Arab-Israeli Conflict in Israeli History, 1948-2000 9780313075438, 9780897897556

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT IN ISRAELI HISTORY TEXTBOOKS, 1948–2000

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT IN ISRAELI HISTORY TEXTBOOKS, 1948–2000 ELIE PODEH

BERGIN & GARVEY WESTPORT, CONNECTICUT •

LONDON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Podeh, Elie. The Arab-Israeli conflict in Israeli history textbooks, 1948–2000 / Elie Podeh. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0–89789–755–2 (alk. paper) 1. Israel—History—Study and teaching. 2. Arab-Israeli conflict—Study and teaching—Israel. 3. Jews—Palestine—History—Study and teaching—Israel. 4. Palestinian Arabs—Foreign public opinion, Israeli. 5. Public opinion— Israel. I. Title. DS126.5.P615 2002 956.94—dc21 2001025179 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2002 by Elie Podeh All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2001025179 ISBN: 0–89789–755–2 First published in 2002 Bergin & Garvey, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.greenwood.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Copyright Acknowledgments Every reasonable effort has been made to trace the owners of copyright materials in this book, but in some instances this has proven impossible. The author and publisher will be glad to receive information leading to more complete acknowledgments in subsequent printings of the book and in the meantime extend their apologies for any omissions.

“The education system set curricula aimed at imbuing Israeli citizens with a love of the fatherland and enhancing their faith in the just of the State’s cause.” (Eyal Naveh, The Twentieth Century, History for Ninth Grade, 1999) “As known to all, it is easier to bear the myths and legends than the bare reality.” (Tahar Ben-Jelloun, L’enfant de Sable) “The temptation is often overwhelmingly strong to tell it, not as it really was, but as we would wish it to have been.” (Bernard Lewis, History: Remembered, Recovered, Invented) “If, for example, Eurasia or Eastasia (whichever it may be) is the enemy today, then that country must always have been the enemy. And if the facts say otherwise then the facts must be altered. Thus history is continuously rewritten. The day-to-day falsification of the past, carried out by the Ministry of Truth, is as necessary to the stability of the regime as the work of repression and espionage carried out by the Ministry of Love.” (George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four)

CONTENTS Preface 1

2

3

ix

The Study of School Textbooks

1

Textbook Research in the West

1

The Present Study

7

Attitudes in the Israeli Education System toward Teaching the Arab-Israeli Conflict

21

Attitudes toward Teaching History

21

Attitudes toward Teaching the Arab-Israeli Conflict

26

Teaching the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Case Studies

75

The Cultural Heritage of Islam

75

The Ottoman Empire and the Image of the Turks

77

The First Aliyah Period (1882–1902)

80

The Second Aliyah Period (1904–14)

83

The First World War Agreements

86

The British Mandate in Palestine (1920–48)

91

The 1947–48 War

102

The 1956 War

110

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Contents

The 1967 War

113

The Post-1967 Period

116

The Arab Minority in Israel

118

Conclusions

143

Epilogue

155

Appendices

157

Bibliography

179

Index

197

PREFACE In Israel, curiously, it is considered odd for a historian of the Middle East to focus on Israeli history and culture. An inherent division exists in our academic institutions between the study of Israeli history and Judaism, on the one hand, and Middle Eastern history and Islam, on the other. This separation (the result of a number of historic circumstances that will not be analyzed here) is largely artificial and is detrimental to both students and scholars, especially in a period when the “iron curtain” that has separated Israel from the Arab world is gradually falling away. The conviction that this division is anachronistic has led me to explore the linkage between Israel, the Arab states, and the Middle East in various areas.1 One such area is the field of education. In May 1997, an academic poll revealed that 40% of Jewish high school students “hate” Arabs and 60% “felt a strong urge to take revenge.” The study also showed that there had been a gradual increase in the articulation of negative Jewish attitudes toward the Arabs since the 1970s.2 Although the reasons for these worrying results are multifaceted, it is likely that biased school textbooks constitute an important factor in the adoption of negative attitudes toward the Arabs. In an era in which wars and violence have characterized the Arab-Israeli conflict, and personal Jewish-Arab encounters have been a rare phenomenon, school textbooks have become a key medium for acquaintance with the “other.” For many Israelis who have not met personally with Arabs, school textbooks, along with children’s books, historiography, and the media have constituted a central prism through which the image of the Arab and information on the Arab world have been filtered. Conceivably, these conceptions accompany the student into adulthood and affect his later political views as well. “We cannot have a perception of the present,” wrote one

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scholar, “that is not strongly influenced by a version of the past—some sort of version—which we have internalized in the course of growing up, and articulated in our adult lives. Such versions vary and matter because they determine how we understand and behave towards events that occur in our own present world.”3 This research is an attempt to analyze the presentation of the ArabIsraeli conflict and the image of the Arab as reflected in Israeli history and, in certain cases, civics textbooks in the Jewish education system since the establishment of Israel in 1948.4 A period of more than fifty years may be viewed as long enough to reveal how and to what extent the historical narrative has been transformed. Although the study of school textbooks is generally the province of scholars in the field of education, this study is carried out from a historical perspective. It is hoped that the historical method will provide a better understanding of the explicit and implicit biases of commission and omission to be found in the textbooks. Admittedly, the aims of this study are not merely academic, as its findings are relevant to the ongoing efforts toward a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In a novel by Margaret Atwood, the heroine observes that “the whole point about being a historian . . . is that you can successfully avoid the present, most of the time.”5 In this historical analysis there is no attempt to avoid the present. I believe that biased Israeli and Arab textbooks have fostered and maintained a kind of silent conflict between the parties. Although this battle of textbooks has not resulted in physical injuries, it has contributed indirectly to the exacerbation of the armed conflict. More important, the negative repercussions of this silent conflict may be abiding, lasting long after the guns fall silent. Therefore, my hope is that better textbooks—free of bias, prejudice, inaccuracies, and omissions—on both sides of the conflict will result in a better atmosphere, congenial to the successful consummation of peaceful relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. “If there were favorable change in curricula,” wrote Alouph Hareven, a leading educator, back in 1978, “then a new generation of Arabs and Israelis would arise whose perception of one another is different from that of the previous generation. Conversely, if such a change were not to take place, in all probability the next generation of Arabs—and maybe the next generation of Israelis—will be educated according to the same [biased] attitudes prevailing today.”6 Over twenty years later, the new history textbooks do indeed generate hope that the young Israeli generation will be exposed to a different kind of approach. Naturally, the same process must take place on the Arab side as well. This study owes much to the support and help of friends and colleagues. I would like to thank my students in my courses on Arab-Israeli relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem who, by their frequent observations along the lines of “this is not what I had studied at school,” impelled me to unearth the reasons for it. Special thanks are due to Mrs. Naava Eisin, at the

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Aviezer Yelin Archive for Jewish Education in Israel and the Diaspora at Tel Aviv University, who provided me with valuable material and was kind enough to guide me on the workings of the Israeli education system. I would like to thank Professor Daniel Bar-Tal of Tel Aviv University, who enriched my thinking by his insights and consistently encouraged my research. Dr. Falk Pingel, deputy director of the Georg Eckert Institute in Braunschweig, Germany, was kind enough to invite me to participate in a conference on Israeli-Palestinian textbook revision. My stay at the institute’s library, which is second to none with respect to the study of textbooks, helped me to overcome my initial gaps in the theoretical sphere of international textbook revision. I would like to state my indebtedness to the late Professor Hava Lazarus-Yaffe. As the first Israeli scholar to analyze Arab textbooks, and the author of valuable textbooks on Islam used in the Jewish school system, she was deeply interested in the findings of the present research. She read the first draft of this manuscript meticulously, and, by her comments, helped me recognize and divest my own biases. I would also like to thank Dr. Yoshua Mathias, who formerly headed the history team at the Curriculum Planning Department in the Ministry of Education, and Mr. Itzhak Komem, a Jerusalem high school teacher, both of whom read an earlier Hebrew version and offered important insights. Professor Ami Ayalon of Tel Aviv University and Professor Ella Landau-Tassron of the Hebrew University offered important comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. Thanks are due also to Professor Moshe Ma’oz, former head of the Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace, at the Hebrew University, and Professor Amnon Cohen, the present head of the Truman Institute, both of whom supported my research through the David Ben-Rafael fellowship. The Institute was also kind enough to publish a short Hebrew version of this study in the Gitelson Peace Publications Series in January 1997. Dr. Susan Varda Gitelson, who established this series in memory of her father, has keenly supported projects to facilitate Israeli-Arab understanding. I would like to thank the Faculty of Humanities and the Institute of Asian and African Studies at the Hebrew University for helping fund this project. I would also like to thank the following institutions for permissions to use illustrations and photos appearing in the book: Ministry of Education, Hagana Archive, Central Zionist Archives, K.K.L. Photo Archive, Government Press Office, Keter Publishing House, and Rafael Bass. Thanks to my research assistant, Nimrod Goren, who was instrumental in acquiring these permissions. I am also thankful to Judy Krausz for her editorial assistance. Lastly, I wish to dedicate this book to my mother-in-law, Ruth Kedar, who has taught me the meaning of tolerance and giving. Elie Podeh October 2000

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NOTES 1. E. Podeh, “Rethinking Israel in the Middle East,” Israel Affairs, Vol. 3 (Spring/Summer 1997), pp. 280–95. Reprinted in E. Karsh (ed.), From Rabin to Netanyahu: Israel’s Troubled Agenda (London: 1997), pp. 280–95. 2. Ha’aretz, 26 May 1997. 3. P.J. Rogers, “Why Teach History?” In A. Dickenson, P.J. Lee and P.J. Rogers (eds.), Learning History (London: 1984), p. 20. 4. On the Israeli education system, see Y. Iram and M. Schmida, The Educational System of Israel (Westport, CT: 1998). 5. M. Atwood, The Robber Bride (Toronto: 1993), p. 32. 6. A. Hareven, “Are Confidential Relations between Israel and the Arab States Possible at All?” In A. Hareven (ed.), If Peace Comes: Risks and Prospects (Jerusalem: 1978), p. 27 (Hebrew).

CHAPTER 1

THE STUDY OF SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS TEXTBOOK RESEARCH IN THE WEST It is common knowledge that school textbooks in social sciences and humanities do not merely convey an objective body of information. Textbooks, according to Howard Mehlinger, are the modern version of village storytellers, since they “are responsible for conveying to youth what adults believe they should know about their own culture as well as that of other societies.” In his opinion, none of the socialization instruments can be compared to textbooks “in their capacity to convey a uniform, approved, even official version of what youth should believe.”1 Moreover, although textbooks pretend to teach neutral, legitimate knowledge, they are often used as ideological tools to promote a certain belief system and legitimize an established political and social order. In other words, the selection and organization of knowledge for schools involves an ideological process that serves the interests of particular classes and social groups.2 In his analysis of the American education system, Michael Apple concludes that what counts as legitimate knowledge “is the result of complex power relations and struggles among identifiable class, race, gender/sex, and religious groups.”3 It is difficult to establish the exact role played by textbooks in comparison to other socialization instruments. The growing exposure of the younger generation to the electronic media undoubtedly has diminished the centrality of the textbook as an instrument of education. Still, most scholars in the field of education tend to agree that textbooks have remained crucial. In his analysis of European history textbooks in the last hundred years, Wolfgang Jacobmeyer came to the conclusion that “our modern societies have developed history textbooks as the most remarkable medium for the

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transmission of history, outnumbering press, radio, and TV.”4 Philip Altbach, too, observed that “in an age of computers and satellite communications, the most powerful and pervasive educational technology is [still] the textbook.”5 A recent study found that although some 85% of students’ knowledge came from outside the school and from sources other than their teachers, “dependence on textbooks in some form or other was likely to remain an important element in the learning of history, geography and social studies.”6 An inherent problem in the study of textbooks is that although they constitute the core of the school curriculum, it cannot be assumed that what is included in the text is actually taught or learned. According to Apple, students respond to the text in three different ways: in the first, dominant way, the student accepts the messages contained in the text at face value. In the second, negotiated way, the reader may dispute a certain claim but accept the overall interpretation of the text. In the third, oppositional way, the student rejects the dominant interpretation of the text. In addition to the fact that texts may have contradictory messages, Apple concludes that “audiences construct their own responses to texts. They do not passively receive texts, but actively read them based on their own class, race, gender and religious experiences.”7 Although these observations are illuminating, it may be assumed that most students lack sufficient historical knowledge and consciousness to prompt them to contest existing historical narratives. It is likely, therefore, that most students, especially in nondemocratic societies, belong to the dominant or negotiated categories. Furthermore, textbooks carry the authority of print. Written texts, according to David Olson, “are devices which separate speech from speaker, and that separation in itself makes the words impersonal, objective and above criticism.” In his opinion, textbooks resemble religious rituals since both “are devices for putting ideas and beliefs above criticism.”8 When the message originates in the textbook, which teachers and parents themselves consult, students attach greater authority to them. Moreover, since textbooks often constitute the ultimate reference source for the student (as well as for the teacher, in certain cases), it is likely that beliefs implanted through them will “persist for a lifetime.”9 A recent study found that when pressed, students chose the textbook as the most accurate of reference sources because “its apparent objective, encyclopedic nature fit more readily with their view of history and because many of their classroom activities involved searching for facts.”10 The role ascribed to the textbook of legitimizing an established political and social order is particularly relevant to textbooks in the field of history. Because each generation makes a considerable effort to transmit its traditions and belief system to the next generation, history textbooks have been traditionally “geared to the teaching of the national past and to generating an identification with it.”11 Ever since the rise of the nation-state in Europe

The Study of School Textbooks

3

in the nineteenth century, history textbooks were used by states as instruments for glorifying the nation, consolidating its national identity, and justifying particular forms of social and political systems.12 Many studies in the West have demonstrated that ethnocentric views, myths, stereotypes, and prejudices often pervade history textbooks. Apple concludes, therefore, that most history textbooks present a biased view of conflicts: “Our side is good; their side is bad. We are peace-loving and want an end to strife; they are warlike and aim to dominate.”13 By defaming the adversary, the education system in general and history textbooks in particular play an important role in molding and reinforcing the state’s national identity. History textbooks also play a significant role in developing the “collective memory” of any given society, which is a necessary component of the national identity. Sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, the first to use this term, explained that “every group develops the memory of its own past that highlights its unique identity vis-à-vis other groups. These reconstructed images provide the group with an account of its origin and development and thus allow it to recognize itself through time.”14 The process of molding a nation entails the “building” of a collective memory, which necessitates rediscovering, reconstructing, or even fabricating the national past. This past includes myths, symbols, and other shared memories that provide “maps” and “moralities” delineating between “we” and “they.” Anthony Smith observed that the creation of nations is a recurrent activity that “involves ceaseless re-interpretations, rediscoveries and re-constructions. Each generation must re-fashion national institutions and stratification systems in light of the myths, memories, values and symbols of the ‘past,’ which can best minister to the needs and aspirations of its dominant social groups.”15 The act of remembering and forgetting is not only a formal procedure dictated from above but is also linked to the social environment. According to Eviatar Zerubavel, this environment plays a major role in helping us determine what is “memorable and what we can (or even should) forget,” and it is often “society that determines which particular bygones we let be bygones.”16 He claims that each community has a different mnemonic tradition (one example is the Zionist tradition), which leads to cognitive differences between “thought communities.” He emphasizes the existence of “mnemonic battles” that are “fought over the ‘correct’ way to interpret the past. As we develop a collective sense of history, we may not agree on how a particular historical figure or event ought to be remembered.”17 Clearly, history textbooks play a “crucial role” in the mnemonic socialization of present and future generations.18 Interestingly enough, historians and sociologists generally fail to note the political and social links between school textbooks and collective memory. Scholars dealing with the tools used by the state to create its own collective memory—such as historiography, literature, cinema, or national

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commemorations—tend to overlook the role played by textbooks. At the same time, scholars in the field of textbook research barely analyze them in the context of attempts to build a collective memory, usually ignoring the social environment that helps shape textbook content as well.19 One rare exception, Ya’el Zerubavel, notes that “early childhood education in particular reinforces those shared images and stories that express and reinforce the group’s memory. Children . . . thus learn about major historical figures or events from stories, poems, school plays and songs.”20 Another noteworthy scholar, Eric Hobsbawm, points out in a study on nations and nationalism in Europe, that “states . . . use [their] increasingly powerful machinery for communicating with their inhabitants, above all in the primary schools, to spread the image and heritage of the ‘nation’ and to inculcate attachment to it.”21 Since in many Western democracies, and certainly in nondemocratic societies, the state controls the education apparatus, it can shape the nation’s collective memory by determining what is to be included and what excluded from the curriculum and from textbooks. Such a course of action opens the way for the manipulation of the past in order to mold the present and the future.22 In this respect, the school system, and textbooks, become yet another arm of the state, agents of memory whose aim is to ensure the transmission of certain “approved knowledge” to the younger generation. Textbooks thus function as a sort of “ultimate supreme historical court” whose task is to decipher “from all the accumulated ‘pieces of the past’ the ‘true’ collective memories which are appropriate for inclusion in the canonical national historical narrative.”23 In constructing the collective memory, textbooks play a dual role: on the one hand, they provide a sense of continuity between the past and the present, transmitting accepted historical narratives; on the other, they alter—or rewrite—the past to suit contemporary needs.24 The manipulation of the past often entails the use of stereotypes and prejudice in describing the “other.” Stereotypes are patterns and images that reduce the complexities of a phenomenon, thus portraying the reality in a narrow, incomplete, and rudimentary way. Although such a depiction of reality is often false, stereotypes “fulfill an important function in that they make it possible for people to orient their actions and reach decisions, even when they do not have sufficient information at their disposal.”25 Prejudices, by comparison, are the result of preconceived attitudes. Gordon Allport defined prejudice as “thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant.”26 Highly emotional and resistant to change, prejudices “portray reality from a selective point of view, reflecting the interests of the person articulating the prejudice.”27 Carried to the extreme, stereotyping and prejudice foster delegitimization—the “categorization of groups into extreme negative social categories which are excluded from human groups that are considered as acting within the limits of acceptable norms and/or val-

The Study of School Textbooks

5

ues.”28 Common means used for delegitimization, according to Daniel Bar-Tal, are dehumanization, outcasting, trait characterization, use of political labels, and group comparison.29 Textbooks offer an excellent starting point for studying the function of stereotypes and prejudice in the forging of society’s identity vis-à-vis the “other.” At the same time, history textbooks contain a self-image “which may be no less stereotyped than the perceptions of other countries.”30 The argument that history textbooks convey the “approved” knowledge that the state or the ruling elite aspires to transmit to the next generation is self-evident. Yet textbooks should also be regarded as cultural or social expressions, reflecting the zeitgeist and the changes that take place in society as a result of meaningful historical events and new historiography. The Ministry of Education, too, is not immune to calls for change coming from the “field” and is bound to respond to these pressures. In such cases, the content of a given textbook may reflect a synthesis between what is directed from above and what is transmitted from below. It is reasonable to assume, however, that the more centralized the educational system is, the less likely the curricula and the textbooks will be affected by changes from below. Historically, already in the late nineteenth century it was recognized in Europe that school textbooks of any given state contain stereotypes and prejudice toward neighboring countries and states with which it is in conflict. The academic study of textbooks, however, commenced only after the First World War, with the realization that chauvinistic textbooks were causes of aggression and hostility between nations. The notion of international textbook revision that consequently emerged aimed at avoiding future wars. Initially, the process was concerned with “the decontamination of textbooks and with purging history textbooks of the ‘drum and trumpet’ school of history.”31 In 1945, the UN Education, Science and Culture Organization (UNESCO) was founded, with textbook revision one of its primary tasks. The organization’s charter stated that “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.”32 Four years later, UNESCO published a guideline called A Handbook for the Improvement of Textbook and Teaching Materials.33 Assisted by the Council of Europe, which was founded in 1949, UNESCO initiated a series of international conferences that made recommendations for textbook analysis, which forms the basis of international textbook revision to this day. Since 1975, the Georg Eckert Institute in Braunschweig has served as Europe’s acknowledged center for administering, organizing, and sponsoring the study of international textbook revision. The first phase of textbook research concentrated on identifying and eliminating factual errors, obvious prejudices, deliberate omissions, and distortions. The main task of these studies was to analyze the texts, compare findings, relate them to acknowledge academic research, and formu-

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late recommendations.34 These studies tended toward “a simplistic heroes-and villains format, in the dismissive wording of one group of scholars.”35 The initial outcome, however, seemed rather impressive: various reports indicated the decline of nationalistic bias in history textbooks. After having scrutinized six European countries, one study came to the conclusion that “school propaganda in all Western countries had to give way to a more complex, internationally-oriented presentation.” This conclusion, according to the report, did not mean that indoctrination and propaganda had altogether disappeared from textbooks but that “nationalism had lost ground, while the idea of peace is more strongly emphasized.”36 The second phase in textbook research began in the early 1970s. Change was manifested on several levels: thematically, the focus of the research shifted to topics previously neglected, such as ethnicity and gender. The new studies focused not only on textbook content, but also on structure, the process of textbook approval and publishing, and the impact of the textbooks on student and teacher.37 Methodologically, studies went beyond the traditional aims of exposing and eliminating errors, distortions, adverse images, and prejudices. Research was now more concerned with revealing “the deep-seated and one-sided patterns of perception with regards to our awareness of history and politics.” These were the “underlying assumptions”—unconscious presuppositions rooted in the collective consciousness. As Fritzsche put it, “Historical or political facts are not of primary interest in this respect; what is of interest is the manner in which these facts are interpreted.”38 In his view, “defeat or victory in wars, successful or failed revolutions may be facts, but these facts allow for various interpretations and are remembered in different ways. It is the way they are represented and absorbed into our consciousness which is the decisive factor as to their influence on present or even future actions.”39 Textbook research, he concluded, concentrated on those assumptions “which are based on ignorance, ethnocentric or nationalistic perspectives or a repression of the past.”40 Three main approaches have been developed in the study of textbooks. The traditional, called the hermeneutic or descriptive-analytical method, focuses on the study of the written content, concentrating on the disclosure of explicit biases and prejudices in textbooks. The second approach, the quantitative analysis of content, is based on empirical research in the social sciences and concentrates on “spatial analysis”—the number of lines or pages devoted to a particular issue, and “frequency analysis”—the number of times a certain term or phenomenon is mentioned. The third approach, the qualitative method, advocates a synthesis, preserving the best aspects of the two methods and reducing their innate weaknesses in order to “quantify qualitative elements.”41 Although the quantitative and qualitative analyses seemingly offer more sophisticated tools for studying textbooks, they still suffer from certain problems that characterized the old hermeneutic method—namely,

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objectivity. The authors of a study on South African textbooks asserted that “while qualitative analysis in not value-free, neither is the risk of subjectivity entirely eradicated in quantitative analysis, since the researcher identifies the concepts for measurement and sets the rules for their classification according to his own preferences.”42 Moreover, while statistical measurement can be applied to explicit forms of prejudicial attitudes, only the textual method (namely, the hermeneutic method) can disclose implicit and hidden forms of prejudice, as well as the omissions in the text.

THE PRESENT STUDY A brief glance at textbook analyses will show that most studies have been conducted in Western democracies or between two partners in which at least one side belonged to this category. Moreover, most of the theoretical framework developed in this field is relevant to the experiences gained in Western societies. In contrast, few studies were concerned with textbooks in Third World countries. This observation is crucial since there seem to be substantial differences in the role of the textbook in Western and Third World societies. While in the West the textbook constitutes only one socialization instrument, the textbook in the Third World is considered “overwhelmingly important” and its influence is potentially greater than in the West. Altbach points out that “the text [in non-Western societies] is very frequently the only book that a student uses, and the goal of one book per student has [even] eluded many countries.” Moreover, he adds, “the text is the link between the student and the wider world of learning, and where the teacher is not well trained and does not have access to additional educational materials, the textbook is a major resource.”43 The second major difference on the role of the textbook in Western and Third World societies is related to the fact that in many Third World states the elites are still struggling to form and maintain their legitimacy as well as forge the state’s national identity. Largely following the older Western model, these elites use textbooks—and history textbooks in particular—as a tool to build their own collective memory. Unsurprisingly, therefore, textbooks generally embody the “illustration of national will and of national policy,” particularly in the fields of history and social sciences.44 Acomparison between the Third World in the 1990s and nineteenth-century America or Europe, however, while helpful, is misleading since the issue of nation-building is far more complex for textbook authors today than it was then.45 This is so because many Asian and African states, as Anthony Smith has observed, lack “any shared historical mythology and memory on which state elites can set about ‘building’ the nation.”46 Culturally, Israel is considered part of Western society, but in sociological terms it has undergone some of the processes that characterize newly developed countries. First, developing a shared collective memory has

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been a major task for Israel during its first fifty years of statehood; school textbooks, it may be assumed, have been a major instrument in this process. Second, the country’s system of education is highly centralized and is responsible for curriculum planning as well as textbook writing and authorization. For most of the period under review, textbooks have largely conveyed the “official” or “approved” knowledge that the state aspires to transmit to the next generation even if they were not actually written by the Ministry of Education. Third, in terms of textbook research, Israel lags behind Western democracies, because this field has not developed beyond the first, traditional stage. Despite important differences between the West and Third World countries in terms of textbook research, any analysis of Israeli history textbooks must take into account the impressive body of work that had been accomplished in this field in Western Europe and the United States. Such a comparative approach, according to Hanna Schissler, “modifies views about the uniqueness of one’s own national development, moves away from re-constructions of history which are frequently unlinear and give the appearance of inevitability, and thus creates a basis for an enlarged understanding.”47 Indeed, I believe that only by moving outside the realm of the Arab-Israeli conflict to other international conflicts one can fully grasp that the way societies portray their enemies is basically similar,48 and that such one-sided depictions in themselves have constituted a prime cause of the aggravation of conflicts. Studies of the Arab-Israeli conflict have usually concentrated on its historical, political, military, and economic dimensions, ignoring the equally important cultural and psychological aspects, reflected in the attitudes and behavior of the participants. Since human behavior is largely shaped not only by reality but by the perception of it, it is highly likely that perceptions (whether genuine or false) of this conflict affect the future course of events. As in other international conflicts, these perceptions are often expressed in ethnocentric terms. A sharp distinction is made between the “we” (Israelis) and the “they” (Arabs), which is essential for maintaining a distinct Jewish-Israeli identity and sustaining the ability to compete successfully with the Arabs.49 Ethnocentric views are largely responsible for the formation of different, if not dichotomic, historical narratives by the parties to the conflict; many Israelis and Arabs (including the Palestinians) perceive their version of history to be “true” and “objective,” while the other side’s is considered “incorrect” or “distorted.” Such antagonistic narratives have often been accompanied by the use of stereotypes, prejudices, and misconceptions regarding the enemy.50 Indeed, various studies of Israeli perceptions have documented the existence of deep prejudicial attitudes toward the Arabs and stereotypical images of them during the years of conflict.51 An international survey held before 1967 revealed that at all age levels Israeli children “would least like

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to be Arab.”52 This negative attitude has also been reflected in the JewishIsraeli stereotypical attitude of the Arab language and is still relevant at present.53 Although the origins of these negative perceptions cannot be exclusively attributed to the impact of textbooks, it is still reasonable to assume that this medium has played a pivotal role in shaping the attitudes of several generations of Israelis.54 It is only natural that a conviction of objectivity and truth be reflected not only in historiography but also in history textbooks, which primarily rely on this historiography. Inasmuch as beliefs and images acquired from textbooks constitute the reality for their readers, these perceptions later function as lenses through which incoming information is interpreted. A cognitive self-selection mechanism filters out information that contradicts existing knowledge while allowing in information that confirms it. In this way, stereotypes and prejudices are entrenched and perpetuated because in order to avoid “cognitive discrepancy” people cling to their beliefs. Unfreezing them, therefore, is a long and complicated process.55 For most Jewish Israelis, the Arab (whether the Arab in Israel or in neighboring states) is the “other.” Ilan Peleg describes this situation (called “otherness”) as “a social condition in which certain individuals or groups are perceived, described, and treated as fundamentally and irreconcilably different from the reference group.” Moreover, he claims, “all negative qualities are projected onto the Other, often the very qualities that the perceiver fears or even recognizes in himself.”56 In his opinion, otherness is an expected perceptual device in sustaining intergroup conflict. In fact, he continues, “not to view an adversary as the Other often produces painful ambiguity, a serious and unsettling cognitive dissonance. Perceiving an adversary as a totally negative, evil entity is thus not an unreasonable solution for people locked into conflict.” 57 Undeniably, the existence of a delegitimized “other” has served as yet another mechanism in molding the Jewish identity. In the present context, Peleg sees a strong link between the gentile perception of the Jew as the other and the Jewish perception of the other—in this case the Arab. This link, he concludes, “has created fertile conditions for the emergence of a new structure of otherness, fed and sustained by the Arab-Jewish rivalry.”58 The existence of this psychological process is crucial, since the “otherness” phenomenon is “disseminated through the process of socialization in which one generation transmits values, norms and beliefs to other generations.”59 It is highly likely that, in this context, school textbooks serve as important agents for implanting these beliefs and images. This study is concerned with illuminating how the Arab-Israeli conflict and the image of the Arab have been portrayed in Israeli history and civics textbooks since 1948. These issues have been partially dealt with in previous studies.60 The present work, however, differs in several respects. First, it offers a systematic analysis of textbooks over a period of more than fifty

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years, thereby facilitating the observation of continuity and change in the portrayal of the conflict. I attach particular significance to textbooks written and taught during 1948–67, which constituted the formative period of the conflict; these would have played an important role in the socialization of the Israeli political elite that was in place in the post-1967 period. Second, the present study reconstructs the historical context, or zeitgeist, that influenced the authors at the time of writing their textbooks.61 Since the textbook is considered here a cultural or social product, it is necessary to establish the connection between the spirit of the times and the textbooks’ content. This involved using such sources as minutes of meetings of the Ministry of Education and private papers of history superintendents to shed light on the thinking that eventually shaped the portrayal of the Arab-Israeli conflict in textbooks. Israeli newspapers also enabled us to gain an insight into the public discourse on the subject matter that was to become part of the textbooks’ content. Third, the present research is divided methodologically into eleven main topics related to the Arab-Israeli conflict as they have appeared in history and civics textbooks. Each topic, or episode, is analyzed separately, with the research chronologically presented so as to discern what changes have occurred in the historical narrative over the years. While distinction is made between textbooks for elementary, junior high, and high school levels, the aim of the study is to illustrate the overall picture acquired by students during their school years rather than concentrate on specific periods in their education. The focus of interest is what students remember in the long run, or, in the words of a well-known sociologist, “the general gist of events.”62 The guiding assumption is that in the absence of well-defined scientific methods of textbook research, analysis should aim to accurately trace how students absorb the material. Since the present history of Zionism and Israel is studied in three separate cycles, by the time students complete high school they have acquired a knowledge of the conflict as defined by the series of topics that have been taught. With the material organized around these topics, it is reasonable to assume that a student’s memory is organized accordingly. The researcher, however, faces a major problem when analyzing the textbook’s narrative: How can one assess the extent to which the material is presented “truthfully,” “objectively,” and in a “balanced” manner? One possible way of solving this problem is by comparing the narrative to existing historiography. Yet this solution is problematic because academic historiography may offer various interpretations and, therefore, the selection of a particular narrative may be by itself biased. As a result, I decided to let the material largely speak for itself. Although this method requires certain knowledge of the Arab-Israeli conflict, I offer the reader additional bibliography that is considered to be “mainstream” historiography. In addition, the narrative in third-generation textbooks—while not flawless—may be

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taken as a litmus paper that enables both researcher and reader to put the narrative in the older textbooks in a better perspective. The empirical material in this study (presented in Chapter 3) is based on the descriptive-analytical method, which closely scrutinizes the text. This method is useful in two respects: it facilitates exposing biases, both open and hidden, and it helps reveal what was excluded from the text. It must be emphasized, of course, that any text is open to multiple readings, and that my analysis offers only one possible interpretation.63 Textbook research in Israel has largely concentrated on the analysis and interpretation of the text only. Recent studies in the West, however, accentuate the semiotic analysis of the proto-text—illustrations, pictures, cartoons, photographs, diagrams, maps, and typography in general. This conclusion is a logical consequence of the present reality; with children increasingly exposed to television, videos, and computers, their attention tends to be drawn to graphics more than to the written text.64 Moreover, Mark Monmonier concluded that “people trust maps, and intriguing maps attract the eye as well as connote authority.” In his opinion, “naive citizens willingly accept as truth maps based on a biased and sometimes fraudulent selection of facts.”65 Various geographers have emphasized that maps are more than measured facts; since maps, in their opinion, “display political inspiration, social structures, power and policy,” their hidden messages should be discovered. Misleading cartography, or the techniques used to persuade, includes omission, partial provision, or incorrect application of information, symbols, and elements.66 In the Israeli education system great importance has been attached to the use of the atlas in history classes.67 In addition, textbooks have extensively used maps as part of their historical narrative since the 1970s. The present study, therefore, devotes considerable analysis to these kinds of educational aids (see also the examples in the Appendices). Methodologically, the study attempted to avoid rigid categorization in the research process so as to facilitate the maximal disclosure of implicit as well as explicit biases. However, to create some consistency, at least as far as explicit messages were concerned, the research was guided by the following generalized criteria:68 1. Categories of Analysis. How is the “other” described—in terms of religion or ethnicity, as part of the larger Arab nation, or according to specific nationality (Egyptian, Jordanian, Palestinian, etc.)? 2. Stereotypical Content. Is the “other” nation, group, or individual described in positive, neutral, or negative terms? Special emphasis is attached to the use of delegitimizing and dehumanizing terms (e.g., terrorists, thieves, Nazis, etc.). 3. Role Performance. Is the “other” presented in a conflictual or a peaceful context? In what role is the “other” described? Is it a positive or a negative role? 4. Intentions, Blame, and Lessons to be Learned. How are the aims or intentions of the “other” described (e.g., exterminate the Jews, eliminate the State of Israel, gain

12

The Arab-Israeli Conflict territory)? Whose fault is the conflict? Who is to blame for the perpetuation of the conflict? Are there any lessons to be learned about the “other” from certain historical episodes?

5. Data Accuracy. To what extent is the material presented in the textbooks accurate? This is a complex issue, as any historical narrative, including the selection of facts, is subjective. Moreover, some of the information known in the present was unknown at the time of writing the textbook. It is necessary, therefore, to compare the textbook’s presentation with existing historiography. 6. Linguistic Usage and Tone. To what extent is the material presented in a rational or emotional tone? Does the author express biased opinions or is the presentation neutral? Does the author conceal his or her presence in the text? Does the presentation reflect a patronizing or superior attitude? 7. Bias by Omission and Self-Censorship. Have important details been omitted or censored from the text (or the proto-text)? What kind of information has the author sought to hide from the student and for what reasons? Is the omission or the censorship done in a subtle and sophisticated, or a blatant way—that’s, is the student likely to discern the distortion? 8. Bias by Proportion or Disproportion. Are certain topics presented in a disproportional way? Is, for example, too much information provided on wars, conflicts, and acts of aggression, rather than on peaceful initiatives?

The study focuses on the textbooks that were primarily used in the secular system (called the State or the General Schools), but it also analyzes the textbooks used in the religious system (called “the State Religious Schools”). The research, however, does not deal with textbooks used in the independent ultraorthodox schools of Agudat Israel and Shas, which constitutes only a minor, though steadily growing, part of the education system. A discussion of the Israeli-Arab education is also outside the scope of this research (though, in general, the Arab sector was exposed to a similar Zionist historical narrative).69 In 1953, the new State Education Law abolished the several education “trends” that had existed since the British Mandate period: the general, the labor, and the Mizrahi-religious education systems. Instead, the new law provided for two governmental school systems: the secular and the religious. The ultraorthodox school system remained unofficially independent. Although the religious system is legally subordinate to the Minister of Education, this system in reality has largely remained autonomous.70 This development, of course, had important repercussions in terms of the content of the textbooks taught in these schools. A distinction must be made between the definition of the term “textbook” as presented in this study and the definition accorded to the term by the Israeli Ministry of Education. In academic literature there is a subtle distinction between textbooks—“books written, designed and produced specifically for instructional use”—and school books—“books used in instruction but less closely tied to pedagogic sequences.”71 However, due

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to developments in the field of education, the concept “textbook” is being widened unofficially. Teachers increasingly rely on manuals, encyclopedias, and other reference books in addition to the traditional textbook. The term, therefore, is used in its broadest possible sense in the present study, and refers to all the material used by the teacher in class except for electronic teaching media such as television, videos, and computers (although this may very well fall under the term in the near future).72 Particular emphasis is given to various Israeli encyclopedias, which, according to reports by superintendents and teachers, are a highly important source in the classroom. Epistemologically, this source is even more important than the traditional textbook since it is considered by the student (and sometimes by the teacher) as the most authoritative and professional treatment of the subject matter. Traditionally, the Ministry of Education has made a distinction between school textbooks and general reference books. Textbooks had to be written for students in accordance with a particular curriculum; be academically accurate and up-to-date; follow a didactic system; in most cases be accompanied by a teacher’s guide; have an outward format that suited educational and instructional needs; and be authorized by the ministry. In contrast, reference books, including encyclopedias, lexicons, dictionaries, and other academic sources, did not have to include any didactic elements and were not subject to ministerial scrutiny.73 With the passage of the State Education Law in 1953, which largely eliminated the diversified education “trends” system, the ministry attempted to supervise the use of school textbooks through the publication of an annual authorized textbook list. To be included in this list, a textbook had to be approved in advance by the ministry’s “Custodian for Textbook Approval.” Later, textbooks written or supervised by the ministry’s Curriculum Planning Department, established in 1966, were exempted from this process.74 Until the late 1970s, the ministry’s attempts to implement these regulations were generally successful, although often enough teachers introduced their own source materials. A ministry survey conducted in 1978 showed that only 4%(!) of the textbooks used in schools were unauthorized. Even if this figure was skewed, it pointed to a high level of conformity to the ministry’s regulations.75 By the early 1990s, however, the ministry had lost control in this area, especially in high schools, with unauthorized privately produced textbooks largely replacing the ministry textbooks. According to unofficial figures, in 1998 some three-quarters of the textbooks used in schools were unauthorized.76 This process, which had significant repercussions in terms of textbooks content, was tacitly, if reluctantly, sanctioned by the ministry. It seems, however, that the ministry has recently succeeded in regaining some control over the use of history textbooks in schools. Another important distinction made in this research is between three generations of textbooks. The appearance of a new generation of textbooks

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has usually been a logical consequence of the development and introduction of a new curriculum in the education system.77 Yet the publication of textbooks, as well as their content, are also a result of historical developments and the prevailing zeitgeist. According to these criteria, it seems that history education in Israel saw three waves of textbooks. The first generation (also called “old”) refers to textbooks used in the education system until the mid-1970s. Some of these had been in use since the 1950s, if not before, in earlier editions. Characterized by low level of typography, absence of proto-text (except for occasional maps), and dense narrative tainted by emotional writing, most of these textbooks were written by teachers or officials in the Ministry of Education. The second generation refers to textbooks published during 1975–92 in accordance with new curricula introduced in the mid-1970s. These textbooks were written and published by the Ministry of Education, with the exception of some high schools’ textbooks written privately. Some of them were not authorized for use by the ministry, yet they became highly popular in schools. Outwardly more appealing, the textbooks of the second generation included pictures, maps, charts, and diagrams; were written in a less passionate style; and followed new, more progressive methodological premises. The third generation (also called “new”) refers to textbooks published since the mid-1990s, in accordance with the new history curricula. Written privately or by university-affiliated bodies, these textbooks were usually approved by the Ministry of Education. Although it is still too early to draw final conclusions, important differences in methodology and content are clearly discernable between the second and third generations of textbooks. The division of textbooks into three generations will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 2. Here, it is sufficent to clarify that this division facilitates a clearer understanding of the changes that occurred in their content, which generally mirrored changes of attitude in society toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.

NOTES 1. H.D. Mehlinger, “International Textbook Revision: Examples from the United States,” Internationale Schulbuchforschung, No. 7 (1985), p. 287. See also M.W. Apple, Official Knowledge: Democratic Education in a Conservative Age (New York: 1993), pp. 1–14, 44–63; F. Pingel, UNESCO Guidebook on Textbook Research and Textbook Revision (Hannover: 1999), pp. 7–8. 2. M.W. Apple (ed.), The Politics of the Textbook (London: 1991), p. 10; K. Wain, “Different Perspectives on Evaluating Textbooks, ” in H. Bourdillon (ed.), History and Social Studies—Methodologies of Textbook Analysis (Amsterdam: 1990), p. 39. Bernard Lewis wrote in this connection: “Those who are in power control to a very large extent the presentation of the past, and seek to make sure that it is presented in such a way to buttress and legitimize their own authority, and to affirm the rights and merits of the group which they lead. . . . This continuing thread can be

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traced from ancient inscriptions on rock faces through medieval annals, modern schoolbooks and textbooks;” see History: Remembered, Recovered, Invented (Princeton: 1975), p. 53. 3. Apple, Politics of the Textbook, pp. 2–3. According to his definition, “legitimate knowledge” is the knowledge “we all must have.” See his Ideology and Curriculum, 2nd ed. (New York: 1990), pp. 63–64. 4. W. Jacobmeyer, International Textbook Research (Goteborg: 1990), p. 8. 5. P.G. Altbach, “Textbooks in Comparative Context,” in R.M. Thomas and V.N. Kobayashi (eds.), Educational Technology—Its Creation, Development and Cross-Cultural Transfer (Oxford: 1987), p. 159. 6. Based on research in England; see J. Slater, “Methodologies of Textbook Analysis,” in A. Dickinson et al. (eds.), International Yearbook of History Education (London: 1995), p. 180. Another study by R. Wade shows that “students engage in textbook-related activities 70%–95% of the time they spend in classrooms;” see “Content Analysis of Social Studies Textbooks: A Review of Ten Years of Research,” Theory and Research in Social Education, Vol. 21 (1993), p. 232. See also S. Eden, “A Comparative Examination of History Textbooks in Israel and Germany,” Kivunim (1986), p. 201 (Hebrew). 7. Apple, Official Knowledge, p. 61. 8. D.R. Olson, “On the Language and Authority of Textbooks,” in S. De Castell, A. Luke, and C. Luke (eds.), Language, Authority and Criticism: Readings on the School Textbook (London: 1989), p. 241. 9. E. Dean, P. Hartman, and M. Katzen, History in Black and White: An Analysis of South African School History Textbooks (Paris: 1983), p. 102. 10. J. Brophy and B. VanSledright, Teaching and Learning History (New York: 1997), p. 20. 11. V.R. Berghahn and H. Schissler (eds.), Perception of History: International Textbook Research on Britain, Germany and the United States (Oxford: 1987), p. 1. 12. Jacobmeyer, International Textbook Research, pp. 4–5; Berghahn and Schissler, Perceptions of History, p. 2; History in Black and White, p. 13. 13. Apple, Ideology and Curriculum, p. 85. 14. Quoted in Y. Zerubavel, Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition (Chicago: 1995), p. 4. 15. The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: 1987), p. 206. See also his National Identity (Reno: 1991), p. 119. 16. E. Zerubavel, Social Mindscapes: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology (Cambridge, MA: 1997), pp. 84–85. 17. Ibid., p. 98. 18. Ibid., p. 93. 19. I would like to mention two exceptions to this generalization: Schissler writes that school textbooks contain “what a society believes should be handed on to the young as part of their historical consciousness”; see “Perceptions of the Other and the Discovery of the Self,” in Perceptions of History, p. 26. See also “The Preparation and Publication of New History Textbooks,” p. 7. My generalization certainly does apply to textbook research in Israel. 20. Ibid., p. 6. See also I. Pappé, “Critique and Agenda: The Post-Zionist Scholars in Israel,” History and Memory, Vol. 6 (1995), p. 72.

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21. E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: 1990), pp. 91–92. 22. M. Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture (New York: 1991), p. 3. See also B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, rev. ed. (London: 1991), p. 201; A. Funkenstein, “Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness,” History and Memory, Vol. 1 (1989), p. 8. 23. This was written in relation to Zionist historiography, but I think it applies as well to history textbooks; see B. Kimmerling, “Academic History Caught in the Cross-Fire: The Case of Israeli-Jewish Historiography,” History and Memory, Vol. 6 (1995), p. 57. 24. N. Ben-Yehuda, The Masada Myth: Collective Memory and Mythmaking in Israel (London: 1995), pp. 273–74. 25. H. Schissler, “Limitations and Priorities for International Social Studies Textbook Research,” International Journal of Social Education, Vol. 4 (1989–90), p. 86. Elsewhere, Schissler asserts that stereotypes protect the group’s members from “cognitive chaos”; see Berghahn and Schissler, Perceptions of History, pp. 14–15. 26. G.W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (New York: 1954), p. 6. 27. Schissler, “Limitations and Priorities,” pp. 86–87. 28. D. Bar-Tal, “Delegitimization: The Extreme Case of Stereotyping and Prejudice,” in D. Bar-Tal et al. (eds.), Stereotyping and Prejudice: Changing Conceptions (New York: 1989), p. 170. 29. Ibid., pp. 172–73. 30. Berghahn and Schissler, Perceptions of History, p. 15. 31. O.E. Schuddekopf, “History Textbook Revision 1945–1965,” in History Teaching and History Textbook Revision (Strasburg: 1967), p. 14. In August 1914, Bertrand Russell included among the reasons that caused the war “every textbook of history with which the minds of children are polluted.” Quoted in R. Richardson, “The Hidden Messages of Textbooks,” paper delivered at the London Institute of Education, spring 1985 (copy in the Georg Eckert Institute, Bruanschweig, Germany). See also Mehlinger, International Textbook Revision, pp. 288–89. 32. Quoted in P. Luntinen, “School History Textbook Revision by and under the Auspices of UNESCO,” Internationale Schulbuchforschung, No. 10 (1988), p. 337. 33. Schuddekopf, “History of Textbook Revision,” pp. 26–27; G. McDiarmid and D. Pratt, Teaching Prejudice: A Content Analysis of Social Studies Textbooks Authorized for Use in Ontario (Toronto: 1971), p. 9. For the most recent and comprehensive guide, see Pingel, UNESCO Guidebook, pp. 9–13. 34. “The Preparation and Publication of New History Textbooks for Schools in European Countries in Democratic Transition,” Report by the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Revision (Braunschweig: 1996), p. 5; Pingel, UNESCO Guidebook, p. 13. 35. R. Lerner, A.K. Nagai, and S. Rothman, Moulding the Good Citizen: The Politics of High School History Texts (Wesport, CT: 1995), p. 2. 36. Quoted in E.B. Johnsen, Textbooks in the Kaleidoscope: A Critical Survey of Literature and Research on Educational Texts, trans. by L. Sivesind (Oslo: 1993), p. 104. Another study that investigated nationalism in Norwegian textbooks concluded that “the national image has clearly been weakened at the expense of the international as well as the local dimension”; see ibid. See also Berghahn and Schissler, Perceptions of History, p. 2; Schissler, “Limitations and Priorities,” p. 84; Berghahn

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and Schissler, Perceptions of History, pp. 4, 14; M. Shennan, Teaching about Europe (New York: 1991), p. 44. 37. “The Preparation and Publication of New History Textbooks,” pp. 6–7; Lerner, Moulding the Good Citizen, p. 4; Schissler, “Limitations and Priorities,” p. 84; Shenan, Teaching about Europe, pp. 45–46. 38. P. Fritzsche, “Prejudice and Underlying Assumptions,” in History and Social Studies, p. 55. 39. Ibid., pp. 55–56. 40. Ibid., p. 58. See also Pingel, UNESCO Guidebook, pp. 15–18. 41. Johnsen, Textbooks in the Kaleidoscope, pp. 141–42. In his authoritative UNESCO Guidebook, Pingel classifies the hermeneutic analysis as part of the qualitative method. He also mentions linguistic and discourse investigation as possible modes of analysis, see pp. 45–47. 42. Dean, Hartman, and Katzem, History in Black and White, p. 40. For further criticism of quantitative analysis, see R. Gilbert, “Text Analysis and Ideology Critique of Curricular Content,” in De Castell et al., Language, Authority and Criticism, p. 62. 43. Altbach, “Textbooks in Comparative Context,” p. 160. See also Johnsen, Textbooks in the Kaleidoscope, p. 105. 44. Altbach, “Textbooks in Comparative Context,” p. 160. 45. Johnsen, Textbooks in the Kaleidoscope, p. 106. 46. A.D. Smith, “State-Making and Nation-Building,” in J.A. Hall (ed.), States in History (London: 1986), p. 258. 47. Schissler, “Perceptions of the Other and the Discovery of the Self,” p. 32. 48. See, e.g., the depiction of the American-Soviet Cold War, in D. Carlson, “Legitimation and Delegitimation: American History Textbooks and the Cold War,” in S. De Castell et al. (eds.), Language, Authority and Criticism, pp. 46–55. For a depiction of the Vietnam War in American history textbooks, see Johnsen, Textbooks in the Kaleidoscope, p. 99. 49. S. Smooha, “Jewish and Arab Ethnocentrism,” in J. Hofman et al. (eds.), Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel (Bristol, IN: 1988), p. 175. See also D.J. Finlay, O.R. Holsti, and R.R. Fagen, Enemies in Politics (Chicago: 1967), p. 19; Z. Lam, War and Education (Tel Aviv: 1976), pp. 29–38 (Hebrew); D. Heradstveit, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Psychological Obstacles to Peace (Oslo: 1979), p. 21. 50. D. Bar-Tal, “Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Cognitive Analysis,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Vol. 14 (1990), pp. 12–13. On the definitions of these terms, see D. Bar-Tal et al. (eds.), Stereotyping and Prejudice: Changing Conceptions (Berlin: 1989); G.W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (New York: 1954); F. Aboud, Children and Prejudice (London: 1988). See also Y. Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Israel (Jerusalem: 1972), pp. 113–19. 51. See, e.g., K. Binyamini, “The Image of the Israeli, the American, the German and the Arab by the Israeli Youth,” Megamot, Vol. 16 (1969), pp. 364–75 (Hebrew); idem, “The Image of the Arab by the Israeli Youth: What Has Changed in 15 Years,” Iyyunim Bahinuch., Vol. 27 (1980), pp. 62–74 (Hebrew); Z. Osteroil and Z. Greenbaum, “The Attitudes of Jewish-Israelis toward Arabs,” Megamot, Vol. 18 (1972), pp. 353–69 (Hebrew); E. Robins, “Attitudes, Stereotypes, and Prejudices among Arabs and Jews in Israel,” New Outlook, Vol. 15 (1972), pp. 36–48; J. Hofman, Identity and Intergroup Perception in Israel: Jews and Arabs, Occasional Pa-

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pers, No. 7 (Haifa: 1976); A. Jacob, “Trends in Israeli Public Opinion on Issues Related to the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1972,” The Jewish Journal of Sociology, Vol. 16 (1974), pp. 187–208; D. Heradstveit, Arab and Israeli Elite Perceptions (Oslo: 1974); Smooha, “Jewish and Arab Ethnocentrism,” pp. 175–216. 52. W.E. Lambert and O. Klineberg, Children’s Views of Foreign Peoples: A Cross-National Study (New York: 1967), p. 66. 53. E. Shohamy and S. Donitsa-Schmidt, Jews vs. Arabs: Language Attitudes and Stereotypes (Tel Aviv: The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, 1998). 54. The same survey revealed that “at the 10– and 14–year levels, books are a major source of information with regard to all the reference peoples” (ibid., p. 68). 55. Bar-Tal, “Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” pp. 13–14. See also K. Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor: 1959), pp. 8–13; Harkabi, Arab Attitudes, pp. 117–18; Finaly et al., Enemies in Politics, p. 7; Heradstveit, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 24; Zerubavel, Social Mindscapes, p. 88. 56. I. Peleg, “Otherness and Israel’s Arab Dilemma,” in L. Silberstein and R. L. Cohen (eds.), The Other in Jewish Thought and History: Constructions of Jewish Culture and Identity (New York: 1994), p. 261. 57. Ibid., pp. 262–63. 58. Ibid., p. 265. See also in this connection, Lam, War and Education, p. 36; S. Mar’i, “Sources of Conflict in Arab-Jewish relations in Israel,” in Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel, p. 16. 59. Peleg, “Otherness and Israel’s Arab Dilemma,” p. 263. 60. See the following sources in Hebrew: R. Firer, Agents of Zionist Education (Tel Aviv: 1985); D. Bar-Tal, The Rocky Road toward Peace: Societal Beliefs in Times of Intractable Conflict, The Israeli Case (Jerusalem: 1996); idem, The Image of the Arab in Readers (Tel Aviv: 1984); idem and S. Zoltak, “The Reflection of the Arab and Arab-Jewish Relations in Readers,” Megamot, Vol. 32 (1989); S. Zoltak, The Image of the Arab in Readers (Tel Aviv University, MA thesis, n.d.); N. Zohar, The Image of the Arab in Readers (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, MA thesis, 1972). 61. On the importance of the context, see P.J. Rogers, “Why Teach History?” in A.K. Dickinson, P.J. Lee, and P.J. Rogers (eds.), Learning History (London: 1984), pp. 30–35. 62. Zerubavel, Social Mindscapes, p. 88. 63. See the same argument in Apple, Official Knowledge, pp. 13, 60. 64. Slater, “Methodologies of Textbook Analysis,” p. 182; “The Preparation and Publication of New History Textbooks,” p. 9. 65. M. Monmonier, How to Lie with Maps (Chicago: 1991), p. 87. See also A. Burnett, “Propaganda Cartography,” in D. Pepper and A. Jenkins (eds.), The Geography of Peace and War (Oxford: 1985), Ch. 4. 66. N. Collins-Kreiner, “Cartographic Characteristics of Current Christian Pilgrimage Maps of the Holy Land,” Cartographica, Vol. 34 (Winter 1997), pp. 1–3. I would like to thank the author for providing me with this article. 67. See, in this connection, M. Hendel, “The Historical Atlas as A Teaching Aid,” Pathways of History, edited by Y. Kloyzner (Tel Aviv: 1967), pp. 342–49 (Hebrew). The article was originally published in 1962. See also the list of authorized atlases in the ministerial list of recommended textbooks. 68. This is partially based on the methodology developed by D. Bar-Tal in his Hebrew research, The Rocky Road toward Peace. See also idem, “The Rocky Road

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Toward Peace: Beliefs on Conflict in Israeli Textbooks,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35 (1998), pp. 723–42. I would like to thank him for allowing me to use some of his private material. See also Shenan, Teaching about Europe, pp. 44–48. 69. There is little academic research on these systems. For some information on the presentation of the “Other,” see S. Mantzura, Torah Stories in the Ultra-Orthodox Kindergarten System: The Image of Biblical Characters and the Image of the Child in the Eyes of Educators (Masters Thesis: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, December 1997) (Hebrew). 70. H. Gaziel, Politics and Policy-Making in Israel’s Education System (Brighton: 1996), pp. 38–39. For information on the number of students in the Israeli education system, see Israeli Statistical Yearbook 2000 (Jerusalem: 2001). 71. Johnsen, Textbooks in the Kaleidoscope, p. 24. 72. Ibid., p. 26. 73. See, e.g., Tel Aviv University, the Aviezer Yelin Archive for Jewish Education in Israel and the Diaspora (AJEID), Ministry of Education, Director-General’s Directive, 5 October 1977. 74. The first ministerial directive that I was able to trace was written by Eliezer Riger, the Ministry’s Director-General and himself a textbook writer. See ibid., 31 December 1954. 75. E. Egozi and S. Klein, A Survey of Textbook Distribution, 1978 (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1981) (Hebrew). Periodically, the ministry published a directive with regulations for the writing and approval of school textbooks. See, in particular, AJEID, Ministry of Education, Director-General’s Directive, 5 October 1977, 2 June 1985, 1 April 1986, 1 December 1992. 76. A. Dayan, “The Textbook Industry in Israel,” Hed Hahinuch, Vol. 72, No. 9 (May 1998), pp. 8–10 (Hebrew). This data is related to existing textbooks, not only to history textbooks. For additional data, see a special report of the Office of the State Comptroller 1997–98 (Jerusalem: 1999), p. 209. It is interesting to note that in the field of history, most new textbooks went through a process of authorization. 77. See, e.g., M. Ben-Peretz and A. Zaidman, “Three Generations of Curricula Development in Israel,” Iyyunim Bahinuch, No. 43/44 (March 1986), pp. 317–27 (Hebrew).

CHAPTER 2

ATTITUDES IN THE ISRAELI EDUCATION SYSTEM TOWARD TEACHING THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT ATTITUDES TOWARD TEACHING HISTORY A state educational system constitutes a major instrument for socializing young people to society’s dominant values.1 In particular, the teaching of history and the use of history textbooks serve as prime instruments in the process of nation-building. With the emergence of the nation-state in the nineteenth century, schools in Germany, France, and Italy, and later in England and the United States, laid great emphasis on teaching their national history, with the aim of consolidating the bond between citizen and homeland. The content of history textbooks, as well as the methods employed to convey it to the students, however, was often the outcome of a struggle between two opposing schools of thought: the academic approach, which stressed the importance of objectivity (or at least the absence of tendentiousness), similar to that ostensibly found in academic research; and the national school, which viewed the teaching of history as a legitimate tool of the state for implanting national values, even at the price of the selective use of historical evidence. At times, attempts to combine these two conflicting approaches resulted in the emergence of a third, synthetic approach.2 All these schools of thought have been represented in the Israeli education system. For most of the period under review, the nationalistic school held sway in the Israeli education system. Michael Ziv, head of the high school education department in the Ministry of Education during the 1950s and author of many history textbooks, was an ardent representative of the “national” school. In his opinion, the aim of teaching history neutrally fails to fulfill history’s underlying mission. History itself, he claimed, is far from neutral; on the contrary, “it aspires to instill specific values, to guide the students to-

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wards a particular point of view, to encourage them to adopt a clearly defined attitude sanctioned by society.” Ziv believed that “each generation possesses its own particular historical truth” that it passes on to the next generation in order to fulfill various national goals.3 In his view, while teachers must teach those facts “which are, to the best of their knowledge, correct,” they must equally emphasize the moral and educational objectives of history, which “pure” historians tend all too often to deride: At times, professional historians are inclined to overlook the key role history plays in the educational process. They disregard that fact that history has a particular social function. They also overlook the task of the school to instill beliefs and opinions, limiting its role to that of acquainting the student with the facts. We would be failing in our duty if we confined ourselves to offering the students a dry academic analysis; offering them the kind of history taught from the heights of the Olympus, the kind of history which lies beyond good or evil, beyond time and place and which aims to provide no more than pure intellectual satisfaction. History must inculcate in the student a sense of responsibility for the future, thus fostering a strong belief in the importance of social activism. Our goal is not to create historians but to mold citizens who will themselves make and shape history.4

The teaching of history, according to Ziv, should imbue the student with a sense of identification with the state, along with feelings of tolerance and respect for minorities. Ultimately, it should fuse the individual’s consciousness to the social and cultural consciousness of the Jewish nation as a whole. The teacher should, therefore, present historical material to the student “prudently,” a term that is central in Ziv’s thinking: Though defects and failures should be neither ignored nor suppressed, it is essential that we proceed with great caution. This prudence is dictated, not least, by the impressionability of youth in general, and of Israeli youth in particular, its tendency to make hasty judgments and reach extravagant conclusions. Israeli youth is not always capable of grasping the root of the matter, or of understanding the complex of “special circumstances” which make up Jewish history.5

Ziv also argued that historical material must be used with extreme care if the desired synthesis between history and pedagogy was to be attained. “It is essential,” he wrote, that “the values underlying the official historical narrative, as taught in the classroom, coincide with society’s principal and accepted values. No society can afford a conflict between these two value systems.” Accordingly, these criteria should be applied when selecting historical material to be taught: it should “instill in the student a love and respect for our most important and cherished values”; it should encourage the young to identify wholeheartedly with society’s goals; and it should inspire them to defend society’s existence and actively contribute to its development.6 Ziv emphasized, however, that the teacher’s task was not to “indoctrinate” the students or encourage “national chauvinism”; rather, he

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was to “aid” and “guide” the students so that their views will emerge naturally from the material taught in school.7 Because of his position in the education establishment, Ziv’s views had a lasting impact on many educators, teachers, and students. One such disciple was Naftali Zon, who succeeded Ziv as the ministry’s superintendent of high school education, a position he held during 1958–72. Zon believed that there was a difference between the historian and the history teacher. He viewed the task of the latter “to encourage true motivation in the student for identifying with his people and acting for them.” The learning of history, he believed, was “the key for the present and the future.” Echoing Ziv, he defined teaching history as “educating the young student to take personal responsibility for the future destiny of culture, society and state.” Reflecting Ziv’s arguments, Zon wrote that the teacher’s obligation was “to select those facts indicating the existence of the values of sacrifice and heroism, which would enable [the student] to identify with the actors.”8 Zon, however, modified some of his views, perhaps as a result of the 1967 war. In July 1971, he argued that “although I stand on one side [of the conflict], there is a need to understand the thinking on the other side, under the assumption that in the near future I would like to live with them [with the Arabs].”9 The academic school of thought represented the other extreme. For most of the period under review, this outlook was marginal in the education system. Its most outspoken representative was philosopher of education Zvi Adar of the Hebrew University. Although he concurred with the view that a major part of the history syllabus should be devoted to the state’s national history, he warned that “to use present needs as the point of departure and to interpret the past in accordance with those needs may distort the past.” In his opinion, history teachers must take their lead from historians who “steadfastly seek the truth and are careful not to color the past with their own prejudices.” By contrast, he criticized the “nationalist” educator who tends to “mythologize history, justify and even blindly revere it. He will sing the praises of the nation’s protagonists, glorifying them and turn them into heroes. Conversely, he will castigate the nation’s enemies, distort and pervert their history.” Adar was convinced that teaching history by means of nationalistic textbooks exacerbates the hatred between nations in that it passes on both individual and national prejudices and hatreds of others.10 The nation’s past and its heroes, he believed, should be judged, for better or for worse, impartially. Moreover, in his opinion, “if a nation’s history contains shameful deeds, events and periods, rather than subjecting the students to long and unconvincing apologies, it is far better that they be taught to view them in their true light, however disgraceful.” The following statement is illuminating in particular:

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The Arab-Israeli Conflict

There is no need to teach the kind of “national” history in which “our people” always act out of the highest moral motives, whilst others invariably behave immorally. This is the kind of history in which every aggressive act of “ours” is the result of historical necessity, while other nations, aiming at mastery and domination, are simply and blatantly aggressive. There is no law saying that history and the study of history must sow hatred and foment prejudices against other people; on the contrary, history textbooks written by ethnocentric pedagogues, who use their books to propagate their prejudice, must be flatly condemned.11

Since Adar was a university professor, his attempt to advance academic discipline in teaching history was intelligible. Although this attitude was not shared by many in the education system, especially in the early decades, it did enjoy some support. As early as 1948, an Israeli educator presented the same view in a conference on history teaching. In his opinion: In systematic learning oriented toward the historical objective truth, to the extent this truth can fully and unambiguously be exposed, one should not avoid confronting facts and events that contradict our basic assumptions, even if they are very valuable to us. . . . There is no need to conceal this [ambiguity] from our students. . . . A high price was paid by movements and nations, which in their education diligently and efficiently erased facts that contradicted their orientation. Our ability to judge [events] objectively is limited to begin with, and there is no need to deliberately add to this deficiency by concealing failures and mistakes or by distorting the facts.12

A prominent representative of the third school—the synthesis between the “academic” and “national” views on teaching history—was Michael Hendel, an educator and textbook writer. While advocating that “the student must be taught to view our national history as the very basis of our existence and the means by which we can understand the present,” he was equally emphatic that the past should not be idealized. “The young,” he argued, “must also be aware of the shadows that darken the nation’s history. They must be informed of all the events which make up the nation’s history and taught to understand and judge them in historical terms.” He warned against teaching national history in a way that would foster patronizing attitudes or ignorance of and contempt toward values developed by other nations. In particular, he feared that Arab animosity toward Israel would encourage biased and inhumane attitudes toward the Arabs.13 Another adherent to this approach was Y. Paporish, a well-known educator and author of geography textbooks. Referring to the aims of the teaching of history, he wrote: When teaching history we should not abandon our national and social goals, nor transform the profession to a “neutral” discipline akin to the sciences. Equally, we must not confine ourselves to offering a single, limited, one-sided point of view. The practice of teaching history so as to produce a fanatic generation which will use all and any means to achieve its narrow political goals, which lacks any understanding

Attitudes in the Israeli Education System

25

of its neighbors and is ignorant of other equally noteworthy ideas, is extremely dangerous. . . . History should be used not merely to promote national and social goals but to advance general humanist values, which will guide and enlighten the student.14

Although the division between these three broadly defined schools of thought was often blurred, the Israeli education system opted for the nationalist approach, during the early decades of the state, although the “synthetic” approach had an important influence as well. In this respect, the Israeli system was not dissimilar from education systems in other developing countries with newly attained independence, which were attempting to create a distinct collective memory. This process was particularly intense in Israel, which was founded as a haven and a melting pot for Jewish immigrants from all parts of the world. David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, firmly believed that within this process of nation-building, the role of education was to be paramount. “The reformed school,” he declared, “stands at the forefront of the institutions whose goal is to shape the new generation.”15 This task was entrusted in particular to Professor BenZion Dinur (Dinburg, 1884–1973), a renowned scholar in the field of Jewish history and Minister of Education during 1951–55. Dinur, by the force of his charismatic presence as well as by his scholarly work, influenced many historians, including Shmu’el Ettinger and Itzhak Ba’ar, history teachers and textbook authors, many of whom were themselves either history teachers or university lecturers. Dinur recognized the importance of integrating the past into the nation’s collective memory. For him, the writing of Jewish history was more then a profession, it was a mission, and was clearly reflected in his own work. One of his prominent students depicted Dinur as the perfect combination of ideological and nationalist historian devoted to promoting and reinforcing national ideas.16 Dinur himself justified his ideological approach in historiographic terms thus: The historian does not describe the past in its entirety [emphasis in the original], but only what he considers to be of value and importance to his own and to future generations. Any such assessment is, by its very nature, subjective, the product of the historian’s own beliefs, perspectives and weltanschauung. Perhaps even more important is “the historical position” of the historian’s generation, from which he, the historian, observes the past.17

The saliency of the “national” school of thought was reflected in the text of the 1953 State Education Law. It stated that the objective was “to base elementary education in the State on the values of Jewish culture and the achievements of science, on love of the homeland, and loyalty to the State and the Jewish people.” The law also stipulated the aim of “striving for a society built on freedom, equality, tolerance, mutual assistance and love of mankind.”18 However, the formal curriculum for elementary schools,

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The Arab-Israeli Conflict

drafted in 1954, stated these aims more explicitly, declaring that history “must instill [in the students] a love for the state of Israel and the desire to act for it and safeguard it.” Two years later, the curriculum for high school aimed to “implant in the hearts of the youth a measure of national consciousness, reinforce their identification with the fate of the Jewish people, and imbue them with a love of the Israeli nation.” Two decades later, in 1975, one of the principal goals of the history curriculum for junior high and high schools in both the secular and religious state schools was “to instill in the student a sense of identification with the people, country and nation.”19 This has remained a major goal of the new history curriculum introduced by the Ministry of Education in 1994–2000.20 Thus, the teaching of the Arab-Israeli conflict, whether as an aspect of Zionist/Israeli history or as a separate subject, takes place in an education system that has consistently aimed to emphasize Jewish and Zionist identity, and must be analyzed in that context. ATTITUDES TOWARD TEACHING THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT For many years, the Israeli education system had no coherent policy regarding the teaching of the Arab-Israeli conflict, an ambiguity that accurately reflected the uneasiness, confusion, and mistrust that Jewish society in general felt toward its Arab neighbors. Broadly, the education establishment went through three phases in its treatment of the Arab question. In the early, “childhood” phase (1920–67), the subject was largely neglected. The second, middle phase (“adolescence,” 1967–84/85), was characterized by a growing consciousness of the importance of the Arab problem, although treatment of the issue in textbooks was still sparse, biased, and filtered through the Zionist narrative. The third, “adulthood” phase may be divided into two periods: the decade from 1984/85 to the mid-1990s, when positive change was discernible in the attitude of the Ministry of Education toward the teaching of the history of the conflict and the Arabs. Actual changes in the curriculum and in textbooks, however, took place only thereafter, in the second period, from the mid-1990s. Generally, it should be noted that the pace of change in the ministry’s attitude toward this issue was faster than the pace of changes in the textbooks. Moreover, some of the changes in thinking did not find their way into the formal school system, but were introduced only in the informal education system. The Early Phase: Childhood (1920–67) In her celebrated study of the Hebrew education system during the early stages of Zionist settlement, Rachel Alboim-Dror pointed out that history and geography textbooks then were based on the conviction that “the chil-

Attitudes in the Israeli Education System

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dren must be raised to know and become a part of the region.” In her opinion, the textbooks emphasized the affinity between Hebrew and Arabic.21 Yet, other evidence points to a systematic evasion of the “Arab Question,” and not only in the field of education. As early as 1907, Itzhak Epstein, a well-known educator, published a controversial article entitled “The Hidden Question” in which he criticized widespread negative Jewish behavior toward Arabs. He urged schools to eliminate prejudices, avoid “the narrow-minded and mean-spirited nationalism which sees nothing but itself,” and seek “to understand the country’s indigenous people” while instructing them “in the ways of our community.”22 Although Epstein’s arguments were largely rejected or ignored, interestingly, his appeal for coexistence was endorsed by a religious weekly put out by the Mizrachi movement. Its editor, Rabbi Menachem Fishman, asked rhetorically: “What do we know of the lives of the Arabs living in our country, what book has been written on the subject? We know more about Scandinavia than about the people with whom we are in daily contact and with whom we would like to reach a mutual understanding.”23 Evidently, even if some individuals or groups hoped to initiate some sort of dialogue with the Arabs, the education policy toward the Arab question remained, on the whole, evasive.24 During the mandatory period (1920–48), history, local geography (known as moledet), Biblical studies, and literature textbooks were suffused with love of the land of Israel. The Bible, in particular, was treated as “a textbook for the study of national history.”25 As historian Anita Shapira has pointed out, “The schools and socialist youth movements provided the younger [generation] with very little information about their Arab neighbors and made little effort to teach them about the Arab way of life.”26 An entire generation lived and grew up alongside the Arab people, she argues, yet remained almost totally ignorant of them, their language, and their culture. Nonetheless, although this generation had little awareness of or sympathy for its neighbors, it was not, according to Shapira, imbued with hatred of Arabs. “Their attitude was free of the traditional hostility characteristic of the Eastern European Jews’ attitude towards the gentile. They did not think of the Arabs in historic terms as a force reaching back to the days of the Pharaohs, Haman, the Crusades and Chmielnicki. Rather, they viewed them in an Israeli context, as a local problem of real rather than mythic dimensions.”27 Shapira’s description may be somewhat misleading; even if Arab-Jewish relations were not marred by hatred, the escalation of the violent conflict in Palestine since the 1920s served to create and sustain prejudices and stereotypes. Terms such as savage, crafty, cheat, thief, robber, and terrorist were frequently used to describe the Arab, while acts against the Jews were depicted as pogroms, slaughters, and massacres, thereby establishing an inevitable link between the Arabs and entrenched anti-Semitic

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The Arab-Israeli Conflict

practices in European Jewish history. The Arabs were also described as a modern version of Amalek, the most vicious enemy of the Israelites in the Bible.28 Thus, both reality and the image of reality as depicted in history textbooks reinforced the process of Jewish alienation from the Arabs. This, in turn, increased the level of the mythologization of the conflict and reinforced the tendency to dehumanize the Arabs. According to Shapira, the Arab “slowly lost all his human and personal attributes. He became an abstraction, a concept lacking any distinctiveness or individuality. He certainly lay beyond the Jewish community’s frame of reference.” All this helped lay the groundwork for legitimizing the use of force against the Arabs.29 In short, the indifferent Jewish attitude toward the Arabs stemmed from the Zionist movement’s ethnocentric perspective. The cultural differences and the existence of a violent national conflict only served to reinforce this attitude. Jewish criticism of this indifference with respect to the Arabs was rather mute. Two exceptions, however, are noteworthy. In 1940, Eliezer Riger, a leading educator who later became director general of Israel’s Ministry of Education, published a two-volume book entitled Hebrew Education in Israel. In his opinion, Hebrew nationalism was being molded first and foremost by the Arab Question, although this was never openly acknowledged. Protesting against the “failure of the spiritual leadership to direct the future generation’s feelings and behavior in respect of our neighbors,” he admonished that “the youth is drifting along full of doubts and hesitations, while our schools stand helplessly by.”30 Jews showed little interest in Arab-Jewish relations, Riger pointed out, tending either to underrate or avoid the issue altogether. In his opinion, one of the tasks of the school was to prevent the youth from becoming entangled in “the web of hatred toward our neighboring people.” Citing several types of negative Jewish behavior toward Arabs, he was convinced nevertheless, that a heightened acquaintance with the Arab culture and language could change these patterns.31 Once this occurred, he hoped, the conviction that Israel is “the common homeland of both the Jews and native Arabs” would finally prevail, “with both communities enjoying complete and assured equality until the very end of time.”32 Significantly, however, the negative Jewish attitude toward the Arabs that Riger had criticized was later to pervade his own textbooks written in the 1950s, an indication that social and political environment constitutes a major influence on the content of history textbooks. Criticism that was even more scathing came from Sigfried Lehmann, the widely respected headmaster of the innovative Ben-Shemen Youth Village. In 1943, a special issue of the journal Shorashim (“Roots”) was devoted to “the Jewish-Arab Problem in our Education.” In Lehmann’s opinion, the entire education apparatus in Jewish Palestine, including the highly regarded youth movements, was engaged in “national mass propaganda” rather than in “political education.” Lehmann was perhaps the first to suggest that the Jewish prejudicial attitude toward the Arab was a projection of

Attitudes in the Israeli Education System

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the Jewish attitude toward the outsider in the Diaspora. “As Jews,” he claimed, “we bear the tendency to see the Arab as the non-Jew, the goy; as Europeans, we see him as an Asian; as Zionists, we see him as an opponent to our national aspirations; and as socialists, we see him as a representative of the darkest type of reaction.” He perceptively observed that many Jews think they know the Arabs, yet in reality they knew them “no more than the German knew the Eastern European Jew.” He particularly denounced two prevalent Jewish misconceptions, which he called “prejudices”: that the Arabs are not a nation, and that the Arabs are morally inferior to the Jews. Lehmann concluded that the task of education was to instill knowledge of the other nation’s language and culture from an early age, thus diminishing Jewish-Arab alienation.33 Broadly speaking, the Jewish education system aimed at strengthening Zionist identity. In the absence of an accepted curriculum for teaching Zionist history, teachers suggested and circulated various syllabi for studying the subject. Leading educators, such as Baruch Ben-Yehuda, Avraham Orinovsky, and Ya’akov Halpern believed that the history of Zionism should be studied as a separate subject in order to instill national values, convinced that “national pedagogy” was merely an instrument, or a “handmaiden,” of the nation. Presenting a Zionist history syllabus in 1941, Orinovsky declared explicitly: “Every public movement must, above all, be internally strong. During the [Jewish-Arab] riots we witnessed how the rot of doubt began to worm its way into the hearts of the young people. Awareness that the justice of our cause is engraved in every stone along the road of Jewish history is the sole defense against this danger.”34 In studying Zionism, Orinovsky was not against studying Arab history as well; on the contrary, he stressed that the Arab question must be thoroughly and honestly examined. Such a study, in his opinion, would lead to the conclusion that the Zionist enterprise constituted an element of progress and culture in the Near East. It would underscore the fact that the Zionist goal to establish a center for the Jewish nation “does not and will not undermine the local Arabs’ economic or cultural development. This, despite the fact that Israel is neither the Arabs’ national homeland nor [their] cultural center.” The content of Orinovsky’s syllabus, as well as its underlying assumptions, typified the patronizing Zionist attitude toward the Arabs, not only negating Arab rights in Palestine but claiming that Arabs should be grateful to the Zionist enterprise. Moreover, a study of the syllabus shows that by a genuine “examination” of the Arab Question the author meant no more than a focus on violent Arab-Jewish clashes. No other aspect of Arab history and culture is introduced.35 Indeed, this was to be the primary prism through which the Israeli student would learn about the Arab in later years. The absence of a study of Arab history characterized not only the general and religious education trends, but also the labor trend, which supposedly

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The Arab-Israeli Conflict

was more sympathetic to the Arab cause. In a discussion on teaching Arabic and Arab history held in the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor) Education Center’s Pedagogic Committee in March 1945, one participant castigated this omission in the history curriculum: The current policy in schools has produced a new form of illiteracy. Our children are taught facts, but are not schooled in the reality of the country. We cannot continue to live as though on an island, or, to be more precise, an illusory island. This is an issue in which acting upon instinct alone may have dangerous repercussions. Sheer ignorance has led to the growth of an undefined and indeterminate fear. At times, it manifests itself, rather paradoxically, in excessive and extravagant courage. A child who does not live in a nationalist environment may develop a grave internal conflict. There is a marked inconsistency between our efforts to cultivate a liberal, humanistic outlook and the attitude toward the Arabs taught in our schools. This sort of education is a subversion of the notion of the return to Zion, not least after our expulsion from the West. It undermines our hopes of becoming an integral part of the region. We cannot, therefore, limit ourselves to teaching Arabic, we must also teach the student about the Arab people. Only a very small part of the history curriculum is devoted to that subject. . . . We must tell the student more about the Arabs living in the country. We must also stress the cultural affinities between the Arabs and ourselves. Only if we offer them genuine knowledge and understanding will we ensure that our children will enjoy personal and national equilibrium.36

In fact, the labor trend did differ to some extent from the other two trends by allocating, in the early 1940s, an impressive number of hours to the study of Arabic. Moreover, in 1947, a special committee suggested including the study of Arab history and culture in the curriculum and encouraging Jewish-Arab student encounters. This program would be implemented in the fourth to twelfth grades within the contexts of geography, homeland (“moledet”), history, social studies, and Zionism classes.37 Yet, reality overcame good intentions: the 1948 war and its outcome exacerbated ArabJewish relations, consolidating and reinforcing mutual negative images. In this climate, the idea of studying Arabic or Arab history became obsolete. For example, in a meeting of high school superintendents held in February 1949, when Dr. Israel Ben-Ze’ev, the superintendent for Arabic, proposed a unified high school curriculum for teaching Arabic, one participant responded that “the new situation demands that we adjust our position on the question of teaching Arabic [entirely]. Though still useful . . . not everyone in the country will need to know Arabic. Only a specific group in society will have any connection with the Arabs, and thus need to speak Arabic.”38 Another official suggested that since Arabic was not an easy language, the Arabs should “accommodate themselves to us and learn Hebrew instead.” This, would “help rid us of our Diaspora induced sense of inferiority.”39 The results of the war, as well as the massive influx of Jewish immigration to Israel, reinforced old demands to formally introduce Zionist studies.

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To fill this perceived gap in the curriculum, Moshe Shemu’eli, a teacher and textbook writer, published a comprehensive program for the study of Zionism that was to serve as a model for teachers.40 As other syllabi drawn up in the past, Shemu’eli viewed the Arab element in Zionist history solely through the prism of the “political battle with the Arabs.”41 Interestingly, it would seem that he belonged to the “synthetic” school of teaching history, since he recommended teaching Zionism with “no excessive romance or sentimentalism.” The teacher, in his opinion, should avoid portraying the Zionist movement as an impeccable phenomenon, and should convey the subject “honestly and critically,” including the errors made by the Zionists. Only thus, he felt, “will the students accept what they are taught, adopt fitting attitudes, and acquire creditable values.”42 Shemu’eli’s syllabus is illuminating since by Zionist “errors” he did not mean misbehavior toward the Arabs. Conceivably, his omission of the teaching of Arab history in earnest was not necessarily the result of a deliberate attempt to obliterate the other’s history, but a consequence of the entrenched Zionist disregard for the Arabs as a separate, legitimate entity. In 1953, the three separate educational trends—labor, general, and religious—were amalgamated under a new State Education Law. The education system was now divided into the secular system and the religious system, both under the supervision of the Ministry of Education, each with its own curriculum. In reality, however, many textbooks that served the secular system were also used in the religious system. The introduction of the new law allowed the ministry to tighten its control over the use of school textbooks.43 On the basis of the 1953 law, new curricula, including for history, had to be devised.44 Two of the immediate problems that faced the ministry were the introduction of Zionist studies and civics. Inevitably, the consideration by the ministry of such a curriculum could not be divorced from the ongoing sense of the threat of war that permeated Israel during the 1948–56 period. The symbiosis between these two elements was well articulated by Minister of Education Ben-Zion Dinur in remarks at a conference on the new civics curriculum in March 1953: We must be constantly aware of our situation. The position of our country must form the underlying premise of the civil education system. The State of Israel was born after a long and difficult struggle. It was established in the midst of a civil war. The struggle still continues. . . . Officially, we are living in that vague and shadowy situation which is neither war nor peace. In practice, we are still in a state of war, albeit a different kind of war. We resemble a city under siege. Our situation is akin to a certain “cold war agreement.” We cannot stop preparing for the war of destruction planned against us. We are surrounded by enemies whom we fought during the War of Independence and who have yet to reconcile themselves to our existence. Meanwhile, they have grown even stronger. Admittedly, we too have increased our strength. On the eve of Israel’s independence, the ratio between us and our neighbors stood at 40 to 1. Each Israeli faced 40 enemies, every single one of them bent on

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our destruction. They announced to the world their intention to throw us into the sea and to erase our name from the map. The numerical ratio has since improved somewhat. . . . But we are [still] a few facing many. Consequently, the principle of defense, ensuring that we are able to withstand our enemies, is our primary civic duty.45

The minister’s remarks are significant because they embody the basic themes, or myths, that guided Israeli thinking with respect to the Arabs during that period: that the Jewish struggle was that of the few against the many; that historically Israel had always been, and still was, isolated and under siege (metaphorically, “am levadad yishkon”—a people dwelling alone); that Israel was in a state of war despite the existence of the armistice agreements; and that the major aim of the Arabs was to destroy Israel (“to throw us into the sea”).46 Obviously, no neutral study of the Arabs was possible in such a climate. At the same conference, the superintendent for Arabic protested against the absence of any discussion on Arab-Israeli relations in the program. “I would like to state clearly and frankly,” he lamented, “that there is a great deal of ignorance and misconception which is the result of our deliberate refusal to examine our state’s genuine and practical needs, and which is, I believe, disastrous. Having declared that our youth must be acquainted with the various Jewish organizations . . . in the Diaspora, it only follows that they should also know something of the [Arab] minority in the country.” He, as many of his colleagues, he said, was astonished to discover that the new civics curriculum did not include a section on the Arabs, and proposed that a special conference be held, devoted solely to the question of teaching Arabic and Arab studies.47 His plea, however, fell on deaf ears. The general atmosphere of uncertainty and suspicion toward the Arabs that engulfed Israeli society at that time pervaded the education system as well. Anew history curriculum for elementary schools, published for the 1954 school year, included the topic “The Revival (tkumah) of Israel,” geared for the eighth grade in both secular and religious schools. One of its stated aims was “to instill [in the students] a love of the State of Israel and the desire to act for it and safeguard it.” The study of the Arab side was, as before, approached entirely within the context of the Zionist struggle against the Arabs. Among the required demands from the student was the “knowledge of the Arab invasion [in 1948], the heroic war of the few against the many, and the armistice agreements.”48 The next school year (1955) saw the publication by the ministry of an interim curriculum for high school. The social sciences curriculum included “The Knowledge of Nation and State (Civics)” and “The History of the Jewish National Idea”49 as two of a total of seven topics. The material on the post-1948 period concentrated on the political system, religious institutions, security apparatus, economic developments, and foreign relations. Only a few lessons, presented with a distinct

Attitudes in the Israeli Education System

33

bias, were devoted to the Arab-Israeli conflict. These dealt with the armistice agreements, the Arab minority, and the refugee problem. Later, a discussion of the 1956 Sinai war was added as well.50 The new history curricula for elementary and high schools thus institutionalized the superficial attitude toward the teaching of Arab history that had characterized Zionist education prior to the enactment of the State Education Law. This trend was further reinforced following the 1956 war, when the education system was mobilized to heighten Zionist and Jewish consciousness. In September 1957, a lengthy directive by the director-general of the Ministry of Education called for deepening the study of the Jewish-Israeli past. Two months later, on the first anniversary of the Sinai war, teachers were instructed to praise the victory over the Arabs, while emphasizing “Israel’s aspiration for a stable peace with all its neighbors.”51 An analysis of the content of the new history curricula following the implementation of the State Education Law of 1953 indicates that only 1.4% of the total amount of time dedicated to history was allocated to Arab history. Although there is no accurate way of measuring the number of hours dedicated to the study of the Arab-Israeli conflict specifically, since the subject was not studied separately but as part of the history of Zionism and of civics,52 an examination of the history curricula, as well as of the topics included in final exams, clearly shows that the Arab side was presented primarily within the context of the history of Zionism.53 A single exception was the introduction in the mid-1950s of “Oriental classes” in a small number of schools, which taught Islamic culture as well as Arab language and history. The students of these classes were viewed as potential recruits for Israeli intelligence, and the aim was to acquaint them with the “enemy.”54 At the same time, the teaching of Arabic in the education system remained a low priority. According to the available statistics, Arabic was taught in only 10% of the Hebrew schools in the 1950s and 1960s.55 In a letter to the chairman of the pedagogic committee in December 1960, Superintendent for Arabic Israel Ben-Ze’ev, who constantly lobbied for expanding the study of Arabic, protested against the ministry’s policy and pointed out that the question had political implications. “How are we to explain to the outside world the fact that our educational institutions do not teach Arabic? It will regard our obvious disparagement of the Arabic language as evidence of extreme chauvinism and a sign that we are blind to our social and political circumstances, that we are oblivious to the fact that we live in a country surrounded by millions of Arabs. Are we to reach the point where no Arabic is included in the Jewish curriculum?”56 As before, his protests went unheeded. The same argument was raised by a veteran Arabic teacher in an article published in the journal for high school teachers in 1963.57 This disregard reached a peak prior to the 1967 war, as the number of Arabic classes in elementary schools dwindled further. By then, it was obvious that parents preferred their children to study French rather than Arabic, which was considered an inferior language.58

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When Abba Eban replaced Zalman Aranne as minister of education in 1960 (a position he held until 1963), it was thought that a change was in the offing. Despite his Western orientation, Eban believed in the importance of teaching Arabic and Arab culture.59 In practice, however, little changed, at least in the formal education system. Although the history curriculum was modified during the 1960–61 school year in response to complaints of overdensity, no substantial changes were introduced in Zionist studies.60 No changes were introduced in textbooks either, which continued to present a one-sided narrative of the conflict. This narrative, it should be emphasized, only partially reflected existing Middle East historiography in Israel. There are indications that superintendents and teachers were familiar with recent literature, which depicted a more complex reality of the conflict than the simplistic picture presented in the textbooks.61 The gap between what these educators knew and what they taught and wrote demonstrates that ministry superintendents, textbook writers, and teachers alike felt an unspoken need to conform to the prevailing nationalistic atmosphere in Israeli society. Some progress did take place in the informal educational system during Eban’s tenure with the publication in 1963 of a new booklet titled Ba’ad ve-Neged (“For and against”). Its declared aim was “to promote and encourage firmly based and well-argued opinions; to widen fields of interest; to clarify differences of opinion; to respond to current issues; and to promote an interest in and understanding of national and international affairs.”62 While the booklet contained a series of generally informative and balanced articles about the Arab world, it is unlikely that this material reached a large number of students. Aranne’s return to the ministry of education in 1963 signaled the beginning of another effort to strengthen Zionist and Jewish identity through the study of history.63 During the 1964–65 school year, Naftali Zon prepared a new program called “The History of the Israeli Nation in Israel and the Diaspora in Recent Ages.” Separated from the teaching of world (mostly European) history, this subject was aimed at strengthening the student’s identification with Israeli history.64 In contrast, the education system did little to encourage the study of the Arab-Israeli conflict or Arabic until 1967. Furthermore, despite the curriculum changes introduced since 1961, history and civics teachers found that there was insufficient time to cover contemporary events such as the 1948 and 1956 wars.65 More important, it appears that the education establishment was not concerned, or aware, that the lack of information on the Arab world and the Arab-Israeli conflict was significant at all, contributing, in light of the prolonged conflict, to the emergence of stereotypical attitudes and prejudice toward the Arabs.66 This indifference was illustrated by a Teachers Union conference devoted to “Education for Values” held during Passover of 1967, with 1,200 teachers participating. Distinguished guest speakers discussed the impor-

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tance of instilling such values as love of homeland, loyalty to the state, and respect for Jewish heritage out of a concern for possible threat to Israeli society of “a young, perplexed, uninformed, unmannered generation lacking in values.” During the conference, one speaker reminded the audience of the existence of the other people with a link to the land and advised that ways must be sought to arrive at some cooperation with them. Another speaker criticized the fact that no Arab educators had been invited to the conference. “If we are aspiring to be part of our East,” he argued, “then we cannot [work] without cooperation, which, in my humble opinion, is the bridge to the world around us.”67 These remarks, however, were the exception. The absence of Arab teachers from the conference, and the exclusion of the Arab issue entirely in the consideration of “education for values” was not surprising, as it reflected the general atmosphere in Israeli society. Superintendent for High School Education Naftali Zon described the situation aptly in March 1967: “Israel is in a state of both latent and open war. The [Arab] aggressive acts on our borders remind us day after day, hour after hour, of the threat of hatred and animosity on the part of the Arab states, which have not reconciled themselves to the existence of [our] state and announce their desire to destroy it.”68 In such a climate, it is clear that a different approach toward teaching the Arab side of the conflict was unthinkable. Up until June 1967, the Arabs may have been geographically close, but in every other respect they were remote, or even nonexistent, for most of Israeli society. The fact that until 1966 the Arabs in Israel were subjected to a strict military rule further stigmatized them as part of the enemy camp.

The Middle Phase: Adolescence (1967–84/85) The 1967 war constituted a watershed in Israeli education, affecting the teaching of Zionism and Israel, on the one hand, and Arab history and Arabic, on the other. The changes in attitude in this context, which reflected changes in Israeli society at large, were a product of three developments: First, the conquest of the Arab territories, and especially the West Bank, brought the Arabs and the Palestinians closer—geographically and psychologically—to Israeli society. The image of the Arab became less anonymous and more concrete. Some Israelis genuinely wanted to learn more about their neighbors. One indication was the increase in number of Arabic classes in the 1967–68 school year.69 The second development was the heated debate in Israeli society over the question of the legitimacy and desirability of Israeli occupation (especially over the West Bank). Those who thought that Israel had liberated, rather than conquered, the territories called for strengthening Jewish and Zionist identity by expanding the study of Jewish-Israeli history. Such study was perceived as a remedy to the doubts that existed in Israeli society regarding Jewish rights to the occu-

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pied territories. Third, Israeli society was exposed more than ever before to information about the Arab world, the PLO, and the Palestinian national movement, both from the media and from the academic world. Particularly important were the studies of Middle East scholars Yehoshafat Harkabi and Yehoshua Porath of the Hebrew University.70 Responding to demands to intensify Zionist studies, the Ministry of Education introduced the new program on Israeli history in the school year that commenced less than three months after the war. Initially aimed at the ninth and tenth grades, its intention was to “strengthen the student’s national consciousness and his link to the [Jewish] people in the Diaspora.” In fact, the ministry had been preparing this subject for inclusion in the history curriculum before the war broke out.71 Again, an analysis of the proposed syllabus shows that there was no attempt to give the student any insights into the Arab world; in fact, the term “Arab” was hardly mentioned except in relation to diplomatic and military confrontations with the Jews. Moreover, since the subject was inserted in the curriculum on a lastminute basis before the start of the school year, no appropriate textbooks had been prepared. The new syllabus, therefore, had to be accommodated to existing textbooks and encyclopedias, which served as the main sources.72 As a result, the students received more information on Israel and the Zionist movement, but from the same old sources that suffered from serious methodological drawbacks and presented the Arabs in a slanted way. A year later, in 1968, the subject was expanded to eleventh- and twelfth- grade levels. The formal introduction of the new subject, however, did not stop appeals in both the secular and religious educational systems for a further deepening of Jewish and Zionist identity in order to strengthen the students’ links with their people and their land.73 The absence of any change in the thinking of the Ministry of Education concerning the teaching of the Arab-Israeli conflict was reflected in a conference organized by Minister Aranne in October 1967 to discuss “the lessons of the Six Day War for the education system.” The key issue in the discussions was how to strengthen Jewish and Zionist identity. The ArabIsraeli conflict was not on the agenda, nor was it mentioned in the minister’s address. In the course of the meeting, however, one official drew attention to the regrettable fact that the war, according to senior army officers, had exposed the poor knowledge that young people had of the Arab world.74 Deputy Education Minister Aaron Yadlin added that, in his view, the new daily encounter with an Arab population had sharpened the conflict. “The Arabs today,” he believed, “hate Israel even more than during the war, and the youth must be brought face to face with this problem.”75 The discussion that followed revealed that in light of the political uncertainty, the ministry was unable to guide the teachers with respect to the Israeli position regarding the occupied territories. Interestingly, some

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officials were under the impression that in spite of the lack of information on the Arab world, the Israeli teacher was educating for peace.76 In contrast to the relative complacency that characterized the ministry’s attitude toward the issue, a more concerned response emerged from the “field.” Typically, in a conference on the repercussions of the war on the education system held by teachers in 1968, three different attitudes were discernible. The first called for a “complete overhaul” in the sphere of teaching Arabic, turning it into a second compulsory foreign language (after English), and for introducing a more comprehensive study of the history of the Arab minority in Israel and of the neighboring Arab states. The second approach called for strengthening education for “national consciousness,” especially with regard to the Jewish right to the land, including the “liberated territories,” a study that would relieve students of their “guilty conscience.” The third response can be termed the “immunization theory.” It called for including the Arab-Israeli conflict in the curriculum in order to “vaccinate” the student; only by familiarizing him or her with the general Arab desire “to destroy us,” so the argument went, would the immunized student be able to confront the enemy.77 The debate over the desirability of teaching the Arab-Israeli conflict in the education system heightened in 1969. The most stimulating and thoughtprovoking discussions took place at a three-part conference organized by the Teachers Union, with the participation of leading academics, education officials, and teachers. Its aim was to discuss the necessity of integrating the Arab-Israeli conflict into the high schools curriculum, thereby filling a void, as the Ministry of Education, according to the organizers, “has yet to rouse itself and direct the teacher to include this subject in the curriculum.”78 One of the organizers pointed out that the teacher must deal with two dangers facing the younger generation: on the one hand, hatred of the neighboring people; and, on the other, the evil of self-hatred and the consequent repudiation of Jewish historic and national rights. Until peace was achieved, he claimed, it was the education system’s responsibility “to give our students a valid and accurate account of the enemy and to encourage a balanced attitude toward the minorities within our country as well as toward the people living around us.”79 Professor Harkabi, former head of military intelligence and a renowned expert on Arab-Israeli relations, opened the first session of the conference. His main theme was that the Arab-Israeli conflict should be taught in high school as an integrated element in various subjects. Pessimistic about the chances of solving the conflict, he thought that the only way to prepare the young generation for a lasting struggle was by “equipping them with knowledge of the Arab point of view.” Harkabi emphasized the importance of “educating for truth,” that is, illuminating inconvenient facts that conflicted with the official line of thinking. At the same time, he recommended keeping the discussions “objective,” exposing the distortions

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(“shadows”) in the Arab attitude toward Zionism and thereby strengthening the Zionist claim. This line of thinking suggests that Harkabi was an advocate of the “immunization theory”—the conviction that studying the Arab- Israeli conflict would “immunize” young people. In reality, however, Harkabi presented a more sophisticated position: “The wisdom is in realizing that we are destined to live with a neighbor who is also an opponent, over a long period of time, and [therefore] we have to think beyond the present day. The wisdom is not to see the opponent as a culprit . . . but to realize that there is no absolute justice . . . and that each side has its own truth.”80 The second speaker was a high school teacher who described her positive experience in preparing students for a matriculation exam based on Harkabi’s article on the Israeli attitude toward the conflict.81 She reported that not only were the students presented with new information, their ability to analyze the complexities of the situation objectively and logically improved. Moreover, she maintained, Harkabi’s article helped the students overcome their reactions of confusion and self-criticism after having read the powerful stories by S. Yizhar, a writer on the 1948 war who focused on the moral conflicts of the Jewish fighters, in particular his stories “Hirbet Hiza’h” and “The Captive.”82 The second session of the conference was dominated by an address by Professor of Education Arieh Simon of the Hebrew University, a former headmaster of the Ben-Shemen youth village. Simon reiterated some of the views originated by his mentor, Sigfried Lehmann, in the early 1940s. Like him, Simon believed that the Jews had transferred the image of the goy from the Diaspora to Israel, and projected it, mistakenly, on to the Arabs. He emphasized in particular that Jewish students were ignorant of Arab history, while at the same time viewed Arabs stereotypically as primitive, cruel, bloodthirsty, and inhuman. To rectify this situation, he believed that the education system should put more emphasis on Isaiah’s vision of peace rather than on Joshua’s conquests and the wars against Amalek; initiate Jewish-Arab encounters; and teach the language, culture, and history of the Arabs.83 The addresses elicited heated debate at the conference over the extent to which the young people should be exposed to the complexities of the “truth.” Two points of view emerged. The first, based on a pithy adage by labor ideologue Berl Katznelson, held that uncertainty is a natural human emotion that encourages open-mindedness. Understanding the enemy would not weaken the Israeli soldier, and familiarity with the language, culture, and history of the Arab world would help to bridge the gulf between the embattled parties.84 The second viewpoint held that it was unwise to offer information that would give rise to guilt feelings toward the Arabs. Teaching the student to “understand the enemy” only served to “undermine the justice of our case and sap the strength of our soldiers when they go to war.” One participant, asserting that uncertainty would bring nothing but “weakness and despair,” demanded: “How can I culti-

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vate in my students a state of perpetual schizophrenia, a divided soul, the sense of being both right and wrong . . . the daily anguish of being both correct and incorrect!”85 In this changing atmosphere, the School of Education of the Hebrew University, in cooperation with the Ministry of Education, sponsored in late 1969 a conference on the implications of the Arab-Israel conflict for high school. The participants, who included Professors Jacob Talmon, Shmuel Eisenstadt, and Zvi Lam, were unanimous in their view that the Arab-Israeli conflict provided a fertile ground for the development and perpetuation of negative stereotypes of the Arab and the emergence of extreme chauvinism. It was possible to overcome these difficulties, they said, only through a presentation of a multifaceted picture of the conflict, in which the attitudes of both Jews and Arabs were objectively presented.86 Although the discussions were inconclusive in terms of practical decisions, they set the tone for the eventual incorporation of the history of the ArabIsraeli conflict into the curriculum, which was to occur in the mid-1970s. The attitudes expressed at these conferences elicited a receptive response at the Ministry of Education. That year, Yigal Allon had been appointed minister of education and deputy prime minister, ushering in a different spirit in the ministry. In the past, Allon had expressed relatively moderate views on the Arab-Israeli conflict.87 In a well-publicized speech in February 1970, he emphasized the importance of humanistic education in times of war, warning in particular against the “worship of power and chauvinistic militarism” instead of striving for peace. In his opinion, one of the most important measures of humanism was the Israeli attitude toward the Arab. He proposed, therefore, integrating the history of the Middle East into the high school curriculum and initiating Jewish-Arab student encounters that would serve to defuse tension.88 An address by him to the Knesset in April 1972 included telling observations: We should beware, when assessing the situation of our nation, our youth and our schools, of judging ourselves either wholly good or wholly bad. Between the two extremes of ignominy and praise lies something called the truth. I, personally, was not alarmed by the doubts our youth expressed before the war [1967], just as I was not surprised by the way it rallied to the defense of the nation. True, the war and its aftermath magnified and sharpened those doubts, some of which, I confess, found an echo in my own heart. My friends, doubt is not the opposite of belief. To suffer the wounds of a lover is not to disavow the principal goal. I would certainly not want a generation, which has no qualms and which fears to question even when there are no answers, and for whom all is crystal-clear and certain.89

In contrast to Allon’s thinking, his deputy, Aaron Yadlin (also from the Labor Party), who had held this post since 1964, was a leading representative of the “immunization theory.” In Yadlin’s view, uncertainty and perplexity were signs of weakness. Teaching the Arab-Israeli conflict was

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justified only if it served to strengthen Zionist consciousness on the part of students and to immunize future generations against harmful influences. Immediately after the 1967 war, in a lecture titled “Education toward Values,” Yadlin summed up his position: I would like to draw attention to an additional matter concerning Zionist studies that worries me greatly, especially following the Six Day War: the question of our position toward and relations with our neighbors. It would appear that today the younger generation needs a special vaccination [emphasis mine] concerning the historic and moral implications of Arab-Israeli relations. One encounters young people who are unaware of the immense gulf that lies between us and our anti-Semitic Arab neighbors. The Arabs’ aim of destroying the State of Israel has not adequately permeated our consciousness. Several very troubling consequences may arise from this state of affairs. It can lead to illusions of imminent peace and the belief that peace is dependent on us alone. It can also provoke an unhealthy and masochistic form of self-criticism. Conversely, there are youngsters who are thoroughly aware of the seriousness and gravity of the conflict. But they are often confounded to the point of despair. It is our duty to equip the youth, these young members of a nation menaced by its surroundings and encircled by enemies who threaten its very existence, with the means to survive. They belong to an exceptional people who have to daily confront the question of survival, of simply staying alive.90

Yadlin reiterated his views on several occasions. In 1971, he pointed out that since the youth faced a world of crises, chaos, and confusion, “one should not be content to offer it odd scraps of information and vague, nebulous ideas.” Students must be provided with clear and well-defined values, such as being rooted in Jewish culture, the value of scientific achievement, love of the homeland, and loyalty to the state, values, it should be noted, that are cited in Article 2 of the 1953 State Education Law. Since Israel did not have the benefit of good neighborly relations, he wrote, instilling such values was particularly important. “All we sought,” he explained, was “one single right, the right to the wilderness,” but the Arabs “rejected our hand that we extended in peace and cooperation.”91 Interestingly enough, both views, as represented by Allon and Yadlin, were in agreement that the study of the Arab-Israeli conflict must be integrated into the high school curriculum. The major difference between them, however, was that Yadlin viewed the study of the conflict as having a specific aim: strengthening the student’s confidence in the Jewish claim to the land, eliminating any doubts, and immunizing him against the (illegitimate) Arab claims. For Allon, however, the study of the conflict was intended to acquaint the student with a complex reality and to ease tension (especially between Jewish Israelis and the Arab minority in Israel), thus preparing the groundwork for an eventual peace. In 1972, Allon instructed a special team in the field of civics to prepare a curriculum, and a textbook reader, on the Arab-Israeli conflict, tasks that were completed only following the 1973 war.

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The 1973 war elicited doubts and fears in Israeli society that displaced the complacency and self-satisfaction of the 1967–73 period. Conferences and symposia held after this war attempted to articulate the lessons in the education context, as well as deal with worrisome self-doubt expressed by students over the historical right to the land of Israel, the necessity of war, and the chances for peace.92 The Ministry of Education was viewed as largely responsible for the alleged ignorance of Israeli history and the withering away of Zionist values on the part of the young generation. President Ephraim Katzir was quoted as saying that “we were all living in a fools’ paradise; we are all to blame for neglecting security, development and education.”93 Criticism of the Ministry of Education was twofold. The first, and more serious charge, was a lack of “education for values,” an accusation that had been leveled immediately after the 1967 war as well. Despite various steps taken by the ministry to tackle this problem, marked decline in the national consciousness of young people was perceived by some observers before the outbreak of the 1973 war. Critics accused the ministry of serious neglect in teaching Zionism, going so far as to describe contemporary education as “schizophrenic” and “twisted.”94 This criticism gathered force after the 1973 war, with intellectuals, teachers, and students demanding that the ministry be involved in, and responsible for, the deepening of Jewish and Zionist consciousness. An intensified study of history was seen as the remedy. All measures adopted by the ministry so far had been palliative, according to the critics. It was necessary to develop the study of Zionism and Israel more thoroughly.95 The second target of criticism was the omission by the history curriculum of information on the Arabs and the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the first time, many of those appealing for the strengthening of Jewish and Zionist consciousness also thought that the Ministry of Education should provide more knowledge on Israel’s “neighbors.” This problem was expressed succinctly by a former student in a symposium of Ministry of Education officials, teachers, and students held after the war: “I suddenly realized that in school they did not teach us to live with the Arabs. They did not teach and educate us to see them as human beings. There was a kind of contempt toward them. With the war came a shock: I found out that the Arab is a human being just like me, and that he can overcome me. Twelve years of education did not teach me that!”96 The ministry, under the guidance of Aaron Yadlin, who became minister of education in 1974 after a stint of ten years as deputy, responded in several ways. The first, immediate step was to initiate large-scale seminars for high school students on Jewish and Zionist history in conjunction with institutions for Zionist education that were linked to the ministry or to the World Zionist Organization. Schools were encouraged to send as many classes as possible to participate in these seminars. The goal, according to an advisor

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to the minister, was that “each student, before finishing high school and enlisting in the army, will participate in such a seminar and will receive a ‘screening’ of the intrinsic moral and social truth of the Zionist revolution.”97 By March 1975, this process was institutionalized as a directive by the ministry specifying the exact procedure for sending classes to these seminars.98 In 1976, the scope and scale of these national-awareness seminars widened as a result of two developments. The first was the increase in the number of emigrants (yordim) following the 1973 war, which was attributed by many to the weakness, or even absence, of Zionist-Jewish values. AKnesset committee appointed to investigate the issue in January 1975 concluded in its report (March 1976) that “the education system failed in instilling Jewish-Zionist consciousness and in educating for love of the homeland.” It recommended “reassessing the entire education system with the aim of strengthening and deepening Jewish-Zionist consciousness.”99 The second development occurred in October 1975, when the UN passed a resolution branding Zionism as “a form of racism and discrimination.” A second, more comprehensive response, was the preparation of new history curricula and textbooks in the realm of formal education with the aim of strengthening Zionist consciousness. The 1975 history curriculum for both junior high (sixth to ninth grades) and high school in the secular system was geared “to instill in the student a sense of identification with the people, country and nation.”100 This aim was phrased differently in the curriculum for religious high schools: “to instill a sense of identification with the Torah of Israel, the Israeli people, Eretz Israel and the State of Israel.”101 With this, both history curricula also emphasized the aim of “cultivating understanding and tolerance toward the feelings, traditions and way of life of other peoples and nations.” However, the content of the textbooks reveals that the former aim took precedence over the latter. Three topics in the secular high school curriculum were designated as mandatory: the Jewish national movement and the establishment of Israel; the major Jewish communities [in the Diaspora] in recent times (including the Holocaust period); and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The last was to be studied only after the completion of the first two topics; its aim was “to deepen the student’s perception of the righteousness of the Jewish people’s struggle for national revival in the country.”102 Soon, however, the Arab-Israeli conflict was dropped from the history curriculum and transferred to the civics curriculum, where it became an optional topic. The new history curriculum for secular high school offered a total of twenty-three topics, including three related to the Middle East in general: Baghdad in the tenth century, Eretz Israel under Ottoman control, and the Arab national awakening and the emergence of Arab states. By contrast, the curriculum for the religious high schools listed seven mandatory topics, of which the Arab-Israeli conflict was the last one, with no optional top-

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ics offered regarding the modern Arab world. In the junior high curriculum, ninth-grade students were expected to learn about the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the birth of Palestinian nationalism. The study of 1948 was to conclude with the “rejection of the Israeli peace overtures by the Arab states, the massive Arab flight (briha), and the birth of Israel as a Jewish state.”103 The expectation was that by the end of junior high school, students would learn about the Six-Day War. In reality, however, classes in both junior and senior high schools rarely managed to cover material beyond the 1948 war. Textbooks for the new history curricula were written and published by the ministry’s Department of Curriculum Planning, established in 1966 to prepare curricula and textbooks as part of a comprehensive educational reform. Although this structural innovation was undoubtedly conceived to ensure better ministerial control over educational planning and textbook content, there was also a conviction that such supervision would allow the ministry to eliminate the mistakes and biases of the first generation of textbooks.104 By 1975, however, only two new history textbooks for high school level had been published, both designated as experimental. These textbooks, which may be classified as the second generation, were published over a period that lasted until the early 1990s. Until the full incorporation of the new textbooks into the education system, schools continued using some of the old textbooks. Notably, the first textbook in the new, second-generation series was the reader on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Geared to the eleventh and twelfth grades, it was tested in a small sample of fifty classes in thirty schools, and was accompanied by a survey analyzing its impact on the attitudes of the students in the sample.105 Apparently, the preparation of the reader constituted a knotty challenge. The teacher’s guide to it acknowledged that despite repeated demands to include the conflict in the curriculum, “the difficulties involved in teaching this subject” delayed the publication of the book. The scope of the topic was limited, consisting of only fifteen to twenty study hours. It stated aim was to “convince the students intellectually of the justice of the Jewish people’s struggle for existence and their efforts to reconstitute their national independence, by means of ideas, historical facts and data.”106 This aim was sharpened in the foreword to the results of the survey previously mentioned as instilling “ideologicalnational” values, with the goal of implanting “universal” values such as tolerance, rationalism, and civilized debate presented as secondary only.107 Amajor assumption was that “the knowledge of various facts and attitudes in the Arab-Israeli conflict would strengthen the link between the student, the State of Israel and the Jewish nation.”108 Following the experiment, most students retained their previously held conviction that Arab right to the land was weaker than the Jewish right or was nonexistent entirely.109

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Following the completion of this experiment, the history of the ArabIsraeli conflict was formally included in the new civics curriculum as an optional topic. Initially, it was to be included in the new history curriculum as a mandatory subject,110 but the overdensity of the curriculum, in addition to the conviction that the post-1948 period should be included in civics, led to this shift. The topic was also included in the civics curriculum for the religious high schools, but a different textbook was offered.111 Its text, however, proved totally inadequate, and the religious schools that taught the topic eventually used the same reader as the secular schools. The topic was also included in the curriculum for the Arab school system in Israel, but its aims were formulated in a different way.112 In contrast to most of the extant textbooks on the history of Zionism and Israel, the new reader on the Arab-Israeli conflict was prepared with the assistance of Middle East scholars. This ensured a more balanced and accurate presentation of the conflict, certainly as compared to the existing history textbooks. Moreover, the reader was a different kind of textbook, based on the methodological premise that it was preferable to present the student with historical evidence (speeches, texts of agreements, maps, etc.) and historical sources (academic articles) instead of a single (probably biased) historical narrative. In the long run, however, this progressive approach proved inadequate, as students and teachers alike found the material too rudimentary and unfocused, requiring additional reading. Another complaint was that it heightened the ideological aspect of the conflict, evoking confusion and uncertainty in the students. Moreover, the contemporary nature of the subject compelled the ministry to update the source material by adding booklets to the reader, creating difficulties for both the teacher and the student to keep up with the material. Finally, problems arose relating to the study of specific aspects of the topic (e.g., the refugee problem; see Chapter 3).113 In light of these obstacles, and the highly political nature of the topic, many teachers opted for other topics in the curriculum. Consequently, the traditional narrative on Zionism, although presented in a new garb by the 1980s, remained the central source for acquainting the student with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, despite the shortcomings of the new reader, and the fact that the topic remained optional, it signified a kind of a revolution in Israeli pedagogical thinking. It marked the first time that the education establishment came to realize, and was willing to admit, that the presentation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as narrated in the existing history textbooks, was inadequate and perhaps biased. This change came about at least partially as a result of pressure on the Ministry of Education from below—by teachers, students, and the public generally after the 1967 war, a process that gained impetus after the 1973 war. The introduction of the new textbook aroused criticism of religious and right-wing political elements, which considered it to be an “anti-Zionist textbook.”114

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The scope of the change, however, should not be overstated. First, the selection of the material was intrinsically problematic, as no balance existed between the presentation of the Arab side and the Jewish side. Second, the aim of the new reader, as of the existing history textbooks on Israel and Zionism, was not essentially an acquaintance with the other, but the strengthening of the Jewish claim to the land and the weakening—through superficial “knowledge” of the other—of the Arab claim to it. A headline in an Israeli newspaper on 1975 captured this point of view accurately: “The Teaching of the Arab-Israeli Conflict Rekindled a Desire among Students to Know about . . . Zionism.”115 Undoubtedly, this line of thinking epitomized the “immunization theory” advocated by Minister of Education Yadlin. In a discussion on the new civics curriculum for high school in early 1976, his opinion was still that basically, “the conflict was asymmetrical; there are Israeli initiatives for peace and Arab initiatives for destruction.”116 The fact that no major steps were taken to solve the problem of the decline in demand for Arabic classes proved that the motivation that underlay the introduction of the new topic was mainly instrumental.117 This reality dovetailed with the approach taken by the new minister of education, Zevulun Hammer of the National Religious Party (Mafdal), following the election of the Likud government—the first nonlabor government in Israel’s history—in May 1977. Initially, Hammer was more interested in intensifying Jewish studies in the state religious system than in initiating major changes in the history curriculum of the secular system. His tenure coincided with the publication of several new textbooks on the history of Zionism and Israel for junior high and high schools, in accordance with the 1975 history curriculum. In comparison with the extant textbooks, which had been in use for over two, and in some cases three and four, decades, this second generation of textbooks constituted a major change in terms of methodological premises, content, and format. They were generally more balanced than the old textbooks, presenting the other in a more neutral way. There was also an attempt to present the well-known Zionist myths of Tel-Hai and the Few against the Many in a more objective fashion. Still, biases and distortions existed, in some cases appearing more subtly in the new textbooks (for further analysis, see Chapter 3). With the introduction of the new history textbooks, the Ministry of Education struck off the old textbooks from its recommended list. In reality, however, several of the old, problematic textbooks written in the 1960s continued to be used in some schools into the early 1980s. Most problematic were a series of highly popular old textbooks written by Shlomo Horowitz, which were replete with errors and biases. Written in a lively and passionate style, his textbooks, teachers claimed, were more interesting than the new textbooks. At one point, the ministry felt compelled to go so far as to warn that it would punish the headmaster of any school found using

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Horowitz’s books.118 This problem, however, was compounded by the fact that the new history high school textbook on the Jewish national movement and Israel suffered from the same problems as the reader on the ArabIsraeli conflict. It was a three-volume work, filled with authentic documents and other source materials, with little narrative, all of which was to be covered in forty study hours. Under the pressure of matriculation exams, teachers felt compelled to refer students to other, more concise, sources, such as the old textbooks and encyclopedias.119 In an amended two-volume textbook published in 1984/85, some of the drawbacks of the three-volume experimental textbook were rectified.120 By then, the first generation of textbooks was almost completely out of use. Two important national events were marked during Hammer’s first term in office: Israel’s thirtieth anniversary, in 1978, and the Israeli-Egyptian peace process, which culminated in the signing of a peace treaty in March 1979. The first event elicited an educational program called “The State of Israel—a Basis for the Realization of Zionism,” which was included in the curriculum for the 1977/78 school year, aimed at highlighting the link between Zionism and Israel.121 Significantly, however, no special ministerial directives were issued and no special programs were drafted to commemorate the second event. Apparently, many schools did seek guidance on presenting this milestone, but, in the absence of ministerial policy, the schools were left to respond individually.122 The ministry’s reticence was embodied in a response by Hammer to a question about the ministry’s readiness to confront the implications of peace in an interview on the eve of the 1979/80 school year: The State of Israel has always aspired to peace. We have never preached hatred between nations. If a need arises to revise textbooks—and it is highly probable that this will be necessary during the process of normalization between the two states—it is the Egyptian government that will have to introduce these changes. In a thorough, repeated investigation that we have carried out in our textbooks, we found no hostile expressions that can hurt the Arabs in any way. Recently, we established a special committee of pedagogues and academics who specialize in the Middle East, tasked to devise a special plan dealing with the educational aspects that could arise as a result of possible daily contact between Israelis and Egyptians. They must work out a commonality that does not require both parties to obliterate their national identity. The signing of the peace process with Egypt will undoubtedly compel us to immunize ourselves spiritually and culturally. There are Arab leaders who think that if they cannot eliminate us in the battlefield, they will succeed in doing so through a process of assimilation. I am aware that deep in their hearts some [Arabs] hope that the peace terms will eventually lead to our assimilation in the ocean of millions of Arabs.123

This passage is illuminating not only because it clearly reflected the minister’s beliefs, but because it also reflected existing perceptions within Israeli society. First, it articulated a conviction that “our” textbooks were

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impeccable and that it was the Arab textbooks only that required revision. Second, it reflected the existence of a deep sense of suspicion toward the Arabs, which led some to conclude that a hidden motive lay behind Sadat’s peace initiative. Since the Arab desire to eliminate the Jews from the region had not basically changed, this argument went, the peace treaty was only a ploy to achieve the same old end. Lastly, Hammer reiterated the “immunization theory” dressed in a slightly different garb: peace with the Arabs threatens Israel’s shaky identity, necessitating the immunization of the youth by strengthening Jewish and Zionist consciousness. A different perception, however, was articulated by Eliezer Shemu’eli, director-general of the Ministry of Education, who believed that the peace treaty with Egypt would compel Israel to view itself as part of the Middle East and would therefore necessitate deeper study of the region. School curricula, he wrote in 1978, will have to be adjusted for greater emphasis on teaching Arab history and culture, with existing textbooks reviewed in order to eliminate prejudices and stereotypes.124 At the time, Shemu’eli was in a minority position, but five years later some of his ideas would become official ministerial policy. Despite his conservative outlook, Hammer was responsible for two important developments. On assuming office in May 1977, he received a newly completed report submitted by the Piamenta Committee, appointed by the previous minister to investigate the status of Arabic in Hebrew schools and offer recommendations for improvement. The committee, headed by Professor Moshe Piamenta of the Hebrew University, stated in its report that one of the major aims of studying Arabic is “education for civil involvement, respectful coexistence with Arabs and awareness of the Arab-Israeli conflict.” Its main recommendation was to turn Arabic into a compulsory subject.125 Although this was not implemented, the ministry adopted measures designed to prompt schools to expand the number of Arabic classes. Furthermore, the Arabic curriculum was expanded to include a course on the history of Arabic and Islam, with a chapter on the Arab national movement and the Arab-Israeli conflict (1948–67). By 1981, 102,000 students were studying Arabic in elementary and junior high schools and 30,750 in high schools,126 a statistically impressive increase that was attributed to growing interest following Sadat’s historic visit to Israel in November 1977.127 The figures are less impressive, however, in light of the small number of pupils who took the matriculation in Arabic (900) and the history of Arabic and Islam (211). Moreover, the 1982/83 school year showed a decrease in the number of Arabic pupils, although the ministry introduced a new program for the seventh to ninth grades.128 The second positive development during Hammer’s tenure was the introduction of two textbooks on Arab-Jewish relations. One, published by the ministry in 1981, was titled We and Our Neighbors, geared to elementary and junior high school. Although the topic was not included formally in the his-

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tory or civics curricula, the textbook was aimed to fill the gap referred to by teachers on the subject of peace and “encourage the teacher to expand on the issue of ‘peacemaking.’” Largely echoing Hammer’s thinking, the introduction to the text pointed out that throughout the conflict “we did not teach our children to hate our neighbors. The school textbooks do not exhibit any sign of hatred of the Arab.” Through class discussions, students were urged to seek friendly relations with Arab neighbors, but cautioned that such a move “should not diminish our right to feel commitment toward the homeland.” Since “we all strive for peace,” the preface concluded, “we must deal extensively with this “neglected subject.”129 In the absence of other material on peace for teachers and students, this textbook was important. The second new textbook, geared for high school, focused on ArabJewish relations and was titled Living Together, published jointly by the Curriculum Planning Department and the Jerusalem-based Van Leer Foundation. This joint effort was connected with the “Living Together Program” developed by the foundation, dealing with education for democracy and coexistence for Jewish and Arab students in Israel.130 An experimental version of the textbook was tested in a small number of schools during 1982/83, followed by the publication of an interim edition in 1984. Living Together was suggested as an optional topic in the civics curriculum in the secular and state religious systems from 1985/86, part of a comprehensive attempt by the ministry to introduce a new education program for Jewish-Arab coexistence launched in February 1984 (see later).131 The final edition of the textbook was completed only in 1988, and the topic “The Arab Citizens of Israel” was formally introduced into the civics curriculum for eleventh and twelfth grades in the 1992/93 school year. The introduction of this topic was a welcome addition to the skimpy course offerings and textbook selection on Jewish-Arab relations. Still, the very fact that it was optional reduced its impact and effectiveness. The ministry took great care to produce a balanced textbook that would enable the Jewish student to feel some empathy for the country’s Arab citizens. Avoiding the traditional dichotomy between a peace-loving Israel and the belligerent Arabs, the text emphasized that Israel was entering a period in which the term “conflict” does not cover all aspects of Israeli-Arab relations, as, for example, Israeli relations with Egypt, Jordan and Morocco.132 Methodologically, the textbook courageously attempted to raise some of the fundamental questions regarding the existence of an Arab minority in a democratic, Jewish-Zionist state. It did not offer, however, clear-cut answers, and some of the messages that it conveyed could be construed as biased. The textbook also chose to use the problematic terms “Israeli Arabs” and “Arabs of Eretz Israel,” playing down the importance of the Palestinian identity. At the same time, the ministry established an institute for Arab-Jewish coexistence in cooperation with the Office of the Advisor for

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Arab Affairs in the Prime Minister’s Office. It aimed at fostering understanding, cooperation, and mutual respect between Jewish and Arab youth through the venue of seminars and other encounters and the publication of educational materials.133 In practice, however, the institute did little to advance Arab-Jewish coexistence. With these important steps, the ministry continued to view the strengthening of Zionist consciousness as high on its agenda, especially in light of the mounting emigration from Israel.134 The central annual theme for the 1981/82 school year was “A Hundred Years since the Genesis of the New Settlement of Eretz Israel (1882–1982).” According to a ministerial directive, it aimed at “presenting the epic settlement of Eretz Israel in order to entrench identification with Zionist values and awareness of Zionist unity of action throughout the ages.”135 Taking into account that changes in the curriculum, as well as replacing or revising textbooks, is a long process, the annual theme constituted a powerful, if finite, lever for the minister. During the course of the year, the entire education system geared various activities—special classes, seminars, annual trips, students’ papers, and competitions—to further the topic. In addition, several study booklets were prepared on the theme.136 Generally, however, the actual study of Zionism, though somewhat expanded, hardly differed from previously. Teachers were urged to emphasize the pioneering First Aliyah period of the late 1800s, but the presentation was based on the traditional narrative that appeared in the first- and second-generation textbooks. Moreover, a certain discontent, especially in the religious system, was still felt concerning a perceived lack of education for Zionist values, which stimulated the publication of several private textbooks aimed simultaneously at preparing the student for matriculation exams and deepening Zionist consciousness. The most important of these textbooks was one by Amnon Hever, a right-wing history teacher, published in 1981 and reissued in five editions thereafter. It concluded with a special chapter title: “Know What to Respond,” which was not intended for final exams but for what the author described as the real test—“remaining in the country in spite of the difficulties and the disappointments.” This chapter, the author explained, was intended “to strengthen the youths’ resolve, prevent erosion of his identity, and strengthen his ability to confront various Arab arguments, which, in the absence of knowledge about the Jewish community in the country, create an illusion of truthfulness.”137 The textbook was filled with omissions, biases, and inaccuracies, a vivid reminder of the old, slanted textbooks that were in use until the mid-1970s.138 The success of the textbook may be attributed to the ministry’s neglect to provide satisfactory textbooks. Be that as it may, the popularity of the textbook points to two additional factors: negative perceptions of the Arabs were still influential in the 1980s, and students continued to be educated according to these perceptions.

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A development that had long-range consequences for Israeli society, including the sphere of education, was the Lebanese war in 1982, which engendered a deep conflict in Israel ideologically and politically. One result was the emergence of extreme right-wing groups, such as the Kach movement led by Rabbi Meir Kahana, and the eruption of violent clashes that culminated in the assassination of a demonstrator in a march by the Peace Now movement in September 1983. In response, Minister Hammer announced that “Israeli Unity” would be the annual theme during the 1983/84 and 1984/85 school years. According to ministerial instructions, the education system was to emphasize the importance of defusing communal tensions, educate for tolerance between religious and secular populations, and demonstrate the avoidance of verbal violence.139 Significantly, however, Israeli unity, as envisaged by the Ministry of Education, did not include the Arab minority and failed to refer to the tension between Jews and Arabs. Still, developments in the Israeli society in the post-Lebanese war period led to certain changes that initiated a new era in the ministry’s thinking regarding the treatment of the Arab in textbooks.

The Transformative Phase: Adulthood (1984/85–2000) In February 1984, the director-general of the Ministry of Education, Eliezer Shemu’eli, launched a new program entitled “Education for Jewish- Arab Coexistence,” which was to be implemented both in the secular and religious school system. Marking a new phase in the thinking of the education system regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and Arab history, the program was the product of a ministerial committee set up by the Pedagogic Secretariat two years earlier. Regrettably, however, its implementation was a slow process. The program on Education for Jewish-Arab Coexistence was based on the perception that the need to deal with Jewish-Arab relations in Israel and relations with the Arab states was an “existential necessity.” Ignoring these two issues, it was stated, meant “educating the young generation toward ignorance and alienation with regard to questions that would always stand at the very core of our existence.” The term “conflict,” it was clarified, was no longer appropriate to describe Jewish-Arab relations because there were Arab states and groups that had dealings with Israel (such as Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Arabs of Israel), while other Arab states were still in a state of war. The program called for imparting the ability to maintain “intercultural contact on the basis of equality and respect for the other’s culture.” More concretely, it recommended teaching Arab history, language, literature, and culture. These subjects were to be integrated throughout the educational process, from kindergarten to high school. In addition, all existing curricula and textbooks would be reviewed with the aim of deleting wording fostering stereotypes and prejudice, while at the

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same time new material would be prepared serving the previously mentioned goals. The implementation of this ambitious program was to take three years. In the absence of the necessary infrastructure, the Van Leer Foundation was asked by the ministry to prepare curricula and textbooks on the subject (for the full text, see Appendix 1).140 The main principles of the program also became part of the aims of the religious education system. When the religious administration in the Ministry of Education published a pamphlet on its general education policy in November 1988, it was stated that the conflict with the Arabs resulted in the adoption of “stereotypical perceptions of foreigners in general and the Arabs in particular.” The student was therefore instructed to treat any individual as a human being and learn to differentiate between Arabs who are still enemies and Arabs who maintain peaceful and neighborly relations with Israel. The religious education, it was further asserted, was committed to emphasize the quest for peace with the neighbors, to educate for mutual respect, and to diffuse negative emotions toward the Arabs and foreigners in general.141 The publication of the program on Education for Jewish-Arab Coexistence coincided with the appointment of a new minister of education, former President Yitzhak Navon of the Labor Party in September 1984. One of his first decisions was to concentrate on the issue of “education for democracy.” The long-term incentive for Navon’s decision was the worrisome developments of a radical right element in Israeli society in the early 1980s, as reflected in the results of the 1984 elections in which the extreme rightist Kach Party gained 1.2% of the vote. A more immediate reason, however, was the alarming finding of a poll conducted by the Van Leer Foundation published in September 1984, just as Navon took office. The poll revealed that a third of the high school student population believed in democracy, 40% expressed democratic attitudes only in respect to certain issues, and 25% expressed anti-democratic positions. Moreover, in response to questions dealing with foreigners in general and Arabs in particular, 50% revealed anti-democratic attitudes.142 Another study, conducted by Haifa University at about the same time, revealed that elementary school students felt great anxiety toward Arabs, linking such stereotypical images to the Arab as kidnapper, killer, terrorist, and criminal.143 Although these studies made it clear to the Ministry of Education that the issues of education for democracy and for Jewish-Arab coexistence were intertwined, priority was to be given to the former issue. In preparatory discussions in the ministry, a shift in priorities was suggested: while in the past, concepts such as nation, land, and state were emphasized, now the focus ought to be the “individual” (adam), or the “Jewish individual.”144 Consequently, a decision was made to include a new optional topic, “Education for Democracy,” in the civics curriculum. This topic was also fixed as the annual theme for the next two school years (1985/86,

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1986/87). One of the declared aims of the program was education for “pluralism, tolerance toward the other, [and] tolerance toward minorities.” In his introductory note to the ministerial directive on the subject, Minister Navon emphasized the importance of education for Jewish-Arab coexistence. The two issues—education for democracy and for Jewish-Arab coexistence—were thus formally linked.145 The ministry was to rely on existing educational materials (such as The Arab Citizens of Israel), as well as new ones that were to be developed. In addition, the plan envisaged the initiation of Jewish-Arab student encounters whose aim was to ameliorate anxieties on both sides and help dispel mutual negative stereotypes. To further education for democracy, some schools, in accordance with the ministry’s recommendations, initiated Arab-Jewish pupil encounters during the 1985/86 school year. Those that were well prepared in advance were generally successful; others, which were improperly prepared, failed and perhaps even reinforced existing negative attitudes. Overall, however, the encounters were important because they exposed acute problems and illuminated the gulf between the perceptions that Jews and Arabs held of each other.146 Moreover, according to the Ministry of Education’s spokesman, the encounters revealed that “Jewish youth demonstrates lack of knowledge, to say the least, about the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and deep ignorance of Arab society and culture.” The ministry recommended, therefore, that the teaching of these issues precede the encounters.147 It was unclear, however, how schools were to respond to this directive in view of the lack of appropriate background on the part of teachers and an absence of adequate educational materials. This may explain why few schools took part in the encounter program and relatively few teachers (only 2–3%) participated in seminars designed to prepare them for the meetings. In addition, schools in the religious system objected to the encounters a priori, fearing that they would affect their students negatively and lead to assimilation.148 The rigid position of the religious establishment substantiates the assertion that the collective memory of the Jews as victims of persecution and annihilation plans had made them “prisoners of their own past.”149 On the whole, it appears that ministry activity in this area, though important, was not sufficiently comprehensive, while also meeting with a degree of resistance in the “field.”150 To further develop activities and educational materials for schools on this topic, the ministry established a special Unit for Education, Democracy and Coexistence in early 1986,151 which was to serve as an important vehicle for promoting issues connected with education for democracy and coexistence during 1987–95. In particular, the unit was responsible for advancing three areas: seminars for teachers, including meetings between Arab and Jewish teachers, as well as workshops for students; publishing materials on democracy, civil rights, and Arab-Jewish relations; and backing voluntary bodies that promoted democracy and coexistence. In the

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publishing area, it was responsible specifically for the textbook Neighbors, prepared as an optional topic for seventh–ninth grades and introduced in 1989.152 The Unit was also responsible for providing materials for teachers and students on various aspects of current affairs. In May 1990, for example, it published a compilation of short articles on the Intifada and on the downfall of the Soviet Union.153 Most of these materials were designed as aids in informal teaching.154 While it appears that most teachers were aware of the existence of the Unit and used its materials, it is impossible to measure the impact of its activities on the education system. What can be discerned is that, unfortunately, the conceptual link that had been posited between education for democracy and for Jewish-Arab coexistence acted to the detriment of the latter. It soon became apparent that the ministry was engaged first and foremost in furthering a wide range of issues related to education for democracy, while education for coexistence was dealt with only insofar as it was connected with the concept of democracy, not as an independent issue. Moreover, since the Unit focused on informal education, each school could decide on its own whether to highlight the issue of Jewish-Arab coexistence. Unless the topic was integrated into the formal system, it was unlikely to have any lasting impact. Indeed, the study of the Arab minority in Israel was gradually integrated into the civics curriculum, but the principles guiding the program for education for Jewish-Arab coexistence remained largely on paper. The study of Arabic was a case in point. When Navon entered office, the expectation was that his affinity for the Arab culture would lead him to encourage and expand the study of Arabic. Indeed, one of his first steps was to instruct Brigadier-General Nissim Atzmon, of army intelligence (a branch of the army that relied on the education system to turn out a pool of conscripts proficient in Arabic), to assess the state of Arabic instruction in the education system. Like Navon, Atzmon was convinced that knowledge of Arab history and language was directly connected with education for democracy and coexistence. “If we sit at home, close the shutters and do not learn about the other nation and its culture,” Atzmon observed, “we will never achieve security.”155 In October 1985, he published an extensive report revealing that only 6% of the students who began studying Arabic in fifth grade continued it into twelfth grade. The most important problem, he found, was that students avoided studying Arabic because it was considered a “low status” subject.156 This perception undoubtedly reflected the negative stereotypical perception Israelis have of the Arabs. Shortly after this distressing report was submitted to the minister, Member of Knesset, Abba Eban, a staunch supporter of the study of Arabic since his own tenure as minister of education in the early 1960s, raised the subject in the Knesset. Lucidly reviewing past problems in the teaching of Arabic and Arab history in a speech in December 1985, Eban observed that the

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unwillingness of students to study Arabic is connected with their tendency to identify Zionism with segregation (“a people dwelling alone”). The great Zionist pioneers, he pointed out, did not acknowledge that Israel was destined to live alongside the Arabs. The slogan “a land without people for a people without land” was part of the common wisdom, he argued, but “there was never a grain of truth to this slogan.” Few recognized the importance of becoming acquainted with the Arabs. Instead, the Arab was viewed solely as the enemy. Although changing this perception is indeed difficult, Eban acknowledged, the education system must prepare for the future by persuading students to study Arabic not because it is the enemy’s language, but because it is the key to understanding the Arabs’ glorious culture. Israel must develop not only its national consciousness, he concluded, but “a regional consciousness” as well.157 Picking up where Eban left off, Navon drew attention to the exceedingly low number of graduates in Arabic and called for “a complete overhaul in the study of Arabic,” emphasizing that Israel is part of the Middle East, surrounded by 200 million Arabs. Like Eban, he expressed the conviction that the education system must not sit by and wait for peace but prepare itself by intensifying the study of Arabic.158 Navon, adopting Atzmon’s report, embarked on a new policy for the teaching of Arabic in June 1986. New measures included a decision to set up a unit (under Atzmon’s supervision) responsible for furthering the instruction of Arabic and Arab culture by means of seminars and innovative study tools, including new textbooks. Another innovation was the designation of Arabic as a compulsory subject in the seventh grade. By 1991, the number of Arabic students climbed to 131,000. There was not, however, a concomitant rise in the number of graduates matriculating in Arabic.159 Despite these important changes, the anticipated upgrading of the status of Arabic studies did not occur, mainly because Arabic was not made a compulsory subject in high schools, and because the attitude toward the status of Arabic had not changed. Side by side with Navon’s commitment to advance education for Jewish-Arab coexistence was his desire to further Zionist education. With the formal history and civics curricula already filled with Zionist education, Navon focused on the informal education system. The Department of Curriculum Planning began publishing a series of “current education” booklets geared to short-duration educational activities. One such booklet, titled “To be a Zionist,” commemorated 1987 as the ninetieth anniversary of the World Zionist Organization, the seventieth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, and the fortieth anniversary of the decision to establish the State of Israel.160 The educational theme for the 1987/88 school year was designated “The Declaration of Independence, the State’s Symbols and the State’s Fortieth Anniversary,” with a lengthy ministerial directive issued to all levels of the education system on how to convey the subject. Schools

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were instructed to emphasize the values contained in the Declaration of Independence: the link between the people and the land, immigration (aliyah) and peace.161 In reality, furthering these national ideals ipso facto conflicted with education for coexistence. Meanwhile, a new textbook published in 1989 for the formal education, The First Twenty Years of the State of Israel, for ninth grade,162 marked a leap forward. It was the most courageous attempt thus far in dealing with some of the serious dilemmas confronting Israel during that period. These included such security issues as border clashes, the 1956 Sinai war, the 1967 war, and their domestic and foreign ramifications. Although still flawed by inaccuracies, omissions, and biases, the new textbook reflected a genuine attempt to present new viewpoints on these sensitive issues. The teacher’s guide clearly made the point of the necessity, in the discussion of political and security issues, more than in other subjects, to give a “balanced presentation and to avoid taking one-sided and definitive positions. The students should be guided to rational discussion, going beyond emotional reactions, which will show them that facts can be interpreted in various ways and that there is not necessarily only one way to solve problems.”163 Still, biases, reflected particularly in the reproduction of condescending caricatures (see Appendix 11), showed that despite significant improvements in the second generation of textbooks, certain stereotypical perceptions lingered. That changes introduced in the 1980s both in the formal and informal education system were still not internalized by the early 1990s was demonstrated by a document drawn up in the ministry in light of the massive influx of Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union at that time. It consisted of a short list of basic Jewish, Zionist, and Israeli terms that each new student should know. The idea was that within a short time the student would become familiar with the “cultural and mental codes” of Israeli society, thus facilitating integration. In the field of history the required material included such terms as emancipation, anti-Semitism, Etzel (pre-state Jewish rightist underground movement), Bilu (the earliest Zionist settlement movement from Eastern Europe in the late nineteenth century), the aliyot (waves of immigration before and after the establishment of Israel), the British Mandate, Zionism, Holocaust, the Declaration of Independence, and the Six-Day War. Basic terms in civics included, among others, the Intifada, the PLO, and the territories (West Bank and Gaza).164 Significantly, these “cultural codes” did not include such terms as Arabs, Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, etc.), Palestinians, the Arab minority in Israel, the Druze, and, perhaps most revealing, the Middle East. The single textbook on the history of Zionism to be published by the Department of Curriculum Planning in the early 1990s, A Journey through the First Settlements (moshavot) for third and fourth grades, reflected the same relative openness as The First Twenty Years textbook of 1989. It was the first textbook for the primary grades that attempted to describe historical reality

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rather than advance, whether directly or tacitly, accepted Zionist myths. For example, teachers were instructed to emphasize that the majority of the population in Eretz Israel prior to Zionist settlement was Arab. Moreover, the Arab, in various roles, was not excluded from the Zionist endeavor.165 Although some of the Arab images in this textbook may still viewed as stereotypical, overall it presents a more balanced picture than previous textbooks. The problems high school students found in the use of the ministry textbooks—that is, overdensity of the material and the inclusion of historical sources on the expense of the historical narrative—opened the way for private writers to produce their own textbooks. Although they hoped that the ministry would include them in its recommended list of textbooks, most were not approved. Still, several unauthorized textbooks became school bestsellers, probably because they were more readable and their typographical format more appealing than the ministry textbooks. In terms of presentation of the other, however, these unauthorized textbooks were replete with inaccuracies, biased descriptions, and prejudicial attitudes, reminiscent, in some cases, of the first generation. That the writers were generally unfamiliar with Middle Eastern history may partially account for these failures; more likely their approach simply reflected the negative perceptions that were still widespread in Israeli society. A pronounced trend during the 1990s was the use made by the various education ministers (Navon, Hammer, Shulamit Aloni, and Amnon Rubinstein) of the informal education system as a means to further their worldviews. Unlike the formal system, in which curricula and textbooks evolved as the end of product of prolonged procedures, the informal system—for example, seminars, booklets on current issues, and the annual theme—involved more flexibility and produced immediate results. Typically, Zevulun Hammer, during his second term as minister (1990–92), announced the annual theme “Jerusalem” for the 1992/93 school year, just before elections were to be held. In his view, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the unification of Jerusalem was a valuable opportunity to strengthen the link between the student and the Israeli capital. Of the various theme-related activities suggested to the schools, the problem of Jewish-Arab relations in Jerusalem was hardly present.166 In the early 1990s, a significant change occurred in the civics curriculum, formally introduced in the 1992/93 school year. The new curriculum expanded the study of the Israeli political system by including one optional topic to be chosen by the teacher from the following four: national security; the Arab citizens of Israel; religion, society, and state; and society and economy.167 The new curriculum thereby signaled an important change with respect to the teaching of the Arab-Israeli conflict: the topic, which had elicited considerable public interest when it was introduced in the mid-1970s, had been quietly dropped from the curriculum. Instead, stu-

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dents interested in studying Jewish-Arab relations could select to learn on the Arab minority in Israel or on certain aspects of Israel’s national security. The reasons for dropping the Arab-Israeli conflict from the curriculum were both political and pedagogic: the ministry’s inability to keep up with current political changes; the growing emphasis on topics directly connected with democracy; the fact that the topic was polemic by definition; and the realization that most teachers avoided the conflict issue altogether.168 Although this curricular decision constituted no more than a formal recognition of reality, it may be viewed as an admission that the attempt to introduce study of the Arab-Israeli conflict into the education system had failed. While the study of the Arab minority became highly popular in both the secular and the religious education systems, few schools chose the topic “national security.” Since the ministry offered no textbooks or teaching aids for it, the content of the subject remained entirely at the teacher’s discretion.169 With the electoral victory of the Labor Party in June 1992, the education portfolio was allotted to Meretz, Labor’s left-wing partner. The main challenge facing the ministry under the succession of two Meretz ministers heading it (Aloni and Rubinstein) during the years 1992–96 was the peace process and the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, for which the ministry was caught unprepared. Despite the urging by some politicians and academics that the ministry should prepare for peace by furthering the teaching of Arabic, Arab history and Arab-Israeli relations—appeals that were not altogether unheeded—the results were unimpressive. The overall number of high school graduates who matriculated in Arabic was still negligible and the study of the Arab-Israeli conflict was insignificant. Although the work carried out by the Unit for Education, Democracy and Coexistence in the informal system was commendable, the main source of knowledge about the Arabs was still the problematic textbooks on Zionism and Israel. In an attempt to tackle the problem, Minister Rubinstein announced in January 1994 that the annual theme for the 1994/95 school year would be “The Peace Process: Israel in the Middle East.” The decision came as a surprise because the ministry had been preparing for another topic.170 The last-minute change mirrored developments in the political arena and the worldview of the ministry’s higher echelons as well. The aim of the theme was stated unequivocally: “To develop a tolerant citizen, aware of the values of peace, sensitive, alert, involved, knowledgeable, with a reasoned and established political world view, able to conduct a cultured dialogue with people holding different views and develop empathy and understanding, without necessarily agreeing with them.”171 This statement could be considered revolutionary. Indeed, the choice of the theme was an attempt to transform the thinking that had guided the ministry heretofore. The term “peace process,” the ministerial directive stated, “has replaced the term Arab-Israeli conflict. This change represents

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a revolution in thinking, emotional attitude and behavior. Such a change cannot be attained by words, and not from today to tomorrow, but through a long process.”172 More concretely, students were expected to learn about both war and peace in Israeli-Arab relations; gain knowledge of the Arab world, including the Arabs in Israel; become aware of the various attitudes in Israeli society toward the peace process; and study the place of Israel in the Middle East. According to the previous head of the Unit for Education, Democracy and Coexistence, Doron Shohet, the main innovation was the realization by the ministry that “education for peace” should top its agenda, especially after having failed to tackle the issue ever since the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979. The annual theme that was selected would allow the education system to stimulate comprehension of the term “peace,” as well as deal with the problem of stereotypes, prejudices, and dehumanization of the enemy.173 In May 1995, the ministry published an impressive catalogue of over 500 pages of suggested activities and teaching aids for schools on the annual theme.174 The Department of Curriculum Planning published several booklets for teachers and students to use in their discussions of the peace process.175 Other privately produced booklets and teaching aids also flooded the schools. In addition, the ministry set up a committee tasked to propose curricular and textbook changes in light of the peace process. The committee was also instructed to check for stereotypes and prejudices in teaching materials, as well as offer recommendations for the study of Arabic and of other aspects of Arab-Jewish relations.176 Despite this plethora of educational activity, there could be no expectation that what the ministry had failed to do in 50 years could be rectified in one year. It was unreasonable to assume that students could absorb so much information in so many issues in one year, and consequently alter ingrained perceptions of the Other. Indeed, the writers of the ministerial directive admitted that a revolution in thinking necessitates a long process. Such a process certainly did not precede the “peace year” and, in the event, did not follow it either, at least in the immediate future. The political and ideological climate was to change drastically in the wake of the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995. The priority of the Ministry of Education in the post-assassination atmosphere was to attempt to heal grave breaches in Israeli society between right and left and between religious and secular. Just before leaving office, Rubinstein announced the annual theme for the 1996/97 and 1997/98 school years as “A Hundred Years since the First Zionist Congress and Fifty Years since the Formation of the State of Israel.”177 While this seemingly uninspired choice may have appeared to be a continuation of the old efforts to strengthen Zionist identity, an examination of the instructions sent to schools reveals a more sophisticated reality. The aim of the theme, according to the directive, was not “reinforcing history classes” but “raising some

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of the normative, ideological and educational issues that lie at the heart of our existence.” Both teachers and students were expected to confront the materials of the so-called “New Historians” and were asked to hold discussions on the essence and content of national values at a period when myths were being debunked. Ultimately, however, the aim was that “the student feel a connection, love, pride and attachment to his state, people and culture.”178 Revealing a measure of pluralism, the ministry advised the teacher that this conclusion was only one possible outcome of teaching the subject. Eventually, the theme was to be implemented by Zevulun Hammer, who reassumed the leadership of the ministry in 1996, four years after completing his previous term in this office. Major changes were also introduced in the history curriculum during Rubinstein’s term, resulting in the further transformation of history textbooks. A new curriculum for the sixth to ninth grades was announced for the 1994/95 school year, replacing the old curriculum dating back to 1975. Two guiding principles published in connection with it are noteworthy: First, the new curriculum aimed at creating a synthesis between world history and Jewish (or Israeli) history. Second, the historical narrative was to be guided by two considerations: the major impact of Western culture on Israeli society, on the one hand, and Israel’s linkage to the Middle East region, on the other. The teaching aims remained identical to the 1975 curriculum. In concrete terms, most of the topics that appeared in the old curriculum were repeated in the new. For our purposes, the major differences were the addition of study of the Ottoman Empire in the seventh grade, and a discussion of the period from the 1973 war until the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, as well as the post-Cold War peace process, both topics for ninth grade.179 A new, “third generation” of history textbooks were written according to the new curriculum, most of which were either produced by the Department of Curriculum Planning or by private authors and approved by the ministry. Consequently, the ministerial textbooks published during 1976–84 were gradually phased out, although some of them were still being used in school year 1999/2000. Concomitantly, a change was also introduced in the history curriculum for high school. In 1995, a ministerial committee headed by a Hebrew University historian, Yisrael Bartal, was charged with developing a new history curriculum for the high school level. On the basis of the committee’s interim recommendations, the ministry issued a transitional history curriculum in the 1998/99 school year. It focused on various themes in modern history (1870–1970) and integrating the study of Zionism and Israel into this context rather than presenting it as a separate subject, as previously. One of the major aims of the new program was to rectify the situation that Israel’s post-1948 period was rarely addressed in history classes. Additionally, the new program was to be implemented in technological and agricultural schools, which had only been partially exposed to contemporary

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Zionist issues in the past.180 New textbooks were prepared on the basis of the interim curriculum, with several new textbooks covering the 1870–1920 period, published for the 1998/99 school year, and others covering the second phase (1920–1970), published for the 1999/ 2000 school year. The new textbooks were intended to replace unauthorized textbooks that proliferated in the schools during the 1990s.181 Another important development took place in the civics education. In 1995, Professor of Law Mordechai Kremnitzer of the Hebrew University was appointed head of a committee to develop a new, comprehensive program for teaching civics, which would be relevant to all Israeli students (including the Arabs and Druze) and based on new textbooks. In February 1996, the committee published an interim report stating that the aim of civics is to “educate for citizenship in the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.” This aim, however, was not considered contradictory to the right of non-Jewish citizens, mostly Arab Palestinians, to “cultivate their heritage and their cultural, religious and national identity.” Moreover, the report stated, the study of civics must pay special attention to the issue of equality, especially with regard to women and the Arab minority, and called for checking all educational aids with the aim of eliminating stereotypes. In the realm of Jewish-Arab relations, the report recommended teaching Arab culture: the similarities between Hebrew and Arabic; and Jewish-Arab relations during the Golden Age in Spain.182 What remains to be seen is how these positive references to the other will be implemented in the new civics textbook. Although it is too early to make a final judgment on these recent changes, it would appear that the new curricula and history textbooks address some problems that typified the first- and second-generation textbooks. Several new textbooks even attempted to inform the students of the problems inherent in the writing of history textbooks. One referred to the role of the education system and the curricula in the process of nationbuilding.183 Another guided the teacher to indicate to the students that as “truthful” as the historical episode is, “it is open to multiple interpretations, according to the angle of the observer.” Moreover, the teacher’s guide for this textbook went on emphasizing that as “the history we are writing is more contemporary, it is more difficult to reach an agreed truth.”184 Clearly, the Ministry of Education has attempted to deal with sensitive issues more forthrightly than in the past. Some of these changes are highly relevant to the study of Arab-Jewish relations. First, the awareness that the history of Zionism and the State of Israel should be studied within the context of global and regional developments means that other nationalist movements (e.g., the Arab and Palestinian national movements) are also considered. Second, the realization that the post-1948 Israeli period is vital leads to the teaching of several important episodes in Arab-Jewish relations that were previously avoided or neglected. Last, the presentation of both

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Arabs and the Arab-Israeli conflict in the new textbooks is considerably more balanced than previously. In some textbooks there is a genuine attempt to construct a narrative that not only glorifies Zionist history but is also critical of certain aspects of Zionism. Justifiably, several textbooks even went beyond the chronological framework of the history curriculum and described the events until the end of the century (instead of until 1970, as specified in the curriculum). These textbooks, therefore, deal also with important contemporary issues, such as the 1973 war, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the 1982 war in Lebanon, the Intifada, and the peace process. Regrettably, analysis of all the new history textbooks reveals that the old Zionist narrative is still found—an indication that the process of transformation has not yet been completed. Moreover, the recent heated public debate over the textbooks’ depiction of the “few against the many” myth shows that some in Israeli society still consider textbooks to be a major socialization instrument that should transmit a certain “approved” knowledge.185 Moreover, the fact the Education Committee of the Knesset, under public pressure, decided in November 2000 “to delay the use” of one new textbook may attest to the fact that the battle over the historical narrative is not yet over.186 Yet the positive changes found in some third-generation textbooks should not be overlooked or underestimated. This improvement stems primarily from two developments. First, the appearance of new historiography based on newly released archival material, which is more critical of Israel and the Zionist movement than before. It took these studies roughly a decade before they penetrated the narrative of the new textbooks. Second, the improvement resulted from changes in Israeli society with regard to perceptions of the other. Clearly, the changes in the history curriculum and in the content of the textbooks reflect a more mature society able to regard self-criticism not as a sign of weakness but rather as a source of strength. Yet, it should be borne out that these changes were incremental; it was the second-generation textbooks that had laid the groundwork for the changes introduced in the third generation. NOTES All sources published in Israel are in Hebrew unless otherwise mentioned. 1. See, e.g., C.S. Liebman and E. Don-Yehiya, Civil Religion in Israel: Traditional Judaism and Political Culture in the Jewish State (Berkeley: 1983), p. 170; O. Almog, The Sabra—A Profile (Tel Aviv: 1997), pp. 52–61. 2. M. Hendel, “Teaching History,” in A.E. Simon (ed.), A Pedagogic Encyclopaedia: The Basics of Education (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, undated), p. 249; E. Livneh, “Nationalist Teaching,” ibid., p. 423; M. Hendel, Pathways of History (Tel Aviv: 1967), p. 129; Teaching History, Unit 2 (Tel Aviv: The Open University, 1980), p. 1. According to Russell, the contradiction between these two schools of thought cannot be surmounted; B. Russell, On Education (London: 1942), p. 10.

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3. M. Vizinger (Ziv) “Improving the History Curriculum” in H.I. Ruth (ed.), Educating the Citizen (Jerusalem: 1950) pp. 116–19. 4. M. Ziv, Teaching History in the Classroom: Methods and Trends (Tel Aviv: 1957), pp. 13–14. For a similar view, see N. Zon, “Some Remarks on Political Education and its Place in Teaching History,” in M. Geter (ed.), Methodology: An Investigation of the Methods of Teaching High School History (Tel Aviv: 1970), p. 57. 5. Ziv, Teaching History, p. 16. 6. Ibid., p. 22. Yitzhak Shapira, who served as principal of the Haifa HaRe’ali High School for thirty years, argued that the principle of freedom “does not assume the school is nothing but a channel for supplying data and information. The school must educate its students and instill values common to the nation as a whole.” See his Teaching in Accordance with the Spirit of the Age (Tel Aviv: 1989), p. 64. The introductions to several textbooks present similar views, e.g., B. Ahiya and M. Harpaz, The History of the Jewish Nation: The Nation’s Resurgence—From Centuries of Yearning for Zion to the Fulfillment of Zionism and the Establishment of the State of Israel (Tel Aviv: 1959). The teacher’s introduction notes that “the student will learn about . . . the difficulties and doubts which beset the Zionist movement as well as about the devotion and dedication of its flag-bearers; they will learn that everything built and achieved in this country was the product of tireless labor, perseverance and much sacrifice. This will help to bind the youth to their homeland with ties of love and respect, shape their character, and imbue them with the values of good citizenship.” 7. Ziv, “Improving the History Curriculum,” pp. 125–28. Educator Avigdor Kelner called this approach “desirable goal-oriented teaching,” in Pedagogic Encyclopaedia; under the entry “Goal Orientation and Neutrality in Education,” Kelner argues that “the teacher should never over-emphasise a favoured goal. Nor should this goal be introduced in the form of an argumentative and disputatious confrontation of ideas. Rather, it should be presented subtly and temperately. Ideally, the student should not even be aware of the process. This requires a great deal of pedagogic tact and restraint as well as the ability to discreetly steer the student towards the desired value” (p. 763). Ahad Ha’am was perhaps the first Jewish pedagogue to hold this view. He believed that a true nationalist education, “by planting general humanistic values in a national context, allows children to unconsciously absorb the spirit of their nation.” See his article “A Nationalist Education” as quoted in M. Eliav and P.A. Klienberger, The History of Education in Israel and Other Nations: Sources (Tel Aviv: 1969), pp. 236–37. 8. These quotations were taken from Zon’s papers, TAU, AJEID, 6.29/21, no dates given. 9. See minutes of a meeting held at the Ben-Zvi Institute in Jerusalem, with the participation of Deputy Minister of Education Aaron Yadlin, TAU, AJEID, Zon Papers, 28 July 1971. 10. Z. Adar, The Humanities in High School (Tel Aviv: 1965), p. 145. See also idem, The Jewish Education in Israel and the United States (Tel Aviv: 1970), pp. 82–87. 11. Adar, The Humanities in High School, p. 146. 12. M. Zeliger, “On the Method of Teaching History in High School,” Urim, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1948), pp. 105–6. For a similar view, see B. Vollman, “The Textbook and its Role in Teaching High School History, Hed Hahinuch, Vol. 7–8 (1947), pp. 12–20.

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13. Hendel, “Teaching History,” p. 268. Quoted also in Pathways of Education, p. 149; and “On the Problem of Teaching Israeli History,” Urim, Vol. 14 (1957), p. 39. See also the material found in TAU, AJEID, Hendel’s Private Collection, 5.215/2221, “The Study of History in Seventh and Eighth Grades,” p. 286; and “The Aim of Teaching History.” 14. Y. Paporish, “Teaching History in High School,” Urim, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1948), p. 115. See also M. Duvshani, Talking About Education (Tel Aviv: 1962), p. 80; P. Kleinberger, “The Right to Teach Affirmative Values,” Megamot, Vol. 11 (November 1961), pp. 332–37. 15. D. Ben-Gurion, “Israel’s Spiritual and Pioneering Mission,” Eternal Israel (Tel Aviv: 1964), p. 158. 16. S. Ettinger, “Ben-Zion Dinur: The Man, the Historian and his Mission,” History and Historians (Jerusalem: 1992), p. 127. See also Y. Barna’i, Historiography and Nationalism (Jerusalem: 1995), pp. 36–40; S. Almog, “The Many Facets of Zionist History and the History of the Jewish Community,” in M. Zimmerman et al. (eds.), Studies in Historiography (Jerusalem: 1988), p. 205. 17. B.Z. Dinur, Generations and Narrations (Jerusalem: 1978), p. 140. For further details on his immense influence see, Firer, Agents of Zionist Education, p. 15; U. Ram, “Zionist Historiography and the Invention of Modern Jewish Nationhood: The Case of Ben-Zion Dinur,” History and Memory, Vol. 7 (1995), pp. 91–123. 18. See the text, Laws of the State of Israel, Vol. 5 (1952/1953), p. 113. 19. S. Shavit, The Significance of the Past: Methods of Teaching History (Tel Aviv: 1985), p. 11; The History and Methods of Teaching It (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1981), pp. 7–10. An accompanying explanatory booklet published by the Ministry of Education underlined the following objectives: “(a) To strengthen the individual’s awareness of the state’s goals and struggles; (b) To reinforce the individual’s motivation and personal commitment toward affirmative action within the framework of the state and society; and (c) To promote a sense of optimism and encourage the need to contribute personally to the State of Israel, the embodiment of Zionist enterprise.” The State and Community Tested, supplementary pamphlet (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1975). 20. History Curriculum, Grades 6–9, for the Secular System, Modified 2nd ed. (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1997), p. 10. An interim curriculum has been published for high school in 1998. The final version is to be published in 2001. 21. R. Alboim-Dror, Hebrew Education in Israel, Vol. II (Jerusalem: 1990), p. 129. 22. Y. Epstein, “The Hidden Question,” Hashilo’ah, No. 17 (1907), p. 205. Ahad Ha’am is the first example. 23. Quoted in Alboim-Dror, Hebrew Education, Vol. II, p. 130. 24. A.E. Simon, “Israeli High School Education: Pedagogic Goals,” in M. Shapira (ed.), High Education: Theory and Practice School (Jerusalem: 1962), p. 166. 25. A. Shapira, Land and Power (Tel Aviv: 1994), p. 352. 26. Ibid., p. 355. 27. Ibid., p. 356. 28. Almog, The Sabra, pp. 298–99. See also Alboim-Dror, Hebrew Education, Vol. II, pp. 359–63. 29. Shapira, Land and Power, p. 487.

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30. E. Riger, Hebrew Education in Eretz Israel: Principles and Trends (Tel Aviv: 1940), pp. 213–14. 31. Ibid., pp. 216–77. Riger expanded his views on the importance of teaching Arabic in an article, “The Problem of Teaching Spoken Arabic,” in I. Ba‘ar, Y. Gutman, and M. Shuva (eds.), The Dinburg Book (Jerusalem: 1949), pp. 408–21. 32. Riger, Hebrew Education, pp. 227–28. 33. S. Lehmann, Roots: The Jewish-Arab Problem in our Education (Jerusalem: 1943), pp. 24–25, 43–44, 48–49. 34. A. Orinovsky, Studying Zionism—What and How? (A Program for High Schools) (Jerusalem: 1941), p. 10. See also Y. Yona‘ i (ed.), Zionism in Hebrew Education (Jerusalem: 1997), pp. 47–49, 68–71. 35. Orinovsky, Studying Zionism, pp. 23–45, 54. 36. Y. Yona‘i (ed.), Arabic in Hebrew Schools (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1992), p. 17. The same attitude was expressed by Professor S. Goitein of Hebrew University in an article published a year later. He claimed that purely Zionist interests demanded that students learn Arabic, which was a prerequisite to the restoration of the Hebrew language and the Jewish return to the Semitic East. “Just as we do not want our children to lose the precious European heritage . . . we want them . . . to feel at home in the East and to be able to live here naturally. To do so . . . they must speak Arabic and know something of the institutions, way of life, and spiritual world of the contemporary Middle East” (Arabic in Hebrew Schools, p. 25). 37. Ibid., p. 56; Almog, The Sabra, p. 302. 38. Yona‘i, Arabic in Hebrew Schools, p. 52. 39. Y. Yona‘i (ed.), Items from the Education and Culture Archives, Compendium No. 2 (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1993), p. 53. 40. M. Shemu’eli, “The Study of Zionism in School,” Hahinuch, Vol. 2–3 (1950), pp. 229–49. Reprinted in Yona‘i, Zionism in Hebrew Education, pp. 78–94. 41. Ibid., pp. 87–88. 42. Ibid., p. 94. 43. TAU, AJEID, a Directive by the Director-General (Eliezer Riger) to all headmasters, 31 December 1954. See also the discussion in Chapter 1. 44. For further details on the setting of pedagogic goals for both local and world geography, see Bar-Gal, One Hundred Years of Zionist Education, pp. 89–91. For the setting of pedagogic goals for history, see Shavit, The Significance of the Past, p. 11. 45. Ben-Zion Dinur, Values and Methods: Problems in Israeli Education and Culture (Tel Aviv: 1958), p. 43. See also his speech in October 1952 entitled “How Would we Educate for Love of the Homeland?” in Yona‘i, Zionism in Hebrew Education, pp. 114–19. 46. Most of these motifs can also be found in Y. Allon’s influential A Curtain of Sand, first published in 1959. See also N. Gertz, “The Few Against the Many,” Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 30 (Winter 1984), pp. 94–104; D. Bar-Tal and D. Antebi, “Siege Mentality in Israel,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Vol. 16 (1992), pp. 251–75. 47. Yona‘i, Zionism in Hebrew Education, p. 120. 48. For the full text, see ibid., pp. 125–29. 49. Ibid., pp. 131–34.

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50. A Suggested Curriculum for High School (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1963), pp. 19–20. 51. TAU, AJEID, DGD, 20 September 1957; 7 November 1957. 52. Y. Peres, A. Erlich and N. Yuval-Davis, “National Education of Arab Youth in Israel: A Curriculum Comparison,” Megamot, Vol. 16 (October 1968), p. 30. Quoted also in M. al-Hajj, Education among Arabs in Israel (Jerusalem: 1996), p. 106. According to these findings, 38.8% of allocated teaching hours was dedicated to Jewish history and 59.8% to general history. 53. TAU, AJEID, Ministry of Education, Director-General’s Directive (DGD), 7 August 1958, 16 October 1958, 1 April 1959; History Curriculum for Elementary School (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1960). This was also reflected in material for final exams. See, e.g., DGD, “Matriculation Exams for 1965,” Jerusalem, 1965 and ff. 54. Al-Hajj, Education among Arabs, p. 112; TAU, DGD, 30 May 1961; 25 May, 7 September 1962. For statistics, see, e.g., Israel Government Yearbook (Jerusalem: 1960), p. 12. 55. Al-Hajj, Education among Arabs, p. 109. 56. Yona‘i, Arabic in Hebrew Schools, p. 77. 57. A. Lavie, “The Problem of Studying the Arabic Language in the Hebrew High School,” Ma’alot (June 1963), pp. 41–43. 58. Al Hamishmar, 9 January 1967. 59. Abba Eban wrote in this connection that “the Jewish public habitually employs expressions such as ‘the only language that the Arabs understand is force.’ Similarly, they label an uncultured person ‘Arab.’ I have even heard children speak in such a way. This kind of speech and thought is offensive and is to be condemned. As Jews, we should be particularly sensitive towards all kinds of national stereotyping and endeavour to paint an entire people in black colours. It is our responsibility and duty to teach the younger generation to respect this region’s past, culture, languages and its desire for progress. Our official speeches must be purged of all hurtful and derogatory references to the Arab culture.” See Al-Hamishmar, 15 July 1966. The article is quoted in full in M. Cohen (ed.), Chapters in the History of Israel: Supplementary Material (Jerusalem: 1974), p. 13. Eban, it should be emphasized, was referring to disparaging expressions used in speeches and not in school textbooks. 60. Yona‘i, Zionism in Hebrew Education, pp. 136–39. 61. See, e.g., a lecture by Naftali Zon, the inspector for high school education in the Ministry of Education (1958–72), to teachers in 1961. In his lecture Zon demonstrated a good knowledge of Arab national history, based on Ya’akov Shimoni’s books, which did not appear in Israeli textbooks. See TAU, AJEID, Zon Papers, “Methodological Remarks on the Teaching of Contemporary Israeli History,” Lecture in Safad, 10 January 1961. Two historiographic sources that bear mentioning are Y. Shimoni, The Arabs of Eretz Israel (Tel Aviv: 1947); and A.N. Polak, The Eastern Question and the Arab Countries (Jerusalem: 1946). 62. The booklet was a joint venture by Ministry of Education’s youth department and the Henrietta Szold Institute. Copies may be found in TAU, AJEID. 63. See, e.g., Y. Yona‘i (ed.), Jewish Content in State Education (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1991), pp. 97–101, 118–22.

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64. For details on the program, see N. Zon, “Discussion in the Program of Teaching the History of the Israeli Nation in Israel and the Diaspora in Recent Ages,” Yedi’on Lamoreh Le-Historia, No. 8–9 (March 1965), pp. 1–7. See also the discussion that followed Zon’s presentation, pp. 7–10. 65. For figures that substantiate this claim, see Yona‘i, Zionism in Hebrew Education, p. 140. See also S. Ya’akobi, “Deprivation of Coverage of the Establishment of Israel,” Hed Hahinuch, Vol. 41, No. 25 (1967), pp. 13–14 (quoted also in ibid., p. 141). See also S. Netzer, “On Teaching the Period 1945–1960 in Schools,” Ma’alot (April 1966), pp. 33–36, which discusses the teaching of world history without mentioning Middle Eastern history. 66. For a unique criticism in this regard, see S. Shamir, “Teaching Contemporary Arab History,” History Teacher’s Bulletin, No. 7 (May 1964), pp. 22–23. 67. “1,200 Teachers Participated in a Pedagogic Conference of the Teachers Union,” Hed Hahinuch, Vol. 41, No. 30 (1967), pp. 12–15, statement by A. Simon, headmaster of the Ben-Shemen youth village; TAU, AJEID, Zon papers, 10.93/12, minutes of the meeting on 17 April 1967, statement by A. Markowitz. 68. TAU, AJEID, Zon Papers, 6.29/21, “The Place of National Consciousness in Education,” opening statement at the meeting of the permanent committee for high school education, 6 March 1967. 69. It should be noted that this was a short-lived development. By 1969–70, the Ministry of Education and the Knesset Education Committee were probing ways to expand Arabic classes in elementary schools. See Ha’aretz, 15 March 1970; Lamerhav, 23 March 1970. 70. Y. Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Israel (Tel Aviv: 1968); The Palestinian Charter and its Significance (Jerusalem: 1974); Y. Porath, The Emergence of the PalestinianArab National Movement, 1918–1929 (Tel Aviv: 1971) [2nd ed. in 1976]; From Riots to Rebellion: The Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1929–1939 (Tel Aviv: 1978). 71. See, e.g., TAU, AJEID, Zon Papers, 6.29/21, “The Place of Education in National Consciousness,” Zon’s opening statement at a meeting of the permanent committee for high school education, 6 March 1967. Elsewhere, Zon wrote that in a democratic system the school must avoid “political indoctrination.” Yet he emphasized that the aim was not merely study of the subject, but bringing the youth to the point of identifying with the problems of their people and state, while becoming aware that the Jewish people in Israel and the Diaspora had a common destiny. See Zon Papers, 6.29/21, “The History of Israel in Recent Ages . . . Ways of Teaching in High Schools,” n.d. 72. For two suggestions on teaching the new subject, see S. Netzer, “A Working Program in the History of Israel in Recent Ages,” Ma’alot (NovemberDecember 1969), pp. 34–41; and suggestion by the History Teachers’ Union: TAU, EA, Zon’s Papers, File 8.124, no date given. See also directions by the Ministry of Education concerning material for final exams, which relate to only one party to the conflict: TAU, AJEID, Ministry of Education, Special DGD for the years 1967–72. 73. See, e.g., an article by G. Knoler, deputy headmaster of Ha-Re’ali School in Haifa and a history teacher, “For Changing the Values in the Teaching of Israel’s History,” Ma’alot (November 1969), pp. 23–24. The 1967 victory coincided with four major events: the seventieth anniversary of the First Zionist Congress, the fiftieth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, the fortieth anniversary of the found-

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ing of the Teachers’ Council for the Jewish National Fund, and the twentieth anniversary of the UN partition resolution. All these served as further incentives to heighten Zionist consciousness. See Discussions of the Pedagogic Secretariat (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1968). See also Aranne’s speech to the Teachers’ Council of the INF, quoted in Yona’i, Zionism in Hebrew Education, pp. 150–52. A ministerial committee headed by Naftali Zon suggested various ways to celebrate these anniversaries in high schools: TAU, AJEID, Zon Papers, 6.27/16, 22 October 1967, minutes of the committee meetings. The following school year (1968/69) saw the publication of a booklet, The Balfour Declaration, 2 November 1917–1967 (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1968). Zon, In an address to teachers, cited one more anniversary, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, see his lecture on the Balfour Declaration at the Levinsky Teachers Seminary, Zon Papers, 6.29/23, 17 November 1967. 74. Discussions of the Pedagogic Secretariat, p. 5. 75. Ibid., p. 26. 76. See, e.g., ibid., p. 27. 77. “Failures in Civil and National Education prior to the Six-Day War,” Hed Hahinuch, Vol. 43, No. 22 (1969), pp. 5–6. On the second attitude, see also Y. Shechter, “A New Confirmation of Our Right to the Land,” ibid., Vol. 41, No. 41 (1967), p. 13. 78. The Arab-Israeli Conflict and Its Significance for Israeli Education, Pamphlet No. 6 (Tel Aviv: The Teachers Union, 1970), p. 4. For a short summary of the proceedings, see “How Should the Arab-Israeli Conflict be Reflected in High School Education,” Hed Hahinuch, Vol. 43, No. 21 (1969), pp. 10–11. The first session took place on 15 January, the second on 13 March, and the third on 8 May 1969. 79. The Arab-Israeli Conflict and Its Significance, p. 4. 80. Ibid., p. 16. For the entire speech, see pp. 6–20. See also “How Should the Arab-Israeli Conflict be Reflected in High School Education,” pp. 10–11. 81. This article was reprinted by the Ministry of Education and distributed to high schools as background material for discussion classes. See Harkabi, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict from Israel’s Viewpoint,” Supplementary Material for Discussion Hours (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1967). 82. The Arab-Israeli Conflict and Its Significance, pp. 20–30. Several months later, both speakers published short summaries of their addresses: Y. Harkabi, “The Teaching of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in High School,” Hayom, 20 May 1969; M. Katz, “An Attempt at Teaching the Article ‘Israel’s Position in the Arab-Israeli Conflict,’” ibid., 27 May 1969. 83. The Arab-Israeli Conflict and Its Significance, pp. 41–53. 84. Ibid., pp. 24–25, 38, 53. 85. Ibid., p. 95. See also pp. 31, 105–6. 86. Interestingly, a detailed account of the proceedings appeared only in the leftist newspapers. See Lamerhav, Kol Ha’am, 18 December 1969. 87. See, in particular, his A Curtain of Sand. 88. See reports on the speech in Yedi’ot Aharonot, 6, 13 February 1970; and editorial in Ha’aretz, 9 February 1970. 89. See the text, “A Speech to the Knesset delivered by Yigal Allon, the Deputy Prime Minster and Minister of Education and Culture” (Jerusalem: Ministry of

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Education, 1972), p. 5. See also his speech on 25 June 1973, in which he extols the value of peace, “Education in the 1970s” (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1973). 90. Teaching Values (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1971), pp. 23–24. 91. A. Yadlin, “The Turning Point: The Development of School Curricula,” in S. Eden (ed.), The New School Curricula (Tel Aviv: 1971), p. 16. See also his lecture, “Education for Zionist Values in School,” quoted in Yona‘i, Zionism in Hebrew Education, pp. 155–59; his opening speech at a conference at Tel Aviv University, TAU, AJEID, Zon Papers, 6.29/18, 27 December 1970; and his address at a conference at the Ben-Zvi Institute, ibid., 28 July 1971. 92. See, e.g., Yedi’ot Aharonot, 25 November; 7, 16, 28 December 1973; 24 April 1974; Ma’ariv, 28 November, 16 December 1973; Yona‘i, Zionism in Hebrew Education, pp. 161–67. 93. Ma’ariv, 12 December 1973. In a similar vein, Mordecai Cohen wrote: “Most of us were convinced that until the truama of the Yom Kippur War, the goal [of instilling Jewish and Zionist values] stood at the forefront of the teachers’ pedagogic concerns and that they served it both loyally and successfully. . . . The war, however, gave rise to many pointed and painful questions, doubts and uncertainties.” See M. Cohen (ed.), Chapters in the History of Israel, Vol. I (Tel Aviv: 1981), pp. 6–7. 94. See A. Israeli, “A National Education Is Required,” Ma’alot (January–February 1973), pp. 15–16. 95. One of the critics even termed the current history curriculum “anti-national,” and urged the ministry to make immediate changes that would reflect the conviction in the right of the Jewish cause. See F. Qaray, “The First Culprit: The Ministry of Education,” Ma’ariv, 24 December 1973. See also responses to this article, ibid., 30 December 1973; A. Weiss, “The Educational Mishap, or the Image of the Israeli as an Arab Fahlawi,” Ma’alot (April 1974), pp. 24–27; Y. Goldstein, “The Teaching and Education of the National Idea,” ibid. (September 1975), pp. 14–17; G. Knoler, “On the Teaching of the Jewish National Movement in High School,” ibid. (February 1976), pp. 41–42; Yona‘i, Zionism in Hebrew Education, pp. 161–67. 96. ‘Al-Hamishmar, 17 December 1973; Ma’ariv, Yedi’ot Aharonot, 16 December 1973. See also Qaray’s article, op.cit, Ma’ariv, 24 December 1973. 97. Yedi’ot Aharonot, 28 December 1973. 98. TAU, AJEID, DGD, 2 March 1975. Hatzofeh (17 February 1975) reported that 20,000 high school students had participated in Jewish-Zionist seminars by then. 99. Yona‘i, Zionism in Hebrew Education, pp. 169–74. For the response of the Ministry of Education to this report, see p. 175. 100. History Curriculum for Sixth–Ninth Grades in the State and Religious State Schools, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1974); History Curriculum for Upper Grade in the State School (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1976), p. 4; Shavit, The Significance of the Past, p. 11. 101. History Curriculum for Upper Grade in the State Religious High School (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1978), p. 5. 102. History Curriculum for Upper Grade in the State High School, p. 16. 103. History Curriculum for Sixth–Ninth Grades, p. 44. 104. Gaziel, Politics and Policy-Making in Israel’s Education System, pp. 120–30. 105. Ma’ariv, 28 July 1974.

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106. The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Experimental Edition (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1974). 107. I. Pukan and A. Moshkowitz, Teaching the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Students’ View (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, undated), pp. 3–4. 108. Ibid., p. 5. 109. Ibid., p. 35. The data were: 52.8% thought that the Arab right was weaker than the Jewish claim; 25.6% thought the Arabs have no right at all; 14.6% thought the Arabs have an equal right to the Jews; and only 1.6% thought the Arab right was stronger than the Jewish. These figures were widely quoted in the press. See Ma’ariv, 22 September 1975; Davar, 29 September 1975. 110. See also TAU, AJEID, Zon’s Papers, Protocol of a Meeting of the Committee for Civics, held at the Office of the Minister of Education, 27 January 1976, Box 6.28/19. 111. Basic Attitudes in Jewish Tradition and History: An Introduction to the ArabIsraeli Conflict (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1978). The title of the textbook is misleading because it contains no information on the conflict except for a single article on Arab anti-Semitism. 112. For the aims as formulated for the Arab schools, see al-Hajj, Education among Arabs, pp. 119–20. 113. For criticism of the reader, see E. Gilbo’a, “Simulation Game as a Tool of Teaching the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” Ma’alot (June 1977), p. 10; A. Frank, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict—Some Critical Comments,” Hahinuch Hameshutaf, No. 115 (February 1985), pp. 40–44. Frank, a teacher, who was a member of the left-wing Hakibbutz Ha’artzi movement, thought that the selection of the material and some of the arguments presented had undesirable political implications. He argued that the writers deliberately switched the usual word order of the expression “the Israeli-Arab conflict” to “the Arab-Israeli conflict,” implying that the prime responsibility for the conflict lay with the Arabs. 114. See, in this connection, the debate in the Knesset, Divrei HaKenesset, 9–11 December 1974, pp. 714–18. The campaign against the textbook was led by a member of Knesset Zevulun Hammer, who would become minister of education in 1977. It would seem that the debate commenced with an article by the writer, Moshe Shamir, Ma’ariv, 29 November 1974. 115. Ma’ariv, 28 September 1975. 116. TAU, AJEID, Zon Papers, 6.28/19, protocol of a meeting of the committee approving the civics curriculum, 27 January 1976. 117. Reports on the declining numbers of students studying Arabic and the measures recommended to reverse this trend appeared frequently. See interview with Avraham Lavie, chairman of the National Committee of Arabic Teachers, Ma’ariv, 12 January 1975. See also an appeal by Shlomo Gazit, chief of military intelligence, to encourage the study of Arabic, Davar, 30 Janaury 1975. 118. Ma’ariv, 10 June 1979; H. Rilski, “On the Issue of Textbooks on the Modern History of Israel,” Ma’alot (October 1980), pp. 22–23. Notably, the reasons that led to the withdrawal of Horowitz’s textbooks were not connected to his presentation of the conflict, but to his partisan presentation of Zionism, especially the negative way in which Etzel and Lehi (the pre-state Jewish underground movements) were described.

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119. Y. Rosenman, “On the New Textbooks for Teaching Zionism,” Ma’alot (October 1980), pp. 25–27. 120. See TAU, AJEID, DGD, 1 October 1984. 121. TAU, AJEID, DGD, 1 September 1977; Yona‘i, Zionism in the Hebrew Education, pp. 189–91. 122. See, e.g., S. Aloni, “How To Educate for Peace,” Yedi’ot Aharonot, 4 May 1979; R. Shreiber, “First Lessons in Peace,” Al-Hamishmar, 10 May 1979. 123. The title of the interview was: “The Peace Treaty with Egypt Compels Israel to Greatly Immunize Spiritually and Culturally.” See Yedi’ot Aharonot, 31 August 1979. The same view was expressed by Professor Yoseph Ben-Shlomo, head of the Pedagogic Secretariat. See S. Aloni, “How To Educate for Peace,” Yedi’ot Aharonot, 4 May 1979; Dr. N.D. Serber, “Peace as a Normative Educational Asset,” Hatzofeh, 15 May 1979. 124. E. Shemu’eli, “Possible Relations in the Spheres of Education and Culture,” in A. Hareven (ed.), If Peace Comes: Risks and Prospects (Jerusalem: The Van Leer Foundation, 1978), pp. 75–79. 125. For the text of the report, see Yona‘i, Teaching Arabic in Hebrew Schools, pp. 135–42. 126. For the figures, see ibid., pp. 152–54, 158, 163. 127. See, e.g., Ha’aretz, 6 March 1981; Davar, 5 June 1983. 128. TAU, AJEID, Director-General Special Directive, 1 September 1982; Ma’ariv, 6 November 1983. 129. We and Our Neighbors (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1981), p. 7. This was not a standard textbook, but a compilation of articles and short stories that treated the subject from various points of view. 130. For more information on this program, see Z. Lanir, “Educating for Democratic Behavior in an Intercultural Context,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Vol. 15 (1991), pp. 327–43. 131. Living Together (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture and the Van Leer Foundation, 1982). For the interim edition, see The Arabs Citizens of Israel: Mutual Relations in Israel between Jews and Arabs (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture and the Van Leer Foundation, 1984). See the ministerial directive in this connection, TAU, AJEID, DGD, 1 September 1985. 132. See the article written by Alouph Hareven, “Dealing with Difficult Question,” The Arab Citizens of Israel: Mutual Relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture and the Van Leer Foundation, 1988), pp. 9–13. 133. TAU, AJEID, DGD, 1 March 1983; Ma’ariv, 19 April 1983. 134. See, e.g., Yona‘i, Zionism in Hebrew Education, pp. 195–202. On 12 October 1981, the chairman of the pedagogic secretariat appointed a committee tasked to recommend methods for intensifying Zionist education in schools. See pp. 209–11. In a related development, the Knesset in 1981 modified Article 2 of the State Education Law of 1953 by adding another goal of state education: “Holocaust consciousness.” See the text as disseminated to the schools, TAU, AJEID, DGD, 1 September 1981. See also S. Levine, Ma’ariv, 5 October 1981. 135. TAU, AJEID, DGD, 1 September 1981. A decision was made to exclude the question of settlements in the territories because of its political sensitivity. 136. For more details, see ibid.

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137. A. Hever, Major Subjects in the History of the People and the State, preparation for matriculation exams, 4th ed. (Tel Aviv: 1983). 138. See, in particular, pp. 184–93, in which the writer is at pains to show that the Arabs have no rights to Eretz Israel, that there is no Palestinian people, and that Israel was not involved in the creation of the refugee problem. For a scathing criticism of this textbook, see Ha’aretz, 18 November 1984. In Hever’s opinion, his textbook helped mold the positions of students who used it during 1981–88. See his article in Panim, No. 6 (July 1998), pp. 80–83. 139. See Hammer’s statement in TAU, AJIED, DGD, 1 September 1982, 1 September 1983. See also DGD, 1 March 1983; Hammer’s interview in Ha’aretz, 19 August 1983. 140. For the text, see TAU, AJEID, DGD, 1 February 1984. See also R. Hochman (ed.), Education for Coexistence between Jews and Arabs: Sources (Jerusalem: Van Leer Foundation, 1986), pp. 3–7. The revolutionary nature of the program was not grasped at the time; the only mention it evoked in the press was a brief item in Davar, 20 March 1984. Certain details had been leaked to the press earlier, see Ha’aretz, 13 November 1983. 141. Basic Guidelines of the State Religious Education Policy (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1992), p. 13. The first issue of this pamphlet was published in November 1988. 142. M. Tzemach and R. Tzin, The Position of Israeli Youth in Regard to Democratic Values (Jerusalem: Van Leer Foundation, 1984). Another poll conducted in June 1985 revealed that 11% of the students would have voted for Kahana and 42% support his views; see Al Hamishmar, 28 October 1985. 143. This research, carried out by Professor Adir Cohen from Haifa University, was based on a sample of 260 elementary school students in Haifa. See Ha’aretz, 30 January 1985. 144. See, e.g., TAU, David Poor’s Papers, “Education for Democracy,” consultations summary, Ministry of Education and Culture, Pedagogic Secretariat, 25 September 1984. 145. For the text, see TAU, AJEID, DGD, “Education for Democracy,” May 1985. Originally, the topic was termed “Education for Coexistence and Democracy.” See TAU, AJEID, David Poor’s Papers, “Education for Coexistence and Democracy,” Ministry of Education, Pedagogic Secretariat, n.d. See also Yedi’ot Aharonot, 4 October 1984; interview with Navon, Al Hamishmar, 27 November 1984. The ministry spokesman made it clear that the ministry’s policy was that the issues of education for democracy and Jewish-Arab coexistence were linked; see his article, “Education for Democracy has Only Begun,” Ha’aretz, 24 June 1986. 146. In one of the encounters, for example, a student asked whether Arab pupils come to school on camels; see Al Hamishmar, 4 November 1985. For further details on Arab-Jewish student encounters and their impact, see Nurit Kahana, Ha’aretz, 18 November 1986; 8 January 1987. 147. I. Cohen, “Education for Democracy has Only Begun,” Ha’aretz, 24 June 1986. This was later published in R. Gerber, “Education for Democracy and Coexistence,” Major Education Subjects in the Education System (1986–1987) (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1986), p. 31. 148. Initially, the Council for State Religious Education decided that the meetings be confined to adult male students. This was overruled by the Department for

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State Religious Education at the ministry, which prohibited all encounters for fear of assimilation. The ban was approved by Israel’s Chief Rabbinate, see Yedi’ot Aharonot, 10 March 1986. For more on this issue, see Ma’ariv, 12 August 1985; Ha’aretz, 7, 9 August; 14, 30 October 1985; Hatzofeh, 17 October 1985. Alouph Hareven of the Van Leer Foundation, who organized many of these meetings, thought that the attitude of the state religious system was tantamount to “apartheid”; see interview in Al Hamishmar, 6 September 1985. 149. S. Mar’i, “Sources of Conflict in Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel,” in Hofman (ed.), Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel, p. 16. 150. See, in particular, a report by Alouph Hareven of the Van Leer Foundation on the ministry’s inactivity during 1983–85. In his opinion, most of the teachers were apprehensive about the topic and many opposed it. See Davar, 25 October 1985. See also interviews with Hareven, Al Hamishmar, 28 October 1985; Hadashot, 10 November 1985. In another report in June 1985, Hareven summarized Van Leer activity in the field of education for Jewish-Arab coexistence, complaining that the introduction of the topic into the school system was progressing very slowly, especially with respect to religious and technological schools. In particular, he pointed to a lack of financial assistance from the ministry. See TAU, AJEID, Poor Papers, Hareven to David Poor, 10 June 1985. For the ministry’s response, see I. Cohen, Davar, 22 October 1985; Ha’aretz, 24 June 1986. 151. TAU, AJEID, DGD, 1 December 1996. 152. TAU, AJEID, DGD, 1 November 1989. 153. The Intifada: A Stage in the Arab-Israeli Conflict and World Changes (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1990). 154. Interview with Doron Shohet, head of the Unit during 1988–95, 11 August 1998. On the Van Leer Foundation’s activities, see Hochman (ed.), Education for Coexistence between Jews and Arabs, p. 13. The book also lists the activities of various institutions and organizations in this field. 155. Interview of Atzmon in Hadashot, 22 August 1985. 156. For the report, see Yona‘i, Arabic in Hebrew Schools, pp. 181–85. See also Al Hamishmar, 29 October, 17 November 1985. 157. For Eban’s remarks, see Yona‘i, Arabic in Hebrew Schools, pp. 175–76. 158. Ibid., pp. 176–77. See also, in this connection, Y. Shur, “Peace Begins with Language,” Al Hamishmar, 11 February 1986. 159. Yona‘i, Arabic in Hebrew Schools, pp. 181–85. For Navon’s new policy, see TAU, David Poor’s Papers, Major Educational Issues in the Education System (1986–1987) (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1986), pp. 55–57. 160.Yona‘i, Zionism in Hebrew Education, pp. 225–29. 161.TAU, AJEID, DGD, 1 May 1987, Special Directive, No. 2, November 1987. See also booklet titled The Symbols of the Israeli State for teachers in the state and the religious school systems, experimental edition (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1987). The introduction by the director-general of the ministry states that “education for democracy and citizenship, attachment to the people, and love for homeland is connected, among other things, to knowledge of the symbols, the hymn and the Declaration of Independence and internalizing their values” (p. 4). 162. The First Twenty Years of the State of Israel (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1989).

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163. The First Twenty Years—A Teacher’s Guide (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1989), p. 1. 164. The list included about 100 terms. See Yona‘i, Zionism in Hebrew Education, pp. 243–49. 165. A Journey through the First Settlements—A Teacher’s Guide (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1994). The textbook itself had been published two years earlier. 166. TAU, AJEID, Special Ministerial Directive, June 1992. 167. TAU, AJEID, DGD, 1 June 1992. See also Civics: A High School Curriculum for Jewish (Secular and Religious), Arab and Druze Schools (Jerusalem: The Ministry of Education and Culture, 1993). 168. Interview with Haya Regev, head of the civics team at the ministry, 28 April 1998. 169. This is based on several interviews held with teachers and officials in the Ministry of Education in February 1999. 170. TAU, AJEID, DGD, 2 January 1994. 171. TAU, Special Ministerial Directive, May 1994, p. 8. 172. Ibid., p. 5. 173. D. Shohet, “The Peace, the Peace Process and Education for Peace: Some Observations on Education in a Peace Era,” Ministry of Education and Culture, 25 December 1994, Shohet’s personal papers, with author’s permission. 174. TAU, AJEID, Special Ministerial Directive, “Catalogue of Teaching Tools and Activities for the Central Theme,” February 1995. 175. See, e.g., Toward a Peace Economy for the high school teacher in social sciences (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1994); “On the Road to Peace,” a special issue of Current Education, Vol. 14, for eleventh and twelfth grades (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1994). 176. Shohet, “The Peace, the Peace Process and Education for Peace,” p. 3. 177. TAU, AJEID, Special Ministerial Directive, No. 19, June 1996. 178. Ibid., p. 13. 179. History Curriculum Sixth–Ninth Grades in the State Schools (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1994). A second, modified edition was published in 1997. 180. M. Yaron, “The Structure of Teaching and Examinations in the Upper Level,” a paper prepared by the Superintendent of History, Ministry of Education and Culture, n.d. I would like to thank Michael Yaron for allowing me to use this information. 181. Interview with Michael Yaron, Superintendent of History at the Ministry, 18 August 1998. 182. To Be Citizens: Education to Civics for All Israeli Students, an interim report (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1996), pp. 11, 14. 183. E. Naveh, The Twentieth Century: On the Verge of Tomorrow, History for Ninth Grade (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books, 1999), p. 157. See the quotation at the beginning of the book. 184. B. Ben-Baruch, The Nineteenth Century: The World of Yesterday: A Teacher’s Guide, written by E. Naveh (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books, 1998), p. 7. 185. Most of the debate was held in the Israeli daily, Ha’aretz. See, e.g., A. Meged, 7, 14 September; R. Briman, 31 August; N. Aloni, 7 September, 12 October;

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I. Bar-Tal, 21 October; G. Levi, 10 October; S. Zand, 16 September; E. Podeh, 15 September 1999. The debate concentrated on E. Naveh’s textbook (The Twentieth Century), but in fact it should be related to the whole new wave of history textbooks (the “third generation”). 186. The Committee decided to withhold the use of D. Ya‘akobi‘s ninth-grade history textbook, A World of Changes, because it lacks “important chapters in the history of the Holocaust, Zionism, and the state of Israel.” For the decision, see Ha‘aretz, pp. 21–22, November 2000. For the debate surrounding the decision, see in ibid.: Y. Porath, 17 September; A. Golan, 30 November; editorial, 3 December; E. Podeh, 4 December; Y. Hazoni, 10 December 2000.

CHAPTER 3

TEACHING THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: CASE STUDIES THE CULTURAL HERITAGE OF ISLAM Logic dictates that knowledge of Islamic culture and history is a prerequisite for understanding the contemporary Arab-Israeli conflict. However, in the Israeli education system a clear distinction has been made between the study of the classic Islamic period and recent Arab-Jewish relations. According to various history curricula, the Islamic period from the Prophet Muhammad until the ‘Abbas Dynasty is studied in the seventh grade, along with other topics such as the Roman Empire and Christianity. The fact that the study of the Islamic period is separated from the modern Arab-Israeli conflict means that authors could generally offer a rather balanced, and sometimes even sympathetic, assessment of Islamic history, religion, and culture.1 Still, many distortions, biases and omissions were to be found, especially in the old textbooks. Their major flaw was that the narrative was related to Jewish history (e.g., the Jewish tribes in Arabia, the role of Jerusalem in Islam), with no attempt to convey Islamic history in its own right. Several textbooks of the first generation had an explicitly patronizing and prejudicial approach to Islam and Arabs of the early period. They attempted to show, to the point of exaggeration, that the Jews in Arabia exerted a major influence over the Arabs. Authors of an oft-used textbook, Avivi and Perski, claimed that prior to the appearance of Muhammad, the Jews “exercised a tremendous influence over the mostly illiterate Arabs.” It was the Jews who revealed to the Arabs that they were sons of one father, and that “the Arabs, who were by nature highly imaginative and easily excitable, were mightily impressed by these tales and legends.”2 The fact that when Muhammad appeared the Muslims adopted new rituals, such as the

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pilgrimage to Mecca and Friday sermons, was explained as related to the process of Islam’s withdrawal from Judaism and its reverting to the “ancient beliefs of Arab idolatry.” Most first-generation textbooks described the war against Arabian Jews in terms of good and evil: the Jewish tribes were portrayed as “honest,” “respectable,” and “courageous,” while the Arabs as “sly” and “treacherous,” their leaders defeating the Jews by intrigue and underhand plots.3 Another textbook, by Ahiyya and Harpaz, reveals surprise at the subsequent rise of Islamic culture, as “the Arabs were far removed from cultural affairs, and Arabia’s cultural achievements were very meager.” The authors argued that the explanation for this cultural and historical paradox lay in the fact that Islamic culture was not an indigenous Arab effort, but a blend of the great Jewish, Persian, Greek, and Roman cultures. The Jewish contribution to Islam was considered especially important since they [the Jews] “poured all the cultural riches of antiquity from one vessel into another.”4 An extremely biased view was revealed by Ya’akov Levy: There was nothing new or original in the teaching of Islam. Muhammad invented nothing. He added naught to Islam other than what he managed to expropriate from Judaism and Christianity (and perhaps from the Persian creed), which he then proceeded to indiscriminately mix together. Yet, it is precisely because of this that Islam was such a great success.5

The second-generation textbooks displayed a more balanced view of Islamic history, but it still suffered from noteworthy biases and errors. In a particular slanted textbook for the religious junior high schools a negative stereotype of the Arab Bedouin was given, depicted as constantly involved with robbery and plunder and in a state of war with fellow Arab tribes. Islam was depicted as “religion of the sword” while the importance of jihad was overly emphasized.6 Although the textbook for the secular schools presented a more balanced narrative, it unjustifiably concluded that the primary Arab contribution to Muslim culture was the Arabic language: “This was because the majority of Muslim scholars were not Arabs, but members of other nations in the region, most notably the Persians.”7 Such a conclusion, controversial in itself, denigrated the importance of the Arab contribution to Islam in other fields as well. Biases found in the first- and second-generation textbooks were largely eliminated from the third. Three textbooks widely used in junior high school, two in the secular and one in the religious system, offer a balanced description of the early Islamic period.8 Although these textbooks focus on relations between Muhammad and the Jews and their fate under Islamic law, they do not neglect other important aspects of Islamic history and religion. A close scrutiny of these textbooks reveals, however, several distortions: First, the textbook for the religious school continues to characterize Islam as a religion of the sword, this time in a more subtle way. Students are

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told that when a certain Byzantine Christian emperor offered peace to one of the caliphs, the latter opted to wage jihad instead. By comparison, students are referred to the Bible, which shows that when enemies of the Jews offered to surrender, war was avoided. The textbook thus transmits an indirect message: the Arabs are inclined to belligerency, while the Jews are inclined to peace. Second, the textbook insinuates that Ishmael, according to the Bible, is not the father of all Arabian tribes, as the Arabs claim, an implied delegitimation.9 A problematic issue appears in the textbook for the secular schools. It refers to ‘Umar’s Pact—the laws promulgated by Caliph ‘Umar to define the status of monotheistic minorities—as “capitulation demands,” while the Arabs view them as an honorable commitment (called in Arabic ‘uhud, a contract or pact) issued to protect these minorities.10 As in the past, the study of Islamic history in these textbooks is completely divorced from the modern era, allowing the student to easily overlook the link between early Islamic history and modern Arab history. This deficiency was partially dealt with in a recent (1998) textbook for high school in the secular system, The World and the Jews in Recent Generations. A chapter dealing with Jewish-Arab relations in Palestine during the period of early Zionist settlement points out that one of the sources of the conflict is the Islamic belief that Eretz Israel and Jerusalem are sacred. With this, the Jewish link to Eretz Israel is highlighted as having been maintained throughout the ages, while the Islamic link has fluctuated following Muhammad’s attempt to place Jerusalem as Islam’s holiest shrine.11 However, the teacher is instructed to accentuate the connection between the knowledge of Islam gained in seventh grade and the history of Jewish-Arab relations in the modern period.12

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE IMAGE OF THE TURKS Although the Ottoman Empire ruled over Palestine for more than 400 years (1517–1918), this long period, in which the Jews constituted only a small minority in an overwhelmingly Muslim population, was largely neglected in all textbooks. Both the first- and second-generation textbooks depicted the Ottoman period in highly negative terms. Shemu’eli described it as a time when “anarchy and poverty reigned” and “religious fanaticism combined with xenophobia to oppress the Jews and destroy their standing.” The Ottoman governors, in particular, labored to make “the Jews’ lives onerous and difficult.”13 Horowitz painted an equally black picture of the period: “The [Ottoman’s] evil rule was accompanied by blatant miscarriages of justice and shameless bribery. The tears and cries of the oppressed did not reach the ears of the sultan in Istanbul. Yet, even had [the rulers] heard the weeping of the oppressed, the decadence, degradation and decline of the Empire

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meant that they would do nothing to help.”14 A junior high school textbook describing Jewish emigration in the seventeenth century depicted the milieu as of “incompetent and corrupt rule . . . when bands of robbers and murderers were allowed to freely roam the country.” Jews who sought to earn a living were “often forced to work for nothing for the ingrate Turk. . . . They were brutally attacked and their property was stolen. If they tried to resist, they were beaten to death. None of this was the handiwork of bandits or Bedouin. It was the work of the people who lived in daily contact with the Jews.”15 Enhancing and legitimizing the Jewish claim to the land, the textbooks underlined the unbroken Jewish presence in Palestine. Jews, they emphasized, had remained in the four holy cities (Jerusalem, Hebron, Tiberies, and Safad). The Arab presence, by contrast, was either ignored or marginalized. Several textbooks included illustrations of Jewish settlements and Jewish activity in the holy cities for comparison with the emptiness and wilderness of other parts of Palestine (see Appendices 3a and 3b). A quotation taken from Mark Twain’s book, Journey to the Holy Land (1867), was intended to further validate the allegation that the land was barren and empty,16 a depiction that was a major Zionist theme. By relying on a distinguished American writer—or any other foreigner not involved in the conflict for that matter—an aura of objectivity was conferred on the argument.17 Of interest in this connection is a segment of text in the annual nationwide eighth-grade test (the sekker) for 1972, which focused on the uninterrupted Jewish presence in Israel. The students were asked to answer several questions on the basis of the following passage: The Jews never abandoned the Land of Israel. There were times when the Jewish community was large and others when it was small. At no time, however, was any importance attached to the question of size. The Jews of Israel saw themselves as an elite, representing the entire Jewish nation. The Jewish community, whether large or small, contained many wise men, rabbis and authors, who wrote and published essays and books. By contrast, the Arabs and Christians who had settled in the Land of Israel produced nothing of importance, leaving behind no significant achievement. This, despite the fact that the land is sacred to their religion [emphasis mine].18

The aim of this text was to establish a link between early Jewish settlement and the Zionist enterprise, while simultaneously delegitimizing the Arab or any other claim to Palestine. Several history textbooks elaborated on this theme, citing the many foreign empires that had controlled Palestine—Rome, Byzantium, Persia, the Arabs, the Crusaders, the Mongols, and the Ottomans, but asserting that none had succeeded in establishing a “political entity” that came close to the Kingdom of Judea.19 The textbooks focused on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when Jewish nationalism emerged and Zionist settlers first encountered the Turkish regime. Most textbooks, however, ignored or distorted

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the Ottoman reality in their narrative. Descriptions of the encounter between Turkish officials and Zionist pioneers accentuated the corrupt nature of the Turks.20 The account of the Jewish expulsion from Palestine during the First World War, when the Turks offered the Jews a choice between assuming Ottoman citizenship or expulsion, portrays the former option as “abandoning themselves to the mercies of the despotic Ottoman regime, which had never displayed the slightest degree of humanity towards its subjects.” During the war, the Turks considered the Jews to be “traitors anxious for their [the Turks’] defeat,” and therefore sent them “to suffer the hell of the work brigades.”21 One textbook informed the students that “one of the chief Turkish butchers, who had ‘excelled’ in slaughtering Armenians, was appointed governor of Jaffa and abused the Jews.”22 All the textbooks lauded the courageous Jewish Nili (an acronym for “the strength of Israel will not lie”) group, which had spied for the British during the war. Several group members were captured and interrogated by the Turks. According to Kirshenboim, these interrogations were conducted, as was the Turkish wont, with exceeding cruelty using inquisitorial methods.23 These accounts illustrate that both in the first- and second-generations textbooks no attempt was made to give a balanced description of the Ottoman reality. The old textbooks presented a particularly slanted picture, while the bias in the newer textbooks was subtler. In some cases, the entire period of the Ottoman Empire was simply passed over. Some of the negative descriptions of life in Palestine under the Ottomans were probably accurate. Yet the wider historical circumstances that compelled the Turks to treat the Jews harshly were not discussed, nor was there any mention of the Ottoman tolerant policy toward the Jewish community within the millet system. Consequently, the student’s image of the Ottoman Empire was of a degenerate entity and of the sultan as a cruel and despotic ruler. This description of the Turks largely dovetails with the negative stereotype of the Arabs, as will be shown. A more balanced picture of the Ottoman Empire, however, emerges in the third-generation textbooks. Yet this relatively balanced depiction also suffers from several problems. First, the lion’s share of the narrative is devoted to the Jewish presence in the Ottoman Empire while disregarding the general situation of the empire that may explain the wider Ottoman attitude toward minorities in general and the Jews in particular.24 This flaw is particularly relevant to a junior high textbook for the religious schools, which describes the Ottoman period mainly through the prism of the Jewish community in Palestine.25 Second, several textbooks refer to Eretz Israel as a separate Ottoman district, thus signaling the unbroken continuity of Jewish history, but in reality no such district existed in the Ottoman Empire.26 Third, although the image of the Turk is less stereotyped than previously, it is sometimes presented in a biased way. One textbook for secular eighth grades quotes a nineteenth-century scholar who stated that “the

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burden of extortion and oppression was so heavy [during the Ottoman period] that it was said of the Jews that they should even pay for the air they breath.”27 Lastly, a high school textbook depicts the empire in the context of European history rather than the history of Palestine or of the early Zionist settlement.28

THE FIRST ALIYAH PERIOD (1882–1902) The First and Second Aliyah (literally ascendance, meaning a wave of Jewish immigration to Palestine) are considered seminal chapters in Zionist historiography. In conveying the story of the first Aliyah, most of the old textbooks ignored the Arab presence, depicting Eretz Israel as an uninhabited and desolate land. In many respects, these textbooks mirrored the traditional Zionist myth that the land was empty, though many writers were aware that this allegation was unfounded.29 Thus, for example, Shmu’eli noted that unlike the Jewish immigrants to the United States, the Jews in Eretz Israel encountered “a desolate and ruined country.”30 The same distortion appeared in several textbooks of the second generation as well. The experimental edition of a textbook published at the end of the 1970s conveyed the impression that the Zionist settlers arrived in a desolate land.31 However, the final version of the textbook, published in the mid-1980s, modified this version, commenting that “it is doubtful whether they [the immigrants] were correct in claiming that Eretz Israel was a deserted and desolate land at the time,”32 although the authors did not explain why this was doubtful. Indicative also is a textbook for fourth and fifth grades, published in 1978, that included a story about a Jewish child whose parents try to dissuade him from immigrating to Eretz Israel. They warn him that he will find nothing but “an empty and ravaged land ruled by the Turks, with a very small number of Arabs.”33 Even several textbooks published in the 1990s disregarded the Arab presence in their description of the First Aliyah.34 Substantiating the “wilderness thesis,” both the first- and second-generation textbooks included photographs showing Eretz Israel as empty and underdeveloped, thus “proving” that the immigrants indeed found a desolate country. By contrast, other photos showed flourishing Jewish communities in the four holy cities and in the new Jewish settlements built from the 1880s onward (see Appendices 3a and 3b).35 In addition, all the textbooks, including those of the third generation that gave a fairly balanced account, contained maps showing the locations of Jewish settlements and of mixed Jewish-Arab towns, but eliminating towns and villages inhabited by Arabs only. These maps were replicated from one textbook to another and all originated in atlases and encyclopedias that were used in schools (see Appendices 6a-6d). Although the content of the maps was consonant with their aims (i.e., displaying the spread of Jewish settlements during a specific pe-

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riod), they indirectly entrenched the argument that Eretz Israel was largely empty.36 In some cases, tables that provided data on the growth of the Jewish population were also included in the text, but without showing the corresponding rise in the Arab population.37 First- and second-generation textbooks divided the Arab population to three social categories: the effendi (the landowning elite), the fellah(peasant), and the Bedouin. In contrast to the positive description of Jewish settlers, all these Arab groups were usually described in such negative terms as thieves, cowards, lazy, and lacking national consciousness.38 According to Ahiya and Harpaz, “robbers and bandits would stare at the Jews’ possessions in Rishon Lezion [an early Jewish settlement], coveting them. They would furtively creep into the settlement and attack passersby. . . . The settlement was left in relative peace only after the Jewish lads taught the Arabs a lesson, taught them the meaning of Jewish might.”39 A 1976 textbook for junior high school related a story of two pioneers who had lost their way: We heard the rustle of soft footsteps among the trees. Within seconds, we were staring down the barrel of a rifle held by a horseman astride a magnificent horse. “Halt,” he thundered . . . My friend’s wits did not desert him. He quickly aimed his own, empty rifle at the horseman, and with tremendous courage commanded: “get out of my way unless you wish to prove your mortality!” Did my friend’s words and manner strike terror in the Arab’s heart, or was he simply afraid that his horse would be wounded? In any case, he departed in a flash.40

In another textbook, an account of a Bedouin attack on a Jewish settlement has a Jewish woman offering a Bedouin food and drink. In return, the “poor Arab,” who had just been freed by the Turkish police, dismantled the barn wall and disappeared while the woman was busy preparing the meal.41 A stereotypical image of the Arab appears also in an elementary school textbook, published in 1992, in connection with the description of Zionist attempts to colonize Umm Labes (later known as Petah Tikva). The Arabs are described as “scrawny, their faces tinged with yellow and covered with flies that they didn’t bother to swat away. Many of the villagers were blind, groping their way hand in hand, as though walking in the dark. The little children went barefoot, their eyes infected and their faces covered with numerous tiny red mosquito bites.” Later on, the Jewish heroine of the story depicts her life in an isolated settlement surrounded by “Arab villages, nomadic Bedouin and alien neighbors who might at any time surprise and attack us.”42 These stories present contrasting stereotyped images: the courageous, daring and compassionate Jew vis-à-vis the cowardly, treacherous and frightful Arab. The role of the Arab laborers in the early Jewish settlements was also a major topic in the first- and second-generation textbooks. The Arab was always a peasant (fellah), while the uplifting term “worker” (po’el) was used to describe the Jew. Most textbooks explained why Jews used Arab labor,

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but did not explore the social implications of this phenomenon. The Arab, they informed the student, “was used to hard physical labor and accustomed to the country’s harsh climate. His standard of living was low and he had few needs.” Detailing these and other advantages accruing from Arab labor, Kirshenboim noted that Arabs “were generally satisfied with a low wage and never offered any advice on the management of the farm. They certainly did not expect their employer to treat them with respect. None of this could be said of the Jewish po’el.” According to Riger, the Jews were not farmers by nature and “could not compete with the Arabs who owned fertile land and were content with a poor standard of living.”43 One textbook did observe that the employment of Arab peasants by the Jewish settlers signified the failure of the early immigrants’ social vision.44 Another book, while barely discussing the Arab factor, indicated that in using cheap Arab labor the Zionist enterprise resembled a classic example of colonization.45 When discussing the First Aliyah, many of the first- and second-generation textbooks elaborated on the ideas of two key Zionist figures at the turn of the twentieth century: Ahad Ha’am and Theodore Herzl. Ahad Ha’am was a brilliant intellectual whose writings influenced many European Zionists. Among other things, the textbooks referred to his denunciation of the patron system that developed in the first settlements, which he articulated in two articles written after his visits to Eretz Israel in 1891 and 1893 (“Truth from Eretz Israel”). The textbooks, however, failed to mention his sharp criticism of the settlers’ condescending attitude toward the local Arab inhabitants.46 Herzl, the founder of modern political Zionism, was also a prolific writer. Several textbooks referred to his utopian novel, Altneuland (“Old-New Land,” 1902), which portrays Jewish-Arab coexistence twenty years in the future. A textbook for junior high school quoted a long conversation from the novel between an Arab dignitary, a German tourist, and an educated Jew while visiting the land. Two points emerge from this discussion: First, not only did the Arabs not suffer from Jewish immigration, they were economically rewarded by it and became healthier and happier as a result of it. Second, the Arabs did not perceive the Jews as foreign intruders but as brothers and friends.47 Two third-generation textbooks replicated the Altneuland discussion in a shortened version.48 Herzl’s novel attests to his romantic naïveté. Including this segment in textbooks, however, constituted a more studied effort at conveying the impression that the Arabs implicitly legitimized the Jewish claim. To sum up, most of the first- and second-generation textbooks ignored the Arab factor or presented it in a biased way. The one-sided description of Jewish-Arab encounters is particularly significant since it was during this formative period of Israel’s history that the patterns of the conflict were crystallized. A more comprehensive description of the complex JewishArab reality would have helped avoid stereotypical thinking and prejudice. Instead, students were led to believe that the immigrants encountered

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a desolate country inhabited by a scattered Arab population, which was insignificant in comparison with the grand Zionist enterprise. Such narrative, however, served to reinforce the Jewish claim to Eretz Israel, while negating that of the Arab.49 At the same time, the textbooks entrenched a negative Arab stereotype: cowardly, treacherous, with little social and economic consciousness. Moreover, the Arabs were always portrayed in the context of their reaction to Zionism rather than as an independent entity.50 In contrast to the first- and second-generation textbooks, the third gave a fairly balanced depiction of the First Aliyah. The new approach was already evident in a textbook for elementary schools, A Journey through the First Settlements (1992) which belongs to the second generation. It includes a story in which an East European Jewish woman attempts to dissuade her husband from immigrating to Eretz Israel, as it is populated by Arabs and Bedouin, with few Jews living there. The teacher is instructed to emphasize to the young students that the Jews constituted only 5% of the entire population in Eretz Israel.51 Nevertheless, Arabs are sometimes termed “non-Jews,” and they are faceless—that is, no names and no identities are given to them. All new textbooks refuted the old Zionist myth of the empty land. One high school textbook emphasized that there were only 50,000 Jews in Eretz Israel at the end of the nineteenth century, in comparison to 400,000– 500,000 Arabs. The head of the Zionist Office in Eretz Israel, Arthur Rupin, is quoted as pointing out that, in contrast to Zionist claims, the Arab population was six times greater than the Jewish.52 Textbooks also discussed the nature of the images that Jews and Arabs had each of its other during the First Aliyah period, as well as the first signs of Arab opposition to Zionist immigration, which resembled local disputes rather than a national conflict. Ahad Ha’am’s criticism of the settlers’ patronizing attitude toward the Arabs is quoted, too.53 Two main flaws, however, are noteworthy: first, the map of Jewish settlements, as in previous textbooks, omitted Arab villages.54 Second, the description of the First Aliyah is separated from that of the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is related in later chapters of the textbook. Thus, the link between early Zionist immigration and the subsequent Arab-Israeli conflict may be lost on the student.

THE SECOND ALIYAH PERIOD (1904–14) In describing the Second Aliyah, the first-generation textbooks could not ignore the “Arab question” in light of the deterioration of Arab-Jewish relations during that period. The historical narrative usually focused on three issues: the pursuit of “Hebrew labor,” which ultimately meant that Arab fellahin were displaced and deprived of their livelihood; increasing confrontations with Arabs, which led to the establishment of a Jewish

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guard organization, named Hashomer; and the decision to leave the Arab city of Jaffa and establish the first Hebrew city, Tel Aviv. One of the guiding principles of the Second Aliyah was “the conquest of labor,” described as a heroic chapter in Zionist history. The old textbooks explained that the pioneers were convinced that it was “impossible to build a state on the labor of others, particularly when exposed to the manifold dangers of being protected by foreign guards.” Riger added that in order to compete with cheap Arab labor, the Jewish immigrants “lived in poverty, content with the meager wage paid by the farmer.”55 Avivi and Perski, however, described a different reality, stating that the Jewish settler could not be satisfied with the poor pay meted out to the Arabs, as they “had very few needs, no cultural requirements, and did not demand medical assistance.”56 Another textbook observed that “in order to compete with the Arabs, Jewish workers endeavored to labor under the same conditions and reduced their standard of living to the level of an Arab peasant. Yet, in spite of all their efforts, they failed because the farmer, among other things, preferred the obedient and submissive Arab to the impertinent [Jewish] youth.”57 The positive image of the Jewish settler and the negative image of the Arab pervaded the second generation of textbooks as well. A private textbook for high school stated that “the Arab workers were obedient, submissive and servile. They were willing to slave away in the farmer’s field and house. The Jewish laborers, by contrast, saw themselves as free men, equal in every way to the farmer . . . They refused to be subjected to rebukes, insults and curses.”58 Both the first- and the second-generation textbooks generally evaded the question of Arab land dispossession resulting from the conquest of labor, while the Ministry of Education published a booklet (1975) aimed at refuting the “myth of Arab [land] expropriation.”59 The negative Arab image also appeared in the first-generation textbooks in the context of Jewish attempts to set up settlers’ guard organization, Hashomer. Although the newly recruited guards imitated Arab dress and behavior, which hinted at a positive Arab image,60 the organization’s task was to defend the Jewish settlements against “the unceasing attacks by bands of Arab bandits, thieves and robbers.” These bands “despised and ridiculed the Jews and scornfully referred to them as the ones deserving of death” (awlad al-maut).61 Kirshenboim related that until then it had been customary to employ Arab guards “in accordance with the old folk adage that ‘it is better to give the key to the thief.’” However, not only did these guards “often conspire and cooperate with the Arab thieves, but they proved generally incapable of repulsing the Arab bandits’ attacks on the Jewish settlements.”62 Avivi and Perski compared this existing state of affairs to the Biblical era of the Judges: “And while Israel sowed, Midian, Amalek and Bnei Kedem arose . . . they, their households and tents entered the land to destroy it.” It was in just such a manner that the Bedouin tribes attacked and totally destroyed the fields of Israel. The Jewish

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settlements were forced to turn to their aggressive neighbors for help. They entrusted the defense of their fields to Arabs and Bedouin. . . . Yet, these were the very men, most of whom were infamous robbers, against whom it was necessary to be defended. The foreign guards derided and mocked the [Jewish] farmers.63

A more subtly biased description of the Arab appeared in a second-generation textbook for junior high school, which relates a story told by Alexander Zayd, the legendary leader of Hashomer: One day, some Bedouin from the Negev arrived. They stared speechless at the [Jewish] armed and equipped young men entering and leaving the town. They gazed at them respectfully. Suddenly the [Arab] shaykh caught hold of [the Jewish guard] Mendel’s hand [and said]: [Arab] Who are you? [Jew] Jews. [Arab] We know the Jews, but you, who are you? [Jew] The same as those you know. [Arab] No! Let me tell you. In bygone days there lived in this land a people known as the “Children of Israel.” You are their descendants.64

This story conveyed ostensible Arab respect and esteem for the Hebrew guards. Moreover, it served to ratify Arab endorsement of the Jewish right to return to Eretz Israel. Several textbooks also included pictures of proud Jewish guards dressed in Arab attire, mounted on horses.65 Interestingly, similar pictures (without the horses) would later be used to depict Arab “gangs” (see Appendices 2a and 2b). Another Arab-Jewish encounter described by first- and second-generation textbooks concerns the Jewish migration to and later departure from Jaffa and the establishment of Tel Aviv. Jaffa had briefly emerged as the center of Jewish activity during the early Zionist settlement period. The World Zionist Organization established its Palestine branch there in 1908. Some textbooks gave the impression that if Jaffa was not a Jewish town, then it had, at the very least, a Jewish majority. One textbook described it as follows: Most of the immigrants disembarked at Jaffa, and some even settled there . . . The World Zionist Organization offices were located in Jaffa, while the representatives of [Jewish] institutions and groups also lodged in town . . . The leaders of the labor parties lived in Jaffa. The newspapers were published in Jaffa. Most of the local children were educated in Hebrew schools . . . The Jews occupied entire streets in Jaffa, which was greatly overcrowded.66

Other textbooks underlined the connection between Jaffa’s poor living conditions and the decision to establish Tel Aviv. In 1909, Ahiya and Harpaz wrote, “the Jewish middle classes, weary of the Arab town, its narrow alleyways, filthy streets and generally Arab character, founded Tel Aviv.

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They wanted to build their own Jewish neighborhood, one becoming to a cultured people and capable of filling all their needs.”67 Elsewhere, a short story by a noted Jewish writer conveyed the picturesque experiences of a newly arrived immigrant: I was struck dumb by the tremendous tumult: the Arab sailors’ and porters’ ear-piercing shrieks, the constant vibrations of the filthy boat and the generally noisy, chaotic port. I disembarked as in a drunken stupor. . . . Having passed in a trance-like daze through the seven departments of hell known as the Jaffa customs, we entered the town’s narrow alleyways. Squalid, filthy and stinking, they were packed with men and beasts. We were on the verge of fainting. . . . Having walked for what seemed to be infinity, we finally reached the hotel. . . . Its courtyard also served as a large stable and housed numerous camels and horses. . . . Sanitary regulations were nonexistent in Jaffa of those days. We couldn’t sleep thanks to the mosquitoes, insects, mice and all kinds of crawling things.68

This colorful description was probably not far removed from reality. Yet, when reading it, the student could conclude that the town was fit for Arabs but not for cultured persons (i.e., Jews). Moreover, the fact that most of the population in Jaffa was Arab had been ignored or submerged in the account of the hectic Zionist activity there. Significantly, the third-generation textbooks presented a more balanced picture of the Second Aliyah. Not only were the Zionist myths of Jewish pioneering labor and Jewish self-defense depicted in a more realistic way, but central issues that were omitted or shunted aside by the older textbooks were addressed. The “conquest of labor” was depicted in less heroic terms, while Arab dispossession from both land and work was acknowledged. In addition, the emergence of local Arab resistance to the Zionist enterprise was described in some detail. Moreover, warnings by some Zionists of the negative consequences of Jewish patronizing attitude toward the Arabs were discussed. In several textbooks there was also a description of Jewish-Arab attempts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict prior to the First World War.69 THE FIRST WORLD WAR AGREEMENTS The First World War marked a new stage in the history of the ArabJewish conflict. During the war, control over the territories of the former Ottoman Empire, including Palestine, became a source of contention between the allies (Britain, France, Russia, and Italy), the Zionist movement, and the Arab national movement. In an effort to reduce this friction, the British made several promises and signed a number of agreements that largely contradicted each other. All the Israeli history textbooks focused on the Balfour Declaration (November 1917), which, from the Zionist perspective, contained a moral as well as legal commitment to grant Eretz Israel (Pales-

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tine) to the Jews. The declaration, however, must be studied in the context of other wartime arrangements, including the MacMahon-Husayn correspondence (1915–16) and the Sykes-Picot agreement (April–May 1916), which show it to be part of a series of arrangements intended to serve Britain’s wartime needs.

Arab Nationalism and the MacMahon-Husayn Correspondence The emergence of Arab nationalism in the second half of the nineteenth century largely coincided with the rise of Zionism, although their appearance was a product of different historical circumstances. The first two generations of textbooks glossed over Arab nationalism whether out of lack of awareness or a reluctance to acknowledge its importance.70 When the issue was dealt with, a Zionist interpretation was offered: Arab nationalism was seen as a monolithic movement, with no distinction between Egyptians, Syrians, Palestinians, and other Arabs, which emerged as a reaction to Zionism rather than to developments within Arab society.71 The first-generation textbooks that discussed Arab nationalism tended to minimize its importance. “The Anglo-Arab administration,” wrote one, “artificially inflated the significance of the Arab national movement, which was obviously nothing more than a reaction [to Zionism].”72 Arab nationalism was sometimes portrayed as representing class, rather then national interests. According to Riger, the movement was led by the upper class (effendis). Fearing “the threat the modern Jewish settlements posed to the feudal system, they worried that the fellahin would, as a result, rebel against their masters and exploiters.”73 Of the second-generation textbooks, two referred to the existence of an “Arab national movement” or a “number of national movements in the Arab world” whose goal was the establishment of “Greater Syria.”74 It short, omission and inaccuracy characterized the first two generations of textbooks. Inasmuch as the origins of the Arab movement were generally ignored, background for the MacMahon-Husayn correspondence was lacking or nonexistent as well. During 1915–16, Sharif Husayn, ruler of the Hijaz, and British High Commissioner in Egypt Henry MacMahon exchanged a series of letters indicating Britain’s agreement to recognize an Arab state in return for a promise by Husayn to instigate a rebellion against the Ottoman Empire. The precise boundaries of the prospective state, however, were never clearly defined. A major bone of contention in the historiography of the Arab-Israeli conflict is whether the British included (according to the Arab version) or excluded (according to the British and Zionist versions) Palestine from the area promised to the Arabs.75 Although this historical controversy became an important element in the conflict, first-generation textbooks simply ignored or glossed over this issue. Ahiya and Harpaz noted vaguely

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that “the Arab nationalists’ goal was to unite Syria and Palestine and create a single state . . . They justified their demand by claiming that the British promised them this in return for fighting the Turkish Empire.”76 Horowitz put forward the explicitly Zionist version of the correspondence: “The British agreed to Arab independence except in those areas where the population was not purely Arab, that is the district of Alexandretta, the Syrian shores, Lebanon and Palestine.”77 The treatment in the second-generation textbooks was also problematic. Although more information was offered, the nature of the controversy was not discussed. One textbook claimed cryptically that “Palestine was included within the boundaries of the Arab homeland,” but “the British did not accede to Husayn’s demands.”78 Another stated offhandedly that although the boundaries of the Arab homeland were never clearly defined, “It was understood that it would include the Arabian Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent (excluding territories along the Mediterranean whose boundaries were not interpreted).”79 Several textbooks omitted mention of the correspondence entirely, while others referred to it in a way that was unrelated to subsequent agreements.80 Several textbooks did indicate the contradictions between Britain’s various war promises. One, however, concluded that the Balfour Declaration freed Britain from its earlier commitments [i.e., to the Arabs]; the second stated that the details of the contradictions were irrelevant; and the third referred to their existence but without describing them.81 The third-generation textbooks gave a more accurate and balanced presentation of Arab nationalism and the correspondence, although they, too, were problematic. First, while several high school textbooks analyzed the correspondence within the context of British wartime promises, they separated the discussion of the Balfour Declaration (which was allocated considerable space) from the correspondence and the Sykes-Picot Agreement (which were discussed in brief). Second, as in previous textbooks, the Jewish-Arab controversy over the interpretation of the correspondence was not discussed, although one textbook reprinted the controversial segment of the text. Third, the correspondence was not discussed in connection with the evolution of Arab nationalism.82 A junior high school textbook, accurate and balanced in many respects, repeated a widespread error in Israeli historiography and Israeli textbooks, namely, confusing the Arab national movement in general with the local Arab opposition movement in Palestine.83 Moreover, a high school textbook described Arab nationalism as a movement lacking historical roots, which stands in contrast to the historical depth of the Jewish national movement.84 Two reasons account for the failure of the textbooks to fully address the nature of the correspondence and its relation to Arab nationalism. First, such a discussion could strengthen the Arab claim to Palestine and weaken the Jewish claim. From a Zionist perspective, this position was understand-

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able, since the correspondence was not considered an official, binding instrument and therefore allegedly did not have the same status as the Balfour Declaration—a document publicly endorsed by the British government. This line of thinking was probably relevant to the writers of the older textbooks. Second, Israeli-Zionist historiography tended to ignore, overlook or diminish the importance of major developments in the Arab world. This ethnocentric attitude was largely responsible for the confusion to be found in the textbooks concerning the evolution of Arab nationalism, and is probably more relevant to the inaccuracies found in some of the new textbooks.

The Balfour Declaration The old textbooks discussed the Balfour Declaration at great length, quoting the text in full. The declaration, wrote one textbook, “marked the beginning of the liberation of the people of Israel . . . It recognized the nation’s existence and its right to build its home on its historic homeland . . . The declaration was no less than international recognition of the justice of the people of Israel’s claim. . . . to rebuild their homeland in Eretz Israel.”85 Since the declaration was vague as to the exact boundaries of “Palestine” (Eretz Israel), one textbook claimed that the term included both sides of the Jordan River.86 Another textbook offered a more accurate account, noting that the text of the declaration as suggested by the Zionists had been altered. The original version spoke of “Palestine as a national home,” meaning that the national home would encompass all of Palestine; the amended text referred to “a national home for the people of Israel in Palestine.” The authors added, however, that the “amended text was the basis of the distorted [emphasis mine] interpretation that Britain was not bound to establish the Jewish national home in all of Palestine.”87 Horowitz noted, somewhat patronizingly, that even if the majority of the Jews were aware of the discrepancy between the two views, they “could not understand it.”88 In 1967, the Ministry of Education issued a special booklet on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the declaration, explaining Britain’s motives for issuing it and detailing the differences between the Zionist draft and the final version. In contrast to most textbooks, the booklet also discussed the part of the declaration that touched on the civil and religious rights of the “non-Jewish inhabitants” (i.e., the Arab majority). It stressed, however, that no mention was made of “political” rights for this community.89 None of the first-generation textbooks recorded the tenacious Arab opposition to the declaration. One textbook gave the opposite impression, stating that “once the British government had promised that the Jewish national home would not impair the religious and civil rights of the Arab population, the Arab leaders no longer opposed the declaration. This was Britain’s sole commitment to the Arabs.”90

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The second-generation textbooks gave a more balanced view of the declaration. However, they omitted or played down the fact that before issuing it the British signed conflicting agreements with the French and made contradictory promises to the Arabs. Those textbooks that discussed the other promises provided much shorter descriptions of them than of the declaration, and no serious attempt was made to explain the contradictions between the various documents. Such a discussion, as has been pointed out, might have signaled a weakening of the Jewish claim to Eretz Israel, which was legally and morally linked to the Balfour Declaration.91 Although some of these biases disappeared from the third-generation textbooks, the description of the declaration was still longer than that of the other documents and detached from them. This separation, and the unequal presentation, suggested to the student that the Balfour Declaration was more important than other wartime commitments. While this is certainly the Israeli view, it was not the British or the Arab interpretation.92 Only one high school textbook emphasized that the Balfour Declaration was one promise among many, preceded by the MacMahon-Husayn correspondence and the Sykes-Picot Agreement.93

The Faysal-Weizmann Agreement Although the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 was followed by the establishment of several Arab states under the control of the Western powers, many first-generation textbooks did not discuss this new order in the Middle East. They did, however, discuss the Faysal-Wiezemann agreement of January 1919, the first to be concluded between Jews and Arabs. The famous photograph of the two at ‘Aqaba, showing Weizmann wearing the traditional Arab head-cover (kaffiyeh), was sometimes included in these textbooks. Horowitz presented the Zionist interpretation, arguing that the agreement proved that the British had not promised Eretz Israel to the Arabs and by implication that the Arabs did not see Palestine as Arab. He also cautioned that the agreement should to be viewed with suspicion: Faysal’s attitude toward Zionism was from the very beginning both fickle and hypocritical. He whispered honeyed words in the ears of the Zionist leaders, while saying entirely different things to the French journalists in Paris [at the 1919 Peace Conference]. When speaking to the Arab dignitaries, he railed against Zionism, declaring that he had signed the agreement “under pressure from the rich Jews.”94

Several textbooks identified King Faysal as “the representative of the Arab national movement.” Although this conclusion is unwarranted, it suited the Zionist view that Faysal signed the agreement on behalf of the whole Arab nation. Some textbooks omitted mention of Faysal’s handwritten reservation that was added to the agreement, which stipulated that if

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the Arab demand for a state, as promised by the British, was not fulfilled, the agreement was null and void.95 In the 1970s, the Ministry of Education published the text of the public debate between the British historian, Professor Arnold Toynbee, and the Israeli ambassador to Canada, Dr. Ya’akov Herzog, in 1961, which focused on the Jews’ historic right to Eretz Israel. In the course of the debate, Herzog referred to the Faysal-Weizmann agreement, arguing that it denoted Arab recognition of the Jewish state and confirmed the Jewish right to Eretz Israel. Significant information, however, was to be found in the footnotes of the published text, which added that the exact impact of the agreement “remains a matter of controversy.” It was also stated that “it was uncertain at the time whether and to what extent Faysal represented the Arab national movement.”96 The second-generation textbooks discussed the agreement in greater detail. Faysal was depicted as a moderate Arab leader who was unable to overcome the strong Arab opposition to Zionism in Syria and Palestine.97 Such a depiction served to transmit a double message to the student: that the Jews always extended their hand in peace but that intransigent Arab leaders made a Zionist-Arab agreement untenable; and that certain Arab leaders recognized the legitimate Jewish rights to Palestine and the Balfour Declaration as early as 1919. Such a claim obviously negated the Arab interpretation of the MacMahon-Husayn correspondence concerning Palestine. The third-generation textbooks present a more sophisticated narrative. While the older textbooks usually blame the Arabs for their intransigence, hinting at Faysal’s opportunistic behavior, Barnavi and Naveh correctly emphasize that the chances for a peaceful agreement between the two national movements, both claiming the same land, were negligible at that time.98 Another textbook admitted that in the early 1920s it became obvious that there was no way to implement the agreement since the control of the local Palestinian population was in the hands of local families, which were not attached to, or under the control, of Faysal.99 The agreement, in this context, is not treated as an Arab ploy, a lost opportunity, or an instrument conferring legitimacy on the Zionist cause. Rather, it is correctly perceived as an unsuccessful, näive attempt to overcome the opposing interests of Jews and Arabs in Palestine.

THE BRITISH MANDATE IN PALESTINE (1920–48) The British Mandate in Palestine is a major topic in Israeli history textbooks. Three issues will be examined in this context: the origins of the terms Palestine and the Palestinians; the recurring confrontations between the Jewish community and the Arab-Palestinian population, as reflected by the violent events of 1920–21, 1929, and 1936–39; and Jewish-Arab efforts to establish a dialogue.

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Palestine and the Palestinians First-generation textbooks evaded the term “Palestine,” preferring the biblical term “Eretz Israel” or simply “Israel.” This was probably because the term Palestine acquired negative connotation in the course of Jewish history, whether because it was associated with the biblical Philistines or because it was the name given to Judea following the Roman conquest and the destruction of the Jewish entity in the land. Undoubtedly, the fact that the Arabs used the term Filastin to describe this same territory stigmatized the term Palestine. Using it was tantamount to accepting the Arab view. Horowitz alone referred to the term, defining Palestine as “the alien Hebrew name officially given to the country. It was a compromise characteristic of the [High Commissioner] Samuel administration, which sought to strike a balance between the Jews’ demand that the country be called by its true [emphasis mine] name and resolute Arab opposition to the name Eretz Israel.”100 This avoidance also characterized the second-generation textbooks. One exception was a textbook for elementary schools that referred to Palestine as the “name of our country prior to the establishment of the State of Israel, which is used mainly by the Arabs at present.” The same textbook offered this explanation: There are some who, having become accustomed to the name, persist in calling our country “Palestine.” They are also perhaps unaware of the origins of the name. The Romans were the first to call our country Palestine . . . naming the country after the enemies of Israel, the Philistines, who had lived in the country several centuries earlier. They hoped that by doing so the country’s Hebrew name would eventually be forgotten. In time, the name Palestine took root and it is still used by many. We will use the country’s true [emphasis mine] name “Eretz Israel.”101

A more complex problem faced the textbooks regarding the description of the Arab population of Palestine. The old textbooks consistently referred to them as Arabs of Eretz Israel, who were part of the Arab nation. Moreover, Palestinian nationalism was nonexistent, completely submerged under Arab nationalism. This attitude also pervaded several later textbooks that blurred the distinction between the two national movements.102 It reflected the traditional Zionist view, which ignored the existence of Palestinian nationalism. Ben-Zion Dinur, a former minister of education and a noted historian (who served as an authority for many textbook authors), expressed this view succinctly when he stated that “there was never any such thing as a Palestinian nation . . . but thanks to the Jews it will eventually arise.”103 The disregard for the Palestinians largely disappeared from the secondgeneration textbooks in light of growing awareness in Israeli society of Arab and Palestinian issues. Moreover, a comprehensive study of the evolution of Palestinian nationalism published by Professor Yehoshua Porath

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of the Hebrew University in the 1970s was available to the second-generation of textbook writers on the high school level. Significantly, however, the segments excerpted from this study tended to play down the growth of Palestinian national consciousness.104 Ultimately, the underlying message projected by these textbooks was that Palestinian nationalism emerged not as a result of an array of geographical, historical, economic, and cultural developments, but entirely as a reaction to Zionism.105 Such a depiction diminished the significance of Palestinian nationalism, making it less authentic than the Jewish national movement. A highly popular, yet unauthorized, high school textbook written in 1983 by Amnon Hever, a right-wing educator, put forward a prevalent view within Jewish society. Negating the existence of a Palestinian people entirely, the textbook relied on non-academic “authorities” to prove its point. Moreover, Ben-Zion Dinur, a highly respected historian of Jewish and Israeli history, was quoted to the effect that, in contrast to “experts” on Arab affairs who accepted Arab allegations as facts, there had never been a Palestinian people. If there was a national awakening, Dinur noted, it was not the product of an organic process but a reaction to external forces, mainly Zionism. The quotation ended with his well-known statement: “for Arabs in Eretz Israel—all the rights; over Eretz Israel—no rights.”106 Statements by so distinguished an authority on Jewish history helped legitimize this argument. All textbooks of the third generation acknowledged the existence of a Palestinian national movement since the end of the war and the beginning of the British Mandate, although this movement, according to the narrative, suffered from a low level of national consciousness and lack of national infrastructure. In contrast to second-generation textbooks that offered more information on Palestinian society based on Porath’s studies, the third generation treat the subject in a more general way. Interestingly, while the term “Palestinian” is used freely to describe the activities of the local Arab population in Palestine, this group is consistently referred to as the “Arabs of Eretz Israel,” rather than Palestinians.107 Among the new textbooks, one gave a surprisingly slanted depiction. According to Naveh (1995): Throughout the mandate period, the Arab-Palestinian community in Eretz Israel constituted the majority of the population. The Arabs of Eretz Israel, as the whole Arab world, were a traditional society, generally unfamiliar with the term nationalism. As a result, key institutions, modern political infrastructure and educational systems that could shape the national consciousness did not develop. The majority of the community lived under the control of rich, powerful families, and their sense of cohesiveness was based on religious (Islamic) and ethnic (Arab) bonds devoid of a modern national component.108

This passage is illuminating because it is reminiscent of the narrative in the old textbooks, suggesting that despite new trends in societal perceptions, the conviction that a Palestinian people did not exist was still ingrained. It

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also shows that progress in the field of textbooks may be a dialectical process. In any case, Naveh omitted this passage from his 1998–99 textbooks. The most accurate and balanced account yet of the origins of the Palestinian problem appears in a high school textbook published in 1998. Under the chapter, “The Palestinians, from Refugees to People” (le’om), Elie Barnavi discusses at length the evolution of Palestinian nationalism from the post-World War I period until the current peace process. Acknowledging that for many years Israeli leaders attempted to deny Palestinian nationality, claiming that the Arabs of the region were part of the “Arab nation,” he argues that Palestinian nationalism, as many other Middle Eastern nations, originated in the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. With this, the struggle with Zionism constituted a crucial factor in consolidating Palestinian nationalism, a process that he compares with the consolidation of the Spanish and the German nations. After shortly reviewing the Mandate period (which is discussed at length in earlier sections of the textbook), the author places the emergence of Fatah and the PLO within the process of institutionalization that Palestinian society underwent. Eventually, he brings the narrative of the development of Palestinian nationalism to its logical conclusion—the outbreak of the Intifada and the peace process.109 Although several textbooks had acknowledged the existence of the Palestinian people, this comprehensive analysis is the first to reflect a more tolerant outlook emerging in Israeli society. Violent Arab-Jewish Encounters In discussing Arab-Jewish relations during the mandate period, all textbooks focused on the recurrent waves of violence, often referred to as “the events” (Hame’ora’ot). The use of such a vague term enabled the Zionists to strip the episodes of any national connotation. Other loaded terms, which on the one hand were devoid of any national meaning and on the other were associated with Jewish history, were pogroms, riots, disturbances, convulsions, disorders, attacks, bloody outbursts, and acts of terror. The old textbooks typically described an inevitable cycle: The events were generally preceded by Arab incitement and provocation. The Jews would defend themselves, mainly with the help of the Haganah organization. Eventually, though not always enthusiastically, the British authorities would intervene. They appointed commissions of inquiry which, as a rule, upheld the “allegations” and “demands” of the Arabs.110

A more sophisticated definition was offered by textbooks of the second generation: “events” occurred when “the Jews were attacked by Arabs.” Another textbook defined them as “Arab attacks on Jewish communities and transport systems during the British Mandate period.”111 In contrast, third-generation textbooks explained that “events” was a Jewish term,

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while Arabs and Palestinians used different terms to describe these violent clashes (see later). All textbooks referred to three waves of violent confrontations (1920–21, 1929, 1936–39) during the Mandate period. The 1920–1921 Riots. The first wave of Arab rioting swept through the northern Galilee area (March 1920), Jerusalem (April 1920), and the center of the country (May 1921). The northern settlement of Tel-Hai was the first to be attacked. The first-generation textbooks echoed the mythical account that appears in Zionist historiography, describing Joseph Trumpeldor’s dramatic defense effort and his death, and recounting how brave and fearless Jews faced cunning and deceitful Arabs. The Bedouin (or Arab, or simply robber) bands, led by an Arab shaykh considered to be a “friend of the Jews,” had requested permission to search the settlement for French soldiers who allegedly had sought refuge there. When the Arabs treacherously attacked, several Jewish fighters, including Trumpeldor, died defending the settlement. The same story, with minor variations, was replicated in all first-generation textbooks and in several of the second generation.112 The Tel-Hai myth was significant because it conveyed certain messages to the student: First, Jews should rely on themselves and not on foreigners. Second, every Jewish settlement should be defended even at the cost of life. Third, the battle eventually resulted in the inclusion of this area in the British Mandate in Palestine.113 Moreover, psychologically, the Tel-Hai episode reinforced the negative image of the Arab as a deceitful and insidious foe. The publication in 1979 of a well-documented study by historian Nakdimon Rogel that largely refuted the Tel-Hai myth,114 influenced the content of several second-generation textbooks. Although a junior high school textbook, published in 1984, reinforced the myth, a high school textbook published a year later presented both the old version and Rogel’s new thesis.115 The inconsistency between the two textbooks may have been a coincidence, but possibly the Ministry of Education thought that junior high school students should not be exposed to such a complicated narative. A third-generation textbook for high school offers a more sophisticated analysis, discussing how the Tel-Hai myth had emerged.116 The terminology used in describing the riots is similar in the first- and second-generation textbooks. They were depicted as “bloody disturbances” caused by an “inflamed Arab mob” incited to violence by the “rich, landowning effendis, prosperous townspeople, jealous muftis [i.e., presumably supporters of the Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, leader of the Arab Palestinians], and meddling European agents provocateurs.”117 The term “pogrom” was often used synonymously for “events” or “bloody disturbances.” The use of the Russian term “pogrom” was particularly significant because of the implicit link it established between the Arabs and other anti-Semitic oppressors who had attacked and massacred Jews in Russia and elsewhere—events that were an integral part of the Israeli history curriculum. A textbook for high schools included a document published in

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April 1920 by the Jews, following the incidents in Jerusalem, that used the term “pogrom” six times.118 An indication of the extent to which this term was entrenched in the collective Israeli memory is observable in the extensive use of this term made by a high school textbook published as recently as the early 1990s.119 Third-generation textbooks offered a more balanced description of the events, although slanted terminology was still common. One textbook claimed that the 1921 “events” led to a growing recognition that “these were not hostilities resulting from conflicts between neighbors, but a political conflict reflecting the objection of the Arabs of Eretz Israel [not Palestinians!] to the Balfour Declaration.”120 Additionally, this textbook not only refuted the Tel-Hai myth, but informed the student that “occasionally national movements turn historical events to myths . . . such an event that turned into a myth is the [Jewish] defense of Tel-Hai.”121 Reverting to the 1920–21 riots, another textbook suggested that they “were an expression of national mood among the Arabs of Eretz Israel, which aimed at avoiding the implementation of the Mandate.”122 At the same time, however, the same textbooks used slanted terminology reminiscent of the older textbooks. The Arabs of Eretz Israel are described as “an inflamed mob,” “attackers,” and “rioters” (pori’im) who initiated “bloody disturbances” or “pogroms” against the helpless Jews as a result of “wild incitement” by extremist Arab nationalists.123 The use of this terminology attests to the lasting impact of Zionist historiography and of early textbooks on the writers of new textbooks. The 1929 Riots. The immediate cause of the second wave of violence was a dispute over a religious issue—the rights of Jews to pray at the Western (“Wailing”) Wall. It erupted, however, against the background of the Arabs’ growing fear of the rapid expansion of the Jewish community. Rather than elaborate on the underlying causes of the riots, the old textbooks focused on the Western Wall incident and on the personality of the Mufti of Jerusalem and Head of the Supreme Muslim Council, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who was deemed responsible for provoking the riots. Husayni was described as “an oppressor,” “a fanatic who hated the Hebrew nation,” “a snake,” “a schemer who lacked any restraint,” and other prejudicial epithets.124 Atypical recounting of the chain of events that allegedly led to the riots is described as follows: Having realized that political pressure would not succeed, the Arab extremists sought new pretexts, opportunities and strategies to plague the Jews and incite the Muslim world. The arrival of a new [British] high commissioner provided them with . . . the perfect occasion. The Arab leaders [sic] began to spread slanderous and false rumors against the Jews, feeding and inflaming Islamic religious fanaticism . . . The Jews were accused of scheming to seize Islam’s holy sites in the country, most notably the [al-Aqsa] mosque. The Muslims, of course, are bound to defend their holy sites, if necessary by the sword. Denials were of little avail. Once more the country was enmeshed in a web of fabrications, falsehoods and lies.125

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The depiction of the 1929 “events” was highly emotional, aimed at arousing outrage toward the Arabs and leading the reader to identify with the victims. This was particularly true with regard to the description of the Arab killing of Jews in Hebron, described by one textbook “the worst and most bloodthirsty murders . . . Characterized by terrible acts of cruelty, the rioters savagely and brutally abused their victims . . . the rioters ran amok for an entire week.”126 Although the description of the riots in the second-generation textbook was less emotional and more concise, the general content and the use of pejorative terminology largely resembled the old textbooks.127 A popular high school textbook published in 1990 described the Arabs an “incited mob” that carried out the “pogroms” as a result of “wild incitement” by the leaders of the “Arab [sic] national movement.” To anchor the emotional impact, these terms were reiterated throughout the text.128 Moreover, the depiction of the episode as an anti-Jewish matter rather than as a nationalist act was carried over from the first- to the second-generation textbooks.129 Beyond the rhetoric, the main flaw of the first- and second-generation textbooks was their omission to describe the episode as marking a turning point in Arab-Jewish relations. Following the 1929 riots, the Zionist leadership realized that the Western Wall incident had not been a religious conflict only, but reflected a more complex reality in which two national movements, each aspiring to rule over the land of Palestine, were facing a menacing conflict. Perhaps because the implications of such a conclusion might have called for a profound change in the Zionist perception of the enemy, these textbooks preferred to evade the issue.130 The narrative of these events in the third-generation textbooks was generally more balanced. The narrative in a junior high textbook was particularly fair, indicating that in parallel to the violent acts in Hebron, several Arab families (of which a list is provided) defended their Jewish neighbors.131 Other textbooks do point out that the 1929 events constituted a watershed in Zionist thinking toward the Arab question.132 Yet the use of slanted terminology persisted even in textbooks that generally provided a rather balanced account. Terms such as “incited Arab mob,” “rioters” (por‘im), and “disturbances” are dispersed throughout the text.133 Perhaps the major flaw in the narrative of the new textbooks is their concentration on the violent nature of the conflict instead of focusing on the developments (especially on the Arab-Palestinian side) that led to the outbreak of the hostilities. The Arab Revolt, 1936–39. The 1936–39 “events,” termed by the Palestinians the Arab Revolt, constituted the most significant anti-Jewish confrontation during the mandate period. Lasting over more than three years, the uprising had important political, economic, and social implications for the British, the Jews, and the Palestinians.134 The old textbooks ignored the national character of the revolt, choosing to treat the events simply as another

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round in recurrent waves of violence initiated by armed Arab “gangs.”135 Even the term Arab Revolt, which might have implied tacit acknowledgment of an organized rebellion by a national movement, rarely appeared in the old textbooks. In describing the background to this stage of hostilities, the old textbooks conveyed disappointment in the Arab behavior. The Arabs should have been shown more gratitude to the Zionist movement for having raised their standard of living. According to one textbook, “a great many Arabs benefited from the Jewish immigration; their standard of living had improved tremendously, especially as compared to the Arabs living in the East Bank or neighboring Arab countries. Similarly, the conditions in the Arab villages situated near Jewish settlements were much better than those of the Arab villages located at a distance.”136 Other textbooks gave the impression that the Arabs were actually ingrates. Notably, Horowitz, who also emphasized the improved Arab standard of living as a result of Jewish settlement, pointed out that this was accompanied by growing Arab radicalization. He singled out the religious leader, Shaykh ‘Izz al-din al-Qassam, who sacrificed his life for the cause. This episode, Horowitz maintained, was a turning point in the evolution of the Arab national movement, since “until then, the leaders had done nothing but make fiery speeches and exploit the ignorant, thieving and bloodthirsty mob for their own selfish political ends. They had never shown any sign of true self-sacrifice. Qassam and his allies, by contrast, were not politicians or bandits, they fought and died for the cause. A great inspiration, they propelled the Arab forward.”137 Although this narrative did not differentiate between the Arab and the Palestinian national movements, it supports the argument that the “riots” were actually a “revolt”—much as the Palestinian perception. Horowitz acknowledged that “while the previous riots had been the work of scheming and maneuvering effendis who incited the mob . . . it is possible to view the 1936 events as a rebellion. Arabs from all walks of life were prepared, whether because they were coerced or of their own free will, to sacrifice their soul and property for the national cause.”138 Several of the old textbooks pointed out to the close ties that allegedly existed between the Arab rebels and German and Italian fascist regimes during the 1930s. One textbook stated that “the Arabs were incited by Nazi and Fascist propagandists.”139 Another wrote that “a radio station in Italy broadcast the Arab demands, inflaming the rebels’ spirit.” The Mufti, it added, “had at his disposal vast sums of money, contributions from Iraq and Pakistan, but chiefly from Italy and Germany. The Mufti also had weapons that were mostly of Italian or German origin. In addition, the Arabs spread rumors that the ‘rebels’ friends,’ Hitler and Mussolini, were about to convert to Islam.”140 Horowitz wrote that “inflammatory Italian and German political propaganda, which aimed at harnessing the Arab movement to the chariot of their own political interests, fell on the fertile

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ground of religious and national fanaticism.”141 Given the connotation of these terms in the collective Jewish memory, emphasis on the ties between Arabs and fascist regimes—which in reality were limited and did not involve the supply of weapons142—was an effective method of delegitimizing and dehumanizing the enemy. In May 1939, following the failure of the London Conference to bring Arabs and Jewish sides together for negotiations, the British published the 1939 “White Paper,” cutting off most Jewish immigration to Palestine, which was considered a grave blow to the Zionist enterprise. Not surprisingly, the authors of the old textbooks described it in highly emotional terms. Horowitz wrote a passionate description: It was for a good reason that the “White Paper” was known as “the Black Paper.” . . . Its hollow rhetoric and sanctimonious hypocrisy hid its manifest objective of totally destroying the national home. It may have eternalized the curse of the Diaspora, condemning our people to be dispersed throughout the world until the end of time. . . . This shameful, contemptible document is suffused with the spirit of Munich. The very same appeasers, like Chamberlain who deserted Abyssinia and Spain and delivered the Czechs into the predatory arms of the Nazis, now wanted to abandon the [Jewish] community to the mercy and generosity of its neighbors.143

The repeated analogy between the White Paper and the Munich agreement,144 which stood as a symbol of capitulation, impacted on a generation that had experienced both events firsthand and therefore found the comparison between them particularly relevant. Implicitly, it also served as a moral lesson for the future, signaling that compromises with the enemy (e.g., Hajj Amin al-Husayni) were bound to fail. A booklet published by the Ministry of Education in 1978, marking Israel’s thirtieth anniversary, highlighted the events of 1936, still portraying Arab activity as nothing more than unorganized acts of violence carried out by inflamed Arab mobs. This was reflected as well in the teacher’s guide, emphasizing two areas: the policies of the Mufti, whose principle objective was to harass the Jewish community by means of rioting (pra’ot) and a general strike; and the inflamed Arab mob, which was incited to injure Jews and brutally attack Arabs opposed to these policies.145 The second-generation textbooks continued using the terms “riots,” “events,” and “bloody disturbances,” although the term Arab Revolt became more acceptable for describing the Arab perception of the events. Generally, the depictions were less emotional and the link to the fascist powers less pronounced, but the narrative largely resembled that of the old textbooks. Arab operations were described as “pogroms” or “acts of terror,” and the attackers were described as “mobs,” “gangs,” or simply “murderers.” Most of the textbooks continued using the term “the Arabs of Eretz Israel” instead of Palestinians.146 Implicitly, the descriptions of unorganized Arab attacks served to refute the Arab contention of an organized national

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revolt. The killing of Arabs by fellow Arabs during the revolt was given particular emphasis. One textbook cited the highly exaggerated figure of 6,000 Arabs killed in “domestic terror” while another claimed that the last phase of the revolt turned into an Arab “civil war,” in which “gangs conducted all sort of conspiracies for the sake of selfish interests.”147 The narrative in the third-generation textbooks is generally more balanced in several respects. First, it is made clear that what the Jews call the 1936–39 “events” is termed by the Arabs “the Arab Revolt.”148 Second, the local Arabs are not described as “inflamed mob,” but as a “national community demonstrating its national will.” Third, the Arab-fascist bond is less accentuated and is confined to the field of propaganda. Fourth, Arab “gangs” have become “guerrilla groups” or “units of armed Arabs.”149 Two additional changes are particularly noteworthy. First, while the older textbooks described Britain’s 1939 White Paper in highly negative, emotional tones, Naveh gave a different view: To the question “whether the White Paper is also an expression of appeasement,” he writes in the teacher’s guide that “Some would say so. But, in fact, the aim was quite contrary. The British tried to assure the support of the Arabs should a war break out. That is, they [the British] knew that the appeasement policy toward Hitler may fail and thought in terms of global conflict.”150 The second noteworthy change is in the description of the implications of the Peel Commission (1937) and its relevance to the current peace process. Barnavi’s textbook states the commission’s conclusion that the Arab-Jewish conflict was not a conflict between justice and injustice, but between two justices that could not be reconciled in a unified political entity. Viewed in historical perspective, the textbook points out, the partition plan failed, yet “it was to become the only realistic alternative: almost sixty years of bloody and bitter conflict have changed the Peel Commission’s boundaries, but they did not change the very idea that guided it.”151 These positive changes notwithstanding, the narrative of the Arab Revolt in some third-generation textbooks is still marred by several biases: First, Arab operations are depicted as “terror acts” and ‘Izz al-Din alQassam’s group is termed a “terrorist organization.” Second, the use of old, slanted terms such as “riots” (pra’ot) and “gangs” (knufiyot) is still common in some places. Third, there is no clear distinction between Palestinian and Arab nationalism, with Hussayni depicted as the symbol of “activist Arab nationalism.” Lastly, developments in Palestinian society are depicted only as a reaction to Zionism and not as an independent entity.152

Attempts to Establish a Peace Dialogue Arab and Jewish-Zionist leaders occasionally met during the British Mandate period in the hope of reaching a peaceful compromise. Although these meetings occurred often enough, particularly those involving Jor-

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dan’s King ‘Abdallah, the textbooks made only cursory reference to them.153 At the same time, however, the textbooks perpetuated the myth that despite Arab intransigence, the Zionist movement always sought peace. This attitude characterized the narrative in the first-generation textbooks in particular. One quoted Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann’s response to the British Commission of Inquiry’s report on the 1920–21 riots, in which he denied the accusation that Zionist leaders failed to initiate talks with the Arabs. “Ever since we first set foot in Eretz Israel,” he said, “we spared no effort to approach the Arabs. We wish to live in peace with them. But we are thwarted by dark and sinister forces from within and without.”154 Another textbook acknowledged that the Zionists underestimated Arab strength, but blamed the Arabs and the British for the failure to reach peace. “Most Arab leaders,” it wrote, “rejected a compromise with the Zionists, while the British, in accordance with their system of divide and rule, frustrated any prospect of compromise.”155 The recommendation of the 1931 Zionist Congress to initiate a dialogue with the Arabs was considered by another textbook to be tantamount to “a hand extended in friendship to the Arabs.”156 Several second-generation textbooks either continued to ignore the existence of Jewish-Arab contacts or emphasized Arab reluctance to accept Jewish peace offers. The reader on the Arab-Israeli conflict provided this characteristic description: Despite the differences of opinion within the Jewish public regarding the policies toward the Arabs, there was a willingness to reach a compromise at all times [emphasis mine]. The Jewish community leaders met frequently with Arab leaders, numerous proposals were submitted, and there was a marked inclination to accept the suggestions put forward by organizations such as the UN.157

Notably, documents included in several second-generation textbooks attested that not only were high-level Arab-Jewish meetings held, but that leftist Jewish groups demanded a more conciliatory attitude toward the Arabs.158 However, since this material was included in the documentary section of the textbooks as appendices, the decision as to whether to make use of it was largely left to the teacher. Most textbooks of both the first and second generations ignored the contacts by the Jewish Agency with King ‘Abdallah. In 1947, the Jewish Agency tried to reach some sort of understanding over the partition plan. Several textbooks referred to the famous meeting between the king and Golda Meir, which took place only two days before the Arab invasion in May 1948. One textbook stated that Meir presented ‘Abdallah with a peace proposal based on the partition plan “plus several additional financial and political advantages.” ‘Abdallah, however, would accept peace only if the Jews agreed to establish autonomy under his rule.159 Other textbooks stressed his ambition to annex the West Bank, but did not refer to his meet-

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ings with representatives of the Zionist movement.160 Interestingly, the omission to discuss Jewish-Arab peaceful encounters characterized also third-generation textbooks.161 In light of repeated claims that the Zionist movement sought every avenue to advance peace, the absence of information on Jewish-Arab contacts is indeed surprising. There is no obvious explanation for this omission. Ignorance was not the cause, as the contacts between the Jews and ‘Abdallah had always been an open secret. Conceivably, the reticence resulted from the fact that the contacts ultimately failed; the implication that by holding meetings at all the Zionist leaders had endorsed certain Arab demands; and a mistaken perception of textbooks’ writers that the history of the conflict was primarily one of war and violence. THE 1947–48 WAR The Israeli War of Independence has a special place in Zionist mythology. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that it was the single most important topic in both the first and second generations of history textbooks on Zionism and Israel. The war was described exclusively from the Jewish point of view; the fact that the Palestinians and other Arabs regard it as “the catastrophe” (al-nakba) or holocaust (al-karitha) was not mentioned. The textbooks described the military campaigns in great detail, documenting Israel’s achievements during the war and their significance; at the same time, the consequences of the war for the Palestinians and the Arab states was only briefly discussed, if at all.162 A noticeable change, however, is discerned in the narrative of the third-generation textbooks; these are mainly reflected in the treatment of two major problematic issues: the question of the few (Jews) against the many (Arabs) and the question of the Palestinian refugees. The Few against the Many Many first- and second-generation textbooks described the war as a battle between David (the Jews) and Goliath (the Arabs). Since this perception is a familiar Jewish myth, its appearance in the textbooks in relation to the 1948 war was both logical and convincing. This myth had a dual function: it served as a unifying mechanism, especially for generations that did not experience the war firsthand; and it legitimized the establishment of Israel. Implicitly, the myth also presented the Arabs in a negative light by accentuating their inability to defeat the Jews despite their obvious numerical superiority. This numerical imbalance, according to the myth, developed once the Arab states invaded Israel in May 1948. The old textbooks underlined the relative numerical superiority of the Arab armies (seven to one), as well as that of the Arab population in general

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(about 30 million Arabs as against 600,000 Jews). They also accentuated the modest quantity and inferior quality of the equipment at the disposal of the Israeli army. One textbook stated that the invading armies were not only stronger, but reinforced by “an additional 30 million Arabs reserves and masses of equipment.” Israel, in contrast, “faced this enormous force poorly armed. It had very little ammunition or equipment.”163 Another textbook described how “seven Arab states declared a jihad, a holy war, against the heretic, State of Israel.” Given their superior strength, the Arab armies were certain that they were embarking on a “picnic.” Their objective was “to throw the Jews into the sea.” Israel, however, had one advantage: it was culturally and socially superior to the Arabs.164 A particularly slanted description was given by Cohen and Gelber, who recounted that a “mob” of 20,000 Arabs in Safad “one night fled in the face of 60 lads of the Hagana with one Davidka” [a small, inefficient homemade cannon that made a lot of noise]. In certain cases, they wrote, “the Arab forces were fifty times stronger than the Jewish, but the Haganah forces demonstrated their power.”165 Israel’s performance during the war was lauded and glorified. Abooklet for the state religious school system, published by the Ministry of Education on the occasion of Israel’s tenth anniversary, contained the following description: Well-equipped, trained Arab armies invaded the country. Their objective was a quick victory. . . . Most nations confronted with such a torrent of bad tidings would have broken down, completely paralyzed. This was not the case with the Jewish community. And especially not our remarkable youth, “the last generation enslaved, the first to be redeemed” [taken from the poem by the Israeli national poet, Hayim Nahman Bialik, “The Very Few”]. . . . They and the world witnessed a miraculous triumph: with God’s help, the armies of the God of the Israelites prevailed. Tiny Israel, born but a day before, withstood seven established, powerful and large states. Little David had overcome Goliath.166

This highly emotional tone did not only characterize textbooks for the religious system, but appeared as well in textbooks for the secular schools. Eliezer Riger, the director-general of the Ministry of Education, wrote in his textbook: Seven Arab states solemnly vowing never to rest until Israel is wiped out waged war against the new-born state. The Arabs hoped for a swift campaign of retribution. With bated breath, countries east and west, watched the battle between the invading armies and the army of the day old state. Would Israel survive? Or would it fall, its army crushed, its towns and villages plundered?167

The myth of “the few against the many” began to erode in second-generation textbooks as they integrated the findings of academic studies showing that the old picture of Jewish-Arab military imbalance was inaccurate.168

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One high school textbook cited figures from Ben-Gurion’s diary, revealing that at the beginning of the war the Arabs had a measure of superiority in manpower and absolute superiority in equipment. However, as the war progressed, the Jews attained superiority in manpower and a measure of equality in military equipment.169 The same attitude appeared in several high school second-generation textbooks.170 The second-generation textbooks, however, were not uniform. A junior high textbook insisted that “the number of forces available to the two sides was vastly unbalanced.” It added that the Jewish community numbered 650,000 while in Israel alone there were over a million Arabs. Together with the populations of the Arab states, the total Arab population reached the “respectable” figure of 40 million. Accordingly, “the chances of success appeared extremely doubtful.”171 Once more, it is possible that the Ministry of Education thought that junior high school students are too young to be exposed to such a complex reality. Third-generation textbooks refute the old myth more explicitly. In describing the “unofficial” war, Naveh’s textbooks for junior high school states: “On nearly every front and in nearly every battle, the Jewish side had the advantage over the Arabs in terms of planning, organization, operation of equipment and also in the number of trained fighters participating in the battle.” When the Arab armies invaded Israel, it goes on, they “enjoyed superiority in terms of soldiers and equipment, but they were disunited, uncoordinated, and their fighting capability was low.” 172 Interestingly, while the text clearly refutes the myth, the proto-text (two cartoons) delivers a contradictory message.173 A similar narrative is presented in a junior high school textbook published by the Ministry of Education.174 Several high school textbooks went one step further, showing that Jewish forces outnumbered Arab forces since the early phases of the war. “There is no reason to conclude from the prevailing anxiety,” one textbooks stated, “that the Yishuv and later the State were inferior in terms of military capability to the Arabs.”175 A teacher’s guide to one of the textbooks instructs “to show that in spite of the common image of the few against the many, overall the Jewish community had a significant advantage over the Arabs and this explains its victory in the struggle.”176 Yet the old myth and slanted terminology are still found.177 Since the myth of “the few against the many” has been a central theme in the Zionist ethos,178 it is hardly surprising that history textbooks mirrored it. Changes in society and historiography, however, gradually found their way into the textbooks, and consequently, the myth, which played such a vital role in the state’s formative period, has largely disappeared from the textbooks. It should be emphasized, however, that the heated debate in the media during the second half of 1999 over the depiction of this theme in the new textbooks shows that the myth still has many believers, probably an outcome of many years of educational socialization.179

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The Refugee Problem Israel’s alleged responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem is the single most controversial issue in the historiography of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The old textbooks usually presented the traditional position upheld by Zionist historiography that Israel had no part in creating the problem. According to this narrative, the Arabs of Eretz Israel had simply fled the country (for various reasons that will be discussed later) despite Israeli attempts to persuade them to stay. This version, with slight alterations, remained largely intact until the 1990s.180 The textbooks cited two waves of Arab flight from Israel: the first occurred prior to the establishment of the state; the second took place during the “official” war, mostly from those areas designated as an Arab state by the UN partition plan. Typically, one of the old textbooks described the situation thus: The Arabs fled the country a few weeks prior to the end of the mandate. A mass and panic-stricken flight began. The spirit of the Arab population was broken and they were in a state of utter terror. Destructive and malicious [Arab] propaganda only added fuel to troubled waters. The Arabs were deluded by into thinking that they would soon return victorious to the country, expel the Jews and seize their goods as spoils of war.181

Another approach to the issue was the seemingly neutral description of the Arab flight from mixed Arab-Jewish cities. One textbook recorded that “once the Arabs saw their towns falling into Jewish hands, they began to abandon their homes.” In Safad “the Arabs ran away” upon the arrival of the Palmach battalions.182 In Tiberius and Haifa “the Arabs evacuated the city . . . and before long began to flee in a panic. . . . The Mufti demanded that they leave the country. He promised those who departed that they would soon return in the wake of the victorious armies.”183 According to another textbook, the Arab residents in Tiberius “surrendered and left the town under British protection.” The “liberation” of Haifa, it added, was accompanied by “hundreds of Arabs fleeing the town and its surrounding villages.” The Arabs also “abandoned” the Galilee, while in Jaffa most of the Arabs “preferred to leave,” once the Jews had conquered the town.184 One of the events that galvanized the Arab flight was the massacre in the village of Dir Yassin in April 1948. Several textbooks of the first generation ignored this unhappy episode altogether, but the textbook by Riger observed that, having refused to surrender to the underground Etzel and Lehi units, Several hundred of the village’s defenders and inhabitants, including the elderly women and children were killed. The world was astonished. No one had believed the Jews capable of such a ferocious and brutal act. Among the Arabs, Dir Yassin became a rallying cry, an excuse for their frenzied and bloody agitation against the

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Jews. . . . Yet, more then inciting the Arabs to revenge themselves against the Jews, Dir Yassin put the fear of death in the Arabs. Hundreds of thousands of Arabs fled from the mixed cities . . . in sheer terror of Jewish aggression. Although fear of the Jews induced a psychosis of mass flight, it was the Arab leadership’s promise that the victorious Arab armies would return the refugees to their homes, which in fact animated and fueled the mass flight.185

To counterbalance the negative impression created by the Dir Yassin episode, the textbooks described the “dreadful, cruel and bloodthirsty massacre” by Arabs of scholars, doctors, nurses, and Jewish students traveling to Mount Scopus, which took place only a few days later.186 Moreover, many first- and second-generation textbooks emphasized that members of Etzel and Lehi, two right-wing splinter groups of the Hagana, who presumably did not represent Jewish community, carried out the Dir Yassin operation.187 Such an argument was meant to absolve the Jewish community from responsibility for the massacre. The description of the Palestinian exodus during the war in the old textbooks was largely similar to the description of the prewar exodus. Atypical description in one such textbook observed that during Operation Dani, “Lydda’s Arab inhabitants fled in panic, accompanied by the Arabs of Ramle. This was not the desertion of a few individuals but—as in Tiberius, Haifa, Safad, Jaffa and Jerusalem—a mass flight which flooded the roads and the front.”188 Several textbooks focused on the question of responsibility, which was laid squarely on the Palestinians and the Arab states. One textbook highlighted “the Arab states’ decision to invade Israel, which Arab strategists insisted required the evacuation of the mixed areas, if casualties among the Arab population were to be avoided. This was why the Arab population was ordered to ‘temporarily’ leave its homes until the Arab armies ‘returned things to normal.’ ”189 Another textbook condemned the Arab states, which “saw the refugees as an excellent bargaining chip, to be used to exert pressure on world opinion.” When the outcome of the war failed to fulfill the hopes of the Arab states, they refused to absorb the refugees.190 Several textbooks not only denied Israel’s responsibility for the problem, but actually observed that the Arab flight “was very advantageous.” One textbook commented that “had the partition plan been implemented . . . the Jewish state, with its tiny Jewish majority, would have indubitably been very weak. The partition plan’s most serious difficulty was the ratio between the Arab and Jewish population. This problem was now suitably resolved.”191 In a similar vein, Nathaniel Lorch, who would later be acknowledged as Israel’s official historian of the war, rejected the assumption that the conflict between Israel and the Arabs would end once the Arab refugee problems were resolved. In his opinion, once the refugees returned, they would have only one aim: “to destroy the state of Israel from within. Acting as a fifth column, they will work to undermine the state’s security and facil-

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itate the task of the foreign troops who will arrive to annihilate Israel.” This conviction, and the experience of similar international conflicts, led Lorch to suggest “resettling the refugees in the Arab states”: Given the fact that the State of Israel had absorbed over 500,000 Jews who had fled the Arab states, leaving behind most of their possessions, which were promptly confiscated, while the number of Arab refugees was about 600,000192 . . . what we witnessed was nothing more than a population exchange. The Arab states, however, for political reasons, wish to freeze and perpetuate the refugees’ status.193

As for the results of the war for the Palestinians, one textbook viewed the results of the 1948 war as an end to Palestinian nationhood, contending that Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank and Egypt’s control over the Gaza Strip “had destroyed the existence of the Palestinians as an independent people.” Moreover, the Arab states deliberately “froze” the refugee problem, turning it into a weapon against Israel. The pressure to allow the refugees to return “was part of a general plan to plant a Trojan horse, controlled from without, in the heart of Israel.” The Arab states, it went on, exacerbated the refugee problem by preventing effective humanitarian aid from the refugees and to ease their plight and by denying them official representation.194 In many respects, the second-generation textbooks offered a similar historical narrative. They, too, blamed the Arab leadership for the plight of the refugees. The expressions used to describe the Arab departure were identical: “flight,” “abandon,” “exit,” “desert,” “vacate,” and so on. A textbook for junior high students, for example, described how, following the conquest of Tiberias, “the local Arab population preferred to abandon the town rather than accept the authority of a Jewish government.” In Haifa, “the town’s Arab leaders consulted with the Arab Higher Committee in Lebanon, which ordered them not to surrender but to evacuate the town instead. They were assured that the Arab invasion would begin shortly and that they would soon return [home] in triumph.” Moreover, the author continued, “dreadful and frightening tales of ‘Zionist cruelty and brutality’ were spread among the Arab population. These, together with the expectation that the Arab armies would soon liberate ‘the conquered lands,’ precipitated the mass Arab flight.” Thus, “Ramla and Lydda—to name but two towns—were emptied of most of their [Arab] inhabitants and the refugee problem [was] created.”195 To strengthen this point, the textbooks presented excerpts from documents proving that Israel did not expel, and in some cases even encouraged, Arabs to stay (see Appendix 8). Arab (Palestinian) leaders were also quoted, condemning both the Arab states and their own leaders for the disaster that befell them.196 It should be emphasized that independently published textbooks for high school, which were not authorized by the Ministry of Education but were highly popular, contained a similar narrative.197 Largely avoiding the issue, the reader on the Arab-Israeli conflict

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displayed “sanitized,” innocuous pictures of Palestinian refugee camps that fell far short of reality (see Appendix 10).198 A careful reading of these textbooks, however, reveals that ultimately they did offer a more complex picture of the refugee problem.199 One high school textbook noted that in some regions the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) “evacuated [my italics] the local Arab population” in the course of battle, and “prevented their return [my Italics] once the fighting was over.” In order to offset the negative implications of this sentence, it was added that “during the Ten-Day Battles a special effort was made to prevent the Arab population from leaving the country, particularly in the regions of Lydda, Ramla and Nazareth.”200 A textbook geared to vocational high schools admitted that “the IDF forces did not prevent the Arab population from fleeing to neighboring countries and in many cases even encouraged [my italics] them.”201 But the photo attached to the text showed Arabs (not Palestinians) “leaving” the country. In addition, the reader on the Arab-Israeli conflict included an article by the distinguished Middle East historian Bernard Lewis, providing nuanced background to the Palestinian refugee problem. 202 Textbooks of the second generation introduced, for the first time, extracts from the Hagana’s “Plan Dalet” [letter D in Hebrew], albeit omitting significant parts that could damage Israel’s image.203 Only one authorized textbook referred to the “cleaning of the Arab villages” and “the conquest of strategic vantage points and the occupation of Arab villages” in discussing Plan Dalet.204 Two further points emerge from a careful reading of these textbooks. First, they dealt with the thorny question of the precise number of Arab Palestinian refugees by presenting the conflicting statistics (Israeli vs. Arab figures), without according priority to the Israeli minimalist estimate. Second, for the first time, a textbook cited Benny Morris’s study on the Palestinian refugee problem. Although this textbook was unauthorized by the ministry, the fact that it used an academic work challenging Zionist historiography showed that the classical Zionist narrative in school textbooks was being eroded.205 Amore noteworthy change is discerned in the narrative of the third-generation textbooks. The textbook for junior high states that “during the battles many of the country’s Arabs were expelled. Some ran away before the arrival of the Jews to the village or to the Arab neighborhood in the city, and some expelled by the occupying force.” It also adds that “more than 600,000 Arabs were uprooted from their places in the country and were settled in refugee camps.”206 The teacher’s guide for this textbook is more explicit, instructing the teacher to emphasize that “in this war over the home and the land there were acts of expulsion by the victors. When the [Jewish] forces conquered the mixed cities and Arab villages, Arab Palestinians were expelled on more than one occasion. This is why the Arabs call this period al-nakba (the disaster or holocaust).”207 Another junior high textbook ex-

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plained that in certain areas, where good neighborly relations existed between Jews and Arabs, there was an “explicit order not to expel Arabs,” but “the expulsion of the Arab population of Lydda and Ramle was confirmed by the political leadership.”208 The history textbooks for high school approved by the Ministry of Education do not present a uniform narrative. In fact, one textbook omits the subject altogether while the second treats it in a superficial and biased way.209 The most extensive and comprehensive analysis of the refugee problem thus far appears in Barnavi and Naveh’s new high school textbook.210 In a discussion that spans over two pages, the text accurately mirrors the current state of academic knowledge and shows some empathy for the refugees’ plight. While the author uses the familiar expressions “fled,” “departed,” and “abandoned,” he also notes that at the end of the fighting, “in order to clear the area of hostile elements, approximately 10,000 villagers were expelled from their homes.” He disparages as myths both the Israeli assertion that the Arab leaders encouraged the Palestinians to flee, and the Arab charge that the expulsion was part of a Zionist plot. The Arab departure, he argues, was brought about by a combination of factors: the Arab elites’ abdication of all responsibility and their abandonment of the local population, the raids and attacks carried out by Jewish forces (at Dir Yassin, for example), and the general chaos of war. He admits, however, that in some places there was “also a deliberate policy of expulsion.” Moreover, though “no formal political decision was taken to expel the local Arab population, local commanders were clearly granted considerable freedom in this respect.” The author notes that Morris, in his book, cited 369 abandoned Arab villages “including 33 whose inhabitants were deliberately expelled by Jewish forces.” Regarding the sum total of refugees, he puts their number at between 600,000 and 760,000, an estimated figure that is accepted by many scholars. At the end of this passage, he assesses the refugee problem in the context of the larger conflict: As the years passed, hatred, alienation, the desire for revenge and the hope of return, all exacerbated by Arab propaganda, fused the refugees into a single nation and transformed the refugee problem into an international problem. True, Israel emerged victorious from the war of survival forced upon it. But the Palestinian refugee problem was to poison its relations with the Arab world and the international community for over a generation.211

The author, moreover, does not attempt to conceal the wretched, poverty-stricken conditions of the Palestinian refugee camps. While previous textbooks showed “sterile” photos of the camps, the author used a realistic photo, illustrating that “the Palestinian problem has ripened in the poverty, inactivity and frustration that engulfed the refugees in their miserable camps.”212 Yet placing a photo of deprived Jewish immigrants opposite the

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photo of the Palestinian refugees may suggest a parallel between the fate of the Palestinians and the Jewish immigrants (see Appendix 9).213 In parallel to the presentation of a complex narrative in the textbooks of the third generation, teachers were exposed to additional teaching aids that largely substantiated this narrative. For example, a 1997 issue of the History Teachers’ Journal, published by the Ministry of Education, discussed the debate between old and new historians.214 By exposing the teacher to revisionist interpretations of the refugee problem, the ministry legitimized the validity of the debate, if not the thesis itself. To sum up, first- and second-generation textbooks reflected the traditional Israeli position on the refugee question. They offered a variety of explanations for the Arab flight to show that except for the negative psychological impact of the Dir Yassin massacre—itself the work of a marginal group—Israel was not involved in the Arab (i.e., the Palestinian) flight. Clearly, the omissions by the textbooks in this respect were not due to the authors’ ignorance, since information on the expulsion of Arabs by Jewish fighting forces was known at least in part. It would appear, therefore, that the main reason for the omission was to absolve Israel of responsibility for the fate of the refugees. A different account might have had negative and embarrassing political implications for Israel. This one-sided narrative, however, is replaced in third-generation textbooks by a multicausal explanation that includes Israel’s partial role in the creation of the refugee problem, a change prompted by new historiography and a willingness by Israeli society to more critically view its past.

THE 1956 WAR Until the introduction of the third-generation textbooks in the late 1990s, the post-1948 period was studied within the civics curriculum. The narrative of the first- and second-generation history textbooks on the topic of Zionism generally ended with the 1948 war. However, teachers and schools frequently bypassed the teaching of the post-1948 period because it involved political issues, and because the matriculation syllabus in history and civics was overloaded as it was. The first topic related to the Arab-Israeli conflict in the post-1948 period is the 1956 war, in Israel known as Operation Kadesh, the Sinai War, or Operation Suez. The old textbooks described it as an inevitable war, the outcome of ongoing terrorist (fedayyin) border raids, Egypt’s blockade of the Suez Canal, Egyptian military development, the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, and Nasser’s alleged goal of establishing a “Muslim Empire” in the Middle East with Soviet help. A typical textbook concluded, therefore, that “in view of the danger of attack, Israel was forced to take bold action.”215 In Lorch’s opinion, “undoubtedly, the fedayyin’s activity was no more than a

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preparatory action intended to lay the groundwork for a larger, more far-reaching [Arab] operation.”216 An updated edition of an old textbook for high school offered a more comprehensive, albeit biased, analysis. It depicted 1956 as “a year of great anxiety for Israel,” emphasizing fedayyin terrorist actions, the Egyptian blockade of Suez, and the formation of a tripartite Arab military command, which constituted a “a serious attempt to form a ring of strangulation around Israel on sea and by land.” However, the main reason for the outbreak of the war, according to this analysis, was Israel’s attempt to preempt Nasser, “who intended to use his enormous stores of arms in Sinai coming from Eastern Europe to attack Israel. The Arab states,” it concluded, “have never hidden their aspiration to annihilate ‘the Zionist gang.’ ”217 A booklet published by the Ministry of Education for the religious schools, on Israel’s tenth anniversary, presented a particularly slanted description: After the total Arab defeat in open battle, some of the Arab leaders contrived to weaken Israel by other means. They organized bands of robbers and murderers across the border who would raid our peaceful settlements, maiming, killing and destroying. . . . The problem of armed raids reached a peak during the year 1956. More then once the question was asked: Until when? Would Israel forever consent to suffer the ravages of a prolonged war at the hands of the Arab states? Or would it act and finally sever the hands of the hireling murderers? Operation Kadesh was Israel’s unequivocal answer. The leaders of our state were resolved not to wait until the Arab states, plotting and planning our destruction, gathered strength . . . [and] stormed Israel’s borders from the north, east and south. . . . There was a complete consensus that Operation Kadesh was executed just in the nick of time. As a result of our army’s decisive victory . . . we had entered an era of calm and tranquility.218

The old textbooks hardly mentioned Israel’s collusion with Britain and France during the war, concealing this collaboration in the overall description of the war. One textbook described the tripartite operation as two separate actions: Feeling the noose slowly tightening around its throat, Israel realized that it could no longer stand idly by and do nothing. . . . Meanwhile, Britain and France attacked the Suez Canal. Their objective was to capture the canal and free it from the clutches of the Egyptian dictator. . . . They failed to achieve their goal because Russian threats and US intervention, aiming to win the sympathy of the Arab states, interrupted them in mid-action. The Egyptian dictator could now appear before the Arab masses posing as the victor. Israel, which had defeated Nasser’s army, was forced to retreat and relinquish its gains.219

Another textbook divided the war into two separate operations: “While Israel was attacking Egypt, the British and French launched an offensive against the Suez Canal . . . to conquer it from the Egyptian dictator.”220 Ac-

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cording to Lorch, Israel alone fought the 1956 war, as neither Britain nor France were mentioned in his narrative.221 Another textbook handled the tripartite coordination obliquely, remarking that “Ben-Gurion met with the French prime minister in order to coordinate actions.”222 The old textbooks lauded the war as a great success. The fedayyin border raids had ceased, the Suez Canal was reopened for the passage of ships, and the deterrent capability of the IDF was increased. One textbook observed that the operation had struck a severe blow to the Arab hope of destroying the state: “It was now evident that Israel could not be broken by mere superiority in arms and force. The Arab rulers’ respect for Nasser diminished and they no longer sought to follow him. . . . Thus the unity of the Arab world was shattered.” The principal result, however, was that even though the State of Israel’s narrow waistline still inflames the Arabs’ imagination and they dream of ‘throwing the Jews into the sea,’ many Arabs now recognize that this outrageous act is in fact unattainable.”223 In contrast, the second-generation textbooks usually referred to the tripartite operation, yet they analyzed it in a superficial way.224 Only one junior high school textbook offered a balanced analysis of Israel’s security problems prior to the war. The narrative, however, implicitly substantiated the thesis appearing in the old textbooks that the 1956 war was inevitable. Interestingly, the textbook discussed the debate, dealt with recently in scholarly studies, between Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and then-Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett concerning Israel’s retaliatory policy.225 The tripartite operation, however, was described vaguely: “At the same time, secret talks were held with the aim of bringing Israel to a British-French military operation against Egypt.”226 Particularly skimpy was the discussion of the war’s results, which emphasized the positive accomplishments but omitted the negative consequences. Among the second-generation textbooks the reader on the Arab-Israeli conflict was particularly disappointing. It did not discuss the war itself but provided the text of Ben-Gurion’s address to the Knesset following the signing of the Egyptian-Czech arms deal, along with two other documents attesting to Egypt’s violations of the armistice agreement and its involvement in terrorist activities along the border.227 It also included a photograph of Hitler’s Mein Kampf, found at Egyptian posts during the war (see Appendices 5a and 5b). Although probably genuine, such a depiction served to dehumanize Egypt (and especially Nasser) by associating it with the Nazis. A major change in the third-generation textbooks was the inclusion of the post-1948 period in the history syllabus, according to the new history curriculum. The first topic to be discussed in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the 1956 war. The new textbooks usually present a balanced account of the background to the war, including the problematic nature of Israel’s retaliatory policy against the Arab states. None of the textbooks

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attempts to conceal Israel’s “collusion” or “secret agreement” with Britain and France prior to the war. One high school textbook even criticizes Israel’s unwise decision to ally itself with these two declining superpowers, a move that served to stigmatize Israel as an imperialist stooge. It points out that Ben-Gurion’s misjudgment of Egypt’s military power was one of the factors that led Israel to launch a preemptive war. Ultimately, the textbook implicitly blames Egypt for the war, since its 1955 arms deal with the Soviet camp, its imperialist aspirations in the Arab world, its maritime blockade of Israel, and its support of the fedayyin made war inevitable. Moreover, it emphasizes, “the Arab world did not recognize the Israeli State and attempted to annihilate it by all the available means: political isolation, economic boycott, belligerent and violent acts, and unrelenting propaganda.”228 The change in the narrative was also reflected in the discussion of controversial issues that were previously bypassed or evaded by textbooks. One textbook discusses Israel’s bloody attack on the Jordanian village of Kibye in 1953, the Ben-Gurion-Sharett debate over Israeli policy against Arab infiltration, and the Israeli massacre at the village of Kafr Qassem on the eve of the war.229 Discussing the results of the war, one textbook even explicitly stated that Israel decided to develop nuclear capability and to build an atomic reactor in order to deter its enemies.230 While most of the new textbooks share the common Israeli assertion that Egypt’s belligerent policy made the war inevitable, other narratives attempts to refute the myth that 1956 was a war of “no alternative” (ein breira).231 Thus, the new textbooks partially reflect the changes in historiography, but they still contain elements of the traditional narrative.

THE 1967 WAR The Six-Day War—particularly the conquest of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—stimulated interest by the Israeli public in the neighboring Arab states. However, since the topic was superficially treated in the reader on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and since history textbooks, as explained earlier, ended their narrative in the 1948 war, this important issue was hardly taught until the late 1990s.232 The narrative in the old textbooks was influenced by the exhilarating impact of Israel’s victory. The term “Six-Day War,” with its boast of the magnitude of the victory and its accentuation of the extent of the Arab defeat, quickly became the Israeli appellation for the war. Similarly, the term West Bank was superseded by the terms Judea and Samaria, which emphasize the historical link of these areas to Jewish national history. The deeper causes behind the outbreak of the war were skimmed over in the textbooks that were written subsequently, leaving the student ill informed about the wider background of the war. The textbooks cited several causes that led to the war: the dispute over the Jordan River waters, the Syrian shelling of

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northern Israel, border infiltration, the establishment of Fatah (1959) and the PLO (1964), the Soviet backing of the Arab states, and Nasser’s aggressive policy during May–June 1967.233 The old textbooks based their approach on the premise that Israel launched a defensive war against a formidable enemy. Responsibility for the war was placed squarely on the shoulders of the Egyptian president. The following account is typical: The blockade of the straits was, by it very nature, an aggressive act of war. Thus, it was Egypt that fired the first shot in the war, triggering the momentous campaign. In early June, Israel, beleaguered and surrounded by enemies, stood with a noose slowly tightening around its neck. Its Arab neighbors, having formed various alliances [with each other], were now united. Egypt had closed the Tiran Straits to Israeli shipping, an act to which the Western powers had responded very phlegmatically. . . . Enemy forces were being deployed along the country’s borders. An enormous number of Egyptian troops were concentrated in the Sinai. The Syrian army, using cement and iron, reinforced its army posts in the Golan Heights and the Bashan mountains, and aimed its artillery at the Israeli border settlements.234

Israel in the aftermath of the war was portrayed as striving for peace, in contrast to the belligerent Arab states: “despite its great victory,” one textbook repeated the conventional argument, “Israel extended its hand in peace but the Arab states continued to plot and plan another war of annihilation.”235 A biased narrative appeared in many second-generation textbooks.236 Thus, a textbook for the vocational high schools listed the previously mentioned causes of the war, whose common denominator was the Arabs’—and especially Nasser’s and Egypt’s—desire to destroy Israel. Nasser’s moves of May 1967 were described as a deliberate attempt to escalate the situation in order to launch a war against Israel. The textbook also made use of the old myth of the few against the many, citing Arab superiority over Israel in terms of military weapons and equipment. The results of the war were only briefly discussed, yet the point was made that the occupied territories gave Israel strategic depth and constituted a bargaining chip for future diplomatic negotiations. Additionally, Israel’s control over the West Bank and Gaza, the text pointed out, strengthened the identity of their Palestinian inhabitants.237 A similar narrative appeared in a junior high textbook; the main culprits here were Nasser and the PLO, who deliberately provoked the war, while Israel felt “the ring of siege is tightening around it.”238 The clear division between good (Israel) and bad (the Arabs) persisted in the second-generation textbooks. The reader on the Arab-Israeli conflict presented an article by Middle East historian Shimon Shamir, who described the conflict in antithetical terms: “While Israel sought to maintain the status quo, the Arabs rejected the right of the state to exist and

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strove to destroy it. The Israelis hoped to stabilize and pacify the region, while the Arabs wanted to alter the present situation.”239 Among the second generation, only a textbook for junior high school offered a relatively comprehensive account of the results of the war. One important long-term result, it pointed out, was the emergence of various schools of thought concerning the future of the territories in the post-1967 period. “Clearly,” it was stated, “many of the current political, social and ideological problems of the Israeli society are a result of the Six Day War.”240 While the discussion of the war and its consequences was generally balanced, the textbook contained certain inaccuracies. An emphasis on Arab opposition to peace as embodied in the resolutions at the 1967 Khartum summit concealed that it gave a green light to the initiation of peaceful diplomacy and that UN Resolution 242 was accepted by Egypt and Jordan shortly after the summit. The most problematic aspect is the appearance of a caricature that conveyed a sense of condescension that reflected Israel’s postwar euphoria (see Appendix 11).241 The third-generation textbooks generally offer a more balanced narrative of the 1967 war, but they still suffer from certain flaws that characterized older textbooks. As before, the Egyptian president and the Syrians are held responsible for the war. According to one high school textbook, Nasser “needed a pretext to initiate a war and the Soviets provided him with it.” One of his belligerent speeches is quoted to substantiate this. In a somewhat contradictory argument, the author explains that Nasser sought a political victory by bringing Israel to its knees through political moves that would make war unnecessary. The description of the background to the war is sometimes punctuated by worn-out phrases such as “the rope tightened around Israel’s neck” and “Israel stood isolated against the most formidable and unified Arab coalition ever.”242 Significantly, the view, based on established academic research, that sees the war as the result of an uncontrolled escalation in which all parties (including the superpowers) were involved has not yet pervaded the new textbooks.243 The description of the consequences of the war in third-generation textbooks contains some significant changes, but it resembles the older narrative in other respects. But perhaps the most significant flaw is the superficial nature of the narrative of 1967. On the one hand, there is a discussion of the controversy in Israeli society concerning the Occupied Territories. On the other, the responsibility for not signing peace treaties with the Arab countries laid squarely on the shoulders of the Arab leaders. The following description appearing in a junior high textbook is typical: The [Israeli] government thought that the Arab states would be willing to sign a peace agreement following the terrible defeat. A vivid expression of this was the statement of the Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan that he is “waiting for a telephone” from the Arab leaders, but this did not happen. Three months after the war,

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representatives of Arab countries convened in Khartum and agreed on three “Nos”: no peace with Israel, no negotiations with it, and no recognition of it.244

In contrast, the most balanced analysis of the results of the war was presented in a high school textbook, which concludes that following the Arab summit, Two strategic alternatives faced Israel. One, bold and generous, a unilateral withdrawal from the territories, whose occupation was forced on it [Israel], with the aim of thawing the political stalemate and convincing the Arab world that it did indeed strive for peace and integration in the region. Such a gesture might have changed the whole Middle Eastern conflict. After all, Israel enjoyed significant advantages: a strong army, the helpless and desperate Arab world, and an unprecedented wave of sympathy in world public opinion. . . . In the event, Israel opted for the other strategy, which in essence meant clinging to its territorial assets while awaiting future developments.245

The appearance of a narrative, which implicitly blames Israel for not choosing the “bold and generous” alternative, was unthinkable in earlier textbooks and attests to the pluralistic attitude that had emerged in the Ministry of Education. The change was apparent also in the instructions included in the teacher’s guides that accompany the textbooks. They suggest holding discussions on the desirability of controlling the [occupied] territories; analyzing the war from the perception of an Egyptian captive and a Palestinian resident in a refugee camp; and raising the question whether a Palestinian state should be established in the West Bank and Gaza.246 THE POST-1967 PERIOD Up until the late 1990s, the post-1967 period was almost completely ignored by the education system. Several second-generation textbooks referred to these events briefly and superficially. The reader on the Arab-Israeli conflict, for example, reproduced the texts of several documents, including the second Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement (September 1975), Sadat’s and Menachem Begin’s speeches to the Knesset (November 1977), and key PLO documents (such as the National Charter and the resolutions of the 1974 and 1977 PNC sessions). These documents, which were intended as a basis for classroom discussion, were not accompanied, however, by textual narrative that would provide the student with the necessary background.247 Although the post-1967 period was essentially omitted from the textbooks, one subject was constantly dealt with, usually in the realm of informal education: the 1968 Palestinian National Charter. In addition to its inclusion in the reader on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the booklet on the charter by Yehoshafat Harkabi was widely circulated by the Ministry of Educa-

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tion.248 However, the study of the anti-Zionist charter without proper background material (which was minimal or nonexistent in the textbooks) could only lead to a further demonization of the enemy. Although the ministry hardly produced information on the post-1967 period in a consistent way, it did occasionally relate to current developments by producing pamphlets and booklets intended primarily for teachers. A booklet on the Intifada and its repercussions for Israeli society was published in 1990, consisting of a compilation of journalistic and academic articles intended for class discussion. At the same time, the ministry youth department distributed a special issue of “Monthly Survey” (Sqira Hodshit), an IDF journal, which was devoted to “The Intifada as a Stage in the ArabIsraeli Conflict.”249 Additional booklets were produced on the decision that the annual theme for the 1994/95 school year would be the peace process. Important as they were, these efforts did not change the fact that until the late 1990s the Israeli student was still largely ignorant about the post-1967 period. This regrettable situation was rectified in the new history curriculum, which included in its syllabus the post-1948 period. Yet, for an unwarranted reason, the new high school curriculum ends in 1970, thus leaving important events in Israeli contemporary history outside the curriculum. While several textbooks follow this decision, others continue their narrative as the picture of the twentieth century, in their mind, is not complete without the post-1973 period.250 Those textbooks that went beyond the 1970 border line, focus on five themes: (1) The Yom Kippur war (1973); (2) the peace treaty with Egypt (1979); (3) the Lebanese war (1982); (4) the Palestinian Intifada (1988); (5) the 1990s peace process that culminated in the Oslo agreement (1993), the peace treaty with Jordan (1994), and the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (1995). Although these topics are generally narrated in a short, factual manner, it is possible to discern a critical attitude. Thus, Israeli rejection of Sadat’s peace initiative in 1971 is explained by “the sense of power and superiority [over the Arabs], which was prevalent in Israeli society following the Six Day war.”251 The failure (mehdal) of Israel in 1973 war is related to the complacency that engulfed Israeli society, the underrating of the enemy and the failure of the Israeli intelligence to forecast the war.252 Likewise, the 1982 war is depicted as “a war of choice,” that is “an unnecessary and therefore illegitimate war in the eyes of many in Israeli society.”253 One textbook even presents the public debate in Israeli society with regard to the necessity of continuing the presence of the IDF in southern Lebanon.254 In describing the background of the Palestinian uprising, one textbook states that “the places which were established in the territories are called ‘settlements,’ and many Israelis perceive them as a waste of resources with no military value,

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which [unnecessarily] provoke the Arab world and constitute an impediment to peace.”255 Finally, all junior high and some of the high school textbooks deal with the ongoing peaceful negotiations between Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab states, seeing it as an inevitable culmination of the peace process that commenced in the 1970s. The most balanced overview of the current peace process appears in a high school textbook under a chapter titled “The End of the War of a Hundred Years?” At the end of the chapter, the author writes: In the Middle East, more than anywhere else, it is dangerous to predict. We live in an area characterized by high strategic tension, instability, and inflicted by intense emotions—an area in which both the possible and the impossible exist. But it seems that the logic of compromise has overcome the logic of “all or nothing.” The long war between Israel and the Arab world has not yet ended, but its termination, so it seems as these lines are being written, is just a matter of time.256

THE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL Until 1985, when the textbook “The Arab Citizens of Israel” was introduced in the civics curriculum, this topic was included in various civics textbooks. Although the description of the Arab minority in Israel was generally less biased in comparison to the description of the Palestinians and the Arab states, it still reflected suspicion and doubt, especially in the textbooks of the first generation. Herzl Fishman, for example, explained the difficulties involved in integrating the Arabs in Israeli society: At present [1960], it is impossible to predict whether the Arabs will successfully adjust to Israel and to the Israeli way of life. Nor is it possible to foresee just how long this process . . . will take. Relations between the Arab sector and Jewish population are plagued by suspicion and mutual dislike. This is understandable. For decades, the Jews in this country fought a long and bloody conflict with the local Arab community and were ultimately forced to wage a difficult and costly war of independence against its Arab enemies. Moreover, Israel has yet to establish friendly and peaceful relations with its neighboring Arab states. Nonetheless, while strictly upholding the state’s security requirements, the Arabs living in Israel must be given the opportunity to become full and equal citizens, enjoying the same rights and duties as the rest of the state’s citizens.257

All first-generation textbooks emphasized the circumstances that compelled Israel to impose martial law on the Arab areas following the 1948 war. “The Arab states,” Ben-Meir observed in 1969, “tried to evoke feelings of hostility and animosity toward Israel on the part of the Arab citizens and to prevent their orderly integration into the state.” They did so by pursuing “an unrelenting propaganda campaign against Israel and creating an atmosphere of terror in which every Arab who refused to fight the Jews was con-

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demned as a traitor.” Moreover, “the Arabs remaining in Israel belonged to the same antagonistic and aggressive population that had only a short while ago fought the Jews. In light of all this, and to prevent further acts of hostility, a military administration of the Arab districts was instituted.”258 One important textbook pointed out that there were “genuine reasons to doubt the loyalty of the Arabs living in Israel to the state.” The Arabs were a minority in a state founded on principles alien to them. Moreover, they had close religious and national ties with the neighboring countries. All this created “a very serious security problem. In the event that the Arab states launch an attack against Israel, some of Israel’s Arab citizens may try to help the invading armies. Yet, even without an invasion, as long as the tension along the borders persists, the Arab minority might assist border raiders and hide them from the security forces. In view of the fact that many of the Arabs live along the borders, this is a very grave danger indeed.” The result was to impose martial law on the Arabs and not draft them into the army.259 The presence of an Arab minority was also perceived as a test of moral strength to the Jewish State. Ben-Meir wrote paternalistically: It was precisely because of our history as a people condemned for centuries to wander the world, always a transient minority that we were entrusted with the responsibility for [another] minority. But because of the conflict with the Arab states, this minority finds it difficult to adjust to the State of Israel. We pray for the day when we can prove to the world that the Jewish people, who have suffered and endured so much, is considerate toward and respects its minorities, treating them in every way as equals. Still, until that day arrives, the State of Israel will ensure that the Arab community is fully integrated. The state will labor to raise the community’s standard of living. It will grant it complete freedom and help it in areas such as religion, culture, etc. that do not endanger the state’s security.260

Another textbook displayed a less forthcoming attitude, emphasizing that Israel’s governance is based on the principle of equality, regardless of religion or nationality, but the Arabs do not have the right to claim the status of “a national minority,” as defined by international law. Equally important, it pointed out, Israel was by definition a Jewish state. Still, the Arabs were allowed “to live in accordance with their national tradition and to maintain their own educational institutions.”261 The first-generation textbooks put emphasis on the process of modernization that was taking place in traditional Arab society—a description that served to show Israel’s good intentions toward the Arab minority. Figures were supplied, showing impressive improvement in the Arab standard of living, especially in comparison to their Arab brethren across the border. Ben-Meir stated that in the aftermath of the 1967 war, the Arabs in Judea and Samaria were amazed to see the high standard of living of the Israeli Arabs. This was even more surprising to them, he wrote, because Arab pro-

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paganda highlighted the “bitter fate” of the Israeli Arabs.262 At the same time, however, the textbooks omitted any discussion of the Arabs’ economic and social problems, including the discrimination against the Arabs in the allocation of state resources. The most problematic issue was the question of identity: they were referred to as “Israeli Arabs” or “Arabs of Eretz Israel,” part of the Arab nation—a terminology that stripped them of their Palestinian identity. In the same vein, the “Israeli Arabs” were differentiated from the “Palestinian Arabs,” that is, the Arabs of Judea and Samaria. A major change occurred in 1982, with the publication of an experimental high school textbook called Living Together. It was a joint enterprise of the Ministry of Education, the Van Leer Foundation, and leading academic figures. The teacher’s guide emphasized the difficulties inherent in teaching the subject, such as the existence of mutual negative stereotypes and resultant prejudices that prompted many teachers to ignore the subject altogether. The authors were guided by the American pluralist model, which advocated the building of cultural pluralism by means of familiarity with the other’s culture. The aims of the subject were not to identify with the Arab culture or Arab political views, but rather to learn basic facts about the minority, learn to respect its rights, and learn to live with the problems inherent in a majority-minority society.263 In 1984, an interim edition was published, titled The Arab Citizens of Israel.264 It was offered as the basis of a voluntary subject in both the secular and the religious systems in the 1985/86 school year. The final edition of the textbook was completed in 1988 and the subject was formally introduced into the civics curriculum beginning in the 1992/93 school year. The addition of this topic to the curriculum reflected the ministry’s ongoing attempts to enhance education for democracy and tolerance toward the “other” begun in the mid-1980s. In The Arab Citizens of Israel the ministry took great care to present a balanced text that would enable the Israeli student to feel some empathy with the Arab citizens. The textbook was careful to avoid the abiding dichotomy between Israel and the belligerent Arabs, emphasizing that Israel was entering a period in which the term “conflict” does not cover all aspects of Israeli-Arab relations, as, for example, Israeli relations with Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco. A distinction was also made between Arab citizens in Israel and Arabs elsewhere.265 Methodologically, the textbook courageously attempted to tackle some questions regarding the existence of an Arab minority in a democratic, Jewish Zionist state. Although it did not offer the student clear-cut answers, it did transmit certain direct and indirect messages that could be construed as negative. The first problematic issue was the question of the identity of the Arabs in Israel. In the past, terms such as Israeli Arabs and Arabs of Eretz Israel had been used to describe this community. After reading the new textbook, the student was still left puzzled as to the group’s national identity. The textbook made a clear distinction between the Arab civil identity (Israeli)

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and national identity (oscillating between “Arab” and “Palestinian”). Although Palestinian identity was discussed, the authors apparently still preferred using the traditional terminology.266 The second problematic issue was the absence of any historical background on Arab society in Palestine. While the textbook mentioned that when Britain conquered Eretz Israel in 1917–18, the Arab population was 600,000 in comparison to 56,000 Jews, there was no attempt to provide information on the Arabs in Palestine in the period that preceded the British Mandate. Moreover, the skimpy description of Arab society during the Mandate period was based on outdated sources.267 The third problematic issue was the absence of a historical account of the Arab disaster of 1948. There was only a vague reference to this period: “During the Liberation War most of the political and intellectual leaders, who belonged to the upper class, left [my emphasis] the territory of the Israeli state. Only the traditional leaders, heads of larger clans stayed.”268 Such a depiction reaffirmed the allegation in the history textbooks that the Arabs “left” Palestine on their own volition. Moreover, it created an artificial division between “our” Arabs (the Israeli Arabs) and the others (the Palestinians), denying the Palestinian identity of the former. The last problematic issue related to the photographs and maps included in the textbooks. Most of the visual material portrayed a traditional society or a society in transition associated with low-income and low-status work (e.g., the use of dated agricultural methods, spinning, sewing), perpetuating the image of the socially inferior Arab.269 Although most of these pictures showed a genuine reality, the absence of photographs illustrating other Arab roles could lead to a negative image of the Arab. In addition, accurate but intricate maps that attempted to show the spread and increase of both the Jewish and the Arab populations seem to demonstrate the success of Jewish settlement more than illuminate the increase of the Arab community.270 Despite all these shortcomings, the textbook may be regarded as a breakthrough in the treatment of this sensitive issue by the education establishment. Amore significant change with respect to the portrayal of the Arabs in Israel occurred in the third-generation textbooks. Under the chapter “The Crystallization of the Israeli Nation,” a high school textbook offers a highly balanced description of the non-Jewish minorities since 1948. The narrative identifies the Arabs as Palestinians who were deprived of their national status and treated unequally by the Jewish authorities. This was especially so during the military administration, which lasted from 1948 until 1966. The textbook describes the Israeli massacre at Kfar Qassem, an event that turned into a “symbol of unjust and oppression in the Arab sector.” A serious problem, according to the textbook, was the confiscation of 300,000 dunams (75,000 acres) of Arab land, a process that continued after 1948 with the confiscation of over 1.5 million dunams (375,000 acres) in the Gali-

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lee. These measures led to economic problems and caused resentment toward the Jews, as the land problem is considered by the Arabs to be the heart of the conflict. The textbook also enumerates positive developments in the fields of demography, economy, and education, where Arab society in Israel underwent “real transformation.” These rapid changes, however, stirred anger and resentment because Arab society compared itself with Jewish society and not with Arabs across the border. The narrative explains that since 1967 the Arabs have been undergoing a process of Palestinazation, characterized not by a desire to secede from the State of Israel or attain autonomy, but acquire equal rights on a par with the Jewish majority. The narrative ends with the following balanced comment: “True, the historical and ideological infrastructure of the Israeli state does not promise [the Arabs] full integration in the Jewish state. However, a more thoughtful and generous policy by the government would alleviate the difficult contradiction of existing with two poles of identity, a Palestinian and an Israeli, at one and the same time.”271 It is unfortunate that this important section was dropped from the 1999 edition.272 However, a balanced, albeit short, description of the Arab minority appears in a junior high textbook.273 Another insightful attempt to improve the portrayal of the Arab citizen in Israel is made by a new textbook geared for the seventh grade in both the secular and religious schools, titled In Five Voices. Through the personal stories of five Arab children—a male and a female Muslim, a male Druze, a female Bedouin, and a male Christian (Catholic)—Jewish students learn about Arab culture. By using the text and the accompanying videocassette, the textbook aims to develop empathy with Arabs in general and avoid the creation of stereotypes and prejudice. The Jewish student is expected to view Israeli society as multicultural by studying Arab culture not from a position of superiority but by accepting it as it is without making comparisons to Jewish society and culture.274 Although the textbook is geared only to junior high school, the successful reception of it in the education system, both by the Ministry of Education and in schools, may signal that the liberal and progressive trend noted in textbooks of the third generation is not transitory.

NOTES All sources published in Israel are in Hebrew unless otherwise mentioned. 1. A. Cherikover, General History, Vol. IV (Tel Aviv: Cherikover, 1970), pp. 9–25. The book was first published in 1936. See also Lessons in History: From the Rise of the Roman Empire until the End of the Middle Ages, a textbook for the secular state school (Tel Aviv: Ma’alot, 1987), pp. 175–213; History of Israel and Other Nations: From the Rise of the Roman Empire until Shabtai Zvi Messianic Movement (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1987), pp. 175–218. Hava Lazarus-Jaffe, A Chapter in the History of the Arabs and the Islam (Tel Aviv: Reshafim, 1981). This textbook was used in upper grades for teaching the history of Islam. See also From

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Generation to Generation, Lessons in History for State Religious Schools (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1994); the entry “Arabs,” in Aviv, Vol. 13 (Tel Aviv: Masada, 1978), pp. 2931–35; the entry “Arabs,” in Yavneh (Tel Aviv: Yavneh/Laros, 1995), Vol. 11, pp. 275–77. 2. B. Avivi and N. Perski, History of Israel: From the Rise of Islam until the End of the Crusades, a textbook for the seventh grade, Part III (Tel Aviv: Yavneh, 1957), pp. 12–13. 3. Ibid. See also B. Ahiya and M. Harpaz, History of the Jewish Nation: From the Islamic Period until the American War of Independence (Tel Aviv: Sheravrak, 1965), pp. 18–22. 4. Ahiya and Harpaz (1956), p. 29; Avivi and Perski (1957), pp. 32, 35. 5. Y. Levi, Israel and the World’s Nations: General and Jewish History, Vol. 4/I (Tel Aviv: Or-Am, 1948), p. 39. 6. The Arabs and Islam, for the state religious school system, experimental edition (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1973), pp. 8, 14–15, 41–42. Interestingly, the textbook does not use the Arab term jihad, but the Jewish term milhemet mitzva (war of necessity). For a criticism of this textbook, see B. Michael, Hadashot, 20 September 1985. 7. Lessons in History: From the Rise of the Roman Empire until the End of the Middle Ages, for the secular state school system, Vol. II (Jerusalem: Ma’alot, 1987), p. 214. For the chapter that deals with “The Arabs and Islam,” see pp. 175–220. 8. For the textbook for the religious system, see From Generation to Generation, Vol. II (1994), pp. 190–237. For the secular system, see A Journey to the Past: From the Middle Ages until Modern Times (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and the Center for Technological Education, 1997), pp. 9–50; E. Barnavi and A. Kleinberg, Middle Ages and Early Modern Times (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books, 1997), pp. 26–45. 9. From Generation to Generation, Vol. II (1994), pp. 204, 215. 10. Middle Ages and Early Modern Times, p. 31. For a more balanced description, see From Generation to Generation, Vol. II, p. 232; Vol. III, pp. 42–43. 11. E. Domke (ed.), The World and the Jews in Recent Generations (1870–1920), for high schools (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Institute, 1998), p. 225. 12. E. Domke and Y. Mathias (eds.), The World and the Jews in Recent Generations: A Teacher’s Guide (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Institute, 1998), p. 60. 13. E. Shemu’eli, Our Nation’s History in the Modern Era: From the Emancipation until Political Zionism, Vol. IV, 5th ed., amended and extended (Tel Aviv: Yavneh, 1952), p. 21. 14. S. Horowitz, Israel: A Brief History of Israel in the New Era, Vol. II, 3rd ed. (Haifa: Ha-Reali, 1977), p. 28. 15. The Emergence of Zionism, History Lessons for State Schools, experimental edition (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1976), p. 82. 16. Ibid., pp. 80–81. 17. Another textbook cited three quotations, from Mark Twain, Henry Triestram, a Christian religious person, and one by Moshe Smilanski, a Hebrew writer, to the effect that the land was empty and uncultivated. See A. Oren, The Jewish People, the Land of Israel and the State of Israel, 1880–1939, Vol. I, Textbook for the Technological Schools (Jerusalem: The Zalman Shazar Center, 1988), pp. 84–85.

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18. Y. and R. Goldenberg (eds.), Hebrew Grammar Exam Questionnaires (Tel Aviv: 1963). The introduction to one of the new encyclopaedias contains a similar erroneous account: “[The Jews] were vastly superior to the country’s many invaders who, having conquered, left nothing behind them but a material culture. The new immigrants, who arrived in Israel at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries saw themselves as landholders whose duty it was to uphold and promote both the principles of culture and agricultural labor” Great Periods in the History of Israel (1981). Its first volume is entitled: “A Land without a People, 1200–1870”; the second volume: “A Province in a Declining Empire.” Notably, Palestine had never been a province of the Ottoman Empire. 19. Y. Cohen and N.M. Gelber, Summary of the History of Zionism, 2nd modified edition (Jerusalem: Masada, 1962), p. 50. 20. L. Hazan and Y. Feler, History of Zionism: From Its Beginnings until the Present Day, 4th ed. (Jerusalem: Kiryat Hasefer, 1951), p. 56; The First Settlements: Chapters in the History of the Yishuv, experimental ed. (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1978), p. 16; A Journey Through the First Settlements: Chapters in the History of the Yishuv, a Reader (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1992), pp. 15–16. 21. B. Ahiya and M. Harpaz, The History of the Jewish Nation: The Rebirth of Israel, from Centuries of Yearning for Zion until the Fulfilment of Zionism and the Establishment of the State of Israel, a textbook for the eighth grade (Tel Aviv: Sheravrak, 1959), pp. 99–101. 22. Shemu’eli, Our Nation’s History in the Modern Era, Vol. V (1955), p. 244. See also M. Shemu’eli, A Chapter in Zionist and Labor Movement History, Vol. II, 5th ed. (Tel Aviv: Yavneh, 1961), pp. 353–54. 23. S. Kirshenboim, History of Israel in Recent Generations (Tel Aviv: The Israeli Institution for Education in Writing, 1974). The book was first published in 1959 and has since gone through nine editions. 24. A Journey to the Past (1997), pp. 198–224. This is also the main problem in E. Barnavi and E. Naveh, Modern Times, Vol. I (Tel Aviv: 1998), pp. 74–79. For a good description of the general decline of the empire, see B. Ben-Baruch, The Nineteenth Century, History for the Eighth Grade (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books, 1998), pp. 104–9. 25. From Generation to Generation (1994), Vol. III, pp. 26–33. 26. From Conservatism to Progress, History for the Eighth Grade (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1998), pp. 248–53. The inclusion of Mark Twain’s quotation to the effect that the land was empty and barren (see previously) is reminiscent of biases that appeared in the first- and second-generation textbooks. The reference to Eretz Israel as a separate district appeared also in Ben-Baruch, The Nineteenth Century, p. 141. 27. Ibid. For other biased descriptions, see p. 192. 28. The World and the Jews in Recent Generations (1998), Ch. 6. In contrast, the description of the Ottomans during the First Aliyah is more typical of the old depiction—see p. 141. Reverting to the old patterns, a new high school textbook ignored the Ottoman period while emphasizing the continuity of Jewish settlement in Eretz Israel. See M. Bar-Hillel, Change and Progress in Israel and the Nations in the New Age, 1870–1920 (Petach Tikva: Lilach, 1998), pp. 208–9. To the best of my knowledge this textbook was not authorized by the Ministry of Education. 29. See, e.g., Barnai, Historiography and Nationalism, p. 39.

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30. Shemu’eli, Our Nation’s History in the Modern Era, Vol. V (1955), p. 112. For a similar description, see B. Ben-Yehuda, History of Zionism: The Resurrection and Redemption Movement in Israel—From Its Beginnings until the Arrival of Herzl (Tel Aviv: Masada, 1951), pp. 1–2; Ahiya and Harpaz, History of the Jewish Nation (1959), p. 32. 31. Jewish National Movement and the Establishment of the State of Israel, Vols. I–II, experimental edition (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1978), pp. 196–206. 32. The Zionist Idea and the Establishment of the State of Israel, Vol. I (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1985), p. 56. According to this book, the Jews numbered 24,000 in comparison to 450,000 Arabs (p. 58). 33. The First Settlements: Chapters in the History of the Yishuv, an experimental ed. (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1978), p. 12. 34. D. Shahar, From the Diaspora to Independence: History of the Jewish Nation in Recent Generations, Vol. 1 (Rehovot: Idan, 1990), Ch. 12. This textbook was not included in the recommended list of the Ministry of Education, but was highly popular in high schools. The second textbook was authorized by the ministry: E. Naveh, The 20th Century, an updated ed. (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books, 1995), pp. 198–99. In this connection one must also include Ziv, Ettinger, and Landau, who in 1991 published a third edition of Chronicles; see Vol. 4/I, pp. 336–38. Although by 1987 the Ministry of Education excluded this book from its recommended list, the textbook was still widely used. See also Bar-Hillel, Change and Progress (1998), pp. 215–30. 35. Emergence of Zionism (1976), pp. 80–81; The Idea and Its Fulfillment: Chapters in the History of the Yishuv, a special program for the older student (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1983), pp. 8–9; Oren, The Jewish People (1988), pp. 85–89. 36. P.A. Tilehaver, Historical Atlas of Israel and the Diaspora, a survey of the history of the Jewish People, including 1,000 maps and diagrams (Tel Aviv: 1946), pp. 93–95; Avivi and Perski, Our Nation’s History: From the Russian Enlightenment until the Establishment of the State of Israel, Part VI, 3rd ed. (Tel Aviv: Yavneh, 1952), p. 100; Y. Spivack and M. Avidar, The Jewish Nation in Its Homeland and in the Diaspora: From the Independence of the United States until the Establishment of the State of Israel (Tel Aviv: Yavneh, 1960), p. 119; Ziv, Ettinger, and Landau, Chronicals, Vol. 4/I (Haifa: Yuval, 1964), p. 347; The First and Second Immigrations: The Foundations of the State, experimental ed. (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1974), pp. 11, 25; Jewish National Movement, Vols. I–II (1978), pp. 215, 240; The Idea and Its Fulfillment (1983), p. 71; The Zionist Idea, Vol. I (1985), p. 99. There are also examples in the third-generation textbooks. 37. For population tables, see E. Riger, History of the Jewish Nation in the Modern Era, Vols. I–II, 3rd ed. (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1954), p. 119; Ziv, Ettinger, and Landau, Chronicles, Vol. 4/I (1964), p. 341; The Idea and Its Fulfillment (1983), p. 72; R. Bar-Sever, Israel: From a Community to a State, chapters in the history of the Jewish nation, 5th ed. (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1990), p. 8. See also the map in Great Periods in the History of Israel: Restoration in the Shadow of the British, 1918–1929, Vol. 5 (Tel Aviv: Revivim, 1980). 38. The literature of the first Jewish settlers made a distinction between Arab social groups: the Bedouin was depicted in positive terms and constituted something of a role model (imitated, for example, by the Jewish guards); the fellah and

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the effendi were described in negative terms and treated with contempt. Y. Berlovitz, Inventing a Land, Inventing a People (Tel Aviv: 1996), pp. 126–27. 39. Ahiya and Harpaz, History of Jewish Nation (1959), p. 34. 40. Emergence of Zionism (1976), p. 111. 41. The Idea and Its Fulfillment (1983), p. 108, see also pp. 59–60. Although published in 1983, I treat this textbook as part of the first-generation textbooks. See also Shemu’eli, Our Nation’s History in the Modern Era, Vol. V (1955), p. 113. 42. A Journey Through the First Settlements (1992), pp. 33, 40. 43. The Idea and Its Fulfillment (1983), p. 92; Kirshenboim, History of Israel (1974), p. 70; Riger, History of the Jewish Nation, Vols. I–II (1954), p. 70. 44. Jewish National Movement, Vols. I–II (1978), p. 220. 45. Ziv, Ettinger, and Landau, Chronicles, Vol. 4/I (1991), p. 339 (first appeared in 1964). 46. Only Horowitz of the older textbook writers remarks that Ahad Ha’am was the first to foresee the dangers of the Arab problem; see Israel: A Brief History, Vol. II (1977), p. 173. 47. Emergence of Zionism (1976), pp. 138–41. See also Avivi and Perski, Our Nation’s History, Vol. 6 (1952), p. 146. 48. From Conservatism to Progress (1998), p. 326; Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times (1998), p. 154. 49. See, e.g., Ben-Zion Dinur’s article, “Our Right to the Land of Israel.” The subtitle of the article was “The Arabs in the Land of Israel have every right but the right to Eretz Israel,” in M. Cohen (ed.), Chapters in the History of Israel, Vol. I (1981), p. 410. Several relevant entries in various Israeli encyclopaedias also neglected this question. See “The Immigrations from the Days of Hibat Zion,” Tarbut, Vol. 10 (Tel Aviv: Masada, 1963), p. 1812; “Immigration” (Aliyah), in E. and M. Talmi (eds.), A Lexicon of Zionism (Tel Aviv: Davar, 1982), p. 267; “Immigrations to Israel,” Yavneh, Vol. 11, pp. 247–49. 50. Jewish National Movement, Vol. III (1978), p. 7; The Zionist Idea, Vol. II (1985), p. 86. The brief section on the Arab reaction to Zionism until 1917 is very similar in both textbooks. This is probably because both were based on Y. Porath, The Rise of the Arab Palestinian National Movement, 1918– 1929 (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1971). See also “Zionism” in J. Nedava (ed.), Hebrew Encyclopaedia, Vol. 28 (Jerusalem: 1976), p. 605. 51. A Journey through the First Settlements (1992), p. 10; Teacher’s Guide (1994), pp. 10–11. This textbook contained at least two distinct biases, see pp. 33, 40 (as discussed previously). 52. The World and the Jews in Recent Generations (1998), pp. 225, 231. Compare with the description of the First Aliyah, pp. 137–40. See also Ben-Baruch, The Nineteenth Century (1998), p. 143. 53. On Ahad Ha’am’s criticism, see also Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times (1998), p. 154. For another balanced description of the period, see From Conservatism to Progress (1998), pp. 279–89; Ben-Baruch, The Nineteenth Century (1998), pp. 144–45; and the Teacher’s Guide, p. 114. For a problematic depiction, see Bar-Hillel, Change and Progress (1998), pp. 215–38. 54. Ben-Baruch, The Nineteenth Century (1998), p. 147; Barnavie and Naveh, Modern Times, Vol. I (1998), p. 96; The World and the Jews in Recent Generations (1998); p. 140.

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55. Riger, History of the Jewish Nation, Vols. I–II (1954), p. 124. 56. Avivi and Perski, Our Nation’s History, Part VI (1952), p. 177. 57. Ron, History of the Jewish Nation (1967), p. 45. 58. Shahar, From the Diaspora to Independence, Vol. I (1990), p. 150. 59. A.L. Avineri, Zionism and the Myth of “Dispossession” (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1975). Parts of the booklet were quoted in M. Cohen (ed.), Chapters in the History of Israel, Vol. II (1981), pp. 689–93. The introduction states that this was a question of great moral significance: “A careful study of the history of Jewish settlement in Israel will lead to the conclusion that not only was the Jewish community at all times careful not to dispossess the Arabs of their lands. On the contrary, the settlement process itself actually encouraged Arab immigration into Israel from the surrounding countries” (p. 689). Evidence of the Arabs’ dispossession can be found in: E. Be’eri, The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1882–1911 (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Ha-Po’alim, 1985); J. Kanu, The Problem of Land and the National Conflict Between the Jews and the Arabs, 1917–1990 (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Ha-Po’alim, 1992). See also the narratives in the third-generation textbooks quoted later. 60. The Sociologist Oz Almog claims that this romantic image of the Arab did not imply a Jewish desire to get closer to the Arabs, but an attempt to turn them into an ecological phenomenon, part of the desolated land. See “The Death of the Bad Arab,” Politika, No. 51 (November 1993), p. 20. 61. Ahiya and Harpaz, History of the Jewish Nation (1959), p. 82. 62. Kirshenboim, History of Israel (1974), p. 71. 63. Avivi and Perski, Our Nation’s History, Vol. 6 (1952), p. 180. See also Shemu’eli, Our Nation’s History, Vol. V (1955), p. 214; Ron, History of the Jewish Nation (1967)¸ p. 49. 64. Emergence of Zionism (1976), p. 185. The story first appeared in Shmu’eli, Chapter in Zionist and Labor Movement History, Vol. II (1961), p. 174. On the defense of Petah Tikva and its lessons, see The First Settlements (1978), pp. 64–68, and the Teacher’s Guide, pp. 35–38. Shahar offers a relatively unbiased account of the pioneers’ relationship with the Arabs, in From the Diaspora to Independence, Vol. I (1990), p. 158. 65. See, e.g., Ziv, Ettinger, and Landau, Chronicles, Vol. 4/I (1991), p. 342; Emergence of Zionism (1976), p. 183; Zionism Tested (1984), p. 125. 66. Katz and Hershko, Israel among the Nations of the World, Vol. IV (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1979), p. 245. For a similar description, see The Idea and Its Fulfillment (1983), p. 143. 67. Ahiya and Harpaz, History of the Jewish Nation (1959), p. 91. For a similar description, see Ron, History of the Jewish Nation (1967), p. 43. 68. Emergence of Zionism (1978), p. 193. See also Oren, The Jewish People (1988), p. 93. 69. See, e.g., The World and the Jews in Recent Generations (1998), pp. 228–32. The Teacher’s Guide (p. 61) emphasizes that a major document was Itzhak Epstein’s article “The Hidden Question,” which deals with the Zionist movement’s failure to recognize and deal with the Arab problem. See also Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times (1998), pp. 110–11, 154; From Conservatism to Progress (1998), pp. 368–76; Ben-Baruch, The Nineteenth Century (1998), pp. 158–63. Only one textbook almost completely omitted to discuss the Arab question during this period, see Bar-Hillel, Change and Progress (1998), Ch. 10.

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70. See, e.g., H. Ormiyan, The Political Idea and its History, a catalogue of source references, 4th ed. (Jerusalem: 1961), pp. 119–24; Hazan and Feler, History of Zionism (1951), p. 195; Ziv, Ettinger, and Landau, Chronicles, Vol. 4/I (1963), p. 348; Zionism Tested, p. 14. 71. See Ahiya and Harpaz, History of the Jewish Nation (1959), p. 109; Ziv, Ettinger, and Landau, Chronicles, 4/II (1964), p. 492; Horowitz¸ Israel: A Brief History (1977), p. 189. 72. Shmu’eli, Chapter in the History of Zionism, Vol. III (1961), p. 194. 73. E. Riger¸ History of Israel in the Modern Era: From the Enlightenment until the Present, Vol. III (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1954), p. 33. 74. Jewish National Movement, Vol. III (1978), p. 9; Zionist Idea, Vol. II (1985), p. 88. 75. For the Israeli version, see I. Friedman¸ The Question of Palestine, 1914–1918 (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1987), pp. 83–143. For the Arab position, see G. Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (Beirut: 1967), pp. 149–83. See also the detailed study by E. Kedourie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and Its Interpretations, 1914–1938 (Cambridge: 1976). 76. Ahiya and Harpaz, History of the Jewish Nation (1959), p. 138; Hazan and Feler, History of Zionism (1951), pp. 196, 202; Riger, History of Israel, Vol. III (1954), p. 34; Ron, History of the Jewish Nation (1967), p. 96. 77. Horowitz, Israel: A Brief History, Vol. III (1977), p. 24; Chronicles of Our Times, 1918–1950, 3rd ed. (Tel Aviv: Chechik, 1953), pp. 149–59. 78. Jewish National Movement, Vol. II (1978), p. 9. The second part of the sentence was included in the final version of the textbook, The Zionist Idea (1985), p. 88. 79. Between War and Peace: The Development of the International Political System in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1986), p. 196. 80. Excerpts from the disputed letter are quoted in Ziv, Ettinger, and Landau, Chronicles, Vol. 4/I (1963), p. 215. However, there is no explanation of the controversy. Moreover, no connection is made between the correspondence and the Balfour Declaration because the two documents are discussed in different chapters. This remained so in the third edition, published in 1991. Similarly, the two issues were treated separately in The Zionist Idea (1985), p. 88. The correspondence was briefly discussed in Lifshitz, History of the Jewish Nation, Vol. I (1985), p. 81; Great Periods in the History of Israel, Vol. 4 (1981), p. 147. The entry in the encyclopaedia declared (erroneously) that “the Sykes-Picot agreement means that there is no point in clarifying the MacMahon-Husayn correspondence.” The correspondence was omitted from Zionism Tested (1984); Oren, The Jewish People (1988); and Hever, Major Subjects in the History of the Nation and the State (1983). 81. Shahar, From the Diaspora to Independence, Vol. I (1990), pp. 196–97; Between War and Peace (1986), p. 197; Zionism Tested (1984), p. 63. 82. The World and the Jews in Recent Generations (1998), pp. 259–62. A separate subchapter was devoted to the Balfour Declaration (pp. 274–78). A vague description of the correspondence was given in Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times (1998), pp. 130–31, 158. The Balfour Declaration was discussed elsewhere, on pp. 135–38. The correspondence was not mentioned in Naveh, The 20th Century (1995). For a balanced account of the Balfour Declaration but without connection to other

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agreements, see Ben-Baruch, The Nineteenth Century (1998), pp. 190–91, and the Teacher’s Guide, pp. 158–59. Another textbook transmitted a dual message: on the one hand, it explicitly stated that Syria, Lebanon, and Eretz Israel were excluded from the British promises to the Arabs, and, on the other, it hinted that a textual analysis of the correspondence would lead to the conclusion that Eretz Israel was not excluded from the British promise. See Bar-Hillel, Change and Progress (1998), p. 329; for a lengthy analysis of the Balfour Declaration, see pp. 352–64. There is no analysis of Arab nationalism in this textbook. 83. From Conservatism to Progress (1998), pp. 370–72. 84. S. Inbar, Struggle and Decline in Israel and among the Nations in Modern Times, 1920–1945 (Petah Tikva: Lilach, 1999), p. 139, and the Teacher’s Guide, pp. 47–48. 85. Kirshenboim, History of Israel (1974), pp. 90, 94–95. Other examples include: Ahiya and Harpaz, History of the Jewish Nation (1959), p. 108; Spivack and Avidar, Jewish Nation in Its Land and in the Diaspora, Vol. IV (1960), pp. 188–90; Jewish National Movement, Vols. I–II (1978), pp. 135–36; Katz and Hershko, Israel among the Nations of the World, Vol. III (1979), p. 257; The Idea and Its Fulfillment (1983), p. 184; Zionism Tested (1984), p. 29; Bar-Sever, Eretz Israel, Vol. III (1990), p. 23. 86. Shemu’eli, Our Nation’s History, Vol. V (1955), pp. 159–260. 87. Hazan and Feler, History of Zionism (1951), p. 184. 88. Horowitz, Israel: A Brief History, Vol. III (1977), p. 25. See also Shemu’eli, Chapter in the History of Zionism (1961), p. 403; Riger, History of Israel, Vol. III (1954), pp. 17–19; Ziv, Ettinger, and Landau, Chronicles, 4/II (1964), p. 480; The Zionist Idea, Vol. I (1985), pp. 166–76. 89. The Balfour Declaration, 2 November 1917–1967 (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Education and the Center for the Cultivation of Jewish Consciousness, 1968), p. 13. The question of “political rights” is also discussed in The Zionist Idea, Vol. I (1985), pp. 173–76. 90. Shemu’eli, Our Nation’s History, Vol. V (1955), p. 258. 91. See, e.g., Zionism Tested (1984), pp. 29–39; The Zionist Idea (1985), pp. 166–70; Oren, The Jewish People (1988), Ch. 23; Hever, Major Subjects in History (1983), pp. 36–38. See also “Declaration,” in Junior Britannica, Vol. 3 (1978). “The Balfour Declaration,” in Great Periods in the History of Israel, Vol. 4 (1981), pp. 149–53. 92. Bar-Hillel, Change and Progress (1998), pp. 352–64; Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times (1998), pp. 134–39; From Conservatism to Progress (1998), pp. 395–96; Ben-Baruch, The Nineteenth Century (1998), pp. 190–91, and the Teacher’s Guide, pp. 158–59. 93. The World and the Jews in Recent Generations (1998), p. 278. 94. Horowitz, Israel: A Brief History, Vol. III (1977), p. 115. See also Katz and Hershko, Israel among the Nations of the World, Vol. III (1979), p. 262; the new edition of Y. Katz and T. Bacharch, Israel Among the Nations of the World: From Empire until the Six Day War, Vol. IV (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1984), p. 6. 95. Riger, History of Israel, Vol. III (1954), p. 35; Shmu’eli, Chapters in Zionist and Labor Movement History, Vol. III (1961), pp. 194–97; Ziv, Ettinger and Landau, Chronicles, Vol. 4/II (1964), p. 482. 96. For an account of the debate, see Y. Herzog, The Jewish Nation and Eretz Israel: A Debate with Professor Arnold Toynbee (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, un-

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dated). For a commentary, see M. Hed, Historic Rights, Morality and the State of Israel. The Dr. Y. Herzog and Professor A. Toynbee debate: An introduction and comments (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1977). Relatively reliable accounts of the Faysal-Weizmann agreement can be found in: Great Periods in the History of Israel (1981), Vol. 5, pp. 36–38; Lifshitz, History of the Jewish Nation, Vol. I (1985), p. 86. Shahar, despite claiming that Faysal was “the leader and spokesman of the Arab world,” offers a reasonable account, From the Diaspora to Independence, Vol. I (1990), pp. 202–4. See also The World and the Jews in Recent Generations (1998), pp. 281–82. 97. See, in particular, Hever, Major Subjects in History (1983), pp. 39–40; The Arab-Israeli Conflict (1979), p. 406; The Zionist Idea (1985), pp. 88, 114; Shahar, From the Diaspora to Independence (1990), pp. 202–4. 98. Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times (1998), pp. 158–59. See also The Jews and the World in Recent Generations (1998), pp. 281–82. 99. E. Naveh, The Twentieth Century, History for Ninth Grade (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books, 1999), pp. 46–47. 100. Horowitz, Israel: A Brief History, Vol. III (1977), p. 124. The reader on the Arab-Israeli conflict included excerpts from Bernard Lewis’s article on the historic origins of these terms. 101. Homa and Migdal (Stockade and Tower): Chapters in the History of the Yishuv (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1983), pp. 10, 46–47. Hereafter I will use the Hebrew term. 102. Ziv, Ettinger, and Landau, Chronicles, Vol. 4/II (1964), p. 492; Ettinger, The History of the Jewish Nation, Vol. III (1969), p. 293. Among the more recent textbooks, see The Zionist Idea (1985), pp. 93, 165; Shahar, From Diaspora to Independence, Vol. I (1990), p. 262. 103. Quoted in Cohen, Chapters in the History of Israel, Vol. I (1985), p. 200. 104. The Zionist Idea (1985), p. 92, cites a quotation from Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929, p. 248. Compare with Porath’s own description on p. 250. 105. The Zionist Idea (1985), p. 86; Shahar, From the Diaspora to Independence (1990), pp. 207–9. The student is asked to explain the argument that it was the confrontation with Zionism, more than geographic, historic, economic, cultural, and religious factors that led to the emergence of Palestinian nationalism. 106. Hever, Major Subjects in History (1983), pp. 184–85. Within a short period of time the textbook was sold in five editions. 107. K. Tabibyan, A Journey to the Past: The Twentieth Century. History to Ninth Grade for the Secular School (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture and the Center for Educational Technology, 1999), p. 67; S. Inbar, Struggle and Decline, pp. 136–44. See also E. Barnavi and E. Naveh, Modern Times, Part II, 1920–2000. History to High School (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books. 1999), pp. 94–95; and Teacher’s Guide, written by E. Naveh (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books, 1999), p. 42. 108. Naveh, The 20th Century (1995), p. 199. 109. Barnavi, The Twentieth Century (1998), pp. 244–57. The same chapter was reprinted in the 1999 edition, which was adapted according to the new high school history curriculum: Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Part II, pp. 316–23. 110. Spivack and Avidar, Jewish Nation in Its Land and the Diaspora, Vol. IV (1960), p. 210.

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111. Homa and Migdal (1983), p. 46; The Zionist Idea (1985), Vol. II, p. 120. See also The Idea and Its Fulfillment (1983), p. 210. According to Junior Britannica, “events was the term which the Jewish Yishuv ordinarily used to describe the attacks by the Arab masses. These attacks were accompanied by bloodshed, robbery and destruction of property” (Vol. 9, pp. 168–69). See also Yavneh, Vol. 9 (1995), pp. 22–23. Great Periods in the History of Israel used the terms “violent outburst” and “bloodthirsty riots” (Vol. 5, p. 43; Vol. 6, p. 61). 112. Kirshenboim, History of Israel (1974), p. 93; Hazan and Feler, History of Zionism (1951), p. 204; Riger, History of Israel, Vol. III (1954), p. 19; Ahiya and Harpaz, History of the Jewish Nation (1959), pp. 139–49; Ron, History of the Jewish Nation (1967), p. 107; Katz and Hershko, Israel among the Nations of the World, Vol. III (1979), p. 262; The Idea and Its Fulfillment (1983), p. 205; Zionism Tested (1984), pp. 81–85; Shahar, From the Diaspora to Independence (1990), pp. 210–15. 113. These lessons were specifically mentioned in Zionism Tested (1984), p. 84; Shahar, From the Diaspora to Independence, Vol. I (1990), pp. 214–15. 114. N. Rogel, Tel-Hai: A Front Without a Hinterland (Tel Aviv: 1979), pp. 182–91. One of his arguments is that Britain and France determined Palestine’s northern border without regard to the Tal-Hai incident. For an interesting study that deals with the function of the Tel-Hai myth in Israeli society, see Y. Zerubavel, Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition (Chicago: 1995). 115. Zionism Tested (1984), pp. 81–85. In contrast, see The Zionist Idea, Vol. II (1985), pp. 119–20. An unauthorized high school textbook reiterated the myth; see Shahar, From the Diaspora to Independence, Vol. I (1990), pp. 214–15. 116. Barnavi, The 20th Century (1998), p. 82. See also a balanced account in The World and the Jews in Recent Generations (1998), pp. 283–84. A return to the old mythical version, however, may be found in Bar-Hillel, Change and Progress (1998), pp. 409–11. 117. Shemu’eli, Our Nation’s History, Vol. 6 (1957), pp. 202, 211; Hazan and Feler, History of Zionism (1951), p. 222; Horowitz, Chronicles of Our Times (1954), p. 178; Cohen and Gelber, Summary of History of Zionism (1962), pp. 149–50; Ziv, Ettinger, and Landau, Chronicles, Vol. 4/II (1964), p. 484; Y. Shapira, Contemporary World History (Tel Aviv: 1974), p. 180; Zionism Tested (1984), pp. 65–66, 73; Shahar, From the Diaspora to Independence, Vol. I (1990), pp. 216–19, 244–50. 118. The Zionist Idea, Vol. II (1985), p. 120; Oren, The Jewish People (1988), pp. 243–45. 119. Shahar, From the Diaspora to Independence, Vol. I (1990), pp. 216–19. This kind of narrative also appears in The World and the Jews in Recent Generations (1998), p. 285. 120. Tabibyan, A Journey to the Past (1999), p. 79. 121. Ibid., p. 83. 122. Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Part II (1999), pp. 94–95. See also Naveh, The Twentieth Century: Teacher’s Guide (1999), p. 46. 123. Barnavi, The Twentieth Century (1998), p. 81; Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Part I (1998), p. 159; Part II (1999), p. 110; The World and the Jews in Recent Generations (1998), pp. 285–86; Naveh, The Twentieth Century (1999), pp. 46–47; Bar-Hillel, Change and Progress (1998), pp. 405–8; Inbar, Struggle and Decline (1999), pp. 141–42, 180.

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124. Horowitz, Israel: A Brief History, Vol. III (1977), p. 157; Katz and Hershko, Israel among the Nations of the World, Vol. III (1979), p. 259; Katz and Bacharch, Israel among the Nations of the World, Vol. IV (1984), p. 73. Ettinger described Husayni as “one of the most radical Arab nationalist activists,” History of the Jewish Nation, Vol. III (1969), p. 281. 125. Hazan and Feler, History of Zionism (1951), pp. 256–58. See also Shmu’eli, Our Nation’s History, Vol. VI (1957), p. 246; Ahiya and Harpaz, History of the Jewish Nation (1959), p. 143; Cohen and Gelber, Summary of History of Zionism (1962), pp. 179–82. 126. Kirshenboim, History of Israel (1974), p. 107. See also Ziv, Ettinger, and Landau, Chronicles, Vol. 4/II (1964), p. 493; Cohen and Gelber, Summary of History of Zionism (1962), pp. 179–80. 127. Zionism Tested (1984), pp. 145–46; The Zionist Idea, Vol. II (1985), p. 93; Oren, The Jewish People (1988), pp. 282–84; Lifshitz, The History of the Jewish Nation, Vol. I (1985), p. 150. See also the use of these terms in leading encyclopeadia, such as Junior Britannica, Vol. 9, (1977), pp. 168–69; “The Jewish Immigrations from the Days of Hibat Zion,” in Tarbut, Vol. 10 (1978), p. 1813; “Bloody Riots,” in Lexicon of Zionism, (1982), p. 212. 128. Shahar, From the Diaspora to Independence, Vol. I (1990), pp. 261–65. 129. Katz and Hershko, Israel among the Nations of the World, Vol. III (1979), p. 226; Katz and Bacharch, Israel among the Nations of the World, Vol. IV (1984), p. 80; The Zionist Idea (1985), pp. 92–93; The Haganah (1985), p. 21. 130. For further details on the Western Wall incident, see Y. Porath, From Rioting to Rebellion: The Arab Palestinian National Movement 1929–1939 (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1979), Ch. 1. 131. Tabibyan, A Journey to the Past (1999), p. 81. 132. See, e.g., Barnavi, The Twentieth Century (1998), p. 92; Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Part II (1999), p. 112. 133. Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Part I (1998), p. 161; Barnavi, The Twentieth Century (1998), p. 83; Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Part II (1999), p. 112. A particularly slanted terminology appears in Inbar, Struggle and Decline (1999), pp. 181–84. It also uses the terms “Judea and Samaria” to describe the West Bank. The Teacher’s Guide (p. 64) emphasizes that the use of violence against the Jews was characteristic of the Arabs of Eretz Israel: “the violence [witnessed] in the 1921 riots [pra’ot] would not be a single event . . . there is a need of course to avoid the fatalistic assertion that Palestinian nationalism is naturally violent. Yet, we cannot ignore the fact that the use of violence characterize the movement since its inception.” 134. On the Arab Revolt, see Porath, From Rioting to Rebellion, Chapters 7–9. 135. Ettinger, The History of the Jewish Nation, Vol. III (1969), p. 293; Hazan and Feler, History of Zionism (1951), p. 270; Ahiya and Harpaz, History of the Jewish Nation (1959), p. 159; Kirshenboim, History of Israel (1974), p. 108. 136. Ahiya and Harpaz, History of the Jewish People (1959), p. 142. See also Spivack and Avidar, Jewish Nation in its Land and the Diaspora, Vol. IV (1960), p. 210. 137. Horowitz, Israel: A Brief History (1977), p. 189. 138. Ibid., p. 203. Riger described these events as “an Arab uprising,” see History of Israel, Vol. III (1954), pp. 35–38.

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139. Kirshenboim, History of Israel (1955), p. 26. 140. Shemu’eli, Our Nation’s History, Vol. VI (1957), pp. 277–78; Ron, History of the Jewish Nation (1967), p. 120. 141. Horowitz, Chronicles of Our Times (1953), p. 190. See also Shmu’eli, Our Nation’s History in the Modern Era, Vol. VII (Tel Aviv: 1958), pp. 122–24. 142. Husayni did ask German consuls in Beirut and Baghdad for assistance, but was turned down. German aid mainly took the form of anti-Jewish and anti-British propaganda. Such German arms as the Arab rebels possessed were smuggled into the country independently. On the relations between the Arab movement and Germany, see D. Israeli, The German Reich and the Arabs of Israel (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1974). 143. Horowitz, Israel: A Brief History, Vol. III (1977), p. 218; Riger, History of the Jewish People, Vol. III (1954), p. 39. 144. See also Shmu’eli, Our Nation’s History, Vol. VI (1957), p. 292; Ziv, Ettinger, and Landau, Chronicles, 4/II (1964), p. 501. On the use of Munich 1938 as a classic stereotype, see M. Confino, “Historical Consciousness in the Culture of Our Times” (Tel Aviv: Aranne School of History, 1980). 145. The State of Israel as the Basis for the Fulfillment of Zionism: The Thirtieth Anniversary, a Teachers’ Guide (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1978), p. 10. It lists twenty-one sources referring to the Jewish side and only five on the Arab side. For a similar approach, see “Zionism” in Michlal, Vol. 7 (Tel Aviv: Yavneh, 1959), pp. 113–14; “Bloody Riots” in Lexicon of Zionism (1982), pp. 212–13; “Jewish Immigrations from the Days of Hibat Zion,” Tarbut, Vol. 10 (1978), p. 1814; Great Periods in the History of Israel, Vol. 6 (1981), p. 61. For a balanced account of the rebellion, see Shahar, From the Diaspora to Independence, Vol. I (1990), Ch. 32. 146. Zionism Tested (1984), pp. 124–27, 158–59; The Zionist Idea, Vol. II (1985), pp. 165–66; Oren, The Jewish People, Vol. I (1988), pp. 287–89; Shahar, From the Diaspora to Independence, Vol. I (1990), pp. 295–99; 310–11. The change may be illustrated by a comparison with Katz and Hershko, Israel among Nations of the World, Vol. III (1979), p. 268. A later edition of this work uses the term “Arab rebellion,” see Katz and Bacharch, Israel among the Nations of the World, Vol. IV (1984), p. 82. 147. Zionism Tested (1984), p. 127; Shahar, From the Diaspora to Independence, Vol. I (1990), p. 299. 148. Barnavi, The Twentieth Century (1998), p. 92; Tabibyan, A Journey to the Past (1999), p. 137. The student is asked the meaning of the terms used by each side. For a good description of the episode, see pp. 137–40. See also Naveh, The Twentieth Century (1999), p. 86; Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Part II (1999), p. 120. 149. Tabibyan, A Journey to the Past (1999), p. 142; Naveh, The Twentieth Century (1999), pp. 85–86; Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times: Teacher’s Guide (1999), p. 54. 150. Ibid., p. 72. 151. Barnavi, The Twentieth Century (1998), pp. 93–94. 152. D. Ya’akobi, A World of Changes (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1999), pp. 93–99; Tabibyan, A Journey to the Past (1999), pp. 137–39; Naveh, The Twentieth Century: Teacher’s Guide (1999), p. 73; Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times: Teacher’s Guide (1999), pp. 54–55. A particularly biased description appeared in Inbar, Struggle and Decline (1999), pp. 263–72, and the Teacher’s Guide (1999), pp. 95–98. The textbook presented a map of “Locations of Arab Rioters” (por’im), and in-

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dicted the exaggerated number of “thousands” of Palestinians who “fell victim to robbery, killing and slaughter” by fellow Palestinians. 153. For further details, see D. Ben-Gurion¸ Meetings with Arab Leaders (Tel Aviv: Keter, 1975); A. Sela, From First Contacts to Negotiations: The Relations between the Jewish Agency, the State of Israel and King ‘Abdallah, 1946–1950 (Tel Aviv: Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1985); idem, “Meetings and Talks Between the Zionist Leaders and Palestinian Arab Leaders, 1933–1939,” Hamizrah Hehadash, Vol. 22 (1972), pp. 1–21. Only Horowitz’s textbook (Israel: A Brief History, Vol. III, 1977, p. 176.) mentioned Jewish-Arab contacts: “It was a unique, once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to talk with the Arabs. It was also a missed opportunity, which helped to widen the gulf between two people whom history has condemned to live together. It is possible, though no more than possible, that an Arab-Jewish agreement at that stage would have prevented the tragedy that followed.” 154. Hazan and Feler, History of Zionism (1951), p. 223. 155. Horowitz, Israel: A Brief History, Vol. III (1977), pp. 190–92. 156. Shemu’eli, Our Nation’s History, Vol. VI (1957), p. 254. 157. The Arab-Israeli Conflict, a guide for the student (1979), p. 13. 158. Jewish National Movement, Vol. III (1978), pp. 42, 149–51; The Zionist Idea, Vol. II (1985), pp.154–60. 159. Shemu’eli, Our People’s History, Vol. VII (1957), p. 198; Ron, History of the Jewish Nation (1967), p. 197; Not on a Silver Platter: From a National Home to a Sovereign State, 1939–1949 (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1984), pp. 164–65; Lifshitz, History of the Jewish Nation, Vol. II (1985), p. 90. 160. Jewish National Movement, Vol. IV (1978), p. 75; The Zionist Idea, Vol. II (1985), pp. 248, 284. 161. Tabibyan (A Journey to the Past, 1999, p. 286) made a brief reference to the Meir-‘Abdallah meeting. 162. See, Not on a Silver Platter (1984), pp. 103–79; The Zionist Idea (1985), pp. 279–301; Shahar, From the Diaspora to Independence, Vol. I (1990), pp. 252–308. 163. Shemu’eli, Our People’s History, Vol. VII (1958), p. 205. Ettinger, too, stressed the point of “the few against the many,” History of the Jewish Nation, Vol. III (1969), p. 335. The Aviv encyclopaedia asserted that “the Arabs had the advantage not only in the number of fighters but also in the types and amount of weapons” (“Israel, the State,” Vols. 9–10, 1976, p. 1929). 164. Ahiya and Harpaz, History of the Jewish Nation (1959), pp. 199–200. 165. Cohen and Gelber, Summary of History of Zionism (1962), pp. 289–90. 166. The First Decade: In Celebration of the State of Israel’s Tenth Anniversary, for sixth–eighth grades in the state religious schools (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Education, 1958), p. 41. 167. Riger, History of Israel, Vol. III (1954), p. 134. For additional accounts on the imbalance between the two sides, see Kirshenboim, History of Israel (1956), p. 165; History of Israel (1974), pp. 223–25; Ziv, Ettniger, and Landau, Chronicles, Vol. 4/II (1964), p. 561. 168. As early as 1969, Nadav Safran commented that throughout the hostilities the Jews maintained and even increased their numerical advantage. See The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–1967 (Jerusalem: Keter, 1969), p. 28 (Hebrew ed.).

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169. Jewish National Movement, Vol. IV (1978), pp. 118–20, 125. The final version reiterated the argument but omitted the tables on both sides’ relative strength on the day of the invasion and during the course of the war, The Zionist Idea, Vol. II (1985), pp. 283–96. 170. Oren, The Jewish People, Vol. II (1988), pp. 176–77; Shahar, From the Diaspora to Independence, Vol. II (1990), pp. 254–56, 281–83. Lifshitz, although describing the forces deployed by both sides, managed to avoid the whole question of numbers; see History of the Jewish People, Vol. II (1985), p. 89. Great Periods in the History of Israel contains symmetrical but exaggerated figures (Vol. 8, 1981, p. 50). 171. Not on a Silver Platter (1984), p. 106. For a detailed record of the Jewish forces, see p. 107. There is no parallel record of the Arab forces. 172. Naveh, The Twentieth Century (1999), pp. 143, 145. See also Barnavi, The Twentieth Century (1998), pp. 184, 187; Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Part II (1999), p. 227. 173. Naveh, The Twentieth Century (1999), p. 141. 174. Ya’akobi, A World of Changes (1999), pp. 164–65. In contrast, Tabibyan (A Journey to the Past) is quite evasive on the subject (p. 286). 175. The World and the Jews in Recent Generations, Vol. II (2000), p. 231. See also Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Vol. II (1999), p. 231. 176. Ibid., Teacher’s Guide (1999), p. 99. 177. S. Inbar, Resurrection and State in Israel and the Nations in the New Age, 1945–1970 (Petach Tikva: Lilach, 2000), pp. 123, 126, 141. This textbook was written according to the new history curriculum, but so far it has not been authorized by the Ministry of Education. 178. N. Gertz, Captive of a Dream: National Myths in Israeli Culture (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1995), p. 13. The first chapter discusses the presence of this myth in posters, speeches, and novels of the 1930s. Another example is Ben-Gurion’s statement: “If I had to sum up the situation in a few words, I would use the following three: ‘quality versus quantity.’ Since the time of Joshua and the Judges and until the War of Independence, the Jewish nation has stood a few against many. Even if we succeed—and I believe that we will succeed—in bringing millions of additional Jewish immigrants to Israel, we will still remain a few against many.” See “Israel’s Spiritual Mission and Pioneering Goals” (Eternal Israel, p. 77). 179. It started with a front-page article in the New York Times (14 August 1999), which reported the new changes in Israeli history textbooks. A summary of this article appeared in The Jerusalem Post (J. Hoagland, 29 August). This opened an acrimonious debate in the Israeli daily Ha’aretz. See, in particular, the following responses: R. Briman, 31 August; O. Shohat, 3 September; A. Megged, 7, 14 September; N. Aloni, 7 September, 12 October; I. Pappé, and E. Podeh, 15 September; S. Zand and D. Margalit, 16 September; T. Segev, 17 September 1999; G. Levi, 10 October; I. Bar-Tal, 21 October. See also the many letters to the editor during this period. Most of the debate concentrated on Naveh’s textbook for junior high school (The Twentieth Century), yet the change in the narrative, as I have explained, was not sudden but started with the second-generation textbooks. Moreover, the change was comprehensive and not related to only one junior high school textbook. 180. For a thorough analysis of the refugee problem in history textbooks, see Podeh, “History and Memory in the Israeli Educational System: The Portrayal of

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the Arab-Israeli Conflict in History Textbooks, 1948–2000,” History and Memory, Vol. 12 (2000), pp. 65–100. 181. Spivack and Avidar, Jewish Nation in its Land and the Diaspora, Vol. IV (1970), pp. 217–19. See also Cohen and Gelber, Summary of History of Zionism (1962), p. 294. 182. Katz and Hershko, Israel among the Nations of the World, Vol. III (1979), p. 278; Katz and Bacharch, Israel among the Nations of the World, Vol. IV (1984), p. 109. 183. Ron, History of the Jewish Nation (1967), p. 185. 184. Kirshenboim, History of Israel (1974), pp. 161–62. 185. Riger, History of the Jewish Nation, Vol. III, (1954), pp.127–32. See also Kirshenboim, History of the Jewish Nation (1956), p. 160. 186. Kirshenboim, p. 161; Riger, History of the Jewish Nation, Vol. III (1954), p. 128. 187. Ibid. Shemu’eli labelled the operation “a misguided, stupid mistake condemned by the entire official Jewish community” (Our Nation’s History, Vol. VII, 1958, p. 189). See also Jewish National Movement, Vol. IV (1978), p.117; The Zionist Idea, Vol. I (1985), p. 292; Shahar, From the Diaspora to Independence, Vol. II (1990), pp. 265–66. Lifshitz stated that “approximately 245 villagers were killed” during the attack. In contrast, when describing the attack on Gush Etzion, he underlined the brutal murder of 127 of the settlement’s inhabitants, “all of whom were savagely massacred by a barbarous mob of Arab villagers” (History of the Jewish Nation, Vol. I, 1985, p. 99). See also an attempt to present three different views of the events in Dir Yassin, Oren, The Jewish People (1988), pp. 237–38. 188. Riger, History of Israel, Vol. III (1954) p. 141; Kirshenboim, History of Israel (1956), p. 167; Ahiya and Harpaz, History of the Jewish Nation (1959), p. 19; Shmu’eli, Our Nation’s History, Vol. VII (1958), p. 191; Bar-Sever, Chapters in History (1983), pp. 59–60. 189. D. Ben-Meir, The Image of the Israeli State: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economy and Society, chapters in civil studies (Tel Aviv: Israeli Institution for Education in Writing, 1969), p. 245. 190. Ron, History of Jewish Nation (1967), p. 197. 191. Shemu’eli, Our Nation’s History, Vol. VII (1958), p. 215. 192. The actual number of Palestinian refugees is still disputed. The Israelis have tended to underestimate the number of refugees while the Arabs have usually exaggerated them. Historian Benny Morris reached the conclusion that it is impossible to accurately estimate the number of refugees, accepting the British estimate of 600,000 to 760,000 (Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, p. 298). 193. Lorch, “Israel in the International Arena” (1967), pp. 50–51. 194. Ben-Meir, The Image of the Israeli State (1969), p. 46. 195. Not on a Silver Platter (1984), pp. 145–46, 176. 196. The Zionist Idea (1985), pp. 300–1. The accusations voiced by Arabs figures had a particularly powerful and convincing impact, not least because they were taken from the book written by a Middle East expert, Michael Assaf: The History of the Arab Awakening and their Flight from the Land of Israel (Tel Aviv: 1967), pp. 180–82, 336–37. Similar “proof” appeared in the experimental edition of The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Booklet No. 10, pp. 8–10.

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197. Liphsitz, The History of the Jewish Nation, p. 110; Sahar, From the Diaspora to Independence, p. 229. 198. The Arab-Israeli Conflict (1979), pp. 135, 149. 199. My interpretation differs from the one offered by R. Firer and S. Udwan; see “I am a Hero, I am a Victim,” Panim, No. 3 (October 1997), pp. 43–49. For a particularly tendentious description of Israeli textbooks, see pp. 43–46. 200. The Jewish National Movement (1978), pp. 128–29. 201. Oren, The Jewish People (1988), Vol. II, p. 230. 202. The Arab Israeli Conflict (1979), p. 137. It should be noted that the reader on the Arab-Israeli conflict was used only by high school students (principally those studying in secular high schools), and not for a compulsory course. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that most Israeli students did not actually read Lewis’s article. 203. One of the objectives of the plan, which did not appear in the “censored” document, was: “to clear a whole area, permanently, of Arab villages and hostile or potentially hostile villagers.” See Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949, pp. 62–65, 112. 204. Shahar, From Diaspora to Independence (1990), Vol. II, pp. 243–49. Another censored version of Plan Dalet can be found in The Jewish National Movement (1978), Vol. IV, pp. 336–38; The Zionist Idea (1985), Vol. II, p. 289; Not on a Silver Platter (1984), pp. 140–41; Liphsitz, The History of the Jewish Nation, (1985), Vol. II, p. 96. 205. Shahar, From Diaspora to Independence (1990), Vol. II, p. 313. 206. Naveh, The Twentieth Century (1999), pp. 143, 146. 207. Naveh, The Twentieth Century: Teacher’s Guide (1999), p. 108. 208. Tabibyan, A Journey to the Past (1998), p. 292. See also Ya’akobi, A World of Changes (1999), p. 163. 209. Shula Inbar, Resurrection and State in Israel and the Nations in the New Age, 1945–1970 (Petach Tikva: Lilach, 2000). This textbook dedicates many pages to the “Independence War” (pp. 122–160), but there is no discussion of the Palestinian (described as “the Israeli Arabs”) refugee problem. It also presents Plan ‘D’ in a censored way. The other textbook presents the issue in a superficial way; see The World and the Jews in Recent Generations, 1920–1970, Vol. II (1999), pp. 244, 285. The biased description is surprising since the first volume of this series generally presented Arab-Jewish relations in a balanced way. 210. Barnavi, The Twentieth Century (1998), pp. 194–95. A similar narrative appeared in Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Part II (1999), pp. 238–39. 211. Barnavi, The Twentieth Century (1998), p. 195; Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Part II (1999), p. 239. 212. Barnavi, The Twentieth Century (1998), p. 194. 213. Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Part. II (1999), p. 239. 214. The dispute first became known to the public through articles in Ha’aretz, 10 June and 1 July, 1994. Excerpts from the debate appeared in the History Teachers Journal, No. 6 (1997), pp. 39–46. 215. Shemu’eli, Our Nation’s History, Vol. VII (1958), p. 351. 216. Lorch, “Israel in the International Arena” (1979), p. 45. On 1956 as a war of ein breira (“no alternative”), see Cohen (ed.), Chapters in the History of Israel, Vol. II (1981), pp. 578–80. Interestingly, this excerpt was taken from “Operation Kadesh,”

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Guidelines to the Commanding Officer, Chief Education Officer, Education and Information Branch, October 1972. For similar accounts, see: “The State of Israel” in Aviv, Vol. 9–10 (1978), pp. 1932–33; Great Periods in the History of Israel, Vol. 10 (1983), p. 7. The volume is titled “A Country under Siege Goes to War.” 217. Ziv, Ettinger, and Landau, Chronicles, 3rd ed., Vol. 4/II (1991), pp. 470–71. 218. Tenth Decade (1958), pp. 59–60. See also Lexicon of Zionism, the entry “Israel,” p. 38; Great Periods in the History of the Land of Israel, Vol. 10 (1983), p. 8. 219. Ahiya and Harpaz, History of the Jewish Nation (1959), p. 238. 220. Shmu’eli, Our Nation’s History, Vol. VII (1958), p. 351. The Egyptian president was often described as a “dictator” (rodan). Ben-Gurion used this adjective several times in his article “Our Security and Position” in Eternal Israel, pp. 313–27. Ben-Gurion also compared Nasser’s style to “one with which we are familiar with from the time of Hitler” (p. 249). 221. Lorch, “Israel in the International Arena” (1969), p. 45. 222. Ziv, Ettinger, and Landau, Chronicles, Vol. 4/II, 3rd ed. (1991), p. 470. More accurate descriptions may be found in Kirshenboim, History of Israel (1974), pp. 303–13. See the new modified edition of the textbook published in 1988, pp. 347–50. See also Ron, History of the People of Israel (1967), pp. 204–5. Katz and Hershko were even more explicit, stating that “Israel, regarding the Egyptian measures as preparatory steps taken prior to launching a war [against Israel], decided to preempt Egypt and attack first. Israel contacted Britain and France who had also been hurt by Nasser’s actions” (Israel among Nations of the World, Vol. III, 1979, pp. 138–39). 223. Shemu’eli, Our Nation’s History, Vol. VII (1958), pp.353, 363. For other assessments of the war, see: Lorch, “Israel in the International Arena” (1969), p. 45; Ron, History of the Jewish Nation (1967), p. 205. 224. See, e.g., Oren, The Jewish People, Vol. II (1988), pp. 251–55; Kirshenboim, History of Israel (1988), pp. 348–49; Between War and Peace (1986), pp. 207–8; Lifshitz, History of the Jewish Nation, Vol. III (1985), p. 129. 225. The State of Israel: The First Twenty Years (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1989), pp. 63–65. Following the presentation of the debate, the student was asked two questions: what are the differences between the two attitudes; and in what way does this argument remind you of current debates. A significant difference was made, however, in the presentation of terrorist activities. Arab terror was described as “murder” and “atrocities,” while Israel’s action against civilians at the Jordanian village of Kibye in 1953 was described as a “retaliatory operation in which the IDF bombed dozens of houses and 93 villagers were hit” (p. 65, note 1). 226. Ibid., p. 66. 227. The Arab-Israeli Conflict (1979), pp. 93–100. 228. Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Vol. II (1999), pp. 274–78. 229. Naveh, The Twentieth Century (1999), pp. 160–61. The student is asked the following question: “IDF soldiers were ordered to shoot at anyone breaking the curfew, and still they were convicted. What can we learn from this tragic event on the duty to obey orders?” The Ben-Gurion-Sharett debate was also emphasized by Ya’akobi, A World of Changes (1999), p. 178. 230. Ibid., p. 179. 231. The World and the Jews in Recent Generations, Vol. II (1999). Perhaps this narrative is intelligible since this section was written by Motti Golani, who advanced

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this argument in his book Israel in Search of a War: The Sinai Campaign, 1955–1956 (Brighton: 1998). See also a nuanced version in Ya’akobi, A World of Changes (1999), p. 178. 232. Y. Komem, “Teaching the Six Day War—Didactic Aspects,” Journal for History Teachers, Vol. 7 (1998), pp. 61–64. 233. Kirshenboim, History of Israel (1974), pp. 319–20; Ron, History of the Jewish Nation (1967), p. 208. 234. Ron, History of the Jewish Nation (1967), pp. 208–9. 235. Kirshenboim, History of Israel (1974), p. 335. For a similar description in second-generation textbooks, see Katz and Bacrach, Israel among the Nations, Vol. IV (1984), p. 142. Lifshitz did discuss several Israeli peace initiatives after 1967, but did not mention any Arabs’ initiatives (such as Sadat’s February 1971). In this way he provided a definite answer to the question he asked: why was there no phone call? (“After the war, the Israeli Minister of Defence, Moshe Dayan said that he waited for a phone call from the Arabs, yet the telephone failed to ring. Why?”) See, History of the Jewish Nation, Vol. II (1985), p. 143. On Israel’s persistent bids for peace see Great Periods in the History of Israel (1983), Vol. 11, entitled “A Victorious People Await Peace, 1967–1973.” 236. Bar-Sever, Chapter in History (1983), p. 74. For a similar approach, see Cohen, Chapter in History of Israel, Vol. II (1981), pp. 589–93. See also “The State of Israel,” Aviv (1978), p. 1933; “The State of Israel,” Lexicon of Zionism (1982), p. 39; “Six Day War,” Yavneh, Vol. 10 (1995), pp. 8–12. For a more accurate description of the background, see Lifstiz, History of the Jewish Nation, Vol. II (1985), pp.132–33. 237. Oren, The Jewish People (1988), pp. 261–75. 238. First Twenty Years (1989), pp. 68–70. A caricature showed a flock of crows—the Arab states—joined by a new-born crow—the Palestinian entity—chasing after the poor Israel (see Appendix 11). The teacher’s guide instructed the teacher to emphasize the difference between the 1956 War, which was “an initiated preventive war” and Israel’s “first strike” in 1967, which was intended to improve the Israel’s conditions for what was “an inevitable war.” See First Twenty Years: Teacher’s Guide, p. 17. 239. S. Shamir, “Patterns in the Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” in The Arab-Israeli Conflict (1973), p. 76. 240. First Twenty Years (1989), p. 82. For the whole discussion, see pp. 75–82. 241. Ibid., p. 73. As for information on the different interpretations of the Khartoum resolutions, see A. Sela, The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order (Albany, New York: 1998), pp. 104–9. 242. Barnavi, The Twentieth Century (1998), pp. 224–25; Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Part II (1999), pp. 278–79; Tabibyan, A Journey to the Past (1999), p. 310; Naveh, The Twentieth Century (1999), p. 162. A more thorough account is offered in The World and the Jews in Recent Generations, Vol. II (1999), pp. 290–94; Inbar, Resurrection and Revival (2000), pp. 291–94. These last two textbooks blame also Egypt and Syria for the war. 243. See, e.g., S. Yitzchaki, In the Arab Eyes: The Six Day War and Its Aftermath (Tel Aviv: 1970) (Hebrew); M. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals (London: 3rd ed., 1971), pp. 107–28: Sela, The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, pp. 91–92.

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244. Tabibyan, A Journey to the Past (1999), p. 312. For a similar depiction, see Naveh, The Twentieth Century (1999), p. 162. An evasive and unsatisfactory narrative is offered by Ya’akobi, A World of Changes (1999), p. 179. 245. Barnavi, The Twentieth Century (1998), p. 228; Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Part II (1999), p. 282. 246. Tabibyan, A Journey to the Past (1999), p. 315; Naveh, The Twentieth Century (1999), p. 163, and the Teacher’s Guide, p. 118; Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Part II (1999), pp. 282–92, and the Teacher’s Guide, p. 122. 247. The Arab-Israeli Conflict (1979), pp. 117–34, 162–75. Some more information on the post-1967 period can be found in a high school textbook for vocational schools, see Oren, The Jewish People, Vol. II (1988), p. 286. A fairly comprehensive and accurate account can be found in an unauthorized high school textbook, Lifshitz, History of the Jewish Nation, Vol. II (1985), pp. 151–76. 248. Y. Harkabi, The Palestinian Charter and Its Significance (Jerusalem: 1974). See also The Arab-Israeli Conflict (1979), pp. 162–75; Oren, The Jewish People (1988), p. 280. 249. The Intifada: Its Repercussions on the Israeli and Palestinian Societies (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1990). See also the booklet, The Intifada, a Stage in the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and the Unit for Education, Democracy and Coexistence, 1990). 250. Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Teacher’s Guide (1999), p. 5. Since the teacher is not obliged to teach these topics, they were omitted from the teacher’s guide. The junior high school textbooks continue their narrative up until the end of the twentieth century. 251. Tabibyan, A Journey to the Past (1999), p. 313. See also Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Part II (1999), p. 300. 252. Naveh, The Twentieth Century (1999), p. 189. The student is asked why the Arabs view the war as victory (p. 190). See also Tabibyan, A Journey to the Past (1999), p. 313; Ya’akobi, A World of Changes (1999), p. 236; Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Part II (1999), p. 301. 253. Tabibyan, A Journey to the Past (1999), p. 331; Ya’akobi, A World of Changes (1999), p. 240; Naveh, The Twentieth Century (1999), pp. 191–92; see also the Teacher’s Guide, p. 135; Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Part II (1999), pp. 319–20. 254. Naveh, The Twentieth Century (1999), pp. 191–92. 255. Ibid., p. 193. 256. Barnavi, The Twentieth Century (1998), p. 257. A somewhat modified version appeared in Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Part II (1999), p. 323. 257. H. Fishman, Citizenship in Israel (Tel Aviv: Chechik, 1960), p. 76. 258. Ben-Meir, The Nature of the State (1969), p. 248. 259. S. Ettinger, Principles of Citizenship (Tel Aviv: Karni, 1967), pp. 101–2. 260. Ben Meir, The Nature of the State, p. 249. 261. Ettinger, Principles of Citizenship, p. 99. 262. Ben-Meir, The Nature of the State, p. 261. 263. The text of the Teacher’s Guide in quoted in R. Hochman (ed.), Jews and Arabs in Israel (Jerusalem: Hebrew University/School of Education, 1989), pp. 9–15.

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264. For the first pilot see Living Together, chapter in civics on the Arabs in Israel and relations between Arab and Jewish citizens (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and the Van-Leer Foundation, 1982). For the interim edition, see The Arab Citizens of Israel: Mutual Relations in Israel between Jews and Arabs (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and the Van Leer Foundation, 1984). See the ministerial directive, TAU, AJEID, DGD, 1 September 1985. 265. See the article written by Alouph Hareven, “Dealing with Difficult Question,” The Arab Citizens of Israel: Mutual Relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and the Van Leer Foundation, 1988), pp. 9–13. 266. The Arab Citizens of Israel (1989), pp. 151–64. 267. Ibid., pp. 24–32. The sources were Shimoni (published in 1956) and Landau (published in 1970). 268. Ibid., p. 106. 269. Ibid., see the pictures on pages 25, 45, 47, 55, 57, 83, 96. 270. Ibid., pp. 33–34. 271. Barnavi, The Twentieth Century (1998), pp. 209–12. 272. Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Part II (1999). 273. Naveh, The Twentieth Century (1999), pp. 160–61, and the Teacher’s Guide, pp. 117–18. 274. In Five Voices: Arab Youth in Israel Talking about their Lives and Culture (Tel Aviv: Center for Technological Education, 1994). See also the attached Teacher’s Guide and videocassette. I would like to thank Mr. Nissim Atzmon, the Director of Shifat, Department of Arabic Culture and Language Teaching at the Ministry of Education, for providing me with this material.

CONCLUSIONS The Arab-Israeli conflict that has been fought on the battlefield, in the diplomatic arena and in the economic sphere is well known and in many cases well documented. However, a different kind of conflict, no less important, has also been waged in the educational realm, through school textbooks. It is a silent conflict, with no physical casualties but a lasting psychological impact. Although this study is concerned with Israeli school textbooks, there is no reason to doubt that the same problem does not exist with Arab school textbooks.1 Each party to the conflict presents its own biased version, which usually attempts to deny the rights of its adversary and to portray it in a negative light. This state of affairs, by no means unique to the Arab-Israeli conflict, has contributed to shaping the worldview of the young generations. As a result, the governing elites may be unable to relinquish a negative image of the enemy acquired during childhood and adolescence. This “silent” conflict may prove more durable than the military battles, since ingrained images are resistant to change and cannot be expected to disappear with the signing of peace agreements. An awareness of this problem, and a sincere effort to eliminate bias, prejudice, and stereotypes from textbooks, would help to resolve this kind of conflict. An analysis of history textbooks during the past fifty years allows us to reconstruct, if only partially, the students’ perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the image they formed of the Arab. Chronologically, three phases may be discerned with respect to the evolution of the attitude of the education system toward the Arab-Israeli conflict: childhood (1920–67), adolescence (1967–mid-1980s), and adulthood (since then). On the basis of this division, the education system saw the publication of three generations of history textbooks: the first existed from the pre-1948 period until the

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mid-1970s; the second during the years 1975–92; and the third since the mid-1990s. Clearly, changes in the thinking and attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict in society and in the education system foreshadowed the publication of new textbooks. Largely oblivious of the Arab factor, the education system was engaged during the first phase (1920–67) in implanting Zionist values. As a result, the first generation of textbooks reflected a highly ethnocentric society that consistently denied Arab rights to Eretz Israel. Generally portraying the conflict in a simplified, one-sided manner, these textbooks were replete with inaccuracies at times bordering on distortion. Arabs were often delegitimized and dehumanized in a way that contributed to the formation of negative stereotypes. A clear dichotomy was created between the Western, civilized, peace-loving image of the Jew and the Oriental, treacherous, belligerent, and backward image of the Arab. Jewish traumatic historical experiences in the biblical, as well as the modern, era became major prisms through which Arab history was filtered and portrayed. No wonder, therefore, that terms such as Haman, ‘Amaleq, pogroms, Hitler, and Nazis, were familiar analogies for Jewish textbook writers when dealing with the Arabs. The fact that this demonization process was also relevant to other socialization agents, such as youth literature, cinema, the media, and arts, reinforced the conviction of Israelis that these stereotypes indeed reflected the reality. In addition, during this phase the textbooks often concealed or censored unpleasant facts on certain sensitive issues (such as the refugee problem), which could arouse embarrassment in Israel. In addition, by frequently presenting a monolithic Arab position (“the Arab world”), which mirrored the attitude of Israeli society and historiography in general,2 the textbooks contributed to the anchoring of overly simplified, and therefore distorted, attitudes toward the Arab states and the Palestinians. In addition, Arab history was always depicted from a Zionist perspective and there was no attempt to understand Arab motives and attitudes toward the Jews and the conflict. During the “childhood” phase, the Ministry of Education was not formally in charge of writing textbooks—usually they were written by officials in the education system. But since the textbooks had to be authorized by the ministry, it was possible to monitor their content. Yet it would appear that such supervision was unnecessary, since the authors of the old textbooks were well aware of their boundaries. Writing out of a deep sense of patriotism, they operated a self-censorship mechanism that evaded or ignored information perceived as damaging to the state. In addition, since they felt personally involved in the process of building the state, their narrative was often couched in emotional tones. At this historical juncture, perhaps this kind of writing was intelligible. According to historian Mordechai Bar’on, the narrative in history textbooks may have been factually flawed,

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but “it was essential and beneficial for the education of a generation compelled to defend the Israeli state.” In addition, he argued, only by providing a simple, one-sided—and not complicated, contradictory, or vague—narrative, was it possible to build strong identification with the state.3 The narrative of the old textbooks also reflected a genuine sense of fear of the enemy, which may, with hindsight, seem exaggerated. The sense of being a state under siege (euphemistically depicted by the biblical phrase ‘am levadad yishkon) (“a people that shall dwell alone”) was perceived as relevant until 1967, and for some it continued in the post-1967 period as well.4 The fear of a second round of war with the Arabs, and the threat of annihilation, was genuine and not theoretical. Moreover, it may be assumed that textbook authors, reflecting current trends in society, sincerely believed in certain conventional truths, which would later turn into myths, such as that of the few against the many.5 In light of this atmosphere of imminent danger and perpetual insecurity, the education establishment was geared to implanting Zionist values, which consisted of inherent convictions and a perception that unpleasant facts should be overlooked and consequently forgotten. That is why Yehoshafat Harkabi’s suggestion to the ministry in the late 1960s to “teach the truth” was not taken seriously. It went against the conviction that to convey the Arab position would sow doubt and confusion among the young. The old textbooks largely reflected current Zionist historiography. How this historiography was used to legitimize Israeli claims to Eretz Israel has already been examined.6 Similarly, the education system used the textbooks as a tool in the Arab-Jewish ideological conflict to justify the Israeli position; emphasizing the Zionist cause served to deny Arab rights.7 Zionist historiography, moreover, had a direct link to textbooks through the work of such historians as Ben-Zion Dinur and Samuel Ettinger, who had a lasting influence over textbook authors (Ettinger himself wrote several textbooks). Key Zionist terminology—for example, the “events” (hame’ora’ot),” “gangs” (knufiyot), the refugees’ “flight” (briha)—were used repeatedly in textbooks, including those published since the mid-1970s. The strong link between Zionist historiography and school textbooks inevitably made them a major vehicle for transforming Zionist ideology into the “master commemorative narrative.”8 In contrast to their extensive use of Zionist historiography, the writers of the old textbooks made selective use, if at all, of Middle Eastern historiography. As most had their origins in Germany and Eastern Europe, they were intimately familiar with European history, as well as with Zionist history, but their knowledge of Islam and Middle Eastern history was sparse. Not surprisingly, the narrative in their textbooks was shaped by concepts originating in the European experience. The Arab was seen as the eternal goy [stranger] and his attack on the Jew was a kind of pogrom. Not all educators were unfamiliar with the major extant studies on the Middle East and Is-

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lam. An analysis of the papers of Naftali Zon, Ministry of Education high school superintendent in the years 1958–72 (himself born in Germany), shows that he had read Ya’akov Shimoni’s important books on the Middle East and the Arabs in Palestine. Although some of Shimoni’s fine distinctions between the Arab national movement and the Palestinian local movement are evident in Zon’s private notes, they did not find their way into the textbooks he monitored. Middle Eastern historiography, it appears, was useful so long as it did not contradict Israel’s perceived truths or blemish its image. Whether consciously or not, textbook writers developed polished self-censorship skills. Moreover, while the writers did not have access to archives, a great deal of information was known at the time. It was the authors’ strong sense of loyalty to the state, combined with their lack of interest in and relative ignorance of Arab history, that often led them to present the conflict in an inaccurate, biased way. Scholars have noted that the very choice of content of a historical narrative entails a value judgment. This, in turn, gives rise to biases and misrepresentations, not least in the writing of textbooks.9 Be that as it may, it would appear that the manifest bias of the early textbooks in the Israeli education system was the result of the conviction—similar to that held by other countries in their state-building phase—that the state must promote “national education.” Teaching history was viewed as a vital mission, indispensable to shaping and consolidating the nation’s collective memory; this dictated that history be taught through a national prism. The education system was mobilized and charged with the task of identifying and filtering the information that the student should remember and, no less important, forget. The old textbooks indeed played a key role in molding the nation’s collective memory. Periods and events that were excluded from, or suppressed by, the collective memory became subject to “collective amnesia.”10 This collective memory, in which history textbooks played such an influential role, served as an element in the formation and preservation of Jewish national identity. A growing awareness of the Arab problem characterized the attitude of the education system during the second phase (1967–mid-1980s). The encounter with the Arab states and the Palestinians in the West Bank following the war, and the increased publication of academic studies on the Middle East at Israeli universities, spurred the ministry to address the issue. The second-generation textbooks, written and published during 1975–92 by the Ministry of Education, reflected changes that occurred both in the ministry and in society as a whole. Corresponding to the aims of the new history and civics curricula of the mid-1970s, these textbooks differed from the first generation in several respects. Methodologically, they dealt with specific subjects or periods; the historical narrative was more concise, with more original sources included; greater use was made of photographs, maps, and diagrams; and their outward appearance was greatly

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improved. The changes in the content, however, were less revolutionary, although generally the textbooks of the second generation were more diverse ideologically and less biased. In fact, fears that the more direct involvement of the Ministry of Education in the production of textbooks would negatively affect their content did not materialize. The positive changes in these textbooks stemmed from several sources. First, they reflected a society that felt more secure and was willing more than before to become acquainted with its neighborhood. The psychological atmosphere in Israeli society was now more open to absorb new information.11 Interestingly, this development occurred at a time when Palestinian guerilla (in Israeli perception: terrorist) activity increased. Second, the 1967 victory, on the one hand, and the devastating effect of the 1973 war, on the other, aroused interest in the conflict and in possible ways of solving it. This was also reflected in a flurry of academic studies on Zionism, Israel, and the Middle East published in Israel after 1967, which influenced the new textbooks. Third, the introduction of a new history curriculum in the mid-1970s necessitated writing new textbooks, which were written by the Ministry with the help of academics. This meant that the texts were scrutinized more thoroughly than in the past, resulting in more credible narratives. With this, there was apparently little ideological monitoring of content by the minister of education or his aides.12 Ministers seemed to prefer to infiltrate their worldview through the informal system, which guaranteed quick implementation and immediate results, rather than through the lengthy and complex procedure of textbook publishing. This was especially true with regard to the officials of the religious-Mafdal Party who headed the Ministry of Education in the post-1977 period. The relative leeway enjoyed by writers meant that textbooks were less affected by political considerations. These positive changes notwithstanding, the second generation of textbooks contained several problems. First, they were laden with information but lacked a clear narrative—particularly on the high school level—making them difficult for the student to digest. Most problematic was the reader on the Arab-Israeli conflict introduced in the mid-1970s. Additionally, in light of the polemical nature of the subject, many teachers preferred to evade this sensitive issue altogether inasmuch as the curriculum allowed teachers a measure of choice of topics to be covered. Furthermore, the fact that the reader required constant updating meant that teachers were studying the subject simultaneously with their students, and could not keep a step ahead, with the result that the subject was largely neglected.13 These problems led to the withering away of the subject long before it was formally omitted from the civics curriculum in the early 1990s. The second problem was that prejudicial statements, stereotypical descriptions, and biases were still common, although they were generally more subtle and indirect than in the older textbooks. Implicit negative mes-

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sages, however, may be more dangerous than the overt since the former unconsciously affect the student and may last longer. Thus, maps, pictures, and caricatures, which attempted to portray a certain reality, often transmitted other, hidden meanings. Third, and perhaps most seriously, there was a continued attempt to silence the past through the deliberate omission of certain facts and perceptions that might have cast a negative light on Israel’s behavior. Although this had been more prominent in the old textbooks, still, the depictions of sensitive issues, such as the refugee problem, the Arab minority, and the Palestinian question, were highly selective. Lastly, the artificial separation between the study of Zionism and world history meant that developments in the Middle East (including the Arab-Israeli conflict) were seen only through Zionist lens. In this respect, the second-generation textbooks resembled the preceding one. Neither one attempted to understand the attitudes and motives of the Arab side. The relative improvement in the presentation of the Arab and of the conflict during the “adolescence” period raises questions about the role of the state in creating its own collective memory. Scholars assume that it is molded by small elites who select the information to be conveyed to the next generation based on their desire to consolidate their hegemony over society. The present study, however, shows that collective memory, at least in democratic countries, is shaped in a more complex way. In the absence of direct and forceful governmental intrusion, the content of Israeli textbooks reflects a power struggle on two levels: between individuals involved in the process of preparing the textbooks and between sectors in society that attempt to affect their content.14 In such a climate, the narrative in textbooks is dynamic, responding to changes within the Ministry of Education and the prevalent atmosphere in society. By the end of the 1980s, the textbooks produced by the Ministry of Education had almost completely replaced the old textbooks. Interestingly, however, another trend occurred in tandem: textbooks written by private authors gradually replaced the ministry high school textbooks.15 Because privately published textbooks were oriented specifically toward preparing the student for final exams, they became more popular than the ministry textbooks, which were often denser and difficult to digest. Although none of the private textbooks managed to enter the ministry’s recommended list of textbooks, some of them became highly popular. The ministry, unable to stem the tide, turned a blind eye to it until the publication of the new generation of history textbooks that were mostly approved by the ministry in the mid-1990s. Yet the fact that these private textbooks bypassed the process of ministerial authorization led to two opposing results. On the one hand, issues that had previously been neglected or evaded (e.g., the revisionist view of the refugee problem) could now be addressed. On the other, in the absence of academic or ministerial scrutiny, the historical narrative was tainted by inaccuracies and biases resulting from authors’ misperceptions.

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In some cases, these resembled the biases that appeared in the old textbooks. For teachers and students interested only in final grades, biased descriptions were not considered too high a price to pay. Another major problem that characterized the second, adolescent phase was the ministry’s failure to devise a curriculum that would mandate the study of Arab-Jewish relations of the post-1948 period, especially in the eleventh and twelfth grades. The topic was briefly discussed in various civics textbooks but was not systematically studied in schools. Even the study program on the Arab-Israeli conflict, problematic as it was and often passed over, was eventually omitted in 1992. In private talks, teachers and inspectors would admit that the post-1948 had hardly been taught because of lack of time and density of the available material.16 The outcome was that most students graduated school with no, or little, knowledge of Arab history and Jewish-Arab relations. In February 1984, the Ministry of Education published guidelines for a new program, titled “Education for Jewish-Arab Coexistence” (see Appendix 1). With the publication of this program, the third, adulthood phase in Israeli education with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict was begun, although implementation was a slow process. Some features of the program appeared in the new, third-generation textbooks published from the mid-1990s, in accordance with the new history curriculum for the sixth to ninth grades (1994), the transitional history curriculum for high schools (1998), and the final version to be published in 2001. Although the ministry was not in charge of writing all the new textbooks, there was an attempt to ensure that only textbooks authorized by the ministry would be taught by schools. These new textbooks reflect, first of all, the decision by the ministry that the history of Zionism and Israel no longer be studied separately but rather in relation to world and regional developments. This methodological shift is significant, although meanwhile, Arab history is discussed mainly in the context of the Arab reaction to Zionism, rather than as an important aspect in and of itself.17 Asecond positive change is the extension of the contemporary history teaching program to the year 1970. The choice of 1970 for the conclusion of the historical narrative is, however, unclear as it excludes some key developments in Arab-Jewish relations. Interestingly, several high school textbooks decided to extend their narrative up until the year 2000, although this was not mandatory according to the curriculum. A third commendable feature is a fairly balanced presentation of the image of the Arab and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Israeli sociologist Oz Almog recently announced “the death of [the image] of the bad Arab,” accompanied by a process of humanization and demythologization taking place in various spheres of Israeli society.18 Although not dead yet, this bad image of the Arab is certainly withering away in most history textbooks. Moreover, the Arabs are portrayed not only as mere spectators or aggres-

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Conclusions

sors but also as victims of the conflict. For the first time, there appears to be a genuine attempt to formulate a narrative that not only glorifies Zionist history but also touches on certain shadows in this history. This was made possible by the integration of material from the new historiography. Additionally, in some cases there is a discussion of controversial questions, such as the Palestinian refugee problem, Israel’s presence in Lebanon, the desirability of establishing a Palestinian State, and so on. This tendency reflects a more open society that is willing to deal with divisive issues. Yet the new textbooks are not free of bias or inaccuracies, especially when relating the post-1948 period. Moreover, the new trend does not encompass all textbooks. These facts may suggest that changing a historical narrative is indeed a gradual process and that a deeper perspective is a prerequisite for offering a balanced narrative in textbooks. The new textbooks attest to the long road that Israeli society and the Ministry of Education have passed since 1948. Clearly, the current history curriculum and textbooks reflect a more mature society, which does not consider self-criticism a sign of weakness but rather a source of strength and pride.19 These important changes, however, still do not fully meet the principles outlined by the 1984 ministry program “Education for Jewish-Arab Coexistence,” which called for developing the ability to carry on “intercultural contact” based on knowledge of Arab history, culture, and language.20 The third-generation textbooks, therefore, should be viewed as an important step toward the realization of this goal. Yet it would seem that this manifest progress is not necessarily a linear but rather a dialectic process, as reflected in the recent decision of the Knesset’s Education Committee to “delay the use” of a ninth-grade textbook (written and published by the Ministry of Education!) because of certain omissions in the narrative of Zionist and Israeli history. This regrettable development may indicate that the battle over the historical narrative in Israeli society is not yet over. One of the findings of the present study is that there were no substantial differences in approach to the subject matter between the secular and the religious system, since many of the same textbooks were used by both systems. An analysis of those textbooks written especially for the religious system, however, showed that they tended to contain more bias than textbooks geared to the secular system. Moreover, since the curriculum of the religious schools includes high-priority subjects not studied in the secular system (in the field of religious studies), it is reasonable to assume that the subject of Zionism and Israel (especially in the post-1948 period) is allocated fewer teaching hours than in secular schools. Professor of Philosophy Akibah Ernst Simon, of the Hebrew University, wrote an eloquent criticism of the education system for focusing on war, in the early 1960s:

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We are hardly doing anything, and certainly not to the extent either possible or necessary, to prepare and equip our students for the future, a future that must bring peace, at least to our region, a future for which we bear direct responsibility. Peace is dependent, among other things, upon healing the breach between Jews and Arabs. It is true that education alone will not bring about this turning point in Arab-Jewish relations. Yet, without adequate preparation, psychological opposition may arise at a time when the political situation is ripe for peace. There are several ways to prepare the ground for peace and none should be neglected: knowledge must be expanded, thought nourished, suitable opinions supplied, and emphatic feelings promoted. Above all, it is essential to do everything to ensure that this long-awaited goal is fulfilled, if not today then tomorrow.21

Although the new wave of history textbooks attests to changes in the Israeli educational system, Simon’s criticism seems still largely relevant today. First, Israeli society has yet to acknowledge that biased textbooks have played an important role in the formation of negative attitudes toward the Arabs. However unconsciously, textbooks may have been a contributing factor to the escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. By sustaining a negative image of the Arab, they have hindered any profound change in the Israeli perception of Arabs. Second, the content of third-generation textbooks largely ensures that young Israeli students will be exposed to a more accurate and balanced narrative. Yet the rectification of past errors alone is not sufficient; once bias and prejudice are eliminated, the education system must go further by promoting the study of Arab history, culture, and language, while taking care that they be taught as accurately and neutrally as possible. But since changes in textbooks are often the product of social and political developments, they may await the fourth generation of textbooks. However the impact of the change, Israeli history textbooks will be limited it no corresponding changes take place in the Arab, and ezpecially Palestinian, curricula and textbooks. In historical and national terms, the Palestinians are currently in the same position that Israel was in fifty years ago, forming their own collective memory and creating their own historical narrative in what may be regarded as their first-generation textbooks. Yet, if Palestinian textbooks must go throught the long, debilitating, and perhaps inevitiable, process undergone by Israeli textbooks, the prospects for a genuine and lasting Israeli-Palestinian conciliation may lie far off in the future. Ultimately, Israeli and Arab educators should join forces and produce textbooks that will combine the Zionist narrative and the Arab-Palestinian counternarrative. Nearly twenty years ago, a joint Israeli-German education project led to the mutual scrutiny of history and geography textbooks, with both teams recommending revisions in respect to the presentation of Israeli-German relations.22 Surely, shortly after the Holocaust the prospects for such a venture would have appeared dim. Likewise, the prospects for initiating joint educational Israeli-Arab (Israeli-Egyptian, Israeli-Jordanian,

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Conclusions

Israeli-Palestinian, etc.) projects may seem far-fetched now, but that should not deter us from aspiring to achieve them. NOTES 1. Unfortunately, there are almost no academic studies of Arab school textbooks. Of the pre-1967 period, see H. Lazarus-Yafeh, “An Inquiry into Arab Textbooks,” Asian and African Studies, Vol. 8 (1972); for a study of several Egyptian textbooks, see A. Giladi, “Israel’s Image in Recent Egyptian Textbooks,” Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 7 (1978). For a recent critical review of Palestinian textbooks, see N. Brown, “Education as a Site of Contestation: Democracy, Nationalism and the Palestinian Curriculum,” unpublished manuscript. Recently, there have been several politically motivated studies of Arab and Palestinian textbooks that were published by private institutions. See M. Wurmser, The Schools of Ba’athism: A Study of Syrian Schoolbooks (Washington: MEMRI, 2000); “Palestinian Authority School Textbooks (New York: Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace, 1999). 2. A major contribution to this perception was Harkabi’s seminal work Arab Attitudes toward Israel, which was published in 1968. For a critical view of this work, see N. Rejwan, Arab Aims and Israeli Attitudes: A Critique of Yehoshafat Harkabi’s Prognosis of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Jerusalem: Davis Occasional Papers, 2000). 3. M. Bar’on, “History That Never Was: Further Clarifications on the Issue of ‘the New History,’” Yahadut Zmanenu, Vol. 10 (1994), p. 10. 4. For a vivid description, see A. Shapira, “Politics and Collective Memory,” in New Jews Old Jews (Tel Aviv: 1997), p. 23. This attitude is reflected in a recent article by Aharon Yadlin, chairman of the World Zionist Labor Movement and former minister of education (1974–77): “Pedagogic Goals in Light of the Peace Process,” in R. Pasternak and S. Zidkiyahu (eds.), A New Era or a Lost Way: Israelis Talk about Peace (Tel Aviv: 1994), p. 270. The article discusses the pedagogic problems of a nation under siege. 5. See, in this connection, Bar’on, “History That Never Was,” p. 35; Shapira, “Politics and Collective Memory,” p. 23. 6. See, in particular, Y. Barna’i, Historiography and Nationalism, Trends in the Study of Israel and the Jewish Community in Israel, 634–1881 (Jerusalem: 1995). 7. Ibid., pp. 11–59; History and Memory, Vol. 7 (1995): see, in particular, O. Almog, “The Many Facets of Zionist History and the History of the Jewish Community,” pp. 202–8; B. Kimmerling, “Does Being a Part of the Nation Mean Distorting History,” Ha’aretz, 23 December 1994. 8. “The master commemorative narrative,” wrote historian Yael Zerubavel, “represents the political elite’s construction of the past, which serves its special interests and promotes its political agenda.” See Recovered Roots, pp. 10–11. 9. G. Cuthburtson and A. Grundlingh, “Distortions of Discourse: Some Problematical Issues in the Restructuring of History Education in South African Schools,” in International Yearbook of History Education, p. 170. 10. Zerubavel, Recovered Roots, p. 8. 11. Shapira, “Politics and Collective Memory,” p. 24. 12. Interviews with Haya Regev, 28 April 1998; Yehoshu’a Mathias, 11 May 1998; Doron Shohet, 11 August 1998.

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13. I would like to thank Doron Shohet, former head of the Unit for Education, Democracy and Coexistence, for sharing this insight with me; see interview, 11 August 1998. 14. For a similar analysis, see Shapira, “Historiography and Memory: The Case of Latrun, 1948,” in New Jews Old Jews, p. 47. 15. Interview with Michael Yaron, 18 August 1998. 16. Ibid. 17. For an exception, see the discussion of the emergence of the Arab national movement under the subchapter dealing with the Ottoman Empire, The World and the Jews in Recent Generations (1998), pp. 44–45. 18. O. Almog, “The Death of the Bad Arab,” Politika, No. 51 (November 1993), pp. 20–25. 19. See, in this connection, D. Ohana and R. Wistrich (eds.), Myth and Memory: Transfigurations of Israeli Consciousness (Jerusalem: 1996), p. 27. 20. TAU, AJEID, DGD, “Basic Guidelines to the Program Education for Jewish-Arab Coexistence,” 1 February 1984. See the discussion in Chapter 2. 21. “The Pedagogic Goals of High School Education in Israel,” in M. Shapira (ed.), Theory and Practice in High School Education (Jerusalem: 1962), p. 232. See also “Education for Peace in Times of War,” in Simon’s The Right to Educate, The Obligation to Educate: Essays (Jerusalem: 1989), p. 12. G. Stern, “A. E. Simon, An Educator for Peace,” New Outlook, Vol. 10 (June 1967), p. 33. For a similar criticism, see Lam, War and Education, p. 6. 22. Deutsch-Israelische Schulbuchempfehlungen (Braunschweig: Georg Eckert Institut, 1985).

EPILOGUE “If we desire a liberal and democratic society, a pluralist society which is creative and above all open to other cultures and mankind generally, education must become our foremost priority. Peace, security, a stable economy are merely stations, albeit important ones, along the road to such a society. Should we fail in the task of creating an open, liberal-minded society, we will remain immured in a spiritual ghetto, intolerant and culturally shallow. To this end, we must expend every effort and invest all our resources to ensure that at every stage of the educational process, from kindergarten to university, our children are taught the value of democratic pluralism. We must all work together, at home and in the community, to ensure that not a single Israeli child—Arab or Jewish—remains outside the education system; that not a single child is deprived of the opportunity to develop to the full his/her abilities and talents; and that all children will be aware and proud of their cultural roots yet remain receptive to other cultures. In this respect, exacting self-criticism in the spirit of the prophets is of the utmost importance. It is an indispensable and integral part of any humanist, pluralist education. Only a society able to subject itself, its institutions and its actions to an impartial critique; that does not claim that all blunders and errors are the fault of others; and that does not believe that others rather than itself are in need of reform, can be considered a truly enlightened, well balanced and healthy society. Self-criticism will allow us to constantly ameliorate and better ourselves as part of our never-ending quest of creating an ideal society. Unattainable perhaps, but, at the very least I hope that we will be able to live up to the verse: ‘May the law flow as water, and justice likened to a powerful river.’ ”* *Taken from a speech by Professor Hava Lazarus-Yaffe on being awarded the Israel prize for History, 1994.

APPENDICES APPENDIX 1 Basic Guidelines to the “Education for Jewish-Arab Coexistence” Program1 The education system has recently given thought to the broad question of how to educate Jewish and Arab students in Israel with respect to two interrelated issues: • Jewish and Arab relations in Israel as an issue of civil equality and as a way of life in a multicultural country. • Israel’s relations with its Arab neighbors as an issue of relations between nations.

The need to deal with these two issues in the education system is existential. There will always be Arab citizens within and among us, and there will always be neighboring Arab peoples. Ignoring these two issues educationally means educating the young generation toward ignorance and alienation with regard to questions that will always be at the very core of our existence. Diversity of Relations We stand at the beginning of an era in which the term “conflict” does not encompass all aspects of Israeli-Arab relations. The polarization between us and the Arabs as enemies no longer constitutes the only pattern of relations. At present, we are witnessing different patterns of relations, and a distinction [therefore] should be made:

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• We have peaceful relations with Egypt since 1979. Although today this is a “cold peace,” it still passes two major tests that indicate peaceful relations: First, both sides avoid belligerent activities—Egypt did not intervene in the Peace for the Galilee war. Second, direct relations exist between the two countries: around 100,000 Israelis have visited Egypt and, except on rare occasions, most were received in a friendly fashion. • Morocco facilitated the peace treaty [with Egypt] and openly hosts Israelis. Countries like Sudan, Tunisia, and Oman overtly support the peace process. • Jordan has maintained an open bridges policy since 1967. It also strictly maintains peace along the border. • We have developed a complex network of relations with various communities in Lebanon, partially on the basis of mutual interests. • According to the Camp David accords, the Arab population of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza is supposed to be granted autonomy. Its economy and Israel’s economy are integrated, and 60,000 workers from the territories enter daily to work in Israel. • The Arabs of Israel are citizens of the state and constitute an integral part of it. According to the Declaration of Independence, they are entitled to equal rights, and all Israeli governments ever since statehood reiterated this principle in their guidelines. • By contrast, some Arab states still continue cultivating hostility and initiate belligerent activity against us. Syria, Iraq, and Libya are the most prominent of these. In addition, the PLO, in all its factions, aspires to perpetuate the conflict and continue fighting against Israel by all means, including the use of terror, until the final destruction of the Israeli state.

Therefore, we can no longer educate students in the second generation of the Israeli state to treat the Arabs as a single entity and only in the context of conflict. Rather, we have to learn to differentiate between various Arab communities and between various levels of relations existing between us and them. First and foremost, we have to observe and distinguish between the “Arab” citizens of Israel, and the “Arab states,” some of which, as noted, are still in a state of conflict with us. Multicultural Approach The whole world is multicultural at present; the distances between various cultures, both in time and space, have been narrowed down. The Middle East, too, is multicultural; the Israeli state, too, is both a state and a multicultural society. This situation compels us to develop a new ability— the ability to maintain intercultural contact on the basis of equality and respect for the other’s culture. Imparting this ability is one of the aims of the educational system, and our ministry must help teachers find ways of doing it. In the field of knowledge. We must give our students comprehensive and firmly based information about the history of the Arab peoples, their language and literature, their past and present culture, the Islamic religion

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(and Christianity), and Arab-Islamic art. First and foremost, we have to teach and study Arabic, both the spoken and literary language. Arab students in Israel are already learning Hebrew and many aspects of Israeli culture, history, and language on a much wider scale than what Jewish students learn about the culture and history of the Arab peoples. In the sphere of attitudes and opinions. We must implant in our students (both Jews and Arabs) a willingness to become acquainted with different cultures, to understand them, and to treat them respectfully, even though they are different from their own culture and may seem strange. Our students must realize that a different and a foreign culture is not inferior (or superior) to our culture, and that all peoples, religions, and ethnic groups have a right to cultivate their culture, even within the boundaries of another state. Above all, we must implant in our students the firm awareness that every person is a human being, and that every human being must be respected, even if he belongs to another people, and even if he is a political enemy. In the sphere of abilities and skills. We must implant in our students the ability to listen to and understand the other, to be able to discuss patiently and tolerantly on a rational basis and develop a culture of debate. We must implant the ability to differentiate between emotional responses and the analysis of historical, political and sociological information. We must also implant the ability to distinguish between different peoples and treat every person as an individual, according to his traits, and avoid the use of stereotypes and generalizations. Plan of Action Our ministry has adopted a comprehensive plan aimed to deal with these questions. The major aspects of the plan are as follows: 1. The relationship with Arabs and their culture; Jewish-Arab relations; and Israeli-Arab relations will be part and parcel of the educational process, from kindergarten and through the twelve years of study in elementary and high schools. 2. This relationship will be included, where possible, in all subjects of school, primarily in social activities and in the following subjects: civics, social sciences, history, geography, moledet [the geography of the homeland], and literature. 3. The existing curricula (in all subjects and on all levels), and textbooks authorized for use, will be evaluated with a dual aim. On the one hand to eliminate wording—if found—that connotes hatred or the existence of negative stereotypes and prejudice; and on the other to add and integrate new content that coincides with the aims that we have set for ourselves.

[Two paragraphs dealing with instructions concerning specific educational procedures were deleted.] This area is still mostly new in the educational system and necessitates experimentation. Headmasters and teachers who opt to participate in this

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experimental program will receive maximal support from the management of our ministry, which views the promotion of this subject as its chief educational and civic aim. NOTE 1. Source: TAU, AJEID, Ministry of Education, Directive by the Director-General, 1 February 1984.

APPENDIX 2A

The photo shows Jewish guards from the Hashomer (”The Guard”) organization. They are dressed in traditional Arab attire and ride horses Bedouin style. The picture conveys a sense of bravery and determination. Source: Ministry of Education, The Emergence of Zionism (1976), p. 183 (with the permission of the K.K.L. Photo Archives). For similar pictures, see: Ziv, Ettinger, and Landau, Chronicles, Vol. 4/I, 3rd ed. (1991), p. 342; Zionism Tested (1984), p. 135; Ben-Baruch, The Nineteenth Century (1998), p. 161.

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APPENDIX 2B

The top photo is a neutral picture of Arab Bedouin. The bottom is titled an Arab “gang” in the Jerusalem Hills. Although largely similar to the top photo, it is turned into a threatening picture by the use of the pejorative term “gang.” Sources: Ministry of Education, A Journey through the First Settlements (1992), p. 206; Not on a Silver Platter (1984), p. 10 (With the permission of the K.K.L. Photo Archives). Similar pictures of Arab gangs appeared in Great Periods in the History of Eretz Israel, Vol. 6, p. 63; and Junior Britannica, Vol. 9, p. 168.

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APPENDIX 3A

Text taken from Mark Twain’s book on his journey to the Holy Land in the mid-nineteenth century: “The road leading to Jerusalem must have the most boring view on earth. . . . The sole difference between the road to Jerusalem and its surrounding area is that the former contains more rocks. There is not a single village in this valley. There might be two or three clusters of Bedouin tents but not one permanent settlement. One may travel for ten miles and still meet less than ten people. . . . ‘And your country will be desolate and your cities ruins.’ No one can stand here and claim that this prophecy was not fulfilled.” Both the picture and accompanying text emphasize the country’s desolation. Source: Ministry of Education, The Emergence of Zionism (1976), 80. (With the permission of K.K.L. Archives)

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APPENDIX 3B

Pictures of the four cities with Jewish populations in the nineteenth century—Jerusalem, Tiberius, Safed, and Hebron—form a sharp contrast to the desolation of the land as shown in the previous picture and as described in the previous text. Source: Ministry of Education, The Emergence of Zionism (1976), p. 81. (With the permission of the K.K.L. Photo Archives)

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APPENDIX 4

Caption reads, “Go on home Ahmad! We must dispose of the oranges first!” The message of this cartoon is that the Arabs (or at least the rich effendis) are concerned more with economic considerations (selling oranges) than the national struggle against the Jews. Source: Zionism Tested (1984), p. 159. (A caricature of Joseph Bass, with the permission of his son, Rafael Bass.)

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APPENDIX 5A

Text reads, “Nazi-Arab Propaganda in Israel: Right: A kite inscribed: “Long Live Hitler.” Poster inscribed: “Every penny you pay a Jew will be spent by him to buy up your land.’ “ Source: Zionism Tested (1984), p. 171. (With the permission of the Central Zionist Archives)

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APPENDIX 5B

167 Right: The Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, visits Croat [should be Bosnian] Muslims serving in a German military unit. Source: The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Reader (1979), p. 40. (With the permission of the Central Zionist Archives) Left: The cover of an Arabic edition of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf, found in Egyptian military posts during the 1956 War. Source: The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Reader (1979), p. 94. (With the permisison of the Central Zionist Archives)

APPENDIX 6A

Title reads: “Jewish Community in Eretz [Israel] Prior to the Zionist Settlement.” Because the map, in accordance with the title, shows only Jewish settlements, the student might assume that the land had been empty, as there is no mention of Arab locations, Source: Ministry of Education, The Zionist Idea, Vol. I (1985), p. 74. (With the permission of the Ministry of Education.) Similar maps may be found in Emergence of Zionism (1976), p. 87, and Jewish Naitonal Movement, Vols. I–II (1978), p. 204.

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APPENDIX 6B

Title reads, “Eretz Israel Prior to the First Settlements,” In contrast to other maps, this map shows Jewish-Arab as well as purely Arab locations. Source: Ministry of Education, A Journey through the First Settlements (1992), p. 31. (With the permission of the Ministry of Education)

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APPENDIX 6C

Title reads, “Settlements of the First Aliyah Period.” The map shows the new Zionist settlements and the mixed Jewish-Arab towns. Villages and towns inhabited by Arabs only, however, are omitted. Source: The Zionist Idea, Vol. I (1985), p. 99 (With the permission of the Ministry of Education.) Similar maps were reproduced in The Jewish National Movement, Vols. I–II (1978), p. 215; The Emergence of Zionism (1976), p. 108; Shahar, From the Diaspora to Independence, Vol. I (1990), p. 141; A Journey through the First Settlements (1992), p. 170. A similar map also appeared in third-generation textbooks; see Ben-Baruch, The Nineteenth Century (1998), p. 147; Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Vol. II (1999), p. 96.

170

APPENDIX 6D

Title reads, “The Second Aliyah Settlements.” Again, Jewish settlements and mixed Jewish-Arab towns are shown, but no purely Arab locations. Source: Ministry of Education, The Zionist Idea, Vol. I (1985), p. 144. (With permission of the Ministry of Education.) See the same maps in The Jewish National Movement, Vols. I–II (1978), p. 298; The Emergence of Zionism (1976), p. 163; see also Ziv, Historical Atlas, 2nd expanded ed. (1970), p. 141.

171

APPENDIX 7A

Title reads, “The 1920–1921 Events.” The purpose of the map is to indicate the locations of Arab attacks against Jewish settlements. There is almost no mention of Arab places, however. Source: Ministry of Education, The Zionist Idea, Vol. II (1985), p. 89 (With the permission of the Ministry of Education.) The Jewish Naitonal Movement, Vol. III (1978), pp. 82, 86.

172

APPENDIX 7B

Title reads, “The 1929 Events,” Locations of Arab attacks. Source: Ministry of Education, The Zionist Idea, Vol. II (1985), p. 113. (With the permission of the Ministry of Education) A similar map was produced to depict the 1936–39 “events” (p. 204).

173

APPENDIX 8

Title reads, “A Hagana Appeal to our Arab Neighbors!” An authentic document that attempts to show that not only were Jews innocent of causing the Arab flight, they even asked the Arbs to remain in the country. Source: Ministry of Education, The Zionist Idea, Vol. II (1985), p. 301. (With the permission of the Hagana Archive.) Originally, the text appears in History of the Hagana, Vol. II, Book 2, p. 1394). For a shorter version, see Not on a Silver Platter (1984), pp. 113–14.

174

APPENDIX 9

Top: The reality of the poverty in which Palestinian refugees lived. “The Palestinian problem festered in the poverty, inactivity and frustration that beset the refugees in their miserable camps.” Source: Barnavi, The Twentieth Century (1998), p. 194; Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Vol. II (1999), p. 238. (with the permission of the State of Israel, Government Press Office) Bottom: Israeli immigrants. During the first years of its existence Israel absorbed hundreds of thousands of deprived immigrants. Many of them were settled in abandoned Arab villages. One of these was the Arab village of Yahud, where these immigrants had been pictured in 1948.” The fact the second photo followed the first may insinuate that there is a parallel between the fate of the Palestinians and Jews immigrating to Israel. Source: Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, Vol. II (1999), p. 239. (With the permission of the State of Israel, Government Press Office)

175

APPENDIX 10

Top: A General View of a Refugee Camp near Gaza. Bottom: The Camp after Construction Carried out by the Israeli Military Authorities, 1976. The two pictures show a “sanitized” view of the refugee camps, emphasizing Israeli assistance. Source: The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Reader (1979), pp. 149, 153.

176

APPENDIX 11

Top caption reads, “Another One Joined [the Flock].” The Arab states and the Palestinians are portrayed as a flock of aggressive crows planning to attack the helpless Israel just prior to the outbreak of the 1967 war. Bottom captions reads, “History: Wait! Wait! I Don’t Have Enough Time [to Write]. The swift Israeli victory of 1967 is portrayed with bravura. Source: The First Twenty Years of the State of Israel (1989), pp. 69, 73. (With the permission of Michael Gardosh)

177

BIBLIOGRAPHY All sources are in Hebrew unless otherwise mentioned. ARCHIVAL MATERIAL All archival material is located in the Aviezer Yelin Archive of Jewish Education in Israel and the Diaspora (AJEID), Tel Aviv University.

Ministry of Education and Culture Directives of the Director-General, 1953 (DGD) Lists of Recommended Textbooks, 1957–98

Private Papers Hendel, Michael Poor, David Zon, Naftali

Israeli Educational Journals Hahinuch Hahinuch Hameshutaf Hed Hahinuch History Teacher’s Bulletin Journal for History Teachers Ma‘alot Panim Urim

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Israeli Newspapers Al Hamishmar Davar Ha’aretz Hadashot Lamerhav Ma‘ariv Yedi‘ot Aharonot

INTERVIEWS Adan, Hana, 16 February 1999 Mathias, Yehoshua, 11 May 1998 Netzer, Shelomo, 7 April 1998 Regev, Haya, 28 April 1998 Rozenberg, Yehoshua, 16 February 1999 Shohet Doron, 11 August 1998 Vider, Sara, 17 February 1999 Yaron, Michael, 18 August 1998

SCHOOL CURRICULA The following are listed chronologically. For the sake of simplicity, the term “state” system will be translated “secular,” and the term “state-religious” system will be translated “religious." History Curriculum for Elementary Schools, Secular and Religious Systems. Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1960. Suggested Curriculum in Chemistry, Social Studies and Civics, Grades 9–12. Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1962. A Suggested Curriculum for High School. Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1963. History in School, a Curriculum Suggestion. Experimental Edition. Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1970. History Curriculum, Grades 6–9, for the Secular and Religious Schools. 2nd ed. Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1974. History Curriculum, Grades 10–12, for the Secular School. 1st ed. Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1976. History Curriculum, Grades 10–12, for the Religious School. 1st ed. Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1978 History Curriculum, Grades 10–12, for the Vocational Schools in the Secular System. 1st ed. Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1983. Civics, a Curriculum for Jewish (Secular and Religious), Arab and Druze High Schools. 1st ed. Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1994. History Curriculum, Grades 6–9, for the Secular System. New ed. Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1994. History Curriculum, Grades 6–9, for the Secular System. Modified 2nd ed. Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1997.

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SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS The period during which the textbook appeared in the Ministry of Education recommended textbook list indicated in brackets. Ahiya, B., and Harpaz, M. The History of the Jewish Nation: The Nation’s Resurgence—From Centuries of Yearning for Zion until the Fulfillment of Zionism and the Establishment of the State of Israel. Vol. 5. Tel Aviv: Shrevrak, 1959. [1957–74] ———. The History of the Jewish Nation: From the Islamic Era until the American War of Independence. Vol. 6. Tel Aviv: Shrevrak, 1965. [1957–74] The Arab Citizens of Israel: Mutual Relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel. Interim edition. Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture and Van Leer Foundation, 1984. The Arab Citizens of Israel: Mutual Relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel. Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture and Van Leer Foundation, 1988. [1991–] The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Chapter in Civil Studies. Experimental edition. Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1974. [1977–98] The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Compilation of Texts and Articles and Guide for the Student. Tel Aviv: Ma‘alot, 1979. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Guide for the Teacher. Tel Aviv: Ma‘alot, 1979. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Reader. Tel Aviv: Ma‘alot, 1979. [1979–98] The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Supplementary Material. Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1989. The Arabs and Islam. Textbook for the Religious School. Experimental edition. Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1974. [1977–1985] Avineri, A.L. Zionism and the Myth of “Dispossession." Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1975. Avivi, B., and Perski, N. The History of Israel: From the Rise of Islam until the End of the Crusades. Textbook for the Seventh Grade. Vol. III. Tel Aviv: Yavneh, 1957. [1957–77] ———. Our Nation’s History: From the Russian Enlightenment until the Establishment of the State of Israel. Vol. VI. Tel Aviv: Yavneh, 3rd ed., 1952. [1957–76] The Balfour Declaration, 2 November 1917–1967. Tel Aviv: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1968. ———. Change and Progress in Israel and the Nations in the Modern Times, 1870–1920. Petah Tikva: Lilach, 1998. Bar-Hillel, M. Change and Progress in Israel and the Nations in the Modern Times, 1870–1920: Teacher’s Guide. Petah Tikva: Lilach, 1998. Barnavi, E. The Twentieth Century: The History of the Israeli People in Recent Generations. History to High School. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books, 1998. [1998–] Barnavi, E., and Naveh, E. Modern Times, 1870–1920. History to High School. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books, 1998. [1998–] ———. Modern Times, 1870–1920: Teachers’ Guide. Written by Eyal Naveh. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books, 1998. ———. Modern Times, 1920–2000. History to High School. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books, 1999. [1999–] ———. Modern Times, 1920–2000: Teacher’s Guide. Written by Eyal Naveh. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books, 1999.

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INDEX ‘Abdallah, King of Jordan, 101–2, 134 n.153 Adar, Zvi, 23–24 Agudat Israel, 12 Ahad Ha’am, 62 n.7, 82–83 Alboim-Dror, Rachel, 26 Aliyah, First, 49, 80–83 Aliyah, Second, 83–86 Allon, Yigal, 39–40, 64 n.46, 67 n.89 Aloni, Shulamit, 56–57 Amaleq, 28, 38, 84, 144 Apple, Michael, 1–2 Aqsa’ Mosque, al-, 96 Arab, image of, 8–14, 35, 47, 51. See also History Textbooks Arab Citizens of Israel, Reader, 48, 52, 118, 120–21 Arab Citizens of Israel, study of, 48–50, 53, 55–57, 60, 118–22 Arab Citizens of Israel, under military administration (1949–66), 35, 121 Arab Higher Committee, 107 Arabic Teaching, 30,33, 35, 37, 45, 47, 50, 53–54, 57, 64 n.36, 69 n.117 Arab-Israeli Conflict, 8–14; teaching, 26–61, 143–52; textbooks, 26–61

Arab-Israeli Conflict, Reader, 40, 43–46, 57, 69 n.113, 107–8, 112, 114, 116, 147 Arab Nationalism, 87–91, 95, 100 Arab Revolt (1936–39), 97–100 Arab Textbooks, 143, 151–52 Aranne, Zalman, 34, 36 Atzmon, Nissim, 53–54, 141 n.274 Ba’ar Itzhak, 25 Baghdad, 42 Balfour Declaration, 54, 66–67 n.73, 88–90, 91, 96, 128–29 n.82 Bartal, Ysrael, 59 Begin, Menachem, 116 Belief System, 2 Ben-Gurion, David, 25, 104, 112–13, 135 n.178, 138 n.220 Ben-Yehuda, Baruch, 29 Ben-Ze’ev, Israel, 30, 32–33 Bialik, Hayim Nahman, 103 Bilu, 55 Britain, 111–13. See also Mandate Civics Curriculum, 31, 40, 42, 44–45, 48, 51–56, 60, 110, 120 Collective Memory, 3–4, 7, 104, 145–46 Conquest of Labor, 84, 86

198 Crusades, 27 Curriculum. See Civics Curriculum; History Curriculum Dalet Plan, 108, 137 n.209 Dayan, Moshe, 115, 139 n.235 Declaration of Independence, 54–55 Dehumanization, 5, 28, 58, 99, 112, 166–67 Delegitimization, 4–5, 99, 166–67 Dinur (Dinburg), Ben-Zion, 25, 31–32, 92, 145 Dir Yassin Massacre, 105–6, 109–10, 136 n.187 Eban, Abba, 34, 53–54, 65 n.59 Eckert Georg Institute, 5 Education for Democracy, 51–53, 71 n.147, 72 n.161 Education for Jewish-Arab Coexistence Program, 50–51, 149–50; text of, 157–60 Education for Peace, 37, 39, 48, 57–58, 151–52 Education Ministry, Custodian for Textbook Approval, 13; Curriculum Planning Department, 13, 43, 48, 54–55, 58–59 Education System, 12–13, 42—43, 150. See also State Religious Schools Egypt, 46–48, 50, 55, 107, 110–16, 120 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. See Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty Eisenstadt, Shmuel, 39 Epstein, Itzhak, 27, 127 n.69 Ettinger, Shmu’el, 25, 145 Etzel, 55, 69 n.118, 105 Events (Hame’ora’ot), definition, 94; 1920–21, 95–96, 132 n.133; 1929, 96–97; 1936–39, 97–100, 133 n.142 Fatah, 94, 114 Faysal-Weizmann Agreement, 90–91, 129–30 n.96 Fedayyin, 110–13 Few against many, myth, 45, 61, 102–4, 114, 134 n.163 First Twenty Years, textbook, 55

Index Fishman, Rabbi Menachem, 27 France, 111–13 Gazit, Shlomo, 69 n.117 Geography, textbooks, 24, 26–27 “Greater Syria,” 87 Hagana, 103, 106, 108 Haifa University, 51 Halbwachs, Maurice, 3 Halpern, Ya’akov, 29 Haman, 27, 144 Hammer, Zevulun, 45–48, 50, 56, 59, 69 n.114 Ha-Re’ali High School, 62 n.6, 66 n.73 Hareven, Alouph, x, 72 n.150 Harkabi, Yehoshafat, 36–38, 67 n.81, 116, 145 Hashomer, 84–85 Hebrew University, 23, 36, 38–39, 47, 59–60, 93, 150 Hebron Massacre (1929), 97 Hendel, Michael, 24 Herzl, Theodore, 82 Herzog, Ya’akov, 91 Hever, Amnon, 49, 71 n.138, 93 Histadrut, 30 History, curriculum, 5, 25–26, 29–34, 36, 39–40, 42–43, 45, 47–51, 59–61, 63 n.19, 95, 117, 146–47, 149 History, teaching, 21–26 History, textbooks, 1–11; Nationalism and Identity, 2–3, 21–26; Stereotypes in, 3–5, 8–9, 27, 29, 38, 47, 49–51, 55, 58, 82–84, 121, 144, 147, 149. See also Arab, image of; Arab-Israeli Conflict; Collective Memory; Zionism Hitler, Adolf, 99–100, 112, 144 Holocaust, 55, 70 n.134 Horowitz, Shlomo, 45–46 Husayni, Hajj Amin al-, 95–96, 99 In Five Voices, textbook, 122 Intifada, 53, 55, 61, 94, 117 Islam, 33, 47, 75–77, 96 Israeli-Egyptian Disengagement Agreement (1975), 116

Index Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty (1979), 46–47, 58–59, 61, 117 Jaffa, 85–86 Jerusalem, 56, 75–77, 96–97 Jordan, 48, 50, 101, 107, 117, 120 Jordan River Waters, 113 Journey through the First Settlements, textbook, 55–56, 83 Judea and Samaria, 35–36, 113–16, 119–20, 132 n.133 Kach Party, 51 Kadesh, operation. See War, 1956 Kafr Qassem, massacre (1956), 113, 121 Kahana, Rabbi Meir, 50 Katzir, Ephraim, 41 Katznelson, Berl, 38 Khartum Arab Summit (1967), 115–16 Kibye, village and massacre (1953), 113, 138 n.225 Knesset Education Committee, 61, 150 Kremnitzer, Mordechai, 60 Labor Trend, 29–31 Lam, Zvi, 39 Lazarus-Yaffe, Hava, 155 Lebanon, 88 Lebanon War (1982), 50, 61, 117 Lehi, 69 n.118, 105 Lehmann, Sigfried, 28–29, 38 Lewis, Bernard, 108 Living Together, program, 48, 120 London Conference (1939), 99 Lorch, Nathaniel, 106–7, 110 MacMahon-Husayn correspondence, 87–89, 91, 128 n.80 Mafdal. See National Religious Party Mandate, British, 12, 27, 55, 91–102 Meir, Golda, 101 Meretz Party, 57 Middle East, historiography, 34, 65 n.61 Mizrahi Religious Trend, 12, 27, 31 Morocco, 48, 50 Morris Benny, 108–9, 136 n.192

199 Mufti. See Husayni, Hajj Amin alMuhammad, 75–76 Munich Agreement, historical analogy (1938), 99, 133 n.144 Nakba (1948), 102, 108–9 Nasser, Gamal ‘Abd-al, President of Egypt, 110–13, 114–16, 138 n.220 National Religious Party (Mafdal), 45, 147 Navon, Yitzhak, 51–56 Nazi, propaganda, 98–99, 100, 112, 133 n.142, 144, 166–67 Neighbors, textbook, 53 New (Zionist) Historiography, 59, 108–10, 113 Nili Group, 79 Occupied Territories. See Judea and Samaria Operation Dani, 106 Orinovsky, Avraham, 29 Oslo Accords (1993–95), 57, 61, 117–18 Ottoman Empire, 42, 59, 77–80, 87, 90, 94 Palestine, definition, 92; under British Mandate, 91–102, 121; under Ottoman Rule, 77–80, 121 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 36, 55, 94, 114, 116 Palestinian narrative, 8, 151 Palestinian nationalism and identity, 48, 60, 88, 92–95, 98–100, 107, 109, 114, 116–17, 119–22, 130 n.105 Palestinian refugee problem, 44, 105–110, 121, 136 n.192 Palestinians, 35–36, 43, 88, 146 Paporish, Y., 24–25 Partition Plan (1947), 101, 105 Peace Now movement, 50 Peace Process. See Oslo Accords Peel Commission (1937), 100 Philistines, 92 Piamenta, Moshe, 47 Porath, Yehoshua, 36, 92–93 Qassam, Shaykh ‘Izz al-din al-, 98, 100

200 Rabin, Yitzhak, 58, 117 Refugee problem. See Palestinian refugee problem Riger, Eliezer, 28 Rogel, Nakdimon, 95 Rubinstein, Amnon, 56–58 Rupin, Arthur, 83 Sadat, Anwar al-, 47, 116–17, 139 n.235 School Textbooks. See Textbooks, generations; Textbooks, role of Shamir, Moshe, 69 n.114 Shamir, Shimon, 114 Shapira, Anita, 27–28 Sharett, Moshe, 112–13 Shas Party, 12 Shemu’eli, Eliezer, 47, 50 Shemu’eli, Moshe, 31 Shimoni, Ya’akov, 65 n.61, 146 Shohet, Doron, 58, 72 n.154 Simon, Akibah Ernst, 150–51 Simon, Arieh, 38 Sinai War. See War, 1956 Six-Day War. See War, 1967 Smith, Anthony D., 3, 7 Soviet Union, 114–16 State Education Law (1953), 12–13, 25, 31, 33, 40, 70 n.134 State Schools, 12, 42–43, 150 State Religious Schools, 12, 42–44, 51–52, 71–72 n.148, 76, 103, 111, 150 Suez War. See War 1956 Supreme Muslim Council, 96 Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), 87–88, 90, 128 n.80 Syria, 88, 91, 113–14 Talmon, Jacob, 39 Tel Aviv, 84–85 Tel-Hai, myth, 45, 96–96, 131 n.114 Textbooks, authorization process, 13–14, 19 n.76 Textbooks, definition of, 12–13 Textbooks, in Europe, 6; Israel, 7–14; South Africa, 7; Third World, 7 Textbooks, generations of, 13–14; first (old), 14, 26–43, 46, 49, 56, 75–78, 80–85, 87, 92, 95, 98–99, 102–4,

Index 105–7, 110–12, 113–14, 118–20, 143–46; second, 14, 43–59, 76–78, 80–82, 84–85, 87–88, 92–93, 95, 97, 99–100, 102–4, 107–8, 112, 114–15, 116–17, 120–21, 146–49; third (new), 14, 59–61, 76–80, 82–83, 86, 88–89, 93–94, 96–97, 100, 104, 108–10, 112–13, 115–18, 121–22, 149–51. See also History Textbooks Textbooks, methodology, 6–7, 11–12 Textbooks, research, 1–14 Textbooks, role of, 1–2, 21–26 Toynbee, Arnold, 91 Trumpeldor, Joseph, 95 Turks, image of, 77–80 Twain, Mark, 78, 123 n.17, 163 UNESCO, 5 Unit for Education, Democracy and Coexistence, 52–53, 57–58 UN Resolution 242, 115 Van Leer Foundation, 48–50, 72 n.150, 120 Wailing Wall incident (1929), 96–97 War, 1948, 43, 102–10, 113, 118 War, 1956, 33–34, 55, 110–13, 137 n.216, 138 nn.222, 225, 231 War, 1967, 35–36, 40, 44, 55, 113–16, 139 n.235, 147 War, 1973, 40–41, 44, 59, 68 n.93, 117, 147 Weizmann, Haim, 90–91, 101, 129–30 n.96 West Bank. See Judea and Samaria White Paper (1939), 99–100 World Zionist Organization (WZO), 41, 54, 85 Yadlin, Aaron, 36, 39–41, 45 Yizhar, S., 38 Yom-Kippur War. See War, 1973 Zayd, Alexander, 85

Index Zionism, the study of, 3, 10, 26, 28–47, 49, 54–56, 58–61, 70 n.134, 83–86, 143–52

201 Ziv, Michael, 21–23 Zon, Naftali, 23, 34–35, 65 n.61, 66 n.71, 66–67 n.73, 146

About the Author ELIE PODEH is Senior Lecturer, Department of Islam and Middle Eastern Studies, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.