Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Israeli History, Politics and Society) [1 ed.] 9781032429847, 9781032429861, 9781003365198

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Israeli History, Politics and Society

SCANDINAVIAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL SOFT POWER Nir Levitan

“In this empirically granular study, Nir Levitan investigates the special mediation approach adopted by the Scandinavian countries during the Oslo years – and how it helped to put the right pressure on the parties to achieve progress. This book constitutes an important contribution to the field of negotiation theory. It also holds a wealth of new insights for practitioners, notably within international diplomacy – simply a must-read!” Dr Björn Brenner, Former UN official; Senior lecturer, Swedish Defence University “This is a very impressive work of scholarship that tells us in detail the involvement of three Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, and Denmark) in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, beyond what we usually know about the ‘Oslo process.’ NGOs, students, politicians, practitioners, from the Middle East, Europe, and North America, will find this book very appealing and attractive, due to its important contribution to the subject matter.” Arie M. Kacowicz, Chaim Weizmann Chair in International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Aaron and Cecile Goldman Visiting Israeli Professor, Georgetown University 2022–2023 “Nir Levitan’s book is an important contribution to the history of the Scandinavian countries and the Middle East peace process. Whereas Norway’s role in the Oslo accords is evident, and Sweden’s position as active non-aligned power is broadly acknowledged, Denmark’s part is less known. Levitan offers exciting new insights, particularly on the initiatives of the former Mossad deputy chief David Kimche and the renown Danish journalist Herbert Pundik.” Thomas Wegener Friis, University of Southern Denmark

Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

This book scrutinises how three small Scandinavian countries – Norway, Sweden and Denmark – developed a unique foreign policy that brought Israel and the Palestinians to the negotiating table. Bringing together the field of soft power diplomacy with the field of conflict mediation, the text analyses the specific type of peace diplomacy offered by Scandinavia. It identifies the different methods and policies of the three Scandinavian countries, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of their mediation strategies. Close examination of the historical record through primary and secondary sources in five languages reveals how Scandinavian involvement worked over almost three decades and to what extent it shaped the content of the Oslo peace talks. The author documents how the Scandinavian countries employed soft power diplomacy to enlist the aid of more powerful countries and international institutions to compensate for their limited authority and legitimacy, and how they used the Middle East peace process to strengthen their own national interests, financial standing and international status. The book will appeal to scholars, diplomats, politicians, educators and students interested in Scandinavian foreign policy and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nir Levitan is a lecturer in the Israeli Special Studies Program for the Security Forces, a research fellow at the Europa Institute and an affiliate fellow at the Center for Koldkrigsstudier, University of Southern Denmark. He is an Israeli-Danish scholar and geopolitical analyst. His academic work focuses on issues of conflict resolution, conflict management and mediation as well as negotiation theory. Levitan is the author of a wide range of articles on foreign politics in the Scandinavian countries and in the Middle East and he frequently appears on Israeli media outlets as a commentator on Scandinavian related political affairs. He holds a PhD from Bar-Ilan University’s Graduate Program in Conflict Resolution, Management and Negotiation.

Israeli History, Politics and Society Series Editor: Efraim Karsh King’s College London

This series provides a multidisciplinary examination of all aspects of Israeli history, politics and society, and serves as a means of communication between the various communities interested in Israel: academics, policy-makers, practi­ tioners, journalists and the informed public. 63. The Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1956–1975 From violent conflict to a peace process Moshe Gat 64. Hamas and Ideology Sheikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī on the Jews, Zionism and Israel Shaul Bartal and Nesya Rubinstein-Shemer 65. The British Army in Palestine and the 1948 War Containment, Withdrawal and Evacuation Alon Kadish 66. The US, Israel and Egypt Diplomacy in the Shadow of Attrition, 1969-70 Yehuda U. Blanga 67. Netanyahu and Likud’s Leaders The Israeli Princes Gil Samsonov 68. UNSCOP and the Arab-Israeli Conflict The Road to Partition Elad Ben-Dror 69. Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Official and Unofficial Soft Power Nir Levitan For a full list of titles in the series: https://www.routledge.com/Israeli-HistoryPolitics-and-Society/book-series/SE0790

Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Official and Unofficial Soft Power Nir Levitan

First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 Nir Levitan The right of Nir Levitan to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Levitan, Nir, author. Title: Scandinavian diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict : official and unofficial soft power / Nir Levitan. Description: London ; New York, NY : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2023. | Series: Israeli history, politics and society | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022051102 (print) | LCCN 2022051103 (ebook) | ISBN 9781032429847 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032429861 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003365198 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Scandinavia‐‐Foreign relations‐‐Middle East. | Middle East‐‐Foreign relations‐‐Scandinavia. | Arab-Israeli conflict. | Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (1993 September 13) | Mediation, International. | Soft power (Political science) | Diplomacy. Classification: LCC DL59.M628 L48 2023 (print) | LCC DL59.M628 (ebook) | DDC 327.48056‐‐dc23/eng/20230109 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022051102 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022051103 ISBN: 978-1-032-42984-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-42986-1 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-36519-8 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003365198 Typeset in Times New Roman by MPS Limited, Dehradun

Contents

1

Acknowledgments

ix

Introduction

1

1.1 1.2 1.3 2

Historical Background 2.1 2.2 2.3

3

Soft power diplomacy 1 Political secrecy in the Middle East 3 Unofficial diplomacy 4

Scandinavian foreign policy: Autonomy, neutrality and Scandinavian balance 9 The beginning of modern Scandinavian mediation 10 Scandinavian foreign diplomacy 12 2.3.1 Norway 13 2.3.2 Sweden 18 2.3.3 Denmark 23

Norway 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10

9

Building the channel: Opening the Oslo channel 36 The first three rounds 42 The process intensifies 46 The point of no return 49 Norwegian shuttle diplomacy 52 Signing the Oslo accords 56 Reaching for a New Middle East: Political and security implications 59 Preserving Norwegian involvement 66 Limitations of Norwegian mediation policy 71 The Norwegian model: Image and reality 74

36

viii 4

Contents Sweden 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11

5

5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 5.15 5.16 5.17 5.18

6

Swedish Mediation in 1988 82 The Geneva Declaration 1988 90 Swedish diplomacy implications 91 Sweden’s response to the Oslo accords 96 Forging political ties 99 The Beilin–Abu Mazen channel 101 The core issue of Jerusalem: Unofficial channel 108 Preparing the path to official Harpsund negotiations 113 Harpsund Negotiations begin 120 The Camp David summit 126 Post Camp David: The Beilin–Schori channel 128

Denmark 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9

82

143

The Louisiana process 145 The first Copenhagen conference 150 The impact of the Copenhagen declaration 153 Wye River memorandum 156 Preparing for the Cairo conference 159 The Cairo conference and the Louisiana process 162 The peace camps 164 The collapse of Louisiana process 165 The outbreak of the Intifada and the collapse of the peace camp 165 Rome 2001: Renewal of the Copenhagen initiative 168 U.S. Government policy and the missions of Mitchell, Tenet and Zinni to the region 169 Møller’s Shuttle Diplomacy 171 The Roadmap for Peace 174 American-Israeli Coordination 179 Quartet support 182 The Copenhagen Group and the Roadmap for Peace 183 The failure of the Roadmap 186 Reflections on Danish Mediation and the Roadmap for Peace 189

Conclusion: Observations and Reflections

201

Index

212

Acknowledgments

The process of writing this book was a journey of discovery and intellectual challenge that broke conventions for me. I had thought that researching Scandinavian mediation in the Middle East would not only reveal the complexity of Middle East politics but also highlight the intricacy of solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In equal measure, the writing revealed the complexity of the Scandinavian diplomacy and the range of considerations and sacrifices involved in promoting their principles. To prepare a well-grounded research account, the findings in this book have been verified by in-depth research of primary sources and countless amounts of archival records. Numerous personal interviews added invaluably to my knowledge of the issues. I hope that this book will not only be instructive for any person interested in this conflict but also that it will be received as a significant contribution to a rich documentation that has been written (and continues to be written) on attempts to secure stability and peace for Israel and its neighbors. On this occasion I would like to thank to all the people who accompanied me on this journey. Without their presence and assistance, I would not have been able to reach my goal of researching, writing, publishing and sharing this book with the public. For that I am very grateful. This research work is based on a PhD thesis I wrote at Bar-Ilan University in the Conflict Resolution, Management and Negotiation Program. I thank my supervisor, Dr. Amira Schiff, for the personal guidance during the writing of the dissertation. I would like to convey my appreciation to the many people in Israel and Scandinavia who have stood by me during the past years. I consulted and learned from them greatly. My thanks go to the people in Israel and Scandinavia who agreed to share their experience, their roles in the work of mediation and the intricacies of diplomacy. Among them are: the Foreign Ministers of Denmark, the late Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and Per Stig Møller who were generous with their time and shared their personal experience. I would also like to mention the late Herbert Pundik who opened a window to the intricacies of Denmark’s diplomatic efforts and shared about his own “unofficial” actions. Thank you to Dr. Björn Brenner

x Acknowledgments for accompanying the research work in Sweden, to Pär Nuder for his insights on the mediation dynamics process and to all the archivists in Sweden and Denmark. A special thank you goes to Ruth Kimche who made the materials of her late husband, David Kimche, available to me, without which this research would not have been possible. In addition, I would also like to thank Prof. Efraim Karsh for the privilege of being part of the distinguished book series on Israeli History, Politics and Society. Likewise to James “Joe” Whiting, Editor of Middle Eastern, Islamic & Jewish Studies at the prestigious Routledge publishing house which provided me with the resources and especially the influential stage. I am grateful to my family and my parents who supported me throughout the writing of the research work and longed for its publication as if it were their own. They gave me moral support when it was most needed. In particular, I must mention my father, Joel, who assisted me in translating all the research materials from the Scandinavian languages. Thanks to his great dedication, he has been an indispensable advisor for the completion of the research. I would like especially to thank Ariel Lester, who assisted in the translation of the work into English and in adapting it for publication. Her great knowledge, writing skill, dedication to the project and patience gave me great strength. During the course of researching for this book, I explored my family’s origins in Denmark and discovered the pursuits of my late grandmother Jeanne Levitan and late grandfather Shmuel (Semmy) Levitan. My grandfather was a former head of the Jewish community in Copenhagen who developed an extensive network of acquaintances across Denmark and Europe. He shared insights and personal stories with me about people who have not yet been written about in the long work of Scandinavian mediation. Semmy Levitan was only able to accompany part of the process of researching my dissertation. This book is dedicated to my grandparents in gratitude. Most of all, thank you to my wife, Sigal, and my daughter, Amalya,. Sigal believed in me from the beginning. She encouraged, supported, advised and was constantly attentive in the progress of the research. Sigal is a source of light for me. To my dear daughter, Amalya, may you grow up in a world of intellectual clarity, compassion and peace.

1

Introduction

1.1 Soft power diplomacy In the long pursuit of peace in the Middle East, Scandinavian countries were a driving force in the negotiating process between Israel and the Palestinians. Even though Norway, Sweden and Denmark were small countries without major military power or limitless economic resources, they developed a unique and oft times successful mediation strategy to address international conflicts.1 This mediation approach to conflict resolution may be considered a form of soft power diplomacy. For more than three decades, researchers have been preoccupied with how countries use “soft power” and to what extent it occurs in relations between countries. The first scholar to coin the term “soft power” was Joseph Nye who made a distinction between measures of political power. He stated that countries differ according to the type of power they have: “hard power” and “soft power” (Nye, 2004, 1990, 2006, 2008, 2011). Hard power refers to powerful countries that can influence other countries through coercion. Hard power strategies have focused on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions aimed at enforcing national interests (Aall, 2007; Baxter, Jordan and Rubin, 2018; Beardsley, 2011; Campbell and O’Hanlon, 2006; Touval, 2003). In contrast to coercive power, soft power described the ability to encourage others to act more optimally in the international arena. Nye explained that in terms of resources, soft power was aided by persuasion as a primary asset (Nye, 2004). Using soft power, small states could create a consensus (in Nye’s language – create a “milieu”) and thus persuade others to take steps that would not have been taken had they been subjected to coercive force (Nye, 2004: 97; Vuković, 2015a, 2015b). According to Nye, the core factor of soft power lies in what he called methods of “attraction” and “seduction” (Nye, 2004: 6, 11). In soft power mediation, means of attraction may include setting up discussions, making compromise proposals and conveying messages between conflicting parties. Means of seduction would indicate a deeper level of involvement including financial incentives, involvement of NGOs and other organizations, cultural

DOI: 10.4324/9781003365198-1

2 Introduction exchanges, setting up think tanks and other foreign policy initiatives as a means to promote mutual trust between the conflicting parties.2 As part of the mediation efforts, mediators sought interests, stability, reputation and ambition to participate in the future of the area where they were mediating. Therefore, occasionally a mediator chose to intervene and influence a conflict under the appearance of promoting peace efforts. Based on studies in international conflicts, Bercovitch proved that the mediation framework illustrated the means in which the mediators identified different alternatives in negotiations: relying on persuasion alone, facilitating poor communication between the parties or assisting in formulating possible solutions based on the information provided to them. Bercovitch and Gartner classified these alternatives into three strategies (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006: 329–354): (a) communication-assistance strategy, which focuses on building trust relationships and creating groundwork for negotiations; (b) a procedural strategy, which focuses on shaping the negotiations by setting the meetings, engagement factors and structural factors between the parties; (c) guidance strategy, in which the mediator seeks to influence the negotiation process and essentially through coercion on the parties. This division in which the mediator uses a combination or one of them depending on the existing circumstances, covered the three strategies named by Touval and Zartman (Beardsley, 2011; Carnevale, 1986: 41–56; Svensson, 2007: 229–248; Touval and Zartman, 1985; Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016: 96): communication-assistance strategy – a strategy in which the mediator’s role was mostly passive, and the main mediation assisted the parties to communicate more effectively during the negotiations, while having minor control over the process; guidance strategy – a strategy in which the mediator formally controlled the process and assisted in the negotiations by formulating possible solutions and offering them to the parties; third strategy – manipulation strategy, the most active strategy in mediation: “mediation with muscles”, in which the mediator provided the parties with incentives or an ultimatum. On the one hand he threatened the parties with coercive measures, and on the other he offered incentives for compromises reached. Soft power diplomacy is complex, nuanced and flexible. It can establish unofficial or official channels and each of those channels can be secret or public. There can be parallel but separate tracks operating at the same time. There can be official and unofficial tracks operating simultaneously, each furthering different goals, using different strategies. Sometimes those separate tracks morph into one official and public channel. However, success in any one of these channels is never guaranteed. Scandinavian soft power diplomacy can also be viewed as a kind of “preliminary diplomacy” that prepares the way for serious summits and permanent agreements. This book introduces the use of soft power diplomacy to describe the mediation efforts of the Scandinavian countries in general and their attempts to bring a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular. The Scandinavian mediators, who could not use hard power and coercive

Introduction

3

means, used soft power in the form of attraction and seduction to influence international dialogue processes. By means of soft power, they sought to advance their own status on the international stage as well. The Scandinavian countries became known for promoting contacts that created mutual understandings between the disputed parties. The book explores in detail the soft power strategies used by the Scandinavians over several decades during their involvement in the Middle East. Advancing a new, comprehensive approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, these three countries tried to resolve one of the most enduring political challenges of the modern era in what became known as the Oslo Peace Process. The Oslo process was a confusing journey filled with hope and disappointment, challenges and breakthroughs, dedication, deception, much passion and mostly good intentions. The material gathered for this book has been drawn from extensive research including personal interviews, archival material, secondary sources when necessary and autobiographical materials. In particular, the unpublished personal correspondence and archive of David Kimche was a rich source of information as was research in the archives of the Royal Danish Library.

1.2 Political secrecy in the Middle East Diplomacy in the Middle East is vastly challenging for many reasons, one of which is the extensive reliance on secrecy. Aaron Klieman studied the use of political secrecy in the Middle East and defined political secrecy as negotiations to achieve political goals that took place behind closed doors. He identified two goals of such diplomacy. One goal was to achieve political objectives through a matter-of-fact exchange of information, a tacit understanding, or the attainment of a secret arrangement that prevented exposure to local or international actors. A second goal was to conduct diplomacy without the knowledge or consent of the public. Sometimes secret diplomacy was the only middle ground between dialogue and disconnection. According to Kleiman, the theorist Hans Morgenthau was also in favor of assuming that secret diplomacy was essential and necessary for the formation of understandings far from the alternative of war and mutual destruction (Klieman, 1988: 25, 29). Secret diplomacy may be motivated by defensive and/or offensive purposes. The defensive approach preserved the existing situation and prevented aggravation. The offensive approach was intended to break through an existing situation and resolve a confrontation covertly. The defined boundaries of secrecy allowed policymakers to speak more openly and to seek possibilities for reconciliation more bravely without those ideas being binding. Negotiating on especially sensitive issues increased the intensity of the secrecy. In addition, the use of secret diplomacy ensured that the dialogue between countries would occur without resistance that might damage the chances for success (Klieman, 1988: 15–17; Roberts, 2009: 515; Zartman,

4 Introduction 1992; Zartman, 2000; Zartman and Touval, 2007). Henry Kissinger argued that the demanding task of the diplomat to seek an acceptable compromise highlighted the necessity for confidentiality and that secrecy allowed the parties involved to negotiate without the influence of internal or external pressure (Berridge, 2001: 199). Against the background of hostile states wrestling with one another by making vague proposals that were only aimed at examining the other side’s position, the Scandinavians offered a different model of negotiation. By joining the element of secrecy with the posture of unofficial, informal talks, the Scandinavians offered a model of mediation that often succeeded in developing an unofficial diplomacy path into an official peace process.

1.3 Unofficial diplomacy Unofficial diplomacy creates an intermediate stage and a convenient replacement for governments that want to continue to conduct negotiations without obligation. Unofficial diplomacy helps official leaders resolve or manage conflicts through creative solutions, away from the public eye, and without formal demands for public negotiation or bargaining (Davidson and Montville, 1981; Montville, 1995; Schiff, 2018, 2010). Unofficial diplomacy promotes a strategy of negotiation that supports participants to create personal relationships, to understand the conflict from the opponent’s point of view, and to develop common strategies for dealing with the conflict as a common problem (Montville, 1991; Zartman and Touval, 1992). Approached psychologically, the aim is to reduce the sense of victimhood of the parties and to soften the opponent’s image. If the process is successful, it will gradually allow for a change in public opinion or a change among key people. These changes have allowed political leaders to take positive steps to resolve a conflict that previously seemed impossible. Official and unofficial diplomacy may be conducted at the same time. There are many ways these two tracks can complement one another. Sometimes the official public channel gives cover for the secret, unofficial one. An official and public channel can provide a distraction that allows the parties to negotiate on more favorable terms without provoking broad public and political criticism. In general, an unofficial track seeks to promote a more sympathetic environment at the political and public level through public opinion so that at a later stage, leaders could take lower risks (Bercovitch, 1997, 2006; Bo¨hmelt, 2010; Diamond and McDonald, 1996; McDonald, 1991). While one of the benefits of a secret channel is to provide an opportunity for a more free exchange of ideas and suggestions for resolving a conflict, there is always concern and apprehension around the moment when the work of the group will become public. The same confidentiality that invites openness and paves the way for progress can become a liability for participants who might have been seduced to go beyond what the authorities

Introduction

5

or their public might accept. Generally, agreements reached through an unofficial channel have incorporated bolder positions and have significant concessions due to the public’s lack of criticism and knowledge. Knowing that the agreement will be made public can prevent the parties from establishing material elements in their final understandings. Although an unofficial channel can be progressed relatively quickly and get understandings faster than official channels, they can be challenged at the stage where the agreement becomes known and has to stand up to public scrutiny (Wanis-St John, 2006: 139). In addition, even if the parties tried to process common creative ideas to overcome obstacles, implementing an fragile peace agreement can become problematic due to failures to agree on details and the emergence of unforeseen events (Saunders, 1996: 419–421) including a strong negative public response. An unofficial channel allows even decision-makers to be involved in negotiations, especially one that endangers their status, until the agreements are published and they take responsibility for them (Schiff, 2018, 2010; Wanis-St John, 2006). Because their involvement is secret and the unofficial channel’s agreements are non-binding, a vulnerable leader can, at that point of public exposure, deny involvement or dismiss the groups conclusions altogether. In the Oslo process, the confidentiality of the talks led to a high degree of flexible thinking and creative ideas among the participants which led to high expectations for a successful agreement. But these expectations could not be backed up. If the parties ignored the reality on the ground, the political echelon would not be able to accept or implement their agreements. As a result, academic studies have concluded that civil society’s lack of involvement has made it difficult to achieve lasting peace (WanisSt. John and Kew, 2008: 11–12, 33–35). Often, covert processes contribute to the initiation of negotiations but sometimes fail to achieve the ultimate goal of reaching an agreement (Kelman, 1995: 20, 26–27; Kelman, 1997). Thus, an unofficial channel does not necessarily succeed in building a consensus in favor of a peace process, even when secret negotiations are conducted (Levitt, 2008). Unofficial channel also influenced the mediation, one that does not depend only on national power and resources. Denmark was a clear example of leveraging an intermediary using the unofficial channel. That is, it compensated for its lack of influence in official processes by unofficial circles. This is also how Norway and Sweden acted from the end of the 1980s to build a substantial foundation for mutual trust and establish a relationship between the mediator and the parties for the benefit of a political framework. In the eyes of the Scandinavian mediators, this had a deep meaning that helped to create common ground, and even more importantly, to strengthen their image in the international community.

6 Introduction

Notes 1 Nordic Approaches to Peace Mediation Research, Practices and Policies, edited by Marko Lehti (2014) is a great in-depth research for understanding the important approaches and studies in making peace according to the Nordic models. 2 Others believe that this diplomacy fits the definition of former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, who named it Niche diplomacy. This diplomacy allowed small countries to play a broader role in the international arena, even though there were with limited resources and capabilities ( Henrikson, 2005: 67).

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Kelman, C. Herbert (1995). “Contributions of an unofficial conflict resolution effort to the Israeli–Palestinian breakthrough”, Negotiation Journal, Vol. 11(1): 19–27. Klieman, Aharon (1988). Statecraft in the Dark: Israel’s Practice of Quiet Diplomacy. Tel-Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. Lehti, Marko (2014). Nordic Approaches to Peace Mediation Research, Practices and Policies. Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute, TAPRI Studies in Peace and Conflict Research No. 101. Levitt, Matthew (2008). Negotiating Under Fire: Preserving Peace Talks in the Face of Terror Attacks. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. McDonald, W. John (1991). “Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy”, pp. 201–220. In Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson (Eds.), Timing the DeEscalation of International Conflicts. New-York: Syracuse University Press. Montville, Joseph (1995). “The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy”, pp. 5–20. In John McDonald & Diane Bendahmane (Eds.), Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy. Washington, DC: Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy. Montville, Joseph (1991). “Track Two Diplomacy: The Arrow and the Olive Branch”, pp. 161–175. In V. Volkan, J. Montville, and D. Julius (Eds.), The Psychodynamics of International Relations, Volume 2: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work. Massachusetts: Lexington Books. Nye, S. Robert (2008). “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power”, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616(1): 94–109. Nye, S. Robert (1990). “Soft power”, Foreign Policy, No. 80: 153–171. Nye, S. Robert (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. Nye, S. Robert (2011). The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs. Nye, S. Robert (2006). “Think again: Soft power”, Foreign Policy, February 23. Roberts, Ivor (2009). Satow’s Diplomatic Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Saunders, Harold (1996). “Pre-negotiation and Circum-negotiation: Arenas of the Peace Process”, pp. 419–432. In Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela All (Eds.), Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict. Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace. Schiff, Amira (2018). ‫[ יישוב סכסוכים ביחסים בינלאומיים‬Conflict resolution in international relations]. Tel Aviv: The Open University. Schiff, Amira (2010). “Quasi track-one diplomacy: An analysis of the Geneva process in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict”, International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 11(2): 93–111. Svensson, Isak (2007). “Mediation with muscles or minds? Exploring power mediators and pure mediators in civil wars”, International Negotiation, Vol. 12(2): 229–248. Touval, Saadia (2003). “Mediation and foreign policy”, International Studies Review, Vol. 5(4): 91–95. Touval, Saadia and William I. Zartman (1985). International Mediation in Theory and Practice. London: Westview Press. Vuković, Siniša (2015a). “Soft power, bias and manipulation of international organizations in international mediation”, International Negotiation, Vol. 20(3): 414–443.

8 Introduction Vuković, Siniša (2015b). International Multiparty Mediation and Conflict Management: Challenges of Cooperation and Coordination. London: Routledge. Wallensteen, Peter and Isak Svensson (2016). Fredensdiplomater. Nordisk medling från Bernadotte till Ahtisaari [Peace Diplomats. Nordic Mediation from Bernadotte to Ahtisaari]. Stockholm: Santérusförlag. Wanis-St John, Anthony (2006). “Back-channel negotiation: International bargaining in the shadows”, Negotiation Journal, Vol. 22(2): 119–144. Wanis-St. John, Anthony and Darren Kew (2008). “Civil society and peace negotiations: Confronting exclusion”, International Negotiation, Vol. 13(1): 11–36. Zartman, I. William (1992). “The Internationalization of Communal Strife: Temptation and Opportunities Triangulation”, pp. 27–42. In Manus Midlarsky (Ed.), The Internationalization of Communal Strife. London: Routledge. Zartman, I. William and Saadia Touval (2007). “International Mediation”, pp. 437–454. In Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (Eds.), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World. Washington: United States Institute of Peace. Zartman, I. William (2000). “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond”, pp. 225–250. In Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman (Eds.), International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. Zartman, I. William and Saadia Touval (1992). “Third-Party Diplomacy and Informal Peacemaking”, pp. 241–261. In Sheryl J. Brown and Kimber M. Schraub (Eds.), Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.

2

Historical Background

Since the core of the study deal with the mediation of the Scandinavian states in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this chapter will review Scandinavian involvement in the international arena in general and in the Middle East particular. The chapter will include an overview of Scandinavian foreign policy, the purpose of Scandinavian foreign aid, and each countries’ policy. This chapter will also present the objectives of Scandinavian foreign policy, the scope of their activities and their impact, which led to their involvement in the Middle East. By presenting the political framework of Norway, Sweden and Denmark, it will also be possible to understand the basic principles on which the Scandinavian mediation in the political process between Israel and the Palestinians was based.

2.1 Scandinavian foreign policy: Autonomy, neutrality and Scandinavian balance The presentation of the Scandinavian policy makes it possible to understand the Scandinavian mediation infrastructure in the conflict, but since the mediation work took many years, ties were established with Israel and the Palestinians. The Scandinavian peace diplomacy did not focus on a single time frame but range over a long period in which they could establish authority and status among the parties and try to advance a political agreement. Thus, the communication of messages and attempts to promote negotiations between the parties were carried out as part of a broad and uneven process in which regional and international changes took place. These changes also created time and maneuver for the Scandinavian countries to promote political sponsorship in the political process. These are not necessarily essential or essential stages, but those that have advanced their status and created future possibilities. In this context, Wallenstein and Svensson believed that patience, transparency and adherence, even in times of recession, were an essential part of Scandinavian mediation (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016: 38, 208, 219–220). Although ostensibly the Middle East did not serve a vital interest in Scandinavian political leaders, it gained wide attention before the State of DOI: 10.4324/9781003365198-2

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Israel was established (Staur, 2016: 76). One of Denmark’s most recognised monarchs, King Erik Ejegod (Erik the Good) went on as pilgrimage to the Holy Land in 1103 but died on Cyprus. His wife Boedil Thurgotsdatter, however, continued and reached Jerusalem where she died and was buried on Mount of Olives in the Valley of Josaphat. Many Nordics were attracted to the Middle East for theological reasons alongside a national ethos that promoted international interest and increased their involvement in the region until the middle of the 20th century (Kark, 1994: 38–40).1 Accordingly, the development of relations and the penetration of the Nordic countries into the Middle East accompanied by a complex relationship. As early as the beginning of the 18th century, three research expeditions were sent by the King of Sweden, Charles XII, to the Holy Land and they accelerated interest in the Middle East. During the 19th century, Swedish representatives visited the country, primarily pilgrims, travelers and researchers who came for personal and unofficial reasons. In 1884, the three sons of King Oscar II visited the area (Kark, 1996: 50–51). When the Zionist movement developed and waves of immigration to the Yishuv began, in broad circles in Scandinavia, Jewish communities in the land were perceived as a sign of the return of the Jews to the homeland and resurrection of Jesus (Carmesund, 2010: 85). In Norway, where there was no consensus on the theological vision among the Christian currents, Jewish history made biblical prophecies a reality and strengthened the positive attitude toward Jews, which was also reflected in the giving of biblical names to children. Some of the curricula included compulsory teaching of biblical stories, called the “Good Book” (Sæbø, 1976). In Denmark, too, Danish Christian societies appealed to the UN SecretaryGeneral and urged him to uphold previous decisions of the League of Nations to build a national home for Jews. Although other Christian bodies called on Jews to convert to strengthen their support for the establishment of Israel and in 1948 established the “Danish Committee for the Support of the Jewish Defense and Struggle in Palestine” (Lausten, 2015: 228, 263). Due to the partition plan and growing international interest in resolving the conflict, the political intervention of the Scandinavian countries has also expanded. However, the foreign policies of Norway, Sweden and Denmark, which were diverse, sought to maintain a uniform political line according to national considerations. Following the adoption of the partition plan and the military clash between Israel and its neighbors, the Scandinavian countries adopted a political line that carried broad and cautious considerations towards the region’s countries. In the next section, therefore, an overview will be given of the policies of Norway, Sweden and Denmark.

2.2 The beginning of modern Scandinavian mediation Scandinavian diplomacy is characterised by a tradition of mediation in international disputes, as reflected in diplomats Trygve Lie, Dag Hammarskjöld,

Historical Background 11 Count Folke Bernadotte, Gunnar Jarring and Martti Ahtisaari, who excelled in making peace. Simultaneously, because historically, the Norse peoples were involved in many wars and some ruled remote areas, they went a long and winding road until their image as peacemakers established. “Nordic peace” is a new phenomenon that began only in the 19th century and intensified after establishing the League of Nations and the United Nations. Streamline their political involvement, mainly through international mediation, by appointing representatives on their behalf who have been sent to the Foreign Ministries in Stockholm and Oslo (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016: 228). Scandinavians believe that the process of resolving conflicts and bringing peace to the world can be achieve under the right conditions. In spite of the fact that peace and conflict resolution differ considerably between Nordic countries, a great deal of collaboration took place between Nordics on many levels. Thus, it is impossible to ignore the Scandinavian culture, as well as their political cooperation. The Scandinavian countries have used diplomacy to increase their maneuverability (Ingebritsen, 2006) and Scandinavian states have established the political infrastructure for their area of operation in line with foreign policy objectives. Owing to this fact, one has to understand the foreign policy design of Scandinavian policies and examine their traditional policies, especially in Europe during the Cold War. In this context, it is possible to mention Norway, which has formulated policies to promote narrow interests alongside fostering international commitment (Riste, 2001).2 This policy also balanced the relationship between conflicting interests and established growing involvement in the international arena, the most recognisable of the Oslo process (Pruitt, 1997). Norway, Sweden and Denmark, which used to identify with other peoples and aid them financially, especially in conflicts of interest, have over time succeeded in strengthening the network of ties between the Western bloc and the Soviet bloc and highlighting their international image (Löden, 2012; Davis, 1990). As small countries, Norway, Sweden and Denmark were countries with fewer international interests. They restricted military use and the use of economic sanctions in their foreign policy. Sweden chose to remain unidentified and remained outside NATO and joint the European Community (EC) in a later stage. Norway remained outside the European Community but joined the North Atlantic Alliance (Ingebritsen, 2002: 12), while Denmark became a NATO member and a pioneer in joining the European Community in 1973. The presentation of the foreign destinations developed in Scandinavia reveals how the Scandinavians realised their goals to influence the international arena, primarily through international bodies. However, apart from that, they also established generous foreign aid and used it towards Third World countries. Although foreign aid did not necessarily establish and strengthen their influence or pave the way for political involvement, it promoted their political status in the international community, a status that persuaded distant countries to agree to Scandinavian mediation.

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Historical Background

2.3 Scandinavian foreign diplomacy To the formation of foreign aid diplomacy had a major part of the influence of Scandinavian policy is to intervene and act as mediators. Allegedly, the Scandinavian countries have gained a positive international reputation because they have not linked economic aid to economic or strategic interests (Stokke, 1989). In each of Scandinavian countries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlined the aid policy, although in the past, all aid ministries were independent and operated within the framework of the Aid and Development Agency. Thus, even in times of change of government, Scandinavian governments have demonstrated that aid policy remains stable and anchored in a unique worldview. On the other hand, the differences between the Scandinavian countries showed that Denmark tended to link aid in the interests of the private sector significantly, while Norway and Sweden tended to keep it modest (Olsen, 2005; Selbervik and Nygaard, 2006: 3, 7; Selbervik, 2003). However, due to the Scandinavians’ desire to be portrayed as economically powerful and prestigious humanitarian nations, they sought similar ways to aid in this endeavor. Over time, aid grants were accompanied by increasing mediation involvement, mainly on behalf of Norway (Van der Veen, 2000). The countries’ generous efforts, which were poor until the 1970s, changed for several reasons, including hidden competition between them for the most generous donor and their role in international institutions (Tamnes, 1997). Thus, for example, the former president of Finland and Nobel Laureate for Peace, Martti Ahtisaari, competed with the Norwegians to promote his peace diplomacy in the previous decade (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016: 228). Even if they shared the same history and goals each state endeavors to demonstrate political superiority over other Nordic states. Because the tendency to maintain a high level of assistance to Third World countries stemmed from the official vision to contribute to democratic development and economic advancement, at the same time, it also revealed an intention other than altruistic values. Given the background, from 1980 onwards, the Scandinavians gradually believed that foreign aid allowed them to promote dialogue between countries and fortify their role as mediators. Official political documents contain mentions and declarations of Nordic countries that link foreign aid to their ability to leverage their status beyond their weight in the international arena (Selbervik, 2003) and promote national interests. However, these countries have officially endeavored not to declare their intentions and have publicly advocated the development of human rights and promoting democratic values (Krab-Johansen, 1995; Selbervik, 1997). Over time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Assistance and Development influenced the identity of aid recipients (Danielson and Wohlgemuth, 2005; Olsen, 2005: 203). These have refined the purpose of strengthening their influence and national image in the international arena. As part of this activity, NGOs have also been able to outline informal connections and create an infrastructure for Nordic mediation (Jørgensen

Historical Background 13 Genefke, Larsen and Udsholt, 1993; Tvedt, 1998), also known as the Oslo model (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016: 225). On the other hand, due to their dependence on government aid funds and the fear of losing their budgets, NGOs have refrained from criticising government policy (Selbervik and Nygaard, 2006: 17). This policy helped the Nordic countries act as mediators and portrayed as honest mediators without considering foreign interests (Browning, 2007; Rasmussen, 2005: 70–74). This foreign policy has also helped these policies become more involved in the international arena and emphasise their contribution to the stability of international conflicts. With that being said, each country’s central foreign policy also integrated their approach to the Middle East conflict. 2.3.1 Norway Historically, Norway had tried to avoid major wars, particularly the conflicts in Europe, until World War II. Post–World War II, the leaders believed that strengthening Norway’s foreign trade was dependent on managing a practical foreign policy pursued by peace diplomacy (HanssenBauer, 2017). The Norwegian leadership decided to project its role as a moral power in the international community and thus gain a “seat at the table” of the great powers (Johnsen, 2012: 73; Leonard, 2002: 169–70; Leonard, Stead and Smewing, 2002). Norway’s traditional approach to international politics has relied on an activist approach with historical roots that advocated cooperation, broad humanitarian aid and comprehensive political activity (Tvedt, 2007). Since the Scandinavian countries declared themselves to be the procedure of European culture in the period between the world wars (Furre and Grepstad, 1997), the Norwegian Foreign Minister 1935–1941, Halvdan Koht, stated that Norway’s ability to influence and noted that he never gave up a struggle for a better world because retain from involving meant giving up his values (Johansen, 1979; Skard, 1982). As early as the end of the 19th century, Norwegian politicians believed that conflicts between countries should be resolved through international negotiation and diplomatic means. Similarly, Prime Minister Johannes Steen claimed in 1892 that Norway had experienced events that enabled it to make peace due to its geographical location, culture and rich experience in making peace (Knutsen, Særbo and Gjerdåker, 1995; Lundestad, 1999; Vogt, 2007). Norwegian historian Olav Riste (Riste, 1983) has listed the goals of Norwegian foreign policy since 1905 and explained that it is primarily intended to achieve stability. To this end, Norway has always chosen to place its trust in one of the great powers – first in Britain and then in the United States – through the Freedom Alliance (1905–1914), then in neutrality (1914–1918) and then in collective security (1918–1940) and in the War Alliance (1940–). The latter was replaced by a mediation policy (1945–1949) and finally by the NATO Alliance in the Cold War (1949–1989). As a result,

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Norway tended to deal with its rivals through four geographical “circles” – the Atlantic Ocean, the European Arena, the Nordic arena and the Global Arena (Børresen, 2011; Dragnes, 2009; Førland, 1988; Holst, 1984; Ulriksen, 2002). Consequently, Norway exercised caution without provoking the Soviets, similar to the policy restrictions imposed by the Soviet Union on Finland. In doing so, Norway symbolised a separatist urge to seek safety from the hostile reality of power politics and NATO commitments (Førland, 1988; Riste, 2004; Skogrand, 2004). After 1985, economic and trade relations between Norway and the Soviet Union strengthened as they agreed to cooperate on fisheries, oil and natural gas in the Barents Sea. The early initiatives stipulated that the two countries would assist each other in an emergency in nuclear crashes and cooperate in protecting the environment. Norway also helped alleviate the economic distress of the Soviet Murmansk region through food supplies and medical assistance (Castbergs, 1990: 90; Skogrand, 2004) and began to serve as an essential mediator between East and West. Its status remained unique because it built a unique model for strengthening its influence in Europe and the international arena (Bersagel, 2008; Kelleher and Taulbee, 2006; Østerud, 2005: 705, 707). In parallel, Norway’s new security doctrine has been formed through an extensive network of alliances and collaborations in four circles: The United Nations, the European Union, the Nordic countries and NATO. Its intervention was intended to strengthen its image as a “humanitarian power” and a “peace nation” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1989; Østerud, 2006: 305, 312, 315). As a result, Norwegian government officials have expanded their influence through mediation and financial assistance. Only at later stages and after failing in some areas, such as in Sri Lanka and Guatemala, did the Norwegian parliament decide that Norwegian foreign policy would be less idealistic and more cautious and that the government would intervene only in areas where there was a high chance of change (Waage, 2009). However, Norway’s image has been influenced by assisting vulnerable countries and supporting peacekeeping and peacekeeping operations, contributing to its status as a mediator (Butenschøn, 1997: 21). Because it mediated political involvement through mediation, political leaders also encouraged the secret channel through collaborations and informal research teams assisted by Norwegian diplomats (Liland and Kjerland, 2003). Thus, its intervention in the international arena was constructed by developing close ties with key regional countries, establishing non-governmental organizations, and strengthening ties between Norwegian academic institutions and international research institutions. Alongside this, Norwegian mediation processes included access to local elites and access to key officials, in a way that Norwegian statesmen could play a significant role and outline policies that indirectly promoted Norwegian interests (Egeland, 1985; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1989; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992; Matlary, 2002; Richmond and Franks, 2009; Waage, 2005).

Historical Background 15 Similarly, Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen declared during his tenure in the early 2000s on Norway’s involvement in conflicts that small countries can offer and contribute creative solutions to conflicts where multilateral efforts have not yielded results or others have failed. This statement characterised the policy developed by Norway to gain senior international status through mediation policy (Henrikson, 2005: 70). It was a policy that was also in line with the other Scandinavian policies, which sought to formulate policy in the international arena. Moreover, Norway, which represents this concept, has demonstrated its ability to mediate in many areas worldwide, arenas that have provided it with vital information on many conflict areas. Thus, for example, Norway’s involvement in Zimbabwe stemmed in part from its desire to provide vital information to European countries that had purchased Norwegian goods. In return, the Norwegians transmitted material information to those interested in Zimbabwe’s conflict (Bruni, 2002). However, small countries have had difficulty maintaining vague policies and have sometimes provoked resentment even in countries with economic support. For example, a Sri Lankan politician accused Norway of grossly interfering in his country’s internal affairs and called them “salmoneating busybodies” (Henrikson, 2005: 72, 84). This rough statement illustrates the difficulty of small countries to evade over time negative images and stereotypes that make it challenging to implement soft power. Norwegian sociologist Arne Tostensen also claimed that state authorities, research institutes and sections of the Norwegian public had banded together to shape Norwegian activist policy. In his view, the relationship triangle enabled Norway to increase its aid budget, regardless of the degree of success or failure, and thus government officials and academics were able to promote a comprehensive policy that combined ideals with Norwegian interests (De Carvalho and Lie, 2014; Tostensen, 2004; Tvedt, 2003; Toje, 2010: 215–217). Similarly, Norway’s political elite, especially in the 1990s, believed that peace involvement was part of its generous contribution to a better world and also benefited Norwegian interests, while other Norwegian statesmen believed that increasing involvement increased its vulnerability (DIIS, 2005; Kjølberg, 2007; Skånland, 2008; Svensson, 2009; Thune and Lunde, 2013). In the early years, Norway’s policy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was sympathetic to Israel but cautious due to commercial considerations with the oil countries and the desire for free shipping in the Suez Canal and the Gulf states. Friendship ties were established between private individuals such as Ragnvald Alfred Roscher Lund, a Norwegian intelligence officer, who was chosen by Trygve Lie as his representative and advisor to the conflict as a military expert. On the eve of Israeli War of Independence, Lund proposed sending a force of 6,000 to 10,000 Scandinavian soldiers as a police force to the international area of Jerusalem. Lund suggested that the leadership in Israel was focused on the surrounding areas of Jerusalem and not on preserving all Israeli localities. He further offered and expressed a

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Historical Background

willingness to send the Norwegian UN Secretary-General a secret letter.3 containing information that would assist Israeli diplomacy until Israel’s independence in May 1948. For these actions, Lund was considered a steadfast friend and confidant in Israel (Zoref, Rosenthal and Lamprom, 2009: 31–32). Lund also shared information he received from a Norwegian diplomat in Cairo that the United States was considering withdrawing from the partition plan in favor of another partition plan. Thus, on March 19th, 1948, the United States announced that the partition plan should be changed to a UN trust regime. The Norwegian intelligence officer informed the Israeli leadership that without a force of 10,000 soldiers, the plan could not be safely implemented and, therefore, recommended that the Israeli leadership prepare for the UN partition accordingly. After Israel declared independence, the Norwegian Labor Party, which formed the government, recognised Israel’s joining the UN in de jure recognition, in contrast to Sweden and Denmark (Waage, 1989; Ottosen, 1990: 214). On the other hand, although most political parties recognised Israel government officials and officials in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry believed that full diplomatic recognition should not be granted to Israel because it was at war, without permanent borders and recognition by Western governments other than the United States (Waage, 2000a: 193, 196; Hagelund, 1983: 19). However, even after Israel war of independence, the Norwegian delegation to the United Nations voted against Arab proposals and showed consistent support for Israel (Waage, 1996). As a projection of the deportation of nearly a million Jews from Arab countries, Norway also refused to blame Israel for the fate of Arab refugees and also refused to pressure it to accept Arab refugees. Norway claimed the responsibility for Arab refugees’ rests with the Arab states (Waage, 2000a: 202). The secretary of the Labor Party, Haakon Lie, was a clear representative of this approach. He supported and assisted Israel in obtaining the heavy water for Israel’s nuclear project and provided the necessary means for its defense. Similarly, the political echelon in Norway developed a friendly relationship with Israel, culminating in negotiations for an official trade agreement with Israel in May 1954, in which Norway agreed to recognise Jerusalem as the de facto capital of Israel. This approach stemmed in part from World War II, as many of Norway’s Labor Party – including the Norwegian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister – were sent to labor camps with Jews due to their opposition to the Nazis (Sanness, 1976). In the days leading up to the Suez crisis in 1956, Norway pursued to maintain a solid line with NATO members and good relations with its main allies, the United States and Britain, in the face of tensions with the Soviet Union and Arab countries (Waage, 1998; Waage, 2000b: 33). However, since the Yom Kippur War, Norway depended more on imports from Arab countries and gradually changed its approach (Keenan, 1995: 85–86).4

Historical Background 17 Evidence of this was in 1975 when two Norwegian delegations went on a tour of Arab countries headed by the Minister of Finance and the Deputy Minister of Trade. They aimed to strengthen the Norwegian shipping industry, which won tenders for oil supplies from the Gulf countries, alongside the decision of the Norwegian Export Council to open a representative office in Dubai and Qatar (Keenan, 1995: 107). These decisions led, among other things, to a tour of the Norwegian Middle East by the Norwegian Foreign Affairs Committee in January 1977, which was also attended by former Prime Minister Per Borten, during which its members met with Arab leaders, including the president of Egypt, the president of Syria and the king of Jordan. On the other hand, their meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was cold and led to great suspicion against Israel (Tveit, 1996: 606–609). The adoption of the Arab line continued and, in the autumn of 1979, a conference “Norway and the PLO” was held, at which a senior Labor party member, Thorbjørn Jagland, first declared support for the PLO and strengthened contacts with it (Strandå, 2011: 143). The first sign of the opening of contacts between Norway and the PLO was created with the increase of the UNIFIL force in 1978, in which Norway sent 1,000 Norwegian soldiers to participate in the force, and they reported to Oslo what was happening in Lebanon. In 1998, Norway decided to withdraw most of its forces after 20 years of operation in Lebanon. The official reason was that the Norwegians could not hold power in Lebanon and Bosnia simultaneously, and there is in this act to indicate the order of priority and the utilization of resources for the benefit of political objectives set by the Norwegian government. Similarly, as the Norwegians aspired to keep their troops, the diplomatic staff at the Norwegian Embassy in Cairo was also forced to review Beirut’s political work and make structural changes to establish a network of contacts with the guerrilla organizations in Lebanon. Hans Wilhelm Longva, who served as the Norwegian envoy to Lebanon and later as a special adviser to the Foreign Ministry, played a vital role in strengthening these ties. Longva’s main role, which operated from the Norwegian Embassy in Cairo, was to establish direct links between the Norwegian authorities and Lebanese groups, especially between Norwegian authorities and the local Palestinian leadership (Bygstad, 2004: 176; Johansen, 2008; Strømmen, 2005). As UNIFIL’s presence allowed the Norwegians to establish informal relations with the PLO, the Norwegian Ministry of Defense learned closely about the confrontation between Israel and the PLO and tried to avoid friction with both sides, while much information began to flow to the Foreign and Defense Ministries in Oslo. The vast amount of information that nourished Norway’s political system also expanded Norway’s limited objectives to a broader range (Bygstad, 2004: 181). Simultaneously, the Norwegians also used the workers’ organizations to form informal contacts with the local leadership. These visits symbolised the strengthening of

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Historical Background

support for Palestinians that led to additional civilian projects on behalf of NORAD (Bygstad, 2004: 184). The Palestinians, who were also acquainted with generous Norwegian economic aid, rewarded them with the transfer of information, and although Arafat initially opposed cooperating with the Norwegian forces, the PLO chairman promised the UNIFIL commander to cooperate with them. As time went on, thanks to Longva’s ties with Palestinians, the lives of many Norwegian soldiers were saved. According to the testimony of senior PLO official Bassam Abu Sharif, he used to warn Longva of planned attacks against Norwegian forces (Waage, 2000b: 28). The cooperation between the parties eventually led to a meeting between PLO representatives and Norwegian Minister of Defense Rolf Hansen, Norwegian Chief of Staff Sverre Hamre and Paul Engstad from the Norwegian Prime Minister’s Office (Waage, 2000b: 29). The beginnings of the contacts began in the early 1980s. As Norway’s participation in the UN Observer Force in Lebanon gave it an important grip on both sides and especially an “open door” for both, Norwegian diplomats became acquainted with the PLO movement and developed ties with its people. Similarly, then–Minister of Defense Johan Holst strengthened these ties because he wanted to reach common understandings with the PLO in southern Lebanon and to keep the Norwegian soldiers (Butenschøn, 1997: 18; Østerud, 1995: 5), while maintaining adequate relations also with the leadership in Israel. However, political change was delayed, and although meetings between the parties were kept secret and not made public until 1981, Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, who met with Yasser Arafat in Stockholm, refused to open a PLO mission in Oslo. Arafat told Longva, who served as Norway’s Ambassador to Kuwait when the PLO was interested in opening a direct dialogue with the United States, and Longva passed the messages to Stoltenberg furthermore tried to grope with the Americans without success (Waage, 2004: 40). Regardless of the development of the negotiations, the Norwegians maintained a positive image and relevance among the parties and in the eyes of the United States, anchored as having a political morality and influencing peace processes. Financial and political capital invested in and promised to Palestinians and Israel formed its role in mediation efforts and improved its international influence, thus linking Norwegian political realism and interests to Oslo’s foreign policy (Toje, 2010: 215). Reconciliation created an equation in which generous financial assistance was provided in exchange for vital ties with all parties. 2.3.2 Sweden Swedish foreign policy reflected in foreign aid, joint trade and support for the independence of developing countries based on recognise for each country’s sovereignty and agreed on international law (Brommesson, 2010:

Historical Background 19 225, 240–243; Carlsson, 1998). Since the preservation of neutrality was an important example of Sweden’s character and international prestige and national pride aspiration. Its commitment to a just and egalitarian world order reflected its aspiration for non-violent solutions out of adherence to the principles of international law. The Swedes maintained a neutral policy towards the United States and USSR and as a result Sweden emphasised its role in stabilising the war between the blocs (Sundelius, 1990) and refrained from overt agreements with one of the two powers. Swedish Foreign Minister, Östen Undén, who supported the idea of neutrality, proposed creating a Scandinavian Defense Alliance (SDU) in the summer of 1948, which Sweden obliged Denmark and Norway to refrain from any other alliance. Despite its proposal, Norway and Denmark decided to accede to the U.S. Defense Convention in 1949, while Sweden remained outside the alliance. Nevertheless, Sweden remained fundamental, as the United States, Norway and Denmark needed direct flight routes through its territory (Weinberger, 2001). Similarly, economic cooperation between the Scandinavian countries in order to create economic union (one of the cornerstones of Scandinavian states), between 1947 and 1959, was influenced by an overall American strategy that forced the Swedes to adapt to the goals of the American Marshall Plan (Jönsson, 1966). However, while maintaining a conciliatory line toward the superpowers and maintaining neutrality, in 1960 Sweden was considered an essential component of Western security doctrine in northern Europe and an important line of defense in NATO’s northern wing. Furthermore, Swedish researchers studying the Cold War revealed that under Amber Nine Arrangement, Sweden has secretly become part of the NATO infrastructure in northern Europe, contrary to its image and statements (Dalsjö, 2006; Nilsson, 2009; Nilsson, 2007: 43–56; Nilsson, 2006). Despite its attempts to disguise its contribution to Western countries, NATO cruise missiles, designed to pass on command day in Swedish and Finnish territory on their way to targets in the Soviet Union, created new political dilemmas in Sweden. Neutrality sparked a sharp debate about maintaining a vague pattern of security debate about maintaining a vague pattern of security. Since credibility was a critical factor in the success of any neutral policy (Bjereld, 2015; Eriksson, 2003; Karsh, 1988: 35–38; Nilsson, 1997), many feared that Sweden’s credibility had disintegrated and could lead the Soviets to act against it in secret. This is why Sweden adopted a more balanced line in the mid-1960s and has been more publicly critical of the persistence of international conflicts than in the 1940s and 1950s. Sweden has also participated in all peacekeeping missions. Since 1968, and has participated in most peacekeeping missions from all neutral European countries – Finland, Ireland and Austria – except Switzerland. Its participation in UN peacekeeping operations has also strengthened its role in missions that have required the confidence of both sides in the conflict compared to other countries (United Nations, 1990; Wehr and Lederach, 1991).

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Due to its international status as a neutral state, Sweden also hosted several international conferences on East-West relations (Bjereld, 1992: 99), while the Swedish public supported its intervention in conflicts in which the powers were involved (Bjereld and Demker, 2000; Brommesson, 2007). The benefit that Sweden derived from national doctrine did not reconcile its openness to undemocratic regimes and its support for them as in Zimbabwe. It created a covert struggle between its ideological preference for democratic regimes and its little political needs to support tyrannical regimes as well, and the strategic necessity and promotion of national interests overcame moral policy (Steene, 1989: 167–170, 187–190). As a result, moral policy, which was part of Sweden’s neutrality policy, did not change at the end of the Cold War and Sweden seek to pursue a policy outlined by Deputy Foreign Minister Pierre Schori, also known as the “Third Way” (Nilsson, 1991). In a world ruled by a politics of power and by promoting universal values, the most prominent was mediation and building trust. This model reflected in expressions of solidarity, assistance in civic development, policy initiatives, support for political movements and support for legal norms (Nilsson, 2006). The Swedes had no strategic or economic interests in the Middle East, but Sweden was dependent on Arab oil and the need to expand commercial deals with Arab countries, and this dependence had inevitable consequences for Israel and the Arabs. After World War II, Sweden agreed to send the Swedish jurist Emil Sandström to the Special Committee for Palestine (UNESCO), where he chaired the committee and played an essential role in the political efforts during 1947. The chairman of the committee that recommended the partition plan, was convinced that the Jewish-Zionist community (the Yishuv) could withstand the Arab attacks through the military organizations built in those years. Following his recommendations, the Norwegian UN secretary-general acted to persuade other countries to join an international force that will work to implement the UN timetable.5 It was Trygve Lie’s initiative to ensure that a candidate from Sweden would be able to maintain the success of the special committee. The Norwegian secretary-general also pressured Sandström to arrive first in New York for the opening meeting and not to arrive directly to the Middle East.6 Sandström’s report on conditions in Palestine was the basis The UN Partition Plan of November 29, 1947, and its efforts were appreciated by the Jewish community in Palestine, while the sympathetic line toward Israel continued at the United Nations (Robinson, 1947: 135). However, the genuine relationship did not continue after Israel War of Independence due to the Swedish Count Folke Bernadotte’s mission on behalf of the United Nations. In May 1948 he was chosen to serve as emissary and stated that although the chances of success were unlikely, he had to fulfill UN considerations. Suspicions of the leadership in Israel arose as Ben-Gurion noted that Bernadotte may be hostile to Israel since his proposals favored the position of the Arabs, even though they also rejected

Historical Background 21 his proposals (Eriksson, 2015: 48–49). The UN partition in 1948 strengthened the sense of hostility towards him (Marton, 1994: 18; Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016: 99) and eventually led to the assassination of Bernadotte by the Lehi organization.7 Swedish diplomat Sven Grafstrom also expressed insult when he wrote that Count Bernadotte, who was destined to be a hero of the Jews worldwide, was murdered by them amid to bring peace to the Holy Land (Abadi, 2001). Thus Sweden refused to support Israel’s request to join the UN General Assembly in 1949, arguing that a decision on the issue was a de jure recognition of Israel, and clarified that no decision would be made before the investigation into Bernadotte’s assassination was completed (Marton, 1994: 227–228). Apart from the failed mediation experience, political and military elements in Sweden preferred close ties with the Arabs thanks to the strategic and commercial advantages in the region. In the Suez Crisis of 1956, there were signs that Swedes became increasingly concerned about their ties with Arab countries and sought to improve them. As early as June 1956, the Swedish government decided to resume arms sales to Egypt after an extended embargo on arms shipments to the Middle East, but not to Israel (John, 1960: 221). On the other hand, in March 1957, Sweden was one of the few countries that agreed to sign a declaration supporting Israel’s right to free shipping in the Tiran Strait. Nevertheless, Stockholm Foreign Ministry continued to downplay pro-Israel actions, and in an effort to avoid damaging relations with Arab countries, Swedish officials deliberately avoided overt expressions of sympathy for Israel. However, even so 2 days after the outbreak of the Six-Day War, the Swedish prime minister praised Israel and said that for almost 20 years, the world had admired the rebirth of Israel, which had succeeded in creating a modern and democratic state. He explained that persecuted Jewish refugees around the world are fighting again, not only for freedom and liberty, but also for their existence (Bjereld 2002: 25). After the Six-Day War, there was another gradual change in policy toward Israel. As early as 1967, Swedish Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson addressed the United Nations and expressed hope for lasting peace in the Middle East. He supported the mission of Swedish diplomat Gunnar Jarring to the region and called on Israel to solve the problem of Arab refugees. Although the Palestinians did not appear in official documents in Sweden until 1956 and in 1974 they were mentioned only in the humanitarian context of their situation as Arab refugees without recognising their national rights. Yet, the Swedes gradually adopted the Palestinian history (Bjereld, 1989). Therefore, the Swedish government also supported the appointment of another Swedish official, Nils Goran Gussing, as a UN refugee expert and as a special representative of the Secretary-General U Thant, under the mandate of Resolution 242 calling on the parties to open negotiations based on territories in exchange for peace. With the opening of Jarring contacts

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between Israel and Arab countries, some of the region’s leaders changed the meaning of Resolution 242, which addressed the issue of withdrawal, by stating that the resolution called on Israel to withdraw from all the territories it occupied during the Six-Day War. Another falsification concerned the refugee problem and the claim that Resolution 242 confirmed the right of return of Arab refugees, although no question was mentioned in the original decision at all (Lapidoth, 2012). For it, Jarring avoided meetings with Palestinian representatives during his mission and explained that he did not meet with Arafat or PLO members, as they were not part of the UN Mandate (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016: 82). Alongside this policy, it was the Prime Minister of Sweden, Olof Palme, who clearly expressed the change of attitude towards Israel after the Six-Day War, and much criticised Israel and blamed it and not its neighbors. Despite this, in the fall of 1976, Thorbjörn Fälldin defeated Palme in the prime ministerial election and symbolised hope for adopting a compassionate attitude toward Israel, since Deputy Prime Minister Per Ahlmark had previously served as vice chairman of the Swedish-Israeli Friendship Association (Bjereld, 2002: 27–28). Nevertheless, the focus on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, especially in the years following the Yom Kippur War in 1973, was partly due to the Arab oil boycott with the goals to appease the Arab world (Bjereld, 1985; Bjereld, 2002: 28). These objectives continued through the Swedish Labor Party, which strengthened its ties with the PLO and in April 1983 invited Arafat to Stockholm and met him with the leaders of the Labor parties of Scandinavian countries. It was clear to cabinet ministers and Labor leaders that the invitation was from the government but was attributed to a party initiative. Bengt Säve-Söderbergh, a senior member of the party, reflected on the party’s policy towards the PLO. Without reference to PLO actions, Labor leaders hanged the blame on Begin’s government policy. Therefore, they believed that dialogue between the parties should be promoted through international pressure on Israel (ARAB/R/104/D/8, Refkod: 3651/460). Following Arafat’s invitation, then–Israeli Foreign Ministry DirectorGeneral David Kimche summoned Sweden’s Ambassador to Israel, Thorsten Orn, and condemned Sweden’s decision. He explained that it was an immoral political decision and noted that it would have grim consequences on peace efforts, since the PLO did not change its position and continued to support acts of terrorism (Eriksson, 2015: 77). Although Swedish Foreign Ministers from various parties supported talks between Israel and the Palestinians, the Swedish center and right-wing parties criticised the Labor Party after inviting Yasser Arafat to Stockholm. While the Labor Party saw the unconscious as a barrier to political compromise and sided with political pressure on Israel rather than the Palestinians, the Liberal Party supported a more supportive stance towards Israel, and a senior Liberal member, Olle Wastberg, said the Palestinians’ goal was to destroy Israel (ARAB/R/104/D/8, Refkod: 3651/460).

Historical Background 23 2.3.3 Denmark Similar to the image of its northern nationals, Denmark’s image as a small and friendly country had deep historical roots. It was strengthened after Denmark’s failed wars with Prussia (Germany) in 1850 and 1860, and especially after the Second Schleswig War in 1864, which led to the defeat and denim of territories of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg to Prussia (Henningsen and Hamre, 1991). This war became a traumatic event in Denmark and served as the basis for adopting a new foreign policy. From World War II to the end of the Cold War, Denmark’s foreign policy was based on political balance and was influenced by three main factors: (1) Denmark’s geo-strategic position; (2) the rivalries of the superpowers in the Cold War; (3) its identity as a small country with little influence on the international arena while avoiding power struggles (Heurlin, 2001; Malmvig, 2013: 7; Malmvig, 2015). The Danish foreign policy in the Cold War expressed on four levels: in defense policy through NATO, in economic cooperation through the European Community, in association and political identity through the Nordic Council and in the promotion of universal values through the United Nations (Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995: 38). Denmark, therefore, attached importance to the strengthening of NATO and the European Community, as these bodies maintained vital economic and military interests for them. Alongside them, Denmark assisted the Nordic Council and the United Nations and promoted policy issues at the regional and global levels. This policy also reflected the Danish perception of advancing peace issues separately from national security (Wivel, 2013: 306). Denmark has also called on the international community to recognise UN institutions as a legitimate factor in keeping the rule of law (through non-interference and respect for sovereignty, equality and conflict resolution by diplomatic means) and has seen the United Nations as an essential means of lowering tensions between powers. Thus, Denmark hoped that through an agreed framework for law and security, peaceful solutions to conflicts and political cooperation, it would influence an international system despite being a small country (Kjærsgaard, 2005: 72). As early as 1950, Denmark participated in UN peacekeeping missions in the Middle East. In this context, it sent two missions to the forces that oversaw the ceasefire in Gaza in the 1950s and also contributed to the UNOGIL peacekeeping force in Lebanon in 1958, which also supervised the withdrawal of British and American forces from Jordan and Lebanon (Haekkerup, 1964; Lawler, 2007; Wivel, 2005). Besides, Denmark had to find its place in the Cold War and define the space of action in which it could advance its interests and values without provoking the wrath of the powers. This policy allowed for a “third way” to discuss U.S. liberal capitalism and Soviet communism as a well-intentioned peace-loving country. Therefore, Denmark developed a cautious policy that also touched on global conflicts between East and West and established cooperation without provoking provocation to any party. In 1960, Danish

24

Historical Background

peace policy emphasised its moral superiority in foreign policy, and in 1963, Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag and Danish Foreign Minister Per Hækkerup travelled to the Soviet Union to bridge the gaps between East and West. Moreover, to promote cooperation with the satellite states of the Soviet Union that were less hostile to the West than the Soviet Union (Olesen and Villaume, 2006: 579; Olesen and Villaume, 2005). Denmark promoted ideas for dialogue between the countries of the Western and Eastern blocs, and in June 1966 tried to promote a conference between the Eastern bloc and the Western bloc. In 1972, Denmark’s vision came true (although its contribution at this stage was modest) when representatives from 34 countries from both blocs met in Helsinki for a summit meeting (Petersen, 2004: 147). In the following decades, however, due to its reservations about NATO policy, Denmark-US relations became tenser. Similarly, its foreign and security policy has openly clashed with American interests, such as its action in the Vietnam War, the arms race, and U.S. interventionist policies in Third World countries (Petersen, 2004: 235). Similar to Scandinavian policy, Denmark’s policy in the Israeli-Arab conflict was characterised by a balanced course of action that changed over time. Since the establishment of the UN Commission on the Division of the British Mandate, Danish politicians have feared the Arab response and refrained from participating in it (Arnheim and Levitan, 2011: 115–116) by virtue of being a sensitive issue. Although UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie asked the Danish Foreign Minister for the Danish Ambassador to Washington, Henrik Kauffmann, to chair the committee, senior Danish officials preferred that Kauffmann lead the talks between Denmark and the United States on establishing Americans bases in Greenland. Even though the Prime Minister of Denmark, Hans Hedtoft, who became acquainted with developments in the Middle East, agreed to host representatives from the Jewish Agency, as hosted by the other Scandinavian prime ministers. In contrast, Danish Foreign Minister Gustav Rasmussen formulated a more cautious policy in the Middle East and feared early recognition of Israel (Arnheim and Levitan, 2011: 140–141, 225). Although Denmark’s policy in the region has remained modest, Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag, who visited Israel in early 1965, well remembered the impression left by his visit to Yad Vashem and pledged to maintain a balanced approach to the conflict, taking into account Israel’s concerns (Kjeldgaard, 2007: 94). Simultaneously, following the Six-Day War in 1967, Denmark, as a member of the UN Security Council, helped formulate the UN compromise formula of Resolution 242 (Malmvig, 2013: 8). During the Six-Day War, Hans Tabor served as Denmark’s Ambassador to the United Nations,8 as Denmark was a member of the UN Security Council at the time, and under his position also chaired the ceasefire discussions on its behalf. When Israel’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Gideon Rafael, asked to announce Israel’s intention to accept the ceasefire, the Soviet Ambassador tried to deny him the right to speak, but Tabor, who chaired

Historical Background 25 the meeting, declined his request and Rafael officially notified of the ceasefire. At the end of the Six-Day War, Krag conducted a political campaign in favor of Israel and opposed the Soviet proposal for a full Israeli unconditional withdrawal. Krag also acted on broad considerations and believed that the solution was a guarantee of powers and direct talks between Israel and the Arabs, and already after the hostility began, Krag declared that Israel had fought for its third time for its independence in less than 20 years of existence. Following Denmark’s accession to the European Community in 1973, Denmark’s policy in the Middle East changed and was influenced by European policy (Hansen, 1998: 144). While Denmark was required to balance its policy towards Israel until joining the European Community, Denmark found it challenging to coordinate its positions and gradually adopted the European line towards conflict (Thune, 1984: 84). Likewise, in Denmark, the public discourse began to change. A review by Danish Foreign Ministry Director Eigil Jørgensen in 1979 stated that Danish foreign policy in the Israeli-Arab conflict continues to play a significant role in public discourse. Despite widespread sympathy for Israel, in these years Denmark has formed a common position with the Nordic countries and with the European community, which have been more rigid towards Israel (Kjeldgaard, 2007: 89). The chairman of the Labor Party’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Lasse Budtz, and the party’s secretary, Steen Christensen, also expressed a more positive attitude toward the Palestinians and opposed traditional support for Israel (Kjeldgaard, 2007: 95). Others described Israel’s action against Arbas as “unacceptable” and stressed that its arrogance could lead to isolation (Kjeldgaard, 2007: 90). Although Denmark officially refused to recognise the PLO, it also began contacting it through the Danish Embassy in Beirut. In 1982, Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen visited Jordan and Lebanon to examine the political process and perceive if Denmark could help reduce regional tensions by being the current president of the European Community. Jensen met in Beirut with the head of the PLO’s political department, and in November 1982 the Danish Foreign Minister visited Israel as well. One month after his visit, in December 1982, former Foreign Minister of Denmark and Norway, Kjeld Olsen and Knut Frydenlund met with Yasser Arafat and completed a round of meetings with all parties (Thune, 1984: 87). In this regard, Jensen noted that although Denmark’s traditional approach to Israel was warm, it acknowledged the issues affecting both sides, including the significance of Resolution 242 promoted by Denmark through the Security Council and its role in the European Community. During the Danish Foreign Minister’s visit in 1982, good relations developed between him and Defense Minister Moshe Arens, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Lebanese Foreign Minister Elie Salem, but Jensen was mainly impressed by his meetings with the king of Jorden and representatives of the royal family in Jordan. He saw them as an essential factor for the stability of the

26

Historical Background

area (Jensen, 2018). Although the Danish media reported that Jensen blamed Israel for the region’s problems, in Jansen’s eyes, the PLO chairman was a mysterious figure who also failed to find a common language with him (Jansen, 2018). Regardless, during this short period, Denmark recognised the complexity of the conflict and the difficulty of drawing up a Danish policy that would meet both the needs of the European Community and the needs of the parties and therefore had difficulty advancing further steps, even though it was President of the ECC. Unlike the Norwegian-PLO ties in Lebanon, in Denmark, the Palestinian Workers’ Union (PWU), the most crucial Palestinian organization in Denmark in those years (Schmidt, 2009: 323, 328, 335), established joint circles with Danish solidarity groups, the most important of which was the Danish-Palestinian Friends, thus creating an extensive network of ties for the PLO. In this context, the security services in Denmark discovered that a Palestinian citizen living in Denmark had contacted a major political party that also updated the head of the PLO bureau in Copenhagen to take advantage of these ties to recognise the PLO. Evidence of the depth of the relationship between PLO organizations in Europe and the Middle East was revealed in January 1987, when the PLO delegation in Copenhagen was in continuous contact with the PLO delegation in Baghdad to follow a policy while also exposing the activities of Force 17 in Denmark (von Essen, LangJensen, Mariager and Tamm, 2009: 260–261). Despite PLO activities in Copenhagen, Palestinian involvement in Denmark did not extend beyond communist left-wing circles.

Notes 1 A 15th-century Latin chronicle, “Chronicon Holsatiae vetus” states that the Danes were of the Tribe of Dan. One reference was King Dan of Denmark, traditionally recognised as the first king of Denmark and the one who gave the country its name. He was considered a mythological rather than a historical figure in the preChristian history of Denmark. One of the supporters of this belief was John Cox Gawler a British Israelite author who identified the Tribe of Dan with Denmark in his work Dan, the pioneer of Israel. Gawler’s work also influenced the Nordic Israelism movement that emerged in the late 19th century in the belief that Scandinavians descend from the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel. Founders of Danish Pentecostalism and the “Apostolic Church” were thought to have been early pioneers in the Nordic-Israelism movement. See Richard Cole, The Jew Who Wasn’t There: Studies on Jews and Their Absence in Old Norse Literature (Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, Doctoral dissertation, 2015). 2 It should be attributed to the activities of Scandinavian politicians who have laid the political foundations for any international involvement and to their right to influence it despite their limited capacity. 3 Ragvald Alfred Roscher Lund was one of the pioneers in the field of information encryption who assisted Norway during World War II. He was in charge of Intelligence and security services but his most unique contribution was recruitment of volunteers for the Norwegian encryption Project. The recruitment took place through seemingly innocent articles in magazines. Lund had

Historical Background 27

4

5

6

7

8

written an article on crypto-logic and those who submitted strong solutions received a letter with more tasks until he felt they were appropriate for recruitment. Lund took over as intelligence chief of the black chamber in collaboration with the General Staff and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, leading the initiative for recruitment of civilians to black chamber activities. Lund had exclusive contacts in the Swedish Military intelligence which informed him about German naval movements and plans. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Norwegian governments were concerned about their growing dependence on oil or, as economists used to warn, on the risk of exposure to the “Dutch disease”. In the following years, the Norwegians were able to promote a stable economic model based not only on oil and natural gas production but by diverting capital to sectors and commodities that were not exposed to the oil market. Financial liberalization in the mid-1980s generated a wide range of credit in Norway, especially between 1985 and 1987. Norwegian banks expanded their operations in other regions and competed aggressively with other banks by expanding lending domestically and internationally (Steigum, 2009). Norway’s financial stability and economic development were able to support foreign relations aspirations. The Swede was independent during his work on the UN Commission and did not receive instructions from Sweden. Sweden, which wanted to emphasize its objectivity, did not want a representative linked to the political system and therefore elected Sandström. see Ben- Dror, The Road to Partition: UNSCOP and the beginning of United Nations Involvement in the Israeli-Arab Conflict (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben Zvi, 2019), pp. 48–49. Ben- Dror, The Road to Partition: UNSCOP and the beginning of United Nations Involvement in the Israeli-Arab Conflict (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben Zvi, 2019), p. 67. Ben- Dror also notes that Bunche made a particular effort to persuade UNSCOP chairman Emil Sandström, who was the leading the support for the partition plan, to withdraw his support. The assassination operation was evidenced by the personal assistant and son of the Swedish consul in Jerusalem, Theo Larsson, who wrote in his memoirs that Bernadotte shot in Larsson’s car with a French colonel. Once in the Katamon area, they were stopped by four or five people, and then fired from a short-range machine gun (Larsson, 1995: 93–94). Yehoshua Zettler commander of the Lehi in Jerusalem, who led the assassination operation in Bernadotte after the decision was made by the Lehi leadership, was interviewed by Israeli scholar Elad BenDror and was surprised when he explained to him the central role played by the American diplomat Ralph Bunche. ‘Bunche was hiding behind Bernadotte’s back’, he said but even if Bunche was the planner, Zettler clarified, Bernadotte was the only one which had the strength and courage to promote and execute the initiative. See also: Elad Ben-Dror, Ralph Bunche and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Mediation and the UN 1947–1949 (London: Routledge, 2016). He later became Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs from October 1967 to February 1968.

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Nilsson, Dahl Ann-Sofie (2006). “Sweden: Once a moral superpower, always a moral superpower?”, International Journal, Vol. 61(4): 895–908. Nilsson, Mikael (2007). Tools of Hegemony: Military Technology and SwedishAmerican Security Relations, 1945–1962. Stockholm: Santérus Forlag, Santérus Academic Press Sweden. Nilsson, Mikael (2009). “Amber nine: NATO’s secret use of a flight path over Sweden and the incorporation of Sweden in NATO’s infrastructure”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 44(2): 287–307. Olsen, Gorm Rye (2005). “Danish Aid Policy in the Post-Cold War Period: Increasing Resources and Minor Adjustments”, pp. 184–215. In Olav Stokke and Paul Hoebink (Eds.), On European development cooperation: policy and performance of individual countries and the EU. New York: Routledge. Olesen, Thorsten Borring and Poul Villaume (2005). Dansk Udenrigspolitiks Historie 1945–1972 – Bind 5 [Danish Foreign Policy’s history – 1945–1972 – Vol. 5]. København: Gyldendal Leksikon. Olesen, Thorsten Borring and Poul Villaume (2006). I blokopdelingens tegn. 1945–1972 Dansk udenrigspolitiks historie, bd. 5 [In the Block Division’s Characters. 1945–1972 History of the Danish Foreign Policy, Vo. 5]. København: Gyldendal. Østerud, Øyvind (1995). “Between Realism and Crusader Diplomacy – Correlates of the Norwegian Channel to Jericho”. Working Paper 02. Oslo: University of Oslo. Department of Political Science. Østerud, Øyvind (2005). “Introduction: The peculiarities of Norway”, West European Politics,, Vol. 28(4): 705–720. Østerud, Øyvind (2006). “Lite land som humanitær stormakt [Small country as a humanitarian super power]”, Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, Vol. 23(4): 303–316. Ottosen, Kristian (1990). Liv eller Dod: Historien om Sachsenhausen-fangene [Life or Death: The Story of the Sachsenhausen Prisoners]. Oslo: Aschehoug. Petersen, Nikolaj (2004). Europæisk og globalt engagement 1973–2003 [European and Global Engagement 1973–2003]. København: Danmarks Nationalleksikon. Pruitt, G. Dean (1997). “Ripeness theory and the Oslo talks”, International Negotiation, Vol. 2(2): 237–250. Rasmussen, V. Mikkel (2005). “What’s the use of It?: Danish strategic culture and the utility of armed force”, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 40(1): 67–89. Richmond, Oliver and Jason Franks (2009). Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Riste, Olav (1983). Frå integritetstraktat til atompolitikk:Det stormaktsgaranterte Norge 1905–1983, FFHS-notat nr. 2 [From integrity Treaty to Nuclear Policy: Norway Superpower Guaranteed 1905–1983, FHF Paper No. 2]. Oslo: Forsvarets Høgskole. Riste, Olav (2001). Norway’s Foreign Relations – A History. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Riste, Olav (2004). “NATO’s Northern Frontline in the 1980s”, pp. 301–311. In Olav NjØlstad (Ed.), The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation. London and New York: Frank Cass. Robinson, Jacob (1947). Palestine and the United Nations: Prelude to Solution. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press. Sanness, John (1976). “Israel og Statsdannelsen” [“Israel and the Birth of the State”], pp. 95–104. In Hallvard Rieber Mohn and Leo Eitinger (Eds.), Retten til å overleve: en bok om Israel, Norge og antisemittismen [The right to Survive: A Book About Israel, Norway and Anti-Semitism]. Oslo: Cappelen.

Historical Background 33 Schmidt, Regin (2009). PET’s overvågning af politiske partier 1945–1989: PET, Folketingets partier og østlig efterretningsaktivitet. PET-kommissionens beretning bind 7 [PET’s Monitoring of Political Parties 1945–1989: PET, Parliamentary Parties and Eastern Intelligence Activity. PET Commission Report Volume 7]. København: Justitsministeriet. Selbervik, Hilde (1997). Aid as a Tool for Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy: What can Norway do? Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Selbervik, Hilde (2003). Power of the Purse? Norway as a Donor in the Conditionality epoch 1980–2000. Bergen, University of Bergen: Ph.D. Dissertation. Selbervik, Hilde, Knut Nygaard (2006). Nordic Exceptionalism in Development Assistance? Aid Policies and the Major Donors: The Nordic Countries. Bergen: CMI Reports Chr. Michelsen Institute. Sæbø, Magne (1976). “Det norske kristenfolket” [“The Norwegian Christian people”], pp. 121–129. In Hallvard Rieber-Mohn og Leo Eitinger (Eds.), Retten til å overleve. En bok om Israel, Norge og antisemittismen [The right to survive. A Book About Israel, Norway and Anti-Semitism]. Oslo: Cappelen. Skard, Sigmund (1982). Mennesket Halvdan Koht [The Person: Halvdan Koht] Oslo: Samlaget. Skånland, Øystein Haga (2008). Norway is a Peace Nation: Discursive Preconditions for the Norwegian Peace Engagement Policy. Oslo, University of Oslo: Department of Political Science: Master thesis. Skogrand, Kjetil (2004). Alliert i krig og fred 1940–1970 Norsk forsvarshistorie, bind 4 [Ally in War and Peace 1940–1970 Norwegian Defense History, Vol. 4.]. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Staur, Carsten (2016). “Ready for Membership? Denmark and Israel’s Application for Membership of the United Nations in May 1949”, pp. 75–94. In Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen (Eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2016. Copenhagen: DIIS. Steene, S Mikael (1989). “Role Model or Power Pawn? The Changing Image of Swedish Foreign Policy, 1929–1987”, pp. 167–194. In Bengt Sundelius (Ed.), The Committed Neutral: Sweden’s Foreign Policy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Stokke, Olav (1989). Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty. The Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Strandå, Tom Rune (2011). “Protest og pragmatism AUF og Midtøsten-konflikten 1967–81” [“Protest and pragmatism AUF and the Middle East conflict 1967–81]”, pp. 127–151. Arbeiderhistor. Tema: De politiske ungdomsorganisasjonene på venstresiden [Labor History Theme: The political youth organizations on the left]. Strømmen, Wegger (2005). I kamp for fred: UNIFIL i Libanon – Norge i UNIFIL: 1978–1998 [In the Struggle for Peace: UNIFIL in Lebanon – Norway in UNIFIL: 1978–1998]. Oslo: Gazette bok. Sundelius, Bengt (1990). “Sweden: Secure neutrality”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 512(1): 116–124. Svensson, Isak (2009). “Who brings which peace? Neutral versus biased mediation and institutional peace arrangements in civil wars”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53(3): 446–469. Tamnes, Rolf (1997). Oljealder 1965–1995, i Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie [Older Age 1965–1995, in the History of Norwegian Foreign Policy], vol. 6. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

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Thune, Christian (1984). “Denmark”, pp. 80–90. In David John Allen and Alfred Pijpers (Eds.), European Foreign Policy-Making and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Thune, Henrik and Leiv Lunde (2013). Hva Norge kan være i verden [What Norway Can be in the World]. Oslo: Cappelen Damm. Toje, Asle (2010). “Norsk utenrikspolitikk: En kritikk” [“Norwegian foreign policy: A critique”], Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, Vol. 1(2): 206–217. Tostensen, Arne (2004). “Review of Terje Tvedt, ‘Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt: Den norske modellen’” [“Review of Terje Tvedt, ‘Development aid, foreign policy and power: The Norwegian model’”], Historisk tidsskrift, Vol. 83(2): 338–344. Tveit, Odd Karsten (1996). Alt for Israel: Oslo-Jerusalem 1948–78 [Everything for Israel: Oslo-Jerusalem 1948–78]. Oslo: Cappelen. Tvedt, Terje (1998). Angels of Mercy, or Development diplomats?: NGOs & Foreign Aid. New Jersey: Africa World Press. Tvedt, Terje (2003). Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt: Den norske modellen [‘Development Aid, Foreign Policy and Power: The Norwegian Model’]. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk. Tvedt, Terje (2007). “International development aid and its impact on a donor country: A case study of Norway”, The European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 19(4): 614–635. Ulriksen, Ståle (2002). Den norske forsvarstradisjonen [The Norwegian Defence tradition]. Oslo: Pax. United Nations (1990). The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations PeaceKeeping. New York: Department of Public Information, UN. Van der Veen, Anne Maurits (2000). Ideas and Interests in Foreign Policy: The Politics of Official Development Assistance. Massachusetts, Harvard University: Department of Government: Ph.D. Dissertation. Vogt, Carl Emil (2007). Nansens kamp mot hungersnøden i Russland 1921–1923. [The Struggle of Nansen Against Starvation in Russia 1921–1923] Oslo: Aschehoug. Von Essen, Sarah, Sebastian Lang-Jensen, Rasmus Mølgaard Mariager and Ditlev Tamm (2009). PET’s overvågning af den antiimperialistiske venstrefløj 1945-1989: Trotskister, maoister, Appel-gruppen, Fælles Kurs Klubben, Skolesamvirket Tvind, Den Røde Højskole samt solidaritetsbevægelser, Vol. 9, PETkommissionens beretning [PET’s monitoring of the anti-imperialist left 1945–1989: Trotskyists, Maoists, the Appel Group, the Joint Course Club, the School Cooperation Tvind, The Red College and solidarity movements. Vol. 9, PET commission’s report]. København: Justitsministeriet. Waage, H. Henriksen (1989). Da Staten Israel Ble til: Et Stridssp0rsmal i Norsk Politikk 1945–49 [When the State of Israel was Born: A Matter of Political Conflict in Norwegian Policy 1945–49]. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Waage, H. Henriksen (1996). Norge – Israels Beste Venn: Norsk Midt0sten-Politikk 1949–56]Norway – Israel’s Best Friend: Norwegian Middle East Policy 1949–56]. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget Waage, H. Henriksen (1998). “Norway and a major international crisis: Suez – The very difficult case”, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 9(3): 211–241. Waage, H. Henriksen (2000a). “How Norway became one of Israel’s best friends”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37(2): 189–211.

Historical Background 35 Waage, H. Henriksen (2000b). Norwegians? Who Needs Norwegians? Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway’s Political Past in the Middle East. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Evaluation Report. Waage, H. Henriksen (2009). “Fredspolitikk i Midtøsten” [Peace Policy in the Middle East], pp. 157–208. In Even Lange, Helge Pharo and Øyvind Østerud (Eds.), Vendepunkter i norsk utenrikspolitikk [Points in Norwegian Foreign policy]. Oslo: Unipub. Waage, H. Henriksen (2004). Peacemaking is a Risky Business: Norway’s Role in the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1993–96, Oslo: International Peace Research Institute. Waage, H. Henriksen (2005). “Norway’s role in the middle east peace talks: Between a strong state and a weak belligerent”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 34(4): 6–24. Wallensteen, Peter and Isak Svensson (2016). Fredensdiplomater. Nordisk medling från Bernadotte till Ahtisaari [Peace Diplomats. Nordic mediation from Bernadotte to Ahtisaari]. Stockholm: Santérusförlag. Weinberger, Hans (2001). “The Neutrality Flagpole: Swedish Neutrality Policy and Technological Alliances, 1945–1970”, pp. 259–331. In Michael Thad Allen and Gabrielle Hecht (Eds.), Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes. Cambridge: The MIT Press. Wehr, Paul and John Paul Lederach (1991). “Mediating conflict in central America”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 28(1): 85–98. Wivel, Anders (2005). “Between paradise and power: Denmark’s transatlantic dilemma”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 36(3): 417–421. Wivel, Anders (2013). “From Peacemaker to Warmonger? Explaining Denmark’s Great Power Politics”, Swiss Political Science Review, Vol. 19(3): 298–321. Zoref, Hagai, Yemima Rosenthal and Arnon Lamprom (2009). ‫ הנשיא השישי‐ מבחר‬﹕‫הרצוג‬ ‫ חיים‬1997 ‐1918 ‫[ תעודות מפרקי חייו‬Haim Herzog: The Sixth President - A Selection of Certificates of Life Chapters 1918–1997]. Jerusalem: Israel State Archives.

Interviews Hanssen-Bauer, Jon (April 6, 2017). (Senior diplomat for the Middle East peace process at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Tel Aviv: Personal interview. Uffe, Ellemann-Jensen (January 17, 2018). (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 1982–1992), Copenhagen: Personal interview.

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The Norwegian mediation efforts were known as the Oslo Process in the name of the Norwegian capital where Israel and the PLO signed a joint formula after months of secret and informal negotiations. This joint formula became the Declaration of Principles later signed on White House lawn and Oslo became the “Peace Capital”. According to Marianne Heiberg, the wife of the Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Holst, the Oslo Process was a common source of Norwegian pride (Henrikson, 2005: 80). For the first time since foreign diplomats had tried to mediate between the parties, it was Norwegian diplomats who managed to remove negative images of the parties, focus on long-term solutions and promote possible reconciliation. Ostensibly, within six months, the Norwegians were able to formulate an agreement that usually would take years to accomplish in international disputes (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016: 209). For some sections of the Norwegian government, the Oslo Process began in 1991 when the Swedes stopped promoting contacts between the parties. At that moment, the Norwegian mediators took the initiative as Norwegian Foreign Minister described the Norwegian took the baton in the Scandinavians mediation relay race (Stoltenberg, 2001).

3.1 Building the channel: Opening the Oslo channel In the early stages of the Norwegian foreign policy overtures, Norwegian diplomats acted to establish and maintain contacts with the parties on several levels. Their outreach was characterised by a commitment to longterm mediation achieved through patience, perseverance and means of persuasion. Officially, Norway outlined extensive ties with the Israeli and Arab sides (Grønstad, 2008: 19) including a direct appeal to the political echelon. At the same time, Norway worked to establish an unofficial channel that would promote substantive understandings between the parties in order to appropriate the political channel for secret mediation in Oslo. This required repeated appeals to heads of the parties and contacts with people who were outside of the professional political circles. Although the Oslo approach was elusive, and its outcome not guaranteed, the Norwegian DOI: 10.4324/9781003365198-3

Norway 37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported economic and moral persuasion, which also indirectly helped strengthen Norwegian interests (Egeland, 1985; Waage, 2004). The previous success of Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson in mediating and conducting talks between Jewish representatives from the United States and the PLO chairman in 1988 provided infrastructure for Scandinavian mediation. Because the Swedes had not gained the trust of Israel through their efforts at mediation, the Norwegian Foreign Minister believed that Norway should initiate its own political agenda. Norwegian diplomatic objectives were aimed at building a dialogue towards negotiations within the framework of a regional arrangement (Aggestam, 1999: 118). In the Norwegian view, Arafat had tried at least eight times to open a dialogue with Israeli representatives through Norway during the 1980s. Arafat attached importance to the Norwegian mediator Stoltenberg who, in his eyes, had won the attention of Israel (Hanssen-Bauer, 2017). At the Arafat and Stoltenberg meeting in January 1989, the PLO chairman requested explicit Norwegian involvement with the intention of meeting with Israeli representatives either in public or in secret. Arafat also supported the idea of initiating a meeting through Norwegian research institutes and tried to convey a message to Moshe Arens through the Norwegians to support a secret channel (Pundak, 2013: 54–55; Waage, 2007: 163). Three months after that meeting, Stoltenberg met with Prime Minister Shamir and Foreign Minister Arens, who made it clear that Israel did not want to talk to the PLO. Israeli foreign ministry stressed that further messages from Arafat were undesirable. Israel’s cold and suspicious attitude (Waage, 2002: 605–607) did not discourage Norwegian attempts to open contacts. Due to Stoltenberg’s meeting with Arafat in January 1989, the Norwegian Foreign Minister believed that bilateral talks could be promoted either directly or secretly with the help of Norwegian research institutions (Stoltenberg, 2001: 166–167). To this end, the Norwegian Foreign Minister and his deputy met with Palestinian figures in the West Bank and PLO members during 1991–1992, including Faisal Husseini, Hanan Ashrawi, Nabil Shaath, Bassam Abu Sharif and Ahmed Qurei, known as Abu Ala. According to the Norwegians, they all expressed support for Norwegian mediation (Butenschøn, 1997). Palestinians assumed that Norway would be able to act as a mediator between Israel and the Palestinians due to the support Norway had given to Israel in the past and the trust it had gained (Ashrawi, 1995; Melchior, 2018). In January 1992, Faisal Husseini offered his help in initiating a political process (Pundak, 2013: 55–56). In February 1992, Jan Egeland,1 a political science researcher, was appointed Norwegian deputy Foreign Minister. He focused Norwegian resources on the Israeli-Arab conflict. Along with official activities and exploration efforts, Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoltenberg enlisted the help of Norwegian researchers working in the region to formulate a political move between Israelis and Palestinians. They were

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joined by Marianne Heiberg, wife of Johan Holst, who became an important part of the unofficial network in the West Bank. The Norwegian team helped maintain ties between the foreign ministry in Oslo and the PLO in Tunis that led to an important exchange of messages in those years (Seliktar, 2009: 13). To understand the extent of the unofficial activities that were carried out during Norway’s fledgling diplomatic efforts and the myriad relationships that were formed, it is important to know FAFO, the Research Institute of the Norwegian Trade Unions. In 1982, the Labor Party in Norway assisted in the establishment of FAFO which engaged in various social research projects, but focused mainly on the situation of Palestinians in the territories. Terje Rød-Larsen was appointed director of the FAFO Institute in 1982. By the end of the 1980s, the institute had succeeded in establishing a system of contacts with the Palestinians in the territories with the encouragement of the Norwegian Foreign Office. Through these contacts, it became clear to the Norwegians that the PLO in Tunis was leading the Palestinian leadership in the territories. Thereafter, Norwegian seek to create a direct ties with them (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016). By 1992, a vital collaboration had been established between Jan Egeland, deputy to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thorvald Stoltenberg, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Terje Rød-Larsen, Director of the FAFO Institute. They believed that together they could help the parties overcome their lack of communication and proposals were made to open an indirect channel between Israel and the PLO. The FAFO institute was promoted because the Norwegians believed that even in the event of leaks of the unofficial mediation channel, FAFO could provide a cover with their academic research activities that included dialogue and deepening the involvement; building a database that included new insights and creative ways of advancing negotiation (Hanssen-Bauer, 2017). The unofficial channel had clear advantages, the most important of which was the high ranking level of the participants. The Norwegians decided to promote the indirect channel when in early 1992 Abu Ala and Egeland, the Norwegian deputy Foreign Minister, met to discuss opening an unofficial channel between Israel and the Palestinians. In parallel, Larsen met with top PLO officials in Tunis. A short time later, in April 1992, Larsen met with Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin to discuss official negotiations in Washington. At the end of their meeting, Larsen proposed arranging a meeting between Beilin and Faisal Husseini in East Jerusalem (Eriksson, 2015: 100). According to Beilin, it was the Norwegian Foreign Minister’s decision to approve Larsen’s unofficial initiative ensuring confidentiality, providing infrastructure and transferring financial assistance that created the window of opportunity for the Norwegians (Beilin, 2018). In September 1992, Egeland visited Israel and met with Yossi Beilin. Although Beilin refused Egeland’s offer to meet with a PLO representative, he did not reject Egeland’s proposal that Norway might be a vital mediator

Norway 39 (Behrendt, 2007: 47). This meeting added significant momentum for the promotion of the Norwegian channel. As a result, the Norwegians tried to arrange a meeting through Beilin’s aide, Shlomo Gur, and Husseini’s office. However, Egeland, the Norwegian deputy minister who sought to promote a meeting between Beilin and Husseini, did not know that two Israeli scholars, Ron Pundak and Yair Hirschfeld, had already opened talks with Husseini and were conveying messages between Husseini and Beilin (Pundak, 2013: 52). In the eyes of the Norwegians, Beilin was an important liaison and a pragmatic figure who, even then, was identified by the top of the Oslo political officials as a key figure in future discussions with the Palestinians. The Norwegians tried to keep several channels open at the same time. Stoltenberg met with Rabin in August 1992, but the Israeli prime minister was not interested in his initiative to arrange a meeting between Israelis and Palestinian representatives. Although all of these Norwegian efforts were not successful, their appeal to a number of personalities was not in vain. On several occasions, Hirschfeld befriended Larsen. At one of their meetings, on the recommendation of Hanan Ashrawi, Larsen revealed to Hirschfeld that he had met with Abu Ala in London. This disclosure indicated to Hirschfeld that Larsen did indeed have direct contact with the top leaders of the PLO. In this context, Larsen’s activity was essential because he was not a member of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ staff and, like Pundak and Hirschfeld, acted without official status (Pundak, 2013: 51). By now, the Norwegian overtures had been rebuffed by Israel on several occasions. Since Norwegian officials understood that Hirschfeld had received political backing from Beilin, they supported Larsen’s explorations with Hirschfeld (Hanssen-Bauer, 2017). At the same time, since Beilin had not outright rejected Egeland’s proposal, the Norwegians hoped that Arafat’s statement in Sweden from 1988, which allowed contacts with Israeli representatives from the Labor Party and Palestinian representatives with close ties to the PLO, would lead to a political channel. Because of the meetings between Faisal Husseini and members of the Israeli Labor Party (Pundak, 2013: 25) and a series of meetings between Israeli and Palestinian scholars (Behrendt, 2007: 66), the Norwegians were encouraged to initiate a political channel once again. Abu Ala was viewed by the Norwegians as an important personality who had contacts affiliated with the PLO. Larsen saw him a possible connecting thread for promoting further contacts. At the end of 1992, Larsen met with Abu Ala and succeeded in persuading him to meet with Hirschfeld, expecting that the meeting would create substantial connections. At this time, Larsen worked to create an academic seminar as the cover for the Oslo peace talks. He was assisted by two other researchers at the FAFO institute, Even Aas and Geir Pedersen, who were included as non-political aides (Aggestam, 2002: 66; Rynhold, 1999: 215). In November 1992, Longva, who had been the Norwegian envoy to the PLO on behalf of Foreign Minister

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Stoltenberg during their participation in the UN Peace Keeping Force in Lebanon, helped to anchor the Norwegian involvement (Waage, 2000b: 82). Longva and Larsen were two examples of unofficial actors employed by the Norwegians over many years who became an essential factor in the success of the Norwegian channel. Sudden and independent events influenced Norway’s success in actually opening the unofficial channel of mediation between Israel and the Palestinians. In December 1992, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin ordered the deportation of 415 Hamas members to Lebanon. In response to the expulsion, Hamas representatives appealed the decision immediately to the Israel High Court. In doing so, Israel lost the surprise effect of the action as Lebanon managed to understand the meaning of the decision and closed its border with Israel. The deported Hamas members were gradually returned to the West Bank under cover of secrecy. There were many repercussions to this fiasco. Rabin’s single act created an international crisis which resulted in political tensions with Washington. The U.S. administration supported a resolution condemning Israel in the UN Security Council by withholding its vote. To repel some of the international criticism of his action, Rabin agreed to approve the joining of Faisal Husseini, a dominant figure in Palestinian political circles, to the official negotiating team with Israel in Washington (Rynhold, 1999: 209–210). Seeing Husseini receive legitimacy in the eyes of Rabin, Shimon Peres, Israel Minister of Foreign Affairs concluded he would also be able to meet with Husseini. Subsequently, Peres offered to meet with Husseini in Jerusalem to examine opening a direct channel of dialogue, even though it was known that the Palestinians preferred secret meetings that focused on the nature of the relationship along with concrete proposals (Pundak, 2013: 77). Because the timing of the Norwegian initiative coincided with this incident, Palestinian leaders gained a false impression. As early as September 1992, the Palestinians had linked Norwegian activity to meetings with American personalities and erroneously believed that a mechanism had been created to open a secret channel between the parties as part of an overall American initiative (Pundak, 2013: 57). The Palestinians believed that Rabin’s decision to include Faisal Husseini in talks between the parties in Washington was the result of direct American pressure and therefore linked the American efforts to the Norwegian initiatives. In reality, there was no evidence of this linkage. Nevertheless, in December 1992, Abu Ala agreed, on Abu Mazen’s recommendation, to open informal talks under the mandate of the PLO leadership (Abbas, 1995: 113). During this time Hirschfeld met with Abu Ala in London in the presence of Larsen. Abu Ala agreed to continue the unofficial talks in parallel to the talks in Washington. Larsen also received permission from Arafat for the unofficial talks. Although the PLO chairman agreed to a political channel between the PLO and Israeli representatives through the Norwegians, Yossi Beilin, deputy of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, made it clear that if the unofficial conversations were exposed to the public, the talks would

Norway 41 be denied any authority and given no official Israeli support (Eriksson, 2015: 102; Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016: 31). The Gulf War in 1990 was another factor that affected Israel and Palestinians in different ways. In Israel, the defeat of Saddam Hussein in Iraq changed the IDF’s strategic perceptions of the Middle East as Iraq was no longer a major threat from the eastern front. This made it possible for Israel to reset its defense priorities and to consider more directly how to approach the Palestinian question. As might be expected, there were political changes in the Arab world as well. Arafat had supported Saddam Hussein. In response, Arab countries banished him by cutting aid to both Arafat and the PLO. Due to PLO support for Iraq, Kuwait expelled hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who worked in the oil industry. This expulsion had significant, negative financial repercussions as it effected Palestinian families in the West Bank as well as the PLO (Khalidi, 2006). As a result of these financial blows, Arafat was forced to make broad cuts in the PLO budget and seek new sources of funding for the organization. The fact that almost half of the organization’s budget financed security mechanisms led the PLO to fear losing its authority within Palestinian political circles and in the territories (Karsh, 2014; Parsons, 2005: 129–130).2 Like other peace attempts where unofficial and informal talks develop into formal and official agreements, one nation’s transition period creates an opportunity for another country to advance their own diplomacy. So, it was for the mediators from Oslo. These temporary setbacks for Israel and the Palestinians may have provided an opportunity for Norway to initiate contact again and thrust itself into the mediation arena, hoping to promote itself as an international peace broker. But it was, perhaps, an inauspicious beginning for the two main parties involved. After all, the Oslo process did not necessarily reflect an historic national decision and a change in the PLO’s basic positions, but rather reflected the PLO’s desire to open a direct channel with Israel. Arafat was interested in strengthening his standing in the eyes of the Arab world after the war in Iraq. In addition, he wanted to put the Palestinian issue in the forefront of bilateral discussions with Israel. He was wary of the regional peace talks in Washington, D.C., that included Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, fearing that they would not, in the end, allow for an independent Palestinian state. Moreover, the PLO had to reconsider their long-term objectives involving the right of return and the right of self-determination. The PLO leadership recognised that the return of the entire homeland was an impossible goal at that time. Instead, the PLO seemed willing to compromise and agree to a political settlement that would ensure the establishment of a state within 1967 borders, but leave the 1948 border open to future generations (Lavie, 2015). In Israel’s view, the Palestinians’ intention was to concentrate on the major security components at the beginning of the talks so that eventually the negotiations for a permanent agreement would take place without bargaining space for Israel (Karsh, 2016).

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Preserving its Jewish identity was as crucial for Israel as retaining control of the elements of its national security. The Palestinians sought recognition that would lead to Israeli withdrawal from the territories and allow the setup of independent rule for the Palestinians. Arafat’s objectives were aimed at isolating the Palestinian issue from any agreement between Israel and Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. In the face of these different positions, needs and perceptions, Israel did not abandon their many parallel diplomatic channels from which they learned about the varied attitudes of the Arab world. For example, they learned from the Israeli-Syrian channel that Syria’s leader Assad was furious at the PLO for attempting to takeover negotiations with Israel and taking the spotlight off Syrian interest in the Golan Heights.

3.2 The first three rounds Cooperation between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the FAFO Institute was extensive and laid the unofficial infrastructure for the talks in Oslo in several different ways. In addition to the academic seminar cover in Oslo, the Norwegians maintained a separate channel of communication through FAFO in Cairo involving Israeli representatives, a number of Arab diplomats, and PLO representatives in Egypt (Hanssen-Bauer, 2017). The strategy was that even if talks between Israeli representatives and the PLO were exposed in Oslo, the Norwegians could claim that there were several channels of dialogue organised through FAFO in other centers. The secret channel of meetings between Palestinian and Israeli representatives began in London and dealt mainly with economic cooperation. Those meetings were transformed into substantive talks in Oslo (Beilin, 2018). To Pundak, the Israeli academic representative, Norway was able to establish the Oslo Channel “rather by chance” (Pundak, 2013: 54). Contrary to his opinion, there was a wide perception that the Norwegians’ soft diplomacy efforts were very effective because they managed to disguise the focus of the talks and move them to Oslo (Parsons, 2005: 75). Furthermore, it seems that the initial statements of the Norwegians to the participants in the early talks did not necessarily correspond to their longterm intentions. The Norwegians told the parties that the talks in Oslo did not require active mediation, but rather involved providing a safe environment for the talks and maintaining complete secrecy. Larsen testified that due to the purpose of the talks, the Norwegians avoided physical presence in the meetings so that the parties could form mutual understandings among themselves on core issues (Eriksson, 2015: 104; Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016: 100). In fact, Stoltenberg stated that the Norwegian mediation team remained open and without bias or interests in the conflict (Pundak, 2013: 87–88). Similarly, Egeland clarified to Pundak that the Norwegian’s main role was to host the talks based on their status in the eyes of the parties (Pundak, 2013: 88).

Norway 43 Nevertheless, Norwegian intentions were revealed over time. While their activities indicated an aspiration to forge a political channel, their decisions also reflected a desire to promote their own broad involvement in the conflict. For example, even if Larsen, Juul and Egeland did not intervene in the content of the talks, Egeland requested a report from the parties on the content of the meetings at the end of the first meeting. Larsen, who enjoyed the trust of the parties, also conveyed messages between the parties and even shared advice with them. In later reflections, Pundak realised that Norwegian mediators such as Egeland and later Holst, were determined to link their relationships directly to Beilin and Peres (Pundak, 2013: 91, 100, 122). Their interests were not in remaining within an unofficial channel without access to those in power. During this time, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made vital personnel changes at the ministry’s headquarters which impacted the talks in Oslo. In May 1993, Stoltenberg was elected special envoy to the crisis in Yugoslavia. He appointed Egeland, the deputy Foreign Minister as head of the Foreign Ministry for the talks. This appointment allowed Egeland to have wider powers and make even bolder decisions. Acting more directly, Egeland asked the participants for a report on basic principles for future negotiations between the parties and expressed great optimism due to the words of the head of the Palestinian delegation. Abu Ala introduced the idea of “Gaza first”, which involved Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as a first step toward an agreement. This proposal had received early support from the Israeli Labor Party which supported the idea of Egyptian involvement. According to Peres’ close adviser, he was also the former Director of the Israeli Foreign Ministry who already in November 1992 persuaded the Egyptians to offer this formula to the Palestinians as their own initiative. It was accepted by the Palestinians because they thought it was an Egyptian and not an Israeli proposal (Gil, 2018: 116). The Palestinians accepted the format which included a gradual withdrawal within three years from the Gaza Strip and international involvement in the development of Palestinian institutions in the West Bank as part of interim talks (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016: 119). In the eyes of the Palestinians, their proposal was in line with the approach of the Israeli representatives who supported the principle of gradualism through a step-bystep approach (Abbas, 1995: 115–120). It was also in line with the approach of Palestinians who did not wish to recognise the end of the conflict. In addition, the two Israeli academics, who reported to Beilin and not Peres, provided the Palestinians with summaries of Shimon Peres’ meetings with Faisal Husseini from the official channel. This signaled to the Palestinians that Pundak and Hirschfeld were operating under official Israeli political backing (Hirschfeld, 2014). However in reality, it is not known how involved Peres was in these initial stages. Peres tended to downplay the importance of Pundak and Hirschfeld and felt that they were too deeply rooted in academic theories and a “win-win” approach. Instead, Peres focused on the line led by Abu Ala

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and on his own skills to control negotiations and the leadership of the PLO (Gil, 2018: 119). For the Norwegians, Norwegian diplomacy remained vital to the process and progress of the talks. They believed that mediation was essential in secret talks in which hostile states remained confused and indecisive, making vague proposals in order to examine the other side. During the first three meetings in Oslo, the Norwegian mediators tried to set a time frame for negotiation (Watkins and Lundberg, 1998). In this endeavor, they were aided by a sense of credibility, legitimacy, moral status and (Wallensteen, 2002, Wallensteen, 2011). This was soft-power diplomacy, which expressed through persuasion, control over the transfer of information, transfer of alternatives and encouraging the parties to reach agreement all the time learning from the experience they had gained as facilitators. Over time, the Norwegians did not try to hide their intentions. Under Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst’s baton, they interfered openly with the issues raised in the meetings and tried to expand and enhance the influence of the mediator (Wall and Lynn, 1993). Holst’s position was ostensibly at odds with Larsen’s early instruction that the content of the contacts should not be interfered with, but Larsen’s room for maneuver and influence was reduced due to his unofficial status. Although Larsen’s wife, Mona Juul, Senior diplomat in Foreign Ministry and deputy to Jan Egeland, had helped to lay the political groundwork to allow the parties to talk in Oslo, Holst was determined to change the role of mediator. These changes in focus and intention created dilemmas on how to promote the channel without harming the position of the parties or the broad considerations of Norway. The role of the Norwegian hosts remained vague and non-binding, even though they had presented themselves as having extensive experience with the Middle East. The Norwegians realised that the parties had not yet committed to continuing contacts in Oslo but they were pleased that the “Oslo spirit” was making important progress. Abu Ala believed that the channel provided faster and more substantial understandings than those in Washington. The Norwegians persisted in meeting the expectations of the parties and already from the second round Egeland and Juul promised that the channel would remain secret (Pundak, 2013: 112, 118). The Norwegians claimed that they scrupulously maintained confidentiality and did not interfere in the content of the meetings, other than receiving regular updates from the parties. A month later, after the second meeting in Oslo, former Defense Minister Holst was appointed Foreign Minister. In his new position, Holst decided to deepen Norway’s role and become a mediator (Holst, 1993: 30–34). Although the Norwegians could not know the hidden strategic intentions of the parties, they recognised the ambiguity of the situation as an opportunity to bridge disagreements and clarify gaps in the parties’ perceptions. Up to this point, Arafat had assumed that the substantive talks were taking place in Washington, D.C., that is until Abu Ala’s Gaza First initiative was discussed in Oslo during the third round of talks. After the meeting on March

Norway 45 20 1993 Arafat changed course. He widened the circle of participants further and delivered initial summaries of the Gaza First initiative to the Egyptian president, the Egyptian Foreign Minister and Mubarak’s close adviser, Osama El-Baz (Behrendt, 2007: 72). Arafat decision to enlist Egyptian support signaled a substantive change in the talks. In the eyes of the PLO leadership, the Oslo channel became a way for Arafat to restore the PLO’s status in the Arab world after the Gulf War. Likewise between the second and third round of talks, Egeland, wanting to upgrade the channel within Norwegian government circles, explained that the talks should continue with American backing. In early 1993, the Norwegians reached out to update the Americans on the status of the talks. Stoltenberg met with the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the NATO summit and gave him two initial summaries of what was happening in Oslo between the Israeli and Palestinian representatives (Makovsky, 1995; Stoltenberg, 2001). A further widening of the circle of participants to the Oslo channel occurred at the end of the second meeting in February. Egeland and Juul met with Daniel Kurtzer, a U.S. State Department official who later became Ambassador to Israel. Kurtzer gave reluctant support to the channel: i.e there was lack of opposition as the channel remained meaningless to him (Eriksson, 2015: 101). He neither dismissed nor discouraged the channel. This communication with the United States by the Norwegians was done without the knowledge of the Israeli prime minister. The Norwegian update was received with contempt. The United States did not pay special attention to the contacts as it was believed that the substantive talks were continuing in Washington with the consent of Rabin who was careful to support American mediation (Makovsky, 1995). Norway’s promotion of direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians was contrary to Rabin’s viewpoint. Rabin preferred American mediation and consistently supported American involvement believing it was necessary in order for Israel to negotiate a secure position. The compromises that Rabin approved as part of the understandings with the Americans in Washington were also intended to preserve American involvement and preserve Israel’s vital interests in the negotiations (Rynhold, 1999: 206). However, at the time the Norwegian channel was being built, the prime minister could not have known that the channel would lead Israel into direct and open talks with the PLO for the first time. More portentously, he could not have known that the bond of trust already cultivated between Norwegians and PLO members would facilitate a dramatic shift in the conflict. Up to this point, Rabin had entrusted the framework and supervision of the negotiations in Washington to his associates. Rabin allowed the security establishment to lead because he believed that only the Ministry of Defense would guard Israel’s security considerations (Gil, 2018: 95). The knowledge that the Israeli prime minister was not updated on the channel’s details contributed to the Norwegians’ influence in the unofficial talks.

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Peres as well attached importance to the Americans’ position. Having heard from Beilin about the channel’s progress, Peres passed several drafts of the talks to Warren Christopher, the U.S. secretary of state during February and March 1993. Peres feared that the Americans would shake off the channel because of his past failure in talks with the king of Jordan held in London in 1987. In these talks Peres had met with the king of Jordan and together they had come to an agreement involving joint governance over the West Bank. But this had been a private initiative on Peres’ part and not one on behalf of the Israeli government. U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz removed his support from the apparent agreement between Peres and the Jordanian king (Rynhold, 1999: 232).

3.3 The process intensifies At the fourth meeting in Oslo on April 30, 1993, Israel examined Abu Ala’s Gaza First proposal. When Beilin first saw the draft document, he criticised the content of the summaries. Beilin believed that the outline included many points that Israel could not accept. Hirschfeld convinced Beilin that the document was not final. Since the document Beilin saw was far from any compromise Rabin would be willing to accept, Beilin feared that Rabin would abandon the channel. He decided not to hand over Abu Ala’s document. Rather, he presented his own joint document to Peres and Rabin that was based on Abu Ala’s “Gaza First” option. Beilin revisions, along with the delays in the messages the Palestinians received from the Israeli side, caused unrest in the PLO headquarters regarding the political backing of Israeli representatives. At the fifth meeting held on May 8, in which Holst also participated, Abu Ala’s demanded senior official Israeli representation in the meetings. Although Hirschfeld and Pundak represented the circle closest to the prime minister, Abu Ala was not convinced. He made it clear to the Norwegians that the talks would not continue without official representation in the Israeli delegation (Makovsky, 1995: 43; Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016: 118). When Larsen handed Beilin Abu Ala’s demand, the Norwegians tried to put pressure on Beilin and his men to reveal the document to the prime minister. In response to Abu Ala’s ultimatum, Peres, Beilin, Hirschfeld and Pundak met with Rabin on May 14, 1993, and revealed to him for the first time a joint memorandum of understanding that had been formulated in Oslo (Pundak, 2013: 166, 168). Peres supported the outline and concluded that talks in Washington between representatives of Israel and representatives of the JordanianPalestinian delegation had reached a dead end compared to the Oslo Channel. He thought that the PLO had agreed to promote more important understandings on the Oslo Channel (Rynhold, 1999: 218). Israel had been open to accepting the agreement reached in the United States, but the Palestinian delegation feared rapid progress due to its dependence on the

Norway 47 PLO leadership and refused to advance the American draft (Corbin, 1994: 146). In retrospect, it became clear that Arafat and the PLO leadership in Tunis refused to promote understandings through the Americans because they believed that the Oslo Channel had given the Palestinians wider powers. The meeting of the Israeli negotiating team with Rabin and the following stages presented one of the many challenges facing Rabin. His perception of security remained rooted in the Labor Party’s strategy and in line with the “Eastern threat” (Shlaim, 2005). After coming to power in 1992, Rabin gradually and reluctantly agreed to examine whether Israel would have to face the PLO leadership directly in order to move the negotiations forward even though he was a former supporter of the Jordanian option (Shlaim, 2005: 243). Elyakim Rubinstein, the head of the Israeli delegation for talks with the Palestinians in Washington, left all possibilities open for the future of the territories. Consequently Rabin’s proposal for Palestinian autonomy presented at the opening of the sixth round in Washington was intended to provide a limited political framework for Palestinians and to retain Israeli security control. Until the unofficial channel in Oslo was exposed, parallel channels operated in Oslo and Washington. Rabin shrugged off the PLO and pinned his hopes on local leaders in the territories who were considered more moderate and pragmatic than Arafat. However, between May and August 1993, Rabin accepted the military echelon’s assessment that the local Palestinian leadership was weak compared to Arafat and that while the PLO chairman remained a weak figure in the Arab world, he might therefore show broader flexibility (Shlaim, 2005: 244–245). At the same time, Rabin was concerned about the political aspirations of Peres, whom he feared might present himself as an alternative to the Rabin government if the negotiations with the Palestinians failed (Gil, 2018: 124). He also realised that compared to withdrawal from Golan Heights (If the talks with Syria succeed), an agreement with the PLO on temporary selfgovernment that involved limited territorial withdrawal and without the dissolution of settlements, was less risky. Arafat was concerned that the talks in Oslo might be exposed and feared that Syrian President Hafez alAssad might sabotage contacts with Israel. Arafat concluded that the talks held in the United States could serve as a cover for the substantive talks in Oslo. He decided to exclude the PLO Advisory Committee because its representatives had close ties to the Arab world (Behrendt, 2007: 57; Parsons, 2005: 5, 79). Even though the Americans did not attach importance to the Oslo channel and unofficial representatives acted on behalf of Israel, Arafat favored informal contacts because of the opportunity to open direct talks with Israel. Although Rabin could not know what a permanent agreement with the Palestinians who sought an independent state would look like, Rabin’s position was based on the Jordanian option and the idea of territorial compromise and Palestinian self-government for an interim period in joint

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agreement with the Kingdom of Jordan (Shlaim, 2005). These understandings were based on reports of meetings with representatives of the Jordanian king during the 1970s, which had been given to U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. These understandings did not advance (Zak, 2007: 193–1949), but had received the support of the Jordanian king because the king preferred Israel on the Jordanian border. At this point, Rabin did not necessarily believe that an agreement with the PLO would end the conflict with the Palestinians. Although Rabin had been willing to withdraw under an earlier agreement with Jordan, still he saw the establishment of a Palestinian state as a security threat. Thus, the parties understood that there were obstacles to advancing a political decision. His support for the Norwegian channel was possible as long as it did not harm American efforts (Rynhold, 1999: 219) and that the talks preserved the principle of gradualism. Rabin’s insistence on a step-by-step approach served both sides of the conflict. Although the Palestinians proposed the “Gaza First” formula, Arafat feared that the transfer of the Gaza Strip to self-government would block the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank. It was known that Rabin had examined handing over Jericho to the Jordanian government while maintaining control of the Jordan Valley (Khalidi, 1978). Arafat knew that Rabin’s perspective did not change during the talks in Oslo. Therefore, Arafat sought Palestinian control of the territories so that Israel would hand over areas such as the Jericho area. But Rabin was careful to condition continued talks on fulfilling security conditions, fearing that the PLO had not matured politically to relinquish commitments to the end of the conflict. Israel’s step-by-step approach was useful to the PLO as well. Because its concessions remained temporary, it was possible to establish a political, military and economic framework for a future Palestinian state without committing to an end to the conflict. Peres also thought that ambiguity served the contacts and helped the parties resolve the difficulties without declaring that they had given up on basic positions (Gil, 2018: 156). Initially, Rabin did not show a substantial interest in the secret channel in Oslo. With the establishment of the principle of gradualism, he took a more active part in the process through Peres. This gave Beilin and his people in Oslo vital political backing. It also contributed to the preservation of the status of the Norwegians who could continue the negotiations because the talks did not obligate Israel to the PLO. Interestingly, it is precisely Rabin’s insistence on a step-by-step approach that allowed Peres, Beilin and his men to continue influencing negotiations with the Palestinians even after Rabin sent his men to Oslo. On May 21, 1993, Rabin sent Foreign Ministry Director General Uri Savir, one of Peres’ loyalists, to the sixth round of meetings in Oslo. On June 13 1993, Yoel Singer, a member of the Rabin camp, joined the seventh round of meetings in Oslo to evaluate and judge the concessions and credibility of the Palestinian representatives. After the meetings, the two recommended that Rabin and Peres promote the Norwegian channel, but

Norway 49 provided two preconditions: (1) The Norwegian channel must remain completely confidential and (2) the PLO must stop advancing further negotiations in Washington. Due to this directive, the role of the Norwegians became essential once again and therefore the channel’s secrecy was critical for further negotiations (Aggestam, 1999: 179). At the same time, Yoel Singer, who was a lawyer, had to draft a document that would be legal and official. He believed that the document drafted by Hirschfeld and Pundak was too ambiguous, too technical and too focused on economic concerns and did not emphasise issues that Israel could sign. The official Israeli representatives changed the wording in order to advance the talks in a more practical direction through a legal formula that would preserve Israeli interests. At this point, the Norwegian mediators demonstrated great resolve while conveying tough messages towards Israel. At the same time, Beilin’s staff was instructed not to forward summaries to Larsen about decisions on how to proceed with direct contacts. Rabin had learned that Larsen had revealed that secret talks were taking place in Oslo to an American diplomat in Oslo. In fact, senior State Department officials not only knew about the talks in Oslo but Kurtzer knew that Israel still saw such talks as not critical (Pundak, 2013: 214, 207). It is possible that the channel’s exposure to a wider and wider range of people contributed to Rabin’s decision to send Uri Savir and Yoel Singer to Oslo in order to validate the talks and make them official but still secret. The Norwegian team saw the arrival of the two Israeli diplomats as a significant upgrade to the channel. Holst, who had been careful to attend the talks after entering the Norwegian foreign office, understood the importance of raising the level of representation. He recognised that Israel’s decision to change the Oslo channel from an unofficial channel to an official one could lead to a political breakthrough. As such, he believed that it was necessary for him to take part in the talks in his official capacity of Foreign Minister. As a professional diplomat, Holst was discreet and kept the confidences of the parties. For example, Holst followed Beilin’s request not to disclose to the Americans the participation of Uri Savir. This ability to keep confidences was in contrast to Larsen who had no official status and was caught revealing the secret channel and perhaps bragging about it also. Savir’s inclusion impacted significantly Larsen’s role in the negotiations. Upon his arrival in Oslo, Savir served as a direct liaison between the PLO and Rabin. In addition, he was successful in his contacts with Abu Ala which he reported directly to Peres who then updated Rabin (Gil, 2018: 131).

3.4 The point of no return As part of the process of secret diplomacy, the Norwegians had to maintain their credibility in the eyes of the parties as well as in the eyes of the Americans. They had to ensure that the messages and the channel were kept in an optimal manner that would also provide adequate coverage for the Oslo process. The early framework for the talks left room for an expansion of secret

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partners while maintaining channel credibility. However, expanding the circle of secret partners led to a channel full of illusions. The American lack of interest stemmed not only from the messages from the prime minister’s office but also from Israeli support for the Syrian channel. That same year, the Clinton administration believed that negotiations between Syria and Israel would address the instability of Iran and Iraq. The Americans believed that an agreement between the parties might form a coalition of moderate states in the region and that the Americans would be able to establish a broader arrangement between Israel and the Arab states (Rynhold, 1999: 211). By this stage of the talks, there was much uncertainty surrounding the process. It was not clear whether Rabin would actually support the Oslo channel or decide to invest in a different channel. The goals of each side remained hidden and unclear. The unofficial contacts made in Oslo by the Israeli government and the PLO were conducted behind closed doors without the knowledge or consent of the people. The parties were there to implement perhaps as yet unexpressed foreign policy objectives by compromise and persuasion. It was clear to the parties that a mutual recognition agreement between Israel and the PLO meant a “revolution” in Israeli thought and a fundamental strategic change in Rabin’s view. Nevertheless, the Palestinians tried to push the Israeli side to decide what the permanent settlement would look like even before entering into interim arrangements. In response to all this uncertainty, the Norwegians tried to continue the talks without addressing the core issues, encouraging the parties to promote a common position paper without those elements. However, in June 1993, Rabin ordered a halt to talks in Oslo (Gil, 2018: 129–130). Israel’s continued contacts with the PLO remained in doubt and shrouded in suspicion due to the escalation of attacks against Israelis by the Palestinians. One of the reasons for this overture outside the Oslo channel might have been due to Rabin’s distrust of Peres and his people who had entered the Oslo channel behind his back. Rabin was wary that Peres was leading Rabin’s government down a dangerous path and if it failed, Peres could blame Rabin. Whatever the motivation, this attempt created a new dilemma. The offered equation of an end to violence in exchange for peace talks was problematic on its face. This dilemma was reflected in the approach of the negotiators throughout the late stages of the talks. It seemed that the Norwegians sought to create a “sterile” dialogue environment which required the parties to disengage from external reality and to speak together regardless of the incidents of violence. In reality, the Norwegians created a situation that allowed each side to risk hardening their positions in the hope that the other side would compromise (Bebchick, 2002). The “spirit” of Oslo was being sorely tested. Egeland approached the PLO and suggested that the organization issue a unilateral declaration of an unconditional cessation of Palestinian violence for three months to encourage Israel to preserve the channel. Egeland’s proposal

Norway 51 was rejected by Abu Ala. Larsen met with Beilin and his men to clarify Abu Ala’s frustration and despair and urged the Israeli team to signal Israel’s intention to continue talks to prevent further escalation and extremism by the PLO. During this period, Rabin supported Ephraim Sneh’s mission to meet with Nabil Shaath to open yet another channel of dialogue. According to Sneh, the channel’s goal was to consider another alternative with the PLO to actually stop terrorism for six months in exchange for recognition and a series of facilitations, but the idea was rejected (Sneh, 2002: 22–24). At this crucial point in the negotiations, the Norwegians were presented with the challenge of having to convey strong and difficult messages to the parties while at the same time conveying proposals that would preserve the channel so that it would not collapse. They wanted to preserve understandings already reached between the parties even in times of crisis and not succumb to impatience or temporary trends that might hurt the content of the conversations. The Norwegians were careful to maintain secrecy while conveying messages between the parties. Larsen informed Israeli representatives that Egeland had received daily calls from Abu Ala that made it clear that the Oslo Channel was fully supported by the PLO. Holst made sure to forward direct reports to Beilin (Aggestam, 2002: 65), showing that he was not content with negotiating only with Pundak and Hirschfeld and receiving updates from the parties between the rounds of talks. At the same time, Rabin’s demand for a gradual process forced the Norwegian team to fend off Palestinian pressure, especially in light of Abu Ala’s pressure on Larsen to promote another official meeting between the parties. Larsen was forced to hold talks on a daily basis that sometimes took place up to ten times a day convincing the PLO representative that the Oslo Channel embodied practical intentions on the part of the Israeli government (Pundak, 2013: 246, 271). As negotiations moved along with the new participants, Savir and Singer, and with Israel’s commitment to the Oslo Channel, the Norwegians changed their attitude towards the parties and the negotiations. The Norwegians, and in particular Holst, now believed that the official status of the talks necessitated pressuring Arafat to outline a detailed “Gaza First” proposal. Even if Arafat delayed a proposal to transfer the Gaza Strip to autonomous rule for fear that Israel would block the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state, Holst thought that the PLO chairman should be pressured (Corbin, 1994: 134–135). In spite of the fact that Arafat had already expressed support for the delivery of “Gaza First” in order to leave aside more essential elements for a permanent agreement at a later date, Peres team persuaded Rabin to examine the Gaza, First move in a practical way. Peres overcame Rabin’s reluctance and Peres and Arafat began to formulate a step by step plan that would establish Palestinian autonomy in the Gaza Strip. The Norwegians agreed with Peres’ view of handing over the Gaza Strip to the PLO leadership and that rehabilitating the Strip would be done in a “Marshall Plan”

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format. Holst supported the understandings as they were on the path of gradualism that accorded with the Israeli lay out (Makovsky, 1995: 15).

3.5 Norwegian shuttle diplomacy The Norwegians understood that the parties had to deal not only with domestic criticism, but also with disagreements within the negotiating teams and with the political echelon in charge of the negotiating team. Nevertheless, in July 1993 the Norwegians could sense that the decisive time in the negotiations was approaching. They thought that the crises that arose between the parties created a necessity for their involvement in order to draw the talks to a successful conclusion. The Norwegians did not shy away from the intensity of the crises between Israeli officials and PLO officials. Rather, they concluded that policymakers were conveying clear messages to the negotiating team that reflected their feelings and status at the time. The Norwegians considered it their responsibility to help the parties reconcile and in covert secrecy gave them the right terms to arrive at a final agreement (Waage, 2004: 107). Thus, the Norwegians became even more active in encouraging the parties to formulate an agreement in accordance with the principles presented during the talks. When negotiations entered into a deep crisis in July 1993 because the parties wanted to make amendments to the draft Declaration of Principles, the Norwegian mediators talked to the parties until they decided to confront the disputed issues. Egeland, who followed the discussions, wanted to prove the Norwegians’ willingness to help resolve the crisis and stayed at the talks alongside Larsen, Juul and Pedersen. Larsen worked with Holst and Egeland missions to bridge the gaps in drafts dictated from Jerusalem and Tunis. At the same time, Holst tried to get direct updates from the teams and stood by the understandings that in his eyes paved the way for an agreed outline (Pundak, 2013: 293, 291). At this point, Holst was getting more involved in the content of the negotiations and put himself into the circle of the Norwegian team. He saw himself as a serious representative of Norway with his own authority and his own vision for peace. He was ambitious and he understood the importance of these negotiations. Eventually with Larsen and Juul, he would take the most active role of all the mediators. This latest crisis came about during the eleventh round of meetings held on July 25 and 26, 1993 when the Palestinians presented new positions that were not raised in the previous rounds. Among other things, the Palestinians demanded control of the Allenby crossing, physical connection between Jericho and the Gaza Strip, and Palestinian control of the crossings between them. The Palestinians justified the changes by saying that the official Israeli representation had made changes to the previous understandings reached with Hirschfeld and Pundak (Behrendt, 2007: 91). In response, Peres strongly opposed the issue of the bridges between Gaza and the West Bank, and even ordered Holst not to raise this issue with Rabin. In addition, Peres refused to accept any proposal to deploy an international force (Pundak, 2013: 279).

Norway 53 The Norwegians’ focus at this stage was aimed at encouraging Israeli willingness to compromise and Palestinian need to adjust their demands. The Norwegians conveyed messages very clearly between the parties so there would be no gaps in understanding. The parties were able to formulate an agreement as part of the understandings reached in the first rounds (Behrendt, 2007: 85) with obvious changes and no room for misinterpretation. This clarity was important. The document submitted by Israel was phrased so that the core issues would be discussed only in later stages. For the Israelis, the farreaching measures that the PLO officials sought to address in the document, even before negotiations on an interim and permanent agreement began, would not be included. The Norwegians understood that Israel would not deviate from Rabin’s guidelines, such as his refusal to allow a Palestinian presence on the border with Jordan or in the Jericho area or at the crossing bridges. They knew that it was not the role of the Norwegian mediator to extract further concessions from the Israeli prime minister, an Israeli general, nor interpret his guidelines, especially at the late stages of a negotiation. Subsequently, Holst, who met with Peres, listened to Peres’ advice and did not discuss the Oslo outline with Rabin (Waage, 2004: 112). Holst’s meetings in Jerusalem were productive and led to a positive assessment in the Norwegian Foreign Office of the chances for concluding an agreement. The range of their work became even broader. Holst flew to Tunis with Larsen and Juul to meet with the Tunisian Foreign Minister. Holst explained that his team was on a work mission and was not trying to go behind the Tunisian authorities’ back. Larsen and his wife, Juul, were to meet with Arafat and encourage the PLO leader to accept the outline of the agreement. They were to tell Arafat that in Holst’s conversation with Peres in Jerusalem, as the Israeli leadership demonstrated commitment to the agreement (Makovsky, 1995: 60). They asked Arafat to present his proposal outlining the delivery of Jericho and the Gaza Strip as first steps towards future withdrawals. They asked Arafat to moderate his demands for a physical link between Jericho and the Gaza Strip and proposed instead Holst’s format for “safe passage” (Waage, 2004: 113; Wanis-St John, 2011: 97; Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016: 120). It is not clear where Holst received the approval to offer such “safe passage” and whether he consulted with Israel in this matter at all. These unanswered questions are strengthened in light of the explicit instruction he received from Peres not to discuss this outline with Rabin. Where did Holst get the confidence to make such an offer? The reason for his proposal remains unknown. After meeting Arafat in Tunis, Larsen and Juul were sent to Jerusalem to hear from Peres about the conditions for concluding the agreement. These conversations included addressing limited control of Jericho and control of the Gaza Strip but not the corridor between Gaza and Jericho that the Palestinians wanted (Waage, 2004: 115–116). Meanwhile in Tunis, Holst made it clear in a

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conversation with Arafat that Israel would not grant Palestinian control over the crossings nor grant a corridor between the Gaza Strip and Jericho. Holst then proposed to Arafat an alternative arrangement in which Palestinians could move freely with special security arrangements. This was his “safe passage” idea. Holst was no longer acting as a simple mediator; he was pressing Arafat to reach an agreement. Holst’s letter to Arafat during July urging him to promote an agreement at a meeting for fear that negotiations would collapse also showed that the Norwegian Foreign Minister was more than a “host” (Waage, 2004: 117). Unlike Stoltenberg, who preferred to maintain an official political distance, using FAFO as a cover, Holst was much more eager to provide official political sponsorship. He went as far as to intervene in the refugee issue (Waage, 2004: 88; 108) which referred to the fact that Arafat was a refugee and there was a question as to how to repatriate him legally within the territories. As Holst tried to clarify what “safe passage” would look like, the PLO leader only emphasised the importance of the crossings between Gaza and Jericho and between Jericho and Jordan without explicit details (Waage, 2004: 117), or mentioning a physical corridor between Jericho and the Gaza Strip. In any case, since Arafat had already agreed to Palestinian control of Jericho, without a Palestinian presence on the border with Jordan, he complied with the outline. Arafat justified his control of Jericho by saying he could better control the riots from within the territories. There was no explicit reference to crossings (Behrendt, 2007: 88; Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 146). As the circle of participants in the Oslo process grew wider and wider, complete secrecy became impossible. Unlike the secluded, secret setting of the first rounds of talks in Outside Oslo, Tunis and Jerusalem were public places. More people knew about the talks, people were aware of the contents of the talks and they were following the travels of the actors. Continuing to convey messages between the parties kept the Norwegians in the negotiations. Their role in building mutual trust remained substantial, especially in the stages when the cover of secrecy crumbled. The Norwegians faced another challenge when Larsen and his wife, Juul, met with Peres, Beilin and the Israeli negotiating team in Jerusalem. Peres was not satisfied with Holst’s letter about Arafat’s intention and demanded that it be made clear that there was no majority in the Knesset that would allow a compromise on the issue of Jerusalem. He feared that the Norwegians were developing false expectations among the Palestinians. When Peres met with Larsen, he explained that Norway should not bear the name of Israel on this issue since the Israelis could not compromise on Jerusalem. Larsen suggested that the Palestinian Council hold its meetings in Jerusalem, Peres vehemently refused this possibility (Gil, 2018: 157). In addition, the Israeli Foreign Minister requested clarification regarding the security of Israelis in the Gaza Strip and the need for Israel to maintain security authority in the West Bank. Peres insisted that a direct road between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and the crossings would not be allowed or be subject to bargaining. Israel intended to be in control of the crossings (Pundak, 2013: 324, 322).

Norway 55 In the meeting, Larsen and Juul admitted that the term “safe passage” proposed by Holst remained a vague concept (Waage, 2004: 115). However, for the first time, Peres expressed a readiness to return Arafat to the territories and to establish independent Palestinian security forces (Behrendt, 2007: 88). Sensing this reality, the Norwegians acted to soften Arafat’s image in the eyes of Israel. In early August 1993, Holst sent a letter noting Arafat’s desire to lead the Palestinians to a new era, while pledging that the PLO chairman had chosen to link his fate with Israel (Pundak, 2013: 327–328). Holst’s encouraged Peres to appreciate that Arafat internalised the need to give up the deployment of Palestinian forces in Jericho and the border crossings (Waage, 2004: 122). Even so, Peres continued to envision a reality in which a Palestinian state would be established only in Gaza, while the West Bank would become a joint government between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority (Gil, 2018).3 With Israel’s willingness to establish Arafat’s rule in the territories and the PLO’s aspiration to strive for a direct agreement with Israel, the parties tried to bridge the gaps in the draft agreement, especially on 16 issues that remained in dispute. The Norwegians mediation approach was to clarify points of agreement, determine points of compromise and identify substantive and controversial issues to be addressed by each delegation. In this way, the Norwegians thought that the parties would be able to establish mutual trust and learn about the intentions of the other side, especially when disagreements and misinterpretations arose (Aggestam, 1999: 172). This approach worked successfully in the round of talks in August when the parties met once more and asked the Palestinians to clarify their demand for a joint border crossing with Jordan. By this point in the process, the Norwegians had worked to narrow the gaps between the parties even without explicit instructions from the leadership in Israel or demands of the Palestinians. As part of the ongoing negotiations, Peres requested Holst to be present at a meeting in Paris to help mediate the political breakthrough. The Israeli Foreign Minister did not know that Arafat continued to press Holst to obtain a vague promise on the issue of Jerusalem as well (Gil, 2018: 144, 158). In Paris, Holst acted on Arafat’s pressure regarding the future status of Jerusalem and he pressured Peres to respond. As noted by Avi Gil, Peres close aide, Holst pressured Peres to accept a commitment of broad political significance. In Paris, the two agreed to forward letters between the parties, but Peres refused to forward the fourth letter to Rabin because it included the mention of Jerusalem (Gil, 2018: 162). Much later, Arafat would reveal the letter Holst delivered on the future of Jerusalem in which Peres seemed to pledge recognition of Palestinian rights in the city. The Israeli Foreign Minister would reject claims that the letter included political commitments to the PLO on Jerusalem’s status (Gil, 2018: 167). For the Palestinians, however, the letter remained vital. In it they saw a guarantee extracted from Peres and the Israeli government that was a politically and quasi-legal commitment.

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Late in August 1993, Rabin agreed to Peres’ initiative to use an official state visit to Stockholm as a cover for a meeting with Holst to expedite agreement on a Declaration of Principles. Rabin felt that Norwegian efforts should not be harmed due to his disappointment with Assad’s response to messages he conveyed to Syria through the U.S. secretary of state (Rynhold, 1999: 220–222). With Rabin’s knowledge, Peres asked Beilin to request that Holst and the Norwegian staff arrive secretly in Sweden (Beilin, 2018), hiding their sudden arrival in Stockholm from Swedish diplomatic officials who might wonder why the Norwegian Foreign Minister had arrived in the Swedish capital. The Stockholm meeting was crucial and complicated. Due to Peres’ refusal to speak directly to Arafat, Holst remained vital to the negotiation process in Stockholm. Holst agreed to deceive the Palestinian members by saying he was sitting in a separate room from the Israeli staff (Gil, 2018: 159). Abu Ala conducted the talks on Arafat’s behalf from Tunis. Holst took on the role of liaison between the parties with sensitivity to the precise messages being conveyed. However, the Norwegian Foreign Minister not only forwarded the proposals between the parties but also helped draft the messages. He took on Larsen’s advice to speak “in codes” and keywords without mentioning the names of the countries and those involved in the contacts. Holst focused on narrowing last-minute gaps over seven hours in the telephone negotiations between Stockholm and Tunis. For the Norwegians, Holst was portrayed as being influential in the talks and having the necessary diplomatic and rhetorical skills (Waage, 2004: 134). In the end, the parties agreed on security arrangements that left Israel with the safe passages requested by the PLO. The question of Jerusalem was omitted from the agreement in principle. Governmental responsibility for Gaza and Jericho was transferred to the PLO. There is no evidence that Holst mentioned to the Israelis that he had introduced the idea for safe passages during earlier talks with the PLO leader. Leaning on Rabin’s preference for a step-by-step process, Holst explained to Peres that a commitment to the late changes demanded by the Palestinians would persuade the Palestinians to make additional compromises requested by Israel in later stages of negotiation. On August 20, 1993, the outline of the agreement was initialed by Peres and Abu Ala in Oslo.

3.6 Signing the Oslo accords As Norway prepared the draft agreements between the parties, the Norwegians believed that any future implementation would be possible only through American sponsorship. Norway had tried to interest the Americans in the Oslo peace process. Now they tried once more. The Norwegians were confident that their role in future negotiations was secure even as they were willing to transfer the responsibility to the Americans. To a large extent, this perception of need for the American sponsorship of the peace process suited

Norway 57 both parties. Norway was not in a position to act against future violations; only a strong mediator like the United States could guarantee the outcome and implementation of the mediation (Waage, 2007: 162). Up to now, the Oslo negotiations had been conducted by representatives of Israel and the PLO with the help of the Norwegians. For the first time, Rabin himself reached out to the U.S. secretary of state and his aide Dennis Ross. On August 25, 1993, he informed them that Israel and the PLO had reached a common understanding in Oslo and that Peres and Holst were expected to arrive secretly in Washington, D.C., to update the White House on the contents of the agreement. In preparation for the meeting in Washington Peres told Holst that the Americans did not think the Norwegians could mediate a political breakthrough. If Norway had announced the agreement without talking with the Americans, explained Peres from experience, the Americans might turn around and criticise the elements of the agreement (Gil, 2018: 138). Peres’ message was received by Holst. At the meeting in Washington on August 29, 1993, the Norwegian Foreign Minister told the Secretary of State Warren Christopher that American support was needed for the implementation of the agreement and he asked for American support of the Norwegian outline (Ross, 2015: 266). Peres pledged that the “Gaza First” measures also included future measures in the West Bank (Gil, 2018: 137). Christopher approved American sponsorship of the Oslo process. After the successful meeting in Washington, Holst decided unilaterally to promote correspondence regarding mutual recognition,4 He justified his actions by saying that letters of recognition would remove the last obstacles to the signing of the final agreement. Deviating even more from the original parameters of Norwegian authority in the mediation process, Holst helped draft the accompanying letters of recognition. Holst knew he had helped harness the parties towards an agreed-upon document (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016: 120). His latest actions regarding the letters of mutual recognition preempted the Americans from achieving the same goal and solidified his reputation as the chief mediator on the Norwegian team. The letters of mutual recognition written by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and by PLO leader Yasser Arafat were delivered separately to each leader as part of Holst’s diplomatic mission to the region. When the Americans deployed their sponsorship of the Oslo process, the role of the Norwegians changed (Hanssen-Bauer, 2017). While the Norwegians believed that only American sponsorship would advance the implementation of the agreement, as Norwegian were aware that their familiarity with the channel they had created as well as the as yet unplanned form of implementation of the agreement which left open opportunities for Norwegian future involvement. The contradictory ambiguity and room for interpretation left deliberately within the Oslo agreement served the role of the Norwegians. Their negotiation efforts could continue and be justified as necessary. Yet, as their

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involvement deepened so did their desire to bring about an historic agreement, at almost any cost. To ensure involvement in the continuation of contacts between the parties the Norwegians had tried to establish additional mechanisms for maintaining their authority in the channel. For example, during the talks in Oslo, the parties agreed that Larsen would serve as the coordinator of economic activity. Although this understanding did not materialise on behalf of the parties, Larsen did receive an official appointment from the United Nations to oversee the establishment of international institutions (Pundak, 2013: 161). While Larsen enjoyed international prestige at the UN Relief and Works Agency and was seen by many as a successful fundraiser who maintained good relations with Israelis and Palestinians, he was also accused of working to advance his personal career. In 1996, Larsen ended his tenure, leaving Danish diplomat Peter Hansen in his position. Eventually, Larsen returned to the United Nations in 1999 to be appointed as the special envoy for the Middle East peace process on behalf of the organization (Brynen, 2000: 102). In addition to Larsen having an extended tenure of involvement in the Oslo process, Marianne Heiberg, who participated in the unofficial negotiations, was later appointed UNRWA director in Jerusalem and promoted the UN relief and assistance program to the Palestinians between 1995–1997. According to an agreed outline, Larsen and his partners set up work teams that expanded Norwegian participation (Pundak, 2013: 165). Since Norwegian mediators had proven to have moral authority in the eyes of the parties and the ability to resolve negotiation failures (Aggestam, 2002: 73; Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016: 184), personnel changes were made in the Norwegian foreign ministry to streamline the role of mediators. Mediators from Oslo like Juul was appointed Norwegian Ambassador to Israel and worked to strengthen cooperation between the parties. Deputy Foreign Minister Egeland deepened his involvement in civilian projects in the Palestinian Authority (Butenschøn, 1997: 8). The signing of the Oslo Accords on September 13, 1993, was not the end point of Norwegian aspirations to be part of the negotiation efforts toward a future interim agreement. Even if the agreement was not a peace agreement, it set out principles for the establishment of an interim Palestinian independent government for a period of five years. The Norwegians hoped to take part in future arrangements as the 1993 Declaration also prepared the groundwork for negotiations on a permanent settlement planned to take place as soon as possible, but no later than three years from an interim period (Aggestam, 1999: 175). The Norwegians were given the opportunity to preserve their activities as the relationship between Israel and the PLO was put to the test due to the lack of explicit commitment and complicated conditions for the end of the conflict. In the meantime, Israel’s IDF undertook to make redeployments during the transition period, but to hold on to international border and the overall security of Judea and Samaria. Arafat was supposed to undertake to end

Norway 59 Palestinian terror, stop incitement, establish democratic institutions and control the territories under the PLO’s control. Only after a successful implementation of this initial phase, would Israel undertake to hand over additional territories. Only with the passage of time and the building of mutual trust would the parties undertake to sign a permanent agreement (Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 151). On September 13, 1993, Rabin and Arafat met at the White House for the signing of the Oslo Accords. The agreement was officially signed by Shimon Peres, Foreign minister of Israel and Mahmoud Abbas, representative of the PLO. The signing was witnessed by U.S. President Bill Clinton early in his first term of office. The agreement established the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and Jericho within three months. The formal ceremony was sponsored by the United States and Russia. Many world leaders and diplomats were assembled on the White House lawn to witness the historic ceremony. As is known from the iconic photo, Rabin and Arafat shake hands as Clinton opened his arms to embrace, perhaps shelter, the gesture. After the famous handshake, Rabin looked at Peres and said “Now you” and Peres shook hands with Arafat also. Two Israeli political opponents had joined with a former enemy in a gamble to bring peace to the Middle East. Sitting among the dignitaries was an old acquaintance of Rabin whose presence added another layer of history to the occasion. After the handshake, Rabin came off the dais and walked straight to Henry Kissinger. Eighteen years previously to the month, in September 1975, Rabin had met Kissinger when the then U.S. secretary of state was involved in the interim agreement signed between Israel and Egypt after the Yom Kippur War. Rabin had been prime minister of Israel for the first time. That agreement was seen as a major step leading to the official Peace Agreement made with Egypt several years later in 1979. Perhaps the warm embrace of the two world leaders foreshadowed a successful outcome for another diplomatic effort transforming into a lasting, official peace agreement.

3.7 Reaching for a new Middle East: Political and security implications In their desire to advance and preserve Norwegian, and not necessarily regional, goals, they disregarded Arafat’s efforts in fortifying his power at the expense of pursuing democratic development and the gradual implementation of policies. Thus, continued Norwegian involvement served Norway’s political goals and especially Norwegian economic interests. They sought stability on the ground and gratitude from every side for brokering the Oslo Accords. They aspired to take part in the future of the area where they had mediated. In the end, and perhaps because of these psychological gaps, the Declaration of Principles signed in Washington in September 1993 did not

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include practical understandings. Rather, it focused on delineating the stages of the negotiations. In the eyes of the parties, the core issues remain complicated components that could only be dealt with after establishing mutual trust and fulfilling the parties’ prior obligations. However, as time went on, no level of trust was created that might have reflected the ability of the parties to engage in the core components. The parties’ intentions remained covert at the end of the signing of the Declaration of Principles as each party zealously guarded the scope of any future bargaining and reduced the Norwegian broker’s scope of action. Government and defense ministers on both sides showed reluctance to reveal their true positions and refrained from exposing their views in position papers to avoid public criticism. Mainly they did not want to give the other side an advantage in negotiations (Peri, 1996; Peri, 2002: 24). Apart from the American sponsorship and the Norwegians’ ability to preserve their involvement, the Oslo Accords provided an infrastructure for future negotiations. The Norwegians were credited with making a breakthrough such that even future interim arrangements did not change the initial agreement. In this context, Pundak considered that the long-term intentions at the heart of the Oslo Accords sought to resolve the dispute eventually through a peace agreement and the dissolution of claims. The Accords had not been conducted without a clear political horizon. Thus, the Declaration of Principles and the exchange of letters that led to mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO on the basis of territories for peace remained binding despite a change in the parties’ perceptions after the agreement was signed (Pundak, 2013: 20). The parties were committed to the Accords, like it or not, even if based on vague guidelines. This acceptance suited Beilin’s preference to create vagueness backed by international guarantees so as not to provoke public opinion against the agreement. He preferred to make it public only after it had become too final and vital to give up (Levin, 2005: 394). Regarding the Accords, Egeland said that imperfect peace was better than perfect war (Waage, 2004: 139). That statement seems tragic in the light of time. The Declaration of Principles opened a new phase of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. The “Paris Protocol” was signed on April 29, 1994, and regulated trade relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Although discussed separately, the Paris Protocol was added to the Cairo agreement that was signed in May 1994. Specifically, the Cairo agreement allowed the Palestinians wide freedom of personal movement and movement of goods and money, not only between Israel and the Palestinian Authority but also through Jordan (Elmusa and El-Jaafari, 1995: 14–32). A variety of experts and leaders from the Arab states believed that the results of the 1994 negotiations mostly allowed Israel to reap the fruits of peace without paying a fair price (Sagi, 1998: 222). This skepticism seemed to ignore the fruits of peace that the Palestinians reaped during these years. The Palestinians had gained practical control over the lives of the of residents of the West Bank that was also funded through the World Bank and other

Norway 61 International Community grants to the Palestinian Authority. Additional funding was provided for the construction of Palestinian institutions. The multifaceted reality of the Middle East complicated the political process. State actors affected by the shifting Israeli-Palestinian situation responded to the events on the ground. Jordanian officials believed that there was a danger of Palestinians moving from the West Bank to the East Bank and thereby threatening the stability of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. At the same time, Assad felt that Arafat “played into the hands” of Rabin. Assad believed that Rabin preferred to negotiate separately with the Arabs rather than as a single bloc thus leaving Syria with less leverage in regard to the Golan Heights. Assad compared Arafat’s actions to those of Anwar Sadat that led to the isolation of Egypt in the Arab world for a decade. He claimed, in part, that Israel had agreed to join the PLO in persuading Jordan to sign a political agreement to isolate Syria, which had taken a hard line in exchanging messages with Israel. There is a certain truth in his claimed as Rabin opened official talks with Jordan to establish a peace agreement. He wanted to ensure that the Oslo Accords would be a gradual arrangement that would not harm Israel’s borders, especially the eastern border. Therefore, the sending of the deputy head of the Mossad and Rabin’s confidant, Efraim Halevi to Jordan, thwarted the option of establishing an irreversible arrangement that would harm Israel’s security interests (Halevi, 2006: 47–52). Halevi’s mission also contributed to softening Jordanian suspicion and strengthened mutual understandings regarding the nature of the arrangement with the PLO. The remarks of General Israel Tal are worth noting in this context. General Tal wrote an internal memorandum in November 1993, in which he revealed the challenges and problems of security arrangements surrounding the implementation of the agreement with the Palestinians.5 Like Rabin, General Tal was aware of the changing reality of the Middle East. With the end of the Cold War, and the results of the Gulf War, Rabin felt that it was an auspicious time to take a risk for lasting peace with the Palestinians. General Tal agreed with this assessment but recommended acting firmly while still showing flexibility. General Tal vehemently opposed the presence of foreign observers who he felt would weaken Israel and undermine deterrence against the Palestinians. In a never before published internal memorandum he explained that if Palestinians would deviate from the agreement they could call on the international observers instead of adjudicating disputes with Israel directly. This action would subject Israel to international pressure and might cause Israel to fold to any violation of the agreement on the part of the Palestinians. He added that “the magnitude of the danger could not be exaggerated as a result of the presence of foreign elements” (Kimche, 1993a). In addition, General Tal believed that if a Palestinian state were created at the end of the process, the Palestinians might create a “federation” that would unite directly with Jordan under Palestinian control. Such a move

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would threaten Israel’s ability to retain security over the West Bank. Such an arrangement would be a deviation from the Jordanian option previously discussed between Israel and Jordan that involved joint Israeli and Jordanian oversight of the West Bank. This option had traditionally won support from the Labor Party. Tal’s main concern was the formation of a single, independent Palestinian state in practice: “Their aim may not be realistic for Jaffa and Ramla but, they can be directed east to Jordan”. He concluded that talks should be continued according to strict political and security models in order to “blunt the sting of future risks” (Kimche, 1993a). Even so reservations were raised on the Israeli side regarding the nature of the agreement. Senior IDF officials criticised the Accords because they were excluded from the secret talks in the Norwegian capital and were not consulted about the security implications. The head of Israel military intelligence at the time of the Oslo talks, Uri Sagi, believed that a paradox had been created at the military level in Israel due to lack of information provided by the corridors of the government in Jerusalem. Sagi explained that the military echelon, which had no influence on the content of the Declaration of Principles, had to deal with the megalomania of officials who were not directly responsible for the territories (Sagi, 1998: 181, 186). Similarly, Chief of Staff Ehud Barak believed that the haste of the negotiators to secure their place in history led to their too large concessions to the PLO. He saw this as problematic sign for the implementation of the agreement (Shlaim, 2005: 250). Elyakim Rubinstein, head of the Israeli negotiating team in Washington noted that if he would have received the mandate from the government that the people of Oslo had received, he would have succeeded in achieving an even better and faster settlement (Sagi, 1998: 179). The Accords were heavily criticised from all sides. This was due in large part because of the secrecy maintained by the participants. This secrecy was supported by the biases and perceptions of the negotiators. For example: as the mind behind Oslo, Beilin believed that there was no need for the security forces to share in the essence of the talks beyond adhering to the principle that the role of the Palestinian Authority would be to disarm except for the possession of local police forces (Levin, 2005: 327). Although diplomatic secrecy allowed Israel to develop channels of communication to important Arab capitals and to give priority to secret diplomacy over informing the general public (Klieman, 1988: 75), Beilin’s format excluded Israeli military personnel from the circle of secret partners. According to Beilin, the army would have a negative effect on the ability to reach an agreement (Beilin, 2001: 257). The retired chief of staff, Dan Shomron, remained skeptical of the process that led to the Oslo Accords, and questioned the parties’ willingness to compromise. He feared that Israel would lose bargaining influence too soon and handover many territories before settling the parties’ differences on core issues around permanent boundaries and the right of return (Drory, 2016: 394).

Norway 63 Similarly, Norwegians’ ability to bridge these gaps in understanding was limited. The role of the Norwegians in the early stages was to bring the Palestinian position directly before Israel and provide conditions that would allow an agreement with Israel to be formulated. Effective in the secret phase of the mediation, the Norwegian mediator’s influence became limited, elusive and insubstantial as the parties moved toward the interim arrangement. The mediators could not provide practical guarantees to the parties and their impact faded. To some extent “stable” peace was only possible if the players involved adhered to the same common strategy. This desire to be more than facilitators and be part of the implementation of the agreement gained strength in light of the continued volatile contacts between the parties. After the massacre in the Cave of the Patriarchs in 1994 and the freezing of talks by the Palestinians, Israel agreed to respond to the UN Security Council’s call for international peacekeeping forces to enter Hebron. Heretofore, the Israelis who operated in the city did so without international involvement. Only after the Security Council approved the introduction of international forces into the city, did Arafat agree to resume talks. In March 1994, it was agreed to establish a temporary international force called TIPH (Temporary International Presence in Hebron) (Høgseth, 2008: 23). As the Norwegians promoted dialogue between the parties following the riots in the wake of the massacre, Norwegian Foreign Ministry officials believed that Israel would refuse to establish a UN observer force if it were too large. They reasoned that a small observer force would satisfy Arafat’s needs in calling for international defense. Further, the establishment of a small civilian force would give a sense of security under the UN Mandate (Hanssen-Bauer, 2017). Larsen, who was well versed in the dialogue between the parties, made a number of drafts. One proposal was to move the Jewish residents outside Hebron and establish a small observation force inside the city. His proposal was rejected outright by Israel. Moreover, Israel had made it clear that Norway could only intervene with a clear mandate from both sides. This condition was underlined by Israel’s opposition to both an international force and to the outline proposed by the Norwegians. Even as Larsen’s early proposals remained confidential and without Israeli consent, the Norwegians believed that their role remained necessary as it created a means for potential dialogue between the parties to resolve the crisis (Hanssen-Bauer, 2017). In any case, as an alternative of the Larsen formula, an Israeli-American decision was approved for the temporary presence of civilian observers and negotiations resumed. Shortly before the decision, the parties updated the Norwegians on the outline that was formulated (Waage, 2004: 193–194). In an effort to maintain their involvement, the Norwegians allocated 20 million Norwegian crowns to the task force (Makovsky, 1995: 146) after Norway was chosen to lead the observer force. For these reasons, the Norwegian government justified its participation in the TIPH force, which

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consisted mainly of Norwegian, Danish and Italian policemen (Butenschøn, 1997: 8). The force began operating on May 8, 1994, and received an Israeli and Palestinian mandate to operate in the city for three months. Since the parties did not reach an agreement on an extension of the power mandate, TIPH left Hebron on August 8 of that year (Høgseth, 2008: 23).6 The participation of the Norwegians in the task force in Hebron revealed not only their ability to maintain a vital status, but also their ability to recruit an observer force through two central groups. The Norwegian force to serve in Hebron was recruited first from former Norwegian police. Second, civilian observers were recruited through the Norwegian Refugee Council, a nongovernmental organization.7 Over time, the Norwegians were able to establish themselves in Hebron through the use of these civilian observers, and through the TIPH Community Relations Division that developed collaborations with the local Palestinian community. The TIPH was an opportunity for the Norwegians to cultivate a permanent presence in Hebron. Over the following years the Division supported civic projects in collaboration with local institutions, such as schools, universities, cultural centers, women’s centers, local NGOs and sports organizations (Hostens, 2004: 47). With its Jewish and Arab populations, the Norwegians understood the historic and religious significance of the city. Norwegians aid organizations strengthened their presence in the area and were effective agents of influence and change. In this way, maintained their positive diplomatic image on the international stage. The questioning views of the Norwegians were not just a matter of personal perceptions or theoretical principles. Reality on the ground was changing because of the Declaration of Principles signed in Washington. At the end of the signing ceremony of the agreement between Rabin and Arafat on the lawns of the White House, Israeli representatives revealed to their Palestinian counterparts’ maps showing Israel’s redeployment plans. Interestingly, Arafat did not explicitly address the scope of the withdrawal, but rather focused on the continuation of negotiations toward the interim arrangement (Drory, 2016). Arafat’s decisions had additional consequences. Palestinian resistance organizations that were not part of the PLO were not given positions in the Palestinian councils. Moreover, Arafat ignored the role of privileged families in each region. For example, the Gaza Strip had four main areas of rule: North Gaza, Gaza Municipality, Khan Yunis and Rafah. These areas were added to the PLO’s eight local zones in the West Bank: Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Hebron and Abu Dis. In all the key areas, Arafat placed his men in local municipal and town leadership positions. In the eyes of the respected, local families Arafat’s men were considered “foreign” and “Western”. Furthermore, strength of power in the hands of the security forces led by Arafat’s own elite “Force 17” distanced Arafat even further from the “field men” and clans in the city centers in the territories (Levitt, 2008: 148, 292). Arafat’s consolidation of power intensified during the interim stages. Whereas the international expectation was that the Oslo Accords would bring

Norway 65 about a change in Palestinian society, this turned out to be an incorrect assumption. The PLO did not see the establishment of political institutions and the creation of political legitimacy in the territories as an essential part of the peace process with Israel. At most, PLO representatives saw the political process as a means of international and Israeli recognition of their rights. Between 1993 and 1996 (from the signing of the Declaration of Principles until the PA elections in 1996), the Palestinian Central Council did not convene due to fears of undermining Arafat’s authority. The other councils of the Authority, including the Legislative Council, did not interest Chairman Arafat because he did not need their approval to negotiate with Israel and the United States. PLO members sought to strengthen their role and replaced the Jordanian Muslim Waqf members with their own (Levin, 2005: 426). Arafat wanted to conclude the interim settlement as soon as possible in order to enter into discussions on a permanent settlement with territorial “assets” that would fulfill Palestinian national aspirations and turn them into an irreversible fact (Sagi, 1998: 274). Arafat believed that he could negotiate greater territorial concessions in the interim agreement than had been offered in the Accords signed in Washington. In September 1995, shortly before the signing of the Interim Agreement, the Palestinians discovered that Israel’s renewed deployment was not as comprehensive as expected. Under the Interim Agreement, Israel undertook to carry out three new military deployments intended to take place within eighteen months from the date of signing the agreement (Savir, 1998). The principles that guided the negotiators in the early stages of Oslo changed in the interim talks. The Norwegian mediators were forced to recognise that the Interim Agreement reached in Taba, Egypt and signed in Washington, D.C., on September 28, 1995, symbolised practical progress between the parties, progress made without explicit Norwegian involvement. At the same time, the IDF’s redeployment in accordance with the Cairo agreement signed in May 1994 was conducted amid direct Palestinian pressure on Israel to disclose the extent of future withdrawals. In 1994, the Nobel Peace Prize Committee in Oslo announced that Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Yasser Arafat had won the coveted prize. Winning the Nobel Peace Prize forced Rabin and Peres to publically recognise PLO leader Yasser Arafat as a partner in the peace process. Interestingly, members of the award committee disagreed about the awarding of the award to Yasser Arafat but awarding the prize to these three leaders was a way the Norwegians tried to influence the outcome of the Oslo process. Peres’ adviser revealed that Larsen made sure that Peres was included in the list of candidates and recommended that he arrive to Norway for a concert to mark Norway’s role in achieving peace in order to increase his chances of being chosen (Gil, 2018: 153). It was not enough and did nothing to change the reality on the ground. The momentum that might have been created by awarding the Peace Prize to these three statesmen was short-lived.

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At this point, the Norwegians did not have the power to strengthen the dialogue mechanism in negotiations. There was no room in the negotiations for both an ideal and a realistic solution. Israel maintained an orderly, step-by-step approach and demanded confidence building measures before proceeding to final status negotiations. The Palestinian side adhered to negotiating permanent status elements from the outset and demanded broader and broader compromises in the interim talks. As a consequence of the hardening of the parties’ positions, the role of the Norwegian mediator remained marginal. Nevertheless, the Norwegians felt that it was still essential to sponsor the process and especially to support the mechanism for the rehabilitation and construction of Palestinian institutions. The assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 damaged the talks further. The stability of the Israeli government was challenged. During this time, Hamas carried out terrorist attacks that led to the murder of dozens of Israeli civilians and weakened Peres’ image in the eyes of the public. This made it difficult for a Peres government to make further compromises and at the same time to make a military deployment in the northern border of Israel. Indeed, while the Peres government was conducting a military operation in southern Lebanon against Hezbollah, it was difficult to restrain Palestinian actions. Moreover, how could Peres fight the terrorists and at the same time show a willingness to make further withdrawals that would endanger the lives of many Israelis? Despite the international mobilisation on Arafat’s behalf for the rehabilitation of the Palestinians, the leadership of the authority refused to take responsibility for the terrorist acts of the Islamic organizations. Instead, Arafat blamed Hamas and Islamic Jihad as agents of Iran and other countries. Although Arafat arrested Hamas members, he acted as if he were forced to do so. To the Palestinian public he justified making arrests against Hamas members as being due to American pressure and not because of any desire to act against the organization. Yet the arrested Hamas leaders were released a few months later as arrests had been a political manoeuver. They were another link in a tragic chain of events and unilateral decisions (Levitt, 2008: 218) that will impact the future of the Oslo process.

3.8 Preserving Norwegian involvement After the signing of the Interim Agreement, the Norwegians were able to identify important maneuvering space that would preserve their role as mediators. The Norwegians could not force meetings or influence understandings already decided, but they could continue to soften the parties’ images, promote the Interim Agreement and thus preserve their role (Hanssen-Bauer, 2017). Larsen initiated a meeting between Peres and Arafat in 1995 in order to reach an agreement on an outline for the promotion of the interim settlement (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016: 185). But simply continuing to identify the gaps in communication between the parties was

Norway 67 not necessarily adequate for how complicated the process had become. The Norwegians found it difficult to decipher the political goals of each side. Nevertheless, Norway persevered. Norwegian largesse continued not only after the signing of the Accords in 1993 but also after the Interim Agreement was signed in 1995. They accelerated public peace projects through NGOs. Over time, they increased funding for the diplomatic channel they had created in Oslo. The Norwegians assisted the Palestinians in writing the “Palestinian Development Plan” (PDP), which the Palestinians presented to the circle of donor countries in December 1997. In this plan, they undertook to enforce previous agreements and fulfill political conditions in exchange for economic assistance (Grevle, 2012: 66). The Americans blamed the delay in the implementation of the political plan on both sides. At the same time, Europeans – with the exception of the Scandinavian countries that showed solidarity with the Norwegians – tried to replace the Norwegians at the head of the AHLC (Ad Hoc Liaison Committee) that served as the principal policy-level coordination mechanism for development assistance to Palestinians (Brynen, 2000: 94). The Norwegians increased their financial assistance to the Palestinians in order to maintain their status in the international body. By 1998, total Norwegian aid had reached $1.9 billion, almost double the amount that had originally been allocated to the Palestinians over a five-year period. In the annual report of NORAD, the Norwegian Aid Agency, the authors acknowledged that continued aid would not compensate for the lack of a final political solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. At the same time, they explained that economic aid strengthened Palestinian governance that remained a necessary condition for a long-term and stable peace with Israel (Grevle, 2012: 71). In addition to directing the initial flow of funds to Palestinian aid efforts, the Norwegians ventured putting pressure for the first time. The Norwegians funded a position paper with the Palestinians in which they pressured Israel to withdraw from additional territories including Jerusalem in accordance with the Interim Agreement. In response to the paper, Israeli representatives froze the talks despite Norwegian attempts to establish mutual understandings (Grevle, 2012: 72). In the face of considerable international pressure on Israel, and especially on the Netanyahu government, to advance further gestures towards the Palestinians, Israel was not impressed by the attempt to dictate new conditions and exert indirect pressure on it (Karsh, 2016: 17). Meanwhile, Israel’s political leaders remained divided over the transfer of additional territories to the Palestinians. They understood that the position paper revived a possibility previously mentioned in the course of conversations as part of the Oslo process. The idea was that Israel might freeze the expansion of settlements in Areas A and B. However, at the time of the publication of the position paper, security issues had yet to be resolved with the Palestinians, and the processes of democratisation in the territories of the Palestinian Authority had yet to take place.

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The Norwegians tried to focus on the vital elements of implementation that the Palestinians had been asked to fulfill under the Interim Agreement. They believed that Israel, which had handed over control of the lives of two million Palestinians in the territories to Arafat, left it up to them to decide how to change the Palestinian economy that had neither heavy industry nor valuable resources (Beilin, 2018). Birth rates remained high in the territories and the need to support Palestinian families was urgent. The Palestinian leadership wanted an independent state but did not have the resources to support such independence. The Norwegians were determined to help develop those resources. They reasoned that only with the building of a stable national economy would the Palestinians be able to promote the building of a democratic society. In parallel with the Israeli redeployment, the Palestinian Authority received a huge $6.5 billion in international assistance to promote civil society building (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: 286). Norway joined other counties, including the United States and Russia, in economic aid efforts to the Palestinian Authority (Butenschøn, 1997: 7). Through the AHLC, Norway contributed 250 million Norwegian kroner from October 1993 after the signing of the Accords through 1994. The Norwegian Foreign Minister sought to maintain a high level of assistance to the Palestinians for a period of five years. Norway alone contributed more than all Arab countries combined during 1994 (Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 164). In addition, Norway assisted in the development of the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction. Unlike other bodies, PECDAR was conducted transparently and its representatives were not selected on the basis of family ties. This body was designated to be instrumental in the execution of the PA’s comprehensive reforms on the way to establishing a democratic society. Those steps were never taken. The Norwegians succeeded in appointing Jan Egeland to head the AHLC. As an international body, the AHLC requested reports and updates from PECDAR. The Norwegian representative kept expressing his appreciation for the PLO’s efforts to advance PECDAR work. In this way, he justified the continuation of aid to the Palestinians. He could be seen as important to the AHLC and useful to the Palestinians. In fact, the Norwegians’ control of both the AHLC and PECDAR created an interdependence between the agencies which played a significant role in Norway retaining its position in the overall political process. Arafat’s intention to establish power through personal political loyalty and delay the construction of Palestinian institutions clouded relations between Arafat and the circle of donor states. As early as November 15, 1993, Holst met with Arafat in Tunis to explain the concern of the donor countries regarding the activities of the Council. Holst, who had established his international standing through the Oslo process, stressed to Arafat that the role of PECDAR was a vital factor in most of the aid money transferred for the rehabilitation and development of democracy in the Palestinian

Norway 69 Authority. Along with the other donor countries, the Norwegians learned that Arafat used the new governing bodies to establish PLO rule in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank for his own political needs (Levitt, 2008: 142, Waage, 2004: 180). The Norwegians thought it was in their interest to maintain a high political profile in the Middle East. Through their participation in the AHLC, they were among the influential countries in the region. Because Norway took on the role of chair of the group as a kind of compromise between the United States and the European Union, its people could serve as a liaison between the United States, Europe and the Far East reporting on the important initiatives and decisions of the AHLC. Norway could participate in consultations held in Washington, at the end of which Norwegian diplomats could update the foreign ministry personnel in Paris, Brussels and Bonn. At this point, the Norwegians believed that no country would be able to take away their role in the AHLC regardless of the level of their financial contributions (Waage, 2004: 107, 207–209; Grevle, 2012: 55). Under the Oslo Accords a Palestinian police force was to be established in areas directly subordinate to the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Police Force (PPF) was established through the Coordinating Committee for International Assistance to the Palestinian Police (COPP), of which Norway served as chair. In addition to all its other activities on behalf of the Palestinians, Norway also contributed heavily to the establishment of the Palestinian police force. They believed strongly, as did many others, that establishing a local police force would contribute to the stability of the region and strengthen Palestinian governance. In reality, the police force acted out of personal loyalty to Arafat, serving his personal interests and not necessarily the interest of building a Palestinian civil society. Holst, who had visited Tunis in November 1993, understood that the issue of security and the establishment of a Palestinian police force had received substantial attention in Israel and was of paramount importance. For this reason, he believed that its success depended on Arafat’s actions, since if there were no security and order in the Palestinian territories, Israel would renounce the interim order (Waage, 2004: 181). As a result, the Norwegians accelerated the establishment of an operational police force. In December 1993, Norway organised a donors’ meeting to find ways to fund the PPF. After a series of consultations with the Norwegian police in Oslo and several meetings with international bodies, Norway decided to propose itself as chairman of COPP. They obtained approval from the United States, the Palestinian Authority and other states as well. In return for becoming chair of the COPP, Norway undertook to transfer 16 million Norwegian kroner in favor of the establishment of the force (Lia, 2007: 44). In this way, the Norwegians persuaded international aid agencies to join with them in support of the establishment of the police force. However, the Americans made it clear that Arafat’s demand for the

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deployment of a police force should be met within the framework of direct understandings with Israel. Nevertheless, Holst tried to circumvent the Israeli conditions and to convince the Americans that Arafat feared his ability to fulfill his obligation following an Israeli withdrawal without a large police force; larger than the one stipulated in the Interim Agreement. Holst was not successful. Next, Larsen proposed setting up a joint body to monitor the transfer of funds to a Palestinian force. Despite these efforts, the number of Palestinian police officers, who had been active since the beginning of May 1994, gradually increased without any agreement on the international funding mechanism. The Norwegians were faced with the challenge of finding additional international support for the growing force. In June 1994, the Norwegian Embassy in Cairo promoted the transfer of funds to the Palestinian Police Force while the United States made it clear that a quota of police force should be with the consent of the parties. In addition to the growing PPF, a separate arrangement with the parties allowed the United Nations to increase its involvement in the territories through UNRWA and UNSCO. These agencies focused on infrastructure and humanitarian aid. The UN liaison mechanism was headed by Larsen (Waage, 2004: 182–187). At this time, there was growing concern about the implementation of the agreement in general. The lack of Palestinian transparency and Arafat’s actions led U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher to condemn the use of aid funds for political purposes and to force the Norwegians to modify the distribution of funds. The foreign ministry in Oslo feared that the Americans would blame them for the failure of the Palestinians to meet the terms of the Interim agreement. In response, the Norwegians initiated an urgent meeting between Norwegian representatives and representatives of the Palestinian Authority to address problems with the distribution and mismanagement of funds that jeopardised future aid to the PA. Israel took advantage of the crisis to express its reservations about the scope of the aid policy. Israeli representatives stressed to the Norwegians that the transfer of funds should be conditioned on Palestinian political progress. Contrary to the Israeli position, the Norwegians believed that the transfer of funds should be done separately from the negotiations regardless of political disputes between the parties (Brynen, 2000). The Norwegians believed that stopping the funds would collapse the construction of the Palestinian Authority and lead to the collapse of the talks. They preferred reliable financial support that would build legitimate governing bodies over the long term. At that time, Norwegian aid reached 383 million Norwegian kroner and was far above the initial Norwegian commitment. The massive increase was justified in a series of internal governmental sessions which focused primarily on the commitment to invest in long-term goals but also to help in resolving immediate crises that arose over time (Grevle, 2012: 49–50).

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3.9 Limitations of Norwegian mediation policy The increase in Norwegian aid was based on the Norwegians’ expectations of success in the political channel. To that end, Norway signed an agreement with the Palestinians in November 1994, setting out the parameters for continuing donations to the Palestinian Authority in return for the Palestinians building a balanced budget by March 1995. The deadline passed without any change or fulfillment of Palestinian commitments. Much of Norway’s subsequent work focused on narrowing the gaps between the position of the European Union, the United States and the Palestinian leadership. By virtue of their role as chairman of the AHLC, the Norwegians tried to present a balanced position. In order to address the setbacks in the implementation efforts in the territories, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated a brief meeting with Rabin, Peres and Arafat when they were in Oslo to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. They wanted to discuss the establishment of a mechanism for continued economic assistance to the Palestinian Authority. Norway proposed a tripartite committee (TC) under which Israelis and Palestinians could raise questions about economic aid as part of the Oslo process. In this way Norway tried to strengthen its position in the eyes of the parties and prove that Norway had the power to influence the position of the United States and the European Union. But they tried to wield a power they did not in fact have. The Europeans refused the Norwegian outline. The establishment of new mechanisms in the midst of the implementation of the agreement did not receive wide backing at all. Thereafter, Norway was forced to share its role with European and American representatives (Grevle, 2012: 44–45). Throughout the Oslo process, the Norwegians had formed important ties. Even if they did not see full reconciliation between the parties, they continued their financial support and tried to increase foreign aid to the Palestinians. In their eyes, being seen as an active force in international diplomatic circles served Norwegian interests. Thus, despite the deadlock in the political process, the foreign ministry in Oslo increased aid funds from 340 million Norwegian kroner in 1995 to 440 million Norwegian kroner in 1996. The increase came from additional Palestinian aid such as the establishment of the emergency force in Hebron, civilian projects carried out by Norwegian NGOs as well as direct aid. New Foreign Minister Bjørn Tore Godal stressed that a portion of the money was transferred to refugees in Lebanon through the World Bank after the establishment of a welfare fund named after late Foreign Minister Holst, who died in early 1994 following a stroke. Godal believed that Norwegian aid efforts contributed to Norway’s international status. In 1996, Norway increased aid to peace efforts and UN activities in order to increase the scope of its economic and political influence (Butenschøn, 1997: 11). Former Foreign Minister Knut Vollebæk believed that Norway’s control of aid organizations led to frequent contacts with the State Department, the

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European Commission and the German Foreign Ministry. Such conversations could include issues related to the Norwegian gas industry (Grevle, 2012: 59; Waage, 2009: 178). In this context, the Foreign Minister explicitly explained how he promoted Norwegian interests: Our engagement in the Middle East has made us interesting. When I talk with Kinkel (German Foreign Minister), with van der Brock (Commissioner in the EU) and Talbott (US Deputy Secretary of State), they are very interested in what happened in the Middle East. What did I get out my visit there? What is my view on this? And then I can include something about salmon and gas market directive and such, because I have already given them something. (Waage, 2009: 178) These opinions were consistent with Norway’s assumption that their assistance in peace efforts contributed to its impact and involvement in distant arenas (Stokke, 2010: 138). Apparently, the Norwegians could argue that while official delegations were not allowed to carry out humanitarian actions in different conflict areas, many Norwegian unofficial, non-governmental organizations became instrumental vehicles of distributing aid all the while acting with political sensitivity (Hanssen-Bauer, 2017). Indeed, Norwegian unofficial organizations funded by the Norwegian Aid Agency had made political connections by way of proxy messengers serving in unofficial capacities. Put another way, Norwegian aid organizations were “friendly proxies” of Norwegian foreign policy. Over time, it became clear to the Norwegians that aid funds channeled by Norway for civilian projects were partly appropriated for personal as well as political purposes by the PLO leader at the expense of developing a functioning democracy in the West Bank and Gaza. Arafat’s actions proved that he used foreign aid granted to the Palestinian Authority to strengthen his position throughout the Palestinian Authority. In this way, the hegemony of Fatah and Arafat’s loyalists in the Palestinian Authority was guaranteed. On the ground, the Palestinians acted according to their own perceptions. Their leadership sought “blind” loyalty to the PLO, even at the cost of government corruption. Although Palestinian society was one of the most educated, political, and socially involved societies in the Arab world, it failed to develop a democracy. This stemmed not only from government corruption but also from the PLO leadership that roamed Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia (Levitt, 2008: 215). The vast amount of aid funds transferred to the Palestinian Authority under Norwegian international auspices turned out to be a political vulnerability for the mediators. Considering the vast amount of financial resources that the Norwegians had invested in the overall Oslo process, the resolute action needed to confront the Palestinians was not an option. It was not a risk they were willing to take. The mediators were unable to condition

Norway 73 the continuation of aid to the Palestinians on progress in meeting PLO obligations under the Interim Agreement. Even strong messages to that effect were not conveyed to PLO members. The Norwegians’ diplomatic vulnerability was compounded by their desire to remain in positions of power in order to serve both Norway’s national interests and their foreign policy goals vis-à-vis the United States and other powers. They were almost forced to ignore their weakness in enforcing agreements and promoting democratic procedures. After all, Norway’s quiet management of the Oslo process and the efforts toward softening of the parties’ positions were applauded by the international community. Norway’s thriving image highlighted its contribution to the negotiations and attributed success in merging different interests to formulate a common solution at almost any cost to the Norwegians. Norwegian soft diplomacy was an undoubted success, at least in the early stages of the unofficial channel. But its initial success faded as the obstacles and limitations imposed by the parties on the negotiations increased. In the process of give and take, the gaps between the parties widened. Due to the ambiguity of the initial agreement, both sides had their own interpretations as to its implementation. Despite the Norwegians’ desire to create long-term trust between the parties, each side sought to reach maximum advantage. Nevertheless, even a vague policy created an expectation of practical moves. Israel withdrew from Palestinian city centers in exchange for cooperation and governmental stability in the territories. From this point on, the Norwegians could not provide additional incentives or extract substantive policy statements because Israel had already committed to a clear process of retreat. The Palestinians continued to engage in discussions about future guidelines without clear promises. Even if there had been a desire to reach a political decision aimed at ending the conflict, the Norwegian mediator would have had no leverage in implementing any further agreements other than economic incentives and deployment of police forces. And so the Norwegians sought the involvement of the Americans and Europeans to support the Oslo process even though in return, the Americans and Europeans wanted to weaken the Norwegian influence and keep them away from the discussions around the remaining core issues. Already at the end of the Declaration of Principles, courageous actions and decisions were required on the part of the all sides. The Norwegian mediators failed to achieve these results despite the economic pressure they exerted to advance the political process. Where the Norwegians failed to persuade the Palestinians to take clear steps, Israel demanded the use of political pressure. Remarkably, in the eyes of the Norwegians, the mediation strategy remained effective even in the later stages. For the Norwegians, negotiations between the parties presented an opportunity for creating a range of options at any moment for advancing political and economic interests through conflict resolution and the avoidance of violence as a common interest. With this assumption, the Norwegians concluded that the perceptions and views of

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Israel and the PLO on each other determined the political reality of the negotiations. That reality undermined their efforts and thwarted their aspirations to preserve the achievements of Norwegian diplomacy. In truth, the mediators found it difficult to adapt to the culture of the Middle East. They were not able to adjust their strategy to the tactics and skill employed by the parties in the negotiation of an Interim Agreement. At the stage of the Interim Agreement, good intentions would not suffice. More practical measures were required. Instead, the Norwegians continued to implement a flawed agreement. Even though the negotiators had gained the trust of the parties and had used their diplomatic skills wisely, patiently and carefully, their position was never guaranteed. The essence of soft power mainly served the need to maintain secrecy and build trust with both parties. In moments of crisis, the Norwegians tried to mend the rifts and revive the process by gradual means to harness the parties without harming decision makers (Hanssen-Bauer, 2017). Nevertheless, the Norwegians did not have the leverage or impact of larger more powerful states and the implementation process remained elusive. Because of this, foreign ministry officials in Oslo believed they could act effectively while in the shadow of a more powerful and authoritative American mediator. Norway’s maneuverability was narrow. Yet under the cloak of the secrecy they guarded so fiercely, the Norwegian mediators found a range of options that also advanced their own status. In a more tragic view of the Oslo process, the Norwegians were resilient and “resurrected” their involvement efforts again and again in the face of what turned out to be insurmountable odds. They were devoted to “growing salvation” and being on the right side of history even as the possibilities of achieving peace in the region grew more and more faint. However, as long as their status remained high, the Norwegians promoted their image and pursued a passive enforcement policy that served Norway well, but not necessarily the political process they were mediating. Even when Norway was charged with strengthening Palestinian national institutions and the Palestinian Police Force, it found it difficult to act against the Palestinian Authority. All the more, they feared being accused of gross interference in Palestinian internal affairs. Whereas the Norwegians’ intention to resolve the Palestinian policing crisis was based on a desire to establish practical stability in the territories, the police force was redirected by the PLO for its own political needs. Instead of confronting the problems of implementation, the Norwegians focused on developing new programs led by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and FAFO based on an image of peace that remained meaningless.

3.10 The Norwegian model: Image and reality Norwegian policy had successfully adopted a sophisticated and complex strategy of soft diplomacy, a subject that has often been left out of the

Norway 75 spotlight in foreign policy discussions. Over time, this kind of diplomacy as an official policy became an integral part of the identity of the state (Henrikson, 2005: 71). Through soft diplomacy, Norway gained a new positive status in the international community. Regardless of the denouement of negotiations in which its influence faded, the Norwegians maintained a positive image in the eyes of the United States and especially in the global arena. They were known for acting with political morality and for having the ability to influence peace processes. Norway had traditionally hosted the Nobel Peace Prize, yet it was the political breakthrough in 1993 that gave Oslo its recognition as the “Peace Capital” of the world. Financial and political resources secured for the Palestinians and for Israel shaped Norway’s role in mediation efforts and increased its international influence (Toje, 2010: 215). Political realism and Norwegian interests were linked to Oslo’s foreign policy. Whether it was a deliberate activity or not, the Norwegian elite had solidified its position as providing better reconciliation services than other countries and had provided generous financial assistance in exchange for vital ties with all parties. On a deeper level, the Oslo process provided a unique sense of Norwegian identity based on helping and assisting conflict areas (Höglund, and Svensson, 2009). The Norwegians made it clear that an important component in their success stemmed from the activities of unofficial organizations that opened an unofficial channel which gradually became an official channel, while remaining secret. As Norwegian diplomacy became an object of admiration, Norway gained international interest. Norwegian representatives succeeded in developing substantive channels of communication in places around the world such as Sri Lanka, Colombia and other areas and as did the Norwegian Church with the president of Guatemala. After the end of the Cold War, Norway sought a political path that focused on international mediation. In doing so, it created a political framework that protected it as a small country. At the same time, the Norwegians could make bold decisions because they were not members of the European Union, but were members of NATO (Hanssen-Bauer, 2017). However, in the rough and tumble of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process, the limitations and shortcomings of the Norwegian approach were revealed. Facing an outbreak of violent crises, the Norwegians found it difficult to promote a common denominator between the parties. The more the Norwegians relied on international sponsorship to promote a democratic regime and independent institutions for the Palestinians, their own influence diminished. Their role was reduced to providing mainly economic aid measures that eventually overshadowed the goals of Norwegian mediation. Even more striking was how Norway’s flourishing position in the international community led EU nations to take a hard line against Norway. Most European countries saw Norwegian activity as a foothold in the international community at the expense of EU member states.

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In the end, Israel saw the role of the Norwegians as an indirect political activity that mainly supported the transmission of messages and the strengthening of trust between the parties. Israel did not adopt Norwegian proposals that did not suit its approach. The soft power engaged by the Norwegians went far beyond persuasion. Balancing the needs of both parties while bringing pressure on each party at specific moments required patience, expertise and wisdom. But their “walk on the threshold” was risky business. It was going to the edge of mediation and crossing over to putting pressure on the parties in order to advance the negotiations. At a certain point, Israel made it clear to the Norwegian mediators that Israel was conducting direct negotiations with the Palestinians and therefore did not need Norwegian guidance or messages. Israel harbored another suspicion. They questioned whether the PLO was willing and/or even able to eradicate terrorism. This suspicion was exacerbated by the continuing violence that undermined any justification of the political process. The prevailing opinion among the Israeli public was that the peace process would contribute to a significant reduction in the incidents of violence and lead to the cessation of hostilities. In the face of continued terrorist activity, Israeli public willingness to engage in the peace process went into freefall. Rabin had seen the Palestinians as former enemies, and yet had sought to reconcile with them. For Rabin, it was a risk worth taking. Arafat saw the Oslo process as a way to mobilise Israel as a full partner in order to overcome Arab opposition to his leadership in the territories (Heikal, 1996: 470–472). Arafat wanted to restore his status in the eyes of the Arab world after his support for Hussein in the Iraq war. In the eyes of the Norwegians, the Palestinians used their service to soften Israel’s position. The tense reality on the ground led the parties’ to delay their commitments under the Interim Agreement. Because statesmen and negotiators had been identified with the political process, every crisis in the process was identified as their political failure. The parties faced increasing public criticism and were cautious in the decisions they made in times of crisis. Their ability to resume negotiations depended on their ability to fend off political and public criticism while at the same time strengthening their legitimacy in the eyes of the public (Levitt, 2008: 211, 214). Crises that erupted between Israel and the Palestinians created a chain reaction from which the parties found it difficult to recover. Returning to the negotiating table required overcoming the “burden” left after the end of the previous crisis. At some point, restoring legitimacy and maintaining mutual trust was not practical (Levitt, 2008: 64–65) and Norwegian mediators were left with no room to maneuver in any realistic way. All these factors and more contributed to the Norwegian mediation strategy losing influence and authority between the parties. The Oslo process had come to an end, at least temporarily. Norwegian foreign policymakers did not view their efforts as a failure. Theirs had been a strategy aimed at preserving its role in the international

Norway 77 community in accordance with the resources and types of authority available to it. The presence of the Norwegians and the appointment of representatives from the NORAD agency, along with missions of Larsen and Juul who lived in Israel and in the PA, helped the Norwegians to continue to preserve and monitor developments (Waage, 2004: 206). It seems that “surrender” would not be part of Norwegian’s foreign policy.

Notes 1 Egeland knew Israel well because, as part of his research studies at the Hebrew University, he wanted to strengthen his research work so that Norway, as a small country, would be able to initiate political negotiations, unlike the great powers. For further reading: Egeland, Jan (1988). Impotent Superpower – Potent Small State: Potentials and Limitations of Human Rights Objectives in the Foreign Policies of the United States and Norway. Oslo: Norwegian University Press. 2 From the beginning of 1993, the PLO leadership had tried to weaken Israel’s influence on the Palestinians through a change in local public opinion ( Brown, 2003: 16). By June 1993, however, lack of funds led the PLO to cut aid to media agencies and foreign relations offices opened during the first intifada. In the same year, the PLO cut aid to the families of Palestinian terrorists (Behrendt, 2007: 24). 3 Peres’ vision as revealed by Pundak on several occasions. It is important to note that Pundak felt offended that Peres did not mention Pundak’s contribution in a book he published on the Oslo process. However, Peres’ commitment to the process that carried and linked his name also damaged his public image, which remained dovish in the Israeli public. 4 The Norwegian letters were never published or found in the archives of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ( Waage, 2004: 11). 5 Among the members of the political team who met with him and heard his views were former diplomats and generals: Abba Eban, Maj. Gen. Uri Or, Yossi Beilin, Shlomo Ben Ami, Maj. Gen. Mota Gur, Maj. Gen. Shlomo Gazit, Ephraim Sneh, Dave Kimche and other personalities. 6 Following the Oslo process in which the Interim Agreement was signed in September 1995, it was decided to partially reorganise the Israeli security forces in Hebron. A second temporary international presence was established with a redeployment of the IDF in the city. On April 29, 1996, TIPH returned to Hebron and included a large Norwegian mission. On October 10, 1996, Israel and the Palestinian Authority signed a joint memorandum extending TIPH’s stay until the reorganisation of the Hebron Agreement on January 17, 1997. 7 Following the deployment of TIPH’s forces, the Norwegian police recruited people from the local police districts as the Norwegian police had the option to use 19% of its total manpower for peacekeeping operations around the world. The Norwegian Observers were recruited through a non-governmental body, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), most of whom applied independently to the council and some had research backgrounds on the Middle East.

Bibliography Primary sources – Archives David Kimche Personal Archive Kimche, (1993a). Israel Tal Protocol 1993, Internal Memorandum

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Secondary sources Abbas, Mahmoud (1995). Through Secret Channels. The Road to Oslo: Senior PLO Leader Abu Mazen’s Revealing Story of the Negotiations with Israel. Reading: Garnet Publishing. Aggestam, Karin (1999). Reframing and Resolving Conflict: Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations 1988–1998. Lund: Lund University Press. Aggestam, Karin (2002). “Quasi- Informal Mediation in the Oslo Channel: Larsen and Holst as Individual Mediators”, pp. 57–79. In Jacob Bercovitch (Ed.), Studies in International Mediation. New-York: Palgrave Macmillan. Ashrawi, Hanan (1995). This Side of Peace: A Personal Account. New-York: Shimon & Schuster. Bebchick, Brian (2002). “The philosophy and methodology of Ambassador Dennis Ross as an international mediator”, International Negotiation, Vol. 7(1): 115–131. Behrendt, Sven (2007). The Secret Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations in Oslo: Their Success and Why the Process Ultimately Failed. Oxford: Routledge. Brynen, Rex (2000). A Very Political Economy: peacebuilding and foreign aid in the West Bank and Gaza. Washington: United States Institute of Peace. Brown, Nathan (2003). Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine. California: University of California Press. Butenschøn, Nils (1997). The Oslo Agreement in Norwegian foreign policy. Working Paper, Paper No. 56. Durham: University of Durham: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. Corbin, Jane (1994). The Norway Channel: The Secret Talks that Led to the Middle East Peace Accord. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press. Drory, Ze’ev (2016). ‫ מנהיגות שקטה‬:‫[ דן שומרון‬Dan Shomron- Subtle Leadership]. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth. Egeland, Jan (1985). Impotent Superpower – Potent Small State. Potentials and Limitations of Human Rights Objectives in the Foreign Policies of the United States and Norway. Oslo: Norwegian University Press. Elmusa, S. Sherif and Mahmud El-Jaafari (1995). “Power and trade: The IsraeliPalestinian economic protocol”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 24(2): 14–32. Eriksson, Jacob (2015). Small State Mediation in International Conflicts: Diplomacy and Negotiation in Israel-Palestine. London: IB Tauris. Gil, Avi (2018). ‫ מיומנו של שותף סוד‬:‫[ נוסחת פרס‬Peres Formula: Diary of a Confidant]. Ḥevel Modi’in: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan. Grevle, Tessa Eriksen (2012). The Norwegian Aid Effort in the Oslo Peace Process 1993–2000: Why Norwegian Aid Increased as the Peace Process Deteriorated. Oslo: Department of Political Science: Master’s Program in Peace and Conflict Studies. Grønstad, Eli (2008). Ordkrigen om Midtøsten Norske synspunkter om konflikten i Midtøsten 1973–1974 [War of Words about Norwegian Views Regarding the Conflict in the Middle East 1973–1974]. Oslo: Universitetet I Oslo. Halevi, Efraim (2006). ‫ המשבר במזרח התיכון מבעד לעיניו של מי שעמד בראש המוסד‬:‫אדם בצל‬ [Man in the shadows: The Crisis in the Middle East Through the Eyes of the Head of the Mossad]. Tel Aviv: Matar. Heikal, Mohamed (1996). Secret Channels: The Inside Story of Arab–Israeli Peace Negotiations. London: HarperCollins.

Norway 79 Henrikson, K. Alan (2005). “Niche diplomacy in the world public Arena: the global ‘Corners’ of Canada and Norway”, pp. 67–87. In Jan Melissen (Ed.), The New Public Diplomacy Soft Power in International Relations. New-York: Palgrave Macmillan. Höglund, Kristine and Isak Svensson (2009). “Mediating between tigers and lions: Norwegian peace diplomacy in Sri Lanka’s civil war”, Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 17(2): 175–191. Høgseth, Henning (2008). Norges engasjement i Afghanistan – demokratibygging eller symbolpolitikk? en studie av norsk bistand til den afghanske politireformen [Norway’s Engagement in Afghanistan – Democracy or Symbolic politics? A study of Norwegian Assistance to the Afghan Police Reform]. Bergen: Bergen University. Holst, Johan Jørgen (1993). “Reflections on the makings of a tenuous peace”, Middle East Insight, Vol. 9(6): 30–34. Hostens, Karen (2004). “The Temporary International Presence In Hebron: A Civilian International Observer Mission”, pp. 39–49. In Louise Olsson, Inger SkjelsbÆk, Elise Fredrikke Barth and Karen Hostens (Eds.), Gender Aspects of Conflict Interventions: Intended and Unintended Consequences. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute. Karsh, Efraim (2014). ‫[ מיתוס המרכזיות הפלסטינית‬The Myth of Palestinian centrality: Studies in Middle East Security 108]. Ramat Gan: Begin – Sadat for Strategic Studies. Karsh, Efraim (2016). ‫[ אסון אוסלו‬The Oslo disaster: Studies in Middle East Security 123]. Ramat Gan: Begin – Sadat for Strategic Studies. Khalidi, Walid (1978). “Thinking the unthinkable: A sovereign Palestinian state”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 56(4): 695–713. Khalidi, Rashid (2006). The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. Oxford: Oneworld Publications. Kimmerling, Baruch and Joel S. Migdal (2003). The Palestinian People: A History. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Klieman, Aharon (1988). Statecraft in the Dark: Israel’s Practice of Quiet Diplomacy. Tel- Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. Lavie, Ephraim (2015). “‫ הסיפור המלא‬- ‫ אוסלו‬:‫ ערוץ חשאי‬,‫ רון פונדק‬:‫“[ ”רשימות ביקורת‬Reviews: Ron Pundak, Secret Channel: Oslo – The Full Story”], JAMA’A, Vol. 22: 147–156. Levin, Kenneth (2005). The Oslo Syndrome: Delusions of a People Under Siege. New Hampshire: Smith and Kraus. Levitt, Matthew (2008). Negotiating Under Fire: Preserving Peace Talks in the Face of Terror Attacks. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Lia, Brynjar (2007). Building Arafat’s Police. UK: Garnet Publishing Limited. Makovsky, David (1995). Making Peace with the PLO. Boulder: Westview. Parsons, Nigel (2005). The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to alAqsa. New-York: Routledge. Peri, Yoram (1996). “Afterword—Rabin: From ‘Mr. Security’ to Nobel Prize Winner”, pp. 380–399. In Yitzhak Rabin (Ed), The Rabin Memoirs. Berkeley: California University Press. Peri, Yoram (2002). The Israeli Military and Israel’s Palestinian Policy From Oslo to the Al Aqsa Intifada. Washington: United States Institute of Peace. Pundak, Ron (2013). ‫ אוסלו הסיפור המלא‬:‫[ ערוץ חשאי‬Secret Channel − Oslo, the Full Story]. Tel Aviv: Attic books, Yedioth Ahronoth, Hemed books. Ross, Dennis (2015). Doomed to Succeed: The U.S.-Israel Relationship from Truman to Obama. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

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Rubin, Barry and Judith Colp Rubin (2005). ‫ ביוגרפיה פוליטית‬:‫[ יאסר ערפאת‬Yasser Arafat – Political Biography]. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth and Hemed. Rynhold, Jonathan (1999). Identity, Values and Culture Change: Israel, the United States and the Palestinian Question since Camp David, London: London School of Economics: Ph.D. Dissertation. Sagi, Uri (1998). ‫[ אורות בערפל‬Fog lights]. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth and Hemed. Savir, Uri (1998). ‫ מאחורי הקלעים של הכרעה היסטורית‬:‫[ התהליך‬The Process: Behind the Scenes of a Historic Decision]. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth. Seliktar, Ofira (2009). Doomed to Failure?: The Politics and Intelligence of the Oslo Peace Process. California: Praeger Security International. Shlaim, Avi (2005). “The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process”, pp. 241–263. In Louise Fawcett (Ed.), International Relations of the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sneh, Ephraim (2002). ‫[ ניווט בשטח מסוכן‬Navigation in Dangerous Terrain]. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth. Stokke, Kristian (2010). “The Soft Power of a Small State: Discursive Constructions and Institutional Practices of Norway’s Peace Engagement”, Power Conflict Democracy Journal, Vol. 2(1): 137–173. Stoltenberg, Thorvald (2001). Det handler om mennesker [It is About People]. Oslo: Gyldendal. Toje, Asle (2010). “Norsk utenrikspolitikk: En kritikk” [“Norwegian foreign policy: A critique”], Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, Vol. 1(2): 206–217. Waage, H. Henriksen (2000). Norwegians? Who Needs Norwegians? Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway’s Political Past in the Middle East. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Evaluation Report. Waage, H. Henriksen (2002). “Explaining the Oslo Backchannel: Norway’s political past in the middle east”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 56(4): 597–615. Waage, H. Henriksen (2004). Peacemaking is a Risky Business: Norway’s Role in the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1993–96, Oslo: International Peace Research Institute. Waage, H. Henriksen (2007). “The ‘Minnow’ and the ‘Whale’: Norway and the United States in the Peace Process in the Middle East”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 34(2): 157–176. Waage, H. Henriksen (2009). “Fredspolitikk i Midtøsten” [Peace Policy in the Middle East], pp. 157–208. In Even Lange, Helge Pharo and Øyvind Østerud (Eds.), Vendepunkter i norsk utenrikspolitikk [Points in Norwegian Foreign Policy]. Oslo: Unipub. Wall Jr, A. James and Ann Lynn (1993). “Mediation a current review”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37(1): 160–194. Wallensteen, Peter (2002). Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System. London: Sage. Wallensteen, Peter (2011). Peace Research: Theory and Practice. London & New York: Routledge Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution. Wallensteen, Peter and Isak Svensson (2016). Fredensdiplomater. Nordisk medling från Bernadotte till Ahtisaari [Peace Diplomats. Nordic Mediation from Bernadotte to Ahtisaari]. Stockholm: Santérusförlag. Wanis-St John, Anthony (2011). Back Channel Negotiation: Security in Middle East Peace Process. New York: Syracuse University Press: Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution.

Norway 81 Zak, Moshe (2007). “A Survey of Israel’s Contacts with Jordan, April 25, 1980: Analysis”, pp. 390–394. In Rabinovich, Itamar and Jehuda Reinharz (Eds.), Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations, Pre-1948 to the Present. Massachusetts: Brandeis University Press.

Interview Beilin, Yossi (February 13, 2018). (Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister and key figure of the Oslo process), Tel Aviv: Personal interview. Hanssen-Bauer, Jon (April 6, 2017). (Senior diplomat for the Middle East peace process at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Tel Aviv: Personal interview. Melchior, Michael (March 14, 2018). (Israel Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), Jerusalem: Personal interview.

Online source Hirschfeld, Yair (2014, September). Negotiating the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Track Two Diplomacy in the Past, Present and Future. Cambridge: Harvard Law School campus. (Access date: 06.07.2017) https://youtu.be/Q9vluS9tS-8?list= PL5QaO7hnkvtWdSSkHuYaFg5eM9yMvOc7

4

Sweden

4.1 Swedish mediation in 1988 As part of Swedish mediation efforts in the Middle East, Sweden sponsored three political channels between the beginning of 1988 and the end of 2000.1 Since Swedish mediation was conducted in discontinuous sections, the influence of the mediators waxed and waned according to the different conditions they faced over time: if the talks were unofficial or official; if outside events impacted the different parties; the changing attitudes of the parties; and the personalities of the changing participants representing each side. The Swedish mediators used the means at their disposal, which in this case were moral authority and economic incentives. Despite making advances toward an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, all three mediation attempts failed, each for its own reason. One element remained constant. Similar to Norwegian mediation, Swedish mediation promoted peace processes as a way to strengthen its own international image. By 1988, the perspective on the conflict in the Middle East was shifting from being identified as an Israeli-Arab conflict to being a conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Swedish diplomacy would further define this change as the Swedish Foreign Office understood this shift as an opportunity to invest in Middle East peace diplomacy. Contact between Sweden and the Palestinians prior to 1988 had positioned Sweden to initiate diplomatic efforts to help solve the conflict. For the Swedes, it was also a way to advance Sweden’s international status. The Swedes’ plan was to create a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians by using the persuasion methods of soft diplomacy. In this way, they would gain international recognition as peace negotiators and earn prestige in the eyes of the Americans. The first attempt to mediate was between the PLO and Jewish American representatives made by the Swedish Foreign Ministry. Most of the efforts under Foreign Minister Sten Andersson in 1988 were unofficial and their main contribution was in paving the way for a channel of dialogue between the United States and the PLO and not between Israel and the PLO (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016: 45). In fact, the Swedish

DOI: 10.4324/9781003365198-4

Sweden 83 channel in 1988 was established without Israeli representatives because Israeli law banned contact with the PLO (Gazit, 2016: 370).2 In 1987, riots began in Gaza protesting bad economic conditions and then intensified in the territories. This was known as the First Intifada. Because Israel controlled Gaza and the West Bank at the time, the government in Jerusalem was held responsible for the unrest. The riots could not be ignored and an appropriate response was required. At that time, there was a united government under the Likud and Labor Parties that was considered the most “hawkish” government in Israel’s history. The reason for this label was that five of its ministers were past and present defense ministers: Yitzhak Rabin, Ariel Sharon, Shimon Peres, Ezer Weizman and Moshe Arens. They were joined by two former chiefs of staff, Haim Bar-Lev and Mordechai Gur (Drory, 2016: 390). With the escalation of the riots, the security policy came into question by many of these same generals. Along with senior army officers, some of them believed that Israel must reach an agreement with its neighbors, even at the cost of territorial concessions. They reasoned that such a compromise would benefit both the Palestinians and Israel. Radical states such as Iran, Libya and Iraq would not be able to use financial and military support for the riots to gain control of Palestinian society. And these radical states could not use the escalation to their own purposes of destroying Israel (Peri, 2002: 16). In addition to these concerns, the government in Jerusalem faced the renewal of American calls for direct talks between the parties. Israel carefully considered the efforts of Secretary of State George Shultz and his request for recognition of the political rights of the Palestinians. Shultz’s position was formulated in a three-stage plan: (1) convening an international conference; (2) promoting regional negotiations between Israel, Jordan and their neighbors toward a settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; and (3) promoting a permanent and comprehensive settlement through direct negotiations between the parties (Sayigh, 1997: 623). Similar to the Reagan and other earlier American initiatives, Shultz’s proposal was received with mixed feelings. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir feared international conferences and called them a “dangerous trap” and the Likud party opposed both indirect and direct talks with the Palestinians (Flamhaft, 1996: 54–56).3 Shultz’s proposal highlighted a regional arrangement and ignored the PLO. This omission was a painful political blow for the PLO (Kabha, 2010: 277, 280). During this time, the Swedes were following closely the events in the region. They understood the riots as an expression of Palestinian aspirations and identified an American desire to arrive at a comprehensive regional settlement through the resolution of the Palestinian issue. Sweden decided to address the issue and focused mainly on supporting Palestinians legitimacy and on promoting American recognition of the PLO. The Swedes saw the escalation of the riots, the American initiative and the low status of the PLO. They believed they could solve these three problems with one negotiation.

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They thought they could halt the Intifada, give the United States room for dialogue between Israel and the PLO and improve the position of the PLO whom they saw as the de facto leaders of the Palestinian people. The Swedes assumed that the successful resolution of these three elements would lead to an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians (Mossberg, 2017). During 1987, Andersson’s ambition for the creation of an unofficial dialogue channel increased (Bjurner, 2017). The Swedes looked for ways to promote an outline that would allow a direct channel of communication between the PLO and the United States (Mossberg, 2017). There was a problem. As part of the Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt in 1975 and the Peace Agreement signed in 1978, the Americans had set certain conditions for any contact with the PLO. The Swedes believed that these conditions constituted an obstacle to any direct dialogue between the parties. However, the region was far more complicated than their assumptions allowed. The king of Jordan was following the events in the region closely also. After losing the West Bank to Israel in the 1967 war, Jordan was widely seen as a representative of the Palestinian people in the West Bank. Twenty years later, the king of Jordan no longer wanted to reckon with another uprising that might damage the stability of the kingdom of Jordan. In August 1988, King Hussein announced Jordan’s disengagement from the Palestinian issue and transferred the mantle of Palestinian representation to the PLO leadership (Quandt, 2005a: 277).4 It is possible that the failure of talks with Shimon Peres in 1987 also influenced the king to act independently at this time. The Intifada of the late 1980s was carried out under the political slogan of “ending the occupation” and “establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel”. Many Israelis were influenced by these slogans and adopted the new political thinking that claimed that the PLO was giving political expression to reconciliation between the two sides (Kelman, 1997). In the opinion of David Kimche, the director of the Israel Foreign Ministry, Arafat used these statements to placate the Israelis, the international community and also the Palestinians. Because Arafat needed the support of the residents of the West Bank and Gaza in order to gain broad legitimacy for his leadership, Arafat waved this particular olive branch to appease the Palestinians (Kimche, 1992: 304). In exchange for his control of the West Bank and Gaza, he promised to fulfill their political ambitions. These circumstances were essential to the timing of Swedish mediation. The Swedes saw that the Middle East was changing and they decided that it was a propitious time to establish a channel of negotiation under their sponsorship. The mediator’s goal was to open a channel of communication between the PLO and the U.S. State Department. Instead of a direct contact with Washington, they started the talks with unofficial Jewish American representatives. The activities of the Swedes were monitored in Jerusalem. Even though Sweden had gained sympathy in Tunis, it had not gained trust in Israel.

Sweden 85 The Israeli leadership was suspicious of Arafat’s intentions. In addition, the previous Palme government had expressed hostility towards Israel which had intensified the distrust between the two countries. In the face of Israel’s distrust, Sweden decided to deepen its already strong relations with the PLO leadership. In Stockholm, Eugene Makhlouf, a Palestinian affiliated with the PLO, set up a direct communication channel between the PLO and the Swedish government. Since Sweden frequently raised the Palestinian issue in the UN plenum, Arafat decided to use the Swedes for PLO purposes. The cooperation between them was reflected in a series of correspondences between Swedish Foreign Minister Andersson and the Palestinian leader Arafat that paved the way for the creation of the Stockholm channel (Abadi, 2001). Andersson decided to change directions. He set up a personal advisory group in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He listened to their recommendations on ways to open a dialogue between Israel and the PLO and on October 4, 1987, sent his personal adviser and loyalist, Pierre Schori, to begin initial explorations with Yossi Beilin, a senior officer in the Israeli Foreign Office.5 U.S. Secretary of State Shultz was also looking for a way to influence the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and made preliminary outreach efforts to Israel in February and March 1988. Aware of these U.S. overtures, Andersson decided to visit Israel and the West Bank in March 1988 (Yegar, 1993: 142, 144). In Israel, he met with Foreign Minister Shimon Peres without success. The Swede’s explorations failed to break through the Israeli wall of suspicion. Next, Andersson held another series of meetings with his colleagues at the Swedish Foreign Ministry. They felt that American consent was needed to make possible their long-term goal of setting up of a channel between Israel and the PLO. Andersson’s associate and Labor activist Mathias Mossberg recommended that Israel be pressured by the Americans (Mossberg, 2017). In the end, the Swedes decided to aim at building public relationship between the PLO leadership and the U.S. State Department. Their first step was to initiate a meeting between American Jewish representatives6 and PLO members (Eriksson, 2015: 82, 86). With this initiative, the Swedes expanded their ties with PLO members even though the Swedish Foreign Ministry had received intelligence reports on the Palestinian opposition that challenged Arafat’s leadership (Bjurner, 2017).7 In the meantime, the shadow war between the PLO and Israel continued on its bloody path. The violence turned out to be a more significant factor than anyone imagined and overshadowed any intention to conduct unofficial contacts in Stockholm. Earlier in April 1988, Abu Jihad had been assassinated in Tunis. He was an archenemy of Israel and had masterminded numerous attacks against Israelis over many years. In response to the assassination of Abu Jihad (Palme, 1993: 77), Andersson’s special envoy, Anders Bjurner, sent a letter to Arafat on behalf of the Swedish Foreign Minister. In the letter, Bjurner expressed Andersson’s feelings about the prospect of a breakthrough

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with the Americans and the PLO. During 1988, Andersson studied the contents of the discussions and believed that Arafat had softened his positions.8 Andersson made sure to inform the U.S. secretary of state on which points the PLO had softened its position in order to reduce U.S. opposition to talking to Arafat. In this way, Andersson served Arafat’s ambition of gaining American recognition of the PLO. In addition, Andersson’s letter urged Arafat to forge a dialogue between the PLO and Israel. In retrospect, Arafat’s actions after the riots in the West Bank and Gaza strengthened his support in the territories. Determined in his quest for official American recognition, he decided to publish the new vision of the PLO leadership through a news agency in East Jerusalem using his spokesman, Bassam Abu Sharif, which also been referred to as “Abu Sharif Document”. Later, it was published in the Washington Post newspaper. The Abu Sharif Document was published again in an extended article in the New York Times on June 22, 1988. In it, Arafat sided with a two-state solution and with the PLO’s willingness to recognise Israel (Abu-Sharif, 2009: 166–167). These publications received recognition due partially to the talks held in Stockholm. The Swedes were quick to attribute the political breakthrough to their activities and their influence on the PLO. Responding to these developments, Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson accelerated his efforts. He sent Mathias Mossberg to Washington at the end of September 1988 for a meeting with U.S. State Department officials to update Washington on the nature of the talks between PLO representatives and Jewish American leaders. A month later on October 3, 1988, the Swedish Foreign Ministry asked the participants in the talks to formulate a joint declaration calling for peace and mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO even though Israel was not represented at the talks. As meetings opened in Stockholm between representatives of the PLO and Jewish representatives from the United States, the PLO adhered to the goals of gaining American recognition and establishing their hold on the West Bank and Gaza. Since the Swedish Foreign Office regarded the unofficial dialogue channel between the parties as significant, it provided vital coverage for the Americans and the PLO. Sweden encouraged the PLO to be flexible in the Stockholm talks so that the United States would agree to recognise the organization (Palme, 1993: 74). Gradually, the Stockholm Channel became a recognised of unofficial dialogue even if it was not yet a direct channel between Israel and the PLO as the Swedes had originally hoped. During the meetings, the PLO representatives hesitated to present bold positions as they were unsure whether the Stockholm talks would promote official American recognition of the organization. U.S. Secretary of State Shultz was suspicious of the Palestinians’ intentions and wanted further clarification. National Security Adviser Colin Powell communicated through the Jewish representatives that the PLO chairman needed to make an official statement recognising Israel and pledging to stop terrorism (Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 126). Powell believed that only such a statement

Sweden 87 would meet U.S. conditions and would have the potential to strengthen the moderate forces within the PLO. Using the Swedish mediators, Shultz forwarded a letter of reservations regarding the recognition of the PLO (Palme, 1993: 109). Thus a political channel had been forged successfully under Swedish auspices that led to a political breakthrough in the Middle East. The PLO leadership changed its historic position and presented a conciliatory political declaration towards Israel and the PLO was given international legitimacy. The way was paved for a direct channel of dialogue between the U.S. State Department and the PLO.9 The signals from the American administration encouraged the PLO leader and increased his willingness to appease the Americans and to fulfill the conditions set by Shultz. Arafat needed the political prestige of being seen by Washington as the leader of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza because the uprising that was initiated by the Palestinians in Gaza and not by the PLO threatened his hegemony among the Palestinians (Quandt, 2005a: 278). Arafat was also motivated by his worry over the United States’ relationship with the USSR. Arafat was afraid that the Soviets might not keep the Palestinian question at the top of their foreign policy concerns and could betray Arafat. Losing Soviet political backup would be a major blow to the Palestinian cause. All of these factors contributed to a change in the PLO’s attitude toward Israel. On November 8, 1988, the PLO declared that they would fulfill the conditions set by the U.S. State Department and they recognised Israel as part of a two-state solution and committed to the cessation of terrorist acts. This became known as the Algiers Declaration. At the summit in Algeria, members of the PLO membership ratified Arafat’s recognition of Israel and the renunciation of terror along with a declaration of Palestinian independence. This change of rhetoric was noticed in Washington and paved the way for the creation of a direct channel between Tunis and Washington. Evidence of the formation of this channel was found in a letter sent by the Americans to the PLO through the Swedes. A statement written by Shultz and sent to Andersson mentioned this channel and the final terms for contacts with the PLO (Rabie, 1995: 76; Abu-Sharif, 2009). In addition, Arafat used the uprising to promote a new policy that paved the way for the Palestinian National Council’s decision of 15 November 1988 to establish an independent state based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338 (Gazit, 1999: 261). At the same time, Arafat mobilised several Arab countries to support the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza (Palme, 1993: 80). Arafat’s leveraging of the violence along with Jordan’s decision to withdraw from direct involvement were a significant factor in advancing Arafat’s political status.10 Forging ahead, Andersson made an official invitation to Arafat to a joint meeting in Stockholm with the Jewish American representatives based solely on the PLO leadership’s stated willingness to recognise Israel (Rabie, 1992: 58). In addition to inviting Arafat to a public meeting in Stockholm,

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Andersson informed Arafat of the benefits of recognising Israel in exchange for receiving American recognition. And yet, Andersson worried about the elusiveness of the political achievement and feared the appropriation of credit by others. The Swedish Foreign Minister understood that the essential contacts were between the United States and the PLO and that the talks in Stockholm were not the only diplomatic activities in the region. Andersson’s worries were not unfounded. The PLO leader’s determination to negotiate unofficially with the U.S. State Department had paid off several months earlier. Along with the talks in Stockholm, Arafat conducted parallel negotiations with American representatives through the U.S. State Department without Swedish involvement. Arafat asked for parallel channels so that he could use a copy of the Stockholm documents to pressure the U.S. State Department in favor of the PLO (Palme, 1993: 102). In this way, Arafat tried to influence the U.S. State Department by leveraging the Stockholm channel’s agreements with the American Jewish representatives in order to soften Shultz attitudes toward the PLO and encourage the Americans to give clear gestures to the PLO (Rabie, 1992: 59, 62).11 An American-Palestinian outline setting the conditions for any future negotiations between the United States and PLO was developed unofficially between Arafat and Shultz. This initiative was conducted by William Quandt, a senior diplomat from the U.S. State Department and Mohamed Rabie, an Arab American scholar. Together they formed the understandings for an official U.S. dialogue with the PLO (Quandt, 2005a: 279). Thus, at a time when the Swedes were initiating an indirect channel with unofficial American representatives, Shultz had already established basic and clear pre-conditions for future contacts with Arafat’s people. Doing so, Shultz excluded both the Jewish American representatives and the Swedes (Rabie, 1992: 78–79) from the content of the talks he had with Arafat’s representatives in the United States. In Shultz view, the American Jewish delegation in Stockholm gave the false impression that they had been negotiating with the consent of the White House. This group had not been given a mandate from the U.S. administration and did not represent American foreign policy (Palme, 1993). Shultz made it clear to the Swedes that the talks in Stockholm were an independent activity and did not represent the White House (Palme, 1993: 119). Shultz clarified that the messages between the U.S. State Department and representatives of the PLO were not part of the meetings held in Stockholm (Shultz, 2010: 1038–1039) and that Stockholm remained an unofficial channel. It seemed that Shultz did not want to confront the American Jewish representatives publicly and he did not call a halt to the talks in Stockholm. Shultz wanted to develop an avenue for maneuvering other than the one in Stockholm. Washington still wondered about the intentions of the PLO after the Algiers Declaration in November 1988

Sweden 89 (Kimche, 1992; 307; Quandt, 2005a: 280–281), which according to Arafat was still subject to approval by the PLO Executive Committee. Although the Palestinians were not ideological communists, they received broad support from the Soviets who encouraged the PLO to use the Swedes with the intention of forcing an American commitment to any understanding of the parties (Rabie, 1992). The leader of the USSR advised Arafat that Israel should be part of a regional peace plan as it would weaken American influence in the Middle East.12 The Swedes knew that the Soviets were supporting the PLO and from this the Swedes understood that Soviet backing of the Swedish initiative was essential (Bjurner, 2017). For Andersson, Soviet participation was crucial as he sought to make sure Arafat would support the Swedish document/initiative. Andersson noted that the PLO’s recognition of Israel relied on an earlier decision by the Palestinian National Council and the Abu Sharif document. In this way, the Swedes justified their activity to open political negotiations between the parties through the Americans on the basis of internal Palestinian decisions that had already been made (Abu-Sharif, 2009: 180). These historic breakthroughs were accomplished while disregarding what were to become the more significant factors in the success or failure of the talks, namely, the actual domestic politics in the West Bank and Gaza and the absence of participation of Israel in the talks. The importance of these two factors would make itself known over time. Although the Stockholm channel was not recognised officially by the U.S. State Department, nevertheless the channel provided cover for the substantial contacts that had already begun between the United States and the PLO. The American-Palestinian understandings were kept secret (Bjurner, 2017). With the Washington-PLO channel in play, Arafat did not attach practical importance to the understandings between the two delegations in Stockholm. Fearing that the Stockholm agreements had given too wide an exposure to recognition of Israel, Arafat pressured Andersson not to publish them. Andersson was forced to deposit the memorandum of the Stockholm understandings in a preserved archive, leaving them for future use. Bowing to Arafat’s pressure about the memorandum meant that the Swedes could not take credit for something that had not been published. And even though the Swedes became acquainted with the AmericanPalestinian channel, they still wanted to demonstrate their involvement in the breakthrough to the outside world. Counting the activities of the United States and the PLO as progress, the Swedes were eager to hold a press conference in Stockholm. Promoting an official declaration in Stockholm in 1988 stemmed from a desire to recognise Swedish peace activities. The Swedish Foreign Ministry has been active in the Middle East for a long time. Through deliberate planning and bold steps, it had succeeded to pave the way for the PLO’s official recognition of Israel and to establish a direct dialogue between the PLO and the United States (Bjurner, 2017). The press conferences would signal the end of the discussions in Stockholm.

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On December 8, 1988, Andersson, Arafat and the American-Jewish delegation held two separate press conferences in Stockholm and declared a future general outline for all Israeli-PLO negotiations. This declaration was made without any consultation with Israel. During Arafat’s visit to Stockholm, the prime minister and the Swedish Foreign Minister met with the PLO leader and informed him that the U.S. secretary of state was expecting an official statement from the PLO on the recognition of Israel and the cessation of terror in exchange for public American recognition of the organization. Arafat said he would comply with their request and sought the assistance of the Swedish prime minister to determine the best venue for such a declaration (Abu-Sharif, 2009: 183–184). Arafat preferred to make an official statement at the United Nations (Abu-Sharif, 2009: 184). Because the United States would not grant Arafat a visa to enter the United States, the UN General Assembly was held in Geneva and not at New York General Headquarters.

4.2 The Geneva declaration 1988 At this point, Andersson was aware that the Swedish memorandum from Stockholm remained fragile due to the secrecy of the contacts. The press conference the previous week in Stockholm signifying the conclusion of the Stockholm talks had been important in highlighting Sweden’s involvement in the breakthrough. Now, Andersson turned his attention to helping the Palestinian leader fulfill the preconditions set by Shultz toward establishing an official and public channel between the U.S. State Department and the PLO (Bjurner, 2017). On December 13, 1988, Arafat arrived in Switzerland to deliver an official statement renouncing terrorism based on the wording promoted by the Americans and the Swedes. Andersson believed American backing strengthened his influence on the PLO leader and he revealed to Arafat the letter Shultz had delivered (Palme, 1993: 115, 118). The letter stated that the United States needed a stronger and clearer statement from Arafat that would fulfill the preconditions for recognition by the United States. The U.S. State Department was leary of the efficacy of the Algiers Declaration. They may have interpreted Arafat’s saying that the PLO Executive committee still needed to ratify it as non-compliance and a stalling tactic. Perhaps for those reasons, between the Algiers Declaration and the statement about to be made in Geneva, the United States pressured Arafat steadily to say it clearly in public in his own words. This presented an opportunity for Sweden to maintain its involvement and to promote a Palestinian declaration that would meet American demands. The Palestinians worked on a formula that would pave a direct and public channel with the Americans and meet their preconditions. Even though Arafat understood from Andersson what was expected in his speech, Arafat ignored his advice. Arafat’s speech in the UN plenum did not meet American expectations. It turned out that this was the first of two

Sweden 91 speeches Arafat would make in Geneva. After the debacle of the first speech, Sweden pressured the PLO leader to change the wording of the Declaration (Kimche, 1992: 307–308). In a series of hectic meetings involving cross-town taxi rides through inconvenient traffic jams, Swedish diplomats raced against the spector of a collapsed American recognition. They worried that the Americans would lose patience with Arafat and not continue to negotiate with him. In an effort to bring outside pressure to bear to his advantage, Arafat presented the principles of the second version of the speech to the Jordanians and Egyptians who gave their approval to the statement. Andersson was furious. He asked Arafat to change his statement once again (Bjurner, 2017). At top volume, Andersson explained angrily to Arafat that he was in danger of missing the only chance to advance the PLO’s case. Arafat might miss his historic chance to promote American support for the PLO and change the politics of the Middle East. Andersson struggled to adapt Arafat’s second speech to conform to American demands (Mossberg, 2017). Andersson almost felt betrayed personally. Not only had he gone out of his way to champion Arafat’s cause, but he had put his own professional reputation as a Swedish diplomat on the line. Andersson feared a contemptuous American response to his diplomatic activities and to his negligible influence on the PLO. In the end, Arafat did change the wording of his speech. He gave the “right” speech and said the magic words. His second speech claimed that the PLO would recognise Israel as a Jewish state and that the PLO would renounce terrorism. This became known as the Geneva Declaration. This second chance declaration met the pre-conditions that Shultz had set for American recognition of the PLO. After the speech, U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia Robert Pelletreau met with the PLO delegation. This meeting symbolised the first public contact between U.S. and PLO personnel (Kimche, 1992: 308).13 Shultz became the first U.S. secretary of state to recognise the PLO in an official manner.

4.3 Swedish diplomacy implications According to the research literature, small countries’ soft diplomacy ventures combine political intelligence, broad understanding, credibility, patience and the integration of civil society in order to influence the international community and their status in it. In this context, Swedish soft diplomacy efforts to advance the PLO led mainly to the coordination of positions with the United States and the advancement of its own credibility in the eyes of the Palestinians. This latter achievement will lead to Sweden’s broader role in the Middle East. An essential factor in the Swedish mediator’s ability to influence the parties was having American backing. In the first Swedish initiative in 1988, the Swedish Foreign Ministry felt that the PLO was the solution to the uprising. In order to deal with it, the Swedes turned their eyes to

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Washington and not to the West Bank. Andersson “pulled out” his proposal to open an unofficial dialogue between the United States and the PLO through Sweden. For Andersson, this dialogue would also contribute to contacts between Israel and the PLO (Palme, 1993: 58). Andersson succeeded in harnessing the Americans to the Swedish initiative with the intention of conducting indirect contacts with the PLO in accordance with the U.S. political plan (Palme, 1993: 53–56). Another factor in establishing an unofficial channel was to circumvent Israeli law banning contacts with PLO representatives (Bjurner, 2017). Andersson initiated a series of meetings between the PLO leadership and a small group of prominent Jewish Americans. He considered this step to be groundbreaking (Eriksson, 2015: 91). Andersson hoped that the participation of American representatives would lead to American backing of the unofficial channel due to the ties of Jewish leaders to the American administration. At the beginning of the talks between PLO and Jewish representatives, Andersson revealed the unofficial channel to the secretary of state. Beyond expressing a general interest in the Swedish initiative, Secretary Shultz did not think that these talks would lead to an opening of a dialogue between Israel and the PLO (Rabie, 1992: 56). The 1988 initiative showed that the Swedes relied on the Americans. Shultz told the Swedes that the United States would examine how the talks in Stockholm unfolded before deciding whether it would lead to a direct channel between the PLO and the United States (Abu-Sharif, 2009: 183). Because of this arrangement with Shultz, the Swedes needed to update the Americans of all meetings and contacts as well as coordinate positions with them (Palme, 1993: 91). At this time, Israel was not a partner in the talks at all and strongly opposed them. According to foreign ministry officials in Jerusalem, the PLO was inconsistent in its positions and succeeded in misleading Swedes and other international bodies (Kimche, 1992: 305–307). In fact, the Swedish efforts to forge an unofficial channel between the PLO and American Jewish representatives did lead to international legitimacy of the PLO and to American recognition of the PLO. For the Swedes, this stage was essential for the future resolution of the conflict even if these acts further clouded relations between Sweden and Israel. Israel saw the intentions of the Swedes as acts of malice that exacerbated their suspicion and distrust of Swedish foreign policy. In order to appease Israel, Sweden tried to enact a more balanced policy towards Israel and worked to soften the PLO’s language. In the eyes of Israel, Sweden had damaged its credibility and relations between the two countries remained ice cold. Overall, Swedish mediation in 1988 enhanced Sweden’s status in the international community even though its contribution was to build a channel between the United States and the PLO and not between Israel and the PLO. Realising that his initiative would not materialise, Andersson reiterated his condemnation of Israel that he had made previously at a meeting with representatives of the Israel Workers’ Union who had visited

Sweden 93 Sweden in March 1989, criticising the Labor Party for not promoting his policy initiatives (Abadi, 2001).14 That Andersson was identified as a clear supporter of the PLO damaged his status as well as Sweden’s image in the eyes of Israel (Eriksson, 2015: 94; Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016: 183). Furthermore, Israel assessed Sweden’s activities as a hostile threat because they jeopardised the close relationship between Israel and the United States. Although credibility and legitimacy were essential to the Stockholm mediation, it was Swedish ambition that led the Swedes to initiate blatant political moves favoring the PLO that gradually weakened their status. After Arafat’s Geneva Declaration, the Americans began discussions with the PLO. These discussions were not going to be simple and straightforward because the interests and intentions of the parties involved in the talks and those outside the talks were not necessarily aligned. It was a complicated situation. To begin with, the Americans were reluctant to be involved with the PLO (Associated Press, 1988; Devroy, 1990). Secretary of State Shultz was still wary of Arafat’s intentions. Terror attacks continued in Israel after Arafat’s renunciation of terror in Geneva and Shultz demanded that Arafat stop the attacks. Israeli leaders understood that the talks between the United States and the PLO had created a new reality. In response, Israel proposed holding elections for a Palestinian delegation that would hold negotiations directly with Israel to promote autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Parsons, 2005: 60). Israeli Prime Minister Shamir tried to initiate negotiations directly with the Palestinians, bypassing both the PLO and the Americans (Kimche, 1992: 312). In addition, Shamir denounced the PLO for joining the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein during the U.S.-Iraq war (Dannreuther, 2016: 169). It appeared that Shamir was trying actively to overshadow, even undermine, the new U.S.-PLO diplomatic track. For Israel, it seemed dangerous to be outside the U.S.-PLO track. For Ron Pundak, Israeli academic and future mediator in the Oslo process, the Geneva Declaration made by Arafat led to actual changes in the PLO’s demands toward Israel. The PLO moderated its stance regarding the far-reaching and unacceptable demands made toward Israel at the outbreak of the Intifada (Pundak, 2013: 19). For the time being, it seemed that the direct communication between United States and the PLO meant that the PLO had to be more compliant to the American demands. All of these factors contributed to the weakening of the Swedish Foreign Minister’s position. Nevertheless, Andersson continued to try to strengthen U.S.-PLO relations. In June 1990, the Swedish Foreign Minister met with new U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in Copenhagen and asked him to be patient with Arafat despite the terrorist acts. In addition, Andersson sent his personal envoy, senior Swedish diplomat Mossberg, to Baghdad to update Nabil Shaath, a PLO member working in Iraq. Swedish attempts to preserve contacts between the United States and the PLO came to naught as the Swedish Foreign Ministry refused to support the U.S. demand that the

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PLO refrain from terrorist attacks. Andersson believed that support for the U.S. outline would harm his influence on the PLO chairman. Instead, Mossberg tried to persuade Arafat to abandon Palestinian terrorist groups. Arafat was caught between two contradictory options. He was afraid to oppose the American demand but also afraid to be portrayed as a weak leader who surrendered just to maintain dialogue with the United States. In the end, the PLO chairman agreed to oppose terrorism (Palme, 1993: 208). This conciliatory repetition of the renunciation of terrorism already made in Geneva was communicated to the United States through Sweden, which continued to mediate between the parties as late as 1990. Despite Andersson’s repeated attempts to restore relations between the parties, senior American diplomat Dennis Ross informed Swedish representatives that the United States would stop the dialogue with the PLO (Palme, 1993: 208–209). In response, Arafat expressed his disappointment with a personal attack on Dennis Ross. Arafat claimed that because Dennis Ross was a Jew, he had caused the channel between the United States and the PLO to fail deliberately (Palme, 1993:203–204). The Swedes believed that it was Andersson’s activity that had created a groundbreaking dialogue between the United States and the PLO. Continuing their soft diplomacy efforts, the Swedes tried to promote a political channel between PLO and Israel based on Arafat’s Geneva Declaration and the U.S. recognition of the PLO. But relations between Israel and Sweden did not improve. Sweden’s lack of legitimacy in the eyes of Israel remained problematic for the Swedes. Israel was in no hurry to initiate direct talks with the PLO. Israel made it clear to the Swedes that their status as mediators had been harmed and that they were barred from any further involvement. In conversations with the Swedes, Shimon Peres tempered the Swedes’ expectations. Peres stated that even after Arafat’s Declaration in Geneva, Sweden did not mediate between the parties. Israel maintained ties with the Palestinian leadership in the West Bank through the Americans and Egyptians (Yegar, 1993: 152, 163). Even when Andersson invited Foreign Minister Moshe Arens for a diplomatic visit to Stockholm in an effort to promote dialogue between Israel and the PLO, Arens rejected the overture. Much like other official invitations from Andersson that had been rejected, Arens refused to attach importance this one also (Eriksson, 2015: 93). Swedish outreach continued. During an official state visit as a guest of the king of Sweden in 1990, Israeli President Chaim Herzog met with Andersson. Herzog received a letter (delivered by Andersson) on behalf of Arafat addressed to incoming Defense Minister Moshe Arens. In the letter, Arafat expressed a desire to stop the violence and open a dialogue. Arens did not pay attention to the letter (Bentsur, 2001: 41).15 The cold responses by Israeli officials to the initiatives put forth by Sweden and by Arafat were not only based on Israel’s questioning of the intentions of the Swedes but also on their distrust of the initiatives the Swedes had tried to use to circumvent

Sweden 95 Israeli foreign policy. More especially, the rejections were based on Israel’s response to the vague and contradictory policy of the PLO. Such a policy was understood in Jerusalem as a sign of Arafat’s weakness in his pursuit of PLO hegemony. In 1991 the Labor Party in Sweden lost the election to the Conservative Party. The policy of the Labor Party was weakened and Sweden’s involvement in the Middle East was cut short. Swedish MPs believed that the new government would alter its policy towards the Middle East and that it would be a reversal of the traditional attitude of the Palme-Andersson axis (Eriksson, 2015: 98). The new government created the expectation that Sweden’s foreign policy would involve the warming of relations with Israel at the expense of moving away from the PLO (Palme, 1993: 240–241). Contrary to these expectations, the Swedish government abandoned the Middle East all together and focused on the outbreak of the crisis in Eastern Europe which had intensified with the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Sten Andersson lost his political power in the Labor Party and feared that the Palestinian issue would become simply an internal political issue in Sweden. He wanted it to be a priority in Swedish diplomacy no matter the party in power. In a bold move, he decided to update the Norwegians on the contacts he had made with the Palestinian leadership.16 Andersson believed that his party’s political leanings were similar to those of the Norwegian ruling Labor Party. He hoped that the Swedish government would continue mediation at an appropriate time in the future (Mossberg, 2017). As a result, Andersson enlisted other Labor Party members from Sweden to encourage the PLO to solicit the help of the Norwegian government to promote contacts with Israel mainly through Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoltenberg and Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Egeland (Eriksson, 2015: 98; Söder, 2018). Andersson understood that any mediation required the parties’ willingness to accept the mediating party (Riksarkivet: Riksdagens strengprotokoll 1990/91: 23). Because of his rapport with Arafat, he believed strongly that the Swedes had been the ones who built the foundation for the talks in Oslo. Another Foreign Ministry official and Andersson’s close friend, Pierre Schori, believed a major setback to Swedish diplomacy had occurred with the rise of the Conservative Party that was unwilling to focus on the Middle East (Lapidus, 2015). Both Andersson and Schori thought that the election was responsible for the Stockholm agreement not developing into the “Stockholm Accords” championing a breakthrough between Israel and the PLO. Had it not been for the change in the Swedish government, the Oslo Accords would not have been necessary. Andersson wanted to continue to be involved in the process and to receive recognition for the diplomatic work he had accomplished. Andersson’s senior aide, Mathias Mossberg, thought the matter was more nuanced than just the election. He believed that the Swedes were actually in a better position than the Norwegians to conduct direct contacts between the parties by virtue of the close traditional ties

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between Sweden and the PLO. However, he felt that the Swedes could not have opened direct talks between the Israel and the PLO in 1991 precisely because of those ties (Mossberg, 2017).17 At the time that Norway deployed its sponsorship of the process, Norway’s legitimacy was different from that of Sweden. Norway had a more balanced diplomatic approach to the parties than Sweden and was able to establish credible and trusted ties with both Israel and the PLO. Because Norway advocated a more conciliatory approach towards Israel, the Norwegian mediators such as Johan Holst had a different attitude towards working together with Andersson and often ignored Sweden’s role in the Middle East (Mossberg, 2017). The stage was set for a competition between Sweden and Norway. Sweden’s Andersson wanted the credit for his work in 1988 as fundamental groundwork for all later negotiations. Norway’s Holst wanted to take credit for the secret negotiations in Oslo along with FAFO’s extensive efforts that paved the way for the Oslo Accords. Who would be viewed as the most successful mediator? Which country would be acclaimed as the most effective peacemaker? This was a race for international recognition and a competition for personal prestige and professional status. The fervent desire for an enduring historic legacy was palpable; each man wanting to be remembered as the one who achieved the historic breakthrough in the Middle East. It turned out to be an expanding Scandinavian relay race with each country carrying the diplomatic baton for its discrete leg of the process.

4.4 Sweden’s response to the Oslo accords Sweden viewed their previous involvement throughout 1987 and 1988 as prerequisite experience in engaging with the Middle East. Based on their knowledge of the area and the personalities involved, the Swedish diplomats believed they could strengthen the Oslo process and find common ground of understandings between the parties (Söder, 2018). In fact, the Swedes had continued their involvement in the area after 1988 and throughout the years leading up to the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. During those years, the Swedes worked to maintain close ties with Labor Party members in Israel as well as with the Palestinians. When the Oslo Accords gained international recognition due to Norway’s role in the political breakthrough, Swedish diplomats “accused” the Swedish government of neglecting mediation attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict precisely at a time when the parties were ripe to reach a political solution (Eriksson, 2015: 124). Similarly, Sten Andersson and the Swedish Foreign Ministry had mixed feelings about Norway’s historic role in what they saw as a dramatic breakthrough for peace. They explained that the Norwegians had “taken over” from the Swedes, even though these were the same Swedish diplomats who had updated their Norwegian counterparts on

Sweden 97 early contacts with the PLO leadership. The Oslo Accords changed the fabric of relations in the region which led Swedish politicians to advance political measures. They argued that Sweden should adopt an active model, similar to Norway’s efforts around the world (Riksarkivet: Riksdagens snabbprotokoll 1995/96:55). Following the signing of the Oslo Accords, the Norwegians held key positions in the continuation of the Oslo political process. In October 1994, the Norwegian team of Stoltenberg, Holst and Larsen updated the Swedish Foreign Ministry on the nature of political contacts between Israel and the PLO. The Norwegians advised the Swedes that generous foreign aid would strengthen Swedish relations with the Palestinians and with the Israelis.18 A variety of significant trade ties would enhance Sweden’s credibility with the parties (Schori, 2014: 294). One of the first steps for Sweden was to increase foreign aid to the Palestinians. At the end of 1993, Sweden increased aid to the Palestinians from 50 million Swedish kronor to 225 million Swedish kronor (Riksarkivet: Riksdagens hurdprotokoll 1993/94: 38). At the same time, Swedish MPs recommended inviting the parties to Stockholm for talks. The government stated that meetings between Israelis and Palestinians had been planned already through Swedish aid activities and projects (Riksarkivet: Utrikesutskottets betänkande 1994/95:UU15). After awarding the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo to Rabin, Peres and Arafat, Sweden invited the Israeli and Palestinian leadership to visit the Swedish parliament in Stockholm. Rabin refused the invitation because he disapproved of Swedish policy towards Israel. Arafat and Peres accepted the invitation and paid a visit to Sweden’s Parliament. This same Parliament increased foreign aid to the Palestinian Authority to $38 million between 1994 and 1995 (Eriksson, 2015: 139). In addition, the Swedish government offered favorable credit terms, loans and commercial cooperation between Sweden and the Palestinians. In 1995–1996, Sweden transferred additional aid of 180 million Swedish kronor to various projects in the Palestinian Authority to strengthen Palestinian governance (Eriksson, 2015: 142). In this way, the Swedes adopted the Norwegian model of strategic deployment of aid funding. These Swedish actions reminded Beilin of how Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoltenberg had indirectly approved an investment to the West Bank and Gaza through Terje Larsen amounting to half a million dollars and had gained important mediating status for the Norwegians during 1993 (Beilin, 2018).19 According to Beilin, such decisions allowed the Swedes not only to position themselves to be future mediators but also to interject themselves into the content of future negotiations between the parties. According to Schori, Swedish aid policy contained components to help in the efforts to build a strong civil society in the West Bank and Gaza as well as supporting Palestinian young people through the UNICEF Foundation of the United Nations (Riksarkivet: Riksdagens hurdprotokoll 1995/96: 55). The Swedes used aid money to increase their power in

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the Palestinian Authority but also to leverage aid to the United Nations to increase their influence in the international body. In January 1995, Schori and Jan Allison had visited the area and examined projects funded jointly through the Swedish aid agency SIDA and the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Schori, 2014: 295). They wanted to explore ways to expand Swedish economic activity in the area. The Swedes were rewarded by the Norwegians for their cooperation in helping to fund the economic development. They offered Sten Andersson a position in the UN rehabilitation efforts and Terje Larsen supported Swedish involvement by virtue of his role in charge of Gaza reconstruction on behalf of the United Nations. Swedish Foreign Ministry officials Schori and Allison examined how to promote Palestinian exports to Sweden (Schori, 2014: 297). By retaining positive relations with each side and offering economic incentives to both parties, Sweden wished to position themselves as proper mediators in the continuing Oslo process of negotiations. Their expanded aid policy gave Sweden a place at the table in the channel that was created after the signing of the Oslo Accords. According to Schori, Terje Larsen had believed that Sweden could mediate between the parties and even informed Peres that the Swedes were interested in deepening their involvement. In response Peres praised Schori, citing his approach to strengthening the political process and rehabilitating the Gaza Strip (Schori, 2014: 295). At this point, Sweden offered another economic incentive to the Palestinian Authority. In February 1995, Sweden signed an agreement for cooperation with the chairman of the Palestinian Authority at a cost of 40 million Swedish kronor (Konstitutionsutskottets betänkande 1994/95: KU30). In meetings held by Schori with Beilin and Peres, the parties agreed that continued Swedish aid to Palestinians would tackle the poverty in the West Bank and Gaza that they believed led to violence (Eriksson, 2015: 139). During their meeting in Jerusalem, Schori signed a memorandum of understanding for extensive cooperation with Israel. He said that even if cooperation with Israel was still controversial, it was essential for Sweden to signal that a new era in relations had opened following the peace process and that Sweden was changing its approach to Israel (Schori, 2014: 296). This memorandum of understanding was an important step in changing relations between Sweden and Israel (Eriksson, 2015: 143) Sweden would improve its relations with Israel through the Oslo process. In Schori’s judgments, this process of rapprochement between Sweden and Israel reflected Israel’s consent to the Swedish outline from 1988 (Schori, 2014: 296). In the preliminary meeting between Beilin and Schori, the Swedish representative suggested that Sweden lead an international working group to coordinate international economic assistance to the Palestinians (Schori, 2014: 293). He saw this activity as being similar to the activities of the Norwegians. Perhaps he was even competing with them.

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4.5 Forging political ties For the Swedes, financial aid to the Palestinians was essential at a time when they were seeking to return to a mediation position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition to a massive transfer of funds to the Palestinian Authority, the Swedes developed an additional way of strengthening political ties with the parties, especially with the Palestinians. Since Sweden did not maintain security ties with Palestinians, as the Norwegians had done in Lebanon during the 1980s, the Swedes established ties with the youth movements. In this way, the younger generation in Sweden and in the West Bank and Gaza could develop extensive personal connections. It was an investment in the future leaders of each country, hoping they would form friendships and common understandings that would serve them in later years as leaders of their own countries. Thus, the Labor Party in Sweden used their own governmental agency, SIDA, to fulfill their political agenda. Under the rubric of aid to developing countries, a framework agreement was concluded between SIDA and organizations operating in the Middle East, namely the Palestinian territories during 1995 and 1996 (ARAB/R/104/E/3, Ref Code: 3651/507). The institutionalisation of ties with the youth movements of Israelis and Palestinians helped to deepen Swedish contacts in the region. For Sweden, joint seminars contributed to the dialogue between Israeli and Palestinians. Potentially, they would strengthen not only the connections between the future leadership on each side but also with future Swedish leaders. To this end, young people from the Swedish and Norwegian Labor Party promoted joint projects with Israelis and Palestinians. The main goal was to create a future democratic leadership in Palestinian society. Though a noble goal, it was also a naïve one. It is documented that the initiators admitted that despite Sweden’s bold ambitions, only thanks to the PLO leadership could the Swedes operate freely with the youth movements in the West Bank (ARAB/R/104/E/3, Refkod: 3651/507).20 At this time, the Labor Party’s youth organization in Sweden had 30,000 members and was considered the largest political organization in the country. Just as the Swedish Labor Party invested in the future leadership of their Party in Sweden, they believed that investing in Palestinian youth organizations would bring a similar benefit to the Palestinian society. The Swedes thought that Palestinian society had undergone significant changes allowing young people a more central role and a broader freedom of action than they had previously known. The Swedes understood that 70% of the Palestinian population was under the age of 35 (ARAB/R/104/E/3, Refkod: 3651/507). For this reason, they believed that support for Fatah youth organizations might influence the Palestinian Authority election process and the expansion of political parties in the West Bank. The young people who had experienced the vicissitudes and pressures of the conflict on a day to day basis had become a significant force for change. The Swedes hoped that joint

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activities that included the promotion of democratic values would help develop Palestinian civil society and strengthen ties between future politicians on each side. This strong belief in the potential for change through the development of the Palestinian youth was backed by an increase in Swedish support for the Palestinians through the Palme Center. In May 1995 the Palme Center transferred 84,000 Swedish kroner to the Swedish Labor Party’s Youth Organization for advancing cooperation, organizational and democratic development in the Middle East. This donation went to Palestinian Authority projects (ARAB/R/104/E/3, Refkod: 3651/507). The Labor Party received 248,000 Swedish kroner for the organization’s youth movement activities in the territories during 1996 (ARAB/R/104/E/3, Refkod: 3651/507). The Swedish aid organization SIDA believed that in addition to strengthening Palestinian governance, ties with the local leadership should also be strengthened. Between 1997 and 1998, SIDA awarded close to one million Swedish kronor to the joint activities of the Labor Party and the Fatah Youth Organization. Sometimes activities were carried out jointly with the youth organization of the Norwegian Labor Party. Both Norway and Sweden recognised that Fatah youths were identified most closely with Arafat. With close to 40,000 members, the Fatah youth organization was the largest and most important group among the Palestinian factions (ARAB/R/104/E/3, Refkod: 3651/507). In January 1997, the Palme Center transferred an additional 700,000 Swedish kroner to a democracy development project through the Fatah Youth Organization (ARAB/R/104/E/3, Refkod: 3651/507).21 In some ways, the Swedish soft power efforts in supporting the Palestinian youth movement were too successful. The older generation of Fatah felt threatened by the youth movement and decided to take action. The Fatah leadership narrowed the scope of the youth movement because the young people had become well organised politically (ARAB/R/104/E/3, Refkod: 3651/507). The Fatah leadership, as the military wing of the PLO, was not interested in democratic reforms. The Fatah leadership alone would decide who ascended to their own leadership positions. With a direct source of funding from the Swedes, perhaps the youth organizations had become too independent and had accumulated too much political power to be tolerated by the leadership. Perhaps those in leadership positions in the youth movement were from the “wrong” families. These kinds of considerations within the dynamics of Palestinian politics did not match the best intentions of the Swedes. Despite the weakening of the Fatah youth organizations, the Swedes maintained their commitment to help the Palestinians reach their goals and in doing so aimed to preserve their own role in the Oslo process. The Swedish mediator’s historical and cultural ties with the Palestinians were an essential factor in the ability to navigate the negotiations. Sweden’s generous economic incentives were also significant factors. But the Swedes learned, just as the Norwegians had, that economic incentives do not necessarily transform societies or their leadership.

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4.6 The Beilin–Abu Mazen channel The signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 created a stir in international diplomatic circles.22 The Oslo Accords stipulated that Israel and the PLO would open talks toward a permanent settlement by May 4, 1996. Suddenly many countries were interested in being involved in these historic developments. The European Union, even Japan wanted to raise money for the Palestinians. Many countries were eager to become partners in the peace process, but no country was more interested than Sweden. In the midst of these global responses, the Swedes believed that they were uniquely qualified.23 In Israel, Yossi Beilin was convinced that the parties must prepare mutual understandings that could be delivered to the political echelon ahead of talks on the final settlement (Beilin, 2018). After a meeting between Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak in Tunis with the PLO chairman, Yossi Beilin met with Yasser Arafat. From these two discussions in late 1993 arose the possibility that the parties would forge a secret and unofficial channel for this purpose. Given PLO backing for further informal contacts, Pundak and Ahmad Khalidi met in May 1994 and agreed to open an unofficial channel of dialogue on Israeli- Palestinian issues. They were joined later by Hirschfeld and Hussein Agha (Eriksson, 2015: 122).24 Both Israeli and Palestinian representatives believed that mutual understandings within an unofficial and secret framework would aid future negotiations on the permanent settlement. Next, Beilin contacted his Swedish counterpart, Pierre Schori. Schori was one of the up-and-coming figures in Swedish politics and had been appointed Minister of Development and Cooperation. Schori was also Beilin’s personal friend of 40 years. They had met as teenagers as part of Labor Party activities. Singled out as potential leaders, both young men took part in the Israeli and Swedish Labor Party’s joint youth movement activities. Capitalising on his friendship with Beilin, Schori decided to form a working group on the Middle East (Eriksson, 2015: 137) with the support of the Swedish Foreign Ministry. In addition to establishing a framework for yet another round of unofficial talks, Beilin revealed to Schori the internal dynamics of the Israeli Labor Party (Schori, 2014: 302–303). For Schori this was a sign of Beilin’s trust in Swedish representatives and their ability to engage the parties in unofficial contacts. For Beilin, the personal connection played an important role in agreeing to discuss highly sensitive matters with Schori and within the framework of unofficial conversations in Stockholm (Beilin, 2018). Their mutual trust led to the establishment of the unofficial contacts and to an agreement to talk openly and honestly. On a more practical side, Beilin reminded Schori that outgoing Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt had promised to transfer additional financial aid to the political process. This financial aid factor was significant to the preservation of the peace process. Sweden signed several significant foreign aid and trade agreements with the parties. The Foreign Ministry in

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Stockholm believed that this aid gave them an open invitation to deepen their involvement in the content of the talks that were about to open between the parties. Foreign Minister Lena Hjelm-Wallén believed that Sweden had promoted the Middle East peace process for decades and now had new opportunities to expand Sweden’s political, economic and cultural involvement in the region (Riksarkivet: Riksdagens hurdprotokoll 1995/ 96: 55). As early as June 1994, Arafat representatives Agha and Khalidi met with Swedish Foreign Minister Margaretha Ugglas, who decided to sponsor the channel by maintaining the confidentiality of contacts and by providing financial support. Arafat received an update on the meeting from Khalidi and Agha and decided that Abu Mazen should oversee the channel. Arafat believed that if substantive agreements were reached in Stockholm, the decisions would also be used by the parties in official negotiations at a later stage (Eriksson, 2013: 213). Thus, the desire of the Israelis and the Palestinians to establish understandings on the possible outline for a permanent settlement came together with the willingness of the Swedes to mediate their discussions. Both parties felt that the Swedes would be able to host the unofficial, secret talks and that the Swedes were adept at the transmission of messages between the parties. For the Swedes, this was an opportunity to host political talks and preserve the achievements of the Swedish Foreign Ministry from 1988. Aware of the content of the Oslo Accord commitments, Sweden offered its mediation services. Under Swedish sponsorship, the Stockholm Channel opened in late 1994 with unofficial and secret talks between Israel and the PLO to formulate a permanent settlement document. Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak represented the Israelis. The Palestinians were represented by Ahmad Khalidi and Hussein Agha. They were sometimes joined by Hassan Asfour and Nimrod Novik (Beilin, 2001: 107). The Israelis were the same representatives who had participated in the Oslo Channel. However, the Palestinian representatives were not Arafat loyalists as in the Oslo Channel but rather they were Abu Mazen’s men who had been authorised by Abu Mazen to conduct the talks. Since the talks between the parties were sponsored by the Swedish government, the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm decided to appoint an unofficial Swedish representative to the talks. Swedish Foreign Minister Ugglas was unfamiliar with the Israeli-Arab conflict and she appointed former Foreign Minister Sten Andersson to serve as the Swedish government’s unofficial representative. Ugglas assumed that with Andersson’s extensive experience in the Middle East, he would provide invaluable advice and vital support to the mediating team (Eriksson, 2015). The appointment of Andersson to the Stockholm Channel opened a significant opportunity for close collaboration with a prominent Swedish institution. Named after Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme who was assassinated in 1986, the Olof Palme International Center was founded in

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1992. At this time, the Palme Center offered Andersson the position of Chairman of the Center and appointed Sven-Eric Söder as the Center’s Director (Eriksson, 2015: 125). First and foremost, the Center’s activities were intended to provide a political anchor for the Oslo process in general (Söder, 2018). Similar to the model of the Norwegian Institute for Social Research FAFO, the Palme Center would be used as cover for unofficial Swedish diplomatic activity under the guise of the Center’s activities. The Stockholm Channel would repeat much of the unofficial activities, financial incentives and camouflage tactics of the Norwegian model of mediation. So that Swedish Foreign Ministry officials could sponsor the channel in Stockholm (Eriksson, 2013: 212), they proposed that an academic conference be held at the Palme Center as a cover for the talks knowing Andersson was one of the mediators between the parties (Eriksson, 2015: 125). Both the appointment as the new chairman of the Palme Center and the appointment as the Swedish government representative to the Stockholm Channel talks added to Andersson’s status when he held background talks with Arafat and Peres as part of the Stockholm Channel’s soft diplomacy efforts. However, the choice of Andersson was problematic. For Israel, Andersson’s previous activities in the region undermined his legitimacy. During the first Gulf War in 1990, Andersson’s diplomatic actions ran afoul of Israel again when Andersson linked the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the Palestinian issue.25 This was an provoking comparison and his public remarks were condemned in the United States and in Britain. Andersson believed he had acted prudently in finding a practical compromise solution to the hostage crisis the Swedes were facing in Iraq (Palme, 1993: 226–227). It could be argued that his remarks served two purposes. One was to assure the release of the Swedish hostages by agreeing to justify Saddam Hussein’s actions by linking the invasion of Kuwait to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The other was to please Arafat with whom he had a close relationship. Andersson wanted to signal to the Palestinian leader that he could be trusted to support the Palestinian cause. For the Swedes, this incident did not obscure Andersson’s reputation as a senior political figure. Andersson was viewed as a successful, professional diplomat who was an expert mediator of contacts. Andersson’s close relationship with Arafat was seen as a valuable asset and he was appointed to this mediation position despite being clearly biased towards the Palestinians (Palme, 1993: 240). The high expectations held by the Swedes and their intention to build an unofficial channel at the end of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO faced an even more significant problem. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres did not want to open negotiations on a permanent agreement at such an early stage and certainly not before the negotiations on the Interim Agreement concluded (Levin, 2005: 328). However, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin thought that preliminary talks should be opened. He was convinced that without reaching a final settlement, the Oslo process would end in a round of violence and with no political progress. He believed that the main problem with

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the Oslo Accords was the lack of a clear political goal and failed implementation. In the absence of a clear political goal, the parties would seek to establish a framework of agreements that would mainly ensure their limited interests (Pundak, 2013: 6–12). In the end, unofficial Israeli representatives without political backing from Israel discussed a permanent settlement with Palestinian representatives who had the support of the PLO and Abu Mazen. As in Oslo, Beilin was willing to begin talks once again without Rabin and Peres’ support or even knowledge (Eriksson, 2015: 123). The Swedish government respected both Beilin and the Palestinian representatives who had paved the way for the establishment of an unofficial dialogue channel. The Swedes conveyed messages between Israel and the Palestinians not only through the Beilin–Abu-Mazen channel, but also with other representatives. As the contacts between the parties progressed in the Beilin–Abu Mazen channel, Abu-Mazen, Khalidi and Agha feared that Beilin had initiated parallel talks. Indeed, Beilin was meeting with Nabil Shaath and General Abdel Razak al-Yehiyeh on the security arrangements for a permanent settlement with the participation of Andersson and Schori (Eriksson, 2015: 130). Despite this concern in April 1995, Beilin explained that these talks outside the Beilin–Abu Mazen channel were not a high priority (Agha, Feldman, Khalidi and Schiff, 2003) and they were separate from the secret and substantive talks in Stockholm (Eriksson, 2013: 215). Unbeknownst to the Palestinians, Beilin shared the parallel contacts he had with the Palestinians with the Swedes Beilin did not transfer the content of the contacts to Rabin and Peres and thus was able to control the content and quality of Israel’s contacts with the Palestinians. The content of the contacts had an effect on the relations between Beilin and Abu Mazen. The senior Palestinian official feared that existence of parallel negotiations could endanger the Stockholm channel and expose it. The Palestinians worried that Beilin’s actions could weaken Palestinian positions. They knew that Abu Mazen had authorised Agha and Khalidi to conduct the negotiations boldly (Eriksson, 2015: 131). According to Söder, the Palestinian representatives disliked Beilin and Abu Mazen’s approach and the way they drafted the document. They believed that the main role of the political mediators was to advance understandings with Peres-Rabin and Arafat and not to rush to present any document as an official outline (Söder, 2018). Rabin had authorised Beilin to reach a common understanding with Abu Mazen regarding the settlement blocs that Israel would annex. Beilin had not received a mandate to anchor Israel’s position on core issues in a permanent settlement (Rynhold, 1999: 229). In response to Palestinian fears, Beilin clarified that the Palestinians’ demand for a complete freeze on settlements had already been fulfilled through Resolution 380, according to which Israel stopped building new settlements (Beilin, 2018).26 After more than a dozen secret meetings final understandings were reached in Stockholm by the unofficial Israeli and PLO representatives on

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October 31, 1995. After some amendments, the document was ready to be reviewed by Yossi Beilin and Abu Mazen. PLO representatives presented the outline to Arafat also. After reviewing the main points of the document, Arafat agreed with Abu Ala’s recommendation to give general agreement in principle to the understandings that had been reached (Eriksson, 2015: 132). Arafat hoped that the talks would be a basis for further negotiations (Gold, 2012: 92). Similarly, Abu Mazen believed the document was not final and would need further changes. Nabil Shaath refused to make changes to the content of the document requested by Israel regarding the borders unless clauses were added regarding the dismantling of certain Israeli settlements as well as additional concessions around land swaps. It is unclear if Peres had knowledge that a unofficial channel had been formed in Stockholm by Beilin and his representatives. According to Schori, Beilin informed the Swedish representatives that the working group operating at the Palme Center was known only to a limited circle (Schori, 2014: 292). Later Beilin clarified that Rabin was unaware of the channel while Peres knew a little about it. Schori requested to inform both of them about the existence of the channel (Schori, 2014: 302–303). Schori never got to make that disclosure. On November 4, 1995, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated. The assassination postponed the presentation of the document but did not derail it. On November 8, 1995, just four days after the tragic event, the plan was presented to the Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. It was the height of diplomatic insensitivity. The Israeli government and especially Peres were trying to recover from the assassination of their prime minister and refused to support the outline of the agreement (Eriksson, 2013: 216). Peres did not want to risk causing a serious rift in Israeli society between supporters of the agreement and his opponents. Peres was convinced that the Israeli public would not support withdrawal from the Jordan Valley and feared that the agreement was an exercise by Arafat to test and assess Israel’s willingness to compromise on its borders (Rynhold, 1999: 229–230). He believed that the days after the assassination should be a time of healing and reconciliation between the religious and the secular within Israeli society. In addition, Peres wanted to see the Interim Agreement implemented in reality before negotiating a permanent settlement. In retrospect, Beilin noted that he knew that Peres did not support the Alon plan that advocated leaving the Jordan Valley in the hands of Israel (Beilin, 2018). General Yigal Allon’s idea was never to give up control of the Jordan Valley because the Valley was too important strategically to Israel’s security to withdraw from it. In all his negotiations, Rabin remained true to the principles of the Allon plan. In other words, Beilin thought Peres would have agreed to the Beilin–Abu-Mazen document even with its mention of withdrawing from the Jordan Valley. However, Peres was surprised by the content of the document. This deceit affected the fabric of the fragile relationship between Beilin and Peres. Furthermore, Peres was

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running in the election to be the next prime minister of Israel against Benjamin Netanyahu. Peres feared that his standing in the election would be harmed by the publication of the secret understandings reached in Stockholm. During the election, he was criticised for compromising positions on political issues and was accused of dividing Jerusalem (Gil, 2018: 65). Parts of the document had been leaked to a major Israeli newspaper just before the election. For Sweden, the talks conducted by the Palme Center focused on the teamwork of Beilin and Abu Mazen. The Swedes were hoping that substantive understandings would be reached in Stockholm and that they would be credited with a breakthrough. But the representatives of each side did not want to advance a political document. They wanted to present options and alternative thinking to guide future talks toward a permanent agreement and an end to the conflict. That is, they wanted to submit recommendations that would be used by the political echelon without presenting a binding document. Interestingly, the representatives of the parties did not interact only within the framework of the Beilin and Abu Mazen meetings. They communicated outside the channel as well. Seeing the success of this trust building diplomacy, the Swedes acted to expand the framework of cooperation between representatives of each side (Söder, 2018). The Swedes tried to exploit the developing friendships between the representatives to arrive at bolder concessions between the sides. According to Söder, the group work that was often done separately from the Beilin–Abu-Mazen Channel meetings allowed the Swedes room for maneuvering and continuing to search for a common denominator (Söder, 2018). Despite Sweden’s economic and political incentives that continued during the Stockholm talks, the parties refused to adopt the Beilin–Abu-Mazen outline and thus decided its fate. Due to Peres’ refusal to adopt the outline, Beilin announced that Israel could not undertake to accept the agreement or base its decisions on the content of the document in future negotiations. The Stockholm Channel understandings remained non-binding for both parties. The Swedes never intended the Beilin–Abu Mazen Channel understandings to be a final document that would oblige either Rabin or Arafat. They hoped that these talks would lead to a continuation of the dialogue process and they knew that what was achieved in this channel would form the basis for future official negotiations advancing a permanent settlement. But they did not understand the inner dynamics of the talks. They ignored the possibility that Israel and the PLO might have their own interests and thereby act differently from Swedish expectations. Nevertheless, even in the face of the failure of the talks, Sweden wanted to encourage the representatives to continue to work together. Their strategy was to create more opportunities for the representatives to interact and increase the chances that their conversations might advance a true peace agreement. A key component of a mediator’s influence was the ability to increase each party’s commitment to their mutual understandings. Since the document

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was shelved by both parties along with the expectation that the document would serve the parties in the future, the mediator’s influence became negligible. Even if Peres had accepted part of it, the likelihood of the outline being adopted by both parties would have been low. The Palestinians saw it as a non-binding document that had to undergo further changes before it became an official outline. That the meetings in Stockholm were unofficial allowed Peres to abandon the channel. The question of whether to adopt these particular understandings at a more suitable time in the future would be left on the shelf also (Klieman, 2000: 24–25). In retrospect, it was not time for a major breakthrough in the Oslo process. Both sides were motivated by conflicting interests and each side carried a level of authority that was asymmetric to the other. On the one hand, Beilin had not received a mandate to negotiate on behalf of the Israeli government and did not inform the prime minister and the Foreign Minister of the contents of the talks. On the other hand, Abu Mazen conducted the indirect contacts on the outline of the agreement by appointment of Chairman Arafat. Arafat supported the outline as a basis for further negotiations. Even so, Abu Mazen worried that he had compromised too much and started to back away from the channel. Abu Mazen vetoed the main points of the document in part because Beilin had divulged the Palestinian compromises to the Israeli public and undermined the credibility of the Palestinian representatives (Eriksson, 2015: 135). As a result, the status of both Beilin and Abu Mazen was undermined. Beilin, who was not a member of the highest Israeli political echelon, ended up clouding his relationship with Peres. Abu Mazen was weakened in the eyes of other top PLO leaders even though he backed Arafat. There was yet another issue obstructing successful negotiations at this time. The Stockholm Channel was problematic from the beginning because it was based on a weak foundation. It relied on the ambiguous infrastructure of the Oslo Declaration that was unclear and non-binding. In the end, the Beilin–Abu Mazen talks failed to establish any truly agreed upon understandings or mutually binding agreements. Neither the leaders nor the time was ripe for a permanent settlement and yet they created a false impression that the time was right for such a permanent arrangement (Savir, 1998). On the Israeli side, the Stockholm Channel elicited different responses from the three different leaders involved. Rabin examined the Palestinian leadership and conditioned the continuation of negotiations on the fulfillment of the terms of the official Interim Agreement. Peres continued to search for common interests between the parties. Peres’ personal associate, Beilin, took a bolder step and sought to advance permanent talks as early as possible. Beilin had wanted to model contacts with the Swedes after the format of his talks with Abu Ala in Oslo where the two had managed to coordinate general positions but leave the implementation of any agreement to the parties to come up with creative solutions in future discussions.

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After the September 1995 Interim Agreement, Beilin’s political power was weakened (Rynhold, 1999: 229). His negotiating in Stockholm without proper political backing undermined the Stockholm talks (Klieman, 2005). All the more so when Abu Mazen denied his own involvement in the outline and denied his consent to the framework of a permanent agreement. In walking away, Abu Mazen disassociated his name with the “Beilin–Abu Mazen” channel. In the end, Peres abandoned the Stockholm document for pragmatic reasons and the PLO abandoned the understandings for political reasons. Nevertheless, Beilin believed that talking about core issues helped the parties understand each other’s mandate and possible compromise boundaries (Beilin, 2018). The channel’s intention was not to present a final draft. Rather it was to present a document that was open to changes that would serve both parties. But the document was presented two months after the official Interim Agreement had been signed between Rabin and Arafat. To present a proposal for a permanent settlement so soon after conditions were agreed upon for interim steps was too soon. That was presented to Peres four days after Rabin’s assassination sealed its fate.27 For Sweden, the parties’ renunciation of the understandings proved both the advantages and disadvantages of the secret channel. On the one hand, the Stockholm channel had been secret and unofficial. The parties could speak privately, boldly, without public attention and without obligation. On the other hand, without obligation understandings could be ephemeral and non-binding. They could be rejected without repercussion and any party could walk away without regret. In Sweden, the parties’ wavering was not viewed as a failure as it did not rule out the possibility of future talks. The Swedes could argue that the framework of the contacts might lead to a permanent settlement in the future in which the Swedes could take part. Swedish diplomatic soft power initiatives were not limited to the Stockholm Channel. Parallel to this first channel, the Swedes had forged a second secret channel designed to focus on the core issue in the conflict and to promote understandings that would strengthen their position with the parties. In the eyes of Swedish diplomats, the issue of Jerusalem was seen as a vital issue and they tried to accelerate unofficial understandings under their auspices.

4.7 The core issue of Jerusalem: Unofficial channel In January 1996, Arafat received a formal invitation from the Swedish government to visit Stockholm. Already in 1995, Swedish Foreign Ministry officials were planning a visit from Arafat in Sweden immediately after his election as chairman of the Palestinian Authority that would take place in 1996. The newly elected chairman28 of the Palestinian Authority made good use of his 1996 visit to Stockholm. Arafat explored whether the Swedish Engineering Company (ABB) would use aid money to build a railway and bridge line between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Eriksson, 2015: 145).

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Although discussed, this particular proposal was never implemented. At this time, the president of the Swedish Engineering Company was the spouse of the Swedish Foreign Minister. Their collaboration contributed to strengthening ties between the political and business echelons in Sweden with the Palestinian Authority (Beilin, 2018). Thus, the flow of Swedish funds to the Palestinian Authority became more sophisticated. There was funding that passed directly between Sweden and the Palestinians. But there was also a way that the funding helped Swedish companies indirectly participate in civilian projects in the West Bank. These moves were accompanied by donations made by Sweden to UNRWA and the PLO for Gaza rehabilitation. These donations were earmarked for the various projects connecting the Gaza strip with the West Bank and included the construction of overland bridges between the two regions (Schori, 2014: 304). During Arafat’s visit the Palestinian leader revealed publicly that there had been yet another secret, unofficial channel opened under Swedish auspices and support. He disclosed that Sweden had offered its mediation in negotiations on the core issue of Jerusalem and that during this visit he had spoken with the prime minister about Sweden being involved in the process in a more official manner.29 Through this informal channel SIDA, the aid agency of the Swedish Foreign Office, and the Palme Center were assisting the Palestinians in preparing the legal infrastructure for a permanent settlement in general and for the status of Jerusalem in particular. Swedish organizations sent legal teams to assess the legal status of the Palestinians’ claims to recognise East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital (Eriksson, 2015: 146). In addition, criticism of the Oslo Declaration of Principles led a group of independent Palestinian legal experts educated in the United States to set up a professional Palestinian legal advisory team whose purpose was to build professional and legal tools for the benefit of the Palestinians (Klein, 2018). Some of the criticism focused on Israel’s legal advantage. Israel was more professionally prepared to defend its position for an undivided Jerusalem than the Palestinians were prepared to advance claims for their capital in East Jerusalem. As mediators to this process, and under the guise of legal aid to the Palestinians, the Swedes maintained their status and involvement. As a result, they were able to create a database of people, ideas and strategies. As early as 1994, meetings had been held between Israeli and Palestinian academics and professionals on the subject of Jerusalem. These meetings were held in parallel to the Stockholm Channel talks. They had been initiated by the Swedish Palme Center. In this context, the Swedish government hoped to promote unofficial talks that they could forward directly to the decision makers in the leadership of the parties (Klein, 2018). On the Palestinian side, Faisal Husseini convened a group of Palestinian experts and established the Institute for Arab Studies. This Institute brought together professional historians, engineers, infrastructure experts and the like to focus on the issue of Jerusalem. As the PLO leadership did not know

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the legal and practical issues involved in the city’s status, Husseini built a detailed archive of recommendations about the city to aid future negotiations on a permanent agreement with Israel. Husseini came from a well-respected Palestinian family in Jerusalem and was independent of Arafat. Indeed, when Arafat was placing his own men in key positions in local areas, Arafat could not dismiss Husseini in Jerusalem. Husseini’s political influence increased after the Orient House gained legitimate status in the Palestinian Authority system in 1994 (Klein, 2018). Orient House became the representative of Palestinian governance in Jerusalem and symbolised the aspirations of the Palestinian people for a future capital in East Jerusalem. For Israel, Jerusalem was an issue of fundamental historical and religious significance. Political officials in Israel refused to deal officially with the status of the city. Yet secret and unofficial talks were arranged between representatives of the Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies and the Institute for Arab Studies established by Husseini. The main points of the talks were conveyed by Israeli representatives to the mayor of Jerusalem, Ehud Olmert, who indirectly represented the government and “supervised” the content of the talks between the representatives. The members of the Jerusalem Institute did not ask for explicit guidance or instructions from Olmert. The main point of the contacts was to have professional conversations among representatives who were knowledgeable about the status of Jerusalem and were independent from political positions. The talks allowed Palestinians to understand the Israeli perception of the city’s future and the range of possibilities on issues related to demographics, holy sites, city mapping and list of key buildings (Klein, 2018). At this stage, the Palme Center sought to contribute more directly to contacts between the parties, especially on the issue of Jerusalem. In addition to hosting the contacts between Beilin and Abu Mazen in Stockholm, the Swedes invested in the seminars on Jerusalem between the Jerusalem Institute and the Institute of Arab Studies. They invited the participants to hold their meetings in Stockholm as well and financial assistance was provided for the seminars. In the Palme Center’s work plan, 30 participants from both sides, members of the Institute for Arabic Studies and members of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, would hold talks on Jerusalem aimed at making decisions that would be passed to the political leaders. SIDA allocated 1.6 million Swedish kronor for the rounds of talks between 1995 and 1996 (ARAB/R/104/E/4, Refkod: 3651/526). Subsequently, SIDA maintained its support for the talks and continued to transfer funds designated for this purpose to the Palme Center until December 1999 (ARAB/R/ 104/E/4, Refkod: 3651/526). Sven-Eric Söder, director general of the Palme Center steered the talks. According to Söder, the general goal was for the parties to talk about the implementation of a permanent agreement in a realistic, practical way that also included the future status of Jerusalem. Söder helped the parties’ representatives to focus on the issues and hoped that they would be able to

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present the work’s conclusions to the political echelon. In addition to hosting the meetings, the Swedish Foreign Office received summaries of the meetings. The reports received from this collaboration between the Jerusalem Institute and Husseini’s Institute for Arab Studies helped the Swedes to imagine possible future opportunities and options for continuing their involvement in the peace process. They were able to assess the information they gained and plan a framework for their future activities (Söder, 2018). For Sweden, there were two objectives for the talks on Jerusalem. The first objective was to conduct talks on the core, forbidden subject of Jerusalem. Hopefully the group would arrive at a consensus on the subject which might influence the political echelon. Even if they could not predict where the channel would lead, the Swedes knew that the representatives from each side had access to the decision makers. Thus, no matter the outcome of the talks, the position papers created in this framework were considered valuable. Sweden’s second objective was to preserve their involvement in the overall Oslo process. Thanks to SIDA’s financial grants and the vital information gathered by the Swedish Palme Center on the positions of the parties, this goal was achieved also. Because they funded the dialogues that dealt with the components of the permanent settlement the Swedes were able to create a record that catalogued the process, participants, options and plan details that could be presented at the political level at a future time. The Swedes understood that they were investing in a long-term strategic process that would require patience, determination and considerable financial investment. For the Swedes, the meetings, the database and the eventual report all contributed to the experience, expertise and status of the mediators no matter the actual result of the talks in either channel. Against the background of Sweden’s continued good intentions and generous financial incentives, something else happened in the city during Arafat’s 1996 visit, something difficult to acknowledge and challenging to address. During Arafat’s visit to Stockholm, he gave a speech during a meeting with 40 Arab diplomats on January 30, 1996. Arafat said that the Palestinian plan was to act against Israel and establish an independent Palestinian state. He said he would make the lives of the Jews in Israel unbearable by the unrelenting use of violence. Because the Jews were “desperate for peace”, he believed that by the use of such psychological trauma that in the end they would immigrate to the United States (Vistnes, 1996). The content of this startling speech was revealed by an Arab diplomat who was present at the meeting. The speech was presented to a known member from the Swedish Jewish community, Shlomo Berlinger. The leaders of the Jewish community were quick to object to the PLO leader and warned that his speeches in English were intended for foreign ears (Berlinger, 2017).30 Even if Arafat’s speech was aimed at Arab ears and to strengthen the PLO leader in their eyes, Berlinger believed that the speech revealed Arafat’s duplicity. This was not the first speech in which the PA leader delivered a

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speech full of false accusations. But precisely because he had spoken in a closed forum, to Arab diplomats in the Scandinavian capital and not in front of a public international audience, Arafat’s speech was an opportunity to understand his emotional state. Sometimes the Palestinian leader spoke brashly in order to serve his own internal political goals of overcoming opposition among the Palestinian public (Levin, 2005). But Arafat’s speech in Stockholm was a dramatic departure from previous bold speeches as it was without practical application. According to Berlinger, this passionate message contradicted Arafat’s political image as a leader willing to compromise for peace that the Swedes had tried to highlight. Instead, Arafat reinforced the image of a leader who refused to make historic decisions based on uncompromising ideology (Berlinger, 2017). Needless to say, the content of the speech created political concern in Jerusalem as the Israeli Labor Party was in the midst of an election campaign. It would be a political embarrassment were the contents of the speech to be published. The Swedes tried to keep the content of the meeting quiet also. Local media pressured the Swedish Foreign Ministry about the matter (Vistnes, 1966) and finally Director of Swedish Foreign Ministry Press Annika Soder31 confirmed that the meeting did take place, but refused to clarify what was said at the meeting. In the end, the documents produced by the Beilin–Abu-Mazen Channel along with the position papers on Jerusalem prepared by the Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies with the Institute for Arab Studies remained vague and non-binding. After Netanyahu’s election as prime minister of Israel, they were no longer relevant. Even though the Swedes continued their sponsorship of the Jerusalem Channel, without political backing from Israel, their efforts remained inconsequential. In December 1998, Arafat marked a decade after the talks of 1988 that had led to a dialogue between the United States and the PLO. He stated at the Palme Center that a permanent agreement should be promoted (Eriksson, 2015: 174). But the understandings formed in unofficial channels and Arafat’s public remarks were ineffective. Netanyahu felt strongly that the core issues were not to be addressed in unofficial channels and certainly not the status of Jerusalem. For Israel, what was not registered officially remained unofficial. It also remained non-binding (Beilin, 2018). Netanyahu clarified that contacts with the Palestinians would continue only at the official level and only after fulfilling preconditions and threshold commitments. If Arafat wanted to be considered and treated as the leader of the Palestinian people, then according to Netanyahu, Arafat needed to speak with “one government and one weapon”. This unity of purpose would be a blow to the independence of the many Palestinian militias. It was also meant to damage Palestinian organizations that were resistant to the Oslo process and were against any reconciliation with Israel. This policy rendered the unofficial understandings gained in Swedish soft diplomacy and any channel of this kind as unnecessary and impractical. It was also the end of the unofficial Stockholm

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Channel led by Sten Andersson. That is, until the resumption of a new political initiative in Sweden led by Prime Minister Göran Persson in 1999.

4.8 Preparing the path to official Harpsund negotiations A decade after Sweden’s initial mediation attempts in 1988 and following the failure of both Andersson’s Stockholm outline and the Beilin - Abu Mazen Channel, Sweden initiated a new direction for Swedish mediation in the Middle East. Sweden’s approach to mediation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict took a dramatic turn away from the approach previously fashioned by Palme and Andersson (Danielsson, 2007: 158). Under the auspices of Sweden’s Prime Minister Göran Persson elected in 1996, Sweden would conduct a more balanced diplomacy between the two parties and refrain from publicly criticising or condemning Israel (Schori, 2014: 308–309). Persson was a statesman who learned from the accountabilities Sweden had made in the past and he had his own vision for the future of Swedish diplomacy in the region. By 1999, the Oslo Accords had already ushered in a change in the dynamics of the relations between Israel and the Palestinians. In the eyes of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, the rise of Ehud Barak as Israeli’s new prime minister in 1999 presented an opportunity to establish a new channel of negotiations on a permanent settlement between the parties. The Palestinian willingness to discuss the elements of the permanent settlement, along with the willingness of Ehud Barak to promote the Palestinian Channel, gave Sweden room to maneuver that had not been possible in the past. This opportunity was buoyed by indirect American support for a back channel between Israel and the Palestinians. For the first time there was the potential for official Israeli representation in meetings that would be mediated by Sweden. The beginning of Ehud Barak’s term as prime minister was similar to the beginning of Yitzhak Rabin’s tenure. Both Ehud Barak and Yitzhak Rabin began their terms in office at a critical distance from the Israeli-Palestinian talks. Barak claimed that the absence of advice from military experts in the development of the Oslo Accords meant that the agreement contained serious “security breaches” that harmed Israeli interests. Therefore, Barak acted in accordance with the IDF’s assessment that recommended advancing negotiations with the Syrians and not with the Palestinians. A settlement with Syria would have significantly improved Israel’s strategic position even if it would have been in violation of the agreement with the Palestinian Authority (Peri, 2002: 26).32 Only after the collapse of the Israeli-Syrian negotiations did Barak turn to focusing on negotiations with the Palestinians just as Rabin had done. The Israeli prime minister tried to rebuild relations with the Palestinians through mutual understandings. He ordered Lipkin Shahak to open a channel of dialogue with the Palestinians that would reduce tensions between the

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parties. Shahak suggested several ways to reconcile with the Palestinians: reestablish contacts, build mutual trust and fulfill the promises made to Arafat under the Oslo Accords that had not been implemented because they were conditioned on the progress of negotiations. One of these promises was to open an airport in Dahaniya (Peri, 2002: 35). New Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson also realised that a new window of opportunity opened with Barak’s rise to power. He believed that there was a chance for further contacts between the parties although he did not know whether the talks would mature into a permanent settlement (Nuder, 2017). Analysing the election platform of Barak, Persson and his close adviser Pär Nuder concluded that Barak would be willing to talk broadly with the Palestinians towards a permanent settlement. Initial explorations began in early 1999 during the Israeli elections when Nuder was sent to Israel to forge personal relations with Ehud Barak (Nuder, 2017). This visit helped the Swedes signal to the Israelis and the Palestinians that relations between Sweden and Israel had warmed and that mutual trust was being built. Persson hoped to challenge, if not change, the negative attitude toward Israel embodied in the traditional diplomacy of Palme and Andersson. In his first meeting with Barak, Nuder did not speak directly about the peace process. Rather their conversation covered only general issues. The cultivation of warmer relations made possible in October 1999 when Persson became the first Swedish prime minister to visit Israel in 37 years. Persson noted that the State of Israel was established out of the ashes of the Holocaust which had been a terrible crime against humanity. Acknowledge these facts, he noted that he chose to change his government’s approach to Israel (Persson, 2007: 257). Like the Swedish statesman and clear supporter of Israel, Per Ahlmark, Persson saw Israel as a lone democracy in the region. He sought to change the role of Swedish Foreign Ministry officials (Schori, 2014: 308). During his historic visit, Persson explained that one of the reasons for his visit to Israel was to “deepen relations between the two countries”. He noted that his Labor Party had strong ties to Israel and wanted to base relations between the two countries on the ideological foundations of social democracy (Ögren, 2005: 135). The Swedish prime minister changed the nature of Sweden’s relations with Israel and tried to foster a more positive attitude toward Israel within Swedish diplomatic circles. He met with suspicion and distrust on the part of his party members who did not view the warming of relations between Persson and Barak with excessive affection (Persson, 2007: 257). Due to Persson’s guidelines and views,33 members of his party, including former Foreign Minister Andersson, often criticised Persson’s policies in the Middle East in general and especially his approach to Israel (Persson, 2007: 261). Even the presiding Foreign Minister in Persson’s government opposed this change in diplomatic orientation and continued to express the traditional Swedish approach supporting Palestinian nationalism in the face of Israeli

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demands. All the while, Persson sought to gain the trust of Israel and open a new page on bilateral relations (Ben-Ami, 2004: 43–44).34 Deepening relations with Israel helped Swedish Prime Minister Persson advance a new political posture toward the Middle East. However, due to the differences between his approach and the traditional approach of his Labor Party and the Swedish Foreign Ministry, two parallel channels were set up with the Americans. The first channel existed through U.S. senior diplomat Dennis Ross who worked with Andersson’s staff in the Foreign Ministry. Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh had grown up in the shadow of Sten Andersson, who had been her political patron. In her eyes, Andersson was the most senior and appropriate figure for renewed contacts between the parties. The Americans knew about the Beilin–Abu Mazen document and asked Andersson about it. They wanted to understand the depth of the understandings reached between the two parties at that time. In February 1999, Aaron Miller, member of the U.S. Middle East team, met with the Swedish political negotiating team – Sten Andersson, Anders Bjurner and Mathias Mossberg (Mossberg, 2017). Both Beilin and Abu Mazen agreed to update the Americans on the older outline they had drafted together, although Abu Mazen made it clear that he was unwilling to adopt the agreements/document and withdrew it from consideration. At the request of Dennis Ross, Abu Mazen sent Khalidi to Washington in October 1999 to update the United States on the contents of the document (Beilin, 2001: 108). The U.S. administration continued to show interest in Beilin - Abu Mazen unofficial understandings even though they were not shown the actual document until a year later. By mid-December 1999, the Swedish Foreign Ministry sent Andersson and Mossberg to Ramallah to meet with Saeb Erekat and Abu Mazen in order to promote an unofficial channel to be mediated through Sweden (Eriksson, 2015: 176–177). Sten Andersson was no longer in official office but he still desired to take a part in the Swedish mediations efforts that he had begun in 1988. According to Mossberg, he suggested that the Swedish Foreign Ministry invite Abu Mazen to pay an official visit to Sweden during which the Palestinians would present their request for Swedish mediation once again to the Swedish prime minister. Andersson was certain that if the Swedish government decided to sponsor another unofficial channel he would be appointed as a mediator. But before that scenario could materialise, he and the Palestinians must get official consent from the Swedish prime minister (Mossberg, 2017). By then, American President Bill Clinton encouraged the parties to advance negotiations for a permanent settlement. In early November 1999, Clinton, Barak and Arafat met in the Norwegian capital at an event, marking four years since Rabin’s assassination. They agreed on the establishment of a secret and personal channel between Barak and Arafat (Beilin, 2001: 87). The channel would discuss the security needs of the parties (Beilin, 2001: 90), but refrain from engaging in core issues. These meetings renewed Abu Mazen’s efforts to initiate an informal channel through the Swedes.

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His proposal was accepted because he had re-established his position in the PLO hierarchy (Shikaki, 2004: 9), despite the failure of the early talks for a permanent settlement. In this context, it is worth noting that part of Abu Mazen’s vigorous activity stemmed from the Palestinian leadership’s recognition that the prospects for a speedy agreement had increased (Shikaki, 2004: 16). The prospects for such a decision fascinated the parties as they felt an important opportunity had opened up for renewed contacts. For this reason, Abu Mazen sought to open a secret and unofficial channel between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (Drucker, 2002: 193). The fact that the Israeli-Syrian channel had failed also encouraged the parties to advance the route between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The second channel created by Persson was established through U.S. senior diplomat Richard Holbrooke who worked directly with the Swedish prime minister’s staff. At this time, the Swedish prime minister’s special envoy, Nuder, was sent to work with Barak’s people in Israel. According to Nuder, during Persson’s visit to Israel in the fall of 1999, Ulf Hjertonsson from the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s Political Department contacted the U.S. State Department’s situation room and updated Holbrooke on talks the Swedes had with the parties (Nuder, 2008: 198–199). From Israel’s point of view, Persson’s actions served as a foundation for building trust between Israel and Sweden for the first time. The legitimacy that the Swede diplomacy gained was mainly from Persson’s change of attitude toward Israel and not from Israel’s negative experience of previous Swedish mediation efforts. Persson’s change in Swedish foreign policy had a broad impact. For the first time in several decades, the prime minister’s’ Office in Jerusalem and the prime minister’s Office in Stockholm acted in cooperation and out of mutual trust. The Israeli prime minister who had been suspicious of the secret talks held in Oslo now agreed to promote a secret channel through Sweden in order to establish common understandings with the Palestinian leadership on core issues. This channel was Sweden’s third and final attempt to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the marathon that was the Oslo mediation process. In contrast to his predecessor’s “step-by-step” approach, Barak had a bold new plan. He sought to promote new understandings but did not wish to base them on the Oslo principles. Barak argued that the “step-by-step” approach was only convenient for the commercialisation of peace but did not serve Israel’s interests. Under the formula of gradualism, the Palestinians were able to seek more and more concessions without offering any practical reciprocity (Shlaim, 2005: 254–255). Instead, Barak demanded that a permanent agreement be promoted with the Palestinians. The purpose of this new approach was to address the core issues, end the political negotiations and arrive at an end to Palestinian demands.35 Lipkin Shahak held a round of meetings with Abu Mazen. Together they tried to establish principles on the nature of the permanent settlement,

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locating common points on core issues and compromise boundaries (BenAmi, 2004: 35). They spoke without relying on the Beilin - Abu Mazen document. In addition to Shahak’s talks with Abu Mazen, Barak decided to promote an additional and parallel channel. In July 1999, Barak asked his close adviser, Gilead Sher, to meet with Saeb Erekat to discuss the implementation of the Wye agreement36 (Beilin, 2001: 78) with the intention of promoting principles for a permanent settlement. All together, these contacts led to a meeting in London in the fall of 1999 between Gilead Sher and Abu Mazen who was accompanied by Hussein Agha and Ahmad Khalidi (Ben-Ami, 2004: 30–32). According to Khalidi, Sher rejected the Beilin–Abu Mazen document at their meeting and stated that Barak wanted a new memorandum of understanding in preparation for a permanent agreement (Eriksson, 2015: 175).37 Meanwhile, the talks between Andersson and the Palestinians continued, as Abu Mazen’s proposal was still awaiting the approval of the Swedish Prime Minister. In March 2000, Abu Mazen arrived in Stockholm in order to obtain funding and sponsorship for unofficial channel. To disguise the reason for Abu Mazen’s arrival in Stockholm, the Palestinian representative was said to have come to promote Sweden’s financial and professional support for the Palestinian negotiating team. During this meeting, he delivered a confidential letter on his own behalf to the Swedish Foreign Minister requesting assistance in opening an unofficial secret channel (Eriksson, 2015:177). During his visit, the Palestinian official met with the Swedish Foreign Minister and not with the prime minister. Abu Mazen was unsure about the possibility of establishing an unofficial channel. The Swedes knew that Barak was ready to advance the Palestinian track and were planning to initiative a new channel for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians mediated through Swedish diplomats in Stockholm. The Swedes intended to prepare a cover for the talks and to promote cautious moves. By this time, Barak had already authorised Ben-Ami to meet with Abu Ala on March 28, 2000, in order to promote a framework agreement for a permanent settlement. Barak allocated about two and a half months for the talks as he believed that if the initial contacts were successful, they could be transferred to public talks. From late March to May 2000, Ben-Ami and Abu Ala met and were joined at times by Lipkin Shahak, Abu-Mazen and Gilead Sher. In this way, the various unofficial parallel tracks initiated by Barak were merged into one official track as he had intended. The parties held preliminary talks that will led to what became known as the Harpsund Channel under the sponsorship of Prime Minister Persson. At the time, Abu Mazen thought that the Harpsund Channel should lead only to unofficial contacts. In the end, the Swedish Foreign Minister persuaded Persson and his close adviser and the head of his chamber, Pär Nuder, to approve Abu Mazen’s initiative without regard to the nature of the channel. Persson stated that an additional secret channel would be held under the prime minister’s office and

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not through the foreign office or with Andersson (Eriksson, 2015: 178). This decision was not surprising. Persson had centralised control and transferred many powers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the prime minister’s office. This included matters related to the European Union. Although Lindh was effective Foreign Minister, Persson managed to weaken her power who in his eyes was young and inexperienced (Furubjelke, 2008: 136). Aside from the steadily growing distance between the prime minister’s office and the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm, Persson was suspicious of Andersson. For Persson, Sten Andersson and his men represented Olof Palme’s approach to diplomacy in the Middle East. Persson wished to change the dynamics of the relationship with Israel and believed that Andersson would not be able to lead the talks between the parties. Similarly Persson and Nuder believed that Beilin would not be able to advance the contacts between the parties. Although Persson and Nuder saw Beilin as an important figure in shaping the negotiations, they understood that he did not enjoy the trust of new Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and was not part of Barak’s circle of trusted advisors. Instead, Persson and Nuder focused on the team that surrounded Barak in the election and on his senior advisers (Nuder, 2017). At the same time, Nuder took advantage of his ties with Palestinian representatives he had known as part of the Labor Youth Organization’s activities with the Palestinians. This was a good example of the political significance of institutionalising the ties between Sweden and the Palestinian youth organizations (Eriksson, 2015: 192 Nuder, 2017). Persson decided to remove Andersson from the position of mediator and appoint his close advisor, Nuder, to be in charge of the contacts between the parties. Although Persson and Andersson agreed on the principles of promoting peace in the region, they acted in different ways (Nuder, 2008: 214). Persson pursued a more balanced approach with the two parties, whereas Andersson was demonstrably pro-Palestinian. Persson felt Andersson was not the right man for the task as he did not have the trust of the Israelis. The former Foreign Minister felt hurt by his removal and showed increased bitterness towards the Swedish prime minister. Persson’s strategy differed in another way from that of Andersson. Persson had begun his own diplomatic channel out of the prime minister’s office and believed that his connections with U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke should be used in addition to those with the American negotiating team for the Middle East. Consequently Persson decided that he should keep Andersson and representatives of the Stockholm group away from the content of the renewed contacts. Instead, he would take an active part in promoting a secret channel and sent Nuder to promote the contacts with the parties. Since Abu Mazen has already updated the Swedes that the Palestinians were interested in a secret channel in Sweden, Nuder handed a letter to Barak about the Palestinians’ desire to advance secret and unofficial talks through Sweden (Nuder, 2008: 199).

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The Israelis received the letter during Nuder’s visit to Jerusalem on April 1, 2000. Danny Yatom and Gilead Sher met with Nuder. In the meeting, the Israeli representative stated that Israel was also interested in secret talks but only with official participation. The Israeli even hinted that Ahmad Khalidi should “not necessarily” be part of the negotiating team (Nuder, 2017). Sher informed Nuder that Barak had approved the secret channel in Sweden to advance the core issues but insisted on senior official Palestinian representation: Abu Mazen, Abu – Ala or Mohammad Dahlan. Nuder updated Abu Mazen, who was deeply disappointed by Sher’s proposal (Nuder, 2017; Eriksson, 2015: 179). Abu Mazen conveyed his disappointment to his closest advisers as Nuder believed that the chances of forming a secret Swedish channel were at risk. Nuder believed that the Israelis were suspicious of Khalidi and Agha since the Palestinian representatives’ meeting with Gilead Sher in London after which the conversation had leaked to the media. Regarding Khalidi and Agha, Persson had a dilemma. He worried about separating them from the talks. Khalidi and Agha were Abu Mazen’s loyalists and had already participated in the Stockholm channel. According to Nuder, the Swedish prime minister believed that the current and previous government had invested heavily in building a channel of dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis within the Stockholm group. These same people remained vital to the Palestinian Authority leadership and especially to Abu Mazen (Nuder, 2008: 200). In other words, even in an official format, Persson hoped to persuade Abu Mazen, through his representatives in London, to promote contacts because he realised that without them, persuasion efforts would be even more difficult. Persson did not despair of building an official political channel because he believed that an unofficial channel would not bear fruit. It seemed as if he were adopting Barak’s position for secret talks with official representatives (Eriksson, 2015: 195). However, Persson’s decision stemmed from other considerations. He had learned the lessons from the failure of the Beilin–Abu-Mazen channel, which had not been adopted by the highest political echelon. The Americans believed that the outline of the talks should be promoted in a secret and official manner as agreed by the parties in Oslo in 1999 (Beilin, 2001: 87). Thus, the Swedish government’s decision reflected the goals of the Clinton administration. It was the American position that determined the nature of the channel and it did not necessarily arise solely from Israel. Persson’s top adviser, Nuder, believed that an official channel would succeed where the Swedes had failed in the past. Nuder criticised Andersson’s Stockholm channel because the channel did not achieve its goals. He claimed that although significant progress had been achieved with the Stockholm group and that its participants had drafted a document, it remained that Beilin was not from the highest Israeli political echelon and that the Palestinian side had rejected the document. Therefore, Nuder

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believed that unofficial channels that existed alongside official channels only damaged the overall negotiations when they overshadowed the official channel (Nuder, 2008: 210–21). Persson and Nuder hoped that by changing some of the basic elements of the talks that they would lead to actual acceptance by the parties. These changes included that the channel would be official and secret; that they would be shorter in duration than the Beilin–Abu Mazen talks that seemed to go on and on; and that there would be clear outlines and an expectation of concrete, enforceable decisions. These admirable expectations were challenged immediately. After Sher communicated the Israeli condition that the talks be official and not unofficial as Abu Mazen had recommended, Abu Mazen walked away from the channel. That same month, Aga and Khalidi received a phone call from Abu Mazen revealing that a Palestinian delegation headed by Abu Ala would take his place in Harpsund. They both understood that Abu Mazen was not interested in participating because the delegation would be headed by Abu Ala. Without knowing what was going on in the Palestinian political tangle, Danny Yatom updated Nuder on who would be Israel’s representatives in the round of discussions (Eriksson, 2015: 180). Barak chose Ben-Ami and Sher as the Israeli representative to the talks and Arafat chose Abu Ala. Persson’s mediation channel survived these initial challenges with renewed hope for substantial progress.

4.9 Harpsund negotiations begin When Barak promoted the Harpsund channel after failed contacts with the Syrians, he wanted to explore an alternative channel to the traditional American track. Ben-Ami believed that the Harpsund channel was essential despite the lack of trust between Barak and Arafat. According to Beilin, Barak preferred to keep the intensive mediation work away from the United States (Beilin, 2001: 75) in order to motivate the channel. The talks in the Harpsund channel were known to the Americans even though they were under Swedish auspices as the American Middle East team with Dennis Ross, Aaron Miller, Robert Malley and Martin Indyk was updated on the contents of the talks by the Swedes and by the Israelis (Ben-Ami, 2004: 39). In early May 2000, the State Department sent Sandy Berger to talk with Beilin and Abu Mazen and assess the parties’ willingness to promote the unofficial Beilin–Abu Mazen understandings. In their meeting, Sandy Berger was given the full Beilin–Abu Mazen document. Abu Mazen said it was far from representing Palestinian interests. In preparation for the talks in Sweden Barak decided the core issues under discussion would include Jerusalem, the settlements, borders and refugee issues. He knew that the talks could not take place with a high profile but only in a secret and official channel (Ben-Ami, 2004: 23). Barak’s contempt for the Oslo talks held “in remote fortresses in Scandinavia” and talks through “academics who are lost in the Scandinavian forests” was well known (Ben-Ami, 2004: 21; Beilin, 2001: 75). As it turned out, Barak agreed

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to send his men to a “forest in Scandinavia”. The talks were to take place at the official summer residence of the prime minister of Sweden in Harpsund, a small village outside Stockholm. It was no surprise, however, that Barak decided “Oslo associates” would not take part in the secret negotiations in Sweden (Ben-Ami, 2004: 40–41). In attendance were Barak’s trusted official representatives Shlomo Ben-Ami and Gilead Sher. There was one additional member of the team. Ilan Shapira, head of Ami Ayalon’s bureau in the Shin Bet, was a representative of the Israeli security establishment and tried to keep his identity secret (Nuder, 2008: 201). One of the reasons for Shapira’s inclusion in the negotiating team was the Israeli security establishment’s lack of confidence in Ben-Ami. Ben-Ami was a dove and they feared he might make far-reaching compromises (Klieman, 2005: 98). Shapira’s mission was important to safeguarding as well as advancing the understandings discussed in Sweden. In the words of former Shin Bet Security Chief Carmi Gillon, mainly army and Shin Bet officers in the security establishment created the framework for an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. That was an operational process that lasted until the late 1990s (Gilon, 2005: 209). The status of the members of the Israeli negotiating team was completely different from the status of those in the unofficial Oslo group. Now they were official representatives trusted by Barak and were accompanied by a representative of the security establishment. These changes in the makeup of the participants were informed by some of the lessons learned by Israel and especially by Barak from the early talks with the Palestinians. Discussions on the permanent settlement between the parties were far too critical and consequential to be attended by unofficial representatives. Likewise, the Palestinian delegation to Sweden had new participants including a delegation of officials from the PLO, Abu Ala and Hassan Asfour. Agha and Khalidi were nowhere to be found as Abu Mazen was not part of the representative group. Since the contacts in Harpsund were made between official representatives on the core issues, the Swedes made sure that the talks were being held in full coordination with Arafat. Persson requested and received an official approval from Arafat for the mandate of the Palestinian team to negotiate with the Israelis in Sweden on the core issues (Nuder, 2008: 202). The Swedish delegation included Pär Nuder and Mathias Mossberg, alongside another representative from the Swedish Foreign Ministry. The inclusion of Mossberg, a trusted ally of Sten Andersson is interesting. Perhaps Mossberg was included as a compromise with Andersson who had been disappointed not to be named as one of the mediators. Perhaps it was a strategic move by Persson that would help ensure the support of the Swedish Foreign Ministry should his channel prove to be successful. In addition to hosting the talks, the Swedish mediators made sure to update the U.S. State Department, including Dennis Ross, on the progress of the talks (Eriksson, 2015: 181). Even if Persson felt that Sweden needed to take a more active part in advancing the political process between the parties (Eriksson, 2015: 191), the Swedish leadership believed that American support was indispensable.

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Although the Swedes adopted the secret but official line, the talks were not conclusive and the Swedes had little room to maneuver. The Swedes acted responsibly while trying to maintain the channel’s secrecy, but the change in the Palestinian representation from Abu Mazen to Abu Ala damaged the channel. The Swedes invested heavily in their relations with the Palestinians. They believed that the political channel represented the continuation of Swedish diplomacy begun by Sten Andersson under the auspices of the Olof Palme International Center. The first round of Harpsund talks was short lived. The talks opened on May 12, 2000. Two days later, on May 14, Dennis Ross arrived in Sweden to take part in the talks. Despite having been updated on the talks, the special U.S. envoy to the Middle East decided to arrive in Harpsund to watch the progress of the negotiating teams. As the parties discussed the refugee mechanism in accordance with UN Resolution 194, Ross made it clear to the parties that the United States would back the mutual understandings reached in the Harpsund channel negotiations. Despite the impression of progress, Dennis Ross wondered about Abu-Mazen’s absence and feared for the outcome of the talks (Nuder, 2008: 206). Ross worried even more when Abu Ala rejected the expectation of success that had been created by the seeming progress in the talks. Abu Ala had told the American envoy not to get his hopes up (Nuder, 2017). The following day, May 15, was Nakba Day, the Day of Catastrophe that the Palestinians mark referring to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Instead of one day, three days of rage broke out in the Palestinian territories.38 The violence halted the talks as the parties retired to their own private consultations. According to Mossberg, it was just a matter of time until Abu Mazen’s personal frustration expressed itself by taking revenge against the talks. Even though Persson and his advisers had worked diligently to make sure their political efforts were coordinated with Arafat, the undermining of the talks seemed inevitable (Mossberg, 2017). When Abu Mazen’s associates leaked the existence of the secret channel to the media, the cover for the secret negotiations was exposed and the depth of ambiguity and fear on the Palestinian side increased. Arafat rejected the Palestinian representative’s authority to formulate formal and confidential understandings. Abu Ala felt threatened because the PA chairman did not publicly back him (Nuder, 2008: 206). This may explain Abu Ala’s limited expectations from the talks. Arafat’s decisions that engendered conflict between his two potential successors seemed intentional. Surprisingly, Abu Mazen’s people leaked the talks even though the parties agreed to discuss the core issues of the refugee compensation mechanism and the right of return. Abu Mazen considered himself to be one of the initiators of the Swedish track yet the channel did not fulfill its purpose. More significant to Abu Mazen’s frustration was Arafat’s agreement to advance the contacts without him. That decision damaged Abu Mazen’s political power and maneuverability at the top of the PLO. When Arafat appointed Abu Ala as the Palestinian representative to

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the talks and bypassed Abu Mazen, Abu Mazen felt weakened for the second time. Previously, he had felt undermined due to the collapse of the Beilin–Abu Mazen talks. But what might have been a significant political blow for Abu Mazen quickly turned into an opportunity for him. Harpsund discussions were held in an official manner which was different from the unofficial format he had proposed. Through the leak of the channel, Abu Mazen strengthened his own hawkish position by claiming that the Palestinian representatives were giving away too much in the negotiations. In this way, Abu Mazen tried to weaken his political rival Hassan Asfour who was one of Abu Mazen’s critics. Leaking the existence of the secret channel ensured that the channel collapsed before significant understandings were reached. Once the Harpsund channel was exposed, the complicated system of political rivalry at the top of the PLO had a deleterious impact on the talks. As public scrutiny and pressure increased, positions became exaggerated and in the end almost forgotten (Ben-Ami, 2004). The Israelis saw that Abu Ala feared for his life after being accused of betraying the Palestinian position by daring to discuss a compensation mechanism for the Palestinian refugee issue. The second round of talks began on May 18. The parties tried to formulate a draft statement of principles (Framework Agreement Permanent Status (FAPS)) in preparation for a permanent settlement agreement. However, following the Palestinian days of rage, the parties found it difficult to continue the format of the talks and the negotiating teams returned to another round of consultations. Facing continuing violence, they were motivated to continue with the negotiations. They decided to continue the talks and try to reach a solution. Perhaps the days of rage would moderate if it were known that they were trying to arrive at an understanding. In the second round of talks, Abu Ala stopped discovering the flexibility that had characterised his participation in the previous round of talks. The exposure of the secret channel and the media coverage of the “imminent formulation” of an agreement reduced Abu Ala’s room for maneuver even further. Contrary to his previous positions, he withdrew his support for the understandings the group had reached on the refugee issue. Nuder felt that after the secret channel was exposed, both parties were suspicious and blamed each other for exposing the channel (Nuder, 2017). According to Ben-Ami, the Palestinian withdrawal from agreements reached in the first rounds of discussions made it clear to the Israeli team that the format of the talks needed to change. In order to formulate a stable agreement, a firm international outline was required to frame the talks and obligate the participants. Furthermore, this arrangement would have to include a written Palestinian commitment (Ben-Ami, 2004: 51). Two days later on May 20, 2000, they were joined by Swedish Prime Minister Persson who had heard about the complications of the talks and wanted to persuade the parties to reach mutual understandings (Eriksson, 2015: 182). At dinner with all the participants sitting around the same table,

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the Swedish prime minister tried to encourage the parties to advance understandings that would allow an agreement or at least a draft of joint principles to be formulated. Persson’s influence was limited however as he had no authority to compel the parties to any particular action. He could only try to persuade them to move from political ambiguity to the creation of a political document. His power lay only in his credibility and in the legitimacy that the parties afforded him. But he was speaking for Sweden and not the United States. His efforts at persuasion were limited. Dennis Ross feared a flare-up of another round of violence across the country following the three “days of rage”. Trying to preserve the channel, he asked President Clinton to send a message to Arafat requesting that Arafat act against the violence and show a willingness to stop the riots. Progress of the talks in Sweden was in the balance. However, Arafat did not express a willingness to protest against the riots (Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 201). It was becoming clear that Arafat cultivated violent options in order to try to extract further concessions from the Israelis. At this point, the Palestinian representatives explained that they were no longer in a position to approve any outline developed from the talks. After the exposure of the channel, losing Arafat’s support and especially after the intense days of rage, they refused to reach any agreement with Israel for fear of being called traitors. Dennis Ross wondered if that Arafat’s lack of action condemning the violence foreshadowed his repudiation of the talks. As a result, the American and Israeli teams concluded that the Palestinian representatives had reached the limit of their mandate (Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 201). The senior American adviser, Aaron Miller, believed that the talks in Harpsund remained unclear and inconclusive. Specifically, he thought that the Palestinians feared an agreement on the right of return mechanism after the days of rage earlier in May 2000 (Eriksson, 2015: 184). The talks in Harpsund had disintegrated. At the end of the second round of talks, Persson met separately with each of the two delegations.39 He was told that they were interested in continuing the Swedish mediation because the Swedish prime minister had become president of the European Union (Nuder, 2008: 207). For Ben-Ami, the Harpsund talks seemed “flightless” at this point. He recommended that the Swedish prime minister pay a visit to the Palestinian Authority and promote the Swedish channel based on the understandings that had already been formed. He felt that while the talks clarified the distance between the parties on the core issues, its participants did succeed in establishing possible areas of future agreement (Ben-Ami, 2004: 53). Gilead Sher, the legal expert of the group, wanted to record and clarify what had been discussed in the talks. He prepared a draft framework document that included the understandings with the Palestinian side (Ben-Ami, 2004: 45–47). For example, no explicit understandings were reached on the overall issues of the West Bank, but it was agreed that Gush Etzion, Ariel and areas in Jerusalem would be under Israeli sovereignty (Ben-Ami, 2004: 48). For some

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Israelis, the understandings were useful even if the understandings were not officially validated because Abu Ala had rejected them. The understandings recognised the principle of “gradual withdrawal”. For Israel, this meant that any withdrawal would be gradual. For the Palestinians it meant that Israel was open to future withdrawals. Even if the talks in Harpsund ended without official understandings, the Israeli representatives thought they the identification of the gaps in the basic issues was a positive step forward (Ben-Ami, 2004: 53). Gilead Sher believed that the parties had reached sufficient understandings for the negotiating teams to advance a summit (Sher, 2016). Israeli optimism was bolstered by the comments of the Palestinian scholar Shikaki who wrote that some Palestinians believed that the Harpsund talks had created encouraging signs on core issues since the opening of the permanent settlement negotiations in May 1996 (Shikaki, 2004: 15). For the Israelis even if the Swedish channel reached a dead end, the understandings that had already been formed should be promoted. This was based on the precarious assumption that the understandings were accepted by both parties. In the tangled web of politics, the main losers from the collapse of the Harpsund talks were Arafat’s deputies. Arafat had allowed both Abu Mazen and Abu Ala to conduct negotiations and to examine the extent of Israel’s willingness to compromise boundaries. The two PLO representatives gained a mandate and broad control over negotiations with the full backing of the Palestinian Authority chairman (Mossberg, 2017). While each of his deputies was trying to promote an independent channel, Arafat withdrew his recognition of the Beilin–Abu Mazen memorandum of understanding and went as far as denying his own involvement in the secret negotiations in Harpsund conducted by Abu Ala. Both men had failed to reach a solution highlighting the interests of the Palestinian people as he defined them. The rivalry between Abu Mazen and Abu Ala led to the loss of legitimacy of both men in Arafat’s eyes and their influence weakened after the secret channel was exposed (Shikaki, 2004: 19).40 In retrospect, Arafat’s initial consent to the Harpsund channel could be seen as a tactical move. Dennis Ross questioned whether Arafat could conduct the crucial contacts to end the conflict. He said that whenever Arafat became entangled in Palestinian politics, he chose to divert public attention away from his actions and focus people’s frustrations toward Israel. Ross explained that this was a common tactic among dictators. Ross felt that Arafat understood that ending the conflict meant that he would not be able to continue with these strategies (Ross, 2004). With the end of the conflict, Arafat would have to change his leadership style and that such changes might risk his authority and control. Throughout the Oslo process, Fatah members feared a split in its ranks as the PLO became a political party. Arafat’s power overshadowed other Palestinian movements (Parsons, 2005: 212). This reality led the PLO to abandon political reforms in support of Arafat’s policies.

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4.10 The Camp David Summit The Harpsund Channel created a false sense of progress. On one hand, BenAmi and Sher were under the impression that the refugee issue would pass at a future summit without opposition since Abu Ala agreed to the compensation mechanism. They convinced Barak that important decisions had been made which in turn gave Barak a bit of optimism about the talks. On the other hand, the Palestinians were in a different place. They demanded that Israel be more flexible on core issues if they wanted the Palestinians to meet Israel’s demand for an end to the conflict (Klieman, 2005: 98; Indyk, 2009). This Palestinian tactic succeeded again and again as the Israeli negotiating team continued to present new red lines, without receiving tangible Palestinian concessions in return. During the Camp David Summit, Palestinians seemed to agree with several aspects of the permanent settlement but disagreed on the issue of timing. While the Palestinian delegation did not believe that the American summit was essential to the Palestinian leader, they did believe that the summit was essential to Clinton and Barak (Levin, 2005: 421; Shikaki, 2004: 5). They saw that both Clinton and Barak wanted to deliver an historic agreement in the Middle East each for his own reasons. Clinton was in his final term as president of the United States and was under pressure to finish his last term in office with a significant feather in the cap of his administration and a win for American diplomacy (Malley and Agha, 2001). Barak was under pressure because his government at home was falling apart. Over time, these differences in motivation and circumstances led the parties down a road of deepening rifts and insurmountable gaps. These differences engendered quite a bit of drama during the two weeks of the Camp David Summit despite all the participants dressing casually in a relaxed setting intended to build friendship and trust and not fuel antagonisms. Right at the beginning of the summit, there were fireworks and insults. Surprising both parties, Clinton presented an outline based on elements of the Beilin–Abu Mazen plan. Barak disliked it and was upset that the Americans hadn’t coordinated with him beforehand as they had promised to do. Arafat took the outline and rejected it. At 2 a.m. the Palestinian representatives woke up Madeleine Albright, the U.S. secretary of state, and demanded that she acknowledge that the Clinton paper was off the table and that they could assure Arafat that it was rejected. She did so. Israeli representatives Shahak and Ben Ami asked Dennis Ross why the Americans had backed off the paper. They wanted the Americans to use the paper to put pressure on both sides. Dennis Ross agreed that it was a mistake and Aaron Miller said he thought that the summit came to an end that day. He felt that they had lost control of the process. Camp David continued as the participants went down a road of deepening rifts and insurmountable gaps (Meridor, 2011). By this time, Barak and Arafat could not meet in the same room. At this point of the

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negotiations, Barak kept presenting what has been called “new red lines” without ability to promote the discussions. This was a major blow for Barak and he began to create his own narrative vis a vis the outside world and the Israeli public in particular. He used the media to leak that Ban Ami and Shahak were pressuring him to compromise on Jerusalem. Following the collapse of the Camp David Summit, Barak experienced great frustration and announced that, in the end, there is not a “partner for peace”. In the Israeli prime minister’s opinion, Arafat failed to conduct negotiations in good faith and had rejected all proposals without raising any counter-proposals. The American negotiating team concluded that Arafat’s decisions were part of Arafat’s tactics to extract further concessions from Israel. According to Dennis Ross, Arafat “did not close the door”, but also did not commit to any long-term move (Ross, 2004: 40). The failure of the talks caused severe damage to the relationship of trust between the parties and led to an exchange of mutual accusations. Nevertheless, after the Camp David Summit, the parties tried to maintain a direct channel of communication between Jerusalem and Ramallah (Dajani, 2005: 73). Israeli intelligence assessed the outcome of the summit and the aftermath of its potential failure. Before Camp David started, Barak had been advised that the talks would fail and as a consequence violence would escalate. As violence spread throughout the West Bank and became what is known as the Second Intifada, suspicion that Arafat was behind the acts of terrorism increased. In response to the violence and perhaps out of frustration with the failed talks, Israeli negotiators agreed to express publicly their views on the PLO leader. Ben-Ami claimed that the whole Oslo process was a huge camouflage for Arafat behind which he maneuvered between exerting political pressure and using violence to undermine the very idea of two states for two peoples (Shavit, 2001). It had become clear that negotiations were a charade to help Arafat discover how many concessions he could extract from Israel without committing to end the conflict. Despite their sympathetic attitude towards the Palestinian representatives, Ben-Ami and Beilin accused the Palestinian negotiators of inflexibility in the important stages of Camp David. They noted that the Palestinians’ single-minded desire for recognition of their narrative and their refusal to consider mutual compromise harmed the chances of reaching an agreement. Even the two Israeli doves believed that Arafat’s questioning the provenance of the Temple Mount and its importance to Judaism was provocative. In response, Jewish supporters of the Palestinian quest for self-government recognition were insulted and incensed (Klieman, 2005: 119–120). In addition, his reckless remarks undermined the political will to continue talks with the Palestinian leadership. The failure at Camp David in July 2000 also left a destructive vacuum (Parsons, 2005: 282) which was exacerbated by the various factions of the PLO. Arafat had used the collapse of the peace process as a means of strengthening his power but faced with violence and suicide bombers that will push away a real chance of advancing a Palestinian state.

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4.11 Post Camp David: The Beilin–Schori channel After the collapse of Camp David in July 2000 there were several attempts to preserve the channels of dialogue that had been created. Swedish mediation sought to preserve its influence through “sticks and carrots”. On the one hand, Sweden continued to provide large amounts of financial aid to the Palestinian Authority, and on the other hand, the Swedish prime minister began to press the PA chairman to return to the negotiating table. Most European countries adopted Clinton’s political outline and blamed the failure of the summit on Arafat (Levin, 2005: 422). They pressured Arafat to stop the violence and to halt the escalation. Sten Andersson, the former Swedish Foreign Minister, refused to condemn Arafat. In August 2000, Andersson sent a personal letter to Arafat congratulating him on his success at Camp David. He noted that the Palestinian leader had strengthened the Palestinian position and paved the way for further negotiations (Eriksson, 2015: 197). Andersson and Schori believed that the Camp David Summit took place mainly through verbal discussions and without written agreements. In their eyes, this justified Arafat’s abandonment of the political summit (Schori, 2008: 160–161). After Camp David, Andersson and Schori supported exerting international pressure on Israel and not the Palestinians. This was an example of the traditional view of the Palme-Andersson line when they blamed the strong side for the conflict (Schori, 2014: 314). During one of visits to the region, Schori delivered a strong speech in the Palestinian Authority parliament saying that Israel did not take the peace process seriously. He noted Israel’s right to live in peace and security but he criticised Israeli government policy (Schori, 2014: 306). Schori believed that Andersson alone had the power to persuade Arafat to take political risks while at the same time demonstrating the power of Swedish diplomacy to advance a political process (Schori, 2008: 161). According to Schori, Nuder agreed that there was room to adjust the Swede’s attitude toward the Palestinians and amend Swedish mediation in favor of the PLO in order to return the parties to negotiations. However, after the failure at Camp David, Nuder wanted to act exclusively with Arafat (Schori, 2014: 310) without Andersson or Schori. According to Nuder, Sweden’s domestic politics had influenced the government’s failed mediation efforts and lack of maneuverability (Nuder, 2017). Andersson had undermined the Swedish efforts when he bypassed government authority to establish contacts with Arafat. As a result, two approaches had been created to the events that occurred after Camp David. Andersson’s loyalist Schori noted that Ben-Ami regretted that Andersson was not sent to Arafat after Camp David (Schori, 2014: 311). Schori believed that Andersson’s Stockholm channel had been the one that led to the talks that Persson promoted at Harpsund. Therefore, Persson should have appointed former Foreign Minister Andersson to be in charge of the

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contacts. Schori believed that only Andersson could have managed the talks to a successful conclusion. In Nuder’s view, the Swedish channel’s failure after Camp David was due to the pressure the American’s put mainly on Arafat and to the inability of the parties to advance any workable framework. It was not Persson’s failure to form understandings between the parties (Nuder, 2017). For similar reasons, Andersson blamed Persson for Sweden’s failure to achieve the understandings that would have increased the likelihood of achieving comprehensive peace. He felt that Persson should have used the Beilin–Abu Mazen understandings as the basis for renewed negotiations between the parties. When Persson looked for a new approach, he damaged Swedish diplomacy. Even with Andersson’s accusations, the Swedish Foreign Minister argued that Sweden didn’t have the ability to influence an agreement between the parties in that year (Nuder, 2008: 211). In addition to Sten Andersson’s unofficial support for Arafat, his views in favor of the Palestinians cause had serious ramifications. In his position as the head of the Palme Center, the Center continued to offer considerable funding to support democratisation processes in the Palestinian Authority. The funding was intended for the economic council efforts of the Palestinian Authority. Most of that capital went to PLO members (Schori, 2014: 493). Sweden’s aid grants through the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and the Palme International Center were aimed at supporting democratisation of Palestinian society as well as helping to maintain Sweden’s political involvement during the length of the Oslo process. Arafat’s efforts to preserve his status and political power by violent means actually harmed the organization he headed. The terrorist organizations that did not submit to his authority strengthened their own power at the expense of the Palestinian Authority. In a meeting with Nuder after the collapse of Camp David, Abu Ala admitted that the PA did not do enough to tackle corruption which only strengthened Hamas’ power (Nuder, 2008: 220). The good intentions of Swedish diplomats in their continued efforts to promote “peace” in the region had unintended, if not opposite consequences. In this instance, it appears that the Palme Center’s well-intentioned aid was used to subvert the Palestinian Authorities ability to properly govern its people. As early as September 2000, Persson met with Barak and Arafat and heard from the Prime Minister his proposal to hand over 73% of the West Bank immediately and to withdraw from 63 settlements and outposts, including a full withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Barak handed over the agreements concerning the gradual transfer of an additional 91% of the territories to Palestinian control. At this point, Sweden decided to renew contacts between the parties to find a compromise formula that would bring them back to the negotiating table (Nuder, 2017). As part of the Swedes’ attempts to renew contacts, Persson and the Swedish Foreign Minister met

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with Nabil Shaath and agreed to transfer medical experts and increase medical assistance to the Palestinians (Riksarkivet: Utrikesfrågor Offentliga dokument m.m, 2000).41 At the same time, Beilin met in New York with Schori, who was appointed Sweden’s Ambassador to the United Nations. According to Schori, the meeting was made possible after receiving Persson’s consent (Schori, 2014: 311). The meeting at the UN headquarters in New York was attended by a high-ranking Palestinian representative who expressed hope that despite the riots, a permanent agreement should be promoted and that international observers should be brought into the area and similar to the TIPH force deployed in Hebron. On the lack of political progress, but clarified that if Israel agrees to accept up to 100,000 refugees, the problem may be removed (Beilin, 2001: 178). Beilin also took advantage of the meeting to create a renewed and public channel of communication between the parties (Beilin, 2001: 219). The prime minister of Sweden knew about the Beilin-Schori meeting at the United Nations but did not know that the Swedish Foreign Ministry was leading another move to renew political contacts with Barak and Arafat. Andersson had been sidelined from the Swedish initiatives at the behest of a prime minister who did not trust him. Andersson felt frustrated and decided to act independently. He initiated a meeting with Arafat in Copenhagen without Prime Minister Persson’s knowledge. Serving as the current president of the European Union, Persson decided to reach out to Arafat. Unknown to both men, their meetings were scheduled for the same day. In fact, the two passed one another in the lobby of the hotel. It was clear to Persson that Andersson had met already with Arafat at the hotel in the presence of the Swedish Ambassador to Denmark. Domestic politics in Sweden were complicating diplomatic initiatives abroad and this incident was an embarrassment between the two men since they were also members of the same party (Nuder, 2008: 211). To get out of the situation, Andersson claimed that he met with Arafat in Copenhagen because Beilin asked for his urgent help (Eriksson, 2015: 200). Despite trying to explain his actions, Persson believed that Andersson’s actions been done both hastily and recklessly (Schori, 2008: 158). At this point, it became clear that Arafat had been able to use Andersson to ease the pressure exerted on him by Persson during Sweden’s presidency of the European Union. According to Schori, Andersson met with Arafat because Andersson felt that Persson had missed an opportunity to prove to Arafat that the Swedish leadership was attentive to Palestinian policy. Only Andersson could persuade Arafat to advance another political move (Schori, 2014: 311). Ignoring the violence attacks against Israeli citizens, Andersson wrote again to Arafat in December 2000 saying that he was ashamed of Sweden’s failure to condemn Israel for its actions against the Palestinians (Eriksson, 2015: 200). Andersson’s political loyalist, Schori, sided with the Palestinian

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leader and believed that Arafat was subject to political manipulation (Schori, 2014: 310). These remarks seemed to ignore Arafat’s disagreements and prevarications at the American summit. In the first week of January 2001, Ben-Ami addressed Swedish Prime Minister Persson. In an attempt to avoid bloodshed, Ben-Ami asked Persson to put pressure on Arafat. Persson responded to the request and pressured the Palestinian leader to submit his answer to Clinton on the American outline for a permanent agreement between the parties (Ben-Ami, 2004: 400). Schori believed that Persson’s efforts had actually harmed Swedish mediation. He felt that exerting pressure on the Palestinian leader to return to negotiations and end the violence demonstrated Persson’s lack of understanding why he failed to persuade Arafat (Schori, 2014: 311). In fact, Persson’s actions were not limited to putting pressure on Arafat. He took a broader approach to solving the conflict than Andersson had taken. Persson wanted to advance talks through the Swedish presidency of the European Union to alleviate the rising violence and renew the post Camp David political efforts. Barak’s offer to sponsor talks in Taba, Egypt came to fruition with meetings between Israelis and the Palestinians from January 21–27, 2001. The talks failed because of the inability to bridge the gaps between the parties and because of the continuing violence. During the talks in Taba, EU-Middle East envoys led by Javier Solana, High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and Terje Larsen from Norway exchanged details with Nuder to coordinate with Sweden the creation of yet another alternative course for talks in Europe (Nuder, 2017). Attempts to promote contacts between the parties continued until the collapse of the talks in Taba in January 2001.42 Nuder tried to coordinate a public statement on the continuation of contacts between the parties. It was yet another attempt to restore trust between the parties and return them to the negotiating table. But it would be in vain. In January 2001, Arafat rejected the Clinton outline, demanded an explicit promise of the right of return and rejected the presence of an international force in the Jordan Valley (Rynhold, 2009a: 50–51). On January 28, 2001, Arafat spoke in Davos and accused the Israeli government of killing Palestinians using uranium. This speech distressed Jerusalem. After hearing about Arafat’s speech in Davos, Barak stopped the negotiations. At the end of the conference in Switzerland, Barak called Persson and informed him that Arafat’s speech removed any chance of resuming contacts between the parties (Nuder, 2017). At this point, Persson was forced to admit that the contacts between the parties had failed, although he still hoped that Nuder would maintain contacts with the parties. Persson’s lost hope in the Oslo process and promote European foreign policy which focused on North Korea rather than continuing negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. The very evening before Sharon took office as Israel Prime Minister Nuder had a tete-a-tete with him. It was an

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interesting meeting. “He was kind and gentle, but unfamiliar of what previously had been discussed in various channels. He had a map on the wall and told me:” “Look at it. It’s all about Israel’s security. Nothing else. Remember that” (Nuder, 2017). In the absence of agreement on an outline for a permanent settlement, each party feared that the other would loss the chance of concluding an agreement. Each side tried either to improve its position in the talks on a permanent settlement or alternatively to prepare for the collapse of the peace process. The assumption that the Swedes could have done more to help the parties reach an agreement was unfounded. Arafat’s renunciation of the understandings formed by the parties in the Harpsund channel widened the gaps between the parties irreparably. Any attempts to renew contacts between the parties were doomed to failure. Regardless of the identity of the mediators, their authority or their influence over the leadership of the parties, the collapse of the peace process rendered all mediators and mediation attempts irrelevant. After numerous attempts to revive the talks between Israel and the Palestinians, the Swedes failed to re-establish political contacts between the parties. They had failed to understand the nature of the conflict which had been in a round of violence and retaliatory actions. In fact, Arafat seemed wedded to violence way beyond its tactical benefit. But the violence only provoked strong public pressure in Israel to respond to the terrorist acts. This public pressure was politically influential and strategically important. Now Israel took more severe measures that included the imposition of closures and surgical operations against terrorist infrastructure as preferred alternatives (Rynhold, 2004). For some, the collapse of the peace process was not due to the violence or the failure of the mediators to implement the Oslo agreements properly. Rather, the continuing conflict was due to the flaws in the original Oslo agreement. The signs of failure were seen in the original Oslo agreement on mutual recognition in 1993 which was empty of content or practical significance. As time went on, the gaps between the parties were exposed. The insurmountable distance between the parties became apparent and turned destructive, leading to mutual distrust in the crucial stages of negotiations (Rynhold, 2009a: 55). It was hard to imagine that there was any chance for success when the incessant violence of the Middle East continued to manifest itself so clearly. The round of violence called the Second Intifada had arrived and would last for several years. Methods of soft-power diplomacy seemed irrelevant in the face of such sustained violence.

Notes 1 In the first channel, Sweden hosted talks in Stockholm during 1988 between representatives of the PLO and Jewish American representatives. These unofficial meetings led to the Geneva Declaration and American recognition of the PLO.

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The second Swedish channel in 1994 involved unofficial talks between Yossi Beilin’s representatives and Abu Mazen’s representatives under the auspices of a research institute: the Olof Palme International Center. This second channel is sometimes referred to as the Stockholm Channel. For the first time after the signing of the Oslo Accords unofficial representatives from both sides gathered to discuss the contentious core issues and to formulate a framework agreement for a permanent settlement. Finally, the third channel during 2000 was official and promoted a permanent agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Following intelligence received in 1985, Shimon Peres, who served as Prime Minister in the rotation government, decided to impose on the Jewish Agency’s Director, Shlomo Gazit to open informal contacts with PLO officials. Gazit and Yossi Ginosar, a senior Shabak official, opened a round of meetings with Hani Al-Hassan, Arafat’s close adviser and PLO representative in Cairo, Said Kamel, whose purpose was focused on receiving information about the missing soldiers from Sultan Yaakov Battle in Lebanon. Although the parties tried to lead the talks to a political level, they understood that the meetings were not ripe for political contacts. In March 1989, the head of Israeli Army intelligence, Major General Amnon Lipkin Shahak, submitted the annual review of military intelligence to the cabinet in which he stated that the Intifada was led by the PLO. Likud ministers and a number of Knesset members did not accept Shahak’s premise that the PLO had instigated the riots. They thought that the riots were a popular uprising in Gaza that was supported and encouraged later by the PLO. In a speech on July 31, 1988, King Hussein announced the disengagement of administrative and legal ties between the Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank. King Hussein said that Jordan respected the desire of the PLO, the legal and sole representative of the Palestinian people, to secede from Jordan in an independent Palestinian state. “The West Bank concerns only occupied Palestinian land and its people, and not Jordanian citizens of Palestinian descent in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Of course, the Jordanian citizens of Palestinian descent have full civil rights and obligations like every other Jordanian citizen … . Jordan is not Palestine”. By the time Schori and Beilin met as colleagues in the halls of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem, they had been good friends for many years. Both had been participants in the Labor Party youth movement as teenagers and had been identified as possible future leaders at an early age. The Jewish delegation for the talks included: Rita E. Hauser, American head of the International Center for Peace in the Middle East. Drora Kass, Director of the Center for Peace in the Middle East. Menachem Rosensaft, founding chairman of the International Network for the Children of Holocaust Survivors, Economist Stanley Sheinbaum and Abraham L. Udovitch, professor of Middle Eastern history at Princeton University. In the eyes of Swedish diplomats, any economic aid that was needed by the Palestinians did not cloud their assessment of the PLO’s resilience or the consequences of Arafat’s leadership. In his letter, Andersson wrote that, as many of his generation in Europe witnessed the persecution and Holocaust of the Jews during World War II, so he was affected by these events and noted that in 1964, he sent his son to Israel to work in a kibbutz and thus became acquainted with the Palestinians ( Rabie, 1992: 56). Behind the scenes, Sweden continued to try to persuade the Americans to advance negotiations between Israel and the PLO ( Palme, 1993: 105). Even then, scholars pointed to Arafat’s duplication of language because there was no change in the PLO’s position: According to Arafat’s definition, terrorist

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attacks outside Israel were illegitimate but terrorist attacks in Israeli territory and the territories remained legitimate. Evidence of this was also found in changes in the content of the document submitted by the PLO to the State Department in which it abandoned the early clause formed with Scultz in September 1988 regarding violence. After the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt mediated by the United States, Egypt turned away from the Soviet Union and looked to the Americans for support. Thus the Soviets lost maneuvering space in the Middle East. With a new set of negotiations beginning in the Middle East, the Soviets saw an opportunity to become more deeply involved. In the context of the Cold War, the Soviets supported the Arab states. If the PLO connected with the United States, it would serve the interests of the Soviets. Russia wanted to see a regional peace in the area as it would take away some of the influence of the United States in the Middle East. After opening direct talks in 1988, Israel demanded from the State Department that the PLO hold elections for each representative body in the territories (Israel already knew of the practical differences between the foreign PLO and the domestic PLO, ie between the Tunisian leadership and the West Bank leading the uprising). In response, the PLO feared that they might lose control of other popular movements as the leadership continued to operate from Tunis. In order not to obscure the talks between the parties, the U.S. State Department abandoned Israel’s demands. Along with failed attempts to talk to Israel, Andersson updated his Nordic counterparts in contacts he had with the parties. In January 1989, Anderson met with Finnish Foreign Minister Kalevi Sursa and Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoltenberg at Arlanda Airport outside Stockholm and heard from his Norwegian counterpart about his expected meeting with Arafat. According to Stoltenberg, his meeting in Stockholm was not part of a Nordic initiative to mediate the conflict in the Middle East, but its purpose was to keep abreast of policy developments since Arafat visited Stockholm and Helsinki and stated that the Nordic countries played an important role in the peace process (Waage, 2000b: 40–43). Because of his meetings with Arafat in Tunis in 1990, Andersson understood that criticism of his mediation policy was growing in various circles in Sweden ( Palme, 1993: 202) and therefore reduced the Swedish Foreign Minister’s maneuverability. Andersson and the Middle East group at the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm arrived in Israel on March 18, 1990, and were received with suspicion. Two months earlier, Foreign Minister Moshe Arens had launched a verbal attack on Sweden, criticising Andersson’s activities. He accused Sweden of being a close ally of the PLO. During Andersson’s visit Arens repeatedly attacked the Swedish Foreign Minister in the media ( Yegar, 1993). From 1988, the Swedes had updated their Norwegian counterparts on contacts with the Palestinians, especially through the Norwegian Foreign Minister. The talks in Stockholm in the summer of 1988 not only strengthened Palestinian legitimacy in the eyes of the Americans but also served as a conduit for the transmission of messages between the PLO and the U.S. State Department ( Palme, 1993: 104, 118). Andersson took advantage of his role as head of the in the Gaza Strip to rebuild his role as an international diplomat in addition to coordinating humanitarian and civilian projects in the Gaze strip. At the same time, in 1994, Sweden launched a Euro-Islam dialogue project with the aim of building long-term relations between Sweden and the countries of the

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Mediterranean and creating European-Mediterranean cooperation ( Lönnback, 1997). Even though the Swedes were aware of the nature of the political reality on the ground, they did not take into account the full reality of Palestinian society at this time with the primacy of family loyalties above any loyalty to a centralised governmental. Following the transfer of funds makes it possible to see the Swedish pattern of action. The Foreign Office delegated to the Minister for International Development and Cooperation. This government ministry was in charge of the aid agency SIDA which transferred grants to the Palme Center to mediate and strengthen Swedish involvement. The Palme Center belonged to the Swedish Labor Party and through its activities succeeded in establishing extensive ties with Palestinian and Israeli youth organizations. This joint activity was intended primarily to establish and strengthen political and economic ties with the parties and with the future leadership of each party. Transferring the funds from the Palme Center to the Palestinian institutions reinforced the Palestinians’ trust in Sweden and preserved Sweden’s status in the Palestinian Authority. When Holst represented Norway at the signing of the Oslo Accords he did not mention the contribution of the Swedes in the establishment of the original political contacts between the parties in his official remarks. The Swedes were hurt by Holst’s omission and turned to the Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland for redress of Holst’s insult. The prime minister forced Holst to mention the role of the Swedes in building toward negotiations between Israel and the PLO ( Eriksson, 2015: 110) in subsequent public forums and media interviews. In 1995, the UN Special Envoy to the Middle East, the Norwegian Terje RødLarsen, decided that Andersson would coordinate the assistance mechanism for Palestinians that focused on reducing unemployment in the PA ( Eriksson, 2015: 140). Sweden wanted to renew its efforts in the region to increase the likelihood of mediation between the parties even though the European Union had appointed Miguel Moriantos from Spain as a special envoy to the Middle East ( Eriksson, 2015: 156). As part of Sweden’s accession to the European Union, Stockholm’s foreign policy makers focused on deepening their involvement in the Middle East through the EU. Less than a year after joining the European Union in early 1995, the Swedes focused, among other things, on the Euro-Mediterranean partnership that opened in Barcelona in November 1995 ( Johansson-Nogués, 2015: 138). They supported the construction of the airport in Gaza with Japan, Germany and Morocco ( Schori, 2014: 307). According to the Palestinians, it was Agha who made the proposal. Swedish diplomat Schori noted that it was actually a Beilin initiative that the Swedish government accepted ( Schori, 2014: 293). (Riksarkivet: Riksdagens hurdprotokoll, Protokoll 1990/91). In the summer of 1990, Swedish engineers from the Henrikson Corporation were arrested while trying to flee Iraq due to the war. Their capture by the Iraqi army created a political crisis between the two countries. Contacts between Sweden and Iraq were opened through Sten Andersson and representatives of the Swedish government arrived in Iraq a few weeks after the arrests. While the Swedish government sought a quiet solution, Saddam Hussein wanted to use the hostages as a bargaining chip. He demanded the linking of the war in Kuwait to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict and introduced this notion into the hostage talks through Arafat. The members of the delegation met with Arafat. At the end of a few days, some of the Swedish prisoners were released with the direct help of Arafat ( Furubjelke, 2008: 129–132). By November 26, all prisoners were released. In an

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official letter to Saddam Hussein, Sweden linked the Iraqi-Kuwait war to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (Konstitutionsutskottets betänkande 1990/91: K U30). To some in the Swedish parliament, Andersson’s public remarks reiterating this supposed link along with the letter from the prime minister exposed a major weakness in Sweden’s Foreign policy. Critics of this diplomatic compromise accused Swedish diplomats and especially Sten Andersson of not being able to stand up to a dictator such as Saddam Hussein. While the Stockholm talks were going on, the Swedes had another separate, ambitious plan. They wanted to be part of the peace process in the region and not just in the Israeii-Palestinian conflict. As part of their contacts with the parties in the mid-1990s in Washington, they sought to mediate between Israel and Syria. According to Schori, Beilin was the one who initiated this secret channel. Schori reports that it was Beilin who turned to the Swedish cabinet secretary and senior Swedish Foreign Ministry officials to help open the dialogue channel with Damascus. According to Schori, Beilin believed that the U.S. secretary of state was not working properly to promote the Syrian channel. Beilin thought that the Swedish Labor Party could open a separate, unofficial back channel with Assad to mediate between the parties ( Schori, 2014: 292). Schori’s claim supports the affinity between Beilin’s bold political aspirations and the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s ambition to bring about an agreement between the parties. Beilin’s desire to formulate a framework agreement with the Palestinians and also to advance a second Syrian channel blended well with the Swedish soft diplomacy goals. The Swedish strategy to deepen its involvement in the Middle East through the foreign assistance it transferred to the Palestinian Authority seemed to be in line with Beilin’s intentions ( Eriksson, 2015: 137). Economic incentives increased Sweden’s involvement in continuing to preserve the Beilin–Abu Mazen channel and at the same time helped Sweden to find convenient alternatives to deepen its involvement in the region. Although Söder believed that most of the Swedish mediation was characterised by facilitation and did not deal with the content of the negotiations ( Söder, 2018), these acts show that the Swedes were bolder in their actions than the parties assumed. This initiative went nowhere. In early 1997, the same representatives met in Stockholm, Israel and London with the aim of expanding and improving the document dealing with Jerusalem, settlements and security issues ( Eriksson, 2015: 155). The Swedes were determined to maintain their connection with the PLO leader regardless of the outcome of the elections. The Swedish Carl Lidbom chaired the EU Election Commission and helped to monitor the Palestinian Authority’s 1996 election process. European observers monitored and supervised 150 polling stations. At the end of the election campaign, Lidbom pointed out the shortcomings of the election process. He criticised the shortening of the election period from 22 days to 14 days; the number of seats allocated to Palestinian Authority institutions; and especially the Legislative Council, where key positions for Fatah and PLO associates were “reserved” ( Parsons, 2005: 201). Although Swedish belief in Arafat’s leadership was tested by the Palestinian election period which revealed a considerable lack of transparency, these irregularities were ignored by Sweden. The Swedes believed that contact with the Palestinians should be maintained. For the Swedes, Arafat’s visit to Sweden was critical because they wanted to preserve close ties with the Palestinian leadership and regain their positions as international mediators in the unfolding Oslo peace process. This was during Gosta Ingvar’s second term as Swedish prime minister from 1994 to 1996. He was serving his first term as prime minister during the 1988 negotiations. In this context, members of the Jewish community added that Andersson’s activities were naive and that he did not understand Arab mindset. The

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Scandinavian view had supported the weak side uncloudedly without understanding its motives. Annika Soder is the wife of Anders Bjurner, a close adviser to Sten Andersson who participated in contacts with the PLO in 1988. The Soders are considered one of the most prominent couples in the Swedish Foreign Ministry. Israel’s lack of political maneuverability in the international community obliged prime ministers to take gradual steps. Although during Ehud Barak’s tenure, the Prime Minister tried to plan a regional peace plan in which Israel would withdraw from several territories simultaneously, the plan remained weak vis-à-vis the outside world and especially in the eyes of the Israeli public. Due to public resistance and their low trust in the government, Israel persisted in adopting gradual steps in negotiations realising that it would be unwise to make major concessions at the same time in parallel channels. ( Quandt, 2005b: 17). Persson’s influence on the Labor party was broad and long lasting. Due to his views, Sweden’s traditional policies that had been active since the 1970s changed. Swedish policy was influenced more by Christian humanism than by the party’s social democratic tradition. When Barak paid a diplomatic visit to Sweden in January 2000 as part of a conference on Holocaust heritage founded by Persson, the two leaders did not discuss the initiative but in late January Israel approved Sweden’s participation in the TIPH force in Hebron ( Utrikesfrågor Offentliga dokument m.m, 2000). It is possible to view Barak’s change of strategy in the context of his election campaign. During the campaign Barak promised to withdraw from Lebanon, to achieve peace with Arabs in the region and to arrive at a permanent, peaceful settlement with the Palestinians. He kept the first promise but failed at the second one. This failure may have put pressure on him to devise an urgent, direct approach to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Under the November 1998 Wye Agreement, Israel undertook to hand over an additional 27% of territory to the Palestinian Authority in a gradual format. Netanyahu agreed to hand over 13% from area C to Areas A and B and also 14% from Area B to Area A. The Palestinians pledged to prevent acts of terrorism and violence against Israeli civilians, including settlers. They would take action against incitement and propaganda in Palestinian educational institutions. It was also agreed that negotiations for a permanent settlement would be open by May 4, 1999. Similarly, although Barak decided that Shimon Peres, Yossi Beilin and other people who participated in Oslo would not be in the circle of secret partners, Beilin decided to give Barak’s people the document of understanding from his meetings with Abu Mazen ( Beilin, 2001: 85). Beilin’s apparent influence also did not wane as the ECF-coordinated organization Beilin continued to influence decision makers. This is because some of the organization’s representatives also participated in parallel channels such as Gilead Sher and his assistant Gidi Greenstein. Both brought with them staff members of the organization, although government ministries were careful not to take an unequivocal position on sensitive issues that ECF staff dealt with ( Drucker, 2002: 228). The staff of the Jerusalem Research Institute also sent a position paper to Shlomo Ben-Ami and Gilead Sher, who coordinated the core issues ahead of a discussion on a permanent settlement with the Palestinians ( Klein, 2018). On May 11, 2000, four days before Barak brought a move to transfer Palestinian villages in the Jerusalem area to Palestinian control to Knesset for approval, Barak sent Yossi Ginossar on a secret mission. Ginossar met with Arafat and updated him on Barak’s expected move. “It is very important that there will not

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be violent incidents that day”, Ginossar told Arafat. Following days of rage, Barak decided to freeze the move. It is interesting to note that as the talks progressed, Palestinian representatives had approached Mossberg, who was identified with the Andersson camp, to change the character of Swedish mediation. They believed the present Swedish approach was coordinated with Israel ( Mossberg, 2017). In other words, the Palestinians intended to use Mossberg, knowing that he was one of Andersson’s men, to change Swedish diplomacy back to the traditional format that consistently had supported the Palestinians’ position. In their eyes, the secret channel and the conditions set by Israel caused the Swedes to cooperate with Israel instead of supporting Palestinian positions. This loss of trust between Arafat and his associates influenced the decisionmaking process of the Palestinian leader during the Camp David Summit. Arafat no longer would consider their advice. Even if offered, Arafat would not be influenced by such advice. These dynamics doomed Arafat to be a one-man, isolated leader amidst the pressures of the high level diplomacy at Camp David. It may very well have been his choice. He would be left to his own strengths and limitations. One of the conclusions drawn from the Harpsund channel’s exposure was that each round of talks must include the PLO’s top political leadership. Israel was aware that the channel’s exposure stemmed from political tensions and prestige struggles within the PLO ( Dajani, 2005: 72). A few weeks after the collapse of Camp David Persson discussed with Barak’s advisors how to assist the Israeli prime minister in the upcoming Israeli elections. Persson raised the possibility that the “Progressive Leaders’ Club” which included Blair (British prime minister), Josephine (French prime minister) and Schroeder (German chancellor) would help Barak in his election campaign ( BenAmi, 2004: 406). The proposal was shelved but symbolised the relationship of trust between Barak and Persson. It showed the Swedish leadership’s willingness to bolster Barak’s image as a master statesman invited to speak in many European countries for the sake of high-stakes peace negotiations. It showed willingness to intervene indirectly in another country’s elections for the sake of Sweden’s reputation in international diplomacy. Ariel Sharon had been elected prime minister in Israel on February 2001.

Bibliography Primary sources - Archives Amnesordnade Handlingar, Olof Palmes Internationella Center, Arbetarrorelsens Arkiv och Bibliotek, Forskaresxpeditionen. ARAB/R/104/D/8, Refkod: 3651/460. ARAB/R/104/E/4, Refkod: 3651/526. ARAB/R/104/E/3, Refkod: 3651/507. Archives of the Swedish Parliament - Riksarkivet Riksdagens snabbprotokoll 1990/91:23. Riksdagens snabbprotokoll Protokoll 1993/94:38. Konstitutionsutskottets betänkande 1994/95:KU30. Utrikesutskottets betänkande 1994/95:UU15. Riksdagens snabbprotokoll 1995/96:55. Utrikesfrågor Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor, 2000.

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Secondary sources Abadi, Jacob (2001). “Sweden’s policy toward Israel: Constraints and adjustments”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37(2): 23–49. Abu-Sharif, Bassam (2009). Arafat and the Dream of Palestine: An Insider’s Account. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Agha, Hussein, Shai Feldman, Ahmad Khalidi and Zeev Schiff (2003). Track II Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Associated Press (1988). “U.S. Vows to keep wary eye on PLO”, Miami Herald. Beilin, Yossi (2001). ‫[ מדריך ליונה פצועה‬Guide for a Wounded Dove]. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth and Hemed books. Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2004). ‫ מסע אל גבולות תהליך השלום‬:‫[ חזית ללא עורף‬A Front Without a Homefront: A Voyage to the Boundaries of the Peace Process]. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth and Hemed books. Bentsur, Eytan (2001). Making Peace: A First-hand Account of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. London: Praeger Publishers. Dajani, Omar (2005). “Surviving Opportunities: Palestinian Negotiating Patterns in Peace Talks with Israel”, pp. 39–80. In Tamara Cofman Wittes (Ed.), How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press. Danielsson, Lars (2007). I skuggan av makten [In the Shadow of Power]. Stockholm: Bonnier. Dannreuther, Roland (2016). The Soviet Union and the PLO. London: Springer. Devroy, Ann (1990). “President suspended PLO talks”, The Washington Post. Drory, Ze’ev (2016). ‫ מנהיגות שקטה‬:‫[ דן שומרון‬Dan Shomron- Subtle Leadership]. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth. Drucker, Raviv (2002). ‫ אהוד ברק במבחן התוצאה‬:‫[ חרקירי‬Harakiri - Ehud Barak: The Failure]. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth and Hemed books. Eriksson, Jacob (2013). “Israeli Track II Diplomacy: The Beilin-Abu Mazen Understandings in Israel’s Secret Diplomacies”, pp. 209–224. In Clive Jones and Tore Petersen (Eds.), Israel’s Clandestine Diplomacies. London: Hurst & Co. Eriksson, Jacob (2015). Small State Mediation in International Conflicts: Diplomacy and Negotiation in Israel-Palestine. London: IB Tauris. Flamhaft, Ziva (1996). Israel on the Road to Peace: Accepting the Unacceptable. Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press. Furubjelke, Viola (2008). “Israelromantik och nedrustningsfrågor” [Israeli Romance and Disarmament Issues], pp. 124–152. In Ulf Bjereld and Ulf Carmesund (Eds.), Israel och Palestina. 60 år i våra röda hjärtan [Israel and Palestine. 60 Years in Our Red Hearts]. Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg. Gazit, Shlomo (1999). ‫ שנות מדיניות ישראל בשטחים‬30 :‫[ פתאים במלכודת‬Trapped Fools Thirty Years of Israeli Policy in the Territories]. Tel Aviv: Zmora‐Bitan. Gazit, Shlomo (2016). ‫ מהפלמ”ח עד לראשות אמ“ן‬- ‫[ בצמתים מכריעים‬At Key Points of Time: From the Palmach to the Head of Aman]. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth. Gil, Avi (2018). ‫ מיומנו של שותף סוד‬:‫[ נוסחת פרס‬Peres Formula: Diary of a Confidant]. Ḥevel Modi’in: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan. Gilon, Carmi (2005). ‫[ שב”כ בין הקרעים‬Shabak between the Rifts]. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth and Hemed books. Gold, Dore (2012). “‫“[ ”זכותה החוקית של ישראל על ירושלים‬Defending Israel’s Legal Rights to Jerusalem”], pp. 87–101. In Alan Baker (Ed.), ‫זכויותיה של ישראל כמדינת הלאום‬

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‫[ של העם היהודי‬Israel’s Rights as a Nation-State in International Diplomacy]. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs – World Jewish Congress. Indyk, Martin (2009). Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American 20 Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East. New York: Simon & Schuster. Johansson‐Nogués, Elisabeth (2015). “Sweden: a ‘supporting actor’ to the EU?”, pp. 133–146. In Timo Behr and Teija Tiilikainen (Eds.), Northern Europe and the Making of the EU’s Mediterranean Policies: Normative Leaders or Passive Bystanders? UK: Ashgate. Kabha, Mustafa (2010). ‫[ הפלסטינים עם בפזורתו‬Palestinians: A People Dispersed]. Ra’ananna: The Open University. Kelman, C. Herbert (1997). “Some Determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough”, International Ngotiations Journal Online, Vol. 2(2): 183–194. Kimche, David (1992) ‫ המאבק לשלום במזרח התיכון‬:‫האופציה האחרונה‬. [The Last Option: the struggle for peace in the Middle East]. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth and Edanim. Klieman, Aharon (2000). Israeli Diplomacy in the Back Channel. Jerusalem: The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations- Davis Occasional Papers, No. 80. (Access date: 15.10.2015) https://en.davis.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/ davisinsten/files/Israeli_diplomacy_in_the_back_channel.pdf Klieman, Aharon (2005). “Israeli Negotiating Culture”, pp. 81–133. In Tamara Cofman Wittes (Ed.), How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate. Washington: US Institute of Peace Press. Lapidus, Arne (2015). “S höll sitt vallöfte till palestinierna” [“S kept its promise to the Palestinians”]. Expressen. Levin, Kenneth (2005). The Oslo Syndrome: Delusions of a People Under Siege. New Hampshire: Smith and Kraus. Lönnback, Lars (1997, July 13–16). A Promising Dialogue for Understanding and Peace Experiences from Three Years of the Swedish Project ‘EuroIslam’. Cairo: of The Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs‐ the 9th General Conference, Speech of the Swedish Ambassador. (Access date: 15.11.2013). http://www.elazhar.com/ conferences_eu/9/8.asp Malley, Robert and Hussein Agha (2001). “Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors”, New York Review of Books. Meridor, Dan (2011). “Camp David Diaries”, Haaretz. Nuder, Pär (2008) Stolt men inte nöjd: en kärleksförklaring till politiken [Proud but not satisfied: a declaration of love for politics]. Stockholm: Norstedts. Ögren, Mats (2005). Makten framför allt: en antologi om statsminister Göran Persson [Power Above all: An Anthology of Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson]. Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand. Palme, Susanne (1993). Tyst Diplomati [Silent Diplomacy]. Sodertalje: Norstedts Forlag AB. Parsons, Nigel (2005). The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to alAqsa. New York: Routledge. Peri, Yoram (2002). The Israeli Military and Israel’s Palestinian Policy From Oslo to the Al Aqsa Intifada. Washington: United States Institute of Peace. Persson, Göran (2007). Min väg, mina val [My Way, My Choices]. Stockholm: Bonnie. Pundak, Ron (2013). ‫ אוסלו הסיפור המלא‬:‫[ ערוץ חשאי‬Secret Channel − Oslo, the Full Story]. Tel Aviv: Attic books, Yedioth Ahronoth, Hemed books.

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Quandt, William (2005a). Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967. Washington: Brookings. Quandt, William (2005b). “Israeli‐Palestinian Peace Talks: From Oslo to Camp David II”, pp. 13–38. In Tamara Cofman Wittes (Ed.), How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press. Rabie, Mohamed (1992). “The U.S.-PLO dialogue: The Swedish connection”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 21(4): 54–66. Rabie, Mohamed (1995). U.S.-PLO Dialogue: Secret Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution. Florida: University Press of Florida. Ross, Dennis (2004). The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Rubin, Barry and Judith Colp Rubin (2005). ‫ ביוגרפיה פוליטית‬:‫[ יאסר ערפאת‬Yasser Arafat Political Biography]. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth and Hemed. Rynhold, Jonathan (1999). Identity, Values and Culture Change: Israel, the United States and the Palestinian Question since Camp David, London: London School of Economics: Ph.D. Dissertation. Rynhold, Jonathan (2004). “Israel’s fence: Can separation make better neighbors”, Survival, Vol. 46(1): 55–76. Rynhold, Jonathan (2009). “Liberalism and the collapse of the Oslo peace process in the middle east”, The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Vol. 8 (1): 45–57. Savir, Uri (1998). ‫ מאחורי הקלעים של הכרעה היסטורית‬:‫[ התהליך‬The Process: Behind the Scenes of a Historic Decision]. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth. Sayigh, Yezid (1997). Armed Struggle and the Search for State. Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies. Schori, Pierre (2008). “Israel 60 år och Mellanösterns framtid” [Israel 60 years and the future of the Middle East”], pp. 153–170. In Ulf Bjereld and Ulf Carmesund (Eds.), Israel och Palestina. 60 år i våra röda hjärtan [Israel and Palestine. 60 years in our red hearts]. Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg. Schori, Pierre (2014). Minnet och elden: En politisk memoar med samtida synpunkter [Memory and Fire: A Political Memoir with Contemporary Views]. Stockholm: Leopard fö rlag. Shavit, Ari (2001). “The day the Peace Died” (interview with Shlomo Ben Ami), Haaretz. Shikaki, Khalil (2004). A Palestinian Perspective on the Failure of the Permanent Status Negotiations. Ramallah: The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. Shlaim, Avi (2005). “The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process”, pp. 241–263. In Louise Fawcett (Ed.), International Relations of the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Shultz, George (2010). Turmoil and Triumph: Diplomacy, Power, and the Victory of the American Deal. New York: Simon and Schuster. Vistnes, Andreas (1996). “Arafat talte om at tilintetgjoere Israel” [“Arafat talked about destroying Israel”], Dagen. Wallensteen, Peter and Isak Svensson (2016). Fredensdiplomater. Nordisk medling från Bernadotte till Ahtisaari [Peace Diplomats. Nordic mediation from Bernadotte to Ahtisaari]. Stockholm: Santérusförlag.

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Yegar, Moshe (1993). Neutral Policy Theory Versus Practice: Swedish-Israeli Relations. Jerusalem: Israel Council on Foreign Relations.

Interviews Beilin, Yossi (February 13, 2018). (Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister and key figure of the Oslo process), Tel Aviv: Personal interview. Berlinger, Shlomo (December 7, 2017). (One of former leaders of the Jewish community in Sweden), telephone interview. Bjurner, Anders (January 11, 2017). (Senior diplomat at the Swedish Foreign Ministry and Sten Andersson’s adviser), Stockholm: Personal interview. Klein, Menachem (January 2, 2018). (Adviser for Jerusalem Affairs and Israel-PLO Final Status Talks to the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs), Ramat Gan: Personal interview. Mossberg, Mathias (January 13, 2017). (Senior diplomat at the Swedish Foreign Ministry and Sten Andersson’s adviser), Stockholm: Personal interview. Nuder, Pär (January 11, 2017). (Director and close adviser to Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson), Stockholm: Personal interview. Sher, Gilead (January 3, 2016). (Chief of Staff and Policy Coordinator to Israel’s Prime Minister, Ehud Barak. One of Israel’s senior peace negotiator in 1999–2001), Telephone interview. Söder, Sven-Eric (October 31, 2018). (Former Director of Folke Bernadotte Academy and head of Talks on Jerusalem), Skype Interview.

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Danish mediation efforts in the Middle East began following the signing of the Oslo Accords and included a vision of peace for the whole region as well as a focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Danish vision continued to develop over time and as circumstances changed on the ground. The first attempt to mediate between the parties was unofficial and took place between 1995 and the early 2000s. The purpose of the unofficial channel was to anchor the Oslo talks broadly and to increase public support for the peace process. The second attempt was an official channel wherein Denmark formulated an outline for a permanent agreement between Israel and the Palestinians that was supported by the Quartet. This channel was conducted between 2002 and 2003. Denmark was able to mobilise the Europeans, the Americans and some moderate Arab states to support the outline which became the Roadmap for Peace. By contributing to the normalisation process between Israel and its neighbors, their strategy was to harness senior representatives to an agreed formula on the future of the political process. The Danish interest was to end the Oslo process and to gain recognition for contributing to the region (Vahr, 2016). Historically, Danish foreign policy was not to interfere in international conflicts unless forced to do so by European policy. Denmark’s involvement in the Middle East began in earnest when Denmark was elected The presidency of the European Council for the first time in September 1982. That year the European Union decided to focus on the Middle East. The European Union’s policy was led by Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann Jensen and conducted through frequent visits to the region. Although he already knew senior Israeli and Jordanian representatives as part of his previous journalistic work, Jensen preferred to consult his friend and fellow journalist Herbert Pundik to understand the developments in the region. In the early 1990s, diplomatic officials in Denmark were skeptical about the prospects of concluding an agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. They did not anticipate that an opportunity with great potential would be offered to them in those years (Jensen, 2018; Pundik, 2015). In 1992, Herbert Pundik’s son, Ron Pundak, had tried to obtain Danish sponsorship of the ECF (an NGO Foundation for the Promotion of Economic DOI: 10.4324/9781003365198-5

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Cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians). Pundak was unsuccessful despite having a positive meeting with the Danish, the Danish Ambassador to Israel, and the Middle East desk at the Danish Foreign Ministry (Pundak, 2013: 51). In order to help his son, Herbert Pundik tried to get Danish sponsorship of the Israeli-Palestinian initiative. He contacted the Danish Foreign Ministry staff in Copenhagen but to no avail (Jensen, 2018). Jensen served as the Danish Foreign Minister until 1993. He did not know about the secret contacts that led to the Oslo Accords. He did not know about the Pundik father and son initiative to hold talks in Copenhagen. Later, he explained that these proposals were not submitted to the Foreign Minister’s office. According to Jensen, Foreign Ministery officials in Copenhagen feared that the political echelon in Israel and the PLO would not back the talks and therefore refused to sponsor such meetings (Jensen, 2018). By these decisions, Denmark missed an opportunity to promote an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. This failure to seize the moment influenced Danish foreign policy going forward, especially after Netanyahu came to power (Pundik, 2015). After the signing of the Oslo Accords, Denmark’s main intention was to promote the peace process actively through unofficial organizations and to encourage the public on all sides of the political spectrum to support the peace process. The Danish Foreign Ministry believed that promoting the process of normalisation between Israel and its Arab neighbors would advance the peace process and eventually lead to political pressure on Israel and the Palestinians. Netanyahu’s rise to power in 1996 surprised many in the Arab world and in the international community even though the Jordanians expressed sympathy for Netanyahu through Al-Aswaq in the days before the election. Al-Aswaq attributed to Netanyahu a better ability to negotiate a permanent settlement with the Palestinians and to preserve Jordan’s interests in the Jordan Valley (Rabinovich, 2004: 89). The Jordanians were concerned about a future Israeli settlement with the Palestinians from what they knew of the outgoing prime minister’s vision. Peres had adhered to a vision of joint Jordanian-Palestinian rule. Peres explained that alongside the rule of an independent state in the Gaza Strip, Arafat had agreed to a confederation with Jordan. This arrangement would give the Palestinians a choice between citizenship in the Gaza Strip and citizenship in the West Bank. Citizenship in the West Bank meant Jordanian citizenship and would remove the possibility of arriving at a permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinians from the political process (Gil, 2018: 191). Jordan feared that the Palestinian Authority would influence the Palestinians in Jordan and could undermine the Hashemite Kingdom. In addition, Arafat’s offer to the Jordanian king to rotate within the framework of a confederation between the Palestinians and Jordan, added to the Jordanian king’s deep suspicion of the Palestinian leader (Gil, 2018: 187–186, 190), especially against Arafat’s attempt to gain control of the crossings with Jordan (Gil, 2018: 236). Additionally the issue of the Temple Mount was a key element in Jordan’s authority in a future settlement. The possibility that Arafat would control

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the Temple Mount worried the king of Jordan even though Peres had made it clear to the Jordanian King that Israel would not agree to such an arrangement. Rather than grant Arafat control over the Temple Mount, Peres promised the Norwegian Foreign Minister that the Palestinians would gain extensive rights on the Temple Mount ( Gil, 2018: 178, 187). Under these vague arrangements the Danish Foreign Ministry began their initiatives by promoting unofficial talks between Israel and Egypt. Herbert Pundik,1 who was an influential journalist and highly regarded figure in Denmark, had previously visited Cairo as early as 1994 to examine the impact of the Oslo Accords on Egyptian society. Pundik believed that an Israeli-Egyptian discourse should be promoted and received Danish support to examine the ways in which contacts between the parties could be promoted (Pundik, 2007: 325).2 The peace between Israel and Egypt was known in diplomatic circles as a cold peace. As discussions around warming relations with Egypt and normalisation processes intensified as part of the political process, David Kimche joined Pundik on his visit to Cairo. Kimche was the former deputy head of the Mossad and former director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. He largely represented a pragmatic view that believed in coexistence and regional political change following the signing of the Oslo Accords. They met with the leading intellectual in Egypt, Lutfi-al-Khuli, who believed that a dialogue between the parties might bear fruit, especially in light of the political tension between Israel and Egypt. He suggested that Abdel Al Moneim Said Aly join the meeting. In a separate conversation with Said Aly, Lutfi-al-Khuli admitted that he himself was hesitant to meet with Pundik and Kimche but he was interested to hear what his “enemies” thought. Al-Khuli was considered to have important influence not only because of his closeness to Mubarak, but also because he had been strongly opposed to peace with Israel. By the time of their meeting, he had changed his view and backed the content of the talks with Israel and expressed his desire to promote a conciliatory policy toward Israel. The attempt to create a political framework that would serve the parties and advance Denmark’s status as a peace mediator did not succeed. The director of the Israeli prime minister’s office, Eitan Haber, accepted the summaries of the meetings but clarified that talks were already under way with Mubarak’s personal adviser, Osama El-Baz (RDL, 1995a). According to Haber, Pundik’s services were not needed at that time.

5.1 The Louisiana process Despite Israel’s rejection of Pundik and Kimche’s initiative, Pundik and the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to move forward with promoting informal meetings between Israel and Egypt in order to strengthen normalisation efforts. Ole Lønsmann Poulsen from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided Danish support for the meetings and Knud W. Jensen, director of the Louisiana Museum of Modern Culture, provided the

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facility for the meetings. In the town of Humlebæk, far from Copenhagen, the Louisiana Museum of Modern Culture was an excellent choice as it was in a remote location where the parties could talk without attracting attention (Pundik, 2015). Thus a political channel was created to convey messages between the parties. Pundik’s role was essential because he identified with Israel as well as with Denmark and remained a valued figure in the eyes of the parties (Brylle, 2018). On September 25, 1995, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs opened a two-day round of talks between the parties. Chaired by Herbert Pundik and senior diplomats from the Danish Foreign Ministry, the talks gave rise to a series of meetings called the Louisiana process. In the opinion of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the unofficial channel was an important component in the success of the process and in trying to reach common understandings. Denmark’s representatives were careful not to publish or disclose the content of the talks. This element of secrecy allowed the group members to feel comfortable that the content of the conversations would not receive public exposure and that the Danes would act in accordance with the instructions of the group members and would not pressure or embarrass them (Brylle, 2018). These factors served the main purpose of the talks, which was to strengthen relations between the countries and the overall normalisation process in the Middle East. The Danish initiative included participants with connections to decision makers (Brylle, 2018). The Egyptian delegation was led by Lutfi al-Khuli. A man of vision, he was also a man of action who wanted to advance the political process. He was an important figure in the eyes of the Egyptians (Brylle, 2018).3 Other Egyptian participants included those who were opponents of the peace agreement with Israel and who agreed to hold talks with Israelis for the first time. The senior Israeli representative was David Kimche. He described the meetings as follows: “A few dozen kilometers from Copenhagen, on the shores of the Baltic Sea, is one of the most beautiful museums in Europe, Louisiana by name. Not far away, under the noses of the Nazis, the Danish underground more than fifty years ago organized the rescue of Danish Jews to neutral Sweden on the other side of the sea. In this ideal place an extraordinary group gathered three years ago for a marathon discussion that lasted three days. At one side of the table sat some of the most prominent Egyptian intellectuals. On the other side sat Israelis and between these two groups sat representatives of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs who organized the event” (Hermann, 2009). The early talks between the Israeli and Egyptian representatives were essential to the process and succeeded in building an important relationship of trust between the parties with the goal of accelerating the processes of normalisation with Israel. The Egyptian delegation acted contrary to the prevailing perception of the Egyptian elite. At this time in the Arab world, Egyptian intellectuals worked to boycott meetings and dialogue with Israeli representatives. The delegation’s change in approach was accompanied by a

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heavy personal cost as al-Khuli was expelled from the Association he founded. In response, al-Khuli stated that the Egyptian and Arab interest was to reach peace with Israel. Together with Salah Bassiouny, Abd alMun’im Sa’id and Ali Shalkani Shalakany, al-Khuli founded the Egyptian peace movement with the support of Egyptian President Mubarak. Although the Egyptian delegation was hesitant about the nature of the talks in Denmark, they agreed to participate in the channel because of the possible rise of Netanyahu in the upcoming 1996 Israeli election. Indeed, when Kimche and Pundik met with Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa and his personal adviser Nabil Fahmi, the Egyptians stated that they had not formulated a comprehensive policy on how to deal with this potential Israeli election result (Pundik, 2015).4 The second round of meetings in the Louisiana process took place from February 10–11, 1996. Already the nature of the participants was changing. The Israeli delegation was comprised of four representatives, including Dan Meridor who was a member of the Likud Party, the party that would come to power with Netanyahu. The Egyptian representatives clarified their intention to preserve Egypt’s status in the region in light of the political process (RDL, 1996a). They did not want to be overshadowed by the diplomatic activities of the Oslo Accords referring to the talks between Israel and the Palestinians and their efforts to reach for normalisation in the region. The Egyptian Foreign Minister had warned as early as January 1995 that Israel’s disregard for Egypt in forging ties with Arab countries as part of the Oslo process would prove to be a grave mistake (Gil, 2018: 105). This statement testified to the importance of close relations with Egypt specifically and their influence on the preservation of dialogue channels to strengthen regional peace policy in general. Kimche made it clear to the Louisiana participants that the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan and the meetings held by Likud members with Palestinian representatives testified to Israel’s readiness for long-term regional reconciliation. The Egyptians noted that Israel’s diplomatic actions posed a danger to Egyptian interests. The government in Cairo feared the loss of regional supremacy in the face of the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan. Further, they explained that the warming of relations between Israel with Qatar and with Morocco had hurt Egyptian supremacy in the Arab world. In the eyes of Egypt, Israel needed Egypt more than Israel needed the rest of the Arab states. They pointed out that peace with Jordan did not imply comprehensive peace with the Arab world and that peace between governments was not peace between peoples (RDL, 1996b). Kimche was well acquainted with the Egyptian leadership and examined their words carefully. He responded by saying that it was in Egypt’s interest to remain the leader of the Arab world and to influence the peace process, but accused Egypt of trying to sabotage Israel’s diplomatic relations with other Arab countries. Meridor believed that the Israeli-Arab conflict stemmed from the refusal to recognise Israel, despite Israel’s aspiration to be

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accepted among its neighbors. Another Israeli representative added that the cold peace with Jordan affected the talks between Israel and Syria because the Israeli public would not agree to a withdrawal from the Golan Heights in a format similar to the cold peace made with Jordan, that is, a peace only between governments and not between peoples (RDL, 1996b). Any agreement towards a new Middle East should enhance civilian life as well and not just be a security arrangement between governments. Because the Egyptian representatives received instructions from the Foreign Ministry in Cairo, they expanded the discussions subtly so that in addition to discussing general regional concerns they also raised the topics of Israeli-Palestinian relations, the problem of Jerusalem and issues related to the political agenda (Pundik, 2015). Expanding the talks to include the Palestinian issue was a way for the Egyptians to cover for meeting with the Israelis at all. The normalisation meetings with Israel were a sensitive issue and soon the Egyptian political establishment made its intentions clear. Mubarak’s senior adviser Osama al-Baz stated that the talks would only continue with the participation of Palestinian representatives because otherwise an honest dialogue between the parties would not be possible (Pundik, 2007: 330). At a meeting of the UN General Assembly in September 1996, after the change of government in Israel earlier that year, Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa told Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen that the content of the Copenhagen meetings should change and recommended the addition of Palestinian representatives. Moussa said that the Palestinian issue was the root of the whole conflict in the Middle East (Pundik, 2007: 336). According to Moussa, Mubarak was updated on the content of the talks that took place in Denmark. The Egyptians believed that the Palestinian issue was causing the tensions between Israel and Egypt and therefore the channel could not be promoted without Palestinian representation (Pundik, 2015). The election of Benjamin Netanyahu as prime minister of Israel in June 1996 disquieted the Arab world. The Egyptians were unsure about his intentions for the region and in particular Egypt’s role in the process. These concerns may very well have influenced Moussa’s recommendations to include the Palestinians in the Copenhagen talks as a way of preserving Egypt’s status in the region. The parties were concerned about how Netanyahu’s rise to power would impact the peace process. Netanyahu was holding official talks with the Palestinians in a step-by-step manner without proposing a regional dialogue framework (Pundik, 2015). It was clear to everyone that Israel’s traditional view was to conduct separate contacts with each Arab country and not to meet as a single bloc. While Israeli representatives explained the impact of the cold peace with Egypt on the future of the region, Cairo criticised Israel’s attempt to normalise its relations with Arab countries without referring Egypt (Pundik, 2015). The Egyptians offered to promote a political declaration that would be announced in a public setting. They wanted to gather intellectuals, businessmen and academics from all participating countries and urge them to advance the peace process and a

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permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinians by appealing to their governments in the Middle East. They hoped to mount a broad-based public pressure campaign. This proposal was conveyed indirectly to representatives from Israel and to the Danish hosts and was seen as a way to promote the informal dialogue meetings. It strengthened the hope of the channel participants that the dialogue would yield practical results. In the end, Denmark was able to bridge the gaps and strengthen the transmission of messages between the parties. Denmark established a political channel that would aspire to meet the expectations of the parties. For Israel that included normalisation within the region in general and warming relations with Egypt in particular. For Egypt it meant supporting the continuation of the Israel-Palestinian negotiations. At this point, the Danish mediators understood that Egypt wanted an essential role in the peace process and that having a central role was part of Egypt’s overall policy in the region (Brylle, 2018). For the Egyptians, if decisions did not pass-through Cairo, then they were not valid. The Egyptians pressed to include Jordan and the Palestinian Authority in the meetings so they could focus on the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (Brylle, 2018; Pundik, 2015). Al-Khuli, who was initially adamant about not interfering in Israeli politics, argued that the Egyptian peace movement should strengthen the peace camp in Israel. He accused Netanyahu of failing the peace process (RDL, 1996c). Pundik hoped that agreeing to the Egyptian outline would lead to overall Egyptian support for the initiative and allow al-Khuli to persuade Arafat to support the group’s activities in Copenhagen. Pundik understood that the initiative would not receive official Israeli support (RDL, 1996c). The parties agreed to proceed in an unofficial format. They agreed to include the Jordanians due to the importance of the Jordanian King to the settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. Ahsan Shudrom, the former commander of the Jordanian Air Force, joined the group on behalf of Jordan. The parties agreed to invite Palestinian representatives to join the group as well. Pundik noted that the Palestinian representatives were people who acted independently and not on behalf of Arafat, even though they consulted with him (Pundik, 2015). At this stage, it was unclear whether the PLO leadership attached importance to the talks in Denmark and for that reason did not appoint their own representatives. In the eyes of the Danish mediators, the unofficial outline served the main objectives of the Louisiana process and was an appropriate framework for political contacts. Tentative attempts to formulate a joint statement were received with suspicion. The Danes supported the efforts as they wanted to host the representatives of the parties who would make a political statement. On the eve of the 1997 Copenhagen Conference, Pundik informed the head of the Middle East desk in Copenhagen, Torben Brylle, that despite public protests in Jordan against contacts with Israeli representatives, former Jordanian Prime Minister Abdelsalam al-Majali agreed to attend the conference alongside the Jordanian General (RDL, 1997c). The Jordanian king reviewed the wording

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of the declaration and allowed Jordanians to attend the conference despite widespread demonstrations taking place in Amman (RDL, 1997c). At the same time, the participants in the Jordanian delegation issued a statement demanding from Israel the cessation of construction in the settlements and the withdrawal from additional areas. They wanted to put pressure on Netanyahu to make decisions and to take actions “that all parties needed” (Oddeh, 1997). The Israeli government opposed the unofficial contacts in Denmark that dealt with the nature of a settlement agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy instructed Foreign Ministry officials not to assist the Israeli representatives in the Copenhagen group and Israeli Ambassador to Denmark Avi Seton warned against Pundik’s activities (Yaari, 1997). Due to suspicion of the Copenhagen Declaration, Meir Sheetrit, a senior member of the Likud Party, refused to attend the Copenhagen Conference because the declaration referred to the cessation of construction of new settlements. Maxim Levy (David Levy’s brother) refrained from attending the conference but was replaced by Yehuda Lankri along with David Libai of the Labor Party (RDL, 1997b).

5.2 The first Copenhagen conference In January 1997, participants in the Louisiana process gathered in Copenhagen. A total of 75 official and unofficial representatives attended the Copenhagen Conference. The group’s leaders included David Kimche, former director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former deputy head of the Mossad; Ihsan Shudrom, former commander of the Jordanian Air Force; and Prof. Sari Nusseibeh, President of Al-Quds University. Nusseibeh belonged to the moderate opposition to Arafat and had been part of the secret leadership of the Palestinians in the first Intifada. The participation of other Palestinians who did not ask Arafat for permission to attend the conference, including Riyad alMaliki and Marwan Barghouti, testified to Arafat’s inability to impose his political authority on them (Pundik, 2015). The Danish Foreign Minister and the minister for development and cooperation attended the conference, along with several international figures and delegations from the Middle East. Unlike the other Israeli-Palestinian dialogue forums held in those years, the Palestinian delegation included a representative close to Hamas, as well as representatives from the Popular Front, the Democratic Front and other organizations in the opposition camp. The Israeli delegation included a number of MPs from various parties, including the Labor Party, the Likud Party and others (Hermann, 2009: 155; Kimche, 1997a). The two MKs from David Levy’s Gesher party supported the Declaration but believed that Arab states should give broader legitimacy to the declaration and promote it with the aim of contributing to normalisation with Israel (Yaari, 1997). The declaration was presented for pre-approval to Egyptian and Jordanian rulers but was not brought to the attention of the PA chairman or

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the Israeli government. The declaration supported the Palestinians’ right to independence but ignored Israel’s core interests. It did not enumerate the terms agreed upon by the parties in the official talks (Pundik, 2007: 338). Prime Minister Netanyahu welcomed the process that promoted normalisation between Arab countries and Israel. However, he did not approve the Israeli-Palestinian component of the declaration. Netanyahu’s rejection of the declaration seemed justified after Shudrom published an open article in The Jordan Times that criticised Netanyahu’s policy. Kimche understood the article as a way for Shudrom to strengthen support for the Copenhagen group in Jordan and Egypt given the sharp public criticism of the group. The article was aimed at the interior political support in the Arab world and not necessarily an attack against Israel. Kimche noted that Israeli members of the group were also accused of damaging Israeli diplomacy due to their participation in the Copenhagen initiative. He stressed that people to people initiatives should work to gain public support for the outline for a permanent agreement and for the advancement of normalisation processes. In Kimche’s words: “Peace of the people and not a piece of paper” (RDL, 1997f). The weakness of unofficial, soft-power diplomacy was evident in the days leading up to the first Copenhagen conference in 1997. Despite the shared desire to promote a permanent agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, public pressure on Arab representatives led to a partial renunciation of the group and the mediator’s legitimacy. When Egyptian representative Said Ahmad decided to withdraw from the conference, he argued that the talks did not include a demand for a Palestinian state or a discussion on the status of Jerusalem. Furthermore, the role of the intellectuals could not be a substitute for the negotiators. He believed that negotiators should strive to achieve political goals but a group of intellectuals should not and could not do so. He thought that Israel enjoyed the normalisation process without providing practical value to the talks (Negus, 1997: 10). Egyptian representative Abd al-Mun’im Sa’id criticised the decision to pursue an unofficial diplomacy track through intellectuals and believed that politicians or people close to the government should have such contacts with Israel. The Egyptian intellectuals believed that Arab participation in the normalisation process weakened Egypt’s position vis-à-vis Israel and promoted regional normalisation processes without extracting a political price from Israel. They felt that the unofficial outline gave an impetus to the Israeli left that, in the eyes of the Israeli public, held rigid and unacceptable positions regarding the Palestinian issue. Against the background of popular opposition to normalisation processes with Israel, Pundik and Kimche met with Sari Nusseibeh,5 al-Khuli and Shudrom to coordinate a joint statement. Al Khuli withdrew from the agreements and wanted to cancel his participation for unclear reasons. In the opinion of the representative of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Egyptian representative felt uneasy about the expression of normalisation with Israel against the background of public pressure from the Arab

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world (Brylle, 2018; Kimche, 1997a). Al-Khuli feared that he had been subject to surveillance by the Egyptian authorities and felt he had not received proper backing from the administration since he felt that he might have acted more boldly than he was allowed to do (Brylle, 2018). The Copenhagen Declaration issued in 1997 led to the establishment of the International Peace Alliance. Its purpose was to reach a permanent agreement between Israel and the Palestinians and to form teams from each side to implement the declaration. Their main objective was to mobilise public support for a process that would lead to the creation of a position paper to be delivered to the parties’ governments. The position paper would call on Copenhagen members to work to advance security arrangements and to cooperate in the fight against terrorism. In addition, the paper tried to persuade the parties to come to an agreement on core issues, borders, Jerusalem, settlements and the refugee issue. The International Peace Alliance tried to link the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians to the promotion of a regional peace process with Syria and Lebanon. In so doing, the Alliance hoped to harness the Arab world to full normalisation with Israel. Despite these optimistic and ambitious goals, or perhaps because of them, the Copenhagen Declaration continued to provoke sharp reactions in the Arab world. Normalisation between the Arab world and Israel was controversial. In Pundik’s opinion, the Copenhagen Declaration was revolutionary. The parties agreed on principles for a permanent resolution of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. More than that, Pundik thought its importance was evident in its informality which included courageous and open statements. In his opinion, Kimche, who was part of the Israeli security establishment, received broad support from the Foreign Ministry and the Israeli Intelligence Service which shared these views (Pundik, 2015). The participants on both sides were not ordinary peace activists but people with access to political leaders (Pundik, 2015). Indeed, the group members continued to be in contact with the political echelon: Kimche with the Israeli president, Shudrom with the Jordanian king, and al-Khuli with the Egyptian president and in parallel contacts with Arafat’s close advisors6 (RDL, 1997d). Arafat himself would not endorse a process in which he was not involved. In 1997, the Danish Foreign Ministry felt that the political process was far from the goals of the Oslo Accords. The Declaration of the Copenhagen group symbolised important progress in the peace process. The Danish Foreign Ministry hoped to use the Copenhagen Declaration to increase public support for the peace process and they intended to encourage peace organizations and the peace camp on both sides (Oldenburg, 2018). Through direct meetings of the Copenhagen group they would emphasise the need to strengthen public support for normalisation and for permanent status (RDL, 1997e). They would end the Oslo process by formulating a much more original and effective peace initiative. Since the chances for success of the mediation were limited, the Danish mediator sought to find a common denominator between the parties to help

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drive negotiations and to find creative solutions that were acceptable to both parties, or at least, narrowing the gaps between them. The mediator focused on finding launch points for a future agreement. The mediator understood that if the representatives of the Copenhagen group could present a longterm vision for a comprehensive settlement between Israel and its neighbors, this political achievement would increase Denmark’s political prestige. Alongside the talks of the Copenhagen group, the European Union was also trying to push forward normalisation with Israel and regional peace. European Union Special Envoy Miguel Moratinos met with members of the well-known Egyptian government newspaper al-Ahram in Cairo. He noted that Netanyahu had proved himself a pragmatic man and his actions indicated that he was changing Israel’s approach to negotiations with the Palestinians. Netanyahu had ordered the release of Palestinian prisoners and had issued work visas to more than 100,000 Palestinians (Sami, 1997). Nevertheless, the publication of contacts between the parties mediated by Denmark caused a stir in the Arab world. The Arab representatives were referred to as “Copenhagen Arabs” (Yaari, 1997). The pressure exerted against the Arab participants signaled that the Arab public was not interested in normalisation processes with Israel. As for the talks themselves, the Egyptian proposal to include Palestinian representatives in the Copenhagen group changed the nature of the dialogue as it held bold discussions about an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The Egyptians were calling for normalisation of relations with Israel and needed the Palestinian issue to be included in the talks in order to justify that initiative. These actions sought to create an affinity between the resolution of the Israeli -Palestinian conflict and the search for a comprehensive peace process in the region. As part of this activity, members of the Copenhagen group (Pundik, Kimche, Bassiouny, Shudrom, and al-Maliki) met at the American Colony Hotel to advance the Louisiana process. Also present were members of the Danish Foreign Ministry staff along with EU president Miguel Moratinos (RDL, 1997i). The representative of the Danish Foreign Ministry noted the steps that Denmark intended to take while Moratinos suggested that the group should cooperate with other civic organizations. This meeting led the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide extensive financial assistance in cooperation with the European Commission (Kimche, 1997b). Fundraising by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was essential for Denmark to maintain its status as mediator of the Copenhagen group as members were also funded by the European Union. The group set up four working groups focusing on the implementation of the Copenhagen Declaration, regional cooperation, settlements and violence (Kimche, 1997d).

5.3 The impact of the Copenhagen declaration Members of the Copenhagen group hoped that the public pressure in 1999 would contribute to continued pressure on the leadership in Israel and on

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the Palestinian Authority. In March 1997, Torben Brylle was entrusted with the Louisiana process by the Danish Foreign Ministry and he initiated a series of joint projects and peace initiatives. Through the activities of the Executive Oversight Committee of the Foreign MInistry, Denmark gained access to the actual discussions between Copenhagen group members and for the first time, gained vital information on the gaps between the parties as well as insight into each party’s attempts to advance its own substantive interests. The Danish Executive Committee members joined the Copenhagen group when they met in Cairo where the Egyptians announced that there was Egyptian opposition to the Copenhagen initiative. The authorities in Egypt wanted to continue to use the Arab boycott against Israel as leverage to advance the political process between Israel and the Palestinians. Nevertheless, al-Khuli was willing to hold a round of meetings with Israelis. Al-Khuli travelled to Israel and met with a group of academics, attended a conference of the Council for Peace and Security in Israel and had a joint meal with politicians, including Shimon Peres. The contents of all these meetings were submitted to the Danish Foreign Ministry (RDL, 1997g). Along with Denmark’s efforts to advance the group’s activities, the Danish Foreign Ministry sought the support of the heads of the Jewish community in the United States, in particular the support of Lester Pollack, who was chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. Wanting to help promote the initiative, Pundak and Kimche presented the main points of the initiative to the Knesset and emphasised that the Copenhagen group was a popular organization that promoted normalisation between the parties. In addition, Kimche tried to enlist the support of Bahraini Foreign Minister Sheikh Muhammad al-Khalifa. In their correspondence, Kimche explained to the Foreign Minister that the peace initiative in Copenhagen included agreements between the parties that could bridge significant gaps toward negotiations for a permanent settlement. Kimche noted that there was a peace camp in Israel that supported an agreement with the Palestinians and even opposed the Netanyahu government policy. Kimche told him that the Copenhagen group was promoting an informal political summit in Jerusalem and was holding a rally in support of the peace process. Kimche asked Bahrain to send an observer to the planned summit and mentioned that the Israeli side had full confidence in Arafat (Kimche, 1998a). Their correspondence revealed to Denmark that Kimche maintained contacts with senior Arab representatives and that the Copenhagen participants had the ability to promote contacts with countries in the region (Kimche, 1998b). Denmark was able to build a database of the group’s extended ties. Using the Copenhagen group, the Danes wanted to demonstrate to the European Union that even as a small country, they could be involved successfully in the Middle East. Denmark’s activities would be a sign of their ability to be engaged in the peace process that had been a focus of the EU for many decades.

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Along with Denmark’s efforts to advance the group’s activities and use diplomatic means to learn about the gaps between the parties on the way to normalisation, the Danish Foreign Ministry was forced to reject one of the group’s proposals. They had to explain that there were limitations to their authority to act in certain situations. The issue arose when the members of the Copenhagen group planned a broad rally in Jerusalem that was aimed at pressuring Netanyahu to advance the political process. The Egyptians wanted to promote people to people meetings along with a rally of solidarity with the Israeli peace camp. The Danes recommended that they convene a small group of representatives rather than demonstrations in the street. Al-Khuli argued that this was a gross interference in the parties’ decisions. He said only a major conference would create a worthy enough impression to gain the support of the Egyptian Foreign Minister (RDL, 1998a). Pundik understood al-Khuli’s motivation in calling for a peace rally in Jerusalem but he believed that such a framework would create “popular demonstrations” against the government in Jerusalem. Danish officials were aware that the peace rally held annually to mark Rabin’s assassination led to demonstrations against Netanyahu’s right-wing government policy. Denmark did not want to be portrayed as an interfering state in Israel’s internal affairs (RDL, 1998b). Pundik, who understood Denmark’s fear of being seen as a sponsor of street demonstrations against an incumbent government, explained to the group that the planned activity in Jerusalem would not include street demonstrations since the European Union and Denmark would not approve. Members of the Copenhagen group met with a representative of the Danish Foreign Ministry, Christian Oldenburg, in Cairo. In their meeting, al-Khuli explained to Oldenburg that the group’s goal was to bring the two sides together and prepare the ground for future political dialogue. He stressed that the representatives were not diplomatic envoys but representatives who founded a peace movement whose role was to soften the “hearts” of the public towards a final agreement in the Israeli-Arab conflict. Al-Khuli wanted to make it clear to the Foreign Ministry officials in Denmark that there was no intention to join the government or hold talks on its behalf but rather to promote the peace process in a popular way. The group wanted the financial support of the European Union and the Danish government, but without being subject to a veto of the decisions taken by the parties themselves (RDL, 1998c).7 Oldenburg was the head of the Middle East desk at the Danish Foreign Ministry and an experienced diplomat who spoke with the full authority of the Danish Foreign Office. He made it clear that the Danish Foreign Ministry intended to encourage peace efforts with the European Union and the United States in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions. Denmark would not encourage meetings under any circumstances that would lead to a direct confrontation with the Israeli government. He noted that the planned rally in Jerusalem was one of many that took place with the aim of pressuring the government to advance the process and that the

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international community understood that the public in Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority was interested in peace (RDL, 1998b). Oldenburg suggested future talks be held with the participation of the senior echelon from the Danish Foreign Ministry. He stressed that the involvement of the Danish Foreign Ministry would persuade the European Union to support further political contacts (RDL, 1998d). In other words, this group needed the Danes more than the Danes needed this group. If they wanted financial support, then the Copenhagen group would have to go through the Danes. At this point, the discussions came to a dead end and support for the rally in Jerusalem dissipated.

5.4 Wye River memorandum At the same time the Danes were pursuing their unofficial Louisiana peace initiative through the Copenhagen group, the United States opened an official channel of negotiation with Netanyahu’s government and the Palestinian Authority. The Americans wanted to preserve the peace process but knew that neither Netanyahu nor Arafat could implement the formula that had been signed in Oslo. According to one of Clinton’s top advisors, Clinton’s efforts to revive the political process did not correspond to the positions of the parties or to the reality on the ground (Miller, 2008: 276) and his administration’s efforts to advance the political peace process were in the twilight stages. As part of the revival efforts, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright traveled to the Middle East in early 1997 to convene a summit between Netanyahu and Arafat. Albright blamed Israel for political procrastination and believed that the process that began with the signing of the Oslo Accords had exhausted itself. She accused the Netanyahu government of failing to arrive at a political settlement because the prime minister held to a strict set of pre-conditions and thresholds for the continuation of the political process (Levin, 2005: 397). Albright’s criticism of Netanyahu seemed unjustified. Both the Rabin and Peres governments had set pre-conditions for the political process on the decisions and actions of the Palestinian Authority. The Netanyahu government emphasised and tightened those pre-conditions. Nevertheless, in order to meet the demands of the U.S. administration to promote further gestures, in March 1997 the government in Jerusalem proposed a re-deployment in accordance with the Interim Agreement under which Israel agreed to hand over an additional 9% of the West Bank to Palestinian Authority control (Levin, 2005: 403). At the beginning of 1998, the U.S. State Department issued a new proposal. Israel was asked to hand over an additional 13% of the West Bank to Arafat’s control in order to complete an Israeli withdrawal of 40% of the territories. After Netanyahu rejected the proposal unofficially, the U.S. secretary of state summoned the Israeli prime minister to a political meeting

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to discuss the scope of the withdrawal. Netanyahu refused the invitation and enlisted the help of the U.S. Congress to repel American demands. To do so, Netanyahu relied heavily on the U.S. State Department’s commitment in the Hebron Agreement to obtain Israeli consent to any American proposal so as not to force further withdrawals on Israel (Levin, 2005: 406–407). The Hebron Agreement included an additional condition that any withdrawal was to be made in accordance with Arafat’s commitment to eradicate terrorism and act against incitement and violence in the West Bank (Levin, 2005: 402). American pressure on Israel had significant effects on the continuing implementation efforts of the original Oslo agreement. President Clinton, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat held a summit in Wye River, Maryland, on October 15–23, 1998. In the Wye River Memorandum Israel agreed to hand over an additional 27% to the Palestinian Authority (13% from Area C to Areas A and B and 14% from Area B to Area A), but in a different, more gradual format than either the Interim Agreement or from the Hebron Agreement. The timing of any transfer of additional territories would be at the prime minister’s discretion and in accordance with the schedule he would set.8 Arafat pledged to prevent terrorism and violence against Israeli citizens, including settlers. He would stop incitement and the propaganda in the Palestinian educational institutions. The parties determined that the permanent talks would open on May 4, 1999 (Shoval, 2016: 362). A month after the Wye River Memorandum was signed the members of the Copenhagen group turned to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and asked for his support for the group’s activities. They criticised the lack of implementation of the Oslo Accords and the Hebron Agreement and questioned the goodwill of the parties to formulate common understandings (Kimche, undated a). Denmark’s relations with Israel and the Palestinians were based on the dialogue created in the Louisiana process which established the legitimacy of Denmark as peace mediators. Denmark deployed its sponsorship in favor of advancing the peace process and aided the normalisation activity between the parties. However, Denmark’s path to gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the parties was fraught with obstacles. At the height of the Louisiana process, Egypt believed that Denmark was promoting Israeli goals without extracting any real return from Israel. At a meeting of the group’s leaders in Cairo in December 1997,9 disagreements and gaps in the parties’ intentions were revealed. The Arab side revolted at the lack of effort on the part of Israeli members to expand public pressure in Israel to reconcile with the Palestinians (Pundik, 2015). At their meeting, al-Khuli attacked Denmark’s activities and criticised the inconsistencies in Danish policy. He clarified that the group’s goal was to put pressure on Israel in order to advance the peace process with the Palestinians. Normalisation with Israel would not take place as long as the peace process with the Palestinians did not bear fruit, by which he meant the strengthening of the peace camp that worked against

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Netanyahu. Al-Khuli explained that the Egyptians believed that Israel was using the Copenhagen group to spy on Egypt and claimed that the Danes “betrayed” Egypt and did not put enough pressure on Israel to advance the political process. In order to renew contacts between the parties, al-Khuli demanded that a delegation on behalf of the group update the Europeans and Americans who would constitute an ”international umbrella“ for advancing the process (Kimche, 1997c). Kimche understood the motivation for al-Khuli’s outburst and criticisms as arising from his precarious position in Egyptian public opinion. Al-Khuli was known to be an ardent supporter of Nasser (Ginat, 1997) and later one of the vocal opponents of the peace agreement with Israel. Suddenly, the Egyptian intellectual became the head of the Egyptian peace camp that promoted normalisation processes with Israel. For the personality who symbolised the resistance of the Egyptians to any peace with Israel, this seemed like an ideological contradiction and became a dilemma for him professionally. In response to such pressure, he hardened his approach to the group’s activities (Kimche, 1997d). In the eyes of Danish Foreign Ministry officials, al-Khuli was protecting his public image. They saw alKhuli’s accusation that the Danes were committing “treason” as a way for him to appear as if he were coordinating with the Cairo government and serving the regime’s purpose (Brylle, 2018). In truth, Lutfi al-Khuli’s role was convenient for the Egyptian authorities who used it for their purposes. Cairo could say that al-Khuli was acting on his own. As part of dismissing al-Khuli’s allegations, Kimche explained that there were about 20 peace movements in Israel while Denmark promoted the only peace movement in Egypt. Kimche clarified that in order to strengthen the Palestinians, Jordan and Egypt should continue to support the talks and not stop just because of a potential failure to advance the policy decisions of the Oslo Accords (Kimche, 1997c). Kimche believed that if future contacts with the Syrians and Lebanese should fail, reconciliation with other moderate Arab states would increase public support for a compromise with the Palestinians. On the eve of Netanyahu’s departure for a state visit to London in April 1998, Kimche urged the prime minister to advance the political process and called on him to formulate a political initiative that would lead to a redeployment of Israel in the West Bank. Kimche believed that the most convincing diplomatic moves were effective only if they were based on real power (Kimche, 1992: 42). Coming from Israel, Kimche adopted a position different from his fellow Copenhagen group members who were careful to please their own governments. Kimche protested against the Israeli government while expressed his feelings against Netanyahu’s policy openly (Hermann, 2009: 154). Despite Kimche’s active promotion of the Copenhagen initiative, his relations with his Egyptian counterpart deteriorated. Al-Khuli published a statement against Kimche in the Egyptian media and in response, Kimche threatened to stop his participation in the Copenhagen group. Kimche

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emphasised that precisely in the days when he demonstrated in public in front of the prime minister’s house in Jerusalem and fought in the High Court to allow members of the Peace Group to demonstrate, he felt betrayed by the Egyptian’s lack of support. He believed that al-Khuli’s accusations in Alexandria required a complete rethinking of the efficacy of the unofficial channel. Kimche believed that one of the reasons al-Khuli had taken a firm line stemmed from the Egyptian authorities’ suspicion that Denmark was serving American interests and indirectly those of Israel (Brylle, 2018; RDL, 1997a).10

5.5 Preparing for the Cairo conference Members of the Copenhagen group hoped that the public pressure in 1999 would contribute to continued pressure on the leadership in Israel and on the Palestinian Authority. The group wanted the leaders to make a political decision to fulfill the peace process based on the Copenhagen Declaration (Pundik, 2015). Denmark continued to promote the group’s activities and agreed to fund another conference under its auspices with the participation of international leaders. Denmark wanted to demonstrate that it was able to promote an alternative political channel to address the impasse between Netanyahu and Arafat. These actions strengthened the image of Denmark and were intended to signal that the Copenhagen group’s activities informed Denmark’s extensive understanding of the nature of the conflict. Denmark deepened its knowledge of the parties through the Copenhagen group meetings and felt that international conferences were unnecessary. This analysis fueled its willingness to fund the unofficial meetings between the parties and to help them promote a dialogue whose details were communicated to Danish representatives. The Danish Ambassador stated that the second conference of the Copenhagen group, named the Cairo Conference, would be the last such alternative, international conference that Denmark would sponsor. He added that Denmark would continue to support joint civilian projects as well as meetings with the Copenhagen group. He warned of a sense of discontent within the peace process and clarified that the results of the Israeli elections in 1999 opened an important window of opportunity (Kimche, 1999b). As part of the Louisiana process, the group members tried to mobilise international support and to make the Danish Foreign Office more active on their behalf. The Danes requested the addition of another member to the Monitoring Committee’s sub-committee on violence. The Danish Development Agency prepared a report for the Danish Foreign Ministry, recommending that Danish agencies and various NGOs assist in joint civilian projects. The Danes were working to ensure their future involvement in the region (RDL, 1997h). Both the information gathering actions and the decision to be more actively involved in the economic development of the area were vital in strengthening

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Denmark’s attempts to forge a successful political channel as well as to anchor their position in the process. Denmark supported the group members’ decision to hold a conference in Cairo in the presence of high-ranking Egyptian officials from all sides. Ambassadors from the United States, the European Union and Russia were invited also. Two months before the conference in Cairo, members of the Copenhagen group met in Amman. They were joined by Shimon Shamir, former Israeli Ambassador to Egypt. During the talks, the Israeli delegation noted that any future conferences after Cairo would have to take place in Israel. If Barak were elected, the conference could include more concrete decisions. If Netanyahu were to win, the Copenhagen group would hold an international conference with a broader message (Kimche, 1999b). The Palestinian delegation led by al-Maliki believed that even if Barak were elected prime minister, the Copenhagen group should create political pressure on him during the formation of the government. The Jordanians added that a conference with representatives from all countries should be held after the Israeli elections and suggested sending 50 Jordanian representatives to such an international conference. Copenhagen members considered preparing a position paper for the Americans in exchange for official support for the Copenhagen initiative (Kimche, 1999b). The nature of the conference scheduled to take place in Cairo would be influenced in accordance with the election results in Israel. As long as Netanyahu was in power, the Egyptians saw Kimche and Pundik as a means for bypassing Netanyahu and influencing the peace camp in Israel. Through the peace movement, they tried to elevate the image of Egypt and the Palestinians in the eyes of the Israeli public (Brylle, 2018). However, with Barak’s election, Egypt’s approach changed. Despite Kimche and Pundik’s meeting with Amr Moussa who agreed to speak at the conference and Peres and Arafat’s agreeing to take part in it, the Egyptians no longer felt that a political maneuver around Netanyahu was needed (Pundik, 2007; Pundik, 2015).11 Pundik commented that after the election and Barak’s rise to power, everything turned upside down. Moussa changed his mind and announced that there was no need for the Louisiana process and withdrew his participation from the conference. Following this, the PA chairman also announced that he would not come to Cairo. In response, the Copenhagen team tried to persuade Faisal Husseini to participate in the Cairo conference (Pundik, 2015).12 After Barak’s victory, Egypt signaled to the newly formed government in Israel that Israel must respect Egypt’s status and preserve Egyptian involvement in the political process with the Palestinians. The Egyptians thought they could continue to work through peace organizations and unofficial bodies that had been used to bypass Netanyahu’s policy (Granot, 1999: 22). Kimche believed that the Egyptian Foreign Minister saw the Copenhagen group as an effective tool during the Netanyahu government but that the Copenhagen group and the Egyptian peace movement had exhausted their purpose. Kimche observed that the Egyptian peace

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movement did not receive the same institutional support after the Israeli elections (Kimche, 1999c). With Barak, the Egyptians would have a direct line of contact with the Israeli leadership. After the Israeli elections the influence of the Louisiana process faded as the need to create public pressure and support for the political process diminished. The Danes wanted to find ways to keep the Copenhagen group together and wanted the group to continue to persuade the political echelon to advance their agenda so that Denmark could continue to be involved in the peace process. The members of the Copenhagen group made a public statement after the Israeli elections in 1999. The group declared that the expansion of settlements should be halted; that there should be respect and implementation of the original Oslo Accords; there should be a release of Palestinian detainees; there should be a cessation of terrorist acts by the Palestinians and that the security coordination between the parties should continue. In addition, the group advocated reaching a solution on the issue of Jerusalem that would recognise the demands of both parties for the city and take into account its importance to three religions.13 The group wanted to reduce what they considered the unilateral actions taken by the Israeli government in Jerusalem. In addition, the statement said that action should be taken to establish a dialogue channel with Syria and with Lebanon aimed at a full peace agreement between countries. This should be implemented by support for dialogue between people; economic cooperation and trade; and ending hostilities between the parties while reducing the arms race (Kimche, undated b). The statement referred mainly to Israel and named a variety of demands that the Israelis should meet. The language of the statement revealed that the Arab side was able to express its interests while ignoring both Israel’s claim to the security guarantees and the lack of implementation of agreements by the Palestinians. This change in content and tenor of the Copenhagen group’s statement was discovered only in the run-up to the Cairo conference and surprised the Israeli representatives. The group demanded that the Israeli representatives blame Netanyahu for the failure of the peace process. A compromise formula was passed from Shimon Shamir to Abdel Moneim Said Aly who opposed softening the statement. Members of the Egyptian peace movement refused to omit the word “occupation” from the declaration which Shamir said distanced the Israeli public from supporting the group’s activities. Said Aly explained to Shamir that the Egyptians saw the conduct of the Israeli government as a disgrace. In their eyes, the former policies of Netanyahu’s government put the whole peace process at risk. The Israeli representatives felt compelled to accept the joint statement and submit to the Egyptian hosts’ demands (Kimche, undated c). Since the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem had time to study the contents of the statement a few days before the event opened, they considered boycotting the event. In the end, Shimon Peres’ chose to attend the conference and a low-ranking representative was sent (Barel, 1999: 7a).

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Denmark’s main contribution to the group was in facilitating the Cairo Conference and in supporting it financially. In addition, Denmark worked to overcome obstacles and misinterpretations on each side and to create a common consensus from which the parties could move forward (Brylle, 2018). Denmark wanted to bring the parties together at the Cairo Conference to announce a mutually approved political initiative and have it received by the international community with appreciation. In this way, Denmark would strengthen its status as a successful peace maker and elevate Denmark’s prestige in international diplomatic circles.

5.6 The Cairo conference and the Louisiana process The Copenhagen group opened its second two-day conference on July 5, 1999, in Cairo under the slogan “Save the Peace”. Publically, the Egyptian peace movement organised the conference under the auspices of Denmark and the European Union. The conference participants included the four representatives of the Copenhagen group and other senior officials from Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt and Jordan.14 The leaders of the conference called on the parties to make difficult compromises and decisions based on the Copenhagen Declaration of 1997. According to Kimche, the group’s goal at the conference was to promote an atmosphere of peace among the participants that was aimed at strengthening Israeli public support in favor of further withdrawals. Similar to the first conference, the second conference agenda reflected an Arab peace equation. This outline included the removal of the Arab boycott and normalisation processes in exchange for a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and its neighbors that would accompany territorial concessions by Israel (Pundik, 2015). The anticipated victory of Ehud Barak in the upcoming Israeli elections on July 6, 1999, influenced the conference greatly. There was renewed hope that Barak would accelerate talks with Arafat in order to reach a permanent agreement between Israel and the Palestinians and that Israel would advance talks with Lebanon and Syria in exchange for normalisation with the Arab world. According to the format of the conference, Denmark encouraged the parties to advance the political outline and to promote broad public support for the peace process. Most of the speeches were intended to convince the general public that a political agreement was possible and within reach. There was a general expectation that the mandate the public would give to Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s government meant that Israel would promote the Louisiana peace negotiations. In the opening speeches, the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Daniel Kurtzer noted that this was a notable period that had reached an historic crossroads because conditions had been created for a breakthrough for peace. Kurtzer conveyed the blessing of the U.S. administration, adding that the conference proved that peace had been endorsed not only between states, but also by

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peace activists and unofficial organizations. The Russians believed that the results of the Israeli elections would indicate that the public had entrusted the Barak government with a mandate to achieve peace. The Russians believed that there was a common interest among all the powers to reach peace on the basis of UN resolutions 242 and 338 (Kimche, 1999c). Shimon Peres presented his vision for the continuation of the peace process. Although his position in the Israeli Labor Party weakened after Barak‘s election as prime minister, Peres remained a vital figure in the international arena and among the leaders of the Oslo process. Peres noted that the Israeli elections confirmed that there was a desire for peace. As a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, he stated that a real and irreversible change had taken place between the most bitter of enemies in the Middle East. There was no going back. Peres favored a quick permanent agreement and took advantage of the conference to attack Netanyahu’s policy. He criticised Netanyahu for blaming the Rabin government for being too rushed in its pursuit of peace. Peres thought that even though Netanyahu had more time and had received more credit for advancing peace than the Rabin/Peres government had received, Netanyahu still did not achieve peace (Kimche, 1999c). Peres expressed hope for advancing a permanent settlement. For the Palestinian representative Riyad al-Maliki, the way to achieve peace was by convincing the Israeli public of the justice of a permanent peace. He was in favor of developing channels of communication with the decision makers. He said that only a comprehensive peace would lead to normalisation, normalisation would not lead to peace in the region. Maliki demanded the implementation of the Wye River agreement, explaining that Barak would be examined according to his forthcoming steps and that the whole of East Jerusalem should be under Palestinian sovereignty. He complained that Israel did not negotiate honestly with the PLO and that Israel ignored the rights of the Palestinians. He pointed out that Israel had started out with rigid positions and over time had relinquished some of them. He believed that Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem would be decided in a similar way (Kimche, 1999c). Israeli representative David Kimche accused Hamas of undermining the Rabin-Peres government and thereby contributing to Netanyahu coming to power. Kimche explained that Barak was sincere in the pursuit of peace and that Egypt would play a vital role in any future settlement between the parties. He added that Egypt could contribute significantly to the normalisation processes through political dialogue. Kimche believed that the issue of East Jerusalem would be decided in any future negotiations but refrained from answering in what way Israel would allow the Palestinians to recognise any part of Jerusalem as their capital (Kimche, 1999c). Salah Bassiouny, chairman of the Cairo Peace Association after alKhuli’s death in May 1999, and Abd al-Mun’im Sa’id, vice president of Egypt’s state newspaper Al-Ahram, expressed hope that the formation of a new government in Israel would accelerate the advancement of the political

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process. They noted that Israel’s step-by-step approach to the peace process had failed because opponents of the agreement had time to sabotage the process (Kimche, 1999b). Jordan’s representative General Shudrom noted that Jordan was mindful of Israel’s security concerns. He emphasised that Jordan was affected by the peace process. In the eyes of the Jordanians, the Cairo Conference was an unofficial gathering but they hoped that the group’s activities would contribute to the implementation of the Oslo agreements and the advancement of the peace process (Kimche, 1999c). Denmark stated bluntly that without peace, there would be war. The Danish mediators wanted to promote the reconciliation of Arab representatives with Israeli representatives so that the public in Israel and in Arab countries would encourage the activities of Copenhagen group members. Thus, the opening statements by the participating delegations were optimistic, idealistic and forward looking, if sometimes critical of one another. They were meant for public consumption.

5.7 The peace camps During the Cairo Conference, a major goal of the members of the Israeli peace organizations was to meet with their Egyptian counterparts. Peace Now held informal meetings with members of the Egyptian peace movement and a transcript of those meetings was given to the Copenhagen group. The goal of the meetings was to understand the pulse of the Egyptian street and to assess how willing Egypt was to mobilise for the peace process. The discussions were eye-opening for the Israeli participants (Kimche, 1999a).15 At their meeting, Egyptian representatives revealed that the Palestinian issue was not at the center of public attention and that there was an expectation that Israel would withdraw from the West Bank and allow the establishment of a Palestinian state. They clarified that Israel’s neighbors were not interested in real peace. Normalisation threatened their regimes and they were only acting due to economic and international pressure. They mentioned the Rabin government’s proposals to return the Golan Heights to Syria that Syria rejected. Syria went on to cooperate with Hamas and Hezbollah in order to overthrow Israel’s peace government and reported that King Hussein of Jordan preferred a Netanyahu victory (Kimche, 1999a). Some Egyptian representatives believed that the Palestinians should accept what Israel offered them and end the conflict. Cynically, the Arab regimes had exploited Palestinian suffering. Referring to the Egyptian peace movement, participants explained that the movement was controlled by Egyptian government officials and they expressed concern that the movement was going through a leadership crisis due to the death of al-Khuli. Parallel to the Cairo Conference, there was an opposition conference being held nearby that was against normalisation with Israel.16

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The Egyptian representatives revealed to Peace Now that Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa supported the opposition conference because it weakened the Egyptian peace movement and the normalisation processes led by Salah Bassiouny, who was a political rival of Moussa (Kimche, 1999a). The “Save the Peace Conference” concluded with a reaffirmation of the Copenhagen Declaration. Following the close of the Cairo Conference, Denmark continued to promote normalisation activities. These activities operated parallel to Barak’s negotiations that were leading to the Camp David Summit in June 2001.

5.8 The collapse of Louisiana process In the days following the collapse of the Camp David Summit, And Barak’s defeat at the hands of Ariel Sharon, Denmark operated through the Copenhagen group even in the face of the outbreak of the Second Intifada. Pundik’s unofficial efforts continued despite the escalation as he believed it was possible to get out of the political tangle and encourage informal contacts. Pundik believed that the lack of trust between the parties and the outbreak of the Second Intifada jeopardised the continuation of the peace process. Only Louisiana-style meetings would advance the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians and the peace camp on all sides. At the time, Danish Foreign Minister Mogens Lykketoft,17 on behalf of the Danish Labor Party, noted that the Danish government was concerned about the violence in the Middle East. Because the riots led to a freeze on talks in the Louisiana process, the Danish Foreign Minister accepted Pundik’s proposal to resume the informal talks through representatives residing in Denmark (RDL, 2001b). The Danish Foreign Ministry sent messages through Pundik to the parties’ representatives informally. Thus, the Danish government agreed to preserve its involvement and to help convey messages between the parties. This proposal won the support of the Danish Foreign Minister (RDL, 2001c) as it was in line with the intention of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by Lykketoft, to promote a political initiative during the months of escalation. However, Pundik had additional motivations. Continuing to work through the Copenhagen group was a way also of trying to pressure the right-wing government in Jerusalem. He wanted to keep political pressure on Israel.

5.9 The outbreak of the Intifada and the collapse of the peace camp The activities of the Copenhagen group continued after the rise of the Barak government, but the failure of the Camp David negotiations collapsed the unofficial activities of organizations such as the Copenhagen group. Although in June 2000 Pundik and Salah Bassiouny agreed to change the wording of the Copenhagen Declaration published in 1997 to suit events that occurred that

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year, the Danish initiative gradually waned (RDL, 2000a). Pundik worked unsuccessfully to arouse public opinion in Denmark. In an open article in the Politiken newspaper the veteran editor explained that Denmark focused on the Norwegian involvement and Sweden’s involvement in the Middle East peace process in order to contribute as well without harming Denmark’s interests or its international status (RDL, 2000b). The members of the Copenhagen group tried to find a creative solution to promoting another meeting in Denmark. The Jordanian Foreign Minister suggested sending senior Jordanian representatives to Copenhagen to bolster the Louisiana process. The Egyptian peace association chairman criticised the Copenhagen initiative. He explained that the peace plan should be sponsored by the Israeli prime minister and should be more an official initiative that an unofficial one. He added that without changing the course of the violence or without more direct Israeli policy adjustments, no normalisation processes would take place with Israel (Pundik, 2015). The Copenhagen group was formed with certain expectations of the Israeli public and the international community based on the Interim Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. But as the peace process faded, a huge number of civic organizations faded also. The emergence of an antinormalisation front weakened the traditional peace organizations further. This new front included a wide range of agendas seeking to present a new political platform, the extreme form of which was a refusal of any dialogue with Israel. This model was completely different from the model of traditional Western peace organizations (Aggestam, Cristiano and Strömbom, 2015). This situation was further exacerbated by widespread political indifference and fatigue of the Israeli and Palestinian public as Palestinian refusal organizations against the normalisation process steadily grew and used international public opinion to weaken Israel’s position. This process intensified with the outbreak of the riots and began to challenge Israel’s legitimacy as a state (Aggestam and Strömbom, 2013). At this time, Pundik gave a detailed explanation to the Foreign Ministry in Copenhagen about the failure of the contacts. He explained that most of Israel’s peace camp had gone into a kind of “coma”. According to this assessment, the peace camp in Israel had progressed too fast in the eyes of the Israeli public and too slowly for the Palestinians. According to Pundik, the Second Intifada had been a major blow to the peace camp in Israel. The peace camp was not in a position to persuade the Israeli public to advance the process, when the majority of Israelis were against concessions. Furthermore, Ariel Sharon’s ascent to the Temple Mount as part of his election campaign for prime minister was a trap into which Ehud Barak fell (RDL, 2000c). Consequently, in the days after Camp David, the peace process collapsed as Palestinian demands continued to rise and Israel’s willingness to hand over more land declined. Pundik noted that his son Ron Pundak had clarified that the basis for the understandings of the Beilin-Abu Mazen document and the

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understandings from Camp David were no longer relevant. The distance between the parties had only increased (RDL, 2000d). In reality, obstacles to the peace process were evident even before Ariel Sharon came to power in 2001. Pundik had tried to revive the Danish initiative through Ziad Abu Zayyad, the minister of Jerusalem Affairs in the Palestinian Authority. At a meeting held at the King Frederick Hotel in Denmark, Pundik asked Zayyad to inform Arafat that the Danish government would assess whether the Louisiana process would continue to advance civilian projects. Pundik added that the Copenhagen group was interested in holding another meeting in Denmark to discuss means to renew the political process (RDL, 2000e). This attempt failed as Zayyad replied that the Intifada and the month of Ramadan would make it difficult for him to persuade Arafat to support the initiative (RDL, 2001a). Denmark tried to re-establish contacts between the parties not only through informal political channels, but also through the provision of economic incentives that reinforced the influence of the Danish Foreign Ministry. At this stage, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs examined additional areas of action and intensified their involvement through the appointment of a special adviser on behalf of the Danish Aid Agency. Professor Søren Villadsen led a joint project in Jerusalem with the support of Egypt and Jordan. In order to preserve policy talks, the Danish Foreign Ministry initiated additional civilian projects. Prominent among them were the exchange of delegations of mayors from Denmark with mayors from the West Bank, the establishment of a television channel to encourage the political process, assistance in translating Arab and Hebrew books, the creation of an online forum to promote the Louisiana process and modernisation processes in Palestinian cities. In another attempt to revive the Copenhagen group meetings, Pundik tried to persuade Riyad al-Maliki to elect Palestinian representatives to meet with Israeli representatives in Denmark during 2001. Al-Maliki waited for Faisal Husseini’s response and for the response of the Jordanian and Egyptian representatives (RDL, 2001e). Despite Pundik’s attempt to resume meetings of the Copenhagen group (RDL, 2001d), the Foreign Ministers of the Arab countries met in Cairo and decided to freeze relations with Israel. At this point, the Egyptian government expected Sharon to win the election campaign and therefore did not cooperate with the group’s initiatives so as not to defy Sharon. In response, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to initiate an informal meeting in Italy. Since the Arab Foreign Ministers’ decision forced the nations’ representatives to freeze talks with Israel, an informal meeting of unofficial representatives allowed Arab representatives to meet in the Italian capital (RDL, 2001f; RDL, 2001g). The meeting was held in May 2001 at the Danish Embassy in Rome. It allowed Denmark to renew contacts between the parties18 and to assert Denmark’s continued involvement in the Louisiana process.

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5.10 Rome 2001: Renewal of the Copenhagen initiative In the first meeting between the group members after the outbreak of the Intifada, the parties tried to moderate the escalation in the territories. However, the attacks that took place weakened the peace movement in Israel. Although the Israelis did not agree with any government policy, 62 percent of the public thought that Sharon had succeeded at his task. The members of the Copenhagen group proposed initiating an international conference with the participation of Arafat, Sharon and other leaders. Alternatively, there could be a meeting between the governments or NGOs or both together (RDL, 2001h). Kimche was invited to this meeting and some of the members were suspicious of him after he spoke positively about Sharon. At the meeting, alMaliki blamed Israel for the outbreak of violence and asserted that the Palestinians only responded to provocations by Israel that were aimed at causing economic damage and undermining Arafat’s status as a partner in the process. The Jordanian representative declared that history showed that the use of violence lead to a dead end. Therefore it was important for the group to keep talking with one another even while he blamed the Israeli side for not fulfilling its obligations. Shudrom agreed that the group should continue its activities but with the participation of NGOs, media people and senior officials from all countries. The Egyptians and Jordanians feared a joint statement due to the reaction of the Arab public. The Palestinians wanted a joint and binding statement. In the end, the group members agreed on three main goals: 1) to initiate a six-month plan to stop the violence; 2) to set up a website and 3) to work on an acceptable formula (RDL, 2001h). The continued attempts to resume political contacts between the parties showed that the Danish initiative stemmed from a sincere desire to revive the negotiations. Denmark wanted to hold talks without blame or accusation and encouraged the parties to work together. At this time, Denmark was also mindful of the run-up to its presidency of the Council of Ministers in the European Union that was to begin in July 2002. Their aspiration to “sit around the table with the great powers and actors” and to be seen as contributing to the stabilisation in the Middle East was also a strong motivating force. Even though the Copenhagen group failed to restore trust between the parties and failed to promote contacts or rallies for a political process, the group wanted to preserve a vital communication channel that Denmark agreed to fund. This was at a time when the political situation had deteriorated into a series of terrorist attacks in Israel, leading to targeted assassinations against the heads of terrorist activity and the imposition of closures in the West Bank. Following the outbreak of the Intifada, the Danish Foreign Minister pledged to transfer funds from Denmark to the Palestinian Authority. The Danish government announced that it would organise an international conference to continue the international community’s contributions to the Palestinians (RDL, 2002a). This move proved

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once again that economic incentives were granted to the Palestinians not only as a gesture of goodwill but also in exchange for the preservation of political involvement in the Louisiana process. That is, the Foreign Minister considered conducting a political process as part of his state’s preparatory tenure in the European Union. These decisions demonstrated a desire to regain the trust of the parties and especially the Palestinian side.

5.11 U.S. Government policy and the missions of Mitchell, Tenet and Zinni to the region At the height of the Second Intifada, a random chain of events affected American mediation and ultimately the Danes as well. Against the backdrop of failed attempts to renew the dying political peace process, a Republican, George W. Bush, was sworn in as the 43rd president of the United States in January 2001. He appointed a number of conservative advisers to key positions in his administration and was hesitant to mediate in the Middle East in the early days of his presidency. He believed that Israel and the Palestinians were not ready to agree on a solution to the conflict and that there was no point in continuing the American mediation process in the Middle East. Ariel Sharon’s firm belief that there would not be a complete cessation of Palestinian violence led the U.S. administration to declare that any future negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians should be conducted directly between the parties and that the United States would reduce its involvement in the negotiations (Elgindy, 2012).19 The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in the United States completely changed American foreign policy. With the rise of radical Islam came a fear of terrorist networks and the leakage of weapons of mass destruction (Fukuyama, 2006: 67). In the wake of the attacks, the U.S. administration along with other world leaders (not necessarily Western ones) redefined the security situation as a “war on terror”. With this declaration, countries changed their courses of action. The coalition formed by the United States against al-Qaeda expanded to the war with Iraq in 2003, which gained legitimacy as part of the war on terror. At the time, Israeli Prime MInister Ariel Sharon told U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell that Arafat was Israel’s bin Laden (Whitaker, 2001).20 This was an attempt by Sharon to link the war on terror with the Intifada and suicide bombings. The war on terror included deep involvement in Middle East peace initiatives. American mediation efforts resumed in mid-2001. Senator George Mitchell issued a report stating that the Palestinians did not intentionally launch a round of violence that year. Rather the Intifada was a matter of riots going out of control. Mitchell’s recommendations were based on a Jordanian-Egyptian plan that called for a ceasefire and the construction of confidence-building measures under joint supervision. Israel rejected the Mitchell plan recommendations. Shimon Peres opposed any future plan that included a construction freeze in exchange for the

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cessation of Palestinian terrorism. Peres believed that although Rabin’s vision included stopping the construction of new settlements, it did not include freezing the expansion of existing settlements (Aluf, 2001). While the escalation continued, Colin Powell’s State Department condemned Israel’s military responses and Powell offered to mediate negotiations (Thomas, 2007: 185). President Bush was quick to adopt the U.S. secretary of state’s recommendation. Bush thought that based on previous experience, the United States could not force an agreement on the parties. Trying to do so only harmed American interests (Rynhold, 2009b: 141; Rynhold, 2009a). Nevertheless, disagreements between the United States and Israel did not overshadow the cooperation between Israel and the United States. In March 2001, the United States vetoed a decision by the UN Security Council to send an investigative delegation to the region. Even before Mitchell published the official report in May 2001, the Palestinians had prepared their own proposal for international oversight which included the participation of representatives from the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, Russia, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Norway to establish an international mechanism for implementing Mitchell’s plan (Chopra, 2003). As time went on, international envoys led a coordinated campaign of official and unofficial efforts to persuade the United States to end its exclusive mediation in the region. In an attempt to take advantage of the chaos, Russian diplomats held informal meetings and consultations with their American counterparts on a regular basis through the Russian Ambassador to Israel. In the end, all these groups realised that their efforts in the Middle East would not succeed without U.S. involvement (Elgindy, 2012: 5). In the wake of attempts to weaken American mediation, the United States sent its head of the Central Intelligence Agency, George Tenet, to the Middle East in June 2001. During meetings with regional leaders, a Tenet plan was drawn up that included a detailed proposal to end the violence and resume negotiations. Tenet included a week of cessation of violence before the start of negotiations. These efforts collapsed within a few weeks. According to Tenet, the failure was due to the inability of the parties to talk and reach a common understanding (Tenet, 2007: 81). Anthony Zinni was in charge of the Central Command of the Middle East in the U.S. Army and was named Special Envoy to the Middle East. He believed that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict required special attention due to the situation in Iraq. During his first visit to the area, there were terrorist attacks in Jerusalem and Haifa (Zinni, 2007: 187) that hampered the dialogue efforts once again. Later on, during Zinni’s third visit to the region in January 2002, an arms shipment named “Karin A” was intercepted carrying illegal weapons to the Palestinians. Arafat denied any connection to the shipment. Both the United States and Israel blamed the Palestinian leadership for financing terrorism. The failure of Zinni’s mission led the U.S. administration to reconsider its steps. In a speech on April 4, 2002, President

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Bush declared that his country was committed to bringing an end to the conflict. Bush demanded that the Israeli prime minister withdraw “without delay” from a number of Palestinian cities. A few months later, however, Bush agreed that Palestinian violence must first be stopped. The unexpected chain of events, the failures in mediation and the contradictory decisions being made in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict influenced Powell’s proposal to hold a peace conference (Hirsh, 2002: 23). All of these factors created maneuvering space for Denmark to raise its own proposal for a renewed political outline between the parties. Ascending to the presidency of the Council of Ministers in the European Union in the summer of 2002 would give Denmark a larger, more authoritative political platform from which to launch its own plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although Denmark worked to promote normalisation between the parties as part of the Louisiana process from the mid-1990s until the outbreak of the Intifada, its tenure as Council of Ministers in July 2002 would become one of Denmark’s main platforms for launching the political initiative. While senior Bush administration officials stressed that the IsraeliPalestinian conflict was linked to the Iraqi issue and that the Americans wanted to act against the Iraqi leader (Ross, 2015: 320; Abrams, 2013: 34–35). It became window of opportunity for Denmark to advance their initiative. However, the Prime Minister of Denmark did not consider Israel and negotiations with the Palestinians to be an urgent issue. Evidence of this lies in the speech of Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who did not mention the Middle East as part of Denmark’s goals for the presidency of the Council of Ministers in the European Union (Statsministeriet, 2002a). Only after European countries changed their foreign policy agendas did Denmark also gradually change its order of priorities.

5.12 Møller’s Shuttle Diplomacy Per Stig Møller was appointed Danish Foreign Minister in November 2001 and brought fresh thinking to his position, especially concerning the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Members of the Labor Party in Denmark had met with PLO members as early as the 1980s and believed that they were advancing peace. But Møller was skeptical about an approach based on appeasement and economic incentives. He wanted to ensure that Palestinian statements were based on actions and not just slogans of “striving for peace” and “true peace” (Møller, 2018). Møller believed that the Palestinians’ claims of historical injustice against them did not served the objectives of the negotiations. He believed that a just peace in the Middle East was not attainable because in the eyes of the Arabs, the Jews took over their lands, while the historical injustice done to Jews who had been expelled from their land 2,000 years earlier had been redressed by establishing the State of Israel. He wanted to reconcile these two opposing views to allow for an historic correction, but not necessarily a “just peace” (Møller, 2018).21

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In January 2002, Denmark’s mediation efforts in the Middle East resumed when senior members of the entire political spectrum in Denmark, including two former Foreign Ministers (Lykketoft and Petersen), submitted a proposal to the Danish parliament to support the Mitchell Committee’s recommendations and the UN Security Council resolution on Israel. The initiators of the proposal called on the Danish government, made up of right-wing and conservative parties, to work with the European Union to reach a joint decision on the continuation of the peace process. The elements of the process would include calling on the Palestinians to act against terrorism and to have the IDF withdraw from all areas. In addition, they wanted to stop the destruction of Palestinian infrastructure, to halt the closures on Palestinian areas and to freeze construction in the settlements. Finally, senior politicians called for third-party oversight with the consent of the parties in order to stop the escalation (RDL, 2002b). This call came from a wide range of parties and affected the parliamentary agenda. Denmark’s Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller replied that the conditions were not ripe for a solution at this stage. He noted that the Mitchell and Tenet plans had tried to find a solution to the impasse, but a lack of trust between the parties hampered efforts to advance the plans. Møller clarified that the Americans had solid intelligence about Arafat’s involvement in arms shipments and that exposing his involvement had hampered attempts to promote Palestinian autonomy. The Danish Foreign Minister stressed that the Danish government would act only in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions and that the implementation of the ceasefire proposed by Mitchell required an observer force that could act only if Israel agreed (RDL, 2002a). He said he would work in the European Union to advance the political process based on the guidelines of the European Union.22 Even though the Danish Foreign Ministry’s hopes had been pinned on the Louisiana process, that process continued to be only an unofficial framework and failed to lead to a breakthrough. Therefore, most of Denmark’s resources were diverted in 2002 to its role in the European Union and creating a common agenda with the European Union. From the beginning of his tenure as Danish Foreign Minister, Møller was careful not to criticise Israel unilaterally. In December 2001, a month after his appointment as Danish Foreign Minister, Møller ordered the Danish Ambassador to the United Nations to vote against a UN resolution criticising Israel, contrary to Denmark’s previous policy. According to Møller, Jerusalem noticed a change in the Danish voting pattern at the United Nations. He thought that this gesture strengthened Israeli trust in Denmark and laid the groundwork for presenting a political initiative on Denmark’s behalf (Møller, 2017: 267). Møller’s approach was a sharp change from the approach of previous Foreign Minister Mogens Lykketoft, who did not win Israel’s trust. A senior official in the Foreign Ministry, Lars Fauborg Andersen, downplayed the impact of Møller’s decision and thought that a

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change in the voting pattern did not make a real change in Israeli suspicion of a small country like Denmark that was to become Council of Ministers (Andersen, 2015). Israel thought that Denmark would represent European policies rather than their own. By 2002, the Oslo peace process was in a deep coma. Møller worked together with officials in the Foreign Office to develop a bold new political outline for peace in the Middle East that would be the first time that Denmark would lead an official political initiative for the region. The plan embodied a strategic format that was to be implemented in three main stages. In the first stage, the Palestinians had to stop the violence and the Palestinian leadership was obliged to continue with political reforms and democratisation processes (Andersen, 2015). At the same time, the plan stipulated that Israel would redeploy its forces to positions prior to the outbreak of the Intifada on September 28, 2000. The Israeli government would remove outposts established during the Intifada and freeze the construction of new settlements and the expansion of existing settlements. The second phase of the plan was to be implemented between June 2003 and December 2003 following the Palestinian Authority elections. It was expected to end with the possible establishment of a Palestinian state within temporary borders. This aspect of the plan would be the first time that the Americans would acknowledge the possibility of a future Palestinian state. The third and final phase of the plan was expected to continue throughout 2004 and 2005. The parties would negotiate on the core issues of Jerusalem, refugees, settlements and permanent borders. Before being published officially, the Danish outline that was later to be called the Road map to Peace23 would undergo several incarnations due to various amendments to the plan outline and being finalised only by the Americans. During the formation of the outline for the Roadmap, Andersen came up with the idea of Denmark including economic incentives through foreign investment in exchange for political concessions from the Palestinians (Andersen, 2015). Andersen believed that both sides needed to rebuild trust. The Quartet needed to oversee the implementation process and be willing to take practical steps in accord with the outline of the plan. He knew that the oversight component was essential to Israel. After the failure of the Camp David talks, Israel claimed that the Palestinian leadership was incapable of establishing proper governance and accused the PA of corruption and lack of cooperation. As part of Møller’s soft-diplomacy persuasion efforts, the Danish Foreign Minister paid a visit to Cairo, Amman and Jerusalem from February 26 to March 2, 2002. According to Møller, he wanted to hold a round of visits to study the parties’ claims, but also to signal to them that Denmark was willing to promote a political initiative for the region (Møller, 2018). Møller saw Egypt, Jordan and Israel as a “circle of peace”. He said he believed that the three countries that had already signed peace agreements with one another would be important players in advancing the political process. Therefore he wanted to hear their opinions and their willingness to embark

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on a renewed political effort. As the parties were far from agreeing on the principles of negotiations, the Foreign Ministry in Copenhagen believed that the outline would be presented to the parties only in stages: first to the Europeans and then to the Arabs and to the Israelis. It was decided that the initiative would not be fully presented to the parties at the time it was being formulated but only after Denmark would assume the presidency of the Council of Ministers in the European Union (Andersen, 2015).24 In a meeting with Sharon, Peres and Ben Eliezer, Møller presented a partial outline of the plan and not the entire outline. At the meeting, Peres supported the initiative and Ben Eliezer opposed the Danish initiative. Sharon was suspicious of the Danes’ intent and did not understand why Denmark was interested in mediating and what motivated it to promote a political initiative. Moreover, in a meeting held by senior Danish Foreign Ministry officials with Sharon’s advisers, the Israeli representatives explained that neither Denmark nor the European Union had the authority to present such an initiative and that an American response should be awaited (Andersen, 2015). Sharon raised a list of questions and doubts about the nature of the initiative (Møller, 2018) and among other things, presented his demand that a Palestinian prime minister be elected in direct elections (Møller, 2017: 275). Israel would not agree to deal with Arafat under any circumstances and wanted a new, freely elected leader of the Palestinians with whom to work. In addition, Møller had a long telephone conversation with Sharon to present additional options for a political process. Sharon did not believe in Denmark’s ability to advance such a process and expressed skepticism (Møller, 2017: 267) stemming from a distrust of Europe. Sharon emphasised the need for much greater security guarantees (Møller, 2018) in any future understanding. Even without receiving definitive Israeli support, the Danish Foreign Minister decided to advance the political initiative through EU institutions. Since the meeting of Foreign Minister in Europe was scheduled for a later date, Møller sought a new path to promote the Danish initiative. Using Andersen’s initial formula, the Danish Foreign Minister promoted the initiative through Germany, France and Britain who agreed to accept it (Andersen, 2015). The Danish Foreign Minister convinced them that the initiative would receive widespread support and might also be accepted by the Americans (Møller, 2018). Møller was optimistic that the establishment of the Quartet25 by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in April 2002 would increase international support for the main points of the Roadmap (Møller, 2018).

5.13 The Roadmap for Peace As Denmark was occupied with formulating the Danish outline and before presenting the Roadmap publicly, Danish Foreign Minister Møller tried to enlarge the scope of the plan. His well-intentioned efforts proved to be more challenging than he might have thought. Møller wanted to include regional

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elements in the Roadmap including mutual recognition between Israel and the Arab world through the sponsorship of the UN secretary-general (Møller, 2017: 271). In addition, Møller wanted the Roadmap to reference an agreement between Israel and Syria. Although Møller tried to explore the Syrian option for the Danish outline, the Syrian Foreign Minister made it clear to Møller that Syria would oppose the Danish initiative. Syria reasoned that the agreement between Israel and Syria would remain in final stages and only after a settlement with the Palestinians would it be fulfilled. Furthermore, Møller’s suggestion was a national insult for the Syrian regime. The Syrians adhered to the principle that an agreement must first be reached between Israel and Syria and only then an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The Syrians believed that if Israel withdrew from Judea and Samaria in pursuit of an agreement with the Palestinians, the Israelis would be less flexible in their negotiations with Syria and less likely to agree to additional territorial compromise with Syria on the Golan Heights. Syria insisted that an agreement with Syria take priority over an agreement with the Palestinians (Møller, 2018). In addition, Assad believed that Arafat should not be trusted and that instead suggested to Møller that he should talk to Hezbollah and Hamas. Assad explained to the Danish Foreign Minister that Arafat’s intentions were contradictory. Only because Arafat was under threat did he even speak to the “infidels”. Arafat had no intention of implementing changes that would put his position in the Palestinian Authority in jeopardy. At this point, the Danish Foreign Minister explored the possibility that Denmark would initiate a political plan between Israel and Syria without the Palestinians in order to pressure the Palestinian Authority to show greater willingness to negotiate. Peres’ willingness to consider the return of the Golan Heights in the event of an agreement with Syria encouraged Møller to examine policy alternatives (Møller, 2017: 286, 288).26 Though unsuccessful, Møller’s outreach demonstrated that even in the advanced stages of preparing the Danish outline for the Roadmap, Denmark was pushing the boundaries of the political outline to include a vision for a more comprehensive Middle East peace. He hoped that the stabilisation of relations between Israel and its neighbors would have international impact. Denmark’s investigation of alternative policies grew out of a desire for a regional peace plan that would change the political reality on the ground in the Middle East. That plan remains a vision on paper to this day. Denmark became Council of Ministers on July 1, 2002. Denmark was asked by the Europeans how Denmark would promote EU policy during its presidency (Andersen, 2015). Clearly, Denmark was expected to promote EU policy in the Middle East and this mandate became a vital opportunity to formulate a comprehensive Middle East policy initiative. According to the Danish Foreign Minister, this was the time to implement a political initiative, not only due to the U.S. president’s vision for the Middle East, but also based on the Europeans willingness to focus on

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the Middle East (Møller, 2017: 268). At this time, Denmark was accepted as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council which gave the country long-term political power. This became a period of time during which Denmark could promote an ambitious initiative due to its position in Europe and its position on the UN Security Council which gave it unprecedented and historical political leverage (Møller, 2018). The summer of 2002 saw an intensification of diplomatic efforts in the Middle East. The American president held a meeting with representatives from moderate Arab states and representatives of the European Union. At the center of the discussions was the Jordanian-Egyptian proposal to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a two-state solution (Møller, 2018). A short time later, on June 24, 2002, the U.S. president dropped the idea of a peace conference as part of his vision to resolve the conflict in the Middle East and demanded new Palestinian leadership before establishing a Palestinian state. Although Bush’s vision speech was received coldly by the Europeans, the Arab world, and even by some government officials, Denmark saw an opportunity to begin contacts with the parties and to present Denmark’s outline for peace. And so did other countries. Shortly after President Bush’s speech, the United States and the Russians began preparing their own drafts for a peace proposal. At the same time, the Americans proposed drafting a joint document with other members of the Quartet to take control of the process (Elgindy, 2012: 10). The Danes believed that being Council of Ministers would pave the way for developing a strategy to promote the Roadmap they had already drafted. In fact, a day after the presentation of the U.S. president’s vision, Møller discussed the timetable and contents of the Roadmap with the director general of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They decided that they would present their outline even if Denmark had to take a political “risk” (Andersen, 2015). Denmark would be bold in its approach to match President Bush’s declaration and would be willing to announce that they were in favor of the Bush plan. The last meetings between Møller and the director general of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs touched on the launch of their political plan for the Middle East (Møller, 2018). Møller and Danish Foreign Ministry officials monitored events in the Middle East and were encouraged by the Saudi peace initiative (Møller, 2018). The Saudi initiative included full normalisation with Israel in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines with minor changes. The Danish Foreign Minister identified essential elements which he could include in Denmark’s political initiative, thereby winning Saudi support for the Denmark initiative. Similarly, after Operation Defensive Shield, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer published a plan for the area. His plan did not receive the support of the parties but included essential principles for the political process (Møller, 2018). Møller identified important elements in the German plan he could include in the Denmark initiative. He felt that both outlines had applied audacious and creative thinking to the political

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process between Israel and the Palestinians (Møller, 2017: 268). Lars Faaborg Andersen, as head of the Middle East desk in the Foreign Ministry, was entrusted with finalising the outline for the Roadmap for Peace. He worked to rewrite the Danish plan to integrate the elements of the other plans that had already been published (Møller, 2017: 269). That is, Andersen was asked to integrate the Danish political plan with the Saudi and Fischer initiatives. According to Møller, the addition of components of the Saudi and German initiatives to the Danish initiative stemmed primarily from a desire to receive support from them. The elements of the Saudi initiative were added to enable the Danes to win the “blessing of the road” of Arab countries. Similarly, Denmark adopted some of Fischer’s conceptions in order to gain German support which they viewed as necessary for any initiative that the Danes intended to place before the EU institutions. Otherwise, according to Møller, the German Foreign Minister would have promoted his own initiative and abandoned the Danish initiative (Møller, 2018). Although Fischer hesitated to give immediate consent to Denmark’s political plan, he also did not reject it outright (Møller, 2017: 269). Finally, Fischer suggested to the Danish Foreign Ministry that Denmark should present the main points of the plan to Sharon and Arafat under the EU mandate (Andersen, 2015). The Danish Roadmap for Peace was on its way to becoming an official policy of the European Union. The Danes also knew that the U.S. State Department was working on a political initiative that reflected the Bush vision. They believed there was a short window of opportunity before an American official initiative would be published and therefore the Danes accelerated their work in order to present a similar outline to the Americans (Andersen, 2015). Andersen identified senior U.S. State Department official, David M. Satterfield, as a key contact for the Danes. Satterfield was close to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and was working on the American Middle East policy initiative. That is, while the Danish Foreign Minister was working on gaining recognition for the Danish political initiative as an official policy of the European Union, the Danes were quick to contact the U.S. State Department in order to coordinate the main points of the plan and to gain American support. This quick action was essential because National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley had described the Roadmap as the “State Department baby” after the U.S. State Department had worked to anchor Bush’s insufficiently focused speech in Iraq to an actual peace plan (Ross, 2015: 319). Those in charge of the initiative were William Burns, who served as the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs and his deputy, David Satterfield. Andersen was able to present the main points of the Danish plan to his American colleague. Satterfield showed willingness for the American plan to be based on the Danish outline and he revealed the main points of the American plan to Andersen. They turned out to be similar to the main components of the Danish initiative (Andersen, 2015).

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The Danish prime minister did not share Møller’s optimism about working with the Americans at this time. Despite the unofficial support of the German, British and French Foreign Ministers, Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen feared that the United States would outright reject the initiative. He asked Møller not to present the Danish Foreign Ministry’s outline. Rasmussen was concerned that the plan might fail and damage Denmark during his presidency. Rasmussen worried that a rejection by the United States would further damage Denmark’s international image. Nevertheless, Møller persevered. And he prevailed. The early coordination between Andersen and Satterfield paid off. At a meeting with Danish Foreign Minister Møller, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice accepted the components of the Danish initiative and asked that they start working together to promote the plan (Andersen, 2009: 7). The Americans sought clarifications from the Danes as the Danish initiative was concise with a shorter timetable for implementation compared to the American version which was more general and included legal formulations that reflected the Israeli position (Andersen, 2015). At this time, Møller met also with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell who agreed to the Danish Peace Initiative (Møller, 2017: 270). The Foreign Ministry in Copenhagen had received the green light to integrate the two outlines into one Roadmap for Peace ahead of its official launch. The cooperation between the United States and Denmark was revealed by Bush’s senior advisor, Elliott Abrams, when he remarked that the U.S. State Department had adopted the political initiative formulated by Denmark. According to Abrams, Denmark presented Israel with a partial draft of the Roadmap that included only three chapters plus the section on the issue of security. At the same time, representatives from Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt met with representatives of the Quartet and the American president to discuss the outline of the plan. Both the Israelis and the Arabs were suspicious of the initiative (Abrams, 2013). The power of Denmark to gain political backing for its peace plan and to establish its authority with the parties was remarkable. Denmark showed that even a small country could initiate a complex international political process. This was true especially when launched with the backing of a broad international framework like the EU. Without the EU presidency, Denmark would not have had the opportunity to initiate a similar proposal on such a scale. Møller explained: “Denmark had political leverage only through the EU. Only in this way was Denmark able to initiate a political plan which was received seriously. Otherwise, no one would have attached importance to our proposal. We had waited for our presidency of the European Union” (Møller, 2018). According to Møller’s senior associate Lars Andersen, Denmark had a big advantage over its American counterparts. The Foreign Ministry in Copenhagen was prepared to turn the Bush vision into an immediate outline and they were able to present a political plan faster than the U.S. State Department. As a small state, there was no complex hierarchy between the desk heads at the Foreign Ministry in Copenhagen and the

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Foreign Minister’s Office. Thus the information between the Ministry’s staff and the Foreign Minister’s Office flowed freely and easily (Andersen, 2015). Denmark was able to promote their initiative more effectively and in a timely fashion. The U.S. backing helped the Danish Foreign Ministry present the plan formally to three European powers: France, Britain and Germany. Their support was significant toward a successful launch of the initiative. On July 16, 2002, Møller presented the Roadmap for Peace plan to the members of the Quartet. They voted unanimously to pass the plan without amendments (Møller, 2018). In addition, Quartet members accepted Kofi Annan’s proposal for the Quartet to oversee the implementation of the Roadmap and to turn the outline into a phased plan based on practical results. Certain conditions would have to be met before passing on to the following stage. The Danish Foreign Minister completed the round of official approvals and presented the plan once again at a meeting of European Foreign Ministers held in Helsingor Denmark in August 2002 (Møller, 2017: 271). At the Foreign Ministers’ meeting, Denmark presented the main points of the three-phase plan. Except for minor changes, Møller received overall support for the plan to become an official EU political policy (Møller, 2018). Denmark could move forward with the authority of the European Union. The Danish Foreign Ministry was surprised by the plan’s rapid success. Andersen explained openly that originally the initiative was not intended to change EU policy, but mainly to prove Denmark’s commitment to European policy and to the political format of its members. As such, the Foreign Ministry officials in Copenhagen did not believe that the initiative would receive such broad support. The acceptance of the Roadmap for Peace was a diplomatic achievement that elevated Denmark’s reputation in the European Union and in the international community (Andersen, 2015).

5.14 American-Israeli Coordination With the approval of the Roadmap for Peace by the Europeans, events took place in Washington, D.C., that dramatically changed the outcome of the Roadmap. In mid-October 2002, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s visited Washington. At a meeting with U.S. State Department officials, Israelis were presented with the full outline of the Roadmap for Peace for the first time. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, his close advisors and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Danny Ayalon were alarmed by the revelation of such a document at the hands of their most powerful and trusted ally. Yet, they were not at liberty to ignore a policy initiative that the United States was supporting. In a separate meeting among themselves, the Israeli team thought the plan was a major threat to Israel. Their suspicions were bolstered by learning about U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s remarks to a closed group of American diplomats. Powell had stated that Sharon did not seek a peace agreement and added that he thought that Sharon needed

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the conflict to continue as much as Arafat did. Sharon, a seasoned former Israeli General, was seen as a hawk in Israel and as long as Arafat and the Palestinians fought against Israel, Sharon could be seen as a protector of his country and fortify his position as prime minister. Powell added that he thought Sharon enjoyed political capital at the expense of Arafat. For the Israelis, such an opinion coming from the U.S. secretary of state was chilling. More than ever Israelis believed that the political initiative was a cover to force a political move on Israel by the Europeans and the Arabs (Abrams, 2013: 50–51). What would Israel do with the fact that the United States, Israel’s closest ally and most powerful nation in the world, was leading the initiative? Sharon decided to postpone the Israeli response until after his visit. Up to this point, Sharon had not attached much importance to his meetings with the Danish Foreign Minister and to Møller’s round of visits. For Sharon, Israel’s relations with Denmark were negligible and immaterial. Despite the Danish Foreign Minister’s meeting with senior Israeli officials, Denmark did not influence Israeli decision making and Israel did not draw attention to Danish activities (Weissglas, 2018). Only after it became known that the United States would promote an initiative similar to the Danish initiative, did both Israel and the Palestinians rush to examine its details and understand its scope (Andersen, 2015). As the Israelis learned about the details of the initiative, Sharon ordered his top advisors to act carefully and quickly. A political team was established that included the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the Israeli intelligence agencies to examine the American proposal. This group produced 14 detailed reservations on the Roadmap for Peace that will communicated to the Americans by May 25, 2003. The overriding principle of the reservations was that every political move would be supervised and authorised only by the Americans in the White House and not by any other international leadership (Weissglas, 2018). Tony Blair, acting prime minister of Great Britain, supported the initiative and wanted President Bush to address a wider vision for the Middle East than Bush had intended originally. Blair’s pressure on the American president seemed to stem from his own need to bolster his image at home rather than coordinating his position with the Europeans. In the end, President Bush agreed with the principle that any implementation of the initiative would be in line with American reference (Weissglas, 2018) and final authority for decisions would rest within the White House. Publicly, Sharon praised Danish foreign policy when Denmark accepted the EU presidency and stressed that Danish policy allowed Israel to feel more secure (Kvist and Skipper, 2007: 375), Yet he remained suspicious of the Danish-American initiative. He was skeptical especially about the success of the Roadmap and how much it reflected the reality on the ground. Sharon wanted to focus on the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority in the west Bank and therefore sought a more realistic political plan that would

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ensure adequate security for Israel. He sought a political plan that would include Egypt and Jordan in a regional settlement. For the Palestinians, agreement on the principles of the initiative was straightforward. The circumstances surrounding their agreement were anything but clear cut. In the wake of the Intifada the Palestinians were in a weakened position and some international figures refused to meet with them. There was mounting international pressure in favor of Roadmap as it represented a commitment to establish a Palestinian state for the first time in the history of the conflict that involved international backing and American consent (Weissglas, 2018). But for Arafat to allow the peace process to go forward, he was being forced to appoint a Palestinian prime minister who would conduct political contacts and take his place at the negotiating table. This moment was a political pressure cooker for the chairman. Earlier that year, Arafat had been invited to the Arab League Conference in March 2002 in Beirut. Sharon had made it clear that were Arafat to leave, he would find himself unable to return. Arafat and his men were restricted to their headquarters in the Muqata in Ramallah. At the Arab League Conference the Saudi initiative was presented (Parsons, 2005: 278).27 Saudi Arabian-led Arab states believed that a new Palestinian figure should lead the negotiations with Israel (Møller, 2018). In addition, the Danish prime minister emphasised to Arafat that the European Union pressured Israel to prevent any further aggravation of the situation and called for greater restraint on the part of the Palestinians as well (Statsministeriet, 2002b). For Møller, Arab state backing was critical to the success of the Roadmap initiative. Without solid Arab support, Arafat would have found it easier to refuse the political outline (Møller, 2017: 281). In the end, although some Palestinians objected to the plan unofficially (Quandt, 2005a: 402), Arafat did not seek clarifications or amendments to the outline in September 2002 (Møller, 2017: 274). Perhaps he felt that if he did not object then the initiative would advance. For Israel, the responsibility for Palestinian terrorism rested with the Palestinian Authority. In their view the Palestinian Authority acted independently and without regard to the consequences of their decisions. Sharon based his policies on the assessments made by the IDF and the Israeli Intelligence Agencies that concluded that Arafat could not be a “partner” in the peace process after the collapse of the Camp David Summit in the early 2000’s (Parsons, 2005: 273). He was not able to negotiate then and no one would believe him now. In the eyes of Israel, the problem lay with the chairman of the PA and his conduct and not necessarily with the Palestinian people. Thus, important objectives of the Roadmap were to weaken Arafat by forcing political reforms within the PA (Levitt, 2008: 149) and to increase security coordination and the processes of normalisation with the Palestinians through the construction of democratic institutions. Israel was concerned that the Roadmap would be forced upon them. Nevertheless, the prime minister’s office saw that the Roadmap presented an official opportunity to remove

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Arafat from his position of power and replace him with Abu Mazen who opposed the continuation of the Intifada. The creation of a Palestinian prime minister who would be the executive arm of the Palestinian Authority would challenge Arafat’s stranglehold on the Palestinian people. Moreover, the Roadmap influenced Salam Fayyad to join the Palestinian government, supported the offsetting of funds for terrorist acts, strengthened Abu Mazen and buttressed Sharon’s intention to promote political contacts only with Abu Mazen while bypassing Arafat (Weissglas, 2018).

5.15 Quartet support As part of Denmark’s attempt to exercise political power and force a political move, Møller used a mandate from the European Union, from the United States and also from the Quartet. Seeing that Møller had included elements of the Saudi initiative, the Saudis agreed to support Møller’s initiative. Although the Saudis supported the plan publicly, privately they were skeptical that the Danish mediator could implement the initiative and believed that the three-year period of implementation was too long (Møller, 2017: 273). Following Saudi Arabia, representatives of the Foreign Ministers from the gulf states announced their support for the Roadmap initiative (Møller, 2018). In November 2002, Møller spoke with Colin Powell at the NATO summit. Powell told Møller that Israel was working against the plan and that there was no value to the Roadmap. These comments seemed to contradict Sharon’s diplomacy. Sharon had told Møller that if the Palestinians would hold direct negotiations with Israel, they would be able to get better returns. Sharon suggested that Israel might agree to examine the path of the security fence and the formula of a two-state solution (Møller, 2017:287). Meanwhile the U.S. secretary of state announced that talks between the Americans and Europeans were helpful and that the mediators were close to agreeing on a final Roadmap plan. Møller noted that European Foreign Ministers would not trust the United States unless the United States put pressure on Israel (Møller, 2017: 277). Møller’s statement reflected Denmark’s attempt to impose a political strategy that was favored by the Europeans. Basically, the Europeans were using their support for the Iraq War as leverage so the United States would have to pressure Israel. In contradistinction to Møller’s statement, Powell made it clear that the Americans were pressuring the Palestinians to do everything in their power to eradicate terrorism and violence. Powell announced that the Palestinians must cooperate with Israel and eliminate the terrorist infrastructure through political and security reform (Møller, 2017: 277). In addition, Sharon had persuaded Bush and Powell not to publish the initiative before the Israeli election in early 2003. This delay was a great disappointment to the Danish team that wanted to officially transmit the outline to the Quartet before the end of its presidency of the European Union in December 2002 (Andersen, 2015).

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The work of the Quartet was slowed down by Israel’s transferring many reservation points to the political plan and by speaking directly with the Americans (Møller, 2017: 276). Israel believed that the Quartet might act against Israeli interests and demanded that all of the group’s assessment be given over to the Americans’ right of veto. The U.S. secretary of state sought to approve the Roadmap as early as the December 2002 meeting of the Quartet Washington (Møller, 2017: 277). At this time, Møller realised that Israel and the United States were conducting direct contacts to correct and coordinate the wording of the initiative to the political needs of Israel (Møller, 2018).28 Bush feared that Sharon might oppose the Roadmap in public for political reasons and thus bury the initiative (Møller, 2018). These factors influenced the Quartet not to approve or publish the Roadmap outline. The Danish Foreign Ministry representative, Friis Arne Petersen, suggested that the U.S. president publish support for the Roadmap without officially approving it. Pertersen’s idea was to circumvent Sharon’s opposition and gain official American support against the possibility that Sharon might oppose the plan before it was approved (Møller, 2017: 278). After further consultations, the Quartet members officially announced that the parties had not been instructed on the mechanism for implementing the political initiative and were therefore forced to postpone approving the plan to 2003. However they did publish support for the political initiative (Møller, 2017: 278). These actions led to Resolution 1515 of the UN Security Council, which ratified the Roadmap outline as the final resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In Møller’s estimation, the Roadmap was the most comprehensive document on the Middle East, which also included reference to the conflict between Israel, Syria and Lebanon (Møller, 2018). Even if this were the case, the American and Israeli teams knew that there were significant differences between the content of the document and the reality on the ground. They knew that this gap would increase the parties’ scope of action even after the initiative was approved (Weissglas, 2018).

5.16 The Copenhagen group and the Roadmap for Peace The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported the activities of the Copenhagen group as part of Denmark’s Louisiana process. The group was called upon in Denmark’s efforts to establish the political channel in 2002. Most of its activities were intended to persuade all sides to renew the political process according to the principles of the Roadmap for Peace. The Danish Foreign Ministry planned to expand the work of the subcommittees of the Copenhagen group to address the issues of refugees, permanent borders and Jerusalem. Representatives from the Danish Foreign Ministry decided to plan a third conference in Denmark. In early 2003, the group would invite 25 representatives from each country, including 2–3 Americans and two EU representatives, Miguel Moratinos and Javier

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Solana. Javier Solana served as senior representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and as secretary-general of the Council of the European Union (RDL, 2002c). The head of the Middle East desk in Copenhagen, Lars Andersen had known of the group’s activities for several years and agreed with their goals. He believed that a political alternative to peace should be reached based on the Taba agreement through the activities of NGOs. Specifically he thought that this unofficial conference could be sponsored by DUPI and the Peres Center for Peace. Participants of the Louisiana process along with Israeli and Palestinian representatives (RDL, 2002e) were invited to attend. Sponsored by Denmark which funded the Copenhagen group, the conference would be guided in accordance with the Taba and Camp David talks (RDL, 2002g). As part of these efforts, a joint meeting was held between members of the Copenhagen group and the Danish Foreign Minister where it was agreed that the attendance at the conference would be expanded to include retired generals, senior defense officials, diplomats, businessmen, representatives of NGOs, media, academics and other influential people who supported the peace process. The purpose of the conference was to bring together about 100 participants from all states that participated in the Louisiana process (RDL, 2003b). Since it was vital for Denmark to attract personalities from the moderate Palestinian camp, Pundik made it clear that Palestinian representatives would not participate without the explicit support of Arafat (RDL, 2002c). To this end, Herbert Pundik, Ron Pundak and David Kimche met with Riyad al-Maliki and Maher el-Kurd, Arafat’s economic adviser and Abu Mazen’s associate (RDL, 2002d)29 to persuade them to join the conference. The Danes had encouraged Pundik to organise and conduct the Copenhagen talks unofficially. In May 2002, a year before the third conference was to be held, Pundik had met with Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan al-Muasher and with Jordanian Major General Marouf al-Bakhit (who was appointed later as prime Mmnister) and received their support to promote the Copenhagen group. In addition to principled support for informal contacts, the Jordanian Foreign Minister referred to the Saudi peace initiative at the Arab League meeting in Beirut and believed that the solution between Israel and the Palestinians would be resolved through joint understandings and normalisation by Israel with Arab states with EU support (RDL, 2002f). With Pundik’s diplomacy, it was evident that Denmark’s efforts to promote the political initiative of the Roadmap were not only made at the official level in 2002, but also through the wide enrollment of representatives of the unofficial Copenhagen group. At the opening of the third conference of the Copenhagen group in May 2003, Danish Foreign Minister Møller stated that a six-month window of time had opened for the implementation of the Roadmap that was presented to the European Union during Denmark’s six-month tenure as president from July 2002 to December 2002. The Danish Foreign Minister made it clear that

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within a few months the American president would be busy with his reelection and would not be able to embark on a new political initiative. Members of the Copenhagen group expressed public support for the Roadmap initiative as a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The group members had intended to advance the Louisiana process (RDL, 2003c), namely, the normalisation process. But in fact, they were quick to declare their support for the Roadmap initiative that was approved by the Quartet in early 2003. During the conference, the group acknowledged the Danish Foreign Ministry‘s work on the Middle East peace effort (RDL, 2003d) and called on the international community, the Quartet and the United States to move the peace process forward and to make an effort to implement it. In a closing statement, they supported the Roadmap’s plan for the establishment of two states and for the exchange of territories based on the 1967 lines. They supported the idea that Jerusalem would be the capital of the two states and that a solution would also be found to the refugee issue in accordance with UN Resolution 194 (RDL, 2003a). Although the conference was an unofficial meeting between the parties, the public statement of members of the Copenhagen group in promoting the Roadmap initiative was crowned a success by the Danish Foreign Office (Møller, 2018). The Copenhagen group’s main focus was on promoting positive public opinion in Israel for the Roadmap and influencing Israeli voters who had moved from the political center to the political right because of the Intifada. Pundik called these voters who had gone to the right “refugees” and the Copenhagen group would work to move them back “home” to the political center. These intentions were challenged, however, by the politics on the ground. With the outbreak of the Intifada, the Palestinians renounced the political process in favor of more hawkish positions (RDL, 2003e). Nevertheless, the Copenhagen groups endeavored to show the public in Israel that there was room for dialogue and that the Copenhagen group conference paved the way for renewed contacts between the parties. To this end, the members of the Copenhagen group met with Abu Mazen and alMaliki to formulate a work plan. Israeli President Moshe Katsav agreed to meet with representatives of the Copenhagen group to hear about their activities and intentions. He clarified that Israel’s official position was that Arafat was no longer relevant and therefore Israel would not give legitimacy to the PLO chairman (RDL, 2003g). In the eyes of the Copenhagen group, the success of the Roadmap outline depended on the way it was presented to the public in Israel. The window of opportunity that Møller had spoken about made their efforts urgent and significant. The Copenhagen group thought that the original Copenhagen Declaration had played a vital role in Denmark’s ability to bring this peace initiative to the broader international community. The group’s representatives understood that acts on the ground were barriers to their policy initiatives and therefore the members of the Copenhagen group pushed for the promotion of an agreed political initiative. Lars Anderson, who agreed to support the

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Copenhagen group in exchange for supporting the Roadmap, stressed that the Danes wanted a work plan as soon as possible to be formulated through the Peres Peace Center (RDL, 2003f). The Copenhagen group allowed itself to be used by the Danish Foreign Ministry to advance the foreign office’s political agenda.30 The group may not have been completely true to its own goals of promoting normalisation within a regional framework; nevertheless, they shared the same strategic goal as the Foreign Ministry, namely trying to reach a peace agreement between “two fated partners” – Israel and the Palestinians. Perhaps the Copenhagen group felt it did not have much choice but to support the Roadmap, given the source of their funding was the Danish Foreign Ministry. Foreign Minister Møller supported Pundik’s activities and saw them as an essential element leading the talks of Copenhagen group. He believed that Pundik led serious delegations that were connected to the political elite in each country. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations included members with ties to their security establishments that would be central in the continuation of official contacts. Møller understood that the political process initiated by Denmark should use the political framework created in the Louisiana process. For Møller, the Louisiana process served the Roadmap (Møller, 2018).

5.17 The failure of the Roadmap Six months after the Copenhagen Conference, the turning point in the peace process came with Israeli Prime Minister Sharon’s decision on a unilateral disengagement plan. In November 2003, Sharon informed Elliott Abrams in Rome that Israel intended to withdraw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip. The plan was explicitly intended to push off the Roadmap indefinitely and to reject the Quartet’s vision for the establishment of a Palestinian state. The world watched as Israel removed all Israelis from the Gaza Strip while continuing to build the security fence. International advisors and statesmen feared that the disengagement plan would put an end to the Roadmap (Dinmore, 2004). The U.S. State Department officials reacted hesitantly. Regarding the Roadmap, President Bush’s expectations were not high and he remained skeptical of the chances of reaching peace. Even if the Palestinian leadership tried to adapt the Roadmap reforms to the institutions of the Palestinian Authority, the PA still acted ambiguously and only with the intention of pleasing the international community. Abu Mazen served as the Palestinian chief negotiator and headed the Palestinian Authority’s Department of Negotiation while Arafat continued to chair the Palestinian Authority’s Supreme Council (Parsons, 2005: 211). Between Abu Mazen and Arafat, Arafat was the decisive leader. Eventually that fact led to Abu Mazen’s resignation and his replacement by Abu Ala, who followed Arafat’s authority and carried out Arafat’s instructions (Weissglas, 2018). In May 2003, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice issued a statement expressing the

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concerns of the United States and Israel against the implementation of the Roadmap which they saw as being contrary to the President’s vision of June 2002 (White House, 2003).31 This statement affected the nature of the negotiations. In the meeting with Bush, Sharon and Abu Mazen, the Israeli leader raised fears that Israel would make withdrawals that would make it difficult to fight terrorist threats. In addition, Sharon refused to discuss refugee return. Bush understood that Israel would not commit to a Palestinian state deadline (Ross, 2015: 322). The United States would adhere to Israeli opposition to the Roadmap. Sharon’s top advisor, Dov Weissglas, described Sharon’s intention as follows: “The disengagement was a plan designed to preserve the opportunity for future negotiations. It is like putting the US President’s formula from June 2002 in a bottle with formaldehyde to preserve it” (Shavit, 2004). Although Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice disagreed with Sharon’s move, President Bush supported Sharon. He believed that the disengagement plan obliged the Palestinians to respond and called it a “brave move” (Ross, 2015: 324). Sharon’s official announcement of the disengagement plan came a month later in December 200332 and was approved immediately by the Bush administration. According to Weissglas, even if the unilateral withdrawal contradicted the Roadmap, it received unwavering Palestinian support and led to full coordination with Abu Mazen. After all, it would implement later stages of the Roadmap outline at a much earlier time period (Weissglas, 2018). Not so with the Europeans. EU officials warned the United States that if Americans did not take a firm stance on the continuation of the Roadmap, Europeans would look for an alternative political option. While the United States was quick to disassociate from Arafat and make him an illegitimate leader, European leaders continued to try to encourage a different policy from the Americans (Weissglas, 2018). A significant part of Sharon’s dilemma stemmed from the Israeli perception that the Palestinian Authority led the struggle in an institutionalised manner and encouraged actively the continued bloodshed and terrorist attacks against Israeli citizens. At the same time, Israeli government officials advocated further negotiations with Arafat. Against the background of Operation Defensive Shield which intended to strike a blow against the Palestinian terrorist infrastructure, IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Ya’alon attacked Foreign Minister Shimon Peres for treating Arafat as the legitimate leader of the Palestinian Authority (Peri, 2002: 56). Sharon sought a political alternative that would weaken Arafat and collapse the terrorism infrastructure. He wanted to delay the implementation of the Roadmap and to push aside European pressure. He put forward a new vision for Gaza and the West Bank all the while strengthening Israel’s alliance with the United States. As a response to the Intifada and the long-standing conflict, the disengagement plan allowed Sharon to make a daring escape from the constraints and pressures of the Roadmap. In the end, the EU, UN and Russia decided to support the disengagement plan in May 2004 adding reservations aimed at pressuring Israel. Four

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months later, the Quartet reaffirmed its support for the plan, but this time with a warning that the disengagement must be consistent with the Roadmap as a step towards the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Elgindy, 2012: 18). Jeffrey Feltman, the special envoy for the peace process, on behalf of the U.S. Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk, noted that the outline of the Roadmap was a guideline and not a binding one, which had increased concern among Quartet members. Quartet members had tried to exercise influence over the United States and Israel to prevent unilateral moves such as Sharon’s disengagement plan. Nevertheless, their willingness to support the disengagement plan helped Sharon’s move to gain international legitimacy (Bauman, 2009: 166–168). Sharon’s plan re-oriented the Bush administration’s thinking regarding the future of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. In April 2004, President Bush had stated in a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Sharon that all future talks between Israel and the Palestinians should be based on the understanding that the “realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers”, had changed the prevailing American view (Slevin, 2004). Even if Sharon did not clarify his full intentions and did not seek a full regional peace but only to settle relations with the Palestinians, Møller thought Sharon’s disengagement plan was a wise move in a positive direction. Reflecting the general European approach, the European Union did not support Sharon’s plan (Møller, 2018). At this point, no one expected to see Sharon as a peacemaker, even if Sharon had mentioned previously the need for ”painful concessions“ (Globes Service, 2001). It was puzzling to see Sharon offer the Palestinians an outline for extensive withdrawals similar to the one presented by Ehud Barak at Camp David in the summer of 2000. But upon deeper reflection, the decisions that Sharon and Barak made may have looked similar from the outside and yet vast differences could be discerned. On the one hand, Barak was willing to withdraw from vast swaths of the West Bank in addition to conceding Gaza to the Palestinians. His “new” red lines seemed like increasingly desperate measures to conclude a Peace deal at any cost. On the other hand, Sharon seemed to be making a strategic concession. Withdrawing from Gaza and turning it over to the Palestinians allowed Israel to retain control of Judea and Samaria while still honoring Palestinian autonomous areas. Despite high expectations and considerable international pressure, the Roadmap failed to reach its goals, especially during its implementation. The vision for ”two states“ was vague and failed to advance. In a report before concluding his term, the UN secretary-general called the Roadmap a failure and added that it was necessary to acknowledge the weaknesses of the Quartet. The Quartet did not come close to achieving its goal of overseeing the implementation of the Roadmap. The American coordinator for the Quartet, Flynt Leverett, noted that beyond the failed settlement issue,

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the outline of the Roadmap did not adequately address border issues, Jerusalem status, Palestinian refugees and other issues that were at the core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Leverett and Leverett, 2009). According to Flynt Leverett, the Roadmap initiative was not intended to be completely fulfilled but was designed to be published only as a political initiative (Leverett, 2005; Melchior, 2018). It was ostensibly part of Bush’s vision for the American initiative for the Middle East and the wish to mobilise European support against Saddam Hussein’s regime. In the words of Flynt Leverett: … . The Roadmap as it existed was conceived really as a place-holder on this issue to show somewhat of an increase in American attention and engagement on the issue in the run-up to the Iraq War and to provide political cover for our allies in the Arab world and in Europe in advance of that conflict. (Leverett, 2005) The principal actors in this unfolding drama of diplomacy around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Arafat, Abu Mazen, Møller, Bush and Sharon, had all conspired to use the elements of the Roadmap for Peace opportunity in such a way as to have them serve their own purposes and to leave the Roadmap unfulfilled.

5.18 Reflections on Danish mediation and the Roadmap for Peace Denmark’s ambition to be involved seriously in the Middle East was ignited by the Oslo process and the handshake between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in September 1993 that was seen around the world. The pioneers of the Oslo process had first approached Denmark about sponsoring their efforts. Denmark had declined. After witnessing the signing of the Oslo Accords in Washington, D.C., Denmark realised that they had “missed the train”, meaning that they had missed the opportunity to be involved in a timely and significant peace effort. Denmark would not be left out again. In 1995, the Danish Foreign Office constructed the Louisiana Process. This was an unofficial channel that opened in Copenhagen at the Louisiana museum with representatives from Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian. Herbert Pundik spearheaded the Louisiana process for Denmark. The goal of this Copenhagen group was to talk openly and honestly about how to support the peace process in the region. That is, the intent of the Louisiana process was to bring a successful conclusion to the Oslo process and to gain international recognition for Denmark (Pundik, 2015; Vahr, 2016). Even if Denmark could not predict where the talks would lead, Denmark’s Foreign Office believed that the meetings would contribute to a

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comprehensive dialogue and a future resolution. Moreover, the Danish Foreign Ministry believed that the Copenhagen group reflected a “step-bystep” approach for building trust between neighbors. In this context, a Danish senior diplomat who conducted the talks believed that group members symbolised a sincere desire to reach mutual understandings. They were influential leaders among their own people and their presence created expectations in the Danish Foreign Ministry (Brylle, 2018). Denmark would try to promote a long-term vision for comprehensive cooperation between the countries of the region or at least to advance the goals of the Clinton administration through public support for the political process. Denmark would strive to promote this wider vision and to enlist the support of the United States. To this end, the Copenhagen group members held a series of meetings with senior American officials and met with representatives of the American Jewish Congress who agreed to help promote the Louisiana Initiative. In early June 2000, Copenhagen Group members met with senior State Department officials: Dennis Ross, Aaron Miller, Robert Malley of the National Security Council and with members of the U.S. Congress (Kimche, 2000a). After the signing of the Oslo Accords, Denmark made a commitment to promote dialogue between the parties and actively sought a way to become engaged. Denmark knew they were to become President of the European Union in July 2002. Surely they could use that position of authority to advance a political initiative for the region. With this in mind, Denmark began its preparations towards becoming involved in the peace efforts and advancing their own international status. The convergence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the war in Iraq opened the window of opportunity for official mediation efforts by Denmark to deploy initial sponsorship of an internationally resonant political process. Denmark’s first steps toward establishing a parallel and official channel took place with the appointment of Per Stig Møller as the new Danish Foreign Minister in 2001. Møller toured the Middle East to gain greater knowledge and acquaintance with the leaders and to hear their concerns. He was building trust with the Arab leaders and preparing to be able to present himself as experienced and knowledgeable about the region. Unlike the unofficial channel, Denmark created an actual outline of a Roadmap for Peace that would become the basis for the official international political initiative. The timing of the Denmark initiative was critical. The Danish Foreign Ministry waited until they had become the president of the European Union before announcing their Roadmap plan publicly. Privately, the Foreign Office, namely Foreign Minister Møller was busy meeting with heads of state in Europe and the Arab states to get their preapproval of a draft of the Danish Roadmap plan. Denmark believed that the European presidency should not be “wasted” on issues that did not lead to a breakthrough and they thought that they had the power to make a difference during the presidency of the Council of Ministers in the EU and thus

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strengthen Denmark’s image (Vahr, 2016). In addition, Danish negotiations in the region the year before the Presidency promoted their political prestige and allowed Denmark to have contacts with many state actors, especially with the Americans and Russians (Vahr, 2016). These actions served the Danish interest and strengthened relations between Denmark and the United States. After Denmark became Council of the European Union, the two countries worked together to develop a political plan to advance the American goals for the Middle East. In this effort, they found a common interest in promoting a broad vision for regional peace. Denmark tightened its cooperation with the Bush administration by integrating Denmark’s outline for the Roadmap with the new American policy of “spreading democracy”. Specifically, Denmark included reforms for developing democracy in the Palestinian Authority (Andersen, 2015). In return for America’s support of the Roadmap for Peace, Denmark led a political initiative to persuade Europeans to support the war in Iraq. Danish Foreign Minister worked diligently to bring together European demands to focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the American initiative to spread democracy. His efforts were intentional and strategic. The Danish Foreign Ministry believed that their Roadmap initiative strengthened Denmark’s position to negotiate between the parties and also strengthened American diplomacy. At this time, Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen declared that the Nordic country was making efforts to promote the values of the West and not just those of the United States. He pointed out that although traditional Danish policy did not tend to interfere in international arenas, it did focus on real politique as part of its international involvement (Vahr, 2016; Viggo and Ringsmose, 2015). Thus, Rasmussen continued, it was important for Danish leaders to attribute an image to Denmark as a country that promoted democratic values and was willing to share the efforts and bear the burdens of Europe. For Denmark, the Roadmap for Peace represented a major foreign policy achievement. Denmark was able to lead a political initiative that aroused international interest. In an effort to enhance regional peace and prosperity in the Middle East, the Danish political plan brought together leaders from Europe countries, the United States, moderate Arab States and powerful organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union. Central to Scandinavian diplomacy in these years was the desire to stand out in world politics and to strengthen their alliance with the United States (Vahr, 2016). In its role as Council of the European Union, Denmark was able to strengthen its cooperation with the United States and to play a vital role in gaining European support not only for the Roadmap for Peace and but also for the U.S. war effort in Iraq. Denmark no longer had to feel they had “missed the train”. They had taken their own place in the Scandinavian Relay Race of Middle East diplomacy. Denmark could declare that they were the right country, in the right place, at the right time. Nevertheless, at each turn, the Scandinavian countries failed to reach the ultimate goal of bringing peace to the region. And yet, each leg of the Scandinavian Relay Race had moved the

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Middle East peace process forward, had brought beneficial changes to the region and had opened dialogue where before there had only been hostility.

Notes 1 Herbert Pundik was the editor and chief of a large Danish newspaper. He worked occasionally with Israeli intelligence and was trusted by the security establishment. Using his own personal social circles, he wanted to promote a peace initiative. Herbert Pundik and his son Ron had a personal reason to pursue peace in the region and to work tirelessly to that end. Their son and brother, Uri Pundik, had fallen in Egypt during the Yom Kippur War. The night before he died, Herbert had cancelled a planned meeting with his son in favor of finishing an urgent news article for his paper in Copenhagen. Knowing that he missed the last chance to see and speak with his son affected Pundik for the rest of his life. 2 Although political ties had already been established between Israel and Egypt, unofficial channels were the ones that could bypass the government bureaucracy and allow the parties to convey messages in secret to a small circle of people. Such informal meetings contributed to the warming of relations between the two countries. These plans were similar to the actions of Mohamed Sid Ahmed and Amos Ayalon, who were old friends and had initiated joint activities in order to help normalise relations between the two countries ( Pundik, 2007: 327). 3 Al-Khuli was a former member of Nasser’s circle of associates and even before the Six Day War wrote many of his speeches. In one of the discussions between the Israeli and Egyptian representatives, one of the Egyptian representatives accused Israel of starting the war in 1967, al-Khuli was quick to accurate his member of the delegation and said that the Israelis acted due to Nasser’s decisions. Al-Khuli’s remarks lowered the fear barrier and built a relationship of trust between the parties, especially in the early stages ( Pundik, 2015). 4 Along with the talks that took place in Denmark that month, Pundik could not know that Ron Pundak was conducting the Beilin-Abu Mazen talks in Sweden. Pundik admitted that Ron did not tell or share with him the content of the conversations in which he participated ( Pundik, 2015). 5 Nusseibeh organised the Palestinian delegation and witnessed firsthand the pressure the Arab States used to stop him and others from being part of any normalisation process with Israel. 6 Although members of the Afro-Asian Writers’ Association rejected the appeal of Copenhagen members on Arafat’s recommendation. Al Khuli, the founder of the Association, was expelled from the Association because of his participation in the Copenhagen group. 7 Copenhagen group members appealed to the European Union to take part in organising the conference, but the European Union conditioned its contribution on the Danish Foreign Ministry’s work plan. As a result, Pundik used Ron Pundak’s connections to promote the transfer of EU funds through the European Commission (RDL: Pundik to De Ojeda, 12 May 1998). To strengthen the group’s activities, Kimche proposed inviting senior figures, including President Jimmy Carter and current and former Foreign Ministers such as Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson and Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg. 8 These withdrawals would be completed during Barak’s tenure as prime minister. 9 Herbert Pundik was considered part of the advisory group and acted on behalf of Denmark as the coordinator of the meetings. On behalf of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Burla Turban, Thomas Østrup Møller, Christian Oldenburg, Erling Harild Nielsen and Henriette Rald attended the meeting.

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10 It is interesting to note that as early as November 1997, Kimche tried to persuade Nelson Mandela to come to the region and promote the peace initiative. In his correspondence with one of Mandela’s aides, Kimche tried to explain the importance of Denmark’s initiative and the importance of the mobilisation of the international community in favor of peace efforts. Ron Pundak and David Kimche planned to meet with Arafat so that the PA chairman could persuade Mandela to take part in the process because Mandela refused to accept an invitation from the Israeli government and would not meet with Netanyahu. At this time, the Egyptians and Palestinians promoted a statement against Netanyahu, but Pundik, Pundak and Kimche focused entirely on continuing contacts with the Palestinians and planned to meet in Cairo at the future conference ( RDL, 1997a). 11 Ron Pundak and David Kimche informed Shimon Peres about the Louisiana process through Yossi Beilin in the early stages ( Pundik, 2015). 12 The Israeli team saw Faisal Husseini as an even more senior figure than Abu Mazen. While Husseini was from a well-known family in Jerusalem, Abu Mazen was from the PLO exile. Faisal’s close relationship with Ron Pundak also helped persuade him to take part in the event. 13 To unpack the sensitive issue of Jerusalem, there were suggestions to make Jerusalem into an official international holy place similar to the Vatican. This arrangement would ensure freedom of religion for all and put to rest Jerusalem’s bloody history of conquest by various world powers seeking the splendor of the holy city and control over the trade routes connecting Europe, Asia and Africa. 14 On behalf of Jordan, 50 representatives led by General Shudrom accompanied by the former Jordanian prime minister, the outgoing chief of staff, ministers, members of parliament, economists, journalists, academics and senior representatives of Jordanian society. The conference was also attended by former Egyptian Prime Minister and former Egyptian Foreign Minister Mustafa khalil; former Israeli Prime Minister and former Foreign Minister Shimon Peres; EU Special Envoy Miguel Moratinos; U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Daniel Kurtzer; Russian Ambassador to Egypt Vladimir Gudev and Ambassador of Denmark to Egypt. 15 Protocols relating to the meetings between the Israeli and Egyptian peace camps were written by Yehudit Harel of the Peace Now movement, who attended the conference and transcribed the words of the speakers. The copy also reached Kimche’s personal archive. 16 Danish mediator Pundik tells of being interested to see what was going on at the opposition conference. Walking down the street, he got as far as viewing the entrance. The flag of Israel had been placed so that anyone going to the conference would have to step on the Israeli flag in order to enter the building. 17 Rabbi Michael Melchior, minister without portfolio in Barak’s government was in contact with Danish Foreign Minister Lykketoft who was critical of Israel but said he was also a “friend” of Israel. Melchior responded to Lykketoft by saying that Israel had many who claimed to be friends of Israel. But in reality, friendship is tested by actions and not by words. “First show us you are a real friend and then if you have criticisms, we will be more open to listening to you”. 18 The meeting was attended by Ron Pundak, David Kimche, Salah Bassiouny, Hassan Al-Ahuan, Stanley Horman of the American Council for Cooperation and Economic Affairs in the Middle East, Karin Roxman of the European Union, Riyad Al-Maliki, Wadi Sharia, Ahsan Shudrom, Abu Liebdek, Herbert Pundik and representative from the Danish Embassy in Rome. The summary of the meeting was written by the Danish Embassy in Rome. 19 As governor of the state of Texas, Bush visited Israel in 1998 as part of a visit by Jewish Republican governors on behalf of the Republican Party. During that visit, Sharon in an airborne tour showed Bush Israel’s ”narrow waist“ and the security

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challenges it faced. Bush later admitted that the tour left a deep impression on him and influenced his attitudes toward Israel ( Aikman, 2004: 122-123). When president, Bush would respect the former general and would not pressure him. The advancement of the new U.S. containment doctrine required a change in American policy toward the Middle East. The new U.S. containment doctrine has created a renewed challenge in the U.S.’s ability to use its power to eliminate new enemies and “evil” regimes while at the same time building a more stable regime and a favorable world order for American interests. This contradiction revealed the strategy of promoting stability through pre-emptive action, even at the cost of undermining regimes around the world, under the Declaration of the Spread of Democracy. Per Stig Møller came to his post as Foreign Minister with an eclectic background. As a professor of philosophy and literature in Denmark and at the Sorbonne in Paris, Møller brought a breadth of knowledge and insight to the position that was evident in his thoughtful and extensive preparations leading to Denmark’s sixmonth tenure as Council of Ministers projected to begin in July 2002. He would be ready to make an impact for Danish diplomacy. Pundik and Kimche initiated another conference in Jerusalem in 2004 through the Israeli Foreign Affairs Council and with the participation of the Egyptian Foreign Affairs Council President Abdel Raouf El Reedy to discuss the continuation of the contacts and the unofficial agreement signed in Geneva. The conference was sponsored by the Danish Foreign Council and chaired by the former Danish Foreign Minister in order to emphasise Denmark’s commitment to the political process (RDL: Pundik to El Reedy, 26 June 2004). Many ascribe the expression “Roadmap to Peace” to a comment made by Shimon Peres as he contemplated how to bring peace to the region. “We need a roadmap to peace” he exclaimed and so the phrase caught on. Although Andersen presented the initiative to the Israeli Ambassador to Denmark, Carmi Gilon, who supported the initiative, he did not adopt it but only passed on the main points to the prime minister’s office. The Quartet was formed in Madrid in 2002 to mediate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The members included the United States; Russia, the UN and the European Union. Eventually this initiative would fail due to the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri by the Syrians, in 2005. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice recalled the American Ambassador from Damascus and ended the chances of establishing an Israeli-Syrian channel ( Møller, 2018). Sharon, who took a hard line with Arafat, said that the PA chairman would be able to go to the conference but would not be able to return to the territories unless he changed his behavior (Whitaker and agencies, 2002). Bush feared that the publication of a political initiative before the Israeli elections would be interpreted as an intervention in Israeli politics. Pundik tried to add Terje Larsen to help advance negotiations and to promote trust between the parties as a partner for peace (RDL: Pundik to Terje Larsen, 9 April 2003). In addition, as part of the preparations for the Copenhagen conference held in 2003, the Danes emphasised that they sought to stabilise Palestinian society and attract investment and economic assistance to the Palestinian Authority ( Andersen, 2015). This factor helped advance the adoption of the Roadmap plan and recruit Palestinian figures which supported the outline. Denmark incorporated economic elements in the Roadmap outline. In the opinion of the Danes, this component was based on the opportunity created for economic and political reform in the Palestinian Authority. To this end, Denmark was assisted by

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economic donors who/contributions that would advance Palestinian reform and offer financial support in line with gradual change. That is, Denmark intended to inject funds in exchange for political changes ( Andersen, 2015). 31 Their remarks led to a change in the political line because the state department headed by Powell believed that Israel and the Palestinians should be obliged to meet their obligations, while the U.S. National Security Council supported Sharon’s position that Palestinians should be forced to end violence first and only then Israeli will freeze settlements. 32 The disengagement plan was announced officially in December 2003 and carried out in the summer of 2005.

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Secondary sources Abrams, Elliott (2013). Tested by Zion: The Bush Administration and the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict. Cambridge: University Press.

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Aggestam, Karin and Lias Strömbom (2013). “Disempowerment and marginalisation of peace NGOs: Exposing peace gaps in Israel and Palestine”, Peacebuilding, Vol. 1(1): 109–124. Aggestam, Karin, Fabio Cristiano, and Lisa Strömbom (2015). “Towards agonistic peacebuilding? Exploring the antagonism-agonism nexus in the Middle East Peace Process”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 36(9): 1736–1753. Aikman, David (2004). Man of Faith: The Spiritual Journey of George W. Bush. Tennessee: Thomas Nelson. Aluf, Benn (10.05.2001). “Peres to Powell: Settlement Freeze – Award to Violence”, Haaretz. Andersen, Lars Erslev (2009). Kulturkamp eller politisk realisme: Danmarks Mellemøstpolitik i transatlantisk perspektiv [Cultural campaign or political realism: Denmark’s Middle East policy in the transatlantic perspective]. København: Institut for Strategi Forsvarsakademiet. Barel, Zvi (05.07.1999). “The Israeli-Arab peace conference opens today in Cairo: Arafat and Omar Moussa will be absent”, Haaretz. Bauman, Kris (2009). The Middle East Quartet of Mediators: Understanding Multiparty Mediation in the Middle East Peace Process. Denver: University of Denver, Ph.D. Dissertation. Chopra, Jarat (2003). “Third party monitoring in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”, The International Spectator, Vol. 38(4): 33–45. Dinmore, Guy (13.01.2004). “Middle East politics: Road to Peace Disappearing from the Map”, Financial Times. Fukuyama, Francis (2006). After the Neocons: America at the Cross-Roads. New Haven: Yale University Press. Globes Service (05.07.2001). Schröder: Freeze the settlements; Sharon: Painful concessions only for real peace, Globes. Granot, Oded (09.07.1999). “Why did Foreign Minister Moussa get cold feet?” Maariv. Gil, Avi (2018). ‫ מיומנו של שותף סוד‬:‫[ נוסחת פרס‬Peres formula: diary of a confidant]. Ḥevel Modi’in: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan. Ginat, Rami (1997). Egypt’s Incomplete Revolution: Lutfi Al-Khuli and Nasser’s Socialism in the 1960s, The Cummings Center Series. London: Frank Cass. Hermann, Tamar (2009). The Israeli Peace Movement A Shattered Dream. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hirsh, Michael (2002). “Bush and the World”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81(5): 18–43. Kimche, David (1992) ‫ המאבק לשלום במזרח התיכון‬:‫האופציה האחרונה‬. [The Last Option: the struggle for peace in the Middle East]. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth and Edanim. Kvist, Jakob and Jon Bloch Skipper (2007). Udenrigsminister. Seks politiske portrætter [Minister of Foreign Affairs. Six political portraits]. København: People’s Press. Levin, Kenneth (2005). The Oslo Syndrome: Delusions of a People Under Siege. New Hampshire: Smith and Kraus. Levitt, Matthew (2008). Negotiating Under Fire: Preserving Peace Talks in the Face of Terror Attacks. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Miller, Aaron David (2008). The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace. New York: Bantam Books. Møller, Stig Per (2017). Udenrigsminister i Krig og Fred [Foreign Minister in War and Peace]. København: Gyldendal.

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Negus, Steve (21.02.1997). “Dialogue of intellectuals”, Middle East International, No. 544. Oddeh, Abu (23.02.1997). “Abu Oddeh Demands Netanyahu to cancel his Settlment plans”, Ra’I Newspaper. Parsons, Nigel (2005). The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to alAqsa. New York: Routledge. Peri, Yoram (2002). The Israeli Military and Israel’s Palestinian Policy From Oslo to the Al Aqsa Intifada. Washington: United States Institute of Peace. Pundak, Ron (2013). ‫ אוסלו הסיפור המלא‬:‫[ ערוץ חשאי‬Secret Channel − Oslo, the Full Story]. Tel Aviv: Attic books, Yedioth Ahronoth, Hemed books. Pundik, Herbert (2007). Du kan hvis du tør [You can if you dare]. København: Gyldendals Bogklubber. Quandt, William (2005a). Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967. Washington: Brookings. Rabinovich, Itamar (2004). 2003 –1948 ‫ ישראל והערבים‬:‫[ חבלי שלום‬Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs, 1948–2003]. Tel Aviv: Dvir. Ross, Dennis (2015). Doomed to Succeed: The U.S.-Israel Relationship from Truman to Obama. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Rynhold, Jonathan (2009a). “Liberalism and the Collapse of the Oslo Peace Process in the Middle East”, The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Vol. 8(1): 45–57. Rynhold, Jonathan (2009b). “The US and the Arab‐Israeli peace process: conflict management versus conflict resolution”, pp. 140–158. In Eytan Gilboa and Efraim Inbar (Eds.), US‐Israeli Relations in a New Era: Issues and Challenges after 9/11. New York: Routledge. Sami, Aziza (27.02–5.03.1997). “Euro envoy backs Copenhagen”, Al- Ahram weekly. Shoval, Zalman (2016). ‫[ דיפלומט‬Diplomat]. Tel Aviv: Yediot Books. Shavit, Ari (08.10.2004). “Weisglass: Disengagement is Formaldehyde for Peace Process”, Ha’aretz Magazine. Slevin, Peter (15.04.2004). “Bush Backs Israel on West Bank”, Washington Post. Tenet, George (2007). At the Center of the Storm CD: My Years at the CIA. New York: Harper Audio. Thomas, Michael (2007). American Policy Toward Israel: The power and limits of beliefs. New York: Routledge. Viggo, Peter Jakobsen and Jens Ringsmose (2015). “Size and reputation – why the USA has valued its ‘special relationships’ with Denmark and the UK differently since 9/11”, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol. 13(2): 135–153. Whitaker, Brian (14.09.2001). “Sharon Likens Arafat to Bin Laden”, Guardian. Yaari, Ehud (03.04.1997). “The Copenhagen Arabs”, The Jerusalem Report. Zinni, Tony (2007). The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America’s Power and Purpose. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Trade.

Interviews Andersen, Lars Faaborg (September 18, 2015). (Head of the Middle East desk at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one of the key drafters of the RoadMap), Tel- Aviv: Personal interview. Brylle, Torben (January 10, 2018). (Head of the Middle East Desk at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Copenhagen: Personal interview.

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Melchior, Michael (March 14, 2018). (Israel Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), Jerusalem: Personal interview. Møller, Per Stig (January 16, 2018). (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2001–2010), Copenhagen: Personal interview. Oldenburg, Christian (January 11, 2018). (Head of the Middle East Desk at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Ålsgårde: Personal interview. Pundik, Herbert (October 14, 2015). (Former editor of the Danish newspaper “Politiken” and founder of the “Louisiana” process), Tel Aviv: Personal interview. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (January 17, 2018). (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 1982–1992), Copenhagen: Personal interview. Vahr, Jesper (April 2016). (Former NATO Secretary General Chief of Staff and Senior diplomat at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Tel Aviv: Personal interview. Weissglas, Dov (October 23, 2018). (Prime Minister’s Ariel Sharon’ head of bureau and a diplomatic delegate for negotiation), Ramat Hasharon: Personal interview.

Websites Elgindy, Khaled (2012, February). The Middle East Quartet: A Post-Mortem. Washington: Brookings Institution, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Analysis Paper, No. 25. (Access date: 07.08.2014) https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ uploads/2016/06/02_middle_east_elgindy_b-1.pdf Leverett, Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett (2009, July). A Road Map to Nowhere. Foreign Policy website. (Access date:01.11.2015) https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/ 07/01/a-road-map-to-nowhere/ Leverett, Flynt (2005, February 23). Speaking for the motion: This House believes that the Middle East road Map for peace is dead. Doha: The Doha Debates. (Access date: 28.11.2018) https://archive.dohadebates.com/debates/playerd1b4.html?d=28 The Prime Minister of Denmark’s Archive website Statsministeriet - Denmark Prime Minister website (2002a, June 14). Priorities of the Danish Presidency – From Copenhagen to Copenhagen. DUPI-conference, New Members - New Deal? Address by Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. (Access date: 28.11.2018) http://www. stm.dk/_p_7374.html Statsministeriet – Denmark Prime Minister website (2002b, September 24). Anders Fogh Rasmussen talks with Yasser Arafat. (Access date: 28.11.2018) http://www. stm.dk/_p_12625.html White House Archive Website The White House website (2003, May 23). Statement by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. (Access date: 28.11.2018) https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/ remarks/2003/20916.htm

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The Middle East draws the attention of those who believe they can achieve their self-interest by being involved in an international arena known for its contentious and bloody history. They believe it is an arena that will challenge their statecraft skills and at the same time, promote their standing in the international community. Their involvement will include economic incentives that also benefit their own country. Their objective is to elevate their status among nations and to have more respect and influence in international politics. In particular, they are looking to cultivate a relationship with superpowers, in this instance, the United States. Such an alliance can be seen as a defensive and protective measure for their home country. Aided by an international consensus to promote an agreement, the Scandinavians volunteered their mediation services to the Israelis and the Palestinians in what became known as the Oslo Peace process. Indeed, the Oslo process involving Norway, Sweden and Denmark, was made possible in large part thanks to many previous attempts to resolve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Tactically, they knew that an alliance with the Americans would make it difficult for the parties to shake off the talks and the framework of understandings they might generate. American backing would strengthen the attractiveness and authority of Scandinavian conflict mediation policy. The Scandinavians knew also that conflicting countries did not want to be viewed as peace-refusers by the international community. They too were seeking legitimacy in the eyes of the superpowers. This desire helped the Scandinavians initiate the Oslo process and convince the parties to join them at the negotiating table. Aside from their desire to bring relief to the region, the Scandinavians decided to engage in Middle East diplomacy because of the future benefit it held for their countries and for themselves professionally. After all, they reasoned, Scandinavian diplomats were expert in diplomatic statecraft. They entered the process sincerely and over time, with increasing sophistication. Each country learned from the efforts of the others and together they honed Scandinavian soft-power mediation skills into a well-planned, smart diplomatic strategy. During the process, no one knew if their efforts would yield DOI: 10.4324/9781003365198-6

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results. They couldn’t know that they were about to face challenges that, as hard as they worked, were beyond their expertise and expectations. The Scandinavians came face to face with passionate cultures with pronounced national identities that were threaded with violence and lived with an evasive communication style that Westerners label as false. Politics in the Middle East were complex and could not be changed with a handshake on the lawns of the White House. In this book, the term soft power was extended to describe the diplomacy of the Scandinavians regarding their efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The essence of soft power diplomacy was to persuade the conflicting parties to join in open, respectful and honest dialogue. Soft-power persuasion aimed at finding common understandings that served the interest of both parties. Scandinavian soft power efforts offered the parties a number of attractive benefits. They offered the parties an unofficial format wherein any common understandings would be non-binding. The parties were invited to participate in a remote location away from the pressures and intensity of political centers, away from public scrutiny. Secrecy was paramount and was considered a pre-requisite of the talks. They would hold the talks in an informal, trusting atmosphere where participants could speak honestly, openly, without reprisal. The mediators would conduct discreet communication between the parties. Lastly, the Scandinavians would fund all meetings. Allowed to test each other without fear of exposure or premature criticism, parties engaged in unofficial diplomacy could be more generous and expansive with one another than with a tough-minded diplomat who negotiated against the reality on the ground in an official capacity. As such, one weakness of soft power diplomacy became apparent in all phases of the Oslo process. Away from the pressure and the reality of the conflict, the amiability of the participants and the visionary talks generated expectations that were not fulfilled. Along the arc of the Oslo negotiations, the Scandinavian mediators expanded the framework of the talks in a variety of ways. Although not their specific responsibility, these extra activities and added personnel helped to strengthen their own involvement. Economic incentives were a true seduction for all sides. Not only did the Scandinavians fund the negotiation channels, they poured most of their economic aid into the hands of the PLO. They engaged actively with NGO’s and other civilian groups to fund Palestinian Authority projects and democratisation activities. One of the weaknesses of the Scandinavian mediators was their inability to stand by agreements that required reciprocal actions in exchange for either further economic aid or further concessions. Pouring in economic incentives may have looked noble from the outside but one of its purposes was to preserve the channel for the mediating countries that were using the process for their own reasons, including increasing their prestige in the international community. Soft power is all about persuasion and convincing the parties to move forward together. A weakness of soft power diplomacy is that the mediators

Conclusion: Observations and Reflections 203 does not have coercive force. Soft-power supports in reaching a resolution in a “cheaper” cost and can avoid all-out war (Nye, 2011). Soft power depends on the self-restraint of all concerned: the mediators, the parties, and their governments. The parties need to agree to a concept other than power politics. Success in soft-power politics depends on self-restraint, compromise and courage. Effective mediators can create a political possibility and be prepared for long-term involvement that will promote a fruitful dialogue as the Scandinavian states did over time in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Parties are responsible for their actions and decisions but in heated conflict areas they need a third party to mediate. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger referred to the dilemma at the center of areas of conflict as “The Impossibility of Withdrawal” and “The Inevitability of Negotiation” (Ferguson, 2016: 674). Governments are interested in alternatives to explore outside the parameters of official diplomacy and understand that an unofficial channel may contribute to the continued involvement of small states as negotiators. In general, soft-diplomacy tracks are influential when they are related to an official peace process. The need for both official as well as unofficial dialogue processes maintains the status of mediators over time. The Scandinavians used soft power to develop a smart, sophisticated political strategy and engaged international actors and organizations to provide the coercive, hard power element. In this way, Scandinavians acknowledged that hard power was a necessary factor in a successful diplomatic policy. It showed also the patience and consistency of soft power negotiations were able to yield real results. Soft-power diplomacy was more than just a form of conflict resolution or even conflict mediation though it borrowed from some of the techniques in these areas ie: persuasion, trust building, etc. Scandinavian foreign policy initiatives demonstrated that soft power could be an effective complement to a government’s diplomatic arsenal and could at times function as a completely self-sufficient, preplanned, strategic form of political diplomacy. A key element in Scandinavian diplomacy was the secrecy of negotiations and its lack of formality. Historically, Israel preferred secret negotiations to public ones. Due to Arab line toward Israel, conducting any diplomacy required Israel to develop secret communication channels to important Arab capitals. Similarly, the Arab countries preferred secret talks due to public rage in their countries against normalisation with Israel. This factor helped Scandinavians to persuade the parties to negotiate unofficially. It turns out that secrecy is a large umbrella and functions as a shield not only for the participants, but also for the decision makers, and the process itself. The services offered by the Scandinavians were essential to Israel and the way it preferred to negotiate, even though the talks led to political risks Israel wanted to avoid. Secret unofficial dialogue did not necessarily represent legitimacy for the means and purposes of each party, but it did help preserve open channels of dialogue over time.

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Secrecy was an attractive asset in unofficial diplomacy even though not all its consequences were positive. Secrecy could isolate the participants from the reality on the ground and thus talks could develop an idealistic scenario of wishful thinking. Secrecy could seduce the participants into thinking they were actually doing the real work of peace negotiations and they could convince themselves into going farther than their countries’ mandates. The well-known Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen talked about this possibility. He said that when diplomats and leaders got involved in the Middle East process, they started to convince themselves that they had the power to change the region, to bring peace that would last forever. They became attached to this idea and they persuaded themselves “we have the ability to become engaged and close a peace deal. Where everyone else failed, we will succeed” (Jensen, 2018). Moreover, the need to preserve secrecy became a more difficult task as the discussions progressed. In the later stages of the talks, the participants required backing from the political echelon and the cover of states to support them. But the more people who knew about the channel, the harder it was to protect the parties from public exposure. The Scandinavians, the participants and the decision makers risked revealing the existence of the talks too early, let alone the content of the talks. Secrecy wasn’t the only attribute of soft diplomacy that had a secondary negative aspect. On the one hand, the fact that any understandings or agreements were non-binding allowed the participants and sometimes even the decision makers to negotiate freely and without consequence. This ambiguity served the mediators, allowing them to assure the parties that the talks would be not only secret and non-coercive as well. The parties would not be pressured to do anything under obligation. This vagueness reduced opposition and even seemed to make a softer landing with the political echelon and with the public. On the other hand, the non-binding quality of any document that was produced meant it could be vague and even contradict other agreements. It is possible that this built-in ambiguity did not serve the Palestinians. Because unofficial talks were set up as non-binding, the mediators had no authority to enforce implementation of any common understandings or agreements. They could be disregarded and rejected outright without explanation. This caused disquiet and frustration for the mediators. Temptation to exceed the parameters of the talks was strong and became a liability for the mediators. After they were inside the cocoon of the secret and unofficial channel, they did not remain as facilitators, they wanted to exercise more power than their role permitted. Among other factors, this contributed to the confusion and dissolution of the talks and a lack of trust between the participants and the mediator. In addition to restraining their own ambitions, the mediators had to be prepared to take the heat of the “blame game”. Eventually one or more sides would blame the mediator for the failure or inadequate results of the talks. The mediators had to contend with constant

Conclusion: Observations and Reflections 205 criticism against their motives, methods and even their good intentions. The mediators worried that they would be identified with the results of the talks should they fail. The role of the mediator was very challenging. The mediator had to balance competing elements and do it all with aplomb and deep modesty. The mediator needed to prevail over the tactics of previous negotiations where one side tried to gain at the expense of the other side. Negotiations before the Oslo process were always a win/lose competition, where one side looked for what it could extract from the other side. One side had to be more clever than the other. To address such a strategy, a third party was needed who knew how to acknowledge this tactic and knew how to overcome it. Because the talks addressed sensitive topics and were non-binding, any agreement had to be left open for future options. This tactic gave more maneuvering space for everyone. If an agreement was too specific, it was less useful to the parties who wanted room for interpretation and a variety of possible implementation plans. If a time frame was set or specific actions were named, it did not leave room for changes along the way or for the contingency options within the agreement. This ambiguity was known also as “slippery language”. It gave the parties a way out of the negotiations and was aimed also at protecting the participating states in the future (Indyk, 2009). It was on the mediators to find a successful formula to balance multiple considerations with newly arising opinions, directives and events. It was the mediator’s responsibility to find the common goals through the morass of assumptions, criticisms, fears and hidden motivations. It was a heroic task. Their ability to do this was critical to the success or failure of a negotiation. But it was not the only element that influenced the success or failure of the talks. Some mediators were more skilled and self-disciplined, some gave in to their personal bias, some were seduced by the promise of status and recognition and some could balance the need to establish trust and positive relationships with the necessity of drawing a line or daring to speak of reality on the ground directly, honestly and constructively. Mediators from a small country engaged in an unofficial mediation did not speak with the same authority as the leader of a superpower. That was an obvious point but a crucial distinction. building exercises beyond a certain point. They were action oriented and resolute. Mediators did not have such authority or personal presence. However, the time of the negotiation, and especially the period preceding it, was an essential window of time for the mediator to establish authority through extensive knowledge he had gathered about the parties and to present it at an appropriate time. The importance of this stage in the negotiations also predicted the mediator’s ability to determine the chance of success, in other words: Gathering information about the parties and frequent contacts with them was an important tool for mediation and the ability to convince the parties to use the mediator’s services. By doing so, the mediator could assess the appropriate timing for hosting an unofficial process, gather information

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about the parties and find a time frame for formulating an agreement. Denmark did it through the Copenhagen Declaration in 1997 and as part of the Roadmap in 2002, Norway as part of the informal contacts in 1993 through Larsen and Holst and Sweden in 1988 (after the outbreak of the first intifada) and in 1996 after Rabin’s assassination and the terrorist attacks. In a comparative perspective, while the Swedes paved a path for talks between the United States and the PLO in 1988, the Norwegians built a relationship of trust over time that also allowed them to convince Israel and the PLO to promote secret talks in Oslo and pass messages through them. In contrast, Denmark focused on the conflict only after the Declaration of Principles in 1993 and tried to build a broad framework of understanding through Egypt and Jordan within the framework of the Louisiana process, which was added to its role in the formulation of the Roadmap in 2002. At times, the Danes assumed that deceleration in the negotiations embodied encouraging signs towards significant progress. The pressure from Denmark was done within the framework of the talks it conducted in 2002. The Danes worked with the Americans and through the European Union to promote a political plan that would be presented to the parties, instead of persuading the parties to promote an agreed formula. Behind the dramatic breakthrough moments with sometimes petulant participants facing a political conundrum that would not yield to good intentions, there were three Foreign Ministers who approached the negotiations with distinctive style, experience and attitudes that colored if not directed the course of the peace process. For Sweden, Foreign Minister Sten Andersson stood out as an elite career diplomat who held the traditional views on the Middle East and the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Andersson was an experienced, diplomat who tried several different paths of soft power diplomacy. His actions were to favor the underdog which he considered the Palestinians to be. When he wrote to Arafat to congratulate him on his success at Camp David, it may be left to wonder if that was a diplomatic tactic on his part or a sign of his personal commitment to Arafat and his cause. For Norway, Foreign Minister Johan Holst was a very different personality from Andersson. Holst had been Norway’s minister of defense and could speak forcefully to the participants when necessary. Holst was an astute strategist and he was able to identify a crucial moment of opportunity to embark on mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestinians. When he saw the possibility of success, he increased his involvement in the process, moved aside the previous negotiators Terje Rød-Larsen and his wife Mona Juul, to take charge of the process. His espoused a more balanced diplomacy than Norway’s as demonstrated by his commitment to the security arrangements between Israel and the PLO. Implementation of the agreements was of concern to him as well. For Denmark, Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller was yet a different sort of diplomat. A long-time scholar and experienced government official, Møller had

Conclusion: Observations and Reflections 207 an altogether different take on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and his objectives were more modest than either Norway or Sweden. Møller was a coalition builder and he held a vision for the region, not just for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His strategy was to bring the Gulf states, Egypt, Jordan and others, together to discuss normalisation of relations with Israel. He knew how to mobilise the United States and the EU for his diplomatic efforts. And he formulated his initiative carefully, over time with the officials in the Danish foreign office, even drafting a possible “Roadmap for Peace” to present to other states. He engaged in effective shuttle diplomacy to gain favor for the Danish outline. He brought all these factors together to push forward the “Roadmap for Peace”. Like with all the previous attempts at concluding any agreement, the Danes were met with defeat. Furthermore, mediators didn’t criticise the participants directly as it could damage their trust. Thus, they arranged for it indirectly and covertly. This was part of the methodology of Scandinavian soft-power mediation. They avoided direct confrontation with the participants and thus they could increase their maneuvering room. They used international organizations and powerful nations to bring the evaluation and criticism factor to the table. Increasing involvement of international organizations and powerful statesmen prolonged the mediators’ involvement and compensated for their lack of authority and coercive force and for their country’s limited resources. Scandinavian mediators brought credibility and a certain degree of legitimacy to the table, along with their experience and skill. Most of all they brought a commitment to solving the conflict. They demonstrated time and again that they would be steadfast and loyal to the process over time and in the face of great difficulty. They were in it for the long term. Wise statesmen understand that there is a tension between using political power out of necessity and using softer means of diplomacy to serve a political vision. The art of diplomacy is in knowing how to use these approaches, in what measure and when to use them. The most effective strategy is to combine them and skilled mediators know how to use them both. The transfer of the conversations from an unofficial process to an official one was usually defined by changing attitudes, fulfilling promises and finally, identifying practical and formal results. It was always a difficult moment. When a political channel transitioned from unofficial and secret to meetings that were official and public, there was a need to persuade the public in favor of the agreements from which they had been excluded. Cultivating public opinion presented a different challenge. It took place in a demanding and tough environment where emotions were high. It was an environment that was far from the remote quiet places “in Scandinavian forests” where there were no distractions and where it was much easier to be generous and flexible. In the eyes of many, the negotiations that took place in remote places did not put enough weight on the reality between the parties. More significant was the fact that the talks could not address adequately the escalation of violence. When they entered into the transition phase to an

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official status, they had to face the hard realities on the ground along with public pressure, additional government interests, motives and intentions and sometimes they had to accommodate different state actors. The process of soft power diplomacy with its cloak of secrecy was a riskfilled process of probing in the dark for common understandings and a vision for a new Middle East. Going into the unknown, the Scandinavian mediators wanted to be involved but didn’t have control of the process. They didn’t know what the parties wanted to achieve or how they wanted to achieve it. They didn’t know the outcome or the end game. Going into the unknown was a quintessentially creative process which was by definition a fragile, vulnerable exploration that was easily subverted by other interests such as the need for power, the search for fame or the desire for status. The danger to the negotiations was that probing in the dark became like entering a black hole where they might reach the event horizon, the point of no return from which no light escapes. When the participants and the mediators were not able to speak about or curb the violence, it served as an “Event horizon” from which they could not recover. The outcome of the Oslo process was set. There were several fundamental assumptions that the participants and mediators held that worked against a successful conclusion to their efforts. One basic assumption was that an exchange of land for peace would bring an end the conflict. The price of negotiating land for peace was high and the basic assumption throughout the negotiations of the Oslo process no matter who the mediators were was that any agreement or permanent resolution must include land. The land for peace equation turned out to be a simplistic formula to address the conflict. Even with the concessions offered at Camp David and with the Roadmap. All the tools of conflict resolution, trust building, personal relationships and long-term investment in dialogue processes were impotent in the face of the escalation of violence, the Israeli public’s response to it and the Arab world’s response at efforts of normalisation with Israel. The rationale for such actions was that Israel was the stronger state. In the eyes of others, putting pressure on Israel was supposed to solve the conflict. In the eyes of the Israelis, they ignored the serious risks undertaken by Israel. There was another basic assumption about the Oslo talks that worked to its detriment. The term used frequently to describe the Oslo negotiations was Peace talks. This short, straightforward term telescoped the international community’s expectations for the negotiations and reflected their aspiration for the political process. But too often the international community’s focus was only on the possible results of the process. Peace talks bring peace. But these noble aspirations led people to ignore significant factors that were central to the process and essential to tackle in order to narrow the actual gaps between the parties. They are focused on the possibility of an historical breakthrough that would lead to peace, but ignored, denied or belittled elements and necessary decisions that were crucial to any lasting end result. People focused on “peace talks” but ignored the violence.

Conclusion: Observations and Reflections 209 Naïve, wishful thinking in peace making damaged any real possibility of resolving the conflict. Glossing over the very factors that were the true obstacles, looking for peace at any price undermined the very goal they sought. While it is true that unrealistic expectations of the “peace talks” had a deleterious effect on the process, it was also true that aspirations and high expectations kept the talks alive. The Scandinavian countries made a conscious decision to keep talking against all odds. Despite the failures on the ground, despite the chaos and violence, they believed that continued contact between the parties would bear fruit eventually. Only continuing to dialogue could prevent greater bloodshed and destructive clashes. The record of the Oslo negotiations showed that the talks were used in ways other than the pursuit of peace. Sometimes the negotiations were used as a stalling tactic, at other times they were manipulated for other purposes and at most times they served the self-interests of all involved, including the mediators. And yet, it is hard not to admire the patience of the Scandinavian countries, the humility and courage it took to believe in the potential, if not inevitability of peace and to just keep talking. Let the change of attitude catch up to us, the Scandinavians seemed to be saying, we will be ready to take advantage of every advance in good will, and in the meantime, we will avoid outright war and put modesty in front of ambition. It makes sense that the Scandinavian countries chose to be involved in the efforts to bring peace to the Middle East. They had a long standing interest in peace and the study of peace. In fact, the field of peace research was unique to Scandinavia. The Scandinavians were curious about how peace was built, how it was implemented, and how countries could be persuaded to be on their better side. Historically, Scandinavian countries were known to act in concert with one another. And yet in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they chose to act individually. Norway and Sweden clearly competed with one another. Even though Denmark approached mediation efforts with a more modest goal than the other Scandinavian countries, Denmark was careful about what they shared with Norway and Sweden. As a result, cooperation was limited and stemmed mainly from sharing limited pieces of information and not from a broad, shared policy on the Middle East. What might have happened had they decided to pool their limited resources together in their efforts to resolve the conflict? Being small states, there was a creative tension between their desire to influence world affairs in a positive means and the limitations they had in authority and financial resources. This tension was the matrix from which a unique and nuanced model of softpower diplomacy was wrought. The whole area of unofficial diplomacy, once the province of individual rulers in isolated countries, became a joint venture of three small countries that developed an entire field of diplomatic relations complete with a range of pre-planned, flexible strategies. They developed unofficial diplomacy to a new level of expertise, as a professional field of research and a positive force in the world.

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In recent years the Nordic countries continue to stand out in their desire to shape the international order in peaceful ways and sometimes they work together on issues of peace and conflict resolution. In 2009, Scandinavian outline revived the need to discuss the common Nordic foreign and security policy. A series of policy initiatives has shown that these countries are expressing increasing political support for cooperation between them. The Nordics are expected to continue to act separately but also together to strengthen their involvement in peace processes and have even stated that they must make peace the trademark of the Nordic countries. The Scandinavian demonstrated solidarity on many issues, but did not necessarily cooperate in the framework of the contacts between the Israelis and the Palestinians. There was not sharing of political briefing as was done in other regions, with the exception of Sweden and Norway in the days preceding the Oslo process in which they exchanged general information with each other. Apart from the appointments of Scandinavian diplomats to key positions in the United Nations and UN agencies, no long-term cooperation was found between them on the issue of the political process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The cooperation was limited and stemmed mainly from fragments of information and not necessarily from a broad consideration of Norway, Sweden and Denmark on the Middle East, particularly due to the independent policy of each state. There is a good reason for this since conflicts are inevitable, but being so they may also create new and unexpected opportunities, as political processes change according to the circumstances of the time. Although each conflict and political process is unique, there are themes common to international conflicts. Even if the parties should be responsible for resolving the conflict, it is quite likely that other actors will intervene in an attempt to resolve it. Effective mediators can and even should create a political horizon and be prepared for long-term involvement that will also promote a fruitful dialogue through a soft mediation strategy, as the Scandinavian countries did in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote: “Peace is the noblest goal of human endeavor, the affirmation of the ultimacy of man’s moral personality” (Ferguson, 2016). In other words, Kissinger considered “man’s moral personality” to be the foundation of all peaceful endeavors. The best mediation methods did not substitute for a moral personality. While mediation was an art and a whole field of study unto itself, there was the primacy of the main players themselves. What of their motivations and biases, their capacity for generosity, vengefulness and reliability? Per Stig Møller, the Danish Foreign Minister, once wrote that “the Middle East was the graveyard of good will” (Møller, 2017: 267). On its face, this statement might be understood as an expression of disappointment and frustration with the Oslo process but perhaps there is a deeper truth to it. The conflict between peoples in the Middle East will not yield to goodwill alone, no matter how many trust building exercises are presented. On the

Conclusion: Observations and Reflections 211 other hand, it will not yield without it. Perhaps the earnest attempts of goodwilled people did move the process forward, not as they hoped or to the extent that they envisioned but incrementally, and always keeping a door open for future insight, a change of awareness, a recognition of our shared humanity and our ultimate responsibility for one another. The Oslo Process brought Scandinavian countries international recognition and they became famous for their efforts regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Oslo process honed their skills and was a learning process for them. It inspired them to put themselves forward as peacemakers. They discovered that there was an internal, national benefit to this approach. The search for peace as an extension of their foreign policy brought the relationships between politicians and diplomats closer together, allowing them to collaborate more directly and in a more secure way. Working together they were a united force, deciding where to focus their foreign policy objectives and goals. The Scandinavians were able to concentrate their efforts toward peace diplomacy and at the same time ensure respect for their own basic national interests. For centuries, people have asked themselves what will be the condition that will enable us to achieve peace. The Middle East is no different. Driven by passion, conflict and tragic events, modern times have created new possibilities for reaching these historic goals of harmony, dignity and peace among neighbors. Surprisingly, curiously even, far away from the Middle East, three small countries believed they would be the ones to fulfill and serve this vision for the Middle East and to bring peaceful resolution to decades of strife and violence. They put in the time and effort and resources to develop that intellectual inquiry into a diplomatic approach capable of bringing hope where there was only conflict and misery. How would they try to achieve it remained a question and became a quest. Despite the setbacks, they continued to pursue a breakthrough, engaging in an innovative form of diplomacy that in the future could lead to a lasting peace in the region. So much so, they want the world to consider their trademark to be peace. It is important to remember that the historic record is never written once and for all. It is never static. As Henry Kissinger once stated, “You have to know what history is relevant. You have to know what history to extract” (Ferguson, 2016: 835).

Bibliography Ferguson, Niall (2016). Kissinger: 1923–1968: The Idealist. London: Penguin. Indyk, Martin (2009). Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American 20 Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East. New York: Simon & Schuster. Jensen, Uffe Ellemann (January 17, 2018). (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 1982–1992), Copenhagen: Personal interview. Nye, S. Robert (2011). The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs.

Index

Abrams, Elliott 171, 178, 180, 186 Abu Ala 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 46, 49, 51, 56, 105, 107, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 129, 186 Abu-Jihad 85 Abu-Mazen 40, 101, 102, 104–108, 110, 112–113, 115–123, 125–126, 129, 166, 182, 184–187, 189 Abu Sharif, Bassam 18, 37, 86 Abu Zayyad, Ziad 167 Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) 67–69, 71 Ahtisaari, Martti 11, 12 Ahlmark, Per 22, 114 Al-Assad, Hafez 42, 47, 56, 61, 136, 175 Al-Khalifa, Sheikh Muhammad 154 Al-Khuli, Lutfi 145–147, 149, 151–152, 154–155, 157–159, 163–164, 192 Al-Majali, Abdelsalam 149 Al-Maliki, Riyah 150, 153, 160, 163, 167–168, 184–185, 193 Al-Moneim, Abdel Said Aly 145, 161 Al-Qaeda 169 Albright, Madeleine 126, 156 Algiers Declaration 87–88, 90 Andersson, Sten 37, 82, 84–96, 98, 102–104, 113–115, 117–119, 121–122, 128–138, 206 Annan, Kofi 157, 174, 179 Arab League 181, 184 Asfour, Hassan 102, 121 Ashrawi, Hanan 37, 39 Arafat, Yasser 18, 22, 25, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 51, 53–59, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68–72, 76, 84–91, 93–95, 97, 100–112, 114, 115, 120, 121, 122, 124–138, 144, 145, 149, 150, 152, 154, 156, 157, 159, 160, 162, 167, 168, 169,

170, 172, 174, 175, 177, 180, 181, 182, 184, 185, 186, 187, 189, 192, 193, 194, 206 Arens, Moshe 25, 37, 83, 94, 134 Ayalon, Danny 179 Barak, Ehud 62, 113–121, 126–127, 129–131, 137–138, 159–163, 165–166, 188, 192–193 Barghouti, Marwan 150 Bassiouny, Salah 147, 153, 165, 193 Beilin, Yossi 38–39, 43, 46, 49, 51, 56, 60, 62, 68, 77, 85, 97–98, 101, 103–110, 115, 118–120, 127, 130, 133, 135–137, 193 Ben-Ami, Shlomo 77, 117, 120–121, 123–124, 126–128, 131, 137 Bernadotte, Folke 11, 20, 21, 27 Ben-Gurion, David 20 Bildt, Carl 101 Bjurner, Anders 85, 115, 137 Blair, Tony 138, 180 Borten, Per 17 Brundtland, Gro Harlem 18 Brylle, Torben 149, 154 Budtz, Lasse 25 Bush, George W. 169–171, 176–178, 180, 182–183, 186–189, 191, 193–194 Cairo 16–17, 42, 60, 65, 70, 133, 145, 147–149, 153–155, 157–165, 167, 173 Camp David summit 126–129, 131, 138, 165, 167, 173, 181, 184, 188, 206, 208 Christensen, Steen 25 Christopher, Warren 45–46, 57, 70 Clinton, Bill 59, 115, 124, 126, 131, 157 Copenhagen Declaration 150–154, 159, 161–162, 165, 185

Index 213 Dahlan, Mahmoud 119 Declaration of Principles (DOP) 36, 43, 52, 56, 59–60, 62, 64–65, 73, 109, 116, 206 Disengagement plan 186–188, 195 Ejegod, Erik 10 Egeland, Jan 37–39, 42–45, 50–52, 58, 60, 68, 77, 95 El-Baz, Osama 45, 145, 148 Ellemann-Jensen, Uffe 25, 143, 204 Engstad, Paul 18 Faaborg-Andersen, Lars 172–174, 177–179, 184, 194 Fahmy, Nabil 147 FAFO 38–39, 42, 54, 74, 96, 103 Fälldin, Thorbjörn 22 Fischer, Joschka 176, 177 Force 17, 26, 64 Framework Agreement Permanent Status (FAPS) 123 Frydenlund, Knut 25 Gaza 23, 43–46, 48, 51–57, 59, 64, 69, 72, 83–84, 86–87, 89, 93, 97–99, 108–109, 129, 133–135, 144, 186–188, 194 Geneva 90, 91, 93, 94, 132 Golan Heights 42, 47, 61, 148, 164, 175 Grafstrom, Sven 21 Gur, Shlomo 39 Gush Etzion 124 Gussing, Nils Goran 21 Haber, Eitan 145 Hamas 40, 66, 129, 150, 163, 164, 175 Hækkerup, Per 24 Halevi, Efraim 61 Hammarskjöld, Dag 10 Hamre, Sverre 18 Hansen, Rolf 18 Hebron Agreement 77, 157 Hedtoft, Hans 24 Heiberg, Marianne 36, 38, 58 Hezbollah 66, 164, 175 Hirschfeld, Yair 39, 40, 43, 46, 49, 51, 52, 101, 102, 144 Hjelm - Wallén, Lena 102 Holst, Johan 18, 36, 38, 43–44, 46, 49, 51–57, 68–69, 70–71, 96, 97, 135, 206 Humlebæk 146

Hussein, Saddam 41, 76, 93, 103, 135, 136, 189 Husseini, Faisal 37–40, 43, 109–111, 160, 167, 193 Indyk, Martin 120, 188 Institute of Arab Studies 109, 110, 111, 112 Intifada 77, 83, 84, 93, 127, 132, 133, 150, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 173, 181, 182, 185, 187, 206 Interim Agreement 58, 59, 65–68, 70, 73–74, 76, 84, 103, 105, 107, 108, 156, 157, 166 International Assistance to the Palestinian Police (COPP) 69 Islamic Jihad 66 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 41, 58, 62, 65, 77, 113, 172, 181, 187 Iran 50, 66, 83 Iraq 41, 50, 76, 83, 93, 103, 135, 136, 169, 170, 171, 177, 182, 189, 190, 191 Jagland, Thorbjørn 17 Jarring, Gunnar 11, 21, 22 Jensen, Knud W. 145 Jericho 48, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59 Jerusalem 10, 15, 16, 27, 38, 40, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 62, 67, 83, 84, 86, 92, 95, 98, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 119, 120, 124, 127, 131, 133, 136, 137, 148, 151, 152, 154, 155, 156, 161, 163, 165, 167, 170, 172, 173, 183, 185, 193, 194 Jerusalem Institute 110–112 Jordan 17, 23, 25, 41, 42, 46, 47, 48, 53, 54, 55, 60, 61, 62, 65, 72, 83, 84, 87, 91, 131, 133, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 151, 156, 158, 162, 164, 167, 170, 173, 178, 181, 189, 193, 206, 207 Jordan Valley 48, 105, 131, 144 Judea and Samaria 58, 175, 188 Juul, Mona 43, 44, 45, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 77, 206 Kauffmann, Henrik 24 Kimche, David 22, 77, 84, 145–147, 150–154, 158–160, 162–163, 168, 184, 192–194 King Hussein 17, 25, 46, 48, 84, 133, 144, 145, 149, 152, 164 Kissinger, Henry 48, 59, 203, 210, 211

214

Index

Krag, Jens Otto 24, 25; Kurtzer, Daniel 45, 49, 162, 193 Kuwait 18, 41, 103, 135, 136 League of Nations 10, 11 Lebanon 17, 18, 23, 25, 40, 41–42, 66, 71–72, 99, 133, 137, 152, 161, 162, 183 Levy, David 150 Lie, Haakon 16 Lie, Trygve 10, 15, 20, 24 Likud 83, 133, 147, 150 Lindh, Anna 115, 118 London 39, 40, 42, 46, 117, 119, 136, 158 Longva, Hans Wilhelm 17, 18, 39, 40 Lipkin Shahak, Amnon 113, 114, 116, 117, 126, 127, 133 Louisiana Museum 145, 146, 189 Lykketoft, Mogens 165, 172 Malley, Robert 120 Meridor, Dan 147 Miller, Aaron 115, 120, 124, 126, 190 Mitchell, George 169, 170, 172 Møller, Per Stig 171–186, 188–190, 192, 194, 206, 207, 210 Moratinos, Miguel 153, 183, 193 Morocco 135, 147 Mossberg, Mathias 84–86, 93–95, 115, 121, 122, 138 Moussa, Amr 147, 148, 160, 165 Mubarak, Hosni 145, 147, 148 Nakba Day 122 Netanyahu, Benjamin 67, 106, 112, 137, 144, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153–161, 163–164, 193 Nilsson, Torsten 21 Nobel Peace Prize 12, 65, 71, 75, 97, 163 Nordic mediation 6, 11, 12, 13, 134, 210 Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) 18, 67, 77 Nuder, Pär x Nusseibeh, Sari 150, 151, 192 Oldenburg, Christian 155, 156, 192 Olmert, Ehud 110; Olsen, Kjeld 25 Operation Defensive Shield 176, 187 Oscar II 10 Palme Center 100, 103, 105, 106, 109, 110–112, 129, 135 Palme, Olof 22, 85, 95, 102, 113, 114, 118, 128

Paris 55, 60, 69, 194 Partition plan 10, 16, 20, 21, 27 Pedersen, Geir 39, 52 Persson, Göran 113–124, 128–131, 137–138 Petersen, Jan 15 Petersen, Niels Helveg 148, 172 Powell, Colin 86, 169, 170, 171, 178, 179, 180, 182, 186, 187, 195; Pundak, Ron 39, 42, 43, 46, 49, 51, 52, 60, 77, 93, 101, 102, 143, 144, 154, 166, 184, 192, 193 Pundik, Herbert 143–147, 149–152, 155, 160, 165–167, 184–186, 189, 192–194 Qatar 17, 147 Quandt, William 88 Quartet 143, 174, 176, 178, 179, 182, 183, 185, 186, 188, 194 Rabin, Yitzhak 17, 39, 40, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 59, 61, 64, 65, 66, 71, 76, 83, 97, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 113, 115, 155, 156, 163, 164, 170, 206 Ramallah 64, 115, 127, 181 Rasmussen, Anders Fogh 171, 178, 191 Rasmussen, Gustav 24 Rice, Condoleezza 177, 178, 186, 187, 194 Rød-Larsen, Terje 38–40, 42–44, 46, 49, 51–56, 58, 63, 65, 66, 70, 77, 97, 98, 131, 135, 194, 206 Ross, Dennis 57, 94, 115, 120, 121, 122, 124–127, 190 Rubinstein, Elyakim 47, 62 safe passage 53, 55, 56 Sagi, Uri 62 Sandström, Emil 20, 27 Satterfield, David M. 177, 178 Saudi initiative 176, 177, 181, 182 Savir, Uri 48, 49, 51 Scandinavian Defense Alliance (SDU) 19 Schori, Pierre 20, 85, 95, 97, 98, 101, 104, 105, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 135, 136 Scultz, George 46, 83, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 134 Security Council 24, 25, 40, 63, 155, 170, 172, 176, 183, 195 Shaath, Nabil 37, 51, 93, 104, 105, 130 Shamir, Shimon 160, 161 Shamir, Yitzhak 25, 37, 83, 93

Index 215 Shapira, Ilan 121 Sharon, Ariel 83, 131, 138, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 174, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 186, 187, 188, 189, 193, 194, 195 Sheetrit, Meir 150 Sher, Gilead 117, 119, 120, 121, 124, 125, 126, 137 Shimon, Peres 40, 43, 46–57, 59, 65, 66, 71, 77, 83, 84, 85, 94, 97, 98, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 133, 137, 144, 145, 154, 156, 160, 161, 163, 169, 170, 174, 175, 184, 186, 187, 193, 194 Shomron, Dan 62 Shudrom, Ahsan 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 164, 168, 193 Singer, Yoel 48, 49, 51 Sneh, Ephraim 51, 77 Söder, Sven-Eric 103, 104, 106, 110, 136 Solana, Javier 131, 184 Special envoy for the Middle East peace process 58, 188 Steen, Johannes 13 Stoltenberg, Thorvald 18, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 54, 95, 97, 134, 192 Suez crisis 16, 21 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) 98, 99, 100, 109, 110, 111, 129, 135 Syria 17, 41, 42, 47, 50, 56, 61, 113, 116, 120, 136, 148, 152, 158, 161, 162, 164, 175, 183, 194 Taba 65, 131, 184 Tabor, Hans 24

Tal, Israel 61 Temple Mount 127, 144, 145, 166 Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) 63, 64, 77, 130, 137 Tenet, George 169, 170, 172 Thant, U 21 The International Peace Alliance 152 Thurgotsdatter, Boedil 10 Tore Godal, Bjørn 71 Tunis 38, 47, 52, 53, 54, 56, 68, 69, 84, 85, 87, 91, 101, 134 Undén, Östen 19 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 20 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 17, 18 United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 58, 70, 109 Ugglas, Margaretha 102 Vollebæk, Knut 71 Washington 24, 38, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 57, 59, 62, 64, 65, 69, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 115, 136, 179, 183, 189 Weissglas, Dov 187 Wye River 156, 157, 163 Ya’alon, Moshe 187 Yatom, Danny 119, 120 Yishuv 10, 20 Yom Kippur War 16, 22, 59, 192 Zinni, Anthony 169, 170