Transforming Agriculture in Taiwan: The Experience of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction 9781501738104

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Food Systems and Agrarian Change Edited by Frederick H. Buttel, Billie R. DeWalt, and Per Pinstrup-Andersen

Searching for Rural Development: Labor Migration and Employment in Rural Mexico by Merilee S. Grindle

Transforming Agriculture in Taiwan: The Experience of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction by Joseph A. Yager

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TRANSFORMING AGRICULTURE IN TAIWAN The Experience of the joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction

Joseph A. Yager

Cornell University Press ITHACA AND LONDON

Copyright © 1988 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 1988 by Cornell University Press. International Standard Book Number 0-8014-2112-8 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 88-47769 Printed in the United States of America Librarians: Library of Congress cataloging information appears on the last page of the book. The paper in this book is acid-free and meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.

Dedicated to the first members of the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction: Chiang Monlin, chairman, 1948—1964 John Earl Baker, 1948—1952 Raymond T. Moyer, 1948—1951 Shen Tsung-han, 1948—1973 (chairman, 1964—1973) Y. C. James Yen, 1948—1950

Contents

Tables

xi

Acknowledgments

xiii

Introduction The Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction

i i

Agricultural Development in Taiwan 2 Questions Raised by the Success of the JCRR 3 Plan of Study 4

Part One

Early History of the JCRR

1 Beginnings of the JCRR on the China Mainland

7

The Founding of the JCRR 7 Policies and Methods of Work 15 Summary 20 Appendix: Summary of Conversations with Y. C. James Yen

2 Evolution of the JCRR Program on the Mainland Staffing and Organization 24 The Program on the Mainland 25 Expenditures 33 Summary 34

vn

21

24

viii

Contents

3 The Move to Taiwan

35

The Situation in Taiwan 37 The Early Program in Taiwan 39 Summary 41

Fart Two

Increasing Agricultural Production in Taiwan

4 An Overview of Agricultural Development in Taiwan

45

Early Developments 45 The Japanese Colonial Period 47 Developments since World War II 51 Summary 5 6

5 The Period of Accelerated Growth, 1952—1967

58

Agricultural Plans and Policies 5 8 Major Agricultural Developments 61 The JCRR and Its Work 62 Major Program Components 67 Summary 77

6 The Period of Decelerated Growth, 1968—1979

78

Agricultural Plans and Policies 78 Major Agricultural Developments 84 The JCRR and Its Work 85 Major Program Components 88 Summary 97

7 Land Reform

99

Rent Reduction 102 The Sale of Public Land 107 The Land-to-the-Tiller Program no Effects of Land Reform 117 Summary 124

8 Farmers’ Organizations Farmers' Associations 125 Irrigation Associations 136 Fruit-marketing Cooperatives 140 Summary 141 Appendix: The Shu-lin Township Farmers' Association 142

125

Contents 9 Research, Education, and Extension Services Research Facilities 148 Education 153 Extension Services 156 A Note on the Taiwan Sugar Corporation 159 Summary 160

Part Three

Special Programs

10 Increasing the Output of Fish Aquaculture 165 Coastal and Inshore Fisheries 169 Deep-sea Fisheries 171 Fishermen’s Associations 173 Fish-marketing 177 Summary 178

11 Forestry Forestry Policy 180 The JCRR Forestry Program 182 Production, Reserves, and International Trade 191 Summary 193

12 Rural Health Beginnings of the Rural Health Program 196 Rural Health Facilities 197 Disease Control 198 School Health 200 Training Health Personnel 201 Family Planning 201 Environmental Sanitation 206 Food Processing 207 Pollution Control 208 Summary 208

13 International Cooperation Training Foreign Agricultural Technicians in Taiwan 210 Training Chinese Agriculturalists in Foreign Countries 211 Supporting Overseas Technical Assistance Programs 214 Summary 228

Contents 14 Agricultural Development on Kinmen and Matsu Kinmen 229 Matsu 239 Summary 242

Part Four

Retrospect and Evaluation

15 The Changing Role of Agriculture in the Economy of Taiwan Structural Changes 245 Agriculture and International Trade 247 Intersectoral Flows of Labor and Capital 253 Problems and Policies 256 Summary 263

16 JCRR Relations with the Chinese and U.S. Governments Relations on the China Mainland 264 Relations Immediately after the Move to Taiwan 266 Relations during the Period of Accelerated Growth 268 Relations during the Period of Decelerated Growth 276 Summary 277

17 Review and Evaluation of the JCRR Experience Review of the JCRR Experience 279 Causes of Agricultural Progress in Taiwan 285 Transferability of the JCRR Experience 292

Index

Tables

1 Sources of growth in Taiwan’s agricultural production during the Japanese colonial period, 1913-1946

48

2 Sources of growth in Taiwan’s agricultural production after World War II, 1946—1977

51

3 Growth rates of total output, total input, and productivity in Taiwan’s agriculture, and relative contributions of growths of input and productivity to growth of output, 1951-1977

54

4 Major components of JCRR programs in Taiwan in fiscal years 1952, i960, and 1968

68

5 Major components of JCRR programs in Taiwan in fiscal years 1972 and 1976

89

6 Farm machinery in use in Taiwan, 1970, 1975, and 1979

95

7 Scientific and technical staffs of organizations in Taiwan engaged in basic research on agriculture, forestry, and fishing, 1982

149

8 Fisheries production of Taiwan in selected years, 1940— 1982

164

9 Numbers of Taiwan fishing craft, sampans, and rafts in selected years, 1944—1982

165

10 Aquaculture areas and production in Taiwan, 1978

166

xi

xii

Tables

11 Protein consumption by the people of Taiwan, 1973— 1982

178

12 Timber production in Taiwan in selected years, 19531982

192

13 Forest areas and reserves in Taiwan in selected years, i953~i982

14 Taiwan’s exports and imports of timber in selected years, 1961-1979

193

194

15 Number of trainees in JCRR overseas training programs, I95I—I979

2.13

16 Industrial origin of Taiwan’s net domestic product in selected years, 1952-1983

246

17 The international trade of Taiwan: Total trade and trade in agricultural products in selected years, 1952—1980

248

18 Values of Taiwan’s exports of agricultural commodities in selected years, 1952-1980

249

19 Structure of Taiwan’s exports of agricultural commodities in selected years, 1952—1980

249

20 Values of Taiwan’s imports of agricultural commodities in selected years, 1952-1980

250

21 Structure of Taiwan’s imports of agricultural commodities in selected years, 1952-1980

251

22 Nominal rates of agricultural protection in Taiwan, 19551982

252

23 Programs to enlarge the scale of Taiwan’s farming operations: Participating households and area covered in 1983

262

Acknowledgments

This book has benefited from the advice and assistance of many people. The support of two successive chairmen of the Council for Agricultural Planning and Development (CAPD)—Chang Hsien-tsiu and Wang You-tsao—was especially important. They shared and dis¬ cussed their own recollections of the Joint Commission on Rural Recon¬ struction, and they gave me unrestricted access to the old JCRR files and freedom to consult members of their staff on historical and technical questions. The Council for Agricultural Planning and Development also generously covered a large part of the travel expenses for work on this book. In addition, most of this work was written while I was a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution, and I gratefully acknowledge the research facilities and other support provided by Brookings. During the writing process, I consulted many other people who had personal knowledge of the JCRR. I am especially indebted to Ray¬ mond T. Moyer, who read and commented on first drafts of chapters. Others who were generous with their time included Samuel C. Hsieh, Robert C. T. Lee, Tsiang Yen-si, and Y. C. James Yen. Li Kuo-ting and Yen Chia-kan provided valuable insights. I appreciate the comments on an early draft of this book by Ralph N. Clough, D. Gale Johnson, and Montague Yudelman. I am also grateful for the advice of Billie R. DeWalt and Ramon Myers in preparing the work for publication. Maxine Hill provided efficient secretarial support at all stages. Copy¬ editing of the manuscript was done by Peggy Hoover. The views expressed in this study are my own and should not be

xiv

Acknowledgments

ascribed to the persons or organizations whose assistance is acknowl¬ edged above. Joseph A. Yager

Bethesda, Maryland

Transforming Agriculture in Taiwan

Introduction

At the end of World War II, Taiwan’s agricultural sector was de¬ pressed and disorganized. The prewar peak in agricultural production was not regained until 1951, and even then the living standards of most farm families were very low. During the next three decades there was a remarkable increase in agricultural production, an increase that was essential to the successful development of Taiwan’s economy as a whole. The transformation of agriculture on Taiwan was guided by a unique binational organization—the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, usually known as the JCRR. This book is pri¬ marily a history of the JCRR. The work of the commission merits examination because the agricultural program that the JCRR managed in Taiwan for three decades was unusually successful and provides lessons and insights that can be used in other areas. This book is also to some extent a history of agricultural development in Taiwan. The activities of the JCRR cannot be understood in isolation from the rural conditions they were designed to influence, and the changing role of agriculture in a rapidly industrializing economy is interesting in its own right.

The Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction The JCRR was established in Nanking on October 1, 1948, to admin¬ ister U.S. economic aid to rural areas of China. After nearly four de-

2

Introduction

cades of war and civil war, conditions in the Chinese countryside had deteriorated badly. Both the Chinese government and the U.S. govern¬ ment recognized the need to help China’s farmers. The China Aid Act of 1948 authorized the U.S. secretary of state to conclude an agreement with China establishing a Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction. The act also provided that up to 10 percent of the funds made available for economic assistance to China should be used for rural reconstruc¬ tion. The China Aid Act and the subsequent agreement between China and the United States called for the appointment of three JCRR commis¬ sioners, including the chairman, by the president of China and of two commissioners by the president of the United States. The first five commissioners were well chosen. All the Chinese had studied in the United States, and both Americans had had extensive experience in China. Although they did not always agree, the commissioners worked well together and set the commission on the course it followed for the three decades of its existence. Because of military developments, the JCRR did not have time to accomplish much on the China mainland. In August 1949, it moved its headquarters to Taiwan, and its last regional offices on the mainland were closed in November of that year. The JCRR’s brief period on the mainland was important, however, because during that time the com¬ missioners developed the policies and methods of work that were ap¬ plied successfully on Taiwan.

Agricultural Development in Taiwan When the JCRR moved to Taiwan, the island’s economy had not yet recovered from the war years. Hundreds of thousands of refugees from the mainland, and members of the armed forces, had to be absorbed, and increased food production was a clearly needed. The commission gradually expanded its program on Taiwan until it became a large and comprehensive effort that put the agricultural sector on the road to sustained growth. After regaining the prewar level of production in 1951, Taiwan’s agricultural sector began 15 years of accelerated growth. During the period 1952—67, total agricultural production in¬ creased at the impressive average annual rate of 4.6 percent. Crop production rose 4.0 percent a year, and livestock production rose 7.6 percent. In the mid-1960s, it became increasingly difficult to sustain the rate of

Introduction

3

increase in crop production. Rapid industrialization drew labor from rural areas, drove up wages, and made the traditional labor-intensive methods of cultivation, including multiple-cropping, less economic. Around 1967, Taiwan’s agricultural sector entered a period of decele¬ rated growth. From 1967 to 1977, the annual rate of growth of live¬ stock production rose slightly to 7.9 percent, but crop production grew only 1.6 percent a year. Total agricultural production increased at the still-respectable rate of 3.2 percent annually. In addition to bringing about increases in crop and livestock produc¬ tion on Taiwan, the JCRR engaged in a number of other important programs. It made major contributions to improving productivity and living conditions on the outlying islands of Kinmen and Matsu, and it participated actively in the overseas technical assistance programs of the government of the Republic of China. On Taiwan, the jCRR admin¬ istered a successful effort to increase the production of fish, the JCRR forestry program brought about the reforestation of large areas, and the commission was also the major force in bringing about the improve¬ ment of health services in rural areas, eliminating or controlling a number of once-prevalent diseases, and organizing an effective family¬ planning system. Agricultural development in Taiwan was part of, and contributed to, rapid overall economic development. From 1952 to 1979, Taiwan’s real gross domestic product increased at an average annual rate of 9.1 percent.1 Agriculture was a continuous source of labor for the rest of the economy, and until about 1970 it was also a source of capital. From 1951 to 1955, the net outflow of capital from agriculture was about three-fourths of total capital formation. The relative importance of this capital outflow decreased during the remainder of the 1950s, and its total size declined during the 1960s. In the 1970s and 1980s, capital has flowed into agriculture from the other sectors of the economy.

Questions Raised by the Success of the JCRR In retrospect, the JCRR’s success in transforming agriculture in Tai¬ wan is surprising. As a bureaucracy answering to two governments, the commission might well have become bogged down in indecisiveness, managerial conflicts, obscure lines of responsibility, and complicated procedures, but it did not. The JCRR became a rare example of success1 Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), Taiwan Statistical Data Hook 1986 (Taipei: CEPD, 1986), p. zz.

4

Introduction

ful bureaucratic entrepreneurship in the field of development, and prob¬ ably the only such binational organization in history. One major objec¬ tive of the present book is to identify the sources of the organizational effectiveness of the JCRR. A second major objective is to determine why the policies promoted by the commission succeeded. This raises a num¬ ber of subsidiary questions: • What were the JCRR’s priorities, and were they generally correct? • What was the role of technology in agricultural development? How were technological innovations made and transmitted to farmers? • What part did rural organizations play in agricultural development? • Was the JCRR right to rely on small farms to achieve agricultural progress? How was the small-farm strategy carried out? A third subject of interest is the relationship between agricultural de¬ velopment and general economic development. This topic has two prin¬ cipal aspects: (i) the ways in which agricultural development supported the industrialization of Taiwan and (2) the extent to which the JCRR’s efforts to promote social justice in rural areas affected the entire society. The chapters in this book provide the basis for at least partial answers to the above questions, and the concluding chapter supplies more spe¬ cific answers. In the development of some of these answers, the JCRR experience in Taiwan is compared with prominent theories and general¬ izations about agricultural development. The final chapter also con¬ siders whether some aspects of the JCRR’s experience in Taiwan might be drawn on to advance agricultural development in other countries.

Plan of Study This book is divided into four parts. Part One covers the early history of the JCRR in mainland China and the move to Taiwan. Part Two, which is in many ways the heart of the study, sets forth the measures taken by the Chinese government with the advice and assistance of the JCRR to increase the production of crops and livestock in Taiwan. Part Three deals with several special programs to which the JCRR made important contributions. Part Four spells out the changing role of agri¬ culture in the economy, describes the relations of the JCRR with the two governments that created it, and reviews and evaluates the JCRR expe¬ rience.

I Beginnings of the JCRR on the China Mainland

The Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) is properly known for its achievements on Taiwan, but the commission was founded on the China mainland and it worked there for almost a year before advancing Communist armies forced it to move to Taiwan. The JCRR’s brief period on the mainland is important because during that time the commissioners developed the policies and methods of work that were applied successfully on Taiwan.

The Founding of the JCRR When World War II ended with the Japanese surrender on August 14, 1945, the Chinese government faced many large and urgent tasks. It had to act quickly to reestablish its authority in Japanese-occupied areas, to repatriate Japanese troops, and to demobilize the Chinese puppet forces created by the Japanese. Roads and railroads had to be repaired so that the war-disrupted economy could revive and so essential supplies could be moved to where they were needed. The government’s expenditures grew more rapidly than its revenues, and the already-serious inflation threatened to get out of hand. Behind all these massive problems loomed the danger of all-out civil war between the government and the Chinese Communists. The government also had to devote major attention to improving conditions in rural areas, if only because most of China’s population lived there. The success of the Communists in gaining support among China’s poor farmers gave rural reconstruction a special importance. 7

8

Early History of the JCRR

Rural problems were high on the agenda of subjects discussed by Chi¬ nese and U.S. officials in the immediate postwar period. In October 1945, the Chinese government gave the U.S. government a proposal for technical collaboration in agriculture and forestry. Discussion of this proposal led to agreement to create “a joint China—United States Agri¬ cultural Mission to outline a broad and comprehensive program for agricultural development in China and to suggest the type and form of public services necessary for its implementation.”1 The Chinese govern¬ ment appointed 13 agricultural specialists to the joint mission, and the U.S. government appointed 10 specialists. The China section of the mission was headed by P. W. Tsou, senior adviser to both the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Food. The U.S. section was headed by Claude B. Hutchison, dean of the College of Agriculture and vice-president of the University of California. The deputy heads of the two sections were T. H. Shen, deputy director of China’s National Agricultural Research Bureau, and Raymond T. Moyer, who headed the Far East Division of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations in the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Both later became JCRR commis¬ sioners. The joint agricultural mission consulted extensively and traveled widely, visiting 14 provinces and Taiwan, which was still a special administrative area. The mission produced a thorough report in May 1947. Major sections of the report dealt with the content of a national agricultural program, agricultural credit, land policy, education and research, and agricultural extension work. Chapters were also devoted to several Chinese agricultural products—tung oil, silk, tea, and wool— that had been important in trade with the United States. In the summary of its report the joint mission concluded, “The de¬ velopment of industry is contingent upon a simultaneous development of agriculture.” The mission was “fully convinced that agricultural production in China can be greatly increased by the application of modern scientific knowledge to the improvement of soils, crops, live¬ stock, and farm equipment.” The mission also believed that “the in¬ come of farmers can be greatly enhanced and the present poverty of many rural communities reduced by improvements in land tenancy, farm credit, and agricultural marketing.” These conclusions were spelled out in greater detail in the recommendations of the joint mis1 Report of the China—United States Agricultural Mission (Washington, D.C.: Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, U.S. Department of Agriculture, May 1947), p. iv. This agreement was subsequently formalized by an exchange of letters between President Harry S Truman and President Chiang Kai-shek, dated June 17, 1946, and July 31, 1946, respectively.

Beginnings on the Mainland

9

sion.2 Military developments prevented the carrying out of the mis¬ sion’s recommendations on the China mainland, but several of the mission’s more important recommendations were put into effect by the JCRR on Taiwan.3 The joint mission expressed the hope that some of its recommenda¬ tions could “form the basis for future collaboration” between China and the United States, but it did not propose that a joint institution like the JCRR be created. A number of qualified observers believe that the report contributed indirectly to the establishment of the JCRR,4 * but Y. C. James Yen, who had a major role in the establishment of the JCRR, sees no cause-and-effect relationship between the two events.^ Yen was the founder and head of the Chinese Mass Education Move¬ ment. He saw the JCRR as a means of drawing on the experience of the movement in a nationwide program of rural reconstruction. Yen mobi¬ lized support for the JCRR from members of the U.S. Congress and from other influential Americans. In tribute to his efforts, the part of the China Aid Act authorizing the creation of the JCRR was known in congressional circles as “the Jimmy Yen provision.” For a fuller account of Yen’s efforts to promote a program of rural reconstruction in China, see the appendix to this chapter.) Several members of Congress actively supported Yen’s efforts to create the JCRR, but the most active was probably Dr. Walter H. Judd, then a member of Congress from Minnesota.6 7 Judd, who had been a medical missionary in China, was quite familiar with Yen’s work and took the lead in steering the necessary legislation through Congress. The China Aid Act (Title IV of Public Law 472) was approved by President Harry Truman on April 3, 1948.8 Section 407(a) of this act 2Ibid., pp. 1-2.. 3This point is made in T. H. Shen, The Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Recon¬ struction (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 12. 4See John D. Montgomery, Rufus B. Hughes, Jr., and Raymond H. Davis, “Rural Improve¬ ment and Political Development: The JCRR Model (Agency for International Development [AID], June 15, 1964), p. 14; and Richard Lee Hough, “AID Administration to the Rural Sector: The JCRR Experience in Taiwan and Its Application in Other Countries” (AID discussion paper 17, April 1968, Mimeographed), p. 9. Conversation with author, June 15, 1983. 6In separate conversations with the author, both Yen and Judd claimed to have been the first to propose a Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction. Their close association and similar views on rural problems in China make it quite possible that they did think of creating a JC RR at about the same time. 7Judd had worked for the Congregational Church. One of the five Congregational mission centers in China was at Ting-hsien in Hopei Province, where the Mass Education Movement also had its headquarters. 8The full text of the China Aid Act is in U.S. Department of State, United States Relations

10

Early History of the JCRR

authorized the secretary of state “to conclude an agreement with China establishing a Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in China, to be composed of two citizens of the United States appointed by the President of the United States and three citizens of China appointed by the President of China. Such Commission shall, subject to the direction and control of the Administrator [for Economic Cooperation], formu¬ late and carry out a program for reconstruction in rural areas in China.” Section 407(b) of the act provided that up to 10 percent of the funds made available for economic assistance to China be used for rural reconstruction. Such funds could be either U.S. dollars or Chinese currency obtained by selling U.S. aid commodities or both.9 Pursuant to the China Aid Act, the U.S. government negotiated an economic aid agreement with the Chinese government, which was signed on July 3, 1948.10 On August 5, 1948, the U.S. ambassador, J. Leighton Stuart, and Chinese foreign minister Wang Shih-chieh ex¬ changed notes providing for establishment of a Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction.* 11 The agreement embodied in the exchange of notes did not explicitly define the authority of the U.S. government over the new commission, but the preamble indicated that the agreement carried out the general principles laid down in the China Aid Act, “and in particular section 407 thereof.” The “direction and control” of the U.S. administrator for economic cooperation was therefore incorporated by reference. The authority of the Chinese government over the JCRR was stated in contingent terms in paragraph 4 of the agreement: “In respect of any decision of the Commission, the approval of the Government of China shall be obtained prior to its execution if the Commission or its chair¬ man, with the concurrence of the Chinese members, deems it neces¬ sary.” This provision appears never to have been used. Similarly, in practice the “direction and control” of the administrator for economic cooperation involved little more than general surveillance over JCRR programs and approval of the allocation of U.S. aid funds for those programs. Paragraph 3 was probably the most important part of the agreement establishing the JCRR. This paragraph specified the types of activity that could be included in the commission’s program in agreement with with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944—1949 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, August 1949), pp. 991-993 (hereafter cited as U.S. Relations with China). 9The China Aid Act authorized the appropriation of $338 million for economic aid to China. 10See U.S. Relations with China, pp. 994-1001, for the text of this agreement. 11 Ibid., pp. 1004-1006.

Beginnings on the Mainland

ii

appropriate Chinese government agencies and international or private agencies in China. Taken as a whole, this paragraph restricted the commission’s freedom of action very little, but it is interesting to note that two quite different approaches to rural reconstruction were ex¬ plicitly authorized. Subparagraph (a) authorized “a coordinated exten¬ sion-type program in agriculture, home demonstration, health and edu¬ cation for initiation in a selected group of Hsien [counties] in several provinces.” Subparagraph (d) authorized “projects to put into effect over a wider area than provided for in the coordinated extension-type program specified in (a) any of the above lines of activity which can be developed soundly on a larger scale.” As we shall see later in this chapter, the relative emphasis to be given these two approaches was a fundamental question debated by the commissioners in the JCRR’s earliest days on the China mainland.12 As both the China Aid Act and the exchange of notes of August 5, 1948, called for, President Chiang Kai-shek appointed three commis¬ sioners, and President Truman appointed two. The Chinese commis¬ sioners were Chiang Monlin, president of Peking National University; T. H. Shen (Shen Tsung-han), director of the National Agricultural Research Bureau; and Y. C. James Yen (Yen Yang-chu), who was noted for his work in mass education at Ting-hsien in Hopei Province. The U. S. commissioners were John Earl Baker, a relief executive in China for many years and a former adviser to the Chinese Ministry of Communi¬ cations; and Raymond T. Moyer, who had been an agricultural mis¬ sionary in Shansi Province and who was an official of the U.S. Depart¬ ment of Agriculture at the time of his appointment.13 Chiang Monlin was elected chairman of the JCRR. Because of his major role in convincing the U.S. Congress to incorpo¬ rate the JCRR in the China Aid Act, the appointment of James Yen was not unexpected. The appointments of Raymond Moyer and T. H. Shen were also not surprising, in view of their important positions on the China—United States Agricultural Mission. Chiang Monlin was chosen because he was a senior statesman who could provide essential links to the top levels of the Chinese government and keep the commission out of unnecessary political trouble. He had been minister of education and ,2This difference in approach even influenced the Chinese name give to the JCRR. In February 1983, the former president of the Republic of China, C. K. Yen (Yen Chia-kan), told me that the original proposal (by James Yen?) was to use the term “village” (tsun) reconstruc¬ tion. Shen and Moyer preferred the term “agricultural (nung) reconstruction.” C. k. Yen proposed a compromise that uses both Chinese terms and means “rural {nung tsun) recon¬ struction.” ,3Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, General Report—1 (Taipei: JCRR, May 1950), pp. z-3. Hereafter, the General Reports will be cited by number.

12

Early History of the JCRR

secretary-general of the Executive Yuan, as well as president of a lead¬ ing university.14 Ambassador Stuart favored Frank W. Price, who had translated Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People, instead of Baker. Baker was chosen at least in part because a prominent American businessman in China had recommended him to the U.S. secretary of agriculture. Con¬ gressman Walter Judd played an important role in the selection process. President Truman telephoned Judd and asked, “Walter, tell me whom I should name to this damn JCRR.” Judd suggested Moyer, Baker, and Price. Judd also talked by telephone with Madame Chiang Kai-shek in March 1948 and asked her to urge her husband to appoint James Yen to the commission, but not as chairman.15 In retrospect, the choices of the first five commissioners were un¬ usually happy ones. Each commissioner already knew at least three of his four colleagues. Shen regarded Moyer and Yen as close friends; Shen and Moyer had been classmates at Cornell University. All the Chinese commissioners had studied extensively in the United States, and both U.S. commissioners had many years of experience in China.16 The five commissioners appear to have been an island of cooperation and good feeling in the stormy sea of U.S.-Chinese relations. The two governments were unhappy with the deteriorating military and eco¬ nomic situation in China, and they were also unhappy with each other. None of this gloom and discord seems to have affected relations among the five commissioners, although it inevitably had an adverse effect on the environment in which they had to work. Brief personal impressions of some of the original JCRR commis¬ sioners may be of some interest. I never met John Earl Baker, but from his memorandums in old JCRR files (reinforced by photographs of him), I judge him to have been a bluff, no-nonsense executive who performed his own duties competently and was not interested in in¬ creased authority. I met James Yen only in 1983, more than 30 years after he left the JCRR. I knew Chiang Monlin and T. H. Shen very well and regarded Shen as a close friend. I know Raymond Moyer somewhat 14Former President C. K. Yen told me in February 1983 that he had recommended to the then prime minister, Ong Wen-hao, that one commissioner be an impartial person, one be a community development specialist, and one be an agriculturalist. The appointments of Chiang, James Yen, and Shen fit these categories. 15Conversation with author, April 29, 1983. Judd placed the call to Mme. Chiang from the committee room of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs so that it would not appear to be improper. He talked to her because she speaks perfect English and he was afraid he could not handle President Chiang’s Chekiang accent. l6General Report—1, p. 4; and Shen, Sino-American JCRR, pp. 14—15.

Beginnings on the Mainland

13

less well than either Chiang or Shen, but I have seen and heard enough to have a clear impression of him. Chiang Monlin was a thin man, taller than most Chinese, and with a dignified bearing. He looked the part of a university president—which he was for many years. He had the quiet command presence cultivated by Chinese leaders raised in the Confucian tradition of ruling by exam¬ ple. He came from the same part of Chekiang Province as President Chiang Kai-shek, which conferred the same kind of advantage as com¬ ing from Missouri during the Truman administration or from Califor¬ nia in the Reagan administration.17 Despite his dignity, Chiang Monlin was not a cold or stiff person, but warm toward friends and somewhat sentimental. He once revealed this aspect of his character during dinner on a small ship that had been converted into a restaurant and was tied up more or less permanently in the harbor at Kaohsiung. Tears came to his eyes when he suddenly recognized that this ship had carried him many times between Shanghai and Ningpo during happier times on the mainland. Chiang Monlin also had a sharp sense of humor. A colleague once observed that in his youth Mao Tse-tung had worked as a clerk in the library of the university that Chiang headed. He suggested that Mao might not have become a Communist if Chiang had paid him better. Chiang’s rejoinder was that perhaps he should have paid Mao less so that he would not have survived to lead the Chinese Communist Party. On another occasion, a senior U.S. official new to Taiwan asked whether the Japanese had tried to suppress Chinese culture on Taiwan as they had tried to suppress Korean culture. Chiang replied, “Oh, no. No Chinese culture, no Japanese.” T. H. Shen was of medium height and build. Like Chiang Monlin, he was from Chekiang. Although not lacking in dignity, Shen did not have Chiang’s commanding presence. He was a plain man, and despite his education (Ph.D. Cornell) and his attainments in scientific research and administration, he was more at home on a farm than in an office. Friendly and outgoing, Shen was still not a great talker. He was thoughtful and analytical, and above all sound and sensible, without giving an impression of brilliance. Once he had set a goal, he worked toward it doggedly. An example of this trait is his overcoming of serious 17Chiang Monlin and Chiang Kai-shek may have been distantly related. In his auto¬ biographical account of the interaction between China and the West, Chiang Monlin ex¬ pressed the opinion that all the Chiangs in Chekiang “find their common ancestral tree in Hueichow,” a mountainous area at the source of the Chien-tang River (Tides from the West [Taipei: China Culture Publishing Foundation, 1957I, p. 10).

i4

Early History of the JCRR

obstacles during the many years spent setting up the Asian Vegetable Development and Research Center on Taiwan. Although Shen was a hard worker, he was fun-loving and had a sense of humor. He welcomed an excuse—which I gave him more than once—to leave the cares of his office and go touring the countryside. He relished the disrespectful tag “Kuomintang communes” that someone pinned on the farm equipment cooperatives promoted by the JCRR.18 He also enjoyed recounting his personal triumph at the Folies Bergeres on a visit to Paris. He was chosen from the audience along with several other gray-haired men to dance with the girls. Rather than making a fool of himself, which was the object of the exercise, he brought down the house by demonstrating an ability that is rare in men in their late sixties—raising one foot and then the other slowly over his head with¬ out bending the knee. He owed this ability to years of practicing a traditional form of Chinese calisthenics at his wife’s insistence. Raymond T. Moyer is a tall, strongly built man. Even in his eighties he is erect and vigorous. He is modest and soft-spoken, traits that undoubtedly helped him in working with Chinese, but these traits are deceptive. He has made a record as a strong executive in the American, more than in the Chinese, tradition. Moyer graduated from Oberlin College in 1921 and spent the next two years teaching English at Oberlin’s branch in Shansi Province. From 1923 to 1925, he was stu¬ dent secretary of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) in Philadelphia. He earned a master of science in agriculture at Cornell University in 1927 and spent the next 15-16 years back at Oberlin’s branch in Shansi as head of the agriculture department. During this period, he managed to complete the requirements for a Ph.D. from Cornell, which he was awarded in 1941. In 1943, he joined the U.S. Department of Agriculture, where he remained until he became a JCRR commissioner. After the JCRR moved to Taipei, he was appointed concurrently chief of the U.S. aid mission to the Republic of China. When I met Y. C. James Yen, he was was eighty-nine years old. Yen is slender and about average in height. He has a magnetic personality and an unusually persuasive way of speaking. He comes from a scholarly family in Szechuan Province. After graduating from Yale in 1918, Yen went to France to do social work with the Chinese laborers who had been sent there to help the Allied war effort. He was greatly impressed by the potential of these illiterate people. On returning to China, he founded the Mass Education Movement, which he has led ever since, 18The Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) is the ruling party in the Republic of China.

Beginnings on the Mainland

*5

working first in China and later in other countries. Yen and his associ¬ ates in the Mass Education Movement believe that poor rural societies are afflicted by four interlocked problems—illiteracy, poverty, disease, and civic inertia—and that solutions to these problems must also be interlocked. Yen describes himself as a Confucian Christian. Policies and Methods of Work The JCRR was formally constituted on October i, 1948, in Nanking and held its first meeting on that day in the conference room of the Hsin Hua Building.19 In addition to the five commissioners, this meeting was attended by the acting minister of agriculture, Liu Shih-shun, and the U.S. ambassador, John Leighton Stuart. The JCRR set up offices in a rented house at 17 Sikang Road, across from the U.S. Embassy Chan¬ cery, and subsequent meetings of the commissioners in Nanking were held there. As Chiang Monlin later said, “In the throes of ideological confusion, economic chaos, social discontentment, political turmoil and military reverses, the Joint Commission set sail on rough seas.”20 Certainly the military and economic situations were deteriorating rapidly. Since De¬ cember 1947, government forces in Manchuria had been cut off from resupply or reinforcement by land. Loyang and Kaifeng on the strategic Lunghai Railroad in central China fell to the Communists in the spring of 1948. The key city of Tsinan in Shantung Province was lost in late September. The inflation raged unchecked, and the decline of the gov¬ ernment’s foreign exchange reserves continued with little prospect that their eventual depletion could be prevented.21 Under the circumstances, the energy and dedication with which the JCRR commissioners attacked their new duties were remarkable. Some administrative decisions had to be made during their daily meetings in October 1948, but these meetings—which were often quite long—were devoted principally to developing basic rural reconstruction policies.22 The commissioners had before them a 16-page paper prepared by the Economic Cooperation Administration in Washington and dated Sep19The commissioners had also met unofficially during September. Chang Hsien-tsiu recalls preparing memorandums for Shen in connection with these unofficial meetings. 20Quoted in Montgomery et al., “Rural Improvement and Political Development,” p. 16. 21 U.S. Relations with China, pp. 318-319, 369—370. 22Detailed minutes of these and subsequent meetings in Nanking and Canton were prepared by Tsiang Yen-si, who was deputy executive officer of the commission at the time. These detailed minutes are no longer in the old JCRR files, but they were used by Daniel Liu in

16

Early History of the JCRR

tember 20, 1948, outlining a program for the new organization.23 Some of the ideas in this paper were similar to those eventually endorsed by the commission. The paper was not intended as a directive, however, and many of its proposals were not adopted.24 The central issue debated by the commissioners was whether to adopt the approach of the Mass Education Movement that had been devel¬ oped by Y. C. James Yen over a 30-year period. This approach involved mounting an intensive effort in selected rural communities to improve both the residents and their quality of life. The movement viewed these communities as social laboratories and expected them to provide mod¬ els for all of China. The first of these communities was Ting-hsien in Hopei Province. Ting-hsien and James Yen became internationally fa¬ mous in the 1930s and 1940s.25 As its name suggests, the Mass Education Movement emphasized education—training in literacy and in citizenship. Projects were also launched in public health, home economics, agriculture, and small rural industries. The entire integrated program was managed by the leader¬ ship of the Mass Education Movement working largely outside govern¬ ment channels. The movement had little confidence in the ability of the government to bring about the needed changes in rural society. Al¬ though the movement’s ideology was fervently democratic, it was also elitist in spirit. Its program was not deliberately responsive to the needs of rural people as seen by the people themselves. James Yen argued vigorously for the approach to rural reconstruction to which he had devoted much of his life. Moyer and Shen disagreed with Yen on several fundamental points. They wanted to attack the problem of agricultural production directly, rather than indirectly through Yen’s program of social improvement. They wanted to work through the government and to improve its effectiveness. They favored projects that would produce results over large areas, rather than a program that concentrated on a few localities. And they wanted to

writing the first general report, General Report—i, which is a major source for this section. Other documents still in the JCRR files (held by the Council of Agriculture in Taipei), including abbreviated minutes dealing largely with administrative decisions, are cited here separately. Documentary materials have been supplemented by interviews with former JCRR commissioners and staff members. 23Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), “Proposed Program for the Joint Commis¬ sion on Rural Reconstruction in China,” September 20, 1948. 24Shen, Sino-American JCRR, p. 16. 25See Pearl S. Buck, Tell the People: Talks with James Yen about the Mass Education Movement (New York: John Day, 1959); and Y. C. James Yen, The Ting Hsien Experiment (Silang, Philippines: International Institute of Rural Reconstruction, 1975).

Beginnings on the Mainland

i7

respond to needs defined by farmers, rather than impose reforms con¬ ceived by outsiders. Chiang Monlin and John Earl Baker did not take strong positions in this debate. Chiang’s style as chairman was to permit prolonged discus¬ sion in the hope of arriving at a consensus.26 There is evidence that Baker became impatient with the debate over basic policies. On October 13, he wrote Chairman Chiang a letter that began: “It appears to me that the Commission has nearly exhausted the possibilities of progress through discussion of general principles. Hence, it seems to me that the time has come to narrow the discussion to more specific phases.”27 Chiang and Baker eventually sided with Shen and Moyer, but the immediate outcome was a compromise, rather than the total defeat of Yen’s approach. The first program developed by the JCRR included substantial funding for the Center of the Mass Education Movement in the third prefecture of Szechuan Province (see Chapter 2). The state¬ ment of objectives and principles released to the press by the commis¬ sion on October 18,1948, was drafted by Moyer and James Yen.28 The Moyer/Shen approach to rural reconstruction dominates the statement, but the Yen approach is also clearly present. The statement listed six objectives of the JCRR program: 1. To improve the living conditions of the rural people 2. To increase the production of food and other important crops29 3. To develop the potential power of the people to reconstruct their own communities and the nation and thus to lay the foundation of a strong and democratic China 4. To help build up and strengthen appropriate services of government agencies—national, provincial, and hsien—that are established to carry out measures pertaining to rural reconstruction 5. To help stimulate and revitalize enterprises of the Rural Reconstruc¬ tion Movement and other private agencies doing rural reconstruction work.30 26Shen reported [Sino-American JCRR, p. 17) that the JCRR never took a formal vote on any question or proposal. “Whenever agreement cannot be reached on an item of business, the matter is postponed, to be taken up again at subsequent meetings until there is unanimous agreement. If unanimity is not reached the question remains in abeyance." 27Baker went on to propose rules of governance, bylaws, a plan of organization, and procedures for developing a program. There is no record of discussion of his proposals, and none of them appears to have been adopted. 28Minutes of the 13th commission meeting, October 16, 1948. 29This objective was added at the last minute at the suggestion of Shen (Minutes of the 1 5th commission meeting, October 18, 1948). J0For some unknown reason, this objective was omitted from the list of objectives of the JCRR in October 1948, which was reproduced in General Report—/.

18

Early History of the JCRR

6. To offer liberals, educated youths, and other constructive elements

opportunities to participate in a program of service The second and fourth of the above objectives reflect the Moyer/Shen approach, and the fifth objective is a brief statement of the Yen ap¬ proach. The other three are consistent with either point of view. The statement of principles relating to program and procedures in the October 18 press release also contains elements of both approaches. Thus, one of the principles relating to program says: “First consider¬ ation shall be given to projects which will contribute most directly and immediately to the welfare of the rural people, with special emphasis to be given to improvement of their economic conditions.” Another princi¬ ple relating to program declares: “A literacy program, supplemented by audio-visual aids, shall be an essential part of the program, as a means of furthering education, organizing the people, and developing and selecting rural leadership.” The first of these two principles is much more Moyer/Shen than Yen, and the second is pure Yen. The principles relating to procedures are bland and noncontroversial, but one reflects James Yen’s thinking in calling for emphasis on “a direct extension type of adult education.” Another states that assistance to any project shall be contingent on the cooperation of provincial and local officials, a proposition that Yen with his emphasis on working outside government channels would not have been likely to put forward on his own. The October 18 statement was intended to provide a rationale for the JCRR program during the period from October i, 1948, to June 30, 1949 (later known as Phase A), but during this period experience and the pressure of events caused the thinking of the commissioners (with the possible exception of Yen) to change significantly. Two key docu¬ ments reveal the evolution in views: “Criteria for Evaluating JCRR Projects,” adopted by the commission on May 30, 1949, and “A JCRR Manifesto,” issued publicly on June 27, 1949. The first of these documents noted: “Since the Commission’s pro¬ gram is going to be carried on until the middle of February 1950 we have a breathing space which we should utilize for evaluating our projects.” The document then stated that projects should be evaluated according to the extent that they (1) met people’s keenly felt needs, (2) increased people’s welfare, (3) involved popular participation,31 (4) had the cooperation of the government, (5) were supported by local re31The third criterion—popular participation—was supported by a warning by Confucious: “When the reformer lives, the reform thrives; when the reformer dies, the reform dies with him.”

Beginnings on the Mainland

19

sources, (6) enlisted the participation of local educated youth, and (7) promoted social as well as material reconstruction. These criteria show that the commission felt an urgent need to gain the support of the farmers and to increase the welfare of as many farmers as possible. The commission also felt an understandable anxiety about achieving lasting results within the short time that might be available to it. The commis¬ sion—or at least its majority—had become more convinced of the importance of government cooperation and local support. The final criterion revealed the commission’s increased interest in land reform. The JCRR Manifesto carried the subtitle “Intentions and Plans for JCRR Program July 1, 1949—February 15, 1950” (the program during this period was later known as Phase B). The idea of issuing the man¬ ifesto is credited to James Grant, who was acting executive director of the commission. Grant, who was born in China, had been special assistant to Roger Lapham, director of the U.S. Economic Aid Mission to China.32 The manifesto was consistent with criteria for evaluating JCRR projects approved only a month previously, but it placed even more emphasis than the “Criteria” on producing results quickly and on a wide scale. The manifesto was crisply written and consisted of only six points. The first point declared that the JCRR would assist “comprehensive” government programs that are “designed to bring about fundamental improvements affecting living conditions of the rural people.” The second point asserted that, under existing conditions in China, “piece-meal efforts will have relatively little immediate benefit, but . . . a vigorous and determined effort to solve a limited number of the most important problems, on a wide scale, might substantially improve the people’s welfare in a relatively short time.” The third point, the most important part of the manifesto, stated that the following types of activity, “carried out on a broad scale,” should “in most cases” be included in the JCRR program: land rent reduction, government encouragement of the organization of farmers into local associations or cooperatives, irrigation, control of animal diseases, mul¬ tiplication and distribution of improved seeds, improvement of rural health conditions, and citizenship education and the dissemination of practical scientific knowledge.33 The fourth point simply specified that the JCRR was prepared to provide both technical and financial assistance. It made clear that finan32Grant was “acting,” because it had been agreed that the executive director should be Chinese. 33The items listed here arc in most cases summaries of the longer descriptions of program components in the manifesto.

20

Early History of the JCRR

cial assistance would supplement funding from provincial or local sources. The fifth point stated an exception to the general approach set forth in the manifesto. The commission said that it was “prepared to offer some assistance to types of projects not yet ready for promotion on a wide scale but potentially important and . . . need[ing] further demonstra¬ tion,” such as “practical forms of rural industries adapted to local conditions” and insect control. The sixth point was a highly conditional expression of the possible future willingness of the commission to expand the scope of its efforts to include “the extension of credit to specific types of community produc¬ tive enterprises, such as small community irrigation projects, coopera¬ tive marketing of rice, and the cooperative purchase of work animals.” Points five and six and the last item—citizenship education—of point three reflect the approach advocated by James Yen. However, the main thrust of the manifesto was toward a program to increase agricultural production on a wide scale, working through government bodies. Land rent reduction, it might be noted, came first on the list of program activities.34 Taken together, the “Criteria for Evaluating JCRR Projects” and the “JCRR Manifesto” define rural reconstruction policies and methods of work that were continued without substantial change after the JCRR was forced to move to Taiwan. But the story of the commission’s time on the mainland cannot be completed without looking at the evolution of the program that accompanied the evolution of its policies, which is done in the next chapter.

Summary The JCRR was founded in October 1948 by the Chinese and U.S. governments in an effort to help China’s farmers recover from years of war and to counter Communist political activity in the countryside. After less than a year, military developments forced the commission to cease its activities in mainland China and move its headquarters to Taiwan. During the brief period on the mainland, the JCRR developed the policies and methods of work it followed as long as it existed. 34Omission of a land-to-the-tiller program did not mean that the JCRR had no interest in this aspect of land reform. It almost certainly reflected the judgment that distributing land from landlords to tenants was not feasible, both politically and administratively, under the conditions that then existed.

Beginnings on the Mainland

21

Perhaps the most important decision the commission made during the months on the mainland was to try to increase agricultural production over large areas rather than to launch an intensive program of social and economic improvement in selected rural communities. The commission also decided to work largely through the government, and in the process to improve the effectiveness of government sponsors of its projects. The JCRR placed great importance on making its program responsive to what the rural people themselves saw as their needs.

Appendix to Chapter i Summary of Conversations with Y. C. James Yen I met with Y. C. James Yen on June 15, 1983, and on September 13, 1984, in his apartment in New York. Both conversations, which in¬ cluded lunch, lasted more than four hours. Only points made by Yen that bear directly on the history of the JCRR are recorded here. In September 1945, a few weeks after the Japanese surrender, Yen went to see Chiang Kai-shek, whom he knew very well.35 (Chiang did not yet have the title of president, but as the head of the ruling Kuomintang and commander of the armed forces, he was China’s top leader.) Yen urged Chiang to establish rural reconstruction centers in various parts of China. Chiang responded that he had great respect for Yen and his work but that priority must be given to defeating the Communists militarily. When that had been done, Chiang said, he would approve a countrywide program of rural reconstruction and put Yen in charge. Yen argued that action was needed on the social and economic front as well as on the military front, but he was unable to win Chiang over. According to Yen, Chiang closed the conversation by saying, You are a scholar. I am a soldier. We cannot see eye-to-eye.” Later it occurred to Yen that it might be possible to stimulate U.S. support for a program of rural reconstruction in China. Yen had a number of influential friends and acquaintances in the United States— 35In 1930, Yen spoke on the Mass Education Movement at the Whampoa Military Acad¬ emy. The audience included General and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, members of the cabinet, and the staff of the academy. After the talk, Chiang commented that Yen was the person best able to put the principles of Sun Yat-sen into effect. Yen stayed with the Chiangs at \X hampoa for three days and had long talks with them about the future of China. Several years later, right-wing elements in the Kuomintang charged that Yen’s Mass Education Movement was communist. Chiang Kai-shek sent General Chang Chih-chung, commandant of the \\ hampoa Military Academy, to inspect the movement’s center at I ing-hsien. General Chang s highly favorable report on the movement reassured Chiang.

22

Early History of the JCRR

for example, Robert Lovett, the under secretary of state, and Congress¬ man John M. Vorys of Ohio were his classmates in the Yale class of 1918. Yen had attended his tenth class reunion in 1928 and had stayed in the United States for eight months, broadening his acquaintances and raising money for the Mass Education Movement. Yen shared his thoughts with an old friend, U.S. Ambassador John Leighton Stuart. Stuart wrote Secretary of State George C. Marshall, urging him to see Yen, which Marshall did for an hour in July 1947. Marshall said that he wished he had known about the Mass Education Movement before he went to China in an unsuccessful effort to prevent a civil war. He said that he hoped to be able to help Yen but that Yen must take the lead. He asked Yen for a written statement of his ideas. Yen wrote a 14-page letter proposing a program of rural reconstruction and emphasizing the need for a joint U.S.-Chinese effort.36 Yen argued that the Chinese government must counter the Commu¬ nists on the social front as well as on the military front and that the experience with his Mass Education Movement provided the proper approach on the social front. He called for four concrete steps: (1) a national literacy campaign, (2) establishment of reconstruction centers, (3) a leadership training program, and (4) creation of a National Com¬ mission on Mass Education and Rural Reconstruction to manage the program. He proposed that the commission “should consist of both American and Chinese representatives appointed by their respective governments.” Yen also got in touch with his friends and acquaintances in Wash¬ ington, D.C., including Congressman Walter Judd, Congressman John Vorys, Congresswoman Helen Gahagan Douglas, Senator William Knowland, Senator Elmer Thomas, and Supreme Court Justice William Douglas. Walter Judd and Helen Gahagan Douglas invited all the mem¬ bers of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to a lunch at the Statler Hotel (now the Capital Hilton) to hear Yen’s ideas. Yen talked for two hours and answered questions for another two hours. No one left early. William Knowland advised Yen to meet with the editorial staffs of leading newspapers. Yen did so, and a number of editorials supporting his proposals were written. Knowland distributed copies of the edi¬ torials to all members of Congress. Knowland, a Republican, also urged Yen to solicit support in the executive branch of the U.S. government. Justice Douglas, a Democrat, arranged an appointment with President Truman and accompanied Yen to the White House on March 9, 1948. 36James Yen to Marshall, September 30, 1947, Department of State Records (DOSR), 893.42/9-3047, National Archives (NA), Washington, D.C.

Beginnings on the Mainland

23

They took a 2-page condensation of Yen’s 14-page letter with them and left it with Truman. Truman said he was impressed by Yen’s ideas and would recommend that all the money in the pending China Aid Act go to finance Yen’s program. Yen said that would be too much and that a fraction—say 10 percent—would be enough. On March 10, Truman sent Yen’s memorandum to Marshall with a note stating that he had “a very enlightening conversation” with Yen and suggesting that Marshall also talk to him.37 Marshall replied on March 12 that he had seen Yen “last summer and again on February 19.” Marshall also wrote that Yen was “a very worthwhile fellow and has some excellent ideas. I am having the Department go into his views at some length, to see just what can be done by us along the lines he suggests.”38 The China Aid Act was passed by Congress on March 31, 1948, and signed by President Truman three days later. The act provided that up to 10 percent of the funds authorized by it could be used to finance the work of a Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction. ^Memorandum from President Truman to the Secretary of State, March 10, 1948, DOSR, 893.42/3-1048, NA. ^Memorandum from Marshall to Truman, March 12, 1948, DOSR, 893.42/3-1048, NA.

2 Evolution of the JCRR Program on the Mainland

Before we go into the evolution of JCRR’s program during the early days on the China mainland, an overview of the staffing and organiza¬ tion of the commission is in order.1

Staffing and Organization The joint commission adjusted its staffing and organization to meet changing functional requirements. Employees were hired to deal with specific needs and terminated when those needs no longer existed. At its peak on the mainland, the JCRR had a staff of 229. Of that total, 19 were Americans. A November 22, 1948, JCRR press release announced that four commission divisions had been established: • The Agricultural Production Increase Division, “emphasizing the pro¬ duction of food crops to meet the present deficit in foodstuffs” • The Integrated Rural Reconstruction Program Division, “emphasizing assistance to Government agencies in building up an integrated pro¬ gram aimed at the improvement of local government administration, land reform, agriculture, health, and social education” • The Social Education Division, “emphasizing a large scale effort to Mhe principal source for this chapter is again General Report—i. The comprehensive information provided by this report was supplemented by documents in the JCRR files and interviews with informed people.

24

The Program on the Mainland

25

raise the level of understanding of the rural people and enable them to participate more intelligently in solving their present problems” • The Local Initiative Encouragement Division, “emphasizing assistance to significant projects in rural reconstruction established by private or Government agencies with their own initiative and resources” In addition, the commission established several specialist units, or com¬ mittees. At the time of the November 22 press release, a health commit¬ tee had already been established, and subsequently specialist units were created in the areas of agriculture, irrigation, public information and education, and land. The Social Education Division was never actually established; its functions were absorbed by the Integrated Rural Reconstruction Pro¬ gram Division. By June 1949 it became evident that the work of the Integrated Rural Reconstruction Program Division could best be per¬ formed by regional offices and that the Local Initiative Encouragement Division was not needed. Those two divisions were abolished, and the specialist units on health and land were made program divisions. Several regional offices were opened, but their number and location varied with the requirements of the program and with the military situation. The November 22 press release said that plans for a program in the lower Yangtze Valley were “being developed from the Commis¬ sion’s headquarters in Nanking” and that regional offices were being established in Peiping, Sian, Chungking, Changsha, Kweilin, and Can¬ ton. Three months later, the commission had five regional offices: Can¬ ton (which was also by then the headquarters), Nanking, Shanghai, Chungking, and Changsha. Consideration was being given to opening offices in Taiwan, Kwangsi, and Fukien provinces.2 In August 1949, when under the pressure of military events the commission moved its headquarters to Taipei, only two regional offices (in Szechuan and Kwangsi) remained. These offices were closed before the end of the year.

The Program on the Mainland The term “JCRR program” can be somewhat misleading. The joint commission was not an operating agency. From the beginning, one of the JCRR’s basic principles was to have other, carefully selected organi¬ zations carry out the projects it supported. But the commission was not 2See Memorandum, “Organization and Functions of the Joint Commission on Rural Re¬ construction,” February 2.6, 1949, JCRR files (prepared by Albert G. Swing).

26

Early History of the JCRR

a passive funding agency. It closely followed the projects it helped to finance and also provided necessary technical advice and assistance. The JCRR program on the mainland was developed in two phases that subsequently became known as Phase A and Phase B. Phase A covered the period October i, 1948, to June 30, 1949* Phase B was intended to extend from July 1, 1949,to February 15, 1950, but before it could be completed, the JCRR was forced to move to Taiwan and close down its operations on the mainland.

Phase A It is not clear whether any detailed work on the JCRR program was done before the commission was formally constituted. On April 27, 1948, Paul G. Hoffman, administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), did send James Yen a letter that contained the following paragraph:3 I hope that after you return to China it will be possible for a considerable amount of detailed preliminary work to be done on the organization and funds required, during the coming year, to develop in a realistic manner the Mass Education Movement, as one of the programs pertinent to rural reconstruction. Such preliminary work should be of considerable assis¬ tance in getting programs started quickly as soon as the Rural Recon¬ struction Commission authorized in the China Aid Act is officially formed by agreement between the Chinese and United States Govern¬ ments.

However, the JCRR files contain no record of any detailed program planning by James Yen or anyone else before October 1, 1948. The unofficial meetings in September 1948 appear to have been concerned with general principles, rather than program, and the ECA program paper of September 20, 1948 (see Chapter 1) was both advisory and general. It is probably safe to assume that the commission began its duties with a clean slate. The commission turned its attention first to fundamental policies, rather than to development of a program. During the latter part of 3Yen’s New York office gave the author a copy of this letter. Yen had hoped to have obtained letters from both Hoffman and President Truman that would have tied the rural reconstruction provision in the China Aid Act of 1948 more explicitly to the Mass Education Movement. See memorandum from Clark M. Clifford, the White House, to Robert A. Lovett, under secretary of state, May 1, 1948, and Lovett’s reply of May 4, 1948* DOSR, 893.42/ 5-1048, NA.

The Program on the Mainland

27

October, U.S. Ambassador Stuart was in fact somewhat impatient about the failure of the commission to take any concrete actions. He looked to the JCRR to establish programs in the countryside that would counter the appeal of the rural reforms of the Chinese Communists. Despite Stuart’s impatience, in retrospect the commissioners devel¬ oped a program with remarkable speed. In the early days, they traveled quite a bit and consulted officials in several provinces. Although small, their technical staff was of high quality; it helped screen the hundreds of project proposals received by the commission and sometimes rewrote promising proposals that needed improving. The staff itself also made detailed studies that led to projects. During its first two months, the JCRR developed a program consist¬ ing of three kinds of efforts: integrated program centers, projects to increase food production, and local-initiative projects.4 The commis¬ sion gave financial support to three existing integrated program centers: the Center of the Mass Education Movement in Szechuan, the Chekiang Agricultural Extension Demonstration Project near Hangchow, and the Lungyen Integrated Program in southwestern Fukien. The first of these centers had been established by James Yen and was already conducting a wide range of educational, agricultural, and small industrial activities. The center in Chekiang was established in the summer of 1948 by the provincial government in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the U.S. China Relief Mission, pursuant to a recom¬ mendation of the China—United States Agricultural Mission that an approach patterned on the agricultural extension service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture be applied in a limited number of hsien (counties). The center in Lungyen, Fukien, had been developed around a land reform program initiated several years earlier by the central gov¬ ernment. The JCRR hoped that, even though these centers started with different activities, each would in time develop comparable comprehen¬ sive programs. The commission considered financing additional centers, but it did not do so because of changes in the military situation and difficulties in finding suitable sponsors. The projects to increase food production were in the areas of water control, multiplication and distribution of improved seeds, and control of animal diseases. The largest project in this category was the Tung 4On December 10, 1949, Raymond Moyer wrote Harlan Cleveland, deputy to the assistant administrator of the ECA, a letter entitled “The Development of the Joint Commission’s Thinking on Program.’’ This letter gives a concise account of Phase A and the reasons for shifting to Phase B. It is reproduced as an appendix to General Report—1 and has been used in writing this part of chapter z.

28

Early History of the JCRR

Ting dike-repair project that helped restore the dikes protecting an important rice-producing area in Hunan Province. The local-initiative projects were intended to help revitalize the many private organizations that had been engaged in rural reconstruction before the war with Japan. By mid-April 1949, the commission had received 198 local-initiative project applications; only 18, mostly agri¬ cultural, were approved. The deteriorating military situation greatly complicated the efforts of the commission to carry out Phase A of its program. During October 1948, Chinese Communist forces gained effective control of Man¬ churia. Mukden, the largest city in Manchuria, was occupied on No¬ vember 1. The Communists next moved on Hsuchow, on the Lunghai Railroad, well to the south and east of the Yellow River. Because of the mounting threat to Nanking, the JCRR moved its headquarters to Canton on December 1. By coincidence, Hsuchow fell on the same day. The JCRR offices in Canton were in a remodeled warehouse at 18 Chu Kong Road on Shameen Island near the Victory Hotel (originally the Victoria Hotel, but renamed after the victory over Japan in recogni¬ tion of the rise of U.S. power and the decline of British power in East Asia). The JCRR commissioners and staff were housed in the Oi Kwan Hotel, then the tallest building in the city. Chiang Monlin and his wife occupied the penthouse suite of the Oi Kwan.5 Before the war, the British had administered two-thirds of Shameen, and the French had administered the remainder. After the war, the extraterritorial rights of foreign governments in China, including those of the British and French on Shameen, were relinquished. The British and French consulates were reopened, however, as was the U.S. consu¬ late in the former British sector. In 1948, Shameen was somewhat run-down, but it retained its char¬ acter as a quiet, affluent foreign enclave on the edge of a crowded, noisy Chinese city. Motor vehicles were barred from entering the island. The island’s pedestrian walkways were shaded by large trees. In the former British sector, a park with tennis courts stretched along the side of the island farthest from the city.6 Not all of the JCRR staff moved to Canton on December 1. Y. S. Tsiang recalls staying in Nanking for a time in order to be with the group working on crop production (other than rice and wheat) for which he was responsible, in addition to his duties as deputy executive secretary. Tsiang also recalls that the minister of agriculture and for5H. T. Chang in conversation with author, February 5, 1983.

61 was stationed at the U.S. consulate on Shameen from December 1947 to May 194^*

The Program on the Mainland

29

estry thought that the JCRR commissioners had moved to Canton too soon. Therefore, the commissioners came back north in early 1949 and spent several weeks in rented offices in Shanghai.7 As the area under control of the national government decreased, the commissioners became more and more uncertain about how long they would be able to continue their work. Moyer shared this uncertainty, but he also believed that continuation of some of the JCRR’s work after a complete Communist victory was not completely out of the question. On January 18, 1949, in a memorandum forwarding a progress report to the ECA in Washington, D.C., Moyer spelled out his thinking on how a Communist victory would affect the JCRR.8 He began by noting that, during the past six weeks, efforts had been made to define and establish projects in Szechuan, Hunan, and Kwangtung provinces. He then wrote: “Attention also was given to certain projects in the lower Yangtze Valley. One reason for projects in this last mentioned location was to set up work which could serve as test-cases of the attitude toward the work of the JCRR in case a new government took over in Nanking.” In the second page of his two-page memorandum, Moyer dealt more broadly with the question of the commission’s future after a Communist victory. He first argued: “If the United States Government finds no interest in maintaining some influence in China once it comes under Communist domination, aid should be discontinued as soon as it be¬ comes certain the area will be so controlled.” He added that aid “should at least be terminated gradually, on the surface appearing to be the result of factors beyond our control rather than upon direct orders from Washington.” Moyer then took up the question of whether the Chinese Communists would want any part of the JCRR program to continue. He believed that they would “not be interested in features of our program related to social education, land reform or local government improvement. They have their own programs in these fields, and meddlers with different ideas would not be tolerated.” Moyer appears to have been of two minds concerning Communist attitudes toward JCRR efforts to increase agri¬ cultural production. Speculating that the Communists “might be inter¬ ested in what we are doing to increase agricultural production,” he then expressed the personal feeling that “the rural reconstruction program will be grouped with all other United States assistance in the ECA program. Broadcasts from the other side indicate they want none of it.’ 7Y. S. Tsiang in conversation with author, February 8, 1983. 8Memorandum from Raymond T. Moyer to Harlan Cleveland and David L. Gordon, “Present Status and Outlook for the Program under the JCRR, January 18, 1949, JCRR files.

30

Early History of the JCRR

His final position was to ask: But what if the Communists do in fact “desire assistance in building up a sound and strong program in agricul¬ tural production?” He concluded: “After termination of the present program, for whatever cause, the next step might be to stand off, see whether there is interest in continuation under an agreement with the new regime.” On January 25, 1949, Moyer, Baker, and Owen L. Dawson, the agricultural attache of the U.S. Embassy in China, jointly cabled the headquarters of the Economic Cooperation Administration in Wash¬ ington, D.C., recommending that certain limited JCRR activities be continued in Communist-controlled areas.9 The authors of this message were apparently not aware of President Truman’s decision on Decem¬ ber 30, 1948, to terminate ECA activities in Communist-controlled areas. This decision was reaffirmed by the president at a cabinet meeting on January 14, 1949.10 On January 26, the decision was interpreted by the ECA as applying to the JCRR program (which was financed by the ECA).11 Moyer knows of no effort to probe possible Chinese Communist interest in continuation of some JCRR activities in Communist-con¬ trolled areas. Any thought of continuing under a Communist regime was soon dropped.12 As areas came under Communist control, JCRR activities ceased. However, the commission continued to press forward with the development and execution of its program in areas not yet under Communist control. The deteriorating military situation was not the only constraint on JCRR activities. The arrangements with the Chinese government to obtain Chinese currency to meet the commission’s program and admin¬ istrative expenses became less and less workable. In principle, the JCRR was to draw on funds in a special account in the Central Bank of China. Funds were to be deposited in the account by the Chinese government in amounts commensurate with the landed cost of ECA commodities and services provided on a grant basis. In practice, the Central Bank delayed honoring JCRR requests to withdraw funds, or provided funds in in¬ stallments over a period of time. There were also difficulties getting funds to the sites of projects. These delays sometimes reflected a physical shortage of bank notes13 9U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1949, vol. 11 (Wash¬ ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), PP- 619-620. 10Ibid., pp. 614-615. 11 Ibid., pp. 617—618. 12Personal communication from Moyer to author, June 6, 1983. 13The Chinese government delayed issuing bank notes in larger denominations because it believed that doing so would feed the inflationary expectations of the public. As prices rose,

The Program on the Mainland

31

and sometimes a reluctance on the part of the bank to drive up prices in the area where the currency would be spent. But whatever the cause, delays during a time of rapid inflation meant a serious decline in the value of the currency being withdrawn. Because of the difficulties en¬ countered in drawing Chinese currency, the JCRR also tried to obtain funds by importing and selling commodities and by using U.S. dollars to buy Hong Kong dollars or Mexican silver dollars. Despite these and other expedients, a shortage of funds forced curtailment of the JCRR program. The commission was able to complete only about 25 percent of the projects it had expected to complete by April 1, 1949.14 In the face of serious difficulties and gloomy prospects, the commis¬ sioners had every right to be discouraged, but they were not ready to give up. On March 25, 1949, Moyer (who was in Washington consult¬ ing EC A officials) wrote President Truman a letter recommending that the JCRR program be continued.15 In the letter, Moyer said he was sure he could speak for Baker, who was in China. The operative paragraph stated: “Our opinion is that interests of the United States would be served by a continuation of aid to this program in territory outside of Communist control as long as conditions permit an effective operation. Present indications are that such conditions will continue in substantial parts of South and West China for a period of between six months and two years or more.” U.S. support of the JCRR was continued—initially for the period ending February 15, 1950.

Phase B

Although what has come to be known as the Phase B Program did not begin until July 1, 1949, the groundwork for it was developed in the spring of that year. On April 20, peace negotiations between the govern¬ ment and the Communists broke down, and Communist forces crossed the Yangtze River at several points. The next day, the JCRR commis¬ sioners met to discuss what they should do in light of these develop¬ ments. They decided that the JCRR could still help in the war against communism by building up “a united social front in the vast territories of Southwest and South China through rural reconstruction.”16 more and more bank notes were required to cover any given expenditure, and physical shortages of bank notes occurred. The minutes of the JCRR meeting on February 1, 1949, note that a shipment of about US $84,000 in gold yuan notes to the regional office in Chungking would weigh about one ton. 14Chiang Monlin to Pei Tsu-yi, Embassy of the Chinese Republic, Washington, D.C., March 31, 1949, JCRR files. 15Letter in JCRR files. X6General Report—1, p. 8.

32

Early History of the ]CRR

On May io, the commission decided to launch a new program for the period July i, 1949, to February 15, 1950. In the interim, existing projects would be carried out, but only a small number of new projects would be undertaken in such fields as literacy education, audio-visual training, rural health, local industries, and land reform, in which the JCRR needed additional experience. Consultations would be initiated with government officials on future programs in their areas. The JCRR staff would investigate possible new projects and conduct economic studies to determine both the size of the program that could be carried out in each province without serious inflationary effect and the best means of financing such a program. Writing in December 1949, Moyer recalled that by June 1949 the commissioners had come to the following conclusions:17 1. The program as adopted at the beginning could not influence the situation significantly within the time which we foresaw would be allowed for the Commission’s work. The integrated program cen¬ ters developed too slowly, and assistance on a piecemeal basis did not help enough people solve their most basic problems. This ap¬ proach might work if given three to five years, but not within one or two years. We decided that a great deal still might be done by action in a more limited program, emphasizing felt needs of vital impor¬ tance to the rural people, carried out on a large scale. 2. Only two things could prevent the remaining parts of Nationalist China from coming under Communist control: effective military action, holding some portion of Nationalist China; and good Gov¬ ernment, meeting the needs of the people to hold the area from within. The first requirement was beyond the control of the Com¬ mission, but it was felt that something might be done about the second. On the basis of these conclusions, the commissioners decided to launch a new program in Kwangsi, Szechuan, and Taiwan. Other provinces still in Nationalist hands were presumably regarded as too insecure. The principles guiding the new program were set forth in the JCRR Man¬ ifesto described in Chapter 1. In his letter to Cleveland, Moyer said that the new program had two broad objectives: improving the living conditions of rural people and increasing agricultural production. He also said that by June 1949 the commissioners had come to believe that land tenure reform and the encouragement of farmers’ organizations were essential components of a program with these objectives. Land reform was needed to keep the 17Moyer to Cleveland, December 10, 1949 (cited above, footnote 4).

The Program on the Mainland

33

benefits of JCRR projects from going largely to landlords. Farmers’ organizations were needed to make land reform and other improve¬ ments effective. Because of its size, population, wealth of resources, and strategic importance, Szechuan Province was given top priority in the Phase B Program.18 The program developed for Szechuan featured land tenure reforms, encouragement of farmers’ organizations, irrigation, agricul¬ tural improvement, rural health, and citizenship education. Chiang Monlin and James Yen had consulted extensively with senior officials in Szechuan, including General Chang Chun, high commissioner for Southwest China. The JCRR commissioners were therefore confident that they had government support for the new program. Second priority in Phase B went to Kwangsi. The program for Kwangsi was similar in scope to that for Szechuan, but it was on a more modest scale because of its smaller area and population. As in Szechuan, the commission had the support of key local leaders, including Acting President Li Tsung-jen (President Chiang Kai-shek had temporarily relinquished his office). The JCRR program on Taiwan, which received third priority, was already similar to the programs planned for Szechuan and Kwangsi. In Phase B, projects in land tenure reform, farmers’ associations, assistance in fertilizer distribution, and agricultural improvement would be con¬ tinued; projects in irrigation and health would be added. The commission hoped to continue Phase A projects in a number of areas outside the priority provinces, and it left open the possibility of starting a limited number of new projects in those areas, but Phase B was essentially a program for Szechuan, Kwangsi, and Taiwan.

Expenditures The JCRR program in Szechuan was closed down on November 22, 1949, and that in Kwangsi was terminated on December 4, 1949. Projects in other provinces had ended earlier, as the Communists ex¬ panded their area of control. In the period October 1, 1948, to Novem¬ ber 30, 1949, the commission spent only US $3,790,107.14 Of this amount, US $3,438,262 was spent on the mainland and the remainder was spent on Taiwan. Phase A accounted for 44.4 percent of total 18“Proposals for the JCRR Phase B Program,” n.d., JCRR Hies. 19The financial information presented in this section is from a memorandum to the JCRR from Albert G. Swing entitled “JCRR Project Status through November, 1949,” December 19, 1949. This memorandum is reproduced as an appendix to General Report—1.

34

Early History of the JCRR

expenditures, and Phase B accounted for 55.6 percent.20 Expenditures on the mainland were heavily concentrated in Szechuan (48.3 percent) and Hunan (27.1 percent). The JCRR clearly contemplated spending more than it was able to. It could in theory have spent US $27.5 million, or 10 percent of the amount appropriated for economic assistance under the China Aid Act. During its first 14 months, the commission actually allocated US $10,142,622 to program categories and allotted US $7,879,981 to specific projects. The fact that it was able to spend only a little more than 25 percent of the funds allocated, and less than half the funds allotted, reflects both the difficult conditions under which the commis¬ sion operated and the obstacles it encountered in trying to obtain Chinese currency from the Central Bank. The relatively small amount spent by the JCRR during its brief period on the mainland cannot be taken as a measure of the magnitude of the rural reconstruction effort. The commission always tried to get the organizations sponsoring its projects to contribute more of their own resources than was provided from JCRR funds.

Summary The JCRR’s initial program in mainland China had three compo¬ nents: financial support for three integrated program centers, localinitiative projects, and projects to increase food production. In the first of these efforts, the commission was building on activities that already existed. In the second effort, it was trying to revitalize the numerous private organizations that had been active in rural reconstruction before the war with Japan. And in the third effort, it was responding to urgent current needs for water control, multiplication and distribution of im¬ proved seeds, and control of animal diseases. After only a few months the JCRR decided that because its initial program was too piecemeal and was not producing results rapidly enough, a new program should be launched. The program had two broad objectives: increasing agricul¬ tural production and improving the living conditions of rural people. Land reform and encouraging farmers’ organizations were seen as es¬ sential components of this program. Because of the military situation, the new program was limited to three provinces: Szechuan, Kwangsi, and Taiwan. 2°For accounting purposes, Phase A expenditures were for projects approved before June 30, 1949, and Phase B expenditures were for projects approved after that date. Thus there were some Phase A expenditures, as well as Phase B expenditures, after June 30, 1949-

3 The Move to Taiwan

After crossing the Yangtze River on April 20, 1949, Communist forces occupied Nanking and moved rapidly to the east, west, and south. By the second week in May, more than 20 Communist armies had pushed 120 miles south of the Yangtze and were still advancing. Hankow fell on May 16—17, and Shanghai was taken on May 25.1 By midsummer, it became increasingly evident that the headquarters of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction could not long remain in Canton.2 Exactly when the decision to move to Taipei was made is not clear, but the move took place in August. Before the move, Chiang Monlin and Raymond Moyer went to Tai¬ pei and talked to Governor Chen Cheng about land reform. Chen was already sold on land reform and had started a program of rent reduction in April 1949. H. T. Chang and Tang Hui-sun of the JCRR headquar¬ ters staff also visited Taipei before the move. They had dinner with Governor Chen, and Tang and the governor discussed land reform. C. K. Yen, who was later to become governor of Taiwan and still later president of the Republic of China, was also at the dinner. Yen was then chairman of the Bank of Taiwan, but he had broader economic respon¬ sibilities too. During the visit to Taipei, H. T. Chang collected information on several new projects: rice seed multiplication, rehabilitation of cement rice-drying grounds and cement facing on compost houses, and increas¬ ing jute production needed to make gunnysacks used in exporting rice •U.S. Department of State, U.S Relations with China . . . 1944-1949, pp. xli, 323. 2The account of the move from Canton to Taipei presented here is based on my conversa¬ tions with H. T. Chang and Y. S. Tsiang in February 1983 and with Moyer in March 1983.

35

36

Early History of the JCRR

and sugar. These projects were written up in Canton and put into effect after the move to Taipei. When the Canton office was closed, most of the wives of JCRR staff members were first sent to the Portuguese colony of Macao. Commis¬ sioners Baker, Shen, and Yen flew to Chengtu in Szechuan before proceeding to Taipei. (This side excursion led to speculation that the commissioners were considering a move to Chengtu rather than to Taipei. Moyer denies this.) Chiang Monlin and Moyer, accompanied by Y. S. Tsiang and Cecilia Hoh, secretary to the joint commission, flew directly to Taipei. The remainder of JCRR personnel came on a char¬ tered ship from Canton to Kaohsiung in southern Taiwan. Shen later recalled that the new headquarters in Taipei was opened with a staff of 3 6.3 Most of this number had been transferred from Canton, although a few were presumably from the regional JCRR office headed by Frank L. Woodard that already existed in Taipei. The first headquarters offices in Taipei were in a building on Chinan Road next to the Control Yuan. Most of this building was occupied at the time by the Provincial Department of Agriculture and Forestry. In 1950, the JCRR administration moved to the Union Building, which also housed the ECA mission; the technical staff remained on Chinan Road. In 1954, the entire JCRR operation was moved to a new building at 37 Nanhai Road, where it remained. The successor to the JCRR, the Council of Agriculture, continues to occupy the building on Nanhai Road. One week after the move to Taiwan, James Yen withdrew from the commission and went to the Philippines to promote the Mass Education Movement there.4 He was later replaced on the commission by T. H. Chien (Chien Tien-ho), head of the Agricultural Production Increase Division, then the largest of the JCRR’s divisions. He had previously been deputy director of the National Agricultural Research Bureau, head of the Agriculture Department of the Ministry of Economic Af¬ fairs, and vice-minister of agriculture after a separate Ministry of Agri¬ culture was established. In 1951, Moyer left Taipei to become deputy director of overseas activities at the Ford Foundation. He was replaced as chief of the aid mission (now called the Mutual Security Agency Mission to China) by 3JCRR, The Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction 1948-1968 (Taipei: JCRR, 1968),

Statement from the Chairman. DD 4On June 15, 1983, Yen told me that he left Taiwan for two reasons: (1) the JCRR on Taiwan had everything necessary to succeed and he was no longer needed and (2) he had been invited to come to the Philippines and wanted to see whether the approach to rural problems he had developed in China would work elsewhere.

The Move to Taiwan

37

Hubert G. Schenck. William H. Fippin took Moyer’s place on the JCRR. Fippin had been an agricultural officer of the EGA mission in Korea before being transferred to Taiwan in 1951 as head of the Farmers’ Organization Division of the JCRR.5

The Situation in Taiwan The move to Taiwan greatly constricted the geographical scope of the JCRR’s activities. Taiwan is only about 240 miles long and 90 miles across at its widest point. Its total area of 13,83 6 square miles is slightly greater than the combined areas of Massachusetts and Connecticut. The central mountain range, with 22 peaks higher than 3,500 meters (11,480 feet), covers two-thirds of the island’s area. Only the one-third of the land with elevations of 100 meters or less is theoretically arable, although part of this land is covered by stream beds, urban and indus¬ trial areas, roads, and graveyards. Taiwan is bisected by the Tropic of Cancer. The climate is warm, and there is abundant rainfall. Three or four crops a year can be grown on the same piece of land. Because of the warm temperature and heavy rainfall, Taiwan’s soils contain relatively small amounts of organic matter and nutrients, and the erosion of topsoil is a continuing prob¬ lem.6 Nevertheless, Taiwan’s farmers, especially during the Japanese colonial period, had developed a more productive and technologically more advanced agriculture than there was on the China mainland (see Chapter 4). In 1949, the cultivated area on Taiwan totaled 864,864 hectares. There were more than 621,000 farm families, so the average farm was about 1.4 hectares. Of the total population of 7.4 million, 52.7 per¬ cent—or 3.9 million—were in agriculture.7 In 1952, the first year for which such statistics are available, agriculture was responsible for 35.9 percent of the net domestic product, and manufacturing contributed only 10.9 percent.8 Although the JCRR’s move to Taiwan came four years after the 5Shen, Sino-American JCRR, p. 2.0. 6For a more-detailed description of the natural conditions on Taiwan, see T. H. Shen, Agricultural Development on Taiwan since World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964), pp. 2—27. 7JCRR, Taiwan Agricultural Statistics 1901-1965 (Taipei: JCRR, December 1966), pp. 7,

8,

11.

8Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 19S4 (Taipei: CEPD, June 1984), p. 34.

3

8

Early History of the JCRR

surrender of Japan, the economy of Taiwan, including the dominant agricultural sector, had not yet recovered from the damage and disrup¬ tion of the war years. Taiwan now had to absorb more than half a million civilians from the mainland, plus 600,000 members of the Chinese armed forces. Increasing food production became a high-pri¬ ority task. Bombing by the United States during World War II severely damaged Taiwan’s electric power system, railroads, harbors, sugar mills, and cement plants. Agriculture suffered because of the destruction of fertil¬ izer plants in Japan and because of bombing and poor maintenance of irrigation and drainage systems, flood-control dikes, and coastal wind¬ break forests. Rehabilitation of physical facilities was virtually com¬ pleted by 1950,9 but the rate of inflation had not yet been reduced to an acceptable level. Prices rose 3,400 percent in 1949 and 306 percent in 1950.10 The military threat from the mainland was not the only problem. The first governor of Taiwan after the Japanese surrender, General Chen Yi, quickly gained a reputation for corruption and poor administration. Urban disorders in February 1947 were put down by the army with considerable loss of life. In May 1947, Chen Yi was replaced by a civilian, Wei Tao-ming, who had been ambassador to the United States. Wei succeeded in stabilizing conditions on Taiwan, but doubts about the vulnerability of the island’s population to Communist political infiltration remained. In January 1949? Wei was replaced as governor of Taiwan by General Chen Cheng, one of the government’s best generals and administrators. Although he was a professional soldier, Chen Cheng had an excellent sense of political and economic priorities. First as governor and later as prime minister and vice-president, he backed the reforms that led to economic growth and contributed to political stability. In retrospect, it was most fortunate that the JCRR moved to Taiwan when Chen Cheng was governor.11 The structure of government on Taiwan after the Communist con¬ quest of mainland China was somewhat unusual. A single provincial government reported to a national government that had previously 9A concise description of war damage and the success of rehabilitation efforts is given in U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration, “Economic Self-help Measures of the Chinese Gov¬ ernment in Taiwan,” Taipei, April 13, 1950. 10Yhi-min Ho, Agricultural Development of Taiwan 1903-1960 (Nashville, Tenn.: Van¬ derbilt University Press, 1966), p. 32. 1 President Chiang Kai-shek gave Chen Cheng a fairly free hand in economic development matters, and Chen in turn took the advice of able persons—e.g., Chiang Monlin, C. K. Yen, and K. Y. Yin.

The Move to Taiwan

39

ruled all of China.12 The JCRR had the same responsibility to the national government that it had on the mainland, and the national government still made all important policy decisions. In day-to-day operations, however, the JCRR worked with the Taiwan provincial government and the governments of the counties (hsien), municipalities, and townships into which the province was divided.

The Early Program in Taiwan The joint commission allocated US $164,540 to Phase A projects and US $2,240,000 to Phase B projects on Taiwan. As of February 15,1950, when Phase B ended (but not those Phase B projects that were in the process of being completed), all the funds allocated for Phase A projects had been obligated (i.e., made available to project sponsors) and 98.2 percent had been spent. Only about six-tenths (61.8 percent) of the funds allocated for Phase B projects had been obligated and 30.7 per¬ cent had been spent.13 Four of the eight Phase A projects were in the agricultural improve¬ ment category—production of hog cholera vaccine, control of crop pests, supervision of distribution of EGA fertilizer, and multiplication and extension of improved rice seeds. There was one Phase A project in each of the following categories: farmers’ organization (survey of farmers’ associations), rural health (health survey), land tenure reform (farm rent reduction), and audio-visual education (public information and education). The largest share of Phase A funds (37.5 percent) was allocated to agricultural improvement projects. Land tenure reform and audio-visual education each received a bit more than 30 percent of total allocations. The US $2,240,000 allocated to Phase B projects on Taiwan was distributed as follows (in rounded percentages): Agricultural improvement Farmers’ organization Irrigation Rural health Land tenure reform Audio-visual education

26.8 3.6 40.2 26.8 1.8 0.9

Some 51 of the 75 Phase B projects on Taiwan were in the agricultural improvement category. The largest agricultural improvement projects l2The government of the Republic of China also retained control of a number of small islands that were part of Fukien Province (see Chapter 14). nThe information on projects, allocations, and expenditures here is from an appendix to General Report—1, pp. 205—112.

4o

Early History of the JCRR

in Phase B were rehabilitation of sericulture (US $40,000), repair of retting ponds for jute and hemp (US $80,248), investigation of farm economy (US $37,450), construction of compost houses (US $47,000), and rice seed multiplication (US $26,119). There had been no irrigation projects in the Phase A program on Taiwan, but in Phase B more funds were allocated to irrigation than to any other program category. The JCRR proceeded cautiously with its irrigation program, emphasizing improvement of existing systems and prevention of misuse of water available to those systems. In screening irrigation projects, the commission took labor supply into account in order to avoid pushing up wages and contributing to inflation. By February 15,1950, only 12.4 percent of the funds allocated to irrigation had been obligated, and 2.3 percent had been spent. Rural health was represented in the Phase A program by one small (US $1,000) survey project. In Phase B, allocations to rural health equaled allocations to agricultural improvement and accounted for more than 25 percent of total allocations. The largest rural health project (41.7 percent of total allocations in this category) was the distribution of ECA medical supplies. This project was one of a very few carried out by the JCRR itself instead of by a sponsoring agency. The next-largest rural health project was the rehabilitation of 77 rural wa¬ ter-supply plants. Other rural health projects in Phase B included reac¬ tivation of the malaria control system that had existed during the Japanese colonial period, strengthening of rural health organizations, and a demonstration project in tuberculosis control. In Phase A, the sole project in the farmers’ organization category was also a small survey (US $2,029). In Phase B, the JCRR launched larger efforts to train staff members of farmers’ associations and to help amalgamate farmers’ associations and rural cooperatives. In the cate¬ gory of land tenure reform, the commission continued in Phase B to support the program of rent reduction and also helped the effort to reclassify land in preparation for the transfer of land to the tillers. The funds allocated to the audio-visual program in Phase B were only 40 percent of those allocated to the same program in Phase A; by February 15, 1950, none of those funds had been spent. After the conclusion of Phase B, the JCRR did not immediately move to expand its program on Taiwan. The guidelines for the period Febru¬ ary 16 to June 30, 1950 (designated Phase C) set forth three princi¬ ples:14 14Attachment to Minutes No. 201, “Guiding Principles for ICRR Program, February 16 to June 30, 1950,” n.d., JCRR files.

The Move to Taiwan

4i

I. Economic Factors. The Commission will give careful consider¬ ation to the amount of program funds that can be safely expended without having an adverse effect on the currency stabilization program of the Provincial Government, and it will limit its pro¬ gram accordingly. II. Present Projects. The Commission will lay emphasis on fully de¬ veloping the present program and on inspecting and evaluating projects already under way before considering new projects to any great extent. In other words, the Commission desires to be fully satisfied with the progress of the present program before attempt¬ ing to extend the program further. III. New projects will be limited largely to the following three general types: A. Projects which contribute to an immediate increase in pro¬ duction. B. Projects which meet other basic felt needs of the rural popula¬ tion (including aborigines), such as in land rent reduction or rural health improvement. C. Projects of an investigative nature, in fields directly related to agricultural production and the improvement of the living con¬ ditions of the rural population.

In adopting these rather conservative guidelines, the commissioners were by no means cutting back JCRR activities on Taiwan. The com¬ mission was in fact engaged in developing a comprehensive islandwide program going far beyond anything attempted on the mainland. By August 1950, at a JCRR meeting convened to brief several visitors, Moyer was able to refer to the Taiwan program as “the most intensive of the programs we have ever gotten into.”15

Summary When the JCRR moved its headquarters to Taiwan in August 1949, the island’s economy had still not recovered from the damage and disruption suffered during the war. Moreover, Taiwan now had to absorb more than one million soldiers and civilians who had moved to the island as the Communists extended their control over mainland China. Increasing food production was essential. Plans for expanding 15Record of JCRR meeting held on August 18, 1950, in JCRR Billet No. 17, Taipei, JCRR files. Present were Chiang Monlin, Raymond T. Moyer, John Earl Baker, T. H. Shen, O. L. Dawson, Willard Savoy, Horace Bristol, Ralph N. Gleason, Y. S. Tsiang, and Cecilia Hoh.

42

Early History of the JCRR

the commission’s relatively small program on Taiwan had been com¬ pleted before the move. The expanded program gave top priority to irrigation. Agricultural improvement and rural health projects were also emphasized. While this program was being carried out, the commission was preparing a larger, comprehensive effort that went far beyond anything attempted in mainland China. That program is described in detail in later chapters of this study.

4 An Overview of Agricultural Development in Taiwan

The review of agricultural development in Taiwan presented in this chapter places the events of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s in historical context and provides an analytical framework for the more-detailed discussion of agricultural plans, policies, and programs in the next five chapters. The history of agriculture on Taiwan over the past four centuries is essentially the story of Chinese settlement and development of the island. But Taiwan was not always under Chinese administration, and shifts in political control affected agricultural developments. Five peri¬ ods can be distinguished: Dutch colonial, 1624-62; Cheng regime, 1662—83; Chinese imperial, 1683 — 1895; Japanese colonial, 1895— 1945; and Chinese republican, 1945 to the present. This book is most concerned with the last period, but developments during the Japanese colonial period influenced later events and are still of interest. Because information on the first three periods is sketchy, they will be treated here only briefly.

Early Developments Four hundred years ago, Taiwan was inhabited by non-Chinese tribes that subsisted by hunting, fishing, and a primitive form of agriculture. The origins of present-day agriculture on Taiwan are found not in this tribal agriculture but in the more-advanced agricultural methods that Chinese settlers brought from the mainland. Chinese settlement of Tai45

46

Increasing Agricultural Production

wan began on a small scale in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries,1 and therefore the Chinese settlement of Taiwan paralleled the European settlement of North America.2 In 1624, the Dutch established a foothold near the modern city of Tainan on Taiwan’s west coast. They quickly expanded their control to include large parts of Taiwan’s western plain, particularly in the south¬ west. The Spanish maintained a small presence in northern Taiwan for 16 years (1626-42), until they were driven out by the Dutch. About 25,000 Chinese were living on Taiwan when the Dutch arrived. The Dutch encouraged Chinese settlement, and the Chinese population is believed to have doubled during the period of Dutch rule. Chinese settlers were clearly important to Dutch efforts to increase agricultural production, both for local use and for export. The Dutch promoted the cultivation of rice, sugarcane, tea, hemp, wheat, and indigo and tried to introduce a variety of vegetables and fruits. Their only substantial successes were in the production of rice and sugar, some of which was exported to the China mainland. In 1662, the Dutch were evicted by Chinese forces under the Ming dynasty loyalist Cheng Ch’eng-kung, known as Koxinga in the West. (The Ming emperor in Peking had been overthrown by the Manchus, who established the Ch’ing dynasty.) During the subsequent two de¬ cades of rule by Cheng and his heirs, the Chinese population of Taiwan probably doubled again, to about 100,000. The area of Chinese settle¬ ment was expanded by a system of military colonization. The Cheng regime continued to promote rice cultivation, but it deemphasized the growing of sugarcane. The rule of Cheng and his heirs lasted only 21 years. In 1683, under threat of imminent invasion, Cheng’s grandson surrendered Taiwan to Chinese imperial forces. For the first time, Taiwan came under the effective control of the Chinese empire. For more than two centuries, the island was administered as a fu (prefecture) of Fukien Province. Only in 1887 was Taiwan made a province. The Chinese population and the area of Chinese settlement expanded continuously during the two centuries of imperial rule. Particularly Chinese traders visited Taiwan—and some of them may have lived there

in earlier

centuries. information on early developments in Taiwan is drawn principally from James W. David¬ son, The Island of Formosa: Historical View from 1430 to 1900 (Taihoku, 1903): and Ronald G. Knapp, ed.. Chinas Island Frontier: The Historical Geography of Taiwan (Hono¬ lulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1980).

Overview

47

during the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth, this process of sinification of Taiwan was accompanied by considerable dis¬ order: sporadic Chinese revolts against the government, fights among different Chinese groups, and clashes between Chinese and the island’s original inhabitants, most of whom were steadily pushed out of the plains and into the mountains.3 Despite the disorder, agricultural pro¬ duction increased as the Chinese settlers brought more land under cultivation. Quantitative information is not available, but exports of rice, sugar, and oil cake (for fertilizer) to the China mainland were apparently quite substantial.

The Japanese Colonial Period Japan acquired Taiwan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the Sino-Japanese War of 1894—95. Japanese troops had not invaded Taiwan, but they were threatening the capital, Peking, and the cession of Taiwan was part of the price the Chinese were forced to pay for peace. Japanese colonial rule lasted 50 years. In 1945, as part of the surrender arrangements ending World War II, Japan turned Taiwan over to the government of the Republic of China. Japanese policy was to promote agricultural production on Taiwan in order to increase exports of food, especially rice and sugar, to Japan. This policy had considerable success during most of the period of Japanese rule. Comprehensive agricultural statistics are available only for the period 1911—45, but some statistical series go back to the first few years of the century.4 These series show rice production increasing 27.7 percent from 1903 to 1913, and sugarcane production increasing 172 percent from 1904 to 1913. The number of swine slaughtered rose 50.6 percent from 1903 to 1913.5 Agricultural developments during the well-documented part of the Japanese colonial period can be looked at in three phases: 1913—21, 1921—37, and 1937—46. The initial phase begins in 1913 (instead of 1911), to permit the use of five-year moving averages. The second phase has been called the phase of agricultural transformation and was 3The aborigines who remained in the plains were gradually assimilated hy the Chinese. 4The basic source used here is JCRR, Taiwan Agricultural Statistics, 1901-1965. 5Five-year averages centered on the years cited were used to reduce the effects of weather and other irregular influences on agricultural production. For example, production in 1903 is average annual production for the period 1901-5.

Increasing Agricultural Production

48

Table 1. Sources of growth in Taiwan’s agricultural production during the Japanese colo¬ nial period, 1913-1946 (percentage change annually)

Phase

1913—21 1921-37 1937-46

Livestock production

Crops Production

Harvested area

i-9 4-3 -4.4

1.0 1.4 -0.3

Total production

Unit yield 0.9 2.9 ~4-i

^•7 3-7 -7.8

2.0 4.2 ~4-9

Source: Yueh-eh Chen and Y. T. Wang, “Secular Trends of Output, Inputs, and Productivity: A Quantitative Analysis of Agricultural Development in Taiwan,” in Conference on Agricultural Development in China, Japan, and Korea, December 17-20, 1980 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1981), table 3, p. 619. Note: The indexes used to calculate annual percentage changes in production (columns 1, 4, and 5) were weighted averages of the values of the production of various crops and animal products, using 1935-37 average prices. aTotal production includes farm intermediate goods—e.g., organic fertilizer and animal feed used on the farm.

ushered in by the introduction of a new and more productive variety of rice—ponlai. The third phase included the war years and was a period of declining agricultural production.6 Rates of change in agricultural production varied greatly in the three phases of the Japanese colonial period (see Table i). In the initial phase, production increased only 2.0 percent a year. In the second phase, the rate of increase more than doubled. In the last phase, production fell at an average annual rate of 4.9 percent. Although changes in livestock production contributed to variations in the rates of change in total agricultural production, livestock production accounted for a relatively small part of the total value of agricultural production during the Japanese colonial period. The share of livestock production in total agricultural production was 19.1 percent in 1911—15. It declined to 14.6 percent in 1931-35 and rose to 17.7 percent in 1941—45. The table shows that the increase in crop production during the initial phase could be attributed equally to an expansion in the harvested area and an improvement in yields per hectare. In the second phase the dramatic rise in crop production was brought about principally by an 6The delineation of phases and the analyses of developments in each phase are drawn from Yueh-eh Chen and Y. T. Wang, “Secular Trends of Output, Inputs, and Productivity: A Quantitative Analysis of Agricultural Development in Taiwan,” in Conference on Agricultural Development in China, Japan, and Korea, December 17—20, 1980 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1981). The paper is based in part on Teng-hui Lee and Yueh-eh Chen, Growth Rates of Taiwan Agriculture 1911—1972, Chinese-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruc¬ tion Economic Digest Series 21 (Taipei: JCRR, January 1975).

Overview

49

increase in unit yields. The fall in crop production during the third period resulted almost entirely from a decline in unit yields. The modest gains in agricultural production in the first phase (191321) were achieved by applying traditional techniques to more and more land and by raising more livestock. Fertilizer was largely farm-pro¬ duced, rather than chemical. The multiple-cropping index remained around 120. Rice yield per hectare planted increased only about 6 percent. The introduction of ponlai rice was only one factor in the surge in agricultural production during the second phase (1921-37). The use of chemical fertilizer per hectare of crop area rose from 135 kilograms to 400 kilograms. More money was invested in irrigation, and the area of irrigated land expanded by 70 percent. Largely as a consequence, the multiple-cropping index increased from 120 to 137. The yield of sugar¬ cane per hectare nearly doubled; the yield of rice, the principal crop, went up more than 45 percent. The rapid rise in agricultural production during the years 1921-37 was the combined result of improved techniques, better varieties of rice and sugarcane, and increased inputs of capital and chemical fertilizer. But this rise would not have taken place if two other factors had not been present. First, the large market in Japan meant that the demand for Taiwan’s agricultural products was essentially unconstrained. Second, the colonial authorities had created rural institutions, including farm¬ ers’ associations and experiment stations, that facilitated adoption of new crop varieties and more-modern methods.7 In 1937, total agricultural output peaked, and then declined steadily for the remainder of the Japanese colonial period. Total output in 1946 was only 63.5 percent of the level reached in 1937. Crop production fell by one-third, largely because of a decrease in yields per hectare. Live¬ stock production was cut in half. This reversal in the fortunes of Taiwan’s agriculture resulted from the direct and indirect effects of war (both the war on the China mainland and World War II) and heavy typhoon damage in the years 1940-42. Agriculture suffered from the U.S. bombing of railroads, harbors, elec¬ tric power facilities, sugar mills, and irrigation systems. Moreover, the institutions supporting agriculture—farmers’ associations, irrigation associations, experiment stations, and rural health centers—deterio7These points are made by Erik Thorbecke in Walter Galenson, ed., Economic Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 133-138.

jo

Increasing Agricultural Production

rated as Japanese supervision declined. Data on agricultural inputs show what was happening:8

Labor (million days) Crop area (thousand hectares) Current inputs (million 1935-37 Taiwan dollars) Fixed capital (million 1935-37 Taiwan dollars)

1937

1946

181.7 1,128.4 69.1 2.95.3

i31.4 980.7 8.2 222.7

Days worked in agriculture fell 27.7 percent from 1937 to 1946. Over the same period, the agricultural work force declined only 5.1 percent (probably because of the military draft). Underemployment must therefore have increased considerably. The area planted in crops was 13*! percent smaller in 1946 than it was in 1937. Because the area cultivated decreased only 2.9 percent, the decline in the crop area was largely attributable to a falling-off in multiple-cropping. The most dras¬ tic drop was in current inputs, which include chemical fertilizer, com¬ mercial animal feed, and irrigation expenses. The virtual drying-up of current inputs (a reduction of 88.1 percent) goes far to explain the decline in agricultural production during the final years of Japanese rule. The more modest decrease (24.6 percent) in annual investment in fixed capital (farm buildings, implements, trees, breeding stock, etc.) was more a consequence than a cause of the depressed state of agricul¬ ture. The declines in some inputs were related. A shortage of chemical fertilizer (caused by U.S. bombing of fertilizer plants in Japan) interfered with multiple-cropping and caused the days worked in agriculture to decrease. The requirement of the colonial government that farmers sell most of their rice crop to the government at a fixed price reduced incentives to maintain production and reduced various inputs.9 The condition of agriculture on Taiwan at the end of the Japanese colonial period was definitely not good, but the years of declining agricultural production did not reverse the transformation of Taiwan’s agriculture that had taken place from 1921 to 1937. When Taiwan was returned to Chinese control, the agricultural sector was badly in need of rehabilitation, but the basis for further progress was present.

8Chen and Wang, “Secular Trends,” p. 668. 9See Shen, Agricultural Development, p. 31.

Overview

51

Table 2. Sources of growth in Taiwan’s agricultural production after World War II, 19461977 (percentage change annually)

Crops

Phase

I. II.

1946-51 1951-67

III. 1967-77

Production

Harvested area

Unit yield

9-7 4.0 1.6

6.1 0.7 -0.7

3.6 3-3 2-3

Livestock production

Total production3

14.5 7.6

10.3 4.6

7-9

3-i

Source: Yueh-eh Chen and Y. T. Wang, “Secular Trends of Output, Inputs, and Productivity: A Quantitative Analysis of Agricultural Development in Taiwan,” in Conference on Agricultural Development in China, Japan, and Korea, December 17-20, 1980 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1981), table 3, p. 619. Note: The indexes used to calculate annual percentage changes in production (columns 1, 4, and 5), were weighted averages of the values of the production of various crops and animal products, using 1935-37 average prices. aTotal production includes farm intermediate goods—e.g., organic fertilizer and animal feed used on the farm.

Developments since World War II Three phases can also be distinguished in agricultural developments in Taiwan since World War II: (i) rehabilitation and recovery, 194651; (2) accelerated growth, 1952-67; and (3) decelerated growth, 1968—79. In 1951, total agricultural output for the first time regained— and in fact somewhat exceeded—the prewar peak achieved in 1937. In the mid-1960s, the agricultural labor force reached its highest level and then declined as labor was increasingly drawn out of agriculture and into industry.10 The end of the third phase is somewhat arbitrary, but it is appropriate in a history of the JCRR, because 1979 was the year in which the Sino-American JCRR was succeeded by the purely Chinese Council for Agricultural Planning and Development.11 Table 2 sets out the remarkably rapid recovery of agricultural pro¬ duction (10.3 percent annually) from 1946 to 1951, the slowdown in growth (4.6 percent annually) from 1951 to 1967, and the continued 10The exact year in which the agricultural labor force peaked is uncertain; different series and different moving averages give different results. nThe main source of the review of postwar developments is Chen and Wang, “Secular Trends.” Useful information also came from conversations with Chinese officials and former members of the JCRR and from Shen, Agricultural Development. Chen has subsequently refined the analysis of the period after the postwar recovery and carried it forward to 1982 in a paper prepared for the Symposium on Agricultural Productivity Measurement and Analysis held by the Asian Productivity Organization, October 2-8, 1984, in Tokyo, Japan. This paper is generally consistent with the 1980 paper by Chen and Y. T. Wang (see footnote 6). Chen’s

52

Increasing Agricultural Production

impressive growth (3.2 percent annually) from 1967 to 1977. In all three periods, which roughly correspond to the phases of the postwar period mentioned already, livestock production increased much more rapidly than total agricultural production. During the recovery period, expansion of the harvested area was the principal source of the increase in crop production. During the other two periods, the growth in crop production was largely attributable to improved yields per hectare. (In the third period, the area harvested actually decreased.) The task of the Chinese government in rehabilitating Taiwan’s agri¬ culture was complicated by the fact that the Japanese had monopolized the senior positions in agricultural administration and research. After the surrender, the Japanese, with one notable exception, went home,12 but many members of the subordinate Chinese staff remained. The Chinese government wisely did not immediately impose its own meth¬ ods and procedures on the personnel of the former Japanese colonial administration. The Chinese authorities instead issued instructions that work be carried on as it had in the past. In this way, essential services to agriculture, such as the operation of the irrigation system and the multiplication and dissemination of seeds, were reestablished without unnecessary delay. Only later were reforms that the Chinese govern¬ ment found to be necessary introduced. One of the first actions of the Chinese government was to abolish the wartime controls over agriculture, including the compulsory rice sales that had weakened farmers’ incentives to produce. (The government did not, however, move directly to a free market for rice; for many years fertilizer was exchanged for rice at a rate that the farmers thought was unfair.) The government gave high priority to the rehabilitation of facilities that had been damaged by U.S. bombing or that had deterio¬ rated during the war. Hydropower plants, fertilizer plants, sugar mills, canneries, and other agricultural processing plants were gradually re¬ paired. Irrigation and flood control systems were also restored. For some time, a shortage of foreign exchange limited imports of fertilizer. Nevertheless, agricultural production increased as the harvested area expanded. The multiple-cropping index rose from the low point of 118

more recent paper has not been used because changes in statistical sources and methods interfere with comparisons between its results for the period 1951—82 and those for earlier periods in the 1980 paper. 12The exception was Iso Eikichi, the developer of ponlai rice, who asked to stay on in Taiwan and continue his work in rice research. He was allowed to do so. When he retired some years later, the Chinese government gave him a pension in rice.

Overview

53

in 1945 to 170 in 1951. Seed improvements contributed to an increase in the production of rice and sugarcane. Two important reforms were instituted in the immediate postwar period. The farmers’ associations were reorganized to make them true farmers’ organizations and to increase the services they provided to members (see Chapter 8), and a comprehensive land reform program was carried out in three stages: rent reduction, sale of public land to farmers, and compulsory sale of excess land by landlords to tenants (see Chapter 7). These reforms were mutually supporting. The reorganized farmers’ associations were able to take over some functions—most notably the provision or channeling of credit—formerly performed by landlords. Land ownership increased the interest of former tenants in the associations that they now controlled and added greatly to their incentive to produce. Land reform and the reorganization of the farmers’ associations undoubtedly contributed to the increase in agricultural production. Land reform increased incentives to produce by giving the actual tillers of the land a larger share of total output. The reorganized farmers’ associations probably gave farmers more-effective support than they had in Japanese colonial days. It is impossible to disentangle the quan¬ titative effects of these two reform measures from the effects of other influences on production, but they probably had a greater effect in the second phase of the postwar period than in the first or third phases. Table 3 compares the growth rates of certain key variables in the periods of accelerated and decelerated growth. Total input grew more rapidly in the second of these periods than in the first, but total output grew less rapidly. The explanation lies in markedly different rates of growth in total productivity. It will also be noted that total productivity was better in the latter part of the second period than in the earlier part, and produced a somewhat higher rate of growth in total output. This modest turn around in total productivity and total output is probably attributable to the accelerated agricultural development program that began in 1973 and is described in Chapter 6. The impressive growth of Taiwan’s agriculture from 1951 to 1967 (Table 2) was propelled about equally by increases in total inputs and increases in total productivity.13 Fertilizer and other farm chemicals 13Chen and Wang (“Secular Trends”) obtained an index of total productivity by dividing their index of total output by their index of total inputs. Note that total production and total output are not identical. Total output is total production minus intermediate farm goods, such as grain consumed by farm animals.

54

Increasing Agricultural Production

Table 3. Growth rates of total output, total input, and productivity in Taiwan’s agricul¬ ture, and relative contributions of growths of input and productivity to growth of output, 1951-1977 (percent)

Period

Annual compound rate of growth3

Total outputb

Total inputc

1967-77 1967-73

4-7 3-5 3.16

2.4 3.25

1973-77

3-99

1951-67

3-2-3 3.28

Total productivityd 2.3 0.25 -0.07 0.71

Relative contributions by

Input

Productivity

51-1

48.9

92.9 102.2 82.2

7-i -2.2 17.8

Source: Yueh-eh Chen and Y. T. Wang, “Secular Trends of Output, Inputs, and Productivity: A Quantitative Analysis of Agricultural Development in Taiwan,” in Conference on Agricultural Development in China, Japan, and Korea, December 17-20, 1980 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1981), p. 636. "•Underlying output and input data are five-year moving averages. bTotal output is total production minus farm intermediate goods. •Total input does not include farm intermediate goods. Total productivity is the index of total output divided by the index of total input.

became increasingly available, and previously surplus labor was put to use. A variety of new and improved techniques were adopted. The multiple-cropping index reached a record high of 188 in the mid-1950s. Much of the general agricultural advance was attributable to the inte¬ grated program developed by the JCRR and supported by U.S. aid that began in 1951. The slower growth of Taiwan’s agriculture from 1967 to 1977 de¬ pended almost entirely on a continued increase in total inputs; total productivity rose very little. A small rise in the rate of growth of livestock production could not compensate for a much larger decline in the rate of growth in crop production. A labor shortage, especially in the peak season, caused agricultural wages to go up. This new development, plus unfavorable prices for winter crops, led to a substantial decrease in the total crop area and a decline in the multiple-cropping index. Since the end of the 1946-51 recovery phase, Taiwan’s agriculture has experienced structural changes on both the input side and the output side. The following index numbers show the differing rates of change in the various agricultural inputs:14 14These index numbers are based on single-year data from Chen and Wang (ibid.), rather than on five-year averages, so both 1977 and 1979 indexes are shown here.

Overview

yy

Year

Labor (working days)

Land (crop area)

Current inputs

Fixed capital

I951 1967 1977 1979

100.0 132.8 117.6 112.4

100.0

100.0 373-8 1,050.2 1,288.9

100.0 162.7

H3-9 106.2 100.4

32-5-9 380.0

All four inputs increased during the first period (1951-67), although the two capital items (current inputs and fixed capital) increased much more rapidly than labor or land. During the second period (1967 to 1977 or 1979), current and capital inputs continued to increase, and at considerably faster rates, but labor and land inputs decreased. The decline in labor, measured by working days, was entirely attributable to a shrinking in the size of the agricul¬ tural labor force; the days worked by the average farm laborer actually increased. The decline in land, measured by crop area, reflected a de¬ crease in multiple-cropping that more than canceled the effect of a small increase in cultivated land. Over the entire period after 1951, current inputs grew much faster than other inputs. Total inputs, excluding current inputs, increased at an average annual rate of only 0.5 percent from 1951 to 1977. During the same period, current inputs increased 9.3 percent a year. Within current inputs, feed rose at the remarkable annual rate of 14.5 per¬ cent.15 Fertilizer increased 5.2 percent annually. Because of these differing rates of growth, the share of feed rose from 24.4 percent of total current inputs in 1951-55 to 40.2 percent in 1966-70 and 68.6 percent in 1976-79. The share of fertilizer fell from 64.2 percent in 1951—55 to 38.6 percent in 1966—70 and 13.6 percent in 1976-79.16 The sharp increase in feed inputs is largely the result of an almost explosive rise in the use of imported corn in the latter part of the postwar period. Corn imported as feed increased from an annual average of 310,676 metric tons in 1966—70 to an annual average of 2,156,636 metric tons in 1976—79. The decline in fertilizer was relative, rather than absolute. The annual average use of chemical fertilizer actually increased from 483,419 metric tons in 1951-55 to 1,286,372 metric tons in 1976-79. 15A part of the increase in feed represents the substitution of imported commercial feed for sweet potatoes in feeding hogs. Sweet potatoes are an intermediate farm product and are not included in current inputs. 16The balance of current inputs consisted of other farm supplies and the cost of irrigation and electricity.

j6

Increasing Agricultural Production

The acceleration in the growth rate of fixed capital in the years 196779 reflected the increased mechanization of farming work. By 1979, some 67,000 power tillers and 2,845 rice transplanters were in use. The number of draft animals on farms steadily dropped from 270,000 in 1970 to only 80,000 in 1979. Major changes also took place in the composition of agricultural production. The share of livestock in the total value of agricultural production rose from 21.3 percent in 1951-55 to 27.4 percent in 1966-70 and 37.4 percent in 1976-79. Major changes also took place in the composition of crop production. The average share of rice in the total value of crop production was 57.9 percent in 1951-55; it fell to 44.6 percent in 1976—79. The shares of other common crops and special crops also dropped during this period.17 The share of other common crops decreased from 13.5 percent to 8.1 percent,18 and the share of special crops decreased from 19.3 percent to 14.8 percent. The shares of fruits and vegetables rose markedly, from 3.9 percent to 12.1 percent in the case of fruits and from 5.3 percent to 20.3 percent in the case of vegetables. The transformation in Taiwan’s agriculture since World War II that is described above was in large part the reaction of Taiwan’s farmers to changing market forces. The effects of industrialization were especially powerful. Expanding industry drew labor away from agriculture and made an increase in the capital intensity of agriculture essential. The rising consumer incomes produced by industrialization increased the market for meat, fruit, and vegetables and changed the composition of agricultural production. But market forces do not explain everything. The pace and specific nature of the reaction of Taiwan’s farmers to changing conditions of labor supply and product demand were strongly influenced by govern¬ ment actions. Those actions were to a considerable extent taken in response to policies and programs formulated by the JCRR, using at first U.S. aid funds and later money provided by the Chinese govern¬ ment, as inducements and seed money. Summary The modernization of agriculture in Taiwan dates from the period 1921—37, when Japanese colonial authorities sucessfully applied pol17Other common crops include sweet potatoes, wheat, corn, barley, soybeans, other beans, and fresh edible sugarcane. Special crops include raw sugarcane, tea, peanuts, tobacco, jute, cassava, sesame, sisal, and citronella. 18A major cause of the decline in the share of other common crops was the change from

Overview

57

icies designed to increase exports of rice and sugar to Japan. As a consequence of the war in mainland China and World War II, agricul¬ tural production in Taiwan declined after 1937, but the foundation had been laid for further progress under Chinese administration. After regaining the prewar peak in 1951, agricultural production in Taiwan continued to grow at the impressive rate of 4.6 percent a year until 1967. As industrialization drew labor from farming and pushed up wages, the annual rate of increase in agricultural production decreased to 3.2 percent in the period 1967-77. During both 1951-67 and 196777, livestock production rose much more rapidly than crop production. During the first of these periods, the increase in total output (both crops and animals) was about equally attributable to larger inputs of land, labor, and capital (both current and fixed) and a higher total productiv¬ ity of inputs. During the second period, total productivity rose very little, and the increase in output depended mostly on larger current inputs, especially animal feed, and greater investments in fixed capital, such as machinery. In the next several chapters, the agricultural developments since World War II described in this chapter will be related to government actions and in particular to the policies and programs of the JCRR. Chapters 5 and 6 recount the specific actions taken, respectively, in the phase of accelerated growth (1952—67) and the phase of decelerated growth (1968—79). Chapter 7 reviews the successful land reform pro¬ gram. Chapter 8 describes efforts to improve the farmers’ organizations that provided the essential link through which the JCRR and govern¬ ment agencies reached individual farmers. Chapter 9 deals with the various research, educational, and extension activities that have sup¬ ported and helped improve Taiwan’s agriculture. sweet potatoes to imported corn as feed for hogs. Sweet potato production fell from a peak of 3.7 million metric tons in 1969 to 1.2 million metric tons in 1979. Provincial Department of Agriculture and Forestry (PDAF), Taiwan Agricultural Yearbook 1982 (Taichung: PDAF, 1982), p. 4.

5 The Period of Accelerated Growth, 1952—1967

Recovery from the disruptions of the war years was completed in 1951 and followed by 15 years of accelerated growth in agricultural production. People who served on the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction during this period look back on it with special pleasure. Increasing production was relatively easy. Farm labor was cheap and plentiful. The domestic market for farm products was expanding, and competition in export markets was not yet a serious problem. Largescale imports of feed grain that depressed domestic production of wheat, corn, and sweet potatoes did not begin until near the end of the period. Land reform, completed in 1953, gave farmers a powerful incentive to produce. The reform of the farmers’ associations, also effective in 1953, made it easier to provide needed credit and physical inputs to farmers and to encourage the adoption of new products and methods of production. The approach in this chapter and the following chapter on the period of decelerated growth is to review agricultural plans and policies, note major agricultural developments, and then take up the JCRR and its work. Both chapters focus on agriculture in the narrow sense. The commission’s fisheries, forestry, and rural health programs are exam¬ ined in later chapters.

Agricultural Plans and Policies Because the period of accelerated growth (1952—67) corresponded fairly closely to the period of the first four Four-Year Plans (1953—68),

Accelerated Growth, 1952—1967

59

the evolution of agricultural policy during the period of accelerated growth can be traced through these plans.1 The results of the special policy review that the JCRR conducted in 1963 are also instructive. The agricultural objectives of the first Four-Year Plan (1953-56), as defined by Committee D (agriculture) of the national government’s Economic Stabilization Board, were (1) to stabilize agricultural prices, (2) to increase agricultural exports, (3) to reduce agricultural imports, and (4) to improve the livelihood of the farmers and at the same time maximize their contribution to the economy. Given the JCRR’s domi¬ nant position in Committee D (see Chapter 16), the similarity of these objectives to those of the JCRR in 1952-53, which are described later in this chapter, was not accidental. The agricultural part of the second Four-Year Plan (1957-60) em¬ phasized the development of potential resources, increasing total pro¬ duction, and expanding exports. Irrigation and flood control were to be improved, and tidal and mountainous land reclaimed. Crop production was to be increased by improved methods of fertilizer use, cultivation (including the use of small tractors), seed selection, pest control, and rotational irrigation. Livestock production was to be increased by im¬ proving the supply of feed, expanding grazing areas, and controlling animal diseases. Export goals concentrated on sugar, rice, tea, and pineapples. The third Four-Year Plan (1961—64) continued the effort to promote better use of Taiwan’s agricultural resources in order to bring about further increases in production. Increased agricultural production was designed to achieve self-sufficiency in food supply, help the economy through increased exports to become self-supporting, and support in¬ dustrialization by providing industry with agricultural raw materials. Agricultural production (including fish and forest products) rose 8.9 percent in 1961, the first year of the third Four-Year Plan, but increased only 2.6 percent in 1962.2 The slackening of growth caused the JCRR to undertake a fundamental review of its program in September 1962. The results of this policy review were reflected in the regular program state¬ ment for the fiscal year 1964.3 After noting the great progress made by Taiwan’s agriculture since World War II, the program statement con¬ tinues: ’The agricultural portions of these plans are described in two books by T. H. Shen: Agricultural Development in Tawain since World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964), pp. 62-77; and The Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 77-87. 2PDAF, Taiwan Agricultural Yearbook 1983, (Taichung: PDAF, 1983)^. 240. 3“JCCR Program Statement for Remainder FY 1963 and for FY 1964” (second draft), March 1963, and “JCRR FY64 Program Statement,” September 3, 1963, JCRR files.

Go

Increasing Agricultural Production

Yet as production figures near maxima, additional yield increments be¬ come increasingly more difficult and costly to achieve. By the end of 1962, it had become evident that a drastic change in aid program is necessary to curtail the range of activities and to concentrate available resources more effectively on highly selective efforts which will place China’s agriculture in a position to successfully meet the major share of the long-run food requirements of a growing population and also to provide an expanded volume of high quality agricultural products for export. Consequently, the program statement continued, the JCRR had adopted in early 1963 a new policy guideline and a new general objective. The new policy guideline declared: Technical and financial assistance provided from USAID sources to the agricultural sector are to be allocated on a selective priority investment basis to those economic development projects which will make a major contribution to a higher level of agricultural production and productivity within five years. The new general objective was: To raise the productivity level of the agricultural sector and increase the production and quality of those agricultural products for which Taiwan has a comparative advantage in order to further strengthen the Island’s total economy, including its balance-of-payments position, and to im¬ prove rural living conditions. The program statement for fiscal year 1964 also included operational guidelines in support of the change in emphasis.4 These guidelines called for a reduction in both the number of projects and the number of sponsors, and agencies of the Taiwan provincial government were to be the primary sponsors of JCRR-assisted projects. The guidelines also called for deemphasizing established activities and increasing innova¬ tive and pioneering efforts. Matching support from sponsoring agencies was to be increased, and greater emphasis was to be placed on educa¬ tional demonstrations. Projects involving investments in new facilities or equipment would be given lower priority than projects that used existing capital investments. With only a few exceptions, revenue-pro¬ ducing organizations were to be financed by loans rather than grants. The JCRR decision in 1963—64 to emphasize production more un4These guidelines are reproduced in full in Shen, Sino-American JCRR, pp. 36-37.

Accelerated Growth, 1952-1967

61

doubtedly influenced both the content and the execution of the agricul¬ tural part of the fourth Four-Year Plan (1965-68). The objectives of the plan were to increase food production to meet the needs of the growing population, to supply raw materials to industries, to increase agricul¬ tural exports, and to create employment opportunities for surplus rural labor. Two objectives are prominent in each of the first four Four-Year Plans: increasing agricultural production and increasing agricultural exports. Two early objectives received decreased emphasis or were phased out: stabilizing prices and producing substitutes for imports. Several objectives were phased in or received increased emphasis: de¬ veloping resources, making the economy self-supporting, supplying raw materials to industry, and creating employment opportunities for un¬ employed rural labor. If there were any general trends, they were an increased emphasis on production (highlighted by the JCRR policy shift in 1963-64) and greater integration of planning for agriculture and industry.

Major Agricultural Developments During the period 1952-67, Taiwan’s agricultural sector made im¬ pressive progress toward most of the major objectives set forth in the first four four-year plans: • Crop production increased 82.1 percent, and livestock production increased 186.3 percent.5 (The reasons for the increase in agricultural production were discussed in Chapter 4.) • Exports of agricultural products increased 128 percent, and imports of agricultural products increased 200 percent.6 (See Chapter 15.) • The sucess of the economy of Taiwan in moving toward economic selfsupport was marked by the phasing out of U.S. economic aid in mid-1965. • The rapid expansion of fruit and vegetable production (476.5 percent and 107.6 percent respectively)7 provided the basis for the develop¬ ment of a large food-processing industry. • Agricultural prices rose 289.3 percent from 1951 to 1967, but the 5PDAF, Taiwan Agricultural Yearbook 1984 (Taichung: PDAF, 1984), pp. 4“ 56Council for Agricultural Planning and Development (CAPD), Basic Agricultural Statistics, Republic of China, 1981 (Taipei: CAPD, 1981), pp. 59-60. 7PDAF, Taiwan Agricultural Yearbook 1984, p. 4.

6i

Increasing Agricultural Production

average annual rate of increase declined from 13.2 percent in the period 1951—60 to 3.5 percent in the period 1960-67.8 • Rural unemployment was followed by a labor shortage, as farm work¬ ers were absorbed by expanding industries. • The total area cultivated (one indicator of resource development) grew from 876,100 hectares in 1952 to 902,400 hectares in 1967, an in¬ crease of 3.0 percent.9

The JCRR and Its Work The commission’s wide-ranging programs were carefully designed to advance the agricultural policies it helped to formulate (see Chapter 16). Before we review major aspects of those programs, it is useful to note briefly changes in the commission’s leadership, organization, and staff¬ ing during the period of accelerated growth, the commission’s finances during that period, and its methods of work in the early 1950s.

Changes in Leadership, Organization, and Staffing John Earl Baker retired in 1952 and was succeeded by Raymond H. Davis, who had been chief of the agricultural division of the military government during the occupation of Japan. William H. Fippin was transferred in 1957 and was never replaced. When Davis was also transferred in 1959, he was succeeded by Clifford H. Willson, who had been director of the Technical Service of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization. Willson resigned for reasons of health in 1962.10 He was replaced by Gerald H. Huffman, who had been deputy director of the Federal Extension Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.11 When T. H. Chien retired in 1961, he was succeeded by Y. S. Tsiang, who had been secretary-general of the JCRR. Chiang Monlin died in 1964, and the commission elected T. H. Shen to succeed Chiang as chairman. Since Fippin’s departure, one American position on the com8Yueh-eh Chen, “Country Study on Agricultural Productivity Measurement and Analysis, 1951-1981, Taiwan, Republic of China” (Draft paper prepared for conference in Tokyo, Japan, October 2-8, 1985), p. izi, appendix table 11. The price index is based on three-year moving averages. 9Chen and Wang, “Secular Trends,” p. 669. 10Because of Willson’s illness, William J. Green served as acting commissioner for several months in 1961 and 1962. information on changes in the commission is from Shen, Sino-American JCRR, pp. 20—

Accelerated Growth, 1952—1967

65

mission had been vacant, and with the death of Chiang Monlin a Chinese position was also vacant. On August 31 and September 1, 1964, the two governments exchanged notes agreeing not to fill these positions. For the remaining years of its existence, the JCRR had two Chinese commissioners and one American commissioner. The desire of the U.S. government to save the cost of one commissioner was the principal reason for this change. From the beginning on the China mainland, the JCRR had changed its internal organization as the problems facing it changed.12 As the result of a series of organizational changes, in the mid and late 1960s the commission had the following program or technical divisions: plant industry, animal industry, rural economics, agricultural credit, irriga¬ tion and engineering, rural health, farmers’ service, forestry, and fish¬ eries. The commission was also served by a secretariat and by the offices of the controller, administration, and planning and programming. Given the scope of the JCRR’s activities, its staff was never large. In early 1952, personnel totaled 198, of whom 57 were technical and 141 administrative.13 Shen reports that the staff peaked at 243 in 1962 but declined to 195 in 1970, of whom 105 were technicians and 90 support¬ ing and administrative personnel.14 Despite the joint nature of the commission, its staff did not include many Americans. Americans were hired only when no equally qualified Chinese were available. Americans were also brought to Taiwan as consultants to work for relatively brief periods on special problems. After the move to Taiwan, almost all Americans on the JCRR staff were technicians. From 1954 to 1963, the commission employed 13 Ameri¬ can technicians. Thereafter, the number of Americans was gradually reduced. By 1970, only a single part-time American commissioner re¬ mained.15 During the years in which the JCRR employed several Ameri¬ cans, some of them occupied senior positions. In the mid-1950s, five JCRR divisions were headed by Americans.16

Finances, 1952—1967 Until June 30, 1965, when U.S. economic aid to the Republic of China was terminated, the JCRR was financed entirely by U.S. aid 12Information on organizational changes are from administrative orders in JCRR Hies and from ibid., pp. 22-23. 13Memorandum from Y. S. Tsiang, JCRR Executive Officer, to C. L. Terrell, Deputy Chief, of the Mutual Security Agency Mission to China, February 27, 1952, JCRR files. 14Shen, Sino-American JCRR, p. 25. 15Ibid. 16Memorandums in JCRR files.

64

Increasing Agricultural Production

funds. From fiscal year (FY) 1952 to FY 1965, the JCRR disbursed New Taiwan (NT) $4.0 billion and US $7.1 million as either grants or loans. Total disbursements in this period were the equivalent of US $366.0 million (1979 U.S. dollars).17 The JCRR received no new funding from the U.S. government after the termination of U.S. aid, but it did continue to benefit substantially from local currency (New Taiwan dollars) generated by past aid. Before aid was terminated, the U.S. and Chinese governments agreed to estab¬ lish the Sino-American Fund for Economic and Social Development, usually known as SAFED.18 The fund consisted principally of local currency equivalent in value to U.S. aid deliveries that the Chinese government had been required to deposit in special accounts subject to the control of the U.S. government, and the U.S.-owned proceeds of the sale of surplus agricultural commodities for local currency. The uncom¬ mitted funds turned over to SAFED on June 30, 1965, totaled NT $3.124 billion (the equivalent of US $78 million). Under the terms of the agreement, future required local currency deposits by the Chinese gov¬ ernment, future receipts by the U.S. government from the sale of agricul¬ tural commodities under existing sales agreements, and repayments of loans of both Chinese-owned and U.S.-owned local currency would also be deposited in SAFED. These various additions to SAFED were esti¬ mated eventually to total NT $16,474 billion (the equivalent of almost US $412 million).19 SAFED was to be used for a variety of purposes associated with the winding up of the U.S. economic aid program. Although the agreement did not explicitly say so, most of SAFED’s assets were clearly to be used “for loans and grants to finance economic and social development in the Republic of China, with no less than 15 percent of the funds made available for such loans and grants in any fiscal year to be allocated for the use of the agricultural sector.”20 17Annual disbursement figures in current New Taiwan or U.S. dollars are given in the financial spreadsheet at the end of General Report—17. New Taiwan dollars were converted to current U.S. dollars using exchange rates given in the spreadsheet. Current U.S. dollar figures were converted to 1979 dollars by using the gross national product deflators in Economic Report of the President 1984 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 224. 18This agreement took the form of an exchange of notes on April 9, 1965, between the U.S. ambassador and the Chinese foreign minister. See “Exchange of Notes between the Republic of China and the United States of America concerning the Establishment of the Sino-American Fund for Economic and Social Development” (Economic Planning Council, Taipei, August 1975)-

19Ibid., Annex (Part III). 20Ibid., p. 6 (paragraph B.2 of Agreement).

Accelerated Growth, 1951-1967

65

The agreement provided that “procedures and criteria for developing and approving programs and projects” for the purposes cited above (and for technical cooperation with friendly developing countries, edu¬ cational exchange, and paying the expenses of the program of selling U.S. agricultural commodities) should be worked out by the Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development (CIECD), the JCRR, and the U.S. AID Mission.21 These procedures and criteria were actually negotiated at the same time as the agreement to establish SAFED and were put into effect on the same day, April 9, 1965, by an exchange of letters between the acting director of the U.S. AID Mission and the chairmen of the CIECD and the JCRR.22 The agreed-on procedures provided that requests by the CIECD and the JCRR for SAFED financing would be approved by the prime minis¬ ter before they were submitted to the Managing Committee of the fund (a group of Chinese officials). Moreover, these requests would be based on programs that had also been approved by the prime minister. No U.S. official was to be involved in this process, although the U.S. Em¬ bassy and the representative of the Agency for International Develop¬ ment were to receive copies of the approved CIECD and JCRR pro¬ grams. The criteria for obtaining financing from SAFED were quite general. Major emphasis would be on new products and better methods of increasing productivity. Only new projects were to be considered for financing. Sponsors of projects were to take adequate self-help measures and pay recurring costs, such as salaries and maintenance. Revenueproducing projects were to be financed by loans, rather than grants. In FY 1966 and FY 1967, the JCRR received and disbursed SAFED funds totaling the equivalent of US $37 million (in 1979 dollars).21 Total JCRR disbursements for the period of accelerated growth were there¬ fore about US $403 million (in 1979 dollars).

Objectives and Methods in the Early 1950s Two special meetings of the JCRR held to brief visitors from Wash¬ ington provide valuable information on the commission’s objectives and methods of work at the beginning of the period of accelerated 21 Ibid., pp. 8-9 (paragraph C of Agreement). 22Document in JCRR files. The acting director of the U.S. AID Mission, Gerald H. Huff¬ man, happened also to be the U.S. JCRR commissioner. 23Information on SAFED allocations are from the financial spreadsheet at the end of General Report—33.

66

Increasing Agricultural Production

growth. The purpose of the first meeting, on October 30, 1952, was to brief two officials from the Washington headquarters of the Interna¬ tional Cooperation Administration: C. Tyler Wood and James P. Hen¬ drick. The second meeting, on February 21, 1953, was for briefing the members of a Mutual Security Program Evaluation Team: Harry A. Bullis, Norwood F. Allman, Clinton Morrison, Raymond T. Moyer, and William A. Worton.24 As was his custom, Chiang Monlin opened both meetings with a brief philosophical statement in which he explained that the JCRR program was based on two mutually supporting principles—social justice (or social security) and increased production. He then turned over the major briefing task to Fippin in the first meeting and to Fippin and Davis in the second meeting.25 Because the two briefings covered much the same ground, the following summary of main points makes no distinc¬ tion between them. The basic objectives of the JCRR were (1) to increase agricultural production, (2) to improve the standard of living of farm families, and (3) to improve and strengthen government agencies and the abilities of the people to help themselves. With respect to crop, production, the JCRR sought to increase total production, and in particular to increase production of export crops and crops that reduce or eliminate the need for imports. With respect to livestock production, the commission sought to increase the number of livestock and to control animal dis¬ eases. Strengthening rural organizations was considered especially im¬ portant. The JCRR had no action program of its own, but it provided techni¬ cal and financial assistance to governmental or other sponsoring agen¬ cies that were responsible for carrying out agreed-on projects. The individual project approach made it easier to control expenditures and measure accomplishments. Screening project proposals was a means of ensuring that the total effort was in the desired direction. Only about 20 percent of all project proposals were approved. JCRR specialists trav¬ eled in the countryside constantly, so they were in a good position to evaluate project proposals. They also sometimes identified needs that led to projects. The JCRR specialists exercised continuous, close super¬ vision over all approved projects. 24Detailed accounts of these meetings, recorded by Cecilia Hoh, are in JCRR files. 25 As Fippin explained at the second meeting, the selection of Americans to brief American visitors was deliberate. He said that the Chinese commissioners wanted to “build up Ameri¬ cans in front of Americans.”

Accelerated Growth, 1952—1967

67

Money was used sparingly. The JCRR used technical assistance as far as possible, and financial assistance was always accompanied by techni¬ cal assistance. The commission never bore all the cost of a project. The sponsoring agency contributed “an equitable share or at least as much as possible.” Loans were favored over grants. The JCRR tried to shift the full load to sponsors gradually, so it could take up new work. The commission followed an open-door policy. Contacts were estab¬ lished not only with top levels of government and private organizations but also with local units and individual farmers. Financial assistance to a sponsoring organization went to the lowest level at which the JCRR had complete confidence that the money would be used for the purpose intended, not necessarily to the top level. Getting tangible, measurable results within a reasonable time was the constant emphasis. In late 1952, the JCRR was experimenting for the first time with supporting long-range projects, but commitments to such projects were for only one year at a time. If the results were not good, and if the sponsor was found to be at fault, support was stopped or the project was transferred to another sponsor. Contrary to the belief of some people in Washington, the JCRR did not follow a “village approach.” The term “grass-roots approach” was more accurate. The commission moved ahead in fields in which there was the greatest felt need, rather than attempting a wide variety of activities in a single community.26 Major Program Components Land reform, farmers’ organizations, and agricultural research, edu¬ cation, and extension services are treated later in separate chapters. Other important components of the JCRR’s efforts to increase crop and livestock production will be looked at here. A good idea of how the commission’s program changed can be obtained by looking at three years at the beginning, middle, and end of the period of accelerated growth: fiscal years 1952, i960, and 1968.27 The major components of the program in these years are listed in Table 4. Comments on some of the items listed are provided below. 26This point, made by Davis, recalls perhaps unintentionally the policy dispute in the commission during its earliest days on the mainland. 27The principal sources used were the JCRR general reports for these selected years (these reports cover fiscal years ending on June 30). The two books by Shen cited in footnote 1 of this chapter also contain useful information.

68

Increasing Agricultural Production

Table 4. Major components of JCRR programs in Taiwan in fiscal years 1952, i960, and 1968 1952

i960

1968

Crops

Crops

Crops

Seed multiplication: rice, wheat, sweet potatoes, vegetables, pineapple (seedlings) Improving varieties of rice and wheat Rehabilitation of tea, cof¬ fee, and tung planta¬ tions Improving quality of jute Controlling insects that at¬ tack rice, sweet po¬ tatoes, vegetables, citrus, and other crops

Breeding programs for both ponlai and native rice Introduction of blast-resis¬ tant rice, early-maturing corn, and improved va¬ rieties of several upland crops Extending seed multiplica¬ tion system to addi¬ tional crops and extending seed certifica¬ tion system to all of Taiwan Increasing jute production Controlling insects, rats, and plant diseases Increasing pineapple yields and improving market¬ ing of oranges

Demonstrations of im¬ proved rice cultivation methods Evaluation of mechanical rice transplanters Introduction of new soy¬ bean varieties Organization of banana re¬ search institute Improving fiber crops and tea Field trials of aerial ap¬ plication of pesticides Improving marketing of perishable crops Demonstrations of use of urea fertilizer

Livestock

Livestock

Livestock

Hogs: Breeding improved hybrids; training techni¬ cians in artificial insem¬ ination; supervising distribution of soybean cakes Cattle .Breeding improved hybrids; experimental cattle-raising in moun¬ tains; registration of draft cattle to control slaughtering Poultry.-Importing eggs and chickens to improve strain

Breeding programs for hogs, cattle, and chickens Artificial insemination of cows and sows well es¬ tablished Controlling hog cholera, swine ascarids, fowl cholera, and Newcastle disease in poultry Livestock insurance pro¬ gram, begun in 1955, well established

Integrated swine produc¬ tion and marketing pro¬ gram well established; also, poultry marketing program Duck research center founded in 1967 Building modern facilities for marketing pork and sterilizing milk Breeding programs for hogs, cattle, and poultry continued

Other

Other

Other

Planning, supervising, and financing irrigation proj¬ ects Supervising distribution of fertilizer imported by U.S. aid agency Demonstrating use of cal¬ cium cyanamide on rice and phosphatic fertilizer on several other crops

Technical assistance to ir¬ rigation, flood control, and groundwater proj¬ ects Assisting with land consol¬ idation projects Encouraging the introduc¬ tion of power tillers Supporting soil surveys and land-utilization studies

Research and planning on irrigation, flood control, and land reclamation projects Establishing farm mechani¬ zation promotion centers and demonstrating a va¬ riety of mechanical equipment

Accelerated Growth,

1952—1967

69

Table 4. (cont.) 1952 Investigating marketing problems: wholesale marketing of hogs; retail food marketing in Taipei; export of bananas to Japan and citrus to Hong Kong

i960 Continued supervision of distribution of fertilizer

1968 Encouraging joint farming Unified Argricultural Credit Program, begun in i960, well established Aerial surveying of slopelands Support for soil conserva¬ tion projects

Sources: JCRR General Reports for the selected years. Notes: (i) This table is not an exhaustive list of the JCRR’s activities in the selected years. Its purpose is to indicate the scope and nature of the JCRR’s efforts to increase the production of crops and livestock. Activities outside agriculture proper (fishing, forestry, and public health) and certain other activities that are treated in detail in later chapters (land reform, farmers’ organizations, education, and extension work) are not covered in this table. (2) In almost every case, the JCRR worked through sponsoring organizations to which it provided financial support and technical assistance. The exceptions were supervision of the distribution of soybean cakes and imported fertilizer.

Fiscal Year 1952 From the perspective of the mid-1980s, the agricultural problems that concerned the JCRR and the agencies of the Taiwan provincial govern¬ ment in fiscal year 1952 belong to another era. In contrast with the troublesome rice surpluses of recent years, a dominant objective in the 1950s was to increase rice production so that larger rice exports could earn badly needed foreign exchange. This was the objective behind much of the agricultural program in FY 1952. However, the base was also laid for increased production of other agricultural products in later years. With respect to staple food crops—rice, wheat, and sweet potatoes—improving and expanding seed multiplication and extension systems was the major activity. A rice-seed multiplication and extension system had been established in Japanese colonial times but had deteriorated badly during the war years. The JCRR gave priority to reactivating this system when it moved to Taiwan. Projects for wheat and sweet potato seeds were added later. The commission continued its support, begun in 1950, of a program to breed improved varieties of rice and wheat. crop production.

The animal industry program in fiscal year 1952 concentrated on increasing the quality and number of hogs raised livestock production.

7°

Increasing Agricultural Production

for meat and cattle raised as draft animals. The hog program empha¬ sized disease control and the raising of improved hybrids by breeding good native sows to imported Berkshire boars. Training technicians in artificial insemination was begun. The cattle program also sought im¬ proved quality by crossing native and imported lines. Most rice on Taiwan is grown in irrigated paddy fields. Increasing irrigated acreage and providing water for a second crop to fields that had received only enough water for one crop a year are among the best ways to increase rice production. The JCRR approved, supervised, and helped to finance 17 irrigation projects in fiscal year 1952. It was estimated that those projects, when completed, would increase annual production by more than 21,000 tons of paddy rice. The commission also cooperated with the Provincial Water Conser¬ vancy Bureau in planning and designing improvements in the irrigation system throughout Taiwan. irrigation.

Even before its headquarters were moved to Taipei, the JCRR was responsible for planning, supervising, and reporting on the distribution of fertilizer imported into Taiwan by the U.S. aid agency. This fertilizer was initially intended exclusively for use in the growing of rice. In fiscal year 1952, the JCRR’s responsibilities were extended to fertilizer for sugarcane and miscellaneous crops. Fifteen field inspectors were stationed in rural areas to supervise the fertilizer program and other programs, including one to distribute soybean cake as hog feed. fertilizer.

Fiscal Year i960 Fiscal year i960 was marked by an extremely heavy rainstorm during three days in early August 1959 that caused severe flooding on much of Taiwan’s western coastal plain. One locality in Yunlin Hsien recorded 1.1 meters (39.3 inches) of rainfall in two days. Rainfall of 0.4 to 0.8 meters was common. The flood took 669 lives and resulted in property losses estimated at NT $3.4 billion (US $94 million). More than 66,000 hectares of farmland—about 7.5 percent of the total arable land in Taiwan—were damaged by serious flooding, deposits of sand, or loss of topsoil. Although the JCRR did not normally become involved in re¬ habilitation work after natural disasters, in this instance it responded to urgent requests by the provincial government for assistance. During FY i960, the commission appropriated nearly NT $68 million, almost equally divided between grants and loans, for flood rehabilitation work.

Accelerated Growth, 1952—1967

7i

Despite the substantial diversion of funds and staff time caused by the flood, the regular JCRR program for FY i960 was also carried forward. crop production. The JCRR estimated that the reduction in planted acreage and soil fertility attributable to the flood reduced the second rice crop of calendar year (CY) 1959 by 86,600 tons, the first crop of CY i960 by 37,300 tons, and the second crop of CY i960 by 28,300 tons (all in metric tons of brown rice). Total rice production, however, was only 2.1 percent lower in CY 1959 than it had been in CY 1958, and it increased 3.1 percent in CY i960 to a level almost 1 percent above CY 1958. The production index for all crops, including rice, declined only 0.3 percent in CY 1959 and rose 1.6 percent in CY i960.28 The ability of Taiwan’s crop industry to absorb the heavy blow of the August 1959 flood with only a minor net reduction in total output must be credited to several programs that were yielding significant results (see Table 4). In its program for fiscal year i960, the JCRR supported a number of activities designed to increase rice production, including breeding programs for both ponlai and native (tsailai) rice. The ponlai program was well established, but work to improve native rice had been suspended in 1954 because the government had decided to try to get rice farmers to give up raising native varieties in favor of the higher-yielding ponlai varieties. The JCRR convinced the government that native rice was too important to be ignored. livestock production. The program to improve livestock by crossing and backcrossing native and imported breeds continued. The resulting livestock had production characteristics that were superior to native animals and better able to stand higher temperatures and humid¬ ity than the imported stock. Despite improvements in hog-producing techniques, hog production fell by more than one-sixth in FY i960. The profit margin of farmers was squeezed as feed prices rose faster than hog prices. Native hens were crossed with New Hampshire or Barred Plymouth Rock roosters with good results in egg and meat production. However, poultry raisers, like hog producers, suffered from the in¬ creased cost of feed. land consolidation. Division of rice land by inheritance had re¬ sulted in a crazy quilt of paddy fields of different sizes and shapes. 28PDAF, Taiwan Agricultural Yearbook 1983, p. 242.

72

Increasing Agricultural Production

Individual owners typically owned several small fields that were not adjacent to one another. Many fields were too small or irregular in shape to be cultivated efficiently by machinery. Land consolidation creates larger, rectangular fields, brings together the holdings of individ¬ ual owners, and buys out the owners of excessively small plots. The JCRR began pilot land consolidation projects in Tainan Hsien and Pingtung Hsien in fiscal year 1959. With the help of the JCRR, the government took advantage of the August 1959 flood to consolidate land at nine localities in the coastal plain of western Taiwan. Original landmarks in these localities had been washed away or buried in sand. Land consolidation was coordinated with the reconstruction of irriga¬ tion systems and roads, so almost all the new rectangular plots could be directly irrigated and were directly served by roads.

mechanization. In 1954, there were only 7 power tillers in all of Taiwan. At the end of fiscal year i960, the number of power tillers had increased to 3,057, about half of which were locally made. The rapid introduction of power tillers to rural Taiwan resulted from the joint efforts of the JCRR and local agricultural agencies. In order to encour¬ age the purchase of power tillers further, mechanicanized farming train¬ ing units of 20-30 farmers were formed in FY i960. The elected leaders and deputy leaders of such units were trained in the use of power tillers and were in turn obligated to train other members of their units.

Fiscal Year 1968 On its twentieth anniversary, October 1, 1968, the JCRR issued a largely photographic report that reviewed its achievements.29 The in¬ troductory statement to this report, by Chairman T. H. Shen, noted that the commission had come a long way since its first meeting in Nanking and that its program had changed to meet the needs of a changing economy. He went on: “The current goal of the JCRR is no longer confined to the solution of problems of food shortage. The requirements from the agricultural sector have become more sophisticated. From a period of dire need we have arrived at an era of innovation.” The guidelines for preparing the fiscal year 1968 program set aside NT

$55.0 million (about US $1.4 milion) for grants to support “innovative new projects.” This amount was more than 30 percent of the total funds expected to be available for grants.30 29JCRR, The Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1948—1968 (Taipei: JCRR, 1968). 30Memorandum from Commission Secretariat to All Divisions/Offices, “FY 1968 JCRR Program,” February 23, 1967, JCRR files.

Accelerated Growth, 1952—1967

73

Beginning with the second crop in 1963, integrated demonstrations of improved rice cultivation were conducted in xi6 townships with JCRR assistance. In FY 1968, this program was carried out on a larger scale in five townships. The results showed that, by adopting a combination of improved practices, crop production and marketing.

participating farmers increased rice yields 25.80 percent in the second crop of 1967 and 22.75 percent in the first crop of 1968.31 A major activity with respect to the cultivation of rice in FY 1968 was the continued effort to evaluate the benefits and determine the best methods of using rice transplanters.32 Experiments at district agricul¬ tural improvement stations showed that machine transplanting was cheaper than the traditional hand transplanting and yielded more grain and straw per hectare. Even in the late 1960s, the marketing system for farm crops was backward. The JCRR paid particular attention in its FY 1968 program to the marketing of perishables. The College of Agriculture of National Taiwan University was given a grant to study perishable marketing, and the Provincial Department of Agriculture and Forestry was given an¬ other grant to improve market administration. Through the Land Bank of Taiwan, the JCRR made loans to a township office, a vegetable marketing cooperative, and three township farmers’ associations to construct fruit and vegetable markets. LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION AND MARKETING.

The total value of hogS

slaughtered in 1967 was about NT $6 billion, or 16 percent of the total value of all agricultural products. The decline of Taiwan’s swine indus¬ try, which began in FY i960, was arrested and eventually turned around by the integrated swine production and marketing program initiated by the JCRR in FY 1962.33 Under this program, farmers entered into a contract with the Provincial Farmers’ Association (PFA), under which they were provided with pre-mixed feed, weanling pigs, and veterinary service on credit. In return, the farmers agreed to sell the hogs through the farmers’ association, which enabled the PFA to re¬ cover its expenses. 31These increases were the difference between average yields on demonstration plots and average yields on “check” plots. 32Rice transplanters are ingenious machines first developed in Japan. The seedlings used by the transplanters must be grown in shallow boxes (rather than in part of a paddy field) in order to produce thin, sodlike mats of seedlings that fit into sloping channels on the machines. The mats are fed by gravity into rotating metal “fingers” that pluck seedlings from the forward edge of the mats and thrust them into the muck of a flooded paddy field. An internal combustion engine moves the transplanter forward and also powers the rotating fingers. 33Information on this program and on a similar poultry program described later in this section was obtained from General Reports—13-18, covering FY 1961 through FY 1967.

74

Increasing Agricultural Production

The pre-mixed feed was initially surplus U.S. grain and soybeans provided under Public Law 480. Later, commercial imports were used. This pre-mixed feed had a high protein content and was fortified by vitamins and minerals. It was designed to meet half the total feed requirements. Farmers were to provide the other half—principally sweet potatoes they grew themselves. The integrated program enabled farmers to raise hogs in a shorter time at lower cost and to sell them for a higher price. A survey conducted in FY 1965 showed that farmers participating in the program earned profits averaging NT $250 (about US $6.25) on each hog. As the integrated program progressed, a number of township farm¬ ers’ associations set up feed mills. By FY 1966, there were 15 such mills, 5 of which had feed-testing laboratories manned by skilled technicians. The program also induced many farmers to specialize in the hog busi¬ ness, raising 50-100 hogs at a time, rather than only 4 or 5. The integrated program revolutionized hog-raising on Taiwan, converting it from a sideline activity of small, diversified farmers to a commercial business conducted by specialists. These new hog farmers depended on imported grain, the services of feed mills, and a relatively efficient marketing system. Beginning in fiscal year 1963, a contract system was extended to poultry raisers in two townships under a program initiated by the Provincial Department of Agriculture and Forestry in cooperation with the JCRR, the PFA, and the Taiwan Cooperative Bank. Under this program, farmers received chicks and feed from their township farmers’ associations on credit provided by the Cooperative Bank and sold their eggs and broilers through township farmers’ associations. The poultry contract system was not very successful, however, and it was dropped after five years. The marketing aspects of the integrated poultry program expanded rapidly. In fiscal year 1964, five township farmers’ associations set up egg-collecting stations with refrigerated storage. By FY 1966, some 15 township farmers’ associations were participating in the program. Eggs were sent from the collecting stations to Taipei, where the PFA graded and repacked them in boxes holding 12 eggs. The PFA also played an important role in stabilizing the price of eggs. When the market price of eggs fell below the cost of production, the PFA would buy eggs at cost and hold them in refrigerated storage until the market price rose above cost. The process of specialization noted in the hog industry also took place in the poultry industry. Poultry farms declined in number but increased in size. Without economies of scale, producing eggs and broilers would not have been profitable.

Accelerated Growths 1952—1967

75

In fiscal year 1968, the JCRR was involved in a wide range of research and planning projects prelimi¬ nary to actual engineering projects in the fields of irrigation, flood control, and land reclamation. These preparatory projects included planning for the integrated development of the Kaoping River basin, conducting experiments and research on upland crop irrigation, rota¬ tional irrigation survey and design, and improvement of tidal land development techniques. irrigation and flood control.

In 1966, the Taiwan provincial government established a revolving flood control loan fund with NT $500 million of its own assets in the form of stocks, NT $100 million from the central government, and NT $200 million from the JCRR. The JCRR contribution was to be paid over a period of five years. Because of the shortage of labor at times of trans¬ planting and harvesting, the use of farm machinery increased at an accelerating rate. In fiscal year 1967, some 15,213 power tillers were in mechanization.

use on Taiwan, roughly five times the number in use in FY i960. One year later, the number had grown to 18,547, an increase of more than 20 percent. In FY 1968, some 75 percent of the power tillers in use had been made in Taiwan. The number of draft cattle declined nearly 12 percent from FY 1964 to FY 1968. The use of machinery other than power tillers—power pumps, grain dryers, and mist blowers or dusters—also increased. Adoption of rice transplanters and harvesters, however, still lay in the future. The JCRR gave technical and financial assistance to the responsible agricultural agencies in a number of projects designed to advance mechanization, including establishment of farm mechanization promotion centers in selected townships, demonstrations of rice transplanters and bin-type grain dryers, and improvement of rice harvesters, grain threshers, and attachments for tiller-type tractors.

The increased yields to be obtained by a combination of improved practices in the cultivation of rice have joint farming operations.

already been mentioned. These results were an aspect of a broader program that also emphasized joint farming operations.34 By farming their land jointly, it was hoped that groups of farmers could use their labor more efficiently and overcome some of the disadvantages of culti¬ vating very small farms. Joint farming was also expected to facilitate mechanization. 34See Shen, Sino-American JCRR, pp. 151-159.

y6

Increasing Agricultural Production

Beginning with the second rice crop of 1967, joint farming was applied to nearly 3,000 hectares in five townships. Two more townships were added in 1968. Groups of 30—40 farm families worked together to cultivate 20-hectare plots. Each group elected its own leader. Advice on improved techniques was provided by local extension workers, who were in turn guided by technicians from agricultural stations. Yields on land in the program were 23-24 percent higher on the average than yields on check plots.

Fiscal year 1968 was the eighth year of the Unified Agricul¬ tural Credit Program established at the initiative of the JCRR to strengthen the credit operations of the township farmers’ associa¬ tions.35 At the heart of the program was the Agricultural Credit Fund, credit.

consisting of NT $300.0 million (about US $7.5 million) of counterpart aid funds, to be built up by the JCRR over a period of five years. An Agricultural Credit Planning Board, consisting of officials from eight national and provincial agencies, administered the fund and made pol¬ icy for the agricultural credit system. Approximately two-thirds of the fund was to be loaned to township farmers’ associations without interest. The other third was to be loaned to the Cooperative Bank of Taiwan and the Land Bank of Taiwan at 12 percent interest. The banks were expected to loan this money to the farmers’ associations at 14 percent interest when the associations needed additional resources for their credit operations. Twenty percent of each loan was to consist of the lending bank’s own funds. From 1961 through June 1968, direct loans from the fund to farmers’ associations actually totaled NT $189 million, and indirect loans channeled through the two banks totaled NT $85 million. The fund was designed to be self-sustaining—that is, interest pay¬ ments and loan repayments would support a continuing flow of new loans. The fund was also intended to decline in importance as the farmers’ associations put more of their own resources into the Unified Agricultural Credit Program. This is in fact what happened. In fiscal year 1961, the fund provided 62.5 percent of the money loaned under the program. In FY 1968, the fund’s share of total loans was only 19 percent. The importance of the program in total agricultural credit and 35The program description here is drawn from Min-shioh Kwoh, Farmers’ Associations and Their Contributions toward Agricultural and Rural Development in Taiwan (Bangkok: FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Far East, October 1964), pp. 118—124. Information on the program’s functioning is from General Report—19, pp. 99-104. See also Shen, Sino-Ameri¬ can JCRR, pp. 207-212.

Accelerated Growth,

1952—1967

77

financing in Taiwan also increased markedly, rising from 4.9 percent at the end of FY 1961 to 21.1 percent at the end of FY 1968.36

Summary The JCRR’s program during the period of accelerated growth (195267) supported the two major agricultural objectives of the first fouryear plans (1953—68): increasing production and increasing exports. A slackening in the growth of production in 1962 caused the commission to tighten up its program to give priority to projects that would yield concrete results within five years. Established activities were deemphasized in favor of more innovative projects. Throughout the period of accelerated growth, the JCRR supported efforts to breed improved varieties of crops and livestock and to make those improved varieties available to farmers. It also helped to improve the irrigation system and to control diseases and pests. As the years passed, the commission paid increasing attention to mechanization, land consolidation, the market¬ ing of farm products, the rationalization of land use, and the encourage¬ ment of joint farming. 36The major source of agricultural credit and financing was direct bank loans, which accounted for 54.5 percent of total loans at the end of FY 1968. These loans were made to farmers’ organizations, government agricultural institutions, and private enterprises engaged in agricultural production, as well as to individual farmers and fishermen.

6 The Period of Decelerated Growth, 1968—1979

The period of accelerated agricultural growth was brought to an end by the combined effect of successful industrialization and developments within agriculture itself. Industrialization drew workers from agricul¬ ture, created labor shortages during times of planting and harvesting, and drove up farm wages. These developments discouraged multiple¬ cropping. Within agriculture, many of the most effective measures to promote rapid growth had already been taken by the late 1960s. New measures generally produced more-limited results. The small size of farms, and slowness in adopting joint farming, delayed mechanization. A good case can be made for concluding that the period of accelerated growth ended in about 1967. As noted in Chapter 4, the agricultural labor force peaked in the mid-1960s and declined fairly steadily thereaf¬ ter.1 In addition, the rate of increase in total productivity in agriculture dropped sharply in 1967 and remained either low or negative during the following ten years.2

Agricultural Plans and Policies During the period 1968—79, agricultural policy continued to be guided by a series of comprehensive economic plans, and the Joint !A number of former JCRR analysts regard the beginning of the absolute decline in the agricultural labor force as a key turning point. See Chen and Wang, “Secular Trends.” 2Ibid., p. 658. An index of total productivity was obtained by dividing the index of total output by the index of total input. All indexes were five-year moving averages.

78

,

Decelerated Growth 1968—1979

79

Commission on Rural Reconstruction continued to play a leading role in the preparation of the agricultural portions of those plans (see also Chapter 16). But planning was by no means limited to the comprehen¬ sive economic plans. Those plans were supplemented by a series of special plans, policy proclamations, and policy conferences. Also, be¬ ginning in 1973, the Accelerated Rural Development Program provided a separate framework for planning some kinds of agricultural projects. The fifth Four-Year Plan (1969—72) attacked six fundamental prob¬ lems involved in continuing the development of agriculture:3 • Long-range development of agricultural science and technology • Integrated planning and use of land and water resources, especially in mountainous areas • Coordination of agricultural financing and investment • Expansion of the marketing of agricultural products • Narrowing the gap between the incomes of farmers and workers in other sectors of the economy • Promoting farm mechanization The plan called for an average annual rate of growth in agricultural production of 4.4 percent (including fisheries and forestry). This goal was slightly higher than the 4.1 percent annual rate of growth specified in the fourth Four-Year Plan (1965—68); the fourth Four-Year Plan exceeded its goal, achieving an average annual rate of growth of 6.2 percent. Actual growth of agricultural production during the fifth FourYear Plan, however, was only 2.2 percent, or half its goal.4 The differ¬ ence in the results of these two plans is further evidence that the late 1960s marked the beginning of a new and more difficult period for Taiwan’s agriculture. The planners in the Chinese government and the JCRR quickly real¬ ized that the agricultural production targets of the fifth Four-Year Plan were not being achieved. In November 1969, the government an¬ nounced a new agricultural policy containing 14 points, including:5 • Expanding the size of farm operations and promoting mechanization • Stabilizing the prices of agricultural products • Strengthening farmers’ organizations 3General Report—20, pp. 137—139. 4T. H. Shen, “The Mechanism for Agricultural Planning,” in T. H. Shen, ed.. Agriculture’s Place in the Strategy of Development: The Taiwan Experience, (Taipei: JCRR, 1974), PP- 2.6— 28. 5General Report—21, pp. 125-27. The points dealing with fisheries and forestry have not been included here.

80

Increasing Agricultural Production • Improving marketing efficiency • Improving the agricultural financing system and supplying long-term low-interest loans • Placing equal emphasis on special crops and food crops • Increasing the production of meat, milk, and eggs • Strengthening slopeland development • Strengthening agricultural research and the training of research per¬ sonnel

The new agricultural policy did not diverge from the agricultural part of the fifth Four-Year Plan, but focused more sharply on some of the objectives of the plan. The JCRR helped the Ministry of Economic Affairs draw up 12 programs to carry out the new agricultural policy. Three high-priority programs dealing with farm mechanization, agricultural marketing, and agricultural finance were approved by the Executive Yuan. The Ministry of Economic Affairs subsequently set up a committee to push farm mechanization, and the Central Bank of China established a com¬ mittee on the planning of agricultural credit. With respect to marketing, emphasis was placed on improving domestic markets for pork and vegetables.6 The Executive Yuan added NT $100 million (about US $2.5 million) to the FY 1972 budget of the Ministry of Economic Affairs to carry out the new agricultural policy. This money was turned over to the JCRR, which developed a program of 22 projects designed to meet three objectives: • Achieving immediate and high returns in crop production • Increasing agricultural exports • Reducing farm production costs and raising the income of farmers The total cost of these projects exceeded the amount appropriated by the Executive Yuan by over NT $32 million. The balance was provided by various sponsoring agencies: the provincial government, local gov¬ ernments, farmers’ associations, fruit marketing cooperatives, and busi¬ ness firms.7 In fiscal year 1973, the national government appropriated another NT $ 100 million for agricultural modernization. This money was han¬ dled by the JCRR under what was now referred to as the Government 6Gerteral Report 7General Report

22, pp. 61-62. 24, p. 67.

—

—

Decelerated Growth, 1968-1979

81

Supported Program (GSP). In FY 1973, sponsoring agencies provided matching funds totaling more than NT $85 million.8 Two other agricultural planning efforts were launched in the early 1970s. The National Science Council drew up the first of three four-year science development plans that included sectoral plans for agriculture prepared with the assistance of the JCRR.9 The Council for Interna¬ tional Economic Cooperation and Development prepared a comprehen¬ sive 20-year development plan for the period 1971—90. Again, the JCRR helped write the section on agriculture. In the area of crop production, this long-term plan called for establishing specialized crop regions, expanding the operational size of farms, and strengthening farm mechanization. In the area of livestock production, the plan advo¬ cated developing animal industry on slopelands and increasing meat and milk production.10 The new agricultural policy announced in 1969 and the various planning activities described above were not enough to achieve the agricultural production goals of the fifth Four-Year Plan. In September 1972, as the four-year planning period was drawing to a close, Prime Minister Chiang Ching-kuo announced the Accelerated Rural Develop¬ ment Program (ARDP). This program was originally intended to last for only two years—calendar years 1973 and 1974—but it continued through fiscal year 1979. The JCRR played a key role in initiating the ARDP and in drawing up plans for carrying it out.11 The JCRR was also made responsible for allocation of a large part of the funds appropriated by the national government for the ARDP. Announcement of the ARDP did not, as might have been expected, delay the sixth Four-Year Plan. This plan, covering the period 1973~7^, featured eight broad measures in the field of agriculture:12

• Changing the structure of agricultural production and enlarging the scale of farming • Raising agricultural productivity and increasing production • Improving agricultural marketing and regulating the prices of farm products • Reducing the prices of farm requisites • Strengthening farmers’ organizations and improving their services 8General Report—25, 9General Report—24,

p. 59. p. 67.

10Ibid., pp. 68-69.

11General Report—26, 12Ibid., p. 61.

pp. 3, 62-63.

82

Increasing Agricultural Production

• Improving agricultural financing and increasing agricultural invest¬ ments • Improving farmers’ living conditions and promoting their welfare • Strengthening agricultural administration and the training of agricul¬ tural personnel In 1974, the JCRR completed an internal plan as a guide for its own future operations. On the basis of a summary in the general report for the period July 1 to December 31, 1974, this plan appears to have developed more fully some of the measures specified in the sixth FourYear Plan.13 For example, the JCRR plan noted several actions that should be taken to enlarge the scale of farming: encouraging one-heir inheritance, merging small farms, and selling land whose owners have given up farming; setting up commercial-scale demonstration farms; and establishing a fund to help farmers buy land. The overall goals of the sixth Four-Year Plan—but not the agricul¬ tural goals14—were achieved in three years. The next planning period therefore began in 1976, rather than in 1977. Contrary to the past practice of planning for four years at a time, the new plan was to cover six years. In the actual event, this plan was terminated two years early to make way for a ten-year plan beginning in 1980. The ten-year plan was replaced after only two years by a new four-year plan. The ease with which plans were changed or overlaid with special programs tells something about the nature of economic planning on Taiwan. Plans are not immutable directives, but general guidelines designed to influence the expectations and actions of private firms and individuals as well as the programs of government agencies at all levels. The work on the Six-Year Plan was undoubtedly influenced by the National Economic Conference, which the Chinese government con¬ vened on March 24—26, 1975, to chart the future course of economic development in the new international environment created by the i973—74 °il crisis. The JCRR helped to plan and conduct the agricul¬ tural part of this conference, which was attended by 20 agricultural economists, experts, and business leaders. This group agreed that the joint farming program should be expanded and that more specialized 13 General Report—30, pp. 2—3. 14The plan called for a 4.1 percent average annual increase in agricultural production. The general index of agricultural production rose only from 87.9 in 1972 to 90.9 in 1975, an average annual increase of only 1.1 percent. PDAF, Taiwan Agricultural Yearbook 1983, p. 240. The record is much better, but still short of the goal, if five-year moving averages are used. In that case, total agricultural output increased 10.9 percent from 1972 to 1975, or 3.6 percent annually. See Chen and Wang, “Secular Trends,” p. 658.

Decelerated Growth, 1968-1979

83

agricultural areas should be created. Specific conclusions were also reached on a variety of subjects, including the need to use land and water resources more efficiently, to stabilize agricultural prices, and to reduce the income disparity between farmers and nonfarm workers.15 The JCRR prepared the agricultural part of the Six-Year Plan in cooperation with the concerned government agencies. The basic objec¬ tives of that part of the plan were:16 • To narrow the income gap between farmers and nonfarm workers, principally through price supports, extension of cooperative market¬ ing, establishment of stabilization funds for major products, and cre¬ ation of off-farm employment opportunities. The goal was to increase the per capita income of farmers to 70 percent of that of nonfarm workers, compared with the 67 percent prevailing in 1976. • To increase agricultural production to meet domestic demands for food and raw materials by such measures as intensified development and better use of marginal lands, introduction of better crop varieties, and improvement of farming techniques. The goals were to increase agricultural production by 2.5 percent a year and to achieve 88 percent self-sufficiency in food. • To raise rural living standards by building roads and water supply systems, establishing health centers, improving housing and sanitary conditions, and providing facilities for cultural and recreational ac¬ tivities. The Six-Year Plan also emphasized regional planning. By concentrating the raising of economic crops in selected areas, it was hoped that the benefits of both specialization and economies of scale would be gained. During the four years in which the Six-Year Plan was actually in effect, agricultural production grew 18.3 percent, or 4.6 percent a year— substantially more than the 2.5 percent annual rate of increase that the plan called for.17 The various plans and policy statements issued during the period of decelerated growth revealed a continuing concern with the need to use Taiwan’s limited agricultural resources efficiently and the desirability of closing the gap between urban and rural incomes and living standards. Expanding the scale of farming operations, mechanization, specializa¬ tion, better use of slopelands, and improved land and water resource planning were recurrent themes. Increased production continued to be xsGeneral Report—31, pp. 1-3. 16Gerteral Report—33, p. 2. 17PDAF, Taiwan Agricultural Yearbook 1983, p. 240.

#4

Increasing Agricultural Production

the dominant goal, but this goal, along with more efficient marketing, was increasingly seen as a means of raising farm incomes. Greater attention was also paid to improving public services and amenities in rural areas.

Major Agricultural Developments The slowing down in the rate of increase in crop production and the continued rapid increase in livestock production were discussed in Chapter 4. From 1967 to 1979, crop production increased only 16.4 percent, but livestock production increased 142.2 percent.18 Several other agricultural developments during the period of decelerated growth also deserve notice: • The production of fruits and vegetables continued to increase much more rapidly than crop production as a whole; from 1967 to 1979, fruit production increased 71.2 percent and vegetable production in¬ creased 202.5 percent. Rice production, however, virtually stagnated and over the same period increased only 1.5 percent.19 • Taiwan’s exports of agricultural products increased 519 percent from 1967 to 1979, but imports of agricultural products rose 1,293 percent, largely because of increased imports of feed grains, soybeans, cotton, and logs and lumber. Taiwan had a small surplus of US $60.7 million in its agricultural trade in 1967. This trade went into deficit in 1970, and by 1979 imports of agricultural products exceeded exports by US $1,171 million.20 • The area of cultivated land increased only marginally from 902,400 hectares in 1967 to 915,400 hectares in 1979. Over the same period, the area planted in crops decreased from 1,689,600 hectares to 1,488,600 hectares.21 As a result, the multiple-cropping index fell from 187.2 to 162.6. • The average farm size decreased from 0.96 hectares in 1965 to 0.81 hectares in 1980.22 Mechanization nevertheless increased significantly, which suggests the spread of custom and cooperative farming. The total horsepower of tractors and power tillers in agriculture rose 516 percent from 1967 to 1979.23 18PDAF, Taiwan Agricultural Yearbook, 1984, pp. 4-5. 19Ibid., p. 4. 20CAPD, Basic Agricultural Statistics 1981, pp. 59-60, 67—68. 21Chen and Wang, “Secular Trends,” p. 669. 22CAPD, Basic Agricultural Statistics 1981, pp. 15-16. 23Chen and Wang, “Secular Trends,” table 13, p. 123.

Decelerated Growth, 1968—1979

85

• During the period of decelerated growth, the gap between farm and nonfarm incomes per household increased. In 1964, farm families were 39.6 percent of total families in Taiwan and received 39.1 percent of total family income. In 1972, farm families were 25.9 percent of all families and received 21.0 percent of family income. The income rela¬ tive for farm families (the ratio of share of income to share of families) therefore declined from 0.99 to 0.81.24 Farm family income was 69.8 percent of the income of the families of nonfarm workers in 1966 and 64.5 percent in 1979.25 • The disparity between farm and nonfarm family incomes would have widened even more if farm families had not been able to increase their earnings outside agriculture. In 1966, the average farm family received 66.0 percent of its income from agriculture; in 1977, only 30.9 of its income came from agriculture.26 The developments noted above present a mixed picture of limited successes and continuing problems. The period of decelerated growth was clearly a time of transition in which agricultural policy was pri¬ marily concerned with adjusting to change without losing momentum. The continued increases in agricultural production, although at a slower rate, are a tribute to the adaptability of Taiwan’s farmers as well as to the guidance and assistance provided by the government and the JCRR. The JCRR and Its Work During the period 1968—79, the JCRR became increasingly Chinese, although it did not entirely lose its joint nature. There were no American staff members, and during most of the period the single American commissioner devoted only a fraction of his time to the commission. The JCRR’s sources of finance also became increasingly Chinese. Begin¬ ning in 1973, the JCRR ran two parallel programs: its own regular program and a substantial part of the Chinese government’s Acceler¬ ated Rural Development Program.

,

Leadership Organization, and Staffing Until his retirement in 1973, T. H. Shen continued to serve as chair¬ man of the joint commission. He was a consultant to the JCRR and to 24John C. H. Fei, Gustav Ranis, and Shirley W. Y. Kuo, Growth and Equity: The Taiwan Case (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 2.44. 25CAPD, Basic Agricultural Statistics 1981, pp. 73—74. 26Ibid., pp. 69—70.

86

Increasing Agricultural Production

its successor, the Council for Agricultural Planning and Development (CAPD), until his death in 1980. His last book was entitled Autobiogra¬ phy of a Chinese Farmers9 Servant.27 Shen was succeeded as chairman by Robert C. T. Lee, who had been secretary-general of the JCRR. Lee was the last chairman of the JCRR and the first chairman of the CAPD. Y. S. Tsiang continued to serve as the second Chinese commissioner until 1978. During much of his tenure, Tsiang concurrently held senior posts in the Chinese government.28 He was succeeded by Chang Hsuinshwen, who had been commissioner of the Provincial Department of Agriculture and Forestry. Gerald H. Huffman, who had been the American commissioner for nearly six years, was reassigned to Vietnam in April 1968 by the Agency for International Development (AID). During part of his time in Tai¬ wan, Huffman was concurrently director of the AID mission and had to spend considerable time on the details of winding down the U.S. eco¬ nomic aid program. Huffman was succeeded by Bruce H. Billings, a physicist, who served concurrently as science adviser to the U.S. ambas¬ sador. Billings was followed by Chester W. Clark, another physical scientist, who also held a concurrent appointment as science adviser. The position of science adviser was abolished in 1975.29 In 1976, Joseph B. Kyle, the economic counselor in the U.S. Embassy, was given a concurrent appointment as JCRR commissioner. When Kyle was trans¬ ferred in 1978, Melvin H. Levine succeeded him as both economic counselor and JCRR commissioner. Levine was the last American com¬ missioner. The organization of the JCRR did not change significantly from the structure that had evolved by the late 1960s, described in Chapter 5. The commission continued to be served by nine program or technical divisions, a secretariat, and offices of the controller, administration, and planning and programming. At some point in the mid-1970s, the for¬ estry division was replaced by the agricultural resources and forestry division, which handled soil and water resources, as well as forestry. The size of the staff did not change greatly either. On March 15, 1979, when the JCRR was terminated, it had a staff of 239, of whom 145 were in professional categories. All staff members were Chinese. 27Taipei: Linking Publishing Co., 1981. 28Tsiang served as secretary-general of the Executive Yuan from 1967 to 197Z and as minister of education from 1972. to 1977. 29The position was in effect transferred to the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, Korea, which had not previously had a science adviser.

Decelerated Growth, 1968-1979

87

Finances, 1968-1979 For seven-and-a-half years after the termination of U.S. economic aid on June 30, 1965, the JCRR was financed principally by the SinoAmerican Fund for Economic and Social Development (SAFED), de¬ scribed in Chapter 5. The SAFED agreement provided that at least 15 percent of the annual withdrawals from the fund should be for the agricultural sector. During the first three fiscal years after the termina¬ tion of U.S. aid, the JCRR actually received about 18 percent of annual SAFED appropriations. SAFED did not, however, provide funds as large as the commission had received before the termination of U.S. aid. The JCRR’s budget had been running about NT $450 million annually, but during the first three years of reliance on SAFED, the commission received about NT $360 million annually. On at least one occasion, the JCRR received a substantial supplemen¬ tal appropriation from SAFED.30 The commission also received some financial support from the Chinese government. Thus, as has been noted, in both fiscal year 1972 and FY 1973, the JCRR administered NT $100 million appropriated by the Executive Yuan in support of the new agricultural policy promulgated by the government in November 1969.31 Also in FY 1972, the commission received NT $15.5 million from the National Science Council (NSC), an agency of the Chinese government. This NSC money was administered as part of the regular JCRR budget of NT $375.5 million.32 The two appropriations of NT $100 million were programmed in consultation with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Provincial Department of Agriculture and Forestry and administered by the JCRR separately from its regular budget. The launching of the Accelerated Rural Development Program (ARDP) in January 1973 brought about a dramatic change in the JCRR’s financial situation. The Chinese government appropriated NT $2 billion (about US $52.6 million) for the first two years of this program. This fund, and some subsequent large appropriations for the ARDP, were allocated by the JCRR and used under the guidance of a 30In FY 1974, the JCRR initially received NT $384 million from SAFED. At the time of the mid-year review, an additional NT $125 million of SAFED money was made available to the JCRR. See Memorandum to the Joint Commission from the Office of Planning and Program¬ ming, “Mid-year Program Review,” January 3, 1974, JCRR files. 31 General Report—24, p. 67. 32Memorandum to the Joint Commission from the Office of Planning and Programming, “JCRR Program and Budget for FY 1972,” May 18, 1971, JCRR files.

88

Increasing Agricultural Production

national planning committee. The minister of economic affairs was convener of this committee. Other members were the minister of fi¬ nance, the governor of the Central Bank of China, the secretary-general of the Executive Yuan, the director-general of budget, accounting, and statistics, the chairman of the JCRR, the chairman of the Economic Planning Council, the governor of Taiwan, and the mayor of Taipei. The secretary-general of the JCRR was the executive secretary of the committee.33 From FY 1973 through FY 1979, the Chinese government appropri¬ ated a total of NT $12.4 billion for the ARDP. Of this, NT $7.5 billion were allocated through the JCRR. The commission administered these funds separately from its regular budget, which continued to be fi¬ nanced largely by SAFED. The provincial government contributed NT $18.8 billion to ARDP projects over the same period and allocated NT $4.9 billion appropriated by the central government. Government banks also made substantial loans to farmers in support of the ARDP.34 Total funding for the JCRR after the termination of U.S. aid was the equivalent of about US $465 million (in 1979 dollars). Major Program Components The FY 1968 program, which straddled the dividing line between the period of accelerated growth and the period of decelerated growth, was described in Chapter 4. A good picture of the regular JCRR program in the latter period can be obtained by looking at fiscal years 1972 and 1976 (see Table 5). The Accelerated Rural Development Program will be dealt with separately. The Regular Program in FY 1972 Fiscal year 1972 was the last full fiscal year in the period of the fifth Four-Year Plan, as well as the last full fiscal year before initiation of the Accelerated Rural Development Program.35 Large-scale field demonstrations of improved cultural techniques were carried out in various parts of Taiwan. Some of crop production.

33Terry Y. H. Yu, “The Accelerated Rural Development Program in Taiwan,’’ in JCRR, Rural Economics Division, Agricultural Economic Research Papers, Economic Digest Series 23 (Taipei: JCRR, October 1978), p. 73. 34Data supplied by the CAPD controller’s office in May 1984. 35Information on the regular JCRR program in FY 1972 is drawn principally from General Report—24 and General Report—25, each of which covers half the fiscal year.

,

Decelerated Growth

196&-1979

89

Tzb/e 5. Major components of JCRR programs in Taiwan in fiscal years 1972 and 1976 1976

!972

Crops

Crops

Large-scale field demonstrations of im¬ proved cultural techniques Breeding new crop varieties with higher yields or other desired characteristics Developing and disseminating new methods of pest and disease control

Demonstrations of direct seeding (rather than transplanting) second rice crop Continued research on improving varieties of rice, sweet potatoes, peanuts, sweet corn, soybean, sorghum, and vegetables Trial cultivation of jasmine and carnations for export Research on control of diseases in flax, citrus trees, and bananas

Livestock

Livestock

Establishment of integrated livestock-crop areas for the specialized raising of swine, dairy cows, or beef cattle Duck-breeding program and research on duck hepatitis Continued efforts to breed better hogs and control hog cholera Importing dairy cattle from New Zealand and beef cattle from Hawaii Experiments on ruminant nutrition and slopeland forage crops

Propagation and extension of improved hogs from nucleus herd of breeding pigs Survey of yields of dairy cows to facilitate breeding of superior dairy cattle Establishment of foundation flocks of chickens for breeding program Continued research on hog and cattle dis¬ eases

Other

Other

Encouraging building modern hog slaugh¬ terhouses and cold-storage facilities for fruit and vegetables Surveying vegetable marketing in Taipei Planning drainage improvements in landconsolidation areas Supporting irrigation improvements and studies of computer program to regulate water distribution Supporting soil conservation and develop¬ ment on slopelands Mechanization: developing machinery for peanut farming; establishing nurseries to grow seedlings for rice transplanters; fi¬ nancing farm machinery purchases Encouraging joint farming

Promoting proper grading and uniform packing of vegetables Building power-driven cableways to carry citrus fruit to roads Planning regional land-resource develop¬ ment Continued support for irrigation and flood control work Developing new types of rice transplant¬ ers, rice combines, peanut combines, and dryers; continued financing of farm machinery purchases Interest-free rice production loans Pilot program to find solutions to prob¬ lems encountered in slopeland develop¬ ment

Sources: JCRR General Reports for the selected years. Notes: This table does not include projects administered by the JCRR under the Accelerated Rural Development Program. See also notes to Table 4.

these demonstrations featured integrated techniques of improved rice cultivation. Others featured mechanized rice cultivation, herbicide ap¬ plication for weed control, or direct seeding (rather than transplanting seedlings). Rice-breeding efforts by the experiment stations of the Pro-

90

Increasing Agricultural Production

vincial Department of Agriculture and Forestry (PDAF) with the finan¬ cial and technical assistance of the JCRR emphasized developing vari¬ eties with greater tolerance of low temperature, increased resistance to bacterial leaf blight, or increased resistance to brown plant-hoppers. A new peanut variety with higher yields per acre and greater oil content was released for commercial use, and in an effort to develop an additional source of vegetable oil, a sunflower-breeding program was launched. The JCRR also helped provincial agencies develop new vari¬ eties of cabbages, onions, and tomatoes, demonstrating improved meth¬ ods of raising tea, jute, and flax and training farmers and extension workers in modern techniques of sericulture. Hog production reached a new high in 1971. As the number of hog producers declined and the number of hogs per producer increased, the industry was becoming more specialized. The JCRR joined several provincial agencies in a program to increase marketing to 1,000,000 hogs a year. Efforts to breed better hogs, and experiments in controlling hog cholera, continued. Dairy-farming and the raising of beef cattle were still small industries, but efforts to expand these activities continued. The Animal Industry Division of the JCRR had developed the concept of specialized animal-raising in integrated livestock-crop areas. Under this concept, animal barns are built in the fields where feed is grown. Manure is collected in tanks under the barns and used to fertilize the fields. The system works best when fragmented farm holdings have been consolidated in plots adjacent to a main path. Consolidation facilitates the application of fertilizer, the use of farm machinery, the delivery of feed, and the shipping of products. Farmers participating in the spe¬ cialized animal-raising program are required to raise only certain kinds of animal—swine, dairy cows, or beef cattle. As of June 1972, several villages specializing in each kind of animal were either in existence or in advanced stages of planning. livestock production.

In FY 1972, marketing costs averaged about half the retail price of vegetables, and about two-thirds of the marketing costs were incurred at the retail level. A survey of the vegetable retail business conducted by the PDAF with the technical and financial assistance of the JCRR found that the average daily sales of vegetable retailers totaled only NT $836 (about US $20.90) and that their daily profits averaged NT $144 (about US $3.60). The high cost of vegetable retailing in Taiwan was the inevitable result of disguised unemployment (under¬ employment). marketing.

Decelerated Growth, 1968—1979

9i

Fruits and vegetables that cannot be sold quickly require cold storage, and not enough cold storage was available in the early 1970s. The cold storage that did exist was mostly in converted ice-making plants that became available because of the spread of household refrigerators. These plants lacked temperature and moisture controls. As a pace¬ setting experiment, the JCRR made loans to two farmers’ associations to help them build modern cold-storage facilities. In the interests of sanitation and efficiency, the commission tried over a period of years to get government agencies and private firms to build modern hog slaughterhouses. By 1972, four modern abattoirs and packing plants had been built, in this instance without need of financial assistance from the JCRR. In fiscal year 1972, the JCRR gave technical and financial assistance to the provincial Mountain Agricultural Resources Development Bureau (MARDB) to carry out soil-conservation measures on more than 8,000 hectares of slopeland. These measures included hillside ditching, orchard terracing, cover cropping, green manuring, and the establishment of grass terrace barriers. The JCRR also joined with the MARDB in selecting 22 areas covering 3,877 hectares for application of an integrated program of soil conservation and land use. Sixteen such areas were established in fiscal year 1972. Within these areas, proper soil conservation practices were applied, farm roads and irrigation and drainage systems were con¬ structed, and mechanization was encouraged. Costs were covered by the MARDB and cooperating farmers and by a relatively small subsidy from the JCRR. SOIL CONSERVATION AND SLOPELAND DEVELOPMENT.

Growing peanuts was a highly labor-intensive ac¬ tivity. As farm wages rose, the area planted in peanuts declined from 103,600 hectares in 1965 to 86,314 hectares in 1971. The JCRR helped the Tainan district agricultural improvement station to develop a fourrow peanut planter drawn by a power tiller and to import a peanut digger and combine drawn by a tractor. Use of machinery for land preparation, planting, and harvesting on a test plot reduced production costs by about 30 percent compared with the conventional method. The rise in farm wages also caused more rice farmers to use power tillers for land preparation and created a need to mechanize other stages of the growing of rice. In the early 1970s, mechanical rice transplanters were beginning to be introduced. These machines require seedlings grown in shallow boxes in nurseries. In northern Taiwan, such nurseries require heating units. The JCRR helped finance the construction of 25 mechanization.

92

Increasing Agricultural Production

heated nurseries in fiscal year 1972. The cost of mechanical transplant¬ ing was 81.8 percent of the cost of conventional hand transplanting in northern Taiwan and 71.3 percent in southern Taiwan (where nurseries do not have to be heated). In support of the accelerated farm-mechanization plan approved by the Executive Yuan, the JCRR in cooperation with the Provincial Food Bureau, the Cooperative Bank, and the Land Bank initiated a farmmechanization loan program in FY 1972. The commission provided NT $50 million (about US $1.25 million) for loans to farmers under the unified agricultural credit program. Also in FY 1972, the JCRR made NT $26 million (about US $650,000) available to the Land Bank for farm-mechanization loans. Since 1970, neighboring farmers pro¬ ducing the same kind of agricultural products had been encouraged to organize joint farming groups. The JCRR provided financial and techni¬ cal assistance to these groups. By 1971, nearly 500 groups had been organized. Members of groups were encouraged to engage in collective purchasing and marketing and to accept contract or custom farming (the cultivation of more than one farm by a single farmer). joint farming operations.

The Regular Program in FY 1976 At the beginning of fiscal year 1976, the Accelerated Rural Develop¬ ment Program had been under way for more then two years. By this time, it is reasonable to assume that the regular JCRR program and the ARDP were mutually supporting.36 Experiments in past years showed that direct seeding was a successful means of planting the second rice crop, because at that season the temperature is high enough to induce rapid germina¬ tion. Direct seeding, it was found, could save 80 percent of the labor cost of the conventional transplanting method and in some cases also produced higher yields. The JCRR and the PDAF jointly supported direct seeding demonstrations in different parts of Taiwan. The JCRR and the National Science Council supported a basic research program designed to improve the varieties of rice. Significant results were ob¬ tained in breeding varieties resistant to blast and bacterial leaf blight crop production.

36Information on the regular JCRR program in FY 1976 is drawn principally from General Report—32 and General Report—33.

Decelerated Growth, 1968—1979

93

and in transferring the semi-dwarf gene to blast-resistant lines. Semi¬ dwarf rice plants resist lodging and have a high tillering ability. Since 1971, the Provincial Livestock Re¬ search Institute (PLRI) and the JCRR had been involved in an effort to improve the hog herds in Taiwan by setting up a nucleus herd of breeding pigs and establishing a propagation and extension system. Using funds provided by the National Research Council, the commis¬ sion financed a number of studies on swine genetics by various research organizations in cooperation with the University of Hawaii. The JCRR and the provincial government jointly planned a six-year program, beginning in May 1970, to improve the facilities of the Pro¬ vincial Research Institute for Animal Health (PRIAH). The commission also continued to help programs working to control a number of infec¬ tious hog and cattle diseases. At the invitation of the JCRR, Ben E. Shiffy of Cornell University came to Taiwan in 1975 as a short-term consultant to help PRIAH in studies of a new vaccine for hog cholera. land resources development. Beginning in July 1974, the JCRR had been engaged in a regional agricultural planning program in coop¬ eration with several agencies of the provincial government. The objec¬ tive of this program was to integrate the development of each region into national agricultural policy and to achieve the goal of raising the right kinds of crops and animals at the right places. The program involved drawing land-use status maps on the basis of aerial survey data and designing optimum cropping patterns or farming systems for all lands that were, or might be, used in agriculture. Planning at the local level was to emphasize joint farming and marketing.37 The JCRR was also involved in several other survey and mapping projects. An aerial survey of paddy land in cooperation with the PDAF was begun in July 1974 and completed two years later. A survey of slopeland was also begun in July 1974 in cooperation with the MARDB. By June 1976, some 9 of Taiwan’s 15 hsien had been surveyed. With technical assistance from a U.S. firm, a pilot project on forecasting rice yields by using remote sensing technology was begun in September livestock production.

1975-

Since June 1973, the JCRR had worked in cooperation with the MARDB on a pilot program designed to find solutions to a wide range of problems encountered in slopeland development: legal (land laws), 37The results of the regional planning program are presented in CAPD, Preliminary Report on Regional Agricultural Development Planning in the Taiwan Area (Taipei: CAPD, July 1980).

94

Increasing Agricultural Production

technical (farming techniques), financial, and marketing. The commis¬ sion was also involved in an integrated soil conservation and land-use program for selected slopeland areas. This program sought to improve the efficiency of land use and, where conditions permitted, to create specialized agricultural areas. The JCRR continued to contrib¬ ute to the Flood Control Fund and to review plans for flood control projects and supervise their execution. The commission made grants to the Provincial Water Conservancy Bureau to make plans for the regula¬ tion of the Chishui River and 32 secondary rivers and to undertake a model testing study on the regulation of the Chishui River. The JCRR also provided financial support for research and demonstration projects on a wide range of subjects, including the irrigation and use of sandy coastal land, the irrigation of upland crops, mechanical desilting of a main irrigation canal, and automatic pipe irrigation for paddy fields. water resources development.

The use of machinery in Taiwan’s agriculture in¬ creased rapidly in the 1970s (see Table 6). During fiscal year 1976, the commission provided technical and financial assistance to agricultural research organizations and farm machinery manufacturers in the de¬ velopment of new types of rice transplanters, rice combines, peanut combines, batch dryers, and medium and large drying devices. It devel¬ oped a four-year program (1976-79) to increase greatly the number of grain dryers in use on the island; the availability of dryers would reduce the loss of grain to spoilage caused by rain at harvest time. The farmmechanization loan program financed jointly by the Ministry of Fi¬ nance, three agricultural banks, and the JCRR continued to be a major factor in the increased use of farm machinery. As of December 1975, the cumulative total of farm mechanization loans was NT $1,569 million (almost US $40 million). These loans financed the purchase of more than 22,000 units of farm machinery. mechanization.

By the end of fiscal year 1976, the JCRR’s unified agricul¬ tural credit fund had disbursed a total of NT $368,650,000 (more than US $9 million) in direct and indirect loans to 251 farmers’ associations. Over the first 15 years of its existence, the unified agricultural credit program made loans to more than half the farm families in Taiwan. Some 70 percent of the money loaned was invested in farmland, build¬ ings, machines, and installations. Most of the remaining 30 percent was used as working capital. Since 1974, the JCRR had helped in the credit.

Decelerated Growth, 1968—1979

95

Table 6. Farm machinery in use in Taiwan, 1970, 1975, and 1979 (units)

Power tiller Tractor Rice transplanter Power sprayer Water pump Rice power thresher Grain dryer Rice combine

1970

1975

28,292

49,347 1,380

539 280 17,820 52>794 0 198 20

*,787 37,874 124,626 27,558 2,419 2,010

1979 84,254 2,894 25,820 52.,554 142,501 35,768 25,032 10,569

Source: Tien-song Peng, “Taiwan Agriculture and Its Mechaniza¬ tion,” in Taiwan Agricultural Machinery Guide 1981 (Taipei, February 1981), p. 12.

interest-free rice production loan program, which was financed by an annual appropriation of about NT $i billion (about US $25 million) from the central government. These loans were repaid in rice. Loans during FY 1976 totaled NT $1,062 million. This program continued until 1985. The Accelerated Rural Development Program The program for accelerating agricultural and rural development (subsequently known as the Accelerated Rural Development Program, or ARDP)38 called for nine measures described below.39 Only the first two of these nine measures were in any sense new. The others echoed aspects of past or existing plans and programs. What was new was a selective emphasis and the backing of that emphasis with substantial financial resources. Since the early 1950s, rice farmers had obtained fertilizer in exchange for paddy rice. This exchange was handled by the township farmers’ associations on behalf of the Provincial Food Bureau. At first, the exchange ratio was 1:1 by weight. Later, as the international price of fertilizer declined, the abolition of the rice-fertilizer barter system.

38Information on the ARDP was obtained in part from General Reports—26-33, covering FY 1972 through FY 1976. Other sources included T. H. Shen, “A New Agricultural Policy,” in Agriculture's Place, pp. 38-56; Teng-hui Lee, “Policy and Performance in the Recent Taiwan’s Agriculture,” in Agricultural Economic Research Papers, pp. 31-39; Yu, “Acceler¬ ated Rural Development Program,” pp. 71-85; and “The Nine-Point Program for Accelerat¬ ing Agricultural and Rural Development in Taiwan,” December 1972, JCRR tiles. 39The principal source used in these summaries was Yu, “Accelerated Rural Development Program,” pp. 74-76.

9

6

Increasing Agricultural Production

ratio was adjusted to increase the amount of fertilizer that could be obtained for a given amount of rice. This system was quite controversial and was regarded as unfair by many farmers. The rice-fertilizer system had been one means of transferring resources out of the agricultural sector to other sectors of the economy. Abolition of the system was one sign that the period in which agriculture subsidized industrialization had ended. (See Chapter 15 for further discussion of the rice-fertilizer barter system.) Abolition of the rice-fertilizer barter system was regarded by the government and the JCRR as a means of increasing incentives of rice farmers to increase production. Beginning in 1974, additional incen¬ tives that were not explicitly part of the ARDP were provided. A rice price-stabilization fund of NT $3 billion was established, the guaran¬ teed purchase price of rice was raised, and non-interest-bearing loans for rice production were made available.40 ABOLITION OF THE EDUCATIONAL SURTAX ON FARMLAND. The edu¬ cational surtax on farmland was quite small—less than 3 percent of the land tax. It is estimated that in FY 1972, before its abolition, the educational surtax cost the average farm family a little more than NT $50 annually (about US $1.25).41 Abolition of the surtax was justified by the expectation that it would improve farmers’ morale. easing of the terms of agricultural credit. During the period January 1973 to June 1976* banks loaned farmers NT $2.7 billion in support of the ARDP. Loans were geared to production needs. No upper limits on loans were set, interest rates were reduced, and no security was required beyond the items to be purchased with the bor¬ rowed money. IMPROVEMENT OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETING. As was true of the regular JCRR program, greatest emphasis was placed on the coopera¬ tive marketing of hogs and vegetables. Marketing facilities were mod¬ ernized, and market information reporting systems were established. STRENGTHENING OF RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE. To Strengthen the rural infrastructure, investments were made in the construction and repair of sea dikes and river levees, the planting of windbreaks, the 40Ibid., pp. 78-79. 41JCRR, “Changes in Taiwan’s Rural Conditions,” February 1977, p. 8, JCRR files.

,

Decelerated Growth 1968—1979

97

construction and repair of irrigation and drainage facilities, reclamation of tidal lands, construction of mountain feeder roads and village water supply systems, improvement of environmental sanitation, construction of fishing harbors, and development of slopelands for farming purposes. ACCELERATION OF THE EXTENSION OF INTEGRATED USE OF IMPROVED

Application of the integrated approach to more and more farmland contributed to increased rice production and increased yields of dryland food crops. Mechanization was regarded as part of the integrated approach. An expanded loan program, which was not strictly part of the ARDP and which was mentioned earlier in this chapter, helped farmers buy machinery. Joint farming, custom farming, and the rental of machinery were encouraged as means of facilitating mechanization. cultural techniques.

ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIALIZED AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION AREAS.

Farmers were encouraged through the construction of public facilities and other kinds of assistance to cooperate in specializing in products especially suited to their localities. By June 1976, some 200 specialized areas of 22 different kinds had been established, principally on slopelands and in coastal areas. STRENGTHENING

OF

AGRICULTURAL

RESEARCH

AND

EXTENSION.

Activities aimed at strengthening agricultural research and extension were similar to activities supported by the regular JCRR program. ARDP research and extension work included breeding improved vari¬ eties of crops and livestock, controlling pest and diseases, improving research facilities, training low-level agricultural workers, and strength¬ ening extension education. ENCOURAGEMENT OF ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW INDUSTRIES IN RURAL

Four industrial parks were established, in which private firms were to be encouraged to set up labor-intensive activities, such as food processing and the making of handicrafts. areas.

Summary During roughly the last decade of its existence (1968—79), which has been referred to as the period of decelerated growth, the JCRR was principally concerned with helping Taiwan’s agricultural sector adjust

5)8

Increasing Agricultural Production

to the consequences of rapid industrialization. Support continued for the breeding and dissemination of better varieties of crops and livestock, the improvement of the irrigation system, and the control of pests and diseases. There was increased emphasis on demonstrating advanced cultural techniques, building better marketing facilities, and developing slopelands. Integrated livestock-crop areas were established for the specialized raising of swine, dairy cows, and beef cattle. Mechanization was vigorously promoted. Since U.S. aid was phased out in mid-1965, the JCRR had been financed by local currency assets remaining from the U.S. aid program and later by increasing funds appropriated by the Chinese government. To counter a serious slackening in agricultural production, the Chinese government launched the Accelerated Rural Development Program (1973—79) and turned over the administration of a substantial part of this program to the JCRR. This program enabled the JCRR to increase its activities, especially in improving marketing, strengthening the rural infrastructure, extending advanced cultural techniques, establishing specialized production areas, and supporting research and extension work.

7 Land Reform

Land reform is an old idea in China. In his foreword to the com¬ prehensive JCRR report on land reform in Taiwan, Chiang Monlin cites several ancient—and largely unsuccessful—efforts to distribute land more equitably.1 According to Chiang, the first advocate of land reform was Tung Chung-shu, who more than 2,000 years ago declared “Let us set a limit to the amount of land an individual may own, give the excess to those who really need it, and put a stop to the concentration of landownership in the hands of a few.” Unfortunately, Chiang com¬ ments, Tung “did not work out any concrete measures for the realiza¬ tion of his ideal.” More recently, land reform was strongly advocated by Dr. Sun Yatsen, founder of the Republic of China and the Kuomintang, the ruling party in the Republic of China. The key passage on land reform in Sun’s basic work reads as follows: A large majority of the people in China are peasants, at least nine out of every ten, yet the food which they raise with such wearisome labor is mostly taken away by the landowners. What they themselves can keep is barely sufficient to keep them alive. This is a most unjust situation. If we are to increase the production of food, we must make laws regarding the rights and interests of the farmers; we must give them encouragement and protection and allow them to keep more of the fruit of their land. The •Hui-sun Tang, Land Reform in Free China (Taipei: JCRR, October 1954). This report and General Reports—2—6 are the principal sources for this chapter. They were supplemented by interviews with several informed people in Taipei, including H. T. Chang, Y. S. Tsiang, and C. K. Yen.

99

100

Increasing Agricultural Production

protection of the farmers’ rights and the giving to them of a larger share in their harvests are questions related to the equalization of land owner¬ ship. . . . Later, when the Min-sbeng Principle is fully realized and the problems of the farmer are all solved, each tiller of the soil will possess his own fields—that is to be the final fruit of our efforts.2

This passage shows that for Sun Yat-sen land reform had two aspects: (i) allowing tenant farmers to keep more of what they produce, or granting them rent reduction, and (2) transferring landownership to the tillers. Sun’s successors in the Kuomintang adopted both these goals but were not able to do much about them in the years they ruled mainland China. The opposition of landlords to land reform was strong, and war and civil war delayed the execution of programs of social and economic reform. Some valuable experience was nevertheless gained on the main¬ land in programs limited to single provinces or smaller areas. As early as 1926, the Kuomintang political platform called for a 25 percent reduction in rents on agricultural land. In the late 1920s, rent reduction programs were undertaken in four provinces—Kwangtung, Hupeh, Hunan, and Chekiang. Because of the strong opposition of “feudalistic forces,” the work was not done “with any degree of thor¬ oughness except in Chekiang where better results were achieved be¬ cause of the Provincial Government’s determination to carry out the program in spite of all obstacles.”3 The Land Law of 1930, which was to be enforced in 1936, provided that no farm rent should exceed 37.5 percent of the annual harvest.4 But action by the various provinces to apply this rent ceiling was taken “only half-heartedly and intermittently and did not lead to any concrete results.”5 Better results were achieved in 1940 and 1941 in Hupeh. Chen Cheng, who was governor of Taiwan during the land reform and later became vice-president and prime minister, was governor of Hupeh at this time. Because of rent reduction, farm production in Hupeh increased, and many tenant farmers became rich enough to buy land. In 1949, in the face of a deteriorating military situation, the government attempted a 25 percent reduction of farm rents in Szechuan, Sikang, 2Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People, trans. Frank W. Price (Shanghai: China Committee, Institute of Pacific Relations, 192.7), p. 456. The “Min-sheng Principle” is the principle of people’s livelihood, one of the three principles of the people; the other two principles are nationalism and democracy. 3Tang, Land Reform, p. 29. 4Because rents of 50 percent of the annual harvest were common, this ceiling had roughly the same effect as a 25 percent reduction in rents. 5Tang, Land Reform, p. 29.

Land Reform

IOI

Yunnan, and Kweichow. In Szechuan, with the technical and financial assistance of the JCRR, some 144,000 fieldworkers were employed in the rent reduction program. This program would have benefited ap¬ proximately 17.5 million tenant farmers if it had not been terminated by the loss of the province to the Communists.6 During the years on the mainland, the government of the Republic of China also tried to move toward Sun Yat-sen’s ideal of land-to-the-tiller by establishing owner-farmers in selected areas. This was done indi¬ rectly by providing loans to farmers who wanted to buy land, and directly by the compulsory purchase of landlords’ land and resale to tenants. The indirect approach was used in 75 hsien in 13 provinces, mostly in central and south China. The direct approach was applied in only a few localities in Szechuan, Kiangsi, Kwangsi, Hunan, and Kansu. Thirteen land-to-the-tiller demonstration centers were also established. From 1941 to 1947, direct and indirect measures combined transferred 929,040 mow (about 62,000 hectares) to 63,309 families of ownerfarmers.7 The government had a strong incentive to push land reform on Taiwan to keep the Communists from exploiting agrarian discontent there, as they had done on the mainland. In 1949, some 36.1 percent of farming families were tenants and 6.7 percent were farmhands, lacking even the leasehold rights of tenants. Most leases were oral and could be terminated by landlords at will. Rents averaged 50 percent of the yield of the main crop and in extreme cases were as high as 70 percent.8 Wolf Ladejinksy described the condition of tenants in Taiwan before land reform: “What they have most are children; what they have least are the things that spell material well-being. Tenants’ huts, so-called barnyards, equipment and livestock as well as their health point to nothing but poverty.”9 Conditions on Taiwan were more favorable to land reform than they had been on the mainland. Protected by 100 miles of water, Taiwan was at peace. Most of Taiwan’s farmers could read and write. Land and industrial properties taken over from the defeated Japanese gave the government useful assets that it did not have on the mainland. Because 6Ibid., p. 30. 7Ibid., p. 91. 8Ibid., p. 13. 9Memorandum from Ladejinsky to Chiang Monlin, “Field Observations on the Application of the Rent Reduction Program in Taiwan,” October 1949, p. 5, JCRR files. The full text of this memorandum can also be found in Louis J. Walinsky, ed., The Selected Papers of Wolf Ladejinsky (New York and London: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1977), pp. 95-108.

102

Increasing Agricultural Production

Taiwan had been cut off from the rest of China for 50 years, the Taiwanese landlords had few connections in the government, and their political position appeared to be weak. (Too much can easily be made of this point, however; there was considerable opposition to land reform on Taiwan, as we shall see.) And finally, the agricultural specialists in the JCRR and in Chinese government agencies could be concentrated on one small province. The land reform in Taiwan was carried out in three phases: rent reduction, sale of public land, and compulsory purchase of excess land from landlords and resale of such land to tenants. Ladejinsky, the architect of land reform in Japan during the U.S. occupation, advised against the phased approach and advocated doing everything at once. This advice was not accepted. The Chinese officials responsible for land reform believed that the phased approach would have greater political impact and that rent reduction would make landlords more willing to give up their excess land. Land reform on Taiwan was initiated by the national government and carried out by the provincial government. The JCRR provided major financial and technical assistance and helped to plan the various actions taken in executing land reform. Chiang Monlin described the role of the commission in land reform: “The land reform program was entirely indigenous. The will for such a reform came from the Chinese gov¬ ernment. JCRR’s contributions were in the form of advice offered, technical services rendered and administrative expenses met. But its contribution to the success of the land reform was by no means small. Government wishes might not have been fulfilled without JCRR’s tech¬ nical assistance.”10

Rent Reduction The basic concept of the rent reduction program in Taiwan was simple: no farm rent may exceed 37.5 percent of the total annual yield of the main crop. Applying this concept, however, proved to be quite complicated. The 37.5 percent farm rent limitation was first applied experimentally in Pingtung City in 1947. On April 14,1949, the provin¬ cial government issued regulations applying the limitation to all of Taiwan. The work of putting the rent limitation into effect was con¬ ducted in three stages over a period of five months. At the end of that 10Memorandum from Chiang Monlin to William H. Fippin, “Dr. Schenck’s Comments on Ladejinsky’s Report on the Occupation and Japanese Agriculture,” July 9, 195Z, JCRR files.

Land Reform

103

period, however, problems remained whose solution required both additional fieldwork and new legislation. The first stage of implementing the rent limitation involved setting up the supervisory agencies called for in the new regulations, training staff workers, and establishing standard annual yields for main crops in each locality. The Land Bureau of the provincial government and the hsien and city governments were responsible for the rent limitation program. To help carry out and enforce the program, rent campaign supervisory committees were established at the provincial, hsien or city, district, village, and township levels. These committees consisted of designated officials, prominent private citizens, and representatives of tenant farm¬ ers, owner farmers, and landlords. The training of staff workers was conducted at different levels. Workers at higher levels received more training than those at lower levels. The number of people trained was 4,257. By far the largest group (3,000) was at the village and township level. Each hsien and city government was allowed to set standard annual yields for the 26 grades of paddy land and the 26 grades of dry land established by the Japanese colonial administration. The existence of this cadastral system—which had no counterpart on the China main¬ land—greatly facilitated the administration of the rent limitation pro¬ gram on Taiwan. The standard yields set by the hsien and city govern¬ ments were reviewed by the appropriate rent campaign supervisory committees. Both the committees and the hsien and city governments had the benefit of tables of annual yields prepared by the Land Bureau, using the land classification categories established by the Japanese au¬ thorities for tax purposes. The second stage of the rent limitation program consisted of the signing and registering of new lease contracts. The procedure was quite simple, but it would have been impossible in the absence of a high level of literacy. A landlord and tenant, using a standard government form would first submit an application for registration of a new lease contract to the appropriate village or township office. If the application con¬ formed to the rent limitation regulations, a village or township official would fill in the blanks of a standard lease contract form and hand it to the landlord and tenant for examination and signature in triplicate. The contract became valid when it was countersigned by the village or township chief and stamped with the official seal of the office. The landlord and tenant each kept a copy of the new lease contract. The third copy was filed by the village or township office. The revision and registration of lease contracts was completed in June

104

Increasing Agricultural Production

1949. July and August were devoted to the third and final stage of the rent limitation program: field inspection and rechecking. This stage was carried out by 26 provincial government supervisors, 125 hsien and city government inspectors, and 788 inspectors from village and township offices. More than 2,000 schoolteachers and members of village and township offices were also mobilized to help in the rechecking. The field inspection and rechecking involved examination of written records, villager meetings, owner and tenant meetings, and personal visits to tenant farmers. Nearly 35,000 irregularities were discovered and cor¬ rected. Failure to sign lease contracts accounted for 40.1 percent of the irregularities, and incorrect calculation of farm rentals accounted for 28.2 percent. Other common irregularities were inaccurate statements of harvest yields (8.8 percent), illicit changes in the wording of contracts (7.3 percent), and inconsistencies in categories and grades of land (6.6 percent). Formal completion of the rent limitation program, even with an intensive two-month field inspection and rechecking, did not bring to an end the problems associated with this initial phase of land reform. Disputes arose over the land classifications used in determining the annual yield of the principal crop. Other disuputes arose over lease contracts. And some landlords tried in a variety of ways to evade the rent limitation program. The ability of the responsible authorities to handle some of these problems was strengthened by the passage of the Farm Rent Reduction to 37.5 Percent Act, which was promulgated by presidential decree on June 7, 1951. This act gave the rent limitation program, which had previously been based on regulations issued by the Taiwan provincial government, a more solid legal foundation and ended the landlords’ use of certain provisions of the Land Law and the Civil Code to limit the rights of tenants. Some critics of land reform had argued that the rent limitation pro¬ gram should not go forward until land classifications had been reviewed and revised as necessary. There was some merit in this position because land classifications were last adjusted by the Japanese colonial authori¬ ties in 1942—44. In the interim, some land had been put to different uses, some land had been improved, and some had deteriorated. After the 37.5 percent rent ceiling had been imposed, landlords pressed for the reclassification of all farmland in Taiwan, which would have been a large and expensive undertaking. On the recommendation of the JCRR, the provincial government decided to reclassify land only in areas where conditions had changed or in other areas at the specific request of a landlord or a tenant. The provincial government appropri-

Land Reform

ioj

ated the equivalent of US $60,000 for this effort, and the JCRR contrib¬ uted an additional smaller amount. Land reclassification began in July 1950 and was completed in No¬ vember of the same year. Even though not all land was reexamined in detail, the tasks falling on hsien and city governments were formidable. Information was first collected on developments since 1944 that might affect land classifications (e.g., natural calamities; changes in canals, dikes, and roads; unresolved applications for changes in land classifica¬ tions). On the basis of this information, areas where changes had taken place were delimited. Necessary adjustments were made in land classi¬ fications in these areas, but before approval of such adjustments could be recommended to the provincial government, evaluation meetings with representatives of the affected landlords and tenants were held. Changes were made in about 5 percent of all farmland.11 Although landlords had been the principal advocates of land reclassification, the changes actually made favored the tenants. Land reclassification re¬ duced the rent paid by tenants on Taiwan by almost 8 percent.12 Perhaps the most serious threat to the rent limitation program was the effort by a minority of landlords to evade the program by terminat¬ ing leases before their expiration dates. In some cases, this was done by court proceedings (This presumably became impossible after promulga¬ tion of the Farm Rent Reduction Act in June 1951.) Other lease termi¬ nations were effected by compulsion, bribery, or deception. One fraud¬ ulent practice was for the landlord to pose as an owner-farmer and to contract on favorable terms with a “farmhand” (actually a tenant) to do the farm work. In the period immediately after completion of the rent limitation program, supervision of compliance with the program was done only on an intermittent and part-time basis. The increase in lease terminations and tenancy disputes, however, caused the provincial Land Bureau with the assistance of the JCRR to devise a new system using full-time employees on full pay. Eighty-two county inspectors and 8 provincial inspectors were employed. The JCRR contributed operational funds to supplement the resources of the provincial government. From March 1951 to June 1952, the inspection system handled 11,525 lease termination cases and 23,788 tenancy disputes. The pro¬ vincial Land Bureau reported that 98.4 percent of the lease termination cases and 93.5 percent of the tenancy disputes were satisfactorily solved (the remaining cases and disputes were settled later). In 8 5 percent of the ■’Technically, “all duly registered land” (Tang, Land Reform, p. 51). l2General Report—2, table 20, p. 100.

io6

Increasing Agricultural Production

lease termination cases, the landlords were required to return the land to tenants for cultivation under lease contracts. The new inspection system prevented the progressive disintegration of the rent limitation program, but the system was only an interim measure. The 1951 rent reduction act called for establishment of farm tenancy committees at both the village level and the township level and at the hsien and city level. These committees were given the task of ensuring compliance with the rent limitation program, and the inspec¬ tion system was abolished at the end of 1952. The farm tenancy committees created under authority of the 1951 rent reduction act replaced the largely inactive committees established in 1949 by provincial regulation. Tenants occupied only two of the seats on these committees, which sometimes had as many as 20 members. When Wolf Ladejinsky visited Taiwan in September 1949, he urged that these committees be reorganized to give tenants at least half the seats, as was the case in Japanese land commissions.13 In part because of land¬ lord opposition, action on this recommendation was delayed until the 1951 rent reduction act had been passed. Tenants held majorities of the seats on the farm tenancy committees created in March 1952 under the terms of this act. Like so much of land reform, establishment of the farm tenancy committees was a complicated task, involving training election staff workers, electing committee members, and holding lecture courses for committee members to acquaint them with their new duties. This work was performed by the provincial Land Bureau in cooperation with the JCRR and with JCRR financial support. The election process was in stages. Qualified voters in each hamlet and section elected representatives, who in turn elected both village and township committee members and representatives, who elected hsien and city committee members. Tenant farmers, owner-farmers, and landlords voted in separate constituencies. Both owner-farmers and landlords received about 22 percent of the committee seats, with the remaining 56 percent going to tenants. The educational levels of the committee members elected in March 1952 are of interest. Only 5.3 percent of the village and township committee members and 1.5 percent of the hsien and city committee members were illiterate. However, 18.3 percent of the village and town¬ ship committee members and 35.9 percent of the hsien and city commit¬ tee members had some education beyond primary school. The educa13Ladejinsky, “Field Observations” memorandum, pp. 14-15.

Land Reform

ioy

tional level of landlords was higher than that of owner-farmers or tenants. One-quarter of the landlords on hsien and city committees had attended colleges or universities.

The Sale of Public Land At the end of World War II, the Chinese government took over approximately 180,000 hectares of farmland on Taiwan that had be¬ longed to Japanese government agencies and private Japanese citi¬ zens.14 This former Japanese land was 20 percent of the arable land on Taiwan, so its management or disposition was of considerable impor¬ tance. In 1946, 27.4 percent of the former Japanese land had been assigned to the national and provincial governments,15 4.9 percent to hsien and township governments, and 67.7 percent to public enterprises, both national and provincial. The Taiwan Sugar Corporation, a provincial enterprise formed to take over the properties of several private Japanese sugar companies, held 83.3 percent of the land assigned to public enterprises, or 56.4 percent of all former Japanese land.16 Almost all the land assigned to governments, and 39.4 percent of the land assigned to public enterprises, was leased to tenant farmers. Over all, 58.9 percent of the former Japanese land was leased, and 41.1 percent was managed directly by a government entity or public enter¬ prise. The Taiwan Sugar Corporation operated 58.2 percent of its land directly and leased the remainder to tenant farmers.17 Many, and probably most, of the tenants on former Japanese land in 1946 had farmed the same land as tenants or subtenants in colonial times. A common arrangement was for the Japanese authorities to lease public land to veterans, retired officials, industrial companies, or local gentry for an annual rent of about 30 percent of the annual produce. These “farmers-general” would then sublease the land to actual farm¬ ers. In most cases, there were no written lease contracts, and subtenants could be evicted by the farmers-general at any time. The Chinese government sought to reform the system of leasing public land that it had inherited from the Japanese. In October 1946, 14This is a round number. Slightly different figures are cited in General Report—2, General Report—3, Tang, Land Reform. 15There appears to be no breakdown of national and provincial holdings. l6General Report—3, p. 152. 17Ibid.

108

Increasing Agricultural Production

new regulations to guide the lease of public land to new tenants were issued. These regulations provided that all public land should be leased to cooperative farms—except land unsuited for cooperative farming, which could be leased to individuals with priority being given to the present tillers. A ceiling on rents was set initially at one-third the yield of the main crop, but it was later reduced to one-quarter. (This of course made leasing public land much more attractive than leasing private land, on which typical rents were still 50 percent of the yield of the main crop.) Under the new regulations, 5 8.9 percent of public land was again leased, and 41.1 percent was retained by government entities and public enterprises. The Taiwan Sugar Corporation continued to hold 56.4 percent of former Japanese land. The results of the new regulations for leasing public land were disap¬ pointing. Only 5.9 percent of leased land was leased by cooperative farmers. The old and now illegal system of subleases was not completely eliminated, and leases to individual farmers were sometimes influenced by favoritism. Selling public land to farmers became an increasingly attractive alternative. Public farm land was first offered for sale in 1948. The original plan was to sell 10,000 chia,18 but only 5,560 chia were actually offered for sale, and 3,383 were sold to individual farmers. The sales program was suspended in 1949, so attention could be concen¬ trated on the rent reduction program. In the fall of 1950, the Taiwan provincial government proposed to sell 36,000 hectares of public land, with priority of purchase being given to present tenants. More than half the land, however, was of poor quality, and about 5 percent (1,700 hectares) belonged to the Taiwan Sugar Corporation. The proposed program was therefore quite modest in both size and quality, and it infringed very little on the large holdings of the sugar company. When the proposed program came before the Executive Yuan (cabinet) of the national government in November 1950, the principal question debated was whether the public corpora¬ tions, including most notably the Taiwan Sugar Corporation, should be given title to the public land assigned to them. The JCRR opposed this action, but on March 21, 1951, the Executive Yuan directed that all land assigned to public corporations should become their property. But this was not the end of the matter. On April 20, 1951, Wolf Ladejinsky arrived in Taiwan at the invitation of Prime Minister Chen Cheng to advise on the land reform program. Ladejinksy’s visit had been arranged by the JCRR, and he was detailed to the JCRR while he 18One chia equals 0.97 hectares.

Land Reform

109

was in Taiwan. Ladejinsky was strongly of the opinion that the pro¬ posed sale of public land was too small and that land assigned to public corporations, as well as land assigned to government entities, should be sold.19 Ladejinsky’s recommendation caused the Executive Yuan to create a technical committee to study how much of Taiwan Sugar Corporation’s land could be sold without damaging the corporation’s operations. (At the time, sugar was Taiwan’s most important export commodity.) On May 30, 1951, before the technical committee reported its findings, the Executive Yuan approved the provincial government’s land sale pro¬ gram without including any land assigned to public corporations. Prime Minister Chen, however, unilaterally announced that the sales program would be revised when the committee completed its work. Subse¬ quently, the Executive Yuan instructed the Taiwan Sugar Corporation to turn over 48,500 hectares of its land to the government for redistribu¬ tion, but the corporation proposed to give up only 27,974 hectares, and this position was eventually accepted. Five sales of public land were held from 1948 to 1953 (one each in 1948, 1951, and 1952 and two in 1953). All the land sold had pre¬ viously been leased to tenants for cultivation, who were given priority as purchasers. About 85 percent of such land (nearly 88,000 hectares) were initially selected for sale, but only 70 percent (61,000 hectares) were actually sold. On inspection, the remainder was found unsuitable for sale.20 The small and largely experimental 1948 sales program has already been mentioned. The controversial 1951 program turned out to be the largest—more than 28,000 hectares were sold—but no land assigned to public corporations was included. However, almost all the land sold in 1952 and in the second 1953 sale had been held by the Taiwan Sugar Corporation—a total of 25,800 hectares. The 3,500 hectares sold in the first 1953 sale consisted of land offered by cooperative farms. In Decem¬ ber 1953, when the sales of public land had been completed, 34.7 percent of all public land had been sold, 24.2 percent was still leased to private cultivators, and 41.2 percent was retained by public enterprises and government entities for their own use. The sale of public land was conducted by hsien and city governments 19W. I. Ladejinksy, “Observations on Rural Conditions in Taiwan: A Report to the Na¬ tional Government of China and to the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction” (Taipei, June 1951, Mimeographed), pp. 22—25. 20Some of this land had been washed away by Hoods, some had been put to nonfarm uses, and some was too poor in fertility or lacked needed irrigation facilities.

no

Increasing Agricultural Production

under the supervision of the provincial Land Bureau. Most of the actual work was done by hsien and city Committees for the Establishment of Owner-Farmers. Sales procedures involved several rather complicated steps: 1. Field investigation to determine the condition of the land considered for sale, its boundaries, its present use, and the name of the present cultivator. 2. Appraisal of land value. The price was set at 2.5 times the annual yield of the main crop. 3. Public announcement of the land to be sold in each township or village, showing all particulars of each piece of land, its sale price, and the name and address of the present cultivator. 4. Sending notices of impending land sales to present cultivators, who had priority of purchase, and holding meetings to explain application procedures. 5. Screening applications, checking them against cadastral maps, and checking the eligibility of purchasers to buy the amount of land applied for. Depending on the quality of the land, a farm family might buy 0.5 to 2.0 chia of paddy fields or 1.0 to 4.0 chia of dry land. 6. Issuance of a purchase certificate to approved buyers when the first of 20 semi-annual installments was paid. These substantial administrative tasks required recruitment and train¬ ing of additional personnel. The JCRR provided funds that helped the responsible governments bear the extra financial burden. The total price of all paddy land sold was 254,674 metric tons of rice, and the total price of all dry land sold was 560,480 metric tons of sweet potatoes. Installments on paddy land were paid in rice. Installments on dry land were paid in cash, using the official price of sweet potatoes.

The Land-to-the-Tiller Program The role of the joint commission in the land-to-the-tiller program was greater than its role in the first two phases of land reform. Commis¬ sioner T. H. Shen and H. S. Tang, chief of the JCRR land reform division, served on the preparatory committee for the land-to-the-tiller program. JCRR specialists helped draw up the program, were consulted at each stage of the legislative process, and provided technical advice while the program was being carried out. The commission also covered about half the administrative costs of the program.21 21The JCRR covered 82 percent (the equivalent of US $323,657) of the cost of classifying landownership, an essential prelude to the actual transfer of land from landlords to tenants.

Land Reform

in

The successful execution of the land-to-the-tiller program was an even greater administrative achievement than carrying out the rent limitation program and the sale of public land. The problems encoun¬ tered were not all administrative, however. The fourth JCCR general report makes this quite clear: The process through which the Land-to-the-Tiller program was enacted represents a series of political struggles inherent to a social reform of this type. The entire legislative process was marked with strong opposition from conservative forces and great pressure from liberal elements, differ¬ ence in opinion between government administration and legislature, and heated debates among the policy makers and economic experts. It took numerous sessions and hearings in the Administration and the Legislature to have the text of the bill changed three times before it finally came out as a law after seven months of debating and deliberations.22 The land-to-the-tiller program was executed in 1953 and 1954, but the essential work of classifying land ownership began in 1950, and much of 1952 was devoted to planning the program and enacting necessary legislation.

Classification of Land Ownership Before the effort to classify land ownership began, land records were kept in bound volumes organized by sections (an area of land used in cadastral management). Individual plots of land were entered in the volumes one by one in the order of their serial numbers. The particulars of each plot were specified, along with the name of its owner and all other rights over it. These records were difficult to consult. They were also often erroneous, incomplete, and out of date. The most difficult part of the classification effort was to check the land records, bring them up to date, and collect information on how each plot of land was being used. The information on each plot was put on a card and given a serial number. The cards were then sorted according to the names of land owners, and a card was made for each owner, listing the plots that he owned. In cases of joint ownership, which were quite common, cards were made for groups of joint owners instead of for each of them individually. The information on the two sets of cards was compiled and analyzed, first on a township basis, then by hsien, and finally for the entire province. The task of compilation involved sorting by hand 4,039,685 12General Report—4, p. 124.

Ill

Increasing Agricultural Production

land record cards and 1,046,892 land ownership cards. This huge task, and the information-gathering that preceded it, was done by the 59 land offices under the various hsien and city governments. The JCRR fi¬ nanced the land classification project and had a leading role in planning it. The results of the land ownership classification project clarified the nature of the farm tenancy problem on Taiwan. Moving toward the ideal of ending tenancy did not require the breaking up of many large estates cultivated by hired hands. In June 1952, only 6.0 percent of all owner-cultivated land was in farms of 20 chia (19.4 hectares) or larger, and only 1.5 percent of such land was in farms of 100 chia (97.0 hectares) or larger. The problem was instead to divest landlords of excessive land and sell that land to the tenant farmers that already cultivated it. Many landlords, it should be noted, did not lease out large amounts of land. In June 1952, about 43 percent of land farmed by tenants belonged to landlords leasing out 3.0 chia (2.9 hectares) or less of land. Only 6.0 percent of tenanted land belonged to landlords leasing out 50 chia (48.5 hectares) or more.23

Legislation The first draft of land-to-the-tiller legislation was prepared by the provincial Land Bureau and submitted to the provincial government on May 25, 1952. The main provisions of this draft were:24 1. All private farm land leased to tenants shall be purchased by the government, but resident landlords may retain two hectares of paddy land or four hectares of dry land.25 2. Absentee landlords and joint owners shall not retain any tenanted land. 3. New households split up from old ones after April 1, 1952, shall not be recognized. 4. The land price shall be 2.5 times the annual value of the main crop. The government shall pay the landlords for purchased land, and tenant purchasers shall reimburse the government, in 20 semi-annual installments at 4 percent interest annually. 5. The tenant purchasers shall pay the government in rice and cash, and the government shall pay the landlords in rice, cash, and the stock of five government-owned industrial corporations. 23Tang, Land Reform, p. 107. 1AGeneral Report—4, p. 124. 25Land required for agricultural research, land owned by educational, religious, and chari¬ table institutions, and land within city development areas was also exempt from purchase.

Land Reform

113

6. Tenant purchasers shall not transfer or mortgage the land without

government permission. Under this program, it was estimated that 83 percent of private tenanted land, or 215,000 hectares, would become available for compulsory purchase and resale. On June 3, 1952, the provincial government convened a special conference of appropriate members of provincial and central govern¬ ment agencies and the JCRR to review the draft legislation. Two sub¬ committees of the conference were established to study the land-to-thetiller program and means of financing it. On July 18, the provincial government approved the program with amendments recommended by the two subcommittees. The retention rights of resident landlords were set at 1—3 hectares of paddy land and 2—6 hectares of dry land, depend¬ ing on the grade of the land. The purchase price to be paid by the government to landlords was to be 75 percent in land bonds and 25 percent in industrial stocks. The proposed legislation did not require the approval of the Provin¬ cial People’s Assembly, but Governor K. C. Wu and his advisers decided it was prudent to submit it to the assembly. (Chen Cheng was now prime minister.) The assembly, dominated by landlords, tried to block the land-to-the-tiller program. President Chiang Kai-shek reacted to this development by calling a meeting of the Central Reform Committee of the Kuomintang on July 24. The committee resolved: (1) the land-tothe-tiller program must be inaugurated in January 1953 and (2) all party members must comply with this decision. As a result of this resolution, the provincial government formally submitted the draft leg¬ islation to the Executive Yuan in August 1952. Subsequently, the provincial assembly tacitly accepted the land-tothe-tiller program, but recommended several amendments to the draft legislation, including raising the purchase price of land and increasing the retention rights of landlords. The most important recommendation of the assembly, however, was that all private tenanted lands trans¬ ferred by landlords to adult family members as gifts after April 1, 1952, should be exempted from compulsory government purchase. It is sur¬ prising that the assembly did not urge that joint owners and absentee landlords be given retention rights. Although the assembly’s recommendations were purely advisory, they encouraged landlords and conservative elements to press the ex¬ ecutive branch of the national government for a drastic reduction of the amount of land subject to compulsory purchase. Initially, this effort was quite successful. The Executive Yuan referred the draft legislation to the

114

Increasing Agricultural Production

Ministries of Interior, Finance, Economic Affairs, and Justice for study and recommendation. Those ministries proposed amendments that would have reduced the total area subject to compulsory purchase to only 60,000 hectares, about 28 percent of the area affected by the provincial government’s draft legislation. The most important amend¬ ments proposed by the ministries were giving retention rights to absen¬ tee landlords and—following the lead of the provincial assembly— exempting from purchase those lands transferred after April 1,1952, by land owners to adult family members as gifts. Chiang Monlin sought to counter the effect of the ministries’ proposals. On October 17, he submitted a three-point recommendation to the prime minister: 1. Land transfers after April 1, 1952, should be subject to purchase. 2. Land cultivated by a landlord himself should be counted against his retention rights. 3. Land owners who cultivate land largely or entirely by hired labor should be regarded as landlords. On November 12, after three months of debate, the Executive Yuan passed the land-to-the-tiller program and sent it to the Legislative Yuan in the form of a bill. The Executive Yuan rejected the exemption of land transferred after April 1, 1952, but raised the retention rights of land¬ lords to three hectares of medium-grade paddy land or the equivalent. Land tilled by a landlord was to be counted against his right to retain land leased to tenants. Absentee owners, but not joint owners, were given retention rights. And half the payment to landlords was to be in rice or sweet potato bonds and half in industrial stock. The Executive Yuan’s version made 179,000 hectares of land available for purchase, compared with the 215,000 hectares available under the draft legisla¬ tion of the provincial government. Consideration of the bill in the Legislative Yuan produced a surprise. A number of legislators argued that it was unfair to deny joint owners of tenanted land the retention rights that were to be given to individual owners. Because 46 percent of all tenanted land was jointly owned, giving retention rights to all joint owners would have greatly decreased the amount of land available for compulsory purchase. President Chiang Kai-shek called an emergency meeting of the Kuomintang ledership on January 13, 1953, to dicuss the land-to-the-tiller bill. This meeting reaffirmed the denial of an exemption to land trans¬ ferred after April 1, 1952, and declared that rights of retention should be given to only two categories of joint owners: (1) disabled persons

Land Reform

115

who depend on the land for subsistence and (2) brothers and sisters or husbands and wives who inherited the land jointly. These provisions were included in the Land-to-the-Tiller Act that the Legislative Yuan approved on January 20, 1953. President Chiang signed the act on January 26, and it became effective immediately. As finally passed, the act made 170,000 hectares of land available for compulsory purchase. The Land-to-the-Tiller Act provided that 70 percent of the purchase price was to be paid in land bonds and 30 percent in industrial stocks. Auxiliary regulations covering the issuance of these bonds and stocks were passed along with the act. Payments in cash were excluded on the ground that if they were large enough to be attractive they might be inflationary. In fact, no cash payments were likely to be attractive, in view of the recent experience with galloping inflation. Moyer recalls that Ladejinsky strongly supported paying landlords in kind. He did not want to repeat the experience of Japan, where landlords were paid in cash that depreciated in value so much that the result was virtual expropriation. Stocks in the former Japanese industrial properties were included in the payments to landlords for several reasons. Some officials apparently thought that inclusion of the stocks would appeal to landlords. Others favored strengthening the private sector of the economy. A major rea¬ son for including the stocks that has not received much attention was to protect the provincial Land Bank from defaults by tenants. Tenants were to pay the Land Bank for 100 percent of the value of transferred land in 20 semi-annual installments, but the bank was obligated to pay landlords for only 70 percent of the value of the land in similar install¬ ments. The industrial stocks used to pay the remaining 30 percent gave the Land Bank a substantial cushion. As it turned out, a cushion of this size was not needed. Tenants’ defaults were less than 1 percent of the total value of land transferred.

Implementation

Carrying out the land-to-the-tiller program was a massive effort involving every level of government. The responsible agencies were the national Ministry of the Interior, the provincial Land Bureau, and the hsien and city governments. The local land offices were in charge of technical work, and the village and township offices were the basic executive agencies. The Taiwan Land Bank handled the financial as¬ pects of buying land from landlords and reselling it to tenants. The provincial Food Bureau received payments in rice from tenants and

116

Increasing Agricultural Production

made payments in rice to landlords. The farm tenancy committees created during the rent reduction phase of land reform helped the agencies responsible for the land-to-the-tiller program. Below the national and provincial levels, more than 32,000 people participated directly in the land-to-the-tiller program. Of this number, nearly 20,000 were specially recruited representatives of tenant farm¬ ers, owner farmers, and landlords. Between February 1 and March 15, J95 3, participants were given training courses lasting from 2 to 20 days, depending on the level of responsibility. In an effort to complete the tasks involved in the land-to-the-tiller program during 1953, a rigorous schedule was established. Most of the work was in fact completed during 1953, but it proved impossible to avoid carrying over some work into 1954. Even though the principles set forth in the law were straightforward enough, applying them was quite complicated and tedious. The most difficult part of the process of transferring excess land from landlords to tenants was determining how much land, if any, each landlord must give up, to whom it should be transferred, precisely what plots should be transferred, and at what price. Answering these questions required both checking land records and conducting field investigations, including some land surveys. Checking land records involved, first, making sure that the more than 200,000 cases of ownership transfers since April 1,1952, were properly entered in the land records. The next step was to prepare 4.6 million field investigation record sheets to be used in inspecting actual condi¬ tions on the land. Part of these sheets recorded facts concerning individ¬ ual plots, and part recorded the land owned by individual or joint owners. The field investigations were conducted by about 1,800 teams, con¬ sisting of one field worker and a hamlet chief or clerk, assisted by representatives of local tenants, landlords, and owner farmers. Each team covered one or two land sections, or 200-300 hectares of culti¬ vated land. The teams checked the information on the field investigation record sheets, added additional relevant information, and inspected household cards and lease contracts. Where necessary (as in cases of plots cultivated by more than one person), surveys were made. The 59 land registration offices used the completed field investigation record sheets in preparing purchase lists for each township and city, showing what land specified landlords were to transfer to specified tenants and at what price. After checking by the appropriate land commissions, the lists were posted in front of the township and city offices where the land in question was located. After one month, the lists became final.

Land Reform

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Landlords were instructed to surrender the title deeds to the land being transferred to village or township offices in exchange for a receipt. Tenants purchasing land were instructed to pay the first installment at local Land Bank offices. Landlords received temporary stock certificates and the first payment on their land bonds by presenting the receipt for their old title deeds to the same Land Bank offices. Tenants obtained new land ownership certificates from the village or township offices by presenting payment receipts from the Land Bank.26 The land bonds were prepared by the Land Bank. Each bond had 20 coupons, coming due at half-yearly intervals with 4 percent annual interest. As previously noted, landlords selling paddy land received bonds denominated in unhulled rice, and landlords selling dry land received bonds denominated in sweet potatoes. At the end of June 1954, rice bonds in the amount of 1,066,170 metric tons and sweet potato bonds in the amount of 376,225 metric tons had been issued. Both figures include interest as well as principal. The original plan had been to use the stock owned by the national and provincial governments in five corporations to pay 30 percent of the value of the land purchased from landlords. When the amount of land to be purchased was reduced, the Fertilizer Manufacturing Corporation was dropped from the program. The remaining corporations and the percentages of their stocks used in paying landlords were: Cement Corporation Paper and Pulp Corporation Agricultural and Forestry Development Corporation Industrial and Mining Corporation Total

37 33 13

17 100

More shares of the Cement Corporation and the Paper and Pulp Corpo¬ ration were used because those corporations were regarded as more profitable and more easily managed than the other two corporations.2^

Effects of Land Reform The three phases of land reform affected a substantial percentage of the farm families and farmland on Taiwan:28 26Payments in rice were handled by the provincial Food Bureau. 27For an account of the complicated mechanics of transferring government stock in the four corporations to landlords, see Clare E. Humphrey, “Divestiture of State Enterprises in Tai¬ wan” (Report submitted to the Graduate School, U.S. Department of Agriculture, for for¬ warding to the U.S. Agency for International Development, June 20, 1983), pp. 26-32. 28The principal source of data on the scope of the three phases of land reform is Tang, Land Reform.

n8

Increasing Agricultural Production

• Under the rent limitation program, the lease contracts of nearly 300,000 farm families—44.5 percent of all farm families (excluding landlords)—were revised. The revised lease contracts covered more than 255,000 hectares, 38 percent of all private farmland. • More than 120,000 farm families bought a total of 61,000 hectares of public land. • Under the land-to-the-tiller program, more than 154,000 hectares, or 23.4 percent of all private farmland, were transferred from landlords to tenants.29 A total of almost 224,000 tenant families, or 39.5 percent of all farm families (excluding landlords), benefited from the program. Land reform moved Taiwan’s rural society a considerable distance toward the ideal of having all farmland owned by its cultivators. Before the land-to-the-tiller program, 38.6 percent of all private farmland was farmed by tenants, but after the program, only 15.2 percent of private farmland was tenanted. The latter percentage, however, represented al¬ most 100,000 hectares. Roughly another 40,000 hectares were farmed by tenants leasing public land, and about 70,000 hectares of publicly owned arable land were directly administered by public enterprises and government entities. Most of the directly administered public land was held by the Taiwan Sugar Corporation. In view of its near-revolutionary character and broad impact, land reform was bound to have far-reaching economic, social, and political consequences. Thirty-five years after the events, it is easy to forget that those consequences could have been predominantly negative. Rural society could have been torn by dissension leading to violence; uncer¬ tainty concerning land rights and disruption of established economic relationships could have caused a sharp fall in agricultural output. That none of this happened can be credited to a number of circumstances. First, although land reform was ideological in its origins, the programs actually carried out on Taiwan were highly pragmatic. Thus, the landto-the-tiller program transferred excess landlord land to the tenants already cultivating it. This approach was much less disruptive than, say, dividing arable land equally among all farm families. Second, each phase of land reform was carefully planned and executed. Confusion and uncertainty were held to a minimum. Third, the obvious determina¬ tion of the government to push through land reform must have dis¬ couraged potential obstructionists. And fourth, the concurrent reform of the farmers’ associations enabled those associations to assume some 29Most of this land (87 percent) was purchased by the government and resold to tenants. The remainder was sold directly by landlords to tenants.

Land Reform

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of the functions, such as the channeling of credit, that had been per¬ formed by the landlords (see Chapter 8). Land reform had three broad economic effects: income and wealth were transferred from landlords to tenants; agricultural yields were increased; and industrialization was indirectly promoted. Measuring these effects quantitatively, however, is difficult. The greatest transfers of income, at least in the short run, were effected by the rent limitation program. Production of paddy rice per hectare (two crops) rose from 3,894 kilograms in 1948 to 5,472 kilograms in 1955. If rent had been 50 percent of current production of the major crop (rice), it would have increased from 1,947 kilograms to 2,736 kilograms. Because of the rent limitation program, however, rent in 195 5 was only 37.5 percent of the yield in the base year, 1948, or 1,460 kilograms. Tenants therefore gained, and landlords lost, 1,276 kilograms per hectare in 195 5, or 23.3 percent of gross yield.30 This conclusion rests, however, on several arbitrary assumptions: that the increase in yield would have been the same without rent limita¬ tion as it was with it, that without rent limitation rents would have kept pace with increased yields, and that there were no significant upward reclassifications of land from 1949 to 1955. The combined effect of these assumptions may be to overstate tenants’ gains and landlords’ losses. Tenants who purchased the land they cultivated under the land-tothe-tiller program incurred obligations for the ten-year repayment pe¬ riod that probably exceeded the rent they had been paying under the rent limitation program. If annual payments for land (including inter¬ est) were 30 percent of the yield in 1948, tenants purchasing paddy land paid 1,168 kilograms of unhulled rice per hectare annually. As owners, they also paid a land tax estimated at 229 kilograms of rice per hec¬ tare.31 The total of these two items is only 63 kilograms less than the annual rent per hectare of 1,460 kilograms (at 37.5 percent of yield). This small gain was more than wiped out by the need to assume the share of operating costs formerly paid by landlords.32 In terms of disposable income, the new owner-operators were there¬ fore somewhat worse off during the repayment period than they would have been as tenants. Focusing on the disposable income of owner30The figures in this example are from Anthony Y. C. Koo, “Land Reform in Taiwan” (Agency for International Development, Spring Review, June 1970), p. 55. 31 Ibid., p. 56. 32Bernard Gallin, Hsin Hsing Taiwan: A Chinese Village in Change (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), p. 108.

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Increasing Agricultural Production

operators, however, obscures the dramatic shift in the distribution of farm income brought about by the land-to-the-tiller program (and to a lesser extent by the sales of public land). The Rural Economics Division of the JCRR estimated that net farm income in 1950 and 1955 was distributed as follows in percentages (major components of wages, rent, and interest are shown in parentheses):33

Total wages Family labor Hired labor Total rent Farmers’ land Landlords’ land Total interest Farmers’ capital Borrowed capital Taxes and fees Net farm income

1950

1955

39.0

48.0

(2.6.5) (12..5)

(39-5) ( 8.6) 30.4

43-3

(22.8) (20.6) n-5

( 7-8) ( 3-7) 6.2 100.0

(2-4-4) ( 6.0) 13.2 ( 9-7) ( 3-5) 8.4 100.0

The most striking changes in the distribution of farm income are the decrease in the share paid as rent to landlords and the increase in the share retained as the return for family labor. These changes are clearly attributable to land reform. Even though the land that landlords on Taiwan were forced to give up was not simply expropriated, as the Communists did in mainland China, there was a net transfer of wealth from landlords to tenants. As noted, under the land-to-the-tiller program landlords were paid 2.5 times the annual yield of the main crop. In the period 1914—43, how¬ ever, the market value of paddy land (the principal kind of land trans¬ ferred under land reform) was four to six times the yield of the main crop. If it is assumed that the true land value is five times the yield of the main crop, NT $2.2 billion (or 13 percent of Taiwan’s 1952 gross domestic product) was transferred from landlords to tenants.34 The rent 33Cited in H. S. Tang and S. C. Hsieh, “Land Reform and Development in Taiwan,” in Walter Froehlich, ed., Land Tenure, Industrialization, and Social Stability: Experience and Prospects in Asia (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961), p. 129. Numbers are rounded. Rent on farmers’ own land and interest on farmers’ own capital were presumably imputed. Family wages are presumably the residual item and include profits. 34Erik Thorbecke, “Agricultural Development,” in Walter Galenson, ed., Economic Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 175-76, citing Samuel P. S. Ho.

Land Reform

in

limitation program had conditioned landlords to accept this transfer of wealth by causing the market value of tenanted paddy land to fall more than 50 percent from 1948 to 1950 in some areas.35 A further transfer of wealth from landlords to tenants resulted from the fact that tenants were required to pay only 4 percent annual interest on land bonds, when market rates of interest ranged from 30 to 50 percent per year.36 Many landlords suffered an additional loss of wealth by selling their industrial stocks at a fraction of their nominal value.37 Land reform is generally believed to have contributed to the increase in agricultural productivity during the 1950s and hence to the increase in total agricultural output, but this conclusion is difficult to document quantitatively. Land reform was carried out during the last part of the postwar recovery and the beginning of a period of accelerated growth. During these years, agriculture was subject to many influences whose relation to land reform is not always clear. At least one important influence, the large increase in government investment in irrigation, appears to have no connection with land reform. The successful effort of the government and the JCRR working through reorganized farmers’ organizations to promote the introduction of improved seeds and new techniques is an intermediate case. This effort can be viewed as an independent stimulus to increased productivity, but its success may have reflected the heightened desire of farmers for increased output that had been created by land reform. During the period 1950—55, labor inputs in agriculture increased 8 percent, inputs of fixed capital increased 25 percent, and inputs of working capital increased 66 percent.38 This increase in inputs is gener¬ ally attributed to the incentives provided farmers by rent reduction and the transfer of landownership to the tillers. The implicit argument is that, because land reform enabled tenants to keep more of any increases in outputs, it in effect raised the marginal returns to them of increases in inputs of labor or capital. Steven Cheung advances a different view with respect to the effects of rent reductions. He argues on theoretical grounds that in cases of unconstrained share tenancy (the dominant form of tenancy on Tai¬ wan), marginal tenant costs will equal marginal tenant products (not just returns to tenants). Rent reduction would not therefore give tenants 35Tang, Land Reform, p. 63. The fall in the price of land caused a number of tenant farmers to purchase land from landlords before the land-to-the-tiller program was implemented. 36Ibid. 37Tang and Hsieh, “Land Reform and Development in Taiwan,” pp. 137—38. 38Shen, Sino-American JCRR, p. 65.

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Increasing Agricultural Production

an incentive to increase inputs. He concludes that the increase in inputs by tenants was brought about by pressure on tenants by landlords, who had an interest in increasing output. Tenants complied with the desire of landlords so long as the net return from farming exceeded earnings from alternative employment.39 Even though the effect of land reform on agricultural yields and output cannot be measured, the judgment of qualified observers that the effect was strongly positive cannot be ignored. One such judgment, based on extensive interviews, deserves to be quoted: In the ten years following the completion of land reform agriculture in Taiwan had shown a considerable amount of progress. This progress was chiefly a result of the farm people’s willingness to work especially hard, to increase farm input to their utmost limits, and to learn, and practice, many new and better methods and techniques. Their willingness was aroused by their happiness, high morale, and hopefulness toward the future of the farming business and farm life in general. Where did these feelings come from? This writer has concluded that, in significant degree, they came from accomplishments of the land reform.40

Promoting industrialization was a secondary objective of land re¬ form. The government assumed that land reform would force the land¬ lords to change their occupation and become industrial entrepreneurs. This proved to be difficult for most landlords, however, and the govern¬ ment had no program to help them make the change. The relatively small amounts of industrial stock received by ordinary landlords could not be regarded as the basis for a new occupation, so almost all of them sold their stock quickly, usually far below par value. More than 90 percent of the big landlords did likewise, and only a few of them became industrial entrepreneurs. The proceeds of stock sales by landlords were spent largely on personal living expenses. Ordinary landlords invested only about 9 percent of the proceeds in some kind of business. Big 39Steven N. S. Cheung, The Theory of Share Tenancy, with Special Application to Asian Agriculture and the First Phase of Taiwan Land Reform (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, !969),esp. pp. 16—19, 100—102, 156—157, 158-160. Cheung recognizes (pp. 109—115) that his argument depends on his contention that the rent ceiling set by the first phase of land reform was 37.5 percent of each year’s actual harvest, rather than 37.5 percent of the standard harvest for specific pieces of land. A case can be made for both positions, but the dispute between landlords and tenants over land classifications, on which estimates of standard harvests were based, suggests that rents were not determined by actual harvests. 40Martin M. C. Yang, Socio-Economic Results of Land Reform in Taiwan (Honolulu: EastWest Center Press, 1970), p. 225.

Land Reform

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landlords used 7 percent in business investments, but they also set aside more than 10 percent as capital for changing occupation.41 Although land reform did not succeed in transforming many land¬ lords into industrialists, it did help industrialization in several ways. To the extent that land reform increased agricultural output, it contributed to a substantial outflow of capital from agriculture to other sectors of the economy, including the industrial sector. This outflow has been estimated at about 75 percent of total capital formation on Taiwan in the period 19 51—5 5,42 An expanding agricultural sector also provided a growing market for inputs from the industrial sector, especially fertil¬ izer and pesticides, and for manufactured household goods. Farmers’ purchases of such goods from outside the agricultural sector rose 5 6 percent from 1950 to 1955.43 Shirley Kuo argues that land reform also helped industrialization by paving the way for the rapid expansion of the food processing industry. Land reform made agriculture more labor-intensive both by reducing the average size of farms and by inducing an increase in labor inputs. A more labor-intensive agriculture produced more fruits and vegetables, which required processing.44 Land reform may even have contributed to the flow of labor from the countryside to the cities by increasing the ability of farmers to pay for the education of their children beyond the sixth grade. Out-migration from agriculture is definitely correlated with educational levels, but the link between land reform and education has not been clearly demonstrated.45 In addition to the economic effects described above, land reform has had significant political and social effects. Chen Cheng expressed the view that land reform had frustrated Communist plans to penetrate Taiwan.46 It also appears likely that land reform improved the standing of the government with the island’s rural population. Furthermore, the participation of farmers (not including landlords) in community affairs increased after land reform. This increase may be explained by the improved financial and social status of tenants and new owner-opera41Ibid. 42Teng-hui Lee, Intersectoral Capital Flows in the Economic Development of Taiwan, 1895-1960 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 29. 43 Anthony Y. C. Koo, The Role of Land Reform in Economic Development: A Case Study of Taiwan (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 120-21. 44Shirley W. Y. Kuo, The Taiwan Economy in Transition (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983), PP- 2-3-*945Koo, Role of Land Reform, p. 52. 46Chen Cheng, Land Reform in Taiwan (Taipei: China Publishing, 1961), p. 90.

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tors. Landlords, who had lost much of their economic and social posi¬ tions in the countryside, had less interest in community affairs after land reform.47 Albert Ravenholt, a sophisticated reporter of change in East Asia, provides a useful general observation on the effects of land reform in Taiwan. Land reform, he states, “has recast farm society, enhancing incentives for production, more nearly equalizing opportunities, and securing a wider distribution of the benefits of expanded yields. All other attempts to facilitate rural progress would have been handicapped without this thoroughgoing change in the pattern of ownership and use of the most essential means to agricultural production.”48

Summary The three phases of land reform had a profound effect on rural Taiwan. Almost 40 percent of all farm families (excluding landlords) benefited from the land-to-the-tiller program, and more than one-sixth of all farm families took advantage of the opportunity to buy public land. Under the rent limitation program, the lease contracts of 44.5 percent of all farm families were revised. Measuring the economic effects of land reform is difficult, but it clearly transferred income and wealth from landlords to tenants and indirectly promoted industrializa¬ tion. Most observers also give land reform a large part of the credit for the increase in agricultural yields that actually occurred. Land reform could have caused violence in the countryside and a fall in farm output, but it did not. These possible negative consequences of land reform were avoided by a pragmatic approach, careful planning, and efficient ad¬ ministration. The concurrent reform of the farmers’ associations en¬ abled those associations to assume some of the functions that had been performed by the landlords. The JCRR helped plan the complex actions taken in carrying out land reform and provided major financial and technical assistance to the responsible Chinese government agencies. 47See Yang, Socio-Economic Results of Land Reform, esp. pp. 3 63 ff. 48Albert Ravenholt, Formosa’s Rural Revolution (New York: American Universities Field Staff, March 23, 1956), p. 11.

8 Farmers’ Organizations

The three principal farmers’ organizations on Taiwan are the farm¬ ers’ associations, the irrigation associations, and the fruit-marketing cooperatives. Greatest attention will be paid here to the farmers’ asso¬ ciations, because their role in the rural economy is more comprehensive than the roles of the other two organizations.1

Farmers’ Associations Early History

Present-day farmers’ associations (FAs) on Taiwan can be traced to four kinds of rural organizations that emerged during the Japanese colonial period: farmers’ associations, animal products associations, cooperatives, and small agricultural-practice societies.2 All these organ¬ izations were initiated by farmers but were brought progressively under the control of the Japanese authorities. Most farmers’ associations were in fact organized by government officials.3 ‘The fishermen’s associations, which have functions analogous to those of farmers’ associa¬ tions, are treated in Chapter io. 2The principal sources of information about farmers’ associations on Taiwan are the JCRR General Reports; other sources are cited when appropriate. Chen Chin-wen and Kuo Minghsueh provided useful comments on the section about FAs. 3The account of the origins of today’s FAs given here is based principally on W. FI. Fippin, “Farmers’ Organizations in Taiwan,” in “Chinese-American Economic Cooperation” (Mu¬ tual Security Agency Mission to China, December 1952. and January 195 3, Mimeographed).

1*5

126

Increasing Agricultural Production

By 1944, the following pattern of rural organization had emerged: Small agricultural practice societies functioned at the village or neigh¬ borhood level, cooperatives operated principally at the township level, and farmers’ associations had been established at the prefectural (hsien) level. The animal products associations functioned at both the provin¬ cial level and the prefectural level. (The cooperatives and FAs also had provincial units.) The farmers’ associations concentrated on agricul¬ tural extension work, the cooperatives on credit and business activities (purchasing, marketing, and warehousing), the animal products asso¬ ciations on animal husbandry, and the small agricultural practice so¬ cieties on a wide variety of activities. There was a large amount of duplication and destructive competition among the various organiza¬ tions. In 1944, following a model previously established in Japan, the Tai¬ wan Agricultural Association Act was promulgated. This act merged all farmers’ organizations, except the agricultural practice societies, into three-level (province, prefecture, and township) agricultural associa¬ tions. The agricultural practice societies absorbed the business activities of the other village and neighborhood agricultural organizations and were regarded as supplements to the agricultural associations. The agricultural associations and their supplementary agricultural practice societies were concerned principally with agricultural exten¬ sion work. Service and commercial activities were subsidiary functions. The agricultural associations increasingly became agents of the colonial government. All officers of the associations were either appointed or selected by the colonial administration. The administrative officer of the governor-general’s office, who was in effect the governor-general’s dep¬ uty, was chairman of the provincial agricultural association. Local magistrates were concurrently chairmen of local associations.4 After the defeat of Japan, the Chinese government turned over con¬ trol of the agricultural associations to their members and changed the name of the organizations to “farmers’ associations.” In August 1946, the consolidation of 1944 was partly undone by restoring the indepen¬ dence of the cooperatives. These two steps did not, however, ensure the successful operation of the farmers’ associations. The technical capabil¬ ities of the associations had been greatly reduced by the repatriation of Japanese specialists and the departure of many local staff members for other jobs. The associations were in fact unable to support more than a fraction of their former staffs, since they had lost the government subsidies, compulsory membership fees, and most of the business reve4Shen, Sino-American JCRR, p. 72.

Farmers’ Organizations

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nues on which they had been depending. In a desperate effort to survive, some associations engaged in commercial activities that had little to do with agriculture or the welfare of their members. The Reorganization of 1949 The JCRR became aware of the poor state of the farmers’ associa¬ tions when several commissioners and staff members visited Taiwan in early 1949. The commission offered to help the provincial government restore the effectiveness of the associations and gradually to entrust them with virtually all projects that concerned the well-being of farm¬ ers. At the suggestion of the JCRR, Chen Cheng, who had just become governor of Taiwan, had the provincial government pass a resolution on February 25, 1949, that called for reamalgamation of the associa¬ tions and the rural cooperatives and instructed the Provincial Depart¬ ment of Agriculture and Forestry (PDAF) to formulate a detailed pro¬ gram for the reorganization of the associations. The commission provided technical and financial assistance to the PDAF in reorganizing the farmers’ associations. Three objectives were emphasized: careful definition of the functions of the FAs, restoration of continuing sources of income to the FAs, and strict government supervision of the person¬ nel practices and business activities of the FAs. In July 1949, after five months of deliberation, a plan for reorganizing the farmers’ associations was completed. Before putting the plan into effect, the provincial government organized a committee to conduct an islandwide survey of agricultural organizations. The JCRR financed the survey and provided four of the seven committee members. The com¬ mittee completed its work in August and recommended (1) reorganiza¬ tion and merger of farmers’ associations and rural cooperatives (except three specialized fruit marketing cooperatives), (2) improving the quali¬ fications of staff members of the new organization, (3) emphasizing agricultural extension work and the promotion of economic welfare, and (4) increasing the revenue of farmers’ associations at all levels. The first of these recommendations was acted on quickly. From August 29 to September 17, a corps of 300 reorganizers was trained. This corps then began work at the lowest level and reorganized 4,981 agricultural practice societies into 4,903 small agricultural units. Reor¬ ganization at the township level began on October 6 and at the hsien and city level one month later. Most of December was devoted to the provincial level. The entire process was completed on January 6, 19 50.5 5The merger of the FAs and the rural cooperatives was formally inaugurated at an hour-long ceremony on December 18, 1949. Speakers at the ceremony included Taiwan’s governor.

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Increasing Agricultural Production

Reorganization involved more than merging two organizations. Links were also created between levels. The small agricultural units elected representatives to the township farmers’ associations, the town¬ ship associations elected representatives to the hsien associations, and the hsien associations elected representatives to the provincial associa¬ tion. At each level, the elected representatives named the members of boards of directors and supervisors. At least two-thirds of the represen¬ tatives, directors, and supervisors were required to be tenant farmers, owner-operators, or farm workers. This plan was devised by T. H. Chien, head of the JCRR’s Agricultural Division, who was subsequently made JCRR observer of the reorganization program.

Continuing Problems and the Anderson Reforms Because many of the people elected to offices in the reorganized farmers’ associations and many of the new staff members hired by the FAs were inexperienced, the PDAF, with JCRR financial assistance, conducted a number of short training courses for officers and staff members in February, March, and April 1950. Another problem the reorganized FAs faced was the wartime destruction and deterioration of the facilities inherited from predecessor organizations. Before World War II, agricultural associations had approximately 424,000 metric tons of storage capacity. In 1949, farmers’ associations had only about half this capacity. Fertilizer-mixing and rice-milling capacity was also greatly reduced. Beginning in 1949 and continuing for several years, the JCRR, in cooperation with the provincial government, provided techni¬ cal and financial assistance in repairing and rebuilding the physical facilities of the FAs. At first, the JCRR made grants covering most costs. Later, the commission insisted that the provincial government and the FAs each contribute one-third, and financial support for revenue-pro¬ ducing facilities was in the form of loans.* * 6 Continued observation of the farmers’ associations convinced the JCRR that something beyond reorganization and restoration of physi¬ cal facilities was needed to put the FAs on a firm foundation. In 1950, the JCRR with the approval of the Provincial Farmers’ Association (PFA) invited W. A. Anderson of Cornell University, a specialist on rural organizations, to study the FAs and make recommendations for im-

Chen Cheng, and the JCRR chairman, Chiang Monlin (Letter from John Earl Baker to John B. Nason, December 19, 1949, JCRR files). 6Fippin, “Farmers’ Organizations.’’

Farmers’ Organizations

129

proving and strengthening them. Anderson spent four months, from September 1950 to January 1951, surveying and analyzing various aspects of the operations of FAs. Most of this time was spent on Taiwan, but Anderson and a group from the JCRR also went to Japan for three weeks to learn firsthand about the system of agricultural organizations developed by the U.S. occupation authorities. Anderson’s report was widely distributed in both Chinese and En¬ glish. The recommendations of the report included better government supervision of FAs; adoption of uniform bookkeeping, accounting, and reporting systems; more training for the officials and staff members of FAs; more equitable compensation of FAs for services provided to government agencies; and revision of the law and regulations governing farmers’ associations. A fundamental change proposed for the law and regulations was the creation of two classes of members in farmers’ associations: active members and associate members. Active members would be representa¬ tives of families that actively operate farms as owners, tenants, or farm laborers and that earn at least 70 percent of their income in farming. Members not meeting these qualifications would be associate members and would not be able to vote or hold elective office. The purpose of this change was to place true farmers in control of the farmers’ associations. In accordance with another of Anderson’s recommendations, a spe¬ cial committee with nine members was established in January 1951 and charged with development of a concrete program to improve and strengthen the farmers’ associations. PDAF, the PFA and the JCRR each contributed three members to the committee. The committee made recommendations that essentially elaborated on those made by Anderson. It also drafted a provisional bylaw governing the organization of farmers’ associations that incorporated Anderson’s proposal that there be two classes of members. This bylaw provided for farming members and for general members. The distinction between the two classes and their rights was somewhat softened, however. A farm¬ ing member was required to be personally engaged in farming opera¬ tions, to produce farm products as the fruits of his labor, and to derive from direct labor in farming at least two-thirds of his total income and at least 50 percent of his family’s total income. General members, as Anderson had recommended, were denied the right to vote, but they were eligible to be elected to the positions of members’ representatives or governors (that is, members of governing boards). General members, however, could occupy only one-fourth of the number of these offices, unless general members exceeded two-thirds of total membership. In

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Increasing Agricultural Production

that event, general members could occupy up to 49 percent of the total number of representatives or governors. The report of the nine-man special committee, including the provi¬ sional bylaw, was transmitted by the PDAF to the provincial govern¬ ment in April 1951. As often happens in governments confronted by complicated and somewhat controversial recommendations, Governor K. C. Wu and his advisers did not act immediately on the committee’s report. Another special committee was set up to study the nine-man committee’s report, and yet another committee was given the task of drafting a new bylaw governing the organization of farmers’ associa¬ tions. After extended discussion, the recommendations of the nine-man committee were approved by the provincial government and the Provin¬ cial Assembly with only minor changes. The final draft of the proposed bylaw was submitted to the Executive Yuan in October 1951. It was promulgated in August 1952 and finally became effective in 1953. During the months in which the reforms in the farmers’ association were under consideration, the provincial government and the JCRR made a massive effort to acquaint farmers with the proposed new arrangements and to prepare them for accepting responsibility for run¬ ning the FAs. As a result of this effort, reorganization of the farmers’ associations proceeded rapidly once the legislation was passed.7 JCRR Assistance In its third general report, covering fiscal year 1952, the JCRR listed the delay in putting the Anderson proposals into effect as one of four overall problems afflicting the farmers’ associations. The commission charged that this delay had “created an irresponsible attitude on the part of many association officers in discharging their duties and in executing programs—not to mention developing new ideas.” The other three problems of the FAs described by the JCRR were an unsound personnel system, lack of operating funds, and the low efficiency of association officers and staff.8 Both before and after the Anderson reforms in the organization of the farmers’ associations were adopted, the JCRR devoted major efforts to dealing with these three problems. In July 19 51, a Farmers’ Organization Division was established in the Provincial Department of Agriculture and Forestry. The JCRR advised the PDAF on the organization, functions, and policies of the new divi7Personal communication from Raymond T. Moyer, November 4, 1983. 8General Report—3 (1953), pp. 126—127. The JCRR regarded the unsound personnel system as the most serious of the FAs’ problems and blamed it on conflicts among local cliques on boards of directors, lack of informed and active leadership, and poorly trained officers and staff.

Farmers’ Organizations

I3I

sion. In 1951 and 1952 it also advised the responsible provincial gov¬ ernment agencies on the establishment of uniform systems of budgeting, accounting, and statistical reporting for FAs. A working group to im¬ prove and strengthen the weakest FAs was formed in March 1952. This group consisted of representatives of the JCRR, the PDAF, the Provin¬ cial Food Bureau, the Provincial Cooperative Bank, and the Provincial Farmers’ Association. The JCRR provided technical assistance to the farmers’ associations both directly and through the PFA. During fiscal year 1952, the JCRR staff members visited 260 local FAs. It provided technical and financial assistance to the PFA in recruiting, training, and supervising 16 techni¬ cal assistants for its field staff. These technical assistants worked contin¬ uously with FAs, especially the weaker ones, and helped them solve a variety of operational and managerial problems. They also served as teachers in training conferences for FA leaders. Also during fiscal year 1952, the JCRR played a major role in the establishment of the PFA Staff Training Institute near Taipei at Sanchiao-pu (now Tien-mu), the site of a former Japanese agricultural training center. The JCRR was represented on the committee that planned the new institute and its curriculum. The joint commission also helped finance the repair of the buildings used by the institute. During its first ten years of existence, the institute provided training for more than 10,000 FA officers and staff members. The JCRR strongly supported the policy of making the farmers’ associations the sole general service organization for farmers, except for a few fruit cooperatives. It also believed that the Provincial Department of Agriculture and Forestry should have sole responsibility for supervis¬ ing agricultural organizations. On May 16, 1951, Chiang Monlin sent Governor K. C. Wu a letter (drafted by Fippin) protesting the activities of the Provincial Department of Social Affairs in encouraging the for¬ mation of tea cooperatives. As a result of this protest, the tea coopera¬ tives were disbanded. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the JCRR continued to help finance the repair and construction of physical facilities for farmers’ associations. These expenditures were gradually phased out, however, aind responsibility for this kind of assistance to FAs was turned over to the Chinese government. The joint commission concentrated increas¬ ingly on improving the efficiency of the FAs, which especially at the township level were seen as a key element in the drive to increase agricultural production. Through the FAs, farmers could receive techni¬ cal assistance, credit, essential supplies, and help in marketing their products.

132

Increasing Agricultural Production

The JCRR provided some technical assistance to county and town¬ ship farmers’ associations directly. These direct contacts were an impor¬ tant means of obtaining detailed knowledge concerning the problems of the FAs, but the JCRR sought principally to improve the efficiency of the FAs by working with and through the PDAF and the PFA. The JCRR helped these agencies formulate training or technical assistance proj¬ ects, advised on the execution of the projects, and helped cover the expenses involved. The JCRR’s financial contributions were typically quite modest. It wanted to influence events but did not want to become an operating agency. Some of the major projects in which the JCRR was involved indicate the range of its efforts to help farmers’ associations. Financial assistance to FAs for the repair or reconstruction of physical facilities, such as rice warehouses, has already been noted. Beginning in fiscal year 1953, the JCRR helped the FAs expand their extension work, including advice in home economics and the establishment of 4-H clubs. In the mid-1950s, the JCRR also helped FAs to establish livestock health insurance pro¬ grams. Beginning in fiscal year 1962, the JCRR provided capital to farmer’s associations to start the unified credit program. In FY 1965 and FY 1966, at the request of the PDAF, the commission made grants to help meet the costs of writing, printing, and distributing a seven-volume training manual for FAs. In FY 1967, the JCRR provided technical and financial assistance to the PFA in developing a better system of business management, principally for township FAs. In FY 1967 and FY 1968, the commission advised and helped the PDAF financially on the revision of personnel regulations for FAs. The new regulations were designed to relate staffing and salaries to the business and financial operations of farmers’ associations. In fiscal year 1972, the JCRR provided technical and financial assis¬ tance to National Chung Hsing University on a study of the business— rice collection, storage, and processing, and the operation of the ricefertilizer barter system—entrusted to township FAs by the Provincial Food Bureau. The FAs had been losing money on this business, and the study documented the case for larger payments by the bureau for the services performed by the FAs. A major activity of the JCRR in fiscal year 1973 was advising the Ministry of the Interior in revising the Farmers’ Association Law of 1948.9 The revised law provided a legal basis for the business activities 9The committee established by the Executive Yuan to screen the draft law prepared by the Ministry of the Interior was chaired by Lee Teng-hui, then minister without portfolio and concurrently a JCRR consultant. Lee later became governor of Taiwan and vice-president of

Farmers’ Organizations

133

of farmers’ associations and for the distinction between the policy authority of boards of directors and the administrative duties of general managers. The revised law also provided for the amalgamation of some FAs, closer coordination among the three levels of FAs, better govern¬ ment supervision of FAs, and the selection of general managers of FAs from lists of people recommended by special committees organized by the concerned government agencies. After passage by the Legislative Yuan, the revised Farmers’ Associa¬ tion Law was promulgated in June 1974. The JCRR helped draft imple¬ menting regulations, which were issued only one month later. Later, in 1974, the commission helped the Ministry of the Interior prepare de¬ tailed plans for putting the new law and regulations into effect. This involved amalgamation of some FAs, reelection of members of FA boards of directors and supervisors, and screening candidates for the position of general manager of FAs. This complicated task was com¬ pleted by June 1975. Steady improvements were recorded in the financial condition of the farmers’ associations. In 1954, only 190 of 337 township FAs (or 56.4 percent) operated with surpluses. For the entire group of FAs, losses were 3.7 times as large as profits.10 By 1965, some 320 of 344 FAs (93 percent) operated with surpluses. Profits in that year were 7.9 times as large as losses.* 11 Comparable data for more recent years are not avail¬ able, but it is clear that the financial condition of the FAs continued to improve as their economic and credit activities expanded and their management became more efficient. Farmers’ Associations in the Late 1970s Over the years, the farmers’ associations on Taiwan became an in¬ creasingly important component of the agricultural sector of the econ¬ omy.12 By the late 1970s, there were 2 FAs at the provincial level,13 20 at the county/city level, and 283 at the township level. Under the township level, each of 4,515 villages had a small agricultural unit.

the Republic of China. He became president in January 1988 upon the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo. l0General Report—4 (1958), p. 6. 11General Report—17 (1966), p. 75. 12The principal source of information on the FAs’ in the late 1970s used here was Y. k. Yang (Chief of the JCRR Farmers Service Division), “Farmers’ Organizations in Taiwan" (JCRR, May 1978, Mimeographed), pp. 5-15. 13One of the two was for Taipei, a special municipality, which (like a province) is directly under the central government.

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Increasing Agricultural Production

More than 950,000 farm and nonfarm households were members of FAs. Seventy-three percent of members were regular or farmer members with full rights to elect and be elected. The remainder were associate or nonfarmer members, who had no voting rights but who could be elected to the board of supervisors of an FA, provided that no more than onethird of the supervisors were associate members. The small agricultural units are not legal entities. They serve as fundamental electoral units and are used by township farmers’ associa¬ tions to spread information. The township FAs are the key link in the FA system. They are in direct contact with the farmers and serve them in various ways. The major functions of county and city FAs are to super¬ vise and assist the township FAs. The FAs for Taiwan Province and the special municipality of Taipei are responsible for supervising, auditing, and assisting the lower-level FAs and for helping to train their staffs and officers. The township FAs, supervised and assisted by the county and provin¬ cial FAs, provide four kinds of services: extension, credit, supply and marketing, and livestock insurance. To provide these services, FAs at all levels have acquired substantial physical facilities—office buildings, warehouses, rice mills, feed mills, and agricultural processing plants— worth about US $80 million. The extension service provided by township FAs is financed prin¬ cipally by the profits earned on loans and to a lesser extent by the net revenues generated through the provision of supply and marketing services. In 1977, the farmers’ associations employed a total of about 1,800 agricultural technicians and extension agents. Total expenditures for extension work in 1976 were approximately NT $270 million, or about US $7 million at the international rate of exchange. The extension workers were assisted by over 10,000 voluntary local leaders. The technical advice provided by the extension workers and their voluntary assistants was channeled to farmers through more than 6,000 farming study groups. The subjects studied by these groups in 1977 included rice culture, hog raising, vegetable growing, upland crops, poultry raising, mechanized farming, fruit producing, sugarcane, mush¬ rooms, and diversified farming. Before the implementation of the land-to-the-tiller program in 1953, approximately half of agricultural credit was provided by landlords. After 1953, landlords stopped making loans to farmers. Government financial institutions were unable to fill the gap because they were not familiar with the special needs of farmers for production financing. The FAs have assumed principal responsibility for farm credit. They

Farmers’ Organizations

135

are especially well suited for this role because they can provide exten¬ sion services at the time they make a loan. Deposits by members are the main source of the funds loaned by FAs. Money is borrowed from government agricultural banks only to meet seasonal shortages of funds or emergencies. Interest paid on deposits is somewhat lower than inter¬ est charged on loans. Deposits in the credit departments of farmers’ associations increased from NT $102 million in 1952 to NT $34.8 billion at the end of 1977. Over the same period, loans by FAs increased from NT $81 million to NT $23.5 billion. In 1977, 80 percent of all agricultural production loans for individual farmers were handled by FAs. Farmers’ associations provide supply and marketing services pri¬ marily to cut the costs and increase the revenues of members. And the profits earned from supply and marketing activities are one source of finance for extension services, as already noted. In 1977, FAs earned NT $103 million on gross revenues of NT $1.5 billion (about US $39.5 million) from marketing, supply, processing, and consigned services for government. Marketing and supply services are closely coordinated with extension and credit services.14 For example, in many townships hog production and marketing are supported by technical services and loans. When the rice-fertilizer barter system was in effect, the most impor¬ tant business of the economic departments of the farmers’ associations was distributing chemical fertilizer and collecting, milling, and storing rice in return for fees paid by the Provincial Food Bureau. The abolition of the barter system on January 1, 1973, and the rapid expansion of cooperative purchasing and marketing of other commodities, has re¬ duced the relative importance of this consignment business in the total volume of business of the FAs. In the late 1970s, farmers’ associations handled about 30 percent of the products marketed by farmers. Cooperative marketing of hogs, poultry, eggs, fruits, and vegetables by FAs for their members has grown greatly in importance. Farmers’ associations also operate almost all the local vegetable and livestock markets in Taiwan, either by themselves or jointly with local governments. The total volume of marketing activities of the FAs in 1976 was NT $18 billion, or about US $475 million. The farmers’ associations supply members with a wide range of items used in agricultural production, including animal feed, pesticides, breeding stock, seeds, and farm implements. The FAs also sell a variety of con14Gross revenue is from Vang, “Farmers’ Organizations,” p. 14. Net earnings figure is from Taiwan District Farmers’ Associations, “Business Statistics Yearbook 1978.”

136

Increasing Agricultural Production

sumer goods at reasonable prices. Strong competition from local mer¬ chants, however, has kept the supply activities of FAs from expanding as rapidly as other services. The farmers’ associations also provide members with insurance against the illness or death of their livestock (mostly hogs and some dairy cattle). Veterinarians hired by FAs treat sick livestock free of charge, but owners of insured livestock are required to follow the advice of veterinarians on animal health and sanitation. The indemnity in the event of the death of an insured animal goes as high as 80 percent of market value. The FAs typically have lost money on livestock insurance.

The Changing Role of the Farmers’ Associations Industrialization and urbanization are changing the role of the farm¬ ers’ associations in Taiwan’s economy. In the 1980s, the township FAs in or near urban areas have become more like banks. Their regular membership has declined, and the number of associate members has increased. These FAs make a lot of money accepting deposits from and making loans to associate members.15 FAs in rural areas, however, are not making much money. In both situations, extension work suffers— in the urban FAs because of a reduced interest by FA management and members, in the rural FAs because of inadequate financing. The appendix to this chapter describes a visit to the Shu-lin Township Farmers’ Association near Taipei. Although no two FAs are exactly alike, the Shu-lin FA may be taken as representative of the urbanized farmers’ associations.

Irrigation Associations The high-yielding varieties of rice grown in Taiwan and other parts of East Asia require sophisticated management of irrigation water. Such rice is grown in level plots, known as paddy fields, that are surrounded by low dikes and that can be flooded to a uniform depth. An elaborate network of irrigation canals, stream diversions, pumping stations, and water storage ponds has been developed to deliver water to the paddy fields. Some parts of this network are 200 years old. Large irrigation projects have required the superior resources of the government. Maintenance and management of irrigation facilities have been the responsibility of irrigation associations. The associations have 15Both urban and rural FAs benefit from interest-free deposits by local governments.

Farmers’ Organizations

*37

also undertaken small construction projects (generally speaking, those benefiting no more than 500 hectares of land). But no sharp line sepa¬ rates the responsibilities of the irrigation associations and the govern¬ ment. The associations assist the government in the planning and fi¬ nancing of large irrigation projects, and the government has from time to time acted to improve the efficiency and financial strength of the associations. The JCRR also took a continuing interest in Taiwan’s irrigation systems and in the associations that maintain and manage them. The irrigation associations were originally organized by farmers.16 Early in the Japanese colonial period there were 181 associations. With the encouragement of the Japanese authorities, successive mergers re¬ duced the number of associations to 40 at the time of the Japanese surrender. The number of irrigation associations was further reduced to 26 in 1956 and 24 in i960. Most of the irrigation facilities had been constructed by landlords who also formed a majority of the members of the irrigation associa¬ tions. After completion of the land-to-the-tiller program, the landlords had little interest in investing in irrigation works, and reform of the irrigation associations was clearly necessary. The Water Law was amended in January 1955 to provide for self-governing water conser¬ vancy associations. Regulations and rules for such associations were promulgated in November 1955. The existing irrigation associations were reorganized and consolidated in 195 6.17 As the result of further consolidations, in 1985 there were 17 irrigation associations—15 in the province of Taiwan and 2 in the special municipality of Taipei. The total service area of the 17 associations is about 440,000 hectares. The largest, the Chianan Irrigation Association in southern Taiwan, serves about 85,000 hectares. The smallest, the Liukung Irrigation Association in Taipei, serves less than 800 hectares. Because of differences in climate and terrain, the physical problems faced by the various irrigation associations are by no means the same. This point is illustrated by two associations that the author visited in October 1983. The Taoyuan Irrigation Association in northern Taiwan serves 28,000 hectares that slope gently from the foothills of the central mountain range to the Taiwan Strait. This association obtains about half its water from the Shihmen Reservoir and half from streams and 16The principal sources of information on irrigation associations were Yang, “Farmers’ Organizations,” pp. 16-18, and informal notes prepared for the author by the Department of Agricultural Resources of the CAPD, Taipei, in February 1983. 17Shen, Agricultural Development, pp. 130-132.

138

Increasing Agricultural Production

storage ponds. The entire system operates by gravity; no pumps are needed. Farm ponds serve as small reservoirs and increase the flexibility of the system. The Yunlin Irrigation Association in central Taiwan is less fortunate. It operates five irrigation systems serving about 67,000 hectares. This association depends on stream water supplemented by rainfall and water pumped from deep wells. Pumping has lowered the water table and permitted a troublesome intrusion of sea water in coastal areas. Distribution of water to users depends on pumps as well as on gravity. Flood control, especially control of the Cho-sui River, is a major prob¬ lem. Because continuous supply of water to all users is not possible, water is supplied to rice paddies (and smaller amounts of dryland farms) on rotating schedules that differ for each of the five irrigation systems. The irrigation associations are organized in accordance with govern¬ ment regulations and are subject to government supervision. The asso¬ ciations have two kinds of members: farmers and nonfarmers. The farmers include both owners and tenants; the nonfarmers include land¬ lords and representatives of public agencies that own or use irrigated land. The members are divided into irrigation working groups that help the paid employees of the association maintain and operate specific irrigation facilities. Under normal circumstances, the members of these groups elect representatives, who in turn select a chairman. Two-thirds of the representatives must be owner-farmers.18 The chairman of an irrigation association selects a general manager and the staff of the association. Appointments must be approved by the government. The head office of each association has divisions responsi¬ ble for engineering, water management, financial management, and administration (personnel, accounting, and secretariat). All associa¬ tions have working stations responsible for maintaining particular ca¬ nals and regulating the water in those canals. The irrigation associations are financed by membership fees that vary with the productivity of the land irrigated and the sources and costs of water. Annual fees range from 20 to 300 kilograms of paddy rice per hectare (paddy rice is rice that has not been hulled). A special member¬ ship fee is levied for land that benefits from new irrigation construction. Since 1973, government subsidies have covered 85—95 percent of con¬ struction costs. 18This procedure was suspended on January 1, 1975, as a part of a program to improve the irrigation associations, and for several years the chairmen and general managers of irrigation associations were appointed by the government. Normal procedures for electing chairmen were reinstated in 1982.

Farmers' Organizations

139

Over the years, the irrigation associations have had financial and managerial problems comparable to those of the farmers’ associations. With the advice and financial assistance of the JCRR, the Chinese government (principally the Provincial Water Conservancy Bureau) made a continuous effort to deal with those problems. There are several examples of this effort.19 In 1957, the JCRR helped the Provincial Water Conservancy Bureau establish a new system of collecting water fees that used the facilities of the Land Bank of Taiwan. This system reduced irregularities in the collection of water fees, but the irrigation associations still lacked the accurate information on irrigated lands needed to assess water fees. From 1963 to 1965, with the technical and financial assistance of the Conservancy Bureau and the JCRR, the associations conducted a detailed survey of the land they irrigated. This survey produced 5 million land cards and 10,000 irrigation maps that have proved useful in planning water resources development as well as in assessing and collecting water fees. In 1965, a program to strengthen the irrigation groups that help the irrigation associations was begun by the Conservancy Bureau with the assistance of the JCRR. The operating areas of the groups were read¬ justed to more workable sizes. Young farmers were elected leaders of the groups and of the teams into which the groups are divided. Group and team leaders were then trained to discharge their duties more efficiently. In 1975, on recommendation of the JCRR, the provincial govern¬ ment took a number of further steps to strengthen the irrigation associa¬ tions.20 The elected chairmen of the associations were replaced by people chosen by the government. The 24 irrigation associations that then existed were consolidated into 17 associations serving major water systems. The amount of NT $300 million was appropriated to reduce the amounts owed by the associations for past irrigation construction projects, and special annual appropriations to improve irrigation facili¬ ties were provided. The JCRR was heavily involved in planning the construction of the multipurpose (irrigation, power, flood control, and recreation) Shihmen dam and reservoir south of Taipei in the early 1960s. The commission provided the NT $3 million that the Provincial Water Conservancy Bureau needed to do a preliminary study of the project. Chiang Monlin, the JCRR chairman, proposed at a meeting of the standing committee of 19See Shen, Sino-American JCRR, pp. 117—118. 20General Report—32 (1976), pp. 13-15; and Yang, “Farmers’ Organizations,” p. 18.

140

Increasing Agricultural Production

the Kuomintang Central Committee that Vice-president Chen Cheng become chairman of the Shihmen Development Commission. This pro¬ posal was approved by President Chiang Kai-shek. When Chen Cheng took on the concurrent job of prime minister, Chiang Monlin succeeded him as chairman of the Shihmen Development Commission.21 The JCRR loaned NT $45 million to pay half the cost of small lateral canals and a rotational irrigation system in the area irrigated by the Shihmen Reservoir.22

Fruit-marketing Cooperatives Some fruit-marketing cooperatives existed in the Japanese colonial period.23 By the 1960s there were six such cooperatives located in Taipei, Hsinchu, Taichung, Kaohsiung, Ilan, and Hualien. A provincial federation of these cooperatives had its offices in Taipei. The organiza¬ tion of the fruit-marketing cooperatives was similar to that of the farmers’ associations. Members elected representatives, who in turn elected the boards of directors and supervisors. The cooperatives dif¬ fered from the farmers’ associations in that their operations were not limited to particular political subdivisions. Also, membership in the cooperatives was restricted to owner-farmers and tenant farmers who produced fruit and who were willing to turn over at least a specified minimum quantity of fruit for cooperative marketing (700 kg. of ba¬ nanas on the plains or 3 50 kg. on slopeland, or 300 kg. of other fruits). In the early 1970s, the six fruit-marketing cooperatives had more than 116,000 members. The Kaohsiung and Taichung cooperatives, with 57,000 and 43,000 members respectively, were by far the largest. The Hsinchu cooperative had 8,500 members, and the Taipei coopera¬ tive had 5,000. The smallest cooperatives were on the east coast. The Ilan cooperative had 2,000 members, and the Hualien cooperative had only 400. In order to correct mismanagement in the fruit-marketing coopera¬ tives and to make Taiwan’s fruit more competitive in world markets, the government issued an order on April 12, 1973, calling for reorgani¬ zation of the cooperatives. The activities of the elected directors, super21Conversation with Yuan H. Djang, February 1983. 12General Report—14 (1963), p. 13. 23The principal sources of information on fruit-marketing cooperatives were Yang, “Farmers’ Organizations,” pp. 21-26; and Chen Hsing-yiu, “Fruit-Marketing Cooperatives in Taiwan” (JCRR, 1969, Mimeographed).

Farmers’ Organizations

141

visors, and members’ representatives of the six cooperatives were sus¬ pended at the end of June 1973. A nine-member committee, selected from the cooperatives, was created to carry out a program to improve the cooperatives. On September 1, 1974, the loose federation of six cooperatives was replaced by a single integrated organization, the Tai¬ wan Provincial Fruit-marketing Cooperative, with branches in Taipei, Hsinchu, Taichung, Chianan, Kaohsiung, Pingtung, and on the east coast (Tungtai). The new organization was expected to be more respon¬ sive to the needs of its members and better able to react to market changes than the former two-tiered arrangement. As in the six separate cooperatives, the members of the integrated cooperative elect representatives who elect directors and supervisors. The cooperative is administered by a general manager chosen by the board of directors. Each branch also has its own manager. The main business of the cooperative is the marketing, especially the export, of bananas and oranges. The cooperative operates 235 fruit-packing sta¬ tions scattered in fruit-producing areas. The branches of the cooperative have agricultural sections that advise members on technical matters, such as the proper use of fertilizer, the control of insects and other pests, and efficient methods of picking and handling fruit. The branches also make production loans to members and sell them inputs, such as fertil¬ izer, pesticides, sprayers, and seedlings. The JCRR provided technical and financial assistance to research and extension programs of the fruit-marketing cooperatives. It also helped improve marketing, including reducing the cost of shipping fruit.

Summary The JCRR devoted substantial effort and resources to strengthening the three principal farmers’ organizations in Taiwan: the farmers’ asso¬ ciations, the irrigation associations, and the fruit-marketing coopera¬ tives. Greatest attention was paid to the farmers’ associations, which became key components of the rural economy by providing farmers with credit, physical inputs, and marketing services. The farmers’ asso¬ ciations also informed their members about new varieties of crops and livestock and improved means of production. Beginning in 1949, the JCRR helped the Chinese government to reorganize the agricultural associations inherited from the Japanese colonial period (renamed farmers’ associations), to restore their facili¬ ties, and to train their managers and staff members. Further reforms in

142

Increasing Agricultural Production

the organization and management of the farmers’ associations were made in 1953 on the recommendations of a JCRR consultant, W. A. Anderson of Cornell University. Over the years, the commission pro¬ vided technical assistance to the farmers’ associations and financed a number of their major programs, including the unified agricultural credit program and the livestock health insurance program. It also made special efforts to improve the efficiency of the farmers’ associations and to put them on a sound business basis.

Appendix to Chapter 8 The Shu-lin Township Farmers’ Association Shu-lin Township is in Taipei Hsien (county), which surrounds the special municipality of Taipei. Shu-lin means forest. The name was probably appropriate in the early days of Chinese settlement of north¬ ern Taiwan. Today, no forests are to be seen in Shu-lin township. The 30-minute drive from the center of Taipei to the main offices of the Shulin Township Farmers’ Association passes almost entirely through builtup areas. The city of Taipei is separated from Pan-chiao, the administra¬ tive center of Taipei Hsien, by the Tan-sui River, and another stream separates Pan-chiao from the most urbanized part of Shu-lin Township. Shu-lin is not yet a bedroom suburb of Taipei City, but many resi¬ dents of Shu-lin commute daily to jobs in the city or in Pan-chiao. Of the 81,000 people living in Shu-lin Township in 1983, only 8,700 (10.7 percent) were classified as rural, but 57 percent of the land in the township was still cultivated. Sixty-three percent of the cultivated acre¬ age was paddy land (i.e., it could be flooded to raise rice); the remaining cultivated acreage was classified as upland.24 Major agricultural products of Shu-lin Township in 1982 were rice, 7,379 metric tons; sweet potatoes, 49 metric tons; vegetables, 846 metric tons; chrysanthemums, 760,000 pieces; hogs, 16,700 head; and poultry, 78,000 birds. The absence of animal feed from this list, except for a small amount of sweet potatoes, suggests that the hog and poultry industries were almost entirely dependent on imported feed grains. The cut chrysanthemums, a relatively new crop, are packaged with a chemi¬ cal preservative and shipped to Japan by air. Agriculture in Shu-lin Township, especially rice-growing, was quite mechanized in 1983. In the township there were 223 power tillers, 7 tractors, 14 combines, 196 grain dryers, 85 rice transplanters, and 170 power insecticide sprayers.

24A11

data in this appendix were supplied by the Shu-lin Township Farmers’ Association.

Farmers' Organizations

143

The Shu-lin Township Farmers’ Association was established in 1917 as a credit cooperative.25 (We shall see later that the association is returning more and more to its origins.) The main promoter of the association—a man named Huang—was aided by the Japanese colo¬ nial authorities. In 1917, the area was much more rural than in 1983. The population of the township in 1917 was less than 10,000. When it was founded, the credit cooperative had only 704 members. In 1926, the cooperative added purchasing services (fertilizer, feed, etc.) for its members. In 1937, the cooperative was put under the control of the colonial government, with the local magistrate in charge. In 1944, in order to achieve better control of resources in support of the war effort, the Japanese consolidated the agricultural associations in three adjoining townships: Kai-yuan, Yin-ku, and Shu-lin. The headquarters of the consolidated association were in Shu-lin. Japanese control was complete. After the Japanese surrender in 1945, the Chinese government re¬ quired that the officers of all farmers’ associations be elected rather than appointed. At some point after the surrender, the consolidation of the three township associations was undone. In 1953, the Shu-lin farmers’ association, along with all other FAs, was reorganized. The principal change was the creation of two classes of members—regular and associ¬ ate. The main offices of the Shu-lin Township Farmers’ Association are in a three-story cement building on a busy street. The building, which the association built in the late 1960s, is faced with small green and brown tiles, giving an overall effect of dull green. Left of the main office building (looking out toward the street) is a one-story cement building with a sloping tile roof that was built for the original credit cooperative in Japanese colonial times. The farmers’ association uses this building as a general library for its members. To the right of the main building across a narrow side street is a long two-story building that the association built in the early 1970s. The first floor is divided into stores, most of which are rented to private mer¬ chants. The association uses three stores itself to sell groceries, electrical appliances, and animal feed to members. The grocery stocks some items not usually found in developing countries, including disposable diapers. On the day of the visit, an attractive young woman was offering shop¬ pers small plastic cups of Maxwell House coffee. The extension section of the association occupies part of the second floor of the long two-story 25The author visited the Shu-lin Township Farmers’ Association on October 14, 198^. He was accompanied by Chen Chin-wen and Cheng Yong Ruey of the CAPD.

z44

Increasing Agricultural Production

building. The extension workers have the use of an office, a classroom, and a fairly modern kitchen for home economics classes. Behind the main building are a soy sauce factory and a small rice mill. At other locations in the township, the association operates two more rice mills, a livestock artificial insemination station, and a farm mecha¬ nization promotion center. The soy sauce factory produces 75,000 bottles of sauce annually. The three rice mills have a combined daily capacity of 36 metric tons. The farm mechanization promotion center provides advice on the use of machinery, repairs machinery, and uses its own machinery in custom farming (land preparation, rice-seedling transplantation, and harvesting by combine). The association also has three branch offices that accept deposits, make loans, and sell farm supplies. The main office building of the farmers’ association is entered through double sliding doors that open automatically as one approaches. Such doors have been popular on Taiwan for more than 20 years, possibly as signs of modernity or because they appeal to the Chinese love of magic. Most of the first floor is occupied by the credit section. Tellers and clerks work behind a long marble counter. A mirror runs the length of the counter on the inside so tellers can see whether they are smiling before they rise to greet customers. Surveillance cameras similar to those used by U.S. banks hang conspicuously overhead. A large bulletin board shows the interest rates offered on various kinds of accounts. The office of the general manager is immediately behind the credit department separated by a glass wall through which he can keep an eye on opera¬ tions. The second floor, fully paneled in light-colored wood (not veneer), contains more offices and the board room. An auditorium is on the third floor. The board of directors, elected by representatives of the regular members, sets general policy for the association. The board approves the budget, actual expenditures (after the event), and major projects. It could theoretically fire the general manager and hire a new one, but its choice would be limited to nominees of a committee convened by the Provincial Department of Agriculture and Forestry (PDAF). Because the board meets only every two months, the general manager has a fairly free hand in administering the association. The general manager, D. Y. Jean, has occupied this position since 1970. He is a professional administrator, not an agricultural specialist. Before becoming general manager of the farmers’ association, he was briefly its secretary (the number-two position). Before coming to the association, he was secretary in the government office for Shu-lin Town-

Farmers’ Organizations

14J

ship. He is poised and alert and has a naturally friendly manner. At the time of the visit, he was 50 years old, but could easily have passed for 40. When D. Y. Jean became general manager, the Shu-lin Township Farmers’ Association was not the efficient, profitable organization it appears to be today. Staff morale was low, and turnover was high. The economic section had a cumulative deficit of NT $1.1 million (about US $27,500). Total deposits in the credit section were only NT $30 million (about US $750,000). Total operational profits of the association in 1970 were only NT $619,000 (about US $15,400). In 1982, total deposits in the credit section of the association were nearly NT $1.6 billion (about US $40 million), or approximately 60 percent larger than all deposits in commercial banks in the township. The operational profits of the association in 1982 were NT $41.8 million (about US $1.1 million). The credit section earned 97.5 percent of total profits (the average for all township farmers’ associations is 96 percent). The economic section accounted for the remaining 2.5 percent of total profits. The profits of this section are low because charges for the goods and services it provides members are set at levels only slightly above costs. The profits of the association are calculated after the credit section has set aside 40 percent of its profits in a reserve fund. The remaining profits are allocated approximately as follows: capital reserve, 20 per¬ cent; extension services, 60 percent; bonuses for staff, directors, and supervisors, 10 percent; local welfare, 5 percent; provincial farmers’ association, 5 percent. The capital reserve and the reserve fund of the credit section are deposited in interest-earning accounts in banks or in the association’s own credit section. These funds can be invested in other assets only with government approval. The contribution to the Provincial Farmers’ Association finances extension work, training, and cultural and welfare activities, particularly in poor farmers’ associa¬ tions. The credit section’s impressive profits are made possible by the size of the association’s membership. In 1983, the association had 10,578 members (one member per household), of whom 8,940 were associate members and 1,638 were regular members.26 This large membership provided the credit section with both lendable funds and borrowers. The ability of the association to attract associate members (84.5 26Only 11 z of the regular members were from households that depended entirely on income from farming. The associate members were by definition from nonfarm households.

146

Increasing Agricultural Production

percent of total membership) is especially important to the profitability of the operations of the credit section. According to D. Y. Jean, non¬ farmers see a number of advantages in becoming associate members of the farmers’ association. It is easier to borrow from the farmers’ associa¬ tion than from a bank. The FA is staffed by local people, and it does not require borrowers to make deposits, as banks do. Some nonfarmers think that the farmers’ association is a good place to shop, and some wives are attracted by the home economics classes the FA offers mem¬ bers. Members can also apply to the association for scholarships for their children. Banks pay taxes, farmers’ associations do not, so one might expect the banks to complain about the large credit operations of the FAs, but this does not appear to be the case, at least in Shu-lin Township. D. Y. Jean attributes the banks’ acceptance of the credit operations of the farmers’ association to the legal prohibition against FAs accepting de¬ posits from, or making loans to, business firms. The FAs therefore do not compete with the banks for the most important part of the banks’ business. The Shu-lin Township Farmers’ Association has a staff of 117, of which 17 are engaged in management and administration. The credit section is by far the largest section, with a staff of 67. The economic section has a staff of 22, who run the various stores, the rice mills, and the soy sauce factory and also help members market hogs and rice. The extension section has 10 members, consisting of a section chief, 6 agricultural specialists, 2 home economists, and one person who de¬ votes full-time to the 4-H clubs. Two of the agricultural specialists work in the farm mechanization promotion center. The livestock insurance section has only one member—a veterinarian whose salary is included in the budget of the extension section. About 6,000 hogs are covered by health or life insurance or both. The association loses some money on this insurance. At the end of the visit, D. Y. Jean was asked what help the association had received from the JCRR. He said that in the early 1950s the commission had helped establish the extension system by financing part of the cost of training extension workers. In 1953, it JCRR helped reorganize the farmers’ associations by giving PDAF money for this purpose. In 1965, the JCRR paid part of the cost of equipment for the soy sauce factory. In 1968, it made an interest-free loan of NT $300,000 to the Shu-lin Township Farmers’ Association as initial capital for the unified credit program. And in 1970, it helped the PDAF establish the farm mechanization promotion center. This list, given from memory without advance notice, did not appear to be exhaustive. 7

9 Research, Education, and Extension Services

Modern agriculture must be supported by continuous research on all aspects of the production process—including plant and animal genetics, methods of cultivation and animal husbandry, the use of physical inputs (especially water, fertilizer, and animal feed), the control of pests and diseases, and the development of machinery. Without new research, opportunities for increasing yields would soon be exhausted; in fact, yields would probably fall as some pests and diseases adapted to avail¬ able means of control. Research both expands opportunities for increas¬ ing yields and finds ways to check the deterioration in the performance of existing systems of production. A large part of agricultural research is area-specific. Results achieved in one area often cannot be applied elsewhere without modification. Thus, a new high-yielding strain of rice developed in Japan or the Philippines would not necessarily do as well in Taiwan. There are, of course, exceptions: a rice transplanter developed in Japan will work just as well in Taiwan. But for many purposes all areas practicing modern agriculture—even an island as small as Taiwan—need their own re¬ search facilities. Acquiring adequate research facilities is not enough. Farmers must be informed of promising research results and helped to use them. Exten¬ sion services maintain a link between the research institute and the farm. Education facilitates extension work and increases its effective¬ ness. Literacy is basic. Farmers with an elementary school education can read simple instructions on products, such as pesticides, that embody the results of research. Farmers that have attended agricultural voca¬ tional schools can understand more-complicated reports and bulletins 147

148

Increasing Agricultural Production

on improved agricultural methods. Graduates of such schools are also good candidates to become extension workers. No sharp line divides education and extension services. Extension workers sometimes conduct short courses. They also must attend train¬ ing classes from time to time in order to keep up with the results of research. Even consultations by extension workers with individual farmers can be thought of as education. But extension work usually deals with specific applications, while education is more concerned with general principles.

Research Facilities Many of the agricultural research facilities on Taiwan were estab¬ lished during the Japanese colonial period as part of a Japanese effort to increase Taiwan’s ability to export rice, sugar, and other agricultural products to Japan. When Taiwan was returned to Chinese administra¬ tion in 1945, almost all the Japanese agricultural specialists returned to Japan. Few local Chinese had been allowed to obtain the higher educa¬ tion needed to fill the positions vacated by the Japanese specialists. But well-trained agricultural researchers were available on the China main¬ land, and many of them came to Taiwan, especially in 1949—50 as Communist armies occupied the mainland. Over the years, the Chinese government, with the advice and assis¬ tance of the JCRR, expanded and improved the research facilities it had inherited from the Japanese. A number of new facilities were also established. A survey conducted in the early 1980s showed that 43 organizations employing 10,397 scientists and technicians were en¬ gaged in basic or applied research in crop production, livestock, fish¬ eries, food processing, and forestry.1 These totals, however, may give an exaggerated impression of basic research capabilities. Of the 43 organi¬ zations, 11 are primarily engaged in administration and 5 are colleges that are unlikely to have substantial research programs. Several organi¬ zations, including the six district agricultural improvement stations, are engaged principally in applied research and demonstrations of research results.2 !CAPD, “Agricultural Science and Technology Developments in Taiwan” (Taipei, CAPD April 1983, Mimeographed), pp. 8-12. 2Basic research is concerned with the development of improved crops and animals and improved methods of crop culture and animal husbandry. Applied research tests the results of basic research under field conditions in preparation for adoption of results by farmers. Applied research and the demonstration of research results are often combined.

Research, Education, and Extension

149

Table 7. Scientific and technical staffs of organizations in Taiwan engaged in basic re¬ search on agriculture, forestry, and fishing, 1982 Organization

Total

Academic degrees Ph.D.

M.S.

B.S.

Institute of Botany, Academia Sinica

21

11

39

7i

Institute of Zoology, Academia Sinica

11

17

100

15 82

66

43 248

College of Agriculture, National Chung Hsing University

54

72.

79

205

Taiwan Agricultural Research Institute

13

62

118

46

73

College of Agriculture, National Taiwan University

7

Taiwan Fisheries Research Institute

2

15

46

63

Taiwan Livestock Research Institute

1

17

63

81

14

23

77

114

Taiwan Animal Industry Research Institute

6

10

52

68

Taiwan Pig Research Institute

4

9

20

33

Taiwan Plant Production Center

6

11

3i

48

Food Industry Research and Development Institute

7

32.

37

76

Provincial Research Institute for Animal Health

4

4

20

28

Taiwan Tobacco Research Institute

1

8

30

39

221

685

rr, r> W

28.4

52.4

100.0

Taiwan Sugar Research Institute

Percent

ill 19.2

0

Total

00

Taiwan Forestry Research Institute

43 20

Source: Council for Agricultural Planning and Development, “Agricultural Science and Technol¬ ogy Developments in Taiwan” (Taipei, April 1983, mimeographed), pp. 11 —12. Note: Staff members without academic degrees are not included.

Basic research capabilities are concentrated in 15 organizations: the Institutes of Botany and Zoology of Academia Sinica; the Colleges of Agriculture of National Taiwan University and National Chung Hsing University; the Taiwan institutes of agricultural, forestry, fisheries, and livestock research; and specialized provincial research institutes for sugar, animal industry, pigs, plant industry, food industry, animal health, and tobacco. These 15 organizations employed a total of 1,308 scientists and technicians with academic degrees in 1982. Of this total, 19.2 percent held Ph.D. degrees, 28.4 percent had M.S. degrees, and 52.4 percent had B.S. degrees (see Table 7). Three-fourths of the Ph.Ds. and nearly half the M.S. degrees were in the four national organizations (the two institutes of Academia Sinica and the colleges of agriculture of the two national universities).3 3The survey that compiled these figures did not include the Agricultural Engineering Re¬ search Center, which was established with JCRR support in 1971. This organization had 27 engineers and technicians in 1984.

ijo

Increasing Agricultural Production

The principal research arms of the Taiwan provincial government in the field of agriculture proper (i.e., excluding fishing and forestry) are the Taiwan Agricultural Research Institute and the Taiwan Livestock Re¬ search Institute. These two institutes were originally a single organiza¬ tion established by the Japanese colonial authorities in 1895 to conduct research on both crops and livestock. These functions were separated in 1958 when the animal husbandry department of the organization was made an independent institute. The Taiwan Agricultural Research Institute was originally located near the city of Taipei. As the city grew, the institute was increasingly hemmed in by built-up areas. In 1977, the institute moved into new facilities at Wufeng, Taichung Hsien, in central Taiwan. At Wufeng, it has an experimental farm of 128 hectares, four laboratory buildings, an administration building, 12 greenhouses, and a number of auxiliary buildings. This institute also operates two branch stations: the Chiayi Agricultural Experiment Station and the Fengshan Tropical Hor¬ ticultural Experiment Station.4 There are six research departments at the Wufeng headquarters: agronomy, horticulture, agricultural chemistry, plant pathology, applied zoology, and agricultural machinery. The re¬ search departments are supported by the farm manager’s office and the instrumental analysis laboratory. The institute s library has more than 40,000 volumes and subscribes to 491 periodicals from many parts of the world. There are approximately 1.5 million specimens in the in¬ stitute’s insect collection. Research achievements of the Taiwan Agricul¬ tural Research Institute include: • Release of new rice varieties with various desired qualities: high yield; early maturity; resistance to diseases, insects, and lodging; and toler¬ ance to drought and cold • Release of one soybean variety that is large-seeded, tolerant of rust, and resistant to lodging, and of another variety that is salt-tolerant • Release of hybrid corn varieties that yield 8-10 metric tons per hectare The Taiwan Livestock Research Institute is located on a large tract of land (445.5 hectares) at Hsinhua, Tainan Hsien, in southern Taiwan. It has six research departments: animal breeding, animal nutrition, animal physiology, forage crops, meat and milk processing, and livestock man¬ agement. The institute also operates three branch research stations (at information on the Taiwan Agricultural Research Institute (TARI) is from Introduction to Taiwan Agricultural Research Institute (Wufeng, Taiwan, August 1983), supplemented by a visit to TARI headquarters in October 1983.

Research, Education, and Extension

IS1

Hengchun in the far south, Hsinchu in the north, and Ilan on the east coast) and six breeding-animal propagation stations (one in the Penghu Islands and five in various parts of Taiwan).5 Research achievements of the Taiwan Livestock Research Institute include: • Breeding swine with improved feed efficiency, more rapid weight gain, and reduced back fat thickness • Breeding early-maturing and fast-growing beef cattle that are well adapted to local conditions • Selection and improvement of dairy cattle in order to increase milk production Two international agricultural research organizations are located on Taiwan: the Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center (AVRDC) and the Food and Fertilizer Technology Center for the Asian and Pacific Region (FFTC). The AVRDC was established in 1971, largely as the result of efforts of the late T. H. Shen, who was the chairman of the JCRR. The purpose of the AVRDC is to increase yields and improve the quality of vegetables grown in the tropics. The center is principally supported by the Republic of China, the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and the Federal Republic of Germany. It occupies 119 hectares of land near Shanhua in southern Taiwan. The research program of the AVRDC concentrates on five major vegetables: mungbean, soybean, tomato, Chinese cabbage, and sweet potato. The AVRDC also conducts training programs for researchers, educators, farm managers, and extension workers. Ten countries are represented on the scientific staff, and trainees at the center also come from many different countries.6 The FFTC was established in 1970 by the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), a consultative group of nine nations (the Republic of China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, the Republic of Vietnam, Australia, and New Zealand) that ceased to function in 1973. But the FFTC has continued to operate. It does not engage in research itself, but collects and disseminates the results of agricultural research in the Asian and Pacific region by publishing information on the Taiwan Livestock Research Institute (TLR1) is from An Introduction to Taiwan Livestock Research Institute (Hsinhua, Taiwan, n.d.), supplemented by a visit to TLRI headquarters in October 1983. information on the Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center is from two AVRDC publications: AVRDC 1981 Progress Report (Shanhua, Taiwan: AVRDC, 1982) and The Training Program (Shanhua, Taiwan, AVRDC, n.d.). 1 visited the AVRDC in October 1983.

ij2

Increasing Agricultural Production

technical papers and holding workshops and seminars. Only the Re¬ public of China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan continue to partici¬ pate on the FFTC’s executive board. Other founding nations, (except the Republic of Vietnam) plus Indonesia, are represented on a technical advisory committee where members serve in their personal capacities. The Republic of China covers the administrative budget of the FFTC. The Republic of Korea and Japan make voluntary contributions to the FFTC program. The Philippines and Thailand contribute when they host meetings.7 From their earliest days on Taiwan, the JCRR commissioners and staff demonstrated their awareness of the importance of agricultural research. Two of the commissioners, Raymond Moyer and T. FI. Shen, had firsthand experience in agricultural research. Shen had been direc¬ tor of the National Agricultural Research Bureau in Nanking, but the JCRR did not emphasize research as much as programs designed to bring about more immediate increases in agricultural production. In the summer of 1951, the JCRR approved a program to help agricultural research and educational institutions by providing labora¬ tory equipment and reference books.8 In fiscal year 1952, the commis¬ sion financed the procurement of more than 3,579 books, 81 periodi¬ cals, and 8,939 items of laboratory equipment. Similar assistance was provided in subsequent years. The joint commission devoted particular attention to strengthening the colleges of agriculture of National Taiwan University (NTU) and Provincial Chung Hsing University (now a national university). At first the emphasis was on improving the educational capabilities of the two colleges, but the JCRR also provided important assistance to their research programs. In fiscal year 1961, for example, the commission financed a wide range of research studies at NTU and helped improve laboratory facilities in a number of fields. In the same year, the JCRR contributed funds for construction of several facilities at Provincial Chung Hsing University, including a greenhouse and an insectary.9 The JCRR also assisted other research organizations. For example, in fiscal year 1958 it purchased for the Taiwan Agricultural Research Institute laboratory equipment that was needed in soil analysis and in the biological testing of pesticides.10 And in FY 19 5 9 it provided labora¬ tory equipment for the new plant nutrition and soil microbe laborato7Information on the FFTC was provided by C. M. Wong of the FFTC staff. 8General Report—2, pp. 38-39; and General Report—3, pp. 57-58. 9General Report—12, pp. 163—164. X0General Report—9, p. 106.

Research, Education, and Extension

153

ries at the Taiwan Agricultural Research Institute.11 The JCRR con¬ tinued to help the institute in subsequent years. Support for agricultural research appears to have received less-emphasis from the JCRR in the mid-1960s. The seventeenth (FY 1966) through the twenty-sixth (the first half of FY 1973) JCRR general reports have little to say on the subject. This apparent change in policy could have been related to the death of Chiang Monlin in 1964 or to the termination of the U.S. economic aid program in 1965, but this is only speculation. In any event, the creation of the National Science Council in 1967 with responsibility for basic research eliminated the need for JCRR support of any but applied research. A new and more limited phase of involvement in agricultural research began for the JCRR in the early 1970s. The major role of T. H. Shen in the creation of the Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center has already been mentioned. The twenty-seventh JCRR general report (for the second half of FY 1973), the twenty-eighth (for the first half of FY 1974), and the thirtieth (for the first half of FY 1975) describe the commission’s financial support of the AVRDC. These three general reports also contain brief sections on the Taiwan Plant Protection Cen¬ ter and the Pig Research Institute. Both these organizations had been supported by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). When the UNDP terminated its operations on Taiwan in June 1972, the Chinese government placed the two organizations under new governing boards chaired by Robert C. T. Lee, then secretary-general of the JCRR. Financial support for both organizations was provided by the national and provincial governments and the JCRR.12 The JCRR’s last three general reports (nos. 31, 32, and 33) say nothing about support for agricultural research.

Education The Japanese colonial authorities promoted primary education on Taiwan for both political and economic reasons. Primary schools were seen as a means of creating a literate population indoctrinated in loyalty to Japan. Opportunities for secondary and higher education were se¬ verely restricted.13 In 1952, the first postwar year for which comprehen11 General Report—10, p. no. 12General Report—27, pp. 60-61; General Report—28, pp. 63-64; and General Re¬ port—30, pp. 72-75. ,3See George H. Kerr, Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement, 1895—1945 (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1974), esp. pp. 176-186.

ij4

Increasing Agricultural Production

sive educational data are available, the results of Japanese educational policy could be seen clearly. Nearly 58 percent of people six years old and above were classified as literate, a high percentage for a stillundeveloped area. (The fact that more than 42 percent were illiterate of course shows that, when the war ended, the Japanese authorities still had some way to go toward their goal of a literate colonial society.) In 1952, only 8.8 percent of the population six years old and above had a secondary education, and only 1.4 percent had a higher education. The Chinese government gave high priority to education. By 1982, 90.4 percent of the population at and over the age of six were literate, 39.2 percent had a secondary education, and 8.0 percent had a higher educa¬ tion.14 Specialized training in agriculture also was expanded during the 1950s and 1960s. The number of students in agricultural vocational schools increased from 14,735 in I952~53 to 26,844 in 1967-68. The number of students receiving higher education in agriculture increased from 1,231 in 1952-53 to 11,477 m 1970-71. The subsequent decline in the numbers of agricultural students at both the secondary school level and the college level reflected the reduced importance of agricul¬ ture in the total economy and the expanded need for trained personnel in other fields. In 1982—83, there were 16,809 agricultural students in vocational schools and 9,974 in colleges.15 Beginning immediately after its move to Taiwan, the JCRR included agricultural education in its program.16 Attention was first directed to the employees of the agricultural agencies, who were expected to spon¬ sor JCRR projects. In 1949 and 1950, some 15 training classes for these employees were conducted under the supervision of JCRR technical divisions. These classes were on a wide range of practical subjects—for instance, animal husbandry and anti-malarial measures. The interest of the JCRR in strengthening the agricultural colleges of National Taiwan University and Provincial Chung Hsing University has already been mentioned. In 1953, JCRR commissioner T. H. Shen, chaired a planning committee created by NTU to improve and further develop its College of Agriculture. Commissioners Raymond H. Davis and T. H. Chien also served on the committee. Other members were the head of the Provincial Department of Agriculture and Forestry and the dean of the NTU College of Agriculture. In response to the planning committee’s recommendation, the JCRR 14CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1983 (Taipei: CEPD, June 1983), p. 7. 15Ibid., pp. 255-256. 16Information on JCRR activities in the field of agricultural education is largely from Shen, Sino-American JCRR, pp. 91-97.

Research, Education, and Extension

155

extended financial assistance to the college to repair its physical facili¬ ties, improve its water supply and its experimental farm, and buy needed laboratory supplies, textbooks, and reference materials. Acting on another of the committee’s recommendations, the commission in¬ vited Leland E. Call, chief of the agricultural division of the Mutual Security Agency mission to the Philippines and former dean of the College of Agriculture of Kansas State College, to come to Taipei and study the curriculum of the NTU College of Agriculture. Call recom¬ mended major curriculum changes and the creation of new divisions to deal with soil and fertilizers, food technology, plant pathology, ento¬ mology, animal husbandry, and veterinary medicine. These recommen¬ dations were adopted with minor modifications. In response to yet another recommendation of the planning commit¬ tee, Knowles A. Ryerson, dean of the College of Agriculture of the University of California, was invited to study agricultural education on Taiwan. As a result of Ryerson’s visit, in the fall of 1954 the University of California entered into a three-year contract to provide technical advice and assistance to the NTU College of Agriculture. The JCRR loaned Paul C. Ma, head of its plant industry division, to NTU to serve as dean of the College of Agriculture in order to ensure close coopera¬ tion between American advisers and NTU faculty. In i960, a new advisory arrangement, financed by the U.S. Agency for International Development, was entered into by the national and provincial governments with Michigan State University (MSU). Under this arrangement, which lasted four years, advisers from MSU helped strengthen agricultural education at both NTU and Provincial Chung Hsing University. Some senior JCRR specialists taught undergraduate courses at NTU and Chung Hsing University during the period of the arrangement with Michigan State University. From FY 1950 to FY 1965, the JCRR allocated NT $90.6 million and US $731,000 for agricultural research and education. After FY 1965, the JCRR deemphasized support for agricultural education, as it did for agricultural research, but comparable financial statistics are not avail¬ able. It did not leave the education field entirely, however. In the mid-1970s, the JCRR helped four vocational agricultural schools carry out a farm business education program. The commission also helped the Provincial Department of Education to prepare guidelines for farm business courses and organize committees to revise textbooks used in vocational agricultural schools.17 x7General Report—32 (July i-December 31, 1975), P- 91; and information from CAPD, April 1984.

15 6

Increasing Agricultural Production

Extension Services During the Japanese colonial period, extension work was conducted principally by government agencies.18 Subsidies and administrative measures, rather than education, were the main means of getting farmers to cooperate with the government’s agricultural policies. With the departure of Japanese technicians and supervisors, the system of agricultural extension virtually disappeared. During the period 1952—56, the JCRR introduced a new system of extension services. Major responsibility for educating farmers in new products and methods was given to the farmers’ associations, especially at the township level. Extension workers were relieved of administrative burdens and became primarily teachers and consultants. Governments at various levels provided guidance and financial support. Technical assistance came ultimately from research and educational institutions, but it was channeled to the farmers’ associations by such government agencies as the Provincial Department of Agriculture and Forestry, by the seven district agricultural improvement stations, and by JCRR spe¬ cialists. The new system of extension services has three major aspects: 4-H clubs for rural youth, farm-discussion groups for farmers (principally men), and home improvement clubs for farm women. These activities are supplemented by a variety of informational efforts: publications, radio, television, and motion pictures. The 4-H clubs in Taiwan are similar to those in the United States. As in the United States, the four H’s stand for head, heart, hands, and health. The first 4-H clubs for boys were organized in 1952; clubs for girls were organized four years later. The clubs teach self-reliance, selfdiscipline, and industry. A major purpose of the 4-H clubs from the point of view of the JCRR was to train local leaders. Members of the 4-H clubs are trained in scientific methods of farming. At first, the emphasis was on individual production projects. Later, the emphasis was shifted to group projects, including the organization and operation of mechanized custom farming teams. By 1978, there were 3,230 4-H clubs sponsored by 272 farmers’ associations, and 70 secondary and agricultural vocational schools. Total membership was more than 57,000. From 1952 to 1978, an estimated 400,000 rural youths were involved in 4-H dub activities. Education work with adult farmers was started in 1955 in three pilot 18The principal sources consulted on extension services are Shen, Sino-American JCRR, pp. 99—102; Shen, Agricultural Development, pp. 94-101; and JCRR, JCRR and Agricul¬ tural Development on Taiwan, 1948—1978 (Taipei: JCRR, October 1978), pp. 167—175.

Research, Education, and Extension

157

townships under the direction of James D. Pope, JCRR extension educa¬ tion adviser. The first farm-discussion groups were formed in 1956—57 in five lowland and two aboriginal townships. The discussion groups proved to be a way to make more efficient use of the time of the farm advisers (extension workers) in the township farmers’ associations. Beginning in 1957, establishment of discussion groups in every small agricultural unit was encouraged. By early 1961, more than 2,000 groups with almost 3 5,000 members had been organized. By 1978, over 6,000 groups with more than 100,000 members had been established in 273 lowland townships. Of these groups, 300 were organized by farm women. In addition, there were 274 groups with more than 5,000 aboriginal members in 53 mountain townships. Some farm-discussion groups are general in nature. Others deal with specific products, such as rice, chickens, and citrus fruits. The average group has about 20 mem¬ bers and meets every month or two for two to three hours in the evening. A farm adviser can take care of from three to five groups. Extension work in home economics was begun in 1956 with pilot projects in 31 townships. The Provincial Department of Agriculture and Forestry sponsored the program, the Provincial Farmers’ Association was the executing agency, and the JCRR provided technical and finan¬ cial assistance. By i960, the program had been extended to 132 town¬ ships. At the end of 1977, there were 2,302 home improvement clubs in 246 townships. Total membership was almost 58,000. At first, the home economics program dealt with only three subjects: food for health, home improvement, and sewing. Other subjects were gradually added, including household insect control, child care, and home beau¬ tification. Training was also added in a variety of skills—for example, machine sewing, weaving, knitting, and artificial-flower-making that enabled farm women to earn money in their spare time. The JCRR, the PDAF, and the Provincial Farmers’ Association have supported the extension program with a variety of bulletins, circulars, leaflets, and posters. The commission joined with the U.S. aid mission and the U.S. information service to publish Harvest, a semi-monthly magazine. The JCRR also took the initiative in developing radio and television programs for farm audiences and made or contracted for a number of documentary films on rural improvement. In 1963—64, the Department of Agricultural Extension of National Taiwan University made a study at the request of the Provincial Farmers’ Association to determine the relative influence of various methods of inducing farmers to adopt improved practices.19 Some 630 19The results of this study are reported in Chin-wen Chen, “Effective Extension Approaches

158

Increasing Agricultural Production

farm families in 42 townships were questioned about 15 improved practices in crop production, pig and poultry raising, and home im¬ provement. The NTU study gave various methods the following ratings: individual contact, 38.23 percent; indirect influence, 25.11 percent; group contact, 21.95 percent; mass contact, 9.24 percent; other influ¬ ences, 5.47 percent. “Individual contact” referred to the influence on individual farmers of representatives of farmers’ associations, public offices, the Taiwan Sugar Corporation, and other agencies. Among these influences, con¬ tacts with extension workers of farmers’ associations were by far the most important (a rating of 26.82 percent). “Indirect influence” re¬ ferred to the influence of neighbors, friends, or other farmers in general. This category evidently included the model farmers or local leaders chosen by extension workers to help carry out extension programs. “Group contact” included extension clubs (farm-discussion groups and home improvement clubs), short courses, tours, demonstrations, and other meetings. Of these kinds of contact, extension clubs were the most important (a rating of 12.16 percent). “Mass contact” could have been called “mass media.” Harvest magazine accounted for almost half the rating given to this kind of influence. Also included were other publica¬ tions and radio. Most of the rating given to “other influences” can be attributed to contacts with businessmen (a rating of 4.48 percent). The NTU study showed that the policy of giving the farmers’ associa¬ tions major responsibility for extension services had considerable suc¬ cess. Counting only individual contacts with extension workers of farmers’ associations and group contacts with the extension clubs and short training courses (for which the associations were largely responsi¬ ble), the farmers’ associations would receive a rating of 42.93 percent. When other activities (tours, demonstrations, etc.) and indirect influ¬ ences through model farmers are considered, well over half the influ¬ ences leading to the adoption of improved practices could probably be traced to the farmers’ associations. If the 1963—64 study were repeated today, the results might be quite different. More farmers might be found to be adopting improved practices on their own initiative. Advice from businesses, particularly those that serve livestock and poultry raisers, might prove to be a more important influence than 20 years ago. And the influence of the farmers’ associations might have decreased substan¬ tially. Applied in Taiwan, Republic of China,” in Bruce R. Crouch and Shankaria Chamala, eds., Extension, Education, and Rural Development (New York: Wiley, 1981), pp. 34—36.

Research, Education, and Extension

Writing in 1970, T. H. Shen foresaw difficulty in adapting the exten¬ sion system to the changing needs of farmers. He pointed out that some farms were becoming more diversified, raising a number of products on the same small acreage, while other farms were specializing in a single product. These trends, he noted, were creating problems for generalized extension workers. Such workers had a difficult time matching the knowledge of the specialized farmers or giving useful advice on several products to the diversified farmers. Shen suggested that the training of the generalized extension workers be upgraded and that they be given more specialized support. He also suggested that specialized extension workers help specialized farmers in an area larger than a single town¬ ship.20 In the early 1980s, agricultural officials on Taiwan had increasing doubts about the effectiveness of the existing extension system. The farmers’ associations were doing less extension work than they once had done. Moreover, the extension workers hired by farmers’ associa¬ tions typically had no education beyond the agricultural vocational school level and remained in extension work for only a few years. Beginning in September 1981, each of the four agricultural colleges assigned three or four professors to work part-time with specialists of district agricultural improvement stations in providing technical assis¬ tance to township farmers’ associations.

A Note on the Taiwan Sugar Corporation The Taiwan Sugar Corporation (TSC) operates its own agricultural research and extension system.21 Research on sugarcane is conducted by the Taiwan Sugar Research Institute, whose headquarters are near Tainan. The institute operates three sugarcane experiment stations, one for each of the TSC’s districts. The results of research are screened by the cane improvement extension committee before they are put into use. This committee has subcommittees for such various technical spe¬ cialities as irrigation, plant nutrition and protection, mechanization, and management. Each of the TSC’s 23 sugar factories has a farming section and an agricultural section that provide extension services and technology to the private and company-owned farms that supply it with sugarcane. 20Shen, Sino-American JCRR, pp. ioi-ioz. 21 Information on the TSC’s research and extension system was obtained principally from Sing Lieh-ming, manager of the TSC agriculture department, in October 198 ^.

160

Increasing Agricultural Production

The farming sections deal directly with the managers of the 175 com¬ pany-owned farms. Contract farmers (about 130,000) are served by 192 cane extension stations under the agricultural sections of the sugar factories. These stations employ more than 900 extension workers. The agricultural sections of the 23 sugar factories coordinate their work with a like number of service stations maintained by two coopera¬ tives assisted by the TSC: the Taiwan Sugarcane Growers’ Cooperative and the Taiwan Sugarcane Growers’ Production Cooperative. The first of these cooperatives both provides credit and insurance to members and sells them agricultural materials, machinery, and daily necessities. The second provides members with advice on production problems, including the raising of livestock and poultry, as well as the growing of sugarcane.

Summary The JCRR’s strategy of agricultural development involved passing the results of research to farmers and helping them to adopt new methods and new varieties of crops and animals. The commission provided some financial support to research organizations, but it gave greater emphasis to improving agricultural education and extension services. In the field of education, the JCRR paid particular attention to training employees of the organizations—government agencies and farmers’ associations—that were expected to sponsor JCRR projects. The JCRR also made a sustained effort to strengthen the two leading agricultural colleges in Taiwan. In the early 1950s, the JCRR introduced a system of extension ser¬ vices that gave the farmers’ associations major responsibility for educat¬ ing farmers in new products and methods. Technical assistance was channeled to the farmers’ associations by government agencies, district agricultural improvement stations, and JCRR specialists. The township farmers’ associations organized discussion groups on farm problems for men, home improvement clubs for women, and 4-H clubs for young people. With JCRR support, these extension activities were supple¬ mented by information disseminated through publications, films, and radio and television programs.

Increasing the Output of Fish

Fishing, along with forestry, has been treated as part of agriculture by the government of the Republic of China. Moreover, except for deepsea fishing, the catching and raising of fish have been rural activities in both mainland China and Taiwan. It was therefore appropriate to include increasing the output of fish among the JCRR’s responsibilities. However, the JCRR did little with respect to fisheries while it was on the mainland. The only exception appears to have been a small project for freshwater fishery production in Kiangsu Province. Allotted to this project was US $10,000, but only US $300 was spent, which suggests that the project never got beyond the planning stage.1 After the JCRR moved to Taiwan, promoting fisheries became an increasingly important part of its activities.2 Before fiscal year i960, the JCRR was concerned only with aquaculture and with coastal and in¬ shore fisheries; assisting deep-sea fisheries was the responsibility of the U.S. aid mission. On July 1, 1959, in order to integrate the development of the fishing industry as a whole, the aid mission turned over its deepsea fisheries program to the JCRR. Changes in the output of Taiwan’s fisheries beginning in 1940, the most productive year during the Japanese colonial period, are shown in Table 8. U.S. naval successes caused the output of Taiwan’s deep-sea fisheries virtually to collapse during the last two years of World War II. Other fisheries production also declined sharply as young fishermen were drafted into military service, U.S. bombing destroyed fishing boats 1 General Report—1, p. 196. 2Except where otherwise noted, the description of the JCRR fisheries program on Taiwan is based on General Reports—2-33.

164

Special Programs

Table 8. Fisheries production of Taiwan in selected years, 1940-1982 (in metric tons)

Year 1940 1944 1945 1950

195

z 1955 i960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1982

Deep-sea fishing2 57,2-93 646 68 12,011 18,514 36,413

85,210 135,949 2-77,955 326,707 370,342340,136

Inshore fishingb

Coastal fishingc

_e

51,788 10,603 8,952 26,048

5,901 2,600 21,458 29,696 5D334 94,856 160,924 234,704 2-95,92-1 358,207 326,509

43,907 47,175 30,044 30,655 2-7,769 2-9,746 32-,777 39,439

Aquacultured 10,439 5,875 5,242 24,689 29,580 45,696 49,030 54,160 72-,72-4 12-7,577 175,008 216,436

Total 119,520 23,025 16,862 84,206 121,697 180,618 259,140 381,688 613,152 779,950 936,334 922,520

Sources: For 1940, General Report—j, p. 108. For all other years. Fisheries Division, Council for Agricultural Planning and Development, Taipei. aDeep-sea fishing is by powered craft of 50.0 tons and more. bInshore fishing is by powered craft of 10.0—49.9 tons. cCoastal fishing is by powered craft of 9.9 tons and less, by sampans and fishing rafts, and by nets and other equipment in shallow waters without the use of any craft, boats, or rafts. dAquaculture comprises the raising of fish, crabs, and shrimp in ponds, reservoirs, and paddy fields, as well as the culture of oysters and clams in shallow coastal waters. eIn figures for 1940, the inshore fishing catch is included in the coastal fishing catch.

and equipment, and U.S. submarine attacks on Japanese shipping cut off supplies needed by Taiwan’s fishing industry. Taiwan’s fisheries recovered rapidly after the Japanese surrender in 1945. Total fisheries production in 1952 slightly exceeded production in 1940. (Thus, the fishing industry took one year longer than agricul¬ ture proper to recover its previous peak in production. The structure of fisheries production in 1952, however, was quite different from what it had been in 1940 (see Table 8). In 1940, deep-sea fisheries accounted for 47.9 percent of total production, inshore and coastal fisheries ac¬ counted for 43.3 percent, and aquaculture accounted for only 8.7 per¬ cent. In 1952, the share of deep-sea fisheries had fallen to 15.2 percent, while the shares of inshore and coastal fisheries and aquaculture had increased to 60.5 percent and 24.3 percent respectively. Deep-sea fish¬ eries did not regain their 1940 level of production until 1958. Total fisheries production continued to expand rapidly after 1952. Total output in 1982 was more than seven-and-a-half times as great as it had been 30 years previously. Over those three decades, deep-sea fish¬ eries increased their share of total output to 36.9 percent, principally at the expense of inshore and coastal fisheries, whose share fell to 39.7 percent. The share of aquaculture declined only slightly, to 23.4 percent of the total.

Fisheries

165

Table 9. Numbers of Taiwan fishing craft, sampans, and rafts in selected years, 19441982

Year 1944 1945

Deep-sea craft3 151 46

Inshore craftb

Coastal craft*1

485

813

5,36i

8,611

154

497

5,000 6,558 8,083

7,595

1950

94

594

661

1955

183

i,53o

i960 1965 1970

356

1,045 1,389

3,796

D93i 3,021

6,568

1975

1980 1982

439

Sampansd

Fishing raftsd

5,797

926 1,622 1,685

3,833

6,547

5,359

1,705

5,2-95

6,857 7,oi8

5,9i7 4,871 3,480

13,468 13,528 16,587 11,570 10,663

4,406 2-,7422,392

12.,737 13,982 13,641

Sources: Fisheries Division, Council for Agricultural Planning and Development, Taipei. aDeep-sea craft are powered vessels of 50.0 tons and more. bInshore craft are powered vessels of 10.0-49.9 tons. cCoastal craft are powered vessels of 9.9 tons and less. dSome sampans and rafts have engines or outboard motors.

Taiwan’s fishing fleet has expanded greatly since the end of World War II (see Table 9), but there has not been a close correlation between increases in production and the numbers of fishing vessels. Fisheries production has also been increased by the use of larger vessels and by a number of technological improvements. The increase in the size of deepsea fishing craft has been especially notable. In 1945, only 2 (4-3 per¬ cent) of the 46 deep-sea fishing craft in operation were 100 tons or larger. In 1982, 1,164 (68.3 percent) of the total of 1,705 deep-sea fishing craft were 100 tons or larger. Technological improvements that have increased production include motorizing sampans and rafts, mech¬ anizing the handling of nets, and equipping deep-sea and inshore fishing craft with electronic fish-finders. The JCRR’s efforts to increase output in the major subdivisions of Taiwan’s fishing industry are outlined below. Because no clear line divides inshore and coastal fisheries, they are considered together. Sec¬ tions are also devoted to the fishermen’s associations and to fish-mar¬ keting. Aquaculture Aquaculture in Taiwan is conducted in four environments: freshwa¬ ter ponds, brackishwater ponds, coastal waters, and miscellaneous im¬ poundments (paddy fields, irrigation ponds, and reservoirs).3 Table 10 3This section on aquaculture draws on Yen-pin Li and Po-wei Yuan, “Status of Aquaculture in Taiwan,” in Proceedings of Republic of China-U.S. Cooperative Science Seminar on Pish

166

Special Programs

Table 10. Aquaculture areas and production in Taiwan, 1978. Environment

Area Thousand hectares

Freshwater ponds Brackishwater ponds Coastal waters Miscellaneous Total

15.8

Production Percent

Thousand metric tons

Percent

27.1

7i-5

43-5

18.7

32-1

15-3

26.3 14.4 100.0

50.3 32.8

30.6 20.0

8.4 58.2

9-7

5-9

164.4

100.0

Source: Yen-pin Li and Po-wei Yuan, “Status of Aquaculture in Taiwan,” in Proceedings of Republic of China—United States Cooperative Science Seminar on Fish Diseases (Taipei: National Science Council, 1981), p. 3. Notes: Miscellaneous includes paddy fields, irrigation ponds, and reservoirs. Numbers are rounded.

shows the areas and production of each of these aquaculture environ¬ ments in 1978. Brackishwater ponds occupied a larger area than any other environment, but freshwater ponds were the most productive in terms of both total output and output per hectare. Freshwater Pond Culture

The principal products of freshwater pond culture are carp (several varieties), tilapia (both Java and a crossbreed of the Java and Nile species), and eels. Several other varieties of fish are sometimes raised along with carp, and freshwater shrimp have been cultured successfully on a small scale. Eels are fed directly. Carp, tilapia, and other fish eat small organisms whose supply is increased by the use of organic or chemical fertilizers. Combining fish culture and animal husbandry (hogs, ducks, or chickens) has become common. Animal wastes fertilize the ponds, thereby supporting the production of fish, and the ponds provide a means of waste treatment and disposal. In 1950, when the JCRR began its fisheries program in Taiwan, the carp fingerlings on which the raising of carp depended were imported from Hong Kong. At that time, carp spawned in the rivers of mainland China, but not in Taiwan. In order to provide a local source of fingerlings, the JCRR in fiscal year 1951 helped rehabilitate fisheries stations at Taoyuan and Tainan and financed a carp propagation project at those stations. The fisheries stations at Taitung and Hualien, both on the east coast, were added to the carp propagation project in FY 1952. Diseases (Taipei: National Science Council, 1981), and on notes provided by the Fisheries Division of the CAPD, Taipei, in February 1983.

Fisheries

167

The JCRR also imported Yamato carp from Japan to increase the quality of carp available to fish farmers in Taiwan. Additional stations to propagate tilapia as well as carp fingerlings were established in FY 1997 at Panchiao and Miaoli with financial assistance from the JCRR. In i960, carp were found to be spawning naturally in the Ah-kungtien Reservoir in Taiwan.4 The JCRR financed a survey of the place and time of spawning. In 1962 in another favorable development, the Tai¬ wan Fisheries Research Institute (TFRI), with JCRR assistance, suc¬ ceeded in inducing spawning of carp by pituitary injection. By 1965, all the carp fingerlings needed by Taiwan’s fish farmers could be supplied locally. In 1966, again with JCRR financial support, the TFRI devel¬ oped a formulated feed to replace trash fish in feeding eels. Raising eels at high density under confined conditions, which is technically feasible, caused fish disease to become a serious problem. Beginning in 1972, the JCRR supported research by several research institutes on the causes of eel disease. At about the same time, a shortage of elvers (eel fingerlings) developed. The JCRR supported research on the culture of elvers im¬ ported from Europe. With JCRR support, the TFRI made major contri¬ butions to the raising of tilapia. By crossing the Java and Nile species of tilapia, the institute produced a hybrid that is more attractive to con¬ sumers and that grows more rapidly and to a larger size than the Java variety originally cultured in Taiwan. Under a JCRR-supported exten¬ sion program begun in 1973, about 10 million fry of the hybrid were distributed to fish farmers in 1977. The ability of the JCRR to support needed research at the institute was increased by two Rockefeller Foundation grants—one for US $150,000 in FY 1967 and the other for US $75,000 in FY 1969. These grants were to finance research by the TFRI, but they were administered by the JCRR. Brackishwater Pond Culture

Milkfish, shrimp (mainly grass and sand shrimp), seaweed (Gracilaria confervoides), and mangrove crabs are the main species raised in brackishwater ponds. These species are usually grown together at vari¬ ous stocking ratios, depending on pond conditions and the desires of individual farmers. Milkfish graze on filamentous green algae and other aquatic vegetation. Shrimp are fed formulated feed, and crabs are com¬ monly fed trash fish, fish offal, and crushed snails. Seaweed grows on 4This reservoir had been completed in 1952 with technical and financial help from the JCRR.

168

Special Programs

the nutrients released by the mineralization of organic matter. Fertilizer, either organic or chemical, increases the food supply of both milkfish and seaweed. Shrimp were formerly a by-product of milkfish culture. The increased demand for shrimp and higher prices caused by rising consumer incomes have led many fish farmers to increase the stocking rate of shrimp in milkfish ponds or to build ponds designed especially for shrimp culture. Milkfish farming depends entirely on wild fry, and production varies with the catches of fry. In fiscal year 1953, the JCRR provided technical and financial assis¬ tance to a study of the use of chemical fertilizer in milkfish ponds. (Fish farmers had previously relied exclusively on organic fertilizer.) By FY 1958, this study had proved that carefully controlled use of chemical fertilizer produced good results. A cholera epidemic in FY 1963 gave a further impetus to the use of chemical fertilizer. Because of the epi¬ demic, the government prohibited the use of human waste in fish ponds. Over a period of years, the JCRR financed a program of loans to fish farmers to improve ponds (both brackishwater and freshwater) and to buy pumps, fingerlings, feed, and chemical fertilizer. The commission also supported continuing research on controlling pests in ponds. Begin¬ ning in 1963, the JCRR provided financial support to research at the TFRI on the culture and artificial propagation of kuruma and grass shrimp. In 1968, this research resulted in the discovery of a means of mass-producing shrimp seeds.

Coastal Aquaculture Oysters are the main product of aquaculture in coastal waters. Tradi¬ tionally, oysters were grown on bamboo sticks in areas of shallow water. In the late 1950s, the TFRI (with the assistance of the JCRR) introduced the method of growing oysters on ropes stretched between sticks. This method doubled yields per hectare and extended the area of oyster culture to deeper waters. In 1972, the TFRI conducted successful experiments off Penghu (the Pescadores) in the long-line method, in which oysters are grown on lines hung between buoys in open sea areas. In 1976, the growing of oysters on ropes suspended from floating bamboo rafts was tested successfully near Chiayi on Taiwan’s west coast. Because most coastal areas suitable for raising oysters are polluted by industrial wastes, the future of oyster culture is in the long-line and bamboo raft methods, which can be used in deeper, less-polluted waters. Taiwan also produces clams. Baby clams (about 0.5 mm. in diameter)

Fisheries

169

are collected with sieves from shallow tidal flats along the west coast and sold to seed-clam growers, who care for them in brackishwater ponds. When the clams reach a size of 800 to 1,000 clams per kilogram, they are sold again to farmers who grow them to market size (2-3 cm. in diameter) on tidal land. Some of the research that the JCRR sup¬ ported concerned clam culture. In fiscal year 1957, the JCRR gave technical and financial assistance to a clam-culture project being con¬ ducted by a cooperative farm. In the following year, the commission helped the Tansui Fishermen’s association cope with a shortage of clam seeds by setting up clam-multiplication beds.

Miscellaneous Aquaculture Aquaculture in paddy fields must adjust to the requirements of rice¬ farming. Rotational irrigation, practiced in many areas, may not fit the requirements of aquaculture. Moreover, the heavy use of agricultural pesticides has caused aquaculture in paddy fields to decline. The yield of fish farming in irrigation ponds and reservoirs is low, because water movements are regulated for irrigation purposes and often conflict with the requirements of aquaculture. However, there has been some success in raising fish in reservoirs in floating cages. The JCRR paid relatively little attention to miscellaneous aquacul¬ ture, because prospects for achieving high yields were not good. In fiscal year 1953, the JCRR did provide some technical assistance in the raising of tilapia in rice paddies. In FY 1974, the commission gave the TFRI technical and financial support in establishing commercial tilapia hatch¬ eries, but by this time most tilapia were raised in freshwater ponds instead of in paddy fields.

Coastal and Inshore Fisheries The distinction between coastal and inshore fisheries is quite arbi¬ trary.5 In its general reports, the JCRR usually used “coastal” to refer to both coastal and inshore fisheries, and that practice will be followed in this section. 5Twenty years ago, coastal fishing could be defined as fishing without the use of powered craft (Shen, Agricultural Development, p. 249). Because most small fishing craft, sampans, and fishing rafts now have engines or outboard motors, it is necessary to distinguish coastal fishing from inshore fishing by the size of the vessels used—i.e., coastal craft are less than 10 tons. Fishing from shore without the use of any kind of floating platform is also part of coastal fishing but has declined greatly in importance.

iyo

Special Programs

The JCCR’s program of assistance to coastal fisheries concentrated initially on improving shore facilities and training fishermen. Most JCRR assistance was channeled through local fishermen’s associations, although some JCRR projects were sponsored by the Taiwan Fisheries Bureau or the Taiwan Fisheries Research Institute. In fiscal year 1952, for example, the commission provided financial assistance for the con¬ struction of four anchorages or storm shelters, the erection of nine signal beacons at fishing hamlets,6 the building of a cement drying ground for shrimp at Tainan, and the rehabilitation of boat-repair slips at Taitung and Hualien. It also helped finance training projects for fishermen (mostly aborigines) at Taitung and Hualien. The JCRR supported similar shore facility and training projects in subsequent years. Constructing or improving anchorages was seen to be especially important as a means of encouraging fishermen to shift to powered craft from sampans and rafts. Powered craft need protected anchorages in rough weather, but sampans and rafts can simply be beached. In the mid-1950s, the JCRR added projects that provided financial support for the acquisition of net-treating plants, cold-storage facilities (including portable refrigerators), and battery-charging units.7 Loans were also extended to finance the purchase of engines or outboard motors for sampans and rafts. In the late 1950s, the JCRR began to help local fishermen’s associations to build warehouses and simple fish¬ processing plants. (Fish were boiled in brine and dried in the sun.) The commission also helped finance experiments and demonstrations in improved fishing methods, including the use of synthetic fiber in nets, pole-fishing for bonito, and making artificial fish nests of hollow con¬ crete blocks. In the early and mid-1960s, the JCRR continued to finance a variety of improvements in shore facilities and some training projects. Loans to finance improvements in boats and equipment were increased. For example, in fiscal year i960 the commission helped finance the con¬ struction of twenty 25-ton purse seiners and made loans to 196 selected fishermen to enable them to buy marine diesel engines for their boats. In FY 1961, the JCRR began to encourage the use of electronic fish finders, and in FY 1964 it promoted the use of an improved otter trawl that increased fish catches 30 percent.8 6These beacons (sometimes called signal posts) were 12 meters high with electric lights on top. They helped guide fishing craft back home. 7These units were for recharging batteries of electric torches used to attract fish at night. They were not needed on powered craft that could be equipped with electric generators. 8In otter trawling, single-powered boats drag nets behind them. In bull trawling, nets are dragged by pairs of boats.

Fisheries

171

By the late 1960s, industrialization was creating a labor shortage in the coastal fishing industry, as it was also doing in agriculture proper. The JCRR therefore began to emphasize the introduction of laborsaving mechanical equipment on fishing vessels. The commission helped finance the demonstration and extension of mechanical line-haulers, power blocks for handling nets, and electric fish-stunners. In the late 1960s, it also helped several hsien governments demonstrate the use of plastic pipes (polyvinyl chloride) to replace bamboo in fishing rafts. Plastic is lighter, lasts longer, and does not become waterlogged. In fiscal year 1971, after almost a decade of effort with JCRR financ¬ ing, a hydraulic power block for purse seiners was tested successfully. This mechanical improvement reduced the number of men required per boat from 12 to 7. The JCRR promoted the adoption of this equipment by subsidizing part of its cost. Also introduced successfully in the early 1970s were mechanical line-haulers that saved two men per small fish¬ ing boat. In the mid-1970s, the commission provided technical and fi¬ nancial assistance on the use of hydraulic drift net-haulers. This equip¬ ment reduced net-handling time by 30 percent and crew requirements by one or two men per boat. By the end of the 1970s, the coastal fishing industry (including in¬ shore fisheries) had increased greatly in both size and output (see Tables 8 and 9). The industry had been improved technically at all levels, and it was supported by expanded and modernized shore facilities.

Deep-sea Fisheries When the joint commission assumed responsibility for assisting deepsea fisheries at the beginning of fiscal year i960, it also took over all of the U.S. aid mission’s fisheries projects. These consisted mainly of lend¬ ing money to finance the building of vessels, the purchase of engines and synthetic-fiber nets, and the construction of refrigeration and process¬ ing plants. The Council for United States Aid (CUSA) later agreed that large loans to develop deep-sea fishing (e.g., loans to build tuna boats of more than 100 tons or to buy engines of more than 100 horse power) would be financed by the China Development Corporation using de¬ velopment loan funds previously allocated by the U.S. aid mission. The JCRR emphasized the expansion of Taiwan’s tuna-fishing fleet that was already under way. In fiscal year 1961, the commission helped finance the construction of 12 tuna long-liners of 160—180 tons each. This increased the number of tuna long-liners from 39 to 51. When

lyz

Special Programs

completed in FY 1963, the 12 new boats operated in the Indian Ocean and were based at Singapore and Penang. In fiscal year 1964, the JCRR loaned NT $10 million to establish a revolving fund to finance tuna-fishing based overseas. This fund initially benefited the 10 tuna boats based at American Samoa and the 20 boats based at Penang. (Only two years later, 55 tuna boats from Taiwan were based at Samoa.) In FY 1965, the JCRR made a loan to cover onethird the cost of ten 120-ton steel tuna long-liners. When completed, these boats were based at Mauritius in the western Indian Ocean. In late 1967, five more tuna long-liners (of 180 tons each) financed by a JCRR loan to Penghu fishermen were completed. These boats were based at Abidjan in the Ivory Coast and operated in the South Atlantic Ocean. More than 100 new tuna boats were completed during fiscal year 1968, including the five 180-ton boats mentioned above and part of a group of 360 160-ton boats financed by a loan from the Sino-American Fund for Economic and Social Development. At the end of fiscal year 1968, 311 tuna boats from Taiwan were based overseas. The principal bases were Samoa, Mauritius, Penang, Venice, and Singapore. In 1967, Taiwan’s tuna fleet landed and exported 36,000 metric tons of frozen tuna and tunalike fish, almost twice the tonnage landed and exported in 1966. Despite its spectacular increase in size and production, Taiwan’s tuna fleet was less profitable than it might have been because its overseas operations depended on foreign firms—particularly Japanese firms— for provisions, supplies, and marketing services. In early 1968, the major tuna producers, encouraged by the government, joined in orga¬ nizing the China Marine Products Trading Company to compete with the foreign firms in servicing Taiwan’s tuna fleet. Two other Taiwanbased firms, Ming-Tai and Fong Chun, entered this business later. These three firms have made Taiwan’s tuna fleet more competitive with the Japanese, and more profitable.9 The JCRR continued to help in the development of tuna-fishing. For example, in fiscal year 1969 the commission helped finance the con¬ struction of four fiberglass reinforced plastic (FRP) tuna boats. Because these boats were quite successful, the JCRR made loans in the next few years for the construction of 18 more (not all these boats were for tuna¬ fishing). FRP boats cost 50 percent more than wood boats and 10 percent more than steel boats, but they can be made more seaworthy and are more durable and easier to maintain. Conversation with Chen Tsai-fah, Fisheries Division of the Council of Agriculture, Taipei, August 14, 1985.

Fisheries

*73

In addition to its support of tuna-fishing, the JCRR tried to revive the stagnant trawling industry. In fiscal year 1970, the commission made a loan to cover part of the cost of five pairs of 200-ton bull trawlers with freezing equipment on board. These trawlers proved to be quite profita¬ ble, and 20 more pairs of freezer trawlers were soon built without JCRR financing. Frozen fish sold for 30 percent more than fish refrigerated with ice. Also, trawlers with freezing equipment can operate farther from bases and can stay on the fishing grounds until their holds are full. Fishing grounds for freezer-trawlers were expanded from the northern part of the South China Sea to the southern part. Agreement at the Law of the Sea Conference on 12-mile territorial waters, plus an 188-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), created a problem for Taiwan’s deep-sea fisheries, because most catches by the deep-sea fishing fleet were made within 200 miles of shore. Efforts were made to open up new fishing grounds farther out at sea. In fiscal year 1975, the JCRR helped pay for an experimental voyage to the general area of New Zealand. The results were promising, and six pairs of trawlers from Taiwan were soon operating in the area. The problem of restricted areas has not been fully solved. The deepsea catch was smaller in 1981 and 1982 than it was in 1980. However, there has been progress in gaining access to exclusive economic zones through three kinds of cooperative agreements: government-to-government (South Africa, Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Tuvalu), fishing-association-to-fishing-association (Australia, Philip¬ pines, Cook Islands, and Micronesia), and fishing-company-to-fishingcompany (New Zealand, India, Pakistan, and Uruguay).10

Fishermen’s Associations The fishermen’s associations perform functions with respect to fish¬ ing that are analogous to those performed by the farmers’ associations with respect to agriculture proper (see Chapter 8). The organizational structures of the two kinds of associations are also similar.11 In 1983, there were 37 district fishermen’s associations and one provincial fisher¬ men’s association, totaling almost 185,000 members. More than 90 percent of the members were Type A—that is, they were directly en,0Ibid. ‘•Information on the current status of fishermen’s associations in Taiwan is principally from Yang, “Farmers’ Organizations in Taiwan,” pp. 19-21, and from “Brief Materials on keelung, Tungkang, and Kaohsiung Local Fishermen’s Associations and Taiwan Provincial Fisher¬ men’s Association” (CAPD, Taipei, 1982, Mimeographed).

174

Special Programs

gaged in fishing and earned the major part of their income from fishing. Other members were Type B—they were engaged in fishing only indi¬ rectly through jobs in fishing research, business, or industry. The highest body in the Taiwan Provincial Fishermen’s Association is the representative conference, consisting of 90 representatives elected by the members of the district associations. The representative con¬ ference chooses the members of the boards of directors and supervisors. The directors select a general manager to take charge of the day-to-day operations of the association. The directors also set rules and policies for the association. The supervisors try to ensure that these rules and policies are followed. Six departments (general affairs, accounting, fi¬ nance, business supervision, credit, and fishery extension), a fish mar¬ ket, and a foundation committee that makes loans to district associa¬ tions report to the general manager. The organization of the district association is similar to that of the provincial association. The top body of a district association is the annual members’ representatives meeting. Representatives are elected by the working groups into which members are organized. The repre¬ sentatives choose directors and supervisors, and the directors select a general manager. But not all the functions of the provincial association are duplicated in every district association. At both the provincial and district levels, at least two-thirds of directors, supervisors, and represen¬ tatives must be Type A members. Over the years, the fishermen’s associations have gradually become important to the efficient functioning and development of Taiwan’s fisheries. This was not always the case, however. In 1951, the JCRR surveyed the fishermen’s associations, which were then organized on three levels: province, hsien or city, and township. The commission found that the fishermen’s associations were in worse condition than the farmers’ associations (whose condition, it will be recalled, was then far from ideal). The fishermen’s associations had little physical equipment, and their finances were in poor shape. Following the survey, the JCRR helped the provincial government prepare a plan for the reorganization of the fishermen’s associations. The plan eliminated the intermediate level of associations (with a few exceptions), restricted the influence of nonfishermen in the associations, specified that each association should have a single general manager appointed by the board of directors, and allowed the associations to take 5 percent of the total value of transactions in the fish markets they operated. The commission also began a program of helping to remedy the equipment deficiencies of the associations and gave the Taiwan Fisheries Bureau a plan for training association managers.

Fisheries

175

The work of reorganizing the fishermen’s associations began in March 1955. To facilitate this effort, the JCRR gave more than NT $200,000 to the Provincial Bureau of Social Affairs and NT $300,000 to 19 hsien and city governments. The commission also helped draft a new bylaw for fishermen’s associations. The main purpose of this bylaw was to make sure that bona fide fishermen would control the associa¬ tions. The fishermen’s associations had been formed in April 1950 by merging the existing fishermen’s associations and the fishery coopera¬ tives. In this way, many people not directly engaged in fishing were brought into the new associations. In fiscal years 1959 and i960, the JCRR helped with another survey of the 77 district fishermen’s associations. This survey showed that the finances of a majority of the associations were poorly managed and that the welfare services and some of the business activities of the associa¬ tions were in many cases run inefficiently. In FY 1961, the JCRR initiated a project to improve the management of the fishermen’s asso¬ ciations. The provincial Social Affairs Bureau was given funds to estab¬ lish an eight-man field team that would check on the finances and management of each association and make recommendations for im¬ provements. During that year, 13 weak associations were eliminated by merging them with stronger neighboring associations. This reduced the number of local associations to 64. In fiscal year 1962, the commission again helped the provincial gov¬ ernment with a survey of the fishermen’s associations. The JCRR’s general report for that year declared: “The fishermen’s association is the most poorly managed among the three major rural organizations in Taiwan.”12 In fiscal year 1964, at the initiative of the JCRR, a revolving fund of NT $30 million (about US $750,000) was created to make loans to district fishermen’s associations for investment in revenue-producing business activities. The JCRR, the Land Bank, and the Provincial Fisher¬ men’s Association each contributed one-third of the fund. The revolving fund was quite successful. By the end of 1983, the fund had loaned a total of NT $303 million. The repayment rate was 97.6 percent.13 In FY 1964, in an effort to weed out nonfishermen, the JCRR financed re¬ classification of the members of fishermen’s associations by the provin¬ cial government. In fiscal year 1965, the JCRR helped the provincial Social Affairs Bureau supervise the elections of representatives, directors, supervisors, X2General Report—13, p. 11. The other two organizations were farmers’ associations and irrigation associations. 13Data provided by the CAPD in June 1984.

iy6

Special Programs

and chairmen of 57 of the 68 fishermen’s associations that then existed in Taiwan. A pre-election survey showed that many associations con¬ tinued to be afflicted with financial problems. Candidates for chairman¬ ships were therefore required to possess qualities of leadership and moral integrity, not to be affiliated with local cliques, and not to have incurred debts or losses in operating fishermen’s associations in the past. These standards were enforced by an ad hoc provincial committee. Despite precautions, election disputes—most of which were attributed to “sectionalism”—occurred in nine associations. In the late 1960s, the JCRR concentrated on improving the manage¬ ment of the fishermen’s associations. Beginning in fiscal year 1966, the JCRR funded four fieldworkers on the staff of the Provincial Fisher¬ men’s Association to help district associations to improve their manage¬ ment. In 1969, three more fieldworkers were added to what then be¬ came the supervisory section of the Provincial Fishermen’s Association. These fieldworkers went from association to association auditing ac¬ counts, helping improve accounting procedures, and planning the de¬ velopment of business activities. In November 1969, the provincial government designated the Fish¬ eries Bureau as the sole supervisory agency for fishermen’s associa¬ tions—a move that the JCRR had long favored. In cooperation with the JCRR and other agencies, the Fisheries Bureau then took several steps to discharge its new responsibilities: (1) A new division was established within the bureau to supervise the organization, management, and finances of fishermen’s associations; (2) with partial JCRR financing, training classes were established for managers, chairmen, and business personnel of fishermen’s associations; and (3) a field investigation on the management and finances of all fishermen’s associations was carried out. The field investigation revealed serious deficiencies. In most asso¬ ciations, the boards of directors and supervisors and the members’ representatives did not take their duties seriously. In many associations, factionalism was rife, elections were often manipulated, and the inter¬ ests of bona fide fishermen were disregarded. The welfare programs of most associations were weak and ineffective. In fiscal year 1970, there were 41 associations with deficits; 14 broke even and only 14 made profits. The credit departments in two of the four associations with such departments were not operated well. The efforts of the Fisheries Bureau (supported by the JCRR), the fieldworkers of the Provincial Fishermen’s Association, and the revolv¬ ing loan fund gradually improved the business operations and financial condition of most district fishermen’s associations. In fiscal year 1973,

Fisheries

177

the JCRR helped the Fisheries Bureau revise the regulations for the organization and management of fishermen’s associations. And in FY 1975, the commission helped the Ministry of the Interior to draft a new Fishermen’s Association Law that replaced several partly obsolete laws and regulations. The new law confirmed the two-tier system that had existed for some time and required weak district associations to merge into neighboring associations. Candidates for the positions of director or supervisor were required to register with the local government so that their qualifica¬ tions could be checked. The law required general managers to be se¬ lected from an approved list of candidates. The Provincial Fishermen’s Association was authorized to supervise the business operations and audit the accounts of the district associations. The law also authorized all fishermen’s associations to establish credit departments to serve the credit needs of their members. The last two general reports issued by the JCRR (General Report No. 32 and No. 33, covering FY 1976) did not include the usual section on fishermen’s associations. This omission is evidence of the success that had been achieved in overcoming the associations’ many problems.

Fish-marketing Because many fishermen’s associations operate fish markets, the efforts of the government and the joint commission to improve the business operations of the associations inevitably included improving the management of fish markets. JCRR assistance to the associations in obtaining cold-storage facilities also helped the marketing of fish. In the 1960s, increases in production caused fish prices to fall. The JCRR reacted by devoting more attention to fish-marketing. Financial assistance was provided for research on means of improving the pro¬ cessing of fish. Loans were extended to help pay for the construction of new fishmarket buildings with refrigerated storage space and to pur¬ chase equipment to process fish for export. Processing facilities for fish exports were also improved with JCRR technical and financial assis¬ tance. In the mid-1970s, the JCRR helped modernize the internal distribu¬ tion system for fish. It also helped establish a cold-storage transport and trading company to move frozen fish from harbors to consuming cen¬ ters and helped promote the use of refrigerated showcases in retail markets in large cities.

iy8

Special Programs

Table n. Protein consumption by the people of Taiwan, 1973-1982 (grams per person per day)

Year

Total

Vegetable protein

Animal Protein Subtotal

1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

73-7 74.2 74-7 75-9 76.6 77.0 78.7 78.2 75-3 7 6.6

48.0 49-5 50.1 49.2 47-9 47.2 46.9 46.1 44.1 44.6

2-5-7 2-4-7 24.6 26.7 28.7 29.8 31.8 32.1 31.2 32.0

From other sources 13.9 12*7 13.6 15-7 17-7 18.9 17-5 20.3 20.7 21.5

From fish

Percent from fish

11.8 12.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 10.9 11.4 11.8 10.5 10.5

45-9 48.6 44-7 41.2 38.2 36.6 35.8 36.8 33-7 32.8

Source: “Taiwan Food Balance Sheet,” Council for Agricultural Planning and Development.

Summary Fisheries have become an important part of Taiwan’s economy and a major source of protein for Taiwan’s people, but this is not surprising for a densely populated island with limited arable land. Statistics docu¬ ment the importance of Taiwan’s fisheries. In 1982, the value of fishery products was 21.5 percent of the value of all agricultural production (crops, livestock products, forestry products, and fishing products).14 In 1979, sea products were 3.1 percent of the total value of agricultural exports15 and 31.1 percent of the total value of all exports.16 In 1982, fish provided 32.8 percent of the animal protein and 13.7 percent of the total protein consumed by the people of Taiwan (see Table n). The successful development of Taiwan’s fisheries could not have occurred without the steady effort of the JCRR and the Chinese govern¬ ment. The role of the JCRR in increasing the output of fish was compa¬ rable in scope to its role in increasing crop and livestock production. The JCRR supported research on improved methods of raising and catching fish and financed the construction of better facilities and the purchase of labor-saving equipment. The commission also helped to increase the effectiveness of the fishermen’s associations and to solve problems in the marketing of fish. 14PDAF, Taiwan Agricultural Yearbook 1983, p. 239. 15CAPD, Agricultural Trade Statistics of Taiwan (Taipei: CAPD, June 1980), p. 3. 16Ibid., and CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1983, p. 187.

II

Forestry

The Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction did not have a for¬ estry program during its brief period on the mainland, but it began such a program and established a forestry division shortly after it moved to Taiwan.1 The JCRR’s interest in the management and development of forests is not surprising. Taiwan’s mountainous interior—about twothirds of the island’s area—is better suited for forestry than any other land use. The forests of Taiwan are more than a source of wood products. They slow the runoff of water from steep mountain slopes and reduce the flooding of the plains. They also retard the erosion of mountain soil and check the silting of the reservoirs that provide water for irrigation systems and hydroelectric plants. Windbreak forests along the west coast protect croplands from sand and salt spray blown by high winds. At the end of World War II, the condition of Taiwan’s forests was not good. During the period of Japanese rule, deforestation from all causes (logging, burning, and encroachment of agriculture) greatly exceeded reforestation. Especially during the war, desirable species in accessible hardwood forests were cut, and at higher altitudes large areas of valu¬ able virgin timber were subjected to clear-cutting. Both during the war and immediately after, established windbreaks were heavily cut, at first for military purposes and later for household fuel. Sand dunes moved inland, causing serious damage to cropland. In fiscal year 1952, the JCRR estimated Taiwan’s total forest capital 'This chapter is based principally on General Reports—2-33, supplemented by conversa¬ tions with specialists on the staff of the Council of Agriculture in Taipei.

*79

180

Special Programs

at 206 million cubic meters of wood. Some of this capital, however, was in inaccessible areas or in protection forests that could not be cut. Manageable forest capital was estimated to be 70-80 million cubic meters. Because most of this capital was in overmature stands of timber, where tree mortality probably exceeded growth, manageable forest capital was estimated to be growing by only about 1 percent annually, or 700,000-800,000 cubic meters. Annual wood consumption, includ¬ ing wood used as fuel, was estimated to be more than 2 million cubic meters.2 As Taiwan’s population grew, so would the consumption of wood.3 Barring reforestation or wood imports, in the early 1950s it looked as if Taiwan’s manageable forest capital would be exhausted in about 35 years. Most of this chapter is devoted to the evolution of the JCRR forestry program. It is useful, however, first to review the major changes in the forestry policy that the commission helped to shape.

Forestry Policy Despite the poor conditions of Taiwan’s forests when the island was returned to Chinese administration in 1945, forestry was seen by the responsible officials in the Chinese government, and later by specialists in the JCRR, as having enormous potential. All that seemed to be needed was to get on with the job of reforesting areas that had been denuded or that needed to be replanted in commercially valuable species and to proceed with the orderly exploitation of existing valuable stands of timber. Taiwan’s large supply of underemployed rural labor pro¬ vided the means for carrying out these tasks. Under the circumstances, and given the prevailing optimism about Taiwan’s forests, it is not surprising that the first postwar formulation of as forestry policy was basically a list of sensible things to do. (This formulation consisted of recommendations by Paul Zehngraff of the JCRR.) It soon became apparent that development of a full-fledged forestry policy required much better information on forest resources than was available. Pending the collection of the needed information, forestry work was nominally guided by a mixture of outdated Chinese and Japanese laws and regulations that were not taken very seriously. 2Per capita consumption of wood was actually quite low because widely available bamboo substituted for wood in many uses. 3In FY 1952, Taiwan’s population was increasing at the remarkable rate of 3.4 percent annually.

Forestry

181

The needed survey of forest resources was initiated by the JCRR in fiscal year 1954. This survey was the cooperative effort of several Chinese agencies under the technical supervision of the U.S. Forest Service and with the assistance of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group. The Chinese Air Force provided the basic data in the form of 1,500 miles of aerial strip photography. Technical personnel were sup¬ plied by the Taiwan Forest Administration, the Taiwan Forest Research Institute, the Provincial Department of Agriculture and Forestry, and National Taiwan University. Maps were reproduced by the Chinese Combined Service Forces, and the Bank of Taiwan put data on punchcards. The survey was completed in 1956. A team of three consultants from the U.S. Forest Service used the results of the survey in making recom¬ mendations for a forestry program for Taiwan. These recommenda¬ tions, and the survey itself, served as the basis for a new forestry policy developed by a forestry committee convened by the provincial govern¬ ment. This new policy was approved by the provincial government on March 11, 1958. The principal objective of the new policy was to achieve self-suffi¬ ciency in forest products on a sustained-yield basis, taking into account projected population growth. The policy also stressed the protective function of forests in conserving soil and water and preventing floods. The policy included a 40-year plan to increase sharply the harvesting of overmature timber and an expanded reforestation plan. The participa¬ tion of private firms in both logging and reforestation was to be in¬ creased. The general outlines of the forestry policy did not change for many years, but there were several major shifts in emphasis. In the early 1960s, bamboo was given increased importance as a replacement for low-value hardwoods at lower elevations, and a program of building forest roads was begun, in order to increase access to valuable conifers in the higher mountains. At the same time, realization grew that the economic success of forestry policy depended on the ability to market timber and wood products. Marketing efforts and research on wood products were therefore greatly increased. In the late 1960s, industrial¬ ization caused a labor shortage and rising wages in forestry, much as it did in agriculture and fishing. The development and extension of laborsaving methods therefore became a feature of forestry policy during the 1970s. In June 1972, in cooperation with the Taiwan Forest Bureau (for¬ merly the Taiwan Forest Administration) and the U.S. Forest Service,

182

Special Programs

the JCRR began an aerial survey similar to the one it had initiated in I954* This survey, which took more than four years to complete, involved photographing 12,882 square kilometers of forested and nonforested land and making ground checks at nearly 4,000 locations. In 1976, the Executive Yuan approved the Forest Management Im¬ provement Program, which called for an important change in forestry policy. This program declared that forest management should aim at the protection of land, including the lower watersheds of rivers and streams, rather than at the production of timber. Soil conservation was strength¬ ened, and the land-lease program was suspended.

The JCRR Forestry Program The JCRR forestry program is described below in terms of its major components: reforestation, windbreaks, forest roads, bamboo, and re¬ search on forest products. As in other fields, the commission did not undertake forestry projects itself, but worked through sponsoring agen¬ cies.

Reforestation The JCRR began its forestry work in the summer of 1950 by subsidiz¬ ing several small reforestation projects as part of its agricultural-im¬ provement program. In January 1951, Paul J. Zehngraff, an American forester, was assigned to the JCRR’s Agricultural Improvement Divi¬ sion. He was shortly joined by Kang Han, a Chinese forester. Zehngraff began by conducting a survey and analysis of forest conditions. In July 195r, he submitted a report that recommended increased reforestation, increased logging, better use of timber and waste wood, stronger protec¬ tion of forestland, improved methods of selling government logs, train¬ ing of forest workers, and improved forestry research. Zehngraff’s recommendations provided the basis for a JCRR forestry program. A Forestry Division, headed by Zehngraff and with a staff of four Chinese forestry specialists, was established in November 1951. The forestry program got off to a rapid start. By the end of fiscal year 1952 (including some work done in earlier fiscal years), projects subsi¬ dized by the JCRR had recorded the following achievements: • Reforestation: 4,844 hectares planted • Windbreaks: 2,032 hectares planted • Erosion control: 1,600 hectares planted

Forestry

183

These projects had cost the equivalent of US $762,000. The JCRR subsidies came to the equivalent of US $372,000, or less than half the total cost. By the end of fiscal year 1952, the JCRR had also stimulated and helped finance a number of important research projects. One study assisted by the commission found that Japanese estimates of forest capital were consistently too high; another study found that Japanese yield tables for young forest stands were an inadequate basis for manag¬ ing such stands. As a result of the first study, the inventory system of the U.S. Forest Service was adopted in Taiwan. The second study was followed by an intensive survey by the Taiwan Forest Research Institute to construct more complete yield tables for cryptomeria, the most im¬ portant species in artificially established forests. The JCRR also initiated, financed, and participated in two forestry training projects in fiscal year 1952. One project was sponsored by the provincial Forest Administration and involved a year’s training for 30 graduate foresters and one month’s intensive training for 80 semitechnical field personnel. The other project, carried out in cooperation with National Taiwan University, gave two months of intensive training to 50 forestry workers. In fiscal year 1952, the JCRR estimated that the cumulative reforesta¬ tion deficit since 1926 was well over 500,000 hectares.4 In order to make Taiwan self-sufficient in forest products on a sustained basis, the commission further estimated that at least 200,000 hectares must be reforested with commercial species of trees over a 15-year period. The JCRR proposed that for ten years 15,000 hectares be reforested an¬ nually and that for the next five years 10,000 hectares be reforested each year. These targets were in fact greatly exceeded. Reforestation was at the heart of forestry policy, and it was therefore the most important part of the JCRR forestry program. Reforestation involved much more than the planting of seedlings. It included forest protection, forest management, soil conservation, and all aspects of silviculture. In addition, especially during the 1950s, the training of forestry specialists was an important part of the reforestation program. To facilitate presentation of the complicated reforestation story, de¬ velopments in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s will be taken up in turn. 1950s. The reforestation effort by the JCRR and the concerned Chinese government agencies (principally the Taireforestation in the

4Reliable forestry data before 19x6 were apparently not available. Total deforestation from all causes was put at 990,000 hectares, and total reforestation (some of which had failed) was put at 452,000 hectares, leaving a deficit of at least 538,000 hectares.

184

Special Programs

wan Forest Administration and local governments) did not really get under way until fiscal year 1953. An effort at reforestation in the first few years after the end of World War II was largely a failure because of lack of technical supervision and proper care of tree plantations. Most reforestation was for fuel production at lower altitudes. The cutover area of natural forest was often not replanted. Beginning in fiscal year 1953, the JCRR concentrated its reforestation efforts on the 10 percent of forestland outside the national forests that was owned by local governments and private individuals. The strategy of the commission was to bring about reforestation in the national forests principally by influencing government policies and to work more directly for reforestation on other forestland by providing technical and financial assistance. The main obstacles to reforestation outside the national forests were a shortage of planting stock and the inability of the private and public owners to provide the necessary financing. The JCRR subsidized the expansion of existing tree nurseries and the creation of new nurseries. It also launched programs to collect and import seeds for the nurseries. During the 19 5 os, the principal seeds imported were those of slash pines and loblolly pines from the United States and Ryukyu pines and Japa¬ nese fir (cryptomeria) from Japan. By fiscal year 1959, nurseries subsi¬ dized by the JCRR were producing more than 140 million seedlings annually. The JCRR regarded forest protection as an important adjunct of reforestation. Local forest protection associations (FPAs) had been or¬ ganized during the Japanese colonial period. In fiscal year 1953, some 136 such associations survived, but they had no recent operational experience and most existed in name only. The commission laid special stress on reviving the FPAs in townships that had requested JCRR subsidies for reforestation. By the end of fiscal year 1954, some 170 FPAs had been revived or established, and efforts to put township FPAs under newly created hsien FPAs had been highly successful. A year later, there were 16 hsien, 2 city, and 181 township FPAs, with more than 50,000 members. These FPAs were engaged in nursery programs, community reforestation, forest protection work, and technical assistance to tree growers. The provincial government instructed each FPA to organize three to five fire¬ fighting crews of 30 members each. In FY 1953, the JCRR had bought 250 fire-fighting pumps in the United States, and these presumably were distributed to the new fire-fighting crews. By the end of fiscal year 1958, the FPAs had 57,000 members. However, they were now more active in

Forestry

185

reforestation than in forest protection work. They found it profitable to lease idle or denuded government land for reforestation. The FPAs sub¬ sequently encountered financial difficulties, and during the 1960s most of them became inactive. As already noted, soil conservation is one of the benefits of reforesta¬ tion, but under the conditions prevailing in Taiwan a direct attack on the problem of soil erosion was necessary. Taiwan’s mountain slopes are steep and unstable. When farmers, driven by the shortage of land in the plains, invaded the mountains, serious erosion often resulted. In the mid-1950s, the immediate problem was checking the damage done by planting inappropriate crops—bananas, casava, tea, citronella, pea¬ nuts, sweet potato, and pineapple—on unterraced slopelands. Dealing with this problem was made more difficult by the lack of effective land use regulations. Moreover, proper planning of land use awaited com¬ pletion of the aerial survey began in 1954. In addition to initiating the aerial survey, the JCRR provided techni¬ cal and financial assistance to the soil-conservation efforts of the Pro¬ vincial Department of Agriculture and Forestry, the Taiwan Power Company, and the Taiwan Sugar Corporation. The commission also supported a number of other soil conservation activities, including ally reforested, the propagation of more than 180 indigenous plant species useful in erosion control, and multiple land-use projects in the foothills of Miaoli, Nantou, and Taichung Hsien. Research on the performance of different species of trees was viewed as an important part of the reforestation program. On the recommenda¬ tion of the JCRR, a Forestry Research Council was formed in 1953. The council consisted of representatives of the Provincial Department of Agriculture and Forestry, the Taiwan Forest Administration, the Tai¬ wan Forest Research Institute, and the Forestry Department of National Taiwan University. The council met two times each year to screen research proposals and coordinate research work. The role of the JCRR was mostly advisory, although it did provide financial support to some projects, including research on fast-growing trees of high commercial value and a survey of the growth rates of various species of trees. The JCRR also helped finance the construction of a facility for the cold storage of seeds at the Taiwan Forest Research Institute. Although the JCRR concentrated on reforestation outside the na¬ tional forests, much of its work directly or indirectly assisted reforesta¬ tion of the national forests. Thus, JCRR support of forestry research and the training of forestry workers contributed to the reforestation of

186

Special Programs

all forestland on Taiwan. Moreover, the help the JCRR provided the Taiwan Forest Administration in an islandwide survey of forest re¬ sources and management practices (FY 1953) and in a survey of forest drainage (FY 1954) contributed to reforestation of the national forests as well as of other forestland. The most important JCCR initiated project that had general applica¬ tion to the reforestation effort was the aerial survey of forest resources begun in 1954 and completed in 1956. This survey revealed that re¬ forestation needs were substantially greater than the JCRR had esti¬ mated in fiscal year 1952. The survey found that 425,000 hectares of former forestland (mostly grassland and dry farmland) should be re¬ planted and that 581,000 hectares of poorly stocked forested land, covered with brush and undesirable hardwoods, should be replanted with commercially valuable species. Of the more than one million hec¬ tares needing reforestation, however, less than three-quarters (728,000 hectares) were in accessible areas.5 By the end of fiscal year 1959, the total area needing reforesting had been reduced to 878,000 hectares.6 Average annual planting in the period 1953—60 was 38,000, compared with an average annual plant¬ ing of only 10,000 hectares in the period 1945-52. Annual plantings in community and private forests, where the JCRR concentrated its ef¬ forts, increased from 5,700 hectares in the period 1945-52 to 25,000 hectares in the period 1953—59.7 1960s. During the 1960s, the JCRR con¬ tinued its programs of collecting and importing seeds and subsidizing the operation of nurseries. It also continued to cooperate with the Taiwan Forest Bureau (TFB) and local governments in reforesting land outside the national forests. The JCRR and the TFB covered 60 percent of costs and also provided technical assistance to the local governments. Plantations of pine, mahogany, and rosewood grew well in areas once covered with low-value hardwoods. Farmers were also helped in the planting of fast-growing, commercially valuable species that were use¬ ful in making pulp, plywood, matchsticks, and tung oil. In the field of forest protection, the JCRR cooperated with the TFB in buying fire-suppression tools and equipment and in establishing more weather stations to report on the danger of forest fires. The commission reforestation in the

5See General Report—8, p. 88. 6General Report—10, p. 100. 7Hsing-chi Yuan, “JCRR 10-year Forestry Work in Taiwan,” November i960, p. 7, JCRR files.

Forestry

i8y

continued to work for soil conservation by helping to finance watershed management projects and by initiating a tree-farming program in il¬ legally cultivated areas in central Taiwan. This program, carried out in cooperation with local governments, helped farmers plant bamboo, fruit, and other trees that checked erosion. In 1964, the JCRR began a reforestation loan program under which loans were made to private farmers through the Land Bank of Taiwan and selected farmers’ associations to finance reforestation work. The commission presumably provided technical assistance to some recip¬ ients of these loans, but the record on this point is incomplete. During its first five years, this program loaned NT $49.2 million to 2,148 farmers and helped reforest 9,882 hectares of land. In fiscal year 1963, a three-man team sponsored by the JCRR went to Japan to promote the sale of timber from Taiwan. In FY 1964, the Taiwan Wood and Bamboo Market Development Center was estab¬ lished to promote exports and domestic sales of wood products by small manufacturers. And in FY 1965, the JCRR had for the first time the services of a timber-marketing consultant, Julian Bass from the United States. His accomplishments included helping the Taiwan Forest Bu¬ reau develop a market for hemlock board in Australia. For several years, progress was made in exporting forest products, but in the latter part of 1966 local costs rose and further expansion of exports became impossi¬ ble. The JCRR continued its tree-improvement program during the 1960s. A production area for luchu pine seeds was established, and pilot plantings were made of five species of eucalyptus. Plots to demonstrate improved management practices—selection, planting, tending, thin¬ ning, and harvesting—were established in 15 hsien. From 1961 to 1970, a total of 279,038 hectares were reforested. The average area planted—27,900 hectares—exceeded by almost 3,000 hectares the average rate of planting in the mid- and late 1950s. 1970s. Major aspects of past JCRR re¬ forestation programs continued during the 1970s. The commission continued to subsidize tree nurseries and to distribute seedlings free. The reforestation loan program expanded. Plantations financed by this program were visited periodically by experienced foresters who pro¬ vided technical advice. In cooperation with the Taiwan Forest Bureau, the JCRR continued the effort to convert poorly stocked hardwood forests at lower altitudes to plantations of fast-growing, high-value species. To provide growthreforestation in the

188

Special Programs

and-yield data, permanent sample plots of these species were estab¬ lished. At higher elevations, existing hardwood stands were more val¬ uable. The JCRR and the Taiwan Forest Research Institute began experiments in improving these stands instead of cutting and replacing them. The JCRR cooperated with the National Science Council, the Taiwan Forest Research Institute, the Taiwan Forest Bureau, and National Chung Hsing University in a tree improvement program. Projects in¬ cluded analysis of the performance of red-pine seeds from different sources, the introduction of a number of tropical pine species, a prove¬ nance study of Japanese fir from seven different districts in Japan, and genetic improvement studies of Taiwania, Taiwan red pine, and China fir. A growing labor shortage caused increased emphasis on finding and adopting means of saving labor. In September 1970, a team from the JCRR, the TFB, and National Taiwan University visited Japan to inves¬ tigate labor-saving silviculture, including mechanization, herbicide ap¬ plication, and forest fertilization. This investigation was followed by a variety of research projects on Taiwan. Experiments were conducted in the mechanical and chemical weeding of tree plantations and in new planting methods. Horizontal planting was found to have several ad¬ vantages over conventional up-down slope-planting. Horizontal plant¬ ing saves labor in seedling transportation, planting, weeding, and fertil¬ izing. Material is saved in chemical weeding. Surface runoff and soil loss are reduced, and tree growth is accelerated. Approximately 8,500 hec¬ tares were reforested by the horizontal planting method during the 1970s.

Windbreaks Before 1945, about 14,000 hectares of windbreak forests and an extensive network of windbreaks on the borders of farm fields had been established along Taiwan’s west coast. During the last stages of World War II, the Japanese cut most of these forests and farm windbreaks to obtain building material for temporary construction projects. After the restoration of Taiwan to Chinese administration, the local population took advantage of a slackening of controls and cut most of the remain¬ ing windbreaks for fuel and other purposes. Sand dunes marched in¬ land, covering good cropland. Fine sand particles and salt spray, carried by strong winds, caused an estimated 10 percent damage to crops 5—10 kilometers from the sea along the entire west coast.

Forestry

189

The JCRR began working on the windbreak problem as early as 1950. Attention was at first concentrated on reestablishing farm wind¬ breaks. In fiscal year 1952, the JCRR set the goal of reestablishing all previous windbreaks within five years. In addition to subsidizing the actual replanting of windbreaks, the JCRR helped finance research on wind-resisting trees and plants and on the use of a mixture of tree species in windbreaks. By the end of fiscal year 1955, some 80 percent of previous wind¬ breaks had been reestablished. A year later, the coastal sand dunes had been stabilized, and most land that had been covered or damaged by sand had been reclaimed. In the period 1950-59, the JCRR cooperated with the Taiwan Forest Administration and local governments in plant¬ ing 11,000 hectares of windbreak forests and 12,000 kilometers of farm windbreaks. The JCRR became involved in the extension and replacement of windbreaks in the mid-1970s under the Accelerated Rural Development Program. From FY 1974 through FY 1976, the commission helped finance the planting of 1,102 hectares of windbreak forests and 5,538 kilometers of farm windbreaks. Of the windbreak forests, 61.4 percent of the area planted was new; of the farm windbreaks, 82.2 percent were new. Planting of coastal windbreak forests continued in the late 1970s and early 1980s. From 1977 to 1979, some 859 hectares were planted; from 1980 to 1982, plantings totaled 408 hectares.8 Forest Roads In July 1957, the JCRR drew up a 20-year program for the building of more than 900 kilometers of timber access roads. Labor to construct these roads was provided principally by retired servicemen. The sale of agricultural commodities supplied by the U.S. government under Public Law 480 helped finance the road-building effort. From fiscal year 1962 through fiscal year 1967, about 400 kilometers of gravel forest roads were built under JCRR supervision without substantial appropriated Chinese government funds. Public Law 480 support ended in September 1967. The JCRR obtained similar support during 1969 and 1970 from the World Food for Peace Program of the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization. With this support, another 300 kilometers of forest roads were built. Beginning in fiscal year 1973, the forest road program (now known as the forest and industrial road project) was financed largely by the 8Data supplied by the CAPD in August 1984.

190

Special Programs

Accelerated Rural Development Program. Twenty percent of total costs were met by local contributions however. Plans for roads were made by the provincial Department of Civil Affairs and coordinated with the establishment of specialized agricultural areas. From 1973 to 1983, some 2,157 kilometers of new roads were built and 3,427 kilometers of existing roads were reconditioned.9

Bamboo The expansion of Taiwan’s pulp and paper industry in the late 1950s drove up the price of bamboo, which the industry used as a raw mate¬ rial. From that point on, bamboo became an increasingly important part of the JCRR’s forestry program. In i960, in cooperation with the Yunlin Hsien Economic Farm, the commission began an experiment in increasing bamboo yields per hectare. Also in i960, some 1,119 hec¬ tares of bamboo were planted with the direct or indirect financial assistance of the JCRR. In 1961, the JCRR initiated and subsidized an islandwide survey of bamboo resources. An expanded bamboo-planting program was begun in 1964. In 1965, farmers helped by subsidies from the JCRR and the TFB planted 2,450 hectares of bamboo. The reforestation loan pro¬ gram, described earlier in this chapter, included bamboo plantations. In October 1970, the JCRR initiated another islandwide survey of bam¬ boo resources, including the use of aerial photography. Fieldwork on this survey, conducted by several provincial government agencies, was completed at the end of fiscal year 1972. Bamboo stock farms were substantially increased in the early 1970s. Beginning in the mid-1960s, 16 bamboo species from other areas had been introduced into Taiwan by fiscal year 1976. Four of these species grew well, and 10,000 stocks were propagated. The JCRR also sup¬ ported research on bamboo, including projects on the control of witch’s broom disease, the adaptability of giant bamboo, and the multiplication of introduced bamboo. In FY 1976, a demonstration project on bam¬ boo culm production, financed by ARDP funds, was conducted in six hsien. The production of edible bamboo shoots for local consumption and export increased greatly in the 1960s and 1970s. Exports of canned bamboo shoots had a total value of U.S. $46 million in 1978, 26 times the value of such exports in 1961.10

9Ibid. 10Ibid.

Forestry

191

In 1973, with the JCRR’s technical assistance and financing from the central government, the first Rural Industrial Park was established at Chushan, Nantou Hsien, an area where bamboo is abundant and cot¬ tage industries making bamboo products already existed. By 1984, some 64 small factories making bamboo and wood products had been established in the park.11 Research on Wood Products Research on wood products did not become an important part of the JCRR forestry program until the mid-1960s. In fiscal year 1964, the commission greatly increased its support of wood products research in cooperation with the Taiwan Forest Research Institute. Projects sup¬ ported by the JCRR in that year included four projects on woodwork¬ ing, glue-lamination, and furniture-making; six on lumber-seasoning; two on wood preservation; three on wood-chemical utilization; and three on market development. Two years later, in FY 1967, the JCRR was involved in 17 projects on wood products in cooperation with universities and research organiza¬ tions. These projects included research on the production of curved wood (“wavewood”), sawdust bricks, bamboo flooring and paneling, treated bamboo poles to support banana trees, and treated bamboo sticks for raising oysters. In FY 1967, the Union Industrial Research Institute began experiments in the radiation of wood with gamma rays with the objective of making wood immune to changes in moisture. During the 1970s, the JCRR continued to support a wide variety of research projects on the uses of wood and bamboo. For example, in FY 1972, JCRR-supported projects included studies on timber-drying, plasticizing wood with ammonia (to make curved furniture parts), improving the quality of composition board, and using oxygen (rather than chlorine) to bleach bamboo fiber used in making paper. In FY 1976, the JCRR was involved in 22 projects, including research on the use of low-grade hardwood fibers as cattle feed, bleaching wood, and manufacturing laminated bamboo boards.

Production, Reserves, and International Trade The annual volume of saw-timber production on Taiwan (excluding firewood and wood used as an industrial raw material) rose fairly

11 Ibid.

19 2

Special Programs

Table 12. Timber production in Taiwan in selected years, 1953--1982

Year 1953 1964 1968 1973 1977 1982

Saw-timber (thousand cubic meters)

Firewood (thousand cubic meters)

Industrial raw material (thousand metric tons)

462.9 1,069.6 1,119.4 1,101.5 689.4

147.2

____

i7i-9 200.2 422.0 138.2 67.8

— 32.4 161.0

494-9

H4-5 52.6

Source: Data from Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1986 (Taipei: CEPD, 1986), p. 76. Note: No production of timber as an industrial raw material is reported before 1968.

steadily from 1953 to I9^4? stabilized at something over a million cubic meters from 1964 to 1973, and declined from 1973 to 1982. In 1982, the volume of production was only 6.9 percent greater than it had been in 19 5 3. If firewood is taken into account, the volume of timber produc¬ tion in 1982 was 7.8 percent below the 1953 level (see Table 12).12 The production of bamboo varied more erratically from year to year, but the volume of bamboo production in 1982 was only 14.2 percent above the volume in 1953.13 The change in forest areas and forest reserves since the early 1950s is also of interest. Forest areas in 1977 were only 4.2 percent larger than they were in 1953, but they contained 60.6 percent more wood (see Table 13). Moreover, the share of conifers (which are generally more valuable than hardwoods) in forest reserves rose from 33.8 percent to 41.8 percent. Both the large increase in total reserves and the increase in the share of conifers, relative to the small growth in forest areas, reflect the success of the program to reforest understocked forest areas with more valuable species of trees. But the increase in total reserves would not have been as large if timber production had not declined so sharply after 1973. Moreover, some part of this increase in reserves is probably attributable to the low price of timber that precluded the desirable thinning of many forest stands. The modest increase in the production of timber from Taiwan’s forests fell far short of keeping pace with the requirements of the rapidly developing economy. The goal of self-sufficiency in forest products that was proclaimed in 1958 proved to be unattainable. Taiwan instead became increasingly dependent on imported timber (see Table 14). 12The production of timber for use as an industrial material improves this picture (see Table 12). 13CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 198}, p. 70.

Forestry

193

Table 13. Forest areas and reserves in Taiwan in selected years, 1953-1982 Year

Forest areas (thousand hectares)

Forest reserves (thousand cubic meters)

1953 1964 1968

1,789 2,147

203,180 239,102 240,872 240,872 326,421 326,421

1973 1977 1982

2,224 2,224 1,865 1,865

Source: Data from Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1986 (Taipei: CEPD, 1986), p. 75. Note: The similarity of figures for 1968 and 1973 and for 1977 and 1982 presumably results from a practice of estimating forest areas and reserves at intervals of several years, rather than every year.

The failure to produce more timber from Taiwan’s forests is at first sight hard to explain. The area devoted to forestry was extensive, the reforestation program was pursued vigorously and successfully, the construction of forest roads opened more forestland for logging, and research on wood products created new marketing possiblities. How¬ ever, these favorable physical and technical factors were overwhelmed by adverse economic developments. As industrialization drove up wages, it became more and more difficult to produce timber at interna¬ tionally competitive prices. Moreover, the policy of the government emphasizes conservation and the protection of land, rather than timber production. Taiwan’s plywood and other wood-processing industries are based mainly on imported tropical hardwoods.

Summary At the end of World War II, Taiwan’s extensive forest areas were in poor condition because of neglects, poor management, and overcutting, especially during the last part of the Japanese colonial period. But optimism was high concerning prospects for the rehabilitation and commercial exploitation of forests. A reforestation program with heavy JCRR involvement was launched in the early 1950s and continued through the 1960s and 1970s. The commission also provided financial and technical assistance to the reestablishment of coastal windbreaks, the building of forest roads, the growing of bamboo, and research on forest products. Forestry policy initially emphasized reforestation, training of forest workers, and generally improved practices. In 1958, after an extensive

I94

Special Programs Table 14. Taiwan’s exports and imports of timber in selected years, 1961-1979 (thousand metric tons) Year

Imports

1961 1965 1970

101.5

35-8

417-3 900.7

1975 1979

35304-3 5,957-*

II3-7 105.6 65.0 68.4

Exports

Net imports 65.7 303.6 795-1 3,2-39-3 5,888.8

Source: Data from Council for Agricultural Planning and Development, Agricultural Trade Statistics of Taiwan (Tai¬ pei: CAPD, 1980) pp. 4, 5, 8, 9.

survey of forest resources, a new forestry policy that called for selfsufficiency in forest products on a sustained-yield basis was adopted, but in the late 1960s and early 1970s industrialization drove up labor costs and made domestic timber much more expensive than imported timber. In 1976, the Chinese government shifted forestry policy to emphasize conservation and the protection of land, rather than timber production. Although hopes for the commercial exploitation of Taiwan’s timber resources were not realized, other important results were achieved by the forestry policies developed and supported by the JCRR. The coastal windbreaks were restored, and successful reforestation in Taiwan’s large mountain areas reduced flooding in the plains, retarded soil ero¬ sion, and checked the silting of reservoirs.

12 Rural Health

From its earliest days on the China mainland, the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction regarded improvement of the health of rural people as one of its main responsibilities. The rural health program evolved over three decades to meet changing circumstances. At the beginning, disease control and improvement of rural health facilities were major preoccupations. Toward the end, considerable effort was devoted to food-processing technology and pollution control. Environ¬ mental sanitation was always an important concern, and for many years family planning—only partly a health problem—may have received more attention than any other subject. As was the case in other fields, the joint commission did not work directly on rural health problems, but provided financial and technical assistance to other public and private agencies. The JCRR worked principally with the Taiwan Provincial Health Department and the National Department of Health (formed in 1971). At this date, it is difficult to determine the relative roles of the JCRR and these two government agencies in formulating rural health policy. Relations be¬ tween the JCRR and the two agencies were remarkably harmonious, and no serious disagreements appear to have arisen in even so basic a matter as the setting of priorities. The only controversial area was family planning, and in that area the differences of opinion were not between the JCRR and the government health agencies.1 ’The judgments in this paragraph are based in part on separate conversations in August 1985 with K. K. Chang, former director of the JCRR Rural Health Division, and C. H. Yen, former director of both the Taiwan Provincial Health Department and the National Depart¬ ment of Health.

I95

19 6

Special Programs

Beginnings of the Rural Health Program The JCRR’s work in rural health began on the mainland in November 1948 with the creation of the Rural Health Committee, consisting of four members and five advisers. Only the committee’s executive secre¬ tary, Dr. S. C. Hsu (Hsu Shih-chu), was a full-time employee; the other members and the advisers were part-time volunteers. In early 1949, the committee became first the Health Unit and then the Rural Health Division.2 Hsu continued to lead the JCRR’s rural health program until 1973, when he was succeeded by Dr. K. K. Chang (Chang Kung-kong). Hsu died unexpectedly in 1978 during a trip to Canada. I knew him well during the late 1950s and early 1960s and had high regard for him. A slender, intense man with unusual powers of persuasion, he had clear goals and drove hard to achieve them. The JCRR at first saw rural health as part of both the integrated rural reconstruction program and the food production program. This formu¬ lation, which may have been an effort to strike a compromise between the approaches of James Yen and the other four commissioners, pro¬ duced few results. The first JCRR General Report says only that the early goals of the rural health program proved to be “too vague and general.” Whatever the explanation, during Phase A (the period from October 1, 1948, to June 30, 1949) the commission approved only eight rural health projects. Largely because of the deteriorating military situation, only three of these projects were completed satisfactorily: the delivery of eight tons of medical supplies and equipment from the Shanghai depot of the Ministry of Health to JCRR rural health programs in Kwangtung and Szechuan provinces, surveys of rural health organizations and wa¬ terworks in Taiwan, and the donation of medical supplies and equip¬ ment to three hsien health centers in Kwangtung. Phase A rural health projects planned for the northwest and for Fukien, Chekiang, and Hunan provinces were not started or were abandoned in their early stages. During Phase B (July 1, 1949, to February 15, 1950), the JCRR’s rural health activities increased markedly, but because of the civil war lasting results were achieved only in Taiwan. The most ambitious health project was the distribution of 470 tons of medical equipment and supplies turned over to the JCRR by the U.S. Economic Cooperation information on the early JCRR rural health program on both the mainland and Taiwan was obtained principally from General Report—1, pp. 81-90.

Rural Health

197

Administration when it closed its Canton office. This material was sent to hospitals and medical institutions in Kwangsi, Szechuan, Kweichow, and Yunnan provinces from JCRR depots in Nanning, Kwangsi, and Pehpei, Szechuan. Other Phase B rural health projects on the China mainland were concentrated in Szechuan and included a smallpox vac¬ cination campaign and several projects to strengthen hsien health cen¬ ters. When the JCRR headquarters moved from Canton to Taipei in Au¬ gust 1949, the Rural Health Division moved to Chengtu in Szechuan Province. In November, the division was forced to close down its opera¬ tions on the mainland and move to Taipei. Because only four members of the division made the move, the division supplemented its thin per¬ sonnel resources with a 12-man team drawn from government health institutions. Seven Phase B rural health projects were carried out satisfactorily in Taiwan. In the largest of these projects, the JCRR helped the Public Works Bureau of the provincial government to rehabilitate 77 rural water plants, many of which had been severely damaged by U.S. bomb¬ ing during World War II. Fifty of these plants were on the east coast. Their rehabilitation enabled farmers, mostly aborigines, to remain in villages and cultivate their land. Twelve more water plants were added to the rehabilitation program in 1952. By that year, the provincial government was able to take over financing of the program completely. Phase B projects on Taiwan also included financial assistance to the malaria-control activities of the Taiwan Malaria Research Institute and the tuberculosis-control work of the Taipei Tuberculosis Center. Other Phase B projects sought to strengthen Taiwan’s rural health system. Soon after the move to Taiwan, the JCRR’s rural health program became too complicated to be described in purely chronological terms. Beginning with fiscal year 1951, the evolution of the program will be set forth by major functional categories.3

Rural Health Facilities The only rural health facilities in Japanese colonial times were small clinics next to some police stations, but these clinics ceased to function information on the JCRR rural health program on Taiwan in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s was obtained principally from General Reports—2—33, supplemented by conversations in April 1984 and August 1985 with K. K. Chang, senior researcher of the CAPD, Taipei. Chang’s article “Rural Health Programs in the Taiwan Area, ROC,” in Industry of Free China, September 1982, pp. 7—25, was also a useful source of information.

198

Special Programs

when Taiwan was returned to Chinese control in 1945. The Chinese government gradually established health centers in some hsien and health stations in some townships. By 1949, there were 17 health centers and 104 health stations, but most of these facilities were poorly maintained and inadequately staffed. The JCRR concentrated first on raising existing health stations to minimum standards. It then encouraged local communities to establish more stations, giving each new station subsidies equivalent to between US $100 and US $600. The new stations were subsequently taken over and financed by the government. In fiscal year 1953, the JCRR launched a campaign to standardize the buildings, furniture, and fixtures of health centers, health stations, and health rooms (largely in aboriginal areas). Five standard building de¬ signs for stations serving different numbers of people were drawn up. At first, the JCRR paid half the cost of new or improved buildings. The commission’s share of construction costs was later reduced to one-third. By the end of fiscal year 1962, 16 of 22 health bureaus (formerly centers), 355 of 393 health stations, and 51 of 168 health rooms had standardized concrete buildings constructed or improved with JCRR’s financial help. The program of improving rural health facilities was phased out in FY 1963 as the result of a change in JCRR policy that emphasized more direct support for agricultural and industrial develop¬ ment. The present system of government health services was largely in place by the early 1960s, although the national Department of Health was not created until March 1971, replacing the National Health Administra¬ tion. The Health Departments of Taiwan Province and the special municipalities of Taipei and Kaohsiung report to the national Depart¬ ment of Health. The Provincial Department of Health supervises 19 hsien or city health bureaus, which in turn control the health stations and health rooms within their respective jurisdictions. In 1982, there were 334 township health stations, 22 district health stations, and 218 health rooms in aboriginal areas. A health station usually serves 20,000 to 50,000 people and is staffed by 1—2 doctors, 2—5 nurses and mid¬ wives, 1—4 health workers, and 1—2 family-planning home visitors. Each health room has one health worker and one midwife.

Disease Control Since Taiwan was returned to Chinese Control, many serious com¬ municable diseases have been eradicated: plague in 1947? smallpox in

Rural Health

199

1954, rabies in 1958, cholera in 1962, and malaria in 1965.4 Other communicable diseases—for example, diphtheria, trachoma, tuber¬ culosis, and venereal diseases—have been brought under good control. The important public health problems have for some time been the more chronic diseases of older people and environmental pollution. In the early 1950s, the JCRR placed primary emphasis on the control of malaria and tuberculosis. It also supported programs to control or eradicate rabies, syphilis, leprosy, filariasis, trachoma, diphtheria, goi¬ ter, and intestinal parasites. In fiscal year 1951, the JCRR helped finance the rehabilitation of 144 local malaria stations. In the following year, these stations were incor¬ porated in nearby health stations. Malaria technicians assigned to health stations were given a four-week training course by the Taiwan Malaria Research Institute, with JCRR support. These technicians con¬ ducted periodic blood examinations of malaria victims and provided follow-up treatment. For the first year, the JCRR gave malaria techni¬ cians a small monthly stipend to help cover their travel expenses. Beginning in fiscal year 1952, the JCRR helped finance a four-year effort to eradicate malaria by spraying the interiors of houses with DDT. The World Health Organization (WHO) supported this effort by assigning a malariologist, an entomologist, and a sanitary engineer to Taiwan. The DDT spraying project had an immediate effect on the number of mosquitoes in houses and also quickly reduced the number of fever cases in sprayed areas. In FY 1957, only 323 cases of malaria were detected, compared with the 1.2 million cases estimated to have existed in 1952. The death rate from malaria dropped from 275 per one million people in 1952 to only one case per million in 1958. After FY I95^, the commission provided no new financial support to the spray¬ ing project, which had expanded to include the entire island, but finan¬ cial support was provided by the U.S. Foreign Operations Administra¬ tion. The JCRR began to provide financial support to the Provincial Taipei Tuberculosis Center as early as December 1949. The center operated a laboratory that produced BCG (bacille Calmette-Guerin) vaccine and gave tuberculin tests to schoolchildren. Children whose tests were nega¬ tive were vaccinated; those whose tests were positive were x-rayed to determine whether they had active tuberculosis. The work of the center was also supported by the WHO and the U.N. International Children’s Emergency Func (UNICEF). In October 1951, the provincial govern4Plague had been endemic only in the offshore island of Kinmen. Cholera appeared to have been eradicated in the mid-1950s, but an unexpected, limited outbreak occurred in 1961.

200

Special Programs

ment started construction of a new BCG laboratory to meet WHO standards. The JCRR provided matching funds. The tuberculin-testing program expanded rapidly. From January 1950 to June 1952, some 1,080,000 schoolchildren were tested. In fiscal year 1953, the JCRR shifted its financial support away from provincial tuberculosis centers and sanatoriums, where it was no longer needed. Support was instead provided to local BCG teams, to hsien and city governments (to set up local tuberculosis centers through existing health centers), and to local governments and communities (to establish tuberculosis sanatoriums). In FY 1954, the JCRR contributed to the support of 23 BCG teams, the establishment of tuberculosis centers in Keelung and Changhua, the creation of tuberculosis sanatoriums in Chiayi and Changhua, and the strengthening of the tuberculosis center in Tainan. In fiscal year 1955, the mass testing and vaccination program was able to continue without JCRR financial support of the BCG teams. By the end of the decade, U.S. aid to the tuberculosis-control program was handled by the U.S. aid mission (now the International Cooperation Administration) instead of by the JCRR. Deaths from tuberculosis had fallen from 916 per one million persons in 1952 to 539 cases per million in 1958. Good results were also achieved in other disease-control programs supported by the JCRR. In 1951, there were 238 deaths from rabies; in r959, Taiwan was free from rabies. The incidence of trachoma among persons examined was 53.5 percent in 1954 and 21.9 percent in 1963. There were 2,186 cases of diphtheria in 1957 and only 446 cases five years later in 1962. Mortality from syphilis per million persons fell from 34 in 1952 to 12 to 1958. In part because of the successful efforts to control communicable diseases, the crude death rate was reduced from 0.99 percent in 1952 to 0.70 percent in i960.5

School Health With the encouragement and assistance of the JCRR, the Taiwan Provincial Department of Education launched a school health program in May 1951. Public health courses were included in the primary school curriculum. One teacher from each school was given a two-week train¬ ing course in public health, after which training was provided for school nurses. An effort was made to improve sanitation in schools. 5CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1983, p. 5.

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201

The JCRR contributed financially to both the educational and the sanitation aspects of the school health program. From fiscal year 1951 to fiscal year 1958, the JCRR helped finance 13 training classes on health subjects attended by more than 70,000 teachers. In FY 1958, the JCRR provided funds to help regional supervisors maintain closer con¬ tact with school health programs. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the JCRR gave priority to improving school sanitation. By the end of FY 1962, some 776 latrines and 180 water supply systems had been built in schools with JCRR financial assistance. The commission’s support of the school health program was phased out in FY 1963 as part of the general change in JCRR policy.

Training Health Personnel Health programs require trained personnel. In recognition of that fact, the JCRR provided financial assistance to three schools of nursing throughout most of the 1950s. One of these schools was established in fiscal year 1952 with a JCRR subsidy. In FY 1953, the commission helped finance the establishment of health training centers at Taoyuan and Hsinchu and for several years contributed to the expenses of people taking courses at the centers. Those receiving such assistance included sanitarians being trained for township governments, and medical of¬ ficers from health stations taking refresher courses. In the late 1950s, the JCRR also helped pay for training courses in maternal and child health for medical officers, nurses, and midwives from health stations. In the early 1960s, the JCRR’s role in supporting the training of health personnel was gradually taken over by the Provincial Health Depart¬ ment and other government agencies.

Family Planning In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the population of Taiwan was increasing rapidly.6 Some observers feared that increases in output 6In addition to the source cited above in footnote 2, this section draws on a paper written in 1970 by S. C. Hsu when he was serving as a regent’s professor at the University of California at Los Angeles: “From Taboo to National Policy: The Taiwan Family Planning Program up to I97°’’ (Taichung: Chinese Center for International Training in Family Planning, reprint, n.d.). The crude natural rate of population increase was 20.16 per 1,000 in 1947. A rise in the birth rate and a drop in the death rate pushed the rate of natural increase to *6.74 per 1,000 in I952- (Information supplied by K. K. Chang, Council for Agricultural Planning and Develop¬ ment in September 1984.)

202

Special Programs

would be used up by rising population.7 K. K. Chang recalls that JCRR Chairman Chiang Monlin raised the subject of family planning with S. C. Hsu, chief of the Rural Health Division, as early as 1949. In 1950, in an action that proved to be premature, JCRR circulated a million copies of a booklet titled “The Happy Family” that advocated family planning by the rhythm method. The public reaction was un¬ favorable. A petition was sent to Premier Chen Cheng denouncing the booklet as a Communist plot to weaken the armed forces. The booklet also aroused the strong opposition of some military officers.8 In the same year, in addition to those who believed that military strength required an expanding population, many people in the govern¬ ment and the ruling Kuomintang were convinced that family planning was contrary to the teachings of Sun Yat-sen, leader of the revolution against the Manchu imperial regime and founder of the Republic of China. Sun had in fact argued in 1924 in his lecture on the principle of nationalism that, on the basis of past population trends, China was in danger of being swallowed up by the other great nations of the world.9 If this argument is accepted, any form of population control would undermine China’s national security. Sun’s argument had some validity in 1924, when China’s population was held down by disease, famine, and war, but it had little relevance to Taiwan in 1950, with its low death rate and high birth rate. After its experience with the family-planning booklet, the JCRR moved cautiously. In 1952, the commission joined the Rockefeller Foundation in bringing George W. Barclay of Princeton University to Taiwan to do a population study. At the suggestion of the JCRR, this study included a household survey in Yunlin Hsien that showed that child deaths and relinquishment of children for adoption increased with the number of children in a family. These findings became a strong weapon in overcoming opposition to family planning. In 1954, with JCRR encouragement, the China Family Planning Association (FPA) was organized and formally chartered by the Minis¬ try of the Interior. The FPA established ten clinics to advise couples who had been unable to have children or who wanted to space childbirths at 7In November 1950, JCRR Commissioner John Earl Baker reported that Premier Chen Cheng had stated privately that the good results of the JCRR program would be entirely “eaten up” by the increase in population within 10-15 years unless something was done about population control (Baker to R. Allen Griffin, Director of the ECA Far East Program Division, November 3, 1950). 8In ibid., Baker also reported that the premier had suggested that a “conference of technical leaders” should be convened to consider how the military opposition to family planning might be modified. There is no record that such a meeting was actually held. 9Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I (see Chapter 7, footnote 2), pp. 21-28.

Rural Health

203

longer intervals. In order to gain support, especially among military personnel, the FPA provided training in first aid in military dependents’ villages to prepare for possible air raids. Information on fertility and child-spacing was also made available. Because the public reaction to the FPA’s work was favorable, the provincial government gradually increased its annual allocations to the association. In 1955, S. C. Hsu asked Governor Chou Chih-jou to approve assign¬ ment of family-planning workers to local health stations. Hsu argued that a high birth rate would divert resources from the industrialization program for 20 years before it would provide more soldiers for the army. The governor told Hsu to go ahead, but not to ask him for formal approval.10 On the basis of this unofficial green light, the JCRR pro¬ vided funds to help the Provincial Health Department add a family¬ planning worker to one-third of the local health stations to promote family planning with traditional methods of contraception. These workers were made part of the already existing maternal and child health program. To avoid hostile publicity, they were called “pre¬ pregnancy health” (PPH) workers. The health station personnel par¬ ticipating in this program were regarded as FPA volunteers. Each PPH worker called on about 70 housewives a month. Each had the goal of persuading 15 women each month to practice child-spacing through the use of traditional contraceptives. From i960 to 1963, some 32,700 women adopted child-spacing. At the end of this period, more than 80 percent were still using contraceptives. In 1961, the Population Council of New York, with the technical collaboration of the University of Michigan, made a grant to the JCRR to finance the establishment of the Population Studies Center in Tai¬ chung. The center was to conduct surveys and studies to determine the causes and consequences of population growth. In 1962, the Population Council made another grant to the JCRR to enable the Provincial Maternal and Child Health Institute to undertake a large-scale project in Taichung City to determine the effectiveness of various approaches to motivate couples to practice family planning and the preferences of motivated couples for various methods of contraception.11 The project found that systematic home visits were the best approach and that the intrauterine device (IUD) was the preferred method of contraception. The Taichung project yielded valuable experience that was used in a

10K. K. Chang recalls that Governor Chou, who was a retired general, gave Hsu only five minutes, but that was long enough for Hsu to make his case. nFor a description and analysis of the Taichung project, see Ronald Freedman and John Y. Takeshita, Family Planning in Taiwan: An Experiment in Social Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), esp. pp. 12-16, 109-148, 292-310.

204

Special Programs

subsequent islandwide program to promote family planning primarily through use of the IUD. This program was begun in poor areas—salt fields, fishing villages, coal-mining districts, and underprivileged parts of cities—containing about io percent of Taiwan’s population. To reduce the risk of political complications, the supply of contraceptives was not directly managed by the government, but was put under the China Maternal and Child Health Association, which was organized and chartered in 1964 for this specific purpose. Despite this effort to limit government involvement, the program was approved in early 1964 by Vice-president Chen Cheng, concurrently premier. Chen sent a semi¬ official letter of approval to Governor Huang Chieh, who referred the letter to the Provincial Health Commission for action. Personnel of the Provincial Health Department and the Provincial Maternal and Child Health Institute then gave their services to the family-planning program on an ostensibly voluntary basis. In fiscal year 1965, the family-planning program was extended to all of Taiwan and the outlying islands. The initial objective was to bring the natural rate of increase (which had been 3.0 percent in 1963) down to 1.5 percent in five years. This objective proved to be unrealistic, and in FY 1968 the goal was reduced to achieving a 2.0 percent rate of increase by 1973. During its first few years, the family-planning program was financed almost entirely by the JCRR. The commission received some money for family planning from the Population Council, but it relied principally on allocation of the equivalent of US$ 1.5 million from the SinoAmerican Fund for Economic and Social Development (SAFED). S. C. Hsu gave K. T. Li (Li Kuo-ting), then minister of economic affairs, principal credit for the SAFED financing. The mechanics of the family-planning program are of some interest. Each PPH worker based in a health station was given a monthly quota of IUD acceptances by women of childbearing age. Workers who failed to achieve their quotas for three months were dismissed; workers who exceeded their quotas were given bonuses. The program was monitored and subsidized by an ingenious coupon system. A woman who agreed to accept an IUD received a coupon on which her name, address, age, the name of the PPH worker, and other relevant facts were noted. She then took the coupon to a participating medical doctor (in most cases a gynecologist or obstetrician) and paid the doctor NT $30 (about US $0.75) for inserting an IUD. The doctor obtained another NT $30 by giving the coupon to his hsien health bureau. Money to pay doctors was provided by the Maternal and Child Health Association. The return

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205

flow of coupons provided data on the overall program and information on the achievements of individual PPH workers. The system of home visits and coupon issuances, which was central to the family-planning program, was supplemented by an information campaign by radio and cinema. Special mailings advocating child-spacing were sent to new mothers. Lectures on family planning were given to new recruits in the armed forces. Family-planning regulations were finally promulgated in May 1968.12 These regulations explicitly legalized the use of contraceptives, required municipal and local governments to provide financial support for the family-planning program, and directed each township health station to have one doctor or midwife and one fieldworker for family planning. Action on the regulations was speeded up to permit pro¬ mulgation on the opening day of the first East Asian Population Con¬ ference, which met in Taipei. The adoption of an official population policy led to an increase in funds for family planning from the provincial government, an increase in the number of fieldworkers in the family-planning program, and new support for that program from national agencies, including the Ministry of Education and the Government Information Office. In fiscal year i97i, the Council for International Economic Cooperation and De¬ velopment (CIECD) took over the family-planning action program and the administration of SAFED funds for family planning. The JCRR assumed an advisory role, including responsibility for developing new approaches to population policy. The family-planning program cannot easily be evaluated quantita¬ tively. The operational statistics are impressive. By the end of fiscal year 1:970, some 40.9 percent of all married women between the ages of 20 and 44 had accepted IUDs. The rate at which use of IUDs was termi¬ nated was very high, however, and the overwhelming majority of women accepting IUDs were over 30 years old. To meet these problems, birth control pills were made available first to IUD dropouts and later to all women under 30. There was some evidence that women who had accepted IUDs managed to hold down the size of these families whether they continued to use IUDs or not. The rate of natural increase fell from 3.02 percent in 1963 to 2.38 percent in 1968 and 1.90 percent in 1973. After rising slightly in the mid-1970s, the rate of natural increase resumed its decline and was 1.73 12The “Regulations Governing the Implementation of Family Planning” in Taiwan were approved on May 17, 1968, but the 'Outline of Population Policy” was not announced until April 19, 1969.

206

Special Programs

percent in 1982. This decrease was attributable entirely to a drop in the birth rate from 3.63 percent in 1963 to 2.21 percent in 1982. Over the same period the death rate declined from 0.61 percent to 0.48 percent.13 The family-planning program was undoubtedly responsible for some of the decline in the birth rate, but some decline might have occurred if there had been no program at all.14 Taiwan has been going through rapid social and economic changes that provide incentives to hold down the size of families. The principal effect of the family-planning program may have been to heighten awareness of the population problem and to provide married couples with better means of spacing childbirths.

Environmental Sanitation Improving environmental sanitation was an important aspect of the JCRR rural health program from the beginning. The rehabilitation of rural waterworks in the early 1950s was an effort to improve environ¬ mental sanitation. Work under this heading appears to have lagged in the next few years, and an effort was made to reactivate it. In the program for fiscal year 1956, the JCRR provided financial support for a variety of projects to improve sanitation around farm homes and to dig wells, build latrines, and improve graveyards. Environmental sanitation goals included digging one model well in each village and building one model latrine in each township. Between 1956 and 1961, the commis¬ sion helped finance the digging of 4,505 wells. When JCRR policy changed in fiscal year 1963 to emphasize direct support to agricultural and industrial development, environmental sani¬ tation was identified as one of the challenging health problems requiring attention. The approach to environmental sanitation became more spe¬ cific, however. In an effort to prevent recurrence of the previous year’s unexpected outbreak of cholera, villages in which cholera had appeared were specially targeted. In fiscal year 1964, with the blessing of President Chiang Kai-shek, an intensive village health training and improvement program was launched. The JCRR shifted the emphasis of its environmental sanita¬ tion work away from the construction of physical facilities—such as waterworks, wells, and latrines—to support of the government’s new program. The commission initially concentrated its efforts in Miaoli 13CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1983, p. 5. 14The birth rate dropped from 4.66 percent in 1952 to 3.63 percent in 1963. During these years, efforts to promote family planning were quite limited.

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207

and Taipei Hsien. In 1968, Taoyuan was substituted for Taipei because of the negative attitude of the Taipei Hsien magistrate. In the selected hsien, the JCRR worked with the local governments, providing funds to cover about one-third of the costs of the health training and improve¬ ment program and assigning specialists to serve as unofficial consul¬ tants. Within each hsien, one township was selected every month for special program attention. A selected township organized a working team drawn from local organizations and public offices. The team would first try to improve sanitary conditions in public areas in the township seat by encouraging such measures as the regular scrubbing of floors, the paving of latrines with white tiles, and the whitewashing of walls. The township team, accompanied by three or four nurses, would then go to a selected village to train the people in elementary principles of hygiene. Each person would be taught to use a separate wash basin, towel, and toothbrush. In teaching home sanitation, the emphasis was on cleanli¬ ness, beautification, and fly control. Teachers and students in the higher grades were organized to conduct weekly inspections of their villages under the supervision of nurses and school administrators.

Food Processing Beginning in the mid-1960s, food processing became an increasingly important part of the JCRR’s rural health program. This development was consistent with the previously noted general change in policy to emphasize direct support to agricultural and industrial growth. In 1964, the JCRR’s Rural Health Division had applied the aseptic technique of the hospital operating room to the quick-freezing of peapods. This led rapidly to the development of a frozen food industry. In fiscal year 1966, there were 16 frozen food factories exporting 7 kinds frozen vegetables, 12 kinds of frozen fruit, and a number of marine products. Later in the 1960s, the production of frozen foods was in¬ creased to meet the shortage of fresh vegetables in Taiwan’s urban areas during the summer. In response to a joint recommendation by the JCRR and the CIECD, in fiscal year 1966 the Taiwan Cannery Association established the Food Industry Research and Development Institute. The JCRR and the CIECD helped pay for the construction of a building to house the new institute. In FY 1966, the JCRR also provided financial assistance to Provincial Chung Hsing University in the training of food technologists.

208

Special Programs

It also sponsored projects in selected factories to develop new processed food products, such as spray-dried banana powder, whole soybean meal, and canned Chinese foods. In the early 1970s, the JCRR continued to support the training of food technologists and the development of new food products. The commission also helped finance a number of nutrition studies. In fiscal year 1973, the JCRR was involved in efforts to improve the quality of canned vegetables; it joined the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the National Health Administration in forming a team to inspect sanitation in asparagus and mushroon canneries.

Pollution Control Beginning in 1975, the JCRR assisted the Provincial Institute of Environmental Sanitation and Water Pollution Control in a survey of air and water pollution in major farming areas. In fiscal year 1978, the commission supported a pilot project designed to determine whether the irrigation associations could monitor water pollution in rural areas. The success of this project led to the launching of an islandwide project that involved all 14 irrigation associations and that was supported financially by the JCRR and its successor, the Council for Agricultural Planning and Development. Under this project, 277 inspection stations monitored 3,107 factories. Two-thirds of these factories were found to be discharging harmful wastes and were reported to the Water Pollution Control Agency for appropriate action.15

Summary The JCRR’s rural health program was notable for its scope and for the way it adjusted to changing conditions and priorities. At various times during its three decades in Taiwan, the commission was involved in creating a network of rural health facilities, controlling commu¬ nicable diseases, improving school health conditions, training health personnel, promoting family planning, improving environmental sani¬ tation, making food processing more sanitary, and controlling environ¬ mental pollution. Some activities (improving rural health facilities and 15Yuan H. Djang et al., “Review on Inspection Systems and Practices of Irrigation Associations,” Journal of Chinese Agricultural Engineering 25 (December 1, 1980).

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financing the school health program) were phased out after 1963 when the JCRR decided to concentrate on direct support of agricultural and industrial development. The financing of these and some other activities was shifted to the Chinese government (training health personnel) or to the U.S. aid mission (anti-malaria spraying and tuberculosis control). Still other activities were undertaken only after economic change made them clearly necessary (making food processing more sanitary and controlling environmental pollution). The most dramatic achievements of the rural health program that the JCRR stimulated and supported were in the control of communicable diseases. Plague, smallpox, rabies, cholera, and malaria were eradi¬ cated. The incidence of diphtheria, trachoma, tuberculosis, and vene¬ real disease was greatly reduced. The most controversial health pro¬ gram was family planning. Circumventing and eventually overcoming opposition by traditionalists and some military officers, the JCRR took the lead in gradually creating a family-planning program that covered all of Taiwan. Birth rates subsequently declined, but it is uncertain how much of the decline was the result of the family-planning program and how much was caused by social changes accompanying industrializa¬ tion.

i3 International Cooperation

The Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction was itself an exam¬ ple of international cooperation, but when it was created there was no thought that this cooperation would extend beyond China. In actuality, the commission developed capabilities that the two sponsoring govern¬ ments called on in support of their foreign policies. Also, involvement in the wider international scene seemed natural and desirable to the com¬ missioners and staff of the JCRR, who were proud of their achievements on Taiwan and who welcomed opportunities to show the outside world what they could do. The JCRR engaged in a wide variety of international activities, in¬ cluding participating in international conferences, exchanging technical reports with specialists in other countries, and showing agricultural progress on Taiwan to thousands of foreign visitors.1 The role of the JCRR in helping to establish international agricultural research and training institutions in Taiwan was described in Chapter 9. The present chapter will concentrate on three major cooperative activities: training foreign agricultural technicians on Taiwan, training Chinese agricultur¬ alists in foreign countries, and supporting the overseas technical assis¬ tance programs of the government of the Republic of China (ROC).

Training Foreign Agricultural Technicians in Taiwan By 1978, 6,162 foreign agricultural technicians had been trained in Taiwan under arrangements made by the JCRR. Of this number, 3,746 *By 1978, the JCRR had taken care of more than 17,000 visitors from 125 countries (JCRR, JCRR and Agricultural Development in Taiwan, 1948-1978, p. 195).

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International Cooperation

in

came to Taiwan from Southeast Asian countries as participants in the third-country training program of the U.S. Agency for International Development. The next largest group, numbering 1,160 entered train¬ ing programs conducted by the Chinese government with JCRR techni¬ cal assistance. Another 1,117 foreign technicians took courses at the Land Reform Training Institute, which was established in 1969 under a cooperative arrangement among the JCRR, the John C. Lincoln In¬ stitute of the United States, and the Taiwan provincial government. The remaining 139 technicians took part in training programs sponsored by a variety of international agencies, including the United Nations De¬ velopment Program, the Rockefeller Foundation, the German Founda¬ tion, the Asia Foundation, and the International Rice Research In¬ stitute.2 Robert C. T. Lee, the last chairman of the JCRR and the first chair¬ man of the Council for Agricultural Planning and Development that succeeded the JCRR, summarized the content of the training given foreign technicians in Taiwan under five heads:3 1. Agriculture, including the culture and breeding of rice, dryland crops, vegetables, and other specialty crops; farmers’ organizations; agricul¬ tural administration and extension; pest and disease control; water conservancy and irrigation; and the operation and maintenance of farm machines 2. Land administration, including land policies and the experience with land reform in Taiwan 3. Technology and skills, including handicrafts, ceramics, electrical skills, sugar refining, and vegetable-oil extraction 4. Animal husbandry, including the management and feeding of live¬ stock (especially hogs) and poultry 5. Fishing, including fish and shrimp aquaculture and deep-sea and inshore fishing Some of this training was in support of the overseas technical assistance programs, discussed later in this chapter. Training Chinese Agriculturalists in Foreign Countries Beginning in 1951, the JCRR sent young and promising Chinese agricultural technicians, selected from the staffs of agricultural agencies, 2Ibid., p. 197. ’Robert C. T. Lee, “The Republic of China Agricultural Technical Assistance to Foreign Countries’’ (CAPD, Taipei, 1981, Mimeographed), pp. 13-14. Lee reports that from 1962 to 1980, there were 7,421 people from 67 countries who received training in the Helds listed.

212

Special Programs

to other countries for advanced training.4 By March 15,1979, when the commission was terminated, 1,372 persons had taken part in JCRR overseas training programs. The largest such programs were the JCRR Technical Assistance Training Program (referred to hereafter as the TA Program), the Sino-Japanese Technical Cooperation Program, and the JCRR/OISCA Cooperation Program (OISCA stands for Organization for Industrial, Spiritual, and Cultural Advancement—International). There were also a number of smaller programs and projects, including the Sino-German Technical Cooperation Program. Table 15 shows the numbers of people participating in various programs and the kinds of training they received. From 1951 to 1965, the TA Program was part of a larger training program that was financed by U.S. aid and administered by a committee composed of representatives of the U.S. aid mission, the Council for United States Aid (CUSA), and the JCRR. After U.S. economic aid was terminated on June 30, 1965, the program was financed by the JCRR’s own funds and administered by a purely Chinese committee. The JCRR continued to be represented on the committee. The other member of the committee was for a time provided by successors of CUSA and later by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Before the termination of U.S. eco¬ nomic aid, the TA Program financed training in both Japan and the United States. After 1965, training in Japan under the program was discontinued, although it continued to be provided under other pro¬ grams. Before 1966, all trainees in the TA Program received nondegree practical training, usually for only a few months. Beginning in 1966, academic training leading to advanced degrees was also included in the program. The Sino-Japanese Technical Cooperation Program began in i960 under an arrangement between the two governments. After the Japa¬ nese government shifted its diplomatic recognition to Peking in 1972, the program was continued by the Interchange Association on the Japanese side and the Association of East Asian Relations on the Chi¬ nese side. The role of the JCRR was to help the Ministry of Economic Affairs select qualified agricultural technicians for training in Japan. All costs of training, including travel and living expenses, were paid by the Japanese. The OISCA is a private Japanese organization devoted to the promo¬ tion of international friendship and cooperation. The JCRR/OISCA 4This section is based on Spencer Shih, “JCRR Overseas Training Programs” (JCRR, Taipei, 1977, Mimeographed). Shih subsequently brought the data in the paper up to March 15, 1979.

International Cooperation

213

Table ij. Number of trainees in JCRR overseas training programs, 1951-1979

Kind of Training

JCRR TA program3

SinoJapanese program3

JCRR/ OISCA program3

Other programs15

Total

In U.S.

In Japan

133

48

47

20c

5

253

Farmers’ organization and agri¬ cultural extension

84

142

62

17

0

305

Irrigation

70

16

35

5

0

126

Forestry, soil conservation, and land use

63

18

44

14

1

140

Livestock production and vet¬ erinary science

45

81

26

0

6

158

Rural health

18

8

0

0

0

26

Agricultural credit

16

23

9

0

0

48

Agricultural economics and planning

55

6

5

0

0

66

Fisheries

17

30

26

3

0

76

Farm machinery

5

5

6

7

0

2-3

Food technology

5

0

12

0

17

Dairy farming

0

0

0

7

60

67

Other

0

0

0

24

43

67

5ii

377

272

97

115

G372.

Crop production

Total

Source: Based on tables appended to Spencer Shih, “JCRR Overseas Training Programs” (JCRR, Taipei, 1977, Mimeographed). Shih has subsequently brought the data in these tables up to March 15, 1979. aThe full names of the programs covered in the first three columns are: JCRR Technical Assis¬ tance Training Program, Sino-Japanese Technical Cooperation Program, and JCRR/OISCA Coop¬ eration Program (OISCA stands for Organization for Industrial, Spiritual, and Cultural Advance¬ ment—International). bAmong the “other” programs were the Sino-German Technical Cooperation Program and projects for the training of dairy farmers in New Zealand and the United States. cIn the JCRR/OISCA program, crop production means vegetable and fruit production.

Cooperation Program began in 1973 on the basis of an exchange of letters between the two organizations. Most of the Chinese agricultural technicians trained in Japan under this program were at the junior level. Training lasted from one to three months. The OISCA paid all expenses in Japan, and the JCRR covered international travel. The Sino-German Technical Cooperation Program began in 1961,

214

Special Programs

but training in agricultural technology was not included until 1966. The JCRR helped the Ministry of Economic Affairs nominate agricultural technicians for training in West Germany. Final selections were made by the German sponsor of the program, the Carl Duisberg Gesellschaft. At first, the German sponsor paid all expenses, but after 1975 international travel was taken care of by the employers of trainees. The period of training ranged from 16 to 22 months. From i960 to 1979, six Chinese technicians were trained in animal husbandry or veterinary science, five were trained in crop production, two in rural services, and one each in forestry, dairy processing, and remote sensing. In 1973-74, the JCRR arranged for the on-the-job training of 60 Chinese dairy farmers, part in the United States and part in New Zea¬ land. Training in the United States was handled by the National 4-H Club Foundation of America and in New Zealand by Trade Span (New Zealand), Ltd. The JCRR financed three months of pre-departure train¬ ing and one-way air travel. All other expenses, including return air travel, were paid by trainees from their wages.

Supporting Overseas Technical Assistance Programs The primary purpose of most of the technical assistance programs of the government of the Republic of China was to strengthen the ROC’s international position.5 The emphasis was on defending the ROC’s seat in the United Nations, until that battle was lost in October 1971. A secondary purpose of the technical assistance programs, which was the principal reason for assisting South Vietnam, was to block actual or threatened Communist penetration by increasing production and rais¬ ing living standards. The technical assistance programs of the Republic of China were predominantly agricultural, so the heavy involvement of the JCRR was inevitable. Except in Vietnam, however, the commission did not man¬ age any technical assistance programs. It provided essential technical support to the government by helping (1) to conduct preliminary sur¬ veys of agricultural conditions in countries desiring assistance, (2) to prepare detailed assistance plans, (3) to train and/or recruit technicians 5This section is based on the following: Lee, “Roc Agricultural Technical Assistance” esp. pp. 2-13, 41-48; General Reports—14-33 (FY 1963 through FY 1976); Shen, Sino-Ameri¬ can JCRR, pp. 227-238; conversations with officials in Taipei; and information provided by the CAPD.

International Cooperation

US

for foreign assignments, and (4) to inspect and evaluate the work of agricultural teams and missions.6

The Evolution of Technical Assistance Programs

Although almost all the ROC’s technical assistance programs were agricultural or agriculture-related, the approach taken in providing technical assistance varied. In Africa, farming demonstration teams were the principal means of assistance. In other areas, the main instru¬ mentality was the agricultural technical mission. In response to political developments, the geographical location of the technical assistance pro¬ grams also changed. The evolution of the ROC’s technical assistance activities can be brought out by a chronological review of developments followed by an examination of the programs in various parts of the world.

Chronological Review

The first venture into overseas technical assistance by the Republic of China was not under government auspices. In June 1959, under an arrangement with the U.S. civil administration that then governed the islands, the JCRR sent an agricultural technical mission to the Ryukyus. This mission—which consisted of specialists in agronomy, plant protec¬ tion, fertilizer, animal husbandry, irrigation, land administration, sugar refining, agricultural extension, water and soil conservation, and for¬ estry—spent two months in the Ryukyus rendering a variety of techni¬ cal services. A similar JCRR mission was sent to the Ryukyus in 1961 for a shorter period. The JCRR also took the lead in the second venture into overseas technical assistance, but this time as the representative of the govern¬ ment. In December 1959, the commission signed a cooperation agree¬ ment with South Vietnam’s Ministry of Agriculture. The technical assis¬ tance to be provided by the Republic of China under this agreement was to be financed by the U.S. aid mission to Vietnam. The admission of 16 newly independent African states to the United Nations in i960 stimulated the government of the Republic of China to launch an extensive technical assistance effort in Africa. By 1965, there were 16 teams from Taiwan at work in 14 African countries. Thirteen 6JCRR, JCRR

and Agricultural Development in Taiwan, p. 199.

2i6

Special Programs

of these teams were farming demonstration teams engaged principally in showing African farmers how to raise rice.7 Five years later, in 1970, the number of teams in Africa had risen to 29 in 23 countries. Of the 29 teams, 22 were farming demonstration teams.8 The ROC technical assistance program peaked in 1970. In addition to the 29 teams in Africa, agricultural technical missions were operating in one Middle Eastern country, two East Asian countries, and eight countries in Central and South America. A road construction engineer¬ ing team was at work on Malta. More than 70 percent of the total of 41 teams and missions were in Africa, and almost 20 percent were in the western hemisphere. This picture was soon to change. In July 1971, U.S. President Richard Nixon announced that he would visit mainland China, in October 1971 the Republic of China lost its seat in the United Nations, and in February 1972 the Shanghai Commu¬ nique, issued at the end of President Nixon’s visit to the mainland, signaled a marked warming in relations between Washington and Pe¬ king. These setbacks for the Republic of China led many countries to sever diplomatic relations with it and to recognize the People’s Republic of China. In almost all cases, a shift in recognition from Taipei to Peking also involved termination of any technical cooperation arrangement with the Republic of China. The losses were concentrated in Africa. By the end of 1975, only 12 teams from Taiwan were functioning in six African countries, 17 fewer teams than in 1970. These losses in Africa were partly made up in Central and South America, where the total of missions and teams rose to 18 in 13 countries (13 agricultural technical missions, 4 fisheries teams, and one handicraft team). The number of missions and teams in other areas increased by 2 to a total of 5, but 3 of the 5 were in one country. Of the 35 teams and missions functioning at the end of 1975, roughly half were in the western hemisphere and about one-third were in Africa. Further changes took place in the next five years. By the end of 1980, only 7 teams in four countries remained in Africa. Total missions and teams in Central and South America declined to 14 operating in 12 countries. However, total teams and missions in other areas rose to 9 in 6 countries, because of new cooperative arrangements in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Despite heavy losses, especially in Africa, 30 teams and 7Rwanda had a handicraft team and a wine-brewing team as well as a farming-demonstra¬ tion team. A veterinary team had been sent to Ethiopia. 8Five countries that had teams in addition to a farming demonstration team were Rwanda (handicraft and sugar mill), Ivory Coast (seed propagation and supply), Madagascar (bamboo handicraft), Central African Republic (highway), and Chad (veterinary and peanut oil plant).

International Cooperation

217

missions in 22 countries were operating at the end of 1980. Of this number, 46.7 percent were in Central and South America, 23.3 percent were in Africa, 20.0 percent were in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and the remaining 10.0 percent were in Saudi Arabia. The above review shows that during the 1960s the technical assis¬ tance program of the Republic of China was heavily concentrated in Africa. During the 1970s, Central and South America was the most important area. In the late 1970s, there was a resurgence of activity in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. These geographical changes affected the relative importance of various ways of extending technical assistance. At the end of 1970, some 51.2 percent of all teams and missions were farming demonstration teams, 26.8 percent were agricultural technical missions, and 22.0 percent were a variety of specialized teams and activities. A decade later, at the end of 1980, farming demonstration teams accounted for only 13.3 percent of a reduced total; 66.7 percent were agricultural technical missions, and 20.0 percent were other teams and activities.

African Countries In late 1959 and early i960, senior ROC officials began to approach African leaders to explore whether they would be interested in agricul¬ tural technical assistance. One official especially active in this endeavor was H. K. Yang (Yang Hsi-kun), director of the African Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yang was later promoted to viceminister of foreign affairs and played a leading role in the shaping and management of the technical assistance program of the Republic of China. In March 1961, Stephen Tolbert, the Liberian secretary of agriculture and commerce, visited Taiwan at the invitation of the government of the Republic of China and inspected the state of agriculture there. After Tolbert’s return to Monrovia, the Liberian government asked that a Chinese survey mission be sent to investigate agricultural conditions in Liberia. In October 1961, the two governments signed a technical cooperation agreement based on the recommendations of the survey mission. In the following month, the first Chinese farming demonstra¬ tion team arrived in Gbedin, Liberia. The pattern followed in extending technical assistance to Liberia was repeated many times with other African countries. A senior African official would be invited to Taiwan, treated hospitably, and shown the agricultural progress on the island. He would return home and convince

2i8

Special Programs

his government that the Republic of China did have something to offer. The Republic of China would then be asked to send an agricultural survey mission, which was usually headed by a specialist from the JCRR. After a field investigation, the mission would recommend that a certain project be undertaken at a certain place. An agreement would then be drawn up and signed. Shortly thereafter a Chinese team, usually a farming demonstration team, would arrive and begin work. From 1961 to 1980, some 39 teams were sent to 24 African countries: Liberia, Libya, Dahomey (now Benin), Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Gabon, Rwanda, Cameroon, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Niger, Central African Re¬ public, Upper Volta, Chad, Togo, Malawi, Gambia, Zaire, Malagasy, Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Mauritius. Farming dem¬ onstration teams were sent to all these countries except Ethiopia, which received a veterinary team. A number of countries received both a farming demonstration team and one or more specialized teams: Rwan¬ da (handicraft, wine making, and sugarmill), Liberia (veterinary and sugar mill), Chad (peanut-oil plant and veterinary), Central African Republic (handicraft and highway), Ivory Coast (seed propagation and handicraft), Swaziland (handicraft), Niger (agricultural machinery plant), Malagasy (bamboo handicraft), and Cameroon (fisheries). At the end of 1980, as he has been noted, only seven teams remained in four African countries: Ivory Coast, Malawi, Swaziland, and Leso¬ tho. All these countries had farming demonstration teams. Ivory Coast also had a handicraft team and a seed propagation and supply center, and Swaziland had a handicraft team. Because it has been the dominant means of ROC technical assistance in Africa, the farming demonstration team merits special attention.9 The typical farming demonstration team has a director, one or more deputy directors, a few technicians, and a number of team members. The size of the teams has varied from 12 in Mauritius to 90 in Zaire. Most teams, however, have had 30 to 50 members. Team directors are graduates of an agricultural college and experienced in agricultural management. They are expected to have a reasonable command over the European language spoken in the country of their assignment. Technicians are also college graduates. Regular team members are re¬ quired to be graduates of senior agricultural vocational high schools and to have had at least three years of practical farming experience. They are recruited on the basis of written, oral, and physical examina9The description of ROC farming demonstration teams here is based in part on research that Peter W. Colm, Nathan N. White, and the author did at the Institute for Defense Analyses in 1971-72.

International Cooperation

219

tions, after which they receive an intensive five-to-six-week training course. The work of a farming demonstration team is carried out in two stages: demonstration and extension. The demonstration stage involves four phases: reclamation, experimentation, demonstration, and train¬ ing. Selection of a site is crucial and has usually been made by the survey mission. The typical site offered by host governments must be cleared and drained or irrigated before it can be cultivated. Local labor is hired to assist in this work, but Chinese team members, who are accustomed to hard work, participate actively. As reclamation progresses, teams collect information on local climatic conditions, water resources, and soil types and begin experimenting with various combinations of in¬ puts—for example, seed varieties, fertilizers, pesticides—to learn which combination promises the highest yields on a particular site. In most cases, first priority has been given to rice, second priority to vegetables. In the demonstration phase, the results of the experimentation phase are applied to an entire demonstration farm. By using improved seed varieties, irrigating and fertilizing properly, and controlling weeds and pests, the Chinese have obtained impressive results. In some cases, they introduced rice and vegetables to areas in which those crops were unknown. In other cases, the Chinese achieved yields that were phe¬ nomenal by local standards. The training phase begins during or imme¬ diately after the demonstration phase. The Chinese teach by example and by working alongside the Africans, rather than through lectures to government officials, who might or might not be able to teach new methods to farmers. The final step—and the crucial test of the mission’s success—is the transition from demonstration to extension. The Afri¬ can farmers must now be convinced that they can do on their own farms what the Chinese have done on a demonstration farm. The work of the Chinese teams in Africa has been supplemented by training seminars in Taiwan. From 1962 to 1974, some 718 Africans from 31 countries were given scholarships to attend six- to nine-month courses on the cultivation of rice and upland crops. Recipients of schol¬ arships must have a reasonable command of English or French and be educated and experienced in agriculture or nominated by the local government on the recommendation of a Chinese team. After 1974, the training seminars were replaced by observation projects lasting from two to four weeks. Organizing, dispatching, and maintaining the farming demonstration teams in Africa must be judged a remarkable administrative achieve¬ ment. The crop yields produced by the Chinese demonstration farms

220

Special Programs

were also impressive, as was the ability of all the Chinese teams to move from the demonstration stage to the extension stage of their work. The long-term effects of the farming demonstration teams on African agri¬ culture cannot easily be determined. Some pessimism on this score may be justified, however. Most of the teams were forced to leave before they had completed their work. Also, it must be remembered that the teams unavoidably concentrated on transferring the technological component of the successful agricultural production system on Taiwan. Uncom¬ pleted tasks, some of which may be beyond the capabilities of any foreign technical assistance program, include creating a network of farmers’ organizations, establishing research and educational institu¬ tions to support agriculture, and improving both marketing facilities and the system of land tenure. The transfer of Chinese technology to a new physical and social environment also caused or aggravated health problems, including an increase in malarial mosquitoes and water¬ borne parasites and the use of dangerous pesticides by inexperienced farmers.

Vietnam Technical assistance by the Republic of China to South Vietnam was initiated in 1959 on the basis of a survey mission sent to Vietnam in 1958 to investigate ways in which the ROC might further economic development. Cooperation among the Vietnamese Ministry of Agricul¬ ture, the JCRR, and the U.S. Operations Mission to Vietnam (USOM/ V) was proposed by William H. Fippin, director of the Food and Agriculture Division of the USOM/V, who had been a JCRR commis¬ sioner from 1952 to 1957. Contracts were concluded between the Vietnamese Ministry of Agri¬ culture and the JCRR, providing for the dispatch of three ROC agricul¬ tural technical teams to Vietnam with financing provided by the USOM/ V. A team on farmers’ associations arrived in December 1959, followed by a team on crop improvement in July i960 and an irrigation team in November i960. These teams initiated no projects of their own, but they worked with Vietnamese and USOM/V personnel in carrying out Vietnamese agricultural programs. Team members also instructed Viet¬ namese farmers in new farming techniques and encouraged them to teach the same methods to other farmers.10 10Although agriculture dominated the ROC technical assistance program in Vietnam, assistance was also extended in other areas, including water treatment, cargo handling, posts and telecommunications, urban planning, rural electrification, port construction, concretepole manufacturing, and machinery maintenance and repair.

International Cooperation

221

In July 1964, the three technical teams were merged into the Chinese Agricultural Technical Mission to Vietnam (CATM) under a new USOM-financed contract between the JCRR and the Vietnamese Minis¬ try of Rural Affairs. The CATM had two divisions—crop and livestock improvement and farmers’ service—and a total staff of 86. Y. K. King, who had been director of the JCRR’s farmers’ service division, was named director of the CATM. In fiscal year 1966, the CATM had 72 members. About 70 percent of CATM personnel were located in the field, principally at six demonstra¬ tion centers. The remainder was engaged in helping Vietnamese coun¬ terparts in laboratory and experimental work. The CATM’s field per¬ sonnel at the demonstration centers provided technical assistance on crop production, animal husbandry, and irrigation and trained workers in crop extension, food processing, and farm mechanization. In FY 1966, the CATM also began to help the Vietnamese government launch its improved village program at three selected villages. In fiscal year 1969, the CATM, renamed Chinese Agricultural Tech¬ nical Group (CATG), had 80 members, including 20 in the affiliated Chinese Rural Reconstruction Team (CRRT). The CRRT had been orangized in July 1967, with 62 members under the supervision of the CATM director. At first, the CRRT was primarily engaged in helping the Vietnamese revolutionary development cadres carry out the agricul¬ tural part of the pacification program. Later, the CRRT also helped the rural development program of the Vietnamese Ministry of Rural De¬ velopment by extending superior crop varieties and teaching fish culture and animal husbandry. The CRRT was dissolved in FY 1970 because of insecurity in rural areas. From fiscal year 1970 to fiscal year 1972, the CATG was drastically reduced in size as part of the Vietnamization policy of the U.S. govern¬ ment. Financing from the United States ended in January 1972. In FY 1973, at the request of the Vietnamese government, the ROC agricul¬ tural aid effort (again called the Chinese Agricultural Technical Mis¬ sion) was increased to 38 people in order to help in the postwar re¬ habilitation of agriculture. The truce between North Vietnam and South Vietnam soon broke down. In March 1975, because of the deteri¬ orating military situation, all five CATM field teams were pulled back to Saigon. On April 5, some 25 days before North Vietnamese troops captured Saigon, all members of the CATM left for Taiwan, ending more than 15 years of agricultural technical assistance. Despite this unfortunate end, the achievements of the ROC agricul¬ tural technical assistance effort in South Vietnam were impressive. From 1959 to 1970, the Chinese teams and the CATM:

222

Special Programs

• Helped establish io6 farmers’ associations and 249 agricultural and fisheries cooperatives; helped train 55,000 people, including farmers, extension workers, and staff members for FAs; and helped in the development of various FA services. • Introduced new plant varieties for experimentation at research institu¬ tions; helped in selecting and breeding adaptable varieties and in adopting improved cultural practices; helped establish profitable new crops from Taiwan; and promoted a superior breeding stock of hogs and the extension of improved techniques in fisheries, hog and poultry production, and food processing. • Helped design 56 irrigation projects for an area of 24,247 hectares and helped review 24 irrigation projects for an area of 20,085 hectares; took part in the surveying of sites for 145 projects covering 179,848 hectares; and helped supervise seven dam construction projects covering 3,552 hectares.11

Other East Asian and Pacific Countries In addition to the major program in Vietnam described above, the Republic of China has extended agricultural technical assistance to seven countries in East Asia and the Pacific: the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Fiji, Tonga, the Marshall Islands, and the Solomon Islands. Programs in the last five of these countries and one project in Thailand were still active in 1985. In January 1964, JCRR Commissioner T. H. Shen led a six-man team to the Philippines to work out the details of an agricul¬ tural cooperation agreement, which was signed in August of that year. Under this agreement, the JCRR immediately sent a farming demonstra¬ tion team to the Philippines consisting of a rice specialist and three farmers. This team demonstrated that by using scientific methods the yield of rice per hectare in the Philippines could be doubled. In June 1966, a 7-man JCRR team was sent to the Philippines to help plan a large-scale rice demonstration project. In August 1966, a 19-member Chinese Rice Technical Mission that had been organized with JCRR help went to the Philippines. This mission, which was expanded to 25 members in fiscal year 1968, included specialists in rice culture, farmers’ associations, agricultural extension, and irrigation. Having completed its work, the mission withdrew in June 1970. From July 1972 to June 1975, two horticulturists dispatched by the Chinese government helped Philippines.

nShen, Sino-American JCRR, pp. 235-236, supplemented by information provided by the CAPD in October 1984.

International Cooperation

223

train students and their families in vegetable production under the auspices of the Filipino Green Revolution Movement. From May 1969 to July 1975, an ROC agricultural tech¬ nical mission with 19 members worked in Thailand. The work of this mission included demonstration of land consolidation with improved irrigation, increasing rice yields, and strengthening farmers’ associa¬ tions. A four-man team from Taiwan operated a demonstration hog farm in Thailand from April 1978 to March 1980. In 1970, several ROC specialists went to northern Thailand at the request of the Thai government to conduct trial plantings of fruit trees. The success of these plantings led to ROC support for a Thai horticultural project in the triangle bordering on Burma and Laos. This technical assistance has continued despite the severance of diplomatic relations between Thai¬ land and the Republic of China. Thailand.

During the early 1970s, Indonesia had received some agricultural technical assistance from the Republic of China through purely private channels. In July 1975, despite the lack of diplomatic relations, a group of ROC officials led by the minister of economic affairs, Y. S. Sun, and including JCRR Chairman Robert C. T. Lee visited Indonesia. This visit ended in an agreement that the Republic of China would provide agricultural technical assistance to Indonesia. In November 1975, a group of 17 ROC specialists went to Indonesia to help plan an assistance program. The plan that these specialists and their Indonesian counterparts drew up called for the demonstration of multiple-cropping in a plains area and integrated crop-livestock farm¬ ing on slopelands. An agreement to carry out the plan was signed in May 1976 by the Indonesian and ROC Chambers of Commerce on behalf of their respective governments. A 14-member ROC agricultural technical mission went to East Java in October 1976, and another mission with 8 members went to Jogjakarta in May 1980. The mission in East Java established two demonstration centers, one on the plains and one on slopelands. The mission to Jogjakarta had the initial task of making plans for increasing production of food and horticultural crops on terraced land and slopelands. Both missions were still at work in 1985. Indonesia.

Agricultural technical assistance to some of the Pacific mini-states is a relatively recent venture for the Republic of China. Agricultural technical missions were sent to Fiji in September pacific islands.

224

Special Programs

1978 and to the Marshall Islands in January 1980. Tonga has received assistance in the growing of sugarcane and the production of sugar since May 1978. Initially, the eight-person mission to Fiji concentrated on training in the use of machinery, assistance in raising sugarcane, trial plantings of economic crops, and training personnel at the Seagaga Farm Estate. In 1980, at the request of the government of Fiji, the mission began demonstrations of the cultivation of rice, upland crops, and vegetables. The five-person mission to the Marshall Islands began by providing assistance in the planting of vegetables and fruit trees and in the raising of hogs and poultry. At the request of the host government, the mission added the demonstration of upland crops and the training of farmers to its activities in fiscal year 1982. ROC specialists were sent to Tonga in May 1978 at the request of the local government to study the feasibility of establishing a small sugar mill there. In October 1979, an ROC specialist went to Tonga to help prepare and carry out a plan for the growing of sugarcane and the production of sugar.

Central and South America By 1980, the Republic of China had sent 24 technical assistance missions to the western hemisphere. Of this number, 20 were agricul¬ tural technical missions, 3 were fisheries missions, and one was a hand¬ icraft mission. ROC agricultural and technical missions were estab¬ lished in four Latin American countries in the 1960s: the Dominican Republic in 1963, Brazil in 1965, Chile in 1967, and Mexico in 1969. The technical assistance effort of the Republic of China in the western hemisphere expanded rapidly in the early 1970s in response to the increased threat to the ROC’s United Nations seat and to the actual loss of that seat in October 1971. Agricultural technical missions were sent to the following countries in the years indicated: • Panama, Peru, Ecuador, and Guyana—1970 • Honduras, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Haiti—1972 • Guatamala and Barbados—1973 The pace of expansion then slowed. Agricultural technical missions were sent to Uruguay in 1974, to Ecudaor in 1978,12 to Colombia in 1979, and to St. Christopher and St. Vincent in 1982. Fisheries missions 12The mission sent to Ecuador in 1970 had been withdrawn in 1971.

International Cooperation

225

went to Panama and Honduras in 1974, to Colombia in 1976, and to Costa Rica in 1980. In January 1980, Colombia also received a hand¬ icraft mission, but it had to withdraw in the following month, along with the agricultural technical mission and the fisheries mission. In 1981, a handicraft mission was sent to Costa Rica, a fisheries mission to Ecuador, and an entomology mission to Bolivia. In 1985, all seven of the agricultural technical missions established in 1972—plus the missions to the Dominican Republic, Panama, Guate¬ mala, Uruguay, Ecuador, St. Christopher, and St. Vincent—remained in place. The fisheries missions to Panama, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Ecuador were also still active. The agricultural technical mission was the dominant means used by the Republic of China to extend technical assistance to Central and South American countries, just as the farming demonstration team was the dominant means in Africa. Because dem¬ onstration farms require manpower, the agricultural technical missions have been smaller than the farming demonstration teams. The largest agricultural technical mission—the one to Haiti—had 25 members. The smallest—the mission to Mexico—had only two members. Most agricultural technical missions had 10 members or less. Where local conditions permitted, the ROC agricultural technical missions in the western hemisphere initially concentrated on rice. Attention was also paid to vegetables, soybeans, and other crops, if not from the beginning then later as the program matured. In some countries, technical assis¬ tance was provided in irrigation and in animal husbandry, especially in the raising of hogs and ducks.

The Middle East and the Mediterranean The Republic of China has extended agricultural technical assistance to three Middle Eastern countries—Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iran— and two island countries of the Mediterranean: Malta and Cyprus. The most important assistance program in the Middle East has been in Saudi Arabia. The 14-person agricultural technical mission sent to Iran in 1969 was withdrawn in 1971, and a one-person agricultural mission sent to Jordan in 1976 stayed only 14 months. The first agricultural technical mission to Saudi Arabia functioned from March 1965 to June 1969. Both an agricultural technological team and a second agricultural technical mission were sent to Saudi Arabia in 1972. A fisheries mission followed in 1980. The agricultural technological team had 34 members, the agricultural technical mission had 62 members, and the fisheries mission had 3 members. The agricul-

ii6

Special Programs

tural technological team consists of Chinese agricultural experts and engineers hired by the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Agriculture and Water under an agreement with the government of the Republic of China. The agricultural technical mission has been engaged principally in breeding rice and other crops and promoting the use of agricultural machinery. The fisheries mission is assisting in the establishment of fish ponds. A five-person road construction engineering team from Taiwan worked on Malta from June 1967 to September 1971, and a two-person ROC veterinarian team was stationed on Malta from September 1971 to March 1972. The Republic of China provided a geologist to Cyprus from September 1967 to September 1969. Administration and Financing The technical assistance program of the Republic of China began without any clear organizational framework. The early efforts in the Ryukyus and Vietnam were entrusted to the JCRR, and the first ap¬ proaches to African countries were mostly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1961, Operation Vanguard was launched as a means of organizing and directing a large program of technical assistance in Africa. The executive group of Operation Vanguard, created in May 1961, consisted of representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs, the Council for U.S. Aid, and the JCRR. In May 1962, a representative of the Taiwan Provincial Department of Agricul¬ ture and Forestry was added to the group, and it was renamed the SinoAfrican Technical Cooperation Committee (SATCC). In 1968, the Overseas Technical Cooperation Committee (OTCC) was formed to manage technical assistance programs outside Africa. This committee consisted of representatives of the same organizations as the SATCC, and both committees were chaired from the outset by the vice-minister of foreign affairs, H. K. Yang. The only difference between the two committees was in the foreign ministry representation other than the chairman. The director of the Department of African Affairs attended the SATCC, and the directors of the Departments of South and Central American, West Asian, European, and East Asian and Pacific Affairs attended the OTCC. Both committees were supported by the secretariat of the SATCC. With two exceptions, the secretariat of the SATCC also supported all overseas technical assistance teams and missions. The OTCC had only nominal authority over technical assistance to Thailand and Vietnam. Programs in those countries were reviewed by high-level binational conferences that met periodically. The Chinese co-chairman of both

International Cooperation

227

conferences was the minister of economic affairs. Staff support for both conferences, and for the missions in Vietnam and Thailand, was pro¬ vided by the JCRR and the International Technical Cooperation De¬ partment of the Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development (CIECD) that succeeded the Council for U.S. Aid. In November 1972, the SATCC and the OTCC were merged into the Committee of International Technical Cooperation (CITC). The SATCC (later CITC) secretariat has been the only insitution exclusively concerned with the technical assistance effort. Its activities include testing and training new members of overseas teams and mis¬ sions, conducting seminars on agricultural techniques for African tech¬ nicians, and supporting overseas teams and missions by procuring sup¬ plies, handling personnel matters, controlling budgets, and transmitting requests for assistance to organizations capable of handling them. In August 1963, the JCRR found it necessary to create an internal commit¬ tee to handle its heavy involvement in the international technical coop¬ eration program. This committee, which was headed by Y. S. Tsiang, had as members T. P. Chen, Y. K. King, Robert C. T. Lee, T. W. Lew, and J. S. Liu. Spencer Shih and Moses Hu were assigned to work with the committee.13 The ROC technical assistance programs have been financed from several sources: contributions of host governments, U.S. aid, and the Republic of China’s own funds. Host governments usually agree to provide housing, medical care, and local transportation for ROC per¬ sonnel and, if needed, sites for demonstration farms. In some cases, these agreements have not been fully honored, forcing ROC teams and missions to draw on their own funds. Until 1965, when U.S. economic aid to the Republic of China was terminated, the U.S. aid program helped finance Operation Vanguard. (As already noted, USOM/V financed the ROC technical assistance program in Vietnam until 1972.) From 1965 to 1972, the ROC techni¬ cal assistance programs were financed partly by the Sino-American fund for Economic and Social Development (SAFED), which consisted of local currency generated by the U.S. aid program. The ROC technical assistance programs also benefited substantially for a time from two agreements for the sale of surplus U.S. agricultural commodities in Taiwan under Public Law 480. These agreements, which were signed in December 1967 and January 1971, provided that half the local currency obtained from the sale of the agricultural commodities would be used to finance the technical assistance programs. The first agreement provided 13JCRR Administrative Order No. 66, August 1, 1963.

2i8

Special Programs

the equivalent of US $18.75 million, and the second provided the equivalent of up to US $10 million. The Republic of China has appropriated funds explicitly for its tech¬ nical assistance programs. In addition, government agencies and corpo¬ rations have provided substantial support for those programs. Some¬ times funds have been budgeted for technical assistance, but often the burden of supporting the technical assistance effort has simply been absorbed.

Summary The international activities of the Republic of China described in this chapter are statistically impressive: • From 1962 to 1980, 7,421 foreign agricultural technicians from 67 countries received training in Taiwan. • From 1951 to 1979, 1,372 Chinese agricultural technicians were sent abroad for advanced training. • From 1961 to 1980, 81 technical teams and missions were organized and dispatched to 55 countries. The JCRR had a central role in arranging for the training of foreign technicians in Taiwan and Chinese technicians abroad. It also provided essential technical support to the ROC’s overseas technical assistance programs. Evaluating the international activities described in this chapter is difficult. Upgrading the skills of Chinese agricultural technicians makes sense, and doing so may fairly be given some credit for continued agricultural progress, but there is no way to express this conclusion quantitatively. Training foreign technicians in Taiwan must be viewed as an aspect of the ROC’s overseas technical assistance effort. That effort failed to achieve the goals of saving the ROC’s United Nations seat and keeping most of the nations of the world from recognizing Peking rather than Taipei. Realistically, however, those goals could not have been achieved in the face of the change in the China policy of the United States. The technical assistance programs may have delayed the loss of the U.N. seat, and they certainly have left the Republic of China less isolated internationally than would otherwise have been the case. Also, there can be little doubt that ROC technical assistance has con¬ tributed to agricultural progress in the countries receiving it, although again that judgment cannot be expressed quantitatively.

14 Agricultural Development on Kinmen and Matsu

After the Communist occupation of mainland China in 1949-50, the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan retained control of a number of offshore islands. The Joint Commission on Rural Recon¬ struction sponsored programs on two groups of these islands similar to the programs it sponsored on Taiwan. The commission made the heav¬ iest investment of money and staff time in Kinmen, which is the largest offshore island group administered by the Republic of China.1

Kinmen Kinmen consists of the islands of Kinmen proper and Small Kinmen, plus 12 small islets.2 This group of islands is a hsien (county) of Fukien Province. Kinmen proper has an area of 162 square kilometers (about 62.5 square miles). It is shaped like a dumbbell and is 18 kilometers long and 3.5 kilometers across at its narrowest point. Small Kinmen is immediately west of Kinmen proper and has an area of 15 square kilometers (about 5.8 square miles). The Kinmen group lies only a few kilometers from the city of Amoy (also known as Hsiamen). Kinmen means “golden gate,” which refers to its location just outside Amoy ’The principal sources used in this chapter are: General Reports—3-33; JCRR, JCRR and Agricultural Development in Taiwan, and Shen, Agricultural Development. The author also benefited from a four-day visit to Kinmen in April 1984 in the company of Yuan H. Djang and C. C. Chen, both of the CAPD, Taipei. 2Kinmen is sometimes romanized as “Chinmen.” It is also known in the West as Quemoy, a spelling derived from the way this place name is pronounced in the local form of Chinese.

229

230

Special Programs

Harbor. Every point on the Kinmen island group can be reached by artillery fire from the mainland. On October 25, 1949, during the final phase of the civil war on the mainland, a strong Communist force landed on Kinmen proper. The Communists hoped to divide the island’s defenders by landing at the narrowest point and driving quickly to the other side, but currents caused the landing to be made near one end of the island. The defenders, who possessed a number of light tanks, were able to trap the invaders in a small area and kill or capture most of them.3 There has been no further attempt to land on Kinmen, although the islands were subjected to heavy artillery bombardments in September 1954 and in August and October 1958. Following the 1958 bombardments, by tacit agreement of the two sides, military activity in the vicinity of Kinmen was restricted to exchanges of leaflet-carrying propaganda shells on odd-numbered days of the month. Even this symbolic exchange of fire ended in January I979-4 In 1950, the civilian population of Kinmen was 38,000. By 1984, the population had grown to about 65,000. Ever since the civil war on the mainland wound down, Kinmen has had a large military garrison. The exact size of this garrison is secret, but it is believed to be roughly as large as the civilizn population.5 Kinmen was for centuries very poor, like many areas along China’s southeastern coast. Poverty encouraged emigration, first to Taiwan and later to Southeast Asia.6 Before the war with Japan, remittances from relatives, mostly in Southeast Asia, are estimated to have sustained 80 percent of Kinmen’s economy. During the war, remittances were cut off,7 and Kinmen suffered from enemy occupation. In August 1949, government troops retreating from the mainland landed on Kinmen. Since that time, Kinmen has been on the front line of the continuing confrontation between hostile military forces. By 1949, although Kinmen was a barren and poverty-stricken group of islands, it had acquired a new strategic and political importance. By holding Kinmen, the government of the Republic of China could both 3This battle is explained in some detail by displays in a small museum on Kinmen proper. 4The unwritten truce that has prevailed in recent years emboldened the Republic of China to build two radar domes, clearly visible and within range of heavy Communist guns, on the highest of the rocky hills in Kinmen proper. 5The garrison on Kinmen is estimated at 60,000 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1983-1984 [London: IISS, 1983], p. 100). 6A new migration to Taiwan took place in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1984, about 50,000 people from Kinmen lived and worked in Taiwan. Remittances resumed after the war, but at a lower level. They totalled NT $4,480,000 in 1958 (about US $nz,ooo).

Kinmen and Matsu

231

keep the Communists from using Amoy as a base for an invasion of Taiwan and maintain a presence in one of the provinces of mainland China. The case for improving the living conditions of Kinmen’s civilian population was compelling. A prosperous and healthy population would be less vulnerable to Communist penetration and would serve as an example for Chinese in nearby areas under Communist rule. Begin¬ ning in 1952, there was a sustained and largely successful effort to improve public health and the environment and to increase production on Kinmen. The JCRR played a major role in this effort.

Public Health Plague was endemic in Kinmen for many years. In 1900, a plague epidemic killed at least 8,000 people. Thereafter, major outbreaks oc¬ curred every two or three years, from 1946 to 1951, plague struck every year, killing from 20 to 200 people. Although the outbreak in 1951 was held to 47 cases (33 civilian and 14 military), the threat to both the civilian population and the military garrison on Kinmen was clear. The possibility that plague would spread to Taiwan also caused serious concern. In early 1952, the JCRR joined several other organizations in launch¬ ing a campaign to head off the next outbreak of plague on Kinmen, which was to be expected in the spring.8 This campaign applied three control measures: poisoning rats (the carriers of plague) with warfarin; dusting dwellings, dugouts, and rat burrows with DDT to kill the fleas that transmit plague from rats to humans; and inoculating the entire military garrison and most of the civilian population with plague vac¬ cine. The JCRR paid for six tons of DDT powder and covered the operating expenses of an anti-plague team. The anti-plague campaign prevented the feared outbreak of plague in 1952, and plague has been kept under control ever since. Plague was by no means the only health problem on Kinmen. For example, in fiscal year 1958 the JCRR assisted in a program to control trachoma in Kinmen’s schools, arranged for a leprosy survey by a team from the Taiwan Provincial Leprosarium, and donated vaccine to check a diphtheria outbreak. In the early 1960s, the commission continued to 8In addition to the JCRR and the civil and military authorities on Kinmen, the organizations involved in this campaign were the Surgeon General’s Office of the Combined Services Command, the National Defense Medical Center, the Taiwan Provincial Health Administra¬ tion, and the National Institute of Health. The chairman of the Medical Coordination Com¬ mittee of the Ministry of Interior, J. Heng Liu, organized a special subcommittee on plague control.

232

Special Programs

support efforts to control plague, trachoma, and diphtheria and was also involved in programs to control tuberculosis, smallpox, typhoid, cholera, tetanus, and conjunctivitis. Beginning in the mid-1950s, the JCRR devoted considerable atten¬ tion to improving public health services on Kinmen. In fiscal year 1954, it helped draw up plans for a small hospital at the Kinmen Health Center and paid part of the cost of the hospital. In subsequent years, it contributed funds to buy equipment and supplies for the hospital and helped finance construction of a dormitory for hospital staff. In the early and mid-1960s, JCRR grants helped build two health stations and expand another. In fiscal year 1970, the commission contributed to the doubling of the size of the hospital at the Kinmen Health Center to a total of 60 beds. Over the years, it also arranged and helped pay for training of Kinmen health personnel in Taiwan. Environmental, school, and home sanitation on Kinmen also re¬ quired attention. The JCRR stimulated the digging of drainage ditches, the segregation of hog sties from houses, and the improvement of wells. It also helped pay for construction of public latrines and improved private toilets. At the request of the JCRR and with JCRR financial support, the Taiwan Provincial Department of Education helped local authorities organize a school health program. In fiscal year 1965, a family-planning program similar to the program in Taiwan was begun on Kinmen. Public health measures had greatly reduced the death rate, but the birth rate was 4.20 percent in 1965. By 1972, the birth rate had been reduced to 3.07 percent. The principal contribution of the JCRR to the family-planning program was to help the Kinmen Health Center train young married women to be family¬ planning workers.

Afforestation Until an afforestation program was begun in 1952, Kinmen had al¬ most no trees. The trees that had existed had long ago been cut down for firewood. The dry weather and strong winds that prevail from fall to spring prevented the natural regeneration of forest cover. In 1951, General Hu Lien, commander of the Kinmen Defense Command, had his troops plant 1.3 milion seedlings imported from Taiwan, but less than 3 percent of these seedlings survived. In 1952, at the request of General Hu, the JCRR began to help with the afforestation program. At first, the commission shipped seedlings by air from Taiwan, but in 1955 tree nurseries were established on Kinmen

Kinmen and Matsu

233

and by 1957 these nurseries were able to supply 6 million seedlings annually. From 1952 to 1956, about 10 million seedlings were planted; the survival rate was 55 percent. By fiscal year 1964, when 3.2 million seedlings were planted in a single year, the survival rate had been raised to 85 percent. During the 26 years from 1952 to 1978, more than 75 million trees were planted, completely transforming the appearance of Kinmen proper and Small Kinmen. Plantings are principally along the shore, where the new forests serve as windbreaks, and on hilly land not suitable for cultivation. By the early 1980s, some 40 percent of Kinmen’s land area was covered by trees. The forests provide cover for troops and military installations (which had been the main reason for Hu’s interest in afforestation), but they also protect both crops and people from wind and sand, stabilize shifting sand, and check soil erosion. The trees are also of direct value as fuel or building materials. Beginning in fiscal year 1970, emphasis was in fact placed on planting species of higher eco¬ nomic value—including pines, acacia, camphor, maple, mahogany, and bamboo.

Farmers’ Associations In fiscal year 1955, the JCRR began a program to increase the effec¬ tiveness of farmers’ associations (FAs) on Kinmen. During the first year of this program, the commission helped finance the construction of four warehouses for farmers’ associations to store fertilizer and other sup¬ plies and made it possible for the Kinmen Hsien Farmers’ Association to supply farm implements, such as plows, hoes, rice threshers, pedal milling machines, ox carts, and pull carts to members at reasonable prices. The JCRR also arranged for 40 directors, supervisors, and other key personnel of farmers’ associations to attend a two-week training course in Taiwan. Similar assistance was provided to Kinmen farmers’ associations in subsequent years. In the late 1950s, the JCRR helped bring the 4-H clubs to Kinmen. The Kinmen Hsien Farmers’ Association was the operating agency for these clubs, which expanded rapidly. As early as fiscal year 1958, there were 64 clubs with 669 members. Other activities sponsored by the FAs also expanded. By the early 1960s, extension work in agriculture and home economics was being carried out in all six townships of Kinmen proper and in the single township of Small Kinmen. Agricultural discus¬ sion groups, 4-H clubs, and home improvement clubs had been orga¬ nized in 103 villages.

234

Special Programs

The farmers’ associations, however, lost money because of low mem¬ bership, low agricultural production, small business volume, and high administrative costs. In fiscal year 1971, at the request of the hsien government, the JCRR conducted a study of the farmers’ associations and recommended that the hsien farmers’ association and the five town¬ ship FAs be merged. This recommendation was accepted, and the town¬ ship farmers’ associations became branches of a single farmers’ associa¬ tion for Kinmen Hsien. Since the merger, the farmers’ association has improved its operations and become profitable. In 1984, the it had 70 employees, 4,018 members, and 1,488 associate members. From 1981 to 1983, the its annual profits averaged NT $2.2 million (US $55,000). Members’ deposits in 1983 totaled NT $770 million (US $19.25 mil¬ lion).9

Land Reform In August 1953, the civil and military authorities on Kinmen, assisted by the JCRR, initiated a land reform program that was in many ways similar to the land reform in Taiwan. As was the case in Taiwan, the program began with a cadastral survey, rents were regulated, some public land was distributed to farmers, and land owned by landlords in excess of specified limits was purchased by the government and resold to tenants. On Kinmen, however, rent control came after other parts of the program had been completed. The payments by the hsien govern¬ ment to landlords were financed by a loan from the central government. In contrast with Taiwan, the social and economic case for land reform on Kinmen was weak. Only 11.07 percent of privately owned land was tilled by tenants, and only 127 hectares of the 536 hectares of tenanted land was purchased by the government and given to former tenants. This redistribution raised the percentage of owner-cultivated land from 89 percent to 92 percent. The only reason for having a land reform program on Kinmen was to contrast its peaceful nature with the Communist liquidation of landlords and confiscation of their land with¬ out compensation.

Agricultural Production Agricultural development on Kinmen is subject to severe natural limitations. Annual rainfall is less than 1,000 millimeters,10 and from 9Data provided by the CAPD in December 1984. 10Average annual rainfall in the important agricultural areas in Taiwan ranges from 1,760 mm. to 3,040 mm.

Kinmen and Matsu

*35

September to March very little rain falls. The terrain is not suitable for the building of large reservoirs. During the dry season, shallow wells are the principal source of water for irrigating crops. Organic fertilizer has traditionally been in short supply on Kinmen, because farmers have burned crop residues as cooking fuel. In the mid-1950s, General Hu Lien made two related decisions that still strongly influence Kinmen’s economy. He expanded the local dis¬ tillery that made a strong liquor from sorghum, known in Chinese as kaoliang.11 And in order both to obtain raw material for the distillery and to improve the livelihood of local farmers, he offered to barter rice (imported from Taiwan) for kaoliang at a one-to-one ratio. This ratio, which greatly overvalues kaoliang, still prevailed in 1984 and has made kaoliang the mainstay of Kinmen’s economy.12 More than 40 percent of Kinmen’s cultivated land is devoted to kaoliang. The distillery with 300 employees is by far the largest indus¬ trial facility on Kinmen. It helps support the only other substantial industrial facility, a ceramics factory, by buying ceramic wine bottles from it. Two-thirds of the output of the distillery is shipped to Taiwan; the other third is consumed locally or sold to visitors. The distillery’s profits of NT $400 million (about US $10 million) go to the hsien government and are that government’s largest source of revenue. The progress made in increasing and diversifying agricultural production on Kinmen has not displaced the kaoliang economy created by General Hu. In early 1953, JCRR commissioners T. H. Chien, R. H. Davis, and T. H. Shen visited Kinmen to plan a food production program to meet both civilian and military needs. The JCRR group decided to extend technical and financial assistance to the Kin¬ men Agricultural Experiment Station, to strengthen the farmers’ and fishermen’s associations, and to carry out a land reform program. The last two of these three measures are described elsewhere in this chapter. Commissioner T. H. Chien, assisted by Secretary-General Y. K. King, was put in charge of the work on Kinmen. crop

production.

Over the years, the Kinmen Agricultural Experiment Station con¬ ducted trial plantings of new varieties of vegetables and upland crops (sweet potatoes, peanuts, sorghum, soybeans, wheat, and barley). Vari¬ eties that did well were released to local farmers. Experiments with rice nThe alcohol content of this liquor ranges from 54 percent to 68 percent. Despite its strength, it is referred to as “kaoliang wine,” because the word for wine in Chinese is applied to all alcoholic beverages. 12The original barter arrangement has been replaced by a system of cash purchase, under which the distillery pays the prevailing market price of rice for kaoliang.

23

6

Special Programs

were dropped, because conditions on Kinmen were found to be unsuita¬ ble for rice culture. Farmers were enabled to obtain rice for their own consumption through the kaoliang-rice exchange program described above and through a similar program that gave farmers 1.4 kilograms of rice for 1.0 kilogram of wheat. Increasing the production of vegetables was given special emphasis. In fiscal year 1955, the JCRR financed the shipping of 20 metric tons of 11 kinds of high-quality vegetable seeds from Taiwan to Kinmen. In that year, Kinmen approached self-sufficiency in vegetables. The com¬ mission also provided technical assistance to a separate military pro¬ gram under which soldiers raised their own vegetables. In the mid-1960s, the JCRR introduced a three-stage seed-multiplica¬ tion and certification system for sorghum, wheat, peanuts, and kohl¬ rabi. The Kinmen Agricultural Experiment Station ran the foundation farm. Stock-seed farms and extension-seed farms were operated by farmers under contract with the Kinmen Farmers’ Association. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the JCRR promoted the planting of fruit trees and plants, including longan, mango, lemon, pomelo, litchi, guava, pineap¬ ple, and watermelon. In fiscal year 1966 alone, 24,000 fruit trees were planted, bringing the total to more than 100,000. As already mentioned, obtaining water to irrigate crops is a serious problem on Kinmen. As early as fiscal year 1955, the JCRR granted funds to the Fukien provincial government and provided engineering drawings for the repair of 515 shallow irrigation wells and the installa¬ tion of 451 derricks and 64 windlasses. In succeeding years, the com¬ mission helped finance the repair or digging of thousands of additional shallow wells. By FY 1963, there were more than 3,300 shallow wells and 31 deep wells on Kinmen. In FY 1964, the Kinmen Hsien govern¬ ment established a shallow well fund, and for several years the JCRR made grants to this fund. From 1966 to 1971, the commission provided financial and technical assistance in the construction of 130 diversion dams and 445 farm ponds on Kinmen to collect rainfall, and from 1964 to 1978 it sup¬ ported the construction of 14 reservoirs with a total storage capacity of 6.5 million cubic meters. As a result of these efforts, about 500 hectares were irrigated and the share of the population supplied with tap water was increased to 70 percent. The increases achieved in the production of major crops are impres¬ sive. From i960 to 1983, the production of sweet potatoes rose 88 percent, sorghum rose 1,028 percent, peanuts rose 55 percent, and corn rose 460 percent.13 13Data supplied by the CAPD.

Kinmen and Matsu

2 37

In the early 1950s, the production of hogs and poultry on Kinmen was far short of military and civilian requirements. About 500 hogs were imported from Taiwan each month, chiefly for the army. The imported animals infected local hogs with diseases and discouraged the raising of hogs on Kinmen. The JCRR’s earliest efforts in the field of animal industry were designed to deal with this problem. In fiscal year 1955, the JCRR helped finance the training of veterinary technicians from Kinmen. When hog cholera broke out on Kinmen in the spring of 19 5 5, the commission arranged for a team of veterinarians from the Taiwan Provincial Department of Agriculture and Forestry to go to Kinmen and conduct a hog vaccination program. The JCRR continued to subsidize this program, which was expanded to include vaccination against erysipelas as well as cholera. A poultry-vaccination program was also instituted. Because of the success in controlling dis¬ ease, the production of hogs and poultry increased rapidly. In i960 the hog population was more than 16 times as large as it had been in 1951. Over the same period, the number of ducks increased almost sixfold, and the number of chickens more than doubled. The JCRR also tried to improve the quality of farm animals on Kinmen. In fiscal year 1957, the JCRR shipped superior native hogs (30 sows and 3 boars) to Kinmen for breeding purposes. In the same year, it sent 285 Pekin ducks to Kinmen. In the late 1960s, the commission helped establish three poultry farms on Kinmen and assisted the Kinmen Agricultural Experiment Station in a project demonstrating how to raise broilers. A few years later, it introduced Santa Gertrudis bulls to Kin¬ men from Taiwan in an effort to improve the local yellow cattle as a source of beef. A major JCRR effort was duplicating on Kinmen the integrated hogcrop production program that had been successfully developed in Tai¬ wan (see Chapter 6). This program was begun in fiscal year 1964 with 100 farm families and was rapidly expanded in subsequent years. In this program, pigpens were built in the fields, and hog manure mixed with water was used to fertilize crops during the dry season. Hog manure was also used to produce methane for household use. animal industry.

Fisheries The fishing industry on Kinmen was disrupted by the war with Japan and by the civil war. The JCRR’s efforts to revive the industry began in fiscal year 1955 in the form of loans to repair and buy gear for a powered long-lining vessel and to buy equipment for three long-lining junks. In FY 1956, the JCRR made a loan to the Kinmen Fishermen’s

23

8

Special Programs

Association to establish a revolving fund to purchase supplies for fisher¬ men and helped to finance the construction of lofts for fishing nets. In both FY 1956 and FY 1957, the commission contributed funds for construction of the Kinmen anchorage, which was completed in FY 1958 in time to be damaged by the heavy Communist bombardment in August 1958. The JCRR helped pay for the necessary repair work. The commission continued to finance the construction of fishing craft and the purchase of equipment. For example, in fiscal year 1958 some 41 sampans were built for Kinmen proper and 85 bamboo rafts were built for Small Kinmen. But the commission was not satisfied with the progress of the fishing industry on Kinmen. The JCRR general report for FY i960 declared: “Fisheries development on Kinmen has made little progress, due mainly to strict security restrictions and poor perfor¬ mance of the Kinmen Fishermen’s Association and the Kinmen Hsien Government, which sponsored JCRR projects.” The general report for FY 1961 said that fisheries development on Kinmen had not been as successful on Kinmen as on Matsu, mainly because of the poor organi¬ zation and management of the Kinmen Fishermen’s Association, which sponsored most JCRR projects. Despite its dissatisfaction with the results achieved, the JCRR per¬ sisted in its efforts to develop the fishing industry on Kinmen. In fiscal year 1961, the JCRR covered half the cost of six powered sampans. By FY 1964, JCRR loans had brought the total of motorized sampans to 43. In that year the catch by Kinmen fishermen was ten times as large as it had been in 1954. In FY 1965, JCRR loans financed the construction of 14 three-ton motorized sampans and the purchase of 750 synthetic fiber nets. A fish market and ice plant built for the Kinmen Fishermen’s Association with JCRR assistance opened on July 1, 1965. The JCRR’s efforts to improve the facilities and services of the Kin¬ men Fishermen’s Association were in preparation for establishment of a fish auction system to break the long-standing control of dealers over the marketing of fish. Fishermen were usually in debt to dealers, who forced the sale of fish at low prices. The auction system was inaugurated on September 1, 1969. Within a few months, the income of fishermen rose 20 percent. During the 1970s, the commission continued to finance the expan¬ sion and modernization of Kinmen’s fishing industry. In fiscal year 1973, two 49-ton and ten 3- to 5-ton powered fishing boats were built with JCRR assistance. In FY 1975, the JCRR made grants and loans to construct 12 5-ton, ten 20-ton, and four 49-ton fishing craft. During the 1970s, it also promoted the expansion of oyster and clam culture in

Kinmen and Matsu

2-39

coastal waters and assisted in the development of fish-raising in fresh¬ water ponds. The production of fish by Kinmen’s fishermen rose from 1,090 metric tons in i960 to 4,715 metric tons in 1983.14

Matsu Matsu consists of five main islands and several small islands, with a total area of 28.8 square kilometers located at the mouth of the Min River in Fukien Province. In 1952, Matsu had a total population of about 10,000 and very little arable land. Fishing has been the main source of income for the people. In 1952 the JCRR began to provide technical and financial support to Matsu in the same manner as it did in Kinmen.15

Agriculture An agricultural improvement station was established in 1956 to carry out crop experiments, seed multiplication, and trial planting of crops introduced with JCRR technical assistance. Before 1956, all vegetables consumed in Matsu were imported from Taiwan. As the result of JCRR technical and material support, Matsu attained self-sufficiency in vege¬ tables in 1971. The JCRR successfully introduced Irish potatoes to Matsu in 1975. About 10,000 seedlings of different fruit trees were introduced in 1973. In 1975, guava started to bear fruit.

Forestry The JCRR started to help in Matsu’s reforestation in 1956. In each township, the commission conducted training classes on tree planting and management and provided seeds, seedlings, and farm tools. Since i960, the two nurseries set up in Matsu have produced about half a million tree seedlings each year. By 1977, about 20 million trees were growing on the islands and Matsu had become a green forest like Kinmen. 14Data supplied by the CAPD. 15Data for the Matsu section was supplied by the CAPD.

240

Special Programs

Fishery The JCRR’s assistance in the rehabilitation and development of Matsu’s fishing industry began in 1954. This assistance included (1) strengthening the organization and management of the Fishermen’s Association established in 1969, and the Fishery Processing Coopera¬ tive established in 1970; (2) providing technical and financial assistance in the improvement of the marketing system, special loans and subsidies for the building and repairing of power fishing boats, and construction of a cold-storage and ice plant; and (3) introducing new fishing tech¬ niques, fishing nets, tools, and so on. In 1977, Matsu had 187 fishing boats, including 15 trawlers of 49-ton class and 172 power and non¬ power fishing boats and rafts. Matsu is now self-sufficient in fish and produces a surplus for processing and export.

Livestock In the early 1950s, livestock production in Matsu was seriously hampered by rampant diseases. Every month between 200 and 300 live hogs were imported from Taiwan for slaughtering. In 1956, the JCRR started to assist Matsu in the eradication of hog cholera by preventive injections of cholera vaccines, disinfection of pigsties, and other neces¬ sary measures. Help was also given in training local veterinarians; introducing superior breeding hogs, breeding chicks, and egg-laying hens; building hog pens and chicken coops; carrying out artificial in¬ semination; and establishing small-scale feed mills and a livestock diag¬ nostic station. In 1977, a livestock-crop integrated farming project was launched on Matsu. Hog manure was used for soil improvement and methane-gas production. By the end of 1977, Matsu had a total of 2,390 hogs (excluding those raised by military farms) and 25,300 chickens. Enough hogs and chicken eggs are produced for local con¬ sumption, and seasonal surpluses are exported.

Water Utilization The average annual rainfall in the Matsu area is about 1,058 millime¬ ters. Because of its hilly terrain and the high intensity and short duration of its rainfall, water resources on Matsu were formerly so scarce that even drinking water was difficult to obtain. Since i960, the JCRR has

Kinmen and Matsu

241

helped Matsu to construct small dams, wells, and water tanks, as well as water-supply systems for collecting, storing, and distributing all possi¬ ble water resources. By 1977, eight reservoirs with a total capacity of 46,000 cubic meters, and 334 wells, had been completed. These facili¬ ties were still inadequate to supply the required amount of water. However, after the completion in 1978 of the Shen-li Reservoir with a total storage capacity of 190,000 cubic meters, the water problem was mostly solved. At present, more than 80 percent of Matsu’s total popu¬ lation is supplied with tap water.

Rural Health As on Kinmen, the JCRR’s assistance to Matsu’s rural health pro¬ gram gave priority to vaccination against epidemic diseases, such as smallpox, typhoid, cholera, and tetanus. Not a single case of any of these diseases has occurred since 1968. The commission also helped carry out a successful plague-control project on Matsu in 1955. In 1956, the JCRR helped establish a rural health center and health clinics. It provided medicines and medical equipment needed for the rural health program, helped finance setting-up patient wards, and helped train nurses and midwives. The JCRR introduced family planning to Matsu in 1956 by training one medical doctor, 5 nurses and midwives, and 20 family-planning workers. Matsu’s crude birth rate dropped from 3.5 percent in i960 to 2.70 percent in 1976. The JCRR also cooperated with the National Department of Health in a five-year filariasis control program on Kinmen and Matsu beginning in 1973. The incidence rate of filariasis was brought down from 16.0 percent in 1973 to 0.57 percent by the end of 1977.

Land Administration There were no official cadestral records in Matsu prior to 1973. Civilians often had disputes about land ownership or land-use rights. In 1974-77, the JCRR helped the Matsu government carry out a landadministration program, including a cadastral survey, land registration, and land classification. A total of 7,240 plots (or 1,570 hectares of land) were registered, and 588 land deeds were issued to their owners.

242

Special Programs

Summary On the offshore island groups of Kinmen and Matsu, the JCRR sponsored programs that were generally similar to those on Taiwan but varied in details because of differences in climate, geography, and social and economic conditions. On the offshore islands, the JCRR gave high priority to improving public health, planting trees, and increasing water supplies for both irrigation and human consumption. It also success¬ fully carried out programs to increase crop, livestock, and fish produc¬ tion that included improving the effectiveness of farmers’ and fisher¬ men’s associations. The family-planning program on the islands was essentially an extension of the Taiwan program. Land reform on Kinmen also drew on the experience of Taiwan, but its justification was largely political, since very little land on Kinmen was tilled by tenants.

i5 The Changing Role of Agriculture in the Economy of Taiwan

Before evaluating the JCRR experience, it is useful to review the changes that took place in the role of agriculture in Taiwan’s economy during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.1 The Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction had a hand in bringing about some of those changes, but other changes reflected economic forces outside agriculture to which the JCRR and the agricultural sector could only try to adjust. The changing role of agriculture in Taiwan is of considerable interest quite apart from its relevance to the history of the JCRR. Developments in Taiwan show how agriculture can contribute to industrialization and how industrialization can in turn create problems as well as benefits for agriculture.

Structural Changes Taiwan experienced marked structural changes during the decades in which the JCRR worked on the island. These changes are continuing during the 1980s. In 1952, the first year after recovery from the damage and disruption of World War II, Taiwan was a poor and largely rural society. In 1979, the year in which the JCRR was terminated, Taiwan was both affluent and urbanized. In 1952, the gross national product (GNP) per capita at current prices was only NT $2,009 a Year (about US $378 in 1979 U.S. dollars). In 1979, the GNP per capita, again at Un this chapter, “agriculture” is used in the broad sense to include fishing and forestry as well as the raising of crops and livestock.

2-45

246

Retrospect and Evaluation Table 16. Industrial origin of Taiwan’s net domestic product in selected years, 1952-1983 (percentages) Year

Agriculture

Industry

Other

Total

1952 i960 1965 1970

35-9 32.8 27.3 17.9 14.9

18.0 24.9 28.6

46.1 42.3 44.1

34-7 39.2

9-3 8.7

45-3 44.2

47-4 45-9 45-4 47-i

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

1975 1980 1983

Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1984 (Taipei: CEPD, 1984), p. 33. Note: “Agriculture” includes fishing and forestry, as well as the raising of crops and livestock. “Industry” includes mining, manufactur¬ ing, public utilities, and construction. “Other” includes transportation, communications, commerce, and all other services.

current prices, was NT $67,283 (about US $i,869).2 In 1955, the first year for which statistics are available, only 22.4 percent of Taiwan’s population lived in cities of 100,000 or larger; in 1980, almost half the population (47.2 percent) lived in cities of 100,000 or larger.3 The structure of Taiwan’s economy has changed dramatically since the early 1950s (see Table 16). Agriculture accounted for 35.9 percent of Taiwan’s net domestic product in 1952 but only 8.7 percent in 1983. The share of industry in the net domestic product rose from 18.0 percent in 1952 to 44.2 percent in 1983. Changes in employment by various sectors of the economy roughly paralleled changes in the origin of the net domestic product. Agriculture employed 56.1 percent of Taiwan’s labor force in 1952 but only 18.6 percent in 1983. Similarly, industry accounted for only 16.9 percent of total employment in 1952, but its share increased to 41.1 percent in 1983.4 Agriculture’s share of employment did not decline as rapidly as its share of the net domestic product. This reflected a serious decline in the productivity of labor in agriculture relative to its productivity in the rest of the economy. Structural changes also took place within agriculture itself. In 1952, crops accounted for 68.6 percent of the total value of agricultural 2GNP per capita figures are from CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1984, p. 25. Exchange rates are from the directorate-general of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Statisti¬ cal Yearbook of the Republic of China 1983 (Taipei: Veterans Printing Works, 1984), pp. 300-303. The implicit price deflator for GNP was used in converting 1952 GNP per capita to 1979 U.S. dollars. 3Statistical Yearbook 1983, p. 12; and Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, Household Statistics Abstract of Taiwan 1939 (Taichung: PDCA, 1959), pp. 166-189. 4CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1984, p. 16.

The Changing Role of Agriculture

247

production, livestock accounted for 15.8 percent, forestry for 6.5 per¬ cent, and fisheries for 9.1 percent. In 1980, the share of livestock production had increased to 27.7 percent, and the share of fisheries had increased to 22.0 percent. The shares of crops and forestry had de¬ creased to 48.0 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively.5 These changes reflected, among other things, the increasing cost of labor and the ability of consumers to afford more meat and fish. The composition of crop production (by value) also changed substan¬ tially, as the following percentage breakdowns for 1952 and 1980 show:6

Rice Other common crops Special crops Fruits Vegetables Total

1952

1980

58.7

41.8

13-3 19.7

7-4 13.1 14.5 23.2 100.0

3-5 4.8 100.0

The decline in the importance of rice and other common crops, and the rise in the importance of fruits and vegetables, is attributable to the shifting dietary habits of Taiwan’s more affluent consumers and to increased exports of fruits and vegetables, especially in processed form.

Agriculture and International Trade During the 1950s and most of the 1960s, Taiwan experienced a chronic deficit in its international trade. Since 1970, however, Taiwan has had a favorable trade balance in most years.7 Taiwan’s trade in agricultural products followed an opposite pattern. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the value of Taiwan’s agricultural exports exceeded the value of its agricultural imports, but in every year since 1969 Taiwan has had deficits in its agricultural trade.8 Table 17 shows both 5CAPD, Basic Agricultural Statistics 1981, pp. 27-28. 6Ibid., pp. 29-30. Other common crops include wheat, millet, corn, sorghum, soybeans, sweet potatoes, and so on. Special crops include tea, tobacco, sugarcane, cotton, rapeseed, among others. 7The trade balance was negative from 19 5 2 to 1970, except in 1963 and 1964; beginning in 1971, the trade balance has been positive, except in 1973, *974> an I95°* After a brief period of consolidation and planning, the com¬ mission launched a comprehensive program that set Taiwan’s agricul¬ tural sector on the road to sustained growth. The prewar level of agricultural production was regained in 1951, and Taiwan’s agricultural sector began a 15-year period of accelerated growth. The JCRR program during this period has been described in Chapter 5. However, the JCRR was not only a source of financial and technical assistance. Beginning in 1953 with the establishment of the Economic Stabilization Board, the commission assumed an increasingly dominant role in planning and policy coordination for agriculture. The planning and coordinating role continued through the remaining years of the JCRR’s existence (see Chapter 16). After the termination of U.S. economic aid on June 30, 1965, the commission’s main source of financial support was for eight years the Sino-American Fund for Economic and Social Development (SAFED), described in Chapter 5. A supplementary exchange of letters in connec¬ tion with the agreement establishing SAFED appears to have narrowed somewhat the scope of the JCRR’s program by specifying that the JCRR should “plan and implement specific programs and projects designed to support the development of new agricultural products, to stimulate increased agricultural productivity and trade, and to strengthen rural society.1 However, the practical effect of any constraint imposed by the SAFED agreement was overridden when the JCRR was given a large part of the responsibility for the Accelerated Rural Development Pro¬ gram (ARDP) during the period 1973-79. From fiscal year 1950 through fiscal year 1965, the JCRR disbursed a total of NT $4,025 billion and US $7,106 million provided by the U.S. aid mission.2 If disbursements in New Taiwan dollars are converted to current U.S. dollars at the exchange rates used by the JCRR, and if current U.S. dollar figures are converted to 1979 U.S. dollars, total disbursements were the equivalent of approximately US $383.5 million. In terms of U.S. dollar equivalents, more than 95 percent of disburse¬ ments were in the form of New Taiwan dollars.3 Economic Planning Council, “Exchange of Notes” (cited above, Chapter 5, footnote 18), p. 42. 2Most of these funds were allocated directly to the JCRR. From FY 1955 through FY 1957, however, the JCRR supervised the allocation and expenditure of the equivalent of about US Si 2.1 million for government budget support of local agricultural programs. This money was provided to the CUSA by the U.S. aid mission. 3The information cited in the paragraph, including the exchange rates used, is from the financial spreadsheet at the end of General Report—17. Current U.S. dollar figures were

Review and Evaluation

281

From FY 1966 through FY 1979, SAFED allocations to the JCRR totaled almost NT $5.4 billion, or the equivalent of approximately US $212 million in 1979 U.S. dollars.* * * 4 During the period FY 1973-79? the commission was allocated NT $7,476 billion, or the equivalent of approximately US $247.9 million (in 1979 dollars) for ARDP projects.5 As noted in Chapter 6, the JCRR also received NT $200 million from the Chinese government in FY 1972-73 to support the new agricultural policy, and NT $15.5 million from the National Science Council. Total funding for the JCRR after the termination of U.S. aid (FY 1966-79) was therefore NT $13.1 billion, or about US $465 million (in 1979 dollars). For the entire period on Taiwan (FY 1950 through FY 1979), exclud¬ ing relatively small expenditures under Phase A and Phase B, JCRR funding totaled the equivalent of approximately US $849 million (in 1979 dollars). Annual funding therefore averaged about the equivalent of US $28.3 million. Given the scope of JCRR activities, this is quite a modest figure.6 The shift in the JCRR’s sources of financing from complete depen¬ dence on U.S. aid to dependence on local currency generated by past aid (but controlled by a purely Chinese agency), and finally to major depen¬ dence on Chinese funding, roughly paralleled the increasingly Chinese nature of the JCRR. The number of Americans employed by the JCRR was never large, but after the termination of U.S. aid the number shrank, and by 1970 only a part-time commissioner remained. The closing of the U.S. aid mission on June 30, 1965, also removed the only American agency on Taiwan that followed the commission’s activities closely. Although the JCRR became more Chinese, it never lost its unique status as an organization outside the Chinese government as well as the U.S. government. Until the very end, both the American and the Chinese flags were flown at the JCRR headquarters on Nanhai Road in Taipei. After the termination of U.S. economic aid, the Chinese authorities converted to 1979 dollars by using the GNP deflators in Economic Report of the President 1984, p. 224 (cited above. Chapter, 5 footnote 17). information on SAFED allocations during the period FY 1966-76 is from the financial spreadsheet at the end of General Report—33. Information on allocations from FY 1977 though FY 1979 was provided by Shen Pao-peng, controller of the CAPD. 5Data provided by Shen Pao-peng, CAPD controller. During the period FY 1973—79* the Taiwan provincial government was allocated NT $4,927 billion for ARDP projects. 6This figure includes only funds disbursed by the JCRR. From FY 1950 through FY 1965, salaries and allowances of U.S. personnel assigned to the JCRR and the costs of sending people overseas for training were paid by the U.S. aid mission.

z82

Retrospect and Evaluation

could have made the JCRR a Chinese government agency in all but name, leaving only a facade of jointness. They chose not to do so for two reasons: They valued the JCRR as part of the connection with the United States, and at least some senior officials realized that the com¬ mission’s autonomy was essential to its continued effective perfor¬ mance.

Policies and Methods

The JCRR’s basic policies and methods of work were developed during the brief period on the mainland, but they were refined during the three decades of work on Taiwan.7 The JCRR usually saw itself as working toward two objectives: increasing agricultural production and promoting social justice. A third objective—encouraging good govern¬ ment—was sometimes added. The following principles guided the com¬ missions work: 1. Felt needs. The JCRR should respond to needs seen by the people themselves. In an internal paper, JCRR Chairman Chiang Monlin exhorted: “Find out the felt needs of the people. Do not imagine that we know more than they do. The difficulty lies in making them feel the long-range unfelt needs, which requires a long process of education.”8 2. Fair distribution. Give highest priority to projects that benefit the greatest number of people. Do not deliberately make the rich richer and the poor poorer. 3. Sponsoring agency. Every project must have a sponsoring agency that is able to make effective use of JCRR financial and technical assistance and that can carry on the project after JCRR support has ended. In the course of a project, the JCRR should help to increase the capabilities of the sponsoring agency. 4. Project preparation. Each project must be carefully planned. Justifica¬ tion, outline of work, time schedule, assistance required, matching funds by sponsoring agency, and expected results must be specified in writing. 5. Technical and economic feasibility. Before any project or activity is extended over larger areas, its technical and economic feasibility must be demonstrated. 7The JCRR’s guiding principles and approaches to rural reconstruction are expounded in slightly varying ways in many JCRR publications and internal documents. The two sources relied on most here are Y. S. Tsiang, “The Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in the Republic of China” (June 1964, Mimeographed); and S. C. Hsieh, “The Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in Taiwan,” in C. W. Chang, Rural Asia Marches Forward (Manila: University of the Philippines, 1969). 8“The JCRR Program as Adapted to Historical, Political, and Social Backgrounds in China” (n.d.), in JCRR files for FY 1964.

Review and Evaluation

283

6. Flexibility and selectivity. As a joint, autonomous organization oper¬

ating outside normal government channels, the JCRR could select the most effective sponsoring agencies in or out of government. 7. Frugal use of funds. In the words of Chiang Monlin, “Minds and expert advice are more important than money. Don’t throw money lavishly into the rural communities. It will do more harm than good. Spend wisely.”9 The JCRR always sought matching funds from spon¬ soring organizations. During the period 1950—64, sponsors contrib¬ uted 48 percent of the total cost of JCRR-supported projects.10 The successful application of these principles required a highly quali¬ fied technical staff, most of whose members were Chinese. The JCRR was able to attract and hold such a staff by paying higher salaries and offering more stimulating work than could be provided by government agencies. The JCRR staff traveled constantly in the countryside, keeping in close touch with local organizations and individual farmers. Contacts were maintained with officials at all levels of government. Contrary to the common practice in U.S. aid missions, JCRR technicians were not required to work through designated counterparts in the government. Because of the wide contacts of JCRR staff members and their famil¬ iarity with rural conditions, the commission was able to screen project applications effectively and to exercise close supervision over approved projects. JCRR financial support was typically provided in installments, and payments were withheld, if the performance of a sponsoring agency was not satisfactory. Chronic unsatisfactory performance caused the commission to change sponsoring agencies. The JCRR and the Chinese government agencies with which it worked were responsible for at least one important institutional innova¬ tion. The U.S. approach of creating a strong linkage between agricul¬ tural research and extension services was superimposed on the Chinese approach of working through farmers’ associations.11 Achievements and Problems The JCRR cannot be given credit for all positive developments in rural Taiwan during the three decades that it worked on the island, nor can it be blamed for everything that went less well than was desired. As elsewhere, much that happened in Taiwan must be attributed to the internal dynamics of the society and its response to a changing interna¬ tional environment. It is also impossible to measure quantitatively the 9Ibid. 10Tsiang, “JCRR in the Republic of China,” p. 4. nI am indebted to Montague Yudelman for this observation.

284

Retrospect and Evaluation

relative contributions of the JCRR, the Chinese government, and local nongovernment organizations to various developments. All that can be said with confidence is that the commission made major contributions to a remarkable list of positive developments and that the problems and difficulties it encountered were largely not of its own making. Much of this book has been devoted to describing the numerous achievements with which the JCRR was associated. These achievements need only be listed here: • • • • •

Sustained increases in the production of crops, livestock, and fish Land reform, especially the land-to-the-tiller program Reforms of the farmers’ associations and other rural organizations Improvements in agricultural research, education, and extension work Improvements in rural health and creation of an effective family-plan¬ ning program • Participation in a far-flung and generally successful international coop¬ eration program In all these endeavors, the JCRR was a source—and often the leading source—of ideas, strategies, and plans. Moreover, through wise use of its financial resources and technical capabilities, the commission en¬ couraged other organizations and the rural people of Taiwan to move in the right directions. The role of the JCRR in rural progress has often been described as catalytic, and to some extent this is true, but this term fails to convey fully the nature of the commission’s contribution. What the JCRR did was stimulate, facilitate, and channel appropriate actions by individuals, government agencies, and private organizations. In terms of its own objectives, the JCRR must be judged a success. The policies with which it was associated certainly achieved the objec¬ tive of increasing production. The land reform, in which the commis¬ sion played a leading role, clearly promoted social justice. The JCRR’s methods of work also contributed to achieving the third objective— encouraging good government. The agencies sponsoring JCRR projects benefited from the commission’s technical and financial assistance and from its insistence on high standards of efficiency. Land reform, the reform of the farmers’ associations, and the formation of 4-H clubs also had the side effect of causing more rural people to take an interest in public affairs.12 Relative to its achievements, the problems and difficulties that the 12For a more detailed discussion of the institution-building effects of the JCRR’s activities, see Montgomery et al., “Rural Improvement and Political Development: The JCRR Model” (cited above, Chapter 1, footnote 4), pp. 23—29.

Review and Evaluation

285

JCRR encountered were remarkably few. Especially during the early years, the low quality of some of the personnel of the Taiwan provincial government was a matter of concern. Some officials of the national government were jealous of the relatively high salaries paid by the JCRR and resented the publicity given to the commission’s achievements.13 Problems also arose from time to time between the JCRR and the U.S. aid mission. Some, but by no means all, of the mission directors were uncomfortable with the commission’s autonomy and relatively infor¬ mal procedures. Not everything that the JCRR attempted succeeded. T. H. Shen reported that a survey of operations in fiscal years 1957-67 found that 1.1 percent of all projects were unsuccessful. Reasons for failure in¬ cluded deficiencies in sponsoring agencies, marketing difficulties, failure to establish technical feasibility in advance, unforeseen developments, and overly ambitious scale.14 The JCRR also experienced a few larger policy failures, although how much it should be blamed for these failures is open to question. The forestry program was a technical success but a commercial failure. Efforts to adjust to the effects of industrialization on agriculture were only partly successful. By hindsight one might argue that the JCRR, and the government, should have moved sooner and more vigorously to encourage cooperative and custom farming. But the commission and the government were by no means idle, and the problem of increasing the size of economic units in agriculture is an extremely difficult one. Similarly mixed judgments can be expressed about the failure of the JCRR and the government to foresee and prevent the rise of a rice surplus.

Causes of Agricultural Progress in Taiwan The Introduction to this book set forth a number of questions raised by the success of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in promoting agricultural progress in Taiwan. In a sense, most of this book has been concerned directly or indirectly with those questions. In this concluding chapter, an effort will be made to provide more explicit answers. 13As recently as 1984, a senior Chinese official told me that the JCRR enjoyed a good reputation because it backed projects sure to succeed. A former member of the JCRR conceded that there was considerable truth in this charge but added that backing success was a good principle to follow in a development program. 14Shen, Sino-American JCRR, p. 142..

z86

Retrospect and Evaluation

Organizational Effectiveness of the JCRR The JCRR could have chosen wise development policies and nev¬ ertheless failed to achieve concrete results in the countryside. For¬ tunately, the JCRR was as good at executing policies as it was at formulating them. The organizational effectiveness of the JCRR may be attributed to good leadership, a skilled and highly motivated staff, considerable autonomy from the two sponsoring governments, and a network of working relationships with government agencies, rural or¬ ganizations, and individual farmers. Good leadership was the largely fortuitous result of the appointment of well-qualified commissioners by the sponsoring governments. Those governments must also be given credit for allowing the commission considerable freedom of action. The quality of the JCRR staff was a by¬ product of good leadership and autonomy. The commissioners hired good people, gave them challenging tasks, and paid them appropriately. The JCRR could have been a conventional and rather passive funding agency. Instead, it adopted a hands-on style of administration that involved detailed planning of projects, careful selection and monitoring of sponsoring agencies, and continuous contacts with other key players in the field of rural development, ranging from government agencies and research institutes to local rural organizations and individual farmers. It paid special attention to improving the effectiveness of the agencies and organizations through which its development policies were executed. Agricultural Development Policies The policies promoted by the JCRR were responsible to a significant extent for successful agricultural development in Taiwan during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.15 That presumption is strengthened by the similarity of the JCRR’s policies and the prescriptions for successful development set forth by some of the leading students of the develop¬ ment process. The broad sweep of agricultural development in Taiwan, beginning with the introduction of modern techniques during the Japanese colo¬ nial period and including the JCRR years, conforms to the view of the development process expressed by Theodore W. Schultz almost a quar¬ ter of a century ago.16 Stated briefly, Schultz argued that agricultural 15Stated simply, someone must have been doing the right things, and that someone (collec¬ tively) was the JCRR. At the same time, it is impossible to sort out and measure the relative contributions to agricultural programs made by the JCRR, the Chinese government, local organizations, and individual farmers. 16Theodore W. Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), esp. pp. 205-206.

Review and Evaluation

287

progress depends on giving farmers access to what science knows about soils, plants, animals, and machines. This can be done by making available physical inputs—for example, seeds, fertilizer, irrigation wa¬ ter, tools—in which scientific knowledge is embedded and by training farmers in the skills needed to use those inputs. The right general approach is important, but it is also necessary to select the right priorities. Bruce F. Johnston and Peter Kilby list the following priorities as being of crucial importance in increasing farm productivity and output and enhancing welfare:17 1. Strengthening the research base 2. Influencing the size distribution of farm operational units to curb tendencies toward a dualistic size structure with subsectors using drastically different technologies 3. Expanding and improving the agricultural infrastructure 4. Promoting the diffusion of technical knowledge and wide access to external inputs 5. Improving systems of agricultural taxation 6. Undertaking certain direct measures to enhance rural welfare, for example, public health and nutrition programs, together with pol¬ icies and programs that will accelerate the lowering of birthrates to levels compatible with sharply reduced death rates Five of these six priorities describe major aspects of the JCRR’s pro¬ gram. The only priority on Johnston and Kilby’s list to which the JCRR paid little or no attention to was item 5—improving systems of agricul¬ tural taxation. It can properly be argued that taxation was outside the JCRR’s mandate, but for many years the JCRR did live with the ricefertilizer barter system, which imposed a hidden tax on farmers and which some observers thought discouraged the optimal use of fertilizer. The commission not only strengthened the agricultural research base (item 1 on the Johnston and Kilby list), but also initiated or participated in a number of innovations in products and methods of culture. Full documentation is lacking, but the way in which these innovations came about appears to be consistent with the theory of induced innovation developed by Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan.ls This theory argues that even in the public sector (which is relevant to the present discussion) research resources are allocated in a manner that responds to resource endowments and economic change—that is, by and large, 17Bruce F. Johnston and Peter Kilby, Agriculture ami Structural Transformation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 449. 18Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An International Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), esp. pp. 84-93.

288

Retrospect and Evaluation

research scientists will try to meet farmers’ needs for technical alterna¬ tives that will facilitate savings in increasingly scarce factors of produc¬ tion. For example, as Hayami and Ruttan point out, the development of the fertilizer-responsive ponlai varieties of rice during the Japanese colonial period permitted increases in production without using more scarce land.19 Avoiding a bimodal pattern of development (item 2) is quite impor¬ tant to a successful strategy of agricultural development. Many coun¬ tries, especially in Latin America, have allowed investment capital and modern technology to flow almost exclusively to large-scale agricultural enterprises, with the result that most of the rural population has been left behind on primitive subsistence farms.20 Bimodal development was probably never a serious threat in Taiwan. Large-scale enterprises arose only in the sugar industry, and even in that industry some production was on small farms. Nevertheless, the JCRR must be given credit for helping to ensure that a unimodal approach to agricultural development would succeed. The land-to-the-tiller program, in which the commis¬ sion played a leading role, greatly reduced the risk of falling into the bimodal trap. The JCRR also strengthened the farmers’ associations that provided the credit and physical inputs needed by small farmers and promoted divisible innovations, such as high-yield fertilizer-respon¬ sive crop varieties, that could be used by small farmers. When rising wages forced a shift away from labor-intensive agriculture, the JCRR did not abandon the unimodal approach, but promoted cooperative and custom farming based on the use of scaled-down machinery. The JCRR more than satisfied item 3, expanding and improving the infrastructure, by its extensive efforts in the fields of irrigation, land consolidation, and land conservation. It also gave appropriate attention to item 6—public health and family planning. Promoting the diffusion of technical knowledge and wide access to external inputs (item 4) was one of the JCRR’s top priorities. The JCRR made the reorganized and strengthened farmers’ associations the major instruments of rural improvement. A study of local organization for rural development in Asia by Uphoff and Esman21 concluded that, of the 16 countries studied, those that were more organized at the local 19Ibid., pp. 280-289. 20For a succinct exposition of the unimodal thesis, see Bruce F. Johnston and William C. Clark, Redesigning Rural Development: A Strategic Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 70-72. 21Norman T. Uphoff and Milton J. Esman, Local Organization for Rural Development: Analysis of Asian Experience, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Center for International Studies, November 1974).

Review and Evaluation

289

level—in the right way—achieved development objectives more suc¬ cessfully than those that were less organized. Taiwan was one of the eight countries labeled “more organized.” Uphoff and Esman also iden¬ tified a number of features of local organizations that facilitated their making effective contributions to rural development: more than one level of organization, more than one channel to higher-level decision centers, controlled decentralization of planning and operational deci¬ sion-making, resolution of local issues through political competition, and accountability of leaders both to local constituencies and to stan¬ dards established at higher levels. In large part because of reforms initiated by the JCRR, the farmers’ associations in Taiwan possessed all these desirable features.

Agricultural Development and General Economic Development The general development strategy followed by the government of the Republic of China in Taiwan had the agricultural sector support the early stages of industrial expansion. This support took the form prin¬ cipally of transfers of labor and capital from agriculture to the rest of the economy. Agricultural exports caused some of the capital flows to be in the form of badly needed foreign exchange. The agricultural sector also provided food for urban workers and their families and a market for industrial products. However, the relative importance of this market rapidly declined as the government replaced a policy of import substitu¬ tion with a policy of export-oriented industrialization.22 Given the predominantly agricultural nature of Taiwan’s economy when the island was returned to Chinese control, calling on agriculture to support industrialization was inevitable. But the government did not devote all its energies and resources to the industrial sector and hold rural living standards to the low level prevailing at the end of World War II. For good political as well as economic reasons, the government gave priority to restoring and increasing agricultural production. As a consequence, during the 1950s and 1960s agriculture was able to sup¬ port both rising rural incomes and a substantial net outflow of capital to other sectors of the economy. 22In 1956—61, some 61.6 percent of the increase in total output was due to domestic expansion and Z2..5 percent to export expansion. In 1971-76, export expansion accounted for 67.7 percent of the increase in output, and domestic expansion accounted for only 34.7 percent. In both periods, the residual (positive or negative) was attributable to the effects of import substitution and changes in the input-output coefficient. See Kuo, Taiwan Economy, p. 149.

290

Retrospect and Evaluation

The importance of giving priority to agricultural development is emphasized by a number of analysts of the economic development process. For example, Lewis believes that an industrial revolution de¬ pends on a prior or simultaneous agricultural revolution.23 Bruce F. Johnston and John W. Mellor argue that agriculture need not play a passive role in development but that it can provide labor, capital, foreign exchange, and a market for a growing industrial sector.24 Johnston and Clark regard an industry-first strategy as a threat to the unimodal approach to agricultural development that they advocate.25 They point out that a highly protectionist import-substitution strategy of industrialization hurts both agriculture and the small rural manufac¬ turing firms on which small family farms depend for off-farm employ¬ ment. They also note that an overvalued currency and artificially low interest rates lead to the rationing of credit and physical inputs in which large farms are typically favored. Cheap capital also favors a capitalintensive form of production. Taiwan is a leading example of the successful transfer of capital from agriculture to industry during a period of rapid industrialization. This process has been described in some detail by Lee Teng-hui, who was an agricultural economist on the staff of the JCRR many years ago and who is now president of the Republic of China.26 Intersectoral capital flows from agriculture to industry have also been analyzed by John W. Mellor.27

Agricultural Development and Social Justice Determining the relationship between agricultural development and equity or social justice (to use the term favored by the JCRR) involves answering two difficult questions: Did the agricultural development strategy followed in Taiwan contribute to the overall reduction in income inequality that actually occurred? Was the reduction in inequal¬ ity in agriculture an important cause of general economic growth? Concerning the first of these questions, Shirley W. Y. Kuo found that 23 W. Arthur Lewis, The Evolution of the International Economic Order (Princeton: Prince¬ ton University Press, 1978), pp. 9-10. 24Cited in John M. Staatz and Carl K. Eicher, “Agricultural Development Ideas in Historical Perspectives,” in Agricultural Development in the Third World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 6. 25Johnston and Clark, Redesigning Rural Development, pp. 72—74. 26Lee, Intersectoral Capital Flows. 27John W. Mellor, The Economics of Agricultural Development (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 84—98. See also “Agricultural Development and the Intersectoral Transfer of Resources,” in Eicher and Staatz, Agricultural Development in the Third World, pp. 136-146.

Review and Evaluation

291

the distribution of family incomes in Taiwan improved—that is, be¬ came more equal—during the entire period 1953—80, but that the improvement was faster from 1953 to 1964 than from 1964 to 1980.28 (Dividing the period at 1964 reflected the improvement in data on family incomes in that year.) The Gini coefficient, which measures inequality of income distribution, fell from 0.558 in 1953 to 0.360 in 1964, 0.306 in 1979, and 0.303 in 1980. Kuo further found that the reduction in inequality of income distribution from 1964 to 1979 would have been about 20 percent greater but for the widening gap between nonfarm and farm family incomes (making due allowance for the changing weights of these two groups in the distribution of family incomes). After subtracting the effect of the widening gap between nonfarm and farm family incomes, 90 percent of the net improvement in income distribution was attributable to the nonfarm group. If the data permitted a similar analysis for the years 1953—64, during which income distribtion was improving the most rapidly, a larger share of the improvement would presumably have occurred among farm families. Certainly, during that early period, land reform would have had its greatest effect. The tentative conclusion must be that agricultural development made a significant but declining contribution to increased equality of income distribution during the period 1953—79. Concerning the second question, the positive effect of reductions in the inequality of income distribution on economic growth are most evident in the agricultural sector. The land-to-the-tiller program, which reduced income inequality, is generally believed to have provided a strong incentive to increase agricultural production. The more general effects of greater equality on economic growth are more elusive. In a major study of the experience of Taiwan, John C. H. Fei, Gustav Ranis, and Shirley W. Y. Kuo reject the view that equity must always be sacrificed to achieve growth. They conclude on the basis of Taiwan's experience that “it is possible for growth to be compatible with an improved distribution of income during every phase of the transition from colonialism to modern growth.”29 Irma Adelman used the case of Taiwan to document another aspect of the general relationship between equity and growth. She argued that Taiwan and other countries that have successfully combined equity with growth have followed “a similar dynamic sequence: a redistribu¬ tion of assets (primarily but not exclusively land), followed by a massive buildup (or acquistion) of human capital, followed by an accelerated 28Kuo, Taiwan Economy, pp. 94-106. 29John C. H. Fei, Gustav Ranis, and Shirley W. Y. Kuo, Growth and Equity: The Taiwan Case (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), esp. pp. 2, 310.

292

Retrospect and Evaluation

human-resource-intensive industrialization and growth strategy.”30 Fei, Ranis, and Kuo left open the possibility that increased equity contributes to economic growth, but they did not assert that this is in fact the case. Adelman endorsed the development strategy adopted in Taiwan as a means of achieving growth with equity, but she also did not reach the specific conclusion that increased equity has a positive effect on growth.

Transferability of the JCRR Experience The success of the JCRR on Taiwan led naturally to the thought that a similar approach should be tried in other developing countries. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to include a new chapter (chap. 7) on Joint Commissions on Rural Development. That new chapter authorizes the president to conclude agreements with less-developed countries providing for the establish¬ ment in such countries of joint commissions on rural development that would carry out development programs in rural areas.31 Although the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction was not mentioned in the new legislation, the JCRR was clearly the model for the proposed joint commissions on rural development. During the late 1960s, the directors of U.S. aid missions in South Vietnam, the Philippines, and a few other countries explored inconclu¬ sively the possibility of establishing joint commissions on rural develop¬ ment.32 Thus far, however, the congressional authorization remains unused. The question whether the JCRR experience on Taiwan could successfully be used elsewhere remains open. In considering this ques¬ tion, it is useful to take up separately the JCRR’s organization and the political arrangements under which it operated, its programs, and its objectives and methods of work.33 Organization and Political Arrangements

The structure of the JCRR and its relationships with the U.S. and Chinese governments were specific to a particular time and place. There 30Irma Adelman, “Growth, Income Distribution, and Equity-oriented Development Strat¬ egies,” World Development, February-March 1975, pp. 67-76. 31 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and U.S. House of Representatives Commit¬ tee on International Relations, Legislation on Foreign Relations through 1976, vol. 1 (Wash¬ ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 60. 32Shen, Sino-American JCRR, p. 254. 33Some of the points made in the following discussion were drawn from one or both of two

Review and Evaluation

293

is no reason to assume that the same organization and the same political arrangements could be duplicated elsewhere. Not every government would welcome an American presence in the sensitive rural sector or see a joint commission as a means of getting more aid with fewer controls, as did the Chinese government on Taiwan. Some governments would view such a commission as an infringement of their sovereignty, an instrument of U.S. political penetration, or both. However, there probably are developing countries with long tradi¬ tions of close relations with the United States that would accept estab¬ lishment of a binational organization similar to the JCRR. Even in such countries, a joint commission could not expect to have all the advan¬ tages that the JCRR enjoyed on Taiwan, including a government willing to appoint highly qualified and well-connected people to the commis¬ sion, the availability of sufficient numbers of skilled technicians, and the absence of a competing bureaucracy. The last of these advantages must be judged especially rare. The decision of the government of the Re¬ public of China not to reactivate its Ministry of Agriculture after the withdrawal to Taiwan is not likely to be repeated elsewhere. It would be easier for the U.S. government to give up the agricultural division of its aid mission to avoid competition with a joint commission (as it in effect did on Taiwan), but such an action would by no means be assured. If a joint commission had to coexist with the ministry of agriculture of the host government and the agricultural division of the U.S. aid mis¬ sion, special care would have to be taken in defining the joint commis¬ sion’s sphere of action. Taking the JCRR’s autonomy as the model, the new joint commission should be free, with a minimum of supervision, to use funds provided by either government to promote specified rural programs in specified geographical areas. This freedom should include broad discretion in the selection of sponsors of projects from among private organizations and public agencies at all levels of government. To the maximum possible extent, the ministry of agriculture and the U.S. aid mission should stay out of the sphere assigned to the joint commis¬ sion. Realistically, however, the likelihood of some overlap, particularly with the ministry of agriculture, must be conceded. Successful coexis¬ tence would depend on mutual goodwill as well as on written under¬ standings.

papers commissioned by the Agency for International Development in the 1960s: Montgom¬ ery et al., “Rural Improvement and Political Development,” pp. 62-78; and Hough, “AID Administration to the Rural Sector,” pp. 32-38 (both of which are cited above, in Chapter 1, footnote 4).

294

Retrospect and Evaluation

Program The projects that the JCRR supported were designed to deal with specific problems in rural Taiwan at particular stages in the develop¬ ment of Taiwan’s economy. Copying these projects in every detail would rarely, if ever, produce good results in other parts of the world. However, the JCRR program on Taiwan is a useful source of general ideas, and knowledge of that program can be of help to people who are responsible for agricultural development elsewhere. The JCRR program on Taiwan demonstrates the value of mutually supporting efforts (such as land consolidation and integrated livestockcrop production) and proper time-sequencing of programs (such as land reform and the reform of the farmers’ associations). The JCRR program also shows the importance of paying attention to social as well as economic aspects of rural problems. Measures to promote rural health and social justice should go hand in hand with measures to increase production. The JCRR program also shows the advantages of relating individual projects to larger goals and making those projects mutually supporting. Piecemeal efforts and isolated projects, however good in themselves, should be avoided. Some of the larger efforts supported by the JCRR could profitably be studied by agricultural policymakers in other countries—not to obtain models to be copied but to be alerted to both problems and oppor¬ tunities. In this category are the land reform, the reform of the farmers’ associations, the development of extension services backed by research institutes, and the fisheries and forestry programs. Knowledge of the changing role of agriculture in Taiwan’s economy and the attendant problems could also stimulate agricultural policymakers elsewhere to reflect on possible future developments in their own countries.

Objectives and Methods of Work In principle, the JCRR’s objectives could be adopted both by the government of a developing country and by the U.S. aid mission in that country. Creating a binational joint commission might not be needed to transfer these aspects of the JCRR experience. Certainly there is no reason that both the donor and the recipient of economic aid should not accept the JCRR’s objectives of increasing agricultural production, pro¬ moting social justice, and encouraging more effective government. Applying the JCRR’s methods of work without a joint institution of some kind would be more difficult. The host government and the U.S.

Review and Evaluation

295

aid mission might separately assess the felt needs of rural people, but arriving at a joint view on this basic question would not be as easy between officials of two governments as it would be among members of a joint commission. An aid mission could not select sponsoring agencies from a wide range of possibilities as easily as a joint commission could, nor could an aid mission channel its resources through a variety of closely supervised contracts in the same way as a joint commission. Procedures that the host government would find acceptable in a bina¬ tional organization could be regarded as obnoxiously intrusive when practiced by an arm of a foreign government. An aid mission might well find itself limited to working principally through traditional counter¬ part relationships and denied the flexibility needed to follow the JCRR’s methods of work.

Summary The JCRR experience on Taiwan is a useful source of ideas for agricultural policymakers in other countries, but if the JCRR experience is to be transferred elsewhere, primary emphasis should be put on applying the commission’s methods of work. Doing so, however, prob¬ ably requires some kind of joint arrangement. A binational commission like the JCRR might work in some countries, but other joint arrange¬ ments should not be excluded. What is needed is an organization with good leadership and a skilled staff that is not part of either government but that can operate with considerable freedom within the territory of the host government. Through wise use of technical and financial assis¬ tance, such an organization would have an excellent chance of progress¬ ing toward the solution of the rural problems assigned to it.

Index

Academia Sinica, 155 Adelman, Irma, 291 Agricultural development: accelerated growth, 53-54, 61-62, 256—

Anderson, Kym, 253 Anderson, W. A., 128-129 Asia Foundation 211

2-57 decelerated growth, 54-55, 84-85, 257260 early history, 45—47 immediate postwar years, 37-39, 51-52. Japanese colonial period, 47-51 problems of 1980s, 260-263 Agricultural plans and policies: accelerated rural development program, 81, 95-97, 189-190, 280 four-year plans, 58-61, 79-80 JCRR policy review in 1963, 59-60 six-year plan, 82-83 Agricultural research: Asian Vegetable Research and Develop¬ ment Center, 151 basic research capabilities, 149 Food and Fertilizer Technology Center, 151-152 JCRR assistance, 152-153 Pig Research Institute, 153 Taiwan Agricultural Research Institute, 150 Taiwan Livestock Research Institute, 150-151 Taiwan Plant Protection Center, 153 Agriculture and international trade: agricultural exports, 248-250 agricultural imports, 250-251 effect of government policies on trade, 215-253

297

Baker, John Earl, 11-12, 17, 30-31, 36, 62 Bank of Taiwan, 181 Barclay, George W., 202 Bass, Julian, 187 Billings, Bruce H., 86 Bowden, T. R., 273 Brent, Joseph L., 270, 272—276

Call, Leland E., 155 Causes and effects of agricultural progress: agricultural policies, 286-289 general economic development, 289—290 organizational effectiveness of JCRR, 286 social justice, 290—292 Chang Chih-chung, 2in Chang Chun, 33 Chang, H. T., i5n, 35, 272 Chang Hsuin-shwen, 86 Chang, K. K., 196, 202 Chen Cheng, 38 family planning, 202, 204 farmers’ associations, 127 land reform 35, 123 Shihmen dam, 140 Chen Yi, 38 Chen Yueh-eh, 255 Cheng Cheng-kung, 48 Cheung, Steven N. S., 121-122 Chiang, Ching-Kuo, 81, 258

29 8

Index

Chiang Kai-shek, 33, 265 land reform, 113 rural reconstruction, 11, 21 Shihmen dam, 140 village health, 206 Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, 12, 265 Chiang Monlin, 33, 36, 38n, 63, 66, 282— 283 appointed JCRR chairman, 11-13 family planning, 202 farmers’ associations, 131 land reform, 35, 99, 102 relations with governments, 264, 267270, 272-274 Shihmen dam, 139 Chien, T. H., 36, 62, 128, 154, 235, 271 China Development Corporation, 171 China Family Planning Association, 202203 China Maternal and Child Health Associa¬ tion, 204 China-United States Agricultural Mission, 8-9 Chinese Air Force, 181 Chinese Combined Service Forces, 181 Chou Chih-jou, 203 Clark, Chester W., 88 Clark, William C., 290 Cleveland, Harlan, 32 Clifford, Clark M., 26n Committee of International Technical Co¬ operation, 227 Council for Agricultural Planning and De¬ velopment, 208, 211 Council for International Economic Coop¬ eration and Development, 81, 205207, 227, 269, 277 Council for United States Aid, 171, 212, 226, 269, 275 Credit, 76-77, 94~95* Crop production and marketing: fibers, 90 fruit, 73 oil seeds, 90 rice, 69, 71, 73, 89, 92-93 sweet potatoes, 69 tea, 90 vegetables, 73, 90-91 wheat, 69 See also entries under crops in tables 4 and 5 Davis, Raymond H., 62, 66, 154, 235, 270, 273, 276 Dawson, Owen L., 31 Douglas, Helen Gahagen, 22 Douglas, William, 22

Drumright, Everett F., 276n Economic Stabilization Board, 59, 268269, 280 Education, 15 3-15 5 Esman, Milton J., 288 Executive Yuan: authority over JCRR, 268, 274-275, 277 farmers’ associations, 130 forest management improvement pro¬ gram, 182 land reform, 113—114 Extension services: farm discussion groups, 156-157 4-H clubs, 156 home economics, 157 mass media, 157 Farmers’ associations: Anderson reforms of, 128-130 changing role of, 136 early history of, 125-127 JCRR assistance to, 130-133 in late 1970s, 133-136 reorganization of (1949), 127—128 Shu-lin township association, 142-146 Fei, John C. H., 291 Fertilizer, 70 Fippin, William H., 37, 62, 66, 131, 220, 271, 272-273 Fisheries: brackishwater ponds, 167-168 changes in fishing fleet, 165 changes in output, 163-164 coastal and inshore fisheries, 169-171 coastal aquaculture, 168-169 deep-sea fisheries, 171-173 dietary importance, 178 fish marketing, 177 fishermen’s associations, 173-177 freshwater ponds, 166—167 Taiwan Fisheries Research Institute, 167, 170 Food Industry Research and Development Institute, 207 Forestry: bamboo, 190-191 forest protection associations, 184—185 forest roads, 189-190 policy, 180-182 reforestation, 182—188 research on wood products, 191 Taiwan Forest Research Institute, 181, 183, 185, 188 timber production, reserves, and trade, 191-193 windbreaks, 188-189

Index Fruit Marketing Cooperatives, 140-141 German Foundation, 211 Gleysteen, W. H., Jr., 276 Government Information Office, 205 Grant, James, 19 Green, William J., 2in Griffen, Robert Allen, 265 Gurow, George, 270-271 Flaraldson, Wesley C., 276 Hayami, Yujiro, 287 Hoffman, Paul G., 26 Hoh, Cecilia, 36 Hsu, S. C, 196, 202-203 Hu Lien, 232, 235 Huang Chieh, 204 Huffman, Gerald H., 62, 86 Hutchison, Claude B., 8 International Rice Research Institute, 211 Intersectoral flows of capital and labor: agriculture as a source of capital, 254— 255

agriculture as a source of labor, 253—254 Irrigation and flood control, 70, 75, 94 Irrigation associations, 136-138, 139—140 Ivy, James T., 267 Johnston, Bruce F., 287, 290 Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction: achievements and problems, 283-285 finances, 33—34, 63—65, 87—88, 280281 founding, 7—15, 21-23 planning and policymaking role, 58-61, 78—84, 268-272 policies and methods of work, 15—20, 65-67, 282-283 relations with Chinese government, 264265, 268-272, 277 relations with U.S. government, 265266, 272-277 staffing and organization, 24-25, 36-37, 62—63, 85-86, 281 Joint farming, 75-76, 92 Judd, Walter H., 9, 12, 22, 265 Kang Han, 182 Kilby, Peter, 287 King, Y. K., 221, 235, 272 Kinmen: afforestation, 232-233 agricultural experiment station 236-237 agricultural production, 234-237 farmers’ associations, 233-234 fisheries, 238—239

299

land reform, 234 public health, 231-232 Knowland, William, 22 Kuo, Shirley W. Y., 290-291 Kuomintang, 99, 113 Kyle, Joseph B., 86 Ladejinsky, Wolf, 101, 106, 108—109, 115 Land Bank: agricultural loans, 73, 76 fishermen’s associations, 175 irrigation fees, 139 land reform, 115—117 reforestation, 187 Land consolidation, 71-72 Land reform: effects of, 117—124 historical origins of, 99—101 land-to-the tiller program: classification of land ownership, in— 112 implementation, 115-117 legislation, 112—115 use of industrial stocks, 115 sale of public land, 107—no rent reduction: enforcement problems, 105-106 farm tenancy committees, 106—107 inspection and rechecking, 104 new leases, 103 preparations, 102—103 tenancy in Taiwan, 101-102 Land Reform Training Institute, 211 Law of the Sea Conference, 173 Lee, Robert C. T., 153, 211, 223, 227, 269 Lee Teng-hui, i32n, 291 Legislative Yuan, 114, 133 Levine, Melvin H., 86 Lewis, W. Arthur, 290 Li, K. T., 204 Li Tsung-jen, 33 John C. Lincoln Institute, 211 Liu, J. Heng, 23 in Livestock production and marketing: cattle, 70—71, 90, 93 poultry, 71, 74 swine, 70-71, 73, 90, 93 See also entries under livestock in tables 4 and 5 Lovett, Robert A., 22, 26n Ma, Paul C., 155 Mao Yu-kang, 253 Marshall, George C., 22-23 Mass Education Movement, 9, 16-18, 22 Matsu, 239-241 Mechanization, 72, 75, 91-92, 94

Index

300

Meiklejohn, Norman, z66 Mellor, John W., 290 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 264265, 268 Ministry of Economic Affairs, 208, 212, 226, 268, 277 Ministry of Education, 205 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 226 Ministry of the Interior, 132-133, 177 Moyer, Raymond T., 29-31, 32-33, 66, 152 appointed JCRR commissioner, 11—14 land reform, 35 member China-U.S. Agricultral Mission,

8 relations with governments, 264—265 Nason, John B., 266 National (formerly Provincial) Chung Hsing University, 132, 149, 154-155, 188, 207 National Department of Health (formerly Administration), 195, 208, 241 National Science Council, 81, 87, 188 National Taiwan University, 73, 149, 154155, 181, 185, 188 Nixon, Richard M., 216 Operation Vanguard, 226 Organization for Industrial, Spiritual and Cultural Advancement, 212—213 Overseas technical assistance programs: administration and financing, 226-228 in Africa, 217-220 in Asia, 221—224 chronological review, 215-217 in Latin America, 224-225 in Middle East and Mediterranean, 225226 Overseas Technical Cooperation Commit¬ tee, 226-227 Pope, James D., 157 Population Council of New York, 203-204 Population Studies Center, 203 Provincial Farmers’ Association, 73-74, 131-132,134 Provincial Fishermen’s Association, 173— 177 Provincial Institute of Environmental Sani¬ tation and Water Pollution Control, 208 Provincial Maternal and Child Health In¬ stitute, 203 Provincial Taipei Tuberculosis Center, 197, 199—200

Ranis, Gustav, 291 Rankin, Karl L., 275-276 Ravenholt, Albert, 124 Rice price policies: rice-fertilizer barter system, 95—96, 258— 259 price support system, 259-260 Rockefeller Foundation, 167, 202, 211 Rural health: disease control, 198-200 environmental sanitation, 206-207 family planning, 201-206 food processing, 207, 208 pollution control, 208 program on mainland, 196—197 rural facilities, 197-198 school health 200-201 training health personnel, 201 Ruttan, Vernon W., 287—288 Ryerson, Knowles A., 155 Schenck, Hubert G., 37, 267 Schultz, Theodore W., 286—287 Second-stage farmland reform program, 261-262 Shao, C. C., 275 Shen, T. H., 37, 62, 72, 152, 154, 270271, 285 appointed JCRR commissioner, 11-14 Asian Vegetable Research and Develop¬ ment Center, 151, 153 convener of planning committee, 268 JCRR cooperation with Philippines, 222 Kinmen agricultural program, 235 member China-U.S. Agricultural Mission,

8 Shiffy, Ben E., 93 Shihmen dam, 139-140 Sino-African Technical Cooperation Com¬ mittee, 226-227 Sino-American Fund for Economic and So¬ cial Development, 64-65, 172, 204, 227, 280 Sino-German Technical Cooperation Pro¬ gram, 212-214 Sino-Japanese Technical Cooperation Pro¬ gram, 212 Soil conservation and slope land develop¬ ment, 91, 93 Structural changes in Taiwan’s economy: agricultural production, 246 employment, 246 origins of national product, 246-247 Stuart, John Leighton, 15, 22, 27 Sun, Y. S., 223 Sun Yat-sen, 12, 99-100, 203 Swing, Albert G., 267

Index Taiwan Cooperative Bank, 74, 76, 131 Taiwan Malaria Research Institute, 197, 199 Taiwan Power Company, 318 Taiwan Provincial Government: Department of Agriculture and Forestry, 73, 74, ^6, 237 agricultural organizations, 127-129, 130—132 forestry, 181, 185 relations with JCRR, 270—272 Department of Civil Affairs, 190 Department of Education, 155, 200 Department of Health, 195, 198, 203 Department of Social Affairs (formerly Bureau), 131, 175 Fisheries Bureau, 170, 176-177 Food Bureau, 115, 131, 132 Forest Bureau (formerly Administration): bamboo, 190 fire prevention, 186 reforestation, 185-188 surveys, 181—182 training, 183 windbreaks, 189 Land Bureau, 103, no Public Works Bureau, 197 Water Conservancy Bureau, 139 Taiwan Sugar Corporation, 107-109, 159160, 185, 268 Taiwan Wood and Bamboo Market De¬ velopment Center, 187 Tang Hui-sun, 35 Thomas, Elmer, 22 Tolbert, Stephen, 217 Training Chinese agriculturalists abroad, 211—214 Training foreign agriculturalists in Taiwan, 210—211 Transferability of JCRR experience: objectives and methods of work, 294— 295 organization and political arrangements, 292-293 program, 294 Truman, Harry, 9, 12, 22, 30, 31 Tsiang, Y. S., i5n, 29, 37, 62, 227, 269

301

Tsou, P. W., 8 Tyers, Rodney, 253 Union Industrial Research Institute, 191 United Nations: Development Program, 153, 211 Food and Agriculture Organization, 189 International Children’s Emergency Fund, 199 World Health Organization, 199 Uphoff, Norman T., 288 United States: Agency for International Development, 155,211,277 China Aid Act, 9-11, 23, 265 Economic Cooperation Administration, 15, 196, 265 Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, 292 Forest Service, 181 International Cooperation Administra¬ tion, 273 Military Assistance Advisory Group, 181 Mutual Security Mission to China, 270, 272-273, 277 Public Law 480, 189, 227 Vorys, John M., 22 Wang Shih-chieh, 10 Water Pollution Control Agency, 208 Wei Tao-ming, 38 Willson, Clfford H., 62 Wong, Martin, 271, 275 Woodard, Frank L., 36 Wu, K. C., 113, 130-131 Yang, H. K., 217, 226 Yeh, George, 276 Yen, C. K., nn, i2n, 35, 38n, 270—271 Yen, Y. C. James, 9, 16-18, 26, 36, 196 appointed JCRR commissioner, 11, 14 proposed creation of JCRR, 9, 21-23 withdrawal from JCRR, 36 Yin, K. Y., 38n Zehngraff, Paul J., 180, 182

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-?ublication Data

Yager, Joseph A. Transforming agriculture in Taiwan : the experience of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction / Joseph A. Yager, p. cm. — (Food systems and agrarian change) Includes bibliographies and index. ISBN 0-8014-2112-8 (alk. paper) 1. Agriculture—Economic aspects—Taiwan. 2. Rural development— Taiwan. 3. Agricultural assistance, American—Taiwan. 4. Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction. I. Title. II. Series. HD2107.Y34 1988 3 3 8.1'0951'249—dci9 88-47769