Transportation and National Defense [Reprint 2016 ed.] 9781512808544

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THE EDWARD EUGENE LOOMIS FOUNDATION LAFAYETTE COLLEGE LECTURES

1941

TRANSPORTATION AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

THE EDWARD EUGENE LOOA1IS FOUNDATION LAFAYETTE COLLEGE PUBLICATIONS

The Present Railroad

Crisis

by WILLIAM J .

Transportation

CUNNINGHAM

and National by

JOSEPH L.

WHITE

Defense

TRANSPORTATION AND NATIONAL DEFENSE By JOSEPH L. WHITE Consultant, National Planning

Resources

Board

Philadelphia UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS London: Humphrey

Milford:

Oxford 1941

University

Press

Copyright 1941 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS

Manufactured in the United States of America

FOREWORD was a devoted Trustee of Lafayette College. He did much to bring the college in touch with the needs of modern life. Especially did he take an interest in having students understand something of the problems of transportation. He was a great railroad executive as well as a leader in economic thought. The Edward Eugene Loomis Memorial Foundation was created as an instrument for the dissemination of knowledge in the fields of his interest. Joseph L . White, who gave the lectures on this Foundation in 1941, is an outstanding authority on railroads. He is a graduate of Harvard University in the class of 1906. He served in the engineering and economic departments of the Grand Trunk, the Monon, the Wabash, and the Union Pacific railroads. He has been associated with the Joint New England Railroad Committee. As a member of the United States Civil Service, Mr. White has served in various official positions. These have included the War Industries Board, the United States Railroad Administration, the Division of Transportation of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works, the Federal Coordinator of Transportation, and, at the present time, Mr. White is Economic Consultant to the National Resources Planning Board.

EDWARD EUGENE

LOOMIS

President. V

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I WISH to express my great appreciation to Dr. G. Lloyd Wilson for his advice and assistance in the preparation of the material for this volume, and to Mrs. Doris W h i t nack for making several large color charts, which were shown at the lecture on "Railroad Regulation and the National Defense Program," in addition to assisting me in the preparation of other material. J.L. W.

vi

CONTENTS Chapter Page I. RAILROAD REGULATION AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM ι II. THE GROWTH OF HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION SINCE 1920 20 III. IV.

INLAND TRANSPORTATION BY WAY, PIPE LINE, AND AIRWAY THE ST. LAWRENCE WATERWAY

WATER48 69

FIGURES Figure ι. Railroad System 1940

Page Insert facing 2

2. Federal Aid Highway System 1940 3. Inland and Intracoastal Waterways 4. Pipe Lines: Crude Oil 5. Pipe Lines: Gasoline 6. Routes of Scheduled Air Carriers 7. Estimated Average Daily Traffic on Routes Selected If Operated as Toll Roads 26 8. Existing Highways Following the Approximate Alignment of the Tentatively Selected Interregional Highway System 31 9. Traffic Flow Profiles of the Tentative Interregional Highway System facing 34 10. Census Regions of the United States

ix

40

TABLES Page ι. Class I Railroads, Freight and Passenger Traffic 1911 to 1940, Inclusive 5 2. Estimated Cost of Proposed Interregional Highway System 3. Construction Costs of Highways of Various Widths

37 38

4. Distribution of theSystem Mileage the Proposed gional Highway by ofCensus Regions Interre- 39 5. Cost of Proposed Interregional Highway System Compared with Cost of a Comparable Interregional Railw a y System (Excluding Equipment) 42 6. Freight and Passenger Traffic Density on Proposed Interregional Highway System, and on Comparable Interregional Railway System 43 7. Traffic in 1939 on Inland Waterways with Depth of Nine Feet or Over 49 8. Traffic in 1939 on Inland Waterways (Excluding Great Lakes) with Depth of Nine Feet or Over, Distributed by Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Coast Territories JI 9. Traffic Handled on Inland Waterways by Federal Operations, 1920 to 1939 57 10. Traffic Handled in 1938 by Divisions of Inland Waterways Corporation 59 1 1 . Estimated and Actual Cost of Various Waterway Projects 82

xii

TABLES

Page 12. Probable Tonnage by the St. Lawrence Waterway, as Estimated by Army Engineers and Niagara Frontier Planning Board 88 13. Yearly Loss to Transportation on the Various Studied Commodities, Based on Niagara Frontier Planning Board's Estimated Tonnages and Present Rates via Cheapest Routes 89 14. Yearly Loss to Transportation on Studied and Unstudied Commodities, Based on Niagara Frontier Planning Board's Estimated Tonnages and Present Rates via Cheapest Route 90

I R A I L R O A D

R E G U L A T I O N

N A T I O N A L

D E F E N S E

A N D

T H E

P R O G R A M

INTRODUCTION

chapter deals first with the regulation of railroads which was necessary under the defense program of the First World War, and second with the railroad regulation which so far has been necessary under the present program of National Defense. In order to bring out the reasons for the radically different method of control of railroads that was required in the defense program of the First World War as compared with the regulation which so far has been satisfactory in the present emergency, there will be outlined for both periods: ( ι ) The transportation facilities of the country; and (2) the operating, labor, and financial conditions on the railroads which resulted in the type of control used in each period. THIS

TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES OF T H E COUNTRY I N

1916

In 1916, prior to our entry into the World War, the inland domestic intercity transportation of the United States was practically all handled by the railroads, the only material exception being the large movement of traffic by vessels on the Great Lakes. Transportation of I

2

TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE

crude oil by pipe line had been in effect on a relatively small scale since 1879. There were 23,797 miles of interstate crude-oil trunk lines in 1919 as compared with 53,641 in 1939. There were no pipe lines for refined petroleum. The development of the great modern system of inland waterway transportation on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers and their tributaries, received during the First World War, was in its infancy, and the enlargement of the Erie Canal into the N e w York State Barge Canal was not completed until 1918. Intercity transportation of passengers and freight by highway was negligible, and by airway was nil. The present mileage of the transportation systems by railway and by the Great Lakes is substantially the same as in 1916; but now we also have the great auxiliary systems of transportation which have been developed by highway, inland waterway, pipe line, and airway. These auxiliary systems of transportation play an important role in the transportation of passengers and freight. Description of Maps

The relative extent of this Inland Transportation System now and in 1916 is shown by the six maps on folded insert. Figure ι shows the railroad network of today, which has not changed substantially since 1916. Add the routes by the Great Lakes and about 24,000 miles of pipe line and you have the Inland Transportation System of 1916. Figure 2 shows the network of principal highways over which the greater part of the intercity freight and passenger traffic moving by highways is transported.

t o СЛ er LU о τ ω h - σ> E < ιό tr ω ω £r ш Ο ί< t ο •Ζ. Ο

о 3 &

RAILROAD REGULATION

3

Figure 3 shows the Inland Waterways, Figures 4 and 5 the present system of pipe lines for carrying crude and refined petroleum, respectively. Figure 6 shows the routes of the Schedule Air Carriers in the United States. The airways represent the only new medium of inland intercity transportation that has been developed since 1916, as transportation by railway, highway, waterway, and pipe line to a greater or less extent was existent then and for many years previous. In visualizing the present Inland Transportation System of the United States therefore, we must supplement the railways and Great Lakes as shown on Figure 1 with the auxiliary systems of transportation by highway, waterway, pipe line, and airway as shown on Figures 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Traffic Handled by the Railroads 1911 to 1940, Inclusive

from

Table ι gives by index numbers a comparison of the ton-miles and passenger-miles handled on the Class I railroads from 1 9 1 1 to 1940. The freight and passenger traffic in 1916 represented substantially all of the intercity freight traffic, except that handled on the Great Lakes during the open season, and 98% of all passenger traffic, including that on the Great Lakes. This table brings out the tremendous increase in both freight and passenger traffic in 1916, 1917, and 1918, following the slump in 1915, the first year of the war before the manufacture of large quantities of war materials for the Allies began in this country. When it is realized that in 1917 the railroads handled

4

TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE

one-third more ton-miles than in 1913, the previous high year, and 58% more than in 1 9 1 1 , and that passenger traffic also during the war period showed substantial increases, the strain on the railroad transportation machine in 1917 is apparent. Furthermore, except for the Great Lakes and the coastwise steamship lines, the railroads constituted the entire transportation machine of the country, and the water transportation lines played only a very limited part in the inland movement of food and war materials from the interior to the ports for export to Europe and the movement of troops and supplies to cantonments, and from cantonments to ports for embarkation to Europe. When the railroad transportation machine became clogged in the latter part of 1917, a grave emergency arose and prompt and drastic measures were necessary.

CONDITIONS ON T H E RAILROADS IN

1917

Let us now examine in more detail the conditions on the railroads in 1917 which caused the congestion in the latter part of 1917, and led to Federal lease and operation during the war emergency. Operating

Conditions

In 1917 the Railroad War Board, consisting of a group of railroad presidents, tried to pool the facilities and coordinate the operations of the railroads in order to use the railroad plant to its utmost efficiency in the war-time emergency. Their patriotic efforts failed chiefly because: First, the earnings of some railroads would have been seriously affected through the necessary routing of traf-

R A I L R O A D

R E G U L A T I O N

TABLE I

Class I Railroads FREIGHT AND PASSENGER TRAFFIC 191 I TO 1940, INCLUSIVE

Index Numbers ι$ιι — too

Index Numbers 1911 = too

Year

Freight revenue ton-miles (millions)

1911

249,843

100

1912 1913

259,982

104

32,37" 32,316

297,723 284,925

119

33,875

105

114

34,567

107

273,94

I 10

3I>79°

98

34,586

107

39477 42,677

122

46,358 46,849

«43

37,34

««5 110

1914 191J 1916 1917 1918 1919

362,444 394465 4°5,379

145 158 102 I46

1920

364,293 410,306

1921

306,840

1922 1923

339,285

I23 I36 165

1924 1925

4I2,727 388,415

164

Passengermiles (millions)

З5470

100 100

«32 «45

37,957 36,091

117

35,95O

III

35478 33,650 31,601

I 10

III

413,814

45 166

1926 1927 1928 1929

443,746

178

428,737 432.9IJ 447,322

172

383,45°

«53

3«,°74 26,815

96

1930 1931

309,225

124

21,894

68

1932

94 100

'934

233,977 249,223 268,711

'935

282,030

1936

«933

1937 1938 '939 1940

«73 179

104 98 83

16,971

52 50

108

16,341 18,033

"3

18,476

57

339,246 360,620

136 144

22,421

69

290,084

116

24,655 21,629

67

333>438

133 149

373,225

22,651 23,770

56

76 70 73

Source: Statistics of Railways in the United States Interstate Commerce Commission, Washington, D. C.

6

TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE

fic to provide the greatest efficiency for the railroad transportation machine as a whole, and this naturally prevented fullest cooperation. T h e Department of Justice did not feel it had authority to waive the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust law and permit pooling of revenues and facilities to relieve these inequalities between roads. Second, the various government departments issued priority orders indiscriminately to expedite the transportation of materials without regard to the necessity for the expedited movement. Under private operation, the railroads were not in a position to question the relative priority of these orders. This resulted in serious congestion on the railways at the ports, in the shipyards, and in the Pittsburgh District, and was, I believe, the compelling reason for taking over the railroads in the last days of December 1917. It was necessary to have a Director General of equal rank with cabinet officers in order to stop this indiscriminate issue of transportation priority orders and give preference to essential war materials in the order of actual requirements.

Labor Conditions Prior to 1917, railroad employees generally with the exception of the train service employees were paid substantially lower wages than employees doing similar work in other industries. The unions, except the train service brotherhoods, were not strong, and the present national scale of wages and standardizations of rules and working conditions which have made for higher wage costs had not been established. The success of the train service

RAILROAD REGULATION

7

brotherhoods in 1 9 1 6 in establishing a basic eight-hour day through the Adamson Act, and the rapidly increasing wages during 1 9 1 7 of employees in war industries, gave impetus to the demands of the Railroad Shop Employees for higher wages and the establishment of the eight-hour day, and these demands were pending at the end of 1917.

Financial Conditions T h e railroads were unable to secure prompt action by the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1 9 1 7 in the matter of general rate increases to meet the rapidly increasing labor and material costs. This resulted in a serious reduction in the profit margins in the latter part of 1917, and there was prospect of actual operating losses on some roads in 1918. Furthermore, on account of these declining profits and also the Liberty Loan drives, many railroads were unable to finance necessary additions and betterments to plant and equipment to meet war conditions. In 1917, therefore, operating and financial conditions were such that effective private operation of the country's transportation system became impossible, and complete Federal control and operation was necessary in order to win the war.

Results of Federal Control and Operation in the War Emergency of 1918 On taking over the railroads in the closing days of 1 9 1 7 , the President appointed as Director General W . G . M c -

8

TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE

Adoo, Secretary of the Treasury. Mr. McAdoo filled both offices and with his great prestige soon straightened out the indiscriminate granting of transportation priorities which had been the immediate cause of the breakdown of the transportation machine. During the first few months of Federal control, the Director General of Railroads also stabilized the labor situation, both by equalizing the prior inequalities between railway wages and those of other industries and by giving additional increases to compensate for the increased cost of living. This caused a tremendous rise in operating expenses which the railroads under private operation would have been unable to meet without prompt and adequate action by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Based on the experience of 1917, such action probably would not have been forthcoming. On the other hand, the Director General of Railroads could act promptly and did so by making a general increase of about 25% in freight and passenger rates in June 1918. These increases were not sufficient to cover the back pay accruing prior to June 1918 under the orders of the Director General, but they were sufficient to insure government operations being carried on at a profit over the rental paid the owners of the railroad properties subsequent to June 1918 if the war-time volume of traffic had continued. The traffic volume, however, dropped suddenly after the armistice and subsequent operations were at a heavy loss after rentals. T h e Government was able to absorb these losses, which would have bankrupted most of the railroads under private operation, and it also was able to advance funds for

RAILROAD REGULATION

9

additions to the property and new equipment which could not otherwise have been financed during the war. During the Federal Control Period the railroad companies under the Federal Control A c t received from the Government, as rental for their properties, the average annual net railway operating income during the so-called Test Period, the three years ending June 30, 1 9 1 7 . As this Test Period represented a period of substantial earnings for most of the railroads, a rental based thereon stabilized earnings on a satisfactory basis for the railroads as a whole during the war period, and all interest and dividends that had been regularly paid during the Test Period were continued, and this in turn helped to stabilize the financial markets. B y taking over the railroads on these terms the Government undoubtedly saved the corporations from the financial losses that would have occurred from the violent fluctuations in traffic and the difficulties under private operation of adjusting freight and passenger rates to cover increased wage and material costs. T h e country would have had a series of railroad receiverships like those of the recent depression, with serious dislocation in the financial markets. This, in turn, would have interfered seriously with the success of the Liberty Loan drives for financing the war. Under conditions that existed in 1917, therefore, Federal control and operation of the railroads was necessary not only to meet the transportation requirements of national defense, but also to stabilize conditions in the financial markets of the country.

TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE RAILROAD REGULATION UNDER THE PRESENT N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E PROGRAM

Let us now turn to the present war emergency and review present conditions both as to the transportation facilities in the country, and the conditions on the railroads at the end of 1939. By that time the present war had been going on for several months, the English and French were buying munitions in this country, and the situation, in a general way, was comparable to 1916. Transportation Facilities in 1939 The general transportation picture in 1939, however, was vastly different from that in 1916. While the railroads were still the backbone of the transportation machine, they no longer constituted practically the entire inland transportation plant for passenger traffic and, excluding the Great Lakes, for freight traffic. Development of Neiv Forms of Intercity portation Since 1920

Trans-

The extensive use of trucks during the World War, followed by improvements in the gasoline engine and in motor vehicles and the rapid extension of surfaced intercity highways all over the United States, gave a great impetus to highway transportation after 1920. This growth in highway transportation between 1920 and 1940 is reflected in the registration of passenger cars and motor trucks by decades since 1900 as follows:

RAILROAD

11

REGULATION

REGISTRATION OF MOTOR V E H I C L E S

Jan. ι 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940

Passenger Cars

Motor Trucks

3,200 305,950

6,77 Ь ° 7 4 23,121,589 26,201,395

6,050

794,3 7 2 3β79- 8 54

4,413,692

Total 3,200 312,000 7,565,446 26,501,443 30,615,087

Source: Automobile Facts and Figures, 1940, Automobile Manufacturers Association. Transportation on the Mississippi and Ohio River systems, the Erie Canal, and other inland waterways which had been an important factor in earlier days but had become relatively insignificant in the beginning of this century was revived after 1920 and now has become an important factor in the transportation of bulk commodities. Transportation of crude oil by pipe line has doubled since 1920, and gasoline also has been transported by pipe line since 1926. Another mode of transport—airways—also has come into the transportation picture since 1920. This newest f o r m of transportation has become an important factor in only the last five years, but its effect on passenger transportation as well as on mail and express transportation promises to be far-reaching. T h e extent of these supplementary systems of transportation is indicated by the maps previously discussed which show the vast network of highways, inland waterways, pipe lines, and airways which were not available f o r transportation in 1 9 1 6 and must now be added to the rail-

i2

TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE

w a y network in appraising the total transportation facilities of the country. Expressed in units of service performed, the railroads in 1 9 3 9 handled 6 3 % of the intercity freight ton-miles, and these supplementary systems of transportation handled 3 7 % . On the other hand, in passenger transportation the railways handled only 8.6% of the intercity passengermiles, the highways handled 90.7% and inland waterways and airways 0 . 7 % . It should be noted that not all of this great increase in passenger traffic on the highways represents a diversion from the railroads. T h e greater portion of this is due to a general increase in the travel habits of the people. Conditions on the Railroads in 1941 Let us now consider conditions on the railroads in 1941 in order to determine whether there exist any of the conditions of 1 9 1 7 which made Federal control and operation necessary in the previous emergency. Operating Conditions T h e railroads have made extensive additions and improvements to their plants since 1918, particularly with respect to additional main track, yards, and terminals, block signals and other devices f o r expediting traffic. In 1929, prior to the depression, they handled 1 0 . 3 % more freight traffic measured in revenue ton-miles than in 1 9 1 8 . T h e peak of railroad car loading usually comes in the autumn. T h e railroads handled 1,200,000 cars during the peak week of 1929 as compared with about 1,000,000 cars in the peak week of 1918, an increase of 2 0 % .

RAILROAD REGULATION

13

So far as passenger traffic is concerned, the railroads handled in 1929 only 72.8% of the passenger-miles of 1920. It is true that while railroad tracks and terminal facilities are substantially the same as in 1929, there has been a substantial reduction in the number of locomotives and cars on account of the severe falling off in freight traffic during the depression. A comparison of the decrease in the traffic requirements and in equipment of Class I railroads in 1939 as compared with 1929, shows the following: Freight revenue ton-miles decreased W e e k l y peak carloadings decreased Passenger miles decreased

2

Number of locomotives decreased Aggregate tractive power of locomotives de-

26.2%

creased Number of freight cars decreased

18.8% 27.5% 22.2%

Aggregate capacity of freight cars decreased Number of passenger train cars decreased

5-5% 28.4% 2 7 . 9 %

26.3%

It should be noted that the character of the equipment has been greatly improved by the retirement of a large number of old light locomotives and cars. For example, the average tractive power of the locomotives has increased 1 2 . 5 % and now is over 50,395 lbs. T h e average capacity of the freight cars has increased 7.3 % and now is approximately 50 tons. Many of the old wooden passenger coaches have been replaced by modern, lightweight,

i4

TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE

all-steel coaches, and most of the cars in main line express train service have been air-condiuoned. The railroads also have added a number of high-speed streamline trains and made substantial reductions in the time between important centers, particularly in the West and South. Furthermore, it is hardly conceivable that the traffic congestion of 1917, arising from the indiscriminate priority orders of the various governmental departments, again would be permitted to occur. The Car Service Section of the Association of American Railroads under the direction of Mr. W . C. Kendall, who handled this work for the Director General in 1918, functions smoothly and is in close touch with the Army and N a v y requirements. It is prepared to adopt on a minute's notice the same system that relieved the emergency in 1918. Since 1917, as described previously, there has been a great increase in supplementary transportation facilities by highway, waterway, airway, and pipe line, and the heavy movement of bunker coal by railroads to seaboard which occurred in 1917 now would not be necessary because of the general use of oil as marine fuel. While there have been some spasmodic shortages of special equipment on individual railroads there has been no general shortage of equipment during the peak loading periods of 1939 and 1940, and nothing remotely approaching the congestion in 1917, which required such drastic remedies, has occurred since 1923.

Relation with Employees T h e Railway Labor Act functions smoothly. Furthermore, railroad employees as a class are reasonably well

RAILROAD REGULATION

15

paid, and an equalization of wages with other industries such as occurred at the beginning of Federal control probably would not be necessary. T h e machinery for adjustment of difficulties between the management and employees without strikes has been tested out successfully in numerous instances, and the critical conditions in this respect existing in 1 9 1 6 and 1917 are not present.

Financial Conditions T h e general financial condition of the railroads cannot be said to be as good as it was in 1 9 1 6 and 1 9 1 7 . On December 3 1 , 1939, 69,875 miles of railroad owned, representing $5,862,000,000 of investment in road and equipment and $2,960,000,000 of unmatured funded debt, were in receivership or trusteeship, as compared with only 28,220 miles-owned being in receivership on December 3 1 , 1916. On the other hand, most of the weaker railroads now are in the hands of the court, and any serious disturbance of financial markets arising from anticipated and actual receiverships is past. This has resulted in a more stable financial position than the uncertainties of 1 9 1 7 . T h e Reconstruction Finance Corporation has functioned well in the financial emergency of the depression and is able to take care of any necessary financing of additional equipment or other facilities that may be required in the present emergency. Furthermore, the Interstate Commerce Commission now has authority to permit pooling of railroad revenues, and may be expected to act more promptly in this respect and in the matter of increases in rates to meet the emergency than it did in 1 9 1 7 .

16

TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE

Transportation

Division of the Office of Management

Emergency

Under the conditions existing in 1940 and 1941, as outlined above, it was found that the drastic policy of Federal control and operation of railroads that was essential to the defense program in the First World W a r was not required. There has been no extension of the peace-time government regulation of the railroads by the Interstate Commerce Commission. However, there was created on January 7, 1941, by executive order of the President, a Transportation Division in the Office for Emergency Management, which is a part of the Executive Offices of the President. This Transportation Division is under the direction of Mr. Ralph Budd, President of the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad, and one of the ablest of the many able executives directing the railroad transportation machine. This Transportation Division was first set up as an operating unit of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense which was appointed by the President on May 28, 1940, under authority of a statute passed by Congress August 29,1916. Mr. Daniel Willard, who has recently resigned as President of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, was the Transportation Member of the original Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense, appointed by President Wilson. The function of the Transportation Division of the Office for Emergency Management, as stated in the book-

RAILROAD REGULATION

17

let published by the Information Division of the Office f o r Emergency Management, is as follows: Function.—It is the function of the Commissioner of Transportation to facilitate the coordination of the transportation facilities of the country to meet the requirements under the defense program, to conduct investigations of transportation problems, to anticipate possible shortages, to provide warehousing space, and to make appropriate recommendations. T h e organization of the Transportation Division is as follows: Staff Ralph Budd, Commissioner Karl W . Fischer, Deputy Commissioner A . Francis Swinburne, Executive Assistant Samuel G . Spear, Warehousing Specialist Consultants Harry D. Crooks, Warehousing Alex W . Dann, Inland Waterways (except Great Lakes) Fayette B. Dow, Pipe Lines Charles Gordon, Urban Transit Thomas P. Henry, Private Automobiles

Arthur M. Hill, Busses J . M. Hood, Short Line Railroads Frederick C. Horner, Private Trucking Ted V . Rogers, Organized Trucking C. R. Smith, Transportation (domestic) A . T . Wood, Great Lakes Shipments

A s described by the booklet, the activities of the Division have been as follows:

18

TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE

Activities.—The Commissioner has established relations with each of the major forms of internal transportation through their trade associations, and has appointed consultants in each field. The facilities of the trade associations have been placed at the disposal of the Commissioner, and their full cooperation has been secured. While no great effort has been made to increase the existing transportation facilities generally, the Commissioner has called upon the railroads to undertake to increase the number of freight cars available for use from 1,645,386 on June ι, 1940, to a total of 1,700,000 and to reduce the number of bad order cars to 6 percent. This request is receiving favorable attention by the Association of American Railroads. Effort is also being made to reduce the use of transportation facilities for storage purposes, a practice which greatly impeded the flow of traffic during the World War. According to a recent speech b y Mr. Budd, the total serviceable cars available f o r the peak loading in the autumn of 1941 will be about 100,000 more than on J u l y ι , 1940, or 1,745,000 instead of the 1,700,000 which was the original objective. T h e Association of American Railroads also recently announced a program of freight-car construction f o r 1942 and 1943 which will add over 200,000 cars to the available supply in the fall of 1 9 4 1 .

Conclusion T h e foregoing comparison of the present transportation facilities of the United States and the operating and financial conditions on the railroads with these same conditions prior to our entry into the First W o r l d W a r leads to the conclusion that present conditions are radi-

RAILROAD REGULATION

19

cally different from those that existed in 1917 and do not justify Federal lease and operation of the railroads as a National Defense measure. Some increases in the powers of the Transportation Division of the Office for Emergency Management may be necessary if the railroads fail to coordinate their operations and use the machinery now available promptly in order to prevent congestion. It also may be necessary to give this Division the necessary authority to secure coordination in transportation matters between Government agencies, between individual railroads, and between railroads and other forms of transport in order to meet the transportation requirements of the present emergency. All this, however, can be done without involving the Government in the complicated financial and operating problems which arose during and after the period of Federal lease and operation in the previous emergency. It was estimated by Walker D. Hines, Director General of Railroads, that the Federal operation of railroads which was a necessary war measure cost the Government some $1,123,500,000. T o this should be added $528,980,000, the cost of the six-months guaranty period immediately following the period of Federal control. This makes a total of $1,652,486,000, which represents the cost of the form of regulation of the railroads which was a necessary part of the National Defense Program of the First World War. In view of the tremendous expense of the present National Defense Program, it would seem well to avoid at this time the great and unnecessary expense of Federal control and operation of the railroads.

II T H E G R O W T H OF H I G H W A Y

TRANS-

P O R T A T I O N S I N C E 1920 THE growth of intercity highway transportation since 1920 has been so remarkable and reflects such a change in the travel habits of the American people that it seems appropriate to describe in some detail this great system of auxiliary transportation. Transportation by highway, of course, is not new. In fact, it is the oldest form of inland transportation known to man where river transportation was not available. In this country highway transportation by stagecoach and wagon constituted practically the only form of inland intercity transportation between the colonies and later between the states until the construction of the Erie Canal and other canals in the early part of the nineteenth century. The canals were followed by the railroads, and for the next hundred years intercity transportation was chiefly handled by railway and waterway. The function of the highway was confined to assembling freight and passengers for transportation, that is, to the relatively short hauls between the farm and the nearest railway station or to short-haul delivery service around urban centers. In 1916 the intercity transportation of passengers and 20

HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION

zi

freight by highway still was negligible. A great change, however, in the position of the highway as a medium of intercity transportation was imminent. T h e rapid development of the gasoline engine and extensive use of motor trucks in the First World W a r for the transportation of war supplies and troops gave an impetus to highw a y transportation after the war. Coincident with the reduction in the price of motor vehicles by Ford through the use of mass production and the development of a cheap and efficient gasoline engine, the Federal government carried on a program of Federal aid to states in the construction of this Federal Aid System of Highways. From a f e w miles in 1 9 1 6 this Federal Aid System now has a mileage of 227,000 miles, substantially as shown in Figure 2. This is approximately the mileage of the Class I railroads. In addition to the Federal Aid System of Highways there are 312,000 miles of road under state control and 2,426,000 miles of county roads. This makes a total of 2,990,000 miles of intercity highways, including 25,000 miles of connecting streets through the cities. THE

PUBLIC

ROADS A D M I N I S T R A T I O N

1

T h e part played by the Public Roads Administration of the Federal government in building up this intercity highway system is so important that I am going to describe in some detail the history and present activities of this Government Department. 1 The history of the Public Roads Administration is taken from a mimeographed pamphlet issued by that organization entitled The Public Roads Administration and its Work, revised September 1939.

TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE T h e present Public Roads Administration has had a continuous existence under different names since 1893. In that year the Office of Road Inquiry of the Department of Agriculture was created by A c t of Congress with an appropriation of $10,000 to enable the Secretary . . . to make inquiries in regard to the systems of road management throughout the United States, to make investigations in regard to the best method of road making, to prepare publications on this subject suitable for distribution, and to enable him to assist the Agricultural Colleges and experiment stations in disseminating information on this subject . . . T h i s organization continued in the Department of Agriculture under several different names until 1 9 1 9 , when it became the Bureau of Public Roads and was so called until 1939. Under a Federal reorganization effective J u l y ι , 1939, the Bureau of Public Roads was transferred from the Department of Agriculture to the newly created Federal W o r k s Agency, and its name was changed to the Public Roads Administration. T h e early activities of the predecessor of the present Public Roads Administration were devoted chiefly to cooperating with the f e w state highway departments then existing in the development of the technique of modern highway construction. W h e n this Government agency first began its work there were only two state highway departments—New Jersey and Massachusetts. N o w , largely through its influence, there are highway departments in all of the states.

HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 T h e influence of the Federal Government in developing a system of intercity Highway Transportation really dates from 1 9 1 6 . T h e Federal Aid Road A c t approved by the President on J u l y 1 1 , 1916, called on the Federal Government through the predecessor of the Public Roads Administration to cooperate with the highway departments of the several states in an extensive program of road construction. This A c t provided for an appropriation of $7,500,000 to be expended in five years for the improvement in all states of roads "over which the United States Mails now are or may hereafter be transported." One of the most important provisions of this A c t was the requirement that before any state could share in this appropriation it must first establish a state highway department which in the opinion of the Secretary of A g r i culture was adequate to cooperate with him in the administration of the improvements provided by the A c t . This provision established the principle of state control of highways by competent state highway departments, which had been advocated by the Federal Government. It is interesting to note that this A c t contained a definite mathematical formula f o r the apportionment between the states of the Federal funds appropriated by the Act. This formula provided that the money was to be divided: One-third on the basis of the area of the states One-third on the basis of population One-third on the basis of the mileage of rural post roads and other routes.

24

TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE

T h e amount payable by the Federal Government on any road Avas limited to 50% of the cost and to not more than $10,000 per mile exclusive of the cost of bridges with space of over twenty feet. (This limitation in cost, however, was subsequently removed.) In order to further the principle of state control, the A c t provided that the states should take the initiative and, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture, should determine the roads to be approved and the character of the improvement. T h e states also were required to assume the obligation for maintaining these Federal aid improvements and provide the financial means to insure that this obligation should be carried out. Federal Aid Highway System There was one defect in the Act of 1916, namely, that it permitted a wide dispersion of Federal funds without insuring that a connected artery of highways should result from this Federal aid. This defect was corrected by the Federal Highway Act of 1 9 2 1 . This A c t provided that the Secretary of Agriculture and the several state highway departments should jointly designate a system of important interstate and intcrcounty roads which would constitute a Federal Aid Highway System upon which all future Federal appropriations should be expended. This system was limited to 7 % of the total road mileage of the United States. The present Federal Aid Highway System which has been developed as a result of the principles established by the A c t of 1921 comprises 227,000 miles. Practically all of these highways which were designated in 1921 as the

HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION

25

Federal Aid System of Highways have been improved; about half of the mileage with Federal funds and the balance by state funds without Federal assistance. Up to 1933, Federal assistance was centered in the improvement of the primary Federal Aid System outside of cities. In that year, as a part of the program to relieve unemployment, the Federal Aid program was broadened to include railroad grade crossings and secondary roads. Appropriations for the Federal Aid Highway

System

Federal Aid authorizations in 1917 were $5,000,000, and increased to $200,000,000 in 1938 and 1939. In 1940 and 1941 the amounts authorized were $135,000,000 and $ 160,000,000, respectively. The distribution of the 1940 appropriation was as follows: On the Federal Aid System including extensions through cities $ 100,000,000 Federal aid on secondary roads 15,000,000 Elimination of hazards at grade crossings 20,000,000 $135,000,000 T w o and one-half per cent of the appropriation, or $3,375,000, is available for the expenses of administration and research by the Public Roads Administration. The research work is carried on in cooperation with the state highway departments, the Highway Research Board of the National Research Council, and with other agencies. It is directed toward the solution of the many technical problems that arise in connection with highway

HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION

27

construction and the improvement of the technique of highway engineering. For the purpose of disseminating the result of its research studies the Public Roads Administration publishes a monthly periodical entitled Public Roads. This publication is highly recommended to all interested in the development of our great intercity highway system.

The Interregional Highway System W e have seen that the designation of certain roads as a permanent Federal Aid Highway System has resulted in a connected artery of highways aggregating some 227,000 miles of road, practically all of which have been improved—that is, surfaced. The degree of improvement on these roads varies widely, from the concrete-paved, eight-lane superhighway to the narrow, dusty, two-laned highway surfaced with dirt or gravel. The density of traffic on these 227,000 miles of highway also varies widely, and sections of the highways carrying large volumes of through traffic between large centers of population often are not adequately improved to carry this traffic swiftly and without serious delays at junction points and other points of congestion. T o remedy this situation Congress included in the Federal Highway Act of 1938 a provision (Section 13) which directed the Chief of the Bureau of Public Roads to investigate and report to Congress on the feasibility of building and operating as toll roads six express superhighways. The results of this investigation will be found in Toll

28

TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE

Roads and Free Roads. House Document N o . 272, 76 Congress. Section 13 of the A c t provided that three of these superhighways should run from the eastern to the western portion of the United States, and that the other three should run from the northern to the southern portion. Figure 7 on page 2 6 shows the location of these proposed toll roads and estimated average daily traffic flow on various sections of these highways. The following conclusions may be drawn from the Summary of Findings and Recommendations on pages 1 to 4 of this report: ι. The buildings of the six superhighways as provided in Section 13 to the high standards required by the project is entirely feasible from a physical standpoint. 2. T h e approximate total length of the six superhighways would be 14,3 36 miles, and the estimated total cost would be $2,899,800,000, or an average cost of $202,270 per mile. 3. A conservative estimate of the average annual expenditure for the period 1945-60 required for financing the construction, maintaining the property, and operating the facility for the six superhighways is $ 184,054,000 per year, or an average of $12,840 per mile per year. These estimates are based on a thirty-year loan with annual interest at 2.6% and an additional 2.24% for retirement. 4. T h e most optimistic estimate of toll-paying traffic that can be drawn from existing free highways to these toll superhighways results in an average traffic

HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION

29

per mile per day f o r these six superhighways of 699 passenger automobiles and 175 motor trucks and busses. This estimate shows a variation from a maximum daily average of 5,998 passenger automobiles and 1,500 motor trucks and busses per mile for the section between Jersey City, N . J . , and N e w Haven, Conn., to a minimum daily average of 96 passenger automobiles and 24 motor trucks and busses per mile for the section between Spokane, Wash., and Fargo, N . D . (See Figure 7). 5. On the bases of these estimated traffic averages and assumed toll rates of 1 cent per vehicle mile f o r passenger cars and 3.5 cents per vehicle mile for motor trucks and busses, the maximum toll collections for the six superhighways are estimated as $84,007,000 for the year i960 and an average of $72,140,000 per year f o r the period 1945-60. 6. A s these estimated average annual toll collections of $72,140,000 f o r the period 1945-60 are substantially less than the estimated annual expense for this period of $184,054,000 (in fact only 3 2 % of the requirements), it was concluded that a direct toll system on these six superhighways in their entirety would not be a feasible means of recovering the entire cost of the facilities. While the toll collections varied on different sections of the superhighway, only two sections from Philadelphia, Pa., to N e w Haven, Conn., showed estimated receipts per mile in excess of the annual cost. Between these points, the estimated annual receipts averaged 1 0 6 % of the annual costs.

3o

TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE 7. If Congress wished to try out a limited mileage of toll roads, it was recommended that such section be between Washington, D.C., and Boston, Mass., where there would be a reasonable expectation of recovering the cost of the project through tolls.

The discussion in this report led to the conclusion that instead of a system of toll roads there should be developed an interregional system of free highways. There was presented to Congress the general outline of " A Master Plan for Free Highway Development" which called for the full cooperation of the Federal and State Governments. This plan had the following five-point program: ι. The construction of a special, tentatively defined system of direct interregional highways, with all necessary connections through and around cities, designed to meet the requirements of the national defense in time of war and the needs of a growing peacetime traffic of longer range. 2. The modernization of the Federal-Aid Highway System. 3. The elimination of hazards at railroad grade crossings. 4. An improvement of secondary and feeder roads, properly integrated with land-use programs. 5. The creation of a Federal Land Authority empowered to acquire, hold, sell and lease lands needed for public purposes and to acquire and sell excess lands for the purpose of recoupment. Planning the Interregional Highway

System

In the June 1941 issue of Public Roads appeared a very interesting article by Η . E. Hilts, Assistant Chief, Division of Highway Transport, entitled "Planning the Inter-

32

TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE

regional Highway System." 2 This article is replete with maps and tables descriptive of this tentative Interregional Highway System, and is a mine of useful information on this important development in the system of highway transportation. It is a good example of the high character of the research carried on by the Public Roads Administration, and the article therefore will be discussed in some detail. Mr. Hilts' article deals chiefly with the first point of the five-point program above described, but also discusses to some extent Point 2, modernization of the tentative regional system to meet the present emergency, and Point 3, the elimination of hazards at grade crossings on the system. This tentative Interregional Highway System described by Mr. Hilts includes practically all the present interregional routes, and consists of 25,554 miles of rural roads and 3,776 miles of roads in urban territory, a total of 29,330 miles. Figure 8 on page 31 shows the present interregional routes which have been selected for this interregional system. Mr. Hilts' studies show that these routes, on the whole, are the most heavily traveled of all the roads in the Federal Aid System of Highways. These rural roads in the proposed interregional system have about 1 % of the total rural highway mileage of the country, but handle about 11 % of the vehicle miles on these rural highways. When improved as a system of largely limited-access free roads the system will attract additional traffic and will 2 Copies of this issue can be obtained from the United States Government Printing Office at Washington.

HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION

33

handle at least one-eighth of the total rural vehicle mileage. The ample capacity and up-to-date safety devices on these roads also should reduce the number of highway accidents. The bottlenecks of this system are at the cities. This is shown by Figure 9 facing page 34, which is a traffic-flow profile of the tentative Interregional Highway System based on 1937 data. While this system will follow the alinement and incorporate the improvements of the existing routes to be included therein, some deviation from the present direct routes may be necessary to accommodate the larger intermediate towns. So far as the movement through the centers of large cities is concerned, the system will use present facilities where adequate; otherwise limited-access belt lines will be provided. Small communities as a rule will be by-passed. Present Capacity of Highways of Proposed Interregional System It is estimated by Mr. Hilts that, except for short periods of maximum hourly traffic, an average daily volume of 3,000 vehicles per day is within the reasonably convenient discharge capacity of a two-lane highway. On these highways the peak traffic on week-ends far exceeds the average daily traffic for the year. The studies of the Public Roads Administration on typical sections of twolane highways in Virginia, Maryland, N e w York, Connecticut, and Illinois indicate that on roads with a daily average of 3,000 vehicles per day, the volume will reach 7,300 vehicles a day on one day each year, and that the daily volume on the ten heaviest days of the year will ex-

34

TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE

ceed 5,700 vehicles, which is about the volume of a normal Sunday in the summertime. Based on studies of conditions in Massachusetts, N e w York, and Illinois, the typical four-lane highway with an average daily volume of 10,000 vehicles will have a peak day of about 18,500 vehicles, and the ten highest days representing the normal summer Sundays will show a daily volume of 15,000 vehicles. On one modem fourlane divided highway, which is the design proposed as standard for the interregional system, the average daily traffic was 10,000 vehicles per day with a peak of 24,000 vehicles on one day and a daily average of 19,000 vehicles for the ten highest days. It is interesting to note that the relationship of these peaks to the daily average is the same as in the case of the two-lane highways. This seems to indicate that the design of this highway is well adapted to accommodate the average desires of the traveling public. Further analysis of the traffic on these highways gives interesting data of the maximum hourly traffic and speed of vehicles, and shows the care and thoroughness with which this highway research is carried on by the Public Roads Administration. On the two-lane highway carrying an average of 3,000 vehicles per day the peak during any one hour of the year will be 750 vehicles and during the ten heaviest hours will exceed 550 vehicles per hour. On the four-lane highway with average volume of 10,000 vehicles per day, the peak hour will show 1,750 vehicles handled, and the heaviest hour will show 1,450 vehicles per hour. On the divided four-lane highway the peak hour will show 2,500 vehicles, and the ten heaviest hours will average 1,800 vehicles per hour.

HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION

35

Although the traffic in each direction usually balances out during the twenty-four hours of the day, the peaks in each direction do not come at the same hours, and it has been found that as much as 70% of the total peak may be in one direction. This means that the average four-lane highway must accommodate a peak of 1,200 vehicles in one direction during one hour, and the divided four-lane highway must accommodate 1,750 vehicles. It has been found, however, that these traffic peaks on four-lane highways require very little restriction of speed. More detailed studies of the speed of vehicles on better sections of the two-lane and four-lane highways in Massachusetts, N e w York, and Illinois indicate average speeds of 42 to 45 miles per hour during periods of lightest traffic with 1 0 % of the cars traveling 52 to 54 miles per hour or faster, while during periods of heaviest traffic the average speed is 32 to 42 miles per hour, with 1 0 % of the vehicles traveling 48 to 50 miles per hour or faster. On the four-lane highways the average speed is somewhat higher during periods of light traffic, averaging 47 miles per hour with 1 0 % of the vehicles moving 58 miles per hour or faster. During periods of heavy traffic the speed is about the same as on the two-lane highways, averaging 40 miles per hour with 1 0 % of the vehicles exceeding 54 miles per hour. These studies give a remarkable picture of the speed at which traffic moves over the highways between population centers even during the periods of densest traffic. This average speed, however, does not take into account delays at cities and other bottlenecks in the interregional highway system. T h e elimination of these bottlenecks in

36

TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE

order to increase the over-all speed of intercity transportation is the major problem which confronts the Public Roads Administration and the state highway departments. When these bottlenecks are eliminated, one of the principal disabilities of the highway as compared with the railway in speed and comfort of movement of passenger traffic between the centers of large cities will be overcome. Widening

of Present Roads

Required

These studies by the Public Roads Administration indicate that out of the 29,330 miles of the Interregional System about 3,000 miles of highways with two lanes require widening in order to carry the traffic expeditiously. It is proposed that these two-lane highways shall be widened by constructing a four-lane divided highway where average traffic volumes run from 3,000 to 10,000 vehicles per day. If the average volume is in excess of 10,000 vehicles per day additional lanes may be required, but no general standards have been developed and each case will be given special consideration. Cost of

Improvements

Improvements to the 29,330 miles of the proposed Interregional System, in order to bring it up to the standards of design required for a completely modernized highway system, are estimated to cost $5,124,672,000. This cost is divided between the rural and urban sections as follows:

H I G H W A Y

T R A N S P O R T A T I O N

37

TABLE 2 ESTIMATED COST OF PROPOSED INTERREGIONAL H I G H W A Y

Miles of Road

Construction

Engineering and Contingencies

(Thousands )

('!%) (Thousands)

Right of Way (Note) (Thousands)

Rural Urban

25,554 3,776

$2,008,738 1,902,834

$301,311

$150,656

Total

29,330

§3,911,572

$586,736

475*7°8 $626,364

285,425

SYSTEM

Total (Thousands) $2,460,705 2,663,967 $5,124,672

Note—Right-of-way costs arc estimated as 7 . 5 % of construction costs in rural areas and as 2 5 % of construction costs in urban areas.

T h e article points out that the urban cost of modernization is not sufficient to meet theoretically ideal standards, but represents the closest to these standards that are practical. These urban sections, however, would be subject to rapid obsolescence because they would attract a disproportionally large share of traffic, and expenditures eventually required to modernize completely all the main connecting thoroughfares in the cities traversed would be five times the estimates given above. A s compared with these estimated construction costs of $2,008,738,000 f o r the rural sections of the proposed interregional highway to provide a system with modern standards, the estimated cost of emergency improvements of the rural sections for military purposes was $365,657,000. T h e estimated cost of these emergency improvements, therefore, was about one-sixth of the estimated cost of the standards f o r long-range modernizations.

38

TRANSPORTATION AND

DEFENSE

T h e article also contains some interesting data on the construction cost (excluding engineering and contingencies and right of way) of highways of various widths conforming to modern standards as specified by the Public Roads Administration: TABLE 3 CONSTRUCTION COSTS OF HIGHWAYS OF VARIOUS WIDTHS

Rural Sections

Miles in System

Construction Cost Total Per Mile

Two-Lane Four-Lane Over Four-Lane

21,237

$1,149,404,000 741,447,000 117,887,000

$

4,048 269

Total Rural Sections Urban Sections

25,554 3,776

$2,008,738,000 1,902,834,000

$ 82,500 503,900

Total Systems

29,33°

$3,911,572,000

$ 136,800

54,100 183,100 438,900

Comparison between Highway and Railway Construction Costs It may be of interest at this point to compare these construction costs of the Interregional Highway System with the construction costs of 29,330 miles of railway lines located in the same sections of the country. T h e 29, 330 miles of the proposed Interregional Highway are distributed between the census regions of the country as follows:

HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION TABLE 4 DISTRIBUTION OF THE MILEAGE OF THE PROPOSED INTERREGIONAL HIGHWAY SYSTEM BY CENSUS REGIONS

Census Regions

Miles of Road City Rural Total

Eastern Regions N e w England Middle Atlantic E . N . Central

1,070 1,185

227 407

1,297 1,592

2

.797 3,029

628

South Atlantic

3,42 5

549

3,578

E.S. Central

2,002

321

2,323

10,083

2,132

12,215

3,754

452

4,206

372 382

6,082

2,562 3,445

438

2,944 3,883

Total Western Regions

I5.471

1,644

I7,N5

Total U.S.

25,554

3,770

29,330

Total Eastern Regions Western Regions W . N . Central Mountain Pacific W.S. Central

The map Figure 1 о shows the location of these census regions. For the purpose of comparing railroad construction costs (excluding equipment) for a system of railroads comparable by location and extent with the highway construction costs of the proposed Interregional System, the average cost of road per mile (excluding equipment but including general expenses) for typical railroads in each

TRANSPORTATION AND

DEFENSE

FIGURE IO

region or combination of regions was applied to the mileage of the Interregional Highway System in that region. This comparison is given in Table 5 on page 42. It shows that an Interregional System of 29,330 miles of railroad with the mileage distributed between sections of the country on the same basis as that of the Interregional Highway System would have cost $1,842,767,400 or $62,800 per mile, as compared with the cost of $5,124,672,000 or $174,800 per mile, shown above for the modernized Interregional System. These costs in both cases exclude the rolling stock but include cost of right of way and engineering cost contingencies. In both cases the costs are undepreciated. The highway costs are those of the present day, whereas railroad costs represent average costs over the life of the properties. On the basis of Interstate Commerce Commission Valuations these costs should be

H I G H W A Y TRANSPORTATION

41

increased by 1 4 % to represent cost of reproduction at present prices on a basis comparable to the highway costs. W i t h this correction, the railway construction costs would be 41 % of the highway costs. It has been pointed out that the estimated cost of the urban sections of this proposed Interregional H i g h w a y System is substantially understated, but without allowance f o r this underestimate it would appear that the actual cost of the proposed Interregional H i g h w a y System excluding rolling stock would be nearly twice that of a comparable Interregional Railway System excluding rolling stock.

Comparisons of Highway and Railway Traffic A comparison of traffic on the proposed Interregional H i g h w a y System and on the comparable Interregional Railway System is given in Table 6 on page 43. While freight traffic density on the H i g h w a y System averaged only about one-fifth that on the railway system, passenger travel density was ten times as great as on the railway system.

The Planning Surveys

3

Frequent mention has been made in this article of highw a y statistics of various kinds—costs, density of freight and passenger traffic, standards of construction, etc. Most of these data became available through the Planning Surveys which were initiated in 1935 by forty-four states in 3

T h e description of these planning surveys is taken f r o m a paper p r e -

sented before the F o u r t h A n n u a l G r e a t e r Philadelphia S a f e t y C o n f e r e n c e at Philadelphia on S e p t e m b e r 21, 1937, b y Chief

of the Division

of

Highway

Η . E . Hilts, then

Transport

P u b l i c Roads, D e p a r t m e n t of A g r i c u l t u r e .

Assistant

of the U . S . Bureau

of

о.

о о