of opinion as to whether the " Presbyter " w a s an official of the Jewish Exchequer o r a judge in the Jewish community.

20

THE JEWS

AND

MINORITY

RIGHTS

affected, 4 and the eastern states, Poland and Turkey, which became in the sixteenth century the most important centers of Jewish settlement, likewise did not abandon the medieval precedent. In both countries the Jews enjoyed extensive powers of self-government. In the Ottoman Empire a chief rabbi ( C h a c h a m Bashi) functioned since the middle of the fifteenth century with powers similar to those of the Greek patriarch. He sat in the state council as official representative of the Jews of the country; he apportioned and collected the taxes of his coreligionists; he appointed rabbis, acted as chief judge and generally supervised the affairs of the Jewish communities. 1 But nowhere in Europe did Jewish autonomy reach such heights of cooperative effectiveness as in sixteenth and seventeenth century Poland. In view of the particular preoccupation of this study with the Jews of eastern Europe, it will prove helpful to survey briefly the self-governing institutions of the Polish Jews. In Poland, as elsewhere, the unit was the organized and autonomous community (Kahal) which took charge of secular and religious matters, of economic, judicial and educational functions. A man's business activity might be curtailed and his moral behavior scrutinized, and he could be banished or otherwise punished. The officials were as varied and numerous as the multifarious activities of the corporation called for. The costs of administration were 4 Professor Salo Baron, however, is of opinion that the development of national states led in many instances to the expulsion of the Jews. See S. Baron, " Nationalism and Intolerance," Menorah Journal, vol. xvi, pp. 503-515; xvii, pp. 148-158. 5 M. Franco, Essai sur Vhistoire des Israelites de Vempire ottoman (Paris, 1897), pp. 31-32, 45-46; A. H. Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent (Cambridge, 1913). PP· 34-35, 37. 151; "Turkey," Jewish Encyclopedia, vol. xii, pp. 279-281; "Türkei," Jüdisches Lexikon (Berlin, 1927-1930), vol. iv/2, pp. 1077-1078; Lord Eversley, The Turkish Empire, Its Growth and Decay (London, 1917), pp. 88-89.

INTRODUCTORY

21

defrayed from taxes imposed and raised within the community which was in all appearances a flourishing and recognized " state." The Jews of Poland, moreover, did not constitute a mass of disjointed and isolated local communities. Rather they achieved a unity and a permanence of organization through periodic and representative congresses the like of which were not to be found elsewhere in Europe. The stimuli for federation came both from the kings, who were ever anxious to centralize the Jewish revenues, and from the Jewish leaders, who appreciated the advantages of a superior organ for appellate jurisdiction, for interpretations of the law and for bargaining with the Polish authorities. The central institution was a Council ( W a a d ) of rabbis and elders. Each Polish province had its district council. But the capstone of the structure of Jewish autonomy in Poland was the body which came to be designated the Council of Four Lands.® It was composed of some thirty members, including delegates from the most important communities and several of the leading rabbis of the country. Meetings were held periodically, generally twice a year, and nothing which affected Jewish life was beyond the domain of the assembled leaders. Direct relations were maintained with the highest state authorities; taxes imposed in bulk by the Polish government were apportioned among the smaller units; conflicts between communities were adjusted; and difficult causes, « T h e H e b r e w is Waad Arba Aratsoth. T h e f o u r lands, or provinces of Poland, w e r e Great Poland, Little Poland, R e d Russia and V o l h y n i a . T h e Lithuanian communities w e r e represented in the P o l i s h councils until 1623. T h e r e a f t e r they maintained a separate central organization because the g r a n d duchy possessed a distinct fiscal administration. On Jewish autonomy in Poland and Lithuania, cf. S. M . D u b n o w , History of the Jews in Russia and Poland (Phila., 1916-1920), vol. i, pp. 103113; idem (ed.), Pinkas ha-Medinah ( B e r l i n , 1925), esp. pp. x i - x x i x ; L. Lewin, Die Landessynode der grosspolnischen Judenschaft (Frankf o r t a. Μ . , 1926).

22

THE

JEWS

AND

MINORITY

RIGHTS

such as criminal actions, were heard. The Council also regulated communal elections, tried to banish bankruptcies by threatening excommunication, frowned on luxury in dress and on games of chance, and in a general way sought to supervise and direct the individual and group life of the Jews. 2 . DECLINE OF J E W I S H AUTONOMY I N WESTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE; PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES I N EASTERN EUROPE PREDISPOSING JEWS TO NATIONALISM

The pattern of autonomy and segregation outlined above was perpetuated in the eighteenth century as a distinctive feature of the old regime. But forces were already at work undermining its very foundations. Trade and industry had increased markedly, and enlightened rulers had come to appreciate the value of a middle class. A growing recourse to credit, and more extensive borrowing for trade purposes, likewise tended to remove much of the opprobrium attached to money-lending. Some men of reason, like Christian William Dohm, the Prussian councilor of state, therefore came to look upon the exceptional status of the Jews as an anachronism. Politically, too, Jewish isolation began to appear obsolete in the eighteenth century. Rulers, seeking to consolidate their dominions and to remove local variations in taxation and administration, could hardly look with favor upon the special position occupied by the Jews. Thus in 1782 Joseph I I of Austria decreed that business documents written in Hebrew or Yiddish be not admissible as evidence in the courts. Moreover, he abolished group responsibility for toleration money and subjected the Jews to all the political, civil and judicial processes of the land. The Austrian emperor was resolved even to grant the Jews equal rights, but only when their political separation had been terminated and

INTRODUCTORY

23

when no more than religion remained to distinguish them f r o m their compatriots. B u t the attack upon Jewish autonomy came not solely f r o m without. Within the Jewish group too, a division of opinion became evident. M a n y Jewish families, profiting by the increased commercial and industrial opportunities, amassed wealth, sought and achieved free intercourse with non-Jews in society and commerce, and yearned to be rid of a status which set them apart from their fellow merchants and marked them as inferior. T h e y had adopted the language, the clothes, the manners and customs, the very ideas and ideals of the people around them, and refused any longer to view the Jews as a political body living in the hope of national redemption. Jewish distinctiveness, they felt, consisted only in religious beliefs and ceremonials. In all nondenominational matters, the erstwhile aliens should be incorporated in the state on an equal basis with other subjects. T h e self-governing community must go. 7 T h e French Revolution accelerated the movement to incorporate the Jews into European society by providing a new ideal and a new state policy. " Men are born and remain free and equal in rights " was the guiding principle, and no one could deny that the Jews were human. Moreover, the revolutionary governments sought to remove all privileges, all classes and enclaves and to merge all Frenchmen, as individuals and brothers, into one great national fraternity for the glorification and perfection of la patrie. T h e National Assembly repeatedly concerned itself with 7 On the developments of the eighteenth century, see I. M. Jost, Geschichte der Israeliten, vol. ix (Berlin, 1828), pp. 58-92 et seq.; S. Μ. Dubnow, Weltgeschichte des jüdischen Volkes, vol. viii (Berlin, 1928), pp. 22-34; C. W . Dohm, Ueber die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden (Berlin, 1781), pp. 89-92 et seq.; the edicts of Joseph I I are given in A . F . Pribram, Urkunden und Akten cur Geschichte der Juden in Wien (Vienna and Leipzig, 1918), vol. i.

THE JEWS

AND

MINORITY

RIGHTS

the Jewish question; and in September, 1791, it voted that Jews who individually took the civic oath and assumed the obligations imposed by the constitution, would be recognized as citizens. Since it was expressly stipulated that the taking of the civic oath involved the renunciation of all privileges and exceptions, autonomy thus came to an end. When Napoleon assumed control he manifested considerable annoyance at the fact that equal rights had not completely transformed the Jews. Though the self-governing communities had been liquidated, rabbis continued to perform functions, such as marriage, without regard to the civil power. Repeated calls to take up arms in defense of the Fatherland had also elicited none too enthusiastic a response from the Jews. Finally, the latter had not abandoned the trade in money, and much ill-feeling against them had developed, particularly in Alsace. Napoleon undertook to eradicate the last vestiges of Jewish isolation. During 1806-1807 the Emperor of the French convoked an Assembly of Jewish Notables and a Rabbinical Council (Sanhedrin) which dutifully agreed that the political provisions of the Jewish faith were no longer binding since, as Frenchmen of the Mosaic persuasion, the Jews constituted a religious community rather than a nationality (un corps de nation). With the help of his Jewish notables Napoleon also elaborated a religious organization for the French Jews. Consistories composed of rabbis and laymen were established in the various departments, and a central consistory of five was set up at Paris and charged with the general direction of Jewish religious affairs. The rabbis and lay officials were directed to concern themselves with spiritual matters and, in ultimate analysis, were subjected to the general supervision and control of the state. The members of the central consistory at Paris were in the first instance named by the Emperor; vacancies were to be filled only with his approval.

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25

The French Revolution and Napoleon thus evolved a new status for the Jews. Assimilated with the general population in all but religion, the latter were assured full civil and political equality, and a purely confessional organization was established to care for spiritual needs. The new regime, as it affected the Jews, soon spread to other countries which directly or indirectly came under the influence of the Revolution. Belgium, Holland, Italy, the Kingdom of Westphalia, all followed the French model; and even Prussia in 1 8 1 2 extended the rights of the Jews and suppressed the autonomy of the communities.* The overthrow of Napoleon resulted in a restoration of the pre-revolutionary status of the Jews in many states of Germany and Italy. But this proved only a temporary reaction. B y the end of the nineteenth century every country of western and central Europe had declared its Jews citizens, and everywhere the century-old autonomy had been relinquished by the Jews or suppressed by the state.* The " W e s t " had apparently found a solution to the Jewish problem. The majority of the Jews, however, dwelt in eastern Europe, and conditions in that region militated against a similar course of action. The western and central-European Jews, being few in numbers, had readily assimilated in nonreligious matters with the general populations of the various countries. In Russia, Galicia and Bukowina, however, the 8

For the Revolutionary and Napoleonic effects upon the Jews, cf. R. Anchel, Napoleon et les Juifs (Paris, 1928) ; H. Lucien-Brun, La Condition des Juifs en France depuis 1789 (Paris, n. d.), pp. 45-189; Jost, op. cit., vol. ix, pp. 145-156 et seq.; " Gemeinde," Encyclopedia Judaica, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 210-229. On the Prussian Edict of 1812 and subsequent developments, see I. Freund, Die Emanzipation der Juden in Preussen (Berlin, 1912), vol. i, parts 2-3; vol. ii, pp. 455-459· 8

Cf. Dubnow, Weltgeschichte des jüdischen Volkes, op. cit., vol. ix, pp. 11-83, 135-156, 281-288, 319-343, 362-381, 460-492.

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Jews dwelt in masses and clung to their language, literature and customs. Moreover, the attempts of Russia and Austria-Hungary to absorb culturally their polyglot minor nationalities occasioned resistance. The infection of national agitation among Poles, Czechs, Finns or Ukrainians would naturally spread to the local Jews. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Russia refused to endow its five million Jews with equal rights and sought to confine them in the western and southern provinces—in a Pale of Jewish Settlement. The rulers of the Ottoman Empire also persisted in treating their non-Moslem subjects as unbelievers and inferiors. But until the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 the Greeks, Armenians and Jews continued to possess group rights. The Turkish state remained on a theocratic basis, and the special privileges with which Christians and Jews had been endowed in the fifteenth century were not curtailed. Even the great reforms of the nineteenth century (the Hatti Sheriff of 1839 and the Hatti Humayoun of 1856), which promised civil equality and freedom of religion to all subjects of the Sultan, left intact the educational and judicial autonomy of the non-Moslem communities. The constitution which was drawn by the Jews of Constantinople and approved by the Sultan in 1865 affords a good illustration of the status of Jewish autonomy in the Ottoman Empire at the close of the nineteenth century. The recognized representative of the Jews of Turkey and the intermediary between the individual communities and the government was the chief rabbi (Chacham Bashi) of the capital. He was chosen by a Jewish National Council (Mejlis Oumoutni) of twenty spiritual and sixty lay members, and confirmed by the Sultan. This National Council, whose members were required by law to possess a reading and writing knowledge of Hebrew, the official language of

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the Jews, met once a year to vote a budget, to hear reports of old committees and to appoint new ones. T h e functions of the community were performed by two permanent committees chosen from among the members of the National Council. A Committee on Secular A f f a i r s of seven members, selected from among the sixty lay members of the National Council, carried out the commands of the government, collected the state taxes, supervised communal property and otherwise cared for the common interests of the group. A second Committee on Spiritual A f f a i r s , of nine, chosen from among the twenty spiritual members of the National Council, supervised religion and meted out justice in civil and family affairs. 1 0 The medieval constitution maintained by the Sublime Porte might have satisfied the vast majority of Russian J e w s too, if the tsar had chosen to pursue a similar policy. But the Russian government neither recognized its Jewish subjects as citizens of equal standing with the rest of the population, nor permitted them to retain their ancient status of self-governing strangers. T s a r Alexander I sought to discourage the use of Jewish languages and narrowed communal autonomy to the functions of religion. And while he still held the organized community responsible for state taxes, his successor, Nicholas I, completely abolished this century-old institution and placed the Jews under the administration of the local Russian authorities. Such measures were calculated to break down Jewish exclusiveness, but innumerable 10

Franco, op. cit., pp. 143-169 et seq.; D. Ben-Gurion, " T h e Legal Status of the Jews in Turkey," in B. Borochov (ed.), In Kampf far Yiddishe Recht (Ν. Υ., 1916), pp. 63-72; " T u r k e y , " The Jewish Encyclopedia, op. cit., vol. xii, pp. 290-291; " Türkei," Jüdisches Lexikon, op. cit., vol. iv/2, pp. 1081-1083; E . G. Mears, Modern Turkey (Ν. Y . , 1924), p. 419 and note 1. For the texts of the Hatti Sheriff and Hatti Humayoun, see A. Schopoff, Les Reformes et !a protection des Chretiens *n Turquie (Paris, 1904), pp. 17-24, 48-54.

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restrictions on domicile, on economic and educational opportunities, and on political rights still marked the Jews as a distinct and peculiar group. The situation was thus anomalous. Incidentally, there was a considerable amount of mob violence at the time. If the government did not encourage these outrages, it appeared to condone them. Whatever the reason, there certainly developed among the Russian Jews an agitation for national recognition. 11 Austria-Hungary, in its treatment of the Jews, appeared to be following the example of the west rather than that of Turkey or Russia. But special circumstances predisposed the Jfewish masses of Galiciaand Bukowina to national action. The J e w s were indeed declared citizens and endowed with equal rights by the Constitutional L a w s of 1867. But while the Austrian (as distinct from the Hungarian) authorities manifested a tendency to meet some of the demands of the " subject " nationalities, the Jews were viewed as a religious group and as such their linguistic or cultural claims were ignored. The Austrian Constitutional L a w s of 1867 guaranteed each people in the state the " right to maintain and to develop its nationality and language." Moreover, the self-governing provinces, called " Crownlands," enjoyed considerable autonomy in educational, cultural and local affairs, and in each unit the language of the majority was employed as an official medium. But the Jews, though numbering nearly one and a quarter millions in 1900, nowhere constituted a provincial majority and therefore had no standing as a linguistic or cultural group. Thus while laws in Galicia were promulgated in Polish and Ruthenian, the language which the 11 On the Russian measures against Jewish autonomy, see Dubnow, History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 344-345; vol. ii, pp. 40-41, 59-61 et seq. For the anti-Jewish laws, see L. Wolf (ed.), The Legal Sufferings of the Jews in Russia (London, 1912).

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Jewish masses understood was ignored. Some Jews began to view this status as discriminatory. By the beginning of the twentieth century, furthermore, some Austrian Jews had come to believe that a grave danger lay in the fact that their nationality was unrecognized. In appointing educational and administrative officials, and in founding schools, the Austrian government was guided by the vernaculars spoken in the various districts. But Yiddish was not recognized as a language, and for that reason the Jews of Galicia were registered as Poles and those of Bukowina as Germans. The claim was therefore made that the Jews were being used to reinforce the dominant nationalities in the struggle of the latter with the minor national groups. Such a policy, it was averred, only accentuated the hatred of and contempt for the Jews. 3. N A T I O N A L I S M IN T H E N I N E T E E N T H C E N T U R Y A N D EARLY IN T H E

TWENTIETH

Nationalism became during the nineteenth century one of the most potent forces in European society and government. 12 It served as a powerful stimulus in the unification of Germany and Italy. It led Hungarians to demand, and to secure, not only self-government for themselves, but actually a partnership with the German-Austrians in the administration of the Hapsburg lands. In the name of nationalism Poles demanded that their country be reconstituted and freed from foreign domination. The Balkan peoples built national states and sought to " redeem " kindred groups in adjacent territories. Czechs, Croats, Slovenes, Finns and Ruthenians clamored for independence or at least for autonomy in " national " affairs. 1 2 The best study of the doctrines of modern nationalism and of their political implications is C. J. H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (Ν. Y., 1931).

3°

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But national agitation was primarily concerned with the political union of people who spoke a common language, cherished common historical traditions and inhabited a definite territory. In such a movement the Jew, as an individual, might identify himself with one or another of the national groups upon whose territory he dwelt and whose language he spoke. But there was no place in Europe for a Jewish national movement as such. There was no territory in which the Jews constituted a majority and which they might claim as their own, and they did not even possess a common language. The intellectuals generally spoke, during the latter part of the nineteenth century, the languages of their respective countries and they held in contempt the mother tongue of the masses, Yiddish. And while an heroic attempt was made to revive Hebrew, outside of Palestine it remained mainly a literary medium. Therefore the early Jewish national movement, Zionism, sought to establish a political commonwealth not in Europe but in the historic land of the Jews—Palestine. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, there appeared a book, entitled Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um den Staat. This work has proved one of the most momentous influences in the development of minority nationalism in general and of Jewish nationalism in particular. The author, Karl Renner, an Austrian socialist, defined a nationality as a community possessing a common language and culture 18 and common political and economic interests. But his greatest contribution was the novel proposition that national affiliation was primarily a personal and not a territorial matter. A union of like-thinking and like-speaking individuals could therefore be effected even if some members 1 8 The identification of nationality with culture antedated the work of Renner. Cf. the theories analyzed in Fr. J. Neumann, Volk und Nation (Leipzig, 1888).

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o f the group lived beyond the limits of a definite territory. Wherever one dwelt in the state, one could still effectively identify himself with his nationality. In building his state-structure, Renner sought to create a federation of nationalities rather than a union o f individuals. H e was, moreover, at great pains to make clear that what he proposed was not that the state disassociate itself entirely from national affairs and that national culture be administered by voluntary associations. He did not recommend a status for the nationality similar to the religious community where church and state were separated. Instead he favored the absorption of state-power by the nationality and the nationalization of the state. T h e organic union of state and nationality was to be achieved by a decentralization o f authority involving a delegation o f power both to the local territorial units and to national diets chosen respectively by each of the nationalities composing the state. But even the local territorial units would be delimited on a national-linguistic basis. Renner thought that nine-tenths of the districts would prove to be uni-lingual, and in these the local board would at the same time perform the functions of national self-government, and act as the unit o f local government o f the state administration. In mixed districts the nationalities and national minorities would be proportionately represented in the local administration by special electoral curiae, and in strictly national affairs they would either form their own local representative bodies, or be cared for by their national diets. Beyond the local districts, the individual units o f each nationality would be federated in a national diet which would deal with all questions involving national interests. Education, art, literature, emigration, and all other functions in which national peculiarities express themselves, would thus constitute the competence o f the national bodies. E a c h national

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diet would likewise have power to levy taxes and to choose a responsible ministry, the head of which, a secretary of state, would represent his nationality in the central state organization. 1 * Renner's projected reform reached the reading public at the very time when a few Jewish intellectuals were beginning to demand national rights for the Russian and Austrian Jews, and it appeared particularly fitted for the scattered Jewish populations of the two multi-national monarchies. Jewish nationalists therefore seized upon national-personal autonomy as the solution to their problem.18 But before we proceed to trace the agitation for Jewish national rights it will be necessary to describe briefly the grouping among east European Jews in the opening years of the twentieth century. 4. PARTY DIFFERENTIATION

AMONG EAST-EUROPEAN

JEWS

DURING T H E FIRST DECADE OF T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y

The vast majority of the Russian and Austrian Jews belonged to no party. The masses of artisans, petty traders and storekeepers lived and labored without regard to any philosophy of Jewish life beyond the observance of the 1 4 K . Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen (Leipzig and Vienna, 1918), pp. 8-13 et seq., 41-47, 74-83, 227-335, 254-259, 262-292. Briefer summaries of Renner's ideas will be found in O . Bauer, Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie (Vienna, 1924), pp. 324366, and in M. Anin, Die Nationalitätenprobleme der Gegenwart (Riga, 1910), pp. 54-62.

Renner's ideas were first presented in a brochure entitled Staat und Nation and published in 1899, under the pseudonym " Synopticus." In 1902 appeared the book Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um den Staat, under the pseudonym " Rudolf Springer." T h e present writer, however, has used for the purpose of his study, not the original work of 1902, but the second and revised edition of 1918. 10 Cf. J. F . Duparc, La Protection des minoritis de race, de langue et de religion (Paris, 1922), pp. 52-53. Renner, however, did not recognize the Jews as a nationality. Cf. Renner, op. cit., pp. 46, 82-84, 257. See also Bauer, op. eit, pp. 366-381.

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traditional beliefs and customs. The intellectuals and their following among the masses, however, were roughly divided into three major groups—the " assimilationists," the middle class nationalists and the national socialists. (a) " Assimilationists " Many of the secularly cultured, and of the wealthy and influential, strove to achieve for eastern Jewry what the civilized west already possessed. They desired complete civil and political equality. National rights they not only considered unnecessary but positively dangerous. The distinctive feature of the Jew, and the only distinctive feature, they contended, was his religion. To segregate him in any but denominational matters such as the synagogue, the cemetery, religious instruction and parochial charity, would be to perpetuate the accursed Ghetto. The Jews should therfore seek to merge with the dominant nationality in language, in education, in culture, in customs and habits of life. Their opponents called them assimilationists. The " assimilationists," however, did not constitute a definite party, for many of them had little in common beyond an aversion for Jewish nationalism. Those who had discarded religious beliefs and practices manifested no interest whatever in specifically Jewish problems. Others remained associated with the Jewish group in spiritual and charitable affairs, and as a rule this element was in control of the important parochial institutions. The " assimilationists " differed widely in their political and social views. They were even divided in their cultural and national allegiance. Those residing in German Austria and in Russia declared themselves of German and Russian nationality. Many Galician and Russian-Polish "assimilationists," however, were convinced Polish nationalists. During the first decade of the twentieth century many of

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the best known Jewish leaders, even in eastern Europe, were counted among the " assimilationists." But their public activity centered largely in non-Jewish parties. Martov and Trotsky were prominent leaders in Russian socialism, while Diamand was one of the founders of the Polish socialist party in Austria. Kuranda and Ofner were actively associated with the German factions in the Austrian parliament. Loewenstein, the outstanding " assimilationist" in Galicia, and others sat in the Reichsrat as members of the Polish Club. 14 Vinaver, a celebrated attorney of St. Petersburg, was a member of the central committee of the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party. These leaders disliked Jewish political parties, but on rare occasions a group of " assimilationists " would band together to fight for Jewish rights or to combat Zionism, when that movement became too threatening. Such an organization was the People's Group formed in Russia at the close of 1906. (b) Nationalists Until the World War, the Jewish middle class nationalists were, with but few exceptions, Zionists. They were better organized than the " assimilationists " and had succeeded in capturing the imagination of the masses. They did not, however, boast of so many great names as did their opponents, nor were they as influential with Russian and Austrian public opinion and with the government authorities. Attempts to colonize Palestine date from the early 1880's, but the Zionist Organization was founded by Theodor Herzl in 1897, when the " Basel Program " was adopted. This formula declared that Zionism aimed " to establish for the Jewish people a publicly and legally assured home in Palestine," and the ideal quickly attracted large numbers of eastern 18

See Jüdisches

P· 556.

Lexikon,

op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 941, 1 2 3 4 - 1 2 3 5 ; vol. iv/i,

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35

1

Jews. ' The organization, however, at first strongly opposed any participation of the Jews, as Zionists, in the political or economic life of their countries. All attention was to be concentrated on the diplomatic activity which sought to secure from the Turkish government a " charter " permitting the Jews to settle en masse in Palestine. This policy was a source of strength for the movement in so far as controversial problems were ignored and all energies directed toward a goal upon which all parties and classes might cooperate. But Herzl's diplomatic efforts failed, and Palestine remained closed to mass-settlement by Jews. In 1903 the British government offered Uganda, in East Africa, to the Zionists for Jewish colonization. The territory was subsequently found to be undesirable, but this socalled Uganda project precipitated a conflict which finally split the Zionist ranks. The Russian Zionists bitterly fought any attempt to find a substitute for Palestine and they carried the organization with them. But some leaders, particularly those of western Europe, seceded and formed, under the leadership of Israel Zangwill, the Jewish Territorial Organization which stood ready to accept any land as a haven of refuge for the Russian Jews. The disappointing results of political Zionism, the split in the movement, and the death of Herzl in 1904, served to strengthen the element which from the very beginning had contended that Zionism must concern itself with local edu17 In 1898 the Zionist Organization counted 78,000 members; by 1905 the number had risen to 200,000. Nearly two-thirds of the membership was in Russia; five to six thousand members lived in Galicia and Bukowina. See Zionistisches A-B-C Buch (Berlin, 1908), pp. 169-171, 234235. The best work on the early, pre-Herzlian Zionist movement is in Hebrew, S. L. Citron, Toledoth Chibath-Tsion (Odessa, 1914). Good surveys of the Zionist movement will be found in A. Böhm, Die Zionistische Bewegung (Berlin, 1920-1921) ; R. Gottheil, Zionism (Phila., 1914) ; J . Sampter (ed.), A Guide to Zionism (Ν. Y., 1920) ; N. Sokolow, History of Zionism (London, 1919).

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cational and cultural activities. Even Herzl had urged his followers to wrest control of the Jewish religious, social and cultural institutions from the anti-nationalists and assimilationists then in power. And the Russian and Austrian Zionists had been particularly insistent upon local national action. These tendencies contributed to the development of Zionist political parties in Russia and Austria in 1906. The appearance of a Zionist party in Russia compelled the non-Zionist nationalists to marshal their forces and to effect an organization of their own. Thus was born, at the close of 1906, the People's Party or Folkspartei. This group was not numerous; in fact, it consisted of little more than a handful of followers of S. M. Dubnow. 18 But its literary influence was considerable; and subsequently, when the Germans overran Poland and especially when the tsar was overthrown in 1917, the platform elaborated by the People's Party served as the basis for a number of political organizations. (c) National

socialists19

The Jewish socialists of the 1880's and 1890's did not take kindly to Jewish segregation.20 They were, as a rule, youthful students who dwelt in university or other large cities, 18

Infra, p. 57 ct scq.

18

No attempt is here made to treat the Jewish parties exhaustively, nor even to apportion space in accordance with the numerical strength and influence of each group. The viewpoint of the influential anti-nationalists and middle-class nationalists can be simply and briefly stated. The r a tional socialists, however, were divided into factions, and their theories and activities are practically unknown to the English reader. An extended treatment of the latter will therefore be necessary. 20

On the Jewish socialist movement prior to and during the I89O'S, see L. Deutsch, Yidden in der Russisher Revolutsye (Berlin, 1934), esp. ch. iv, and pp. 50-60, 89-90, 105-107; Rotier Pinkos (Warsaw, 1 9 2 1 ) , vol. i, ΡΡ- 5 - 4 4 . 7 0 - 7 7 , 9 2 - 9 4 et seq.; vol. ii, pp. 1 5 9 - 1 6 4 ; 25 Yor—1897-1922 (Warsaw, 1922), pp. 35-50, 110-113, 130-165.

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and participated in the general revolutionary activities of their non-Jewish friends. Of a special " Jewish question " they either knew nothing or, if they did, effectively ignored it. Their aim was to have the Jewish workers assimilate with their Russian, Polish or Austrian brethren and together to agitate for freedom. Even in the Russian Pale of Jewish Settlement where revolutionary agitation was assuming recognizable proportions in the early 1890's, no separate Jewish movement was contemplated. The revolutionary leaders still made no distinction between Jewish and nonJewish workers. A n agitator's sphere of activity was conditioned not by his nationality, but merely by his habitat. If he chanced to be in St. Petersburg he sought to influence Russian workers; if he found himself in Vilna the Jewish worker attracted his attention. A t the turn of the century, however, new influences asserted themselves and produced two national socialist movements. Zionism attracted Jewish workers and intellectuals alike, and some of the latter sought to synthesize the new nationalism with socialism. Moreover, an attempt on the part of the anti-national socialists to organize the Jewish workingmen resulted in a Jewish revolutionary party. W e shall first devote our attention to the latter movement. Toward the close of the nineteenth century it became evident that the method of propaganda then in vogue in Russia did not produce the desired results when applied to the Jewish proletariat. Ignoring the masses, it was customary to build a small " circle " of the more promising workmen, and, under the leadership of an intellectual, to enlighten the group in history, political economy and, of course, socialism. T h e Jewish workers, however, knew Russian either not at all, or not well enough to understand the propagandist. T h e enthusiastic youths who sought to reconstruct Russian society therefore found themselves engaged in the painful

38

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occupation (and that illegally and at the risk of police apprehension) of grinding a knowledge of Russian into tired men to whom the mere learning process was an ordeal. And the few workers who did make progress and were expected to serve as a leaven for the stagnant and motionless mass also failed their leaders. They soon became contemptuous of the ignorant laborer, and sought to graduate from the proletariat by acquiring some " intellectual" pursuit. Instead of creating a class-conscious revolutionary army the leaders had only aroused " bourgeois" hopes among an insignificant group. To remedy these difficulties a new revolutionary technique was evolved at Vilna, the cradle of the Jewish labor movement in matters of theory and practice. The pioneers, chief among them Arkadi Kremer, Samuel Gozhansky and the subsequently famous Martov, urged the socialists to interest the workers in an economic struggle with their employers. This mass agitation, they hoped, would gradually lead to a political conflict with the authorities. But a mass movement among Jews would have to become more Jewish, precluding particularly the use of the Russian language as a medium of agitation. When, therefore, the new policy was put into effect, a distinct organization was thought necessary, and in September, 1897, a small group met secretly at Vilna and founded the General League (Bund) of Jewish Workingmen in Russia and Poland. 21 In March, 1898, six months after the launching of the Jewish socialist party, a number of Marxist groups which had arisen under the influence of Plekhanov, Lenin, Martov 21 Der Yiddisher Arbeiter, no. 9 (1900), pp. 9-30; Rotter Pinkos, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 32-33, 40-41; vol. ii, pp. 176-177· 1 ° 1901, the name of the organization was altered to the General League of Jewish Workingmen in Lithuania, Poland and Russia. Martov never joined the Bund. He remained a leader of the Russian social democrats.

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and others met at Minsk and founded the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. The Jewish Bund played a leading role at this constituent convention, and entered the party with the express understanding that its autonomy in matters affecting the Jewish proletariat would be respected. Police apprehension, however, quickly destroyed the effectiveness of this first attempt at unity, and in 1900 Lenin, on his return from exile, assumed the leadership of a group which, after three years of unceasing effort, succeeded in convoking and in controlling the second convention of the Russian social democrats. Lenin and his followers strongly favored a rigid centralization of party activities and a strict discipline, and vigorously disapproved any concessions to the national idea. The Bund, on the other hand, resolved at its fourth convention in 1901, that the Russian social democracy be reconstituted as a federation of national social-democratic parties and that it be recognized as the representative of the Jewish nationality." With the issue thus clearly drawn, the second convention of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party met at Brussels and London during July-August 1903. A group of delegates, headed by Martov, would have been willing to allow the Bund an extensive organizational autonomy, if the latter had consented to withdraw its demand for a reorganization of the party along federative lines. But the 22 Der Yid. Arbeiter, no. 12 (1901), p. 101; " O u r Aims," Di Arbeiter Shtimme, no. 11 (1898), pp. 4-8; L. Kulczycki, Geschichte der russischen Revolution, vol. iii (Gotha, 1914), pp. 431-435; J . Martow, Geschichte der russischen Sozialdemokratie (Berlin, 1926), pp. 13-34, 56-66; V. Averbuch and S. Shapiro, Dos Organisotsionelle Problem in der Yiddisher Arbeter Bavegung (Berlin, 1923), pp. 13-14. 23-37, 31-34· The Bund was strongly influenced by the action of the Austrian socialists, who resolved at the Brünn Congress in 1899 in favor of extensive autonomy for the nationalities resident in the Austrian state. On the Brünn Congress, see Bauer, op. cit., pp. 322-323, 527-537·

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4° absolute minimum of the Bund's desires, i. e., the formal recognition of the latter as " the only representative of the Jewish proletariat," which could, furthermore, not be circumscribed by any territorial limits, proved unacceptable even to the moderates. The demands of the Bund were therefore rejected, and it withdrew from the united Russian party. The Russian Social Democratic Labor Party was greatly weakened by the loss of the Bund—one of the most powerful elements in Russian socialism at the time. The second convention, moreover, revealed a further rift between the Bolshevist followers of Lenin, and the Menshevists, who balked at what they considered his dictatorial tendencies and extreme centralism. The feud widened after the convention, and the social-democratic organizations were everywhere torn into contending factions. The apparent weakening of the autocracy in 1905-1906, however, convinced many that all revolutionary energies must be concentrated in order to prepare for a decisive blow. In response to a widespread demand of the organized rank and file, therefore, a Unity Convention was summoned to Stockholm for April, 1906. This Stockholm Convention accepted the Bund's conditions, and the latter reentered the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party as a national organization which was not limited by any territorial bounds.28 The activities of the Bund were instrumental in creating a similar organization in Galicia. In that region, Jewish workers had since the 1890's been incorporated in the 28

V. Medem, Fun Mein Leben (Ν. Υ., 1923), vol. ii, pp. 20-32, 123145; Die Protokolen fun der ν'ύ-tcr Konferents fun Bund (St. Petersburg, 1906) ; Roiter Pinkas, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 5-21; Martow, op. cit., PP· 79-91 et seq., 153, 190; Der Yiddisher Arbeter, ed. by A. Kirzhnits, hereafter referred to as "Kirzhnits" (Moscow, 1925-1928), vol. ii, heft 2, pp. 174-188; and the discussion on the question of unity in Der Vecker, nos. 16, 24-27 (1906).

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branches of the Polish Social Democratic Party. But there was perennial complaint that the party was not exerting sufficient effort to attract the Jewish workers who understood no Polish. The few proposals to establish an independent Jewish group met with overwhelming disapproval. The resolutions of the Brünn Congress, and particularly the propaganda of members of the Bund who sought refuge across the Austrian border, however, led to the secession of a sufficient number of members to form an independent faction. A f t e r a series of preparatory steps dating from 1903, the Jewish Social Democratic Party in Galicia was proclaimed on May 1, 1905. This " Galician Bund," as it came to be called, was discountenanced by Austrian socialism, and remained an insignificant group. Close relations, however, were maintained with the Russian parent body and much needed aid was thus secured. The ideas and policies of the two organizations were practically identical.24 The Bund's nationalism at first consisted only of the possession of a distinct organization and of the utilization of the Yiddish language for propaganda purposes. Other national policies were adopted with much hesitation, for this socialist party ever remained fearful of the possibility that national agitation might weaken the class-struggle. The second movement in national socialism, the so-called proletarian Zionism, was more outspokenly nationalistic. Jewish workingmen had participated in Zionist activities from the very beginnings of the movement, but the first separate proletarian Zionist society was organized, with the aid of some intellectuals, at Minsk in 1900. A distinctive name, Poale-Zion, or Worker Zionists, was adopted, but no essen24 On the " Galician Bund " see Bross, in Roiter Pinkos, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 26-46; Der Vecker, no. 29 (1906). In May, 1906, the faction claimed a membership of 2800.

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tial difference existed between this and other Zionist groups. A careful examination of conditions in the Jewish world, however, would have revealed that further division was inevitable. The tsarist repressions, and particularly the Kishinev and subsequent pogroms, aroused many workers and radical intellectuals actively to participate in the struggle against the autocracy. But the middle-class Zionist leaders discountenanced such a policy. Moreover, in the Russia of that time the propaganda of the Bund and the active struggle between workers and employers rendered anomalous any cooperation with middle-class Zionists. Class-consciousness would furthermore require not only a separate organization but also a revaluation of the very concept of Zionism, in which the need for a Jewish land would have to be established on a proletarian basis. This process of reorganization and reinterpretation took a half dozen years, but it produced a number of parties or factions each with a distinctive ideology and with a definite party machinery. The existing Poale-Zion groups seceded from the Russian Zionist Organization in 1902, and with time more of such societies came into existence. An attempt at unity in 1903 served only to reveal the ideological chaos which reigned among the proletarian Zionists. All agreed that the Jewish problem was the result of the evils of capitalism made infinitely more onerous by the lack of a common national territory. Moreover, unlike the Bund, which sought only a minimum of national life for the Jews and could view their dispersion optimistically, the Worker Zionists despaired of a Jewish national future in the galuth, as they termed dispersion among other nations. But should Palestine be designated as the destined national territory or must another be found? Moreover, since the present non-territorial existence, having no future, was doomed to extinction, it was open to question whether attempts to improve the workers'

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conditions in their present homelands were worth while. There was likewise no unity of opinion on the question of participation as socialists in the political struggle against autocracy. When we note further that the answers to these questions had to be woven into a self-contained theory and cloaked in socialism, the division into factions becomes thoroughly understandable. The proletarian Zionists grappled with these problems for some time. But the Russian Revolution spurred them to take decisive action, and between 1904 and 1906 three distinct and antagonistic factions appeared. In July, 1904, representative Jewish national socialists assembled at Warsaw and selected an organization bureau. The agitation of the latter met with a ready response, particularly in South Russia, and steps were therefore quickly taken to launch a new party. A conference assembled at Odessa in December, 1904, but on the second day of the sessions all the participants were apprehended. In February, 1905, however, the delegates were freed, and they soon contrived to complete their deliberations 25 and to organize The Zionist Socialist Labor Party S. S. 2e The founding of this party stimulated opposing elements among the national socialists to take similar action. In the summer of 1905, while the seventh Zionist congress was in session at Basle, a conference of proletarian Zionist delegates met at Fribourg. But differences over national action in Russia and particularly over the choice of a territory for Jewish settlement occasioned sharp encounters, and no unity could be achieved. One faction was led by a small group of 25 The young and enthusiastic revolutionaries found means of continuing their discussions in the Odessa jail, which evidently afforded greater freedom from molestation than did the outside world. 28

The symbol " S. S . " represents the initial letters of the Russian equivalent of Zionist Socialist.

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Kiev intellectuals known as Renascence (Fozrozhdeniye) while a brilliant and highly educated young man named Ber Borochov placed himself at the head of an opposing element. The controversy was carried over into Russia, and during the subsequent fall and winter two organization committees, representing the opposing factions, sought to capture the local societies. By December, 1905, when a south-west conference at Berdychev was won to the Renascence viewpoint and when another south-Russian conference at Poltava accepted the views of Borochov, two distinct parties began to take shape. Finally in April, 1906, a founding convention at Kiev created The Jewish Socialist Labor Party; and, about the same time, the Jewish Social Democratic Labor Party—Poale-Zion appeared.28 Each of the three proletarian-Zionist factions elaborated its own synthesis of nationalism and socialism. But for the Infra, p. 68 et seq. The organization of the Poale-Zion party was begun in February, 1906, at Poltava. But no program was definitely formulated until JulyAugust, 1907, when the faction's second convention assembled at Cracow. Small proletarian-Zionist groups appeared also in other countries. In 1903-1904 groups centering in Cracow and Vienna coalesced to form a Federation of Jewish Workingmen and Business Clerks " Poale-Zion," and during the following two years Russian fugitives, including Borochov, who sought refuge in Austria, exerted a telling effect upon the Austrian movement. In 1906 a reorganization produced the Jewish Socialist Labor Party " Poale-Zion " in Austria. In 1905-1906 a Jewish Social Democratic Labor Party in Palestine " Poale-Zion" appeared. A t about the same time, the east-European Jewish immigrants in the United States organized a Poale-Zion party and another group, SocialistTerritorialists, which closely resembled the Russian Zionist Socialist Labor Party. Weak organizations of the Poale-Zionists appeared also in England, at Paris, Antwerp and at a few other centers in western Europe, and in Bulgaria, Rumania and Argentina. See Borochov in Der Kami, Dec. 1922, pp. 18-19; Feb. 1923, pp. 4-7; Yiddisher Arbeter Pinkos, ed. by Zerubavel, hereafter referred to as " Zerubavel" ( W a r saw, 1927), pp. 283-284, 591-593. On the English and Argentinian PoaleZionists, see Der Yiddisher Kaempfer, nos. 19, 30 (1907). 28

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purposes of this study a bare outline of the basic principles will suffice. All subscribed to the theory that the lack of a national territory rendered impossible the normal development o f a Jewish proletariat. It was maintained that the Jewish laborers were at a disadvantage in seeking employment because of religious observances and physical and technical backwardness. The same condition was presumed to affect the petty bourgeoisie which was driven by capitalism into the ranks of labor. The competition of non-Jewish workingmen therefore repelled the growing Jewish proletariat from mines and large-scale factory industry into the semi-domestic branches of production. This hindered the effective struggle with capital and prevented the socialization o f Jewish life. It was therefore obvious that a territory must be found for Jewish concentration where the economic laws of capitalism and of the class struggle might freely operate. T h e designation o f a territory, however, created irreconcilable differences. The Poale-Zion party contended that a land could not be chosen at will but was pre-determined by economic necessity. It must be half-agricultural and sparsely settled so that the colonizing Jews would not again encounter competition. And the land which most nearly met all the requirements was Palestine. Thus economic forces were as surely driving the Jews toward Palestine, as capitalism was inevitably leading to socialism. T o this contention the Zionist Socialist Labor Party took strong exception. It declared that not economic necessity but merely sentiment led Jews to desire the bleak and barren strip that was holy ground for three faiths. This party sought a more suitable territory for Jewish settlement. The Jewish Socialist Labor Party, moreover, refused altogether to lend the territorial question immediate and serious attention. The faction agreed that Palestine was undesirable but

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it would do nothing to find another land. S o important a task, it insisted, could be performed only by a people which had achieved national unity in its present home—in Russia. The Jewish Socialist Labor Party therefore concentrated all its attention upon Jewish national activity in Russia." The question of national life and national work in the present homelands of the Jews constituted another basic difference among the national-socialist groups. But with this problem we have reached the main preoccupation of our study. We shall, therefore, proceed now to trace the origin and early development of the idea of Jewish national rights at the beginning of the twentieth century, the increased Jewish national agitation at the time of the Russian Revolution of 1905, and the decline of movement during the years immediately preceding the World War. Our attention will then be directed toward the revived activity for Jewish national rights during the war period, particularly in the United States and in revolutionary Russia. The study will conclude with an extensive treatment of Jewish efforts to secure from the Paris Peace Conference guaranties for the protection of Jews and of other minorities in eastern Europe. 28

For further information on the development of preletarian Zionism, the organization into parties, and the various theories, see Roiter Pinkos, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 126-194; Zerubavel, op. cit., pp. 31-46, 62-83, 106-150; A. Tartakower, Toledoth Tenuath ha-Ovedim ha-Yehudith (Warsaw, 1929-1930), vol. i, pp. 57-74; idem, in Der Jude, vol. viii, pp. 16-38; Jüdischer Almanack, 1909-1910 (Vienna, 1910), pp. 114-115, 118-125; Unser Shtimme (Warsaw, Nov., 1918), pp. 51-70; Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. ii, heft 1, pp. 377-384, 434-435; " Our Tasks," Der Neier Veg, nos. 1-2 (1906), pp. 3-8, 56-60, 80-84. J . Lestschinsky's Der Yiddisker Arbeiter (Vienna, 1906), is a scholarly work depicting the abnormal condition of the Jewish worker in Russia.

PART I THE MOVEMENT FOR JEWISH NATIONAL AUTONOMY OR NATIONAL RIGHTS PRIOR TO T H E WORLD WAR

C H A P T E R II T H E B E G I N N I N G S OF T H E M O V E M E N T

W E have seen that special circumstances predisposed the Jews of Russia and Austria to nationalism. However, the considerable agitation which had developed by the beginning of the twentieth century was preoccupied with Zionism and Palestine—a phase of nationalism with which this study is not concerned. Our objective is rather to trace the development of the claim that the east-European Jews constitute a distinct nationality and are therefore entitled to a special national existence, or to national rights, in their native lands. It has already been indicated that the repressions and the denial of equal rights in Russia, as well as the devotion of the Jewish masses to their language and customs throughout eastern Europe, figured prominently in producing a desire for national rights. At first view then, it would appear that the status forshadowed by the novel demand was not unlike that which had prevailed before the French Revolution ushered in the era of Jewish emancipation. On closer examination, however, it will become clear that the resemblance is more apparent than real. The ancient constitution had segregated the Jews as aliens, and the self-governing institutions which the latter maintained also bore a strong religious coloring. The Jewish nationalists of the twentieth century envisaged something radically different. The Jews were not to be segregated in modern ghettos. On the contrary, they were to be incorporated in the state organism as a national unit along with the other nationalities who clamored for recognition in eastern Europe. Besides, 49

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religion was to constitute but one function, and to many Jewish nationalists a minor function, in national selfgovernment. The basic ideas of the new nationalism are thus quite simple. Little difficulty need therefore have been expected in tracing the movement, if the Jews of eastern Europe had only composed one united group. But such was not the case. Political frontiers separated the Jews into Russian, Austrian, Hungarian and Rumanian subjects, each group living under differing political and social conditions. Moreover, the Jews in each country, in Russia and Austria particularly, were hopelessly divided by internal dissensions, class differences proving the most clearly marked line of cleavage. Our account of the beginnings of the movement for Jewish national rights will therefore gain in clarity if we treat separately the middle-class and the proletarian agitators, as also the Russian and Austrian groups. Between the late 1890's and the summer of 1904 only several small groups of intellectuals were concerned with the cause of Jewish national rights or of national autonomy, as the idea soon came to be known. The masses remained completely unaffected. The movement may be said to have begun with two theories which were propounded contemporaneously and independently by two Jewish thinkers. Dr. Chaim Zhitlowsky, a Russian revolutionary living abroad, was the first to broach the question. But the man who gave the theory of Jewish national autonomy its most thorough foundation and development was a Russian middleclass liberal, Professor Simon M. Dubnow. During the early period, Zhitlowsky's ideas, because they appeared in illegal journals, were known only to a very small group of disciples. Dubnow's views, on the other hand, were published in the legal and respected journal Voskhod, and though, like Zhitlowsky's among the revolutionaries, his, too,

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was at first a voice crying in the wilderness, his theory became known among the Russian Jewish intelligentsia, and he has since been characterized as " the Father of the Movement for Jewish Autonomy." The writings of Dubnow and Zhitlowsky were primarily directed to the Russian Jews. In time, also, Dr. Nathan Birnbaum, an Austrian intellectual, who apparently came under the influence of Dubnow, took up the novel ideas of national autonomy and presented them before the Jews of his country. The movement thus at first embraced no more than a few theorists and their disciples. The organized groups among the east-European Jews kept aloof from the new non-Zionist nationalism. W e shall see that the Russian Zionists, who constituted the most active element among the middle classes, categorically refused at the beginning of the twentieth century to concern themselves with the matter. The proletarian groups were only slightly more sympathetic. One small group among the proletarian Zionists, the Renascence, commenced an agitation for national rights. Furthermore, while a number of Bund leaders came to favor national autonomy, the new claim succeeded only in dividing that socialist organization against itself. W e shall now proceed to treat in turn these early developments, commencing with the two pioneers, Chaim Zhitlowsky and Simon M. Dubnow. I . T H E DOCTRINE OF C H A I M

ZHITLOWSKY

The contribution of Chaim Zhitlowsky (1865), as a pioneer, to the idea of Jewish national autonomy has been almost completely ignored by writers on the subject. Even Dubnow in his comprehensive Neueste Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes (published soon after the World W a r ) barely mentioned his name. But Zhitlowsky himself is thoroughly convinced that he preceded Dubnow. The fail-

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ure to accord him due recognition, however, should not be attributed to a conspiracy of silence. Dubnow's own explanation of his sin of omission appears thoroughly convincing. Zhitlowsky's writings on this subject, because they were printed abroad and in illegal sheets, were difficult to procure in Russia, and quite dangerous to possess. Always rare, they became almost extinct soon after publication. The man's personal activity, moreover, centered in foreign student groups, and until the Revolution of 1905, his Jewish national views were either not heard of in Russia, or at best attracted but little attention.1 Zhitlowsky's great contribution to the movement for Jewish national autonomy was his considerable aid in synthesizing socialism with nationalism. Thus he made the latter palatable to Jewish and other socialists. Further he insisted that national-socialist ideology recognize the claim of the Jewish nationality to national rights equally with all other groups. This activity began in 1883-1884 1 when Jewish nationalism was highly unpopular among Russian socialists. For in the empire of the tsars even the revolutionary movement was imbued with a spirit of centralization 1 Cf. C. Zhitlowsky, Gezamclte Shriften (Ν. Y., 1912-1919), vol. vii, pp. 226-327; S. Dubnow, " Zhitlowsky's Autonomism," Zhitlowsky Zamelbuch (Warsaw, 1929), pp. 190-191; ibid., pp. 152-153. In an interview granted the present writer in April, 1930, Zhitlowsky definitely maintained that he had preceded Dubnow in the claim for Jewish national rights. 2 One obscure reference to Jewish cultural autonomy antedated the activity of Zhitlowsky. The Ukrainian revolutionaries, under the leadership of M. Dragomanov, desired self-government for their nationality, and in the 1880's they worked out the idea of a " free union of peoples." The basis here was also to be territorial but the Jewish cities were to be recognized as self-governing centers. The one Jew among them, Rodin, issued a proclamation in 1880, urging the Jews to join the revolutionary movement and to demand cultural autonomy in the Yiddish language. But he was not heard from again. Interview with Dr. Zhitlowsky, April 10, 1930.

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which was ready to concede autonomy only to the Poles. Zhitlowsky, however, sought to convince the Jews that they constituted a nationality and must demand national rights. In 1885 a small circle called Teshuath Israel was formed under Zhitlowsky's leadership, and the recognition of the revolutionary organization, Narodnaya Volya, was sought for it as a Jewish association. The application was rejected because of the " national-separatistic" tendencies of the group, and thereafter the few members devoted their attention to combating the assimilationist views of the Jewish intellectuals. This society did not as yet demand national rights for the Jews, but it did vaguely favor an " independent " Jewish life. In 1888 the persistent Zhitlowsky created a new band in Switzerland (The Society for the Promotion of the Life and Learning of the Jewish People) for the purpose of carrying on Jewish national-revolutionary propaganda. The philosophic outlook of the group coincided with the view expressed by the leader a year before. It maintained that the Jews had been preserved from extinction not by their religion but by the striving for national survival; the religion was maintained solely as a means of survival. This society, too, lasted no more than three years, but the Jewish national ideology of its founder found expression in other ways. 4 In 1892, there appeared Zhitlowsky's significant brochure entitled A Jew to Jews. It was published in the Russian language under the pseudonym of I. Chasin and was directed chiefly to the Russian-Jewish intellectuals. But, printed in London, it had to be smuggled into Russia, and could reach at best but a limited audience. The appeal was further circumscribed by the fact that the ideas seemed strange at the time, and the very publishers apologized for permitting " Z h i t l o w s k y , op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 147-148 et seq.; biich, op. cit., pp. 23-27.

Zhitlozvsky

Zamel-

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them to see the light. T h e y were, however, extremely important in the unfolding of the idea of Jewish revolutionary nationalism. T h e precise formula " national rights " had not as yet crystallized in the mind of the author nor was it to be found in the booklet. B u t the idea was unquestionably implied, and within a half dozen years Zhitlowsky had formulated the means wherewith the desired end, i. e., Jewish nationalism, might be furthered and achieved. In 1897 in an article, " W h y only Yiddish? " he maintained that only through the Yiddish language and literature could the social and national revival of the Jewish masses be effected. A n d in 1898, Zhitlowsky wrote in " Zionism or Socialism " that the welfare of the Jews required not only civil equality but also " national equal rights with all peoples . . . " in the state.4 A brief review of Zhitlowsky's theory of Jewish nationalism will now be useful not only as marking the individual ideology of this pioneer, but also as a background for that of the proletarian groups, which were soon to command the attention of east-European Jewry, and which were directly or indirectly influenced by the many-sided activity of this tireless man. T h e entire structure rested on a profound faith in the possibility of a productive and fruitful group-life f o r the Jewish masses residing in eastern Europe, particularly those of pre-war Russia, Galicia and Bukowina. Zhitlowsky sought the mainsprings of national affiliation in the cultural past of a group, rather than in such absolute standards as race, language, religion or the possession of a territory. To him. a nationality consisted of a body of people that for 4

Zhitlowsky, op. cit., vol. v, pp. 31-43, 47-76; vol. vi, pp. 13*55· Zhitlowsky believes that the tract A Jew to Jews presented the first proposal for Jewish national rights. Dubnow, however, cannot discover in the pamphlet any definite traces of the " modern concept ' autonomism'." Cf. ibid., vol. vi, pp. 7-9; Zhitlowsky Zametbueh, op. cit., pp. 37-38, 191192. 217-219.

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many generations had coped with the cultural problems of humanity and had solved some of these problems in a manner of its own. In this process had evolved " special creativeforms, a peculiar national-spiritual and bodily type, which are transmitted from generation to generation "—in short, marked characteristics which distinguished one people from others. On the basis of this definition the Jews constituted a nationality, and like every other such group must be viewed as a national whole and endowed with national rights. This radical nationalist had no sympathy with those who could see no value at all in the traditional past. We must not blame Moses, said he, for not reading Darwin, or Joshua for neglecting Copernican astronomy. Further, he discerned socialist monotheism in the prophetic teachings, and great human as well as Jewish-national values in the Bible, and in Talmudic, Geonic, and other Jewish literature of the past. But the past must not be set up as the criterion of Jewish nationality; he particularly sought to disentangle Jewish nationalism from the traditional religion in which the group had for many centuries found a means of survival. In his view, the laws and customs of the rabbis had served to separate and to preserve the national group, while the devout faith in a miraculous Messiah was really a longing for national redemption. The appeal to the supernatural was, in his opinion, due simply to the fact that in the struggle with Rome the material strength of the smaller nation had been shattered. Affiliation with the Jewish group must, in the view of Zhitlowsky, remain independent of any body of beliefs or opinions, of any system of philosophy, of any religious or social-political creed. No phase of life must be excluded, nor must any circle of thought or particular Weltanschauung be made obligatory. One could remain identified with the Jewish nationality even if he abandoned the Jewish religion.

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If the majority of the Jews had adopted Christianity, the group would not have suffered in a national sense, thought Zhitlowsky; since the faith, like any system of thought adopted by a mass of Jews, would have assumed a unique Jewish character. Indeed, if the entire Jewish past were to vanish, this Russian-Jewish revolutionary was certain that the present would be sufficient to maintain the Jewish nationality. The Yiddish language and separate educational and cultural institutions were adequate for survival. There was no need of any heroic efforts, or of any special exertion of the national will. S o convinced was Zhitlowsky that his people would find complete national salvation in the present homelands, that he stood adamant against every suggestion of the need of territorial concentration through emigration to other lands. 5 The Jews need only insist on national rights and then live their own life. Unlike most of his socialist comrades in Russia, Zhitlowsky favored the recognition of the various peoples as national entities; the Jews, of course, were not excepted. He particularly disapproved of any view of the Jews " as 4°/o of some one else, when we are 100% of ourselves," and urged the Jewish working class to participate in the revolutionary struggle as a national unit. His opponents, the Russian Jewish revolutionary assimilationists, were taken severely to task for desiring not a free and equal union with all peoples inhabiting Russia, but complete amalgamation with the Great Russian nationality. T h e east-European ruling nationalities, insisted the pioneer national socialist, must not be permitted to dominate and absorb the Jews and other minor groups. Instead, Russia and Austria-Hungary should be reconstituted as commonwealths of multiple nationality " whose state life would rest on the foundations of • Zhitlowsky subsequently modified his views on this question. p. 128, note 47.

Infra,

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the most complete equality of rights for all languages and nations." * These national-radical ideas at first found no response among Russian revolutionary intellectuals whose point of view was thoroughly assimilationist. It was therefore a rhetorical exaggeration when Zhitlowsky wrote in 1898 that, unlike the bourgeoisie, the Jewish socialists were demanding not only civil rights but also " national equal rights." T h e truth was this: one solitary Jewish socialist had merely raised the question. 2 . THE DOCTRINE OF SIMON M. DUBNOW

Simon M . Dubnow ( i 8 6 0 ) , a bourgeois intellectual, whose religious, social and economic views were diametrically opposed to those of Zhitlowsky, expressed at the close of the nineteenth century a similar desire for national rights. H i s theory of Jewish national autonomy was evolved in a series of essays entitled, " Letters Concerning Ancient and Modern Judaism." T T h e precise claim for national rights • C / . Zhitlowsky, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. m - 1 1 8 et seq., 150-168; vol. iii, pp. 218-226; vol. iv, pp. 33-43; vol. v, pp. 51, 101-106; vol. vi, pp. 17-18 et seq., 33-37, 47-53; vol. vii, pp. 227-238; vol. viii, pp. 222-223 et seq. 7 T h e " Letters " appeared in the Russian-Jewish monthly Voskhod between 1897-1902; in 1907 a revised version w a s published in book f o r m . N o translation of the entire volume has as yet appeared. Die Grundlagen des Nationaljudentums ( B e r l i n , 1905), is a translation, by I. Friedlander, of the first t w o letters, in which the theoretic foundations of Dubnow's views w e r e f u l l y presented; it contains also summaries of other letters, which amplified the ideas expressed in the first two, or examined current Jewish movements in the light of the theory of autonomy. In 1926, Der Jude published a new translation of the first letter, by E . H u r w i c z . T h e best brief statement of the theory of autonomy is D u b n o w ' s beautifully written essay, " T h e Secret and L a w of the Preser( 1 9 1 2 ) , pp. 112-117. A vation of the Jewish Nationality," in He-Athid comprehensive bibliography of D u b n o w ' s writings will be found in the Festschrift su Simon Dubnows siebzigstem Geburstag (Berlin, 1930), pp. 266-295.

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was enunciated in 1898, the very year in which Zhitlowsky had arrived at a similar formula. But whereas the latter, whose major preoccupation was socialism, was content to treat of Jewish nationalism in general terms, Dubnow evolved both a philosophy of Jewish history in support of his theory, and a comprehensive and detailed program of immediate action. The two cardinal principles in Dubnow's ideology are an emphasis upon spiritual-cultural determinants in national consciousness, and an optimistic view that the Jews can find a normal expression of their national life even in the Diaspora. He sees in the historical development of any national group an evolution from physical to spiritual individuality. In Dubnow's view, the first stage in the growth of nationality was the racial type which was distinguished by physical characteristics, which in turn were the product of physical environment and of heredity. This original or biological form of nationality soon gave way to the territorial-political kinship produced by material culture. Social life, resulting particularly from economic cooperation, created the need for union in a state or territory, while migration and mixed marriage resulted in a partial obliteration of the racial type. Many territorial-political nations have, however, disappeared through the absorption of weaker by more powerful groups, and even ruling peoples have been dragged down to the abyss by overgrown states or world empires which fell of their own weight. External factors of power and strength have, therefore, not preserved peoples from extinction. Only great spiritual assets, such as altruistic emotions and ideas, a religion of universal import, the identification of national customs with ethical values, and a language employed not only as a means of communication, but also as a vehicle of learning and literature, can preserve nationality. The deciding factors are not race or territory, nor even common

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interests. Common ideals, common struggles and suffering, not for conquest but for spiritual treasures, are the foundations of national consciousness in the cultural-historical or spiritual stage—the highest type and the essence of national existence. Applying these general criteria of nationality to the Jewish people, Dubnow found that his own group had not only passed through all the stages of national growth, but had actually reached a unique point in the evolution of a spiritualcultural national community. The racial type of Jewish nationality early gave way to the territorial-political union of the age of the kings. But when the powerful neighbors became too much f o r the little Palestinian commonwealth, the prophets sought to shift the national emphasis to the growing spiritual ties of universal monotheism and social and ethical ideals, and to effect a harmonious union of the national and universal aspects of Jewish life and thought. The attempt of the prophets to raise the Jewish people at one stroke to the " apex of national existence " was not immediately successful. But the vitality of their teachings became evident when the loss of state and territory in 586 B. C. did not result in the extinction of the nationality. The period of the Secgnd Commonwealth, with its social and cultural autonomy,' made possible a further growth of the spiritual bonds of union, so that when the political and spiritual conceptions of nationality clashed in the SadduceePharisee feud, the spiritual prevailed. The iron hand of Rome put an end to the political ambitions and terminated the territorial stage of the Jewish nationality, but the group survived as a spiritual-cultural community. Thus did the Jewish people reach the highest plane of national existence. Dubnow, however, saw an even more striking phenomenon in his nationality's survival. He cited

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Ireland and Poland as examples of peoples who possessed sufficient vitality to resist annihilation despite the loss of political independence. But, in his view, the Jews constituted the only living group which had lost even its territory and its unity of language. Such a people the Jewish historian termed indestructible. The proponent of national-cultural autonomy did not view the survival of the Jews as an historical miracle. Rather, he believed that in passing through the same stages of national development as other peoples, his group had been fortunate in evolving a predominating proportion of spiritual bonds of union which the " national will " contrived to preserve even after the nationality had been scattered among other peoples. The all-embracing " Law " compensated for the loss of the state, and in place of the national territory arose national-cultural centers to which the remainder of the Diaspora gravitated. Thus cultural hegemony was transferred successively from Palestine to Babylonia, thence to France and Spain, and thence to Germany and the Slavic lands. Even in our own times, says Dubnow, an unfriendly environment in the east would result in a transplantation of the cultural heritage to a new home. The secret of Jewish-national persistence should, according to him, be sought also in the self-governing communities, with their institutions of national-cultural autonomy, which the scattered people had succeeded in maintaining in its numerous new homes. But these expressions of national life are, in Dubnow's view, variable. Formerly when the Jews were strangers in European society, their autonomous institutions segregated them, and they constituted a state within the state. To-day, however, with emancipation an accomplished fact, the Jews should be viewed as a nationality among nationalities, meriting equally with others broad pow-

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ers of national self-government within the framework of the state.* Since this view of Jewish nationalism clashed with the accepted theories of the time, the author undertook to reveal the fundamental fallacies of what he considered ill-founded interpretations of Jewish life. Dubnow thought that the tendency to perceive the result of historical development rather than its evolutionary process was responsible for the denial of Jewish nationality by proponents of orthodoxy and of religious reform, as well as by many freethinkers. The non-nationalists failed to comprehend that religion had only absorbed, for a time, the distinctive manners and customs, a peculiar legal system, in fact all other national institutions. In designating the Jews a religious community, they were therefore mistakenly identifying the spiritual-cultural phenomena of creative evolution with a stabilized religious tradition. The Zionists, too, asserted Dubnow, in assuming a negative attitude to Jewish life in dispersion, and in their great emphasis upon the need for a Palestinian political entity, were confusing the husk with the spiritual-cultural essence of Jewish nationality. And recognizing that Palestine could not harbor more than a fraction of world Jewry, they were, in the opinion of Dubnow, condemning the majority of the Jewish people to ultimate extinction, or at least to spiritualcultural sterility. Dubnow's theory conceded the importance and cultural value of a Jewish center in Palestine. But it insisted that equal attention must be devoted to a strengthening of national-cultural and social autonomy in all other lands. In like manner, the religious complexion of Jewish life was neither magnified nor denied. Dubnow merely sought to 8 Dubnow, Die Grundlagen des Nationaljudentums, 4 1 - 5 8 ; Der Jude, vol. ix, pp. 33-45·

op. cit., pp. 23-35,

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secularize the national idea. Therefore, while granting that formal acceptance of another religion would involve withdrawal from the Jewish group, he would include non-believers as genuine members of the Jewish nationality. The theory of national-cultural autonomy alone, thought Dubnow, was free of the distortions which had led other thinkers to ignore living members of the Jewish national body. Therefore, it alone could serve as the comprehensive system of thought and as the guiding influence in the current phases of Jewish national life.® 3. T H E AUSTRIAN J E W I S H AUTONOMIST, N A T H A N BIRNBAUM

The first important advocate of Jewish national autonomy in Austria was Nathan Birnbaum (1864). He was 1 0 in turn called the Achad H a - A m and the Dubnow of western Europe, and he bore certain external resemblances to Herzl too. But he lacked Herzl's capacity for action and organization, nor could be hold steadfastly to his theories as did the Russian founders of cultural Zionism and national autonomy. Birnbaum was one of the pioneers of Zionism in the west. In the early 1880's he helped organize the first Jewishnational student society in Austria. Thereafter he agitated for Jewish nationalism, and when political Zionism was launched by Theodor Herzl he joined the movement, address• Dubnow, Die Grundlagen des Nationaljudentums, 58-63; Der Jude, vol. ix, pp. 45*52.

op. cit., pp. 35-40,

1 0 This is the famous Asher Ginzberg, the exponent of spiritual or cultural Zionism. He realized that Palestine could not absorb the Diaspora, and would, therefore, not solve the Jewish problem. H e desired a spiritual or cultural center in Palestine where the Hebrew language and a Jewish national culture might develop without hindrance from a foreign environment. His ideas are brilliantly expressed in the collection of his essays, Al Parashath Derachim, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1921).

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ing the first Zionist congress and becoming the first general-secretary of the Zionist bureau. After a year, however, he left political Zionism, having come to doubt its efficacy. He next came under the influence of Achad Ha-Am's cultural Zionism. But he did not rest content with that either. The Russian thinker could see little vital force, little capacity for culture or survival in a dispersed Jewish people without Palestine. Birnbaum, on the other hand, having learned to know the distinctive life of eastern Jewry, saw in it a nationality in existence, and literally became obsessed with it. The ideas of Dubnow and of Renner, moreover, appear also to have affected the Austrian thinker. Between 1902 and 1905 Birnbaum worked out his idea of non-Zionist nationalism or Alljudentum (Pan-Judaism), as it was called in German. He refused to view the dispersion as an absolute and eternal source of Jewish misery, and therefore did not grant the negation of Jewish life outside of Palestine. He would not abandon the Diaspora to destruction as did the political Zionist, nor, like the Achad Ha-Amist, would he make of it the handmaid of the Palestine center. The status of the Jews in the various countries, he maintained, differed at different periods. In modern times progress had consistently minimized oppression, and Birnbaum could look forward to an even better future. He would therefore promote Jewish national and cultural life in the present centers of the Jewish masses, and would further strive to secure the recognition of Jewish nationality by the powers that be. When opponents maintained that the eastern Jews would ultimately follow the example of their western brethren and assimilate, he pointed to an inherent distinction between the two groups. He denied that the difference between the eastern and western Jewries was due solely to the fact that one had been emancipated while the other remained restricted.

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Other factors were involved, said he, and those would continue to function even a f t e r emancipation. A m a j o r force w a s the fact that the western Jews, at the time of emancipation, had been relatively f e w in number. T h e y consisted almost entirely of middlemen and capitalists w h o desired assimilation. T h e eastern Jews, on the contrary, were concentrated in large masses, and boasted nationally conscious middle-class and proletarian parties. Moreover, when the western Jews were emancipated, little w a s k n o w n of national rights, and equalization w a s made contingent upon assimilation. In eastern Europe, argued Birnbaum, others, as well as the Jews, were demanding national rights, and emancipation there would result not f r o m assimilation w i t h the ruling nationality but f r o m the national organization of the Jews. 1 1 4 . T H E A T T I T U D E OF T H E ZIONISTS TOWARD N A T I O N A L RIGHTS

T w o Russian intellectuals had thus proposed that the J e w s demand national autonomy, and an A u s t r i a n publicist had carried the idea into his country.

B u t the proposal proved

unacceptable both to the middle-class Zionists and to the radical workingmen.

O n e might conjecture that the Zion-

ists, as Jewish nationalists, would have taken kindly to national rights.

Such, however, w a s not the case, largely

because the Zionist movement f r o m the first assumed a pessimistic and negative attitude to the possibility of healthy group life outside o f Palestine.

a

T h e thinking o f

1 1 For Birnbaum's views on Jewish autonomy, see his Ausgewählte Schriften zur jüdischen Frage (Czernowitz, 1910), vol. i, pp. 147-153, 169-180, 237-250, 260-275, and esp. 181-190. See also vol. ii, pp. 13-33; idem, Um die Ewigkeit (Berlin, 1920), pp. 77-133. T h e best estimates of Birnbaum and his theories are L. Herrmann, Nathan Birnbaum, sein Werk und seine Wandlung (Berlin, 1914), and S. Niger, " D r . Nathan Birnbaum," Literatur und Leben—Di Yiddishe Veit, nos. 7-8 (1914), pp. 245-255, 283-297·

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the early Russian leaders was strongly affected by the pogroms of 1 8 8 1 , and the Russian government manifested no inclination to relax its anti-Jewish policy. The two greatest proponents of Zionism in western Europe, Theodor Herzl and Max Nordau, likewise saw in anti-Semitism a monster from whom one could only flee. The hopelessness of Jewish life in the Diaspora was eloquently expressed by Nordau in his addresses before the Zionist congresses, particularly before the gatherings of 1897 and 1898, 12 and it became the creed of political Zionism. Zionists saw only insecurity, even of life, in Russia, and in the very free West they discerned cultural and spiritual disintegration. This state of mind would prove most uncongenial soil for the sprouting and nourishing of ideas of national rights for the Jews of the European countries. In fact no one among the Zionists broached the question of national autonomy, even for the Russian or Austrian Jews. But in 1900 occurred an incident which evoked, in the manner of a hasty aside, some opinions on the question. On August i, 1900, C. R. Motru, professor at the University of Bucharest and director of the Rumanian periodical Noua Revista Romana, wrote to a number of prominent Europeans requesting their opinions as to what course of action should be followed in connection with the Rumanian Jews. In his reply, Max Nordau suggested that the Jews be accorded civil rights, but that political rights be withheld until anti-Semitism should have declined and the Rumanians should have become ready for them. In developing his ideas Nordau urged that where Jews possessed political rights they should employ them cautiously so as not to arouse hostility. They should not seek public office, and when they did render service to the state it was to be distinctly as Jews. The lack of political 12

See M. Nordau, Zionistische Schriften PP. 39-76.

(Cologne and Leipzig, 1909),

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rights should furthermore not be viewed as disadvantageous, since it was likely to result in a revitalizing of Jewish life, where religion would not be confined, as he expressed it, to the synagogue and the cemetery. He expected, for instance, to see the Jewish organized communities care for all branches of education and culture. When attacked for sponsoring a return to the Ghetto, he manifested no fear of the word. The evils of the Ghetto he saw only in compulsion from without. If the Jew returned of his own accord to order his inner life, Nordau saw nothing but good in it.1* The ideas expressed by Nordau contained the germs of a restricted communal autonomy, but the little criticism which they evoked concerned itself chiefly with the impracticability of drawing a distinction between political and civil rights. However, a certain S. Rosenfeld addressed a letter from Berne, Switzerland, to the editor of the Russian Hebrew daily, Ha-Tsefirah, in which he designated as political the rights enjoyed in Switzerland by the three nationalities; i. e., the rights to manage their own schools, to further the development of their own cultures, and to utilize their own languages in public and state institutions. He pointed to the demand for similar rights by the Czechs in Bohemia, and declared that when a powerful nation desired to assimilate small nationalities, it was just these political rights which were attacked. He even recognized that the existence of a minority nationality depended on such guaranties. But being a Zionist, he could see no possibility for a normal Jewish life in the Diaspora. The Jews could therefore hope to attain such rights only in their own land. A new idea was thus injected into the controversy by Rosen feld who had stumbled upon national rights by con13 Motru's letter, Nordau's reply, and the latter's development of his ideas are in, M. Nordau, " Die politische Gleichberechtigung der Juden," Die Welt, nos. 47-50 (1900).

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fusing his terms. Nahum Sokolow, one of the editors, replied in the manner of a schoolmaster correcting an erring youngster. He differentiated between political and politicalnational rights, and informed his correspondent that Nordau's proposals had not at all been concerned with the latter, which were entirely beyond the realm of possibility. He warned his readers not even " to dream " of national rights in the Diaspora, and irately remarked that " it is impossible to ascribe to Nordau so silly a notion." Another famous Zionist writer, Simon Bern feld, expressed in the same periodical his disagreement with Nordau, and added that Rosenfeld's idea was entirely extraneous, as the Nordau proposals had not dealt with it. He further maintained that the Jews had nowhere reached a stage where they might demand national rights, and concluded that such rights were really not necessary and also not practical. His questions, should we demand that the government proclaim its laws in Hebrew? and should Hebrew be recognized in the courts ? were meant to point to the ridiculousness of the idea of national rights, and conclusively show how primitive the thinking of the Zionists on this question really was. 14 Unlike the critics of Nordau who could discern no national rights in his ideas, Joseph Klausner, also a recognized Zionist leader, did follow those ideas to their logical conclusion. His contribution proved the keenest and the most clearly formulated of all those who touched upon the question. He saw in Nordau's suggestion the aim to make the Jewish community the guardian and promoter of Jewish culture and agreed that the Jews would not necessarily be secluded by the proposed scheme. But Klausner contended that national rights could result only in more violent anti-Semitism, since no European nation would tolerate the existence of a " state within the state." Such rights would thus be impossible. 14

Ha-Tsefirah,

nos. 259, 266, 272 (1900), pp. 955-956, 981-982, 1005.

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But even if impossible, he would support the idea if it were only desirable. A n d Klausner did not find national rights desirable because, in his view, only Palestine could serve as the home of Hebrew culture. Moreover, the striving for Palestine might be endangered by devoting attention to national rights. F o r , if such a program were possible in Russia, many might come to question the very necessity of a Palestinian home." The conviction that Jewish national rights were impossible of attainment, and even undesirable, persisted among the Zionists until the time of the Revolution of 1905. One Zionist element, the proletarian group Renascence, however, did commence to agitate f o r national rights before the Russian upheaval. W e shall now briefly survey the activity of that small group. 5· T H E RENASCENCE GROUP

Of all the proletarian-Zionist elements organized during the formative period, none exercised so profound an influence upon the development of the idea of Jewish national rights, and indeed upon the entire Zionist-socialist movement, as did the group Renascence. It was organized at Kiev by a few Zionist youths who had been members of a non-partisan club of Jewish students. When the club came under the influence of the Bund, the more nationally inclined members held a consultation in the spring of 1903 and decided to call a conference of worker-Zionist sympathizers in order to consider the questions of Zionist-socialist program and tactics. The 15

Ha-Dor (1901), no. 3, pp. 5-8; no. 4, pp. 1-2; no. 7, pp. 1-3. Klausner was aware that Dubnow had already proposed that the Jews demand full civil, political and national emancipation, and that Nordau differed only in his readiness to dispense with political rights. He failed, however, to discern another fundamental difference; i. e., Dubnow would integrate the national rights of a minority with the general political machinery of the state, whereas no such notion was implied in Nordau's writing.

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conference met at Kiev in the fall of 1903 and, under the leadership of Zilberfarb, Rosen and Shtiff, it was decided to concentrate all attention upon Jewish national work in Russia and to issue a journal in Russian and Yiddish in order to propagate the novel views. Thus was born that small but active group, with a total membership of no more than ten but with a determination and enthusiasm which more than compensated for the meager following. The center remained at Kiev, but the small band was very fortunate in its foreign representative, Zilberfarb, an able and wide-awake medical student at Berlin, who assumed responsibility for the issuance of the first number of the journal, and who during 1904 carried on an extensive propaganda among the Jewish students in the German and Swiss universities. He dreaded, however, the responsibility of facing the revolutionary world in print. Having heard that Zhitlowsky, who was famed as one of the founders of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, had in a lecture at Zurich expressed ideas similar to those held by himself and his friends, he at once sought to secure Zhitlowsky's leadership for the group. The pioneer national socialist was approached in the spring of 1904, and though he agreed with most of the ideas of the young enthusiasts, he declared that he would never accept territorialism. That ideal he termed an idle dream capable only of diverting the energies of the workers from their real revolutionary aims and goals. The unceasing effort to persuade Zhitlowsky was continued, but no more than a partial victory could be achieved. Territorialism still prevented the leader from joining the group, but he promised, in the fall of 1904, to become a "permanent collaborator " in issuing the journal. 18 The journal, also called Renascence (Vo2rozhdeniye), i« Cf.

Roiler

Zamelbuch,

Pinkos,

op. cit., vol. i, pp. 72-77, 1 1 3 - 1 2 5 ;

op. cit., pp. 1 5 1 - 1 5 8 , 278.

Zhitlowsky

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began to appear in March, 1904, and it was this publication together with a tireless propagandizing of the worker-Zionist groups that won for the numerically insignificant band an important place in the little world of proletarian Zionism. It was evidently intended for the intellectuals, and not a f e w of those must have found it trying to wade through the cumbersome elaboration of relatively simple ideas and the heavy language made more difficult by needlessly abstract terminology and by endless repetition. The group's viewpoint, however, was presented, and that relating to national autonomy rather extensively, in chapters written by M. Zilberfarb. 1 7 T h e Renascence theorists maintained that the individual was a social being expressing himself in association with others. T h e concept of individual rights and duties was therefore an abstraction, and, unless group action were assured for the enjoyment and perpetuation of the stipulated liberties, even human and civil rights would prove mere fictions. Austria-Hungary was cited as an object lesson where the absence of recognized autonomous institutions for each group made possible the oppression of the minor nationalities, despite the constitutional guaranties of civil and political equality and despite even the express provision that all nationalities were equally privileged to preserve and develop their cultures and languages. Russia, no less heterogeneous than the Dual Monarchy, must, therefore, if it would be rid of national oppression and national strife, assure each nationality the status of a juridical unit, and it must further create state organs to afford expression to the national " united will " of each group. See Roitcr Pinkos, of>. ext., vol. i, p. 127, note. T h e first two numbers of the journal appeared in 1904, but the group's system of national socialism and autonomy w a s most thoroughly developed in the third number, w h i c h appeared in December, 1905. T h e v i e w s there expressed, however, w e r e propagated orally prior to the Russian Revolution; they are t h e r e f o r e included in this chapter. 17

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The sphere of national activity must furthermore not be confined to national-cultural autonomy. For, argued the Renascence, while it was true that national characteristics were most clearly marked in cultural life, their significance could not be ignored in other phases of a group's activity. Each nationality's parliament, or seym, must be entrusted with the regulation of all peculiarly national affairs, and its jurisdiction was to embrace all persons, resident within the bounds of the state, who chose to identify themselves with the national group. The Renascence agitators sought also to synthesize the Zionist aim, i. e., a territorial solution of the Jewish problem, with the revolutionary struggle of the Jewish masses for their proletarian and national interests in those lands " where they could constitute a political power." But the synthesis was achieved by throwing the entire territorial problem into the background. A Jewish homeland was indeed declared indispensable, but the agitators were particularly careful to point out that a national territory could not be achieved by an unorganized and nationally indifferent people. The Jews must first be induced to engage in a struggle for national rights in order to increase and strengthen the political and cultural powers of the nationality and to develop national institutions. The immediate aim was, therefore, national autonomy in Russia; " territorialism [would] be realized whenever and wherever the social and national conditions [would] become ripe." The institutions of national autonomy, which alone could unite the energies of the Jewish population, would be in a position to undertake the acquisition and settlement of a territory, and thus to contribute to the final, territorial solution of the Jewish question.18 18 Vozrozhdcniye (St. Petersburg, 1905), pp. 47-56. For a critical review and summary of the contents of the journal, see Dos Yiddishe Folk, no. 2 (1906), pp. 17-18.

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6. T H E BUND AND N A T I O N A L RIGHTS

The early leaders of the Bund were apprehensive of and even hostile to Jewish nationalism. The first two conventions of the party, held in September, 1897 and September, 1898, dealt with practical matters affecting an underground revolutionary body. Only a separate organization was declared necessary because the Jewish proletariat had special interests and needs. It must strive to remove civil inequality and must provide itself with literature in Yiddish—its language. The Russian proletariat, concerned with political and economic matters touching all peoples, would have neither the necessary knowledge of Jewish needs, nor the practical means of furthering them. The national question was thus ignored, and, although the Bund press began at about this time to designate the Jews a " nation," no special demands other than civil emancipation were presented. There was not even a claim for the recognition of the Yiddish dialect. For the latter had been " unwillingly " adopted as the medium of agitation. Few of the early agitators knew the vernacular well, and a feeling still persisted among the leaders that the language problem would prove a temporary matter. They hoped that the Jewish workers would ultimately learn Russian, and that the need for the " Jargon " would disappear. 19 In March, 1899, however, the Bund leadership was obliged to declare itself on the extensive national claims of Zhitlowsky. The latter submitted a treatise entitled " Zionism or Socialism," and the official Bund organ felt called upon to publish it, albeit with a qualifying remark that " as 19 Cf. 25 Yor—1897-1922, op. cit., pp. 7, 29-34; Di Arbeiter Shtimme, no. 11 (1898), pp. 1-8; Der Yid. Arbeiter, no. 6 (1899), pp. 28-30 et seq.; Der Bialystoker Arbeiter, no. 1 (1899), pp. 1-5; Medem, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 231-232; vol. ii, p. 47.

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a basis o f discussion this article is not superfluous. . . . " T h e burden o f the article was the incompatibility o f Zionism and socialism, but the writer postulated a decidedly nationalistic course o f action f o r Jewish socialists.

Much sym-

pathy might have been evoked for the view that socialism did not seek to eliminate all national peculiarities, but rather, by removing restrictions

and irritations, to permit each

people to develop unhampered.

But Zhitlowsky went on to

declare that the Yiddish language was as " holy " to J e w i s h workers as Russian or German was to the proletarians o f those nationalities; that J e w i s h national literature would some day equal the finest o f European literature.

H e proph-

esied that the concept " nation " would no longer be identified with the political state, but with culture and education, and that the J e w s would come to possess their own schools, including

universities.

Jewish

socialists

must,

therefore

develop the Yiddish language and literature and spread Jewish education and enlightenment among the masses, and they must, furthermore, unify the Jewish proletarians o f all lands by founding " an international Jewish workers secretariat."

Such views went beyond orthodox socialist opinion

in Russia, and the readers were warned that the editors did not fully share the author's optimism.

A n editorial note

ran: W e vigorously maintain the principle, that the Jewish, like all other nations, should possess equal political, economic and national rights. W e even fight for it. But whether the Jewish tongue, the " Jargon," will so develop, that it will become a cultural language; whether . . . in time a special Jewish literature and science, a special Jewish culture will develop; whether learning in Yiddish will stand on so high a plane, that the Jews will be able to possess, in the future, universities and other schools; whether it is necessary to unite the Jewish workers of various countries with entirely differing political conditions—all

THE JEWS

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these are questions which it is difficult at present to answer definitely." The determination to avoid or postpone consideration of the national question was, however, quickly shaken. The tone of the official organ of the party changed abruptly when, toward the close of 1899, the Austrian Social Democratic Congress at Brünn assumed a favorable attitude toward nationalism. The Brünn deliberations and decisions were presented in detail and with evident approval, and the commentator in the Bund periodical was particularly pleased with the view that nationality was not conditioned by the possession of a territory. Therefore, he argued not only that " a people which possesses a land may consider itself a nation and may demand national rights," but that the Jews too might aspire to such a status. And in phrases significantly reminiscent of those employed by Zhitlowsky, we learn that the standard would no longer be " the nation is its land," but rather " the nation is its culture." In fact the Bund editors evinced a strong desire to grapple with the national problem. We read: We Jewish workers in Russia and Poland have a special interest to see how our brothers, the Austrian workers, seek an answer to the national question. We also have a national question . . . and we must also provide an answer to our national question. What our answer will be—we do not as yet know. But an answer there must be and the sooner the better! . . , 21 In the midst of this vacillation on the national question, the third convention of the Bund met at Kovno in December, 1899. Some fifteen members participated and the debates lasted three days. The national question was here f o r the 20 Der Yid. Arbeiter, no. 6 (1899), pp. 3-14. peared under the pseudonym " Ben Ehud." 21 Ibid., no. 8 (1899), pp. 23-27.

Zhitlowsky's article ap-

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first time posed for consideration; point six on the agenda read, " the national point in our program and our special demands as Jews " ; it proved the chief problem before the convention. Joseph Mil, better known as " J o h n " and one of the founders of the Bund, was the stoutest champion of " equal national rights," without which, he maintained, civil rights too would be endangered. He cited Germany as an instance where the requirement that only German be spoken at public meetings deprived the Polish proletarian, who knew only his own language, of the right of assembly which theoretically obtained for all. The Russian Jewish proletariat who knew only Yiddish, he warned, would find freedom of assembly only " a pretty phrase " unless its language enjoyed equal rights with the Russian tongue. Mil further argued that the conditions which had called the Bund into being might continue to render it indispensable for a long time. Provision must therefore be made for the cultural and national needs of the Jewish workingmen. The majority of the convention opposed Mil's views. Some expressed " great doubt whether such [national] emancipation for Jews would ever possess [even] in the future a permanent basis." And others argued that Russian Social Democrats " must avoid such demands, which might distract the attention of the proletariat from its class interests to the benefit of its national interests." The destruction of absolutism and the attainment of political freedom constituted for the time being " closer interests " which claimed the undivided attention of the whole Russian proletariat irrespective of nationality. New national demands would result only in a dissipation of the meager strength of the revolutionaries. Finally the long debates were terminated and a resolution was voted. It read:

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Among its political demands the Bund presents only civil emancipation and not national. But in order to give our comrades an opportunity to express their opinions on the national question a section is to be opened in the Yiddisher Arbeiter under the caption " Discussion," where the national question will be debated on the responsibility of each author.22 T h e Bund organ immediately invited its readers to participate in a free discussion of the national question, and in 1901 three contributions were published. The first was written by a well-read and competent person who was equally at home in Hebrew, German and Russian, knew M a r x and Engels, wielded a sharp satirical pen and documented his remarks, a far from usual practice in the Bund publications of his time. He surmised that the indecision of the partyleadership was due to the apprehension lest national demands and socialism prove irreconcilable. T o meet this objection, he therefore quoted from M a r x and Engels, from the senior Liebknecht and from Kautsky, to the effect that national hatred would be eliminated by socialism; but that national differences and the nations proper would not cease to exist. The great socialist leaders sought unity and cooperation among nations, not their complete amalgamation. Just as a person who joins a society does not cease to be an individual, so also in the future society of nations, each nationality would still preserve its own interests in its culture, language and literature. Internationalism was thus not the converse of nationalism but its complement. Neither, thought the writer, was the fear of distracting attention from proletarian 22 Ibid., no. 9 (1900), pp. 5-7. Mil is referred to as Comrade A in the illegally published report. For his identity, see Roiter Pinkos, op. cit., vol. i, pp. S3, 60. Although the need for Jewish national rights was denied, the convention voted that " the existence of the Bund is necessary for the development of the class-consciousness of the Jewish proletariat"

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class objectives justified. Indeed, he was certain that national demands would not only not hinder the destruction of tsarism, but would actually serve as a splendid means of attack. For, the more the demands against absolutism, the greater the disaffection and the number of disaffected, and the greater the power against the enemy. The conclusion of the article contained a reproach for the indifference to nationalism in the past, and a hope for wiser counsels in the future. Socialists, complained the writer, were ready to consider all questions, whether imperialism in China or the war in South Africa; " but the ' Jewish question ' is still a ' foster child' to the world proletariat, and entirely a superfluous thing to the Jewish proletariat itself." Blood accusations, the smashing of windows, the looting of stores of poor Jews, pogroms, attracted the attention even of the German parliament, he said, but the Jewish socialists still saw no need for special Jewish demands. He hoped, however, that the Jewish proletariat would soon awaken, demand national rights, " and emancipate the entire oppressed Jewish people." His final slogan was characteristic of his decidedly nationalistic bent of mind. " Long live the Jewish proletariat, the vanguard of the Jewish nationality, the true redeemer, the real emancipator from its burdensome Galuth."

Another contributor dealt chiefly with the question whether it was " practical" to present national demands. His conclusion was that " so long as we are a nation, we must demand national rights; we have no other alternative; we must be privileged equally with all nations." For, if all the nationalities in Russia, anticipating a constitution, demanded autonomy, the Jews must not stand aloof. When Russia was nationally decentralized, he asked, to whom would the Jews belong? Certainly not to the local nations, many of whom were culturally inferior to the Jews. They

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could likewise not pose as Russians, for then the native peoples would regard them as Russifiers and enemies. The only anti-nationalist contribution to the " Discussion " came from an opponent of the Bund, and the editors felt constrained to take exception at least to some of his opinions. A Galician-Jewish socialist, apparently a member of the Polish Socialist Party, he denied that the Jews were a nationality or could ever become one, and therefore could not and should not demand national rights. He maintained that even the eastern Jews lacked the indispensable element in nationality, a distinctive language, " because the Jargon which they speak is no more than a makeshift which serves very badly to satisfy cultural needs." T o be sure, the Jews whom he knew were not as yet Poles, but he could discern " no peculiar national interests and needs whatever," the claim for Jewish civil and political emancipation being not a national but a " self-evident democratic demand." The writer did not stop with the denial of Jewish nationality. He took the next logical step and denied the very right of the Bund to a separate existence. He looked forward to a time when Jews and non-Jews would form one organization and " the intellectually advanced Jewish comrades would then be able to affect by means of agitation the indifferent population of city and country, to enlighten and organize it . . ." and, of course, to bring it into the socialist fold. He even accused the Bund of Russifying the Jewish proletariat in Poland. Such damaging opinions could not be allowed to go unchallenged, and the editors appended a " reply " to the article. The anti-nationalist was reminded that the Bund functioned not only in Poland but also in Lithuania and in south Russia, and therefore must and did remain neutral as to which non-Jewish language the workers should acquire. T h e Jewish socialists were concerned neither with Russification nor with Polonization and em-

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ployed the Yiddish language as a means of propaganda " because that is the only language which the majority of J e w i s h workers understands." " T h e B u n d , " the editors insisted, " is first and foremost the party of the J e w i s h proletariat . . . and its duty is therefore primarily to protect the interests of the broad mass of J e w i s h workers, and since this mass . . . speaks and reads only Yiddish, the Bund must apply its entire strength to perfect and to develop this very language." 28 T h e press discussion and the editorial comment revealed a significant growth of national sentiment within the Bund. But when the fourth convention assembled at Bialystok in the latter part of M a y , 1 9 0 1 , the difference of opinion concerning J e w i s h autonomy was still so great that no more than an unsatisfactory compromise could be achieved. The question w a s hotly debated at the sessions. N o agreement could be reached, and the leaders decided to straddle the issue. T h e resolution designated the J e w s a nationality, but declared that f o r practical reasons no autonomy was as yet demanded. It read: The convention holds that a state like Russia, which consists of many differing nations [nationalities] must in the future be converted into a federation of nations [nationalities] and that each of these will be entirely autonomous irrespective of the territory in which it might live. The convention holds that the concept of nationality should 2 1 be applied also to the Jewish people. Finding however, that . . . it is yet too early to present the demand of national autonomy for Jews, the convention holds that for the present it is advisable to fight only against all exceptional laws against Jews, to . . . protest against every oppression of the Jewish nation, 23 Der Yid. Arbeiter, no. 8 (1899), p. 44; no. 11 (1901), pp. 87-100; no. 12 (1901), pp. 53-60. 24

A B.fundist?], Di Geschichte fun Yiddishcn Arbcitcr-Bimd 1906), p. 26, used the word " m a y . "

(Yilna,

8o

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but at the same time to guard against the inflation of national consciousness because that can only dim class consciousness and may lead to chauvinism." The small but persistent nationalist element in the Bund had thus won an important concession. The J e w s were a nationality. But the decision to postpone, for the time being, the positive demand for autonomy, especially when the same convention insisted on the right of the Jewish proletariat to an autonomous socialist organization, must have proved irksome to members of the Bund as it was difficult to defend before the outside world. Moreover, national rights began to be widely discussed as one of the " burning questions of the day " in Jewish socialist circles within Russia, and prominent party men, those living abroad particularly, insisted on raising the issue. Early in 1903, a conference 28 of the most important Bund leaders who were then living outside of Russia declared in favor of national autonomy and delegated Vladimir Medem, a strong advocate of national rights, to present a report on the subject to the approaching party assembly. When, therefore, the fifth convention of the Bund met at Zurich in June, 1903, the perennial problem reappeared and figured prominently on the agenda and at the convention. T h e official report, however, failed to disclose this fact. 25 Der Ytd. Arbeiter, no. 12 (1901), pp. 97-102; Roiter Pinkos, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 54-60. The " extreme " nationalist viewpoint was championed at this convention by Michal Goldman (better known as " Lieber") of Lodz. He favored the immediate formulation of a demand for national autonomy. 26

The conference was called by the Foreign Committee of the Bund which had been organized in 1899-1900. The Committee consisted of prominent Bund leaders living abroad; its function was to aid the parent body with money, books, etc. The champions of national rights, Mil, " Lieber," and Medem, were among the ten men who attended the conference. See Medem, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 1 1 - 1 7 , 37-40; Roiter Pinkas, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 77-78.

THE

BEGINNINGS

OF

THE

MOVEMENT

8l

Medem's address before the convention eloquently urged favorable action on the mooted question. But the discussion to which it gave rise quickly revealed an irreconcilable difference of opinion. " Estimating at a glance," Medem tells us, " it can be said that the proponents and opponents of the national program were equally divided at that convention." It was therefore clear that no authoritative resolution could be adopted. Fearing, however, that the failure to reach a decision on so important an issue might create a bad impression, the Central Committee proposed to remove the question from the agenda, and the delegates acquiesced. It was even agreed to expunge the debates from the protocols and not to divulge in the official report that the question had appeared at all before the assembled representatives of the party. 27 Thus the nationalist element had grown numerous enough to divide the Bund. It could be neither categorically pushed aside as at the third convention nor, as at the fourth, conciliated with a formula recognizing the Jews as a nationality. That it was not as yet strong enough to carry its motions simply meant that the matter must wait until the subsequent gathering. Judging by the progress made by the sponsors of national autonomy since the third convention, victory could reasonably be anticipated at the sixth. The prospects of victory were further enhanced by the fact that during this period Bund intellectuals succeeded in synthesizing the political radicalism and socialism of the Jewish organization with the need for national rights. And the man who was particularly responsible for this achievement was Vladimir Medem. Medem ( 1 8 7 9 - 1 9 2 3 ) was an extremely popular figure in the Bund, despite the fact that for many years he knew no Yiddish and was not close to the Jewish workers. He was a clear thinker and brilliant speaker, and his memoirs reveal a 27

Medem, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 17-20.

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charming personality devoid of pettiness or malice.28 Moreover, the man was a sensation in Bund circles. The son of a thoroughly assimilated army doctor at Minsk, he was baptized at birth and grew up entirely unaffected by any Jewish influence. The entire family was later converted to Christianity, and among the friends of his father and brothers were government officials and army officers. A brilliant future seemed assured for Medem. But he chose the outlaw existence of a revolutionist, and threw in his lot with Jewish workers. Medem first became conscious of a Jewish national question in 1901 when he witnessed in Switzerland severe attacks upon his party both by Lenin's " Iskra Group " and by the Zionists. He was soon convinced that an unambiguous position on the national question was imperative; that the compromise resolution adopted by the fourth convention was inadequate. Setting himself the task of clarifying the issue, the Bund leader thought and read assiduously, but he found the greatest difficulty in posing the question. The concrete answer, national-cultural autonomy, was relatively simple. The problem was to express the Jewish need for self-government in socialistic terms, and to harmonize that need with the general socialist doctrine. However, by the summer of 1903 he was able to address the Bund convention on the subject, and before the revolutionary year 1905 had arrived, Medem had definitely formulated his theory of " Neutralism." 29 28 When suffering untold hardships in Russian prisons during the war, he could coolly attribute his troubles to the fact that the war strain was too much for the creaking administrative machinery of Russia. See Medem, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 7-8, 11-12, 112-124, 171-178, 191-197 et seq., 232-233. For brief estimates of his life and influence, see Arbeter-Luach (Warsaw, 1924), pp. 117-141. 28

Cf. Medem, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 225-226, 296-298, 333-335; vol. ii, pp. 54-55In 1906, after the Bund had committed itself to national-cultural

THE

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OF THE

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83

Medem postulated the premise that capitalist development had created nationalism and that trade rivalry was the mother of national strife. But assimilation too, particularly in the case of the Jews, had its origin in the same desire for gain among the bourgeoisie. Socialists would therefore countenance neither nationalism nor assimilation. But the Bund theorist discerned a peculiar phase of the national question which was of vital concern to the proletariat, and which he therefore sought to incorporate into socialist ideology. There were two aspects of nationalism. One was concerned with the active promotion and perfection of national culture or with its active annihilation (assimilation), and the other related to national domination and oppression. T o the social democrat national culture or national spirit was no more than general culture colored by the language, psychology and general characteristics of a particular group. The socialist was concerned neither with perpetuating the peculiar coloring nor with its destruction, nor even with the creation of one cosmopolitan outlook. I f history decreed that the Jews must assimilate with other peoples, " w e , . . will not expend any energies either to hinder this process, or to support it. W e do not interfere; we are neutral." I f , on the contrary, the Jews were destined by historical evolution to develop a flourishing culture, Medem would strive neither to accelerate nor to retard the process.80 National oppression, however, must under no circumstances be tolerated because it pressed most heavily upon autonomy, Medem's articles on the national question were issued in a special brochure in Russian and Yiddish, under the title, Di Natsionale Frage un di Sotsial-demokratie. 8 0 Medem would, of course, vigorously combat the Jewish nationalists; but not because he opposed national culture. " We are not opposed to the national character of culture; we are opposed to national politics," he wrote.

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the working class. The employment of a strange language by governmental institutions would cut the worker off from all political life, as non-recognition of his mother tongue and interference with the development of his national literature would smother his cultural life. National oppression, also, by creating a feeling of contempt for the oppressed and a slave psychology among the members of the submerged nationality, would constitute " a terrible blow to the development of a true class-psychology of the conscious proletariat." The greatest defect of national domination, thought Medem, lay in the fact that it engendered resistance which in turn tended to unify the various classes within the nationality, destroying class-consciousness and rendering a classstruggle impossible. Socialists must therefore bend every effort to remove all forms of national compulsion whether direct or indirect, and to allow the historical process, which decides what nations are to survive, to function freely. True, this need not become the main function of a socialist party, but it should occupy the same position as other " important questions. Not more, but also not less." In formulating a policy that would preclude national oppression, Medem did not hesitate to present broad demands. He denied that the repeal of exceptional laws would remove the evil. The guaranty of the right to secure an education in the mother tongue, which the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party was ready to concede, would likewise not suffice because " with language alone one cannot be satisfied," and because also the principle of territorial autonomy was faulty. For, a nationality consisted of " the totality of all individuals, who belong to a certain historic-cultural group, independent of the fact that they live in different territories." The transfer of education to the local government would thus not solve the problem, since within the emancipated territorial entities there would still remain oppressed nationalities.

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T h e cultural functions must be decentralized, not on a territorial, but on a personal-national basis. Each nationality must set up its own institutions and autonomously direct its cultural life. " In order to conduct its cultural affairs—and only for that purpose—each nationality constitutes a juridically collective unity. T h e necessary organs . . . [democratically chosen] . . . take over from the state its control over cultural affairs. . . ." Cultural needs common to the entire country and beyond the means of an individual nationality " are satisfied through a federative league of national diets." T h e competence of the national institutions would terminate with the distinctive cultural interests of the group. In all other political and social spheres the national bodies would cease to function, and the individuals would become citizens of territorial administrative units irrespective of their national affiliation.* 1 O u r survey of the early development of non-Zionist Jewish nationalism has revealed that the bare beginnings of a movement were in evidence before the summer of 1904. A few intellectuals evolved theories and published essays, and some agitation developed among the Russian-Jewish revolutionaries, particularly among the members of the Bund. T h e mass of Jewish workers and the multitude of petty tradesmen were completely unaware of the meaning of or need f o r national rights. A n d the majority of the intellectuals and the wealthy either ignored the new demand or opposed it. It was the popular activity of the years 19041907 which brought the question of national autonomy to the attention of eastern Jewry and made it a mass movement. 3 1 V . Medem, Di Natsionalc 1906), pp. 6-40, 46-59, 62.

Frage

un di Sotsial-dcmokratie

(Vilna,

CHAPTER

III

T H E G R O W T H OF A G I T A T I O N D U R I N G T H E P E R I O D OF T H E RUSSIAN I.

REVOLUTION

(1904-1907)

T H E RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

AND T H E

JEWS

T H E Russian autocracy began to totter when on the heels of disastrous defeats suffered in the war with Japan followed the assassination of Plehve in July, 1904. In September of the same year, the liberal governor-general of Vilna, Prince Svyatopolk-Mirski, was appointed Minister of the Interior and he at once appealed for " mutual t r u s t " between government and people. The rigid censorship of the press was relaxed. Peaceful petitions for reform were encouraged. A congress of zemstvo leaders unanimously urged the calling of a national assembly, and the proposal was re-echoed at numerous banquets held all over Russia by the professional classes. The " springtime " of the Russian Revolution was in full bloom. The tsar and the bureaucracy, however, thwarted every effort at peaceful reform. Moreover, a procession in St. Petersburg of striking workmen who sought to present a petition to the emperor was fired upon by the troops and dispersed. This unprovoked massacre of peaceful petitioners on " Bloody Sunday," January 22, 1905, and the resignation of Mirski aroused all Russia. Workers readily listened to revolutionary propagandists and an epidemic of strikes ensued. Attacks upon officials increased. The universities had to be closed down because of student riots. Peasants set fire to the houses of landowners, carried off cattle and corn, and clamored for land. Even the middleclasses who had until then been content to register their dis86

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87

approval of autocratic government by means of petitions, resolutions and similar mild measures were infected with the revolutionary spirit. Radical political unions of doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc., sprang up in St. Petersburg, and with lightning rapidity the movement spread to the provinces. In May, 1905, a federation of these societies was effected under the presidency of P. Milyukov, and this League of Unions was destined to play a significant role in the days of the general strike, along with the Ail-Russian Peasants Union, formed in Moscow in August, 1905, and of the St. Petersburg Council of Workmen's Delegates. The general strike of October, 1905, compelled the tsar to yield to the popular clamor for reform. Civil liberty was proclaimed, and a Duma, or national parliament, with control over legislation was assured. But the autocracy was able to rally during 1906. Socialist armed uprisings in Moscow and in other cities in December, 1905, proved the turning point. The middle-classes hoped to complete the revolution peacefully and constitutionally through the projected Duma, and they particularly feared the violent methods and economic objectives of the workmen. The opponents of the government failed to cooperate; the armed uprising was suppressed; the " Black Hundreds " organized pogroms against Jews and radicals. The revolution had spent itself, and from the beginning of 1906 the government was master of the situation. A constitution, known as the Fundamental Laws, was promulgated on May 6, 1906, and four days later the first Duma met. But irreconcilable differences arose between the latter and the tsar's ministers, particularly on the questions of land reform and parliamentary government, and in July, 1906, the first Russian parliament was dissolved. Stolypin, the new Premier, actively interfered with the elections to the second Duma but his efforts were in vain. The majority

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of the new body likewise opposed the autocracy, and after a troubled existence of a little more than three months the second Duma too was dissolved. Moreover along with the decree of dissolution on June 16, 1907, and in contradiction to the provisions of the constitution, the electoral law was so altered as to assure control of the third Duma by the government forces. B y June, 1907, therefore, the reactionary elements had triumphed, and a conservative Duma remained as a legacy of the first attempt to destroy Russian absolutism. The J e w s reacted to the developments of the first Russian revolution in much the same manner as did the other peoples and groups in Russia. During the regime of Mirsky, and later, innumerable Jewish petitions, telegrams and deputations poured into the Russian capital. Towns and cities pleaded for rights; combined petitions of important Jewish communities, a deputation of Siberian Jews, a document bearing thousands of signatures, all urged emancipation; societies passed resolutions; conferences formulated demands for full Jewish equality. When the peaceful attempts at reform had failed, the Jews, like their Russian compatriots, resorted to more radical measures. Soon after " Bloody S u n d a y " middle-class leaders organized a non-partisan League for the Attainment of Equal Rights for the Jewish People in Russia which joined and cooperated with the League of Unions, called upon Jewish aldermen in the municipal Dumas to resign their posts and carried on a vigorous propaganda for Jewish rights. The proletarian groups, particularly the Bund, which boasted at this time a membership of over 30,000 workers 1 and an 1 The Encyclopedie socialiste, syndicate el cooperative (Paris, 1913), vol. v, pp. 377, 385-386, 397, credits the Bund with a membership of forty to fifty thousand in 1906-1907; the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party with about 150,000 members; the Polish Socialist Party with 23,000.

THE PERIOD OF THE RUSSIAN

REVOLUTION

89

income of some 3,000 rubles a month, participated in the revolutionary activities of the non-Jewish socialists. Demonstrations were staged, strikes were organized and preparations were made even for an armed uprising. But the pogroms and the disheartening contest with the " Black Hundreds " shattered the strength of the Jewish revolutionaries, so that by the close of 1907 the Bund was but a shadow of its former self. Like all revolutionary organizations, the Jewish proletarian parties were once again reduced by the triumphant counter-revolution to small and ineffective underground bands of outlaws. The Duma, too, disappointed Jewish aspirations as it failed to meet the expectations of the general liberal movement. The elections to the first Duma were boycotted by the Jewish socialist factions, but considerable enthusiasm was aroused among the Jewish masses by the middle-class elements which worked under the general direction and encouragement of the League for the Attainment of Equal Rights. Jewish candidates campaigned on platforms demanding full civil, political and national equality, and twelve men, five of them Zionists, were elected to the Duma. But Jewish rights were obscured in the first Duma by the pogrom question, and the Russian parliament was dissolved before any decisive action on the Jewish question could be taken. The active participation of the socialists in the elections to the second Duma succeeded only in dividing the Jewish vote, and contributed to the general defeat of the Jewish candidates. Only a few Jews were elected, and those were of less renown than the Jewish members of the first Duma. A n abortive attempt was again made to secure Jewish emancipation, but the second Duma was dispersed as easily as the first.2 2 References to Jewish petitions, to the election campaigns, and to other Jewish activities are too numerous to cite. See f o r example ( M S . )

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Of particular significance from the standpoint of this study, however, was the development of Jewish national consciousness during the period of the Russian Revolution. The J e w s were strongly affected by the clamor of Poles, Finns and other submerged peoples for national recognition. The old cry for civil and political equality was therefore amplified to include national rights. Nor was the demand voiccd merely by a handful of intellectuals, as had been the case previously. The interest of the masses was aroused and national autonomy became the question of the day. It figured prominently at innumerable meetings, conferences and conventions, and the Jewish press kept the issue before the public by reporting every new development and by debating the merits of the new claim. This chapter will reveal that during the three years commencing with the summer of 1904, the question of national rights commanded the attention of every organized element among Russia's Jews. It was at this time that an effort was made to unify Russian J e w r y in the League for the Attainment of Equal Rights. The latter long grappled with the question of national rights, and when the issue could no longer be compromised, several distinct middle-class groups appeared, and each professed to favor national rights. During these years, too, the Bund definitely committed itself to national-cultural autonomy. And during the same period the three proletarian-Zionist parties took shape, and each declared itself on the all-important question. Minutes of Convention of the League for the Attainment of Equal Rights for the Jewish People in Russia, Nov. 22-25, 190S; Ha-Zeman ( m o n t h l y ) , nos. 1-3 (1905), PP- 156-157. 3 " - 3 i 4 , 473*474, 478-480; Ha-Zeman ( d a i l y ) , nos. 56, 62, 64, 74 (1905) ; Der Freind, nos. 12, 3543, 48, 61-64 (1905) ; Dos Yiddishe Folk, nos. 28-29 (1906) ; nos. 1-9, 25 ( 1 9 0 7 ) ; Di Hofnung, nos. 12, 17-27 ( 1 9 0 7 ) ; Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. ii, h e f t 2, pp. 236-244, 369-373, 400-404 et seq.; vol. iii, pp. 70-73, 226-228; Medem, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 108-116 et seq., 216-220.

THE PERIOD OF THE RUSSIAN

REVOLUTION

A n account of the Russian developments will not exhaust the evidences of Jewish national agitation during the years of the Russian Revolution. It will be necessary also to trace the growth of the movement for Jewish national rights in Austria. Finally, we shall have to sketch briefly the beginnings of national activity among the J e w s of Turkey and of the United States. 2 . T H E A C T I V I T I E S O F T H E M I D D L E CLASSES

(a) The League for the Attainment of Equal Rights for the Jewish People in Russia Early in 1905 the St. Petersburg Jewish notables who had previously sought, in a self-appointed manner, to speak in the name of the Jews, began to organize a society in order to render more effective their struggle for equal rights. During the closing days of March, 1905, representative leaders of thirty-two towns met illegally in convention at Vilna and founded the non-partisan League for the Attainment of Equal Rights f o r the Jewish People in Russia. The delegates consisted mainly of liberals and Zionists, but the leadership was assumed by the prominent J e w s of the Russian capital, headed by Μ. M. Vinaver, the Louis Marshall of Russia, and G. B. Sliosberg. Thus in choosing a central committee of twenty-two, it was decided to divide the representation equally between residents of the capital and of the " province," or the rest of the country. The fact that St. Petersburg was also designated as the seat of the central committee which spoke and acted in the name of the League between meetings or conventions, served further to enhance the influence of the non-nationalist leaders. Vinaver and his friends were allowed to have their way in matters of organization. But when a program came to be formulated they encountered violent opposition. All agreed, to be sure, that every restrictive law, every special

THE JEWS

AND MINORITY

RIGHTS

tax placed upon the Jews must be removed. The Jews must also be accorded the right to participate in the people's parliament. But at the very time of the League's first convention, the Zionists and nationalists commenced an agitation for national rights. In March, 1905, several hundred Vilna men expressed disapproval of a petition which had been signed by over seven thousand Jews and which, in addition to a plea for full equal rights, declared that " together with the other nationalities in Russia we will order our life, we will develop our energies for the benefit of the state and of humanity." The Vilna nationalists insisted on having the national question clearly presented and sought to add to the resolution: " As a cultural nationality, we demand those rights of a conscious cultural nationality which should be granted to all the nationalities that compose the body of the Russian state." Soon after the incident of the petition, a conference of Jewish intellectuals met (probably in Vilna) and demanded, in addition to civil and political equality, " freedom of national-cultural selfdetermination in all its aspects, and especially a broad autonomy of the communities, freedom of language and of instruction in the schools. . . ." At Yekaterinoslav, too, a conference of parents and pedagogues claimed the right for each nationality to maintain schools in its own language on a basis of equality with the general Russian schools. And the Jewish press, particularly Dubnow's Voskhod and the Zionist Ha-Zeman, proclaimed the need for national rights.' This rising national agitation could not be ignored by the League leadership, nor could the latter fail to reckon with the strong nationalist element within the organization. The League's program therefore declared in favor of the " civil, political and national rights of the Jewish people in 8 See Ha-Zeman (monthly), no. 3 (1905), pp. 473-474; (daily), nos. 62-84 (1905)·

Ha-Zeman

THE

PERIOD

OF THE

RUSSIAN

REVOLUTION

Russia " ; of " the freedom of national-cultural self-determination in all its manifestations " ; and, more specifically, of " a comprehensive Kehilla^&utonomy [communal self-government], freedom of language and of school education"/ The anti-nationalist leaders of the League were thus committed to national rights. When the second convention met at St. Petersburg November 22-25, I 9°5> there was every indication that the League had been well received by Russian Jewry. In the eight months of its existence, the membership has grown to nearly 5,000, and close relations with some 160 local bodies assured it further strength. The central committee, furthermore, had labored diligently to further Jewish interests. The nationalists, however, were not satisfied because the League leaders had done practically nothing to elaborate the content or to clarify the meaning of " national rights," nor had they manifested a willingness to present the issue before Russian public opinion. Vinaver, who again headed the convention, sought to avoid the national question. He spoke of the pogroms that had just taken place, of uncertainty for the future and of the crying need for absolute unity of Russian Jewry in order to secure equal rights and to guard against future attacks. The conferees showed some willingness to be led and discussed the pogroms at considerable length. But the delegates proved unable to formulate a definite course of action even in this matter. The inevitable inquiry as to the aims and objectives of the League could not be sidetracked, and the assemblage soon faced the troublesome issue. S. Levin, a prominent Zionist, maintained that the League's program had been too narrowly conceived, and urged complete Jewish national autonomy as the objective. 4 ( M S . ) Minutes of Convention of the League . . . , Nov. 1905; HaZeman, no. 3 (1906) ; Der Freind, nos. 76-77 (1905).

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Μ. B. Ratner, a popular radical leader, was more scathing in his criticism. He found that when Poles or Esthonians spoke they presented concrete demands. The Jews, however, floundered and spoke hesitantly and in uncertain terms. The only immediate aim of the group, in his view, was to unite more or less closely the various elements of the Jewish people in favor of a national program, and to convoke a Jewish constituent assembly specifically to frame that program. The soothing phrases of Vinaver and Sliosberg had given way to real issues, and the convention warmly debated each point. The widely differing opinions expressed, and, on occasion, the ill-concealed rancor, boded no good for the future. The very need and effective usefulness of the League were questioned. The major issue, however, was whether or not to call a Jewish constituent assembly. Some opposed it, but the irrepressible Vladimir Jabotinsky expressed the opinion of the majority when he insisted that the national program of a people could be formulated only by a constituent assembly. The League could only act as a preparatory body. It must not arrogate to itself the right to speak in the name of the Jewish people. In the final decisions, the views of the radicals and nationalists prevailed. It was agreed not to join any political party but to continue to function as an independent Jewish organization with the Vilna program as the basis. And what is most significant, all but two members voted in favor of a Jewish national assembly. The resolution read: For the purpose of achieving, in their complete fullness, the civic, political and national rights of the Jewish people in Russia, the convention has resolved immediately to undertake to convene . . . an all-Russian Jewish National Assembly for the establishment . . . of the forms and principles of their national selfdetermination and the foundations of their inner organization.8 5 Cf. ( M S . ) Minutes of Convention of the League . . . , Nov. 1905; Der Vecker, nos. 1-2 (1905) ; no. 11 (1906).

THE

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OF THE

RUSSIAN

REVOLUTION

95

This nationalist decision, on paper bold and far-reaching, nevertheless remained a dead letter. The projected Jewish national assembly was not convoked, and even the third convention of the League which assembled at St. Petersburg on February 10, 1906, did not dare broach the question. The nationalists were fully aware that too costly a sacrifice had been imposed upon their opponents at the second convention, and that an attempt to follow up the advantage so soon might destroy Jewish unity in the League and nullify the concessions to Jewish nationalism already achieved. This liability became particularly evident when Dubnow proposed that Jews elected to the Duma be required to join a Jewish parliamentary group in order to forward the Vilna program and, in general, to promote Jewish interests. The Zionists, of course, strongly favored the proposition. But when rumblings of a threatening clash filled the hall, the clever Ratner saved the day by introducing a colorless resolution which was quickly adopted." The issue, howeyer, was destined to arise again, and with most unfortunate consequences for the unity of the Jewish organization. The fourth convention of the League, which met at St. Petersburg May 9-12, 1906, proved also the last one. Vinaver, the perennial chairman, again directed the deliberations, and exhibited great skill in attempting to avoid the inevitable crash. His opening address was a marvel of tact. The time, he said, was favorable for securing equal rights, but the Jews must preserve unity. And unity would not be β

The resolution read: " The convention finds it necessary that the future Jewish deputies in the Duma . . . should . . . unite when all questions affecting the rights of the Jewish people are discussed, in order to consider and as far as possible to work together for the attainment of equal rights for the Jews of Russia. The Convention further finds that Jews should not enter non-Jewish national groups." For a full account of the sessions, see Ha-Zemati, nos. 37-42 (1906) ; see also Der Telegraf, nos. 41, 43 (1906).

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jeopardized if only the members thought of the major issue, the ultimate goal—equal rights—and forgot for the moment the methods of action and the form which those rights would ultimately assume. It was clear to all that he was deftly referring to the question of a Jewish parliamentary group. But his plea fell upon deaf ears. Twelve Jews had just been elected to the Duma, and the nationalists were unwilling to forgo so effective a means of national action as a Jewish representation in the Russian parliament. The second session commenced with a report by Jabotinsky favoring a parliamentary group. He agreed that in general questions the deputies should be free to act as they would, though he personally hoped that they would cooperate with the progressives. But on questions affecting the Jews, the Zionist reporter insisted upon the need for a compact Duma group to present one authoritative viewpoint on Jewish desires and needs. Conflicting opinions and independent action on the part of a Jewish minority, he asserted, would only occasion confusion among the people's representatives and would ultimately affect the Jews adversely. The opponents of a parliamentary group were most unfortunate in their reporter, Deputy Ostrogorsky. Arguing that unity, supported by moral discipline, already existed among the Jewish deputies, he asked, " why then do you knock at an open d o o r ? " Such reasoning would hardly shake the determination of the nationalists; and when he referred to the appearance of a Jewish group in the Duma in an uncomplimentary manner, even his own partisans became impatient. Vinaver, however, came to the rescue with a brilliantly enticing argument. In principle, he too favored a group, but he feared its practical consequences. The Polish deputies, he asserted, had made little impression on the Duma largely because, constituting a separate group, they could not influence others. Insinuating, furthermore,

THE PERIOD OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

gy

that he was not free of doubts even with regard to the Cadet circles among whom he sat, he expressed an anxious desire to continue to sit with the deputies of his party in order to prevent backsliding on the Jewish question.* Several other deputies expressed their disapproval of a parliamentary group, and rightly indicated that since there really was no unity, at best only a paper discipline could be effected. T h e anti-nationalist view was thus being defended with ability, when Gruzenberg, another reporter f o r the opponents of a Jewish group, suddenly launched into a diatribe against nationalism as a reactionary movement, and accused his opponents of selfishness in seeking rights only f o r the J e w s . This speech evoked a storm of indignation; and when the anti-nationalist Sliosberg angrily protested against the attack on nationalism, an outburst of genuine applause greeted his remarks. Finally the convention proceeded to vote. The proponents of " a Jewish collegium with consultative power " were out-voted 57 to 44 in f a v o r of the nationalists' resolution which read: " T h e Jewish deputies unite in a distinct parliamentary group, which works in unison in all questions affecting complete Jewish emancipation, according to the program of the V i l n a convention." T h e nationalist victory, however, was short-lived, for the opponents of a parliamentary group immediately announced their resignation from the League. All appeared lost, but after considerable dickering the matter was reconsidered and a new and harmless resolution was adopted: " The I V t h convention finds it necessary to build a Jewish parliamentary group, which shall work in unison in 7

Three of the Jewish deputies belonged to the Labor Group, and nine were Constitutional Democrats. The Zionist deputy Levin denounced Vinaver's policy as an opportunistic one, upon which no lasting program could be built. Although only five of the twelve Duma deputies were Zionists, he insisted upon a parliamentary group, or " collegium," with a strict discipline.

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all questions of Jewish emancipation without a stringent discipline." T h e two factions were reunited and many expressed their j o y at the saving of the League. In his closing address, Vinaver spoke touchingly but vaguely. H e did not deny that dissonances existed. But unity, he felt, had been preserved not only because of the weakness of the Jews, but also because of " the love for the people." F e w , however, were deceived by this appeal to sentiment. T o many observers the differences at the fourth convention appeared to presage (and in effect they did) the disintegration of the League.* T h e views of the " assimilationists " could really not be reconciled with those of the nationalists. T h e incorporation in the program of some general phrases regarding national rights had made cooperation possible for a time. But any atempt to define the national terms or to translate them into action was sure to occasion the withdrawal of the antinationalists. Neither group, however, was sufficiently strong to welcome independent action at this time. Besides, the Jewish middle-class leaders had but recently become politically conscious and active, and their programs were still but vaguely conceived. T h e League was, therefore, suffered to linger on with a semblance of life until May, 1907. T h e various elements composing it, however, at once began more actively to formulate their programs and to perfect their organizations for independent action. (b)

The formulation of a national program by the Russian Zionists

T h e Russian Zionists were profoundly affected by the Revolution of 1905. T h a t upheaval threatened the power and apparent permanence of the anti-Semitic autocracy, and 8 For a complete account of the deliberations, see Dos Yiddishe no. 2 (1906), pp. 19-23; Der Freind, nos. 103-106 (1906).

Folk,

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therefore held in prospect a brighter future for Russian Jewry. At the same time, Zionism was encountering insuperable obstacles, and the Palestinian homeland became an ever more remote ideal. Many Zionists, feeling impelled to give heed to the immediate needs of the Jewish masses, therefore, modified their pessimistic view of Jewish life in Russia and abandoned their indifference or even hostility to national rights. These Zionists became stout advocates of Jewish national autonomy both in the League and before the public opinion of the country. Zionist agitation for national rights commenced in the spring of 1905. Meetings and conferences at Vilna, Kiev, Grodno and elsewhere declared that the Jews constituted " a distinct nation, inhabiting the Russian territory " and resolved to seek particularly a Jewish representation which might authoritatively proclaim the needs of the group. The Zionist press began to devote much attention to national rights, and though the pogroms momentarily threw the question into the background in the fall of 1905, the agitation continued unabated. A Jewish national assembly was proposed for the clarification of the meaning of the new claim; and, on occasion, specific attempts were made to formulate the content of Jewish national autonomy.® Moreover, when the conflict in the League was approaching a crisis, the Zionists made a definite effort to close their ranks in preparation for the final battle over national rights. On May 4, 1906, hardly a week before the opening of the League's momentous fourth convention, the St. Petersburg Zionists met and resolved that the Jewish Duma deputies must unite in a parliamentary group in order to further the peculiar economic, political and cultural needs of the Russian Jewish nationality. Similar action was taken in other cities, so that the joining of the 9

See for example, Ha-Zcman 259 (1905)·

(daily), nos. 62, 71-72, 76-83, 233, 253,

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issue in the League found the nationalists thoroughly prepared. Nor did the Zionists make any secret of their resentment at the outcome of the struggle over a parliamentary group. A t the final session of the League's convention, after the resolution calling for a parliamentary group had been rescinded, the Zionist Pasmanik rose and, in a powerful speech, uttered defiance to the victorious " assimilationists." He warned those who were joyously hailing the reunion of the two factions that the time for " sweet melodies " was over. Irreconcilable differences on momentous issues remained, and to hide the dissonances, he was sure, was no longer wise or even desirable. " Between us nationalists and you assimilationists," he exclaimed, " there can be no peace. If we have made peace now, it is because both sides are as yet too weak for a final contest." 10 By May, 1906, the Zionist proponents of national rights were convinced that the apparent concession of the antinationalists to the national ideal was really no more than an empty gesture. They therefore concluded that further cooperation under such conditions would only compromise their principles and undermine their influence with the masses, and determined to create an independent party. But they were not yet certain that the populace and even some of the Zionist leaders would approve of their plan. T h e national program likewise was still too vague in their minds to afford a clear platform for a political party. They therefore redoubled their efforts to clarify the program, to win a following, and to capture the leadership of the Russian Zionist Organization. O n May 15, 1906, three days after the conclusion of the League's fourth convention, a new Zionist weekly, Dos Yiddishe Folk, was launched by J. Luria and S. Levin. 10Dof

Yiddishe Folk

(1906), no. I, pp. 4-5; no. 2, pp. 1-3, 22-23.

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This organ sought to attract the masses (whose language, Yiddish, it employed) to the new-found interest in national rights. Zionism, it maintained, could not remain oblivious of Jewish rights in Russia; it must actively participate in the movement for freedom. But the editors of the new periodical did not limit Jewish rights to civil and political equality; they declared that " together with equal civil and political rights we now desire national rights, the right equally with the other nations of Russia to conduct for ourselves all the inner affairs of the national life." Moreover, in designating national rights the new watchword, Luria, one of the editors, cautioned Zionists not to view national politics merely as a means toward the Zionist goal. It possessed the virtues of an end in itself, through the promise it held forth of hindering assimilation with the ruling nationalities, of uniting Jewish energies, of vitalizing Jewish life. It would, of course, nourish and strengthen the work in Palestine, but the writer was careful to point out that Palestinian achievements would likewise strengthen a healthy national life in Russia. The two tasks were only two approaches, and both necessary approaches, to the ultimate goal, i. e., a healthy Jewish national life. 1 1 This periodical and other Zionist publications continually focussed attention upon the issue, reiterating the need for national rights; suggesting various methods by which such might be attained; pointing out that all Russian progressive parties were sponsoring self-determination for the nationalities and that all Jewish political organizations were demanding some form of national rights; and even attempting to determine the necessary content. The authors of the weekly editorial paragraphs and of the general news items scanned the Jewish horizon and commented approvingly on all mani11

Ibid. (1906), no. I, pp. 1-4; no. 3, pp. 1-3; nos. 8, 10, pp. 1-2.

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festations of Jewish national politics in Russia or elsewhere.12 While the Zionist rank and file was thus being indoctrinated, representatives of Dos Yiddishe Folk and of two Zionist periodicals in the Russian language met at Vilna (July 7-9, 1906) 18 for the express purpose of working out a program of political-national work in Russia. The participants favored a thorough democratization of the Russian government, with national-territorial autonomy for the provinces and with self-government for the national minorities. The compulsory use of the Russian language must likewise give way to the recognition of the national languages in the various territories. The use of all languages must be permitted in public life, and where the population reached a certain fixed number, then the state itself must communicate with the population in its national tongue. With regard to the specifically Jewish national demands, this so-called Zionist press conference demanded the recognition of Russian Jewry as a unified nationality with selfgovernment in all affairs of national life. Recognition was to be accorded by the central legislature of the state on the basis of a petition presented by a democratically chosen allRussian Jewish national assembly. The organs of national self-government were to possess the right to conduct the official register of the Jewish population, to establish and direct institutions for religious and cultural, economic and social welfare, and to issue ordinances regulating the activities of the various institutions under its control. For the support of these activities, the directing national bodies would 12 See f o r example, ibid. ( 1 9 0 6 ) , no. 3, pp. 4 - 5 ; no. 5, pp. 8 - 9 ; no. 6, PP· 13-IS; no. 7, pp. 1 7 - 1 8 ; no. 1 3 , pp. IO-II, 1 5 ; no. 20, pp. 1 6 - 1 8 ; no.

25, PP· 3-6, 15. 18

A proclamation of the Zionist Central Bureau, dated Oct., 1906, stated that the journalists' conference had taken place in J u n e ; this was obviously an error in print.

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command a proportional share of the state funds allotted for such purposes, and, in addition, might levy special imposts upon the Jewish population. T h e supreme directing organ of Jewish autonomy was designated a " national convention." B u t no agreement could be reached on the constitution of that agency, and two alternative views were incorporated in the resolutions. 14 T h e conference concluded its decisions with a plan of action which was calculated to induce both Jewish and non-Jewish public opinion to approve of national rights. T h e persistent agitation for participation in Russian political life, and perhaps more particularly the crisis in Russian Zionism, 15 finally induced Kohen-Bernstein and Ussischkin, the leaders of the movement, to take action. A n unofficial convention of well-known Zionists was held at Odessa from July 29 to August i , 1906. Vladimir Jabotinsky, the reporter on the subject of political action, proposed in substance the platform adopted at the Vilna press conference, but the assemblage found it inadvisable to pass upon such weighty matters in a hurry. It was therefore decided to consider only the question whether a general Jewish national party consisting of Zionists and non-Zionists alike should be formed, or whether the political party should be a strictly 1 4 Some of the journalists desired a strong and centralized body to regulate the activities of the local Jewish communities and to constitute the source of authority in all matters pertaining to the Jews. Others preferred to lodge final authority in each community, which might unite with similar bodies into district and national federations. The " national convention" would therefore consist of a weak and loose " voluntary union of communities." The resolutions are given in Dos Yiddishe Folk, nos. 10-11 (1906). 1 8 The Zionist membership was falling o f f ; many of the Jewish youth had abandoned the standard; and, what was most significant, many thoughtful observers saw an important cause of the crisis in the fact that Zionism had closed its eyes to the needs of the present and had not formulated a clear policy of Jewish national action within Russia. Cf. ibid. (1906), no. 14, pp. 1-2; no. 15, p. 3 ; no. 26, pp. 1-2.

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Zionist body with its own standard and program. This decision involved a complete surrender to the demand for national-political action and national rights in Russia. And there was really little difference of opinion. Many saw bright possibilities in revolutionary Russia, and all were anxious to save the Zionist movement. With few exceptions the convention favored a strictly Zionist political party, and a resolution to that effect was finally adopted without dissent.18 The platform worked out at the Vilna press conference was " submitted as a programproject," with the understanding that the central committee of the Russian Zionists had not the right, until the forthcoming official convention, to take any action contrary to those Vilna decisions. The active journalists who favored national rights had thus won over the entire party machinery. It was then merely a matter of convening an impressive convention where the new policy might be launched with great eclat, and the Russian Zionist movement would, it was hoped, immediately assume a leading role in Russian Jewish life. The rapid march of events in Russia necessitated an early assembling of the much looked-for convention, and the leaders took immediate steps to arouse the interest of the rank and file. While gathered for the World Zionist Congress at Cologne, the Russian members of the central Actions Committee met in conference (September 1-2, 1906) and unanimously decided to summon a convention " as quickly as possible." 17 A month later there appeared a proclamation 1 9 The resolution read: " The all-Russian Zionist Organization appears before the public as an independent party with a definite political program. . . ." Ibid., no. 13 (1906), pp. 10-11. 1 7 The two editors of Dos Yiddishe Folk were among the twelve men who participated at this meeting; together with four others they were delegated to direct the Zionist Central Bureau in Vilna. Ibid. (1906), no. 15, p. 15; no. 16, p. 8.

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of the Central Bureau summoning a Zionist convention, and at the same time taking occasion to explain why the assembly had been so long delayed and to outline carefully the work before the gathering. 1 * Once a convention had been determined upon, the active proponents of national rights took every precaution to arouse popular interest and to assure effective and enthusiastic sessions. A s early as October, 1906, the leading reports had already been assigned, and in a general way had even been worked out. The Central Bureau sent the journalists' project program to a number of important personages requesting comment and criticism, and the replies were printed in Dos Yiddishe Folk.19 Moreover, the indefatigable journalists who had previously elaborated the general program now focussed attention upon the specific problems with which the assembled Zionists would have to deal. They also convened a second Zionist press conference at which tactics were concretely and minutely formulated. 20 18

Cf. ibid., no. 20 (1906), pp. 16-18.

Dubnow agreed with the main points of the program and carefully criticized various articles, suggesting changes and improvements. [Ibid^ no. 24 (1906), pp. 6-7.] Achad H a ' A m , however, expressed the fear that a compulsory Jewish community, controlled by the unstable mass, might tyrannize over the more profound and less fickle minority. [Ibid., no. 23 (1906), pp. 9-10.] T o this latter view, Idelson effectively replied [in Yevreyski Narod, no. 3, quoted in ibid., no. 25 (1906), p. 4] that the question at issue was not the relative rights of minorities and majorities within the nationality, but specifically whether the Jewish cultural institutions, supported by taxation, should be controlled by a minister at St. Petersburg, or by the Jewish community—whether the Russian or Jewish majority should be the deciding factor in matters affecting the inner life of the Jews. 18

2 0 See esp. J. L., " T h e Forthcoming Convention," ibid., no. 18 (1906), pp. 1-3. This article exhibited a rare clarity of aim and method, and stamps Luria, its author, as one of the outstanding leaders in the movement for national rights. See also ibid., no. 19 (1906), pp. 1-3. The resolutions of the second press conference are given in ibid., no. 23 (1906), pp. 7-9·

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The determined and purposive agitation described above was productive of results. New life was infused into the Russian Zionist movement. The individual societies chose delegates, discussed the projected program, received instructions from and sent proposals to the Central Bureau. 2 1 All indications pointed to a successful convention. On November 2 1 , 1906, seventy-two delegates representing fifty-six localities met at Helsingfors, Finland, 22 to consider the pressing problems confronting Russian Zionism. Chlenov, the chief presiding officer, sounded the keynote in his speech from the chair by pointing to the great effect upon Zionism of the Uganda crisis and the Russian Revolution. Proletarian Zionism was one effect of those stirring movements, and active participation in Russian Jewish life was the other. It was to the latter that the convention lent its greatest attention. A n introductory report on the general aspects of the political program, submitted by Isaac Greenbaum, explained that the belief in a speedy realization of their Palestinian ideal had led the Zionists to ignore the present. However, the recognition that the immediate solution of the Jewish problem was but a dream, as also the audible demand of the masses for attention to their current problems, and the crisis 21 22

See ibid., nos. 23-30 (1906).

A city in the Pale of Jewish Settlement would have been preferable, but even constitutional Russia was not quite safe for progressive conventions. The best source on this convention is ibid., no. 27 (1906), 24 pp. I. Greenbaum (ed.), The Third All-Russian Zionist Convention in Helsingfors (Petrograd, 1917), 1 1 2 pp. is another excellent source. Ha-Olam, no. I (1907), pp. 11-12, contains a fair but brief summary. Of the secondary sources, Böhm, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 54-55, contains the best, though inadequate, summary of the resolutions. H. Chashin, " A Few Words About the Helsingfors Program," Der Proletarisher Gedank, no. 2 (1907), pp. 43-54, is an unusually keen critical analysis of the convention and its work.

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in the movement which he attributed chiefly to the lack of an active claim for national rights in Russia, had led to a revaluation of ideas. Zionists had become convinced that their movement was seeking primarily to gather national energies both in Palestine and in the Diaspora, and that the ultimate goal, an untrammeled national life, could result only from such a closely-jointed dual process. National rights were thus necessary in order to secure the most favorable conditions for the gathering of the national energies. Following this preliminary statement was to have come the major elucidation o f the question. Luria was expected to present his report " O n National Self-government and O u r National Demands." But on his way to Helsingfors he was arrested. A substitute report was submitted by A . Seidenman, who reiterated the Zionist belief that full selfgovernment would be possible only in a Jewish Palestine with a distinctive national-political, economic and social life. In Russia, although the Jews must be content with a narrow autonomy, it should include national culture in all its phases, religion and spiritual matters (such as the special Jewish laws of marriage and Sabbath rest), and Jewish emigration. The speaker then proposed as his resolution the project-program which the Vilna press conference had elaborated. 2 * The debates quickly revealed that practically all the delegates favored, or at least dared not oppose national rights. Yet, a fundamental difference of opinion can be discerned. One view, ably championed by Leon Motzkin, 24 would have had national action recognized as a vital issue for the Jews and as a m a j o r goal of Zionism. The majority, however, Dos

Ytddishe

Folk,

no. 27 (1906), pp. 2-3, 11-13.

Motzkin maintained that national survival w a s the objective of the Zionist movement; even the acquisition of a territory would be only a means to that ultimate ideal. National-political w o r k in Russia was, therefore, not " a supplementary means but a primary goal . . ." of Russian Zionism. 24

I 0

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followed Pasmanik and Jabotinsky in admitting only the present value of a national program as an effective means. In principle the old negation of the Diaspora persisted, and national rights were demanded with the full realization that little might be expected of the new claim in the way of solving the Jewish problem. The question of tactics was another issue placed before the convention. The majority voted in favor of a separate Zionist party and of a Jewish parliamentary group or club. The reporter, Jabotinsky, made it clear, however, that he would welcome the organization by Dubnow of a non-Zionist party, and would gladly cooperate with any group that manifested similar sympathies. The Zionist party, he urged, should be independent only when agitating within the Jewish nationality. For the general political scene, as at state elections, he favored a united Jewish f r o n t Common election committees, coalitions, and federations should be sponsored so long as candidates or groups accepted a national program and championed a Jewish parliamentary group. 25 The convention, originally scheduled to come to a close on the sixth day, had to be prolonged. O n November 27, 1906, the seventh and last day of the sessions, a series of important resolutions 26 was voted; those relating to national rights were both comprehensive and explicit, bespeaking mature and careful consideration. 25

Cf. Dos Yiddishe Folk, no. 27 (1906), pp. 13-20.

2tIbid.,

no. 27 (1906), pp. 22-24; no. 28 (1906), pp. 14-15. The section of the resolutions entitled " The National-Political Demands," the most important part of the national program, was printed in no. 28. It really belongs after column one, p. 22 of no. 27, between " The NationalPolitical Program" and " The Immediate Political Work in Russia." Kirzhnits, vol. ii, heft 1, pp. 405-407, in seeking to reproduce the nationalpolitical program from Dos Yiddishe Folk, was confused by the error just noted, and merely reprinted p. 22 of no. 27 of the weekly. He thus omitted the most important part of the program.

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iog

The decisions on the national question were divided into three parts—the general aspects of the political platform, the national-political demands and the problem of tactics. The preamble recognized in the national organization of the J e w s in the Diaspora a most important and invigorating means for the attainment of the Zionist goal—Palestine. Participation in the attack upon the Russian autocracy, though long neglected, was likewise called necessary, because a secure national organization and its recognition by the state would be possible only in a democratic government. In formulating the specific demands, the project worked out previously by the first conference of journalists was evidently used as a basis. But the various demands and statements of policy were more logically grouped in the Helsingfors resolutions and more clearly and precisely expressed. The general political program demanded, in the first place, " the recognition of the Jewish nationality with the right of self-government in all affairs of Jewish [national] life." The precise national constitution was to be elaborated by an all-Russian Jewish national assembly. It was then to be confirmed and guaranteed by the general legislative institutions of the state for the entire Russian territory, so that no provincial authorities might interfere with or alter the stipulations. In anticipation of the Jewish national assembly, however, the assembled Zionists presented their version of national autonomy. ι ) Each Jew, who has not reported that he withdraws from the Jewish nation is recognized as a member of the Jewish nation. 2 ) Self-government is conducted in the localities by the communal councils, in the autonomous provinces by provincial conventions, and throughout the state by the Russian Jewish conventions. All these institutions are elected by the Jewish population. . . .

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3) A s representative bodies of the Jewish population the organs of national self-government possess all the rights of a juridical person. . . . 4) The organs of national self-government receive . . . the money which is proportionately deducted from state or local appropriations for Jewish needs, and have in addition the right to impose taxes upon the Jewish population. 5) The organs of national self-government possess the right to found, conduct and support all kinds of institutions, which serve the ends: 1) of national education, 2) national health, 3) mutual and labor aid, 4) emigration, and 5) matters of faith . . .,2T as also to issue, in accordance with the laws of the state and province, ordinances and regulations for their institutions. T h e above demands must not, however, be viewed as an outline of special privileges desired by the Jews. T h e convention looked forward to a complete democratization of the Russian government and to its decentralization both territorially and nationally. Parliamentarianism, together with complete civil, political and national equality, and special protection for labor, must be achieved. But particular emphasis was placed on the safeguarding of the rights of national minorities. Thus, while favoring full autonomy for the national provinces, the Zionists stipulated that the central parliament must first guarantee the rights of the national minorities in those provinces. Proposals were further made f o r the representation of the minorities, proportional to their numbers, in all legislative bodies, and even judges and administrative officials were to be apportioned according to nationality. Language, too, must be respected; and the convention specifically demanded 2 7 T h e convention demanded that Jews be permitted to w o r k on Sunday, and that the Jewish Sabbath and other religious observances be respected in the public educational institutions. In the military service, however, account w a s to be taken of the Jewish religion only " in so f a r as it would not be a source of injury to the state."

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The right of each nationality to utilize its language everywhere in public life. In those localities where the population reaches the number determined by law, the government, the provincial and local [bodies of] self-government, must in oral or written communication with that section of the population utilize its national language. In the case of the Jews, Hebrew and Yiddish were to be privileged as national languages 2Ta " in the school, at court and in public life." Finally, methods of agitation and election tactics were outlined. T h e Zionists would strive to predispose the general public opinion of the country and particularly the numerous national parties and groups to regard favorably the newly formulated national ideas. T h e Jewish masses, too, would be informed of the vital meaning of a Jewish national assembly; and self-governing communities would be founded wherever Jews dwelt in sufficient numbers. W h e r e such already existed, efforts would be made to democratize them, to extend their functions and, above all, to secure their legal recognition. Zionists could not join any political factions 28 and must agitate as an independent party. But for specific purposes cooperation with other groups was recommended. For election purposes the convention favored a united Jewish election committee selected by the population or by the various parties. Non-Jewish candidates would be supported if they recognized the democratic and national program here outlined. B u t Jewish candidates must in addition promise to join the Jewish national group which 2 7 1 T h e question of a national language divided the Jewish nationalists into two hostile camps. Some favored H e b r e w , others Yiddish. The Zionists therefore demanded the recognition of t w o languages. 28

A note appended to this resolution declared that the L e a g u e f o r the

Attainment of Equal Rights w a s not a political party.

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was to be created in Parliament to safeguard the national interests of the Jews. Thus did the Helsingfors Convention debate and decide upon an extensive program for Jewish national rights in Russia. But formulated resolutions do not always convey the full import of decisions even to contemporaries. It may, therefore, be desirable to inquire what the new course of action meant to the revitalized Zionists. The official view maintained that the goal of Zionism remained unaffected. Only the means had been altered. The Palestinian ideal might be achieved through the organization of Jewry and through the gathering of great material and spiritual energies. But no illusions need be harbored. For under no circumstances could a healthy Jewish national life prevail outside of Palestine. The Jews, therefore, could not demand what other territorial nationalities demanded— full national-political autonomy. Possessing no territory, such a demand would not be granted, and even if it were, the group would not know what to do with iL Nationalpolitical autonomy for the Jews, with a separate legislative diet, was thus rejected though not without some reluctance. It was a beautiful idea but a fantastic one. This was the official view. Unofficially, however, many influential Zionists were rather skeptical of the possibilities of the Helsingfors program, and, on occasion, their writings revealed unintentionally what must have agitated the minds of many Zionists. The national demands, even the extreme demands of the Seymists, would be eminently desirable. Certainly if all nationalities in Russia secured their own diets, the Jews must not spurn so valuable a national institution. But ever there lurked the danger that these national demands might become the ultimate goal, and that Palestine would be forgotten. A conviction therefore arose that national rights would never be realized. And this convic-

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tion, oddly enough, sometimes reached the intensity of a fond hope that full national rights would not be secured even on paper. The Zionist aim was thus not so much the actual acquisition of such rights. The very demand constituted a worthy national objective. 29 Taking into account all of the above tendencies it would appear just, in making a final appraisal of the Zionist work at Helsingfors, to say that conditions had driven the group to accept a compromise. Disappointed in the hope of an immediate realization of their ideal, torn by a new nonPalestinian territorial movement and orphaned by the death of the great leader, Herzl, some came to view Zionism as a process of gathering national energies in anticipation of the final ideal. And none could deny that national demands in the present homes of the Jews would contribute powerfully to the growth of national consciousness. Similarly, much of the early pessimism with regard to Jewish national life in Russia had been due to the autocratic regime which, Zionists felt, could not be successfully challenged. With the apparent success of the revolution, however, a change of attitude had become imperative. For if in revolutionary times the Zionists had ventured to stand aside and take no part in the liberation movement, and to ignore Jewish daily needs, then " not a living being would have remained with them." While men like Luria and Motzkin seized upon autonomy as an invaluable instrument for the furtherance of nationalism, the general leadership of the party, one feels, accepted the national-political program as a sort of necessary evil. 80 29 For the official Zionist view, see " Circular of the Central Committee," Dos Yiddishe Folk, no. 28 (1906), pp. 1-6; examples of unofficial skepticism will be found in Ha-Olam, nos. i, 6, 18-21 (1907), pp. io-ii, 67-68, 223-224, 233-234, 248, 257-258.

so C/. Der Proletarisher Gedank, no. 2 (1907), p. 48; B. Krupnik, Die jüdischen Parteien (Berlin, 1919), pp. 15-16.

I 14 (c)

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The Program of the People's Party

(Folkspartei)

The determination of the Russian Zionists to declare unequivocally for national rights and to build an outspokenly Jewish national party in Russia, and more particularly their final decision at Helsingfors in favor of an independent, strictly Zionist, political body, rendered a further cleavage among the Russian Jewish middle classes inevitable. Because they possessed no ready organization upon which to build a party, Dubnow and his followers would most probably have preferred to agitate for national rights within an organization like the League, which was progressive in its general policies, and which in matters affecting the Jews evinced a readiness at least to render lip service to national demands. But when the Zionists launched their own association, and when the League's anti-nationalists of the Vinaver and Sliosberg stamp prepared openly to attack the Zionists, Dubnow could not very well afford to remain passive. Had the Zionists, furthermore, been willing to combine with the non-Zionist nationalists, there can likewise be little doubt that some basis of union could have been found. But Helsingfors put an end to this possibility. Dubnow and his followers, therefore, met in St. Petersburg during the latter part of December, 1906, and created the Provisional Organization Committee of the People's Party. The organizers of this faction asserted 81 that while the Jews of the various countries formed component parts of their respective states, they could not be considered members of the nationalities composing those states. The Jews of the world constituted a united nationality with a community of interest which was conditioned not by any negative cause such as anti-Semitism, but by positive historical, cultural and 81

T h e communications of the Provisional Organization Committee were signed by S. M. Dubnow, A . B . Zalkind, Μ. N. Kreinin, B . S. Mandel, and S. I. Choronzhitzki.

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social factors and needs inherent in the life of the group. The removal of all disabilities would, according to this view, afford no guaranty against national disintegration and death. The most complete civil equality could not compensate for a lack of national rights. The western Jews, thought Dubnow, the leader of the People's Party, had committed an unpardonable error in having undertaken, in exchange for equal rights, to discard all vestiges of their national existence. As a result, individuals of the Jewish faith had been emancipated; but western Jewry as a group remained in a state of national subjection, and its very capacity for continued existence became problematical. " It is clear," declared the organizer of the group, " that this was half-emancipation, civil emancipation without national, the emancipation of the Jews without Jewry." Dubnow was certain that the active group life of the Russian Jews would serve as a guaranty that the error of the West would not be repeated; he pointed to the fact that nearly all Jewish parties desired some form of autonomy as proof that the Easterners had profited from the example of the West. But he could not subscribe to the platforms of the other parties. Cooperation with the Jewish socialists was unthinkable, because of their policy of " artificially sharpening " the antagonism between classes, and because they ignored the interests of 9 0 % of the Jewish people—the petty bourgeoisie. Amalgamation with the Zionists was likewise impossible because the People's Party could not visualize any possibility of realizing the territorial aspirations of the former and therefore feared that such illusions for the future would only becloud the nationality's vital interests of the present. Moreover, the Zionists viewed national-cultural work in the Diaspora as only a means, a preliminary step to the Palestinian main aim; whereas their

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opponents, seeking to make normal the Jewish national existence in the Diaspora, found national-cultural work in Russia a .major goal. The new party would, however, readily cooperate with the " realistic work " of the Zionist program. As for the non-nationalists of the League, Dubnow would work in agreement with them so long as they remained loyal to the Vilna program. But he warned those who would " cleverly " at first demand only civil and political rights, and thus postpone the demand for national rights until the former had been achieved. These men, he thought, were playing with fire, for they were in the meantime affixing a nonnational stamp upon the Jews. Such a stamp would prove difficult to remove. The party platform resembled closely that of the Zionists,' 3 but it sought more minutely to provide for every contingency in general Russian affairs and in specifically Jewish national matters. The organizers were convinced that only through the triumph of the constitutional parties could their national aims be realized, and they surmised that the liberal opposition to the autocracy would center in the Cadets. Part I, or the General Political Program, therefore, incorporated the main points of the Cadet platform, with some changes conditioned by the peculiar needs of the Jews. The fundamental rights of citizens were defined, and a democratic state organization was provided for. Advanced judicial, financial and economic state policies were formulated: particular articles stipulated the abolition of special taxes imposed on certain nationalities; liberal provisions were formulated for agriculture and for labor legislation; and great care was taken to assure freedom and autonomy in education. The National Program, or Part II, of the party's platIt must not be assumed, however, that the Zionist platform was used as a model. In fact the probability is that the Zionist national-political tenets were drawn from Dubnow's writings.

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form, presented a plan for local and national autonomy in general, and a more carefully elaborated scheme for Jewish self-government in particular. All nationalities in Russia must be guaranteed, on a basis of absolute equality, " freedom of national self-determination " and the possibility fully to express and develop their national peculiarities. Territories or provinces possessing distinct national majorities would be accorded national-territorial autonomy, with a diet or other similar organ. The central parliament would assure the national minorities full inviolability of their civil, political and national rights, and proportional representation in all legislative bodies. T h e J e w s who did not constitute a majority in any territory must be guaranteed national autonomy in the form of a non-territorial, communal organization. Yet, they were not to be segregated as a foreign element. They must constitute an integral part of the state, and must actively participate in the civil and political life of the country. Otherwise equal rights would prove an illusion. The unit of Jewish self-government would be the Jewish National Community functioning through a governmental organ, the Communal Union, elected periodically by the members. The activities of the individual communities would be coordinated by a Union of Jewish Communities representing the united Russian Jewry. The organs of this central body would consist of Periodical Conventions of delegates from the communities, and of a permanent Executive Committee elected by the convention and responsible to it. The competence of Jewish national autonomy was to include the organization, maintenance and support of institutions for the promotion and supervision of public education, for mutual and labor aid and welfare, for emigration and for charity. The autonomous organs would constitute juridical persons with the right to tax Jews for specifically

n8

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national needs not provided for by the general state budget. A proportional share of the governmental appropriations for national needs would likewise be placed at the disposal of the Jewish national organs of government. T h e Jewish language must likewise be accorded full equality in public life; Saturday rest must be vouchsafed the adherents of the Jewish religion; and the regulation of the marriage laws must be left to the Jewish national group. Finally, the People's Party demanded that a Jewish national constituent assembly be convoked to elaborate and formulate the fundamentals of Jewish national autonomy.' 3 Dubnow and his small band of followers thus carefully elaborated a program for the civil, political and national equalization of the Jews. But the powers of reaction soon reasserted their sway, and the contemplated launching of a nationwide party did not materialize. Besides, the distinctive contribution of the new group—Jewish self-determination in Russia—had been adopted by the Zionists and by other parties too. Dubnow's direct and immediate following therefore remained small, and his group did not play any significant role in the life of the Jews during the first Russian Revolution. 84 (d)

The ambiguous position of the People's (Folksgruppe)

Group

Contemporaneously with the efforts of Dubnow to found a Jewish national party, a new group was being born. Vinaver and Sliosberg, and their anti-nationalist followers within the League for the Attainment of Equal Rights, did 83

Cf. Volkspartei

(St. Petersburg, 1907), 30 pp.; Der Freind, nos. 8,

25 (1907)· 84 Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. ii, heft 2, p. 436; Krupnik, op. cit., p. 24. See also Folksshtimme (1907), no. 4, p. 11; no. 5, pp. 18-21; Dos Yiddishe Folk, no. 29 (1906), pp. 2-3; no. 2 (1907), pp. 10-11.

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not relish the organization of Jewish parties." Such action could only serve to accentuate Jewish segregation, to them an evil which must be eradicated. But the preparations o f the Zionists, and their final organization of a political party, made some action on the part of the " assimilationist " leaders imperative, for the nationalists threatened to discredit them completely before the Jewish masses. T h e antinationalists could not very well use the League for their purposes, for that would entail the withdrawal of all nationalists. A new organization must therefore be formed, and the anti-nationalists created the People's Group ( F o l k s gruppe). T h e primary purpose of this association was to combat Zionism. But in the heyday of the revolutionary ferment in Russia, the new group with all its influential leadership would not have secured a hearing among the Jews if it had ignored completely the question of national rights. Vinaver and Sliosberg therefore had to pay homage to the spirit of the times and to formulate some national demands. T o w a r d the end of December, 1906, attacks against the Zionists began to be h e a r d , " and an election proclamation soon apprised the electorate of the aims of the new party. T h e Jews, it began, must not act as strangers in their native Russia. T h e y must not organize a separate political party. But the Zionists had committed just that wrong, and they furthermore viewed Russia as a foreign land and sought to emigrate. T h e People's Group would therefore wage incessant war against these traducers of the Jewish people, and would do its utmost, so ran the peroration of the manifesto, to prevent the election to the Duma of any Jew whose words would stamp his coreligionists as " aliens among Russia's peoples." 3 5 The League was not considered a Jewish party. 28, p. III.

Cf. supra, note

s e S e e Dos Yiddishe Folk, no. 29 (1906), p. 3; no. 30 (1906), pp. 1-2; no. I (1907), pp. 1-3; Yiddishe Virklichkeit, no. 4 (1907), pp. 12-26.

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The new group, however, had its positive program too, and that bore witness to the fact that Vinaver and his followers were not thoroughgoing anti-nationalists. They would guard the rights of Jews not only as individuals, " but as a nation, which should possess the full freedom to develop its spiritual countenance without hindrance . . . on the part of the governmental power." But striving for national rights, the People's Group cleverly insisted, did not mean " setting the wanderer on his w a y . " Nor did national rights mean the creation of " a new type of Ghetto in the form of such a compulsory national union, which has not as yet been tried anywhere, which has been reared only in theory, . . . and that this should through a single central institution direct the entire spiritual-cultural life of the nation." Truly desirable national rights would involve, in the view of these so-called anti-nationalists, the guaranty of the rights of all national minorities in the autonomous provinces and communal adminitrations; it would imply the democratization of the Jewish community, as well as its legalization and recognition by the government; it would permit " the communities, individually or in voluntary union with other communities, to work out that type of national-cultural institutions, which will accord with their needs . . . " ; it would signify absolute freedom to found schools and full liberty for " each group of the population, which comprises a certain proportion, . . . to demand, that at the expense of the general or local budget a school should be founded, where instruction would be in its own language . . . " ; it would mean " demanding the free development of the language, the freedom to establish those institutions which protect and develop the language. . . ." The question of national rights thus appeared paramount, and the People's Group, when addressing itself to the Jewish electorate, devoted much attention to this issue. But some-

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i

how the new party felt that what it promised was not sufficient to satisfy the voters. Or perhaps the anti-Zionists feared that they were not quite convincing. A t any rate the manifesto half-apologetically said: " W i t h these indicated demands it is self-evident that all our aims are not exhausted. They express only the minimum of the aims, they express the direction in which we propose to go." " The national program of the People's Group remained vague. These " assimilationists " either could not or would not express their demands in unambiguous terms. One suspects that Vinaver and his party would have preferred to limit Jewish distinctiveness to the religious sphere. When they referred to the Jewish community they therefore spoke in sufficiently general terms to permit of such an interpretation. In speaking of Jewish education they were likewise particularly concerned with " the ethical ideals of Judaism." But in a study of Jewish demands for national rights, it is most significant that so influential a group of " assimilationists " felt constrained to make concessions to nationalism, to talk of special recognition of national minorities, to demand rights for a Jewish language, to employ the very term " national rights." This action of the People's Group lends substance to the claim of some writers that the agitation for national rights made so profound an impression upon Russian Jewry, that not a single Jewish party or group dared openly to reject or even to ignore this momentous issue.*8 87 C f . Kirzhnits, op. cit., Fremd, no. 1 1 9 ( 1 9 0 6 ) .

vol. ii, heft I, pp. 407-410, 435-436;

Der

The People's Group maintained close relations with the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party. But it neither claimed the status of a national section, nor was it recognized as such. 88

C f . Zhitlowsky, op. cit., vol. v, p. 106; Folksshtimtne, pp. 12-27.

no. 4 ( 1 9 0 7 ) ,

The disintegration of the League gave birth to another faction, the Jewish Democratic Group, which was headed by L . Bramson and G .

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3 . T H E ACTIVITIES OF T H E PROLETARIAN GROUPS

T h e proletarian elements among the Russian J e w s were as profoundly affected by the momentous events of the years 1904-1907 as the organized middle-class factions. L i k e the Zionists and the followers of Dubnow and of Vinaver, the Bund and most of the Zionist-socialist groups were constrained to espouse the cause of national rights. W e have seen how the proponents of national autonomy had gradually gained ground in the Bund and also how a distinctive national-socialist ideology, known as " neutralism," had been evolved. We shall now see how the Russian Revolution finally put an end to the vacillation of that socialist organization on the national question. (a)

The Bund committed to national-cultural autonomy

T h e secession of the Bund from the Russian Social Democratic Labor P a r t y 4 8 resulted in a growth of national sentiment among the Jewish socialists. A s an independent organization accountable to no one, the Bund no longer had to reckon with the anti-national views of the leading Russian socialists. Moreover, fearing the effects of isolation upon the rank and file, the leadership launched a wide propaganda to explain the party's position to the members. But the primary reason f o r a separate Jewish organization not delimited by any territorial bounds, was the existence of a J e w i s h nationality. The writers and speakers were therefore obliged to put more emphasis upon Jewish national peculiarities and needs. A t the same time the violent attacks upon the resolutions of the Bund's fourth convention— attacks which the Jewish leaders felt were entirely unmerited Landau. This group likewise favored Jewish national rights, but it was primarily concerned with democratic objectives of a radical nature. Cf. Der Freind, no. 24 (1907) ; interview with Dr. L. Bramson, Apr. 20, 1930. 39

Supra, p. 40.

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—had to be answered; and the national question assumed a prominence it might otherwise not have attained. Moreover party discipline bore the strain, and the action of the leaders was confirmed by local meetings of the members. The Bund became conscious of its power and strength even when facing the dangers of revolutionary action alone.40 The socialist faction also sought to consolidate its position with the Jewish masses among whom it was isolated, in the hope, one feels, of compensating for the increased sense of security which solidarity with the Russian Social Democracy must have afforded. But this was the very time when nationalism was penetrating all sections of the Jewish population, and when even socialism was being synthesized with Zionism. The Bund must, therefore, not only seek to attract the Jewish intelligentsia and guard the proletariat against the attractive promises and hopes of the Zionists; it must fight for its very existence because the socialist-Zionist groups might prove a real menace. Its half-hearted championing of a Jewish nationality had cost the Bund unity with Russian socialism. A weak and indecisive position on the question of autonomy might estrange the very Jewish proletariat in whose name it claimed a separate existence. B y the close of 1904, the position of the Bund had sufficiently shifted to enable some of its responsible leaders not only vigorously to insist that Russian Jewry constituted a nationality, but even to assert that it was destined to survive as a national unit and that Jewish socialists should actually guard against its dissolution. But these expressions as well as the vacillating resolution of 1 9 0 1 , no longer sufficed. The rumblings of revolution, the popular activity at the time of Prince Mirsky and the clamor of groups and nationalities 40 Cf. Die Tätigkeit des allgem. jüdischen Arbeiterbundes . . . nach seinem V Parteitag (Geneva, 1904), esp. pp. 2 - 2 3 ; Medem, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 41, 57, 65-69; Averbuch and Shapiro, op. cit., pp. 27, 30-31.

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for rights 41 removed the national issue from the realm of theoretic polemics into that of practical politics. A decided stand on the question now became imperative and the Central Committee, on its own responsibility, assumed such a position in a proclamation issued in December, 1904, and entitled " What must we not forget now ? " The Bund leadership positively declared that Jewish workingmen required f o r their welfare more than civil emancipation, and demanded f o r all nationalities, " freedom of cultural development . . . " and " freedom to utilize their own languages . . . in all governmental and social institutions." 42 This action of the supreme leaders clearly committed the Bund to national rights, and when the sixth convention of the party met at Zurich in October, 1905 (the revolution was then at its height) the national question no longer occasioned any difficulty. Medem merely analyzed and confuted the arguments of the opponents of autonomy, and then the great majority of the convention confirmed the action of its Central Committee and adopted the proposed resolution demanding " national-cultural autonomy." The resolution declared that while only a socialist society would completely uproot all forms of national oppression, social democrats must seek to attain the maximum assurance against national conflicts even in bourgeois society because national oppression " falls with its entire weight upon the working class of the oppressed nation, in that it retards the development of its energies in all phases of its life and deflects its class-struggle from the true path. . . . " Moreover, since Russia was inhabited by many nationalities which, in the opinion of the convention, could not be delimited territorially, governmental institutions 41 42

Supra, p. 86 if seq.

Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. ii, heft a, pp. 123-127. See also Der Yid. Arbeiter (1904), no. 15, pp. 25-37; no. 16, pp. 15-26; Di Letste Passirungen, no. 5 (1905)» P· i·

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concerned with national culture would have to assume " a non-territorial form, a form of national-cultural autonomy." The precise program of the Bund on the Jewish national question demanded ι ) Full civil and political emancipation for Jews. 2 ) The possibility for the Jewish population . . . to use its own language in communications with the courts and with the institutions of the state and of the local and territorial self-government. 3) National-cultural autonomy: to remove from the province of the state and from the local and territorial self-government the functions which are associated with matters of culture (education and others) and to transfer these to the nation proper in the form of separate institutions, central as well as local, elected by all members on the basis of general, equal, direct and secret vote. 4) Note: National-cultural autonomy does not deprive the central legislative power of the right of instituting certain standards, which all are obliged to accept, in questions which have a general significance for all nations of Russia, as, for example, that all must secure elementary education, that the subjects [of instruction] must bear a purely secular character, etc., and of the right to exercise control so that all these standards should be observed.48 Thus the Russian Revolution brought to a close a process of development in the Bund which had proceeded for nearly a decade. During this period the leaders of the party were driven by circumstances from almost assimilationist views to a clear demand for national-cultural autonomy. At first the Bund ignored the national question entirely, insisting that the Jewish workers required a separate organization solely because of the need for agitation in Yiddish. Soon, however, the restrictions upon the Russian Jews had to be considered, « Cf. Der Vecker, no. I (1905), p. 4 ; Medem, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 86-93.

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and the Bund made it its special province to fight for civil and political emancipation. The emphasis on Yiddish as the special language of the Jews ultimately led to its recognition as a national language; and this recognition of the Jews as a nationality compelled the socialists, almost against their w i l l , " to formulate national demands. T h e anti-national attitude of the Russian social democrats for a time deterred the Bund leaders. T h e decisions of the Austrian socialists at Brünn, however, gave them heart, and the struggles with the Russian and Polish socialists, who looked to the complete assimilation of the Jews, only intensified their resistance. T h e arguments leveled against their separatism had to be answered, and every counter argument was bound to emphasize the special needs of the Jews. Within the Jewish group too, the Bund had to face Zionist propaganda, especially when the latter was being synthesized with socialism. And the weakening of the autocracy in 1904-1905 made further ambiguity on Jewish national autonomy impossible. T h e resultant of all these forces was a gradual and halting formulation of a demand for national-cultural autonomy. (b)

The national programs of the proletarian-Zionist

parties

The years of the Russian Revolution witnessed a lively activity on the part of the proletarian-Zionist groups. During that period, as we have seen in the introductory chapter, three distinct parties took shape. A t that time also, the programs of these factions were clarified. W e are already familiar with the general policies and differences of the organizations. There remains only to point out the position assumed by each on the question of Jewish national autonomy. 4 * Mr. A . Liessin, editor of the Yiddish monthly, the Tsukunft, and an authority on Jewish socialism, said to the present w r i t e r : " T h e Bund found itself between t w o fires. T h e ' I s k r a ' attacked it f r o m the l e f t and the Poale-Zionists f r o m the right. T h e Bund was compelled to adopt a national policy, and national-cultural autonomy was its happy mean."

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The Jewish Socialist Labor Party, or the Seymists 4 5 as the group was often called, was most thoroughgoing in its championing of national autonomy. Its national ideology, resting on the Renascence viewpoint, maintained that throughout their history, even in dispersion, the Jews had contrived to maintain in the various countries distinctive forms in their social and economic, as well as in political and cultural life. The need for a Jewish territory was conceded, but unlike other territorialists the Seymists insisted that only the institutions of national autonomy culminating in the seym, or national parliament, could command the means and energies which so ambitious a scheme would render necessary. For that reason the program declared that " national-political autonomy assumes for the Jewish proletariat and the entire Jewish nation the importance of an unconditional historical necessity. . . ." National-political autonomy thus became a necessary transition stage through which the " objective march of historical development" would lead the Jewish proletariat and along with it the entire Jewish nationality " to the territorial concentration and development of its national autonomy whenever and wherever the necessary political energies will become available." The official party view maintained that a permanent adjustment in the Diaspora was impossible, and that even nationalpolitical autonomy was no more than an indispensable step in the march toward the true goal, i. e., toward a national territory. But this remained a theoretic formula. In actual practice, the means—national-political autonomy—really became the end, and all the party energies were directed toward its attainment. The ultimate solution of the Jewish 45 This popular appellation was due to the strong emphasis of the party upon the need for a Jewish seym, or national diet. The group was also known as the Serpists; S. R. P. were the initial letters of its Russian name.

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problem, territorialism, it was pointed out, would be possible only in the future, and so distant was the contemplated future that, writing in 1907, one of the most important leaders of the party warned that " even concretely to pose the problem would be impossible at the present moment." Territorialism would become a problem of the day for the Jews to consider and solve only when Jewish national energies had been sufficiently gathered and strengthened through nationalpolitical autonomy. The party even decreed an uncompromising opposition to all immediate territorial ventures and to all existing territorial organizations. The slogan of the Jewish Socialist Labor Party was " from national-political to territorial autonomy—that is our historical path." 46 The Seymists never succeeded in attracting as many followers as did the other factions, but their influence in Jewish life was out of all proportion to their numbers. They attracted many prominent persons, among them Zhitlowsky, who, on his return to Russia in 1906, joined the party and lent it his active support.47 They also carried on a considerable oral and written propaganda, and their writings were well-edited; they exhibited a greater readiness to analyze a problem; and they were far less partisan than, say, the writers of the Bund sheets. But the greatest source of Seymist strength lay in the party's emphasis upon the im48

Cf. Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. ii, heft I, pp. 391-394; Vozroshdeniye, op. cit., pp. 99-117; Di Shtimme (Vilna, 1907), pp. 47-52; Folksshtimme, no. 14 (1907), ΡΡ- 10-17. " See Zhitlowsky Zamelbuch, op. cit., pp. 158, 232-233, 278. Zhitlowsky had abandoned his uncompromising opposition to territorialism. The Kishinev pogrom had brought home to him the insecurity of Jewish life in Russia, and before long his faith in national autonomy as the ultimate solution of the Jewish problem was gone. By the time the first Russian revolution had run its course, he was convinced that an unhampered cultural development was impossible for the Jews, unless they could become masters over their economic and social-political life—a condition which could be realized only in their own land.

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g

mediate needs of the Russian Jews. Less concerned with the distant future, they devoted less attention to vague phrases and strained theories, and sought instead to examine the existing Jewish institutions—their legal status, the abuses which must be removed and the reforms necessary f o r the further extension of their competence—and to evolve new means of extending Jewish self-government. They were also less doctrinaire than other radicals. While conceding that Jewish educational, charitable and other social institutions must be radically rebuilt, they nevertheless preferred active penetration of and agitation within those institutions. Their tendency therefore differed from that of other revolutionaries who were content to heap abuse upon obsolete usages from a disdainful distance, and to wait for the revolution with one sweep to clear away the past and to make room for the new order which, however ardently desired, was none the less vaguely conceived. The Jewish Socialist Labor Party was affiliated with the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party. 48 The latter was generally more friendly to the national question than the Social Democrats, but it hesitated to concede more than territorial autonomy to the nationalities. The Seymists, however, were anxious to convince other factions of the need for protection of the national minorities, and at their instance the Socialist Revolutionaries cooperated in summoning a conference of national socialist parties. Some sixteen delegates representing the Socialist Revolutionary Party, the Seymist, the Polish, the Armenian, the Lithuanian, the White-Russian and the Georgian groups met in Finland in April, 1907, and discussed the proposals which the Seymists had formulated. The conference unanimously approved a 48 The Socialist Revolutionary Party was founded in 1901 after a decade of preparatory activities in which Zhitlowslcy played a leading role. Cf. Kulcsycki, op. cit., pp. 447-472; Zhitlowsky Zamelbuch, op. cit., pp. 39-43·

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resolution presented by the Jewish socialists to the effect that the election-law must guarantee " the rights of political and also of national minorities." But a further attempt to commit the delegates to non-territorial national autonomy failed, because the Socialist Revolutionary and Polish representatives could not be convinced. T h e conference, therefore, merely resolved that the question was important enough to merit further consideration, and urged the participating groups to bring it to the attention of their own membership. It was also decided to establish a common secretariat in order to promote cooperation among the national groups and also to encourage a further elucidation of the national question."

Ber Borochov 50 and his followers in the Jewish Social Democratic Labor Party (Poale-Zion) in Russia likewise gave much attention to the question of national autonomy. T h e polemics with the Seymists convinced them 51 that the idea of a national diet was productive of much good for the proletariat. It was even admitted that the Seymists had done well to spread among the masses the idea of national4 9 O n the conference of the national socialist parties, see Folksshtimme (1907), no. 5, pp. 63-67; no. 6, pp. 1-6; no. 8, pp. 3-19; no. 9, pp. 3-10; no. 15, pp. 3-14; no. 16, pp. 3-26. e o Borochov was the father of the Jewish Social Democratic Labor P a r t y . H e fought the Seymists, guided the formation of his party and elaborated almost single-handed the theoretic foundations of its program. A t the time of the organization of the faction, he was in his middle twenties, but he already had a reputation as a brilliant and highly educated young man, and his perseverance and capacity for work astounded all those who came in contact with him. 5 1 W e have it on good authority (Zerubavel, op. cit., p. 72) that autonomy was emphasized in order to combat Seymism by stealing some of its thunder. But it is equally true that Borochov and his friends were convinced of the value of national rights. Cf. Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. ii,

h e f t i, pp. 152-154·

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political autonomy. But the Poale-Zionists objected strongly to what they considered an exaggeration of the importance of that demand. T h e y would not grant that the national parliament was the only possible means, or even a necessary means, for the realization of Zionism or territorialism. T h e y contended that as in actual life one could not first gather and then expend energy, so in national energy, the gathering and expending must be done simultaneously. Both in the Diaspora and in Palestine national energy would be gathered, and in both places it would be expended. T h e national policies of the other Jewish socialist parties were likewise found inadequate. 52 T h e Bund, said Borochov correctly, had adopted its national program unwillingly, and he further contended that it never really viewed the national question in full earnestness. Characterizing the Bund's position on the national question as opportunist since it still clung to the cosmopolitan tradition and attacked nationalism as reactionary, bourgeois and Utopian, he pronounced national-cultural autonomy inadequate, and the Bund's " neutralism " as " sitting between two stools." The Zionist Socialist Labor Party was hardly more satisfactory, thought the brilliant Poale-Zionist leader, for, while the Seymists, engrossed with the present, had forgotten the future, the Zionist Socialists had so intently fixed their gaze upon the future as to ignore the present; i. e., the immediate needs of Jewish life in Russia. T h e Poale-Zionists alone, he insisted, possessed sufficient historical perspective to combine organically the present with the future, striving at the same time to achieve territorial autonomy in Palestine and self-government in Russia, not only in matters pertaining to culture but also in all other national affairs, whether political or economic, cultural or social. 52

See " U n z e r P l a t f o r m , " B . Borochov, Poalc-Tsion

1920), vol. i, pp. 160-194.

Shriften

(Ν. Y.,

132

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The Poale-Zionists were very careful to limit the possibilities of national-political autonomy. It was characterized a? a palliative rather than as a final solution of the Jewish problem. Guaranties were necessary to protect the national interests of the Jewish proletariat in its present homelands, because territorial autonomy in Palestine was not immediately realizable. But national autonomy could not affect the abnormality of Jewish economic and social life in Russia, and one need, furthermore, not w a x enthusiastic about its potentialities. Even before the limited corrective could be achieved, society must be completely democratized, the political and social groupings must be reorganized on a nationalfederative basis, freedom of national education must be assured and the equality in rights of all languages must be recognized. And even then the most important guaranty for the effectiveness of national-political autonomy; i. e., the existence elsewhere in the state of a ruling territorial majority of the same nationality ™ would still be lacking. Thus even the reconstruction of the state into a federation of autonomous nationalities, and even the assurance of nationalpolitical autonomy, would not secure the Jews against national oppression. T o the Poale-Zionists, the true value of national-political autonomy lay in the probability that it would afford the Jews the opportunity better to regulate their inner national life; that it would provide a recognized representation for the Jews and put an end to the humiliating pleading and " backstairs diplomacy " ; that it would make possible for the Jewish nationality a normal financial apparatus; and finally, that it would give the Jews a political education.54 88

This clearly shows the influence of Renner.

" For the general theory of the Poale-Zionists, see Borochov, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 29-100, 118-143, 194-293, and documents in Zerubavel, op. cit., pp. 408-413, 43S-448, 457-465·

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T h e definite formulation of the national demands was evolved gradually. A conference, held in 1906, immediately after the formation of the party, resolved that since it was necessary to remove national conflicts and national oppression, the working class of oppressed nationalities would demand " national autonomy, which should include in its competence the inner cultural and economic interests of each nationality. . . . " W h e n the elections to the second Duma were under consideration, the party leaders felt that a more definite commitment on national rights would be necessary. A conference was, therefore, convoked at Grodno toward the end of October, 1906, and after a thorough discussion of the question it was resolved that " the conference presents, as our maximum national demand in the Diaspora: Jewish PersonalPolitical Autonomy." This Grodno conference did not possess binding force, but the project-program presented to the second party convention at Cracow, and there adopted, was recognized by all as the authoritative platform of the Poale-Zionists. Part II of this document entitled " T h e W o r k in the Diaspora " clearly and precisely outlined the party's national-political demands. In addition to a demand for the complete democratization of society, the platform declared : A s regards the national question the party presents the demand for national-political autonomy with a broad economic, cultural and financial competence in all inner affairs for those nationalities whose interests cannot sufficiently be satisfied through territorial (district) autonomy. Presenting the demand of national-political autonomy, as a maximum formula of Jewish national rights in the Diaspora, the party nevertheless insists that this institution can under no circumstances be considered the necessary and only means to Zionism, and that until the realization of national [territorial]

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autonomy no democratic institutions or national rights in the Diaspora can solve the Jewish question. A s pre-requisites for the maximum formula of national rights which are possible in the Diaspora, the party presents a series of transitional demands: freedom of national education, nationalcultural autonomy, equality of rights of languages, proportional representation in the legislative, administrative and judicial organs. 65

Unlike the Seymists and Poale-Zionists, the third proletarian Zionist faction early assumed a negative attitude toward Jewish national autonomy in Russia. T h e Zionist Socialist Labor P a r t y declared that only in a territory of its own could the " J e w i s h nation " find relief f r o m the social, economic and national-political oppression and the cultural sterility to which it was doomed in the Diaspora because of the lack of a national economy. T h i s group further maintained that national-political institutions, resting on a wide national autonomy, could be effective only where the various classes of a nationality were " organically linked in the production process," a condition which did not obtain among the J e w s whose bourgeoisie was not at all dependent upon a Jewish proletariat. F o r that reason the first regular convention of the party which met in April, 1906, declared that national autonomy in the form of a political diet is a reactionary dream of certain sections of the Jewish bourgeoisie . . .; that national autonomy in the form of a cultural diet . . . possesses no real foundation in the present national-cultural life of the Jewish people; and finally, that national-cultural autonomy, by attempting to give an ideological-cultural answer to the social-economic problems of the Jewish masses, confuses 55

Cf. Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. ii, heft I, p. 388; Zerubavel, op. eit., pp. QO-97, 460-462; Der Proletarisher Gedank, no. I ( 1 9 0 7 ) , pp. 71-75.

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revolutionary socialism with an ethical-political radicalism and diverts the Jewish proletariat from its true emancipatory course. Having thus disposed of the broad claims of other factions, the convention proceeded to formulate its own " national demands." " The Jewish proletariat," it asserted, " can satisfy in the Diaspora only those national needs which consist in the acquisition of education in its own national language," but the institutions necessary for that purpose " cannot assume in Jewish life any actual compulsory effect." It was therefore proposed that " Jewish national education be transferred to free school associations, . . . and that these school associations should receive a definite subsidy from the state." 56 Thus did the Zionist Socialist Labor Party seek to minimize the value of national rights. But the hostile attitude soon began to grow more moderate. The very first convention, recognizing that the " school associations," which were to direct so important a phase of cultural life, had not been clearly defined, resolved that " the question of the organization of the school associations, their relations to the state, and the amount and character of the subsidy, are to be discussed and considered in the party literature." The official party organ declared, soon after the convention, that the constituent assembly of a democratized Russia must guarantee " freedom for all nations—freedom also for the Jewish nation." Furthermore, while reiterating the narrow demand for voluntary school associations to control Jewish education, the wider and vaguer assertion was made that the Jewish proletariat " strives to secure in its own hands the satisfying of its cultural needs on the one hand, and the organization of emigration on the other." These broader Cf. Zionist Socialist Labor Party, Deklaratsion Der Neier Veg, no. I (1906), pp. 39-4°· 66

(n. d.), pp. 1 0 - 1 6 ;

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claims, moreover, did not represent merely the personal opinions of the editors. F o r the official platform of the party in the elections to the second Duma demanded, in addition to the removal of all exceptional laws, " the complete equality of rights of the Jewish nation and of the Jewish language." T h e latter demand would certainly involve wide national pretensions, though the party preferred not to specify them. Even the cardinal principle of " school associations " underwent some modification. In place of a mere subsidy, the party demanded in 1907 that " J e w i s h education should at state expense be transferred " to the school associations." 4 . A G I T A T I O N FOR J E W I S H A U T O N O M Y I N A U S T R I A

T h e agitation for Jewish autonomy in Austria before the period of the Russian Revolution was entirely an academic matter. The theoretical writings of Birnbaum may have produced some effect upon a few nationally-inclined intellectuals. They could hardly reach the masses. During 19051907, however, the character of Austrian-Jewish nationalism changed completely. A t this time, the people of Austria were engaged in a great struggle for electoral reform, and the Jews, too, were aroused. W h e n the representation of the various nationalities was under consideration, Romanchuk, the leader of the Ruthenians, proposed in the Austrian parliament that the Jews be recognized as a nationality, and, as such, be given separate representation. He sought, of course, to detach the three-quarters of a million Jews of Galicia from the ruling nationality, the Poles. But the Jewish masses were stirred. Moreover, the widespread activity for Jewish national rights in Russia stimulated similar developments in the Hapsburg lands, especially in " Cf. Der Neter Veg (1906), no. i, pp. 7-8; no. 2, p. 80; Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. ii, h e f t 2, pp. 239-242.

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Galicia and Bukowina. 68 Mass meetings and demonstrations were held, petitions were sent to the government at Vienna and to the Galician Diet, and the Jewish press actively debated the question of national rights. The nationalists demanded universal suffrage and the recognition of the Jewish nationality; and for the first time the Jewish masses heard also the proposal of national autonomy for the Jews. The leaders of the old school, the " assimilationists," fought this new nationalism tooth-and-nail. But in the heat of the conflict Jewish groups and parties adopted autonomist programs." The Austrian Zionists passed through a process of development similar to that of their fellows in Russia. They at first refrained from meddling (as Zionists) in the internal politics of their country. But the desire to wrest control of the religious communities from the hands of their enemies led the nationalists to demand that the purely denominational organizations concern themselves also with education, social welfare and the like. With the assurance of universal manhood suffrage in 1906, the opportunity seemed at hand for securing a Jewish representation in Parliament, and perhaps also for winning recognition for the Jewish nationality. Zionists, therefore, came to recognize the importance of national-political work. 08

Cf. Dos Yiddishe Folk (1906), no. 3, pp. 4-5; no. 20, p. 1 7 ; HoZeman (daily), no. 265 (1905), p. 5. There was really a mutual influence between the Jewish national movements of Russia and Austria. The more numerous and more active Russian groups were admired in Galicia, and their revolutionary character lent them a certain heroic glamor. The Austrians, on the other hand, were watched and envied in Russia because of the open and untrammeled activity which they were allowed. 58 Cf. Neues Lemberger Tagblatt, no. 6 (1906) ; Ha-Zeman, nos. 12-13 (1906) ; M. Rosenfeld, Die polnische Judenfrage (Vienna and Berlin, 1918), p. 156; idem, Polen und Juden (Vienna and Berlin, 1917), p. 19; Zerubavel, op. cit., p. 285; Rotter Pinkos, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 43.

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Preparations f o r an extraordinary convention of the Austrian Zionists were begun in the spring of 1906, and on July ι of the same year one hundred and thirty-five delegates from the various Austrian provinces assembled at Cracow. 80 The sessions were characterized by a spirit of optimism and by a sense of power which were in no small measure due to the fact that Benno Straucher, the only nationally-inclined Jewish representative in the Reichsrat,® 1 had agreed to join forces with the Zionists, and actively participated in the deliberations at Cracow. The convention, originally called to debate the desirability of Jewish national participation in Austrian political life, devoted very little time to that question. F o r there were very few who championed the negative view. Isidor Shalit, who opened the congress, presented a report on political action. He called attention to the altered political conditions in the country, and asserted that Austria must before long be rebuilt on the basis of nationality. The J e w s should, therefore, formulate national demands without any further delay, and they must especially seek to establish a " Jewish Club " in parliament to protect the national interests. The overwhelming majority conceded the need for political action. The points at issue were really two. Should the Zionists as such direct this work; or should a separate political organization be created in which Zionists as individuals could assert leadership? The second question was whether 60

In May, 1906, Zionist leaders met in conference at Vienna and appointed a committee of eighty to prepare the ground for Jewish nationalpolitical action in Austria, and to elaborate a program for the forthcoming party convention. On the preparatory action, see Neues Lemberger Tagblatt, nos. 6, 13 (1906) ; Der Yiddisher Kaempfer, no. 13 (1906) ; Ha-Eshkol, vol. vi, pp. 37-38. For a full account of the Cracow convention, see Neues Lemberger Tagblatt, nos. 22-23, 26 (1906). β1

On Straucher's political career and earlier affiliations, see S. R. Landau, Der Polenklub und seine Hausjuden (Vienna, 1907), pp. 41-42.

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i^g

non-Zionist Jewish nationalists should be encouraged to participate in the political body created by convinced Zionists. Some important men, Thon of Cracow f o r example, favored the creation of a national party composed of Zionists and non-Zionists alike. The opposing forces were led by Margulies of Vienna, the reporter on the question. He insisted on a political body distinct from the Zionist Organization, yet restricted only to Zionists; his view prevailed. The decisions of the convention declared that the Zionist Organization was not an Austrian political party, but that the convention viewed as highly desirable the organization of Austrian J e w r y on a national program, aiming to secure the recognition of the Jewish nationality and its complete equality with the other nationalities of Austria. The resolutions further insisted that a Jewish national party must recognize the importance of Palestine in Jewish l i f e ; it must be " loyally Austrian " and socially progressive; it must reckon with the interests of the " broad masses of the Jewish people." Immediately after this convention, a conference was held to launch the Jewish national party. The leadership of the Cracow gathering, including Shalit and Straucher, directed this conference too. But difficulties arose and prevented final action. The delegates could not decide whether to include the Basle program" 2 in the party platform. There was also strong opposition to the adoption of a Zionist name for the party. Finally it was agreed to establish a countrywide political organization with a central committee whose seat of action would be in Vienna. Straucher and the outstanding figures in Austrian Zionism, including Shalit, Margulies, Böhm, Mahler, Stand, Reich and Braude, entered the Central Committee. These leaders were also empowered Supra, p. 34.

I 4

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by the conference to select a name for the party and to formulate its program. The organization was subsequently named the Jewish National Party, and the program drawn by the leadership was similar to the one subsequently adopted by the Russian Zionists at Heisings fors. In substance it demanded national autonomy for the Austrian nationalities, including the Jews. 8 ® The non-Zionist nationalists were of far less significance than the Zionists. Until the summer of 1906, the two groups cooperated. The Zionist, Shalit, and the non-Zionist, Birnbaum, were both leading members of an Association to Secure the National Rights of the Jewish Nationality which functioned in Vienna. At the Cracow convention, however, the Zionists abandoned their less numerous and poorly organized associates. Of even greater importance was the defection of Straucher. That able and active Reichsrat member had gathered and led a group of non-Zionist nationalists at Vienna. But these united with the Zionists. The remaining autonomists, among whom Birnbaum was still numbered, therefore remained a weak group of intellectuals, much like Dubnow's parallel group in Russia. They united in a Jewish People's Association (Jüdischer Volksverein) in Vienna, and, rejecting Zionism, agitated for Jewish national rights in Austria." 83

Cf. Neues Lemberger Tagblatt, nos. 22, 26 (1906); Böhm, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 58. Shortly after this action had been taken by the Austrian Zionists, an echo was heard among the Hungarian Zionists, too. At their fourth conference at Pressburg, Hungary, Abramsohn urged that the Jews must " pursue Jewish national politics." But in Hungary, where the Jews desired no national rights, this proved of only academic importance. See Dos Yiddishe Folk, no. 17 (1906). 84 Cf. Ha-Zeman, (1906).

no. 14 (1906) ; Neues Lemberger

Tagblatt,

no. 6

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During 1905-1906, the two Austrian-Jewish labor groups, the organization of which we have noted in the introductory chapter, likewise definitely committed themselves to national autonomy. A n d here the influence of the Russian-Jewish national movement is clearly discernible. The most significant event in the early history of Austrian Poale-Zionism was the third party congress held at Lemberg, October 1 1 - 1 3 , 1906. It met at a time when the popular agitation of the Poale-Zionists was at its height,*5 when the influence of the Russian Poale-Zionist leaders was potent, and when the example of the Austrian Zionists was still before the public eye. This convention was well-attended, ninety-two delegates representing thirty-nine cities. The leadership, too, was effective. M a x Rosenfeld, a youthful but able law student, who, we are told, was the first among the Austrian Poale-Zionists to apply himself to an investigation of national autonomy, was chairman. Kaplansky and Gross actively led the congress in the matter of national rights. The former introduced and explained the program which he had worked out, and the latter sought to deduce the need for the recognition of the Jewish nationality and for Jewish national autonomy from the principles adopted at the Brünn socialist congress. The resolutions of the convention maintained that the Jewish denominational communities, which were characterized as the remains of the old autonomous Jewish national bodies, must be democratized and rebuilt into representative national institutions. Properly reformed, the national communities would be in a position to assume the functions of national autonomy. Since, moreover, the Austrian government was apportioning electoral districts according to national interests, the Poale-Zionists demanded that the Jewish 65

In less than two years the party membership had doubled, reaching a total of over 4,000. Cf. Yiddisher Kaempfer, no. 32 (1906).

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nationality also be so recognized. Finally, the program declared that until the territorial solution of the Jewish problem would be realized in Palestine, . . . the party strives to attain, in states harboring several nationalities, the full equality of the Jewish nationality on the basis of national autonomy, not considering however the attainment of national diets, (which are autonomous in economic, political and cultural matters) . . . as a solution, or even as a preliminary condition to the territorial solution of the Jewish question.8® The Jewish Social Democratic Party in Galicia, or the " Galician Bund," did not declare in favor of Jewish national autonomy at its constituent convention which met at Lemberg in June, 1905, although it did then approve the national program of the Austrian Social Democracy. The party organ, however, soon made it clear that it favored nationalcultural autonomy; and at the second convention of the faction, held at Lemberg in May, 1906, after the Russian Bund had adopted a national program, a resolution definitely committed the Galician group to national-cultural autonomy. The concept, however, was allowed to remain ill-defined, and individual members differed widely in their understanding of the term. T o some it meant no more than language and school autonomy; others stretched the term considerably, urging a national curia to assure the Jews representation in the general assemblies, a national register to unify Austria's Jews for cultural affairs, even a national diet with the right to levy taxes, and an executive body chosen by the diet to direct the nationality's cultural affairs. 67 ββ Zerubavel, op. cit., pp. 420-424, 592-595. Good accounts of the convention are given in Der Yiddisher Kaempfer, nos. 32-34 (1906), and in Neues Lemberger Tagblatt, no. 90 (1906). βτ

Cf. Der Sotsialdemokrat, vol. ν, nos. 4-6, 8, 30-31, 43, 45; Der Vecker, nos. 9, 29 (1906) ; Roiter Pinkas, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 46; Zerubavel, op. cit., p. 298.

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The adoption of national programs by the Austrian Zionists and Poale-Zionists and by the " Galician Bund " was accompanied and followed by an intense agitation in Austrian Jewry. The electoral reform granting universal manhood suffrage for Austria was gradually pushed through parliament in 1906, and after its approval by the Emperor in the following January, a general election was set for May, 1907. In the election campaign the Jewish nationalists sought by various means to arouse national feeling among the masses. Large mass meetings and conferences were called, especially in Galicia. Straucher was instrumental in organizing active Jewish national societies in Bukowina. A n understanding was reached with the Ruthenians. J e w ish university students organized and agitated for the recognition of the Jews as a separate nationality in the universities and for the establishment of chairs in Jewish history and literature. A n attack was launched against the Jewish " assimilationist" leaders—lackeys of the Poles, their enemies called them—and an attempt was made to deprive them of control over the Jewish religious and communal organizations." 8 The results of the election, while by no means a triumph, were encouraging. The Jewish masses manifested interest in minority nationalism and elected four nationalist deputies with the aid of the Ruthenians. The deputies immediately organized a " Jewish C l u b " under the leadership of 88 Birnbaum and the Poale-Zionists supported the Zionists, who bore the brunt of the election struggle. C f . Neues Lemberger Tagblatt, no. 49 (1906) ; Landau, op. cit.; Dos Yiddishe Folk, nos. I, 17-18, 2 1 , 2 3 (1906) ; nos. 1-4, 7, 13, 1 6 - 1 8 (1907) ; Birnbaum, Ausgewählte Schriften, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 3-S, 125-169. T h e anti-nationalist Jewish leaders attacked the entire autonomist agitation as an attempt to segregate the J e w s and restore the Ghetto. See S . Mayer (President of the österreichische Israelitische Union), Die Wiener Juden (Vienna and Berlin, 1 9 1 7 ) , PP· 465-468, 481-490.

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Straucher who was forthwith invited to acquaint the prime minister with the aims of the group. T h e Club in a formal statement declared that it would favor nationaldemocratic policies, and would particularly exert itself to secure the full recognition of the Jewish nationality. It also declared its intention to seek in the protection of minorities and in national autonomy a solution of Austria's national problems. 5. SLIGHT ACTIVITY IN T H E OTTOMAN EMPIRE A N D IN T H E UNITED STATES

The Jewish national agitation in Russia and Austria during the period of the Revolution of 1905 occasioned also some slight activity among the Jews of Turkey and the United States. In the latter t w o countries the question of Jewish national rights was raised between 1904 and 1907 only by national-socialist groups consisting of workmen and intellectuals, recent arrivals f r o m eastern Europe, who transplanted their parties and party-wrangling to their new homes. In Turkey the initiative was taken by the Jewish Social Democratic Labor Party in Palestine (Poale Z i o n ) . Organized in 1905-1906 and never numerous before the W o r l d W a r , this group yet contrived by press and propaganda to call attention to its principles. Its project-program, worked out by Ben-Zevi, declared in f a v o r of " political autonomy for the Jewish nation " in Turkey, and demanded the democratization of all Jewish self-governing institutions. T h e party press also agitated for full national rights for every nationality in the state, and for the recognition of Hebrew, the Jewish national tongue, as an official language in public institutions, wherever the Jews dwelt in proportionately large numbers. 70 e> Tt>

The Club's statement is given in Böhm, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 59, note. In 1912, this " party " consisted of 300 members.

[Der Kamf,

no. 3

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The pioneer work in America was done by Zhitlowsky, who arrived in 1904 to seek financial aid f o r the Socialist Revolutionary Party. He visited and lectured at many cities in the United States and Canada urging, among other things, the need for a Jewish socialist party with a national program. This veteran national socialist would have had the United States rebuilt as a state embracing several nationalities, each with a considerable amount of autonomy. In a lecture on " The Future of Nationalities in America " before a students club at the University of Chicago in 1906 or 1907, he enlarged upon the merits of a commonwealth consisting of the " United Peoples of the United States." 71 But save for a handful of disciples, who called themselves the Jewish Socialist Labor Party, he was alone in this demand. The SocialistTerritorialists favored national activity within the Jewish group but viewed national demands in the Diaspora as impracticable. Even the Poale-Zionists, who did favor autonomy, tempered this demand in their program with the qualification that no uniform formula for national rights would suit the needs of the Jews living in various countries and under differing political and social conditions. For, added the party credo, " if national autonomy, for example, is desirable for the Jews in Russia or in Austria, . . . [it] is not necessary for Jews in America, where they can protect their own interests through the structure of American politics and civil rights. . . . " Nor was this an heretical view, for Borochov, the leader of Russian Poale-Zionism, agreed with it. He called the United States a " nationally-indifferent state " where minorities, readily adopting American culture, were not conscious of any national needs. " Therefore," (1923), p. 6.] Its platform is given in Zerubavel, op. cit., pp. 425-428. See also Der Proletarishcr Cedank, no. 3 (1907), pp. 63-66; Ha-Achduth, no. ι (1910), pp. 9-10. 71

Interview with Dr. Zhitlowsky, Apr. 10, 1930.

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continued Borochov, " there exist in America no national questions and no national politics, and there can for the present be no talk of national rights there." 72 7 2 B o r o c h o v , In Kampf far Yiddishe Recht, op. cit., p. 85; the PoaleZionist p r o g r a m is given in Der Yiddisher Kaempfer, nos. I, 3 (1906). O n the early Jewish national socialist movement in the United States, see Zhitlowsky Zamelbuch, op. cit., pp. 173-179; Yiddisher Arbeiter Yorbuch un Almanack ( Ν . Y . , 1927), pp. 43-59. In A p r i l , 1905, aided by the propaganda of Zhitlowsky, the nationalist w o r k m e n sought to organize a party, but the very first convention resulted in a split. B e f o r e long two weak organizations, the Jewish Socialist L a b o r P a r t y " Poale-Zion " in the United States and Canada and the Socialist-Territorialists (corresponding to the Russian Zionist Socialists) sought popular support.

CHAPTER

IV

T H E D E C L I N E OF T H E MOVEMENT

(1907-1914)

THE heyday of Jewish national activity passed with the years 1904-1907. Thereafter the movement for Jewish rights languished. T o be sure, agitation continued; but by 1 9 1 4 the non-Zionist national effort appeared to have spent itself. In Russia mass agitation ceased entirely. What remained of national action was confined, as in the years prior to the Revolution of 1905, to feeble groups of intellectuals. The Jewish nationalists of Austria did appeal several times to the populace but their action yielded no positive results. Among the J e w s of the Ottoman Empire the rise to power of the Young Turks occasioned a flurry. But no autonomist movement developed, because the new rulers of Turkey did not seriously affect the ancient Jewish national-religious institutions. Beyond the ineffective activities in Russia, Austria and Turkey, only one national effort is worthy of note. 1 Several Jewish national-socialist parties made an attempt to secure the recognition of the Jewish nationality by the international socialist movement. But that too failed. In fact, failure and impotence characterize Jewish national action undertaken between 1907 and 1 9 1 4 . 1 During this period, Zhitlowsky and others expended much energy in an attempt to unify the several Jewish national-socialist groups in the United States. In 1910 unity was for a time achieved. But from the standpoint of Jewish national rights this agitation was of little significance. Cf. Zhitlowsky, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 47-108; Zhitlowsky Zamelbuch, op. cit., pp. 179-180; Dos Neie Leben, no. 5 ( 1 9 0 9 ) . PP· 47-53; Zerubavel, op. cit., pp. 475*476.

147

148

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AND MINORITY

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I . I N RUSSIA

The widespread agitation for national autonomy in Russia ceased abruptly in 1907. The reactionary autocracy reigned supreme; the radical elements were driven underground; all efforts to secure rights for the nationalities were stifled. The two Jewish representatives who were elected to the third Duma, and the three who sat in the fourth, could do no more than remind their colleagues of the discrimination against Jews. The " assimilationist " followers of Vinaver, content to speak of the need for civil and political equality, ceased to render lip service to Jewish national rights. The Zionists again looked to Palestine as the only hope for Jewish national survival. The proletarian agitators dared not show themselves for fear of banishment or worse. The neglect of the Jewish national claims was, however, primarily due to fear. With the possible exception of Vinaver's People's Group, no party repudiated its nationalist program. In fact we find that the Jewish element which had been most critical of national rights at the time of the Revolution of 1905, felt impelled during this period to reconsider its policy. The Zionist Socialist Labor Party had boasted early in 1907 a membership of 27,000—a significant number for tsarist Russia, but the reaction which set in in that year caused its almost complete disintegration. It is true that all socialist parties suffered; but this group, we are told, was particularly vulnerable: it had not formulated a comprehensive national program for the J e w s in Russia, nor could it point to a definite territory to which the Russian Jews might remove. S o discouraging was the party's outlook, that even some of its leaders began to desert it. A s a result, the negative attitude to national autonomy and to Jewish self-governing institutions underwent modification. In February, 1 9 1 1 , when the fourth party conference was held at Vienna, though full national-personal autonomy was

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not as yet accepted, the Zionist Socialist Labor Party decided to participate in the Jewish communal institutions and to further their autonomous development. About the same time the first steps were taken to bring about a union of this faction with other proletarian-Zionist groups which strongly favored Jewish national autonomy. 2 2. I N AUSTRIA

The Austrian Jewish nationalists were less handicapped than those of Russia. National agitation was not illegal in the Hapsburg realm, and much energy was expended in efforts to win recognition for the Jewish nationality. The results achieved, however, were meager. Between 1909 and 1 9 1 1 the advocates of Jewish national rights were engaged in three tense campaigns in Austria. First the Bukowina Landtag decided to alter the electoral law by introducing national curiae for the various nationalities inhabiting the province. The Zionists and their allies scored a great triumph when the local diet agreed to recognize the Jewish nationality. But the influence of the powerful anti-nationalist Jews in the Austrian capital proved more potent. The Vienna ministry refused to permit the establishment of a Jewish curia and the Bukowina J e w s were registered as of German nationality." 2

Cf. Kirzhnits, op. cil., vol. iii, pp. 86-89, 345· During this time the Bund appears to have been instrumental in moderating the hostility of some Russian socialists to national autonomy. By 1910-1911 the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party had hopelessly split into Bolshevists and Menshevists, and the Bund threw in its lot with the latter. The Menshevists had always been less hostile to the nationalsocialist parties; while the Bolshevists consistently denied any claims to national-cultural autonomy, their opponents approved, at their Vienna conference in 1912, of national self-determination in the spirit also of national-cultural autonomy. See Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 185-189, 198-200, 350-351. See also Martow, op. cit., pp. 250-273. 3

However, ten Jews were elected to the diet of Bukowina, and they

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D u r i n g 1 9 1 0 the Austrian Jewish nationalists, anticipating the census which was to be taken at the close of the year, carried on a wide agitation f o r the recognition of Y i d d i s h as a colloquial tongue. T h e Austrian census did not register nationality, but it did record the language of daily communication of the people. T h e J e w i s h national parties seized upon this opportunity. T h e Poale-Zionists issued a proclamation in which they urged that, should a large number of Jews register Yiddish, then the Yiddish language will have to be recognized, . . . in Galicia. Then in time it will be possible to . . . [demand the recognition o f ] Yiddish in court, in the administration. Then Yiddish documents will have to be considered valid. Then they will have to grant us national schools. . . . M a n y J e w i s h students approved of this plan. T h e Zionists actively cooperated. E v e n the moderately national " Galician Bund " pronounced the recognition of the Y i d d i s h language a national-cultural need, and entered the lists. 4 The J e w i s h nationalists organized hundreds of meetings, assemblies and lectures; they staged street demonstrations; they arranged a house-to-house canvass. B u t those J e w s who heeded the agitators were fined or jailed, and the movement miscarried. 5 T h e last serious effort to further J e w i s h nationalism in organized a " J e w i s h Club." Cf. S. Kassner, Die Juden in der Bukowina (Vienna and Berlin, 1917), pp. 55-56; Der Jude, vol. ν, p. 210, note; Borochov, In Kampf far Yiddishe Recht, op. cit., pp. 59-60; Mayer, op. cit., p. 482. • T h e fourth convention of the "Galician B u n d " (October, 1910) decided in favor of registering Yiddish as the Jewish language. The Russian Bund commended this action. 5 Cf. ( M S . ) Chasanowitsch, Kaplansky and Locker, The Jews in Galicia and in Bukowina; Zerubavel, op. cit., pp. 288-289; Rotter Pinkos, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 46-47; Der Sotsialdemokrat, vol. vi, nos. 1 1 , 40. Some results of the census are given in Der Jude, vol. ii, pp. 725-727.

THE DECLINE

OF THE

MOVEMENT

pre-war Austria was made at the time of the Reichsrat election in 1 9 1 1 . The nationalists were anxious to retain the four seats won in 1907, but they encountered a well-directed opposition from the " assimilationists " as well as from the Galician Poles and the Vienna authorities, who were all determined to eliminate the Jewish national representation from the Austrian parliament. The national leaders contended that fraud and violence were employed against them; and at least in one city, in Drohobycz, an election riot did result in the death of twenty-four Jews and the wounding of fifty.' Whatever the cause, though, the results proved disastrous to Jewish nationalism. The only Jewish national deputy to survive the election was Straucher, who had been a member of the Reichsrat before the wide autonomist agitation began. In tangible results, therefore, the half-dozen years of agitation yielded little. Discouragement set in, and the Jewish autonomist movement subsided, not to rise again as. a mass movement in Austria until the era of revolutions which brought the World War to a close. 3 . A N ABORTIVE A T T E M P T I N T H E OTTOMAN E M P I R E

W e have noted in a previous chapter the national program of a handful of Poale-Zionists living in Palestine. Beyond that no autonomist agitation was in evidence in the Ottoman empire, because the Turkish Jews were not conscious of any non-Zionist national problem. The victory of the Young Turks in 1908, however, occasioned some apprehension among the Jews lest their autonomy be curtailed. The Association Law of 1909 which forbade the existence of purely national organizations aroused the opposition of many subject peoples, including the Jews. Moreover, a Hebrew weekly, Ha-Mevasser, founded at Constantinople at the close of 1909, set itself the task of Jewish 6

Böhm, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 60.

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national and cultural development. It sought to further the full national recognition and equality of Ottoman Jews, autonomy in national education with Hebrew as the language of instruction, and Jewish national representation in government institutions. The readers were kept informed of the achievements of Jewish national politics in Austria. They were told of the unsatisfactory manner in which business was conducted by the Jewish National Council of Constantinople. The editor, moreover, showed particular zeal in ascertaining and in presenting the attitude of the government leaders toward the national question in general, and toward the Hebrew language in particular.7 This incipient agitation, however, quickly died away, because the anticipated menace to the Jewish autonomous institutions did not materialize. An interview with the Minister of Education produced the assurance that the government favored full freedom for the nationalities to develop culturally and was quite satisfied that Hebrew be maintained as the Jewish national language. The minister even promised financial support for the Jewish schools. He stipulated only that the Jewish children learn Turkish too, and that the Jews should not adopt a foreign language, such as German, French or English, as their national tongue. Nazim-Bey, the leader of the Party of Union and Progress, expressed similar views; and a party congress declared in favor of national rights, including the recognition of the languages of the various nationalities in the state. The editor of the Hebrew periodical, who had sought to interest his readers in the east-European Jewish national politics, declared that all the hopes of the Ottoman Jews had been fulfilled and their faith in the Young Turks justified. He ι Ηar-Mevasser, vol. i, no. I, pp. 1-3; nos. 31-36, pp. 478-479, 494-496, 507-508, 5 5 2 - 5 5 3 ; no. 39, PP· 583-585.

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was satisfied that the Turkish nationalists desired " political unity and not cultural assimilation " of the nationalities. 8 4.

NON-RECOGNITION OF J E W I S H NATIONALISM BY T H E SOCIALIST I N T E R N A T I O N A L

During the period under consideration, several Jewish socialist parties sought admittance into the international socialist organization. The Second International was a federation of national socialist parties. But the term " n a t i o n " signified a territorial rather than an ethnic unit. The Bund participated in the annual world congresses because it formed a constituent member of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. There was no place in the International f o r independent Jewish national parties. When the socialist congress convened at Stuttgart in August, 1907, it was confronted with the proposal that a national section be formed to represent the various Jewish proletarian parties. This the congress declined to do. It did, however, admit the Russian Seymists and the Zionist Socialist Labor Party to the International; the former was allotted one vote in the Russian Socialist Revolutionary delegation ; the latter secured a consultative vote.® The Poale-Zionists presented a more formidable problem because the Russian, Austrian and American parties acted in common. In the name of 19,000 organized workers, the International Socialist Bureau was requested to grant the combined Poale-Zionists representation " as a socialist party of the proletarians of the Jewish nationality." The petition was denied, but the Jewish nationalists refused to view their defeat as final. They met at the Hague in August, 1907, and united in the International Jewish Socialist Labor Fed8

For the guaranties of the Young Turks, see ibid., vol. i, supplement to no. 10, appendix facing p. 748; no. 12, pp. 190-191; no. 45, pp. 653-654. See also Ben-Gurion, in In Kampf jar Yiddishe Recht, op. cit., pp. 70-71. 9

The Zionist Socialist Labor Party's vote was subsequently withdrawn.

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eration Poale-Zion. A central bureau was established at Vienna and placed under the direction of Borochov. This central body, among its other activities, never ceased to agitate for the recognition of the Jewish nationality by world socialism. Until the World War, however, the hesitation of the Socialist Bureau, together with the unbending opposition of the Russian Bund, were sufficient to prevent the establishment of a Jewish section in the Socialist International. 10 The outbreak of the World W a r in 1 9 1 4 brought to a close the formative period in the movement for Jewish national rights. In the space of somewhat less than two decades the idea of Jewish national autonomy grew from a mere theory, held by a handful of intellectuals, into a veritable mass movement. In Russia practically every Jewish party, which commanded public attention at the time of the Revolution of 1905, formulated national demands. The Austrian assimilationist " leaders proved less willing to compromise with Jewish nationalism. But the idea nevertheless attracted many followers. The Jewish press of both countries seriously debated the new demands, and the Jewish masses of Galicia and Bukowina, as well as those of Russia, became conscious of a Jewish national problem apart from Zionism and Palestine. T w o other characteristics of the first stage of Jewish autonomist activity should be noted. First, the movement declined after a number of initial successes. Both in Russia and in Austria proponents of national rights were elected to the central parliament. The tsarist government, however, 1 0 See Der Yiddishcr Kacmpfer, nos. 14, 24-25 ( 1 9 0 7 ) ; Di Shtimme (Vilna, 1907), pp. 1-46; Ha-Achduth, vol. iv, nos. 44-45, pp. 23-38; Zerubavel, op. cit., pp. 104-105, 151-171, 431-434, 469-494, 582-583; Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. ii, heft I, pp. 384-387, 396-397; heft 2, p. 411; Zhitlowsky, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 161-207.

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discountenanced national agitation. Its triumph over the revolution therefore hampered the Jewish nationalists. In Austria, on the other hand, the progress of Jewish nationalism was halted by the influential assimilationists. Secondly, pre-war agitation for Jewish national autonomy was confined to eastern Europe, notably to Russia and Austria. Insignificant groups of proletarian Zionists, w h o had immigrated into the large cities of western Europe and of America did occasionally refer to national rights. But they desired such rights not for themselves but only f o r Jews who resided in states of multiple nationality. 11 Outside of the Poale-Zionist groups one can find in the western countries or the Balkans no more than sympathetic interest in the work of the Jewish nationalists of Russia, Austria and Turkey. T h e organ of the Belgian Zionist Federation noted with approval the national-political work of the Russian and Austrian Zionists. The German Jews' interest in the matter consisted of no more than an occasional article in a periodical or a reference at a Zionist congress to what was happening in the eastern lands." A s for the Balkans, William Filderman, President of the Union of Rumanian Jews, has informed the present writer that he knows of no record of any movement " in regard to minority or national rights in Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia or Greece prior to the W o r l d W a r . " T h e Jews of Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria enjoyed equal rights and were too few in number to warrant a demand for national rights. The Rumanian Jews bent all energies to the struggle for civil and political rights. T h e Jews of Saloniki, who had enjoyed complete national-cultural 11

Z h i t l o w s k y w a s a notable exception.

Supra,

p. 145.

Cf. Hatikwah, nos. I, 7 (1907), pp. 3-5, 78; no. 9-10 (1909), p. 107; Der Neinter Tsionislen-kongress in Hamburg ( V i l n a , 1910), pp. 38-39. D r . A . T a r t a k o w e r has informed the present writer that he is unaware of any p r e - w a r Jewish autonomist movement, either in Germany or in the Balkans. 12

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and religious autonomy under the Turks, did constitute a problem when transferred to the Greeks, who recognized no national-religious organizations. But no movement for national rights developed, perhaps because the World W a r , coming hard upon the transfer of Saloniki, turned men's minds in other directions. 1 " The peculiar conditions in which the Jews of eastern Europe found themselves gave birth and nourishment to Jewish minority nationalism. One effect of the World W a r was that sponsors for the new idea appeared among the Jews of western Europe and the United States. 18

( M S S . ) Letter, Filderman to Janowsky, Dec. 20, 1930; L . Feraru, The Jnus in the Balkan Stales and Salonica. I. Alcalay, " The Jews of Serbia," American Jewish Year Book, 1918-1919, pp. 75-87. Rabbi Jacob Meir, the Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Palestine, who was in Saloniki until the close of the World War, has informed the present writer that a conflagration destroyed all pertinent records.

PART II ACTIVITY IN BEHALF OF JEWISH NATIONAL RIGHTS DURING THE WORLD WAR (1914-1918) T H E preceding chapters relating to pre-war activities, have presented a fairly coherent movement f o r national rights. B o t h in Russia and in A u s t r i a Jewish nationalists banded together in political parties and demanded the recognition of their nationality by the state as well as some f o r m o f selfgovernment in the national and cultural affairs of the group. A more complex situation will confront us in surveying the developments during the four years of war.

Several Rus-

sian provinces were overrun and occupied by the Central Powers.

Jewish agitation in that region will have to be

treated apart f r o m the general Russian movement.

The

overthrow o f the tsar in March, 1 9 1 7 , created political and social conditions materially different from those described in P a r t I o f this study.

T h e rise to power of the Bolshevists

further complicated matters.

D u r i n g this period, further-

more, the Ukraine experimented with projects for national autonomy.

O u r attention will therefore be directed not only

to agitation in conferences and at elections but also to constructive efforts which sought to rear institutions of national self-government. N o r will an account of Jewish nationalism in eastern Europe suffice.

In the first t w o or three years of the war,

the Russian and A u s t r i a n developments were obscured by widespread agitation among the Jews of the United States. W e shall also find propagandist groups in Copenhagen, in 157

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Switzerland and in Holland. All these activities will require explanation, and care will have to be taken to distinguish the objectives of the western nationalists from those of the eastEuropean autonomists. The former did not demand national rights for themselves. They rather sought to unite world Jewry on a program calling for national rights in the east-European states of multiple nationality. Jewish national activity in the west was directed toward the anticipated peace conference which was to terminate the war and in which Jewish leaders hoped to exert some influence. The Russian revolution of March, 1 9 1 7 , marked a decided turning point in war-time Jewish national activity. Until that great upheaval, the most significant agitation for Jewish national rights centered in the United States. Contemporaneous with the overthrow of the tsar, however, occurred the entry of the United States into the war. The American agitation was silenced, and the Russian nationalists again assumed the leadership in the movement for Jewish autonomy. The Russian revolution will be used as a convenient line of demarcation in the forthcoming chapters.

CHAPTER

V

F R O M T H E O U T B R E A K OF T H E W O R L D W A R TO T H E RUSSIAN

REVOLUTION

DURING the first two and a half years of the war, the center of Jewish national agitation was not in the eastEuropean strongholds of Jewish nationalism. The Russian and Austrian movements for national rights were none too vigorous in 1 9 1 4 ; the immediate effect of the war was to cause them to be almost completely forgotten. Many of the youthful agitators were drafted into the armies. The censors smothered all publications and activities which they considered harmful to the state, and war-time impatience with dissenters, to say nothing of martial law, made Jewish national agitation extremely hazardous. With the outbreak of hostilities, the east-European Jews were faced by far more pressing problems than national rights. Concentrated on the frontiers, they found themselves in the path of opposing armies and suffered all the dangers and consequences of war. The Russian Jews particularly were adversely affected by the war. They were branded as disloyal by tsarist officials and burdened with responsibility for Russia's defeats. The Jews of the war zone were therefore at the mercy of ruthless military men. The government also decided upon a policy of evacuating Jews from the front. Evacuation meant loss of home and possessions; often it involved the separation of families; at all times it brought ruin to those affected. Hundreds of thousands were thus uprooted and made dependent, at least 159

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temporarily, upon others. 1 T h e eastern Jews, especially those of Russia, were thus confronted with a gigantic relief problem which, even in normal times, would have taxed all available energies. T h e Russian Jewish leaders, moreover, were constrained to labor incessantly in order to convince public opinion that the Jews were loyal and patriotic; they hoped thus to compel the authorities to relax their antiSemitic policies. Little energy was left for national agitation. In contrast with the unfavorable conditions in eastern Europe, the United States afforded an excellent opportunity for Jewish national activity. T h a t country was not involved in the war as yet. It harbored a large Jewish population, many of whom had themselves emigrated from eastern Europe; these understood and sympathized with the national aspirations of their old-world kinsfolk. A l l American Jews were anxious to help remove the restrictions under which many easterners were still laboring. These factors contributed to produce a widespread agitation in behalf of Jewish national rights. T h e American movement will be surveyed first. In western and central Europe too—in neutral as well as in belligerent centers—innumerable Jewish groups became active. This phase of war-time activity appears bewildering indeed until we discover that nationalism divided the Jewish elements into t w o well-defined classes. T h e nationalists everywhere demanded national rights for the Jews who 1 In May, 1915, over 280,000 Jews were evacuated from the provinces of Kovno and Kurland within two days. Landauer, op. cit., p. 29, note 28. Cf. also Discours prononcis a la Duma et au Conseil d'Empire sur la situation du peuple juif en Russie (Lausanne, 1915) ; The National Question in the Russian Duma, trans, by E. L. Minsky (London, 1915) ; M. Vinaver, Rapport sur la question juive (Paris, n. d.), pp. 6-53; Vilner Zamclbuch (Vilna, 1916-1918), vol. i, pp. 7-28 et seq., 196-217; vol. ii, pp. 112-116, 152-158.

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resided in states of multiple nationality. T h e anti-nationalists pleaded only for civil and political equality. Finally, the limited agitation which developed in Russia, in Austria and in the Russian provinces which the GermanAustrian armies conquered, will have to be treated separately from the west and central European and American movements. T h e east-European agitators demanded rights f o r themselves, whereas even the nationalists of the " w e s t " desired only to aid their eastern brethren. Only the Austrian Jewish nationalists manifested a two-fold tendency; they sought national rights for themselves and also for the Jews of the occupied regions. Austrian Jewish national agitation will therefore figure both in the activity of the westerners and of the easterners. I . T H E MOVEMENT FOR A N AMERICAN J E W I S H

CONGRESS:

N A T I O N A L RIGHTS A BASIC ISSUE

In 1914 the Jews of the United States did not constitute a homogeneous mass. T h e descendants of the German immigrants who had arrived at about the middle of the nineteenth century, as well as the Jews w h o claimed Spanish or Portuguese ancestry, were thoroughly assimilated to the American environment. T h e y were, as a rule, wealthy or well-to-do; few belonged to other than the professional or upper middle classes. T h e great majority of this group looked upon their Jewish affiliation as a religious one and, with but f e w exceptions, opposed Jewish nationalism. T h i s element would readily assist coreligionists in eastern Europe. But it would not take kindly to national rights. T h e majority of American Jews were, in 1914, of east European origin. Many had but recently arrived from Russia, Austria-Hungary or Rumania, and had transplanted their old-world attitudes and institutions to their new home. T h e y spoke Yiddish, and their cultural needs were served by

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a press, a literature and a theatre in that language. The greater part consisted of factory workers and petty tradesmen, and economic struggles with the factory owners made many of them " class conscious." On the national question this group divided. Some were affiliated with or sympathetic to the Zionist or proletarian-Zionist parties. Others (the radical labor element in particular) looked to the antinational, socialistic Jewish Daily Forward for guidance. Each of the three groups possessed or created early in the war an organization which concerned itself with international Jewish affairs. The most important was the American Jewish Committee which included in its membership many of the wealthiest, most prominent and most influential of America's Jews. In 1914 the guiding genius of the organization was Louis Marshall, an able and forceful leader who had rendered unusual service in connection with the abrogation of the Russian-American Treaty. 2 The leaders of the Committee had made it their special province to champion Jewish rights in eastern Europe. But they opposed Jewish nationalism, and could see neither the value of nor the need for national rights." 2 See Treaty of 1832 with Russia. Hearing Before Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, sixty-second Congress, Dec. 13, 1 9 1 1 ; Termination of Treaty Between the U. S. and Russia. Hearings Before Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, sixty-second Congress, Feb. 16, 1911, Dec. 1 1 , 1911. 3 The American Jewish Committee was organized in 1906 under the leadership of Judge Mayer Sulzberger, but Jacob H. Schiff has been characterized " perhaps the most conspicuous member" of the group. It set for itself the double task of combating any " infraction of the civil and religious rights of the Jews in any part of the world," and of affording relief wherever persecution or calamities rendered assistance necessary. The Committee consistently protested against discrimination, particularly in Russia and Rumania. Cf. Seventh Annual Report of Amer. Jew. Committee, Amer. Jew. Year Book, 1914-1915, pp. 384-387 et seq.; L. Marshall, " The American Jewish Committee," Jewish Com-

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The American Jewish nationalists acted through the Provisional Executive Committee for Zionist Affairs which was organized in New Y o r k City on August 3 1 , 1 9 1 4 . The chairman and leader of this group was Louis D. Brandeis who subsequently became justice of the United States Supreme Court. The Provisional Executive Committee was mainly concerned with Zionist affairs; it sought particularly to discharge some of the functions of the International Zionist Organization which was disrupted by the war. However, it stood ready at all times to support the eastern Jews in their struggle for rights. A s nationalists, moreover, the Zionists saw no reason to fear the term national, and when the question of national rights arose, they decided in its favor. 4 The labor element did not at once achieve an organization similar to the American Jewish Committee and the Provisional Zionist Committee. The anti-national socialists, because they despaired of any improvement in capitalistic society, were apathetic. But the rank and file of the Jewish labor movement was strongly affected by the propaganda of the national socialists; by the Poale-Zionists, who were strengthened by the arrival, as fugitives, of some of their ablest east-European leaders; by Zhitlowsky; by Pincus Rutenberg, a Russian Socialist Revolutionary, who arrived in 1 9 1 5 and exerted considerable influence upon the workmunal Register (Ν. Y., 1918), pp. 1369-1371; C. Adler, Jacob H. Schiff, His Life and Letters (Ν. Y., 1929), vol. ii, p. 303. The Union of American Hebrew Congregations, which represented the Reform Jews, likewise concerned itself with Jewish rights. It shared the viewpoint of the American Jewish Committee on the question of national rights. During 1915-1916, Simon Wolf, its spokesman, appealed to President Wilson to help secure civil and political equality for the eastern Jews. Cf. S. Wolf, The Presidents I have Known from 1860-1918 (Wash., D. C., 1918), pp. 422-424, 436-437. * Cf. J. de Haas, " The Provisional Executive Committee for Zionist Affairs," Jewish Communal Register, op. cit., pp. 1401-1405.

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men. A s a result of this agitation, a National Workmen's Committee for Jewish Rights was organized in April, 1 9 1 5 .

The leaders of the major groups in America J e w r y began almost immediately on the outbreak of the World W a r to consider ways and means of furthering Jewish rights at the forthcoming peace conference. The element represented by the American Jewish Committee would have preferred to work quietly through a small group of conservative and influential leaders; to formulate a program in collaboration with similar Jewish groups which exerted influence in other lands; and at the proper time to present memorials to sympathetic government officials or to the peace conference. The Committee and its followers disliked popular agitation and distrusted both the radical workingmen, and the nationalists who were certain to raise the questions of Palestine and national rights. They opposed a popularly elected Jewish assembly because the masses of eastern immigrants were likely to be swayed by the nationalists who would thus be empowered to speak in the name of American Jews. For the same reason the nationalists and the Provisional Zionist Committee favored a more democratic organization of American Jews, and in time came to champion an American Jewish congress. The first step in the war-time movement for an American Jewish congress 5 was taken on August 30, 1 9 1 4 , when at an extraordinary conference of American Zionists, held in New York, N. Syrkin, B. Zuckerman and B. G. Richards presented a resolution in favor of a convention f o r the pur6

Proposals for an American Jewish congress had been made years before the war. Cf. B. G. Richards, " The American Jewish Congress," Jewish Communal Register, op. cil., p. 1385. This is the best brief survey of the early congress movement.

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pose of considering Jewish affairs. The resolution was referred for action to the Provisional Zionist Committee, and on the very next day, when the latter body was constituted, Brandeis commenced negotiations with the American Jewish Committee. He invited Marshall, the Committee's president, to cooperate with the Provisional Zionist Committee " in calling a conference of representatives of all the important Jewish organizations and groups in the country." Marshall replied immediately that the American Jewish Committee had already taken appropriate steps to care f o r Jewish needs, but that it welcomed the proffered cooperation. T w o strong sub-committees met," but no agreement could be reached. Negotiations with the American Jewish Committee were not resumed until months later, but both the nationalists and their opponents began to consolidate their positions. The nationalists quickly abandoned the original plan of Brandeis for a conference of representatives of Jewish organizations. The immediate question at issue became— should a democratic congress be called to formulate and to make known the desires of American Jewry, or should a conference, limited in scope and not directly responsible to the populace, be convoked in order to act for the Jews of the country? During the winter of 1 9 1 4 - 1 9 1 5 the congress idea gradually gained ground. A certain Joseph Krimsky initiated conferences in New Y o r k City which led to the organization of a Jewish Emancipation Committee with the object of securing full rights for the unenfranchised Jews. The American Poale-Zionists met in convention at Rochester December 24-30, 1 9 1 4 and resolved that through united action only would Jewish interests be effectively safeguarded 8 Brandeis, Gottheil and Lipsky represented the Zionists; Adler, Marshall and Magnes, the American Jewish Committee.

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at the forthcoming peace conference. They therefore urged the calling of an American Jewish congress to further the civil and national emancipation of the east-European Jews. 1 Yiddish newspapers of N e w Y o r k City began to advocate the plan for a congress. The Jewish press discussed the question of national rights; the national socialists particularly sought to enlighten the American Jews on the meaning of the term, and to explain why the eastern Jews were so persistent in their demand for national rights. Finally Joseph Barondess, a member of the Board of Education of N e w Y o r k City, summoned the officers of Jewish organizations to a conference, and on March 21, 1915, the Jewish Congress Organization Committee was formed with Gedalia Bublick, the editor of the Jewish Daily News, as chairman. Several days later the Provisional Zionist Committee officially endorsed the congress movement, and the well-organized Zionists joined the Congress Organization Committee. 8 While the nationalists were organizing, the American Jewish Committee was not idle. In October, 1914, Jacob H. Schiff called a small conference to consider ways and means of securing an improvement in the condition of the eastern Jews at the close of the war. N o t long thereafter, particularly as agitation for a congress was becoming wide7 Cf. The Jews and the War ( T h e H a g u e , 1916), pp. 85-86. T h e resolution declared that " the national rights of the J e w s in the community, school, language, county and city governments, as well as the right of self-government in all national affairs, must be internationally g u a r anteed," particularly in the case of an autonomous Poland. 8 Cf. T h e A m e r i c a n Jewish Congress, To the Jews of America. The Jew. Cong. vs. The Amer. Jew. Committee ( Ν . Y . , 1915), pp. 5-6, 8 - 1 1 ; Jewish Communal Register, op. ext., pp. 1386-1387; Literatur un Leben— Di Yiddishe Veit, N o v . , 1914, pp. 83-88; A p r i l , 1915, pp. 1 1 4 - 1 1 7 ; S . Levin, In Milchamah Tseiten ( Ν . Y . , 1915-1917), vol. ii, pp. 64-68, 104107; Zhitlowsky, op. cit., vol. ix, pp. 98-104, 162, 166-171. M . K a t z , " W h y W e Need National Rights," The American Hebrew, N o v . 26, I9I5.

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spread, the Committee decided to call " a conference of the representatives of national organizations—each to be represented by its president and another member . . ." in order to consult on a program ( " insofar as a program could be laid out at a time when the situation was changing cons t a n t l y " ) to be presented to the future peace conference. In the meantime the Committee sought, by correspondence with many individuals and organizations abroad, to ascertain the views of European Jewish leaders as to how they could best secure equal rights for the Jews of all lands. Its own formula called for full civil and political equality. 9 National rights were completely ignored. The first test of strength occurred in April, 1 9 1 5 , when the opposing forces met at the convention of the Jewish Community (Kehillah) of New York City. Marshall reported that the American Jewish Committee could " only behold the possibility of infinite mischief " in a congress such as its proponents contemplated. He felt that it must result in misunderstanding, and, by affording expression to outbursts of emotion and to the theories and dreams of propagandists and visionaries, it could only occasion ridicule or ill-will. From another source 1 0 we learn that Schiff viewed the agitation for a congress as chiefly the handiwork of the Zionist Organization. He was opposed to the summoning 9 Adler, op. cit.. vol. ii, p. 296; Ninth Annual Report of the Amer. Jew. Committee, Amer. Jew. Year Book, 1916-1917, pp. 311, 332-323. Somewhat later, the Committee published and distributed a carefully prepared account of the deplorable condition of the Jews in the eastern war zone. It issued special editions of M. J . Kohler and S. Wolf, Jewish Disabilities in the Balkan States, and of M. J . Kohler, Jewish Rights at the Congresses of Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle; both works dealt with the international protection of Jewish rights. It appealed to the Vatican to use its powerful influence against anti-Jewish excesses. Cf. Tenth Annual Report of the Amer. Jew. Committee, Amer. Jew. Year Book, 1917-1918, pp. 451-458.

10 Adler, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 297-298.

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of " a large Jewish Congress for the purpose of discussing unnamed and untold questions," and was certain that a conference " composed of conservative and thoroughly tried men and leaders, is sure to accomplish more than a congress such as the Zionists and others seek to force upon American J e w r y . " Apparently this was what Marshall meant when he informed the convention that his organization had decided to call a conference of the leading Jewish national organizations in order to secure " an interchange of views " as to how the Jews of the east could be aided. The debate that followed Marshall's report was heated, and a resolution in favor of a " Jewish Congress to consider the Jewish question and to devise ways and means how to place the same on the agenda of the peace conference " did not come to a vote. Action was deferred for a month, and when in May the delegates reconvened, a compromise resolution was voted. The convention substituted the word conference for congress but urged that the delegates from the Jewish societies to that conference be " chosen by their membership." The assembly was to convene " for the sole purpose of considering the Jewish question as it affects our brethren in belligerent lands." The American Jewish Committee was requested " to consider the advisability of calling " such a conference. The American Jewish Committee met in June and resolved to call a conference for October, 1 9 1 5 . 1 1 But each participating organization was empowered to " choose its delegates 11 The Executive Committee was empowered " to defer the convening of the Conference " if it thought such action advisable. It was, furthermore, expressly stipulated that the conference was not to be held until the president of the Committee had communicated with " representative leaders " of the J e w s of other countries, and had obtained the desired information: namely, how the American J e w s could best aid their brethren in belligerent lands. C f . Ninth Annual Report of the Amer. J e w . Committee, Amer. Jew. Year Book, 1916-1917, p. 3 1 3 .

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in such manner as it m a y deem advisable " ; the Committee merely recommended that " the members of the organizations or their governing bodies be enabled to express their p r e f erence

for delegates."

The American Jewish

Committee

also appointed a special commission of seven to decide which organizations were to be invited and to apportion representation among them.

T h i s action of the Committee, in ignor-

ing the stipulation that delegates be chosen by the membership of the participating organizations and in not sharing responsibility with other organizations, w a s deemed unsatisfactory by the congress advocates.

T h e issue w a s again

deadlocked. In the hope of removing the dealock, several men, including J u d g e Julian W . M a c k , who were members of both organizations, brought Brandeis and D r . C y r u s Adler (representing the A m e r i c a n J e w i s h Committee) together.

A

w a s held and an interchange of correspondence

conference followed.

B u t in A u g u s t , 1 9 1 5 , relations were again terminated with the groups even further apart. 1 2 12

The congress group objected to the limitation upon the purpose and scope of the congress as an undemocratic measure, while the Committee insisted that an unlimited conference would prove " futile and dangerous." The Brandeis group also contended that neither group, nor both together, " should arrogate to itself or themselves the function of determining on what subjects the Conference (or Congress) should act," and complained that the Committee had " assumed to determine" by itself when and where the conference should meet, the participating organizations, the representation of each, even the plan and scope of the deliberations. T o this Adler replied that the Zionist Organization and other national bodies were devoted to special purposes, whereas the Committee's function was to " serve as a central point for bringing about united and effective action." Finally the Committee, fearing that " intemperate and even ill-considered speech" might, in the inflamed atmosphere of wartime, prove a menace to Jews in belligerent lands, planned to have the conference meet " in executive session." But such secrecy, contended Brandeis, was the very means of breeding suspicion and misunderstanding. He insisted that only through " a frank and open discussion " of

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Unable to reach an understanding with the American Jewish Committee, the national elements launched an intensive popular campaign in order to force the hand of the anti-national leadership. The Zionist leaders urged their followers throughout the country to agitate for a democratic congress. On August 16, 1 9 1 5 , the Congress Organization Committee was reorganized and strengthened; Brandeis became president, Leon Sanders and Joseph Barondess vicepresidents, and Bernard G. Richards executive secretary. Within a few days a demonstration was held at Cooper Union, in New York City, and, hard upon that, a conference of out-of-town delegates met in the same city and formulated plans for the organization of local congress committees throughout the country. The national socialists, particularly the Poale-Zionists, agitated among the workmen. They created a NationalSocialist Agitations Committee which cooperated with the congress organization and which began in August, 19x5, to issue The Jewish Congress, a Yiddish weekly devoted entirely to the cause. This periodical gave much attention to the question of national rights. A large national-socialist mass meeting, held at Cooper Union early in August, likewise declared in favor of civil, political and national rights for the J e w s . " The widespread propaganda compelled the anti-national Jewish problems and needs could the cooperation of non-Jews be secured. Cf. ibid., pp. 311-318, 356-357; The American Jew. Cong., To the Jews of America, op. cit., pp. 6-22; ( M S . ) Letter, J . L. Magnes to I . A . Hourwich, May 12, 1916; Jewish Communal Register, op. cit., pp. 1388-1389. 13

(MS.) Minutes of Jewish Cong. Org. Com., Aug. 16, 1 9 1 5 ; the summary of a powerful address by Brandeis before the Cong. Org. Com., is given in the Minutes of the meeting of Aug. 25, 1915, when the new president was first introduced; see also ( M S . ) Minutes of Administrative Committee, Aug. 30, 1 9 1 5 ; Der Yiddisher Kongres, nos. 1-18 (Aug. 6, 1915-Feb. 18, 1916). See infra, p. 391 for an account of the ( M S . ) Minutes.

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labor leaders, who controlled the National Workmen's Committee," to make some concessions to nationalism. A convention of labor organizations, was held in New York City, September 5-7, 1 9 1 5 , under the direction of anti-nationalists like Panken, F . Rosenblatt and Olgin. But the final resolution called for a democratic congress and a program demanding " civil, political and national rights for the Jews wherever those rights are denied them." 1 5 The convention also instructed a committee to confer with the American Jewish Committee and the Congress Organization Committee in the hope of bringing about united action. B y the fall of 1 9 1 5 there were thus three powerful organizations in the field. The nationalist element predominated in the Jewish Congress Organization Committee which then claimed to represent the masses, since organizations with a total membership of some 900,000 had declared in favor of a congress. 18 The American Jewish Committee and the National Workmen's Committee for Jewish Rights would, under ordinary circumstances, have made strange bedfel14

Supra, p. 164.

15

The convention declared that " the more comprehensive definition of the demand for national rights and national autonomy is left to the Jews of the respective lands, such as Russia, Galicia, Rumania, Palestine, etc." But it did express its preference for " the creation of such constitutionally recognized and internationally assured institutions as will make possible the national self-determination and unhindered national development of the Jewish people in the lands of Russia, Austro-Hungary, Rumania, Palestine, etc." Cf. The Jews and the War, op. eit., pp. 87-88. For a report of the proceedings, see Der Yiddisher Kongres, nos. 6-7 (1915). Zhitlowsky was a leading figure among the national socialists. He played a significant role in the labor convention, toured the country on behalf of a congress, and was an editor of Der Yiddisher Kongres. Other outstanding national-socialist leaders were I. A. Hourwich and N. Syrkin. 16

See ( M S . ) Minutes of Jewish Cong. Org. Com., Oct. 12, 1915. The National Workmen's Committee claimed to represent 350,000 organized workmen.

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lows; the radical labor leaders were wont to characterize the men of wealth and position as bourgeois oligarchs and plutocrats; the followers of Marshall and Schiff found the agitation and revolutionary theories of the workmen distasteful. Yet, we shall soon see that nationalism, which both groups feared and hated, finally led the wealthy and conservative leaders to cooperate with the socialist immigrants in an attempt to thwart the holding of a democratic congress. We may well pause to reiterate that nationalism was the basic question upon which the proponents and opponents of a congress divided. Much was said in the negotiations about democracy, about representation, about the scope of the proposed deliberations, about the question as to who should summon the congress. But these were not the fundamental issues. Behind all these maneuvers lurked Jewish nationalism or the characterization of the Jews as a national group. The real issues were Zionism, Jewish national rights and the question of a permanent American Jewish congress. For a full year longer the three organizations continued to parley and to maneuver for position. First Adolf Kraus, leader of the Independent Order B'nai B'rith, called a conference in the hope of effecting an agreement. But his effort proved unavailing. On October n , 1 9 1 5 , negotiators for the National Workmen's Committee and the Congress Organization Committee did draw up a tentative agreement; a conference of national organizations was to be called " for the purpose of taking such action as will obtain for the Jews in belligerent lands . . ." civil and political equality. The statement further stipulated that, " where the rights of national groups are recognized as such, these rights too should be accorded " the Jews. The Congress Organization Committee, however, sensed in this proposal of the Workmen's Committee an attempt to sidetrack the plans for a congress and rejected the agreement.

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At the instance of the Congress group, representatives of the three organizations met on November 12, 1 9 1 5 . Judah L. Magnes, one of the three men representing the American Jewish Committee, suggested that a conference be called to consider Jewish rights and to take steps for the summoning of a Jewish congress on a democratic basis. The representatives of the Congress and Workmen's Committees were agreeable to such a proposition, but two delegates from the American Jewish Committee would not consent, unless it were definitely stipulated that no congress be held before the conclusion of the war. 17 This modified position of the American Jewish Committee certainly involved a considerable concession to the congress idea, and was probably induced by the widespread agitation for a democratic congress. 18 But unity was still unattainable because the nationalists and the Congress Organization Committee were convinced that the postponement of the popular assembly to the end of the war would prove fatal to their project. 19 By the close of 1 9 1 5 the nationalists were beginning to tire of the protracted and futile negotiations; every postponement rendered the likelihood of a popular assembly more remote. But the Congress Organization Committee never allowed the parleys to absorb its entire attention. It was always fully aware that the calling and organizing of a congress might devolve upon itself, and prepared for it. 17

Two days after the meeting of the sub-committees, the American Jewish Committee at its annual session officially agreed that the proposed conference " take steps to call a Congress on a democratic basis after the termination of hostilities. . . ." Ninth Annual Report of the Amer. Jew. Committee, Amer. Jew. Year Book, 1916-1917, pp. 353-354. 18 Jacob H. Schiff believed that the Yiddish press attacked and maligned him because of his opposition to a congress. See Adler, op. cit., vol. ii,

pp. 301-304· 19

Ibid., pp. 320-322; (MS.) Minutes of the Jewish Cong. Org. Com., Aug. 16, 1915, Sept. 21, 1915, Oct. 12, 1915, Oct. 26, 1915, Nov. 8, 1915, Dec. 8, 1915, Dec. 23, 1915.

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The first suggestion to call a preliminary conference, independently of the two rival organizations, appears to have been made on October 5, 1 9 1 5 , by Louis Lipsky, the chairman of the Administrative Committee. The proposal was immediately taken up and plans were formulated to hold the conference during the latter part of November, 1 9 1 5 ; but the negotiations outlined above rendered postponement necessary. When, however, a middle-western convention met at Chicago on January 23, 1 9 1 6 , and called upon the congress leadership to summon a conference, the Organization Committee resolved that the Preliminary Conference be convened on March 26, 1916. 2 0 The preparations for the Preliminary Conference were carefully made. 21 A s a result, when the sessions opened at Philadelphia, on the appointed day, with 367 delegates claiming to represent more than a million Jews, the assembly felt assured that it represented the will of the great mass of American J e w r y , and proceeded with its work in a spirit of calmness and good order which was symptomatic both of 20

The resolution declared, however, that sub-committees might continue to negotiate with the rival organizations. ( M S S . ) Minutes of the Jewish Cong. Org. Com., Oct. 12, 1915, Oct. 19, 1915, Dec. 8, 191s, Dec. 23, 1915, Jan. 9, 1916, Feb. 7, 1916; Minutes of Administrative Committee, Oct. 5, 1915, Oct. 14, 1915. 21

The work was done under the leadership of Brandeis, Louis Lipsky and the executive secretary, Richards. The cooperation of many Jewish newspapers was secured; mass meetings were held in various cities and local congress committees organized. Of particular moment, in this connection, was a mass meeting held at Carnegie Hall, in New York City, on January 24, 1916. Brandeis delivered an unusually powerful but temperate address, which must have won the congress movement many adherents ; he focussed attention upon the need for a congress in order to work effectively for the protection of the Jewish minorities in eastern Europe. Cf. ( M S S . ) Minutes of Jewish Cong. Org. Com., Sept. 21, 1915, Oct. 12, 1915, Nov. 8, 1915, Dec. 8, 1915, Dec. 23, 1915, Feb. 7, 1916; Minutes of Administrative Committee, Sept. 21, 1915, Jan. 3, 1916; L. D. Brandeis, Jewish Rights and the Congress (Ν. Y., 1916).

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the self-confidence of the rank and file and of the directing ability of the leaders. Brandeis was not present at the Conference, but there was no question that he was the supreme leader of the movement; he was chosen Honorary Chairman. T h e permanent chairman of the Conference was Hugo Pam, of the Appellate Court o f Illinois, to whose tact and good judgment the success of the deliberations was largely due. In his opening address he set a valuable precedent by recognizing the sincerity and honesty o f purpose o f the opponents of a congress. T h e Conference, therefore, was not to become a rostrum from which opponents might be denounced. Rather, he declared that the congress needed and wanted its antagonists to join it. T h e latter must be reasoned with and made aware that the masses and public opinion were not of their view. Moreover, he assured the Conference that by considerate, yet effective, action it might so prove the justice of its cause " that all organizations in every part o f our land not only will be glad, but compelled, by the strength of public opinion . . . " not to stand aside. Besides the chairman, the most important personage at the Conference was Stephen S. Wise. H e delivered both the keynote address at the opening session and an extensive closing salutation, and he was the only delegate, other than the chairman, who was tendered a rising vote o f thanks. H e rendered valuable service, particularly as a conciliator. On several occasions when strong differences of opinion, or alleged grievances, threatened to mar the peacefulness o f the proceedings, he contrived to quiet the aroused feelings by some alternative proposal, or by a tactful plea to maintain the high level which had thus far been the pride o f the Conference. In each case his efforts were instrumental in effecting some compromise which restored harmony. T h e Conference had been called to consider all matters pertaining to the convocation o f a Congress; this function it

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fully performed. A n Executive Committee of seventy, with Brandeis as Honorary Chairman, was chosen and charged with the duty of making all necessary preparations for the summoning of a congress at Washington, D. C., before the close of 1916. Rules were adopted to govern the election o f delegates, and a program was formulated to guide the deliberations of the projected congress. T h e most important point on the program was the one relating to Jewish rights. A l l agreed that the congress must strive to attain for Jews equal civil, political and religious rights. But the demand for national rights occasioned some difficulty. T h e original proposal of the Committee on Resolutions urged " that the Congress consider the question of securing to the Jews free and equal rights, civil, political, religious and national, in all such lands where these rights are denied to them." Considerable dissatisfaction immediately developed, but it appears that the opposition was directed not against national rights as such, but rather against the loose formulation of the demand. A s originally drawr, even the western democracies and the United States woulc have been involved. F e w , however, were ready to demand national rights f o r the American Jews. W h e n therefore Wise presented a compromise resolution which clarified the issue, it was unanimously adopted. The final resolution proviced: a) That the Congress consider the question of securing to Jews free and equal rights, civil, political, religious, in al such lands where these rights were denied to them; b) That the Congress consider the question of securing to the Jews national rights in all such lands in which national rights were or are or ought to be recognized.22 ( M S . ) Minutes of Administrative Committee, March 21, 1916; T h e Amer. Jew. Congress, Report of Proceedings of Preliminary Corference ( Ν . Y., 1916), pp. S-13. 20-27, 30-38. 22

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The Preliminary Conference proved the turning point in the controversy over a democratic congress. The absence of discord, the considerateness and good order with which opposing views were heard, the prevailing harmony which all seemed ajixious to maintain, and the enthusiasm and unanimity with which resolutions were voted, impressed all who were interested in the movement. The Conference elicited the admiration of the Jewish press and public, heartening the leaders of the movement. The latter immediately took steps to prepare for the forthcoming congress. But they still hoped to secure the cooperation of the opposing elements; 28 the newly elected Executive Organization Committee for an American Jewish Congress met early in April and chose temporary officers. Brandeis became the temporary chairman. In June, 1916, the American Jewish Committee, probably influenced by the success of the Preliminary Conference and by the increasing likelihood that a successful congress would 23 The very first meeting of the new Executive Organization Committee was called upon to consider a communication from the National Workmen's Committee. T h e letter, dated April 1 (the fourth day after the conclusion of the Preliminary Conference), invited the congress organization to confer again with sub-committees of the two other bodies. It was, however, the unanimous opinion of the meeting that the Workmen's Committee sought only to hamper the congress movement by means of endless negotiations. Moreover, the American Jewish Committee had not been heard from, and it was the conviction of the congress leaders that the action of the Workmen's Committee would be dependent upon that of the American Jewish Committee. In reply, the workmen's group was informed that a committee would meet them to arrange for their proper representation on the Executive Organization Committee. T h e anti-nationalist labor leaders chose to misunderstand, and acknowledged receipt of the letter " accepting our invitation to a joint conference of the American Jewish Committee, the Philadelphia Congress Conference and the National Workmen's Committee." When their " error " was corrected, they declined to enter the Executive Committee. ( M S S . ) Minutes of Exec. Org. Committee, Apr. 9, 1916, June 22, 1916; Minutes of Administrative Committee, A p r . 20, 1916.

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at all events be held, took action which finally led to a complete understanding. In its own name and in that of the National Workmen's Committee and of six other organizations, a conference was called for July 16, 1 9 1 6 , at the Hotel Astor in New York. The proposed " conference of National Jewish Organizations " would consider " measures, including the discussion of propositions that may be presented relative to the organization of a Jewish Congress, to secure full rights for the J e w s of all lands. . . ." The phrase " full rights," moreover, was so defined as to include " civil, religious and political rights, and, in addition thereto, wherever the various peoples of any land are recognized as having separate group rights, the conferring upon the Jews thereof of such rights, if desired by them." This constituted further concessions on the part of the American Jewish Committee, for mention was no longer made that the proposed congress must not meet before the end of the war, and, what is particularly significant, something more than civil and political rights was to be sought for the Jews. " Group rights " might well be viewed as a concession in the direction of " national rights." The Conference met on the appointed date and, under the chairmanship of Louis Marshall, adopted a series of resolutions. These included expressions in favor of unity and the basis on which unity might be and ultimately was achieved. " This Conference," declared the resolution, " desires to bring about united action, in the first place among the Jews of America, and then by the J e w s of the world, to secure full rights for the Jews of all lands . . . " ; and the resolution went on to include group rights precisely in the language used in the call to the Conference. The Confer24 Schiff, for example, accepted the congress " particularly as it would have been held anyhow, in order to maintain a closed front in American Israel." Quoted in Adler, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 304.

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ence, furthermore, declared that it favored " the calling of a Congress of the Jews of America for the sole purpose o f taking appropriate action to accomplish . . . " the aims outlined above. It delegated full power to an Executive Committee of twenty-five to secure the cooperation of other American Jewish organizations, to prepare and call the congress, and otherwise to take measures in order to accomplish the desired ends. 25 Negotiations between the rival groups were resumed on the day following the Conference of National Jewish Organizations. A delegation from the Executive Committee of the latter called upon a meeting of the Congress Executive Organization Committee. 29 They presented their resolutions and, pointing out the possibilities for an understanding, assured the congress leaders of the readiness of their group to reach an agreement. When the delegation had departed, the congress faction warmly debated a motion that a com25 A special meeting of the American Jewish Committee, held on May 14, 1916, had decided to summon the conference. The Congress Executive Organization Committee declined to attend the conference at the Hotel Astor. By a majority of one, it decided to name a committee of three (Brandeis, Pam and Sanders were named) in order to present, if invited, the views of the organization before the conference. Tenth Annual Report of the Amer. Jew. Committee, Amer. Jew. Year Book, 1917-1918, pp. 440-448; ( M S . ) Minutes of Exec. Org. Committee, June 22, 1916, July 17, 1916. 2 6 The delegation included Harry Cutler, chairman; Julian W . Mack, Samuel Schulman, Jacob Massel and F. F. Rosenblatt. The last-named represented the National Workmen's Committee. This was the last meeting over which Brandeis presided. He was no longer present at the special meeting on the following evening (July 18), and at the meeting of August 9, 1916, his letter resigning from the Executive Organization Committee was read and tabled. It is probable that Brandeis opposed the projected understanding with the American Jewish Committee and that his withdrawal from the congress committee was due to the evident desire of that body to compromise. Cf. ( M S . ) Minutes of Exec. Org. Committee, July 17-18, 1916, Aug. 9, 1916; Interview with Mr. Louis Lipsky, Feb. 17, 1931.

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mittee be chosen " to ascertain the points of difference and agreement." There was strong opposition to a resumption of negotiations, but the views of the moderates prevailed. A committee of seven, under the chairmanship of Hugo Pam, was instructed to negotiate with the opposing delegation.2' The two sub-committees met on the morning of July 18, 1916, and remained in conference until late at night. As a result of their labors the rival organizations reached a tentative agreement. The Congress group was ably led by Lipsky; Schulman vigorously maintained the anti-national viewpoint; Mack and Cutler were active participants, and both sought in a conciliatory manner to find some basis of agreement. It was at once evident that this time the conferees were really anxious to reach an understanding. They immediately got to essentials, among which nationalism and national rights proved of prime importance. Schulman pointed out what he considered two material differences in the wording of the resolutions of the opposing organizations on the question of Jewish rights. The Conference of National Jewish Organizations demanded group rights for the Jews in countries where such rights were recognized, but qualified the demand with " if desired by them." The second difference related to phraseology. He admitted that " practically" group rights and national rights were identical, but insisted that " their theoretical implications are different." To the 27 G. Bublick said, " the string must not be pulled too tightly. The other side practically appealed to us and we dare not ignore their plea for a possible unity." I. A. Hourwich urged the meeting to see that something unexpected had happened. " Our opponents had sheathed their swords and now came to ask terms of peace." Judge Pam's committee included Leon Sanders, Abraham S. Schomer, Joseph Barondess, Maurice Katz, Louis Lipsky and Jacob G. Grossberg. ( M S . ) Minutes 0} Exec. Org. Committee, July 17, 1916.

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non-Jew, he maintained, a demand on the part of American Jewry for " national rights " where such " were, are and ought to be " recognized, would imply that the American Jews considered themselves a nationality and desired national rights for themselves; that, he felt, would involve great danger. He would furthermore avoid the word nation entirely, and use " peoples " as a safer word, since no theory of Jewish life was involved in it. In reply to Schulman, Lipsky pointed out that the resolution of the Conference of National Jewish Organizations did not cover Poland. At the time, no national rights were recognized in that country, and should an independent Poland arise, the Jews would be unable to secure group or national rights. Moreover, the other men who spoke for the Conference of National Jewish Organizations chose to view the whole question as merely a matter of words. Mack early declared that he saw no difference between " group " and " national " rights, and Massel agreed with him. Rosenblatt explained that the National Workmen's Committee, whom he represented, had preferred the words " national r i g h t s " but that " the representatives of the American Jewish Committee were afraid that it would be impossible to present the matter to Government officials who are not acquainted with the European use of the word ' national'." Furthermore, in his view, the use o f the word " peoples " would avoid raising the question whether the Jews are a nationality. Since all agreed that the word " national " did not express the same concept in English as in some European languages, Mack urged that the word be momentarily forgotten, and turning to the underlying principle involved, he pointed the way to a possible compromise. The anti-nationalists' resolution, he felt, was too narrow since it would not provide for the Polish situation. T h e nationalists' formula, on the

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contrary, he found too broad. He would eliminate the word " o u g h t " as allowing " for a large discretion," and further proposed that somewhere in the resolution the words " customarily granted " be inserted. Barondess, of the congress delegation, proposed a compromise which read: " Whenever the various peoples in any land, had, have, or desire to have separate group or national rights, the conferring of such rights also upon the J e w s . " This did not prove satisfactory to Schulman, who further pointed out that since an element in American J e w r y would not agree on the term " nation " some other formula must be found in order to achieve unity. Obviously further argumentation would lead nowhere, and Cutler, who had remained silent throughout the discussion on " national rights," deftly suggested that " inasmuch as there was general agreement as to the intention, the form of the Resolution " could be left to a sub-committee. This was done, and the conferees turned to a consideration of other matters relating to the projected congress. Less difficulty was encountered on these questions, and before very long a number of compromises was reached.28 The problem of employing the term " national " was not raised again, but the word did not appear in the proposed call for the congress which was drawn by the conferees. 28 The congress was to be a temporary institution; the Executive Committee was required to wind up its activities within one year after the conclusion of peace negotiations. No limitations with regard to Zionism or nationalism would be specifically expressed in the call f o r the congress, but a gentlemen's agreement bound the participants not to allow any resolution " tending to commit the Congress to any theory or philosophy or articles of faith." The principle of democratic, direct election of delegates to the congress was accepted; but provision was made f o r the separate representation of national organizations. T h e congress group would not be considered to have absorbed its opponents; a new Executive Committee of 120 members (subsequently changed to 140), divided equally between the two organizations, would summon the congress. ( M S . ) Minutes of Conference of Delegates Appointed by the Amer. Jnv. Cong. Exec. Org. Committee and the Conference of National Jewish Organizations, J u l y 18, 1916.

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The understanding, so auspiciously effected at the first conference of the sub-committees, was not destined to be finally concluded until more than two months later. The report ot the tentative agreement was drawn up by Lipsky and Rosenblatt. It had first to be approved by each of the conferees, then by both organizations, and finally the congress group, bound on many particulars by the decisions of the Philadelphia Preliminary Conference, had to submit some of the proposals to a referendum of the delegates to the latter. Difficulties were encountered as the agreement moved from step to step. On July 24, 1916, Lipsky sent the report to the various conferees. On the question of national rights, only the comments of Mack and Schulman were of importance. The report and the proposed call for the congress had included in the term full rights " civil, religious and political rights, and, in addition thereto, group rights in such lands where group rights are, or were, or upon the demand of the Jews of the land affected (democratically ascertained) should be recognized." Mack found this wording open to criticism,29 and proposed a new version reading: " . . . group rights in such lands where group rights are or should be recognized, upon the demand of the Jews of the land affected. . . ." To this he would add " such demand to be ascertained in as democratic a manner as may be feasible," if a stipulation with regard to the method of ascertaining the desire of the Jews be insisted upon. Schulmnn argued that the manner of determining the desire of the Jews affected had not been discussed at all; he 29 H e thought that it ought to be made clear that " should b e " had been added to include an independent Poland. H e feared that the words " democratically ascertained " would commit American J e w r y , in a public statement, to work for democracy in Russia. H e desired that the wishes of the J e w s affected should be a condition not only where group rights " should be " recognized, but also where they " are."

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also preferred the phrase " customarily granted " as originally proposed by Mack. His version would read: " group rights in such lands where group rights are customarily granted and where the Jews desire them." Lipsky informed Schulman of Mack's suggestions, and indicated the readiness of his party to agree to the changes. Schulman, however, was adamant, despite Lipsky's assurance that no other member of the conference had raised similar objections; Mack's proposed wording on group rights did not satisfy him. He would consent only to a formula which would declare that " in such an Imperium where so-called peoples or groups of peoples are recognized as having group rights, and the Jews desire them, we seek to obtain for the J e w s also such group rights." 40 There was no other alternative but reconvene the conferees, and Lipsky immediately did so. The sub-committees reassembled on August 9, 1 9 1 6 , and succeeded in disposing of the objections raised by Schulman. This success appears to have been due largely to the intervention of Marshall, the undisputed leader of the forces which had opposed the congress. In a long letter to Massel, one of the conferees, Marshall had carefully rewritten the entire agreement " merely for the purpose of clearness and to avoid misunderstanding." Declaring that he had not made a single suggestion which was at variance with the purpose of the conferees, as he understood them, he produced 80 Schulman also insisted that the report must inform the Executive Committees that Zionism and nationalism had been expressly excluded from consideration by the congress. Lipsky rejected this proposal because the report was to be made public. On this exchange of views, see ( M S S . ) Report of Committee (probably July 24, 1916) ; Report of Committee as Revised to August Third; letters, Lipsky to conferees, July 24, 1916; Mack to Lipsky, July 26, 1916; Sanders to Lipsky, July 26, 1916; Schulman to Lipsky, July 28, 1916; Grossberg to Lipsky, July 31, 1916; Lipsky to Schulman, Aug. 1, 1916; Schulman to Lipsky, Aug. 7, 1916; telegrams, Lipsky to conferees, Aug. 8, 1916.

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a forceful, clear and legally worded document. He did not mention by name Zionism or nationalism as excluded from deliberation by the congress, and rewrote the clause defining the aim of the congress as follows: the congress was to be called exclusively for the purpose of defining the methods whereby in cooperation with the Jews of the world, full rights may be secured for the Jews of all lands, and all laws discriminating against them may be abrogated. It being understood that the phrase " full rights " is deemed to include : 1. Civil, religious and political rights, and in addition thereto 2. Wherever the various peoples of any land are or may be recognized as having separate group rights, the conferring upon the Jews of the lands affected, of such rights, if desired by them, and 3. The securing and protection of Jewish rights in Palestine. The letter must have been read before the meeting of the sub-committees, for the final report drawn by the latter reproduced Marshall's phrases almost to a syllable. 81 It was fortunate f o r those who desired unity that Marshall had intervened to conclude a settlement; the nationalists were in no mood for further concessions. Some men, like Bublick and Hourwich, sought to minimize the importance of the concessions made.82 But Wise expressed the sentiments of many of the members when he said that the congress group had blundered when a committee had been sent to the Conference of National Jewish Organizations to be sent away 31 Cf. ( M S . ) Letter, Marshall to Massel, Aug. 9, 1916; Minutes of Exec. Org. Committee, Aug. 9, 1916. 82 Bublick said that the opponents " were only trying to get out of a tight situation by making certain limitations. . . ." Hourwich thought that the difficulty over national rights " lay in the paucity of the English language which had no word comparable to the German word ' nationalität'." ( M S . ) Minutes of Exec. Org. Committee, Aug. 9-10, 1916.

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" with a minimum of courtesy " ; that the subsequent secret meetings and negotiations had constituted another blunder; but that the group was no longer a free agent. A n understanding must be reached so as not to jeopardize the congress. The Congress Executive Organization Committee accepted the agreement with three reservations, one of which related to national or group rights. Referring to the clause " if desired by them," Wise insisted that " the Congress must be the final resort for any decision as to which J e w s require national rights " ; the meeting agreed that the clause would be accepted only if to it were added " as determined and ascertained by the Congress." This modification was accepted by the conference committees on the following day, and the Congress Executive Committee forthwith submitted the agreement to a referendum of the delegates of the Philadelphia Preliminary Conference. The latter, nearly twothirds of whom voted, rejected by small majorities the two most important points of the agreement—those relating to the program and to the representation of national organizations. But both sides desired peace, and they soon set about to compose the differences. 83 The sub-committees met again on October 2, 1 9 1 6 , and discussed the results of the referendum and the remaining 33

The minutes of the Congress Executive Organization Committee, particularly those of Aug. 9, 1916, reveal a weariness in body and spirit, and an anxiety to end the exhausting negotiations and to effect unity. The nationalists' reservations relating to the special representation of national organizations and to the consideration by the congress of rehabilitation, after the war, in eastern Europe and Palestine, were rejected by the sub-committee of the Conference of National Jewish Organizations. ( M S S . ) Minutes of Conference of Delegates . . . , Aug. 10, 1916; Minutes of Exec. Org. Committee, Aug. 9-10, 1916, Sept. 1 1 , 1916, Sept. 23, 1916; Minutes of Administrative Committee, Aug. 2 1 , 1916, Sept. 25, 1916. Report of Referendum . . . issued Aug. 27, 1916. The Referendum appears to have been written by Lipsky, who was the most active leader of the congress group throughout the negotiations.

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obstacles to unity. Lipsky pointed out that his group, " especially the Galician Verband and many Zionists," objected to the elimination of the phrase " national rights," and Barondess expressed the fear that his committee might not be supported if it omitted " the word which is dear to a preponderant element in Jewry." The latter read the wording requested by the congress organization: " Wherever the various nationalities of any lands are or may be recognized as having rights as such, the conferring upon the Jewish people of the lands affected of like rights, if desired by them, as determined and ascertained by the Congress." 84 Schulman objected to the word " nationalities." Rosenblatt's position, like that of the National Workmen's Committee which he represented, was ambiguous.85 Marshall said, " we are all agreed as to what we want," and urged that the word " peoples " be retained. Lipsky, however, swerved the discussion into another direction. He asked whether, by accepting the word " peoples," his group would forfeit the right to introduce at the congress a resolution in favor of " national rights." Marshall three times tried to avoid giving a direct answer to the question. It was only when Lipsky asked for a " categorical answer," whether a resolution calling for " national rights " would be declared out of order, that Marshall answered in the affirmative. This created a deadlock, and the men turned to a consideration of other questions. 34

The instructions were that " nationalities" or " peoples " be accepted, but that the former word be preferred. It was also stipulated that in place of " if desired by them," the formula should read " if desired by it." " I t " would characterize the Jews as a unit, a nationality. ( M S . ) Minutes of Exec. Org. Committee, Sept. 23, 1916. 35

He said that since his committee was rights," he would gladly vote for that term. present sub-committee he favored the word " of Meeting of Sub-Committees . . . , Oct. 2,

instructed for " national But as a member of the peoples." ( M S . ) Minutes 1916.

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Similar difficulties arose with reference to every point, though the discussion proceeded most amicably. Finally, after a short recess, Marshall read a series of compromises upon which the conferees agreed. On the question of group rights, he accepted in substance the nationalists' formula, with the substitution of " peoples " for " nationalities." T h e final version read: " Wherever the various peoples of any land are or may be recognized as having rights as such, the conferring upon the Jewish people of the land affected, of like rights, if desired by them, as determined and ascertained by the Congress." *e The agreement was soon ratified by a referendum of the Philadelphia Preliminary Conference delegates, and it remained only f o r the Executive Committee of 140, representing both sides equally, to meet and effect a united organization. Fearing, however, that so large a meeting, if left to itself, might prove unwieldy, the two sub-committees, somewhat enlarged, met on December 3, 1 9 1 6 , and arranged the date, place and agenda of the first general meeting of se

Marshall's compromise version had read: " wherever . . . are or may be recognized as having separate rights as such, the conferring upon the Jews . . . as ascertained and determined by the Congress." The nationalists desired to substitute " Jewish people " for " Jews," and " i t " for " them " in the phrase " if desired by them." This too was compromised. "Jewish people" was accepted (Schulman alone opposed this; he preferred "Israel," to which Rosenblatt objected), but " i f desired by them " remained unchanged. The Conference of National Jewish Organizations was represented at the meeting of Oct. 2, 1916, by the same sub-committee, except that Marshall came in Mack's place. The congress committee consisted of Joseph Barondess, Jacob Carlinger, Abraham Goldberg, Aaron J . Levy, Louis Lipsky, Louis S. Rubinsohn, Abraham S. Schomer, and Leo Wolfson. For this discussion, see ( M S . ) Minutes of Meeting of SubCommittees . . . , Oct. 2, 1916. See also ( M S . ) Minutes of Special Meeting of Exec. Org. Committee, Oct. 10, 1916; Tenth Annual Report of the Amer. Jew. Committee, Amer. Jew. Year Book, 1917-1918, pp.

449-451.

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the united organization. Cutler was designated to open the meeting. The first meeting of the united Executive Committee for an American Jewish Congress was held at the Hotel Savoy, in New York City, on December 25, 1 9 1 6 ; it proved an allday affair. It was decided that the congress be convened in Washington not later than May 1 , 1 9 1 7 , but provision was made for reconsideration in case of an emergency. A n Administrative Committee was provided for. A committee on methods of election to the congress, with Hourwich as chairman, was named. The most important work of the meeting, however, was the election of officers, and this appears to have constituted a test of strength between the two erstwhile antagonistic groups. Marshall was defeated by Adolf Kraus for temporary c h a i r m a n ; " when both men were again nominated for the permanent chairmanship, Kraus suggested that both withdraw to secure unity. This was done, and Nathan Straus was unanimously elected chairman. With similar unanimity, Richards, the secretary of the old congress organization, was named executive secretary. 88 37

The nationalists opposed Marshall. Mack was nominated, but he declined to be a candidate. Kraus was in a strategic position, because he and the D'nai B'rith had preserved a strict neutrality in the conflict over the congress. Cf. Letter, Kraus to Congress Organization, July 10, 1916, in ( M S . ) Minutes of Exec. Org. Committee, July 17-18, 1916. 38 ( M S S . ) Minutes of Administrative Committee, Oct. 30, 1916; Minutes of Exec. Org. Committee, Nov. 2, 1916; Minutes of Meeting of Sub-Committees, Dec. 3, 1916; Minutes of [united] Executive Committee, Dec. 25, 1916. The day following the meeting of the Executive Committee, the Administrative Committee organized with Cutler as chairman, and immediately began preparations for the calling of a congress. In preparing the necessary material, the plan adopted by the former congress organization [the plan of commissions had originally been presented by de Haas. See ( M S S . ) Minutes of Exec. Org. Committee, April 9, 1916; Minutes of Committee on Plan and Scope, May 3, 1916, May 27, 1916; letter,

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By the beginning of 1 9 1 7 the controversy over an American Jewish congress was at an end. The nationalists and anti-nationalists had found a formula upon which they could cooperate. Such, however, was not the case in western and central Europe. There the proponents and opponents of national rights worked independently. We shall first give our attention to the nationalists. 2.

T H E AGITATION OF J E W I S H

NATIONALISTS IN

AND WESTERN

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Jewish nationalists were aware that activity for Jewish rights would of necessity be limited in the belligerent states. Centers of agitation were therefore set up ( frequently under the leadership of fugitive easterners) at Copenhagen, in Switzerland and in Holland. Early in the war, the Zionist Actions Committee, whose seat was at Berlin, established The Copenhagen Office of the Zionist Organization in order to make possible communication between all sections of that international body. The Office opened in February, 1 9 1 5 , under the direction of E. W. Chlenov, Nahum Sokolow and Leo Motzkin, and it soon became a center of propaganda and a medium of intercourse. Its Bulletins, or news sheets, its press telegrams, and the exchange of Jewish newspapers which it facilitated, served as an information service for the Jewish press and public which would otherwise have found it impossible to secure authentic information on the status of the Jews in the various countries. The Office, moreover, did not limit itself to purely Zionist efforts. It gave much attention to Jewish I. Friedlander to Brandeis, M a y I, 1916] was used as a basis. It is interesting to note that information was sought " on the legal recognition accorded nationalities and other groups " in the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires; on the status of " Jewish communal and social institutions," and of " Jews and other nationalities and their languages in the Central Powers." ( M S . ) Minutes of [united] Administrative Committee, Dec. 26, 1916, Jan. 14, 1917, Feb. 25, 1917.

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problems created by the war, and, winning for that reason the confidence of the eastern Jews, it early became the center to which the latter turned with their complaints and demands. One of the questions often dealt with by the Office was of course Jewish rights; particular attention was devoted to " Jewish national development in the Diaspora." Information relating to the establishment of Jewish representative bodies and to the formulation of Jewish national demands was eagerly gathered and transmitted to the Jewish world. " Detailed accounts " were published of the movement for an American Jewish congress and of similar movements in Europe." Copenhagen witnessed agitation from another source. Vladimir Jabotinsky, the Russian nationalist, was dissatisfied with what he considered the inactivity and lack of plan of the official Zionist leadership. But in addition to his purely Zionist demands he raised the cry of full political and national emancipation for the Jews. In cooperation with M. Grossman, he started a Yiddish periodical, Di Tribune, at Copenhagen in October, 1915. The editors accepted and urged upon their readers the program of the American NationalSocialist Agitations Committee, which favored " full political and national rights for Jews in all lands." With the aid of the newspaper, a United Initiative-Group of Jewish Workers and Students was organized at Copenhagen. On February 9, 1916, a mass meeting at which several hundred people were present, greeted the growth of the congress idea in America and declared in favor of " full political, civil and national rights for Jews. . . ." 40 36 Report of the Work of the Copenhagen Office (Copenhagen, 1920), pp. 4-21. Chlenov and Sokolow left Copenhagen soon after the establishment of the Office, and, until Nov., 1916, Motzkin remained in charge. When the latter left, the leadership was taken over by V . Jacobson. T h e secretaries of the Office were M. Rosenbluth and S. Bernstein. 40

See the articles of Jabotinsky and Grossman in Di Tribune, esp. nos.

i, 5, 9 (1915-1916).

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T h e Zionists took the initiative also in Switzerland. In 1915, a conference of Swiss Zionist leaders began to plan for the peace conference which, all hoped, would soon bring the war to a close. A m o n g other decisions, it was agreed to submit for discussion before Jewish meetings in Switzerland, the question as to what national demands the Jews should present to the peace negotiators. Early in 1916, a conference of Swiss academic Zionist groups expressed its hearty approval of the congress movement in the United States as the desirable method of organizing the Jews to demand Palestine and " equal civil, political and national rights for the Jewish people in all lands." A more ambitious attempt to organize Swiss Jewry for the purpose of furthering Jewish rights was made in March, 1916, when the Swiss Committee Pro Causa Judaica was founded at Zurich. Under the leadership of J. D r e y f u s Brodski, the president of the Union of Swiss-Jewish Communities, it soon came to include the outstanding Jewish leaders of the country,* 1 and a wide agitation was begun. T h e Committee issued literature, appealed to various governments, held conferences, organized mass meetings and otherwise tried to influence public opinion in favor of the Jews. A t first the aims presented were rather general; full equal rights were demanded and also freedom to settle upon and colonize a territory. Soon, however, the Committee announced its agreement with the program of the American Jewish congress group and definitely committed itself to national rights. In countries where the Jews were too small in number to form a national group, full civil and political 4 1 It included the heads of the Jewish communities of Geneva, Lausanne, Zurich, and others, as well as members and officers of the federation of communities. A Justice of the Supreme Court at Zurich, the President of the Swiss Zionist Federation, editors of newspapers, and other public men were members. Among them was a New Yorker, Hermann Conheim, who then resided in Zurich.

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rights would alone be demanded; but " where the Jews constitute a group which is distinguished from the rest of the population by its own culture, as is the case in Russia, in Poland and in Galicia, and where the state accords to all peoples special national rights—the Jews must receive similar rights." These safeguards, insisted the Committee's appeal, were necessary in order " to put a stop to the persecution of the Jews as individuals and as a nation. . . ." The Jewish nationalists in Switzerland made an attempt to secure the sympathy and cooperation of the spokesmen for the " oppressed " nationalities, who were then agitating for the Allied recognition of their claims. At the close of June, 1 9 1 6 , a number of "national committees" convened the third Conference of Nationalities at Lausanne. A J e w ish delegation, representing the National Jewish Committee of Switzerland, or more precisely " a group of Jewish intellectuals living in Switzerland," participated in the Conference. Zevi Aberson, a member of the delegation, delivered a stirring address which by its eloquence and winning manner elicited frequent applause. The burden of his message was that the world must finally recognize in the Jews " a nationality and not merely a religious group " — a concept which the Conference warmly applauded. He paid homage to France for inaugurating the liberal policy of Jewish political and civil equality, but declared that " the time has come to proclaim . . . the insufficiency for our nationality of the regime of civil and political emancipation." He demanded, in addition to full civil and political equality in Russia and Rumania, Palestine and " national rights in the countries where we live in large groups, such as Poland, Lithuania, Galicia, Russia, Rumania, etc." It was as " national minorities " that he sought for the Jews, wherever they lived in " compact masses," complete self-determination in matters pertaining to national education, language, cus-

I94

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toms and culture. Finally, with the evident intention of impressing the Conference, be made sure to declare that the demands presented by him were in harmony with the program of the congress of American Jews, then in preparation—a program, he assured his audience, which " enjoys the general approval of Jewish public opinion." 42 The socialist leaders of Holland and Scandinavia and the remains of the Second International became, early in the war, the targets of a well-directed attack by the Poale-Zionists and their allies; the Hague Bureau of the International Jewish Socialist Labor Federation Poale-Zion was particularly zealous in the agitation among the socialists. The Bureau was then under the direction of Borochov, Chasanowitsch and Zerubavel, three Russian leaders, and somewhat later, included the Austrian leaders, Berl Locker and S. Kaplansky. These men established a Jewish Socialist Press Bureau which issued bulletins in five languages. They also carried on an incessant personal agitation at the Hague, in Stockholm and at Copenhagen, among the socialist leaders of various countries who chanced to come to those neutral points, and with some of whom the Jewish socialists were well acquainted personally. In November, 1 9 1 5 , the Poale-Zionist international federation submitted to the International Socialist Bureau an impressive memorandum entitled The Jews and the War.*z 42

Union des Nationalites, Compte rendu de la IIIme conference des nationalites . . . (Lausanne, 1 9 1 7 ) , pp. 22-24, 32-33, 145-152. On the Pro Causa Judaica and the Zionists' activities, see I.es Buts et les moyens du Comite Pro Causa Judaica (Zurich-Lausanne, 1 9 1 7 ) , esp. pp. 1 0 - 1 1 ; Di Tribune, nos. 2, 9, 15-16 ( 1 9 1 5 - 1 9 1 6 ) . 43

The memorandum was neither a hysterical nor a rhetorical document. It explained the status of the J e w s in the various countries, recounted their sufferings in the eastern war zone, and reviewed the persistent, though until then largely ineffective, efforts made by the J e w s to secure national recognition from their individual governments and

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In this document the Jewish socialists placed greatest stress on the need for national rights and for Palestine, because they were reasonably certain that the International Socialist Bureau would favor civil and political equality for the Jews. They maintained that the denial of national rights must render uncertain even civil and political equality. Thus the memorandum asserted that " in a state composed of various nationalities . . . civil rights without guarantees for national minorities are illusory. Hence the denial of the national equality of the Jewish people ultimately leads to the restriction or abolition of civil and political equality." The Socialist International was therefore requested to recognize the Jewish nationality by creating a Jewish section, and also to endorse the Poale-Zionist demands. The latter, generally stated, included " the free profession of nationality and of national self-government in poly-national regions." More particularly, the Poale-Zionists desired the right of national self-determination for the Jewish minorities in all countries . . . particularly in poly-national States, where the Jews form an independent community and endeavor to conserve their specific national life, legal guarantees for our national existence and our unfettered intellectual development, self-government in national affairs, and national equality in the government of State, county, and city.44 from the Socialist International. The major portion of the memorandum consisted of documents. T h e booklet was published in English, French, and German, and served as a powerful means of propaganda. 44 The Jews and the War, bavel, op. cit., pp. 584-587.

op. ext., esp. pp. 16 et seq., 33, 3 7 - 3 9 ; Zeru-

American socialism and labor were also induced to espouse the cause of Jewish rights. In September, 1915, the National Executive of the Socialist Party of the United States endorsed the program of the N a tional Workmen's Committee for Jewish Rights, which had been instructed by a Jewish labor convention to favor national rights. In November, 1916, the American Federation of Labor, at its Baltimore Convention, approved Jewish rights in a negative resolution which

ΐ φ

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The Poale-Zionist propaganda gradually began to tell upon socialist public opinion. The conference of socialists of neutral lands which met at The Hague from July 3 1 to August 2, 1 9 1 6 , declared in favor of autonomy for the J e w s as well as for other national minorities. 45 But the effects of this Jewish national activity did not become fully evident until after the Russian (March) Revolution. The treatment of the matter will, therefore, be reserved for the following chapter.

The Jewish nationalists of the west and central European belligerent states developed only slight activity in behalf of national rights for their brethren in the east. Before the overthrow of the tsar there seems to have been no agitation whatever in France or Italy. Russia, the worst offender against the Jews, was an ally, and it would have been considered highly unpatriotic to have called attention to wrongs committed by a comrade in arms. The Jewish nationalists in England, particularly the radical fringe, did on occasion call attention to the need for Jewish autonomy in eastern Europe. Early in the war, Israel Zangwill courageously denounced Russia's discriminatory policy, and, somewhat later, he formulated what he considered a necessary program for the eastern Jews. He demanded civil, political and religious favored the removal of all political, national and civil restrictions upon the Jews. Chasanowitsch and Motzkin, op. cit., pp. 94-95, 98-99; Der Ytddisher Kongres, no. 8 ( 1 9 1 5 ) . In the United States the Poale-Zionist influence was exerted indirectly by means of agitation among the Jewish workmen, who, when assembled in convention, forced a national program upon the anti-nationalist leadership. In the neutral centers of Europe, all achievements must be directly attributed to the Poale-Zionists. 45

See Chasanowitsch and Motzkin, op. cit., p. 96.

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equality, and also national rights, equally with the most privileged group in any land. T h e radical Jewish national workmen were always dissatisfied with diplomatic, " backstairs," appeals. T h e y organized a Labor League f o r Jewish Rights. In September, 1 9 1 5 , a conference of English-Jewish labor organizations met at Leeds and resolved in favor of " securing and protecting the rights of oppressed nationalities, as well as of national minorities everywhere. . . . " This program the Labor League made its o w n ; it agitated among the Jewish masses and sought to influence English public opinion. 46 The conquest of Russia's western provinces afforded the nationally-inclined J e w i s h leaders in the Central Empires an opportunity to call attention to the needs of the eastern J e w s . Soon after the capture of W a r s a w , it was discovered that the Germans and J e w s in Poland possessed common linguistic and cultural interests, and some German and Austrian J e w s were not slow in pointing out the advantages of cooperation. The furtherance of the Yiddish language and of Jewish cultural institutions, it was contended, would not only make it possible f o r the eastern J e w s to maintain their identity and to survive as a people; it would also reinforce the German element and German culture. The J e w s , furthermore, would prove of practical as well as of moral and cultural value to the Germans. They would serve as a medium f o r German industry in the eastern market. The

most

influential

German-Jewish

organization

to

48 I. Zangwill, in Judaean Addresses, vol. iii (Ν. Y., 1927), pp. 98-100; Di Tribune, no. 17 (1916) ; The Jews and the War, op. cit., pp. 88-89; Chasanowitsch and Motzkin, op. cit., pp. 63-64. In September, 1916, Jabotinsky, who had been active at Copenhagen, began to issue Unser Tribune, a Yiddish daily, which favored, among other things, " equal national rights in all lands." But the response in London was so discouraging that the newspaper lasted no more than a month. See Unser Tribune, nos. 1-3, 8, 23 (1916).

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champion national rights was the Committee for the East. This group was organized at Berlin early in the war, and, under the leadership of Franz Oppenheimer, it sought to induce the government authorities and public opinion to vouchsafe autonomy to the eastern Jews. A Zionist convention, held at Berlin in December, 1 9 1 6 , likewise favored the recognition of the Jewish people in eastern Europe as a distinct national group. The German-Jewish national press called attention to the heterogeneous character of Russia, and sought to clarify the demands of the Russian Jewish parties for national autonomy. Toward the close of 1 9 1 5 , a Committee for the East, similar to the one at Berlin, became active at Vienna under the headship of Gustav Kohn. It agitated within the Dual Monarchy, and appealed to the Austrian authorities at Lublin to safeguard the peculiar cultural interests of the Jews in the occupied area.47 But in the Hapsburg realm this activity in behalf of Russian-Polish Jews was obscured by the more widespread and more significant demand that the Jews of Austria proper be recognized as a nationality. The efforts of the Austrian-Jewish nationalists to secure national rights for themselves will be discussed presently. The activities of the Jewish nationalists in the various neutral and belligerent centers were at first conducted independently of one another. But the Europeans soon came *" On the agitation in the Central Empires, see M. J. Bodmer, Ein neuer Staatenbund und das Ostjudenproblem (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1916), esp. pp. 19-21 et seq., 35-36; Der Jude, vol. i, pp. 590-595; J. W., " Deutschland und die Ostjudenfrage," Jeschurun, 1916, pp. 1-19, 65-95, 177-210; I. Kahan, " D i e nationalen Forderungen des jüdischen Volkes in Russland und seine Parteien," ibid., July-Aug., 1917·, PP· 353-373, 483509; N. Birnbaum, Den Ostjuden ihr Recht (Vienna, 1915) ; Mayer, op. cit., p. 483; Jüdische Korrespondenz, Dec. 9, 1915, p. 3; Dec. 16, I9i5> Ρ· 3; Η eint, no. 165 (1915)·

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to look upon the numerous and powerful Jewish center in the United States as the leading protagonist in the movement for Jewish rights. In 1 9 1 6 , soon after the sessions of the Philadelphia Preliminary Conference, the congress organization sent a letter, signed by Brandeis, to forty-five Jewish central organizations in Europe, South A f r i c a , Australia and South America, and to the Jewish press of all countries. The missive called attention to the troubles of the Jews and to the urgent need for action. It asserted that the war involved the rights of small nationalities, and raised the hope that the Jewish problem, too, would be given consideration. The organizations were informed of the movement for an American Jewish Congress; they were encouraged to send any materials which they thought should come before the congress; they were urged to cooperate in the work f o r Jewish rights. Within a short time, replies expressing sympathy or pledging cooperation arrived from many of the centers which we have surveyed. The congress organization maintained contact with the Jewish bodies, and soon became a clearing house for information and proposals bearing upon Jewish rights. 48 The suggestion was made that the American Jewish nationalists cooperate in summoning a world Jewish congress. But the Executive Organization Committee never seriously considered this proposition. A world Jewish congress therefore remained, for the time being, an idle dream cherished by a few radical nationalists. 48 T h e Brandeis letter appears to have been proposed and written by de H a a s . Cf. ( M S S . ) Minutes of Committee on Plan and Scope, M a y 3, 1916; Minutes of Administrative Committee, M a y 3, 1916. Jewish Congress Bulletin, June, 1916, pp. 2-3. Some of the replies a r e in ( M S S . ) Minutes of Exec. Org. Committee, June 22, 1916, July 17, 1916, Sept. n , 1916, Nov. 2, 1916; Minutes of Administrative Committee, Aug. 1916, May 31, 1917, July 7, I9I7-

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3. THE ACTIVITIES OF T H E WESTERN NON-NATIONALISTS

The anti-nationalist Jews of western and central Europe possessed well-informed and influential leaders. The French Alliance Israelite Universelle, the British Conjoint, or Joint Foreign Committee,49 the Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden and the Viennese Israelitische Allianz were no less eager to secure equal rights for the eastern Jews than were the nationalists. But they favored only civil, political and religious equality; national rights they stigmatized as a delusion and a snare. Furthermore, while sharing the general viewpoint of the American Jewish Committee, these organizations did not adopt the latter's policy. They acted independently of the nationalists and refused to compromise on the question of national rights. The British group alone began to manifest a willingness to champion more than civil and political equality. Since our study is concerned with national or minority rights, we shall pause only to explain the action of the British anti-nationalists. Acting through its able secretary, Lucien Wolf, the Conjoint Foreign Committee was in communication with the British Foreign Office throughout the war period. It pleaded for the removal of civil and political disabilities in Russia and Rumania, but made no mention of national rights. However, strongly opposed to Zionism and to a Jewish Palestine as these anti-nationalists were, they could not entirely ignore the Palestinian question. In a communication of March 3, 1916, the Foreign Committee requested for the Jews of the Holy Land " reasonable facilities for immigration and colonization, and such municipal privileges in the towns and colonies inhabited by them as may be shown to be necessary." 00 Zionism had thus compelled the 49 This body represented two Jewish organizations, the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Anglo-Jewish Association. 50

The Peace Conference,

Paris, 1919.

Report of the Delegation

of the

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British anti-nationalists to seek special rights for one group of Jews. The increasing insistence with which eastern Jews demanded national rights, and the conversion of the American anti-nationalists to " group rights," were destined before very long to induce a further concession in the direction of Jewish minority rights. 4 . T H E DEMANDS OF EASTERN J E W S FOR NATIONAL RECOGNITION : RUSSIA, AUSTRIA AND T H E RUSSIAN PROVINCES UNDER GERMAN-AUSTRIAN OCCUPATION

The agitation among American and among west and central European Jews, which we have thus far described, was all calculated to aid the Jewish masses of the east. Our attention must now be directed to those regions where the Jewish nationalists desired national rights for themselves; first to Russia and Austria, the strongholds of pre-war Jewish nationalism, and then to the Russian provinces under German-Austrian occupation. The Russian-Jewish national movement remained dormant throughout the period under consideration. On occasion a Bund proclamation appeared demanding " national-cultural autonomy." We hear now and then of small party conferences. We even discover some enthusiasm engendered by the agitation for a Jewish congress in the United States. But as symptoms of a national movement these activities are hardly significant. However, an occurence of 1 9 1 5 revealed that the so-called Jews of the British Empire . . . (London, 1920), hereafter referred to as " Joint Delegation Report," p. 60. In October, 1916, the Foreign Committee pleaded for the removal of disabilities in Russia and Rumania, and for the safeguarding of Jewish rights in territories to be ceded to those states. The reply of the Foreign Office, hardly two months before the collapse of the tsarist regime, stated that no favorable action could be hoped for either then or " in the immediate future." Ibid., pp. 13-16, 41-60.

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Jewish assimilationists, who had been least ardent in their support of Jewish nationalism, still favored cultural autonomy, and that the liberal non-Jews were not unwilling to sponsor self-determination in matters pertaining to national culture. In June of that year, the Constitutional Democrats held a conference at Moscow. Vinaver, the distinguished Jewish Cadet leader, presented a report on the Jewish question in the name of the central committee of the party. On the basis of that report, the conference voted in favor of " the full recognition of the rights of the citizen [for the J e w s ] , and of the right of self-determination in matters of national culture." 5 1

The Austrian Jewish nationalists were somewhat more active than those of Russia. T o be sure, agitation for national rights ceased almost entirely during the early months of the war. But the movement gradually revived and gained in volume and influence as the war dragged on. In the summer of 1 9 1 5 , the Poale-Zionist party raised its voice in behalf of Jewish national autonomy. Thereafter it, and particularly the party's able theorist, M a x Rosenfeld, continued the agitation. The latter presented constructive suggestions for the democratization of the Jewish religious communities, for an extension of their competence and for their conversion into institutions of Jewish national and cultural autonomy. It was during the period of the war 51 M. Vinaver, Rapport sur la question juive, op. cit., pp. 54-57; The Jews and the War, op. cit., pp. 75-77; Zerubavel, op. cit., pp. 313-318; Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 314, 320-321. Milyukov's view was not to raise national questions until the problem of Russian liberalism had been solved. He sought the full cooperation of the " Jewish nation " in the struggle to liberalize the Russian state. Cf. J . Kruk (ed.), Great Russians on the Jewish Question (London, 1916), pp. 15-24.

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that he finally supplied the theoretic foundations for the party's national program. A t the close of 1 9 1 5 , the Zionists likewise took action. A party conference directed the Actions Committee to work for national rights in all states of multiple nationality. Early in the following year, leading nationalists like Robert Strieker organized a Jewish National Association which asserted that Austria must soon be reconstructed as a federation of national units, and urged the Jewish masses to demand rights equally with all other nationalities. B y 1 9 1 6 a movement for a Jewish congress in Austria had likewise developed and occasioned a conflict similar to that in the United States. Anti-nationalists like A l f r e d Stern, president of the Vienna religious community, were at first opposed to a congress. The Poale-Zionist leaders and other radical nationalists preferred to act without the " assimilationists." But Adolf Stand and other moderates urged that a congress must include all Austrian J e w r y , even if that must entail concessions on the part of the nationalists. 52 However, this national effort, like so many others which we have noted, achieved significance only after the Russian Revolution.

Russian-Poland and Lithuania were conquered by the German-Austrian armies during the summer and fall of 1 9 1 5 . T w o distinct German administrations were set up at Warsaw and at Vilna, while the region centering in 52

See The Jews and the War, op.. cit., pp. 72-75; Max Rosenfeld's books and articles — Polen utid Juden, op. cit., pp. 42-52; Nationales Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Juden in Polen, op. cit., pp. 17-62; Die Polnische Judenfrage, op. cit., esp. introduction and chs. v, v i ; Der Jude, vol. i, pp. 290-297; vol. ii, pp. 160-162; Sokolow, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 2223; " Proclamation of the Jewish National Association," Heint, no. 107 (1916).

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Lublin was placed under Austrian occupation. The Central Powers did not ignore the national desires of the Poles and Lithuanians. On the contrary, they sought to gain the confidence of the subject peoples; they desired to detach the provinces from Russia, to establish national governments under their tutelage, to control the regions indirectly. A new Polish state was proclaimed at Warsaw on November 5, 1916, and subsequent to the Russian Revolution, Germany also recognized a Lithuanian state. However, as regards the Jews of the occupied territories, the policy of the German-Austrian authorities was neither carefully conceived nor vigorously or even consistently applied. The conquerors were aware that the Jews might be used as a Germanizing influence, and thus as a powerful support of Teutonic policies in the east. But they failed to respect Jewish national aspirations. Nor were they willing to antagonize the Poles by favoring the Jews. The Austrians refused to recognize either a Jewish nationality or a national language. Thus Baron von Diller, governor-general of the Lublin area, said: " The nationalism of the Jews is of a reserved nature and lays claim to national rights for the jargon which has no juridic foundation whatsoever and which from the practical point of view admits of no defense." The Germans, too, at first issued proclamations and public notices in German and in Polish or Lithuanian translation; the language of the Jews was ignored. The Germans even neglected to remove the tsarist restrictions. Early in the war, a German-Austrian manifesto, in Hebrew and Yiddish, had promised full religious freedom and civil equality to the Russian-Polish Jews. When in a position to make good the promise, the Germans declared that the status of Polish Jewry was an internal problem to be solved by the restored Poland. This declaration should have precluded any definitive action with reference to the Jews.

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Yet, at the very time when Poland was being reconstituted, the German authorities saw fit to proclaim an edict on " The Organization of the Jewish Religious Community," which predisposed the settlement of the Jewish question on a western, non-national basis. Many Polish and Lithuanian Jews manifested genuine enthusiasm when the Russians were driven out. The Teutonic powers appeared as liberators; they need have experienced little difficulty in improving upon the Russian regime, at least so far as the Jews were concerned. But the policy of ignoring Jewish nationalism, and at the same time of doing nothing to remove the Jewish legal disabilities, estranged the Jews. Aware that they were being used merely as a tool, they resisted, and as a consequence Jewish nationalism was greatly stimulated. Nor did the Germans do anything to mitigate the hostile Polish-Jewish relations. The German policy has been well characterized as a " wretched fiasco." 53 The struggle for Jewish national rights began immediately upon the appearance of the Germans. In Warsaw and Vilna particularly, the Jews protested against the failure of the authorities to issue public notices in Yiddish translation. They argued that the masses understood their own language only, and that the neglect of the language of the Jews constituted a national insult. The Germans yielded, and proclamations appeared in Yiddish too. Similar efforts were required to induce the officials to carry a Yiddish translation on passports. However, the climax of the struggle for the recognition of a Jewish language was reached on the question of education. 63

Cf. P. Roth and W. Stein, Die politische Entwicklung in Kongresspolen während der deutschen Okkupation (Leipzig, 1919), p. 148; I. Nissenbaum, Ale Cheldt (Warsaw, 1929), p. 323; The Jews and the War, op. cit., p. 78. Kol Mevasser (Berlin, Aug.-Sept., 1914), p. 2.

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On September 17, 1 9 1 5 , a school ordinance prescribed Polish as the language of instruction in Polish schools, and German in the schools of the German and Jewish minorities throughout the territories subject to the governor-general. The decree was greeted by an opposition which was wellnigh universal. The Jewish " assimilationists," as champions of Polonization, condemned the measure. The nationalists, supported by the erstwhile apathetic masses, attacked the decree as constituting a double danger. In the first place they pointed out that the Jews were being used as a Germanizing agent. Indeed the Poles protested vehemently for that very reason. The nationalists, moreover, went further and insisted that the Jews were neither Germans nor Poles. They were a distinct national entity with a language of their own which must not be ignored. The Jewish opposition was so persistent that the school decree could not be enforced. The orthodox masses held fast to Yiddish as the traditional language. The Zionists, the nationalists and even the Bund viewed the medium of instruction as a determining element in national or nationalcultural autonomy. A f t e r some vacillation on the part of the German authorities, a concession was tacitly made. The regulation remained on the statute books, but Yiddish was characterized as a German dialect and allowed in the Jewish schools. Viewed by many J e w s as a fundamental element in the desired national autonomy, however, the school question continued to occasion strife, until the obnoxious clause was finally repealed in October, 1 9 1 6 . Instruction in Yiddish was thereafter permitted not because the language was a German dialect but because it was the mother tongue of most Jews. This very repeal, signifying as it did a triumph for Jewish nationalism, served further to enhance the prestige of the nationalists. Their influence upon the

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Jewish masses, particularly that of the Zionists, was greatly increased." The elections of the Warsaw Municipal Council which took place in July, 1 9 1 6 , constituted another significant moment in the development of Jewish national demands in Poland. In anticipation of the election, and partly as a result of the election campaign, the inchoate Polish-Jewish nationalism began to take form in groupings independent of the Russian organizations upon which they had relied until the coming of the Germans. During this time also the Jewish press gave much attention to the explanation and clarification of the meaning of national a u t o n o m y " and strongly influenced thereby the programs of the parties then in the process of formation. The Zionists established at Warsaw a central committee and agitated for " Jewish civil, national and religious rights " as well as for " an independent administration for all Jewish affairs." They were supported both by orthodox and proletarian-Zionist elements. 5 ' In order to further Jewish unity, the Zionists cooperated also with moderate non-nationalist groups in organizing a common Central Jewish Election Committee. It is significant to note that this committee, composed as it was of many non-nationalists, declared in favor of "equal civil, social and national-cultural rights." The uncompromising assimilationists were losing their influence with both Jews and Poles. Even an Orthodox Asso54

F o r the school ordinance, see Heint, no. 182 ( 1 9 1 5 ) . See also The Jews and the War, op. cit., pp. 89-90; Roth and Stein, op. cit., pp. 1531 5 6 ; Vilner Zamclbuch, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 8, 1 1 , 24-48; Pinkas (Vilna, 1922), pp. 1-6, 725-727; J . Vigodsky, In Shturm (Vilna, 1926), pp. 3753 et seq., 157. 55

See f o r example, Heint, nos. 60-61, 72, 78, 86, 90, 101, 114, ( 1 9 1 6 ) ; Lebensfragen, no. 3 ( 1 9 1 6 ) .

127

5β Although united in a separate federation, the Mizrachi, or orthodox Zionists, continued to support the Zionists politically.

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ciation (Agudath harOrtodoxim), which was formed by two German Rabbis who came for the express purpose of combating nationalism among the orthodox masses, and which was greatly favored by the German authorities, could attract but scant numbers to its banner. The Bund campaigned independently. It had begun to gather its energies with the coming of the Germans, and had established early in 1 9 1 6 an organ, Lebensfragen, under the editorship of the veteran Vladimir Medem. The Warsaw voters were urged to accept the Bund slogan of nationalcultural autonomy. But that vague formula required specification. Demands were therefore made for a free, compulsory and secular school with Yiddish as the language of instruction, and for a special school committee, representing the Jewish population, to supervise all matters pertaining to popular education. In the summer of 1 9 1 6 , a considerable part of the Jewish electorate of Warsaw became even more nationalist than the Zionist leadership. The Jews composed 4 4 % of the total electorate of the city and were therefore entitled to nearly forty of the ninety representatives. The Central Jewish Election Committee, however, in order to further friendly relations with the Poles, recognized the preeminence of the latter and offered to take less than half that number. The Poles, on the other hand, resented any independent Jewish political action, and showed no appreciation of the gallant move. This aroused many non-Zionist nationalists, and resulted in the crystallization of a new party. A n influential attorney, named Noah Prilutski, assumed leadership over the scattered (non-Zionist) national clubs, societies, and groups, and brought their leading men together in a " People's Committee." The faction assumed the name " Populists " {Volkisten) and adopted as its chief slogan a

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broad national autonomy for the J e w s . " Prilutski's followers emphasized the demand for autonomy in their writings, proclamations and platforms, and gained a following among the masses. Although organized in the midst of the campaign and therefore unable to contest more than a few seats, the Populists elected four representatives against the vigorous opposition of all other Jewish parties. The Zionists were hampered by their coalition with the moderate " assimilationists," and secured only three seats.58 The first session of the Warsaw Municipal Council (July 24, 1 9 1 6 ) witnessed an unusual spirit of harmony between Poles and Jews. The Jewish national parties greeted the new Poland and pledged it their loyalty and solidarity. They made sure, however, not to pass in silence the demands of the Jews. The Zionists expressed their conviction that the free Polish nation would safeguard Jewish civil and national rights. The Bund repeated its old formula of nationalcultural autonomy and particularly urged the need for Jewish schools with Yiddish as the language of instruction. The non-Zionist nationalists demanded, among other reforms, public support of Jewish schools and full permission to rest on the Jewish Sabbath with the concomitant right to work on Sunday. 59 07

This element was strongly influenced by the writings of Dubnow.

58

T h e electoral system employed at the Warsaw elections was complicated. T h e voters were divided into classes or curiae. The PolishJewish agreement related to the first five curiae; the Jews secured fifteen out of sixty seats. The fifteen Jewish seats were apportioned equally among the Zionist, the orthodox, and the three moderate " assimilationist " groups. The Populists campaigned only in the sixth curia; they won all four Jewish seats. The combined Jewish representation in the Warsaw Municipal Council was nineteen. On the Jewish parties and the election campaign, see Roth and Stein, op. cit., pp. 158-163; Heint, nos. 156-157, 161-162 (1916) ; nos. 14, 18, 23, 35 (1917) ; Lebensfragen, nos. 2-3, 35 (1916) ; Nissenbaum, op. cit., pp. 323-326. 5» Hcint, no. 171 (1916) ; Roth and Stein, op. cit., pp. 163-164.

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The decree on " The Organization of the Jewish Religious Community," which the Germans issued in November, 1 9 1 6 , afforded the Jewish nationalists an opportunity again to express their views as to the future of Jewish life in Poland. Along with demands f o r national rights, many J e w s had consistently agitated for a reorganization and democratization of the religious communities, which had remained largely under the control of the non-nationalists. The declining influence of the latter intensified the desire of the nationalists to dislodge their enemies from the hold on the Jewish communal institutions. The new decree provided for a supreme Jewish council to supervise the religious communities. The religious basis of the new organization did not satisfy the Jewish nationalists. But many saw in the project a good beginning in the direction of unity—a good shell to be filled with proper contents. The desired contents, national, or national-cultural Jewish affairs, would, it was hoped, convert the union of " persons of the Jewish faith " into a national federation for the autonomous management of distinctly national affairs. 60 Communal elections were expected to be held in the spring of 1 9 1 7 , and the nationalists commenced preparations for the contest with the " assimilationists." But in the midst of the agitation the tsarist regime was overthrown and the civil and political emancipation of the Russian Jews was proclaimed. Thereafter, the Jews of the occupied provinces were strongly influenced by the developments among their more numerous and better organized Russian brethren. 90

The text of the decree is in Heint, nos. 264-265 (1916). For an excellent analysis and criticism, see Max Rosenfeld, " Die neue jüdische Gemeindeverfassung in Polen," Der Jude, vol. i, pp. 578-583. See also Roth and Stein, op. cit., pp. 167-170.

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THE plan of organization employed in the preceding chapter will serve also as a convenient framework for a survey of Jewish national developments between March, 1917 and November, 1918. T h e distinction between the Jewish agitators o f eastern Europe, who sought national rights for themselves, and those of the " west," whose objective was to help their eastern brethren, was as clearly marked during this period as in the earlier years of the war. T h e differences between the nationalists and anti-nationalists of central and western Europe persisted. The vast majority of the Jews of the United States remained united on the compromise platform elaborated at the close of 1916. However, the active agitation among the American Jews, to which so much attention was devoted in the preceding chapter, ceased with the entry of the United States into the war. O n the other hand, the collapse of the tsarist regime removed the influence which had held the Russian nationalists in check, and also heartened the proponents of Jewish national rights in Austria and in the occupied provinces. During 1917-1918 the activities in behalf of Jewish national rights centered in eastern Europe. W e shall therefore first examine conditions in that region. 211

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I. PROPOSALS FOR N A T I O N A L AUTONOMY IN REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

In March, 1917, tsar Nicholas II abdicated, and the task of governing Russia was assumed by the Provisional Government. The latter was at first dominated by the Constitutional Democrats; it included only one radical, the Socialist Revolutionary Kerensky. T h e new regime proclaimed political liberty and made preparations for the calling of a constitutional convention. But the middle-class leadership did not satisfy the Russian masses. Soviets or councils of workingmen, soldiers and peasants appeared everywhere, and soon fell under the influence of the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Menshevists who desired radical economic reforms. In May, 1917, the soviets were instrumental in effecting a reconstruction of the Provisional Government whereby several moderates were replaced by Socialist Revolutionaries and Menshevists. T h e coalition, however, was short-lived; in August the Constitutional Democrats withdrew from the government and Kerensky became Prime Minister and virtual dictator of Russia. Kerensky could satisfy the Russian masses no more than did his middle-class predecessors. He could not make peace, and in war time social reconstruction was impossible. Popular disaffection grew. Gradually the Bolshevists secured control of urban soviets and gained influence even in the rural councils. O n November 7, 1917, they overthrew the Provisional Government and seized control. The effect of the Russian Revolution upon the movement for Jewish national rights was profound. A s if from under ground, thousands of conscious Jewish nationalists suddenly burst upon the scene. Hundreds of mass meetings, conferences, conventions were held in bewildering succession. The parties, smothered and disrupted by reaction, were reconstituted and greatly strengthened in numbers and

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influence. A Jewish press appeared almost overnight. The air was filled with programs, platforms, elections. And all this feverish activity, insofar as it was concerned with exclusively Jewish affairs, was primarily devoted to the cause of national rights and to the organization and reform of Jewish communal and national institutions. Civil and political rights no longer constituted an issue in Russia, because one of the first acts of the Provisional Government was to appoint a commission to arrange for the removal of the Jewish disabilities. A decree, dated March 21 (Apr. 3 ) , 1 9 1 7 , and signed by L v o v and Kerensky, removed all restrictions which Russian subjects had suffered " on account of their religion, sect or nationality." Happy as the Russian J e w s were to secure civil and political equality, they viewed it, nevertheless, not as the final goal of their endeavors, but rather as a step in the direction of full emancipation. And " f u l l emancipation" meant some form of national rights—a principle which became at this time a fetish among Russia's Jews. The Jewish press clamored for national rights; the phrase electrified thousands of meetings; and the Jewish parties, practically without exception, hastened either to reaffirm the demand or to adopt it. The political groups which had formerly espoused the cause of Jewish national rights gloried in their perspicacity, while those who had slighted or neglected the dogma, suddenly abashed and rendered repentent, sought by a newlyfound zeal to atone for their former transgressions. 1 The Zionists took action immediately after the autocracy 1

For the Emancipation Edict, see The Zionist Review, no. 3 (1917), p. 51. Dr. L. Bramson, one of the founders of the Trudoviki, or Labor Group, in the first Duma, and a close friend of Kerensky, served as an expert on the commission, and aided in the writing of the decree. Interview, April 20, 1930. See also, Heint, nos. 79, 102 (1917) ; Ha-Shtloach, vol. xxxvi, pp. 97 et seq.; A . Margolin, The Jews of Eastern Europe (Ν. Y., 1926), pp. 6, 45 et seq.

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had been overthrown. A large mass-meeting in Petrograd hailed the Provisional Government as the only power which would respect Jewish civil and national rights. Soon a proclamation of the central committee recalled the decisions of the Helsingfors Conference and added that the revolution had endowed those basic principles with " practical significance." On May 24 (June 6 ) , 1 9 1 7 , an all-Russian Zionist convention assembled at Petrograd, after an endless number of local mass-meetings and district conferences had been held. The convention with its 552 delegates, representing 140,000 dues-paying members, 2 afforded a spectacle of a truly popular representative assembly. The resolutions reaffirmed the Helsingfors national-political program, and demanded particularly that in the elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly the national minorities be allowed separate representation proportional to their numbers. The central committee was instructed to cooperate with nonJewish minorities and to take the initiative in calling a congress of Russian Jewry, in order to secure from the Constituent Assembly, and thereafter to guard, the civil and national rights of the Jewish people.3 The non-Zionist middle-class nationalists also succeeded, during those blooming days of Jewish nationalism, in attracting a following. We have seen in Part I of this study how an organization center, known as the People's Party, was established at St. Petersburg under the leadership of Dubnow. No organized following could be built up during the years of reaction and war; but the platform which included a broad program of national rights proved a positive asset. A s soon as the iron hand of the autocracy had been re2

In 1913 the number of active members or " Shekel-payers " had been 26,000. »Η eint, nos. 94, 106, 153-154, 158 ( 1 9 1 7 ) ; Sokolow, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 27-28.

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moved, a number of national groups or organizations, each basing its policy upon the program of the People's Party, took shape. A Jewish Democratic Union was founded at Petrograd, and before long a number of branches appeared in other cities. The aim of this group, to quote the d r a f t of its platform, was " to stand for the principles of democracy, socialism and self-determination of nationalities " ; the national principle was to have precedence over any class interests. Another faction, the Jewish National Democratic Party, was founded at Odessa soon after the revolution. Its activity was limited to southern Russia and its general policies were less radical than those of the Petrograd organization. But as regards Jewish national affairs, the two factions were as one; both based their platforms on the principles of autonomy propounded by the leaders of the People's P a r t y / The People's Group, which had been organized in 1907,® revived soon after the overthrow of the tsar. Though small in numbers, it wielded considerable influence; Vinaver and other prominent public men of the Russian capital were among its members, and affiliation with the Constitutional Democratic Party lent it added prestige. The leading men of this faction were not convinced nationalists. But at the time of popular agitation they drifted with the tide. In March, 1 9 1 7 , Sliosberg publicly spoke in favor of national rights. Vinaver counselled that the Jews, for the time being, should not raise the question of national rights. But when taken to task by Bund leaders, Zionists and nationalists alike, he announced that he too favored the recognition of * Cf. S. M. Dubnow, The Demands of the Jews (Ν. Y., n. d.), pp. 3-4; " At the Conference of the Democratic Union," Der Yiddisher Proletarier, no. s (1917) ; Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. ii, heft 2, p. 436. N. Shtif, Yidden un Yiddish (Kiev, 1919), ch. iv. 8

Supra, p. 118 et seq.

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the Jews " as a nation without a territory." Nevertheless, he insisted that the demand for national rights must be delayed " not years, but days." 6 Like the middle-class parties, the Jewish proletarian factions resumed their agitation for national rights. The Bund returned to its commanding position in Jewish socialism immediately on the outbreak of the revolution. Nationalcultural autonomy again became a popular slogan. Before the revolution it had been a vague formula; now the probability of its realization led the half-hearted nationalists to specify their national demands. When the Provisional Government declared its intention to remove all " national restrictions," the Bund maintained that that term would have to include the recognition of the mother tongues, and the free development of the national schools and cultures of Russia's peoples. The conference held at Petrograd April 1-6, 1 9 1 7 , went further in clarifying the national demands of the Bund. Jewish national institutions, recognized and supported by the state, must be created and endowed with a competence to include the whole cultural life of the nationality. Education, literature, art, science, even technical knowledge, would be cared f o r separately by each national group. Thereafter, in conference and convention, in the party press and at public meetings, the demand for national rights, as the Bund understood the term, was consistently urged and reiterated. 7 The Jewish Social Democratic Labor Party (Poale-Zion) held a conference at Moscow April 4-10, 1 9 1 7 , and adopted β 7

See Heinl, nos. 79, 1 1 4 ( 1 9 1 7 ) .

The Bund membership grew rapidly in the revolutionary days. B y August, 1917, the organization counted some 16,000 members in south Russia alone. In December, 1917, the delegates who attended the eighth convention at Petrograd represented about 30,000 workers throughout Russia; the civil war prevented other delegates from coming. Cf. Kirzhnits, op. eit., vol. iv, pp. 44-45, 68-69, 1 0 8 - 1 1 1 , 266, 274.

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a most comprehensive national program; on September 8 of the same year, an all-Russian convention met at Kiev and reaffirmed the national provisions of the conference. The Poale-Zionists demanded that a ministry for national affairs, representing all nationalities, be established in the Provisional Government. They sought to reconstruct Russia " on the foundations of national self-determination and autonomy . . . " ; the provinces were to be vouchsafed territorial autonomy and special guaranties were to protect the rights of national minorities. The Jews as a " national minority " must be assured national-political autonomy on a non-territorial (personal) basis. The language of the Jews must be recognized in the administration and in the courts. The form and content of Jewish self-government would be elaborated by a Jewish constituent assembly, or by a Russian Jewish congress. Finally, the Poale-Zionists designated the Jewish community the " foundation-stone of national autonomy," and urged its immediate reorganization on a national-democratic basis. 8 The Zionist-Socialists had been, in pre-revolutionary years, the only proletarian-Zionist faction which had minimized the value of national rights for the Jews. The revolution, however, apparently had disproved the contention that Jewish national rights, while desirable in themselves, could not possibly be secured in the Diaspora. The party, therefore, made haste to rectify its error. A s early as March, 1 9 1 7 , Zionist-Socialist leaders became aware that the Jews living in the various countries were not merely sojourners but citizens, who sought to further the progress of the state, as well as their own political, social-economic and national-cultural development. They began to view the Jews as " a nation of large minorities, 8

F o r the resolutions, see Z e r u b a v e l , op. cit., pp. 522-530, 541-548.

also Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 80-81.

See

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which live concentrated in various lands . . . " and, unlike their former pessimistic outlook, they now granted that a development of J e w i s h life in the Diaspora was both possible and desirable. The sixth all-Russian conference of the party, which met at Moscow April 2-6, 1 9 1 7 , crystallized the new attitude toward autonomy; its most important achievement was the incorporation of national-personal autonomy into the party program. The debates were chiefly concerned with the question whether the change involved a revolution in the outlook of the group, or was the result of an evolutionary development. The desirability of autonomy was conceded by all. In fact the attitude of the conferees was an apologetic one—they had " sinned against the Diaspora " and were ready to make amends. The new national program of the Zionist Socialists was closely modeled on the older platforms of the national socialists, although the stock phrases of the rival parties were rejected in f a v o r of a new formula — " nationalpersonal autonomy f o r the peoples of R u s s i a . " 8 The devotion of the Poale-Zionists to Palestine still presented an insurmountable obstacle to unity with this group. But the acceptance of national autonomy by the Zionist Socialists removed the basic difference between themselves and the Seymists, whose chief concern had been national autonomy before the war and naturally remained so after the revolution. E f f o r t s to unite the two factions were therefore vigorously pursued until an agreement, the first point of 8

The new platform declared in favor of " national-personal autonomy," we are told, because the Bund formula, "national-cultural," was inadequate, and because the employment of the term " national-political" would create the impression that the J e w s sought to separate themselves completely f r o m the state life. It would have been truer to say that the other slogans were already associated with existing parties. What then would people think of a party which capitulated entirely and could not even present a difference in phraseology from other groups?

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which called for an extensive national autonomy for the Jews, was announced at Moscow on May 20, 1 9 1 7 . A combined committee was constituted as the central body of the new United Jewish Socialist Labor Party. The two weak groups, once united, became extremely active and gained popular favor especially in the Ukraine, where they soon assumed the leadership of Jewish life. The convention of the United Socialist Party (they came to be called the F er einigte), originally set f o r August, 1 9 1 7 , was postponed. But a series of district conferences, including those of Kiev, Hömel, Moscow, Kharkov and Odessa, confirmed the union and gave much attention to national autonomy, especially in relation to the Jewish community and to the proposed Russian Jewish congress. Early in September, 1 9 1 7 , the Central Committee, meeting in plenary session at Kiev, called upon the Provisional Government to decree the equality of all languages and to establish a Council for National A f f a i r s to represent all nationalities. It was also demanded that, until a permanent constitution should come into force, the state budget must provide for the schools and other social institutions of the Jews. 1 0 Simultaneously with the revival of the Jewish parties, and with their renewed agitation for national rights, a movement developed to unite all Russian J e w s for the purpose of formulating a common program. A united Jewry, it was hoped, would secure a hearing both from the Russian ConIn August, 1917, the united party counted some 150 organizations with about 13,000 members. On the national program of the Zionist Socialists and their union with the Seymists, see Der Yiddisher Proletarier, 1917, no. 1, pp. 1-7; no. 1-2, pp. i, 7-8; no. 10, pp. 1-26; Heint, no. 109 (1917) ; Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 73-74, 86, 126-127. In addition to the parties outlined above, another Zionist-socialist group, the Zeire Zion, appeared. But it remained part of the Zionist Organization and cooperated with the Zionists in furthering Jewish national rights. See Der Jude, vol. viii, pp. 649-652.

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stituent Assembly and from the peace conference which, the Russians believed, would soon be called. Immediately upon the overthrow of the old regime, a United Jewish Committee, representing the various parties and organizations, appeared in Moscow. When Jewish emancipation was proclaimed, this body staged a demonstration; a large massmeeting at Moscow joyfully hailed the new freedom and expressed the conviction that the Russian Constituent Assembly " will guarantee the Jewish people, as all other peoples of Russia, not only civil freedom, but also national rights, national self-government and free national development." The meeting also voted in favor of a Russian Jewish congress. Similar resolutions were adopted at Petrograd and at other Jewish centers. 11 The movement for a congress quickly won the support of practically all elements in Russian Jewry, but considerable difficulty was encountered in formulating a program which all parties could accept. The Bund argued that the Jews of the various countries constituted different national groups; it therefore disapproved of the proposal that the projected congress consider Jewish rights in lands other than Russia. Vinaver's group and other anti-Zionists denied the Bund's contention, but refused to accede to the demand of the Zionists that Palestine be specially singled out for consideration. A f t e r much negotiation, a Preliminary Conference, held at Petrograd July 18-21 (July 3 1 - A u g u s t 3 ) , 1 9 1 7 , succeeded in effecting a compromise. It was unanimously agreed that the Russian Jewish congress concern itself with the following : I. The elaboration of the fundamentals of Jewish self-government in Russia. 11 The Moscow meeting was held on March 24, 1917 ; some 7,000 people were present. See Η eint, nos. 94. " S (1917) I Sokolow, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 38-42.

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22I

2. The determination of legal guarantees for the Jewish national minority. 3. The determination of the forms of Russian-Jewish communal organization during the period of transition. 4. The guaranty of the civil and national rights of the J e w s : a. In independent Poland. b. In Palestine. c. In Rumania. 1 2

In the summer of 1 9 1 7 the numerous J e w i s h factions in Russia had thus achieved unity on a program calling f o r national rights. Russian public opinion, as represented by the democratic elements who controlled the Provisional Government, likewise appeared favorably disposed to the Jewish national claims. When civil and political equality was decreed in March, 1 9 1 7 , the remnants of Jewish communal autonomy were not eliminated along with the exceptional laws. T h e door was thus left open f o r a continuation, and perhaps also an extension, of J e w i s h self-government. 13 T h e Provisional Government, however, was too busy to plan positive legislation f o r the Jewish communities, and it possessed neither the time nor the inclination to interfere with the functioning of those bodies. A type of extralegal self-governing institution was therefore taking shape and demanding government recognition. In the early days of the revolution, the national-socialist parties, which represented the various Russian minorities, again met in conference. 1 4 Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, i: C / . Chasanowitsch and Motzkin, op. cit., pp. 35-37; The Zionist Review, no. 7 ( 1 9 1 7 ) ; Ha-Shiloach, vol. xxxiii, pp. 1 1 8 - 1 2 2 ; Der Yiddisher Proletarier, 1917, no. 3, pp. 14-19, 30-31; no. 8, pp. 16-19; Kirzhnits, of. eit., vol. iv, pp. 69-71, 1 1 7 - 1 1 8 , 629; Zerubavel, op. cit., pp. 5255-6· 13 Interview with Dr. Bramson, Apr. 20, 1930. 14

Supra, pp. 129-130.

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RIGHTS

Jews, Armenians and other nationalities combined to form a Council of National Socialist Parties and presented demands, which in most cases called for territorial autonomy. The Jews, of course, spoke of national-cultural and nationalpersonal autonomy. The platform-project drafted by the Council included, in addition to territorial autonomy, provisions for the protection of the national minorities, linguistic rights and national-personal autonomy for non-territorial peoples. The United Socialist Party and the Bund raised the question of autonomy before an all-Russian conference of professional (trade) associations which met in June, 1 9 1 7 ; the Jewish socialists proposed that national sections be created for cultural and propaganda work. The conference rejected the proposal and voted in favor of more restricted nationalcultural commissions. The all-Russian convention of Workmen's and Soldier's Councils which met at Petrograd in June-July, 1 9 1 7 , proved more friendly to national rights. It declared in favor of a decentralized Russia; of territorial autonomy for the national provinces; and of an assurance of the rights of the national minorities " through the creation of special representative organs, both local and generalgovernmental." More specifically, the convention favored equality of status for the various languages in the courts, in the schools and in the organs of the state and local administration. It also recommended that the Provisional Government create councils for national affairs on which all nationalities should be given representation. 15 T w o of the most important Russian political parties like15

" Platform-Project of Council of National Socialist Parties in Russia," Der Yiddisher Proletarier, no. 4 (1917), PP· 22-25; " A t the Convention of the Workers and Soldiers Councils," ibid., 110. 6-7 (1917), pp. 14-16, 32-35. On the conference of trade associations, see ibid., no. 6-7 (1917), PP· 23-28. See also ibid., no. 8 (1917), pp. 24-25; Heint, no. 94 (1917) ; Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 100-103.

RUSSIAN

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TO CONCLUSION

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223

wise committed themselves to national autonomy. The Socialist Revolutionary Party had recognized the necessity of protecting national minorities before the revolution, but it had then rejected the concrete proposal of non-territorial autonomy. 1 ® The Revolution of 1 9 1 7 induced the party to accept even that principle. A convention, held at Moscow at the end of May and beginning of June, 1 9 1 7 , resolved in favor of a federal democratic republic for Russia, and stipulated territorial autonomy for the ethnic units. The resolution on the national question provided further that, " in order to administer all their cultural and national affairs, the nationalities which possess no territories and the national minorities in the regions with a mixed population, may unite in extra-territorial national-personal associations with local and general-governmental representative organs." The question of national rights was most carefully considered by the Party of Popular Liberty, otherwise known as the Constitutional Democratic Party. At a session of the national convention on August 6, 1 9 1 7 , Baron Β. E . Nolde, an authority on Russian public law, presented a report on " The National Problem in Russia." The Russian professor characterized the solutions of the national question as " the simpler and less perfect one—the territorial form, and the less simple yet more perfect one—the personal form " ; he declared his preference for the latter. Territorial autonomy, he asserted, was likely to result in new national imperialisms; in the oppression of national minorities by the dominant national majorities: in the creation of a hierarchy of nationalities. New Russia, however, must assure to all nationalities " an equitable share in the central government and local self-government." Furthermore, while recognizing Russian as the central language, each nationality must be empowered to use " its own language in its relations with 16

Supra, p. 130.

224

THE

JEWS

AND

MINORITY RIGHTS

the government, and to demand that its own language should gradually be adopted, along with others, in the transaction of public business." The national school, the national church and any other manifestations of national-cultural activity, possibly also national activities involving " public charity, economics, etc.," must be submitted to the selfdetermination of " personal, extra-territorial bodies of people." These national activities, moreover, must not become private endeavors. Rather, the great national bodies directing them " must be recognized by public law and must constitute one of the wheels of the general machinery of the Russian state." The state must define the competency of these national bodies; it must regulate membership in them by requiring everyone in mixed districts to declare his affiliation with a nationality; and it must provide f o r their needs by means of appropriations from the public treasury and by permission to tax their own members. Baron Nolde was uncertain as to the f o r m of organization the various national bodies would assume. But he made a significant suggestion with regard to the Jews. Said he, " The national organization of the J e w r y , f o r example, may rest upon its time-honored communal organization adapted to modern conditions, with communities, district federations of communities, and a supreme council, with proportional representation and a democratic organization of communal government and finances." In conformity with the suggestions of Baron Nolde, the convention amended the Constitutional Democratic platform as follows: The state may delegate to the several nationalities, acting in the capacity of indivisible extraterritorial municipal bodies, the carrying out of certain objects of cultural administration designated by law, viz: educational, religious, charitable, economic, etc., in relation to all persons avowing their affiliation with such

RUSSIAN

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225

nationalities. The organization of such national bodies, their jurisdiction and scope of authority, the amounts appropriated for their benefit from the resources of the state treasury and the manner of assessment of their members, as well as the relation of such bodies to the state, shall be determined by federal legislation. The Russian language, as the general language of the state, must be the language of the central state institutions and of the army and navy. In local state and municipal institutions and in the schools supported by funds of the state or of the local autonomous governments and municipalities, it shall be lawful to use the local languages in accordance with the national composition of the population, provided that equal rights be assured by federal legislation to the Russian language as the language to be used in federal relations and in the relations among the several nationalities, and that equal rights be likewise assured to the languages of the national minorities. The population of every locality must be assured the opportunity of primary and, as far as practicable, of higher education in its mother tongue.11 The widespread demand for national rights voiced by the Jews in the press, at meetings, conferences and conventions, and at local elections, 18 was thus gaining the support of important public organizations. In fact the goal of Russian Jewry—the recognition of its national rights—seemed close at hand. On January 18, 1 9 1 8 , Chernov, the chairman of 17

For the decisions of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, see Der Yiddisher Proletarier, no. 3 ( 1 9 1 7 ) , pp. 8-14. The information on the Constitutional Democratic convention was secured from a (MS.) report prepared for the American Jewish Congress and entitled, The Problem of National Rights in Russia. No attempt is made here to trace every expression of non-Jewish opinion on the question of national minority rights. Only those organizations in which the Jews played an active part and contributed to the shaping of the party platforms, are briefly reviewed. 18

See Der Yiddisher Proletarier, 1917, no. 1, p. 4; no. 4, pp. 26-28; Ha-Shiloach, vol. xxxiii, pp. 274-275, 279-284; Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. iv, P. 85.

220

THE JEWS

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RIGHTS

the Russian Constituent Assembly, said in his opening, keynote speech: " Also the Jewish people, which has no territory at its disposal, will have the right, equally with the other peoples, to fashion on the territory of the Russian Republic the organs of its national self-government, and in these to express the will of its active elements." 18 However, at the time when these ringing words were being uttered, power had already passed from the hands of the democratic elements who composed the Provisional Government. On November 7, 1 9 1 7 , the Bolshevists had seized power; subsequently when the Constituent Assembly refused to follow the dictates of the Bolshevist minority, it too was dissolved. Lenin and his followers were the new masters of Russia. The Bolshevists were, of course, hostile to the Jewish middle-class parties, and to their national aspirations. They were also highly displeased with the Jewish socialist movement. The dictators of Russia complained that before the revolution the Jewish working masses had flocked mainly to the national-socialist parties; they reckoned the Bund among the latter. A f t e r the revolution too, the Bund, and certainly the other Jewish parties, were anti-Bolshevist, and gave too much attention, the radical socialists felt, to the reform and democratization of the Jewish communal institutions. They were preoccupied with inner Jewish affairs, with autonomy. T o many Bolshevists, national culture was a bourgeois concept. Therefore, Jewish socialists should cherish no special national, but only class functions and ideals. The Jewish community and other " bourgeois " institutions, as well as separate Jewish national-socialist parties, must therefore be destroyed. The working masses must be drawn into the all-inclusive Communist Party. The " dictatorship of the proletariat" must be vigorously furthered in Jewish circles. 18

Quoted in Chasanowitsch and Motzkin, op. cit., p. 89.

RUSSIAN

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TO CONCLUSION

OF WAR

2 2

j

The Revolution, however, profoundly affected the Bolshevist position on the national question. While originally favoring only territorial autonomy, they came to acknowledge the rights of every cultural and ethnic minority to complete self-determination. On November 1 5 , 1 9 1 7 , the Bolshevist government issued the Declaration of the Rights of Peoples, which proclaimed the rights of national development and self-determination even to the point of secession. The new policy manifested itself in the treatment of the Jews. A Commissariat for Jewish Affairs was therefore established in January, 1918, and S. Dimentstein, long a Bolshevist of standing, was appointed Commissar. The latter appealed to the Jewish workmen in the Yiddish language; he particularly urged them to join the Communist Party and to form Jewish sections in the workers' soviets. A s soon as local commissariats and sections had been formed in about a dozen cities, the first Conference of Jewish Commissariats and Communist Sections was held at Moscow in October, 1 9 1 8 . A t one of the sessions a conflict ensued when the presiding officer began to speak Russian. Many delegates demanded that Yiddish be the language of the Jewish Sections. Dimentstein thereupon declared, without mincing any words, that the only purpose of the Jewish bodies was to realize communist aims among the Jews. N o special Jewish party was contemplated, since the Jews, like other Russians, possessed only class interests. He made it clear that language was a means and not an end. There must be no fanatical devotion to Yiddish. It must not become a " Holy Yiddish." Should the " richer languages of the stronger and more developed nations " displace Y i d dish in the near future, Dimentstein said that he would shed no tears. What is more, he would do nothing to hinder that development. The Yiddish language was employed simply because the Jewish workers were backward and understood

228

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no other language. It could serve as an effective means of helping them catch up with their more advanced Russian comrades. 20

H a d the Bolshevists not been beset with f a r more pressing problems, they would quickly have put an end to the plans for a Jewish congress and to the activities of the J e w ish communities. The unsettled conditions in the country afforded the Jewish nationalists an opportunity to continue, for a time, their agitation for national autonomy. Elections to the Russian Jewish Congress were held during the winter of 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 1 8 , despite the hindrances of civil w a r ; the Zionists appear to have won a majority of the seats. The congress never met, because the Bolshevists prohibited it as a "bourgeois" institution. Instead, a Jewish National Council was formed at Petrograd in 1 9 1 8 from among the delegates to the congress. Under the leadership of M. Alienikov, the Council assumed the task of guarding the " national political interests of the Jewish nation" in Russia. In July, 1 9 1 8 , it invoked the aid of the executive committee of the American Jewish Congress " for the furtherance of the national interests of our people in this land." 21 20 C f . E . Antonelli, Bolshevik Russia ( X . Y., 1920), pp. 156-158. On the Bolshevist attitude to the Jews, see S. Agurski, Der Yiddisher Arbeter in der Komunistisher Bavegung, 1917-1921 (Minsk, 1 9 2 5 ) , esp. pp. v, x-xii, 4-14, 21-28, 4 1 - 4 9 ; idem (ed.), Di Yiddishe Komissariatn un die Yiddishe Komunistishe Sektsyes, 1918-1921 (Minsk, 1928), esp. pp. 19-60, 1 5 2 - 1 5 6 ; Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 140-141, 143-144, 1 5 7 - 1 5 9 et seq., 232-234, 252-262; Μ . Kipper, Tsehn Yor Oktiabr Revolutsye (Kiev, 1 9 2 7 ) , pp. 41, 7 1 - 7 2 et seq., 99-101 et seq.·, Unser Gedank (Berlin, 1920), pp. 69-71.

Subsequent developments relating to Jewish national rights in the Soviet Union are beyond the scope of this study. 21

The socialist parties did not participate in the Council.

( M S . ) Letter

RUSSIAN

REVOLUTION

TO CONCLUSION

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WAR

The evident impossibility of convening the Russian Jewish Congress led to an attempt to achieve a measure of unity through the federation of the local Jewish communities. Although the revolution had effected no legal change in the status of these bodies, democratic elections had been held everywhere, including far-away Siberia, and representative communal councils had begun to supervise the spiritual, cultural, social and economic activities of the J e w s ; in Moscow even a Jewish court of law had been established. A t the beginning of July, 1 9 1 8 , a conference of representatives of the central-Russian communities was held at Moscow. The forty participating local bodies, which were represented by 149 delegates, were united in a Federation of Communities, with a central committee as the executive organ. The conference, in which the Zionists predominated, 22 declared that the self-governing community was the local organ of self-government of the Jewish population; that all Jews living in a locality were considered members. The Communal Council, democratically chosen in each community, was charged with the direction of local Jewish affairs. It was to serve also as intermediary between the local Jewish population and the state power, or the general organs of local self-government; it was to act as the medium for the latter in the discharge of all national functions; it was to receive the sums allotted for special Jewish needs. The community was also empowered to levy a progressive income tax upon its members to cover those budgetary needs which oi Jewish National Council to Exec. Com. of Amer. Jewish Congress, July 28, 1918. See also Ha-Shiloath, vol. xxxiv, p. 252; The Zionist Review, no. I (1918), p. 2. 22 Mr. Ussisclikin informed the present writer, in an interview, that the Russian Zionist leaders had feared the effects of the revolution upon their movement. But popular elections everywhere resulted in overwhelming victories for the Zionists.

THE JEWS

230

the state and

AND MINORITY

municipal

contributions

RIGHTS left

unprovided. 2 3

T h e plans f o r a permanent federation of communities, like those f o r a congress, however, proved abortive.

The Bol-

shevists ultimately destroyed both as " bourgeois "

institu-

tions. 2 . T H E E X P E R I M E N T W I T H NATIONAL

MINORITIES

IN T H E U K R A I N E

T h e Ukraine had long constituted an integral part of Russia, and the active elements a m o n g the J e w s had functioned as members of greater Russia. revolution,

the larger parties and

groups

of

B u t immediately upon the outbreak of the

the Ukrainians

territorial autonomy.

asserted a claim

to

complete

T h e J e w s thereupon threw in their

lot with the majority of the territorial population. In March, 1 9 1 7 , the U k r a i n i a n nationalists founded at K i e v a Central R a d a , o r council, consisting, in all, of over 5 0 0 members, and comprising representatives o f parties, of peasant's, worker's and military organizations, of cultural, professional and cooperative societies, and of local Radas. E a r l y in April, 1 9 1 7 , this body convened at K i e v an allUkrainian national congress which sanctioned the demand f o r autonomy, and promised to guarantee the full rights of the national minorities.

I n M a y the R a d a demanded that

the Provisional Government recognize it as the

regional

power over twelve provinces and that steps be immediately taken to f o r m Ukrainian

military sections in the

army.

T h e Great Russian element in the Ukraine strongly opposed these demands, and the political leaders and parties at Petrograd, while not generally hostile, desired to postpone definite action until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. 23 I. Greenbaum, Di Yiddishe Kehillah (Warsaw, 1920), pp. 79-86. The Zionist Review, no. 9 (1919), pp. 165-166; Ha-Shiloach, vol. xxxv, pp. 361-362; A. Tscherikower, In der Tekufah fun Revolutsye (Berlin, 1924), pp. 129-132.

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2t,1

A deputation o f the Rada, headed by the socialist, Vinitschenko, arrived at Petrograd toward the end of May to plead their cause; but the demands for autonomy were rejected. T h e reply o f the infuriated Rada to this rebuff was the First Universal (issued on June 10, 1 9 1 7 ) , a fiery act which declared that thereafter the Rada would discharge all governmental functions in the region. A t the same time, a General Secretariat, or cabinet, was appointed to take charge of affairs. T h e Provisional Government yielded, and by July a compromise had been reached. T h e General Secretariat was delegated to act as the representative of the Provisional Government in the Ukraine. But a most important further stipulation was made by the Provisional Government; namely, that representatives of the non-Ukrainian nationalities—the Great Russians, the Jews and Poles—were to constitute 3 0 % of the Rada. In accordance with the agreement with the Provisional Government, the Ukrainians were ready to assign several portfolios in the General Secretariat to the minorities. However, the United Jewish Socialist Labor Party, with the support of the Poale-Zionists, contended that general positions in the cabinet would not afford the minorities protection of their national interests. It was therefore agreed to create special positions for the Great Russians, Jews and Poles. But, unwilling to increase the number of General Secretaryships, the Rada established, on July 15, 1917, three Vice-Secretaryships at the General Secretariat for National Affairs. These positions, however, bore a close resemblance to full Secretaryships; the men appointed to represent the minorities were empowered to participate in the deliberations of the cabinet; they resigned with the cabinet; they were not chosen by the General Secretariat but by the Rada itself. 24 24

T h e Jewish socialist and democratic parties entered the Central Rada

THE

JEWS

AND

MINORITY

RIGHTS

The new institution thus created was unlike any government organ in Russia or in western Europe. It was necessary to determine the scope, competence and functions of the Vice-Secretaries; their relation to one another and to the General Secretariat. But neither the Provisional Government nor the Ukrainian officials had any clear idea as to the purpose or functions of minority autonomy. T h e task was undertaken by M . Zilberfarb, who was Vice-Secretary f o r Jewish A f f a i r s and a leader of the United Jewish Socialist Labor Party. He proposed " Instructions " which were accepted by the other Vice-Secretaries and by the General Secretary for National Affairs. The " Instructions " declared, in the first place, that the function of the Vice-Secretaries for National A f f a i r s was " to protect the rights of the national minorities of the Ukraine, and to safeguard the freedom of development of their national life." Each Vice-Secretary was therefore empowered to guard the civil and political rights of his national minority against any infraction or limitation. But his chief functions were positive; i. e., " to put in order the early in the summer of 1 9 1 7 ; the prospect of securing national-personal autonomy was a determining factor in the decision to join the Ukrainians. T h e leadership in this movement was assumed by the United Jewish Socialist Labor P a r t y , then the strongest Jewish socialist party in the Ukraine (it numbered then some 15,000 members), and the most zealous f o r national autonomy. A l l Jewish parties, however, manifested an enthusiastic, or at least a friendly attitude. Cf. A . T s c h e r i k o w e r , AntiSemitism un Pogromen in Ukraine (Berlin, 1923), pp. 62-65; A . R e v u t ski, In di Shvere Teg oif Ukraina (Berlin, 1924), pp. 21-23 et seq.; Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 75-76. O n the relations between the Ukraine and the Provisional Government, the composition of the Rada, and the provisions of the " Universale," see F . A . Golder, Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917 ( Ν . Y . and London, 1927), pp. 435-443; Memoire stir I'independence de l'Ukraine prescnte a la Conference de la Paix . . . ( P a r i s , 1 9 1 9 ) , pp. 109 et seq.; Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 268-269; T s c h e r i k o w e r , op. cit., pp. 32-44; Der Yiddisher Proletarier, nos. 6-7 ( 1 9 1 7 ) .

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233

inner life " of the national minority, to endow its institutions with the character of public agencies, to create for it new governmental institutions in order to satisfy the growing needs of national life and to regulate the activity of these institutions. Thus each Vice-Secretary was to establish a national council, composed of the members of his national minority in the Small Rada " and of representatives of parties and groups, to advise him. Each was also empowered to appoint commissioners who might assist him in his work. According to the " Instructions " , the Vice-Secretaryship differed from other government institutions in that it was " primarily an organ of national autonomy." The tongue of the national minority was to serve as the medium of communication between the Vice-Secretary and the institutions under his control, and it was to constitute the language of his office and its private records. Moreover, no edict or decree touching upon the inner life of a minority could be published without the signature of its Vice-Secretary. This virtual veto power upon all enactments of a distinctively national character was characterized by the author of the " Instructions" as one of the fundamentals of national autonomy. Finally, if a difference of opinion among the national Vice-Secretaries could not be reconciled in conference with the Secretary for National Affairs, then the question was to be carried direct to the General Secretariat. 28 The Vice-Secretaries were anxious to have the all-important " Instructions " approved not only as a departmental ordinance, but as a general governmental policy. The Gen25

This was an executive committee of 85 members distributed proportionately among the various parties. 26 M. Silberfarb, Dos Yiddishe Ministerium un die Yiddishe Avtonomie in Ukraina (Kiev, 1918), pp. 1-8. This is the best source for the subject under discussion; it contains all the pertinent documents.

234

THE

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eral Secretariat doubted if it had the power to approve so momentous a policy without legislative authorization, and merely " took cognizance of it." Unsettled political conditions made further action impossible until September, when a new cabinet was formed. The premier, Vinitschenko, incorporated, in the declaration to the Rada, the section of the " Instructions " which dealt with the functions of the ViceSecretaryships (fl. 2). When dealing with public education, the declaration of the government announced that the public education of each national minority would be placed under the control of its Vice-Secretary. 27 Thus the General Secretariat officially recognized the competence of the national Vice-Secretaries, and the Rada, by voting confidence in the new ministry on the basis of the declaration, might be said also to have approved the proposal first made by the Jewish Vice-Secretary. But this, too, was no more than a governmental declaration which might be repudiated by another cabinet. Although the autonomy of the national minorities did not as yet rest on a firm legal basis, Zilberfarb, the Vice-Secretary for Jewish Affairs, commenced in September, 1917, to organize and to direct the Jewish national institutions. The work of his department was divided into three divisions— education, communal affairs (Kehillah), and the general office. In order to maintain the support of the Jewish socialist parties, upon which the Jewish Vice-Secretariat depended, a Bund leader and a Poale-Zionist were each placed in charge of a division. A Jewish National Council, consisting of representatives of the Jewish parties, began to function on October 1, 1 9 1 7 ; to it were submitted the more 27

Vinitschenko at first desired to state merely that " the cultural and political rights of the national minorities " would be respected. It was at the urgent request of the Vice-Secretaries that the cabinet approved the more specific program.

RUSSIAN

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235

important questions with which the Jewish Vice-Secretary was called upon to deal. The local communities were taken in hand; with the approval of the Rada, an edict was issued requiring them to elect, democratically, communal councils, and the Jewish Secretary issued directions governing those elections. Laws relating to the Jewish nationality were introduced into the General Secretariat and into the Rada in both Ukrainian and Yiddish. When adopted, the laws were published in both languages. Extensive educational reforms were contemplated, and preparations were made for the convocation of a Jewish national constituent assembly. 28 During the fall of 1 9 1 7 there was every likelihood that the Provisional Government would approve the Ukrainian experiment with national autonomy. In recognizing the General Secretariat as the governing agency in the Ukraine, the Russian authorities had not definitely fixed the functions of that body. They had merely required each Secretary to draw up a statute delimiting the functions of his department and describing the organization of its governmental apparatus. When approved by the central government, the statutes would acquire the force of law. The General Secretary for National A f f a i r s incorporated in his statute the important provisions of the " Instructions " ; he placed the control of education of each national minority in the hands of its Vice-Secretary; and he specially directed the Jewish Vice-Secretary (evidently at the latter's request) to assume control over and to reform the Jewish communities. Early in November, the statute was to have been considered by the General Secretariat, and then submitted to the Provisional Government. 29 But the Bolshevist coup d'etat occasioned a rupture of relations between the Ukrainian authorities and =8 Zilberfarb, op. cit., pp. 20-39, 47-50, 63-65, and documents in Appendix, pp. 9-17, 48-66, 74· Ibid., pp. 9-19.

T h e text of the statute is in Appendix, pp. 3-8.

236

THE JEWS AND MINORITY

RIGHTS

the central government, and the final recognition of the functions of minority autonomy was again postponed. T h e Ukrainian officials refused to recognize the supremacy of the Bolshevists and proceeded to reorganize the administration, in order to discharge all the functions of government. T h e Secretary f o r National A f f a i r s began to concern himself with foreign a f f a i r s , and the National Vice-Secretariats were converted into General Secretariats. Since the statute, which was to have been submitted to the Provisional Government, was no longer applicable, and since even the authority of the " Instructions " had waned, a new governmental commitment in f a v o r of minority autonomy became necessary. The " Third Universal," which was issued soon after the overthrow of the Provisional Government, filled this need. I t proclaimed the Ukraine a " People's Republic," as a constituent part of a federal Russia, and then added: The Ukrainian people . . . will strongly guard the freedom of national development of all peoples, who live in the Ukraine; we therefore declare, that we recognize for the Russian, Jewish, Polish and other peoples of the Ukraine the right to nationalpersonal autonomy, which will assure them freedom of selfgovernment in their national life. We authorize our General Secretary for National Affairs to submit to us in the nearest future a law-project about national-personal autonomy.40 30

Ibid., pp- 41-47-

T h e original draft, by a commission of the Rada, contained only a general provision guaranteeing the " national r i g h t s " of minorities. When the Jewish General Secretary remarked that the minorities required a specific assurance of national-personal autonomy, the commission readily altered the guaranty to read: " T h e national rights of all peoples of the Ukraine will be secured through national-personal autonomy." This, too, did not prove satisfactory, and the paragraph quoted in the text was proposed by the United Jewish Socialist Labor P a r t y and accepted by the Ukrainian authorities. T h e leader in this matter was Zilberfarb, the Jewish minister.

RUSSIAN

REVOLUTION

TO CONCLUSION

OF WAR

237

The Secretary for National A f f a i r s , who was directed by the " Third Universal " to prepare a statute with regard to national-personal autonomy, was too busy with the new state's foreign policy, and the cabinet charged the Jewish General Secretary with the task. This difficult function of formulating, for the first time, the legal and juridical status of national minorities, their relation to one another and to the state, was performed by a commission of three men— Zilberfarb, the Jewish General Secretary, J . Churgin, his assistant secretary, and M. Schatz, the legal adviser of the Jewish Secretariat. The project prepared by these men was first considered and approved by the Jewish National Council, and then submitted to the Central Rada. Objections to individual provisions of the project which were raised by the Bund and by non-Jewish groups were voted down, and finally on January 9, 1 9 1 8 , the Ukrainian parliament unanimously adopted the law of national-personal autonomy; only minor variations were introduced into the project of the Jewish minister. The law consisted of ten articles. The first assured the right of national-personal autonomy to all nationalities inhabitating the Ukraine. Each nationality was empowered to regulate its national life through the organs of a National Association whose jurisdiction (over its members) should embrace the entire Ukrainian territory. The second article conferred upon the Great Russian, Jewish and Polish nationalities the right of national-personal autonomy, and prescribed the manner whereby other minorities might avail themselves of the same privilege. The organization of the national minority was provided for in articles three, eight and nine. Each national group constituted a National Association whose membership was individually inscribed in a National Register, and each Ukrainian citizen possessed the right to demand his inclusion or (by the mere declaration

238

THE

JEWS

AND

MINORITY

RIGHTS

that he no longer belonged to that nationality) exclusion from a given register. T h e organs of the National Association were declared government organs. T h e highest representative body was to consist o f a National or Constituent Assembly, elected democratically by the members of the nationality. A National Council, chosen by and responsible to the popularly elected assembly, was invested with the highest executive functions. T h e remaining articles of the law dealt with the competence of the National Associations and with their relation to the state and to the institutions of other national minorities. T h e National Association was endowed with legislative and administrative power, and it alone represented the nationality before the state authorities ( A r t . 4 ) . Funds f r o m the treasuries o f the central and local governments, allocated to purposes within the competence of the National Associations, were to be equitably apportioned among the national bodies which were authorized also to tax their members and to contract loans ( A r t . 5-6). T h e general delimitation of the competence of each national group was to be decided upon by the Constituent Assembly of each nationality and then confirmed by the Constituent Assembly of the Ukrainian Republic, or by the parliament ( A r t . 7 ) . Finally, provision was made for the adjudication of all conflicts and irritations that might result from the functioning of national-personal autonomy ( A r t . 10). 8 1 Unsettled conditions rendered impossible a genuine test of the law of national-personal autonomy. The hostility 3 1 T h e law had also provided that the National Associations of the U k r a i n e might unite with similar bodies of their respective nationalities in other parts of the federated Russian republic. But when it was published, the region had already declared its complete independence. T h i s provision was therefore eliminated. Cf. Zilberfarb, op. cit., pp. 51-58; for the text of the law, see Appendix, pp. 75-82. See also Ha-Shiloach, vol. x x x i v , pp. 325-334; T s c h e r i k o w e r , op. cit., pp. 65 67, 70-71.

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TO CONCLUSION

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239

between the Ukrainian leaders and the Bolshevists quickly led to an open break. On January 1 2 , 1 9 1 8 , the complete independence of the Ukraine was proclaimed, but two weeks later the Bolshevsist army took Kiev. The Ukrainians thereupon made peace with the Germans, and, with the help of the latter, succeeded in dislodging their enemies. On March i , 1 9 1 8 , the Ukrainian authorities returned to K i e v , but their ardor f o r national minority rights had cooled. 32 However, the National Secretariats were suffered to exist f o r a few months longer. The puppet Ukrainian cabinet set up by the Germans was not supported by the socialist parties. Since no Jewish socialist would enter the ministry, Vladimir BertholdiLatski, a non-Zionist nationalist, was chosen General Secretary, and confirmed by the Rada on April 10, 1 9 1 8 . I t was, however, made clear that his program must be acceptable to the socialist majority of the Jewish National Council. The Jewish Secretariat again prepared to call a Jewish national assembly, but on April 28 a revolution, fathered by the Germans, scattered the republican ministry and set up Skoropadski, a general of the former tsar, as Hetman of the Ukrainian State. The Hetman's government disliked the whole scheme of national-personal autonomy. The Germans and Austrians, too, possessing minorities whom they sought to assimilate in their own states, were none too anxious to see the U k rainian experiment become a precedent. N o new general secretaries or ministers f o r national minority affairs were appointed, and the functioning of national autonomy prac32 The national minorities did not favor the complete severance of the Ukraine from Russia. T h e Polish Socialist P a r t y ( P . P . S . ) was the only faction among the national minorities which voted f o r independence on January 12, 1918. T h e Jewish parties abstained from voting, and on January 16, 1918, the Jewish General Secretary resigned in protest against attacks upon the J e w s .

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tically came to an end. In June, 1918, the officials in the Jewish ministry submitted a long report to the government which pointed out the value of minority autonomy both to the minorities and to the state. But it availed nothing, and on July 8, 1918, the Hetman's government repealed the law of January 9, 1918, providing for national-personal autonomy. The national ministries were forthwith liquidated.83 3 . AGITATION FOR J E W I S H N A T I O N A L RIGHTS IN T H E RUSSIAN PROVINCES UNDER

GERMAN-AUSTRIAN

OCCUPATION, AND E L S E W H E R E I N T H E " EAST "

Jewish national activity in revolutionary Russia and in the Ukraine stimulated agitation in the occupied provinces. The Polish-Jewish nationalists launched a vigorous campaign in order to compel the authorities finally to permit the long-delayed Jewish communal elections.3* We have seen in the preceding chapter how the non-Zionist nationalists created the nucleus of a party in Warsaw. In March, 1917, they met in conference at the Polish capital and organized a countrywide People's Party (Folkspartei). A Zionist Federation of Poland was created soon after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution. The orthodox masses were represented by the Mizrachi, which cooperated with the Zionists, and by a new group, the Agudath Jeshurun, which demanded Jewish national-religious education, with the mother tongue as the language of instruction. Even the numerically weak anti-national Orthodox Association 35 felt constrained to declare in this electoral campaign against assimilationist tendencies. 33

On the status of autonomy after March, 1918, see Zilberfarb, op. cit., PP· 59-75. 79. 81, Appendix, pp. 18-47, 83-85; Cherikower, op. cit., pp. 103, iso, 155; Kirzhnits, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 207-209; Zerubavel, op. cit., PP. 552-554. 34 Supra, p. 210. 35

Supra, pp. 207-208.

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T h e Jewish socialist parties at first manifested little interest in the elections because they considered the communities purely religious institutions. But when in April, 1917, a government ordinance provided for elections on a highly restricted franchise, they (the Poale-Zionists in particular) joined in the outcry against the oligarchic and non-national character of the Jewish communal agencies. The protests and petitions were so numerous and insistent, and the threat to boycott the elections so serious, that the authorities felt constrained in September, 1917, to " democratize" the franchise; all tax-payers o f at least one mark were permitted to vote. In the course of 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 1 8 communal elections were held in many of the smaller Jewish communities, and orthodox, Zionist and nationalist representatives were invariably chosen. But in the two large communities o f Warsaw and Lodz, the Jewish " assimilationists ", the Poles and Germans were all unwilling to permit a popular vote. By means of postponements and other artifices, they contrived to prevent the holding of elections until the end of the German occupation.8®

T h e inhabitants of Vilna and the Lithuanian districts under German occupation were strongly affected by the Russian revolution; both Lithuanians and Jews formulated national plans. In September, 1917, some Lithuanian nationalists met at Vilna under the leadership of Smetona, formed a Taryba or national council, and petitioned the German government for an independent Lithuania. The »· Roth and Stein, op. cit., pp. 163, 176-180. The franchise proposed by the government in April, 1917, carried high property and other qualifications. No more than 7,000 of a total Jewish population of about 300,000 would have qualified to vote.

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request was repeatedly ignored until the Lithuanians agreed to accept German tutelage in military, railway, customs and financial affairs. The Lithuanian state was then proclaimed on March 23, 1918. Even before the formation of the Taryba, the Jewish nationalists 37 had demanded adequate representation as a nationality. When, therefore, the Lithuanians allotted only five of the twenty-five seats in their national council to the non-Lithuanians, the Jews along with the Poles and White Russians refused to participate. The Jews demanded that Lithuania become a state of multiple nationality in which no one group should predominate. They urged that the Jewish, Polish and Lithuanian languages should be recognized equally in school, in court and in the administration; that each nationality should be equitably represented in the state institutions; that the distinctively national and cultural affairs be delegated to national-personal associations for autonomous management by each nationality. The Germans were at first inclined to ignore the Jewish claims. A t the end of October, 1917, " representatives of all the political and social tendencies as well as cultural, economic and philanthropic organizations of the Jews of Vilna . . . " applied to the German authorities for permission to hold " a national conference " of all the Lithuanian Jews, in order to formulate the conditions upon which participation in the Taryba would be possible. The Germans never acted on the application. But when subsequently the German-Jewish Committee for the East 3 8 intervened, Falkenhausen, the administrator of Lithuania, in a guarded 87

The Jewish parties in Lithuania closely resembled those of Poland; there were " assimilationist," orthodox, Zionist and socialist factions. A group resembling the Polish People's Party also appeared. Cf. Pinkos (Vilna, 1922), pp. 689-700; Zerubavel, op. cit., pp. 353-354 e t seq. 3

« Supra, p. 198.

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statement, committed himself to the recognition of a Jewish nationality. H e told representatives of the Committee on July 6, 1 9 1 8 , that in the greater Lithuania, which the final settlement was likely to create, the rights of all national minorities to civil and religious freedom and to the " cultivation of their individuality and tradition " would be fully preserved. Therefore, he went on to say, " the Jewish nationality, too, will possess the right to the autonomous management of its cultural affairs, hence to an extensive cultural autonomy, and it may therefore reckon on further concessions, as for example in the sphere of self-taxation for its own affairs. . . . " 39

Austrian Jewish national activity during this period centered in the movement for a Jewish congress. In July, 1 9 1 7 , a Zionist conference at Vienna decided in favor of an all-embracing Jewish congress, and proposed that such an assembly demand the recognition of the Jewish nationality by the Austrian government. During the subsequent fall and winter, much opposition to this program developed in the congress committees of the various cities. The Prague group reached a compromise which provided for the final determination of the program at a preliminary conference. But difficulty was encountered in effecting an understanding in the Vienna congress committee; Robert Strieker and the radicals demanded full national autonomy, including a national register and a Jewish minister; A l f r e d Stern, of the Vienna religious community, threatened that a permanent split in Austrian J e w r y would result if such demands were insisted upon. Finally, Stern agreed to cooperate and even 38 L. Rosenberg, Die Juden in Litauen (Berlin and Munich, 1918), pp. 35-48; Vilner Zamelbuch, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 23-24. For Falkenhausen's statement, see Neue judische Monatshefte, vol. ii, pp. 435-436.

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to allow the congress to concern itself with Palestine, if only the idea of a Jewish national register were dropped. In March, 1 9 1 8 , the Vienna committee adopted the proposal of M a x Rosenfeld to proceed with the formulation of a precise program. B y that time, a tendency had developed to favor national minority rights f o r those Jews who lived in compact masses, as in Galicia and Bukowina. But the collapse and disintegration of Austria-Hungary came too soon to allow for the convocation and organization of the projected Jewish congress. 40

The only Balkan states which possessed substantial J e w ish populations were Rumania and Greece (Saloniki), and in both, some activity in behalf of Jewish rights developed during the period under consideration. The great emphasis upon self-determination, which followed as a consequence of the Russian Revolution and of American participation in the war, and the movements for Jewish congresses, encouraged the Jews of Saloniki, who had enjoyed considerable autonomy under Turkish rule, to demand national rights. A congress committee began to function in Saloniki in the spring of 1 9 1 7 under the presidency of Jacob Cazes, and within a few months elections were held and a program adopted. The program was closely modeled after that of the proposed American Jewish congress. It demanded " f u l l civic, political and religious equality of rights," where such were still withheld; the " g r a n t i n g of national rights to Jewish communities in countries where other nationalities enjoy or should enjoy similar rights " ; and a Jewish center in Palestine. 41