Trends in Israeli Democracy: The Public's View 9781685854607

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Trends in Israeli Democracy

An Israel Democracy Institute Policy Study

Trends in Israeli Democracy The Public's View Yochanan Peres Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar

Lynne Rienner Publishers • Boulder & London

Published in the United States of America in 1992 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU Published for the Israel Democracy Institute P.O.B. 4702 Jerusalem, Israel 91040 © 1992 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Peres, Yochanan Trends in Israeli democracy : the public's view / by Yochanan Peres and Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar. (Israel Democracy Institute policy studies) Includes bibliographical references ISBN 1-55587-308-1 1. Democracy—Israel—Public opinion. 2. Israel—Politics and government—Public opinion. 3. Public opinion—Israel. I. Yuchtman-Yaar, Ephraim. II. Title. III. Series. JQ1825.P359P47 1992 956.9405—dc20 91-43887 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

Contents

Foreword Preface

Vll IX

Arye Carmon

1

Introduction

1

2

Method of Inquiry

5

3

Findings

9

Empirical Questions Value Commitment to Democracy The Commitment to Democracy Versus Other Values Tolerance Is Democracy Less Deeply Rooted in Israel Than in Western Countries? Trust in Institutions—International Comparison Democracy: A Matter of Demography? Trends over Time 4

Concluding Discussion

41

5

An Unexpected Sequel: Democracy Under Missiles

45

The Findings Explication Notes References About the Israel Democracy Institute About the Book and the Authors

v

55 57 58 59

Foreword Arye Carmon

With the publication of Trends in Israeli Democracy: The Public's View, the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) inaugurates its series of IDI Policy Studies. The first in Israel in its effort to draw academic thinking and policymaking together, IDI has deliberately focused its programs on strengthening democratic institutions and values in the state of Israel by means of facilitating political reforms within the nation's body politic. Our new series, IDI Policy Studies, will allow us to share the products of IDI's efforts with decisionmakers and thinkers in Israel and abroad. Social scientists who have already been exposed to Israel's sociopolitical dynamics recognize the laboratory-like nature of Israeli democracy; we hope with IDI's Policy Studies to make a unique, universalistic contribution to a wider audience. Trends in Israeli Democracy: The Public's View summarizes an uninterrupted three-year effort to measure the "public pulse" within the body of Israeli democracy. Through this program, labeled "Democracy Indexes," IDI has endeavored to gain a scientific, professional insight into trends in the attitudes of the Israeli public toward various aspects of democracy. The idea of "Democracy Indexes" was engendered by the peculiar role of a rather temperamental cost-of-living index, which impacted on the lives of that public. In the political arena, Israelis are affected by profound factors such as the country's incredible defense burden, danger to its very existence, the need to absorb waves of immigrants, and deep social and cultural cleavages. Facing this reality, our aim was to analyze the various aspects of commitment to democracy among Israelis, and with this, we hoped not just to satisfy the researcher's curiosity, but to contribute to public debate and to public education. In retrospect, all our researchers' expectations proved appropriate. We started to measure the pulse of Israeli public opinion in the fall of 1987. In hindsight, this gave us a particularly interesting point of departure, as the outbreak of the intifada occurred just a few months later. Consequently, a basis was established that enabled us to measure the effects of a very tense period in Israel's sociopolitical dynamics. Similarly, a rather comprehensive pulse taking was done in December 1990, and a few weeks

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thereafter the Gulf War erupted. We saw this as an unusual opportunity to measure the same pulse under extremely different conditions. Our researchers went back to the same sample and, as a result, we received important data on the effects of the war in our region. IDI is continuing with this specific project, as well as several others, and is committed to carry on and amplify the pulse taking within the framework of the "Democracy Indexes." In 1992, we intend to enlarge the scope, to include for the first time the Israeli Arab sector, and we will establish a network of contacts with emerging democracies in Eastern and Central Europe. The latter effort may provide a comparative perspective from which both we in Israel and the international community may gain innovative insights. Arye Carmon President Israel Democracy Institute

Preface

In early 1987, under the initiative of Arye Carmon, president of the Israel Democracy Institute, a group of scholars from Tel Aviv University met with the aim of tracing and analyzing the vicissitudes of Israeli democracy. Our initiative was based on a concern that the continued Israeli occupation of territory inhabited by another people, in conjunction with the bitter domestic controversies aroused by that occupation, were likely to threaten the very existence of democratic government in Israel, or at least to deny democracy its lifeblood: public support and legitimacy. A variety of methods for measuring the shifts in the condition of democratic life were discussed; several were even tested (for instance, a systematic study of relevant Supreme Court decisions). Ultimately, a single operative project was carried out: an examination of the values and attitudes held by Israeli Jewish society on issues pertinent to democracy, by means of public opinion research. The more we probed this idea, though, the broader and more complicated it became. As in similar surveys undertaken in the United States, it was discerned that in Israel, too, the public supports democratic values in principle but is, in actuality, prepared to recognize a whole range of qualifying factors justifying a "temporary" suspension of those principles. Apparently, certain matters and groups are "outside the democratic pale." The specific characteristics of these situations or groups varies from person to person, and over time. We found that, of the factors that influence the Israeli's deviation from democratic views, the Arab-Israeli conflict is central. This has sundry expressions. First and foremost, the conflict casts an aspersion over the democratic rights of Israeli Arabs who, while being full citizens of the state of Israel, are often identified—rightly or wrongly—with the enemy. The more radical proposals for solving the conflict—on one hand, annexation of the occupied territories or even an expulsion of Arabs; on the other hand, creation of an independent Palestinian state—engender an existential confrontation. A symmetrical conviction exists at both ends of the political spectrum that acceptance of the opposing solution would endanger the very existence of the state; and such a belief leads to the conclusion that ix

X

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in Israeli

Democracy

everything must be done to prevent that solution from being carried out. In opposition to the forces threatening to compromise or even bring about democracy's gradual demise in Israel, our study uncovered other, no less important, tendencies that work to preserve democracy and even broaden it. As previously noted, democratic values, some explicitly enumerated in Israel's own Proclamation of Independence, enjoy broad and stable support among the majority of the population. There is also a demographically welldefined sector of the population whose support for democracy encompasses specific positions on actual issues. In the long run, with an increase in the level of education and the size of the middle class, the relative influence of this sector within the society as a whole tends to grow. Finally, it was shown that even the effect of the Arab-Israeli conflict on democratic life has an additional facet: when tensions between Israel and its neighbors (or some of its neighbors) reach a certain level, a process of domestic unification or solidarity takes place. The sense of external danger mitigates the import of internal conflicts and reawakens, indirectly, the faith in democratic rules and institutions. * *

*

It is our pleasure to thank those who assisted us in preparing this monograph and the opinion surveys upon which it is based. The Israel Democracy Institute and its president, Arye Carmon, inaugurated, supported, and encouraged our work through all its stages. Our colleagues on the social science faculty at Tel Aviv University—Avishai Erlich, Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Uri Ben-Eliezer, and Chana Herzog—were helpful with counsel and critical attention. Michal Shamir from the faculty of social science generously offered ideas and methodological insights as well as the findings from her own important studies on tolerance. Vered Livne and Yael Har-Even contributed at various stages of the work. The Dahaf Institute, under the direction of Minah Tzemach, was responsible for executing all the interviews. Yasmin Alkalai gave devoted and skillful service on the computer. * *

*

After such thorough acknowledgments, the authors wish only to claim for themselves, in a suitable democratic fashion, all responsibility for the conclusions herein, not to mention any errors. We hope that the latter will not detract from the former. Yochanan Peres Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar

Introduction

This monograph primarily seeks to describe and explicate recent developments in Israeli democracy; more precisely, it explores the condition of public opinion vis-à-vis democracy. Our interest in this subject was stimulated by concern that the public's commitment to a democratic system of government and its underlying values might have deteriorated as a consequence of the mounting pressures faced by Israeli society in the late 1980s. This situation has affected political institutions as well as the daily life of ordinary citizens, and it has been the source of fundamental disagreement over the desirable course of action for the country. The Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories (the intifada), currently in its fourth year, has in particular upset the sense of national and personal security, and it has provoked widespread criticism and disaffection. At the heart of the problem is the debate over the resolution of the ArabIsraeli conflict and the future of the occupied territories, a debate familiar since the end of the 1967 War. This debate has split Jewish society in Israel into two main, albeit unequal parts: a larger hawkish Right and a smaller dovish Left. The intifada has only enflamed this controversy, raising its level of urgency and increasing its centrality. During its early phases, most Israelis believed the intifada to be an essentially external event, a nuisance difficult to eradicate but kept within tolerable limits. However, save for brief intervals, the Palestinian uprising has in fact increased its momentum and, rather than being suppressed, has even penetrated into Israel proper, threatening the personal security of ordinary citizens. The two major political camps have been affected by these developments in opposite ways. The Right, insisting that the response to the intifada has been too soft, calls for harsher military and political countermeasures. The extreme Right even explicitly advocates a policy to expel—"transfer" in the local jargon—the Palestinians from the occupied territories. The Left, in contrast, argues that the intifada, like the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole, can only be resolved through moderation and political compromise. For the extreme Left, establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the occupied territories is the only possible compromise. Although only a small 1

2

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in Israeli

Democracy

minority of Israeli Jews hold this view, it is supported wholeheartedly by virtually the entire community of Israel's Arab minority. Quite predictably, the Right accuses the latter of disloyalty to the state and considers them a security risk. Also, predictably, similar accusations have been made against the Jewish Left. This account of events, albeit abbreviated, suffices to describe the nature of the political strife and the intensity of the political discourse within Israel. As recent historical experience has shown, such a climate can provide fertile ground for popular nationalist sentiments of the kind that lend themselves to manipulation by antidemocratic leaders. Indeed, one of the intifada's primary consequences for Israel has been a polarization of opinion, with uncompromising nationalist views gaining over moderate ones (YuchtmanYaar, 1990). When considering the potential impact of these trends, it must be remembered that Israel is a young immigrant society whose population arrived from numerous countries lacking democratic politics or traditions. Approximately half of Israel's Jews are first- or second-generation immigrants from authoritarian states in the Middle East and North Africa, with much of the rest of the Jewish population having emigrated from the totalitarian systems of Eastern Europe. This fact, together with the growth of nationalistic sentiment, underscores the fragility of the popular commitment to democracy. The question we ask here is whether the turmoil and malaise has so disaffected the Israeli public as to cause a popular loss of faith in the democratic process, its guiding principles, and major institutions. Israel is not the only contemporary democracy to face serious challenges. Since the 1960s, observers of Western societies have expressed a growing concern about the vulnerability of democratic systems and the declining support for them on the part of their citizenries. A prominent scholar recently made the following remarks: The last two decades were ones of tumult and political uncertainty for most Western democracies. . . . The stable consensus of a democratic party system was threatened by new issues and new political contenders. Citizen action groups of all political views pressured government to address their concern. Many Western political systems faced severe challenges that would determine the future of democratic politics. (Dalton, 1988: xiii)

The new threats to most Western democracies, according to Dalton and other observers of the democratic scene, are the problems raised by environmentalism, feminism, consumerism, and the peace movement. Without belittling the importance of those issues, however, it can be reasonably argued that Israel faces a set of problems that overshadow that agenda and constitute a greater threat to democracy.

Introduction

3

To put this claim in perspective, let us examine the environmental movement in Germany where, perhaps more than anywhere else, it has captured the public's imagination (Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt, 1981; Buerklin, 1985; Muller-Rommel, 1982). The popularity of the environmental issue culminated in the stunning electoral success of the "Greens" in 1987. Nevertheless, by the time of the more recent elections in December 1990 the movement had suffered a serious setback. While no comprehensive account of the Greens' 1990 failure has yet been written, it seems safe to speculate that it was to no small degree influenced by the collapse of East Germany and its absorption into the Federal Republic. The point is that when the fate of a nation becomes an issue, other items on the political agenda become less relevant. In Israel's case this dynamic has been demonstrated consistently at all levels and in all modes of the political process: in the institutions of governance, the political parties, "grassroots" and citizen action groups, electoral behavior, and the mass media. The single most important issue cutting across all these spheres is the conflict with the Arabs, its ramifications for national security, and preservation of Israel as a Jewish state adhering to the tenets of democracy. With this in mind, the present monograph asks whether these processes have affected the commitment to democracy in Israel and, if so, how. There are several ways to answer such a question. We decided to approach the problem from the viewpoint of the public. In so doing, we presume the public to be a vital political force in democracy, providing a unique resource without which the system cannot function: legitimacy. "How a nation reacts to a crisis of political effectiveness—a period in which powerholders are not able to provide what people want—depends, in large part, on the degree of legitimacy that its political institutions sustain" (Lipset, 1983: 4). Of course, this does not deny the crucial role of elites or other political agents. Yet, as Dalton noted (1988), the public's attitudes generally set the acceptable bounds of politics and determine the shape of permissible measures for resolving crises and controversies. When the elites exceed these bounds, or when the issue at hand has an immediate effect on people's lives, the potential for direct public involvement in the political sphere is substantial. The issues confronting Israel's society are of the kind that wield a fundamental impact on life in that country. That there are high popular levels of both passive and active modes of political expression in Israel should come as no surprise. The fall of Golda Meir's government in the wake of the 1973 War was mostly due to widespread distrust and protest against the government and its leadership. Likewise, the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) from Lebanon in the aftermath of the Sabra and Shatila

4

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in Israeli

Democracy

massacres was effected by mass street demonstrations, the largest of which attracted nearly half a million people. These examples suffice in indicating the bounds within which the Israeli political system operates: high public awareness and action, especially when the nation's security or moral behavior is at stake. This means that the governing elite must keep abreast of popular opinion; it is an important component of the viability of Israeli democracy. To be sure, since its establishment in 1948, Israel's democracy has never been seriously challenged by domestic political movements. The best known and best organized advocacy of antidemocratic ideology in Israel is that of the "Kach" Party, founded by the late Rabbi Meir Kahane. In the 1984 general elections, Kach won one seat in the 120 member Knesset. Just prior to the last elections, in 1988, the Supreme Court, on the basis of Kach's antidemocratic ideology, disqualified it from seeking election. However, Kach's marginal electoral success in 1984 does not necessarily mean that some of its ideas have not gained wider popular support, especially after the outbreak of the intifada and the growing public frustration with the government's inability to quell it. The following chapters examine the extent and the nature of attrition in public support for democracy in Israel after more than three years of intifada.

2 Method of Inquiry

The empirical basis of this monograph is a series of surveys executed between January 1987 and February 1991. Since the surveys were designed to trace the changing status of democracy in the eyes of the Israeli public, the same questions were presented each time. Budgetary exigencies, however, along with the emergence of new issues on the public agenda, precluded the inclusion of all the questions in all the surveys. Our conclusions were thus made under less than optimal conditions: anyone seeking to compare opinion at two or more different points in time can only use those questions that were asked at all relevant times. Each of the surveys was conducted on a sample of approximately 1,200 men and women, who were interviewed in their homes. 1 The sample was an area sample and was organized in a combined stratified and cluster sample method. The country was divided into several geographic regions, distinguished by the demographic traits of their residents. These regions, which constituted the strata in our sample, are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

The three largest cities (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa) Cities established before national independence (1948) New cities (whose present population arrived in large part after 1948) Rural settlements founded before 1948 New rural settlements (founded after 1948)

(Kibbutzim and the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories were not included in the sample.) Several cities or settlements were chosen at random from each of the four strata (in the first strata, all three cities were included). These comprise the sample's clusters. Each city (or settlement) so included was divided into statistical areas (as the Central Bureau of Statistics, or CBS, has published their population size). Within each statistical area, a number of households were randomly chosen in a way that allowed for correct representation of the area within the city and the strata (for instance, pre-1948 cities). In each household an adult (someone over 18) was interviewed. This person was also randomly chosen 5

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Trends in Israeli

Democracy

out of that household's adult population. A list was prepared by each interviewer containing the names of all persons living in the sampled household, ordered by age. Each third adult on the master list was interviewed. This ensured a correct representation o f family sizes (interviewing one person from each family results in an overrepresentation of small families) and of husbands, wives, and adult children living with their parents. In the end, we achieved a rather precise representative sample of the adult civilian Jewish population (save for members of kibbutzim) living within the pre-1967 borders of Israel. The most serious limitation of the sample (one that unfortunately appears in almost all public opinion surveys made in Israel) is the nonrepresentation of the Arab public, which constitutes approximately 18 percent of the country's adult population (see Central Bureau of Statistics, 1990, Table 2.21). We are aware that the resulting partiality of our conclusions is a direct product of the partiality of our representative sample. The reasons for not including the Arab sector in the surveys were twofold: 1. The need to conduct the survey in a second language (Arabic) entailed considerable expense. 2. There is little point to a common analysis of Jewish and Arab responses to many political questions (for instance, on the question of whether Arab citizens of Israel have the right to demonstrate). Answers by Arab interviewees must be analyzed separately, and such an analysis would require a subsample whose size would have to be much larger than 18 percent of the general sample. The size of the sample is almost completely unconnected to the size of the population; it is influenced by its variability. If we were to assume that the variation of opinion within the Arab sector on political issues is about half that of the Jewish sector, then the Arab subsample would have to be enlarged from 18 to 33 percent. We hope that the funds required to include such a sample of the Arab population will be available for our next study. Our findings were systematized in two main ways: 1. Comparison of the answers by different sections of the population (religious versus secular, highly educated versus poorly educated, and European versus non-European); and 2. Comparison of public opinions at different points in time. In the demographic analysis (number 1 above) we used all available data (that is, all the figures collected at various times). This was done only after we had confirmed that the disparities over time were significantly smaller than the

Method of

Inquiry

7

disparities between different demographic sections of the population at any point of time. So that this study and its results could be accessible to the general public, we have avoided complicated or abstract statistics. W e have preferred to present our data so that the reader would be able to follow the answers to the original questions and discover the interrelationship between variables, as well as changes measured over time.

Findings

Empirical Questions Empirical investigation of a theoretical problem usually requires a fine distinction between that problem's various levels and dimensions. This is especially so in the case of the problems of democracy since democracy is a complex concept that is applied in the dynamic reality of every citizen's life. This simultaneous complexity and popularity is the source of a wide spectrum of views, all calling themselves democratic and each emphasizing a different aspect of that esteemed concept. This includes democracy as a way of thought, a style of interpersonal relationships, as a system of governance, or as a declaration of rights. The question of democracy's status among the Israeli public must, therefore, be divided into a number of subissues: 1. Which principles of democracy are more accepted by the public, and which less? To answer this question we identified separate facets of democracy, such as the principle of majority decisions, the rule of law, equality before the law, freedom of expression and organization, tolerance toward minorities, and trust in institutions essential to a democratic system. 2. What is the social basis of support for democracy? Are there systematic differences in the support of democratic values and norms of behavior on the part of various sectors of the public? 3. Of no less interest are the combinations of these questions: Do members of different social groups in the population tend to emphasize different aspects of democracy (for instance, such formal aspects as elections in contrast to interpersonal and behavioral aspects such as human rights)? Are there some groups that have reduced their commitment to democracy while other groups intensified it? The findings presented below will help us answer these questions. How does commitment to democracy change

9

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Democracy

over time and in response to events? As noted above, our study covers the period of the intifada: the first survey was conducted almost a year before December 1987, when the intifada began, and the last survey presented herein was conducted in the winter of 19901991. Periodic opinion surveys are far from being controlled experiments. Obviously, those conducting the research are unable to control the events that occur between the time of the interviews. And, indeed, events other than the intifada took place during the period in which our survey was conducted. For our purposes, probably one of the most relevant of these events was the Knesset elections in the fall of 1988, in the wake of which a broad national coalition government was formed. This government was to fall a year later as the result of differences over foreign and defense policies. A government comprised exclusively of right-wing and religious parties replaced it. Nevertheless, it appears to us that the most long-lasting and influential event during the period of time our study was conducted was the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories, the intifada, which has no less than altered the parameters of national and private life in Israel, turning the clock back to an almost pre-June 1967 reality. Among other consequences, the intifada has ensured the Palestinian problem a prominent place on the international agenda and raised serious doubts about Israel's democratic system. This is the factual context for exploring the empirical questions suggested above.

Value Commitment to Democracy Since its inception, Israel has officially considered itself a Western democracy; its commitment to democratic values is integral to its Proclamation of Independence. However, as we have already noted, the majority of the Jewish population immigrated to Israel from countries having little or no democratic traditions. Given this background, and in light of the turmoil created by the intifada and related events, the question is: To what extent are the democratic principles enumerated in the Proclamation still supported by the public? We asked the interviewees to respond, by agreeing or disagreeing, to three statements taken from the Proclamation (without revealing to them the actual source). The responses, presented in Table 1, represent approximately 2,300 interviewees, questioned in two separate surveys. The results were combined only after comparisons showed that the disparities between responses to different questions within the same time period were considerably greater than those within the answer to a single question over time.

11

Findings

Table 1 Commitment to Democratic Values Israel must grant equal social and political rights to every citizen regardless of religion, race, and sex. Disagree Not sure Agree Total (N = 2,331)

15% 14 71 100%

Israel must grant freedom of conscience and religion. Disagree Not sure Agree Total (N = 2,329)

6% 15 79 100%

Israel must grant freedom of language, education, and culture. Disagree Not sure Agree Total (N = 2,320)

9 84

100%

The Commitment to Democracy Versus Other Values At first glance, the picture that emerges from the findings presented in Table 1 are encouraging: between 70 and 85 percent of those interviewed support the principles of freedom and equality in Israel; only 6 to 15 percent oppose them. However, a more realistic interpretation of these results must take account of the fact that our statements did not put any price on democratic values: no security risk, no despised minority behaving in a socially unacceptable manner, and no elected government pursuing policies opposed to the opinions of the interviewees were made part of their choice. None of these factors complicated the interviewees' expression of near-pristine democratic principles. When a price tag is attached to it, commitment to democracy tends to decline. This is evidenced in the series of questions and answers presented in Table 2. The picture derived from the data presented in Table 2 differs considerably from that of the previous table. Here approximately half of the interviewees express democratic stands, while 20 to 40 percent support proposals or ideas of an explicitly nondemocratic nature. The hypothetical situations described

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Table 2 Commitment to Democratic Attitudes What do you prefer, a democratic government whose opinions and policies are opposed to your own, or a nondemocratic government whose policies you agree with? 1. A nondemocratic government with which I agree. 2. Both are equally bad. 3. A democratic government opposed to my opinions. (N = 3,365)

22% 28 50 100%

The most marginal threat to the country's security is sufficient to justify a serious curtailment of democracy. 1. Agree 2. Not sure 3. Disagree (N = 4,492)

34% 15 51 100%

Under the present circumstances, it is best to have a strong leadership that will "impose order" in Israel without having to depend on elections or Knesset votes. 1. Agree 2. Not sure 3. Disagree (N = 4,497)

42% 10 48 100%

in the questions are a fair reflection of the existential conflict raging within Israeli society: 1. For half of the respondents, a government with policies opposed to their own is worse or just as bad as doing away with democracy. In other words, in certain conditions these people are prepared to impose their own views on the majority of the population. 2. In the opinion of approximately one-third of the interviewees, complete preference should be given to security considerations over democratic rights, to the point of placing significant limitations on democracy, even when the threat to security is, at most, "marginal." 3. Approximately 40 percent of those interviewed expressed the desire for a strong leader who will impose order irrespective of democratic controls (elections and Knesset majorities). Thus, we can see that the domestic debate in Israel over policy, leadership, and security severely qualifies the near general commitment to abstract democratic values. More precisely, when support for democracy

Findings

13

begins to exact a price, it falls from a clear majority of 75 percent to a near parity between pro- and antidemocratic stands.

Tolerance An even more strenuous test of the commitment to democracy is the willingness to accord democratic rights to minority groups within society that do not conform to common values and beliefs and thus provoke enmity and suspicion on the part of the majority. Tolerance toward such minorities has repeatedly proven to differentiate between genuine democracy and "tyranny of the majority." In order to assess the degree of tolerance characteristic of the Israeli public, it is first necessary to identify unpopular groups; the attitudes of each interviewee toward his or her specific object of dislike then can be tested. In two surveys (July 1987 and August 1989) interviewees were presented with an identical list of political groups. Each was asked to identify that group that "he or she likes less than any other." The resulting list of the most "disliked" groups, ranked according to the frequency of their mention in the survey (only groups identified by at least 1 percent of the interviewees are included on the list), is shown in Table 3. The results of Table 3 indicate that the specific identify of unpopular groups and the frequency with which they are mentioned in the surveys remained almost unchanged over the course of the two years (1987 and 1989). "Kach," the ultra-rightist political party of the late Meir Kahane, which endorses an explicitly antidemocratic ideology and calls for expelling all Arabs from the "land of biblical Israel," continued to be the premiere object of hostility, in spite of its having been disqualified from participation in parliamentary elections in 1988 by the Supreme Court, and despite the consequent decline in its public visibility. The second most unpopular group is the Israeli Communist Party, over 90 percent of whose voters are Arab. In the past, the communists symbolized the anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli alliance between the Arab world and the communist bloc. The remaining groups on the "most unpopular" list all received a rating of less than 10 percent. To understand the general pattern by which political hostility is formed in Israel, we divided the "disliked" groups into three main categories (see the last three rows of Table 3). Once this is done it becomes clear that negative popularity is also a negative "exposure" of positive popularity: in striking similarity to the results of the last national elections, here, too, the Left and Right constitute the two largest blocs, more or less equal in size, with the balance held by a significantly smaller religious bloc (see Peres, 1988). This division of negative attention is remarkably stable over time. After identifying the unpopular groups, the question of tolerance toward them is

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Trends in Israeli Democracy

Table 3 Most "Disliked" Groups, in Order of Unpopularity According to the Frequency of Their Mention (in Percentages)

1. Kach (radical right-wing party) 2. The Israeli Communist Party (mostly supported by Arabs) 3. Agudath Israel (ultra-orthodox party) 4. Progressive List for Peace (radical Arab party) 5. Ratz (a dovish, liberal party) 6. Peace Now (a dovish, extra-parliamentary movement) 7. Shas (an ultra-orthodox, Sephardic party) 8. Tehiya (a right-wing, hawkish party) 9. Mafdal (a religious, hawkish party)

1989

1987

Average

42

40

41

25

26

25

8

9

9

7

7

7

5

8

6

5

4

5

3

3

3

3

1 1

1

2 1

99

99

99

45 42 12

41 45 13

43 43 13

Summing Up All right-wing parties All left-wing and pro-Arab parties All religious parties

raised. What fundamental rights are the interviewees prepared to deny those groups, and which rights are perceived as truly universal? (Refer to Table 4.) In referring to Table 4, we see that the levels of tolerance change not only from group to group, but from subject to subject as well. There are civil rights that 60 percent of the public is willing to grant to even an unpopular group; there are also rights that the overwhelming majority of the public is willing to deprive such a group. This gauge of respect for civil rights is revealing of the emphases and limitations of tolerance in Israel. Only 25 percent favor surveillance practices common to police states (listening to private telephone conversations) and approximately half insist on the universality of the franchise. In contrast, a majority tend to favor denying "disliked" groups the opportunity to acquire public exposure and influence. For instance, during the period when these figures were collected, there was only one television station in Israel; access to that station was considered an indication of influence and power.

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Findings

Table 4 Respect for Civil Rights of Unpopular Groups

Right

Percentage of those Percentage of those prepared to respecting this deprive the unpopular right (even for the group of this right unpopular group)

1. To conduct private telephone 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

conversations (without surveillance) To vote for the Knesset To demonstrate To be interviewed on national television To be elected to the Knesset To serve as prime minister

25 38 39 48 51 80

60 48 45 37 35 15

Note: These percentages do not total 100 since several of the interviewees replied inconclusively ("not sure").

Ultimately, in spite of Israel's law guaranteeing (as do the rest of the world's democracies) the right of any citizen to be elected to parliament, 51 percent support restricting this right and denying it to members of groups they despise. Only 35 percent are prepared to support this right for everyone. In conclusion, we may claim that while the Jewish public in Israel largely supports democratic values when they are presented on a general and abstract level, this support diminishes when it is placed in the context of more concrete and specific issues (i.e., "strong" leadership, the rights of minorities). Another question of interest is: which causes a greater weakening of democratic values, the price tag (in terms of security threats or the absence of a strong leadership) or the need to tolerate unpopular groups? We have no definitive reply. In our study the interviewees' tolerance of the same unpopular group was put to a series of increasingly severe tests: the greater the influence a certain right was liable to award an unpopular group, the greater was the willingness to withhold that right. We found that 60 percent support the need to respect the right to a private telephone conversation, while 35 percent respect the right to be elected to the Knesset. In other words, the principles of democracy and tolerance are not perceived by the majority of the population as "absolute" principles or as standing above all other considerations. It seems fair to speculate that if our questionnaire were to include a scale of rising prices (rising, let us say, from a marginal threat to the country's defense to a severe blow to national security), we would uncover in response a gradual retreat from democratic commitment. Lack of tolerance toward "disliked" groups (particularly if these groups

16

Trends in Israeli Democracy

Table 5 Perceived Threat from Unpopular Groups To what extent does this group (i.e., the one you like least) endanger the existence of the state? Constitutes a danger Don't know Does not constitute a danger (N = 2,072)

56% 18

26 100%

propagate politically extreme views) may be rationalized as a commitment to defend democracy against internal threats. An empirical example of this dynamic is evident in the responses listed to the question in Table 5.

Most interviewees seem to perceive a tension between a direct violation of democracy (by deprivation of some rights) and an indirect violation (endangering the existence of the state by excessive liberalism). In a society like that of Israel, facing real questions of existential proportions (war and peace, the establishment of permanent borders, and defining national identity), situations may frequently occur in which the insistence on every detail of democratic procedure appears as actually endangering the social and institutional basis of democracy. In other words, democracy is liable to disintegrate as a result of an exaggerated democratic tolerance, or be strangled by too much protection.

Is Democracy Less Deeply Rooted in Israel than in Western Countries? A survey of democracy's status in the Israeli public consciousness would not be complete without a comparison with parallel findings taken during the same years in other democratic countries. In light of the extenuating circumstances of the Israeli reality (first and foremost the Arab-Israeli conflict and its innumerable ramifications), we would expect to find a gap between the stands of the Israeli public and those of other countries not experiencing a similar political-security situation. Of course, there are technical difficulties associated with such a comparison: neither the questions, the samples, nor the dates of the surveys are identical. These differences stem in part from varying demographic, linguistic, and budgetary conditions in each of the comparable surveys, and in part from the fact that the comparison was not preplanned (as it was, for instance, in our longitudinal comparisons), being made after the fact. In light of these qualifications, the criteria for validity of any

17

Findings

comparisons will be consistency. Any consistent trends transcending the varying formulations of the questions and differences in the surveys' samples will assuage our methodological qualms. We will now proceed with a comparison, using those same measurements of commitment to democracy that we employed in the previous sections.

General

Democratic

Values

For this subject, comparison was relatively simple because there exists a series of annual surveys called the Eurobarometer, which are carried out in twelve European countries and in which special emphasis is given to issues

Table 6 A Comparison of Israeli and European Commitment to Democratic Values 3 Eurobarometer Survey (1989) :

Israel Democracy Index:

(N= 11,000)

(N = 2,300)

For each of the following rights and liberties of man, can you tell me if in general you think that they should always be respected under all circumstances, or does it depend on the situation? Religious freedom and freedom of conscience

The state of Israel must grant freedom of religion and conscience

Always

83%

71%

Agree absolutely; agree

It depends; no response

17

29

Not sure; disagree; disagree absolutely

100%

100%

The right of the people to their own language and culture

Israel must grant freedom of language, education, and culture

Always

79%

84%

Agree absolutely; agree

It depends; no response

21

16

Not sure; disagree; disagree absolutely

100%

100%

Source: European data from Eurobarometer—Public Opinion in the European Community, November 1989, Commission of the European Community, Brussels.

18

Trends in Israeli

Democracy

of racism and xenophobia. The Eurobarometer uses questions similar to ours. The data in Table 6 are drawn from the responses of over 11,000 interviewees. We will present the "European" formulation of the question alongside our own and then compare the two sets of answers. The general impression from the responses in Table 6 is that no significant, unequivocal differences exist between the two sets of populations. In both questions and both samples there is a large majority (in the range of 75 to 85 percent) favoring a democratic position. Within this context, though, the European public places greater emphasis on freedom of religion and conscience, while in Israel there is greater emphasis on freedom of language and culture. The source of this differentiation becomes clear with some reflection. Europeans are bound to be more sensitive to questions of religious freedom because some countries in Europe are multireligious and committed to the protection of the rights of a religious minority. In addition, "conscience," as a concept, has a clearer and more central standing in European culture. Israel, on the other hand, expresses its tolerance and pluralism toward its Arab population by separating the spheres of education and culture from other social spheres and awarding a free choice in the former. Thus, each respective public emphasizes a different facet of the same value, making it difficult to argue on the basis of this data where a higher commitment to democracy exists, in Western Europe or in Israel. Desire for a Strong

Leader

Among the questions designed to weigh democracy against competing aims or values, only one parallel question was found; it pertained to the popular desire for strong leadership. The question in Table 7 was posed to a sample of 3,000 individuals in the Netherlands. This time it appears that the Israeli public was less desirous of a strong leadership than were the Dutch in 1978. However, a careful examination of the formulation of the two respective statements creates some doubt. The Israeli version explicitly refers to a strong leader who will suspend or, at least, derail democratic processes (not being dependent on elections or Knesset majorities). The Gallup question provides, as an alternative to strong leadership, a situation in which "everyone has something to say in government." Even in times of genuine democratic leadership it is difficult to claim that "everyone"—or even almost everyone—has something to say in government. In other words, the difference in the percentages of those agreeing with the statement (40 and 45 percent, respectively) is likely to be a function of the greater antidemocratic bias inherent in the Israeli question in comparison to the Dutch question. These and other international data, of which comparison to our figures

19

Findings

Table 7 A Comparison of Israeli and European Commitment to Democratic Attitudes European Data: (Gallup, 1978) Does this country need strong leadership at the top or should everyone have something to say in government? Israel Democracy Index: In light of Israel's present circumstances, it is preferable to have a strong leadership capable of "imposing order" without having to depend on elections or Knesset majorities. Answer

Israel (1989)

Netherlands (1978)

In favor of a "strong leadership" (strongly agree; agree)

40%

45%

Not sure, no opinion

10

8

Opposed to a strong leadership (strongly opposed; opposed)

50

47

100% (2,300)

100% (3,000)

Total N

Source: International Gallup Polls—Public Opinion, 1978, p. 111.

was even more problematic, do not testify that the standing of democracy in Israeli public opinion is worse than in European public opinion. But a more carefully and broadly plotted comparative study is required in order to reach less ambiguous conclusions. Trust

in Public

Institutions

From time to time almost every democracy encounters contradictory demands born of accepted principles: the tensions between the majority's authority versus minority rights, national security versus personal freedom, and tolerance in the face of cynical exploitation of democratic protections by potentially authoritarian minorities. In the absence of a general formula, democratic societies are the home for numerous independent institutions and competing interests whose function is to balance these sundry facets of democracy and prevent any dangerous detours onto the paths of the "tyranny of the majority," "anarchy," or even an overzealous defense of democratic principles that may include suppressing part of the population. Those institutions that stand out as particularly important to the functioning of the democratic system are political parties, parliament, and the government. No less essential in the long run, however, are those institutions designed to be above the domestic political debate—the courts, the police, the army,

20

Trends

in Israeli

Democracy

education, and science—and those that give extra-parliamentary expression to public controversies such as the media and the trade unions. In order for these institutions to check each other in the interests of democracy, they must have public trust and confidence. The well-known legal aphorism that "justice has not only to be done, but to be seen as well" is relevant to one extent or another for all these institutions. Because the public lacks the professional tools to supervise the activities of these institutions in their respective areas, it relies on their trustworthiness and on structural balance to ensure mutual supervision and control in the public's name and in its service. The following question, responses to which are listed in Table 8, was designed to test the public's trust in institutions: "To what extent do you have trust (believe it to be properly filling its function) in the following institutions?" The possible answers were: complete trust; trust; some trust; almost no trust; and no trust at all. In order to abbreviate matters, we will combine the first two answers (trust) and last two (no trust), and omit the intermediate category "some trust." The institutions are listed according to their scores, rather than the order of their appearance on the questionnaire. The figures in Table 8 point to very large disparities in the degree of trust accorded the various institutions on the list (ranging from 94% for the military to 14% for the political parties). The most trusted institutions are those that supposedly serve the general national interest (IDF, courts, universities, and police—whose mean score is 73). At the bottom of the scale are those institutions whose function is to give expression to conflicts of interest and differences of opinion (trade unions, rabbinate, media, and political parties—their mean score is 24). This general ranking appears natural: the man in the street is likely to trust the army as a whole but certainly not all the newspapers or all the political parties. What provokes concern in Table 8 is the size of the disparity and the specific order at the top of the list. The army is more trusted than the courts and the universities, the police more than the Knesset. We can hone our conclusions if we divide the list of institutions into three levels of trust. Only institutions standing above politics win the trust of the majority of the population (the army, courts, and universities). The trust of approximately half the population (47 to 52 percent) is enjoyed by those government institutions involved in politics. Institutions whose independence are characteristic of democracies (the press, political parties) receive the trust of only a minority (29 percent and below) of the public. These figures may be interpreted as expressing trust in the state of Israel as a stable republic but not necessarily as an open, pluralistic, and tolerant society. Those institutions representing these latter aspects of democratic life are trusted only by a minority of the population.

21

Findings

Table 8 Trust in Institutions (1990) Trust

No Trust

Army (IDF) Courts Universities Police Knesset Government Trade unions Rabbinate Big business Press Political parties

94% 83 62 53 49 48 29 32 21 20 14

2% 5 10 17 10 16 37 47 39 43 52

Mean (N = 1,204)

46%

29%

Trust in Institutions—International Comparison The tension between individual rights and social institutions is not, of course, particular to Israeli democracy. Democratic tradition is bom of the respect and trust accumulated by institutions over the course of time and generations. On the other hand, a democratic polity is supposed to facilitate change, readjusting social and political arrangements according to contemporary demands. The populace and institutions cannot have identical interests because the latter acquire a certain independent momentum of needs and interests that transcend their constituent parts, or members. The obvious conclusion is that in the democratic public's relationships with institutions, trust and skepticism are equally necessary. In other words, in well-established democracies we can expect an optimal rather than a maximal degree of popular trust in institutions. Open disagreement and the desire for change are supposed to be legitimate in a democracy. On that basis, we can expect popular respect and trust for institutions, even when they give expression to conflict and criticism. It follows that in order to estimate whether the level of trust in institutions matches democratic needs and assumptions, the mean scores of trust accorded the institutions are insufficient; the range and disparity of the scores must also be taken into consideration. To what extent does the public prefer certain institutions (usually integrative ones) to others? (See Table 9.) A cursory glance of Table 9 shows that democratic countries, including

22

Trends in Israeli Democracy

Table 9 International Comparison of Trust in Institutions Institution

W. Germany Great Britain

Armed forces Legal system Police Legislature Press Labor unions Average SD Range

France

United States Average

54 66 71 53 49 33

81 66 86 40 29 26

53 55 64 48 31 36

81 51 76 53 49 33

67 60 74 49 40 32

54 12.2 38

55 24.2 60

48 12.1 28

57 16.4 48

54 14.8 42

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